The End of Apartheid in South Africa

A lesson plan developed by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and brought to you as part of an Una Chapman Cox Foundation project on American Diplomacy and the Foreign Service

High School Grades 9–12

Objectives and Skills:

Students will understand

- What apartheid was, why it lasted so long, and what domestic and international pressures led to its dismantlement.
- How anti-apartheid activists and F. W. de Klerk’s government team worked through obstacles to negotiations over the new form of government in South Africa in order to lead to the 1994 peaceful and democratic elections.
- The changing role that the United States played during that period.
- Similarities and differences between simultaneous racial issues existing in the United States and South Africa.
- The role that Nelson Mandela played as a change agent for his country.

Standards: This lesson plan is aligned with the following Virginia Department of Education History and Social Science Standards of Learning

- SOL World History & Geography Modern Era 1500–Present
  WHII.13b, WHII.1 (a-h)

Time required:
- Up to four 45-minute class periods, if incorporating all activities
Background information:

Introduction: This lesson will introduce students to the history of apartheid in South Africa, the rise of the domestic and worldwide opposition to it, and the key figures in the negotiations to end it. Students will consider the relative importance of various factors to ending minority rule—e.g. international sanctions by governments, boycotts and disinvestment by private individuals and organizations, rising violence, Nelson Mandela’s commitment to a peaceful transition, F. W. de Klerk’s vision for moving the country forward. Students will also learn of the role that U.S. diplomats played, first in quietly supporting the South African regime during the Cold War as a bulwark against communism in Africa, but later in pushing for Mandela’s release and for negotiation of majority rule.

Context: Because of apartheid, South Africa lagged behind the rest of Africa in achieving true self-determination. During the Cold War, leading members of the UN — the United States, Great Britain, and France—worked closely with the South African regime on a full range of issues and watered-down sanctions proposals. But international condemnation and isolation grew over time, as did violent resistance within South Africa. By the 1980s, factions within the U.S. government were pushing for Mandela’s release and the end of apartheid.

Lesson Preparation

Materials:

Part A
- The End of Apartheid | Department of State Office of the Historian
- Excerpt from The Foreign Service Journal December 2020 interview with the first black U.S. ambassador to South Africa, Edward J. Perkins, “Pioneer, Bridge Builder and Statesman”.
- Excerpt from 1987 Time magazine article “Quiet Sting: A Diplomat Makes His Mark”.
Amb. Herman (Hank) J. Cohen
Assistant Secretary Chester A. Crocker

- Excerpt from Nelson Mandela’s public statement in Cape Town in February 1990, after his release from prison.
- Handout: How and why did apartheid fall?
- Circle of Viewpoints A routine for exploring perspectives | Project Zero Harvard Graduate School of Education (optional)

Part B
- Truth & Reconciliation Commission (TRC): The Difficulty of Forgiveness | British Broadcasting Company (BBC) YouTube video (note Tutu’s description of the therapeutic effects of the TRC in the last minute of the video).
- Nelson Mandela’s Fight for Freedom Best Documentary | The Discovery Channel
- Excerpts from Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training oral histories of:
  Amb. Princeton Lyman
  Aaron Williams
  Monica Joyi
- Excerpt of Francis Sejersted, Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, presenting the Nobel Peace Prize to Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk, 1993
- Handout: Negotiation of New South African Democracy and Constitution
  Group A Prompt: Nelson Mandela/ANC Perspective
- Handout: Negotiation of New South African Democracy and Constitution
  Group B Prompt: Government Perspective
- Handout: after the Negotiations
  (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 – Preamble)

Additional resources:

Film/Visual Media
- USG documentary film c. 1957 describing apartheid: Apartheid in South Africa (1957)
- Scenes from the film Invictus illustrate Mandela’s approach to post-apartheid racial tensions:
  - Invictus bodyguard
  - Invictus. Mandela’s team motivation. First Day in Office
  - Extract Invictus Final
Books and Readings

- Collection of Mandela’s speeches and public messages: [Speeches by Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela](#)
- The Nobel Peace Prize 1993 (Mandela & F. W. de Klerk) Presentation Speech – [NobelPrize.org](#)
- The *Learners’ Book* from the Apartheid Museum’s [Resources Page](#) (chapters 3-5).
- MSU: Unit 6. The End of Apartheid and the Birth of Democracy, Bantustans
- MLK on apartheid: [Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Speech on South Africa](#)
- *Long Walk to Freedom* and *The Prison Letters of Nelson Mandela*, both by Nelson Mandela. The former is an autobiography from childhood to his 1994 election. The latter is a collection of letters that Mandela wrote during his extended imprisonment.
- *U.S. Policy Towards Africa: Eight Decades of Realpolitik*, by Herman J. Cohen. A survey of U.S. policy towards African nations over the past eight decades and the factors that have shaped this policy.

Lesson Procedure

Give the class 15–20 minutes to read the background “Apartheid and Factors Leading to Its End.” Show students the following video from MSU’s collection of apartheid-related footage, where ANC member Bob Vassen talks about his experience engaging in anti-apartheid sabotage.

[overcomingapartheid.msu.edu](http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu)
Part A: The End of Apartheid

Background Information: Apartheid and Factors Leading to Its End

In 1948, after the Second World War brought nonwhite workers into South African industries, the segregationist government of South Africa responded with a nationwide system of laws called “apartheid.” Apartheid laws tried to ensure that nonwhite South Africans could not pose a threat to white dominance.

From 1960 to 1964, the government forcibly relocated many blacks to barren “homelands,” declaring them “citizens” of these supposedly autonomous regions rather than citizens of South Africa. The ultimate goal of this policy was to move South Africa’s entire black population into these homelands.

Because these homelands were barren of resources, this policy simultaneously sank many blacks into poverty and stripped them of any real power over the South African government. As one pro-apartheid legislator put it: “The Natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them.”
A vast coalition of whites and nonwhites, including everyone from Communists to church groups, fought back. At first, these groups, such as the ANC (African National Congress), used nonviolent mass actions like protests and strikes, calculated to shame and pressure their government into abandoning racial discrimination. The South African government responded with terrifying brutality, driving activists underground. Martin Luther King, accepting his Nobel Prize in the early years of the apartheid movement, remarked: “Even in Mississippi we can . . . organise the people in non-violent action. But in South Africa even the mildest form of nonviolent resistance meets with years of imprisonment.” And imprisonment under apartheid often meant torture or murder. Alternatively, South African police simply lashed out openly. In 1960, South African police massacred unarmed protesters in the township of Sharpeville.

