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INTERVIEW

Q: Jack, could you give a little background of yourself before you got into the foreign affairs business?

CROWLEY: Well, Stuart, I entered the Foreign Service fairly early. I did teach English for two years at the University of Puerto Rico. Following that, I entered the Information and Education Administration of the State Department, which shortly afterwards was separated off and became USIA.

Q: Where had you gone to school?

CROWLEY: I got my undergraduate degree at West Virginia and my master's degree at Columbia.

Q: Coming out of West Virginia, did you get much in the way of foreign affairs? Were you able to develop much in the way of foreign affairs?

CROWLEY: Well, very little, Stuart, but, you see, I had spent only my high school years in West Virginia and actually grew up in the southwest and had had exposure to Spanish and lived El Paso and Tucson and Albuquerque, New Mexico, so I had that kind of experience.

Q: Had you developed rather early on an interest in Spanish culture and foreign affairs and all of that?
CROWLEY: Somewhat. I think it coalesced during World War II when I was still in high school. My aunt lived in Washington. She worked in the State Department, and I met some of her friends, some of whom I guess were role models for me, and my interest developed in that direction.

Q: Well, unlike many, you actually knew some people in the State Department prior to coming in. The almost not quite universal theme is, "Well, I really didn't know what the hell the State Department was or how it worked until I came in," but you'd had some of this.

CROWLEY: I had at least the experience of meeting some Foreign Service people who were stationed in Washington at the time who were friends of hers. I didn't have much idea about the Department as a whole, but the people I met I liked, and I thought I'd like to do that kind of work.

Q: How did you first get into the Foreign Service?

CROWLEY: I took my master's degree at Columbia and was hired as an English instructor at the University of Puerto Rico, and after two years, I took the Foreign Service exam. However, there was a hiring freeze brought on by Senator McCarthy's investigation of the Department.

Q: This is Joseph McCarthy?

CROWLEY: Joseph McCarthy. And I was not able, even though I passed the written and oral exams, I wasn't hired as an FSO. But I was hired as an FSS to--

Q: That would be Foreign Service staff officer.

CROWLEY: Staff, because of my experience in the cultural field. My first assignment then was not as a Foreign Service Officer, but as a staff officer to Maracaibo to work in the information center.

Q: What sort of work were you doing there in Maracaibo?

CROWLEY: Another fellow and I opened the place. We received a shipment of about 3,000 books. We found a suitable site, and we went through the leasing procedure. We put the furniture in, and we went into business as the Biblioteca Bolivar Washington, which was open for about three years. Unfortunately, in a budget crunch it was decided to close it when I was leaving. But the books were all donated to the local university, and we felt that we'd gotten a good bit of mileage for the taxpayer out of our operation.

Q: Had you had any sort of training at all, or did you just sort of drop into this?
CROWLEY: In my Army service I had worked in public affairs and I was a writer for a magazine. That, combined with the fact that I had been teaching in a Spanish-speaking country in Puerto Rico, I think, is what convinced the people in the State Department to give me a chance as a public affairs assistant.

Q: We're going to sort of move ahead, but did you get any impressions in how the United States was seen in Venezuela at the time?

CROWLEY: One of the things that impressed me most in Venezuela was the fact that my first residence abroad, not counting Puerto Rico, which, of course, is part of the United States, was in a country which had quite a repressive dictatorship. And for the first time I realized in the flesh, so to speak, what it was like not to be able to have sources of information in a free press. We couldn't buy Time magazine, radio was censored, people were arrested arbitrarily, and it was a pretty tough regime.

We were blamed to some extent for that, because right in the midst of this dictatorship, the US Government awarded a medal to the dictator, Marcos Pérez Jiménez, against the advice of some of the people in ARA. But nevertheless, it was done.

Q: Do you have any idea what was behind this?

CROWLEY: Well, it had to do with the feeling that he was a staunch opponent of communism, and I think also because we had then about three and a half billion dollars' worth of US investment in the country.

Q: We're talking about you were in Maracaibo from 1952 to 1954.

CROWLEY: To '55.

Q: '55. Then you went back to the State Department for what? Were you melded into the Foreign Service?

CROWLEY: Well, unfortunately I missed the opportunity of having a class. Most FSOs have a class and a class picture. But I was appointed FSO in the field, and from the field I returned to Washington, and my schedule didn't track with any junior officer courses.

Q: This was when?

CROWLEY: In '55. And I was already on my way to Lima. So what they did was to improvise a short training course for me alone, and I went around to several offices and did things on the job and then went on to Lima as a consular officer.

Q: Let me just stop for a second. [Tape interruption]
We're not going to dwell on your early time, but you went to Lima. This is 1955 to '59. You were there a fairly long time.

CROWLEY: Yes. My first two years I was assigned as a consular officer. I worked for my first woman boss, Sophia Kearny, who was a rather legendary figure in the consular corps and a wonderful person, and she taught me the trade. After two years working with her, I became the labor reporting officer. I think that probably the high point of that tour was to see the effect locally of US trade restrictions, because at that point Washington, in its wisdom, imposed import restrictions on lead and zinc, both of which were important contributors to the Peruvian economy.

All my labor contacts I found to be up in arms about this, and I had to go around and try to make peace with some of them and explain why Washington had done this. So I attended rallies, and even street demonstrations, against the United States, and, fortunately, they didn't involve me. [Laughter] They said he's just the agregado de trabajo from the embassy. But it was an eye-opener to see, you know, the effect that a decision in Washington could have on things abroad.

Q: Who was our ambassador there at that time?

CROWLEY: Well, I worked first for Ellis Briggs. Of course, he was another legendary ambassador. And then for the late Ted Achilles, who was a very different one.

Q: Well, they were certainly two professional ambassadors.

CROWLEY: Yes, indeed.

Q: Were they able to get anything done on this lead and zinc business?

CROWLEY: Not during my time there. It was a question of the domestic industry here being able to have its way.

Q: How to work in a situation like that? I mean, all of a sudden you have something which you know is going to have a major effect, and there you are as the labor officer and there is the ambassador. How does an embassy work under these circumstances? What did you do?

CROWLEY: Well, we tried to explain it reasonably and we tried to compensate for it in some ways. Through AID, we expanded our labor exchange program. AIFLD had not yet been created as the American Institute for Free Labor Development, but Bill Doherty, who is now the head of AIFLD, was the inter-American representative for some of the white-collar unions, and he had already started the program up here at Front Royal to conduct seminars and classes for the labor people from abroad. So we tried to expand that program, and we tried to get our message across that this was something only temporary. And we hoped also through the AID program that other compensations could be . . .
Q: How were the Peruvian labor people looking at you at this point?

CROWLEY: Well, fortunately they had a kind of fraternal feeling for me as an individual since they knew that I had been a member of the American Federation of Musicians, and so I was "Brother Crowley."

Q: What did you play, by the way?

CROWLEY: I played piano. But they didn't have much sympathy for the decisions of Washington, I must say, so it was kind of a damage-limiting operation.

Q: As the labor officer in an embassy, the labor officer is often sort of the odd man, or odd woman, out, because traditionally our interests in the Foreign Service is looking at political parties and not labor, and this is a fairly new concept still. How did you fit into the embassy?

CROWLEY: Well, organizationally I was in the political section. I was the labor reporting officer, but I also covered some other areas. I was, I think, very well accepted. I was covering the Aprista Party, which was a labor-based party, anyway. As Haya De La Torre used to say, "The intellectual and manual workers together form the party." So everybody in the party felt, in a sense, they were labor representatives. And since it was the second largest party in Peru, I was not shunted aside as a kind of a labor specialist, but was treated as a full-fledged political officer.

Q: Trying to get some idea of how embassies operate, you said Ellis Briggs and Theodore Achilles were two quite different people. How were they different and how did they operate within the embassy and within Peru?

CROWLEY: Ellis Briggs, by the time he came to Lima, had been ambassador, I guess, in six or seven countries, and he was well settled into the role. I don't mean to say he was pompous, but there was a kind of air of majesty about him and he moved with a lot of poise and he impressed people very much, both in English and Spanish. He was a very kind person and very sociable, but he had a certain hauteur, I guess you could call it.

Ted Achilles, on the other hand, despite the fact that he was born to a large fortune, was a much less imposing person. He was much more down to earth. Some people might say that he was a little out of his element in South America. He had spent most of his time in Europe.

I liked both of them and I learned a good deal from both, but there was quite a difference in their personalities. I would say that probably Briggs was the more broad-gauged type. He had been ambassador in Korea, in Czechoslovakia, in Uruguay. He knew many languages, and he was very cosmopolitan. He felt at home in those places. And I think that Achilles, at least at the beginning when he came from Paris (where he had been DCM)
to a Third World country in Latin America, took a little while for him to get accustomed to it.

Q: Here was the second country you'd been in. How did you feel was our policy towards Peru and Latin America in general? Did we sort of take them for granted? Did you think we were giving sufficient understanding to their needs and pride and all?

CROWLEY: Well, in Venezuela we made the mistake of becoming too much closely identified with the dictatorship. And after the dictatorship was overthrown in 1958, there was a tremendous outpouring of emotion against the United States, and it took us several years to help to counter that. Finally, when Rómulo Betancourt was elected president, he was a person who had always had ties to the Democratic Party in this country, who had been a communist at one time, but had become quite anti-communist. And through careful management of the relationship, we built up to the point where we became relatively popular again in Venezuela, but it cost us some effort.

In Peru, we were not that associated with General Odria, and, in fact, General Odria did us a favor in the late '50s--I forget which year--by voluntarily stepping down, which was a very smart thing for him to do because forever after he could come back to Peru and walk on the streets and he was accepted like any other citizen. Nobody was out to assassinate him.

