The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR RAYMOND C. EWING

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is November 29, 1993. This is an interview with Ambassador Raymond C. Ewing. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Well, to begin with, could we have a little bit about your background--where you came from, a bit about your family and early education, your childhood, and so forth.

EWING: I was born in Cleveland, Ohio, [on September 7,1936]. My family and I moved to California when I was 7 years old, during World War II. My father was a Presbyterian minister. He had been pastor of a church in the Cleveland, Ohio, area and then became the Presbyterian University pastor at the University of California at Berkeley. We moved there in 1943, were there for six years, and then moved to Santa Cruz, California, where he became pastor of a local church. I graduated from high school in Santa Cruz and went on to Occidental College in Los Angeles.

Q: You graduated from high school when--in about...

EWING: I graduated in 1953. During World War II my recollection is that there was an effort to get children through school as quickly as possible. I suppose that the idea was that if the war was still going on, they could be drafted into the service. I skipped second grade. When I arrived in Berkeley and went into the second grade class, the teacher began asking questions. I realized that I had used the same book in first grade in Ohio. So I put my hand up, and the next thing I knew, I was in third grade. So I finished high school when I was 16.

Q: So then you went to Occidental College. What prompted you to go to Occidental?

EWING: Well, both my father and my grandfather had gone to Princeton University. I very much thought of myself as part of the West and didn't particularly like the idea of going all the way East, across the country. Occidental is a coed school, a small, liberal arts college. It has a Presbyterian history, and it was really for that reason that I applied to go there. I wanted a small, liberal arts college. At least in those days there weren't all that many to choose from in California. I didn't particularly want to go either to the University of California in Berkeley or to Stanford University.

Q: That was the choice you had at that time.

EWING: Well, in Northern California it really was. There were a few Catholic schools. I had lived on the Berkeley campus. I felt I knew it. And as I had identified myself pretty well with the University of California, I didn't particularly like the idea of going to Stanford, its main rival. My only choices in California at that time involved going to Southern California. There was not yet a campus of the University of California at Santa Cruz in the 1950's. I was very happy with Occidental College.

Q: What was your field of concentration, your major subject at Occidental?

EWING: I majored in history, with particular emphasis on modern history, both Europe and the Far East.

Q: Did you find that as you were at a West Coast university, you probably paid a bit more attention to the Far East than, perhaps, you would have gotten...

EWING: I think so. One of our history professors had been in the Chinese Nationalist Government and had come from China shortly after World War II. He certainly had a lot of interesting experiences in China. We studied quite a bit about Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Indochina, etc.

Q: So you graduated when?

EWING: I graduated in 1957.

Q: So this was in the middle of the Eisenhower period. You were a member of the so-called "silent generation" or whatever it was, with everyone very interested in getting on with his or her career. That is, at least, a common caricature of the period.

EWING: That's certainly the picture that people have of that period. I think that in many ways my experiences at my campus were, perhaps, a little bit different. For example, in my senior year Rev. James Robinson from New York City came to speak to us for a week. He had a vision which he presented to our student body of what he called "Crossroads Africa"--the idea of sending young people, that is, college students or recent graduates, to participate in work camps or projects in Africa and get to know the people of Africa. Our student body got so enthusiastic after only a week of listening to him that we committed ourselves to send 10 students, raise all the funds, and provide all of the necessary support for the following year, which would have been 1958. I think that that shows that we were interested in things well beyond our campus.

My interest in the Foreign Service had a number of different sources although it was not something that I had always wanted to do from high school.

Q: How did you become interested in going into the Foreign Service?

EWING: Well, as I say, I think it was a combination of several things. One of my other history professors had been in the Foreign Service for a brief period shortly after World War II, following his military service in Italy. He had positive recollections of his experience, although he, himself, very much wanted to be a history professor, a scholar. Another professor was very interested in contemporary Europe and in efforts to integrate Europe, which ultimately led to the Common Market. And I mentioned the professor who had had a lot of experience in government in Asia. So that was one aspect. Plus the fact that I had an international relations professor who was an extremely enthusiastic teacher. I think that through contact with all of these teachers I became interested in the Foreign Service. A recruiter came to the campus, which added to my interest.

My father had pastorates in several places in the United States, but before he went to seminary, he had taken a short term teaching position in Beirut at the preparatory school of the American University. He taught algebra. In many ways, that was one of the most formative experiences of his life. As a result, I often heard him talk about the Middle East and about his friends in Beirut. For example, he went to a reception at the time of the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945. A number of the delegates at the reception had been to the American University in Beirut. He was glad to be there, even though he never went overseas again until he and my mother visited me at my first post [in Tokyo]. He had a keen interest in world affairs. We read "Time" magazine. To the extent that you could keep informed in the San Francisco area, we did so.

Q: How did you get into the Foreign Service or the State Department?

EWING: During the late fall or winter of my senior year in college I took the written examination and passed it. The oral exam was then given periodically on the West Coast. I took that in Los Angeles in the spring of my senior year--it must have been around April, about Easter time.

Q: What year was this?

EWING: It would have been 1957. I had an opportunity to come into the Foreign Service and did so in October, 1957. Actually, I entered the Foreign Service about two months after my 21st birthday. At the time I think that I was the youngest Foreign Service Officer. I figured that [Secretary of State] John Foster Dulles was probably the oldest man in the State Department at that time.

Q: You came into a Foreign Service class, I guess. How was the initial training? Can you personify the class and what type of people were in it?

EWING: We had three women out of about 26 people in the class, I believe. There were no members of ethnic minority groups. Perhaps three or four of us were in our early 20's, just out of undergraduate school, and about the same number were pushing the upper age limit, which I think was then 31, or something like that, at the time you actually entered. The rest were somewhere in between. I think that a handful of the members of the class were married. Probably half of the class was not married. We came from all parts of the country--from the Ivy League, from the West, like me, while others were from other regions, too.

Q: Looking back on it, how was the training at that time? You were at the Foreign Service Institute. How did you feel about it?

EWING: The initial course, as I recall, was about 12 weeks in length. It was essentially an orientation program. I think that most of us were not terribly satisfied with it, but on the other hand I knew so little about the State Department and really about the Foreign Service. To step back just a minute, while I was interested in the Foreign Service--I had taken the examination and I mentioned some of the reasons why I was interested--I really wasn't at all sure that this was the career that I wanted. I was 21, I really wasn't ready to go to Graduate School, and I thought that I'd been studying pretty intensively for a long time. I certainly had in the back of my mind going to Graduate School. I didn't really want to go into the military, and at that point the draft wasn't too pressing. This was the period between Korea and Vietnam. I decided that I would go into the Foreign Service and give it a try. I had the idea that I would have a period of training and then would immediately go overseas. I was given the impression that this was the pattern at that time.

What happened was that I had this period of orientation, which lasted for three months, and then I was assigned to German language training. I did not know a foreign language at the proper level of competence when I came into the Foreign Service. I'd studied some German in college, and German seemed a reasonable language to study. I thought that the language training was fine--really excellent. I was very impressed with it and I have been ever since, with the emphasis on oral communication and the ability to comprehend and communicate.

At the end of this training, though, instead of being sent to Germany, Switzerland, or Austria, I was told that there was another priority, and that was a chronic one. They felt that they had a dearth of economic officers. While I hadn't any particularly extensive training--I'd taken a couple of economics courses in college--I was asked to go into an intern program which essentially consisted of training in the economic function. The idea was to spend 16 months in four different parts of the Economic Bureau, working in different areas. Well, I worked for four months in the Commercial Policy Branch and had started an assignment in the Economic Development Division.

Then I was asked to fill a vacancy as a staff assistant in the office of the Assistant Secretary.

Q: Was this the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs?

EWING: Yes.

Q: Who was it?

EWING: Tom Mann. Thomas Mann was the Assistant Secretary. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs at that time was Tom Beale. I tended to work more with Tom Beale in the early period. There were two staff assistants. We sort of paired off, to some extent, with the Assistant Secretary and the single Deputy Assistant Secretary. I wound up staying in that job for the better part of a year.

Q: I'm still doing an interview with Michael Smith, who also worked with Thomas Mann. I'm not sure if it was at this period. How did you find Thomas Mann--what was your impression of his method of operation, as seen from your particular viewpoint?

EWING: I had a lot of respect for him. I didn't feel that he had a very deep and broad experience in the economic function. I tended to think of him more as a political officer with a special interest in Latin America. He brought that approach to his work as Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. On the other hand that part of it was probably fine, because in many ways the State Department doesn't necessarily have to have extensive economic expertise. It needs to be able to put things in a proper, political context. I really tended to work more with Tom Beale. By contrast he had a very deep and strong trade background.

Q: What was his background?

EWING: He had been in the Office of International Trade. He went from the Economic Bureau to London as Economic Minister. He did a lot of work on trade negotiations. He was technically more able in the trade area than Tom Mann.

Q: Did you get any feel how the Economic Bureau operated in trade matters? You had the Department of Commerce, the Treasury, and all that. We're talking about the period around 1957-58.

EWING: Yes. I started in the Economic Bureau in 1958 and was there till 1959. My recollection at that time was that it was still a very strong bureau. There were a number of people who were very respected and talented. In many ways they were more "powerful" or prominent, if you will, in the making of economic policy than the Commerce or Treasury Departments. My recollection is that, to some extent, those other agencies became stronger as the State Department lost some of its capability. Or, to put it another way, the issues became more technical, more complex, and more demanding. The other agencies improved their capabilities and therefore their role in dealing with the economic aspects of our foreign policy.

One of the interesting developments during that period was that the State Department had not yet completed the construction of its expanded new building, so that the only parts of the Economic Bureau in the main State Department building were the offices of the Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Assistant Secretary, their two secretaries, and the two staff assistants. Everyone else in the bureau was a block or so away in the Munitions Building on Constitution Avenue. While we were very junior officers, it was very important that we could communicate to the rest of the staff in the other offices--and, vice versa, through us. So I enjoyed that part of it. It wasn't just a matter of shuffling papers and filing work.

Q: How did you find the economic training when they started you in this job? Were you picking up economics more or less by osmosis?

EWING: Well, the theory was that through practical experience and by osmosis we would pick up training allowing us to become economic and commercial officers. I don't think that it worked very well in my case, although this process made me more excited about the Foreign Service and the State Department, because I was really impressed with the kind of issues we were dealing with, and how important they were. I think that even before I left that job for my first overseas assignment, I was much more committed, interested, and enthusiastic than I had been when I actually entered. But in terms of economic knowledge, skills, and analytical ability, I don't think that I really got much from the initial internship in the Economic Affairs Bureau.

Q: Well, there really isn't any way to do that except by the academic process.

EWING: I think that the academic process is of fundamental importance in giving you a foundation, a basis for then coming to grips with the issues. On the other hand I learned how the Department works and the role of the various bureaus. I certainly was much more comfortable with Washington at the end of the two years than I would have been otherwise. I think that that helped me in my overseas assignments and when I came back to Washington the next time.

Q: This is, of course, one of the areas where the staff officer's job is so important. I know that I had never had such an assignment before and I never felt comfortable with Washington, particularly early on in my career. I think that such an assignment later on is better for one's career prospects. However, an early assignment like this is an excellent, learning experience.

EWING: About half of my total career has been spent in Washington. I think that I look back on Washington assignments in a positive way--all of them that I've had. I think that part of the reason is that I had that first experience of working 16 months in the Economic Bureau--not just the FSI training period, because I think that that was less important. The experience gave me a positive mind set about Washington.

Q: Your first assignment overseas was to, what, Tokyo? You were there from 1959 to 1962. Is that it?

EWING: Yes, it was from 1959 to 1961. Tokyo, in many ways, seemed like kind of an odd assignment, the kind of assignment that we would not be giving in the 1980's or 1990's, I hope. I had had German language training, and there I was, sent to Tokyo. I can't explain why I went to Tokyo. I think that the circumstances under which I learned about going to Tokyo were sort of interesting and perhaps indicative of the times. I was playing on a softball team--actually the FSI [Foreign Service Institute] softball team--and I got a hit and ran to first base. The first baseman on the other team was from the Bureau of Personnel, or, at any rate, he worked in Personnel. He said to me something like, "Hey, that was a good hit, but I hear you got a good assignment." I said, "Oh?" He said, "Yes, I think it's Tokyo." And that's the way it turned out. So I didn't have a chance to use my German and went to Tokyo without any Japanese language or any other kind of specific training or preparation for that assignment. I went as a commercial officer, so that, in a sense, followed up on my experience in the Economics Bureau.

I also was able to go a month earlier than was originally planned, at the request of Tom Beale, who at that time headed the United States delegation to the meeting of the Contracting Parties of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], which was having its first meeting on that side of the world. It really was the first international conference of any consequence which Japan had hosted since the end of World War II. It was a major event as far as the Japanese were concerned. My first office in Tokyo was in the old Imperial Hotel building, where our delegation was quartered. This was the first great earthquake-proof hotel, designed by Frank Lloyd Wright, which was eventually torn down to give way to a high-rise building. That's how I spent the first period of my assignment in Tokyo.

Q: You were there first under Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, and then Edward Reischauer was the chief of mission. This was your first overseas post and experience. What was your impression of the Embassy when you got there?

EWING: My initial impression was very limited, because I had very little to do with the Embassy during the first month. I was part of the [GATT] delegation, which gave me a wonderful opportunity to experience Tokyo and an international conference. The Japanese were wonderful hosts. They took us on several tours. I went on a tour to the "Ajinomoto" food additive factory which made monosodium glutamate. We were even interviewed on television, we were such a sensation.

Then I went into the Commercial Section [of the Embassy]. I felt that I was a very small piece of a very, very large puzzle. It seemed like such a large Embassy. I enjoyed the commercial work but I was only in that job for about three or four months, because in 1960 the Embassy became totally preoccupied with a planned visit by President Eisenhower, scheduled for June, 1960. I was asked in March, 1960, or thereabouts, to come and work in Ambassador MacArthur's office. The staff aide to Ambassador MacArthur, whose name was Bob German, was completely occupied with preparations for the President's visit. The Ambassador felt that he needed somebody else to help with everything else. I was brought into the office to do that. Then, when President Eisenhower's visit was ultimately canceled, Bob German was given an opportunity to take some leave. Ambassador MacArthur had gotten used to the idea of having two staff assistants, and a conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union was coming up in Tokyo. The long and short of it was that I stayed in that job for most of the rest of my time in Japan.

Q: You had a pretty good view of how this Eisenhower trip was canceled. Was there concern about anti-American demonstrations and all that? How did this work out?

EWING: Certainly, it was a time of great tension and there was a lot of strong, anti-American feelings, particularly on the part of the university students. It was really related more to the negotiation and signing of the U. S.-Japan Security Treaty, which they saw, in effect, as a continuation of the American occupation which included the risk that Japan would be involved in some future war because of the presence of American forces in Japan. I think that the Eisenhower visit became a symbol of their frustration and anger. It wasn't the visit so much, per se, that was the problem. There would have been demonstrations, there would have been strong feelings expressed even if there had been no presidential visit coming up. There were university students continually in the streets around the Embassy. I certainly didn't feel any threat, any danger, any anti-American feeling directed at me and I don't think that any of us in the Embassy did. It was all kind of half policy and half what U. S. Forces represented than opposition to us as individuals.

Q: Was there a feeling of "let down" or unhappiness at the fact that the President didn't come? Was this seen as a blow at the United States?

EWING: There was certainly a feeling of "let down" and disappointment on the part of those of us who had been preparing for the visit. I don't know how many scenarios and schedules we prepared, but we'd been working for months, preparing for the visit. So it was certainly a disappointment that it didn't take place. I think that we were not all particularly surprised that the decision was made to cancel the visit. President Eisenhower was actually on a trip to the Far East and was in the Philippines when he decided that he would not come to Japan. But prior to that there had been an advance visit by Jim Hagerty and Tom Stevens, the press spokesman and appointments secretary to the President, respectively. Their visit to Tokyo was a very scary experience for them.

Q: Rocks were thrown at their car [by a crowd]. Were you involved in that?

EWING: I was not at the airport. I remember being at a meeting in the conference room at the Embassy after they came in from the airport. They were quite shaken by the whole experience. I remember picking up a note afterwards that had been written by one of them to the other, referring to a rock that had apparently come through the window. The note said that this rock should be put with their collection along with a rock thrown at them in Kabul [Afghanistan] in a demonstration during a previous visit. There certainly was great relief that they were not hurt and that the incident wasn't worse. I think that if we had known what was going to happen over the next 30 years or so, the visit would have been canceled far earlier than it was, because there certainly were great risks. Rocks were thrown at the car, as you said.

Q: Ambassador MacArthur was the nephew of Gen Douglas MacArthur. He had the reputation of being a very demanding person. One can't avoid mentioning the fact that his wife was known as one of the "Dragons of the Foreign Service." How did you find this?

We're trying to get a feel for "life in the Foreign Service," as well as the political considerations. I would have thought that this would have been, for a young officer, a rather difficult and vulnerable position. How did you find that?

EWING: Mrs. MacArthur--Wahwee--was certainly a demanding and difficult person. But I was unmarried. I think she probably looked at me, in a way, as her son, or nephew, or something like that. We always had a friendly and cordial relationship. She never yelled at me or made life difficult for me in any way. On the contrary, several times they hosted small functions for the immediate staff of the Ambassador which went beyond what they really were expected or needed to do. They were very nice--birthdays and times like that. I tend to think that Ambassador MacArthur was the right kind of ambassador for the United States to have in Japan at that particular time. The key thing was to stabilize the security relationship with Japan and the role of the U. S. Armed Forces in Japan. Ambassador Reischauer was exactly the right person to follow him. Reischauer was much more attuned to Japanese history, culture, and personality and less convinced that the military relationship was the most important aspect. He felt that there was a much broader role that the United States could play in Japan.

