The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR JOSEPH S. FARLAND

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Ambassador Farland]

Q: This is an interview with Ambassador Joseph S. Farland. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Today is January 31, 2000. You go by Joe, don't you?

FARLAND: Yes, I go by "Joe."

Q: I go by "Stu." Could you tell me when and where you were born and something about your parents?

FARLAND: I was born in Clarksburg, West Virginia on August 11, 1914. My father was cashier of a smalltown bank. My mother was a housewife. I had two wonderful parents.

Q: At that time, so few had college educations.

FARLAND: Neither one of them had a college education. As a matter of fact, I don't believe my mother had gone through high school.

Q: This was very much the pattern. What was Clarksburg like?

FARLAND: Clarksburg was a small southern town, very southern. As a matter of fact, we were the "hotbed of copperheads," as we were referred to by the North. My father was very much a southerner. My mother was from Pennsylvania, but her grandfather had come from Culpeper, so her background was actually South. Her mother was the loveliest little German lady you ever could imagine. Her father lived in a town called Punksatawney, which was north of Pittsburgh.

Q: Well known for the groundhog.

FARLAND: Yes. My grandfather was a hardworking young man. He farmed. He had a farm outside of town. He worked very hard and he became Mr. Punksatawney, as a matter of fact. He became president of the Punksatawney National Bank. He owned saw mills and a few things of that nature. Mother was much more of a [homebody] than [her father]. Going down to Clarksburg was a little bit of a shock, I think.

Q: What about your father? What was his family like?

FARLAND: My father's [family] were southerners way back. They had come over to the United States, the first one that I know of, in about 1703. Two of them became ship captains in Maryland. His father was born in what was then Washington City. He went down to Tappahanock. They were basically just hardworking people who were trying to get in through the Reconstruction period.

Q: As a young boy, were you hearing stories about the South being a lost cause and all that? Is that what you grew up with?

FARLAND: To a certain degree, from my father, yes, but not a great deal.

Q: West Virginia, of course, had basically sided with the North.
FARLAND: Basically, the ownership of West Virginia was northern. It was Cleveland, Philadelphia, and New York City. The people were basically Southerners. West Virginia was about the poorest state in the Union at that time. It was backwards and back woods.

Q: As a young boy, you went to school in Clarksburg?

FARLAND: I started school in Clarksburg.

Q: Clarksburg was in what area? Was it a mining area, orchards, or farming?

FARLAND: My grandfather had come from Tappahanock to that area and opened several coal mines. These were pick and shovel mines. It was on the edge of Pittsburgh's [anthracite] coal, which was extremely important and extended all up through Pennsylvania. He died quite young.

My father was at school and had to come back and go to work. He started as a runner for a bank. Because there were no telephones, they had little boys that carried messages back and forth. He started as a runner and worked up to cashier.

We were middle class or slightly less than middle class, frankly.

Q: What was your early elementary education like?

FARLAND: I went to school in Clarksburg until the fourth grade, at which time my father was diagnosed tubercular. That meant breaking up the home. Mother and I went back to the charity of my grandfather in Pennsylvania, so I got to know Punksatawney pretty well, besides the groundhog.

Q: When you were in Clarksburg, because of the mining interests... This was a pretty difficult time. There were small labor movements. It was a pretty rough crew, wasn't it?

FARLAND: From my position as a child, I didn't see it. There was a section of it

called Pinikaneke, which was an original blackhand section in which much of the present mafia grew.

Q: The Italian miners. When you went to Punksatawney, was your father ill?

FARLAND: My father had to go to Ashland, North Carolina. We were in Punksatawney for three years - and I mean poor. I went to school with holes in my shoes. We were strictly at the charity of my grandfather.

Q: What was school like there?

FARLAND: It was a public school. When I first got there, when I as called on, I stood up and said, "Yes, Ma'am. No, Ma'am." I felt there was a little antipathy towards me in the class from some of the boys. That evening, I had to fight Tony Infantino. I whipped Tony Infantino and I took over that gang. The [group] has never been the same since.

Q: How did you find the education at that school?

FARLAND: Well, in retrospect, it was very poor to medium.

Q: Your grandfather was a farmer at that time?

FARLAND: He was part of the bank, a farmer, a coal operator, and a timber operator. He was a big, tough man. I got whipped about once a day.

Q: He didn't take kindly to...
FARLAND: Oh, he took kindly, but I was always into something that caused a little difficulty.

Q: Did you have any brothers or sisters?

FARLAND: I am an only child.

Q: You were there through the seventh grade then?

FARLAND: I unfortunately during that period contracted rheumatic fever. I was in bed three months. There was no medicine at that time. My mother and my grandmother would make onion [poultices] and mustard [plasters]. I think we had aspirin. That was about it. I'll be forever grateful to the school system. I missed three months of school and they graduated me from the sixth grade.

Q: Were you reading much as a young boy or did you have a chance to?

FARLAND: This was one of the problems that I had with my grandfather. I read all the time. He told my mother one time, "I don't know about Joseph. He is either

going to grow up to be a bum or a millionaire and I don't know which."

Q: Well, were you involved at all by being a runner or doing anything with your grandfather's enterprises?

FARLAND: No, I didn't do any particular work up there. I trapped muskrats. As far as working, I didn't. My father came back and a local man decided that he ought to come in and have his teeth looked at. Father said, "No. I've had my teeth looked at a thousand times." He said, "Come on in. It's not going to cost you anything. We're friends." Every tooth in his head was abscessed. He pulled his teeth and he never was sick another day until about 10 days before he died. What a lawsuit that would have been today!

Q: Oh, yes! How did your mother react to being under her father? This must have been very difficult for her.

FARLAND: It was difficult, but Mother knew the problem and just had to do it.

Q: Did you have much contact with your father?

FARLAND: Oh, yes. My father taught me to use my imagination. He taught me to shoot for the stars. My mother taught me religion, to believe in God, to love your fellow man, and to be friendly to your fellow man. She taught me leadership, honesty, and faith [in your] job, and to work. She taught me work ethic.

Q: You can't ask for anything better than that.

FARLAND: I had two wonderful parents.

Q: When you say you read a lot, do you recall the sort of things you were reading?

FARLAND: I read everything. I read "Tom Swift," "Tarzan," etc. I got very much interested in history. I would read whatever I could find at the local small library there in Punksatawney. I have been an avid reader all my life.

Q: After there years in Punksatawney...

FARLAND: I came back. My father during that time had no job, no social security, no income. When I say we were POOR, I mean POOR. That's spelled with capital letters. We came back to a job in the bank. Mother worked. It was tough. He then became cashier in another bank in Wheeling, West Virginia. At that time, I was being told my job was to get through high school and to get the best education I could.

Q: So you were going to high school in Wheeling.

FARLAND: I went to high school in Clarksburg. I trapped muskrats. I would get up at four o'clock in the morning and run my trap lines. I made enough money to pay my tuition for my first year in college.

Q: In high school in Clarksburg, what sort of courses were you taking?

FARLAND: I took preparatory courses. I was lousy in Latin.

Q: Welcome to the club.

FARLAND: I was very proud of my last report card. I had two 98s, a 95, a 94, and a 90. My parents were very happy. I was debating an oratory. This was during the Depression.

Q: I was going to say-

FARLAND: It was right in the middle of the Depression. I graduated in 1932 from high school. My high school class dissolved instantly because those that could find jobs, got them. The others went out looking for them. The ones who were going to school left. The day that I was to go, I woke up with an appendicitis. I ended up in the hospital having my appendix removed.

Q: That was quite dangerous in those days.

FARLAND: Yes, it was. Appendicitis before that was almost a death sentence. I had no money to go to school then and I couldn't get a job. I was going to be a doctor. From the time I was a little kid, I was going to be a doctor. Across the street from me was a friend of Herbert Stein. Her name was Oldman. Down the street from her lived Mrs. Stottler, who was a photographer for the Navy. They wanted a male mind to mold. During the time between then and when I started school in the second term, I read a book and a half a day under their supervision and made a test at the end of each week. One week it would be ancient history. One week it would be astronomy. One week it would be whatever. They changed my mind from medicine to law and broke my mother's heart. That changed my whole life.

Q: These two very unusual women being in Clarksburg, how did they come to be there?

FARLAND: Mrs. Stottler was a housewife who I must say did not maintain a very neat home. She had books stacked to the ceiling. Her husband worked at [West Virginia] Natural Gas. They had a big store there in town. She had few friends that could equate with her mental capacity. They were looking for something to do, both of them.

Q: How wonderful.

FARLAND: I was there for the molding.

Q: This was just after you graduated from high school, is that right?

FARLAND: Yes.

Q: What was the feeling? If you were going to be a doctor, then your mother and father must have been pushing you to go on to college.

FARLAND: Oh, yes, definitely. Their whole basis of living was to get me through college. I had to justify their faith.

Q: In West Virginia, in Clarksburg, by the time you were getting ready to get out of high school, we're talking about the depth of the Depression. West Virginia was number 48 of the 48 states. That must have been a very-

FARLAND: There was nothing. The other states didn't realize that West Virginia had little dirt roads back in the country. I well remember getting stuck and having to get a farmer with a team of horses to pull us out when I was just a kid. It was very backwards. West Virginia University at that time... They called me back one time to give me a doctorate and there were more graduate students there than there were when I was there as a student. There were only 3,200 students there at the state university when I first went there. It was poor.

Q: At the University, when you first went there, you started there when, in 1932?

FARLAND: I started in January of 1933.

Q: Was there such a thing as a pre-law course or were you just taking general courses?

FARLAND: You had to begin with a nightly course. They had a combined course. You would graduate from law school in six years - three and three, in other words.

Q: In West Virginia and your family, how did they look upon the New Deal and Franklin Roosevelt?

FARLAND: They both were democrats. My grandfather Simpson was a democrat from Pennsylvania. My mother and father were both democrats. They had a hard time understanding why I would be a republican.
Q: When did you start feeling republican?

FARLAND: When I saw the Russians walking down the streets of Seoul.

Q: So this was some time in the future.

FARLAND: Yes. Did the New Deal make any impression in West Virginia at this time?

I think it made a big impression in West Virginia. I know it did to me. I thought Roosevelt was a great, great man. In retrospect, if he weren't stopped in their terms, he would have been even greater.

Q: Yes. Did politics intrude while you were young at the university in West Virginia?

FARLAND: Not particularly, although I made one basic mistake. I was going to run for president of the student body on a non-fraternity ticket. I decided that my future would be benefitted by being a fraternity man, which made no sense to me at all later in life, but at the time. I would have been elected president of the student body at that point.

Q: Some of these things can seem so important at the time.

FARLAND: Well, that was a major mistake.

Q: Your courses were what?

FARLAND: Political science and economics. My major was political science. I minored in economics.

Q: Did foreign affairs intrude at all?
FARLAND: Only in a way almost outside the university. I had some professors... One professors for instance, had four or five of us to dinner one night and said, "Hitler has already lost the war." Of course, at that point, Hitler was winning.

Q: This had to be a little later if you went to school in 1933.

FARLAND: That's right.

Q: The war didn't start until 1939.

FARLAND: That's true, but he was already moving. This may have been after I was out of college. I'm not sure about that. That impressed the heck out of me. This man said it. I'm not sure of the exact timing.

Q: It could have been a little later.

FARLAND: It could have been.

Q: Were you able to sort of follow events in Europe and in Asia?

FARLAND: There were a few exchange students. I knew one boy in law school who was there from Germany - obviously handpicked for some reason or other - and some others. But West Virginia was pretty much in the backwater.

Q: Oh, absolutely.

FARLAND: That has to be remembered in everything that I'm saying.

Q: So you were thinking of being a lawyer.
FARLAND: I just had to be a lawyer.

Q: So this started in 1933 and a six year course would be 1939. Were you taking law?

FARLAND: I got out in 1938. I took law. I have a doctor's degree in law.

Q: What was the job prospects for a lawyer?

FARLAND: Well, I worked two summers in Wheeling. One I had [over] 100-some titles. The other summer I did general cleanup work of any kind, all of which I was paid the [munificent] sum of nothing. "You are getting experience, lad, you're getting experience. Be grateful." I was grateful.

Q: Did you have any part time job when you were going to school?

FARLAND: I came back from the first year in college and got a job as a construction worker and proceeded to get a hernia forthwith. There was no workman's compensation. That turned out to be more expensive. That didn't help.

Q: When you got out in 1938, did you go right into a law firm?

FARLAND: I started to work as special prosecuting attorney in Wheeling, West Virginia, which was a big title with very little work. I wasn't appreciative of that and decided with two other fellows in my law class to open our own firm back in Morgantown, which we did. Then the war hit and they were both Reserve officers. Away they went. My decision was what I should do. I had more knowledge about mining.

Q: How did you pick that up?
FARLAND: Both of my grandfathers were coal operators. It just was natural. Any time I was around the coal mine, I was into something. I'm fascinated by it. I knew that the German saboteurs wanted to disable our coal industry. I knew that very few boys who had what little background I had in coal mining. So, I was in

Washington and I went and had an interview with the FBI.

Q: This would be 1941 or 1942?

FARLAND: I told them very forthrightly that when I was in college, I had been recruited into the Communist Party of the United States.

Q: How did you get into that? I can't think of a more uninspiring ground than the University of West Virginia.

FARLAND: What a wonderful place, the poorest place in the world. The miners were in revolt. They had machine gunned a bridge along the [nearby] river. One of the teachers was very smooth about it and invited four of us to have a free meal. A free meal at that time was very important. The next free meal, she started to discuss her political views and forms of government and so forth. Then she advised us all to go to meetings at Martin Hall every Sunday at 11 o'clock. I went four times and I said, "The hell with these apples. I don't like what I'm hearing." That ended my entire activity with the Communist Party of America. One of the boys became a top officer in the national party. The other two just went by the wayside.

Q: Were you actually signed into the Communist Party or were you more an auditor just going and listening?

FARLAND: I didn't take a pledge, if that's what you mean. I don't think she asked any of us to do that.
Q: What was the FBI's reaction?

FARLAND: "Pity. We're delighted. You can better serve us." That was my only misadventure.

Q: Did you actually join the FBI then?

FARLAND: I became a special agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Q: When did you start?

FARLAND: I can’t remember.

Q: It should be around 1942 after the war started.

FARLAND: They just had started the war, yes. About 1942. Yes, it was 1942.

Q: What about training? What was the FBI training in those days?

FARLAND: Well, the training was intense and I mean intense. They would come

in and say, "This normally is a three month course and we're going to have to do it in three days" or words to that effect. The toughest fellow in the class fell by the wayside. He couldn't take it. It was tough.

Q: What sort of things were you learning?

FARLAND: Fingerprinting to maintaining the authenticity of evidence to wiretapping (in which I became particularly fluent and did a lot of) to surveillance, the whole works.

Q: Were you married at this point?

FARLAND: Married, yes.

Q: When did you get married?

FARLAND: And I had a child. I was married in 1939.

Q: Where did you meet your wife?

FARLAND: In Morgantown.

Q: Then what did you do, move to Washington or were you assigned somewhere else?

FARLAND: We by that time had a home with a substantial mortgage. She and our child came with me.

Q: What was your first job with the FBI?

FARLAND: My first job was in Washington. It was basically routine. I hadn't specialized in anything. I went from there to another posting and started getting into wiretapping and more involved matters, including... I was finally at that point picked to be one of the very select group of individuals who could only talk to a select few in the office. It was a secret organization within a secret organization. Our job was the protection of the atomic bomb, which I knew was under construction.

Q: Where were you located?

FARLAND: I was moved around a great deal.
Q: Were you aware of what you were protecting?

FARLAND: I knew exactly what I was protecting and I knew that we had minor problems with Germans and major problems with the Russians. That is where the basic anti-effort that we were undertaking was based.

Q: How well were we made known of the Soviet attempts to penetrate? Did we have lists of people who were considered to be Soviet agents?

FARLAND: These were being developed over time by the normal means of identification. We did some very interesting work, I might add, without going into detail.

Q: Can you go into any detail?

FARLAND: I can't on this.

Q: Alright. During the war, it must have been difficult in a way that the Soviets were our allies, yet at the same time, here we were concerned about them.

FARLAND: Very much so. Our investigation had to be premised on shaking their [verbal] statements. Some of it was on other bases.

Q: The director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, were you feeling his direction in this?

FARLAND: Very much so. This was our biggest effort.

Q: Were you aware of the problem that we had some major figures who were both excellent nuclear physicists and attached to the Communist Party? This was hard to figure out. I mean, you win on one side and lose on the other.
FARLAND: I had one client who was a very, very brilliant man, a college professor. His affiliation was totally with the Russians.

Q: What was your feeling as you watched this? Was it a matter of more or less reporting or was action being taken that you were aware of?

FARLAND: We had to stop what we could. I'm not sure I exactly understand what you mean.

Q: What I am saying is, there is one thing about reporting this activity as going on. There is another thing about either removing somebody from the job, arresting them, and foiling them, doing something like that.

FARLAND: That aspect was out of my hands. Our work was to get the information as to who was who and who was doing what to whom and how they were doing it and where they were located.

Q: Was this what you were doing basically during the war?

FARLAND: Well, it reached a point where in 1944 I had a cousin who was an

admiral. We had several long talks. I reached a point where I can't take very many more criticisms of "Why aren't you in the Army? Why aren't you in the Navy? Why are you a civilian?" I finally said to my wife, "I've got to join the Navy." She said, "If that's what you want, that's what you do," so I did.

Q: So you joined in 1944.

FARLAND: Yes.

Q: Where did you get your training?

FARLAND: In Blacksburg, New York. I'll never forget Blacksburg.

Q: Did you get in during the winter?

FARLAND: Well, it was something. Then, I asked for submarine duty. Being a coal miner, I wanted a sub. I thought that would be the greatest thing in the world. After Blacksburg, I was sent to Princeton University. We listened to all of these lectures on how, why, and when we were going to invade Taiwan. Every bartender on the East Coast knew that we were going. We had admirals, captains, commanders, even someone as lowly as I. Our last lecture was given by a young lieutenant who did a superb job at lecturing. He ended up with a few remarks on Okinawa, including the number of prostitutes in the city. I walked out of there and said to my buddy, "Taiwan, no. Okinawa. We've been sitting ducks." We were a decoy set up purposely, the biggest charade that you can imagine and I didn't like it.

Q: So then what happened?

FARLAND: Well, where else do you think they would send me? To Stanford. I started to get some things that I could use in the future. I got a complete and thorough understanding of the Japanese, the background, culture, way of life. Then they started making me look at [some] pictures: "Where are you in Tokyo at this point?" So, by the time I got through that, after about two weeks, I could see a picture and I knew how far it was to the police station, how far it was to the railroad station, and so forth. So, I learned all that and then they sent us overseas and we went to Tokyo/Naha, where I was trained to go. I went to Seoul, Korea.

Q: This was when? Was the war over by this time?
FARLAND: The war had just ended.

Q: What was Korea like at that time?

FARLAND: It was a desperately poor, sad country at that point. It was pathetically poor. It was worse than West Virginia.

Q: You were in Seoul from when?

FARLAND: I was sent down to Suncha. I was supposed to be in command of the town of Yosu, which was a port that was being constructed there at the end of the railroad and went up to the coal fields of the north. Things were a mess there at that point. Everybody had one thought in mind and that was to go home. I was sent back up to Seoul and had the great title I told you about.

Q: What was the title?

FARLAND: Navy liaison to the military government forces of Korea. I had my orders to go home, but then I told my commanding officer, who was a captain, a fellow with about 50 other field officers, and he said, "You can't go. Who is going to take care of me?" I said, "Captain, if you can't amend my orders, my advice to you is not to go out on the streets of Seoul at night." I turned on my heels and walked out. I decided that I had better get the heck out of there and get in a boat. Otherwise, I may be in Leavenworth. The only reason I'm telling you that now is that I'm sure the statute of limitations is run out on that one.

Q: Did you have any contact with the Koreans while you were in Korea?

FARLAND: I had a good friend [who] was such a nice fellow. These were a few that I talked to in Japanese or some of them knew a little English. There were a few Roman Catholics over there who stayed during the war, nuns and the like. They were all real people. I liked their industry. I liked the way they worked.

Q: You left Korea when, around 1946?

FARLAND: 1947.

Q: Then what happened?

FARLAND: I went back home. My two partners, one of them said that he didn’t want to practice law; he wanted to teach. He was offered a job as a law professor at Boston College. He had accepted it. So, he was gone. The other one said he was interested in politics. It suddenly became apparent that there was virtually no business in town. I had been gone for then better than four years. I had to make some money. So, I started in the path of my grandfathers. I started a timber company, which did very well. I started an insurance company. I went into the coal business.

Q: I think this might be a good place to stop for tonight, don't you?

FARLAND: I'm getting tired.

Q: We'll pick this up and talk a little about the businesses you were in before we

move on to the foreign affairs side of things.

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Today is February 1, 2000. You say you started an insurance business. How the hell does one start an insurance business?
FARLAND: Well, you get a license. I didn't buy a company, but I got a license and my wife got a license. We started in and made a pretty successful business out of it. My wife did most of the work; I didn't.

Q: In coal mining, did you buy auctions or property or what?

FARLAND: No, my first real effort was the purchase of a mine in Shimston, West Virginia, which was operating in the Pittsburgh Seam. It was being operated by absentee owners who knew nothing about mining. They were producing (and this may mean nothing to you) 10 tons per day per man on the payroll (That's everybody.). I, a lawyer with a doctor's degree in law, took it over. In six months, I was producing 20 tons per man. They were breaking even. Obviously, I was making money.

Q: Was it plain management?

FARLAND: Management, very definitely. I learned in the course of activity that there is a big difference between management and labor. At the end of my operations, I tried to sell to the key people the remainder of the mine so that they could get a chance to make some real money before they retired. In one instance, these key people who were making money at this one mine for the operator turned around, raised their salary, took an extra day off, decided they would even steal some coal that was not theirs, and I had to come back and get them straightened out on that. The others, with one of their operations did pretty well. Management is so important.

Q: One always hears about the coal miners of West Virginia being a very tough crew and just plain difficult. Did you find this to be true or not?

FARLAND: I like people. This has been a trademark of mine. My mother taught me that basic Christian principles, Love Thy Neighbor as Thyself, and I liked people. I intuitively like people. I liked the coal miners and they liked me. They liked the fact that I put on hardhat, put on my light, rode in a mantrip with them, stayed in with them, ate with them, showed them what I thought they should be doing, cuss them out, enjoyed their company, listened to their jokes, and went to the union meetings. They liked me. I liked them. That was my basis of management.

Q: You started this when, about 1947 or so?

FARLAND: That was about the end of it, I think. This has been a long time ago now. I was young. If I hadn't been so young and audacious, I doubt if I would have taken on this. After I took over this one mine along with the help of some other people financially, John L. Lewis called a nationwide strike. There I was, sitting. I called the men together and said, "Look, I have enough money to pay you for two weeks. If this strike goes beyond two weeks, I'm through, and so are you at this mine." It was over within that period. I'm happy to say that I succeeded. I never had [labor troubles] after that.

Q: While you were doing both the insurance business and mining, were you in the lumber business, too?

FARLAND: I was on the wrong story about how I got into it. An old wood [chopper] from the mountains was sitting out in front of the courthouse square. He came in and had a speech impediment. He was also wearing a World War I coat. I don't think he had had a bath in six weeks or six years. He said, "Mr. Farland, I have been sitting out there in the cold. I figured that you didn't have anything to do (and he was right about that). How about I just come up and talk to you?" We talked for a while and he left and I aired the place out. He came back in about two weeks. He said, "Mr. Farland, I've got an idea. I've got a lot of friends who have their own saw mills. I like you and I think you like me. I'm sure you'll like these guys. They'll bring you timber. All you have to do is just merchandise it. Get rid of the coal mines and so forth. You could make a little money." I did. That is the way the timber company got started.

Q: Just to get a little feeling, you were involved then in three major fields along with your wife.

FARLAND: I was also in banking.

Q: Were you getting involved at all in politics?

FARLAND: Not particularly, no. I was interested in politics, but I didn't take an active part in politics. When Eisenhower ran for office, I made some effort to support him, but financially, big gifts, no.

Q: When did you sort of move on to the scene which would lead to appointment as an ambassador?