Frustrated, many African activists eventually turned to violence. For example, shortly after Sharpeville, Nelson Mandela of the ANC founded a military and sabotage organization in hopes of forcing the government to the negotiating table. Although many prominent leaders, including Mandela, ended up in prison or in exile, resistance to apartheid, both violent and nonviolent, continued. By the 1980s, the sheer scale of resistance eventually made several areas ungovernable, and even deploying the military could not restore control.

Other anti-apartheid activists worked to raise attention abroad, with substantial but mixed results. On the one hand, international publics, especially as the civil rights movements of the 1960s progressed, were often so horrified by the images of apartheid brutality that they forced their governments to act. Foreign governments enacted sanctions. Foreign publics called for boycotts of South African products and for symbolic gestures of disapproval, such as banning South Africa from the Olympics. Multinational companies started to disinvest. On the other hand, South Africa’s apartheid government had been friendly to the Allied Powers during World War II, and some considered it a valuable ally against Communism. (It didn’t help that several prominent anti-apartheid activists actually were sympathetic to socialism, at the very least.) Thus, while the U.S. Congress was eventually moved to pass the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which sanctioned the South African government, they did it over the veto of President Reagan, who considered Mandela and his ilk dangerous terrorists. (A third faction of American policymakers, represented heavily in the oral histories below, had no tolerance for apartheid but disliked sanctions.)

By the time the Cold War drew to a close, South Africa became more and more of an international pariah. In 1990, caught between international infamy and domestic disaster, the apartheid government began negotiating for the specifics of a transition to a more equal form of government. Apartheid was on its way out.
This poster is an example of the international outcry raised against South African influence, including its sports teams. Notice that the poster’s address is listed as London.

From Northwestern University: If you could see their national sport, you might be less keen to see their cricket.

This activity requires two class sessions.

**Class Session 1**

- Form small groups of 2–4 students, assign for reading *The End of Apartheid*, and distribute the excerpts for Part A (Perkins, Eicher, Lukens, Carney, Aker, Dinger, Swing, Cohen, Crocker, and Mandela’s public statement after his release from prison).
- Have each small group summarize for the class and share 2–3 key points from each oral history excerpt, using the Library of Congress Oral History Worksheet.
- “Snowball” the small groups by combining two small groups into a larger discussion group so that there are 2–3 larger discussion groups within the class, and distribute the “How and why did apartheid fall?” handout for them to reflect on and discuss. Give the class another 15 minutes (or more, as needed) to read the excerpts again and answer the handout questions.

**Homework:** Have students write a short position paper (no more than one page) describing what they believe were the main causes of the end of apartheid. Encourage students to both closely examine the primary sources and do their own research.
Class Session 2

- Sort the returning students into groups based on the factors they identified in their papers. These groups can then discuss or debate on the relative weight of the factors in the ending of apartheid. Make sure that at least one group of students considers the transformation of United States government policy on South Africa, from World War II to 1994.

Part B: The Aftermath – How to Negotiate a Constitution

Background Information: South Africa’s Negotiations of a New Constitution

The negotiations over a new democratic government in South Africa began in 1990, after President de Klerk released several political prisoners (including Nelson Mandela) and legalized anti-apartheid political organizations. That same month, the apartheid government, the African National Congress (ANC), and a variety of smaller allies began to plan the transition from apartheid to a democratic government with free and fair elections and equal protection under the law. To allay the white population’s fears of violence and reprisal, they also considered at length how to protect the rights of minorities, among other issues.

Several times, disagreements threatened the negotiations through political violence. From August 1990 through 1992, gangs of Zulu tribesmen fought pro-ANC blacks in a brutal civil war. Many in South Africa, including Mandela, believed that the de Klerk administration was quietly encouraging the Zulu attackers: the violence made it harder for the ANC to rally and discouraged others from supporting the negotiations. In 1992, an exasperated Mandela temporarily withdrew from the negotiations, causing such fierce protests that de Klerk resumed bilateral negotiations. In addition, the prospect of ANC dominance frightened some whites into violence. Extremist supporters of apartheid demanded a separate state for white South Africans. They armed private militias for civil war, allied with the rulers of all-black “homeland” puppet states within South Africa, and at one point successfully interrupted the negotiations by smashing a truck into the negotiation area, breaching the perimeter.

In the end, however, black and other nonwhite South Africans gained political power; after a brief power-sharing agreement, a national election handed the presidency to Mandela in 1994. In a gesture of goodwill, he named de Klerk deputy president. To heal the psychological wounds of apartheid, the new government developed “Truth and Reconciliation Commissions,” where perpetrators (black or white) of apartheid-related violence could publicly confess to their crimes, and victims of such crimes could
describe their experiences. While this may not have completely sealed the racial breach, there was no mass civil war or forced exodus of whites. In the context of decolonization in other parts of Africa, the result was a major success.

The United States and other countries offered to mediate the negotiations, but the South African parties on both sides decided that their best route forward was to negotiate directly. Each side did turn to the United States at times for support when the negotiations faltered. But the final result was all theirs, as recognized when the Nobel Committee bequeathed the Nobel Peace Prize to both Mandela and de Klerk.

This activity takes 1–2 class sessions.

This activity provides students an opportunity to experience to some degree the challenges of this type of monumental negotiation. Select for students to view portions of Nelson Mandela’s Fight for Freedom Best Documentary that address the negotiations for a new democratic government. Also assign the excerpts for Part B (oral history excerpts of Lyman, Williams, Joyi, and the Sejersted excerpt, presenting the Nobel Peace Prize to Mandela and de Klerk in 1993).

Divide the class into two groups, one representing Mandela’s ANC and the other representing the white government. Distribute the Negotiation handouts accordingly and ask each group to generate a list of factors that would have been most important to each side during their four-year negotiations.

Reunite the class and role-play negotiations.

Distribute the “After the Negotiations” handout and have students reflect on the results of their role-play compared with the results of the actual negotiations.

Lesson Evaluation

Assessment:
1) When examining sources, did the students identify and account for biases?
2) Did students make compelling arguments in class, in role-play, and in their writing?
3) Did students demonstrate an understanding of the history of apartheid, the movement against it, and the relevant negotiations?

