The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project  

HERBERT G. HAGERTY  

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*  
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### TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born and raised in New Jersey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia College (Columbia University); University of Pennsylvania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Navy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Intelligence Agency (CIA); South Asia analyst</td>
<td>1960-1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-China War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. military aid to India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-aligned movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entered the Foreign Service in 1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department; Operations Center; India desk officer</td>
<td>1965-1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan war</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador Galbraith</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Delhi, India; Political Officer</td>
<td>1967-1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador Chester Bowles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indira Gandhi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Nixon visit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Missions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassies New Delhi and Islamabad rivalry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Untouchables” issue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo, Norway; Political Officer</td>
<td>1970-1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NATO
Scandinavians
Environment
Government

State Department; (PM) Political Military Affairs 1973-1975
U.S. military base negotiations
NATO
The French
Soviet Union
Diego Garcia
Vietnam
Nuclear powered naval ships

National War College 1975-1976

London, England; Political Advisor to CINCUSNAVEUR 1976-1977
General Al Haig
International cooperation
NATO
Greeks and Turks
U.S. nuclear powered vessels
Soviets

Islamabad, Pakistan; Political Counselor 1977-1981
U.S. Military relations
Zia al-Haq
Embassy attacked and destroyed
Rioting
Voluntary evacuations
Students
Author, *Embassies Under Siege*
Russians invade Afghanistan
Arms
India
U.S. Pakistan relations
President Carter policies
Ethnic and religious sects
Afghan refugees
U.S. media corps

Colombo, Sri Lanka; Deputy Chief of Mission 1981-1984
Tamils
Sinhalese
U.S. interests
INTERVIEW

Q: This is an interview with Herbert G. Hagerty. This is being done on behalf of the Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training and today is July 20, 2001. You go by Herb, is that right?

HAGERTY: That’s right.

Q: Okay. Well, Herb could you start at the beginning. Could you tell me when and where you were born and something about your family?

HAGERTY: Sure. I was born in Orange, New Jersey on February 23, 1932, in the last year of the Hoover administration. My parents both grew up in Hoboken, New Jersey, where one grandfather had been a policeman, the other, an employee of the DL&W Railroad. At the time, I was born we were living in East Orange, New Jersey. My father’s family had previously settled somewhere in the Port Jervis, New York area. His father was native-born David Hagerty, who died when my father was six.

Q: But your father’s family came from, was it Ireland?
HAGERTY: It would have been Ireland, and as I’ve found since, the spelling with one “g” suggests a more northern rather than southern origin (Belfast vice Cork). I was raised a Catholic because my father was converted to Catholicism when his widowed mother remarried while he was quite young. My mother was born in New York City but was raised in Hoboken, a town of heavy Irish and German immigration. She was raised by her mother’s sister, a Corbett, one of nine and first generation Irish, whose husband, George Baker, a stone mason become a policeman, was of first generation German extraction.

My mother was a high school graduate and very proud of it, in the class of 1927. My father, unfortunately, was not, having been sent out to work by his family after seven years of schooling. He was first a butcher's apprentice, and then he worked as a messenger on the docks on the Hoboken waterfront. He eventually attended a vocational school for at least part of a year and became thereafter an automobile mechanic. At the time I was born, he was employed as an automobile mechanic and was also the manager of gas station in East Orange.

Q: The year 1932 was not exactly the greatest time to have another mouth.

HAGERTY: My parents were married in 1930, and I was their first-born. And yes it wasn’t a great time for having kids. My father considered himself lucky to have a job at $20 a week and with one-day off a month. In my early years, we moved around a lot from rental flat to rental flat, almost always in the same neighborhood in East Orange. We actually lived on every one of the numbered streets in that part of town at one time or another. Always looking for an apparently perfect flat, my Mother usually found each to be imperfect after a short spell, that is, until we moved to another part of town as I was about to enter third grade. There we stayed, for reasons I will never know, until I finished high school. In 1937, prior to that move, my father left the gas station business in favor of a better job, working for Public Service Electric and Gas in New Jersey first in the turbine room, then as a boiler mechanic, in an electric generating station where his mechanical aptitude was put to use. He eventually retired many years later as a Chief Boiler Repairman, akin in many ways to a senior Chief Petty Officer in the Navy. I came to know that work environment myself because for two summers, while I was in college, I worked shift work in the turbine room of a neighboring generating station in Kearny, N.J.

Q: Any brothers or sisters?

HAGERTY: Two brothers, Dennis born thirty months after me and Richard, ten years later -- after World War II. Sadly, Dennis came down with diabetes as a child and lost his sight in his 30s. But despite this, he lived a remarkably full and active life in New Jersey into his early sixties. He and his wife Lucy had two children, a daughter (now a career Navy JAG officer) and a son (an engineer). My brother Richard and his wife Pam also live in New Jersey; he has worked for years for Verizon.

Q: That’s the telephone company.
HAGERTY: Yes, that’s right, that’s right. He manages large corporate accounts and is responsible for providing information systems for them.

Q: As you recall it, what was life like at home? Your mother was working at home and raised you? Is that what she did?

HAGERTY: That’s right; she remained at home until Richard was a teenager, when she put to use her former clerical and administrative skills to work for Essex County, N.J.

Q: Was there much in the way in sort of talk and all that around the dinner table?

HAGERTY: Yes, I recall that weekday dinners at the kitchen table were at 5:30 p.m., when my father came home from work and midday on Sundays, after church. When after-school jobs kept me later, my dinner plate would be kept on a warmer on the shove. I’m always amused when I hear Cal Ripkin comment that the big change in his life when he retires from baseball will be that he will have “dinner at 5:30 p.m.”

Q: Cal Ripkin is a famous ballpark baseball player.

HAGERTY: That’s right, but like me, from a blue-collar background. In any event, dinner was a daily time for catching up. And there were times when the meals were pretty lean, especially Wednesdays, the day before my Dad’s payday.

Q: Was there macaroni?

HAGERTY: Rarely macaroni and cheese; more likely frankfurters cut up with potatoes and canned tomatoes, or simply hamburgers. My mother would be horrified if she knew that I said this, but I can recall even just bread and gravy. But we always had fresh milk, and, thanks to my Grandpa Baker, we kids always had oranges for juice. I recall that we were happy and considered ourselves lucky, and we knew people who were worse off.

Q And your father had a steady job, and money was scarce until after World War II.

HAGERTY: Yes, he had a secure job, having moved to steady day work from round-the-clock shift-work; and yes, money was tight.

Q: In those years, too. What about, where did you go to school? You were brought up Catholic I take it; your mother was Catholic?

HAGERTY: Yes, we were Catholics but not believers in Catholic education. I went to public school.

Q: That’s interesting. Did you get any feel for why they felt that way?
HAGERTY: Well, first it cost money to attend a Catholic school, more than we could afford at the time. But besides, my mother had gone to public school and believed in public education. My father may have attended a parochial elementary school, but I don’t know if he had a strong feeling either way. But, like lots of things, it was her choice.

Q: In elementary school, do you recall any teachers or subjects that particularly interested you?

HAGERTY: I had an early fascination with foreign countries but certainly not because of family interest. The earliest newspaper stories I can remember had to do with the war then going on in China, following the Japanese invasion of 1937. I can remember telling my Mom of my concern about what we would do if Japanese soldiers ever came down our street in East Orange.

Q: There was not a big probability of that.

HAGERTY: No, there wasn’t, and she allayed my fears. But newspaper pictures kept my concern alive also. In the later years of World War II, while I was in the fifth and sixth grades, I was always the top kid in my class at the current events time.

Q: Do you remember what paper you were reading?

HAGERTY: It would have been the tabloid New York Daily News, then later the Newark Evening News, a paper no longer around but one that looked in format a bit like the Washington Post. I had also begun delivering newspapers by the time I was in the sixth grade, so I would occasionally get a glance at the New York Times and the Herald Tribune while working.

Q: What about reading books and things like that?

HAGERTY: I read almost exclusively nonfiction and adventure stuff. I can recall I read Richard Haliburton’s series of books, Elmer Davis’ travels, and American history.

Q: Yes, Haliburton swam the Dardanelles?

HAGERTY: And the Panama Canal too.

Q: I have to put for the record, could you explain Richard Haliburton. I mean a number of people who’ve gotten into the Foreign Service mention him; could you explain who he was?

HAGERTY: Well, I’m not sure I remember exactly who he was, but he traveled extensively, exploring such things as the so-called “Seven Wonders of the World.” I can remember his descriptions of the Suez Canal and the pyramids and the gardens in what
are now Iraq and Mesopotamia, the Taj Mahal. I remembered him again when I finally visited the Taj Mahal in India many years later.

Q: Well, he really opened up the world, and he wrote in a fashion that particularly attracted young boys.

HAGERTY: Oh, a wonderful style. I was also fascinated with reading the works of other explorers, as well as military history. That hasn’t passed either.

Q: He is showing me a book called Jefferson Davis’s Generals that was published last year. I imagine you had the equivalent to a carnet in the library down the road somewhere?

HAGERTY: Yes, but it was just an ordinary neighborhood branch public library.

Q: But, it was a great refuge?

HAGERTY: Yes, and I used it a lot. I got to about the sixth grade and asked my parents to give me only books as presents. So, I read a lot of war stories, too. Tank Tinker and Hop Harrigan and that kind of series about daring-do during World War II. At this point, I wanted to become an aviator.

Q: Well, you were about nine I guess when the United States entered the war?

HAGERTY: Yes, it would have been right.

Q: But even before that, was World War II particularly the European side and all, did you have a lot of kids in your neighborhood who were from various ethnic backgrounds?

HAGERTY: The part of East Orange where I lived was heavily settled in the “New Immigration” early in the 20th century. It had a very substantial Italian population, and those who weren’t Italian tended to be Irish or Scottish. Starting with the war, with the northern migration of blacks from the south, it became increasingly a mixed population so that by the time I went to East Orange High School, the mix was a little over a third black. The rest were about a third Italian and a third all the rest. It was noticeable especially in the sports, the soccer team, which was a state champion, was all first generation white -- German, Scottish, Italian, and so forth. The football team, made up heavily also of track stars, was almost totally black. The basketball team was mixed, but predominantly white. What was interesting to me that some groups went to one sport. I was not an athlete, always the last person chosen even for a pick-up softball game. So, I was a spectator on sports but an avid one.

Q: Well, during high school you have more of a chance to concentrate, what were sort of your favorite and least favorite subjects?
HAGERTY: I should preface my comment by suggesting that the most important thing I did to do well in high school was what I had done while in junior high. There, for the first time, I had to choose elective courses. To this day, I am still amazed that I felt I needed some kind of justification to take these certain of these electives. So I went to a library and spent two Saturday afternoons there reading about careers to decide what I wanted to be so, that I could begin to take the right kinds of courses then and later. The two most useful books that I found on careers each had a chapter on the Foreign Service Officer, one describing him in a diplomatic context and the other describing work as a consul. I read them both avidly and thought, “Gee, that sounds like what I want to do.” From then on, when people would say, “What do you want to do with your life?” I would say, “I think I would like to be in the Foreign Service.”

Q: That was pretty early. I mean people must have looked a little bit astounded.

HAGERTY: Yes, my godmother used to say, “Why don’t you want to be a lawyer?” But my mother didn’t have any view on the subject. She was just pleased that I had some focus in knowing what I wanted to go to college, even while privately wondering about costs. But my focus led into the courses that I enjoyed most, which were social studies and history and language. I never had a great feeling for math and technical things, although I did graduate from high school with honors in physics in addition to social studies. Mathematical computations usually left me pretty far behind. I took an Italian elective in junior high and studied Latin and French in high school, and I enjoyed them all very much. Languages seemed to come with some ease. I had a remarkable English teacher in eighth grade, Miss Barrett, who was one of those classic, old maiden English teachers that everyone should have had somewhere along the way. She was committed to diagramming sentences and taught me the structure of English so well that when I started to learn Latin the next year, I understood how a language is structured. It all fell into place, with French as well -- and later with Hindi/Urdu.

Q: What about your social life, dating and that sort of thing?

HAGERTY: I dated in high school and appeared generally popular. I attracted the attention of the staff of the school as well for my performance. I was elected president of the school’s General Organization (G.O.) in my senior year, so I must have had something of an Irish political flair also. I had a B+/A- average and a good record of extracurricular activity as well, especially a lot of choral work. I sang in the high school boys glee club and its a capella choir, as well as the adult choir at my church, usually as a tenor. I also appeared in a couple of musicals at the high school. I was generally outgoing and enjoyed being on stage, whatever the occasion. For instance, I was a master of ceremonies for our weekly student assemblies, alternating each week with my best friend, who was senior class president. He is now retired from Radio Free Europe and living in nearly Virginia. We lunch occasionally at a kebab joint in Arlington.

Q: What were you pointing towards? Was your mother pushing you to go to do something?
HAGERTY: No, unlike lots of the mothers in our parish, she had no thought that her sons should be priests. I was fortunate; we didn’t have that. My mother thought that education was everything. She was proud of being a high school graduate in 1927. And with her background, that would have been rare.

Q: Absolutely.

HAGERTY: She believed that education really counted. That was a very big influence on me. Two other things come to mind. I remember she occasionally would tell me, with some awe, that somebody was a “college graduate.” She suggested this reflected both lot of work and a superior understanding of the world. Even after I began to understand more clearly what a college education meant, her words had a positive ring to me. I wanted to be one of them. She kept encouraging in that direction, pointing to the high rankings I received in the periodic intelligence tests at school as evidence that I was clearly someone meant to be going on to college. My teachers reinforced this view.

Q: Well, I think at that time I think less than 10-15% of people in the United States were college graduates, even high school graduates, and then if you came from an essentially working class family, the percentage was way down.

HAGERTY: The other thing I remember -- a very important memory for me -- was being told that my father had sacrificed something of the joy of being an automobile mechanic, which was better suited to his problem-solving skills than what his job in the powerhouse; but he did it for the family. The job he took in 1937 in an electric generating station had regular hours, a better pay scale, a retirement system, and all those things. I began to have some sense that the distinction of being a college graduate was that you could plan a career rather than a job, and that a career somehow meant you chose to do work that you enjoyed. When it came time to think about college, I had already given it some thought. I remember I checked again at the library to see where the main sources of the Foreign Service officers were in terms of colleges. Harvard, Yale, and Princeton were at the top, followed by Columbia, Georgetown, Wisconsin, California, and Chicago.

Q: At that time, really until in the late ‘50s or so, you could name the top ten universities very easily. Now, today, it’s a whole different game. Maybe because of the G.I. Bill and the education opportunity.

HAGERTY: And the generations after that. My son is an assistant professor, so I am well aware of what his situation is like. Anyway, I was fortunate. Columbia College ran something called a “Forum on Democracy,” as is part of its recruiting program. They took promising high school students and give them a weekend of lectures and activities all focused on democracy. In my high school, the social studies department put together a list of outstanding social studies students, and all the social studies kids voted. I was chosen to represent my school in my junior year and again in my senior year, by which time Columbia had me hooked. And I guess I had them hooked on me too, because they gave
me a scholarship, so in 1950 I went off to Columbia College, then an all-male undergraduate college within Columbia University. The college is now coed.

**Q: 1950 to ’54?**


**Q: Well, now let’s talk about Columbia at that time. When you entered there the Korean War was just getting cranked up.**

HAGERTY: Yes, I graduated from high school in mid-June, and eight days later the Korean War broke out. I had just registered for the draft in four months earlier, and by November 1950, at least two members of my high school class had been killed in Korea.

**Q: What, at Columbia, what was it like then? Was it all these things about being a real city college and very much picking up the vibes that were coming out of New York City?**

HAGERTY: Heavily influenced by being in New York City, of course, but it had a very explicit recruitment policy which aimed to keep the student mix at one-third from New York City, one-third from within a fifty-mile radius, and one-third from beyond fifty miles. The aim was to preserve the College’s national standing. I fell in that category of within fifty miles, and they gave me a two-thirds tuition scholarship (that is, $400 of the $620 tuition cost at the time!). They stipulated also that I live on campus, even though I lived close enough to have commuted, as about half of my fellow students did. But to do so would have cost me about three hours each day on public transportation. Luckily, by living in the dorm, I was able to support myself by working three hours a day on campus.

**Q: What sort of work were you doing?**

HAGERTY: I worked in the mainly in the cafeteria, where I worked behind the steam table. I also worked the student-run hot dog stands at football games and summers in factories in New Jersey. But as a sophomore, I worked in another student-run business, the Student Laundry, competing with four other sophomores for the manager’s position. I won, so that in my junior year I supervised the five sophomores who were competing as junior manager (at $25 per week), and I automatically moved up to be senior manager the following year (at $35 a week, a princely sum in 1953-54). I was also a fraternity president that year, which also earned a free room at the fraternity house. I was living rather high for a poor kid.

**Q: I was in the Air Force as an enlisted man getting $60 a month.**

HAGERTY: Yes. With what I earned, I could cover my meals and even manage a little social life. I wouldn’t say I was fat and happy, but it was the first time in my life that I had a little cash in my pocket that I didn’t have to pinch for.
Q: What subjects were you particularly interested in?

HAGERTY: Oh, history and government. And fortunately, in those years, Columbia did not require the usual choice of a “major.” But in addition to the 126 “course credits” you needed to accumulate to get a BA, they also awarded “maturity credits” which I earned in increasing numbers for courses beyond the introductory level in both government and history. A total of 50 of these were required for graduation. For instance, I received eight “maturity credits” each for senior seminars I took in international affairs and in Jacksonian America but none for introductory or required courses in any subject. The system allowed, even encouraged, a bit of dabbling, and I had no difficulty amassing fifty of these maturity credits in the social sciences and advanced French language courses. (In a typical “major” system, I could almost have qualified as a French “major” by the end my sophomore year). But between my sophomore and junior years, a family friend urged me to shift my focus to either Asia or Africa, by suggesting that I find the Foreign Service ranks full of people who know Europe” but in need of officers knowledgeable about Asia or Africa.” I took this advice, and as I began my junior year, I took the Asian Contemporary Civilizations sequence (which was an elective follow-on to the two-year sequence in Contemporary Civilizations sequence I had completed dealing with Western civilization. I also took some Asian history, a graduate course in imperialism, and, dropping French, I studied Hindi.

Q: I’m surprised they had a course in Hindi.

HAGERTY: It was an evening course in the School of General Studies rather than in the College, and I was the only full-time student among my six classmates. In my senior year there was no further offering of Hindi, but since I was focused on Asia, I decided maybe I should get a taste of another Asian language, so I took Mandarin Chinese. Although the two one-year efforts didn’t give me much command of either by the time I graduated, I looked on the courses as possible head-start on a language that would be required in an area studies program in graduate school. I applied for admission and fellowships in East and South Asian studies, and in 1954 I was awarded a Ford Foundation Foreign Area Studies fellowship to study South Asia.

Q: While you were an undergraduate there, did you…how was start of the Cold War played out in your courses?

HAGERTY: Well, it was the backdrop, of course, especially with the Korea War underway. But remember it was also the McCarthy period, with Congressional committees looking for who “lost China?” and investigating academics, including Philip Jessup and other Columbia faculty members. The student body was liberal and anti-McCarthy but at the same time caught up in the Cold War and in the Korean War, which was hanging over all of our heads. I mean, the College had a student population of roughly 2,200, all male and all “draft” age. Classes were small and interactive – 20-25 students, all in the same age bracket, with a sprinkling of WWII veterans still in the college and a bit older. It combined a small college atmosphere in a very large city. A
high percentage of the class, particularly the ones from New York City, were Jewish, high
achievers, kids from Erasmus or Bronx Science high schools, who arrived running, many
of them bound for medical or law school. Then there were guys from Wyoming who had
played football against others from Colorado. It was a terrific mix. The Cold War was
affecting us because we could be drafted into the army if we didn’t keep a B-minus
average. Eventually with the Cold War intensifying, I joined the Air Force ROTC in my
junior year, guaranteeing me the two years I Columbia I needed to finish my BA. My idea
then was to spend the second two years of ROTC wherever I would go to graduate school,
with an Air Force commission at the end of MA.

However, I was not physically able to the flight physical at that midway point, so I wasn’t
able to stay in the Air Force ROTC beyond the Columbia years. I went on to graduate
school at the University of Pennsylvania where they had a two-year program in South
Asia Regional Studies. By this time, the Korean War was over, and my student deferment
continued, so I was able to finish the two-year MA in 1956.

By then, I had already applied to the Navy to enter their intelligence officer program. But
before the Navy could finish my processing, I got a “draft” notice one morning to report
for induction into the Army in July. The Navy told me that the process was far enough
along that they could take me for their “line” officer program at OCS, but I’d have to get
my “draft” board to “lift” its notice. They assured me also if I was able to do that and my
Top Secret security clearance came through before my commissioning date, I would be
assigned as an intelligence officer, as originally planned.

So, I met the members of my draft board in New Jersey and told them that I was prepared
to sign up for the Navy for three years’ service (vice two in the Army) in the hope that I
would be able to do this intelligence officer program. The members agreed to my request,
and its chairman told me he would take me “out of the August quota, and put me in the
September call.” Leaning across the table, he added, “But, Mr. Hagerty, your ass better be
in the Navy by then.” I assured him it would be and returned by train to Philadelphia
where I was sworn into the Navy the next day. I reported to the Navy OCS at Newport,
Rhode Island two weeks later to me part of the class convening on the 13th of August
1956.

Q: Okay, I want to go back now. Well, while you were at Columbia, did you get involved
with the UN or any affairs there?

HAGERTY: Yes, to a degree. I can remember going to the UN on my own to attend
Security Council debates. I can remember in particular seeing Andrei Vishinsky and
Krishna Menon argue their cases regarding the Korean War. I had also visited the UN
earlier as part my attendance in the Columbia “Forums on Democracy.”

Q: I didn’t know they argued with each other.
HAGERTY: Right, not with each other, but it was interesting nonetheless. Also, I got very much caught up in observing the New York political life, particularly the ‘52 election because Dwight Eisenhower, who had been Columbia’s president, was the presidential candidate. We all knew that Harry Carman, the great American history professor and friend of Eisenhower, had said that Ike probably would be a terrible president. The student newspaper came out against him and for Stevenson. Most of us were for Stevenson, but I think also that I was genuinely internationalist in my orientation by that time.

Q: During the ‘30s Columbia was up to its neck in sort of the New York socialist politics, particularly the immigrant Jewish group who were bringing over European socialism and all that which sort of melded over specifics into communism.

HAGERTY: The Communist Youth League was very active there then.

Q: But I take it at this time, these no longer had quite the same...

HAGERTY: No, there was a Young Communist Youth League on campus still. They agitated on behalf of the university blue-collar employees when they went on strike. The employees -- predominantly Puerto Rican – were the people who pushed brooms, did maintenance, and worked in food services. Jim Wexler, who headed of the Communist Youth League in the class of 1937, was by 1952 the editor of the New York Post, which took up their cause. All of us read the New York Post. After the Post, and I would move my way left and to the New York Daily Compass. And during the long Rosenberg trial, I occasionally picked up the Communist Daily Worker to see what they were saying.

Q: There was a very political awareness thing.

HAGERTY: Very much, yes. I doubt that there were many of my fellow students who were misled about the ultimate allegiance of people claiming to be Communists or touting communist causes right down the line during the early 1950s. The Communist Party USA was obviously a tool of the Soviet Union and danced to Moscow’s tune. And despite the excesses of Senator Joe McCarthy and his fellow Communist hunters in the early 1950s, we also understood that many good Americans had been led to support the Communist Party during the “Great Depression” of the 1930s because of economic issues and because the Communists were actively anti-Fascist and opposed to Nazi expansion in Europe. I know that Communists in the U.S. and elsewhere lost credibility with the brief Hitler-Stalin Pact on the eve of World War II, and many essentially innocent followers left the Party in droves then. As the Cold War began to take shape in the 1950s, anyone who supported Communist causes in the U.S. had no claim to public support in our eyes.

Q: What about teachers? I mean Columbia’s always had a wealth of teachers. Any teachers that particularly grabbed you?
HAGERTY: Yes, because Columbia even required tenured professors like Mark Van Doran to teach a basic freshman humanities course, for instance. My good fortune was to have a great historian, Richard Hofstader, for the second year of the required two-year Contemporary Civilizations sequence and also, as a senior, for the seminar on Jackson’s America. Being exposed to teacher like him was a literally mind-blowing experience, because he challenged understanding us so much. He also taught me a lot about writing.

Q: Were you learning more about the Foreign Service as you went on?

HAGERTY: Yes, but I knew that the military “draft” had to be dealt with first.

Q: Well, let’s see, graduate school was what two years? And you were taking what?

HAGERTY: Two years in an inter-disciplinary program in South Asia Regional Studies.

Q: This was the University of Pennsylvania?

HAGERTY: Yes, in Philadelphia.

Q: How did you find it? Was Penn particularly good in South Asia?

HAGERTY: Yes, the South Asia Program, which was heavily funded by the Ford Foundation. I used to describe it to friends as akin to acquiring a BA in another culture, but at MA level. I wrote my thesis under the tutoring of the historian in the program.

Q: What was the thesis?

HAGERTY: It was a political biography of one of the leading British figures in 19th century India.

Q: Who was that?

HAGERTY: Henry Bartle Edward Frere, who went out to India in 1832 and was later knighted. During his career, he served first as British Resident in Satara, a princely state governed indirectly, then successively as the first British Commissioner of Sindh Province (now in Pakistan) in the 1850’s, as Governor of the Bombay Presidency, and a Member Viceroy’s Council in Calcutta in the 1860’s. In England, he later was a member of the Council of India and, still later, of the Privy Council. He was best known for his advocacy of an active British role in Afghanistan during what has become known as the “Great Game” with Tsarist Russia during the last half of the 19th century – popularized recently in the “Flashman” series of novels.

Q: I think the author’s name was Fraser.
HAGERTY: An imaginative series based in part on the history of that time. The part of Frere’s career in which I was interested was between the First Afghan War of 1837-42 and the Second Afghan War of 1877-79, a period when British imperial policy was became preoccupied with defending the Indian Empire from Tsarist expanding pressure from the north, focused on Afghanistan. Frere was a principal architect of an activist “Forward Policy” aimed at maintaining Afghanistan as a neutral buffer state leading up to the Second Afghan War.

Q: At the University of Pennsylvania, already the lines had been drawn between India and Pakistan. Did it have an attitude on this thing or was it, I mean, did you towards

HAGERTY: Do you mean did the department have it? The department had a bit more of an Indian flavor than Pakistani, because most of the academics there had India experience prior to Partition; Pakistan was still very new and still a bit uncertain; their experience did not encompass two countries. It was also a fact of life: India is the region’s largest, most complex, and most important country.

Q: And Pakistan, the area that was Pakistan would not have particularly attracted most scholars?

HAGERTY: I was interested in Pakistan too because Frere spent much of his career in what was to become Pakistan 100 years later. My year of Hindi at Columbia spared me half a semester of graduate study so I only had to do a second semester of Hindustani (Hindi/Urdu). We were five students around the table for three-hour classes, with an American professor at one side and a language informant at the other side, a Pakistani who was himself a Ph.D. student. So we learned a lot of pronunciation that in fact was a bit more Urdu in sound, and we learned to work with both scripts. The program’s political science courses concentrated on the politics of South Asia, the economic development course was a study of India’s five-year plans just then beginning, and the history course was of British and pre-British India. We tried to look at the then newly independent nations of South Asia as a whole.

Q: What was the attitude towards the early government of India which was, correct me if I’m wrong, heavily influenced by sort of Fabian socialism, the London School of Economics-type stuff, and all that. Was this of interest?

HAGERTY: I think we all had read Nehru’s works, so we obviously understood what motivated him. As Prime Minister, he was India’s driving force. He recognized also that there were strong traditional forces in India that opposed his secular and socialist views and did not share the kind of Cambridge-educated upper-class British intellectual attitudes that he had acquired as he was growing up. So yes, he was a Fabian socialist. He believed India had been exploited by its imperial masters in London, whose policies benefited England while squeezing the people at the bottom of the economic ladder. If India were to survive as an independent nation, it required rapid economic and social development across all sectors of the society.
Q: You were saying the theory was?

HAGERTY: He believed, with many Western disciples and non-disciples of Karl Marx, that the capital accumulation that funded the industrial revolution in the West had been at the expense of the lower classes. India couldn’t afford to do that. Because he and India were committed to democratic government, India had to rely on a planned economy so that the voters at the bottom wouldn’t get squeezed for needed capital accumulation. I think most of us at the time tended to accept it. It was probably true that if India was to stay democratic, and voters, to remain committed to universal franchise, government in India to be able to point to progress. This was unlike Western European, where large segments of population in the early days of the industrial revolution were not franchised to vote.

Q: I know, but it also seemed to be sort of a carryover that the pie was a certain size and if you kept switching the pie around rather than growing the pie.

HAGERTY: Sure. We (and the World Bank) tended to think that the Indian five-year plans looked like the way to go, but we were also very well aware that out there in the Indian private sector there was a lot of money and energy –and corruption – with the ability to buy its way around this Fabian socialist system, bribing and buying the permits that they needed. We were clearly were aware that that private sector, if it somehow could be channeled, could be infinitely more dynamic in producing and advancing Indian development than the government was with its often rigid and subsidy-heavy five-year plans.

Q: Were you picking up any of the feeling of animosity towards, at least part of Indian on the part of the people of the United States who had to deal with India, the Krishna Menon in particular. Even today when his name is mentioned, you know, I can feel a mild boiling in my mind, and I never had to deal with India.

HAGERTY: That's right. Very frustrating. That slice of the Indian polity that was reflected by the Krishna Menon world view made it difficult to say anything good about the United States in many Indian circles during that time. There was this feeling in the United States that Nehru’s policy of nonalignment during the growing Cold War was somehow or other pro-Russian. But those of us who compared Nehru’s speeches with George Washington’s “farewell address” found remarkable parallels between George’s “non-entangling alliances” and Jawaharlal’s “non-alignment.” We came to know that India that had provided twelve million men to World War II, and something like five million to World War I, without a single Indian having a voice in the decision that those guys would be called on to fight, not unlike the Americans of the late eighteenth century who objected to being taxed, without the right of choice, to pay for England’s wars.