FARLAND: In the early 1950s, all the mines were working out. We were reaching a point where a big operation was no longer tenable. To be perfectly frank, I thought I had made enough money to support my family for the rest of my life. I wanted to do more. I wanted to do something for my country. This was a sincere motive that I had. What I had read about other men's lives, I felt I was too young just to quit, so I had the opportunity of an introduction to Herbert Hoover, Jr., who was then Under Secretary of State. I went in to see him and I said, "Is

there anything in the State Department that I can do to be of assistance to you and to my country?" He said, "I'll let you know in a couple of weeks." He called me in in a couple of weeks and said, "There is. This place is so big and it is so complicated and there is so much going on. I'm not getting all the word that I should. With your background, I want you in a position to attend every staff meeting and report back to me what you think is going on."

Q: This was about when?

FARLAND: 1955, I would say. Hoover was number two and John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State.

Q: What was your title?

FARLAND: Assistant Counsel to UMSA (Under Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs).

Q: What was your impression of the State Department when you first arrived there?

FARLAND: I couldn't believe... I thought to myself, "I could sit here in this chair for a year and no one would call and I wouldn't do anything except get a paycheck." I went down and had some coffee in the cafeteria with some fellows and they were talking about, "Well, I think we should have given them 10. I thought we should give them 20." I said, "What are you fellows talking about, thousands?" "No, we're talking about millions." This threw me. I couldn't quite understand that. These fellows had never met a payroll. They never had to say, "I no longer need you. You're fired." Try that sometime. It hurts, especially when they're competent men. I took it upon myself to get acquainted. I decided that one possible way of getting acquainted was the old girls network. You've heard about the old boys network, but there is an old girls network. I made friends with a lot of the old girls there in the Department and they told me what was going on.

Q: Were these mainly executive secretaries?

FARLAND: No, I'm talking about gals in charge of... One, for instance, who was in charge of sending out furniture and so forth to embassies. She knew everything that was going on in every embassy. Others that were in various and sundry posts or positions gave me access to a lot of information. I made a lot of friends in the State Department.

Q: Mutual Security Agency, that was what later became AID, wasn't it?

FARLAND: No.

Q: The Mutual Security Agency did what?

FARLAND: It was concerned with the assistance to foreign countries, not in the form of aid, but in the form of other support (military aid and basic financial loans, etc.).

Q: Where were decisions made? Did you find it was done in the cafeteria?

FARLAND: Normally, they were made in the area meetings, but usually the decision was made before that.

Q: Were you able to work with Under Secretary Hoover to get any control over this?

FARLAND: No, my job again was to get the facts and get an understanding of what was going on and get as much information as I could.

Q: How did he receive that?

FARLAND: He was delighted to get it. I did that for the better part of a year. I was in the Department. He called me in one day and said, "Joe, you and one other man came down here out of the 100-some people who approached me and offered to do a [job for me] that was necessary. Now I want you to be an ambassador. I want you to go, if you're interested, to Paraguay." I said, "I will talk to my wife. She is my partner." He called me in about a week later and said, "Joe, I want to be very careful in saying this because there is no hyperbole in it whatsoever. We've assigned you to Paraguay if you want it. We have another post that is exploding on us. It's extremely dangerous. As a matter of fact, it might cost you your life. I want you to know that before you go any further. This is the Dominican Republic and the era of Trujillo. We are terribly concerned about what's been going on. There's been a kidnaping in New York. From the reports we're getting, there is further activity that we should be concerned about. Would you be interested?" I said, "I had better again talk to my wife." She said, "If that's what you want to do, that's what we will do." So, that is what I did.

Q: You were in the Dominican Republic from when to when?

FARLAND: I went there in August of 1957. I left in 1960.

Q: What were you told before you went out to the Dominican Republic?

FARLAND: This was one reason why I stopped that other interview. I didn't want to get into this. I was told "You are to go down to the Dominican Republic. You are to be friendly with Trujillo, outwardly a close associate of Trujillo, as another ambassador has been, but I want you to get into the underground and find out what is going on and what is going to happen at this time and in the future. It's a delicate operation, but your background and training makes you the best possible

selection we have in the Department. We do not want to eliminate Trujillo. In other words, assassinate him. But we want him to take his loot and go off to Estoril or some other place and leave those people alone, let them be free." We've been accused of wanting to assassinate Trujillo. That was not my assignment. That would have been easy. What I had to do was try to convince them to get the hell out of there.

Q: Why were we so concerned in 1957 about the situation?

FARLAND: Well, human rights for one reason, definitely. There was an American citizen, a man by the name of Galinda, kidnaped on the streets of New York, flown to Miami, flown to the Dominican Republic, and killed. Part of my job was to find out the truth of that story. It was true. I found that out definitely. He was murdered in the Dominican Republic.

Q: Who was he?

FARLAND: He was a Spaniard who had been a tutor for Ramphas and Rademus, Trujillo's two sons. He left, went to Columbia University and was teaching at Columbia, was picked up off the street by Arturas Beyat's organization (He was then consul general in New York.) and flown to Miami and subsequently killed. One of the pilots on that plane was a man by the name of Adel Masa, who presumably hanged himself in a jail cell, but the fact was he was murdered by Trujillo.

Q: What was Galinda doing?

FARLAND: He wrote a biography of Trujillo. I've never seen it. There supposedly is a copy. Trujillo did everything in his power to eliminate every copy. I have been told (I can't verify this for a fact, but I have a pretty good idea it's true.) that Ramphas came in the seat of a cabana when Trujillo's mistress in a period of spite departs for Cuba and shacks up with Galinda. If that is in there, he would certainly kill anyone. That is what I heard was in that book.

Q: What was happening in the Dominican Republic when you went out there?

FARLAND: Trujillo was in complete control. He was eliminating his opponents. Murder was in style. It was completely amoral. I want to go back a ways. Before I left Morgantown, I did what I consider my greatest contribution in life. I built a church. I worked terribly hard. I would put on my miner's clothes and go up there in the morning to raise the dickens with the workmen to do a little better, do a little faster. The architect was the architect of the National Cathedral in Washington. He was a great artist and a very poor businessman. We had to fight with him all the time.

Q: This was an Episcopal church?

FARLAND: Yes. We built that church. The architect originally said we could build a church, a rectory, and a hall for $160,000. Remember, this was right after the war. Inflation had not set in. We didn't get plans for about two years. Inflation was going up at about 10% per annum at least. We broke ground with only the floorplan. I was determined to get that church built. I had come back from Korea believing even more fervently in God and I wanted to do that in His great honor and for our people of the town, so I did. I was chairman of the building committee. Everyone had suggestions.

We have to go back. When I got to the Dominican Republic, I found that there was no priest or rector in the Episcopal church in Ciudad Trujillo. He had been killed at the crossing by Trujillo, murdered. I preached for a year and a half along with Ambassador McGinney, the British ambassador. We got that church together. Did the Lord have anything to do with sending me to the Dominican Republic? That's anybody's guess. But I took that church and we finally got a rector and [put it into] operation again. When I got there, it was shut down. But I always add, every time I preached, there were two men in the back of the church wearing [overcoats] and carrying a .38 underneath them, listening to what the ambassador had to say from the pulpit.

Q: Before you went out there, one of the things I've heard is that, like Somoza, Trujillo had his almost pet congressmen. Can you talk about this?

FARLAND: I can talk about it, but I'm not going to name names.
Q: I think the names have been named before.

FARLAND: Mano Namoya was the Dominican ambassador to the United States. He was a very good looking, suave, socially correct individual. He loved all the women in town. Mano had a love nest just outside of the city that you entered by a maze of hedges so no car could be observed. It was totally wired. There were two way mirrors. There was a supply of whatever one wanted in the way of your desire. A number of our congressmen made use of that and were photographed and taped. I had one senator come down and I said, "Senator, I and my country team are prepared to brief you." He said, "I know all I want to know about this damn country. All I want from you is to make diddly darn sure that I'm well supplied with liquor in my hotel room for a week. I don't want to see you during that period of time." Can an ambassador report that at the time? No. That's only one instance. I know of several.

Q: Were you getting from congressmen and senators before you went out "Be extra nice to Trujillo" or anything like that?

FARLAND: No, no. I was being extra nice to Trujillo.

Q: Were you getting warnings from the Department of State, from the desk or

something, telling you "We've got to be extra careful because of congressional or senatorial interest in this?"

FARLAND: No, I cant say that I did. I was getting from Trujillo, for instance, his entire take on the intelligence situation in Cuba and I was reporting that. One day, I got a lovely telegram saying "Pay more attention to your client and less to Batista," which I thought was stupid." That was the best source of information we had.

Q: At that point, Batista was giving information to Trujillo?
FARLAND: No, Trujillo was getting information in Cuba from his own sources. No, they weren't the best of friends because Batista owed Trujillo money for some weapons he had supplied. Trujillo had a mine factory at San Cristobal.

Q: Had you been fairly well briefed when you arrived there?

FARLAND: No, I was not. The briefing I got was primarily from... Only three people knew my new assignment. Stuart, this is important. This is why I kept it so tight. John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Herbert Hoover were the only men who knew my assignment to the Dominican Republic, what I was to do and why I was doing it.

Q: This is normally the job of the CIA station chief in the Dominican Republic. When you arrived there, who was it and how did it work?

FARLAND: I think his name was Reed, but I'm not sure about that. One day, he came to me and said, "Mr. Ambassador, I hate to bother you, but I've locked myself out of my office." I said, "You what?" He said, "I've locked myself out of my office." I took him by the hand and we went back. I picked the lock and opened it up and said, "Please, I have other things to do besides get you in your office. Please be more careful."

Q: This was your old FBI training.

FARLAND: This was my old FBI training, that's right. Secondly, we had a character come down who was a code clerk. After he had been there for about three weeks, he came rushing in and told the political officer that his room at the hotel had been ransacked. Everything had been gone through. His life obviously was in danger. He wanted out of the Dominican Republic. So, I called the CIA and said, "Go question this fellow. See what the heck is going on." They came back in and said, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, the room is really torn up. Do you know what? They even went so far as to take this man's portable radio and carefully unscrew the back and take it off and look inside and see if there was any kind of a transmitter in it." I said, "They did what?" He said, "Just exactly what I said." I said, "You go back and talk to that young man and really talk to him like a Dutch uncle. He's lying." He came back and said, "Yes, he was lying. He had

done it." Perfectly obvious. If they had torn up the room, why wouldn't they have been so careful and unscrew the back of his particular piece of property.

Q: So he just wanted out of there.

FARLAND: He wanted out of there. Besides, he had sexual proclivities that are unusual. He felt that he wasn't safe in that place.

Q: So I take it that you didn't feel you were terribly well supported by the CIA.

FARLAND: That fellow was called out of there and another man by the name of Smith came in and was much better and did a competent job. Later, Reed was the last agent there who made some contacts with various sundry people. Stuart, I had to operate on my own. I had a DCM who was definitely in the pocket of Trujillo.

Q: Who was your DCM?

FARLAND: He has a son and he's no longer living. I don't want to...

Q: Okay. But when you came there, did you find an embassy more or less that was sort of in the pocket of Trujillo.

FARLAND: No, the DCM was accepting gifts. The stupid character, he even told me he had spent some time in Mano Demoyo's love house. I had to go back to Washington. Do you realize, for a political appointee to get a Foreign Service officer kicked out is quite an undertaking. I undertook it because I had to. I couldn't carry out my job with him there. Everything I was doing when I would go on leave, he would try to negate. So, out he went.

Q: Who took his place?

FARLAND: One of the best officers I've ever had contact with. You interviewed him. He didn't talk too much about that particular phase of it. He was there afterwards. Henry Dearborn, a great, great man, superb. I couldn’t recommend him more. He and John Barfield, who was a political officer. I had one political officer there, Robert Allen. He hated my insides. He thought I was a devotee of Trujillo. John was more perceptive, although I never discussed it with John until towards the end when Dearborn had come in and it was pretty obvious that I was leaving.

Q: The normal embassy goes out and reports on what's happening. Here you were in a country where you had a dictator who was doing nasty things all over the place. Was this a steady source of reporting? Had this been?

FARLAND: It had been reported. John Barfield was a highly competent political reporter and did some beautiful work in reporting. Allen also was a great reporter.

Allen was totally on the side of the underground, so he was getting information that was invaluable also, but he [didn't have the opportunity] to report it. The DCM would cut him out.

Q: Let's talk about Trujillo and your overt relations with him.

FARLAND: We were great friends for a while.

Q: Was this his style, to make nice to the American ambassador?
FARLAND: Very much so. We were the virtual country... And, of course, the first Christmas, my wife receives from Tiffany's a beautiful, beautiful tea set, which I returned with deep appreciation and a full explanation that American ambassadors aren't supposed to do this sort of thing and we don't let them do it, but that it was deeply appreciated and the kindness shall long be remembered.

Q: How about dealing with him personally? Did you get together?

FARLAND: I had lunch with him. He spoke a lot of English and my Spanish was not what you would call fluent. But I could speak a little. But the two of us understood what we were saying. He understood English perfectly.

Q: What would you talk about?

FARLAND: For one thing, I told him that the Azamo River was full of mud every day, which meant that the campesinos were cutting down and burning back in the mountains and that that should be stopped. They had to keep the topsoil. Remember, I'm from West Virginia. I said, "That topsoil is the most valuable thing you have here." Then, of course, there was coal. They had an operation there of bauxite. They had a pretty big operation over in Santiago in cigars and the like, a local operation. They made some good cigars over there. I wouldn't smoke them, but they do.

He asked me one time, "How will I protect myself against assassination?" I said, "It's almost impossible." He said, "Well, first, can you tell me how it might be done?" So, with the imagination that my father impressed me with, I said, "Well, it would be very simple and no one would no why. Just get a piece of uranium when you had your shoes made in the States or in England. Have a little piece of it put in your shoe and you put it on every morning and pretty soon you'll be dead." He had a rather dark [expresion]. He turned white. He asked me, "Where do I get those shoes?" Then he said, "You should be the head of the CIA." I said, "I don't think that's the job for me. I'm satisfied where I am."

Q: Were we giving him any help, assistance?

FARLAND: A little, but it was rapidly going downhill. One of the rough things was, we cut off special compensation on sugar. He would buy armament. France

was the principal supplier of armament to him. The United States got credit for it, but it was France who was doing it. One of the rough things was we cut off special compensation on sugar. To come up abruptly to this [time] to a period in 1960, I went down to tell him that all military equipment, every ounce of military equipment, was stopped. I went all by myself. He had his ambassador to the United States, the head of the army, the head of the navy, and the head of the air force standing there at attention. He blew up. He turned red. He proceeded then to do the unmentionable. He began a tirade against Eisenhower, my president. He called him "Stupid," said that he didn't understand politics, didn't understand what was going on in the Caribbean, and he called him (I hate to say this on tape.) a "son of a bitch." When he did that, my diplomacy took a flight out and I was a coal miner again. I decided the time had come when I would have to say a few words in support of my country, which I did, ending up by saying "As far as you are concerned, in my estimation, you're nothing but a two bit dictator and your country compared to mine is nothing but a fly speck on a map." He turned redder than anything in this room. I suddenly realized, "Old Joe, if you blink, you're dead. I'm all by myself. He's wearing a gun. He has four million here who will support him. I'm a dead man if I blink." But I didn't blink. He blinked. He came walking around the corner of the desk and said, "Mr. Ambassador, my friend, in moments of stress, we oftentimes make comments that we really don't mean. Let's forgive and forget." I couldn't help myself. I said, "Trujillo, I am a Christian. I will forgive, but I won't forget." I turned on my heel and walked what looked like 24 miles across that office, all the time wondering if I was going to get a .38 in my back.

Q: What had caused this cutting off of everything?

FARLAND: My reporting on what he was doing. I had previously gone to see his older daughter. I drove out there in a Volkswagen that I had. I said, "Flora, I've come to talk to you about your father." She said, "Why talk to me?" I said, "Flora, you're the only one that I can talk to who has the guts to tell him what I'm going to tell you. Your father is going to be assassinated. There is no question in my mind whatsoever about that. It's not the purpose of the United States to have that happen. We want him to retire and leave this country and let it become a normal way of life here in the Dominican Republic, which it can. This is a great country." She said, "I know that." Later in an article, she said I was the only ambassador that the United States ever had there who wouldn't lick Trujillo's boots. Then, at a party about five days later, she arrived at the party and said, "I talked to Daddy." I said, "What did he say?" She said, "The ambassador said that? Yuck!" I said, "That's the end."

Q: He had been killing people and all. Was there an organized group or was it just that you felt that somebody whose son had been killed by Trujillo's people was going to end up by shooting them or something like that?

FARLAND: My difficulty with their apparatus down there was that they had too many people talking. They tried to set up what they called a "triumphal tree." One

would know... But they didn't stick to it. They talked. This conversation is all out of whack. I should have told you in the beginning when I got there what-

Q: Let's go back to the beginning.

FARLAND: When I got there, and the DCM had not told me, I didn't have an embassy. I had an embassy residence. The roof was off of it. There was about two inches of water on the parquet floors. We had no place to live. What was available was [a hotel]. So, I had my wife, three kids and a baby, and a nurse who moved in. The first thing I did was, I looked around to see what electric appliances could be operated there. I figured I had better know. In every room, there was a little radio arrangement whereby you could switch between four different stations and then off. That is a direct [connection]. That can be turned into a plug in every room. So, I made use of that. I would come home and tell my wife what a great man Trujillo was, that what he was doing for this country was superb, then go in the bathroom, turn on the water, flush the toilet, and whisper what the truth was. This was an unusual type of operation.

Q: Yes. You say part of your operation was to make contact with the opposition. How did you work that?

FARLAND: The first party we had, I didn't know a soul. I didn't know who I could depend on, the embassy's names. Also, Trujillo was very kind and provided me with an aide de camp in navy uniform because I had been in the navy. He was assigned to me and all I had to do was tell him what we needed or somebody needed and he provided it. A real nice arrangement. I won't say anything more about him, but he was more useful to me than he talked.

Q: Time has gone on. How could you use him?

FARLAND: He is still alive.

Q: But how were you making contact?

FARLAND: At this first party, I didn't know anybody, but through shaking hands, "Nice to see you," and everybody was coming in and smiling... One person didn't seem to be smiling as much as the others. Later on, I told my wife, "I think I've found my contact" and I did. It was awfully hard. No one wanted to trust the American ambassador, even the businessmen didn't.

Q: How could you carry on these cordial relations? I'm talking about at the very beginning in 1957. Cordial relations with Trujillo, which had been more or less the pattern of other American ambassadors, at the same time convince people who were opposed to him that we were not opposed to them...

FARLAND: Very carefully. That was very difficult, believe me. That is why it

took so long. I had to do it individually. I couldn't tell anybody else what I was doing. It was too dangerous.

Q: When you're talking about somebody like Trujillo, there are obviously two ways of dealing with it. One, to have him leave, just say, "Okay, I'll take my money and go." The other one was to get killed. I can't think of a single dictator who actually left outside of... Maybe there was a mob outside the place and he goes out the back door.

FARLAND: Batista left.

Q: But he left because he was driven out.

FARLAND: Esponia left Colombia. Peres Jimenez left Venezuela. Peron left... I had met them all. They all came there. [It was a] dictator convention.

Q: In dealing with the underground, what message were we preaching?

FARLAND: The first thing I had to establish was to get somebody to trust me. I did a lot of hunting and fishing. I would get a man out in the field hunting and I could ask him some casual questions that had a double meaning and find out his feelings a little bit. I would indicate also that if the atmosphere was right, mine. It took time. This was 1957 until Henry came in 1959. There was not a great deal of movement except for me trying to sell myself and that was hard to do.

Q: How were your political officers like John Barfield and Robert Allen?

FARLAND: Bob left and I don't remember what the circumstance was. He was very much against me.

Q: Were you concerned that your embassy officers were too close to the Trujillo group?

FARLAND: I had a consul who was very close, but he also served a purpose because I was finding out a lot from him that I couldn't from others. John was not close to Trujillo. Allen most certainly wasn't. So, those two men were not playing footsy with Trujillo. The DCM was.

Q: How about your naval attache, Edmond Simmons, a Marine officer?

FARLAND: He was a great guy, but he did not play too big a part in this. The head of my military mission, did, however, in the course of events. As a matter of fact, there was a period when in 1959 when they had an invasion from Cuba and one by sea and a slight war broke out, which didn't amount to much, Trujillo's army didn't prove [effective], but it did prove the campesinos would fight for Trujillo. That is one thing it did prove. There is so much to tell. At that point, I

was pretty close to the underground. They had four or five of those boys flown in from Cuba in a cellar someplace and they were losing their tan. I flew over to Guantanamo and got a sunlamp. That is not exactly what an ambassador normally does. By doing that, I ingratiated myself.

Q: At the time, obviously, most of the revolutions against dictators usually end of by being taken over by leftists just by the nature of politics. The Eisenhower administration was responsible for the Jacobo Arbens in Guatemala under Ambassador Peurifoy and the thought that he was probably too left wing, which...

FARLAND: That still had nothing to do with it.

Q: But that had been our pattern. I would think that we would be extremely concerned that anybody who would take over the Dominican Republic would come out of the fairly extreme part of the left.

FARLAND: Well, that is interesting. I cannot tell you the parties involved. Some people are still alive and I'm not going to put their life in jeopardy. It may be that Trujillo is someplace and wants to get even. I was asked by Dick Rhubarb to supply him-

Q: He was Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs at the time.

FARLAND: That's right. To supply him with a list of the names of the people who were [prepared] to take over the government once Trujillo was assassinated. I'm not exaggerating. I put my life in jeopardy when I tried to get this - and the individuals or individual in jeopardy to get it. But I surprised Dick with a list of who would take over the government.

Q: This was very dangerous to do. The State Department leaks...

FARLAND: This was "eyes only" to them. I hope they didn't, but they didn’t know my contact. I never mentioned that contact even today and I don't want to.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the Department of State was at all compromised in the Department with Trujillo?

FARLAND: I felt there was a compromise in ARA. I'll tell you why. Let's just say I like to hunt and fish and travel the interior a lot. It was a good cover for me. During that period, I bumped into what was obviously an invasion fleet being put together by Trujillo against Castro.

Q: Castro was still up in the hills.

FARLAND: No, he was out of the hills by that time. This was right in the beginning of the administration. There had been some diplomatic move by

organizations against Trujillo and Trujillo was organizing. He had the largest standing army in the Caribbean, his own gun factory, and a few other things. I see these boats and these men and I get back to the office and I think to myself, "I don't want to report this. [You should] report only what you want the State Department to know." I sat on it for three or four days and thought, "If I don't report this, somebody in this embassy is going to find out about this whether it's through the Navy, the Marines, or whoever," so I reported this. I immediately got a telegram back from the Department: "See Trujillo once and advise him that we look upon this with the greatest disrespect" or words to that effect. I reported that. I went to the foreign office with it on Friday. I"m in my office on Saturday or Sunday. The place was closed. A Marine came in and said, "Sir, the foreign minister is here." "Send him in." His name was Perfurio Herrera Baez. He walked in. I said, "Perfurio, you wanted to see me? I'm supposed to come to see you." He said, "I've just seen Trujillo and he wanted me to stop and see you and tell you that the invasion is off. You can report that to your government." As far as I was concerned, I was very happy that the two of them fought it out. Washington would get involved with that if Trujillo wanted to take on Castro.

Q: What was the role of Ramphas?

FARLAND: That was my first problem of major consequence. Ramphas was invited to attend the General Staff College of Leavenworth and no officer can go to Leavenworth who is above the rank of colonel. So, Ramphas had to take off his general uniform and put on a colonel's uniform and go to the College. He took over a whole floor of the Mulhollend Hotel there. In no time, you find that he puts on his general uniform. In no time, he decided "I don't have to attend these classes. They're boring." He got Mrs. Merriwether Post's "Seacloud," now called "The Anolita," a beautiful sailing ship that is now being put back in service, and sailed it through the Panama Canal as the warship of the Dominican Republic, pays no toll, goes up to Hollywood and spends many a happy hour with the starlets. He comes back eventually and graduation day comes and he leaves and goes to the Republic. Now the question is, "Does he graduate?" This was the son of Trujillo, the favorite son, the apple of his eye, Daddy's boy. I know this went clear to Eisenhower. No graduation certificate. A certificate of attendance. I take that down to the foreign office. I handed it to Perfurio. He touches it with two fingers, scared to death. I said, "It's a great honor. You know he's been ill and so forth." Then, I got a call and talked to Trujillo. The foreign office will send a car. I didn't like that. I'm traveling in a Dominican car with a Dominican driver. We drove out to San Cristobal. There was Trujillo with campesinos scraping and crawling around before him. He was there with his campaign hat on. He's got on his holsters. I had to tell him that Ramphas did not graduate, that he got a certificate of attendance. He said in English, "You mean to tell me that my son did not graduate from the staff school at Leavenworth?" So, I had to say, "Mr. Trujillo, you of all people understand that when a man is ill, as your son has been, if the climate didn't agree with him, he couldn't attend class. If he didn't attend class, there is a standard that has to be maintained. You maintain the highest

standard for your troops. The United States does likewise. The fact that he couldn't attend, failed to attend because of some illness, it did get him a certificate of attendance." I thought I was going to get shot. I really did. He was violently mad. Ramphas would hardly speak to me.

