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   Born and raised in Kansas
   University of Nebraska
   US Army WWII, Korean War
   Marriage
   War Shipping Administration, Italy
   Private business

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   Assistance Program for Lebanon
   Environment
   Agriculture
   Technicians
   Relations with Embassy
   Operations
   Palestinian refugees
   Transfer to Department of State

Karachi, Pakistan: Administrative Officer 1953-1954
   Staff
   Support for USAID
   Relations
   Military aid
   Reduction in Force (RIF)
   Environment
   Refugees
   Operations

Rome, Italy: Assistant Administrative Officer/Admin. Counselor 1954-1958
   Bill Boswell
   Operations
   Ambassador Mrs. Clare Booth Luce
“Poisoned” Bed Room
Congressman John Rooney
Elbridge Durbrow
John Jernigan
Environment
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Personnel recreation
Embassy staff
Housing
Jefferson Caffery
Personnel Changes

State Department: Deputy Budget and Fiscal Officer 1958-1961
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Wayne Dwinell
Congressman H. R. Gross
Congress/State relationship
Congressional funding
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“Bay of Pigs” speech
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Roger Jones
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INTERVIEW

Q: Let's start with the beginnings of William J. Crockett. Tell us first of all, were you born and educated?

CROCKETT: My life started in Western Kansas in 1914 on a farm, west of Dodge City, Kansas, where my parents lived. My father was a farmer; my mother was a country school teacher. Those were the days before pesticides so that my father's life was devoted to fighting grasshoppers, who were usually the victors in the struggle. So it was really left to my mother to support us through her teaching. I remember those days with pain and pleasure--the pleasure was great because my mother was a great reader, who recited many poems generally by memory and who read to my brother, my father and me each evening before we went to bed. Those are happy memories. I went to grade school and high school in Western Kansas; then I had two years of Junior College in Hutchinson, Kansas where I lived with an aunt. In the meantime, I had fallen in love with a girl--Verla--whom I had met in high school. Her father was a banker who moved to Hastings, Nebraska in 1934 during the Depression--after Roosevelt began closing banks. He asked me to come to join him as a member of the bank staff. He had obviously read the hand-writing on the wall that I would be his son-in-law one day. So I joined the bank in Hastings, worked as book-keeper and then teller. In 1936, Verla and I married.

I had joined the National Guard to increase our income and therefore was in the Guard when World War II began to loom on the horizon. But I was not called into service because I was married. Verla suggested that I leave the bank and finish my education. She didn't want me to stay in Hastings and be known just as the son-in-law of her father. So due primarily due to her urgings, in 1941 I went to the University of Nebraska. She started to work in a bank to supplement our income.

At the University, I met a very enlightened, non-bureaucratic business school dean who said that he would give me credit for any course for which I could pass the final examination. I had taken many courses from the American Bankers Association while working in the bank. It was evident that sooner or later, I would be called into military service. By permitting me to take the final examinations without having attended the courses, the dean enabled me to complete several courses for which I would never had the time otherwise. He also permitted me to take correspondence courses along with the regular class work-load. All of this enabled me to graduate after one year at the University, making up enough hours to complete what would have otherwise taken two years. So I graduated with the class of 1942 and was called into service that Fall.
I was assigned to the Ordinance Corps and to Aberdeen Proving Grounds. The Army wouldn't permit Verla to join me. But the first thing I knew, I received a call from Verla saying that she was in Aberdeen, had a room and a job. I went to see her at the first opportunity. My life has been filled with coincidences, strange serendipities that I have never understood. The job Verla had gotten was as an assistant to the Colonel who ran the accounting department at Aberdeen. The room she found to rent was in the Colonel's sister's house. In due course, I graduated from OCS. Without my knowledge or involvement, the Colonel asked Verla whether she wanted me assigned to Aberdeen. So when orders were cut for OCS graduates, I was sent to the accounting department in the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Verla and I spent several months there until I was transferred to the accounting department in an ordinance office in Philadelphia and from there to Washington, DC in the ordinance headquarters office doing auditing work.

I traveled around the country during my audit assignments. The war was obviously coming to an end and I didn't really want to return to Hastings. So I looked around for other jobs. I joined the War Shipping Administration to help close its Italy program. So Verla and I went to Naples, where we spent a couple of very happy years. We were turning the Administration's activities back to the regular shipping lines. We went over on a troop ship which was sailing to Europe to bring back European war brides.

We went first to London for some preliminary training. When we got off the boat train, I spotted a sign which said "William Crockett". I went to the man holding the sign, assuming from his fancy dress that he was a general or admiral. So I carried most of our bags to the car. When we got to the car, he got into the driver's seat. He was the chauffeur. That is just a small indicator of how naive we were. After the training we were sent to Naples. We were in Italy soon after the troops had departed. The conditions in Naples were dreadful. We were not supposed to eat on the local market; we were not supposed to buy things on the local market. There were no tourists; we were part of a small group which consisted mostly of American wives who were joining their military husbands, who were the tail end of our military presence in Italy. The Italians were very friendly, very appreciative of Americans. They trusted us. It was in some respects an ideal time to be there because we were received so warmly. We lived in Naples, in a wonderful apartment which had been confiscated by the US military from the Fascist owner. It was on a high hill overlooking the bay. We had a wonderful time in Naples; we had access to a small boat which we used to go to Capri every weekend.

We were young enough and naive enough to enjoy ourselves. This was our first international experience and fell in love with the Italian people. We traveled mostly in Italy, but to other parts of Europe as well. In those days, the travel facilities for the military and other US government employees were still available— inexpensive rooms and meals. We took advantage of these resources.

The War Shipping Administration job terminated in late 1947. I returned to the States. but like many of the ex-GIs, I was not happy about working for someone else. My father-
in-law urged me to return to the bank, but Verla and I decided to strike out on our own and went to Denver instead. There she had an uncle, who helped me in purchasing an outdoor advertising agency. I spent a couple of years putting advertising signs all over that lovely Colorado landscape. We would sell various institutions, such as motels, fifteen or twenty signs. These we would put up as the client desired along highways and other prominent spots. We would rent the space and put up the signs for which the client would pay a monthly fee. I didn't really like the work; I have never been good at selling; I hated to sell and I hated to ask a farmer to lease a part of his property for the signs. I remember one farmer who wouldn't lease me space. When I asked why, he pointed to a sign already standing on his property. He said: "That sign killed my best bull". Upon further prodding, it seemed that one day, someone had come along and had shot at the sign. In doing so, he also killed the farmer's bull that had been standing unseen behind the sign. When the opportunity arose, I sold the business without too much loss and went back to the bank in Hastings in 1949. I resigned myself to spending the rest of my life as a banker. Verla and I bought a house. We adopted our son Bobby. Verla didn't really want me to return to the bank; she didn't think it was the right place for me because, although her father and I got along very well, she thought I would always be seen as the son-in-law. She wanted more than that for me. Once back in Hastings, I once again rejoined the Reserves, primarily for income reasons. So when the Korean war started, I got word from my old boss in the Pentagon that I would be recalled to active duty. When I received my assignment at Christmas 1949, it was to job in the Pentagon, making loans to industries who were retooling from the production of civilian goods to support our war efforts. Before being recalled to active duty, I had to have a physical. I didn't pass it because of some foot problems, which were not severe enough to keep me out of World War II, but were enough to bar me from serving during the Korean war. Verla didn't want to accept that finding. So I went to see our personal doctor, who sent in a certificate which said that I had had this foot problem since birth and that it would not effect my service. So I finally joined the Army again. We never told Verla's parents what we had done and I shall never forget the sadness they exhibited when they saw their first grand-son--Bobby--get into the car to drive off to Washington.

We found a place to live quickly, but also found out that a Captain's pay did not go very far in Washington. I also discovered that Captains in the Pentagon were a dime-a-dozen. The job of making guaranteed loans was not very taxing because there was very little judgment or decision required. A company would make an application to convert some of their civilian production lines to make military end items, for delivery under contract to the US military. This required some retooling for which the Company could get a loan from the government or one guaranteed by the government. In passing on the application, there wasn't much judgment required. If the company certified that it had the capacity to fulfill a government contract, but needed a loan for retooling, it was pretty cut and dried. There were lot of applications because many businesses saw the program as an opportunity to get into what they perceived as a lucrative war production. Nobody could foresee how long the Korean war would last. Companies saw it to their advantage to participate in this program because they could not predict to what extent civilian production might be curtailed if the war were to last for any length.
One day, I was supposed to approve a loan to Revere Copper Industries to make shells. I used a form that was not quite appropriate. I had never had much patience with mindless bureaucracy which stressed form over substance, paper over judgement. I filled out the form and added a few comments of my own and took it to the General. He looked at it and said: "Captain Crockett, you changed the form!". I said that I had indeed because "I thought...". He never let me finish the sentence. He said: "That is the trouble with the military today. Too many Captains trying to think". That was the straw that broke the camel's back. I went off job hunting again--or more aptly--seeking a way out of the military.

I had a friend who worked in the State Department. He was responsible for recruitment for a new government program: the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), also known as the Point IV program. This was a new program initiated by the Truman administration. He told me that the Department didn't ask officially for military deferments or discharges. But he suggested that he would write a request for my release on State Department stationery to the General. Surprisingly enough, the General granted permission for me to be discharged from the Army to take a TCA job. So I was employed by TCA to be part of the first assistance program in Beirut, Lebanon. I didn't know that this would be my assignment when I first joined TCA; there were several options in the Middle East. They did it very well; they got the whole initial team together in Washington. It was headed by Hollis Peter who had been in the Department at one time. We were given a month's orientation together in Washington and were given a little time to learn about our jobs. I was hired in October, 1950 and arrived in Beirut around Christmas time.

Q: What attracted you to taking this major step?

CROCKETT: I was enticed by the opportunity to be part of a program that had the potential of helping others in the world. Right after World War II, there was a perception that we should "save the world" and become involved in efforts to help others. I was very hopeful about what America could do to make a better world. So in 1950, I went off to Beirut.

Q: What was your role in this new Lebanon TCA team?

CROCKETT: I was the administrative guy. I was responsible for all administrative matters: recruitment, procurement, office space, automobiles, contracts, etc--the typical activities that fall within the jurisdiction of a State Department administrative officer.

Q: What was TCA trying to do in Lebanon?

CROCKETT: Lebanon in those days was a beautiful country, but backward. It contained a visible contrast between wealth and poverty, both extreme. The government was stable, divided between the Moslems and the Christians according to a well established formula.
for sharing of governmental functions. Our basic mission was primarily directed to the improvement of agricultural production and of rural living conditions. The rural population lived in dreadful circumstances; they still used wooden plows—in many cases, you would see a donkey and a cow hooked together pulling a plow. They still used thrashing floors to thrash grain. You could see animals being herded over the thrashing floor with the grain being thrown into the air so that the wind blew the husks away. The living conditions were dire. They had a common water well which in most cases, upon testing, was filled with impure water as the result of drainage from the villagers' wastes. The villages had no toilet facilities so that they contaminated their own water supply. One of the first things we did was to build community toilets which we hoped people would use. We tried to get the villagers to let us brick up the walls so that the drainage would be eliminated or reduced. We experimented with new strains of grains and chickens. We brought in fertilizer to increase productivity. We attempted to improve irrigation with a plan to dam the Litani River to create a large irrigated area. That never got off the ground. All our efforts were directed to improving the villagers' living conditions. Our emphasis essentially was on rural development, although we also had a program in education curriculum improvement. We did very little in industry.

Q: Did you have any difficulties in recruiting for the TCA mission?

CROCKETT: No, we did not. As I said earlier, in those days, there was a feeling in the United States that we had a responsibility to help the world. So we had no problems getting people to join us. The technicians came primarily from universities. Most of the ones in Lebanon came from Iowa State. They were agricultural experts.

Q: How did the Embassy receive this new breed of American representation, namely the TCA team?

CROCKETT: Badly for the most part. We were never really accepted socially. We were never really formally recognized as being part of the Embassy, although even in those days, Washington wanted the Embassy to provide administrative support to our group. It was my job to try to work with the Embassy's administrative officer in getting the necessary services, like contracting, housing, local recruiting, etc. But we were viewed as an appendage of the Embassy. We were in a separate building far away from the Chancery. The TCA Director went occasionally to Embassy staff meetings, but even he was not very cordially received, although the Ambassador was much more cordial than either the Political or Economic Sections. They viewed us as interlopers and as additional burdens to their responsibilities for conducting diplomatic relations with Lebanon. An action program was beneath their status. I must say that I hated the Embassy.

The Embassy was relatively small, probably about forty people. The TCA mission grew to approximately 200 people. Such a large presence of course had an impact on the Embassy's personnel. We had to have housing and paid higher rents. We had household staffs whom we compensated better. We therefore raised the cost of living for the Embassy and ruined their little nest.
**Q: Did you ever receive the level of administrative support you expected from the Embassy?**

CROCKETT: We got help but it was not high quality because the attitude of the Embassy was to control and not to support. For example, we were going to import a herd of Holstein bulls to disperse throughout the country to improve the cattle stock. Holsteins were the cattle chosen by our technicians as the most appropriate for the job to be done. The Embassy's contract officer in the pursuit of his duties decided to seek bids and the Holstein was not the lowest bid. So he insisted that we get the cheapest bulls--another breed entirely. The attitude was not one of supporting the program, but of controlling our activities to fit into the bureaucratic controls established by the Department. All of this reinforced my distaste for bureaucracy because we were governed by State's regulations which were too often mindlessly followed by its minions overseas.

It finally became so bad in the housing area--we couldn't get the necessary housing for our people and we complained so bitterly--that the Department allowed us to hire an enterprising young Lebanese to find and rent houses for the TCA members. He was given his instructions--"We don't want to pay more than the going rates. We don't want to force rents up. We don't want to be laughed at by the natives as being those rich American suckers! So--get us only good deals!". And he did. We got fine places at rock bottom prices. Everyone was amazed by his effectiveness. then one day another Lebanese came to my office with a complaint: "Your rental officer is taking big fees from the landlords for renting their houses to you Americans. He is cheating you! Oh, it is true that he is getting low rents from you, but he is making a fortune for himself!". I asked: "Why are you telling me all this? You don't even work for us!". He replied: "Because when you fire him, I want his job". So we looked into the charges and our man quite freely told us that he did get fees from the owners for renting their houses to us. He said: "So what? That is the way business is done here". We threw the "American book" at him. "Taking kickbacks is illegal!. We must fire you and you're lucky that we don't do more". He was confused, hurt and unhappy. "Fire me? Why? Haven't I done what you have told me to do? Haven't I gotten you fine housing at the lowest prices? Isn't that what you wanted?!". We agreed that it was. Then he continued: "Then why do you complain? I have done what you wanted and have used the ways business is traditionally conducted in this country. Why should you punish for following the practices of my country?!". Why should we have indeed. Are we to always upset everything? Aren't there some customs we should leave well enough alone?

**Q: Did you eventually build up your own administrative staff?**

CROCKETT: A little bit, but not basically. Before I could do so I was co-opted by some State people who came from Washington to review the situation. They sold me on the State Department. We helped the Embassy to hire some people, who were on our payroll, but worked in the Embassy's administrative section on our programs. This turned out to be model for other Embassies which had to support Point IV missions and other similar
government endeavors. It was generally concluded that this was the way to support new programs rather than create two parallel competing administrative sections. I spent a lot of time with the Embassy's administrative officer--whose name was Ernie Betts--to get the support our Point IV team needed. I worked with him; I socialized with him; I made available to him some of our resources that were not available to the Embassy. That embassy, even in those days, was a resource-poor organization, as embassies have always been. State Department was strapped financially. It did not then nor did it have during my period in it, have enough resources to adequately support those that were assigned to conduct diplomatic relations. Not enough cars, not enough staff. So in Beirut, we helped the Embassy with those resources and in other ways which then resulted in reciprocity with the Embassy providing assistance when it was necessary. We got much more done that way than in fighting with them.

Q: How long were you in Beirut?

CROCKETT: Approximately for two years, from 1951 to 1953.

Q: Besides reinforcing your antipathy to "bureaucracy", what other lessons did you learn in Beirut?

CROCKETT: One was to listen more to the needs of the local people--not be so sure of ourselves that we knew better than they when it came to their needs. I also learned that our norms and values might not be accepted by all and not to be so arbitrary in imposing them on others.

Q: When you left in 1953, did you feel that Point IV was making any dent on the Lebanese rural areas?

CROCKETT: Not very much. We attempted a number of excellent experiments, in such areas as poultry improvement, animal up-grading, agricultural productivity increases--apples particularly--but to get the Lebanese farmers to accept new approaches was very difficult. For example, the elders in some village that didn't want their wells encased because they were afraid it would spoil the taste of their water. People were change resistant. They liked their old customs and habits--their old ways even when they were detrimental and harmful to them. Change was very hard. But then change is difficult everywhere!

Q: Did you see any hope in the next generation?

CROCKETT: We dealt primarily with the existing generation. In looking back on my Lebanese experience, I regret that we missed an opportunity to do something about the refugee camps. Many of the Palestinian refugees were encamped in the Beirut area and we did nothing to alleviate their miseries. We left of all of that to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. It was a missed opportunity because those camps bred the "Arafats" of today.
Q: In 1953, you were reassigned.

CROCKETT: Not only reassigned, but transferred to the State Department due primarily to the two Washington representatives who had come to Beirut to inspect the situation. By that time, the Embassy and I had made our peace so that there wasn't any major controversy left. But through them, I was offered the opportunity to transfer to the Foreign Service as an administrative officer and be assigned to Karachi. One of the two was Bob Ryan, who served in the administrative area of the Department for many years and then became an Ambassador. The other man was Henry Ford who is also remembered for his many years of fine service in the Department's administrative area. This was another time that Verla came to my rescue. I had disliked the State personnel so much that I wanted to refuse to talk to them when they came to Beirut. Verla told me that was childish and stupid. She suggested that I see them and charm them. So I tried and later was offered the opportunity to transfer to the Foreign Service.

Q: So in 1953, you were assigned as administrative officer to our Embassy in Karachi, Pakistan. What did you know about State Department administrative practices?

CROCKETT: Nothing. I had home leave between the Beirut and Karachi assignments, but I didn't see anybody in the Department. I didn't see the country desk officer or anyone in the administrative area. I didn't see anybody or know anything when I left for Karachi. I was so naive. I didn't even know that when transfer orders were issued that it included authorization for transfer of personal effects--cars, furniture, personal effects--as well. The only person I knew at all was Henry Ford, who was the Executive Director for the Bureau of Near East Affairs. I had met Ford in Lebanon, as I mentioned earlier. But I didn't see him either. As a matter of fact, I don't think on that home leave that I even went through Washington. As I recall it, I went from Beirut directly to Hastings and then to Karachi.

Q: Who was your supervisor in the Embassy?

CROCKETT: John Emmerson became the DCM soon after I arrived. He was a part of a whole new top team which arrived about four months after I arrived. At about the same time, a new military assistance program was initiated. We also got a new AID director and a greatly expanded assistance program. So this put me one the other side of the fence that I had been in Beirut. I was now responsible for the administrative support to all the other agencies.

Q: What size staff did you have when you got to Karachi?

CROCKETT: There were three Americans in addition to myself. It was a very small Embassy. We had a personnel officer, a procurement officer and a general services officer. We had about ten local personnel. So it was a small administrative section in a small Embassy. But about four months after my arrival, the situation changed
dramatically. The American representation in Karachi increased by leaps and bounds as I have mentioned. Having been on the receiving end of Embassy administrative support in Beirut, one of the first things I did was to brief the new Ambassador on the opportunities, the challenges and responsibilities we had for supporting these new American programs. This helped him to focus on how the Embassy staff should behave towards the newcomers. He was very supportive of our efforts to cooperate. I viewed as one of my primary responsibilities, right from the outset, to integrate the new arrivals into the Embassy family to avoid their feelings that they were "outsiders". I talked to the Ambassador about including them in Embassy functions and about including the AID Director in Embassy staff meetings; we made all possible efforts to make the new people part of the whole US effort in Pakistan. The AID administrative officer was Pittman, a wheeler and dealer, but we quickly agreed on the administrative support arrangements. He saw that we were interested in supporting his program and he quickly decided that he would help to provide the necessary resources. Even though the agencies were split in Washington, we got close cooperation locally. AID was very helpful in providing certain resources that just were not available to the Embassy. For example, it was through their assistance that we managed to start an American School in Karachi--there had not been any kind of English speaking school until then. So thanks to some TCA funds, we converted a building into a school house so that American children and children of other diplomatic families would have a place to obtain and education locally.

The Embassy itself did not grow very much during this period, except for the administrative section. CIA may have grown and there may have been some intelligence officers among the new AID personnel. This was the beginning of a new, closer relationship with Pakistan. The Pakistanis seemed to welcome this new American interest. We were received well; many may have thought that we had the magic potion to cure the local ills. The Government was very friendly. Our Ambassador had very good relations with governmental officials. So our assistance programs got off to a very good start. One of the attractive features for Pakistan of that assistance program was the military aid part of it. They liked that; they supported it ardently and sort of suffered the rest of the assistance as a necessary adjunct. As in Lebanon, the assistance package include aid for rural development.

Q: With military assistance programs normally come large numbers of American military personnel. Was that true in Pakistan as well?

CROCKETT: Yes. But from the beginning, we tried very hard to provide what they needed with administrative support. They also had an administrative officer with whom we dealt closely. I think we had something to offer them and they accepted that. They were happy to be part of a homogeneous American presence and not be separate and apart. So they readily accepted the concept of Embassy administrative support. In many other countries, I suspect, the fig leaf of Embassy administrative support was maintained while underneath, the various groups operated on their own, competing with each other.
Q: Did this spirit of cooperation in administrative matters extend to the substantive side as well? Did the MAAG chief speak to the Political Counselor or the TCA Mission Director to the Economic Counselor?

CROCKETT: I think the Ambassador caused much of that to happen at least formally on a weekly basis. My experience has been that when the picayune things of administration are solved then the people will work together more cooperatively in the substantive areas.

Q: Do you recall any particular problems you had in this mushrooming administrative support effort that you were directing?

CROCKETT: Many of our problems were resolved through the generosity and cooperation of the agencies we supported. We did have a traumatic experience in the year after my arrival. Truman had left office and Eisenhower had become President. Dulles took over as Secretary of State and as you'll remember imposed a dramatic reduction-in-force in the Department soon after taking office. This effected some of my staff who were forced to leave. I later discovered that I was just above the RIF line myself; so this was a rather traumatic experience for all of us and caused some problems for us.

Q: Was housing adequate in Karachi?

CROCKETT: Never, but we stimulated a housing construction program in Karachi. Some enterprising Pakistanis, recognizing the need, began to build housing for the Americans which they rented to us on a long-term basis, at exorbitant prices. This of course drove up the rental costs in the whole city because we had the allowances and could afford the increased costs. This generated a small construction boom which produced several poorly constructed structures.

There were two other problems in Karachi: one, Karachi had a very poor population, some of which supported itself by robbing American homes. We therefore had to hire and maintain a guard force. We posted guards at every home and then had to hire people to keep the guards awake. Some thought that the employment of the guards guaranteed that the homes would not be robbed because the guards would bribe the thieves to stay away. The other problem stemmed from the number of homeless people in Karachi, who if they saw a vacant wall would put a lean-to against it and become squatters. Once the lean-to was in place, the authorities would not remove them. So we had to have a surveillance crew which went around to all the homes and compounds to knock the sticks down before they actually turned into lean-tos. It was dreadful time; Karachi was filled with refugees who had been forced from their homes by the separation of Pakistan from India. These refugees were homeless and no means of support, no sanitation, no water. It was a dreadful time for these people.

Water was always in short supply. We had to boil our water. We had no screens for the windows that had to be left open because we had no air conditioning. So our living conditions left something to be desired. But thanks to TCA, we managed to import some
air conditioners and got some screens. It became an assistance program to the Americans as well as the Pakistanis. These are actions you take outside bureaucratic channels which you could not do if you followed "the book" or the regulations. Such actions, although perhaps extraordinary, are necessary to increase morale and productivity for the whole American presence. The other alternative is to make these items available only to the people of organizations that have the resources, thereby creating tensions and invidious comparisons in the American community. You can be passive on one hand and not do much, or collaborate and share and cause good things to happen for everybody if you are willing to be what I call "a broad Constructionist Administration"--i.e. you can do anything that is not specifically prohibited by regulations! Regulations bind administrators and are a burden to everyone.

Q: Since this was your first inside contact with the Department's administrative operations, do you remember whether you had any frustrations?

CROCKETT: The main frustration was the lack of Departmental understanding. So I soon learned not to ask. I did what I thought was required and necessary by a situation. I asked for money and tried to get that, but I didn't ask for guidance. I remember the time when one of our secretaries became pregnant after an association with a Pakistani man. She didn't want the child nor was she interested in a permanent relationship with the man. But the Embassy nurse checked with Washington and there was nothing that Washington would let us do. She couldn't even be returned to the United States. The Department would not condone an abortion. One evening, the head of the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital came to my home and told me that we had a pregnant woman in the Embassy. He said that his hospital could not perform an abortion, but that he knew of a local doctor who would perform the abortion. He added that after the abortion was performed, they would take our secretary into the hospital. He said that he knew that the woman didn't want the child. He also said that if he were the father of the woman, he would be pleased if something were done to relieve her of her burden. So I caused that to happen. That is the kind of assistance I like to provide people; I did not worry that I stuck my neck out to do this. I was more interested in the welfare of the human being than in the Department and its regulations. I don't say this entirely with pride because I am sure that no large organization can tolerate too much of this of independence. If everyone behaved as I did, you would have chaos. So I don't recommend my approach to anybody else, but it was me.

Q: After Karachi, you were transferred to Rome in 1955. How did assignment come about?

CROCKETT: After two years in Karachi, I went to Washington for consultations. I was asked by Bob Ryan, then an Area Personnel officer, what I would like to do in my next tour. I thought I was ready for a bigger and better post. So it was agreed that I would go to Rome as Assistant Administrative Officer under Bill Boswell. Bill had been in Rome for a couple of years and had lost his assistant. I had never met Bill. Verla had left Karachi early and had gone to London to be with her parents in Europe. Our young son Bobby
stayed with me in Karachi. So he and I went and stopped in Rome on our way back to the
States for home leave, and Bobby and I met the Boswells. We liked the Boswells. The
role of the deputy was pretty loose; neither Bill nor I knew exactly what my functions
would be. But we liked each other and trusted each other. Bill Boswell was a hail-well-
met fellow. The first time I met him he took me to lunch with several other men from his
section. We had fresh strawberries and fresh asparagus at exorbitant prices. I didn't order
any of those items because I knew the condition of our personal budget. When the bill
came, we split it; the others laughed and laughed because Crockett had to pay his share of
their very expensive lunches while he had a very modest one himself. But Boswell treated
me very well. One of the first things that happened that helped our relationship was that
the Embassy's Budget and Fiscal officer went home unexpectedly and no replacement
was in sight for several months. I offered to step into the vacuum, and I think he was
grateful for that. I probably impressed him as being flexible and a good team player and
one who didn't stand on formalities. So our relationships were cordial and it continued
that way even later when he worked for me in Washington. He gave me good ratings; he
helped me to grow.

After my stint as Budget and Fiscal officer, Boswell went on home leave and I acted as
Administrative Counselor in his absence. Soon after that, the Refugee Relief program
started in Italy and all the Consulates were beefed up to handle this new workload.
Boswell let me do the administrative planning to support this new activity. That took up a
great deal of my time. I also did some work with personnel. Generally, as the deputy, I
was the trouble shooter, with no specific day-to-day responsibilities.