I think our policy then, and certainly later, was perhaps too much dictated by the interests of individual companies that were there. The economic side of it always seemed to me a little out of proportion. On the other hand, we went out of our way to show friendship and support as much as we could for the Apristas, who were basically a sort of leftist, social democratic party and anti-communist.

Q: So we weren't completely entrapped with the rightist side as often as was happening in those particulars?

CROWLEY: No, I don't think so. The fact that we had this large labor program spoke pretty well for us, and we dealt not only with the Apristas, we dealt with the Christian Democrats, and their unions, that is, Christian unions. The only people we didn't deal with were the communists because, in my experience, there has never been very much point in dealing with them because they are usually so convinced of their own viewpoint that, you know, there's not much point in seeking them out. But among the others we worked with a pretty broad spectrum.

Q: You then had a pretty grounding in the labor field. You went back for labor studies?

CROWLEY: Yes. You see, the distinction between labor reporting officer and an attaché was that the labor reporting officer, at least in my time, could be assigned by the Department without necessarily consulting the American labor movement. But the attaché,
once you reach that level, the Department of Labor and the AFL-CIO like to have some say, at least give their okay, to the job.

Since my labor background consisted of being just a union member, they didn't consider that without further specialization, I was really that well prepared to do technical labor work. So I went to Wisconsin, with two other FSOs, that year, and we went through a curriculum that was mainly in the economics department, and had to do chiefly with technical labor subjects. And then I went from there as--

Q: This would be 1959 to 1960.

CROWLEY: Right. And then in '60, I was transferred to Brussels, which, as you know, is sort of the world headquarters of the international noncommunist labor movement.

Q: Before we move to that, I wanted to ask how did the Foreign Service look upon labor specialization? Did you feel that you were moving on the leading edge of something new, or did you feel that you were getting into something that interested you, but didn't seem much opportunity within the Foreign Service? What sort of advice and pressures were you feeling as you moved into this specialty?

CROWLEY: I found it quite interesting, but I had a notion back in my mind that it was not something that you wanted to spend your whole career in. And so at the same time that I was pursuing it, I felt that I probably wanted to go on and broaden myself to become a general political officer.

Q: Did you feel that you could do that, or did you feel once you got labeled a labor specialist, that was it?

CROWLEY: Well, having come from the Foreign Service into labor, rather than from labor into the Foreign Service, I felt that I had enough flexibility, and it turned out, in fact, that I did.

Q: You were in Brussels from 1960 to '64. What was the situation there as far as you saw it? I mean, what were you dealing with?

CROWLEY: Well, I'll describe my arrival. I arrived with a wife and two small babies in New York to go on to Brussels, and in those days, we could travel on foreign airlines. We were booked on the Sabena, which is the Belgian line. We arrived in New York and we called them up, and they said, "Well, all of our flights are canceled."

And we said, "Why?"

"Because we have diverted every available aircraft down to Leopoldville to evacuate our people." As it turned out, not only the whole Belgian air force and Sabena was down
there, but we had sent our transport planes down from the old Wheelus Air Force base in Libya. There was a huge airlift going on out of Leopoldville up to Brussels.

So we finally, after a day or so, we got on another line and made it via London, and we were quite exhausted by the time we got to Brussels. But when I did report to work, they said, "The highest priority around here is to go out to the airport and work in these 24-hour shifts to receive the evacuees as they come in, because we haven't had time to document them in Leopoldville."

So I went out to the airport. My French was rather poor at that point, so I got some fast practice. We were basically making a record of these people, because it was expected that we would send them bills for their transportation, the ones that came on US planes. [Laughter] But after we did all this work, it turned out in Washington someone made a decision that it was a humanitarian operation and they wouldn't have to pay after all, but that was my introduction to Brussels.

I went to work there as the assistant labor attaché to Arnold Zempel, who was one of our leading—he was a real labor expert, had come out of the Department of Labor. He assigned to me the local socialist labor group and the local Catholic labor group, and he dealt mainly with the ICFTU, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and the other one which was then called Christian, and which now they've taken "Christian" out because they have affiliated so many people in Asia and Africa who are not necessarily Christians, but who have the same kind of ethical philosophy.

So that was quite an education. I learned about the international labor movement by helping him, but I was also more specialized in learning about Belgium. At the same time, of course, we had the Congo blowing up occasionally, and we got called in to do things there.

Q: Let me deal with the Congo thing a bit first. What was your impression of the people coming out of the Congo? Had they understood what was happening?

CROWLEY: In the first place, there was not an awful lot of sympathy. I was surprised. There was not an awful lot of sympathy in Belgium for these people because it was assumed that they had been down there making a lot of money over the years and there were tales about how they had exploited the natives. The socialists, in particular had put this out. They had been exploiting the natives and they kept the natives under their heel and they had made all this money, and when they were finally getting thrown out, there was a large sector of Belgium's public opinion didn't care very much.

On the other hand, of course, the government did, and we worked with them on the coordination of the later U.N. operation movement that came in to try to keep the peace. But, in general, there was not a terrible outcry until later, when the U.N. forces at Elisabethville, actually took aggressive action and some Belgians were accidentally killed in that operation. That caused quite an emotional outcry, and there were photos that were
shown over and over on television in Belgium, so it whipped up a lot of public outcry. That was basically an Indian force that was serving under the U.N., but we got part of the blame for it because we were looked on as one of the chief sponsors of the U.N. operations in the Congo.

Q: Then back to the labor side, what did you do? Say you had the socialist side. These interviews are being done for people who don't really necessarily understand what people do at an embassy.

CROWLEY: Surely. We had some routine kinds of reporting, including studying the wage levels in the different industries and reporting them here so that the people in the Department of Labor in Washington would have a good idea of the international picture, helping them make union directories, getting together the numbers of people in the unions, and the names of the officers and so forth because they publish an international directory here. We also contributed to studies made in the economic section, to present labor costs and labor influence and so forth. That was the technical part of it.

The political part I always found more interesting. For example, in 1961, the socialist labor confederation called a general strike in protest against some legislation that had been passed. The government was a Catholic government. This general strike grew to the point that practically all of Wallonia, which is the southern half of the country, was involved in it. Stores were shut down, factories, schools--it was really a highly effective thing. It seemed likely that if the Catholic unions were to join with the strike that the government would have to fall because it would create be such a ferment.

Nobody in the embassy was able to find out what the Catholic unions had in mind at the top, so they called me and said, "See what you can find out." And I remember going over to the headquarters and talking to some of my contacts. They all assured me that the Catholic unions had no interest whatsoever in joining the strike at all at that point. So I went back, and this was reported to Washington. Fortunately, we made the right prediction, [Chuckles] and I had a certain feather in my cap because I was able to ascertain that.

Q: Did you feel that you were serving two bosses? I mean, was there the United States, i.e., Department of State policy, and the AFL-CIO Labor Department policy, or not? Did you feel yourself caught between these?

CROWLEY: Well, not usually, because George Meany came frequently--the late George Meany--to the meetings of the ICFTU and he basically had no great discrepancy with US policy. In fact, he was, you know, rather conservative, and very anti-communist. He was in favor of higher wages overseas so that foreign workers would have more purchasing power. And second, because the cost of production would rise so that our expensive goods would be more affordable in those countries. I never saw any particular conflict.
Q: So you didn't feel any tug. Well, for political reporting and all, you say that maybe we would have very little influence on the communist union and the communist movement, but at the same time, there often are areas of cooperation, I mean, mutual interest. Sometimes they just dovetail or would want to know which way they're springing or what's going to happen so that it is handy to have contacts within the communist's, i.e., often the workers' world. Were you inhibited from doing this or did we have these, or was this a problem?

CROWLEY: What we had was the socialist movement which had a spectrum from, you know, right to left, and at the left end of the socialist unions, it sort of transitioned off into the communists. I used to go out to that edge, and I dealt with a lot of people. In fact, my ambassador one time chastised me for my association with a guy there.

Q: Who was your ambassador?

CROWLEY: This was Douglas MacArthur.

Q: Douglas MacArthur II, I believe.

CROWLEY: The second, exactly. The nephew of the general.

Because the fellow I was dealing with, Ernest Glinne, who later became a socialist labor minister and was really quite respectable, was somewhat radical and he talked a lot about socialism and the bourgeoisie and that kind of business, but I found by dealing with him that he was basically anti-totalitarian, so he drew the line at getting in bed with the real Marxist-Leninists. In fact, he later promoted US investment in his district in Wallonia. The socialists and the Christians in their unions had done a pretty good job in Belgium of purging themselves of the really totalitarian types, both right and left. The communists were only strong in a couple of very minor unions where they were largely isolated. So I more or less agreed with the ambassador's policy that since they were isolated and since the majority of the union people didn't want to have anything to do with them, it did not serve our purposes to be seen associating with them. On the other hand, by keeping up with the far left of the socialist party, you could know pretty much what the Communists had in mind.

Q: How did you see the communist movement within the international labor movement at the time? We're trying to get somewhat the perception of how we saw the world, and in your particular sphere, how did you see it?

CROWLEY: Well, I must say, I agreed pretty much with George Meany that there are no free trade unions in communist countries. They're all government organizations, and if the union doesn't have enough independence to be able to bargain and to be able to speak freely, then, it's not free. I can understand why we agree that they should be in the International Labor Organization for political reasons. We accept it. But I think one also
has to say they're not really unions. It's like their amateur athletes. We compete with them, but we know they are not amateur athletes. There were many front organizations that they presented as unions which were not in my definition of a free trade union. What we were trying to deal with and trying to promote was free trade unions.

Q: So moving on, how effective do you think American policy, as you saw it, was with the labor organizations? Did you feel that we had a role and influence, or was this sort of an amateur operation?