Q: This "illness" was just your word for...

FARLAND: That was a euphemism. He wasn't ill. I made up something.

Q: What was Ramphas' role?

FARLAND: He was a general and he was in charge of the air force, but there was another man who did the actual work. Ramphas was pretty much of a playboy. He enjoyed that very much. Even after the assassination, he didn't take over really the control of it. He didn't go to Johnny Abbis or to Espeyel and say "Kill them all." He wasn't a hands on operation.

Q: Who was seen as the successor to Trujillo?

FARLAND: There was no one.

Q: Were you able to raise the subject with Trujillo, saying "Why don't you go and take your ill gotten gains (in a polite way) and live it out in Spain or something?"

FARLAND: Mark Clark came down there, which made me a little angry.

Q: This was General Clark, now retired.

FARLAND: Yes. He talked to Trujillo along that line. Trujillo submitted to him in Spanish, so he had to send his paper over to him to be written in Spanish. It was late in the evening and I carried it over to next door to the station there before he got into his property. I stopped, at which point I had two submachine guns stuck in my car. They didn't know who I was or what was going on. They hadn't been forewarned. So, I made some general remarks about that at the time. I gave them the paper and went over to the embassy and took off my shoes and said, "I'm not going out again tonight." The phone rang. A man called and said, "Trujillo, here is what happened at the gate." He said, "Oh, come on over and have a drink." "No thanks, I'm in for the night. I've had enough for one day. Thank you very much. No thanks." That was Mark Clark's end of that effort.

Q: I take it nothing happened.

FARLAND: Nothing happened. [A family member' went] over and talked to him, which I thought was the best possible... To have a member of his family tell him... Nothing happened. I knew it was all over.

Q: By this time, in your opinion, Trujillo was going to be carried out feet first.

FARLAND: Absolutely. I wrote to Dick Rubaum a letter. I spelled out 10 things that I thought were going to happen. I would like to get a copy of that letter if it's available. Those things happen. They happen by chance and sequence and they ended up with the assassination of Trujillo within a year.

Q: Were you seeing at the time, in this 1957-1960 period, a steady decline in the control situation by Trujillo? Here is an absolute dictator. Were you expecting that he would have to take even more extreme measures in order to keep control or would an assassination just be a bolt out of the blue with no lead-up to it? Did you see the situation of Trujillo's rule beginning to get tighter or more difficult because of internal composition?

FARLAND: It was tighter because of the economics, the shutdown of this tax that favored him (the sugar crop). He had been buying copiously anything he could get from France, Czechoslovakia, wherever he could get it. Also, the day I left, at the airport my last handshake with Henry Dearborn, he palmed a note to me which indicated that Trujillo had told his officers to stay out of the Roman Catholic Church. So, there was a break with the Church and that was one of his main supporters. So, he was losing money and church. The United States had obviously given up on him.

Q: Were we concerned at that time with communist influence?

FARLAND: There were surprisingly few communist- (end of tape)

Q: We had already seen what happened with Cuba. Was there a concern about the aftermath of Trujillo?

FARLAND: According to Henry Dearborn, who had a conversation with Kennedy...

Q: In a way, his power was really threatened by this point?

FARLAND: He was. I told you before that I had a little bit of interest there in communism. I saw no evidence of it there of any consequence.

Q: Where was the opposition coming from? The better educated?

FARLAND: The opposition came from those who were educated. These were lawyers, doctors, engineers, top-flight merchants, people generally who had been trained in the United States. Most of them spoke English.

Q: Were these people particularly persecuted by Trujillo?

FARLAND: Trujillo had a very interesting habit of saying that he liked sending one of his minions to see Senor Gomez or Senor Jimenez and say, "Generalissimo Trujillo thinks your daughter is very nice and would like for her to be out at San Cristobal for the night," at which point the recipient of that conversation would say, "My house and home is greatly honored by the Generalissimo's interest in my daughter." Would you believe that?

Q: God! I would think in any society, but particularly in a Spanish...

FARLAND: That's what happened. I can't verify this, but I understood there was a 12 year old girl out at San Cristobal the night that he was going out there when he was killed.

Q: He must have had a tremendous number of bitter enemies then among the people who-

FARLAND: He did, but what he had done was, it locked that population to the top of the mountain and showed them all the glories that lay beyond. He said, "All this is yours and all you have to do is give me your morals." Many of them did.

Q: So, it wasn't just a matter of military dictatorship. It was also a matter of corruption of the upper class.

FARLAND: When he took over originally, he was doing fine for the first few years. He was doing some excellent things. He got roads back into shape. He got businesses restarted. They had a hell of a hurricane down there. But he got surrounded by a bunch of sycophants, who wanted to feather their own nests. They would tell him that if he burped, it was the greatest burp in history. Whatever he did was the greatest that had ever been done. He could do no wrong. It was laughable to an outsider, but he believed his own press agents.

Q: You mentioned the times you had to confront him, but in normal conversation, did you find him rational?

FARLAND: Oh, yes, he was rational. I had lunch with him a number of times. We didn't do any heavy thinking during that conversation, but rational, yes, he was. A man cannot live in that kind of a climate for 30-some years without having something on the ball.

Q: Did you have many congressional visitors? You mentioned a senator, but did you have others of the same type?

FARLAND: And we had some American businessmen who came there. Bell Polly was one. This was a man who had an interest in Cuba at one time. He had his brother signed over there to the Dominican Republic to look after his interests. There were plenty of opportunities to make money there. I was offered one night,

"Mr. Ambassador, we've just issued some new stock at the abattoir. It costs very little and I think there will be a lot of profit. Would you be interested in having a few shares of that?" "No, Manuel, I've had to put my stocks all in trust. That would just complicate things mightily if I got any other stock. I would have to put that in trust and that would be too much of a complication. Thank you very much though." The cement plant was another. He had a lock on a cement business. He had been locked on the abattoir. He also took 10% of all profits. You give a man, for instance, the Jeep Agency. You have exclusive. I want 10% minimum.

Q: What was he doing with his personal money that he was making?

FARLAND: He was sending it abroad for one thing. I don't know what he did with it all. Ramphas got a lot of it.

Q: What about his other children?

FARLAND: Rademus, a couple of years ago, was saying that he was going to kill me. I was the one that caused his father's death. There was enough substance to it to justify me carrying a gun, which I did for another year. Rademus was not a very bright boy. He got mixed up with the Medellin cartel in Colombia. He got a nice shipment of cocaine and sells it and forgot to return the money to the cartel. So, Rademus is no longer among the living. When I got there, he was about 11 or 12 years old and he had a bevy of whores in one of the hotels for the use of his friends and himself. It was amoral. It was unbelievable! As John Barfield said to me one time, "If we write a book, people won't believe this. It us so utterly amoral."

Q: I recall one time in prep school in the 1940s during the war, there was one young man from the Dominican Republic at this school (I was not a fancy guy, but there were some fancy people there.) who said he was a captain in the Dominican army. This guy was about 14 years old. What the hell was this?

FARLAND: Ramphas was a colonel at 11. It was a different world.

Q: Back to this contact with the underground. What were we doing except talking to people? Were we saying "Go to it" or was it just for information?

FARLAND: My first effort was to try to get into the underground. My wife also moved into the area. Towards the end, she was going to a book meeting every week and exchanging books and brought back a book, in which there would immediately be a message. They never did find that one out.

Q: But what was our purpose?

FARLAND: Our purpose was to ascertain exactly what was going to happen, when it was going to happen, and who was going to take over.

Q: What was your analysis of... You've got, if nothing else, an awful lot of fathers and brothers getting a little tired of their sisters and daughters being despoiled. This was a very likely source of assassins. If it happened, what did we see moving in at that time?

FARLAND: I didn't see it happening that way. I saw the establishment of a democratic government. I had the list of those who were going to be in it. As I say, that almost cost me my life to get it. I had to go through a lot of subterfuge and covers in order to make the contact and the contact had to become somewhat obvious.

Q: What were we doing? Were we talking to people who might supplant Trujillo after his removal from the scene and saying "We will support a democratic regime, but we will not support another dictatorship?" Was that our message?

FARLAND: No, our message was that we would support the underground as we knew them. Johnny Puccini, who was one of the wealthiest young men in town, asked me one day, "We need 12 Enfield rifles." I said, "Why in the hell do you want an Enfield rifle?"

Q: A British army rifle, a rather elderly one.

FARLAND: That's right. He said, "Well, we hear that they're the best." I said, "Well, I'll take it up, but I'm not going to guarantee it." I mentioned it to Dick. The Church committee asked me and I mentioned it to the Church committee. I didn't expect him to get them. But if I didn't at least go back and say I asked for them, how much confidence would the underground have in me? So, I had to make some kind of a visual effort, so I did. But I didn't get them. They arrived later. One boy said to me, "You know, you are right here. You look right into Trujillo's bedroom. Why don't you shoot him?" I said, "Johnny, why don't you shoot him? You went to military school in the United States. You know how to shoot a rifle. Why do you want me to shoot him?" He said, "I want to go to the funeral."

Q: With this effort, what support did we give while you were there to the underground?

FARLAND: The support that I gave to the underground was the fact that they knew that the United States would back a democratic government. I didn't give them a diddly darn thing as far as weaponry is concerned or any kind of apparatus of any kind. But they knew that I was on their side.

Q: When you left there in 1960, how much longer was Trujillo in power?

FARLAND: It was a little less than a year before he was killed.

Q: Was this in the air? Had there been other attempts on him?

FARLAND: There had been a couple. The day I left, Trujillo tried to do me in. This is a complicated situation. John Barfield had a call from his counterpart in another embassy saying "My ambassador is all upset. He wants to go with the American ambassador to the airport, along with other members of the corps, and he received an invitation from the Papal Nuncio that there would be a meeting at the exact time that the ambassador is leaving to go to the airport, so he's got to go to that meeting." A few months later, someone came to the embassy with a little present to me from a local organization. It was a little silver tray. This individual was frightened to death and said to me, "Do you know who I am?" The question was "Do you know I'm in the underground?" I said, "Yes, I know who you are." The individual said, "I've been told to tell you to be extremely careful on the way to the airport." And out the person went. I told Dearborn what the situation was. I knew it couldn't be true because the night before, the Papal Nuncio, not being able to come to a party that I was attending, sent me a little painting of the Crucifixion, along with a note of his high regards. He wasn't supporting Trujillo and we knew that. I knew this was a fake, but John went up and was told there was no meeting, that that was not our invitation. It was all printed with a seal and everything else. It looked official. So, what actually happened, the whole corps said, "The hell with that" and they all went with me to the airport.

Q: When you got to Washington, I assume you were debriefed and you were seeing people. What were you saying?

FARLAND: Most of what I've told you. But I was basically talking to Dick Rubottom. They were working on my next post, which was Panama.

Q: Before we leave the Dominican Republic, during 1957-1960, what were relations with Haiti like? This was the time of Papa Doc Duvalier. Were there much relations there?

FARLAND: The Haitians sent a couple of delegations over to the Dominican Republic and they were frightened to death. Papa Doc was scared to death of Trujillo and justifiably so. I told you at another time before we started recording that one day Trujillo killed between 30 and 40,000 Haitians and the Zone Sanitaire, which was the borderline between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He let them come over to harvest his sugarcane, paid them 50 cents and as much sugar as they could eat from the cane, really slave labor. So he made use of them when he wanted to.

Q: What about the Dominican army? How did we see that back at this time?

FARLAND: As far as the numbers were concerned, that was the largest standing army in the Caribbean. They were well-equipped with everything that Trujillo could buy. They had some tanks, though not many. They had a fairly good rifle

that was made near San Cristobal. They made pistols there also. As far as their fighting ability, when that so-called invasion came from Cuba, they didn't purport themselves too well, but the boys were all...
Q: Usually, there are two sources. The enlisted men in these armies come from the campesinos and the officer corps can either come from the upper class or from the campesino class, but the brighter ones move up through this and therefore owe their allegiance more to both the army and to the dictator.

FARLAND: That was Trujillo's case. He rose through the ranks when we sent Marines in down there. He got his training from the United States Marine Corps. He was very proud of that.

Q: Let's move to 1960. Let's get set up for Panama. You came back to Washington in the summer of 1960?

FARLAND: I came back in early summer of 1960, yes.

Q: Things were getting ready for a new administration one way or the other. It was Kennedy versus Nixon. I would think, as a political appointee, that everything would be on hold.

FARLAND: Well, it wasn't because of the situation in Panama. There was a bad situation in Panama. I certainly started to consider myself a cleanup man. There was a horrible situation in Panama, but we'll go into that when we want to start Panama.

Q: Here you are, as you mentioned, a devout Christian in an amoral situation and having to keep a good face on it. Just daily life there for the ambassador.

FARLAND: For me, it was Hell really. I was running with the foxes and playing with the hounds. That made it doubly hard. Life in general for the average Dominican of some education, the lower-middle class, was pretty rough. There was a box on the front page of the local paper which was called "El Tublico." If the headlines had said "War Is Declared. Atomic Bomb going to be dropped," people would ignore that and read that box first to make sure that their name wasn't in it. It was reput that Trujillo specified that box and what was on it. "John Jones is not keeping the front of his store clean" and that was enough to make a man shake in his boots. We in this country can't realize what it really meant to live in a dictatorship of this kind.

Q: In normal social intercourse with the Dominicans, this must have been very difficult. Everybody must have been watching what they said.

FARLAND: They were. There were parties and get-togethers. I remember one party after someone had been murdered in town and it was pretty well known. The party was like a wake. Nobody was saying anything. Even the corps was

being quiet. I was sitting across from the Japanese ambassador's wife. Everything was just quiet. Nobody wanted to open their mouth. I said to her, "[quote in Japanese]" and she laughed. I asked her if she spoke Japanese. She giggled for a while and then went silent again.

Q: We'll pick up Panama now. You came back from the Dominican Republic. It's still the tag end of the Eisenhower administration. What was waiting for you when you got back to Washington?

FARLAND: I had definite indications that I was going to Panama. When I got back, I started being briefed on Panama. We sat around and waited. There were problems in Panama that I couldn't believe. I began to understand them better as I heard about them. In came a telegram from Harrington, who was then ambassador in Panama. It said, "Please don't ask me to leave until the head man here in the Canal Zone leaves," at which point Dulles blew up. He said, "Tell him to get out of there." So, Harrington then left. Did you know him?

Q: No.
FARLAND: He was very much a part of the State Department. He said that the ambassador there in Panama was a good man, but his wife was a definite detriment. But you can't put that in an efficiency report.

Q: No, but this often can be a problem.

FARLAND: I wish someone would tell me why you can't put that in an efficiency report.

Q: It used to be and they took it out. But even when you allowed it in, it didn't get in.

FARLAND: They've gotten an efficiency report... At least when I left, you had to show it to the man, get his approval before you sent the thing in. This is not the way to run a...

Q: Anyway, you were ambassador to Panama from 1960 to when?

FARLAND: To 1963, I think.

Q: You were ambassador from 1960-1963. What were you told about the situation in Panama in 1960 before you went out?

FARLAND: I was told that it was a mess and to clean it up. I was told that the ambassador was not speaking to the governor of the Canal Zone, the governor of the Canal Zone wasn't speaking to any of them, and no one was talking to anybody else. The Panamanians were playing against each other.

Q: The governor of the Canal Zone was an American.

FARLAND: That's right.

Q: The general of the Southern Command was an American.

FARLAND: Very much so.

Q: And then you had the Panamanians. So, these were all three powers unto themselves.

FARLAND: Three American powers there that were not talking to each other.

Q: This was before you went out. Were you told why they weren't? Was it personality?

FARLAND: Personalities. I brought this up with Eisenhower. I requested that when I went out and if the governor of the Canal Z one and I could not agree on the policy, then it should be referred to him for decision. He agreed to that. That was in the basis of my departure.

Q: What about the general in charge of Southern Command?

FARLAND: Generally speaking, of no particular effect on policy, although at the end, proved himself to be quite a pain, if you know what I mean.

Q: Usually what happens when the American military (really any military) has its own zone, it tends to be rather oblivious to civilian desires, whether they're American or Panamanian.

FARLAND: Well, generally speaking, we had one commander down there who was oblivious to most everything because he was on the bottle all the time. But while I was there, I'm glad to say that the governor of the Canal Zone and I had no difference of opinion. If we had, they were minor and they were solved between us. And that worked.

Q: Since this is for the historical record, could you explain what the situation was when you went out there, how the situation in Panama was at the time in 1960?

FARLAND: It was ready to explode again.

Q: I'm talking about the actual governmental situation. Could you explain a bit about the role of the Republic of Panama and the role of the Zone? For the reader of this, they won't be as familiar with this as you and I are.

FARLAND: I don't know how to even begin to explain that. It was a situation in

which there had been a hiatus between all of them and [it was possible] for the locals, the Panamanians, to exploit and bid. I tried to heal that situation.

Q: For somebody who is not familiar with the role of the United States at that time, there was this American sovereignty right in the middle of Panama called the Canal Zone.

FARLAND: This is true.

Q: I'm talking about somebody reading this later on.

FARLAND: They're going to have to do a lot of studying to get a full understanding of it.

Q: What was your understanding of the role of the ambassador and the role of the governor of the Canal Zone?

FARLAND: The governor of the Canal Zone was supposed to be the governor of the Canal Zone. The ambassador of the United States was supposed to be the ambassador to the Republic of Panama. The people in the Canal Zone felt that the American ambassador was also their ambassador, which, in fact, he was in one sense of the word, but in reality he wasn't. The governor was interposed between us. It was a unique operation which no longer exists because of the change in status. But it didn't have to be that way. It didn't have to be as demarked as it was.

Q: What was the government of Panama like at that time?

FARLAND: The government of Panama was as it always was. Ernesto De La Guardia was then president. He was a delightful man who I enjoyed the company of. I liked him very, very much. The government was run by Anofson Blaya. It was a republic. It was not bicameral. It was one in itself, sometimes less than appropriate people, but mostly it was pretty well done. I don't know exactly how to get to your question.

Q: What I'm trying to do is to paint a picture for somebody who is going to read this a century from now. We are trying to recreate what the situation was at the time there.

FARLAND: They had an ongoing government that was operational.

Q: Did we consider the government of Panama to be a friendly government?

FARLAND: Yes. I did.

Q: We'll talk about the Zone a little later, but let's talk about Panama to begin with. As you went there, what did you see as the major problem with our relations

with the government of Panama?

FARLAND: The problem always was the Canal Zone. That was the problem. We had no other basic problems.

Q: With the Canal Zone, what was seen as the clash? Was it just that it shouldn't be there, that the Panamanians should take it over?

FARLAND: No, no, no, no, no. I've said this a thousand times. I never once heard one responsible Panamanian request the turnover of the Canal to Panama while I was there. Never. Surprising as that may sound in view of the fact that it has been turned over.

Q: What did they want?

FARLAND: They wanted a partnership. President Shoddy, who was subsequent to the president we just discussed, kept saying, "I worked on the Panama Canal" and I had to go to the silver window and the Americans went to the gold window." We practiced a form of separation there-

Q: Segregation.

FARLAND: Precisely. That was in 1955. They attempted to get rid of it. It was not gotten rid of until I got down there and Bob Fleming, who became governor of the Canal Zone, and we pointed out some of the vestiges that were still hanging on and we eliminated them then, and not until then.

Q: What had prevented getting rid of this blatant segregation? Wasn't it also a matter of toilets and drinking fountains?

FARLAND: Everything.

Q: It was really very much a deep South mentality, wasn't it?

FARLAND: I'm a southern boy and I love the South. I love my fellow man. I love my fellow man regardless of his color. I was not going to stand for any of the continuation of these vestiges. I've talked to Bob about it. I said, "Look, these are still existing in these forms." He said, "We'll get rid of them immediately." He was completely cooperative. I couldn’t have had a better partner in this.

Q: How had this discrimination existed up to then?

FARLAND: It just passed by. People were both ignoring it and practicing it in the State Department and the embassy.

Q: There had been no pressure from anybody to...

FARLAND: There was none coming out of the embassy. I can get very hot about this. This is one thing that I object to strenuously.

Q: We're beginning to go through the segregation fight from 1955 on in the South, but there wasn't any reflection of that?

FARLAND: It was once removed and the practices were still in operation. Many of them had been canceled. I don't mean to say that they weren't. In 1955, many were, but there were still vestiges of it there. When I pointed this out to Bob, he agreed wholeheartedly.

Q: What was Bob Fleming's background? Was he a Zonian himself?

FARLAND: No, he was a United States engineer and a one star general. He was from the Corps of Engineers.

Q: When you arrived there, what was your initial impression? Here were these people who weren't talking to each other.

FARLAND: Well, the absurdity of it was a major impression upon me. I decided I was going to do something about that immediately. In the first place, the three principals didn't do any talking to each other and left by that time. I arrived with a clean slate. We had the best possible relations. Bob Fleming, a military man, a feisty little guy in many respects, couldn't have been a better companion to my efforts.

Q: How did you find the embassy at the time, your DCM, etc.?

FARLAND: The DCM was an awfully nice man who wasn't the least bit happy about seeing a non-career officer come in. When he left, he made a speech saying that he was very much opposed to me arriving and that that attitude had completely changed and he appreciated the work that I had done.

Q: Did you feel that you were going into a difficult situation?

FARLAND: I didn't realize I was going into that much of a situation. I knew it was going to be difficult. Carl Davis- (end of tape)

Carl Davis was a very close friend in the Dominican Republic. He went to Panama. He was writing me, telling me what was going on in Panama.

Q: What was his position?

FARLAND: He was head of the USIS. There was much [discussion] about a former coal miner coming to Panama.

Q: They must have had political appointees before that.
FARLAND: Oh, they did.

Q: And you were not coming straight out of East Oshkosh. You were coming from a difficult embassy. You were coming with professional credentials.

FARLAND: That didn't make any difference. The head of the CIA over there and the ambassador spent long weekends up in Al Baliay, which was a watering spot up in the mountains, playing bridge. They were exchanging information between themselves and they didn't know any information. As a result, the embassy was going flat and the embassy was sitting there on their cans writing reports based upon the local newspapers. My first meeting... I had my spies there, let's put it that way. I knew what was going on. At the first staff meeting I had, a secretary came in and said, "The staff is ready." I said, "Let them wait 10 minutes" and I sat there. I said, "Tell them to come in" and I sat there. I didn't get up. They walked in. You've got to remember my background. I said, "My name is Joseph Simpson Farland and I don't have a damn thing to prove to any of you, but each one of you have a great deal to prove to me. I don't give a damn if you never write another report. If you're sitting here on your pots writing reports based upon what you read in the newspapers, it means nothing as far as I'm concerned or the Department is concerned. I want you to get out and meet the people and start showing them by the way you act and conduct yourself and the way you talk what makes the United States great. We have the greatest government in the world. Prove it to these people. Show them. That is what I expect. That is what you will do if you're going to stay at this embassy. I have more clout than you have. If there are no questions, this meeting is adjourned." That is virtually verbatim.

Q: What was the reaction or your impression of it?

FARLAND: There was a quiet that set over the entire embassy. One fellow I saw in the hall and I said, "Do you have a car?" He said, "Yes." I said, "I'd like to go down and see Fourth of July Avenue." He said, "Your chauffeur isn't here." I said, "You said you had a car." He said, "I have." I said, "Well, does it have four wheels." He said, "Yes." I said, "Can you drive?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Could you drive me down?" He said, "In my car?" I said, "Sure, why not?" He said, "Certainly." So, we drove down to Fourth of July Avenue. They didn't understand that I wasn't just striped pants out of nowhere. I meant what I said. I had one officer that couldn't take it. He went by the board. The rest of them came to. I had some good officers there. They just needed direction.

Q: There had been nobody pushing them to get out and mix and meet?

