(Continuation of interview)

State Department - Bureau of Near East Affairs 1956-1957
  Suez Crisis

Johannesburg, South Africa - Commercial Officer 1957-1959
  African National Congress
  Environment

Foreign Service Institute [FSI] - French Language Training 1959-1960

Leopoldville, Congo - Political Officer 1960-1962
  Independence
  Patrice Lumumba
  Riots
  Flight to Stanleyville
  Rescuing Belgians
  Evacuation
  Katanga secession
  CIA
  Russian assistance
  Adoula
  Kasavubu
  Carlucci attacked
  Allison Palmer
  UN operation
  Mobutu
  House arrest
  Stanleyville
  Congolese government

State Department - Congo Desk Officer 1962-1963
  State team
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State Department - Personnel Officer 1963

Zanzibar - First Secretary General 1964-1965
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NASA tracking station
Karume
Government contacts
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State Department - FSI - Italian Language Training 1965

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil - Portuguese Language Training 1965

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil - Executive Officer 1965-1968
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Office of Management and Budget  1970-1972
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Private Business  1981-1986
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INTERVIEW

[Note: This is a continuation of an interview that began December 31, 1996.]

Q: Today, why don't we start off by concentrating on the African experience? I have you going to Johannesburg in about the end of 1957.
CARLUCCI: That's correct, yes.

Q: You had been in post management. Where had that been? I'm just trying to figure out how you got yourself into Africa.

CARLUCCI: That was the Bureau of Near Eastern - what was then Near East African Affairs. They were combined. I was slightly above a file clerk. The most dramatic assignment I had in those days was to keep track of the dependents that were being evacuated at the time of the Suez Crisis.

Q: This would be October 1956?

CARLUCCI: That's right. Since that particular bureau encompassed Africa, when the time came for assignments, they chose Africa for me—even though I spoke Spanish.

Q: Could you give me a little feel about what was the attitude towards Africa then? This was just at the beginning of the discovery of Africa by the foreign service but had it penetrated down to where you were? Was there a sense of excitement or what was the feeling?

CARLUCCI: There was a sense that Africa was becoming a major player on the world political scene, that the cold war was extending its reach into Africa and we needed to pay more attention to it. I was involved peripherally in helping to organize the trip by then Vice President Nixon to Africa which underscored the commitment of the administration to Africa. So it wasn't a full scale crisis. They were mighty concerned about the pace of change in Africa.

Q: Did you feel a sense of disappointment by going to Johannesburg which was sort of one of the few old African posts and not Guyana or Nigeria or one of the places that was beginning to...?

CARLUCCI: Well I wasn't an African expert and I hoped to go to Latin America. But I really wasn't disappointed in going to South Africa. I thought it was an exciting place and a pretty place. I studied some of the history and became interested in it. I became personally interested in the evolution of apartheid and while I was a commercial officer in essentially an economic and consulate post-Johannesburg - I undertook on my own initiative to go to a number of ANC [African National Congress] meetings.

Q: Now was this a legitimate group at that point?

CARLUCCI: They were allowed to meet. There was surveillance on me when I went to the meetings. And after I had gone to a certain number of them, the South African Government complained to our ambassador, Ambassador Byroade, at the time about my activities. So although I wasn't doing anything illegal, they
thought it was suspect activity.

Q: What was the situation as you saw it in 1957 in South Africa?

CARLUCCI: I saw it, happily erroneously, as a looming clash between the black population and the white population. When I left South Africa, I left with a certain sense of despair because it was very difficult to see how their problems could be worked out. I think the world owes a great word of thanks to the leadership in South Africa for the way in which they have so far solved an extraordinarily difficult problem.

Q: Now I was in Africa in INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] in 1960 and more or less I think our feeling was there was going to be a night of the long knives at some point.

CARLUCCI: That was my feeling.

Q: I don't want to let Johannesburg go. Let's talk a bit about it. What were you getting out of the ANC meetings? What was your impression of these?

CARLUCCI: I got a sense of what their politics were, how militant they were. Frankly, I felt they were less militant than they'd been described. I got to know some of the splinter groups. I was the first person, for example, to talk to Robert Sobukwe, who founded the Pan Africanist Congress. He later died. But I got acquainted with the movement, which, interestingly, nobody in Pretoria had been able to do. Our embassy was constrained from the attending the meetings. The meetings were in Johannesburg. So I established a relationship, a personal relationship, with some of the political officers in Pretoria and reported to them. I wrote a number of political - what in those days were airgrams you may recall-political airgrams on these meetings on the ANC. They were well received in Washington and I think were basically responsible for my subsequent assignment to the Congo as a political officer.

Q: What was the attitude towards your going out and developing these ties? Let's start at the consul general level.

CARLUCCI: The consul general, General Arthur Beach, didn't take a deep interest. But he never blocked what I wrote and had no problem with me doing it as long as I didn't get into any difficulty. The embassy at first, I think, was a bit skeptical but then tended to encourage me as long as I had time for my basic duties, my commercial duties, which I did. I remember I wrote the Basic Annual Industries Report for South Africa which was favorably received by the Department of Commerce.

We had a very able local employee in Johannesburg named Gideon Uys, who was able to contribute enormously. He and I worked together almost as equals on the
Annual Industry Report. The report received high marks from Washington.

Q: Well, this is towards the end of Eisenhower administration and our own segregation was coming under increasing attack and we'd had schools becoming desegregated but certainly segregation was the rule of thumb in the American south. Were you getting any reflections from this either from your bosses or from the South Africans who were looking at what we were doing?

CARLUCCI: No. The guidance that I had was that apartheid was wrong, we didn't favor it. And we were certainly in those days much less activist in opposing that kind of poor human rights policy. But it was clear that we did not favor it. When I'd see lines that said Europeans only, I was frequently tempted to get into the other line and say I was not a European. I certainly found the segregation distasteful. And I must say I found a number of South Africans who felt the same way.

Q: How long had apartheid been sort of the rule there before you arrived in '57?

CARLUCCI: Oh, since right after World War II, following the Jan Smuts government.

Q: So it was well entrenched. Was there in Johannesburg the equivalent to an opposition? I'm thinking of Suzman and other people like that.

CARLUCCI: Oh, yes. Helen Suzman was active. And you had the United Party in opposition. While their rhetoric was a little bit more conciliatory toward the blacks, they did not favor integration by any means. Helen Suzman was a lonely voice. You had Alan Paton, who wrote Cry the Beloved Country, and a few other people speaking out. But they were very much in the minority.

Q: Were we assigning black officers, or did we have any black officers at that time to...?

CARLUCCI: When I was there, I don't recall any black officers. I don't know what the policy was.

Q: Well then, you went in 1960 it was to the Congo.

CARLUCCI: Right.

Q: This as a political officer. What was the situation in the Congo when you arrived there?

CARLUCCI: I arrived 15 days before independence. We had a Consul General who was leaving and an ambassador had been designated, Clare Timberlake. The situation was one of considerable confusion. Nobody knew what was going to
happen on the day of independence. There was a lot of focus in the consulate general on getting our independence delegation in place, making sure we were appropriately represented. There was a feeling that we did not really know the real African leadership. What was it going to be? Who was it going to be? What did the Belgians let go of at the time of independence? There were just a lot of unanswered questions. Some felt the Belgians had gone too fast. Everybody knew that education-wise the Congolese were not fully prepared for Independence so there was anticipation of difficulty.

Q: At the beginning, were you involved in busy work or were you really starting anew?

CARLUCCI: The most you could get was what you could dig out of the newspaper. The bio files were inadequate to non-existent, to say the least. I set about to get to know the political figures. I did several unorthodox things which irritated the administrative officer of the embassy no end. I persuaded the DCM [deputy chief of mission], Rob McIlvaine, a marvelous man, to allow me to rent a Volkswagen so I had my own car and didn't go around in an embassy chauffeured car. I then got myself some press credentials because the press moved around more freely than anybody else could. Lumumba tended to hold a press conference a day and I figured it was important to get into those. Then I got myself a pass to the Parliament which was in formation. And basically spent all day outside the embassy. Just floating in from time to time.

Q: How does one get to know the new Congo and how did you set about that?

CARLUCCI: I'd sit in the bar in the Parliament and go up and shake hands with them and strike up a conversation. I got to know Patrice Lumumba under fairly adverse circumstances which is getting ahead of the story a little bit. But after independence when chaos broke loose-I might as well go into this story, its an interesting story. It has to do with Ralph Bunch.

Q: Yes. He was Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

CARLUCCI: He came out just after independence. Prior to that, we had been through the evacuation, the rapes and the pillaging. We were living in the embassy around the clock. He dictated a cable calling on the UN [United Nations] to send in a multinational force from my office. I was standing right beside him when he dictated the cable. When the first planes came in bringing Ghanaian troops, we had a critical situation. The ambassador called me up and said, “There is nobody at the airport, the controllers have fled, the airplanes are in the air, they're something like an hour from landing, get out there and get them down.” So I went out to the airport and spent the day acting like [an air traffic] controller, an airline attendant, and what have you.

Q: This is for a naval, an ex-naval officer?
CARLUCCI: That's, right. But we got the airplanes in. Meanwhile the Belgian troops had moved in to take over part of the airport.

Towards the end of the day, Rob McIlvaine, the DCM, called me and said, "Patrice Lumumba called and wants to go to Stanleyville and would we take him."

And he said, "Frank, he's coming, he's on his way out."

I guess that was early afternoon. Well, he didn't show up until about 5:00 and just drove out onto the tarmac with a big entourage. On the other side, the Belgian forces drove up and confronted him. I was standing in the middle between the two forces with machine guns pointed at each other.

Lumumba said, "I'm here to go to Stanleyville and you're going to take me."

The aircraft commander came up and said, "We've just learned that the controllers in Stanleyville have been killed and all the lights are out. We're not going."

The Belgian colonel said, "Unless you get these people off the tarmac in five minutes, I'm opening fire."

So I had a dilemma on my hands. I finally grabbed the aircraft commander and I said, "I don't care if we fly up to Stanleyville. Turn around and fly back. We're getting in this airplane right now or there is going to be gunfire here."

He said, "Okay."

So I took Lumumba and Kasavubu, both to Stanleyville.

Q: Could you explain, at that point, who were these two?

CARLUCCI: Lumumba was prime minister and Kasavubu was president at that point. And there was a man named Maurice Mpolo who was accompanying them as sort of a military aide, who later became Minister of Sports. I told him that we had a problem in Stanleyville, but if they insisted on going, I would take them. They said we insist on going. In fact Lumumba had screamed at me. He called me and he said something to the effect that "You Europeans are all hypocrites. You promised me."

And when we got on the airplane, I said, "Why did you scream at me?"

He said, "I didn't realize you were an American. I thought you were European." The two of them stood in the cockpit. It was a Globemaster C-124. They stood in the cockpit the entire flight to Stanleyville. On the way up, I told them that there
were Europeans in Stanleyville and I assumed they didn't have any objection if we took them back on the plane. Lumumba agreed. Then when we got off the plane, the Europeans came to me and said, "We want to leave but the immigration authorities won't let us leave."

I said, "Well, that's your problem. You go work it out with them. I'm not your Consul." These were basically Belgians. There were about 30 of them. They came back a couple of hours later and said, "It's really hopeless. They won't let us leave and they are now treating us in a way that our lives are in danger."

I said, "Well, I'm not your Consul but I'll see what I can do."

So I went around to the governor's house in Stanleyville where Lumumba and Kasavubu were having a cocktail party and talked to Lumumba and said, "You had in effect said I could take them out. We have done you a favor by bringing you up here and I hoped that we could go ahead. You should let these people loose."

And he responded with something like, "These are bad “Flemish” and they shouldn't be allowed to go." But then he turned to me - he was tall and I am short - and dropped his hand on my shoulder and said, "But I like you. Your are my friend. I give you the Belgians. It's a gift."

I said, "Don't give it as a gift, but I'm happy to take them."

For several years thereafter I got cards from the Belgians thanking me for getting them out of Stanleyville. That's how I got to know Lumumba. We became pretty good-I don't want to say friends-but every time I'd run across him, he'd have a pleasant greeting for me.

Q: Tell me, Frank, when you started this thing, when you arrived, this is obviously Cold War time and all that, what were you getting when you arrived at the embassy about sort of American interests in the Congo and the people who seemed to be coming in - Lumumba, Kasavubu, and that?

CARLUCCI: Well the Congo was the focus of world attention. It was at the heart of the Cold War struggle at the time. There was a lot of feeling that Lumumba was a Communist sympathizer. We had Senator Dodd, Tom Dodd, who was an active critic of people like Lumumba and Gbenye, the latter being Lumumba's Interior Minister. Dodd came out and I was his escort officer. I thought he had become convinced that Lumumba and Gbenye, while they may have had some sympathy for the Soviets, didn't really understand what communism was. But when he went back to the U.S., he called them communists again. We should remember that Lumumba came to Washington and was rejected before he turned to the Soviets. How he got to Washington was an interesting story.
Q: Well, let's hear it.

CARLUCCI: DCM, McIlvaine called me one day and said the prime minister had just called him and he said that he wanted to go to Washington. McIlvaine had said, "Fine, we will be glad to welcome you in Washington. Could you tell me when the visit will take place?"

The answer was "This afternoon." McIlvaine instructed me, "Frank, you've got to organize this."

I went to the consul, who was a rather strong-willed woman named Tally Palmer - Alison - who later became famous for defense of women's rights in the State Department. I said, "Tally, I want you to prepare about 20 visas on blank sheets of paper." She looked at me like I was crazy. I said, "Now, just do it." Sure enough, all of a sudden a delegation appeared on her doorstep and said, "We want 20 visas." She was able to issue these visas on blank sheets of paper.

I then went to the airport. I couldn't find an airplane. I couldn't figure out how they were going to get to the U.S. So I went to the controller's office and said, "Do you have an aircraft coming in that is going to take the prime minister of the Congo to the United States?"

He said, "No. The only thing we've got in is a Ghanaian Air Force plane that just landed and disembarked some troops."

So, I went back to the radio room and at that moment, Lumumba and his entourage pulled up. I stopped them and said, "Mr. Prime Minister, we would like to welcome you to the United States, but do you know how you are going to get there?"

He said, "Do you see that plane over there?"

And I said, "Yes. It's a Ghanaian Air Force plane."

He said, "We're going in that plane."

I went over to the plane and said to the pilot, "Did anybody give you any instructions to take a group of Congolese to the United States?"

He said, "No." And at that moment Lumumba and company approached the plane. The pilot looked at me and he said, "What should I do?"

I said, "You better salute and let him board and take them wherever they want to go," which is precisely what the pilot did. In fact, there was a humorous sequence when he got out on the tarmac ready to take off. A straggler came running out
and stood in front of the airplane and wouldn't let them take off until they put him on board. They lowered the ladder and put him on board. They flew to Accra where apparently they got a plane to go to the United States.

Q: Let's go back to the time of the independence, when independence happened. What were your experiences sort of on the day and right afterward?

CARLUCCI: On the day of independence I had heard rumors that rioting was occurring at the Parliament building so I grabbed an Lingala-speaking driver and went to the Parliament building where the troops were indeed rioting. I went up to them and through the driver asked what they were rioting about. The answer was interesting. They were upset not so much at the Belgians as at their own leadership, Patrice Lumumba and others, who had suddenly sprouted big cars, big houses, and flashy suits. They said General Janssens, who had been made commander of the Force Publique, had written on the blackboard independence equals no change for the military. They asked, “What's in it for us? Everybody else gets something and we get nothing.” Subsequently, Lumumba who was an absolute spellbinder, a very charismatic man…

Q: Was he from the Leopoldville area?

CARLUCCI: He was from Stanleyville. He didn't have a tribal base in Leopoldville. He didn't have a strong tribal base anywhere, in fact. He'd been a postal clerk in Stanleyville. I think he'd actually been arrested for embezzlement or something similar during the colonial period. He went out to the military camp at Djelo Binza and talked to the soldiers. He managed to turn them against the Belgians. That's when anti-Belgian rioting started. I went out, I think it was either that day or the next day to the neighborhood where I was living which was past the military camp. We assembled the Americans and I led a convoy of Americans into the embassy. We were stopped a number of times by soldiers. In fact, my then two year old daughter had a bayonet poked right in her face. But we made it to the embassy. People essentially lived in the embassy until they were evacuated. We evacuated as many as we could by ferry but then the ferry…

Q: Was the ferry over to Brazzaville?

CARLUCCI: Brazzaville, yes. Then the ferries were shut off. On occasion soldiers would come up and point guns at the embassy. I remember going out and confronting one. He was pointing his gun at the embassy. I told him that he had a duty not to attack the embassy but to help me go over and rescue some Americans who were in a hotel. To my surprise he agreed and we went over and got some Americans out of the hotel. But we lived in the embassy for a couple of days. Timberlake did a marvelous job as ambassador.

Q: What was he doing at that time?

CARLUCCI: He was sending cables and giving instructions. It was he who told me to get out and get the planes landed. He began to feel that the Lumumba
regime was increasingly erratic and very difficult to deal with. He was pushing for the UN troops to come in quickly as the only means of saving the situation. Peacekeeping has a somewhat mixed reputation these days but the Congo has to be characterized as a very successful multinational peacekeeping operation. The troops who came in - the Ghanaians, the Moroccans, the Nigerians, Ethiopians, subsequently Indians, Pakistanis - all did a marvelous job. Basically, they restored order after a period of time. The panic with which the Belgians fled was amazing. I went around my neighborhood and remember a houseboy coming out and telling me his employer had said, "Take everything; it's all yours."

Another said, "They left the phonograph playing. Should I turn it off?" People fled literally in their nightgowns. The neighborhoods were deserted for quite some time.

Q: When was the decision made to get the families out? Was this right after independence?

CARLUCCI: When the rioting broke out. It became very clear that it was an extremely dangerous situation. I think the rioting broke out around the early part of July, about a month after independence.

Q: Were you able to get any fix on where Lumumba and Kasavubu were or what they were trying to do at that time?

CARLUCCI: Oh yes, we had some contact with them. Lumumba wasn't hard to get a fix on because he had a press conference practically every day. By talking to his aides and by attending the press conferences, we could keep track of Lumumba. It wasn't very good news. Kasavubu kept pretty much to himself in his presidential residence, but Timberlake would call on him. He took me along as the interpreter. We called on him several times. Lumumba, of course, at one point called on the Russians to come into the Congo which made big headlines. That's another interesting story. I attended that press conference. At the end of the press conference, I was rushing back to the embassy to file my cable and three reporters, Welles Hangen, who later was missing in Cambodia, Henry Tanner of the New York Times and Arnaud De Borchgrave, who was then with Newsweek, said, "Frank, it's more important that the U.S. government get this message straight than it is that we file our dispatches early. So we're going to come back and help you write your cable." Very unusual. They came back and helped me write the cable and then went off and filed their despatches. Bob McIlvaine who was a stickler for good drafting took a look at my cable and puffed on his pipe and said, "Well I guess it can go by cable and not by airgram. But get it down to one and a half pages, Frank."

I said, "But my God, he's called on the Russians to come in!"

He said, "Go do it right."
I learned a lesson and I went back and redrafted it.

*Q:* What was the analysis of why he called the Russians in?

**CARLUCCI:** I think he had become frustrated with the west. He had gone to Washington and asked us for military help. He realized, correctly it turned out-we didn't agree at the time-that the Katanga secession could only be put down by force.

He wanted military assistance to do that. He went to Washington and did not get the kind of assistance that he sought. He went to Moscow and they responded by sending him some trucks-something like 100 Russian trucks came into Congo. As history can now document, in the end we had to agree to allow the UN forces to go in to Katanga and put an end to the secession. I ended up in the front wave of the troops that did that.

*Q:* Before we come to that, what were we saying as far as American participation or doing something when we'd helped Lumumba go to the United States? What was the embassy recommendation on his sudden coming there and how to treat him and how did it work out from your perspective?

**CARLUCCI:** Well, there wasn't much time to make any recommendation other than he's coming to the United States and wants our support. Treat him hospitably and be as responsive as you can. The embassy, as I recall, it was a long time ago, but I don't think we were arguing in favor of giving military support to Lumumba. We thought that preserving the integrity of the Congo was important and we were sympathetic on that goal. But it was the means to accomplish the goal that we could not support.

*Q:* What was the attitude toward the province at that time as far as American interest and the recent secession movement? How did we feel about that?

**CARLUCCI:** At that time, those were the early days, the days of Patrice Lumumba, there was very little sentiment in the United States for a separate Katanga. That changed, over the course of the next year and a half as Tshombe’s very successful lobbying machine got into operation.

*Q:* Did we know any of the leaders in Chatting? I mean, did we have much of a fix on Chatting?

**CARLUCCI:** We did indeed. We had a consul down there named Bill Canup, who know Tshombe as a provincial governor. I had met Tshombe during the independence ceremonies. And we knew Monongo, the Interior Minister who allegedly was present when Lumumba was killed.
Q: When you arrived in Leopoldville and started there as a political officer, what was your impression of the CIA station there and it's duty? I mean all this is brand new and I was wondering-later this became a very important thing-but what was your impression when you first arrived?

CARLUCCI: When I first arrived I didn't have much contact with the station. The consulate general had virtually no outside contacts. I remember being startled when the consulate general said to me, "You need to find out what's going on here," go down and mix with the U.S. press.

Q: Wait a minute, we're talking about Consulate General, this is before it became an embassy?

CARLUCCI: Before it became an embassy.

I thought to myself, that's a strange way to function to mix with the U.S. press and I proceeded to do my own thing. We weren't getting much information out of the CIA. They didn't have a lot of contacts either.

Q: What about the meeting-the press going in there-this was sort of a precursor to Vietnam. I mean this is where all the...

CARLUCCI: We were swamped with press people. I think the quality was quite high. Some of them went into danger. There was one who was killed in the Kasai. He was a very bright and able young man.

Q: Did you find there was a close relationship between the embassy reporting staff and the press corps at that point?

CARLUCCI: Since I was the principal writer in the embassy, there wasn't a day that the press wasn't in my office. Those were the days when it wasn't a sin for the press to talk to government officials and vice versa. Those were also the days when I could say to the press, "This is confidential," and know that they would respect the confidentiality. They would also share information with me. So we did have a good relationship, plus the fact that I saw them all the time at Lumumba’s press conferences.

Q: What about as these trucks arrived? What were we seeing by that time? Had Lumumba with his 100 trucks, Soviet trucks, I mean had this become a cause for us or...

CARLUCCI: Yes. This had been blown up out of proportion to its intrinsic worth. We were all worried about the Russian technicians who had come along with the trucks and what they would do. It was a symbol that Lumumba was willing to, if necessary, play the Soviet game and that aroused a great deal of concern. Lumumba moved further and further to the left. You could argue that he was driven there by the west's lack of responsiveness. Whether it was that or
whether it was his inclination, or whether he was enticed by what the Soviets had to offer, those were all fears. The fact was that he gradually became more critical in his comments toward the west and more erratic in his behavior. I came to fear that he had lost not only our confidence but he was losing the confidence of his own parliament. A lot of people thought I was nuts when I said that. One of the riskier things that I've done in my entire career was to do a nose count of the Congolese parliament in 1960. But I listed each member and where I thought he was going to vote and I concluded that Lumumba would lose. Washington couldn't believe that but we managed to persuade Washington that the UN should be allowed to hold what was called the Lovanium summit where the parliament was sequestered. It was kept insulated from political pressures and beer until they voted. Lumumba was defeated. It was out of that meeting that Adoula became Prime Minister, a much more moderate man. It's common to say that Lumumba was - there was a coup against Lumumba - but in fact he was voted out. It was then that he, as I recall the sequence, that he reacted.

He went into his residence and it was only when he left his residence to try and flee that he was captured. Had he stayed in his residence, he probably wouldn't have been captured. As it was, I was probably - I and then Senator Gale McGee - were probably the last two westerners to see him alive. We were having a drink about mid-afternoon at a sidewalk café and a truck went by. Lumumba had his hands tied behind his back and was in the rear part of the truck. The truck was on the way to the airport. As you know, he was killed either in the airplane or shortly after he got off the airplane in the Katanga.

Q: At that time, did we see the... Were the Soviets or the Soviet embassy, was it a real competition? I mean did you find yourself jostling the Soviet political officers or not?

CARLUCCI: No. I can't recall the Soviet embassy being that active. But I have to say I was not dealing with the diplomatic community. I was essentially the embassy's outrider and I was dealing with the Congolese. But the diplomatic relationships with the embassies were being handled at level higher than mine.

Q: You mentioned when Lumumba was using these 100 trucks, you got involved with those?

CARLUCCI: I didn't get involved. I was at the press conference when he called on the Soviets to come in. The trucks were sent and that caused quite a fuss, quite a stir in the western press. It was the beginning of the slippery slope that Lumumba got on.

Q: When Adoula came in, what was the feeling towards him?

CARLUCCI: We'd known Adoula, we liked him, there was a warm feeling, a feeling that we wanted to make his government a success. He was invited to Washington. By then I had gone back to Washington. I was his escort officer
when he was in Washington. It was a whole new atmosphere.

Q: Kasavubu, where did we see him?

CARLUCCI: Well, we saw Kasavubu as a moderate figure, but he was very slow to action. We made efforts to persuade him that he had to move and I guess eventually, certainly when the Congress and the Parliament voted, he dismissed Lumumba. But there was no love lost between Kasavubu and Lumumba.

Q: With this group, I think wasn't there an instance where you got knifed or something like that happened to you?

CARLUCCI: Yes. That was during a visit of, I believe it was Loy Henderson.

Q: He was Under Secretary for Political Affairs or something like that or number two man...?

CARLUCCI: I think he was Deputy Secretary. Anyway, he came out. We were heading back to the airport. I was in a separate car. I wasn't part of the entourage. I was in a car that was being driven by the chief warrant officer of the Defense attaché's office. We had in the car Lieutenant Colonel Dannemiller, who was the Army attaché, and his wife. I was sitting in the front seat. The car was going too fast. I can remember telling the warrant officer that I thought he was going too fast. A bicyclist was crossing the road - one of these things where neither could guess which way the other was going and eventually we hit him and plowed into a ditch. I could see right away that he was dead. I knew what was going to happen. I told the warrant officer to run and get out of there quickly which he did. The wife of our Army attaché was in a state of shock. We couldn't get her out of the car, so I did the only thing that could be done at that point. I went over to the body to draw the crowd away from the car. I was successful. He eventually got her out of the car and they got away. But in the meantime, of course, the crowd surrounded me. Several people stopped and tried to help. Tally Palmer stopped. She had a silver convertible. I'll never forget it. I told her, "Get out of here," because she couldn't get close to me.