Q: Both these ambassadors had extra "clout," you might say. Ambassador MacArthur was very close to President Eisenhower because he had been his Political Adviser at one point during World War II. Ambassador Reischauer was a professor at Harvard and close to President Kennedy.

EWING: That's true, although Ambassador MacArthur, in his previous positions, had certainly had contacts with a wide range of people. I remember that, shortly after President Kennedy's election, there was a very warm exchange of letters between them. They had known each other over a long period of time. I think that Ambassador MacArthur may have known President Kennedy as well or better than he knew Vice President Nixon. As you say, his service and his own background, in many ways, were more in Europe where Eisenhower...

Q: John Kennedy had stayed in MacArthur's house in France when his father [was Ambassador to England].

EWING: I didn't know that, but I knew that they had known each other for a long time. I don't know how close Ambassador Reischauer's personal relationship with President Kennedy had been although obviously there was a Harvard connection.

Q: How about the way Ambassador MacArthur ran the Embassy? You were, I guess, his "point man" in that respect.

EWING: He was very strong and even overbearing, in many ways, with people in the Embassy. I think that the further you were from him, the more you may have felt that. He tended to work a lot through Bill Leonhart, the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission], who was also very strong and, in many ways, also a difficult personality. If Ambassador MacArthur had people that needed to be dealt with or new projects that needed to be undertaken, he probably would use the DCM as much as he would the staff aide, who tended to be more involved with visitors, shuffled papers, did the minutes of meetings, and that sort of thing.

Q: Did you perform the same function when Ambassador Reischauer was there, or did you cover much of his period?

EWING: Reischauer came in 1961. I don't recall the month, but I think that it was roughly in June, 1961, after the Kennedy administration had entered office. Ambassador MacArthur left, I think, in about April, 1961. One of the things that I remember about the transition was that the request for agrément for Ambassador Reischauer arrived in the Embassy on a Sunday morning. Ambassador MacArthur was leaving by ship that afternoon from Yokohama. The request for agrément was addressed to the "chargé d'affaires." Ambassador MacArthur came into the Embassy that morning, his last day in Japan, in his usual, workaholic spirit to see what telegrams needed attention. He saw [the request for agrément for Ambassador Reischauer] and was furious, feeling that people in Washington were moving too quickly, before he had a chance to leave. He let the State Department know that. In any event, there was a period of six weeks to two months when Bill Leonhart was chargé d'affaires.

I worked for Ambassador Reischauer until about September, 1961, and then moved briefly to the Consulate General in Yokohama before leaving Japan in early December, 1961. Ambassador Reischauer brought a staff assistant with him from Harvard University, a kind of scholar-graduate student. There was a feeling, as far as I was concerned, that it was time for a change. They also brought in a staff aide from elsewhere in the Embassy. Actually, he came from the Consulate in Osaka to give more continuity with the new political appointee's staff aide. During the couple of months that I spent in Yokohama I had my only opportunity to do consular work during my career in the Foreign Service.

Q: What was your impression of Japan? What were you getting from people you were working with who were dealing with the Japanese? What was the feeling about how the Japanese system operated?

EWING: I think that by that time the immediate post-war period was over, and there weren't many signs of rubble or damage left over from World War II. The Japanese Foreign Ministry and Government were beginning to function again and to display more self confidence. The GATT Conference I mentioned was their first international "coming out." A delegation headed by George Ball came to Tokyo to initiate steps toward having Japan join the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. A decision had been made that Japan would host the Olympic Games in 1964. So we were really at the beginning of the next period of Japanese economic expansion, dynamism, and growth. As far as the Japanese Government was concerned, I had a lot of dealings with my counterparts, the private secretaries to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. I certainly found them very effective and easy to work with. These people were primarily from the Japanese Diplomatic Service, so their English was excellent. In most cases they had served previously in the United States. I didn't have a particularly wide range of contacts among the Japanese, but those I did get to know--I taught some students English--I certainly was impressed with. Several of the problems which have since emerged in the Japanese political system weren't apparent at that time. That came much, much later with the Liberal Democratic Party.

Q: Then you left Japan in 1962?

EWING: I left in late 1961.

Q: 1961. And your next assignment involved your going at last to a German speaking country?

EWING: I was assigned to Vienna with the United States Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. I was the junior officer among a resident staff in Vienna of five officers. I was married between leaving Tokyo and arriving in Vienna.

Q: Had you met your wife before?

EWING: My wife and I had known each other at Occidental College in Los Angeles. She was a year behind me and then became an elementary school teacher in southern California. In the summer of 1961 she decided to participate in a work camp organized by the World Council of Churches in Korea. She planned to take an American President Lines [APL] ship from San Francisco to Yokohama, spend some time in Japan, and then go on to her work assignment in Korea. She wrote to me. We had dated to some extent in college and had had some contact but were completely out of touch for a period of time. She wrote to me and said, "I don't know if you're still in Tokyo or if you would have any time, but I'm going to be coming through and maybe we could have a cup of coffee and see each other again." I wrote back and said that I would love to do that. It would be great. I said, "By coincidence, my parents and sister will be on the same APL ship. They're coming to visit me, and I've arranged to take some time off and take a trip through Kyoto, the Inland Sea, and southern Japan. Maybe you'd like to come along." She replied that she would be glad to do that. I met her at the ship. Of course, I hadn't told my parents this. They were delighted. That's how we got reacquainted.

She stopped in Japan again after the six weeks or so she was in Korea before flying home. We decided to get married in January, 1962.

Q: So you were in Vienna from 1962 to 1964. How did we regard the operations of the IAEA?

EWING: The IAEA was still quite a new agency in the United Nations system. It really came out of President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" initiative. It was established in Vienna in the late 1950's and had not been there very long. So part of what we were involved with was essentially helping it through its initial phase, getting it organized and staffed, beginning programs of technical assistance in developing countries and holding international conferences. So a lot of it was fairly routine, administrative work. Part of it, though, was the initial negotiation of steps leading toward a nuclear safeguards system to make sure that the peaceful applications of atomic energy did not lap over into military uses. There were a lot of strong, political overtones to much of what went on in the IAEA, both in terms of the Cold War and relationships with the Soviet Union, but also with the developing countries. They were trying to assert their rights to make sure that they did not lose out in this organization which, in many ways, they saw as dominated by the United States and the Western European countries. There were issues relating to South Africa, which was a very important part of the IAEA Board of Governors in those days.

Q: What about the Soviet Union? I would have thought that this would be one place where we were very strong allies, or did it work out that way?

EWING: As to an alliance between us and the Soviet Union, this was probably too strong a word to use for the IAEA in those days. We certainly had some common interests and were able to continue a dialogue on issues within the agency throughout that period. On the other hand, it was also the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which, of course, was followed to some extent by a period of limited détente. We were very much affected by what was happening elsewhere in the world, but we did have an ongoing dialogue with the Soviets in Vienna. There was probably as cordial and productive a relationship with them as anywhere else in the world.

Q: What was your impression of how the Soviets dealt with this organization at this time?

EWING: I think that they took it seriously. They saw it, certainly, as an opportunity to score political points, but I think also that, as they had their own atomic energy program and wanted to use that in some of the developing countries, they saw opportunities to make some gains, if you will, through the agency. They had Soviet personnel in some key positions in the agency. It also was a time when Vienna was a place for interaction with the West in many respects, not just the IAEA, although the IAEA was of considerable importance for both of our countries. We put a fair amount of money into the IAEA and had some Americans in key positions in the Secretariat of the agency.

Q: Well, this was also a period which extended for quite some time. Atomic energy for peaceful purposes was considered the wave of the future, wasn't it?

EWING: We were probably pretty naive in some of the ways we looked at atomic energy, not sufficiently taking into account the health and safety aspects and the potential for proliferation of nuclear weapons. Not enough attention was paid to the possibility of accidents like the Chernobyl affair, nor did we anticipate that at that time. There were some very good people involved in the IAEA. Vyacheslav Molotov [long time Soviet Foreign Minister] was actually the Soviet representative on the Board of Governors at the time I went there, except that he was never in Vienna. He was recalled to Moscow, and there were rumors that he was returning for the next meeting or the next session. He never did come again to Vienna and eventually was replaced by somebody else.

Q: How about the French? The French have always seemed to be the "odd man out" in our Alliance in various aspects. The French have gone in heavily for atomic energy projects. How did we view the French at this particular time?

EWING: We had a good, cordial relationship with the French in Vienna. However, EURATOM [European Atomic Energy Commission], of course, was already in existence. However, in many ways, I think that the French played a much more independent role as far as the European partners were concerned--as much with them as with us. We weren't the only ones for whom the French caused some difficulty. They were very talented, very able, very serious in the IAEA, as I recall.

Q: Two of the countries which became real problems later on were India and Israel. Did problems with them begin to loom at this particular time or not?

EWING: I don't remember very much about Israel. India and Pakistan were both extremely active in the IAEA. I don't recall any particular apprehension or fear that India--or, for that matter, Pakistan--were going to involve themselves in an atomic bomb program. The head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, always came for the key meetings of the IAEA. There was also a Pakistani, who was also internationally renowned as a theoretical physicist and who was extremely active in the agency. Of the countries that were the most active I remember particularly India and Pakistan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, and the United States--and that was about it. A number of other countries were members, but they tended to be much more "low key" and didn't take initiatives.

Q: How did we feel about South Africa at that time?

EWING: I think that we generally didn't think about apartheid. South Africa was not yet a pariah in the IAEA. They were one of the original members of the Board of Governors, they took things seriously, and they generally played quite a positive role, as far as I can recall.

Q: So it wasn't a matter of glancing at them and wondering what they might do with this field? Did this come later?

EWING: I think that that came later. I don't recall any initiatives to expel South Africa. You mentioned Israel before. There were always political issues involving Israel and their status in the agency. I remember those issues more than anything to do with South Africa. But Israel involved political issues, as opposed to atomic energy problems as such.

Q: What kind of work were you doing?

EWING: I was called a Political Officer. Probably one-third of my time was really administrative work, both vis-a-vis the IAEA itself but also in terms of the Embassy. We were sort of part of the Embassy [in Vienna] for administrative support but if we needed something done, either for our offices or for our houses, people looked to me to deal with the Embassy General Services Officer or whoever else was involved in the Embassy. I would go to the staff meetings of the Administrative Section of the Embassy. Another part of my job was helping the other political officer on political issues. Then part of my work was to function as a conference officer, making arrangements for delegations that came from Washington--doing reporting on meetings of the Board of Governors and the General Conference of the IAEA. I did a number of different things. I was not expected to assume any initiatives or take on any major responsibilities.

Q: Who was handling contact with the IAEA, from the American side?

EWING: Dr. Hugh Smythe was a professor of physics at Princeton University and the author of the UNCLASSIFIED report on the Manhattan Project, the World War II atomic bomb project, which was published shortly after the war. He was the U. S. member of the Board of Governors of the IAEA. He would come to Vienna three or four times a year. He had the rank of Ambassador and represented the United States before the agency.

Then we had in Vienna a resident representative, with the rank of Minister. Most of the time that I was there he was Bill Cargo. Frank Hefner replaced Cargo. So the resident representative was the day to day head of the mission. We also had another political officer, who was more senior than I was, by quite a bit. This was Betty Gould, who had had a lot of experience with the United Nations, going back many years and who knew all the ins and outs of parliamentary procedure in international conferences and so on. We had two other officers who had more of a science background. One of them was on detail from the Atomic Energy Commission and one had the title "Science Advisor." He had experience in the atomic energy field. He went back to private life with the Bechtel Corporation and had been with Stanford Research Institute.

Q: You left Vienna in 1964, is that right? You moved away from the fleshpots of Europe and went off to Lahore, Pakistan, from 1964 to 1966. How did that assignment come about?

EWING: As I recall, the Herter Commission on Foreign Service personnel made a report shortly before I was due for transfer from Vienna. One of its recommendations was that there should be more interchange of personnel between the foreign affairs agencies. I was somehow picked out to go on detail to the U. S. Information Agency [USIA] and assigned, initially, to Dacca in what was then East Pakistan. I came back from Vienna, spent several weeks in Washington, mainly at USIA, getting briefings on Dacca. I was going to be the executive assistant or administrative officer, in Dacca.

Then I went on home leave in California. While I was there, I got a call from USIA in Washington, saying that, instead of going to Dacca, they wanted me to go to the same job as executive officer in Lahore. The reasons for this change were not terribly clear. They said that they thought it would be an easier assignment. I had a wife and child, the person going to Lahore was single, and Dacca was more isolated...

Q: And considered more unhealthy, too.

EWING: I think that it was also partly because at that time the Country Public Affairs Officer was in Karachi. Lahore was a little closer, and perhaps they felt more confident that, since I didn't have any background with the agency or much experience with administrative work, I could be under closer supervision in Lahore than way off in Dacca. I have never been to Dacca. We never made it there. It wasn't all of that difficult for us to make that switch. We wound up going on the same ship to Hong Kong. The timing was pretty much the same. Our car and some of our household effects took a little longer to reach us because they had to go to Dacca first.

Q: What was the situation in Lahore or in Pakistan itself during the period from 1964 to 1966?

EWING: During the early part of that period the United States was very important in Pakistan. We had provided assistance and had a military relationship through CENTO [Central Treaty Organization]. Pakistan didn't have all of that many friends in the world. The United States was one of its main supporters, and USIS [United States Information Service] in Lahore was a large operation. We had, I think, eight or nine American officers and a large Pakistani staff. We had bookmobiles and we had vans that would go out to villages and show films. We had an active lecture series, with visiting speakers and others. All of this changed rather dramatically in 1965 when tensions began to rise between India and Pakistan, eventually resulting in war in September, 1965. Thereafter, I think that the Pakistanis felt that the United States was not sufficiently supportive or forthcoming. The Indians felt pretty much the same. [Laughter]. So we didn't win any friends, but then it was much quieter during the period after the war.

Q: Lahore at that time served as what? The Embassy was in Karachi?

EWING: It was a period of transition. The Embassy already had an office in Rawalpindi with a small staff. There had also been an Embassy office in Murree, a hill station up above Rawalpindi in the mountains. That office had already been closed, and they moved a minimal staff to a house in Rawalpindi. But before we left in 1966, the Embassy had completely relocated to Rawalpindi and had acquired a site for a chancery and some houses in what became Islamabad, which is just outside of Rawalpindi. But for USIS the branch post in Lahore was responsible for the whole northern part of West Pakistan. So one of my jobs, as well as that of others in our office, was to travel to Rawalpindi, where we had a library run by a Pakistani in the market area of the old town of Rawalpindi. In Peshawar we had a USIS office for which we in Lahore provided administrative support and monitor operations. I would visit Rawalpindi and Peshawar every one to two months. We also ran a summer library in Murree up in the hills. It was only open during the summer and closed on Labor Day.

Q: What was the target audience you were aiming at?

EWING: Our target audience was essentially the educated group--the journalists, university people, and students in the major urban centers. But to some extent we were interested in anybody who would walk in through the door. That's partly why we sent bookmobiles to smaller cities, and vans [mobile units] which would show films outdoors to anybody.

Q: Was there a problem at that time with what we now term, "The Religious Right" with books and showing films and so forth?

EWING: I certainly don't remember any such problems. I think that in many ways Pakistan at that time was as open and non-fundamentalist as any country. Christian schools were open, respected, and renowned. Christian missionaries were active. Pakistani Christians held positions of responsibility in the government, business, and so on--and certainly in the field of education. I don't remember many women, for example, dressed in heavy veils such as one would see in other places.

Q: As seen from your level, were we making any effort to make sure that we had a balance with India, so that we weren't being sucked into the conflict between the two countries?

EWING: I think that, as I saw it at my level, we were conducting these operations in Pakistan, primarily because Pakistan was a good friend and ally. In India we had had a more "checkered," if you will, or "unbalanced" relationship in the sense that there was some concern about Nehru and his espousal of the Bandung or "non-aligned" philosophy. This contrasted rather sharply with Pakistan. On the other hand, India had been invaded, as they saw it, by China in early 1962. The Indians realized that their security was at issue--not just from Pakistan, but from China as well. The Indians began to establish a more "balanced" relationship, if you will, with the United States. The Pakistanis began to resent that, feeling that they had been loyal, steadfast allies. I saw cables from our Embassies in Karachi or New Delhi. I knew that there was a lot of competition, but at USIS we really worked hard on our programs.

Q: Our Ambassador was Walter McConaughy. Did you get any feel about how he operated or what his interests were?

EWING: I know that the Pakistanis and, to a certain extent, the Embassy, were jealous about the fact that Ambassador Chester Bowles [Ambassador to India] had access to President Kennedy...

Q: It would have been President Lyndon Johnson by this time.

EWING: In 1964, of course, it was President Lyndon Johnson. I don't think that Chester Bowles was still Ambassador to India. Ambassadors Bowles, Moynihan, Galbraith, and other figures as ambassadors to India over the years had a relationship with the White House which our ambassadors in Pakistan didn't have.

Obviously, I didn't see very much of Ambassador Walter McConaughy. I'm not sure that he came to Lahore very often during that period. Bill Cargo, who had been my boss in Vienna, was then the DCM in the Embassy in Karachi. I saw more of him. In many ways it was a very professional group in the Embassy. They were very balanced, serious, and thoughtful. I really didn't know very much about their contacts: whom they were dealing with, how often they would see Ayub Khan, and so on.

Q: How did you and USIA deal with the Pakistani authorities? How did that work?

