

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

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INTERVIEW

Q: Could you give me a little of your background--where you were born, where you came from, a little about your education, etc.?

FRY: I was born in December of 1934 and began my travels in January 1935 at six weeks when, as my mother recalled, I took the Twentieth Century Limited from New York to Chicago to join my father and sister who were already out there. My father had started work for Montgomery Ward. I grew up in the Middle West until about age ten and then returned to the New York area. My parents divorced and my mother moved to Northampton, Massachusetts, the home of Smith College, and began working at Smith until she retired. I went to high school there and then on to Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire, up the Connecticut River a hundred and ten miles. I graduated

in 1956 and spent the next year on a Dartmouth fellowship at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland.

As I was finishing off my first year studies at Edinburgh, and was getting ready to travel for the summer, it dawned on me when I got a letter from the draft board that I had not renewed my student deferment. I would like to remind anyone who was not around in those times that the draft was a no nonsense thing in the nineteen '50s when Eisenhower decided to beef up two eighteen thousand-man infantry divisions, plus other elements of the army, reflecting the growing concern about the Cold War and some of the activities of the Soviet Union, particularly in Europe. So I was drafted and went into the Third Infantry Division which was stationed in West Germany at Bamberg; our positions were up on the Czech border and the Fulda Gap where we trained and would have been annihilated within about twenty-five seconds had war actually come. We were using military equipment at that time that was basically from the First World War except for the Garand Rifle which was from the Second World War.

Q: When was this?

FRY: We arrived in Germany in January of 1958 and I left in October of 1959.

Q: You were protecting me when I was there at the Consulate General in Frankfurt. You were all that stood between me and the Soviet forces.

FRY: It was a thin reed, I want you to know. It was an interesting experience in the sense that for the rest of my life I was, for reasons originally not of my own choosing, involved in the Cold War on the periphery of the Soviet Union or in the Soviet Union. I think that the element of having been in the military and knowing a bit about how the military conceives its action plans on the basis of civilian instructions--how they interpret threat in a concrete military sense--was always of very great value to me. I think it helped in a practical way later in more senior jobs in dealing with the military mission at our embassies, with the military attachés, with intelligence work and in understanding the dedication that it does take to serve in the military, particularly in peacetime. That is when you begin to get the slackness and the feeling of "why are we here?" We certainly had an element of that in the nineteen '50s; however, we had enough alerts and enough things to keep us busy so that the time passed pretty quickly.

Q: The Hungarian Revolution was about that time.

FRY: The Hungarian Revolution was over by early December 1956, but it was exactly that, together with the Suez crisis, which was seen as crippling NATO resolve because of the conflict between the United States, Britain, and France, and other elements which occurred in the mid-'50s, that led to the resolve to rebuild the American Army after the end of the Korean War and to form it for the first time to fight a nuclear war. The divisions were called pentomic divisions, which was simply an acronymic form for a five regiment division. One of the regiments was mobile for the first time, with helicopters

that were not generic to the regiment but were always available. I was in this regiment which was said at the time to be the first helicopter assault regiment--I don't know if that is truly accurate. So we were flying around in helicopters all over the place and also guarding the atomic canon that now seems like the *tyrannosaurus rex* of the military world. It was a gun that would throw a nuclear shell twenty-three miles; I guess you hoped that it landed where you wanted it to land. When that cannon came out of its cave at our base in Bamberg we would fly along behind in case it broke down because the whole secret of being able to throw a shell that far was in the breach; this had only been tried on railway guns and naval cannon in the past. What we didn't want to happen was to have it break down so that some squad of East German or Soviet commandos in place could come and steal the breach. We were not actually told that, but that is what we figured out. The wheels were something like twelve feet high and sometimes when we would go through a German town they would shave off the church and part of the school and we would have to stop and apologize.

Q: I remember seeing that thing go through; we are talking about a real monster.

FRY: We would fly down and put a perimeter around it; we had twenty-four people, four machine guns and four BAR's, so we weren't kidding, and live ammunition which was kept in a locked case that I as a sergeant was responsible for. It was something that when I was at Dartmouth and the University of Edinburgh I hadn't counted on for the next two years of my life.

Q: You are touching on something here that I think is very important. In this oral history program the interviewees, mostly male, belong to a generation in which the great majority of us have served in the military, mostly with reluctance; but we did it and came away with the idea that while this wasn't for us these were people who knew their job and it was a very difficult job. There was a greater appreciation and understanding of the problems and how to handle them and of what military force means than came out of the next generation. Many who ducked the Vietnam War or the post Vietnam period just don't have that military experience and they don't have an appreciation for the military which still remains a major element of our foreign policy.

FRY: Yes. I would not argue that my Foreign Service judgments on the civilian side would be so much different if I had not had military service, I don't know. But I would say that, on balance, that part of the composite of my life was positive, even though I didn't think so at the time. I never had a feeling of what some people have described as bitterness over the fact that college classmates were graduating from law school when I was just getting out of a sergeant's uniform--and what had I been doing with my life the last three years. I had a feeling of amazement that three years had gone by so quickly, and that it was my fourth year out of college, when I returned to the United States and entered graduate school. This time I decided to stay until I got a Master's Degree, or at least complete the work for it. As fate would have it, as I was being discharged, leaving active duty--not the final discharge as we had five years of reserve duty--I saw a sign in a post office that said, "You can sign up until November 5th, 1959, to take an exam for the

Foreign Service of the United States." I had thought about the foreign service a lot in the past but it had sort of slipped my mind for a while as I was concentrating on graduate school. So I took the exam; I probably got my card in about the last day that you could for that year. I have often wondered what would have happened had I missed that date. Would I have wanted to take it a year later? The upshot was that I entered graduate school.

Q: You went to graduate school where?

FRY: At the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. That allowed me to live fairly near home, I didn't live at home, in an area that I knew and in which I had had odd jobs, knew people and could get temporary work. I was given, rather it was given to the University and they bestowed it on me, a Ford Foundation fellowship to help in the research that was being done for the establishment of the "Four College Program" in which the purchasing of valuable and expensive books would be combined by the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Smith, and Mt. Holyoke. They found that with costs rising it was nonsensical for Smith College to purchase a five hundred dollar book on African art and for Amherst to do the same thing, so they began to coordinate the purchases. I was one of the people in that program funded by the Ford Foundation and that is how I earned my way through; they also waived your tuition with that grant. While I was doing the classwork I was also processing through the Foreign Service because I passed the written and in the summer of 1960 I took the oral in Boston. The exam was so different from the procedure used now that it appears to be almost neanderthal, I suppose. Three on one as they used to say.

Q: I have done both types and I think the three on one works better.

FRY: I think the three on one--well, I don't know how you pick people out of a group of fifteen and tell them that they are not real leaders. In any case, I worked my way through that and then there was the security examination which for me was quite interesting. By this time I was hard at work on a Master's Degree on the investigation of subversion at the state level in the United States. I had been very much angered by the investigation of Dartmouth College, while I was an undergraduate, by McCarthy-type committees that were formed at the state level, in this case the state of New Hampshire. The investigation was led by the then Attorney General, Louis C. Wyman, later a Congressman from New Hampshire, who was an arch-conservative, a protégé of Styles Bridges who was the Republican old guard in New England. The investigation had no clear end except to prevent the State of New Hampshire from being overthrown by a communist conspiracy. If you lived in New Hampshire you would find this pretty funny, but if you didn't live in New Hampshire and then were there as a student you would find it hilarious.

An example of the hysteria was a case that worked its way to the Supreme Court involving a Methodist minister, a graduate of Yale Divinity School, named Willard Uphaus. Willard Uphaus was a leader in the peace movement, not appreciated at the height of the Cold War, who had people of all persuasions, including communists, at his summer home in New Hampshire. The Attorney General asked him for a list of the

people and he refused. The Attorney General, as it turned out, already had a list and all the license plates. The Supreme Court held only that the State Legislature had the authority to convene a committee such as the one that subpoenaed Willard Uphaus; nothing about the merits of the subpoena or the facts in the issuance. Willard Uphaus was cited for contempt. At age seventy some he was put into a one hundred and twenty-year old prison in Concord, New Hampshire, where he languished for two years. He was finally released by a lot of protests and sympathy movements. I went to see him in prison.

I tell all this only because when the FBI agent came to my house for the security interview he asked me about where I had worked and what I had done, and I told him. He said, "How is your school work going?" and I said, "Oh, fine. I am working on a Master's Degree." "What are you working on?" And I knew right then that my name had been sent to the FBI as one of the men who had visited Willard Uphaus in prison. I told him exactly what I was doing and we had a very genial conversation about it. I say, to the credit of everyone involved, that as it was a legitimate scholarly research project for a Master's Degree that was later published, and that was the last I ever heard of it. I have often thought that one of these days I would get my FBI file through the Freedom of Information Act and see how they actually handled that. In any case, I completed my classwork at the University and was called into the Foreign Service for January of 1961. I asked for the next class so that I could complete at least the first draft of my Master's thesis for approval. Then I could just touch it up and finish it. It was rather complex in that it was a constitutional law thesis with a lot of legal citations requiring some very careful checking.

I sat in a restaurant/bar on January 20th, 1961, listening to John F. Kennedy's inaugural speech. Knowing that I was going down in March to join the Foreign Service, I was very moved by the speech. It seemed to be almost targeted at me personally. In 1952 I had won the Junior Chamber of Commerce "I Speak For Democracy" contest in Massachusetts. At the Boston award ceremony Kennedy was the speaker. They played the record of my speech and he congratulated me. I was very impressed with him.

In the days of cynicism that can come later in life it is hard to remember how bright and bushy tailed and positive you can feel about a new way of life that is coming. I had always respected the State Department and the State Department officers, particularly for what they put up with in the McCarthy period. I also felt that diplomacy was much more complex than people in Congress wanted to make it; that there were no black and white issues but an endless gray zone.

So I was very taken with Kennedy's statement that we were engaged in a long twilight struggle, basically against communism, in which freedom must prevail, so "ask not what your country can do for you," and so on. I found that a nice send off when I joined the Foreign Service in March 1961 and found that my presuppositions were correct. In diplomacy there is the long gray zone of negotiation and compromise and there are very few other things that you are involved in in your career, except for mechanical things like

visa issuances--which aren't always so mechanical. Indeed the struggle against communism as a philosophy was going to be long and hard.

I had ended my Master's thesis by saying that serious damage had been done by the misuse of power in investigating subversion at the state level. Instead of taking an idea and forcing it to be debated openly and honestly in the marketplace of ideas, which was what I had been taught that our system was going to do, we forced it into a corner, into darkness, into basements and cellars. We then talked about a conspiracy that was afraid to come out into the sunlight; the long history of the Communist Party in the United States and the penalties against even speaking the word communism. I think in the end the communist philosophy as I studied it and later learned to live with in my professional life, was so flawed at the beginning that there never was any hesitation in my thinking that communism would fail. To jump ahead, when I reached the Soviet Union in 1966, in the first month I realized how completely and totally it had failed in the Soviet Union as any kind of a measure of an advancement of a modern society. It was so obvious.

Q: I think probably among most of us at that period it seemed a great form of social control as far as maintaining power--I didn't think it would collapse the way it did--but other than that it didn't work.

FRY: I think one of the things we could discuss as we go along is something that you in your own life don't notice as it is happening, it is contemporary; but I see it now in retrospect of thirty years in the Foreign Service and three years out. That is the influence of the information revolution on everything that touched my life in the Foreign Service. I am not just speaking about computers, but towards the twilight of communism about the influence of tape recorders, of pocket recorders, of walkmen, of VCR's, of this endless wave of information that even the most totalitarian systems couldn't stop. I began to be more and more aware of it when I realized that *Playboy* magazines were bringing the equivalent of thirty-five or forty dollars from Russian soldiers in East Berlin, for obvious reasons in a puritanical society. Then I realized what it would mean if instead of the self-printing, "samizdat" program of Boris Pasternak's works, for example, in the Soviet Union, you could get a tape which had a reading of Pasternak. Something that could be concealed in a cigar box, not papers that had to be laboriously copied and carried around. Indeed that was exactly what was happening. When I was in Finland I got to know the influence of Finnish television, which had a lot of English language programs, on the people of Estonia who were line of sight, only about forty-five miles from the transmitter. The Russians couldn't jam it because they would have jammed Finnish national television. So if you were going over to visit in Tallinn on one of those summer cruises where you could go over for a day or two, one of the highest priorities for a Finn was to take a Finnish-English and Finnish-Estonian dictionary. In this way they were adding fuel to the fire because people were beginning to tape things and put a translation with it and send it to people in the interior, into the other republics.

Q: Back to the period of 1961. You came into the Foreign Service in March and you had, I assume, the normal basic officer training. Could you give a little characterization of your fellow officers and what their outlook was?

FRY: We had twenty-nine people in our class; a little bit larger than those that had been coming in, but roughly the same size as others in that period. The average age was rather high, about twenty-seven and a half or twenty-eight. What made that interesting was that in those days, if my memory serves me, you could not enter the Foreign Service if you were more than thirty-one.

Q: Something like that.

FRY: Another interesting thing was that there were two women in our class, both very well educated and very fine potential officers, who because they married American citizens, both Foreign Service officers, had to resign from the service. Those were the archaic days when that was the way women were treated in the American diplomatic service. I know that stunned me at the time because after my first post I had begun courting Polly Gann, at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, who was interested very much in the Foreign Service. She was from a family that was extremely well-educated and literate. Her father was Ernest K. Gann, an author who was famous for his books on sailing and flying; many movies were made from his books, *The High and The Mighty*, for example. A Renaissance man if there ever was one. The mini-series *Masada*, which was one of the most popular mini-series ever produced, was from a book he wrote called *The Antagonists*. She was not a person, I saw right away, that was going to be interested in staying home while I went to the office.

As it turned out we were part of a group of junior officers in the State Department who began to lobby actively against rules like this. I won't say it was because of our lobbying, but this sentiment was growing stronger in each class; the disappointment we felt when colleagues, who happened to be women, married colleagues who happened to be men and had to leave the service. By the end of the decade those rules were gone. Both of the women in our class were reinstated in the Service after they had, of course, lost several promotions on the rest of the people.

The class had a high degree of military service. Several had been in the navy for as long as four to six years, and one actually took a pay cut to come in the Foreign Service. My pay, incidentally, on entering the Foreign Service in March of 1961 was \$5,400. I thought that was a pretty great amount of money considering that in the military I was making \$900 a year and in graduate school I was making \$125 a month. The class was highly motivated and we kept together as friends over the years, even some I never truly saw again except to pass in the hall. We figured out that after the first five years, four or five had left--one for medical reasons and others because they decided it just wasn't for them. Of those remaining the attrition rate was very low; in fact as we speak in 1993, I know of four from the class that are still in the Foreign Service. Roscoe Suddarth was Ambassador to Jordan. Frank Crigler was Ambassador in Somalia and Rwanda, and some were

Deputy Chiefs of Mission. It was a pretty solid class in the sense that we enjoyed it and stayed in for full careers and left to do other things whenever we felt that mid-'50s was enough to do one job.

Q: Your first post was a very interesting one, I would have thought. It was at a time when you could get a look at two different worlds. You went to Trieste where you served from 1961 to 1963. How did you feel about the assignment and what was the situation when you got there?

FRY: At the end of the training class in June 1961, I was assigned to Geneva and was going to take a French language course. We then went into another week or two of very specialized consular training and the day before we finished my orders were changed to go to Rome and study Italian one on one with a barrage of tutors. They wanted a test to see how quickly a person could learn a romance language and Italian was a language that I didn't know a word of. Also they needed a junior officer in Trieste in September because the visa situation there was fairly active for a small post, and there were other things to do where they needed a first-tour officer. So I went to Rome and studied Italian very hard all of July and August, and about half of September. I lived in an Italian hotel and I tried to speak only Italian; I didn't have to work in the Embassy. The Embassy, the Ambassador in particular, was extremely supportive of this program; I was invited twice to the Ambassador's house for cocktails.

Q: Who was the Ambassador?

FRY: Ambassador George Frederick Reinhardt, later killed in a car accident in northern Italy. He had been Ambassador to Egypt and Vietnam. The Embassy didn't ask me to come in on a Saturday and help out; language training was my business. It did allow me to arrive in Trieste towards the end of September and by November, when I was tested up there, I did get a three-three, which amazed even me because I had a fairly low language aptitude on the entering test.

Q: Three-three is considered a useful...

FRY: Yes, I think it was called professional proficiency in your work, that is you couldn't talk grand opera but you could tell people what they had to do to go to the United States.

Q: The first three is for speaking, the second three for reading, I think.

FRY: Yes. I always found Italian fairly easy to read because if I didn't know a word I would glide over it and didn't worry about it too much. I subsequently studied fairly hard in Trieste and since there were very few Americans there and the consulate was rather small, there was no one my age, I tended to meet quite a few Italians. Most of them didn't want to speak English or didn't speak it, so my language got stronger. I started getting the Trieste dialect, which is a very interesting dialect, woven into Italian because when I asked about a word they would give me the Triestine word, not thinking too much about

it. This led to situations such as one at a dinner party out of Trieste when someone was talking about music and how the Italians love opera, etc., and I said, "Every morning about six o'clock I have a toothbrush that comes down my street singing while cleaning the street." They all looked at me wondering what I was saying, and I said, "Well you know what I mean, he's a toothbrush and he sings." As it turns out, it was the difference between spazino, street sweeper, and spazolino, the Trieste slang for a toothbrush.

Q: What was the situation in Trieste when you arrived there in 1961?

FRY: Churchill, in his 1947 Fulton, Missouri, speech on the Cold War--and I was very aware of that speech as we all were in the '50s and early '60s--talked of the iron curtain that was descending from Szczecin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic. Trieste in 1961 was only six years away from the severe violence in the main square where students had been fired on by British soldiers and Italian constabulary. Trieste was then the Free Territory of Trieste. It had not been determined how Trieste would be divided between Yugoslavia and Italy. Trieste did not have representation in the Italian parliament; it was occupied by five thousand American soldiers and about an equal number of British. Fortunately for the Americans, they were responsible for public health and so on; the British were responsible for public security. So they were the ones involved in the student uprising against the possibility of going to Tito. Yugoslavia was not the friend that it later became to the West; this was still a very dicey time in Yugoslavia and there were a lot of people in Yugoslavia who wanted the B zone of Trieste, as opposed to the A zone which was more on the Italian side, simply to be annexed without any agreements. What had happened was that the earlier negotiations that had been headed by Ambassador Tommy Thompson, who was then Ambassador to Austria, and Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce, who was then Ambassador to Rome, and others, had really worked out an agreement on Trieste. That finally came to pass and time allowed emotions to recede. By 1961 I have to say that Trieste was fairly calm, in that the border was businesslike.

As diplomats, we were given a three-month multiple entry visa to go across the B zone into Yugoslavia proper. You needed it to get into the B zone which the Yugoslav military handled. There was a five-kilometer military zone on each side of the border outside of the city that was very strictly controlled. The situation was always a little tense and there were occasional shootings, but nothing of the seriousness that happened in the mid-'50s. I used to go into Yugoslavia a lot, even down the Istrian peninsula to Pula, over to Abbazia, the Italian name for Opatija, and over to Rijeka (Fiume). All still Italian speaking were all the waiters, the people along the shore, the people who fixed your car. I was able to use Italian and I felt very comfortable, and they did too. They liked Americans. I was able to go in there quite a bit; my diplomatic passport had to have a pull-out page by the time I left, I had gotten so many Yugoslav visas. To say that I went across the B zone to the beaches would simply be to say in Washington, DC, that you went to Georgetown. We are talking about a very small distance there to enter into Yugoslavia proper. The line came right into the city, and on Saturdays and other shopping days the peasants from Slovenia, where the land was very fertile as opposed to the solid rock lunar landscape of Trieste, would flock in with marvelous vegetables and melons;

they would just fill up the Trieste market. That kind of flow of life had been reestablished and it gave an air of tranquility to a situation which was still a little dicey in international politics. But as far as people on the ground were concerned, they had had enough of it. So as the border finally was agreed upon, it was pretty much the A and B zone that I had known.

After the mid-nineteen '60s, when the Italians in Trieste started having a representation in the Parliament, I would consider the Trieste situation went off the burner on everybody's scale. Also, Yugoslavia had begun to change its attitude toward the Soviet Union. I might mention one thing very briefly to show you how sensitive issues were in the Cold War. During my time in Trieste, Italian socialists were not allowed to have a visa to enter the United States without a waiver. This meant getting their passport in advance; sending a telegram which took a long time from our post because it had to be encrypted by hand on the one-time pad system and sent to Rome where it was decrypted and sent to the Department, back to Rome and so on. It took a long time to get approval.

We had the case of a man named Solari who wanted to go to the United States on private business, though he was the Senator from that part of Italy and a very distinguished Italian patriot during the war--not a communist, but he was a socialist. We had to get a waiver and to write in big red letters where he could enter in New York. Solari's company had been picked by the airports in the United States because of the famed Solari clock that you still see all over the world. The clock where suddenly you hear a click, click, click, and all the times and flights and places flick around on these little chits; it is the clock used at Dulles airport from the day it opened. Solari was going to the United States only for business. So here we were outfitting our installations all over the United States with the product of his company and he couldn't enter without a waiver that made him look like he was the son of Joseph Stalin.

All of that eventually changed in the *apertura a sinistra*, the opening to the left, in Italy when we decided the socialists weren't such bad chaps after all since they were in power in England and France, and were a major power in Germany. All the other NATO countries seemed to be going socialist, not to mention Scandinavia. Somebody finally said, "Why are we punishing the Italians, they eventually joined us in the Second World War, let alone afterward." Those are the highways and byways of fighting the Cold War by punishing honest Italian Senators.

Q: This visa thing was following pretty strict standards. At the time you were doing this, I was running the Consular Section in Belgrade. I could pick up the phone and get my waivers over the telephone from our immigration people in Vienna.

FRY: Yes. Near the end of my time we were finally authorized to do that. At first the small post in Trieste could not pick up the phone and cut through the red tape, it had to go through all the paper work. The added fillip was that Trieste was still considered a special location since it wasn't, at that time, technically a part of Italy. It was still the Free Territory of Trieste, and still had a certain connection with the United Nations. You look

on the maps of that time and it says Free Zone, US Zone, Yugoslav Zone. But that began to pass. Fortunately, and I say fortunately because of the workload that would have been involved, Trieste was not responsible for processing immigrant visas. Immigrant visas were done in Genoa, Naples, and Palermo, is my memory, and what we would do when someone would come and say they wanted to emigrate to the United States was to give them the materials they would need and those materials they would have to send to the appropriate place. Our non-immigrant workload I wouldn't say was excessive, but there were a lot of people in Trieste who by the standards of the time had rather shady backgrounds because Trieste had been annexed by Hitler into greater Germany--Trieste, Croatia, and a part of the Alto Adige.

Q: They annexed Austria and this was formerly part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.