Q: Boswell left about 18 months after your arrival and then you became the
Administrative Counselor. Was there any doubt about that promotion?

CROCKETT: In the State Department, there is always doubt. It had certainly been my
hope and expectation to take his place, but there were no guarantees. That was clear from
my conversations with Ryan before going to Rome. I am sure that Bill Boswell's
recommendations carried considerable weight and I know that Bill recommended that I be
his replacement. I am sure that the Ambassador also supported my assignment.

Q: You worked with a number of well known personalities when you were Administrative
Counselor. Let me first ask about Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce.

CROCKETT: My relationship with her was not close, although she was friendly and
cooperative. There was one time when she developed great doubts about me and about
our administrative section. She had sent an "Eyes Only" telegram to Washington. The
"Eyes Only" reply came back, but the communications unit, for some unknown reason,
failed to deliver it to her. She only became aware that the message to her was in the
Embassy when she called the person in Washington with whom she was communicating.
He told her that he had sent an "Eyes Only" message. We were thoroughly investigated
and spent days and days looking for the telegram. There was no record of it having been
received at all. The subject of the exchange of communications was the assignment of a
new DCM. She always suspected that the Foreign Service or that part of which was running communications had destroyed the incoming message so that she would not act upon the change of DCMs. That of course was not the case, but she, for a long time, was very suspicious of the communication section and of me. She began to use her own channels rather than the Department's. Otherwise, she was supportive of our efforts to bring closer collaboration among various Embassy elements. She did have people to the Residence and I worked closely with her protocol officer--Matilda Sinclair. Matilda was very old-school oriented and did not concede, for example, that even American generals who were assigned to the MAAG had some status in the American community. It was a somewhat difficult problem to convince her that there was a larger constituency beyond the Foreign Service. Eventually it worked out.

Mrs. Luce was a cruel woman. I remember a staff meeting during which she reduced the AID Director to jelly by her severe questioning and criticism. She took advantage of the fact that she was a woman and the Ambassador, which sharply restricted his ability to respond. She chastised him publicly with no sense of delicacy, with no regard of the feelings of others. I thought that was very cruel. I always viewed her as being on stage, acting out a role to fit varying situations. One day one of the Alitalia airplanes went down during a flight to New York. She had been scheduled to fly to Washington a little bit later. She immediately canceled those reservations and publicly made new ones on the same Alitalia flight that had gone down. It was a gesture; it may have been a nice gesture, but there was a certain amount of grand-standing in it.

Ed Adams was the Italian country desk officer in Washington and was close to Mrs. Luce personally. He accompanied her on a trip to Rome from Washington. Her plane had to make a refueling stop in Gander and couldn't take off because of weather. So Mrs. Luce and Ed had cocktails and dinner with the military group stationed there. In the group, there was a young military officer who may have had a few too many drinks. He sat near her at dinner and said: "Mrs. Luce, besides being the Ambassador, what else do you do?" She responded: "I write occasionally. I am an author, as you may know." The young man remarked that Mr. Luce was a publisher and then commented: "I bet you don't have much trouble getting your works published! Ha, ha." It was a bad joke. Mrs. Luce became very angry and turned to Adams and asked: "Ed, how do I rank in the military structure?" Ed told her that she ranked with and above the four star generals. Then Mrs. Luce turned to the young officer and said: "I used to relate to people with the stars in my eyes. I now relate to them with the stars on my shoulders and I have four of them on each!" That is the way she was.

Q: Did she interfere with your work?

CROCKETT: Not at all. She had no real interest in administration, except to get what she wanted. During my tenure, the ceiling of her bedroom flecked off and she told the press that she was getting arsenic poisoning from the paint that fell into her breakfast, which she often had while in bed. So we covered that ceiling with some kind of sail cloth, repainted and made sure that it wouldn't flake off on her. But she always maintained to
the public and the press that she was being poisoned. I am sure it was not the case. No doubt there was lead in the paint, but there was not much evidence to suggest that it was flecking off. It could have happened, but I seriously doubt it. In any case, she always put it in a sinister context, implying that there was a threat against her or that this was one of the aggravations she had to put up with for being an Ambassador.

She and John Rooney (the Democratic Congressman from Brooklyn) were ardent enemies--being ardent partisans on opposing sides of the political fence; she being a woman and he being a man; she being rich and he being from a poor family. Rooney came to the Embassy on one of his visits. With great deal of difficulty, I convinced Mrs. Luce to have Rooney and his party to lunch. At the last minute, Rooney refused to go. He let her go through all the trouble of inviting various people and then, after they had arrived, he refused to go. She was not happy!

She took it upon herself to lecture Rooney about his parsimonious treatment of the Embassy and the Department in general. She told about the shortage of secretaries, typewriters, cars--about which she knew very little--and made a ridiculous presentation. She knew from reading the press at appropriations time how Rooney had treated the Department; she knew precious little about the Embassy's operations and needs. The Department of course used Rooney's comments on how he had cut the Department as a rationale for denying Ambassadors who wanted too many additional resources!

The first DCM that I worked with was Elbridge Durbrow, who was an old hand in the Foreign Service--traditional in many ways. He had a very violent temper. He would swear and curse and kick things. I didn't have to deal with him much because through most of Durbrow's tenure, Bill Boswell was the Administrative Counselor. Boswell had the advantage of also having been on old hand in the Foreign Service, so that he had a different relationship to Durbrow than I did. There was a distinct and obvious different relationship among the old hands than there was between them and the Foreign Service staff or the new members of the "club" like myself. Then, old hands had an obvious understanding, trust and rapport among each other that did extend to non-club members.

**Q: Let me pursue that comment. Did you have that feeling while you were in Karachi?**

CROCKETT: I did not. The Ambassador was a political appointee and John Emmerson was a wonderful DCM, without any of the traditional Foreign Service attitudes and conceits. He had a wonderful wife who did not carry the Foreign Service aura with her. He was very inclusive in the way he treated people, particularly in the conduct of their social life. The Emmersons and we didn't become social friends, but we became good friends. He was always gracious and nice to me. But in Rome, we ran into the "club," which consisted of the DCM, the Political and Economic Counselors and the CIA Station Chief. They were all old European hands. Boswell was an exception. Although a member of the "club," he paid attention to his staff both at work and at home. I was never in Durbrow's home. It was his departure and replacement that was the subject of Mrs. Luce's "Eyes Only" telegram exchange. She had told the Department that Durbrow should be
removed and not appointed as an Ambassador. She was certain that Boswell or I or some member of the "club" had intercepted the return message to protect Durbrow. The relationships between Luce and Durbrow were not very good because she thought that she knew more about being an Ambassador and about US-Italian relations than anyone else. She thought she knew more about the internal Italian political scene than her DCM. She was Catholic and had direct access to the Pope. You remember the story that when she visited the Pope one day, he commented to her after her remarks: "You know, Mrs. Luce, I am a Catholic, too". She also had direct access to President Eisenhower. She didn't rely upon a DCM's advice on policy issues. Durbrow certainly wasn't interested in the management of the Embassy. So there was always a tension between the two--turf fights.

Durbrow showed no interest in management or administration, unless something went wrong--a car didn't arrive in time, a telegram was delayed, a secretary got something wrong, his apartment wasn't in good enough shape--then he showed interest--negative, related essentially to his own self-interest. That unfortunately was too often the case with many of the old Foreign Service Officers.

Q: Durbrow was replaced by John Jernegan. How were your relationships with him?

CROCKETT: He was a breath of fresh air. He was very relaxed, as was Mrs. Jernegan. They didn't pay any attention to rank. He got along well with Mrs. Luce, who trusted him. He did what Mrs. Luce wanted and did not interfere in her jurisdiction. He took an interest in management and supported our administrative efforts. He listened and helped when needed, but did not interfere in day-to-day activities. He supported many of our new initiatives after Durbrow and Luce left, especially when Mr. Zellerbach came as Ambassador. We sponsored many activities to try to help the Embassy staff. The Jernegans, for example, often used the beach club that we developed for all Embassy members--both Americans and locals--regardless of Agency affiliation. The Jernegans opened the club; were there with their kids sitting on the beach on their blankets. They talked to the lowest staff and were a model for effective management. I can't comment on his abilities in the substantive area, but he was superb in his people relationships and in his ability to make things happen.

Q: You mentioned some innovations that you instituted in Rome. What were they, besides the beach club that you mentioned earlier?

CROCKETT: The commissary was already in existence when I arrived, but we increased the range of goods available. Housing in Rome was a difficult problem; it was expensive and hard to find. Therefore, new arrivals had to wait in a hotel--several days at least and sometimes weeks--until they could find permanent lodging. That was very unsettling and expensive for families with children. So we established a private organization which rented apartments and furnished them. So then the newcomers could move into these apartments while they searched for permanent quarters. The Embassy took the temporary living allowance that the government paid for people in those circumstances and with that we paid the rent. If the family liked the apartment, they could rent it for their stay in
Rome; if they didn't like it, it was a base for finding something more suitable. It worked well; it didn't cost the government anything. The organization may have made a small profit, but if it did, it was very small. This employees' organization branched out from there—if you had a car for sale, it would buy it and rent it to the newcomers until they managed to get their own transportation. We also made arrangements for personnel to pay their utility bills at the Embassy rather than having to go to the local offices. The association used to buy opera and theater tickets for resale to the employees. The association also bought some dishes and serving bowls and other necessities in case people had large parties and didn't have enough china of their own. We had forty-gallon coffee urns. We would rent out whatever additional housewares they needed. This may have been the first U-rent in any Embassy. We also started a commissary for local employees. That was very controversial. The cost of food was high in Italy. So we found a room in the Embassy that was large and stocked it with cheese, pasta and other basic Italian diet items. We bought them at wholesale and sold them for a small profit—below the market prices. The local employees appreciated that kind of support, but it was very controversial with many "old line" officers who thought that "hardships made you strong!"

All of this was run by a private employees’ association controlled by the same board of governors that ran the commissary. These new morale-boosting efforts were not popular with every one; the staff people—secretaries, communicators—liked it; the American military people liked it, but the old-line Foreign Service officers considered these efforts as too much coddling. They felt it took away initiative; they believed that it would have been better for families to spend their first few days or weeks in hotels, even if it impoverished them. It had been good enough for them. I have never understood their logic, but they strongly and vocally opposed efforts to improve the staff's morale. They even went to the Ambassador in an effort to kill some of these initiatives, fortunately to no avail. When we were inspected by the Department, that report really took us apart for taking on all those activities. We were criticized for undertaking activities that had not been specifically authorized; we therefore had no right to undertake these activities, which, not having been specifically approved, were wrong and illegal. We were severely reprimanded for doing it, although the Embassy's response, approved by the Ambassador and the DCM, objected strenuously to the inspectors' reasoning. And we didn't change our practices, but my successor did.

That is one of the problems of the Foreign Service, or any organization for that matter. When actions are taken beyond the strictures of regulations, they become the responsibility of the person who wants to make the extra effort and is willing to take the risk. His or her successor, however, if not so inclined, can dissolve it all. That gives the organization an impermanence which is very unsettling and in some cases detrimental to the efficiency and effectiveness of that organization.

Q: Tell me something about the philosophy behind these innovations?
CROCKETT: It may sound corny, but the philosophy had two aspects: a) to help people and b) to improve the effectiveness of the Embassy. I didn't see how a Foreign Service Officer or US interests were well served if he had to put a wife and two children into a pension or hotel, in small rooms, and then had to spend six weeks looking for a permanent residence. Not only was such living uncomfortable, but it was also expensive, since he would have had to pay for all meals in local restaurants. I felt that such an officer would have been a much happier employee, and presumably therefore more productive, if he could place his family in an established living quarters fully furnished with the basic needs and cleaned by a maid. Not only was the family's morale maintained, but the house-hunting time was reduced because both the officer and his wife--mostly the latter--could spend more time looking for permanent quarters. I still do not understand why providing such support makes an officer weak. It seemed to me that the program was good for husbands, wives and the children and eventually good for the Embassy. An officer who had to constantly worry about his family and his finances could not be as productive or attentive as one who was less concerned about just keeping his family's head above the water. The officer, with his home cares somewhat relieved should have been more productive and at an earlier time. I couldn't see how a program that would be beneficial to an officer and the institution could be considered detrimental. But as I said, the program was not universally accepted; many people objected strenuously.

Q: What was the philosophy behind the innovations that you implemented on behalf of the Italian employees?

CROCKETT: There were two programs through which we hoped to improve the lot of the local employees. One was the beach club, which was open to all Embassy employees. I had hoped that such a collective meeting ground would bring all people closer together to share experiences. The interesting part of this program was the negative reaction of the senior Italian employees, who came to me after we decided on a beach club. They praised the idea for the opportunity it would give them to mingle with Americans in an informal setting. But they were very disturbed that lower-ranking Italian employees, like drivers and cleaning people should have access to the club. But we did permit the use of the facilities by all employees as a real lesson in democracy.

The commissary, on the other hand, was done for morale and financial considerations. It helped the locals' morale because they could buy their staples at more reasonable prices. It was also the custom of the country; almost every government agency, almost all large enterprises had their own commissaries. So our people asked why the Embassy couldn't have one as well, and I knew of no good reason why it shouldn't. It wasn't authorized by any regulation, but that didn't make it wrong. Of course, there were a number of Foreign Service officers, mostly the traditionalists, who objected to this facility as well. There were some young Foreign Service officers who also opposed these innovations. One of them wrote me about two years ago, upon his retirement, saying that he apologized for all the opposition he provided during our days in Rome and recognized that he had been wrong.
An interesting aspect of all of this fuss which was highlighted by the Inspection Report was that soon after the Embassy made its appeal on the report I was transferred back to Washington. There I found that one of our strongest supporters was Loy Henderson, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. As an old hand, he would have seemed to be an unlikely supporter. He brought me together with the Chief Inspector and we buried our differences and the Inspection Report—at least that part pertaining to administration—at the same time.

Q: Before we leave Rome, let me go back to your experiences with John Rooney while you were there. You didn't know John Rooney before his visit to Rome?

CROCKETT: I did not. I first met him when he visited Italy after I had become Counselor for Administration. He arrived on a ship. He preferred to travel by ship. So Verla and I went to Naples to meet Rooney and his party and brought them to Rome. I had never met a Congressman, much less one like Rooney. I didn't know why he was there or what I was supposed to do. Mrs. Luce directed me to be the "control" officer. My own concept was to present the Embassy in the best light possible. I wanted to make sure Rooney understood our needs—as subtly as possible—and that he and his party had a good time. So Verla and I treated them as our guests and showed them Rome by day and night. Frankly, I soon found out that his interests in the Embassy were marginal, unlike his interest in having a good time. So that is the way the visit was conducted.

His day didn't start until late lunch because we would stay up late; he would drink hard and then he slept very late. But after lunch, he would be ready to go out. One of Rooney's interests was Embassy housing because that was a large part of the Department's budget, which was under the jurisdiction of his Committee. One of the items that he looked at most overseas was housing. In those days, the Crocketts lived in a State Department house which was on the same compound with a large multi-story house in which the DCM and the Political and Economic Counselors lived. Our house had been the gate-keeper's house for this palazzo. It was a nice enough house, but it was run-down. One of my philosophies was that the administrator had to get everybody else's house fixed before he fixed his own. An administrator should never have something in his or her house that is not available to other senior officers first. That is one way to avoid animosities and envy. So our house was not very fit, but we didn't mind. It was comfortable. John Rooney wanted to see the house, so we invited him and his party in for after-dinner drinks one night. There was a lot of hilarity and loud talk, which finally awoke our son Bobby. He was a little boy of about six and he came downstairs, carrying a stuffed dog. He was not afraid and Rooney fussed over him in a big way. Rooney immediately liked this cute, bright tow-headed little boy. Finally, I heard the Congressman say to Bobby: "How do you like the house you live in?" I was horrified when Bobby responded: "Oh, we don't like it at all. It is small and dirty and doesn't have nice furniture. I would like to live in a nice house like my friend Jenny Freeman has!" (Freeman was the Political Counselor). We had never talked to Bobby or in front of him about the house. Then Rooney said: "Did your father tell you to tell me that?" And without hesitation Bobby responded: "Yes. He did". By this time, the whole group was paying rapt attention to the conversation.
Rooney said: "Thank you, Bobby, for telling me. Maybe we can get the house fixed up." He flashed a leering smile at me. Bobby was bundled off to bed before he could do anymore damage. The crowd awaited Rooney's reaction. He said: "Well, I'll be damned! I have seen some low down tricks pulled on me, but never would I expect to have a man try to influence me through his six-year-old son. That is the way of the Foreign Service—deceitful, dishonest; they will anything to get their way. You are something else, Bill Crockett!" I protested my innocence, but neither Rooney nor any of the other guests would ever let me forget the incident. He roared at my obvious sincerity and discomfiture. He liked nothing better that to have a "little skin that he could twist," and he twisted mine continuously and the crowd loved it. After Rooney parted, I wondered whether my Foreign Service career was finished. Years later I thought that episode might really have launched it. Rooney may not have remembered me or Verla, but he certainly remembered Bobby. I will never know. In general, the visit was a successful one with the exception of Rooney's snub of Mrs. Luce, for which I paid later—I had to explain why I didn't get him there. I had to apologize. But it was a good visit—the party had a good time and things went well. Rooney only had a brief conversation with Mrs. Luce and that was the extent of his substantive briefings—actually most of the meeting was devoted to her criticisms of his parsimoniousness.

Rooney always traveled with his principal staff aide, Jay Howe, who was narrow-minded, touchy, sensitive person who hated the Foreign Service. He was suspicious of the Service and very critical of it. He hated USIA even more. Howe was always with him whispering in Rooney's ear questions to ask or things to see. Mrs. Rooney was always with the party. Jay Farrell, who later became Commissioner for Immigration and at the time of the Rome visit was probably the Assistant Commissioner, always traveled with Rooney. He was a long time friend. Later on, when I traveled with him, Mich Cieplinski also went along. He never traveled with another Congressman. The ranking minority member of the subcommittee, Congressman Frank Bow, would also travel and often to the same places that Rooney visited, but always separately. Rooney's ego demanded all the attention and service; he couldn't share it with anyone else.

**Q:** The Rome Embassy's administrative staff was relatively large. How was the quality?

**CROCKETT:** Mixed. We had a personnel officer--Bertha Beaton--who was a dreadful human being. She was terrible with her staff. She was an awful supervisor and therefore the section was very ineffective. Her supervisory skills were so bad that the staff was basically non-functioning. At one time, we had a very ineffective General Services officer. Later he was replaced by John Bacon, who was a good General Services officer. He had under him a young officer by the name of Larry Roberts, who was responsible for the maintenance of US government-owned residences and buildings. He was very good and cooperative and very efficient. My first security officer was Chuck Johnson, who was difficult to deal with. His attitude was that security was not a part of administration; he thought he should report directly to the Ambassador, which he did frequently over the head of the Administrative Counselor. It was a very difficult official relationships although we were socially friendly. He was very efficient. So it was a mixed bag. The
clerical staff in the Administrative Section were better than the officers. In those days, none of my staff received any training. The Department didn't provide any administrative training except perhaps to Budget and Fiscal Officers, who were instructed what to pay and what not to pay and what would send them to jail. But I don't remember the Department providing any training in the other administrative areas. I think that has improved, although I don't know whether such vital skills as supervision of local staffs are taught.

*Q: But you had a good local staff?*

CROCKETT: Yes and that is the saving grace of Foreign Service administration. In most Embassies around the world, the local staff provides the continuity. They know their jobs, know how to get things done and do their jobs pretty well. It is sad when incompetent FSOs try to supervise them!

*Q: But the Rome staff was considerably different from the Karachi staff?*

CROCKETT: Very much so. The Italian staff was very professional. Most of them had been with the Embassy for many years, dating back to the end of the War. They knew their jobs well; the Americans come and go. The quality, ethics and values were high. To my knowledge, we never a problem with a local staff member. The Karachi staff was new and not very effective.

*Q: How much impact did the American supervisors have on the efficiency of the local staff?*

CROCKETT: There was always the possibility of a negative impact; there was always the possibility of revoking delegations of authority to the local staff, making the locals bring all decisions to the American supervisor before any action was to be taken. The less able and less secure the supervisor was, the greater the risk that decisions would be made by him or her. Those supervisors tended to distrust the locals. The possibility of negative influence was very great. There wasn't too much positive influence. It was my view then and now that many Embassies, particularly in Europe, didn't need American supervisors in the administrative sections because the locals were honest and efficient enough to get the job done. This may not be true in Third World Embassies or some of the more difficult posts, but in Western Europe, I believe we could have operated effectively with a much smaller American presence in the administrative sections. I am not sure that anybody else agrees with that, but I firmly believed it.

*Q: Did the American supervisors grow in their jobs in Rome?*

CROCKETT: Probably. My attitude toward bureaucracy enabled them to do things and undertake activities which might not have been permitted under other administrative officers. That should have made them grow. It may have caused them trouble later on, but I believe that they grew in terms of attitude. I always maintained that administration was
to serve and not to control. That was a difficult message to get across to people. Many of them, if they gave out pencils, would wish to control the use by not issuing new ones until the stubs of the old ones were turned back in! It is very hard to keep people who have support functions to remember that the operative word is "support." It is not control. I hope therefore that the staff in Rome grew in attitude at least with a better appreciation of the meaning of support and with a better appreciation of the role of an administrative section in a larger institution, such as an Embassy. Even though supported by a strong local staff, the Americans did not devote much thought to "management" as contrasted to "administration." They did not do enough planning and that may have been my fault, stemming from my lack of experience in the Foreign Service and my lack of understanding of management opportunities at an Embassy. I should take the blame for that, and not they. There were opportunities for us to do more in the Embassy in terms of such things as local training and development for managers. That was my fault. I and they were too devoted to details, which could have been left in competent local hands.

Q: Did you have a deputy administrative officer after you were promoted to Counselor?

CROCKETT: Yes, Joe Eggert was my deputy. He came some months after Bill Boswell had left. I am not sure that I wanted one, but I got one. Joe turned out to be an excellent deputy--loyal, supportive and with the same attitude towards support of people as I had. He had the same attitude as I did when it came to trying to develop a sense of community. If I did anything in any Embassy where I served, it was to develop that sense of community among the American employees as well as the locals. By community, I mean a sense of oneness, not as a force against any other group, but to foster a sense of cooperation and collaboration and not competition, which often destroys the cohesiveness of an organization.

Q: Rome was one vivid illustration of a situation in which Americans for the most lived in "ghettoes." That was true for the senior officers as some of the lower-ranking staff. Did you ever feel that was an unnecessary barrier to our relationships with the Italians?

CROCKETT: Yes, I think the "ghetto" concept is poor policy. It was probably driven by financial considerations and not by substantive policy, but I think it is a bad policy. Our personnel should have lived among Italians, although even if you lived "on the economy," that was no guarantee that you would have become acquainted with your neighbors. It is hard to become neighborly in foreign communities. My comments are relevant to when I was in Rome. Today, the situation is changed, with terrorism and overt actions against Americans--and a "ghetto" may be more justified.

Q: You left Rome in 1958 and came to Washington as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget and Finance. How did that assignment come about?

CROCKETT: The job was almost exclusively oriented toward the accounting function, although the plan was that after a few months of familiarization, I would also become responsible for the State Department budget. I was disappointed with the assignment
because I wanted to shed the administrative label and move into a consular or political job—from which, after all, most of the Ambassadorial appointments were made. I saw administration as a dead end. One didn't go anywhere from administration. I had applied to go to Milano as Consul General. But the powers-that-be assigned me to the Budget and Finance position. In due course I reported to the Department and met my predecessor for a brief discussion before he left for his next assignment. He asked whether I knew why I had been selected. I said: "No". He said: "As you know, the person in this job must be able to get along with the Chairman of our Appropriations Committee. So when I decided to leave, we went to see John Rooney to see whether there was anyone that he would like to see appointed". He said: "No, there are none of your cookie-pushers that I particularly want. Send anyone and I'll help you squeeze your lemons!" We thanked him and as we were leaving, he said: "Oh, yes--I met a man in Rome by the name of Crockett. Why don't you select him? He is not so smart, but he has a smart son!". That is how my name may have come up, although it may have been under consideration even before then. I don't know. After telling me the Rooney story, my predecessor left, wishing me luck because "you will would need it!"

Q: You mention disappointment with another assignment in the administrative area. Did you feel that little could be done to modernize administration in the Department and/or were tired of being viewed as a "second class" citizen?

CROCKETT: Both. I saw the administrative function in the Department as a terrible bureaucracy; one that didn't listen and had no motivation or intention to change. It was entrenched to the point that reform appeared hopeless. The Rome Inspection Report, that castigated me in dreadful terms for what I tried to do to help and support people and programs--was a very bitter pill to swallow. , but it characterized the Service's view of what administration was supposed to be. Furthermore, I also thought that career-wise the only way to move up through the ranks to be an Ambassador--which I wanted badly--was through other avenues in the Foreign Service. There was no possibility at that time to become an Ambassador if one had spent his whole career in administration.

To be fair about the "second class" citizenship, after Zellerbach and Jernegan came to Rome, that situation changed and there were other personnel changes in the Embassy. Mr. Flake came as Consul General and the new people were far more supportive and accepting of administration. They removed some of the "second class" taint. One of the people who came to live in Rome after retirement was Ambassador Jeffery Caffery who was one the giants of the Foreign Service. His last post had been Cairo and he wanted to retire in Rome. He had a Swiss house-boy to help him. We got the Italian government to approve his immigration so that he could stay with the Ambassador. We did a lot of things for Caffery--he was a retired Ambassador with a great reputation. The Cafferys had Verla and me occasionally for dinner and we reciprocated. He told me once: "Bill, I can't tell you how much I appreciate all you do for us. I admire the way you get things done. I often forget that you are not a real Foreign Service officer!". It was a genuine thanks and not meant in a condescending manner, but it did give me further insight into the mind set
of the veteran Foreign Service officer. I think the "second class" issue will never really go away.

Q: But while in Rome, you began to think about Ambassadorial opportunities?

CROCKETT: It was a natural thought for someone in the Foreign Service. After all, that was the top of our career. I had seen Ambassadors and I thought I could rise to that level. I of course was aware of the unstated policy of not promoting administrative people to Ambassadorships.

Q: How long were you responsible for only the finance operations?

CROCKETT: About six-eight months.

Q: And then you were also assigned the budget responsibilities?

CROCKETT: That is right. I worked for Lane Dwinell, who was the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. He was a former governor of New Hampshire and a former CEO of a very successful textile mill. He was a nice man and our relationship was good, as long as I did what he told me to do. When I tried to do what I wanted, the relationship was not as cordial. Having been a practicing politician, he had a good appreciation of the Rooney's importance and the importance of doing what we had to do in order to cater to him. He understood that getting money from Rooney was more than presenting annual figures and justifications. There had to be a solid relationship between Rooney and the Department that had to be nurtured every day. For example, one time Rooney had a dinner given for him in New York by a group of his constituents. Rooney invited me and I invited Dwinell and a couple of others in the Bureau of Administration to go to New York to attend this dinner. Dwinell went and was introduced; he gave a very gracious little speech praising Rooney. Then Rooney announced that he had a surprise for everybody. He said that one of his friends, who was the President of a tow boat company, had invited Rooney and his friends to take a ride around the harbor after dinner on one of the company's tow boats. The cruise started about midnight and at three o'clock in the morning we were still plowing around the harbor, drinking scotches. Dwinell understood the need to share such moments with the Chairman and didn't complain one bit. He understood that this was part of the process of getting appropriations. Rooney, on the other hand, felt that Dwinell's presence was useful to him in political terms.