EWING: Again, I don't remember that that was particularly an issue of concern at the time. Our libraries were open and accessible, without any difficulties for students and others who wanted to come. The same thing was true of other programs. After the India-Pakistan War [of 1965] and the change of relationship, to some extent, with the United States, we were a little bit more cautious about arranging for "high profile" events. As I recall it, we sensed that there were limits on what the traffic would bear. No edicts or pressures were applied by the Pakistani Government.

Q: Were you there during the India-Pakistan War of 1965?

EWING: Yes.

Q: What were your experiences at that time?

EWING: We very much sensed that trouble was brewing and tensions were rising, beginning in the late spring or early summer of 1965. There was a dispute over the Rann of Kutch, a very arid region in the southern part of West Pakistan, a kind of desert area that was contested by the two countries. Both the Indians and Pakistanis, at one point during the spring of 1965, deployed forces opposing each other in that area. Eventually, the tension was eased, but the atmosphere at that time was difficult.

About that time my wife and I and our two-year old son made an "R & R" trip to Tanzania in East Africa. I was glad to be away but also glad to come back, because Lahore seemed to be home to us at that time. I was asked to run the summer library in Murree for the last two weeks of the season and then close the facility and come back to Lahore on Labor Day. We listened to the BBC and Voice of America and knew that things were getting more tense and that something was perhaps going to happen. On the morning of Labor Day we drove down the mountain from Murree, not realizing that anything was going on. We went to the Embassy, which was then in Rawalpindi. I remember meeting a friend of mine who had been secretary to Bill Cargo in Vienna and was working for him again in Pakistan. She was running across the courtyard and called to me, "The war has started. Can't stop to talk," or something like that, and went rushing into the Embassy. That was about all that I heard from her. Then I found out a little bit more.

We had had our two year old son in the car. My wife was pregnant. Our home was in Lahore. Nobody paid much attention to us. They had all of these important issues involving the war to handle. So we got into our car and drove back to Lahore. On the "Grand Trunk Road" between Rawalpindi and Lahore we felt that the whole Pakistani Army was on the highway with us. There were armored personnel carriers and tanks on trailers. We also had a feeling that they had put everybody into the service to drive to the front, including people who had never driven before. We saw two or three accidents along the way. We saw one enormous military vehicle that was sitting in the middle of a railroad track, with soldiers scratching their heads and trying to figure out what to do next. The vehicle was obviously blocking the railroad. Eventually, we got back to Lahore. As we were going across the river bridge, entering the city, a couple of planes went over us very low. We weren't sure what side they were on. We stopped at the Consulate before going home and reported in, to say that we were back.

Then I was asked to work with the Consulate staff in planning to evacuate the post. As it turned out, we had about 10 days to prepare before an arrangement could be agreed on between India and Pakistan to allow US Air Force planes to land at the airport in Lahore, because a lot of the fighting was taking place in the Lahore/Amritsar area. We could hear artillery shelling and, of course, see aircraft in Lahore. We were under a blackout and obviously couldn't do any of our normal, USIS work during that time. So I was involved in planning for the evacuation. And then, eventually, the US planes were able to come in. It was a difficult time for my family and me, partly because I was not giving as much attention to them as I should have. My wife was in an advanced stage of pregnancy and was due in September, 1965. Eventually, my wife and child--and about 600 people altogether, consisting primarily of American women and children--left on the aircraft and went to the safety of Tehran [Iran]. And my second son was born in Tehran about 10 days after the evacuation, on 24 September.

It was a very difficult time. We had decided that air evacuation was the best way. The British Consulate people went out by road, overland to Peshawar and then into Afghanistan. While they were overnighting on the way, there was an air attack by the Indians. They were in much more danger than we were, sitting in Lahore, because Lahore, as I recall, was never bombed. While the fighting was very close, we were really quite safe there, as it turned out. Actually, we probably could have sat out the war, because it only lasted 17 days. My family left after about 10 days. At that point ammunition stocks were beginning to run low, and the fighting had already begun to ebb. Anyway, my family stayed in Tehran until after Thanksgiving, when it was safe for them to come back. I was able to make a brief visit to Tehran to see my wife, our new son, and our other son.

Q: How long were you there [in Lahore] after the end of the India-Pakistan War, which took place in September.

EWING: 1965. We left in May, 1966. My wife [and children] came back [to Lahore] in early December, 1965. Then we had six months together. So I completed my full tour.

Q: Did you find that, after the war, you had to change what you were doing in USIS?

EWING: Yes. We were certainly much more limited and modest in our program. A few visitors, speakers and lecturers [from the United States] came under our programs, but not so many. I think that the Fulbright scholars stayed. Our library opened up again after the war. I don't think that we sent out so many bookmobiles or film vans, but, as I recall, things returned to some degree of normality before we left.

Q: What did you go back to? You left in May, 1966.

EWING: Throughout these two assignments--or three assignments, really--I realized that I couldn't make a career of any one of them. I wanted to go back to the State Department. I didn't want to transfer to USIA. The atomic energy area and international organizations were interesting, but I didn't want to make a career of that, either, and I couldn't be a staff aide in Tokyo for my whole career. So I asked if I could go into the economic course, which had just recently started. This was the six-months' course at the Foreign Service Institute. That's what I did after I came back to Washington in 1966.

Q: This was quite a departure for the State Department. You were one of the early students. The idea was to start training with the equivalent of what, about a master's degree, or at least to have people who were economically literate? How did this work out?

EWING: As I recall, the objective was a little bit more modest. It was to teach the equivalent of an undergraduate major in economics. I think it was in response to the same situation that prevailed before, that the State Department did not hire enough economic officers through the Foreign Service written examination and was not getting enough people with strong economic backgrounds or credentials. They'd tried this other experiment which I had also been part of, essentially learning economics by osmosis or the intern program. It was clear that that wasn't going to work. So they decided to offer this economics course. The Department had also been sending some officers to various universities for graduate work in economics, but many of them weren't fully ready to take full advantage of that kind of study at the university level. The Department made an effort to conduct "in house" training, something that was tailored for the State Department and the Foreign Service.

We essentially studied the building blocks of economics. We had courses in macro and microeconomics, money and banking, international trade, and international finance. We had some calculus and a limited amount of econometrics/mathematics, although later on they began to put much more emphasis in those areas. We studied some statistics. I think that it was a good, solid program. They used some professors from the Washington area, who came as adjunct professors to work at the FSI. John Sprott had been hired to be one of the core staff instructors at the FSI. I think that my class, which was the second group to go through this program, was the first that he had taught on a full-time basis. He later became the Deputy Director of the FSI and is now going out as Ambassador to Swaziland. Warrick Elrod was the person who really ran the course. He had had quite a bit of previous experience in the economic area in the State Department.

Q: This took you to the end of 1966.

EWING: Yes. I was assigned, as most of us were--I think all of us were--to economic jobs, either in the Department or abroad. I was quite ready for an assignment in Washington, since we had been overseas for six years and were settled back in Washington. I was assigned to the Trade Agreements Division in the Office of International Trade. I worked there from about January, 1967, till the summer of 1969.

Q: What were the main things that you were dealing with?

EWING: I was involved initially on the fringes of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations. By then the position of Special Representative for Trade Negotiations [STR] had been created within the White House. The State Department was playing a supportive rather than a leading role in the Kennedy Round. I never went to Geneva but I worked closely with STR and worked on short term assignments in that office. I was also involved in a few other, GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] related trade negotiation matters. Particularly during the last year or so that I was in the office, I was given responsibility for Canada. I really enjoyed working on the Automotive Agreement, which was, in many ways, the first step toward what has now become NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement].

Q: What was your impression of the Kennedy Round at that time? Were we pretty much the 500 pound gorilla? I mean, whatever we wanted, we were in a pretty strong position to get it.

EWING: Well, we were certainly the strongest party in the negotiations, but I'm not sure that we could get everything that we wanted. We perhaps leaned over backwards to encourage countries like Japan and the countries of the then fairly new European Community to take real responsibility and play an active role. Perhaps in some cases we didn't push as hard as we could have since we wanted to bring them along as well in the negotiating framework. I'm also referring to Canada, Australia, and other such countries.

Q: During the period that you were there what were considered the problem areas? I mean, things like "the chicken war." Had "the chicken war" raised its head at that time?

EWING: I think that "the chicken war" in terms of GATT was over. We had worked out compensatory trade concessions. In many ways the issues were the same as have always been there: textiles, given their importance in the United States economy; steel; and agriculture, particularly in terms of exports. There was the Common Agricultural Policy [of the European Community] and its implications for US exporters. Those were the main issues that I remember. In the automotive sector imports were not yet a particular issue or concern. The Automotive Agreement with Canada was somewhat controversial in both countries, but at that particular time it was more so in the United States. There was a feeling that Canada had gotten a little bit of an advantage. Part of our job was to try and work through the statistics, analyze the trade, and try and encourage people to realize that this was a long term process and that there would be short term adjustments which could not always be taken into account.

Q: Were you basically doing the staff work behind the negotiations or were you involved directly in the negotiations?

EWING: In the Trade Agreements Division I was very much a staff person, doing "behind the scenes" work, rather than negotiating, for the most part. In the case of the Automotive Agreement it had already been negotiated when I came into this job but it was still in the fairly early stages of implementation. The State Department in that case was the primary agency, so I worked particularly with Jules Katz, who had been one of the negotiators of the Agreement. We went to Detroit and had meetings with the [automotive] industry and had a couple of meetings in Ottawa. I was the note-taker, prepared the position papers, worked with the other [Washington] agencies, and, in a sense, prepared the way. I was also involved in implementation after the fact.

We also got involved with some agricultural products, taking the lead, working with the Department of Agriculture on issues with Canada which caused problems during particular seasons, like carrots, potatoes, and turkeys--problems like that.

Q: I have found, as I do these interviews, that one of the themes which run through them is negotiating with the Canadians. This is not necessarily all sweetness and light, as one might think. I understand that these are very difficult negotiations.

EWING: Well, my experience is not so much that they're difficult negotiations but that they're very concrete. They were very real, dealing with real subjects like cars, turkeys, carrots, and water pollution, as well as projects that have implications across the border. I remember--to anticipate a later period in my career--when I was Deputy Assistant Secretary in the European Bureau. My successor at the time I left that position was an officer named Tom Niles, who had been, until then, Director of the Office of Central European Affairs. He was very much a person who thought a lot about Germany, Berlin, and major political and military issues in Central Europe. When Tom and I were talking about my responsibilities, I said that I was also handling Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. I added, "You probably don't want to have anything to do with that. But you probably ought to take a look at Canadian affairs. The Secretary of State doesn't think a lot about things to do with Canada, and nobody else does, really. These are very difficult issues on very substantive matters, involving very real problems." I said that I had enjoyed it and was sorry that I only did it for two or three months.

Tom also had been involved with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. He said, "Oh, I think I'll pass on that [Canada]." Well, later he did have quite a bit to do with Canada and became Ambassador to Canada. He didn't take my advice at the time.

Q: Were you there [in the Trade Agreements Division] when the Nixon administration came into office?

EWING: Yes. I left in the early summer of 1969. I didn't feel a lot of impact from the change in administration at the level I was involved with, so it didn't have a lot of meaning in terms of my job.

Q: You went off to Harvard for....

EWING: I went to Harvard University. I was interested in doing more in the economics area. I thought that after only getting an undergraduate major in economics or the equivalent at the FSI, I really would like to do something more and felt that that would be useful in a career sense. So I asked if I could be assigned to graduate level economics training. I was accepted. I applied to Harvard University and was admitted to the Kennedy School of Government, which was still in its early days.

Q: You'd been learning economics strictly through government assignments, with a lot of "hands on" work of one sort or another. How did you find the academic world and their approach? How did this mesh with your experience?

EWING: On the one hand, I found it very challenging and demanding, because I really didn't have as good a grasp of calculus and mathematical skills as I probably should have had to be at the graduate level at Harvard. On the other hand many of the professors there--certainly those teaching the courses I took--had had a lot of experience in government and were aware that their students were a mixture of those interested in econometrics and working toward Ph.D.'s and also those who came out of government. Not just the federal government. There were some students who had come out of state and local governments and also students from abroad with extensive foreign government experience. Their own interests and instincts were partly very practical and policy oriented and not just theoretical. I think that it was a great place to go. I had some very fine professors there.

Q: Were you getting any reflections of the Vietnam War at that time?

EWING: I was there from 1969 to 1970. During the spring of 1970, the invasion of Cambodia essentially meant that the campus closed down just before [as I recall, I was taking] final examinations. These were made optional. I took all my finals and finished the year. The campus was in turmoil. It was very difficult. On the other hand, I was not particularly singled out as being a Foreign Service Officer. Most people didn't even know that and cared very little about it. I didn't think that I needed to be defensive and I wasn't inclined to demonstrate, either. My wife did go to some of the demonstrations down on the Boston Common. She felt that that was part of her experience at the time.

Q: We got you out of Harvard finally. After this new-found polish of a Harvard education you went to [the Embassy in] Rome from 1970-73. Is that right?

EWING: Yes, I had obtained an MPA (Master's in Public Administration), studied Italian for about eight weeks in 1970, and then went to Rome as an Economic Officer. Initially, I served in a financial economist position, working for the Treasury Attaché, reporting on Italy's economic situation and financial matters. Subsequently, after about a year and a half doing this, I was moved over to be the head of the Economic Policy Unit in the Economic Section, doing things related to the Common Market, the Common Agricultural Policy, trade policy issues, and civil aviation.

Q: This may be a difficult question. What was your impression of the Italian economy during this period?

EWING: My recollection of the Italian economy at that time is that there already was a lot going on that wasn't fully reflected in the [government] statistics. The state sector already was unwieldy and having difficulty. The private sector--Fiat, Olivetti, and so on--was going along very well, and there was a lot of small entrepreneurial activity that really wasn't showing up in government statistics. Generally, we thought that things were better than they seemed to be on the surface.

Q: I remember being told later on, at the end of this decade--in 1979 or in 1980--that the Naples area was the prime producer of gloves in the world. But there wasn't a single, registered glove factory in the area.

EWING: That was the sort of thing which was already evident. There were advantages in not being too public about activities--not that they were illegal or illicit but more a matter of trouble in dealing with the bureaucracy...

Q: The tax question?

EWING: Yes, taxes. If you could avoid contact with the bureaucracy, it was to your advantage.

Q: What were our economic interests in Italy during this period, 1970 to 1973?

EWING: We had, of course, substantial trade. There was a substantial American business presence in Italy. Those were economic interests. In terms of our economic diplomacy with Italy, we were beginning to think of Italy, not just as a country by itself, but as part of a larger European Community. We would try to influence the shaping of positions in Brussels at the European Community level by making representations in Rome, trying to encourage the Italians to take positions in Brussels that would be to our advantage and in our interest.

Q: How did you find dealing with the economic side of the Italian Government?

EWING: There were some very capable professionals, especially in the Bank of Italy. I had quite a bit to do with the Ministry of Foreign Trade. There were some able people there. I had the feeling that they were very "thin" in terms of numbers and were overworked. They sometimes had trouble with the political level of the government, because issues were often extensively politicized.

Q: Did the politics of the country intrude on the economy?

EWING: Oh, I think that they did. They already had coalition governments. The Socialists often had the Ministry of the Budget. I don't think that we were aware of a great deal of corruption or political "contributions" being used or misused. Given the role of the state in the economy, the question of who controlled a given ministry had a very important impact on what happened in the economy.

Q: We were an influential country but did we ever make any noises about any of these state industries? I'm thinking of automobile factories such as Alfa-Sud and other such plants down in Naples which really did not seem to be economically viable. Was this something that we observed and reported on?

EWING: I don't remember that we did. We certainly reported on the Mezzogiorno area [southern Italy], the disparity in income levels and prospects between the North and the South of Italy, and fiscal policy measures taken to try to compensate for that situation. In terms of the role of the state enterprises I don't think that we tried to influence them or to change the shape of the state-dominated sector. However, we could see the inefficiencies and the problems those industries were causing.

Q: Our prime concern with Italy at that time was its allegiance to NATO and the Communist Party of Italy. How did we feel at that particular period about the Communist Party, its orientation, and its involvement in the economy?

EWING: In some ways the Communist Party of Italy was not as "loyal" to Moscow as some of the other communist parties in Western Europe and elsewhere. They had tried to open up to others on the Left of the political spectrum. As I recall, our political officers had limited contact with Communist Party officials. I didn't have any contact myself. I think that we tended to think of the PCI as primarily a political party or mechanism, but in terms of the Communists' direct impact on the economy if they came into power or participated in the government--that wasn't something, as I recall it, that we thought about very much. It hadn't happened yet, and we didn't expect that it would very soon, if ever.

Q: Were your dealings mainly with the people within the government at the professional level, as opposed to dealings with Italian Deputies from various areas?

EWING: I didn't have much contact with Italian politicians, members of Parliament or otherwise. In addition to the officials in the government I certainly had some contact with people in private sector banks. My knowledge of the Italian language was not as good as it ought to have been. You can't learn Italian in eight weeks.

Q: I went through the same thing. You just can't get started...

EWING: That was always a problem. I could use Italian in handling official business, but if I were dealing with somebody who spoke Italian, and I could understand him and then reply in English, I was much more comfortable. Or, if I were delivering a demarche, and the person I was talking to usually could read the document in English, I could understand their response in Italian. In terms of communication it wasn't by any means a perfect situation. Eight weeks of language study is too short a time to learn the language.

Q: How did we feel that the Italians were responding to the beginning of European economic unity at that time?