FARLAND: No. When the boss goes up in El Baliay for a weekend all weekend, what is their point in getting out working? You've got to set an example by working yourself. They didn't.

Q: Can you talk a bit about arriving on the scene and getting to know people, getting involved?

FARLAND: The first morning I got there, I went down to the embassy and walked in the front door. There was no American flag flying. That was a very important point. There was no American flag flying in front of the American embassy. This Marine was standing there and I said, "I have trouble finding this embassy. Usually, there is an American flag flying. This is the American embassy?" He said, "Yes, Sir." I said, "Why isn't there an American flag flying?" He said, "That is the ambassador's orders, Sir." I said, "Listen, Gyrene, I've got news for you. I'm the American ambassador and when I present my credentials, I want that flag on that flagpole. Does that suit you?" He said, "Yes, Sir" and that is the way we had one upstairs. From then on, it was all history.

Q: Why hadn't the flag been flown?

FARLAND: The ambassador was afraid they'd tear it down. When I told Eisenhower that, he said, "What are you going to do about it?" I said, "I'm going to put the flag up." He said, "You'd better God damn well do that." I said, "I intend to. We've got a lot of flags to keep flying."

Q: Eisenhower had actually served in the Panama Canal Zone.

FARLAND: He did.

Q: He had been there. This was a very formative period for him.

FARLAND: Yes.

Q: Was there the feeling that not only was undirected but also was hunkered down, too?

FARLAND: It had hunkered down. We had a Foreign Service officer that was afraid, afraid of his title, afraid of the future, afraid of what was going to happen to him.

Q: You mentioned the Fourth of July. What was this?

FARLAND: This was sort of the dividing line between Panama City and the Canal Zone. It was a business section. It's still called Avenue de July Fourth. I had friends on it.

While I was there, Stuart, we never had a riot. When I got there, we were faced with one. I told the staff, "We have to work to prevent the riot. There is one coming up. We're all dedicated to preventing that."

Q: Why was there going to be a riot?

FARLAND: I don't remember exactly the reason, but it was very much in vogue at that time.

Q: There were a series of riots coming up.

FARLAND: Yes.

Q: How did you go about preventing the riot?

FARLAND: Well, in the first place, I called in a group of Americans that I had been told were key Americans in the community. I said, "What do we do to prevent this?" They gave me their opinion.

Q: Which was basically what?

FARLAND: Start being friendly. Start being partners. Start being neighbors. How do you become friends? You become a friend by being one.

Q: How did you find the Panamanians? Had they been sort of ignored? I'm talking about both in the government and the people, opinion makers and all that?

FARLAND: They felt like they were left out of it. Panamanians basically wanted to be considered part of the partnership. President Shoddy told me this one time. They wanted to feel like they contributed something to this. They didn't want to feel like the cousin that had an abortion or something. There was plenty of good feeling among the Panamanians. It was there, but it had to be corralled and it had to be supported.

Then I brought in all the Panamanians I could think of and we had a session. Then I got Americans and Panamanians together and we had a session. We talked. How else do you get to know people? You talk.

Q: Looking at the other side, what was your impression of your initial meetings with the people from the Panama Canal Zone, the Americans? These have all been portrayed as being very insular.

FARLAND: There was a small group in the Zone who were insular. It was headed up by none other than Judge Crowell. I use his name very carefully. The judge was a very important man in the Canal Zone. He had a judgeship and he ran it over the smallest territory. He did quite a job. He didn't like me and I didn't like him.

Q: Did you see the American Canal Zonians as one of the groups you had to deal

with?

FARLAND: A small group, yes. The basic Zonian, no. Some of my best friends were Zonians who had been there for a couple of generations. They didn't have that feeling. They felt they were part of Panama. They did not. I can't stress that point too strongly. There were a few (and they had a constituency in the United States government in the Congress) and they were loud and made all kinds of noises, but it was a small group.

Q: How did this affect you all and what you were trying to do?

FARLAND: It didn't help in the least. He represented most of [what] was accredited to the Zonians.

Q: Was it that he was prejudiced?

FARLAND: Yes, he was highly prejudiced.

Q: What was his background?
FARLAND: I don't know his background.

Q: When you arrived, were there ongoing problems of jurisdictional complaints between Panamanians and Zonians?

FARLAND: Those were problems which could have been solved easily, but they weren't. But they weren't ongoing. This didn't represent a major problem. Looking at it from a Panamanian standpoint to be judged in an American court because you're on that territory particularly was aggravating, but that was not a fundamental problem. It became a problem. Now that's all passed. You're talking about "has been." But no, that was not something that raised any havoc.

Q: I am told that one of the great irritants was the fact that a Panamanian, in order to go from the north to the south of his own country had to be stopped by military police and all that going through the Zone.

FARLAND: They wanted a right of passage, which would have been a simple thing to do. We had some stubborn people in the United States that couldn't see the obvious. We agreed to build a bridge. That is a long, sad story. We didn't build it. We didn't build it. We didn't build it.

Q: Was the bridge designed to sort of go over-

FARLAND: Yes, it went over the Canal. There was a nice, wonderful old gentleman by the name of Thatcher. They named the ferry that ran across there "Thatcher Ferry" and then they wanted to name the bridge "Thatcher Ferry Bridge." The President of the United States, one of the speechwriters, and I were

in conference. The President said, "Go see Mr. Thatcher and see if he will agree to taking his name off that bridge." Well, we went. I felt sorry for the old man, honestly. He was sitting there in an old office that had the dust of centuries in it. His breakfast for several years had been on it. He said, "I would like to acquiesce to the President's suggestion, but I have friends that won't understand. I will be letting them down if I take my name away from that." I felt sorry for him.

Q: Why did they want to take the name away?

FARLAND: So it could be named "The Bridge of the Americas" and have no connection with the Panama Canal. But Thatcher's Ferry was a name that was synonymous with the Canal. And there was almost a riot the day the bridge was [transferred]. They, the Panamanians, changed the name of it that day.

Q: Was it built during your time?

FARLAND: Yes.

Q: It did get built, but did that mean that the Panamanian-

FARLAND: Not during the time I was there, but it was promised in 1955.

Q: Could a Panamanian then go across that bridge without touching-

FARLAND: No problem. All you had to do was drive across it.

Q: It later became a big problem. Were you concerned about the younger generation, particularly high school kids, in the Zone?

FARLAND: Those younger kids were egged on by their parents. They wouldn't do that by themselves. Before that happened, Shoddy went to Washington to see the conference with Kennedy, a Washington trip. Kennedy (and I was in the meeting and heard it precisely) told him that he understood it was a marriage consummated with a shotgun, but be that as it may, we were considering the possibility of... He said, "First, right now, with politics being what it is, we can't very well do too much to change things. Secondly, we're considering the possibility of a sea level canal to be dug by nuclear energy. That would take about seven years to ascertain the "yays" and "nays" of that situation. So, we don't want to do anything during that period." Shoddy bought it.

Then we start home and Shoddy had only asked for so many hours to be away. We were flying back in a Panamanian plane from Miami. We got over Cuba and we lost an engine. Dickie Audies, a former president, came back to me and said, "Joe, we've lost an engine." I said, "Don’t give me that stuff, Dickie! I'm tired. I'm worn out. I want to sleep a bit." He said, "No, I mean it. We're going back to Miami." I said, "Are we?" "Yes, we are." And back to Miami we came. Well,

Shoddy came to me and said, "Look, if I don't get back to Panama, I will no longer be president. If I am not there by midnight, I am not going to be president of Panama. I know what those politicians are doing. They are down there figuring out who is going to be president. You've got to get a supersonic jet." I arrived back in Miami and got a hold of a phone. I think it was PanAm. I don't know who paid for it. But I called the White House, SAC, everyone. They wondered who the crazy guy was yelling about saving the president of Panama. And I'm yelling for a supersonic plane. Finally, somebody said, "Well, the plane will be at Helmeted Air Base." I said, "How in the hell do I get there?" He said, "We'll have a helicopter come and pick you up." I said to Nino (Charlie's nickname), "Nino, who do you want to go with us?" He said, "Well, I guess my foreign minister." "You mean Nyato Galileo Solis?" "Yes." So, the three of us get in this helicopter and go through all that traffic and out to Helmeted. We get off the plane and there are a couple of pilots in work clothes that had just been torn out of a cocktail party with a 707. Nino Shoddy said, "That's not a supersonic plane." I said, "No, that's not a supersonic plane." He said, "Take me back to Miami." I said, "Okay. Call that chopper back." It came back in. We got in and flew back over to the airport in Miami and dropped down into the traffic circle. At that point, Charlie is going literally out of his mind. He is no longer going to be president. I saw purely as a coincidence, one of these things that happen, a Panamanian flag on the tail of an airplane with the motors running. I said, "Nino, get your butt up on that plane. That is a Panamanian plane. As soon as it's three miles out, you're in Panamanian territory." He ran up to the plane, up the steps, and Galileo followed him. I went to bed. That actually happened! Nino Shoddy knows that I saved his presidency that night. That plane took off. I'm not sure it took off by twelve o'clock, but that's when it was recorded at.

Q: You went out there in the summer of 1960 under the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower. By January 20, 1961, John F. Kennedy was president and here you were appointed by one president. Did you feel your position was precarious?

FARLAND: I was probably ready to go home, if that's what you mean.

Q: Normally, when a new president-

FARLAND: They ask for your resignation. I was perfectly willing to resign... For reasons that I have been told, that a petition that was signed, the first name on it was Nino Shoddy was sent to the presidency asking that I be kept. I don't know. I don't think anybody did me a great favor by keeping me there. I got into nothing but trouble from there on.

Q: Let's talk about the trouble. First, what sort of support were you getting when the Kennedy administration came in? Each time a new administration comes in, there is always a learning curve. The Kennedy one, as I recall, particularly in Latin American Affairs, was sort of an amateur takeover at the beginning.

FARLAND: It was amateur. I sat back and enjoyed it. There was not anything I could do about it. I was there. Dean Rusk comes down and I take him to meet the President. On the way down, he told me in no uncertain terms that I was not his choice as ambassador and I'd better mind my Ps and Qs. I didn't appreciate those comments a bit.

Q: It seems sort of grumpy on his part.

FARLAND: It seemed grossly inappropriate.

Q: Did you have any reason why he felt that way?

FARLAND: I have no idea why he felt that way. I was a Republican, of which they were well aware. I was the only Republican they kept. I got along fine with Kennedy as far as person to person was concerned. I'm not quite sure at the end of it, but...

Q: Who was originally the head of ARA at that time, the deputy secretary?

FARLAND: Ed Martin was appointed by Kennedy. Ed Martin did not like me. He and Rusk must have had conversations about it before because he didn't like me a bit. It became mutual after a while.

Q: Did you have words with Martin?

FARLAND: I was told by Martin one day, "You will not go up on the Hill and talk to congressmen. You will not do that and I'm telling you right now." I said, "You're telling me that I cannot exercise freedom of speech? I intend to go up to the Congress and talk to congressmen. What do you intend to do about it?" He said, "I'm telling you not to?"

Q: Why would you be going up there?

FARLAND: I wanted to tell them what was going on. I wanted support for some projects that I had. Naturally, I wanted support. With AID, I was having all kinds of problems. AID had wanted to build superhighways from here to there with no traffic on them. I wanted to build little roads. I wanted to build little schoolhouses with people using a machine to make bricks, which could be built for about $5.00. I came from West Virginia. I saw this done. In West Virginia, we had dirt roads. You don't have to have superhighways to open up commerce. I opened up Tro Bray, which opened up a whole new area of Panama. I don't know how many people came down to tell me I couldn't do it.

Q: Where was the impetus coming from for the superhighways?

FARLAND: Out of AID/Washington.

Q: Was it that they were enamored with it?

FARLAND: That's the way it should be, government to government on a big scale.

Q: How about your AID director?

FARLAND: He was a nice man. He had bulldozers, shovels, scrapers, jackhammers, and Ingersoll compressors all over the field. The were digging holes and filling them up. I said, "The hell with these apples. Let's get them in the line and build a road." That's what we did at between four and five thousand dollars a mile. We opened up a whole new section of country. We were told we couldn't do it and we did it.

Q: I would imagine that the AID director would begin to feel conflicted.

FARLAND: He was going back and forth to Washington. I don't know how much it cost every trip he made, but he told them that I was going ahead and doing this, that, and the other. They told me that we couldn't build houses because the people wouldn't work. Once they got their house built, they would... I said, "You don't understand how it's done. We will build five houses with these men working on them. We will supply the equipment. At the end of that time, we will have a drawing for who gets the house. All the houses are going to be built the same." It's simple. It was done by the pilgrims when they first came over here the same way. We were in virgin territory. There was no reason why we had to start big. We opened up a whole area which was a hotbed of communism down at Sonawa. I think it was about four or five thousand dollars a mile. They're now exporting rice from that area. Before, Panama was importing rice. This to me was so self-evident that I was willing to fight for it.

Q: Did you feel that the administration was set to only do large projects?

FARLAND: This was their policy. It was government to government. They didn't believe in government to people. And I did.

Q: Under the Kennedy administration, there was the Alliance for Progress.

FARLAND: Alianza Para El Progreso. It was a good thing, but there wasn’t enough money in that to do what they were planning to do. There wasn't enough money. There wasn't enough money in the United States to rebuild Latin America.

Q: Did it have any impact on Panama?

FARLAND: Oh, I made some speeches to that effect and when I did, I said, "I'm

going to put up some signs indicating what we're doing here." "You can't do that. They'll tear them down." I said, "You're nuts. They won't tear these signs down." As far as I know, they're still there. They weren't torn down while I was doing it. I had Alianza Para El Progreso, Panama and the United States joined in partnership shaking hands, building a road together. They're going to tear that sign down? No way. They didn't.

Q: All during this time, particularly the Kennedy administration, you had almost a habitual Cuban crisis. What about the Bay of Pigs? Did that Cuba have any effect on Panama?

FARLAND: I got rid of it early on. I got the Cuban ambassador kicked out of Panama by the government. Panama was a route that the communists were coming up into Latin America, especially into Mexico and across Cuba. Did that have an effect on Panama? Not particularly at that point. Things were pretty well under control by that time. I was settled in.

I want to tell you about the flag. President Eisenhower said, "What about the flag issue?" That is when I said there were two issues. He was talking about a flag in front of the embassy. He said, "I want you to go down there and give me your best opinion on whether or not we should raise the flag in the Canal Zone." I did and I talked to Panamanians, Americans, and those who the locals knew. Finally, I decided to raise a flag. I so indicated to the President. He decided that he would raise a flag to indicate "titular recognition of titular sovereignty in Shaylor's triangle." The Panamanians thought Shaylor's triangle was part of Panama anyway, so the impact was a little less than had been planned. I got a telegram to that effect. Either in that telegram or one that came immediately thereafter, I was informed that the president of Panama cannot touch the halyard when that flag of Panama is being raised. I couldn't believe it! We're doing a magnanimous act. We raise their flag. We're meeting their expectations. He can't touch the halyard? This didn't make any sense! I sent a telegram back to the Department saying, "I've been informed that there is going to be a riot if the President does touch that halyard." I got a telegram back saying, "He cannot touch the halyard because 'this might establish a precedent.'" I'll be damned if I understand where in the hell the precedent would be in such an event. But that is what I got from the State Department. I would like to know who formulated that telegram.

Q: In other words, the president of the Republic of Panama was not allowed to touch it.

FARLAND: He was not allowed to touch it. This was Ernesto De La Guardia. I had to go tell him that he couldn't touch the halyard. I'll tell you what I did. I had a copy of the prayer of Saint Francis of Assisi. I read it. I reread it and reread it. I carried it with me out to where his home was. The first line of that is, "Oh, Lord, make me an instrument of Thy peace." I sat down with Ernesto De La Guardia and said, "This is the situation" and he cried. He said, "Not you, Joe, but those

people in the State Department don't understand that we Panamanians think with our hearts and not with our heads. Foreigners mean so much to us. I'm crushed. I graduated from Dartmouth. I've lived in the United States more years than I've lived in Panama. I don't understand. I don't understand." I cried with him.

Q: Did you get any feedback from the Department about why all this peculiar-

FARLAND: Not a peep. This was tough.

Q: Did the fact that the president didn't touch the halyard become common knowledge?

FARLAND: He wasn't there. He didn't come to the flag raising. I had to do something. The only thing I could to do to save the situation, which I knew was going to be a disaster, was say, "Ernesto, I know you won't come. I know you can't come under the circumstances. Will you invite me down to the presidencia for a drink after this is over?" He said, "Of course, Joe. Heavens, mi casa es su casa (my home is your home). Of course you can come down and have a drink." When the flag went up, I got in my car immediately and drove down to the presidencia and had a drink with him. I'm not only proud of that, but that is what I did. It saved a riot and it also buzzed up a situation to which-

Q: Was the fact that you went down there-

FARLAND: The question was raised "Why did the President invite him down?" So, there was enough buzz to give rise to a question.

Q: This was high Castro time. Were the Cubans trying to take advantage of all this?

FARLAND: They were shipping books into the campesinos, into their schools. Yes, they were definitely trying. There were some Panamanians, Margot Fonteyn being one, who tried to start a little revolution.

Q: She was a very famous British ballerina who was married to a Panamanian.

FARLAND: They thought they would have themselves a little revolution. It didn't work. They landed at the wrong place. I think that's a sad commentary on our policy.

Q: How about members of Congress? Were you dealing with members of Congress coming down there?

FARLAND: I saw quite a number of them that did. It was a nice place to come to when the snow was flying in Washington. I gave good cocktail parties for them. I would get these telegrams saying, "Senator So and So is arriving with two AAs

(administrative assistants) or three AAs and would like to meet 100 representative Panamanians, business people, and 100 representative American businessmen, and is traveling with black tie. Does not expect any untoward representation." I love those words: "any untoward representation." That meant two or more big cocktail parties at my expense. I did it.
Q: Speaking of finances, how did finances work out for you there?

FARLAND: It cost me a lot of money, but that wasn't the point. I was glad to do it.

Q: I just wanted to say that a Foreign Service ambassador couldn't have done it.

FARLAND: Not what I did, no. I had a big party for all the members of the local press and they drank copiously. But I got to know them and they got to know me. That was part of the job.

Q: How did you find the local press?

FARLAND: They were ready to chew me up. Then they were ready to embrace me. My wife had a wonderful idea. Because people in Panama City stayed right there or went up to El Baliay or went to Colon (That was the only route across the Isthmus.), the people in the interior never got to see the embassy. So, she suggested that we take the embassy to the people. (end of tape)

We went to Santiago and we went to other major capitals. We had an embassy party. People were delighted. I got to meet an awful lot of people and they got to meet me. That was part of it.

Q: How did you find the political situation in Panama working? Was it a matter of some political leaders who would have cohorts following them around or was it corruption? What was the situation as you found it?

FARLAND: Corruption isn't only limited to Panama. There was plenty of corruption in Panama. Candelio was still a part of Latin American heritage. It's one reason why Moralias was elected president three times and kicked out three times. No, they followed the leader and did the same things we do in the States. They had more of an English system. They would go to an area and say you wanted to represent that area and not live there. We require residency. They didn't in Panama.

Q: How about the Panamanian national guard at that time? What role did it have?

FARLAND: It was the national guard. They had no army. We took over the... Here is where the cheese is going to become binding today. I was at a cocktail party one time up in Colombia. A very intelligent, erudite woman said to me,

"You give the Canal to the Panamanians and we'll come and get it because it is ours. That country belongs to Colombia. You helped take it away at one time. Now we'll take it back." Incidentally, as of today, the year 2000, Panamanians are having trouble in the Daliene because of the influx of Colombians into the Daliene area. I wouldn't be a bit surprised if someday they'll be screaming for the United States government to send troops in to save the Canal from the Colombians.

Q: Was the national guard a political force at that time?

FARLAND: Not particularly.

Q: Were any of the figures who later became important, Noriega and Omar, coming to your attention?

FARLAND: Not then. They were small fry when I was there.

Q: Knowing what was going on in the country, how well did you feel the CIA station chief and his organization served you?

FARLAND: I kicked the head of the CIA out.
Q: Why?

FARLAND: Because he was spending too much time in El Baliay playing bridge. He was spending the rest of his time in the Canal Zone where he had his offices. Seldomly did he attend even staff meetings. I thought "This is no good. This is not going to work" and I suggested his removal and [it he was removed].

Q: When his replacement came, did it work better?

FARLAND: We built additional facilities on the embassy and said "This is where you're going to have to do your business."

Q: Let's talk about as things developed. Were most of your officers located in Panama itself? Were they attached to the Zone or not?

FARLAND: Well, except for the CIA, they were all in Panama.

Q: Their residences were in Panama, too.

FARLAND: None of them lived in the Zone.

Q: Did you find that there was too much attraction to the Zone, the commissary, etc.?

FARLAND: No, they used the commissary, but... The line of demarcation there

didn't exist really except in the way that one was cleaner than the other, the grass was greener than the other. They had the right to use it.

Q: Who were the Panamanian leaders? Was it a small group of people located that divided up jobs among themselves?
FARLAND: In any country, as you well know, you can go in and in a week you know who is running what and whose voice you're going to hear. Panama is a small country. There were some fine, educated, knowledgeable people there. Some of them were then... The Moda family was very influential. These were wonderful men. There were five of them. They were outstanding. There were two families Odias. I shant make the differentiation between them. There were two sisters. One of them was an Odias and one of them was a Herbomat. They were the social lions of this town. But it didn't take long to know with whom you were dealing. One night at a cocktail party, you could meet almost everybody.

Q: I'm told that the elite (not the social elite, but the political elite), that the majority are graduates of American universities.

FARLAND: Many of them Notre Dame.

Q: Was the currency the dollar?

FARLAND: The currency was the American dollar. They called it the "balboa" for their edification.

Q: At that time, was it a case of the Panamanians trying to differentiate themselves or to have equality with Americans?

FARLAND: They thought they should have a national currency, but they wanted to use the American dollar. They certainly profited by the fact that they used the American dollar.

Q: Were you keeping an eye on how the Canal was going or was it going so well that it was not a factor?
FARLAND: You mean at that time?

Q: Yes.

FARLAND: It was running along smoothly. I've gone through the locks. I've been down in the locks. I've always been interested in mechanics. I wanted to see how it worked. I wanted to see how everything came together. I was down in there, up in the towers, and so forth. I saw the whole works. It was an unbelievable construction job. It was the greatest undertaking at the time. We spent more money, according to one history book I read, in buying that area which is about 1/4 or ½ of the size of Long Island than we did for the Louisiana Purchase, Alaska, and the Gadsden Purchase.

Q: It came up at one point that people were talking in the Carter administration, the Canal Zone is ours. We stole it fair and square.

FARLAND: That's like Teddy Roosevelt. He was always making comments just to make the dirt fly while they talked.

Q: At the time, it's sort of appalling to think that we were considering putting off nuclear explosions, considering the radiation and the damage, to dig a canal, but this was a very serious-

FARLAND: This is still under consideration.

Q: Were nuclear explosions?

FARLAND: It still is. It was in the agreements that they've signed here recently. There were three parts to that treaty. That was one of them. However, let me tell you a little story about this. While Shoddy was sitting there waiting to hear from Kennedy and while we Fleming and I were appointed ambassador and consultant to deal with Galileo Solis and another man whose name I don't remember, I go to a ball game one night with President Shoddy. I had heard that day over our wire that we had signed a non-nuclear defense agreement. That meant no Panama Canal by nuclear means. The fallout would be 50 miles or something. I don't know the exact wording anymore. I said to Nino that night, "You know, I had word today that you signed a nuclear agreement." He said, "I heard it on the radio." This didn't help our cause any at all.

Q: Panama is not a very large area. To put a nuclear explosion in-

FARLAND: There were virtually no people. There were some Indians down there, some people, yes, but they can be moved out. They could do a 50 mile stretch. A controlled blast could be done underground, no overeffect. But still, there is going to be something. It was a big deal.

Q: How about the talk that had gone on prior to that? We're talking about the turn of the century. That is a Nicaraguan canal.

FARLAND: There were those in Congress who were still fighting for the Nicaragua canal when Teddy Roosevelt took possession of Panama. They still believe it. As far as I know, they still think Nicaragua is it.

Q: Did you get involved at all in the politics of the Canal?

FARLAND: No.

Q: It was something that hovered over everything, wasn't it?

FARLAND: No. Actually, there it was. There was a small group in Washington in Congress who represented "the Zonians." Dr. Morgan in the House of Representatives was one of them.