Then the crowd started beating me up. I felt what I thought was a hard blow to my back, and about that time - actually somebody else, I think Larry Detlan stopped as well - and shouted at me and said, "Some people will take you into the village."

I said, "Larry, the last place I want to go is into the village."

It was getting fairly serious when a Congolese bus driver drove his bus right through the crowd and opened his door right at my back and I just stepped into the bus. I didn't know I had been stabbed until I saw the pool of blood on the floor of the bus. He, in essence, saved my life.
Q: It was an extremely dangerous time, wasn't it there, at that point?

CARLUCCI: Well, yes. Subsequently there had been a lot of dangerous posts in the foreign service, but that was one of the earlier ones.

Q: What about Alison Palmer? What was your impression, because she became a figure in her own right particularly on women's affairs and this? How did she operate?

CARLUCCI: She was a consulate officer in the embassy. I think she showed courage, certainly by stopping and trying to help me at the time. I didn't have a lot of interaction with her. We had a cordial relationship. She didn't really comment on political affairs. She didn’t spend much time outside the embassy. She just basically did visa and passport work. Certainly she might have held strong views, we didn't hear those views at the time. At least I didn't.

Q: The Kennedy administration came on in January 1961 and did you see a change in the embassy policy and all because the Kennedy administration came and Soapy Williams was the assistant secretary for African Affairs? You know there was a lot of emphasis on Africa.

CARLUCCI: The major change was there had been a history of bad feelings between Chester Bowles and Clare Timberlake. I can remember Timberlake telling me when Chester Bowles was named Under Secretary of State that his days on the job were probably numbered, because he and Bowles had clashed in India. In fact, that turned out to be the case. Timberlake became increasingly critical of the UN operation, Rajeshwar Dayal in particular.

Q: Who was he?

CARLUCCI: He was the Indian who headed the UN operation. Not a particularly good choice, if I may say so. He was a very bright man, but he had a somewhat supercilious attitude toward the Africans—tended to look down on them. They didn't like him. In fact, it is fair to say they despised him.

Q: When you say Africans, does this also mean the troops of Guyana and from other African...?

CARLUCCI: No, no. The Congolese. They tended to view him as a new form of colonialism. This was post-Lumumba, but certainly Adoula had problems with Dayal. Mobutu, the military, all had problems with him. Timberlake came to feel that the UN was not being supportive enough of the central government efforts to deal with Katanga's secession as well. Timberlake was called back for consultation and never returned.

Q: This was after the Kennedy administration came in?
CARLUCCI: Yes, after the Kennedy administration. He was called back for consultation and never returned. At the same time, Dayal was called back for consultation and never returned. So there was an obvious swap. It looks like that's what happened. A man named Sture Linner took over, a Swede, who was much more effective. He gradually gained the confidence of the Congolese. It cost us a very able ambassador, not that we didn't have a good replacement. Mac Godley came as chargé and did a superb job.

Q: How did Mac Godley operate? Was there a difference between how he operated and maybe his outlook than Clare Timberlake?

CARLUCCI: Clare Timberlake was kind of a street fighter. Godley was a very courageous individual, but he had a more sophisticated approach. Timberlake was very blunt. Once when Washington told him to do something, he shot back, “I'll go ahead and do it, but trying to do that out here is like trying to stuff a raw oyster in a slot machine.” I can remember staying up with Godley all night while we were arguing with Dean Rusk about the Lovanium Conference. At one point the State Department felt that Lumumba was going to win at Lovanium and they wanted to call the whole thing off after it had been started. We went out to a secure telephone in a trailer in a remote area and spent all night arguing with Washington. Our channel was through Sheldon Vance, the office director, but Dean Rusk was the real problem. Godley stood up to the State Department and convinced them that the Lovanium Conference ought to continue. And it had, as I mentioned earlier, it had a successful outcome. We turned out to be right, thank God.

Q: How about Mobutu? We're talking today on April 1, 1997, and Mobutu is seemingly on the ropes in Zaire now, but he's been around since that time. Did you run across Mobutu and have any dealings with him?

CARLUCCI: I knew him because of my habit of mixing with the Congolese down at the parliament. He'd show up at the parliament and I got to know him while he was still a Sergeant, before he became commander of the troops. I can remember one episode after he became commander of the troops. I wanted to get into the parliament and I had already missed their passes. The guard at the door wouldn't let me in and actually pushed his bayonet against my stomach. The picture was in the New York Times the next day. I was very irritated. I went over and I found Mobutu having a beer at the bar. I said to him, "Look, here are all my credentials, don't you think I should be allowed to get into the parliament?"

He said, "Yes."

I said, "Well will you please see that I'm allowed in?"

He said, "I can't do that."
I said, "Why not?"

He said, "Because I'm not in charge here."
I said, "Well you're commander in chief of the Army and if you're not in charge here, who is?"

And he pointed to the guy who had just jammed the bayonet in my stomach and said, "He is."

We developed a relationship. I don't want to say it was close, but we certainly knew each other. I think Larry Devlin and I went to see him shortly after he took over. I walked out of there saying, "Larry, this guy can't last 10 days!" Shows you how good a political leader analyst I was.

Q: What was the reaction of the embassy on the report of knowledge of Lumumba's murder?

CARLUCCI: Well, we were of course distressed, but what we tried to do was report the facts as we had them. There wasn't a lot to be obtained in Leopoldville. Most of the action had taken place in the Katanga and we had to depend on our consul in Elizabethville to report in on what had transpired there. Our best assessment was that he had been killed after he arrived in the Katanga. A UN report subsequently said this, probably in the presence of Monongo.

Q: Did this cause a change? Was there at that time any concern that maybe this was part of the United Nations' effort to rid ourselves of this gentleman?

CARLUCCI: We had other things on our mind. When this happened, as I recall, I was in Stanleyville. This was shortly after they had arrested all the Europeans in Stanleyville and thrown them out. Timberlake asked me if I'd go up there, back and forth and act as consul for Stanleyville. They announced on Stanleyville radio that Lumumba had been murdered and that I was the man who had done it. They claimed I was a paratroop captain or colonel, I guess. I had made it up to the rank of colonel. They were going to see that justice was done. And as I recall, Kwame Nkrumah sent a cable to Dag Hammarskjold about me killing Lumumba and a few other things like that. So we had to worry a little bit about survival. I had to find my way out of Stanleyville. I did that by hitchhiking. In fact, I hitchhiked in a UN plane to Bukavu and then to Elizabethville and then back to Leopoldville. I went back up to Stanleyville a couple of weeks later and they arrested me.

Q: What happened then?

CARLUCCI: Well, they put me under house arrest. They declared me persona non grata.
Q: *This was the Congolese government.*

CARLUCCI: It was a breakaway government in Stanleyville, headed by Antoine Gizenga. Kabula was a member of that government. I didn’t know him well.

Q: *He's now the rebel leader looking like he might take over.*

CARLUCCI: We had Gizenga, Gbenye, Weregemere, and a number of other Lumumba supporters in Stanleyville. They had broken away when - I guess after Lovanium - I can't recall the exact sequence, certainly when Mobutu had taken over. They declared their own government. I'd been going back and forth, meeting with them, when they declared me persona non grata. About then, I wanted to introduce my successor, Tom Cassilly (who later got arrested himself), so I said I'd go up one more time. I flew up and at the airport, they arrested me and they said I should get back on the airplane and go back to Leopoldville.

I said, "I had no intention of doing that. I was staying in Stanleyville."

By that time the airplane had left and the next airplane was four or five days away. So they said, "Well we're going to put you under house arrest."

So they put me in a house with a guard out in front. The guard had a machine gun. I managed to step out once or twice anyway. The day I was due to leave, the acting foreign minister, a man named Arsen Dionge, acting foreign minister of the Gizenga breakaway government, came around. He was trying to be very diplomatic. He came in and he said, "How is everything?"

I said, "Not very well."

He said, "What's your problem?"

I said, "I certainly don't like being under house arrest and I don't like being declared persona non grata."

He said, "Oh, well, that. That, you shouldn't worry about it. It's just that it's not convenient to have you around right now. It's really not persona non grata or anything like that."

I said, "Well the next thing you are going to tell me is that I'm not under house arrest."

He said, "No, you're not under house arrest, no problem."

With that, the guard, who had apparently lost his patience, came in and pointed his machine gun at the acting Foreign Minister and starting talking in a local
dialect. And Dionge turned to me and said, "Well, could you tell him who you are and who I am and that I'm the acting Foreign Minister because he doesn't seem to understand."

Well, it was a little hard to contain my laughter. So I tried to explain to the guard that it's okay because he was the foreign minister and the foreign minister is a big man around here. Finally, the guard decided it was okay, and he put down his gun and walked back to his post. With that, the acting foreign minister turned to me and said, "This place is terrible. Can you sell me any dollars?"

They then took me and put me on an airplane and that was my last time in Stanleyville.

Q: What were the people in our consulate general doing there?

CARLUCCI: Oh, they had closed that.

Q: It had been closed by that time?

CARLUCCI: Oh, yes. You see what happened, shortly, I guess about three or four months into Independence, they rounded up all Europeans and made them stand in the sun all day long. They chased out our consul and there was nobody up there. Timberlake called me. I'll never forget, he called me on the phone and said, "Frank, I hate to have to ask you to do this but somebody's got to protect the American citizens in Stanleyville. Are you willing to go up there?"

I said, "Okay."

I must say the first airplane ride up there was pretty lonely. I was the only person on the airplane. Nobody was going near Stanleyville. I was able to, I think, restore some sense of confidence to the Americans and able to deal a little bit with the breakaway government.

Q: When you say, who were the Americans and how did they...?

CARLUCCI: Missionaries.

Q: Missionaries.

CARLUCCI: I tried to get them to leave. I can remember urging them to leave. They were very fatalistic. They didn't want to leave. And you may recall that about a year later Belgian paratroops had to go in and rescue them and some were killed.

Q: Was this...Elizabethville is now...?

CARLUCCI: No, this is Stanleyville.
Q: This is Stanleyville in the Katanga?

CARLUCCI: No Stanleyville is in Orientale.

Q: Oh, yes, Orientale Province.

CARLUCCI: Stanleyville was Patrice Lumumba's home.

Q: Was Michael Hoyt there at this point?

CARLUCCI: He was much later.

Q: Much later. And he got caught in that Dragon Rouge operation.

CARLUCCI: Yes.

Q: As you are dealing with the Congolese at that time, either in Parliament or at these breakaway assemblies, what was your impression of how the government was operating?

CARLUCCI: The Congolese government?

Q: Yes.

CARLUCCI: It was chaotic. There was no government. There were ministers and soldiers who had big cars and big houses. All your conversations with them were political. Nobody was interested in restoring the country’s economy or dealing with payment problems, inflation, or anything like that. Adoula’s government took it a little more seriously. There was a man named Albert Adele who was governor of the central bank. He was one of the Congo's only three or four Ph.D.s, and he was very bright. He tended to take it seriously. There were others. There was an opposition politician who I gave a leader grant to, Kamitas Kamitata, who was governor of the province that included Leopoldville. He, I thought, was responsible. There were elements of leadership, but the chaos almost overwhelmed everyone.

Q: Now, I was in African INR about this time, and although I had the heart of Africa, we'd look at the airgrams and all, there was a feeling that it reminded me at that time of caricatures, hostile caricatures, of what happened in the South during the early Reconstruction period when the freed slaves were taking over. This is a caricature that has gone on but the reports seem to almost define that.

CARLUCCI: It was pretty chaotic. I was in a hotel room one time in Stanleyville when a farce took place. A minister of the breakaway government and I were talking. He had his girlfriend in the hotel room and a man came pounding on the door shouting it was his wife. The man was hauled away in a jeep. It was
Q: Were we pretty much, except for trying to protect ourselves and all, were we trying to do the equivalent of later what would become nationbuilding?

CARLUCCI: Yes. When I got back to Washington, I found there were three of us working on the desk: Bill Harrop, Charlie Whitehouse, and myself. I concerned myself with internal politics, and Charlie worked on nationbuilding. Basically the first task was to get the rabble called the Congolese Army under control. Of course, 35 years later, it's still not under control. There is no discipline in it. There was no discipline then. It was a pure rabble then. It is a pure rabble now. We tried. Now, of course, we are being criticized for trying because that was characterized as military aid to Mobutu. So you're damned if you do and damned if you don't.

Q: By the way, while you were in the Congo, you were talking about being used as the point man and going out and I mean this is not a comfortable period. In fact, your exploits there became legendary within the Foreign Service. I heard about these. The aura lingers on.

CARLUCCI: The embassy administrative officer called me accident prone because I kept smashing up his Volkswagen. It was a rented car. It was exciting.

Q: Tell me, what about the other side of this? What about your family?

CARLUCCI: They were evacuated. They were sent to Ghana. They later came back. You had personal inconvenience. Our house was robbed several times. I caught a burglar cutting through the screen with a machete three feet from my baby daughter's crib. We had a lot of personal inconvenience. We were all young and lived with that.

Q: We'll finish up on the Congo side as the desk officer. With the three of you working on that, did you sense a different attitude when you got back to Washington? Did they have a sense of the reality of the Congo?

CARLUCCI: No, Washington was torn. There was an acknowledgment that probably it was desirable to keep the Congo together but there was a lot of sympathy for Katanga's secession. Tom Dodd lobbied…

Q: He was the democratic senator from Connecticut.

CARLUCCI: …lobbied the Kennedy administration incessantly. State Department wobbled all over. Basically the bureau of International Affairs (IO) was sympathetic to us in the African bureau. The European bureau tended to sympathize with the Katanga secessionists, and George McGee, who was Under Secretary of State, frankly would vacillate on the issue. We turned out to be very
hard chargers. We had people like Bill Harrop and Charlie Whitehouse who were very able. Mac Godley became officer in charge succeeding Sheldon Vance, a very headstrong individual. A very strong team. Wayne Fredericks, who was Deputy Assistant Secretary was good. The governor, Governor Williams, bless his heart...

Q: This is Soapy Williams?

CARLUCCI: Soapy Williams. His heart was always in the right place, but he was no match for the bureaucrats. He'd get outmaneuvered practically all the time. We tended to ram things through. So much so that we finally ended the Katanga secession by giving the green light to the UN to move in. George Ball said no two of us should ever be allowed to serve together again.

Q: I would have thought that this whole thing would have particularly attracted somebody like Robert Kennedy and some of the activists around President Kennedy? You were young and you were hard charging. Africa was sort of the Kennedy playground...?

CARLUCCI: Dean Rusk did not take a deep interest. George Ball did from time to time. He generally came out right. Whenever we got into real trouble, we would use Ed Gullion, who was then the ambassador. Kennedy liked Ed Gullion. He'd met him in Vietnam or someplace and liked him personally. Gullion was a marvelous man, very bright, very articulate. So when we felt ourselves sliding down the slope, we'd call Gullion back for consultation and have him go over and see the President. And that always worked. Kennedy's instincts were quite good. He was perfectly willing to take on Tom Dodd. Some of the people in the State Department were less willing to take on Dodd.

Q: Tom Dodd was not just alone. In a way didn't he represent, you might call, the European centric but also...

CARLUCCI: To some extent. But he didn't have a lot of support in the Congress. The Chairman of the African subcommittee at the time was Al Gore, Al Gore, Senior. I can remember endless hearings which I used to go up and support Soapy Williams. Gore was not sympathetic to Tom Dodd's point of view. In the house, we had Barry O'Hara as chairman of the House Committee and he understood our story. Fred Dutton was the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations and he used to take me up there for endless briefings. We really blanketed the Congress and fairly well isolated Dodd. And as you know he was later censured by the Senate, not for the Congo activity but for some other activity.

Q: I think it's an interesting thing, and I'd like to get this, to see how able people have really essentially rather quite subordinate roles in the thing, can be quite important within a policy consideration that is not attracting the very top echelon.
CARLUCCI: Well, I guess the answer to that is in those days you could. I don't know if you could today. You've had people resign over Bosnia. They were subordinate people. Marshall Freeman and people like that. It's true that today there are dissent channels and people taking a different point of view is more common I suppose. We put our careers on the line, there's no question. I can remember one point when Mac Godley was ambassador I was in a meeting with Dean Rusk, who in frustration said, "Does our ambassador over there understand what our policy is?"

Q: I thought sort of the one constant in our African policy which hangs on today is that once you start allowing these breakaway provinces and all, because of the tribal intermix, absolute chaos will be and maybe there are lousy borders, but there are borders and we better stick to those.

CARLUCCI: You're citing almost verbatim the standard paper that I used to write and rewrite. I'd just switch the paragraphs around saying just about that. Once you start down this slope, it's very slippery. I think there is something like 36-or I can't remember how many-52 different tribes in the Congo. They'd all be seeking their independence. Africa would fragment. The only solution is to respect the colonial boundaries. INR, I might say, at a critical point and time was very helpful. Ed Streator wrote a paper very well done on precisely that issue and said that unless we act decisively, things are going to collapse; it's all going to fall apart. That was shortly after the Kennedy administration's successful prosecution of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Q: This had been in what October of '62?

CARLUCCI: Something like that. They were feeling confident about their ability to handle foreign affairs. They were flexing their muscles. They were becoming more assertive. They were becoming more cohesive. So that when we finally said, "Hey, look, the balloon is about to go up on the Katanga. You can't vacillate any more." They were willing to make the hard decision. The Pentagon was the first to come in and say-there was a Colonel in our meeting who said, "I think you've got to support a military solution here. There's no other way." Then the tide began to turn and we were able to turn a blind eye to the UN because the UN wanted to do what was quite clear was the only solution and we were holding them back. We were able to send a signal that said something to the effect don't over restrain yourselves.

Q: When I get you again, we'll go into Zanzibar. Also, I'd like to have you expand a bit more on the incident in, I think it was, Stanleyville, where you were with a Minister who was with his lady friend. If you could give me more detail on that. I think it's highly amusing and indicative of the situation. You also mentioned off mic how your telegrams and cable and dispatches were received in Washington and the sage advice given to you about humor in the foreign service. A final question. Did you notice any change when Kennedy was assassinated and
the Johnson administration took over in the attitude toward the Congo at that point. Was there any change in emphasis or interest?

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Today is the 30th of June, 1997. Frank, could you go into a little more detail about that time in Stanleyville. Do you recall the incident with the young lady?

CARLUCCI: Yes.

Q: You more or less eluded to it last time and I think it catches something.

CARLUCCI: I had struck up an acquaintance with a man who was a Minister of Mines in Lumumba's government, named Weregemere. He joined the Gizenga breakaway government. As I mentioned earlier, I went back and forth up there until they finally kicked me out. On one occasion, he asked me to come around to his hotel room. I think it was his hotel room because he wanted to talk to me. The purpose of the meeting was to warn me that the Gizenga people were out to get me. When I entered the hotel room, he had a young lady there, a rather attractive young lady. As we were discussing weighty matters-the UN presence and the Gizenga government-she apparently got tired, went over to the bed, took her clothes off and just laid down on the bed. We continued talking and drinking our beer. All of a sudden, there was a pounding on the door. Weregemere went to the door - and I could hear some scuffling and a man shouting, "I want my wife! I want my wife!" With that, the young lady went to the bathroom. I didn't know what to do, so I sort of followed her into the bathroom. The scuffling continued and eventually whoever was pounding on the door was taken by soldiers and dumped into a jeep and driven off someplace. Weregemere came back in and we resumed our conversation.

Q: I remember this vividly because there was an African INR at the time and when this came in, I think it was a despatch describing this thing. It, of course, made the rounds to everywhere. It certainly made vivid the situation there, but could you talk a bit about the fact that you were sending in these rather detailed pictures of the area?

CARLUCCI: Well, it was hard not to laugh. In fact, humor was the only way you kept your sanity in a place like Stanleyville unless you wanted to turn to liquor, which a lot of people did. I can remember being in the presence of the president of Stanleyville, a man named Jean Foster Manzikala, and hearing him answering the phone by saying, "Yes, yes, Excellency." "Well, which Excellency are you?" They all called each other “Excellency.”

Fist fights in the hotel were an every day event and I think sent in a dispatch about those one time. Of course, there was a humorous event, which I think I described for you, with the acting Foreign Minister Dionge.
It was kind of fun sending those things in. I don't know how they were received. It was later when I went to Zanzibar and I continued to do the same thing. Wayne Fredericks one time told me, time, he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, he said, "Frank, you're cables make the best reading in the African bureau. Keep it up and you'll never get promoted." There were more than a few people who thought I was a bit frivolous.

Q: You went from the Congo, were you assigned directly to Zanzibar?

CARLUCCI: No. I came back and I was in effect Congo desk officer during the Katanga secession. Then I had a brief tour in Personnel. When Zanzibar broke - that is to say, when they expelled our consul and closed our consulate - and a few months later, I was asked to go out there.

Q: So you went to Zanzibar. You were there from when to when?

CARLUCCI: I arrived 1964 and I was there just about a year. So it would have been probably-I think I would have gone out in early ’64 and I think I was expelled in January 1965.

Q: What had been the situation in Zanzibar that led to the previous expulsion?

CARLUCCI: Zanzibar had become independent in 1964. We had a consul, Fritz Picard was his name, who has since died. The Africans rose up and slaughtered the Arabs because the Arabs had been running the place. They drove a number of them right into the sea. They took over but they had a decided communist tinge. A lot of the Africans had been trained at the Patrice Lumumba University.

Q: Which is in Moscow?

CARLUCCI: Moscow. Now there were a couple of Arabs involved with them. Babu and Ali Sultan Issa, who had been trained in Moscow and Beijing respectively. By the way, they have since both become capitalists. At the time, I remember shortly after I got there, the hospital was named the V.I. Lenin hospital and the stadium became the Mao Tse-tung stadium. All land was nationalized. In effect, all the Westerners were kicked out. There was a good deal of hostility toward the Americans and our consulate was shut down. Fritz Picard was marched out of the country, I think, literally at gun point. A long, intensive effort began to reopen our consulate, then turned embassy. A number of us in the State Department favored reopening the embassy as soon as possible. The upper levels of the State Department wanted us to play a secondary role to the British. The British were more cautious. They didn't want us to open and their embassy had been closed down, too. It was quite a long negotiation getting back in. Actually I went to Dar Es Salaam and worked on the issue with then Ambassador Leonhart. We struggled to try to get me over there. Eventually the Zanzibarics agreed and I
Q: Now what was the situation in between Zanzibar and Tanganyika at that time?

CARLUCCI: They were independent countries.

Q: Two independent countries.

CARLUCCI: Two independent countries. It was later, in fact it at least partly our design, I think it was Bill Leonhart's idea as a matter of fact, that Tanganyika swallow up Zanzibar as a way of getting rid of the communist influence in Zanzibar. And eventually that proved to work, but it took time.

Q: Well, why were we pressing to develop or resume relations with this rather small, little island nation?

CARLUCCI: There was a lot of the focus on it. It was being called the African Cuba. But we also had a NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] tracking station in Zanzibar which NASA at least thought was quite important. When I got to Zanzibar, I concluded that it was hopeless and we would have to dismantle the tracking station.

Q: What was it that in your estimate... In the first place, how did these negotiations go with Zanzibar? What was your role, what were the contacts like?

CARLUCCI: Well, the contacts, there were multiple channels. Basically, sometimes using the British, sometimes working with other African countries, or sometimes using Tanganyika to get in touch with the Zanzibaris. Eventually, Amani Abeid Karume, who was president, agreed that we could come back in.

Q: What was the rationality from their point of view to bring us back in?

CARLUCCI: I can't really answer that. I assume they didn't want to be totally isolated from the western world. Karume himself was not a communist. The government under him was basically communist and Karume was not a very sophisticated man (He was later assassinated.). He had a certain amount of good will toward the west. I assume that eventually he prevailed, allowing us to come back in. One of the reasons that I think I got kicked out was that I managed to develop a good relationship with Karume. Karume spoke very little English and at one point I asked him what I could do to develop better relations with Zanzibar. He said learn Swahili, so I set to work and learned it. I was the only senior diplomat on the island who could converse with him in Swahili and he loved that. So we had a very good relationship.

Q: Well when you arrived there in early '64, what was the situation from your
CARLUCCI: It was pretty chaotic. People would be thrown in jail left and right. Asians sometimes literally were whipped in the streets. Mosques had been invaded and people killed. All land had been nationalized. The British club became the people's club, which was advantageous to me because tennis balls then became free and I was the only westerner left who played tennis. I found [locals] who could play with me.

There was just a lot of hostility toward the West. The Soviets and the Chinese flooded the place. There were well over a 100 Soviets attached to their embassy and the East Germans had a very significant presence. All doctors had fled except one female Asian doctor. The only doctors on the island were East German. We had a North Vietnamese embassy. We had a North Korean embassy and a very substantial Chinese communist presence, hardly matched by a very small British and American presence. I think there were three of us, a vice consul, one other officer, and a secretary or two. A very small British presence and that was it as far as the West was concerned.

Q: To me, one of the enigmas is the large Chinese, at that time called Communist Chinese, presence in Africa which seemed to often have quite large missions and they were doing things, and yet I haven't heard anybody say it had any particular influence as far as getting involved. What was your impression in Zanzibar?

CARLUCCI: My impression was that the lead country for the Communists was East Germany. They had the most influence. They had a young, attractive ambassador, although the Soviets sent one of their most senior ambassadors. He had been ambassador to Canada. I think clearly the Soviets and the East Germans exercised more influence than the Chinese.

Q: Were the East Germans heavily into the security side as far as secret police and that sort of thing, because that seemed to be their specialty?

CARLUCCI: Yes, they got into that and they got into the media and the education system. They were building houses. Some of their projects turned out to be disasters. I managed to get one small aid project going. I built a school which I'm told is still functioning in Zanzibar today.

