The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR FRED L. HADSEL

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INTERVIEW

Q: You were born in 1916 in Oxford, Ohio. Tells us a little about your younger years.

HADSEL: I was born in Oxford, Ohio on March 11, 1916. I was the son of a Latin professor at the Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. I grew up there, went through grade

school and high school and Miami University, graduating in 1937 with reasonable honors.

After that, 1937-39, I went to Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts where I majored in international relations under a distinguished scholar, George Hubbard Blakeslee, who was a specialist in Far Eastern international affairs. He was on the staff of the Lytton Commission back in the 1930s and in fact, during the war, came back to the State Department as an associate of Ambassador Nelson to help him on special assignments.

In 1939, I transferred to the University of Chicago and stayed there until September 1942, when I received my Doctorate in Diplomatic History. My dissertation for that degree, which I have never looked at since its submission, dealt with imperialism in the latter part of the 19th Century--namely the international policies of various European powers. I finished at the University literally one month before entering the Army in October, 1942. October was a decisive month for me because on the 21st. of the month, I married Winefred Nelson and on the 24th, I entered the Army. It has been a matter of some embarrassment when I occasionally confuse the two dates.

Winefred had been at the University of Chicago, having graduated with top honors at Nebraska and having earned a Master's Degree there. By 1942, she had completed all of her Doctoral requirements except the thesis when she joined the Foreign Policy Association in New York as a research assistant. She worked there until after the war.

My life in the Army was one of complete chance. I started on the West Coast--Fort Roberts--for basic training, preparing to go to the Far East. I was summarily yanked back to Chicago where for approximately a year, I pretended to be a counter-intelligence agent. After having gone to Officers' Candidate School in Michigan, I was then sent to join the historical section of the Army under the command of S.L.A., known as "Slam" Marshall. From the beginning of 1944 through to the start of 1946, I served in the European command attached generally to the Ist Army, VII Corps, under General Lawton Collins as a combat historian. I was either with troops in combat or interviewing troops immediately after battle in order to flesh out the inadequate records that are kept of military affairs. This was an interesting assignment. I was the only second lieutenant who was his own boss. I worked largely with the VII Corps up through its final destination--Leipzig-- on the eve of D-Day. At that point, I was transferred back to Paris with the other historians from early Summer, 1945 until January, 1946. I had the rough life of working in the historical section in Paris. I was making preliminary drafts of studies of operations of which I had personal experience.

Q: These were based on your own observations?

HADSEL: On my own and those of others I served with. For example, I did a tremendous amount of interviewing on the disastrous battle of Schmidt, a little place near Cornelingmunster on the Siegfried Line. The town had been taken, lost and retaken.

Battalions had been torn apart. My record in addition to others documents became the preliminary draft of that particular operation. I worked entirely from notes, and it was very interesting because it eventually played a role in my post-Foreign Service career. Slam Marshall was a distinguished military historian. With him, were other well known historians, not the least of whom was my oldest friends--Forrest Pogue-- who is now the authorized biographer of General Marshall. We have remained friends for the last fifty years.

At the end of this tour, I was returned to the United States. I was on a post-Liberty ship--a very small ship--which took seventeen days from Le Havre to Hoboken. Fourteen of those days were spent in a hurricane. At one point we had to turn around completely; at another point, we listed 43%--a little more and it would have been the end.

I was discharged on a Friday in late January, 1946. In the meantime, my wife with a certain amount of optimism about military procedures, had already accepted for me a position of history-international relations instructor at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. I got out on a Friday, reported to the University, but received permission to appear late for classes because I had not yet seen my mother since returning. I went to Oxford, Ohio for a quick visit and returned to Rutgers to start to work.

I was blessed by another chance. We were living in New York and commuting against the traffic each day to New Brunswick. Those precious 45 minutes on the train during which I worked on my class lectures, kept me literally one day ahead of the class through the semester. I taught modern European Diplomatic History, international relations and similar subjects. Teaching at a University in the immediate post-war era was not financially rewarding. I remember the head of the Department saying :" I am sorry but I cannot pay you more than $2,700 per year". This was while he was trying to encourage me stay.

In April 1946, I was told by the Foreign Service that I passed the written exams, which I had forgotten that I had taken. I only remember the stale smell of beer of some U.S.O. in Paris. I therefore came to Washington for the oral exam in May. Like any other Foreign Service officer, I could describe that examination in excruciating detail, but I won't except to indicate the role of chance. As I was waiting for my turn, the previous examinee came out looking very pale. He had been grilled exhaustively on the geography of Latin America of which I knew absolutely nothing.

When I took the exam, the two principal subjects were 1) the economy of Belgium, which any fool who had lived there for months as I had, could discuss reasonably well, and 2) my views of American policy toward Germany. By chance, I had just given a talk on that subject for the Foreign Policy Association. It was just a matter of grinding out the conclusions. I did pass the examination.

But fate intervened. During the time of my orals, I was offered a position the State Department's Historical Division. Having just returned from overseas and recognizing that if I entered the Foreign Service, I would immediately leave the country again thereby forcing my wife to abandon her job, I decided it would be wiser to accept an appointment as a P-4 in the Historical Division. That was the beginning of my first three years in the Department.

Before talking about my work in the State Department, it might be helpful to outline some of the reasons for my interest in foreign affairs for a number of years. In the first place, there were the three degrees--Miami, Clark and Chicago Universities--in which my major emphasis was international relations and diplomatic history. In the second place, both Blakeslee at Clark and Bernadette Schmidt, my principal professor at the University of Chicago, were involved in diplomacy and international relations. That undoubtedly had a bearing upon my interests and upon my selection of dissertation subject at Chicago. In addition to those three degrees, I studied at Grenoble, France in 1933 where I fortunately learned enough French to carry me through my major in College along with history without any difficulty. I supplemented my foreign languages by a summer in Freiburg and Breisgau in Germany in 1938. This was a period, of course, of Nazi euphoria. When I look back on this period, I am astonished by my innocence of what was going on. It was an interesting experience both from the stand-point of language and international affairs.

Q: Did you learn German?

HADSEL: My German was not as good as my French and less permanent, largely due to the fact that I met a very charming English girl at University of Freiburg. The German was necessary for the Ph.D. and I found that when I was back in Germany after the end of the war, my German served me reasonably well, given some rough interpretations.