Q: Where was Morgan from?

FARLAND: Pennsylvania.

Q: What was his tie to-

FARLAND: I don't know exactly, but he certainly had a very strong opinion about it.

Q: This must have been a very difficult thing to deal with, wasn't it?

FARLAND: Well, I didn't have any problems until I left. Then I was suddenly found to be most derelict in everything I did.

Q: We'll come to that. Did you have an active program in getting the Zonians together with the Panamanians? Had this been a problem?

FARLAND: That wasn't a problem. There was a great deal of association between them. There was a small group that were perfectly content to be totally separate, be antagonistic to Panamanians totally. There was a small group of Panamanians who were perfectly content to be antagonistic toward the Canal and were. This we had to deal with. We had some wonderful people in Panama who were understanding and were voices of moderation. We didn't have that many in the States at that time.

Q: Did the Cuban Missile Crisis impact at all? We're talking about around October 1962.

FARLAND: It didn't impact it. The warships came through there. Hubert Humphrey happened to be a guest at that time of the embassy. I took him over to the Canal and he wanted to know, "Is anybody there from Minnesota?" Nobody seemed to be. I said to my wife after dinner when we were up in the bedroom, "How did you get along?" She said, "I got along fine. Hubert said I was the best conversationalist he had talked to in a long, long time." I said, "What did you say?" She said, "I didn't say anything."

Q: He was known for being extremely smart, but once he started talking...

FARLAND: I thought I was going to die with him one day. He wanted to go over to the jungle training area on the east coast. He wanted a twin engine plane. Well, I had no planes. I didn't even have a boat. I finally got a single engine plane. He

didn’t like that. But we started to land over there and hit a crosswind and it turned up on the side. The pilot gave it the gun and we hung on the prop. I think Hubert thought we were going to crash. I wasn't too damn sure we weren't going to crash. We just hung there for a while and finally... He wanted to go home right then and there. He didn’t want to see anything else. So, he went back to Panama.

Q: During that time, did you have any dealings with the general training in the School of the Americas?

FARLAND: I'm the guy that started the School of the Americas, but I had started it on a different basis than it ended up. Having been in the FBI and knowing that there was animosity between the police forces of each country, I wanted some place where you could get groups of these forces together and let them get drunk together, have a big time together, get into a canteen, and get to know each other. There would be unity and there would be the transfer of information between countries, which at that time there was not. So that was the basis for the organization of that. I went to J. Edgar Hoover and told him what I had in mind. He thought it was a good idea. He thought it was an excellent idea. He said, "But don't let the army get involved." Well, once I suggested it and started it, I had no control over it.

Q: I know you have Panama City and then Colon.

FARLAND: That was the only road across the Isthmus.

Q: Did you feel that Panama was a viable country at the time?

FARLAND: Yes, I thought it was a viable country. The lower end of it was the Dowdiene, which was nothing but jungle and was up against Colombia. The northern end is up against Costa Rica. There was David, which was a very energetic town. The Chiticanos up there wanted to separate themselves from Panama because they weren't getting proper treatment from Panama. But the Inter-American Highway, which I finally drove over all the way to Costa Rica, made it more united. David was a delightful little town with very prosperous, hardworking, and energetic people.

Q: Did you see Panama as being a meeting place between North and South America, particularly commercial and that sort of thing?

FARLAND: It was, but I didn’t visualize that. I was too busy trying to make sure that we didn’t have a riot. It obviously is. I'm going to get this little remark into the conversation. Through the help of the government, I kicked the Cuban embassy out of Panama.

Q: How did you do that?

FARLAND: By suggesting to the president that their presence was not conducive to the best relations and he agreed and out they went. The day I was leaving, I had about 50-60 people up in the embassy, dignitaries and government. A lady whose presence was not exactly [appreciated] in the embassy before I got there, but I saw no reason why she shouldn't be made a part in being invited was Thelma King, who was head of the Communist Party. She walks in. Well, I can't very well take her in to where the foreign minister is, so I take her into the library. Thelma says, "I just came back from Cuba." I said, "Really? Did you see Fidel?" She said, "Yes." I said, "How is he?" "Oh, he's fine." I said, "Did you tell him I was leaving?" She said, "Yes, I did." "What did he say?" He said, "It's a great, great, great day for Latin America." At one point, I got her to stop a riot.

Q: You keep talking about riots and stopping riots. Was this a continuing problem of keeping order?

FARLAND: Anytime there was a flashpoint which could suddenly arise, it would give rise to the possibility of a riot. The communists were pretty well organized there in Panama. They didn't like me a bit because I had taken away their voice, their publication, and gotten rid of their embassy. I was persona non grata as far as they were concerned. But they were still there. They were there at the time of the riots in 1964.

Q: I can see riots taking place when an American military person or a Zonian has an automobile accident, particularly if they seriously injure a Panamanian. I would think that would be one of the standard things.

FARLAND: Sure.

Q: Was there a task force between you and the Panamanian government of how to deal with these?

FARLAND: Yes. There was no formal setup, but we understood each other. It was in the best interests of both of us not to have a riot and to do everything we could to prevent it.

Q: What could you do yourself? Most of these riots would be instigated by Panamanians.

FARLAND: Thelma came in one day. As she was getting up, she said, "There is going to be a riot starting at the university." I said, "Thelma, come on back and sit down. I want to talk to you. You're a Panamanian. I most certainly am an American. We both have the interests of this country at heart. I'm here to help Panama. I'm not here to hinder it in any way. I want to help my country, but I'm certainly here to be of assistance to do what I can to bolster your country. A riot is not going to help the Panamanians. It's not going to help the United States. It's going to be a further detriment. It's going to injure a lot of people. It's going to

hurt a lot of people. What is gained by it except publicity, tear gas, and problems? Why don't you join me in this and go back and talk to those students there at the university and tell them to call this one off for a change just to see how that would work?" She said, "I'll see what I can do?"

Q: Who was Thelma King?

FARLAND: She was a member of parliament, of the Alsamblaya. She was a very influential woman. She was quite a speaker.

Q: Was she an American by origin?

FARLAND: No, she was Panamanian. She was a woman that needed somebody to at least talk to her frankly and with some degree of understanding.

Q: Was she able to talk them out of the riot?
FARLAND: No riot.

Q: There would be two things. One would be the flashpoint. I'm thinking particularly of an accident.

FARLAND: I almost had a fight over one of the Marines chasing a little girl. The father came to me. I was able to put quietude to it. Otherwise, there would have been a riot over there, for sure.

Q: Young American men-

FARLAND: It was a rough situation.

Q: And girls of another nationality. We have continual problems in Okinawa and elsewhere even to this day. Was our military working to keep this sort of thing from happening?

FARLAND: I hope so. I don't know why they wouldn't be.

Q: Sometimes what happens is, if there is a problem, the military tends to just get the person the hell out of there.

FARLAND: Well, they ship them out, but that isn’t a complete cover. It requires goodwill on the part of both sides to soften this thing down. It worked. That's all I can tell you. I know the way I played it worked.

Q: Particularly in the Latin American context, but other places, too, any university is often a source of agitation. These are young men and some young women who want to sew their oats and they're almost supposed to do this. How did you deal with the university?

FARLAND: Well, I knew a couple of the professors who were very instrumental in carrying the word from me to the students. I didn't make any appearances over at the university, although I lived close to it. I wasn't going to volunteer to go in. If I had been invited, I would have. I had enough other people to carry the torch.

Q: During the Kennedy administration, both John Kennedy and his brother, Bobby Kennedy, there was tremendous emphasis on getting to youth, particularly picking out leaders and reaching out to young people. Every embassy had to have a youth officer. How did you deal with that?

FARLAND: I tried to keep them away for a long time. I finally had a group come in. I was talking to one young lady in the group one night. I said, "Who do you consider to be one of the most important men in Latin America?" She said, "Fidel Castro?" I said, "Why do you say that?" She said, "Because he is a leader and I respect him." I said, "Where did you learn all this about Fidel?" She said, "That is what we were taught in our class before I came down here." I said, "Well, that's very interesting. I appreciate your position, but I don't agree with it. I think there are others that represent a better point of view, but I'm sure that your point of view has some merit, whatever it is." That was one indication that I had. Another indication was, I had one young man up at Tillo Bray, where I got a school started, built. It must have been a 12-14 room school, all handmade. He had sexual relations with every teacher in the place. I don't know how many children he squired. On the other hand, there was one girl in a village who was such a great asset to the other village that when her tour of duty was up, she went home and came back to that village of her own accord. She was a shining light in that area. So, there were some that did and some that weren't.

Q: It simply came out at the time of Kennedy's assassination... You had left by that time.
FARLAND: I was on an airplane when I heard it. I was coming down from New York.

Q: Did you feel that the Kennedy mystique was striking a responsive cord with the Panamanian young people?

FARLAND: I think they respected him and felt kindly of him. I didn't see too much...

Q: Was there at all the problem that we certainly suffer in places like Greece, even in Canada, where it was "Oh, your country is so big and we're so small. You really have to understand us?"

FARLAND: I didn't hear that.

Q: This wasn't a Panamanian attitude.

FARLAND: No. I didn’t have any sense of that at all.

Q: I don't know whether you can give an explicated version of your dealings with the brother of President Kennedy, Teddy Kennedy. It was not a happy occasion.

FARLAND: It wasn’t a happy occasion for me and he had no official position whatsoever, but I was told to roll out the red rug. He came to Panama and did not make much of an impression. The headlines of one paper said, "He came, he saw, and he left." The embassy did everything we could to make his stay worthwhile.

Q: But this was a trip Teddy Kennedy made throughout Latin America. He was quite a young man, had not been elected to the Senate. So, he was obviously under 30 at the time, I think. From the descriptions, it was more a playboy's romp than a fact finding trip.
FARLAND: Well, he paid no attention to the briefing which we gave to the group. They were more attentive. He was reading something in his briefcase most of the time. Then he finally just said, "Enough of that" and suggested everybody leave, so they left after being fed sufficiently.

Q: Sometimes dealing with the relatives of the powerful is not much fun.

You mentioned Margot Fonteyn, who was the prima ballerina of the world, more or less, at the time.

FARLAND: She was married to Inalos.

Q: What was her role there?

FARLAND: She was a known communist agitator. She agitated. I was surprised that Trujillo allowed her in the Dominican Republic, but he did. She tried at one time along with her husband to bring about a small revolution there, which failed utterly. They were chastised. But no one really gets hurt when everybody is related.

Q: Yes. What was the role of the British embassy there?

FARLAND: They were very active. At one point, the British ambassador when I was complaining about... I can't recall enough to tell the story, but he stuck it into me about "Well, why didn’t you mention that when you started making callous remarks about England when we were trying to take over the Suez?" They were active. We were in best relations.

Q: When you left there in 1963, you kept riots out of the headlines?

FARLAND: Yes. But we're leading up to when I left. It was a very unfortunate

situation.

Q: Can we talk about that now?

FARLAND: Yes. This is a very important aspect of it. There were two concerns. Kiel Kilbane Housing Project, which was very much on my mind. It was about a $10 million project. According to the best Panamanian accountants, there looked like there was going to be about $3 million left going to a senator here in the United States and to a Dominican who was part English. His father was American. That was of considerable concern to me. I was told to sign off on it.

Q: Who told you to?

FARLAND: A little man comes down. He said, "I'm here from the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State wants you to sign off." I said, "If you want to go back and have the Secretary of State put that in writing... Here I am in Washington. I don't have my staff with me. Therefore, I'm breaking a classic rule. But if the Secretary of State orders me to sign off on it, I will." He never showed up again. That housing project never came to fruition.

Q: How did you get the feeling that this was a graft project?

FARLAND: First, the two individuals who were sponsoring it. The senator, I knew, was involved in all kinds of activities. Second, the fact that, according to one individual who joined my embassy down there, who got very drunk one night and didn't know who he was talking to, he started telling me about how he happened to be sent to Panama and who was his mark. He was talking about the ambassador. Well, I was sitting there listening to all his comments with great enjoyment. It was pretty evident, the number of units and so forth that it couldn't be done and have a halfway kind of a house. You had tarpaper houses and with the first rain the thing would be gone. I don't have the figures. I can't go back on it. But I had them at the time and so did the Panamanians. They were opposed to it. I was opposed to it. I thought that $3 million was too much.

Q: This was supposedly part of an AID project?

FARLAND: Well, it came through the AID program, yes. I presume it did. If I had to resign on that basis, I was going to resign. I was not going to let that go on. I got a call from President Shoddy. He said, "Go up to your residence and put on a sport shirt and I'll be up to pick you up." He drove up to see me. He was doing the driving. The two of us drove around for about four hours. He said, "Joe, I've got to have some more money." I said, "Nino, it isn't the $1,930,000 that the United States pays in so-called 'rent,' but it's all this other money that- (end of tape)

We drove around. I kept talking about the millions of dollars that the army was bringing into this country, the payment to laborers, etc. He said, "I'm taking all

that into consideration. You're paying $25 million for this island down here over which you're flying on your flights out of Kennedy. I'm telling you a fact of life. I have to have at least $2 million more. If you can see your way clear as a country to provide Panama with $2 million more, I will personally guarantee with all my honor and family honor that there will be no other request, there will be no agitation for anything further for at least seven years. I am using that seven year period because of what President Kennedy said, that it would take seven years to decide whether or not you're going to do a sea level canal."

Q: What did he want the money for?

FARLAND: To run his government. The more I thought about it, the more I thought that that wasn't too exorbitant a request since here we had paid $250,000 for a long time and then we raised that to a total of $1,930,000 a year and in light of the environment and the economy of today. It was within reason assuming that he would carry out his statement that there be no further agitation. I think he was a man of honor. I could trust him. Believing that, I asked for a consultation in Washington. I finally got it. I went up to Washington and had a meeting arranged in one of the Under Secretary's meeting rooms. I don't know whether there were 16 or 18 people there. I don't know how many. But there was a sizable number. I am sitting with my back to the entrance door. I had my papers there. I said, "I guess Ed Martin has been held up for some reason. It's almost 10 minutes past our time. Let me just give you a little background." I started casually to talk about a little background. The door opened with a swish and Martin walked in. He in a loud, raucous voice said, "I'm only going to say this once because I don't like to say it. We're not going to give those God damned Panamanians a God damned cent." So, I closed up my books and I went over to see Ed Dungan at the White House and told him that my activity in Panama was finished, what would be my next post. He said, "Oh, go and see head of Personnel in State." I went over to see the head of Personnel in State. He was about the color of your piece of paper there, bright red. I said, "Where is my next post?" He said, "I've been told (which meant that he had had a telephone call before I got there) to offer you lateral entry into the Foreign Service." I looked at him for a minute. I sort of smiled and said, "And what would I get out of that?" He said, "For Heaven sakes, don't ever say I said it, but maybe you would get a desk in the hallway on the first floor." I said, "That is what I thought. Thank you very much. You've done what you were supposed to do. Now I have to do what I am supposed to do." I went back to Panama and started to say goodbye. It took me three weeks to make my rounds and say goodbye. I don't know how many people in those various towns I talked to. There must have been 35,000 at the dock to say goodbye to me when I left. I am proud of the fact that I made some impression on Panama while I was there. We never had a riot. President Shoddy a couple of days before I left said, "You know, Joe, I'm glad you're leaving." I said, "I don't understand that. You were the one who not two days ago said how sorry you were that I'm leaving." He said, "You stayed two more weeks and you would have had my job." So, that is when I left Panama. I left with regret.

Q: What did you see as Ed Martin's outlook on this?

FARLAND: I have no idea. He had a deep abiding antipathy for the Panamanians. As a matter of fact, he came down and stayed at the embassy for a couple of days and I took him up to Rio Alto, where we had started with the financial help also of the Panamanians who had driven up there to be there when he arrived, to help the fishermen a Rio Alto preserve their catch. As it was, fish don't keep well in the tropics. If they didn't sell them that day, they're gone. They're not edible. What we did was a refrigerator plant, a small one. I think it cost maybe a little more than $5,000. Part of this money was put up by the Panamanian people. These businessmen were there. I couldn't get a conversation in the car with Ed. I tried to talk to him. We drove silent. We got there. He got out of the car. I introduced him to these Panamanian businessmen who were there. He looked at this building, which was about 20 feet by 11 feet, with a compressing unit that had a refrigerating unit in it. The first thing he said to a good friend of mine, a Panamanian, he looked around and said, "How is this going to be advertised?" He didn't say, "I think this is a nice idea. I think it's nice of you businessmen to come out here. I'm glad you're all taking an interest. I know you had to get up early to drive out." No, no. "How is this going to be advertised?" He was an economist. I think he was a good economist from all I could hear. But where was the feeling of empathy towards these people. They were interested in a project to help Panamanians. This is what I cannot understand and don't understand. I find it unfortunate.

Q: To finish up this Panama period, would you tell what happened not on your watch but afterwards in 1964.

FARLAND: In 1964, I am taking my younger son to try to get him enrolled in Lawrenceville and on the radio I hear about these riots. I said, "This is going to blow." It did. That night, my mother called me and was worried to death for fear that he son was going to be blamed for it. I had a hard time explaining to my mother that, no, I would have no part of it, that I had been long gone. As I told you, she died that night, too, so all this burns on me pretty badly.

Q: What was the cause of the riot and what happened?

FARLAND: The high school students, the Zonians, tore down the Panamanian flag. They had been egged on by, presumably, certain parents who didn't like to see the Panamanian flag flying. The riots were carefully orchestrated by the Communist Party. There is no question in my mind about that, but "The New York Times" had an article... To me, it was sickening. It didn't have to happen. That riot should never have happened. I still say if Washington had listened a little bit longer with a little bit more care to some of the things I was telling them, there would have been a better understanding. I felt terribly sorry about that.

Q: What was the aftermath of the riots?

FARLAND: Several people were killed. Several Americans and a number of Panamanians were killed. They had a large number, but they weren't all killed in the riots. Some of them fell down from someplace. They have a Day of the Martyrs now. It's now a cause celebre. This hurt. I spent almost three years working like the devil down there to bring about better relations. "We're not going to give the Panamanians a cent." Well, now we're given them billions and the canal to go with it.

Q: So we're really talking about the middle of 1963 when you left. I think we should pick this up the next time with what you did between posts before you went off to Afghanistan.

FARLAND: I didn't have much to do with the American government or want any part of it.

Q: What did you do?

FARLAND: My wife and I decided we would like an apartment in New York and finally decided against that and finally bought a place on Massachusetts Avenue in Washington. Like all ladies, she wanted to remodel it, so we remodeled it and moved in. Then came the riots in Washington.

Q: This would be the Martin Luther King riots in 1968 or so.

FARLAND: I decided to sell it. By that time, there was a possibility of Nixon coming in and possibly another post. We took two apartments over at the Watergate, two penthouses. We used one of them for storage and for servants to live in and one for us and were there when I was appointed ambassador to Pakistan.

Q: Talk a bit about your dealings with the Nixon campaign and that and then we'll move to Pakistan.

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FARLAND: I think it's important to add this. When Shoddy was there with Kennedy, they discussed what could be done within the context of the existing treaties, the original one and then as modified in 1955. Kennedy suggested the possibility of a four man meeting, two from the United States and two from Panama. Kennedy said, "I see no reason why an ambassador and General Fleming couldn't represent the United States." Shoddy suggested that the foreign minister, Galileo Solis, and a former foreign minister, Octavio Faberga, could represent Panama. We met. Very formal, short. We met for 13 months. We accomplished absolutely nothing.

Q: Why not?

FARLAND: Anything that Panama suggested the United States turned down.

Q: Was this on your part?

FARLAND: This was out of Washington. Panama requested adjustments that actually were quite modest. They wanted a corridor (This is what you mentioned earlier.) to the canal zone on the populated Pacific side. Well, we finally got the bridge.

Q: That was on the Caribbean side, wasn't it?

FARLAND: No, that was on the Pacific side. But on the Colon side, it was so simple to put something across there. That could have been done, but that was not done. They wanted admittance into the Zone of Panamanian enterprise, which was kept out. "No way" said Washington. They wanted a small increase in their share of the revenues. It began with money, money, money. That was turned down. They wanted a portion of the 10 mile wide zonal strip not being used at this time by the United States. There were lots of areas that weren't being used. That was turned down. And a continual flag alongside as ordered in 1960.

Q: Do you feel that this was Ed Martin?

FARLAND: Look, when a telegram comes out of Washington, who has sent it? I don't know. I had plenty of problems in the Dominican Republic about this. Who sent that? Who said "Pay more attention to your client and less attention to Castro? Who wanted to send that? Those things can slip by very easily, but they're all signed by the Secretary.
Q: Did you have any feeling for the Pentagon per se, the military? Pentagon lawyers are notorious for trying not to set precedents or give an inch. Did you feel that?

FARLAND: I can't believe this came out of the... I know Bob Fleming was 100% behind all of this. It was part of the conference. When we sent that in [with] our recommendation [it came back] approved.

Q: When you would sit around with your officers at the embassy and Governor Fleming, etc., was there the general feeling that, "Gee, at some point, we've really got to make adjustments. This situation isn't going to go on forever. Let's try to preempt it?"

FARLAND: On the part of the embassy, yes. In good conscience, I couldn't say that this should continue in perpetuity the way it is now. The United States didn't put that in perpetuity into the treaty. That was Belo Beria, who whether they like

it or not was the ambassador from Panama. It was also ratified by the Asemlaya twice, which I'm sure they'd like to forget, but it's a fact. They say he wasn't a Panamanian. Well, he wasn't. But he was their representative.

I know there was one other officer on Ed's staff, a lady, who was equally adamant against the Panamanians. I don't remember her name. She detested the Panamanians. Why this animosity? I don't know. I can't even think of anything funny to say about it.

Q: No. Sometimes this happens. Sometimes, particularly Washington operators learn to throw their weight around. With some countries, you can't throw your weight around because the repercussions are pretty obvious and they aren't really sovereign. In a way, Panama was perhaps a little too helpless and it brought out the bully in some Washington operators who wanted to prove that they were real tough negotiators. Some of the African states, the smallest African states, sometimes have found the people in Washington saying, "Well, we really ought to sock it to Sierra Leone," whereas they wouldn't dare do it to Nigeria. It's sort of a nasty thing that is a personality problem of really the bully.

FARLAND: I was appalled that my friend, a man named Champ Sourd, a Panamanian, was asked, "How is this going to be advertised?" The lack of friendship, the lack of love, in the broadest sense. Even if you're against it, you could congratulate the people on what they're trying to do, but if you only point out what was the matter, that is... It still disturbs me.

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Q: Today is February 2, 2000. You've left Panama. You're back. What were you doing when you left Panama? You went back into business?

FARLAND: Let me add just a few words. You asked me a question heretofore and I couldn't think of the man's name. The DCM in Panama when I arrived was John Shillock. John was a highly competent Foreign Service officer who in the beginning, unfortunately, had made an opinion that was not being particularly appreciative of my appearance on the stage. At the end, he and I became the closest friends. I have seen him subsequently and we still are. He was totally in accord with my policy at the end.

Q: By the time you left there and from what you've heard subsequently, did you feel that the idea that the governor of the Canal Zone, the head of South Command, and the ambassador agreed that these three should really cooperate or did it just depend on personality?

FARLAND: The three of us cooperated. Before I went down, I secured an agreement from the President of the United States that, in the event of a disagreement between me or the ambassador and the governor of the Canal Zone,

the matter involved would be submitted to him for final judgement. We had to have some way of reaching an accord. Not talking was absolutely absurd. It played directly into the hands of the Panamanians.

Q: What were you doing in this period? You left there in 1963. The Nixon campaign started in 1968.

FARLAND: I went back feeling a little bit disheartened with the State Department and the treatment that I had received. I decided I was not going to go back into any major business such as coal. I was offered at a later time... This was after my other assignment-

Q: Let's only talk about this 1963-1969 period.

FARLAND: I was offered the opportunity to go on the board of education. I turned it down. I felt I was walking into a situation comparable to what I walked into at the State Department. There were a great number of retired men who wondered why in the dickens, here comes an outsider as a director in one of the subsidiary companies looking towards being a director of the main board. I had been through that in the State Department and I was darned if I was going to go through it again.

Q: How were you occupied?

FARLAND: Eisenhower asked me to take over People to People. I did that. Actually, I was trying to save it from oblivion.

Q: What was People to People?