Q: While you were there was there any opportunity to go to India?
HAGERTY: It was my hope that the second year of my fellowship would take me to India. But the Ford Foundation did a rethink on that policy, having found that M.A. level students were frequently not able to cope with doing research in India. My grant was extended for a second year but only in the US. I was disappointed but also grateful for the opportunity to finish the degree at Penn, while hoping to get to India later.

Q: By this time though had you been watching American policy towards India? I mean what was some of your colleagues’ and the department’s attitudes towards how we were dealing with India?

HAGERTY: You mean the South Asia Department, not the Department of State.

Q: Yes.

HAGERTY: Not the Department of State. Okay. I think there was… It’s hard to pull that together this many years later, but all I can do is give you my own feeling which is that we understood the basis for the alliances and treaty organizations that, under Dulles and in the early Eisenhower years, the U.S. had put in place around the world.

Q: SEATO.

HAGERTY: SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and these linkages between these tenuous membership links between them, which Pakistan played vis-à-vis SEATO and CENTO. We understood that Pakistan was prepared to play our game by being willing to say the right things to us regarding the USSR if they could hope and trust that we’d be provide military aid and their side if India ever threatened them. We understood that. Those of us who spent enough time studying India also understood the likelihood of India’s wanting to take in a hundred million additional Muslims was not very great. We also thought the chance that India would overrun Pakistan was very slight. India would always have the military capability to do it by a factor of not less than ten-to-one in the air, five-to-one at sea, and three-to-one on the ground, but we did not believe that it was something that any serious Indian leader would ever advocate. There weren’t that many Indians who were intent on reversing Partition, and the Pakistani leadership felt that it was better in their interest for them to play it our way, e.g. serving U.S. interests, like allowing Francis Gary Powers to fly from Peshawar.

Q: So after Penn, you were in the Navy -- from when to when?

HAGERTY: I was commissioned in December of 1956 and stayed on active duty until December 1959, when I reverted to Ready Naval Reserve status.

Q: Three years?

HAGERTY: Yes. All the time in Washington as a briefing officer, in and around the Pentagon’s “E-Ring.”
Q: How did that work I mean as a briefing officer? Who were you briefing?

HAGERTY: Well, I briefed Admirals and others. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) provided a good introduction into foreign affairs and the world of intelligence. I worked in an ONI office in which all intelligence coming in was divided into four categories: surface, air, subsurface, or everything else. Its main focus was on direct Navy interests, but I was the guy who covered everything else – including all the political intelligence. I also wrote a highly-classified daily that was hand-carried around to flag officers on the “E-Ring.”

Q: Where did you get your information?

HAGERTY: From both finished and raw intelligence delivered to my desk, everything from Defense Attaché reports, State Department cables, CIA and military intelligence, etc. I summarized key highlights of this intelligence in an Operational Intelligence Summary every morning that also included summaries my colleagues wrote and that I edited. I learned quickly how to do very tight writing, summarizing long pieces into three sentences for busy senior officers. I also learned a lot about the world and about the intelligence business too. It was a terrific learning experience for a newly commissioned officer. In my third year, I spent the late afternoon representing ONI at a CIA editorial panel for its daily all-source publication for the President the next day. For somebody at my age and in that stage of my life, I could not have asked for anything more to satisfy my military service obligation -- especially in comparison with assignments to which the military ‘draft’ might have taken me.

Q: Well, were you sort of, I mean the other guys were given sub-surface, air, and all that, they were professional officers?

HAGERTY: They were all senior to me, all professionals, mostly Lieutenant Commanders and Commanders. My direct boss was a Commander, a Georgia “Cracker.”

Q: How did you find it? Were you tolerated?

HAGERTY: I wasn’t tolerated; I was part of a team. I learned a lot from them, but they learned a lot from me, too. In fact, they often give me their copy to edit before they’d move it someplace else. They liked the way I wrote. While disciplined, it was also a relatively small collegial unit, working long hours under a lot of pressure.

Q: By this time, was there a significant other, married?

HAGERTY: Yes, I had married Shirley Rotella, a high school sweetheart, when I went off to graduate school. She had graduated from college in 1954 too.

Q: What was her background?
HAGERTY: Both similar to and different from mine. She was mainly Italian-American. Her grandparents had been immigrants, three of them from Italy and the fourth, from Poland. And like me, she was the first college graduate in her extended family. She worked for the university in Philadelphia.

Q: While you were in Washington, were you able to dip your toe into the Foreign Service?

HAGERTY: I took the Foreign Service exam while I was at Penn in my last semester there, and I didn’t pass. I got a 69!

Q: I got a 69, but I got a 69.75. I was averaged into the Foreign Service.

HAGERTY: Well, anyway, the next year (while I was in my first year here in the Navy) the Department didn’t give the exam. And by the next year, I had already connected in CIA through my Navy work. CIA offered me a position as a current intelligence analyst on South Asia, my specialty. That seemed like something I’d like to do. My then-spouse wasn’t awfully interested in going overseas in any event. So, I decided that I would make that jump and worked as an analyst for five years in CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence, as it was known at the time.

Q: That would be ’66?

HAGERTY: 1960. But, my connections at the State Department were very close, both with the Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) and the NEA office of South Asia Affairs (then known as SOA). By the early 1960’s, I had pretty much decided that I really wanted to be involved in policy, and I began looking to the possibility of entering the Foreign Service so as to pursue a diplomatic career that would draw on my area knowledge. I was then more than 32, too old at that time for the FS examination. And Carol Laise, then the SOA Office Director and later to be Ambassador to Nepal, helped make that possible for me.

Q: And she was later Director General of the Foreign Service?

HAGERTY: Yes.

Q: Well, before we go on to that problematic ground, we’re talking about the CIA, but my God, we’re talking about the 1960s, 30 years ago. What was your feeling about the information that was coming in about the area, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Afghanistan, I guess?

HAGERTY: As I said before, CIA reports were occasionally one of the sources of the intelligence that I used in my Navy “daily summary.”
Q: Was there a different thrust, would you say, when you’re looking, since you’ve been reading Navy, INR, and other intelligence things, did you find that what you were producing had a different thrust to it?

HAGERTY: No, I don’t think so. For me the distinction was that at CIA I was focused on a single country, rather than -- as in the Navy job -- having to be knowledgeable about on lots of countries on the periphery of the USSR. At CIA, I could really focus on South Asia, reading everything about that region, from newspaper coverage to some of the same material I had been reading in the Navy. So, I was using those inputs to produce finished political analysis in CIA publications.

Q: I’m not sure I guess around ‘62 or so, when you had the India-China War?

HAGERTY: Yes, I did was very busy reporting and analyzing developments on a daily basis, working closely, of course, with a China analyst.

Q: What was your take on that?

HAGERTY: What was my take? Pretty much as it appeared in the press; the Indians felt they’d allowed themselves to be pushed around by the Chinese following the Tibetan rebellion and after they discovered a Chinese-built a road across Ladakh in 1959. They hadn’t even known about it. They had tried at times to reassert themselves in that remote area, and there had been incidents between troops there and elsewhere along the Indo-Tibetan boundary, disputed since 1911.

Nehru and the Indian army had begun to rearm India’s WWII-vintage armed forces in the late ‘50s, shopping the international market, including the USSR, when the U.S. chose not to be involved – at least initially – due to our relationship with Pakistan. The Indians wanted to challenge what they regarded as Chinese inroads, particularly in Ladakh, by infiltrating outposts into Indian-claimed parts of the Aksai Chin Plateau– an extension of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. They got very aggressive with the Chinese. The Chinese threatened that they’d hit back, but the Indians kept pushing. Finally the Chinese did attack, and the Indian Army took a terrible beating there and as well as in northeastern India. The Indian Army wasn’t as good as they thought it was; nor were they as well armed or as well organized as the Chinese, and they got clobbered. The Chinese then committed the ultimate indignity by terming it a “self defense strike back” and unilaterally declaring a cease fire. In fact, the Chinese were careful not to go beyond the extent of the Chinese claims in the contested areas along the ill-defined Indo-Tibetan boundary, which mostly follows the Himalayan watershed. And less than a week later, when the fighting was over, they pulled their forces back, leaving behind a threat to do it all over again if the Indians attempted to challenge them anew.

Q: At this particular time, since the U.S. had come down heavily obviously on the Indian side, we’d brought in, I guess, arms...
HAGERTY: Well, the Kennedy administration saw it as an opening to support India against China, or at least to overcome the disability we’d had in trying to achieve a closer relationship with India over the years. We began a significant military assistance program to India, immediately providing recoilless anti-tank and mortars directly from European stocks and providing APCs, surplus transport aircraft, artillery, jeeps and trucks, and God knows what – even negotiating to sell India a defense factory,. Within two years of that Chinese attack, there was a U.S. Military Supply Mission India New Delhi of more than 100 officers. But the Kennedy administration was careful in seeking to improve our relationship with India without necessarily destroying our relationship with Pakistan. But the effort was short-lived; it didn’t survive a brief military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1965, when the U.S. cut off security assistance to both countries.

Q: The people who were dealing with India in the CIA at that time, India and Pakistan, did they fall into two camps or sort of, I mean Pakistan was giving us support in intelligence activities and all that.

HAGERTY: India and Pakistan both had their advocates within most U.S. Government (USG) bureaucracies, but the USG was not an advocate of either side. Pakistan was regarded as a reliable friend, and in India, the Chinese attack allowed the USG, for a while, to overcome the Indian reluctance to a closer relationship with us even as they enjoyed support from Moscow (which had also become anti-Chinese at the time). That was also good in terms of our difficult relationship with China, as well as the terms, we hoped, of undercutting the Indian relationship with Russia. So that all of that looked pretty good, and I don’t think that my sitting in CIA in Langley gave me a different perspective on South Asia than if I’d been sitting at Foggy Bottom (or even possibly the Pentagon).

Q: Did Ceylon play any role?

HAGERTY: No. I was aware that Ceylon was out there, I didn’t follow it much. The Ceylon sat at an adjacent desk; I used to read her copy, and we’d talk about it, but Ceylon was very much a backwater. Thereafter, the Prime Minister of Ceylon did attempt a prolonged – and eventually fruitless -- mediating role regarding the Indo-Tibetan border.

Q: Afghanistan?

HAGERTY: An office colleague handled Afghanistan and Pakistan. The latter always seemed to me to be heading toward or getting over a military dictatorship -- a seemingly failed democracy in the eyes of many Americans. That was reflected in the attitudes we were facing when dealing with that country. As for Afghanistan, according to the old Oxford Unabridged Dictionary, the word “Afghanistanism” once was used to describe a place about which little is known. That’s been true for most of its existence. It’s such a tragedy what has happened there in the last 25 years, but it was pretty far off the scope. In the early years after the British departed South Asia in 1947, the U.S., in fact, applied the old British policy view about Afghanistan; that is, we attempted to support Afghanistan
as a neutral buffer between the USSR and the newly independent nations of South Asia. The British fought two wars and numerous smaller dust-ups, in Afghanistan in the 19th century and another in 1919 to keep Afghanistan as such a buffer. We believed such a policy was in our long-term interest. We had no desire to establish any “Cold War” bases in Afghanistan. In the early 1960s, just before the jet age came along, we helped the Afghans build the airport at Kandahar; it was intended to provide PanAm’s last propeller-driven, long-range transports with a refueling stop on their round-the-world service but was overtaken by the appearance of longer-range, jet-powered 707s that did not need such a refueling stop. And of course, I am sure that U.S. military aircraft would have used the runway for staging in a possible war with the USSR if things came to that. But we didn’t have any serious thoughts about making an ally of Afghanistan. We were content that the Eurasian alliance system that we had developed circled along the southern edge of Afghanistan, with allies Iran on one side and Pakistan on the other.

Q: What was the attitude towards India? This was when the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) was pretty strong and had moved over really to the left. I mean you had Castro and Tito in it. These were not friendly nations.

HAGERTY: Well, as the India analyst, I did a lot of the current intelligence analysis also about the Non-aligned Movement because India was such a strong player and, you know, Nehru was regarded as an elder statesman of the movement. And as he aged -- he was 69 in 1947 -- as he moved toward the end of his own life, he took a less active role at home and abroad. His own health was failing so that he wasn't the force in the Nonaligned Movement that he had been in its early days. The Nonaligned Movement wasn’t serving anything that was of special usefulness for U.S. interests, except in its commitment to the independence of newly independent states in the “Third World.” But as it often tilted toward causes championed by Moscow, it was a thorn in our side.

Q: What about in India? Were you concerned?

HAGERTY: To a degree, especially when NAM leaders were prepared to be apologists for the Soviets on most issues, while focusing their venom on the former colonial powers of the West, with whom we were allied. I never considered Nehru to be an apologist for Soviet imperialism; Stalin’s purges of the 1930s put him off. But there were people in India and in the NAM who would avert their eyes. Tito wasn’t an apologist for Soviet imperialism either, but there were prominent others who clearly were.

Q: Well, they used, I mean the United States, in a way this was a way of being able, the Soviets were out there and everybody knew where they stood and the NAM was a certain way of kind of thumbing your nose at the United States.

HAGERTY: Also, playing both sides of the street. Getting economic assistance from both sides and getting military assistance from the Russians or Czechs.

Q: What about at that time were concerned?
HAGERTY: It was part of the competition game from when phrase “peaceful coexistence” – a product of the Khrushchev and Bulganin visit to India in 1955.

Q: Were we concerned about - and I’m not sure if I’m pronouncing it correctly - Kerala as being, you know, sort of the beginning of the threat of Communist influence?

HAGERTY: Well, don’t forget there had been a Communist insurgency in south-central India in the early 1950 that was brutally suppressed by the Indian Army in a place called Telangana, now the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. No one who knew India believed the Government of India was soft on communism domestically; Congress Party governments were very tough on Communists domestically because they saw the Communist Parties as domestic rivals. When an Indian Communist Party government led a coalition government in the southern state of Kerala in 1957, following the 1956, it held together for two years. When it fell, amid state-wide demonstrations, and with little hope of being reconstituted, Indira Gandhi, then President of the Congress Party, recommended that her father invoke the Indian constitution’s provision which allows imposition of “President’s Rule” in any state where governance has failed. This was a provision that India’s 1950 constitution inherited from the last pre-Partition Government of India Act of 1935. It provided for the state governor to run the state while the central Parliament acted as its legislature for renewable periods of six months, subject to a Parliament’s approval, until a stable state government could be formed. This has occurred more than 60 times in India since 1947.

Later, non-communist governments were formed in Kerala, only to be followed by elections in which stable Communist-led governments came into power, as they are today. The state of West Bengal has been ruled by the same wing of the Communist Party for probably 15 years, and as time has gone by – what with the Sino-Soviet split -- India’s two Communist Parties have stopped being perceived as the foreign threat they originally appeared. Kerala and West Bengal may be India’s most stable states today.

Q: Back to your decision to leave CIA, you’re saying that you felt you didn’t want to get into its clandestine side. Why?

HAGERTY: Well, two things, one was that I really had no interest in that kind of work. Secondly, in career terms, I would have been five to eight years behind most of my contemporaries in what the agency calls that “tradecraft.” As an analyst, my responsibility was to present the policymaker with what has happened, how and/or why it’s happened, and where it’s likely to lead. At that point, the intelligence analyst walks away from the problem, and it’s left for those who make policy elsewhere to determine what to do about it. I was increasingly frustrated because at the point I finished my analysis, I didn’t want to drop the problem. I wanted to be part of the policy solution, and the only way I could be a part of that to seek entry into the Foreign Service with the State Department.

Q: What did you do?
HAGERTY: Well, for the last two years I was with CIA, I regularly attended the weekly SOA meetings at State and got to know the players there very well. I decided that I would try to make this switch when I became aware that there would shortly be a vacancy opening up in SOA. I then made SOA Director Carol Laise aware of my interest, and she said she’d see if there were a way I could come into the Foreign Service on a “lateral entry” basis. She began work on that in the early spring of ’65, and after a seemingly endless round of paperwork, she was successful in getting the Department to offering me a position as Indian desk officer, as Foreign Service Reserve Officer (FSR) on a five-year appointment, with the opportunity to go through the “lateral entry” process later on.

I made the transition between the two organizations over a weekend in the middle of the Pakistan-India War of 1965 – actually a transition from a CIA task force to a task force in the Operations Center of the Department. And I never looked back.

Q: The Indian-Pakistani war of 1965, what was that all about?

HAGERTY: Inevitably Kashmir. Pakistan had decided on a rather adventurous policy under Ayub Khan, goaded by Z. A. Bhutto as Foreign Minister. To put pressure on India to negotiate, it sent hundreds of infiltrators into Indian-held Kashmir, as they had been done several times before (and since). The Indians came down heavily on the infiltrators, the Pakistanis military moved forces that would have threatened the Indian supply lines into Kashmir and instead of responding to that threat in Kashmir, the Indians sent Indian armor across the international border in the Punjab, stopping just short of Lahore. It was all over in six days, with both armies pretty much out of fuel and ammunition by that time anyway. The UN brokered a cease-fire, and the U.S. and the U.K. got actively involved afterwards in a major push to get India and Pakistan to negotiate about Kashmir. Several rounds were held, talking and talking, but nothing ever happened except the restoration of an approximate status quo ante.

Q: At least the war stopped.

HAGERTY: Yes. The cease-fire held, the forces withdrew, and things went back to where they were. The only difference was that the boundary in Kashmir, previously known as the Cease Fire Line, had been adjusted in minor ways as a result of the fighting. It became known as the Line of Actual Control, as it is to this day – and remains a frequent scene of skirmishing between Indian and Pakistani army units.

Q: Over in State, was there any feeling about, you know, when you first got there and began to be involved with India and Pakistan and all, what the hell to do about Kashmir and all that, what should be done or what have you?

HAGERTY: Well, I think I understand the issues involved for both countries. I did then also. They are deeply rooted of the independence movement history that led to the 1947
of the Partition and in the countries that resulted. I don’t have a unique solution for Kashmir.

Q: Oh no, I’m really not asking for you today to do this, but at the time did we have Department or CIA guys doing the analysis and all, but at coffee time, saying why the hell doesn’t this or that happen?

HAGERTY: Despite Indian suspicions early in the Cold War, the U.S has never coveted bases in Kashmir. And throughout the dispute, the U.S. government has maintained, more or less loudly, that Kashmir’s legal status is a “territory in dispute.” We do not accept as final the present situation and have encouraged them to negotiate it out, while I think recognizing that the most likely way it’s going to be resolve is the way in which it came very close to being negotiated after the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1971 that established the nation of Bangladesh. At that time, the two sides came very close to accepting the Line of Actual Control as an international boundary so that India would remain that portion of Jammu and Kashmir it had. Coupled with minor adjustments, Pakistan would retain what it now controls, the less desirable western fringe -- called Azad Kashmir -- plus what are called the Northern Territories, states formerly owing allegiance to the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. I spent lots of time in Kashmir later, while I was in the Embassy in New Delhi, and I must say that seems to me the only solution. Any solution must in the end ratify or make minor modifications to the status quo. It’s not going to go either way one hundred percent; nor can independence be considered. The stakes are too high in terms of the raison d’etre of the Partition that created the nations of India and Pakistan.

Q: When you moved to State, how were you received?

HAGERTY: I was accepted for what I was -- the Indian desk Officer. I could just have arrived from anywhere in the world. In the Foreign Service, as you know, people are always going or coming, so I was just the new arrival. The first time I met B. K. Nehru, the Indian ambassador, as I escorted him to a meeting with Secretary Rush at which I was the note-taker, I replied to his query about where I had come from by telling him I’d been an analyst at CIA. My own immediate colleagues had known me before; and others were equally uninterested in where I’d been.

Q: Did you find there is a difference in that normally an analyst in the CIA stays there for life practically, whereas you were in a job where people move around a lot. I would think that although they’re further low down on the feeding system, there is a certain policy element to. I mean there’s quite a bit of this. Did you find this?

HAGERTY: It was great to be involved in policy -- what can I say?

Q: Yes, I mean there’s really quite a difference in saying, yes, you shoot the rocket up and you don’t give a damn where it comes down.
HAGERTY: But the point was, I didn't stop doing analyses, because as any Foreign Service Officer or a desk officer knows, I always had to predicate my recommendation against an understanding of what’s happened and how we got here. That involves drawing on other people’s expertise, as well, but I had a lot in my head too -- and I write well.

Q: How long were you on the Indian desk?

HAGERTY: For two years.

Q: '65 to ‘67. How were communications with the Pakistan desk?

HAGERTY: Very close. We were all part of one office at the time, although it eventually did split into two, India/Nepal/Ceylon (INC) and Pakistan/Afghanistan, which, after 1971, became Pakistan/Afghanistan/Bangladesh (PAB). Even after the office divided, the two Office Directors maintained adjacent offices with a connecting door. They could knock on it and keep in close contact with each other. The offices are now in an integral suite of offices.

Q: Differences flare up and down depending on the personalities of the ambassadors. I was wondering whether you all back in Washington during this period would see the wars of telegrams between what was coming out of New Delhi and I was at Karachi at that time. You know, you always think, you know Galbraith and McConaughy and other people who take the cause to heart and then our ambassador to Pakistan weighs in, the hell you say and that sort of thing, you know.

HAGERTY: We were in a position of having to try to reconcile that, and Carol Laise was extremely good at that. One of the things that she did when the Country Director system was established was to ask Secretary Rusk what he, as Secretary, was expecting from the new organization. She said, “Mr. Secretary, we have this problem. We have ambassadors who have different views. Do you want us to represent the ambassadors to you or do you want us to represent you to the ambassadors?” He reportedly said, “You don’t have a choice, you represent me to the ambassadors.” In my own dealings later on, I’ve had the same approach, and not without difficulty later in terms of “my” then ambassador in Pakistan.

Q: At that time, were there two opposing camps in India and Pakistan? I’m talking about our embassies.

HAGERTY: As you know, embassies tend to espouse what they perceive what would be the best American course of action with regard to dealing with country Y or Z. It was up to the State Department and the national security system as a whole to attempt to broker what was best for the United States in both countries, accepting that very often we could not please both equally. We almost never displeased both equally. Sometimes we’d have to come down on one side and sometimes we’d come down on the other side. But our aim was to do what was best for the U.S.
Q: Well, I'm talking about sort of a practicalities of the. Did you sit down say with Carol Laise and the Pakistan desk and sort of figure out what the hell are we going to do with this one or not? In other words?

HAGERTY: Yes. Policy frequently begins with draft memo or cable. An officer would be charged with drafting and getting it cleared by other desk officers and by other offices around the Department -- then moving up the line for approval. As somebody said years ago, “Policy making is a matter of cables and getting them cleared.”

Q: Well, then would you be getting cables in sometimes from one or the other and almost get a case of the giggles? Because when you get into these things, you realize how localitis has taken over?

HAGERTY: Oh yes, there’s no question about that. If we were on a classified basis, I could quote from cables.

Q: You can quote some cables. Almost everything has been declassified.

HAGERTY: I don’t know which have and which have not. But yes, they were often very bluntly worded cables during Galbraith’s time; he had the connection at the White House so that you always had to factor in how the White House would react. Galbraith was a Kennedy favorite and stayed at the White House when he was in Washington. But I also assume that, like most opinionated people, he outwore that welcome at times.

Q: What rank were you coming in?

HAGERTY: I was an FSR-4 (step-two), which matched precisely with my former Civil Service GS-13 (step-two); the parity was required by law and regulations.

Q: Which is about lieutenant colonel? Did you have any idea after two years you were getting ready to go?

HAGERTY: FSR-4 was more the equivalent of major or lieutenant commander in the military. And yes, I was ready to go. Early in 1967, Carol asked me one day if I would like to go to the domestic politics job opening up soon in Delhi. She thought I would be the ideal person for it, and I agreed!

Q: Sounds great. How did your wife feel about this?

HAGERTY: She seemed excited about the opportunity it afforded me it, but her own transition to not having her own job and to Foreign Service life in India went badly. Sadly, our marriage broke up there a year later.

Q: In Washington?
HAGERTY: No, in New Delhi.

Q: Well, then you went out when?

HAGERTY: Went out in June ’67, right in the middle of the Six-Day War in the Middle East.

Q: Okay, we’re going to pick this up in 1967 when you’re off to New Delhi as political officer. Great.

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This is August 3, 2001. Herb, you were in India from ’67 to when?

HAGERTY: Until June ‘70.

Q: Okay, let’s talk a bit about what were sort of the India-American relations at the time you went out there in ’67?

HAGERTY: Well, Mrs. Gandhi had just visited from Washington while I was Desk Officer. Lyndon Johnson was making an effort to have a decent relationship with India, but India was going through some difficult times. There had been monsoon failure a couple of years before resulting in serious food problems, which the PL480 program was helping meet. PL480 wheat going into Calcutta, for instance, was keeping Calcutta from draining the countryside of food. And India needed massive foreign assistance to support its ambitious development plans. The relationship we had with Pakistan, of course, was a factor in our limited relationship with India. I heard Carol Laise once muse that the U.S. relationship with India and Pakistan was like a man’s relationship with a wife and a mistress: India, “the mistress,” and Pakistan, “the wife.”

Ambassador Bowles at the time had decided that his political officers didn’t know enough economics and his economic officers didn’t know enough politics, so he created two political-economic sections, one dealing with India’s internal affairs and the with, India’s external policies. He expected us to be able to talk about economics as well as our political work. We referred to them jokingly as “gynecology” and “dermatology wings.” My responsibilities were for Indian domestic politics, as well as the internal politics of Indian-held Kashmir.

Q: Okay, before we move on to what you were seeing and working there, how did you view Bowles as an ambassador?

HAGERTY: He was well motivated with regard to India, but his vision of India was one that India kept failing to meet. He wanted India to be more open to free enterprise, less caught up in a socialistic planned economy, more focused on what he regarded as the real world, rather than being blinded by Soviet largesse and continuing to be caught up in anti-
imperialist struggles. At that stage of his career, however he was really without much influence in Washington. He had held a senior position in the Kennedy administration; he and FDR Junior had been instrumental in Kennedy’s West Virginia primary victory. He expected more as a reward -- the UN job, for instance. When the jobs finally got passed out, he didn’t get Secretary of State, and he didn’t get the UN job, but he got the Deputy Secretary position under Rusk, and then found himself frequently out of the loop and isolated. When the ambassadorship to India opened again – he had served in that position once before -- he decided that’s where he wanted to go because he really didn’t have any other place to go. But he didn’t have much influence from there either.

Q: Well, let’s talk about your job. I mean, both politically and economically, why don’t we talk about the economics first. How much of a planned economy was it and how was it producing?

HAGERTY: Well, the conventional wisdom at the time may have proven to be correct, which is that the Indian planners knew where they had been, and where they wanted to go. But their problem was that between where they had been and where they wanted to go was the space of from five to ten years during which they never quite knew where they were. So the planning process would sometimes go askew. They would have resources aimed at a particular target, but their record-keeping, their database was such that they could end up, for instance, in some years having a glut of engineers having started out on the assumption that they could never have too many engineers. But at that stages, they couldn’t get the resources shifted in time, and the real cost to produce a widget was never quite understood in the State sector. All of the problems of the Soviet economy (less the authoritarian style) were present in this kind of economy where a market place didn’t establish what you had to pay and what it cost you to produce. Nonetheless, with the help of foreign assistance, they were doing remarkable things;

Q: Well, were you observing again on the economic side, was there appreciation among the economic movers and shakers that the Soviet economy really stunk. I mean no doubt about it. Outside of producing military weapons, the USSR just wasn’t delivering to its people. I mean did they as they were looking at what they were doing, did they really have a cold objective eye on what was happening in these other countries’ economies?

HAGERTY: You know, I think so, but I also had the feeling that the Indians were locked into their suspicion of free market forces. It had been free market forces as far as they were concerned that had driven the period of imperialism that imposed Westerner rule on them and so forth. It was Nehru’s perception that the whole industrial revolution, which India was in the process of attempting for itself, had resulted in a squeeze of the lower classes in the West while resources were being mobilized. India couldn’t afford that and have a democratic government as well, so the only way to deal with it was to do it with a planned economy.

Q: The politics of the thing. Can you give sort of a broad-brush treatment of how you saw Indian politics in ‘67 to ‘70 period?
HAGERTY: Well, these were Mrs. Gandhi’s first years in power. She had come to power and then won an election in which she really lost her large parliamentary majority, so she headed essentially a minority government dependent on certain independents and on occasional temporary alliances across the party lines. So, her efforts to consolidate her power were badly undermined by the fact that she hadn’t done well in the elections. It was the first time that the Congress Party had lost its overwhelming majority in the Parliament. In India’s multi-national system, a plurality of the vote usually delivered a seat in the Lok Sabha. Congress had always pulled 42% or 43% of the popular vote, and in that kind of a shootout, that guaranteed the seat. But in ’67, there was much more cooperation among the opposition parties to put up the strongest candidate; the result was that in many instances, the vote for the Congress Party candidate was not large enough to take the seat. The party was also weakened because of Mrs. Gandhi’s own failures as a domestic politician to keep the party a vital force in national affairs.

Q: How at this point did you see Mrs. Gandhi as an Indian politician, not on the international scene, but in India?

HAGERTY: She was a crafty, single-minded politician. But, she effectively destroyed the party she had inherited from her father and from his generation her failure to keep the Congress Party itself revitalized within. Her often high-handed activities eventually cost her power, and then eventually cost even more – her life. The period known as “The Emergency,” which followed her conviction of electoral irregularities and eventual suspension of democracy for partisan advantage, resulted in a brief period of totalitarian government in India.

Q: Well, did you see her as someone who really didn’t have much of a common touch, sort of the daughter of a high class family who lived in sort of an imperial cocoon or something of this nature?