FRY: Exactly. And Trieste was always the main port of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. It was heavily German-speaking. The buildings were built by Germans, and many of the businesses were headed by people with clearly Germanic names. So there were a lot of questions on the denazification issue. Many of these people had come out all right. I might insert that we had a very large CIA contingent in Trieste; it was larger than the State Department by some triple. There were very heavy undercover people who sold insurance, were in shipping and whom I didn't know about at the time but found out years later were an integral part of the network. They had a double net and a lot of the people who worked there were managed from Switzerland, instead of from Rome, because these were the people who were doing the penetration into Yugoslavia. Also there was a team that interrogated people who had fled Yugoslavia and Albania, which was a real black hole at the time for intelligence. The only Albanian speaking Foreign Service officer that I have ever heard of, at least bilingually, was a guy named Steve Peters who had been stationed in Trieste as the deputy consul for several years. They then had Albanian speaking CIA employees or others on contract who, at the San Sabba Refugee Camp, used to interrogate people who had come across the border or who had escaped on small boats and had worked their way across the Adriatic up into the Italian side. Wherever they landed they were sent up to Trieste for preliminary interrogation and then they were sent down to a larger camp outside of Rome.

I had to go to San Sabba sometimes to talk to Albanians who had a claim to American citizenship, who would say that they were born in New York, had a sister in the United States and we had to process through to see if this was true. San Sabba was, incidentally, a place where they used to process salt, so they used to call it the salt mine. It was a beautiful warehouse structure, very thick to keep dampness out and was really kind of a scary place as it looked like a prison though it wasn't built to be a prison.

Q: I find this fascinating. I knew this was taking place but it seemed sort of unreal because at the time I went to Yugoslavia and served in Belgrade for five years, from 1961 to 1967. Here you were treating Yugoslavia as an enemy nation while we were sitting there and we could go anywhere. We really felt that they weren't on our side for practical

reasons but nobody in Yugoslavia from Tito on down had any doubts that the real enemy was the Soviet Union. All their radar pointed east.

FRY: I never had a single problem traveling alone in Yugoslavia. I visited Ljubljana many times. I took former Ljubljana residents, who went with me for protection as they thought I was a white flag, back for the first time since the war. I got to know our people, Bob Barry, a Dartmouth classmate and others, in Zagreb. I always thought Yugoslavia was a wonderful place along the shore. I had traveled there as a student in the summer of 1957 before I went into the army. When I was in Yugoslavia, I was perfectly comfortable; I loved the beaches. The problem, of course, was that for their own propaganda reasons they had to keep the pressure on the border until they were sure that the resolution wasn't going to be something in which they lost territory. The Italians really wanted Istria, which was Italian speaking, and Slovenia; without that Trieste had no food. There is that seventeen mile rocky road, now improved, and no airport until Venice. Trieste was really out on the end of a stick; nothing there.

I would like to say something about George Kennan, then President Kennedy's ambassador to Yugoslavia. One thing that influenced my life quite a bit, the direction of my Foreign Service career certainly, was that as the most junior officer in Trieste I often met Ambassador George Kennan, who would very frequently come by train, particularly in the winter when the weather was bad, from Belgrade to a small station on the Yugoslav side called Sezana. The reason that the train stopped in Sezana was that the Yugoslavs had taken the *Wagon Lit* cars that belonged to companies in western Europe; they didn't pay for them but simply seized them and used them on their train system. Therefore they could not allow those cars to come into the West because they would be seized. Also, the tracks from Trieste had been ripped out, so they couldn't come down even if they wanted to. There was no way, except for one freight line, I think, with a lot of controls to get into Yugoslavia without switching around in Trieste. The upshot was that you didn't have the famed Orient Express anymore. The Orient Express stopped in Trieste. Somebody had to go up, for a VIP or an Ambassador, to Sezana, pick them up and drive them down to Trieste, wait at the train station until their train came in, and see that they were safely on to Milan or Venice, wherever they were going to get an airplane.

When I first met Ambassador Kennan I was scared stiff. I had read his books in college, and he was a towering figure then. He turned out to be, of course, a very delightful human being, a wonderful man, someone for whom I have had the deepest respect all my life. He had his children with him--this was his second family, I believe. His older children were in their late teens or college--I knew a daughter who was about ten or twelve then and a son about seven or eight. His son loved to mess around with me. He would come to the Consulate with me when I went to send the telegram that the Ambassador had arrived, and then take it with me to the Post Office to be sent through the regular commercial system. Then I would go and have soup with the Ambassador at the station and talk with him for a long time.

My first promotion came at the end of my second year in Trieste. I was promoted from FSO-8 to FSO-7. It wasn't high enough to let me become a consul but I was very happy to get another twelve hundred dollars a year. The very first letter of congratulation that I got was from Ambassador and Mrs. Kennan. I have always treasured it. He said, "We know you deserve it and we want to thank you for your many kindnesses and courtesies to our family. We wish you success in your Foreign Service career."

Actually, it was talking with Kennan a number of times that decided me to apply, as my next assignment when I left Trieste, for something dealing directly with the Soviet Union rather than the periphery as we were doing there. So when our inspectors came right at the end of my assignment I found out that I was assigned, on direct transfer, to work in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs on the economic side. We didn't have cones then--cones being the division of labor that the Foreign Service was divided into later, consular, administrative, political, economic. Prior to the cone time you just applied for a job in economics. I had no particular economic background but thought it would be interesting and I would learn on the job. So I went from Trieste directly into the Department in October of 1963 and learned what it was like to work in the State Department. I had never set foot in the Department itself except for a photograph-taking session and a couple of visits to offices to learn what the State Department looked like when we were in the training course at FSI.

My break-in was tragically colored by the assassination of President Kennedy. On that occasion in November of 1963, I was at my desk and literally heard in the hallway the sounds of shouts and screams and running. I had no idea of what was happening and I ran to the door to hear, "Kennedy has been shot." In about twenty minutes that building was simply shut down. People just went to their safes, put all their classified material in, and sat at their desks in complete shock. They didn't know what to do and they just began to drift out of the building. I am sure that people who had jobs where they had to stay, in communications and other places like that, and the higher ranking people, probably stayed. We didn't have television very much in the building in those days so you couldn't go watch it anywhere. I didn't have television as I was still staying in a hotel, so I wandered over to a friend's house who lived nearby and we spent the rest of the day listening to the news and going up to the White House, and standing in Lafayette Park, during the evening.

I mentioned before how much I had been moved by the Inaugural speech. And I guess because I had met him and shaken his hand, I was as caught up in the Camelot myth as much as anyone else and was not assessing Kennedy the way I would assess him now. I was assessing the Cuban missile crisis and other things that had happened, which was all you had to go on at that point in history. I think my shock was as much as anybody else's and maybe personally a little bit more in the sense that I identified my coming to Washington with his call to join the government and roll back the forces of darkness and to join the good fight against communism. I also remember watching the funeral cortege which came right by the State Department. Most of us wept at this sight. The only thing I have ever seen in my life which compared with this true sense of grief of the people who

were watching was, curiously enough, a funeral in Moscow, where all things are staged and everything is kind of stilted and no one shows any emotion. It was the funeral of Yuri Gagarin, the first cosmonaut, the first man in space, who was killed in a flying accident. His funeral was very moving because it was the only time I ever saw in the Soviet Union, then or later, true emotion in the man on the street as his cortege came by. It reminded me then, and still does, of the temper and the sense of feeling while watching Kennedy's cortege come by.

Q: What were you doing in Soviet Affairs? You were there from October of 1963 to June of 1965.

FRY: The principal activity right at the start had to do with Kennedy's decision to sell grain to the Soviet Union. It has become commonplace in recent years for countries to sell to the Soviet Union. It is hard to remember that this was a terribly controversial decision. This was aiding and abetting the very enemy that you said you were going to fight. It was assisting their economy, which led to "a fat Russian is a happy Russian," "you won't erode communism with people being fed, you will erode communism without any bread," right down to very silly things. The right wing launched a tremendous campaign which had a letter writing element, because of which I spent half my time in responding to Congressional inquiries. One which I remember very clearly: the reason that the Soviet Union is buying the grain is so that it can make alcohol which it can use as primers for a special hand grenade they have invented which will be used against NATO forces. Another: the Soviet Union is taking the grain sacks and putting, instead of USA and the handshake symbol, USSR on them and sending them to other countries. No grain to the Soviet Union was shipped in sacks, it was shipped in things like the sterilized tanker *Manhattan* and other bulk cargo grain ships, it was off loaded with suction pumps in Odessa, and so forth and so on. We had to answer all this stuff because there were people who really believed it. That was one of the first things.

The other thing was that I had to process, this was my specific job, all the visa requests for any "Soviet businessman" who was coming to the United States or was coming to confer with the Amtorg Trading Company, which was a US corporation. This was a holdover from the pre-Second World War and Second World War Russian Purchasing Agency in New York that had American employees as well as Russian employees. It was considered a hotbed of spying and industrial espionage. So every time a Russian wanted to come over here and said he was coming on business, I had to call up the businesses, make sure of the exact time of the appointment, etc. It was very time consuming; I might be working on three or four at one time and have to make thirty or forty calls for each one. Then at the end of each week the FBI liaison with the State Department would come in and I would give him all the information so that they could surveil these people. Then we had to get the visa approved and I had to write the waiver request, and so on. So that was another element of the work. For each Russian businessman--and plenty of them weren't businessmen, they were obviously a certain level of espionage, but not the Abels and the spies of fame; these were the journeymen, plumbers coming in to see what they could see in the factories--it took a lot of time.

Other things included working on the air traffic arrangement; Pan American and Aeroflot were chosen to have reciprocal flights between the countries. You remember that we had no American planes flying into the Soviet Union directly when I first started working on Soviet affairs. To have a military flight go in to supply the Embassy was a very big deal and it took a very long time to arrange each and every flight. The end of all this work--and I worked on this all the time that I was on the desk; I was in the group that was meeting with the Russians because it had the economic slant, of course, on the freight and passenger revenue--was that the first flight came through when I was consul in Moscow in the fall of 1967 or spring of 1968. I was at the airport collecting the passports from the pilots after the first Pan Am flight came in. We had other agreements that we were working on--I wasn't involved directly but I would sit in and take notes when I was called upon to do it--and one was the first consular agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. We had Americans in jail, we had Americans who had been arrested for manslaughter, accidents, and so on, without the benefit of a consular agreement. There was no access to prisoners unless the Soviets allowed it. I later benefited from the consular agreement during my time in Moscow; I processed five arrests of Americans, attended trials, hired lawyers for them. I was benefiting at that time at least from the first muscle-flexing of the agreement. Later the agreement was far more effective when the bugs were worked out.

Q: Back to your time when you were on the Soviet desk. What was your impression of the Soviet officials that you had to deal with?

FRY: I dealt with very few Soviet officials directly, except for some junior officers in the Soviet Embassy whom I later found out were usually of the intelligence variety. I met them mainly socially through the encouraging of all junior officers of Embassies to join our International Junior Foreign Service Officers Club in the State Department.

Q: This was a period of, what was it called--JFSOC? This was very much a part of the Kennedy mystique--youth is important. The young Foreign Service Officers had a lot of clout at that time.

FRY: We were encouraged to socialize with other Embassies, but of course the Russians were very suspicious of this as were the Eastern Europeans. We also sponsored and raised money for and did all the administrative work for the Junior Foreign Service Officers' Fourth of July reception which was popular for many years before the eighth floor was rebuilt. We had over a thousand people, including Lyndon Johnson's daughters, two years in a row, who would come to see the fireworks from the balcony of the State Department. I met a couple of Russians that way. Then I did meet some Russians because I had to deal on visa matters and I sometimes had to clarify something about the businessmen who were coming. And so in 1964 and 1965, when I was in Russian language training, I was invited to the Embassy on Soviet National Day. I knew enough people there to be invited. There was very little socializing except in a formal setting. Almost none that I know of. I asked a Russian diplomat to come to a friend's house to watch a Muhammad Ali fight in

the mid-'60s and he very much wanted to come because there would be a lot of junior diplomats there, but in the end he didn't come.

Q: How did they operate?

FRY: They were very, very professional. I had great admiration for their language training and the background that they had received prior to their assignment to the United States. One of the people we dealt with was Georgi Korniyenko. Korniyenko later became one of the highest ranking officials in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and had a very successful career. After the retirement of Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin he was really their top American specialist for many, many years. The reason I knew him and watched him operate was that I was called up fairly frequently to take notes for memoranda of conversation, as one of the junior officers, for such Deputy Assistant Secretaries as Dick Davis, Richard Davies and for William Tyler, who was then Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Sometimes there would be just the two of them and myself, and I would have to do the whole memcon. When I first did it I was very nervous and scared; I read up on how to do it and I practiced and got to be pretty good at it. Then they asked for me because I always went right down and wrote it out in longhand--we had no computers in those days--and gave it to a secretary or typed it myself. They always wanted it quickly to do a telegram to Moscow. I also very often was called to escort the long-time Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin from the diplomatic entrance. He was dean of the Diplomatic Corps when he left. That was how long he had been here. He probably ranks in the top five of all the diplomats that I know anything about, certainly of the ones I have read about. We are talking about a man who was simply superb in his diplomatic role. That is why he was kept in this country for twenty some years, and he had been deputy chief of mission before that.

I got to know Dobrynin well enough so that when I was married in 1965, I was still on the Soviet desk, he heard about it and congratulated me in the elevator. When I was courting my wife, we were walking along the C&O canal up near Great Falls. It turns out that the circle that Russians were allowed to travel in fell just short of Great Falls. I knew it because I had to keep track of my Russian businessmen. Dobrynin was coming up the towpath with his wife beyond the permissible point. He saw us and we stopped and I introduced him to my fiancée and we had a nice chat. I wanted to say, "Mr. Ambassador, you are out of bounds," but I had such deep respect and awe for the man that I couldn't find it in my heart to ever tell anybody about it and I don't think he had a clue. I figured a man the stature of Dobrynin on the tow path was going to be just fine as far as I was concerned.

Q: While you were on the Soviet desk, what were you absorbing from those who were dealing with the Soviet Union as professionals at the time?

FRY: I think that what I was absorbing was that there were two elements you always had to take into account in dealing with the Soviet Union. The first was that you had to follow the shield that the administration wanted to put on its activities. You didn't want to look

like you were coddling communists--there was still a lot of that pressure. On the other hand we were involved in the day to day operations of trying to manage a relationship between two increasingly armed superpowers. You simply could not start each day by saying, "What can I do today to weaken communism?" What you started your day with was, "What can I do to solve this problem? How can we get this eighty-year old Jewish woman out of the Soviet Union for medical treatment that her brother is willing to pay for in New York? How can we get the Bolshoi Ballet out this time more simply, for a tour?" In all of those things it was the human problems, it was the day to day mechanics of managing a relationship.

What I learned from people who were later Chiefs of Mission--Foy Kohler, Spike Dubs who was Ambassador to Afghanistan and was subsequently assassinated, and many other senior officials at that time--was that you don't carry any Cold War emotions or any other personal beliefs into the relationship that you are building on a professional diplomatic level with your counterparts. You do your business, you do it professionally, you don't raise your voice. I heard Richard Harding Davis, then a Deputy Assistant Secretary, call in a Soviet diplomat to complain about a border incident or something in Berlin and give him very harsh words in a very dignified, civilized, soft-spoken voice. He realized, and then I learned, that the tone of your voice with your counterpart over the table has nothing to do with how things come out, or how problems are solved or not solved. What it can do is to arouse human antagonisms which may simply cloud the real issues; you don't want that so you don't do it.

I learned that making your point very clearly, so there is absolutely no doubt on the other side as to precisely why you called them in, was the whole point, and shouting did no good. Also, as in all diplomatic relations, there were those on the military or intelligence side who welcomed confrontations with the Soviet Union. They saw it as an opportunity for their work or for disruption of the system. That was not necessarily compatible with what you were trying to do, not that you would stand in the way of it. So there would be times when reciprocity ruled. If an American's tire was slashed in Moscow, for whatever reason, you can bet that a Soviet tire would be slashed in Arlington, in Bethesda, on 16th Street, or wherever, about a week later. And vice versa. Even if it was a hoodlum with no connection to anybody in America it would wind up with some poor Foreign Service officer having to buy a new Goodyear out in Moscow. So reciprocity was the name of the game and the order of the day. If I allowed a Soviet diplomat a waiver to go to San Francisco to talk with someone there it was only done with the understanding that an American would be allowed to go to a closed area.

The closed areas in the United States and the closed areas in the Soviet Union were monitored very carefully and they were part and parcel of the relationship. It occupied a lot of time. The Soviets actually began their closed areas program, that is areas denied to foreigners for any reason except on a very special waiver, long before we did. We tried to negotiate out of it, but they wouldn't so we just began one. I had a map in my office, and a map at home in case I was called there, and a list of cities that were especially closed--under no circumstances would waivers be granted. I had rings around New York, rings

around Washington, where they couldn't go beyond. If a policeman called the State Department and said, "I arrested this guy for speeding in Chappaqua, New York [sixty-five miles from New York City], what do I do with him?" then we had one on them and they would have to let one of our guys off when they caught him outside the ring in Moscow. It is minutiae like that that actually took up a lot of time on the desk.

Q: Then you went to Russian training, is that right?

FRY: I asked to go to Moscow and as part of that there was Russian language training at the Foreign Service Institute. I had started trying to learn some Russian on my own, to get an idea of the language. I was accepted for assignment to Moscow, to go in June or early July of 1966, so in September 1965--I had been married in the summer of 1965--I was released from the desk and began Russian language training for one year.

Q: So you were taking Russian from 1965 to 1966?

FRY: From the late summer of 1965 to the end of June in 1966 and then went to Moscow immediately afterwards.

Q: You served in Moscow from 1966 through 1968. What was the situation there when you arrived?

FRY: In a curious way, we were allowed to do things then that subsequently we were not allowed to do. I will tell you a quick story. When I went to Europe from New York in the summer of 1966, my wife and I took the *United States*, landed in Le Havre and drove--I had my Ford Fairlane which had been specially built for Russian roads, special springs and so on--through Scandinavia, stopping in Copenhagen, Stockholm and Helsinki, and on to Leningrad where we stayed for three days over Soviet Naval Day. I had a movie camera--I had never signed in at the Embassy, I was going strictly on my visa, the Soviets gave me permission to drive in, the Embassy gave me permission to drive in--and went up along the Neva River and filmed the whole review of the Soviet fleet and the newest cruiser, the head of the Soviet Navy coming across in his launch; I took pictures of the crowd, people waving at me. Then we went to Novgorod, stayed overnight in a hotel there and did all the tourism there. Finally we drove through Kalinin, which might have been a bit closed because it was industrial, had almost no surveillance that I recall, got to the Embassy in Moscow, parked the car and went in and introduced myself and that was the way I started my work. Several years after that our side would never have allowed you to drive a car in and not check in with the Embassy first as they would have feared a provocation or something like that.

In any case, I began work immediately in the consular section and my wife began work, as a contract employee with USIA, in the downstairs cultural section which adjoined the consular section and used the same waiting room. That was where the library was. Mainly Africans students and foreign students came in to use our materials. Very few Russians were allowed in because the militia wouldn't let them pass the gate.

The embassy situation was very correct but you were very much aware of the heavy hand--the militia outside the Embassy, the concern that your Russian nationals were working both sides as they probably had to. On the other hand, the professionalism of the consular staff, that is the Russians--they were all women, there were four and later five when I was there, headed by a woman named Mary Litvenienko, famous to a whole generation of Foreign Service Officers--was excellent and so cooperative and helpful. We weren't handling anything in the consular section that was particularly sensitive, so the working environment with our Russian colleagues was excellent. I became devoted to them, and showed them movies when the Embassy was closed on Wednesday afternoon. They never came to my house, but when I left they gave me a little chit on a commission store, which is like our second-hand store, and said, "Go there and give this to the woman." That is all they told me. When I went there I was given a beautiful samovar that they had arranged to give me which I still have.

Also, at that time we were experiencing a rather sharp increase in the number of American tourists that were allowed to come in. For the first time Americans were allowed to drive into the Soviet Union from Finland--which I was allowed to do as a diplomat--and from Poland through Minsk and down into Moscow, and I think they could drive from the crossing in Czechoslovakia--later closed after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia--through Kiev and on to Moscow. So there was an increase in tourism. Eventually the Pan-Am flights started and American tour companies began to sell more and more tours. What this meant was a lot more work for the consular section. It also meant that the Russians had to begin to realize that you cannot allow tourism and then treat tourists like prisoners. You can herd them around with Intourist but there are people who are going to want to photograph a bridge or a cathedral in the center of town. To have militiamen come up and want to snatch the camera for photographing a bridge that is on a postal card being sold in the Soviet stores is ridiculous. We had to keep reminding them that they were in the big time now and if they wanted tourists they were going to have to be responsible for providing the tourists with the tour they had paid for. We would get all kinds of complaints in the consular section about rooms that didn't look out on the Kremlin and "what are you going to do about it," a lot of aggravations because we had to treat those complaints seriously or tourists would report us to their Congress person.

But on the serious side we also began to get elderly American citizens who were returning to see relatives in the Soviet Union that they hadn't seen since the '30s or the post-war period, and they died. Or those who were on tour ships, like the Moore-McCormick Line that came into Leningrad and later Odessa, who simply had a heart attack while they were on Soviet soil on tours. That required us to do all of the Foreign Service things regarding death of US citizens abroad, to arrange for shipment of the remains to the family, consular report of death, etc. A lot of things began during my first watch in the Soviet Union that we simply hadn't been doing before.

Another thing was that American tourists, not diplomats, were allowed to fly into the Soviet Union from Afghanistan--from Kabul to Tashkent in Uzbekistan--and then continue on a Soviet domestic flight, which was about a tenth the price of a direct international flight to Scandinavia. They were booked from Kabul, say, to Stockholm via a domestic flight. What happened was that a few Americans thought that when they entered the Soviet Union they were just going to transfer to another flight, then they would fly up to Leningrad and transfer to another flight and go out to Helsinki. The first one, in the fall of 1966, brought in hashish taped to his body; I won't say that he was an addict but he later told me that he had made more than fifty LSD trips in college in the mid-'60s and he was pretty messed up. He had also brought in hashish in a suitcase that had a false bottom which we subsequently found out was provided to him by a KGB informer in Kabul. The KGB has primary jurisdiction at ports of entry so it meant that the minute the arrest was made at the airport we were dealing with the KGB. We were not dealing with the KGB part that sent espionage agents abroad, it was the domestic counter-intelligence and border guards. But in any case, you were dealing directly with the KGB. On the first arrest I went down to Tashkent and was able to talk with the gentleman. I went alone, incidentally, and that was the first time in the Embassy's memory, I won't say ever but certainly in a long time, that an officer had gone out alone some 4,000 miles from the Embassy.