CROWLEY: Well, in Europe, after World War II, the AFL-CIO helped to create the anti-communist labor movement in France, because the CGT was communist-dominated--the main confederation of labor--and we helped to create Force Ouvriere. US labor was also active in helping unions in Germany and Italy. If there hadn't been some outside help, the communists could have tried to wreck the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Western Europe.

In Belgium, we didn't have to do that, fortunately, because the Belgians themselves defeated the communists--they purged a lot of them out of important unions, and they ended up in, as I said, in some of these small, isolated places. So I don't think there was any resentment, except among the far left and the communists. We were helping the free trade unions, just as the Marshall Plan was helping the economies.

Q: Were we giving any support to them? I mean, I'm thinking of financial.

CROWLEY: Yes. Well, I know at least we gave office equipment. Irving Brown, who has been on the international side of the AFL-CIO for many years, and I think is still head of the--

Q: He just died.

CROWLEY: Did he die?


CROWLEY: I didn't know that. Well, God rest his soul. He was the one who led the campaign to start the Force Ouvriere, and I remember him saying he had to get typewriters for them and desks and set up an office and get them telephones. [Laughter] I don't know that it was a very big expenditure, but it was pretty important at the time.

Q: How would you characterize the Belgian labor leaders compared to some of the other ones? I mean, did you find them different?

CROWLEY: The division was pretty strong based on the religious line. You know, if you were a socialist labor leader, I suppose you could go to church, but you couldn't talk about it very much. On the Christian, Catholic side, they expected to see you in church. So this
divided Belgian political life and the parties, and the labor unions followed the parties pretty much. There's more politics involved in it, because a lot of people in the Parliament and other politicians come out of the labor movement much more than they do in this country, so it's more political.

On the other hand, they're quite professional, too. I was impressed by the organizations. They had good organization, good systems of education, teaching the local union how to keep its books, how to conduct meetings, techniques to use in bargaining, that sort of thing. So I would say the main difference, probably, is that they are more openly political.

Q: You left Belgium in 1964, and you came back and you spent two years in the Department. What were you doing?

CROWLEY: Well, this was my second experience with Venezuela. I was the desk officer for Venezuela for two years.

Q: Was Perez Jiménez still the ruler, or had he been ousted?

CROWLEY: No. He had been ousted in '58. There had already been the presidency of Rómulo Bétoauncourt, and there was the second president of that same AD party, Raul Leoni. But it was the second democratically elected term. For the first time in the history of Venezuela, they had ever managed to have two democratic elections in a row.

Q: One to another.

CROWLEY: That's right. It was the same party, but then, of course, the next election they transitioned to the opposition party, which was the real test of whether democracy was going to stick there, and it did.

But the problems we had at that time had to do mainly with the oil market. The fact that we had at that point the program called the oil import program. We had oil imports limited on national security grounds that we should have more incentives to discover oil in this country. You could also make the other argument, of course, which was that we were draining out all of our reserves and not buying the foreign oil, but at that point, the administration came down on the first.

Q: Was this a philosophic argument, or was this one of the local Texas interests and all this?

CROWLEY: It was mainly the local interests, I think.

Q: Was this time when the Venezuelans were told they couldn't send as much, yet Canada was getting a better deal. You know, it didn't make much sense.

CROWLEY: You have a very good memory.
Q: Well, I think it was Ambassador Bernbaum, or somebody who at one point was talking about this, and attributed it to Senator Humphrey and company.

CROWLEY: Well, reportedly on national security grounds, they made an exception for both Canada and Mexico. It was called the overland exemption, and the rationale was that since both of these countries were contiguous to the US, they were more certain suppliers and, therefore, we should let their oil in without any quota. However, the thing that was laughable about it was that Mexico at that point had no oil to export. So we used to ship some Texas oil down there and transship it back up so there would be some record of barrels of oil coming in.

Q: Am I correct in saying this was a rationalization in order to allow our people along the northern upper tier of states, particularly Hubert Humphrey's Minnesota, to get their oil from Canada?

CROWLEY: Sure. That was certainly a strong motive.

Q: It was a political decision, internal one, but had major repercussions. Now, did the Venezuelans buy this at all?

CROWLEY: They said, after all, they had been just as reliable suppliers as Canada, why should they be penalized? I must say, I was hard put to find argument.

Q: This was one of the times you have to sort of learn a line and just keep repeating it, isn't it?

CROWLEY: Yes, I'm afraid so.

That was one of our main areas of interest. The other was that they had an insurgency going on in Venezuela that was fomented by Castro, there was the great find of a large arms cache on the beach down there, which served as the basis for condemning Cuba for the first time in the OAS, and then later, for their suspension, when they ceased to be members. So that was a time-consuming and important activity.

Q: Well, what did you do? I mean, here you are the desk officer for Venezuela. You saw Cuba seeing Venezuela as being a possible target, a possible weak spot, in which you could work. What did you do as the desk officer? I mean, was this just reporting, or were there things one could work with to try to stop this?

CROWLEY: Well, one of the things we did at that point was, with the cooperation of the US Navy, we did some aerial patrolling in the area off the Venezuelan coast, and suspicious vessels were reported and the information was given to the Venezuelans. I don't know that they ever caught anybody, but at least this was something we did.
It was difficult because the coast is, particularly between the Dutch Antilles and Venezuela, the waters are full of small boats, mostly smugglers, and it's the kind of boat you might use if you were going to haul in arms, you know. So it was very tough from the air for anyone to say what it might be. But anyway, the sightings were reported.

We also beefed up their military assistance. And, in fact, after I left the desk, the program that we started resulted in the formation of several ranger units in Venezuela, who were the ones who put the final coup de grâce to the insurgency.

Q: At the time we obviously had a policy, but how did you personally see the Cuban threat? Did you feel that Venezuela was vulnerable, that Cuba might be able to do something, or not?

CROWLEY: Well, in those days, we weren't too far from '58, which was the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez, it revealed a tremendous increase in the influence of the left wing there. They were never satisfied with the electoral process, and that's why a number of them decided to go into the bush and become guerrillas. It was widely known, for example, that we had many weekend guerrillas there. During the week, they were at the Central University, and the weekend, they put on their camis and went out to fight--yes, really--so that we felt it didn't have any legitimate base. After all, it was one of the countries with the highest standard of living in Latin America, and you had a democratic government, you had a land reform program going on.

In fact, I remember one short anecdote where the guerrillas came into a mountain village and they came into recruit people, and they asked this campesino there if he would join them, and he said, "No."

And they said, "Why not?" And he showed them his little house. He had a big picture of Bétancourt, you know, Rómulo.

And he said, "Because we have Don Rómulo and we have the agrarian reform, that's why I'm not going with you."

But it not only failed because it was repressed, but it also failed because it didn't have roots in the country. It was mainly a kind of intellectual, radical program, of the stripe of the Tupamaros in Uruguay or revolutionaries in Argentina, but down there, of course, there was a tremendous discontent already which they were able to take advantage of which didn't exist in Venezuela.

Q: Well, then we move to your assignment as deputy chief of mission from 1966 to 1969 in Quito in Ecuador. How did you get this assignment? This is always a sort of crucial assignment in the Foreign Service career ladder, and how did this one come about?

My question was, how did you get the sort of very important assignment as deputy chief of mission to a good-sized embassy?
CROWLEY: Well, I think one of the reasons was because I had good lungs. There were a number of candidates, some of them, for one reason or another, were not accepted by the ambassador. The ones who were that were tested by the medical branch (given the fact that they had to serve at a post at 10,000 feet altitude) were eliminated. And finally, by process of elimination, I took the lung test, passed, and I was given the opportunity. [Laughter]

Q: Who was the ambassador, and how did he operate?

CROWLEY: Well, it was Wimberly Coerr, Wim Coerr.

Q: C-O-R-E?

CROWLEY: C-O-E-R-R. He had been there for, I guess, over a year, and when I arrived there, I soon realized there was a good deal of tension--well, you could sense it in Washington, but you could see it better down there--tension between the embassy and the government there on the AID program and on the conditions that were being sought by the United States for various kind of aid. In fact, it had been a little bit much, and we had rubbed the sensitivity somewhat raw.

So Coerr, I think with the best will in the world, made a speech, for which he had permission from the Department, although they hadn't reviewed the text. He told them more or less what he was going to say and the Department said, "Go ahead." He made a speech in which he very mildly put forward our side of the question. It was immediately picked up in the press, and, in fact, I remember the leading newspaper of Quito, the way they started the story it said, "In an obvious retort to the president of Ecuador yesterday, the American ambassador said the following and the following," so the press put it right up as if it were a shootout between the American ambassador and the president.

But I still found it hard to believe when, a couple of days later, the ambassador called me and he said, "Well, it happened."

And I said, "What?"

And he said, "Well, I've been PNGed for that speech."

Q: PNG meaning made persona non grata. In other words, told to leave.

CROWLEY: Yes. And what happened was that the Ecuadorian Embassy had delivered the note here in Washington, and they couldn't find anybody on Saturday to deliver it to. They finally gave it to somebody, and they took it to the op center. And then when the senior people got it, they sent it down by immediate NIAC to Quito, because we did not have daily plane service and the Ambassador and his family had to plan to get the next convenient flight within 48 hours. So that meant that he had to be out by Monday, and the Monday flight was less than 48 hours away.
Q: What was the issue? You say we were pushing too hard.

CROWLEY: It's not only my view, but I think it's been documented by scholars who had better knowledge than I later, that the Alliance for Progress began with a great spurt of idealism and enthusiasm, mainly the personality of President Kennedy. And after President Kennedy passed from the scene, the idealism in the program began to go away, and it became much more a matter of dollars and cents. And in some cases, it became a gravy train for American business because of the tied aid.

Q: "Tied aid" meaning?

CROWLEY: Well, in other words, the United States would give you, Ecuador, ten million dollars to build a road, but you're going to have to give eight million to this Texas company which is going to come down and build it. Tied to American procurement of goods and services.

