

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR PARKER T. HART

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APPENDIX:

“Faisal – A Perspective of 1945-1965” by Parker T. Hart

INTERVIEW

Q: Peter, what got you into the Foreign Service?

HART: While I was nearing the end of my sophomore year in college at Dartmouth, I began to wonder what I was going to major in for my junior and senior years. A Rotary friend of my father--my father was a strong Rotarian in Boston--happened to sit with me at a dinner one evening and he asked me what I was going to do when I got out of college. I said, "I haven't the slightest idea."

He said, "What do you like to do?"

I told him I liked to travel. I had had quite a lot of travel due to the generosity of my father and had gone on some rather remarkable trips by that time. So I told him that that's what I would like to do.

He said, "Why don't you go into the Foreign Service?"

I said, "What is it?"

He then told me a little about it and said that he thought there was a booklet on examinations given. So when I got back to Dartmouth, I talked to my student counselor and he brought out a copy of an old examination record which they published in those days.

He said, "I think you have to major in political science."

Q: What were you majoring in at that point?

HART: I wasn't majoring. In sophomore year you're still not majoring. At least it was true at Dartmouth at that time. So I made the decision to major in not only what we call government, political science, but also economics. They offered international law there and few other things that were obviously necessary, although they didn't have everything that I needed.

When I got out of college, I hoped to take the exams. They didn't give them because we were in the Depression. There was a freeze on all employment. In fact, there was a cut across the board of 10% on Civil Service and Foreign Service salaries. So I went home to my family, my father and mother, in Medford, and signed up for courses at nearby Harvard and pursued these courses further. Still they didn't give an exam, and so I got a fellowship to study in Geneva, Switzerland. While I was over there, they gave the exam and I missed it. So I came home and took it the next year in 1937 and I was commissioned in 1938.

Q: What were the foreign travels your father had made possible for you?

HART: The first one was in 1927 to Panama where my sister and brother-in-law were posted. He was in the Army at Fort Sherman. That was one trip. The next trip was an exchange trip with Scandinavian students. I lived in Scandinavian homes during the summer of 1928. In 1929 I went out to the West Coast and traveled all around the United States. In 1930 I went to live in the home of a Japanese friend of mine in Tokyo who was returning after three years of study in the United States. I lived in his home in Tokyo for the summer and made trips around the country somewhat. That was the extent of my travels prior to my decision.

I had some more travels after that. My father sent my mother and me on a trip to Europe in 1931 and, therefore, there was a great deal of travel under my belt by the time I got started. It had stimulated me to want to know what makes the world tick a little more than the average student at that time.

Q: Obviously, your father and mother must have had a strong interest in--

HART: My father had a very strong interest in making sure I received the broadest possible education, but I don't think he had thought about the Foreign Service. He was a banker who had worked his way up from being a bank messenger with a relatively slender formal education, but he was self-made and self-educated and he wanted me to have these advantages. He loved to travel himself. He did a lot of it in later years.

Q: Did you have siblings who had similar opportunities?

HART: Not the same. I had two much older sisters. I was a late-comer in the family. One of my older sisters had married an Army officer and he was posted here and there and everywhere so that they got in a lot of travel. In fact, we almost converged once in Rio de Janeiro and later on in the Middle East. So it was around in the atmosphere but it was not

something which characterized people's interests in those days as I remember them. Some of my father's friends thought I was making a great mistake to go to work for the government. He said, "You'll never earn any money there. You'll never get anywhere. You're just wasting your time, your life, and your patrimony to go into working for the government."

Q: Once you made your decision about majoring in political science and the related subjects, did you have any particular professor or professors whom you found particularly inspiring?

HART: Yes. I would say more at Harvard graduate school than at Dartmouth, to be frank about it. I'm very loyal to Dartmouth, my alma mater. The professors there were good but they were not particularly outstanding at that time, whereas at Harvard I had some outstanding teachers, particularly in the fields of history and the history of political theory. They were very, very good.

Professor Charles Howard McIlwain was an extraordinary professor. He infused enthusiasm into his class about a subject which on paper looked rather dull but it turned out to be extremely interesting. It was one of the best courses I ever had. So I spent two years there with some very stimulating professors and a very fine atmosphere.

Q: That was post-graduate work?

HART: That was post-graduate, yes. I took an M.A. at Harvard in 1935 and then I went to Switzerland to study there.

Q: Which was the school in Switzerland?

HART: It was called the Graduate Institute of International Studies. In French it was known as L'Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales. It was bilingual. You could use either language in the course. So I lived with a French family, so as to learn better French, for the first half year and for the second half year with a German family. Then I took some evening courses in Italian. It was a stimulating atmosphere.

Q: How long did that last?

HART: One year. I followed up with a summer in Germany and tried to improve my German by living with a German family there for a few weeks. I then came home.

Q: That must have been helpful when you actually got into the Foreign Service because, by then, you had quite a bit of German under your belt.

HART: That did make a difference because the usual probationary assignments--first post--were border posts in Canada and Mexico. They didn't have to invest very much in you if you didn't work out. It was cheaper to bring you back and the whole operation was

cheaper. In my case, they had in Germany and in Austria--which had just been taken over by Hitler as part of Germany--a tremendous back-up of Jewish applications for immigration visas into the United States. It was a perfectly enormous back-up. They desperately needed people to help and they preferred people who had some German. I was sent to Vienna and I was there for a year, a very memorable experience. I came home just as war broke out in Europe.

Q: You then went on to Belém, Brazil, for quite a long time.

HART: That's right. I had a very short assignment in the Department just a few months in the new Division of Cultural Affairs before I was sent to Belém. I was there for approximately three years, but I was asked to go first to Rio de Janeiro to be briefed on the embassy scene. It was all consular work and Jeff Caffery was the chief of mission at the time. I made some very warm Service friendships there, particularly with Phil and Minette Williams who became very close friends of mine. He took me under his wing as a fledgling and helped me get started.

I then went back up to Belém. There I had been asked by the War Department to do some scouting on infrastructure and landing beaches. They were afraid that Hitler's forces--his Luftwaffe--which seemed to be invincible might come down to Senegal. There was an African program in the Nazi plan of conquest and they might cross over to Brazil and try to see what they could do there. Brazil was totally defenseless. They didn't have any forces of any consequence.

Later on I was sent to the Upper Amazon to the Rio Branco in the far north in open savannah country to see if there was anything to the rumor that the Germans were interested in building an airfield from which they could bomb the Panama Canal.

Q: You must have learned Portuguese.

HART: Yes, I did. I became pretty fluent in Portuguese because I used it in the office except when I was talking with Americans and I used it outside a good deal. I had many Brazilian friends. We used to do a lot of things together and it was all in Portuguese.

Q: In what capacity did you return to the Department in 1943?

HART: In 1943 I came back from the Amazon for about a year in the Department. I was put into the Division of International Conferences which was run by a man named Dr. Warren Kelchner (Chief Division of International Conferences and Chief of Secretariat of numerous U.S. conference delegations), a bachelor and very fine man. He was a very able fellow and I enjoyed working with him. Then I was sent to Cairo.

Q: Was this at your own request?

HART: No, it was at the Department's request. I discovered a couple of things and I should digress for a moment on this.

When war broke out in Europe, there was a period of scrambling around in the Department. Jack Erhardt (Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel, 1941; Minister to Austria, 1946) was chief of personnel. He was feeling the pressure that he was going to lose his Foreign Service to the draft. I told him that I would like to be released to go into the armed forces and he said, "Nothing doing."

He said he was going to send me to Cairo instead. I got to Cairo--which is a fascinating place--but when I got there, I found that there really was not much for me to do. I got very upset and impatient about it and decided to make a move toward joining the forces right out there. There were some unit representatives there, particularly OSS. I went pretty far down the line in getting started and I was set in my mind. However, I hadn't yet taken the final step when a chief inspector named H. Merle Cochran (First U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, 1949-1953) showed up and found out what I was doing and understood why. He took me aside and said, "You mustn't do it. We need you badly. We're going to be in a hell of a shape if we don't protect our Foreign Service people from being used elsewhere and used up. We need you down in Saudi Arabia."

We argued quite a bit because, as I said, my mind set had already gone pretty far, although I hadn't signed any papers. Finally, to convince me altogether he said, "If you do this, you'll never be allowed back in the Foreign Service. I can tell you that right now."

He said it to me with great emphasis and he seemed to be a very sincere man. I like Merle Cochran as a person. He was a straightforward type. What he was telling me, of course, turned out not to be true at all, although I didn't realize it at the time. It shook me because I had prepared so much of my life for this work. When you've got a presidential commission, you don't walk out on it. You ask permission. Here is something signed "F.D.R." on three pieces of parchment. Remember, we got three commissions in those days--as a Foreign Service officer, as a consular officer, and as a secretary in the diplomatic service.

What he wanted me for was to relieve an FSO (Foreign Service Officer) who was sick in Jeddah. His name was J. Harold Shullaw. He said that he wanted me to relieve him and then to go over to Dhahran and open a consulate. We didn't have one but we had received permission from the king to open one. They were going to build a refinery there as part of the war effort. We needed somebody over there who could get the consulate office going and to help take care of the influx of American workers who could get into trouble and would need a lot of help. So I went down there to Jeddah and relieved Harold Schular.

Q: What was there in Jeddah at that point?

HART: Very little. It was an old walled city of about 30,000 people. It didn't have a single paved street but it did have a black-top road to Mecca. Camels wandered right

through the town. There were no public utilities of any kind--no electric lights, running water or sewage system. There was a way of having water, from a water distillery plant which had partially broken down. It was constantly breaking down. We drank distilled water, but because of the way it was handled we always boiled it again. Otherwise, brackish water taken from open pits, was sold by 5-gallon tin lots for general use. It was dug out of the coral reefs and carried in by donkey-back, etc. It was a very primitive city, but fascinating to me as a vignette of ancient Arab civilization.

In any event, I was there for about 2 ½ months. While I was there I made one more stab at getting released to go into the military. We were hearing of the Normandy landings and I just felt like the devil being out of it. I can't describe it but I guess you can imagine. The Department turned me flatly down. This was the third time and they wouldn't have any part of it. So I felt that I didn't really have any choice. I proceeded to open the consulate. I had to travel through Cairo.

Q: Did we have a minister in Jeddah at that point?

HART: We had a Minister-Resident who was Jimmy Moose . He had opened the legation in 1942 in an old building just inside the city wall close to the ARAMCO Building. The company was not yet called ARAMCO. It was CASOC--California Standard Oil--but it became ARAMCO about that time when they took on Texaco as co-owner. They provided us with electric power from their generator. We didn't have any.

Q: Was this the same building we kept until we moved out to the compound?

HART: We kept it and two other ancient buildings under lease until the final move, but by 1949 the Ambassador had moved out to a relatively new mansion-type building which had been built out on the seashore to the north of the city.

To resume my story of travel to Dhahran from Jeddah: To get across to Dhahran is about 800 airline miles straight but there was no airfield and there was no air communication to any location but Cairo, and that was by U.S. military aircraft. There were no roads and no vehicles existed that were in shape for such an expedition. Most were pretty well used up without replacement. You couldn't really drive them safely and would require a convoy. I had to fly around through Cairo, and I was ill at the time suffering from a pulmonary disorder. I went into the 38th General Hospital of the U.S. Army outside of Cairo, and there I met my future wife, Jane, who was a patient there for one of the many gastro-intestinal disorders that Cairo was famous for and still is.

Q: What was she doing in Cairo at that time?

HART: Jane C. Smiley was in the OSS doing cryptographic work and analysis of messages coming from behind the German lines in Greece. We didn't get married for five more years, but we met then and got well acquainted. As soon as I recovered, I went on to Baghdad, Basra, Bahrain, and then by small boat to Al Khobar, the small-craft port of

ARAMCO on the Saudi mainland 6 miles from Dhahran. Just ahead of me was FSO Clarence Joseph McIntosh of our legation in Jeddah who had managed to get ahead of me by ship, because of my hospitalization. Together we opened the consulate.

Q: Did you have a building?

HART: At first, they didn't have any buildings to spare. The oil camp was still primitive. They had built only a topping plant and very limited, simple housing since the war had stagnated everything--no supplies--and they only had about a hundred men who stayed there through the war. In fact, a book has been written about the hundred men ("The Hundred Men," by Philip c. McConnell (one of the hundred), Currier Press, 85 Currier Avenue, Peterborough, NH 03458) of ARAMCO who stayed through that period. They got bombed once by the Italian Air Force. It didn't do any damage to speak of but it was a major long-range effort from Asmara, with light bombs.

We took one-half of a duplex that had been built before the war. That had a bedroom with two beds--double occupancy or more was the rule everywhere. We had a nice little living room and a kitchen.

Q: Had this been built by ARAMCO?

HART: It had been built by Standard of California. It had been there since before the war and there were a number of those buildings. We took this half of a duplex. One-half of the living room became the office and the other half of the living room was for relaxation and social life. Subsequently, they made available to us a rather primitive office in the center of the camp in the utility section. I think we had several rooms there and we put up a flag.

Q: Was your flag imbedded in Saudi soil?

HART: That was it. We got quickly caught up on that and they sent word through ARAMCO--which had the only communication system across the country--that the Saudis said you can have it grappled to the side of the building but you can't sink it in the ground. So we had to rip the whole thing up--to the disgust of the ARAMCO workers who had done it for us free of charge--and have it grappled onto the side of the building.

The Americans were so delighted to see us, they wanted us to fly the flag every day. We said, "We fly it on holidays and special days." We flew it fairly often, but that wasn't good enough for them. They wanted it every single day, if possible. They were homesick.

Q: What were your actual functions as you set up there?

HART: The most important functions were to keep guys out of trouble. Construction men came in to do this work, and among them were some pretty bad apples. Occasionally, we would have serious problems. We had one particularly bad case where two men got into a

fist fight. One of them took a knife and waylaid the other, who was badly stabbed. The case had to go to trial before the Shari'a Court (court of religious law). No Americans there knew what that meant and we didn't know, either. I had to attend the trial, of course, but I must add that before the trial took place, the rest of the construction workers wanted to lynch the knife wielder. To avoid this, I hid him out in my lodging until the mob had dispersed, then smuggled him out of the country, across to prevent angry American workmen from perpetrating "lynch-law" on Muslim Saudi soil. There was no police presence to speak of. It was sparsely populated desert, had no prison system, but Islamic law would have to govern the final result. The main concern was to protect the assailant from sudden death.

We got him across to Manama, but we held him in Bahrain and wouldn't let him go. We had him under informal (and no doubt illegal) house detention.

Q: How did you hold him in Bahrain?

HART: ARAMCO had a guest house in Manama. We used it as a safe house. We fed him, took good care of him, but he couldn't go anywhere. There was no place to go anyway except by aircraft and we could control that, so that he could never get on a plane. Those planes landed on the water. He was really isolated. When the Saudis found out that he was there--we didn't try to disguise it--they said, "You must bring him back for trial."

We felt that it was going to be a difficult problem to get him to come back. We might have to do it by force, but he was persuaded. He came back and stood his trial in a civil case. It was quickly settled, but the King ruled that he was guilty of assault with a weapon. He was given ten days detention and then exiled forever from the country. It was a neat way of getting around the problem, the knifing victim (who was well handled and quickly recovered) was persuaded by his employer to drop charges.

Q: I'm sure the assailant was quite grateful.

HART: We were infinitely relieved because we didn't know if they would take him out and try to either beat him to death or behead him. We didn't know what they'd do.

Of course, the king had a diplomatic problem of his own religious authorities, the ulema. He handled it very well and the man was put on the plane by a giant of an ARAMCO man who acted as a kind of bodyguard and took him all the way to Cairo. From there, he saw him off on a plane for the States.

Q: What were your dealings with the Saudi government and its instrumentalities? Did you deal with the Governor of the Eastern Province, Saud bin Jaluwi?

HART: Saud bin Jaluwi was a little remote at this stage. Later on I got to know him very well. He governed the Province from his redoubt in Hufuf which was a huge complex, almost as big as the Murabba Palace of Riyadh--a walled city with gates, fully controlled

by his police. There was a local officer named Sammy Kutbi, whom we had known in Jeddah and who was a representative of the Saudi government for ARAMCO and U.S. consular business. I would sometimes take problems to him and he would bring problems to me. He had a lot more business with ARAMCO and then with our consular office.

Q: Was he a Saudi?

HART: Yes, he was a Saudi. He was replaced by a much higher ranking person in the Saudi hierarchy of things. Sayyid Sami, as we called him, was a very nice fellow and spoke fair English. Most Arabs didn't speak anything but Arabic in those days. He was replaced by Amir Khalid Sudairi a young cousin of the king. He was roughly my age. The Sudairis are a high nobility, so to speak, in the Saudi hierarchy of bedouin rank and famous in the history of tribal relations. They are very important. I found him an extraordinarily fine person to work with. We exchanged Arabic and English lessons once a week.

Q: When actually did you begin the study of Arabic?

HART: I started a little before that time but there was nothing to grab hold of in Saudi Arabia. When I was in Cairo during that 2-1/2 months that I spent there, I went to the American University program of Arabic studies--the Oriental Studies Department of the American University of Cairo--and took lessons. That was just an opener to break a little ground. Then when I got to Saudi Arabia, I found there was really nobody to teach me. I asked help in finding a teacher from our top Arab employee who was Muhammad Ibrahim Masud--now His Excellency Muhammad Masud, a minister and ambassador-at-large in the Saudi government.

Q: This is Muhammad Masud who was in Jeddah?

HART: Yes. Muhammad Masud found a fellow to come and to try to teach me, but he didn't know how to teach. You don't get very far in breaking ground if you don't have the grammar. I had no book or anything of that kind.

When I got to Dhahran I found a book by John Van Ess on Iraqi Arabic ("The Spoken Arabic of Iraq," by John Van Ess, M.A. American Mission, Basra, Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 1938, reprinted 1941, 1942, 1944) and I immediately latched onto that and tried to teach myself with anybody's help that I could find. Our pouch was carried weekly to Bahrain. The only way we could get mail in or out was through Bahrain. So McIntosh and I would swap weeks--he would go one and I'd go the next. On those trips I would try to talk to the Arabs while consulting the Van Ess book, useful for both standard and Gulf Arabic. In Dhahran, ARAMCO helped me find Suliman Olayan who was a stock boy keeping track of their inventory. He had had Bahraini education and had learned English, British style, quite well. He was not trained as a teacher but he was a very nice guy and an most intelligent. He later went into business for himself and as we know now, he's probably a billionaire [Laughter].

Years later, Jane and I were traveling in 1981 through Jeddah and had dinner at the Embassy with Ambassador Dick Murphy (Richard W. Murphy, career ambassador, retired) as the host. With Suliman present during a conversation with another gentleman, I said, "You know this gentleman here gave me Arabic lessons for three riyals an hour."

Suliman said, "You could have had me for two." [Laughter]

At any rate, pedagogically this was not a satisfactory way to learn Arabic, but it at least broke some ground. The Arabs are very anxious to help the foreigner learn, so that, at least, I got acquainted with the language during the tour. Later on, when Jane and I, newly married came back to Dhahran, Dr. Charles Matthews--an outstanding scholar of linguistics and professor of Semitic languages--was engaged by ARAMCO to teach their own employees. I joined that class and there we went right into Thatcher's grammar ("Key to the Arabic Grammar of the Written Language," by Rev. G.W. Thatcher, 1942, London: Lund Humphries and Co., Ltd., 12 Bedford Square). We went through it as a textbook and studied the structure of the language.

Q: Did you continue to have two of you in Dhahran or were you the only one?

HART: In this first assignment, I stayed there until late 1946 and was ordered back to Washington. There were four of us there for most of the time, at least after the first year. By the time of my second tour, we had at least a dozen people because the responsibilities of the post had burgeoned.

Q: It strikes me that you were rather far distant from any sources of logistical support in getting that consulate established.

HART: It wasn't all that difficult to get it established. We had mail service via Bahrain, where, as I said, the pouch service brought in the necessary things including some very simple cryptographic equipment. We had to get a safe shipped in by sea. That seems to have arrived pretty early. I suppose by that time, in 1944, shipment by sea was getting to be somewhat more secure. In that year I came to Egypt via Central Africa. I came across northern Brazil, to my old post in Belém, down to Natal, across to Ascension Island, and then to the Gold Coast at Accra. I then flew across Central Africa north of the Congo area, through Nigeria, el-Fasher, Khartoum, and then up to Egypt. With a safe and some filing cabinets we were able to settle down to doing business. There was a long time when we didn't have any forms, then a bunch of forms arrived that didn't seem to have any relevance to our work [Laughter]. We had passports and we had to be able to issue passports, renew passports, etc.

I had an impression seal weighing about 5 pounds that stood about 6 inches off the desk-- I don't know if you remember those great big things where you pull the lever? I also carried a booklet of blank drafts on the Secretary of State with stubs just like an ordinary checkbook, but it was engraved nicely. I went to the only bank in Bahrain that I could

find which was Eastern Bank Ltd., a British bank which conducted its accounting by ledgers as in the days of Charles Dickens. Penmanship counted. There was a nice manager who told me he would be glad to take my five-day sight drafts when I had properly made them out. So I used to take those drafts over and cash money--rupee money for Bahrain since the Indian rupee notes circulated there, and old Saudi coins on the other side. Then I had to make up all the accounts every month. They had to come out to the last para and gersh. That was difficult. Discrepancies, no matter how small, were not tolerated and they had to be resolved right down to the last fraction, in currencies not on the decimal system.