Over all the time I was there I had four arrests in Tashkent; I went to Tashkent eight or ten times round trip and I had a lot of surveillance but no harassment. The KGB was very correct; sometimes I had to wait three days for an interview and it made me pretty angry to sit around. But then I walked around the city and got to know it better and began to do some reporting on what I saw, so it turned out to be pretty valuable. I was also buying local newspapers; when you were out of Moscow you bought up all the local newspapers you could and took them with you. Usually the Russians let you do that. One time they stole them from my hotel room because I had been down there more than a week and they finally decided I was getting too much consecutive information rather than one or two papers. They claimed that the cleaning woman took them. I said get them back and they said that it wasn't possible. Then I saw the non-velvet hand of the KGB stepping in to remind me that I was alone down there and had better behave like a good consular officer instead of a showboat getting all the local literature. I did manage to buy some books that we hadn't been able to get and they let me get those. I guess they didn't realize what I was doing. I had to take my notes with me, notes that I took at the trial: since I was writing more than was said at the trial I had to carry those with me. Because it was very hot down there, my wife helped me fabricate a case which was plastic so the papers wouldn't get wet but was cloth on the outside. I would fold that in half and tuck that into my shirt so that I always had that with me. I don't know if they knew that. So I went to Tashkent for those trials.

The first person was released in November of 1967 on the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet Union. For two subsequent arrests, both gentlemen in question went to prison. They got three to five years at Potma, which was in the R.S.F.S.R. southwest of Moscow, where foreigners were kept. It was a minimum regime labor camp where you made gloves

and chessmen and things like that. One of the guys was actually a deserter from the Vietnam draft from Ford Ord, California. He wanted, for his defense, to throw himself on the mercy of the court because he refused to fight against the Vietnamese. I argued against this and his lawyer also thought this was not a good idea. I had hired a lawyer for him who was a member of the Jewish community in Tashkent and whose family had lived there for hundreds of years--there is a big Jewish community down there, including a synagogue. Well the guy wanted this defense and did throw himself on the mercy of the court. What he forgot, and what I had warned him of in the few moments when I was alone with him, was that Russians don't like disloyal citizens, draft dodgers, and deserters. He got three to five years at Potma.

I might say, as to the Soviet system of law, that I first saw it as a complete aberration of law and order. But later on, in curious ways, I came to respect the system in this sense: the preliminary investigation conducted by Soviet authorities is extremely thorough. It encompasses the crime and the person's past; recidivism, the recommitting of a crime, is very serious under Soviet law. Soviet law is surprisingly lenient, or was, in many first cases, in particular with young people. The second time you are caught it is very, very hard on you. You almost always get a medium regime, or hard regime, labor camp, or even prison. Labor camps aren't considered prisons. This young man, the deserter, had a very clean record; the Soviets knew that I had documents showing what a fine young man he was and who went astray just this one time. Whether it was true or not, the documents were introduced into court. But he kept playing on the idea that he could have been fighting in Vietnam but instead was for peace. I tried to tell him that this was not necessarily a good defense in the Soviet Union because the Soviet authorities, and in general the Soviet people, do not respect persons who will not do their military obligations. It is a very serious offense in the Soviet Union, a long penal sentence.

I did not see that this defense would play as well as he was expecting it to and indeed it did not. Basically, there is a judge and two lay assessors, who are factory people put into white shirts for the day, but the judge makes the decision. After the American had a chance to testify and his lawyer appealed for him, the prosecutor asked for five years. The judge sentenced him to three to five years. The judge concentrated on the fact that he had entered the Soviet Union with the drugs, that he would have had an opportunity to try and sell them in the Soviet Union, and even if it was not in the Soviet Union he was going to take them to another country where he would condemn people to a life of using drugs. The Russians were very, very strict and very much law and order both on their own people and on foreigners in the matter of drugs. This was long before it was fashionable in the US to be so hard on port of entry drugs; we were strict but not anything like it became later.

The Russians were very hard on these people. He went to prison, and two others that I handled all served their time. One, who was an Hispanic-American, opted hard-line, that is wouldn't cooperate and took a Buddhist stance and refused to help his defense attorney; he went into a silence strike when he was sentenced to prison. Finally the Russians got tough with him and put him into a medium regime part of the camp where he had to work

pretty hard. The end product was that instead of getting out in three years they made him stay four. That proved to me that the best thing you could do once you were in their hands was to cooperate in every way, because you weren't going to make your point in a totalitarian system by pretending that you were tougher than the camp guards. The final case I was working on as my esteemed colleague Robert Barry, who later became Ambassador to Bulgaria, and Indonesia, and many high level stops along the way, came to replace me. The outcome of that trial was Potma, also.

One of the saddest cases I had was a person not in good health; he was a drug user, had been working in Spain, owned a bar there, was married to a British woman, one thing and another. He got all involved in stolen cars, driving them to the Middle East, and had decided finally to make a killing on the hashish. He went to the same store, got a false bottom suitcase--the same store that supplied the first American with a false bottomed suitcase--and when he walked into that airport they had dogs, photographs, the works. He also had a vest, which was *de rigueur* for smugglers in those days, lined with flat pressed hashish. Never was a person nabbed and nailed so cleanly. They had a movie of undressing him while he was standing there with a shocked expression, peeling all this stuff back with the dogs going crazy. Anyway he was not in such good health and the upshot of this was that he went into the labor camp--this was before prisoners were brought up to Moscow where we could see them and offer them medicines in the program that the State Department introduced into the consular system to make sure right at the start that there were no medical problems--with a vitamin E deficiency. He lost most of his hair, a lot of his teeth, and his skin was bad. When he finally was released, he got three to five years but I think they let him out a little early because the Russians were getting worried, my colleagues saw him at the airport on his exit flight and he looked like an old man and he was only in his early '30s. This was the down side of messing with Soviet authorities. Even if you tried to cooperate you were still in a labor camp far, far away from, in those days, any direct Embassy support or moral support; you just didn't see anybody for a long time that you could talk to. Plus, the camps were very dangerous.

There was the case of Newcomb Mott. As I was preparing for the Soviet Union, a young American illegally but inadvertently used a small border crossing in north Norway that was only for Norwegians. He was tried in Murmansk and was sentenced to the Gulag, I forget for how long, for illegal border illegal crossing, another KGB operation. This was in the spring of 1966. The Soviets said that Newcomb Mott committed suicide. We say that he was murdered, probably by other prisoners who were on the train who were hard core criminals and really tough. They probably killed him for his watch and whatever else he had on him. An autopsy quite a bit later did find what was compatible with a stab wound, among other things; he was beaten and was probably strangled.

This was a very serious game in the Soviet Union with regard to Americans who were arrested and we took it very seriously. I traveled about sixty thousand miles alone in the Soviet Union; to Odessa, Kishinev, Minsk, Kiev, Leningrad where two young Americans were arrested. They had just been released from the Army. This was in the fall of 1966 shortly after I arrived. They did some black marketing and also stole a bronze bear from

the *Europa* hotel in Leningrad. They were charged with all kinds of things. What was interesting about their trial was that the Russians allowed the Intourist guides (women) who had helped them along on their trip, and served as interpreters, to testify at the trial. The prosecutor showed the notes that the women had taken about the behavior of the men before they committed their crime and it was a real eye opener--why the Soviets did it I didn't understand at the time--to see the detailed reports that were made on each and every tourist the women were with. How they joked about their own country, whether they appeared loyal to the United States, etc. In other words, they were being set up as possible co-optees if later on they professed a love for the Soviet Union and didn't like the American military. What was bad about these two arrests was that one of the Americans had been a pilot of a prop plane that used to fly along the East German-Czech border on patrols and he kept part of his flight book with him. He had violated US Army regulations, US regulations, everything; plus, it was just dumb.

Even more interesting about this case was that the Soviet Union, for the first time ever, allowed what we would call bail for one of the young men. His father came over and the son was allowed to come down to Moscow on \$10,000 bail. It wasn't a bond. They had to send \$10,000 to Soviet authorities which was put in a dollar account until the disposition of the trial. The other, the military pilot, was not allowed to leave his cell so the consul, Harlan Moen, and I had to go and visit him in his cell a number of times. Both Americans were tried and both of them were found guilty, but both were released with heavy fines. Wouldn't you know that the fine for the one was the \$10,000 that was already on record. The other one I think was \$15,000. I was thinking today that one of the two young men came from Arkansas, and I wonder if he is still down there and voted for Governor Clinton.

We were talking before about businesslike relations as opposed to the Cold War hysteria. My message from those trials was that the Russians were telling us to tell our tourists to be very careful, and to obey Soviet laws whatever they thought of them. That is why they let us see and hear what the Intourist women had recorded. They didn't do this by chance; they wanted us to know that they were following people very carefully. So we put into our brochure, "You don't joke about the Soviet system. You can discuss your country honestly, you can be a normal American. In the Soviet Union you do not take souvenirs from your hotel room, you do not take towels, you do not take bronze bears that turn out to be by a famous sculptor. You toe the mark, however painful it might be. The Soviets do not look on these things as shenanigans; it is hooliganism and its a crime and you may be arrested." You didn't want to scare the bejesus out of people who were coming in to have a nice tour and most of the people were no problem. On the other hand when you started getting younger people coming over on language exchange programs you really had to give them a hard briefing.

Q: It was also a period of student rebellion which in an earlier time--and maybe even now--would not have been accepted. In those days young men, up to their early '30s, could get away with a lot more in the States and maybe Western Europe.

FRY: By 1968 the greening of America was well under way. The Tet offensive had passed in Vietnam and things were very difficult on the campuses of the United States. What we had to tell people was that Soviet law applied to them while they were in the Soviet Union, and in the Soviet Union you do not get on a street corner and start preaching about democracy. We used to use the old joke--to soften the pill about behavior patterns there--of the Soviet who was arguing with an American and the American said, "Anytime I want I can get on a street corner and denounce Lyndon Johnson as a fool." The Russian said, "We have the same freedoms here; anytime I want I can get on a street corner and denounce Lyndon Johnson and call him a fool." They got the point very quickly about what that meant. There were Americans who came through Russia who had deserted from I think either the *Wasp* or the *Enterprise* from Sasebo or Yokohama, Japan. There were five sailors--a famous case--who deserted and went on Soviet television and were later popping around Sweden and over the years have gone home. We did have a lot of deserters who tried to convince the Soviets that they wanted to live in the Soviet Union and didn't want to serve in the American army. Curiously enough, in many cases, the Soviets just put them across the border into Finland. They didn't want any part of this unless they were going to be really valuable. Although once they put the Americans on television, I don't recall that they ever did that again. These were just young sailors and I have forgotten all the circumstances of why they had gotten in trouble on the ship and finally deserted.

We had an Embassy program where every night one language officer would follow television from when it went on to when it went off. Since there was only one channel it wasn't hard. You monitored everything and had it written up in the morning, dictated it to your secretary, or whatever, and that was on the Ambassador's, DCM's, and others', desks by nine or ten in the morning. We often picked up things on the Soviet news about Americans who had come to the Soviet Union that we didn't know anything about. We would go to the Foreign Ministry and ask to talk to the person to be sure he was there under his own free will.

Sometimes the Americans were willing to meet with us and sometimes they were not. There were a number of cases like that. I don't know what the disposition of the cases were, I can tell you that most Americans who had lived in the Soviet Union for very long, who had gone there with the idea that they would be some kind of hero for denouncing the war in Vietnam, very soon found out what the reality of life was like there. Once the show was over and the television lights were off it wasn't very pleasant. Most of them were not allowed to stay in Moscow, they went off to smaller towns. I think all of them left at some point and the Russians let them go; once their propagandist value was used they were simply a drain on the Soviet economy.

I would like to mention one other incident in Moscow that moved me a great deal. It was the kind of thing that happens that for just a fleeting moment took the hard mask off the Cold War and gave a glimmer of hope that underneath the Soviet tyranny was the Russia that we are perhaps seeing a bit more of today. There was first the Soviet shock after the assassination of Martin Luther King. Since this followed President Kennedy's

assassination by a very few years there was the feeling that the United States was in serious trouble. Not just trouble because we were bogged down in Vietnam, but, just as we later saw in the Soviet Union, they began to say that American society was beginning to disintegrate. They were looking at the worst that you could.

I had television duty in Moscow the night after Martin Luther King was assassinated. I will tell you what the Soviets had on their television. They took all the television coverage of the riots in Washington, DC, and they shortened them so what you got was a tape running all the worst case scenes in about a three minute clip. So what I saw when the television came on was, with the announcer saying almost nothing. There was the Memorial Bridge with the cars backed up and a car burning so that there was smoke there, a machine gun emplacement on the steps of the Capitol with sandbags, tremendous smoke pouring out on H Street, solid smoke and fire, pillaging, National Guard at camps in Stanton Park and Lincoln Park on Capitol Hill, and the Mall with armored cars and men armed with automatic weapons who were marching towards and ringing Union Station. All of this was shown on Russian television. I was stunned. I stopped writing. At that time we did not have a taping facility in our homes--I don't know whether the surveillance people in our Embassy were taping this. I wrote it all up and we sent in a telegram immediately. I was not only stunned by what was happening in the United States but by the Martin Luther King assassination itself. That was the Martin Luther King assassination. Subsequently Robert Kennedy was assassinated.

Q: This was in June of 1968 wasn't it?

FRY: Yes, near the end of my time. When he was assassinated that was it. John F. Kennedy was, for all kinds of weird, psychological reasons, revered in the Soviet Union for his American University speech in 1962 or 1963. It was the first presidential speech which sought to reverse the tide of Cold War polemics and attempted to stake out new ground.

Q: I think it was early 1963. It was the summer before he was assassinated.

FRY: That's right, it was after the Cuban missile crisis. In any case, there was a sense of good feeling, that things could change. The Bay of Pigs was over with the attempted invasion of Cuba by dissidents. The one gift that Soviets prized more than anything and that I gave, rarely, to Russians who had been helpful on my consular trips, was a Kennedy half dollar. I cannot tell you the effect that this had on people.

Q: I was in Yugoslavia and this was a very important gift there too.

FRY: Yes, it was really a very moving thing to see their response. I gave it once to a doctor who had treated an American in a car accident way out in the Ukraine. It was a closed area and I was allowed to go there. He died and his wife was injured and we brought her back to Moscow. I went there with the Embassy doctor; it was near Poltava. I

gave the doctor a Kennedy half dollar and he was really moved; I won't say teary, but he couldn't thank me enough.

When Robert Kennedy was assassinated it was more than anyone could think about. We thought we should do something here, the flag went to half mast, of course. The Ambassador, then Llewellyn Thompson, said it would be appropriate to have a sign-in book, or else we got something from the State Department that said if you wanted to do it it would be appropriate. So we got a big book for people to sign and in the lobby of Spaso House, the Ambassador's Residence, we set up a table and got a black cloth for it. I found in the library a *Look* magazine which had a picture of Bobby on the cover. We cut it out and framed it and put that over the book for it. I think we had some Bach or dirge or quiet-type music, which is very typically Soviet. Whenever a prominent Soviet citizen dies the radios immediately go onto dirges. I was given the first assignment to stand by the book and greet people as they came in. The idea was to put out someone who was on the country team, as I was as a section chief, but not someone really high ranking like the head of the political section. Everybody thought that nobody would come at the beginning and then the Foreign Ministry would say who was coming over from the Foreign Ministry, if anyone, and then the Ambassador might be there. I think we opened the book somewhere around ten in the morning a. We had sent around a diplomatic note the day before saying that the book would be open for signatures.

The doors had not opened before the cars started pulling up. In the first car was an official whose name I do not recall but he would be the equivalent of the Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs in our State Department. That was starting up pretty high; the next one was a Soviet military official, then the Ambassador of Peru, or wherever. Suddenly Ambassadors' cars with the flags flying appeared, another high ranking military officer, and so on. They were coming through and there was no one in the House to speak of except myself and a Chinese servant who had worked there since the forties and was a fixture around Spaso House.

I felt I couldn't leave him there and run to the phone, but then Georgi Korniyenko, the head of American Affairs at the Foreign Ministry came in, and by this time we were already on the third or fourth page of the book. Every visitor was so deeply solemn, so apparently shocked, and with the dirge music, I was close to tears myself. I just had to run to a phone. I told them what was happening and all hell broke loose. The political counselor came right down and I guess I was relieved of command. But the thing that struck me was that with the Russian political hierarchy there was no sense of "you see that your country is falling apart," "you see what happens when you get into Vietnam." Nothing like that, I can only describe it as profound shock. Now they were really getting worried that something was deeply amiss and deeply afoot in the United States that might ultimately affect how the United States was looking at the Cold War. In particular, they held to the conspiracy theory of President Kennedy's death. The assassination of his brother, who was then running for President of the United States, more or less confirmed their view of something of much greater import. In their own country that would be the way it was since there was no way for orderly change to take place. So they just saw this

as some massive kind of plot. I think they were so concerned about this that it actually showed and was why they wanted to appear on the scene immediately. It was their message that this had graver implications in their mind than just the death of the man who was running for president.

Q: I think we had reached a modus vivendi and it looked like there were hidden forces. Actually this one was probably an off-shoot of the Palestinian problem, but to somebody outside of the system...Even in the United States it was...

FRY: Certainly, and until very recently we tended to filter many world events through the prism of US-USSR relations. Whether they were appropriately placed or not that was where they got imprisoned.

Q: What was your impression, at this particular period of time, of the morale, the caliber, the outlook of the Embassy staff and the leadership of Llewellyn Thompson?

FRY: I think over all the morale was very high in the officer corps. There were spouses whose morale was low because they had not had an opportunity to really learn Russian, or in some cases even to study Russian. They seldom left the compound, they did not share in the excitement of the work in the same way that someone who was at a desk everyday did, they were not reading the classified messages to know what was really going on behind the scenes, and they were under surveillance and their homes were being bugged by electronic devices. But over all, I would say, morale was the kind of morale you get among professionals who consider themselves sort of an elite. We were the shock troops on the farthest reaches of the ramparts of the Cold War. You couldn't get any more into the heartland than being in Moscow since at that time there were no other posts open in the Soviet Union. When we walked into the Soviet stores, when we walked down the streets, we were both in a fascinating country with a long history and in the camp of the enemy. And the enemy was never far away. The surveillance was heavy; the electronic surveillance was just assumed, in your automobile if not always in your home, and in restaurants where you went and hotels where you stayed when you were traveling. There was that constant sense of--we didn't really use the term 'big brother' so much, although the term was used in the public a lot from the Orwell novel--"big brother is watching you."

I think my own personal morale, and my wife's as well, was very high. For one thing, we took vacations in the Soviet Union. We also spent three days in Odessa touring and meeting the first US passenger ship, and three days in Vladimir simply touring. We went through the Intourist program, though we could do some things on our own. My Russian was getting good at this point on getting around and I felt pretty comfortable talking to people on a one-time conversation basis. I used to pick up some interesting, not earth shaking, information on how life was going there. I think all of us who could travel, as part of our jobs, loved it. That was a real sense of being on the front lines, you might say, and of gleaning whatever information you could.

I remember going into a courtroom in Tashkent about a half-hour earlier than I was supposed to--by this time they were so used to seeing me that they didn't pay any attention to me anymore--and I sat in on a trial that was absolutely fascinating and which they probably wouldn't have let me hear if they had thought about it. There was a dentist in Tashkent who was shaving gold that he was supposed to put into fillings. He had stolen gold--it was some kind of gold scam--and there were people who had been arrested who had been helping him. One guy who was helping him in this gold scam had already been drafted, his head had been shaved and he was already doing time in the military system. Now he was getting slammed by the civilian court. I wrote all this up. It was the first time I had been to a real criminal trial with real political overtones.

The interesting part was that they were all Russians but they were scamming the Uzbeks, they were shaving the gold out of the Uzbek mouths not the Russian mouths. There was a lot of hard feelings against the Russians that I picked up by talking with the Uzbeks while walking around the street. This was because there was an earthquake in Tashkent a few years previously and the Russians had rebuilt their part of the city but the Uzbek part still looked like hell, and you could see the fault line through the city.

The Uzbeks were very bitter about this. I remember one guy, I was buying papers from him in the underground that went under the main street, and he said to me, "I am really curious about you." Now he is speaking his second or third-hand Russian, he probably had a dialect before Uzbek, and I was speaking my Russian which he could tell was foreign. "I think I finally know who you are." I was absolutely amazed. "I talked about it with my friends," and he looked around at some people there, "you are very tall [because I am over 6'5"] so you can't be one of them [meaning Russians] but you are very dark, so now we know. You are Lithuanian, aren't you?" I said, and I was always very honest with people because I never knew when I was looking at a setup or a provocation, "No, I am an American, a United States citizen." And I always told people I lived in New York City because that is the one city in America that they know; I told him I was born in New York. I want to tell you, they never stopped talking about that and from then on every time I would come around their shops in the underground they would salute me and say, "American." They would stand up. They thought it was great that an American was down there. I'll never forget that statement, "You're tall and dark so you're not one of them."

Q: What about Llewellyn Thompson and how he ran the Embassy and how he dealt with things from your perspective?

FRY: When I first was on the Soviet desk and studying Russian, Foy Kohler was the Ambassador. Ambassador Thompson had been brought back to the United States in 1962 and was President Kennedy's advisor. He gave him that wonderful advice in the Cuban missile crisis when the President had received two letters from Khrushchev. He said, "What you do is don't pay any attention to the second one. Just pretend like you didn't get it." That seems to have been one of the factors in breaking the problem down to a manageable solution. He was considered a very good advisor and his office was in the State Department. I used to take Memoranda of Conversations for him and had gotten to

know him a bit. He knew that I was going to go out there. He was a great gentleman, soft spoken, kind. I was very concerned about his chain smoking. He was one of the few people I have known who simply never had a cigarette out of his mouth or his hand. I mention that because as you know he died of lung and throat cancer.

Q: 1964 was the year when the famous Surgeon General's report came out.

FRY: That's right. The Ambassador then in Moscow was Foy Kohler; he had been there since late 1962. I had also met him in Washington. All those Ambassadors took a great interest in the junior officers coming out because they knew that the junior officers were the real backbone of a lot of the work, particularly in the consular office where we were all basically junior officers, FSO-fives or lower. I was a six by that time and then I was promoted to five while I was there to be consul. They paid attention to what you said and gave you advice. Ambassador Thompson, for example, was interested in the fact--more than just saying, "Oh,"--that my first post had been Trieste. I said, "Of course, your name is so well known there." I didn't say revered, but the Italians were damn glad that he pulled their chestnuts out of the fire in the Trieste agreement. Thompson was very pleased at that.

When I went to Moscow, Foy Kohler was there. The very first week Foy Kohler and Phyllis Kohler had my wife and me and all the new officers who had just arrived, over to the residence. Now sure, Ambassadors do this all the time. We had a very nice long chat. Then three weeks or so after I had started working in the consular section, I looked out into the waiting room and there was Foy Kohler talking to my wife. She took him into the library and showed him some things they were doing and then he walked across to the consular section. The Russian employees practically fainted; they said, "He rarely comes down here; this is just amazing." He came in and we showed him a few things in the consular section. He joked that the consul's office was actually bigger in square footage than the cramped Ambassador's office up on the seventh floor where it was all under surveillance with Marine Guards. We didn't have Marines downstairs since we had Russians working with us and a lot of Russians in the waiting room. He did make the effort to come down and see you in your job. It did wonders for your morale, and at staff meetings he always went around and listened equally to each officer and gave you the impression that he was interested. If you wrote a telegram or an airgram that he thought was good he might even mention it. He would see you upstairs and say, "That was a nice piece on the (such and such)," or, "Your trip report on Kishinev to see that dying American was quite nice; that will save the State Department from any questions from the family as to what actually happened."