FARLAND: That was one of Eisenhower's concepts of trying to get people together in many ways. One was by letter writing; by people traveling between countries; by the Good Ship Hope; by medicine getting back after going out. It was people to people. It was sponsored primarily by the president of Hallmark Cards, who was a great devotee of Eisenhower's.

Q: How long were you doing that?

FARLAND: I did that for a year or so, fortuitously. I found it interesting, although I was trying to salvage what was going downhill pretty fast.

Q: Were you involved in any other things?

FARLAND: I was at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Q: That had an affiliation with Georgetown at that time.

FARLAND: I was on the board of Shenandoah University and on a board of West Virginia University (not the main board). Subsequently, I was on the board of the Regents of Georgetown. I had always been interested in education. This was a natural thing for me to do.

Q: Nixon ran successfully in 1968. Did you get involved with the campaign?

FARLAND: Very slowly, very gingerly. I did. I finally ended up on the board of the Republican National Finance Committee and tried to raise money for the campaign.

Q: Did you get involved either emotionally or otherwise in the Vietnam War?

FARLAND: No, I did not. I saw it. My wife and I had traveled in Europe and seen a lot of young men who had left the country for the purpose of not serving. I felt it. You couldn't read a paper without realizing what was going on. I was concerned about it. But since I was outside of government, there was not much that I could do to affect it.

Q: What was your impression of the Republican Finance Committee? The next time, when it was the reelection in 1972, it became quite controversial.

FARLAND: I had served on it previously under Jareman. It was a hard sell and they were at it. I didn't come into contact with anything like that.

One other thing I did, I went out... This was in New York where I was working and I was going back to Washington. I got back to Washington one night and they asked me to please go out to Chicago. This was the last thing they were going to ask me to do. Save a dinner, the last dinner for Nixon out there. I said, "I'm tired. I've just come back from New York." "Well, we have to save this dinner. It's going to be a bust if we don't." So, I said, "I need 12 or so girls out there to do some phoning. I'll have to set up a phone back to do this. [Get] a hold of somebody's phone bank out there, so that has to be arranged." That was done. I sold the tickets. I wanted warm bodies. I didn't care about the money. I didn't go to the dinner. I went to bed. I went home and said, "That's enough. I'm through."

Q: Did you have much contact with Nixon's inner group?

FARLAND: They were as far a distance from me as from here to Chicago. I just knew the people on that finance committee.

Q: In November of 1968, Nixon won a very close election. By this time, you certainly were a veteran diplomat. I would assume that you would hope for something.

FARLAND: My wife wasn't too enthusiastic. I really didn't have any great push

about it. We had the riots in Washington after the death of Martin Luther King. I felt that I wanted to get out of Washington. The town was growing and it wasn't the same town that I knew when I first went there years before. I was [longing for] the country life, frankly. I sold my house on Massachusetts Avenue and rented an apartment at the Watergate, two townhouses really, at a reasonable price, with the idea of, if there wasn't something offered to me, we could consider it. Anyway, I was out of the house and I was going to Virginia.

Q: You have a home in Berryville, Virginia.

FARLAND: Not at that time, although I do now. We subsequently built a house in Winchester, Virginia. That is where my wife died. We previously stayed at a big property. It was too much for two people. We gave that to ship Hope.

Q: Operation Hope is a medical ship that goes around.

FARLAND: I don't know whether they've turned it into a good thing or not. It was a good property. We couldn't handle it.

Q: Nixon comes in January 20, 1969. What happens?

FARLAND: I had some feelings about the possibility of an ambassadorial assignment. But nothing tangible. I didn't go out seeking it. I don't know what the date was, but I was called into the Department. [They] said, "Argentina. How does that hit you?" Not one way or the other, but I said, "I'll talk to my wife." My secretary had been born in Argentina. When I told her, she was ecstatic.

Then about two weeks later, I get a call one night from Al Haig saying "Pakistan." I looked over at my wife and said, "Pakistan" and she shrugged. I said, "Okay" and that was that.
Q: You were in Pakistan from when to when?

FARLAND: I was in Pakistan from 1969-1972.

Q: By this time, you were an old hand. You went to the Department, I assume, to get briefed on Pakistan.

FARLAND: I did.

Q: What were you getting?

FARLAND: As an old hand, I was getting a good briefing.

Q: You knew what to ask.

FARLAND: I knew what to ask. Originally, the only person you got to pick was

your secretary. By that time, they had switched over to the point where you could pick everybody. In Pakistan, I had to pick three consul generals. I had a stack of efficiency reports in front of me and I didn't know these people from Adam. A consul was there up in Peshawar. I picked a consul for Dacca. The consul in Lahore was still there, but he was leaving, so I had to pick a consul for Lahore. I picked a consul for Karachi.

Q: The capital by that time was...

FARLAND: It had been moved from Karachi to Islamabad. It was an ordinary house. It lacked all the amenities.

Q: I assume you picked a DCM.

FARLAND: I picked my DCM and I picked an extremely fine, competent, high grade, superb Foreign Service officer by the name of Sid Sober.

Q: Normally, you get these piles of efficiency reports, but the best way to find out is to go out in the corridors and ask people "Who is a good person?"

FARLAND: Yes, but that was a disadvantage I was in. I could go out in the corridors, but I wasn't knowledgeable of people who had been in NEA. Joe- (end of tape)

I looked in that efficiency report for key words and I found in Sid's, "He's apt to be irritating when it comes to decisions. He might not agree." I said, "I don't want someone to agree. I want someone to say 'No.'" I couldn't imagine a better DCM. He was highly competent. He was an exceptionally good writer and a delightful person.

Q: You had been a Latin American hand. Did you make an effort to get yourself known and plugged into the Near Eastern Bureau?

FARLAND: As best I could during the time that I had for consultation there before I was sent out. I appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee. It was pro forma. There were only two senators there, the chairman and Senator Aiken. I think there were two men in the audience from the Pakistani embassy and that was it. They asked me a couple of very casual questions and said, "We hope you have a good time in Pakistan.

Q: Did you find at the time when you were dealing with NEA that NEA was pretty well focused on Israeli-Arab relations?

FARLAND: I got all the attention that I could because Pakistan was the largest embassy in the world excluding Vietnam because of the huge aid program. With the three consulate generals, you know the size of their staff. That is no small

embassy. There was a consulate. That didn't require very many people, but there were a few people up there. Then there was the consulate general over in Dacca, which was over 1,000 miles away from us clear across India. That had to be completely self-contained. I felt I was fully satisfied with the reporting and the help out of the Department on Pakistan.

Q: Do you recall the desk officer? You were getting a good picture from the desk officer?

FARLAND: Not only that, but I heard from Joe Sisco quite often direct, saying "I appreciated that wire. It was highly competent. You gave us a completely new picture," that sort of pat on the back every now and then.

Q: Before you went out, other than to keep good relations, were there any issues at the time that you went out where you said "This is a real problem. Can you work on these?"

FARLAND: Honestly, no, I didn't.

Q: Who was our ambassador in India at the time?

FARLAND: Keating.

Q: He had been a senator from New York.

FARLAND: I might add one of his activities made me call for a security investigation.

Q: We can come to that. Anybody going particularly to Pakistan even more than going to India knows that you're up against a century old conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims, and it's all exacerbated.

FARLAND: I studied it completely. I had a complete briefing. I had friends on the National Geographic and the owner of it. They did a very nice thing. They prepared for me a Geographic book of all the articles on Pakistan. That gave me a great oversight picture. I'll never forget that kindness. That was delightful.

Q: When did you first arrive in Pakistan?

FARLAND: Let me tell you before that, there is a little factor here that I think you'd be interested in knowing. I went to see Nixon for a final word, a pat on my head, and a picture. I didn't have a picture...

Q: Normally you have a picture with the President which you put on your piano or your shelf.

FARLAND: That wasn't the idea. I wanted to know what he had in mind besides the briefing I got over at State, what was his word, what was the big word? The name Pakistan was never mentioned during our conversation. I heard nothing but "Our emphasis should be on the countries known as the east. We have paid too much attention to the countries we know as the west." I listened to this for 20 minutes or so. He said, "That is the way I'm thinking." I said, "Well, thank you very much. I'll catch up with my wife, who is in Germany, and go on to Pakistan." So, I finally mentioned Pakistan. I walked out of there saying, "What in the hell is he thinking about? Never mentioning Pakistan at all. Am I being set up for something?" Remember, my background, I was suspicious. The FBI was still at work. I thought something was amiss. I later found out what it was.

Q: Before you went out, did you run across Henry Kissinger? Had you ever met Kissinger before?

FARLAND: I had met Kissinger at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I knew him before he had a job. I knew him as "Henry." Then I saw him later as "Mr. Kissinger."

Q: Was he there when you were talking to Nixon?

FARLAND: No, he wasn't there.

Q: You say you went out with nothing but "Do a good job," which is the normal course. Sometimes, as you were told "You've got to do something when you go to Panama and the Dominican Republic," you must have felt... You had clearance. Also, you were to clean up the relationship in Panama. Here you were setting out and were told, "Have a good time."

FARLAND: "We should be concentrating on the east."

Q: Yes. Do you have any idea what he was talking about?

FARLAND: No, but I was suspicious as hell.

Q: In retrospect, do you think he was maybe not using Pakistan as a tool to get into China, but do you think he was talking about China?

FARLAND: My studies, my research, on Nixon's view of the future leads me to believe that he was thinking about Chinese relations at that time.

Q: Did you get any feel about how Nixon, Kissinger, Sisco, etc. felt about India? India being this huge country, but its leaders usually set the teeth of American officials on edge, particularly Nehru, Mrs. Gandhi, etc.
FARLAND: Mrs. Gandhi eventually didn't like me at all.

Q: It was always very clear that they sort of considered us as country bumpkins. It's never been a very happy relationship.

FARLAND: Not since 1947. It was split solely on religion and it was a bloody split.

Q: Before you went out, did you sense any antipathy towards India within the Department or were you running across the opposite?

FARLAND: It was the opposite, not on the Assistant Secretary of State's level, but on the lower levels there were those that thought that India could do no wrong. Then, of course, there were a few that thought that Pakistanis could do no wrong.

Q: India either attracts or repels. Most people who deal with these countries are not indifferent to them.

FARLAND: No, it's either love or hate.

Q: When you arrived, for the general reader, what was the state of affairs as it was explained to you in Pakistan, what Pakistan consisted of at that time, who was the ruler, and how our relations were?

FARLAND: I found nothing but good relations. I must tell you this story. We arrived in Karachi in the middle of the night. I was still half asleep, groggy. I was thinking about what the Pakistanis did. I walked down the steps. The plane lights were on. My wife was walking behind me. When I hit the tarmac, my sense of humor went into high gear. I turned around to my wife and said, "I divorce you! I divorce you! I divorce you!" She said, "The hell you say!" [That was] cut out. That is the way we arrived. It is cold there in Karachi at night in the desert. There was a group down from Islamabad. The consulate was out in force. We were terribly tired. We stayed a day or so. I read the lesson at the cathedral and promptly was called to read the lesson and said to never, never again ask the man to read the lesson from the little prayer book, but for Heaven's sake, send to England and get a real book for that lecture, which he did. Then I went on to Islamabad.

Q: I'd like you to go back and go into a professorial mode. Who was the head of the government there? What was the government like as you saw it? What was Pakistan as you saw it?

FARLAND: The head of the government was the military government, Yaya Khan. He and I got along famously. He had been trained in England at Sandhurst. I got along well with him and the entire organization, including even the head of their secret service.

Q: You say it's a military government. Was there at least the facade of a parliament, elections, and that sort of thing, or was it just under military rule?

FARLAND: Well, they were talking about elections and they finally had elections. While I was there, they didn't. It was ruled basically by the Iet, a real dictatorship.

Q: Bhutto, the father, had been hung, hadn't he?

FARLAND: Indeed. He finally ran and was elected.

Q: When was this?

FARLAND: That was after I left. They were in the process and he had one of his lieutenants who was constantly fighting with the United States as the opponent rather than Yaya Khan. I was up in Peshawar one night. Bhutto arrived and brought this guy in. He sat there with his mouth shut. I said, "I am very happy that you brought this man in. He has been making all kinds of vilifications towards me and I'm surprised because I've never seen him before." He didn't say anything. Later, Bhutto came to this country after his election. I was here, but that poor guy that I was talking about stood up before a lectern in Peshawar and turned on the mike. When he turned on the mike, a bomb exploded and killed him. So, things were a little rough. We had some difficulty with attacks on USIS, but there was really basically nothing at that time.

Q: One of the classic things within our foreign affairs establishment has been the India-Pakistan War as done by our embassy in New Delhi and our embassy in wherever it was in Pakistan at the time. Did you find yourself rather close on, reading the telegrams that were coming out of New Delhi, responding, and that sort of thing?

FARLAND: We, of course, got information out of New Delhi and cables out of the Department. I in turn infoed Delhi on my cables to the Department. One fine morning, my USIA man comes in. He says, "Mr. Ambassador, this is going to shock you. This is in 'The New York Times.'" I read it. I said, "These are my words. That was in my cable. Those are the exact words." So, I forthwith sent a [cable] over to the Department demanding an investigation. I knew that somebody had leaked. In abut two hours (and of course an info of that went to Delhi), I got an info from Delhi of a telegram to the Department from Keating saying, "Mea culpa." I found out that he had taken the files home, which you don't do. He had a "New York Times" reporter staying with him, which is unusual. Three, he gave the files to the reporter to copy. What did the Department do about it? Nada (nothing).

Q: Keating was a very powerful figure.

FARLAND: Had that been you or me, we would have been out on our tail.
Q: We would have been crucified.

FARLAND: He gets appointed to Israel later on.

Q: This is a fact of life. A very powerful political figure. He had clout in New York State and Nixon needed New York State.

FARLAND: That's right. But you would think that a senator would have sense enough not to take the files home.

Q: Yes. Certainly not to give them to a "New York Times" reporter.

FARLAND: What did he think the reporter was going to do with them? For me, it was disgusting.

Q: The problem was that Senator Keating always remained a senator.

FARLAND: He was one of the boys.

Q: He was one of the boys as opposed to really engaging as a diplomat. He had the same problem in Israel. Of course, he was getting older, too. He too overly identified with the Israelis.

FARLAND: I just couldn't conceive of anyone doing that.

Q: Did you find that you and your embassy were spending a certain amount of time responding to these info cables from Delhi which could talk about India-Pakistan relations and that you felt you had to say, "Wait a minute. There is another side to this?" Was this an ongoing thing?
FARLAND: I don't remember anything specific. I presume we did or we just sent our own cables. The night it started, I was in the residence. We were having a blackout all over Islamabad. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs appeared and said that the President wanted to see me at the guest house down in Rawalpindi. So, in the dark of the night with all those bullocks moving along in the dark silently, traffic going every which way, without lights, I thought I was going to get killed on the way to see the President. We arrived. Here was the entire military's top with the President in a state of jubilation on the theory that they had made an instant victory. Needless to say, most of them were pretty well soused by that time. I stayed for a little while and finally got back.

Q: Did Yaya Khan have anything to say to you?

FARLAND: Oh, yes, he was telling me that he wanted me there so that I would know and be able to inform my government that India started the war.

Q: Which war was this? Do you remember when this was and what was the issue?

FARLAND: This was the only war that we had while I was there.

Q: This is when East Pakistan split?

FARLAND: That was tied onto this, but that was a carryover from this. As a matter of fact, Pakistan hadn't surprised the Indians. In no time flat, the Indians were just knocking the living daylights out of the Pakistanis. My consul general in Lahore who carefully, happily, and proudly showed me a certificate he had received from the Department for bravery. He was one of the first to sell out as fast as he could get out of there. On the other hand, I had some people who, though one would never suspect it, turned out to be the bravest people.

Q: What was happening?

FARLAND: The Indians were about to cut Pakistan in two. Remember, Pakistan was a long-

Q: We're talking about West Pakistan.

FARLAND: Yes. We're separating East Pakistan, but West Pakistan is where the war was going on. At the time, the Indians' plan was to cut through, separate, north and south, so that Islamabad and the area north would be separated from Karachi in the south. There was also this bloodshed starting over in East Pakistan. The West Pakistanis got pretty rough. There was a lot of bloodshed.

Q: That now is Bangladesh.

FARLAND: Yes. The truth of the matter is, the Bengalis had nothing in common with West Pakistan except the religion. They were neither similar in shape, size, or anything. Religion was the only thing they had in common. It wasn't enough to hold them together.

Q: What was happening militarily? How were we responding in the West?

FARLAND: Other nations were pulling their embassies out. I was told to stay. We were down to practically the United States being the only one there. I was hanging on there in case there was a breakthrough and Islamabad was overrun basically by thugs from Rawalpindi looking for TV sets, etc. I was the one that was going to get the blame. I was trying to establish without making any fear in the embassy an escape route. That had to be through Murree and into Afghanistan and hopefully out of there. This was pretty hairy for good old Joe, I'll tell you.

Q: What were you getting from the military attaches at this time?

FARLAND: There wasn't too much activity from the military attaches except for Chuck Yeager, who was on fire. I have accused him of this jokingly (maybe not too jokingly) that perhaps he took an F-4 up there and did a little practicing himself. He had close contact with the Air Force and kept me thoroughly advised as to what was going on. Pakistan was rapidly losing that war. I sent out five FLASHs one day, which is unheard of. Nixon chose his hand by tilting towards Pakistan. But then I got a direct order to go see Yaya and tell him to call off the war. One bright day, I had to get in the car without the flags flying and go down to his bungalow [and] the foreign ministry and tell him he had to call off the war, that he was the loser. That was quite an activity for an ambassador of a foreign country to tell the president of another country, but I did. On the way back, we were being bombed. I finally got under a tree so that they wouldn't see the car. Bombs were falling around the area. One thing nice about the bombing was that they didn't bring in telegrams to me in the middle of the night. I got to sleep. As long as they were bombing, I got to sleep. But this was no fun really. This was scarey.

Q: Had you been apprised of the fact that a war was going to start? Were we getting information that India and Pakistan were on the verge of war? Were we following it?

FARLAND: I was pretty sure that something was going to happen, yes. Yes, I knew it was close. I was even shown their nuclear plant. I even got into that. I must have a sympathetic face or something. I've done things that are almost impossible.

Q: What was the cause of this war as we saw it?

FARLAND: Kashmir was always the cause of it. It always will be. 80% are Muslim in Kashmir. The Indus River in the Hindu religion is a goddess. Here you have a country in which your goddess is your main source of water. You can't have it. Kashmir has been the flashpoint.

Q: When you got there and subsequently, did you go often over to East Pakistan?

FARLAND: I tried to make a point of being there more than any other ambassador ever had been. I did that purposely because they felt that they were not part of Pakistan. I wanted them to feel that I had a definite interest. I flew back and forth over India every whipstitch. Archer Blood was my consul general over there. When the Bengalis revolted, he revolted also. The embassy wasn't taking care of him properly. Had I been in his place, I would have felt that way, too, 1,000 miles away. They were far, far away from us. I can understand his feeling. I am sure he felt that I was not sympathetic. I say this now and I felt then that basically I was sympathetic to him. I more than likely would have done the same thing if I had been in his place.

Q: Were you getting reports and also were you seeing on the ground as you went there the fact that the West Pakistani army was being particularly brutal towards the Bengalis?

FARLAND: I had some reports. I complained to Yaya. I told him. He said, "No." I went over. They showed me their intake stations where they were taking care of their people. It was a sham. They had all the signs in English for people who didn't speak English. That was for my benefit. That was a complete bungle. There was no love between the two of them. I know that and it's regrettable. Bangladesh is a basket case.

Q: Did you find yourself under any direction or instructions from Washington, either from the White House or from the State Department, that it was our policy that Pakistan should hold together?

FARLAND: I got that from the White House. My job was to save West Pakistan. That was paramount.

Q: Looking at this war that the Indians were beginning to win, did you see it in the cards that somehow or another India would absorb all of Pakistan, which would seem to be an almost indigestible lump to try to include in a greater India? Did this seem to be Indian policy?

FARLAND: I don't know what their policy was. From my standpoint, I think they were happy to have them off by themselves. That is unfortunately going to be a sore spot for years to come. India has the resources and the manpower to squash West Pakistan. That is why West Pakistan wants an atomic bomb. I knew they were getting it. There was always some question coming out of Washington, saying, "Well, we don't know." I knew damn good and well they were getting it. They were close to it anyway.

Q: When a rather famous tilt towards Pakistan came-

FARLAND: Gibson sent the fleet around.

Q: Yes, he sent the Enterprise, a nuclear carrier, up into the Indian Ocean. Did you feel that maybe this was a bit much?

FARLAND: I think it stopped the Indians from breaking up Pakistan. I think it helped to, at least. It was a lot, I must admit that. It was pretty much of a threat. We were about going to World War III over this.

Q: Didn't this seem to be a bit excessive, our posturing on this India-Pakistan thing? It was interesting, but I didn't see that...

FARLAND: I thought it was a big deal, let's put it that way. Remember, I was sitting there wondering whether or not we were going to be overrun. I was

thinking of how I was going to get these people out. So, I was [responsible for] the lives of those that I had under my command, so to speak.

Q: How were relations between you and the foreign ministry of Pakistan?

FARLAND: The foreign minister was Shaktan Han, a very fine man. After we broke the veneer of two separate nations, two separate nations, and two different cultures, we got to be close friends.

Q: You were there when Bangladesh was created?

FARLAND: It was happening. Probably at the end of it when I left... It was in the process, yes. When Arch Blood moved out, that was a break right there.

Q: I don't recall it. Did you request that Blood be moved?

FARLAND: At the end, he said, "Well, I stand on this." I said, "Arch, what you've done is, I can't very well bring you into West Pakistan into our group thinking here. Your actions - and I'm not condemning those actions as such - but I had no warning of this and you can't say that I wasn't attentive to the needs of East Pakistan. I was there more than any other ambassador ever had been. I traveled more. I traveled clear down to Chittagong and to Coxis Bazaar."

I liked the Bengalis. At the time of the hurricane, which we'll come to, I was talking to one Bengali who was a professor. I said, "The whole world is concerned about what's going on. You all don't seem to care." He said, "Why should we? Regardless of the number killed, that is just fewer mouths to feed. Within weeks, they'll be replaced." That is a heck of an attitude. Maybe it's part of the religion, I don't know. Not mine.

Q: Was Islamic fundamentalism a factor at that time or did that come later?
FARLAND: Not in the way it is now.

Q: What did we do when things got tough while you were still there in East Pakistan? Did we shut down our consulate general?

FARLAND: It kept going until Arch pulled out and that was the end of that. I'd gone over and talked to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who had spent most of his life in jail. I found him a very reasonable person. I had a long talk with him. He was willing to talk. I knew there were difficulties, but I didn't realize it had come to the head that Arch perceived.

Q: You mentioned a hurricane. Did that happen during this time?

FARLAND: I had a hurricane and I also had my friend Kissinger. One fine night in the mouth of the Ganges, a tidal wave came rolling in out of the Indian Ocean

and inundated that whole area down there and killed that night by drowning anywhere from 350-500,000 people. It was unbelievable! When I got that word, my first thought was "What can we do to help on this?" I was in Islamabad. I had ordered the plane service to prepare to fly. I called a top meeting of AID and alerted them, asked what they could do, and told them whatever facilities they had, to get them ready for action. We had a huge emergency on our hands and we had to be there firstest with the mostest. That resulted in the acquisition of a number of C-130s, a lot of emergency biscuits, tents, all that sort of thing. That had to be collected.

I flew immediately over to Dacca and stayed with Arch. He and his wife couldn't have been greater help to me. I got in touch with our Air Force base and asked for five helicopters. They sent them over in a C-141 from the States with crew forthwith. They arrived. They were put together. I was the first one down there. We had emergency blankets. It was token, but I wanted the people there in the drama that were still alive to see that there was action coming to help them. We flew down there these helicopters, circled around all over the place, stopped at one point, and people came up out of the ground. That is the way they do. I don't know where they come from, but they're there. They were frightened of us. They were scared to death. [They had been] through Hell. So, we put the blankets down and went back and took off. They got into one hellacious fight over those blankets. It looked like they were killing each other. Then the newspeople started to arrive. We tried to organize the distribution of emergency biscuits that the Army has and rice. Russia started coming in with rice in their type of crafts that were somewhat like a C-130. I was going back and forth. There was no incident of outbreak of flu, diphtheria, plague, or anything like that. They were either dead or alive. Those that were alive were more careful to boil the water than they had been before. They knew that the water had been contaminated. I hate to even think about the pictures in my mind of the dead that were heaped all over that place.

