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INTERVIEW

Q: I wonder if you would give a little background; when and where you were born, a bit about your family background, and where you were educated.

GREENE: I was born in New York City, April 9, 1920. My parents were both New Englanders, although from different directions. My mother's side of the family had been seafarers and traders in Connecticut and New London, the Lawrence family of New London. My father's family, the Greene family, was actually an Army family. My grandfather had married an Adams from Massachusetts, so I always thought of myself as a born-again Yankee.

I went to day school locally in Pelham Manor, New York, and then I went away to Hotchkiss School, graduating from there in 1937. I went to Yale in the class of 1941.

While I was at Yale, I spent time visiting my grandmother still at the Lawrence home nearby in Milford. One of her sons, my mother's brother, was at that time in the Foreign Service. He was a language officer in China, married to a local Milford girl. During my freshman and sophomore years, I remember the way he talked about the Foreign Service and I knew it was something I wanted to do. I majored in international relations at Yale with Arnold Wolfers. Fred Dunn was the International Law professor. It was a great roster of professors, including, on American diplomatic history, Samuel Flagg Bemis and A. Whitney Griswold. So it was pretty heady stuff.

I guess I got a little better than acceptable marks, and came to Washington the summer after graduation in 1941 and went to Colonel Campbell Turner's cram school for the Foreign Service exam. One of the teachers was Dean Acheson and, as it turned out, I got my best marks in the written exam in economics. It was the subject that Dean Acheson taught. In those days, the Foreign Service Entrance Exam was three and a half days long. It was all essay questions.

Having surmounted the written exam, but before I was called for the oral exam, along came Pearl Harbor. I, meanwhile, had taken a low-level job at Phillips Andover on the understanding that if I were appointed to the Foreign Service I could leave. Even before my oral exam, in circumstances I only later came to fully understand, the State Department wrote all of us who looked like we were going to get jobs in the Foreign Service. We were asked if we would join the visa division, which at that time was overwhelmed with trying to regularize the status of thousands of refugees from Europe.
So, my first job on the payroll was to settle the fate of whether people whose files were sent to me would be allowed to stay in or come to the United States. I had nothing more than a guide sheet referencing something about public dependency, good behavior and no prison record as criteria to consider. When they were approved they had to go somewhere for a visa; they usually went to Montreal or Toronto. Only much later did I comprehend the enormity of the refugee problem that Uncle Sam was dealing with, particularly the Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe.

Pearl Harbor happened in December and I passed the oral exam, I think in January. Joe Green, was the chairman of the board of examiners at that time. Even before Pearl Harbor, my friends were going off to join the Marines, the Army, and the Navy. I remember Howland Shaw, and particularly the Board of Examiners, saying the Foreign Service was just as important as the other services. And the administration's policy was just that. They assured us that if they wanted us and we wanted the Foreign Service, they would square it with the draft boards. My decision was simple, I had invested a lot of time and effort to get in the Foreign Service.

Meanwhile, a nice young lady whom I had gotten to know from Lake Forest, Illinois said she'd marry me. We were married in March, 1942 and went off to my first posting, Montreal, where the Consul General was Homer M. Byington. I found out only after I got to Montreal that he had been chief of personnel when my Uncle Larry had been asked to leave the Foreign Service. Evidently, while Uncle Larry was in language school in Peking he was living too well. As chief of personnel, Byington, fired him, but later didn't seem to hold it against me.

At that first post, I quickly realized that after studying international relations, government, law and international economics, I was the only one who thought I was ready for that great world out there. At the grunt-work level, the Foreign Service isn't very romantic. Along with another neophyte, Jim O'Sullivan, I was assigned to the task of dealing with border-crossing traffic, natives of Canada who wanted to visit their friends in the United States. I wasn't even in the immigrant-visa mill. It was just a daily routine of border-crossing-temporary visas which was a pain in everybody's neck and didn't do much to preserve our security. But, one did what one was told.

Byington was a good teacher. He didn't let you lose heart by the routine and quite simple level of the work. One day I asked whether I could do something. His answer has stayed with me all these years. He asked me whether I had ever heard of the monk story. Well, I hadn't. It seems there was a young fellow who joined the monastery. His first day after lunch he joined the other brothers out in the garden. He looked around and went over to the abbot to ask if it was alright to smoke there. The abbot said no, it was not allowed. "But those brothers over there behind the big rhododendron bush are smoking." And the abbot said, "Ah, my son, but they didn't ask." The lesson learned was, before you ask a question be sure you need to know the answer and that you can live with the answer.
I remember one day, the counselor, the number two in the embassy in Ottawa came by, Lewis Clark. Only later did I find out that he was recruiting for a junior political officer in Ottawa. I guess I did something right because I was transferred to Ottawa in the summer of 1943. We had been in Montreal about a year.

I loved doing political reporting and reading all that I could. It was fun getting to know people who would tell me things. One of the most valuable contacts I made, most interesting for me and useful for whatever we were doing at the time, was Jack Pickersgill, the assistant to the prime minister Mackenzie King. We had lunch every two or three weeks. In my innocence, I assumed this was a great advantage to me. Only when I grew older could I see it from another perspective, and appreciate he was getting something out of it too.

We didn't have an ambassador, Pierrepont Moffat had died while I was in Montreal. Ray Atherton had come along and he was a real pro. From him and Lewis Clark, I observed how senior professionals behave; the importance of attention to detail, the importance of sharing what you find out, and being careful what you share outside the embassy.

Q: In the luncheons with the assistant to Mackenzie King, did you get any impression of the prime minister? He was sort of an interesting character, a long-time minister; but also he sort of lived in his own world.

GREENE: I don't remember what I got from a whole range of Canadian junior diplomats with whom I kept in touch. What I do remember is before our departure from post, the Athertons very kindly included us in a dinner for the prime minister at their residence. Mr. King was such a cool customer, a man unto himself. I've never forgotten one of the things he said in conversation that night: "In politics never make a decision until you have to. The art is knowing when you have to." (A later extension of that I learned at someone else's knee: Politics is the art of timing.) Mackenzie King was a consummate political artist and he cultivated his relationship with Franklin Roosevelt very carefully. What I didn't realize at the time, and don't know how many people in the embassy did, was that the two leaders were discussing the uranium mines in Canada leading up to the Manhattan Project. The project was nuclear research which led to the atomic bomb.

Until 1944 in the context of the presidential election the administration's position was that Foreign Service officers' work was just as important to the national effort as anybody with a gun. The State Department figured if I were assigned to the new embassy for Italy, which was waiting in Algiers, the Department could notify my draft board that I was doing important work in a dangerous place and should be left there.

Everyone didn't share that view. For example, Mrs. Patterson, the publisher of the Washington Times Herald, published a rather strident piece in the context of the 1944 election campaign. It drew attention to what she called the State Department's draft dodging.
I went to Algiers and then to Italy with Alexander Kirk who was the Ambassador-designate to liberated Italy. We waited in Algiers until we could go to Italy. Meanwhile, the State Department notified all the draft boards we were now at their disposal. (I was in Rome by the time the news trickled down to me, 6-8 months later.)

Q: You were sent from Ottawa to Algiers, is that right?

GREENE: I spent only a short time in Algiers before I went on to join Ambassador Kirk's neo-mission, then in Naples. Since I was the most junior on the staff, I was the administrative officer. That meant dealing mostly with the US Army and the people who had requisitioned the villa we were in. We had our own mess in the villa up on a hill out of harm's way. There were anti-aircraft batteries on either side of us.

At some point, the Allied Military Government Headquarters in Naples, which was a subordinate command to Allied Forces Headquarters in Caserta, told the ambassador they needed someone to help them with daily political issues. I was assigned to the office of Samuel Reber, the Political Adviser to General Jumbo Wilson of the British 8th Army.

Q: I remember one question that came up when the American 5th Army was trying to get past Monte Cassino and it was a bitter bloody fight. One issue was the Benedictine Monastery.

GREENE: General Wilson asked the Political Advisers what to do about the Benedictine Monastery, should it be blown up? Ambassador Kirk said we had better first find out about the Benedictine monks there. That was hard to do without going there. But, as a political officer, I wrote something that saved the monastery, at least initially. Eventually, we went after it with the Air Force and it turned out that the Germans had not been using it.

Anyway, we stayed in Naples until there was somewhere to go in Rome. Rome was liberated almost the same day as D-day. The same day they were landing on Omaha Beach, the American troops were arriving in Rome. Not long thereafter the ambassador okayed our moving to Rome. He arranged with the Army to requisition Palazzo Marguerita on Via Veneto, which had been the Queen Mother's residence. In the gardens adjoining it there were two small villas which had been the American Embassy and the American Consulate when Ambassador Kirk had been counselor there before Pearl Harbor. (He was back in Italy in 1944 because he knew his way around the country.) He knew his way around Germany, too; he had been in Berlin until Pearl Harbor.

Ambassador Kirk was eccentric to a degree. He affected to not be able to stand the sight of glass. Anywhere he lived, his aide, Alfred Horn's first task was to buy up all the white wallpaper in town and have it applied to the inside of all the windows where he was.

Kirk was tall, thin and lanky and carried a long cigarette holder. He wore all grey clothes. He had a mind like a steel trap. He was really quick, smart and clever. But one didn't dwell on his eccentricities.
When we had to move he said I was reverting to administrative officer status. It was my job to fix it with the Army for us to have offices in the Palazzo Marguerita. One of the first things I did in Rome was to seek out an Italian teacher. I had been studying Italian in Naples. Signora Marchi, who was to go on and teach a whole generation of Foreign Service officers including Ambassador Reinhardt, taught me grammar while she taught the ambassador about Dante. She came every morning to the embassy.

Walter Cecil Dowling replaced Johnny Jones in Rome. Walter, through contacts he had made in earlier, happier days in Rome, was able to wangle a flat in the Palazzo Colonna down near the Piazza Venezia. That was really the center of old Rome. Beautiful. He invited me to share the flat and I happily accepted. We commuted, we had embassy cars to get us around town and back up to Via Veneto.

Not long after we got there in August or September, came a message from the draft board. I had been drafted and was to report to the training depot at US Army Headquarters, Naples, for enlistment in the Army and assignment to basic training in southern Italy. I didn't think much of that idea and didn't want to be in the Army, so somehow I wangled a ride home with the Navy. An airplane took me to Rabat and there I wangled another ride on an old, four-propeller seaplane. We went to Ireland and eventually got home. I reported to the draft board and eventually wound up in Navy boot camp.

On my way through Washington, I went to see my old history professor from Yale, Sherman Kent. He was then with William Langer in the Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis Division. I told him I was on my way back to boot camp and asked if there were any openings in OSS. There weren't. So I went off to boot camp and there was a delay; I got sick for a couple of weeks and fell back one class. I was coming out of boot camp in January, 1945, with orders to report as Seaman 2nd Class to a battleship in Norfolk when a young ensign said he had orders for me. I was sworn in as an ensign and told I was going to the OSS in Washington to the Office of Research and Analysis. I said fine, got suited up in my ensign suit, turned in my Seaman II Class suit, and met my wife in Washington. I went around to see Sherman Kent to thank him and to ask what had happened. The Germans got one of our guys so now there was a vacancy.

In order for me to be assigned to the OSS, Kent had to say I was an expert on Italy and spoke good Italian. They wanted me to make my way around Italy doing more research and analysis than special operations, but they wanted me to spend a little time in Washington getting ready. I went to language school and was told what the US priorities and targets were.

I was in my Berlitz Italian lesson on that April day when FDR died. We all wondered what was going to happen. Then one day I got a notice from General Donovan's office, he was the commanding general of the Office of Strategic Services. He said he was going to London and he would be glad to give me a lift as far as London. He was the kind of general
who wanted to talk to all the troops. I can't remember what we talked about, but I came away thinking what a great outfit OSS was.

Eventually I made my way back to Italy, just about V-E Day, in May, 1945. They still had a lot of lines out they wanted to pursue but I was able to pick up some political reporting wearing a navy suit. I lived in the BOQ; I wasn't part of the embassy, although that was where all my buddies were. Eventually I moved into an OSS compound with a guy named Charlie Hughes, a brilliant scholar who went back to Harvard. Martin Gibson was there, and Phil Mangano. Our job was overt political reporting, nothing covert. I resumed my study of Italian.

By May, the American 5th Army and the British 8th Army had gotten as far as Trieste. The British Commander was General John Harding of the 13th Corps. Mark Clark was Commander of the 5th Army. Both armies had parts of the real estate in Trieste at their disposal for offices and billets. I had been to Trieste once from Rome. Hans Lansburgh, who later got into difficulty because his loyalty was questioned, I think unfairly, but he and I made an exploratory visit to Trieste. On the basis of that one outing, I went back to Rome and wrote up my assessment of who was who and what was what.