HAGERTY: Not quite, not quite, because she was cutthroat in her politics. For instance, she was chosen by a group of senior party elders who were referred to as “the syndicate” and included four major figures in the party, each strong regional bases, south, west, east and north. They assumed that she would be malleable. In the end, by playing them off against each other, she undercut each one of them, not denying them their power bases, but reducing their influence at the center. In the process, she suspended intra-party elections, locking in the then-party leaders but denying access to a younger generation for what became years.

It was an interesting time to be there because my job was following parliament and national politics. I was in the visitor’s gallery for Question Hour almost every day when it was in session. I wrote about the parliament and talked incessantly with MPs. I used to describe my job as a reasonably well-paid gossip. I would very often begin the day by having have tea with two or three MPs before parliament convened at 11 A.M. They were great talkers. My predecessors in the job had established a pattern of this kind of working
level contact with MPs, and I fit right into their gossip network. I knew what was going on well enough that I could be a good sounding board for them, as they would talk to me about domestic politics. I was discreet, so I didn’t reveal what “A” told me to “B,” respecting their confidences. Then I traded gossip with the parliamentary correspondents of the Delhi press, pooling info with them about the political situation.

Q: You know, how would you describe the dynamics of parliament during this period of time?

HAGERTY: Well, even with the vast majority shattered, in the parliamentary system, everything depends upon the “whip,” that is, governing depends upon the majority holding, so that for minority parties, particularly when they began to feel that some of their own strength, get close to being a force on the floor of parliament, they continued to be frustrated by their exclusion from the policy process. All they could do was raise ugly questions during “Question Hour,” occasionally launch protests, walk out of the parliament, protest outside, and get their members arrested.

Q: You say, Indira Gandhi destroyed the Congress Party. How did that come about?

HAGERTY: The Congress Party, like lots of parties in India and throughout the ‘Third World,’ was organized on the concept of democratic centralism. Each level of the party, from the bottom to the top, elected members of the next higher group in a pyramid shape. It cost ‘eight annas’ (half of one Rupee) to be a member and to be eligible to vote within the party for the next echelon in the party’s pradesh or state committee, and so forth up the line. Before Mrs. Gandhi’s ‘reign,’ intra-arty elections were held regularly, each time rejuvenating its various echelons and enabling the party to keep in touch with political reality in India. But from the time Mrs. Gandhi came to power, the party stopped doing that. Intra-party elections stopped being held, and tended to atrophy with all the same face at the top and at all other levels. There was virtually no popular input from the district level up through to the All-India Congress Committee and its smaller, all-powerful, executive, the Congress Working Committee.

Q: Well, what was in her calculation in doing this?

HAGERTY: I never quite understood that except that she wanted to control the existing system. I think she didn’t trust her own ability to manage an evolving system in which she would have to deal infusions of with new blood. She had control of the people with whom she worked, and she had in fact destroyed the so-called “syndicate” of older party leaders who had put her in power and then had attempted to control her, essentially cutting them off at the knees, one after another -- S. K. Patil from Bombay, Atulya Ghosh from Calcutta, K. Kamaraj Nadar from Madras, and Sanjiva Reddy from Andhra, I knew them all. They remained as elder statesmen with regional power but with limited influence on national affairs, as she went her own way, taking the party with her. She was Nehru’s daughter, and India is a society in which even today, maharajas or others powerful families exercise a lot of influence. For instance, when I served later in
Pakistan, the Maharaja of Baroda, whom I knew as a Member of the Indian Parliament, visited a spokesman and sponsor of the Indian cricket then touring Pakistan. At my house, my servants treated him as if he were the maharaja in “old” India, and most of them were born after ‘Partition.’ Nonetheless, they virtually prostrated themselves in his presence.

Indira Gandhi’s position as her father’s daughter (and only offspring) was part of her mystique. She was also ruthless in the way she played politics. She abided no innovation, and substantive policy was not her game. Rather, maneuver and manipulation were her game. Ambassador Bowles had no dialogue with her at all.

Q: While you were there during part of the, did Kissinger come out?

HAGERTY: Yes, I was the Embassy Control Officer for the Nixon visit in 1969, and Kissinger was along on that visit, not as Secretary of State but rather as NSC advisor. That was a monster visit. Nixon was coming from the splashdown of the lunar landing in the Pacific, stopping on the way in Thailand and Vietnam on the way to Delhi. He went on thereafter to a few hours in Lahore, Pakistan and a visit to Romania. The visit to Delhi lasted 23 hours. Five Boeings came in serially, three of them filled with journalists, one the backup plane, and one - Air Force One - with the first-term Nixon White House on board -- Erlichman, Haldeman, you name them, plus two Assistant Secretaries of State, Joe Sisco and Marty Hillenbrand, plus a lot of other NSC people, Hal Saunders, and others. While Kissinger was going to participate in the main talks, of course, his interest beyond that was in meeting with former students. So, he avoided lots of the ceremonial parts of the visit.

Q: How did the Nixon visit go with Indira Gandhi?

HAGERTY: It went reasonably well. We didn’t expect much from the visit, and I don’t think Nixon expected much more than his hopes that he would draw bigger crowds than Eisenhower drew during his 1959 visit. At this point, former Senator Keating had become ambassador in India, a Nixon appointee, having lost his seat as senator from New York. The visit ended was essentially a pro forma stop, without much serious content.

An interesting sidelight on the visit: we’d had a difficult time as we were dealing with Indian protocol people getting Indian permission to use the Nixon Presidential limo, which was one of two leapfrogging from post to post while the president was traveling. The Indian side took umbrage, insisting that Nixon would be safe in the Indian President’s Rolls Royce Silver Cloud. At my suggestion, our White House negotiator denied that security was our reason for preferring our own car. It was communications, i.e., the President’s need to be in touch with US military forces around the world. Only his car would do for that. He then said the President could not have his own car, he would decline to stay as a guest at the Indian President’s official residence.

That led them to refer the issue to Mrs. Gandhi. When they came back, they agreed to our request; the communications argument carried the day, they said. But later, via a Member
of Parliament, I learned that when Indira Gandhi learned of our position, she simply said, “Okay, let him have his car. If he gets killed here, it’s his car, not ours!”

Q: Did you find that the parliamentarians played much of a role in the thrust of India or not?

HAGERTY: Not really; individual MPs did play much of a role, and those in the opposition had virtually no influence. Indian Parliament, like the mother of Parliaments in London, doesn’t have the kind of committees in which you have minority and majority members and so forth. There would be an ad hoc committee established to deal with a specific piece of legislation, but it was dominated by the Congress Party. And the Congress Party had usually been able to ram through everything the leadership wanted. There was very little effort to persuade, to do the kind of coalition stuff that George H. Bush has to do everyday on everything he wants to get through the US Congress. That just is not the Indian (or British) system. For the opposition parties, it was very frustrating thing; their leaders resorted demagoguery, creating uproars in parliament and pitching for headlines the next day to embarrass or criticize the government. And through it all, the government majority just rolled on. During the 1100 AM “Question Hour,” ministers often answered members’ questions with a fair amount of information. The government rotated ministries to respond to questions on a daily basis, as in the British system. Certain subjects were up for certain days. And at noon, at the end of “Question Hour,” there would be a time – called “Zero Hour” in the local parlance – for tabling special motions, before moving on to the day’s legislative agenda. “Zero Hour” was often tumultuous, as the opposition used it to call for setting aside time for special debates on subjects of interest aimed at embarrassing Government or influencing public opinion. Such debates, which the Speaker could grant or not grant, gave all of the players a sense of participating in this drama that went on and on and on and was widely reported in the newspapers and in the press and on the Indian TV. But, mostly, the Government steamrollered its way into its legislative agenda. With little effort given to coalition building or attempting in terms of attempting to produce national consensus.

Q: Well, what was in it for the people out of power?

HAGERTY: Well, all MPs had a public role to play. They had a sense of being important and were able to help constituents seeking access to Government; many of their living expenses were covered, including free postal services and Delhi housing at government expense. And they received a modest income. What you should understand also is that most of the people who were on opposition benches had, at one time or another, been part of the Congress Party -- other than the communists or right-wing Hindu nationalists, that is. Most of those in parties to the immediate left of the Congress Party – members of the several socialist parties and those representing regional parties -- had been in the Indian National Congress prior to Independence. Those socialists who left Congress found that Nehru in power wasn’t socialist enough for them. They felt that he’d sold out that side of his ideology for power. They had worn homespun khadi cloth and been politicians all their lives, and that’s what they saw as their “karma.”
While it was expensive to run for office, MP were in a position to hope to be ministers, in
time, at the state or federal level, to live reasonably well until then, and – still only 20
years after independence had been attained -- to be part of the effort to create a new and
proud nation. The bulk of the private sector required government permits to get anything
done, and money could deliver permits. What was remarkable to me was that, yes, there
was corruption, but its incidence was remarkably low considering the stakes. They were
still operating in the pre-independence mode, but government had become a “Permit
Raj.”

Q: Did we have any issues while we were trying to get votes you know I mean were we
just reporting or were we saying it would be kind of nice if you voted on this bill or that
bill?

HAGERTY: The Embassy did not lobby MP’s per se but counted on our ability to ensure
that they were aware of our views and of the reasons for our policies. For instance, a
member of the upper house whom I knew well was clearly being lobbied by foreign drug
companies, with his foreign travel being paid by them because he was on the committee
dealing with a patent reform bill that was before the Parliament. A very substantial part of
the world’s pharmaceuticals are derived from natural products produced in India. I
wouldn’t have urged him how to vote, but I certainly made sure he was aware of how
important patents are to the US drug industry. In respect to this side of my job, my role
was to explain U.S. policies, often in answer to their questions. So I would explain why
we were doing something, what its background was, and what our aims were. I could
provide USIA books, excerpts from the Wireless File, and Unclassified USG
publications; I could make arrangement for them to meet the Ambassador or other
colleagues, and will as US officials and Congressman visiting India.

But the main point of my job was to stay on top of what the Indian Parliament and the
Indian Government were doing and how the political system was operating. Many of
them, of course, were aware that the person in my position could recommend politicians
for so-called “Leader Grants” to the U.S. to visit and travel around the US; every year
we’d send at least one and sometimes two parliamentarians on those grants. But that was
‘peanuts.’ The lower house had 538 members, upper house, 238. I may have come to
know 60-70, from both houses, including a handful of lesser ministers but none of the full
Ministers or Ministers of State (totaling another 60 or so), since they would be the
Ambassador’s preserve. I also knew and met with party and regional figures not in
Parliament.

Q: How did you find the sort of dealing and conversing with Indians? Indians tend to,
they’re worse than we are at least in my opinion as far as being both moralistic and
talking a lot?

HAGERTY: They’re politicians, and I think Indian politicians are a bit different in their
own turf. Yes, they are preachy when they get outside India, as preachy as our politicians
can be. But on a one-to-one basis, when I’d call on them and spend 25 or 40 minutes over
tea talking about the news of the day, they enjoyed talking. They especially liked talking
to somebody who understood their system and who could understand their questions and
feedback. And, as I have said, they often used me as a sounding board, since they rarely
talked across party lines (and I did). I had an interesting kind of relationship with many of
them and saw them often.

Q: Were you I think you’d have to be careful that you didn’t overwhelm our India desk
back in the States with too much information. I imagine you’d sort of have to.

HAGERTY: Yes, David Schneider, but an early boss of mine in the Foreign Service and
later Ambassador to Bangladesh, had also done this job in Delhi several years ahead of
me. His key word of advice was, “You have to know everything that is going on in Delhi,
but Washington doesn’t. It’s up to you to distill and interpret it.” And that’s what I did,
reporting by Telegram when timeliness warranted, otherwise by pouched Airgrams. These
reports circulated among people in the Department and other Executive Branch agencies
who were interested or specializing in India -- some more voraciously than others. For
every telegram I wrote, I must have written ten airgrams. I also kept in touch with the
India “desk” in Washington by pouched “Official-Informal” letters (long before the
advent of ‘Official-Informal’ cables, secure phone links with Washington, and before e-
mail.

Q: Was anybody else I’m talking about other embassies, the Soviets or the Brits doing
this or were you pretty much alone?

HAGERTY: There were maybe six what I called “serious” missions in Delhi, that is,
embassies keeping close tabs on Indian politics as we were doing. I traded information
and political ‘gossip’ all the time with four of them, i.e., my British, Australian,
Canadian, and New Zealand counterparts (even though the last two, from smaller
embassies, were spread very thin, with more rank and wider areas of responsibility. Also
occasionally the French, more often the Yugoslavs, who were very well plugged in
Nonaligned matters and who were more than happy to be trading political gossip. To
these I would add the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Soviets, but I had little opportunity
do any trading with them. Representatives from these “serious” embassies were invited,
with me, as “foreign guests” to periodic and well-publicized All-India Congress
Committee meetings, held in various places in India. So I would go off to Jabalpur or Goa
or someplace else in India for one of these gatherings where I’d spend a week on the edge
of a large Congress Party gathering and trading impressions and information with my
Commonwealth and Yugoslav counterparts. Usually there were Russians in attendance
also, but we tended to ignore each other. My British counterpart, by the way, was much
later to serve as HMG’s ambassador in Paris, then in Washington.

Q: While you were working on domestic politics did you get hit with, I mean we were
going right out to Vietnam at that time.
HAGERTY: Oh sure. Whenever my colleagues and I talked with Indian officials, including MPs, we were called upon to defend US policies and actions in Vietnam and elsewhere. You may remember that it was during this period that India closed down our USIA libraries in various places in-country largely in response to US criticism of remarks by the Indian deputy foreign minister made on a visit to Hanoi. An interesting sidelight to this was that when we checked our files, we had virtually no documents signed by the Indian government ever authorizing us to establish those libraries; all we found was a report that Pandit Nehru “nodded” when informed by an earlier US Ambassador of our intent to establish these centers.

Q: Did you feel that you were in semi hostile territory, what was sort of your gut impression?

HAGERTY: No, I don’t think so. I always felt that Indians had a great deal of respect for the United States. In those early years of the Indian Republic, knowledge that the United States had supported Indian independence, even to the annoyance of His Majesty’s Government, was widely known among Indians with whom we were dealing. On the far left, there were those who were hostile to us, like with Communist Party MPs with whom I would never meet and who doubtless would not have welcomed my attention. But I knew who they were so that when they would demonstrate in front of the American embassy, I’d be the embassy officer who would be sent to greet them by name. I’d say, “Hello, Mr. Gupta, how are you? Do you have a petition for us? I’ll make sure that the petition goes to Washington so that the President is aware of it” -- that sort of thing. Sometimes they would appear a little embarrassed by my greeting, perhaps fearful that their colleagues would sense they had a prior relationship with me. So be it; their comfort was not my concern. But I didn’t feel there was much hate.

It was a golden time in lots of ways. The post-Kennedy period had sort of revolutionized a sense of the American image. We really thought we were out there on the front lines of the ‘Cold War’ and on the ‘war on poverty.’ The AID mission was huge, and we were part of a World Bank consortium providing billions to Indian development efforts. We had helped to sponsor the “green revolution” and were moving in other areas, such as public health and PL-480 food aid. We had more than 1,200 Peace Corps Volunteers in country; the largest single Peace Corps program at the time, prompting Indians widely to refer to healthy chickens in India as ‘Peace Corps chickens.’ At the time, I used to remind Indians that while one out of every seven human beings was an Indian, one out of every six Peace Corps Volunteers was in India. It was an exciting and pleasant place to live and work.

Q: What about down south, in Kerala?

HAGERTY: Yes, Kerala had elected a communist government in 1959, as I said before, and Indira Gandhi, as President of the Congress Party, had persuaded her father to oust that government when demonstrations threatened its hold on government, exercising a provision in the 1950 Indian constitution to impose six-month periods of central rule and
Parliamentary control of its finances in such circumstances. But years later, when Kerala again elected the Communist Party to power, Communist rule there it became the norm; the state has communist governments to this day.

Q: They were just another one of the opposition.

HAGERTY: Yes, they were just another of the many opposition parties at the center. In fact, of the opposition parties, that party -- the more militant, originally Maoist-influenced Communist Party Marxist (CPM) -- has for a long time governed in the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal, as I have said before. Many have suggested they are the best administered governments at the state level in India. And as you know, the Communist Party had earlier split; with the other wing under more direct Moscow influence. But even they were hardly Bolsheviks. The terminology, as indeed their platform, was outdated.

Q: Were you looking at the, I don’t know what you want to call them, the divisions or do you want to call them tribal, caste, and you know, I mean the whole hodge podge of mixed up India? Were these?

HAGERTY: Well, these identities help to explain the workings of Indian politics in the way that ethnic and racial considerations play out in urban politics in much of the US. You know, the electoral tickets are balanced in India in caste, ethnic, and sub-regional terms. One additional factor is that the Indian constitution reserves legislative seats for Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, former “Untouchables,” who made up the 23% of Indian society at the very bottom of the social scale. That percentage applies also to places reserved for university admissions, government jobs, etc. But because twenty-three percent of the Lower House of parliament is also reserved for them, it also meant -- and continues to mean -- that these lower caste office-seekers run against each other for those reserved seats; they would be unlikely to win any non-reserved seats. This has kept the lower castes divided politically. And when elected, then they have been often been up for ‘grabs,’ suborned, bribed, and that sort of thing, for their votes in Parliament and in state assemblies.

Q: We had the one visit of Nixon and that was about it, or did you have a lot of congressional delegations and that sort of thing?

HAGERTY: Not a lot, but some. Senator Javits and Foreign Relations Committee people came, I remember. I looked after them. There were others more concerned about the aid program and economic matters (of policy), but I didn’t get to deal with them. Ambassador Bowles, a former Congressman, and later Ambassador Keating, a former senator, attempted -- often in vain -- to encourage more Congressional visitors.

Q: You were dealing obviously with domestic politics, but was there a war going on over the cables between our embassy, I guess, in Karachi in those days, I mean between our embassy in Pakistan and our embassy in India?
HAGERTY: Yes, well, the U.S. Ambassadors in New Delhi and Islamabad inevitably were in competition with each other for Washington’s attention. Later, when I was the Pakistan Director in Washington, I was at the other end of that, and I’ll talk about that at another time perhaps. But each embassy, in its advocacy of policy options tended to look at them from the prism of that originating capital, recommending what the Ambassador perceived was the best thing for US relations with that country. Also, you should never forget that ambassadors are also interested in their own records of achievement during their time as chief of mission, so that they were looking out for that, too. It’s clear when countries are as antithetical as India and Pakistan can be, the perceptions of the two embassies are going to be almost as different as the perceived interests of those two countries. That requires the sorting out in Washington of what is in the U.S. interest in the region, whether or not it is in the US best interests with one or the other country. I should also add that while Embassy and Consulate political reporting doubtless influenced Washington perceptions, the Embassy’s advocacy on policy was essentially separate from our day-to-day reporting of Indian political and economic affairs.

Q: I don’t know if it really pertains, again I speak of somebody whose been off to one side on this, but in a way I always had the feeling that the Republicans were particularly interested in and more amenable to Pakistan and the often military government whereas the Democrats got more entranced with India. I mean, did you have any feeling of that?

HAGERTY: I think there had been a popular impression that Democratic administrations in Washington tended to favor India, and Republican administrations, Pakistan. But I think that folklore died. The Roosevelts were vocal advocates of Indian independence, but I don’t see that a consistent partisan favoritism has existed at all in recent years. During the early Cold War years, for instance, John Foster Dulles and his alliances (with Pakistan among others) were looked upon with scorn in India, but Eisenhower wasn’t. He had a fantastic visit to India in 1959, was well thought of and in many ways was highly revered. When Kennedy came into office, the perception was that relations with India would get a boost, and then John Galbraith made sure that lots of people believed that because he was involved, too. But Johnson seemed to have a soft spot for Pakistan, in part the result of his personal relationship with Ayub Khan. But this alleged partisan favoritism was riddled with so many exceptions that over time it didn’t seem to hold water.

Q: Okay, well, then why don’t we move on.

HAGERTY: I can remember the effect in India, the assassination of Martin Luther King.

Q: Oh, yes, well, talk about that.

HAGERTY: That was quite moving. It was understood in India that King quoted so much from Mohandas Gandhi and organized nonviolent protest. I think Indians did feel that there was a loss in his death. I looked after Mrs. King when she came out to accept the Nehru Medal, an annual award that the Indian government introduced after King’s death
for an outstanding foreigner I think she was rather remarkably moved, and this was some months later, at the outpouring of sorrow and affection in India at the time.

Q: Well, this does bring up a subject. You were there at the height of our, the racial situation in the United States.

HAGERTY: The civil rights movement, yes.

Q: Yes, the whole civil rights movement. How did that play in India because I mean, for one, they probably have a worse caste system than we have in some ways, but, two, would they identify with people of color? I mean, how did this work in the circles that you moved in?

HAGERTY: Yes, they did identify with people of color and kept from exercising their rights in any country abroad. As newly independent, they had quite explicitly drawn on constitutional provisions in effect in other liberal democracies, including our own, in drafting their own 1950 constitution. For instance, following Gandhi’s example, they had declared “Untouchability” unenforceable. No doubt that discrimination based on caste still enjoys the force of tradition in small rural villages where there are separate for those with caste and those without. Ordinary people in those areas have to live and survive, and so it exists even though no court or police force can enforce it. But with world news available by radio everywhere in India, informed Indians were sympathetic that the Administration and the US courts were trying to do the right thing. I think that went a long way. (The anti-US “left” was something else!)

India has a federal system, in some ways similar to ours. State leaders do things that the national government doesn’t necessarily approve of, and we’re seeing more and more of that as time goes by. Indians understood something about how federal systems operate, even if there are differences between ours and theirs in terms of residual powers. In India, all powers unspecified in the constitution reside with the central government, unlike our system where the reverse is true.

Q: A question that I forgot to ask. In the parliamentary system, was there an upper house?

HAGERTY: Yes. The upper house (Rajya Sabha or House of the States) is elected the way the US Senate was elected before 1912, that is by the state legislatures for six-year terms, with one-third expiring every two years -- like the US Senate. Thus the upper house – with about 240 members -- reflects the composite political balance of the state assemblies. In the days when the Congress Party had majorities in every state assembly, the upper house also reflected that Congress dominance. Increasingly in the ‘60s and into the ‘70s, as more and more state legislatures have come under the control of opposition or purely regional parties, this has changed the balance in the Rajya Sabha. Today, nearly all Indian states have coalition governments, and the Congress Party – even in control of some states – has lost its national dominance. The national government in Delhi is now a
coalition of seventeen essentially regional parties represented in the lower house (Lok Sabha, or House of the People), the upper house, and in those assemblies.

Q: Did you find that you spent much time with members of the upper house?

HAGERTY: Yes and no. Upper house members often gave me a different perspective. There were times when their party positions made them a better source of information, more authentic. They lived a more relaxed pace, since all real power was vested in the lower house. I had good contacts in both houses, but I spent most of my time with the more numerous members of the Lok Sabha, a number of them I came to regard as friends. I got on very well with Atal Behari Vajpayee, then an opposition leader but now prime minister. In 1971, when he was visiting Copenhagen, he arranged to come to Oslo, where I was then posted, and to have lunch with me. And I saw him in later years whenever I visited India from Pakistan.

Q: Well then you, so in 1970 you went to Oslo?

HAGERTY: Yes, on direct assignment to Norway, which I described to some Indian friends as a small ‘princely state’ in northern Europe.

Q: I mean, certainly climate wise it must have been quite a thing. How did you feel about that?

HAGERTY: Well, by then I was a bachelor father, with custody of two boys, the ages of seven and ten, who came with me. Before I left India, I had completed the Foreign Service ‘Lateral Entry’ process, just one step ahead of the Nixon Administration’s “BALPA” restrictions on hiring (in an effort to reduce balance of payment deficits). I was now an FSO-4, and I looked forward to seeing how I’d function as a diplomat in a different milieu in which I had no area specialization. For this, I had asked for an assignment outside of South Asia -- this in the days before bidding on jobs through the computer and so forth. My DCM in India, Galen Stone, put in a strong word with the European Bureau to see if they could find something for me in Europe where I could continue to function usefully as a political officer and as a solo parent with two young sons.

I was initially told that I was going to be the deputy principal officer in Palermo, but almost immediately, the “BALPA” program, which I described previously, abolished that position, so I was assigned to the political section in Oslo where my “beat” would be was NATO and Norwegian foreign relations.

Q: Okay, so you were in Oslo from ‘70 to when?

HAGERTY: ‘73.

Q: What was it like in Norway?
HAGERTY: Well, it seemed to be exactly what I wanted. It was the kind of change that I thought would be stimulating for me because it also required me to think more broadly about foreign relations issues rather than being limited to domestic politics. But I learned quickly that unlike some of the political swings in the Third World, elections in Norway that involve a shift in percentage of national vote of a half of one percent can produce a government change. During my time, there was a Labor Party government, then a non-Labor Government. But a major issue affecting both parties was a referendum in which the Norwegians voted to remain outside the EC -- also by a slim margin. Norwegians, it seemed, saw the EC as controlled by nations that did not share their interests, by far-away Catholic countries with too many people who weren’t as fair skinned as they. They also felt that the French intrude into their fishing waters up in the north if they went in the EC, so they stayed out.

Q: Had oil been found yet?

HAGERTY: Yes, North Sea oil had been found just off Norway’s coast, and Norwegians seemed overwhelmed by the momentous economic and environmental decisions they were forced to make about what to do with their new wealth. They knew the oil was not going to be there forever and wanted to make sure that they did the right thing with this new wealth. In Norway, hydroelectric generation fueled much of Norway’s prosperity, but the number of environmentally suitable new hydroelectric sites had dwindled to a few. So this oil, and its accompanying natural gas, came along at the right time for them. The gas they could either burn clearly in the north and generate electricity from it or be piped down to the south for that purpose. Either way, it was environmentally and economically sound.

Q: Who were the ambassadors when you were there?

HAGERTY: Philip Crowe was Ambassador when I arrived and virtually through my stay.

Q: How do you spell his last name?

HAGERTY: C-R-O-W-E. He was a political appointee, had been an Eisenhower appointee to Sri Lanka, and had spent the war in OSS in China. His father was the first publisher and owner of “Life” magazine, later selling it profitably to Henry Luce. The Ambassador was married a woman who, herself, was also wealthy, so Phil had lots of money. He enjoyed the official residence in Oslo, which was the former Nobel residence, where he entertained in grand style, mostly in “black tie.” I don’t think anybody in Norway paid much attention to him, actually. He seemed interested mainly in hunting and fishing, everywhere in Norway, and those subjects dominated much of his conversation.

As for me, NATO was getting involved in environmental issues, via its Committee on Challenges to Modern Society (CCMS) -- a Nixon initiative. So, I got similarly involved with environmental things at the same time that Norway was in the process of creating an
environmental ministry. I got an award for some of the things I did on the environmental side there as an extension of my NATO “beat.” I took Crowe to meet the new minister heading the environmental ministry once that had been set up. The minister was a taciturn man, uninterested in hunting and fishing. Before long, he and Crowe were engaged in a strained conversation since Crowe really wasn’t interested in environmental things.

At one point, the minister mentioned that there had been a polar bear attack on a man in the north, and since Crowe had once hunted polar bears, he picked up on that. The minister stopped him short, however, by saying, “Mr. Ambassador, I have to tell you that when I hear a story of an attack of a polar bear on a man, I always reserve judgment until I’ve heard the bear’s side of it.” At that point, Crowe decided the conversation was at an end, and we quickly left the ministry.

Q: How did the embassy operate? Was it basically the DCM?

HAGERTY: John Ausland, the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), ran the embassy; he was a first generation Norwegian-American.

Q: Yes, he just died not too long ago.

HAGERTY: Yes, that’s right. He retired in Norway when he left the Foreign Service.

Q: He’s written on Norway. So, I take it he was quite.

HAGERTY: He ran it very well, from an easy chair in his office; he never sat at his desk. Next to his chair, on a table, he had an out-basket but no in-basket. He handled paper just once and sent it to a burn bag or to someone else’s in-basket for action. That was his style. He was respected by the Norwegians, and he handled Crowe quite well, especially when Crowe was acting the part of a “Prima Dona.”

Q: Was there a Mrs. Crowe?

HAGERTY: Yes, but she was never at post. They eventually divorced, and after Oslo, Crowe went on to be ambassador in Denmark where he remarried, a much younger woman from Scandinavia, I believe. He died in Copenhagen.

Q: You didn’t have any… I mean one of our ambassadors, I think, was there or in another of the Scandinavian countries around this time was certainly renowned for chasing young ladies around the desk and all that.

HAGERTY: No, that was not, to my knowledge, Crowe’s game. He wanted to fish every stream and to hunt in every forest in Norway. When the U.S. Army in Germany announced a pheasant hunt, they could know that Phil Crowe would accept any invitation to visit Germany to shoot game. Crowe took me along once because I was the Embassy Politico-Military officer and could be his note-taker on any calls that occurred. When I
told him for openers, “I don’t kill birds,” he said, “I don’t care if you kill birds, as long as you eat them with me in the evening.” So a USAF colonel, who headed our Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) joined me and the Ambassador for a full week in Bavaria Germany in which the Colonel and I were mostly on our own -- except for dinner.

Q: When Norway opted out of the European Community, how did they feel about NATO at that time? We’re talking about ‘77?

HAGERTY: NATO was very important to them. The previous Nazi occupation, even 25 years later, was something that still cast a dark shadow. Norway’s commitment to NATO, an uncharacteristic decision for them because it defied the sense of Scandinavian neutralism and isolation, was their bet against not having to live through another such hostile occupation. Our problem in our bilateral relationship with Norway was that when the United States looked out at Norway, we saw NATO, while when the Norwegians looked out at NATO, they saw mainly the United States. Their bilateral link with the United States was of significantly greater value to them than membership per se in NATO. And while we tended to see Norway in the alliance context, it was also true that Norway possess strategic of great importance in military and security terms also, largely because of its proximity to the USSR.