Anyway, the press got down there. We tried to [feed] as many as we could. We had rice made up into what amounted to 10 pound bags. The women in the embassy made a bag and we filled up a C-130 with that. I took a lot in a helicopter. We landed and tried to distribute it. They had started crowding the helicopter. We knew that somebody was going to get killed, so we took off and just dropped it. There was no control of the crowd. There was one stringer who proceeded to say I, being a politician, made him shake hands before I would give them rice, which was absurd! In the first place, he didn't speak Bengali. How did he know I was saying that. I was trying to pass out rice. Anyway, that was the headlines all over the world and that has hurt me ever since. It hurts me now. I got affidavits from the helicopter crew and I called in the AP man. I said, "You know me. You know I wouldn't do that. Why did you take that stringer's advice?" He said, "Well, it looked like a good story." I said, "Well, send a contradiction out." He said, "What good will that do? It's already in print." That cut.

Q: That is unfortunate. Did the Indian government do anything about this?
FARLAND: I didn't see any Indians. Yaya Khan got there seven days after I did. He said, "So, you've been here for a while." I said, "Yes, seven days."

Q: Did you feel while this was developing that our consulate general with Arch Blood as consul general was maybe a little too close to the insurgent movement of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman?

FARLAND: I did not. Both he and his wife were very helpful. They gave a weiner roast or something for the visiting newspeople. But it was one of the saddest things that I've ever been in.

Q: Were you doing anything prior to this... When you had been in the Dominican Republic, you had been in contact with the underground. Was there any cause for you as the ambassador to be in contact with the Bangladeshi opposition that was developing?

FARLAND: From my standpoint, no, there was no cause for that, no suggestion on the part of anybody. I did make one effort with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who had been a very active anti-everything. We had a nice conversation. He had been in jail most of his life, but he seemed to be reasonable enough in talking. I presume if there was anything of that nature, that this would be [the consul general's] job to find out. I had no indication of the emergency as it finally arose.

Q: How about the CIA? Were they inhibited? Was this a matter of much interest?

FARLAND: The CIA was not too involved.

Q: In Pakistan at that time, was the Soviet Union much of a factor?

FARLAND: In the beginning, when I first got there, they were very much a factor. After I had been there about six months, I was moving closer and the engine was moving back. The Soviets were seeking forever and always will an outlet on the Gulf or the Indian Ocean.

Q: This has always been part of the great game. When one looks at the fleet and all, it seems to be a real stretch to think that you could do much with lines of communication being such that...

FARLAND: The head of the KGB in Afghanistan was then moved over to Islamabad as the ambassador. He was the head of the KGB in both instances. Even the one that dug the tunnel through the mountains that [got] him to the capital. We built a highway down towards the Gulf. That was very convenient from their standpoint.

Q: When you arrived there and during the three years you were there, what was

your impression of the operation of AID?

FARLAND: They were a big outfit and they had all the troubles that a gigantic outfit would. They considered themselves to a large extent removed from the embassy. They didn't like the ambassador giving orders to the [AID Director]. For instance, in Pakistan, it was expected when you went into an office that you had your coat on. They were very formal. I told the officers, "When you are expecting a Pakistani official to call at your office, put on your coat, for Heaven's sakes." That went down like a lead balloon, but they put their coats on.

Q: One of the criticisms of AID has always been that when it comes in, the infrastructure often gets huge. These are Americans. They set up offices. A lot of our money that we supposedly give to the country ends up by the salaries, the housing, and the maintenance of Americans, as opposed to translating it into actual elements that are of benefit to the country. You came in with an experienced eye. Did you look at this?
FARLAND: I saw. It was one of the largest embassies and it was primarily AID. They were trying to make rivers run uphill. This is a little difficult, even in the best of circumstances. There were a lot of things they could do on a lesser scale which would be quite productive.

Q: In Panama, you were talking about doing small dirt roads rather than grandiose schemes. Was this a problem?

FARLAND: They were so big over there that it was past that stage. They were into dams. This wasn't their project, but there was a dam being built on the Indus. It was one of the largest American dams ever built. All of their projects were huge. It was beyond my control at that point.

Q: How about USIS? How effective did you feel they were and how well were you served by them?

FARLAND: Pretty well. I'd give it a C+ or a B-. It got a lot of public exposure. I don't want to say too much. They were doing their part, but that is about it.

Q: Is there an inherent difficulty in having a USIS type of operation in a relatively unsophisticated Muslim country?

FARLAND: I think there was that. Most of their books were in English. In East Pakistan, that was fine from the educational standpoint for the educated, the university types. Most of those people were not educated. Most of them spoke Bengali. Not many of the Americans spoke Bengali. We had a consul general in Karachi who spoke it fluently. I must say that was perhaps his only asset.

Q: Were you underimpressed or impressed by the support you were getting from your consulates general? We've already talked about the one in Dacca, which is a

special case, a very strong person who was making his case for a very difficult situation. What about in Peshawar and Karachi?

FARLAND: In Peshawar, I had a consul up there. It was a very small group. He did a great job. He had as a part-time employee a former major general in the [Pakistani military], from whom I still get Christmas cards. A very fine person. He had a wife who was exceptional, too, I might add. Together they did particularly well.

Q: Do you remember who that was?

FARLAND: I can't think of his name right now.

Q: I take it you were underwhelmed by our consulate general in Karachi.

FARLAND: He could have done better, I thought. I thought his wife did exceptionally well. He objected to any criticism. When we were going to have a party when I was there, one of the first things to do is to check to make sure all the lights work and the toilet paper is there. This upset him. He had his faults, but he had other assets that weren't too apparent.

Q: Did you go over to New Delhi at all?

FARLAND: I stopped there twice. I wasn't exactly welcome.

Q: How was Senator Keating? Did he ever come over to Pakistan?

FARLAND: He never came over. Why should he leave the lovely [residence] like that to come over to what I had.
Q: We're talking about doing your job.

FARLAND: No, he didn't.

Q: What was Mainland China, which was then known as Communist China, representation in Pakistan?

FARLAND: They had a sizeable embassy in Islamabad.

Q: We weren't at that time allowed to have contact with them, but we were obviously watching them.

FARLAND: We were watching them. I presume our CIA was watching them. They were watching us. We were watching the Russians and they were watching us. I'd go to a meeting or a party and the Chinese ambassador was there. We somehow or another met like ships in the night.

Q: Let's talk about the Kissinger-Nixon connection with China. This was a major event. Can you tell the story?

FARLAND: It's quite a story, too. I was in my office one day with my faithful, ever-present secretary, Eleanor Taylor, whose value to me as ambassador and to the United States government as a secretary cannot be overstated. She was superb. She was the wife of a political officer by the name of Henry Taylor. A navy attache from Karachi came in with an envelope. He said, "Mr. Ambassador, this is for you" and he turned around and walked out. I opened it up and it said, "Back channel communication." Back channel means it did not go through the State Department. Actually, this channel was a super-secret navy channel that had several names. One of them was SR-1. It was sent to Karachi by the naval attache there. He had to hand carry it up to me. The gist of that telegram was that he, Kissinger, wanted me to meet him, presumably in California, at a later date, of which I would be advised. Be prepared to travel early. Boy! That was the first back channel communication I had ever gotten. Secondly, didn't he know that I don't leave my post without permission of the Secretary of State? I got a second one saying, "You will travel on such and such a date. Meet me in California."

Q: San Clemente? This was Nixon's California White House.

FARLAND: I didn't know where I was going to meet him in California. Another communication followed, to wit that I would travel [to a] private airport and ask for plane number such and such and they would take me to the destination. This was about as mysterious as you can get. I still didn't have permission to travel. So, I sent a back channel telegram to Kissinger stating something to the effect that "I don't know what the circumstances are. Normally, I would get permission from the Department of State. If that isn't reasonable under the circumstances, then have Al Haig from New York send me the following telegram," which I then spelled out a charade (to be perfectly frank, a lie). I hate like the Devil to do that. This is not the way I live. I'm still mad about it. To wit, "The sale of the coal land which you had to so and so is proceeding uneventfully. However, one factor has occurred. So and so's, the finder's, fee to us seems to be exorbitant. Your presence in the States is absolutely essential for the solution of this problem. Signed James Meenon." Oh, I hated that. I sent this triumphant [telegram] through the Pakistani [post]. So, in comes a telegram with that message on it. It goes through the mailroom and the mail clerk comes down and hands it to Eleanor Taylor, saying, "Looks like the boy's made another seven million dollars." It was my telegram. So, I had to code that and send it to the Department asking for permission to travel. Any travel voucher has to be coded.

Time passes. I don't get a reply. I can't wait. I've decided I'm going, permission or not. So, I went down to Karachi. The telegrams come in there and then they're forwarded. In the middle of the night, I got it and then went on. This was cutting it awfully fine. I stopped that night in Hong Kong. As luck would have it, I bumped into a fellow I knew from Panama. He said, "What are you doing?" I said, "I'm on

my way to Washington on consultation." I left the next morning. The next day, I went to Los Angeles. I got in there in the morning and went to the airport, asked for that number plane. It was a lovely twin engine jet. I was the only person aboard. Being a former FBI agent, I was trying to figure out whose plane this was. I was looking in the ashtrays to see if there were any paper matches or anything else. It appeared that it was Sinatra's plane.

Q: Frank Sinatra is a famous singer who was also close to some presidents - and to the mob, too.

FARLAND: Right. I couldn't say it was his plane, but I had reason to believe it might be. So, we landed at Palm Springs. That is a local watering place out there.

Q: Palm Springs is where Frank Sinatra had a home.

FARLAND: There was a little black car there with a man. I went over and he said, "Are you Meenon?" I said, "Yes." So, I got in the car. I got to the house and saw some big men standing around. They looked like Secret Service people. I saw Henry was out on the patio with a drink in his hand. He was in a sport shirt and was relaxed. I was anything but relaxed. I said, "Henry, I've come halfway around this damn earth and I don't know why." He said, "I want you to put me into China." I said, "I don't think that's very funny, Henry." He said, "It's not funny. You know it. Haig knows it. Nixon knows it. I know it." I said, "I didn't ask for this job." He said, "You are going to do it." I said something about "Don't be so damned dictatorial. I'm not up to that yet." We talked for a while. I calmed down a bit. It was still exasperating in no uncertain terms. I said, "Look, Henry, you fly west of K-2, the Russians are going to pick you up on their radar. There is no question about this. If you fly east of the K-2, the Indians have got you pegged." How are you going to get into China?" He said, "That is for you to figure out." I said, "I need about three days. Henry, I've got a solution. In three days, I can hide you at Murree." Murree is a British hill station that is about 7,500 feet outside of Islamabad north in the foothills of the Himalayas. Fortunately, there was a big cottage up there that somehow or another the embassy had the rights to. It had a phone connection with the embassy. So, I figured I could hide him there. That was the first thought that came to mind. So, we talked for a while. He said, "You figure it out. I'm coming through. I will be stopping in Pakistan, at which time I want to go into China." On the way back, I thought of nothing else but how to do it.

I had to get rid of the doctor on my plan. We had a doctor or nurse assigned to the embassy because of the size of the embassy. I had to get rid of him. If I claimed a slight indisposition, he as the doctor would want to be there. So, I arranged for him to go to East Pakistan at that particular time. Sid Sober was too diddly darn bright for me to try to hide this from. So, I sent him on vacation. The head of the USIA there was a very intelligent person who wanted to pry into everything. I didn't want him prying into this, so I got him out. I forget where I sent him. Not

that it made any difference, but my wife was in the States at that time anyway, so I had plenty of space in the house, but that wasn't necessary. I eliminated as many as I could. I was down to a man by the name of Dennis Kux, a very, very bright young guy. He damned near blew it, too, I might add. Then I had arranged that when he was in the air, I would take a Cessna up to Murree with trumpets blaring, flags flying, and everything else, and then call back and cancel all the plans for parties and so forth that I had set up. That worked out fine.

My biggest hurdle was to get Kissinger from Islamabad into China. I knew that the Paks almost had a daily run by air in 707s, the PIA (Pakistan International Air). But I don't have permission to discuss this with anybody. I had to put it over my head. This was where I stood at that point.

I would like to catch up on some of the history. In 1969, I came over there, to Pakistan. In 1967, Kissinger was becoming interested in better relations with China and made some public statements to that effect. From 1954 on, there had been 134 meetings trying to work out some kind of arrangement.

Q: In Warsaw, Czechoslovakia-

FARLAND: And Poland and everywhere else. Then came the invasion of Cambodia. So, that broke that previous chain at the State Department. This is what Nixon and Kissinger wanted. This was God-given as far as they were concerned. They wanted that break. Kissinger made one attempt through General Vernon Walters with a contact in Paris, but that did not work. Finally, a channel was chosen after months of overeager signal sending by Washington. This was, as I previously described, through Pakistan. The amazing thing about this was that, at that point, neither Secretary Rodgers or the State Department were in any way informed on this matter.

Q: Was Yaya Khan informed at this point?

FARLAND: I knew nothing about his being told. It was so damned secret, I don't know whether they even talked to each other sometimes.

Q: But they had obviously talked to the Chinese.

FARLAND: They had talked to the Chinese. The Chinese, of course, were very close to the Paks.

Q: How did this work out? You still had to get an airplane.

FARLAND: That's right. At that juncture, the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan, Romania, and the Soviet Union all knew that the Americans were acting on a mission to China, but the State Department didn't know it. That is unconscionable.

Q: I know. This is Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon.

FARLAND: On April 21, 1971, [a] message [was sent] through the back channel stating "The Chinese government-" (end of tape)

"Publicly, in Peking, a special envoy of the President of the United States (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the United States Secretary of State or even the President of the United States himself for a direct meeting." So, here we had a real initial contact between the United States and China.

Nixon thought about going. Kissinger didn't want him to. This was Kissinger's play. He played it for all it was worth. March 3, when I got that back channel.

Q: You're saying in April the Chinese government sent this. But you had gotten a back channel of it in March. The timing isn't-

FARLAND: That was April 21 that the Chinese government sent... On March 3 is when I went.

Q: But we didn't know that the Chinese had accepted it.

FARLAND: I don't know.

Q: Obviously, it had to be after.

FARLAND: Anyway, on June 2nd, Zhou En-lai approved Kissinger's trip and expressed Chairman Mao's pleasure at receiving Nixon sometime soon thereafter. At that point, I was authorized to talk to Yaya. I went down and said, "Hi, I have something very serious to talk to you about, Yaya." He grinned. I said, "Do you know what I'm going to talk about?" He said, "I think I do." I said, "Has somebody been talking to you?" He said, "Somebody has been talking." I said, "I need one of your airplanes to fly to China." He said, "You have it." Almost words to that effect. I said, "I don't understand this. I didn't get permission to talk to you until I just came down here." He said, "Well, they've been talking to my ambassador in Washington." I almost had a hemorrhage. All those sleepless nights trying to figure out how in the Devil I was going to get him over there. That is the way it was. That is the way it happened. By using a PIA plane, there was no question.

Q: You were having to deal with Yaya. What was your arrangement for the plane?

FARLAND: They made constant trips and I told them... He was as aware of the situation as was I at that point, much to my amazement and disgust. On July 9th after my conversation with Yaya, not that that was important, Kissinger back

channeled to Zhou En-lai a statement that he would be flying in a Pakistan Boeing aircraft from Islamabad to Peking. Nixon and Kissinger were at each other's throats as to who was going to get to go on this thing. Nixon ordered Kissinger not to put his name on that communique. Kissinger simply ignored it. He was that type. He was bound and determined he was going to get the glory out of it and did. On July 1, 1971, Kissinger started on a fact-finding tour through Asia, including Vietnam, Thailand, India, West Pakistan, and Paris. He got into Kennedy on July 8th. I had a luncheon and dinner for him, an interesting meeting, and so forth. I had all the arrangements for him. There were parties, receptions, all the invitations sent out, etc. Normal procedure.

In the afternoon of about the second day, a Secret Service man with a big cigar in his mouth came in and stood there and said, "Mr. Ambassador, something screwy is going on here." That is when I had to lower the boom. This is when the old FBI came back into effect. I said, "Look, my dear friend, I am as responsible for the lives of every American in Pakistan. You and everybody in this trip are my responsibility. I know you are to take care of Kissinger, but I am to take care of you as well as Kissinger. I am telling you right now, buddy, don't you for one minute mess around too close to whatever you think is screwy or you're going to find yourself going back as a tourist on a paid flight and not on the flight you're on. Get that understood right now between us. I am fully responsible for both of you." He turned around and walked out. Obviously, somebody on that plane talked. It was nobody at the embassy. They didn't know. But he kept quiet. That settled him down.

That night before Kissinger's departure in the morning of the 9th, the President had a little dinner party at his bungalow for a very small group. This group included the foreign minister, who was privy to this, Yaya, the head of the army, and I think the head of the air force was there (I'm not sure.), and I was there, and maybe one other person, but that was it. Those were the only ones that knew about this trip, except for my secretary. At 3:30 that morning, Kissinger went to the airport. I was getting my gear together to take Kissinger to Murree. He and his group were going to Chaklala Airport. When he got there (I was not at the airport, but I can tell you this because it is part of the story.), he had three aides: Winston Lord, Richard Sminer, and John Holdridge. At that juncture, the whole deal almost blew up. This is a fact that has been public, but it's not known widely. At that airport at the far corner in the military section for reasons unknown, there was a newspaper man by the name of Beg. Beg is a stringer for "The London Telegram." He saw Kissinger and asked an official what was going on. The official told him and the guy ran to a telephone and called London. The editor, having had dealings with Beg in the past, figured he was drunk and canned the story. That is how close that came to blowing up. The Boeing was manned by two Chinese pilots and a Chinese navigator. That scared a couple of the small group nearly to death, including the Secret Service men who were with us (There were two of them.). On Friday that afternoon, they landed in Beijing.
What was I doing? I was heading a parade that was going up the hill to Murree

with flags flying. There had been one change in the program. The President suggested instead of stopping at Murree, go on about 20 miles to Nagiagali, which is another rest home that is fully outfitted and which was prepared to take care of us. I said, "I'm all set at Murree." He said, "The other one is farther away, which means better security." I said, "I couldn't agree with you more." So, we went to Nagiagali. I turned around, drove back to Murree, got on the phone, called the embassy, and told my secretary, Mrs. Taylor, "Believe it or not, Kissinger is suffering from a slight indisposition (and that is the word that went around the world.). No problem, but cancel all arrangements. He will be back in time to continue his flight."

So, that was my part to be played. I played it. I told the Secret Service men in the group, "Do not drink the water unless it's boiled. Remember, we're at 10,000 feet here. It takes longer for water to boil. If it isn't boiled, you're going to get a stomach full of bugs that you won't like." Well, one of the Secret Service men the day we were supposed to leave got so damned sick I thought we were going to lose him. What a way to end up the whole thing, with a Secret Service man who has got Delhi belly! So, he got a hold of a doctor someplace who didn't know whether he was treating Nixon, Kissinger, me, or what. He didn't know anybody. He gave him a shot of something and got him on his feet. With a sick six footer, we started down the hill. I thought, "Well, that's over." We got down to where Kissinger was supposed to meet us and no Kissinger. I couldn't stop there. I went on to the President's rest house, where Kissinger was staying. Pretty soon, Dennis Kux arrived. "Where is Kissinger?" I said, "Dennis, that stupid ass is up there in the Murree bazaar arguing about some horrible piece of rug or something, looking for bargains. I wasn't going to stand up there with him and make a fool out of myself. If he wants to stay there, that is his business. My business is to come back here, report back, and here I am. I am madder than all get out and I don't like it a bit. This is a hell of a way for a visitor to act." I put on what might be called a first-class act. I fooled Dennis. I had to keep that up for almost an hour and a half until he finally arrived.
While in Peking, they sent back (This, too, really appeals to me.)... The secret code word was "eureka!"

Q: I can't believe it!

FARLAND: They sent that over the air. Eureka! Thus, the President of the United States knew that we were successful. On July 13, I was sitting there holding my breath. I still couldn't say anything. Every morning, I was listening to the-

Q: Kissinger came through. You saw Kissinger off.

FARLAND: I saw him off.

Q: Did he say anything about it?

FARLAND: Oh, yes. I had a frank talk with him about the whole thing. He told me, "I got everything I wanted." It was a total success on my part. I did a beautiful job. I said, "Look, I'm through with this. I've got a hurricane, I've gotten you into China." Now I want Japan.

Q: As an embassy.

FARLAND: That's what I wanted. "Give me a month in intensive Japanese and I'll have it back. [I was an] interpreter in World War II. I can get it back in a month. I know that subject. He said, "We have something else planned for you." That was wrong. Nixon announced this. I was listening every morning, glued to that television set I had. On July 15... All that did right then and there... Tokyo had been getting assurances by Washington that there would be no initiatives toward Peking without full consultation. As a result, they made both Taiwan and Japan mad.

Q: To be practical about this, Taiwan had been informed beforehand. They had a formidable political apparatus in the United States. They could have probably stopped this cold. Two, the Japanese, being a consultative type government, it would have been leaked. It would have been impossible-

FARLAND: Do you know that matter was leaked? I don't know whether you want me to go into this or not.

Q: Was this part of your experience?

FARLAND: It was not part of my experience, but the story [was leaked].

Q: How did it get leaked?

FARLAND: A navy yeoman by the name of Charles Edward Radford, who was on that trip, was a spy. He was a personal aide to Admiral Rembrandt C. Robinson, the top assistant to the Chairman Admiral Thomas H. Moore. Tom Moore and I were longtime friends. Moore knew this whole story.

Q: Radford was a spy for our navy, not for the Soviets.

FARLAND: That's right.

Q: The navy has an extensive spy system throughout the government.

FARLAND: What was so libel about this was that Nixon and Kissinger would hardly talk to each other and yet this whole thing was going to the navy. Not only that, but poor [Secretary] Rodgers being completely in the dark about this... There were others besides the navy that knew about it.

Q: I did an interview with Marshall Green, who was Assistant Secretary for East Asia at the time. He went out with Nixon on the trip to China. He said that when

he heard that Kissinger had gone up to this hill station because he had tummy trouble or something, he was at a staff meeting and said, "That doesn't make any sense. That is a long, hard trip. It's bouncy. That is not the place to go." Then he realized something was fishy.

FARLAND: He got [sick]. He was supposed to have gotten it up there. But Delhi belly is what it is.

Q: Did you get any repercussions from the State Department or your staff, saying, "Why the hell didn't you tell us" or was everybody pretty well understanding of why...

FARLAND: As soon as I heard this news on the radio, I went over and held a staff meeting and said, "Kissinger was in China, not in Murree" and their faces dropped. They didn't know it. No one at the embassy except Eleanor Taylor knew. Eleanor couldn't have been a better secretary. A man couldn't ask for a better secretary than she was.

Q: You were obviously involved in Pakistan-American relations. Did you have the feeling a little later on that the secret trip to China was sort of a capstone to the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy and the fact that Yaya Khan had helped bring it on, did that give him extra favor so that when we are talking about tilts to Pakistan... We had seen it almost dominate our-

FARLAND: I can't believe otherwise. If you save my ox from being gored, I am going to have to be at least appreciative. Whether that was the cause or not, Nixon tilted and he sure as hell had gotten help from Yaya.

Q: I think we're at the end of the Pakistan thing. We've covered the war, the hurricane, normal relations, and the China trip. Is there anything else we should cover on Pakistan?

FARLAND: One of the three big items of my tenure over there was, I traveled a good deal. The first thing I did (and I advise any officer to do) was study the maps of the country. I read maps religiously. You can get an awful lot of information from a map. As far as Pakistan is concerned, I don't know of anything else. I know I preached in the Christmas shows in the cathedral in Rawalpindi and I nearly froze to death that night. I went back to the embassy and stayed in bed for a week with flu.

Q: You left Pakistan in 1972. Did you know where you were going?

FARLAND: I knew when I left, yes.

Q: What were you going to do and how did it come about?

FARLAND: I came back to Washington and began briefing on Iran and waiting for my call from the Foreign Affairs Committee chairman to allow me to be an ambassador. I got a call from one of the people connected with the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. They had seen me enough that they didn't want to see me. I didn't have to come up. So, I was cleared. I had to get over pretty hurriedly because Nixon was going over to see the Shah. So, I had to get acquainted quickly, which I did. But unfortunately, I didn't realize that I had already run into a buzzsaw - one of these situations that are made in the past that suddenly comes up and bites you. An Iranian boy came to West Virginia University. I met him. He was delightful.

