The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

DEAN DIZIKES

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INTERVIEW

Q: Dean and I served together in Athens back in the early 1970s. Dean, I wonder if you could give me a brief summary of your background and where you came from.

DIZIKES: I was born in Utah, and moved to California as a child. I grew up in Southern California, went to the University of California at Santa Barbara, and graduated with a B.A. in history in 1966. I was in the Army for two years. I joined the Foreign Service in 1970 and served in Stuttgart for two years as a visa officer, then in Athens from 1973 to '75. Then at the Pentagon as a political-military officer with the Navy from 1975 to '77. Then in Kuala Lumpur as chief of the consular section from 1977 to '81. I came back to the Department in the Office of Management Operations for three years, from 1981 to '84, and then to Copenhagen as chief of the consular section from 1984 to '88. I am now here in the visa office of the Consular Affairs Bureau in Field Operations Division.

Q: Dean, could you describe the situation and what happened? I was intimately involved. I sent you off on a task in 1973. Could you describe what happened as a consular officer?
DIZIKES: It was the Yom Kippur War, October of '73, and we were in Athens. We got a message from the Department, I think that indicated that about 450 Americans had been stranded in Egypt, in Cairo, when the war began. These were tourists in various parts of Egypt. They had been brought to Cairo and collected there, and they needed to be evacuated. We were told to send a consular officer and to find a ship to evacuate them. So the administrative section found a Greek ship. Being October, it turned out to be difficult to find one. You don't just go down to the harbor in Piraeus and say, "Give me a ship which can carry 500 people." They had all gone to the Caribbean, as I remember it, by that point. The cruise season was over. So the admin section located a Greek ship that was filled with Greek tourists, primarily, and as I remember it, it was coming to Cyprus or in the vicinity of Cyprus, so I was told to fly to Nicosia.

At this point in the war, I think the cease-fire had gone into effect. Sharon had crossed the canal and cut off the Egyptian 3d Army or 6th Army.

Q: Third Army.

DIZIKES: The 3d Army. The 6th Army was Stalingrad. [Laughter] So there was a cease-fire, but the Americans were still stranded there. So we literally chartered this ship out from under the people who were on it. As I remember it now, some of this may be somewhat embellished, but as I remember it, the Department, typically, said, "First of all, send a consular officer." In fact, several would have been the right thing to do, but we could only send one. The second thing was that the Department told the admin officer, "Find a ship. We don't care how much it costs." So he located this ship and said what he needed it for, and the shipowner said it was going to cost $500,000. When he notified the Department of this, they said, "That's too expensive," after having said, "We don't care how much it costs. Find a ship." Then when he told them that it was the only ship available and he thought he could get it for less--I think he got it for $450,000 or something--so we chartered it. This was for about two days.

Q: I want to add one other thing. I remember the problem was that some of this was being done over a weekend, and you had to get insurance.

DIZIKES: Yes.

Q: You went to Lloyd's of London, but Lloyd's of London is British, and nobody was home.

DIZIKES: They were all in the country.

Q: They were all in the countryside over the weekend. It was incredible. You couldn't find anybody to pay this insurance money to.
DIZIKES: Exactly. That's right. Finally, someone was called out on the wicket or wherever. [Laughter] That's right. So I was told then to fly to Nicosia because the ship was going to be diverted from wherever it was cruising and was coming into Limassol Port in Cyprus. So I flew to Nicosia. I remember, too, I took a bottle of Johnny Walker, which Stu Kennedy told me would probably come in handy for talking to some of the Americans, and it did.

So I got to Nicosia and then went by car to Limassol, and the ship had come in, and the Greek passengers had all been told they were just going to have to find their way back to wherever they way, the shipowner having taken his $450,000. Then we were supposed to leave immediately from Limassol to go down to Alexandria. The Americans were going to be brought up from Cairo to Alexandria on buses or on the train, and they would meet us.

A couple of things. Of course, the Israelis and the Syrians and the Egyptians had all declared a zone of hostility, and that's where the insurance got complicated, because we were going to be sailing through a war zone.

Q: That's the reason we couldn't put in airplanes to take them out.

DIZIKES: That's right. As I remember, too, the Syrians and the Egyptians, once we notified them this was what we were doing, they both said, "Yes, that's fine." The Israelis never said it was fine, never said they could guarantee, as I remember. They took note of the fact that we would be going through and said they weren't responsible beyond that, which I thought was pretty interesting.