Q: The Kola Peninsula?

HAGERTY: Yes. We had a close partnership with the Norwegians on a number of sensitive matters, especially keeping track of the Soviet Northern Fleet. For instance, in order to get into the Atlantic, Soviet submarines had to transit the Norwegian Sea, that is, within range of Norway-based aircraft. Under NATO terms, you know, the Norwegian Air Force and the German Army were the only two national military forces that were full-time under NATO operational control. The NATO Northern Command located under a mountain near Oslo was involved, and the senior air deputy there was a USAF two star general. So Norway played its NATO role fully, if carefully, and saw this part of their ultimate security link to the United States.

Q: Well, did you have to be careful in talking that you always mentioned the magic word of NATO?

HAGERTY: Not necessarily; Norwegians wanted to hear about the United States more than NATO. The reason why they were in NATO wasn’t because they liked the French, or the Italians, or the Greeks, or the Turks. As for the Brits, that’s another story.

Q: What about the Germans?

HAGERTY: The Germans had overcome some of their opprobrium but not all of it. The naval deputy at the NATO command outside Oslo was a German two-star admiral who had been a U-boat commander in World War II. The only requirement imposed by the
Norwegians on such assignments to Norway was that the individual could not have served on Norwegian soil during World War II. As this U-boat commander would be frank to say, and the Norwegians privately acknowledged, that he had “never served on Norwegian soil.” But, he would smile, “We mention Norwegian waters.”

Q: Speaking of U-boats and waters, you know, certainly in the waters near Sweden, the Soviets doing kind of a very peculiar game of underwater probing and all that in. What about Norway?

HAGERTY: Yes, in the Baltic, near Sweden. That created unease in Norway, but no more than it did among the Swedes. However, sometime in 1972, the Soviets worried the Norwegians even more by running an amphibious exercise which they staged from the Baltic all the way around through to the Norwegian Sea to land Soviet troops on the Kola Peninsula -- seeming thus to “envelop” Norway. The Norwegians saw this as a Soviet assertion that, “Hey, we could just sweep you in.” Norwegians needed lots of reassurance that year, which we provided in a number of ways with evidence of our military presence in the form of exercises, etc. to bolster their confidence restoring. But their concern was still that they could be cut off and isolated from us and from NATO.

Q: What about their relations with Sweden?

HAGERTY: Well, you know, the foreign ministries in Scandinavia, at every level, talked daily by phone with counterparts. But, there was also animosity that carried over from the Swedish-German relationship during the war, even 25 years later. And in addition, the Swedes and the Norwegians have their own history, some of it typified in their languages. Swedish is a richer, more subtle language than Norwegian, with a vocabulary five times the size of Norwegian. Thus, a Swede often has several words to describe something for which a Norwegian has only one, often the same as one of the Swedish words but the least subtle or the superlative. So, when a Norwegian says that he’s hungry to a Swede, his word suggests to Swedes that he is “famished” or “starving,” rather than peckish or mildly hungry. This vocabulary problem often fed into their unflattering images of each other -- a Swede appearing to be a “city slicker” to Norwegians, and a Norwegian appearing to be a country bumpkin to Swedes. Now, of course, they watch each other’s television, and I don’t know how that affects this. The 1970's was a long time ago.

Q: How are the Danish? Were they considered serious or what did the Norwegians think that about the Danish?

HAGERTY: Well, you know, the Danes were Norway’s their last rulers prior to 1905, so the Norwegians also have a history with the Danes. But I think that they overcame some of that, at least, because they were fought the Germans and thereafter joined NATO together, cooperating closely on military matters. A Danish brigadier rotated regularly with a Norwegian as the NATO Northern Europe ground force commander at the Oslo NATO headquarters, for instance. I don’t ever remember hearing very much about the Danes of the sort that I heard often from older Norwegians about the Swedes. And, of
course, we had little reason to like the Swedes either. We were taking so much flack from the Swedes about Vietnam that our Charge in Stockholm once referred to Stockholm as the “Holy See of Moral Imperialism.” We knew also that when we’d have some sort of demonstration in front of the embassy in Oslo, the police would break it up, while in Stockholm, the police would stand by and watch windows being broken. They were different atmospheres.

Q: What about the parliament of Norway? Did you find, how were your contacts there?

HAGERTY: I didn’t have any. My Norwegian language colleague did all of it; he was the labor officer and the Norwegian language officer. I had come away from the Indian parliament thinking that the parliamentary system was one I was happy I didn’t live under, because of the way in which it so stiffly controlled events by the will of the majority. The government had to keep winning, and if it didn’t win, then it was out of power. You can get impatient with our system, but ours is a constant coalition, and I think that broader interests get served on that basis. I had the feeling that the Norwegian parliament was a stiff organization too. I once asked Norwegian friends if there was an earth-shaking crisis taking place, what five Norwegians would the prime minister feel he needed to consult. They would reply that one would be the king, one would be the president of the labor federation, one would be the head of the opposition in parliament, and one would be the head of the church. But in the two years I had been there, I hadn’t ever heard anything about the head of the church! And opinions about the fifth one would vary widely. Politics was not a very lively art there.

Q: You know, they had all this money coming in from oil. How did you feel the Norwegians were investing it?

HAGERTY: My impression was that they were giving as much thought as they could to putting it to use in infrastructural ways that would produce long term gain for the economy. But I left in ’73 before the real big money started to come in.

Q: The October war.

HAGERTY: That’s right. They were still sorting out their priorities in this. They obviously had some infrastructural questions that they used with some additional power generations, some additional road building and nation building activities that they felt were needed. They hadn't really come down hard on where they were going to come out on that, so I don’t know.

Q: Were the Norwegians pretty responsible citizens? You begin to get some wealth and all in some places, people just sort of sit back and say, “Well, we’ll get some Pakistanis to do the work for us” or something?

HAGERTY: Many Norwegians were racist, in my view. They did not like dark-skinned Italian soldiers as part of a NATO force exercising on Norwegian soil. One of the things
they didn’t like about the Common Market and the whole European Union idea was that they wouldn’t have control of people – like dark-skinned Gypsies -- entering Norway from other places in Europe. They were a curious mixture, because they could become very agitated about poor, dark-skinned people being slaughtered in the Sudan, particularly is they were Christians. They could be absolutely open-minded on racial matters far from Norwegian soil, but under their own noses, they tended to be different. At the same time, I must say, they were wonderfully straightforward, honest people people. It was almost routine in Norway to learn that a lost wallet was returned to its owner – often a tourist -- with all of its credit cards and money intact. As I told my parents, Norway reminded me of the United States my grandfather used to talk to me about. It was a wonderful place for me to be with two young boys.

Q: Where did they go to school?

HAGERTY: They went to the DOD-sponsored Oslo American School. I lived right on the public transit lines that took them to school. And the house I rented had a basement with a separate apartment, so I had an au pair living there to look after the boys when came home from school. Au pairs were not hard to find, often Danes, Germans, and Dutch who wanted an opportunity to live in an English speaking household. I married a Foreign Service Officer in the embassy consular section while in Norway, and we kept the au pair. It was also a very healthy place for my sons. In the Foreign Service, as you know, you take a physical as you’re getting ready to transfer, and it was at that time that I realized that I didn’t know a pediatrician in Norway because my sons had been healthy for my entire three-year tour. In India, my pediatrician and my physician were people I had come to know very well because there were so many bugs for us to catch.

Q: Was it one of these places where every weekend everybody headed up to the mountains to ski or hike or something like that?

HAGERTY: Yes. In his farewell remarks as he was leaving the country, DCM Ausland said he would always remember Norway because it taught him “what to do with the rest of his day.” Norwegians place a great premium on the ‘rest of the day,” with offices closing down at 3:30 to permit Norwegians to go home for dinner, leaving them lots of time in the rest of the day until retiring, usually after a light supper called “aftens.” During long summer daylight, they spent lots of time outside. My kids skied and skated and built snow forts and traveled up into the country. And they both learned Norwegian, which they sadly forgot after we returned to the U.S.

Q: Well, I think this is probably a good place to stop. We’ll pick this up in ‘73 and whither?

HAGERTY: I went back to Washington, assigned to Politico-Military Affairs (PM).

Q: Politico-Military Bureau (PM), then, in ‘73. And you sort of broke out of South Asia?
Today is August 13, 2001, Herb, and you were in the Politico-Military Affairs Bureau in the Department from ‘73 to when?

HAGERTY: ‘73 to ‘75. Two years.

Q: Could you give a little idea of the structure and how it fitted in at that time; what sort of issues was it manning?

HAGERTY: Assignment to PM was a logical step following to my work in Oslo. There, I had dealt with the Foreign Ministry on both foreign and politico-military matters, the latter including both bilateral US-Norwegian issues and multilateral NATO issues. The offices in the PM Bureau dealt with the regional bureaus in State and with relevant components of DOD and the armed services. One PM office dealt with disarmament issues and related negotiations with the Soviet Union, SALT for instance. Another was responsible for security assistance matters, under legislation that put policy on these matters in the hands of the State Department. Still another dealt with licensing of exports of commercial munitions. Two offices, including the one I was in, had broad day-to-day interaction the OSD on a range of issues. One was the Office of International Security Policy (ISP), monitoring and facilitating the long-term policy link-up of diplomacy and defense issues. The other, of which I became in time the deputy office director, was the Office of International Security Operations (ISO), which was involved daily with the regional bureaus and with OSD and the services on such matters as Navy ship visits, especially nuclear-powered ship visits, abroad, U.S. negotiations for and access to overseas facilities and basing, the maintenance of status of forces agreements, and in general the operation of U.S. military forces in foreign areas. I was initially involved only in Europe, but in my second year I was also became involved in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

Q: Who was the head of PM at that time?

HAGERTY: Leslie Gelb had just succeeded Ron Spiers, and he was followed by George Vest. During my tour, I did a lot of travel, mostly as part of a joint State-Defense team negotiating an extension of the U.S. defense treaty with Spain in 1975, but also to visit and become acquainted with U.S. facilities in Iceland and the Azores, Morocco, and various other places in Europe. With my Department colleagues, my role was to represent the State Department (i.e., foreign policy) interest in any of these negotiations, including the political ties with the country where the troops or the forces were going to be deployed or based, as well as to ensure that our basing and policy concerns in neighboring countries were also taken into account. We also did some of the brokering that involved the security assistance that often was part payment for the base or operating rights we sought.

Q: Let’s talk about a few of them. First, how about Greece? From, I was Consul-General in Athens in ’70 to ’74.
HAGERTY: I visited Athens.

Q: Did you get into the home-porting thing?

HAGERTY: Yes, my office did, and we got into the negotiations to expand our military and naval operations in Crete.

Q: In the home-porting, I mean this was sort of... the embassy didn’t really want a home-porting agreement, but and eventually there wasn’t one, but I mean it was.

HAGERTY: The effort was being made because in part it was very much a function of the limited number of ships that were had. The old World War II fleet had shrunk, and one of the ways in which maximize ship time presence could be optimized in the Sixth Fleet, for instance, was by having ships home-ported there. That was not the Navy’s preference; they preferred other arrangements, but some home-porting had worked out fairly well by reducing transit time to and from CONUS, including the one in Japan.

Q: What about?...It seems like our relations with Portugal are strictly about the Azores; I mean, we seem to be going through perpetual negotiations on the Azores.

HAGERTY: Well, the Azores arrangement goes back to World War II. My father’s half-brother was in the Air Force spent most of the war there in fact, and I had him in mind when I visited the islands with our negotiator on a weekend jaunt from Andrews AFB. Remember that the Portuguese were charter members of NATO, and all of our basing arrangements in the new NATO countries were subsumed within NATO as part of the *quid pro quo* for the American umbrella that was protecting them. We do not need to negotiate for base rights with NATO allies as we did with non-NATO members. The presence of American forces ensured that Americans would die if there was an attack in Western Europe and that essentially certified that America would come in rather than sitting idly by for two or three years as it appeared to do in the late 1930s.

Q: What were some of your toughest negotiations?

HAGERTY: Hard to say. The problem in Portugal, for instance, was that the relatively short period following the end of the Salazar dictatorship, that NATO government had a couple of communist ministers. Henry Kissinger was prepared to cut off the Portuguese from security access for fear that NATO secrets would leak to the Russians as a result. Ambassador Frank Carlucci was quite courageous in standing up to him, and Frank was right. Eventually, we worked it out and when that government was replaced by another, we had lost nothing. The Portuguese remained very sensitive though. During the Seven Days War of 1963, we needed to seek the permission to use the Azores to refuel our non-NATO-related support flights to Israel. The first couple of times we made the request, the Portuguese were unsympathetic. They were concerned about their own access to oil and feared Arab reprisals that would impact their African possessions. Their help was
essential, since our need for the refueling was critical as part of the lifeline of equipment we were flying into Israel.

At one point, armed and fueled tanks that had just been delivered by C-5 aircraft would be in combat within a half an hour of landing. But our major need was for the more numerous, but short-legged, C-141 which was limited by its lack of capacity for aerial refueling. To have used the UK -- had the British permitted -- as an intermediate stop between the US and Israel would have meant unequal legs, limiting their overall load capacity. France, Spain, and others also denied us refueling or overflight rights for the Israel airlift. The Azores was the perfect alternative since both “legs” of the flight -- from the US to the Azores and from there to Israel -- would be roughly the same length. On the third go-round with Lisbon, the US persuaded the Portuguese to let us use it by assuring them regarding oil supplies. Before the short war was over, the USAF flew 23,500 tons of military equipment into Israel. We had no serious problems over our continuing access to the base thereafter.

Q: Well, now were we considering shutting down the Azores or what were we considering doing?

HAGERTY: No, we weren’t considering that because the Azores had other roles. At that time, the Azores was a critical place also for anti-submarine warfare. P-3s patrolled the Atlantic “trench” from Iceland to the Azores back and forth, and that was the area where Soviet missile submarines loitered. I suppose ultimately we could have forced the issue and done it, picking up the pieces with the Portuguese thereafter. But it never got to that point. We could also have made some sort of a deal to fly some of our flights in via the UK, but that route was denied us by overflight restrictions from France, Germany, and Spain. The Department was very much at the heart of our diplomacy on this, and in the period immediately afterwards, I led a one-man desk at the Operations Center task force dealing with all of the aircraft clearances that had to be done as we flew elements of the UNEF that was going to patrol the cease-fire zone. Our C-141s delivered Nepalese soldiers from Kathmandu and Indonesian soldiers from Jakarta and all of that. That meant lots of aircraft clearances, operational problems, and diplomacy, all of which were sort of thing that my office was intended to do.

Q: In your agreements, were we trying to open up any new places or was this mainly a matter of keeping the system going?

HAGERTY: Most of our post World War II overseas bases were in facilities we occupied in Germany, Japan, and Italy after the war. Others, particularly air bases, were originally predicated on short range B-47s that needed fueling stops going into and out of Russia if they were to be ordered to undertake a bombing missing. As B-52s came in, and later as ICBMs followed, not all of these bases were as necessary to support our deterrent forces. There was a continuing evolution of what our true basing needs were overseas, and we were actually cutting back on some bases or renegotiating bases with perhaps a different focus that it had before. Our facilities in Morocco, for instance, which were originally
aimed at providing air base and air facilities, but by the time I was in PM, it was the Moroccan-based communications facilities that were important to us. We closed down the bases.

In Spain, in the last years of the Franco dictatorship, our hope was that when Franco – dies -- he was a pariah in much of Europe and a former friend of Hitler’s -- Spain might somehow find become a member of NATO. So, our negotiations for the ‘75 treaty were predicated on setting the stage for that preserving that bilateral relationship so as to facilitate that next step. Franco did die just before the treaty was finished, and we were successful in getting a treaty that we and Spain were happy with. By the time the treaty came up for its next renewal, Spain was on its way to NATO where it remains today. We’ve since had a Spanish secretary-general of NATO.

Q: What about our base in Ethiopia, the communications facility station in Eritrea?

HAGERTY: That was a tricky situation because of what was going on in Ethiopia at the time. Of course, one thing that we haven’t mentioned is that during this period of time, the U.S. negotiated with the British for a presence in Diego Garcia. One of the great problems that the Navy had in its worldwide communications was the spacing of high frequency (HF) communications facilities around the world for optimal utility. HF needs to bounce in and bounce again and be picked up and repeated and relayed. Eritrea was critical for that. With Diego Garcia in place after 1974, Eritrea – a troubled area in any event – became less critical. Eventually, the place was overrun, and we were forced out. That was after I’d left PM but while I was the Political Advisor at U.S. Naval Forces in Europe in 1977. The search for communication facilities for HF use began to play out once satellite communications became available.

So, the rapid changes in communications and in military needs and capabilities that were underway in the world – Low Frequency (LF) communications, initially longer range aircraft, then IRBMs and ICBMs, and eventually satellite communications -- began to make fundamental changes in the original requirements for overseas facilities and access. W were essentially retrenching overseas, trying to hold things that we still felt we needed for our Cold War posture, while letting go and/or changing the role of others. Where there was a genuine, continuing need, we (the U.S.) were not prepared to give up a facility or operating rights or access. The negotiations were all in that context.

Q: Well, also in that context, correct me, were you all seen the world was getting more hostile really in a way, I mean and these places to put things. I mean it just wasn’t the same game?

HAGERTY: Yes, that was another consideration of course. These facilities had been established in the post-WWII period while the rest of Europe was struggling to recover. No question about it; we had privileges and access that only the world’s strongest power and/or the victor could have commanded. But there were times when even our most faithful allies required that we make adjustments. A contentious issue in the Spanish
negotiations was the policing at the gates of what were legally Spanish bases in which we exercised what amounted to extra-territorial powers. The Spaniards determined that they should no longer have to pass U.S. sentries to get onto a Spanish base. We eventually conceded that, but that concession led to pressures in other places where friendly governments knew that we’d given in on that issue in Spain. A short time later, we all breathed a sigh of relief when it was Spanish police that shot and killed an Arab trying to sneak across the fence at Torrejon AFB. In Spain, our compromise led us to police only the immediate perimeter at the flight line within the base, so as to protect US equipment on the ground. But the base itself, as also other joint-use facilities, was properly dealt with as a host country installation in Spain and in many other overseas locations.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Pentagon and the people who dealt with base agreements and all saying, it’s not your foreign people that you’re dealing with, it’s the Pentagon lawyers you’re dealing with, your worst.

HAGERTY: Not necessarily the Pentagon lawyers; I don’t hold any brief for the State Department lawyers either. I’d rather not deal with lawyers on either side if I can help it because lawyers constantly tell you what you can’t do. They rarely tell you how you can do what you perceive it is necessary to do – not unlike some Admin officers at Foreign Service posts who can cite regulations only about what you can’t do.

In our base negotiations, State often found that pre-negotiations with the Pentagon were more difficult than dealing with a foreign country, largely because there were issues at stake that had an impact as between the military services. A perfect illustration in Spain: the Spaniards wanted new tanks when we were negotiating in 1975. Did the U.S. Army have an interest in Spain? No, the U.S. presence in Spain was Navy and Air Force, so the Army declined to step aside on the M-60 tank production line so as to allocate some for Spain as payment for an Air Force facility? I think we often felt that by the time we were ready to leave Washington on a Saturday night to go for a week’s negotiation in Madrid or wherever else we were going in Europe, we’d had the toughest negotiation just to get out of town and get an agreed U.S. position. And sometimes that meant that the argument had to be pushed up to the senior-most levels in both State and DOD – and occasionally to 1600 Pennsylvania Ave.

Q: What about France?

HAGERTY: Well, France never left NATO; they simply has pulled out of the military structure and its supporting military planning activities.

Q: Were we using French facilities around or not?

HAGERTY: No, we were not using French facilities. But the French quietly cooperated with us on a number of things during the post-DeGaulle period when their actions could be portrayed in bilateral rather than alliance terms, particularly in regards to Germany. As one of the four occupying powers after WW II, they had an occupying zone in Germany.
In the earliest days after DeGaulle pulled out of NATO’s military structure, those French forces still needed to be somehow integrated with the other NATO forces that were there. The French participated in the political level of NATO, as well as at the corps and division level. But they didn’t subscribe to all NATO planning, they didn’t participate in the annual NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire and in NATO maneuvers, and they didn’t make an annual designation/commitment of forces to NATO in the way that all other NATO members did.

**Q:** Did you find that you had to make deals with them about using some facilities from time to time or in contingency?

**HAGERTY:** We just didn’t. We didn't. I mean the main use we made -- bilaterally -- of France was bilateral support of the port calls for the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

**Q:** And overflights?

**HAGERTY:** We didn’t do that much flying over, more like a lot of flying around. That could be a problem at times, as it was during the 1971 Israel airlift.

**Q:** France was sort of a pain in the neck?

**HAGERTY:** Yes. They wanted to be clear about what the mission was of the plane flying over, to be certain it was something that suited their sense of what their interests were or what our joint bilateral interests were. But I think the major problems with the French pull-out of the military structure were in matters of supply to our NATO forces in Western Europe if the balloon went up, and we had to fight a ground war there. Belgium became critical to whole supply effort when we could no longer count on using French pipelines for fuel, instance. The key problem was that there were places there where these changed supply lines might not have been defensible from a determined Soviet effort. Fortunately, that NATO plan never had to be implemented in a ground war in Germany.

**Q:** Did you ever get involved with the Soviets or were they?

**HAGERTY:** No, nothing that I did had anything to do with them, except for a small role in support of negotiations to avoid inadvertent incidents at sea. Most of the PM role was being involved on the disarmament side -- not ISO’s business.

**Q:** This was, to avoid the planes were buzzing each other, they were, the fighter guys on both sides, and I’m talking about destroyer captains as well as the airplanes were getting too aggressive, and we had to cut out that nonsense.

**HAGERTY:** Right, so the Incidents at Sea talks were very productive. At the same time, don’t forget that there was developing a web of confidence -- reinforced by negotiations and by the advent of satellites -- between the U.S. and USSR on conflict-avoidance
issues. We and they had begun to understand that we could talk about issues that were sensitive. We and they were being accustomed to being straight on certain disengagement issues, in our mutual self-interest. This was a very important contribution of the Nixon administration.

**Q:** You were working not strictly but pretty much on the Mediterranean European.

HAGERTY: Yes, I was the Office Deputy Director. Others in the office were dealing with the Far East, and we had an Air Force Officer attached who dealt with Greece.

**Q:** What about Britain and Germany? Did we have problems with them?

HAGERTY: Not really. Britain and Germany were largely dealt with in EUR/RPM. Our problems were principally elsewhere. There were occasional problems with the British because, again, we had a lot more bases from World War II time in England than we came to need over time; there was a constant cut back. There was a problem of whether we would be allowed to stage tankers from one of them, for instance, for non-NATO missions, and that became a *cause célèbre* in England. We had public protests about those tankers, and it was particularly sensitive because the British Defense Secretary was the MP from a constituency where one of our joint-use bases was located. Working things out bilaterally with the British was never that difficult on political or military terms, since our interests were so clearly parallel, if not identical, and we had so many joint things going with them. Diego Garcia was a very important part of that.

**Q:** Were you there when the idea originated?

HAGERTY: Yes.

**Q:** How did that come into being? Somebody is sitting there and looking at a map and saying, what is this?

HAGERTY: Well, it was an outgrowth of our difficulties in supplying Israel in the Six-Day War. There was a perceived need to find a place where it would be possible to stash some equipment and perhaps also to store some ships that could deliver it if this were to come to pass again. We had already worked with the British closely on Diego, following their offer -- as they were getting ready to pull out of some of the islands in the Chagos Archipelago -- to share usage with us of some space that they would retain control of for potential military purposes. For a while, we maintained a relatively small radio team there on Diego Garcia. But a new proposal for usage appears to have come directly from Mr. Kissinger in 1974 and was discussed first by him at lunch with the British Naval Attaché in Washington. Before we knew it, we were engaged in negotiations with the British about it. The State Department wasn’t keen on the project, but it was Kissinger’s driving force that pushed it through. Eventually there was an agreement which allowed us to dredge the harbor in Diego Garcia for storing ships and to build a good runway there on the coral, which easily supported weight of a B-52 or C-5, so long as it was wide enough.
And we did. We now have an air base there that we and they use. It is a British base, but we’ve used it for flights going across the Indian Ocean. The harbor eventually was dredged out sufficiently to permit an aircraft carrier to turn within its confines. And ships were mothballed there, that is, freighters with mothballed equipment that would be made available to the Israelis if we had to go in again. And, don’t forget this was also at a time when we were concerned about a new threat of a putative Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, courtesy of their activities not just in Egypt but also at Socotra, Aden and at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. They were also thought to have eyes on Gan Atoll in the Maldives.

Q: Well, you were doing this at a time when South Vietnam collapsed? How did that affect you all? I mean was it sort of psychological or was it more than that?

HAGERTY: Yes. It’s interesting you should say that because so much of what we’ve been talking about had nothing to do with Vietnam. Much of what was going on with regard to Vietnam was not a factor that my office in PM had anything to do with, beyond our basing concerns in Thailand and the Philippines. Once the fighting war was underway, it was more a DOD operation and a preoccupation of the East Asia Bureau and of the Seventh Floor Executive Suite.

Q: I was just thinking, you know, you’re dealing with equipment and all and you watch all this equipment fall into the hands of the North. It must have made one pause.

HAGERTY: Yes, but what I’m saying is, I think we were all shocked -- and many of us relieved -- that it was over. My feeling about people in the Foreign Service was that we were in many ways among the last Americans to decide that maybe we were in the wrong place at the wrong time fighting the wrong battle and that was partly because so many of us had had to defend what we were doing in Vietnam in so many other places in the world where it was an unpopular thing to do. So, it was only when I came back to the United States in 1973 and was in Washington for the three years thereafter that I really had a sense of the revolution that was going on in the United States, too, not just the civil rights revolution, but the Vietnam revolution and what popular feeling was here. Only then did I become persuaded by it and of it in my own right.

Q: What about disassembling our presence in Morocco? Sometimes this is more trouble than setting something up?

HAGERTY: Yes, I think so. Eventually that went by the board as well. Communications satellites had taken all of that over so it never really was a problem, but we had already stopped using the bases in Morocco. The same things were true in the bases we were negotiating in Spain; one of the four major bases we were negotiating to retain was one to which we simply reserved access in case of need. It would have been extremely important if we’d had to launch SAC aircraft against the Soviet Union, but Rota’ value in support of our naval presence in the Med and of our SSBN fleet loomed larger as time passed.
Q: Back to Diego Garcia, this was really predicated on Israel at that time? I mean, this is what you were thinking about; you weren’t thinking about a Gulf war?

HAGERTY: Yes to the first and no to the second.

Q: I mean the Soviets were messing around, but Iran was on our side and....

HAGERTY: What you have to reckon is that Indian Ocean distances made even the question of Israel sort of strange because Diego Garcia is just as far from Israel as Dover Delaware is. So, we weren’t getting any closer. What we were doing, however, was positioning so that we— as the premier maritime power in the world -- would have things already earmarked that could be moved quickly without having to assemble them, load them, and then send them. So, that was an important consideration, but yes, the defense of Israel was the principal thing that led to our expanded presence there.

Then other things were associated with it, including our concerns about Soviet submarines in the Indian Ocean and our concerns about the Gulf. I mean, we never stopped caring about the Gulf, but we already had a long-established naval presence in Bahrain in the form of the Commander, Middle East Force, with a ship that was eventually home ported there, four destroyers assigned, and a staff on the ground. So we tended to focus on that and our access to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and to Oman.

Q: What about Massawa in Kenya?

HAGERTY: Well, it has always been one of the better harbors for liberty for our ships, and as we built up an Indian Ocean squadron of our own, Massawa and Djibouti both became much more important places for us for port calls and for airfield access for P-3 ASW aircraft.

Q: These were submarine hunting planes?

HAGERTY: Yes, yes. Basically they’d land, refuel, and leave -- essentially in transit -- but they wouldn’t base there. They might fly several days of flights that would be box-like or trapezoidal, flying from A to B, and then on to C and/or D, rather than simply returning directly to A, so our agreements truly covered transit, not unlike a ship visit.

Q: How about ship visits?, Were we having problems putting our sailors ashore in places say like Turkey or something, civil unrest and that sort of thing?

HAGERTY: No, that wasn’t a problem. Our problem with the ship visits in some places tended to involves one or two things. First, nuclear-powered ships often caused concern at the port and on our account as well. The Atomic Energy Act laid down conditions in which we had to be certain of facilities of our own before we could even consider putting in a ship that was under nuclear power. That was a bugaboo with lots of foreign countries, and with many of them, we could never obtain agreement to our conditions. The other
consideration for some foreign ports was the question of the presence of nuclear weapons on board a ship. We neither confirm nor deny their presence, and obviously we wouldn’t visit if this policy was not acceptable to the host nation.

Q: Well, then you left there in ’75.

HAGERTY: ’75. I attended to the National War College at Fort McNair for a year.

Q: How did you find that year, ’75 to ’76?

HAGERTY: Great! It was just a terrific year and it coincided with the 200th anniversary year of the U.S. My class of 1976 numbered 145 officers, roughly one quarter civilians, one-quarter Army, one-quarter Air Force, and one quarter “sea services,” which was Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. I’m still in touch with many of them -- several of them four star generals, including then-Colonel Colin Powell. It was a great year off and an opportunity to test out with my military classmates a lot of the things that I’d been dealing with for two years or longer. Don’t forget also that this was 1975. Almost every military officer who came to the class that year had Vietnam experience. So, they were all working their way through that whole humbling experience of ours. It was quite interesting because quite often the hawks in the class were the civilians when we’d do politico-military simulations. The military guys were by no means hawkish. What was to become known as the “Powell Doctrine” Colin later enunciated was evolving at that point. It was clear that the military officers were smarting from what had happened in Vietnam. They were not in any great hurry to undertake military actions without an end game in sight. It was a very important year for me and them.

Q: Did you find that were they holding the State Department responsible for getting involved?