But back to the State Department. The job in the Historical Division--later to be the Historical Office-- was a rather specialized one. Under a former professor at the University of Chicago--Professor Harold Goznell--, the Office was preparing an administrative history of the State Department during the War. This was dull study of organizational charts, personnel rosters and developments, etc. There was however an extremely interesting part of my work which became in due course considerable help to me. In the administrative history itself, we interviewed principal participants in foreign affairs during the war period. I remember for example, long talks with John Carter Vincent, the leading China expert of the period. I also talked with Joseph Ballantine, a Japanese expert and Sumner Welles, with whom I had a long interview which was undoubtedly the highlight. He had by then retired and was living in Oxon Hills, just south of the city. I remember Welles' butler--who was a very proper butler--and I remember Welles who with a mixture of shrewdness and frankness described his work as Under Secretary. He remarked with some wryness that although he was a professional diplomat, that he had failed in the most important diplomatic task of his career which was his relationship with Cordell Hull. As we know, with a mixture of scandal as well, Cordell Hull managed to force Welles' retirement from the State Department in 1944 when

Roosevelt had to go along with Hull's decision. I got an understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses of the State Department during the period when Cordell Hull with consummate naivete for the wily old politician that he was, thought that the officers of the State Department could sit by quietly while the war was waged and then pick up foreign policy at the end.

This of course was a basic fallacy. The OSS, OWI, Economic agencies and others had developed expertise in the areas in which the State Department turned out to be sadly lacking. Consequently, while I wasn't immediately involved, I came into the Department when it and the Foreign Service was making its first series of incomplete moves to re-establish the Foreign Service as a career service and to re-assert its leadership in foreign affairs.

My second job turned out to be even more relevant to my later work. I was assigned to prepare a narrative and documentary collection of the negotiation for the German, Italian and satellite peace treaties. I worked on this in the latter years of this period. This not only gave me an insight into our diplomacy at the end of the war, but out of that, in due course when I was in German affairs, I became one of the scribes for the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in 1949 and later for the NATO and Council of Foreign Ministers' meetings in New York in late 1950 or early 1951. This was when Acheson was Secretary of State. Watching Acheson, Vischinsky, Earnest Bevin, Robert Schuman as a very junior officer was an experience that I still recall in great detail.

It was out of that work, dealing with the Council of Foreign Ministers, the German problem, etc. that I was offered a job in 1949 in the newly established Office of German Affairs. Initially, Robert Murphy was its chief, but the leadership soon fell to Henry Byroade, a former military officer and a favorite of General George C. Marshall in China and then subsequently to Jake Beam, who also had a distinguished career. Working for all those men was a rare experience. Those two years were essentially training as a desk officer. I was in German political affairs and worked there with great pleasure and interest.

In 1951, when the Secretariat within the Office of the Secretary was looking for additional staff, I moved there for two years as a specialist on the personal correspondence of Secretary Acheson. My colleague was Frank Meloy, who was later to suffer a tragic death in Lebanon. Those two years, as an observer of the work at the top of the Department, was fascinating. We were right around the corner from the Policy Planning Staff when Paul Nitze was active and working with Dean Acheson on many things including the initial phase of the Iranian problem.

It was because of my staff experience in that job that I was picked up as special assistant to Henry Byroade, then Assistant Secretary for Near East, South Asia and Africa, working particularly close with John Jernegan, who was his deputy and a superior officer of the Service. I worked as special assistant from 1952-55. Here again, although obviously young and inexperienced, I got tossed into various activities which I remember with great

interest although not always with great affection. A principal assignment was as low man on the totem pole for a trip by John Foster Dulles to the Near East and South Asia. That was in May 1953. The trip confirmed all of our prejudices about Mr. Dulles. I found him remote, very stand-offish in his relationships with any career officer and suspicious of the State Department. The trip group consisted of Dulles, Harold Stassen, the Administrator of the Agency for International Cooperation, Henry Byroade and MacArthur, then Counselor of the Department. The tour was of many countries in a few days--nine countries in fourteen days. Having fallen deathly ill on shrimp at the first stop in Cairo, I merely hung on until I recovered later. It was a fascinating experience, preparing the briefing book, taking notes of meetings and seeing Mr. Dulles in action. His way of working was so opposite to that of Mr. Acheson that as a young Foreign Service officer, I became very mistrustful of him. I got to admit that he reminded me of a man treading through a field of deep clay, drudging determinably to the other end of his assignment. His perseverance was incredible. His pleasure was going swimming in the Bosporus in May when the icy waters were still flowing, to the complete dismay of the Turkish security man who had to go in the water with him. This gave Mr. Dulles a dimension which forced from me a grudging admiration.

Q: He was born on the St. Lawrence River.

HADSEL: That's right. I also have to add that by the end of Mr. Dulles' tour, as he acquired a better understanding of the capabilities of the Foreign Service, my criticism became less strident. Mr. Dulles ranks as one of my two least favorite Secretaries of State under whom I served in a remote way.

Q: That is a remarkable beginning to a career--to be so close to Acheson and Dulles.

HADSEL: That's right. In January 1953, the whole State Department assembled, in the lot behind New State, Acheson delivered one of the great speeches of his career. We stood out there and cheered him to such an extent that he was surprised and almost embarrassed at the support we displayed. Dulles' staff thought that a similar performance by Dulles would be good. We all assembled in the same spot. The day had turned cold. We stood out there shivering when Mr. Dulles, putting his finger in his vest, talked in his ponderous Presbyterian fashion and called for positive loyalty. That was the sourest note a new Secretary could possibly have uttered. We expected to be loyal; we were insulted that that was not assumed. This more than any other single word or action, disillusioned and disabused the career officers with respect to John Foster Dulles.

Q: He never overcame that.

HADSEL: Never. When it came years later to his disgraceful treatment of Ambassador Bohlen, we all thought that it was in character.

Q: He delegated to me, as head of the Near East personnel office, to deliver the final blow to John Vincent Carter. He wouldn't do it himself. He left the dirty job to the lowest officer on the totem pole.

HADSEL: During the McCarthy period, Dulles in some ways was scared of his own shadow. These were days that "tried men's souls". When we needed loyalty from the top, we got none. Fortunately, we were junior enough that we only occasionally felt the cold blast of this attitude. In fact, during my three years as staff assistant to Byroade and then George Allen, it was a life full of support work for both able Assistant Secretaries. I look back on that period with pleasure. I was exceptionally fortunate to have bosses throughout my career whom I admired. There were very different. Byroade was a very intelligent, but completely non-intellectual. I don't think he read any newspaper except those clippings that were placed on his desk first thing in the morning. He was a distinguished West Pointer, the first man to take an advance degree in engineering. He was the youngest to become Brigadier General in the Army during the war. It was when he was still a Colonel that Marshall picked him during his trip to China and thereafter Byroade was a fair haired boy of General Marshall. When Acheson asked Byroade to become Assistant Secretary--Byroade was the first to recognize that his experience was not in that area--he said that when a Secretary asks you to do a job, you just can't say no. He then tackled with is energy and his shrewdness. When I said he was intelligent, I meant that he had that special capability of spotting bureaucratic log-jams and identifying the particular log that was holding up a policy, pointing out the log and getting things moving. Byroade was an operator. Nobody ever claimed that he was a profound student of foreign policy. In fact, when Byroade was given his first oral examination for the Foreign Service, he was turned down by, among others, my former professor Bernadan Schmidt because Byroade knew no diplomatic history. I think they managed to get him the appointment when Schmidt was not around. Byroade was a good man to work for. He was an understanding boss; he left full initiative to his staff, as did Jack Jernegan. The two were a very interesting pair--Jack with his deep knowledge of the professional service and Byroade with his superb knowledge of the way governments worked.