Then in June, the Army said they needed a political adviser in Trieste. This young Naval Officer who had nothing much in the OSS left to do, we had won the war, or we had won that part of the war, was sent back to Trieste as a political adviser. The British political adviser was William John Sullivan, a merry round little fellow. The commander of the military government was an American, Colonel Al Bowman who was a rough and ready type. One of his rough and ready officers from the Treasury Department called Lane Timmons, a brilliant financier who joined the Foreign Service after he got out of uniform. In the 1960's he was minister in New Delhi and then ambassador in Haiti. One thing I had to do to be on an even footing with the British political adviser in a British Corps Command Headquarters was to get out of my navy suit. You can't have an ensign sitting in with four-star generals telling them what you think ought to be done. I don't know to this day whether John Harding understood my true status. I was attached to a navy outpost in Rome for pay and administrative purposes. We had an understanding, except for when I was in Rome, I wouldn't wear my uniform. I decided then I would never make a good undercover agent. Later, someone I worked for said I was too literal minded because I argued about the way something was expressed in a position or speech. In those days I was too literal-minded to be a spy or to appear to be something that I really wasn't. I knew I was in the navy and hoped no one else knew.

Most of my job was to keep Al Bowman, Military Governor, and General John Harding aware of what was going on. Tito's people were trying to make trouble and get Trieste for Yugoslavia. The 88th Division had the frontier with Slovenia and Croatia but General Moore (American) had his headquarters in Udine, I had to go out there often. They had their own military intelligence sources, but because I wasn't in uniform, I could mingle with the civilian population and in particular the press. The local press was very hostile. All those
years under fascism, they were accustomed to doing what they were told. Suddenly, the allies were advertising democracy and free press.

There was a joint Allied Information Service, British and American. Everything was joint, we were co-equals. The American in charge was Charlie Moffly, a very astute, low-key journalist. He was well connected and we were able to find out things other couldn't. I reported to the Political Adviser Homer Morrison Byington, Jr. in Caserta which was where Allied Headquarters was. Since I was still in the navy, that was my chain of command. Then, Byington reported to the embassy what they wanted to know.

One day General John Harding felt the press had gone too far: maligning the Allied Military Government, inciting sedition and rioting and misbehavior. And sure enough, we had a riot and the military police had a hard time. He called a meeting at his headquarters in Duino Castle, which he had requisitioned from a well-to-do family of Austria. We sat around discussing what to do with these rags to which accuracy didn't matter. General Harding was very indignant and felt the best thing was for the Allied Military Government to close them down. It seemed most people sitting around that circle agreed we should close them down. But when they got to this 26-year-old I said it would be a big mistake to shut them down. It would leave a bunch of reporters with nothing to do but brood. Not to mention, this was the opposite of democracy and a free press. My advice was ignored, and the press was shut down. Naturally, once they were again allowed to print, it was worse. The lesson there was if you think you have it right, say so. If you are a minority of one, tough luck.

Q: Were we getting anything from the Yugoslav side as far as intelligence, intentions, land operations of the Yugoslavs under Tito?

GREENE: I don't remember that Sullivan or we civilians picked up much of anything except for what their local minions put out through their newspapers. They had a very strong communist party organization, and the organized political voices in Trieste were monopolized by Tito's partisans. It was clear he wasn't about to concede that Trieste belonged to anyone but him. We were a holding operation at that time, trying to hold Trieste for the Italians. Since we had won the war, we felt neither Yugoslavia or Italy was going to run that place, until we, the Allied Military Government, decided what was going to happen to it. Tito said he thought he was on our side. The Ustashi (Croatian Fascists), who had been on the Nazi side, were a lot closer physically to Trieste in some ways than the Serbian partisans. The Ustashi were really nasty. The Chetniks were just as nasty, they were the Serbian Nationalists. The Triestines just wished it would all stop so they could get on with their lives.

For a long time in my working life I couldn't shake the time I spent there in Trieste, during which Harry Truman abolished the OSS. Obviously, the war was over and we didn't need a secret intelligence service any longer. That was in August or September. But I was still in the navy and they told me to just sit tight for awhile.
I was living in the army hotel but my family was still in the States. As the Peace Conference in Paris got underway in early 1946, Trieste came up. The Foreign Ministers agreed to have a Commission of Inquiry to go out there and see what was going on. Philip Mosley, a distinguished professor at Columbia before and after the war, was part of the US Delegation to the Peace Conference, and headed the Commission of Inquiry. He was a linguist and could do things I couldn't or hadn't thought to do. The commission went down to Istria and Pola and talked to people on the street in their own language, whether it was Italian or Serbo-Croatian. They could ask them whether they really wanted to be with their brothers in Serbia-Croatia -- Yugoslavia or with Italy.

By late summer of 1946 I had enough points to get out of the navy. I went to Naples where I was discharged and could again be assigned to the embassy in Rome. By then, David Key was the chargé until James Clement Dunn came as ambassador.

Q: Before you left Trieste, what was the prevailing feeling? The British Army and American components were sitting on Italian soil, basically, dealing with this troubled spot. Was their a bias toward Italian rule? From what I gather there really wasn't a lot of contact with the partisans.

GREENE: We didn't let them in and we didn't let the Italians into the government. It didn't solve the question that went back to the time Trieste had been the Adriatic port of Austrian-Hungarian empire. That was the historical circumstance to Tito's logic of why we should give it to him. After all, he had been on the winning side of the war. But we didn't want to just give it to him because there was a lot of Italian business, ship building and insurance, and it was still an entrepot for the Austrian hinterland. It was hard to get there, the roads had all been destroyed in the war. The Italians were very insistent to reclaim Trieste and the job of the British and American military was to keep them out. The Italians were certainly not in a position to try and take it physically, but the Serbo-Croatians were in a position to try and grab it and later did try.

As I said, for a long time I couldn't shake Trieste. I hadn't been in Rome very long in 1946 when they decided neither one was going to get Trieste. They were going to follow the Potsdam example of WWI and make it a free city, like Danzig. I was summoned to Paris to help design that. The way to design a free territory of Trieste was to write their constitution. So I spent a month or so in Paris with the American delegation drafting what came to be called the Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste, the basic constitution which became part of the Italian Peace Treaty.

As an aside, years later, when I was Deputy Assistant Secretary in International Organizations, the State Department had passed a new language proficiency requirement to qualify for further promotion. I boned up on my Italian and went to take the exam. The examiner handed me something in Italian and told me to read it to him in English. So, I started reading it and the examiner stopped me and asked me whether I had ever seen it before. It was the statute for the Free Territory. I told him, well, I drafted it. That was in 1969 or 1970.

Q: You keep mentioning Caserta.
GREENE: It was a place about 30 miles northeast of Naples, a huge palace put up by the Neapolitan Bourbons and it was used as the Allied Headquarters. During the wind-up process of the military establishment, General Clifford Courthouse Lee was the last Allied Commander. He moved his headquarters to Leghorn, the port through which everything was leaving. He asked for a political adviser and the ambassador and the DCM naturally thought of me. So, I commuted from Rome. General Lee also had a British political adviser named Peter Scarlet. Scarlet and Greene--there were a lot of jokes made about the colorful political advisers.

It wasn't all fun, however. One of the residues of the Allied Military Government was the fate of a couple of dozen Ustashi (the Croatian Nazis) that the Allied forces had captured. They were very fierce, unforgiving fighters who had done a lot of unpleasant things to people on all sides. Tito wanted to get his hands on these guys and they were in an allied prison camp somewhere in Italy. With 20/20 hindsight, Scarlet and Greene were assigned the task of reviewing the files of those really nasty characters to decide what should happen to them. Whether they should be tried by an allied court or turned over to the Yugoslav authorities. All we had to go by were their military dossiers compiled by a lot of intelligence to decide their fate, there was certainly no due process. I don't remember what our decisions were but we did decide them all and in short order. I don't regard that as one of my finest moments. But again, it was a learning experience. If you are asked to do something, don't be stampeded into doing it if you don't feel it is right. General Lee was a good guy in many ways but he was anxious to get the many jobs done.

Q: Had General Lee been Commander of Allied Supplies on D-Day and what was he like?

GREENE: I was his American Political Adviser, I was his direct communication to the American Ambassador and he had no desire to cross wires with the ambassador. To me he was very helpful. Whenever I had to go anywhere he would call up a plane. He wanted to get the job done and if that meant Greene needed to go somewhere, he wasn't going to argue about it.

Q: What was Jimmy Dunn like?

GREENE: He was very urbane, very calm, cool and collected. I don't remember ever seeing him lose his cool. I had the greatest regard for him. He expressed himself clearly and knew what questions to ask. He had an inquiring mind, never took anything for granted. Back in Washington, they were tired of hearing about the problems, they wanted answers. He was thoughtful, the soul of care and concern. His compassion was more likely to be aroused than his temper. He didn't suffer fools gladly but he had a great touch. The Italians trusted him, as did the administration in Washington.

Q: As the Italians moved from a war-time situation to re-instituting themselves, what was the feeling about political parties? Were you trying to "de-fascist" the parties?
GREENE: That had happened long before in the context of the armistice with Italy in 1943. The partisans caught up with Mussolini and strung him up in Milan and then the allies found a General Badoglio to head up an interim government to take charge of the infrastructure of governing Italy. That was the situation until the Peace Treaty came into effect. We didn't concede that Italy had full sovereignty over its political affairs until late 1946 or early 1947. Meanwhile, we encouraged the revival of democratic parties. After the end of Mussolini and the advent of Badoglio, there was hardly a fascist to be found. There was a small party of a few die-hard fascists called the MSI (Movimento Socialista Italiano). We, the French and the British were trying to do whatever we could to foster the growth of political parties. And from our point of view, the more democratic the better. The Christian Democrats were our party of choice. And then there were the Socialists, and the Communist Party. They captured the trade union, had a loud, noisy, and articulate following, and got a lot of support money and rhetorical support from Moscow.

After the Peace Treaty crept up toward the democratic elections in 1948, there was much concern that the communists might get a majority in the Parliament and all us democrats would be stuck with them. So Uncle Sam went to considerable pains to back the Christian Democrats, a lot of money went to them covertly. We denied it, and continue to deny it, particularly to newspapers. We Americans tried to demonstrate we were good friends of the Italian government. The interim government was Christian Democrat.

In March, 1948, the Americans, British and French announced that they thought they had made a big mistake in the Italian Peace Treaty--taking Trieste away from Italy and establishing it as a free territory--and thought Trieste should be returned to Italy. This made the people in Belgrade and Moscow very cross. I'm not sure if it did us that much good in the vote, but it vindicated De Gasperi's friendly posture toward Italy's liberators. It was one of the major gestures we made publicly. It turned out to be an albatross politically. But in the end the Christian Democrats won enough seats in the Parliament to form a coalition with the Republican Party. Again, in all of that, Jimmy Dunn was so artistic, deft.

Q: Was there any effort at the time to woo many of the socialists away from the communists? Italy had a peculiar thing happen to it; whereas the socialist parties in France and Germany came back and acted as a real counter to both the communists and the moral conservative Christian Democratic movements and allowed for a change back and forth in those countries, in Italy the socialists essentially got swallowed up by the communists.

GREENE: There was the Partito d'Azione, as part of the socialists' network. I can remember a lot of my contacts were with guys in that party as well as Christian Democrats. I can't remember sitting down for a conversation with communists. We had a very adroit labor attaché named John Adams from Syracuse University. We left that part of the beat to him, seeing the trade unionists in the CGIL. The non-communist trade unions had a very hard time even though we were putting a lot of money through the international office in Brussels trying to foster non-communist and, hopefully, anti-communist trade unions in Europe. It was called the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU. But it
was dangerous. The communist party trade unions were rough necks. It was a trade union there to deliver votes to the party. In the end, the Christian Democrats obtained a majority in the 1948 election and quickly chose a president.

Q: Was it a real feeling that communists might get, if not a majority, at least a working coalition?

GREENE: Yes, to be able to lead a coalition. The Action Party wasn't all that keen. There were two parties, the PSI and the Partito d'Azione which was socialist who did not want to be in the PSI because they were too close to the communists. There was real concern and that is why the Americans, French and British put so much effort and resources into forestalling Togliatti's communist party from getting hold of the levers of power in 1948-49 in Italy. And it worked for awhile. The Italian governments, were notably unstable. The coalitions were shaky. Italian politicians are world-class prima donnas and they are much more selfish than I ever thought party politicians ought to be.

Q: When you left Rome, you returned to the State Department, to be the Italian Desk Officer from 1949-1952. What were the issues you were dealing with?