Q: With the expulsion of the Arabs, I would have thought that this would have been a disaster for the economy in Africa. Had the Arabs been sort of the merchant class and that type of thing?

CARLUCCI: The economy essentially was closed-tourism and some small trade. The economy spiraled down, such as it was. It wasn't a very significant economy to start with. They just planned to live on aid from the then Soviet Bloc.
Q: Did you have any problems getting the small aid project rolling?

CARLUCCI: Oh, yes. I had difficulty getting it accepted. Once again the President had agreed to it and he actually, as I recall, came out and dedicated the school which was fairly major event because we couldn't get anybody even to attend our Fourth of July party. One of my neighbors, a minister named Jumbe, who later became vice president, had a tendency to drink a bit and one night he came over to my house. No sooner did he come in than the police arrived and essentially told him to get out. We were pretty much isolated. We were socially ostracized. Virtually every Sunday there would be a demonstration against me. I would get my tear gas [mask] and my beer and I'd go to the embassy and watch the demonstrators. They would go around the block about three or four times to exaggerate the numbers. Sometimes I'd go down and mix with them as they were getting ready to demonstrate.

Q: Was there any focus or was there just...?

CARLUCCI: Anti-American. It got serious when the Belgians sent paratroopers into Stanleyville.

Q: This is Dragon Rouge?

CARLUCCI: Yes. That's the one time the demonstration got quite serious. By then we had had some Tanganyika police on the island. They managed to keep the demonstrators from breaking into the embassy. I guess it was then a consulate general because technically we had merged with Tanganyika. That demonstration by the way was led by the chief of protocol.

Q: How did this...Let's talk first about the NASA station. It was a space monitoring station was it? Had it been running during the time that we had no relations with the country?

CARLUCCI: No, I think it had been shut down temporarily. There were some NASA people-I'm not even sure if the NASA people stayed, they may have been evacuated. It was essentially dormant when I got there. To get back to the aura of your question, the only reason Zanzibar was important was U.S. domestic politics. I can remember before I left, Averell Harriman, who was Under Secretary of State, called me in and gave me essentially two instructions; get the NASA tracking station back in operation and to make sure that Zanzibar was not a political embarrassment to President Johnson during the campaign. Those were two difficult tasks.

Q: Was Zanzibar at all on the political map? Did you have correspondence coming in?

CARLUCCI: Oh, yes. There was quite a bit of press about the “African Cuba.”
It had become, I don't want to say it was a major story, but it had become at least a significant story in the U.S. press.

Q: Were you able to do anything about that or...?

CARLUCCI: Well, there was eventually, as I said, we merged with Tanganyika and the situation moderated, but that was over a period of time. During the first year, it was pretty chaotic. We didn't manage to score any major victory, I guess I'd have to say although it was clear that our influence was increasing as time wore on. To the extent that our influence increased, the Soviets and Chinese influence decreased and I was warned that they were going to try and get me.

Q: Was there a Soviet fleet presence there? If I recall, about this time, this was not too long after the Cuban Missile Crisis which was '62 and the Soviets really didn't have a very major fleet.

CARLUCCI: No, there was no Soviet fleet there.

Q: I mean it was really in the '70s when the Blue Seas Navy was developed.

CARLUCCI: No, it was really a civilian presence but they would spread scare stories. I can remember one time being called off the tennis court by the President of the country who said to me, "There's an American submarine surfacing in our waters. Get it out of here." Of course there was no American submarine.

Q: How would you conduct...What would a day's work be there for you when you say you were pretty well quarantined against most contacts?

CARLUCCI: The ministers would receive me in their offices and I had pretty good access to the President. When I asked to call on the President, invariably they would agree and I used to have some fairly good and lengthy conversations with him. Essentially, my time was spent providing political analysis, observing what was going on, establishing as many contacts as I could, talking to my colleagues in the British embassy, talking to the Israeli consul general, seeing what they had found. I also had some contact with the Soviets. The Soviet ambassador became quite friendly. I remember he brought my daughter one of those Soviet dolls. And I spent a fair amount of time, at least in the early portion of my stay, learning Swahili.

Q: When you were having these conversations with the President, what were the subjects?

CARLUCCI: Trying to reassure him of our desire for a mutually beneficial relationship and to convince him that a lot of the stories that he'd been reading about us were not accurate. I talked to him about ways in we could help Zanzibar, working with him on the school project. Essentially, trying to regain their
confidence because there were a lot of misleading and inaccurate stories that had been spread about the United States.

Q: What about relations with Tanganyika? Did you go over there fairly frequently?

CARLUCCI: Yes, I did. I never looked forward to the trip because the only way of getting over was a 1930, I think it was a ‘30s DeHavilland aircraft, which could hold about four or five people. The pilot, I remember, would pull out his novel the minute the wheels got off the ground, which was always a bit disconcerting.

Q: We're talking today, the 30th of June and on the 26th of June, Ambassador Leonhart died. Unfortunately, I never interviewed him. What was your impression of his support and how he ran his embassy?

CARLUCCI: His support as far as I was concerned was absolutely outstanding. He and I had an extremely good relationship. Bill Leonhart was a brilliant man. I'd have to describe him an intense man, a workaholic who spent hours and hours and hours in the embassy. No cable left his embassy unless it was perfect. He worked it over. I think he ran a really tight embassy. But he was always receptive to ideas from me and would take them and make them better if they were good ideas. He'd come up with a lot of ideas himself. I had such high regard for him, that when I later became deputy director of the CIA, I brought him over to the CIA and put him on a review panel for our analytical shop.

Q: Did you play any part, or our embassy in Tanganyika play any part, in this merger of Zanzibar and Tanganyika into Tanzania?

CARLUCCI: The answer to that is yes. I'm not sure exactly how Bill Leonhart did it, but clearly he played a significant role in it. Whether he convinced Julius Nyerere on a one to one basis or whether there were other channels that were used, I can't say because I was not party to those conversations. But I knew that Bill broached the idea to me long before it happened so there's something that was germinating at least through our embassy in Tanganyika.

Q: What were you reporting from the Zanzibar side as far as you saw through receptivity of the people on Zanzibar to this greater merger?

CARLUCCI: I think it was a mixed bag. The Communists were not favorable to it. They saw it as loss of authority for them. Karume was very much in favor of it. I think it was seen as a threat by the Revolutionary Council. Those were the days where African unity was very important. You could not argue with the idea of African unity. It was a hard concept for them to argue against.

Q: As far as being in Zanzibar itself, was this a subject you could raise at all or was this something that almost better if you didn't raise this?
CARLUCCI: I can't recall whether I actually raised it. If I did, the only one that I could have talked to about it would have been the President. Certainly none of the Communist ministers had any kind of dialogue with me on that subject.

Q: _What about the Soviets and the Chinese? Were they involved in this trying to stop this thing or were they...?
_

CARLUCCI: Not overtly. What they did behind the scenes I can't say. Clearly they were involved in getting me and Bob Gordon expelled.

Q: Bob Gordon was your...?

CARLUCCI: He was the DCM in Dar Es Salaam.

Q: The DCM, okay. Did you find that the East Germans, for example, were following you or harassing you or anything like that?

CARLUCCI: No. To the best of my knowledge nobody followed me or harassed me. The East Germans and I never talked because we didn't have relations. We would frequently be standing near each other in ceremonies. Everybody would gush all over him and ignore me.

Q: It must have been a little awkward on a small island with the diplomatic corps. You had the East Germans that we didn't recognize, the Vietnamese who we didn't recognize and the North Koreans that we didn't recognize?

CARLUCCI: The only people at ceremonies I could talk to were the Brit, the Israeli, and the Soviet. I'd have to listen to all the diatribes. In one of the more humorous incidents, I decided to visit the neighboring island of Pemba, which was being run by a Commissar, named Ali Sultan Issa, a man who was trained in Beijing. He was so indoctrinated that he insisted we even share the same bed. "This is the way we do it in the People's democracy." He took me around the island with people chanting and singing since it was in the "workers paradise." Then he had a rally and meeting and I could see during the rally, this was in the early stages of my stay, that he would point at me and the crowd would applaud and yell and scream. So I asked someone what he was saying and he told me he was saying, "There's the enemy. Why don't you applaud or don't you think we ought to throw the Americans out?" Right then and there, I decided that learning Swahili was essential.

Q: I would have thought that you would have been up against all these groups and you being sort of the butt of their attacks and speeches and all that at any ceremony you went to, you could almost stand up with a target painted on you or something like this. You must have had to make the decision, do I just stand here and smile or keep a stern face or what do you do?
CARLUCCI: Just smile and roll with the punches. There was one other African that I could talk to. He was the Chairman of the Afro-Shirazi party, Thabit Kombo, who was probably in his 70s or 80s at the time, and was such a revered figure in Zanzibar that he could talk to me without fear of retaliation. He and the President were essentially the only two that I could talk to.

Q: Turning again to the NASA station, they opened it up, reopened it while you were there?

CARLUCCI: No. Well I can't recall, to be honest with you, whether it was open for a brief period or not. I doubt it. We had to negotiate its removal and of course we stalled for time. Time was an issue because the government was demanding that we remove it within a matter of weeks and NASA said that just couldn't be done. It was very valuable equipment, which they wanted to get out. So I spent a lot of time trying to negotiate a reasonable period for dismantling the station.

Q: Was there any feeling about NASA one way or the other?

CARLUCCI: Of course, the communists had thoroughly planted the idea that this was a spy station; it was all run by the CIA and so the situation was almost hopeless. Everybody believed that it was a spy station.

Q: What about the Soviets, because if I recall, although space flight was in its early stages in those days, yet we had made offers that if the Soviets had a space problem they could use our space facilities and vice versa. Did they play any part in it?

CARLUCCI: I'd have to assume that the Soviets were behind the campaign to force us to remove our tracking station. That the attacks came from the communists, there is no question.

Q: How about the press. Is there anything to report on the press?

CARLUCCI: It was entirely government controlled. Anything the government wanted they'd give to the press. There was no free press. The only way that I could know about the real world was through tuning in VOA [Voice of America] on my radio.

Q: Did you notice any difference when Zanzibar and Tanganyika became Tanzania? You were there during the initial stages of the amalgamation?

CARLUCCI: Yes. I went from being chargé to being consul general.

Q: Did you notice how the amalgamation was working at that point?

CARLUCCI: Well, very slowly. We virtually couldn't feel any effects in
Zanzibar, other than as I mentioned earlier we finally negotiated getting some Tanganyika policemen into Zanzibar. This was the first tangible presence. The island was very unwilling to give up its de facto independence.

Q: Could you do a little compare and contrast between the way things were run in Zanzibar while you were there and what you'd seen in the former Belgian Congo?

CARLUCCI: Well, there was a certain similarity obviously. There was initial hostility toward the west but in the case of the Congo, there had not been the kind of thorough Communist penetration that you'd had in Zanzibar. The Congolese didn't know what communism was, although some of our politicians, particularly Senator Dodd, called them Communists - Senator Tom Dodd, not Chris Dodd, the son. The Zanzibaris, a lot of them, had been to school in Moscow or in Beijing. They were much more sophisticated in their approach. Both situations were chaotic of course. I suppose the Congo might have been slightly more dangerous. We regarded Zanzibar as not particularly dangerous, although some people were killed. Of course during the revolution, a great number were killed.

Q: The similarity is the extreme nationalism and the anti-western overtones.

CARLUCCI: They were more explicit in Zanzibar than they were in the Congo. Zanzibar at least had a resolution. The Congo has never found its resolution.

Q: You were seeing the products of the Soviet training of Communists. Did you find that the people coming out of then named Lumumba University in the Soviet Union were pretty fairly indoctrinated?

CARLUCCI: Oh, yes. The big thing was the young pioneers, which was East Germany. I can remember large numbers of Zanzibaris being taken to East Germany and coming back as young pioneers in uniforms. Indoctrination was pretty thorough. Lumumba University hadn't really been established when I was in the Congo. By the time I got to Zanzibar, it was in full swing and there were large numbers of Zanzibaris, way out of proportion to their population, going to places like East Germany and Moscow and Beijing to study.

Q: Did you find any, were there any, Tanganyikan officials starting to drift over that you could talk to?

CARLUCCI: No. Not outside of the police. Even then I didn't have much contact. There was a Zanzibari police chief that I could talk to. He was not totally hostile to the West, but he was subsequently removed. While I was there, you could not feel much Tanganyikan presence.

Q: How did you expulsion come about?
CARLUCCI: Bob Gordon and I were having a phone conversation. This is about January of '65. We were discussing a message of congratulations on the second anniversary of the revolution. We did something very foolish.

Q: Where were you calling from?

CARLUCCI: I was in Zanzibar. And Bob Gordon was the DCM in Dar Es Salaam, Bill Leonhart's deputy. We started to double talk, which you should never do; it's easily decipherable. We started talking about the anniversary of the revolution and shouldn't we send a message, meaning a message of congratulations. Bob said, "Well, they are very reluctant in Washington and you will need more ammunition" meaning a stronger argument to make our case. I said, "I want to come over and discuss this."

I flew over and I was at the home of Jack Mower, one of our embassy officials. He had the radio on and the radio announced that Bob Gordon and I had been expelled.

Bill Leonhart went to Nyerere and said, "What's this all about?"

Nyerere said, "We have a tape of this conversation." And when Nyerere described it, it was obvious the tape had been doctored in some way to make it appear that we were plotting to overthrow the government of Zanzibar.

I went to see Karume, who even under those circumstances received me. He said this was wrong and should not happen. It was the Tanzanian government now that had expelled me, not the Zanzibar government. He said he'd call Nyerere, but there was nothing much more he could do. There seemed to be no alternative, so I left. A number of years later, I was at a reception at the State Department. A big Russian came up and almost swept me off my feet and said, "Don't you remember me?"

I said, "I'm not sure."

He said, Well, I'm so and so. I was the Tass correspondent in Zanzibar when you were there."

I said, "Then maybe you can satisfy my curiosity. Who was it that plotted my expulsion and doctored the tape. Was it you Soviets or the East Germans?"

He said, "Oh, we were all in it together."

Q: It's interesting though that Nyerere got into this because he certainly must have...

CARLUCCI: Well, apparently somebody took the tape to the cabinet and played it for the entire cabinet. Of course the more radical members of the cabinet,
insisted that we be expelled. What position Nyerere took in that cabinet meeting I
don't know to this day. Don Peterson, who was my vice consul, later became
ambassador to Tanzania. He told me that he had a conversation with Nyerere, this
is years later, and Nyerere said they had made a mistake and that I was welcome
to come back. But I don't know what transpired in that Cabinet meeting. I
thought my career was at an end that day.

Q: I think it's interesting to comment on this in the spirit of the times. Did you
find that the atmosphere, no matter what you did, if you got expelled it was
somehow your fault even though it may have been part of the machinations of
hostile powers?

CARLUCCI: I thought Harriman was - Bob Gordon and I had lunch with him -
seemed to understand the situation. But I was called into the office of the director
general of the Foreign Service, Joe Palmer. He had a totally clean desk. I'll never
forget it. He had my file sitting there. I had been promoted fast until then. In
fact, in the old system I was an O-3 and only 35 years old.

Q: In those days, about equivalent to a colonel.

CARLUCCI: I was the youngest, I think, at the time. He said, "Well, young
man, you're obviously intelligent, you've got ability, and you'll probably go to the
top of the service, but you're very impulsive, very free wheeling and you must
learn to fit into the system."

I said, “Sir, all due respect, I don't really want to fit into the system.”

He said, “Well you're going to have to learn to fit into the system and you are
going to a big embassy in Europe.”

I said, "I'm not interested in a big embassy."
He said, "You are going."

He put me in an Italian course and I was scheduled to go as Transportation
Officer to Rome, which I certainly did not look forward to. I struggled mightily
to get out of that job and finally succeeded when Lincoln Gordon asked for me to
go to Brazil. The director general said well maybe I could go to Brazil, and
maybe that embassy was large enough, provided I was buried down in the
embassy. I think I went five years without a promotion.

Q: How were you treated by others in the Foreign Service? Did you have a
feeling that this person was PNG (persona non grata) maybe...?

CARLUCCI: I didn't feel any real hostility from my colleagues. Obviously, we'd
done something that wasn't terribly wise-in fact, it was downright dumb. I think
the Foreign Service wrote [it] up to show how not to conduct a telephone

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conversation, and sent it to all posts. But, other than that, I think people
recognized it was a difficult situation over there.

Q: If I recall, I think somebody else got at least in trouble and developed a
hostile press and that was in Pakistan for also using a term “ammunition,” which
we often use in just the way we talk which means data - “I need some more
ammunition for this.” President Bhutto, not Benazir but her father, got this on a
wire tap and I can't remember what happened but somebody else was given a
rough time on this damned phrase.

CARLUCCI: Well, obviously thereafter, I was very careful about what I said on
the telephone. I would never double talk. I took the lesson seriously.

Q: So you went to Brazil in, would it be in '65 still?

CARLUCCI: Yes. I finished the Italian course. That took me pretty much
through the summer of '65. I think it was about the fall of '65 that I went to
Brazil, speaking Italian.

Q: Well, that was handy. It probably would have been much handier if you'd
gone to Argentina in a way?

CARLUCCI: In fact I remember negotiating my apartment lease in Italian
because it was owned by an Italian. Then I learned Portuguese.

Q: You were there until about 1970?

CARLUCCI: In Brazil? '65 through '68, I believe. Well, maybe even the
beginning of '69. It think I came back to Washington in late 1968 I guess it was.

Q: You say Lincoln Gordon, who was a presidential appointee, an economist,
and very much involved in the Marshall Plan was sent to Brazil. How had he
heard about you?

CARLUCCI: He was already ambassador to Brazil. I had a friend in the ARA
[Bureau of Inter-American Affairs], Tan Baber, who was, I think, executive
director or deputy executive director. It was quite well-known that I didn't want
to go to Italy. He said, "Why don't you have a session with Lincoln Gordon?"
Gordon is a brilliant man who later became president of Johns Hopkins. But he is
given to talking a lot. I had one of the strangest interviews I've had in my life. I
went in; he asked me what university I went to and I gave the right answer there.

Q: Princeton is it?

CARLUCCI: I think he'd gone to Princeton. Then I said, "You know, I'd be very
interested in the situation in Brazil."
One hour later I'd barely said a word and Lincoln Gordon thought I was brilliant. So he went to Joe Palmer and tried to get me to go to Brazil. He wanted me to go as principal officer in Brasilia replacing Herb Okun, but Joe Palmer said, “No.”

Lincoln said, "Well, can I have him in the embassy?"

Palmer said, "As long as you bury him."

Q: You were not to be trusted with a separate mission.

CARLUCCI: That's right.

Q: When you went to Brazil in '65, what was the situation there?

CARLUCCI: We'd had the Carlos Costello Bronco government, military government, albeit a fairly enlightened military government with a very large American aid program. We had some 900 Americans in Brazil. Our influence was pervasive. We had Roberto Campos as the Finance Minister [Finance Minister during President Castelo Branco’s presidency, 1964-1967], known as Bob Fields because he was so pro-American. But you also had a certain simmering social situation in Brazil which continued to go unresolved, and indeed needs more attention today. We had a large military presence as well. We had a big MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] with, if I remember the situation correctly, two generals and an admiral. This gets into another story, but Lincoln Gordon was replaced by Jack Tuthill, who started the TOPSY operation. He pulled me up from my job in the political section, promoted me to position of executive officer of the embassy. In fact, I became the chief administrator of the embassy. The DCM at the time, Phil Raine, was much more interested in the political side. He was de facto political counselor and I as an FS-03 and was, in effect, the closest thing to a DCM in the embassy. I was given the responsibility for implementing the TOPSY program.

Q: What was the TOPSY program?

CARLUCCI: This was an effort by Jack Tuthill - interesting story how it got started. Tuthill was a marvelous man. He died about four or five months ago - a wonderful person to work with. I've been fortunate in my career that I worked with some great people. He called me in one day, and he said, "Frank, this embassy is too large. Who is the most useless person in the embassy?"

I thought for a minute and I said, “Well, the assistant science attaché is a good tennis player, but he doesn't do much.”

He said, "Get rid of him."

I went to work on that. Tuthill called me back in about a month or two later and said, "How's it going on getting rid of Mr. X?"
I said, "Gee, Mr. Ambassador, I've never had such a difficult job. This guy is useless, but everybody in Washington is defending him."

He said, "Well, I've been thinking. It probably wouldn't be much harder to get rid of half the embassy than it is to get rid of one person."

I said, "I think you're probably right."

He said, "Well, I'll think about that."

He came back from lunch one day and went into his office, came out and walked into my little office and handed me a draft cable and said, "What do you think of this?"

It was a cable back to Washington saying, "I request authority to cut the staff by 50 percent." I went back into his office and I said, "Well, it probably needs to be done, basically for political reasons, but, Mr. Ambassador, you at least have to allow the different sections of the embassy to comment on this before you send it."

He said, "Alright." He called everybody into his office and he said, "You can comment."

And as I left his office, the general in charge of the MAAG said, "Well, you of course don't mean us?"

He said, "Oh, yes, I do." He said to everybody, "Get your comments in to Frank by noon tomorrow."

And all the comments came in. And the comments of the MAAG were a marvel to behold because they said, "If you cut us by 50 percent, we'll lose space in the ministry of war; we'll lose some hanger space; we may have to give up one of our airplanes, and we might even have to close the PX."

Jack Tuthill said, "Frank, you respond to all the other comments. I want to respond to this one." And he had a field day.

We sent the cable and then Tuthill and I went to Washington and walked the halls arguing for a 50 percent cut. We got all the way to Katzenbaum, who was deputy secretary at the time.

Q: Nicholas Katzenbaum?

CARLUCCI: Yes, Nicholas Katzenbaum. We got his support, but that support kind of evaporated as we got lower in the building. There were something like 18
agencies represented in Brazil and the State Department didn't control those agencies. They were the hardest to deal with. We brought in a special task force to look at the CIA. Eventually, after a year, of full time effort on my part and probably 80 percent of the Ambassador's time, we ended up with a cut of about 30 percent. I went in with trepidation to tell Tuthill that was the size of the cut we were finally ending up with and he said, "That's about what I expected."

Q: Now how did the name TOPSY develop?

CARLUCCI: I think Tuthill coined it. He said this place just grew like TOPSY [Note: a literary character from the 19th century novel, Uncle Tom's Cabin]. He pointed to an AID request that had come out asking us to do a study on rats, bats, and noxious birds in Brazil. He had a great deal of fun with that one, too.

Q: What was your position on this operation TOPSY, as the implementer? I would have thought that this would have been more dangerous, in a way, than the Congo - a walk in the embassy...

CARLUCCI: It was and when Tuthill left I became very vulnerable. Before he left, he made me political counselor, but I was not a very popular man in the embassy. I took a different point of view than much of the senior staff. For example, when I was political counselor, there was another institutional act decreed by the government, the fifth institutional act, I believe.

Q: This is the government of Brazil?

CARLUCCI: The government of Brazil. We suspended our aid program. Most of the top level of the embassy was pushing to restart the aid program. The embassy became badly divided. A lot of the younger officers fought against reinstituting the aid program and I sided with them, but I was the only one on the senior staff. Those were the days before we had a dissent channel. The embassy, the aid people, drafted a cable which the DCM, chargé now, favored saying let's restart the program. I said, "If you send that cable I'm going to enter a formal dissent." The cable was never sent and the program was not restarted for an appropriate period of time.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point and we'll pick it up again. We're still in Brazil. We've talked about operation TOPSY, but let's talk about the next time about relations with the Brazilian government as you saw them, developments there, personalities, particular military. Was Vernon Walters there?

CARLUCCI: I ghostwrote the fitness report that got him his first star.

Q: So we'll talk obviously about Vernon Walters and other elements...

CARLUCCI: My first assignment when I was buried in the political section of
the embassy was to report Vernon Walters' conversations. He and the president of Brazil had a close personal relationship. Walters would come back from Sunday dinner with the president and on Monday he'd give me a stream of consciousness and my job was to take it and put it into State "Departmentese." Walters had a fantastic memory. He could remember the conversation word for word, but that wasn’t suitable for reporting.

Q: We'll pick that up and we'll also pick up starting from what your first job was in the embassy.

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Today is the 3rd of October 1997. Frank, something you'd mentioned earlier on - there was the issue of do you renew aid to the Brazilians. I think you said there was a split between the young officers, yourself included, and the older officers at the embassy as to whether we should keep the pressure on or relax it a bit. Do you recall that?

CARLUCCI: Well this occurred towards the end of my tour after Jack Tuthill had left. I of course was not the most popular fellow in the embassy having been hatchet man from TOPSY and being fairly low ranking to be political counselor. I think I was still an FS-03. Bill Belton was chargé d’affaires and Bill was very much a traditionalist. The Brazilians had implemented another institutional act (I think it was the fifth.) and the U.S. government had frowned upon that and had suspended aid. After about, I would judge, two or three weeks, the powers that be in AID in the embassy, accompanied by the economic side, the economic counselor and his people, began to urge that aid be reinstated. This provoked a good deal of concern on the part of the younger officers, myself included, although I was a little older than they were. We protested. It came down to a meeting in the chargé’s office where the chargé went around the table and all the senior people said they favored the resumption of aid and had drafted a cable to this effect. I didn't say much at the time and then the cable was passed around. I read it and towards the end of the meeting, I simply said if you send this cable, I request that the following sentence be put on the end. The political counselor dissents from this cable and reserves the right to write his own cable. Those were the days before we had dissent channels. Dissent was not very much in vogue and there was somewhat a startled reaction in the room. But Bill Belton said, "Well, if Frank's got these reservations, we need to consider them," and the cable did not go. In essence the embargo on aid programs continued for another month or so.