This went to the extent in Ecuador that it was a real irritant, and then it was compounded by the fact that the president realized that he could find and exploit a political issue there, you know. So, when he went to the meeting of Latin American presidents, at Punta del Este on the Alliance For Progress--what year would that have been? Well, in '65 or '66, I guess. He was the only president who refused to sign the charter, and when he came back to Ecuador, he received a tremendous ovation. Thousands of people went to the airport, because he was standing up to the Yankees. He portrayed US aid as a program in which the US Government and companies were taking advantage. And he even issued a stamp which showed him there pounding his fist on the table in Punta del Este and saying, "By God, I won't sign it!"

Q: Were we tempted to just say, "Okay, if you don't want it"? [Laughter]

CROWLEY: Unfortunately, Ambassador Coerr had tried to make what I thought was a very reasonable speech, but the president thought, "Ah, this is another chance to kick the Yankees." I think he regretted it later. In fact, we were told by various sources that he had regretted it, but there was no way to reverse his decision.

Q: You mean the president of Ecuador?

CROWLEY: The president of Ecuador regretted having taken such a rash decision.

Q: Wasn't there a lingering anti-Americanism going back to our role in--was it '42 or something like that--of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border dispute where we ended up as a guarantor of boundaries which the Ecuadorians didn't like, or something like that?

CROWLEY: I didn't detect a lot of--of course, there was a lot of anti-Peruvian feeling; it has been for years--I didn't detect a lot of anti-American feeling based on that. Because
after all, the boundary was delineated. It has never been fixed, but it was delineated by a Brazilian geologist, and that boundary was then guaranteed by the guarantors.

However, other geologists in the area dispute the physical findings that he made there about watersheds, and the Ecuadorians said right away, "Ah, he picked the wrong watershed. He meant that one. He didn't mean this one." And in the meantime, the poor fellow had died, and so now nobody knows what he really meant.

So it's a stalemate, and they have never been able--they were supposed to proceed with putting in the markers. The markers have never been placed there because Peru says, "No, that's the watershed," and Ecuador says, "This is the watershed." But I didn't detect a lot of blame against the Americans.

Q: Were we able to move away from this issue? One, did it leave you as chargé for a while?

CROWLEY: I got a lot of experience in a hurry, yes. I was what used to be called FSO-3, which I guess is called FSO-1 now. The ambassador departed. I got a cable from the Department--or not a cable really, a letter--from Bob Sayre, who was then the deputy assistant secretary, and he said, "We are not intending in the near future to replace the ambassador here because of this offensive treatment that we received and, therefore, you will be chargé for a while." And he knew that my only previous experience really was as desk officer. I'd never even been a chief of section. But he said, "Jack you have to run it." And he said, "I mean, you have to run it." [Laughter] So I got the word about that.

About six months later, they sent the deputy inspector general down, the late Spencer King, on a kind of a special look-see, and I must say I was pretty nervous. But as he was leaving, he made me feel a lot better by saying he thought I was doing pretty well under the circumstances.

Q: Well, what do you do? I mean, here you are, a relatively junior officer in the system. A persona non grata of an ambassador is really a major step. This is not a minor incident. This means relations are bad, and one of the weaknesses of the whole diplomatic system, not just the American one, is that the worse the relations get, the more the day-to-day work devolves upon less and less senior people as you withdraw. I mean, it's a peculiar system. But what do you do? What type of instructions were you having? How did you see the situation? What were you trying to do?

CROWLEY: We were instructed to just go on with business as usual, no new programs. The AID director proposed--since it was the AID program which was the source of the irritation--he proposed to have a major review with the senior Ecuadoran officials of the AID program and see if there were areas where we could reduce the tension and try to look at some of their criticisms. So that was approved, and he then launched on this with some of his staff.
On the other side was an Ecuadorian Foreign Service officer whose name is Jaime Moncayo. The reason I mention his name now is that he's the current Ecuadoran ambassador to Washington, but then he was one of the few young economists that they had in their diplomatic service.

This review took place over a period of several months, and it did not have a satisfactory conclusion, and as a result, AID withdrew the AID director. So we had a chargé in the embassy and a chargé in the AID mission.

Q: But the AID mission continued?

CROWLEY: Yes, but with no new programs, only the continuation of what was going on.

Now, in the meantime, what was exacerbating the situation even more was that we were having the constant seizures of our fishing boats off the coasts because of the difference in interpretation of international law. At that point, we were still recognizing only three-mile territorial water and ten miles for a fisheries zone, I think. We also held tuna to be a migratory fish which anyone could follow into anybody's territorial sea.

That was our interpretation, and the Chileans, Peruvians, and Ecuadorans were holding out for 200 miles. This is what they based their claim on an action that President Truman had taken during—I'm sorry, President Roosevelt. It was during World War II, so I guess it was President Roosevelt—when he declared a 200-mile security zone around the United States, which was intended to be just for the war. But the people down there said, "Well, that would be a good idea to do that permanently, so we'll just say everything in that zone is ours and it's our fish and our security."

So over the years, we had a lot of problems with them, and it's interesting to see how it's turned out. Basically, they have won, you know. That now is the accepted position. The Law of the Sea Conference has come down on their side, but at that time it still hadn't. And every time we had a seizure, we had to go in to the Foreign Ministry to protest. We had to send a consular officer down to the port to make sure that the crew was all right. We had to negotiate about the catch and all that, because that would cause the inflammatory headlines in the paper. Fortunately, this troublesome president's term was ending.

Q: Which president was that?

CROWLEY: Otto Arosemena was his name. A new president was elected, the old man, Velasco Ibarra. Washington, at one point, was thinking of sending a new ambassador before Velasco Ibarra was elected, and I advised Washington that I thought that would be bad—it sounded a little self-serving—but I said, "Why should we reward Arosemena with a new ambassador? Let's wait and send a new one to the new president," and they finally did agree to that. And that's when Edison Sessions came down and relieved me, because I
had been chargé for 11 months, and we started a new regime. But the fisheries problem remained and the AID problem was only somewhat improved.

Q: We were improving the AID problem by mainly toning it down?

CROWLEY: Mainly, yes, cosmetic things. Also Velasco was not as tempted as Arosemena was to keep making issues out of it. But I was there less than a year with Ambassador Sessions, and then I left to come to the National War College. And after I left, the fisheries problem became worse, and we retaliated by cutting off their military assistance, at which point they kicked out the MAAG.

Q: MAAG means military assistance group.

CROWLEY: Advisory group. I wasn't there when that happened, but that is the way it evolved. It hit bottom, and we've been, I think, coming back up since then.

Q: We seem to have more problems in Ecuador than in many other places where, in many ways, we shouldn't have these issues as much. It's pretty much a democratic country. I mean, it's had its military juntas coming in and all.

CROWLEY: I think their policy in terms of the fisheries was more severe because they had, unlike Chile and Peru, they had actually incorporated into the constitution of Ecuador that the territory of Ecuador extended 200 miles to sea. And, of course, it also extended 200 miles back from the Galápagos Islands, so they had a hell of a lot of water, but not very much area in between. [Chuckles] And they also were more energetic in enforcing, going after the poachers.

The Peruvians and the Chileans sometimes would say, "We saw one of your boats out there, and you better get it out or it's going to be in trouble." The Ecuadorians would just go out and take it, you know, and shoot some shots across the bow and bring it in, and they'd say, "We've got one of your boats." So they had a much more energetic policy.

Q: Well, did you find yourself in a position where some of our people who were fishing said, "Hell, we'll buy an Ecuadorian license," and we said, "You can't do that," or something like that?

CROWLEY: You're exactly right. That's right, yes. And, finally, I think that was acquiesced to. It was after I left, but at the time, Washington was adamant that they should not buy the licenses.

Q: Did you find yourself with screaming skippers of ships saying, "You got me into this, you get me out"?

CROWLEY: Well, they were being compensated. You know Congress had passed a law to compensate them for any fine that they had to pay and also for any catch that they lost.
The fishing industry is small in this country, but it has a lot if clout. I think, partly, because it's kind of romantic. You know, man against the sea, and everybody says, "Gee, those guys are brave out there, and they're picking on our fishermen." So they suffered really very little financially.

_**Q:** You came back to the War College, and you were there from '69 to '70. And then on went onto again as deputy chief of mission to Santo Domingo. How did you get that assignment?_

**CROWLEY:** Well, that was pretty normal. I actually had wanted to go to Caracas, because my career interest has been in Venezuela. I tried to do that, but Joan Clark, who was then the personnel officer in ARA, said, "But we want to send you to Santo Domingo because the DCM from Santo Domingo, Frank Devine, is going to Caracas, and the ambassador has already accepted you"—Ambassador Frank Meloy. So I said, "Okay." So it was just a normal assignment.

_**Q:** Well, what was the situation in Santo Domingo? You were there from 1970 to '74. When you arrived, what was the situation?_

**CROWLEY:** It was a relatively prosperous time. The price of sugar was up and the price of petroleum had not yet taken its great leap. It was still about $4.00 a barrel. The Dominicans sold a lot of sugar to us and other places; they had plenty of foreign exchange. Not to say they were not a poor country, but they have since been in worse shape. They are, in fact, in worse shape today, relatively speaking, than they were then.

As far as embassy problems are concerned, I began to run into security problems for the first time. My namesake, Lt. Colonel Donald Crowley, the Army attaché, had been kidnapped just a few weeks before I went down there. Fortunately, he was released after the government gave in to the demands of the kidnappers. But we began to see that we did have a security problem. The ambassador began to travel with a follow car and bodyguards, and I had a bodyguard all the time I was there, plus a driver.