Q: Tell me something about Rooney's views of the Department and the strategies he used in dealing with the Department's budget.

CROCKETT: In the period we are discussing, there was a Congressman from Iowa by the name of Gross. He hated the State Department and thought that the Department was unnecessary. In fact, there was a strong anti-State feeling throughout the Congress. Some of this was due to policy differences, such as immigration and some foreign policies. The climate in Congress was not favorable to the Department. Rooney said that his strategy
was to examine the Department's budget thoroughly, to question all items, to give hell to
the Department, to demean us if we didn't know the answers to his questions, to show
how incompetent we were and finally to cut our requests drastically. He could then take
that record and the drastically reduced budget to the floor of the House, present it and
defend it and be upheld on his recommendations. He never suffered a cut on the floor of
the House. Gross and the other critics would praise him for his bashing of the Department
and for reducing the request so drastically. Rooney would frequently quote parts of the
budget hearings on the floor particularly those moments in which he looked good and the
Department looked ridiculous. They felt that he had done a great job and would then fall
in line and approve Rooney's recommendations. That was his strategy, or at least how he
described it to us. I was never sure that he needed to go as far as he did. He was even
tougher on USIA because they were even more suspect in Congress. But he treated the
FBI entirely differently. J. Edgar Hoover would appear before Rooney's committee and
tell the members what his requirements were and that was it. He had great clout and
credibility. Congress was supportive and the FBI's requests were not cut. There was the
great contrast between the FBI and the Department.

Rooney's "game" was not well received by the Foreign Service. It saw him as an ogre and
resented Rooney for presenting them as an unprofessional group and for making fun of
them. There was therefore a mutual feeling of antipathy. The committee was run
essentially by Rooney, the Democrat, and Frank Bow, the Republican. One of the two
would always be the chairman depending on which party had won the elections. They
worked together closely and marked up the budget together. One time, they demanded
that our appropriations for "Emergencies in the Foreign Service" be audited. This was a
discretionary fund appropriated to the Secretary of State and the expenditures from it had
always been classified as confidential. The outlays were theoretically for purposes that
should not be made public. But the appropriations committee decided one year that they
should be audited. They showed Loy Henderson, who was then Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration, the results of the audit. They read him, in an off-the-record session,
various expenditures which showed that some Ambassador had bought cigars as a gift to
some foreign leader and that a camera had been bought for another leader and so on. Both
Rooney and Bow had Ambassadors who they considered to be good friends. These
Ambassadors were also on the list and Rooney commented to Bow that it was indeed
amazing to see so many friends on the audit list. Henderson plead with them not to
publish the audit because it would very detrimental both to the Foreign Service and some
of the recipients of the gifts. Of course, Rooney and Bow toyed with Henderson and made
life miserable for him, but in the end they did not publish the audit.

The two of them also had a lot fun with the "Representation" appropriation. These funds
were made available to senior Foreign Service officers to compensate them, in part, for
the extra expenses they had to incur to conduct the necessary social amenities--the
lunches, dinner and parties for the leadership of the country to which they were assigned.
They had that fund audited and had great fun commenting on the types and costs of
entertainments undertaken by the Foreign Service. Privately, neither Rooney or Bow were
anti-State Department nor anti-Foreign Service. Publicly, they were. One Congressman
on the committee said one day to his colleagues that he agreed with the appropriations that the Committee was about to approve to the Department, but when the bill got to the floor of the House, he would have to publicly criticize the budget level because his constituents considered that whatever was appropriated to the Department would be excessive and a waste of money. That is the situation that you have to understand and the Foreign Service did not. Both the Foreign Service and USIA felt that logic and reason would be all that was required to obtain the necessary appropriations. That isn't the way it worked and there was no use in trying to do it this way. For an organization which prides itself in political expertise, I found the Foreign Service very naive in the day-to-day realities of political life. There had to be a way to meet the political needs of the Congressmen. They had to satisfy their constituencies, whether they be their electorate or other Congressmen. Those needs had to be recognized and met if possible.

_Q: Your relationship with John Rooney is, I believe, a "real world" view of the Executive-Legislative Branches relationships. I'd like to examine it more closely. For example, was there an understanding between you and Rooney before the President's budget was submitted as to the amounts it would contain for the Department of State?_

CROCKETT: We never explicitly and formally discussed the amounts to be included with the Chairman, but I am sure that Roy Little, who was our liaison man with the Appropriations Committee, discussed with Rooney our requests to the Bureau of the Budget and subsequent developments. Rooney would often advise us on what we could expect to get from his Committee. We always had to submit a higher level than we expected to receive in order to give Rooney an opportunity to make his cuts. We most always discussed new initiatives with Rooney, particularly those that might result in additional financial resource requirements.

_Q: Were there some projects you did not pursue because of Rooney's opposition?_

CROCKETT: Yes, because of that and because of stupidity on our part as well as my inability to devote enough attention to a particular project. For example, most of the initiatives which I undertook I did at the beginning without Rooney's knowledge. That was a big mistake. It was then easy for him to eliminate the dollar amounts requested to support those initiatives after I left and my successor had taken over. It was also easy for my successor to disassociate himself from those because neither he or Rooney had in fact been involved in their origins. That was a big mistake; I should have associated Rooney with these projects so that they would have had his support after my departure. My view was that since these projects required minimal extra expenditures, there was no reason to involve the Chairman. On those projects that were submitted to him for pre-approval, he never gave his stamp of approval and never acknowledged that they had been discussed with him, although in the end he allowed them. But he still made us jump over all the hurdles during hearings, although we knew that in the end he would approve funding for those projects.
Q: You were instrumental in introducing computers into the Department. That was an expensive item. I assume that was discussed with Rooney before the program began.

CROCKETT: Yes. Our computer and communications needs were fully discussed with Rooney and Bow, so that they were aware of the problems and our solutions. The need for a new communication system was really highlighted during the "Bay of Pigs" episode when we could not contact all of our missions before the President's speech. It was a terrible fiasco because a number of governments were caught flat-footed by Kennedy's announcement about embargoing Cuba. Rooney understood and supported the modernization of our communications system.

Q: You did not have a similar relationship with the Senate?

CROCKETT: No. For one reason, Senator Lyndon Johnson, who was the Chairman of the full Appropriations Committee as well as subcommittee responsible for the State Department, didn't have time and delegated over-sight on our budget to Harold Merrick, a long time Senate staffer. Johnson did chair the hearings. For another reason, the Senate reviews were very brief. Johnson and Rooney were close friends and I am sure, although I can't substantiate it, that Johnson depended on Rooney to examine our requests closely. The Senate review was therefore generally perfunctory. For a third reason, we looked to the Senate as a court of appeals to restore cuts made by the House. Generally, we were successful in getting some reductions restored. We would always tell Rooney which items we would appeal. He didn't seem to care. He understood that it was part of the process. In some respects, Rooney saw the whole budgetary process as a big game. He therefore looked at appeals as part of the game. He knew that even if an item was restored to which he strenuously objected, he could prevail in the House-Senate conference to have it excluded from the appropriations. I don't think Rooney talked to Johnson about any of the items that were being appealed because Johnson really didn't care very much about State's appropriations. Howe and Merrick, the two staffers, discussed our budget and probably agreed to what actions the Senate Committee would take and what would happen in conference. This is why I have always felt that a government agency had to have solid and close relationships with the senior Congressional staffers. That may be even more important than good relations with Congressmen and Senators. Both Howe and Merrick were very sensitive and touchy. They saw slights that were never intended and had to be treated with extra special care. Merrick was the worst of the two. We catered to them although they never asked us for anything. I tried to create an atmosphere of trust so that they felt that I wouldn't lie to them. I tried to create an atmosphere of respect so that our requests would be taken seriously. I would tell them the truth. I tried to build friendship, which was true for all of our people who worked in the budget area. This is not to say that we ever reached the stage where we got carte blanche. Jay Howe always whispered in Rooney's ears, but at least they would listen to us and often agree with us. And they knew that they could trust us top tell them the truth. We didn't play games.
Q: One of the current issues in Washington concerns alleged Congressional micromanagement of the Executive Branch agencies. Did Rooney include any provisions in the appropriations acts that would tie your management hands?

CROCKETT: No. He threatened to, but never carried it out. We tried our best to keep the Chairman up to date on any substantive crises or policy changes, even if they didn't effect the budget. That bolstered his ego, because then he had information that many of his colleagues didn't. That, I believe, kept him from legislating on substantive issues. Occasionally, he would require certain administrative actions, but never tried to influence substance. He never used the appropriations avenue to dictate policies or actions that might have been helpful to his constituents. He was very ethical in that way. The staff was the same way. That was also true of the Senate, even though we never catered to Johnson as we did to Rooney. We never briefed him on substantive issues, although he may have gotten information from other parts of the Department. We did cater to Merrick; we tried to make sure that he was aware of all that was going on so that he wouldn't be surprised.

We were not invited to the House-Senate conferences. Sometimes, Little would sit outside the conference room to answer any questions that might arise. He always got the first information about the conclusions of the conference.

Q: Was Rooney enthusiastic about any part of the Department?

CROCKETT: To the best of my recollection, he was not. The one issue that he was passionate about was the question of homosexuals in the Department. He always wanted to know how many we had found in the prior year. It was part of his public posturing. I remember one time, just before appearing in front of him, that the Department was picketed by a homosexual organization. When we got to the hearings, Rooney said: "You bastards! How lucky or smart can you be to get the Department picketed just at the start of appropriations hearings!".

Sometimes we would run out of money and need a supplemental appropriation. I generally would not talk to Rooney about it personally, but had Little or Frank Meyer raise the issue with Rooney. They would take the line: "Poor old Bill needs help; he is in trouble. Can you help poor old Bill?". That seemed to be a more successful approach than if I had gone personally. It is interesting to note that more often than not, the appropriated amounts were more provided on the basis of a personal relationship than on the merits of the request. Rooney's willingness to approve requests was based more on his friendship with us than on our substantive needs. That also true about the way he handled witnesses. Personal friends or people that had my support had a relatively easier time during hearings than others. I couldn't always protect everybody, but it was true to a certain extent he would treat me and other friends differently. He had a great antipathy towards phoniness. If he sensed that the witness might not have been genuine or what he called a "stuffed shirt", regardless whether that was true or not, he was remorseless.
Q: You accompanied Rooney on his annual pilgrimages. Tell us about those.

CROCKETT: Most of the trips were annual, although there were some exceptions. For example, he attended the World Fair in Moscow. He would always go to the three "Ts": Italy, Ireland and Israel. These were countries to which most of his constituents had some ties. We went to Latin America one time; he went behind the Iron Curtain once, but he tried to get to the three "Ts" at least once during his term. These visits were primarily for public consumption, although he never brought a photographer along; they had very little to do with the Department and its operations. But as time went on, I succeeded in having the Ambassadors brief Rooney on substantive issues. He appreciated that; his ego was easily enhanced.

Q: Let me return to the question of how your relationships with Rooney were viewed by the Department. Did any one on the Seventh Floor--Secretary, Under Secretary and Deputy Under Secretaries--raise any objections?

CROCKETT: No, no one on the seventh Floor. Secretary Rusk would always be our first witness before the Appropriations Committees. He had some appreciation of Rooney's political needs and complied. None of the other Seven Floor principals got involved.

Q: You answer suggests that below the Seventh Floor there was some skepticism, if not outright antagonism.

CROCKETT: Yes, there was. It seemed to me that there was a feeling that I used Rooney as my foil against the rest of the Department. It was again that feeling of the "we and they". I was viewed as Rooney's "patsy" and perhaps to some extent I was. There was some feeling that I used Rooney as a weapon against the Department instead of turning him into a proponent. This view was probably most wide-spread among the old hands--the "club". There was open questioning and debate of my strategy with Rooney. There were those who suggested that we confront him, deal sternly with him based entirely on facts and data. They thought that in the end the Department would have been better off.

Q: In 1961, you became Assistant Secretary for Administration. How did that appointment come about?

CROCKETT: In the Fall of 1960, John Rooney and his party toured South America. We went by ship because that is the way he preferred it. Kennedy had already been elected, but had not yet taken office. Rooney discussed with me and Ray Farrell what our aspirations were. I told him that I would like to be Deputy Under Secretary for Administration; Ferrell wanted to be Commissioner for Immigration and Naturalization. That was the end of the conversation. Verla and I went to Hastings, Nebraska, for Christmas. Rooney called me around New Year from Palm Beach said that he had talked to Kennedy about me. He said that Kennedy had decided that the major posts in the world, including those in Europe, would be filled by career Foreign Service officers. He understood that most career officers could not afford these posts and had asked Rooney to
do something that would make such assignments possible. Rooney said that could be
done by increasing the "Emergency" fund, but that he wouldn't trust anybody to handle
that fund except Bill Crockett. He said that he had told Kennedy that if he wanted the
extra money for the new Ambassadors, he would have to make Crockett the Assistant
Secretary of State for Administration. Rooney said that he had listened to me on the trip,
but didn't know whether I wanted the job or not, but he was confident that I would be
offered the job. He added that my name wouldn't be mentioned; that a lot of other names
would speculated about. He suggested that I pray and keep my mouth shut and wait to see
what happened. I didn't know Kennedy or any members of his staff. I was just a name.

That conversation with Rooney was followed by a lot of rumors, lot of names, but never
mine. I didn't say anything and I think everyone was surprised when my appointment was
made. There was some consternation in some quarters of the Department about Crockett.
I never had a discussion with Rusk at all. I don't even know who started the paper-work. I
assume the White House, because no one in the Department seemed to know anything
about my nomination. I don't even know if Rusk knew. I had never met him; I didn't meet
him really until I was sworn in. He never called me before my hearings or acknowledged
that I existed. My name was submitted to Congress; the hearings went well in part
because I was a known commodity. I had appeared before some of the Senators when I
was the Department's budget officer. Even after my confirmation and swearing in, I did
not have a meeting with Rusk. I really worked for the Deputy Under Secretary for
Administration, Roger Jones.

Q: When did you meet Roger Jones?

CROCKETT: I met Jones when he first came in. He was appointed early and met with his
staff. So I met Roger soon after his appointment. After I was appointed and confirmed, I
was called by Bobby Kennedy' office; he wanted to see me. I will never forget that
interview. It took place in his huge office in the Justice Department--he was the Attorney
General. When I stepped into the office, there was a big dog lying across the doorway.
Kennedy didn't look up, but feeling my presence, said: "Just step over him". So I stepped
over the dog and approached his desk. He asked me to sit down. Almost without looking
up he said that we needed to get some things straight. He said: "I don't know how you got
your job, or how you think you got your job. But I can tell you where your loyalties lie.
You work for my brother, the President of the United States, and you do whatever he
says. Your job in the State Department is to make sure that all the personnel in the
Department understand that they work for the President and that they are to be loyal to
him. So now you know what your job is!". Then he said: "Do you know how to do your
job?". I hesitated a second, so Kennedy continued:" I can tell you. You kick people in the
ass so hard that teeth will rattle in all the Embassies. That's what you will do. That is how
to get your job done!". With that the interview was over. That was the first and last time I
ever saw Bobby Kennedy. I got calls periodically telling me to do certain things,
particularly when he spearheading the Administrations counter-insurgencies efforts. The
calls were always orders; he never asked; he only ordered. I never heard of any other
Assistant Secretary receiving the same treatment; they may have, but I never heard about it.

*Q: Roger Jones was a professional administrator. Do you have any idea how his appointment came about?*

CROCKETT: I don't know, but I think that Ralph Dungan, who became very influential in White House personnel matters, had worked with Jones in the Bureau of the Budget and may have had something to do with it. Jones was a very credible and highly esteemed Civil Servant. Jones left his job as Deputy Under Secretary about a year after his appointment. Roger may have been an excellent administrator, but not a very good politician. He managed to get on Wayne Hayes' bad side. Hayes was the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee that dealt with foreign policy issues. He too was a very touchy, ego-driven person. I don't remember exactly what Jones did to affront Hayes. But I do know that one time, when the President needed something from Hayes, the latter told him that he would try to accommodate him if Jones were removed from the Department. I also know that Hayes recommended me to be Jones' successor. I had not courted Hayes as I had Rooney, because I didn't really need him that much. He was not involved in any legislation of immediate need or interest to me, with exception of the Foreign Buildings authorization. But we certainly took care of him during his trips abroad. We sent escort officers with him. It was funny in one respect: Hayes and Rooney were so much alike, but disliked each other intensely. One year Hayes remarked to me that I always traveled with Rooney and never with him. He added that he wanted me to travel with him as well. I told him that I would be glad to do so. It just happened the first time after that conversation that Hayes' and Rooney's trip schedules overlapped. So I went to Congressman "Doc" Morgan, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and explained my dilemma to him. He suggested that I "get sick" and thereby unable to escort neither. And so I got "sick" and didn't go with Hayes or Rooney.

Hayes in many ways was more demanding than Rooney. He had no hesitation in calling the Secretary to rant and rave about some minor problem. That was his style.

*Q: What shape did you find the Bureau of Administration when you took charge of it?*

CROCKETT: I didn't find a horrible mess. The work was flowing along in a the turgid, traditional bureaucratic way that it always had. There was dissatisfaction among overseas posts with the support they were receiving from the Department, about the rules and regulations which didn't take differing needs and situations into account, but I didn't find a mess. very early in my tenure, Chester Bowles, then Under Secretary, took an extensive world-wide fact-finding trip. He agreed to let me go along to talk to administrative officers while he talked to Ambassadors. I got Bowles to agree to bring administrative officers to his Ambassadorial conferences. So I got a chance to talk to administrative officers and Ambassadors' wives about their posts' needs, the impact of Departmental rules, regulations, and policies on their daily problems. I was able in this way to isolate
dozens of problems that were common enough to many posts so that they needed to be attended to.

*Q:* I assume that in light of your Karachi and Rome experiences, you had a pretty good idea of the what regulations were inhibiting effective administration overseas. Were there any additional items that surprised you?

CROCKETT: No surprises, but a lot of confirmation about my suspicions. The comments from these meetings confirmed my impressions of what needed to be done. In general, we all agreed that Embassies needed to have more leeway and more discretion about solving their own problems. We all agreed that more decentralization should be tried.

*Q:* Let me pursue the question of Jones' successor. You mentioned that you were one of the candidates, but you were not selected. William Orrick, an Assistant Attorney General, was appointed as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. Is it fair to assume that was another Bobby Kennedy involvement in the State Department?

CROCKETT: I think so.

*Q:* Do you know whether Orrick had any other mandates from Kennedy beyond the instructions he had given you?

CROCKETT: Not to my knowledge. I think Orrick distrusted me and in effect abolished the Assistant Secretary position by moving me out of my office and giving me space in his suite. The distrust caused the *de facto* amalgamation of the two offices. He effectively took me out of the channel of command. I lost my line authority with the Bureau of administration because I got very thin gruel to work on from Orrick.

*Q:* Did Orrick have an impact on the Department at all?

CROCKETT: I don't think so. It would be hard to find any legacies of the Orrick period, except for the symbol of his office, which became known as "O". He started to work on the Herter Committee report. He had Herman Pollack working on it. Rooney didn't like Pollack and Hayes didn't like him. So Orrick had little support or impact. I had nothing to do with that poor relationship between Orrick and Congress. I did not poison the well. I was not part of Orrick's inner circle and I did have a strong feeling that I would be sent overseas as soon as they could find a job for me. I was part of the front office; had a desk, but very little to do. I didn't see the correspondence nor the people. I had no contacts with other Seventh Floor principals; I was screened out of that. I no longer attended the Secretary's or Under Secretary's staff meetings. I became for all purposes a non-entity.

*Q:* Now Orrick lasted only for a year or so. What was the cause of his downfall?
CROCKETT: The same as Jones'. He didn't get along with Hayes.

Q: Then you were appointed as Deputy Under Secretary. Was there an effort made by Rooney and Hayes to get you appointed to that position?

CROCKETT: Not by Rooney. Hayes did. Rooney had made his case earlier and apparently wasn't interested in doing any more. But Hayes still pushed. By this time, however, I had established pretty effective contacts with Ralph Dungan, who, as mentioned earlier, was part of the White House staff. He was principally interested in Ambassadorial appointments. I had no social relationships with the Dungan, but our professional relationships were very positive. He seemed to trust me; he seemed to appreciate what I was trying to do. But I was distressed by the distrust of the Foreign Service that was exhibited both by the White House and by the Congress. Even Dungan was leery of the Service as an entity and questioned its loyalty to the President. I don't know where all that originated, but it was certainly present and persistent. There was a long legacy of this distrust reaching back to Truman or perhaps further.

Q: Of course, that is a perception that then and probably still today is shared by the American public. Did Rooney's Foreign Service "bashing" have any impact on the public? Did he recognize what the general impact of his pronounced views might have on the status of the Foreign Service?

CROCKETT: I suspect he did, but really didn't care.

Q: Did you deal with any congressional members who were friends of the Foreign Service?

CROCKETT: Yes. Senator Pell, for example. He was the greatest and most ineffective friend we had. He had been a Foreign Service officer. Sometimes he was critical; sometimes supportive, but mostly the latter. Fulbright was occasionally supportive, but then Fulbright and Rusk had a falling out and after that, we got nothing from Fulbright. But I must say that Congressional "friends" were few and far between.

Q: I gather from your comments that neither the White House or the Congress cared about the image of the Foreign Service.

CROCKETT: No, neither did. That was unfortunate, particularly of the White House, because that poor image certainly didn't help the President. I must say that I never discussed the issue with any Seventh Floor principals and they certainly never raised it with me.

Q: I would like to move on to your tenure as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. For ease of discussion, I would like to ask you about a) improvements in the support of the Foreign Service and the Department which you instituted; b) improvements in the
administrative processes; c) attempts to change the psychology of the Foreign Service
and then; d) programming systems. But before that, I would like to ask you about you
management style. Tell me about the way you worked and particularly about the "boiler
room".

CROCKETT: My perception is that I delegated liberally and dabbled constantly. I made
broad delegations of authority along with imparting confidence in my people that they
had my support to make improvements wherever they could. At least, I hope that is what
they felt. But I dabbled constantly on improvements. Every time I saw something I
thought could be improved, I got involved. Many of these memos were written at night or
in the early morning at home next to my furnace, where it was warm and comfortable. I
used to take home a briefcase full of ideas and from some of those, I wrote memos listing
opportunities for improvements. The involvement took the form of memoranda, which I
think mostly went into waste-paper baskets and were not acted upon. It was a most
ineffective management process. I had no follow up mechanism; I had no way of knowing
whether anything was done about my memos. There were too many memos. I learned
later out of my own experiences, that people are generally too busy just managing their
day-to-day responsibilities to have time for improvements. A manager is harassed from
morning to night just to get the work of his unit completed. He had no time for the
improvements or changes that Crockett, in some cases far removed from him, wanted. I
am convinced now that improvements and changes have to be brought in by outside
specialists working in conjunction with the managers. But at that time, I was not smart
enough to recognize that.

Q: I think that history will show that thesis wrong. But let's continue with your
management style. By my count, after you reshaped the administrative part of the
Department essentially by abolishing the Assistant Secretary for Administration position,
you had 56 people reporting to you. That is a unique management style. Most public
administration academics would have considered that span of control too wide. How did
you conceive this scheme?

CROCKETT: I was convinced that a highly structured, multi-layered bureaucracy was
inefficient and detrimental to innovation, initiative and effectiveness. I was convinced
that effective administration could only come from the people who were facing the day-
to-day responsibilities. They knew the problems. In a multi-layer organization, a manager
at low level had to send his recommendations for improvement up the line, where it was
approved or rejected by a long series of supervisors. That caused a lot of wheel-spinning.
It was ineffective. My idea was to create independent operators, in charge of activities
small enough so that they could be well supervised, who would not need to go to any boss
for approval of any changes which they would wish to make. If they really had the
authority to run an operation, that would make that operation more effective. Therefore,
the wider the span of control, the less likelihood of supervisory interference, particularly
from me.
About the time I was thinking about a new organizational structure, I attended a "T-Group" session, at the suggestion of Dick Barrett. Verla and I went. I learned a little more about myself during that session. During this period, we had also convened a group of "Three Wise men"--business people who had had experience in organizational development in their companies. They encouraged me to proceed with my plans to reduce the Department's bureaucracy. It should be noted however that they were not doing the same thing in their organizations. They suffered with the same kind of bureaucratic hierarchy as we, for they were unable to do anything about it. I learned then and again later through my own experience that private industry suffers from the same bureaucratic problems that bedeviled the State Department.

Q: However, as part of this structure, you also brought in the concept of “management by programs and objectives”. Tell us about that.

CROCKETT: The two concepts--the wide span of control and the management by programs and objectives--were closely linked. One way of supervising these 56 people was to enter into an informal contract with each of them at the beginning of a year, which would clarify for both of us what the program was that had to be managed and what accomplishments the manager hoped to achieve in the following twelve months. He or she would have five or six priority goals that we could discuss, including the resources required, the actions needed, the policies changes that would have to be effected. After reaching agreement, I would free that person to do what he or she considered necessary in order to achieve the mutually agreed goals. That eliminated the continual requirement by the managers to get approval for each of their moves. It was in fact a contract between the program manager and myself in which the manager received approval to achieve certain goals and I agreed to provide any additional resources if needed. After that, the managers were on their own with minimal supervision or interference.

Q: You had a number of special assistants, each looking after for certain programs and activities. Did they become a supervisory layer in fact?

CROCKETT: I think that they became an informal supervisory layer, although it was not so intended. Looking back, one of my big mistakes, was to appoint to some special assistant positions, people who had been in a supervisory positions, like Bill Trone and the head of Personnel. We had by broadening my span of control made these former supervisors' positions superfluous. I had to find something for them to do and therefore I appointed them as "coordinators". That was a big mistake because they soon became a "supervisory layer" again. They did not understand the fundamental changes I was trying to implement. These comments are not applicable to special assistants like you and Bill Sherman and Ed Adams. I didn't see these assistants as supervisory layers but rather as expediters to get things done. But the old line supervisors, then appointed as "coordinators", never understood; I should have removed them from the administration in the Department. But I didn't have the wisdom to do it.
Q: You did treat certain administrative functions differently from others. For example, the Foreign Service Institute continued to have a director. That was also true of a couple of other groupings that remained as they were before you took over, like the Foreign Building Operations. How did you draw the distinction?

CROCKETT: I viewed FSI and FBO as distinct programs which already were in the organizational mode that I wanted for all. Therefore they logically should have been left as they were. But one of my mistakes was my appetite for change. I had already bitten off more than I could chew in too short a period of time. I didn't take the time necessary for the digestive process before moving on to the next improvement effort. In the final analysis, I was somewhat disappointed with the results of our decentralization efforts in the administrative area of the Department. I had thought that I had given people opportunities to work independently, without much supervision. I found that too many did not rise to that challenge and were in fact captives of their background and traditions and training. The same thing happened in the substantive area when we upgraded desk officers to country directors and told them to take charge of all US government activities in the country for which they were responsible. They didn't want to take charge of the military or economic assistance programs. They didn't want to get involved in USIA programs. They wanted to continue as desk officers; that is what they had been and that is all what they wanted to be. A directive from the Secretary didn't change the people. The same thing happen in Administration. No change in rules that I might have signed didn't change the bureaucrats. We needed time to find people who would rise to the opportunities and move the ones that wouldn't to other positions. One important and vital truth is that organizational change does not necessarily bring about change in behavior. We wanted people to change their attitudes, their concepts and their behavior. Organizational change just won't cause this kind of change to take place.