Q: I was wondering - this may be almost philosophical - but could you explain, this is a scenario that has played out quite often where the most senior officers at an embassy on something don't want to disrupt relations and to make things good and the more junior members say “The hell with it, we have a policy and we've got to stick it to them.” Can you talk a little about, in general, your observations of the dynamics of youth versus age?
CARLUCCI: I suppose youth is more prone to risk taking and taking strong positions than those of us who have reached, shall we say middle age, or a little bit more. I think that's a very healthy characteristic. Studies have generally indicated too that people tend to be more liberal in their younger years than their older years. You don't get so much in a rut and your views don't become so formalized. You're more open to new ideas and new approaches. I think I told you in the last session that I was lectured by the then Director General on my free wheeling approach and maybe that was part of the function of youth although I'd like to think that I still am able to think a little bit outside the box.

Q: As you became political counselor, what was your impression of the Brazilian government at that time?

CARLUCCI: When I first came to the embassy, Carlos Costello Bronco was president, a military man - a very competent military man - who was guiding the country, I felt, toward a more democratic system. He was succeeded by another general, Costa e Silva, who candidly speaking didn't have Carlos Costello Bronco's intellect. In fact, the Brazilians, as you know, like jokes and he became the butt of jokes all around Brazil. His alleged low IQ was always poked fun at. He was a rather stolid figure, quite unimaginative, basically a place holder. We enjoyed cordial relations with him and Ambassador Jack Tuthill would see him fairly frequently. I used to serve as Jack's interpreter in some of these meetings. I accompanied Tuthill to the meeting when Tuthill told Costa e Silva we were going to start the TOPSY program, cut the staff by 50%. Everybody in the embassy had predicted that the Brazilian reaction would be very negative to TOPSY. On the contrary. Costa Silva's reaction to the TOPSY program was quite favorable. He understood the political ramifications so he was quite supportive throughout that exercise.

Q: With Vernon Walters having these ties going back, it was sort of legendary he was the liaison officer to the Brazilian division during World War II in Italy and all. What was your impression of how this translated into helping us?

CARLUCCI: Oh, I think Dick Walters was probably the single most influential American. When he spoke, they listened. He had a marvelous relationship with Carlos Costello Bronco.

Q: I think so, yes.

CARLUCCI: When Dick served as the liaison officer, Dick would go around on Sunday, practically every Sunday night, for a one on one dinner with Carlos Costello Bronco. There was hardly a military man in Brazil that Dick Walters didn't know and have a relationship with. He was admired and respected and as you know he was extraordinarily fluent in Portuguese - probably the best Portuguese speaker - in the embassy. He played a very key role in U.S.-Brazilian relations. Dick pretty much confined his activities to the military side. He didn't
get involved in questions of aid policy, the kind of things we were just discussing.

Q: Did the ambassador use him because I imagine with a military government, this was a very important aspect?

CARLUCCI: Yes. Tuthill liked and admired Dick Walters and from time to time when he wanted to get a message across he would ask Dick Walters to convey the message. Tuthill was never very status conscious. He didn't have a sense of insecurity because Dick Walters had more access than he did. That didn't bother him at all. He viewed Dick as an asset and worked rather closely with him.

Q: As political counselor, did this intrude upon you work or...?

CARLUCCI: On the contrary. I felt like Tuthill did, that Dick Walters was an enormous asset. I worked extremely closely with Dick. I decided it would be useful if I got to know the military myself and Dick was only too happy to introduce me. I also got myself as political counselor named assistant director of AID and would attend the AID meetings and work with them to shape a program that I thought was more politically acceptable.

Q: How were your relations, when you were political counselor, with AID because often, particularly in that era, AID tended to be an agency on its own and it has its own dynamics and all that?

CARLUCCI: There's no question there was that. I had been through the TOPSY exercise. I understood the aid program quite well as a result. So when I moved over to the job as political counselor, and I said to the AID director, Bill Ellis at the time, "It would be useful if I continued the relationship. I'd like to have a title and go to the staff meetings and contribute what I could to the program."

Bill welcomed it and I carried through on that undertaking.

Q: How was AID integrated into furthering our political objectives at this time would you say?

CARLUCCI: Both Tuthill and I felt that large numbers of technical people - while each individual may contribute to progress and to good relations - the cumulative impact of such large numbers was bad. It tended to create a sense of dependency, while we really were trying to encourage Brazilians to do more on their own. Our goal was to try and reduce the numbers and obviously to get the resources down to a manageable level and to try to move the Brazilians to take up more of the slack. We also tried to point the programs in the certain areas that we felt were critical-education would be one of them-and to change the focus of the programs from trying to do everything to trying to do the things we thought were going to give the democratic forces in Brazil the greatest leverage.
Q: Did Brazil, with their young people going away to universities and all...I always think of Chile and other places where you have the University of Chicago boys and all that. Was there anything of this nature developing in Brazil or were they going back to Portugal to universities? What were the dynamics there for foreign higher education?

CARLUCCI: Well there were some that had very close connections with the United States. Robert Campos was Minister of Finance and he was known as Bob Fields which is a humorous translation of Roberto Campos. That's because he was so pro-American, spoke fluent English, so there were close associations. I don't recall there being a University of Chicago school or anything like that, but I remember Brazilians had substantial exposure to the U.S. educational system.

Q: What about their economic planners? Did they seem to be going a different course? So many of these countries, particularly in those days, were going for a status as opposed to a more open, free wheeling system. What were the atmospherics?

CARLUCCI: Well, certainly Roberto Campos and Delfim Neto, who was the finance minister, seemed very receptive to building a private sector. They were a long way from where Brazil is today on issues such as privatization. That wasn't very much in vogue. There were large government-owned companies and there was no effort to privatize those. On the other hand, they were trying to stimulate a market economy. It's just that Brazil had enormous economic problems at the time. It was like trying to turn an aircraft carrier. It moved very slowly.

Q: What about on the economic side, particularly, we have a Consulate General on the pad for a long time in Sao Paulo which is really almost another capital on its own, isn't it, as far as industry? Was it difficult being the political counselor? Did you find it was almost another dynamic coming out of Sao Paulo as far as our people there?

CARLUCCI: Sao Paulo didn't do a lot of political reporting. They confined themselves to commercial and counselor work. The larger issue was the move to Brasilia. I had an apartment in Brasilia and basically shuttled back and forth. The Brazilian politicians at the time hated Brasilia. The less amount of time they could spend there the better. But Sao Paulo, I don't recall Sao Paulo playing a very significant political role.

Q: On the move to Brasilia, what was our impression at the time? Was this a pain in the neck or...?

CARLUCCI: Yes. We all liked Rio and the Brazilian politicians liked Rio. Brasilia was in the middle of nowhere. It was a long flight. They would spend the least amount of time possible there. Generally two or three days a week. Air travel was free for the politicians. It proved very useful to me because simply by
flying I could get to meet all the Brazilian politicians. I got to know quite a number of them that way.

Q: I would imagine that these flights would end up as political caucuses in a way?

CARLUCCI: They did indeed. And the liquor flowed freely on the flights. It was a very congenial atmosphere.

Q: Did you find it quite useful.

CARLUCCI: Yes, I found it very useful. I actually came to rather like my trips to Brasilia because I thought it was fun. I enjoyed going around the halls of Congress.

Q: As the political counselor, what was your impression and how did you deal with the political class as opposed to the military?

CARLUCCI: Well, it was a little hard to distinguish between the political class and the military class. The country was being run by the military, but there was a political class growing up. I made an effort to get to know them. Sometimes those efforts were controversial. The principal opposition politician was a man named Carlos Lacerda who had been governor of Guanabana and had run for president. He was a brilliant man. I had gotten to know his son and tangentially gotten to know him. I did something extraordinarily controversial. I set up a meeting between Tuthill and Carlos Lacerda. The result was that the President, Costa e Silva, called Tuthill in and complained about the meeting. Basically, he complained not about Tuthill, but about me for having set it up. The meeting became headlines in the newspapers and I became quite a controversial figure.

Q: Was this politician legitimate opposition, so this was not going to the underground or anything like that?

CARLUCCI: Of course not. But that's a concept that was a little hard for the military people to grasp when they're in control of the country.

Q: How did Tuthill respond?

CARLUCCI: Tuthill liked the meeting, he liked Lacerda and he thought it was the right thing to do.

Q: Were we sitting around at a country team meeting and saying well, Brazil is eventually going to get rid of the military and we have a new political class is going to emerge with whom we have to be on good terms and identify who they are going to be. No matter what the military says, we've got to get ready for that day and working on that?
CARLUCCI: Essentially that was the message I was trying to get out. Nobody would argue with that, but everybody had their day-to-day business and the institutional forces take hold. If you are AID, you want to continue to do business with the people you are doing business with. You’re not necessarily in favor of change. I was probably the one who was arguing most forcefully for change. Tuthill essentially agreed with me—or I agreed with him I guess would be a better way of putting it—because he was the leader in the embassy. It all worked well as long as Tuthill was there. When Tuthill left, I became, as I said, a little more vulnerable.

Q: During the Tuthill period, what about the mid and junior level political officers in the embassy. I would think it would be difficult for them to get out and see military figures and they'd be more prone to go after the civilian politicians who were not very powerful at that time or how did that work?

CARLUCCI: Well, we had some able political officers - Lowell Kilday, Lou Bolden, Bob Bentley. Bob Bentley knew practically everybody in town. They got around and met both the military and political types. I thought it was a very effective embassy. Tuthill always encouraged people to come up with new ideas. He loved dissent and he would bawl people out if they didn't dissent from him. He was always thinking in different terms. He created an embassy that looked at issues differently. He once - I may have mentioned this to you in the last session - told me to draft an airgram on what I thought the ideal embassy would look like. I did one which essentially abolished all sections and organized it along functional lines. He was always thinking of new ideas and new concepts and that cascaded all the way down in the embassy.

Q: What was our prime message? There is the normal reporting on political developments which in a way is passive, but that's the observer role. Being the United States, we were an activist country and we were trying to influence events. What were the main things we were trying to encourage with respective to the political scene?

CARLUCCI: The main objective was to move them toward a fully functioning democracy and get the military to do what they said they were going to do—hold elections, respect those elections, make sure that there was freedom for the press, freedom of association, all the things that constitute a democratic system. We kept nudging them in that direction and by the nature of our contacts, which were broad and included the opposition, we demonstrated that we wanted a free and open society.

Q: How well was this message received by the military people, not just at the top but also at various levels?

CARLUCCI: Some accepted it. Some thought it was interference in internal affairs. We would get criticized, but I think we had the desired effect.
Q: What was your impression of the military, the people who came into power, not just at the top but at various levels you were dealing with? Were they sort of a narrow, traditional type military or did they have broader interests?

CARLUCCI: I would say most of them were traditionalists, although there were clearly exceptions like Carlos Costello Branco. The idea was to try and deal with the people who had a broader sense of the issues and not spend a lot of time on the narrowly focused people.

Q: How well do you feel you were supported back in Washington by the Secretary of State...?

CARLUCCI: The main interaction we had with Washington was on the TOPSY program. Washington was by and large supportive although they left the tough fighting to Tuthill. In terms of the political message, we had a very good office director, a man named Jack Kubisch, who was extremely able and extremely supportive. I thought we had good backing from Washington.

Q: Tuthill left when and how much longer were you in Brazil?

CARLUCCI: Oh, I'd have to check the dates.

Q: Approximately.

CARLUCCI: He must have left about '68 or so and I was there, I'd say, six to eight months or maybe even a year after he left.

Q: You mentioned that you felt more vulnerable when he left. How did that translate itself?

CARLUCCI: Oh, it was no secret that Tuthill and I had a very close relationship. My office was right outside his. He essentially administered the embassy through me even though I was a fairly junior officer. Phil Raine was the DCM. Phil was an old political counselor and liked to focus on the political side. So Tuthill increasingly turned a lot of the administrative side over to me. That didn't trouble Phil Raine at all. Bill Belton replaced Phil Rain. He was a slightly different kind of personality - he was a bit more interested in the administrative side. By then I had moved over to the political counselor. Tuthill liked to comment that in eliminating jobs, I eliminated my own, which I did. I felt that the executive officer was no longer necessary in the embassy. The people who were implementing this, namely me, and to a lesser extent Jack Tuthill, were obviously not terribly popular with the rank and file. Although Tuthill himself had such an engaging personality and a wonderfully open style that certainly the junior people in the embassy enjoyed working with him.

Q: When he left, did you find the system began to close in on you?
CARLUCCI: It tried to. But I like to think I was able to keep a step ahead of it.

Q: How would that translate itself?

CARLUCCI: Well, into arguments over policy. The more traditional people mainly those that were in the economic section arguing in favor of the status quo, going slow on nudging the Brazilian government whereas I would argue the case for putting more pressure on the Brazilian government to move towards a fully functioning democracy.

Q: Were there any issues during either the Tuthill or the post Tuthill period while you were there - events or policy matters - that particularly engaged you?

CARLUCCI: Well, other than what I mentioned, there were things that came up from time to time but they were in the normal course of diplomatic activity. No, I'd say when Tuthill was there, by far the vast majority of our time was devoted to the TOPSY exercise which Tuthill viewed, correctly in my judgement, as essentially a political exercise. He didn't view it as a numbers game. He always made the point that TOPSY was the right thing for Brazil but it may not be the right thing for other countries around the world. And of course it was picked up later by the State Department and translated into BALPA [Balance of Payments Program], and applied worldwide. It was never Tuthill's thinking that this was a template to be used around the world.

Q: While you were there-I'm just thinking this was the time when the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia and all this-was there concern about a growing Communist influence within Brazil?

CARLUCCI: Oh, well, yes, certainly. We had to deal with a certain amount of terrorism. One of our military people in Sao Paulo was assassinated.

Q: He was a language student, wasn't he?

CARLUCCI: Yes. Assassinated in front of his family and I as political counselor was the one that had to deal with that. There was increasing terrorist activity. There was certainly a lot of left wing activity in the church. This was countered by right wing death squads. I tried to keep in touch as best I could with the left wing elements. I would have some contact with liberal educators, those kinds of people. There was considerable concern about the rebirth of communism.

Q: When you were talking to what was considered the left wing in Brazilian political society, did you find they had a tendency to blame the United States for what was happening in their country?

CARLUCCI: Sure. We tried to establish contact with the students. Those were the days - I don't know if they still have them - when you designated a student
affairs officer in the embassy. We designated a man named Larry Lazer and he reported to me on student activities. I would meet with student groups. We'd hear their views. Certainly there was a fair degree of anti-Americanism, a feeling that we were responsible for the military government, that we were encouraging the military government, that we were not doing enough to move them to a democratic system.

_Q: In a way, it's difficult to counter by telling them what you're trying to do because that alienates you to the powers that be. Was this...?_

CARLUCCI: You tell them that you favor democracy but then they'd point to all the shortcomings in the process and that was a little hard to defend.

_Q: Was there any effort to get to the more violent left wing elements there or were they out of bounds?_

CARLUCCI: There was no effort to get to them. Their monitoring was left up to the agency.

_Q: Obviously this is an unclassified interview, but how effective did you feel that you were supported and informed by the agency while you were political counselor?_

CARLUCCI: I had very good relations with the agency which may have been one reason why I was accepted when I finally went into the agency as Deputy Director. I always enjoyed good relations with the agency. I worked with them on meeting with some of the dissident groups. They kept me informed on their activities. I never asked to know their sources, I didn't need that. But I got all their reports and included them in my staff meetings. I thought it was a very cordial relationship.

_Q: Sometimes as I do these interviews I find that the agency work and the political work are on parallel tracks that never meet or mutually support each other, particularly the political section doesn't get the information that's going to the agency. It goes into the agency and may come back but there isn't much support._

CARLUCCI: I never had that sense. I always saw the reports as they went out. I didn't have a problem.

_Q: What about the press? Did you find...Was the press sat on so much that it was not something worth dealing with or...?_

CARLUCCI: Oh, no. The press was very important and we had some exceptional people in USIA. John Mowinckel was head of USIA and he was excellent. We talked to the press and Tuthill met quite frequently with the editors. Roberto Marinho and Tuthill were good friends. The Brazilian press was very
Q: Were they, could they lock horns with the military from time to time as far as policy goes or did they tread a very careful path?

CARLUCCI: They would criticize the government but they were circumspect in their criticism. They would take positions which were not necessarily supportive of what the government was doing.

Q: How did you find our Congress at this time? Was Brazil off Congress's radar or did it intrude as far as what was happening?

CARLUCCI: I don't think Brazil was the focus of attention. We had some CODELs [congressional delegations]. I remember Rooney came down.

Q: This is John Rooney of Brooklyn, who is the chairman of our State Department of Appropriations committee?

CARLUCCI: He came down and spent something like three days in Brazil. I think he got off the ship once to call on the ambassador and that was all. His other activities were rather well known.

Q: Yes.

CARLUCCI: We'd get the odd congressman but it wasn't on the beaten path at that time.

Q: Did you feel at all, was it reflected at all, about Vietnam. This is sort of the height of our engagement in Vietnam and the opposition movement in the United States. Youth was protesting and all that. I was wondering if that translated itself into your context.

CARLUCCI: No, there wasn't a lot of activity or concern in Brazil about Vietnam. It was not a big issue. A bigger issue was trying to stabilize the Dominican Republic [DR] in the wake of our intervention there. In fact, the head of the MAAG, General Linville, had been the leader of the military forces that went into the DR. Ellsworth Bunker was conducting his negotiations in the DR and Brazil was a very important player in those negotiations.

Q: Did they send troops in eventually or…?

CARLUCCI: I think they did.

Q: I'm not sure either. I think we tried to get a joint force to give it...Main thing was at that time I guess there was...
CARLUCCI: Get us out.

Q: Get us out and there had been political disorder in the Dominican Republic and trying to stabilize the situation.

CARLUCCI: We eventually did it.

Q: Yes.

CARLUCCI: People say military interventions don't work. This is an example of one that did work. We established a functioning democracy in the DR.

Q: Is there anything else you think we should discuss about Brazil?

CARLUCCI: No, I think we've covered it.

Q: You left what in early '69 or so?

CARLUCCI: Yes, I think it probably would have been about January or February of '69. I'd received an assignment to go to MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology].

Q: So did you go to MIT?

CARLUCCI: It would have been late '68 maybe. No, I didn't. I got sidetracked. Don Rumsfeld, an old college friend, had been named Director of OEO.

Q: OEO?

CARLUCCI: Office of Economic Opportunity. Don was an old friend. He was a congressman who had visited us in Brazil. We had stayed close since our college days. He asked me to come over and see him and talked me into becoming assistant director of OEO and head of the Community Action Program about which I knew absolutely nothing. So, I never did get to MIT. It must have been '68 now that I think of it because I became Director of OEO in '69.

Q: You were in OEO from when to when. You say you started in '69?

CARLUCCI: It must have been late '68 and '69 that I was in OEO. I started out as assistant director. Rumsfeld was there about a year. I must have gotten there about March of '68.

Q: '69?

CARLUCCI: No, Rumsfeld left in early '69 and I succeeded him in early '69. That was an absolutely fascinating period in OEO. The program had been created
by Lyndon Johnson to eliminate poverty but it was hated by the Republicans. The Nixon administration came in disliking OEO intensely and I could never understand why Don took the job.

Q:  *Because he was a Republican?*

CARLUCCI:  A conservative Republican. The first thing we were faced with was an amendment by Congressmen Edith Green and Al Quie which would have essentially turned OEO over to the states. Without much support from the administration, indeed maybe even opposition, I could never tell, Don single handedly lobbied and defeated that amendment.

Q:  *This is still during the Johnson administration?*

CARLUCCI:  No, it was Nixon.

Q:  *The Nixon administration. Came in in '69.*

CARLUCCI:  Well, it would have been '69 then. I was right earlier on then. I went into OEO probably when the Nixon administration had been in office three or four months.

Q:  *So were talking about March, April, something like that, '69.*

CARLUCCI:  Yes, '69. Then I must have become director in '70. I guess it was '70 because I was only Director about eight months. Don did save the agency but he gave instructions to me to make sure that the Community Action Program began to move toward cooperation with governors and mayors. It had been a very confrontational program. When we moved into OEO, there were pictures of Che Guevara on the wall.

Q:  *Guevara being the revolutionary from Argentina...*

CARLUCCI:  He was the idol of a lot of people at OEO. This was a very confrontation oriented organization. We used to have constant demonstrations. I would be locked in rooms, we'd have screaming people in the halls. You'd go out and meet with a community action agency and they would pin your back against the wall. I can remember one confrontation I had out in Oakland. Somebody, I think the Director of the Community Action Agency there, said where did I come from and I said, "Well, I was a Foreign Service officer."

And he said, "Christ, and I thought the President said he was going to appoint capable people to these jobs."

So I set about to change the staff structure. I also set about to close down some of the more controversial Community Action Agencies. There was one in
Minneapolis that I shut down. I shut down the one in Sacramento. I had quite a tussle with the Mayor out there. Governor Reagan got involved. It was a difficult but very educational period. I can remember deciding to cut back on the Community Action Agency up in my hometown of Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania. I was called on the carpet by my congressman, Dan Flood, who was also Chairman of the OEO Appropriations Committee. He was quite a character - later pleaded *nolo contendere* to charges of bribery. I will never forget the conversation. I said, "Congressman, we just have to cut this one because I'm closing others down and cutting back on any number of them. It's a matter of principle."

He looked me and said, "Young man, there comes a time in everyone's life when you must learn to rise above principle."

We faced those kinds of complications. Of course, the biggest problem that I faced, I inherited from Don when I became director. OEO contained within it the Legal Services Program which was the most confrontational of all the programs. Lawyers who got involved in haircut suits and challenging the federal...

*Q: You are talking about people whose hair was too long and they were being fired...?*

CARLUCCI: Yes. They would do some good things like defend tenants, but some of them were very confrontation-oriented and used Legal Services as a program to change society. Well, that infuriated the traditional politicians. But the program was supported by the ABA, by the organized Bar. It was headed by a Harvard trade lawyer who was rather close to the more radical elements, a man named Terry Lenzner, who today runs a kind of a detective agency. Don had become dissatisfied with Terry Lenzner. When Don asked me to succeed him as director, I said, "Well, there are two things you have to do, Don, before I take over. You have to fire Terry Lenzner, which you intend to do anyway. And you have to assure me that Governor Reagan, the governor of California, will sign the grant to California Rural Legal Assistance," which was the premier legal services program in California, solidly supported by the ABA. But it also defended the grape pickers in the NAPA Valley. The grape growers were Ronald Reagan's primary source of political opposition so Ronald Reagan hated the program. It was a very confrontational program headed by Cruz Reynoso, who is now a judge in the California court system.

Don said, "I've issued the grant and Ronald Reagan won't veto it." Let me explain. The OEO director had authority to issue grants, governors could veto those grants but then the OEO director had an override. This had been used very sparingly, I think only once, certainly not with a governor like Ronald Reagan.

So, I said, "Okay, fine, Don," and Don left. The next day, I got the flu, and was named director the following day. The day after that, Ronald Reagan vetoed the grant. He not only vetoed the grant, he called Richard Nixon and said, "Don't let
Carlucci override the veto." About that time, Alan Cranston called me up, senator from California who was chairman of the…

Q: Democratic senator.

CARLUCCI: Democratic senator-liberal democratic senator-who was Chairman of the committee that was going to confirm me. He called me in and he said, "Frank, unless you override that veto, you're not going to get confirmed." So I had Richard Nixon, through John Ehrlichman telling me don't you dare override the veto and I had Alan Cranston telling me if I didn't override the veto, I wasn't going to be confirmed. That started quite a saga. John Mitchell got involved. I ended up one night over the Justice Department with Pat Gray and we got into a dialogue with Ronald Reagan, but that broke down. He and I ended up calling each other names in public. I told him that he had been deceitful or something like that and he countered with some criticism of me, I can't remember what it was. So the whole thing was off to a very rocky start. Ronald Reagan produced something like 500 pages of charges against the program - all the alleged wrongdoings he could find. I took those charges and appointed a three judge commission, two Republicans and a Democrat - state supreme court judges - one had been former Chief Justice - to look into the charges. They conducted for five or six months a road show up and down the state of California. When they produced their report, it essentially said that none of the charges was accurate. I took the report and dove underground. The program, CLRA [California Legal Rural Assistance], instantly sued me under the Freedom of Information Act to get the report. But I called Ronald Reagan on the phone and said, "Governor, I have this report. You and I ought to sit down."

He said, "Well, okay, come our here." So clandestinely I went out to Sacramento and sat down alone with Ronald Reagan.

I said, "This report is going to be very critical. Three Supreme Court justices, two Republicans, that say not one of your charges can be substantiated. There's going to be a lot of criticism. Now I will cover you on the criticism. I will also give you your own program. I'll give you a separate grant for the California State Legal Services Program. In return for doing these two things, I want the longest grant in CLRA history. I want a two year grant."

We had something like a three day dialogue basically between me and Ed Meese in which at one point my general counsel threatened Ed Meese with leveling Sacramento. The White House was calling constantly saying what the hell am I doing? Why don't I cave? Eventually Ronald Reagan agreed to give the grant.

That followed a stormy congressional hearing where I was called on the carpet for something like 13 hours with Congress screaming at me. Although the liberal democrats constantly asked why did I do this, I simply said, "Look, they've got the longest grant in their history." Don't worry about my rhetoric, they got the
grant." At the end of that hearing, Ronald Reagan called me personally and thanked me.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point and put the end here. We're talking about the Office of Economic Opportunity. You've talked about how you got into it and you've talked about your confrontation with Ronald Reagan over particularly the grape growers thing. But we haven't really talked about what the program was doing, the general policy for the historian to understand what was going on and you've mentioned closing down some of the more controversial, confrontational Legal Assistance Offices and I'd like to talk more about how those were judged. How you were sorting apples from oranges in order to keep this program going during the Nixon administration and how a bureaucrat who wants to get something done survives in a highly charged political atmosphere, particularly under the Nixon administration.

CARLUCCI: With difficulty. ***

Q: Today is the 22nd of December, 1997. Frank, you heard the questions. Let's talk first about what the Office of Economic Opportunity was.

CARLUCCI: That's right.

Q: What was the goal of it as you saw it?