EWING: As I recall, the Italians were very positive. We thought that was good. They saw--and, I think, we did, too--that some of the solutions to the very clear problems of Italy were more likely to come in a European context, in a broader way, than just in Italy. We saw the critical disparities between the North and South of Italy. The Italians--certainly, more than the French--wanted a Europe that was open to the outside world. They valued their relationship with the United States and with some other parts of the world. They wanted to make sure that Europe was not a closed fortress but instead was open to others, to imports and other kinds of interaction. So we appreciated that as well.

Q: What about your Ambassador at that time, Graham Martin? He was one of the "characters"--perhaps that's not the right term--but a "presence" within the Foreign Service, due to his method of operation. How did you find it?

EWING: Again, I was pretty far down the line in terms of the Embassy hierarchy. Over me was the Treasury Attaché, then you had the Economic Minister-Counselor, then the DCM, and the Ambassador. So I didn't have all of that much to do with him directly. It really meant a lot to me when he would read a cable which I had prepared on the Italian economy, could understand it, and would say something laudatory about it. That certainly happened from time to time. Wells Stabler was the DCM during most of the time I was there. I had great respect for him and had an opportunity to work directly with him on a couple of matters. I think, for example, of the visit of one of President Nixon's daughters. I was the Control Officer. There were also Congressional visits. A lot of our time in the Embassy in Rome, in addition to our day to day work, was involved with visitors.

Q: You got a lot of them. Did you have any presidential visits while you were there?

EWING: Yes, President Nixon came very soon after I arrived there in 1970. I think that he came in September or October of 1970. I had just arrived and wasn't really involved in the preparations for the visit. However, I was asked to be the "gift" officer. I delivered the presidential gift to both the Palazzo Quirinale, the Presidential Palace, for Italy, as well as to the Vatican. That was sort of a nice thing to do during the first few weeks that I was there.

Q: You mentioned the Vatican. Did you have anything to do with looking at the Vatican banking system, which later became quite a scandal. This was in the future, but I was wondering...

EWING: No. We really didn't, in terms of reporting. I was aware of the American Bishop [Archbishop Marcinkus] who later was involved in that scandal. We would see him around, but I didn't really know him personally. Already by that time Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was the President's representative to the Vatican. There was an officer in the Embassy who spent all of his time on matters relating to the Vatican. For that reason we really didn't think that that was an area for our reporting. We were pretty much concentrated on Italy.

Q: At that time did you at all look at the economic consequences of criminal issues, such as the Mafia, drug smuggling, and so forth?

EWING: Really, very little of that. Of course, we were interested in the Mafia, but it was very hard to get much information in terms of their economic activities, investments, or what they did with their money and so forth. Again, this was something which I never tried to learn about--certainly not to do any reporting on.

Q: Then you left Rome in 1973 and went up to Bern [Switzerland].

EWING: Yes.

Q: You were there from 1973 to 1975. What were you doing in Bern?

EWING: This was really my first opportunity to be a supervisor, although during the last half of my time in Rome I did supervise a couple of officers and a secretary in a unit of the Economic Section. In Bern I was the Counselor for Economic and later for Commercial Affairs as well. That was a good chance to be more integrated and involved in our Mission--certainly with the Ambassador, although Bern was obviously a smaller post than Rome and with fewer American interests to protect. I often have said that I probably had the best job in that Embassy. The Swiss, obviously, are very interested, very involved, and very knowledgeable in economic matters, not only in their own country but really worldwide, both of a financial nature, but also involving corporations, communications, transportation, and so on. The Swiss are not members of the United Nations and don't really participate politically in any international organization but are very involved in things like the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. They were very interested in GATT and generally in the international economic organizations, even those of which they were not members. These included the IMF and the World Bank. A continuing dialogue with the Swiss Government at the senior level, which is primarily what I did there, was a large part of my responsibilities. All of this seemed to be of interest to Washington. We did a lot of reporting, and that was a lot of fun.

The other thing that we, of course, did concerned the financial markets in Switzerland. I spent a lot of time visiting Zurich, Geneva, and Basel to talk with bankers and get their thoughts about the U. S. dollar, the price of gold, and international financial questions. Of course, the energy crisis broke, and OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] raised the price of crude oil. There was a lot that the Swiss had to say about that, at that particular time, too.

Q: What were the Swiss interested in getting from you? What were their concerns?

EWING: I think that they were interested in getting from us the views which Washington and the United States Government had. They are a neutral country and are very independent. They also wanted to cooperate to the extent possible. So what they wanted was as open a dialogue as possible. Certainly, that's what we tried to give them.

Q: While you were there, you must have had rather close ties to our Treasury Department.

EWING: A lot of the reporting which I did on the Swiss economy and on the views of both government officials and bankers on international financial matters was primarily of interest to the Treasury. At that time the Treasury Department did not have a Treasury Attaché in the Embassy in Bern. Later, I think within a year or two after I left, they did assign a person there. But at that time we did all of that reporting. Yes, we recognized that much of what we did was of no interest to the Swiss Desk Officer in the Bureau of European Affairs, and probably of very little interest to anybody else in the State Department. But it was of major interest to the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and other agencies of the United States Government in the economic area.

Q: Were we pushing the Swiss to play any role, say, when the energy crisis came?

EWING: Well, we wanted as much solidarity and cohesion among the petroleum consumer countries as we could possibly get. We got involved fairly quickly in trying to set up what became the International Energy Agency, based with the OECD in Paris. We wanted the Swiss to be very much a part of that, as they have been, from the beginning. The Swiss are very much oriented toward the private sector. They were not inclined to making government to government deals, to the extent that some of the other countries did.

Q: What about bank accounts--numbered Swiss bank accounts?

EWING: Not long before I went to Switzerland we reached agreement on a judicial assistance treaty. That took effect and allowed for the exchange of information or handling requests for information under certain circumstances. So to some extent that dealt with a major irritant in our relations. We tried to make that work effectively during the time we were there. We had some visits. The Swiss, obviously, were not going to give us everything that we wanted, but at least this treaty established some parameters and structure for requests that we would make.

Q: Were you involved in either trying to implement or to expand this treaty?

EWING: Not to expand, because it was still in its early days. We wanted to work with what we had. I was involved to some extent with this question in the Embassy. The Consular Section handled some of the requests for information to the Swiss Ministry of Justice. I had liaison and contact with the Banking Commission and, of course, with some of the banks, too, as well as with the central bank, the Swiss National Bank. On occasion I would accompany visitors [interested in such matters]. So I was involved with that, though I was not the main action officer within the Embassy for specific requests for particular information.

Q: I'm sure that everything was spelled out very neatly in the treaty. As we all know, when hard charging prosecutors--I'm talking about American prosecutors--want something, they don't pay as much attention, you might say, to the rules as one would wish they would. Was this a problem?

EWING: I think it was a problem--certainly a potential problem. Usually, we would hear from the Swiss if somebody, say, a prosecutor, went directly to a bank or to somebody in the Swiss Government. They would not respond, they would not deal with him, until the request was put back in the proper context, in the proper channels. They would tell us about it. Part of the problem was information. Some people didn't know how to go about making a request. In other cases they were trying to go as far as they could until they were stopped. I don't remember it as a major issue. It was sort of a brush fire. It had some potential, but, usually, we were able to control it.

Q: How did Ambassador Shelby Cullom Davis operate?

EWING: I happened to like him and actually had a lot of affection for him, although some people in the Embassy, and certainly some of the Swiss, didn't have too high a regard for him. He came from an insurance background. There were two things about him which I particularly liked. One was that, as far as my area of responsibility was concerned, I had a full opportunity to have contact, make demarches, transact business, and do reporting with very little second guessing or direction from either the Ambassador or the DCM.

Q: Who was the DCM at this time?

EWING: The DCM was Roy Percival. He had a very strong, economic background himself. He certainly read carefully what I did and made some good suggestions but didn't feel that he had to make all of the contacts himself. And the Ambassador didn't, either. I think that during the whole time I was there with Ambassador Davis only once did he have a meeting at a higher level in the government on an economic question. That was when the Swiss called him in about something that they wanted to protest. In terms of dialogue with the United States Embassy on most economic matters, they were quite happy to talk to me. And that went up to fairly senior levels. The second thing I liked about him was that he knew an awful lot of people in Switzerland. He'd come there often before he was appointed Ambassador. He loved to travel in the country. He liked to meet new people and he liked to socialize. One of the things that he did was to hold a series of small lunches with bankers, not only in Bern, but especially in Zurich, Basel, Geneva, and Lausanne. We arranged those and were always able to go along with him. It gave us a wonderful opportunity to meet senior Swiss bankers. It wouldn't have been easy for an economic officer in the American Embassy to make an appointment and walk in and see them. Through these lunches and social engagements we had opportunities to meet lots of key people. For those two reasons I had a lot of respect for him and enjoyed working for him.

Bern was also a great assignment from the family point of view. It was a wonderful place for children to grow up. They liked the school and skiing. There were a lot of good things about it.

Q: Then you headed back to [the Bureau of] European Affairs [in Washington]?

EWING: Yes. I was assigned to Bern for three years and expected to stay until 1976. My family expected to stay as well. However, early in 1975 Joan Clark, who was then Executive Director of the Bureau of European Affairs, called me and asked if I'd meet with Assistant Secretary Arthur Hartman, who was coming to Switzerland shortly thereafter with Secretary of State Kissinger. [Hartman] needed a new Special Assistant. She said that it was a great job and asked if I wanted to be interviewed for it. I said, "Okay." I was interviewed, we seemed to hit it off well, and he asked me to come back to Washington a year early. From a career point of view, this was excellent and led to some good things. But from a family point of view it was difficult, because our kids were very happy in Switzerland, they liked to ski, they liked their school, and had a lot of independence to move around the city. They were disappointed to come back, particularly our eldest, who was going into seventh grade. They found the change not particularly easy.

Q: Well, you were in European Affairs from 1975 to 1981?

EWING: Most of that time, yes. Initially, for a little bit more than a year, I was Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary Hartman. That, in turn, led to the Deputy Director position in the Office of Southern European Affairs (Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus). I later became the office director and then left the bureau in 1979 and went into the Senior Seminar. However, in January or February, 1980--I was actually on a seminar trip to Miami and Puerto Rico--the then Assistant Secretary [for European Affairs], George Vest, phoned me and asked if I'd be interested in coming back into the bureau as a Deputy Assistant Secretary. Jim Goodby, [who had held that job] was going very soon to Finland as Ambassador. I said, yes, I would like assignment as Deputy Assistant Secretary. At first it was understood that this assignment would be made in the summer of 1980, after I completed attending the Senior Seminar. I became a little concerned about that, feeling that maybe it would be difficult to take charge after a gap in the position of several months.

George Vest asked the Director General, who was then Joan Clark, if I could leave the Seminar early, which I did, and become a Deputy Assistant Secretary, which I did. This was a good thing to do--also before the change in administrations. So I actually held that job until June 1981.

Q: Back to your initial period under Arthur Hartman. What did you do as Special Assistant?

EWING: I did several things. I was primarily responsible for the flow of paper through the office, sending things up to the Executive Secretariat, to the deputy assistant secretaries, and so on. I handled a number of ad hoc assignments which Assistant Secretary Hartman would give me, sometimes relating to personnel questions or conveying views and instructions to others in the bureau. In many ways I was his "right hand man," whereas the Staff Assistants were one or two steps removed, primarily handling the paper work. I tried to coordinate a number of things within the front office of the bureau, with the deputy assistant secretaries and the secretaries, generally trying to make sure that the office worked effectively and efficiently.

Q: How did Arthur Hartman operate within the State Department, from your viewpoint?

EWING: In that period, 1975-76, Henry Kissinger was the Secretary of State and Helmut Sonnenfeldt was the Counselor of the Department. Sonnenfeldt had enormous interests, especially related to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and NATO, to some extent. So this was one of his major areas of interest. One of the things which I did was to have as effective a relationship as possible with the Office of the Counselor. Then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs also had great interest in the European area. I tried to work effectively with that office and the Under Secretary's assistants. So a part of what I did related to communications.

However, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, at least in those days, had an enormous job, with a great range of countries, from Canada to Cyprus and Vladivostok to Vancouver. He had to set the priorities for his deputies but also had to take an interest in things because the [people on the] "Seventh Floor," his supervisors, were inclined to act themselves as the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. So it was not an easy job by any means. It was very demanding.

Q: What was your impression of Henry Kissinger? Was he doing things without keeping people informed and, if so, was this a problem? Was he just a very effective...

EWING: We certainly didn't have any competition with the NSC [National Security Council] in that period, which we had previously had, since Henry Kissinger was [now] Secretary of State. I don't know whether he failed to keep people informed. It seemed to me that Hartman was aware of most things that were going on and involved with them. Some things were held very closely. Desk officers or others down the line might not have known about things, but I don't think that a lack of information was a problem [for Hartman].

Sometimes, Kissinger would get very involved in things. However, usually, he kept Hartman at least aware and informed of them. At one time there was an Ambassador to Yugoslavia named Larry Silberman. He was a very difficult individual. There was a lot of tension within the Embassy in Belgrade but also between the desk, the bureau, and that Embassy. There were allegations back and forth. At one point things got so bad that Hartman and Kissinger held a staff meeting in Hartman's office with the desk officers concerned with Yugoslavia. I was impressed that Kissinger would take an hour of his time, come down, and hear out the complaints of the desk officers. I think that he wanted to assure them that he was aware of the situation, not that anything could necessarily be done about it. At least, that was impressive and may not have been generally known. I kept the minutes of that meeting.

Otherwise, Kissinger was always planning trips. He was very active and very energetic. Europe, after the Middle East, was certainly one of the main areas of his concern. At that particular time Europe was probably even more important in his view of American diplomatic interests.

Q: How did you find the transition to the Carter administration in your particular area, at the beginning of 1977?

EWING: By then I was in the Office of Southern European Affairs, so that transition was a very important one, in terms of our relations with Southeastern Europe. Henry Kissinger was certainly blamed by the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots for the situation that prevailed. The Turks weren't too happy with things, either. The same thing might have happened if the results [of the election of 1976] had been different. But we saw the new administration, especially with Carter coming in, as a chance to look hard at the old issues and take some initiatives. So we were involved at the beginning of 1977 in our office with the mission of Clark Clifford. We didn't come up with the name of Clark Clifford, but we certainly had the idea that sending a special presidential envoy would be a good way to "whip" the parties concerned in the region into taking a fresh look at our policies in that part of the world.

Q: You're talking about Southern European affairs. In the first place, when did you take over the Office of Southern European Affairs?

EWING: I took over as Deputy Director in September, 1976. Then, as Director, in December, 1977. At the beginning of the Carter administration, I was Deputy Director. In the State Department Southern European Affairs concern Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, three countries that came to the European Bureau from the Near Eastern Bureau in 1974. It's one office. At that time we had two desk officers for Turkey, two for Greece, and one for Cyprus. We had a junior officer who handled special projects on issues which cut across the region.

Q: This was your first, professional exposure to this intractable problem of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. What was your impression when you came to the office? How did you see the situation?

EWING: I really had the chance to watch the area closely for a year before I came into the office, when I was working for Assistant Secretary Hartman. I think that roughly one-third of his time that year [1975-76] was probably devoted to those three countries. So I was aware of all of the developments during that year. I didn't know that I was going to go into that office until shortly before the time when I actually [assumed those duties]. I never felt particularly defensive about my lack of prior, professional experience. I thought that if I had served, say, in Turkey, and then tried to come into that job, I would have been perceived within the State Department and probably by the Embassies concerned as more comfortable, more familiar, and perhaps even biased for or against the Turkish position. By coming in fresh I didn't have that problem. I felt that having some background in economic affairs was probably useful, because economic issues--especially with regard to Turkey--became very important in that period. Primarily, it was a problem of diplomacy--trying to encourage a dialogue, problem-solving, and conflict resolution--rather than necessarily knowing everything about the history of Greece, Turkey, or Cyprus.

Q: How did you find dealing with the various Embassies of these countries? Was this a problem? Were they always looking at you as if to say, "You're either with us or against us."

EWING: I think that the Embassies in Washington were always trying to influence us or to get us on their side. But I think that they recognized--and this was an advantage of having all three countries in one office--that they really couldn't do that. That really couldn't be expected from us. Their objective, I think, was primarily to make sure that we understood their position--not necessarily agreeing with it or buying it, hook, line, and sinker. We had good relations with all three of the Embassies concerned. Lines of communication were fairly open, and relations with the three Embassies in Washington were fairly good.

Q: What were the main issues that you were dealing with at this time?

EWING: Really, there were three issues: first, the Cyprus problem, primarily left over from 1974; secondly, bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey...

Q: You mean our bilateral relations?

EWING: Our bilateral relations with Greece and Turkey, primarily related to our forces, our bases in both countries, assistance levels, and the relationship of assistance levels [between the two countries]; and, thirdly, the problems between them, relating to the Aegean Sea and other issues they had between them--including the minorities in both countries.

Q: Taking the last point first, regarding the Aegean Sea, this involves the definition of territorial waters and all that. If the Greeks get their way, they basically blocked off the

Aegean to anyone else--particularly the Turks. Did we see any way out of this problem or was this so emotional that there wasn't much that you could do?

EWING: We certainly didn't have our own plan or our own solution to those issues, because they were so emotional and complex. The main thing that we tried to do was to encourage the process of addressing the issues, either through negotiations or through some judicial approach, the International Court of Justice or otherwise. But there it was more of a matter of watching them, because we really saw that they had the potential for major conflict between two NATO allies. We studied these problems, we analyzed them, and Clark Clifford looked at them when he undertook his mission to the area. However, we never really took the initiative to put forward a plan, or anything like that.