We had a security watch committee, and we declared different levels of alert for the USG community. Some alerts meant everybody should stay home, and others meant you could go downtown, but not to the beach. We had a very large post. We had the residue of LBJ's huge civilian invasion which followed the military invasion in '65 to help straighten the country out, and we had all kinds of AID people.

_**Q:** What was the general judgment in the embassy, not officially, but among yourselves, about the calling in of troops and all. This was what?_

**CROWLEY:** '65.

_**Q:** '65. I've heard varying accounts of it. What was your judgment? You know, five, six years later, people who were around there are wondering._
CROWLEY: At the time, in '65, although I was part of the task force here in Washington, my personal thought was maybe it was an overreaction based on the imperative not to have another Cuba in the Caribbean. Based on the evidence, though, it didn't look like we were about to have another Cuba.

However, during my time there, when Colonel Camano Deno, who had been the leader of the '65 revolt, came back into the Dominican Republic clandestinely with about, I forget, 30 or 40 people, armed by the Cubans and apparently in a boat that they bought for him, came in and declared that the savior had returned and the people should all rise up. Then I began to think, this guy left here, went to Mexico, he's been living in Cuba all this time and he visited the Soviet Union. He's here with their arms and their money, maybe LBJ was right and I was wrong about this. As you probably recall, the support he got in the Dominican Republic was zero. Nothing happened, and, in fact, he and everybody got wiped out in the mountains. I think there was one survivor. So I think that there is a possibility that in 1965 the place could have gone the way of Cuba if we had not intervened.

Q: Often, in retrospect, it's very easy to say, "Well, it wasn't necessary," but you're never quite sure what you've squashed. What was the feeling of the Dominicans towards Americans after this? I mean, the fall in party lines, or was there sort of a general feeling of what?

CROWLEY: You know, Dominicans are conscious of the fact that, as they say, when Uncle Sam sneezes, they're liable to get pneumonia down there. They're very conscious of the fact that they are in our zone of influence. They know that we're the largest trading partner, we're the largest aid benefactor, and all that. Some of them accommodate to that very well. Others don't, and they say, "Well, we don't like this situation. We want to change it."

Juan Bosch is one of those people, and the people in his party. So there could be outbreaks of anti-American feeling, mainly stirred up by people like this. Not long ago there was a ship visit down there and there was a violent riot just because an American ship visit was coming in for the first time in several years.

We had threats that we received through intelligence sources against the ambassador, sometimes against me or against military people. We didn't have any attacks, bombings of any of our buildings, but there was a feeling of tension. We did have a second kidnapping. You know, the late Barbara Hutchison, who was the PAO, was kidnapped, so these things could always happen.

Q: What were our interests in Santo Domingo or the Dominican Republic, American interests?
CROWLEY: They're so close to us and, as you may know from history, they almost became a state. During General Grant's time, some of his cronies went down and they figured that it would be a nice real estate speculation around Samaná Bay. Well, you can't see it there too well on your map, but Samaná Bay is one of the best natural harbors in the whole Caribbean.

So they wanted to negotiate a deal whereby we would pay the government so much money and then the Dominican Republic would be annexed and the Samaná Bay would become a naval base, and these birds were going to buy up all the real estate around Samaná Bay and make a million. Fortunately, it was stopped by one vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Senator Sumner found out what was going on, and he put his foot down and that ended it. Even though they had conducted a plebiscite also in the Dominican Republic about whether this was acceptable, and it came out some tremendous number of people in favor of it and only 11 against. [Laughter] Obviously a rigged result.

We've done a lot of intervening down there, so we feel, I think, we have to feel a certain responsibility for the place. We wanted to see a democratic system evolve from the legacy of Trujillo, and it has pretty much. And we wanted to, at least in the State Department, wanted to keep the sugar trade up so that they would have a decent income, but the Department of Agriculture has other interests, of course. The domestic sugar people now have reduced our purchases down there to the point where it's very serious for the Dominicas, and people are going out of the sugar business trying to find other products they can sell.

Q: So really looking at this, this is a case where, say, when you were in Peru, American economic interests in Peru were quite influential. In the Dominican Republic, our economic interests were such that we were just trying to, at least from the State Department point of view, help the Dominicans as opposed to American interests. In other words, we were not involved in the Dominican Republic for economic purposes.

CROWLEY: That's right, although we had some major investors there. We had ALCOA, who were mining bauxite in the south, and we had Gulf and Western, which had the most economical sugar mill. But if you take a minute and look at what Trujillo did, Trujillo made the country his private preserve, and he took over practically all of the profitable business in the country. So that when he died, the state's influence there was such that they didn't privatize, which they should have done, but they kept it all together. So they have about 30 or 40 enterprises run by the government, most of which have not been very profitable, but they had the bulk of the sugar production and the other exports, so they didn't have a lot of US investors that would come clamoring, you know, beating on our door.

But I think it's fair to say that they have been a--I hesitate to use the term--but it's like a client state, and they know that and they need to operate within our sphere of influence.
Q: Now, you're operating within this thing, and here you are as a deputy chief of mission. You had two ambassadors while you there. How were you used?

CROWLEY: Well, Ambassador Meloy, Frank Meloy, this was his first time in Latin America. He was still learning Spanish, and he used me quite a bit in visiting the number two official in the foreign office. Most of the other things I did, though, were internal, because we had a large mission. We had AID and many appendages of AID, we had a Peace Corps and we had the MAAG, so that there was a good deal of administration to be done and coordination, mainly, to make sure that everybody was adhering to policy.

Q: What was your impression of AID? Sometimes these programs tend to be over-administered and run more for the convenience of the bureaucratic apparatus of AID. How did you feel about this?

CROWLEY: Well, in contrast to the program in Ecuador, which I think was serving American business too much, the one in the Dominican Republic was very labor intensive. The strategy of it was to soak up the unemployment so there wouldn't be a lot of disaffection that might go over to the left and build pro-communist and anti-American sentiment.

So the reconstruction of the city, and actually the reconstruction of the damage of the war, plus the rebuilding of old Spanish colonial buildings down there, was an AID program which absorbed lots of people, thousands of workers, with pick and shovel and paintbrush and everything. It was good for the country because it made a real jewel out of the old part of the city. It was wonderful for tourism. You know, the oldest cathedral in the hemisphere and then now these buildings are there, Columbus' nephew's house and all that. So it served a good economic purpose and, I think, good political purpose, and there was no way, except for some Americans maybe selling them a few tools, there was no way that a big American contractor could get in on it.

Q: How about the AID apparatus itself?

CROWLEY: I thought they were two very good directors. Strangely enough, two succeeding directors, both named John Robinson. The Dominicans thought there was some kind of plot. [Laughter] The first one, Jack Robinson, died just last year, and the other, John, is retired. But they had, I thought, a good basic program. They had some difficulty operating there because the Dominican bureaucracy was not well developed, having been run as a one-man show for so many years.

A book that I have read recently and which I'm reviewing for the Times of the Americas is on the Dominican Republic, and the authors think that in the last couple of decades, there's been considerable economic reform and democratic progress. And they say now if the people at large can get a better share of the benefit of all this, then they can say something has been achieved.
Q: Did you find that we were calling the shots more than, perhaps, we should have been as far as saying, "Well, you should vote this way in the United Nations, and you should open up this sector of your political life to . . ." I mean, were we being a bit big brotherish?

CROWLEY: Well, when I was there, Joaquin Balaguer was the president, as he is now again. At that time, I guess he was in his late '60s and he could still see. He's a very astute politician. He's not terribly attached to the niceties of democratic processes, but he goes along with them, although he doesn't really think a lot of it is necessary.

He would take our advice on some things, but on other things, he was very independent. And if he didn't like a particular AID program that was proposed, it wouldn't get signed. So I would not say that Balaguer is a kind of person you could put under your thumb. He recognized our influence and our power and all, but one of the reasons why the Dominicans liked him, I think, was that they knew that--although he never confronted us the way Arosemena did in Ecuador--they knew that he was a tough customer and that he would not give in to anything he didn't want to.

One experience I recall was Ambassador Meloy chatting with him one time and saying, "Mr. President, you've been president now for two terms and you're probably looking forward to retirement. Have you thought about a successor? Is there someone that you would want to sponsor?"

And Balaguer thought about it, and he said, "Yes, probably," but he didn't say who, you know. As a matter of fact, there was nobody, because he's been re-elected twice since then, and could he's now 83 and blind. But I don't think he had any successor in mind at all. [Laughter] He was considered himself indispensable.

Very interesting man. Never accused of any personal corruption. No need for money. Lived in a very modest house, and really had nothing to spend money on. He worked all the time. Even at his beach home he wore a coat and tie. The problem was that there was a good deal of corruption in his government, and we always thought that probably the military corruption, he definitely didn't look at, because that was the way to keep the military happy.

On the civilian side, it may have been just incompetence or ineffective bureaucratic procedures. But it was not only common to him, this corruption problem, because his successor, Antonio Guzmán, later committed suicide when he found out the amount of corruption that his own family had been engaged in, and he was millionaire. He didn't need the money, either. So corruption, I'm afraid, is kind of endemic there, as it is in many Third World countries.

Q: Again, to make the next step, you went from this place to becoming the director of northern European affairs in '74 to '77, which I can't think of a greater contrast. What did this involve, and how did you get this?
CROWLEY: Well, what happened was that, having served my four-year tour in Santo Domingo, I was coming back to the Department and I was assigned as coordinator of Cuban affairs in ARA. But in mid-flight, there was a policy enunciated rather suddenly by Dr. Kissinger that people who had been too long in one area would be sent to another area. I forget, there was a--

Q: GLOP.

CROWLEY: Oh, GLOP, that's right.

Q: G-L-O-P, which stands for global placement, or something. Anyway, the idea was to get people to serve in different areas.