As it turned out, Foy Kohler went back to be, I believe, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Llewellyn Thompson came back out as Ambassador. He was there at the time that I left and gave me a signed photograph. We got to know him; my wife was a very lovely and charming person, good natured and a good morale builder, and he appreciated that in the Embassy. So I think in that sense he was a very good morale builder. I also think that some of the senior officers were pretty hard task masters because

they didn't want you to start feeling sorry for yourself because you got harassed by somebody in the street or were the subject of a provocation or your wife was unhappy. But at the same time you learned so much about speed drafting and speed reading, particularly the guys in the political section, for example. The pressure was always on, and it was a very high pressure Embassy.

But I learned something then that I found discussed in the management courses that I took later on in my Foreign Service career: there is no such thing as a stressful job. There are only people who are stressed. (This doesn't really help you much if you are stressed.) But what I found was that if you break your job down into what is precisely the most important thing that has to move at that moment--that was my Foreign Service lesson there--that is when a lot of the stress goes away. Although you might have to come in on a weekend or a night, the principal fact or information that Washington needed to know had gone, and in a high stress for information flow post that is what you did. It sharpened my priorities which kept me in good stead for the rest of my career because I knew the tendency was to do the easy part first and then ponder how to do the hard part. That was doing it exactly the wrong way when we were on the ramparts out there. Washington wanted it, wanted it fast, and didn't want any excuses when that Assistant Secretary sat down at his desk--and we had that eight-hour turnaround so sometimes it was a little hard; they were going home to sleep when our day was starting. That is why people stayed after hours and just got those telegrams out. There were superb language officers like William Brown, who was Ambassador to Thailand and Israel, and many other language officers who become Chiefs of Mission; Allen Davis, Bill Price, Norm Anderson, Bill Dyess, Bob Barry, Bill Farrand, Tom Niles. There was a very solid corps of officers; not a turkey among them as we used to say.

Q: Today is the 24th of October, 1995 so we just finished a two year gap in this. Let's move to Oslo where you were from 1968 to 1971. What was your job there?

FRY: My job was the second American in the economic section. There was also a commercial counselor and three or four local employees because America had a surprising then - and I guess still now - amount of trade. At the time I arrived in 1968, the ferment on the economic scene in Norway was the oil picture. The test well drilling in the North Sea had been going on for several years. In 1969 a field being tested by Phillips Petroleum called Echo Fisk, way out in the North Sea in the Norwegian sector, brought in oil that was so pure that we could bring it into the embassy as part of a demonstration and put a match to it and it would burn like whale oil. The scientists told us that in certain kinds of cars that were not too fancy you could put this oil in directly.

So it was a very, very high quality oil. And that really set the tone for the work that I was doing there from 1969 to 1971. My specific jobs were, I guess, the usual thing for a mid-career officer in economic work. I was given certain sectors of the economy which were actually the important sectors: shipping and timber. Shipping was for Norway a very important sector of the economy, with Norway having one of the largest merchant fleets in the world. And a very closed shop: most of those companies were owned individually

or had a few shares and were very tightly held in Scandinavia, and Norway. It was awhile before this young Foreign Service officer was able to gain their confidence. I was the control officer several times for Helen Bentley, who was at that time the head of the Maritime Commission, and who used to come over to Norway to compare notes on legislation that was pending in the United States, and meet with all Norwegians in the shipping field. My memoranda of conversation took days to collate and prepare. Bentley later became a congresswoman.

Over time I think I got the ability to call a major shipowner and simply say I have a question which has been posed to me, or our Department of Commerce has a question and could I come in and talk to someone. Surprisingly enough it was usually the owner. It wasn't a matter of being foisted off.

There were interesting sidelights. For example, we had a Vice-Presidential visit by lame duck Vice-President Hubert Humphrey in 1969. Hubert Humphrey's mother was from Norway and he had wanted to come over for a long time. He may have been there privately but he came to the funeral of Trygve Lie who was the first Secretary General of the United Nations. It was quite a funeral to say the least. That was the first time that I had the opportunity to be a control officer for a delegation which included President Truman's daughter, Margaret Truman, and other dignitaries. But since it was not politically oriented, it was more or less - to the extent a funeral can be - a fun opportunity, it taught me a lot about dealing with people who traveled on official visits for the United States Government at that rank. There were many, many official visitors to Norway. In the area of NATO, for example, they usually wanted an economic briefing and I usually did those. So I got to know a lot of the people who were dealing in NATO political-military affairs, which I must say later on, when I was stationed in the Operations Center, helped me quite a bit in knowing important players.

There was another sidelight which was fascinating. Most people associate the Nobel Prize with Sweden and rightly so since all but the Peace Prize are decided by a committee of the Swedish Parliament, and the awards are made by the King of Sweden in Stockholm. The Peace Prize is decided by a Norwegian parliamentary committee and the presentation is made in Oslo by a member of parliament. It's a prerogative that they esteem very highly and the Nobel Peace Prize, as you can imagine, is one of the heavy weight awards of all time.

In 1970, the award was given to Norman Borlaug, who was then - is now, the father of the green revolution. Working through the Rockefeller Institute, particularly in Mexico and other places in the world, he was able to create yields of rice and corn and other crops which, given the same area of space and climatic conditions, would be able to yield three or four or times as much as the previous crops had been yielding. He brought with him not only his family and friends, and the President of the University of Minnesota - because he was a Minnesotan - but he brought from Mexico the field hands: that is the Spanish-speaking men who had labored for years with him - to the wonderful white tie formal dinner where the workers were rather simply dressed. It was very moving to see

his loyalty to them as he pointed out at the dinner that it would have been very difficult for him to achieve success without the dedication over many, many years of the people who actually labored in the fields.

So that was a very nice touch. I was interested to see recently that the Peace Prize is now in the range of a million dollars. I think Doctor Borlaug, if my memory serves me, got \$185,000 which will give you an idea of inflation between 1970 and the 1990s. There were other Americans who came on the Peace Prize. The previous one I think I had been Martin Luther King. The International Labor Organization won the Peace Prize and at that time the director was an American so he represented the ILO at that meeting. Also, Ralph Bunche, who was at that time retired, or was at least Emeritus at the UN and a very distinguished American in his own right who had himself won the Peace Prize for his work in the 1940s in Palestine, was a visitor. We were able to entertain him and work with him on some of the things that he wanted to do there. So all in all it was a busy place. Governor Hickel of Alaska was then head of the Interior Department and he came to Norway. He was very interested in the northern countries because of their relationship with Alaska.

Q: Your ambassador during that time was...

FRY: The ambassador when I went to Norway was Margaret Joy Tibbetts, who was one of the first career women Foreign Service officers to be appointed chief of mission. She was a superb manager, and I often reflect on the fact that my colleague Rozanne Ridgway, who was then the number two in the political section, must have learned a lot from her because next to Ambassador Tibbetts I would say Ambassador Ridgway was without doubt the best manager and the best leader that I ever worked with in the Foreign Service. I think of them in the same breath because they were of the same mold.

Tibbetts left about six or eight months after I got there and the next ambassador we waited for with some trepidation, I guess. He was a political appointee named Phillip Kingsland Crowe. He was 100 percent political and very proud of it. He had been Ambassador to South Africa, and Ceylon, now Sri Lanka. He was a good friend of Secretary Dulles and so on. His wife was the heir to US Shoe, a vast manufacturer of many products and headquartered in Saint Louis. He used to laugh that every time there was an election, or Senator Fulbright was running, or however the land lay in the election period, his wife who was a democrat, and he used to split their donations. So he used to joke that when he went into the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for his ambassadorial hearings it used to be, "Hi Phil. When are you leaving?"

As a matter of fact he turned out to be a fascinating person, a very decent human being. His main interest was in world wildlife. He was a founder of the World Wildlife Fund with Prince Phillip and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands. He had been a big game hunter and the whole nine yards when it came to killing animals and then he realized worldwide what was happening and wrote a book called The Empty Ark and got very much involved in wildlife rehabilitation and rescue.

I sometimes wonder if my own interest in wildlife and work which I have done since leaving the Foreign Service was not at least spurred by Crowe.

I was the only guy in the embassy at that time who had a boat. I had a 28' inboard diesel fishing boat and he loved to go out and take photographs. The first day he was there he asked, "who has a boat" and they said, "Well, Fry has a boat" and they said take the ambassador out on the weekend. So my wife and I did so and became quite good friends with him. I was concerned that people would wonder why he did so on the first day when he didn't know anybody else in the embassy. At the first staff meeting, he was calling me Sam. I traveled with him a great deal. One of the great experiences of my life was in 1970, not too long after his arrival; about a year.

We decided to show the flag in the Norwegian Island of Svalbard, sometimes called Spitsbergen, which since 1925 was under international treaty but under Norwegian sovereignty. A number of nations are equal signatories to the Svalbard Treaty, which mainly concerned demilitarization of the first and only area in the northern hemisphere, and which remained so all during the Cold War. During World War II there was a breach with a small German party that tried to set up, as they tried to do in Greenland, a weather station. They didn't send troops or try to occupy it, but it did lead to a British commando raid with loss of life. But with that exception all during the Cold War, which I'll mention a bit more later, it was a demilitarized zone. Norway turned it into a peaceable kingdom. Hunting was restricted and only once did they get into the business of allowing some test well to be drilled for oil. Oil turned out to be nonexistent and it remains as it was, although more modernized than when we went there.

Svalbard has been of interest to the United States because the capital city, if you want to call it that, is called Longyear City. John Longyear was an American venture capitalist who bought out a coal claim in the beginning of the 1900s. During the First World War, Longyear left that venture and America had no more economic interests there, but we did have an interest in the settlement of the issue of Svalbard which was the only territory by the 1920's which was technically called in international law a "no man's" land. We were very concerned along with other Europeans that something would develop up there that would not be favorable for the world community, which led to the Svalbard Treaty. With equal right to go up there, no American ambassador - if my memory is correct - had been there since at least the 1950's. The Russians had gone in quite strongly with equal rights. They had then two coal cities with a population of 1500 or 2000.

So Ambassador Crowe decided to go up and show the flag and that we did. We went up on a ship that makes a one-day stop there. But we stayed for ten or twelve days with the governor general. He took us on his boat all the way up as far as you could go to the pack ice, up to a little island called Moffen, where we saw for example - no one had been up there for many years - the first walrus pup seem in decades. Which meant that the walrus were beginning to come back. Until the treaty was signed and well into the 1930's, all

wildlife had been virtually exterminated up there by unregulated hunting. Muskoxen were reintroduced later on, and now it has more of a normal appearance with wildlife.

We scoured the islands. We visited all of the sights. We did not visit the Russian encampments because the Norwegians felt that it would be a bit complicated. Originally we had asked the Russian Ambassador to come with us. Right up to the last moment he was going to do so, so that he could visit his Russian sites while we would take him to the Norwegian sites. But at the last moment, of course, he bailed out. It seemed a bit much for us to push our rights too far. In any case we took the Governor General's boat into the Russian harbor and through the "graphics program" for which another agency allowed us to use a very fine camera and all the film we wanted, I took dozens and dozens of telephoto shots of the whole area as we cruised up and down from about 75 yards off shore on the Governor's boat with no Russian able to say anything. I think during my stay in Svalbard I took about 400 shots. They were the first on the ground, detailed, top-to-bottom ones of every inhabited location that had been done other than what would have been done by U-2 or something like that. So we really brought everybody up to date in Washington on what was being done there.

I had the pleasure of doing a very long airgram about the trip, with the Ambassador contributing a great deal. It turned out to be some 30 or 40 pages. Subsequently in the mid-'70s, there was a great to do when the Norwegians wanted to build an airport in Svalbard and the Russians said, "Oh, if you have an airport then we'll build a helicopter pad." It went bouncing around NATO. The airport was built and of course it was not military. It was built so that supplies could be brought in during the winter time when the ice pack surrounded the island. I was told by the Norwegian Desk Officer later that when the word went out for an NSC task force on Svalbard they said give us everything you have. All they had was my airgram.

NATO had acquiesced to Norway's and Denmark's firm commitment to not having any nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil except in time of war. However, the northern wing of the NATO Air Command was in a bunker right outside of Oslo. I had an opportunity to go in there a number of times. And that was real Cold War stuff with star wars. Everything was underground. I don't know what would happen as time went on with a direct hit, but it was pretty impressive. It showed that Norway, for all its occasional Labor party desires to pull back or reduce its contribution to NATO, believe me was a full participant. Also, both under the economic hat and just kind of wandering around as an embassy officer I got permission to go into the Norwegian naval installations on the west coast in which tunnels could swallow up a very large frigate, what we would call a small destroyer, in about five minutes into a mountain.

No wonder the Germans coveted those fjords during the war. I visited all of their steel plants, their aluminum sites that were very important to us because of world competition and aluminum prices. On fisheries I visited Norwegian fishing ports of every size; Christiansand, Trondheim, Bergen, and up to Tromso, the northern most city in the world. In general, I would say I had the real fun and pleasure of visiting everything you could

think of in Norway that was in any way of economic interest to the United States. It was a very, very satisfying assignment.

Q: How did we view the "Soviet threat" at that time? We're talking about 1968 to 1971.

FRY: Very seriously. For those who were invited to Munich to play war games, which I never was, I know that one of the major games was the penetration of the north of Norway by a Soviet task force. The scenario started out with, "all we want is a little more buffer between Murmansk and the Kola peninsula and NATO, and all we want is 1000 square miles. We don't want to go to war with this." How would NATO take the bait or would NATO stand by its commitment that one inch of NATO soil was the same as the United States? There was a great deal of concern. It led to the establishment at that time - but not to the degree that it later became - a so-called prepositioning in which large quantities of equipment and supplies: food, winter clothing, and weapons; were prepositioned in Norway for a US Marine brigade. When the first Marines were there it led to a political crisis in the Norwegian Parliament about having foreign troops actually exercising on Norwegian territory. It wasn't anywhere near the Russian border; it was down near the middle of Norway where the ports were. But of course, the Russians went bananas and communist parties all over Scandinavia had a joy-ride with this since Sweden and Finland were neutral. So here was a country which curled up into the Arctic Ocean and bordered the Soviet Union and it was having NATO maneuvers. You see, it was the only NATO country that could do that except for Turkey and we weren't up in the mountains of Turkey.

So yes, the Soviet threat was taken very seriously and the work that our political section did on the NATO issue was clearly the major political issue that we had. The major economic issue, interestingly enough, was whether Norway would, at some point, join the European Community. Shortly after I left it decided not to do. There was an alternate form in the European Free Trade Association, EFTA, that the Finns were negotiating with the other Nordic countries. Those negotiations took forever and we in the economic section did all the reporting on that. That was of interest to us because the relationship that Norway would have with Finland - and Finland with the rest of Scandinavia - was a bit dicier than it later became. You figure in the '60s and the '70s the Cold War was really at its height and people were settling in for the long haul. Where Finland stood and what might be the scenario for Sweden was, if not crucial, of great interest to our planners. Any relationship that brought Finland closer to the west was viewed with great interest by us, and I might say with some concern by the Soviet Union. So that linkage between the economic and the NATO military was always present in any Norwegian equation that you wanted to talk about.

Q: How did you find the Norwegian political scene as far as NATO, United States, Soviet Union, communists and all that?

FRY: The NATO connection was strong and when pressed, even the leftist Labor Party, which in fact was in power a substantial part of the time when I was there went short of

wanting to leave NATO. There were members on the left of the ruling coalition headed by the Social Democratic or Labor Party, who did want to pull out of NATO. And then there was a small Communist Party. But all of the other parties and a majority of the Labor Party definitely wanted to remain. They couldn't see a role for Norway which was the equivalent of the role that Sweden or Finland were taking. So the answer was in reality, the NATO connection was never in doubt but everybody loved to play with it.

Q: How about Sweden? I mean, what was the outlook of the Sweden you saw?

FRY: Sweden and Norway have had this wonderful love-hate relationship partly because Norway did not become an independent country until 1905 when it split from Sweden. That's why I mention the Nobel Peace Prize being there. Gustav Nobel built a beautiful home in Oslo because he had a lot of factories over there. It wasn't his primary residence but you'd think it was. His daughter married a Norwegian and lived there. The street around his house was later named Nobel's Gate. His residence became the residence of the American ambassador. So we had a connection to Nobel other than the prizes.

There was the usual banter, for example, about the dumbest Norwegian that moved to Sweden and raised the IQ of both countries. All kinds of Norwegian jokes like that. The reality was that the relationship was very close. If there was residual slight bitterness about the Swedish role during the Second World War, you would never really notice it. Sweden also played a great role in WW II taking people in from Finland and Norway. So it was just an historical kind of banter back and forth, but the economic relationship was very strong because as it developed in the '60s and '70s, there was a free market in labor in Scandinavia where many thousands of Norwegians were working in Swedish factories and also Finns working in Sweden. So they are all a band of brothers; they are all Nordics, and they all stick together. They had SAS, the unified airline between Sweden Denmark and Norway. They cooperated totally in the UN. They cooperated on all issues dealing with shipping and seamen and many other issues.

Q: You were there when the Nixon administration came in. We were still heavily engaged in Vietnam, the Swedes - particularly Olaf Palme - was vehemently against us. We saw Sweden basically as the enemy almost. How about Norway... from your perspective, how did you see the Norwegians?

FRY: The anti-US in Vietnam demonstrations and feelings in Norway ran high. At the university it was, you might say, universal. There were conservatives in the younger set in the political parties that stood by - if you want to use that term - the commitment that we had made in Vietnam. But in general it was looked at with outright disgust and horror, replete with many marches past the embassy, I might add. There was great concern about what the United States was doing, the image it was creating. In the mildest from, as I suppose in many other countries, the Conservative Party was kind of a shaking its head - what was our goal there; where were we going to go? So I would say we tried to make the sale. We had the usual people coming through: Douglas Pike and company from USIA trying to make the sale on why it was important to be in Vietnam. Certainly the

Norwegians never criticized us officially or at the government level, but it was very, very unpopular.

One example was when Vice President Hubert Humphrey came to the funeral of the first UN Secretary General, Trygve Lie. There was a large park across the street from the embassy which was an extension of the park that was the king's palace. It was a park you could just walk through and it wasn't particularly patrolled. There were policemen in front of our embassy; they were worried about demonstrators. But just about two hours before Humphrey arrived, persons - I think eventually identified - got giant slingshots and fired ball bearings from across the street into the embassy front. They went through triple pane glass. Since the embassy, which had been built by the Finnish architect Sarrinen, was a unique building; everything had been made just for that building and there were no spare parts. We could not replace the windows. There was glass everywhere and it could have been serious; the bearings came through almost like bullets and there were a number of windows broken.

The Vice President handled it beautifully. In fact when he came to the embassy, it was to say hello to the folks but it was not a visit for the embassy, it was a visit for a funeral so he was not out gallivanting around. That was the kind of thing you got. After that we had a heavy police patrol. This was the first, and I believe we were the only embassy that had to have that kind of heavy coverage. It made us all a little uncomfortable.

Incidentally, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry used this attack in a way that showed Norwegians being so sensible and so practical about money and about their affairs. They turned it on the left by simply pointing out in the paper in several long articles exactly what it cost the Norwegian people to replace the windows and other damage to the American Embassy. They said every Norwegian had to pay so much money and wasn't that a silly way to spend your tax money. They tried to put the shame to all sides; "that's not the way real Norwegians behave." Signs and things were pasted on the side of the embassy wall when the policeman wasn't looking. But to sum it up, Vietnam, as in many posts, was a time of, if not of outright hostility, then of great questioning by an ally that wanted nothing more than a close friendship.

Q: Why don't we move on to your next job which was the Operations Center. I've got you serving from 1971 to 1974? That's a long haul.

FRY: Yes, yes. It was an assignment that grew like Topsy. If I had to separate out one assignment in my 30 years that covered the waterfront this would be it for the sheer input of knowledge about what was going on in the world and how the State Department operated. I guess I reached the point where I thought that my head was going to burst and others had had that feeling up there.

What happened was the inspectors, in their wisdom in the fall of 1970, came through Oslo and decided that from their point of view oil was flowing in, the Norwegian economy was going to change and so on, and that we really didn't need three American

economic officers. What we needed was more economic reporting by the Foreign Service nationals. We needed a commercial officer and then one American, the chief of section, who would do the economic reporting that was classified. You didn't need this mid-career 05 or whatever it was position. So the upshot was my position was abolished. When they asked me about it I said, "Well, abolish away. I suppose if you don't want as much reporting and you don't want as much travel then that's what you'll get." But I said I had a feeling that Norway was going to play a much more active international economic role when oil starts flowing in, both through the UN or economic organizations. Its going to have a lot more money and be able to play more of a role internationally. In fact, that's exactly what happened. After four years they put another American back in the same position I had. This is nothing new to Foreign Service officers.

The Operations Center was always looking for mid-career officers to serve as the senior watch officers. A watch team was then three. I won't even purport to know what has happened to the Operations Center since I was there. It's a revolution of electronic wonders since those days. When I started out in 1971, the word was that this was the "heart" of the State Department. It was, in fact, a small room with a modest telephone system, tucked away on the 7th floor. Lots of teletypes and TV and radio, but not anything approaching state-of-the-art. President Kennedy had authorized the Ops Center to begin work after the Cuban Missile Crisis, building a more alert and viable system than had been setup after the Bay of Pigs. That's when it really got started. What was the heart and soul of the system was no more than a couple of desks and teletypes. We weren't even connected to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. But it was pretty jazzy compared to not having anything. The main construction while I was there was building what was called the modern Operations Center. There are very large areas for task forces to work in during critical times. There is a very large and classified meeting room with all wonderful buttons that brought down maps and had all kinds of audiovisual things; and a very modern Operations Center which is still the room that is used even in 1995. In 1973 the new phone panels tripled the capacity that we had had. We began to have drop lines to every major agency in Washington, where you press a button and you are onto CIA, the White House, and the military command center at the Pentagon. You began to have exchanges on a monthly basis with officers who worked in other centers and a much closer, more efficient and therefore more successful interaction between all the operations centers in the city. So it really was a giant step forward.

That assignment was supposed to last, I think, a year or eighteen months. Since I had been out of the United States, for five and a half years - close to six years - I thought that I would stay in the Operations Center for a year or so and then move on to something else in the European bureau.