Then the problem was getting the Greek crew to agree to go down there, because apparently the shipowner hadn't calculated that a lot of the crewmen didn't want to do this. So I spent the next, seemed to me, 12 or 15 hours in the hotel with a couple of the executives, waiting while some so-called sort of senior captains from the company went out to talk the crew into going. And by talking them into it, apparently they threatened them with losing their jobs, never getting another sailing job. They also gave them supposedly another month's pay as a bonus. Eventually, enough of the crew agreed to go, but three stewards and one cook went. This is on a 10,000-ton passenger ship. The crew went, the captain, the first officers, and enough engineers and others to run the ship, but three stewards and one cook.

So we left from Limassol in this 10,000-ton empty ship, and by some bizarre thing, aboard the ship along with me was a man who was some senior executive from the Shell Oil Company, the leader of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt, who had been stranded in Cyprus and had talked his way aboard the ship, along with our driver, one of our local employees from the embassy in Cairo, who was a Greek, had been in Greece on vacation or on leave, and he managed to get aboard. So we sailed on down to Alexandria.
I got to be fairly friendly with the crew, a couple of whom who had Greek families from
the Greeks in Alexandria, most of whom had left when Nasser tossed them out or made
life difficult for them. So one of these fellows, as we approached the harbor in
Alexandria, was explaining to me how his father used to tell him about when King
Farouk was still king in Egypt, he used to block off the very narrow entrance to the harbor
and water ski with one German mistress under each arm, skiing along behind this
motorboat, with the entire harbor brought to a standstill so he could sail back and forth.
Now, this is coming from a Greek sailor, but it's certainly possibly a believable story.

So we arrived there, as I remember it, at 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, and the scene was
just indescribable. The Americans had been brought up. You have to remember, too, we
were the Israelis' great patron, and the Egyptians were not about to make things easy for
us.

Q: There was also a story at that time that the United States had actually contributed
planes and all this, which we had not.

DIZIKES: Yes. I guess the other thing that I remember is that on the way down there, we
were also told that our fleet was informed of our presence and that there would be some
sort of generally unmentioned kind of support, which never was clear to me what that
meant, but somewhere over the horizon was supposed to be the Sixth Fleet in case we
needed them.

On the way down there, as I remember, too, I guess you aren't buzzed by a jet, but a jet
flew over extremely low, what appeared to be either a Syrian or Egyptian jet, because it
was a Soviet fighter of some sort, saw what we were, and then went on and didn't bother
us. The Greek crew at that point, ran up and started painting Greek flags on the deck and
hauling out extra Greek flags and stretching them over the lifeboats, so that from the air
you could see that this was a Greek ship and not, by any means, an Israeli or American
ship.

So off we went, and we got into the harbor in Alexandria and it was the most god-awful
thing I've ever seen. The Americans were there, and they were just brought aboard, up a
ladder onto the ship, and as they came aboard, I was thinking what I needed to do was
collect their passports and start to make up a list, because one of the things the
Department and everybody in Washington wanted was a list, obviously, of who these
Americans were. The first guy who came aboard, I still remember him, sort of a 40-year-
old American executive type, pretty affluent, as I approached him, I said, "I'm from the
American Embassy in Athens. Could I collect your passport?"

And he said, "Where are you from?"

I said, "The embassy."

He said, "Is that the US Government?"
I said, "Yes."

He said, "I'll keep my passport." And that indicated that these people had, like many Americans, as you probably heard in other contexts, they had, in fact, unreasonable expectations. In the days that they'd been waiting, they had developed a certain amount of resentment and animosity toward the American Government and toward the embassy in Athens. Well, it turned out specifically the embassy in Athens.

Eventually, they all came pouring aboard, and the captain decided we had to clear out of the harbor as fast as possible. There was a Soviet ship next to us, unloading torpedoes, and next to that there was a Libyan passenger ship, which looked like a scene out of *Gungha Din* or *Lord Jim* or something. The people were pouring down the gangway and the baggage was just being tossed off the top of the ship down to people who were waiting on the dock 50 feet below. Half the suitcases, of course, were landing in the water, and others were landing on people who were trying to catch them. [Laughter] I sat there with the Greek crew on the bridge, looking over at this thing, and the captain sort of shook his head, you know, made a couple of real Greek gestures, and said, "We've got to get out of here." [Laughter] So we immediately cast off and started off. The Americans had all poured aboard.