GREENE: Before I got to the Italian Desk--the seat wasn't vacant yet--I was assigned to the then new office in the budding CIA, called the Office of Policy Coordination that Frank Wisner headed. The reason for that was, I had spent some time as a junior political officer in the embassy in Rome on the problems of Albania. What OPC wanted was to see if there were any avenues to de-stabilize Enver Hoxha. So I spent three to four months consulting with others who were in the business of "dirty tricks." We were interested in cooking up schemes of events which would provoke the demise of the communist region in Albania. Once I left my interim assignment, and reported to the Italian Desk job, I didn't hear anything more about it until almost 1986 or 1987 when a journalist in Boston who had done a book on a British Operative, Fitzroy McLean, and had come across something about Albania. My name came up and the journalist called me. But I pleaded amnesia or a case of mistaken identity.

Q: Can you talk a little about how one looked at Albania at that time and how we tried to de-stabilize it?

GREENE: I really don't remember the particulars, but it was a political action plan rather than a military action one without anyone getting hurt. Starting with the few Albanians still hanging around Italy and plenty of them in what was then Yugoslavia. But all of that was communist territory. It was long before the Bay of Pigs.

But back to Italy. You asked me what our principal preoccupations were. In the wake of the 1948 elections, in which the communists had been defeated, the thrust of American policy was to sustain both politically and economically the concept of democracy in Italy while completing the Italian Peace Treaty. In that connection, a good deal of my time was spent
on making sure the British/American administration of Trieste kept the Italians and Yugoslavs at bay until that almost free territory could run itself. The Yugoslavs made a couple of attempts to move in by force. The Italians never tried to move in by force. They did try to insinuate themselves and their system into the political life. One particular issue crystallized many of the other issues: The jurisdiction of the Italian court of Cassation in Trieste. That is an appeals court in the Italian judicial system and the Italians tried to insinuate themselves into the allied administration of a Free Territory utilizing their control over the course of events in the Court of Cassation. For all the reasons that bespoke bucking up De Gasperi, we wanted to help. But they went too far and got caught at it; we could not let them infiltrate through the judicial system what they couldn't accomplish through the political system directly. And although Tito had split with Moscow, Moscow as a communist signatory of the Peace Treaty, wasn't going to do us any favors, especially as their party, headed by Palmiro Togliatti, was still a force in Italy and they didn't want to do De Gasperi's supporters any favor doing something that would embarrass Togliatti.

I recall being sent out to Rome and Trieste, where we were represented by Leonard Unger, to try to get a modus vivendi, at least de facto, on the Court of Cassation issue. Ellsworth Bunker was then the ambassador. We finally got one acceptable to the British and ourselves.

The other aspect of the Italian Peace Treaty on which I spent some time in both Washington and with the United Nations at Lake Success, was the disposition of the Italian colonies. I spent at least one summer, 1950 probably, negotiating with the British and the Italians a formulation of what to do with Libya and Eritrea. The Italians had a pretty strong delegation in New York that summer and fall headed by Leonardo Vitetti. Libya was finally set up as an independent state with all three provinces in it. Eritrea was set up as a province of Ethiopia to the Eritreans' considerable chagrin. Forty years later, they fought their way out, and they are now independent.

On the Trieste issue as well as the Italian colonies, we worked hand in glove with the British. We had to do everything in complete understanding with them.

Q: Was there any discussion about letting Eritrea have its independence or not?

GREENE: I don't recall if there was. That was a time of trusteeships and the question was whether to perpetuate the trusteeship. Mind you, the UN had only 50 odd members and it was easy to get things done. And we were the winners in the war, we were running things into the early ’50s. The economic aid program was a major ingredient of our policy toward Italy. Dunn and then Bunker were very influential ambassadors who managed to keep the political environment positive for giving economic assistance to the struggling Christian Democratic government in Italy. We also had some pretty sophisticated political action programs that the CIA was running to undermine the communists, one of whose major instrumentalities was the CGIL. That was quite a force in organized labor--the Free Trade Unions who had an international labor organization also. Irving Brown in Brussels was our
way to try and get into organized labor. But again I am talking more politics than economics.

My chronology may not be 100% correct, but at some point the Italian government, when Truman was still President, announced they wanted to give the US a token of their appreciation for all the Americans had done from the end of the war, when they changed sides, up to the early ‘50s. They offered enormous bronze equestrian statues that are on the northwest end of the Memorial Bridge in Washington. De Gasperi came over for that and Truman attended the dedication ceremony. It was a great show.

President Truman had a great knack for keeping awkward cats off his back by going back to simple basics. Whether he had read all the briefing papers we so laboriously had put together or not, he would simply say we have to keep peace in Europe; we are starting to put NATO together. It was such a simple concept, hard to carry out, but he didn't take his eye off the ball. All of this good friendship was not without its detractors, particularly in Congress. It was recalled that it wasn't all that long ago that these fascists spawned the Nazis and then lined up with them against us.

About the Immigration Act of 1950 or 1951: one of the crosses I had to help carry on the Italian Desk and in the Bureau of European Affairs, was a provision banning visa eligibility, thereby banning from admission to the US anybody who had ever been a member of the fascist party. This caused great consternation in the Bureau of European Affairs, in our embassy in Rome and in the body politic in Italy. We were all so literal minded that we took the language that came out in that law and wrote instructions to the embassy and consulates about what they had to ask people, all of whom had been fascists as a matter of survival or convenience. So we disqualified for admission to the United States most of the adult population of Italy whose friendship we were trying to attract so they wouldn't go communist. I don't think anyone thought of discussing the issue of congressional intent. What did they really intend to do? We should have ascertained that before issuing any instructions on how to carry out the law.

The Trieste part of the Italian Peace Treaty continued to be a problem, especially the concept of a Free Territory that no one really wanted. One of the pressure points was the joint British, French, American declaration of March 1948 seeking to curry favor for our friends in the Italian elections declaring we thought in the end Trieste should become Italian. That declaration became a monument standing in the path of almost everything we wanted to do. Whenever anything else came up, the Italians would ask us when we were going to make good on it. The Yugoslavs didn't like it at all. I was the note taker when George Perkins (Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) met with the Yugoslavs in New York during one of the UN General Assembly sessions. The Yugoslav ambassador several times requested the US government retract the proposition of March, 1948 that Trieste be returned to Italy. A technique I learned from George Perkins: he said that would be very difficult for us to do. The Yugoslavs eventually gave up and went away never having heard a flat "no" that they could attack but never hearing what they wanted to hear either.
Against all that background, one more time in the spring of 1952 we had started to devise some kind of formula to get the Italians more involved in the administration of Trieste without having the Yugoslavs blow us out of the water. A three-month conference with the British and Italians in London in the spring of 1952 did not get it done.

But before I move on to Singapore, there is one more thing about my time on the Italian Desk that I think I should touch on, lest it be forgotten.

In addition to other jobs, I was desk officer for the Vatican. Just before General MacArthur was fired in 1951, President Truman nominated General Mark Clark to be ambassador to the Vatican. I never learned what impelled Mr. Truman to stick his neck out like that and seek to supplant an arrangement whereby previous Presidents had appointed a Personal Representative of the President to His Holiness The Pope. For many years this was Myron Taylor. Taylor's sole assistant in that job had been a Foreign Service Officer named Franklin Gowen, who was remarkably inconspicuous in minding the store in Rome. The store was in one of the little villas on the grounds of Villa Marguerita where the US Embassy was. The store was two or three rooms and Frank Gowen never talked much about what he did and every once in a while Myron Taylor would come to town and they would go off to see The Holy Father; the whole network of relationships with the clergy through the American College was kept very quiet.

Sometime in late 1947, early 1948, J. Graham Parsons replaced Frank Gowen. He had been primed by CIA to try and get a little more out of the position. Mr. Taylor found out about that and Jeff Parsons was on his way to India within the week and Frank Gowen was back in Rome. But in the meantime, Myron Taylor would come to Washington every once in a while and he would take me to lunch. He would do most of the talking. I think he was trying to find out who was doing what to whom in Italian relations and how things were in the bureaucracy. At one point he even suggested I be the one to go back to Rome and take that job when Frank Gowen had to leave. I certainly was not at all interested in pursuing that.

When Mark Clark was nominated to be ambassador, all hell broke loose on Capitol Hill; it became a highly sectarian, really undignified battle. An awful lot of people in the US felt it was inappropriate for the United States to have a formal diplomatic relationship with the Pope of Rome. The President took a lot of heat. Mark Clark must have known what he was getting into. My job was to draft learned briefings about how and to what extent the Vatican is a sovereign state, with which the US could properly have diplomatic relations.

I remember the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, calling me to his office to explain myself on why the Vatican was an independent state and why it was all right to have an American ambassador there. He was very loyal to the president and wanted to get done what the president wanted if he could. We were interrupted when he turned on the radio to hear General MacArthur's farewell speech to Congress. The punch line was: Old soldiers never die, they just fade away. Before that, he had been pretty hard on the Administration, the Secretary of Defense and the President.
Q: How was Acheson responding to what he was hearing?

GREENE: He was a very cool customer. For him the worst was over. For the president, the worst was over. The guy was fired, so let him say whatever he wanted. But well into the speech I did comment to the secretary that it must be pretty tough for him. And he said, "Don't worry, time wounds all heels." Dean Acheson was a very shrewd man.

The Trieste thing came to an end in early 1953. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson was designated very secretly to go off to London with the British and the Yugoslavs and Italians. Over a long period of time they renegotiated an amendment to the Italian Peace Treaty which everyone was happy with to get that part of the Italian Peace Treaty off the books. Trieste came back to Italy, and Istria was partitioned. Most of the hinterland around Trieste went to Slovenia, which was Yugoslavia.

Q: You were assigned to Singapore from 1952-54. What were you doing there?

GREENE: I was a political officer. I think folks in the Department thought I needed a change. But it wasn't that much of a change because I had started in a British Commonwealth country and here I was returning to a British colony. The principal concern out in Malaysia was the communist guerrilla attempt to de-stabilize the British government of Malaysia.

General Sir Gerald Templar was the military commander of the British counter-terrorist effort in the Malay states. Malcolm MacDonald was the British Commissioner General in Singapore where he had a large regional intelligence brief. Their brief went all the way up to Indochina.

Chuck Baldwin was the Consul General and his number two was Richard Hawkins. The CIA station chief was Bob Jansen. Jack McGuire was an economics officer and Harry Loftus was a consular officer. We did a lot of consular business, particularly since it was a shipping port. One of Jack McGuire's preoccupations was getting the British to arrest a ship that came into port doing things no one wanted them to do and finding a pretext to refuse to let it leave until we could determine what the crew and the captain had been up to. It wasn't drug trade but maybe trading with China.

I can remember one major project was going around Malaya, which was not easy because of the security situation, and talking to the local Chinese and Malays. My subject was the MCA, the Malaya Chinese Association which was a big Chinese political vehicle. The MCA was active in Singapore where the population was just over a million then, largely Chinese, very successful businessmen. I read a book The Overseas Chinese by Oliver Purcell and the punch line of the book was that the overseas Chinese were there to make a living, and they didn't care who held the cow so long as they could milk it. They were much more interested in the economic infrastructure and being able to control that, as many well-to-do Chinese were doing, than they were in going to meetings about self-government.
Q: How did you find the Indian community?

GREENE: They were professional people, storekeepers and lawyers. They were not into big business. They were content in small business and law and manipulating what power they could. The Malays were the most relaxed of them all. They had their ceremonies and one felt they had to be pushed to be active in anything. There were ten Malay states and each had its own leader. They took turns being prime leader of the confederation, and they still do. I felt the Indians and the Chinese just didn't take the Malays seriously. The British and the Chinese controlled the tin and the rubber. They controlled all the economic muscle.

During the time of the Korean War, until the armistice in Korea, 1953 (which a great achievement for Eisenhower and his administration) the US in Singapore took a lot of unfriendly comment from the Chinese and British, particular rubber plantation owners and operators but also tin miners. Once peace was restored in Korea, the bottom fell out of the rubber and tin markets, and it was held to be Uncle Sam's fault!

Q: Did you find in dealing with the British economic people that they viewed Americans as trying to supplant them and as rivals, unnecessarily stirring the nationalist pot?

GREENE: Not in that part of the world. One of my British colleagues, Michael Stewart, was the principal intelligence officer and I used to talk to him about more regional things. I think they indulged us that because I was no way part of the real intelligence establishment. I don't recall any sense of jealousy. We wanted to help the British put down the guerrilla war in Malaya. I recall we wondered whether any of the Malay states or Singapore were ready for independence.

The Gold Coast was cranking up for independence in Africa and independence was the going game in the mid 1950s.