The subdivision of a Saudi rial was a gersh and there were 11 official non-circulating Saudi gersh to a Saudi rial. There were also 22 unofficial but circulating gersh, and you used the unofficial gersh for accounting. Then on the other side, there were subdivisions of a rupee called paras, which were something like eight or twelve to a single rupee. This created so many problems of arithmetic that I literally spent a third of all my time getting those petty accounts straight. It was a ridiculous waste of time and effort, but that's what our State Department accountants demanded.

There were some interesting aspects to the job. I got to know Bahrain and the British India service in charge of Bahrain's foreign relations. I also got to know something of the eastern part of Saudi Arabia and its British-protected neighborhood. My consular jurisdiction extended informally from Bahrain down through Qatar to the Trucial Coast and to Muscat, Oman. One of the interesting things that developed was travel to those areas to get to know them and to meet the few Americans who lived there, most of whom were missionary teachers. There was a good opportunity to visit Oman when a U.S. military mission came through in 1946 to sell U.S. surplus army equipment that had been left in Masírah Island and in Salálah, Oman. We had a C-47 at our disposal and we flew into Matrah. After calling on the Sultan, Saïd bin Taimur, and making our business proposition to him, he put some of his ministers on board our plane and we flew together to Masírah Island to look over the equipment. We then flew down to Salálah to look over the equipment there. I guess we sold it for something like ten cents on the dollar.

Q: I didn't realize we had actually introduced military equipment into Salálah.

HART: These were stand-by bases, needed in the propeller age of short-range planes. There were gravel-strip airports with a wind sock and not much else, except some vehicles and drums of aviation gas and lubricants. On Masírah, for example, they had to have distillation equipment because there was no water on the island. They had a number of jeeps and a few trucks, Dodge Weapon Carriers, and various other vehicles such as generators, desalination kits, trucks, and that sort of thing. We had a small contingent of people there who were very glad to get out. The same was true of Salálah which was a somewhat more pleasant place but still extremely isolated. We had just a few things. These were British bases on which we had tenancy rights as allies. Those were being turned over, of course, to the Sultan.

It was an interesting job because it involved quite a panorama of little-known corners of the Arab world.

I was called home for the San Francisco Founding Conference of the United Nations in April of 1945. I then went back to Dhahran at the close of the conference.

Q: You were recalled because of the Saudi presence in San Francisco?

HART: Yes. Warren Kelchner was in charge of international conferences and he had the duty of doing a lot of the housekeeping work of setting up this conference, making all the arrangements, managing tickets to sessions, etc. There were protocol problems. When it came time to the signing of the charter, I stood next to Faisal, later Crown Prince--he wasn't a crown prince then, he was second prince and Foreign Minister--when he signed the Charter. Saud was not there. Although Faisal was titular head of the Foreign Ministry, most of the daily work was left to Sheikh Yussuf Yassin. I got to know Faisal a little bit at that time. Prince Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz was with him, and much later succeeded Faisal as king.

Q: As you look back on that period of opening the consulate, what stands out most in your mind, other than the incredible heat?

HART: You get used to the heat. We were better off than they were in Jeddah. In Jeddah we had at the start, no air conditioning at all for general use. There were two units going in the entire establishment. For all intents and purposes, none of the other units arrived in operable condition. They were broken from rough handling. We lived without air conditioning but we did have circular ceiling fans which we kept going all the time, even at night. That is what gave me my pulmonary problem because I had it going full blast over my bed every night in order to keep the mosquitos off. During the day, if I were in bed sick--as I was for a while--I had to keep it going during the day to keep the flies off. There were no screens either, you know. They had very few utilities.

Over in ARAMCO, these houses in a simple way were air conditioned. They had what they called "desert air conditioning." I think you know what I mean by that--water evaporation systems. That technique was available if you had electric power and you had a few people who knew how to put it all together. In ARAMCO they did. We were actually more comfortable over there than they were on the other side at this early period. Later on that changed, but ARAMCO kept its workers comfortable if it could because their daytime work was right out there in the hot, blazing sun. To be able to retreat into a trailer which was air conditioned desert-style was a great relief. We would encounter these trailers, for example, out in Abqaiq where, at that time, there was no camp to speak of, just trailers on dunes where ARAMCO was doing seismology testing. Those fellows would come in from a day's work and they could go into an air conditioned trailer, even though it was pretty crowded, sit down, and have a bottle of beer. In those days they could get that stuff in.

I would say that the most interesting recollections I have were of my trips in the desert. One duty brought me much travel alone. We had an American group that had come at the king's request to develop an experimental farm at Al Kharj fifty miles south of Riyadh in the desert. There was a large supply of spring water there as a result of geological idiosyncrasies, two very large sinkholes of open and deep water, with pumps. The King wanted to bring that water to some land nearby and see what could be done for crops for his household and family. It was to be an experimental and demonstration farm. We had three dirt farmers with college graduate degrees in agriculture from Skull Valley, Arizona, David Rogers (leader), Carl Quast and Rahleigh Sanderson, plus a guy named Ernie Chambers who was a good mechanic. He kept the machinery going. The people who briefed them in Washington had no idea what the conditions were going to be like. They told them to just rent rooms in a hotel and submit vouchers. [Laughter] If you had a mud hut to shelter yourself in Al Kharj, you were doing very well. There was very little there. They developed a string of mud huts with desert air conditioning, contrived when they obtained electric power from a transportable generator.

They did their work. They subjugated and planted the terrain, brought in the water from the deep pits, and they grew some very fine vegetables. Then the locusts came and destroyed the whole thing all at once--the hoppers, millions and jillions of them. They had to start all over. We had short-wave radio contact via ARAMCO.

I used to drive out every two or three weeks with mail to see how they were getting on, and give them a chance to relieve their isolation and blow off steam. I usually made this trip alone in a weapons carrier, the desert track of some 300 miles included Hofuf (about 100 miles from Dhahran), the Dahna pink sand dune belt and Wasi'a, on the plateau beyond. At each stop there was fuel, water and radio contact. Often I would encounter, standing beside the desert track, a solitary bedouin, holding in his hands an empty wooden bowl. He would not utter a word, nor make a gesture, nor even look in my direction, rather, he would gaze at the route, eyes down cast. I would stop, dismount, take a Jerry can, and fill his bowl. Still in silence, he would nod his appreciation and move off slowly, holding the bowl so as not to lose a drop, and disappear behind a dune where I could assume his tent, with family, awaited him.

Accompanying this group, but not a part of it, was Dr. Glen F. Brown of the U.S. Geological Survey who had been sent out just a few weeks after I arrived in Dhahran. He stayed with that team, but his work was to scout geology for Wrather, the head of the USGS. Glen and I have since been lifetime friends. We have special memories in common.

You asked me what stands out--those trips into the desert were interesting. They required overnight in Hofuf, usually at the guest house of Sheikh Abdullah Al Sulaiman, Minister of Finance. There were certain stakes put up by ARAMCO in the sand, also shields of painted metal on long poles, to show us the way. You just followed these signs and the much-used tracks. When you got into the soft sands, it was a little bit more tricky. We had to cross 30 miles of the Ad Dahná to get out onto the rocky plain on the other side.

That and these trips into the lower Gulf were really very fascinating, and I had a very good time.

The British didn't like having me there officially. They were very suspicious that we were going to take over their last bastions of important income. Oil had been found in Bahrain and Qatar. Oil was being prospected in the Trucial Coast and Oman. The boundaries of these areas with Saudi Arabia were far from settled, but the ARAMCO presence was unsettling.

I was rebuffed, at first in a request to the political agent in Bahrain, for permission to travel to the Trucial Coast. He was Thomas Higginbotham, later knighted. I had to report back to Washington that I had been told by his aide that he didn't see any reason for me to have business in the area, there being no Americans there. The Department took it up with London. London's India Office gave him positive instructions and he sent me a note saying that perhaps I'd like to accompany him on a trip he was going to have to make down to the Trucial Coast and to bring along a 12-gauge shotgun and some ammunition. I did and we had a very pleasant journey, most instructive to me.

I saw how he handled some of these sheikhs of Trucial Coast. One of them, the ruler of Ajman, was accused and judged to have committed piracy against his neighbor, the ruler of Umm al-Qaiwain. The latter's sailing dhow, carrying cargo, had been beached in a storm on Ajman shore, where the ruler had just taken everything that was on board. Higginbotham had to judge that case and he did it right in front of me. He just told the Sheikh off, in Arabic, insisting he must restore the cargo and vessel. Both Sheikhdoms were desperately poor.

Ras al Khaymah was little but a ruined fort. In a later period when Jane and I came back, I completed trips to still other sheikhdoms and we came to know Muscat quite well. It was a fascinating period, on the threshold of great transformation. Oil income had not yet arrived.

Q: In a few years that sort of thing was no longer possible. It had changed entirely.

HART: I did get back in the 1970s. There was a transformation that was almost unbelievable. Outside the cities it was the same old desert. When I first saw Abu Dhabi in 1949, there were jillions of flies but mighty few people, no sanitation, and no public utilities of any kind. As you know, in the space of just 30 years it was totally changed. I must say that, fascinating though it is to see, I enjoyed the old scenes the most. The people were so hospitable and nice and they had time to pass in conversation. They don't have time for you anymore. They are all busy making money. You'd have to find an old timer to sit and talk with, in order to find out what's really going on in the background of tribal affairs. But we have diplomatic missions there and I find that those who have served in them come back very stimulated to learn more about the Arabs and their way of life.

Q: You returned to the Department in 1946 after opening the consulate.

HART: Yes, in late 1946 at just about Christmas.

Q: You were out of the country most of the time since about 1938.

HART: Yes, most of the time.

Q: What did you do back at the Department?

HART: I was ordered back to the Division of Foreign Service Planning which had as its mandate drafting regulations pursuant to the Foreign Service Act of 1946. This restructured the Foreign Service. It was a job which I, frankly, didn't find terribly interesting. But it was useful for me to get acquainted with the structure of the Foreign Service and some of the legal and operational problems and trying to put into effect the general principles of the Act. It was really not my bag. I was rather glad to get out of it after a couple of years, but I enjoyed the people. It was a nice way to get started. The most important thing was that it got Jane and me together again and we got married.

Q: What was she doing by that time?

HART: Jane's experience in Egypt was very fascinating but it only lasted about a year because she became very ill from a variety of infections, including some highly dangerous ones. She finally had to be sent home. She completed her work with the OSS in the State Department, working in research and analysis, evaluating reports from overseas, synthesizing and preparing documents. She always says, "I was there to steal documents from the files of the State Department for OSS purposes." [Laughter] That was because they didn't freely make documents available but they had to have them in the OSS as long as the OSS was running. When the OSS was dissolved, she was transferred to Blanche Halla's Coordination and Review Division. She worked there for a while until there was a restructuring going on and she realized that she wasn't going to get anywhere. So she took a job with the Middle East Institute as Assistant to the Editor of the Middle East Journal, Harvey Hall. She was Book Review Editor and Assistant General Editor. She loved that work. We were married in early 1949. While we were still engaged, she asked me, "Where do you think we'll go?"

I said, "I don't know, but it won't be to Saudi Arabia because I never heard of anybody going back there."

Sure enough, that's where I was assigned, right back to Dhahran because they had upgraded the consulate to consulate general and had some strategic matters very much in mind for the post. It was the kind of a call you couldn't refuse. I was basically glad to go, but it is not an easy place for a woman, although supplies, housing and community living were better than on my first assignment.

Q: The consulate general housing was completed during that period.

HART: Not really. We struck it about midway between what it was in this very primitive period toward the end of World War II and what it later became. It was being transformed even while we were there.

Q: The famous Orris Page?

HART: Yes. I was talking about ARAMCO housing because Jane and I were the last U.S. official team to live in ARAMCO. We had a duplex which was not a very comfortable place but Jane made it as comfortable as she could. We had our first child there and we really had some good times in spite of certain deficiencies in the house.

In the meantime, Orris Page had come out of Tompkins Construction here in Washington to manage the planning and the building of a consulate compound. I have to back up a little bit.

While I was in Washington working for Foreign Service Planning, I was twice detached by Fritz Larkin (Frederick Larkin, Chief, Foreign Buildings Operations, Department of State) to go out to Saudi Arabia to make sure we had property on which we could build an embassy and consulate compound. A negotiation had taken place before I went that established the principle that we would have 25 years of rent-free use of any space that was agreed upon for both the embassy, as it was now going to be called, and the consulate compounds. We had to pick sites and to agree on the rate at which we would pay rent after the 25 years. So I had my instructions from Larkin's office and I was sent out twice--once in the summer of 1947.

I spent most of the summer in Jeddah. We had a much larger staff in Jeddah at that time, some very nice people and the foreign community had grown. I picked an empty area on the shore that I thought was most suitable, called Ru'ays. It was on Saudi government land and encompassed a very primitive little golf course put there privately by the foreign community. There were no greens, there was not even grading or sifting of the fossilized coral. Nevertheless, we had a nine-hole course with poles and rags to mark the holes. I felt that this might do because there was a project to bring water from the Wadi Fatima for the Beni Harb tribe to water their flocks of sheep. Further, the location was upwind and well out of the city, which would grow in that direction. So I recommended the site to FBO .

Negotiating about the rent that we would have to pay at the end of 25 years proved to be a complicated business because the Saudi ministers wanted a lot higher rate than we were willing to pay. I had been told I could go as high as two per cent of the original cost of construction, not the replacement cost. Sheikh Yussuf Yassin, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others wanted ten per cent and so did Sheikh Abdullah al Suliman, the Minister of Finance. For awhile we were stuck.

Reeves Childs who was the U.S. Minister Plenipotentiary and who later became Ambassador didn't help much. Without authorization, he tried to split the difference to make it five per cent. The Saudis seemed ready to agree. This made FBO mad and they made clear their disapproval of his intervention. Keeping the Ambassador informed, I now asked for permission to call on His Majesty, the King. I had met him in Riyadh before in 1946 during the time that the Dhahran airfield was being built. Immediately I received agreement that I could see the king. He was over in Hufuf, main city of the Eastern Provinces, taking the waters. He even sent a C-47 for me as I was in Dhahran at this time. I went to see him and took along an interpreter. To my surprise, I found Sheikh Abdullah al Suliman there and we met at his house. The king asked, "Now what is this trouble? We shouldn't have any difficulties between us. We're friends."

I agreed we were friends, but explained that the Saudi government was asking an exorbitant future rent for property now vacant.

He said, "You know, you can't really own property in Saudi Arabia because we have a very old law. It goes back to the time of the Turks. You can rent it but you can't own it. How much do you think you should pay?"

I said, "Your Majesty, I don't think we should pay anything. It's a piece of empty desert."

There was dead silence. I could see he wasn't going to go for it, so I said, "I am, however, authorized to go as high as two per cent of the cost of construction."

He turned and said, "Abdullah, that's reasonable."

Abdullah looked at me and said, "I'm sorry you came here." [Laughter]

The result of it was that Fritz Larkin brought me out the next year (1948) to nail down the sites for the Jeddah embassy and the Dhahran consulate. I had selected for Dhahran a few acres on the Jebe (hill) in the concession area, well below the ARAMCO camp, breezy and overlooking the Gulf. Ground water had been tapped by ARAMCO. However ARAMCO didn't like giving us this site. They wanted to keep it reserved for their own expansion. They used all kinds of persuasion to try to get us to go down to Dammam, the "city of the future."

Dammam was a sinkhole in those days--on the sea, smelly, hot, very humid, no view, no breeze, isolated. Later, of course, it became quite a city, but in the 1940's it was not attractive at all. Being up on the Jebel you would be near the American community we were to serve, had proximity to the new U.S.-built airport. Fritz Larkin then had a real tantrum with ARAMCO's management, which broke down and reluctantly agreed to relinquish the site. It was not a very pleasant encounter, but when it was over and the agreement made in principle, they sent around Tom Barger to help us mark it out. Of course, Tom was just the salt of the earth, delightful in every way. Fritz Larkin melted and asked me why ARAMCO had not used him as negotiator in the first place.

When Jane and I came back in 1949, construction was already advanced on that site.

Q: You then returned to Dhahran with a wife. What are your recollections of that period?

HART: I think I should straighten out the chronology. I was detailed out from my job in Washington with the Division of Foreign Service Planning and in the summer of 1947 to negotiate (eventually with King Abd al-Aziz) on the rental rate, and to pick sites for our embassy and consulate. I accompanied Fritz Larkin to firm up the choice of sites in 1948. The return with my wife was in June of 1949.

We arrived there in the mid-afternoon and it was extremely hot. I'll never forget it because Colonel Richard J. O'Keefe, USAF, in command of the airfield at Dhahran, had ordered out a welcome guard. It was flattering as I was just a consul general. The post had been upgraded for policy reasons and O'Keefe was about to be promoted to Brigadier General. He wanted to make a show out of the all round upgrading. However, it was terribly hot and I felt very guilty towards those men who were standing at attention all that time.

Q: What season of the year was it?

HART: It was in June. It was about three o'clock in the afternoon, at the very height of the heat. Later on we had tested the radiation temperature from the tarmac at about that time of day and it was 154 degrees. When we got out of that plane it was like walking into an oven. We walked up and down the line as directed the honor. I thought to myself as we were doing this, "I'll bet every one of those soldiers will hate our guts for what was done to them." I never saw any sign of it afterwards. They were all very nice fellows, but they were certainly putting up with a lot to go on dress parade at three o'clock in an afternoon of June.

We were also met by the staff of the consulate general. They were housed in Quonset huts on the base because there were not enough permanent facilities to accommodate them. The USAF expansion and upgrading of Dhahran airfield involved taking over all of the stone buildings that had been built back in 1946 and which had been idle for most of the time since. They were now being used--practically every inch, by O'Keefe's command.

Our people had an office in a Quonset hut on the base and we called it the "Quonsulate." They also lived in Quonset huts. They were good sports and were able to get properly fed, had access to movies and other entertainment on the base. They had some air conditioning--those Quonsets were equipped with mobile window units. However, the situation was crowded and spartan. It was an effective operating office, but called for teamwork and good nature.

The consulate general compound was under construction and proceeding very slowly and not very efficiently. Quarried limestone (from a hill east of the airport) was being used for

buildings which we could see might be in full use after another year or two. Jane and I were allocated space in ARAMCO and we were the last U.S. officials to live in ARAMCO's housing. That was an arrangement to last only until our own quarters were ready. As it developed, they were not quite ready some two years later when we left, although the rest of the staff had moved in and the "Quonsulate" had disappeared.

Q: What were the principal and substantive developments during your second tour in Dhahran?

HART: There was a considerable focus on Dhahran by our military as an important staging place for propeller-driven aircraft. The containment policy of President Truman was in force. We arrived in 1949, and as you remember, a year later in June of 1950 the Korean War broke out. Even before it broke out, the mood in the United States Government was tense and the military were doing an awful lot of planning pursuant to the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe, the Soviet threat to Iran, the threat to Turkey, etc., all the history which you know. The result was an upgrading of Dhahran airfield, an identification of that field in our strategic planning. The old king was still alive, Abd al-Aziz, and he didn't mind a bit this close identification with the United States. As long as he was alive, it meant to him an ultimate security for his kingdom. He, his family and his subordinates all reflected a desire to have a close relationship with the United States, and at that particular juncture they were not excessively worried about Arab opinion in neighboring countries. That came later.

To give you an idea of his attitude, Richard J. O'Keefe--whom I mentioned earlier--was a colonel and promoted to be brigadier in the Air Force. The king had apparently taken a shine to him and had told him, "Look, I want you to be my commander at Dhahran airfield as well as commander for the U.S. You will be my man as well as Washington's. You represent me." O'Keefe wired his headquarters and the State Department backed up acceptance of his dual role.

Well there weren't any troops at that time to be in command of, as far as the Saudis were concerned, but there would be a handful of people around him who would represent the Arab interest. O'Keefe wore two hats, so to speak. This was an unusual situation and I encountered a reflection of it later in another context with his son, when his son became king--King Saud. O'Keefe was a hard-working commander, not very popular with his people in some ways because of his rather close adherence to the rule book and his sensitivities. He was a good figure to have there at the time because he was effective and he got along very well with King Abd al-Aziz.

We made trips together to see the king on airbase matters. My going to see the king had to be cleared with the embassy in Jeddah, as I was not an emissary to the king. These were working visits to accomplish some problem. O'Keefe would ask that I would go along with him.

Q: Who was our ambassador in Jeddah at that point?

HART: When we first arrived, it was Reeves Childs. Within a year or less--I've forgotten just when--he was made Ambassador to Ethiopia. He was replaced by Raymond A. Hare. It fell on Ray Hare to negotiate with Sheikh Yussuf Yassin, the Acting Foreign Minister--he was actually titular Deputy Foreign Minister but he was doing most of the work as far as the foreign ministry was concerned--to negotiate a status of forces agreement called the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. The Dhahran Airfield Agreement set out the privileges and responsibilities of the United States in connection with the field and it took quite a long bit of negotiating. To get the story on that you really ought to talk to Ray Hare because he would remember it as you trigger things in his memory which are very interesting indeed. Sitting in Dhahran I was reading the traffic as it went through--that is, his reports came to me for information because it concerned our immediate area. In any event, while they were exacting and difficult negotiations, basically the motivation on both sides was, "Let's get it done."

They got it done and we had a very good agreement built on a five-year period near the end of which one-year notice could be given to renew or to revise or to annul this arrangement. It carried on actually for many years. In fact, I'm not up to date, but I think it is still in effect in most of its basic aspects although I don't know the details. It may well have been revised, not so much by formal agreement as by mutual tacit consent. Negotiating agreement of that kind--as I was to find later--involved almost as much trouble with Pentagon lawyers as with the opposite party that you're negotiating with.