Then we had another 20-some hours before we got back to Piraeus, first to Crete, then to Piraeus. So the idea was, we were going to spend one night aboard this ship. Everybody would have to sleep, and cabins had to be assigned to these people. So the idea was that the purser would assign cabins as these people came aboard. So I had a microphone and announced who I was, that I was from the embassy, and that cabins would be assigned.

About 15 minutes later, the purser came to me and said he was being offered bribes, he was being threatened by people. They all wanted first-class cabins, they all had connections in Washington, and they demanded various things. He said he wasn't going to do it, that the only way it would work would be for me to assign everybody to their cabin.

Again, on the good advice I had gotten from Stu Kennedy in Athens, I tried to divide them into two groups and informed them that we would quickly assign them their cabins, and then we would sit down in two sessions and I would try to explain to them everything that I understood had happened from the beginning. So my perception was that the Americans, a lot of their problems are solved if you can tell them what the hell is going on. Like waiting in a line. If they know why they're waiting in a line, they'll be more patient about it. But these people, of course, had built up a certain amount of resentment.

So it turned out there were six or eight or ten tourist groups among this group of 450. One was the World Affairs Council from Los Angeles, so these were people who were supposed to be sort of sophisticated, interested in foreign affairs, but also very prominent, affluent, and first-class world travelers, sort of. All of these people were having a hard time understanding that this now was not a cruise that they were engaged on; it was an
evacuation. So as I started assigning them the cabins, I don't recall precisely, but we realized that out of, say, 450 passengers, 100 of those passengers could get first-class cabins, and then the rest were either tourist class. We also had a small number of people, a few Spaniards, as I recall, because Spain was our protecting power. So we made an agreement they could come out. There were one or two Greeks.

Q: You might point out at this point we did not have official diplomatic relations with the Egyptians, although we had an interest section in Cairo.

DIZIKES: Yes. The other thing which added to the resentment was that a few days before, or a day or so before, the Common Market had chartered a ship and evacuated EC citizens, and the Americans had all heard about this. I gather some of the Germans and Brits and others had gone off from the Hilton, sort of saying, "Well, good luck. We're leaving," and off they'd gone. Of course, this ship, as I remember it, that evacuation took place from Benghazi, and the EC people went by bus across Egypt to Libya. So even though I found that out later, it would have been nice to have pointed out to the Americans that that wasn't maybe as wonderful as it sounded. But it was earlier, and there's no question that the EC was a little quicker. I think that was because they were lucky in some ways. Maybe they had a ship of their own, which we didn't.

We then started assigning the cabins and people all demanded first-class cabins, and fortunately there was also a Canadian--I remember clearly--Canadian diplomatic courier's wife, who we had agreed, also, to evacuate because of some bilateral arrangement. She was about eight months pregnant, and she was feeling very ill. So I used her as an example and said there were two first-class suites, as well, and a couple of people had asked why they didn't get the suites. I said I was assigning this lady, who was eight months pregnant, to one of the suites and, in fact, a couple of people had asked why they didn't get the suites. I said I was assigning this lady, who was eight months pregnant, to one of the suites and, in fact, a couple of people had asked why they didn't get the suites. I said I was assigning this lady, who was eight months pregnant, to one of the suites and, in fact, a couple of people had asked why they didn't get the suites. I said I was assigning this lady, who was eight months pregnant, to one of the suites and, in fact, a couple of people had asked why they didn't get the suites.

So I tried quickly to say, "We'll assign these cabins by sex and age, elderly females getting preference, elderly males second, middle age and . . . " This was interesting, because people then started to identify themselves as elderly or middle aged. [Laughter] Which added a little humor to the thing. Then young single men were last. So quickly--when I say "quickly," this probably took a couple of hours. They all came by me, literally, and got their key to their cabin, and I told them I was responsible. If they didn't like their cabin, they could complain that I had given them a bad cabin, but it seemed to me that that should be the least of their concerns, since we were now leaving Egypt, and that's what they had all wanted to do.

I also had to explain to them that we were going to charge them for this, and we had this IOU set up, and it was about $100, as I remember it. Some people complained about that. On the other hand, a lot of people rightly recognized.
Then jumping ahead, we assigned the cabins and I told them we'd have these two sessions. That's where I sat down with them and said, "Let me just tell you from the beginning everything I know. Maybe you'll then see all I'm telling you is what we've done. I'm not apologizing for anything." But getting the ship and the insurance and getting the ship down there and throwing off the 400 Greeks who had been on the ship.