CROWLEY: I'm glad you remembered that, because I'd forgotten. Anyway, the fellow who was coming into the northern European job was sent to be Cuban coordinator. [Laughter] Actually, I was a deputy for a year. I worked for Bill Buell, and then Bill retired and I became the director.

Q: I want to stick more to the Latin American side. But just quickly, what did your northern European affairs, what did that cover?

CROWLEY: Well, it covered a wide range of territory. It covered all of Scandinavia, Britain, Ireland, and the Benelux. But the way the Bureau of European Affairs is structured, the functional bureaus handled some of the most interesting business, you know. NATO was handled by a functional, not geographic, office, but I and the economic office handled economic problems, so that we didn't have a full plate of major issues and it wasn't quite as challenging or stimulating a job as one might think.

In fact, we did an awful lot of travel bureau type work, particularly in '75-'76 during the bicentennial. We were organizing visits by royalty, you know, the King of Norway, the Queen of Denmark, the Queen of the Netherlands, and all this scheduling was very time-consuming and it required working with protocol all the time. It was interesting, but as far as challenging problems is concerned, I imagine, out of all that we had, one of the few would have been maintaining the Navy base in Iceland and trying to maintain a receptive environment to it up there by Icelanders. So our tiniest jurisdiction was often our most critical.

Q: How did you? I mean, what did we have to offer Iceland, or how did we keep relations with a country that is essential neutralist in outlook?

CROWLEY: Well, it's neutralist, but it is also a member of NATO. And the territory, or the land where the base is located, is given free by the government because, NATO members don't charge each other for base rights and base rent.
But the presence of 3,500 Americans in a country that only had 250,000 population, had quite an impact. They have a low birth rate there, and not a lot of young ladies coming of age each year. I think there was a good deal of jealousy there by the younger Icelanders. They didn't like to see their girls going out with the Americans. So there was a good deal of that, and there were cultural problems.

We had, for example, US armed forces radio and television. We broadcast the normal American programming, and it could be picked up as far away as Reykjavik. There was a big campaign against that, and we had to set up a screen to block it off, even though the average Icelander was enjoying it and knew enough English in order to understand. But the politicians grabbed it as a political football, so we had to turn that off.

You know, you couldn't drink beer in Iceland. You could drink all sorts of rot gut they made there, but somehow beer was wrong, and a lot of times our military wouldn't realize what was happening, or didn't know the rules, and they'd go off base for a picnic and take some beer and they'd be fined.

So we had a continual public relations problem. But on the substantial business, they said, "We're giving you the base free, but we need certain improvements. We need a better highway there, we need another section in the base for the--because the base was used by both the military and civilians--we need a better passenger terminal and so on." We had a constant battle with the Defense Department, who didn't like to go to Congress to get money for these construction projects. We had to actually show progress in that field, and at the same time, we had to try to mollify and conciliate all these other complaints.

Q: Should we move on? Now this would be your third DCMship, going to Caracas at last. You were there from 1977 to 1980.

CROWLEY: Right.

Q: This, I assume, was a fairly normal assignment. Had you been asked for?

CROWLEY: Well, it was interesting. As I was leaving the northern European job, there was a possibility I would go as a DCM somewhere in Scandinavia, which I, frankly, didn't look forward to very much. And there was a possibility that I might work for Ambassador Todman, who was then assistant secretary of ARA, and I was of two minds about that. I would have looked forward to the job, but I had just spent, you know, three years in Washington and I was anxious to get overseas. So when Ambassador Vaky asked for me, I said, "Fine. That's where I'd like to go." [Chuckles] So I went to Caracas.

Q: Pete Vaky is one of the well-known ambassadors. What was his operating style?

CROWLEY: Well, Pete is a very scholarly kind of person, but I don't mean to limit him in that way. He, as you know, as far as I know, still doesn't have a Ph.D., but his ability
has been recognized to the point that he teaches courses here in Georgetown and he's at the Carnegie Endowment. So he is a scholarly person.

He is also a surprisingly public kind of person. In other words, if you talk to him, you get the impression of someone who's rather reserved. But on the other hand, in a public setting, he is a marvelous speaker. I heard him give a speech in Spanish that I was--you could have recorded it, and you would have thought you had a native speaker speaking, and I mean Latin oratory. You know, not carried to the absurdity, but moving, very, moving.

So he is a person of many talents, I think, who doesn't flaunt them as much as some other people. He's not flamboyant. He's very detailed. He was a faster typist than almost any secretary in the embassy. He would come in early in the morning and you would hear him tick, tick, tick, and he was typing up his schedule and notes for the day. He's not a person of very many hobbies. I think the only thing he likes to do besides work is the garden. He had nice flower beds around the residence there. His Spanish, as I say, is bilingual. He had good rapport with all the Latins, and he had good rapport with his staff.

Q: What role did you play as DCM? How were you used?

CROWLEY: Well, once again, I was mainly an insider. He told me again, as in Santo Domingo, to cultivate the senior people in the foreign office. Not the minister, of course, but the vice minister, and that turned out to be a pretty useful thing to have done, because this vice minister was one of these people who got his hands on the way things operated in the foreign ministry pretty fast.

I did some representation for him. You know, speaking engagements and things that he couldn't do, but it was mainly, again, inside work. We didn't have an AID mission, but we had several other agencies. We had the FBI there and we had the permanent IRS mission. We had the DEA, and we had a lot of kind of personnel turbulence, morale problems, because of the high crime rate there. We had a location that was when we put it there 20 years ago, out in the country, but Caracas has grown so fast that it's now on a big, heavily traveled street surrounded by shopping centers. Not a good area for security. We had a lot of muggings, purse snatchings, house-breakings and that kind of problem.

Q: What do you do in a case like this?

CROWLEY: Well, one thing we did, you know, we didn't have any hardship allowance there, and we doubted that we could justify it because the elements of hardship just weren't there. However, it seemed to me that people were sent into Caracas, some of them for three years without any leave, into a very expensive place, a place that had practically no recreational opportunities for kids. They had the most horrendous traffic outside of Calcutta, plus the security problem. It seemed to me they really needed to get out of there for a change.
So the security officer and I got together and, with his statistics, I wrote a telegram to the Department including all the problems we were having, water shortages, and all the things that contributed to bad morale, and then a listing of the number of incidents that affected our people in terms of being mugged, robbed and so on. And I sent it in and said that although—with the ambassador's approval, of course—although we were not applying for a hardship allowance, we were applying for authority for rest and recuperation (R&R), and lo and behold, the Department accepted it. So, where there had been no R&R before, that meant people on a three-year tour, at the end of a year and a half got their way paid home to Washington with their families. A single person could probably have done it on his own, but somebody with children could never. So that was one of the things that I took some satisfaction in, and it improved the morale.

Q: You were saying you had contact at the foreign ministry at the vice ministerial level, and this was very profitable. How was this profitable?

CROWLEY: For example, this is another inside case, but one of the children—well, he was a young teenager—of an employee of the embassy came down from the States and didn't realize that the culture was different down there and he wore long hair and looked a bit like what we would call a hippie. And he was picked up one night on suspicion of having drugs. I don't think he had drugs, but he had long hair, which was definitely not looked kindly on by the police.

So they locked him up, and when we tried to get him out the next day, this police chief was adamant. He wasn't going to let him out, and he didn't recognize his diplomatic immunity or anything. And so it was rapidly becoming a crisis because the employee's wife was frantic and he was saying, "If something isn't done, I'm calling my congressman." So we got the Vienna Convention out and showed the Venezuelans that it said in there that even though this—of course, he was a dependent—that he was immune from arrest. In other words, he didn't have total diplomatic immunity, but he was immune from being put in jail.

So I went over to the foreign office, and the vice minister then called in the head of the legal department, and he was shilly-shallying around, but I pointed out to him that they had actually incorporated the Vienna Convention into their own legislation and I asked if they were going to break their own laws? And the vice minister said, "Yeah, are we going to break our own law?" [Laughter] So the legal eagle guy said, "Well, I guess we'll have to do something." So they finally read the riot act to this police chief and got the boy out. That's a minor thing, but those are the little crises a DCM is often faced with.

Q: Because something like this could get played up. How were relations with Venezuela during this period you were there?

CROWLEY: Well, our relations were good, particularly with the party that's back in power now, the Acción Democrática. The main issue we had with them was that they nationalized all the US oil company holdings there in '75 and had made only partial
payment in compensation. And so we were under pressure from--and it was reasonable--to try to get the government to finally settle, because, you know as the lawyers say, justice delayed is justice denied, and so we pressed them on that quite a bit.

After the AD Party was defeated in the election of '78, then we didn't have such good relations.

[End Tape 1, Side 2] [Begin Tape 2, Side 1]

CROWLEY: I was just saying that the Christian Democratic Party in Venezuela has always been more oriented toward that type of party in Europe, the French, the Italians, the Germans, the Belgians and so on, and they don't have the relations with the Republican Party in the US that the AD has with the Democratic Party. And so, therefore, you could tell when they came in there was a slight distancing. We didn't have the same rapport with them.

But it was satisfactory. There weren't any great problems. I suppose the biggest problem that we had was that we, frankly, didn't really know much about what was happening at the end of Carlos Andrés Perez's term (that would have been through '77 and into '78) concerning the fact that he and Torrijos in Panama and the president of Costa Rica, whose name I forget, and a few others, were conspiring to send arms to the Sandinistas. And every time we got a report that this might be happening, we would go in and all these people denied it. "Oh, we'd never do that." Finally, some of these arms were actually observed in Panama, and one of our people there got some serial numbers and it was pretty clear that they had come out of things that we had sent earlier, many years earlier, to Venezuela.