Q: What was the Clark Clifford mission, and how did it work out?

EWING: I mentioned before our hope that he would take a fresh look at this whole complex of issues. To some extent this mission came out of the presidential campaign of 1976, when Jimmy Carter had made some promises and commitments, particularly to Greek-American voters, which, he thought, ought to be given priority attention when he entered office. One of his early actions was to ask Clark Clifford to undertake a mission to look into these serious problems. He didn't have to wait for Senate confirmation. He went a matter of weeks after the inauguration in 1977 to pay a visit to all three countries.

Q: Did you brief him before he went?

EWING: As I said, I was Deputy Director of the office at the time. The Director of the office was Nelson Ledsky, who accompanied Clark Clifford on the trip, along with Matthew Nimetz, who was Counselor of the Department, a close associate of Cyrus Vance who was quickly given responsibility on the Seventh Floor of the State Department for Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus matters. We were involved in a number of briefing sessions with Clifford, both before he went and when he came back. He continued to have this role as a kind of special envoy for the region for a couple of years. I continued periodically to meet with him, usually over at his law office, to keep him informed and abreast of developments, although he certainly pulled back and did not continue to play a really active role after 1977-78.

Q: On his initial trip, was he able to break any ground?

EWING: I think that he broke some ground in terms of U. S. policy and the Carter administration posture by a couple of things. One, he recognized that a restoration of the relationship with Turkey was very important. If we couldn't really solve the Cyprus problem or really improve relations greatly with Greece--the arms embargo with Turkey was in effect...

Q: This was imposed by Congress, due mainly to domestic Greek-American pressure.

EWING: Well, there was a strong feeling on the part of many people in Congress that Turkey had invaded Cyprus in 1974, had misbehaved, and the United States shouldn't continue as a major arms supplier. Therefore, they felt, we should cut off this relationship and so Congress enacted the arms embargo in 1975 over strong opposition from the Ford Administration. Clark Clifford felt, after he went there, that we needed to restore that relationship with Turkey in order to deal with the other issues of the region. I think that that was an important development. Now, initially, we put the emphasis on approving a defense cooperation agreement, which was negotiated when Secretary Kissinger was in office and which called for, I think, $1.0 billion in security assistance over four years, as a means of restoring that relationship. Later on, in the following year (1978), the administration decided that the way to proceed was to get the embargo lifted and then go ahead separately with an assistance relationship, rather than using the approval of the defense cooperation agreement and its $1.0 billion of assistance to break the embargo.

Q: How did you view the communications between [our Embassies] in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia as far as local bias was concerned?

EWING: I think that our Embassies in all three countries did tend, at times, to take on some of the color of their respective places of assignment. However, I don't think that "localitis" or "clientitis" was anywhere near some other situations which I've been aware of over the years. In 1976-77 our Embassies [in Turkey and Greece] had very strong Ambassadors--Bill Macomber and Jack Kubisch, respectively. They recognized that, whatever the solution to the problems of the region at that particular time, there was no way we could ignore the legitimate interests and objectives of the other countries. You couldn't solve the problems of Greece alone or Turkey alone. You had to take the whole region into account. I think that one of the things I remember is that some of the harshest criticism of positions taken by the Greek Government came out of our Embassy in Athens. To some extent that was true in Ankara as well.

Q: Did you ever run afoul of Bill Macomber's temper?

EWING: Bill Macomber tended to raise his voice so that one wondered sometimes if it were really necessary to use the telephone to talk to you in Washington. He had some strong views and certainly expressed them vividly. But I liked him, and we got along well. He was in Turkey and had a very difficult time shortly after the embargo and the events of 1974. This was a time of frustration and concern, but I think he, of all people, recognized that it was very important to communicate effectively with the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs and try to get us on his side. He understood that yelling at us or blowing up wasn't the way to do that.

Q: Who was our Ambassador to Cyprus during most of this time?

EWING: Bill Crawford was Ambassador to Cyprus. He had a very strong background in Cyprus. He had served previously as DCM there. So he really knew his way around, knew all of the parties, and knew the fine points of the issues.

Q: That was also a dangerous time there, wasn't it?

EWING: Well, Ambassador Rodger Davies was assassinated there. "Killed" is probably a better word than "assassinated," in view of the way it happened in 1974. So Bill Crawford had a security detail of Cypriot policemen who went with him everywhere. It was a very difficult time for his wife and his daughter, who were also with him at the post. I think that virtually all Greek Cypriots were mortified at what had happened to Ambassador Davies. Certainly, the Cypriot Government was determined that there wouldn't be any such threat again to the American Ambassador, from anybody in Cyprus. So this may have been a safer period of time than it seemed at the time because the Cypriot political situation quieted down fairly quickly, with the division of the country and with the fact that the Right Wing in Cyprus, if you will, was at fault in staging the coup d'etat against Archbishop Makarios. So, in a sense, things were calmer during this period than they had been in an earlier period.

Q: I don't think that we're repeating at this point, because we had a little trouble with the tape before, but could you talk about dealing with Congress and the "Greek lobby"?

EWING: Yes. Obviously, Congress had an enormous interest in the Cyprus issue but also in relations between Greece and Turkey because in 1975 it had enacted the arms embargo on Turkey. The group primarily interested in this was, of course, the "Greek lobby." This included people like Senator Paul Sarbanes, who had been a member of the House of Representatives in 1975, John Brademas, and some others. But there were still others in the Congress who were very active, informed, and interested, particularly as the Carter administration took a clear stand in 1978 and sought a lifting of the embargo. Some were Democrats but some were Republicans who were concerned about the cohesion of NATO and the role of Turkey and Greece in the alliance. These included people like Senator Tower, Senator McGovern, Congressman Solarz, and Congressman Lee Hamilton. They ranged across the political spectrum. They took a less emotional or intense initial interest than some of the members of the so-called "Greek lobby" but came to be very well informed and were eventually among the supporters of the Carter administration [in its efforts] to lift the embargo on Turkey.

Q: Were human rights a particular problem for you? I was thinking particularly of Turkey but probably, to a certain extent, of Cyprus.

EWING: In the Carter administration human rights, of course, became a much more significant foreign policy priority than they had been previously. There were issues relating to human rights in Turkey, in terms of how prisoners were treated, problems with the Greek Orthodox Church in Istanbul, Armenian issues--that certainly was something that we spent a lot of time and energy on. In Cyprus there was the missing persons issue, going back to 1974 and previously. This was something that we were interested in, together with other countries and the United Nations. That was the primary issue in...

Q: What was the missing persons issue?

EWING: As far as the Greek Cypriots were concerned, a number of them were missing, following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. They were civilians. They either had been killed, taken to Turkey, or moved to northern Cyprus. Nothing had been heard from them, and nobody knew where they were. There were a few American citizens who were Greek Cypriots by origin, who also were on the list of the missing. As far as the Turkish Cypriots were concerned, they also had a list--not quite as long but still a substantial list. These were Turkish Cypriots who had disappeared during the earlier period, particularly from 1963 to 1974 when there were inter-communal difficulties. According to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, these people had not been heard from and had never been accounted for. So they both had lists, and that issue has never been fully resolved.

Q: So the assumption is that these people are dead?

EWING: The assumption is that they are dead, for the most part.

Q: A final note on this question, and I think we might stop at that point. What was their view of the Soviet threat, and how did this influence our policy in that area?

EWING: As far as Greece and Turkey were concerned, we saw them as important members of NATO, the key to the NATO southern flank, providing protection, if you will, for the eastern Mediterranean, where we had a major fleet. We considered that Turkey had an important role to play in bottling up the Soviet Navy and controlling the [Turkish] straits--the Dardanelles--to prevent the Soviet fleet from breaking out [into the Mediterranean]. As far as Greece was concerned, they were also neighbors of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Both countries [Greece and Turkey] played an important role with respect to U. S. bases. They provided a means of supplying the U. S. fleet. We had important installations in both countries that were aimed at the Soviet Union, both from an intelligence and defense point of view.

Q: Were we considering at that time with the Pentagon the problem of a diminution of our presence in Greece, because it was such a political issue?

EWING: At that time we really weren't. Our military presence wasn't that large. As I recall, we sought to ensure that everything there was useful or essential to us, but this presence became an issue later on, during the Papandreou Government. At that time...

Q: Karamanlis was the Prime Minister [of Greece], wasn't he?

EWING: It was Karamanlis. You know, the Greeks had mixed feelings about the United States and the role we played with regard to Cyprus. They had negative feelings in this respect. However, they also recognized that if they were to ask that the U. S. presence be eliminated or even reduced, that would make Turkey even more important to us and our presence in Turkey [would become] even more valuable than it already was. So that was certainly something on their minds.

Q: OKAY, well, why don't we stop at this point? I'd like to put something on the tape so that I'll know where to pick up. We'll ask how you were appointed Ambassador to Cyprus and go on from there afterwards.

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Q: Today is December 3, 1993. Ray, we got you out of Southern Europe and European affairs. How did you get your next assignment? How did that come about?

EWING: After I left the Office of Southern European Affairs in the summer of 1979, I went into the Senior Seminar at the Foreign Service Institute and was very much looking forward to that opportunity to look at a number of U. S. domestic as well as international issues and to have time to reflect on them. I very much enjoyed this stimulating experience. I was on a trip with other members of the seminar to Florida and Puerto Rico when I received a phone call in Miami from George Vest, who was the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. He asked me to come back and be a Deputy Assistant Secretary, which I did. As it turned out, I served in this capacity from April, 1980, to June, 1981. Early in 1981, after the elections, when the Reagan administration came in, Lawrence Eagleburger was appointed Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. He decided early on, before he got to know any of us, that he would keep only the senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, Allen Holmes. He indicated that he would try to be helpful to the rest of us in obtaining an onward assignment. I really give him credit for pushing my nomination as Ambassador to Cyprus. As it turned out, that worked out, and I was nominated, confirmed, and went to Cyprus in October, 1981.

Q: So you were in Cyprus from 1981 to 1984? I think I mentioned this before, but with Larry Eagleburger in EUR, I take it that things went fairly smoothly as far as the Reagan administration was concerned. In ARA, I understand, there was "blood in the corridors." The change of administration did not involve a friendly takeover [in this area]. However, I take it that in the area of European affairs there wasn't much of a problem.

EWING: I think that, on the whole, that's right. There was perhaps some tension [in the bureau] because the new administration was regarded as following a very "hard line" toward the Soviet Union. During the transition period there were some people who came to the State Department to ask some very sharp, harsh, and challenging questions. However, in the area that I was responsible for at the time, which was Central Europe, including Germany; Southern Europe, including Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus; and Canada, there really wasn't much tension and controversy. Larry Eagleburger, of course, was a professional who was well known in the Department. He did not stay long in EUR before moving up to be Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I was succeeded as Deputy Assistant Secretary by Tom Niles, who had been Director of Central European Affairs, so he had worked directly with me. It was really a very smooth transition as far as EUR was concerned. It was nothing like ARA at that time.

Q: How did you prepare yourself for the confirmation process?

EWING: Of course, I'd been working on Cyprus, essentially since 1976, with a few interruptions. I'd been to the island three times, first in 1976, then in 1977, and again in 1978. I had worked on a Cyprus plan which the Department developed in 1978. I had met, really, with all of the key figures, either in Cyprus itself or in New York or Washington: President Kyprianou; Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriots; the Foreign Minister; the communal negotiators; and so on. So in a sense it didn't take a lot of homework or detailed preparations to get ready. However, I did some specific things. Of course, I spent a lot of time on the Hill, meeting not only with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but also some other Senators who, I knew, were interested in Cyprus, plus some people in the House of Representatives. I tried to see and talk with all of the former Ambassadors who were still living and was able to see all but one or two of them. I did some reading which I had never had time to do before. Since I had left EUR around July 1, [1981], and my confirmation hearing was not held until, I think, August, [1981], I really had a little bit of time that summer to try and get ready and be prepared. Of course, I went around and talked to people in other Washington agencies.

Q: Given the efforts of the "Greek lobby" in the United States, was Cyprus as much of an issue then, as it had been previously, or was it less sensitive then, in 1981?

EWING: I would say that it was less sensitive. The "Greek lobby," and the Greek-American community generally, I think, at that particular point, was somewhat disillusioned with the role of the United States Government. They had had very high hopes and expectations when the Carter administration came in. President Carter made some promises during the campaign. I would say that a fairly strong, diplomatic effort was made by the United States during the Carter administration, which essentially had produced very little, as far as Cyprus was concerned. I think that, as the Reagan administration came in, the Greek-American community did not expect very much. They were somewhat angry and frustrated about that but they didn't try to extract promises or commitments from either candidate which they [the candidates] couldn't carry through on. I think that the interest and concern about Cyprus was as great as ever, but the expectation that something was going to be achieved--or that the United States could do something--was somewhat less at that point.

Q: Were there any Senators who felt very strongly and who, you thought, were going to "keep an eye on you" and what was happening?

EWING: Senator Paul Sarbanes had been very much involved [in the Cyprus issue], initially as a member of the House of Representatives, and then as a Senator, throughout the last part of the 1970's. He continued to be very interested. I always made a point, when I came back from Cyprus, of going and talking with him. He was well informed, thoughtful, and considerate, as far as I was concerned. Sometimes he would say some things publicly that were a little different from what he would say privately, but he was probably the most vocal and active member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator Paul Tsongas was also a member [of the Committee] at that time and was present during my confirmation hearing. I don't think that Senator Paul Sarbanes was even there. Senator Tsongas asked me a question about whether I knew how to speak Greek. I said that I didn't, and I didn't know Turkish, either, but I intended to study both while I was in Cyprus. Of course, I pointed out that in Cyprus, a former British colony where English was the official language, English was very widely known--in Cyprus even more so than in Greece. Those were the two Senators who were the most interested and active. Some of the others, including Senator Pell; Senator Lugar, then the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee...

Q: Yes, it was a Republican controlled Senate at that time.

EWING: Senator Lugar was interested. There was a university in Indiana--actually the university with which he had been affiliated between the time he was Mayor of Indianapolis and was elected to the Senate--which had a program in Cyprus. I talked to him about that, and we kept in touch during the time that I was there.

Q: You arrived in Cyprus in...

EWING: I arrived in Cyprus in October, 1981.

Q: What was the situation on the ground when you arrived there, in political and economic terms?

EWING: The geographic situation was as it had been since 1974--and as it is today, in 1993. That is, the Government of Cyprus, which was controlled by Greek Cypriots, controlled the southern part of the island up to a demilitarized zone, which was essentially controlled by the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), a peacekeeping unit. The Turkish Cypriots controlled the northern part of the island. In 1981 the Turks referred to themselves as "The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus." Their view, as they expressed it, was that, eventually, there would be a "Greek Federated State of Cyprus," and the two could have some kind of federation arrangement with each other. The Turks had therefore gone ahead and organized themselves in that way.

Economically, Greek Cyprus, the southern part of the island, had already begun to recover pretty well from the extreme disruption and other dislocations which occurred in 1974, when perhaps as many as 200,000 refugees moved within the island. Hotels were being built on the coast in places like Aya Napa, Larnaca, Limassol, and Paphos. But in many ways what had really stimulated the economic recovery was the civil war in Lebanon, which is only about 100 miles or so away. Beirut is that close. Many Lebanese, as the civil war began in the late 1970's, moved to Cyprus, perhaps to have a safe place for members of their families. They bought apartments, invested in real estate, and then, in some cases, moved some of their business activities there, as did some international companies. The troubles and travails of Lebanon--and Beirut in particular--were certainly to the benefit of Cyprus at that juncture.

Turkish Cyprus--the northern part of the island--was fairly stagnant economically. There was agriculture but very little in the way of industrial activity. None of the positive, "spill over" effect of the Lebanese civil war had come to northern Cyprus. It [Turkish Cyprus] was very dependent economically on Turkey and on the support it received from Turkey, both in terms of the Turkish troop presence but, more importantly, in many ways, the government budget support that it received. People from the outside often said that the economic disparity was so great that it would be an incentive to a settlement. I think that the problem was that Turkish Cyprus was doing as well at that juncture as mainland Turkey. But the Turkish Cypriots tended to compare themselves with the Greek Cypriots, with whom they had very little interaction economically, rather than with the peasants of Anatolia. They could see buildings going up in the Greek side of Nicosia, but it didn't really have any particular impact on them or their standard of living.

Q: One is always enjoined not to make comparisons between populations or people, but the point is that any rational being will see that one group of people makes much more of a success with its situation than another group. Did you see any dynamics of change within the Greek Cypriot side, as opposed to the Turkish Cypriot side while this was happening?

EWING: It's hard to be categorical about that, because there are certainly some very able Turkish Cypriot businessmen, lawyers, and so on. But I think, in general, that they did not have the same base to begin with, in the sense of educated people or people with entrepreneurial skill and talent. And I suppose that they didn't have as many advantages from outside the island. Turkey, at that particular time, was not a great success, either. I might just go back, for a minute, to my time in Washington. The Turkish economy was a matter of great concern to us at the State Department in the late 1970's. There was a lot of violence in the country, but there was also rather sluggish economic growth. The Turkish workers in Germany were one of the main sources of foreign exchange. There was not a lot happening in Turkey itself in terms of exports or economic growth. One of the good things that happened late in the 1970's was the appointment, initially as Minister for Planning, of Turgut Ozal. Later, he became Prime Minister and then, eventually, President. When the Turkish military took over the government in September, 1980, one of the very good things that they did was to keep Ozal in a position where he was responsible for the economic recovery. And then, slowly during the 1980's, that program began to take hold and have an impact. But in 1981 Turkey wasn't doing very well, and Turkish Cyprus wasn't, either.