My mandate in Dhahran also involved other responsibilities. I was head of what was known as the Dhahran Liaison Group. That was for contingency evacuation planning of Americans in case of war with the USSR. The Dhahran group area, which had its focus right on my desk, included not only the Arabian peninsula but also Iran, Pakistan--which was newly established--India, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan. In 1950 I had to travel to the different countries of the Dhahran Liaison Group area to ensure that their evacuation planning was coordinated and brought up to date. I made that swing with the deputy commander of the base, Lt. Colonel Curt Frisbie, in military aircraft.

For purposes of reconnaissance and updating my knowledge of the place, I also visited the Trucial Coast, Qatar, and Bahrain. Bahrain I visited fairly often. Over there was Colonel Sir Geoffrey Prior, relocated from Búshehr to Bahrain as political resident of the Gulf, a position which was then taken over by Sir Rupert Hay when Sir Geoffrey retired. These were men out of the old British India army and political service because, even though India had become independent by this time and Pakistan was established and independent, the personnel in the Foreign Office were not as acquainted with this area as were those of the India Office. Britain gave certain of these former political agents of the India Service contracts with the Foreign Office for periods of two or three years. Instead of immediate retirement, they would take those contracts and work in the same positions as before but not with the same duties. Prior to independence, political agents in the Gulf, serving under their political residents, and thus in turn serving under the British government of India, were enforcers of old treaties with Gulf rulers. They were keepers of

the peace but also judges in the event of a clash between one Arab Gulf state or between a Gulf state and any foreigner.

I found examples of that during my early career and how they behaved in these situations. I attended court hearings. I attended a session with Thomas Higginbotham, political agent for Bahrain, who later became Governor of Aden. He sorted out disputes over what looked like an act of piracy by Ajman against Umm al Qaiwain, one of whose vessels in a storm, had been beached on the shore that belonged to Ajman and whose ruler had seized the vessel and all its cargo. He was forced to give it up by Sir Thomas since British treaties with the Gulf rulers required that all foreign relations of any of these sheikhdoms, even with a neighboring sheikhdom, were to be handled by the political agents. Since independence of the Gulf rulers (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial Coast--now the United Arab Emirates) British treaty relations no longer include these old capitulations, nor any magistrate functions whatsoever. British envoys became diplomats and not all of them settled into that new role very easily.

Rupert Hay was a very broad-minded man and very able. We took to each other and had a good relationship. I visited him with Jane as his house guests in Bahrain and he returned the favor in Dhahran with his wife, Sybil, and stayed with us for a while.

Q: Had the British at that point begun their later practice of assigning as deputies to the political resident of the Gulf people of the foreign office?

HART: Yes. But the men that I'm talking about are the old India Office men who were political agents under a political resident, etc. Others I think were pretty junior. We got to know Patrick Stobart pretty well who was a junior political officer on the Trucial Coast. He was a Foreign Office man under the political agent in Bahrain, and was in charge of immediate external relationships of the various Trucial sheikhdoms and their inter-relationships. Jane and I got to know him in Bahrain. I visited him in the Trucial Coast from an American warship on a courtesy visit. He came on board and I had to be accompanied by him when we called on the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, who was Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan. He was a small, amiable chap whom we entertained at dinner aboard and showed him a movie which I had to try to explain to him in my weak Arabic. We then visited him on shore.

Abu Dhabi at that time didn't have a single road. It had no public utilities of any description and it had no pier. Conditions under which people lived were absolutely miserable. The sheikh's quarters were a two or three-storied building made of local faroush, the sun-dried mud that is cut and raised from the tidal bottom along the shallow east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. You are aware that this salty mud consolidates into a crust under the shallow warm water and hardens after a while. You can cut out slabs of it of any size you want and you can raise it to make a whole wall section out of it. Houses and buildings were built that way in the Gulf generally and on the Saudi east coast. In fact, the only coastal Arab buildings other than old forts, were built out of that material when I first went to the area. Cheaper houses were barrastees made of palm fronds woven

together. Such was the entire village of Al Qatif and the smaller nearby villages of Dammam and al-Khobar. Qatif was the largest coastal community. Down in the Lower Gulf they used much the same type of construction but the styling was different. They built large wind-towers above the sitting room (majlis) to trap breezes from any direction.

Q: In effect, you in the consulate general had to have relations with two U.S. military commands--the Air Force in Dhahran airfield and the U.S. Navy in the form of Comideastfor in Bahrain.

HART: Yes. I visited Bahrain quite a lot, partly for that reason. I believe that our pouch service by this time came directly into Dhahran and didn't have to go through Bahrain as it had on my first assignment in that area. We had good radio communications between Dhahran airfield and the Navy headquarters in Bahrain. It was reasonably good so that we could get messages back and forth. For example, if an American ship was coming in and I wanted to go aboard or there was some reason to consult with the head of Comideastfor in Bahrain rather than in Dhahran (where he could come any time he wanted to), we would arrange those things. Also we would arrange a cruise on board an American Navy ship for good-will purposes to visit some of the sheikhdoms. I mentioned our visit to Abu Dhabi. We also went to Muscat. Jane flew in by an Army plane to Beit al-Fallaj, just outside of Matrah. I went in by ship. You couldn't carry a lady passenger on a U.S. Navy ship. So I went back on the ship and she flew back to Dhahran. It was a very fascinating experience for her as it was for me. I had been there before and things hadn't changed a great deal on the ground because Sultan Said bin Taimur was still the Sultan and continued to be through my period out there--the ruler of Muscat and Oman. He gave us a very courteous reception. It was just a good-will visit.

Q: Was he sociable and welcoming?

HART: He was welcoming and very courteous. He spoke impeccable English. He had been educated in the College of Princes in Ajmer, India. He wore on his head a turban which looked to me rather Indian--rather brightly colored and a valuable piece of fabric. His dress, otherwise, was strictly Arab. He wore a thobe and a mishlah, like any Arab of the Arabian Peninsula. I always found this symbolic of the man. His outlook was much more oriented toward the Arabian Sea and India than it was toward the Arabian Peninsula. His body was Arab-African. He had a mixture of African blood in him. Among his forebears had been Said bin Sultan, of the mid-1800s, who had been a potentate in that whole region. His merchant fleet was the largest in the Indian Ocean. His political control extended all the way down the African coast to Zanzibar--in other words, to the Equatorial area. He was known as the Sultan of Oman and Zanzibar.

Q: Isn't Socotra in that as well?

HART: Socotra was, as I recall it, definitely in it and so was--at least in some kind of relation of suzerainty--the whole south coast down to Aden and around. Not up into the Red Sea particularly, but around the bend and across to Africa and then on south.

Q: I asked if he was welcoming because he did have a reputation of being very in-grown, reclusive, absent from the modern world.

HART: He was absent from it by design. He was by no means absent from it in his education or in his culture. He loved to go to England and did so about once a year or so. When transportation improved, I guess he went every year. He was very pro-British, although he was by no means under British protection.

This was something I had a little trouble with a lot of our people in Washington to get them to understand that this was a sovereign state in British eyes. They gave a 21-gun salute whenever they made a visit to Muscat. The Sultan was not obliged to accept a British advisor. He elected to accept a British foreign minister who was simply his messenger boy for anything he wanted to do. He ran his own foreign affairs, such as they were. There weren't very many. He didn't have any relationships he did not wish to cultivate. He wanted to be left alone. He was obviously afraid of modernization and did absolutely nothing that I could ever identify to develop his country. At the time I'm talking about he didn't yet have oil, nor any oil income. So he was pretty poor and you couldn't blame him for not doing much because there wasn't much to do with. But he was definitely insular. His relationships were mainly with Great Britain, and then as we developed a presence, with the United States. He didn't have any interest in a relationship with his big neighbor, Saudi Arabia, and for that matter he didn't show much interest in a relationship with Trucial sheikhs or any of the Gulf rulers.

He also had a British officer seconded to him in charge of his Muscat levies. They were a small group of Baluchis who constituted his little defense force and that was all there was.

Q: Was his son anywhere in evidence?

HART: Not at all. I never even heard about him. He listed the children he had--he had a large family--but I didn't get to meet them.

Q: Did he seem to be aware that his country had had a very early treaty with the United States?

HART: Yes. At the very first meeting I had with him, I reminded him about the visit of Edmond Roberts in 1833. Yes, he knew all about that. He was a man who was well informed about the history of his country and about its foreign relationships.

I also found out from him a lot about his boundary claims. In 1949 ARAMCO, getting its go-ahead from the Saudi government, began to spread out its exploration activity in the Gulf and down toward the lower Gulf on the mainland. This was on advice from no less a person than Dr. Manley O. Hudson, a renowned professor of International Law at Harvard

University whom I had met many years before and who, on retirement became an international law consultant. King Abdul Aziz said, "Yes, these islands are mine."

He wanted a map, etc. He also said, "Down here in the Trucial Coast in Buraymi we have a position."

This was prompted by some of his advisors and caused a lot of trouble. That's another story--a long one.

When I was visiting with Said Bin Taimur he pointed out on the map where his Buraymi position was. He had an agent -- a wakil -- in one part of the Buraymi complex. There were really three parties to what developed into the ultimate dispute between Saudi Arabia, the Trucial sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi and Muscat.

Q: Do continue with what became the Buraymi dispute, ARAMCO's role, and your role.

HART: ARAMCO had the responsibility under its concession of developing oil resources wherever they were within the kingdom in the concession (eastern) region. That was a very large region. Their concession area went deep inland and went down the whole length of the coast. The problem for ARAMCO--which you can't blame ARAMCO for really

--was that they didn't know where the boundary was on the eastern coast. In fact, nobody seemed to know exactly but the British had one point of view and the Saudis had another. Of course, the king was persuaded at that time by his advisors to extend the claims as far as he thought he could. Buraymi became important because it was close to a structure that ARAMCO's geologist believed could be oil-bearing near a mountain called Jebel Hafit. Buraymi was a cluster of rather miserable little villages in the sands, carrying several names, about 110 miles inland from Abu Dhabi town, in the general direction of Oman.

The thought that the Saudis had was that, at one or more times in the past, Zakat (religious taxes) had been collected by Saudi officials from the inhabitants of the Buraymi hamlet called Al'Ayn. This hamlet (today a real city) is part of the Buraymi complex, but is not the Buraymi village per se. There is a single village called al Buraymi, and the general expression used for the whole cluster is al-Buraymi.

Based upon that thesis the Saudi Government asserted that: "Buraymi is Saudi, it should be and we claim it." They really meant al-Ayn.

I was fairly close at that time to Amir Saud Bin Jaluwi, viceroy of the Eastern Province. I think I described in an earlier tape our relationship. When I came back on the second hitch to Dhahran, Bin Jaluwi was very pleased that anybody would come back to a place that was pretty raw and not very comfortable to live in and not very attractive, for a second tour of duty. He said, "You must be a friend."

He was very cordial to me, and invited me to bring my bride out to Hufúf and spend some days visiting out there. I did--that's another story. In any case, one day I spoke to him and said, "By the way, I've been going around the area. Does Saudi Arabia have any jurisdiction in Buraymi?"

He said simply and emphatically: "No."

I knew that he was closer than anybody in Riyadh to the background, probably better than the king. At least he knew it a lot better than Sheikh Yussif Yassin who was a Syrian nationalist, expelled by the French from his homeland and who had come in many years before to the King's service. Specifically, he had said to ARAMCO, "Buraymi is ours."

I reported Bin Jaluwi's statement to the Department of State. I stood by it, of course, when consulted by ARAMCO. The discrepancy embarrassed ARAMCO and embarrassed, I think, the Saudis, but I never heard complaint from Bin Jaluwi that I had misquoted him. Years later when I was Director of Near East Affairs and Prince Faisal made a visit to Washington at the close of the Truman administration, he took me aside and said, "You are not with us on this problem of Buraymi."

I said, "No, I'm not, because I don't think it is correct."

Years later when I was being nominated as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, I thought maybe this would turn the Saudis against me, but it didn't. As you know, Buraymi ceased to become a serious question in the course of the 1960s because there were bigger questions that faced Faisal. He was not anti-British. However, was a hot issue when the old kind died in 1953. Crown Prince Saud, his son, assumed the throne. Saud was not a well-educated man and didn't have as good judgement as his half-brother Faisal. He was very anti-British about Buraymi and tackled John Foster Dulles when Dulles made a visit out there in the early part of 1953. Saud invoked the Truman general pledge of support of 1950, contending that in this dispute the British were absolutely wrong and were claiming a piece of Saudi territory. He was saying that the U.S. must do something about this. He weighed in very heavily. Finally, Dulles became annoyed and said, "Are you asking us to declare war on our ally, Great Britain?"

That put Saud back on his heels a little, but the bitter dispute over this question lasted throughout the 1950's.

Q: Wasn't it basically an underlying contest between the reach, respectively, of American versus British oil companies because Buraymi really decided how far inland they were into the peninsula British oil companies?

HART: This was an oil rights dispute but to the British it was a lot more. They felt that they had retreated enough when they ceased to press for the old 1913 frontier line which they had drawn right down the central part of the Arabian Peninsula, through the empty quarter, or Rub al Khálí from north to south, and that everything to the east of that line

was under British protection or in the British sphere of interest. They had retreated enough so that they claimed quite a slice of peninsula territory south of the khor al-'Udagd, which was at the base of Qatar peninsula and ran inland south to include the oasis of Al Jiwa and then forked up toward Oman where it intersected the Omani line. These were negotiating lines that the British believed were based on tribal realities which gave allegiance to the sheikhs on the coast, the various sheikhs who were later called emirs.

As you may remember, the dispute heated up while I was Director of Near East Affairs. I assumed that desk in 1952 in Washington after I'd been at the National War College for a year. One of the hot items on our desks was Buraymi and I talked a good deal with my British counterpart, Ronald Bailey, later Sir Ronald Bailey, who is a very agreeable and sensible fellow. One day I suggested, "Why don't you arbitrate this question?"

There was a period of no response to that, and finally he came in one day and said, "We've agreed to arbitrate."

I said, "I think that's fine."

So the arbitral board was set up--it was an international one--and it seemed to be going along all right until two things happened. One was that Sheikh (late Amir) Turki al-Utayshan, whom I knew, was sent in by the Saudis with a bag full of sovereigns to try to claim this territory of Al 'Ayn. He moved in with some men and British levees chased them out. Patrick Stobart had a hand in it as political officer for the Trucial Coast sheikhs.

Q: What year is this?

HART: I was back in Washington as Director of Near East Affairs in 1952. Just when this particular incident occurred, I'm fairly sure, that it occurred in 1949 or 1950. Later, the arbitration procedure began about 1953 or 1954 and seemed to be going along all right, when suddenly it was abruptly terminated by the British who announced that one of the members of the tribunal had been suborned by Saudi money. He had been bribed and the British had proof of it. I believe it was a Pakistani, but I'm not sure. The result was that the arbitration was scratched right there. The British fell back on the use of local force, if necessary, but only if necessary. They were very discreet about the use of force. They didn't overdo it. They didn't want to have real trouble anymore than was required to defend their boundaries of their protected sheikhs from threat of take-over.

The dispute over boundaries just rocked along over the years that followed. I learned later that the Jebal Hafit geologic structure turned out to be not as interesting after all as it once appeared. This made a difference in the atmosphere. In other words, nobody was crowding the question particularly, pushing hard on it. Also the dispute was complicated by the claims of the Sultan of Oman in the Buraymi area. For a while there was no real negotiation. The British did not abandon their role of protector of the frontiers and security of all these sheikhs by reason of the independence of India. Their special treaty relationships with the individual sheikhdoms continued. It wasn't until 1971 that these

treaties were superseded by British recognition of the Trucial rulers as sovereign states. Buraymi, by that time, had ceased to be a very hot issue.

When I was ambassador in Saudi Arabia during the period 1961 to 1965, Buraymi was hardly mentioned. Faisal was so exercised about the Egyptian encroachments and the Russian moves into the area with their fishing fleets, which he said were all rigged for electronic surveillance and espionage, that he was glad to have the British around as friends. He wasn't pressing anything on Buraymi. By this time, of course, oil was beginning to move into the economic arteries of the sheikhdoms and things were beginning to change anyway so that the issue just subsided the way things do in the Arab world. Instead of pressing it too hard, just let it die slowly.

I wish that I could give a more complete story of the diplomacy of the latter period, but I can testify that between 1961 and 1965 it was totally shelved and not pressed on the Saudi side. Whatever happened after that, maybe you would know.

Q: Now in a sense it's resolved itself in favor of the non-Saudi position, and that Al 'Ayn is totally a part of Abu Dhabi and is the headquarters of the University of United Arab Emirates. This really ties it into it. I think that's the reason for that.

HART: Obviously, the Saudi claim was rather shaky anyway and it was based upon some 19th century collection of the zakat. Rulers collected zakat where they could in those days, but it doesn't mean that you could consider it a boundary claim in the usual Western sense of the word.

Q: I always had a feeling that it was ARAMCO's researchers who found most of those tax records.

HART: No doubt about it. The research couldn't be done by the Saudis at that time. They had no means of doing it. ARAMCO was able to employ expert researchers and they did. Of course, the results of these researches were pegged down here and there--this is a place where your documentation or our documentation shows that the Saudis have a claim and, therefore, if you want to put in a marker tablet on this little island--there was one, I remember, in the Gulf, the name of which I can't remember now, but it was used as an illustration. A bronze tablet was put up there in Arabic and in English saying, "This is the island (we'll say) of Al Makta and it belongs to me, Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia and to my successors," or words to that effect. Along came the British a few days later and blew up the marker with a charge of dynamite and sent a picture of what they'd done to us.

Of course, they were very suspicious that the United States Government had some hand in backing the Saudis in this. It isn't true. We didn't back the Saudis. As I indicated, we tried to stay out of it and we even disagreed with them somewhat. We disagreed on Buraymi because of testimony of one of their own key people, but we really tried to stay out of the dispute.

It came up in bilateral conversations which I attended during the period 1953. After Dulles came in as Secretary of State, he had a visit from the foreign secretary from London who raised the question of Al Buraymi. I remembered he referred to the visit of the late Turki al-Utayshan as an illustration of high-handed action by the Saudis. They had to defend the interests of their people, their Gulf treaty partners. Dulles said, "Well I recognize that. We also have an interest in our relationship with the Saudis. I think this thing ought to be worked out peaceably by negotiations."

I went in before this meeting to brief Dulles about Al Buraymi. He hadn't the vaguest notion where Buraymi was so I had a large-scale map and showed him where the different villages were. I gave him a little historical background, and he sat there a chuckled over the whole thing. He thought it was very amusing, but it wasn't so amusing when he got in with the British foreign minister because the later was pretty insistent.

Q: Let's turn to that period following your return from Dhahran in 1951, your attendance at the National War College, and then your taking over as Director of Near Eastern Affairs in 1952. What were the principal issues and personalities during that period?

HART: It was the end of the Truman Administration. I had some contact with Secretary Acheson on issues related to the Middle East. What brought things rather strongly to his attention was the revolution in Egypt of July 23, 1952. I came in one day afterwards to take over my desk. The relationship with Egypt was one to which Acheson, perhaps reluctantly, had to pay a lot of attention. He was not very fond of the Middle East as an area. He was very much a European strategist with a profound interest in Europe and not a very great interest in peripheral areas, but this was something he couldn't overlook. He faced up to it rather well. There wasn't anything he could do about Israel and Palestine as he's written in his own memoirs. In Egypt he tried to see if he couldn't moderate the Arab-American confrontation. He was encouraged to, after the revolution had been in power in Egypt for a number of days and its leaders had proclaimed a number of reforms that were badly needed. Acheson made a public statement at a press conference to the effect that we were pleased with the way things were working out in post-revolutionary Egypt. Jefferson Caffery was ambassador there and he was an old timer who had a most distinguished and unusual record of tenure and longevity in the Foreign Service.

Q: You remembered him from your period in Brazil.

HART: Yes, I had met him in Brazil and my brother-in-law had worked under him as military attaché. Caffery was very business-like and very taciturn. His messages were very, very brief, indeed. He was accustomed to high level attention at the Department and judged that his comments needed no elaboration. He held the attention of Acheson partly because he was succinct, pungent and quickly readable.

Q: As I recall, there was one wonderful one when the revolution occurred. It was a telegram that began or ended, "Here we go gathering nuts in May." In other words, we are in a wholly new ball game.

HART: Yes. At any rate, I remember another one in which he spoke about one of the royal family, an elderly member, a prince, coming in to see him after the revolution and complaining bitterly. He said, "I listened to him and I told him the trouble was that he talked too much." Period. End of message. [Laughter]

I think Acheson rather liked that--he got a lot of wordy messages, otherwise. Acheson did listen to competent explanations about what was going on in Egypt. I remember one of the most competent presentations was by Wells Stabler, who was Egyptian desk officer working with me at the time. He presented a brilliant exposition to Acheson of the situation in Egypt on one occasion and it was long and detailed. Acheson was prepared to listen and he listened for an hour and a half with utmost interest and almost total silence. Several times he was going to get up and call Truman. Each time Wells would say, "Don't, please, I haven't finished yet. I want to get more to you before you do that."

Acheson sat down and listened very patiently. He was not noted as being a patient man, but he was very patient in listening to a well-reasoned and informative presentation. It was an interesting period those first few months in NE for lots of reasons. Of course, there was the question of military aid to the new Cairo regime, and Israel's objections to it, because the revolutionaries hadn't come forward and negotiated a peace, and American Jews didn't want to arm Egypt. Egypt was the great potential antagonist and had been already in the war of independence, so to speak. Henry Byroade was the Assistant Secretary and he hadn't been on the job very long before I arrived to direct the Near East Office under him. He took hold with a very energetic program and was carried over into the Republican administration when it came into power. I would say that a great deal of our time in those years was spent on Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian problems--the question of evacuating the British bases at Suez, getting a long-term base agreement out of the Egyptians, a stand-by facility in the Suez Canal complex. The British had spent half a million pounds sterling on infrastructure which was a lot of money in those days.