Q: You then went to Bonn from 1954 to 1956. What were you doing there?

GREENE: I was assigned to the Office of Political Affairs. We had a High Commission until May 5, 1955 when the treaty established the Federal Republic of Germany. The mission of the High Commission had been to tell the government of occupied West Germany how to run their business. The Office of Political Affairs of the High Commission was enormous, it had both an external and an internal branch. But by the time I got there we weren't really telling them what to do. The Germans were more sure of themselves and happy to begin to build a more conventional relationship between two sovereign countries.

I had been assigned to Bonn because my wife and daughter had become very sick in Singapore. Johnny Jones back in Western European Affairs had made arrangements for me to be transferred. Red Dowling was DCM in Bonn and he got wind of this and saw to it that I was assigned to Bonn. We went home, got everyone's health straightened out so we could go on to Bonn.
It was a tight little group there and I felt they weren't all that keen to have one of the DCM's pals dropped in their midst. My beat was the Foreign Office. But being the temperament I was, I hated being confined in narrow relationships. So I made a lot of friends in the community. It was a government community. Bonn/Bad Godesberg, the last thing the little town wanted to be was the capital of Germany, it was a quiet university town. The Americans had built a community all our own of housing for everyone, Plittersdorf. One-family houses for senior officers, Co-op City-type buildings for everybody else. Mrs. Dowling had arranged for us to have one of the better ground floor flats on the main street which for a Second Secretary coming in late in the game raised some eyebrows among those who thought they were more entitled. While it was awkward, it all worked out.

My primary concern was the Federal Republic of Germany's external relationship with us but also the European Defense community. And, during the Eisenhower years there was a big push to try and get reunification of Germany. Of course, the Soviet Union was not about to agree to that in the mid '50s and we spent a lot of time cultivating our image as Germany's friends interested in the unification of a democratic Germany and keeping a major military force there. Ray Lisle was the principal officer in the Political Section responsible for negotiating endlessly a Status of Forces Agreement. We had one, but as they became an independent state, we had to renegotiate it. It was rough going, the Germans didn't feel defeated any more. I had little to do with that, except it is part of the backdrop of all the other things that were going on.

They were not a nuclear power, but they were a whole lot interested in nuclear power. They were to stay out of anything that could be converted to military use. So that took a certain amount of watching, covert and overt.

I was also assigned to help with the programs of VOA and Radio Free Europe to assure their consistency with American foreign policy. We had some battles royal over the propriety of some of the scripts that VOA and Radio Free Europe wanted to run. It was hard to control news stories, quite apart from the philosophical issues of censorship. My assignment was to make sure these two outlets for the American point of view did not undercut American policy. The journalists felt news was news, didn't matter if it was bad news. There were discussions from time to time about all that.

Q: James Conant was your ambassador when you first arrived. How did you see him, how did he operate?

GREENE: He was upstairs. The Political Section was on the ground floor of the wing where he and the DCM were. I remember being proud he was there, he was a very steady guy. Red Dowling, because I knew him so well and we would see him informally, probably used that as a way of finding out what was going on in the rest of the embassy. Red was very diligent to keep right with Jim Conant.
What I learned and took with me when I became a DCM in India, you stay close and hope you can head off things that are not so hot and make things that should be done, happen quickly.

Red Dowling was a very resourceful and intelligent, professional officer. He was wise in the ways without being too clever or too narrow minded in the ways of political movement. Most of what I wrote about was Germany's relationships with their neighbors and the European community and with the rest of the Control Commission. I didn't have much to do with Berlin because we had a mission there. Jack Tuthill was the Economics Minister and a brilliant officer.

Once a week I went to the Economic Sections staff meetings. I could keep Red advised what Tuthill and his people were up to. Not in a derogatory way, but it was better to have a heads up on issues. Bonn was a very large embassy.

Q: How did you find the German Foreign Ministry?

GREENE: George Lilienfeld was the desk officer and Fritz Gaspari was his colleague. George came to Washington in later years as DCM and then he was Germany's ambassador in Iran. In 1960, Fritz Gaspari was Germany's Political Officer or Minister in London. They were very professional men and I didn't spend much time worrying about where they had been from 1935-45. (They had to have been in the service of the Third Reich.) George had an American wife. I remember doing a lot of business with Karl Carstens, who later became president of the republic. But it was all constructive, friendly and businesslike. One theme that would often come up was how to advance the cause of reunification. A footnote for the future: When unification came about in 1990, I thought back to the ‘50s. We were so ill prepared; we didn't know what we would have done with a united Germany.

Q: I would have thought by the mid-50’s, we would all have been saying, yes, Germany should be reunited. What was your gut feeling, did you think it would happen in one or two decades?

GREENE: I recall the continuous efforts that our embassy had made to help prepare summit meetings to talk about it with the Soviets in Geneva and to keep the flame flickering. Our influence with the moderate democratic leadership that we wanted to see succeed in running the country, the Christian Democrats again, depended on a public perception of our being on their side. No German who aspired to leadership could afford to be seen as lacking in enthusiasm for reuniting the fatherland.

Q: Were you thinking in terms that this was really going to happen?

GREENE: I was thinking in terms that it may not be a great idea. We never gave any thought to were we ready if it happened. Confronting the Soviet military threat, we had to keep the Federal Republic hospitable to the NATO military establishment. NATO had to be structured to be sure that the Germans were doing their part with their new Bundeswehr,
but not so much as to scare the neighbors again. Part of the American Seventh Army's mission was to sit right next to the Germans. I regarded it then and even now, the American physical military presence in Germany was a reassurance to the French, the Belgians, the Dutch and the British that we weren't going to let the Germans get out of line, reunited or not. The Soviets didn't want Germany reunited either, they had suffered enormously in World War II. Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik came later.

Q: *How did we feel about the SPD?*

GREENE: We had to tolerate them. The CDU were our people but you couldn't get away from democracy is democracy. To make it possible to keep in touch with all these people in the Bundesamt, Jock Dean ran a lunch mess in Bad Godesberg. We rented a house or most of a house, so that we could invite Germans to lunch, hear them and tell them what we wanted them to think about. I worked hard on my German but it never got good enough to get into big arguments in German. I went to some of the lunches when there were English speakers. We had to balance our attention between the CDU and the SPD. I know there were covert operations but I wasn't privy to them. I assume we were more comfortable with the CDU than the SPD. The Bavarians, Franz Joseph Strauss's party, was too right wing. That was embarrassing.

In 1956, I went back to the State Department as Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, arriving in the middle of the Suez crisis. I later became Special Assistant to Secretary Dulles, and stayed with him until he died in May 1959.

I did an "oral history" of that period for the John Foster Dulles archive at Princeton University. A copy is attached to this oral history.

Q: *There is one question that might possibly not have been asked. During Dulles' time, 1956-60, what was the view of the Soviet threat?*

GREENE: Mr. Dulles made almost a crusade of effective containment of the Soviet political and military threat to democracy through a series of mutual security treaties with the nations around the perimeter of the Soviet Union. He sought to make that effective with appropriate military contributions from the US and also from our partners in the several alliances. "Appropriate" being a matter of what you could negotiate with Congress. Doug Dillon, as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, was the principal architect in that respect. Mr. Dulles not only rhetorically, but politically, determined to keep up a level of intensity of containment through these mutual security treaties. He spent a lot of time traveling and in the last couple years of his life, I traveled with him to meetings of NATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and CENTO which started life as the Baghdad Pact.

In 1957, the Russians put up Sputnik. Mr. Dulles was determined, as was President Eisenhower, that the Soviets wouldn't get one-up on us like that. Quickly a NATO summit was arranged for Paris in December 1957. This was rallying not only the political and
rhetorical response to major Soviet scientific and perhaps military achievement, but it was a way to pump up enthusiasm for countering both economic and political Soviet threats.

Another side of that coin was Communist China. The two had not yet so visibly split as they did in 1960. I can recall visits with the Secretary to Asia, the SEATO meetings in Canberra, and in Manila two separate years. I once wound up writing a major piece of a speech the Secretary delivered in Seattle, robustly standing up to any pretense of the Communist Chinese regime to expand beyond the mainland--starting with a couple of little islands called Quemoy and Matsu.

In anticipation of this conversation, I have thought of one little vignette I would like to share. It illustrates not only the vigor of the Secretary of State's and the President's zeal to stand tall and firm against communist expansion east or west, but the intimacy and care of the relationship between them that Mr. Dulles took. He took great pains to never upstage the President. One of my jobs was to help arrange scenarios with my opposite number in the White House. At that time, it was General Andrew P. Goodpaster. One of our tasks was to be sure the two of them were in synch. The Secretary had a white phone right by his desk and whenever he wanted to, if the President was available, he could talk to him.

There came a time that the Secretary persuaded the President to make a definitive speech about the US policy in the Formosa Strait. It was getting pretty nasty. The Chinese tried to intimidate us and the nationalist government of Taiwan into giving Taiwan over to them, starting with Quemoy and Matsu. The State Department prepared drafts for the President's speech and they were sent to him in Newport where he was taking a little break at the Naval War College. At one point, the President suggested to the Secretary of State that he come up so they could talk about the final text. The Secretary took me along and I remember our sitting there "word smithing" this ringing declaration of no compromise with Communist China over a couple of little islands in the Formosa Straits. We flew back to Washington and that evening I assembled my family around the television to watch the President make this ringing declaration of intent. And it rang great when the President said that we would never give up Quemoy and Matsu, we will not be party to another Munich, and, if necessary, we will send troops to help the Nationalist government defend itself. We thought that established all the strategic and moral parameters. When it was over, I asked my two teenage daughters if there were any questions. My eldest daughter who was 16 or 17 and had, so far, a pretty good education, said she had two questions: (1) You talk about sending troops. Has anybody invited you to? (2) What is Munich? I shared her reaction with the Secretary who then relayed it to the President. They subsequently got a lot of mileage out of that experience, citing it to colleagues as an example of trying to persuade the body politic what was right while a whole generation of educated people coming up didn't have the same knowledge of history. It showed how one had to be very careful in using historical comparisons in political declarations.

When it came to the Eisenhower doctrine in the Middle East and thinking that putting troops ashore in Lebanon would be a good idea, I recall a staff meeting in which Mr. Dulles said we had to stop those people in Lebanon. He turned to the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Radford, and said, "Raddy, can the Navy handle that?" "Yes, the Navy can handle that but you haven't told me yet which side we are going to be fighting on."

Ambassador Robert McClintock in Beirut was instructed to get the government of Lebanon to invite us to send 5,000 Marines ashore. Some time passed before we finally got what was an acceptable invitation. These are just little vignettes of how we went about projecting and converting into reality containment of the Soviet military and ideological threat.

In the Spring of 1959, there had been a lot of discussion about a so-called "missile gap," supposedly the inadequacy of US strategic missiles and strategic weapons. One way to deal with the problem was to try to agree with the Soviets on arms control and limitation--not reduction yet.

Gerry Smith and Phil Farley were members of the Planning Staff who were particularly concerned with that part of the government's agenda. They had a hand in the President setting up a separate disarmament study group, of which I was made Executive Secretary after Mr. Dulles died. We had separate quarters over on Jefferson Place, across the street from the old State Department. Each department concerned contributed at least one officer. The Navy had retired Admiral Davis and the CIA sent Bob Komer. As Executive Secretary, I thought, who could we get to help with the substance of it? I pried Mac Godley away from Freddie Reinhardt who was State Department Counselor. The chairman of the group was Charles Coolidge, a Republican from Boston. He didn't feel all that comfortable surrounded by bureaucrats, each of whom had a different turf to protect. He got White House approval to recruit as his deputy a close friend from Boston, Guido Perera.

The end of the calendar year was our target date for completing a report to the President. Toward the end of the year as I was leaving for the IDC in London, I realized that Charlie Coolidge and Guido Perera really weren't talking to the rest of us. They were sitting there with a yellow pad drafting a report to the President. One of the significant recommendations which came out of the experience of that small task force, was that a separate agency adequately staffed to deal with all the facets of arms control and disarmament should be established. Thus, was born the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA. The Eisenhower administration saw to that before they left office in January, 1961.

Q: You went to the Imperial Defense College in 1960. What was the value of that for you?

GREENE: The value of that for me was exactly what the Commandant (a British diplomat, the first civilian commandant they had) said in his welcoming remarks. He said it was a year that all of us would be relieved of operational responsibility for anything. It would be a chance to explore intelligently and abstractly economic, political, and military issues worldwide. We would hear lectures by people still in the action. There would be some travel around the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. He called it a "sabbatical defensemanship." What is defensemanship? That is the art of winning without actually fighting. That made quite an impression on particularly the military members of the group.
It was a good framework to keep in mind as we worked our way though all the problems of NATO and SEATO. There were four Americans: Army, Navy, Air Force and Foreign Service. Out of 75 members of the class, maybe 50 were British from the three services and the British Foreign Service and the Secret Service. The rest were from the Commonwealth: Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Canada, Australia and Ghana.