Then I opened it up to questions. Typically, some people said, "Well, I'm glad you've told us this. We understand. It's a lot more complicated than we thought, and thank God we're out of that place." Other people, of course, wanted to know--a couple I remember specifically said, "Why the hell didn't the Sixth Fleet come down and get us? What are you paying for if you can't send the Sixth Fleet?"

I told them I thought, number one, given the situation, as you mentioned, our relations with the Egyptians and our role, at the same time, which I didn't realize, we were madly resupplying the Israelis, of course. The Egyptians knew all of that. I doubted that they were going to let the Sixth Fleet sail into Alexandria and I doubted that the Sixth Fleet wanted to sail into Alexandria, number one. Number two, I told them that I thought a passenger ship, given that they were going to have to sail back across the Southern Mediterranean toward Crete, did they want to sail on a destroyer and sleep in between decks and sort of on hammocks, or did they want to sleep in a regular passenger ship, it seemed to me. Secondly, they asked why they hadn't been evacuated by air. I think the answer to that was that we couldn't get clearance to do it, and if they thought that we were in a position to fly into Egypt without permission, then I thought they were pretty naive.

So that went on for a while. But in general, I thought that went pretty well. Then I did the same thing with the second group, and people asked what was going to happen when we got to Athens. We tried to anticipate all that.

Then the owner and the crew of the ship were very good, because they provided an enormous amount of booze. And the weather was gorgeous! By the afternoon, we were then out in the middle of the Mediterranean with not a whitecap in sight, and all of these people sitting out on the back, drinking. It turned into a pretty--then, of course, the stories about what had happened in Egypt. They had seen missiles fired. In fact, most of them got to Cairo after the cease-fire had been declared, and I suspect that by today some of the stories must be really hair-raising. I mean, God knows what they'd seen. They've seen missiles fired nearby the hotel and Israeli planes strafing downtown Cairo. I haven't read in detail, but I suspect none of that actually happened.

In any case, then we got back into Greek waters and got back to Athens real early in the morning. The other thing that struck me is at that point I just about lost my voice, because I spent most of my time going around talking to people, trying to reassure them. Then I ended up having my picture taken. We'd sit around by the swimming pool and people would come up and have their picture taken with me, because this was going to be a great adventure to tell friends about.
The other thing that was fascinated was human nature. I mean, you see two men, say, a 40-year-old executive, like the one I described, and another 40-year-old executive, one of whom, for no apparent reason, same sort of economic level, same education, same age, and the one fellow is bitching because he doesn't have a first-class cabin, and the other one--now, what I skipped over a bit is that the great trauma was the meal. As I mentioned earlier, we had three stewardesses and one cook to serve 450 people. I informed people that they were going to have to volunteer to help if we expected to get any food served and anything orderly done. People would have to chip in and help. Amazingly--or maybe not--a large number of people were willing to volunteer. There were some stewardesses on board, five or six stewardesses, who were terrific about that, and they sort of took charge of that and the people worked for them. But what I encountered was the situation where you'd get the one guy saying, "Why didn't I get a first-class cabin? I'm really resentful of this. I'm going to write to my congressman," and the other guy saying, "You want me to go down and wash dishes and help serve the next round?" That's what you can never sort of explain, how people react in a situation like that. To me, it was really fascinating to see, although it was more fascinating after we got back to Athens.

The other thing, I think, finally, without droning on too long, I thought it was fascinating when we got to Athens at about 4:00 or 5:00 in the morning, there were, as I mentioned, some Canadians, some Spaniards, a couple of dual-national Greeks, and others, so there were representatives, not only our consul general, Stu Kennedy, and some of the people from the consular section in Athens. I remember clearly the Spanish consul general was there. When I looked down from the ship, as we got in there and saw the people getting off and their luggage getting off, Stu Kennedy and American officers from the American Embassy were carrying luggage for these people, and the Spanish consul sort of shaking hands with them and then driving off, saying, "Welcome to Greece," and that was the end of the Spanish role in this. I think that sums up a lot what we try to do and what we see as our role and what a lot of other countries do.