Q: Was this at Isma'ilya?

HART: This was at Isma'ilya and in the canal area as a whole. There were railroads, warehouses, repair shops, barracks, all kinds of infrastructure that was very valuable. I think the canal zone area was set up to accommodate 80,000 troops. The British were going to move those troops out after a long-term base agreement was signed. They'd already moved some. The negotiations were difficult and Nasser would periodically launch guerrilla attacks against the British and that would make them angry and they wouldn't negotiate for months. Then they'd come back and resume slowly. It was a very interesting and touchy period in American-Egyptian relations and American-British relations. Byroade was on the go a good deal of the time, between Washington and London, and he made two extensive reconnaissance trips to the whole Middle East.

Dulles also went to the Middle East in early 1953 and Byroade was one of his party. We all worked hard to prepare the documentation for that trip. We even wrote every greeting, departure, or ceremonial speech that Dulles would be called upon to deliver at every point on the way in every country. He covered the stops very thoroughly. We also drafted in advance of his trip a statement about U.S.-Middle East policy which he could go over and decide how much he wanted to use on his return. He carried with him at least a locker-trunk full of documents which, of course, he couldn't fully devour on the trip even though he read a lot, but he had Doug MacArthur there to read with him as well as other aides. We really loaded him with materials for what were going to be some long flights.

Q: When did the trip take place?

HART: The trip took place in May of 1953 and a key visit, of course, was Egypt. Basically, he was rather pleased with the people he met there, with Nasser and his team, with the president whom later Nasser deposed--front man, General Mohammed Naguib. Then he went over to Syria where he was very interested in Adib Shishakli, the military dictator with pro-Western leanings.

The image of these two leaders at the time, was that they were modernizers, enemies of corruption, and enemies of special privilege of families who contributed very little to the situation in either country and who formed a kind of an elite crust on a restive population. He tried to show friendliness toward Nasser and his group and tried to pull him into the outward fringe of the NATO alliance system. What he really wanted to do was to get Syria and Egypt on board in some auxiliary fashion, but not as full members of NATO. He thought he could make some progress. He didn't realize what he was dealing with. Shishakli's position was fragile. He was out of power shortly after Dulles' visit and Nasser was using that visit to see how much he could get. He had no intention of becoming an appendage of the United States or of NATO, but saw advantages in obtaining military hardware.

It was a useful exploratory trip and Dulles worked at it very earnestly and acquired a lot of information that was new. He went all the way to India and he had arguments with Nehru. Nehru was, of course, a non-aligned personality and Dulles tried the high moral ground that this was unsustainable in the face of the brutal regime of the Soviet Union.

His interest in the Arab-Israel question was very high. When he came back he made a very statesman-like speech on his entire trip but particularly on that subject. We had a new look in the Eisenhower Administration which was perhaps the only administration that I can recall that had a truly independent foreign policy on the Arab-Israel issue. It was put to the test a number of times, as you know. It was a good period to be in Washington and I found it extremely stimulating.

Then Jane and I went to Egypt where I was to be Byroade's deputy. He wasn't there a full tour.

Q: One more question about the Egyptian relationship in the early days after the revolution. It seems that a lot of people forget that we really were very sympathetic towards a lot of the things we felt Nasser was trying to do in the early days. At some point, that whole intelligence relationship with Egypt--CIA assistance in helping the Egyptians build an intelligence establishment, etc.--this is all pre-Aswân Dam and before things soured. Have I got the flavor of that right? Weren't we really quite hopeful about the direction that the Nasser regime was taking?

HART: Yes, we were. Dulles set the tone and Kennedy followed through. The souring, however, took place during Dulles' time. The attempt to establish and maintain a decent relationship with Egypt was picked up by Kennedy.

Going back to the Dulles period, I think American diplomacy with Byroade doing most of the real hard work on it with strong staff support, did assist in getting an Anglo-Egyptian agreement in 1956.

Q: This was Byroade as Assistant Secretary of State and before he became Ambassador.

HART: Yes. There was quite an effort to extend economic assistance to Egypt and also a sincere effort to provide military assistance to Nasser's Egypt. Why? Well I think everybody felt that the monarchy of Farouk had worn itself out completely for the Egyptians and it really hadn't accomplished very much. Farouk was not a successful ruler at all. He had given a bad image to Egypt. It was hoped that the new regime would open the way for a reformed democratic system. Well it didn't, but reforms did take place. One of the things they did was to spend what money they had more effectively on education, on village water, on improved facilities for upper Egypt and the lower Delta which were in deplorable shape. The country was an unhealthy place to live. Foreigners can testify to that. I had amoebic dysentery there. My wife had two or three different kinds of dysentery. Trachoma was rampant, flies were terrible and they were all over the place in your food. You didn't know where they were before but you could figure out where they probably were. It was a country that needed a lot of work.

The Army consisted of young, dedicated fellows who were teetotalers and very earnest. They looked rather admirable. They kept up their physical appearance and were lean, hard, and athletic as contrasted to the potbellied Egyptian generals of the late Farouk regime. The trouble, as time went on, centered on two things. One was that the United States could not produce in Egypt an instant transformation. It took time. Nasser didn't figure he had the time. He ran scared of time always. He also developed a broad ambition for international leadership in the political field, and he neglected domestic concerns in certain important respects in favor of adventurism in the international-Arab sphere.

What really turned Dulles off was that Nasser adopted what he called "positive neutralism" which was really playing off the Soviet Union against the United States and vice-versa. He permitted Anwar Sadat, who was one of his most loyal followers in the revolutionary command council, to be the spokesman for some very-anti American

statements which were gratuitous and which annoyed Dulles very much. They seemed designed to try to please the Soviet Union or else just to prove to the Egyptian public that Nasser was not going to be anybody's patsy. He carried them pretty far and that was certainly one of the factors which led Dulles to withdraw support for the High Aswân Dam.

Q: By this time you were in Cairo as Deputy Chief of Mission.

HART: Yes. My DCM job lasted from August 1955 to March 1958. Back in Washington we also had another fascinating problem which was the beginning of the organization Dulles called the Northern Tier.

Here I would like to set my view of the record straight that the Baghdad Pact was not an American creation as some scholars have averred.

The Baghdad Pact was really the creation of the leader of Iraq, Nuri Said, and Adnan Menderes of Turkey. Each had a motivation and saw advantages in such an alliance, linked to the U.S. Nuri Said spoke Turkish impeccably. He had been an Ottoman army officer. Adnan Menderes was very keen to get as much aid as he could from the United States and to transform Turkey while showing great loyalty to American connection. As far as the area was concerned around him and around Turkey, Turkey had shown no interest in the Arab world for a long time--ever since World War I, really. There is a good deal of anti-Arab feeling in Turkey, a feeling that the Arabs had turned traitor against their Muslim Ottoman leaders. In the age-old fraternity of Islam, it wasn't traditionally a question of nationalism. It was a question of whether you stayed with your co-religionists. The Turks were long the defenders of Islam. Muslims were brothers in the Ummah. Arab nationalism of the turn of the 20th century went against that. It was exploited by the British and by Arabs leaders against Turkey in World War I, and the Turks had never since quite forgiven the Arabs for this. This was a first adventure into Arab politics that Menderes made and he saw advantages in it because he saw the United States building a cordeon sanitaire against the USSR and he thought the Pact was a good idea. Turkey was, after all, right on the front line, and he could see a lot of aid coming his way. Turks had participated in the Korean War with great distinction.

Nuri Said's proposals were very fertile in Turkey. Menderes and he proceeded from there. Pakistan came on board because Pakistan was a fragment of India and very worried about being reabsorbed by force into India. They knew that Nehru was very hostile to their breakaway. That's a long story that you know. Pakistan had a very well-trained army. Byroade made a visit out there and said he'd never seen a better parade-ground presentation and better looking soldiers. He said, "I'm a West Pointer and I've never seen anything better than this anywhere

The United States certainly did nothing to discourage the Pact and perhaps said quite a few words to encourage it. The genesis of the movement was not in the State Department, however, nor in the Pentagon. The British Counselor of Embassy, Harold Beeley, came

around to see us one day and said to Jack Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary at the time, "We're thinking of joining the Baghdad Pact. Are you going to do it?"

Jack said, "No. We will not do it. We like the idea but we don't think we should be a member."

Obviously, if the U.S. were a member of the Baghdad Pact, the pressure would be enormous to form a balancing alliance with Israel. We didn't want to get into that situation. Then Harold Beeley said, "Do you see any object to our joining it?"

Jack said, "No, not at all. Fine."

That was our position, and they joined. Then, of course, the revolution occurred in 1958 in Iraq which upset all these arrangements. Before that happened, the reaction in Cairo was furious. I was still in Washington at the time since this was 1954. The revolutionary regime in Egypt thought that on his 1953 visit Dulles had in effect said, "Egypt is the natural leader of the Arab world and we'll support you in that leadership position."

In fact, Dulles gave the Egyptian revolutionary government every reason to think that that's exactly what he'd meant. It was very close to those words. He got a little too euphoric about the possibilities of a useful relationship between the United States and Egypt. So when this Baghdad Pact episode became apparent that it was going through, the Revolutionary Command Council was absolutely furious with the United States.

Q: Did it also seem as aimed against Egypt?

HART: Yes. They claimed it was aimed against them because they saw us as choosing Egypt's rival Iraq and giving it the leadership position. We said, "No such intention, and not our initiative."

They said, "Now don't try to tell us that. We don't believe you. It's your work."

They were absolutely red-eyed about it. As far as the British were concerned, the Egyptians didn't expect very much. They had had plenty of problems with the British anyway, but they were angry with us. So a cloud came over our American-Egyptian relationships at the time which was never dissipated, in my opinion, under Nasser. They went to work immediately to make sure that no other Arab country could join the Pact and they did their best to undermine Nuri Said's regime in Iraq. That's another long and complicated story. We saw a lot of it.

During the time that I was there until I went to Egypt in 1955, the U.S. relationship continued, although no longer cordial. It continued because the Egyptians needed our economic aid upon the completion of the negotiations with Great Britain and the formation of a stand-by base agreement between Egypt and Great Britain. We had promised that once that agreement was initialed, we would grant them grant economic aid

and also grant military aid. They accepted at once the grant economic aid which I think was around \$40 million, badly needed--railroad engines, all sorts of infrastructure would be improved as a result.

The military assistance was going to be \$20 million. That sounds like a small figure these days, but in those times it was really important and it would have made a big difference in the modernization of an Egyptian Army, 50% of whose equipment was obsolete or unusable. Only a fragment of the Egyptian forces could operate. In spite of a great deal of Israeli lobbying, the Dulles government--the State Department--was able to go ahead and make this commitment and it made the offer.

In making that offer, the only conditions were that Egypt not transfer the materiel without our consent to somebody else.

Q: What year are we up to now?

HART: This was the summer of 1954 after the Baghdad Pact. Egypt was not to use this materiel for offensive purposes, only for self-defense. Also, an American military team would deliver the weaponry and see to it that it is integrated into the proper units and then the team would go back home.

Nasser latched onto those conditions as denigrating Egyptian sovereignty. It was pointed out to him that Farouk had already agreed to the same provisos covering small weapons (like police weaponry) in a 1951 U.S.-Egyptian agreement. Egypt was therefore already committed to similar principles, as were 35 other countries which had accepted U.S. military grant assistance. You couldn't very well expect to make Egypt an exception, and then have potential trouble with 35 other countries. Nasser clung to his objections.

We sent a special secret mission out. Al Gerhardt, a colonel in the U.S. Army, whom I had known as a student colleague in the National War College class of 1952, led the team. Bill Eveland was another member. I don't know whether there was a third person. There may have been. They made a very quiet, unpublicized trip. They talked to Nasser and tried to explain all of this in a series of sessions and he just wouldn't budge. We came to the conclusion, therefore, that he may have had other reasons for wanting to turn it down but he would have demanded that there would be no conditions whatsoever--just hand it over.

We told him, "Look. The military team that is supposed to deliver these goods can come in civilian clothes and they'll leave as soon as the materiel are integrated into your forces."

Even that wouldn't budge him. So that mission failed and there was no military assistance agreement. The result was that the Egyptians held to the thesis thereafter that we had refused them military aid. For years Nasser repeated again and again that we would give military aid to others but wouldn't give it to Egypt, that we were trying to keep Egypt weak. A lot of Arabs chose to believe Nasser.

By the time I got to Egypt in the mid-summer of 1955 with Jane and our two little girls, my job was to be deputy to Byroade. We had a considerable cloud on the horizon over the question of military aid because the rumors had already started that Nasser could become a leading member of the non-aligned movement as a result of his early 1955 participation in the Bandung Conference. Great attention had been given to Nasser at Bandung by such famous people as Nehru, Tito, U Nu of Burma and others. It turned his head. He was convinced that Egypt should play a key role with Nehru and Tito as a central non-aligned power, as well as the leader of the Arab world, the Islamic world and the African world. The rumors began that he was going to apply this by going to the Soviets now for weapons, and of course he did. The Soviets apparently preferred to have Nasser deal with the Czechs, but it was really Soviet handling.

This crisis in U.S.-Egyptian relations arose within a few weeks of my arrival. Before it finally came to a head, Nasser told Byroade that he needed about \$21 million worth of equipment very badly, and if he could get it from the United States, that would be fine. He didn't have any money to pay for it. A study of our aid program revealed a loophole, according to a visiting economic expert from the State Department L. Wade Lathram. Lathram sat in the embassy and stated that he believed if we told Washington thus and so, according to the regulations and executive orders, etc., we could have a kind of long-term loan.

He drafted a telegram, using helpful technical references and we sent it off. We got a very curt reply from Dulles saying in effect, "Military aid to Egypt only if they agree on a peace with Israel."

That was just so far out and so far from any immediate prospect of implementation that it represented a turndown based on other, unstated considerations. It killed the last prospect of such an agreement. So then, of course, the Czech agreement followed immediately. We realized it had been under preparation for some time and Nasser was playing with us. In a way you couldn't blame him. We knew the condition of the Egyptian Army. We knew that his position with the Army was important. We believed he'd not be a threat to Israel in the early foreseeable future, and indeed showed no interest in the Israel relationship at this point. This was near summer of 1955.

Things got steadily worse in our relations during the course of the period of 1955 to 1956, but I should say that when the Czech agreement was announced, Dulles got a little bit frantic. He sent to Cairo George V. Allen who was the new Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asia. He sent him with nothing more than a letter to try to dissuade Nasser or better stated, to try to persuade the Egyptians to backtrack on their just concluded agreement with the Czechs. Of course, we knew from the moment this was announced in a message from Washington, that the Allen visit was going to be one of those frantic things that wouldn't do us any credit and would certainly fail. Before he could even get there, George was being bombarded by demonstrations in the streets of Cairo shouting, "Egypt will not knuckle under to the United States. We have our own

defense to be concerned with and our own interests and we're not going to take orders from you, George Allen."

George Allen arrived in a most unfavorable atmosphere with this letter. He came to me and he said, "I don't know why Dulles did this. He gave us no time to argue the question at all. He gave us no opportunity to take exception to this step. He just told me to pack my bag and get out there right now and he gave me this letter to see what I could do."

This was Dulles at his worst. I would say, he was at his most impulsive. There are a lot of things that I'd stand up for in Dulles' policy in the Middle East, but his impulsiveness didn't do any good. It did a lot of harm. It fed right into Nasser's desire for an image of one who can stand up to the big powers--tell them off. Did he stand up to the Soviets? Well he did, in a way, because later on Khrushchev objected to Nasser's trying and imprisoning members of the Communist Party in Egypt. There were three Communist Parties. I'm not sure which one Moscow favored, but we learned that they'd all been tried and locked up. Nasser wasn't out to have any competition from these people amid his source of power. Khrushchev objected and he just told Khrushchev off. In a way he was playing the game according to his rules, trying to get both of them to recognize that he was boss not only in his own house, but in the Arab world. As a whole, he didn't want the Soviets to gain any power, especially in Syria. He wanted Soviet military aid and he got it. He knew they would have a big interest. This would be their first inroads into the area in competition with the United States. They could gain a lot and he was going to give them that as a bait. As far as we were concerned, the fact they were there should arouse the Americans to try to stay in the picture and they could handle the economic front. He knew that he would probably get more money out of us than he would out of the Soviets in that respect. They'd give him equipment but not a lot of money.

That was the atmosphere that we found. Of course, the High Dam is quite a complex story. I don't know whether you want me to get into that.

Q: As much as you choose.

HART: I'll try to make it short. The United States, with an engineering organization called Alexander Gibb, Boston, had drawn up plans long before this for the feasibility of a High Dam on the Nile above the old Aswân Dam. We had a kind of inroad there to start with. The British were very interested and, of course, we were sensitive to their sensitivity about taking over jobs and things that the British would normally have had in the past due to their preferred position in Egypt which was fading but it was still there in their minds. They wanted to make sure that they didn't lose good contracts.

It was an American-British proposition presented to the World Bank. Eugene Black was the head of the bank. During this period we are discussing, which was late 1954 to early 1955, this thing was ripening up. It was known that the Egyptians who had come out of World War II with a wonderful foreign exchange position of some £400 million--good, hard, solid Egyptian pounds of those days, equivalent to British pounds, had really--

through the spend thrift vagaries of Farouk and the revolution--lost practically all of it. They were down flat.

The question was how to finance this dam. Here I'll have to do the best I can to resurrect my figures. It was thought that the dam would cost about £800 million to build, out of which about £400 million would have to come in the form of foreign exchange--hard currency--to pay for equipment, engineering skills, practically everything except the concrete and the hard labor which would be Egyptian. Black and the Egyptians were in discussion, and after the revolution, of course, the head of all economic concerns in Egypt at the time was Abdul Mon'eim al Qaysuni, who was a Western educated Egyptian, very sophisticated and a good economist.

Finally, Nasser was given a proposition by the bank in which the bank said, "This foreign exchange will have to be provided partially by grant and partially by loan. The bank is willing to make the loan provided approximately 50% would be covered by grants from guaranteed non-bank sources."

So you would divide \$400 million into two parts and half would be grant. A major element of the grant portion of the \$200 million would come from the United States, with a minor portion from Great Britain--as I recall it, 85% would be U.S. and 15% would be British. To start the program off, the United States was prepared to grant at once about \$56 million and the British some fraction of their 15%--I can't remember how much. Both U.S. and U.K. would require, for the purposes of making these grants and to cover their own parliamentary situation and practices, an undertaking by Egypt to not only use this money in the way it was supposed to be used but to make certain reforms in fiscal management in allocation of financial resources. The fiscal situation in Egypt was very confused. This meant some reforms concerning which the bank had held discussions with Egypt. Qaysuni was sympathetic with this objective.

Also--and this was a very key point--the American loan would be based upon a prior agreement in principle between the Sudan and Egypt with respect to the amount of Nile water to be stored by Egypt and how much was to be used by Egypt and how much would be reserved by the Sudan. In other words, a general international waters agreement would be required.

Nasser didn't like the Sudanese aspect at all. At this particular juncture you have to remember that this was late 1955. Sudan was still technically an Egyptian-British condominium, but actually was under British control. The Egyptians under Nasser inherited a position on the Sudan which had been set by King Farouk: that the Sudan was really a part of Egypt and should be considered as poised to rejoin Egypt. Farouk, in fact, had proclaimed himself in October 1951--before the revolution of July 1952--King of Egypt and the Sudan. He did this while rejecting the Middle East Defense Agreement which the U.S. had proposed to Farouk's Egypt, an agreement which would have brought Egypt into an association with, but not part of, NATO.

Nasser was saddled with this policy question and he had already made his decision. He was going to do everything he could to get the Sudan to join Egypt. The Sudanese unionist party of Ismail al Azhari, Nasser hoped would be the vehicle to accomplish this union as soon as the Sudan became independent of the British. Nasser had a member of the revolutionary command council (Zulfikar Ali Sabry) posted in the Sudan whom I met there in early 1954. He was doing everything he could in the framework of Sudanese politics to prepare the ground for Ismail al Azhari to win the first Sudan-wide election and to unite the two countries.

He miscalculated. Some of us knew he would anyway because I'd gone up there in the spring, in March, and I'd met--thanks to a very good political officer we had there by the name of Joe Sweeney--and had talked with Ismail al Azhari and I asked, "Are you for organic union with Egypt?"

He said, "No."

"No? What does it mean then?"

"Well it means simply we want closer relations with Egypt. We want very good, close relationships with Egypt, but we're not going to be a part of Egypt."

They either didn't believe him in Cairo or else al-Azhari told them a different story than he told me. Perhaps they discounted it. Zulfikar Ali Sabry worked very hard and did a lot of maneuvering in the Sudanese political sphere which was trying to pull itself together to face self-determination and independence which finally came in early 1956.

Nasser didn't like this idea of tying up Egypt's commitments on water through the British. He'd be in a much stronger position if the Sudan were a part of Egypt. He could then dictate how the water problem should be handled.

Eugene Black came out to Cairo and I was in charge at the embassy. Byroade was on consultation in Washington. Byroade phoned in to say that Gene Black was coming and hadn't gotten an invitation yet from Nasser and would I try to arrange that this invitation be quickly issued to him. For some reason or other it hadn't come through, although Qaysuni wanted him to come. It obviously was stuck with Nasser. Byroade's call came in the evening fairly late. I knew that first I should go to Mahmud Fawzi, the Foreign Minister, and I phoned him. He said that he couldn't disturb the president at that time of night. I said this was very urgent. It didn't matter. He couldn't disturb him. We'd have to wait until tomorrow.