We spent that year brainstorming issues one at a time around the world. Then in the summer tour in August, some went to Latin America, some went to Africa. I joined the India tour. We were in India, Pakistan and Kashmir, and Ceylon. At the end of December, school was over and my next assignment was DCM in Lagos. When I got to Lagos, I found out that my two Nigerian classmates, were respectively, private secretary to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in the Foreign Office. Whatever else I got out of the course, I was only a phone call away from solving a lot of problems over the next two and one half years. We had had the intimate time together, intellectually and politically, and we understood each other. That didn't mean anybody was soft headed about anything but you knew where to call.

The same thing happened in India. I went from Lagos to New Delhi. There had been only one Indian at the course because the Indians were starting their own course that year. But they had sent a token airman who, by the time I got to New Delhi three years later, was Deputy Chief of the Air Staff and soon became Chief of the Air Staff. It gave us a way to talk about some things that we couldn't talk to anyone else about. Relationships, as much as substance, are often a major part of what you get out of a sabbatical experience.

By the end of my time in Washington, after Mr. Dulles died, my wife and I decided to part, so she didn't go to London with me to the Imperial Defense College. During that year in London, I met a wonderful lady, a widow, and we were married in Lagos in 1961. So another thing I got out of the IDC course was 33 years of happiness.

Q: How did you get the job in Lagos? You were there from 1961-63.

GREENE: Along about October or November you begin to wonder what is going to happen next. Eventually I got a communication from Jim Penfield who was directing personnel in the Bureau of African Affairs. He said Joe Palmer had agreed to my coming to Lagos as his deputy. He remembered me from when I was working for Mr. Dulles. A lot of people were in the department when I worked for Mr. Dulles and I learned when you are wielding somebody else's power, they remember both of you.

Q: You were in Lagos from 1961 to 1963. What was the political situation in Nigeria at that time?

GREENE: Nigeria had become independent in 1960 and Joe Palmer had been transferred there as ambassador. He was one of the few Foreign Service Officers with extensive experience in Africa. Ghana had been independent for a year or two. The thought was that Nigeria was an African nation much more populated and more richly endowed with natural
resources. It had to be good, we had to be sure it worked. We (meaning the Kennedy administration) wanted to be all the help we could. We had a significant AID mission. One of our discussions was about the American contribution to economic and social development of Nigeria.

I had never been to Africa. I had never been exposed to this before. I can remember helping the AID people compose ringing recommendations of why we should put a hundred million dollars a year into economic assistance as evidence of our faith in their success.

The Peace Corps came along and I recall Washington decided Nigeria had to have a big Peace Corps. They needed all the help we could give them, Washington thought. Joe Palmer was away when the final instructions came to ask the Nigerians. So I set it up with the Foreign Minister and talked to him for over an hour about the Peace Corps. But it wasn't an easy sell. He wanted racial quotas in our contingent. He felt he needed to be sure that we weren't imposing white people on black people. I replied that the whole point of desegregation in our country was that you don't draw that distinction. I told him if he insisted, he would be setting us back. It eventually sorted itself out. He also wanted to be assured that the people we sent would be qualified in the fields of endeavor that they were there to help, like raising chickens or teaching English or simple sanitation in the villages.

We had a wide range of a couple hundred Peace Corps Volunteers. They were spread out all over the country. Their first indoctrination almost derailed the whole thing. It was arranged to take place at the University of Ibadan. We all warmly welcomed a plane load of people mostly in their mid '20s and early '30s, full of idealistic zeal. The Nigerian leaders didn't feel they needed so much help but they went along with it; it was hard to tell JFK no.

During that training period at the university, Marge Michelmore wrote a postcard home in which she said they were having a great time and were getting use to life among the Nigerians--some of them even went to the bathroom in the street. She mailed it at the university post office. Well, it found its way into the public domain and the Nigerian press made a lot of it. "We take a bath at home, we do not take a bath in the streets." They totally misunderstood what she was saying, deliberately or otherwise. But very deliberately, they tried to undermine the standing of the whole operation in the minds and hearts of the Nigerians.

I was sent to talk to the president of the university to see if I could calm things down there and learn how that postcard found its way out of the post office and into the newspapers. "Well, she must have dropped it on the way to the post office." I knew whatever else I did I had to get Marge Michelmore out of Ibadan. I put her in a car with my wife Kitty, and the driver, and sent them off to my house in Lagos. Just as they were leaving, an AP correspondent came along and asked if he could have a ride. He didn't know who the young woman in the car was. I told him he could have a ride if he never used the story. He didn't know what I was talking about so he agreed. He got to Lagos full of the story but honored his commitment not to use it until it was all out anyway. This was a real political hot potato and none of the Nigerian government would touch this. Joe Palmer took Marge to see the Governor General, one picture was taken of them together, and that was enough to calm the fire and save the Peace Corps in Nigeria. But Marge had to go home.
Q: From what you are saying, there seemed to have been a real reluctance on the government's, the media's and everyone else's part about having this program. Was it that they just didn't want a bunch of do-gooder Americans?

GREENE: It was part of the worldwide syndrome of "Yankee go home." We didn't intend to appear patronizing. But the fact is, the world, particularly in Africa and South Asia, saw the Peace Corps as more likely helping the spirit of the young American generation that was involved in it than helping Nigerians or anybody else. It was a very idealistic thing of President Kennedy and Sargent Shriver. They got a lot of steam behind it here in this country but it never rested terribly well with the recipients until much later when it provided targeted technical assistance.

Another thing Joe Palmer and I worried about was the unity of Nigeria, an important premise for the AID program. Mid-way through my time there, came a memorandum from one of the INR specialists on west Africa. He expressed his view that tribalism in West Africa was far from dead. It was bound to again rear its head. In Nigeria there were three main states, Northern, Western and Eastern Nigeria. Each had half a dozen tribes. Palmer submitted that if we were going to make a durable AID program, we had to figure out how to relate it to the reality of tribal conflict. Speaking only for myself, I came to see later my crystal ball was clouded by our enthusiasm. We wanted to help these people and didn't anticipate whether we could or should. I don't know what we would have done differently. At one point, in agreement with the ambassador, I went up to talk to the prime minister of Northern Nigeria; the Prime Minister of all Nigeria was also a Northerner. I talked about our premise of the unity of Nigeria and granted that the three states each had their own way of looking at local issues. But in the context of a nationality for the whole country, which they inherited from the British, we hoped we were right in premising our policy on continued unity. The Prime Minister was offended by the notion that we would doubt that. It turned out, however, that he was one of the greatest doubters of all. Civil War, as predicted, broke out in the '60s.

Q: Was he assassinated?

GREENE: The Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa was unity personified, whether rightly or wrongly. In the end, he was one of the first to get killed when war broke out. The power was in the tribes up north, one had to talk to them.

Q: Was there opinion in the African Bureau, headed by "Soapy" Williams, that there was an ideological bent to the Peace Corps? Did you find you had to be careful about reporting back to Washington because maybe you saw things not so palatable? After all, the Kennedy people had a big commitment to this program.

GREENE: I can never remember anywhere shrinking from telling it like I saw it. Sometimes, there and in other places, the staff and ambassador didn't always agree on what to say and how to say it. I didn't have that problem with Joe Palmer.
Remember, "Soapy" Williams, his appointment as Assistant Secretary for Africa was announced at the White House before the Secretary of State was announced. Kennedy wanted to make a showing that we were going to help Africans as part of the new frontier. So, yes, there was an ideological bent to it. But I never thought of myself as an ideologue. I can remember when Mr. Dulles asked me if I would be his Special Assistant. I told him I was honored and would like to try and help, but that he should recall that I was a career Foreign Service Officer, not a political person. My two predecessors had been highly politically motivated and I wanted to be sure he wanted someone who would work with bureaucracy. I don't remember ever fighting the proposition that we ought to be helping the Nigerians.

A couple of episodes may illustrate the extent of anti-American feeling and of my access to the people from my IDC days to help contain it.

There came a day when a mob went through the streets of Lagos, by the American Embassy, and threw rocks and broke all the windows on the street side. Joe was back in Washington trying to sell our program. I was in charge again so I called the Foreign Secretary, the highest civilian--not the Minister for Foreign Affairs--Lawrence Anionwu, whom I knew at the IDC. He came over to the embassy and I showed him the destruction. He couldn't believe their people would do that and offered to make it up to us. They were stuck with that kind of anti-American outburst. We used to spend a lot of time thinking of things for the Information Service to put out to show that we weren't all that bad and wanted to be friends.

**Q:** Why did they think we were bad, what was behind it? Was it general leftist business or was it our racial policies which were just beginning to be turned around?

**GREENE:** I think it was a spin off of the anti-colonialism. It was difficult not to be tarred with the British brush. We certainly were in favor of Nigeria's independence, and we were on very cordial terms with the British High Commission. Occasionally, we talked privately about what to do. There was a perception in which the tribal conflicts were all part of the backdrop. The way to get at whomever was in charge was to get at the white people, particularly the Americans and British. The Americans were even a bigger target. They had gotten the British out of there for the most part and we were seen as the new colonists. It was vintage rabble rousing.

**Q:** Was Nkrumah stirring things up? He was leader of a small country, Ghana, but his ambitions were bigger.

**GREENE:** I don't remember feeling the crew in Ghana had much to do with the multi-tribal government in Nigeria. We had information outposts; we had a consulate in Kaduna, and consulates in Enugu and Ibadan and information reading rooms in both places. All that was pretty low key, but not so low that it didn't provide a focus for those who just wanted to embarrass our government. Joe and I traveled around and tried to show the flag. We didn't
have big AID projects as we had in India. There was a lot of competition between the tribes in the government.

I learned a bureaucratic lesson while Joe Palmer was in Nigeria but out in the bush and unreachable. The political issue was the news that the Nigerian Ministry of Defense and Army had invited the US Army in Germany to send a team to demonstrate some of their latest anti-tank guns. We hadn't known anything about this invitation, but two or three planes flew in to northern Nigeria loaded with the latest in cannons. They went out in the wide open spaces of northern Nigeria to demonstrate these. Had there not been an accident, the Embassy might never have known about it. As it happened, one gun crew chief had the misfortune of standing up in the driver's seat of his jeep just as the guy on the trigger end of the anti-tank gun mounted behind him pulled the trigger. The round went right through him and he didn't live very long. They couldn't do anything for him but they had an enormous problem on their hands. That was when they thought maybe the Embassy could help. Of course, we didn't have any status of forces agreement, and no one knew they were there. I decided to get the whole business out of there, immediately, back to Germany. That was done within a day. Once they were gone, I called the Foreign Secretary and said we had to square this. Anionwu had never heard of it. The Foreign Minister didn't even know they were there. They tended to take on the embassy and me in the turf battle that ensued between the Foreign and Defense Ministries.

It was an illustration of what the memo from INR was trying to tell us. It also illustrated that the number two has to speak for his boss, even when the boss is in the country. You have to be sure to get it right. Joe Palmer never faulted me on that one. But it is a good lesson for aspiring diplomats to learn. No matter the circumstance, when the ambassador is there, you are working for him. When he isn't there and you are chargé d'affaires, you do the best you can to keep his philosophy alive and well.

**Q: At this point, we were in the very early days of dealing with African sovereign states. How did you feel the embassy was staffed for that task? It was much before we developed a corps of specialists. Was this a learning experience for us?**

GREENE: I wish I had been more sophisticated to appreciate how we fitted in to their scheme of things. To make sure what we wanted to do was doable. It is very embarrassing if it isn't, as we learned in India and in Nigeria. The young embassy was out to be the best friends the Nigerians had ever had.

In the early spring of 1963 when Chet Bowles was going back to India, I got a cable in Lagos from him asking me to go to India as his deputy. I had met him and his wife on a couple of occasions and we had done some things together. Chet had chaired Chiefs of Mission conferences in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The African one was in Lagos. Joe Palmer was again home preparing for a visit to Washington by the Prime Minister. It was just before Kennedy met Khrushchev in Vienna and we wanted to be sure the Prime Minister got the right message before that meeting. So I sat in the Lagos chair at the Chiefs of Mission conference and I think I was probably the least cynical of the chiefs of mission.
Everyone had their problems. I don't think I had stars in my eyes but I felt we were doing a good job. And that was where I met Chet Bowles.

Q: You went from Lagos to New Delhi as DCM and were there from July 1963 until January 1968. Could you give me a feel for what kind of an ambassador Chester Bowles was, and how he operated, and how he used you?