When George Allen came in and subsequently Bill Rountree as his deputy, one dealt with two great career men. George Allen had been the youngest Ambassador we ever had in Iran; Rountree in due course became Assistant Secretary, Ambassador to Brazil in an another distinguished career. Both men expected a lot and because they had a very loyal staff, got a lot from all. It was an example of career at its best--State Department and Foreign Service. I look back on those periods with men that I knew, whether it be Joe Palmer or Ed Mulcahy, with great admiration for my colleagues.

George Allen, when he left his Assistant Secretaryship, for ambassador to Greece, told me that he got that appointment somewhat to his surprise. That may indeed illustrate Dulles' somewhat devious manner. I suspect that George Allen, who was such an effective career person, was not the most sympathetic person to Mr. Dulles. That just speculation, but George Allen once told me that he went as Ambassador to Athens somewhat to his surprise because once in a very casual way he had mentioned to Mr.

Dulles that as a young man he had served in Athens and would have liked to serve there again. Lo and behold, in a matter of weeks, Dulles took him up on his wish and sent him to Athens, bringing in Rountree as Assistant Secretary. Rountree established, unlike many career officers, a very close working relationship with Dulles. Rountree was one of the relatively few career people whom Dulles trusted. Consequently, while I was not in the Bureau during this period, Rountree did a superior job as Assistant Secretary.

At the end of 1954, another element entered into my career-we must recognize the role of chance plays in our careers. Wristonization was in the air. I myself looked at it with no great joy and in fact one of my Foreign Service friends gave it the succinct definition that Wristonization was a double shot-gun marriage.

Q: Very true. We tried to achieve what the British had done under the Eden reforms, in one fell swoop.

HADSEL: It caused many difficulties, but Wristonization was a great concern to me personally because my wife was by now an officer in the State Department in the Division for Research for Western Europe--she was a specialist on France. I came to the conclusion with her agreement that while entering the Foreign Service would mean the end of our life as we had established for almost ten years in Washington--we had three daughters by then--still it should be done. At the same time, there were Foreign Service officers that were very much opposed to Wristonization. I could understand why. None were more opposed to it than a senior Foreign Service officer, John Utter, who was so appalled at the wave of riffraff that he saw coming into the Service that he resigned to go back to the Rothschild Brothers in Paris, where in due course he became the financial advisor to the Duke of Windsor. I am sure he made a great deal more money there. John was a very nice guy. I could sympathize with his dismay but because he resigned rather hastily from the directorship of the Office for African Affairs, there was an immediate need for a director. They were prepared to move me from my staff job to the Deputy job under Leo Cyr, which took place at the end of 1954.

Q: This of course was before the Bureau of African Affairs was established.

HADSEL: Let me mention at this stage a second path that I have also followed as much as possible throughout my career. I taught for a brief period at Rutgers before coming to the State Department. During the summer of 1946, while I was visiting Washington, I was offered an appointment as professorial lecturer at George Washington University's School of Government. There I taught, part-time, international politics, diplomatic history and Far Eastern politics. The teaching at GWU lasted eleven years, as long as I was in Washington. It was renewed for an additional six years in the 1970s. It was a very exciting and stimulating task because the material that I was reading in preparation for teaching was invariably related to foreign policy and foreign affairs. In 1960, I achieved a "first", in that I taught at Columbia University during my home leave. I remember the Executive Officer of the Bureau saying that there was a file two inches thick on this appointment, not because anybody was opposed, but it had never been done before and

therefore nobody knew how to approve it. But I did take the place of Gray Cowan, the Africanist, at Columbia in the summer of 1960.

After returning to Washington in the 1960s', I taught again at GWU and on occasion at John Hopkins' SAIS Africa program when its director, Vernon McKay, was on sabbatical in South Africa. I also spent a year at Howard University where my class in African history was part black America, part black African and part white European. I think it is fair to say that throughout my career I always walked a double path. Whether this was a good thing in terms of professional advancement or in terms of concentrated effort, is indeed a moot question, but in retrospect I would not have had it otherwise. It was a dimension of interest and relationships with individuals and subject matters that I have always treasured. I found it fascinating and I am glad that I did it.

When I was offered the job in African Affairs, I realized that while I knew a little about North Africa but I knew nothing about Africa south of the Sahara. I asked, as an element in my new assignment, if I couldn't be given a tour of the Continent. This was granted and in the Spring of 1955, I made a complete encirclement of Africa, starting with Dakar, where Vaughn Ferguson was Consul General, going through all of our posts and some places where we had no posts. I toured through South Africa, then through the Rhodesias to Kenya to Cairo, where Henry Byroade was Ambassador, then across the North African littoral--Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and Morocco. It was invaluable. Without that practical exposure, I think it would have taken me far longer to get a sense of perspective of the Continent, which was already beginning to change rapidly.

Q: In those days we had exactly five Embassies on the entire Continent, including Cairo.

HADSEL: It was Cairo, Addis Ababa, Tripoli, Monrovia and Pretoria. Morocco and Tunisia were not yet independent. I drove from Tripoli to Tunis on that marvelous highway.

In 1955, there was one African office which had responsibility for the independent countries of the Continent, except Egypt and indirect responsibility for the rest because the Bureau of European Affairs had jurisdiction over the colonies. In 1956, it was decided to divide this Office into Northern Africa Office, which Leo Cyr headed, and Southern Africa Office--the Sahara and south of it--, which I headed. In the meantime, in that same period, a special Deputy Assistant Secretary was assigned to African Affairs--Joe Palmer, who by all odds was the most experienced officer in African affairs since he started in Kenya during the war as a young Foreign Service officer. I went off to my next assignment in London in May 1957. The two Offices came under a fully designated Assistant Secretary--Joe Satterthwaite--in 1957. That established the Bureau of African Affairs which continues to today, with some jurisdictional changes. The Offices multiplied--Offices of Western African Affairs, Southern African Affairs, Eastern African Affairs and a regional Office established in the 1960s. Coming in to African Affairs, as the Bureau was being born, was both exciting and for most of us at the time, professionally rewarding.