I said, "Thanks very much."

I secured an embassy driver and car and said, "We're going to find Nasser. I don't know whether he might be at the Gazira Rowing Club or might be home. Let's go to the rowing club first."

We went there and they said, "No. He's not here. He's at home."

We turned around and went out to Menshiat al-Bikri and there the lights were on atop the high wall around his house, so we knew that he was awake. We punched a bell and a large man came. We said, "Here's the American Chargé d'Affaires who would like to see His Excellency urgently. Is he awake? Can we see him?"

He said, "Yes. He's awake. Come on in."

Just like that--very simple. The gate opened and soon I was in a small waiting room. The guard went ahead to announce that I was there. Nasser arrived shortly in a sweater and open-neck shirt. In answer to my apology for disturbing him, he said, "No. I don't go to sleep as early as this. Don't apologize. I'm around until at least one o'clock. I listen to the radio and read the press. I read especially the British press, such as The Spectator."

He mentioned other media. He said he wanted to know what people were saying about Egypt and him in other parts of the world, especially in the English-speaking areas. He knew English well from military service.

I told him that Eugene Black had not received the invitation he required to come to Egypt to discuss the High Dam.

He said, "I sent it today. It's done."

I said, "Good. It just hadn't reached him when I was called on the phone so I'll go back and tell Ambassador Byroade that it is all right for Black to come."

"Oh, yes. Sure. That's fine."

We had a chat for about ten minutes on various things, mostly related to his personal routine. Then I left and sent word to Byroade.

Gene Black came to see me at the embassy after talking with Nasser. Hank Byroade was still in Washington. Black said, "I've talked to Qaysuni and he thinks it's all right, but Nasser is red-lining a lot of conditions that the United States has set down as prerequisites for actual disbursement. I've taken the position that all this is part of a Bank package offer. Nasser doesn't even have to reply to these conditions set by the United States. They are U.S. statements, not calling for direct answer. He doesn't even have to make a comment on them. All he has to do is say, 'I accept the Bank's proposition,' but he won't buy it."

Black told me the story in two installments. I knew what the problem was going to be before he went in to see Nasser. When he came out he told the waiting press (as agreed

with Nasser): "The situation is as follows. We have a substantial agreement, but there are some details that need to be worked out."

Black gave me the text penciled and lined by Nasser, the things that Nasser would not accept. One blue-lined item concerned a prior agreement with the Sudan. This was very key. The other was the insistence on reform of his economic priorities in the various ministries to make sure that adequate money would be available throughout the project and that it was spent as it was supposed to.

Nasser had said, "This is a denigration of Egypt. I won't go for that." Black told Nasser, "Look, we've got an agreement on everything else. Shall I say we have an agreement in general subject to a few little things?" and he said, "Yes. That's all right."

The press descended on Black as he came out of the office and he told them just that, but wouldn't go into details. He went off thinking that there was a better than 50-50 chance for the project, something like an 85% chance perhaps, and he left. I wired, of course, the details of what he'd told me. It had a negative effect in Washington. There was silence for quite a while.

Sadat stood up and made one of his statements hostile toward the United States aid program. He liked to tee-off on our aid program to Egypt. He had already launched one broadside about our sending over a lot of poultry that turned out to have a respiratory disease. He said, "Instead of sending us weapons, they give us sick chickens." [Laughter]

This made good headlines in the Egyptian press, and Ros al-Yussuf and other publications had a good time with that, with caricatures. This time he went after us on something else--I don't know what it was. He was pretty abusive. That turned people off in Washington. They had reports that Nasser's people were agitating against us in Libya concerning Wheelus Field. The atmosphere was darkening all the time. Dulles did another impulsive thing. Without consulting Bob Murphy, his right-hand man who was Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs and who had enjoyed the fullest confidence of the White House, he decided that he was going to withdraw from the high-dam proposal. Ahmed Hussein, the ambassador of Egypt to the U.S., was in Egypt at this time. He returned with Nasser's modified stance on the High Dam package,--what Nasser objected to--but stating that agreement with Nasser was at hand and affirming that matters of only secondary importance were outstanding. When he got off the plane at National Airport, he was met by the eager press which had been following these negotiations as closely as they could. They asked, "What have you brought back with regard to the High Dam?"

He said, in effect "I brought back the Egyptian agreement. It's now up to the U.S. Government to go ahead. There are just a few little things we have to discuss. In general, it's agreed."

Thus Ambassador Hussein gave an interview to the press before he had talked with Dulles. Dulles didn't like that, either. Hussein then asked to see Dulles. Dulles had his own press notice already prepared. He handed the draft to Bob Murphy for an immediate go-over, and it was the first indication that Bob Murphy had--and he told me this himself, afterwards--that Dulles was going to turn down the American participation in the High Dam. He was going to withdraw. "Please edit this."

So Bob Murphy called in NEA officers and others and they edited this draft in an effort to take some of the sting out of it. It had plenty of sting, regardless of what you said. In effect, what he did was to hear Ahmed Hussein and then hand him this piece of paper and say, "This is what our position is--sometime in the future maybe, but not now." Of course, Ahmed Hussein was crushed. He had been very strong for the American relationship. All his time as ambassador he worked very hard for it. He used to come in and argue with us like blazes about Israel and all those things, but basically you could see that he was hurt. He believed in the American relationship very fully. His wife had been a student at the American Girls' College in Cairo--she speaks impeccable English, is very Western in her outlook, very much a women's libber--birth control, etc. She is a very nice woman, comes from a very fine Egyptian family, the Shoukrys.

Nasser had quality representation in the U.S., but he wasn't using it. Ahmed Hussein told me many years later that, when he came in to say farewell to Nasser before going back with his instruction about the High Dam and as he was walking out the door Nasser said, "By the way, Ahmed, don't be surprised if we take over the Suez Canal."

Hussein said, "What!"

Nasser said, "Yes."

Then somebody burst in on Nasser and Ahmed never had a chance to follow up and obtain from Nasser any elucidation or chance to argue.

As you know, Dulles withdrew the Aswan Dam offer, explaining that the provisions that Nasser had objected to were ones that Dulles felt could not be overlooked. Within a matter of ten days after the withdrawal, Nasser gave his speech in which he said, "We have now taken over that Suez Canal."

It was on July 23, the Revolution Day, and sealed instructions had already been issued. As Nasser spoke, they were triggered by one name that he used, Ferdinand de Lesseps. The use of that historic name gave the signal word to open the sealed instructions. They were to the armed forces to move right in and take over the canal.

It was a dramatic period. I heard one of Nasser's earlier speeches--the one that foreshadowed the takeover. It was on July 19 and it was a dedication of new factory. I went over to listen to Nasser, and in that he excoriated the United States' withdrawal

from financing the dam project as an insult to Egypt. He said, "We've got 22 million people in this country and we can build that dam with our bare hands."

Everybody cheered and clapped and thought it was great. It was about four days later that he gave his famous speech nationalizing the canal. You know the story from there on. Byroade was transferred. Ray Hare came in just in time for the Suez War.

Q: Why was Byroade transferred?

HART: His relationship with Dulles had soured badly. They were not really communicating. He was made ambassador to South Africa.

The end of October 1956 was the beginning of the Suez War with Israel and with France and Great Britain. That's a long story.

Q: You might deal with the things which led to Nasser's reactions to that and the event which led to the British-French-Israeli military action against Egypt in late 1957.

HART: As Ambassador Ahmed Hussein was leaving Nasser's office after getting his instructions from Nasser about accepting American help in the World Bank proposition for construction of the High Aswân Dam, Nasser said, "By the way, Ahmed, don't be surprised if you hear that we've taken over the Suez Canal."

Hussein froze and turned to protest to Nasser that this was going to be a profoundly shaking event, but someone else intervened at that point thinking that the meeting between the two was over and he never got a chance to get back Nasser's attention and make his warning comment. He had that in his worry list when he arrived in the United States. I told you the story about how the High Aswân Dam loan was subverted by withdrawal of the American assistance. I may have told you that shortly thereafter I attended a speech by Nasser at a site where he was inaugurating a new industrial plant. In that he said, "We will build this dam with our bare hands. We are 22 million people."

I remember him using that population figure which we thought was low. "We will build this with our bare hands and we're not going to accept tutelage from other people about our economy and how it should be run. We'll build this dam ourselves."

This was wildly cheered by the Egyptians who were present. In other words, it threw the insult back in our faces. As he came out of that meeting, he grinned at me and held his hand out to shake my hand. I was standing in a line. I interpreted this to mean, "Don't get mad." [Laughter] But Washington did get mad, unfortunately.

In the period that followed after Nasser on July 23 proclaimed that the canal was now under the full control of the Egyptian Government, there were frantic efforts in Washington to try to prevent a war from starting. The State Department was very well aware of the violent reaction that Anthony Eden had displayed. We had a report by our

Chargé d'Affaires in London, Aaron S. Brown--the ambassador for some reason was not there--that Anthony Eden had referred to Nasser as "a tin-hatted Hitler" or something similar. "He was not going to get away with this." Eden really had quite a fit, an intemperate reaction which worried everybody around him because it was feared he would do something very hasty. Washington didn't want to see a war in that area, especially in the cause of outworn Western imperialism.

Dulles frantically tried to develop something to calm the British down so they wouldn't choose the path of force. One step was to propose what he called, "a users' association," "users" being the important users of the canal, countries which had enough shipping going through to make its blockage or interruption a source of real economic concern. This "users' association"--instructions were issued by Dulles to try to promote it with Australia, Great Britain, France, Italy, everybody who had substantial shipping. But it didn't add up to anything because it had no clout whatsoever. The threat of boycotting the canal was hollow. The Association had no means of stepping in to run the canal or to govern any part of its operation or insure free use. It had no police power.

There were missions that came out. I remember in particular a mission from Australian Prime Minister MacKenzie. I was there among others to see him in as head of an allied power. He conferred with Nasser. We had a report later from the Australian ambassador that he had gone in to see Nasser and had said he'd come to see him about the crisis. Nasser said, "What crisis? There's no crisis unless somebody else creates one."

He was a cool customer. MacKenzie found out right away that he really had nothing to say to Nasser that Nasser was interested in, and Nasser was totally immovable. The job was done. "We're running the canal. It's going to be well-run, an excellent operation. Why should anybody complain? Why should there be a crisis?"

Of course, this made Anthony Eden, if anything, more furious and he found kindred spirit in the current government of France at the time. Molet and Pinot--Molet was Prime Minister and Pinot was Foreign Minister--I may have them mixed up. We were aware of the fact that they and Eden were talking but that was about all. There was a great deal of nervousness in Washington which was not reflected in any particular nervousness in Cairo because the job had been done. The Egyptians had exploded with joy. They had received accolades from all over the Islamic and Third World. The post-imperial colonies or protectorates of Britain and France around the world were all cheering, especially in the Far East such as in Indonesia who had just gotten rid of the Dutch. All these countries felt they had to side with Egypt's action.

Q: When is this now?

HART: This is the late summer of 1956. There was a great deal of watchfulness in Egypt. Henry Byroade, the ambassador, was relieved and offered the post of ambassador to South Africa sometime in the late summer of 1956. I was in charge for a while. Ray Hare arrived on September 17, 1956. He arrived alone and his wife followed later. He started

immediately to organize the embassy into a very strong reporting team on what was going on. He met with Nasser repeatedly. I think Ray's policy was to keep relations with Nasser on a quiet business-like basis. Ray is not a fellow to fool around with. He knows his facts and prepares for meetings with great care. He's quiet and doesn't pound the table or shout. He doesn't do anything that isn't very professional. Nasser was just sitting tight. People would say, "Aren't you afraid of what the British or French may do?"

He would just say, "I'm waiting." And he would leave it at that.

In October there was an incident on the Israel frontier with Jordan. I've forgotten what it was--a shooting incident of some kind. Israel had been habitually reacting--almost 100% overreacting--to a lot of these incidents. In other words, when there was something that happened on their side which was generated from the other side of the border (and it usually was Jordan) Israel would react very strongly. This had everybody worried because we didn't want to see another big fracas. We'd had a number of bloody incidents along the frontier aggravated by the powerful over-reaction of the Israel defense force. In this case we were worried all the more because there seemed to be a semi-mobilization by Israel, not a high-level or top-level mobilization but a considerable movement. We were afraid that what that meant was that there would be an invasion of Jordanian-held Palestine which we had tacitly recognized as a part of Jordan and that it would be an armed encounter.

I remember a message to the Department coming from Israel which was repeated to us. One of our assistant military attachés or our Army attaché reported that he had gone out to take a look at what was happening and had been invited by an Israeli officer to join him in a ride in a new combat vehicle which he'd never seen before and didn't know the Israelis had in inventory. The Israeli officer asked him with a grin, "What do you think's going on here?"

The American military attaché said, "Looks to me like a partial mobilization. Something less than a full mobilization."

"Pretty big?" said the Israeli.

He said, "Yes."

The Israeli said, "Well, you are not far off."

That's all he said. At the very end of October, they pounced on Sinai, paid no attention to Jordan at all. The war was on. In lightning moves, they were right on the canal and surprised the Egyptian force completely. Such forces as Egypt had in Sinai were quickly overrun or chased out. We had intelligence reports that many of the Egyptian troops just took off their shoes and ran barefoot to get out of there faster. It was a rout.

In the Egyptian press there was nothing of this at all. The Egyptian press carried fabricated reports of fighting on the frontier with Israel. It depicted the situation an Egyptian repulse of Israel at El-Areesh. During the ensuing weeks, Egypt's press never recognized that the Israeli forces had actually reached the canal until the British and the French joined in. They had sent an ultimatum to Nasser to withdraw his control from the Suez Canal area ten miles and the Israelis to withdraw ten miles. It sounded as though they were trying to police the situation. It was, of course, rejected by the Egyptians and I don't think the Israelis bothered to answer because it was all part of a scenario.

Very soon the operation was in Port Said. British forces and French forces were coming right into that area. The Egyptian press recorded the presence of alien aircraft or enemy aircraft over their heads and explained that the wing tanks that were discarded and found in certain places in Cairo were fragments of enemy planes shot down by Egypt. They were put on display. It was a triumph of wishful thinking and of nationalism and pride in an atmosphere of naivete. I found it a very interesting psychological display.

I have to back up a little bit. As a result of the Israeli attack, which was the opening of the hostilities, we received instructions from Washington of a most urgent nature to evacuate at once all our official dependents from the embassy and from the consular offices in Egypt and to reduce the size of our official presence to the absolute minimum necessary to carry on emergency business. Further, we were to encourage all private Americans living in the country who didn't have very compelling reasons to stay to get out. Evacuation would be provided by the U.S. Navy. They called it "Program to Reduce the American Presence in Egypt".

We had no choice but to put into effect long-standing evacuation plans which are routine for so many posts around the world where there's always a chance of trouble. So we did and it went very smoothly on the whole. Our chief administrative councilor, Barr V. Washburn, was in Alexandria and took the program under his direct control. People were evacuated in vehicles of all kinds. The embassy aid program and the attachés between them had quite a few vehicles. My wife and our two little girls were in the last contingent to go out. They took the Cairo West Road as everybody did, to avoid the congested areas of the Delta and took people right across the desert past the Wadi el-Natroun to Alexandria. On the way they had to pass by Cairo West Airport which was under bombardment. As it happened, the Egyptians sometime before, in order to avoid close observation by spies--meaning military attachés and such people--had fortunately built a loop around Cairo West so that you couldn't have a close look. You went around this loop. If it hadn't been for that loop, I don't know what would have happened to some of our people, including my own family, because the British paid no attention to the fact that we had given them our evacuation plans in detail and they went ahead and bombed airports throughout our evacuation movement. They bombed Cairo West vigorously.

Q: From Cyprus?

HART: I assume so. I don't know where else it would have been unless they used some aircraft carrier, but I don't recall that I heard that they had an aircraft carrier.

In any event, there was a bombing of Cairo East and Cairo West. I remember the very first night after our families got to Alexandria, there was heavy bombardment of these airports on both sides of Cairo. We went up on the roof of the embassy building and you could see the flashes on both sides. There was considerable noise. Antiaircraft was thudding away with that famous noise--fwop, fwop, fwop--and the explosions. So far as I know, I don't remember hearing of a single British or French plane being shot down. There was an awful lot of ordinance used. The reason I mention that is because the press of Egypt again was playing up victory after victory in repelling this invasion. They even had the French cruiser Jean Bart as having been sunk in the Mediterranean off Alexandria by Egyptian action. We later heard that the Jean Bart wasn't anywhere in the neighborhood. Egypt's press manufactured victories to appeal to public morale and carry on the hopes of the people that everything was going to come out right.

I have to say, at the same time, that beginning with the very first night there was a total blackout. All windows had to be curtained or you'd have somebody tossing pebbles at your casement and banging on your door. The city lights were all out and vehicles that moved had blued-over headlights for just enough light so that, if you were driving, you could find your way. Of course, we didn't drive at night for the most part. We walked, but when we had to go somewhere, we had an embassy chauffeur with a blued-out headlight.

I remember, at the start of the black-out, having to go to see somebody who was about to embark in Alexandria. I had a message for him to take. With the driver, we found our way to the part of old Cairo where this apartment building was. We groped our way into a darkened entrance and got hold of an elevator that worked. We went up to the top floor. We sat out there and I looked out over Cairo in medieval darkness. It was a fantastic sight because the stars were so brilliant. It was just like being in a planetarium. There wasn't any light to interfere with total visibility of the heavens at their very best. I thought to myself, "This is a sight that people won't see again unless there is another war, so I'd better appreciate it while I can."

I just looked and looked at this magnificent display. I delivered my message and went back to our house which was now very quiet since my wife and children were gone.

We had the impression that the people of Cairo took this crisis in beautiful stride. There was no panic whatsoever. There was total discipline. The police were polite but insistent in carrying out their duties. There was no rioting. I didn't hear of a single case of looting. There was total control of the streets which raised a question as to whether, if the British had actually tried to come into Cairo, they wouldn't have found it a very, very tough mission. The discipline was so admirable in every respect. The almost total blackout went on until after hostilities actually ceased.

In the meantime, in order to make sure the evacuation was going well and our consular officers safe, we were on our clandestine radio network which was part of our evacuation planning and had been in place for some time, being occasionally tested. We had a transmitter and receiver in the embassy up on the top floor. We had similar installations in Port Said and in Alexandria. We were in touch with them all by voice. We used call names as "Bat Boy" and other names beginning with "B." It was very important, also, for reporting on the British advance into Port Said.

This way we got up-to-date and instantaneous reports on our own circuitry which would have been impossible by regular telephone or telegraph. All of the regular circuits were tied up by the government. We very soon found out that there was extensive bombing of Dekhalia airfield at Alexandria. Our Navy attack transport, with a fairly large contingent of marines aboard, arrived to take out the first of our evacuees. There were altogether, including the private non-governmental people, something like 2,400 individuals and there were various shuttles made. I had to clear with Ali Sabry, who was a high official of the Egyptian Government, permission to use a minesweeper on the passageway out to the open sea from Alexandria because we were afraid that mines would have been sown there by somebody, maybe by the Egyptians. We didn't know. He readily agreed to this. The minesweepers found no mines at all. The embarkation of our people in Alexandria was done under bombardment. The Marines on board, who had bayonets already in their rifles and were all set to fight their way into Cairo to bring out these refugees, realized at once that this wasn't going to be the game. Everything was moving all right on land with full Egyptian cooperation except for the danger of British bombardment. The bombardment was directed at military targets which we tried to avoid. The refugees were put up in tent camps arranged by Millard Neptune a representative of one of the big oil companies that had a concession in the western desert. Millard and Barr Washburn made a very efficient team. He and Barr Washburn organized accommodations in these tents until the passengers could be put aboard ship by landing craft.

In the meantime, back in Cairo, we were working around the clock to make sure all of this went well in liaison with the Egyptian Government which accepted our program and was very helpful.

We began to get calls from Iron Curtain countries saying, "Can you take some of our people?" At five o'clock one morning, just at daybreak, I was in my office and a car with a different flag approached. It was the Polish Chargé d'Affaires. He asked if he could get some of his people on board. The standard answer always was, "On a space-available basis, but we have to take our own people first and foremost." The Hungarians also appealed, but managed to book a Greek freighter.

I remember that the East Germans went into a panic and headed overland for the Sudan, and quite a few Soviets went out that way. The Soviets were quite afraid that they would be targeted. It seemed to be the general opinion that the British and French would pull together after they had taken the Suez Canal and move into Cairo or into the Delta, although it seemed to us that the British policy was based on the idea that Nasser's regime

would fall as soon as they had taken the canal area. We and some of the better-informed British embassy people were quite certain that it wasn't going to be that easy. It was unlikely that Nasser's regime would fall because it had the population solidly behind it and had a great deal of backing by the international fraternity of the Third World, especially the Muslim countries. He would stand up to this attack and fight it out in the delta, if necessary, street by street. Anthony Eden did not think so, but those who had served in the British embassy in Cairo did. Among them, I'm quite sure, was Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, the British ambassador, and his wife Peggy. They were a fine couple and we got to know them quite well before all of this happened. He took great exception to British policy and resigned shortly after these events and later was picked up by the United Nations' Secretary General to be one of his principal aides. I guess you would call him an under secretary in the United Nations Secretariat.

The British in October 1956 found themselves locked into their embassy compound. We didn't realize this until one of our military attachés was traveling in his car past the big iron gate which is very close to our embassy. He saw a group of people waving at him. He waved back and then they called and said, "No. Come over here, please."