Well, what happened was I enjoyed the work and I enjoyed the people in the Secretariat. I enjoyed working up there. And when the time came to think about an assignment, I was asked by Ted Eliot, who was then the Executive Secretary of the State Department, if I would consider staying on and being the deputy in the Operations Center. The deputy's job was basically preparing the Morning Summary for the Secretary of State. It was

prepared on the watch but you'd be responsible for it. And then there was a magazine that was called Foreign Affairs or something like that. It was a classified magazine that was sent out once a week to all posts. It seems so archaic now, the way we put it together was snipping out a picture from Time magazine and going through our own morgue and getting reports from bureaus. It was classified "secret" but basically it was everything you were reading in the newspaper. We were not allowed to put in anything that was really sexy or sensitive which later we were able to do. I worked in that deputy job and also filled in on the watch for about a year. I had bought a house in Washington and I was perfectly content to stay there and not worry about moving out of the country.

So the same thing happened again. Ted Eliot was still there and William Rogers was still Secretary of State - and they asked if I would like to stay and be Director of the Operations Center, and that would have made the three years. Well, I said yes. I knew the ropes and I knew how the Secretariat functioned. So in June 1973 I took over after a nice vacation. Then Mr. Rogers left and Dr. Kissinger became Secretary of State. I want to tell you that from the moment it was announced that Kissinger would be both the President's National Security Advisor and retain that hat and be Secretary of State, nothing was the same. The Operations Center and the Secretariat in general were the focal point of the fulcrum for all of the changes of the Kissinger revolution in managing the State Department.

I can honestly say it was not just hectic, it was mind-boggling to adjust to the demands that he was making. There were demands that were being made on all parts of the State Department. But the main thing was the speed of information flow, Kissinger used FLASH- designated telegrams to people who would normally have gotten priority. FLASH, a war-situation precedence, was virtually never used and he was using it constantly. It was that kind of speed up of "where is it? where is it?" For example, one night I was getting ready to leave and without warning I saw Secretary Kissinger and his then top assistant, Larry Eagleburger, who in fact later became Secretary of State through many permutations, wandering down the hall toward the Operations Center. I said, "Good evening Mr. Secretary." He had never been in the Operations Center. This was four or five months after he had arrived. And he said, "Show me around."

So I did and I explained what was going on. His attention span for this kind of thing was pretty short. I took him into the room where the compartmentalized or highly sensitive coded information was coming in for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which we weren't allowed to touch, and where the anchor end of the hotline to the Soviet Union to Moscow was located. In fact, the real anchor end was located in the Pentagon War Room, but there was a transmission line which could go from the Defense Department to State directly. It even played out day-after-day-after-day, the tests every hour that people were doing - the Russians and the Americans. So he said, "So if I want to send a message all I do is come here and you send it to Moscow?" And I had to explain that we couldn't transmit; it was only a receiving station; that he would have to go over - or however he wanted to work it - to the Pentagon and that was that.

He looked at Eagleburger and gave Eagleburger a scowling look and said, "Call General Such-and-such." I don't know who the general was but I know he ran the hotline over there and I want to tell you that although we couldn't get money for other things, in about three weeks we had completely changed the terminal end of the hotline. The team that managed it of course still stayed in the Pentagon War Room. But if circumstances demanded, we could actually put a teletype - it was archaic by today's standards -- almost directly to the Kremlin.

The upshot of the conversion about this little teletype circuit was that Kissinger would send a message, without leaving the State Department, to the Pentagon on their system where it would then be translated or whatever had to be done, and be put on the main system to Moscow. But there were many other innovations that he required.

It helped us a great deal because it led to an upgrade of telephonic communications and other things that he required. When he traveled - even up to New York for one night and had his room in a hotel -- the phone team spent about two days before he got there putting exactly the phones that he wanted, where he wanted them, in which room. I mean, he was never without massive communications support, dwarfing anything that Secretary Rogers had asked for. And that led to a lot of people using the Operations Center for calls to be connected to Kissinger that were not on the classified lines. We began to be and then became a much more integral part of the Secretary's team because we were constantly phone patching members of his immediate entourage and other senior officers in the State Department. The telephone switchboard really came of age, and lest anyone consider that the Foreign Service officers then were just telephone operators, let me tell you that the conversations were wonderful to hear. We of course - while we were not supposed to be listening - simply turned up the speaker and had the pleasure of not being on the line but hearing what was said.

I might add that the Secretary's staff was monitoring and recording all of his calls at that time, as was well known. They were used in his memoirs. Anything that went through his office was monitored and written up whether it went through the Operations Center or not. But the Operations Center had the ability to tape. At that time, unless it was some specific kind of inter- governmental call, if it was an outsider then the beep went on every 30 seconds and you had to say it fast or however the formula was that the caller was being taped. The briefing books that were done for his travels were quite different: much more elaborate and more highly classified than they had been for other secretaries. So in short, the whole operation in both the Staff Secretariat and the Operations Center became more entwined with the front office of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary than had ever been the case.

Well this led, of course, right into the question of Vietnam, which was then at its final agony. As when he was in the White House, this meant NODIS and EXDIS messages - No Distribution meaning that they could not be distributed without prior instruction either from the Secretary of State or the Executive Secretariat. We were flooded with these messages all of the time. It used to be that they were sent up to the front office in locked

metal tubes, and waited until morning or until the Executive Secretary or the Deputy Executive Secretary could look at them. It got to the point where they could be spending all day on that. So the senior watch officers in the Ops Center became the people who opened the tubes, sorted the messages, and by prearranged instruction made the distributions ready for morning. It sounds like a modest revolution in terms of information flow but some of the code word messages would go only to the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and let's say the Under Secretary for Political Affairs - period! Not to the assistant secretaries, not to the other principals on the 7th floor. The only other people who would see them were the FSO-3 officers in the Operations Center. It was quite a step up, and consequently we were brought into meetings where it was explained what was expected on the weekend and who to call. They didn't even commit to paper. They said if "such-and-such" comes in then the Watch will only call this person and will simply say your presence is required at the State Department. That's all that person needed to know. It gave you a real sense of participating.

We refined our measures and mastered all the new equipment, which was a fortunate thing because in October of 1973, with Kissinger barely in his seat, and a lot of reforms and changes that he instituted coming into play, he went up to New York on a weekend. I and FSO Peter Sarros became very concerned about messages that we had been seeing for a week or more about the Middle East. I got so concerned on my watch that I called the duty officer in NEA and then spoke with the NEA deputy assistant secretary. I sort of got the "yes, well we know about that - you don't have to worry about that - and you just do your job and we're following the Middle East" kind of thing. It finally reached the point with me, as I was about to go off duty at midnight, that I called the Executive Secretary and in oblique terms told him what my concerns were. He said he understood and would call whoever dealt with this in the intelligence community. This was Tom Pickering who was then the Executive Secretary. He called me back because I was going off and he said, "Well, just keep your eye on things." In effect, I said, "I've been here over two years and this is the first time that I've ever had a gut feeling that somehow these messages are really telling us something that we are not sensing. I can't put my finger on it but that's the way it is."

The Arabs attacked Israel to begin the 1973 war the next morning. I don't claim any prescience on it; a lot of other people had this feeling but what can you do if you don't have the hard information. The Israelis were caught by surprise too. But I can tell you that after two years of training yourself on messages it didn't make you dull, it made you sharper to tone and nuance. I was absolutely convinced that night when I went home - and so were other watch officers I might add - that there was something going on that we hadn't seen before. I remember that my mother had just come down to Washington to visit. The war started on October 6, 1973, the Jewish Day of Atonement. I never saw my mother again on that visit of one week except to say good-bye. Two years later she was dead as the end result of a mugging in Buffalo, New York. I have always thought of how work took over her last visit with me. I went to the Ops Center and I think I went home probably the next Tuesday, with my wife bringing me some clean shirts. There were task forces beyond belief. We went to whatever the alert status was that was practically ready

to launch. Defcon four or something like that. I mean guys were called back from leave; it was a real dicey period. Then the message came in that the Soviet airborne army in the famed Odessa district was getting ready to board planes. That's when war talk actually started going on. The whole relationship with the War room over in the Pentagon was not "Hi, Sam - How's it going over there?" We filled massive briefing books by the moment for the Secretary.

The reason I mention this was not the war story but a very practical outcome to an event that changed the way the State Department did communications and certainly changed the way the Secretary did. Everyone always had the feeling that if you sent a high transmission speed message, that is to say an immediate or FLASH message, that it would get there faster. But what all of the people who dealt in the system knew was that there was an infinite line of messages. All you did with the FLASH message was to go to the head of the cue of the next speed of messages and so on down the line. With every FLASH message, everything else got pushed back one. If you sent two FLASH messages that went from the State Department to Athens and on to the Middle East, one of them had to be second. If you sent ten, one of them had to be tenth. The briefings that we used to give, that a flash message should be some place from the time it left our hands to the time it was received in under three minutes, of course, was thrown onto a cocked hat.

Well, there was an exchange that Kissinger was trying to have with King Hussein in Jordan. A message took about 25 minutes and I want to tell you that when Kissinger blew his stack you could feel it all the way down the hall and through the walls. He simply thought every one was betraying him with what was going on, and "why couldn't these people do their jobs." Later, it was a matter of a massive task examining what happened to our communications in the beginning of the Middle East war in 1973. What had happened was that every area commander or military attaché in the Middle East, and from central Europe all the way down to Egypt, were sending FLASH messages and then they were doing FLASH override. FLASH messages were put into a queue. The FLASH override might say, "there are Turkish tanks moving out of Ismir" or God knows what that had nothing to do with the transmission of diplomatic information. But it was using the same electronic system. That's what the higher ups could never quite understand. It wasn't that the State Department had its own transmission system. The Diplomatic Telecommunications System (DTS) is managed by the Central Intelligence Agency and NSA. And that's the truth of the matter. It's not that they were putting their messages first or anybody else's. The computer had queues of FLASH messages - at one point I think it was 300 or 400. I can't be quoted on the number but it was absolutely amazing. Therefore, an immediate message was routine.

This realization completely changed how the DTS was to be managed in a crisis. What the task force found out was that the United States Diplomatic Telecommunications System in the event of an emergency - and we won't even go into the event of a full scale war - was hopelessly inadequate if it was not used properly. Because what was required was absolute communications discipline by everyone. In the case of the Department of State, the use of the precedence FLASH was so strictly controlled that it wasn't a State

Department problem. But when you got into the military, when the military was not using the strict military system but was interfacing with attachés in the diplomatic telecommunications system, then the message of any military officer anywhere had equal weight with Kissinger's message. And Kissinger didn't like that very much. He did not see himself in terms of diplomatic negotiations equated with an assistant naval attaché in Istanbul. He made sure that everyone understood that fact. In fact, we did change all through the system what would happen and who would be able to authorize such messages.

We also, at that time, changed communications procedures between intelligence agencies and operations centers beyond the secure lines using the old type secure telephone where you changed the electronic card everyday. You needed something that was much faster and more sophisticated than that. It led to the introduction of a second classified telephone network between Washington and overseas which really brought us into the age in which we live now. The reason that I mention this is because when I started out in 1971, when people were told "this is the heart of the State Department -- we can reach any embassy in the world in a matter of minutes" we'd all shudder because it might be 25 minutes if the satellite was out or whatever. I mean, what happened between 1971 and 1974 was absolutely astonishing. And even then, even though it was the cutting edge, it would today be looked at like a 1930s Packard next to a modern race car. But the changes were all made by the exigencies and the need for speed. That speed was personified by Secretary Kissinger. Once they were in nobody ever looked back. The Internet between intelligence agencies finally broke down this wall which had existed in the so-called "President's Daily Brief," which was prepared only by CIA. Kissinger said, "Why can't the State Department have one?" "Why do I have to work at the White House to see this material?" As it turned out in a study that he conducted, which I sat on, that 85% of the President's Daily Brief, aside from the sexy code word messages and things from very controlled sources, 85% of it was Foreign Service reporting. When Kissinger heard this he said that the State Department will have its daily brief. It was at that point in 1974, or the end of 1973, that we integrated highly classified information, which was closely held in the State Department, in with the Secretary's Morning Summary. It more or less began to compete with the President's Daily Brief that the President got directly from CIA. It raised the prestige and the morale of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department. And then it wasn't "why is the President's Daily Brief from the Agency" it was "why can't I see the Secretary's Morning Summary from the State Department?" I was very glad that I played a role in that. I helped with the negotiations with the intelligence community. Fortunately, it came at a time when both CIA and USIA and others were either starting - in the case of USIA - an operations center, or in the case of the CIA, were completely rebuilding theirs as we had rebuilt ours. I was on the panel that was advising on what we had found that was good, what was bad, how we had begun to shave corners and things that might be of interest to them. In all, it was a very exciting and innovative period. To discuss the actual substance of messages would of course be impossible because you saw so much with five or six teletypes banging away day and night and the message volume growing steadily. In the course of an eight-hour watch I was looking at - for distribution to senior officials, not to the bureaus - something on the range of three or

four hundred messages. And it was steadily rising. It was what was called a "growth industry" from 1971 to 1974 and it never looked back.

Q: Did you get involved in the Pueblo incident which happened while you were there?

FRY: Yes, peripherally. We got involved with the Pueblo mainly as an interested player because the technical part of it, the handling of it, was 100 percent White House and Defense Department, with the Secretary, of course, a major player in the National Security Council. But, no we were not in the sense of other than being a transmitter and distributor of messages. The State Department, as always, had to pick up the pieces around the world wherever they fell, but it was not a State Department show.

Q: During the Kissinger National Security Advisor time before he became Secretary of State, was the feeling of the State Department or the Ops Center that they were sort of playing second string to the national security operation or...

FRY: Yes, I think that was very much the feeling. The feeling had a good basis in fact. When you consider - I don't know what has been written in modern times - but I know that Secretary Rogers did not know, nor did the Executive Secretary Ted Eliot know, that Kissinger went to China when he went the first time. As a matter of fact, the cover for that was that he was traveling in Pakistan, and we got an EXDIS message from his staff saying that he had an upset stomach and was not able to continue his trip. He needed about 24 to 30 hours to rest and the Pakistani government had very kindly allowed him to use a mountain station in the hills where he could just relax. "Please send the morning summaries to the embassy" and it would bring messages to him. It was jokingly said that he had "delhi-belly" or something like that and no one gave it much thought. A few hours into the second day he was leaving Pakistan and off he went to continue the rest of his trip. I know that no one in the State Department - unless something has come up in really recent times - had any idea that he had done that with Winston Lord and whoever else was with him.

I'm sure that there must have been some kind of impact on Secretary Rogers. But he was so busy in his own right; I mean he still had all the Secretary things. How he felt personally about being cut out - I have not read his memoirs so I don't know. Yes, the State Department was cut out and there was a lot of talk on that. It wasn't cut out in the sense that Kissinger didn't use its personnel because that led to the same exodus of very top-notch officers being seconded to the National Security Council to the point where Congress kept saying, "who are all these people?" They were on duty over there but they showed on the State roster. So the White House could say that they had not increased the staff of the National Security Council at all when in fact there were something like 60 or 70 State people over there. It was replicating all the activities of the bureaus of the State Department. The people who were working over there really felt that they were in the in-system. How much they were doing, privately telling people, I don't know. But if they wanted to keep their job they weren't doing much of that and they weren't doing it in print. So Kissinger was using the State Department a lot and he was using the best and the

brightest. Some of the brightest got so upset, as you may recall, well - Mort Halperin wasn't at State but others who were working over there on Vietnam, Bill Watts, for example, resigned.

Q: I'm interviewing with Bill Watts tomorrow.

FRY: Bill Watts comes immediately to mind because he did resign and he was exactly in that kind of situation. Bill was concerned enough to leave that position. So there was a lot of interplay going on but it wasn't going through Secretary Rogers.

Q: One last question before we move along. What about the personnel of the Operation Center? I know that when I was a supervising officer, I used to tell officers - second, third tour officers - try to get into the Ops Center. It's hard work, lousy hours but this is where you learn.

FRY: If you want to see how it operates, yes. I give immense credit to Charles Thomas, later ambassador to Hungary and wherever else. Superb officer, military-political specialist who was director of the Operations Center when I was his deputy. He was the kind of officer who would say that's the way it has been done but it's either not right or let's do it a different way. And in a quiet way he would make sure. He was the spearhead on getting codeword and other highly sensitive material into the Secretary's Morning Summary. He said, for example, why is it necessary for people to have three or four years in the Foreign Service before they can be a junior watch officer. Chuck Redman, who recently has been the ambassador to Sweden and was Assistant Secretary for PA when he was only 40 something. He had gone to the Air Force Academy and had been in the military for several years. Charlie had met him and said let's get him on his first tour. "That's the way to teach a guy." You don't have to issue visas to know the State Department, although you may have to some time.

So the revolution was that you could get people who had just come into the State Department. Charles Thomas said, why is it - because of the fewness of women in the Foreign Service - we never seem to get women into the Ops Center jobs. Actually women on the Watch started before Charlie Thomas with Karl Akerman and Bruce Flatin, but Charles just beat the bushes to get women officers in. The percentage of the Foreign Service that comprised women officers in the early '70s was not as large as it would be 20 years later. You had a much smaller pool. But we did get them. I know that for my watch team, although it wouldn't be politically correct to say it now, people said, "Sam Fry and his all girl watch team;" April Glaspie, later ambassador to Iraq and many other things; Aurelia Brazeal who has been ambassador twice; Sylvia Stanfield who has been DCM in Asia, and others. These were top flight young female FSOs who went to the top because they were so qualified and just so good.

Q: I remember there was one young lady I pushed to go: Lang Schermerhorn.

FRY: Lang Schermerhorn was another example of an absolutely superb officer, who would have been a senior watch officer, but just wasn't quite the grade yet. I think you had to be an O3 or something. We had lots of women and they all did a superb job. That became a thing of the past. There had never been, until 1973, a woman who served as the senior watch officer. Regina Eitz broke that barrier. From then on it wasn't even considered. It was just another job for anyone in the State Department.

Q: Then from 1975 to 1977, you were in personnel dealing in what, training?

FRY: Yes, the office was called Training and Liaison. That followed a year at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces for mid-career training.

Q: You were there from 1975 to 1977. What was the main thing you were doing and how did the system work?

FRY: The Training and Liaison office of personnel, aside from sitting on the panel that made assignments at several times during the week for all posts, was designed to do two things. The first was to select people for mid-career and senior training. That was a big part of the job, you might say. And also to place people into language training, because Secretary Kissinger was concerned about the level of language training in the State Department. He required designated positions to be filled with language officers. He wouldn't accept no for an answer on why a person wasn't trained and why you were assigning someone who was not language proficient. That became a big part of the program. The other office function was to place State Department officers on detail outside the Department of State. That meant in the Labor Department, Commerce Department -- cross-fertilization with different agencies. It was a tough nut to crack because a lot of people felt, "are you just sending the officers you don't want at State and farming them out" or "why is it that they don't want to be working in the State Department" and so on.

When I took over in 1975, Ambassador Carol Laise, Director General of the Foreign Service, said, "We want to turn that around. We want to find positions in other agencies that would make sense for a Foreign Service officer to be assigned to, and persuade them to take that assignment." Indeed, that was a challenge and one that I worked on very hard. I did place a number of people in such positions that you wouldn't think of: EPA and their international section, Bill Brown, whom I mentioned before, and who later became a Foreign Service super-star and ambassador to Israel and Thailand, and so on. We tried to change the image of an 18 month assignment to another agency to do penance, or because you had a spouse or dependent who was ill and you needed to stay in Washington beyond your cut-off time, to something that would really be considered a good and positive assignment in your career. How successful we were depended on the person, but it certainly changed the idea of that kind of assignment. Also on training, the pressure grew to select people for economic training, for labor training, for use consistently throughout a career. In other words, try and develop a projected pattern of how officers would be assigned and used by the bureaus.

You wouldn't send a person for a year of area training at Harvard and then at the end of that year assign them to another area. Kissinger and Laise, when they looked at our previous reports, just thought that was crazy, and indeed it was. So, what it did was to give this little office in personnel a lot of power in the assignment panels. What we could do was to say to an ambassador overseas who had worked with a mid-career officer and wanted him or her at that post. "No, that doesn't fit in with the training that they have just had. The post training assignment has to flow in and utilize the training they've had." It sounds very simple but it wasn't being done up to that point.

But the other bombshell came when Senator Pearson, who was from Kansas, proposed legislation that was passed in the fall of 1975. In contrast to the then Foreign Service statutes, the new amendment allowed the State Department to assign Foreign Service Officers to the legislative branch - although that came a little bit later - and to state and local governments and eventually to universities. Not for study or to work for a masters degree or something, but to take part actively in the management of a Foreign Affairs program with the university. So this Pearson amendment program was given to the State Department and the Department was enjoined to do something right away.

Well, I had arrived in August 1975, the Act was passed in October and then Carol Laise said: "All right Sam, we want to start assigning people to the governors of states, what are you going to do about it?" What I did was to both write letters and call, and I got a lot of help from senior officers and their contacts all around the country. I told the Director General: "What I have to do is to make some field trips to sell this to key people in high ranking state offices to get a Foreign Service officer on their staff." I had a travel budget which would have probably taken me down to Richmond and back once a year. So Carol Laise simply chopped out \$5000 from the Bureau budget and where it came from I don't know - and said: "This is what you have to build this program, try not to use it all, but use it wisely." My memory is that my first trip was to Wisconsin to Governor Lucy, where we placed a Foreign Service officer. That was helped out by Larry Eagleburger, because Larry was close friends with Governor Lucy.

I went to California and talked with the Secretary of State of California, who even after that time was in for another twelve years or more, March Fong Yu, a very powerful political figure in the state. I had to tell her that if she accepted an officer and liked the deal a lot, that she couldn't extend it because, our rule was that you could only have an officer for one year. Well, March Fong Yu is an example of the success of the Pearson program. When the time came after the first assignment of an officer to her she said: "I want another one and don't tell me I can't have it or I'll go up to the President" or something. That was the story. That was after I was gone. In any case I made, as my memory serves, something like fourteen trips around the country: to the states of Washington, New Jersey, Alabama, Michigan, Columbus, Ohio whose mayor was the President of the Conference of Mayors. I spoke to people when they came to Washington, I went to the Hill, went to Congress. Congressmen said: "I want one of these officers" and I had to say: "Well, the Act, the amendment doesn't permit that yet, but we do have our

mid-career assignment." Subsequently the Act was amended so Foreign Service Officers could go up and work in the Foreign Affairs Committee and so on. I placed something like fourteen or fifteen people in the first year of the Act. The program took off after that.

There was a lot of fine tuning to be done because there were horror stories. For example, the amendment didn't take into account the fact that you were only allowed one move from overseas to the United States at State Department expense. We never thought of the fact that if a person came directly from overseas to Kansas City, and had their furniture sent to Kansas City, two years later, when they came back to Washington, they had to pay for the entire shipment themselves. The regulations allowed only one shipment during a US tour. I mean, it was just loose ends like that when you got into the regs. All of that, over time and after I left, got straightened out. But it was a very exciting period because the criteria, and I think the quality, and number of people going to senior training and mid-career training, increased a great deal, thanks to the pressures and to the desires of - actually in this case - both the White House, which was very supportive, and the senior officers in the Department and the start of this very fine Pearson program.