I took what might appear as a digression when I went to London. It really was not, because I became the man in the American Embassy who was responsible for African affairs as they affected the United States-United Kingdom relationships. This made me embassy action officer for the evolution of African independence from the Colonial Office, the development of the African Commonwealth in the Office of Commonwealth Relations and the more traditional foreign affairs policies of the British Foreign Office. Those four years turned out to be extremely interesting because Britain moved from a colonial power to a Commonwealth power. Sudan became independent in 1956, Ghana in 1957, and Nigeria in 1960. South of the Sahara, the political independence movement was going full blast by 1960 when all of the Francophone states became independent, with Guinea having gained independence in 1958. Africa by 1965 was all independent with the exception of the Portuguese territories, Southwest Africa and the Rhodesias.

The work in London was interrupted three times. Once was a next-to-unique experience which required me--by now an expert in African affairs of three year standing--to lead a group of twenty young Foreign Service officers in an intensive study tour of Africa south of the Sahara. It involved Ghana, Nigeria, what was to become Central African Republic, Uganda, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique, the Congo and the Ivory Coast. This group of officers were by and large destined to play a fairly important role in African affairs. I took a rough reading about fifteen years ago and found that of the twenty, fourteen had major careers in Africa, which for a governmental educational effort, is a very high percentage.

The second interruption of the London period was my assignment as advisor on African affairs to our delegation to the U.N. in the Fall of 1959. It was an experience shared by many of our colleagues, but the exposure to the frustrations and the fascinations of the United Nations was memorable.

The third was assignment as political officer to a naval squadron, SOLANT Amity, along the coast of West Africa. It was divided into two groups, and I went with the one sent to find the hijacked Portuguese ship, Santa Maria. My tour ended ignominiously with hepatitis.

The senior Deputy Assistant Secretary under Satterthwaite was Jim Penfield. He kept his hand on personnel matters of interest to the Bureau of African Affairs. I never discussed my next assignment with Penfield, but I believe that it was he who felt it sensible that after my assignment to London I should go to Ethiopia as Deputy Chief of Mission under a first rate career officer--Arthur Richards--and I went there in the Summer of 1961. I went there on a direct transfer and therefore in the Summer of 1962, I returned to the U.S. for home leave. At that point, counter-insurgency was the rage. My return to Addis was postponed for a month in order that I could be an instructor in a counter-insurgency course. Through lack of foresight on my part, I did not have my physical examination until I was ready to leave for Addis. My wife and children had already returned. I was informed by the Medical Division that I had tuberculosis--we think I got it from our cook

who was also a bad cook in addition to being a T.B. carrier. Consequently, the Addis assignment was canceled, and I spent the late Fall in and out of the Naval Hospital in Bethesda. I came back to the Bureau in January 1963. By this time, G. Mennen Williams was Assistant Secretary. I was assigned first as planning advisor--there was no acting director for the Office of Inter-African Affairs. I subsequently became Director of that Office and began a six-year career in Washington that ended with my assignment to Somalia in 1969.

This was a period of major cross currents in Africa. Mennen Williams, the five-term governor of Michigan and an active civil-rights advocate, was a man of essentially simplified views. He was a politician; he had great determination, but the subtleties of a problem were not his concern. In retrospect, his forte was the constant support of the evolution of African nationalism. He wrote a book entitled "Africa for the Africans". This represented probably the single most important positive aspect of his five-year tour of duty as Assistant Secretary. He left in 1966 when he ran unsuccessfully for the Michigan Senate seat.

During this period, I felt very much like the poor man's Deputy Assistant Secretary because I was asked to write so many memoranda on the importance of Africa, on African strategy or what ever the subject might be. All of the assignments dealing with more than a limited Continental geographic area came to my desk. I enjoyed it, even though I remember many weekends, many holidays spent going over drafts for a man whose comprehension of subtleties of policy was deliberatively or unconsciously absent. He also was a man despite his hardy voice, his glad-handing manner, including his green polka dotted bow tie, and his political aspirations, who was very reserved. He was a devout Episcopalian. He never really felt close to any of his staff, with the possible exception of his Principal Deputy--Wayne Fredericks. I remember one time having been baffled by something the Governor wished to have done, going to see .Fredericks--a non-career man, reserved, who rarely laughed, very serious--and telling him that I did not understand what the Governor wanted. Fredericks burst out laughing and said:" I spend most of my time trying to figure out what Governor Williams wants."

It in part because there was a strong pattern of Deputy Assistant Secretaries --Henry Tasca and Bill Trimble--the Bureau was well served by its career officers. Moreover, there is a certain rule in the Foreign Service: the more difficult the problem, the better the esprit. We felt put upon, beaten up, mutilated and drawn and quartered so many times that in fact the morale of the officers dealing with African affairs during this period was very high. My job, being a very "miscellaneous" job--nothing that fit any other pattern--actually reflected an instinctive attitude of mind which I always had. I much preferred diversity to concentration, like the diversity of teaching and the Foreign Service.

The job was attractive. It involved me in key preparations for participation in the various conferences of heads of missions that were held in Africa. It placed me in 1968 as the State Department representative to tour nine countries of Africa in thirteen days with Hubert Humphrey--that was a memorable experience. Consequently, while it was a six

and seven day work-week, I found it demanding and exciting job, and again, here came the question of colleagues. The head of the North African Office was David Newsom. He was followed by John Ruth. Both were absolutely superior officers. Then there was you--Ed Mulcahy-- with your wide experience in Africa. So it was that in the Bureau there was lots of ability, lots of willingness to tackle difficult problems and live under difficult conditions. There was a feeling of sympathy with the Africans, and a feeling that with the independence of Africa, a new period was evolving-- a period of possible greater optimism than we had a right to expect, but still an exciting period.

Q: We were also confident of the interest of the White House in what we were doing.