Credits Kailas Menon, Janine Knauerhase
**Extension Questions for Further Discussion:**

1. Did Ronald Reagan’s weapons boycott help or hurt the apartheid regime?

2. What are the arguments for and against Chester Crocker’s “constructive engagement” policy?

3. Is there evidence that F. W. de Klerk’s official visit to the U.S. really transformed his thinking on race? (See ADST interview with Robert Heath.)

4. President George H. W. Bush made the first congratulatory call to Mandela the day he was released. As described in Mandela’s biography, how was the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria able to pull this off?

5. What role did the U.S. government’s educational and cultural exchanges play in the transformation? (Reference book: *Outsmarting Apartheid* by Daniel Whitman)

6. Is it a coincidence that Mandela was released from prison the same year that the Iron Curtain came down in Europe?

7. What is the importance of the Bank of England’s lowering of Apartheid South Africa’s credit rating?

8. Where and how did secret meetings take place in Senegal and Ireland to negotiate Mandela’s release? (ANC + apartheid regime)
HANDOUT: How and why did apartheid fall?

Name ______________________________ Date ______________

- What factors does each source imply was important in bringing about the end of apartheid? If sanctions were mentioned, did the source believe that U.S. sanctions imposed by the U.S. Congress over the president’s objectives were effective?

- Consider the background of each person behind the readings. Who are they? What position did they hold? In what time frame are they speaking? How does that background affect their reliability as a source, or how they thought about apartheid generally? Were they close enough to the action to get a full picture? Were they possibly biased?

- Do you agree with their point of view?

- Why did the United States government initially ignore the repressive nature of apartheid during the Cold War? When did U.S. popular sentiment in favor of sanctions and boycotts start to change and how did that affect U.S. government policy? What role did the United States play in the early 1990s to support the negotiations of a new Constitution and the installation of true democracy?

FSJ: President Ronald Reagan tapped you as the first Black U.S. ambassador to apartheid South Africa in 1986. What was your mission there, and how did you manage it?

EJP: When President Reagan interviewed me for the job, he asked me what I would want to accomplish in South Africa, and I told him that I would try to change the system using the power of his office. He asked me how I would do it. I told him that I would get to know the Black South Africans, as well as other South Africans. I told him that we didn’t know Black South Africans well, that they were suspicious of the United States, and we needed to gain their trust. I added that we needed to work toward a peaceful transition in South Africa, and we needed to convince the Afrikaner government that their time was up. Finally, I told him that I would expect to speak on his authority, and that everything I would say would be on his behalf.

It was difficult and challenging because the Afrikaners were a small group of people who had come from Flanders to South Africa to start a new life; they felt people were trying to take away the lives they had built over hundreds of years. I told President Reagan that the denial of rights to the other racial groups in South Africa was untenable and could not continue, but that it would be my job to understand all the actors in the country, by meeting them.

FSJ: I read that when you found a totally segregated society in South Africa, you said: “Our embassy must be a giant change agent.” Can you tell us about the significance of attending the Delmas Treason Trial?
EJP: The Delmas Treason Trial was the trial of 22 anti-apartheid activists, including three senior United Democratic Front leaders: Moses Chikane, Mosiuoa Lekota and Popo Molefe. The men used peaceful protest to let the country know that apartheid was wrong; the Afrikaner government accused them of terrorism and wanted to use their trial and resulting sentences as a lesson to others. The trial took place in the small village of Delmas, in northwest South Africa. When I walked into the courtroom, everyone went silent; by the time the court recessed, the three senior UDF members had made the decision to meet with me and had already outlined their requests related to their prison conditions on paper. Delmas became well known throughout the world.

FSJ: Do you think that U.S. embassies and diplomats can still be change agents in the world?

EJP: Yes, I do believe that U.S. embassies and diplomats can still be change agents. When serving overseas, diplomats should strive to get access to all parts of host-country communities to make a difference. This means representing the United States at its best. American diplomats should also be a reflection of the various communities that we come from and make the effort to represent the best parts of our society. I would advise them to do what I did—learn to represent not just the State Department, but the heart and soul of the United States. To do this, you need to understand the Constitution and the various constituencies of our country.


Excerpt: 1987 Time magazine article “Quiet Sting: A Diplomat Makes His Mark”

“I sense a growing realization that a valid political system here must be one that correlates with the demographics of the country -- not merely black participation or black cooperation, but a government which truly represents the majority of South Africans.” Strip away the diplomatic jargon and that statement is pure dynamite. Its author? U.S. Ambassador Edward J. Perkins, writing in the influential South African bimonthly Leadership, whose latest issue appeared last week. Perkins’ article was viewed by some observers as a breakthrough, if only in his reference to the word majority, a term usually shunned in deference to white fears of one day being overwhelmed by blacks. Said the Rev. Allan Boesak, a leading opponent of apartheid: "No one in his position has said that for years."
Deliberately provocative or not, the Leadership article was the latest step in a closely watched diplomatic performance. As a black representing a conservative Republican Administration in white-ruled South Africa, Perkins received a generally negative reception when he landed in Pretoria late last year after spending eight years dealing with black African affairs for the State Department.

Perkins, 58, routinely declines press interviews, and has not discussed the article. But in his occasional speeches to civic and business groups, he loyally follows the Administration's policy of discouraging U.S. firms from closing down or selling off their South African operations to protest apartheid. In a speech while on home leave last spring, however, he said the economic sanctions passed by Congress in 1986, in making "a statement of abhorrence by the American people of a hated system," had been a success.

Source: *Time-The Vault: December 21, 1987 "Quiet Sting: A Diplomat Makes His Mark"

**Peter David Eicher, U.S. Political Officer, Pretoria/Cape Town, 1976–1978**

(Note: Part of the U.S. Embassy moved with the South African government back and forth between Pretoria and Cape Town each year)

Because of apartheid, they [the South Africans] were already a bit of a pariah and there were various kinds of rather mild sanctions that were imposed on South Africa, which increased during the time I was there. The sanctions included an arms embargo, which resulted in the South Africans developing their own quite effective arms industry… There was also a sports embargo, at least an informal one, of countries refusing to invite South African teams or to visit South Africa, because South African teams were segregated.

Interestingly, this seemed to bother the South Africans the most, because they were a very sporting nation and couldn’t stand the idea that their teams were not able to compete internationally. Occasionally, they would find an international team willing to come to South Africa, and whenever they did, it was a big deal for them.