CARLUCCI: It was originally a Lyndon Johnson great society program, the goal being to eliminate poverty which was to say the least a very optimistic goal. The first director of the office was Sarge Shriver. Then the Nixon administration came in and Don Rumsfeld took over. By then the program had been pretty fully developed. Some would say overdeveloped. The Community Action Program was a very large program. Legal Services was extraordinarily active. You had VISTA [Volunteers in Service to America]. You also had a health program. It was a fairly substantial agency. There was no question that the Nixon administration took a decidedly different view of OEO than the Kennedy/Johnson administration and in the end decided to close it. When Rumsfeld first came in there was a congressional offensive led by Congresswoman Edith Green and Congressman Al Quie to put constraints on OEO, to force OEO to make all its grants through state and local government. Don Rumsfeld fought that off. I don't know how he managed his relationship with the White house while doing that. It struck me as some trick, but he was successful. When Don left to go to the White House as a counselor to the President, I was asked to replace as director, which I did.

Q: What was the atmosphere that you found within the office? Was it confrontational to the Nixon administration or...?
CARLUCCI: Oh, yes. When we took over—perhaps it's best characterized by saying there pictures of Che Guevara on the wall.

Q: Who was the revolutionary hero of Communist Cuba.

CARLUCCI: It was certainly a radically oriented agency with very altruistic goals. We were going to help the poor and we were going to do that by empowering them politically. That was the theory. Particularly the theory of legal services. You could use the law to empower the people. Our view of it was somewhat different. Our view was that it should be a service delivery organization with some multiplier effect. The Community Action Agency should not be confrontational. Their job was not to confront state and local government but to work with state and local government to establish a harmonious relationship to make sure the funds were allocated in as efficient a manner as possible. That is to say the funds between state and local government and the Community Action Agencies. The lawyers should not be bringing haircut suits or confronting the federal government on major programs, bringing class action suits to change society but should be dealing with the individual needs of poor citizens. In the end we came to the conclusion that the lawyers needed to be part of an independent legal services corporation. I had drafted the statute to create the Independent Legal Services Program. That's how it came into being.

Q: Did you find as you peeled below the surface that the Nixon administration, particularly in social affairs, was really much more liberal than it was given credit for?

CARLUCCI: I don't think there was any question. You had revenue sharing, HR1 [House Reduction One].

Q: HR1 being the...?

CARLUCCI: The social security amendment that provided benefits to the disabled. The largest single bill, I think domestic bill, certainly up to that time. Nixon signed. It created an enormous entitlement program for the disabled. Nixon supported the Peace Corps. There were a number of programs in the domestic area. When I later went to HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare], we developed a national health insurance proposal which the Nixon administration basically encouraged. It didn't see the light of day until the Ford administration. We also worked on welfare reform, a negative income tax program, all ideas that today would be regarded today as liberal.

Q: How did you deal with the lawyers, particularly the younger lawyers who were coming out of the sixties thing? Did you find yourself dealing with a revolutionary situation or...?

CARLUCCI: To some extent. You had to try and get good supervision over
them. We fired the then director of Legal Services - I say Rumsfeld did - and I brought in a new director named Fred Speaker who related very well to the lawyers. He'd been a former attorney general of Pennsylvania, and had a very engaging personality. He seemed to be able to manage the lawyers yet had a philosophy that was consistent control. So, it gradually came under control. We tangled with some people. One of the more difficult people for me to deal with was Spiro Agnew at the time.

Q: Vice President.

CARLUCCI: And Pat Buchanan.

Q: Who was the President's speech writer.

CARLUCCI: He got involved in policy issues. He also spent a lot of time with Agnew and wrote some of Agnew's speeches. They hated the Legal Services Program. They kept calling me and telling me to kill it, to kill this or kill that. I finally, just gave up trying to deal with them. The best account of the attitude towards these kind of programs is in Len Garment’s book. Len Garment has written a book called Crazy Rhythm. You asked earlier how I survived. I survived by finding friends wherever I could. Len Garment was a friend in court.

Q: What was his position in the White House?

CARLUCCI: He was an assistant to the President. He was a senior assistant. But he'd been Nixon's law partner and was very close to him personally. He had a different view than the rest of the White House staff. He certainly had a different view than John Mitchell. He was much more supportive of programs like Legal Services. Len was very helpful during that. He was also very engaged in civil rights initiatives. I was engaged in some of that as well. We worked together on Indian affairs. In his book he recounts how he and I negotiated the Indians out of the Bureau of Indian Affairs when they were about to immolate themselves on election eve in 1972. People forget this. On election eve, a group of Indians…

Q: We're talking about American Indians.

CARLUCCI: American Indians occupied the BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] and threatened to blow themselves up. Len became the negotiator and he asked for me to work with him on it and the two of us-successfully I might say-negotiated them out. But right after we negotiated them out, we went in and looked and there were Molotov cocktails all over the building so they had been indeed serious about blowing themselves up. These were the same Indians, that later got - some of them, the leadership - involved in Wounded Knee.

Q: The confrontation with the FBI or state or the authorities anyway and someone was killed.
CARLUCCI: Leonard was helpful and of course Don Rumsfeld was helpful when he went back to the White House. There were others. Bob Finch was in the White House. He tried to be helpful but he didn't carry a lot of weight. I developed working relationships with people like Ken Cole and to some extent with John Ehrlichman.

Q: What about Congress? Did you have both friends and enemies in Congress or was it more a matter between you and the White House?

CARLUCCI: No, the people who were sympathetic to the program tended to be on the liberal side. The one I worked with most on Legal Services was Fritz Mondale and he and I became—I don't want to say friends, but we certainly grew I think to respect each other and have been associates every since then.

Q: He was at that time a senator from Minnesota, later Vice President.

CARLUCCI: Alan Cranston was on my committee, too. Teddy Kennedy was but he tended to be a little more confrontational. I could work behind the scenes with Mondale and to some extent with Alan Cranston but it was harder working with Kennedy. On the Republican side, the principal person I worked with was Jake Javits, who, of course, was brilliant and highly effective, but far too liberal for the White House's tastes.

Q: You mentioned that you got the Legal Services into a corporation. What was the rationale behind that and how did that work?

CARLUCCI: I think the Nixon administration finally concluded that Legal Services was too hot a potato for them to handle and they could be insulated if they created an independent Legal Services Corporation. I'm not sure where the idea arose. It was either John Mitchell or Don Rumsfeld who suggested it to me and I said that's a good idea and I'll do it. I think it came to me from Don. Don said that he'd talked to John Mitchell about it.

Q: Who was Attorney General at the time?

CARLUCCI: Yes, Mitchell was Attorney General at the time. John Mitchell and I had had a bit of a falling out. We had certainly differed on the handling of the Ronald Reagan problem and I had...

Q: This is grapes?

CARLUCCI: This is in California Rural Legal Assistance. I finally told John Mitchell I didn't work for him. I wasn't going to take his orders any more. If he wanted to talk to me, he had to go through Richard Nixon. I think John Mitchell discovered that the Legal Services Program was a bit of a third rail and that he was just as happy to get it out from under the administration. So that's how the
independent corporation was created.

Q: Were there any other particular issues with... You were at the Office of Economic Opportunity from when to when?

CARLUCCI: Oh it wasn't long. It was only about a year or a year and a half in 69 to 70 or 71. I basically had time to work through the CLRA issue, set up an Independent Legal Services Program, and to get a reasonable amount of funding to the Community Action Program. VISTA was then moved out and combined with the Peace Corps in something called ACTION. Joe Blanchard became the director of that. So all these things took place in a very short period of time. But I'd only been there about a year when George Shultz called me and asked me to come over to OMB.

Q: This is Office of Budget and Management, Management and Budget I mean. What was your impression of the inroads that were being made by Federal action dealing with poverty at that point and time?

CARLUCCI: My reaction was that some good was being done, no question. Whether it was cost effective was a very different issue. These programs tended to be very expensive. I think their major success was to provide upward mobility for the people who were poverty stricken and in the low income brackets. An awful lot of the leadership came up through these programs, including people who became subsequently members of Congress. I can remember one time I was testifying before the Congress and the questioning came down near the end and one of the more junior members said, "Mr. Carlucci, you may not remember me but I was Executive Director of the Community Action Agency in Dade County Florida. That was the agency you closed down." I found myself in some trouble right away. A number of political leaders did have their early years, their formative years, in the poverty program so I think in that sense it made a contribution. There was no question that Legal Services did bring about some changes in the way people were able to relate to government programs. On the other hand, did they go too far? Sure, they went too far on occasion. So all in all, I think it made a contribution. Did it eliminate poverty? Obviously not. Can it eliminate poverty? No, I don't think so. I think by far, the engine to eliminate poverty has to be our dynamic private sector. These programs can fulfill a niche, but it's very much the market that will determine the poverty level.

Q: You went to the Office of Management and Budget with George Shultz. You were there from when to when?

CARLUCCI: It would have been about '70 to '72.

Q: How did you know George Shultz?

CARLUCCI: Well he was Secretary of Labor when I first went into OEO. As
Director of Community Action, I related quite a bit to the Department of Labor because we originally had the Job Corps under us. That was moved over to Labor. So we had to handle it, I had a lot of dealings with the Department of Labor. We came to know both Larry Silberman and George Shultz.

Q: Did you have the feeling that you were known as a no-nonsense, non-political, Mr. Fix-it or somebody who could take care of things without getting too political about them?

CARLUCCI: Well, to answer that would be self-serving.

Q: Well, yes, but...

CARLUCCI: I think it speaks for itself that I was put in some very difficult situations. When George asked me to come over and be the number three person in OMB, he said I was going to replace Arnie Webber. Arnie Webber was a brilliant man and had a very tough style. And he said, "Frank, Arnie has more or less worn out his welcome and he's gone about as far as he can. We want somebody with a less confrontational style."

Q: So did you deliberately keep this in mind when you were doing this?

CARLUCCI: I just did what I thought I had to do. Certainly I've had the opportunity to work for a number of outstanding people like Rumsfeld, Shultz, Weinberger. All three of them sort of picked me up and moved me along in my career. Obviously I was able to contribute in some way.

Q: In this office, what was George Shultz's operation style would you say?

CARLUCCI: George was a very good manager. He tended to concentrate on policy. He delegated the budget to Cap Weinberger, the number two and he delegated the management to me, number three, but he was very interested in management of government. In fact, that's when OMB first developed a managerial role. They never had one up 'til then.

Q: Under George.

CARLUCCI: Uh huh. George would listen. He'd have faith in his subordinates. He was willing to delegate. He was willing to make hard decisions. Later on when I became National Security Advisor and George was Secretary of State, we'd differ on occasion. I think that George would get very stubborn or very morose, but he was always analytical. I think George liked to intellectualize a problem. He was tough. I don't mean in a mean spirited way. He would think through the issues before he'd make a decision. He'd never make snap judgements and he would listen to his subordinates. So he was a very good manager. I'm sure that your colleagues in the State Department found that to be
the case when he was Secretary of State; he was very good to work with.

Q: I never worked for him, but for the people I've interviewed, George Shultz really, when you add up all the pluses and minuses, I think comes out as the most effective Secretary of State we've had in the span since Marshall and Acheson.

CARLUCCI: Well, certainly the results speak for themselves. The way we were able to wind down the Cold War and pursue a strategy which was basically laid out by George about mid-term of the Reagan administration. He pursued it with dogged determination. Some of the rest of us had a role to play. But I'll give to George the credit for the strategic rationale of the whole thing.

Q: What was your... You said you had the management portfolio from about '70 to '72. Where did you see your priorities and problems that you...?
CARLUCCI: Well, you had crises. We had a place like the Office of Minority Business Enterprise in the Department of Commerce that was chaotic. I had to send my own team in to run it. I remember my first assignment was - I think I'd been in the job one day and John Ehrlichman called me after his morning staff meeting and said, "Frank, I want you to go over and tell John Mitchell he doesn't know how to manage worth a damn and the President is very dissatisfied with the way he is running his department."

So I screwed up my courage and went over and gave that message, in slightly more diplomatic terms, to John Mitchell. He took it with humor and some grace. My job was to see that the departments were well run. We put in various systems to try and do that. Management by Objective systems, which I would say were marginally effective, but they were carried on into the Ford Administration under my successor, Fred Malek, who I think made them far more effective.

Q: Did you see the OMB being maybe overly intrusive into policy operations? Running things well is one thing, but that can get into the programs and what you're trying to accomplish.
CARLUCCI: On the managerial side we didn't see OMB being intrusive enough. We felt the Federal Government was abysmally run because it should be far more efficient and the people should pay far more attention to good management practices. They needed to have objectives that were consistent with the President's objectives and that wasn't always the case. So OMB needed to crack the whip. The policy on the budget issues automatically (I later moved over the budget side,) carried over into policy issues. OMB is in fact the President's policy making instrument - that and the Domestic and National Security Councils. The agencies do not have independent policy making responsibility. The President is the policy maker. The agencies are the implementers. The Cabinet as a group can have an input into policy. I differ very strongly with the theory which a lot of people hold that agencies should be independent policy makers or advocates of their constituents. I don't think they should do either. They should be agents of
the President since the President after all is the only one who is elected.

Q: **Looking at the various government departments during this period, where were the better and worse elements would you say?**

CARLUCCI: Well, it's hard to say. The Defense Department was an entity all to itself. You had to deal separately with the Defense Department. The OMB couldn't treat Defense as it treated any other agency. It was just too big and we had to have a different budget process with Defense than with the other agencies. State Department certainly wasn't looked upon as a very good manager, small department in terms of the budget, but in terms of management, not very well run. Elliott Richardson tried to do some good things over at HEW. He was the first one to put in some real management systems, but that was a big sprawling department. Earl Butz was Secretary of Agriculture. He was probably one of the most cooperative in dealing with the budget issues. Interior is a relatively small department. George Romney was at HUD [Housing and Urban Development]. He was a wonderful man. He was not known as a strong manager. It is very hard to find an agency that you could argue was very well run. I think that's changed now. I think there are some agencies - FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] I think is pretty well run now. I think Defense is now working on it's management systems a lot harder than it was in its earlier days. I don't think there's anybody that can claim the federal government is well-run.

Q: **I think we better stop at this point here. I'll just put at the end of the tape we're talking at your time at the Office of Management and Budget. We've talked about how your general impression of how George Shultz ran things and which departments were in relative terms were better run during the '70-'72 period. Next time we might pick up on some of the crises and problems you were picking up and we've just started to talk about when you were on the managerial side. We'll pick up when you were on the budget side.***

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**Today is the 20th of January 1998. Frank, we're moving to what did you do on the budget side of Office of Management?**

CARLUCCI: Well, I replaced Cap Weinberger when Cap became Director of OMB replacing George Shultz who had moved to the Secretary of the Treasury. In those days, the Director of OMB spent a lot of time as an advisor to the President. The responsibility for putting the budget together was left to the Deputy Director. So Cap before me, and I when I moved into the job, had the basic responsibility of putting the federal budget together.

Q: **The budget you would have been working on would have been the what '93, the '92 budget?**

CARLUCCI: Oh, no. This was…
Q: I mean '70...You were there '71 or '72?

CARLUCCI: Well, it would have been the '73 - '74 budget because you are working a couple years ahead.

Q: How was the process in those days as far as the discipline of bringing it up? Was there battles royal or...?

CARLUCCI: Well, there are always struggles. We in that budget, I think it was the '74 budget, decided to try and phase out 125 programs. This is always bad news for the Cabinet secretaries. Only one, Elliott Richardson, appealed to the President. Others I can remember dealing with, Earl Butz, and telling him I was going to hit, I think it was the Farmers Home Administration...

Q: He was Secretary of Agriculture?

CARLUCCI: He was Secretary of Agriculture. He said, "Well Frank, I will take my medicine as long as you promise me you are going to hit other departments as well."

I said, "Earl, I will." So he marched off and sort of led the parade of people who said they would take their medicine. It was a very tough budget. In those days, Congress was a big spender. If my memory serves me correctly, of the 125 programs, we were able to phase out only one. I think it was an Arctic Research Center. The rest of them if anything grew. Those were the days of entitlements. It was also the days when we used the technique of impounding money.

Q: Could you explain what impounding money meant?

CARLUCCI: Even if the Congress had voted, we decided the Executive would not spend it. A line item veto if you will. After we lost 30 straight court cases, we decided that strategy wasn't working very well. This led to the Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, which in essence forced the executive to spend all the money Congress appropriated or ask for recessions.

Q: How did you find your relations with Congress when you were going after these? Did you maintain cordial relations while going after these pet cows.

CARLUCCI: It was difficult, although there wasn't a requirement to testify on the hill because the agency heads did that. The director of OMB handled the initial budget presentation press conference but then it was the responsibility of the different Cabinet secretaries to defend the President's budget. So you didn't have to spend a lot of time testifying but you certainly had to spend a lot of time in interagency struggles. Individual congressmen would call you and exert a certain amount of pressure. Generally, the Congress exerts the pressure on the
Cabinet departments because they have direct responsibility over those departments and they know are going to be more responsive than OMB. OMB is a tough nut for anybody to crack.

Q: I don't like ranking systems, but in general, could you - which of the various departments were the more difficult budgets for you all to try to get some handle on?

CARLUCCI: Well, the Defense budget was always treated separately. With the other budgets, the departments submitted a budget, OMB reviewed it and gave [it] back to the department as a budgetary target. In the case of Defense which was so large and complex, there was really a concurrent review. I don't know how it's handled today but that continued even when I was Secretary of Defense. Which meant that the OMB people sat in on the Defense Department’s own deliberations so when the budget reached OMB it was essentially a joint budget. I would say that process worked fairly well. The hardest budget probably to deal with, I would think, was the HEW where you had all the social programs, the entitlement programs, the congressional favorites. HUD to some extent was the same. The programs where you had entrenched constituencies were the most difficult to deal with.

Q: Did you find that the retired community was much of a factor? Now it's become a huge factor, but in those days was the retirement community something you worried about?

CARLUCCI: Well, at the time we were in OMB, the Congress passed something called HR 1 which greatly expanded the social security system and disability payments. We had opposed that but the President decided to sign it over OMB's objections. That created a very large entitlement program, specifically the SSI Program.

Q: SSI?

CARLUCCI: Supplemental Security Income Program. That started us down the path. I don't want to get ahead of your story but then Cap and I went over to HEW and had to defend the budget we had to put in. The Congress accused us being insensitive and bad advocates. We tried to phase out such things as the Hill-Burton Hospital Program, reduce the grants for medical students, on the grounds that we were over supplied with hospitals and over supplied with medical specialists. I think history has proved us to be correct.

Q: What about the veterans' lobby, particularly veterans' hospitals? Was this a particularly difficult thing to deal with?

CARLUCCI: It was a very strong lobby. There's no question. The VA [Veteran’s Affairs] is a very large organization. Most people don't realize it. I think all of these groups were difficult to deal with. They all had their vested
interests. They all pressed very hard. To a great extent, your ability to manage
the process depended on your relationship with the Cabinet secretaries. If they
were responsive and the secretaries that we had—Veterans Administration was not
a Cabinet department at the time—the people we had to deal with I thought played
the game fairly straight.

Q: We've touched on this before, but did you sense at this time, when Nixon was
still the President, a continuing commitment to social programs on the part of the
President as opposed to his general persona which was supposed to be Mr.
Conservative but yet he was really...?

CARLUCCI: He had a commitment to certain kinds of programs. He had a
commitment to revenue sharing. He certainly had no commitment toward some
of the more traditional social services approaches. Even though we had put the
budget together, we really only had one session with the President. We flew up to
Camp David. Cap Weinberger, me, George Shultz, John Ehrlichman, Bob
Haldeman, I think Ken Cole - I can't remember who else was there. We had a
session with the President where I basically presented the outline of the budget. I
was astounded when the discussion focused on a small agency, OEO, where I had
just come from, and the strength of the President's feeling that OEO had to be
phased out. “Change the name, phase it out, this ought to be easy to do.” I said,
"Mr. President, it's not going to be easy because we've changed OEO. It now has
the support of mayors and governors and they're going to object." That was
brushed aside and I was given instructions to eliminate OEO, which started a
whole different saga. I essentially messed that job up.

Q: Did you have a sense that President Nixon...He was renowned for having his
enemies list. Was OEO...

CARLUCCI: OEO was the enemy.

Q: I mean this was not a rational calculation. This was personal.

CARLUCCI: Here we were dealing with the space shuttle and all kinds of far
larger programs, and we devoted most of the time talking about OEO. I thought it
was out of proportion. There's no question there was a very strong emotional
feeling on the part of the President. He did not like the great society programs.

Q: While you are in a meeting like this were you picking up, because you're
going to get into it later on I guess, the chemistry between Weinberger and
Shultz? Was that apparent at that point?

CARLUCCI: That's always been a strained relationship. Yes, I got into the
chemistry between Weinberger and Shultz. I can remember one time in George
Shultz's office when they were arguing, I intervened and said, "Come on; can't
you two guys just cool it for a minute?" I think George Shultz put it rather well
when he said that Cap is a position taker and I like to analyze a problem from all angles. Cap did tend to take positions very quickly and defend them as an advocate, as a lawyer, which he is, whereas George was far more analytical and took more time to reach his position but was equally stubborn. So once the two of them dug in - Cap would dig in right away, George would dig in a little later - it was a rock against a hard place. Very difficult to move either of them. When I later became National Security Advisor, the invitation was offered [to me] in a secret meeting with President Reagan - Don Regan was the only other person present. When the President asked me if I'd take the job, I sort of expected that he might say well you've got a Foreign Affairs background or you've done this or that, or you're reasonable competent or something like that. What he said was, "You're the only person I can find that George Shultz and Cap Weinberger can agree on." I spent a large part of my time mediating between George and Cap. That being said, while they frequently argued, they both had a lot of respect for each other and I have enormous respect for both of them.

Q: Well there to, they are not lightweights in the intellectual field at all. They are very big heavyweights. So it's not just a personality thing. It's where they're coming from. With the OEO were you able to make any-

CARLUCCI: They didn't do that. They trusted me. I proceeded to do my thing. I decided first of all that we needed to get a new director for OEO. The then director, Phil Sanchez, who I had brought in, was a lovely man but he was certainly not the one to phase out the agency. He was a supporter. My first move was to get him named ambassador. I think it was to Nicaragua.

Q: In those days a pleasant place to go.

CARLUCCI: That created an opening. I needed to find a new Director. I got a recommendation from Don Rumsfeld and I called the man in. He was a lawyer, a very able guy who served a little time in OEO. I told him what the mission was and he almost literally turned green in my office and said, "I don't want to touch that at all."

I thought to myself who in the world am I going to get to come in and just phase out an agency. Nobody is going to want to do that. Then I made a mistake. I thought of Howard Phillips who had been an assistant to me when I was director of OEO and had, as everybody knows, very far right leanings. Howard is still active politically today, very much on the right. I called Howard in and asked him if he would be interested and he leapt at the opportunity. I said, "Howard, let me give you two words of advice. Declare it a victory. Don't declare it a failure. Secondly don't take on the Legal Services Program." Howard did not pay any
attention to that advice and a big mess ensued at OEO. The constituency rose up in arms, the press attacked and the administration [blanched. Eventually, it was phased out or phased into HEW, part of it, but it was done in a very… it was mangled. In the end we had to move Howard Phillips out and bring in Dwight Ink who was a very experienced bureaucratic administrator, even-tempered person, well known in administration circles. Dwight calmed things down and eventually it turned out all right. But I regret the misery I put a lot of people through.

Q: In a way, this is sort of a lesson that somebody with rather extreme views dealing with a bureaucracy doesn't work very well.

CARLUCCI: It certainly didn't in this case.

Q: Revenue sharing. Here you are as part of a bureaucracy, federal bureaucracy, revenue sharing means you going to pass money that had control over down to the states. I would think just looking at a bureaucracy as such, there would be a great deal of reluctance on the part of letting those people out beyond the...

CARLUCCI: There was. But everybody knew that the President was very committed to revenue sharing. In fact, if you look at the Nixon administration's record of domestic programs, you had revenue sharing; you had the development of a national health insurance proposal; you had development of a welfare reform proposal. It was quite a progressive record devoting resources and energy to the social services. Revenue sharing was very simple. It just had to be developed by OMB and put into the system, you put in a given amount of money and it was automatic.

Q: What was your experience looking at it from when you started this and when you went to look at this later from different perspectives. How did revenue sharing work?

CARLUCCI: The idea of course was that you give more responsibility to the states. I think in concept it was a good idea. On the other hand, the states were not known for managing their resources that well. Of course, neither was the federal government. The question of who is the least inefficient is one way of putting it. I think there's no question that we had centralized too much spending authority in the federal government. The federal government was into all kinds of areas that could be better handled by government closer to the people. We needed to push things down. When I got over to HEW, I tried to decentralize HEW at least put the authority in the hands of the regional directors and allow some co-mingling of funds. I'd visit a welfare family and find that they were receiving funds from 15 different programs, all with their own set of rules and regulations and all with their own social workers. Well that was not only wasteful, it was confusing. So I advocated something called the Allied Services Act which would
allow funds to be transferred from one program to another by people on the ground. That was soundly rejected in Congress.

Q: What was the problem?

CARLUCCI: The Congress wanted to control the expenditure of funds. Very simple. They wanted to decide the kinds of grants schools would get from Washington and not have them in the hands of some local administrator.

Q: OMB is really a very small organization compared to this...

CARLUCCI: I think it was about 600 people.

Q: Were you able to set up something to monitor the revenue sharing was going or was it basically turning it over?

CARLUCCI: It was too early in the process for us to have any kind of effective evaluation. So no, we didn't try.

Q: You moved out of OMB to HEW. When did you go there?

CARLUCCI: You may recall when Nixon was reelected he called his entire Cabinet in and fired them.

Q: December of '72 I guess.

CARLUCCI: People were looking for other opportunities. I can recall somebody, perhaps whether it was Bill Rogers, talked to me about becoming Under Secretary of State for Administration. I was contemplating that when the President called Cap Weinberger and asked him to be Secretary of HEW. Cap then asked me if I'd go with him as his Under Secretary - number two person. In those days, it was called Under Secretary. You may recall that those were the days when John Ehrlichman came up with the idea of Counselors to the President. Certain Cabinet departments were more important than others and their secretaries would be a counselor to the President. Departments were to be clustered. So Cap started off as the head of the Human Services Cluster as a counselor to the President, which meant that de facto at the outset I was running HEW. That system broke down and Cap then came over to HEW as opposed to staying in the White House and we worked together as a team. I'd like to think it was an effective team.