HADSEL: That varied. This raises another question that should be discussed. The Bureau of African Affairs had in Governor Williams, a man for whom the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had no sympathy whatsoever. Their personalities were different. I don't think Rusk resented the fact that President Kennedy appointed Williams as Assistant Secretary even before he, Rusk, had been named as Secretary. There was a total difference of attitude, opinion, ways of working--the complete professional Rusk and the complete political activist Mennen Williams. Consequently, it was often an up-hill battle within the Department because our Assistant Secretary did not have the essential power and prestige. In contrast, it was very interesting when his successor, Joe Palmer, came. Joe was at the heart of the Foreign Service establishment. The relationships he established as Director General of the Foreign Service and then as Assistant Secretary were of an entirely different sort than that of the political activist G. Mennen Williams. Joe worked very closely with Averell Harriman. Harriman had been given responsibility for Africa while Williams was still assistant Secretary because Rusk didn't want to have anything to do with Africa. He never visited Africa; the most senior State official that did so was an Under Secretary, Nicholas Katzenbach. I was involved in the briefing for that visit in the latter part of the 1960s. But Katzenbach and Humphrey were the two most senior U.S. Government people who went to Africa during this period.

I was continuing my teaching, although at a reduced level because of the pressures of work. In 1969, the appointment to Mogadishu came through somewhat unexpectedly. In this case, a very able Foreign Service officer-Ray Thurston--was our Ambassador in Mogadishu in 1969. Ray Thurston developed a strong attachment to a very attractive Italian lady who was teaching him Italian. The attachment was such that her husband, a doctor, wrote to the Secretary of State. That set in motion a series of events, in which Thurston presumably--I never asked him about this--was asked to leave his post. He resigned and went into the University field. Someone was needed and I seemed to be the man who was available. Therefore in July 1969, I went to Mogadishu with my family. I took responsibility for the post in July, just a few days before our astronauts went to the moon. This event started a tour of duty in Somaliland which proved to be quite eventful.

The Somali period can be divided very simply: for the first months, until the latter part of October there was a parliamentary government headed by Prime Minister Egal and President Shermarke. The latter was assassinated, Egal was overthrown and the

government was taken over in October, 1969 by a military dictatorship headed by Mohammed Siad Barre who is still the President today. This was a difficult period because the United States basically had been assisting actively in the economic development of Somalia. The Soviets were actively involved in military assistance. When the military became the government, the Soviets became advisors to the government and they moved against us, cutting down our programs, identifying people that were with CIA--they fingered some who weren't-- and declaring them persona-non-grata. With the military regime, we were unable to resolve what was becoming the major single obstacle in economic relations between the two countries. I refer to the famous "Title VIII" of the Foreign Assistance Act which said that nations whose ships, as determined by the flag they were flying, were involved in trade with Vietnam and some other countries, would not be eligible for continuing economic assistance. The Somalis, for various reasons that they never explained, permitted Communist China to put some of its ships under Somali flag. In due course, the Somali ships went into Hanoi and were spotted by our intelligence agents. We were trying desperately to point out to the Somalis that for the few thousands dollars which they gained in ship fees, they were likely to lose $ 150-250,000 of aid annually.

The distinguished Senator from Virginia, Harry Byrd, who was really opposed to economic assistance, was fed material by a reporter from some place in the State of Washington. He read into the Senate Record that ships flying the Somali flag were sailing into the communist post of Hanoi. This put the fat in the fire. We therefore were required to terminate our aid. This was taken by the Somali leadership as a deliberate blow against their country. As often happens, coincidence played a role. By chance, the German Parliament had debated Somalia in a critical way a couple of weeks earlier. This was taken as a Western European conspiracy against the struggling independent People's Republic of Somalia. This was by all odds the major crisis in our relations and we came very close to being all declared persona-non-grata. Our military attaché who a few months earlier had acted like a fool, had been kicked out--the Somalis were right in this case; our aid program, which had far more officers involved than our Embassy, was terminated; our information program continued under great difficulties. We were shortly restricted to a forty miles limit from Mogadishu. Consequently, normal travel were restricted; very shortly thereafter our Consulate General in Hargeysa was closed.

Again by chance, in 1972--as relations continued to be very tense--two American shipping firms entered Somali waters without permission. One was a tug boat fleet owned by a very important Texan Republican who later became Deputy Secretary of Defense. The captain, who knew nothing about international law, was sailing 500 yards off the coast without permission. This was followed by another incident of similar kind and two incidents became a conscious policy in Somali eyes. There was nothing I could do to persuade the Somali government that this was not a calculated insult on the part of the United States. We rode out the storm. We finally got the sailors released. It was nip and tuck for sometime. In fact my departure was delayed until the last tug boat captain was out of prison.

This to me was a fairly exciting two years. Nobody forgets his or her first assignment as Chief of Mission. The adversity that we faced brought the staff together in a spirit which could not otherwise have been the case. Life in Somalia was not easy. I was served by able officers and I was proud of what they were able to do under difficult circumstances. Consequently, in a way, this period of greatest adversity was one of the most, if not the most, interesting period of my career.

The next phase of my career started with my transfer to Ghana as Ambassador from 1971 to 1974. Just as we were to go to Ghana, my eldest daughter married an extremely attractive young man, Bill Mabers, who is now a member of the Vermont State Legislature and a writer of considerable ability. She is the director of a Foundation dealing with museums.

Ghana was very different country from Somalia. In the first place, the Ghanaians had had decades of experience with Europe. It had an educational infrastructure that was extensive; they were by nature on of the most generous, hospitable, relaxed group of people in all of Africa. They had a sense of humor, they had a complex religious pattern of Catholics and Anglicans and other Protestants. They burst with vitality. However, they had gone through the shock of Nkrumah's deposition in the Spring of 1966. They had reestablished in due course a parliamentary government under the very able scholar rather than politician, Busia. He was Prime Minister at the time of our arrival, but he too was overthrown by a coup six months later. My friends noted jokingly that every place I was sent had a coup. They questioned where else I might be sent.

The military coup had some interest. The leader of the coup was the leader of a regiment which had been trained by our CIA to be the special unit available to the Busia government to prevent a possible coup. So when the coup started, Busia pushed the button, but there was no answer because the coup leader was the officer in charge of protecting the government against such actions. He was a man who had gone through Fort Leavenworth's Staff and Command College without leaving a trace. No one could find a record, good, bad or indifferent. His name was Acheampong, a man of adequate intelligence, modest education whose eventual downfall, long after I left, was due to the avarice of his wife. In fact, he and his wife were the first Ghanaians to be killed as result of the first counter-coup in the modern history of Ghana. Up to that point, coups had been bloodless.

Our Embassy in Ghana was a large one with 75 to 100 AID staffers, over 250 Peace Corps members, a half-dozen in the Information Service, a small defense Attaché Office and a sizable Embassy staff. The administration of such a large group was a challenge. It was not a great difficulty because I was blessed with able people. The AID Director, Haven North, before his recent retirement, was certainly the most experienced single AID official in the entire organization. My political staff, headed by Robert Bruce, was again absolutely first rate as was my economic officer and even my Chief-of-Agency was man I could trust. The Peace Corps staff was very good. One of the youngest staff members is now of the senior planner of the Department of Energy in Washington. Consequently, the

job in Ghana, though more complex on paper and with more potential problems than Somalia, was not as difficult as the job as Ambassador in Mogadishu. I could take advantage of this to join with another old Foreign Service colleague, Dwight Dickinson, who was the Ambassador in Togo, to see parts of West Africa which I had not seen or knew at all. The opportunity to travel in the area was a pleasant addition to the assignment.