GREENE: He operated as a political person trying to sell to the Indians and his own government his view of the way Indian society ought to be shaped and sustained--money and arms--to defend itself against China. And if need be, against Pakistan. He demanded of his staff fidelity to his causes. I was expected to run the mundane part of embassy business. We reorganized the embassy at one point so that the heads of the economic and political sections were both Minister Counselors and the DCM was a Minister. I got to do more of the unpleasant tasks. Tasks that the Indians would see as unpleasant like arguing with them about whether we would provide high-performance aircraft. We had an understanding with them we would do that if they didn't get any MiG 19s or '20s from the Russians. I was the one who reached that understanding and recorded it. Our airplanes came and a couple of weeks later one of our air attachés saw MiG ‘20s flying around an air base near Agra. After a lot of consultations, I had to call the Indians on it. Chet couldn't think ill of the Indians, he didn't want to call them on it when they were lying. But the rest of the US government expected someone to do that. Once they even sent the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to ream them out.

Some of the relationships between India and China, and India and the Soviet Union, affected American relations with India, such as the Indian zeal for developing a nuclear weapon. India refused to sign the Non-proliferation treaty despite our urging. The US government went to some pains to assure that the public and political leadership—the thinking people who in the end would be party to the decision, understood that one got very little security out of having one or two nuclear weapons. In fact, as we tried to explain both publicly and indirectly, the French experience of force de frappe only made them that much more vulnerable to a preemptive, first-take-out strike. We tried to convince the Indian leadership of this. That was part of an intelligence operation. Twenty-five years later, I'm not sure where the bounds of discretion or secrecy are anymore, but I think it was one of our better operations. Our intelligence people were able to get articles printed in the French press which were picked up by the Indian press. In very subtle ways like that, we were able to get the contrary word around about nuclear weapons. That didn't stop the Indians from eventually exploding a device in the Rajasthan Desert some years later. It said nothing for their military capability but presumably made them feel better in that they showed that they could, although maybe not all that smart to proceed from one nuclear explosion to a weapons system. There were a lot of things useful mutually between the Indian services and ours, and, of course, we shared everything with the British.

There were pretty sophisticated operations directed against China. We had a way of keeping track of some of the Chinese nuclear missile tests with systems based in India with Indian cooperation. Even when things went mechanically or scientifically wrong, they were
able to get fixed, or at least concealed without public uproar. Going back to the Russians, I remember one day the Chief of Station came in with a blueprint of the latest MiG. I asked him how he had managed that and he said "it only takes one traitor."

I just wanted to flag for further exploration whenever it is appropriate that we did have these cooperative intelligence relationships, and we also ran some operations to be sure we could find out what they didn't want to tell us when we felt we needed to know. None of this was among Chet Bowles' favorite topics. He felt uncomfortable running intelligence operations within or against India.

Q: How would he deal with it? Did it become almost understood that you would be informed of these things so that he wouldn't get stuck?

GREENE: It was very awkward for me sometimes because the theory that you can protect an ambassador by not telling him, is very dangerous. On the other hand, the NSA (National Security Agency) had a unit there monitoring telecommunications in south Asia and they were under Army Attaché cover. I tangled with them a few times over what they were doing. The CIA station chief thought it was more prudent in the end to have someone in the front office aware of what was going on so if there was trouble, or choices had to be made, the DCM at least could help them deal with such things. The station chief and I had a rather close personal and professional relationship that the ambassador didn't share.

Sometime, with a broad brush, it might be interesting to look at how well that arrangement served us. As uncomfortable as my role was at times, I felt it was the right thing to do.

Q: Here you were, you had a very aspiring ambassador. He belonged to the school which didn't want to touch "dirty" things. You are the DCM; our relationship with India wasn't that close, and we use intelligence gathering to keep on top of things. How did you deal with Ambassador Bowles since almost every ambassador tells his DCM he doesn't want to be surprised?

GREENE: Intelligence operations are one of the easiest ways to be surprised if you don't know about them. I just hoped it would never come up, I finessed it. When something did come up I would suggest to the station chief that he tell the ambassador.

President Kennedy, early in his administration, said the ambassador was in charge of everybody and everything in the field. CIA never really went along with that and were always keeping things from the front office.

In India it seemed to be working in affecting the course of political events, by subtle press placements. Certainly we had to "buy" agents. We had to "buy" the guy who got the MiG blueprint. And, of course, one always has the feeling if they will sell to you, they'll sell to other side too. When Ramparts Magazine blew the cover off the Asia Foundation in the late ‘60s what had been, ostensibly a cultural, educational effort, funded entirely by the CIA through the Asia Foundation office in San Francisco, caused many people who had wanted
to help to back off. It was too hot for them in their own society. Any Indian wanting to play the game was at some risk of being exposed.

Q: You mentioned you had problems with the NSA.

GREENE: The Army Attaché had clued me into what they were doing. One day it was clear that the Indians were going to be moving troops. I thought it was important to make them think twice about it. One very effective way to learn what was going on was to listen to their communications. I said I could run the diplomatic end of it if I could share in the take on what they were getting from the Indian military communications. They said they wouldn't do it. I told them they were just taking up space in the embassy if they weren't going to be a team player. Of course, they couldn't do anything about it there at post but I did raise a fuss back home and in the end, they told me enough to shut me up.

Q: This is one of the problems of intelligence. Often it is filtered to the highest level where, frankly, they don't give a damn. At the lower level where it can be of use, the folks are cut out.

GREENE: That's right. That is not only to protect the operation from unfortunate disclosure. One of the troubles of having information clandestinely obtained, is that by using it you give away the fact that you know it. All too often, if I tell you what I found out, you will figure out how I got it. And I don't want you to do that. So, in a way it is an inhibitor. Once it all gets back to Washington where it becomes part of a massive effort, the question is, who is screening it?

Back to India. There were three episodes involving Soviet defections which I haven't seen recorded. They didn't seem to be mentioned in Dennis Kux's book, *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States*. It was very thoroughly researched and well documented account of the relationship during a sequence of American and Indian administrations. There is no reference to the defection of Svetlana, Stalin's daughter, to the American Embassy in New Delhi. She just walked in, told a Marine she was Russian and told him she wanted to go to the United States. He called the consul in to discuss a visa with her, and it came out she was Stalin's daughter and that she was unhappy with treatment in the Soviet Union and India. She was in India primarily because she had taken up with an Indian in the Soviet Union. She lived with him several years but he had recently died and she had brought his body back to be cremated. She had no where to go so she came to us. I think it was only three or four hours from the time she walked in to the time she was driven to the airport for a plane to Rome. She had a passport with her name in it, everything done legally. On the same plane was a senior level CIA officer who spoke Russian. They traveled together safely and routinely. A lot of communications were flying back and forth. It had happened at an early hour in New Delhi so it was mid morning in Washington. By the time the plane arrived in Rome, the cat was out of the bag and all hell was breaking loose. The Soviets were angry and the Italians were embarrassed. She was detained several days in Italy until the Swiss agreed to take her until her future could be determined. The Soviets demanded that she be returned. Eventually, she traveled on to the U.S. I learned about all
this when I returned from Manila where I had been attending a Chiefs of Mission conference.

The next time I was in Washington, I had lunch with my old friend Malcolm Toon, who was at that time our Director of the Office of Soviet Affairs. We reminisced about the uproar that episode had caused in Washington, particularly during a time when LBJ and Dean Rusk were very sensitive about their relations with the Soviet Union. They didn't want apparently irrelevant things to upset apple carts they were working on. They were mad at Chet for sending Svetlana on her way. Malcolm Toon told me Dean Rusk had commented that it would never have happened if Jerry Greene had been there. I was offended by that, I really didn't know why Dean Rusk thought that, and that was not a rap I wanted to carry.

Q: It certainly shows the bureaucratic mind, up to and including the President and Secretary of State level. Often there are nasty little bits of life that get in the way of vast political maneuvering. Like it or not, there are those people you just know are going to get to the United States. Bowles was absolutely right.

GREENE: There are two other episodes which illustrate that defection question. Some weeks after the above episode, all the embassies in New Delhi got a circular note from the Foreign Office saying the Government of India had decided that it would be regarded as an unfriendly act if any embassy assisted in the defection and departure from India of a person from another country.

There ensued two defection episodes. The first was a man who spoke Russian. He turned up at the British Deputy High Commission's office in Bombay, saying he wanted to go to England. They weren't aware of his credentials nor did they trust him. The British consulted with us and we suggested that we try to find something out about him. One way or another, the British ducked and he wound up as a houseguest in the American Embassy residential compound in New Delhi. The one thing we had to be careful about was whether this was legitimate defection or whether we were being set up by either the Indians or the Soviets. We wanted to be more forthcoming than the British so we granted him asylum while we debated.

The British and we determined it was best to level with the Indian government. In the context of leveling, the defector wrote Ambassador Bowles a letter saying he thought he would be in danger if sent home because of what he had said and done. He requested asylum and asked to go to the United States. I shared the letter with the Indian Home Secretary. Washington didn't want to defy India but we need a resolution. It eventually occurred to me that the ambassador's written reply should be in consultations with the Indians. I asked the Indian Home Secretary what would happen if, following the Indian government's directive, we turned him over to the Indians. We told him we had an obligation to preserve his freedom and the Home Secretary concurred that they did too. Then it took the Indians a couple of weeks to agree to making such assurances in writing through a letter from Chet Bowles to the defector. We explained to him we would turn him
over to Indian custody, he would be well looked after and given an opportunity to decide where he wanted to go. In that connection, we had offered the Soviet ambassador a chance to talk to this guy and he told the Soviet ambassador he didn't want to go home.

The dénouement was one of the most painful Christmas Eves I had ever spent. We had a tunnel from the main embassy building to the AID annex. It was elaborately arranged that I would walk this guy through the tunnel and when we got to the other end there would be a car from the Indian Interior Ministry, a driver and one guy in it. He had everybody's assurance that if he got into that car he would be free and not persecuted for his defection. It was only a four minute walk but it seemed to take all night. We shook hands, said good by and wished each other good luck, and it was over. Not long after that, after I left India, he wound up in England. The Indians wanted him out of India and eventually the British changed their minds.

Q: In a good sense, you were also putting India on the spot by making sure that they were on record to take care of the situation.

GREENE: The third episode was even more dicey. I still think it was a case of someone trying to set me up. I was at home with my family one evening, the doorbell rang. I was told a Mr. Micklos was here and wanted to see me. Jack Micklos was our consul in Bombay and I wondered why he hadn't sent word. In came someone whom I had never seen before. He spoke passable English and said he was a Russian named Micklos. He had a passport. He had been working on an agricultural development project and didn't want to work on it anymore nor want to return to the Soviet Union. He wanted to go to the United States. I told him that would be difficult. Then I got on the phone and called some colleagues to come over to the house. I didn't want to go anywhere, so instead of going to the embassy, we did it there, including getting the CIA. If the guy had been sent in by the Indians, it was a good act; if he had been sent in by the Soviets, it was still a good act. By the Indians listening to my telephone, they quickly knew who was in these things. All the discussions with this fellow took place out in the garden where no listening devices could pick it up. All the conversations designed to ascertain his authenticity were conducted by our Russian specialist, Roger Kirk. "Micklos" only asked that we not take too long because he had to explain to his boss his absence. Finally, the CIA and the State Department agreed to send him to the U.S. We arranged for him to pick up a visa at the embassy. He was to go in to the press office. I stayed home during all this. The phone rang and our station chief commented that this one had just gone through the cracks. "Micklos" had said he wanted his visa but also wanted the name of a good psychiatrist he could talk to when he got to New York. At the visa office they asked him why he would want a psychiatrist. He said he had told us about his wife and family, but actually, the wife was male and that he really needed to do something about his homosexuality problem and that maybe a psychiatrist could help him. The CIA and all dropped him like a hot potato. The deal was off. The next day I was leaving on an Air India flight through Moscow on home leave. I thought I would see him on that flight but no one ever saw him again.
Q: Two questions occur to me. I have no feeling for the Indian press. How did you find dealing with them?

GREENE: The Indian Express was a very responsible newspaper not given to sensationalism. The Hindustan Times was a reliable paper. The editor of the Express was a good friend of the ambassador and the embassy. The Delhi correspondent of The Hindustan Times was an intelligent, responsible journalist who wound up as a Nieman Fellow at Harvard. There were inflammatory papers and it was difficult to know what effect they had on the political course of events. Some of the most excitable rhetoric used to come from the papers in Calcutta where the Bengalis are excitable people. The Indian Express was more of a peoples' paper. I thought there was responsible reporting and when we wanted something in particular reported, we could get it in, even if it was about American policy in Vietnam. The Indian government felt we were wrong in Vietnam and that our policy and intervention were not supported by the body politic in the United States. LBJ resented that, of course.