Q: What was the word in the corridors of government of why President Nixon fired everybody and wanted to start again? Was it just unhappiness or just...?

CARLUCCI: I can't recall what the speculation was. My own view is that it was a fairly typical Nixon move. He liked to startle people. He liked to shake things
up. He liked to be dramatic. He liked to be tough. It fulfilled all those requirements.

Q: You were at HEW until you went to Portugal.

CARLUCCI: Right.

Q: So this would be what ’73 to ...?

CARLUCCI: I went to Portugal in January of ’75 so in the ’73 and ’74 area.

Q: To be number two in HEW is sort of an awesome task. It's such a huge sprawling organization.

CARLUCCI: It was.

Q: Could you give me a little tour of the horizon as you saw it when you arrived. Where were the places you could almost leave alone and where were the problems as far as the responsibility of HEW. This would be ’73.

CARLUCCI: The biggest initial job was implementing the SSI Program that I mentioned earlier. That required all kinds of determinations on who was eligible for benefits and who was not.

Q: This was basically a type of welfare isn't it? I mean, we'd call it welfare?

CARLUCCI: Yes. For the disabled. We had a lot of requirements in the social services area. Once again, we were trying to bring the programs together because we had such diversity. I can't remember how many programs HEW administered. Well over 100 and each with their own requirements and laws. In the education area we had to deal with the higher education amendments which I basically took on and negotiated with the Congress. I brought about some, I felt, constructive changes in higher education. In the health area our major effort was to get some focus into the health activities of HEW. Once again, we were all over the lot. I succeeded in combining the job of Surgeon General with the job of Assistant Secretary for Health. We put first of all, Dr. Edwards, Charlie Edwards, in the job and then he was succeeded by Dr. Ted Cooper, a marvelous man who later became CEO [chief executive officer] of Upjohn. We were able to bring the health activities under one roof. We of course had the FDA [Food and Drug Administration]; and we had Virginia Knauer, Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs. We had a very large Consumer Affairs office, almost as large as the State Department; a lot of the health activities overseas. Then you had civil rights. We had Title Nine passed at the time and we had to develop regulations for it. We were still implementing Title Six at the universities, a very controversial area. There was a lot to do.
Q: Title Six?
CARLUCCI: Civil Rights Act.

Q: Civil Rights Act. What was the status as far as it impacted on your work of the Civil Rights community? What were your major problems-issues?

CARLUCCI: The Civil Rights community was of course pushing very hard for rigid goals and timetables or quotas. Most of our focus was on the universities that received federal money and obliging the universities to come up with goals and timetables. We took the goals and timetables approach as opposed to the quotas approach although one could argue whether that's a distinction without a difference. Most of the flack came from the other side. The university administrators would claim we were distorting the educational process, that we were degrading education by moving too fast. It was always a balance between satisfying the needs of the law and the civil rights and at the same time making sure that we didn't go the way of reverse discrimination. We had the DeFunis case at the time.

Q: The [Marco] DeFunis case was what?

CARLUCCI: Reverse discrimination case where an [applicant to the University of Washington law school] sued for reverse discrimination and, I believe, got some redress. [The lower court ordered him admitted] My memory is a little hazy on it. [On appeal, the case went all the way to the Supreme Court, which said in April 1974 that since DeFunis was close to graduation the case was moot]

Q: Was it that the idea of higher education was essentially to open up the educational process to more minorities, particularly blacks - African Americans?

CARLUCCI: That was the idea and it was to be done by statistical analysis at the universities to make sure something was happening. That's entirely appropriate because there was no question there was a lot of discrimination. We worked hard to eliminate that discrimination but it was necessary to strike a balance.

Q: Was there a regional dividing line as far as compliance or was this pretty much across the board?

CARLUCCI: Across the board.

Q: Across the board. What was the problem? It was just that the universities weren't reaching out more or...?

CARLUCCI: That's right. In some cases there was certainly discrimination. Something needed to be done. No question. It was a question of how fast we could do it without major disruption to our educational system.
Q: How did Congress see this issue? They had passed the law but it once you get into implementation it does not always sit too well.

CARLUCCI: The Congress was basically on the liberal side. They kept pushing us to move faster on imposing goals and timetables on universities.

Q: How did you find the more prestigious universities—the California system, the Ivy League, Chicago and some of that? Were they ahead of the game, behind or were they...

CARLUCCI: Well, it's a little hard. So many years have passed for me to recall individual cases. My general recollection was that you couldn't…that there were faults in almost every system—all the universities. But our focus was mainly on the Southern universities. There's no question that- (end of tape)

Q: Did Cap Weinberger have any particular areas where he focused on and left you of the various things like education, health...

CARLUCCI: He focused a lot on the National Health Insurance Proposal. He became very deeply involved in that. He also focused a lot on the Welfare Reform Proposal.

We used the Milton Friedman model, essentially a negative income tax with a work requirement. The secretary should focus on the big issues and leave the day to day management to the deputy secretary. But sometimes he would get involved in some of the details. It was inevitable. I can recount a rather humorous story. Head Start was a federally funded program for preschool schooling for children. It's generally regarded as a successfully program, very much the favorite of the local communities. Very much the favorite of the Congress. My staff came to me one day and said they had a very good program in Georgia but the program had just been vetoed by then Governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, on the grounds that it's planning districts did not conform to the state's planning districts. They said, "We have to get the Secretary to override the governor's veto." The Secretary had the authority to override a governor's veto.

I said, "Well have you tried to negotiate it?"

They said, "Yes. It's hopeless the governor won't back down so you need to get the Secretary to override."

So I went in to see Cap who had come from state government. He said, "Oh, I don't want to override the governor's veto."

So I went back and told the staff he would not do it. Well, they came back when the deadline was nearing and appealed to me once again. So I said, “Alright, I'll go back and see Cap. I went back into see Cap and Cap said, "Let's call the governor." So Cap and I got on the phone with Jimmy Carter and tried to persuade him that the veto would be damaging to a very good program,
essentially minority children, and that surely he didn't want the program to be damaged. He said no, he didn't want the program to be damaged but he had to have his state planning districts conform. With that, we hung up and I said to Cap, "Cap, look, this is an important program. We can't let it go down the drain. Jimmy Carter is a lame duck governor. You'll never hear from him again. You ought to override the veto." With that, Cap overrode the veto.

Q: On the health side, was there any type of consensus about what there should be... I assume that everyone even in those days was looking at various systems throughout the world as far as general-health delivery?

CARLUCCI: We started the experiment with HMOs [health maintenance organizations]. In fact, I think I was the first person to testify on HMOs, so we did do some innovative things. I think Elliott Richardson actually developed the concept and we picked it up.

Q: Was there a feeling by the people who were looking at it without political concerns that a national health program-a basic one-would be feasible or not?

CARLUCCI: Oh yes. We developed one. It became the victim of Fanny Fox.

Q: Could you explain who Fanny Fox was and how that happened?

CARLUCCI: Well, actually Nixon approved the program. It was essentially a national program based on private health insurance. It was greeted with some enthusiasm in the Congress. Senator Kennedy supported it. Wilbur Mills supported it.

Q: Could you explain who Wilbur Mills is?

CARLUCCI: Wilbur Mills was Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, a very powerful man in Congress at the time. There were a number of Republicans that supported it. With essentially a conservative administration, with some liberal support from the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, prospects looked pretty good. It was opposed by the AMA [American Medical Association] and my friend Joe Broyhill, who was the ranking Republican on Ways and Means at the time. He took the AMA position so the vote was very close in the committee. Well, something like two days before the vote, an episode occurred when Wilbur Mills [was revealed as escorting] Fanny Fox, a local stripper. Apparently she jumped into the Reflecting Pool, [bringing the couple to the attention of police] and that became a big scandal. Wilbur Mills overnight lost his authority in the committee and we lost by, I think, one or two votes. So the National Health Insurance Proposal become the victim of Fanny Fox.

Q: Such is Washington. Tell me, what was your impression of the power influence of the AMA, American Medical Association, in those days? It's now sort
of a shadow of itself.

CARLUCCI: In those days it was quite strong.

Q: '73-'74, Watergate was beginning to bubble. The power of President Nixon was beginning to be challenged on almost a personal basis. Did that intrude at all into your operations?

CARLUCCI: Oh, yes. Every time you'd testify, you'd get castigated by the Congress for being part of the Watergate administration. I can remember at one point, I think I was out in Aspen, it was the week the President had resigned. I called Cap - I was at the Aspen Institute. He and I discussed over the phone whether we should resign or try to maintain some stewardship of the programs. We had grown disenchanted as well. We decided that we would try and hang on a little bit longer. Well something like three or four days later Nixon resigned. So that solved the problem. It became... Sure, it was a burden to carry.

Q: Did it have any effect on programs? Did programs sort of stop-the development...?

CARLUCCI: Quite the opposite. The Congress was pushing to expand social programs. This made it easier for them to expand because they had all the cards.

Q: Did you take advantage of this?

CARLUCCI: No. We were opposed to the expansion of the programs. Remember, I told you we wanted to stop Hill-Burton.

Q: Hill-Burton being the...?

CARLUCCI: Hospital construction program. No question today we have too many hospitals as a result of Hill-Burton. Congress wouldn't allow us to phase it out and when you lost your political influence, it was harder to stop these kinds of programs. We tried to stop the growth of entitlements. We didn't like that concept. Now today everybody wants to undo entitlements and they don't know how to do it. But we didn't have the political clout to force our will on the Congress.

Q: You say you and Cap Weinberger were discussing resigning. Was this at a personal level?

CARLUCCI: Yes. I said to Cap, "This is getting pretty bad. I'm not comfortable. Should we resign?" I can't remember what he responded but after we talked it over, we decided no, it was probably best not to resign. We thought we'd wait a little longer to see what happened.

Q: We're really talking about what was this, September of '74, about that time
anyway. But it's August, September of '74 when Nixon resigned and Ford came in. How did that impact on what you all were doing?

CARLUCCI: Well, we both knew Jerry Ford quite well. We were very comfortable with President Ford. He quickly went around to all the Cabinet departments. He came over to HEW. Cap was away so I introduced him. Funny story, because the President was en route and I went into the bathroom in the office next to mine. I don't know why I used that one, but I couldn't get out. There I was, the acting secretary of HEW with the President on his way to HEW and I was pounding on the door of the bathroom trying to get out. Finally I got out. It was a moment of panic. I got down there just in time to greet the President. He came over and talked to the employees and was very reassuring. Jerry Ford was able to pick up immediately because he knew the federal budget very well. He is greatly underrated president. He understood all the HEW programs. When you wanted to appeal your budget mark, you would sit down directly with Jerry Ford and he without notes or assistants would talk about what the program ought to be. He moved in without missing a beat as far as we were concerned.

Q: When you were working on trying to slow down or stop entitlements and also expansion of hospitals and other things like this, was Ford on the same wavelength?

CARLUCCI: Oh, yes.

Q: Did he have any different thrust that would impact on…?

CARLUCCI: No. He was very supportive of what we were doing. We didn't have to change direction at all.

Q: Then we come to the time in early '75 when you were off to Portugal which we have already discussed. Was there anything else during this HEW time you think we might want to cover.

CARLUCCI: Oh, there was one other thing I spent a lot of time on. I was particularly proud of the results. This will sound a little bit strange coming from someone who just espoused deregulation and decentralization. When I got into HEW I found one thing that I considered absolutely shocking and intolerable. That was the situation in the nursing home industry. People lying in their own excrement. A lot of the nursing homes were fire traps. Fire codes were not being enforced. Regulations were not being enforced. So I took that on as a personal project. I appointed a person as my personal assistant for nursing homes. We cracked down very hard. We cut off funding to the nursing homes that did not live up to sanitary and fire regulations and we put pressure on the states. The most difficult state was my own state, Pennsylvania where the governor refused to move on the nursing home industry, Governor Shapp. I went up and tried to work with him and ended up I guess fighting with him. I finally ended up suing him.
We managed to move the state of Pennsylvania by going through the courts. But I spent a lot of time on nursing homes. When I left HEW, the nursing home industry presented me with an award for all that I had done to upgrade the standards of the nursing homes. Actually, the industry liked it because they didn't want these bad actions putting a stain on their good name and reputation.

Q: What brought your attention to the nursing homes?

CARLUCCI: Oh, just the stories of the kinds of things that were going on. I just said this was not tolerable.

Q: What was the government role in the nursing...?

CARLUCCI: The nursing homes received Medicare and Medicaid payments. We cut off the funding in essence. They were heavily dependent on Medicare and Medicaid.

Q: Why was the Governor of Pennsylvania, and I assume others, opposing you in it?

CARLUCCI: I suppose it would have meant putting some resources in that area, taking on entrenched lobbies - the nursing home lobby of the individual states. The nursing home owners sometimes carried a lot of political clout. I can't really speculate much further on his motive. All I know is that he was very difficult.

Q: Jumping way ahead, you left Portugal in '78 was it?

CARLUCCI: Yes.

Q: In '78 what did you do?

CARLUCCI: I came back as deputy director of Central Intelligence. There was a little episode prior to that. You may recall that Dick Moose was under secretary of State for Administration...

Q: This is the Carter administration.

CARLUCCI: Carter administration. He called me while I was in Portugal. He had talked to Cyrus Vance and Cy Vance would like to have me replace him, because Dick was going to become Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Would I please do that? I said, "Dick, with all due respect, I think you're out of your mind because I came out of a Republican administration. That's a job that brings forth the nominations for ambassador. The White House and Congress aren't going to want a Republican in that job."

He said, "No, no. Cy Vance thinks very highly of you."
I said, "Well, okay, but before you do that, go any further, you've got to go over and make sure the President is comfortable." I obviously knew the President from his days as governor.

Dick called me back and said, "Oh, Ham Jordan talked to the President and Ham tells us the President likes you and would be very comfortable with you in the job."

I said, "Dick, I still think you are going to have problems."

Dick called me-nothing out for about two weeks-and Dick called me. He said, "Frank do you know John Brademus?"

I said, "Yes, I know John Brademus quite well. I've dealt with him extensively and he's going to oppose me, Dick."

And he said, "Yes."

Q: Can you explain who John Brademus...?

CARLUCCI: John Brademus was one of the senior democrats in the Congress. A former Rhodes scholar, very bright man, very able man, but highly partisan. John and I are friends to this day. He talked to me about it afterwards. He said, "I hope you understand what my position was..."

I said, "I understood what you position was-a partisan position and you're perfectly justified."

So I said, "Dick, I think ought to better drop this." He dropped it at that point. A little while later another phone call came. I can't remember who it was, I think it was David Aaron or Zbigniew Brzezinski asking me about the Central Intelligence job. To this day I don't know how that came about, but eventually I ended up in the Central Intelligence Agency.

Q: You were there from '78 until when?

CARLUCCI: 'Til the Reagan administration came in, which was what January... Q: '81.

CARLUCCI: ...of 81.

Q: What-again this is obviously an unclassified interview-but what does the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence...What was your major concern?

CARLUCCI: Stan and I worked out an arrangement...
Q: Could you explain who Stan...?

CARLUCCI: Stan Turner.

Q: Yes.

CARLUCCI: Stan Turner was the DCI [Deputy Chief of Intelligence]. I came back and visited him and he wanted to divide the intelligence operation into different groups. I would run some groups and he would run others. I told him I wasn't comfortable with that. That I'd been used to working across the board and that it seemed to me more appropriate if he would focus on the intelligence community activities and I would handle the day-to-day management of the CIA. He accepted that. That's essentially the relationship that we used and I think it worked very well.

Q: Did you find yourself in almost a strange culture or was it one that you were comfortable with?

CARLUCCI: I was very comfortable with it. I had worked with the agency throughout my Foreign Service career. I was known as someone who was able to work with the agency and I had a very good understanding of their activities on the ground. I saw no conflict between the State Department and the CIA although I spent a large portion of my time trying to prove that I was right. Dave Newsom and I tried all kinds of things to build bridges between the State Department and the CIA including starting courses for ambassadors and [senior] CIA [officers] given at a CIA site.

Q: This was sort of height of the Cold War, one of the heights. Did you see a different perspective of the Soviet threat from the CIA viewpoint as opposed to what you had been used to in State?

CARLUCCI: I had come in direct contact with the Soviet threat in Portugal. The communists put out a book called Dossier Carlucci's CIA. It was about an inch thick. It had me doing everything from assassinating Moro the Italian prime minister to killing Lumumba, to instigating the counter revolution in Brazil. They had me responsible for everything.

Q: Quite flattering.

CARLUCCI: So I was very familiar with the kind of tactics they used. I did not have an in depth knowledge of the Soviet military establishment but that came very quickly. I certainly had no illusions on their system or what they were up to or what their goals were.

Q: Because it became a matter of some controversy eight or nine years later,
particularly the Soviet economic system, were you getting any indications there that this was probably the weakest part of the Soviet...?

CARLUCCI: Bob Gates goes into this quite a bit in his book. There were some papers that said the system may not be as strong as we think it is. I have to say, at least speaking for myself, I was very much focused on military might and it did not occur to me, to be honest, there would be total economic collapse.

Q: How was the estimate of Soviet military capabilities?

CARLUCCI: The military. In retrospect, I think our judgements on the size and capabilities of the military were quite accurate. What we did not anticipate was the economic weaknesses that would lead to the collapse.

Q: Did you find the intelligence community and the State Department analyses coming into conflict in various areas or not?

CARLUCCI: No. We worked pretty closely with INR. State participated in all the analyses. Sure there were differences, but there were differences with Defense, differences with NSA [National Security Agency]. We'd work those differences out. The problems would arise where you had an ambassador who didn't trust the Agency, took almost a punitive attitude toward the agency, or wanted to see everything the agency did, to know all their contacts. Some didn't want them doing any kind of activity. It was well known that the ambassador to Iran prohibited the Agency from establishing any contact with the opposition when the Shah was in power. Usually Dave Newsom and I were able to work these things out.

Q: David Newsom being the...?

CARLUCCI: Under Secretary of State. A fine man and a long-time friend of mine. He and I served together in the African Bureau.

Q: We have an oral history with him, too. I was reading this book The Line of Fire by Admiral Crowe on his time in the Defense Department. He was saying that sometimes the intelligence agencies, including the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] tended to come up with the worst case scenarios to cover themselves if anything happened. He found this was difficult to deal with because particularly Congress and others would focus on a worst case scenario and therefore we would tend to take extreme positions. Was this a problem of moderating how the intelligence agencies...?

CARLUCCI: I think Bill's got a point. I'll give you a concrete example of that. When I was National Security Advisor, we had the Kuwaiti Reflagging Operation. The Iranians were harassing shipping with the Boston Whalers and the Boghammers [i.e., small boats]. We had ships over there to protect U.S. flag
vessels. The agency produced a report which essentially said that no military confrontation with Iran would work. They will just escalate their terrorist activities, their harassment activities. Every time you take a step, they'll take a counter step. That report hit the Hill even before the administration had a chance to look at it. It really said the administration policies were all wrong. You should stop the reflagging operation. In the last analysis, the policies worked. The Iranians provoked us and we sank half their Navy in 24 hours. They went back and put their ships in the harbor so we were able to sail with impunity in the Gulf. The CIA analysis in my judgement, in retrospect, was wrong. But it was as you say, the worst case scenario.

Q: Well, looking at it almost bureaucratically, if things work out all right who cares, if things work out wrong, you can say I told you so. This is the time of Camp David and openings with the Israeli-Arab situation was looking a little better particularly between Egypt and all. Did you find that there were inhibitions or problems in dealing with this because of restrictions on the government for dealing with Europe components? Was this a concern?

CARLUCCI: Not from a CIA point of view. We had cooperative relationships with intelligence services in Israel and of course in the Arab world. We were able to conduct our normal activities without any particular problems. The saddest moment of my tenure with the CIA was when the embassy in Beirut was blown up. One of our very finest analysts, Bob Ames, was blown up with it. He was a pillar of strength in analyzing Middle East developments, respected throughout the government.

Q: What about cooperation with France? Did you find a problem there or not or was this...?

CARLUCCI: [Alexandre] De Marenches was the head of French intelligence. He was a very colorful character. He would come over and we had a cordial relationship but we were never sure what they were doing. The relationships were good. Later when I was in DOD, we had pretty good working relationships in the procurement area and certain other areas. I personally didn't have a lot of frustration dealing with the French. They are different. There's no question. We got what we needed.

Q: What about our activities in Africa? I mean, you were in Africa and in a way it looks like almost an impossible thing to focus an intelligence agency on, almost chaotic.

CARLUCCI: We had listening posts in most of the countries in Africa and we got a lot information. Africa's problem was that it was not on the front burner as far as the policy makers were concerned. We could produce the intelligence, but nobody wanted to pay attention to Africa. There were a lot of other areas. We
were very much focused on the Soviet Union. One of the main purposes of having people in stations in Africa was to try and recruit the Soviets who were stationed there. That was the number one priority. That's all changed now. I can't remember what proportion of our resources went to the hard target, but it was a lot. These were also the days when we were trying to cope with the impact of the Freedom of Information Act on the intelligence agencies. I remember we got a Freedom of Information request from the Czech or Polish embassy. We were obliged by law to respond to it. So there were a lot of silly things...

Q: Were you comfortable with the efforts to recruit agents? Because one of the complaints I get from my Foreign Service interviews is that they would say, I knew so and so in such and such government and we'd have lunch together and I'd find out things and then I'd find out later on that he was also getting paid by the CIA and they were paying for information that I was getting for a lunch. This may sound facetious but was this a problem or something you were looking at, almost over recruitment?

CARLUCCI: There were those kinds of complaints that came up from time to time from Ambassadors but there was no way you could manage that from Washington. That had to be the responsibility of Ambassador and a Station Chief. I can remember in my own Foreign Service career I had a very valuable contact. I thought to myself the CIA can handle this contact better than I can. I turned him over to CIA with the understanding they'd show me all the reports they were sending. That worked pretty well.

Q: Were you sensing a generational change in the CIA because so many came out of the OSS [Office of Strategic Services] and - very operational, going out and jumping into Burma and doing nasty things to the Japanese and all. As much as this daring-do spirit permeated, it is my understanding, still permeated within the CIA. Was this beginning to dissipate? Maybe I'm over characterizing it, too?

CARLUCCI: There's no question the culture was changing. They were traditionalists. The OSS types were fading out. Stan Turner, as you know, was very much a non-traditionalist. He liked to dive down and pull up the young people and make their voices heard. So we did shake the place up. We said this is not going to be four different agencies. It's going to be one agency. We're going to move people between the different parts of the organization. We're going to bring about closer relationships between the clandestine service and the analytical side. So I think we began to change the culture considerably.

Q: Next time we'll just finish up this period in '81 when you left the CIA, but one question I would like to ask and that was during the time you were there about the role of the agency that you can talk about in the rapidly developing things in Central America at that time and we can pick that up. Well, we can do that now, yes.
CARLUCCI: Well, the agency essentially supported policy. There is this tendency to think the agency creates policy. I can remember being on Portuguese TV one time trying to persuade people that it was not a policy organization. There were a number of covert action programs in Central America that were started in the Carter administration. The Carter administration came in criticizing covert action programs. It availed itself frequently of covert action programs.

Q: Attorney General.

CARLUCCI: Attorney General Griffin Bell. Marvelous man. We'd go over the programs thoroughly so everything was consistent with policy. No rogue activity though.

Q: Frank, we'll pick this up in '81- you left and went into private business for a while. I'd like to cover a bit of that talking about your feeling about Americans in the early '80s dealing abroad.

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Today is the 15th of May, the Ides of May. Frank, could you talk about in '81 where you went and what type of work you were doing and why?

CARLUCCI: Well, I was financially a bit strapped so I had to leave DOD. I think we covered that in the last session. And as I looked around for interesting things to do, I talked to a number of people. As you know it's not easy to make the transition from government to business and one of the more attractive opportunities seemed to be a startup venture that Sears Roebuck was involved in called Sears World Trade. Rod Hills was the CEO designate for Sears World Trade. He talked to me. I think I was suggested to him by Don Rumsfeld who was on the board of Sears. We had a very interesting conversation about starting a trading company as one of the Sears Roebuck principal subsidiaries. Ed Telling was the CEO of Sears at the time-he had a strategic vision that was based on diversification-the purchase of Dean Witter, Allstate and Sears World Trade which would leverage off the buying power of Sears around the world. We got this company going with a lot of hope and promise.

Q: When you say trading, what do you mean?

CARLUCCI: Well, the exchange of goods for money. Part of the idea was that we could buy goods cheaper because Sears had buying power overseas and sell them in the United States and we could bundle exports from various U.S. companies and get economies of scale that way and export overseas. There were a couple of things wrong with that philosophy as it later turned out. One is that it was not easy to leverage off of Sears buying power because Sears was a great big bureaucracy and Sears buyers weren't particularly interested in Sears World Trade. It didn't help their bonus. We were never able to fully exploit the Sears
buying power. Secondly, on the exporting side, we ran headlong into a very strong dollar. Exports were pretty expensive. We made some mistakes on our own too. We created a large infrastructure before we had the business to support that infrastructure. We existed for a couple of years and never really got to the break even point but we were lost in the rounding for Sears Roebuck. We were never told that we had to break even at an early stage. We were told to build the business as we best saw fit. We had a number of units and probably employed, I'd say close to 75 or 80 people both in Chicago and here. We acquired a Dutch company called Hagenmeyer which was a good company but somewhat difficult to oversee. Dutch are great businessmen as you know but they aren't called stubborn for nothing. When the leadership of Sears changed and Ed Brennan took over from Ed Telling, he had a different strategic vision and he also had not had the same positive experience, at least he didn't think he had the same positive experience with Rod Hills and Sears World Trade that Telling had had. In the meantime of course, Rod Hills moved out. I think Telling describes in his book that it was Telling's suggestion that Rod move out. I became CEO. When Ed Brennan became CEO of Sears, it became pretty obvious to me that Sears World Trade days were numbered because Ed Brennan really wanted to go back to traditional merchandising. He was a second generation Sears person and very much oriented towards the domestic operations of Sears and not very interested in international activities. That's in fact what happened. He decided to fold up Sears World Trade. As coincidence would have it, that's about the same time I received a call from the White House which led to my becoming National Security Advisor.