Q: One of the most vicious groups promoting civil unrest--ranking up with the IRA [Irish Republican Army]--was the "EOKA B", or whatever it was. There seemed to be offshoots of this group engaging in terrorism. I recall that in 1972 a Greek Cypriot set off a bomb near our Embassy when I was there. Luckily, it killed him and not us. Were there bombing and small scale raids going back and forth between the two sides in Cyprus?

EWING: No, there was really none of that going on during the time that I was there. Really, there has been very little of that since 1974. At that time Samson and some of the other EOKA B elements were involved in an attempted coup d'etat against Archbishop Makarios. Essentially, they were completely discredited, and the whole notion of Enosis, or union with Greece, was really not something that people thought about or talked about. The last gasp of Enosis, as far as I could see, was in 1974. It failed. Whatever you want to say about the Turkish intervention in or invasion of Cyprus, even some of the sharpest critics of that action will acknowledge that Turkey was provoked by the threats that Samson represented against Makarios and against the Turkish Cypriot community. So during the time that I was there, there was almost no threat or tension or interaction between the two communities--and certainly no terrorism. There were a couple of border incidents or incidents in the demilitarized zone. Somebody would stray across [the line], somebody would be cleaning a rifle which would go off, or someone would get bored and take a shot [at somebody]. But it was almost more of a matter of sloppiness or laziness than anything more definite than that.

As far as the Greek [Cypriot] side was concerned, they certainly perceived a threat from the Turkish [Cypriot] side. At one point when I was there, there was a fair amount of tension when threats and actions against Turkish diplomats around the world were made by a group of Armenian extremists. The Armenian community in Cyprus--and the Greek community as well--were afraid that Turkey might think that there was a soft, easy target in the Armenian community in Cyprus and would come across the line with the idea of retaliating or getting even. But that didn't happen, either. So, in general, the island itself and the line [of separation] were very calm, peaceful, and free of tension.

Q: This is very interesting because, when you consider how much Enosis, and all of the terrorist activity it generated at one time, [caused], here was the greatest provocation you could have, with the Greeks losing their predominance throughout Cyprus...

EWING: In a sense both sides feared each other. The Greek side feared that Turkey would try to take over the whole island. Cyprus was close to the Turkish mainland. Greece was preoccupied at that time with its own problems and could not be expected to come and help. And the Turkish side, which was a minority on the island itself, knew that the Greek Cypriots were economically thriving, doing well, and purchasing arms. They used to fear that the Greek Cypriots would try to take over the whole island. But at the real and practical level, very little of that was happening on a day to day basis.

As I said before, I think that Enosis was really dead at that time. On the other hand, there is no question that the influence of the Greek Government and Greece in general was very great in Cyprus. That is certainly where the Greek Cypriots looked for the only support they could count on, both in the United Nations and in the world, generally. There were lots of investments and connections in both directions. The Greek Ambassador in Cyprus certainly had an influence that was far greater than that of any of the other ambassadors. Whenever the time came for a major decision or a meeting was coming up, the President of Cyprus would go to Athens, and, often, other [Greek Cypriot] political leaders would touch base with their friends and associates there [in Greece] as well. Prime Minister Papandreou came to Cyprus while I was there, and that was seen as a major step, because that hadn't happened before. Usually, it had been the other way around. There is no question that the Nicosia-Athens axis is very important. But in terms of Enosis or union [with Greece] most

Greek Cypriots that I talked to valued their independence. They recognized that if they were part of Greece, they would be more or less forgotten, as a small element away out to the East. They wouldn't have accepted unification with Greece at that time, even though it was an important issue in the 1950's, 1960's, and early 1970's.

Q: During the time you were in Cyprus, what were American interests there?

EWING: American interests primarily related to a resolution or settlement of the Cyprus problem, for several reasons. One, because of the impact that issue had on our relations with two important NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. But also because of our concern for the people of Cyprus. We certainly didn't want to see another event like 1974, when a number of people were killed or dislocated, and the whole situation was put in jeopardy. We worked, as best we could, to encourage the two communities to resolve the Cyprus problem. Our policy during that period, as well as before and after, was primarily to rely on the communities and to encourage the United Nations, the Secretary General, and his Special Representative in Cyprus to take initiatives and to look for opportunities and openings to move ahead.

We did have some other interests, of course in Cyprus. It is a very important, geographic area, very close to the Middle East and to Turkey. It was [also] close to the Soviet Union. One of the things that happened while I was in Cyprus, which I had not fully anticipated, occurred after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. During the summer of 1982 we were involved on the periphery of it. We helped to arrange for ferry boats for the evacuation of the PLO forces from Beirut. I remember getting phone calls on a Sunday when, contrary to the understanding and agreement, the PLO had put, I think, 20 Land Rovers on one of the ferry boats. It was understood that they wouldn't take their heavy weapons or their vehicles out of Beirut. By the time anyone realized what was happening, they were already on the boat, and [the PLO] wouldn't take them off. This got high level people involved on a Sunday, including the [U. S.] Secretary of Defense and senior officials of the Israeli Government. I think that Secretary Weinberger was on a "talk show," and there was a minor flap. It was finally agreed that the ferry boat--it was a Cypriot registered boat, as I recall--would come to Limassol and offload the 20 vehicles. We had to arrange to put them into storage. Then everybody conveniently forgot about them. Later on, the question came up about what to do with them. The Israelis still didn't want the PLO to have them, and the PLO still considered them their property. In fact, they were old and beat up. I think that one or two of them even had to pushed off the ferry boat. By then they'd been sitting in a locked, parking lot in Limassol for a year, open to the sun, dust, and everything. They were worthless. I don't know whatever exactly happened to them.

That was a minor aspect of the Lebanon situation. But a more significant matter, perhaps, was that for the better part of the next year and a half or so the only way, or the best way, for Americans to get to Beirut was by helicopter from Larnaca [Cyprus]. This connection came up in an odd way. Early in the fall of 1982 I received a message from the [U. S.] Navy Headquarters in Naples, saying that during the early period the [U. S.] Marines were in Beirut one problem was that they couldn't get any mail. This was a morale problem during those first few months. You may remember that the Marines were pulled out of Beirut after the PLO left Lebanon and then were reintroduced right after the massacres at the Shatila and Sabre refugee camps. It was after that second deployment [of the Marines to Beirut] that I was asked whether I thought that there was any way for Cyprus to be used [to base] a helicopter to take mail into Beirut. I thought, "Well, that sounds like a great idea. Why not?" Since Cyprus is a place where you could get things decided very quickly, I made an appointment and went over and saw the Foreign Minister that morning. I said, "This question has come up, and you're interested in peace in Lebanon. You know why our forces are there--to try and stabilize the situation. We're not asking you to send forces yourselves or do anything more difficult, but what would you think about having a couple of helicopters and a few people at the civilian airport in Larnaca which could take U. S. mail to the Marines there?" The Foreign Minister said, "Well, that sounds like a good idea. Let me talk to the President, and I'll get back to you." Within an hour, after I had returned to the Embassy, I received a phone call and was told that this arrangement would be fine. I communicated that to Naples, and they were delighted. It was only later that the State Department heard about this.

It later turned into quite an operation and continued for years and years after I left Cyprus. At the time we were using this service not only to support the Marines in Beirut but also the U. S. Fleet that was offshore Cyprus for months at a time. I remember once standing there [at the airport in Larnaca] with the Soviet Ambassador, waiting for the arrival or departure of some head of state. A US C-5, an enormous aircraft, landed at Larnaca. He just looked at it, because Cyprus took pride at being a neutral country. Here was a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement...

Q: A C-5 is as big as they come.

EWING: Can't get any bigger. Anyway, it was an important arrangement. Various officials came to Cyprus that way. Secretary of Defense Weinberger came, Vice President Bush was there at one point, as were many members of Congress. It gave us a few headaches in terms of logistical support but also an opportunity for them to see at least a tiny bit of Cyprus. Sometimes a senior Cypriot Government official would come down to Larnaca to receive a high level visitor.

Q: I might mention as an aside that I've just finished an interview with Terry McNamara, our Deputy Chief of Mission in Beirut, a little later in this period. He said that during the nastiest times in Beirut this was the way we got our people out and in during the terrorist gang fighting that was going on in Beirut.

EWING: Yes, it was really essential. It allowed us to keep our Embassy open [in Beirut]. I think that you can argue whether that was a good idea or not. But the helicopters were vital to assure access to the Embassy in Beirut. And even in the periods that were sort of calm--the interludes between the fighting and tension, and there were some brief periods--we continued to think that the helicopter flights were the most secure. It was much better to use them than to use the ferry boats, which also operated from Larnaca to both East and West Beirut.

In the late fall of 1982 I was invited out to visit one of the U. S. Navy ships--I think it was the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY.

Q: An aircraft carrier.

EWING: Yes. This was for briefings and to see what we were helping and supporting. I took along the Minister of Defense of Cyprus, on another occasion, it was a fairly quiet time, so they flew me to another ship just off the [Lebanese] coast from Beirut and then into the [Beirut] airport. I was taken around to see what the Marines were doing and then to the Embassy, where I met with Ambassador Bob Dillon and had lunch at his residence. They took me back to the airport and flew me, by fixed wing aircraft, back to Cyprus. It gave me at least a chance to see Beirut.

Q: After all is said and done about how we wanted to see everything get back to normal, I take it that our relations were preponderantly with the Greeks. Our Embassy was located in Greek [Cypriot] territory, this was where decisions were made, and all that. Is it fair to say that or not?

EWING: Yes. The United States had its diplomatic relationship with the Government of Cyprus, which was the government representing the Republic of Cyprus abroad. I was accredited as United States Ambassador to that government, and our Embassy certainly had relationships with all of that government's departments.

Q: And all of which were essentially in Greek [Cypriot] territory, staffed by Greek Cypriots?

EWING: Yes. That was in Nicosia, in Greek Nicosia. However, we also recognized that the Turkish Cypriots needed to be a party to any settlement of the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Cypriots were there in Cyprus to stay. They were obviously very close to an important ally, a friend of the United States--Turkey. Therefore, as United States Ambassador, I felt that it was appropriate that I should have contact with some key Turkish Cypriots. So I would regularly see Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. I would also see the negotiator in the inter-communal talks for the Turkish Cypriot community. And I would meet regularly with the representative of Turkey--the Turkish Ambassador, who was not accredited to the Republic of Cyprus. He never came across to the Greek side and stayed on the Turkish side. I would go and meet with him, frequently. I would also see other Turkish Cypriots, including ministers and officials of their so-called "Government" on a social basis, including at a residence that the U. S. Embassy [in Ankara] rented for us, just outside of Kyrenia.

Q: This was essentially the "capital" [of Turkish Cyprus]?

EWING: No, their "capital," and you have to put it in quotation marks, was on the Turkish side of Nicosia. Kyrenia is a port. It was the seaport for hydrofoils and ferry boats--to Turkey. It is one of the more famous resorts in the northern part of Cyprus, Famagusta being the other one, in the eastern part of the island [also in Turkish Cyprus]. We had a house in Kyrenia. We would go there on weekends. It was delightful to be in a very quiet and beautiful place, but it was also a place where we could invite Turkish Cypriots to come for receptions, to see a movie, or whatever. Congressman Solarz once was there. He and Denktash had a meeting on the porch of our residence there. So those were the contacts which we had with the Turkish Cypriots. Now, other officers of the Embassy also had some contacts below the ministerial level. We had a political officer in our Embassy who spoke Turkish. He had a number of contacts with political party figures and others. We also had a small office in the Turkish part of Nicosia, staffed by Foreign Service Nationals who had been with the Embassy for a long time. There was a total of three of them. They would arrange appointments for us with Turkish Cypriot officials. Whatever we had to do with them, they would arrange it. I think that one of them was a part-time librarian and we kept a small collection of books and university catalogues at the office. But we also had some other programs for Cyprus which were of benefit to the Turkish Cypriots, as well as to the Greek Cypriots. We had an assistance program. A share of that program was administered through the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees for the benefit of the Turkish Cypriots. While I was there, we also started, with the strong support of Congress, "The Cyprus-American Scholarship Program" for college and university study in the United States. Some of those scholarships went to Turkish Cypriots as well. They also had an opportunity to compete for Fulbright Scholarships.

Q: As happens in other, divided countries, did you have a problem with people watching you closely to ensure that you didn't do this or that? This isn't exactly like Israel dealing with the Palestinians, but did you have to be very careful about the balance between scholarship awards to the two Cypriot communities? Or were people more relaxed?

EWING: No, I think that people were watching us constantly, all the time. Anything that appeared in the newspapers was read intently by the other side. So we had to exercise a certain discretion. If I'd spent all of my time on the Greek side and never gone to the Turkish side, I think that the Turks would have regarded me as totally one-sided in my activities. Or, if I'd neglected the Greek side and gone around and done things on the Turkish side, beyond what I said before were our policy contacts, that would have created a problem as well. In 1983 Denktash [the Turkish Cypriot leader] declared the independence of his state. He called it "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." This was somewhat of a surprise, although we had thought of it as a possibility. We weren't sure that Turkey would allow him to do it. Fairly soon after that, after some argument and discussion with Washington, we essentially took the posture that this action didn't mean a thing and that we weren't going to recognize it. In fact, no other countries in the world recognized this new status, other than Turkey, of course. I would continue to meet with Denktash as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community but not as the president of "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." In fact, I went to see him fairly soon after their declaration. There were some people who thought it was too soon. But it seemed fairly important to me to do this quickly to get across the idea that nothing had changed and that he was still the leader of [the Turkish Cypriot] community. However, we were not going to accept that this new step had any particular political significance. We were essentially going to ignore it. I think that this was the right thing to do. But, as I say, some people on the Greek Cypriot side and some people in Washington felt that it was, perhaps, premature to do that.

Q: Did Denktash get into a position of saying that unless you see me as the president of my republic, I won't see you or anything like that? You can get into such a situation.

EWING: Oh, yes, he could certainly have made it difficult for himself. On the other hand, I think that he realized that there was value in contact, that if the American Ambassador was willing to come and listen to him--even though without acknowledging the title and status that he'd like to have--there were advantages in that. He knew that we would report and seriously take into account his point of view. Of course, the other thing was that the United States was giving far more help and assistance to the Turkish Cypriots than anybody else in the world (other than Turkey), and it was to his advantage not to be 100% dependent on Turkey, but to be able to say to Turkey, "Well, others are taking me seriously, paying attention to me and giving our area help." It was obviously to his advantage, as well, with other diplomats and with the United Nations. When I saw him the first time, I told him, "I am going to have to make clear that I am not calling on you as president of 'The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.'" He replied, "Well, you do what you want." He didn't argue with me about that or say that he never could see me again.

Q: Did you make clear to the other side, the Greek Cypriots, that this was what you were doing?

EWING: I did. They weren't too happy with it, because they thought that it was too soon. But we made it clear to them that this was the basis on which it had been done.

Q: What is your impression of Denktash and Kyprianou?

EWING: Well, neither one liked each other at all or had much respect for each other. I always thought that there were two Greek Cypriots whom Denktash knew, respected, and could, perhaps, have worked with. One was Archbishop Makarios, and the other was, of course, Clerides. In fact, one of the agreements going back to 1977 was between Makarios and Denktash. I don't think that Denktash particularly liked or admired Makarios, but he did respect his position, political background, and so on. As far as Clerides was concerned, he and Denktash had similar backgrounds. They were roughly the same age and were both lawyers. They had known each other and negotiated together for a long time. I think that Denktash saw Clerides as a practical person who was more interested in trying to solve an issue than to make points, and so on. But I don't think that Denktash had much respect for Kyprianou [He didn't respect him], and, certainly, Kyprianou didn't think much of Denktash. By that time they had had one or two meetings together, but most people didn't see much point in trying to work out a high level meeting. That probably wasn't going to get very far.

Q: How about your impression of these two? Did you have problems with either of them?

EWING: Well, I had problems with both of them, I guess, to some extent. I always thought that Denktash could posture and parade with the best of them, especially in a larger group. When I met him, one on one, over a cup of coffee, I thought that he was a different person from what he was in public. I think that he believed that he had accomplished a lot. He had more or less what he wanted--control of his area. His people and he had a certain position and stature. Maybe the rest of the world didn't pay much attention to it, but they felt secure and able to run things themselves. I think that they thought that in any kind of settlement or arrangement with the Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots would probably come out ahead, because they were clever, capable, and effective. [He felt that] they weren't to be trusted. On the other hand Kyprianou sort of spoke the same way. He had the high ground, in terms of international support, recognition, and prestige. And to give up on the idea of a unified Cyprus, with the Greek Cypriots in charge, clearly, would have been a loss, even though the [Greek Cypriots] would have gained in getting some additional territory, perhaps allowing refugees to go back, and getting an opportunity to do business throughout the whole island. Just that idea of giving up their goal, their ideal, was something that gave them very little incentive really to negotiate.

Q: Were there any particular developments between them during the time you were there?

EWING: There was very little, really. The establishment of "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" was a setback. We spent a lot of our time with the UN Special Representative. During most of the time that I was there he was Hugo Gobbi, from Argentina. We [tried] to find a formula to get talks going, or to resume the talks that had taken place intermittently in the past. There were a few, occasional meetings, but really there wasn't a lot of progress or development.