In 1992 after my retirement, when I was working on a conference in Fairbanks, Alaska, the FSO who had been detailed to the University of Alaska to help Alaska with its relations with the Soviet Union - she was a Russian speaker, was a Pearson assignee. She became the mastermind and work force of the first post-Cold War arctic conference held in the United States. She was there under the Pearson program. So I had a chance to see my initial work many years later in its full power and effectiveness, thanks to Senator Pearson.

Q: That's great. Well now, let's move on to your next job. You were sort of continuing your northern focus here; you went to Helsinki from 1977 to 1981.

FRY: I mentioned that Rozanne Ridgway was a friend of mine and that we had served together in Norway. We stayed friends, not close personal friends, but good professional friends and we liked working with each other when we had the occasion. She had become Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Latin American Bureau and was negotiating all over the world on the new fisheries regulations and the extension of our economic zone. Many new treaties had to be negotiated. When she was appointed ambassador to Finland she called me and asked would I, since I was coming to the end of my time in Washington, be interested in being her Deputy Chief of Mission. I said, indeed I would. The first hurdle was that this was, if everybody's memory was correct then, and I think it was, the first time, since I was no longer married, that an unmarried female career ambassador would have an unmarried male career DCM. Strange things happen in the Foreign Service, but this kind of situation had never come about.

Believe it or not, there were those who said that would not work. I don't know what they had in mind, but the answer was that it did work very effectively. The other side of the problem was that the position was for a Class Two officer before the grade change occurred in the late '80s. It was a Class Two position and I was a Class Three officer.

Q: In military terms you were the equivalent to a colonel and this was probably a brigadier-general job.

FRY: Yes, that would be right. It would be the difference today of a Senior Foreign Service position instead of an FSO-1 position. So Rozanne said: "That will be my battle, you just do your job and start thinking about Finland." Well, it went to the panels and I was told that it would probably not happen and that I had misjudged Ambassador Ridgway's skills. In fact, it did happen and so she went to Finland in the summertime and I went after she got settled. I went in the fall and we were a team from the fall of 1977 until January of 1980, when she returned to become Counselor of the State Department. I say with pride and without hesitation that, based on both the inspections we had there and several other things that happened in Finland and that were happening in the Foreign Service on how you manage posts, that this was one of the top three best managed posts world-wide for several years. The Foreign Service Institute made it a model for its DCM course and for its ambassadorial course. It was a case study in how you manage an embassy. The reason for that was not myself but the fact that Ambassador Ridgway saw very clearly what her role as ambassador was, and what the role should be of the manager of an embassy. It by no means meant that she didn't know what was going on or that she forfeited any of her responsibilities. Quite the contrary. She was splendid in laying out guidelines the way she wanted to see things run, and then you filled in all the blanks.

We were able to do this very effectively because she had great respect for the staff and the staff was more than dedicated to her, to the point of hurling on swords where necessary. The morale was extremely high. When we had our inspection, the inspectors sort of went away wondering what they should write, because things were working that well. I think it helped disabuse any nonsense that had remained about a single ambassador and a single DCM. I have never yet to this day, wondered whether they thought it would be a personal relationship, which of course it was not. I think it was just the old guard saying; "It's kind of strange, don't you think." The Finns loved it. She became the toast of the town as a most vivacious - it that's not socially incorrect - person, because she was. I mean she was a vivacious person, she was everywhere. She spread America thicker and with a greater intellectual content than any ambassador in modern times in that part of the world.

There have been a lot of political and career appointees to Finland, but they didn't have the depth that Rozanne had, and particularly on the Finnish debates about the Cold War and the Soviet Union. She would weigh in and tell them what she thought. Finns are a tough people to get to know. She gave them the sense of confidence that I was, indeed, as the Foreign Service regulations said, her alter ego and that what I was told would be accurately reported to her and to the State Department. So there was never any question when she was out of town, that her deputy spoke for her and for the State Department with her full support.

The Finns had, in 1979, expelled two Russians for activities incompatible with diplomatic status and there were a lot of people who thought, oh oh, we better balance this off now

or the Russians will wonder why it is that we are leaning on them. Our Naval attaché did something relatively innocent, but it could be misconstrued. I had an opportunity to handle that. I certainly didn't want the man expelled. I was called into the Foreign Ministry and asked what the Embassy planned to do. So I made a series of proposals to the State Department and said that I would like to go back to the Ministry as soon as possible. Ambassador Ridgway was in Washington and we were able to work something out. But the interesting thing was that there was never a second of hesitation on the Finnish part to treat her deputy exactly as they would have treated her, and believe me, her treatment was absolutely first grade. They considered her probably the strongest and most overall effective American ambassador in Finland since the Second World War.

There were some others they liked deeply, some very fine ambassadors. But at the time when they needed American reassurance about a number of things that were happening in the aftermath of the Vietnam war and great changes that were developing in the Soviet Union, they needed someone who really understood Finnish views, and would not take the position that Finland was just a stalking horse for the Soviet Union, which it never was. She was the person who more or less turned around the thinking in Washington on that and did a very fine job. Not that she was co-opted by the Finns in any way, but she made people see Finland for what it was, rather than what they thought it was, without being experts on Finnish affairs. In any case, the relationship worked out very, very well.

The fact about Finland was that we had very good bilateral relations and very few issues that were prickly or were insoluble. Almost everything could be worked out. The question with Finland, however, was that you never wanted to take it for granted. You wanted the Finns to know that they did play an important role in the world community. When you think about it, it was the Finns under UN mandate who were sending, long before many of the other countries were sending their soldiers -- and their soldiers were dying in peacekeeping efforts around the world. The UN Blue Beret was a badge of great distinction for the Finnish army, since the army itself had been curtailed in size by the treaty with Russia after the Second World War. The Finns had a highly trained professional corps, although they had conscription, because the army could never be more than 42,000 at any one time. They rotated everyone through the reserve, so the top officers were absolutely first rate.

They proved to be invaluable to the UN. Other Finns were in high positions in the Middle East negotiations and in other areas of international activity. We exchanged sensitive information with the Finns on a continuing basis and did it in a way that reflected on them as equal partners, you might say, in a lot of the international events that were taking place. Not to mention the Namibia war and the war in Biafra -- where for reasons which are too lengthy to explain in detail Finland was involved. The Biafran national anthem was the Finnish anthem "Finlandia." There were a lot of interesting things going on all the time with our Finnish relations.

Q: The African war was a great play thing of the benign left or something. In the United States for the glitterati, certainly in Sweden, and all the pop stars in London, and all this, I mean, it was an interesting time.

FRY: Yes. The war actually was pretty much over by that time, but the Scandinavians had both missionaries and shipments especially of fish to that area amongst other things. For decades before the long revolutionary wars in the Southwest Africa area, Finns had gone there as missionaries. The Finnish Lutheran church was very strong in Namibia. So the Finns had been drawn in, you might say, by the fact that there were a lot of Finnish nationals around there. These were all peripheral things to the major world scene, but nevertheless there was always something that popped up that Finland was involved in.

I might add one other thing that was a joy to work on in Finland. Although Finland did not participate for political reasons in the Marshall Plan, it was a country renowned for having paid back its debts. They were debts incurred with the United States after the First World War, and they were paid back on a regular basis. The Finns used to shudder at toasts when someone said, "All Americans know that gallant Finland fought the Russians in the Winter War," "that Paavo Nurmi was the great Olympic flying Finn," and "they pay their debts on time." These were all true, but tiring to hear repeated. Then Finland made an offer in 1975 which was that, if America agreed, the last three payments of the debt would be put in escrow, if the US would match them for a pool to allow a fund to develop for the Fulbright exchange program.

Thousands of Finns had participated in the many levels of the Fulbright exchange program. But, both countries were having, or at least the United States was having occasionally, funding problems. The Finnish idea was that in addition to what both countries could put into the Fulbright program, could there not be seed money that, if invested wisely, would provide a pool which would in times to come even reach perhaps the point where it could be independent of the largess of each country. That occurred, and the money sat for several years while people figured out how to invest it. It grew to something in the range of \$700,000 but the stricture was that there had to be an inflation edge taken from the interest, and that only the interest could be used for the grants. It wasn't all that much money when you look at the cost of paying a full exchange professor for one year. As the program developed it was decided that the Deputy Chief of Mission would represent the United States on the investment panel along with a representative from the United States Information Agency and two people from the Finnish side.

I sat on the first board. It was great fun, since it was not my money kind of thing, beginning to figure how we could invest this tax free fund, and build up a pool where we could start using it. What we did as a test case, since there was some money in the pot already, was to establish an American professorial chair at the University of Helsinki in 1977, the 50th anniversary of Finnish independence. An American delegation to this celebration was headed by Joan Mondale, the wife of Vice President Mondale. The bombshell announcement was made about the Chair in international relations and international history. The first participant was a true academic superstar both before and

since, John Gadi, who still is the foremost authority on the origins and activities of the Cold War. He was the perfect choice. He was also greatly respected in Eastern Europe.

Q: A pre eminent historian, to be sure.

FRY: That's right and, as I say, respected on both sides. Through this fund, which the Finns had originated, he became the first occupant of that Fulbright chair. For the 4 years I was in Finland I sat on that panel. It was very interesting to see it develop. I had occasion in 1980 while Ambassador Ridgway was preparing to leave, to take home leave. I met with Senator Fulbright, who was by that time out of the Senate, and I gave him a briefing on where the program stood. He had heard about this, of course, and it was very heart-warming to see his reaction. If you think that Senator Fulbright was not proud of the Fulbright program, I can tell you this was the thing that he knew he would be remembered for long after the time that he had been a senator and for his role in opposition to the Vietnam war. By 1981, when I left Finland, the mutual exchange of people under all aspects of the Fulbright program had reached 3,000. It was, for the size of the country, by far the largest in the world, and gave the lie to these facts that Finland in the end was sort of under the Soviet orbit.

This was the kind of program that Finland could have because the Soviet Union didn't have a similar one. In addition, there were thousands of Finnish high school students who were going for their junior year abroad in the United States. I made it a part of my job to speak to every group that I could before they went to the United States for their year. There was the Rotary Club, the Lions Club, or church exchanges, the Lutheran Church particularly since Finland is Lutheran, Youth for Understanding, American Field Service and so on, all these youth exchanges. We were very strong in supporting that in the embassy. The reverse was that not many American kids studied in Finland because of the almost insurmountable language barrier. Of course, most Finnish children were almost fluent in English, I mean that's the way they operate in that country in foreign languages. Whatever was said about Finlandization, or the idea that somehow the Finns were playing their cards close to their chest in dealing with the Soviet Union, perhaps more closely than they had to, the reality was that Finland was totally western-oriented; a market economy. Those of us who worked there wanted to use that orientation the best way we could. The Fulbright Program was an absolutely outstanding example.

Q: How did you find the Soviet influence? I mean we're still talking about this was not a good period. The Soviets had gone into Afghanistan, Carter had come with big ideas, he ended up firmly anti-Soviet after what happened in Afghanistan and relations were bad. Finland had the reputation of having to be very careful about how it dealt with the Soviet Union.

FRY: Indeed. Finland had a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union that was extended while I was there. That treaty required Finland to use all its resources to repel any invasion intended for the Soviet Union by way of Finnish territory. That was always misinterpreted in the West, that Finland would fight along side the Soviet Union which,

of course, was not what the treaty said. After fifty wars with the Russians over the centuries, and with the brutality of the Winter War in 1940, and then the war from 1941 to 1944 the Finns realized that they could never fight the Soviet Union again. By the same token, they declared their neutrality in the sense that they said that Finnish territory could not be violated by anyone for any purpose. They never said a specific country. But what the Soviets had written into the pact was if Finnish territory is violated by Germany or any nation aligned with Germany, since the Soviet paranoia was always Germany, the Finns would do such and such. The Finns themselves, although it was in the treaty, never used those terms, but they had this burden of defending the idea that Finnish territory could not be used and this led to all sorts of angels on the head of a pin. I mean that Finland could not be violated by anyone.

What people tend to forget was that the Finnish handling of the Russians was masterful in two ways. From the Russian viewpoint, if you started on the Norwegian border, since Finland has no border on the Arctic Ocean anymore, and went all the way around to Alaska, with the sole exception of Finland, most every country was hostile to the Soviet Union or was in some way a member with the United States in NATO or with SEATO or whatever it was, perhaps India and Iran excepted. We have our troops in South Korea. In other words the containment policy had worked beyond our wildest dreams with the exception of Finland. This gave the Finns and Russians an opportunity to say, ad nauseam, that this is an example of two countries with very different political systems, working in harmony and friendship, and so on and so forth, so you wanted to have a lot of wine to get through the dinner. That was the truth.

The other thing was that Finland has few natural resources and certainly no resources for producing energy. They don't have any waterfalls, any oil, they don't have any coal. So all of their resources for a modern industrial state, which is what Finland certainly is, had to come either from the world price of oil being shipped in or natural gas and oil from the Soviet Union. The deal they worked out with the Soviet Union, which was in full bloom all the time that I was there, was that they would denominate the oil and gas at world prices, or perhaps at a discount, and Finland would supply the Soviet Union with an equal amount of material or equipment or engines or build hotels or help in Russian pulp mills or build railways or whatever it was. Well, this was great for Finland because it kept their assembly lines running at full capacity. When they got non-Russian orders that was even better, because then they got the hard currency. For Finland, almost all energy supplies could be achieved without the expenditure of hard currencies.

What other country was in that position? The Russians benefitted from the skilled labor and the very high quality of Finnish - excellent quality just superb - equipment. Finns did not get engaged in weaponry other than shotguns or things like that, but they did a lot in construction. That was so good from the Finnish point of view that of course a lot of Finns said; "Maybe some day the Cold War will end and we'll have to pay for all this energy from the Soviet Union in dollars, and that's going to change the picture a lot." That's what has happened in the 1990s although there are still exchanges under construction contracts and all that. That relationship with the Soviet Union was handled

beautifully by the Finns. There was even in their arrangement a deal where if the imbalance - if the Finns imported so much oil and hadn't built factories - that at a certain clearinghouse point they would pay hard currency. But the Finns always got the contracts. They'd really hustled through the Soviet Union, talked to plant managers, "what you need to improve your plan is this and that." So there wasn't, in fact, any exchange of hard currency. That's just one example of the things that were going on. The Finns had some MiGs and they had western airplanes.

They had two 440 megawatt nuclear plants that were built by the Russians, but two 660 megawatt plants built by the Swedes. The Russians wouldn't build containment shelters. So US Westinghouse built the containment shelters for the Russian plants and everyone called the plants Eastinghouse, since it was part Russian and part western technology. This is the balancing act they did all the way down the line and it worked very well for them. At no time was there ever a truly serious word on the Russian side that they were dissatisfied. There was one time with Khrushchev, I can't recall the story exactly, when Finland had done something or a Finnish politician had said something. "Well maybe we need consultations under the pact", said the Russians, which was always the scare word for the Finns. The Finns went down to Moscow and said; "those days are over, those days are over, we don't need that kind of behavior from you because we both know what our relationship is and we are carrying it out to the letter". Whatever the Soviets were talking about was dropped right away. There was never during my time, or immediately before and certainly since, anything that would resemble a crisis between Finland and the Soviet Union, or today's Russia.

Q: How did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the coup there, play in Finland? I would have thought that this would have had - I mean here was a neutral country, although of a completely different nature than Finland, but where the Soviets didn't like the government, and just came in and tried to change it.

FRY: It made the Finns very, very uncomfortable. From the day the Soviet invasion started either the ambassador or myself were briefing the top people in the Foreign Ministry on a weekly basis about what the Russians were doing. That slowly died out because nobody expected the war to go on that long. Then President Carter canceled US participation in the Olympics. The Finns disagreed with us entirely, because Finland is, if nothing else, an Olympic country. As a small country it has won medals way out of proportion to it's size and human base. So Finland refused to go with that and said; "why" openly "we don't think this is the right thing to do." There were various issues in the UN on voting where they were strained, they stretched their limits, but in general if they could abstain or avoid a position which put them either on one side or the other of the super powers, they did so. This met their criteria for behavior which was; Finland is a neutral country that neither favors nor disavows either one of the super powers. It was a dicey time for their diplomats, and in their heart of hearts they thought the Soviet Union was crazy, they thought communism was wrong, but they couldn't say that. But I'll tell you an interesting adventure when the hostage crisis was going on in Iran...

Q: ...when the Americans were taken hostage by fundamentalists Islamic forces.

FRY: That's right. There were two cases early on where Americans who had escaped the take-over of the compound, found refuge with Finns, were eventually delivered to the Finnish military attaché and were smuggled out of Iran. We said that we wanted to tell the world, and the Finns said; "I beg you quietly. In the diplomatic channels will be fine please." It was only after it was all over that the fact that the Finns had performed these acts was brought out. The Finns were not willing to be a patsy for either super power, and for a lot of good reasons: for treaty obligations down to emotional reasons. They played their cards the way they thought best for Finland. What else can a small country do when you have 4,800,000 people next to the Soviet Union, and you have a treaty of mutual security, you have to be pretty careful in choosing your words.

Q: Did you have a problem in explaining Finland's position, particularly to American politicians who tried to see things in black and white?

FRY: Yes we did. Finlandization, which was a German term, was quite the rage at that time. It was looked upon by Finland as a very negative thing, since it put them as a patsy of the Soviet Union. The Finns made an abortive effort to put a positive spin on it, which was that if Finlandization is what we say it is it's too bad other countries can't do it. That is hard to sell since the Finnish situation was unique. It was the only country in the entire world periphery of the Soviet Union that the Soviets could look at without feeling that there was some kind of hostile pressure there, and indeed there was not. So, yes that was a period where they just had to tough it out you might say. They just had to say, and they were always very polite about it and there was always a civil argument, "Well, then perhaps you don't understand fully our history, our conditions, our relationships," and so on.

We at the embassy were criticized on occasion for perhaps presenting the Finnish position maybe too clearly. Then it looked like you had gone to too many Finnish saunas. I might interject, but long since I mentioned about going to Finland with a woman ambassador, one of the other things that concerned people when Rozanne Ridgway went was that she couldn't sauna with the President of Finland or the Foreign Minister. She would miss these sauna confidences. This turned out to be utter and complete nonsense, of course. The interesting part was that when she saunaeed with their wives she learned a hell of a lot more from them about what was going on in Finland than she ever would have if she had been behind a wall talking with the men. In any case, if there was any slack to be taken up, which there really wasn't, it would have certainly been taken up by others in the embassy.

The time came when President Urho Kekkonen, who'd been in power for 25 years, was nearly at the end of his reign because he had, as we would probably designate it now, Alzheimers disease. Whatever it was, he was losing his memory. We had prepared in advance, starting with Ambassador Ridgway and working through Ambassador Goodby, a whole series of scenarios. We had done airgrams on every conceivable Finn, how they

stood with us, what would be the likely course of Finnish politics if they came in, in other words a really first-class job. So when and if the time came he had a heart attack, we wouldn't be running around saying; "Are they going to go pro-Soviet now? Well, the last public sighting of President Urho Kekkonen was on the fourth of July in 1981 at the American Embassy. It was the first time he had gone in many years. He told his staff; "I want to go to the American Embassy." We always asked him, of course, but he hadn't come in a number of years. He said; "I want to go to this one." Kekkonen was removed from office in August but everything was in place for an analysis on our side of who the next President might be. We had already sent in that information. The embassy's position was; ""We want to know what's in it for the United States."

The President who was chosen was an American dream. Mauno Koivisto had been head of the Bank of Finland and a personal friend of the embassy for years. We couldn't have had a better relationship with him and suddenly he became the President of Finland. He was a man who never talked about the war, and yet was a pathfinder who used to go over on the Soviet side and slit throats. So the Soviets knew all about Mauno Koivisto. He was the perfect example of Finnish politicians. He had supported the Finnish position on relations with the Soviet Union, he had been a masterful central banker, and yet he was a friend of the United States, if you want to put it in our personal terms, and that worked out beautifully and ended any problem of the Kekkonen demise. Finland had to do some punching on Finlandization here and there, but it wasn't, in the end, a real problem.

Q: You mentioned Ambassador James Goodby, who was essentially a nuclear arms control and disarmament genius, how did he fit in there?

FRY: Ambassador Goodby was the intellectual equal in every way of Ambassador Ridgway. I'm not trying to compare them. Their personalities were quite different. He was brilliant, an accomplished author and was precisely the kind of ambassador that the Finns more than appreciated the United States sending. Here was a heavyweight of heavyweights on everything to do with disarmament and nuclear affairs, the kind of thing that the Finns were endlessly involved in at the UN, and in their own society He was asked to speak publicly from the first day. He had many prestigious opportunities to put the American view forward in a quiet way. He knocked down into small pieces the Soviet idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. He showed in a very civil and brilliant way, the value of such a policy coming from a country that had the biggest nuclear arsenal in the world fifty miles from the Finnish border in the Kola Peninsula. Jim Goodby was the ideal ambassador for that time and also because a lot of people began to sense that the Soviet Union was in turmoil. Not on the surface, but things had been stretched so far to paper over grave problems. With his long involvement with NATO, Goodby was able to give excellent scenarios, both public and private, to the Finns about NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Just the right ambassador at the right time.

Q: You left Finland in 1981 and you went to Bucharest which was in a way, somewhat the same Soviet border situation, but in a way a whole different scene.

FRY: That's right. In the Foreign Service I started out on the Iron Curtain in Trieste. In the army I was on the Czech border with an atomic canon. If I wasn't in the Soviet Union I was on its borders. I was told that the Department was interested in someone with an Eastern-European background to interview with a political appointee, David Funderburk from North Carolina. He was highly touted by the conservatives not only as a conservative, because he had worked briefly in Romania as a USIA guide. Senator Jesse Helms supported him. He was Helms' candidate for Romania.

I interviewed with him to be DCM. Basically, he said; "Do you have any feeling about political appointee ambassadors?" And I said; "I've worked under political appointee ambassadors. It is not a question of dealing with political appointees or career officers, you deal with the Chief of Mission." I said; "I feel that way very strongly." The regulations notwithstanding about being an alter ego, you fit into the ambassador's game plan in so far as it's consonant with US policy and the ambassador's instructions. So I said that wouldn't be a problem for me. I said; "I don't speak Romanian, I speak Italian and Russian," and they tell me Romanian is a blend between the two of them. I don't really believe that about any language, but I thought I could learn it. Funderburk spoke Romanian. He had been there as a USIA guide years before and his Ph.D. was on some aspect of the Romanian/British relations in the 19th century. Anyway, he picked me. I did have some Romanian language training to get a start on how the language was constructed. I already read about Romania quite a bit, I mean I knew a lot about the Eastern European countries. I went to Bucharest in October 1981, and was there until selected for the Senior Seminar in 1983. So I was there just under two years.

Q: We have taken Funderburk's oral history. He's now a congressman.