Q: Looking at this trade side, because the series of interviews is pointed more at the Foreign Affairs side, two questions. One, did you find your experience as an Ambassador in the Foreign Service was helpful, and two, what was your impression at that time of American big business? Was it hard to get it to look at foreign trade as being important? Was the domestic market so all encompassing, at least for many, that this is where they were pointed?

CARLUCCI: Those are hard questions to answer. In terms of my Foreign Service experience, it was helpful in certain respects. In some countries, I managed to generate some business - in Portugal, for example. It gave you a certain amount of access. It's not terribly useful in giving you the analytical skills that you need in business-how to analyze a good acquisition or what the margins will be on a particular trading deal is not something that you learn in the Foreign Service. It takes time to acquire these skills. Even now, I'm a lot more sophisticated than I was, but I still have a lot of trouble keeping up with the young MBAs [master's degree in business administration] on such things as acquisitions and present values analyses, and those kinds of things - IRRs. It's helpful but it doesn't give you the full range of skills. In terms of attitudes towards international trade, international business, that varied enormously by company and still does, although increasingly companies are recognizing that they have to be global players. Sears Roebuck, as I mentioned, really didn't have any global
concept. Ed Telling had a global concept but when he left, nobody else picked it up. There are other companies that were quite interested in world trade. As time goes on, the number of companies that plan to go global of course has increased. It's a lot different today than it was then.

**Q:** You mentioned Portugal. What about Brazil? Brazil is a huge market. I also have the feeling it was not an easy market for Americans to get into or was it?

CARLUCCI: We did some things in Brazil. I remember going down there and working with them. We did some things in the rest of Latin America. I think we were involved in some coffee trades with Brazil at one point. We had some projects in the Amazon. I can't remember, it's been some time what the actual projects were. We were doing some things in Brazil. Most of our activities were in the Far East. We had some activities in Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, China importing from that area.

**Q:** You were called by the White House when?

CARLUCCI: It was probably late November or December of 1986. I think it was late November. It was a Monday at noon and on Sunday night I had received a call from a journalist friend of mine, Arnaud De Borchgrave saying, "Frank do you know anything about becoming National Security Advisor?" I said, "I don't know what you were talking about."

He said, "Well, I just heard it from a good source." Actually he'd heard it from Bill Casey. "The President is going to ask you to be National Security Advisor."

I said, "I don't know anything about it and I don't think I'd be particularly interested." I was having lunch the next day at The Willard. I got a call from Don Regan asking me if I could come in to the White House through the Treasury entrance through the basement so I would not be seen by the press. I went in to the basement and there was Don Regan and the President.

**Q:** Don Regan at that time being...?

CARLUCCI: Chief of Staff.

**Q:** Chief of Staff.

CARLUCCI: There were only three of us in the room. Ronald Reagan made his approach by saying, "I'd like you to be my National Security Advisor because you're the only person that George Shultz and Cap Weinberger can agree on." I wasn't sure if that was a very good qualification.

I responded by saying the he ought to understand there were at least two things that I disagreed with. I disagreed with some of the things that were almost done
at Reykjavik and I disagreed with Iran Contra. The President then went through the Iran Contra drill that everybody later became so familiar with where he starts out saying that it was not a swap - arms for hostages - and ends up convincing you that it was. Then I tried to describe to him what I felt were my strong points and my weak points so he would know what he was getting as a National Security Advisor. After weighing it, I think I went home and discussed it with my wife, I decided it was an obligation that I really should take on. I wasn't that keen to do it but it was just something that needed to be done, clearly. Besides, I needed a job!

Q: You mention Reykjavik. Could you explain Reykjavik and what almost happened that had you concerned?

CARLUCCI: That was the negotiation where Gorbachev caught the President by surprise and proposed the virtual elimination of nuclear weapons if the President would give up SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative, what the press liked to label Star Wars - a misnomer. At any rate, the administration came very close to agreeing to that but Ronald Reagan fortunately was unwilling to give up SDI. Obviously, this had a real traumatic effect in Europe. One of the ceaseless tasks that I had, and my predecessors had all had was trying to convince Ronald Reagan that nuclear weapons were essential to keep the balance between the big powers. The Soviets had conventional superiority and nuclear weapons had actually kept the peace for many years. While we should reduce them - no question we should negotiate a balanced reduction. I was very much in favor of that, to simply eliminate them would put us at very high risk and traumatize our allies. Of course this was the position Margaret Thatcher took as well. That was very helpful. Ronald Reagan had always been very much against nuclear weapons and the faster you could get rid of them, the better he liked it.

Q: You were National Security Advisor from when, around December of '87...

CARLUCCI: I actually started on January first. There were some benefits from Sears that didn't accrue until the end of the year and I told the President I'd start on January first. I spent some time making plans up 'til then and was National Security Advisor from January first, I guess it was [to] November of 1987.

Q: '87?

CARLUCCI: Yes.

Q: As you took over the job, what did you see... What was your own personal agenda when you went there thinking this is what I better do?

CARLUCCI: Very simple. It was clean up the mess. In my judgement it was a mess. As you know the President had fired Oliver North. John Poindexter had left and it was up to me and Colin Powell to fire Fawn Hall.
Q: Fawn Hall being…?

CARLUCCI: Oliver North's secretary who later became somewhat famous for shredding documents. But the organizational structure, in my judgement, was non-functional. We had two deputies. The General Counsel was somebody who functioned as a Special Assistant. It was a part-time General Counsel who was basically Special Assistant to the National Security Advisor. The one functioning part was the Executive Secretariat. Oliver North had a separate office called Political-Military Affairs. My view of that was that the whole NSC was political-military affairs and if you give somebody that title they had a hunting license. Which is precise what Oliver North did. He went hunting. I eliminated that office completely. If memory serves me correctly, I ended up firing some 65 percent of the staff. George Bush at one point told me that the President was getting worried that I was firing too many people, so I wrote him a handwritten note saying, "Don't worry, Mr. President, this will come out all right."

Ronald Reagan says in his book it did come out all right. We put in an organizational structure where you had a single Deputy and I brought Colin Powell in to be my Deputy—probably the best move I made. I set up a separate General Counsel's office and he was the one that had the hunting license. He could go anywhere he wanted, attend any meeting he wanted and had unfettered access to me so that we had some controls on the place. Then there was the question of sorting through the relationship between the National Security Advisor and the Chief of Staff, which had been a somewhat fractious one and the question of access to the President. We had the Scowcroft commission report at the time, which made a series of recommendations in part based on some of the briefings I had given. In any event, it was determined that I would have direct access to the President. In fact, I insisted on that although at all the meetings, I made it a point of inviting - telling - the chief of staff that I was having a meeting with the President and he was free to come in.

Q: Who was the chief? It was still Regan.

CARLUCCI: It was still Don Regan at the time but he only lasted a month. I ended up firing Don Regan then Howard Baker took over. While there was sort of a break in period while we had to adjust to each other, once we got going it was an extraordinarily smooth and productive relationship. If you are interested I can describe the firing of Don Regan.

Q: I would like for you to.

CARLUCCI: Don has a little bit of it in his book, but he doesn't have the full description. I'd had breakfast with Don Regan one morning and I said, "Don, has anybody talked to you about leaving because reports are all over" because I'd been tipped off that he was going to be leaving and that Howard Baker would replace him—"because there are rumors that Howard Baker is replacing you."
He said, "No, nobody has talked to me Frank."

I forgot about it. That wasn't really my business. About two o'clock in the afternoon I got a call from Bob Tuttle who was the White House personnel officer. He said, "Frank, it's all over CNN that Don Regan has been fired and that Howard Baker has been named chief of staff."

I said, "Why are you talking to me about it?"

He said, "Well, I'm not sure that anybody has talked to Don Regan. And you're the next highest ranking person in the White House and you need to talk to Don Regan."

I said, "Well, before I jump into that snake pit, I better call the President." So I called the President. He's up at his quarters and I said, "Mr. President, this is all over TV, have you said anything to Don Regan?"

And the answer was, "Oh, my goodness."

I said, "Uh oh."

He said, "Well what do you think I should do?"

I said, "Well, I don't know, let me go down and talk to Don Regan."

There was a New York Times journalist in Don Regan's office and I had the Secretary go in and say I had to see him urgently, "Please toss out the journalist." I went in and said, "Don, remember that conversation we had this morning? Well, it is true. The President has decided to change chief of staffs and Howard Baker is going to be taking your place."

Don Regan, as everybody knows, has an Irish temper and he exploded. There was nothing for me to do but go back to my office and call the President and say to the President, "Mr. President, you really have to talk to Don Regan. You need to call him." And then I ran down to Don Regan's office and Don Regan wasn't even going to answer the phone. I said, "Now come on Don, that's the President of the United States. You've got to answer the phone." What then ensured one of the shorter historic phone calls on record. When the President did say something, I couldn't hear him obviously, to Don Regan about making a change, Don Regan said something like, "Thank You Mr. President," and hung up. That's when he dictated his one sentence letter saying Mr. President, I hereby resign as your Chief of Staff. That was the firing of Don Regan.

Q: What was your sense that there had been no real control in not only the National Security Council but elsewhere in the White House? One does have the
feeling that people were bypassing the President all the time and that there wasn't somebody taking control?

CARLUCCI: I made it a point of not going into history. Instead I had my hands full looking at the future. So I didn't try to do any analysis of what went wrong. I just tried to fix the situation so it would be right going forward. It was a very loose management structure. I can't really speak to Don Regan's shop and how he managed his shop but certainly the National Security Council, as I found it, was very loosely organized. John Poindexter, I was told, would retreat to his office for an hour or two a day and just communicate with his people by e-mail. Anybody in the NSC could communicate to him. There were some desirable aspects to that but it also meant that people could bypass their superiors and things could get out of control because one person can't control that many people. I forget how many there were-120 or something like that. There had to be order in the channels of communication. I have a bit of an aversion to using computers for that kind of communication so I shut it down and said if anybody has anything to communicate with me, they can pick up the phone or come through the door. That worked pretty well particularly since I had Colin Powell who could speak with authority and the two of us could divide responsibility. We set up a system of dividing how meetings would be handled and how he and I would allocate our respective times. We brought in Grant Greene to be Executive Secretary. He got that organization functioning well.

Just as an example of the kinds of things that had been allowed to languish, Colin came into my office one day and said, "Frank, I know how you love arms control. Take a look at this." He had a stack at least, I'd say, two feet high of backlogged arms control decisions. He said, "you've got no choice but to go through these and make your decisions or decide to take them to the President. So, I set aside an hour or an hour and a half every lunch and for about two weeks, I went through nothing but arms control, trying to make choices. Where I thought I could do it I did, and saved the others. I remember we were down in Miami meeting the Pope and I told Howard Baker that I had to sit down with the President and go through these arms control issues. So we sat in a very steamy hotel room in Miami, just Howard Baker and the President and me where I tried to lead the President through a whole host of arms control decisions, and that's real esoteric. At least it was at that time. It may be simpler now. I wasn't even sure I fully understood all of it. I could never tell how much the President understood. I felt he always came out in the right place. It may be simpler now. I wasn't even sure I fully understood all of it. I could never tell how much the President understood. I felt he always came out in the right place. We got down to two or three issues where I knew Cap and George would be at one another's throats. I can't now remember what they are but if you gave me some time I could probably remember. I told the President, well this one Cap or George are undoubtedly going to appeal. You're going to have to tell them personally. When we got back to Washington, we finally got them all out of the way. Once we got them all out of the way, the stage was then set for us to begin some serious negotiations. I can remember Rysmartnik, who became Soviet Foreign Minister, telling me, when I was National Security Advisor, “Well, we finally are able to negotiate with you people
because you now are making some decisions. We couldn't negotiate with you before.” We got the process going. It had been clearly jammed up.

Q: You said you had fired 65 people. Why ...?
CARLUCCI: Sixty-five percent.

Q: Sixty-five percent. Were these just too much politically oriented or were they doing the job or you were trying to trim down or what was the...?

CARLUCCI: First of all, I should clarify what firing generally means in terms of the NSC. It means, in many cases, sending them back to their agencies because the NSC is generally composed of people who are on loan from agencies. In some cases they left the government. They were people that either I or their supervisors felt had either outlived their usefulness or we had some new people that we wanted to bring in. In some cases they were very good people and we hung on to them. Let me give you a case in point. For years, I have been very close to Bob Oakley, who I regard as a very talented individual, who knows the Middle East extremely well. When I brought Bob into the NSC, Dennis Ross was there. I talked to Dennis and I'd heard good things about him and I said, "Dennis would you be willing to work for Bob?"

The answer was yes. The result was I had a hell of a strong team on the Middle East because I had Bob Oakley and Dennis Ross as my two leaders.

Q: During this '86 to '87 period, this was the post Reykjavik thing but Gorbachev was in charge of the Soviet Union. Did you see a real change in attitude towards the Soviet Union on the part of the President and his team looking to see who we could do business with or not?

CARLUCCI: No question that attitudes began to change. The President had a fascination with the Soviet Union. While the speech writers liked to put in evil empire and those kinds of things, he really had a deep interest in two things: freedom of religion in the Soviet Union and human rights. Finally, when I got to the NSC, there was a lady named Suzanne Massey who was a social anthropologist from Harvard who was the only outsider I could find that got in to see the President alone. She would go in and talk to him about the Soviet Union. I finally said to the President, "Look, Mr. President, I can't function as your National Security Advisor unless I know what's going on here."

He said, "Fine, well you can sit in." So I sat in and it was a very, perfectly proper, very cordial relationship that they had. She had a lot of impact on the President. They didn't talk much about geopolitics. They talked a lot about the social issues in the Soviet Union.

The President also used to carry around with him, names of Soviet dissidents
who'd been imprisoned. Where he got them I don't know. Whenever George Shultz would go over there, he'd give George some names and say, "I'd like you to get this person or that person out."

Once we got the arms control decisions in place, there remained the question of conditioning the President to negotiations which we knew were coming. George Shultz had done a wonderful job, which he describes in his book, of conditioning the President for negotiations and then saying we're going enter into negotiations. These are your choices. Do you want to do this? And Ronald Reagan, here's where he deserves real credit because his constituency was not terribly supportive, said yes we are going to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

Howard Baker said to me, "Frank, you need to prepare the President for these negotiations." Knowing how he operates, you don't prepare him best by inundating him with a lot of position papers. He likes to see people."

Howard and I agreed that we should start bringing some people in?

I went to the President with a list of names. I can remember I mentioned Brzezinski he liked, Richard Pearl he liked, Kissinger he was not terribly keen to see, but the name that hit the jackpot was the first one I mentioned: Richard Nixon. He said, "Yes, he'd like to see Richard Nixon."

I said, "Why don't we start with him?" And I'm not sure this has come out to this day, but we smuggled Richard Nixon back into the White House. It was the first time he was in since he left the White House in disgrace, maybe the only time, I'm not sure. We flew him by helicopter to the back lawn and I met him right at the door of the White House basement entrance and I took him up to Ronald Reagan's study on the 3rd floor of the White House. Just Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Howard Baker, and me. Nixon and Reagan discussed the Soviet Union for I'd say, about an hour and a quarter, maybe two hours. Obviously a fascinating discussion. Nixon doing most of the talking, Reagan listening. And that's how we kicked off the preparations for the negotiations. Then we brought in various other people. I think Brzezinski did come in. Richard Pearl did come in.

Q: These negotiations were pointed towards what?

CARLUCCI: They were pointed first towards the INF [Intermediate Range Nuclear Force] treaty. As you may recall with the deployment of SS20s we responded with the deployment of Pershings and GLCMs [Ground Launched Cruise Missile] (Shevardnadze later conceded that the deploying the SS-20s had been a mistake.) We began negotiating the INF treaty. George Shultz asked me to participate in the negotiations. I chose not to initially because I was a little worried about maintaining the independence of the National Security Advisor, but I concluded that working with George was more important. I went to Moscow with George. That was the trip in June of ’87 where Gorbachev blew up at me.
resulting in the postponement of the summit. I can go into that if you want.

Q: Yes. Oh, yes.
CARLUCCI: Kenny Adelman has this in his book because he was in the meeting. He was taking notes. It went something like this: Gorbachev, as was well known, hated SDI. Not without reason, because he knew it would force a reconfiguration of the Soviet strategic forces. He believed we could do it, unlike a lot of people in the United States. At one point in the deliberations on INF, he said something to George like, “You're going to have to get rid of the SDI.” George, I guess, had been tired of hearing this, and he said, "Well, SDI is really President Reagan's initiative so I'm going to ask Frank to respond to that."

I was tired of it, too. I guess we were all tired. I said, “Well, Mr. Secretary General, (which is what he was at the time), what you just said is totally unacceptable to the President.”

With that Gorbachev threw down his pencil. His staff later told me this was not planned-he threw his pencil and said if that's the attitude you have, then there won't be a summit.

George said, "Fine. There won't be a summit."

And I thought to myself, bless George's heart.

And that's why the summit was postponed from September to December. I remember we had a December summit. It was because of that one episode.

We started with the INF treaty and then moved on to various regional negotiations. Remember George set up an agenda which was arms control, regional issues and human rights issues. Later on when I became Secretary of Defense, I set up Defense agenda which paralleled it. We would talk about arms control but not as negotiations. The Soviets wanted to talk about those. I said, “I'll only talk about those if you talk about other things - doctrine, military doctrine, avoiding dangerous incidents (We had Major Nicholson assassinated on a legitimate mission in East Germany.) and military to military contacts.” Those proved to be very beneficial for several reasons. First of all, I went over and lectured at the Voroshilov military academy, lectured the top Soviet generals and admirals probably about 100 of them with Marshall Akrinmayoff, their chief of staff, introducing me, on why we considered Soviet military doctrine to be offensive in nature, why they represented a threat to us, and why our doctrine was defensive. An extraordinary session. One of them got up and said to me, "How is it you know so much about us?"

I said, "It's very difficult. We have to do it from satellites, and calculate what you're spending for that kind of force, and convert it into dollars. It would make it a lot easier if you'd just do what we do and publish your military budget. With
that the room broke up into laughter. I said to my escort officer later, "Why did they laugh?"

He said, "You don't understand. You attacked the heart of their system which was secrecy."

Then I visited various war games and climbed through the Blackjack bomber. That had an interesting effect too because the Soviet people then say well we've never seen this kind of military equipment. We've never seen these kind of maneuvers, yet the U.S. Secretary of Defense can see them. What's going on here?

Meanwhile, we structured contacts on down through our military establishment ending up with ship visits. We started with Bill Crowe's relationship with Marshall Akrimayoff, which developed into a very good dialogue, and led to various other relationships all the way down. So the Soviet military began to see, a) our strength, but also b) our real intentions, not what they had been told. That began to bring about very decided change of attitude on the part of the Soviet military. This is sort of an untold story about how our military, without firing a shot, helped to win the Cold War.

Q: Going back to the White House years, you had the reorganization, getting arms control, getting some decisions made, and getting ready for further negotiations. I have the feeling that there was, particularly early on, there was sort of a fight for the soul of Ronald Reagan within the White House. They had your triumvirate and your various groups doing this. Had that settled down by the time you were...if it were indeed true...?

CARLUCCI: Both Howard Baker and I had a very strong mandate because at least for the first month. Ronald Reagan was in a state of semi-shock. He didn’t really understand what had hit him. So we had to assume a large responsibility. Colin Powell has a quote in his book of us leaving the Oval Office after our first or second meeting with the President and me turning to Colin and saying, "Colin, we didn't sign on to run the world." But we really had a big charter.

The main fights were those over speeches. What would be the tone of the speeches. Colin took over that chore and he was masterful. Howard Baker brought in a new team which worked very cooperatively with us. Conservative groups felt very strongly about SDI, which was fine. They came in several times lobbying on the behalf of the Contras and Mozambique. They had access to Gary Bauer, who was an active spokesman for them in the White House. Pat Buchanan was still in the White House but he didn't get too much involved in foreign policy. Some people would get to the President from time to time. I don't know how, but he would get some ideas that were not policy and would seem to come from very conservative groups. That was not a major problem. I think we were able to deal with it effectively. They certainly had a right to have their views heard. My view
of Ronald Reagan was that he was conservative in his approach, no question, yet he was anything but a right winger, and had a masterful touch in listening to people. He'd listen and then he'd leave the room and leave the problem to us. They all felt good that they'd had their day with the President. We were left with the problem, but that was our job.

The other big issue was our support for the Contras in Central America, and even Ronald Reagan's own minister came in to lobby him against that.

**Q:** You're talking about a religious minister.

CARLUCCI: Yes. Religious minister. To lobby with him, he brought in a group of ministers. We got incessant lobbying on that issue from both sides—from the liberal side and the conservative side. Ronald Reagan was determined to continue his support of the Contras.

**Q:** Frank, what was the role at that time of George Bush. He was Vice President, and did he participate?

CARLUCCI: George Bush was always present at our briefings with the President when he was in town. He participated in all the NSC meetings when he was in town, of course. I would go in periodically and bring him up to date on some of the issues that he might have missed when he was out of town and I would, on occasion, seek his advice because he'd been very helpful to me when I came in. When I first came in, even before I'd taken the job National Security Advisor, he asked me to come around to his house. He spent an hour or so with me just giving me the lay of the land in the White House and how I might operate, what I should expect, which was very helpful. I tried to keep him fully informed. George Bush in meetings, generally did not take strong positions on the policy issues under debate nor did he seem to do so in the small briefings that I would give the President. Either he was just holding himself in reserve or he was conveying his views to the President privately in the, I think weekly, lunch he used to have with the President. George Bush became a much - I wasn't in his administration but from everything I hear - much more detail oriented, much stronger figure when he became President.

**Q:** He was the prince in waiting, in a way?

CARLUCCI: I guess you could describe it that way.

**Q:** What about James Baker? Your turf was National Security Affairs, and he later became Secretary of State. I was wondering how his interest in those areas was and how he operated.

CARLUCCI: Well, he was Secretary of Treasury when I was National Security Advisor. He made it clear at the outset that he was the Czar of economic affairs and if anybody wanted to deal with economic affairs they had to deal with him,
which was fine. He wanted to be sure that the National Security Council didn't get into it too deeply, but he and I agreed that I would go to the weekly breakfasts that we had with George Shultz so that I was kept informed. Jim was a very strong figure. When we got into the negotiations on NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement] with Canada we'd had a slow down. Jim moved in and handled it personally and did a masterful job. He wrapped it up when nobody else could. He did not attempt to get into national security issues from his perch in Treasury.

Q: Did you find yourself betwixt and between George Shultz and Cap Weinberger?

CARLUCCI: That's the story of my life. I was constantly negotiating between those two. That started way back when I was with both of them in OMB. When I was Deputy Secretary of Defense, I had proposed breakfast once a week between the two of them so they could try and see eye to eye. I remember one breakfast broke down and George walked out. When I became National Security Advisor, I would have them once a week for lunch in the White House and we'd try and work out the differences, but they both had strongly held views. George put it best when I think he said, "Cap is a position taker and I'm more analytical." Cap is very quick to take positions, he's a lawyer and George waits to take positions but both are equally tenacious once they've taken a position. It was just a question of chipping away and I tried to avoid having these issues come before the President but on occasion, I had to take the differences to the President to get them resolved.

Q: Did you have any on the Iran-by this time it was no longer the Iran Contra, but the Contra work in Nicaragua. Did you have a feeling on the Contra issue before you came in to be National Security Advisor?

CARLUCCI: Yes. I had some questions about its effectiveness. Once I got in, I did make a trip down to Central America and I concluded that it was a desirable thing to continue to do. There was some opposition growing. Oscar Arias, in Costa Rica, was a bit of a problem-more than a bit of a problem. Of course, the Iran Contra thing did not help. After my visit to Salvador and Honduras and Costa Rica, I concluded that we needed to continue to pursue that strategy. In fact, what I tried to do was to put together a political coalition. That was not my side of the business - I had certain restrictions on me - so I asked Howard Baker's shop to put that together. We did begin to work with people like Bob Graham on the Hill. It was going pretty well until all of a sudden Howard Baker brought some new people on the staff and they negotiated the so called Wright Agreement with Jim Wright. I heard about that when I was traveling in Bonn.

Colin called me and said, "We've got this agreement with Jim Wright and here's what it is."
I said, "That undermines our whole strategy." And indeed it did prove to undermine our whole strategy.

Colin said, "I'm afraid the President has already signed off on it Frank." So that's when they got ahead of us.

Q: Was that more a problem because Howard Baker was chief of staff, but a creature of Congress and he looked for deals with Congress?

CARLUCCI: When he brought in on his staff a former congressman from Texas, Tom Loeffler, who had access to Wright, he more or less rammed it through. It just got ahead of the process. Howard obviously supported it. I told Howard of my opposition but it didn't work.

Q: Well, what happened by the time you were leaving? Where did the Nicaraguan business stand?

CARLUCCI: I went over to Defense and we'd had all these problems with Jim Wright who clearly was communicating, if not daily on a weekly basis, with the Sandinistas. The so-called agreement basically put our whole strategy in jeopardy but we managed to hold together. But I can't tell you how many hours I spent arguing with Jim Wright about this and trying to work with him, but it proved to be impossible. It was also very difficult to work with David Bonner. Tony Cuello, who happens to be a friend and right now a business associate, was much easier to work with and I could talk to Tony.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point and we'll pick it up next time when you leave the National Security? Is there something else we should cover do you think?

CARLUCCI: On the National Security Council? I think we covered most of it.

Q: Well, we'll pick it up next time when you're off to Defense.

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Today is the 7th of July, 1998. Frank, you went over to Defense as Secretary of Defense. When did you go and could I get when you were there and when you left?

CARLUCCI: Well, I'm speaking from memory. I believe I went over in November of 1987 and I left when George Bush took over which was what January of '89. I think I was nominated in November. It only took me three or two weeks to get confirmed which was some sort of record on confirmation.

Q: You'd been around so long on various things, this was a natural. How did this appointment come about?
CARLUCCI: Well, Cap had let Howard Baker know that he wanted to step down.