Q: When was this?

FARLAND: This was long before I was in ambassadorial service. It was in the 1950s sometime. His name was Jahanbani. His father had been a general. Naturally, he was an important person. He didn't know why he was at West Virginia University. His child had been run over in an accident in Teheran. His wife wasn't with him and he was very unhappy. We had him to dinner and he finally moved in and stayed with us for a while. I was instrumental in getting his wife over. We became quite good friends. He told me about Iran and so forth. That summer, I took him out to the country. He said, "You know, you ought to strive to be an ambassador. You're the type that should get into that service. You've obviously shown a great deal of sympathy towards foreign students. You've helped me. You should think about that." Well, I did think about it. So, when I got my appointment to Iran, this was a story that I loved to tell because it was a connection with Iran. What I didn't know was that the foreign minister and the minister of court were violent enemies. They hated each other. I didn't have any idea about that. Secondly, the foreign minister's private secretary is Jahanbani. She was a very brilliant, beautiful member of that family. So there is a foreign minister with a member of the Jahanbani family and here is the minister of court who doesn't like this situation. I am telling the story and the foreign minister hears it and thinks it's great. The minister of court thinks it's awful. He acquires a great deal of hatred for me without ever seeing me.

Q: When you say "the minister of court," you're talking about the Shah's minister of court. This was not the legal system. This was the man who runs the Shah's entourage.

FARLAND: That's right. He was a very important person. Before I got over there, that story had circulated and I had friends on one side and an enemy on the other. So, I ran into that situation when I got there. Nixon came over.

Q: Kissinger was with him on this trip, wasn't he?

FARLAND: I don't remember. He must not have been. If he had been, I certainly would remember.

Q: Maybe not. This was in 1972.

FARLAND: That was 1972.

Q: You were there from 1972-1973.

FARLAND: Yes.

Q: Before we get to the trip, when you were getting ready to go, what were you getting from the desk and all about... Iran and the Shah were special cases which turned out to be a problem. Were you being told to be extra careful?

FARLAND: I don't remember a whole hell of a lot about how much I got. I was in such a rush. I got a very casual briefing, to be frank about it. I did a lot of reading and that was it. I was on my way. Nixon sent several advance parties over. This was not a big trip. I think to think of the one Clinton made to Africa with 400 people. I can't believe it. Anyway, he arrived and the Shah... There was trouble going on and they were worried that there would be some upsets along the line. They had five bodyguards for the ambassador. I didn't want any bodyguard. If they wanted to get me, they were going to get me, bodyguard or no. The only thing that made it possible was that I could always get a parking place. That was nice.

Big embassy, a lot of work. Nixon arrived and the Shah put on the most lavish dinner I've ever seen in my life. I never saw so many diamonds, emeralds, and rubies, so many ambassadors wearing a big line of medals. The American ambassador was without any. The plane lights were hitting Nixon right in the eyes and he couldn't read his speech. He ended up making one heck of a good speech. I was really proud of that. Then the following day, Nixon had a small dinner in one of the palaces and ordered lobster flown in from Maine. Nobody asked me. I just happened to know the Shah was allergic to seafood, shellfish particularly. So, the Shah was pushing his finger around the table quite a lot. It was a reasonably quiet little dinner, not too much said. They went on.

In the meantime, they had a satellite move over for communications. A red phone direct to... All this costs an awful lot of money. So, I presented to the court. Normally, after a presentation, you go into an anteroom with the Shah and you have maybe 10 minutes to chit chat. I seemed to make an impression on him for some reason or another. One of the things I told him was that one thing I wanted him to know was this: when I got a telegram from State, I would advise him what that said if it was directed to him or to his government, and I also would tell him what I thought personally. He liked that. He kept me for almost 45 minutes, which was unusual. Whether or not he was trying to make an impression on me, I don't know.

I got along fine with the minister of court, I thought. I know I got along fine with the foreign minister. We had rapport right off the bat. I was doing my best to get acclimated to Iran and to its customs and studying everything I could find. Unfortunately, just at the point where I had reached where the Shah was beginning to trust me, Dick Helms had to oversee the accommodations. Dick said that Nixon suggested Iran. I don't know. I know they offered me... First, they were talking about Greece and then they withdrew that because of Colonel Papas intervening. They offered me five other posts. One was Mexico and that was too far up in the air for my plunk, plus the fact that so much activity is in Acapulco, this being a port.

Q: This is not good for anybody with a heart problem.

FARLAND: No. Then they offered me Argentina. My wife said, "You can go to Argentina. You'll get along fine. You know Senora Peron. You certainly know Peron. But I'm not going. So and so down there now won't go out of the embassy residence because he is afraid of getting shot. Knowing you, you are going to be out with the campesinos or whoever all over the country. I am not going to lose you that way." Then they offered me Jamaica and I wasn't interested in that. They designated me to New Zealand. My father in law was dying. He by that time had become a big coal operator. My father in law pleaded with me not to go. I was the only one who could possibly take over what he had. There was a lot of money involved in that. It was a big operation. I was back in the State Department listening to some of the briefings. They had a big meeting one day to decide whether or not between the embassy residence and an adjacent hall, the walkway should be curved or should be straight. There were about 12 men sitting there making a decision of that kind. I thought, "No. Here are a number four post. I've had number one post. Listening to a discussion of the curvature of a walkway, I am not interested."

Q: Also, having tasted some really raw meat, some difficult things, New Zealand sounds... That's what you do to the inoffensive person with little diplomatic skills. It's a good burial place.

FARLAND: That's right. With my father in law in the condition he was in... We're talking big money and a piece of mining equipment of $25-30,000 minimum, once it goes into that mine and you bring it out, it's all rusty. It's still in perfect shape, but it's lost 98% of its value. So, I kept going, hemming and hawing. I finally decided "The hell with it. I am not going to go."

The State Department had me posted to New Zealand. I was carrying a card that said, "Seventeen years in the Service. Last post: New Zealand as an ambassador." I never went to New Zealand. I told the Council of American Ambassadors this and "This is not according to fact," but the State Department- (end of tape)

Q: Before we see what you did in your post diplomatic time, I would like to go

back to Iran. When you were there-
FARLAND: I covered that pretty rapidly.

Q: We covered it too rapidly. One of the concerns was, and it certainly became more apparent later on, Nixon and Kissinger seemed to be delighted with selling as much military equipment as they could to the Shah. It was sort of whatever the Shah wants, he can have. Was there disquiet on your part or the officers of your embassy about what was happening? When military equipment comes in, there are lots of American technicians.

FARLAND: Generally speaking, the officers, particularly the military people, were delighted to see it coming in. I thought they had plenty of it. That was meant. As far as objection to the sale, I never heard an officer complain about it. They were all salesmen.

Q: This was military. How about our political officers?

FARLAND: They made no objection.

Q: Who was your DCM?

FARLAND: A fellow who later became ambassador. I cant think of his name. That is awful of me. My effort there at that point was getting acquainted.

Q: Was your embassy under any constraints on what to report? I'm not sure if it was going at this time, but it became sort of notorious that we had agreed to the Shah that we wouldn't make any contact with opposition. So there were constraints.

FARLAND: I had no constraints on that. I let the Shah know my entire background as far as FBI, etc. He was aware of that. I also revealed the fact that the CIA was weekly in contact with the Shah. I indicated that I didn't think that was such a good idea. I told the Shah, but he didn't give it up. I felt that I should be there when that conversation was ensuing if such was going to ensue. But I hadn't reached the point where I could...

Q: You really didn't have much of a chance to...

FARLAND: No. I was just reaching the point where the Shah was beginning to have faith in me.

Q: If I recall, and correct me if I'm wrong, I think one reason why Helms was sent to Iran was, in a way, to get him out of the way. There were some problems with the CIA. It was to get him out of the Washington game.

FARLAND: He wanted out. I don't know exactly why. It was a big difficulty...

This was too bad, really. This was strictly from the standpoint of the States. During his hearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee, a friend of his said, "Did the CIA have any activity going in Chile?" Helms said, "No." That was strictly untrue. They had a hell of a lot of activity going on in Chile, a great deal of it. That was a friendly questioner, somebody that didn't know what to ask. Helms was going back almost weekly to Washington to try to minimize that damage.

Q: What did you do when you finally left foreign affairs? What sort of things did you become occupied with after you left Iran and you looked at these other posts and decided that you had to take care of your father in law's estate?

FARLAND: That I had to do. My father in law died. I had some cleanup work to do. We decided the property that he had acquired was more than we wanted and more than the two of us could handle. It was too big. So we remodeled a house in Winchester, Virginia. Then my wife died. I've been very lonesome ever since.

Q: I'm sure you have. Do you have any general comments at this point?

FARLAND: I would like to tell you very frankly that I think your project has merit - not from what I'm telling you particularly. I would like to see it somewhere where there can be a closer feeling of contact between the Foreign Service than I was offered, but that was not my handshake. That was the back of somebody's hand that I was getting. Here was a great honor which I would have been glad to accept if it had been a continuation. But that meant the end of my career. I wish there was some way that the Foreign Service and the political appointees could get closer together. How to do that, I don't know. If it were possible for a political appointee to have what I had done, a year's tenure in a lowly position in the Department, that would help. But they are not going to do that.

Q: No, they are not. This is often offered not because of what the person can do for the foreign affairs, but rather as a reward. It is often because of political contributions or because more and more people who have been involved as staff assistants to congresspeople.

FARLAND: Mansfield, for instance, was in Japan and he could stay as long as he wanted.

Q: He did bring an extensive foreign affairs background.

FARLAND: He was there for a long time.

Q: Well, he was untouchable.

FARLAND: That was off-limits. I wish some of the Foreign Service officers

could have a year of corporate experience.

Q: They try sometimes, but it hasn't-

FARLAND: I know. These suggestions are not mine alone.

Q: There is real merit. There often is the problem of having never met a payroll. It is a real problem. I know I suffered from this and I think most of us do.

FARLAND: I wish there was one little simple addition to telegrams, that the writer of that telegram had his initials on it.

Q: Yes, instead of the ambassador signing everything.

FARLAND: The ambassador's name could be on it, but someplace along the line should be who wrote it.

Q: It used to be that when they did the airgram, the drafter's initials would appear. But with the telegram, that went.

FARLAND: I don't know why. You have no idea. In the paper on February 16, 1964, or whatever, a person in the State Department with a name that he or she does not want published, said, "I have had three or four conversations with him." Who was that? The janitor? How much of an authority is an individual of that kind? That is another thing. How am I going to [navigate] that situation? "A State Department official..." It also said "The despatch is a disaster." That doesn't mean anything.

My other only comment is that I frankly enjoyed it, serving overseas and in the Department. Seventeen years was enough.

Q: Yes. You were both in important and interesting places. New Zealand, unless you're dealing with the nuclear issue or something like that, there isn't any other issue out there.

FARLAND: No. I like to fish- (end of tape)

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Q: Today is February 3, 2000. You said you had something you wanted to put on tape and you weren't sure how you wanted to treat it. We thought we would do it now and see how it goes.

FARLAND: There are two items. Two situations arose that were delicate in the sense of I was intrigued and I debated long and hard whether to even mention this. I think I shall. A month or so before I left Iran, Governor John Connelly

(Governor of Texas, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Commerce, a major figure in the Democratic and Republican parties) arrived with pomp and ceremony. He let it be known that he wanted a conversation with His Imperial Majesty without benefit of embassy accompaniment. He wanted to go by himself. That smelled of something, palace intrigue of some magnitude. I just was not going to have it and I told him so, that if he wanted a conversation with His Imperial Majesty, I was going to accompany. He didn't like it a bit. We drove in virtual silence up to the palace. He had a short conversation that amounted to absolutely nothing. It dealt with the weather, the nicety of the country, and how pleasant things were. He just happened to be there. We got in the car and started down the hill and he said, "Would you mind closing that window between us and the chauffeur. I want to speak to you in confidence. I want you to do the following," which I thought was very inappropriate. The suggestion was not to my liking. Obviously, that was what he had in mind to talk to the Imperial Majesty about. I mulled over this thing for some time. In due course, I wrote a double talk, back channel communication to Kissinger conveying what had transpired and asking for advice. In short order, I got a reply back: "Drop it," which confirmed my suspicion. I felt very good about that.
Q: What was Governor Connelly's position at this time?

FARLAND: As far as I know, he didn't have any official position.

Q: What was the subject? You're making the money motion.

FARLAND: The way he phrased it, I don't know where it was going. In any event, it was either for himself, for the political campaign, or to be divided up. I have no idea. It was inappropriate and, as far as I'm concerned, illegal. So, that passed over. The election was held. I was reappointed ambassador. I was getting down to work and thought, "Now I can really go to work. I am strongly entrenched here in the embassy and with the Shah." The Shah was a good friend by now. He trusted me. I mentioned during the first six months, "Look, Your Majesty, this is not from the CIA. This is my personal observation. I think you're going to have some major trouble with the mullahs." He didn't answer. He sent word to me subsequently that he was aware of that situation and he had it under control. Well, obviously, he didn't.

Q: From where were you getting this information about the mullahs?

FARLAND: Personal observation and comments that I heard as an observer. I felt that there was more going on than was being reported to him. I knew the CIA hadn't reported it. How did I know these things? you go into a city and look at the people's faces. You get a pretty good idea of what is going on. You look in the shops and you get a pretty good idea of the economic situation.

Q: Most of us, when we start looking at the Russian Revolution and the French Revolution, we see a court society which is living very well.

FARLAND: Too well.
Q: This is the problem. It doesn't seem to be well integrated. Was this quite apparent at the time?

FARLAND: It was. The Shah was trying to minimize that, although he himself overdid it. That was a bad mistake.

Q: That was terrible.

FARLAND: Whoever advised him on that...

Q: I can't remember what anniversary it was - the recreation of the Persian Empire.

FARLAND: Whoever advised him on that began the Shah's downfall. It was a pathetic situation. The Shahbanu was a lovely, lovely, solid person. The Shah was trying to do the right thing. There were overtones of the past empire, yes. I was back in 1978. He told me, "Joe, I don't know what to do. The embassy tells me one thing. I do it. A special envoy comes from Washington, sent by the President, and tells me something else diametrically opposed and I do that. Another envoy comes from the United States military and tells me something else and I try to do that. I've given the women the right to vote. I've given the right to hold land. I've made them citizens of this country. I've taken land away from the mullahs and given it to the poor of our country for farming. I've tried to do what the United States has recommended, but the people are in the street walking against me. The women are wearing the chador and parading against me. I don't understand it."

Q: It was trying to put American values into another culture.

FARLAND: And too fast. His family was a part of the difficulty.

Q: I understand that the family was essentially very corrupt.

FARLAND: They were. The twin sister was...

Q: She was really the dominant person, wasn't she?

FARLAND: You can read in his book that the Shah criticized her vehemently as being one of the thorns in his side.

Q: I am talking about what you were getting from your embassy, your staff. Was there the feeling that the Shah was a powerful person or essentially a rather weak person who was trying to do what was best but really didn't have the strength of personality to do it?

FARLAND: I didn't get that from the embassy or the CIA. Incidentally, there was a CIA officer there who I consider one of the best I've bumped into. Another one was a CIA officer in Pakistan who was absolutely tops. Some of those officers were great and some of them weren't.

Q: Who was top within the Political Section, your main people who knew Iran best, studied the language, and were the best plugged into the situation?

FARLAND: I had an excellent economic officer and a very good political officer. I think the economic officer was better.

Q: Who was that?

FARLAND: I can't remember. The staff was adequate. It was a first-rate embassy as far as I was concerned in many respects. But we were working under certain hardships, too. Their contacts with the so-called opposition were most limited. That is the way the situation was. I can't fault the embassy.

Q: Off mike, you were saying you wanted to talk about the appointment of Richard Helms as ambassador.

FARLAND: I settled down thinking I could really go to work now and do what I felt should be done. In about a month or six weeks, I received a telegram from the Department saying that I was to go to the foreign office and ask for agrement for Richard Helms. I was shocked. I was surprised. I had no previous warning. I had no consultation on this. Nothing. So, I gathered up two or three other items that I was going to talk about in the foreign office. Incidentally, in the other tape, I was referring to the foreign minister. That should have been the prime minister. Albayta was the man who turned out to be a good friend of mine. I went down to the foreign office and went over a few of these things. At the end of it, I said, "By the way, I will be leaving this post and I have been asked to ask for agrement for Richard Helms, a very fine officer. He is now head of the CIA. I am sure that he will follow in my footsteps and do an excellent job here in Iran. I trust that you will extend agrement to him." Then I started to walk out. I got almost to the door and the foreign minister said, "Mr. Ambassador, please come back. I didn't get the endpoint of what you said." So, I repeated it quietly and smilingly. He said, "Thank you very much." That night, my wife and I went to a cocktail party in one of the embassies and the prime minister, Albayta, was there. He saw me. He walked over with his little cane in his hand, banging it on the floor. He said, "I am mad! I am mad!" I said, "I'm not exactly jumping with joy." He said, "I am mad" and turned around and walked away. I was getting ready to leave. I was sure that he asked for agrement. Not to do so would be almost paramount to breaking relations. It would cause a problem.

Q: It would cause a problem, but you can really say "I don't think this is suitable." I can't think of his name now, but the Iranians had a very strong ambassador in

Washington.
FARLAND: His name was Zahedi.

Q: He was very well connected.

FARLAND: He was a watering spot in a social center the like of which hadn't been seen since Demoyer from the Dominican Republic was there. There was a party virtually every night. Wine and liquor flowed freely, along with caviar, which was in abundance. Zahedi had been the general who had helped put the Shah's father back on the throne. Anyway, about two or three nights before I was to leave, my secretary got a call not from ALAN's (the court ministry) office, which was the normal procedure, but apparently from someone close to the Shah. It may have been his major domo, for all I know. He was asking that I alone come up and see the Shah at 8:00 that night. Without benefit of bodyguards, I was not worried. I drove up to the palace in which the Shah was resident and it was dark. The lights weren't on. The entourage in front was not there. The place looked empty. I wasn't exactly sure what I was getting into. This was most unusual. I got out of that car and walked over to the door and the major domo, who knew me, said, "Oh, Mr. Ambassador, come in." I walked in. I thought they hadn't paid the light bill. There were only just a few lights in the hall. He said, "Just follow me, Sir. I will take you to His Imperial Majesty." We walked down, made a turn, made another turn, and he came to a door and said, "I am not permitted to go into the room, Mr. Ambassador, so I will open the door and you walk in and I will close it behind you." Well, I've come this far. I might as well go on. I walked in and over at the far end of the room sat the Shah in an old sweatshirt, an old pair of pants. They looked like the dog had slept in him. There were shoes that the dog obviously had been chewing. He said, "Come on in." I walked in and he said, "If you want a drink, you're going to have to help yourself. My servants aren't allowed to see me dressed as I am now. That is to say, undressed." I said, "I had better have a drink under the circumstances," so I fixed a drink and went back. He said, "Sit down here beside me. I want to say something." There was a long pause. I took a sip of my drink and he said, "No one likes to have something pushed down their throat. Royal throats are even more tender than that of the plebeian. I have had something pushed down mine. But I know how to get even and I am going to get even." "Thank you very much. It is awfully nice to see you. I am sorry I'm leaving."

Q: Was it obvious he was referring to the ambassadorial appointment? This was unsaid, but known?

FARLAND: You have been at this game a long time. You know what he was talking about. I did, too. After some smalltalk, I went out the door. The major domo was standing about 50 feet away. He met me. I did not report that conversation to the State Department. I knew precisely what he was telling me. He was telling me, "If you want to make some money out of this, you talk to some oil people. I am raising the price of oil." And it happened.

Q: On the Helms thing, a personal shock is one thing, but his background going there would have struck me as being almost gratuitous because it was widely assumed that the CIA, run by Archie Roosevelt right after Mossedegh had [been deposed] and put him back in.

FARLAND: It was a fact.

Q: Yes. So, putting a CIA man in sounded like we were putting a handler in as ambassador. It sent a very bad message.

FARLAND: That is the way I thought about it. That is the way the prime minister, Albayta, felt about it. That is obviously the way the Shah felt about it.

Q: We look at the effect of what happened in Iran, but it sounds like this was really more of a domestic deal that was put together to move Helms out of the way.

FARLAND: Well, Helms' story of how it happened and Nixon's story as I've read and other stories that I've read [differ]. "The Chinese Corridor" is one book that has something about it. They are all slightly different. Helms says that Nixon suggested it, that he hadn't thought about it. Regardless of that fact, Dick went over. Unfortunately, during his confirmation, a friend of his wanted to ask a gratuitous question which Helms answered negatively and the question was, "Does the CIA have any activity in Chile?" Helms said, "No." Well, Helms as a result thereof was going back and forth to Washington almost on a monthly or bi-weekly basis trying to get that straightened out. The CIA certainly did have a big operation in Chile. I think Dick did a good job as far as he could, but he didn't spend a lot of time there because he traveled a lot.

Q: And the message was very bad. How about SAVAK, the police organization of the Shah's government? What was your impression of how that ran?

FARLAND: The CIA had a meeting with SAVAK constantly. I finally said that I thought I should meet the head of SAVAK because of their relations with our CIA and I did. From an outsider, they were rough. There is no question about that. They were rough. This, remember, is the Middle East. Things were rough in Pakistan.

Q: Things were rough in Israel.

FARLAND: Things were rough in Israel. I told Albayta... I went back into the practice of law and was with a big law firm in Washington of Council. I represented a big firm in Chicago on a dam they were building there. That is what took me back in 1978 and that is when I last saw the Shah. The Shah was aware that that the world was a little aghast at the way people in that part of the world treated each other. He knew that this was a problem.

Q: I've talked to people who went out as Iranian experts, who studied Farsi and served in the consulates, etc. They said that there was always a major problem, that it was almost impossible to make meaningful contact with the mullahs. It wasn't a matter of our not wanting to, but you just couldn't.

FARLAND: You couldn't. It was like trying to talk to the Pope privately, especially the ones who sided fervently with Khomeini.

Q: Was there a problem with the court society absorbing an awful lot of your embassy time? You've got the Bazaaris and the newly educated... A lot of Iranians went to the United States and other places to get educated.

FARLAND: There are right now 600-700,000 Iranians in the Los Angeles corridor north to San Francisco. The Shah wanted the right for Iran Air to land in Los Angeles because of all these people. The United States kept saying "No." He called me up one day and said, "Will you convey to the United States that Pan Am will no longer stop in Teheran." I got a telegram back: "Iran Air can stop at Los Angeles."

Q: Sometimes some of our most bitter negotiating points are over airline stops, airline franchises.

FARLAND: It's true. Well, I don't know what to do with this.

Q: I see no problem with it. Time has gone on. It's not the man's fault. The Shah has passed from the scene. It doesn't reflect on Richard Helms.

FARLAND: It doesn't reflect on him [except for] the sense that he did get himself into a jam.

Q: That was a whole different matter. That is a matter of public record. Again, it was quite apparent... You had this very peculiar relationship, I've found, between Kissinger and Nixon. They treated Iran as almost a toy. We didn't use common sense in our dealings with them as far as putting too many American technicians in, which helped upset an awful lot of traditionalists. It was big money and whatever the Shah wants, he can get.

FARLAND: Plus oil.

Q: And oil. The whole thing. So, it wasn't handled well. In hindsight, it's quite obvious. But a lot of it came from what was set by Nixon and Kissinger and carried on by Carter, really not trying to keep at some remove from the Shah and trying to downplay American influence in the country.

FARLAND: There was a great hatred over here towards Iran. I certainly sensed it

when I got back. But those are little bits and pieces that are a part of the...

Q: I'm glad we'll put this in the record.

FARLAND: I made some good friends. But again, it was impossible for me to get down to the average household.

Q: I think this is true of any ambassador. You go around and shake hands, but when you get right down to it, you have to deal with either the ruling class or, in some countries, the opposition. In a normal country, it's both. I have been told that it started under Kissinger and Nixon that we were not to report much (This may have come later.) on internal matters within Iran because the Shah didn't want us to be messing around.

FARLAND: No restrictions were laid on me, but-

Q: I think this may have come a little later.

FARLAND: As I said on the previous tape, I kept talking about the foreign minister. That was the prime minister. His name was Hobayda. Jahanbani is now married and living in France.

Q: I want to thank you.

End of interview