Q: Did you ever try to train the new program managers so that they could use the new concept effectively?

CROCKETT: No, we didn't. It was both for a lack of time and because I thought they would rise to the challenge. We of course discussed the concept on many occasions, but never had a formal training program. I guess we didn't think such training would be necessary. But time was probably the biggest problem. I don't think anyone recognized the time pressure that I found myself in as my tenure went along. The broad span-of-control soaked up a lot of my time; I didn't realize how much time it would. Rooney took time, Hayes took time. The special projects that I was trying to undertake took time. The time bind became unbearable.

The new structure did not take more of my time than the old one did, but I should have taken more time to orient and train the staff, to answer all their questions. I should have had the program directors together at least weekly or biweekly to listen to their problems, how they related to other programs and what our options for solutions were. I did not have time to do that. I also abdicated my responsibilities to the "coordinators" who had been line managers before the reorganization. As I said, that was one of my biggest
mistakes; I should have moved them out. They had lost their jobs, their fiefdoms and I am sure they were unhappy and uncertain about their futures, so they made much of their "coordination" functions.

Q: Did anybody on the Seventh Floor follow your reorganization and innovations?

CROCKETT: Under Secretary George Ball did. He had an assistant, George Springsteen, who followed developments and informed Ball. Ball discussed them with me and asked about the why and wherefore. It was primarily for information. He never indicated any concern. Nor did he provide any support. That was another mistake I made. I did not involve my principles sufficiently so that they were committed to my programs and initiatives. That was true of CCPS (Comprehensive Country Programming System) and all of my initiatives. I went forward hell bent and didn't take the time to build support from other Seventh Floor principals.

Q: You had an interesting staff working for you. I like to have your comments on some of them. Let's start with Mich Cieplinski, whom you have already mentioned.

CROCKETT: Mich came as a gift from John Rooney and Senator Thomas Dodd. Senator Dodd was on the Internal Security Committee. When I became Deputy Under Secretary, that Committee was headed by Senator Hruska of Nebraska. He was the most conservative of conservatives. That Committee was after State Department for all sorts of alleged security breaches. They got their information from Otto Otepka who worked in our Office of Security. Dodd was the only friend we had and so we cultivated him. Mich was his token ethnic and also Rooney's. They twisted my arm to employ him and so we did.

Q: The next one I would like to ask about is Roy Little, whose name you have also already mentioned?

CROCKETT: Roy had been in the office when I got there. He had been the Department's liaison officer with the Appropriations Committees for a long time. Roy was a very loyal and dedicated person who worked well with John Rooney and Frank Bow as well as with the staff. When we needed to get something for Rooney and he something from us, it was Roy who carried the messages. My relationship with Rooney and Bow continued from the days when I was the budget officer for the Department when I became Assistant Secretary and then Deputy Under Secretary, I already knew them well. They would not establish the same relationship with successor budget officers because as I moved upward they felt that their contacts with me became more prestigious. Unfortunately, therefore, budget officers who followed me were squeezed out of those Congressional relationships. I had to carry them on, which took a lot of my time. In essence, the Deputy Under Secretary became the State budget officer and in retrospect, that was unfortunate.

Q: You mentioned earlier Wayne Hayes' interest in the Foreign Buildings operations. How did that start and what were some of the consequences?
CROCKETT: He first became involved when we needed to have some legislation passed by his subcommittee. This legislation authorized the Department to construct certain buildings. We had to get legislative authorization for every construction project abroad. His Committee and in effect Hayes had to approve these projects. That was along standing practice. Hayes fancied himself to be an architect and was often critical of our architecture in many places. He was not loath to let his views be known. He did not pick the architect, but insisted on reviewing at least some of the plans. He wanted to make sure that they were not exotic or outlandish, at least in his eyes. He favored functional designs; he did not want taxpayers' money wasted. No frills, but strictly functional. At one time, he did insist on having architects from his constituency. He was prone to be hands-on. We had to hire, at his demand, a person—Ernie Warlow—from his constituency to work in FBO. That fellow became later assistant director and then I think even director.

Q: Hayes had other holds on the Department?

CROCKETT: Right. Most of his pressure came on substantive issues through the Secretary. When the Department needed legislative authority, it had to go to Hayes to get it. We were his captives and often the administrative side had to give him something in order for him to pass substantive legislation.

Q: Let me ask about another person who comes to mind, namely Gerson “Lefty” Lush.

CROCKETT: Lefty was an administrative assistant to a Senator or Congressman from Pennsylvania. When his principal left his position, Lefty went to work for Lane Dwinell. So he was in the Department when I became Deputy Under Secretary. I knew Lefty was a writer and a literary person. I thought that we needed an in-house journal, a monthly that would keep the field informed of what was going on in Washington. The availability of Lefty made for a readily available editor and so the State Department Journal was born. Lefty was instrumental in making that a very important part of the Department.

Q: One of the highlights of your administration was that you were able to accept some new staff people and give them assignments, sometimes new functions, that benefitted the Department. How did this process work in your ming?

CROCKETT: The name came first from the White House as a "must" appointment. Then I would go home and worry about how to use the person and then some idea would come to me. I tried to marry the person's background and interests to some needs of the Department. It sometimes worked in reverse as well when I would perceive a requirement and would have to recruit someone to take care of it. For example, I thought that we should establish a Regional Supply Center in Africa in order to reduce the time delays and paperwork for getting supplies to many small posts. In that case, the concept came first and then we found someone to run it. The Paris Finance Center was in the same category.
Q: To go on to some comments about some members of your staff? What do you remember of Eddie Williams, who has since gone on to make his mark in Washington as the head of a think-tank?

CROCKETT: Eddie Williams came to the Department when we began to move aggressively to increase the number of minority officers in the Foreign Service. As I recall, Eddie Williams was suggested to me by Dick Fox, who was also instrumental in getting the program off the ground. Fox thought that Williams would be a great help in moving the program along and I saw Williams as a bright, attractive young man. I really liked him. Eddie was very helpful to us; the Department had a very bad reputation in the minority community, especially among the blacks. We tried very hard to improve that reputation. Unfortunately, I have lost contact with Eddie Williams, although I have followed his success with great interest.

Q: Let me ask about one more: Marvin Gentile.

CROCKETT: As a result of the Otepka problem, we had to move John O'Reilly, who was then the head of the Security Office. He had gotten in trouble with the Internal Security Committee and there was also an episode in which he and some of his staff had tried to "bug" Otepka's telephone and open his safe. Otepka, we learned through an FBI investigation, was feeding personnel data to the Internal Security Committee. In any case, O'Reilly and his deputy, Dave Belisle, had taken unauthorized actions against Otepka. Not only were they unsuccessful, but their activities became known to the Internal Security Committee. I had to remove both of them from their jobs. Both were facing possible charges of illegal activities and I was really concerned. I had to appear before the Committee and defend them. Fortunately, no actions were taken and we were able to re-assign both.

"The Ship of State is the only vessel with which I am familiar that leaks mainly at the top", said Secretary Dean Rusk one time when we were directed by the President's office to "shut off those damned leaks to the press!". Often, when investigated, we found that the real source was at or near the top of the Department. Nevertheless, leaks are an irritant to the leadership and every President, sooner or later, becomes so aggravated with people giving out unauthorized information to the press that he reacts very violently. This is a predictable Presidential pattern. "Leaks must be stopped and the leakers found and punished". Aggressive steps are often taken by the President and his staff to stop leaks and find the leakers--including lie detectors, oaths, rigid rules of conduct and other harsh, but mostly futile remedies.

It was obvious to us--the Secretary and his chief assistants--that there was a serious security leak in the State Department. The most sensitive and secret information in any institution is the content of an employee's personnel file, including information collected during a security investigation, even a pre-employment one. Every alleged indiscretion, transgression, error of judgement, every embarrassing incident and every private relationship over time go into a personnel file. In those days, those files were kept from
the individual concerned, so that they did not know the contents and had no opportunity
to set the record straight. This raw material was getting to Congress and the press. We
obviously had a very serious leak.

Recognizing the personal nature of such information and the devastating impact its loose
dissemination could have on the lives of people, Congress had passed a law prohibiting
any person responsible for the files from revealing their contents to an authorized person.
Specifically, members of Congress were listed as being unauthorized recipients, unless
the head of an agency made a personal determination to release a file. The early days of
the Kennedy Administration came close upon the heels of the McCarthy era. During that
sad period in the Eisenhower Administration, the Foreign Service and the State
Department were the most scarred of all agencies from the inquisitorial impact of those
dreadful days. A McCarthy henchman had been appointed as head of the Security Office
of the Department and under his supervision a witch hunt had ensued that ruined the
careers and lives of dozens of State and Foreign Service officials. Few, if any
Communists, were found, but the fear of McCarthy hung over the Department like a pall.
The chief problems were legitimate career problems--i.e. if an officer predicted the
political outcome based on certain policies, would he be punished, regardless whether he
had been right or wrong?. The famous example of course were the China experts who
warned about the weaknesses of Chiang Kai-shek and the probability of a Communist
take-over. The same potential problems were encountered by our reporting officer in
Cuba, during the last days of Batista. No one was safe from the inquisition.

When the Kennedy administration came to power, many of the hard-line McCarthy
disciples were still in control of the Security Office. When I became Assistant Secretary
for Administration, the Security Office became part of my responsibilities. It was my job
to stop witch hunting, to restore credibility to the political and economic reporting from
the field and to ensure above all else that no personnel information from anybody's file
was being given to any person without the personal authorization of Secretary Rusk.

But we had a leak. Day after day, I would be called by the Senate Internal Security
Committee to be grilled about why certain people had been given security clearances,
how the investigations were being conducted and why we had taken certain actions. It
was obvious from the questions asked by the staff that Senators had access to our files.
Motivation for leaking varies. Sometimes it is done so that a person can feel important
and the leak provides self-satisfaction. Sometimes it is done under the guise of "saving
the government and the country" from poor policy decisions made or about to be made by
superior officials. Other times, leaks occur when someone wants to embarrass other
officials. And sometimes, leakers are paid informants. A leak to Congress was a violation
of law, but more importantly, it was an indication that someone on our staff was so
disgruntled and upset that he/she was taking the opportunity to punish us. Also we were
concerned that the individual might leak the information to the press. In any case, the
action undertaken by that individual was illegal, but that didn't seem to be deterrent.
So we called The FBI to do an investigation. Some weeks later, we received a report from the Bureau indicating that the leaker was one Otto Otepka, a high ranking official in the Security Office and a hold over from the McCarthy period. He was upset with the new policies and procedures we had instituted and with the new people, especially me, with whom he had to deal. He justified his actions by saying: "I feel it is my higher duty to my country to reveal the security risks that this new Administrations is bringing into government. I am willing to break the law and sacrifice my career to bring this practice to a halt".

The Internal Security Committee of course denied the charges, but the FBI fingered it as being the recipient of the information. The leaks stopped and the Committee's inquisitorial attitude towards us softened. As a result we developed a more collaborative and less adversarial relationship with the Committee which served both the Congress and the Department well. As for Otepka, we fired him, but his appeal dragged on forever. Finally the Department's action was sustained. But he was subsequently appointed by the Nixon administration to another security office position in the government. I had a close association with Dick Helms, who at that time was the Deputy Director of CIA. We met two or three times a year to discuss our mutual problems. We used the CIA's communications facilities. During one of our discussions, he offered to give us Marv Gentile as our Security Officer. He was a down-to-earth, non-bureaucratic and courageous person. He was not afraid to do what was right. He was a breath of fresh air in our security program and he made the program a professional arm of the Department.

Q: While on the subject of personnel, I would like to remind you of Abba Schwartz, who was the controversial Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. I believe that was somewhat of a misnomer because Security had been split from that Bureau before your appointment as Deputy Under Secretary. How did Schwartz come to the Department?

CROCKETT: A man by the name of Haynes was the Administrator before Schwartz. He was not very effective. Schwartz came to the Department because Congressman Francis Walters of McCarran-Walters Act fame insisted on the appointment when he was instrumental of passing the Refugee Relief Act. Walters demanded that appointment in exchange for his cooperation and got it. So Abba was Walters' man in the Department. I didn't know Schwartz before these events. Someone in the Bureau may have because of Schwartz' involvement in refugee matters. Of course, Schwartz became Frances Knight's boss. Knight was the Chief of the Passport Division, having been there for many years following another legend, Mrs. Shipley. Like her predecessor, Knight had tried to maintain a separate entity for her Division, barely recognizing the authority over her of even the Secretary of State. She operated directly with her Hill connections and they protected her. She never bowed to the authority of the Administrator not mine. I occasionally visited her and talked to her; theoretically she was part of my responsibilities. Had I stayed longer, we would have broken up the Bureau and had the constituent parts report directly to me, as we had done for in the case of the Bureau of Administration. Interestingly enough, she then may have ended up as she wished: the
head of an independent program. I must say that her power stemmed from her ability to meet congressional demands for passport services to their constituents. She had inherited a fairly ineffective operation and to her credit, she got it organized and streamlined. During her stewardship, passports began to be issued by post offices. She did a good job, but she was completely lacking in loyalty and in any sense of team-work. Although never proven, it was suspected that she worked with certain Congressmen to pass legislation which would have made the Passport an independent agency of the government.

Q: Back to Abba Schwartz. Do you remember how his tenure in the Department ended?

CROCKETT: President Johnson was not as liberal on immigration and refugee issues as Kennedy had been. Abba was more of the Kennedy school. Abba had made a statement while abroad which was contrary to Johnson's views. The President was absolutely incensed and he called me, partly because Abba theoretically was part of "O", although he never acted like it. I never exercised much authority over him or the Bureau. But the President directed me to fire Abba. We had a reorganization plan ready to send to Congress in which, as I mentioned before, we would have abolished the Administrator's position and establish a group of independent programs. This time, unlike what we did in "A", we would have done by legislation. I did not want to send the legislative package to Congress until Abba had returned and I could talk to him about it. But Barr Washburn, who was one of Abba's assistants and very loyal to him, learned of our plans. So when Abba returned, his staff was there to meet him and to brief him on the proposed legislation. Abba became so incensed that he resigned almost on the spot thereby sparing me the task of firing him. It caused a major uproar, particularly in the House, because there were a good number of Congressmen became incensed that Abba, a liberal Democrat, had been forced to resign. The word was out that "Crockett fired him. Crockett was a reactionary". I had considerable difficulty with that issue in the House; so much in fact that I thought I might get fired because I was becoming an embarrassment to the President.

But my good friend, Carl Rowen, who at that time was already a powerful columnist, wrote a column in which he defended me saying that he knew that I was not a reactionary. He described the series of events leading up to Abba's resignation and that put the whole issue to rest. One of the interesting aspects of this whole episode was that President Johnson had predicted to me that the "firing" might create strong back-lashes and had told me that if they came, they were all mine. He said that I would have to take the heat and neither he or the Secretary would become involved. I guess that is one of the harsh realities of Washington. That is the way many, many subordinates lose their jobs; when the pressure becomes too strong and Congress demands a pound of flesh, the subordinate is fired and sacrificed. I thought that would be my fate in the Schwartz case.

Q: I would now like to start the discussions on the improvements you brought to the Department. Included will be your efforts to improve the living conditions of the Foreign Service people and to improve the efficiency of the administrative operations of the Department. Let me start by asking you to summarize your views of the role of
administration in the Department. You have mentioned it here and there throughout this interview, but I would like to get it again in one place.

CROCKETT: My view was and still is that administration is a service function. It is administration's responsibility to support substantive operations so that they could be more effective. This could be best done by making sure that substantive officers and their families overseas had maximum support so that they could concentrate on the policy issues. We wanted to make their jobs easier and more effective with the introduction of modern management tools and techniques, such as improved communication and computer support. All of our efforts were directed toward making people more effective in their jobs. I also wanted to minimize administration's policing function, i.e. always deciding what could or what couldn't be done.

Q: You have mentioned several times your philosophy of the role of administration in the Department. Do you think you had any impact on the people who worked in administration in the Department?

CROCKETT: Not much. That was one of the frustrations that led to the reorganization of the administrative area of the Department. I just hadn't seen enough action and change or even reaction to my concepts.

Q: You attribute that failure to time limitations, the inability to promote the younger generation and the lack of training for the bureaucrats who had been in their jobs for a long time? Were there any other factors?

CROCKETT: Another reason why the necessary changes were not made was that my constituents--the substantive officers--didn't see them as being useful. They subverted my efforts by their opposition; my people in administration could and did legitimately ask why the changes were necessary or even desirable when the intended beneficiaries--substantive officers--were not supportive. Substantive people saw these changes as my ideas and not theirs and therefore they were either not concerned or were in opposition. They did not appreciate that they would be the beneficiaries of changed administrative attitudes and changed practices. I always felt, and I still do, that the substantive people viewed all my efforts as self-aggrandizement, self-promotion and intended to increase my power. They never gave much if any credit to the real motivations behind my program. I assume that was partially my fault for not being able to better articulate my objectives.

Q: Did this passiveness or negativeness on the part of substantive officer apply equally to the older and younger generation of officers?

CROCKETT: I think so. The younger officers were rapidly co-opted into the culture of the Foreign Service. I don't know for sure why that happens. My perception was during the period we are discussing now, the older Foreign Service officers viewed themselves as Brahmans and high priests--better, smarter, more able, working on more important matters than anybody else. That conviction attracted the younger officers who wanted
therefore to simulate their seniors. Therefore they were quickly sucked into that atmosphere of "uniqueness". We also have to recognize where I was coming from. I was coming from the other side of the railroad tracks. I may therefore have had a sharper reaction to this perceive attitude than was warranted.

Q: Was it your feeling that a member of the "club" like Loy Henderson had more support than a new "boy on the block" like yourself?

CROCKETT: By far. Loy Henderson could take administrative or substantive actions than not even his superiors would dare countermand. I never heard any officer from the highest to the lowest who disagreed with anything that Henderson did. I do believe that Henderson himself was deeply disappointed with the Foreign Service in terms of not fulfilling its opportunities and its real destiny. He was deeply distressed by how some officers acted. He would periodically expressed his frustrations during Congressional hearings. He had clout, real clout because he was Loy Henderson: the quintessence of a model Foreign Service officer. In a strange way, that image did a disservice to someone like me because I was not a "true blue"--I had not entered the Foreign Service through the examination procedure, I had not been in a substantive position, I had not been an Ambassador. Had I been a Loy Henderson, I could have implemented the Wriston Committee's recommendations for changes in the personnel system, many of which were killed because of the Foreign Service. Loy would not have had to face that opposition.

Q: After your tenure, there were a number of substantive officers that occupied your position. Did they have the same aura as Loy Henderson?

CROCKETT: I don't think so. Henderson was unique. He was not only a career Foreign Service officer, but he had great skills and magnetism. None of the other Foreign Service officers who became Under Secretaries for Management had Henderson's aura. He was "Mr. Foreign Service".

Q: I would now like to list a number of innovations that you instituted. They are not listed in any particular order. I would like to have your comments on each. Let's start with the Overseas School program.

CROCKETT: That was started accidentally because Bobby Kennedy asked me to find a place in the Department for a gentleman by the name of Ernie Mannino. Mannino had been involved in education and I felt that the educational opportunities for the children of our Foreign Service officers and other Americans abroad had been sadly neglected. When I was in Beirut, we had a school which was attended by American children from all over the Middle East. They were sent there because that was the only American school available in the region. They were separated from their parents. The education was expensive. We needed an educational support system which would not be so detrimental to family life. We also needed a school system that was not depended totally on the whims of Congress, but that had support from the American business community. Mannino did a first class job and the whole effort has turned out very well. We got the
necessary legislation and funds and that program has blossomed. As far as I know, it still a very valued effort to support the Foreign Service.

Q: What did you do in the Medical Services area?

CROCKETT: That program was in existence when I became Deputy Under Secretary, but there were a lot of complaints. Our personnel did not have much confidence in the medical support they were receiving. One of the first things I did was to change Medical Directors. There was a real change when Dr. Woodward took over. His predecessors tended to be regulations-bound and bureaucratic. Lou Woodward, with my support, provided care beyond that allowed by the then existing regulations; he brought in new doctors and expanded the doctor and nursing services abroad. We also started an emergency leave program for those employees abroad who had family members in the US in serious medical condition. They were permitted to visit the family member at US government expense.

Q: Let's now discuss the Family Services Program.

CROCKETT: This program was also initiated when the Department was instructed to employee a Mrs. Katie Louchheim. She had been a senior official the Democratic National Committee. I had not been satisfied with the support the Department was providing to families when they came back to the US for home leave. We left them pretty much on their own and many did not have deep roots in this country. So Katie developed a program which would enable families on home leave to see some of their own country. It helped Foreign Service officers to become re-acclimated and we also hoped that by enabling Foreign Service families to travel in the United States, we would give the public a better appreciation of what the Foreign Service did. Katie got a trailer company to provide trailers and subsidize the rental of cars to pull them. A family would be loaned the trailer and it gave them the opportunity to spend an affordable vacation seeing their own country. As I mentioned, the program was also intended to improve the American public's understanding of the role of the Foreign Service. In that connection, we also started an Ambassador-in-Residence program in which we would assign a former Ambassador to a college or university for a one year tour during which he was expected to both teach some courses and be available for lectures and discussions with groups in the region. For the same purpose, we brought private citizens into the Inspection Corps. We were trying to give the Foreign Service more visibility and a better appreciation in the American public.

Q: Now let's cover "One stop service".

CROCKETT: When Foreign Service employees returned from overseas and were preparing themselves for their next assignment, they used to have go from office to office--travel, transportation, medical. personnel, passport and visas, etc. There was a long checklist of places a person would have to go, all over Washington. It was a lot of wasted time; so we set up one central place which contained the representatives of many
of these offices to enable an employee and family to conduct most of the business attended to "home leave and transfer" or "home leave and return" or just "transfer" to an overseas post in one place. We hoped to better serve our clientele and save them time and money. I don't remember whose idea it was, but it was a good one and I asked that it be implemented. The "one stop service" is an illustration of an initiative that came up from the staff. Not all of the initiatives were generated by me; many came to me and I embraced them.

Q: Tell us a little about the "water reservoirs"--one of the great scams.

CROCKETT: In many of our Embassies, particularly African ones, there was a serious lack of recreational facilities. There were few ways for a Foreign Service employee and family to relax and have a few moments of recreation. We also had a need for water reservoirs at the same Embassies, particularly during the dry season. Normally, reservoirs were in tanks above a house. We changed the concept slightly and put them in the ground, usually behind the Ambassador's residence and large enough so that members of the American community and other guests of the Ambassadors could swim in them. The budget showed that the Department had requested funds for the constructions of reservoirs, which they were, although not exclusively for saving water.

A somewhat similar challenge confronted us when we wanted to up-grade our State Department drivers in Washington. Since they were under Civil Service, they were classified as drivers and placed at certain pay level. They couldn't be promoted. We decided that all cars after being purchased, but before being shipped to their overseas destination would be driven first in Washington. We wanted them "tested" before overseas delivery. So our State Department drivers drove them for a period, to make sure that they were in working order. This additional function permitted us to up-grade our drivers by making them also vehicle inspectors.

I am not totally proud of these subterfuges, but on the other hand, there are sensible ways to by-pass meaningless and needless regulations that tie the hands of managers who want to improve their operations. Of course, it is fine if the scheme succeeds; failure has its penalties and there isn't much credit for just having made the effort. In all cases, there are bound to people that will criticize you regardless of what you do.

Q: You mentioned earlier a resource called "Confidential Funds". Please describe that fund and its uses for us.

CROCKETT: "Confidential Funds" were appropriated moneys made available to the Secretary, administered by the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. As I mentioned before, when I became the Assistant Secretary for Administration, the Kennedy Administration had decided that a number of career Foreign Service Officers would be appointed as Ambassadors to large European posts. In order to enable those Ambassadors to afford the appointment, we supplemented their salary and allowances with grants from the "Confidential Funds". These funds could be used for any legal
purpose; some were used to buy additional food, some bought proper clothes for themselves and their wives; some were used for gifts and other tokens for important contacts. Eventually, we made some funds available to many Ambassadors so that most Ambassadors could afford the privilege of being an Ambassador. These funds were always carefully used; each recipient were briefed on the purposes of the funds. I went to the Director of IRS to talk about the tax consequences of these grants; we got a letter from him excluding these grants from taxable income. It was a good program which was not abused and did permit a number of Foreign Service officers to accept appointments which they could not have otherwise afforded. We did not discuss the program widely in order to maintain the confidentiality of the program and the "Confidential Funds" appropriation as a whole. Chairman Rooney of course knew about the program because, as I also mentioned earlier, it was part of his package with President Kennedy which included my appointment.

We also used these funds in connection with Presidential trips. These trips were very expensive. The last one I took with President Johnson went around the world. We had to do everything. We had to send advance parties to plan the visit in each Capital; we had to supplement the staff of each Embassy so that there would be enough Americans to support the influx of the President, his party and the press. We had to take good care of the press; otherwise we would have had major problems. So the trips were very expensive. We bought flags to give out to the nationals of the country to be visited so that they could exhibit them--some of that was USIA funds, but a lot came from the "Confidential Funds". We used to hire private back-up planes so that we always had a transportation fall-back if necessary. We used them to supplement the resources available to an Embassy, because these Presidential visits were also very costly to an Embassy. It had to pay a lot of overtime for the local staff. Our regular budget could never have been stretched far enough to cover these expenses. During the last trip, which was to the Far East, we exhausted the whole "Fund". We had to go to Rooney to consult on what we should do. He said that he thought that we were in real trouble; a supplemental appropriation would probably not be passed without raising a lot of questions and subsequent problems. He suggested that we go to CIA for money, which I did. I went to see Dick Helms and in his usual cooperative manner, he found funds to pay for that Presidential trip. That saved us from asking for a supplemental and probably saved the "Confidential Funds". In my days, that is the kind of support that we would receive from other agencies and it was based essentially on the relationships that one established with the people. I can't emphasize enough how important relationships are if you expect the government machinery to operate.

Q: Let me ask now about some other initiatives. First, the NEWSLETTER, that we discussed earlier in connection with its editor, Lefty Lush.

CROCKETT: That was one that didn't result in any major complaints from the Foreign Service. It was a good program. The NEWSLETTER was broad in its coverage; it didn't focus only on administration. I think it was appreciated and supported by the Foreign
Service. It still exists, although under a different name. It turned out to be a vital communication link between the Department and the field. It helped *esprit de corps*.

*Q: Let me now ask you about the "Arts in Embassies" program?*

CROCKETT: This program had been in existence before I became Deputy Under Secretary. It was a private program supported by private individuals, who collected art works to be loaned to certain Ambassadorial Residences abroad. When the White House asked the Department to find a position for Nancy Kefauver, the widow of Senator and Presidential candidate Estes Kefauver, our "Arts In Embassies" program was born. It is said, necessity is the mother of invention, we decided to establish a formal governmental program of "Arts in Embassies" program. The program was not to compete with the private effort, but really to supplement it so that American art could be made available to as many Ambassadors as we could throughout the world. It was seen as an avenue to garner public support and to develop a constituency in the art world. Mrs. Kefauver had to go to art galleries to find works that the owners would be willing to lend for exhibit abroad. She did an excellent job of getting it organized. Rooney was well aware of the program; he saw some of the results overseas and approved. Rooney urged us to find private funds whenever and wherever we could to supplement appropriated funds. This was true for the school program, the arts program and the eighth floor enhancement program. He warmly supported our efforts to get funds from the private public. He thought that the tax-payers would never support some of these efforts. "The Arts In Embassy" program was a companion to another program which was intended to display American products in Embassies and residences of American officials. We tried to get Ambassadors to serve American wines, for example.