I think that, in retrospect, we felt that we'd been had to some degree, and I think now, you know, Carlos Andres has shown in recent years that his faith in the Sandinistas was rather misplaced, because, when they had their first elections, he refused to go to the inauguration of the president there because he said the elections were not fair. And now he's president of Venezuela again, Carlos Andrés Perez. He has also held them pretty much in arms length. But at the time, these people were so anti-Somoza that they were somewhat blinded to what was going to happen once Somoza fell and there was a vacuum. There was only one group that was going to come in and take over, and it did.

Q: How about the Panama Canal business at that time? Did that give us a shot in the arm as far as relations in that part of Latin America? This was during the time when President Carter had--we gave up our control over the Panama Canal.

CROWLEY: It raised our stock, I think, all over Latin America--I saw in Venezuela that they were very pleased. In fact, I remember President Pérez saying one time, "If you keep doing this, there won't be any issues for the leftists to come out and riot about." [Laughter] "Your behavior will become too perfect."
Q: How about the oil problem? Had that been pretty well solved?

CROWLEY: That's been solved since then, yes. The other major experience I had there was, you know, as they say, if you ask an ambassador what are the worst things that could happen to him, one of the stock answers is if you had an attack on your embassy and some of your people were injured, that would be terrible. Second, if Washington suddenly did a big flip-flop in policy and left you hanging in the end of the limb, and the third thing is if you have a presidential visit. Well, that's a disaster, also.

I was the control officer for the Carter visit which took place there in--what was it--'79. And I must say, that was a rather traumatic experience dealing with the hordes of advance people who came down, the Secret Service, who didn't care about anybody except the president and his immediate family, and the rest of the arrangements, they couldn't care less about, the local officials who thought they were being pushed around by these Americans. It was a major undertaking. And after we got them through that, in a few more months then Vice President Mondale decided to come with his wife. So we had more than the usual exposure. [Laughter]

Q: There's a Foreign Service saying, "One presidential visit is the equivalent to two earthquakes." [Laughter]

CROWLEY: I would endorse that.

Q: Well, then a place where I don't imagine any president ever has been or ever will go, your appointment as ambassador to Suriname. How did you get the appointment?

CROWLEY: Well, I believe--I never saw it in writing--but I believe I was under consideration before--you know how the system is in the Department. They make lists of people. I think I was on lists before. But one time Lowell Kilday, who was then in personnel, called me and he said, "If you want to, your name could be on a list for Suriname."

And I said, "Lowell, you know, I spent my whole career practically in Latin America. I'm much more comfortable in a place where they speak Spanish, but . . ." And he said, "Well, but you served in Belgium and, you know, they speak Flemish there and so forth." [Laughter]

Q: The language in Suriname being Dutch.

CROWLEY: The official language being Dutch. So I said, "Okay." And so, lo and behold, it went through. They were having a bit of a crisis because the democratic government had been thrown out in February of '80 by the then-Sergeant Bouterse, who later became a colonel and the dictator for all intents and purposes. And so I was sent there rather
hurriedly with no training in Dutch, and I hadn't really learned any in Belgium, either, because I was concentrating on French over there. [Laughter]

I arrived and presented my credentials to the last elected official, who was the president. He was the only one—he still had enough prestige that the military hadn't thrown him out. But a month after I presented credentials to him, he was out, and from that time on I dealt with either Colonel Bouterse, or his hand-picked government, which consisted of a civilian cabinet, but they all answered to him.

**Q: In the first place, what were American interests in the area, if any?**

CROWLEY: ALCOA had bauxite mines, an alumina plant and a smelter, plus its own hydroelectric dam. That was a major American investment. It was still the eighth largest aluminum producer in the world. Next to the government, ALCOA was the largest employer in Suriname, so we had this big, sort of elephantine, you know, kind of investor there, and nobody else. Well, Castle and Cook were there canning a few shrimp, packing a few shrimp, but as far as investment, it was this giant that had supplied the aluminum during World War II when other sources were not available. And they had their own shipping line, and also we had that to look out for, besides our own political interests in not wanting to see areas of communist influence expand.

**Q: How did you deal with ALCOA? I mean, did they have sort of their own foreign ministry and take care things? I'm speaking with some experience. I was in Dhahran with ARAMCO, where they generally went along with us, but actually they had a far larger staff and all. I mean, was this a similar case?**

CROWLEY: Very much. We were, to a great extent, overshadowed. Visitors used to look at the ALCOA manager's house and say, "Well, he's got a much grander house than the ambassador." I used to say what you say, "He's got a bigger staff, too, you know. A bigger investment."

We got along very well. Our personalities were compatible and he came to call on me, you know, and he was deferential to a certain extent, and we became good pals. So we had no conflict with them. Their policies were basically not in conflict with anything we wanted to do. The only bad thing that happened when we were there was the world price of aluminum declined, and they had to lay off some people and that caused some friction with the government. But we had no basic problems.

**Q: We had, by this time, a new administration. It was the Reagan Administration?**

CROWLEY: Yes.

**Q: Had you felt any of the repercussions of the change of administrations? Because the Latin American field, I was told, there was sort of blood in the corridors. And on the Latin American side, where actually in Africa and the Middle East and other places, you
know, it was done in a workmanlike way, but there were some zealots who came in—I mean, this is the impression I have—from the far right who were allowed free rein in Latin America. Did you feel any of this?

CROWLEY: Well, I think a lot of that was concentrated in Central America. Suriname is pretty far out at the end of the line there, although it was in a certain amount of light because of the fear, you know, that the communist influence would grow.

No, I didn't feel any particular change in policy. I think the frustration I had all the time I was there was that we had always counted on the Dutch to be the leaders there. They had an enormous assistance program. They had the highest per capita aid program in the world, sort of like conscience money. You know, the Dutch were saying, "Oh, we treated these people so badly we have to make amends," and, consequently, they had a very high standard of living and they had very high sanitary standards and almost everybody was literate, and all this Dutch money kept coming into the country. So the thought in Washington was, "Well, why should we give them anything? You know, the Dutch are in NATO, and let them take the responsibility. We'll set up a little embassy and we'll have 20 people in it."

When I got there, like any other ambassador, I said, "What are my tools?" I found that we could send five or six people to the States under USIS grants, and we finally got a little IMET program started, but aside from that, we had no leverage.

Q: IMET is?

CROWLEY: IMET is International Military Education and Training. But that was around $50,000 annually, and the Dutch had these millions available. We had a trade fair and we did things to try to stimulate interest in US products. I was working on a proposal to start a limited AID program and possibly a Peace Corps program. But what happened? Bouterse kept getting rougher and rougher against the democratic institutions. The Dutch then began to say, "Whoa," and then we had to hold back on the aid. The people here in Washington said, "Well, gee, if the Dutch are going to cut back, maybe we should do that, too." And whenever I would talk to Bouterse, he would more or less say to me, "Well, what have you done for me lately and what are you prepared to do?"

It was a rather discouraging climate, and my messages to Washington on this subject, I thought, elicited less than reasonable responses. They always kind of put things off, saying, "Well, we'll have to see." Finally, AID did send down John Bolton, who was the general counsel and who is now, I think, the deputy attorney general (in 1990 he became Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations), and he came back and gave a personal report to the head of AID, and then they agreed that they would start the small mission.

But what happened was that in the fall of—let's see if I have my dates right—'83. I forget when the massacre was, but I think it was in the fall of '83— that Bouterse had about 20
people rounded up whom he didn't like, including the head of the Free Trade Union movement, and ex-minister whom he thought was traitorous, some media people and so on. He had them all beaten and shot to death, and then later the explanation was that they had to be shot because they were trying to escape, you know, ley de Fuga.

In any case, then at that point, the Dutch cut off every penny of aid. Nothing. And we said, "Well, we aren't going to give any, either." I wasn't there at this point, but I could feel for whoever was there, because he or she was left with nothing. Our strategy then became, since these people are sitting up there on the shoulder of Brazil, let's get the Brazilians to do something. The Brazilians don't want Castro, you know, screwing around up there in the country next to them.

So they did have some success. The Brazilians were very lethargic because they said, you know, there are many hundreds of miles of jungle between us and then some. But, finally, they went up and they offered Bouterse some simple stuff--boots and uniforms and some M-1 carbines and some trucks and a few, I think, joint business ventures. But the deal was: no more encouragement of Castro down here. So he's been playing pretty much by that rule and has permitted elections.

Now they have an elected government, but he's still sitting in the background with the Army. Plus they have an insurgency going on in the part of the country near French Guiana, so it's not terribly stable. But I must say that it was a frustrating time, and I was caught up the rigidities of policy and there wasn't any time to change it.

Q: What was your impression of Bouterse?

CROWLEY: Well, he was a very clever man. He had probably a high school education, but he had been in the Dutch Army. He had been stationed in Germany and he spoke German. He spoke fairly good English. His mother was Carib Indian and his father was Creole, the name they give blacks there. He had certain superstitions. He told me several times about things that he had to do, you know. Like he had to go a certain time of the year and make a pilgrimage to certain shrines--they were not Christian ideas.

He was also a physical culture type. When the revolution took place, he was head of physical education for the Army and a sergeant, and he was a natural leader. He took over. They raided the arsenal, he and the other NCOs, they got their guns out, they arrested all the Dutch officers, they put them on a plane, sent them out, and they were in charge of the country. The only people they had to worry about were the police, and so they went over to see what the police were up to. The police took a look at them (all the police had were sidearms) and they said, "We're with you."

I think he was probably surprised that he took over the whole country in 24 hours. But then once he got a taste of it, it was pretty nice. He became a colonel and he indulged in quite a few luxuries around there, although he always looked like an austere person. He always wore a camouflage uniform.
My impression of him was that he was a person of no ideology, that for a while he was swayed by these leftists, particularly when the Dutch cut off the aid and he wanted to retaliate against them and against us. But after his friend Maurice Bishop of Grenada was killed, and when the Brazilians came up and told him about the facts of life, he retreated from that Marxist position, and what he wants to do is just be in charge.