Source: *Peter David Eicher Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)*
LUKENS: [South Africa] was a frustrating place to work. I mean you just got tired of hearing the same old story; people that called themselves "liberals"—the English-speaking liberals—weren't liberal by any stretch of the imagination by our standards. They were [frustrated] and nothing was being changed, but they were also scared of going too far and sticking their necks out..

One of my most interesting periods, I think, was in Port Elizabeth when I was asked to settle a Ford strike. I'd gotten to know the black leaders and, of course, all the Ford executives, and they couldn't produce Fords without black workers. They'd stopped; and in the old days, what had happened in South Africa when there was a strike, they'd throw all the black strikers in jail; and then they'd hire more whites. But the Blacks had gotten so that they had all the skills of the job, everything but management, so they couldn't produce Fords without them. So we finally had a meeting in my hotel room and we had an eight-hour session and hammered out an agreement. . . it sort of came about by accident when I was up there and I agreed to do it. . . Ambassador Edmondson was a little surprised. He seemed to support it, and Dick Moose, who was assistant secretary, when he heard about it, thought it was fine. And the Ford people were happy in Detroit. I don't think the local whites were, because they lost out on the agreement. The Africans were very happy.

Q: Was there a marked change after the Reagan administration came in?

LUKENS: It was more of a subtle one. I think it hit the embassy more quickly. Of course, we did change ambassadors. The problem was not so much the personalities in our relationships; it was the perception on the part of the Blacks that Washington had turned against them and was no longer interested. And after the administration changed, it was very much harder to get black leaders to come around and talk, because they felt they had been kind of let down. Of course this was exacerbated by the white leaders, thinking that now they could do anything they wanted and nobody would criticize them in Washington; which, of course, wasn't really the case but it was their perception, and it was borne out to some extent.

Disinvestment was basically getting American companies out of there. It came about from pressure within the United States by stockholders and colleges, and everything else, to get those companies to stop dealing in South Africa. Now it was unfortunate because the companies, basically following the Sullivan principles, had set the pattern of what companies should do.
Sullivan principles were named for the Rev. Leon Sullivan, a Baptist minister from Pennsylvania. He became a little bit of the front man for American companies (that is, the better representatives of American companies), who felt that the best way to preserve investments in South Africa was to lead the way—a liberal way—and train and promote black Africans, help with housing, do all kinds of things like that. Get away from the old tradition and try to instill American standards in some of these American companies. And they all got together and agreed to these principles; equal pay for equal jobs. They were called the Sullivan principles after Leon Sullivan and the major companies all agreed to these. And that gave everybody a handle to go in there and see if they were indeed doing that. Some did it more than others. But while there were cases of nothing happening, one could be very cynical and say plenty of companies didn’t do very much; the fact that they were doing this meant that they were the leaders, certainly vis-à-vis the South African companies, in improving the lot of black workers, and in training, and in promotion, management, and housing, and in other sorts of things, education.

And so when disinvestment came along, the pressures on American companies from their American stockholders for these companies to get out, it basically meant backing out of there, and in a sense losing the leverage that we had because these companies behind the scenes had a lot of clout with the government, and the government didn’t want to see them go.

[The local South African police and officialdom] were tough and mostly unpleasant. They were mean types, reminding one very much of the war with the Germans, Nazi types. I think that’s going to be the biggest problem in the future. One of the biggest problems. De Klerk is going to have to clean out the security apparatus and he’s going to really have to make changes.

Source: Amb. Alan W. Lukens Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)

**Amb. Tim Carney, Political Counselor in Pretoria (later Ambassador to Sudan), 1983-1986**

CARNEY: [It] makes one feel good to put sanctions on and talk big, but it does not get the job done. And anyone in the United States, in my view, who thinks it was we who were instrumental in getting the change from apartheid into modern South Africa is a fool. The notion that a U.S. arms embargo had any impact at all is someone smoking the office drapes. What it effectively did was create an indigenous arms industry in South Africa that ultimately included a capability, the actual making of a nuclear bomb! It’s -- and that is a classic unintended [consequence] of the foolish American
congressional and civil society desires to feel good by babbling where there’s no purpose served.

I was part of constructive engagement, and [I] believe that you also needed it calibrated with the sticks, you must have sticks. Let me not leave you in any doubt about that. You must have sticks as part of the policy, because the Afrikaner politicians had to see sticks as well as carrots. I think in many ways -- the biggest stick -- the stick that worked was when the international banking community decided in, I think it was 1984, not to roll over South Africa’s loans, because it was becoming too great a credit risk due to the policies of the government and the reaction to those policies by black South Africa. It wasn’t the United States that did it. It was the banks.

P.W. Botha in 1983 decided to add Indian and colored, and I’m using the South African terms-- Chambers of Parliament, but not a chamber for black South Africans. He just, in my view, was simply not able to overcome his own background and family history. And that sparked a grievous uprising -- uprising’s too strong. Let’s say grievous consequences from black South Africa...That sort of thing, I think, caused the banks to stop South Africa’s credit.

In any case, one of the significant things that the United States had been doing... was to send mainly white South Africans overseas to the United States so they could see what a multiracial society was like and learn that it wasn’t the end of the world as they saw it. There were a huge number of people who went. They included...F.W. de Klerk in 1976, the two of the young men in the then National Party who helped negotiate the elections, Leon Wessels, who at one point was Deputy Foreign Minister.... was heavily focused on getting white South Africans who needed to go to see what the U.S. was all about, with all of our warts and, and inability to move quickly in bringing about racial justice in the United States...No one at that time thought apartheid would be over. [We wanted] to move the change as we could.

[About] the Sullivan Principles...It just ---it was such a good idea...the most effective way... to see apartheid abandoned and changed. And I lump all those people in the anti-Sullivan Principles camp, with the people who wanted to feel good by bashing, rather than by drawing white South Africans forward.

I could see so many Afrikaners who had either figured it out or were beginning to figure it out....[A colleague] was interviewing the Minister of Justice, the late Kobie Coetsee. And she almost mouse trapped him into admitting he was seeing Mandela. ....I also had an interesting story from one of the journalists who was talking with de Klerk at an interview with a number of other journalists. And this would have been ’85 I think it was.
He had become head of the Transvaal wing of the National Party….And that’s what he used as a springboard to become head of the National Party….And my source basically asked, “...does not survival of the Afrikaner require domination?” Because that was the mantra of the strong apartheid wing of the National Party. And apparently, de Klerk...waffled in his answer on that....And of course now we know that he waffled because he couldn’t publicly... P.W. Botha would have had his guts for garters, literally if he’d gone off the reservation there.