HAGERTY: No, I think they held the politicians responsible. I don’t think that the State Department suffered in their eyes. What I did manage to do there though, and what was personally enriching for me, was to affiliate with the Strategic Studies Group for my big paper. That resulted in my publishing a monograph on the history of US military basing in the post-World War II period, for which I got good ‘vibes’ from the Joint Staff and others around Washington. So, it enabled me to take what I had been doing and spend some time researching the history of how we got there. It was a great pleasure for me to do that.

Q: Well, then ’76 whither?

HAGERTY: I was assigned as the Political Advisor to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR).

Q: Okay, now where is that located?

HAGERTY: In London at that time.
Q: Who was the USCINCEUR at the time?

HAGERTY: The USCINCEUR (Commander-in-Chief, Europe) was General Al Haig, who was concurrently SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) when he wore his NATO hat. My boss -- CINCUSNAVEUR, (sometimes referred to in the Navy as ‘SINK US NEVER’) -- was Admiral Dave Bagley. As Haig’s U.S. Navy component commander, he reported directly to Haig and commanded all U.S. Navy forces in Europe (including the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf). It was a busy command, and he had heavy responsibilities, including the maintenance of close ties with the British, our hosts. We worked in a headquarters building in London that had been Eisenhower’s headquarters during World War II. NAVEUR, as the command was called, was special in that it had no NATO association or role. If a NATO Alert required commitment of NAVEUR’s forces to NATO, they were to become subordinate to a NATO command, CINCSOUTH (another U.S. Navy four-star), in Naples. At that point, NAVEUR would have become USCOMEASTLANT with important responsibilities for maintaining the Atlantic lifeline to Great Britain and Europe.

Q: So what did you do?

HAGERTY: Well, I asked the Admiral, “What is it precisely that you want me to do?” He was frank to say that he wanted me to keep him “out of trouble.” Then we talked about what that meant, and clearly what was important was that he wanted to make sure that he had on his staff somebody who’d give him sound and up-to-date counsel and advice on the political aspects of the military problems that he was dealing. I also traveled with him wherever he went, and I would organize our embassy meetings if there were to be any.

My experience as a POLAD led me to believe also that senior military commanders in Europe always sought to ensure that politico-military problems in the Command area were resolved in Europe, rather than allowing them to bounce into the Washington arena with results uncertain. They’d rather work the issues out with embassies, assisted by a POLAD, on their side of the Atlantic. So this was a part of my standard marching orders, and I worked closely with the POLADs at the other commands to carry it out when necessary. We had a very important set of relationships in Europe, and working the politics of it was critically important to whatever we did in military terms. Once, in the space of three weeks, I traveled with the CINC to the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and the Turkish Straits. I recall kidding him as we were coming back from the trip saying, “I wonder what the Russians make of your visits to these Straits that area so for them.” We laughed about it because although he was doing this with no specific agenda in mind, it was that kind of consideration that he and I talked about.

The other thing that was important was the role I played within the Headquarters. I occasionally I helped staff officers understand orders they had just received, sometimes
through several levels of command, from the morning meeting by recounting how the subject arose and precisely what the CINC might have said. Their awareness of my previous naval service also helped in this. The CINC sought my advice directly on issues before him for decision. But he also made it clear that his staff to consult with me at the lieutenant commander level so that when he got their recommendation, it might already have had my input. He said that I could present to him whatever considerations I thought appropriate, but he wanted them presented to him when he had already had the best naval and military advice he could get from his staff. And he was right.

Q: I mean it really is. He was able to deal with the raw stuff rather than.

HAGERTY: That's right; he was gruff but politically sensitive. Most political considerations I would raise with him were not new to him. Very often my point would be to sort out what I thought was the most relevant one to his problem and how we might best deal with it. But, I think the advice I got from my immediate predecessor, Don Gelber, was that you have to remember that these Navy guys that you are working with have very serious and important problems to deal with, and whatever you do with them, you should always appreciate the seriousness of their jobs. What they look to you to do is figure out ways that they can do it better. I did. I had a very good relationship with the staff. In most cases, the POLAD also has a special relationship with the CINC because, with the doors closed, the POLAD can say things to the CINC that nobody in uniform on the staff would likely say to him. I mean I could close the door and say, “Admiral, I think you’re wrong.” He’d say, “Why the hell do you believe that?” And I’d say, “Well, this is why” and I’d tell him. He’d listen to it, and I always had the feeling that I had an open mind. Also our travel together provided lots of “face” time for less formal conversations.

Q: How about in dealing with this, in running through some of the people, on the naval side, the French navy was pretty cooperative with us?

HAGERTY: Oh, yes, very much so.

Q: I was the Consul General in Naples from '79 to '81, and Admiral Crowe was the CINC there and was saying, “Well, you know, the French are in a way far better melded in certainly than the Greeks and the Turks.”

HAGERTY: Oh, yes, of course. Those were terribly frustrating command arrangements that we had to deal with in the Eastern Mediterranean whenever Greeks and Turks were involved.

Q: Well, tell me now, what did you do, just as far as the Greeks and the Turks are concerned? Was this a major sort of hot potato that you had to deal with? Did you kind of say, “Oh, let’s just forget the Eastern Mediterranean because of them?”

HAGERTY: No, not really. It just meant that more attention had to be paid to the minutest national sensitivities, particularly in terms of the command structures in the
Eastern Mediterranean. Greeks and Turks would not work for each other, but they somehow or other could work together under a common superior. I suppose it’s just as well at the height of the Cold War that NATO never had to fight a war in the Eastern Mediterranean, because I don’t know how it could have worked command arrangements that existed. I assume would have been surmounted under combat conditions, just as they were among the Allies all through WWII.

Remember though, that the Sixth Fleet, including ballistic missile submarines based in Sardinia, was the NATO nuclear force in the Mediterranean. This kept the nuclear side of things totally in U.S. hands. My assumption was always that if we’d ever gone to war with the Russians, even a NATO war, and found our NATO allies lacking or missing the boat, we would have done what we felt we had to do. I think that was probably understood, although never acknowledged by many of our NATO allies.

_Q: What about places like Sweden and the Baltic, I mean was this outside our purview?_

HAGERTY: Pretty much. We didn’t send ships into the Baltic as far as I know, although we might occasionally send a warship in to pay a port call at one of the German or Danish ports. We didn’t accept that the Baltic was a Russian lake, but in fact we didn’t go in and challenge particularly. The same thing for the Black Sea into which we occasionally would send in a ship, in exercise of our rights under the Montreux Convention that controls passage through the Turkish Straits.

_Q: What were the Soviets up to? You were there from ‘76 to ‘78?_

HAGERTY: No, I was there for just nineteen months. I finished the War College in summer 1976 and was in London until the fall of 1977.

_Q: What were the Soviets up to? I mean was there a lot of submarine activity challenges, that sort of thing?_

HAGERTY: Submarine activity was always an issue. The POLAD tended to be kept out of an awful lot of the purely military stuff. I would sit in the morning brief -- known as “The Line-up” -- but then the CINC would go to his N2 for a more sensitive brief that included things that I had no need to know. The Command didn’t have operational forces out there dealing with the Russians in the Atlantic itself. That was mostly CINCLANT’s business. US Navy aircraft, personnel, and ships crossing the Atlantic to Europe came under our command once they had “chopped” to one of our subordinate commands, like the Sixth Fleet. Obviously the Russians were very much on the CINC’s mind and what drew the Command’s attention were Soviet activities.

_Q: Well, then late ‘77 you were off to where?_

HAGERTY: I went off from there I was sent off to Pakistan as Political Counselor.
Q: You were in Pakistan from what?

HAGERTY: I was there for four years.

Q: Four years. Interesting four years?

HAGERTY: From ‘77 to ‘81, on direct assignment from London.

Q: Why a direct assignment?

HAGERTY: Well, this was the time of a new administration coming in Washington, and the Political Counselor in New Delhi was being brought back to head up Policy Planning at State. Howie Shaffer, who was Political Counselor in Islamabad, was being moved over to Delhi, and that created a vacancy in Islamabad. I was of the right rank and had the South Asia background, so this allowed me to return to South Asia after a preoccupation in political military affairs and European affairs for almost seven years. I looked forward to dealing with South Asia problems from a different capital than Delhi.

Q: In ‘77, what was the situation in Pakistan?

HAGERTY: Pakistan had just had a military coup, ousting Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto, who had been running the place as if it was his own private fiefdom. We were increasingly moving toward concern about Pakistan’s apparent fascination with the idea of -- “an Islamic bomb,” a phrase of art that Mr. Bhutto had coined as he sucked up to the Arabs and the Iranians for financial resources.

The U.S. military supply relationship had never been fully resumed after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 war. We permitted the cash sale of spare parts and that sort of thing, but the heyday of our military supply relationship had been over for some time. Pakistan had a military establishment that included French tanks and airplanes, Chinese gunboats and airplanes, and old American armor, artillery, and aircraft, but their military establishment had increasingly aged equipment, F-86s for instance. We were headed for hard days with Pakistan. Bhutto had just been overthrown by General Mohammed Zia al-Haq, the army chief, who exercised power as Chief Martial Law Administrator under the existing, figurehead President. In his first weeks, he had said he would restore representative government, promising elections in 90 days. But after 90 days had passed, he said that he had found a bigger mess than he thought it was when he made his earlier commitment. So he continued in power for all my time there, promising elections – at some point. Our relationship with Pakistan continued to decline, particularly as the nuclear question began to be much more on the front burner from our point of view.

Q: Who was our ambassador when you were there?

HAGERTY: Art Hummel, who became the U.S. ambassador earlier that year. Art and I worked there for the whole of my tour.
Q: Did you, you know, looking at this from the opposite side, did you see a warming of our relationship with India reach to a degree compared... I mean?

HAGERTY: Well, there was a slight warming, but both of the countries tend to look at it their relationship with the U.S. in zero-sum terms. If one is up, the other must be down. That wasn’t really the case. We didn’t have better relations with India because our relationship with Pakistan was declining but rather because India’s relations with China were bad and because we competed with the Soviets for influence in India. But to tell the truth, we weren’t paying a lot of attention to South Asia at the time. We had other fish to fry, and we were frying them in other parts of the world.

Q: Well, things were beginning to unravel in Iran by the time you arrived, am I right? Were you looking over your shoulder at that or was that just another country?

HAGERTY: Well, it had threatened to unravel so many times that I think there was at least a feeling that somehow, some way, the Shah would survive it all. But he seemed to be using up his nine lives, and the situation in Teheran was unraveling. Meanwhile, before he had been deposed, Bhutto had taken Pakistan out of the British and had sought a better set of relationships with the Islamic and Arab world to the west. So there were lots of considerations in terms of those relationships. US-Pakistan relations were fast becoming testy on human rights, democracy, and nuclear issues. Some people lamented the death of our former alliance, but others were quite happy that it had come to pass.

Zia meanwhile brought Mr. Bhutto to trial for conspiracy to murder a political rival. And after an extended trial and appeal, Bhutto was found guilty based on evidence from a state’s witness. The Supreme Court subsequently decided 4-3 in favor of hanging, which in Pakistan is the only penalty provided for capital murder. So he was hanged. It was about this time that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship began to unravel faster on the nuclear issue.

Q: Well, were we sort of trying to do something about the trial of Bhutto although he was not our friend?

HAGERTY: Not our friend by any means, but we and the rest of the world pleaded for clemency, including the Chinese deputy foreign minister who was in country. But Zia never reversed a capital verdict, and so Bhutto was hanged in rural Sind in the middle of the night. We had thought that the Chinese pitch would be the strongest because the Chinese had had a close relationship with Pakistan in the pentagonal rivalries that set the Russians and the Chinese at odds re both India and Pakistan, the Chinese at odds with us and the Brits re India, and, of course, the Paks and the Indians at odds with each other most of the time. So, anytime our relationship with Pakistan went down a bit, the Chinese, who were anti-Indian, would take advantage of it. In April 1979, not only was Bhutto killed, but entirely separate from that we suspended all our aid and virtually withdrew our USAID mission under legislation triggered by Pakistan’s evident pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.
Q: I want to come to that, but before we do that, how did you find...? I mean here you were Political Counselor, and your job is to go out, you know, to have close contacts with the government and with the parties and all that, and there were no parties to play with were there?

HAGERTY: I saw all the main party leaders. They were there. I mean, a leftover from British rule in South Asia is something called Section 144 of the Pakistani (and Indian) Penal Code that allows the government to proscribe an assembly of five or more people. So they couldn’t hold party meetings, big party meetings, but they would meet each other at social events, weddings, and other socially acceptable, non-partisan gatherings. On a one-on-one basis, nearly all the party leaders I wanted to see were accessible to me in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Islamabad. And I am certain the police took note.

Q: Were the party leaders saying, well this too will pass?

HAGERTY: It’s interesting, you know, they chaffed under martial law, but they had all suffered even more under Bhutto’s harsh “emergency” rule. By comparison, Zia’s martial law was often described as “a mailed fist with velvet glove.” Bhutto hadn’t been thrown out of office by the army. Under Bhutto, law and order broke down in the spring of 1977, and in Bhutto’s final days of power, the army moved in to end the chaos. Bhutto had been capricious with all of these party leaders, jailing and/or harassing large numbers of them with little reason, so while they lamented the restrictions of martial law, few were sorry that Bhutto had been deposed. Most wouldn’t say that publicly, even though separately and privately many condemned the way he was treated thereafter.

But in fact, I had no trouble talking to them, and in time, many of them made their own accommodation with the martial law authorities. In fact, the army presence was felt and visible only at the top. Zia eventually assumed added the ceremonial presidency to his offices of Chief of Army Staff and Chief Martial Law Administrator, observing bluntly that the additional function would take “only 20 minutes more of his time each day.” Pakistan’s four provinces, civilian governors were replaced by Army lieutenant generals, who were already the local corps commanders. Beneath them, normal civil administration, courts, and police, the face of government to most Pakistanis all the way down to the District and Tehsil, continued. Military courts dealt only with explicitly martial law offenses. In time representative institutions began to be developed at the very local level. Politicians, who appeared content to bide their time on the assumption that eventually they’d come back, often found themselves consulted by government. And in his last years, in fact, Zia was gradually moving toward a restoration of party democracy. He appointed a civilian prime minister, civilian chief ministers governed the provinces, and there were legislatures at the center and in the provinces, elected on a non-party basis but in many ways reflecting the arrival of younger politicians in the system.

Q: Well, before the embassy was attacked, were you able to have... you and the ambassador... many dealings with Zia and the military government?
HAGERTY: Oh, yes, absolutely. The ambassador had a good, somewhat naturally formal, relationship with Zia. I came knew him, too. When Hummel would see Zia, he usually took Peter Constable, his DCM, with him. But when he met most other senior government ministers or officials, I went with him as note-taker and was often encouraged to participate in the talks.

Q: Well, other than our making protests about nuclear activities or the treatment of Bhutto, what did we have to talk about?

HAGERTY: Well, we kept up a fairly steady drumbeat on the human rights issue. We did a pretty heavy reporting volume on what Pakistan was doing with regard to other countries, especially India, Iran, and the region. We were talking at all levels of the government about that. We managed, but without much bilateral content, until the time that the Russians invaded Afghanistan. But even before that, for instance, after the king had been deposed, our concerns in the region, both in Iran and Afghanistan led us to have a pretty steady dialogue with the government about what was going on in the region and elsewhere. Our concerns - and Pakistan’s -- were about what the communist leadership in Afghanistan was doing well before the Soviet army moved in, but then, you know, all this took place in the same year. We’re talking about 1979.

Q: Oh, yes. The King had been replaced in 1978. Then in ‘79 was a real change as the Russians moved in to save a Communist government in Kabul that had replaced the monarchy.

HAGERTY: Yes. Prime Minister Daud, the king’s cousin took over as president and then was himself killed himself by local communists who took over; and then they fought among themselves. Bang! Bang! Bang! The Shah was, of course, done in Iran before that, but then on the 4th of November 1979, the embassy hostages are taken in Tehran. And seventeen days later, a wave of anti-Western violence swept the whole Islamic world that we were caught up in.

Q: Well, let’s talk about that now. The Shah, I mean the hostages are taken. This is in November I guess it is. I suppose the general feeling was, well, this has happened before and they’ll be let out and all that.

HAGERTY: It was the 4th of November. Yes, there had been an earlier attack on the Teheran embassy. I think there was an assumption that this would be short-lived too, but there was an almost frenzy across the Islamic world, something the NSC Adviser termed a “Crescent of Crisis,” a nice turn of phrase actually. It was a ferment that was caused by what had happened in Iran; it just shook up all of the givens.

Q: Was your political section getting indications of this earthquake that was coming about in Pakistan?
HAGERTY: Our relationship with the government was on a serious downturn, and we were constantly aware of a greater sense of militancy. And of course, Zia himself was talking in more fundamentalist and militant terms, having determined that Pakistan’s problems were caused because it was not Islamic enough. The people and their rulers had not been faithful to Pakistan’s establishment as an “Islamic Republic.” That was the sort of mood that was underway, and so he was imposing much more of an Islamic code on the system. More conservative dress was being pushed for men and women. The Foreign Ministry gave up wearing suits and ties; they took to wearing much more traditional garb. And that multiplied throughout the society, so we were getting a much more aggressively Islamic attitudes and sentiment being expressed.

Q: Well, let’s talk about where you were and what happened?

HAGERTY: Well, on the morning of the 21st of November, when the Islamabad embassy and other posts in Pakistan and elsewhere in the Islamic world were attacked, the Voice of America had carried the disturbing news that the Kabah, the most holy Islamic place in Mecca had been attacked by unknown miscreants. The immediately second item of news was a White House statement that the U.S. would not rule out the use of force to get back the hostages in Iran. So these back-to-back news stories on VOA became back-to-back news stories in the Pakistani press as well. The strong suggestion was that somehow they were related, that White House statement about getting back the hostages and the attack Kabah were connected -- that the U.S. was either involved with what was going on at the Kabah, or that the Israelis were, or that we and the Israelis were -- whatever.

By late morning, things grew pretty tense in Islamabad. We suddenly had indications of a crowd forming, an angry crowd at the university nearby; by about 11:30 we had a demonstration out front of I would guess 1,000 or 1,500 students. They presented a petition. Officers went out and got the petition from them and told them that they’d make sure that the crowd’s concerns about what was going on in Mecca would be brought to Washington’s attention…the usual. The crowd started back to the university, and we breathed a sigh of relief. We had been concerned for several weeks at the possibility of violence because the Iranian embassy, with us in the diplomatic enclave, had been the scene of nightly bonfire rallies urging Pakistani students in Islamabad to do what the Iranian students had done in Teheran.

I no sooner was on the phone to the Australian ambassador to let him know that the crowd was moving back to the university and would be passing his embassy en route when he called back to me and said, “Well, yes they passed, but there’s a much larger crowd headed your way in busses.” We had about a ten-minute warning on that, and before long we had a crowd at our gates screaming, throwing stones and trying to break down our gates, which had been closed. Soon shots were fired from the crowd, which we later understood reached about 10,000 as more came from Rawalpindi. And we then put out E&E plan into effect, which called for all personnel in the building to move to the second floor vaulted area.
Q: Had the embassy been reduced prior to this because of the situation in the Middle East?

HAGERTY: No, not the embassy, but the USAID Mission almost fully withdrawn earlier in the year. Its reduced staff of a half-dozen was a building a mile away that they shared with the UN. They were just sort of turning over the clock. But the embassy remained at full strength, so when it was attacked and we retired for safety to the vault, we numbered 137 or so, 50 Americans and 87 Pakistanis, not counting others who were on leave, at the American Club, or otherwise occupied. We had exercised that drill previously, and we had also held meetings with the resident American community in the embassy auditorium to calm their fears and try to what we were doing and what we were talking to the government about. At all of these we expressed the confidence we actually felt—obviously misplaced, in view of events—of being able to count on the government of Pakistan to live up to its assurances and to its international obligation to protect us.

Q: Well, I assume when you heard the mob was coming were we calling on the Pakistan authorities?

HAGERTY: Absolutely. We were in touch with every level of the government. The ambassador, who was a mile away at lunch in his residence, was in touch with the Zia’s office and the foreign minister by phone. The DCM was also at home at lunch. This was the routine. The only reason I wasn’t home for lunch was that I was planning lunch at the Embassy with the *Time Magazine* correspondent, who had just arrived from Delhi. At the time the first crowd came, I had told her to go to the cafeteria and just wait for me until we dispose of this demonstration. She eventually spent the entire afternoon with us in the vault.

Q: What were you hearing from them?

HAGERTY: Well, as it played back to us, what we were hearing from them was virtual disbelief that this crowd -- that a crowd of this size -- had formed at our gates. You know a rush hour traffic jam in Islamabad in those days was five or six cars. Islamabad wasn’t a highly populous area. We could normally look out windows and see women washing clothes in a stream or cows wandering across a field. I mean it was that kind of rural atmosphere. So the notion of a determined crowd of 10,000 suddenly appearing was hard to accept. And of course we could not see them. The Pakistanis had increased their police in the area at our request earlier, and in fact there was a contingent of 24 armed police officers on our compound. But, they were overwhelmed, afraid or reluctant to use their weapons to face down the mob.

Q: Well, who were these people? Where did they get them?

HAGERTY: They were mainly students, at least at first. They were young...those that I could see from my office before I went into the vault. They were a young crowd, shouting, chanting. They eventually broke through the main gate by putting a barricade up
against the brick pillar and knocking it over. There were shots fired from there. Shots came into the Embassy and window glass broke in the political section. A young Marine on the roof took a bullet, a crease; he’s the one who later died in the vault. Suddenly all hell was breaking loose. We didn’t have all of our Marines present. There were several of them off at other places at the time. The Marines couldn’t have done anything anyway. The Marines would have been authorized to shoot to protect their own lives if necessary and to protect the lives of Americans, if in fact there was that kind of threat, but we were very far away from that point of decision.

Q: You all went into the vault.

HAGERTY: We went into the vault and bolted the door.

Q: What’s the theory, that if you go into the vault, help will arrive, I mean what?

HAGERTY: Yes. We could withstand them. Essentially give them the building. Stay in this secure area. We were confident that help would arrive with the Ambassador on the outside and the phones working. We were talking to the Ambassador on the phone, talking to the DCM on the phone; I was talking to the foreign ministry, but help didn’t arrive.

Q: Well, did the Pakistan government have, I mean the police…Others must have been telling that it was happening. Were there troops nearby?

HAGERTY: No, there were no troops nearby. There was a brigade of troops -- 1500 or more soldiers -- in Rawalpindi where they had been on a parade-drill that morning, but that was 20 miles away. They had just been dismissed at the end of the drill, making their way back to their barracks on their own. They were not marching back, so they were essentially not recallable and never did turn up in Islamabad. A battalion numbering several hundred turned up just about the time that we finally got out of the burning building at 6:30 PM.

Q: Well, what happened to you all?

HAGERTY: Well, there we were. People were sitting on the floor. The building outside our vaulted door had been filled with tear gas by the Marines. The chancery had both front and rear entrances, and in response to attacks on other U.S. missions elsewhere in the world earlier that decade, the front entrance had been made impregnable. Plans called for the back entrance and the cafeteria windows to be made impregnable by the end of 1979, but that’s where the rioters came in. We decided to order the Marine at the post near the back entrance, to come to the vault, but it was dicey. I got instructed him by phone to try to join us (His only alternative would have been to exit through the door, where he might have been torn apart. So, he agreed, and I recall hearing one determined shout on the radio that sounded like, “Up against the wall, you…” He had on a gas mask
and had a shotgun in his hands to protect himself, if necessary, and no rioter attempted to stop him. And we happily we opened the vault to let him in.

From there onward, we spent our time talking with the outside by phone and radio. We learned that there were problems at the American International School, two miles away and tried to learn more about that. Later there was a bit of a riot there, too, and we all worried about our kids. The day just dragged on and on. Then about 3:00 in the afternoon, we heard a helicopter passing overhead, and we all hoped that meant rescue might be at hand. We had already checked the blood types of various people in the vault and had two volunteers ready to go with the wounded Marine if we could get him air evacuated off the roof. The helicopter was an army helicopter that apparently was just there for observation and wasn’t prepared to try to land. We were then aware also that there were rioters on the roof, and they were working on the hatch above our heads that was going to be our escape hatch if we ever got out of there. We could hear them pounding on it. They were also firing shots into the air vents so we could hear bullets whizzing through the ventilating system.

That noise was compounded by the fact that we were breaking up commo equipment in the other part of the vault. There was a lot of sledge hammering going on there. Then we began to get a lot of smoke, so we realized the building was on fire. The nearby British Embassy told us by phone they could see that the building had been set on fire. We got a lot of tear gas as well. We had one air conditioner working in one room of the vault that continued to work throughout, so we took turns rotating people in by that air condition to get some fresh air, but for the rest of the time, we breathed through wet paper towels, most of us sitting on the floor, trying to do what we could to keep people from panicking, and at the same time making sure that the people outside knew that our condition was increasingly perilous.

Meanwhile, despite the nurse’s efforts, the young wounded Marine with us had died in another small enclave of the vault. Those of us in charge kept news this from being known by the others at that time, and in view of later developments that was a wise decision.

A little later in the day, the floor began to be pretty hot. The temperature inside was rising because the fire was beneath us, and this was after all a vault. The carpet began to smolder in the corner, at which point one of our very youngest and a young female FSN was just beginning to wail...you could just hear her. It was going to be the start of a huge panic for her. Almost at the same moment, another FSN, a most grandfatherly gentleman, the only guy in the room who could have done it, went over to her, put his arm around her, soothed her, and she stopped. Luckily, there was no other sign of panic at all.

The person who reported the smoking carpet was my secretary who was sitting over there, and I just motioned to her to come away from the corner and go find another place to sit. But it was an endless afternoon. We went in at 12:30 on beautiful Pakistani sunny fall day. I had gone to work in a tweed jacket. It was that cool that morning. I left the jacket in
my office, and I learned the next day that it burned up with everything else in my office. The day dragged on. We had lost our capacity to communicate by cable after about an hour into the vault, and later the phones went out, leaving us with just our emergency two-way radio on a circuit with the British Embassy, the Canadians, the school, the Ambassador’s residence, and the DCM residence. The DCM had taken up station by that time at the Foreign Ministry at Ambassador Hummel’s request, so that he could be putting his pressure there. Hummel, of course, was on the phone to Washington, to Zia, and to others in the Pakistan Government.

Q: Okay, we got you in the vault. I mean what happened?

HAGERTY: It was getting hotter and hotter, but the November daylight was also fading. Eventually we got word from the Canadians -- a Canadian residence compound nearby that the crowd was thinning and those on our roof were gone. We could tell also since that there weren’t any noises on the roof. The temperature dropped suddenly as it does in November in Islamabad, often into the 40s. But our eyes were blinded still. All we had was what other people could tell us. Our Admin Counselor and I -- we were the two senior officers in the vault -- we agreed to send an armed group up to the roof by a route that the rioters hadn’t known of. So, our “Gunny” led an armed group including two other Marines with shotguns, an Army major, an Army captain, both under the Gunny’s command, plus one embassy officer who’d been a Marine officer and who was also armed, and one FSN, for Urdu and Punjabi language capability. All were volunteers. As they got to the roof, they saw the last of the rioters climbing down. The crowd was smaller on the outside. The building was just smoke all over, smoke everywhere. So, they cleared the roof and established themselves in control. When the rioters realized they had not been able to force the hatch open, it was clear that they had attempted to jam it, so we wouldn’t be able to get out. We’d had four Marines or other people sitting on the floor of the corners of the small room directly under the hatch all day in anticipation that the hatch might go, and they had shotguns pointed up so there would have been bloodshed had the hatch gone. We lucked out on that. It took a little extra effort to get the hatch opened from the inside, but when finally opened, we could begin to exit. There was so much smoke and so much tear gas that we had to go through a hall where it was thick in order to get to the ladder. We did it five people at a time so that we didn’t have a lot of people just standing there. We sent first the Pakistani women, then the American women, then the Pakistani men, and finally the American men, with our consular officer organizing this line-up and with the Admin Counselor and I part of the last five to climb out. Of course, it was wonderful to be out. There was a clear sky, and I could see the stars. But then I looked around the roof edge and could see nothing but flames. The good news is, I’m out in fresh air, but the bad news is how the hell am I going to get off here?

Well, the “Gunny” and our Pakistani employees had scouted the roof and found that there was a place with a drop of about ten feet down to the roof of our auditorium. At this point, fire trucks were pulling up to the building, and Pakistani troops were just moving into the compound. Suddenly the whole complexion of the compound changed, and we felt it was safe then to go down. Several of the Pakistani FSNs, the men, who had stayed
on the roof until all the Americans were out of the vault, jumped down to this secondary roof of the auditorium. After that their colleagues on the roof dropped individuals who were then caught by those below. I found myself lifted, dropped, and caught by burly Pakistani FSNs.

Others found their way to the ladders that the rioters had used, and we all climbed down to the ground. I was one of the last down the ladder, at which point I was met by the Director General for U.S. affairs in the Foreign Ministry, who wanted to take me to the ministry so I could fill them in on what was going on. I was prepared to go with him, and I had been told to do so by the ambassador. But we were all standing at the bottom of the ladder, and we were just sort of in a state of shock to be out of this whole thing and then the “Gunny” said, “Well, I’m not going to leave my dead Marine in there.” So he climbed the ladder and went back into the hole, got the dead Marine over his shoulder in a fireman’s carry, and carried him out -- the dead Marine still dripping blood. Most of us who were holding the ladder broke into tears at this point, terribly moved by this episode.

**Q: On the Marine, was it a head wound that did it for him?**

HAGERTY: Yes, well, he died of principally of shock and possibly loss of blood, but I think it was shock more than anything else. If he’d had prompt medical attention, he would have been saved. It was particularly sad. He was out youngest Marine, very popular. As you know, how Marines are in diplomatic posts. Everybody knew he was the young one, a friendly kid from Long Island.