Some of these programs survived my incumbency; some didn't. For example, the eighth floor program, run so effectively by Clem Conger, is still in existence today. The eighth floor of the Department is reserved for the Secretary for his diplomatic functions--dinners, Ambassadorial swearing-ins, receptions, etc. We gave Clem some "seed" money from the "Confidential Funds". It was his idea and a very good one. He suggested that the eighth floor be turned into a complex of rooms which would be filled with 17th and 18th Century American furniture and art. I put him in charge of it. He has done a magnificent job. Before Clem took over, we had a collection of miscellaneous pieces on the eighth floor that didn't have any significance and were not related to each other. We needed direction and consistency to furnish the area. I had no idea at the beginning that it would develop into such a major project. That came after my departure under Clem's direction. He had the talent and the connections to make it a highly respected and well known bit of Americana.

*Q: Tell us a little about "this Worked For Me". What started you on developing that publication and what you hoped to achieve with it?*

CROCKETT: Again, I had to find a job for person, Mr. Wheelan. This time, it was not a White House request, but a Foreign Service assignment problem. Wheelan was our
political officer in Cuba who had to be reassigned. The Senate Internal Security Committee was holding him responsible for Castro's overthrow of Batista. One of the first demands that was made on me after becoming Deputy Under Secretary by that Committee was to fire Wheelan. I will always cherish the fact that we didn't fire him; we reassigned him, but he remained in the Foreign Service. I took him into my office, known as "O". We discussed what he might do for us and out of that conversation came the idea of "It Worked For Me". The intention was to interview Ambassadors while they were in the States and get anecdotal information from them about what they found to be effective management techniques. What did they do that was successful? How was it done? It was to be a collection of experiences that could be provided to new Ambassadors so that the latter could be better prepared to meet the challenges they would encounter. It was not a manual mandating certain actions under differing circumstances, but I perceived it as a tool that might assist new Ambassadors in meeting problems they had not encountered before. Wheelan interviewed many Ambassadors; I never saw a copy of the finished product, but I understand that one was produced. I am not sure that it was ever used to the extent I had in mind. I put this effort in the "dropped ball" category which unfortunately had too many items in it. I didn't have the time to follow through.

Wheelan himself had President Johnson's support; when Johnson appointed one of his friends from Texas--Clark--to be Ambassador to Australia. I had met Clark on one of Johnson's trips. So when Clark came to Washington for his briefings, I asked him whether he would take Wheelan as a consular officer. Clark agreed and Wheelan served in Australia until his retirement. Clark had no compulsion or hesitation about taking Wheelan. I am still proud that I and the Department didn't cave into the pressures from the Internal Security Committee. We didn't sacrifice a human being on the altar of expediency. This is one of my proudest accomplishments.

Q: Next is the "Ambassadors in Residence" program.

CROCKETT: This was also a program of necessity. We had too many senior officers without assignments. These were good officers who were temporarily caught in a situation over which they had no control. We had a surplus. So we looked around for a way to keep them profitably employed and the idea came that a number, small, but significant might be assigned to Universities and Colleges. While on campus, they might teach or lead seminars and they could speak to local groups such as the Rotary clubs. They could also improve their skills by doing some research. They increased our presence in the United States so that people could see what a Foreign Service officer was and what the Foreign Service did for its country. I got approval from Rooney for the program; he thought it was a good idea. I am not sure that all who were assigned enjoyed their work, but by and large many who went profited and were satisfied. The program became somewhat prestigious in that a number of academic institutions became anxious to have one of those free resources., Ohio University was one such institution and it got its Congressman, Wayne Hayes, to get one of the officers assigned to it. We were glad to do it, although there wasn't much enthusiasm on anybody's part to go to Ohio. But that was typical of the kinds of favors we had to do for Hayes and Rooney; not big things, but if
we didn't accede we were in for a lot of trouble. This was also an illustration of the kind of thing that my special assistants like Bill Sherman and you, Tom, would do without telling me. I never minded.

Q: Do you remember the history of the "FSO retirement ceremonies".

CROCKETT: I thought it was tragic and demeaning that an individual would serve in the Foreign Service for a long time, much of it abroad in all kinds of conditions and then retire without a ceremony. These individuals would comeback to Washington in preparation for retirement, see the desk officer--maybe--of the last country of assignment or in rare cases senior officers of the Bureau. They might take the officer to lunch, but that was it. No thank you for a long and honorable career. No ceremony; no expression of gratitude on the part of the government. Since we controlled the eighth floor, I decided to use it for periodic retirement ceremonies for officers or staff--anybody who was retiring. They could invite families and friends. We would have the Secretary or another senior official give a speech. Once Senator Humphrey came. They talked about our debt to these people and it was greatly appreciated. Then retirees left with a good feeling and they became part of our domestic support network. I remember one woman whose parents came all the way from New Mexico just for the ceremony. They were tearful. However, this effort did not last. I think it became too troublesome for both senior officials and the staff. It also cost a little bit of money. And it took a little bit of time of the Deputy Under Secretary. Some people are very parsimonious. Obviously, some people thought that time and money could be invested in more important ways. That is sad because it shows that some managers did not consider human beings as important. As far as I know, it was never re-instituted.

Q: One interesting aspect of this story is that this retirement ceremony was by and for the Foreign Service. It obviously didn't care enough to keep it going after your departure. That tells you something about the Foreign Service, at least that which existed in the 60's and 70's. In the same vein, you initiated Foreign Service Day.

CROCKETT: Right. I was invited to give a speech to a group of Foreign Service officers and spouses. I didn't even know that the group existed. It was a private, exclusive club. I was invited to give a dinner speech. I had one prepared which was entitled "The Foreign Service That Could Be". It was a speech that was intended to urge the Foreign Service to improve. Joe Palmer, who was the Director General of the Foreign Service at that time, urged me not to give that speech. So I gave a different one based on his idea that the Foreign Service needed to be more closely connected with the Department. He thought that the Foreign Service was too separated from the Department and felt no loyalty to it. He felt the need to reconnect these two institutions. Out of that view, came the idea of Foreign Service Day which would permit the alumni to come back to the Department every year to be briefed by senior officials and to see their old colleagues. We had a reception on the eighth floor where they could meet senior officials. We hoped that in that way we would reconnect the Foreign Service to the Department. That is one program that has survived.
Q: The final management innovation intended to improve the morale of the Foreign Service was the CORDS program?

CROCKETT: This was a program to support Foreign Service employees and the families who were serving in Vietnam. It was a good program which was supported by formal legislation. That law permitted us to give the employees more frequent leaves, permitted families to remain at other posts even though the employee was in Vietnam, and gave the employee extra credit toward retirement for his service in Vietnam. Hayes passed the substantive legislation and Rooney provided the extra funds required. It was a program that was badly needed and as far as I know successful.

Q: Let me now move to questions concerning White House-State relationships when it came to individual personnel cases. In Dean Rusk's book, which was just published, he says: "I did wrestle with the White House staff and occasionally President Kennedy over Ambassadorial appointments....There were always 10 or 15 percent who are old-fashioned political appointees and among these we would always pick a few dogs". Is that your recollection of events? Did the Secretary challenge the White House on some of their prospective political appointments?

CROCKETT: Not to my knowledge. He may have, but I don't know about it. Most if not all Ambassadorial appointments and candidates were discussed between Ralph Dungan, of the White House staff, and myself. There was not a formal review procedure. I would take the list of candidates to the Secretary and George Ball. We would review them and the Secretary would return the list formally to the White House. This was to maintain the fiction that it was the Secretary who had recommended the candidates; in fact, the groundwork had already been done and the submission of the list was a mere formality. Most of the choices had already been made by Ralph Dungan and others in the White House.

Q: You have already discussed a number of individuals that the Department employed at the behest of the White House, both in the Kennedy and Johnson period. Was the list from the White House large?

CROCKETT: There quite a few individuals that we had to place in the Department, particularly in the early days of the Kennedy Administration. Interestingly enough, most were at the junior or mid-career levels. People who had worked on Kennedy's campaign. We absorbed them and most were very good. I did inform either the Secretary or Under Secretary of these appointments, but didn't seek their permission; we made them as routine as possible. The interesting aspect is that some of these appointees are still in the Department. They took on the coloration of a bureaucrat like every one else and worked their way up the ladder. No one today, I am sure, remembers how they got into the Department. Many have already retired, but I believe that one or two may still be left.

Q: In the same book I mentioned earlier, Dean Rusk also said that he had problems with Bobby Kennedy on personnel appointments. Kennedy wanted only "dedicated Kennedy
people" appointed. That confirms your own experience that you described earlier. Was Bobby Kennedy involved to any great extent in the personnel appointments in the Department?

CROCKETT: Not that I remember. I was never aware that he forced any ambassadorial appointments. He may have participated in the selection of Seventh Floor principals before the Administration took office, in which I never got involved. I suspect that Bobby was involved in the Bowles appointment as well as the Bowles dismissal. Because I was not part of the original selection process, I suspect my Seventh Floor colleagues never got the special treatment that I received from Bobby. He had not been involved in my appointment but undoubtedly was involved in other senior officer selections.

There were a few lower level people. For example, we had to hire someone, whom we sent to Hawaii to head our reception center there.

Q: Again, back to Dean Rusk's book, he refers to President letter to all Ambassadors, putting them in charge of all U. S. government operations in his or her country of assignment. Why and how was that letter written?

CROCKETT: The concept came out of the Herter Commission study. It urged a Departmental structure which was equipped to support an Ambassador responsible for all governmental activities in a country. As I remember, Herman Pollack worked on the first draft of the letter. After clearing the Department and perhaps other agencies as well, it was transmitted by the Secretary to the President for signature. We had felt that ambassadors, as the personal representative of the President, should be responsible for all agencies in their countries, but apparently they needed a written mandate from the President before they would exercise their authority.

Q: Mosher and Harr, in their study which we will discuss at greater length later, pointed out that a comparable letter was never sent to the Secretary of State. Did the Department make any attempts to get such a letter.

CROCKETT: No. I think that was a major error on our part. In Washington, there was a White House structure that was theoretically the coordinating power comparable to the Ambassador's responsibility in the field. It was this White House structure that developed major policies and issued instructions to the various agencies involved. So we never even considered getting the Secretary more authority. The Department came somewhat closer to playing a coordinating role when the SIGs and IRGs were conceived in the late days of the Johnson Administration. That was an effort to put the Department in charge of foreign policy, but these interdepartmental groups, although chaired by officials of the Department, were not part of the Department organization, but part of the National Security Council--a White House organization--apparatus. The flow of authority did not go through the Secretary of State.
Q: That raises another interesting comment found in Secretary Rusk's book. He says: "I reduced these many echelons to three and concentrated responsibility in the assistant secretaries. In my scheme, the first echelon was the Secretary of State and his Under Secretary, the second echelon the assistant secretaries and the third, the country officers. Running the Department of State for eight years provided a fascinating study of the workings of a bureaucracy. Deputies and assistant directors want to remain part of the decision making, and once they get their feet under the table, it is hard to move them out. The layering created considerable delay and bickering. But my efforts to streamline the bureaucracy did not last, and the causes of slowdown often wormed their way back". This sounded very much like your own views which gave rise to the reorganization of the administrative area of the Department. Did anything similar happen on the substantive side of the Department?

CROCKETT: Not to the extent that it happened in my area. But the Secretary did try to put the "country director" in charge of the US activities in his country was in a sense a version of "Management by Programs and Objectives". The US activities in a country could be viewed as a "program" and all the activities under that "program" could be viewed as sub-programs. There is some parallelism between the two concepts. The results were certainly parallel; some were good, most were bad.

Q: Did the Secretary spend any time on management issues?

CROCKETT: Virtually none. Neither did the Under Secretary. They had no time for organizational philosophy or changes. About the only time I could see either Rusk or Ball was when it was necessary to get the signature of one or the other to send proposed legislation or budget either to the White House, the Bureau of the Budget or Congress. Then they took a little time to understand what they were signing. That was about it. Rusk was involved in the development of the country director concept and later became involved in the Comprehensive Country Programming System (CCPS), which I am sure we will discuss later. You have to remember that Rusk had worked in a Regional Bureau and therefore had an understanding of the bureaucracy at that level.

Q: It is interesting that Rusk makes no mention of his Deputy Under Secretaries in his management philosophy. You have already explained your relationship to him. Was it similar to his relationships to other Deputy Under Secretaries?

CROCKETT: My perception was that Rusk was so bogged down in details that he in fact was not involved with anybody. Every time I went to see him, there was a huge stack of cables on his desk. You could hardly see him behind the piles. He was so involved in the details of foreign policy making that he didn't have time to manage. He was involved in details because that was the way he was; that was his style. It had little to do with the Department's organizational structure. The President was in part responsible for that as well. Both Kennedy and Johnson had the well-known propensity to call anybody in the Department to get information. This put pressure on the whole organization to know the minutiae so that they wouldn't be caught without an answer if the President were to call.
them on the same issue. That meant that everybody had to read all the cables and be familiar with many details.

**Q:** Rusk also says: "Ironically, more often than not, the State Department's office directors and assistant secretaries play a critical role in policy planning and prophecy. It is at this level that judgements are made about whether a problem needs immediate attention, an be left alone, or will disappear on its own....The idea that policy is sent down from high is just plain wrong. The endless stream of business, the pace of events, and the complexity of the modern world require even junior officers in the Department to make high level decisions". Is that the way you saw the process?

**CROCKETT:** No, I didn't see it that way. Maybe that is the way it should be, but it wasn't. I saw an everlasting movement of paper laterally and upwards so that approvals could be gotten. It was a collective decision making process. I don't think junior officers made "high level" decisions. It was more a bargaining process to get agreement.

**Q:** Did the Secretary ever talk to you about doing something about his perception?

**CROCKETT:** No. He never discussed organization or changes to improve efficiency. Never. He never called me on anything; I initiated all meetings that were held between us. I was concerned about taking his time because he seemed so busy. I didn't want to impose on him. That was also true of the Under Secretary. None of the senior officials of the Department saw the connection between management and substance. They didn't see that there could be a synergy between the two activities. As far as the Secretary and Under Secretary were concerned, substance and administration were separate and distinct. One was worth their time; the other was mundane and therefore of little interest.

**Q:** Let me pursue the question of the decision making process just a little more. Is it possible that the Secretary in his comment might have put his finger on one the Department's principal problems; namely because of the very heavy work-load on the Seventh Floor, there are decision made at lower levels which become only latter when they become problems?

**CROCKETT:** That is possible. It might have worked that way, but I think it would have been unlikely due to the rigid requirements for clearances on all papers. Very little, if anything, left the Department, without clearances. An individual decision was almost impossible. Somebody, and most often many, would have had to approve the paper.

**Q:** You have discussed the very mixed results of the attempts to make the country director the pivotal figure in US relations with foreign countries. To what do you attribute the many failures?

**CROCKETT:** To the same causes that created my failures in the administrative area: attempting to impose a new concept by fiat; assigning responsibilities to people who weren't prepared, to people who didn't want to accept the responsibilities; putting
personnel in management positions when they were solely interested in diplomacy. It is
the same reasons that caused some of our Ambassadors to do be poor managers because
they viewed themselves as "diplomats" and not "managers". We failed to convince the
people who were involved that their new tasks were challenging and important both to
themselves and the Department. We probably should have removed the recalcitrant. Our
failure to up grade the country officer' behavior was exactly the same as out failure to
improve administration. We neglected the process. It was not a failure to understand
the substance of the issue, but we did not devote enough time to the process of introducing
change. The process was flawed in both cases.

Q: There is discussion again today in Washington of putting the Department in charge of
what is called the "150 account" (a budgetary term to cover most of foreign affairs
agencies). Is it your view that would have been hopeless when you were Deputy Under
Secretary because the Department's staff was neither willing or adequately trained to
take over the task of managing a large amount of resources?

CROCKETT: Yes. It was not only a question of willingness or competency, but the need
to for State officials to overcome their fear of doing battle with other agencies about
programs and operational issues. It seems to me that there needs to be a linkage between
policy and resource allocations. The relationship between the policy and the its
implementation by other agencies has to be well established before budgets are developed
and before the resources are actually allocated. That was the uniqueness of the CCPS
concept which was rooted in formulated policies from which budgets and other resource
requirements were developed, country by country. But the country directors did not see
that to be their responsibility. They didn't think that they had been trained to do that.
Furthermore, they foresaw that such a program would get them into a lot of controversy.
One of the problems we encountered in trying to bolster the role of a country director was
that there wasn't anybody to arbitrate the differences. For example, if one government
agency wanted to do something in Country X, but its plans were opposed by the
Department and the Ambassador, there was no dispute settlement mechanism, short of the
President and you certainly couldn't take all of these differences to the White House. So
issues were raised but never settled. Conflicts arose and not even the Secretary of State
was empowered to settle them. He certainly didn't have time to discuss many issues with
his counterpart in other agencies. There was no settlement structure. In the administrative
field, that was different; in theory at least, I had the power to settle issues.

Q: What you say suggests that the Kennedy's letter to Ambassadors did not have the
intended effect.

CROCKETT: It did not because most Ambassadors didn't want to assume responsibility.
They didn't want to fight with their AID directors, their Station Chiefs, the Public Affairs
Officers or the head of MAAG. As a result, they mostly rubber stamped the proposals
made by other agencies represented in their Embassies. I don't want to minimize the
difficulty of making the process we are discussing work. It is complicated and needs a lot
of the "right" people in order to make it work.
Q: I would now like to move to your management improvement efforts, focusing first of all on the changes you made in the administrative processes of the Department. I'll mention a few and ask for your comments on each. Let me start with the reorganization of the personnel process and particularly your decision to decentralize the assignment responsibilities from a central personnel office to the Regional Bureaus. What was the situation when you began your tenure and what changes you made?

CROCKETT: When I became Deputy Under Secretary, the Personnel Office thought that all employees belonged to them and they were dished out to the available vacancies as it saw fit. I am sure other offices were consulted, but Personnel viewed itself as a power broker. Such a process did not fit my concept of "service". It was "control" and authoritarian. The Bureaus who had the operating responsibilities were often unhappy with the process and felt that they were not being well served. I thought that the Bureaus would be happier and could be held more accountable for their management if they had responsibility for the assignment of their personnel, within certain guidelines and protection for the employees. This change improved the assignment process somewhat. A lot of other things might have had to be done to make it really effective. I learned later that many of the changes we made were only small pieces in a much larger picture. Changing one small piece often did not result in the anticipated results because there were so many other factors that hadn't been resolved. Sometimes, a change made things worst because the larger picture had not been taken into account. Some of the changes I directed were done in too an imperious manner and I didn't take the time to look at the broader perspective.

We also introduced the "cone" concept into the personnel process. That was Dick Barrett's idea. He thought that we could manage careers better if we could place people in the major specialties of the Foreign Service rather than having to deal with a large pool of human resources. If we put people in specialties, known as "cones", we could follow their progress better, we could be responsive to their needs and those of the Department better and we could have better developmental programs for them. Incorporated in the concept was the idea that there would small staffs in the central Personnel Office each of which would concentrate on a different "cone" knowing thoroughly the employees within that "cone" and thereby being in a better position to assist the employee's development while at the same time fulfilling the Department's requirements. It was a more effective way to manage our personnel resources. We agreed that the Service was, with the exception of some senior positions, better staffed by specialists in the various functions, rather than by generalists who had been expected to perform effectively wherever they might be assigned. We believed that most of the Foreign Service preferred to be specialists. It is true that too many wanted to be political specialists and not many wanted to be administrative or consular specialists.

Q: Let me pursue this issue. The question of "specialist" vs. "generalist" is one that had bedeviled the Department since the end of World War II. The debate is still alive today. How do you view the nature of the Foreign Service?
CROCKETT: My perception is that it is indeed a compilation of "specialists", as I have said earlier. There is one favored specialty and that is the political. It is the "cone" from which many Ambassadors come, far more than from any other "cone". But the Department and the Foreign Service needs highly skilled and trained economists as well and we are kidding ourselves if we believe that you can take a political officer and turn him into a qualified economic officer. It is a waste of resources. The concept of "generalist" is a wasteful concept. I suppose that behind the generalist concepts lies the thought of broadening an officer's experience so that he or she is well qualified to assume the Ambassadorial mantle. But in reality, any specialist will have sufficient exposure to most of the other disciplines to be able to have at least a passing knowledge. It is true that in most cases, the passing knowledge of consular and administrative responsibilities will be superficial at best, but I am not sure that anybody has yet found the solution to that problem. Furthermore, I don't see either the "specialist" or the "generalist" concept as the solution to the "management-skill" deficit in the Foreign Service. Despite the fact that we may give fancy titles to our senior positions, there is no internal value given to management skills. The Foreign Service just doesn't value that skill, when in fact I think it is the key to the success of the Department.

Q: One of the arguments made against specialization is that much competes with the expertise of other agencies. That is true particularly in the economic areas with Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture claiming international expertise. It is even true in the Consular field in which the Immigration and Naturalization Service has the final word on who is let into the United States. What was your view about this competition.

CROCKETT: It was my view that was one of reasons why our economists had to be professionals. They needed to have the necessary training, both academically before they entered the Service and in-house after employment. That in-house training should have covered all issues, including trade matters and agriculture. I thought that we could find enough economists with enough knowledge or who could be provided enough in-service training so that they could provide the domestic agencies with the information they required to do their jobs. In the Foreign Service Act that we tried to pass, I tried to encompass in it most if not all civilian personnel working overseas. That would have gone a long way to assure equal treatment for all American civilians abroad. But until such legislation was passed, the choice was either to surrender the function to representatives of domestic agencies or to try to satisfy the requirements of those agencies from Foreign Service resources. I wasn't enthusiastic about the first alternative because it was wasteful, expensive and increased the US presence abroad beyond the actual need. On the other hand, I recognized that the work of the Foreign Service was not respected by some domestic agencies. These domestic agencies did not believe that our people were qualified or that their work was professionally adequate. In retrospect, I still believe that the Foreign Service can serve the needs of the domestic agencies if it decides that it is willing to do a professional job, which may entail some sacrifices of personal benefits. That is to say, officers would have to accept that they would have to remain as specialist for much longer than is now the case.
The organization of the personnel system by "cones" best recognizes the value of the professionalism that the Service can provide. It is vital that any personnel system accept the values of its participants and that it take into the consideration the self-perceptions of the people which it services. Unless a personnel system does that, it is pushing water uphill. I think that is what happened in the reorganization of the administrative area. We didn't fulfill the values and self-perceptions of the employees working in those vineyards. The same criticism can be made of our concept of a country director's role. We tried to superimpose our views on them. We tried to make managers of people who resisted the concept. It doesn't work. We created a gap between an officer's expectations and management's and a gap between the officer's perception of the role of the Foreign Service and the Secretary's. Until that gap is closed, there will not be any acceptance by the Foreign Service of any management changes.

Q: Let's now discuss the changes that were made in the Foreign Service telecommunications system. We briefly mentioned earlier, but I like to discuss it at greater length. You mentioned the collaboration you received from Richard Helms, the Deputy Director of CIA. What was that all about?

CROCKETT: Our relationship with CIA during this period was one of mutual support. They needed some help from us--mainly cover for their personnel--and we needed resources from them. We had depended since the end of World War II very heavily on both CIA and military communication facilities. The system was adequate except in crisis time. When a crisis arose, both agencies, not surprisingly, put our traffic at the bottom of the basket. As a consequence, when the Cuban missile crisis arose, very few of our messages reached our Ambassadors. None of our Consulates received very critical messages. Our people therefore were unable to inform their host government officials of the position of the United States. Therefore many of our allies were caught unaware when President Kennedy gave his famous speech announcing a blockade of Cuba. Many of our friends were taken by surprise by the Kennedy announcement. The way to make things happen in government is to have a crisis to make things happen. So this crisis enabled the Department to obtain administration and Congressional approval to up-grade the Department's communication system. CIA and all agencies were behind the effort. Helms came to our rescue by giving us one of CIA's top communications specialist--an officer by the name of Jack Coffey. He was an expert. He was able to turn a very outdated, gerry-made communications system into a modern one responsive to the need of the US government. We got a lot of money from Congress which of course was key to the modernization effort. Although the Department developed a modern communications system, the duplication among agencies continues to this day. All our effort did was to put the Department on a competitive basis with CIA and Defense. It didn't reduce duplication at all, but maybe in the communications field, redundancy is appropriate.

Q: During your tenure, the Department expanded its use of computers, first for administrative functions and then subsequently even for some substantive functions. How did this effort come about?
CROCKETT: The effort really started under the aegis of Lane Dwinell, when he was Assistant Secretary for Administration. He had come from industry and was up to date on modern management techniques. He knew and liked computers and urged me to get our accounting process mechanized. Frank Meyer and I dragged our feet, we procrastinated, we gave excuses. Finally Dwinell became totally fed up with me. One day he brought me into his office and showed me a big map. He pointed to a little spot in Africa and said: "Bill, you have two choices. If you would like to be an Ambassador, we'll send you to that little spot on the map and we'll send you soon. Or, if you prefer to stay in Washington, you can get cracking on mechanization". The message was clear enough; I was not about to go that little spot on the map. I saluted and told him that we would move quickly on his wishes. We put a task force together--everything in the Department is done by task forces. It studies the problems and opportunities. In a matter of months, we got started on computerizing accounts in Washington. At about this time, an effort was being made in Paris to computerize accounting, payroll and disbursements for Western Europe. That may have been already in operation when we got started.

I must admit that I was never pleased with the progress we made on computerization. Progress was always slower than I hoped; it never fulfilled its full promise that we had been led to expect. So I was essentially disappointed. It didn't reduce staff; it didn't result in savings. We may have expected too much from the technology. We ran into a lot of resistance from potential users. As I said, I did some foot-dragging in great part because my staff was reluctant to proceed. They were afraid of the unknown. Furthermore, they didn't see the need to "fix it; it wasn't broken". Typical bureaucratic reaction. Endemic to the human being who is essentially change resistant.

Once again, our experience with mechanization is proof of the importance of process. The process of implementation was inadequate. We didn't involve the people who would be the operators. We tried to impose it from the top. We didn't bring together and explain what this new beast would or would not do. We didn't reassure them that they wouldn't lose their jobs to these new machines. We didn't promise them that we would retrain either to operate the machines or to become proficient at another skill. The essence of the process was "Here it is. You are going to use these machines!". No preparation for the change.

What I have learned since leaving the Department is the importance of process in human affairs. When I looked at other organizations, during my time with the Saga Company, the major impediment to innovation and improvements is the absence of an effective process. How are you going to go bring change? How are the people going to be told? What will cause the change to happen? My conviction is that process must be carefully attended to if many of the problems brought by change are to be eliminated or alleviated. By process, I mean the introduction, explanation and involvement in change.

Q: In connection with mechanization, do you remember Al Moreland coming to seek your assistance to bring computerization to the visa process?
CROCKETT: Yes, I do. He was interested in bringing both the passport and visa operations into the modern world. We told him to go to work. I believe that his effort concerned the introduction into a computer of information, which until then had been kept manually in what was called "the look-out book". That was a compilation of information on people that were to be excluded from entry by law into the United States. I think that he was finally able to move the project along and I guess today all negative information as well as passports are computerized.

Q: Let me ask about another improvement, namely the African Supply Center.