There was some effort made to find "confidence building measures" or efforts to bridge some of the difficulties. The United Nations Development Program [UNDP] tried to do a few things with both communities in Nicosia in particular, relating, for example, to sewer and water supply systems. As far as the United States was concerned, we talked a little bit before about the Reagan administration wanting to make some kind of an effort--although maybe not having the same priority, as far as Cyprus was concerned. Secretary of State Haig recognized that during the Carter administration a lot of the things that the State Department had done, such as [assigning] primary responsibility for Cyprus to a high level officer, (Counselor Nimetz) gave a certain visibility to our efforts. This made it possible for the Secretary of State to avoid spending a lot of time on Cyprus. As much as anybody, Secretary Haig arranged to have a special Cyprus coordinator appointed. That was done before I went to Cyprus. The first person to fill this position was Reginald Bartholomew. He was connected to the Office of Southern European Affairs but could also deal at higher levels as well. Bartholomew recognized that not very much was likely to happen and that, if he were to come to Cyprus, that would give the impression that we were preparing to take an initiative or involve ourselves to an extent that we really did not want to do. So he never came to Cyprus as Special Cyprus Coordinator during the time I was there. The first time I saw him in Cyprus--although we had known each other before, and I actually met with him in Greece on one occasion just after he gave up this position and became a negotiator on our bases in Greece. He visited Cyprus when he was Ambassador to Lebanon to attend a meeting at my residence with Don Rumsfeld, who had just taken up the position of Middle East negotiator and wanted to meet quietly with Bartholomew and our Ambassador to Israel and Syria.

Later on, other Cyprus special coordinators did visit Cyprus. I don't think that the problem of a perception that we were prepared to launch major Cyprus initiatives was, in fact, a real difficulty.

Q: While you were there, did you find that your part of Cyprus was a hotbed of Israeli-PLO "games"? Was this a problem for you? I'm talking about a few assassinations and things like that?

EWING: Let me answer that but first take issue with your saying, "My" part of Cyprus. I considered that all of Cyprus was part of my responsibilities.

Q: All right. Point taken.

EWING: That was the basis on which we traveled in northern Cyprus, because we considered all of Cyprus was our area of responsibility, even though the government's control only extended to a part of Cyprus. All of Cyprus was part of the Republic of Cyprus except for the British Sovereign Base Areas. We could travel there as well.

However, as to your question about Israeli and Palestinian activities, this only pertained to Greek Cyprus, because I don't think that either Israelis or Palestinians were ever very active in northern Cyprus, to my knowledge. Because of Cyprus' geographic location and the ease of travel to all parts of the Middle East and North Africa, it was certainly a place where Israelis, Palestinians, Libyans, and Arabs of all kinds were present and active, engaging in business, [holding] meetings, and doing various things. In terms of activities directed against diplomatic offices, I don't remember very much happening. I know that the Israeli Embassy was attacked with a bomb not long after I left. One of the things, I think, worth keeping in mind is the fact that Israel had an Ambassador to Cyprus. Israel had diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level, which was not the case with either Greece or Turkey at the time. Israel was [represented] there. Cyprus Airways flew three flights a week to Tel Aviv, as well as to Baghdad, Damascus, and Cairo. The Libyans were active there. Their airline office was bombed. It was just a few blocks down from our chancery, which was also our residence. So we were always very aware [of the situation].

We talked before about tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In terms of security for the Embassy and security in general there was certainly a greater threat from outside the island than from activity within the island. Since the killing of Ambassador Rodger Davies in 1974 the Cypriot Government had provided a full-time security detail to United States

Ambassadors. When I arrived in 1981, I was met by a seven-member detail of Greek Cypriot policemen who went with me everywhere I went outside of the Embassy in Greek Cyprus. When I went across to Turkish Cyprus, they would accompany me to the United Nations checkpoint, and we would go beyond that point on our own. In my view at the time the only real reason for continuing with this arrangement was the history of the problem but, more importantly, the possibility of something happening from outside Cyprus. Eventually, after I'd been there a year or so, I realized that this protection was really a bit much and that, if I did something purely spontaneously, like taking my daughter to school or to the Marine House to see a movie or to do a baby sitting job--or even, say, on Sunday morning, to go to the North--it probably wasn't necessary to have a security detail with me. I eased up a bit. I felt much more comfortable and I tell you that my children really felt much better. It had been a bit intimidating for them, especially with all of the weapons around.

Q: How did you find the Embassy staff while you were there?

EWING: It was a fairly small staff. I suppose, by [the usual] American Embassy standards, it would have been called a medium sized Embassy. We had about 40 Americans, including our Marine Security Guard detail. There were people there with the FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, who were monitoring primarily [regional] radio stations in the Middle East region. We had a few people there with the United States Information Service; a couple of political officers, one speaking Greek and the other speaking Turkish; an economic/commercial officer who, in many ways, was one of the busiest in the Embassy because, not only did he do economic reporting and assist the increasingly active US business community and support the possibility of promoting the export of U. S. goods and services, he also was the only point of contact with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees concerning our aid program which, oddly enough, was running at about $15 million per year--without AID [Agency for International Development] actually being present on the island. We had, of course, a security officer. It was a highly competent staff with great ability and dedication. I think that they enjoyed Cyprus. The local people were very nice, and I think that most of us found friends both on the Greek Cypriot as well as the Turkish Cypriot side. We enjoyed the archeological activity. There was something there called "The Cyprus-American Archeological Research Institute" which supported various "digs" on the Greek Cypriot side. We had a chance to visit most of those during the time that I was there.

The other thing that was happening, as I think I said before, was the economic burgeoning of Greek Cyprus, which was all to the good, because it was raising income levels. It was also overwhelming, as hotels were built along this beautiful coastline, not always with full regard for the environmental impact.

Q: You left Cyprus in 1984 and came back to Washington. Could you talk about your next job, how you got it, and what you were doing?

EWING: There was kind of an interval there. I didn't have an onward assignment when I came back from Cyprus, except on a short-term basis. I was asked to head the United States Delegation to the meeting of the Group on Mediterranean Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--CSCE. This meeting took place in Venice in late October, 1984. In preparing for that conference I paid visits to Brussels (NATO Headquarters), London, Tel Aviv, and Rome. That pretty well took me through the fall. Then I was asked to be a negotiator on a new Status of Forces agreement in Greece. I spent some time preparing for that negotiation in Washington, with the Defense Department and other interested agencies. It fairly quickly became apparent that the Greek Government under Prime Minister Papandreou really wasn't ready for any such negotiation and that the negotiations were very unlikely to take place. I think that, with some reluctance, the American Embassy in Athens agreed with that assessment. They wanted to have a negotiator ready, but the Greeks turned the idea down. It was clear that nothing really was going to happen.

I asked the European Bureau if they would be willing to keep me on "stand by" in case the Greek negotiations got under way and let me go over and study French at the Foreign Service Institute. They were agreeable, so I studied French for about 16 weeks. Near the end of that time Stephen Low, who was the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, came down to the French class one day and asked if I'd be interested in being the Dean of the School of Language Studies at the FSI. Not having a better offer at the time and thinking that it would be kind of interesting and a chance to manage a fairly active program, I agreed to do that. I started that in the summer of 1985. Between my French studies and the FSI assignment, the Under Secretary for Management asked me to head up a committee studying all mid-level training in the State Department. There had been a course for mid-level officers, six months in duration, that was wildly unpopular. They asked us to take a look at that and mid-level training in general. We made a series of recommendations, including dropping that course immediately. We came up with a concept of what we called a "Continuum of Mid-Level Training," under which we would have a series of shorter, more focused assignment or job specific training to substitute for the mid-career course, and that was generally accepted.

Q: Was the problem of mid-level training that it took too long, or was it a kind of parenthesis or generally awkward time for people?

EWING: Yes, all of that. The people who liked it the most were consular and administrative officers, who saw it as a chance to break out of their fairly narrow areas of specialization. But to most officers it was too much, too long, it interrupted their career progression, and they didn't have the desire--there wasn't the demand for that kind of training. That was essentially our conclusion there.

I began in July, 1985, as the Dean of the School of Language Studies.

Q: What were some of the major things that you had to deal with in connection with language studies?

EWING: I thought that the major role for the Dean was to connect the School of Language Studies and other elements of the Foreign Service Institute with other parts of the State Department, and with other agencies as well. I saw it as primarily an outreach and coordination function. To some extent it was a problem solving job as well. I didn't go to the classrooms and teach classes and didn't really have a lot to say about the techniques of teaching languages. We had some very able teachers and instructors and also supervisors who were very gifted in those areas. I tried to make sure that we were meeting the demands of our client agencies, that we were responsive to the needs of not only the State Department but other agencies as well, that our program was integrated and well coordinated with the schools of area studies and professional studies, and that we were responsive to the Director of the FSI.

At that time a decision was made to relocate the FSI to Arlington Hall. So we had already begun during the time that I was there to think about how we could take advantage of that opportunity in new quarters and get away from the frustrations of the several buildings we had in the Rosslyn area. Either they were too hot [in summer] or some of them were too cold in the winter. Generally, they weren't designed for language training at all.

Q: You were there until 1987? What was your impression of the attitude toward language training, on the part of the management of the Department of State?

EWING: It was mixed. I think that everybody paid lip service to the importance of speaking effectively in a foreign language, when an officer was assigned to a post which required the foreign language ability. One of the concerns during the time I was there in the School of Language Studies, which Ron Spiers [Under Secretary for Management] and others expressed, was that our competence in "hard" foreign languages, in particular, was eroding, and we ought to see what we could do to beef that up. He asked Ambassador Monty Stearns, who had just come back from Greece, to do a study of how we could do that more effectively--especially in terms of Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian. We worked closely with him. Some of his recommendations, I think, went further than either FSI or the rest of the Department was prepared to accept at that juncture. But I think that there was a recognition that we were not as well served by our foreign language officers as we needed to be, and we ought to try to see what we could do to improve them.

Q: Then you moved from being Dean of the School of Language Studies to Personnel for what--about a year and a half, from 1987 to 1989?

EWING: Yes. I'd been at FSI only about a year and a half. I certainly had expected to stay there somewhat longer, was enjoying the work there, and certainly there was no need for me to leave. But George Vest, who had become the Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Personnel, asked me if I would be willing to come over to the Bureau of Personnel and be the Director of the Office of Foreign Service Career Development and Assignments. I saw that as an opportunity and a challenge and welcomed that chance, although I had never worked in Personnel before. It was hard at first because I came into that job right in the middle of the assignment cycle. It was hard to come up to speed quickly. However, Bill Swing, who had been the director of the office that I went into, had been moved up to be the Deputy Assistant Secretary with George Vest to replace Hank Cohen, who had gone over to the NSC [National Security Council] staff. Bill was a good boss, he had the [necessary] experience and background, and [he] gave me a lot of good guidance. So I wound up doing that for about two and a half years. I was there for most of three assignment cycles.

Q: What were the main "challenges," to use a Foreign Service term?

EWING: That office is one of the largest in the Department. A part of the challenge was to administer and manage it effectively. We had, I think, 12 or 13 divisions, with something like 80 people in the office. I had a very capable and effective deputy--first, Bill Farrand. Then, when he left, Jim Tull came in. Jim Tull had been the DCM in Cyprus. We had had a very close, effective, and, I think, fortunate relationship there, so I was very glad to have Jim come in. So just managing the office was a challenge.

Then the other challenge was to try to make the "open assignment" system work the way it ought to work. This required constant hand holding, if you will, particularly [with] senior officers but also with others who felt aggrieved that they weren't being heard. I had to lend my ear to a lot of people. And then the most exciting and interesting thing each week was chairing each Friday what is called the Inter-Functional Panel, which handles all of the assignments of senior officers and a good many assignments which cut across the "cones." That was fun, as I got to be comfortable with it. That was something that we looked forward to each Friday.

Q: The assignment process, in many ways, is the "guts" of the Foreign Service, because the promotion system--I've served on promotion panels and think that it is a pretty fair system--and careers depend on the "right" assignments. There are a lot of assignments which are just not "career enhancing." The new Foreign Service Act puts such a premium on moving up or out. It doesn't seem to allow much flexibility. Were you wrestling with this problem?

EWING: We were certainly wrestling with that problem every day. The "open assignment" process [is that it] requires the Foreign Service employee to assume a great deal of responsibility and interest and to participate in the assignment process. We tried very hard--not entirely successfully, but tried hard--to overcome the bureau "old boy" networks, in order to give openings and opportunities to people who were qualified and able and needed "career enhancing" assignments but who were, perhaps, not part of a favored "network." Sometimes we succeeded and sometimes we failed. I guess I tend to be a little defensive about it, but I think that there was more fairness--and certainly more seriousness--than many people gave us credit for at that particular time. Both the career development and assignment officers, I think, had a lot of integrity. They tried very hard to be fair. Certainly, when we met in the panel, we had at times very strenuous and exhausting arguments about what was the best thing [to do]. The motivation, as far as we were concerned, was what was the best for the Foreign Service and what was the best thing to do for the individual employee. Not necessarily what was best for EUR or NEA but what made the most sense from an overall, Foreign Service perspective and what, in the long run, would be best for the individual.

Q: But you know, as you say that, one of the things that one looks at--and I'm now out of the system; at the time I was in it I had a different perspective--is the fact that, in many ways, what is best for EUR is essentially best for the United States. I mean, the Foreign Service should not exist as a "career enhancing" program. Rather, it is a matter of how to project American knowledge, information, and policies in the best way possible. It's really not "old boy" business. It looks like "old boy" business, but to a certain extent, to get the right person [in the right job] may mean keeping somebody for five or ten years in a job in which he [or she] is extremely competent.

EWING: I would hope that when we made our decisions, and I should have said before, we were trying to do it from the objective of what's best for the United States. Certainly, that ought to be our primary consideration. On the other hand you need to have a certain pattern and framework. You have to balance a lot of considerations. A person may be regarded by the bureau and maybe by an ambassador as indispensable and the only person who could do a given job. You used an extreme example. You said "10 years." That, in fact, may be the case. On the other hand, what is going to happen when the 11th year comes around? Don't you need to have somebody else in the pipeline, learning the language, getting the experience--and, in some cases, getting the perspective, which does not come only from being in, say, Germany, but perhaps being in Japan or in Africa. So there are a lot of things that need to be weighed. We tried very hard to do that. We also felt that it was important to have some predictability of rules, so that people didn't spend all of their time in Washington, or all of their time in Japan, or even all of their time overseas. It's a delicate balance. I think that during the time I was there--I'm outside the system now and have been outside of Personnel for quite a while--I had the feeling that it worked most of the time. The problem is that it didn't work all of the time, not that it [only] worked some of the time. Sure, there probably were cases where an officer was put in the wrong job at the wrong time. We tried to avoid too many square pegs being put in too many round holes, but that certainly happened sometimes. I recognize that at times in the past our women officers have not always had the same opportunities as our men officers. Certainly, minority officers were not always given a chance. So we've got to give special consideration in several directions as well. I think that in the future more will be done in this respect than when I was there.

Q: Were you making a special effort to assign women as Deputy Chiefs of Mission?

EWING: We were working hard at that, but not as hard, again, as happened later on. I think that a much more conscious effort was made to make sure that there were more women selected. At the time I was there, I was the secretary of the DCM committee, which was chaired by the Director General and included the Under Secretary for Management, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel. At those meetings we often talked about women or minorities or both being put on DCM lists for ambassadors to consider. However, once again, at that time, if the chief of mission had somebody in mind or preferred somebody on the list who wasn't a woman or from a minority group, we would let him make the choice. Subsequently, more of an effort was made to "force" the issue, so the situation was moving in that direction, but not to the same extent as subsequently was the case.

Q: Then in 1989 you went to Ghana as Ambassador. How did that come about, or was there an interim period there?

EWING: In 1989, with the change of administration, it was clear that it was time for me to move out. I'd spent two and a half years in Personnel and I was ready to go on to something else. It had been five years since I'd come back from Cyprus. For family and other reasons I had decided that it was really time to go overseas. I was very anxious to have the opportunity to have another ambassadorial assignment in 1989. There were numerous discussions with Director General George Vest and then with Ed Perkins, who succeeded him in that position, as well as with Bill Swing, about various possibilities. Ghana was not on the original list of ambassadorial vacancies in 1989. [Ambassador] Steve Lyne, [who was then in Ghana], had some health problems, and, fairly late in the process, decided that he would need to leave there in the summer of 1989. So Ghana was put on the list fairly late. I had the good fortune to be put on the list and was selected by the committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary, which looked at State Department career nominations. I'd never served in Africa before, so there was understandably some resistance from the African Bureau, including from Hank Cohen, who had just come in as Assistant Secretary. His objection was not so much to me as a person but because of my lack of African experience. But eventually I was nominated by President Bush.

Q: Was there a "political" candidate for the post of ambassador coming out of the White House at this time?

EWING: No. It was clear that the position was going to go to a Foreign Service Officer. That was not an issue at all at that time. As far as the African Bureau was concerned, it was simply a matter of one of "their own," or somebody else. And that would be the only difference.

Q: You were in Ghana from 1989 to 1992. What were American interests in Ghana?

EWING: Certainly, American interests were limited. There was no geopolitical or strategic interest. We were interested in seeing Ghana develop politically toward a more democratic system. We were very supportive of this, in terms of our aid program and Ghana's economic recovery program. When I went there, the economic recovery program was already established and under way. It was getting good marks from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the donor community generally. We very much wanted to encourage that, not only for the benefit of Ghana and whatever U. S. business and economic interests might exist, but just as importantly for the model and the precedent that would be set for other countries in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. We also recognized that Ghana, perhaps, had a slightly greater role which it wanted to play in Africa and in the world than might be warranted by its size--15 million people. In turn, this went back to its history. Ghana was the first independent country in Black Africa after World War II. It achieved its independence in 1957. Kwame Nkrumah was one of the leaders and founders of the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement. Ghana took seriously its role in the United Nations and other international agencies. It was quite active in international peace keeping activity in Lebanon and elsewhere. Therefore, it played a role in the world which was somewhat larger than, perhaps, would have been expected. We had a dialogue with the Ghanaians about South Africa and a number of international questions.