So, I went to the Foreign Ministry where I was introduced to a Brigadier who had just arrived with the troop from Rawalpindi. I spent time with several senior Joint Secretaries, talking about what had happened and what was happening. Even though the Foreign Ministry was virtually in sight of this, there was still sense of disbelief on their faces. Whoever heard of a crowd like this in Islamabad, et cetera. But I did find the brigadier attentive and spent 20 minutes with him going over on a city map where our people lived because he was going to make sure the troops patrolled those areas in the night. We were concerned about the kids also at the school. There a halfhearted mob attack had been repulsed by some very courageous people with broomsticks. I had a son there, a high school senior. But something wonderful happened there, too - it was an international school - and the French military attaché, who had two kids in the school, organized a parental caravan of non-American parents to make sure that every child at there was delivered to parents, face to face, in private diplomatic vehicles that afternoon, so that all the kids got out and went home.

Then when I finally finished with the Brigadier, I went to the British Embassy, which had a phone line open to the State Department. I went there at Ambassador Hummel’s request, and as I walked up the steps, the British Ambassador, whom I knew well, greeted me at the door with a very dark whiskey glass full of Scotch. I happily drank the whole glass. Then I had a long phone conversation with Washington and went home to see my family. My then spouse, who was head of the consular section in Karachi, had flown to
Islamabad that afternoon because this was Thanksgiving eve. She had been driven to my house and had spent the entire event with an open line from my house to the Operations Center in Washington and alternately to the Karachi Consulate, passing what she knew and what she heard on our radio circuit to both. As you know, our other posts in Pakistan (and elsewhere in the Third World) were attacked at the same time. We lost our USIS library in Lahore. We damn near lost our consulate and all the people in it too but for the bravery of the two junior officers who took control and toughed it out. Our consulates in Karachi and Peshawar were threatened but were protected by timely police actions that interposed between the consulates and the crowds. A lot of other Western symbols were burned also. For instance, the Bank of America office and the Convent of Jesus and Mary in Rawalpindi was attacked and burned.

Q: So, the embassy was totally destroyed?

HAGERTY: Yes, it was a smoldering, blackened shell when I saw it the day after.

Q: What was the feeling toward the Pakistani government by you all?

HAGERTY: Well, I think most of us were, to put it in a word, pissed off...shaken, disappointed, and angry. And also annoyed at our own government because we learned that evening that when Washington learned we had escaped being burned alive in our building, President Carter issued a statement from the White House thanking President Zia for getting us out. The *Time* correspondent told me that she sent in her report that night and was then queried by New York, saying, “You’re telling us you got out on your own, but we’re being told by the White House that the Pakistanis got you out.” She replied, “Well, you can do two things -- take my story and print it, or accept my resignation, because we got out ourselves.” And that’s how *Time* printed it. The next day we went around and looked at the building of course. It was shattering, and arrangements were being made to evacuate all dependents and non-essential personnel. They left the next day on a diverted 707, so we drew down to a hard core of just a few officers. We were that way from November 1979 until, basically, schools were out in the US in the spring of 1980, so the dependents didn’t come back until the evacuated kids could finish the school year in the States. I don’t think we would have wanted to have them back much before then anyway. As you know, the Department wouldn’t want to bring dependents back only to face the possibility of yanking them all out again.

Another little amusing tale on all of this is that a Southerner in the GSO, Wannie Lester, who was a retired Seabee, was very popular with the American journalists, whom he had come to know at our Club. Several days after the attack, while he was standing outside this burned out shell, one of them said, “Well, what do you think, Wannie? How much do you think the damage cost?” He looked again at the building and drawled, “Well, Ah don’t know. But Ah’d guess about 21 and half million dollars.” The Ambassador was upset when he heard this, because we hadn’t begun to estimate the bill on this. But two years later, when the bill was presented to the Pakistanis, it came to $21,500,000. And the Pakistanis paid.
Q: You know, from your point of view and from the point of view of others, let me put it in diplomatic terms, this puts a certain strain in your relations. I mean, you know, it would seem almost that really we should get everybody out of there and put a new team in because....

HAGERTY: Art Hummel told all of us that we were volunteers, so anybody who wanted to leave could leave without prejudice, as far as he was concerned. A couple of people did. He also assured everyone who stayed that he would make sure that each of them would get home for either Christmas or New Years. So the survivors set up the embassy the day after Thanksgiving in the USAID offices that were all vacant in another building nearby and we had a going embassy very quickly. But you are right; I’m amazed at the anger level we felt and suppressed. It said something about being professional diplomats. We were able somehow to step outside ourselves and deal with our function, not our emotions. We recognized that there were important issues in the region, and, of course, a month later almost to the day, the Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan, changing our whole relationship with the Government of Pakistan. Everything about the way we were doing business changed, and we responded to the call.

Q: Was there any type of investigation?

HAGERTY: Yes, there was an investigation by the Pakistanis, and a Congressional team investigated, took hearings in Washington. I testified to the investigating Pakistani general that Zia appointed to do so. But nothing came of it. A report was issued that simply concluded -- and I think we agreed -- that the reason why the crowd was so big was that it was one of these issues where both the “left” and the “right” were so pissed off at us for a variety of reasons, starting but not ending with Mecca, that they were able to join against us on this; we estimated it was mostly students, probably two-third “rightist” and one-third “leftist,” and there were Palestinian students involved. We knew that Arabic was among the languages spoken on the embassy roof and that there was a sizeable contingent of Palestinian students at the university. They had been creating part of the chanting that went on at the earlier Iranian embassy bonfire rallies. But our one Persian speaker said he did not discern any Persian spoken on the roof.

Q: Well, Herb, I think this is a good place to stop. I think we’ll pick this up the next time. We’ve burned your embassy, you’ve put it back into somewhat order and all of a sudden the Soviets invade Afghanistan because that’s a whole new ball game. So, we’ll start with that whole new ball game in December of 1979.

HAGERTY: A number of years later I wrote a chapter about it all in a book that published at Georgetown.

Q: Embassies in Crisis?
HAGERTY: *Embassies Under Siege*. I wrote the Islamabad chapter. It wasn’t until I started writing the windup of that chapter that I realized how much anger I still had about the event. I was retired at the time and so my chapter concluded much more harshly critical of the Pakistanis than it would have been if I were still a serving officer.

Q: Okay, so we’ll pick this up next time, December 1979 when the Soviets invade Afghanistan.

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This is September 7, 2001. Herb, obviously you’d had other things to worry about including wondering whether you’d be burned alive, but had you all been following events much in Afghanistan?

HAGERTY: We had of course. The political section in particular had been. It had special meaning for me since my M.A. thesis was a biography of a ‘Brit’ who had played a very important role in British Imperial policy toward Afghanistan through the second half of the 19th century. So I had a special interest and had driven up to Kabul on a private visit in 1978, after the April communist coup, but more than 18 months before the Red Army moved in. On that visit I’d paid a call on the Afghan education minister, and he also came to dinner at an embassy home where I stayed. Also, as I had done on previous visits to Kabul, I called on my opposite numbers, the Pakistani and Indian Deputy Chiefs of Mission (DCM) at their embassies there, some of whom I had known previously. I tried to get a feel for what was going on in the country, like any political officer would do. I found that while there was considerable concern about the communists having taken over. This, following the intra-family coup that had ousted the King Zahir Shah in 1978, had changed the shape of the political landscape. There was still some feeling that Afghan Communists were sufficiently (and ethnically) Afghan that events would not necessarily lead to what eventually happened. But the Afghan party had always been heavily divided into two distinct wings based mainly on their ethnic differences. And in the end, it was the fall-out, the internecine killing of their leaders, that started turning things very bad for the Communists.

The Russians claimed at the time that they had been invited in by the Afghan President, but the world knew that was nonsense. The Soviets decided, foolishly, in December 1979 that their military intervention was needed to save the Communist regime.

Q: Well, what were you getting at that time, this is really, this is not just one of these little occasions of people sort of Central Asian to do. It probably was a major event in eventually bringing down the Soviet Union? But, when you heard about this, what was sort of the thinking of the people in our embassy in Pakistan, I mean, you know what the hell is going on here?

HAGERTY: Well, it was a shock. The one thing that none of us had figured on was that the Russians would actually send troops in. The history, in the long history of
Afghanistan from the 1820s on, Afghanistan had always been, one way or another, been something of a neutral buffer between Central Asia and South Asia. That’s the way the British and the Russians had sort of divided it up, by events and even explicitly, in the early 20th century. That's the situation had sort of inherited that British view after World War II and after Britain left the subcontinent. The assumption was that the Russians would never be so stupid as to do this, but they came in strong and suddenly galvanized then Islamic world against them. The remarkable success that we had in raising the world’s consciousness level of what the Russians were doing in Afghanistan was predicated and rode right on the back of an Islamic upsurge of anger with the Russians. Jimmy Carter’s reaction was initially not much, that is, we would boycott the Moscow Olympics and so forth. When the Pakistanis expressed concern about suddenly having Russians on their border, the US came up with a package of $400 million worth of economic and military assistance. Zia then publicly said that’s “peanuts,” and there wasn’t any further movement on it for a while. But more important, it was the Islamic reaction, and especially the Pakistani and Iranian coalescence, at several foreign ministers meetings at the Islamic Conference Organization, which produced the upsurge that we were then able to support in opposing the Russians. In fact, we were not fulfilling a unilateral or a Western policy in Afghanistan, but rather a policy in support of the Islamic world’s anger. It meant the policy had wide support in the world.

Q: Well, what happened? I mean the Soviets invaded the day before Christmas, or Christmas day or something?

HAGERTY: The 26th, yes. It was a little over a month after we had come through our own terror.

Q: Yes. Was it all of a sudden, I mean what happened at the embassy when you heard about this invasion. Did you say, “Oh my God,” or what?

HAGERTY: Well, it was more likely, “Whatever possessed the Soviets to do something this stupid? This is even worse than Hungary in some respects.” The cable I wrote reporting the event, as seen from Islamabad, used a subject line that I chose very carefully with a historic sense, i.e., “The Cossacks have arrived in Kabul.” The whole thrust of Russian imperialism through Central Asia had been advanced by Cossacks in the second half of the 19th century, and finally – nearly 100 years later – the Russians had crossed the historic border at the Oxus River and were in Afghanistan. But it didn’t take very long before they found themselves in a dogfight that was going to be very difficult. We proclaimed our support of the Islamic world’s outrage. It was clear that Pakistan wished to support the Afghans in its own interests. And when the Reagan administration came into power in 1981, with its aim of pursuing an aggressive anti-Soviet policy at various places in the Third World in support of regimes opposed to communist expansion, Pakistan fit the bill.

We couldn’t understand how the Soviets could have given us this kind of a present, this policy blunder on their part. It eventually became their Vietnam. The irony, of course,
was that in many ways, Moscow’s folly in Afghanistan in December of 1979 turned around our relationship with Pakistan, which couldn’t have been at lower ebb a month earlier.

_Q: Okay, you get this attack and so what do you do? I mean all of a sudden do you both sort of look over and say, “Oh my God, let’s be friends.” I mean I’m talking about the real details._

HAGERTY: Well, we had never really stopped talking to the Pakistanis. We all worked our government contacts hard, especially in the Foreign Ministry hard, where many senior officers were graduates of Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in the U.S. But we also were very thin on the ground, ‘non-essential’ personnel having been evacuated together with all of our families. Our promised -- and staggered -- holiday visits home left us operating an embassy that was a shell, with maybe a dozen Embassy staff members present during that whole year-end holiday period. Art and I waited until early January 1980 before we went to the U.S, by which the DCM and the all of the others had returned from their holiday visits home. The return of more staff members and of our dependents would take another 4-6 months.

_Q: Talking about relations with the Pakistanis, in November when you got burned, were Pakistani officials coming up to you saying, “God, that was awful. We’re so sorry this happened?”_  

HAGERTY: Yes, there were Pakistanis -- officials and private citizens -- who privately volunteered that they had been embarrassed by the attacks on the U.S. mission as a whole…just shocked. The coincidence, in Islamabad, of an angry crowd of 10,000 people and the unavailability troops was astounding. Lots of Pakistanis couldn’t believe it, but I have to add also that there were also young Pakistanis who would sidle up to our people in bazaars or on the street in the weeks following and say, “Next time, we’ll get you all.” So, there were a lot of threats too. As I think I mentioned on the previous tape, it was with some satisfaction that the army raided the local university just before Christmas and confiscated a horde of handguns from the students. There was an investigation underway about the students, and there were some photographs that had been taken by private individuals in which faces were identifiable in the crowd.

We eventually concluded some months later, as I have said before, that the crowd was itself composed of both leftists and rightists, including conservative Islamics unhappy with us for our Pakistan policy and U.S. policies regarding Israel, as well as Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), pro-Bhutto leftists who held us accountable for Zulfikar Bhutto’s demise. It was coalescence, among students especially, of very strong anti-Western anti-American sentiments, inflamed by the day’s news from Mecca. We shouldn’t forget that the attacks on our posts in Islamabad and in Lahore, as well those in Peshawar and Karachi that were quickly blunted by swift police action, were part of a wave of anti-American violence that day throughout the Islamic world, from Dhaka to Morocco. A broad confrontation seemed to be brewing between “Westernism,” with the US
representing modernity and Western ideals, and an Islamic world, in Iran and elsewhere, increasingly in ferment.

And within a month, suddenly the Russians invade Afghanistan and almost totally deflect that ferment against them. The burning of the U.S. Embassy in 1979 was a low point in the Pakistan-US relationship, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan month later served to rejuvenate our bilateral relations with Pakistan in almost every way.

Q: Well, get back almost to put you on an hour to hour basis, but I mean you’re in this very difficult situation on the 26th of December, this thing happens, I mean, how did you sort of the American embassy and the Pakistan foreign ministry authorities and all that, how did you come back together? But I mean, were you called in?

HAGERTY: Yes, they felt seriously threatened and sought our support. As they saw it, they had the Indian Army armed with Russian arms on one side of them, and suddenly the Russian Red Army on their other border. They were feeling suddenly surrounded and very vulnerable. So they sought assistance and assurances from us, the West, and the Islamic world. I have to assume the Pakistanis also saw it as a way of drawing our attention back to the roots of our alliance relationship with them, which always involved a certain amount of ambiguity about India. They had been our friends with regard to the Communist world – which was where our earlier alliance and arms supply relationship had begun. And as long as we could bolster that friendship again, they gained a measure of confidence in their own security. Many of them saw it as a way of repairing their relationship with us as well.

Q: Well, from your observation, what sort of noises were you hearing from the Indians?

HAGERTY: Well, the Indians initially got off on the wrong foot. The Indian UN representative, for instance (I can’t remember his name now, he may have been the deputy UN representative, or possibly a member of parliament with the Indian UN delegation), made some very stupid comments in New York that were quite apologetic about what the Russians had done. Lots of Westerners had assumed over the years that the Indians always could find a way to apologize for the USSR, and here they did again.

Q: Well, there was the time back in 1961 at the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference when the Soviets exploded a hydrogen bomb.

HAGERTY: The largest thermonuclear weapon that they ever exploded…at Novaya Zemlya, in the Arctic.

Q: Yes, the Indians were saying well actually, that’s a peaceful, that’s a good one, but an American one’s a bad one.

HAGERTY: It was certainly apologetic. But in this instance, most serious-minded Indians, who realized that something radical had changed in their neighborhood, saw that
the Soviet actions in Afghanistan were a matter that India had to be concerned about, too. Indian policies also had counted on a certain constancy in Russian friendship, but Russian friendship in a restrained way. The Indians had been very brutal themselves in putting down communist insurgencies inside India in the late ‘40s and early ‘50s, so they were wondering what happened, what was going on in Moscow that led the Kremlin to make this change, because it radically altered the five-way relationship among the USSR, China, India, Pakistan, and the U.S. Suddenly this was a radical change that just upset the entire calculus for everyone, and it took us awhile to come up with what we really needed to do. But it also required a new administration in Washington to do it.

Q: Was there a feeling of, oh, I don’t know what you’d call it, unease, a feeling that the center of the United States being the president and his advisors were a bit soft in this whole thing I mean at the beginning?

HAGERTY: Well, as seen from abroad, the Carter administration’s reaction was pretty weak, and especially so at the State Department and Defense Department levels. So was the U.S. initial response to condemn, to boycott the Moscow Olympics, and to propose $400 million in aid, which Zia regarded explicitly as “peanuts.” Things were going wrong in lots of places in the world, and Carter was not reelected. But even before his term ended, change began to occur, and there were some radical differences in our policy which eventually led to a negotiation of a remarkably large assistance agreement for Pakistan under Reagan. I participated in those negotiations which agreed on a $1.6 billion program over five years. Interestingly, that came out at not much more than $400 million a year, but it involved $800 million in military assistance and $800 million in economic assistance, e.g., dollars, usable for their own foreign exchange purchases.

Pakistan’s military had declined since our earlier days of military assistance. Their armed forces were based on US F-86s and outmoded B-57s from the ‘50s. They had old M-47 tanks with gasoline engines and 75 mm guns on them. Their ships were archaic and outmoded. The only modern aircraft they had in their air force were more modern French jets and ASW aircraft, but their MiG-19s from China had a terrible maintenance problems and could not be counted on. With the Russians now at their door, they felt vulnerable. Eventually that $800 million package facilitated the purchase for the Pakistan Air Force of 40 F-16s, on essentially commercial terms with the USG, guaranteeing the loans. They didn’t want to take them grant or credit assistance. We in fact offered better terms on those aircraft than they were prepared to take, and it’s interesting because they’d been in an aligned relationship with us before, and they really wanted our help, but they didn’t trust us a lot. So, they made their peace with the Nonaligned Movement; they wanted to preserve that, and when our negotiator tried to remind the Pakistan Finance Minister and the Foreign Minister across the table that we were offering better terms on this if they wanted to take that concessionality, the Finance Minister looked up and said, “Well, I can read those numbers. You don’t have to persuade me of that, but try to persuade our Foreign Minister,” pointing his finger at Agha Shahi. It was Shahi’s foreign policy that was dictating that they try to keep this relationship essentially commercial, not grant, so
as to avoid the sense of *alliance*. But it was a shot in the arm for them to begin getting these aircraft.

*Q:* Well, now the Carter administration didn’t go out until January of ‘81.

HAGERTY: That’s right, it took a whole year.

*Q:* So, we’re talking about basically a year of 1980 when the election was going on and you had Secretary Vance resigning and you know, it wasn’t, what was happening during that time were we just, were things pretty?

HAGERTY: We were talking to the Pakistanis, but we never really got a go ahead to broaden our support of the Pakistanis until the new administration came in. That’s my recollection. The Carter administration was viewing the situation with greater and greater seriousness that year, but they were preoccupied with the election and with the hostage crisis in Iran.

*Q:* Well, the thing was so concentrated anyway on the situation in Tehran.

HAGERTY: In Tehran, of course, very focused there.

*Q:* Were you feeling were the Pakistanis were nervous about what was happening in Iran at that time?

HAGERTY: Yes, of course. They had made a deal with the Iranians, and the Shah’s largesse was what they had been counting on. Suddenly, in 1978, the Pakistanis found that there wasn’t anybody there that they could count on in Iran. The Shah was gone, and they were suddenly dealing with Islamic Iran’s erratic Shia fanatics who weren’t very well thought of in Pakistan, a mostly Sunni nation with strong *Wahhabi* tendencies. We suspected that Shia numbers were large in government services and that some Shias “pass” as something other, because in some parts of Pakistan they felt threatened, as do the even smaller number of *Ismaelis*. I should add that nobody knows just what the Shia percentage was in Pakistan, but as political counselor, I thought we should at least be consistent in our reporting. Our sources suggested Shias numbered between 13% and 30% of the population, with most guesses at just under 20%. I decided arbitrarily that we would use between 18-20% as our routine estimate.

The remittance flow from Pakistanis working in the Arab world had become an importance source of foreign exchange for Pakistan in the 1970s, but they still had counted on the Iranian Government for new investment. But in 1980, with Iranian resources drying up, but with Russian communists in Afghanistan, Pakistan began to find money and support from the Arab world, especially the Saudis.

Then there was the growing Afghan resistance, led by seven organizations, none of which trusted or talked to each other. Their leaders and their rank and file epitomized the
traditional ethnic and linguistic divisions as among Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pushhtuns, Baluchis, and Hazaras. The leaders, moreover, held longstanding grudges going back more than 40 years to the arcane politics of the former monarchy. This the resistance movement never really pulled together, but there were some groups within it that became very adept at organizing fighters and laying claim to outside support. Meanwhile, Pakistan suddenly found itself encumbered with two million refugees on its soil, with a portion of its male component prepared to go back periodically to fight the “infidels.”

Q: I’m trying to divvy this up before the Reagan administration came in. The refugees who were coming in. What were we doing?

HAGERTY: Afghan refugees were pouring into Pakistan and Iran. And the world responded to that in a very big way. If it hadn’t been for the numbers of Pakistanis from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province who had gone off to the Gulf and to the Middle East in search of so-called “petro” dollars, it would have been worse. A huge sum of money was being repatriated from these migrant workers who’d gone off to the Middle East, and it was pouring into this area where there were increasingly labor shortages. If that hadn’t happened, if that wasn’t coincident with this refugee surge, I don’t know how those refugees would have survived because resources were constantly being poured back into that area. But the refugee camps, as always pretty terrible places, began to take on a life of their own.

Q: Were we getting pretty good, were we beginning to get good information out of Afghanistan? I mean was Islamabad and our embassy becoming sort of a focal point for, you know, what was happening there?

HAGERTY: Well, yes, it was. Our embassy in Kabul was down to minimal numbers under a Charge d’Affaires. They were reporting what they could see and hear, but their access was limited. They were also able to protest now and then and to deal with consular matters, but not much else. And with the loss of our embassy in Teheran, the Islamabad Embassy became a focal point in reporting on the subject of Afghanistan. But at that early stage, we were heavily dependent on the press; we just weren’t getting an awful lot out of Afghanistan.

Q: I would have thought that you would have had a major influx of people, like CIA people coming in or not?

HAGERTY: I have no idea.

Q: Well, but today it’s known as such; I don’t want you to get too far into this, but obviously this became a major CIA operation. I mean it’s quite well known.

HAGERTY: Obviously, the United States government publicly supported the Islamic world’s call for resistance to the Soviet occupation and supported what the growing resistance movement was doing on the ground. But the U.S. government was not out in
front in Pakistan and elsewhere in the Islamic world. And U.S. support was of the Pakistan Government’s actions and of the Islamic world’s distress. I do not recall any large influx in the permanent Embassy staff, but we certainly were aware of lot of travelers and visitors.

Q: I’m sure you had everybody and their kid brother coming to take a look.

HAGERTY: Well, yes. Dan Rather came, you know, “Gunga Dan Rather” going up to the border and looking over. Walter Cronkite came, Robert Novak came, and lots of others.

Q: These are media superstars?

HAGERTY: Oh yes. There we also extra large numbers of working journalists coming to and through Pakistan because the war was covered from Peshawar and Islamabad and, to a lesser degree, from Karachi. I think it’s a remarkable effort that was made because, as I have said, the U.S. did not want this to ever be seen as a U.S. Government effort. We and the Pakistanis were sensitive to the visibility of the U.S. presence in Pakistan because of the memory of the Francis Gary Powers (U-2) shoot down in 1960 and the earlier U.S. military presence near Peshawar. The Pakistanis, as a still newly independent nation, were sensitive to any hint of foreign involvement in their own affairs.

Q: Of course, we had right next door the, to show them what we had when we got too far in front in Iran.

HAGERTY: Yes, so there was all of this history we were conscious of. We wanted to make sure that whatever we were doing was in support of the Islamic world’s anger on this one, and I think we were remarkably successful in doing that. As I understood it at the time, most of the equipment then flowing in to the Afghan resistance from outside of South Asia was surplus Soviet bloc equipment, ubiquitous throughout the Third World. This had the advantage of muddying the waters regarding its sources, while providing commonality in Russian ammunition for the Afghans. The much later appearance in Afghan mujahideen hands of light-weight, hand-held anti-aircraft missiles was a significant departure from this.

Q: A U.S. anti-aircraft missile?

HAGERTY: The full term is “hand-held and manned-transportable anti-aircraft missile.” Although they appeared in Afghanistan much, much later in the conflict, they appear to have made the difference finally for the Afghans because the mujahideen, as the Afghan resistance was called, had up to then been getting chewed up by Soviet helicopter gunships. The missiles would apparently deny that low-level airspace to those gunships.
Q: You’re Political Counselor in Islamabad, so you’re looking at the situation in Pakistan, the political situation; did you find that what the Soviets did in Afghanistan pretty well diffused the anti-Americanism?

HAGERTY: Not really, because we still had to deal with more than a year of other Carter administration policies, with human rights as a main focus. Pakistanis lived under martial law administered by a military dictatorship, and -- based on our required human rights reporting -- the Carter Administration was critical of the continuing martial law and introduction of Koranic punishments. The administration also had a strong bias against arms transfers, so that was also a problem. Then there was the nuclear question and the evidence that Pakistan was working to provide the groundwork for a nuclear weapons program.

But what tended to happen slowly was a gradual transition as the Afghanistan issue grew more important than some of these other concerns. This really didn’t manifest itself fully until the Reagan administration came into office. But in 1979 and 1980, these other policy considerations continued to be very much in our minds, although where we could exercise a Congressionally-mandated exception we did. Also, Congressional support grew strong for the Afghans, so we were able to soft-pedal some of these other considerations. We continued our pressure on the nuclear front in particular because we had legislative sanctions that we could not evade on that one; we were nonetheless able to be much more forthcoming in our political support and security assurances.

Q: When did you leave Pakistan?

HAGERTY: I left in the fall of… it would have been September ’81, on direct assignment to our Embassy in Sri Lanka as Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). By that time, of course, we’d begun to negotiate a second security assistance package for Pakistan. A lot of the things that we had suspended in 1979 were back on track. The U.S. Mission was back to reasonable numbers, and our military supply mission at last had work to do.

Q: Did you have a new building there?

HAGERTY: Well, the former Embassy building remained gutted. Luckily the USAID Mission had half of a building nearby, the other half owned and operated by UN agencies. But there was enough space in there for us to squeeze in embassy offices in the fall of 1979 because the AID mission had been so significantly cut back earlier that year. So the day after the Embassy burning, actually on the day of Thanksgiving, we had begun to function as an embassy in those former USAID spaces. We continued to operate in that structure through the rest of my time in Islamabad.

Q: Did Art Hummel stay?

HAGERTY: Yes, until 1981. He left to become Ambassador to China shortly after I did in 1981.
Q: Did you have much involvement during this time with the Chinese embassy?

HAGERTY: Not until after the Shanghai Agreement. Hummel, as you know, was a Chinese speaker and had been born in China. When we began to have a formal relationship with the Chinese again, we exchanged parties with the Chinese embassy to celebrate the event. Ours was a large movie party, featuring a first run U.S. movie, the title of which I cannot recall. They responded with a big dinner for us. So, we were on a talking basis with the Chinese Embassy, but that all it was. The kind of conversations I would have with my Chinese counterpart were quite stilted, even though a little less so, and less frequent, than those with my Russian counterpart. Every once in a while somebody in the Soviet embassy would reach out and try to get to know somebody on our side, and I was responsive to that when it served our interests. There was a so-called “scholar” there, with whom I was able to have some pretty straightforward conversations, which I trust were reported accurately in their channels as accurately as they were in ours. The Soviet Ambassador was a member of the CPSU Central Committee, and this fellow appeared to work for him in his party ‘hat.’

Hummel would doubtless have liked to have a bit more of a conversation with his Chinese counterpart, maybe even to influence what they were doing in Pakistan in a more constructive way. They were very supportive of what we were doing with regard to the Afghans, of course, since they had their own well-known problems with the Russians.

Q: How about the Indians? Did the Indians see us in Pakistan, I mean, from their embassy as being sort of a not a hostile power, not exactly a friendly power or not?

HAGERTY: Indian Ambassador Bajpai, whom I had known before, eventually became Ambassador here in Washington. Those of us who had a South Asian connection and understood how to deal with Indians and Pakistanis with some ease were able to maintain a civil relationship with the Indians. But clearly their perception was that we were using the gift that the Russians had presented to us in Afghanistan to resurrect an alliance relationship with Pakistan, which Pakistan would find a way to use against them. So, that’s where it came from. They understood what the Pakistanis were doing. We understood what the Pakistanis were doing. We understood what the Pakistanis were doing, but the point was, they were serving one of our interests and serving theirs as well. We were very sensitive in our decisions about military supply. Some items were intended to blunt any kind of armored attack across the northwestern border, but it was obvious to all that the main armored threat Pakistan faced was the Indian army on its other border. So, there were a number of weapons proposed for packages with Pakistan that we very quickly stepped back from because they couldn’t really be seen to be focused on the northwestern frontier. In fact, even the F-16s we provided were an air defense/ground support version, not a bomber version like those we had sold to Israel.

Q: By the way, for the transcriber, the missile we were talking about earlier is the “Stinger”.
HAGERTY: Yes, the “Stinger,” thank you; I could not recall the name before. I should add my understanding that it was a superior weapon to the SA-7 that the Afghans themselves had occasionally captured from the Russians. The British had also had a SAM called a “Blowpipe,” which was around the world at that time, too. The apparent availability of these and other light-weight anti-aircraft weapons systems was additionally worrisome to some because there was concern that those systems could come back to haunt us if they were passed on to others in the Middle East for use against civil airliners.

Q: What about, and this is a final thing, the British; how were our relations with them in Pakistan?