CROCKETT: Soon after Kennedy's inauguration, Africa came apart as the colonial powers left or were driven out. A good number of new countries were established which brought the requirement for new Embassies. These new institutions had to be supplied; the new American staffs had to have living support. It was a tremendous support burden on our supply system. Some one suggested that in order to shorten the supply line, we establish a regional center in a central African country which could be close to all the posts and thereby expedite their requisitions. The central point would order all the necessaries in large bulk and store them until each constituent post would indicate a need. The center reduced the need for procurement and supply experts for each of these small Embassies. Like many other initiatives, once it had started, I focused on other issues and never followed up adequately. Without my involvement, a friend of mine--Richard Farnsworth--was put in charge of the new operation. He immediately got into trouble with the Ambassador who didn't view the operation as a regional one. He put a lot of stumbling blocks in the way. Nevertheless, as I recall it, it was a successful effort, although I don't know whether it still exists.

Q: As the final part of this section, I would like to hear your views on a variety of issues stemming from the concept of a single personnel system and a combined administrative and management office overseas. Tell me about what you had hoped to achieve by establishing one administrative support operation at each Embassy.

CROCKETT: Basically, I was trying to eliminate duplication at one level and a more uniform treatment for all government employees at the post at another level. Helms and I discussed this issue at some length. He was sensitive to the problems created by the difference in treatment between his people and those of other agencies--the allowances, the pay, the houses, etc. Foreign Service people were treated less generously. That made the CIA people stand out in a local scene. It was hard to give his people "cover" as long as they had special privileges. So he sympathized with the concept of a single administrative support office. Many other agencies were not sympathetic because they felt probably, and with some justification, that a single office would bring every one down to the Department's level of support. In those days, the Department was the poor kid on the block. We didn't have the resources of other agencies and couldn't do some of the things that other agencies did. Nevertheless, I felt that one support system was the appropriate way to proceed, thereby reducing duplication and more importantly, it would reduce
invidious comparisons at posts. I had hoped to achieve, as I tried in Karachi, to establish a single American presence overseas--a single American community.

For example, Foreign Service people were assigned to government housing that was furnished with old furniture. The newer agencies had the funds to give their people new furniture. This created morale problems. In many cases, the Foreign Service people, having less and much more beaten furniture, were envious. That created negative emotional responses that sometimes took the form of a feeling of the "have and have nots". It resulted in some cases with the Foreign Service people excluding Americans from other agencies from the social affairs at their homes. That was a childish, but human, response in which the State people took it out on other agency representatives by excluding them from their social life. It drove a wedge in that American community thereby losing the concept of "oneness" that I thought should permeate all Americans at a post. The difference in treatment went beyond furniture; it applied to transportation and representation funds for entertainment purposes. All of it was very divisive.

Q: How much progress do you think you made in bringing the standards of treatment for US government employees at each post to a more equal level?

CROCKETT: One of the keys to bring greater equity of treatment was to obtain more money for the Department. We didn't want always one to be in the position to having to decide to be either a beggar or to have to do without. We tried to beef up the administrative staffs at posts both quantitatively and qualitatively; we tried to recruit professional administrative people at all levels. We attempted to recruit people from other agencies, such as the military--people who were about to retire, but who had skills that we desperately needed. Joe Eggert headed up that effort. It worked relatively well although we sometimes did not hire the right people and certainly not enough off them. But by improving the quality of administrative support and by trying to imbue them with the concept of the "one big family" we may have made some improvement on the equity issue. I don't think we reached our goals, but may have made a dent in the problem. I had hired at one time a former AID official, who had been fired by his agency. We hired him as our liaison man with other agencies to negotiate administrative support agreements--that is reimbursements from other agencies to the Department for services rendered by us, mainly overseas. He did that for several years. When he was about ready to resign, he said that he had negotiated with the Russians and many other hard bargainers, but those negotiations had never been as difficult as the ones he had with other agencies. The other agencies were very difficult. We had a very a very intricate system which was intended to support our reimbursement requests which started at each post where the local administrative costs were parceled out to each agency based on work-load factors. That post by post analysis was then compiled on a region by region basis and finally into a total global summary. Every year, agencies would ask for more and more supporting data. It was also true that every year, as personnel in the other agencies changed, there would be a review of existing practices and agreements which usually resulted in further documentation being required.
Q: Related to this concept of a unified administrative support operation, you also developed the idea of a single Foreign Service of the United States. What was the background of this idea and how did it develop?

CROCKETT: That idea came from the Herter Commission report. Included in that report was the recommendation that there be a single Foreign Service which would cover all civilian American employees abroad. It seemed to me, as it did to the members of the Commission, that each agency had different standards applicable to their employees. The benefits were different, the rules and regulations governing overseas employment were different, there were different governing laws. This created the situation we discussed before—one of inequities. Furthermore, all overseas employees had loyalties to their own agencies, which was appropriate, but that view often was contrary to the total US effort in a country. The Herter Commission concept, which was strongly supported by John Macy, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, and by Carl Rowen, who was the Director of USIA, by Loy Henderson and somewhat less fervently by AID, was based essentially on the idea that the Foreign Service of the United States should be analogous to the Civil Service which set standards for all domestic agencies. Under the Civil Service, an employee could be working for agency X, Y or Z, but the standards were the same regardless where he or she worked. The employees of all civilian agencies were under a single personnel system. That was what we were seeking to establish for Americans overseas. They would all come under a single personnel system which naively, perhaps, we saw as being administered by the State Department. All civilian employees serving overseas would be operating under a single set of standards, uniform policies governing leave, tenure and all the other aspects of a personnel system. These policies would apply to the State Department as well and therefore was strongly opposed by the Foreign Service because they feared that the Service would be pulled down to the lowest common denominator and not be the "elite" service that it perceived itself to be. Other agencies opposed it as well because they saw their own power being reduced. The President and his staff supported the idea and we forwarded implementing legislation to Congress. In the House, it was known as the "Hayes bill" because he strongly supported it and introduced the measure. Carl Marcy, who was the chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator Fulbright, strongly supported it. We really thought that this proposal would be approved by Congress. We did the process well; we brought Henderson and other past Foreign Service leaders into to testify on behalf of the legislation. But the proposal floundered on one single man's animosity toward another. When I retired from the Foreign Service, I paid a courtesy call on Chairman Fulbright and told him that one of my biggest failures was the inability to push the Foreign Service legislation through the Congress. He said: "You must not take the full blame. I would not have approved in any case". My guess is that his position was based on his animosity towards Dean Rusk. He and the Secretary had been feuding for a long time, never in public, but well known in the subterranean labyrinths of Washington. Senator Hickenlooper also opposed it vigorously, because he was strongly prejudiced against USIA. He was concerned that the new bill would make USIA employees "permanent" whereas he saw USIA as only a temporary agency. So the Hayes bill went nowhere; it was reported out of Committee but I don't remember it ever having been brought to the
floor. Hayes felt that the Senate had to approve it first before he would take it to the House floor. I am sad that the proposal was not enacted; I thought it was a great initiative.

Q: I would like to move to the next block of issues which deal essentially with the psychology of the Foreign Service and focuses on the number of attempts you made to change it. First of all, during your tenure you called on a number of outside experts to look at the Department and the Foreign Service. Why did you feel the need to open these institutions to outside scrutiny?

CROCKETT: It seemed to me that many of the efforts originating from the inside of an institution were mostly defensive in character, mostly intended to defend and explain the status quo rather than objectively to review existing conditions and attempt to find improvements. The institutions of State were "change resistant". I wanted to get a more objective view of what was good and what was bad, what should be left alone and what should be improved. I hoped to achieve two goals through this process of outside review: a) credible recommendations for change which came from people with no vested interest and which therefore might have greater acceptance and b) some increase in our constituency among the American public--more people who had knowledge of the Department, its functions and responsibilities.

Q: With that introduction, let's discuss specific people or groups that were brought in from the outside to review the efforts of the Department, totally or in parts. The first group consisted of representatives of the American Legion. Do you recall how that came about?

CROCKETT: The early days of the Kennedy Administration were not far removed from the era of national hysteria about Communist in government. This deep public concern was stirred up by Senator Joe McCarthy in the early 50's. Of course, the Senator's charges were quite effectively proven false in the Senate hearings which subsequently resulted in his censure by the Senate. Still this public suspicion that employees of the US government and especially the State Department were at least "pinko" if not actually "red" lingered on in the public mind. And nowhere was this more prevalent than in the American Legion. It was not unusual for their national meetings to pass resolutions to "Impeach the secretary of State" or to "abolish the Foreign Service" or to "Close up the Department of State" and other equally angry and antagonistic public pronouncements!

The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, held informal weekly meetings with his principal deputies--some five or six of us. We discussed all kinds of issues and problems. At one such meeting, Secretary Rusk told us that he had been invited to give a foreign policy report to the next National Convention of the American Legion. He went on to note that this group was very hostile to the Department and that was unfortunate. He thought that we should be working together since we had objectives in common. He ended his comments with the thought that he would invite a Blue Ribbon Commission of the Legion to come to investigate the Department and to make their findings public.
The shock in the room could not have been greater if he had dropped a bomb. "What? Invite the enemy into our camp? Let the enemy see our files? Let the enemy make a report based on their investigation?" And so on and so on. I should mention that I was among the nay-sayers, responding to his suggestion just like many others on similar occasions had responded to mine! I had become a part of the bureaucracy--afraid to take chances, wishing to play it safe. People expressed their negative views in more diplomatic language that I have indicated, but the Secretary, much to his credit, was not to be dissuaded. He said something along the lines: "What do we have to hide? What do we have to lose? Is the American Legion really our enemy? Or at least, should they be? We have much to gain from openness. Let's make them our partners and not our adversaries".

So during his speech to the convention, he made the invitation and the Legion's leadership accepted it with obvious pleasure. It appointed three of its own past National Commanders to be the Blue Ribbon Commission to investigate the Department of State. In order for us to make our top secret materials available to them, each had first to go through a thorough security investigation and be "cleared". This was their first taste of the thoroughness of our system and it impressed them greatly.

Once they had received their security clearances, they met with Secretary Rusk and myself. Rusk told them in effect that the Department was theirs. They would be given an office and a secretary to help them find the files in which they might be interested. I was given the job of liaison officer. I was instructed to make any and all documents available to the group. Rusk expressed the hope that the Commission would visit around the Department to get acquainted with the personnel, sit in on meetings, hear the problems and challenges confronting the Department. He asked the Commission to ask any questions which they wanted. After a period in Washington, he wanted the Commission to visit some overseas posts to see the Foreign Service and its activities. He stressed that he wanted the Commission to become thoroughly familiar with the Department's policies, people, programs and problems. He ended by saying that he was always available to talk to the Commission.

I was deeply impressed with the sweeping nature of the Secretary's mandate of "openness". I suspect that I really didn't believe all that he said. But I took his instruction literally. When the Commission and I returned to my office, I asked them where they wanted to start. Almost in unison they said: "Cuba. We want to see all your files on Cuba. We want to talk to the people who were in the Embassy in Havana when Castro took over. We want to see the early CIA reports on Castro and his movement before he took power". They obviously were intent on finding the guy who "gave Cuba to that Communist"! Their surprise was evident when I gave instructions to their secretary to find all the files dealing with Cuba and to alert all officers who had been involved in Cuba to be ready to talk to the Commission. There was evidence that they thought we would turn them down or that we would be coy and find some excuse to keep information from them. Instead we showed full cooperation. They seemed almost disappointed by our cooperation. Later, one of the members of the Commission confidentially told me that they had not expected access to the Cuba files and if that had been the case, they were
prepared to pack up their bags and leave and make a public statement on how they had been treated. Our sincere willingness to help them in their evaluation had thrown their game plan into disarray and forced them to proceed with their review which they had anticipated would have been stopped right at the beginning.

Investigate they did. They worked hard. They read reports and documents. They attended briefings and sat in on important decisions. They talked to lots of people--whomever they wished. They were taken to a number of Embassies overseas and talked to our people there. They saw first hand the painstaking care we took in selecting, "clearing", training, assigning and promoting our Foreign Service personnel. They saw how reports and evaluations of foreign events and attitudes were made by the Foreign Service and the CIA and how these reports were reviewed and used in the policy making process.

They came, they saw, they talked and they learned. They were "converted".

The time to wind up their investigation came and they had to write a report to their Legion members. They met with the Secretary before they left the Department. They did not furnish us with a copy of the report, but orally reported that:

-- The Foreign Service of the United States was an able, loyal, hardworking arm of the US government. The country could be proud of the men and women who worked in the Foreign Service.

-- The Foreign Service people reacted almost automatically--harshly, rigidly and negatively to any positive Communist initiative or suggestion. They had been criticized for so long as being "soft" on Communism that they were in fact far too rigid and too conservative in attitudes, approaches and reactions to the Communist block. The Foreign Service had a "knee jerk" reaction to any issue that had a Communist aspect to it.

-- Because of this rigidity the State Department and the US may be missing opportunities for enhancing relations with the Communist countries that might be in our long range to explore. The foreign policy establishment should be less rigid and more receptive to possible initiatives from the other side.

-- The time had come for the US public in general and the American Legion to stop its automatic criticism of the State Department. The Legion needed to start a new process in which it and the Department could work more harmoniously together in understanding the deep issues affecting our country's security and foreign policy.

-- The Secretary should be a regular and respected guest at the Legion's executive meetings so that the Legion's senior officials could be briefed on the issues and on the supporting role that the Legion might play.

The Secretary was of course enormously pleased with that informal report. His fondest wishes had come true. I had been as I said earlier a skeptic; I came away from this
experienced deeply impressed with the process—it was indeed a change in our previously acrimonious adversarial position vis-a-vis the Legion.

The Commission's report was subsequently delivered to the next Legion convention and adopted by it. Thereafter, Secretary Rusk, while he was in office, met regularly with the Legion's leadership to discuss various foreign policy issues. The Legion became one of our strong supporters. And over time, the Foreign service became less paranoid about Communism and Communists. We became less rigid and more rational in our analysis. The Secretary had proved once again to be as wise a tactician in human relations as he was in foreign affairs.

*Q:* A second effort at openness that you undertook was to appoint public inspectors to overseas inspection teams. How did that work out?

CROCKETT: It worked very well. The Foreign Service officers that were on the inspection teams enjoyed and appreciated the efforts and contributions of the public members. The public members got an appreciation of Foreign Service life and problems—living and working overseas. We didn't keep track of the public members as we should have—we could have formed them into a constituency, but we didn't. The ones I did keep track of even now have a good feeling about the Foreign Service. They did not contribute much to the improvement of our Foreign Service management. They were charmed by their Foreign Service colleagues and were co-opted very quickly. They became defenders of the status quo. I received no suggestions for changes from the public members. That often happens—the new boys on the block join the old boys as quickly as possible.

*Q:* You also established a number of study groups staffed by non-Foreign Service people. One was a group of three businessmen. What was that all about?

CROCKETT: I used the three businessmen as a sounding board for organizational development ideas. They were all people who had had experience in the field of O.D. in their own organizations. O.D. focused on process as well as substance. The process included sensitivity training and team building. The objective was to change the culture and climate of an organization. These three men had had experience with that approach in their own organization and I sought their advice on how it might be applied to the Department. I wanted more organizational development in the Department, more team-work in the bureaus and in Embassies. They encouraged me to believe it could be done in the Department and that it would be useful. I understood organizational development to be different from the customary way of looking at organizations—boxes on charts—nor organizational theories such as vertical vs lateral. I understood O.D. to essentially interested in developing the human system—relationships among people to achieve mutual trust, respect and support to eliminate or minimize inter-personal competition, to surface behavioral issues that people didn't understand or even know existed. I was interested in improving the human system, the ways people worked together. I was not interested in substance or organization as such, but in improving the climate within which a group worked in order to improve its effectiveness as a group.
Q: We are now talking about the period of the mid-60's when these theories of organizational development, like "theory X and Y" and "T-groups" were becoming the focus of administration in the academic community. Were there any inhibitions that you perceived in bringing these new concepts in to the Department?

CROCKETT: Indeed. A psychologist by the name of Chris Argyris wrote a report on the Foreign Service which I think answers your question as well as anything I could say. Argyris of Yale University conducted some of the T-group meetings in the Department. T-groups were essentially sensitivity training session during which we brought strangers together who were encouraged to express their feelings in an effort towards self-improvement--to improve your own style, your ability to communicate, to become more effective in your relationships with others. My hope was to show people--and I think it occurred to some extent--the terrible human costs of the Department's "up-tightness". There is a cost to denying human emotions and submerging feelings--of always being on guard and mistrustful of others. The cost of that behavior was not only damaging to the individuals but to the organization itself. We attempted through the T-groups to change people's attitudes toward their own behavior. Argyris wrote a report which emphasized that the Foreign Service culture was closed and therefore change resistant. He noted that Foreign Service people tended to avoid personal conflict and tended therefore to withdraw when an issue became viewed as a personal matter. They submerged aggressiveness because such behavior was mistrusted by the Service. Mutual trust and openness was at a minimum. Leveling with each other was not something to be done in the Foreign Service. Any perception of self-aggrandizement was resented and was perhaps the reason I was viewed with some misgivings; undoubtedly some of the Foreign Service suspected my motives. One of the tenets of diplomacy is that you present a "stone face" and that you don't show your emotion or reveal what is going on in your mind. The old style of diplomacy was very much akin to poker; you don't give away your hand by any expressions. Control over your emotions was viewed as essential. T-groups were useful to some extent; changing the culture of a large and widespread organization was long-term effort. But I thought we were making progress. For example, Ambassador Allen, an old line Foreign Service officer, attended one of the T-groups and volunteered that it was very helpful to him and that it had changed his behavior. For a while, we invited all DCMs to attend T-groups so that if they found it useful they might take the concept back to their own posts. From my own personal experience, I know that you have to confront other people's views of yourself that don't conform with your own perceptions. That is a traumatic experience. I am sure that a number of people who participated in T-groups had such pain.

O.D.--organizational development--on the other hand was designed to improve the team work among people who were working in the same place and for the same objectives.

One of the Department's great weaknesses is that it divides substance and administration. The substantive officers looked upon administration as nuts and bolts, toilet cleaning,
keeping the cars running. There was no concept in the Department of management and the linkage between substance and administration.

Q: Given the Argyris analysis, did you reach any conclusions about the kinds of people you were recruiting into the Foreign Service?

CROCKETT: Yes, indeed. One of the actions we took was to review the examination process. We had a man by the name of Kenneth Clark, a psychologist from NYU, who conducted a long and intensive review of the process. As part of his study, he tried to validate the selection process to see whether there was any relationship between selection and success in the Foreign Service. I must admit that this was another one of those projects that I did not have time to follow-up on it. Clark's report was turned over to Personnel and I don't know if anything ever happened.

Q: What about other outside experts that you brought into the Department to look at its operations?

CROCKETT: We did bring in a number of groups to review what we were doing in administration. I remember particularly one group that looked at our commissary operations overseas. I had hoped that we could develop a world-wide commissary network. What we had was miss-or-hit operation, each run by the Embassy, some well and some not so well. Some like Rome and Paris flourished, earning lots of money and reserves. I hoped that we could meld those commissaries into a world-wide system so that the profitable commissaries could support their less affluent operations in other parts of the world or that we could establish new commissaries in places where the staff was too small to make it an economic proposition. So we had a group look at commissaries, but nothing concrete came out of it.

Another group looked at our foreign buildings operations, but that also didn't produce much. They traveled, they saw, they enjoyed. They returned and reported to the Foreign Building Office, but nothing much came of it. That was true of all the outside groups, except there was a spin-off. We did get a wider recognition of the problems and successes of our overseas operations. There was an additional awareness of the Foreign Service, but it may not have been worth the cost. In every case, the operation being analyzed, like FBO, resented and resisted what they perceived to be an intrusion. They discounted the recommendations, even the few that were made. It was bureaucracy in action. This syndrome of course does not apply exclusively to the department, but is true for most organizations. As I said before, the process to involve those that might eventually be affected was non-existent. I didn't take the time to introduce the study groups to the FBO director and his staff; I didn't explain to FBO what the purposes of the review were and what my expectations were; I didn't take the time to listen to the FBO's staff concerns and expectations, we didn't discuss the opportunities that such a study group might provide. I just put FBO and the outside group together with a very brief introduction and told them to get going. I didn't do a good job of managing the process. I confess that at that time I didn't really know and understand process and its importance. I didn't recognize that in
every human endeavor there is a distinction between process and substance, the
difference between how what is to be done and how it is to be done. If there is one thing
lacking in all human affairs, it is the appreciation for the importance of process.

Q: Your earlier comments suggested that the people you selected for these outside groups
did not have too much to contribute. Is that a fair statement?

CROCKETT: Yes, that is a fair statement. Our selection process was based on referrals
from different constituencies. The people who were selected were not necessarily experts
in the subject matter being reviewed. It made their conclusions somewhat less than valid.

Q: During your tenure as Deputy Under Secretary, you sought the advice of a number of
psychologists; for example, Argyris and Clark. There was also a New York industrial
psychologist by the name of Levenson. Why the emphasize on psychologists?

CROCKETT: The main motive for at least Argyris and Levenson was that they had
experience with T-groups. They had also run some team building groups. We also
employed a Professor Ferguson of UCLA who ran the "O" area T-groups. It was one of
the first ones. They had the greatest expertise in what we were trying to do. They were the
"gurus" of their time.

Q: You tried to institutionalize organizational development by establishing a staff called
ACORDS (Action for Organizational Development). What were your hopes and how
would you evaluate their success?

CROCKETT: I hoped that the staff would be available to advise heads of our various
organizations including Embassies, on how to approach team building. They were
intended to be experts on how an organization develops the necessary human
relationships to make it effective and efficient. One Assistant Secretary used the staff; the
Director General used the staff and I think perhaps parts of the Latin America Bureau
used ACORDS. A few Embassies used it, but by and large, it was a failure. It was not
accepted; the concept was not valued; it was feared and perhaps even ridiculed. It was
seen as another of Crockett's schemes. Again, we didn't have a mandate from the
Secretary and without that often nothing happens, although I must also add that we
witnessed that even mandates from the President or the Secretary had little impact on the
Foreign Service. Mandate is undoubtedly helpful, but no guarantee for success.
Resistance to change is the greatest barrier.

Q: When you first considered organizational development, did anyone speculate what
impact a more open Foreign Service on the US foreign policy?

CROCKETT: There was a connection. In those days, I was Vice President Lyndon
Johnson's travel escort officer. Mr. Johnson had a terrible reputation in the Foreign
Service for talking too much and being too open and direct. When he went abroad, he
would never be permitted to see a head of state privately. The Ambassador always had to
go along. I remember Rusk calling me into his office once before one of Johnson's trips and telling me that he wanted me to make sure that Johnson would have an opportunity to talk directly and personally with the heads of state of the countries he visited. He said that no one in our government was better in one-on-one situation than Lyndon Johnson. This was an indication that Rusk felt that a more open and direct presentation of our views was the best approach. He felt that the Johnson open style was better than the style of indirection and insinuation which was the customary diplomatic style. That was the connection between a more open Foreign Service and foreign affairs. But there was no mandate form the Secretary. It should also be noted that openness might the best approach in a one-to-one situation; it may not be in a group setting. I do think we have seen the results of openness in the more recent meetings between our Presidents and Russian leaders. I think openness has paid off in those sessions. These gain were one-on-one meetings.

Q: You have mentioned the name Kenneth Clark before. He is best remembered during your tenure for trying to help you to open the Foreign Service to minorities and women. What were your hopes for these groups?

CROCKETT: At that time, our focus was on Afro-Americans. In truth, the pressure for increasing minority representation in the Foreign Service came from the White House. It demanded that we have more black Ambassadors and more black Foreign Service officers. It started when Kennedy was President, but Lyndon Johnson certainly stressed it. Ralph Dungan and his successor Horace Busby, two White House staffers, were the spearheads of the campaign. Dick Fox, who then worked for us brought Kenneth Clark to our attention. Clark came to the conclusion through his studies of the entrance process that blacks were not passing the examination because they didn't have the required background. We therefore wrestled with changing the examination; Clark told us that this would be the wrong approach because we would dilute the quality of the Service. His advice was to bolster the quality of the black applicants. We instituted a very extensive program, funded by the Ford Foundation and led by Dick Fox, which would enable us to select top Afro-American undergraduates in many black Universities in the United States. We subsidized these candidates, we added additional courses to their curriculum which would help them pass the exam, we brought them into the Department as summer interns to help them get a feel for the culture. Our objective was to nurture and motive those people until they passed the examination. It was a great program for American professions, but not necessarily for the Department. Most of the people we trained became doctors or lawyers or other professionals because they saw those avenues as being more attractive, but the program was somewhat successful as far as the Foreign Service was concerned. We brought a few blacks in this way.

During my tenure, the Department appointed the first black woman Ambassador. Her name was Mrs. Patricia Roberts Harris. Lyndon Johnson wanted to be known as the first President to make such an appointment. I think Dick Fox suggested the name to me. The President was involved in convincing her to serve. It was not an easy choice for her; she was a well known and established professor whose husband was an attorney. She was
very reluctant in part because she was concerned that people would think that she was being appointed only because of her sex and skin color. She was also concerned that her husband not become an "Ambassadorial consort". He would have had to give up his practice to go with her. She also wasn't enthusiastic being the Ambassador to Luxembourg, which was hardly a prestigious appointment. But we found Mr. Harris employment in Switzerland and Mrs. Harris accepted the appointment.

Q: The first black Ambassador was Clifton Wharton, a career Foreign Service officer, which happened before your time. You did however recommend the appointment of several minority candidates for Ambassadorial appointments.

CROCKETT: Yes. I don't remember the number, but there were a number of women, blacks, Mexican-Americans and other minorities. There had been women--i.e. Mrs. Luce, Mrs. Mesta--but they had been rarities. We tried to increase their numbers in the Ambassadorial ranks and many came from the Service itself--i.e. Carol Laise and others. That was also true for other minorities; we found qualified candidates in the Service itself. There was always resistance in the Foreign Service to the appointment of any one who was not a member of the Service. It had always resented political appointees and that they might have come from minority group didn't make any difference. The Service didn't distinguish between the campaign contributors and minorities; they were all outsiders. I should add that I think the Service acquitted itself admirably in its support of the minority and women Ambassadors once they were at their posts. The Secretary and Under Secretary were passively supportive of our efforts. It is my recollection that neither actively supported any of my initiatives. That was even true for such continuing operations as the budget. They gave their passive acceptance; Rusk made his perfunctory appearance before each appropriation committee, but never took any initiative to support anything we tried. "Full" support is not a phrase that I would apply to either the Secretary or Under Secretary. The White House was much more supportive and in many cases, full-hearted.

Q: I would now like to move on to the next section of this interview which will focus on programming systems. You will be remembered in the Department's history as the first person who tried to relate resources--money, people, training, etc--to substantive efforts. Before we discuss the details, why did you try to quantify the Foreign Service's output which had always been regarded as unquantifiable?