Q: …[Is] it your impression that his trip to the U.S. accelerated that type of thinking?

CARNEY: Yes. His and Roelf Meyer’s and all of those white South Africans who went to the States. Because the biggest thing that I can recall anybody ever saying, and again, I can’t remember who said it is, “You all didn’t try to hide what’s wrong in America from us. You just let us see what was going on. And that was the powerful message.”

Source: Amb. Tim Carney Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)

Richard Aker, Public Affairs Officer in Durban, South Africa, 1985-1988

The thing that people who were never in South Africa didn’t appreciate was how lively and intense the domestic debate was within the white population. Of course, there were some really bigoted people, but for the most part … these were people struggling with a really difficult problem. They didn’t feel good about what had happened; they did not feel good about running a system that disenfranchised and deprived the majority of the people, but they had inherited this system and there was a real fear of what would happen to them if they were to lose control.

I didn’t think it would move as fast as it did. I don’t think anybody at that point thought that Mandela would be released so soon… I think almost everybody felt it would go on for a long time but eventually it would come to some, probably bloody, confrontation. The fact that it hasn’t happened is quite interesting. What happened, apparently, is that the ANC essentially left the economic power structure and the system intact, which means that the country has maintained, for Africa, a high standard of living. I think that is the biggest reason there has been relatively little violence -- not that there hasn’t been some: crime is apparently much worse now than it was in those days.

Many [Afrikaners] were strong Calvinists; they came from a very strong religious background. It gave them sort of a sense of biblical mission…. However, this strong
religious feeling played both ways, because as Christians they had a sense of guilt about the situation, which I think played a big role in ultimately undermining apartheid.

Source: Richard Aker Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)


When Mandela was released in February of 1990, I was in Japan getting married. I watched it on TV. After I got back, things were loosening up. About a year later the government suddenly unbanned the ANC and other organizations. Among English-speaking whites there seemed to be a fair amount of support for the changes; some called them “swimming pool liberals.” [But] Afrikaners saw that their world was at serious risk. They disproportionately benefited from apartheid. The atmosphere during my three years in South Africa was highly charged politically. I never experienced the like before or after. There never seemed to be an occasion or event that wasn’t about politics and apartheid; not a play, a concert, or social event…

Nelson Mandela and de Klerk are examples of what two individuals can do as leaders. There was every reason to think that South Africa would descend into chaos and interracial strife, but it didn’t. I’d meet trade unionists and activists, and they’d say, “I spent eight years on Robben Island with Mandela,” or “Police killed my brother,” or tell me other horrific personal stories. And yet, Mandela led black South Africans away from revenge. When I see examples in the world where it looks like things might descend into chaos and violence, I think what a difference the right leadership makes.

Source: Amb. John R. Dinger Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)


I think sanctions are really sui generis. It works in some cases. I think it worked in Haiti eventually. Probably hasn't worked in some other places. It worked in South Africa, for sure. Because it convinced people there that the West was serious about getting rid of apartheid. And FW de Klerk recognized it.

Well, he is a pragmatist. His brother, Wimpie De Klerk, who was a professor and a PhD and all of that; a scholar, a writer of books and so on. He wrote a biography of F.W. De Klerk that came out right after De Klerk became president. And in the book, I may have mentioned this before. He said that F.W., his brother F.W. De Klerk had a Damascus Road conversion.
F.W. was furious. He said, "I didn't have a Damascus Road conversion. I'm a Christian, it's not that. What I discovered was the billions that it's costing us to circumvent the sanctions. With that money, we could educate every black in Soweto." So as an economist, he saw things very pragmatically. He believe that apartheid, while it may have served a purpose at some time, was costing too much now. He said "and it's also costing us politically, we're not in the UN. We're not in the African Union. And so we need to get rid of this."

Now, he never ever said it was wrong. He never apologized for it. He simply said, "it doesn't work anymore." That's the kind of pragmatist he was. And I have to say that I was so pleased that both Mandela and De Klerk got the Nobel Prize. They deserve it together. It couldn't have happened with just one of them, there would have been much more bloodshed.

Source: Amb. William Lacy Swing Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)

Amb. Herman (Hank) J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
May 12, 1989 – February 26, 1993

In 1989 some interesting things were happening on the ground in South Africa. … There was a new generation of white Afrikaner leaders in their 50's who were getting ready to take over. These people were much more enlightened and saw that for South Africa to prosper and continue to be a prosperous industrialized country, that the blacks had to be brought into the system.

When we saw that F.W. de Klerk was going to be president of the country…[He and I] had a one-on-one conversation and he told me very frankly that he grew up under apartheid, he made his career under apartheid, he had no apologies for apartheid, but as a new grandfather he saw that unless changes were made, there could be no future for his grandson. Our diplomacy changed from one of putting pressure on them to change the system to working with them to see how they can have a smooth transition.

Source: Amb. Herman J. Cohen Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)

Assistant Secretary Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1981-1989

Between roughly November of ’84 and March of ’85, the urban unrest in South Africa began to grow by the day and the South Africans were handling it very poorly. The Western media were having a field day and were reporting on the daily brutalities in South Africa’s urban areas.
So increasingly my job was to explain to the American people on American television what was going on in South Africa’s urban areas and…why didn’t we support sanctions and so forth…A major movement had gotten underway in this country, led by a number of church and labor and other organizations, to mount protest campaigns on American campuses, as activists arranged media coverage of getting arrested outside the South African embassy on Massachusetts Avenue.

[There] were protests in a lot of places. A lot of campuses, you had protests which pressured the administration of universities to divest shares in companies that were invested in South Africa. So it was like an investment portfolio sanction. Had no impact, really, on South Africa. It had a big impact on American companies… The South Africans didn’t realize on some occasions how deep a hole they were actually in…

The key issue for us [was]…the regional diplomacy and ending the regional wars, the assumption being that you would not see the end of apartheid until the regional wars were concluded. That was our premise going in and yet, by the time we got into these heavy seas, with lots of domestic and international debate, in ’85-’86, as you just said, a lot of people were saying, “Well, you’re talking about Namibia and Angola and Cubans and SWAPO and so forth, but what about the big kahuna?” The big kahuna is apartheid and to explain to people that you have to walk before you run…that was a complicated message. It didn’t fit on a bumper sticker. What fit on a bumper sticker was “Sanctions Now” or “Disinvest Now” or “Down With Constructive Engagement” or whatever you like….