HAGERTY: Very close and cordial at that time and throughout. We were working, I would say hand-in-glove. We were also very close with the Canadians. It was the Canadians -- I don’t know whether I mentioned this on the other tape -- it was the Canadians who came around the day after our Embassy was gutted and took the US CD tags off all of our surviving cars and put Canadian CD license tags, so that they’d all pass as Canadian Embassy cars. They did that on their own -- a wonderful idea. And the French military attache developed a convoy system for getting his own kids, and all of our kids, home from the school on that awful day in 1979. So, lots of people in the diplomatic community rallied around. I spent New Year’s Eve of that year, after the Russians had come into Afghanistan, in Peshawar at a New Year’s Eve party at the consulate, and my reaction to Peshawar was interesting. We were all feeling sort of shaken about what had happened to us, and yet it was comforting to be in Peshawar, where all the men carry guns out in the open, as opposed to having to wonder, in Islamabad, which students still had a handgun that he hadn’t had a chance to use.

Q: Well, then you went in 1981 to Sri Lanka, direct transfer? Just to put at the beginning, you were in Sri Lanka from ’81 to when?

HAGERTY: Yes. ’84. Three years.

Q: What brought about this very quick turn around?

HAGERTY: Hardly quick; I was four years in Pakistan. My own career plan had been to go on to Afghanistan as DCM, but that didn’t work out obviously once the post there had shed its dependents. Don Toussaint was Ambassador in Colombo, and he chose me from, I understand, a large number of bidders on the job. The sad thing is that Don didn’t stay very long with the change of administration. He was gone in the space of six months, I was Charge for a month, and then I had a very different kind of ambassador.

Q: Well, his name was what?

HAGERTY: John Reed
**Q:** Well, what was his background?

**HAGERTY:** Unlike Toussaint, who was a career officer, Southeast Asia hand, and a former DCM in Jakarta, Reed was a former governor of Maine who had served once before as Nixon’s ambassador to Colombo and had come to know Reagan was governor in California. He parlayed this to promote another stint in Colombo. So, he arrived, and I have to say, he had a lot of weaknesses of the type often attributed to such political appointees. Let me add, however, that I worked for more political appointee ambassadors than career officers, and among them some were excellent, while others were not. John Reed was a weak reed, not make a pun but...

**Q:** What were some of the weaknesses that you saw?

**HAGERTY:** First off, he had no real interest in or understanding of foreign relations. I came to believe that he liked being ambassador but didn’t like doing ambassador. The work of being ambassador was not to his interest. He was vain and liked the status and the ‘perks’ of the office. He had become governor of Maine because he happened to be next in Maine’s upper house when a former governor died. He though of himself as a politician but never was reelected. Despite his earlier stint in Colombo, he simply seemed to be over his head and required a lot of careful hand-holding. I was ‘Mr. Inside’ to his ‘Mr. Outside,’ in the sort of traditional way. I ran the embassy for him, but I also had to spend a fair amount of time coaching him on being ‘Mr. Outside.’ When he’d go off to carry out an instruction by cable from Washington, he simply would not take a note-taker. He didn’t want to take me because I think he felt that I might upstage him. I met that concern by regularly suggesting that he take an officer from the political section as note-taker. But he would say, “No, I’m going to see politicians. I’m a politician, and I know politicians don’t like to talk with note-takers around.”

His reluctance to use a note-taken gave us a hell of a time trying to figure out what happened so as to report the result to Washington. He would come back from the conversation and sit down with me and tell me in general about how it went. Then I’d write the reporting cable as if I had sat in on the meeting anyway. It was very difficult to assess the nuances of his exchange with the Sri Lankan government official with whom he had met.

When I prepped him for such a call on the government, I often felt that it was like preparing someone for a tennis match in which he had to ace his serve; if the other side returned the volley, he (and we) would be in trouble, since his ability to follow up would be limited. To ensure he got the message across, I often took advantage of my own contacts at the ministry to make sure that whatever message he was supposed to have conveyed was understood at the next echelon in the ministry. I did not undercut him, but I played it as if I wished to ensure the level where I was frequently in contact also got the message. As they got to know Reed, I think my contacts understood where I was coming from. The Sri Lanka Ambassador in Washington, a friend, later told me he and his government understood and appreciated my ‘follow-up’ actions.
Q: I’m sure they were used to sizing this up and finding out. But it does mean that our position is not as strong there where you have to deal in this type of thing.

HAGERTY: He had a tough time saying no to Sri Lankans about things to which they had no reason to expect a positive response. He’d get a call from somebody about a visa case, and you know, we’d have a conversation about it before I checked with the visa officer to assess what the problem was. Usually, the visa officer had absolutely done the correct thing in terms of the consul’s responsibility under our immigration laws.

Q: The ambassador cannot issue a visa. By law, only the consular officer can issue it.

HAGERTY: Actually, the ambassador cannot order an officer to issue a visa. I could have issued the visa if I thought the consular officer was in the wrong. But when, as usual, I saw that the law was appropriately executed, I would then tell the Ambassador, “We’re doing what the law requires and don’t have much of a choice.” I would then inform him that he could approve the visa on his signature, but I would counsel against doing so in this case – that kind of drill. We had problems about the “leader grant,” where USIA and the political section and the economic section would come up with candidates for such grants to travel to the United States. We only had a limited number of them, and very often he’d get pressure from some political element of the government in favor of somebody who was somebody’s bag man and not the sort of person we wanted. I’d make the best case possible for our choices. In fact, I was as interested in a broad range of Sri Lankans during my time as DCM. Sri Lanka was undergoing a rejuvenation of the private sector at that time, which we encouraged as a matter of policy. So I’d try to ensure that two of the seven or eight grants a year that we had went to both deserving private sector candidates and deserving women. But it was occasionally very difficult to resist Reed’s efforts on behalf of deserving candidates when he was under that he recognized as a politician-to-politician pressure.

Q: What was the situation in Sri Lanka during the time you were there in ‘81 to ‘84?

HAGERTY: Well, there had been a major change of government in the 1977 elections, with the success of the United National Party (UNP) and its commitment to privatization of the economy. President Jayawardena had a towering majority in the parliament, where the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), with a dozen seats or so, led the opposition. But Tamils generally had welcomed the UNP’s success because Jayawardena had offered negotiations on a number of long-standing Tamil grievances. As time went on, however, it became clear to me (and to the moderate TULF leadership) that these negotiations were a bit of a sham, because each round of negotiations would de novo, virtually where the previous round had started, rather than ended. There never was any progress, and the end result was that the moderate leaders of the TULF were undercut by not being able to deliver. In time, a number of moderate Tamils were assassinated, and the Tamil leadership fell into the hands of increasingly extremist elements. By the time I left, of course, there was a civil war underway up in the northern part of the island where Tamils
were the over-whelming majority. During part of the summer of 1983, the deaths of 13 soldiers in the north led to extensive anti-Tamil bloodletting all around the island, including in Colombo. We were under twenty-four-hour curfews for a time when I was Charge that summer, and the government found itself under great pressure. While Jayawardena, as President, had been remarkably effective at doing a number of things that opened up the society for free enterprise, in his heart he was a Sinhalese nationalist and really didn’t want to do much to address the Tamil minority’s legitimate political grievances.

Sri Lanka, as you know, is a unitary state; its provinces are little more traditional geographic entities with no local power. Tamil strength is in the north and on the east coast, and Tamils were demanding an opportunity to have more local influence on taxation and spending in the Tamil majority areas. They were also asking for more respect for their distinctive language and culture. Back in 1956, all education in the country from the first grade on had been divided into two language systems, one for Tamil-speakers and one for Sinhalese speakers. This was the act of the Sinhalese Prime Minister at the time (and the father of the current president of Sri Lanka). So these two tracks had taken the population that previously had gone to school together and separated it by language (and thus culture). So that by the time this civil war started, no Tamils under the age of 40 had ever gone to school with Sinhalese students and vice versa, and few Lankans had friends of the other community. The society had divided, in some ways retribution by the Sinhalese for the widespread notion that Tamils had been favored by the British prior to 1948 when the British departed. Whether this was true or not, I’m not certain. It may have been the case that the Tamils were harder working or better educated in some urban areas, but whatever it was, the majority of the Sinhalese were determined that once they got independence, it was going to be their country, and with 80 percent of the population, they had certainly all the means - and the votes - to make sure that was the case.

Q: Were we doing anything, I mean, you know, a normal embassy just sits there and observes and reports. Did we get involved in this at all?

HAGERTY: Of course, we observed and reported, but when given an opportunity we would express sadness that the latest negotiation hadn’t worked out. We wished them well, and we also kept our lines open to the moderate Tamils, with whom I sought to remain in contact. But, basically, we did just that and not much else. And, once the insurrection began to take shape, Washington’s interest was limited to keeping a watching brief, with concern about the possibility of foreign intervention or exploitation.

One thing you should remember is that historically a lot of the northern Tamil leaders had been influenced by the presence, the Christian missionaries, mainly American Baptists. During the British days, when American missionaries came to old Ceylon, the British sent them to the north. The result was a strong American Baptist influence from the 1870s on to the north of Sri Lanka. The Federal Party, which was the original Tamil party in the early part of the 20th century, was a party that urged a federalist structure on the island in part because its leaders had learned from Baptist teachers about American history and the
way in which the American federal system protected the rights of people in distinctive areas. While we were actively in support of the Tamils, we recognized that history and did not want to appear to be their advocates. Many Singhalese were aware of that history of the American private involvement in the north, and so that was a constraint. I don’t think we would have done anything very active anyway, but it was a constraint.

Q: What were American interests there at that time?

HAGERTY: We encouraged the Sri Lankans in the commitment to the private sector and in their economic development. We had the largest per capita aid program in Asia going in Sri Lanka. We were contributing to this free market economy in many ways. We were also involved in assistance to secondary irrigation projects, which were intended to bring to fruition the primary irrigation and dam projects that the Sri Lankans and Europeans had invested in. We had some interest in naval access to the port of Colombo for ship visits. Remember, also Trincomalee on the east coast had been a huge British naval base during WWII. Lots of Sri Lankans and other South Asians assumed our interest in Sri Lanka was in the possibility to the port Trincomalee, which was in total ruin by the 1980s. There wasn’t anything except a very large natural harbor. To make it a base again would have involved the same kind of investment that we put into Vietnam or in other places around the world. We didn’t have that kind of interest. At the time, you know, we had a less active naval interest in this Indian Ocean at the time than we had a decade before.

Q: Because of what was happening.

HAGERTY: Well, partly because we had developed and had access to the British facility at Diego Garcia. We had earlier beefed up the number of ships that we normally keep in the Indian Ocean because there was a Soviet naval squadron in the Indian Ocean with access to Aden and an anchorage at Socotra. We occasionally had US warship visit, and once, while I was in Colombo, we had visit to Colombo by an aircraft carrier, with several one or two escorting ships. So port visits were an important part of our naval interest. But basically, we wanted a moderate, friendly government there that was looking free enterprise our way, and in a third world setting; we wanted them to succeed.

Q: How about what was Sri Lankan ties to India? Were they good, bad, indifferent?

HAGERTY: Suspicious. You could compare Sri Lanka and India in some ways to Canada and the United States or Mexico and the United States. Canada is a better illustration, but the Canadians might be offended by that. But Sri Lankans and Indians are the same kind of people. The Sinhalese are said to have come into what is now Sri Lanka from somewhere in northern India, different schools of thought suggesting Bengal or possibly western India. There are linguistic commonalities. But some of that is because Buddhism came to Sri Lanka in the then-languages of northern India where the Gautama lived and preached (Pali or Prakrit, I can’t recall which).
Then there were two very substantial Tamil migrations from just 14 miles across the strait in what is now Tamilnadu, a state of fifty million Tamils. One Tamil movement goes back deeply in history where the Hindu kings of the Tamils and the Buddhist kings of the Sinhalese were at war with each other for control of the island. And in the nineteenth century, the British imported a large number of Tamil workers for the tea estates. So, you had that additional movement. Overall, the Tamils make up about 18% of the population, but about one-third of which are these estate workers who are essentially outside the dispute. They are organized in unions and are not party to this civil war. The insurrection derives support from the larger part of the Tamil population, which lives in the Tamil majority areas in the north and along the east coast.

Q: During this '81 to '84 period, was the civil war going on at that time or was there unrest?

HAGERTY: As I left it was beginning to look like a civil war up north. The central government had lost control of the northern city of Jaffna and that whole peninsula up there, and they were beginning to lose control of other areas in the northeast. What you were dealing was a situation in which Sri Lanka was an insignificant military country. During my time, the Lankan army amounted to like 11,000 or 12,000 soldiers in the country the size of West Virginia and with a population just under 20 million. I remember that during a call I paid on the chief of the army when I arrived as DCM -- having just been involved in multi-million dollar arms negotiations with Pakistan -- I asked the Chief what was his main problem as army chief? He replied, “Bullets for training.” I said, “Sir?” He said, “Yes. We have to import all of our rifle ammunition so we can only train our soldiers with seven bullets each during their basic training.”

It was a minor league military operation by any account. They were not looking to us for any kind of military assistance, and we never offered any. They bought their systems out on the world market. But this all changed soon after. The army expanded as the fighting spread. The Indians came in, forced their way in, in an attempt to force a cease-fire after I had left, and for their troubles, they ended up with thousands of casualties of their own. They eventually withdrew acknowledging that they couldn’t handle it. The Sri Lankans on both sides weren’t awfully unhappy about that; they were perfectly happy to have the Indians get a bloody nose. But the war continued and the number of casualties continued to rise.

Q: Did you have much contact you or the ambassador in Tamil territory?

HAGERTY: Neither he nor I went up to the northern Tamil majority areas. I visited the east coast, the Trincomalee area, twice, I guess. I traveled up fairly far north, but I wouldn’t have gone to Jaffna because I would have been a target for kidnapping. Toward the end of my time, when the fighting really began to be severe, the Lankans encouraged the Israelis to provide some assistance to them. The Israelis have a variety of skills they can offer apart from military skills, including on-farm water management and irrigation and so forth. The Israelis did establish a diplomatic presence finally in Colombo but only
with the U.S. as their agent. That is to say, the Israeli diplomat in town who represented the Israeli government was legally and officially part of the Israeli Affairs Office of the American Embassy. The Sri Lankans shied away from direct relations with Israel so as not to offend the Arabs, who were a major market for Ceylon tea. Once the Tamils got the wind that maybe this meant that we were supporting the government against them or might support the government, then we began to get bomb threats of our own. I spent the last year that I was there with a bodyguard, and so did the Ambassador. Two weeks prior to my departure in 1984, I think, we had three bomb threats at the Embassy. In fact, we were building a new embassy to replace the former residential building we had long used. I was Charge that summer, and when the new embassy was ready, I sought and received Washington’s to approval to move into it, since its security was tighter. We postponed a formal opening until the Ambassador got back. I left the day after he returned, and he had his formal opening ceremony the day after that.

Q: Well, in a way despite this thing having come from Pakistan, it was essentially a backwater, wasn’t it? It can be very pleasant though.

HAGERTY: It is very pleasant tropical island, but from excellent from professional point of view, you know, it was good to be moving up from being political counselor to being DCM. Sure, if I’d gone to DCM of a post the size of Pakistan, that would have been a bigger job. These are the days when we had Class one (e.g., London, Paris, etc.) down through Class two and Class three to Class four posts, and I recollect that Colombo was Class three. We had a USAID mission of over 50 people, and it was a managerial challenge. But it was not on the front burner on the way that Islamabad had been in regard to the Afghan situation.

But as you know, if you worked with South Asia over the years, you were pretty accustomed to not being on anybody’s front burner in Washington anyway, because South Asia doesn’t normally get a lot of attention in Washington and hasn’t for all of the years that I’ve been involved with it -- except when there is a crisis going like the Afghan crisis to focus attention or during the Dulles days when we were recruiting alliances around the world and establishing a cordon of alliances around the Soviet Union.

Q: Was Sri Lanka doing anything with the Chinese at that point?

HAGERTY: They had a good commercial relationship with the Chinese. The “rice-for-rubber-agreements” of the 1950's and 1960's that caused lots of problems for the US Congress were still in existence. A huge amount of the cotton that went into the mills near the Colombo airport that produce shirts and garments for the Western market was coming from China in return for rice for Sri Lanka. So, yes, they had a good commercial relationship, and politically, they were friends, but I had virtually nothing to do with the Chinese there. By the way, I was also accredited to the Republic of the Maldives while in Colombo.

Q: What was going on there?
HAGERTY: Not very much. I would visit Male, the capital, once every three months for a long weekend. After a one-hour flight on a Thursday, I would pay calls on government figures and then enjoy the Islamic Friday on one of their resort islands. They worked half a day on Saturday so that meant I pay another call or two on Saturday or Sunday (a normal work day for them) before returning to Colombo on Monday. The Ambassador would over a month later and do it, and followed by our political officer the next month. So, I was there about every three months, not counting longer leave time there. It’s about 400 miles to the west of Sri Lanka, and a very quiet and interesting place to visit. We had an interest in making sure that the old British facilities that were there on the southern island of Gan did not fall prey to supporting the Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean. But the old facility there, like Trincomalee in Lanka, had declined. Many of its former buildings had been converted into sort of an industrial park producing cotton goods for export under the generous ‘developing world’ quotas allowed the time. We were happy to keep it that way. Since Gan was about 500 miles from Diego Garcia. We once had success in getting a US Navy P-3 to land at Gan to check out the runway. They seemed little interested in doing it again.

Q: P-3 being a?

HAGERTY: A turboprop antisubmarine (ASW) maritime surveillance aircraft. It staged from Diego Garcia. We did have a continuing interest in insuring that that facility stayed out of hostile hands. The Maldivian government was a non-aligned and friendly, nominally democratic but actually autocratic in its structure. There had been a couple of coup attempts earlier, but it was a peaceful place without much going on and without much trade except for cotton exports to the West and fish exports to Japan. We had a Maldivian as our Consular Agent in Male but didn’t have any particular issues with the government. We were just showing the flag.

Q: Well you left Sri Lanka in ‘85 or ‘84?

HAGERTY: ‘84.

Q: I thought this would be a good place to stop, but where did you go so we can put it at the end?

HAGERTY: I came back to Washington to be the Director of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs (NEA/PAB).

Q: Oh, busy time.

HAGERTY: Yes.

Q: All right, we’ll pick it up then.
Today is September 13, 2001. Herb, you wanted to just make a certain qualification?

HAGERTY: Yes. As Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh (PAB), my attention was heavily focused on Afghanistan. But before saying anything else, I just want to make it clear that in what I have said from my years in Pakistan and what I will be saying now about my years in NEA/PAB, I haven’t gone back to check every subject or the sequence of events that occurred. I was out of the Pakistan ‘loop’ when I was in Sri Lanka, and I may have made references then that in fact apply to the period that we’re just about to discuss. I also want to underscore that neither during my four years in Pakistan nor in my three years in the Department as PAB Director three years later, did I have official access or the clearances to be officially aware of covert action programs in which the U.S. may or may not have been engaged at the time. It was obvious to the press and to the world at large that the U.S supported the courageous Afghan effort being made to oust the Soviets from their country, as well as the outrage of the Islamic world occasioned by the Soviet actions there. Although much information is now available from books and articles written by the players about the apparent U.S role in support of the mujahideen most of what I knew and understood at the time I inferred from my own day-to-day observations, rather than any ‘insider’ information or direct involvement.

Q: Okay, then you’re back in ‘84 and you’re on the desk. I mean, you’re the office director, the names changed. I always call it the desk, but anyway...

HAGERTY: The “office,” that is, me, my Deputy Office Director, and four Country Officers (two of whom worked on Afghanistan).

Q: Yes. How long were you there? You were there from 1984 to when?

HAGERTY: Until 1987, three years.

Q: Maybe some of these will overlap, but let’s talk about Pakistan first.

HAGERTY: Yes. I was going to say I think that it became clear to me as I came into the job and came back to Washington to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh affairs, that I was not going to want for help in dealing with Afghanistan. A lot of official Washington was “acting” as Afghanistan Country Officer, often up to and beyond the level of a “seventh floor” principal like the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. As for Pakistan, I had a somewhat freer hand; I didn’t have quite as many “helpers.” Actually, I quickly found that much of my work had to do with attempting to maintain our relationship with Pakistan across a broader and longer-term spectrum of U.S.-Pakistan relations than what a lot of official Washington was looking at Pakistan for, i.e., in the context of getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan.
Bangladesh was the quiet patch in my turf. We had no real problems with Bangladesh, and my Bangladesh Country Officer was highly competent, despite, at times, being my junior-most subordinate. My dealings with Bangladesh were essentially on economic issues that we dealt with through USAID and our AID mission, and the large economic assistance program they managed.

Q: Well, usually in a three-year thing you'd have at least one typhoon or flood or something?

HAGERTY: Oh sure, and I can’t remember. It’s such an endemic thing that during one of the monsoon, summer or winter, a piece of Bangladesh the size of New Jersey floods out. But Bangladesh was otherwise, as I said, my quiet patch. I made several trips out to the area while I was the Director, visiting both Pakistan and Bangladesh (and stopping in New Delhi to see friends along the way and to play a round a golf). Remember that Bangladesh at the time, like Pakistan, was a functioning military dictatorship, and so we had serious human rights concerns in both.

Q: Well, before we move to the sort of the guts of your time, which would be Pakistan and Afghanistan, how did you find during this time relations between your office and the one dealing with India? Because this has always been one of these classic cases… I’m wondering at this ‘84 to ’87; how did this go?

HAGERTY: Well, let me give you a little history. Up until the late 1960s, NEA/SOA (for South Asian Affairs) handled all of South Asia; It was then was divided into two offices, one for India, Nepal and Ceylon (INC) (now INS once Ceylon became Sri Lanka) and the other, for Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh (NEA/PAB). The two office directors at that time, Doug Heck and Jim Spain, insisted that the connecting door between their offices be maintained. When I came back in 1984, the suites had been rearranged, but in such a way that they were still sufficiently contiguous that we continued to have a sense that this was a sub-region in which problems dealt with in terms of U.S. relations with one country impacted on U.S. relations with the others. As I have said earlier, Indians and Pakistanis often saw relations with the U.S. as a ‘zero sum game,’” a gain for one had to mean a loss for the other, despite our best efforts to suggest this was nonsense.

Q: How about, still looking at this relationship, did you or your counterpart on the India side get cables from the ambassadors in either country that led you to sit down and say, well, what’s really happening here and sort of add them together and divide?

HAGERTY: Oh, no question. We were colleagues, sharing information and impressions, obviously. Both offices got all of the South Asia-related cables, so we each knew what the other was receiving and sending from and to the field and, memo form, to our superiors. The key was that at the Assistant Secretary, or ‘sixth floor’ level, as well as at our level, we were determined to make sure that the sense of competition shown occasionally by the Delhi and Islamabad embassies -- and that the two ambassadors tended to reflect in their argumentation to Washington -- was measured against to what
was in the best interest of the United States as a whole, as seen from Washington. We had personal and professional ties across the offices, and more than a few -- like me -- had served in India and Pakistan, as well as other countries in the region. So there was a sense that we could talk to each other about what seemed best for the U.S. You should recall that when the Country Director system was established under Dean Rusk, the former SOA director (Carol Laise) asked Rusk whether he looked upon country directors as representatives of their ambassadors or as his representative to their ambassadors. He was perfectly clear on the latter, and I believe every Secretary since then has reflected this same view. Put simply, the U.S view looks different from Washington than it does from any other capital in the world.

Of course, we also had to support and look after our ambassadors…there’s no question about that. But we believed it was our duty to take what they said and then help our Department masters to weigh their recommendations in the broader context of their Washington responsibilities, i.e., from the perspective of the Secretary of State, rather than from the perspective of an ambassador’s office in New Delhi or Islamabad or Dhaka. There were pitfalls in this, but we always tried to maintain a Washington perspective, even if it occasionally annoyed our respective ambassadors. Apart from that, the other thing at factor was that the INS and PAB office directors, over the years – usually friendly colleagues – sought, if possible, to resolve questions at the level of their ‘fifth floor’ offices, so as to keep the issues in their hands as they worked to present recommendations up the line.

Q: Well, it’s almost dangerous to kick decisions up because the farther you kick them up the less expertise you have and

HAGERTY: You lose control, of course. So when a cable required a quick response, an officer in PAB or INS could prepare a draft and then have the other office review it make sure that it reflected our best combined judgment, while taking into account the views of the ambassador at one or the other post. Then we were in a better position to deal with the often daunting coordination process as the draft cable, with the incoming attached, moved through lateral clearances (if needed) and then up the chain to that ‘magic’ level where someone on the ‘sixth floor” or the “seventh floor” (or occasionally the NSC or the White House) would decide that he or she had the authority to authorize its transmission. And, of course, there were times when the PAB and INS Directors did present divided views.

Q: Who was your counterpart on the India side?

HAGERTY: Well, Grant Smith was and then Peter Thompson. Grant and Peter have both gone on to ambassadorships. Grant, I think, to Uzbekistan, after having been the DAS for ‘drugs and thugs,’ as it was called, and Peter Thompson, with ambassadorial title, in charge of the final stages of the negotiation process on Afghanistan. Then I believe he went to a job dealing with the residue of the breakup of the USSR in Central Asia.
Q: Well, then, let’s move to Pakistan, I mean did the Afghan side almost dictate how we dealt with Pakistan? How did this work out during this period?

HAGERTY: Well, Pakistan was clearly critical, just as it is today with considerations about Bin Laden and Afghanistan following after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Q: And it was just two days ago the World Trade Center was destroyed.

HAGERTY: Two days ago, right. You look at Afghanistan and you see immediately that it is not merely landlocked but is virtually isolated from the world. So you get there either via Pakistan or via Central Asia -- in those days, the Soviet Union -- or you get there via Iran. Other than air, those are the only ways in. Well, the three countries and those three access routes were in fact critical to the ways in which the war to dislodge the Soviets was playing. The Iranians were obviously involved in supporting up to a million Afghan refugees in Iran and -- presumably -- the Afghan Hazara-based (Shiite) resistance against the Russians in western Afghanistan. The Russians, of course, were supplying their effort by air and overland across the Oxus River and then down through the Hindu Kush mountains, where it was being harassed regularly of course. Meanwhile, support from the Islamic world, from the West, and presumably China, was coming into Afghanistan via Pakistan from the many nations opposed to the Soviet presence in Kabul. Contributions consisted of support (and NGO assistance) for the more than million Afghan refugees inside Pakistan, as well as for food aid and weaponry. And on the last part of the route into Afghanistan, such commodities moved westward over traditional routes and by traditional means -- on the backs of men or camels or mules -- through the Sulaiman mountains, as in the days of Alexander the Great, Darius, and Babar.

As I understood it from my Western press contacts, the Afghan mujahideen were operating mainly out of the refugee camps on the border. They would sortie into Afghanistan for several weeks of sustained fighting, then return, handing their arms on to others on their way in or holding on to them -- as have traditionally for centuries. In the later stages, I was told that many sold their weapons for hard cash -- up to $300 for an AK-47 -- certain that others would be available when they went back to fight again.

Q: I mean, so much of this was one of these covert-overt things. I mean the world knew what we were doing, but did you get, I mean what were you getting, what was your involvement in the war, the insurgency?

HAGERTY: I have already described my earlier role. But as PAB Director, my key objective was maintaining a U.S. relationship with Pakistan that assured its support of the struggle in Afghanistan being fought by the mujahideen, while at the same time carrying out our responsibilities -- under tough U.S. laws aimed at limiting the Pakistan nuclear program and monitoring for human rights conditions. So you can see there were problems. With regard to Afghanistan, I worked with our International Organizations (IO) Bureau, for instance, to make sure that we also lined up the votes in various international forums to condemn Soviet actions and to support the Afghan fight against the Russians.
In a series of overwhelming annual United Nations General Assembly votes, we would try to get at least one vote more than the previous year. And we succeeded in bringing the number of abstentions down -- to nine, then eight, then seven, I guess -- in UN General Assembly voting to condemn Soviet actions and to call for Soviet withdrawal. These were margins unheard of for the General Assembly, So, it was big issues and small issues, but it all had to do with the mobilizing support and opinion. I also helped organize a two-day conference at CSIS on Afghan refugees, for instance.

Q: CSIS being?

HAGERTY: The Center for the Study of International Studies. It’s a Washington ‘think tanks’ and I arranged their support of it. Our lead speaker there was Jeane Kirkpatrick, who was then UN ambassador. Other U.S. actions covered a wide swath, but as I said I had lots of help on Afghanistan because lots of other people were involved. There was, for instance, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs on Afghanistan, there was a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; and behind me I had extremely diligent desk officers. There were two of them. One of them was Phyllis Oakley, who moved on to be an Assistant Secretary in her own right; she was followed by Desire Millikan, who has continued on to a meteoric career herself. Phyllis was to become the Department Spokesperson, in part, as a result of her impressing George Schultz in an appearance on National Public Radio and, in general, in her dealing with the press as Afghan desk officer.

Q: How about the NSC because this is, you got there in ‘84 and so Ollie North was still I guess running supreme? Did he cast his eyes over your way or were you fortunate?

HAGERTY: Not really. The only time that I had any kind of awareness of his presence was when a PanAm jet was highjacked to Karachi. That was right in his special operations bailiwick at the time. I was aware that the people that I was dealing with in the Counter-Terrorism Office and in the Department Center were also dealing with him. As it turned out, the Pakistanis stormed the plane on their own, killing the terrorists but unfortunately killing a few passengers also. That’s the only time I was aware of his presence.

There were occasionally problems dealing with the NSC, the usual problems. In particular, you’d send something over, a letter, for instance, with well-considered and thoughtful text, only to learn that it was signed by the President with changes made by the NSC staff without any further consultation with the Department. So the next time you saw it, say as an outgoing cable, it was already “approved” by the President or by someone on his behalf. This left no way to correct errors that might have been introduced into it by unknowing people at that end. That’s been a problem of the NSC system for a long time. During the Reagan administration, it was particularly difficult because, with Reagan, you never knew who actually had signed it off. It was clear that he wasn’t personally involved or signing off all those things. Reagan frequently did not follow up one-on-one meetings
with a Memorandum of Conversation (known as a ‘memcon’). He had a one-on-one with General Zia, and when he emerged from the meeting, he reportedly put his briefing paper on the desk of the secretary and said, “I did it.”