Q: Moving on from India, you came back in 1968. What did you do?

GREENE: I was on the BALPA Task Force, the Balance of Payments Task Force. The administration had decided they had to cut down on expenses and, obviously, anyone in the foreign relations business was using a lot of money to buy foreign money. Ambassador J. Graham Parsons was head of the task force. We were charged to go through all the operations of all the bureaus of the Department with questionnaires of our devising asking about what they could cut back on, cut out, save money, or do differently with fewer people and less foreign exchange, including the UN. It was not a popular exercise in most of the Department.

Then I was assigned to the selection boards that September. It was one of the first of the Cone (specialty) boards. We had a public member, a labor member, a Department of Commerce member, there were five of us. The idea was that everyone read all the files and gave grades. We took it seriously and it was a chore. We also had to write ratings of the adequacy of the rating officers. Once in awhile you found someone who wrote a really good evaluation and sometimes it was clear the rating officer was inadequate or scared to tell it like it was. Both of those extremes usually merited a memo in the rating officer's file. For the most part, the reports were average.

Q: After those two temporary assignments, where did you go?

GREENE: Barbara Watson was an African-America from New York who had made a mark on Democratic politics in New York and been appointed Director of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. She told the Director General she wanted a career Foreign Service officer as her deputy. There were no FSOs in her front office. There were some consular officers in the Visa Section and I don't think any in the Passport Division. Frances Knight ruled there with an iron fist, or misruled, depending how you looked at it. So I wound up as Barbara Watson's principal deputy, to the chagrin of the bureaucrat named Fred Smith who
had been her number one deputy. One had to tread delicately to find a function in what I thought was a wasteful expenditure of energy and time on bureaucratic in-fighting, right in the front office and then between the front office and Frances Knight. Frances was a master of friendly rhetoric and impenetrable defenses. She was going to run the passport office her way and no one was going to tell her otherwise. Even Barbara Watson wouldn't take her on. All our functions were consular functions by the time I got to the bureau. It wasn't originally set up that way. During Eisenhower's administration, Scott McLeod was the administrator. And even more prominent in their concerns than consular affairs were security affairs prompted by Senator Joe McCarthy's attacks on the Foreign Service and people in the State Department, alleging communist sympathy. Part of the State Department's defense was to show that we had a good security operation over our own people. By the time I got there, the name was still there but not the function. I did my best to bring order to the operation. We had a lot of political visas, visa questions that turned political. We spent a lot of our time dealing with questions from Congressmen on the Hill for and against politically prominent permanent resident visa applicants. Barbara did most of the leg work on the Hill. I remember it was quite a bureaucratic kind of a job.

In early 1969 Sam de Palma, a Foreign Service Officer, was the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. He didn't understand why he had been picked for that job. Charlie Yost had been named as the representative to the UN with cabinet status and Bill Rogers somehow settled on Sam de Palma as Assistant Secretary. Sam asked me to be his principal deputy and I was glad to make a change. I had some experience around the UN in its early days. Again, coming in as principal deputy, what do you do with two other deputies, one of whom wanted the job but didn't get it.

Q: Before we move too further along, what was your impression of Barbara Watson, her operating style?

GREENE: She spent a lot of time on the defensive. She was not very well organized. If she had perceived her own need for someone to help her organize the conduct of the bureau, whether it be passports, visas, regulations, or protection services, it would not have been so frustrating. Barbara would agree to almost whatever I suggested made sense organizationally, but she was concerned about whose ox was going to get gored, and maybe even her own. She would invite my wife and me over for social evenings at her apartment at Foggy Bottom. Most of her friends were also Afro-Americans from New York. She didn't seem to have much of a constituency around town. Frankly, I never understood what clout she had for being in the job other than that she was black. My job was to translate that into something effective. Barbara kept her own counsel.

Q: You were in IO during the early Nixon period. As Principal Deputy, what were the major concerns?

GREENE: Dave Popper had been the senior Deputy Assistant Secretary in IO, and when he was transferred, I inherited the intensifying negotiations in the UN framework for a new law of the sea convention. It was prompted by the evolution and development of new
scientific technologies that made it possible to exploit the mineral resources lying at the bottom of the ocean. Those resources under the bottom of the ocean, such as oil and gas, could now also be exploited. And there was still the potential to exploit in new ways all the resources swimming around in the ocean. The Geneva Convention in early years had been overcome by technology and the American spirit of adventure. Some American companies were ready to scoop up manganese and other materials off the bottom of the ocean at depths beyond the limit of the continental shelf. It was a very technical concept and needed to be managed from IO. A very diligent, bureaucratically oriented individual, Stuart McIntyre, ran the thing in the office of UN Political Affairs and helped me to get up to speed. We had an interdepartmental task force of 12 or 13 departments and agencies and bureaus within departments, who felt they had legitimate concern in the national interest to be represented in discussing the terms under which ships would pass on the ocean, people would fish in the ocean, people would scrape things off the bottom of the ocean, and people would drill into the floor of the ocean at different depths. It evolved into an elaborate formula of different limits of national jurisdiction at different depths of the water column. Most countries didn't have the technology for mining the deep sea. At the UN, the notion that the resources of the deep sea were the heritage of all mankind became conventional wisdom: everybody had equal claim to the wealth of the seabeds even though they had far from equal access. The trick was to negotiate a treaty with all these levels and limits.

Elliot Richardson as Under Secretary and Alexis Johnson as Deputy Under Secretary had to get into it because of interdepartmental fights. One of the steadiest hands was the then new legal advisor of the State Department, John R. Stevenson. He had come to the job from the New York law firm Sullivan and Cromwell, John Foster Dulles old firm. When Jack Stevenson left State, he returned to his old law firm as managing partner and was also President of the National Gallery of Art. He was a very bright and distinguished lawyer and diplomatist. We spent a lot of time together on this subject.

I remember a meeting with Alex Johnson arguing about one of the position papers after I had been there six to eight months. We were spending as much time negotiating with the US Senate, all the corporate interests, resource interests, defense interests, as we did in the UN and I expressed the opinion that I didn't think we could really negotiate a treaty that would be ratified by the Senate. Or, if the Senate ratified it, no one else would sign. Before that was settled, I went off to London. Three or four years later, in the mid-70s, Elliot Richardson, who had left government, became the principal US negotiator of the Law of the Sea Treaty. They finally got a treaty by the time Reagan came into office, but the new Administration pulled it back from the Senate. I have no idea where it stands today.

Another IO story was the effort that Charlie Yost undertook in New York to negotiate with his British, French, and Soviet colleagues some kind of peace settlement between Israel and its neighbors. Those negotiations went on and on and clearly neither the Israelis or the Arabs liked any part of what was happening. So they never got anywhere, but Charlie Yost spent a lot of his talents trying to find ways to satisfy all. In the Spring of 1970, Secretary Rogers made a speech that became known as the Rogers Plan suggesting ways to negotiate secure borders between Israel and its neighbors. Joe Sisco who was then Assistant
Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, had a considerable role in putting him up to that. The Israelis quickly sabotaged the plan in the American political environment. The Rogers Plan caused a stir for awhile and then disappeared, except in Egypt, where President Sadat tried for some time to get the US government to live by it.

We spent a certain amount of time trying to attract support in the UN for other aspects of our foreign policy. I recall one lunch meeting that Sam de Palma and I attended with the Secretary and the Under Secretary to discuss how we could get more out of our work in the UN, where the membership was approaching a hundred or maybe even more. The Secretary was talking about peace keeping among other things and I said the trouble with the concept of the UN as a peace keeping agency (and I still think so) is that we and the Soviets whose relationship was the most proximate danger to peace, wouldn't let our problems into the UN forum at all. Most of the rest of the people whose peace we wanted to keep around the world didn't think that the principal function of the UN should be keeping the peace between them. They thought the principal function should be as a mechanism for transferring resources from rich nations to poor nations. We had to find someway to acknowledge that different view. It was very difficult to do, and my view of the problem was not terribly popular at the top of the State Department.

Not least of the reasons it was so hard, was that the constituency for the UN as a claimant on American fiscal resources was very thin in the Congress. Many members of the Congress, particularly after 1967 and the Arab-Israeli War, had come to regard the UN as against Israel and for the Arabs. They were damned if they were going to appropriate anymore money than they had to. That is when we started falling behind in our payments and now we are outrageously behind. At one point we thought of having Sam de Palma say if we don't appropriate the money needed to maintain the UN and some of its agencies in New York, the UN might move out and go to Geneva or Vienna, or somewhere else. It was decided prudently and quickly not to use that argument because so many Congressmen would have welcomed its departure. Sam de Palma had a very difficult job in trying to help Secretary Rogers run an operation that had little constituency support either in the Congress or the rest of the administration.

Q: How strong was the will of Henry Kissinger at that time? At that time he was head of the National Security Council. He liked to be center stage and when he wasn't, he wasn't happy.

GREENE: He played a role on things like arms control negotiations with the Soviets. On Arab-Israeli issues and law of the sea issues, they weren't anything that he thought he and the president should get involved in. When Rogers and Sisco cooked up the Rogers Plan and floated it, Kissinger's view was that there was "nothing in it for us." That was in the first years of the administration, before Watergate. He left Bill Rogers to hang out to dry on that one. The Secretary wasn't comfortable at all in his job. One day we all read in the newspaper that there was going to be a new US arms control proposal. We were astonished. I went to the Secretary's staff meeting and everyone was equally perplexed. The Secretary arrived at the meeting late, quite red in the face, sat down and said "these leaks have to
"We all knew at once it was true. He never should have said that. He was a very nice man and I came to know him better when I went to Cairo.

Kissinger would interfere and even undercut Rogers where Kissinger thought it would help, as came out later in the shuttle diplomacy after the Arab-Israeli War in 1973. But in the SALT negotiations of 1972, the State Department and our Embassy in Moscow, didn't know anything about what Kissinger was doing behind Gerry Smith's and Bill Rogers' backs. That was the way he operated.

Q: You went to London in 1970. How did that come about?

GREENE: It came about sadly. Tom Hughes who had been involved in Democratic politics and wound up as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Johnson Administration, had been picked as the number two to Walter Annenberg in London in the Nixon administration. It was the first time that a non-career person, and a Democrat at that, had been sent to be Deputy Chief of Mission in London. He seemed a fish out of water. But more sadly, his wife, Jean, didn't take to it. After five or six months, Jean tried to take her own life. So Tom had to leave. His departure was delayed because he broke his ankle in an accident at home. When it was decided that he had to go, I was later told, by people involved such as Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Bill Macomber, Under Secretary for Management, both of whom I knew from my line of work, decided I was the person to go in Tom Hughes' place. That got the DCM job back in the Foreign Service. When I was told I was going to London, I pointed out that my wife was British and asked whether it mattered. They said it didn't. I held out to first ask my wife how she felt about it and they told me to hurry up, they were anxious to settle this. My wife, Kitty, was delighted. When I had been a junior officer, the best career job in the Foreign Service was number two in London. So, when you are asked to go, you don't really argue. I went out in May and the family came at the end of the school year.

I tried to set up the embassy as an operating unit, providing support for whatever the ambassador and our government were trying to do. Annenberg saw his job as primarily one of public relations. But he had a terrible job because the British press was being mean to the former publisher of The Daily Racing Forum and the Philadelphia Inquirer. They really didn't take him very seriously. Gradually, it emerged, to the extent the US and British governments had business to transact, it was being done through John Freeman, the ambassador in Washington. I had known him very well when he had been High Commissioner in New Delhi. We became good friends and saw each other socially in Washington before I went to London. I began to also feel that the Embassy there was a set of fiefdoms: every agency in Washington who had a couple of officers in London didn't want anyone monkeying with their business. It also seemed to me that a lot of our talented people in diplomatic work spent a lot of time on the schedules of important visitors on their way to somewhere through London. The most important person in the embassy was the lady who made hotel accommodations and got theater tickets. The rest were making appointments for visitors with people in the British government. Then the question always arose of who would accompany whom. The ambassador didn't like to so I did a lot of that.
This included Henry Kissinger. The ambassador and Mr. Kissinger didn't really take to each other.

There was a memorable time when I went out to Heathrow Airport to meet Kissinger's plane. On the way back to town, we talked about his schedule. Since no one could really agree on the schedule, I suggested that Mr. Kissinger come back to my house where we could more freely discuss it. He often didn't want anyone from an American embassy around when he talked to someone of importance in a government he was visiting. We finally got that schedule settled and I went with him everywhere he went. When it was time to go to the Prime Minister, however, he went alone. That was his habit no matter where he was. Not the ambassador nor the deputy would accompany him except when he wanted a witness. He went on from London to Pakistan. He was there a couple of days, was said to have suffered a stomach bug and was out of circulation. Then he suddenly resurfaced, having been to Peking with Winston Lord. My British friends were annoyed with me because Kissinger had been to China without telling them. I pleaded ignorance, as did the ambassador. But they were outraged. That was how Henry Kissinger worked.