**Q:** Did you find yourself having to go up and say, "You really shouldn't do this. You should be more conscious of human rights and all," and getting a rather fishy-eyed stare? Did you find yourself having to do things that you realized weren't going to get anywhere but were instructions?

CROWLEY: Well, during my time, you see, it hadn't come to the point of actually committing these atrocities, and there were always doubts. If you went to him and said, "Well, there ought to be more freedom of speech," he'd say, "There's freedom of speech. They can print anything they want to, the newspaper here." You couldn't really pin it down. Of course, once the murders were committed, then he was over the hill.

What I used to do with him was talk mainly--I talked some about local conditions--but it was mainly geopolitical, saying, you know, it was bad for his country to get off in this orbit with Grenada. And, as it turned out, Bishop was murdered and so on, and this was not a good thing. But he always assured me, he said, "Mr. Ambassador, your country has nothing to worry about from me from a security standpoint. I know that we're in the US sphere of influence and all that." But his bottom line was really, "What do I think is good for me? How far can I go?"

**Q:** Did your find our invasion--or whatever you want to call it--of Grenada, did that have a solitary effect in that part of the world? I mean, the feeling that if they went too far, who knew what Reagan and company might do?

CROWLEY: I wasn't down there then, but I know that earlier in the Reagan Administration somebody leaked a plan that CIA had been working on to destabilize Bouterse, and the fact that it was leaked then killed it. But I understood from people down there that this had quite an effect on him. He thought actually the CIA was actually moving. [Laughter] He moderated his stand on a few things.

What I heard about Grenada was that it scared the hell out of the Sandinistas, and some people said this is the very moment to go over there and negotiate. But we didn't, you know, because the White House hard line was "no negotiation." At the time that we hit Grenada, they would have been ripe to talk to because they were really concerned; they were frightened. But we let it pass. I don't know if that's accurate, but I heard that.

**Q:** To sort of get on towards the end, you left in 1982 and you were an inspector for two years. Without going into all the details of it, how effective did you find the inspection corps at that time? It's my impression that at one point, going back to the '50s and '60s
or so, when the inspectors came around, everybody sort of snapped to attention. They had a lot of clout. I had the feeling later on that the inspections were done, but you sort of had the feeling the inspectors' reports really were sort of rather benign documents. Did you have that feeling?

CROWLEY: Well, I can only speak from my experience. I inspected about 20 countries, I guess, and people who worked with me were all pretty serious, particularly what we called the AQIs, the audit qualified inspectors, looking for financial problems and that. I found, in general, people were fairly strict. There was a built-in conflict of interest, I must say, with the lower-ranking inspectors, because it's quite possible that they might hold back a bit on criticism of a senior, thinking that they might some day have to work for him. This is one of the things, of course, that Senator Helms pointed out, and there is some truth in that.

I was a senior inspector. I was an MC and had been an ambassador. Even when I inspected the European Bureau, I had a big to-do with the Assistant Secretary and I changed some of the language that I had put in my report, but it had the same meaning. In other words, he thought the language was inflammatory, and if it were quoted out of context, it would make him look bad. For example, I said that he ran the bureau with a kind of "kitchen cabinet," and he objected to that very much. So I said, "All right. Let's put down here that you run the bureau with a group of close-knit advisors." He said, "Okay." [Laughter]

So the other thing I thought was good about inspecting was that it gave you such a marvelous bird's-eye view of everything. You know, you can see the whole operation of the embassy. When you get the inspection team together and they say, "I've seen so-and-so today and I've seen this," you get a picture of embassy operations I don't think you can get any other way, unless maybe you're the DCM.

Q: What was your overall impression of how the Foreign Service was run--this is in the early '80s--from your inspections?

CROWLEY: Well, you know, we saw all those problems that were common in posts. Where the wives were able to work, we had good morale, and where the wives weren't able to work--or spouses, I should say, low morale--that was almost a measuring rod you could use. The style of the ambassador was very important. We had a lot of ambassadors who were very caring and very open, like some who said, "Call me by my first name," and that kind of thing. We had others who were very distant, who never dealt with the staff at all, and let the other people deal with it.

But, in general, I thought we were doing a pretty good job. One thing we tried to do was quantify political reporting, which was very hard to do. But we got to the point where we would take all of the political reporting for a whole year and survey it and appraise it, according to a matrix that one of our people put together, and try to weigh it and have it evaluated that way and then have someone also evaluate it separately in the old-fashioned
way, and it was quite surprising how they would match. So now they're using that system more often, instead of just doing the horseback evaluation.

Q: Did you get any impression about the various major bureaus? Was there much of a contrast between, say the African, Middle East, Latin American bureaus? Could you weigh them or say there's a problem more?

CROWLEY: Well, no. I didn't see anything. You know, they have their reputations, I think, but it depends which bureau you're in as to how you feel about the others, so I don't think there's anything very scientific you could say about it.

EUR, of course, is still the largest bureau, has the most people, has the most posts, actually, even still larger than Africa. And it is the one that, except for people who are kind of specialized, like yours truly, it's the one I think generally people would like to be in. However, there is a price to be paid at the senior level in that very few ambassadorships in EUR go to career people. Whereas, as you know, if you can stick it out in Africa, you have a fair chance of getting one of the--what is it they have, 35 embassies down there? But I would say if more younger people could somehow be exposed to the inspection process, it would be excellent, because they would learn an awful lot in a very short time about how things actually work.

Q: Moving to your last assignment, you were a deputy US representative to the OAS in 1984 to '86. What were you doing?

CROWLEY: Well, I suppose, Stuart, you could say that was my last DCM shot. I may have set some kind of record, because I was a DCM in four different jobs and I worked for eight different ambassadors. And, as somebody said to me, "You're lucky none of the eight ever kicked you out," because it's a fairly common occurrence. [Laughter] So I guess I must have been doing something right.

By the time I got to this job, the OAS had been in decline for some time, decline simply because the members had decided that there were better channels to use. The ones who didn't like certain things about the OAS would take their cases to the U.N., or people wouldn't take anything to it. I must say, frankly, some of my first meetings at the Permanent Council were rather discouraging. We would discuss what should be the pension of a retiring gardener. [Laughter] This is the council representing ministers, you know, at ambassadorial level.

Then the previous Secretary General, who had just left, Alejandro Orfila, had brought some, perhaps unfavorable publicity to the OAS because of his flamboyant lifestyle and the fact that when he left, he had already been working for Gray and Company, the public relations firm, had received several thousand dollars prior to his departure that he hadn't told anybody about and the fact that he fired his secretary, as it turned out later, so that she could receive the benefits of severance rather than having her quit, and then he
immediately hired her over at Gray. So there were little, you know, minor scandals going on.

But it was rather disappointing in that nobody seemed to use it for, you know, substantive reasons--now, fortunately, there's been an opportunity in Central America for it to have a bit more of a role, and they were in, as you know, on the cease-fire between the Contras and the Sandinistas. And now there's this mission which--I wish them luck--they're trying to talk General Torrijos into stepping down. If they do that, I think--

Q: You mean Noriega?

CROWLEY: I'm sorry, Noriega. Excuse me. It'll be quite a feather in their cap, and it could help to raise their stock, and then maybe the countries, the members, will take another look at it and say, "We can do some effective things here after all."

Q: Well, Jack, it's been a long interview. There are sort of two questions that we usually ask. Looking back on your career, what gave you the greatest satisfaction, would you say?

CROWLEY: Well, I suppose it's not any great accomplishment in foreign affairs, but the fact that, as a young, fairly inexperienced officer in Ecuador, I was suddenly put in charge of one of the 20 largest missions in the world and managed to run it for 11 months without causing any disasters. [Laughter] I think probably I look back on that as one of the things to be proud of.

Q: The last one is if a young--and I imagine they do--a young person comes to you, man or woman, and says, "You know, I'm interested in the Foreign Service as a career," how do you advise them?

CROWLEY: The Foreign Service, of course, is a lot different now, Stuart, as you know. I came in at age 24. I know others, for example, Ted Briggs, Ellis Briggs' son, came in very young. He was only 22. I mean, we had never done anything else, almost fresh out of school, right into the Foreign Service.

If you look now at the average age and education of people who are coming in, they're well up into their '30s, and many have Ph.D.s. It's a different mind-set also. It's a group of people--I don't want to cast any aspersions on them--but I suspect they're not as amenable to, let's say, to the kind of discipline and the kind of spirit that we used to try to instill in the younger officers. They've been around more, they are more sophisticated, and they think more for themselves and so on. So I would have to ask this person if this is the kind of group they would feel comfortable with, dealing with a lot of people who are maybe former assistant professors of international relations or whatever and instead of the kind of younger, more generally educated, less specialized, less experienced kind of group.
Also, one would have to point out, although it would probably be unnecessary, that service abroad is a lot more dangerous now than it used to be. When I first came in, I never, never conceived that I would be the target of anybody--I mean, after all, I had "diplomatic immunity!" They weren't going to shoot at me. This is, of course, totally different now. That's something else to be considered.

And, of course, one has to think about the attitude of the spouse or the future spouse, and I think that people should sit down very carefully with their wives or husbands and say, "This is what the Foreign Service is going to entail, and these may be the limitations on your or my career." Even if you have a tandem couple, I don't think they've still solved the problem of what happens when one of them is eligible to be DCM, because the other one cannot work as a subordinate.

So there are these problems that didn't exist in my time. But, on the other hand, I would say that if you're interested in foreign affairs and you like languages and you want to be out in the thick of it, I would say, "Go for it."

Q: Well, I want to thank you very much. This has really been interesting. Thank you.

CROWLEY: Thank you, Stuart.

End of interview