CROCKETT: We always encountered in our budget presentations the committee' insistence on being shown what results we had gotten from their previous appropriations. They wanted quantitative measurements which would validate or disprove their previous financial decisions. They wanted to see whether the resources had a connection with substantive output. The committee were disappointed by the reluctance of substantive officers particularly to try to relate resources to output. Foreign Service officers were reluctant to quantify, they were reluctant to discuss foreign policy as a product which could be quantified. My interest in programming systems came from my experiences in the budget process during which I was continually badgered to come up with quantitative
indicators of policy efforts. I believed that budgets should flow from policy and not the other way. I thought I had to find a way of linking policy and resources if the Department were ever able to obtain adequate resources from the Congress. Part of the concept of quantification came from Dick Barrett, part came from my conversations with the Policy Planning Staff, under Walt Rostow. That staff was trying to force the Department to come up with a policy statement for each country with which we had relations. Those statements were to be all inclusive; that is to say, it would cover the efforts of all U.S. agencies in the country. I thought that we could develop country budgets that not only would be consistent with those policy statements, but would be a part of mutually reinforcing processes of policy development and implementation and resources. That was the genesis of our effort of linking policy and resources.

Q: Your hopes of meeting that objective is evidenced by a number of efforts. Let me start with "Management by Objectives and Programs" which you have previously described as part of your effort to reorganize the administrative area. You used that to broaden your span of control and eliminate layers of bureaucracy. Then you went to the "Comprehensive Country Programming System" (CCPS). What was the genesis of CCPS and how did it develop and end?

CROCKETT: This effort is well documented in a book by Fritz Mosher and Jack Harr. There were two beginnings to the CCPS saga. One effort was started by Dick Barrett and Mel Spector, who essentially focused on a programming system. It was experimented with in the Latin America area. My involvement began with my conversations with Rostow and his staff about the need to link policy and resources. I wanted the resource requirements to come out of policy goals and not having substantive efforts be supported by budgets from other agencies. I wanted a have a consistent effort on the substantive side as we were trying to do in the administrative area. Barrett had linkages to the White House through Dungan and came to the Department from the Bureau of the Budget. He was an innovative and energetic person. He began to put together the CCPS concept. Once again, we had the passive approval of the Secretary. We had in the beginning the full support of the White House. We collected a relatively large staff under Barrett. He used the computer for the manipulation of the data. He got several Ambassadors to agree to be test basins, in which the country team agreed on the various budgets that the field had to submit to each Washington Department or Agency. We hired Henry Rowen from Rand in California; he had had experience with McNamara's whiz kids and their systems approach. We used him as one of our consultants; he helped with making refinements as the results came in from the first countries.

In retrospect, I remember that several Ambassadors in using CCPS did not avail themselves of the opportunity to rule on policy differences; they merely noted them and sent them to Washington for resolution. I remember the inordinate amount of time we spent trying to resolve the differences with other agencies on what resources should be devoted to a country. The weakness was that it was the administrative arm of the Department that was trying to resolve substantive disputes. It should have been the substantive people from the various agencies trying to do that. The problem was not the
resources; it was a question mostly of policy goals. It put administration in the policeman's role once more. We were forced to resolve policy differences which was the responsibilities of others.

**Q:** You mention the Mosher-Harr book. Let me quote some paragraphs from it and get your reactions. First: "Against it (CCPS) were arrayed not only the normal obstacles to major bureaucratic life, but such complicating factors as the strong traditionalism of the State Department, the conservatism of the Foreign Service, lack of interest or acceptance of management concepts in State, the centrifugal pressures of the many federal bureaucracies, the extreme geographic scatter of foreign affairs, and the complexity and intangibility of much of modern foreign policy and operations in contrast to the hardware and logistic base of the Pentagon". I think your earlier comments addressed all of those comments, with which I gather you would agree. In light of that, what made you believe that there was any chance of instituting a programming system in the Department of State?

**CROCKETT:** In retrospect, looking at the many things we tried to start and never accomplished, I think I was the Foreign Service's Don Quixote. I saw wind-mills to combat and I never contemplated failure. I was naive or inordinately optimistic about what we could accomplish; I never contemplated even the possibility of failure. I saw the possibility of linking organizational development and programming system; that is to say, if the Foreign Service were to become more open and team oriented, than the possibility for a viable programming system would be improved tremendously. In some instances, and perhaps most, the Ambassadors who were willing to try CCPS were also those who had been involved in the ACORD program. Certainly the theory of the ACORD program was to change the culture so that people so that people were more accepting of change and less fearful of it.

**Q:** Mosher-Harr also said: "Finally, Crockett's power within State, though considerable, was far from conclusive. It was sufficient to protect and support the development of the (CCPS) system, but not to make it official and accepted agency way of doing business". You addressed this issue earlier when you commented about the passive acceptance of your initiatives by the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

**CROCKETT:** That is right. Another reason was that at a critical juncture in the process of CCPS implementation, Rostow was away on a trip and unavailable for support when we desperately needed him. However, you must remember that Rostow was also an "outsider" and therefore viewed just as skeptically by the Foreign Service as was I. He was a great economist, but not a member of the Foreign Service. Perhaps the skepticism about Rostow was even greater than about me. So his credibility on things like CCPS was not very great with the Foreign Service.

**Q:** Tell us if you will the efforts to made to sell CCPS to the Secretary and the Under Secretary?
CROCKETT: I remember having several meetings with both separately. I rarely met with them together on any issue. I think we even got Rusk to write a letter to Ambassadors, in which he supported the concepts and encouraged them to support it. Rusk was supportive as long as it didn't create any problems for him. He would not have become engaged in any controversy with other agencies; he was not a bureaucratic in-fighter; that was not his style. As long as we kept him out of it, he was supportive. If any controversy arose, he backed out quickly.

Q: One of the major opponents of CCPS was David Bell, the AID Administrator. What were his objections?

CROCKETT: Essentially, he thought that AID was already engaged in a similar practice. He already had a system and saw no gain in joining a broader exercise. He probably also doubted that we had the capacity to manage such a system. Like other agencies heads, he undoubtedly saw it as a possible loss of autonomy and as a surrender of certain prerogatives. In the end, however, he agreed to cooperate in a limited way in a limited number of countries as a pilot project.

Q: If the perception of other agencies was one of loss of independence, did any Ambassadors see it as an opportunity to increase their supervision over the programs in the country?

CROCKETT: Very few. One who did was Tony Freeman, who saw the opportunity that CCPS provided him to improve his management capabilities. He was an exception. Most Ambassadors saw it as make work, administrative minutiae, increasing conflict among their staff rather than improving coordination. So even though Rusk supported the concept with a letter, most Ambassadors were either neutral or opposed. The White House--Horace Busby in particular was very supportive of CCPS. He saw it as a Presidential tool to improve his ability to manage the over-all government, particularly in foreign affairs. He saw it as opportunity to consider all US programs overseas in one total, rather than piece-meal, agency by agency. The then existing budgetary process did not permit you to see what was happening country by country. It is interesting that the BoB helped to sabotage the effort; it was not on the same wave length as the White House, at least some of its staff. That tells me that throughout government and probably beyond that, people are most interested in protecting their own turf and when they see threats, loyalty to their boss may not matter. In all fairness, I don't remember Busby ever getting involved in the debate on the issue, but he was always supportive.

In general, however, we failed once again in the process: inadequate consultation and training. The system was essentially not adequately presented; we pressed too hard for its acceptance. If I had had a second chance, I would have taken much more time in introducing the system. I would have exchanged speed of implementation for long range goals. The process determines the end results all too often. The failure to consider the process often causes failure of implementation.
Q: Your repeated emphasize on process raises the very interesting question of time management. I suspect that time is a critical factor in all organizations and particularly for its leadership. A leader knows that his or her tenure is finite; whether you are a career civil servant or a political appointee, you know that your appointment may be terminated at any time. What then is the answer to the problem you have raised, namely the need to move slowly and thoroughly in the installation of innovations while at the same time recognizing that time may not permit you to see the project to completion?

CROCKETT: It is a difficult question and I am not sure I have the answers. There were some studies done in TRW's space program. That company was under severe time restraints to develop a space capsule. The company brought two different groups together; one was given two weeks first to talk about the process--how they would tackle the project, who would need to be involved at what stage. It didn't worry about the project at all in the two weeks. The other group started immediately. The first group ended up ahead of the second. My conviction is that if you first take a little bit of time to introduce the project properly, to get organized, to develop the necessary relationships and process, you will probably achieve your goals faster and certainly more successfully. Although we have been discussing my experiences in the State Department, the problem of project implementation is not unique to it. When I subsequently worked for the Saga Company, we worked on team building and on process. Whenever we looked at a management failure, it more often than not was because the process had been inadequate and had been left unattended. When we asked people why they didn't pay greater attention to process, the answer was that they didn't have time for that "organizational development nonsense". That is a general attitude; no one has time for process. But I believe that process not only dictates the quality of the innovation, but also accelerates and solidifies its implementation. There must be time for the process, regardless of the manager's time constraints because unless the process is attended to, success is not likely. Process goes on all the time, whether the manager pays any attention to it or not. But that process may well be negative for it may leave the initiative subject to detrimental bureaucratic undermining, unresolved conflicts, inter-personal tensions and other negatives.

That is a lesson I learned first as Deputy Under Secretary and since. That is why after leaving the Department, I spent so much time trying to make people aware of the importance of process. I might add that this issue is not one for organizations alone; it applies to human relationships in general, including marriages and child-parents relationships. It is the "how" and not the "what" that often creates the conflicts. But I see no place in government, in business, in academia where process is taught, discussed or understood. It is a blind spot in our society. Interestingly enough, in the scientific or technical world, process is viewed as critical. These disciplines have adopted an orderly way of achieving their goals, recognizing that step one comes before two and two before three and so on. That is process and it is well recognized in scientific and manufacturing endeavors. It is the key to success in those areas. But not in the world of human relationships. I believe that a sound process could be as important to human relationships as it is to the scientific and manufacturing community.
Q: The Mosher-Harr study noted that: "...the environment and the driving energy of Barrett and some of his staff set in motion a vicious cycle of steadying worsening interpersonal and intergroup relationships". What are your recollections of that issue?

CROCKETT: It was probably true and resulted from our neglect of the process. I don't blame the Foreign Service at all; the near horizon time frame that we all thought we were facing was a pressure on all of us and undoubtedly led to some abrasive behavior. It was always: "Get it down now; otherwise it won't get done at all". That time pressure created frustration, particularly with those seen as "feet-draggers". There were therefore demands that were made in an abrasive fashion.

Q: The CCPS effort led to a very critical meeting that took place in March, 1966 at the Bureau of the Budget. Although Mosher-Harr cover it at some length, it is still a controversial meeting which I want to discuss. But before going into that, let me ask you what you thought the status of CCPS to be just before March, 1966. Did you still have hopes at that time of having CCPS accepted by the Department?

CROCKETT: No, I think my hopes had been pretty well dashed by that time. The reality had set in and I saw no real reason for more bureaucratic in-fighting because the opposition was simply too strong. The Bureau of the Budget pretty much pulled the rug from under us just before this time by instituting their own concept of PPBS (Planning-Programming-Budgeting System).

Q: To return to the meeting of March, 1966, I would like to quote Mosher-Harr again. They said: "Barrett felt that his trusted friend and leader had deserted him at the crucial moment... The notion that Crockett had given almost everything away was reinforced for Barrett when, after the meeting, Jones and Frey (NOTE: two Bureau of the Budget officials) in a genuine way offered some sympathy in view of the hard work and tough fight that Barrett and his staff had put up.... For his part, Crockett was mystified by (Barrett's) reaction... and felt that nothing had been given away as yet, that negotiations were still to be carried on.... Barrett had not realized how far and fast Crockett had moved for compromise. On the other hand, Crockett feared that Barrett and his staff would rather gamble for glory or total defeat, risking everything in a bureaucratic confrontation". What is your recollection of the atmosphere and of your own state of mind just prior to this meeting?

CROCKETT: I remember the meeting. I was tired of the fight. I was tired of the whole thing and didn't believe that we could overpower all of the opposition arrayed against us. To fight was to lose, whereas compromise might have kept the project alive. Indirectly, the time that CCPS took for me was at the cost of doing other things. It was almost intolerable because there was an expectation that I would resolve every Embassy's budget problem when a conflict arose. I didn't have that time available and sad to say, there was no other place willing or able to perform the adjudicating function. It should have fallen to the Policy Planning Staff, but it wasn't prepared to accept the responsibility. I would not have described the situation quite as dramatically as Mosher-Harr did, but I did feel
that Dick Barrett was pressing for a confrontation that I perceived as unnecessary and undesirable.

Q: You have suggested that in March, 1966 you were under severe pressures from a large number of opponents to your various initiatives. Was the burden becoming overwhelming?

CROCKETT: You have to remember that in addition to all the initiatives that we had underway, I was also burdened with considerable travel demands as escort officer for the President, Rooney and Hayes. I not only had the normal work-load of the regular job and our initiatives, but I had the travel load that was imposed on me and my family. I was beginning to ask whether the pressures were worth the effort. I was especially hurt by the constant opposition of the people for whom many if not all the initiatives were intended to serve--the Foreign Service. My main purpose was to help the Foreign Service and it did not support me at all. Had I had any kind of support, things may have turned out differently. But when you labor year after year to help and improve an institution and in return get nothing but opposition and criticism and some imputing of your motives, it wears you down and it wore me down. But many of the things we did in good faith still were not in response to the felt needs of the Service. So these initiatives were viewed as foreign and unnecessary and therefore were not supported. CCPS was not perceived as a useful tool by the Foreign Service. Ambassadors, political officers, other agencies saw no merit in the system. They felt no need for it; so it was too much to expect for CCPS to take roots. If there is no felt need, yet someone tells you a change would be good for you, it is a waste of time to pursue the matter. In March, 1966 I could not face another conflict.

Q: That is an interesting comment because some of your initiatives were in response to felt needs (e.g., the overseas school program, etc).

CROCKETT: And those things lasted. They were accepted and remain.

Q: My question was intended to explore whether you felt that you had received sufficient credit for those efforts and whether your name is still connected with those initiatives?

CROCKETT: No, to both questions. Even the initiatives that I personally took--personally--like the Foreign Service Day or the Foreign Service Journal are not credited to me. It hurts. I don't dwell on it but it does hurt. I may have met a felt need, but the attribution was forgotten. On the other hand, the initiatives that we took, but were opposed, I am sure my name is still connected with those. You are remembered for the negative and not your positive contributions. That is a general human failure and not unique to the Department.

Q: Based on your experiences, can you draw some conclusions on the importance of a management strategy for an official in a senior position such as you were?
CROCKETT: What we lacked was an over-all management goal and a strategy on how to reach that goal. We didn't contemplate the necessity for a campaign--an over-all strategy from which we could pick and choose certain short, intermediate and long range objectives. We didn't know how the various initiatives really linked with each other and certainly did not know whether they would make a meaningful whole. Too many of the efforts were based on their own intrinsic values; the linkages to other efforts might have become apparent after implementation, but is certainly was not a considered matter before initiation. There was no synergy among the efforts. They were each individual approaches to single perceive problems. Each took a lot of time and may not have made sense if seen within a broader context or may not have been initiated at the time they were because some higher priority ones should have been. That was certainly our shortcoming and may well be that of many who attain high level management positions. We and they didn't take time to formulate and articulate the over-all objectives and goals and the accompanying strategy. Another important concept is to poll the organization itself for its own felt need for changes. Participation is a powerful management strategy.

Q: Is there some inconsistency between your concept of a wide span of control within "Management by Programs and Objectives" and an over-all strategy. An "MPO" assumes that innovations will flow from the bottom and be approved at the top, whereas a total strategy begins at the top and imposes some limitations on the lower level managers?

CROCKETT: The two concepts may well be in conflict. But that problem can be alleviated if the over-all strategy is carefully developed and in the best of all possible worlds, developed in conjunction with the program managers rather than in the higher echelon exclusively. The imposition of a strategy from top down surprises the managers and reduces their incentives. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive; there is conflict, but the recognition of that fact dictates close attention to the process of developing the strategy and the MPO.

Q: Going beyond CCPS, there were other efforts made to bring programming systems to the Department. I would like to mention a few to you because they are an indicator of the interest in certain quarters to relate resource requirements to established policy. There was FAPS (Foreign Affairs Programming System), which was developed in 1955 and 1956. Then there was MUST (Manpower Utilization System and Techniques). That was essentially a method to try to control the overseas staffings of all agencies. Then there was PPBS (Planning-Programming-Budgetary System), which has already been mentioned. I think you said that this a White House-BoB inspired effort.

CROCKETT: I don't remember what the genesis of PPBS was. BoB was well aware of our efforts and had participated to some extent in CCPS. I believe that BoB did PPBS in a defensive ploy to try any programming-budgeting system in the Bureau and not letting it be in State. PPBS was a State-controlled system and would have reduced the BoB role in determining the allocation of resources to the foreign affairs agencies. I therefore saw PPBS as a bureaucratic defensive response to our efforts. It effectively undercut anything
that we were doing or thinking of doing because other agencies would accept BoB leadership—it was after all a part of the President's Office—whereas they wouldn't accept the same role for State. When BoB decided to proceed with PPBS, I knew that battle for CCPS was lost.

*Q: Let me finish with the list of programming efforts. Next was EROP (Executive Review of Programs) which I believe even was supported by a Presidential letter.*

CROCKETT: That was a Presidential initiative to reduce the size of our overseas representation. Like other initiatives, the results were nil or insignificant. There was a lot of fluff, but no results. There may have been a few reductions in positions, but they were minimal. My recollection was that Horace Busby was behind this effort. It stemmed from criticism about the bloated bureaucracy overseas. What the reviews showed was that post after post, the State Department contingent was very small and usually outmanned by one or several other agencies. Busby saw this as an opportunity to strengthen the Foreign Service. Linc Gordon, I believe, was one of the Ambassadors who complained bitterly about the size of his mission in Brazil. When he was ordered to do a review, he put a young Foreign Service in charge whose name was Frank Carlucci, subsequently CIA director and Secretary of Defense. Gordon's view that Ambassadors were by and large ignored when it came to staffing of the post. Agencies did almost what they pleased in staffing their overseas missions without much justification and certainly without putting their perceived requirements in the context of the over-all size of the American mission.

*Q: The last of this rather lengthy list of programming systems was CASP (Country Analysis and Strategy Paper). You mentioned Mel Spector earlier. I believe this was a system he tried to install in Latin America after the demise of CCPS. Before we leave this segment of our interview, I should note that after our retirement, efforts were made and I think are still being made, to revive some system that would link resources and policy objectives. Much effort went into bringing the whole foreign affair account (known as the "150" account) together in the hopes of somehow making sense of our expenditures in every country. I am sure that some people in the Department believe that they have made progress on this road. As an outsider, I don't know whether this is true or not, but one can certainly say that there is not a consolidated foreign affairs budget as yet. What are your views of these continuing efforts to relate resources and policy objectives?*

CROCKETT: My view then and my view now is that the goal of a system that relates policy objectives with resources is essential. It is difficult to achieve, but absolutely necessary, not only to improve the management of foreign affairs, but to more effectively apply scarce resources. There is duplication in our overseas efforts that must be rooted out. We need to bring activities together, whether they be in the substantive or administrative fields. But for anyone working in this effort, it cannot be done with numbers alone or through the budget process alone. The basis of the system must be in the determination of policies, country by country in as concrete terms as possible. The budget will flow from the policy and not vice-versa as happens too often. In CCPS, we may have been backwards because I don't think we worked hard enough at the Embassy
level to produce policy statements that could be translated into resources. The US foreign policy objectives must be stated in goals from which stem programs from which stem resource requirements. If you start with resource requirements, it is not going to be meaningful and defensible. I still think that this is a viable concept. It seems so clear and elementary to me; I can only conclude that the process of introduction was deficient. The system may require the introduction of new techniques—such as quantitative analysis—that may be resisted by the culture. That may also have been a reason for failure, although I certainly have drawn a distinction between the responsibilities of an Ambassador and the Foreign Service culture. An Ambassador must be a manager, a leader who understands and deals with various agency cultures. He is not just a super-diplomat; his responsibilities are far greater than that. I am afraid however that most of career Ambassadors did and may still view themselves as super-diplomats and not as a manager of many programs, many of which have little to do with normal diplomatic practices. Until that concept of an Ambassador is accepted, no programming system is going to go very far.

Q: Going back to the Mosher-Harr book, I would like to read to you one comments that appears at the beginning of their work. They said: "The efforts of the new (Kennedy) Administration to imbue State with an action-oriented, aggressive managerial spirit pursued three main tactics. The first was through direct political appointments to the top positions in Washington and to the critical ambassadorships in the field. The second was simply exhortation, and one of the leading exhorters was Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The third tactic was to modify the systems of operations in the Department, an effort that was principally pursued by subordinate officers several echelons down". You have already agreed that "action-oriented, aggressive managerial spirit" is a requirement for the Foreign Service. We have already discussed Rusk's role. The third tactic seems to be addressed primarily to your efforts and some that took place in the Latin American Bureau.

CROCKETT: Right, but I should point out the blindness of the Department. It was my blindness as well, but principally Rusk's and Ball's. Soon after Kennedy took office, the Overseas Coordinating Board—a White House staff—was abolished. It coordinated our policies overseas. The President said on a number of occasions that he would look to State to replace the OCB. Never did the leadership of the Department take advantage of that opportunity and try to organize the Department to do what the President had asked. Never was there a discussion as to how the abolition of OCB would impact the Department and foreign policy or how the vacuum would be filled. The Department did not rise to Kennedy's challenge. No exhortation to the Foreign Service to take the leadership and no recognition that something needed to be done to pick up the slack was ever made by anyone.

Q: One aspect of the Mosher-Harr observation concerned personnel appointment. Kennedy appointed among others, Rusk, Ball, Bowles, Mennen Williams, Averell Harriman, Roger Jones, Harlan Cleveland, Kenneth Galbraith, Lincoln Gordon, Samuel Berger, George McGhee. Did any of these see to your knowledge the opportunity and
challenge that the demise of the OCB provided or did any of them see the need to introduce new techniques to make State an "action-oriented, aggressive" manager?

CROCKETT: Two did. One was Bowles and the other was McGhee. The latter was at the beginning the Director of the Policy Planning Staff and he helped me understand the linkage between policy and management. I had a number of conversations with McGhee and he was very supportive. He helped me learn as did Bowles who was also supportive of our efforts. I probably talked to Bowles more than any other Seventh Floor principal—he was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. But neither suggested that we needed to do something to take the place of the OCB or that the Department find an organizational location within itself that could take over some of the OCB's functions. This was really our blind spot and resulted in lots of problems and lost opportunities for the Department. None of the others showed the slightest interest in the managerial issue—not even Harlan Cleveland who was known as a public administration expert. McGhee after he went to Germany as Ambassador accepted a CCPS team, but that didn't last very long.

Q: There is one other new organization that you brought into being that I would like to note, namely the Center for International Systems Research, which you began in 1965. What was the genesis of this staff?

CROCKETT: I think this is also was born out of necessity. There was a person to be taken care of. I felt that new insights into the way diplomacy is conducted would be useful. I recall that an officer by the name of Howard Ball suggested that this research approach might be useful in trying to change the culture of the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service in general knew of the Argyris report, but we debated for a long time whether it should be made public. I finally agreed that it should be made available to the public and we published it as part of the Center's efforts. The publication created a major uproar with me being accused again of being disloyal to the Foreign Service because I had washed the Foreign Service's dirty laundry in public. The report soon thereafter disappeared from the list of public documents and was no longer available. I left soon after the start of the Center and I didn't keep track of its life.

Q: I would like to devote the last section of our interview to your memories of well-know personalities that you knew. Let me start with President Kennedy. When and how did you meet him?

CROCKETT: The first time I ever saw him was in the Oval office—Vice-President Johnson was being briefed for his first overseas trip. This trip was to Senegal to represent the US at its Independence Day. I was Johnson's escort officer. I was impressed with Kennedy's calm, easy approach; he didn't give off an aura of being a big-shot; he didn't seem to have an over-inflated ego. He was self-confident. The next time I met him was when we returned from Senegal. The trip had gone well; Johnson had performed well. Rooney was also on the delegation. On the way back, John imbibed as he usually did. We had no expectations of any requirement upon return and John had consumed considerable amounts by the time we landed. When we were one or two hours away from landing,
word was passed to the plane that the President wanted to see Rooney upon arrival. I tried
to get Rooney to decline because he was in no condition to see the President or anyone
else for that matter. But Rooney insisted, but he did take me along. So we went to the
Oval Office and there was Kennedy in his rocker. Kennedy really wanted to know how
Lyndon Johnson had performed. Rooney was thick-tongued, but very effusive in his
praise. Kennedy quickly saw Rooney's condition and said that he had planned for a press
conference immediately after our meeting. He said that now that he had been briefed, he
would do the talking and Rooney and I could stand beside him. He told me to take
Rooney's arm and hold him--without having to say anything. I was impressed by how this
young man handled an old man who had been somewhat indiscreet. Kennedy had been
understanding, gentle, kind and didn't reprimand Rooney one bit. I was thoroughly
impressed with his tact and humanity. I saw Kennedy once more later. I have a picture of
us together at a White House reception, but that was the last time that I saw or spoke to
Kennedy.

Q: What are your recollections of Ralph Dungan, who has been mentioned often during
our discussions?

CROCKETT: Ralph was my contact at the White House during the Kennedy years. He
was somewhat critical of the Foreign Service. It is amazing how wide spread the criticism
of the Foreign Service was in the 1950s and '60s. This was particularly true for the
Washington power centers. This was true in the Executive Branch as well as the
Legislative one. Ralph was also a critic. He was the key White House official on
Ambassadorial appointments. He pressed hard for candidates that met the Kennedy
criteria whether political or career appointees. He was more interested in quality than
political or career background. He was in the forefront of getting career officers appointed
to some of our major European posts. Under Kennedy and Johnson, we reached the high
water mark in terms of Ambassadors from the Foreign Service ranks, especially at major
posts. Ralph was interested in the Department's organization, but did not press me at least
to look at any changes that might have been needed in light of the demise of the OCB.
Later, he was assigned as ambassador to Chile, I think, and I sorely missed him because
he was someone I could talk to about some of our administrative-management problems.

Q: Let's now talk a little about Vice-President and then President Johnson. You were his
escort officer on all of his trips. What memories do you have of those trips?

CROCKETT: Dreadful memories. Those trips were essentially nightmares. They were
filled with small crises caused by minor mishaps that were often mended by luck. Unlike
Kennedy, Johnson had a large ego; he could be very abusive to people at times and very
kind and friendly at others. He didn't suffer protocol easily. He always growled about
having to sit next to the "old ladies" when the younger and prettier ones were down at the
other end of the table. He hated to lay wreaths and other ceremonial acts. He always
wanted to do policy business. He always pressed to get involved in policy and more
policy. Frankly, on the trips he took as Vice-President, there wasn't much policy to
discuss; they were essentially representational functions. Johnson was petty in his
demands--no pictures from his left side, no motorcycle escorts, the shower heads had be a

certain height; he wanted his own bed wherever he went; he wanted his masseuse every

night at every stop (they had to be soft-handed women, no "sand-papered hand of a man);

the whisky had to be of a certain brand. He was difficult. I remember we went to Seoul on

one trip and in the middle of the night--some of these demands I suspect were made to
test people--he wanted tapioca. He loved tapioca. We had prepared for some of these
idiosyncrasies; we used to "war games' the trips so that we'd be prepared at least for his
usual demands. So we had tapioca ready. But in Seoul also, we had a small crisis because
his favorite suit had been lost; it had been sent to the cleaners. The driver who took it said
that he had misunderstood his instructions and had understood that the suit was for him.
After a major search and uproar, the suit was found; the driver had taken it home, but we
finally found it and Johnson wore it that night. This was good illustration of the kinds of
problems we encountered and the continual challenges that we had to face to satisfy the
Vice-President. It was a twenty-four day when you traveled with him.