When Black September broke out in the fall of 1970 in Jordan and the Palestinians blew up planes in the desert, I set up an embassy task force. We had the military attachés to help keep track of military events, and the intelligence people and the political section with a Middle East expert, and an economic officer watching the oil embargo, just to monitor it and talk to the British. The British had a big stake in it and wanted to know what was going on and what we were going to do about it. Of course, as I said earlier, big decisions, particularly on what we might do, were made in Washington. At one point, the British police arrested some Arabs in London on terrorism charges. They told the FBI staffer in the Embassy that one of them, Leila Khalali, had an American passport. Only incidentally did I hear about her some days later, from the Foreign Office, which assumed we knew. Whatever else she was, she was entitled to consular protection, so I had it out with the FBI fellow. One illustration of fiefdoms at work oblivious to their context as part of an Embassy.

Q: Moving on, why don't we hop over the Brandeis period, when you were Diplomat in Residence since it only lasted three months of 1971. What happened then?

GREENE: In November, 1971, I got a call from Joe Sisco who was Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. They wanted me to go to Cairo to take charge of the US Interests Section in the Spanish Embassy.

Nasser had broken off relations in 1967 when he was convinced the Americans were party to the Israeli attack on Egypt, and ordered that all Americans leave Egypt. Even before they all left, the ambassador at the time, Dick Nolte (who left before he even could present his credentials) was quietly told that maybe we could leave a couple of Americans in case they needed to talk to them. So there was always an Interests Section in the Spanish Embassy. By the time I got there, there were 22 of us.
Kissinger was still leaving the Arab-Israeli hornet's nest to Rogers and Sisco because he didn't see anything to be gained by involving the President in it. Don Bergus had been my predecessor and had incurred Bill Roger's wrath by trying to advance the cause of what Sisco had dreamed up as "proximity talks." calculated to get around the Israelis and the Arabs' refusal to speak to each other directly. The idea was to devise a system of dialogue in which they would be near each other, each talking to us or the British or the British and us. At one point in the summer of 1971, Bergus had responded to an Egyptian request for his views on what this all might look like with a memo on a sheet of a yellow pad. That was unwise because they promptly leaked it. That embarrassed the Secretary of State and the Secretary wanted Don to go somewhere else soon.

Sisco and the Department had picked Michael Sterner who was officer in charge of Egyptian affairs and a very able and intelligent officer to go to Cairo as the officer in charge of the Interests Section. One day, after Mike's farewells had begun, Bergus reported that Sadat's friend Hassanein Heikal, had protested that they weren't sending anyone of rank to replace Bergus. So Joe remembered there was at Brandeis a recent minister from the Embassy in London (although I was no longer a minister) and that seemed to appease Sadat. When Joe called me, I wanted to know what the assignment was all about and said that I wanted to talk to Joe and the Secretary. I was particularly keen to make sure the Secretary and I were on the same wave length.

When I got to Washington, I asked Rogers why he wanted me to go. I pointed out that I had worked on the Arab-Israeli problem in many other contexts but had never been there. The Secretary said that was the reason: He could assure both sides I had never been there and wasn't committed to either. I still treasure that frame of reference. I asked whether I should talk to Kissinger before I went, and both Rogers and Sisco said no. I finally got to Egypt in January 1972, after having stopped at the Sixth Fleet who assured me if we got in trouble they would come and get us out. Sadat would never receive me. He increasingly blamed all his troubles on Uncle Sam and our little mission. I was part of his problem. We had a rather routine time; occasionally a new idea would come along about how to get the Israelis, the Arabs, and particularly the Egyptians talking to each other. This included the proximity talks and a "Greene Paper" was thought to exist. It was believed that I had arrived with a new way of going about it. Well, I hadn't. In fact, that came later. When it did, I was instructed to show it to the Foreign Minister, Murad Ghaleb, but not to give him a copy. The Department didn't want to get sandbagged like they had sandbagged Don Bergus. I was told to tell no one else, not even the British about it. My first meeting with Murad Ghaleb was interesting and set a tone for my whole time there. He noted that I had never been in the Arab world before. I said no but was glad to be here. He increasingly blamed all his troubles on Uncle Sam and our little mission. I was part of his problem. We had a rather routine time; occasionally a new idea would come along about how to get the Israelis, the Arabs, and particularly the Egyptians talking to each other. This included the proximity talks and a "Greene Paper" was thought to exist. It was believed that I had arrived with a new way of going about it. Well, I hadn't. In fact, that came later. When it did, I was instructed to show it to the Foreign Minister, Murad Ghaleb, but not to give him a copy. The Department didn't want to get sandbagged like they had sandbagged Don Bergus. I was told to tell no one else, not even the British about it. My first meeting with Murad Ghaleb was interesting and set a tone for my whole time there. He noted that I had never been in the Arab world before. I said no but was glad to be here. He explained that those in the western world have many art forms that they enjoy--performing arts and graphic art. But the Egyptians were too poor for all that; their art form is rhetoric, it costs nothing. And he told me he was telling me that so that I wouldn't believe everything I heard or read. I told him I was glad he warned me because I was a New Englander and in New England we say what we mean and mean what we say. And I told him I hoped he would remember that. I had evidence later in getting that straight and reporting it back that some of the people I talked to realized they had a Yankee there who took things literally and only said things he meant.
Every once in awhile they would try and get me to talk about the Rogers Plan. I told the Foreign Secretary there was no good in our sitting there speculating about what I thought might work. I told him what my government's view was and that was the one they had to deal with. The proximity talks never got anywhere. The Israelis stonewalled all of that. The British learned about it and the British Ambassador Dick Beaumont was put out with me for not having told him. Of course, I had been told not to tell him and he insisted that he knew there was a Greene Plan. Joe Sisco never admitted that he gave it to them in Washington. If the State Department didn't give the Greene Plan to the British, I surmise they got it by reading the Egyptian telegrams.

It was becoming apparent that the Egyptians were becoming ever more uncomfortable with us and our president and not showing even rhetorical sympathy to their view of their relations with Israel. They felt Israel had to make some gesture of reconciliation, at least not keep getting so many high performance aircraft for their Air Force from the Americans.

Ismail Fahmy, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, called me in one day in April 1972 and said that President Sadat had decided that because we were not standing by the Rogers Plan, on which he had premised expansion of the Interest Sections in Cairo and Washington, the staffs thereof would have to be cut in half. By this action, Fahmy said, the Government of Egypt intended to signify its displeasure with the state of relations with the US I asked whether they had anyone specific in mind; he said he would find out and let me know. Later, he told me they had no one in mind, but wanted to record their regard for the way I was doing my job. In any event, we had to go along, and I flew to Rome to meet Joe Sisco, on his way to join President Nixon and Kissinger at a Summit in Moscow, and Mike Sterner to decide who would be transferred from Cairo. It was a personally distasteful task, because everyone in the Interests Section was doing good work in difficult circumstances. After a little creative and political math with the Foreign Office, including redefining diplomatic functions, I got agreement that half of 22 was 12.

The May 1972 Summit produced a SALT Agreement and, among other things, an agreement that the US and Soviet Governments would not let regional difficulties impinge on their relations with each other. The Egyptian Government was outraged at the thought this meant we would not try to help them with Israel. Soon thereafter, Hafez Ismail, Sadat's National Security Adviser, called me in to say he would no longer see me, I should confine my contacts to the Foreign Office. (The exact chronology of all these things should be checked against the record; my memory may be a bit off.)

I had reported both then and later at a chiefs of mission conference in Tehran in April or May 1972 that one of Sadat's senior political associates who was not in the government (so I could see him once in awhile) had called me in. He said the situation was getting intolerable for the Egyptian leadership both militarily and politically; they had over a million men under arms in the Army and the Air Force, sitting in the desert with nothing to do. They were getting restive and if the US couldn't change their rhetoric, change the situation along the Suez Canal and get Israel to show some accommodations, Egypt would have to attack Israel. I said that would be folly. Egypt believed the alternative for them was
a rebellious military who if not permitted to turn on Israel, would turn on their leaders in Cairo. He said he knew that because they were them once. I remember when I reported that at the chiefs of mission meeting in Tehran, the then newly appointed Under Secretary of State Kenneth Rush was impatient. Not only me, but the same restiveness and acute discomfort was being reported from Amman and Jeddah. We suggested that we didn't have to do much if we could just change the rhetoric and do it with mirrors and smoke. The answer was, "Joe, I guess your colleagues out here want the Administration to exchange one set of irritants for another. What's next on your agenda?" That was the way our political leaders looked at this very dangerous problem. They couldn't believe that there was going to be a war.

Henry Kissinger set up separate communication with his opposite number, Hafez Ismail. I didn't know anything about it. He did it through the young fellow who was station chief on my small staff. One day the Saudi ambassador invited me for tea. The other guest at tea was the Saudi king's national security advisor, Kamal Adham. They had got wind from the Egyptians that Kissinger had some chain of communication with Sadat. They wanted me to tell them about it. I told them I didn't know anything about it and couldn't imagine that would be going on because things were at such arm's length. Well, when I reported all this, Washington told me to mind my own business. It was the way Washington said it that whetted my curiosity. I called in the station chief and told him I had the impression that something was going on in communications that I knew nothing about. He told me he couldn't enlighten me. I rephrased my question and he said he could not answer that. I then wrote a telegram to Bill Rogers with no distribution, for your eyes only, to let him know something was going on that I wasn't informed of. I asked him why we were doing it. That telegram was the first Bill Rogers knew anything was going on. And Henry Kissinger was angry with me for not keeping quiet. He wrote up this episode in his memoirs *The White House Years*. He commented that Greene was not in an enviable position. He told me later he had memorialized me in his book. That was the only instance of that kind of rebelliousness by the Foreign Service to his secret way of operating mentioned in either of his books. He chose that story to illustrate how some of the Foreign Service didn't like what he was doing. He remembered some of the facts differently from me but I can't say he was mean spirited about the way he recounted it.

I had actually gone to the chiefs of mission conference in Tehran from New Haven, Connecticut. The then-President of Yale Kingman Brewster, whose classmate I had been as an undergraduate, had asked me if I would like to be director of a new study center, a think tank, he was setting up in some property that was left to Yale by Agnes Meyer, widow of Eugene Meyer. I thought it sounded good and just had to return to Cairo to clear it with my wife. So, I had somewhere to go and was less concerned about Joe Sisco or Henry Kissinger. In June, Yale announced I was leaving. I was happy to have an option to leave.

Later, as we had predicted, the Egyptians attacked Israel across the Suez Canal on Yom Kippur, 1973. Ultimately, the Israelis were persuaded to stop their counter attack at the Suez Canal, on the grounds that it would do no one any good if Sadat fell.
One more short intelligence vignette:

I learned later after I was back in the Yale family, the Spanish ambassador was called in and told by Foreign Minister Zayaat, before the Yom Kippur war in 1973, that Marshall Wiley was really intolerable and that if the Americans didn't move him, they would declare him persona non grata. He was in charge of the mission after I left, and he was very peremptory and contemptuous of some of the Egyptians and didn't take trouble to conceal it always. That left Dick Smith in charge when the Yom Kippur war broke out. He later told me when the fighting had stopped and Kissinger had begun his shuttle diplomacy, after his sessions with Sadat, Kissinger would come back to the ambassador's residence to debrief the staff. Sadat's then National Security Advisor took Ambassador Hermann Eilts aside one day and told him one really had to be more careful after your man sees Sadat about what you talk about at home. That was correctly interpreted to mean the bugs were still operating but President Sadat had lost control of the tapes. We had never been able to find the bugs while I lived there. Whenever I talked to the Egyptians or anyone, we went out in the garden. Eventually they found the bug, it was voice activated and right over the mantel piece in the living room. We were always bugged and watched. After the dreadful murder of the ambassador and DCM in Khartoum, the Egyptians reluctantly let us send in a military plane with Bill Macomber on it to try and negotiate for their release before they were killed. What we didn't know, the minute President Nixon said we weren't going to knuckle under, the Black September gang murdered the ambassador and his deputy in the basement of someone's embassy in Khartoum. The Egyptians didn't even want to be a party to our sending a military aircraft carrying a peace maker through Egypt. We finally, got them to do that, and all they could do was bring home the bodies. But it was that tender and sensitive.

End of interview