Q: What was the political situation in Ghana when you were there?

EWING: Jerry Rawlings had seized power on December 31, 1981. He came out of the Air Force, was a Flight Lieutenant, and kept that rank. The government had been formed under the Provisional National Defense Council, the PNDC. It had become somewhat more civilian oriented as time went by. He had always said that, when the time was ripe, Ghana would be returned to a democratic system when the people were ready for that. At the time I got there, there was no clear indication of when that time would come. Fortunately, it came when I was there. It was exciting to see the process of opening up and liberalizing the system. By the time I left, there were many newspapers being published which were very free and open in their criticism of the government. There was a Consultative Assembly which drafted a new constitution, which was approved and put into effect shortly after I left. Elections took place for both president and vice president and for a Parliament--again, just after I left. Rawlings was elected President at that time. But, as I say, it was a time when political parties were legalized and became active. It was an exciting time to be there--a very satisfying time, although Ghana did this for lots of reasons and not just interest expressed by the United States or by anybody else. However, it all happened in that period, basically in the 1991-1992 period.

Q: Did you have much contact with Rawlings?

EWING: Yes and no. I didn't have as much contact with him as some of my predecessors had, at a time when he was probably insecure and may perhaps have relished the thought of a long conversation with somebody who wasn't an enemy but an ambassador he could talk with. I met with him on several occasions by myself--I think there were three occasions--once, shortly after I presented my credentials and once at a time when Ghana was very concerned about the situation in Liberia and essentially made the decision to intervene there, along with other West African states. He invited me to come to his private living quarters at the Castle. We had a meeting which was really quite interesting and not really known of by others. And then there was another meeting before I left. Then, in addition to that, I went to see him with several visitors. Assistant Secretary Cohen came shortly after the Liberian intervention had begun. Deputy Assistant Secretary Leonard Robinson came a couple of times. I went with Congressmen and with various delegations to see him. I would see him socially or at various events. I felt that I had a good relationship with him. He was not a person who would call me up in the middle of the night and ask me to come down and talk. I was just as happy that I did not have that kind of relationship.

Q: Tell me about the Liberian situation. Did we play any role in it? What caused it and what was happening?

EWING: The Liberian civil war began in late 1989 when Charles Taylor invaded Liberia from Ivory Coast, a neighboring country. This caused many people to flee their homes and eventually led to the death of President Samuel Doe. The Ghanaian aspect was interesting. It started out because of their great concern about the threat to Ghanaians who were residents of Liberia. But Ghana also had a concern about the disarray, the chaos, and the number of people being killed. Liberia was a country which was not an immediate neighbor of Ghana but was a fellow, English-speaking country in the subregion. The Ghanaians became increasingly concerned about the situation there. They did not particularly like Charles Taylor. They had known him. He had been in Ghana and under detention. They were afraid of what would happen if he were to take charge [of Liberia]. They decided that things had gotten very bad there. I think that they would have liked to see the United States intervene, although they didn't quite come out and directly say that. However, they saw Liberia in many ways as an "American" country, an "American" problem. They thought that we ought to have done more to try to address and resolve the situation.

By the summer of 1990 they felt that things were at a point where something had to be done. They didn't see the United States or the United Nations doing it, so they took the lead, to some extent, together with other countries in the subregion, to do something about it. At one stage they were even talking about doing it themselves--unilaterally. Then they realized quickly that Nigeria was also concerned and was prepared to do this with them, together with some other countries, too. So the West African Peace Keeping Force was established--ECOMOG--which also included Guinea and Sierra Leone. General Quainoo, a Ghanaian, was appointed as the first commander of ECOMOG. I remember that our role in the Embassy was in some ways a little bit out in front of the United States, because I think that Washington was not quite sure whether the West African states could pull this off or could do anything effectively. [The U. S. wasn't] quite ready to endorse this initiative in its early stages. I remember that General Quainu and Mohammed Chambas, who was kind of his political adviser and was Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs, came to our residence on a Sunday before they went into Monrovia. We had a very low key, informal kind of conversation which went on for several hours, with me and one of the political officers in the Embassy. In a sense they didn't have a clue about what they were getting into. They didn't know Monrovia. Part of what we did was to sit down with an oil company road map of Monrovia. We said, this is where Charles Taylor is, this is where the other elements are, this is where President Doe is and this is where the airport is. We weren't trying to tell them what they should do but we were at least giving them some basic information that wasn't immediately available to them from any other source.

So we had a relationship with the Ghanaians. In fact, when Rawlings called me in, he was anxious to have the United States be as supportive of ECOMOG as we possibly could be and do things that Ghana wouldn't have asked the United States to do under other circumstances. They wouldn't have wanted to admit it. I think that they were disappointed that we weren't immediately responsive, although Hank Cohen's visit a few weeks later led to increased U. S. cooperation and support, including some financial assistance, although in general I think that the Ghanaians never thought that we did as much or were as supportive as they would have liked. But we were able to help them in a low key way. And we developed a relationship which our ambassadors in both Monrovia and Freetown were able to develop further in arranging for cooperation and collaboration with ECOMOG.

Q: How did this intervention work out?

EWING: The intervention has to get a kind of mixed report card. On the one hand it eventually led to a kind of status quo cessation of hostilities. A considerable period went by when nobody was dying, or fewer people were dying and not much fighting was going on. On the other hand it didn't lead to a political solution or to the withdrawal of Charles Taylor or a pullout by the West African states, either. It led to a kind of stalemate. In a sense it was a success because it was better than having people die or having Charles Taylor take full charge of Monrovia. In that sense it was successful and timely.

Q: You were in Ghana during the demise of the Soviet Empire and so much of what flowed from that. Did that have any repercussions where you were? So much of our policy in Ghana, particularly in the earlier years, was focused on Soviet versus United States influence in Africa. Had this pretty well died by the time you got there or was this still a...

EWING: The Cold War was well on its way out. I think that one of the elements that influenced Jerry Rawlings in his decision to allow the country to move to return to a democratic system was looking at what had happened in Eastern Europe. Not so much only the Soviet Union but Romania, East Germany, and so on. I think that he saw that the movement toward a democratic system was pretty prevalent, not only in Eastern Europe. Other countries of Africa and other parts of the world were moving in that direction as well. He was a very proud person and was very determined that he was not going to do this because the United States or the World Bank told him to. He was going to do it because it was the right thing to do. So it turned out that he was ahead of the curve to some extent and ahead of the pressure. I think that we realized, at least in the Embassy, that hard pressure and threats weren't going to work with him. Pointing out some of these trends could have and did have an impact, but I don't think that we deserved any particular amount of credit for moves in that direction.

The Soviet Embassy was there. They had given some assistance to Ghana in the past, but I think that they were essentially a non-factor already by the time I arrived there.

Q: Were you under any instructions or pressure to bring Ghana along? Did you have to serve as a buffer to carry out instructions but not push too hard?

EWING: I think that the feeling in the Department, particularly in the African Bureau, about Ghana at the time I went was probably somewhat more negative than I thought was warranted. Negative for several reasons. These included the human rights and political situation. The bureau saw the abuses and the lack of opportunities for self-expression, rather than the potential for positive change. The bureau also continued to be concerned that the Ghanaians in the United Nations and elsewhere were critical of "the West" in general and the United States in particular. I remember having a discussion with the bureau where I said, "This glass is half full and not half empty, and I'd like to look for opportunities to develop things further and see if there aren't ways in which we can not only develop our relationship with Ghana but move in the right direction." I didn't feel that I was inhibited from trying to do that. However, I also knew that any time that something would happen, people in Washington would say, "See, we told you so. You can't trust the Ghanaians." There was a history of very uneasy relationships which covered the better part of 25 years, going way back to Nkrumah. During a good part of the subsequent period Ghana had been under military rule--for most of its history since independence, with some exceptions of brief duration. Rawlings was not particularly liked, respected, or admired.

There were a couple of things going. One of the things that happened just prior to my going there, early in 1989, occurred at the funeral in Tokyo of Emperor Hirohito. President Bush, who had been newly inaugurated, had gone to that, as had Jerry Rawlings, who didn't travel much abroad and didn't particularly like to go to conferences or ceremonial events. I think that he recognized how important Japan was. Japan was the largest [if not one of the largest] bilateral aid donor to Ghana. Japan had shown a lot of interest and respect for him. Both President Bush, when I went [to the White House] for a "photo opportunity" before going to Ghana, and Rawlings soon after I met him for the first time told me essentially the same story. Apparently, one of the events at Emperor Hirohito's funeral was held outside. It was rather a cold, gray Tokyo day in February. They pulled a curtain or drape or some such thing. The wind really whipped up. President Bush was cold and showed it by pulling his sleeves down. Somebody tapped him on the shoulder. He looked back, and [somebody] recognized [him and told him] that it was somebody from Africa, who offered him a scarf. President Bush said, "Oh, no, I'm all right." The person persisted--and it was Jerry Rawlings. Finally, [President Bush] took the scarf and wrapped it around him. As he said to me later, "I really felt good. It saved my life," because it was a bitterly cold day. President Bush was very appreciative, and the next day he sent the scarf back to Rawlings with a little token or gift--cufflinks or something like that. The Embassy officer who went to deliver the gift, to his surprise was ushered into Rawlings' suite at the hotel, and they had quite a nice, brief, but cordial conversation. Later, Rawlings wrote a nice, long letter of thanks--certainly, more than would be expected. He sent along a "Kente" cloth, and the White House responded with an equally warm letter of appreciation. President Bush said to me, "We all know about 'ping pong' diplomacy with the Chinese, and I've never heard of 'scarf' diplomacy but perhaps something can develop with Ghana." There is no question that Jerry Rawlings had a certain respect for George Bush which he really didn't have for Ronald Reagan.

I think that, partly as a result of this and for lots of other reasons the Ghanaians weren't going out of their way to take issue with or find fault with the United States. It seemed to me that here was an opportunity, at least in public, to look for ways to see things develop in a positive way. That was the general posture and attitude that I took. Certainly, there were problems with democratic expression and restrictions on what people could do and say. There were problems of more interest to the United States, such as the banning of the Mormon Church and Jehovah's Witnesses. There was the arrest and detention of a dual American-Ghanaian citizen for the better part of a year. All of these were problems that we worked hard on and which eventually were resolved. I think that, overall, our relationship did improve during the time that I was there.

Our assistance level went up considerably, and Ghana improved measurably, both in terms of its economy and its political system.

Q: How did you deal with the problems of missionaries? I'm thinking of the Mormons and the Jehovah's Witnesses, both of whom were relatively aggressive.

EWING: Jehovah's Witnesses did not have a lot of missionaries [in Ghana]. The Mormons did have a number of missionaries in the country who were expelled at the time the church was banned. This happened before I arrived there, partly because they were perceived as being somewhat aggressive. A couple of indigenous churches were also banned at the same time.

The Mormons also had problems because a film criticizing the Mormon Church was shown in Ghana. Jerry Rawlings saw it, [and an extended portion of it] was shown on Ghana Television. I think that was a [substantial part] of the reason which influenced him to think in a negative way about the Mormon Church. There were a number of [Mormon] missionaries [in Ghana]. They had a lot of vehicles and a fairly high profile. I had meetings with a Senator from Utah and a Congressman from Utah before I went out to Ghana. They made it clear that this was a matter of concern and urgency as far as the Mormon Church and they were concerned, not just because of Ghana, where the Mormon Church had been fairly successful, but also in other countries of Black Africa, as well.

I spent a lot of time on the issue. I realized fairly soon that it was probably going to be best to do it in as low key a way as possible by looking for a way to allow the Ghanaians to back down and come away from their position of their own volition, rather than by making speeches about the problem. That's essentially what we did. I had a number of meetings with Kojo Tsikata, who was probably Rawlings' right hand man and a member of the PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council], and involved with national security issues. I established a dialogue. I also talked with Ghanaian Mormons. One of the leaders of their church and the person who represented them as far as the American Embassy was concerned happened to be Rawlings' half brother. They had the same mother but different fathers. [Rawlings' half brother] met fairly often with Tsikata himself but didn't meet with Jerry Rawlings. He had become a Mormon while he was living in England. Eventually, the Mormon Church sent various representatives, including a delegation which contained a couple of African-Americans who were members of the Mormon Church. An understanding was reached, whereby they were allowed to come back, reopen their church, and resume their functioning, with an understanding about the number of missionaries and their "profile" in the country. All of that was satisfactory to the Church, and so it was resolved. At one point in 1990 I was on a home leave and went through Salt Lake City. I met with a senior official of the Church to try to reassure them that I thought things were moving in the right direction and that with a little patience and quiet effort on their part they would be successful and productive, rather than by threatening the Ghanaians and exerting public pressure too blatantly in the Congress. I think that that was a very useful meeting. I was satisfied that the problem was resolved satisfactorily.

The Jehovah's Witnesses problem was a little different in that the American branch of the Church showed no interest as far as I was aware, either in terms of correspondence, visits, or otherwise. However, this seemed to me to be a matter concerning the freedom of religious expression, so I quietly worked on it. I got to know a few of the Ghanaian Jehovah's Witnesses. I think I played at least a small role in opening up a dialogue between the Ghanaian Government and the Church. Before I left, the ban was lifted, and they were able to function effectively. But it was less of an "American problem" than the one affecting the Mormon Church.

Q: You left Ghana when?

EWING: I left Ghana in August, 1992.

Q: Was that the normal length of tour--about three years and then on your way?

EWING: Yes. The three year rotation for both career and non-career ambassadors was pretty well established by the mid-1980's. When I was in Cyprus, it wasn't quite so clearly established. In fact, until February, 1984, I kind of expected and hoped that I could stay in Cyprus until 1985 for several reasons. I was enjoying it and I thought that it was good to have a little continuity. I thought that it was better to wait until after the 1984 presidential elections before a change took place. It would have given my daughter a chance to finish high school there. But the Department decided that the "three year rule" should be applied, and so I was caught up in that and had to leave during the summer of 1984. Subsequently, for career ambassadors--and for non-career ambassadors as well--the policy was pretty well set in place, and it was only major exceptions that called for shorter or longer periods of service. So I served my three years in Ghana and left in 1992 just about three years to the day after I was sworn in, in 1989.

Q: Then what did you do when you left Ghana?

EWING: My wife and I had a great week, hiking in Switzerland in the Alps. Then I came back to Washington on a weekend in late August, without any idea of what I was going to do next, without any onward assignment. I went into the State Department on Monday morning to the Bureau of African Affairs. They said to me, "How would you like to go to

Tanzania as chargé d'affaires for a period of time?" They said that the ambassador in Dar es Salaam, Ed DeJarnette, "Was very much needed and wanted in Angola as quickly as possible, as there would be an election there. We want him to go first as the head of the US Interests Section. We hope, eventually, that he will be chargé d'affaires and then ambassador, when full diplomatic relations are established. So we need him to leave Dar es Salaam. Pete De Vos, who has been nominated, confirmed, and actually sworn in as Ambassador to Tanzania, is not ready to go, because we need him to do a special job on Somalia. We can't let him go. There's no DCM there. When DeJarnette leaves, the charge will be the Administrative Officer. He is due to go on R&R [Rest and Recreation] with his wife, who is the consular officer. And we'd like you to go."

I said, "Well, that sounds kind of interesting." [Few words unclear.] With regard to Tanzania I asked three things. First, how long would this assignment be? They said, "We really don't know. Maybe till the end of the year [1992]." They had to hold on to De Vos because of Somalia. I said, "Okay." The second thing I said is that I'd like to have at least a little time to move into our house. Could I go in a few weeks instead of tomorrow? They said, "Yes, that will be fine. September should be fine." I said that I would very much like to take my wife along, if I'm going to be there for several months. They said, "Well, we think that we can arrange that, too." I said, "Fine." So I went to Tanzania for what turned out to be about two and a half months. I came back in mid-December [1992].

Q: How did you see Tanzania at that time?

EWING: In many ways Tanzania was like Ghana, but several steps behind. They were beginning to adopt an economic reform and stabilization program. They were working closely with the World Bank and the IMF. However, the privatization aspect of the program and the results of the program had not yet become apparent to the extent that they had in Ghana. On the political side they were also moving toward a more open system, including elections, but I don't recall that elections had yet been scheduled. Political parties were beginning to organize and to be active. The process was clearly behind that of Ghana.

Q: So then you came back to Washington?

EWING: Yes, I came back. It was really an interesting experience. I had never done this before. When you're a charge, you're only there for a short time. People really don't need to take you too seriously, either in the Embassy or outside it. But I was given a good deal of respect within the Embassy. They were glad to have me there. The Embassy was very short-staffed, compared to our Embassy in Accra. It was very inadequately staffed, partly because of these vacancies, but also because the staff wasn't as good as it should have been. But the other diplomatic missions and the Government of Tanzania paid [suitable] attention to me, and I had a chance to meet with the President and various other officials before I left. I had contacts with the other ambassadors. I came back in mid-December by way of Moscow, where I had a chance to visit our son, who was doing graduate work.

Q: I guess we stop about at that point.

EWING: I think that that's about it. I retired at the end of September, 1993, after about six months working with the Recruitment Division of the Bureau of Personnel.

Q: You were with the Board of Examiners for a while?

EWING: Well, not actually as an examiner, but more as a recruiter. I traveled to a number of colleges and universities and worked with an exciting new program that we have. It's a program aimed at minorities, called the Foreign Affairs Fellowship Program.

Q: Well, thank you.

EWING: Thank you very much.

End of interview