There is an unwritten, often unspoken dictum in the Foreign Service of the United States which says that the more senior your position is, the less you are told. The only person in the Department of State really sure of his instructions is the messenger boy who delivers envelopes to the various offices. I didn't feel impelled to try to ferret out the political complications of the last part of my tour. One self-evident complication was that for a least a year I had heard the rumor that Shirley Temple Black was interested in becoming the next Ambassador to Ghana and that she stood very well in the Nixon White House. At the same time, this was the year of Watergate and Nixon's resignation occurred less than two weeks after the end of my tour of duty in July, 1974.

Q: I had the pleasure of preparing Shirley Temple Black for her assignment.

HADSEL: My departure, in fact, was delayed by the paralysis of the White House with respect to appointments during that period. In the meantime, the Assistant Secretary had passed from David Newsom to Donald Easum, both very able men of different temperament. It was made clear to me by the Director of the Foreign Service, Bill Hall, that the opportunities of a two-time Ambassador were so limited at that time that he could not even faintly promise an on-going assignment. Rather I would be walking the halls of the State Department looking for a job. At this time, I was 58 years old. I had almost accidentally thought to myself that if I were going to change careers, that was the year to do it. I claimed no great prescience; I believe that this was another element of chance. About six or eight months before my departure from Ghana, I was back in Washington on consultation. On the spur of the last moment--I was to leave Sunday afternoon--, on Sunday morning, I drove to Lexington Virginia to be interviewed by a search committee for the post of Executive Director of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

I put this aside and had not paid much attention to it, but in the Spring of 1974, their interest became serious. By March, it was clear that they were getting ready to offer me the job and by that time, it was also clear that my Ambassadorial appointment would be terminated within a very few months. I was therefore able to make arrangements to complete the selection interviews for the job and was offered the position on June 1, 1974 to be effective in the Fall. I think I was very fortunate, particularly having seen the travails of senior Foreign Service officers who through no fault of their own came from responsible assignments to face a situation in which there very few opportunities for another assignments of comparable responsibility. Had I waited until I was 60 or 62, the transition would have more difficult and prospects for an effective service diminished. The twenty year period during which I served in the Foreign Service was a period of dramatic growth in which we, the African Corps, as we might be called, had an esprit, a

comraderie, a feeling of joint effort which was unique. We were free of the trauma of Vietnam; we were in a period in which the expansion of posts was commensurate with any reasonable man's ambition; and we were at a point at which young officers could assume major responsibilities. The fact that this has changed since then is again a part of the evolution of a large foreign policy institution. These opportunities made the 20 years of service in Africa an exciting and challenging career.

Q: Do you have any comments on the Kissinger 1973 "global outlook" policy which inundated Africa with people who were assigned there unwillingly? This had been the case before the mid-50s, when I was in Personnel, when I saw a large number assigned to African for punishment.

HADSEL: Commensurate with this in 1973-74, there was what might be called a "diaspora" of the African officers. Three years later I took a trip to Europe on behalf of the Marshall Foundation and in ever European post was an old friend from African days. I think the influx of people who did not want to come to Africa was real blow to morale. It is true that I could point to almost twenty years of experience either with or connected to Africa, but there were others by that time who had far more experience than I. It was a period of morale, of confidence, of change, of new assignments, challenges. The feeling of being "under-dog" created a certain amount of determined optimism. I remember one of the cliches of the Corps that was " If you are dealing with African affairs, you must assume that every disaster is a glorious opportunity".

I left the Foreign Service officially on the last day of August, 1974 which was a Saturday and started in Lexington, Va on Monday. That was a mistake. I didn't realize that after the years in the State Department I needed and even deserved a significant break between the two jobs. Coming down to Lexington, I was the first resident director of the George C, Marshall Foundation. This was an organization established about twenty years earlier by friends of General Marshall. Originally it was an effort to collect documents about him, gradually developing a capability to build the present Foundation building in 1963. By 1974 it found itself at a cross road. It did not have the funds to keep going; at times it couldn't even pay the due salaries. The director "in absentia" was the very able scholar, Forest Pogue, the biographer of General Marshall. Forest, whom I have described as my oldest living human friend. But he was no administrator. Things were in difficult straits. When I saw the director of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation, Robert Lovett, he gave me one simple task: prevent the Foundation from becoming a polite mausoleum. Consequently, my job was to build a program, because it became clearly evident that you don't get significant funds if you don't have a significant program. I was with the Marshall Foundation for almost eleven years. During that period we have moved from a budget of $125-150,000 to $ 800,000. This increase was not possible without the development of a program. We had a traditional museum; we had a good, if limited, archives based on Marshall's or copies of Marshall's papers and some related collections. But in terms of programs that would attract major funding and be of values themselves, were deficient. Within three years, we established the Marshall ROTC award program. This was done with the assistance of one of our Board members, General Maxwell Taylor whose aide in

1950s was the Chief of Staff of the mid 1970s, General Bernard Rogers. My staff work and the Taylor-Roger relationship ended up with the Army supporting two-thirds to three-quarters of the costs by bringing the best Army ROTC senior students from all over the country to Lexington for a conference on the national security of the United States. There was considerable organization required. The Army played a full role which it is still continuing to play. The program took place every April. It began with about 150 award winners and now numbers about 250 as the ROTC expanded in the US. We have the Chief of Staff as a speaker; Dean Rusk spoke once; we were fortunate to have local institutions--VMI's ROTC unit provides the administrative assistance, and Washington and Lee, on vacation during that period, provided the dining facilities. The program is now in its twelfth year and continues to be a major contribution. We notice the quality of the ROTC winners increasing. The Army, as one four-star general said to me, thinks that this is the greatest thing that ever came down the road.

The other program began at the end of my stewardship to reflect Marshall's contribution in international affairs. We are now in the fourth or fifth year of a smaller, more select conference in the Autumn in which various major political-diplomatic problems are studied. This Fall, it will be the Pacific Basin; next year, it will be European security, etc. My successor, also a former Foreign Service officer, Gordon Byron, took over in the Summer of 1985 and is carrying on with this program. The planning and the acceptance of this program was done in the last year of my term and I look back at this tour of duty as a period in which we indeed put the Marshall Foundation in a solid financial condition which continues today.