At that point, there was also this fascinating group of interior decorators who were in the group from North Hollywood, California, who tended to be candidly, among the males, rather effeminate in manner, at least, and that was absolutely hysterical to watch these people carrying on.

So it was just an amazing experience.

Q: I saw glimpses of this and sort of launched you as our missile off there, but you came back, we were all apprehensive, and it worked.

Dean, how long have you been in the visa office?

DIZIKES: I've been back in the visa office since the summer of 1988, a year and a half.
Q: What are you doing there? Pass on some of the problems from the perspective of the visa office and the field and where some of the problems are, and any examples you can think of.

DIZIKES: Sure. I'm the Acting Director of the Field Operations Division, but was assigned to what's called the Post Liaison Division. It's an office which is broken down geographically to correspond to the five geographic regions, and we have one officer of the current 02 level responsible for each of the five regions, and these officers primarily see to it that operational questions on visas are answered, reciprocity, you know. On a given day the kind of thing that will happen is the embassy in Brazil will come in with a cable saying that the Brazilians changed the fee for a visa to visit Brazil, and our schedule of visas is based on reciprocity, so we have to consider whether we don't want to change ours to conform. That sort of thing.

In general, what they spend most of their time on, though, is trying to see to it that the operations in the visa sections are uniform and are consistent, and posts come in with questions about using forms, requiring documents. This is all in general. We have a Public Inquiries Division which deals with specific ongoing cases. So the difference being if you have in Nigeria, in Lagos, how do you deal with refusals? Do you want to make a note in their passport? Do you want to enter them into the automated system? We answer those questions. But a specific Nigerian who's been refused and a congressman is interested, that goes through the Public Inquiries Division.

What we try to do is see to it that there's some sort of general consistency in operation. The big problem, of course, is that a lot of the inconsistencies come from personalities, and so the visa officers in Lagos and the visa officers in Monrovia, even within the same region, may be approaching cases somewhat differently. Because of the organizational thing, they don't work for us. We cannot direct them on adjudicating cases; that's up to them. Many of them are very jealous of that prerogative, as you know, and resent the idea that anyone in Washington would presume to tell them how to adjudicate case. What we try to do, though, is make sure that they're not making errors of law in adjudicating the cases. But if they are questions of law, that goes to the legal division of the visa office, advisory, opinions, questions of whether people are ineligible under certain sections of the law, they deal with.

In a way, too, we deal with everything that doesn't fit into either the public inquiries or the legal division. In some ways, I like to see it as it's like being in a consular section overseas. It's in some ways as close as you can be in Washington, because here your clients are the sections, and every day you come into the office, there is no telling what sort of bizarre question you're going to get.

Q: Can you give any examples of some of those?

DIZIKES: Right off the top of my head.
Q: You can always fill in later.

DIZIKES: Yes. It's hard for me because I don't see them every day as much as some of the officers do. But we got a report from Warsaw that their electric visa machines, they got them, they were working fine, but one of them stuck and was just stamping out visas, and the only way they could stop it was to unplug it. When they plugged it in, it started up, as they said, "randomly stamping." So they asked us whether there was something we could suggest. That's the sort of question you get in the morning. That's not directly something we can do.

The other thing we see a lot, though, are individual officers, and one Gulf post sticks in my mind.

Q: The Persian Gulf.

DIZIKES: The Persian Gulf. One officer had refused a visa in a case. I was called by an immigration attorney with a question as to whether this case should have been refused. As I did a little research, I ended up calling the post and finding out that the officer didn't understand that she couldn't be refusing. This was an Indian accountant who had lived in this Gulf country for 20 years, and the visa officer was telling him that he had to apply in India for his visa because he was an Indian. The immigration attorney, rightly, was questioning, because, of course, in fact, the poor man went back to India, was refused in India because he didn't reside in India and they didn't know how to evaluate his case, and then when he returned to the Gulf post, she used as confirmation the fact that he'd been refused in India and said, "You see? They agree with me. You're not eligible." In fact, what I did was call her and say, "He doesn't have to prove, number one, that he's going back to India, since he hasn't lived there for 20 years. He only has to prove that he's going to leave the United States." That's the sort of thing that we, unfortunately, sometimes spend our time trying to sort out.

Q: This is often the case with inexperienced officers having to make rather vital decisions.

DIZIKES: Yes. In this case, she is the consular officer in this post. It's her first tour. And then you have to question--not that you question the quality of her training, but I wonder sometimes.