Q: This is Weinberger.

CARLUCCI: Cap Weinberger, yes. I was National Security Advisor at the time. Howard Baker was chief of staff. Cap had suggested Will Taft as his replacement and I had a high regard for Will. Howard Baker wanted me to take the job. I at first said, “No.” I was quite happy where I was. He talked to me two or three times. The two reasons that Howard had were that I could get confirmed very fast and that the President was quite comfortable that I had someone who could immediately step into my role in Colin Powell, my deputy. I guess after some discussion I said, "Well, fine. If that's really what the President wants, I'd obviously be happy to do it."

And then I had a conversation with the President. I could remember one aspect of that conversation. He asked me if Colin could replace me.

I said, "Not only could he replace me, in my judgement Mr. President, but he'd be far better than I am in the job." I said, "I'm not seeking compliments. I just think he will be." And as you know Colin did perform magnificently in the job.

Q: When you went over to Defense, here you had been betwixt and between George Shultz and Casper Weinberger, a long time in various positions. When Weinberger left did you have an agenda or something different from Weinberger or not?

CARLUCCI: Yes. I wouldn't say I came in with an agenda but I came in with somewhat different perspective on some of the issues. For example, George Shultz wanted to have direct contact with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Bill Crowe. Cap had objected to that. I had no objection to that. Cap had basically dragged his feet and found all kinds of reasons not to negotiate with his Soviet counterpart, Minister of Defense Yazov. I turned that around and negotiated with him. Cap had been pushing very hard for an early deployment of SDI. I had serious questions in my own mind as to the feasibility of early deployment, indeed the feasibility of the whole program. I commissioned a study which said, yes it will be feasible, but you've got to get the cost down. I worked harder at getting the cost down and moved SDI pretty much into the Pentagon system so that I could evaluate it's priorities alongside other priorities where as Cap had kept it very much separate and above the kind of scrutiny some of the other programs went through. So there really were different things.

Q: How did you...

CARLUCCI: That doesn't mean, by the way, let me emphasize. That doesn't mean, I didn't have very high regard for Cap. He was a great Secretary of Defense.
Q: This applies to everyone because I think everyone comes in with a somewhat
different agenda or somewhat different set of priorities than his or her
predecessor. How did you find the atmosphere at the Pentagon? I would have
thought that where everything was sort of together at the white House, the
Pentagon was almost too regulated—a big structure.

CARLUCCI: It's a big structure, but I always found the Pentagon pretty
responsive. The key is in having good military assistants and using them. Now I
had a big handicap. That was since there was only a little over a year left in the
Reagan administration, it was extremely difficult for me to bring in new people
and get them confirmed. So I had to really make do with the people who were
there and there were some I didn't think were appropriate. No secret, I moved
Frank Gafney out. Cap suggested that Frank Gafney be made assistant secretary
and I said no. I didn't find his style compatible with my own. So there were those
changes that I made.

Q: I was wondering whether you found...

CARLUCCI: The state of the Pentagon. The Pentagon's morale was heavily
impacted by what's happening on the budget. When I got there, I had to do the
first big cut. I took something like 350 billion dollars out of the five year plan.
People began to feel the pain, not nearly as much as they felt it in subsequent
years. That always has an impact on attitudes. I felt the institution was working
pretty well. After all, it hasn't been that long since I've been there. I spent a lot of
time working on internal management when I was Deputy Secretary. Will Taft
had tried to carry through on a lot of things that we had put in place during the
first couple of years. So I was quite familiar with the management structure. I'd
like to think that after my almost 30 years of government service I knew pretty
much where the bodies were buried and where the leaders were.

Q: Admiral Crowe was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

CARLUCCI: Yes.

Q: How did you find working with him?

CARLUCCI: Terrific. He's a wonderful man, great sense of humor, very easy to
work with, commands a lot of respect from the services. He didn't have the public
flair of Colin Powell but he was a very solid, serious man who did not hesitate to
step up to the difficult jobs. I can remember when the USS Vincennes shot down
the Iranian Air Bus. Bill Crowe called me in the middle of the night and said,
"We've shot down an Iranian F-14." He called me a couple hours later and said,
"Well, we're not sure it's an F-14." And I said, "I better come in." By that time
we discovered that it was really an airliner and he notified Colin Powell and I
notified the President. One of the things you obviously have to do is go out and
tell the press. Bill Crowe immediately volunteered to do that. We all know that initial reports are never accurate and the press takes them as accurate no matter how many times you say they are not going to be accurate. We always get castigated if those reports differ from subsequent reports. That, of course, happened in this case. I probably should have done the press conferences. I cite that as an example of Bill Crowe's willingness to step forward and take the heat.

Q: It strikes me that Crowe also had a feel for the change of situation in the world. Particularly what used to be the Soviet Union, still Soviet Union at that time that put him ahead of many of the military people.

CARLUCCI: Crowe's role in the dismemberment of the Soviet Union was pivotal and it's really never been told. Indeed the whole role of the military, as I think we've said in the previous sessions, has never been told. After I had my initial meetings with Yazov, and we got the Major Nicholson affair settled - you may recall that was the American who was killed by the Soviets in East Germany. He was on a liaison mission. He was brutally shot and left to die in the field. Cap had correctly told the Soviets that we didn't want to negotiate with them on any kind of military contacts until they had apologized for that. Well, I ended up practically writing the Soviet apology in Minister Yazov's office. Thus, we got pretty much the apology we needed. We then set up contacts, starting with Bill Crowe and Marshall Akrimayoff, former chief of staff. Crowe and Akrimayoff hit it off immediately. That relationship reshaped all kinds of attitudes on the part of the Soviet military. It was a very productive kind of personal relationship. Bill Crowe went over there several times. Akrimayoff came over to the United States as Crowe's guest. It worked very well.

Q: Did you find that Crowe was having the same challenge within our own military in changing our way of thinking? Militaries tend to feed enemies and very obviously the Soviet Union had been the enemy for so long.

CARLUCCI: I didn't find a problem, to be quite candid with you. I thought our military was more than willing to engage in a dialogue. In fact they looked forward to it. They liked the exchange of visits. We ended up with a ship visit. We had all kinds of exchanges and they enjoyed them. They called them productive. I don't recall anybody saying to me they are still the enemy, I don't want to have anything to do with them. That was not the attitude at all. The attitude was look, if this can help solve the Cold War, we want to do it.

Q: What about Congress? Are there concerns within Congress, the congressional staff about this growing contact between the United States and the Soviet Union?

CARLUCCI: I don't recall getting any static from the Hill either. Certainly Sam Nunn was supportive. Aspen was supportive. John Warner, Bill Dickinson. The people I dealt with who were the ranking people and the Chairmen of my
committees. The Appropriations Committees were supportive. I didn't detect any criticism from the Hill. The Hill was principally interested in budget issues. Of course, don't forget that the President set the tone. Ronald Reagan stood pretty tall in the Congress in those days; he had recovered fully from the Iran-Contra affair. He was leading the negotiating effort. George Shultz was actively participating. I found the Congress primarily supportive.

Q: What about budget problems in Congress?
CARLUCCI: Well, there the principal issue that I faced was the issue that the Pentagon still faces today. That issue is reducing the support infrastructure as much as you take down the fighting forces. When I started the cuts, I said to myself there just has to be a way that I can reduce the [base] infrastructure so that we don't get the tooth to tail ratio worse than it is. We have not been totally successful in that, because the force structure has come down around 33 percent, whereas the [support] infrastructure has come down about 25 percent. The idea I came up with was the base closing commission. I don't know if I've every told you the story of the base closing commission? I thought to myself there has to be a way to close bases. I remember the nightmare Elliott Richardson went through when he tried to close some bases. They were all over him and he ended up not closing any. Somebody called to my attention a bill that Congressman Dick Army had introduced and which set up a congressional commission on closing bases.

I asked Dick Army to come and see me and I said, "Look, I think your bill has some attractive features but it can't be a congressional commission. It has to be run by the Executive branch. Its recommendations have to be forwarded intact. You can't take out the pieces. If I restructure it that way, will you support it?"

He said, "Yes, we can work together on it."

I recall that Sam Nunn was immediately supportive. Les Aspen thought I was crazy and said so, but later became one of the biggest supporters.

Q: Les Aspen being the...?

CARLUCCI: The chairman of the House Committee, House Armed Services Committee in those days. I think they call it the National Security Committee now. Bill Dickinson, the minority member of the House and John Warner, the minority member of the Senate, were both supportive. I then went to see Ronald Reagan. I'll never forget the meeting. I said, "Mr. President, I need to tell you that I'm going to close some military bases." And he just stared at me. I said, "Mr. President, I'm going to do this in a way that's going to be politically acceptable. I don't think you are going to have to get involved."

He stared me and he finally said, "Alright. If that's what you want to do."
That was my blessing, my enthusiastic blessing from the President. He knew what this entailed politically, too. The third step was to get the right people to lead it. After considerable effort, I persuaded Abe Ribicoff to be co-chairman along with Jack Edwards. Abe Ribicoff had such a sterling reputation for integrity on the Hill and that was the main reason the first BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] was accepted.

**Q:** He'd been President Kennedy's first Secretary of HEW?

**CARLUCCI:** That's right.

**Q:** And governor of Connecticut.

**CARLUCCI:** And Governor of Connecticut. He was known of Mr. Integrity in the Senate. He was a democrat so I was not being partisan. Once he accepted, the commission got going. I think we put very good people on it. People like Arthur Levitt, Don Craig. I reached out to people of stature. So the commission was successful and as you know there were a lot of follow on base closing commissions - the BRAC - process, which is now in trouble for political reasons. It was by and large successful over a period of years.

**Q:** Could you explain to somebody who might not understand what the political sensitivity about base closings?

**CARLUCCI:** Well, no community likes to have a base closed because people are put out of work. Now as history tells us, the communities end up doing good things with the base structure after it is closed and in the long run they're better off. But trying to persuade the community of that fact is very difficult. Congressmen are almost instinctively opposed to any base closure. President Clinton violated the sanctity of the base closure commissions recommendation by taking out two bases in politically sensitive states, California and Texas, and “privatizing” them in place. The Congress has now understandably said Clinton destroyed the whole process; therefore, we won't close any more bases. That's very unhelpful because absent closing basis, you're going to have to cut back on the fighting forces or the equipment we give our soldiers. We're going to keep bases open to deal with the “Indian threat” while we deprive our soldiers of the next generation of tanks or aircraft.

**Q:** Fort Apache remains.

**CARLUCCI:** Fort Apache remains.

**Q:** You mentioned the problem of trying to disassemble the infrastructure as opposed to the-or at least in proportion to the fighting force. Why is this such a problem?
CARLUCCI: Because [support] infrastructure means jobs and they're public sector jobs. The politicians like public sector jobs. In fact, we ought to do more, far more than close bases. We ought to privatize a lot of the logistics activities at the Pentagon, but that becomes difficult. I'll tell you another story. When I first became Deputy Secretary, I took a look at some of our bases and said why do we have [government employees] for firefighters and security guards? Why don't we contract out that function? We could do it cheaper if we contract out. I tried to push contracting those functions out. I think it took two weeks for a bill to go through the Congress preventing us from contracting out firefighters and security guards. If my memory serves me correctly, that bill is still on the books today—that statute is still on the books today. That's the reaction you get on the Hill by doing things that are eminently sensible. Business outsources left and right and saves money doing it. There is no reason the Government shouldn't outsource as well, except for the political resistance you get on the Hill, and to some extent within DOD.

Q: What about in procurement, what about Congress and it's role in asking you to continue to build C-130s—it may have been some other number, C-130s stick in my mind.

CARLUCCI: Well, there was an article on C-130s the other day. Sure. When you're Secretary of Defense, you've got an intense lobby to either continue weapons systems or start up weapons systems, or put weapon systems in a particular district. You just have to continue to fight that. One time when I was deputy secretary, the A-7 aircraft was built in the district of Joe Addabbo, who was chairman of the Appropriations Committee. I went to a Defense Resources Board meeting, which is an internal meeting of the Service Secretaries and the members of the Joint Chiefs and other people from OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]. I said, "We're going to stop production of the A-7. It's out of date. We're going to move to production of the A-10." I literally walked back into my office and within five minutes Joe Addabbo was on the phone saying, "You are not going to stop the production of the A-7. I'm going to force you to continue it." That's how fast the word spreads up on the Hill on those kinds of issues. But you just have to fight it. That's what you spend a lot of time going. I can remember when I was deputy secretary, one of the things that made sense was to put weapons systems on a multiyear contract. You could bring down costs enormously by doing that. So I sought authority in the Congress for multiyear contracts. Congress did not like to give it, obviously because it meant they lost control on a year to year basis. They wanted control where the money goes, and if you lock in a system over a period of time, it deprives them of some ability to move money around. The principal opponent was Jack Brooks, who you may recall was a very powerful congressman.

Q: Government operations.

CARLUCCI: Government operations committee. I decided the only way to do it
was to fight him head on. So I mustered all the forces I could get and took him on
and we won on the floor. I went up to see Jack Brooks the next morning. I don't
know if you ever met Jack Brooks, but he very tough and sarcastic.

He looked at me and said, "Carlucci, you son of a bitch. You brought up every
contractor you could find to defeat me on this."

I said, "Mr. Chairman, if you'd been in my shoes, what would you have done?"

He said, "I'd have done the same damn thing."

And we became friends. But those are the kinds of things you had to do.

Q: How did you find being Secretary of Defense? Were you sort of alone? You
are sort of the pinnacle. There aren't other departments that you can call on to
support you.

CARLUCCI: I was fortunate that I had the kind of relationship with Bill Crowe
where I could talk to him and seek advice. He'd drop into my office to chat. I had
superb military assistants, first Air Force general Gordon Fornell, who I'd
inherited from Cap. He left after a couple of months. Then I chose Admiral Bill
Owens as my military assistant, the man who subsequently went on to become
vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs and enjoys, as you know, a sterling reputation.
Bill was superb and I could talk to him and get candid advice from him. Then I
had, obviously, a very close relationship with Colin Powell who was National
Security Advisor. So we could talk. I'll give you an example. When the
CINCCENT [Commander in Chief, Central Command] job came open, that's the
job in the Middle East, which had been held by a Marine Corps general, now
retired. His name was George Christ. The Navy came in and said, "It's their turn
to have the Central Command job." They nominated a man named Hank Mustin.
He had a good record. He had some weaknesses but he was obviously a bright
man. The institutional forces essentially said, "Its the Navy's turn; give it to the
Navy." And I thought to myself, "Gee, I'm not sure about putting a Naval officer
in the job. It seems to me if there is going to be a war over there, it will be a land
war." So I turned to Owens, who was a Naval officer, and I said, "What do you
think about this?"

He said, "I think your reservations are well founded."

I talked to Colin Powell and he said, "I think your reservations are well founded,"
as well.

So then I asked the Army to submit the names of their best combat generals and
one of those names was Norm Schwarzkopf. I read his file in its entirety and I
called in Schwarzkopf and spent about I'd say about 45 minutes to an hour with
him. I liked him. His was the name that I forwarded to the President instead of
the name that the Pentagon wanted. I cite this because you asked a question about loneliness. I did have people that I could sound out like Bill Owens and Colin Powell, who would give me very candid advice, advice that might be different from what the institution would give.

Q: In mentioning Schwarzkopf... When you talked about the Airbus thing over Iran, how did you view the Persian Gulf situation during your time from ’87 to ’89?

CARLUCCI: Well, that was our biggest crisis. When I became National Security Advisor, one of the first things I did was try and address the Persian Gulf situation. I was essentially the point person in the Kuwaiti Reflagging Operation. Essentially we reflagged Kuwaiti ships so we could provide escorts for them. It was not without its drawbacks. Some people like Mitch McConnell [Republican Senator from Kentucky] argued quite persuasively “How come you are escorting foreign tankers even though they carry the American flag and American owned bottoms carrying foreign flags are not escorted?” The Iranians became more and more aggressive; you may even recall they sent a flotilla to threaten Saudi Arabia. They were harassing ships at an increasing pace. We had already taken out one of their oil platforms. When I came over to the Pentagon, tensions were high. As you know, fighting did in fact, break out. We sank about half the Iranian Navy in about 24 hours. We lost one helicopter. I think there were two people on board. But the casualties on our side were very light. That was an engagement that essentially Bill Crowe and I conducted [from] the operations center in the Pentagon. In fact, there's a couple of stories that are interesting. The Iranians fired on us. We had an airplane in the air and the pilot requested permission to attack. We had to change the rules of engagement to do that. So, I called Colin Powell and I said, "Colin, you need to get the President right away, because I need different rules of engagement in order to retaliate."

Colin called the President and got back to me inside of five minutes. That was some kind of record in changing the rules of engagement.

We then launched a campaign. Every time the Iranians attacked us, we returned fire. Our missiles were extraordinarily accurate. Our laser guided bombs were very accurate. I can remember at one point, there were two Iranian frigates, the Shaban and the Saharan. I get the names mixed up, but one, the Shaban, I think, was sunk and the other one, the Saharan, was dead in the water. The pilot was circling overhead. He had a laser guided bomb that could drop right down the smokestack. No question he would have sunk it. By then we knew we'd won the engagement. Bill Crowe came to me and he said - I think he used to call me “Mr. Secretary” in those days, "I think we've shed enough blood."

I said, "Bill, I think you're right. Spare that ship."

You asked about decisions the military didn't like. They didn't like that decision.
Maybe it was the wrong decision because I subsequently heard that the ship was back out harassing shipping. It seemed to me to be useless expenditure of life to let that bomb go. So those were lonely decisions that you have to make.

Q: What about the Airbus incident? You mentioned we had shot down an Airbus thinking it was an Iranian attack and it was a civilian plane. It has often been expressed we didn't make immediate compensation or something to that effect.

CARLUCCI: Well, we did apologize and I think we did offer fair compensation to the families of those on that plane. I'm pretty sure we did. I'm speaking from memory. I of course appointed a Board of Inquiry and spent a lot of time going over the report. In fact Bill Crowe and I flew to Patuxent Naval Air Station where we had a mock up of the Vincennes. He and I reenacted the whole thing. We had people playing the roles of the different participants based on the reports so that we could put ourselves in the mindset of the Captain and the crew members and the state of confusion or semi-confusion that always exists in battle. We concluded that the judgement that the Captain made, the Captain of the Vincennes, was not an unreasonable judgement. He was under attack. You could actually hear the bullets hitting the ship. He didn't have a lot of time to make the decision and when he did, it was terribly unfortunate, of course. But he did warn the aircraft many times. The aircraft was not squawking a civilian indicator at the time, and there were no other indications that it was a civilian aircraft.

Q: I recall hearing that the Navy was quite unhappy about the flagging situation to begin with, of the Kuaitis, of the escort duty?

CARLUCCI: I never sensed that. That first started when Cap was Secretary and I was National Security Advisor. I didn't hear any opposition to that. I just can't comment intelligently on that because nobody ever told me the Navy was unhappy.

Q: I could be wrong.

CARLUCCI: The one thing, the Secretary of the Navy, Jim Webb, resigned.

Q: He got really hooked on a 600 ship navy.

CARLUCCI: It wasn't really a 600 ship Navy. As we were taking the Navy down, I said we better take some ships out. There were some frigates that I regarded as eligible for retirement. The budget people essentially supported that decision. Will Taft was in charge of the budget and I told Will to go ahead with that decision. None of us knew that the Navy Secretary felt so strongly about it that he would resign. Certainly he didn't appeal to me. He didn't appeal to Will. If you don't have an appeal on a decision, and you get a resignation over it, it's a bit of a surprise. The resignation letter was sent to the White House and a copy dropped on my desk. That was an unfortunate episode.
Q: Looking at this '87 to '89 period. You had the Soviet Union moving toward something but I mean it was less menacing and all that. You had this war going on in the Persian Gulf, which is dragging us in and you had problems elsewhere. What were some of the hot spots that you were concerned about?

CARLUCCI: It was mainly the Gulf and the negotiations with Russia. You always had to worry about Korea. Then on the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] front, you had the nagging Greece-Turkey problem. You could never ignore that one. We also had some problems in Africa which were mainly the concern of the State Department - the Mozambique problem and the Angolan problem. The military didn't get too much involved in that. Those were principally the trouble spots.

Q: Was anybody...

CARLUCCI: Then we had such issues as low-level flying in Germany. That one became a big political issue. That cost them a minister of defense in Germany. My colleague in Germany had to resign over low-level flying.

Q: This is training flights?

CARLUCCI: Training flights. He was supporting us and it was not very good politics for him to do so, so he had to resign.

Q: How did you view the French at this point?

CARLUCCI: Well, interestingly enough, I never had any problems with the French. The French Defense Minister was Chevenement, who is in the current socialist government as Minister of Interior, is far to the left, but he cooperated. When I wanted help in the Persian Gulf, I appealed to the European allies to put some ships in because our Congress wouldn't sustain our reflagging operation without some of the allies there. The French came in, the Brits came in, the Dutch came in, the Italians came in.

Q: Was there any concern about the Iran-Iraq war, about Iraq and the future?

CARLUCCI: Of course, we had the Stark incident. That was when I was National Security Advisor. I think the degree of our support for Iraq has been greatly exaggerated. To my recollection the only thing we gave Iraq during that struggle with Iran, the war with Iran, was very rough order of battle information. We did not give them targeting information. And I don’t know of any weapons systems that we sold to them. There was some dual use technology that may have gone to them. But the common belief that we sold Iraq weapons during that war I certainly can't sustain.
Q: You mentioned that such a command might need a ground commander. What were you thinking of?

CARLUCCI: I was thinking of either Iraq or Iran. There was also the possibility of some kind of Soviet incursion. Those were the standard scenarios. As I looked around at the nature of the threat, it seemed to me that the land war was much more likely.

Q: What about China? Was China considered a problem at the time? Were we watching it closely or...?

CARLUCCI: I was fortunate. We enjoyed good relations with China. I made a very successful visit to China [in September 1988]. It was a very strange thing for me, because I'd been in uniform during the Korean War, to sit opposite the Chinese Minister of Defense for one hour, Qin Jiwei, and listen to him tell me about the problems of the People's Liberation Army. We had military exchange programs which produced a very good relationship. We also had managed to balance the Taiwan-China relationship rather well. I'm a little disturbed that that balance may have been altered a bit by some of the comments President Clinton made in Beijing. But we had good relations with Taiwan. I, of course, didn't visit Taiwan at the time, but we did give them some frigates. China was not the kind of "concern" that it is today.

Q: Sometimes a military force almost has to have somebody to build against. During the time you were there, was their the feeling that the Soviets were slipping?

CARLUCCI: Well first, yes, during negotiations it became clear that they didn't have the kind of capability that we thought they'd had. They certainly had a lot of weapons. That we always know. But where the weaknesses emerge were the capabilities of their troops. I can remember Akrimayoff, the Soviet Chief of Staff, when he came over as Bill Crowe's guest, called on me before he went back and I said, "Marshall, what did you find to be the most impressive thing during your visit to the United States?"

He hesitated a minute and said, "The quality of your non-commissioned officers. We don't have that kind of quality." And that's true. If you look at the then Soviet structure, the Russian structure today, they've got officers doing jobs that our noncoms [non-commissioned officers] do. That's because they've got a conscript army and navy. We began to observe those weaknesses. We also began to clarify a lot of misunderstandings. The Soviets were deluding themselves. They were paranoid. That paranoia came through loud and clear. I can remember one discussion with Yazov where he kept producing a map that showed the Soviet Union surrounded by the West, and including bases in South Africa. He kept saying we were poised for attack.

I said, "Come on, General Yazov, you know that NATO has no offensive
capabilities. It's a defensive force. We're not threatening the Soviet Union.

He finally said, Maybe you aren't but somebody else is."

I said, "Well who?"

He said, "Well, Japan."

I almost fell out of my chair.

On another occasion when I was getting briefed at the Voroshilov Military Academy by Akrimayoff and his people, they pulled down a map and they had the blue arrows of NATO striking at the heart of the Soviet Union. And I looked at one arrow and it had Danish forces advancing to the Polish border in something like 20 days.

I said, "You can't be serious."

These were the kinds of things they would produce, and you never knew whether they believed them or not. I gave a lecture to 200 of the top Soviet generals and admirals at the Voroshilov Military Academy and I told them how their force structure was offensive in nature, and ask why they were spending so much of their GNP on military.

One of them asked me, "How come you know so much about us?"

I said, "Well, we have to observe what we can from satellites and other information and we convert it back into dollars to see what you are doing. I'll tell you what, it would be a lot easier if you'd publish your information just like we do."

And the place broke out in laughter. I asked my military escort, a man named Shabanov, afterwards, "Why did they laugh?" He said, "You don't understand. What you said went to the very heart of our system - secrecy. They don't understand anything but secrecy."

Q: When you left this job in January 1989, what was the thing you felt most pleased about as far as what you'd accomplished?

CARLUCCI: Well, I think several things. I think the negotiations with the Soviet Union and the military-to-military contacts. The avoidance of dangerous incidents. Those were, I think, significant achievements. The fact that we began to attack the infrastructure and turnaround the budget, the successful Middle East policies. I had done some useful things more as Deputy Secretary than as Secretary in the procurement area. I also had to, as you know, had to manage the Ill Wind scandal. That broke three days after I took the job.
Q: The what scandal?

CARLUCCI: The Ill Wind procurement scandal. Remember “the biggest procurement scandal in the Pentagon's history?”

Q: Oh, yes. Could you explain what it was?

CARLUCCI: It was about three days after I was in the job. Ed Meese asked to come see me. He came over and said, "In one hour we're going to announce the largest procurement scandal in history."

I said, "What? I don't know anything about it. Nobody briefed me." The Inspector General later told me she decided not to brief me because it wouldn't be in my interest to know about all this. “Thank you very much,” I thought. When the scandal broke, Les Aspen called for a freeze on all contracts. All hell broke loose on the Hill. This is a question of kickbacks and all kinds of illegal payments. I guess a number of people went to jail. I can't recall exactly how many. I had to work through that at the same time as I was working through these other things.

Q: Let me stop at this point.

End of interview