Since my retirement in the Summer of 1985, after Gordon had been selected, I have returned to Africa, both in 1986 and 1987. I toured a total of ten or twelve African countries for our Information Service, speaking on U.S. policy towards Africa, both in a historical context and in terms of the area's problems. This got me interested again in African affairs and scholarship and now I am in my second year of writing an intellectual history of the growth of African studies in the United States, Britain and France. At the moment, I am beginning the United States. With luck, I will finish that by then end of 1990. I hope then to move to England as a subject and then on to France. It is a long project in which one of the fascinating things is to renew old friendships with the early scholars of Africa. Like Rip Van Winkle, I came back to Africa after my eleven years with the Marshall Foundation. Here I am at the doddering age of 73 and with luck I have ten years ahead of me to complete this book.

Q: It is very interesting that you have found enough in the field of African affairs to write a book. I must confess that when I tell people that I am writing a book, they assume that it is about Africa. I am not sure that I have anything to say about Africa.

HADSEL: This is why I have no intention of writing my memoirs. But the other project is dealing with intellectual thoughts of leading African scholars and I find that very interesting. One problem is that many of the younger Africans have come to the States

and that raises the question of who is an African scholar? With a typical Foreign Service attitude, I have postponed dealing with that issue because I don't know how to handle it.

Q: At this stage, I would particularly hear your views on the evolution of African affairs while we were in the State Department and then I would like your views on the Foreign Service as a career.

HADSEL: Recently, I gave a speech Monday to a Washington and Lee class on the Foreign Service, which I do regularly. I always end up as a strong supporter of the Foreign Service.

On the first subject--the whole relationship of the State Department hierarchy and African affairs--to my surprise in 1955 in the recent edition of the "United States Foreign Relations" there is the first volume on Africa. To my even greater surprise, the memorandum that sets the framework for a discussion of the African policy was, as I noted in a footnote, written by Fred Hadsel. I had, of course, forgotten it completely. I made the brash, revolutionary statement that within ten years, the United States would face a crisis of colonialism in Africa. Of course, we faced it in five years. The other interesting thing about that long forgotten memorandum was the footnote in which Mr. Dulles said he had read it, but he didn't think that any action was necessary on it. And that indeed represented Mr. Dulles' attitude towards Africa. He was so preoccupied with other things that Africa was not an element in his perspective at all. So if you are dealing with Secretaries of State--leaving Christian Herter aside since he was an incumbent for a very brief time--you do not have a Secretary considering Africa until the Kennedy Administration--Dean Rusk. Rusk, however, was a man who was basically uninterested in Africa. He could be interested in certain specific problems, but as a professional he had a very limited restricted view of his role as Secretary of State. He was the advisor to the President. If the President didn't accept his advice, all was well and good, and he would continue to do his best. He avoided the bureaucratic in-fighting which gave the Defense Department a tremendous advantage when it came to relations with the State Department. He delegated, to the extent that it was done, either to Chester Bowles, George Ball--who was not interested at all in Africa--Averell Harriman, under certain circumstances and Nick Katzenbach--as an after thought. Because Rusk was not interested in Africa and had no confidence in G. Mennen Williams, who was the Assistant Secretary from 1961 to 1966, the Bureau of African Affairs had to sink or swim on its own activities. It was often sunk because of the over-riding French and European accent of the Department, as the critics used to say. This gradually changed, but it did not change as international development changed. There was a time lag.

The next Secretary of State was William Rogers who was a marvelous nineteenth century gentleman, not in any way capable of engaging in guerrilla warfare against Henry Kissinger at the National Security Council. Under these circumstances, the Department was fortunate to have David Newsom as Assistant Secretary, who was probably the single most competent Assistant Secretary of State we had during my time. He had to carry the burden with occasional help from the Seventh Floor, but not very much. Rogers, as far as

I was personally concerned, couldn't have been more congenial, more sympathetic and he did go to Africa. He opened a meeting in Kinshasa. As an illustration of Roger's gentleness, I remember that I had taken Omar Arteh, a somewhat fiery Foreign Minister under General Siad of Somalia, to see Rogers. To my utter embarrassment, as we sat down Omar Arteh launched into an oration, in which he compared me to George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. I was sitting there, squirming. Rogers wasn't phased at all. He listened with a pleasant attitude and as soon as Omar had finished, he quickly picked up the subject that he wanted to talk about and we went on. He never teased me about it because that was Roger's benign nature.

His successor, Henry Kissinger, never visited Africa, except for Egypt.

Q: He told me once that he had spent 36 hours on the Continent, giving a speech in Johannesburg and visiting Nairobi.

HADSEL: Kissinger, as far as I am concerned, ranks along with Mr. Dulles for entirely different reasons as the Secretary of State for whom I have the least sympathy. I accepted his brilliance--there was no doubt about that. But I deplored his vast comprehensive egotism. I felt that he was both self-serving and devious--all those things that I didn't want to see in a boss. Interestingly enough, I never met the Secretary of State while I was his Ambassador in Africa. David Newsom, in fact, forbade me to ask for an appointment feeling that that would just invite disaster. I almost got myself fired during Kissinger's regime by a slip of the tongue which was fortunately not reported. A National War College group was visiting Africa. They wanted to go to the "Shining Light of Sub-Sahara Africa"--the Ivory Coast. With some dint of effort, I managed to persuade them to stop over for a few hours in Accra on their way. We had a meeting in the Embassy and we talked about Africa. At the end of it, with this group sitting around the living room, I got the following question:" Sir, what do you think of Secretary Kissinger's African policy?"--the question obviously came from a military man since he addressed me as "Sir". Before I thought, I replied :"The best thing about African policy is that Secretary Kissinger doesn't know where the Continent is". It brought a hoot of laughter and I saw myself like the man at the guillotine putting my neck in the rack and having it cut off. Obviously, if Kissinger had heard that, he would have me fired immediately. Fortunately, the National War College was sympathetic, I guess, because it never got back to him.

I had no personal relations with the subsequent Secretaries, Cyrus Vance, George Shultz and General Haig. I shake my head over Haig. I do have one reflection however and that is on Chester Crocker. He is the only man to serve longer as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs than Mennen Williams. He was a complete contrast to Williams in every way possible. I think upon reflection that a statement made by an author in politics may be a epitaph for his policy of constructive engagement. "Crocker's policy was one which was doomed to failure, but should, in any case, have been tried". Crocker brought such a different dimension of ability, quite aside from constructive engagement, that he certainly ranks as the single most influential Assistant Secretary for African Affairs that we ever had.

Q: He ended up in a blaze of glory.