The other thing we've gotten involved in a lot recently is the attitude of officers toward attorneys in the whole process. My experience is the attorney can fulfill a perfectly useful role and in many cases with immigrant attorneys, you don't want to make them the issue. Some of the inexperienced officers tend to get wrapped up. Their ego gets involved with the attorney, who, after all, is advocate and wants a certain decision and may get pushy about it, and the poor relatively inexperienced officer may start attacking the attorney, which the attorney then uses as the issue, rather than the merits of his client's case. So
what we try to do is explain to them that you don't have to give into the attorneys, but you also can't exclude attorneys from the process.

You also can't get too personally involved in the idea, which bothers a lot of Americans, why are you paying for something which is perfectly objectively done by us? That leaves aside the cultural thing. In most of the world, I think the perception is if you get a lawyer or you get someone to act on your behalf, you get something which you wouldn't get if you were just dealing by yourself. As Americans, we tend to say, "That's not true. Don't you understand? If you come to me by yourself, I'll give you the same answer that I would give your attorney." Well, that doesn't mean anything to the Greeks and the Iranians and Nigerians and Pakistanis, whose culture is based on knowing people to get things.

So we then get our officers in the situation where they are treating the attorney as though he's got no business--and, in fact, the next step is the short step of, "You're taking this poor person's money for no reason." Some officers, unfortunately, tell the attorneys that, and then we have to try and sort it out.

Q: Particularly in the visa process, the personality structure of the individual consul can make a tremendous difference, how they take it, whether they have a sense of humor, whether they have an objectivity and balance. This is something that no matter what you do, you can't control. Yet their decisions are terribly important, which rests not just on an objective reading of the law, but also the personality.

DIZIKES: Absolutely. That, to me, is the single most frustrating thing, is that this thing we called judgment is the most important quality in the visa process and in what most of the junior officers are doing, adjudicating. Deciding yes or no on visa applications is totally dependent on their judgment, and I don't know how you train people. You can't teach them judgment, I don't think. That's the frustrating thing. Some of them have it, some of them don't have it. Some of them are intellectually brilliant, but simply can't make these decisions either rapidly or consistently or rationally, and they shouldn't be doing the job because I don't think you can teach them that sort of quality. Others just have it. Why some have it and why some don't, I don't know.

Q: I don't think there's any way of measuring it before you hire the person.

DIZIKES: No, I think that's right. Unfortunately, though, some, of course, who don't have it like the authority and like the role and they want to continue on. Then, of course, it's hard to evaluate. Then we get into the whole question of promotions and evaluations, which I'd rather not get into, but it's such a nebulous field that I'm not sure that we're rewarding necessarily the right people or advancing the people with those qualities, especially in the visa function. It's just very frustrating to see.

On the other hand, I think you're right that many people then say, "What we need is an objective standard or some kind of point system or some hard line which will determine, a bright line that will determine who is eligible and who isn't." I think the whole beauty of
the Immigration Act is that we don't have that, and that we do allow--it's the officer. He's commissioned and is theoretically brought in because he's got these qualities, and he's supposed to use his judgment.

Q: Again, there's the other factor that every country is different. The culture is different. So you can't draw a line that might work in Germany, but it's not going to work in Pakistan.

DIZIKES: Absolutely. Sure. In fact, that's it. We talk about issuing visas and adjudicating visas and being consistent, and yet you've got one world, which is Western Europe and Japan and Australia, and the rest of the world. That first world is made up of people who are totally legitimate. Almost 99% of those people are in the situation that Americans are in. They are legitimate travelers who want to come to the United States for a legitimate purpose, and it's so obvious that you almost don't need to question it. Yet in the rest of the world, there's no getting around it. The majority of those people are intending immigrants. But you've got one Immigration Act which you're supposed to apply around the world, and it applies much differently.

Then you've got officers moving from one region to the other. You've got the guy who started in Western Europe and gets sent to Guyana, having done two years of the most routine, bona fide cases, and then is suddenly put down in a place where you've got 65% of the people probably are ineligible for visas. Or you've got the guy who started off there and goes to Paris, the other way around. The Department's problem is to help those people adjust. You'd think, again, that one of the things we're looking for, whatever the qualities are, is a person who can make that adjustment, but it's not always the case by any means.

Q: I don't want to hold you anymore. I thank you very much.

DIZIKES: Okay.

End of interview