FRY: Yes, he was elected in the 1994 conservative sweep into Congress.

Q: He came out more than almost any other political appointee as someone extremely suspicious of the Foreign Service, at least this is my impression, and somebody who felt essentially that our policy towards Romania was too lenient. He didn't agree with what our policy was. That's what I gather.

FRY: You gather correctly. He had three positions: first, he believed that the US policy for Romania was the State Department's position, not the President's and that the brainwashing of President after President to approve the "most favored nation" status for Romania was tantamount to treason. We were propping up a dictator, we were causing suffering in Romania, and we had no business doing this. We ought to put our cards on the table and tell the world what Romania was and stop all this nonsense about Nicolae Ceausescu being the first communist to recognize West Germany, the only communist leader to have relations with Israel, and so on. You could make a list of 30 or 40 things, some of which I'll mention later, things that they had done to appear maverick in the Soviet system. Funderburk violently disagreed with that analysis.

His was not a unique position incidentally, a lot of people felt this way. Also, he believed that a conservative in government, no matter who appointed him, would always be under suspicion by the system. He had deep and grave reservations about the State Department system; just the State Department as the State Department it didn't matter who was running it, whether it was Secretary George Shultz or anybody else. He was very paranoid about whether people were going behind his back, were embassy officers going behind his back to try to do things. In my naivete I tried to explain that that's not the way embassies work. I mean, embassy officers like myself do not send telegrams that the ambassador doesn't see. He was not the representative from the State Department, as he had learned in his preparation course. He was the representative of the President. At any time, day or night, that he wanted to talk to the President of the United States - I mean in theory - although smart ambassadors wouldn't do that more than once, he could go to the President. He could certainly send in a first-person message and slug it through the White House and info Secretary Shultz or whatever.

As I said, the idea that you're surrounded by hostile people, and so on, I don't think holds water, but then again I didn't realize how deeply paranoid he was. I also didn't realize what a true dyed-in-the-wool deep religious, far right conservative is all about. I subsequently have learned in American politics what that's all about and so have a lot of Americans. The book which emerged from his stay in Bucharest, as we all knew was being written, was called: "Between the Pinstripes and the Communists". That shows you that we were equally balanced as far as Funderburk was concerned. I considered that that was the kind of mentality a strongly narcissistic personality would develop, in which only your position is right and every one else is seen as an enemy - whether an enemy or a hit list of Nixon or whatever.

Ambassador Funderburk really disliked Nixon. When Nixon came to Romania he even left the country. I took the Nixon visit and had dinner with Nixon and Ceausescu. Funderburk would not be seen with Nixon and Ceausescu. The reason, of course, was that all of this time he was planning to run for high office and he did not want photographs appearing later on of a Funderburk sitting with Ceausescu and Nixon. This would have been death to his position and that's why he actually left Romania when Nixon came. He played his cards that way all the way through his term. On his tour there everything was geared to what would eventually be grist for the book, prior to his run for Congress.

When he did leave Romania, the first thing he did was to hold a press conference in Vienna which bashed US policy before he even got back to the United States. That was all played up in the press. After he left the State Department he subsequently ran for US Senator in North Carolina and was trounced. FSOs like Larry Eagleburger said; "This isn't the kind of man you want as your senator" - I don't know but it is what he says in his book - how much they did say I don't know. I didn't pay any attention to his campaign and was not involved either way. In fact, I was still in the Foreign Service and when I was called up by reporters about his campaign, I said that there's one thing that I hold sacred in the Foreign Service. That is the relationship between the Deputy Chief of Mission, who had served as Charge on frequent occasions, and an ambassador - while either one is still in

the Service. This relationship should be inviolate, and I would not break any confidences for whatever reason. And that was the end of that, I never made any comments on his politics.

But going back to Romania, it's interesting that in Funderburk's book, all of the bad guys are in Washington. He was fairly balanced with his staff and the staff comes in for no derogatory mention whatsoever in any way in the book. I think this was because it would have been a little untoward for the people who were drafting your messages or were giving you the information that you wanted to do messages to be pilloried. Near the end of my tour, the Romanians instituted a penalty for leaving Romania. I won't go into the whole Romanian visa story, which is an oral history in itself -- Romanians selling people to go to Israel, and selling people to go to the United States, and selling people to go to Germany, which is the whole thread of how Ceausescu treated his people. He had a special tax on emigrants with an education. If they were getting an American visa, they would have to pay \$25,000 in dollars, which means the American people who were sponsoring these people would have to ransom them out. We, at the embassy, went crazy over this and said to the Department; this is a time to really come out against this policy. The State Department didn't see it that way. Larry Eagleburger came out and tried to smooth things over. Ceausescu never really gave in. What happened was that he sort of said; "We won't enforce it yet" and until he was shot it was still on the books but it wasn't enforced. In the end, we got what we wanted, and he got what he wanted and it worked out, but it was pretty bloody in the meantime, because the embassy was then seen as being sort of hyperbolic about the State Department's position.

In the end what the American business community wanted and what Congress seemed to want was, in the absence of any horror stories beyond which we were dredging up, that Romania would continue to get MFN. When Ambassador Funderburk went to DC and they were talking about this around the table -- well he told me this himself and Larry Eagleburger mentioned it later and Shultz's staff aide told me later -- they all went around how they were going to go and how they were going to present this to the President. Eagleburger gave a note to Funderburk which said; "Do you agree with this? Do you want to make a dissent?" Funderburk said, in fact; "Yes, OKAY, I'm not going to make waves."

Later he would say, "What could I do against this juggernaut;" what could he do as one man fighting the pinstripes while being squashed by the communists. But he never, in all of his time in Romania, ever sent a first-person message, never sent any message to the State Department which explicitly said; "You must not under any circumstances continue MFN. He went to Washington as ambassador and managed to have a meeting with the President which was arranged by Faith Whittlesey, another right-winger and later ambassador to Switzerland.

Q: This is Ronald Reagan?

FRY: Yes, a meeting with President Ronald Reagan. Jim Baker and Ed Meese were there. What he said in effect was; "Mr. President, you don't know what's happening out in Romania. The State Department is keeping it from you," and so on. Meese and Baker were absolutely astonished as I later learned since they didn't know what the meeting was about Funderburk had just said he wanted to meet with the President. Shultz was not invited, nor had Funderburk told Shultz or anybody in the State Department that he was going to do this.

When Shultz heard about it from Baker, Funderburk had just gone back to North Carolina. Shultz brought him back immediately to Washington. In Funderburk's book he wears this as a badge of honor that he was brought back and put on the carpet. He was the only person who would stand up for what was right and honorable in foreign policy as it dealt with Eastern Europe and with Romania. Shultz just saw it as a complete stab in the back and betrayal according to what his aides later told me, because he simply said; "If anyone has ever been open to any position it has been myself, anyone can come to me, any ambassador. They have said we are not doing it right we ought to change it. Funderburk never came to me, never even sent me a message saying that he was concerned." So that's the relationship. There were times when I felt that he was very unfair with members of the embassy.

For example, the incident with the son of Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, who had one of the longer and most distinguished diplomatic careers. His son, Steve, was a political officer. As Steve and his wife were leaving the post, in the final staff meeting in the secure room, as we were saying goodbye, Ambassador Funderburk said something to the effect of: "Well, all I can see since I have been here is that you appear to be working for Securitate," that is the Romanian Service. "In presentations you've tried to do the Romanians favors," and things like that. I had never before or since heard of a chief of mission make such a statement in public to a subordinate.

I would do a telegram based on a meeting with Grand Rabbi Moishe Rosen, who would pass me a written note to avoid electronic surveillance. The Grand Rabbi was not a person that Funderburk trusted or liked--and I would have to tell you that it was reciprocated, although not publicly. The Jewish Romanian leadership worked with the Israelis and with the Romanians to get more Jews out of Romania to Israel. Funderburk thought Rosen was a fraud. Anyway, if I came back and sent a telegram that said I was called in by the Grand Rabbi and this is what he said, and then I put our twist on it at the end that would be in the comment, so whatever the comment was. I would say to Funderburk this is what I would suggest as a comment--"It's a self-serving statement and he's coming to the States and he's getting ready to go, you know, it's the usual from the Chief Rabbi of Romania." But Funderburk might say; "Yes, but you really believe him don't you, he's really convinced you hasn't he." In other words, I was sucked in by his propaganda in my reporting and I really felt that we should be nice to the Romanians because they were good people. Funderburk never understood that when you report exactly what the other side says, as a matter of historical record, that you were not promoting their position. He was an historian who did not want verbatim history reported.

I never felt that way at all. I carried out American policy. When Secretary Alexander Haig wanted to come to Romania he said in a message; "Tell me why I can come" so we did. Funderburk was dying a thousand deaths, because he didn't want Haig to come but he approved all of the messages. I said; "Well, look he wants to come here, he wants to be a Secretary of State who's going into a communist country, why don't we use it for our advantage? If we are going to say no, you, the Ambassador must put in a first-person-message. The post can't say that the embassy feels it would not be a good thing." You can't do that with a Secretary. You've got to be the ambassador saying no. He wasn't willing to do that. I said; "Why don't we put a spin on it? Tell the Romanians that Haig is completing a long trip--three countries--he's coming from Morocco and several other places and will hold a press conference for the western press and anybody who wants to come. He is going to answer any questions he wants the way he wants to do it whether it's about Romania or not. He's going to have a western-style press conference." That is exactly what happened and what Haig did. I can't remember now about remarks concerning Romania, but in any case he had a full western-style press conference. Frank Carlucci, who was then the Deputy Defense Secretary came to Romania and Eagleburger came.

After I left George Bush came as Vice-President--I don't know what all the circumstances were on that, but Funderburk decided to leave and come back to the United States, where he set up his pins by having a press conference in Vienna.

I had cordial personal relations with him, certainly with Mrs. Funderburk and the family, and I worked very, very hard. My performance reports were okay and, as a family, they always treated me well. But I know he didn't trust me, and that's where I more or less left it when I left.

Q: How did you view and maybe talk about the embassy aside from the ambassador? What was your view Romania in this 1981-'83 period, Ceausescu and all?

FRY: I believed that Ceausescu had gotten away with one of the greatest Cold War ploys, which was appearing one way to the West and yet maintaining in his own country probably the worst cult of personality dictatorship and abusive human rights that had existed since Stalin. He was a master at juggling this. He had stood up to the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Prague, which was his great strength in the West. That is the reason that President Richard Nixon visited Romania in 1969. Nixon wanted to be the first president to visit a communist country. He thought it would aid in a split ala Yugoslav-style in the 50's, to sort of reward Ceausescu for not being in the group that invaded in the "Prague spring." That gave Ceausescu a lot of ideas on what he could get away with.

Of course everybody knew, I mean who worked with Romania, that the conditions the country itself lived in, and the cult of personality, was just so out of control that it evened out Stalined, Stalin. Everything in the paper was Ceausescu. It was almost sickening to

live there and have to see this. I refused to stand up at a meeting, which wasn't a government one - Ceausescu wasn't there as President, but communist party head - and the Chief of Protocol came over and told me I better well start standing up and down as the audience jumped up and down. I said; "I'm sorry I was invited as a representative of the United States to see this Communist Party meeting, it is not a meeting of the government to which I'm accredited." And that was that. That was about my only public display.

Other times I had to shake hands or something like that. But on the other hand, what were you going to do? What were the alternatives? We were getting two to three thousand Romanians a year who were joining families in the United States. 11,000 were going to Germany. 3 or 4,000 a year were going to Israel, and others were emigrating, although it was very hard for them to do so. There was a semblance of a USIA exchange program, that we didn't have with other communist countries. Were we to simply stop diplomatic relations? In which case what would be the grounds; that cult of personality? What do you do then about the Congo? What do you do about Nicaragua? Talk about cult of personalities and things like that! I'm not comparing the social systems obviously, but I mean if you're talking about not liking the head of state or the governor... So the point was how do you juggle it?

For most of the businessmen, when the crunch came for deciding about MFN treatment, there was a point where we had a billion dollar trade with Romania heavily in our favor to the tune of some \$600 million balance of payments in favor of the United States. For these businessmen and for our agricultural surpluses, things were flowing to Romania. We had our NATO ship visits through the Bosphorus every year. Destroyers would play radar tag with the Russian navy and drive the Russians bananas in the Black Sea. We did have a window on the Warsaw Pact from a Warsaw Pact country that wasn't participating in Warsaw Pact maneuvers. Any change in that, any blip on the radar screen, would show how Romania was actually dealing. We did find some things where they said they weren't helping the Russians at all in the Warsaw Pact, but may have been in small ways, not in major ways. Their command and control for air defense remained in Warsaw Pact control. So, there were a lot of variables and like anything in diplomacy, perhaps in life, but certainly in international affairs, it wasn't all black and white. Day in day out we went with lists of why is this person in jail, why can't he leave? We were just insistent. They finally would get very annoyed at us at the Foreign Ministry even though they were more or less all on our side. There are guys who - after Ceausescu was shot - came right to the fore and ran things at the ministry.

Romania is a very complex country that never had democracy. Anyway, it wasn't a matter that if we snubbed Ceausescu some good guy would show up. I mean, he was going to stay until he got a bullet; that was pretty clear and probably his son would come in then. No it wasn't a hard one to call the shots unless you were willing to say no most favored nation treatment. Near the end, Ceausescu said; "I don't need your MFN". And when it finally went away he said; "I can do without it, you can't use that as anything against me". And that's exactly what happened. So other than MFN, what would have been your

leverage to stop them? Stop reuniting the families, stop agricultural trade, stop the naval visits? We had to swallow a very, very bad dictator, who was very cruel to his people and caused a lot of suffering and hardship. But have we done that in the interest of peace somewhere else? I think we have, often.

Q: Did you ever have this type of conversation with Funderburk?

FRY: Oh Yes, we talked about... I mean he was a guy of heavy mood swings and there were times when he said; "yes I understand" or something but he didn't really. He wanted to be where he is today. He wanted to be in the Senate or the House of Representatives. He had a plan and he was going to write that book and so on. So, full credit. He has managed to ride the wave right to where he wanted. When he came out he used all his pull with Romanian groups all around the country. And human rights groups. He's got awards -- bushel baskets full. He played his cards exactly as he wanted and he's got what he wants. So, that's what Americans do, that's the way successful careers are made, regardless of a person's real inner qualities.

Q: What about the staff? I mean part of the thing with the embassy is the DCM is not only the "alter ego" of the ambassador, but when you have an ambassador who obviously is not willing to go along with the Foreign Service professionally, you would have the other role of trying to keep up the morale and all without undercutting the ambassador.

FRY: Well, yes I see what you're saying and it didn't work, because it wasn't that kind of a relationship. He had three secretaries while I was there, including one that was non-career who was sent out by Senator Jesse Helms. He felt they were all betraying him and that they were all undercutting him and stealing his secrets. He couldn't hold a secretary there. He didn't like some people in the embassy and when they left, as I mentioned, he said; "Well good riddance." On the other hand there were people in the embassy he did like, who were very fine officers and good analysts. The business of trying to soften his cruel remarks, I never did and never would consider. If someone had been hurt by his comments or something, I would not say "Well I'm sure he really didn't mean it". I never said it. I thought to myself, "what the ambassador says to people is the ambassador's business and I'm not going to fuzz it or do anything else." I didn't talk to people like that and so that was my style.

He was not liked by the diplomatic community for a lot of reasons. He didn't like them and considered their dislike a badge of honor. He didn't like the German ambassador so he snubbed him at a big evening. The German ambassador came to me and said, "What's going on in your embassy?" He didn't like to go to the NATO meetings at the other embassies or have it at ours and they didn't think they got a very good briefing from him. So when I went they would say things like, "oh boy now we have a professional!" I would tell them, "I will not accept that comment, I do not appreciate it and I do not like my ambassador thought of in those terms" and I meant it very sincerely. I didn't want to say; "Yes isn't it a horrible life" or something, because it wasn't. I felt they were wrong in making an allusion like that. I told the German ambassador and I told the Italian

ambassador on occasion and several others that if they thought that they could talk about an ambassador that I was working for, about him behind his back to me, they were dead wrong. That's the way I played it, and no one could ever deny that I can tell you.

Q: What was morale like at the embassy?

FRY: Well I think the morale--I mean it was a difficult post in the sense of very little Romanian cooperation on everyday requests. But I don't think the ambassador hurt morale. He may have intellectually for some people, but not for everybody if you think of the embassy as a whole. He was behind us building a lunchroom and an after-hours place. He had movies every Saturday night and he invited as many Romanians as he could. He cultivated a lot of Romanians and got them together with our people. He used the residence very, very well. He constantly tried to get marginal shades of Romanians in. He had huge 4th of July receptions and invited dissidents. He went up country and talked to priests. He went to churches and he used to report on the Baptists. He was doing some positive things. Don't get the idea that he was sitting back because he didn't like the policy. He was pursuing his own policy in the sense of having as much outreach as he could.

Q: How did the timing work out? Was he still there when you went to the Senior Seminar?

FRY: Oh yes. I would have probably left--the DCM assignments in Eastern Europe generally were two years, the ambassadorial assignments weren't much more than that. I believe that he stayed until early 1985. Frank Corey, a fine officer, good analyst and good communist scholar, who had been head of the political section, was made DCM. The ambassador didn't want to bring in a new person. So Frank moved up, and a person came in for the political section and that worked out fine. They had a good relationship. Funderburk's views never changed on the State Department and I'm sure they never will. He was fixed on that from the time that he was a USIA guide. There was a story told, later documented, that when he was a USIA guide in Romania he complained to his congressman even then about embassy treatment. He felt he wasn't getting a fair shot from the embassy. I think David Funderburk, with all the qualities he had, including some things I liked about him, had it in for the State Department and nothing and no one ever would have changed that.

Q: This is the 25th of October 1995. Okay, Sam we've basically got you out of Bucharest and then you went to Senior Seminar?

FRY: I returned to Washington and went to the Senior Seminar. I had what I call the usual wonderful Senior Seminar year.

Q: This is eighty...?

FRY: This was 1983 to 1984. I was often asked if the Seminar is something that the Foreign Affairs community really needed and that needed to be funded and all that. Even in those days those questions were being asked. My feeling always was, yes in many ways. But I did not see the Senior Seminar as absolutely crucial to senior management positions in the government. So while I loved it, I would never argue that it was crucial for one's career or that what you would learn there would always make the difference of success in a senior position. However, having said that, nothing could ever take away from the marvelous opportunity to learn just about everything you want about this country, and the nooks and crannies you may have missed during your many years overseas, which was one of the Seminar's intentions.

In my case it also helped me a great deal because I was continuing an interest that had been developing over the years in the Arctic and arctic areas. During my opportunity to travel when we were doing our paper for the year, I chose native Arctic people and their changing political and economic identity. It allowed me to travel to Alaska and do several other things that were in connection with the arctic areas. I must say that served, some seven years later when I left the Foreign Service, to be very important. Contacts I had made then paid off, although I didn't realize it at the time--sort of my own preparation for life after the Foreign Service that has stood me in good stead.

At the conclusion of the Senior Seminar, or near the end, I did not have an onward assignment and I was not going to go overseas. This was in January or February 1984. I knew I didn't want to go overseas immediately after seven years out. One thing that surprised me--and contrary to what you might expect from people in the Seminar--I was receiving no knocks on the door, at least from my own bureau of EUR, although I did get possibilities overseas. When I was called by Bill Harrop, who was then the Inspector General, I thought to myself, "Well there's a position I think I know a lot about, having been inspected a number of times." It would allow for a goodly amount of travel out of Washington, but at the same time it would be a Washington assignment, so I gladly accepted that.

Harrop ran a good recruitment drive. I think I had some excellent colleagues who came in at that time to the Inspection Corps. I visited fourteen countries that I had never visited before and went to something like twenty-four posts. That was a wonderful education process again, proving that you're never over-educated in the Foreign Service. I found one of the most satisfying things in that job--if I could put it in two words--was righting wrongs; that is, not cosmic changes at a post, but getting to the problem of some conditions whether they were driven by personalities or management problems or whatever. Just making sure they were solved before you left. I'm sorry that some of the issues had to come to having the inspectors solve them rather than being solved on the ground, in place so to speak. At least there was some satisfaction in seeing all parties then on a more positive relationship basis.

Q: Can you give some examples - whether you mention names or not is not terribly important - but just an idea of what you mean, because the inspection service has

changed considerably. We're talking about you were there doing this from '84 to '86. Can you talk about some of the righting-wrongs that you got involved in?

FRY: There were a number senior officers--although they didn't have to be all that old, maybe in their early to late '50s--who had not made, in my view, the transition to a modern Foreign Service in their relationships with junior officers and the responsibilities that senior officers have to their training and to their professional growth. Their attitude, I think, was subtly hostile toward women in the Foreign Service. Certainly their attitude towards what was then even sort of a dying breed in the Foreign Service secretary--I say dying breed in the sense of dictation or all the things that are now purely passe in the age of electronics--was patronizing. I felt on a number of occasions that they simply didn't give people credit for the skills they had. I had the feeling that I was back in what I was told what it was like in the '40s and '50s and even when I joined in the early '60s.

I think the solution there usually turned out to be a heart-to-heart talk, with a little bit of the steel edge showing from the Inspection Corps side on what the problems were. We couldn't reveal specifically what was in the personal questionnaires. But you could certainly work around it in such a way as to let people know that they really needed to do something about the way they were managing people in the Foreign Service. There were other cases that would border on near, I would say, malfeasance, where a DCM and the ambassador together simply lost perspective as far as I was concerned. It was to the point where, even after considerable talk and explanation of what we were driving at, we didn't seem to get through. We recommended that the Deputy Chief of Mission leave the Service or certainly not have any more managerial assignments.

Q: What are you talking about?

FRY: I'm talking about, for example, using non-US citizens who were well connected to US business men, in embassy positions such as in the protocol office of the embassy where they were dealing quite closely with the ambassador and the DCM, and had access to, almost free access to the ambassadors area, although they themselves had undergone only a very cursory security check. Upon careful checks on our part that turned out to be the kind of person you would not want in your embassy. Certainly not in an embassy position where they saw all of the guest lists, the discussions about who would come to dinner and why they would come and things like that.

It's hard to be a bit more specific, I guess the confidences still prevail on specific cases. But my overall feeling was, as it really had been before I was in the Inspection Corps, that the inspection served an absolutely essential purpose in the Foreign Service. The main purpose is accomplished before you arrive at the post. That is, by the time everyone has filled out the forms and thought about what they're doing and thought about "am I up-to-date in certain reports" or whatever their responsibilities might be, that just about eliminated most of the problems. So what you really did at the post was to concentrate on the issues that meant a lot in a morale sense, and also to follow up on concerns that the bureaus or the country director might have. They asked for your judgment in saying; "Are

we right in thinking that certain things are not being handled quite the way they should be."

Q: What about dealing with say the problem of alcoholism. Did you get involved, in those cases?