The president supported his lieutenants in supporting his policy, which was, as he defined it, by ’86, it was to prevent sanctions. So he had a very simple approach to this. He saw South Africa as a country that had been an ally in World War Two and in Korea and so forth. He did not think that Marxist terrorists should take over South Africa and I’m sure that there were people around him telling him that’s what the ANC represented, Marxist terrorists….

Source: Assistant Secretary Chester Arthur Crocker Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)

Excerpt: Nelson Mandela’s public statement in Capetown in February 1990, after his release from prison

We have waited too long for our freedom. We can no longer wait. Now is the time to intensify the struggle on all fronts. To relax our efforts now would be a mistake which generations to come will not be able to forgive. The sight of freedom looming on the
horizon should encourage us to redouble our efforts. It is only through disciplined mass action that our victory can be assured.

We call on our white compatriots to join us in the shaping of a new South Africa. The freedom movement is a political home for you too. We call on the international community to continue the campaign to isolate the apartheid regime.

To lift sanctions now would be to run the risk of aborting the process towards the complete eradication of apartheid. Our march to freedom is irreversible. We must not allow fear to stand in our way.

Universal suffrage on a common voters' roll in a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa is the only way to peace and racial harmony.

In conclusion, I wish to quote my own words during my trial in 1964. They are as true today as they were then. I quote: "I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination. I have carried the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunity. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But, if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die."

Source: Nelson Mandela's address in Cape Town on his release from prison, Nelson Mandela Foundation

Hank Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, May 12, 1989 – February 26, 1993

We knew there were going to be very tough negotiations. The minority whites wanting to maintain their economic status, wanting to be protected against real majority rule. So, the whites were not going to give up power without real concessions. Of course, the blacks were saying majority rule means majority rule, things like that, so it was going to be a tough negotiation, and we wanted to be helpful in all of that.

Now, one thing that was much different in South Africa...they did not want mediators. This was true of the whites as well as the blacks. We are all South Africans and we will work it out ourselves, which I thought was encouraging because they shared a common culture... It wasn't like the blacks said you guys are white colonialists and you come from Mars; you are South Africans too; let's work it out. I was very happy with that.

What actually happened was what I call invisible mediation. They started a process called Codesa which was a sort of council of negotiators from the various political parties, the white parties, the ANC, all of the African parties got together in a formalized
negotiating forum where they set up an agenda with all the problems. What kind of government is it going to be. What would the transition period be. What were going to be the powers of the central government and the federal. All these were out on the table for discussion. Human rights situations, bill of rights, all these things were being discussed, grandfather clauses for civil servants, very detailed discussions.

Source: *Amb. Herman J. Cohen Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)*

**Part B excerpts:**
- Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) Oral History excerpts (Lyman, Williams, and Joyi).
- Excerpt of Francis Sejersted, Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, presenting the Nobel Peace Prize to Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk, 1993


In May of that year [1992], the negotiations reached an impasse. The issue was how to develop a new constitution. Both sides had probably gone further than their constituents were prepared to support. Mandela was clearly ahead of his people; he was ready to accept a requirement that 70% of the parliament would be required to approve or amend a new constitution. De Klerk was holding out for 75% – he was assuming that his party would garner more than 25% of the vote in any election. Suddenly, the negotiations broke off. We were facilitators of the process; we were not mediators. In my view, that is what gave the South African settlement its strength. Whatever agreements were reached, they were theirs. Nevertheless, we did play an extremely important role ... We and the British as well as others did everything we could to get the two parties back to the negotiating table.

Mandela and de Klerk finally met towards the end of 1992. They came to an agreement which changed the direction of the negotiations - that instances of violence would not be allowed to interfere with negotiations. That was a key element... The negotiations were resumed at the end of 1992. There were of course a lot of violent incidents. It became the sorest point between Mandela and de Klerk over the next two years but despite all the suspicions, the two parties never again broke off negotiations... At times, de Klerk floated ideas about a veto by the minority. We would say to all that it was acceptable that minorities be protected, but the majority could not be denied the right to govern...We were also very critical of some ANC tendencies to show their power in ways that would provoke violence. We urged them to stop some of the marches they were planning.
We used our resources in our efforts to assist the South African parties to reach agreement. When I arrived, all the aid flowed through non-governmental institutions, [but] many of these NGOs were white-led, raising a lot of resentment in black community. I had an AID director who ... developed procedures that shifted the emphasis and provided assistance to black NGOs. These were the people who would have key roles in the government after the 1994 elections. We funded a lot of conflict resolution processes around the country; that was our way of trying to keep the violence from exploding. We put more than $25 million into the election – voter education, etc. We supported South African election monitors as well as American ones. We also provided experts on every issue that was being negotiated – freedom of speech, federalism, etc. There were American foundations involved – many of them had been working in South Africa since the 1980s. I should mention one other area where we played a significant role [convincing] the right wing, including the security forces, [to] support whatever arrangements might be agreed upon by the government and the ANC. We talked about the dangers of a civil war to an Afrikaner retired general, Constand Viljoen. We sensed that he really cared about his country. He did agonize over what a civil war might do to South Africa. One day, Viljoen called me and asked whether he could trust Mandela. Would he really come through? I assured him that Mandela could be trusted. So he made the decision to participate in the elections.

Source: Amb. Princeton Lyman Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)

**Excerpt: Francis Sejersted, Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, presenting the Nobel Peace Prize to Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk, 1993**

This is the third time the Nobel Committee has awarded the prize to human rights advocates who have actively participated in the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa. There are many reasons why South Africa has attracted so much attention. After the second World War and the fall of the Hitler regime, racism as a system was thoroughly discredited. The general trend was to remove institutionalised racial barriers at the same time as the old colonial empires were being dismantled. But just when this was the general trend, South Africa chose to move in the opposite direction. From 1948 onwards the apartheid regime was consolidated and systematically, through legislation and organisational forms, developed into a brutal regime of oppression based on criteria of race alone. Thus it also became the symbol of a particularly debasing form of oppression. The apartheid regime gave racism a face. When ANC leader Albert Lutuli was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1960, more than a generation ago, he drew attention to the systematic, institutionalised undermining of human equality.
On the eve of the 1990’s the regime reversed its policies under its new president, Frederik Willem de Klerk… It is astonishing what has been achieved since Mandela was released in 1990. The institutionalised apartheid regime has been dismantled, a provisional constitution has been adopted, a broadly based Transitional Executive Council has been established. The date for fully democratic elections has been set. Yet we know that the process is not finished. The danger of setbacks exists. There are groups who are not party to or who have withdrawn from the negotiations. South Africa today is still a society marked by bitterness, fear and violence. The number of people killed while the negotiations have taken place is in the tens of thousands. The vicious circle has not been decisively broken. Thus, there are today two competing trends – conflict and reconciliation. In the ongoing process it is vital that all parties demonstrate their goodwill by doing their utmost to bring the violence to an end. It is also essential that the groups now outside the negotiations are drawn into active participation in the continuing process of reconciliation and compromise.