He drove his car over and there were Egyptian guards there. They didn't interfere with the conversation. The British embassy staff said, "We are locked in and we have no food. Can you help us get some?" The U.S. attach turned his car around and went right back to the American Embassy where we had a commissary. He proceeded to pile high the stuff needed and delivered it alone right up to the gate, where the Egyptian guards permitted the vehicle to go in but nobody to come out. Later the Egyptian Government gathered together the British and the French Embassy people. They put them on a special guarded train which took them to Alexandria. Then by some conveyance--I've forgotten how--they went on to Tobruk. There they were taken on into Libya which was at that time in a friendly frame of mind toward our country and Britain. They were embarked on ships and returned to Great Britain and France. To these embassies were cleared out. The Swiss took over the British Embassy and ran it very effectively. They made very good liaison with the Egyptians. Since telephones were tapped, they did all oral business among themselves in Schweitzerdeutsch and no Egyptian (presumably) could understand a word.

This British absence lasted for quite some months. As for us, we carried on in a skeleton force but we still had an adequate number of people to run essentials, but aid programs had ended. Throughout the blackout period, which lasted several weeks, we were treated with great consideration by the Egyptians. We had no problems of law and order. Social life, was very quiet. Our families had been evacuated from Egypt in an attack transport shuttle to Crete where in Soudha Bay they were picked up by a big U.S. Merchant Marine transport ship. Transportation aboard the attack transport meant great crowding. The Marines were sleeping on deck in relays giving their bunks to the evacuees. The conditions on the attack transport were emergency conditions. Once they got on the Merchant Marine transport in Soudha Bay, politics of an unpleasant kind began. These were influence exercises by some people--I won't mention names. Bribes were paid to

crew by some evacuees to obtain the best staterooms and to avoid sharing. The crew gave little attention to family needs.

Q: These were some of the deportees?

HART: Yes, some of the deportees. It began to be an important factor. My wife, Jane, was the wife of the DCM, but she was concerned about getting everybody else fixed before she got herself fixed. When she finally was allocated a room, she found it was occupied by a woman who said, "I have this room to myself. I paid for it."

She had bribed somebody. Jane said, "We have no other place to go. There isn't a single..."

"That's your problem."

Jane said, "You can't do that."

So Jane came in and she had to fix up a sleeping place for our smallest daughter on top of a locker trunk. She found this woman had locked the bathroom door and had taken the key. Our little girl had to relieve herself in the washbasin. The woman was just as nasty as she could be. She was the wife of some correspondent. Another woman from the embassy succeeded in getting the captain of the ship to provide her with excellent quarters very close to his. She put on a weeping act and got the ship diverted to go to Greece where she had connections.

Still another woman had a fit when she found that an embassy woman, against regulations, had a dog hidden in her clothes as she was embarked on the attack transport. The complainant was a nurse and a single lady and she had had to leave her dog behind her in Egypt with friends. The dog meant a great deal to her, like a substitute child, we'll say. She had a great sentimental attachment and was worried stiff about the animal. When she found another woman had sneaked her dog aboard, she went into hysterics.

So there were scenes aboard that made it somewhat less than a beautiful experience.

Q: This was aboard the Army transport?

HART: Merchant Marine. The transport brought them into Naples after the stop in Greece. This was in November. Naples was cold and wet. Our embassy and consular offices had been advised of this movement of people. They were going to have all these people descending upon them. The U.S. military group who were evacuated, some of the attaché people and particularly their families, had been in direct touch through their military circuitry with attachés in Italy. There was a large U.S. military presence in Naples. Those dependents got into a nice hotel which was well heated and had excellent food and service. My wife and all the rest of the non-military dependents found themselves in an unheated hotel out of season which management would not heat and in

which no kitchen was functioning. The best you could do would be to get a hot plate and hope you didn't blow out a fuse. You had to go out and buy the hot plate. Getting food was a real problem. Most evacuees didn't have any Italian, but apart from that necessities weren't available anywhere near the hotel. With small children you couldn't manage. Parents took turns sitting while others shopped.

Fortunately, this situation was brought to the attention of the consul general's office in Naples and the wife of the consul general arranged for her chauffeured car twice a week to make tours to the U.S. military commissary and to do the other shopping that was necessary. So the transportation was made available periodically so they could get their food, but they never got warm in that hotel. Children came down with all kinds of colds, fevers, and childhood illnesses. It was very difficult.

Jane had one liaison which proved to be critically important. The secretary of Mrs. Luce, the ambassador, was an old and dear friend Mary Nix. Mary was on the phone with Jane and some things were straightened out by that circuit. Eventually, Jane found, as others did, that it was best to leave Naples and get up to Rome where conditions were better. They were able to get into a pensione and get proper accommodations as well as to make schooling arrangements. It was cramped and not easy, but it was a lot better than Naples. They at least kept the place partially warm, warm enough so that you could stand it although they weren't overly generous. These pensioni are pretty close-fisted and they don't make very many concessions. They always try to cheat. They always have some extras on the bill that you have to go down and fight about. Over and over again, there was a fight just about every day over bills. Nevertheless, evacuees had access to the embassy and to Treasury checks which were coming in for them for living allowances as a result of the command evacuation taken in Washington.

People scattered when they got to Rome. Some, who might have helped others just disappeared. All evacuees were offered a choice by the Department, either to stay in Italy until things were in such shape that they could go back to Cairo or to go home to the U.S. if they wished. The Department would pay for that. This meant going home to mother and father for most of them because they didn't have homes which they owned they could immediately repossess in the States.

Many people took advantage of that. Others felt, "I can't go home and live off dad and mother. It's too late in life."

So they stayed where they were. Some went to third places. They were trying to be generous in the Department but after quite a while, they began to run out of money.

This evacuation took place at the end of October and it was not lifted until April, six months. I had some hand in getting it finally lifted. It was obvious from some time in November that the war was over. The British had withdrawn and the French and Israelis had withdrawn. In England, the whole operation had been a scandal and a failure. Anthony Eden, as you remember, had gone away to his country place in a very bad frame

of mind and near a breakdown. Still they didn't lift the evacuation order in Washington, and I think it was a political decision. They wanted to keep pressure on Nasser. His action, which was traceable directly to Dulles' withdrawal of the High Dam offer, had caused a rupture in NATO. We had taken exception. Dulles had stood up against his own allies in the United Nations and made a strong speech. Having taken this position--which we thought was right and even Nehru, who was very anti-American, praised it--the effort that Dulles was making from there on very obviously was to try to patch things up as quickly as possible with the British. The canal in the course of hostilities had been totally blocked by Egyptian action by dynamiting bridges--one bridge in particular. Egypt also sank ships loaded with concrete--barges mostly and some small vessels. Then the Egyptians were asking us for wheat under PL 480. I received that request and passed it on with a positive recommendation. It was rejected out of hand in Washington, whereupon the Egyptians started saying publicly for everybody to read and hear that all of this U.S. siding with Egypt was a fake, that the U.S. was really going after Nasser and trying to starve Egypt out. Any good will publicly that we might have obtained from this action was quickly dissipated by this decision not to sell PL 480 wheat. Of course, the U.S. rejection was based on a desire not to make the British any madder than they were already. The U.S. was trying to get the canal cleared as well. Lieutenant General Wheeler, the head of the U.S. Corps of Engineers, was sent out to see what needed to be done to clear the canal, to get somebody to agree to clear the canal. He came and stayed with us, and he was approached at once by the Egyptian press which was trying to get him to endorse the thesis that the bridge had been blown up by enemy action. Everybody knew the Egyptians had done it themselves to block the canal to prevent British and French resumption of control. Of course, when Wheeler was asked what caused the bridge's collapse he replied very simply, "Explosives." He wouldn't say who planted the charges. He didn't succeed in getting any program started but Dulles kept frantically after us to try to get the Egyptians to agree to a program of removing the obstacles to movement through the canal. The chief holdup was who was responsible and who was going to pay for it. The Egyptians weren't about to pay for it and I've forgotten how it was eventually financed. It took a long time to do before the canal was back in use.

All these things were going on and we were reporting regularly on conditions. Washington showed no signs of lifting the evacuation and I think they held it in place as a pressure--they thought--on the Egyptians. I don't think it had any effect on the Egyptians at all. It just kept our families separated and some of those families ran into crises, domestic crises, as a result. In Rome, evacuees were struggling to get along in evacuation status and they had no embassy status at all. They were just refugees and an annoyance. I must say the embassy in Rome was not very attentive. It depended on whom you knew. The embassy, per se, did the minimum. Individuals helped but the embassy as such did not grapple with this refugee situation as a high priority. They just had their collective mind on other things. It was a big embassy, of course, in a big city.

My father, near Boston, was going into his last illness. Things were quiet in Cairo and so I had no problem in asking Ray Hare for permission to go home before it was too late. A decision was made at once between me and Jane that I would pick her up and take her

and our girls back to the States until they could be returned to post. So I did. I should mention that all of us in the embassy during this period of six months had an opportunity to make one round-trip flight, with air attaché aircraft when the aerodromes were open, to fly to Rome and visit our families in exile. I did. Then I came back in April of 1957 to pick up Jane and the children on a regular commercial flight home. I was home for my father's final days and Jane was with her family in Chicago. When that was over, we all flew back together, including Jane's mother. Her father, Dean F. Smiley, head of the Association of American Medical Colleges, went out to Beirut to do an inspection of AUB Medical School for the Association. He joined us in Cairo. We returned to something like normal in Egypt, but we were a much smaller mission. AID was gone.

The atmosphere in our relations with Egypt was ambiguous partly because of the attitude of Dulles, who had a personal feeling against Nasser. It was reciprocated fully by a very personal feeling against Dulles by Nasser. Also it was reciprocated by Nasser's toying with left-wing elements in the Third World. The distrust of Nasser was very deep in the White House and in the State Department, as far as Dulles was concerned. Anything that was going to be a gesture of friendliness by the United States had to be cleared at the highest level and it was usually not cleared. I went back with the family in May of 1957. In late fall I was told that I was going to be nominated to be ambassador to Jordan and that I should come home for the formalities and the hearing. Loy Henderson sent the telegram to me and it was the most gracious telegram that I ever dreamed of getting from the Department. "Would you accept this if offered?" I went to talk to Jane. I was flattered by the honor, but we talked it over because I wanted her to share in the decision. She concurred and I sent a message agreeing. I never thought I'd get the offer of a post in quite those terms. I still think of it as one of those master touches by Loy, who knew how to handle his troops. Dulles had no feel for his Foreign Service, except for those immediately around him. However, Loy Henderson knew his people.

I went back to Cairo and picked up the family after having been sworn in and gotten my credentials and all the rest. While I was in flight between the United States and Cairo, an overnight flight in a propeller aircraft, with my credentials under my pillow, King Faisal of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan stayed up all night and decided to federate. It was announced in the morning and by the time I got to Egypt I got word from the Department, "Don't proceed further. Wait."

Of course, you know the result. It was decided that, in view of this federation between Iraq and Jordan which looked rather fragile but nonetheless was in place as a defensive response to Egypt's union with Syria, the United States would back this federation and recognize it by having only one ambassador named to it. Well Waldemar J. Gallman was already in Baghdad and much senior to me. He had already been there for some time so it was automatic that he would be named the ambassador to the new federation. The federation was finally proclaimed in 1958.

I had flown to Washington in January 1958. I went alone and my family stayed in Cairo. I received my credentials, went back and was stopped in Cairo, where I waited out federation negotiations between Iraq and Jordan.

Q: The Arab Federal State, so called, which was between Jordan and Iraq, was announced on February 14.

HART: In the meantime, telegrams flew back and forth as the discussion proceeded about implementing this basic decision of federation between the two. It was finally resolved that Waldemar Gallman would be the ambassador and, therefore, my post in Jordan was canceled. I was asked to resign it before getting there. Instead, I was to go to Syria as consul general in Damascus with the personal rank of Minister.

Friends in the Department and NEA, particularly Lampton Berry and Bill Rountree, insisted that I be given the personal rank of minister as a consolation for having lost an embassy. It was nice of them. So I was made consul general with personal rank of minister to Damascus which was now a part of the United Arab Republic. The person whom I was replacing was Charles Yost, who had just been sworn in about a month earlier as ambassador to Syria, his first embassy post, and had taken his position there but had found the atmosphere rather strange. Sure enough, it was strange because he was going to lose his post, and he lost it by the union with Egypt which took place in February. I think he had only been there about a month before his whole position was washed out. Charles was in rather bad shape. He was broke and ill. When we arrived, he still was living in the Residence but trying to recover from amoebic dysentery which he'd picked up on a trip which he'd recently made outside to Jordan. I think he'd been to Petra and there picked up the bug. We were living in the same house, the Mardom Bey house, which became the embassy residence in the Abu Rumani district of Damascus. He was trying to recover and we were just settling in. We were temporary housemates. He was at the office when he could be. He was well enough to get around but still very weak. Furthermore, he didn't know where he was going to go. There was no other embassy immediately available for him.

Q: Did he still hold ambassadorial rank at that time?

HART: No. By the time the United Arab Republic was proclaimed the union recognized no ambassadors to Damascus, but there were a number of lame ducks still around. They hadn't been transferred out yet. For instance, Adnan Kural, the Turkish ambassador and a very fine man, was still there. I got to know him quite well. Once the ambassador moved out, they were replaced by senior consular officers. The Syrians made quite a point that consular officers were not to be engaged in political work. No political officers were recognized. Of course, we simply converted the consulate general into a pocket embassy and our consular officers reported to Washington on political and economic topics, as would an embassy. Charles Yost eventually got his orders to go home and he departed. Jane and I and the children were in Damascus for almost exactly six months, from mid-March to mid-September of 1958. It was an eventful period. The first part was largely

devoted to settling in and reorganizing what had been an American legation into a consulate general, changing the signs on the door, changing our roster of people. We had to get rid of the military and other attachés. I remember the air attaché was able to get a Globemaster aircraft to come in and take out all of his household effects in one batch. That plane was such an impressive, thing in Damascus that the Syrian police tried to keep all the Syrians away so they wouldn't see what a powerful country they were vilifying in their press. The vilification was going on all the time. The controlled press was very hostile.

Q: Who was the Syrian leader at that point?

HART: Abdul Hamid Serraj, a major of the Syrian tank corps, a faithful follower of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Anything Nasser wanted he would do. He believed in direct action. He had around him a special intelligence police who intimidated Syrians. Most Syrians hardly dared come to the consulate general but some did. I did receive visitors. We also tried to entertain at dinners. I joined the Rotary Club as a result of an invitation that came to me from a member of it who represented the Mobil Oil Company in Syria. He had nerve enough to come to my office, and ask me if I'd join. I did because it gave me a little contact with Syrians I wouldn't have possibly had otherwise. We'd go to evening dinners and things of that kind that the Rotary organized. It was a normal Rotary Club. When we tried to invite people to our house, we found them wary and might well they should be because we could hear the screams of people being tortured up the street by Abdul Hamid Serraj's bully boys, only two blocks away.

I called on Serraj as I, of course, had to for protocol reasons. He immediately tried to get me to talk about an earlier incident that involved CIA and an attempt to smuggle a Syrian informant of Syria out in the trunk of a CIA car--Remember? Miles Copeland and others, I believe, were involved. I just told him that that was a matter which occurred before my time in this area and that I really had nothing to clarify it. That's about all I could say. I had heard about it, of course. He wanted to know if I'd heard about it and I said, "Yes."

Q: This was the smuggling out of an alleged Syrian agent.

HART: Serraj launched into a diatribe about the United Arab Republic. All Arabs were going to be obliged to join the United Arab Republic, or else. He implied he was going to use force to bring the whole of the Arab world into the United Arab Republic. He closed several newspapers while I was there which had been rather free in their expression of views until that time. He closed them saying, "You are against the union, the wahdeh (union)" and would accept no argument on the matter. Syrian papers that would have been interesting and critical disappeared, and just one or two that followed the explicit line of the government remained.

I called on some of the leaders of the Baath Party, the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party. They were pleasant enough.

Then we had burst upon us the situation in Lebanon. I think it started in May when Camille Chamoun decided he wanted to have a second term as president and the constitution limited presidents to only one term of six years. His action took on the tone of an assertion of Christian supremacy over Muslims and over a popular vote or referendum (if you could have one which they didn't have). Fighting began. This was the cause of the resistance to Chamoun and was, of course, picked up by Nasser, who tried to organize armed resistance and to make sure it was successful. He used his position as head of the Union to call for insurrection in Lebanon. Arms were issued and units formed. Some of the recruits were Palestinians in Syria who were given weapons and rudimentary training and sent down into Lebanon. Lebanese frontier posts with Syria disappeared. There was one post, Mesne'a, which I remember well on the main road from Damascus to Beirut, right down in the Bakaa. The minute you came out of the hills of Syria and down into the plain, right at the foot, there was this frontier post.

In Damascus we had some shortages of food and some difficulty getting quite a few household items. We knew that down in the Bakaa was an Armenian grocery store which had catered to American residents of Beirut. They had put in a stock of things that Americans like and kept them there and had a lively little business. It was nothing like a Safeway store or anything of that size, but they had a useful inventory. We decided, despite the troubles, that we were going to send a car down to get some food and take orders from everybody. It wasn't that we were so desperately short but we were mightily inconveniently short. I decided to go with Peter Spicer of my staff in our official car. I didn't ask the embassy in Beirut for permission, which was, of course, the wrong thing to do. I knew that had I asked I would probably have been told, "No." I must admit now that part of my decision to go with Peter was curiosity to see what was happening. It was not very sound judgement. At any rate we went. At the frontier post, Masha'a, lines of oil trucks, burned out, stood in the parking area. There were no personnel in sight. There was broken glass all over the place. We drove very carefully. We were not challenged from any side and there was nobody around. It was eerie. We came down in a further decline toward the Bakaa and there was a tank with its barrel pointing right at us, so we slowed up. A Lebanese officer got out and demanded that we stop which we did. He wanted to inspect our trunk, which we opened up and there was nothing there. It was empty, of course, because we were on our way to fill it with food. He waved us on through. We went over to Shtawrah to this Armenian store where they welcomed us, glad to see some customers. We filled up the car with all the orders. They had everything. They offered us a roll of hot unleavened bread stuffed with greens and we ate that as our lunch. We then turned around and drove back, past the tank and up through Masha'a. At that point we began to worry a little bit because banditry could easily be in those steep hills around both sides. It's a gorge going up through the hills and we had heard of a case of some people being robbed by armed brigands. However, we made it through without incident. Everybody was very glad to see the food. Of course, I made a report on what we'd seen. That aroused an instantaneous reaction by Ambassador Rob McClintock saying, "What do you mean by coming into my territory without my permission?" [Laughter] That was the end of the incident. Rob later visited us, he came as our houseguest. He wanted to see what was going on on the other Syrian side. Later, Jane and I went to Beirut together with

the kids and stayed at the embassy. Jane was even able to go to Ain Tab, a hill station that belonged to William A. Eddy, our old friend. It was a summer place with spectacular view that he used, and there was firing and shooting all night in that area. This was not so close as to actually place Jane in imminent danger, but Bill Eddy, a combat Marine veteran of World War I, gave her instructions to take cover if fighting came closer.

Soon afterward, the U.S. Marines landed and the situation became quiet in Beirut.

Q: The Marines landed on July 1958, as I recall.

HART: Yes. Before the decision was made to send the Marines, I sent in numerous reports on the intervention of Abdul Hamid Serraj's boys in the Lebanese standoff and civil war. As you may remember, the basta district of Beirut was the center of the resistance to Camille Chamoun. In fact, that whole section of the city was blocked off and under control of the resistance. The amount of intervention in the affair from the Syrian side, which was always denied by Cairo, we knew was considerable. Some very intelligent and very courageous Syrian businessmen took it on themselves to come and see me in my office and tell me about it. I made full reports on what they had told me. I had big maps out and I was following everything in as close detail as I could. We were getting a lot of intelligence reports along with regular embassy reports flying back and forth, so we were pretty much abreast of what people felt and saw down there in Beirut. We were supplying material which was used in the American delegation to the United Nations as background information. But I was very careful, in the case of these courageous informers, to tell Washington and the U.S.-U.N., "Please do not quote these people."

Henry Cabot Lodge got up in the UN and he almost blew me out of the water. He didn't actually give the names but he described the people in order to lend credence to stories that I had provided him with in his denunciation of Egyptian-Syrian intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon. He didn't clear it with me or anybody else. He was a very arrogant man. He knew what he wanted to do and he was no team player. He held a position in the government which was almost like that of the Secretary of State. In fact, he didn't even recognize the authority of the Secretary of State. He said so once when Bob Murphy attempted to make a point with him that what he had done was contrary to the policy of the Department and to specific instructions by Dulles. He in effect told Bob Murphy to forget it, saying, "If you have any problem with what I do, go and see the President. He'll set you straight."

He figured that by being campaign manager for Eisenhower, he had a very privileged position and indeed he did, and he was in the Cabinet.

All this was of no concern of mine. My concern was whether he had blown my sources. So far as I was able to determine, nobody took any action against those men who had been my informants. There may have been a reason for it. They may have been afraid.

When it was heard that the Marines were coming in, the Egyptian representative--who was not an ambassador but a special representative of Nasser intended to keep an eye that Abdul Hamid Serraj wouldn't be the exclusive link with Cairo--came to me and said he was very nervous about a rumor that U.S. troops, already in Lebanon, might march to Damascus.

He asked, "Will they come to Syria?"

I said, "I don't know."

I deliberately left him with that to mull over. Syrians approached our little Marine guard unit and asked the gunny sergeant, "Are the Marines coming up here?"

He replied, "Sure. They'll be here for breakfast tomorrow morning."