Later, with each trip, I got smarter. In the beginning, we tried to support these trips on a
shoe-string. I may have taken one person, if any at all, along on the first trip. I depended
totally on the Embassy to do the advance work, the scheduling and the subsequent
support. I soon found that Embassies were not prepared in terms of concept or
requirements or resources--money, cars, people--needed for adequate support. It cost us a
lot more, but we started to send advance teams, we pulled people out of other embassies
to help out those who would host Johnson. That additional planning and added resources
made the trips easier.

The Vice-President's first trip was to Senegal. The next time, he went around the world.
We started in the Far East--Vietnam, where he met with the President--, the Philippines,
and all around the world and ended in Bermuda to write the trip report. The major
purpose of the trip was to determine what we should do in Vietnam. We had not yet
committed ourselves very deeply to that war. In Bermuda, the report writers--I was partly
involved--were told by Johnson repeatedly: "I want twenty-five facts in this report!". I
don't know whether we reached twenty-five, but I think that report was very influential in
making a US commitment to the freedom of South Vietnam.

We went back to Vietnam after LBJ became President. That was a trip that covered
Australia and New Zealand as well as some other South Asian countries. It was a
nightmare, even though we had a lot of support and help. It was an awful trip. I was
exhausted after it, particularly since I had done the advance travel and then after a week
back home, went with the President. That trip I will always remember because at one of
the stops one of Johnson's favorite secretaries came to me and said that the President had
asked her why she had been wearing the same dress every day. She said that she hadn't
wanted to bother me, but in fact, her baggage had been lost. She was afraid to tell the
President. She apologized for bringing this matter up with me, but she didn't know who
exto turn to. I think this happened in Manila where we had an Naval base with
commissary and PX. So we put her a helicopter, sent someone along with some money
and bought her a new wardrobe. This is typical of the things that happen on these trips.
They appear so petty in retrospect, but at the time they loom like major catastrophes. It was small matters that could make LBJ explode. There was no difference between President Johnson and Vice-President Johnson when it came to these trips. He may in fact may have been worse as President.

He was a man of many contrasts. One time, he had ordered that there were to be two people to every room. He didn't want the tax-payers to be paying for singles. Then he would go out and buy fifty Belgian guns, art works and other gifts and never worry about the tax-payers.

Q: Which staffers accompanied Johnson on his trips?

CROCKETT: Walter Jenkins was his senior assistant when Johnson was Vice President, but didn't go on the trips. Reedy, his pressman, generally did not go along. On his trips, Johnson depended primarily on Bill Moyers, who was very supportive, understanding, courageous--he was one of the few people who would confront Johnson when needed--. Lady Bird always went along. There was always a staff of secretaries and a personal valet--an Air Force person. He took care of the clothes and some of the special food needs. He didn't have a big personal entourage, but State always sent a relatively large team, including substantive officers knowledgeable in the countries that we were going to visit. We always had the DCM of the country to be visited brief Johnson on the flight to that country. He would tell Johnson about the schedule, the local personalities he would meet, the political and economic issues. Scheduling was always a problem; he didn't want to this or that. He complained about being over-scheduled. The DCM carried a lot of the responsibility for the mission. I only escorted him on his Vice-Presidential trips. I don't think he traveled as President while I was still in the Department.

He may have been over-scheduled, certainly in some places. He didn't have much private time. Generally, there would be a dinner at night, so that he was busy most of the day.

Q: Let's talk about the other side of Johnson: the positive humanitarian side. You have some recollections of that side from the trips?

CROCKETT: Let me return to the Senegal trip that I mentioned earlier. I remember one day when the African sun was unmercifully hot. The Vice President and Lady Bird were walking among the mobs of natives who wanted to touch him, to shake his hands and to hear his voice. The "walking among the people" was a fetish with LBJ. It gave him new strength and zest. It affected him like some strong addictive drug. And he loved it. Of course, this habit drove his Secret Service detail to distraction--"how do you protect a man who won't be protected?". On this trip, it being his and our first trip, we felt obliged to trail him--in the heat, dirt and the stench of these hot and excited crunch of people.

Rooney, pudgy and citified, growled our of the corner of his mouth: "What does he think he is doing--running for President of Senegal?". When I finally gathered the courage to remonstrate with Johnson--his safety and his health--his response was classical-- "I shall
ever be available to the people who really want me! So don't try to stand between me and the people". I remembered this remark years later when he was visiting Turkey and a adoring crowd chanted and clapped for much of the night in front of his hotel, keeping him and all of us awake.

When we arrived in Dakar the Ambassador and his wife briefed us upon the health hazards of Senegal. They were concerned that our health would be seriously challenged by the dirt, disease, and lack of sanitation. They warned us not to shake hands unless we were wearing gloves because they felt that many diseases could be transmitted through the shaking of hands. They also strongly recommend that we stay in our cars when visiting markets and other places where the local population gathered. When in the cars, we should keep our windows closed and air conditioning on. Only then would we be safe from the environment and the "dirty people". This advice, coming from the US's senior representative in the country, incensed Johnson. Almost as a deliberate act of defiance, he walked and walked among the screaming and excited mobs. He touched the people and they touched him. He shook hands--bare handed--until the skin of his hands were red and sore. The Senegalese loved it. And the press loved it. He was the hit of Senegal's Independence Day--the only visiting dignitary who had forsaken the official speeches and cocktail circuits to meet the people. He loved the crowds and the silent disapproval of the US Ambassador. He loved the publicity that his behavior that his actions gave him in the world press. The visit had been a glorious success for Johnson--his first visit as Vice-President. He had tried his wings and found not only that he could fly, but actually soar. He was pleased as a kid with a new toy. Rooney, who was a long-time Johnson friend and supporter, was also proud of the way Johnson had conducted himself.

Not long after Johnson's return, the Ambassador was recalled and quietly retired from the Service. A new era of American diplomacy was beginning--a diplomacy that Johnson when he became Ambassador used to describe in some detail to a group of new Ambassadors that I took over to the White House to meet the President. Most of these Ambassadors were career Foreign Service officers who were about to go on their first Ambassadorial assignment--mainly in Africa and the Middle East. He told them that when they arrived at their posts, he expected them to represent the President to all the people of the country, not just the politicians. He wanted to leave their air-conditioned houses and offices and cars and meet the people. He wanted them to get some "hockey" between their toes. Since I had been born and raised on a farm, the term "hockey" was a familiar one. It was apparent to me, as well as to the President, that his newest Ambassadors didn't have the faintest idea what he was talking about. So he explained: " I want you to mingle with the people of the country-side as well as those from the cities. When I was a barefoot kid in Texas and worked in my father's barn-yard, I sometimes stepped in a pancake of fresh cow manure. It would squeeze up between my toes. That was "hockey"". He added that he didn't expect the Ambassadors to take their shoes off, but he did expect them to stick their brand new shoes into some fresh cow manure. The Ambassadors were aghast, but they got the message.
Q: Are there any stories you remember about Johnson as a person?

CROCKETT: Yes, indeed. One concerned my family. It started one day when the Johnsons were returning to their Texas ranch. The President had invited a number of foreign dignitaries to join him on the ranch for a three day celebration. He had also invited a number of "sub-Cabinet" members and families to join him and help entertain the foreign guests. The Crockett were among the guests and so had gone to Andrews Air Force base to wait for the Johnsons. The President arrived and moved easily around the group, meeting and greeting each of us by name. He gave most of his attention to the wives who were present, telling them how important their husbands were, how much he needed them and depended on them and what a fine job each was doing. The women glowed and the men all felt a little more important. Johnson was a master of creating effective human relationships. Finally, he came upon a nine year old boy dressed in everyday garb. He knelt in front of the boy and grasping his hands, said: "Bobby, have you ever been to Texas? Have you ever ridden a pony? Do you have a cowboy hat?". Bobby shook his head. The President said: "Bobby, go out there and get on that airplane and go to Texas with us. We'll get you a cowboy hat". Verla protested. "Oh, no, Mr. President! He doesn't have any clean clothes, he doesn't have his pajamas, and he doesn't even have his toothbrush. He is only here to see us off!".

The President brushed aside her excuses, saying that all those things were available in Texas. He told Bobby to get on the plane. Bobby didn't need any further urging and ran out of the door, down the apron and on to Air Force One. The rest of us continued to talk to each other until it was time to board Air Force One. We had been airborne for approximately an hour when we heard over the loud-speaker: "Bobby Crockett--the President would like to come forward to his private compartment". It wasn't me the President was asking for, but our nine year old son. So Bobby went and returned glowing. He had talked to the President, had gotten his autograph, but most important of all, he had talked with Eddie Arnold, the popular country folk singer. Eddie was along to provide entertainment for a dinner dance that the Johnsons were to host. He promised to send Bobby an autographed copy of his newest album. What an experience that was for a nine year old.

After we had landed we were taken to the Alamo and Lackland Air Force Base, where a demonstration was held, and got to the LBJ Ranch about dusk. The Crocketts were invited to stay at the West Ranch. In our ignorance, we assumed that this was a guest house on the spread and were much surprised in fact that this was a house on an adjoining ranch owned by a Mr. and Mrs. West, who were friends of the Johnsons. It was about thirty miles from the LBJ house. As soon as we arrived at the LBJ ranch, we and our baggage were quickly whisked into a helicopter for a flight to the West Ranch. In these semi-darkness and due to the pilot's unfamiliarity with the territory, we were soon lost. We had to land in the backyard of a farmer's house. He and his wife came out nonchalantly, as if helicopters had landed in his back yard every day, and gave us the proper directions. We landed at the West Ranch after a great experience particularly for Bobby.
The Wests greeted us with true Texas courtesy and hospitality. They had already been briefed on Bobby's situation and therefore turned him over to their "houseman". The two of them took off to find, clothes, pajamas, toothbrush, etc. Later that evening the West and the Crocketts were picked up by limousine to be taken to the dinner dance at the LBJ ranch. It was a festive occasion--music, entertainment, dancing and dinner. Verla and I were the hosts at one table. Toward the end of the evening, gifts were passed out to all the guests. This was a LBJ custom and everyone enjoyed this part of the Johnsons' hospitality. This gift giving was a personal matter to Johnson. We used to carry a plane load of gifts when we went with him on his trips. He preferred gifts--silver pieces, for example--that could be inscribed from him to the recipient which was usually the head of state. His demand for these gifts became so great that we used to borrow from an engraver from one of Washington's jewelry stores. We took him along and he used to work long hours, night and day, engraving LBJ's gifts. Our main problem was to hide the engraver so that the press didn't know that he was along and write a big story. So we designated him as a baggage handler. But he was a very important member of the entourage.

In any case, the ladies were given small Steuben crystal pieces and the men received a Benrus wristwatch with an LBJ saying on its face: "Come, let us reason together". I had received the same watch as a gift on a previous occasion. The President was like a kid watching the opening of the gifts. He came over to our table and, kneeling beside me, put his hand on my left wrist, covering the watch. As the men opened their packages and found their watches, he said: "I hope that you will like your watches. I gave Bill one just like it". Then he looked at the one I was wearing and realizing it was not the one he had previously given me, he looked at me and said in a hurt voice: "Bill, You aren't wearing my watch. Don't you like my watch?". And then of course, the joking, fun and hilarity really broke loose. The ice had been broken for everyone.

During the barbecue the next day, all the guests were given cowboy hats. Bobby and I tried ours on and then put them back in the boxes in order not to sully them. Of course, we ran into the President during the afternoon and he demanded that we take the hats right out of the boxes and put them on. A few days after we arrived home, Bobby received a letter from the White House. It said: "Dear Bob, Lady Bird and I were very pleased that you could come to Texas with us. We are enclosing a picture of you and your parents watching the Air show. Of all of our guests on that occasion, we enjoyed you the most. All the best for your future good fortune. Sincerely, LBJ". And that was another side of a very complex man, President Johnson.

Q: Any other stories about LBJ come to mind?

CROCKETT: Yes, one more. I was sitting in my office one day when the white phone on my desk rang. It was the line that tied directly to the President. I answered it and the familiar drawl at the other end said: "Bill, there isn't much that a President of the United States can do. But why can't he help a poor little man in Sicily?". The reference did not
strike my memory; I didn't know what the President was talking about. I could sense the President's impatience. He finally said: "Bill, Bill! Are you there? I am referring to a letter you sent to a man in Sicily in which you said that the President could not help in providing medical assistance to his young son. I want to you to get that letter back and when you have reread it, call me back and tell me how we are going to help that man. It is just such a small thing for us to do, but it is life itself to that Italian boy and his family. So tell me how you are going to be helpful!". I told the President that a messenger was on his way to get a copy of the letter and that I would get back to him. Then LBJ said: "Okay, Bill, that is good. By the way, how are you getting along? Is there anything I can do to help you? You know I depend on you and couldn't get along without you. So call me any time you need me and take care of yourself. Oh, yes, Bill, one other thing. When you have helped that Sicilian family, I don't want to read about it in the morning papers. Do you hear me?". I promised it wouldn't turn up in the papers.

I had learned from hard experience that once the President focused on such a matter, there was no shaking him. I would be expected to attend to this personally. So I dropped the myriad of activities that I was involved to focus on this Sicilian family. I found out that the Department's Executive Secretariat which made up a daily briefing book for the President for some unknown reason had decided to include a copy of my letter to this Sicilian family. We were supposed to send the President illustrations of our correspondence with foreigner so that he had some feel for what people in other countries might be thinking about. The exchange with the Sicilian family hardly fell in the category of high policy or even mood indicator. In any case, the deed was done and I was stuck with a problem. The letter had come from a member of the city government in a small rural community in Italy. He had a nine year old son with a deformed heart—a birth defect that seemed hopeless. But a doctor had told the father of a new operation that Children's Hospital in Boston was performing which might just succeed for his son. So he had written the President of the United States for assistance. The answer from my staff, which I had signed, but not reviewed carefully, had been negative.

Of course, nothing is simple in a bureaucracy. Not only did we have to find legislative authority, but the child and family had to pass the scrutiny of the immigration laws, including the question of "political acceptance " (i.e., no communist or sympathizer), police record, financial viability, etc. We had to find the money, convince the hospital to accept the child and somehow keep all of this out of the newspapers. So I put the security Office to work on an immediate investigation; I asked the US Medical Corps at the NATO base in Naples to check on the boy's condition; I called the hospital and got its agreement; I called a friend in the Immigration and Naturalization Service to clear the child for entry into the United States; I took the necessary funds from the "Contingency Funds"; I asked the Consul General in Frankfurt to see whether he could get an Air Force plane to pick up the boy and fly him to Boston. Having put all the wheels in motion, I called the President and reported. He was pleased and expressed the hope that the boy could be helped.
I went back to my piled up desk and in a few days I received word that the child had arrived in Boston, although in bad physical condition. I reported all of that to the President's staff and forgot the case. The next afternoon, the white phone rang. The President called to say how pleased he was. He also asked whether I had had any trouble bringing the parents into the United States. I said that we had not brought the parents. The President expressed deep disappointment. I told him that it would be very difficult to do so, but he was no dissuaded. He said he knew I could do it and was surprised that someone like me would not have thought of it. How could I let this poor child who didn't speak any English languish in a hospital without his parents? The President thought that the kid must be very lonely and he insisted that his parents be brought to Boston as well. As usual, he expressed faith in me that I would do the job and immediately.

So I went back through the whole routine and within a few days, the parents were re-united with their son in Boston. I reported so to the White House staff--the white phone was used only for calls from the President; never to the President. I thought that was the end of it. I should have known better.

Soon after, the white phone rang again. As I answered it, an assistant slipped me a note updating me on the medical condition of the child. His operation had been delayed a while longer while he was being built up so that he could withstand the procedure. Surely enough, the President wanted to know how the child was getting along. After hearing my report, LBJ said: "Bill, you did a fine job. That is one of the reasons I need you. You get things done. By the way, have been to Boston to talk to the doctors and to check on the parents?". When I admitted that I had not done so and had explained why I had not had time, LBJ said: "Bill, I know how busy you are and how much you are doing for me. But that paper shuffling can wait while human hearts and lives can't. So I want you to go to Boston tomorrow, talk to the doctors, talk to the parents. Make sure Mama and Papa understand the situation and still want to go ahead with the operation. And if you'll stop by my office tomorrow before you go, I'll give you an autographed picture you can take to them. Will you do that?". He need not have asked the last question. I did as instructed while at the same time wondering and appreciating the humanity of this President, who certainly had far greater responsibilities than I had, but had taken so much time on one very small case of humanity.

Q: Tell us what you remember of Mrs. Johnson--Lady Bird?

CROCKETT: She was a great, forgiving, generous lady. For example, on the around-the-world trip I took with LBJ, the party included Mr. and Mrs. Stephen Smith--she was Kennedy's sister. They were gracious and gentle people. Johnson, I am sure, suspected that they went as Kennedy's eyes and ears. We stopped at one place, where it was hot. The Vice President walked for several miles from downtown to the airport among throngs of people. When we remonstrated, he said that he was going to make sure that the local politicians would get out among their own people at least some of the time. When he got to the plane, he was hot and sweaty. As soon as he hit the top of the gangway into the plane, he started to disrobe. He took off his shirt, his pants and his undershirt. He
scratched and wiped the sweat off him. You could see the Smiths recoil at the sight. Lady Bird handled him well; she wiped the sweat off him, she rubbed his feet; she was a gracious person. She never, never let any one feel that she disapproved of anything he did; she was always supportive. One time, at another overseas post, we had mistakenly set up a press conference without asking LBJ. He was furious when you did things without asking him--I don't know how his staff ever managed to live with him. He refused to attend the press conference--"You didn't ask me. I don't have anything to say. I won't go!". We had all set up; so Lady Bird said: "Well, then I will go". And so it happened. She had the press conference and answered the questions gracefully. She was wonderful person. I don't know how a gracious person like Mrs. Johnson handles all the terrible things that are being said about her husband now.

Q: You mentioned Horace Busby earlier. What are your recollections of him?

CROCKETT: He did not have as strong a personality as Dungan did. He was not as familiar as Dungan was on how the government and its bureaucracy worked. But he was very helpful; he handled Ambassadorial appointments and supportive of the career service. He also tried to help us to install CCPS and he carried the ball to the President on EROP. I had a good working relationship with him. It was my impression that Dungan could be direct with Kennedy, whereas Busby had to be much more circumspect with Johnson. Bill Moyers could be direct. When I needed something done on the trips, I went to Moyers who would take the issue up with the President and got answers and actions. I am sure he received some lashings, but nevertheless did a fine job. I must say that LBJ was always quite gentle with me. He called me once at home, when he was supposed to go to Dag Hammarskjold's funeral--I hadn't planned to go partly because I really didn't like the trips very much. He first put on his act--"Bill, I depend on you; none of my staff are going; I need someone that I can trust and understands me. You are my good luck charm because when you go with me, things go well. Please go with me!". So I agreed to go. When things would go wrong, and they would, he was never rough on me. There was a trip to the Middle East during which he was on his worst behavior. We got him into a large hotel in Istanbul and he demanded that we clear the whole floor. So we got a number of the guests kicked out. Then he demanded that we board up the stairway so that no one had access to his floor. On one occasion, he called me and said that surely he didn't have to call the Secretary of State in order to get his needs taken care of. He expressed full confidence that I could do that and he wouldn't have to resort to calling the Secretary. That was the closest he ever came to threatening me. Of course, after a while, we learned when he was displeased; his mannerisms made that quite clear. On the same trip which I just mentioned, we were in Ankara and assigned to a terrible hotel--the air conditioning wasn't very good and the hotel was full of smells. LBJ was terribly unhappy. He confined everyone to their hotel rooms. He said that he didn't want to see anybody in the hallways. Carl Rowen was along on that trip, but had not been in the hotel room when the Vice-President had issued the confinement orders. So he innocently went to the Vice-President's suite to ask something. LBJ roared and yelled and sent Rowen to his room. The next day, he called Rowen and apologized saying that he had made up his mind the
night before that he would give hell to the next person he would see and unfortunately it had been Carl.

LBJ was very suspicious. He was supportive and loyal to President Kennedy, but he really distrusted Bobby Kennedy. We used to have a custom officer meet us at our last point of departure before we reached the US so that we could pre-cleared. We needed that because LBJ was a big shopper. Once when we were coming home from Europe—he had bought lots of Belgian rifles and other gifts to be given away--, he began to worry about how he would get them into the States. He said that he wouldn't be surprised if Bobby Kennedy had instructed the custom officer to seize these purchases to make an example of him. He was really suspicious of Kennedy.

From the beginning, he had decided that he would collect art from each of the countries he had visited. He had atrocious taste when it came to art. When we were in Rome, our Ambassador--very prissy and proper who thought he knew something about art--he was just the type that grated on LBJ's nerves very quickly--and LBJ took a car ride together. I was in the same car. The Ambassador said that he understood that LBJ was collecting art. LBJ confirmed that and told him of work that he had seen the night before that he had almost bought. It was a painting of a nude woman lying down being watched by a man. He told the Ambassador that he had said to the artist that if the woman were slimmed down by fifty pounds in the derriere, he would buy the painting. The Ambassador didn't know what to do--to laugh, be quiet, cheer or what. It was this crudeness of LBJ's that startled people. He reveled in crudeness to achieve some objective that had always mystified me. But he did it deliberately, probably to shock. It was intentional and calculated.

**Q: The other person I would like to ask you about is Katie Louchheim. What are your memories of her?**

CROCKETT: Katie was one of the female pioneers in the Democratic Party. She was one of the Vice-Chairpersons, if I recall correctly. The Louchheims had a very lovely home in Georgetown which they used for gracious entertainment. She would collect an interesting group of people on Sundays, including politicians and other leaders. I met Senators Humphrey and Gene McCarthy there. Katie was very well connected politically. Her husband, Walter, was well known in financial circles. I don't know how she got to the Department, but the first time I met her was on Chester Bowles' trip that I have already mentioned. She was in the group as well as the Director General. I didn't know before then who she was or how she got on the trip. It became apparent sometime after that trip that I had to find a suitable assignment for her. We might have used her as a liaison with Congress, but we had enough experts already in that area--Roy Little and Mich Cieplinski. Somehow we came up with the idea of a program to support families on home leave. She did an excellent job. She had lots of nerve and presence. She managed to get a trailer company to furnish us trailers and cars and expense money for travel costs. There were other things she did with the program which enhanced the Department's visibility and boosted the morale of the Service. Many officers and their families took advantage of
the opportunity and traveled for a period of time during home leave becoming reacquainted with the US and letting the American public increase its understanding of the Foreign Service. Later, Katie became a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Public Affairs. I was never certain how strong her Congressional connections were because on occasion, when her name was mentioned, people would smirk, suggesting that she might have not been taken too seriously. But she was certainly influential in social circles because lots of big wigs came to her home. She had many other talents like poetry. She was a delightful and very nice human being.

Q: Now let me ask you why you decided to retire at the end of 1967?

CROCKETT: I have considered this question at great length since that day. I may have acted precipitously, but I was bone tired and very disillusioned. I felt discredited by the Foreign Service. I felt an outcast from the Foreign Service. The treatment I was given by the Service hurt me very deeply. The suspicion that surrounded my actions began to wear down my self-confidence and self-esteem. In retrospect, I might have been wiser if I had accepted an Ambassadorial appointment or go to a U.N. agency, but at that time, I wanted to escape from the Foreign Service and from the whole scene. My dreams had died; my working life had become mundane and not worth pursuing. My goals were not being achieved--the Foreign Service of the United States concept had just been shot down, CCPS was floundering, many of the other programs were barely alive or already buried. I was tired, very tired. I had just finished two long trips with and for the President--first an advance and then with him--to South Asia, which I described earlier. I was worn out in body, soul and spirit and decided that the struggle wasn't worth it. I did feel that I had left a lot of people in the lurch by pulling out as I did. Rooney was very angry for my decision to leave and Hayes as well. They had lost their "important" contact in the Department who could and did help them. They were less upset by my departure as a person than their loss of a very useful arrangement for them.

Q: Let me ask you a question about an issue that keeps arising in many of our interviews. It concerns those well-known "turf battles". In retrospect, how much time you during your three years do you think you devoted to this issue?

CROCKETT: It seems that many of my initiatives did in fact intrude on others' "turf"--certainly the United Foreign Service of the United States, CCPS and other programming systems encroached on the "turf" of other agencies. I can understand their unhappiness and their defensiveness. But nothing in a bureaucratic world is static. The encroachment went both ways--Commerce wanting to establish its own service abroad. In fact, they did manage to get their noses under the tent by assigning a few of their own people to some overseas posts. While I was Deputy Under Secretary, the agricultural attachés were transferred to the Department of Agriculture. There were always inter-agency tensions. I may have spent as much as 15% of my time on issues of this nature, which is considerable when viewed in terms of my total work-load. Of course, this was not only my time, but that of my whole organization. I am sure it spent a lot more time than I did, in some cases defending the Department from "raids" and in other cases, trying
aggressively to take "turf" away from other agencies. Then there were the intra-
Department "turf" battles that may not have been as evident, but certainly existed. When
we tried to re-organize the administrative area, we took a lot of "turf" away from lots of
people--I mean an Assistant Secretary and a number of deputies lost their jobs. Of course,
those episodes were brief because the incumbents didn't have much choice.
Unfortunately, "turf battles" are a Washington phenomenon. It is the penalty it pays for
having some energetic administrators who seek some of the greener pastures across the
fence. We often fought with the Bureau of the Budget--I am sure they saw CCPS as an
invasion of their territory. So this is a concern to which a modern administrator has to
devote time. And he or she has to live with the issue.

One time, Dean Rusk told a staff meeting that he was there to support his staff on
substantive issues, but not support anyone who was in a bureaucratic battle. So I never
felt that I could go to him on any of the inter-agency battles we were involved in. He
therefore never got involved in bureaucratic fights. He avoided conflict in part, I suspect,
because he was uncomfortable with it. I really don't know how he handled the substantive
issues, which undoubtedly must have raised some inter-agency tensions. In the final
analysis, he was a very poor manager; he was just not concerned with many of State's
functions nor were his deputies. The absence of Secretarial interest in the operations of
the Department and many of its functions is often pointed out as one of State's major
deficiencies. Most Secretaries, when faced with the choice of being part of the policy
development process or managers of a Cabinet Department, opt for the first to the
detriment, I believe, of the second. I am sure it is far more attractive to run around the
world like Shultz did--involved in diplomatic activities--that staying at home managing a
fairly large organization--certainly a complex one. State is unique among Cabinet
Departments in that regard because a Secretary can get by without paying much attention
to the management of his Department. It does however engender continual criticism. The
Herter Commission, in recognition of this problem, recommended the establishment of a
Permanent Under Secretary position--a career officer who would take care of the
management of the Department--very similar to the British system. That would leave the
secretary free to pursue policy issues without leaving a vacuum as was certainly the case
in my days. I am sure that the Secretary's job is enormous and a "no-win" job. Whatever
you do, someone thinks you should be doing something else.

Of course, the Department is also unique because all agencies want to dabble in foreign
policy. Ever major Department, and even some minor ones, has representatives abroad. It
is amazing the number and kind of agencies that feel they must have their own staff
abroad. The Department is also under more Presidential scrutiny than most of the other
Departments, because every President wants to leave his "mark" on foreign policy. That
increases the difficulty of the Secretary's role. When the Secretary is moved aside--for
example by the National Security Advisor--as has happened in the past, to some extent
that reflects on the whole Department because it is then not fully utilized.
Q: With that comment, I think we'll close this interview. On behalf of the Association for diplomatic Studies and the Foreign Affairs Oral History program, let me thank you very much for your valuable contributions.

End of interview