It is the hope of the Nobel committee that this year’s award will serve as a contribution, however small, for the peaceful development towards complete democracy in South Africa.

Source: The Nobel Peace Prize 1993 (Mandela & F.W. de Klerk) Presentation Speech - NobelPrize.org

Aaron Williams, USAID/South Africa, Mission Director, 1996-1998

Q: You said this emerged out of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Did USAID or the U.S. Government have any involvement with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?

WILLIAMS: Yes, we funded a portion of the TRC’s budget, as did other donors, e.g.: the British, the Canadians. And I traveled and observed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings all over South Africa, which was another amazing South African story. The Commission was national in scope, so they had regional hearings in every region of the nation. Archbishop Tutu, as chairman, would often travel to various regions to chair a specific hearing of national importance. The hearings were very complex and well-planned sessions.

The hearing I vividly remember was held in Paarl, in the Cape Town region, in the heart of the wine country. This beautiful, idyllic part of South Africa had been the locale for terrible, heinous crimes during the apartheid era.

I took (U.S. State Department) Assistant Secretary for Human Rights (Democracy, Human Rights and Labor) John (Howard Francis Shattuck) to attend one of the
hearings. After serving in the Clinton administration, he became director of the JFK (former U.S. president John F. Kennedy) Library in Boston. Susan Rice, then the Asst Secretary of State for Africa, as I recall also accompanied him to this hearing.

The hearing was at a local school. They had the stage in the auditorium surrounded by flowers. The families of the victims and the perpetrators were seated in separate sections of the hall. The process allowed the accused to present themselves to apologize and express their contrition for what they had done, and ask for reconciliation and amnesty. Translators were present to manage the five major languages of South Africa, and the hearing used simultaneous translations. Psychologists were on the scene to deal with the anticipated emotional breakdown of the accused and/or the victims’ families during and after the testimony.

Q: Wow.

WILLIAMS: Obviously, heavy security was in place. It was a surreal setting.

In this case, Archbishop Tutu chaired the hearing. This was a case where a young black man had disappeared in Paarl region, and his family wanted to know what had happened to him in the 1980s. He had gone out drinking with his friends in a bar. He never came home—he had disappeared ten years ago.

The local police commander of the squadron that killed him came forward to testify and admit to his guilt. Turns out that the young man that they killed was not an anti-apartheid activist. He was just in the wrong place at the wrong time in that bar. They killed him and buried his body by the river. The policeman pointed out where the body was so that his remains could be recovered. The man’s widow was there with his children. A tragedy, one of hundreds of thousands that occurred during the apartheid era.

In the second case the accused were an ANC (African National Congress) cadre that had kidnapped an Afrikaans policemen, then tortured and killed him. After that they tossed the body in a pit, never to be recovered. These men came forward and testified and described the events of that night. They asked for amnesty, and of course the victim’s family was present in the hall.

And so we took a break after two hours of these, heavy-duty emotions.

We went to a break room to join Archbishop Tutu and the rest of his commission for coffee, and to remove ourselves from this situation for a short break. The Archbishop
was just crying, due to the emotional toll that this had taken on him. But he also said that these were also tears not just of sorrow, but of joy because people were confronting their demons in a way that could improve the greater society.

It was just one of the most emotional, heart wrenching days that I had ever experienced, and I believe that it was the same for most of us in that school that day.

Q: Hm.

WILLIAMS: No country has been able to replicate the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s process with the effectiveness of the South African authorities.

Source: Aaron Williams Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)

Monica Joyi, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions Office, 1996-1997

Q: Whose idea was it?

JOYI: I guess it must have been a collective coming from the President...I think more the President, President Mandela and his cabinet –

Q: It didn’t just come out of nowhere, there was; they didn’t invent it did they? They drew from sources, some precedents, how did this idea come into being?

JOYI: Well from my understanding it was more to show the rest of the world, which was waiting for the other shoe to drop because this ‘new’ South Africa was perceived as impossible, this whole transfer of power had gone over so peaceably that something else was expected to happen.

I think [the establishment of TRC] was to appease the fears of white South Africans; but at the same time, to give answers to those many mothers who had lost their children and their loved ones through the atrocities of apartheid. If you look at the whole notion of amnesty, and how the perpetrators (some of them) were granted amnesty, you begin to wonder what a forgiving nation and black South Africans are specifically.

The Archbishop Desmond Tutu was also the Chairperson. He saw it more as a catharsis for the nation so that post-1994, you have this cleansing process for the nation. But the whole process of the Truth Commission was developed as part of the Reconciliation and National Unity Act to redress the atrocities of the past, including violations of human rights, and more importantly, to restore a level of dignity to the
majority of South Africans who lived under the draconian laws of apartheid. I believe it was the first of its kind in the world.

Q: What was it that convinced the perpetrators to be present in a process that could likely turn against them?

JOYI: I think there is something about one’s conscience, which eats at you...all of those perpetrators, I want to believe, did not sleep peacefully at night and they wanted to. If there’s something troubling you, you want to get it off your chest….

People came because it was part of that….that euphoria, that liberating process, where you were in an environment where the majority of our people were under this law of apartheid and it gets dismantled--and I still maintain that whole process started in 1976 when our youth decided enough was enough. [As] the late [African National Congress] ANC President Oliver Tambo once said, “We have no more cheeks to turn.” And so, here you are with peace-loving communities and a people who have had this liberation start for them for the first time…. It is almost that the TRC had to happen and I think that period must have given those individuals a way to come clean, regardless what would happen at the end.

If you look at the incident with Amy Biehl, the Fulbright student who was murdered in one of our townships in Cape Town, that [reconciliation] process is how her parents embraced these men, these perpetrators, responsible for the death of their daughter. [Note: Biehl, herself an anti-apartheid activist, was murdered by a group of anti-apartheid extremists.] You begin to see how cathartic that process was, listening to the parents, and how these young men went to meet with Amy’s parents asking forgiveness. Instead of her parents turning their backs on these young men, they embraced them….for me that epitomizes what the TRC process was all about. To me, the purpose of the TRC started as a path leading to forgiveness.