We had a demonstration once outside of the consular general office building. It happened in an early evening when I was at the home of one of our staff for some little social event. I got the call that a big crowd had gathered right outside our entrance and were chanting and making a lot of rather threatening noises. The Marine guard were braced for defense. I went from that house immediately to our house, our residence, to get on a more reliable telephone and called in and said, "Shall I come?"

They said, "You don't need to, sir. The crowd is gone."

I said, "What happened?"

They said, "Well, a contingent of the special forces arrived, picked up the whole crowd and put them in trucks and took them away."

So I was relieved on two counts. We didn't have a crisis right there and then. The other was that there was no shooting by the Marines either. We had an indication that the Syrians were very worried. I decided, however, to make them a little more worried, not just for that purpose alone but because I thought it was wise. We started reducing our files. I had big, bulging diplomatic files going years back. I got our staff together and ordered them to burn files on the roof using oil drums and chemicals for fast destruction. We had no inside furnace that could do that kind of thing. So the Marine guard and others burned what was given to them by the more knowledgeable staff of the material that we could spare and was duplicated in Washington. We didn't have to have it. It was the kind of material that, if the Abdul Hamid's forces had grabbed it, could have made a lot of trouble for us, intelligence reports and all sorts of classified material.

They took these oil drums up on the roof which had a gravel over asphalt surface and they watched it very carefully while they burned the stuff up. The oil drums made a big noise as they turned them over to cool off. After using one they would let it cool off before they put in another load. The yellow smoke was going up in the air for everybody to see. I was

receiving visitors in the meantime in my office, interestingly enough, still coming in with information. We would hear this bumping and banging up on the roof overhead. They wondered what it was and I said, "It's just the oil drums."

We made no secret that this was taking place and we did reduce our files so that we would be in a position to destroy the final element on very, very short notice. However, we were never aware of being threatened with an invasion of our premises at any time. In fact, one day a Syrian guard outside who had a machine pistol, was toying with it; was obviously not well trained and lost control of his weapon. It sprayed the building with bullets. One went right through the window passing just a foot or two from the head of my economic officer who ducked down. Another police officer came up quickly and grabbed him, turned the weapon off, put the safety catch on, and took the guard into custody. That was the nearest thing to any hostile action, and it wasn't really hostile at all. It was just a fellow who didn't know how to handle his weapon, acting perhaps out of boredom.

Q: How did you read Dulles' decision to go into Lebanon?

HART: I was personally opposed to it. It didn't seem to me like the right thing to do. I have to say afterwards that I think it may have helped. If it had been I who had had any recommendation to make--nobody asked me, of course, I would have said, "Don't do it."

This was based on the general principle that, when we try to get into something and use our muscle, we usually make things worse. At least I felt that way. It "savored of imperialism" as they called it and came on the heels of the British intervention in the canal area. I just felt that that wasn't the right thing to do and wasn't going to really advance the situation. As it turned out--partly as a result of very skillful action by Rob McClintock, who was a good officer in an emergency--General Shehab prevented an actual confrontation on the beaches as our Marines landed by, as he said, "kidnapping" the general out of his office and getting him down there to the beach where he could then tell the tank commander to turn the barrels the other way. "Don't aim at these people." This was fortunate and it had a calming effect. Shehab, as you know, became President of Lebanon.

Q: I was wondering if you saw this as part of Dulles' frustration with Nasser as well as a general signal to the Soviets that we had not--

HART: There was no question that Dulles knew that Nasser was behind a lot of this although he was not the fountain of the trouble. The trouble began because of Chamoun's ambition to perpetuate himself President. He felt that he had the backing of the United States. It turned into a kind of U.S. indirect confrontation with Nasser again. Nasser, of course, was giving out a version of the Lebanese situation which was distorted according to his propaganda needs. The argument was intense in the United Nations, in the General Assembly and the Security Council. Russia got into it. Khrushchev, I think, was in power. He threatened to turn the American fleet into steel coffins. He used terms like that, but

then he did nothing about it. Nasser made a hurried trip to Moscow which he depicted later as being an effort to prevent Khrushchev from taking action and starting World War III. Actually we believed that he went there to try to get Khrushchev to take military action, but Khrushchev preferred just to talk about it and make noises. That was not lost on the area, that is, that the Soviet Union in a pinch was not going to risk a war with the United States Sixth Fleet which was right there in numbers and just standing off the shores of Lebanon.

Actually, it developed that we bought a little time for Lebanon by this intervention. So that's the way it worked out. I think that we've seen now that it wouldn't work again. After what happened a few years ago in 1982, we would never do this again, probably.

The idea that we have some special thing to defend in Lebanon was based on a superficial knowledge of the country, in my opinion. It's a very complex situation as we all know. The complexity of it and the difficulty of dealing with just one sect like Chamoun's, asserting that he represents all of Lebanon--Charles Malik, very eloquently sounded off on the same theme--this line of argument had very deeply influenced American policy. But it did not represent judgement in depth, in my opinion, about the situation in the area or about Lebanon itself. That's why I was against it, but nobody asked me for my opinion. I was, of course, totally occupied with intelligence reporting.

I was ordered out to go back and be Deputy Assistant Secretary in September of 1958, so I was in Syria on duty for six months. These were a very interesting six months for another reason and that was that we had the revolution in Iraq, the disappearance of the federation between Jordan and Iraq in mid-July. This was an event which also influenced Washington disproportionately. The Administration saw itself as defending a Western position in the Arab world, namely Lebanon, against powerful, hostile forces subservient to Nasser and influenced by the Soviet Union and as giving the Soviet Union an increasingly important position.

On the ground in Syria, the Syrian reaction to the revolution in Iraq was very interesting. The Syrians Baath Party people took the following line, semi-publicly: "Well, this means that we're going to have a United Arab Republic made up of three countries, and Syria will be right in the middle to guide this. Damascus will be the real headquarters. We Syrians have the ideological core here, in any case. The Baath Party belongs here. This is where its strength is. So Iraq will join us. Egypt will supply Nasser as the front man but will not be running the show which they can't do anyway. They don't know how to run anything." The Syrian attitude toward the Egyptians was that they were very poor administrators.

It didn't work out as the Syrians hoped. In fact, Iraq was a very bloody affair. I talked to one Syrian who was caught in Baghdad but managed to escape being torn limb from limb, as some people were. He had a lot to tell me about the savagery of the Iraqi mob. There was an interesting reaction in Syria--first there was elation and then there was deep disappointment that a three-power Union didn't eventuate. That was apparent before I left.

Then we went back to Washington, arriving early October, 1958.

Q: Let's turn back to your three years as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Near East and South Asian Affairs working for Bill Rountree.

HART: Bill and I had a very fine relationship. He was there part of the time that I was there. Then he was made ambassador to Pakistan. His place was taken by G. Louis Jones as assistant secretary. The Rountree period came at a time of great ferment in Iraq. The Abd al-Karim Qasim regime was struggling to find its way. Qasim himself seemed to be a very strange man. Some people felt that he was unbalanced. He certainly was very insecure. Bill Rountree went out to visit him and was nearly mobbed by an uncontrollable and very hostile crowd of thousands of people in the streets who pelted his car with everything. The driver got them safely through by just gunning the engine and plowing in. People just had to run or be crushed. It looked for a while like nip and tuck. We had claims for the murder of three men by Iraqi mob action, including George Colley of Bechtel, whom I had known from his time in Saudi Arabia when he was the vice president of Bechtel and project manager for the Trans-Arabian Pipeline. He was a wonderful guy. There were two others whose names skip my mind right now and whom I didn't know personally.

The Iraqi revolutionary regime was obviously unstable but was determined not to be subservient to Nasser. This aroused immediately the hostility of the Syrian Baath Party and of Nasser. In fact, revolutionary Iraq didn't seem to have any ideology. The scene in Syria went on about as I had left it. There was nothing particularly new. The Marines were withdrawn from Lebanon the end of September, just about the time I left Damascus. In fact, as I went out through Beirut, they were pulling their team together to evacuate.

In Washington I encountered with the ambassador of Egypt a wholly different attitude toward Iraq than had earlier been the case. When the revolution broke out, Nasser in effect opened his arms and said, in effect, "Come to me, my boy."

They didn't come. They weren't his boy. By the time I got to Washington, Nasser was furious with Qasim and wanted to overthrow him. The ambassador of Egypt proposed to me that we undertake a joint enterprise to overthrow Qasim. I said, "No. We're not going to get into that kind of thing."

"Well this is an opportunity. Egypt's really your best bet in the Middle East and this man would introduce the Russians. As you can see, we're not subservient to Moscow in Egypt at all."

He argued and he had me repeatedly to lunch. It always wound up the same way. "No. Not interested in this kind of approach. Let Iraqis work it out."

In the meantime, Ya'cov Herzog, Israeli deputy chief of mission would meet with me about once a week. He would come to the State Department and directly translate from Israeli intelligence reports, all in Hebrew, all the reasons why Jerusalem felt that the United States under no circumstances should go after Qasim. "He is not really under the control of anybody."

Then he'd read very extensive sections providing details about the internal situation in Iraq. I thought it very interesting that they had all this information. We had it also and we had more, but he had a lot. I have to say that my admiration for Israeli intelligence collection was increased. The late Ya'cov Herzog was the brother of the current president of Israel. He was a very fine guy and I liked him. His father had been a rabbi in Dublin. He was an erudite young man, a fine scholar of Judaism. He always said that his principal interest in life was the Talmud and politics. He was an honest person and I found him very decent to deal with. He didn't try to misrepresent things.

The Turks were also worried about the United States getting caught in policy that might mean an attempt to overthrow Qasim.

One day we had a message from Turkey. Bill Rountree said, "Look. The Turks have urgently asked for either the Secretary or the Under Secretary to come out to Turkey to talk about Iraq. Neither the Secretary nor the Under Secretary are about to do this. They have other things that are much more demanding than that. Would you go? I can't go. I've got other things that would keep me here. This will give you an opportunity to see your bailiwick."

I had a speaking commitment of a certain date in May 1959 and this was already April. I felt I had to get back for that engagement, but I went off to the Middle East.

I went first to Greece to get acquainted with our people there in the embassy and have a briefing. I went on to Cyprus. Toby Belcher was there as chargé. It was a fascinating transition period with Sir Hugh Foote as governor. He was phasing out British rule but still living in his sumptuous quarters with his wife. I met a number of the Cypriot political leaders. I met Archbishop Makarios, Glafkos Clerides, Papaioannu, who, I think, was head of AKEL, the communist labor party. He was a very young man at that time. I also met Fazil Kucuk, head of the Turkish community, and several of his senior men. Toby Belcher had a group of us out to his place in the area of Kirenya. That was a very interesting meeting.

Then I went on to Turkey. When I got to Ankara, William Fletcher Warren was ambassador and I stayed at his residence. We had some rather intense discussions about Iraq, arguing over policy toward that revolution. Fletcher embraced the principle that Iraq was about to fall under total communist influence and I said that I didn't believe it. He wanted the U.S. to take action and I asked what sort of action we should take. He got quite steamed up. We had a problem that developed later with respect to his senior personnel and I'll come into that in a moment.

A meeting was immediately arranged for me to see Fethi Rustom Zorlu, the Foreign Minister. We had a preliminary meeting in the Foreign Minister's office, the same one that I was later to get to know well. He said, "For our discussion about this question of Iraq, I'd like to transfer the venue down to Istanbul. If it's all right with you, we'll meet in the Hilton hotel which has just been built on the Bosphorus."

We met at that hotel, where we had practically the entire top floor to ourselves. I found my old friend and associate, Adnan Kural there from Damascus and a number of other people. I had someone from the Embassy in Ankara with me as well. The purpose Zorlu had in mind was to try to convince us that we should not intervene in Iraq. I at once told him, "We have no intention of intervening in Iraq." We could have finished the whole conversation in five minutes, but he kept pounding away, apparently not believing me. I kept answering him the same way. We discussed all the ins and outs of the situation in Iraq so that we could match our versions. We had lunch and went on for a while in the afternoon. Finally, he accepted the fact that our policy was pretty firm and we saw things very much as they saw them.

I went back to Ankara. I think I was there one day and then flew to Tehran. I had briefings there from Ambassador Tom Wailes and then went on to Afghanistan stopping in Kandahar. I think I flew in a C-47 aircraft owned by the Afghans. We landed in Kandahar and it was hot. We couldn't proceed any further because the airport in Kabul had been closed. Prime Minister Prince Daud was going to use it for some kind of a trip and was about to fly out, but no one knew exactly when. We had to wait until he had cleared. We waited a long time and we fried. We walked into the terminal every now and then which was not air-conditioned. At least it was a change and better than sitting inside the aircraft. Finally, after we had been there a couple of hours or so, we were told we could proceed. We flew up to Kabul and stepped out into that lovely mountain air and it was just beautiful. It was a simple grassy airport with a windsock and not much else, quite adequate for a C-47.

I was taken to the embassy residence where I stayed with Henry Byroade, who had been my chief in Cairo 1955-1956 and had been assistant secretary when I was directing Near East Affairs under his supervision. We knew each other well. I got a pretty good briefing there. I called on Prince Naim, who was the foreign minister. I didn't get to see Daud, of course, since he had gone. The king was not on my program for some reason. I guess he may not have been available or maybe they didn't consider me to have high enough rank. It was a hurried trip and I would have loved to have stayed there a week, but I had this unfortunate schedule back in Washington that I felt I had to meet. In retrospect I wish I had canceled it, but I felt I would have been letting down a lot of people.

To get out of Kabul it was decided that I would go best by car to Peshawar. They provided me with a driver and car and we drove down through the Kabul Gorge. The road which was still raw and barely completed. It hadn't been surfaced and it was sharp gravel.

It was a fascinating ride and very picturesque, as Kuchi tribal families were migrating out of the hot Indus Valley to the Afghan highlands.

I spent the night in Jalalabad where we had a small AID mission who were trying to help people build their own roads. In fact, the Kabul Gorge Road had been built with advisory help from this team. I sat up late in the night listening to the woes of these American engineers, who said, "You know, we are here to advise them on how to build a road, not to build it ourselves. The Afghans are blaming us all the time for not building the road, but we can't do that. We don't have the men or the equipment. We're trying to teach them how to use their equipment. They can ruin even a rock crusher. They'll wreck one thing after another. They don't understand the machinery."

I went on from there. Coming out of Jalalabad we drove to Torkhum which is the frontier station with Pakistan. There was a very picturesque assembly of trucks waiting to get through the Khyber Pass. They were beautifully decorated Afghan trucks with pictures drawn quite artistically all over the sides and even the front and the hood. I guess a lot of people know about the Khyber Pass. I went on to the consulate at Peshawar where I spent one night and got a briefing there. Barrington King was the Consul there and gave me a very nice welcome. Many years later, in 1978, I was to occupy his house temporarily in Carthage when he was away and I had my wife, two daughters and their husbands on a Tunisian holiday. Ed Mulcahy, who was ambassador at the time, gave us a great welcome.

I flew down then to Karachi where our embassy was located. The ambassador there was James M. Langley and he met me at the airport when I arrived. We had an evening together. I spent the night and then flew back to Washington. I would have loved to have gone on to a more extensive trip to India, for example, and other places but I had this commitment.

Langley resigned shortly afterward and went back to live in Concord, New Hampshire. He was a newspaper man and a very nice guy. He was very helpful to me in the brief time I was there.

That brings us to the summer of 1959. In that year, 1959, there was a meeting between Karamanlis and Adnan Menderes, which was very significant for the future of Greek-Turkish relations and Cyprus matters in particular, because their initial meeting--and I've forgotten the exact date--in 1959 had led to the Zurich agreement in principle on an independent republic of Cyprus ruling out enosis and partition. This was a change in the position of both sides. It was an act of statesmanship which gave us great relief in the State Department because it meant that the heat was off for a while between Greece and Turkey and reduced the threat the Cyprus question presented to the unity of NATO. It led, of course, in 1960 to the London meetings so that the London-Zurich body of agreements emerged into very elaborate arrangements with respect not only to the sovereign base areas that Britain would retain on the island but a great number of smaller sites which

they would lease from the government of Cyprus for an indefinite period for purposes of military communications, surveillance and training.

About this time Dulles became desperately ill with cancer. I can't remember the date when he went to Walter Reed for his last stay. His place was taken by Christian Herter. We had what I remember as a period in which the Foreign Service really came into its own. Herter had the respect for the Foreign Service and believed in using it to the full and I think he had the utmost confidence in Loy Henderson as did the whole administration, especially Eisenhower. I found myself attending meetings when Bill was absent or in the interim between Bill Rountree's departure for Pakistan and Louis Jones' entry as assistant secretary. Loy Henderson was usually at meetings held by the Secretary to discuss the Foreign Service and the Department's organization, but he was frequently called upon, also, to express his opinions on substantive matters, especially including the USSR. Sometimes we'd have some very interesting exchanges on the subject of Soviet intentions and policies.

Herter was sworn in after Dulles' death as I remember it. Eisenhower wanted him and a number of us met him on his return from the Senate where he had been approved right away. He served as Secretary of State for about a year.

Quite apart from the Cyprus agreements, Turkey in 1960 had an upheaval. The military took over the government. The embassy was caught short on this surprise event and it was realized in Washington that reporting out of the embassy had been very deficient. Doug Dillon, who was the under secretary, i.e., number two in the Department, went out on a special reconnaissance trip to see why we had not had reports of the developing crisis. Reports had been pretty rosy. He found that, starting with Ambassador Fletcher Warren, all the top positions were occupied by people who had no experience in that area or even in the Middle East. Two of them were old colleagues of mine, friends from my Foreign Service class of 1938. The Deputy Chief of Mission, an older man, had had much experience in Latin America as, in fact, had Fletcher and at least two of my classmates. This lack of familiarity with Turkey may have been responsible for some of the uncritical acceptance of the Menderes Government's versions of events as they were developing. Doug Dillon, exploring the matter in greater depth, became incensed that we should have such poor representation from the standpoint of experience. They were perfectly fine officers, but were just out of their depth. Dillon wanted to fire Fletcher Warren but he didn't. Instead he fired his number two, whose name I can't remember. Fletcher Warren, in due time, was retired and replaced by seasoned veteran Raymond A. Hare.

This move by the Turkish Army is a long story but it was triggered by a developing crisis in the parliament in which the Menderes forces, heavily outnumbering the opposition, seemed to be directing their efforts toward crushing what was left of the opposition by very high handed methods. There were complaints about Menderes' expenditure of American aid money. Menderes knew how to please the top levels of the American government, especially the Eisenhower Administration, by his staunch anti-Communist posture, and his willingness to assist in the formation of the Baghdad Pact back in the

early 1950s. I am afraid he got the idea that he could almost write a blank check on American assistance by being a great ally. I don't think Menderes had planned to spend a great deal of time thinking about his Arab neighborhood. I don't think he understood the Arabs and what was really going on in that area. I got the impression from Zorlu, that Menderes had a positive policy toward Iraq. That policy was that they were going to keep Iraq on the friendly side because both countries had in common the Kurds.

The thing that triggered the final military action was two things as I remember it. One was that Menderes was beginning to lose the battle for the minds of the students and they were all in an uproar against him and blaming him for suppressing news as well as for suppressing them. Then Menderes went ahead and put on trial the leaders of the opposition, and, to cap that, arrested Ismet İnönü, great patriot of the republic. This was too much for the Army to take. They said that the whole structure of government was threatened. Since the Army in Turkey considers that its mission is to preserve the republic and the Atatürk principles from dangers from within as well as from outside, they moved in and Menderes, Zorlu, and Polatkan (Minister of Finance) were tried and executed. Others were tried and imprisoned. Celal Bayar, the President of the Republic, who was an old war hero of World War I period, was tried and just separated from politics but treated gently. Quite a few others were kept on Yassiada in the Marmara Sea for a while and then eventually allowed to come back to their homes but not to get into politics. The Democratic Party, Menderes' party, was abolished. The Republican People's Party thus held the leadership position. That's the party of Atatürk, the founding party of the republic, headed by İnönü.

While all of this was unfolding, Turkish financial difficulties were mounting. The new government which came into power--with the military putting civilians in many key positions--sent delegates to Washington for financial assistance. Under Secretary Doug Dillon took the active part in meeting them, being the top economist in the Dulles-Herter State Department.

I have left out one thing in this period that I should perhaps mention and that is Saudi Arabia's position during this period of the late 1950s. Starting back in the 1950s, King Abd al-Aziz, the founding father, died in 1953. As had been foreordained, Crown Prince Sa'ud bin Abd al-Aziz took over. He was known to be a man of very little education and not particularly intelligent but a nice guy. He was good in tribal relations. Following in his father's footsteps, he married extensively by a rotational system to keep up the connections with all major tribes. His mental equipment wasn't very good. He just never understood anything complex. He oversimplified things and made the wrong judgments. He was spending money hand over fist and giving the country the image of gross extravagance and corruption. The word had gotten around through the Arab world and to Nasser in Cairo.

I remember when I was in Cairo in the mid 1950s that Sa'ud and his party came through on their way to Washington to make an official visit to Eisenhower and to ask for aid and support. Saud was already afraid of Nasser. He saw him as a real threat to his position and

to Saudi Arabia but he hadn't yet broken with him in any way. He came through to talk to Nasser before going to Washington. Nasser said in effect as I remember it, "You can do two things for us and we set a great deal of store in our relationship with you by whether you are able to do this. We want the Gulf of Aqaba closed to Israel's use. We want a decision made that makes it an Arab gulf. We want wheat from the United States and we need a lot of it. They've been hanging back on this."