Relations with the NSC staffers were sticky at times, for Department Country Directors in particular. NSC staffers often preferred to deal with more senior levels in the Department, as befit their own sense of self-importance.

Q: What about, was everybody sort of looking over their shoulder at Iran, I mean, here Iran was to use their term, they were our great Satan at the time.

HAGERTY: That’s right, they were.

Q: But yet, they were involved essentially on our side against the Soviets.

HAGERTY: Well, the great thing was that the communiqué published in 1980 by a meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization in Islamabad was jointly drafted by the Pakistani and Iranian foreign ministers. That language stood up for the whole of the war to get the Russians to withdraw. We didn’t have to deal with the Iranians; we dealt with the Pakistanis, and the Pakistanis would deal with them. We were dealing with other members of the Islamic Conference, of course, the Egyptians and the Saudis especially, but we really had no basis on which to deal with the Iranians after the hostage crisis. On this particular subject, our aims and theirs were the same.

The real problem was the Afghan resistance; it was itself divided six ways out of seven with various figures within it being unable to deal with or work with other figures within it, each of them having had a history of warring with each other. One of the great mottoes talked about by USIA at the time was “Let Afghans rule Afghans” or “Let Afghans be Afghans” — a sort of the follow-on to USIA’s earlier “Let Poles be Poles.” But anyone who knew Afghanistan was aware that if you let Afghans be Afghans, they could end up killing a lot of each other. They did this during and after the insurgency, and they haven’t stopped doing it since.

Q: Was there at your level was there any sort of political life to look at in Afghanistan or were you following the?

HAGERTY: As I recall it, the Embassy received had no reporting of consequence from inside Afghanistan. We depended heavily upon the world press, and occasionally, a chance to talk to some NGO or neutral or media representative who came through and had traveled there. But not many people were really traveling to Afghanistan at the time. Some, who were no longer there, would talk a lot about what the Islamic schools were doing in the rural areas. And it was those small Islamic schools that set the tone for what became the Taliban. No question about it, though, if you put the seven Afghan resistance organizations on a spectrum from ultra conservative jihadists to Islamic moderates, the ones that were doing the bulk of the fighting were probably at the extreme conservative
end. We all assumed that those elements received the bulk of the outside support, since that is where it would seem to do damage the Soviets the most.

Q: Well, in a way it's very much the same way I served for five years in Yugoslavia. It was well documented that during World War II that the Communists were the one group that was fighting and the Serbian nationalists and the Chunks and others were spending more time going after each other and so the Communists got the bulk of the equipment and came out on top.

HAGERTY: I guess it was obvious that this was happening in Afghanistan too. We used to get questions about why does the U.S. seem to support only the most conservative Islamics and so forth. But why not? They appeared to most informed observers to be carrying the main burden of the fight. It wasn’t the Taliban either. The Taliban came into it after the main show was over. They had been fighting out in the countryside, yes, but it was after the main battle was over for Kabul that the Taliban moved up from Kandahar and fought its own war against fellow Afghans.

Q: During the ‘84 to ‘87 period, what was the, how did the war go?

HAGERTY: Well, it appeared to go better for the Afghans, for the resistance, partly because they were getting better arms. It was during this time that the effectiveness of the “Stingers” against the Soviet helicopter gunships essentially took the helicopters out of the war. Then on the ground, of course, there were reports of heavy Soviet casualties. And on the Afghan side too. But for the Russians, it began to be a running sore, and it was clear that by late 1986 the Soviets were beginning to look for some way to get out. They had a tiger by the tail, but they didn’t know how to let it go.

It was then when you had an active UN effort aimed at facilitating withdrawal. The UN serves such a useful purpose for situations like this. A special representative was appointed by the UN secretary general, with the support of the General Assembly, clearly with our support and clearly with the support of the Islamic Conference, to attempt to work out some arrangement with the Russians for a withdrawal. That eventually was what happened, but not while I was Country Director. But by the time I left PAB in 1987, that process was playing out, and it looked to me as if it was going to produce what we all hoped it would -- a Soviet withdrawal. It just didn’t work quite as fast as that, but by the time I retired from the Foreign Service two years later, it had produced a success in Afghanistan -- and ultimately in Europe, where the ‘Iron Curtain’ also came down.

Q: I have a feeling the young men were out, you say mainly from the extreme right, fighting the war... You had a bunch of graybeards sitting around, literally with long beards, sitting around in the camps talking a big game of politics and all that. Were we monitoring what they were saying or were they inconsequential?

HAGERTY: They were perfectly happy to expose all of their divisiveness in public, over and over and over again. There was little hidden about what they were doing and the fact
that some of their groups were doing a large part of the fighting. I’m not saying that the ‘gray beard’ groups were totally out of it, they were active too, but they just weren’t as effective. I suppose they didn’t have the religious zeal that enabled the extreme right wing to put up with the casualties they suffered and the dangers and privation they face to put up a tough fight when it was so uneven in the early days. I think it’s quite remarkable that the insurgency continued so well for that long; it didn’t seem to wear down the Russians down like the quagmire in Vietnam did the U.S.

Q: What were the divisions? Is it a religious division or was it a tribal division?

HAGERTY: Among the seven?

Q: Among the Afghan groups, was it down to the clan or family?

HAGERTY: There were clan, family, ethnic, and linguistic divisions, all with long histories. I can’t remember many years later, who was the Uzbek leader, who was the Tajik leader, who was the Pathan leader, who was this leader, who was that leader, but they all had all of these ethnic differences. They had regional differences from within Afghanistan itself that separated them as well. Every one of them would have told you he was a God-fearing Muslim, and they all were. For some, it was a different sense of zeal than it was for others, so that their degree of Islamic orthodoxy was what sometimes appeared to be the most obvious difference, but in fact differences were fundamental in language and culture. And all they all had rivalries and bitter memories going back to the early days of their opposition to and repression by Zahir Shah’s monarchy.

Q: There’s not an Afghanistan.

HAGERTY: Yes and no; Afghanistan is a geographic entity. It was defined by British and Russian agreement at the end of 19th century. But as of the middle of that century, there were three kingdoms. When later under one king, it was only loosely run from Kabul. And even in the 1970s, under the last government in Kabul before the local Communists Parties took over, if that government of the king wanted to be successful in replacing a provincial governor, he had to send army units with the new guy -- a bit like the way the Royal Navy had to change ship captains centuries ago when they had to make sure that the new captain coming in wasn’t killed by the incumbent before he presented his credentials. It was that kind of thing.

There’s always been a strong sense of regional independence across the face of that country in terms of sturdy people with, you know; to say it’s hilly is rather mild. Its main boundaries are mountainous and fluvial, and it’s got an 18,000 foot range cutting right down through the middle of the country, east to west. All of this sense of independence, territorial turfdom, and warlord-ism are endemic in such a country. And in Afghanistan, the internal divisions have been exploited for centuries from beyond its boundaries by
ethnic rivalries that pay no mind to boundaries or the more modern conception of statehood.

Q: While you were in Pakistan, the president was Zia al-Haq?

HAGERTY: Zia al-Haq was President, Chief Martial Law Administrator, and Army Chief. He was moving toward restoring, gradually restoring democratic rule. He held local bodies elections, district councils and then elections were held over time for the provincial assemblies, and then finally -- on a non-party basis -- for the National Assembly. A Prime Minister was appointed, and martial law was lifted, but Zia stayed on as president with enhanced constitutional powers. The then-prime minister visited Washington, had a very successful visit here in the late stages of the Afghan war. Things were going better for Pakistan. Our relationship was on the up swing. We restored a lot of that sense of confidence in us that our failure to come to their assistance at other times had destroyed. And on balance, we had a very good relationship with Zia, despite nuclear and human rights issues. He was, of course, much maligned abroad and despised by the ineffective, and often venal and corrupt, politicians he had displaced at home.

Yes, his rule was authoritarian, but at any given time during Zia’s presidency there were probably fewer people in what I would call ‘political detention’ than there had been under Zulfikar Bhutto, whom he replaced. In fact, the last years of the Bhutto regime were filled with midnight sweeps of people and politicians, and they’d just disappear. Zia was a remarkably “velvet glove” dictator in this sense, and I don’t mean to be apologetic for him. But he eventually did move the country -- albeit slowly -- in the direction to which he had committed himself. His public remarks were often quite candid; he would be perfectly happy to admit that he’d made a mistake. His original commitment when he took power was that he would restore democratic procedures in 90 days, and when he was asked about that in a later press conference after deciding not to do so fast, he said, “Well, I just didn’t know enough about how bad it all was. It’ll take time, but we’ll do it.” When the previous president’s term expired, and he chose to add “President” to his other titles of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), he was asked by the press if he had enough time to do all three jobs. He said, well, he thought it would take only another “fifteen minutes a week” to be President, because all he would have to do was receive ambassadors now and then. His most operative and powerful titles were the other two, and some Pakistanis, in jest, translated CMLA as “Contrary to My Last Assertion,” a reference to his successive decisions to stay on in power.

I’m not saying that Zia wasn't harsh when it came to imposing Islamic penalties. Flogging was installed as a way to deal with criminal actions, adultery for instance, but when they tried to apply amputation of a hand, the old Islamic penalty for theft, they couldn’t find an army doctor who would allow himself to be ordered to do it. I think he came to power with a sense that something had gone wrong with the great idea of Pakistan being the country for all Muslims, and maybe the thing that had gone wrong was that the people weren’t Muslim enough. If being a good Muslim was a good rule of life, then why should it not apply to a nation also?
In fact, he may have been at least partially right. But I think he failed to understand that the Islamic state of Pakistan that emerged in 1947 had very Westernized, secular-minded initial leadership whose main concern was to bring about an end to British rule that did not condemn the bulk of South Asia’s Muslims to be a permanent minority in a free, united, and Hindu-dominated India -- whatever its claim to secularism. I don’t think that Islam was the problem either. South Asia’s Islam -- having existed in a multi-cultural Indian environment for centuries -- was not a sufficient basis alone for the development of a sense of nationhood in modern terms. Pakistan’s often fragmented polity continues to have the same problem, exacerbated by its repeated failures to make its democratic institutions work.

Q: Were we concerned at that time looking around at extreme Muslims or were we keeping our eye on the war?

HAGERTY: Oh we were, I think we were concerned about extremist Islamicists. Clearly it was in our interest to support the Afghan resistance to the Russians. They were well trained and became battle-hardened, there's no question about it, but many of those veterans had nothing to do but to continue fighting with each other when the war was over. There wasn’t any French Foreign Legion to take them in Asia, so some of them gravitated into the Kashmir underground and have been part of what has been going in that anti-Indian insurgency. Others clearly ended up in the Middle East, or returned to Lebanon, so there is this roving band of trained guerrilla fighters who, once an action is over, seek employment in the only thing they know how to do. Look at the IRA; it’s virtually the same thing. There are generations of IRA members who know nothing but this kind of struggle...have no other livelihood. In regard to the Afghan resistance there’s a strong element of that, exacerbated by the poverty, wartime devastation, and the lack of a sense of national identity -- larger than clan or ethnic loyalty -- inside Afghanistan.

Q: What about the Saudi influence there? Was this of interest or concern or not?

HAGERTY: Well, the Saudi influence was very strong partly because of their money, and they were very close to one of the seven resistance leaders who had a Wahabi approach. His name was Sayyaf. The Saudis were clearly seen to favor a more conservative Islamic wing of the resistance as more in tune with their views, although the Saudi monarchy has as little use for terrorists as any monarch does.

Q: I mean you had this nuclear problem we’ve had, we’re up to that and all over again.

HAGERTY: It was teetering all along we were there because we pressed, pressed, and pressed, and we believed our information about what they were up to was very good at the time. They knew we knew, but they also knew what the limit of our legislation was, and they just stayed clear of that limit so that we could certify every year that they hadn’t assembled a weapon. Those who had to make that annual assessment knew better than I may very well have said to themselves that all they need to do is to assemble the separate
pieces, but they had not assembled them and that was what would have triggered the legislation. And the Pakistanis for a time counted on us to not let the Indians do anything to threaten Pakistan. The Indians having tested their own device earlier, and had the Chinese very much in mind at the time. The Indians weren’t doing anything aggressive on the nuclear front anyway, preferring to build up their conventional deterrents.

Pakistanis always saw their nuclear deterrent as a counter, not so much India’s nuclear program, but to India’s vast conventional superiority. The Indian Army is four times the size of the Pakistan Army. The Indian Air Force is five times and the Indian Navy ten times the size of Pakistan’s equivalent services, with more modern weapons at every level.

Q: Were we at all involved with supplying weapons?

HAGERTY: To Pakistan’s armed forces?

Q: Yes.

HAGERTY: Yes, but it’s interesting. We negotiated two agreements with the Pakistanis; the first was for $1.8 billion, and the second, $2.2 billion, if I remember. They were equally divided between security assistance and economic assistance. We sold them forty (40) F-16s, but they were the air defense and ground attack variant, not the bomber variant we had provided to Israel. We sold them anti-tank weapons. And sold them and helped them to get M-48A-5 tanks that had been ‘Dieseled’ and up-gunned to 90 mm guns. At one point in the early negotiations, we recognized that they needed better tanks just on the face of it. Their tanks went back the M-47s we had provided in the ‘50s. So, we offered M-60s, which was what we were producing at that time. But they did not want to go the M-60 route at that time, partly because in a lot of the areas in which they would have to move tanks in Pakistan, road and bridge and railway tolerances would not take anything larger than the size of the M-47 and M-48. So the improved M-48 clearly met their immediate needs at the time.

The Iranians helped them, too; they had a bunch of Pakistan’s M-47s in Iran being up-gunned and re-engined at the time the Shah fell. We didn’t have much influence in Iran, but the Pakistanis did, because the Iranians speeded up the process so that the tanks could get back to Pakistan. On tanks, the Pakistanis were clear in the minds what their limits were; our best was not the best for them. Almost all of the equipment we provided was on a purchase basis with U.S. guaranteed credits at less than commercial rates. There have always been in the Congress stronger pro-India voices because India is democratic and all of that, going back to the ‘50s. But that tended to be muffled because the Pakistanis were supporting a good fight against our main adversary, the Russians.

However, the Congress remained exercised about the nuclear issue, and so we were always walking a tightrope in terms of hoping and doing what we could to ensure that the existing legislation was not amended to reduce our maneuver room. The legislation
always gave the President sufficient flexibility to be able to “certify,” just as long as the Pakistanis didn’t detonate something or put it in our face. When George H. Bush left office, it became the Clinton administration’s to deal with, and it was Clinton’s decision that finally did impose the legal sanctions our laws required.

Q: What about, yes, how did you find, at that time you were in the Near East and South Asia Bureau – with busy Arab-Israel issues, did you find yourself off in a corner or was this a war big enough?

HAGERTY: I was one of many who argued against a separate South Asia Bureau, and even now I think a separate bureau was a mistake, pushed in part by Congressional committee lobbying, eager for a separate sub-committee chairmanship. But to me, a separate bureau would make sense only if it also included the Central Asian “stans,” Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, etc. Without them, the South Asia Bureau is too small to count, even with a population of more than a billion people. In my experience, whenever there were important issues that needed resolution, issues of vital interest in the United States -- like the China-India war of 1962 or the India-Pakistan conflict of 1965 or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 -- there wasn’t any want of attention from the top of the State Department and the U.S. Government. Each time there was a major problem, someone on the seventh floor would take charge of it. In time, it got too big for NEA to handle, especially with Dick Murphy preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli peace process. So the Afghanistan war found its way regularly to the desk of Mike Armacost, then Under Secretary for Political Affairs and, at times, the de facto Afghan Country Director. So, there was never any trouble getting to the seventh floor for action. George Schultz too was very active and was a very important influence on the Pakistan Foreign Minister, with whom he had productive relationship. I sat in on their conversations as a note-taker a dozen times during the time I was PAB Director. They understood each other, and Schultz knew what the issues were, too.

Q: Well, what were our relations in that area during this time? Did the members of the European Union or Japan play any role at all or this is our game?

HAGERTY: Well, let’s see, I think all of our allies supported what we were doing and would rally with us. There was a lot of support from the Europeans particularly on the refugee side. We got the European allies to step aside on six or eight F-16s for Pakistan that had been slotted for Norway or Denmark and the Netherlands, so that we were able to get those planes quickly into Pakistan Air Force mufti. It suited the interest of the northern Europeans, too, since they weren’t quite ready to absorb or pay for them, so it was a marriage of convenience there.

Q: Did Israel play any role in this?

HAGERTY: The problem that every American diplomat in that part of the world has to learn is that everything about U.S. relations with Israel is unique. Nothing counts as a precedent if we do it with Israel. It’s distinctive, sui generis. It sets no precedent for any
other U.S. relationship. We do it because of a unique set of circumstances, and that’s the way I’ve always tried to explain it. I think I’ve been credible with foreign diplomats by explaining it candidly that way.

Q: Were there any other issues that particularly engaged you?

HAGERTY: I think not, I think these were the major issues and they just kept pounding, we kept pounding away at them. They kept pounding away at us, but the overall aim was to get the Russians out and in the end we were successful, but actually after I had moved on to my next assignment.

Q: What about the refugee situation? Was that more or less out of your hands?

HAGERTY: Well, there is a Refugee Affairs Bureau, but as the Country Director I had to be concerned about what they were doing obviously. They had “action” on a refugee matters, and the U.S. contribution basically financial assistance to the international refugee organizations and NGO’s involved. I followed it closely, but I was peripheral to that decision-making.

Q: By the time you were dealing with Pakistani affairs did the day you had in the vault... was that still ringing, I mean, did you keep that in mind or was that pretty well gone by then?

HAGERTY: That was fairly well gone, and as a professional, I believe I was dealing with the issues. One of the things we do as professionals, if we’re going to be good at it, is to take ourselves out of the act and deal with what we're dealing with. So, I put that aside; I didn’t have any hate from it. It’s still a sore spot with me, and I still have reminders of it. It keeps coming back, and as I think I mentioned on an earlier tape, when I summarized that half-day in a chapter of a book I realized that I still had a fair amount of anger deep down that I was able to write about, but that didn’t really influence my operations.

Q: How effective did you find the Pakistan embassy in Washington during this time?

HAGERTY: In a sense, it went from zero to very effective with the change of ambassadors. When I first became Country Director and we wished to convey something that we wanted to ensure the Pakistanis got straight, we dealt through the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad first, then, followed up by talking to the Pakistan ambassador here -- at the time headed by a retired general. Months later, when Pakistan sent one of their best professional diplomats here, one who had been an ambassador in Moscow, Paris, and Bonn before -- and a long-time friend of mine, besides -- it all changed. He and I had a relationship that was very different, and we could count on the fact that he would convey accurately whatever message we wanted conveyed to his government. We also knew that when he was conveying something to us he was conveying it exactly the way he had been instructed to do it. And of course, we always kept our ambassador in Islamabad informed so that he could follow up as necessary, as is the usual custom.
Q: Well, this is all those situations when you don’t really know if you’re telling and this is true on any side of diplomacy, if you’re telling an ambassador how it will be played back in?

Q: Well, in ‘87?

HAGERTY: I’d hoped to go overseas again; my hope had been to go off to New Delhi as DCM, but it didn’t work. I obviously had ambassadorial hopes as well. I’d been on, as I understood it, two early Chief of Mission lists for countries in the Gulf, but none of those had gone very far. I had the feeling that my attraction for a post in the Gulf was because there were so many Pakistanis there. Anyway, I was assigned to INR where I became Director of the Office of Intelligence Liaison (INR/IL).

This was right at the end of the “Iran-gate” crisis, where DCI Casey had been running his own policies, leaving the State Department out of the loop. So, I found myself in a very busy job helping to put back together some of that seemingly lost coordination of intelligence and foreign policy at the institutional level. I had a very comfortable and a very successful two years in that job, working for Mort Abramowitz as Assistant Secretary and John Wiust as my immediate boss. At the end of that two-year assignment, as I retired, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), then Judge Webster, presented me with the National Intelligence Medal for my work.

Q: Well, you were there in what ‘87 to ‘89?

HAGERTY: Yes.

Q: What was your impression of how intelligence gets distributed? One of the things that I picked up sometimes in some of my interviews is that you ask them about, well the CIA is very active there, well did you get much intelligence from them and they kind of look at you and say, not really, they were reporting back to Washington and it has always struck me if that is more of the case, then what they’re collecting really isn’t much operational good to anyone. What was your take?

HAGERTY: I really can’t talk much about that, but I’m not sure I would agree with you. But I have to say that the substance of intelligence was not on my plate in this job. Of course, it is true that in terms of finished intelligence, CIA looks to the President and the NSC as the principal ‘market’ for what it produces by way of intelligence analysis. Most of that CIA product is available as well to the State Department and to the rest of the Intelligence Community. INR produces its own analyses based on much the same inputs, from open-sources to Foreign Service reporting to the most sensitive, compartmented intelligence, both ‘raw’ and ‘finished.’ I think the CIA and INR were generally well respected around town for their analytical capabilities, but from what I heard at the time, DCI Casey did the Agency a lot of harm, firing many experienced people and trying to run his own foreign policy. Since then they’ve had a series of directors, and although
George Tenet, the current director, has established some longevity, that revolving door at the top didn’t do the Agency any good either. But that’s really all I can say.

Following Casey’s departure, and after the indictment of several officials and lot of pressure from the White House and the Congress, orderly and regular coordination between CIA and State was restored, so as to ensure that CIA policies and actions were consistent with broader foreign policy as defined by State and approved by the President, rather than vice versa. And in my job, I was able to play a small role in this process.

Q: How did you find INR, how well was it used in your impression in the policy process?

HAGERTY: INR is a relatively small organization whose main business is intelligence analysis. It was generally respected within the Department and by the leadership of the Department -- its main ‘market.’ It seemed also at times to make a genuine contribution to the intelligence community. But, as ever, the quality of its analyses usually depended on how knowledgeable and experienced the senior analyst for that particular area of the world was. I do think that INR analysts had a good feel for what senior State Department policymakers need and for how they think and make decisions. That’s a tough standard to meet.

Q: Did you find yourself in any, how do you find the country directors and the bureaus, the geographic bureaus using the intelligence at that time? I mean, did they come to you and task you?

HAGERTY: I wasn’t involved in the provision of substantive intelligence; my work was more with the operational relationship between the Department of State and CIA, as well other members of the intelligence community. That covered a wide range of sensitive matters, but it didn’t involve substantive intelligence.

As Country Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, I relied mainly on Foreign Service reporting and the media for my day-to-day information, supplemented, when possible, by thoughtful INR analyses. But time and again, I drew heavily on my area knowledge, based on my own years of experience in and with South Asia. At that point of my career, I was a better judge, I think, of developments in South Asia than many younger and less experienced analysts in the intelligence community, all more or less feeding from the same mill.

But on reflection, what I think is interesting is that if you are dealing with a country or a couple of countries in a policy bureau, you don’t rely a lot on finished intelligence stuff coming across your desk in terms of your geographic responsibilities. But you do find that finished intelligence stuff is very useful for understanding developments in areas of the world that you don’t know that much about, especially in terms of their interaction with or bearing on the policies of the countries for which you are responsible. The same applied to such analyses and reports of wider developments when serving overseas.
Q: Well, I, not too long ago I interviewed Phyllis Oakley, whom you’ve mentioned. Phyllis was very unhappy because when she was the head of INR, she found that our Secretary of State at that time Madeline Albright, basically said, “Well, you don’t have to brief me because I’m getting a briefing everyday from the CIA” which, you know, I mean it may be parochial, but at the same time it’s a little bit dangerous because you don’t want to rely on one source particularly from people who are not in a way action oriented.

HAGERTY: Well, I can understand why Phyllis would be unhappy, and that doesn’t surprise me about Madame Albright. But I would add that INR needs to make sure that it produces something distinctive, that it isn’t just going to repeat what CIA reports, so that it is useful and has, possibly, a different slant that the Secretary of State can actually use. But if INR is producing nothing more that a rehash of what the analytical community is circulating or preparing elsewhere, why should the Secretary of State see them both? Why then should INR exist?

Let me add that I think Madeline Albright was probably one of the worst secretaries of state we’ve ever had; on the other hand, Phyllis, previously my Afghan Country Officer, was one hell of a good officer.

Q: How did you find the defense intelligence productivity with the attaches and all?

HAGERTY: What limited DIA products I saw seemed to me to have useful elements to it, but only when dealing with the military or military/technical matters. Too often, over the years, the DIA product that I used to see -- we’re talking 12 years ago or more -- always reminded me of French press agency, Agence France Press (AFP). They seemed to strive more to be first than to be right. You wouldn’t want to count on what they said until you’d seen it elsewhere, too.

Q: Were there any other agencies, well NSA.

HAGERTY: I had no dealings with NSA. My dealings were basically with CIA, although people who worked for me also dealt with DIA and others.

Q: Did you see any impact during this time of the Contras getting very unhappy over the Iran Contra affair and really hitting hard on what was happening?

HAGERTY: No. That was very much on the background when I moved to INR from NEA, but none of that was on my plate in either Bureau. Personally, I think the public and the Congress had good reason to be up in arms, lots of good reasons. There were officials who were violating the law in the Executive Branch led by a President who managed to have enough Teflon on his back so that he never quite got tagged with it. And if Casey had lived, I believe he would -- and probably should -- have gone to jail

Q: Did you feel at that time that there was a drawing back or I mean did you see an effect on what was being produced?
HAGERTY: Being produced? No, no, no. I simply can’t answer that. I just don’t know enough to have a view. The Iran Contra thing was both a policy matter and an operational issue. It revealed also the corruption that Casey imposed on such matters. There were good people -- some of them friends of mine -- who got hurt in the process, possibly by not resigning at the right time.

Q: Well you left in ’89?

HAGERTY: Yes, I retired from the Foreign Service when I came up against a ‘time-in-grade’ problem. I’d been a Minister-Counselor (MC) for a while, but before that I had jumped through the grade of Counselor (OC) very quickly while I was a DCM -- effectively “losing” the two additional years of “grace” I might have had available in that grade had I remained an OC longer. So, despite distinguished service awards for most of the years I was in NEA/PAB and INR/IL, I was not granted a “limited exemption” from the time-in-grade rule. Of course, I appealed the Board’s decision, but the appeal was denied, and I retired on 1 October 1989, content to be credited -- for retirement purposes -- with nearly 35 years of government service, but otherwise very disappointed.

Q: Well, just briefly kind of what have you been doing?

HAGERTY: I managed to set myself up rather quickly. For a while I thought I might be able to work it out with the Asia Foundation to go out as its representative in Bangladesh. That was my immediate aim; I knew the incumbent would be leaving the following year, and I thought that I had laid the groundwork to replace him. That would have taken me to Dacca for three years. Sadly that didn’t work, but by the time that fell through, I’d worked out several part-time activities that I was quite happy with.

For instance, I began teaching “professional writing” to the FSO A-100 course at the Foreign Service Institute; I did that with every A-100 class for the best part of six years. That was great fun for me, and I enjoyed keeping in touch with the Foreign Service via its new entrants. I also signed a contract with CIA to work part-time on a number of things, including several projects for the Counter-Narcotics Center and occasionally reviewing drafts of National Intelligence Estimates on South Asia at the National Intelligence Council. Other odd things came along, one of which led to a contract with a private contractor to the Department of the Navy which produced and managed politico-military simulations, i.e., gaming. I did scenario writing and occasionally played the part of an ambassador in such simulations.

All of that wound down by about 1995, when I lost the FSI contract. I still retained the ‘gaming’ contract, but Clinton administration austerity moves have cut the money for such activities. However, the Clinton Executive Order 12958 of 1995 on the automatic declassification of classified information 25 years or older, gave me a new opportunity. In the fall of 1995, a friend of a friend put me in touch with the CIA official who was going to be running that program at CIA. He and I connected, and I am now working part-time as an Independent Contractor on that project, where I provide declassification policy
guidance -- based on my long foreign affairs experience -- to those (mainly CIA retirees) who actually review the documents involved for declassification. It is interesting work, and without the earning limitations that I might have encountered in the State Department “when actually employed” rules in program under the same Executive Order.

Q: You mentioned one job that you had, you were teaching writing to the basic officer’s course. What was your impression, you know, one hears about the new TV generation, you know, I mean, we’re two graybeards talking to each other. What was your impression about writing and all the people who were coming up, this would be in the mid-’90s.

HAGERTY: I was generally impressed with the quality of the recruits that I saw coming through. The new FSO’s were bright, sharp, and eager, and they weren’t all young either. The age limit had changed, and I had a few new officers in my classes who were in their early ‘50s, for instance – one of whom a former Treasurer of the State of Alaska.

Generally, there writing wasn’t bad, but they needed work in ridding their product of the undergraduate and graduate school verbiage that it often contained. I taught them to write reporting cables as journalists do, you know, simple sentences with a lead paragraph that spells out the Who? What? When? Where? and, How? of the event being reported. I emphasized to them -- in the words of a former boss -- that you need no more than three sentences, ten lines, to inform the Secretary of State adequately about any development about which he or she needs to know: first sentence conveys the news; the second relates this to what has happened earlier; and the third suggests what it means for the future. When coupled with a substantive subject line, this often was all that needed to be said. But other, the report may need several following paragraphs to flesh out the details.

Other problems I encountered were wordiness and especially the use of meaningless adjectives, including ‘tremendous” and “terrific” and otherwise poorly chosen words. I often had trouble getting the drafters to get themselves out of the story, a problem for both Foreign Service reporting officers and journalists. As I reflected on it, I think that because of talk radio, talk TV, and the degree to which our own newspapers have become so feature-oriented, they often saw themselves as feature writers rather than reporters.

Finally, in my writing exercises, I underscored that reporting in the Foreign Service is writing about people doing things, often half a world away from the intended audience. Memorandum writing, I pointed out, has its own rules, but they reflect much the same need for brevity, simplicity, and clarity as cables.

Q: Great. I think this is a good place to stop.

End of interview