Q: Were there instances of perpetrators who resisted or refused to be part of the process?

JOYI: Yes, there were and again I would add that while they do exist there was not any real focus on them, there was more focus on the individuals, who came and the example I gave earlier with Amy Biehl, and also there were other individuals, white former security policemen, who appeared before the amnesty committee and again I would think that their conscious drove them to appear before the committees.
Q: The force of personality of Desmond Tutu, tell us how that’s a factor in the success of the TRC.

JOYI: Well as Desmond Tutu is an icon, he is a Nobel Peace Prize winner and he was also the former Archbishop of the Anglican Church in South Africa, he also participated in the marches and demonstrations, also led them with other religious leaders. I think he had the right fit to lead such a process.

…. [But] I thought of the parents, especially the mothers, how their wounds would be reopened and I was always concerned about the aftermath. Who goes home with these mothers? Who goes home with these parents? Was there a support system in place once these families returned to their communities? If there was, I was not aware of it. But personally, I was just critical about that particular aspect of the process.

That it is a cathartic experience, I accepted that, but the reality for me is here you are appearing before the Commission, you talk about your loss of a son, a husband, a wife, a daughter, and you bare your soul, and you cry your eyes out, and you leave the confines of that meeting. And you return home…What happens to that individual? Who holds his or her hand? Who is there to console them? Personally, that bothered me.

Q: Do you not think that, looking at the TRC, I think the main idea--from what just simple research shows--that it’s kind of searching; giving these mothers a chance to kind of say this was done to my family and I?

JOYI: I agree with that.

Q: But do you not think it was a sense of closure that they got?

JOYI: I do not know.

Source: Monica Joyi Oral History, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)
HANDOUT: Negotiation of New South African Democracy and Constitution
Group A Prompt: Nelson Mandela/ANC Perspective

Objective: To achieve a new negotiated constitution that creates a peaceful transition to majority rule.

Background Information: After F.W. de Klerk’s election as State President of South Africa in August 1989, he took steps to legally abolish key aspects of apartheid. Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990. Negotiations began in 1990 but took another several years before a new constitution was ratified and elections occurred in 1994. Imagine you are considering these talks in 1990 and that you need to prepare a negotiating position. This position should allow you to gain your ultimate objective of majority rule, while allaying the concerns of the white South African population that in a full democracy, where they are so outnumbered, they would be subject to second class citizenship, seizure of their land and businesses, or violent retribution for past human rights abuses.

Some issues to consider in developing your negotiation strategy (your demands and areas in which you could compromise).

- What bottom line “rules” for elections and for the new government system are necessary to ensure that there will be true majority rule democracy?
- What institutions or policies can you agree to that will allay the fears of the white South Africans that they will be persecuted or in danger afterward?
- How will you allay the grievances of nonwhite South Africans against their former oppressors? Will Truth and Reconciliation Commissions truly be enough?
- Should the negotiations continue if the government continues to incite black-on-black violence? If so, how will you keep the negotiations going?
- Should you support mediation by third parties like the African Union, the UN, or the United States to ensure that the South African government negotiates in good faith?
HANDOUT: Negotiation of New South African Democracy and Constitution
Group B Prompt: Government Perspective

Objective: To achieve a new negotiated constitution that creates a peaceful transition to majority rule.

Background Information: After F.W. de Klerk’s election as State President of South Africa in August 1989, he took steps to legally abolish key aspects of apartheid. Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990. Prior to his release, President de Klerk spent long hours with him trying to understand whether his vision of a united, peaceful majority rule South Africa was sincere. After his release, negotiations began but took another several years before a new constitution was ratified and elections occurred in 1994. Imagine you are considering your position for talks in 1990 over a new government system and that you need to prepare a negotiating position. White South Africans have concerns that under majority rule, because they are so outnumbered, they would be subject to second class citizenship, seizure of their land and businesses, or violent retribution for past human rights abuses.

Some issues to consider in developing your negotiation strategy (your demands and areas in which you could compromise).

- Are you legitimately committed to the negotiations, or do you prefer to stall?
- What kinds of protections do you seek for White South Africans, to ensure their safety and security after the move to true majority rule democracy?
- What kinds of institutions can be developed to assure your stakeholders that a new majority government would not take violent reprisal for the decades of apartheid?
- How will you satisfy or neutralize extremist supporters of apartheid, who are calling for civil war to maintain their position?
- Are Truth and Reconciliation Commissions a good idea?
- Should the negotiations continue if violence erupts?
- Should you support mediation by third parties like the African Union, the UN or the United States to ensure that the ANC negotiates in good faith?
Consider the preamble to South Africa’s constitution (below).

How successful were you in obtaining something similar? (Don’t blame yourself if you weren’t; it took the original negotiators several years.) If not, why not?

**Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 - Preamble**

We, the people of South Africa,
Recognise the injustices of our past;
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to

- Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights;
- Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law;
- Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and
- Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.

May God protect our people.

Nkosi Sikelel’iAfrika. Morena boloka setjhaba sa heso.
God seeën Suid-Afrika. God bless South Africa.
Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afurika. Hosi katekisa Afrika.
Circle of Viewpoints

A routine for exploring perspectives.

1. Brainstorm a list of difference perspectives.

2. Choose one perspective to explore, using these sentence starters:
   - I am thinking of ... the topic ... from the viewpoint of ... the viewpoint you've chosen
   - I think ... describe the topic from your viewpoint. Be an actor—take on the character of your viewpoint
   - A question I have from this viewpoint is ... ask a question from this viewpoint

**Purpose:** What kind of thinking does this routine encourage?
This routine helps students see and explore multiple perspectives. It helps them understand that different people can have different kinds of connections to the same thing, and that these different connections influence what people see and think.

**Application:** When and where can it be used?
The routine works well with topics and artworks that deal with complex issues. It also works well when students are having a hard time seeing other perspectives or when things seem like there are only two sides to an issue. The routine can be used to open discussions about dilemmas and other controversial issues.
Circle of Viewpoints

Directions: Choose 3 people whose oral history excerpts you have read, or famous historical figures, and label each part of the circle. Give their perspectives, using this prompt:

1. “I am thinking of apartheid from the viewpoint of _________________.
2. As ________________, I think ___________________.
3. One question I have is ____________________.”