HADSEL: Yes, although the Angola withdrawal may not work in the final analysis. The Kennedy Administration I knew only second hand. It did give support particularly to broadly, sympathetic public relations gestures because as Kennedy once said "We really don't have the money to do very much else". Johnson was swamped with Vietnam, but he gave the first speech any President had ever given solely on Africa in May 1966--he was giving the speech in effect on the Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity. He emphasized the need for African cooperation. I worked very hard on the memorandum for that speech and was very pleased that, particularly under Bill Trimble's supervision, it was sent to the White House. Because I was the lowly drafting officer, I attended the preceding reception. At first I was appalled when I heard that Bill Moyers had completely rewritten my memorandum because I, of course, felt that every word was a pure jewel. But I was greatly impressed by Moyers' touch, putting the memorandum in Johnson's manner without destroying any of its substance. Johnson's attitude was reflected in a tiny incident at the end of this. He did his duty. He was tired and exhausted. We were the last to leave and I did permit myself to say to the President that I was very grateful and pleased that this event had occurred because I was the State Department man who had drafted the original memorandum. Johnson clearly spotted a potential voter. His eyes lit up. He grinned, he took my hand in both of his and said :" Ah am so grateful". That was a purely political response and that was his attitude toward Africa. That memorandum which was classified "Confidential" has not been located although I have requested it. I told this story a couple of months ago to a young English historian on African affairs who is been down working in the Lyndon Johnson papers in Austin. He thought that he had seen that memorandum. He went to the stack of papers that he had reproduced from the Johnson files and there, lo and behold, was the memorandum. So now I have one copy no thanks to the State Department, but thanks to an English historian. The other memorandum that I would like to recover is one that I wrote to Nick Katzenbach on which he wrote a sympathetic note, but that is still lost to posterity.

Q: I think it is a shame that we are not allowed to keep a record at least of the titles of things we had written.

HADSEL: We could have done that without damage to national security, but we were all too conscientious.

Q: One of the striking things about your career is that you were one of the officers who went to the top rank without ever having a sabbatical. You didn't at any time go to the National War College nor to the Senior Seminar.

HADSEL: I would have liked to have done that, but I think it was decided in the labyrinth of personnel policy that I was over-educated when I came into African affairs and under-experienced. That was something to this since I was teaching during my career and had a certain amount of graduate work. I therefore never had the opportunity. I did teach once

on home leave and I continued to teach both during and after State Department. This was therefore the decision of the powers-to-be.

There is one thing that I would like to add. It concerns the role of families in African affairs. It is to the credit of the Bureau of African Affairs that its administrative-executive sections worked very hard to make living conditions as supportable as possible in Africa. The policy of permanently renting or buying houses so that you didn't have to wait six months for your household effects, the policy of improving living conditions each time an officer arrived resulted in living conditions in Africa by the end of the 1960s were by and large were quite supportable--with the exception perhaps of Ouagadougou and some other places. This doesn't mean that role of the wives wasn't exceptionally difficult. Because of education problems, the paucity of recreation, the chance of relief from the climate--the husband went to a usually effective air-conditioned office and he always had his in-box to console him--the wife had a much more difficult life. I found in my own experience that my wife did a remarkable number of activities in part because if she hadn't it would have driven her up a wall and in part because she is a very competent person. We personally were fortunate because the chance of education meant that we didn't have to cast off except one daughter. She was here in Washington at the National Cathedral School and then Northfield Mt. Hermon in Connecticut Valley. That prepared her to go on to Harvard, Hartford College in Oxford and then graduate school in architecture in London. We were lucky. When I think of my colleagues whose children got involved in drugs and had broken families. I consider myself extremely fortunate and blessed. Education of children was and still is a hazard of service, but we were extremely fortunate. I am full of admiration for wives and families.

As far as relationships with the Central Intelligence Agency were concerned, I was blessed because the men I had in Somalia and Ghana were able; I had confidence in them. I think they had confidence in me. Consequently I ran into none of the trouble that "wheelers and dealers" create, of which there were an appreciable number in Africa. I have only good to say about my relationship with the representatives of the Agency and I say that with pleasure.

As far as my advice to student at Washington and Lee on making the Foreign Service a career, I am of course a representative of the Wristonization process, which involved for me the first ten years as a State Department employee with relatively good promotions and responsibilities. I therefore came in at one and perhaps even two grades above colleagues of my age in the Foreign Service. I felt and observed that the impact of Wristonization on State Department employees was very much a shot-gun marriage. A certain number of them succeeded quite well, but there were a number of failures, misfits and in effect, careers if not ruined, were cut short by those who were not able to become a full Foreign Service officer. I look back on my own career and realize that particularly in the early years, there were a number of things that I did through lack of experience that I wished I hadn't done--judgements, administrative procedures, things like that. In my case, I hope they weren't fundamental things. I would argue that what a person of reasonable good fortune coming from the other side of the railroad tracks could contribute was

something that I certainly was never defensive about. I could have considerable sympathy for those Foreign Service officers who fell behind in their promotions. Loy Henderson got a number promoted very rapidly, some to their serious detriment. The double shot gun marriage was necessary; it did not succeed in gaining for the Department of State the effective leadership in foreign affairs. It succeeded in getting it partial leadership and the failure, if you look at it from a Foreign Service point of view, to gain more complete leadership lies in the policies of the Department and the government of the 1960s. I have little to say about that because I wasn't involved. It seems to me that the very traditional Foreign Service--the old, old Foreign Service-- indeed had some serious handicaps. Some of them were social--they came from a type of institution in which social relationships were more important than the rough and tough economic or political competitions. This group retired or died in due course. I think in balance the combination, as uneasy as this marriage was, Wristonization was probably an enrichment of the Foreign Service from those who survived from the Department and those who survived in the historical traditional pattern. I can't speak of the present decade since the mid-70s. The single most important thing, and this is what I said to the W&L class, in retrospect was the quality of my colleagues--the men, the women, the wives. I do not know of any other group in which ability is as widespread. Of course there were duds in the Foreign Service and some of them got along far too well. But the incidence is small. I, therefore, put that on the top of my list as I look back into the period of almost three decades. The present Foreign Service has tremendous problems, but it is still an excellent career.

In the Foreign Service, I did have my quota of illnesses, not only tuberculosis, mononucleosis and tuberculosis, and on my latest trip for the Information Service, I managed to pick amoebic dysentery for the first time. With the latest pills, I got rid of it in six weeks without any difficulties.

I greatly appreciate your taking the trouble to come down here to Lexington to talk with me, Ed. It was a delight to renew our old friendship of our service with respect to Africa.

End of interview