FRY: Yes, I've had during my time as DCM, Inspector, and once as an Officer Director in the Department, five cases where I got directly involved in alcohol-abuse matters. The first time was with a civil servant and I was very discouraged at the way this was handled. Not that I wanted any punishment, quite the contrary, I wanted medical help. But by the time I did the monitoring and writing the report and talking with her and going through all the procedures--but this was in the '70s--it ended up that nobody really did anything about it. Nor did she, and she therefore continued on a path which eventually was really bad for her health and led to her leaving the government for that matter. In the Foreign Service people, in general, accepted the idea that alcoholism is a disease and deserves to be, at least in the first instance, treated with government help. After that the rules get tougher.

So in the Foreign Service I had excellent cooperation. The Department came through beautifully with support in the field, with the rehabilitation program in the Department, and then a good onward assignment. Cases were resolved so favorably that the people had long and interesting careers in the Foreign Service. That was very encouraging to me, that these things can definitely be worked out. I was always impressed with the modern day attitude of the medical office both in mental health problems and in alcoholism. The psychiatric advice which I received in two posts in and near Eastern Europe for people that I was responsible for, was excellent and thoughtful and responsive to the point of a doctor visiting the post and really getting down into the nub of the problems. In the Inspection Corps it was more a matter of going to a supervisor or to the DCM and saying, do you understand how bad the situation has gotten? We would usually have her or him on an airplane within 48 hours. That's the kind of response time the Department was willing to give us.

Q: During this period, we're talking about the early '80s, what would happen if you found an officer, staff, but basically an officer who had a spouse problem--usually a wife--who would say that alcohol was making a serious problem?

FRY: That's a difficult situation because the dependents, the spouses, were, in effect, out of our jurisdiction, unless a situation had a direct and immediate effect on the performance of the officer or the staff person in question. In the couple of cases I can think of, where a situation was the talk of the town, the only thing you could do would be to suggest to senior management in the embassy that this was deleterious to embassy operations, in the sense of reputation, and that it was simply cruel to the person in question to keep them in this kind of situation without going for help. We said, regardless of the immediate responsibility and the willingness or unwillingness of the husband or

wife, that the embassy should take a firm step and request that the medical division help the person go for treatment.

In one Latin American country, Brazil to be exact, this was done and I think with great success. In two cases that I can think of while we were there nothing was done. While I was in the Senior Seminar, I had occasion to visit a post where the senior officer was clearly alcoholic during a luncheon and on into an afternoon session and was a gross embarrassment to everyone present. He missed his own reception in the evening. The military members of the Seminar were so incensed that they wanted to write an immediate letter to the Secretary of State. They couldn't believe that someone could be on duty in his condition. Since we weren't inspectors, we simply talked with the relevant Deputy Assistant Secretary and country director when we returned. We asked if they were aware of this problem or had heard rumors. We could advise them that it was far, far worse than anything they could imagine. That led to the person being removed from the post for what I understood, later on, was full recovery. So this pops up in the Foreign Service: what I guess amazes me over my entire career is that, given the number of people that you're crossing paths with, that both in terms of alcohol abuse and drug abuse--and this is certainly not to mitigate it--it was a surprisingly small part of my career both in terms of people that I was directly responsible for and things that I could witness. So while the cards are on the table and the statistics are well known, I think the Service, in general, is probably in very good shape.

Q: What about the other saga, sexual harassment and race problems?

FRY: I was never involved in either of this kind of case. That is to say either as a witness or someone brought into a grievance. I've never been involved in a grievance myself or in anybody else's. Whether that is luck I don't know. I just didn't happen to be in places where that occurred. I was surprised when I came back to the State Department in 1983 at what I thought were clear cases of, if not discrimination, sexual harassment of women in many layers of the State Department. And a lot of those turned out to be people in secretarial positions, mail room type operations; service operations. My feeling was--most of those were civil service--that they just hadn't gotten the word. Overseas I don't know what all the women were thinking that I worked with or that I observed. I didn't know of any cases where I would have felt we should take an immediate action.

Of several ambassadors that I worked with, two were women. Rozanne Ridgway told me she felt her early career was hindered by discrimination against women; that women belong only in the consular service or things to that effect. She was acutely sensitive to this in all of her relations with her staff and the staff's relations with each other. In the Inspection Corps yes, there were cases that were brought to our attention and some of those, as I understood later, became grievances. It is very hard on the spur of the moment, when you're in a post for two or three weeks, to make a sensible presentation of something which may have been ongoing in subtle ways for years.

Q: I noticed during the Reagan administration, and it has continued on, that we were having people getting killed, we were having people living under very difficult circumstances - talking of the Foreign Service - and yet one big sign in corridors even today, was to report waste, fraud and mismanagement, which all struck me as being; "Yes, that's a problem, but that's not exactly a battle call to go out there and deal with a very difficult situation". How did you find the waste, fraud and mismanagement element of the inspection?

FRY: In the inspection corps there was a hot-line for waste, fraud and mismanagement. I was not directly a part of it. If there had been a charge made at the post we were going to it was on our list of things to examine. I found fraud non-existent. I never handled a case and I never was involved in a case where direct fraud, that is something that would be resolved in a criminal action, was uncovered. Waste? Very little surprisingly enough. Most of the things that come to mind are things where people use modern communications facilities, such as xeroxing, for their own use, you should be excited about it in an inspection sense, but it's awfully hard to make too big a point of it other than to say; "You shouldn't be putting out the fact of a general sale on the weekend on government paper."

I think that your point about the security situation in the Foreign Service should be used in our relations with Congress when talking about what it is that the Foreign Service does. I used to make the point often, long before the deaths that have occurred in the '80s and '90s, that by the end of the 1970's, more Foreign Service officers and staff had died in the line of duty than all of the FBI officers in all of the history of the FBI and pre-FBI in this century. The lost of life, if you just take Vietnam as a ratio to the number of people in the Foreign Service, was by far--except for the direct military--the highest in any federal government department or agency. When I was at mid-career training at the Industrial College of The Armed Forces in a math course, I did some kind of analysis--which started out more or less for fun--on the people who were at that time on the roster of deceased in the line of duty in the entrance to the State Department. I believe there were over one hundred at that time. It went quickly from lost on a ship in a hurricane--some of the older ones--to exactly what it was, which was a direct death as a result of terrorism or dying as a result of peripheral military activity in the Middle East and places like that. That was telling the tale already in 1975. Since that time, and right up to Bosnia and Yugoslavia, the case has been made. When people talk about the Foreign Service as a nice, I don't say cushy, they don't say cushy job, but having fun overseas and so on, I say; "Well, would you feel differently if you knew that your child had to ride to school in a bus which was lined with sand bags? How do you think that would effect their growing up?" and so on. The point about change in Foreign Service life, if I were to put my finger on the two things that I see as the most important, are: communications and personal security.

Q: Then you moved from being an inspector to Public Affairs from '86 to '88.

FRY: At the end of my time in the Inspection Corps, I was interviewed for a deputy assistant secretary job in human rights and humanitarian affairs and also in the

environmental bureau, OES, in dealing on the environmental side which I was very interested in. As it turned out I did not get either of those jobs. At the same time I was informed about a public affairs job, which didn't excite me at the start, in the office of Public Programs. The future seemed to lie, according to Secretary Shultz, in having more Foreign Service officers go outside of the Department, and tell the foreign affairs story. Shultz and his staff assured me that this was something they considered a high priority and they felt that that the Office of Public Programs could do the job. It was an office Shultz knew very well. One section of that office handled all the Secretary's domestic speaking arrangements and other aspects of his domestic work, not the overseas trips. Another part of it dealt with arranging conferences, right from getting the rooms, to the content, to working with the visitors.

The main part was helping Foreign Service officers and Civil Service officers go on speaking trips around the United States, both where requested and where we felt it would be worthwhile, where we hadn't been in some time. My staff and I met personally with Secretary Shultz perhaps many times, which I won't say was the envy of the Department, but it was certainly an indication that he took very seriously this role of outreach on the part of Public Affairs.

At this time Bernie Kalb, the TV personality, had been brought into the Department, and was my first boss. Actually, Kalb resigned over an issue with Secretary Shultz, but resigned in good favor and politely as a gentleman. I don't remember the precise issue, but that brought in Charles Redman, or Chuck Redman, whom I had known and who'd actually worked with me in the Operations Center. As Department spokesman and head of the Bureau of Public Affairs, he was with the Secretary every day. Therefore, we had excellent feedback for the programs we were developing.

So in the FY 1987/1988 we had approximately 6,000 what we called events, which was to say if a Foreign Service officer went to Seattle, was on a TV station, talked to two universities, talked to a Rotary Club and so on, a Foreign Affairs Association meeting in the evening, those were all events. We had close to 6,000. We hit all the states and we also utilized in a very serious way, a little known but very important, amendment to Department regulations. Our Office of Public Programs could be reimbursed by a sponsor for some of the activities, hotel room and so on, of a Foreign Service officer or Civil Service officer speaking on an established, that is on an agreed program. Otherwise for an officer or for the Department to receive money would have been illegal and outside the regulations. We were the only office that had this authority.

What it meant was that we could send a person to San Francisco, have the way paid by the Foreign Affairs Council of San Francisco, and while out there have five or six other events. So, we were able to increase our budget by 75% in a sense over what the allocation from the State Department was. Much of the expansion of our activities was, in fact, at no cost to the Department. But the Department was getting, or the Foreign Affairs community was getting, very good publicity. This was at the time, for example, of

high interest, I must say, with the Vietnam overtones of our activities in Central America-El Salvador and Nicaragua.

There were some very heated weekends in college foreign affairs seminars when some of the military officers who were assigned to the State Department went out along with Foreign Service officers to participate as a panel. I think that was all to the good. It elevated the confusion into some sort of orderly debate where we were then able to get a lot of the information out and pamphlets and guidance right into the hands of people who were trying to figure out what position they would take on our activities in Central America. By no means did we win all hearts and minds. On the contrary. But at least it went from a one-sided shouting match against the State Department to State Department participation in the program. So that I think was very useful.

Q: But on that... I can't remember where, but there was something about almost an independent operation within the State Department about informing around the United States about our Central-America policies.

FRY: What happened was that in the, you might say, high moments of the debate about activities in Nicaragua with the Sandinistas, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs formed a sub grouping which was not the desk and not the country directors, but an office of--the exact name I forget--Central American activities. They had their own speaking program, and not the kind of speaking program which simply went out to the Rotary Club or to a college weekend at the University of Kansas or something like that. These were people who were authorized to deal almost directly with the press, and to appear often on television. We helped to manage the mechanics of those appearances, but we had nothing to do with choosing the sites. They were chosen by this Central American group.

There was criticism of that both in funding and in other ways. It didn't really affect our operation in the sense of what we were doing in Public Affairs, but it was an off-shoot of a policy which was very controversial, in which the Secretary of State and others wanted to have a very sharp handle on what was being said about Central America. We had to have our speakers, who might be going out to talk about the Soviet Union or about Japan, fully briefed on what to say about Central America, if asked on a television talk show or radio program, so that their position was consistent with what the State Department was putting out in general and what this group in particular in the Inter-American Bureau was doing.

Q: Were there any other elements to this period?

FRY: No.

Q: I have something about you being in the UN...

FRY: Yes, I had begun to look for an overseas assignment as 1988 came around. It wasn't clear to me then, as I was getting near the end of my time in Public Affairs in the

springtime, whether I would go overseas again or not. I wouldn't have minded having a deputy assistant secretary job in the Department or a similar ranking job. Then I was approached to see if I would be willing to join the 43rd US delegation to the United Nations. My particular role would be as an advisor on Soviet, Eastern European and European affairs in general. There were usually three or four advisors who were made full members of the delegation and had offices at US UN. The more I thought about this, the more I wanted to do it. For one thing I had never really been involved in what was then Multi-Lateral Diplomacy. I knew a lot about the UN, but not very much about the mechanics of it. I thought that would be very interesting to do. Although you are a member of the delegation for a year, the active work was roughly from the end of August into January.

So I went to the United Nations and I was given that full entree as advisor to the delegation. As a member of the delegation I found it one of the most rewarding and, I must say, exciting experiences of all the time that I was in the Foreign Service. The reason was that when you took that job the officers at USUN, including the ambassador, General Vernon Walters, assumed that you had been picked because you could simply be given either an instruction or general guidelines and then take it from there, as was in the case during my time with the 43rd delegation. There was going to be significant change in policy on the Soviet side. We wanted to cover it as closely as possible and to see where it dove-tailed with other things that were happening under Gorbachev--events that were taking place under perestroika and related economic matters in the Soviet Union, not to mention political-military. Well, I had a good idea of what glasnost in the Soviet Union was and wasn't.

Q: Could you sort of explain... ?

FRY: Glasnost being the idea of openness or a window that Gorbachev was opening on and in Soviet society. Unfortunately, the word opening or opening of a window did not mean the same thing in the Soviet society as it would in the West. However, what it did mean in my interpretation of it was still a remarkable change in how the Soviet Union was doing business and more importantly how it was doing business overseas and in its relations at the UN. So I began right from the first day trying to get to know people at the Soviet Mission and in Eastern European countries.

I renewed contacts with my Nordic friends, particularly Finland, who had a great deal of information on what was going on. During the fall there were many events where votes of interest to us were undecided. Most importantly was a very strong thrust by the Russians to revamp how the UN does business, right from the Military Committee to various things which are arcane to someone not familiar with the mechanics of the General Assembly. It reflected a much mellower, you might say, a much more open Soviet attitude towards things: on caucusing, on getting together. I mean, they were asking us to lunch when that was something relatively rare still. When they had delegates who came to committee meetings only for one or two weeks they were seeking out American lawyers

or American diplomats at the UN that they had heard about and knew were interested in the same subject. In other words, it was a complete change of tone.

I was disappointed, when heads of State were invited to speak, at the speech of President Reagan. I felt that he had a great opportunity in that year to make a real statement about the relationship of the United States to the United Nations in view of the rapidly changing situation in the Soviet Union. He did not do this. I felt that he gave a warm and friendly speech, a little bit to the fact that we would be paying some of our arrearages. But in general--since it was his farewell to the UN--I did not find it up to the caliber that I was hoping for from the American side.

In contrast to that, in what was really the high point of the UN that year in many ways, was the arrival of Gorbachev. He met with President Reagan and then-to-be President Bush on Governor's Island. But that was preceded by a speech which Gorbachev gave--this was in December and long after most people expected any other senior leaders to appear at the General Assembly--a speech which I thought was, if not the most impressive, one of the top five speeches I had heard in my entire life in diplomacy. It was brilliantly executed. It laid out a Soviet position which was quite different than anything that had been expressed before. It expressed great willingness to open cooperation, even to things relating to arms control and disarmament, activities in the Arctic, many other facets of UN life and through UN life of diplomatic life in bilateral relations, that no one really expected. People were looking to a speech that would be reflective of the things that were happening in the Soviet Union, but not as much as he gave. Also I would say his demeanor, the way he delivered the speech, the power of his presentation, was absolutely spellbinding. It was far and away the most impressive speech that was given in 1988 in the UN.

My job was, of course, to listen to the speech. I had planned for some 10 or 15 of my colleagues, immediately at the speech's conclusion, to go out to other embassies, to other delegations, to ask their impressions, to go as high as they could on this. While they were doing this, I went back, wrote up the speech--I knew it would be on the wire services, but I wanted to cap the highlights as quickly as possible--because our President was leaving the next morning to come to New York, and I wanted him to have something from the State Department.

As I was finishing this sort of stream of consciousness, pouring it into the Wang, into our word processor, I didn't even want to stop since my notes were too sketchy to try and dictate it, go up into a secure room and all that. I just blasted it out. People were coming to me and leaving these notes; the Swedish say this, the Romanians say that, whatever it was. The Vatican says that. And I was able to incorporate that feedback. It took about--from the time the speech ended to the time the telegram was sent--two and a half hours, and I look back on it as sort of the high point of yoga-concentration. I mean that I was just so focused on getting this report done and making it as good as possible, that I couldn't believe it was such a short time. We then worked on Gorbachev's meeting with the

President. USUN got kudos, not just for my report, but in general for the whole handling of the visit and the overall reporting.

Subsequently--and this was to my astonishment--I found out that Vice-President Bush had sort of read my cable on the way up, however his advisors had given it to him, and he said: "Now this is the kind of mission reporting--having been ambassador at the UN--that I appreciate, because this is helpful. Now I know how the speech was reflected in the opinion of others whose opinions I respect," such as the Canadian ambassador whom he knew. This was followed by my getting a \$5,000 Presidential Award or whatever they are called. I assumed it was for our work, my colleagues and myself, on the changes in the policy of the Soviet Union in that 43rd UN session of 1988-1989, and the work on the Gorbachev visit and speech.

Q: On that high note what happened?

FRY: When that was completed I actually went back to the UN in the early part of '89, partly because they had had some illnesses in the staff. I served not so much as an advisor in European affairs, but just served as a reporting officer to help close out this 43rd UN session. Another thing that happened which had confused the ending of the session, had made it run much later and therefore put off a lot of things into the springtime, was the fact that Mr. Arafat wanted to come and speak at the United Nations and we would not allow this at that time.

Q: He is the leader of the Palestinians, the PLO...

FRY: Who was the Palestine Liberation Organization leader. And as a result, the UN was very angry with the United States and we were terribly outvoted on this. My dismay was registered with Ambassador Herbert Okun, who was the Deputy Chief of Mission at the UN, in a photograph which appeared in Time magazine. The two of us are sitting at the American desk in the General Assembly with "USA" in front of us, hearing country after country lambaste the US for its small-mindedness in not allowing Mr. Arafat to speak at the UN directly. The look on our faces told how happy we were to be hearing all this. The UN delegates, simply arose as a body, packed up, chartered planes, and flew to Geneva where Arafat talked to the UN in December 1988. But this threw everything in a tailspin in the month of December because it added a week and a half on to the session. So anyway, I worked with the International Organizations Bureau and at the UN until well into the spring.

At that time I did not have an overseas assignment or a Department assignment. I had made an offer previously, because of my interest in the Arctic and northern areas, to get a temporary assignment, as senior officers were more and more frequently allowed to do, under a program where you could do a concrete report that needed doing but just had not been done. What I wanted to do was a summary of how the US had been involved in the Arctic, with suggestions for what our policy might be, and to explain the origin of Presidential statements on the Arctic, which had been in my case President Nixon and

President Reagan. The reason for my suggesting this was that Gorbachev, both in his UN speech and in a previous speech in 1987, had completely changed the whole policy of the Soviet Union in regard to Arctic cooperation.

I knew from my friends in the Polar Affairs Office and in the European Bureau that we--aside from knowing how to answer questions about nuclear-free zones which had been coming up for years--were not prepared to consider the broader implications of what this meant. Not just for American policy, but for NATO policy: for Denmark, Norway, for Iceland, for Canada. Having a background on how we got to where we were, which was simply Cold War rhetoric year after year, might help in understanding what Gorbachev was suggesting. I said maybe four or five months would do it into the summer. I went into the archives. The more I got into it the more involved it got. It led to some peripheral studies on political-military changes in the Arctic areas, in the northern areas. It was the kind of research that desk officers and country directors certainly could have done if they had had the time, but of course they are always tied down to day-to-day operations. So the upshot of all that was that it lasted well into the fall to the end of the year.

Q: You were promoted during this period?

FRY: Yes in the fall of 1989. I had been promoted to Minister-Counselor during that time and was debating then whether I would remain in the Foreign Service to seek an overseas assignment, or whether I felt that as I was reaching my 55th birthday, a deadline you might say--the sort of the end of the line for doing something else in life. Although having been recently promoted, I decided to retire in 1990, though I did some fill-in jobs during that spring working in the Bureau of European Affairs and OES. Things where they just needed a senior officer for a while. That led into my retirement in June of 1990.

Q: Just a brief summary of what you did after you became the August age of 55. What did you do?

FRY: I stayed in Washington about six months after my retirement, kept my security clearance, and helped on some projects both in Public Affairs and in the Historian's Office. I completed a 110 page partly classified project on "US Foreign Policy and International Relations in the Arctic." That was very compatible and worked out well. I had always wanted to teach and since childhood I had enjoyed working with wild animals. I was trying to figure out a way how I could blend both an interest, more than an interest, in the outdoors, with actually working as a veterinarian-type assistant or working with wild animals who had been injured, or were under scientific investigation, and then teaching at the same time.

How that was resolved was through a series of fortuitous events tying into the University of Alaska in Fairbanks after I moved from DC to Olympia, Washington, where I had built a home. A new graduate program at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) was entitled: "Northern Studies." They were filling out the curriculum and I suggested a course called: The History of US Arctic Politics. It was built in substantial measure on

what I had learned both in my project in the Senior Seminar and in my detail to the Historian's Office for the paper on US Arctic policies. This shows that there is not only a life after the Foreign Service, but it may well be an extension, in a very nice way, of the things you were doing for the Department of State.

I developed a course in Fairbanks with a professor who was on the faculty. We taught it first in 1992. We've continued to teach it every other year, and in the meantime I often lecture on parts of the course in the spring and fall.

While I was in Alaska working on this program, I also started working as a volunteer, that is not as a paid member of the faculty or anything, at the Large Animal Research Station, which is outside of Fairbanks, but is part of the Institute of Arctic Biology of the University of Alaska. As time went on, I enjoyed that work more and more, became integrated into the program, learned to work with Arctic animals, muskoxen, reindeer and caribou. I learned the computer programs for monitoring them at certain times of the year when they are watched day and night as part of a long-term nutritional, reproduction study. Between the fall of 1991 and the fall of 1995, I have worked up there about three times a year, sometimes as long as two months. In 1993 I traveled 600 miles on the Porcupine River collecting information for a book I am writing on the survey of the 141th Meridian--The Alaska-Yukon Boundary; an article on a smallpox epidemic in Alaska in 1911 has been accepted by "Alaska History Magazine." I have lots of "work in progress." In 1996 I'll be site manager for an archaeological dig on the Chukchi Sea near Barrow, Alaska.

My life in Olympia developed as I had hoped. I didn't know anybody when I moved out there, but now I work with several civic and community affairs programs. I serve on the editorial advisory panel of the "Daily Olympian," the Gannett newspaper. I'm vice president of the World Affairs Council, and the Olympia Opera Guild. I work at the Olympic Wildlife Refuge Center where I began the practical task of learning how to care for injured wildlife. The work I hope will lead to a state license as a wildlife rehabilitator, for which near the end of 1995 I had accrued about 850 hours towards the 1,000 required. So, my life after the Foreign Service has been very interesting and enjoyable. However, the Foreign Service itself continues to play an important role in my life because I am very much involved in volunteering at the local universities, at the foreign affairs community gatherings in the Puget Sound area, and contribute and help arrange for speakers and am a resource myself. That has proved to be very exciting. This is an area of the United States in which there is a great deal of interest in foreign affairs and specifically in the Pacific Rim in relations with Asia, about which I knew very little. I have been able to bring people out from the State Department and to recommend programs. So it has been a nice tie-in with my State career.

Q: Well, thank you very much.

End of interview