George Wadsworth came through at the time. He played a round of golf at the Gazira Sporting Club. Saud apparently made his promise to do his best for what Nasser wanted and they went on to the United States he was given a very good reception and he gave in return a very lavish banquet which I didn't attend, since I had no business there, my responsibilities being in Cairo. Subsequently, Saud came back through Cairo, having won U.S. grant of a \$5 million much-needed civil airport building in Dhahran. From the time of U.S. Corps of Engineers construction of Dhahran Airfield, finished in 1946, there was a solidly built but small terminal building, deemed sufficient by the Corps.

Saud had made no progress on the Gulf of Aqaba with Dulles. It was a foregone conclusion that he wouldn't. It's an international waterway. As far as getting any wheat was concerned, he couldn't budge Eisenhower any more than we could from Cairo. Nasser therefore gave him a very cold reception and said, "We got our wheat from the Soviet Union. I'll send you pictures of it."

Nasser then turned his propaganda guns on Saudi Arabia. Ahmed Said, the famous, vitriolic broadcaster for "Voice of the Arabs," cut loose every day against Saudi Arabia and Saud's corrupt regime and its pro-Americanism, its anti-Arabism, its money fever, its spendthrift ways. He said, "After all, this oil belongs to the Arab world and not to Saudi Arabia and its king. Oil is for the Arabs and should not be under the full control of such a regime as this."

It was a declaration of political war. In Washington we could see this developing and we could also see that Saud's was a very weak regime in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis came to believe that it was weak when Abdul Hamid Serraj held up a check in front of the crowd in Syria and said, "This is a million-dollar check. Everyone come here and look at it. It was drawn by Saud to kill Nasser."

The reaction in Saudi Arabia was the acute embarrassment of the regime. What could be called the College of Princes, sons of the late King Abd al-Aziz, is the supreme body and they apparently concluded: "We've had enough. This Saud has run us into the ground. He's ruined our reputation and our image in the Arab world. His wastefulness and bad judgment has created a dangerous situation. We've got to make a change and put Faisal into authority."

So they went to Saud and they threatened him. Mohammed bin Abd al-Aziz, a kind of chip off the old block, is said to have made the more potent threats. Very reluctantly Saud made Faisal, of whom he was very jealous, Prime Minister with real authority and Saud

stood away. He was not to involve himself in financial matters and he was to let Faisal develop his own program for the use of oil revenues.

Q: What year was this?

HART: Late 1958. This action was taken and Faisal moved in on a situation where a budget for the country had never existed. Saud had let others handle the influx of oil money, which was now getting very large. Abd al-Aziz, his father, had handled the relatively modest income in gold sovereigns that had been ARAMCO's pre-1945 royalties. In other words, the old fashioned Arab-Bedouin way was used: that the coffer of money was under your chair or your cushion and you as guardian, gave the key to some trustee who would hand out money to you as you required for public purposes. This was because it was not the sovereign's money. The money belonged to the realm. The sovereign drew on it for what he needed and you gave it to people as needed. This was Saud's inherited philosophy. There was no budget. Nobody had ever heard of a thing called a budget.

Faisal, we estimated, found a situation in which 60% of all the oil company income was being spent on the royal family for whatever they wanted and for the hangers-on who were innumerable. A lot of it was being handled by one 'Id bin Salim, who was what the Arabs call a sa'is, a groom for the horses but he was actually head of the vehicle department. He was black and was totally loyal to King Saud and gave everybody all the money the king wanted given. On royal air trips he handed out bunches of \$100 bills to members of the household as they got off the plane in Europe or elsewhere. The king had also built palaces after palaces, at least two of which he had never occupied. One was near Medina and was never quite finished. I saw it years later. One was built down in Abha on a beautiful site. He never went there. He built a tremendous palace at Riyadh with fountains playing and he built a big one in Jeddah. There was also another which was more modest in Dammam. Money was just flowing around. He had authorized a road to be built from Medina north to the area of Mada'in Salih and beyond. It was given to Muhammad bin Ladin, an Arab contractor without prior engineering. He put it right down the middle of a wadi and it was washed out by the first sayl (torrent).

There was also a bin Ladin road project from Makkah to Ta'if up the steep mountains, a very difficult project. That was started and went way over budget immediately. There was enormous wastage from this.

Faisal took all this over. He reduced the amount of royal take from oil income from something like 60% to about 14%, as we estimated. He put civilians in charge of ministries. These were people in whom he had confidence, but he kept very close track of their expenditures. He once showed me a piece of paper which he kept in the pocket of his thobe which showed every minister's budget. Every time he would meet them, and he would meet them often, he would say, "What have you done with this money? I want an accounting for your part of the budget."

He really had things moving in a good direction. Of course, all the hangers-on asked Saud, "We can't get any money. What is happening here? Aren't you the king?"

They started heckling him and making life miserable for him. He got more and more jealous, because Faisal was getting the plaudits of a wider and wider circle of people. Finally, in late 1960 around November a budget was prepared by Faisal to take effect in March. It was submitted to the king for his approval and he decided he would make this a test case. He rejected the budget. When Faisal heard that it had been rejected by his half-brother, Faisal got up and left the meeting and his position as Prime Minister.

He went out and took some members of his family and camped in the desert which is the way his father always did things. Saudis always like to camp in the desert. They love the desert. Faisal just went off there and stayed by himself and refused to have any further contact with his brother, the king. Messengers went out and people tried to get him to come back. He brusquely told him he would not under any circumstances come back unless the king changed his position totally. He realized he wouldn't and so said that he was not going to have anything more to do with him, that without authority he did not want the position of Prime Minister.

Q: The last time we were talking about the strain and stress between King Saud and Prince Faisal, who was acting as prime minister at that point.

HART: I think I should intervene at this point to say that Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, the Egyptian counselor to King Abdul Aziz (personal advisor for a great many years in Saudi Arabia)--I believe he had long since become a Saudi citizen, subject to the king although he was an Egyptian-born diplomat--told me the following. A year or so before the death of the king in 1953, the king took him with him for a drive from the Murabba' Palace--the old citadel which is now kept more or less intact as a historical structure in the center of Riyadh but at that time was way out in the desert from the small community that was Riyadh. On this drive they hadn't gone very far before the king spotted a house being built with structural reinforcing rods, re-bars, and concrete. He said, "What is this?"

With some embarrassment, one of his men said, "Your son, Saud, is building this for his house."

King Abdul Aziz immediately demanded that the driver turn the car around and go back to the palace. He summoned his son, Saud, and said, "Is this true that you are building a house here?"

Saud confirmed that he was. The king then gave him a lecture right on the spot in front of Sheikh Hafiz. He said, "We are the people of the black tent. This is something you must never forget. Don't build a house like that. You will separate yourself from your people. Stop that nonsense. Live simply and the Kingdom will be better off."

Of course, the work stopped, but after the king died, Saud became one of the greatest builders of palaces that the whole Middle East has ever seen. These were palaces that he never even lived in. The king was disturbed by his son, Saud. He knew he wasn't as smart as Faisal and he knew that Faisal was very smart and very able and that he had admirable qualities in other directions that were recognized by the king. He summoned the two men--this being somewhat later than the event I just described--and Hafiz Wahba happened to be present when he summoned them. So Hafiz asked to be excused. The king, however, insisted that he remain and witness what was about to take place. The two princes arrived and the king said, "I demand that you, Faisal, give me your word of loyalty to your elder brother, Saud, as he becomes king. You must give him your loyalty and your support. Swear that to me."

He made Faisal say it seven times. Then he turned to Saud and said, "I demand that you recognize the position of your half-brother, Faisal, to be Crown Prince, and listen to him. Give him your personal loyalty and consideration in response to his."

He made him say it seven times. This was important in what happened later. In the meantime, what had happened with respect to the Dhahran Airfield Agreement was simply that King Saud--this being at the end of the year 1960--had been on the throne now for about eight years. He was feeling the heat of great criticism for his extravagances for his personal wandering away from strict Islamic rules of personal conduct such as drinking. But above all, the criticism was directed toward his extravagance and his splurging of oil money for personal aggrandizement rather than for the good of the country. It gave Cairo the ammunition it wanted to try to overthrow him and to place on that throne, if they could, someone who would be more or less obedient to Cairo's and Nasser's wishes. Nasser considered at that time that the Arab world was pretty weak and flabby and that he was the natural leader. He was going to be the leader. Ahmed Said, the broadcaster from Cairo who was full of vitriolic speech and who was feared in the Arab world but listened to, was fulminating against the Saud clan as unworthy to lead a nation with such resources, and that those resources belonged to the Arab world in general, etc.

The criticism had gone so far that King Saud was really in a panic. He decided to give notice on Dhahran Airfield to the United States simply to assert that he was master in his own house. So he did it and he gave one full year's notice which was in accordance with the basic Dhahran Airfield Agreement.

Q: When did he take this action?

HART: He took this action publicly in the beginning of 1961 before April. April 1961 was the time when the year's notice had to be filed. Otherwise, as I recall it, at the beginning of April 1962 the agreement would automatically renew itself for five years.

I was back in Washington when all of this happened. We, of course, had discussions about it and I was taken over one day to meet President Kennedy after I had been named

ambassador to Saudi Arabia. We briefly discussed the situation there but we didn't get into details or how we were going to handle it. We were just going to see what we could do. In the meantime, our official attitude as transmitted by our then-ambassador to the Saudi government was to accept the king's decision and we began plans to move personnel out. The Saudi response showed a great deal of concern that the United States should not leave precipitously. They wanted to talk about details. They really didn't want us to go but they could not disavow the king's public action. Having made it, they were rather panicky about what we would do, particularly when we showed a willingness to just get out. That wasn't really what they wanted.

At any rate, when I arrived with my wife, we didn't get down to business on this very quickly.

Q: When was your arrival?

HART: I arrived in July of 1961 right in the heat of the summer. The Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles had called a conference of ambassadors of Africa and the Middle East to meet with him in Nicosia, Cyprus. I first went and presented credentials, made calls and then turned right around and took a flight, with Jane, to Nicosia. Once this conference was over, which was really a conference to discuss our general policies for the benefit of Chester Bowles, I returned and we got into this airfield question fairly soon. I have to say first of all that, in the course of presenting credentials, the king was at Ta'if, up above Makkah in the mountains at an altitude of about 6,000 feet where people liked to go in the hot summer period because while the days were warm the nights were always very cool and pleasant. It was a summer station for him. He had a fairly sizable palace up there.

After I presented my credentials, I flew back to Jeddah and then made separately an appointment to return to Ta'if for the exclusive purpose of calling on Crown Prince Faisal, who had moved into his home, a rather beautiful period piece of old Hejazi architecture several stories high, which had been purchased by Faisal from the Al-Husseini family. This was the family of Sherif Hussein, the man who said he was king of the Hejaz back at the end of World War I and who had fought with King Abdul Aziz, had lost, had been exiled, and whose sons, Faisal and Abdullah, were given the thrones of Iraq and Jordan, respectively, and whose great grandson is the present king of Jordan. In any event this is the Husseini household.

I called on Crown Prince Faisal in Ta'if. The only person whom he had asked to join us was Abdullah bin Abd al-Rahman, Faisal's paternal uncle, the brother of King Abd al-Aziz who had passed away in 1953. Faisal and I had a very pleasant conversation. We had known each other ever since the 1945 San Francisco conference which I believe I mentioned earlier, and also from a meeting that I had with King Abdul Aziz in which he introduced me to both Saud and Faisal in 1946. I had had rare contact with him in an official way and now I was going to see a lot of him. It was important to call on him, for he was a figure of great influence in the country and in the government, whenever he

might want to exert that influence. He was in a position of retreat as a result of what I have described. He never once, nor did I, mention the crisis that he had had with his brother. In fact, during all of the period that followed while I was ambassador, he never mentioned this crisis with his brother and I never mentioned it to him because that wouldn't have been wise. I learned what I could from other sources, but not from him. The Saud clan hold their cards very close to their chests. All of the members do, young and old. I heard from other sources that the king had come to call on Faisal at his house and Faisal had received him. However, he would not return the call. The standoff was very firm.

During the fall of 1961, things were relatively quiet. We proceeded with incipient preparations for the change that would come about in April of 1962. I am afraid I haven't got all the details in my mind. In general, the commander of Dhahran Airfield was also head of a tactical arm of the U.S. defense establishment. That would be phased out--that role, that particular hat would be gone by April. With it would go a fair amount of equipment and it was important to decide which equipment would stay. We didn't, as I recall it, get into that question during the fall of 1961, I believe it came just a little later.

There was a Cabinet that the king had rebuilt, after Faisal walked out, naming as foreign minister a man who was the only non-member of the Saud family to hold that title. His name was Ibrahim Sawayel. He later became ambassador here in Washington. Sawayel was a nice man, a pleasant person and easy to talk with. We were on a very friendly and easy basis from the start. I don't think he really had a great deal of authority or influence, because real decisions were being made by the king among members of his family with whom he could get along, which weren't very many. I would say he made as few decisions as possible. Having done what he did, in the very important decision regarding his relations with the United States, he was anxious to make sure that the United States didn't just leave him alone, unprotected in a situation where there was an electric influence of Nasser over the whole Arab world. Anybody who stood up against Nasser was standing up, at that time, against the wave of Pan-Arab opinion which was very powerful. He would do so at his peril.

In the brief period of the fall of 1961 relations were friendly enough and we did what we were supposed to do in preparation to turnover Dhahran Airfield to the Saudi Government. We began to get visits by mediators who wanted to make sure we weren't just going to leave altogether.

The king fell ill in the late fall of 1961. I was informed that he was going to go to the United States and wanted to go to Boston to Peter Bent Brigham Hospital. It happened to be rather close to where I was brought up. I could visualize the situation better. As time came for him to leave, intensive efforts were made within the royal family and outer circles beyond it, to get an accommodation between Faisal and the king. The king was going to leave and Faisal had to step in and take his place. There was no one else really to do that properly. Public opinion would demand it. When I speak about public opinion in Saudi Arabia, it really exists but it is a little different then the way we see it in the West,

but it is strong. Information moves very rapidly in this network. Even when they didn't have telegraph and telephone systems that worked, news traveled very fast and through immense distances. It is surprising.

Public opinion was strong for Faisal taking over. The king never traveled modestly and alone. He always traveled with an enormous retinue. On the eve of his departure they were all down at Dhahran saying goodbye to him before he took the plane the next day. The usual Arab farewell, or greeting, is to kiss the king on both cheeks and even on the nose or the forehead. They were all doing it as he sat there in his room in the ARAMCO hospital. Faisal came, too. He did his duty like everybody else and left at once without saying a single word to the king. What had been arranged and what Faisal had accepted was something like the following. Faisal was to be in the king's place as a locum tenens, but only to manage the mechanics of the kingship without real authority to make any decisions of a consequence on his own. In fact he would not take decisions. He refused to act in any other capacity than locum tenens. This was not something which the wiser heads wanted but that was as much as he would give. Somebody had to sit in that position and receive visitors and recommend things for the king. The king did not, in other words, give up being king. It was not like a sick and absent President turning over things to the Vice President with full authority to make decisions. Not at all.

The king went off on his flight to Boston and was there for some weeks. I don't remember how long he was at the hospital. He took over an entire floor of Peter Bent Brigham, since he brought with him his harem and hangers-on. Id bin Salem, the ever-present handler of money, was there and I don't know how many others, but it was a very large retinue and it amazed the hospital staff and disturbed their routine. Saudis were coming and going constantly in elevators and it must have been very confusing. The king's people were extremely generous and open-handed to the hospital and I think they gave it a lot of money as gifts in addition to more than covering expenses. Id bin Salem, I assume, was paymaster.

Q: Didn't President Kennedy go to Boston to call on the king?

HART: No. President Kennedy and the king had never met. Of course, it was to be expected that they would. In fact, if they didn't, there would be something wrong. The President wanted to base his policies in the Arab world as U.S. backing of regimes serving their people in terms of education, progress and human rights. He was worried over a close identification of the U.S. with undemocratic, retrogressive regimes. King Saud's rule did not well advertise the desired image.

The question raised in the White House was when the king would be well enough and pay a call on the President. The king's position with his silly advisors was that, because he was a guest in the country and ill, the President should come and call on him. This got things off to a not very good start because the White House regarded this as absurd and a bad practice to start. They would find that others would demand the same thing.

For quite a while the quiet messages were going back and forth but with an increasing irritation on both sides when they couldn't resolve it. It was finally decided by the White House that President Kennedy would go and make a visit to his Palm Beach estate which was in the Kennedy family. I don't know that it was his personal place so much as a family complex similar but perhaps not as large as the one in Cape Cod. The king was to go down there, stay at a hotel and they would meet without starting a precedent in protocol which would be very difficult to follow with other people. The nonsense about it irritated both sides, I am sure, but particularly President Kennedy.

The king did come down and they met. Actually when they got down there, the President called on him. He didn't insist that the king come to the place in Palm Beach. They met somewhere else where the king was staying. The aftermath of that which I heard was that President Kennedy was not at all impressed with King Saud. He did what was necessary and he invited him to come to dinner in Washington when they both got back up north. I think a definite time was proposed and the king's reply was, "Inshallah," which was translated literally by whoever the translator was as, "If God wills." But this was carrying the implication to President Kennedy's ears that he might or he might not come.

We old hands know that in Saudi Arabia Inshallah means, "Yes." You never do anything without saying that it is subject to God's will, because God governs every action and every circumstance. So when you say Inshallah, it means, "Yes, I'll be there unless God prevents it." This was not correctly conveyed to President Kennedy, and he didn't take it very kindly.

Of course, Saud did show up and they did have a meal together as I recall it.

Q: According to my records, that was on February 13, 1962.

HART: Yes. He came back and I made a call on him. By this time I felt that it was time to really grapple with the question of Dhahran Airfield in certain essentials. I called on him with an interpreter, who was Isa Khalil Sabbagh, Public Affairs Counselor of our embassy. This was a delicate thing. The king received me alone in Riyadh. He didn't have anybody with him. It was just Isa, the king, and I.

I asked him, of course, how the trip had gone. He said, "Oh, fine." He was full of ebullience and obviously felt much better. He felt very good about his meeting with President Kennedy at this point. He seemed to be in such a high mood that I popped the question. I said, "We are, of course, following Your Majesty's wishes about Dhahran Airfield, but would you like to have a U.S. military training mission remain?"

He immediately replied that he would.

I said, "Some of your people are suggesting that it be limited to about 80, a small group. That might not be adequate for training and advice. Would you have any objection if more were necessary?"

No, he would have no objection at all.

I said, "Now with regard to the facilities on the field itself, we would like Your Majesty to consider whether or not we could continue to use the field for non-fighting transport aircraft as a turn-around facility with nose docks and repair facilities so that unarmed planes could get repairs and servicing there by Americans who would be there and who would double as instructors for your people in the handling of aircraft repairs and maintenance."

He said, "That's fine."

We gained what we wanted at that point in the essentials. That is, we were still going to have a presence at Dhahran Airfield for essential purposes. This had been worked out in Washington but we hadn't presented it to the king before. I was lucky enough to have the king there in that mood at that point and alone. I hadn't arranged that. We just took advantage of the opportunity on his immediate return and his feeling so well to pop this question and get a positive answer.

Subsequently, the Arabs were asking me, "Where are the notes on that meeting?"

I said, "There aren't any, but this is what the king said."

The Saudi Foreign Ministry couldn't refute it because there was nobody there but thinking to testify. I had Isa with me and the Saudis liked and trusted him. I'm sure they consulted him as to details and he would give them to them. There was nothing there that would make any real qualification to the king's consent.

We began to feel a little better about Dhahran Airfield and so did the Saudis because they really did not want us to go. They simply had done what they did in a moment which they didn't themselves describe as panic, but it was basically political panic.

Then the question arose about the equipment that would remain and the equipment which would be removed by our forces as they pulled out of that particular responsibility of a tactical nature in the framework of free world defense. There was a lot of equipment there and very expensive equipment. In general, the principle seemed to be accepted that what was fastened into the ground or bolted into the concrete or otherwise made permanent should stay. What was light and readily removable would be divided into two categories, one of which would be what we basically needed in our defense establishment in other places. This would go, e.g. to NATO, Europe or to the Far East. A lot of things of considerable value would remain for the Saudis to use, with fair compensation. That's as much as I can remember at the moment. When it came to deciding these matters on the spot, the king named General Tusan, the Chief of Staff of all forces and a veteran of World War I against the Turks. We would go inspecting together with such supporting

elements as we wanted to verify and inventory everything. Then on decision-making, when it was put up to the king, he said, "The American ambassador will act for me!"

This reminded me of the action by the king Abd al-Aziz with respect to Brigadier General O'Keefe in Dhahran for 11 years before. O'Keefe wore two hats at Dhahran, one for the king and one for the U.S. command operations at the airfield. King Saud's decision was flattering but it also put quite a responsibility on me. It tended, as it was designed to do, to make me lean towards the king's side in a pinch. That was all right in principle if you didn't carry it too far because we should be generous in principle. We had had the use of Dhahran Airfield for a long time with virtually no restrictions. We could bring fighter aircraft in there as well as bomber aircraft pretty formidable stuff on board. If we weren't going to do that anymore but stay in a non-fighting mode--the base being obviously reduced to a non-combatant status--we had to consider that we wanted to leave behind and do it gracefully with good feeling.

The general and I went out and did our inspection together. I found some things that he complained about that astonished me. Some of our people had cut the bolts and had removed heavy equipment such as machine lathes and maybe even a generator or two that had been anchored into concrete. There was a big machine shop I remember in particular. Here were the bolts and you could see where they had sliced right through them and they were sticking right up out of the floor. They had removed the stuff that was on top and it was gone.

I put in a loud complaint on this to Washington so that they could coordinate with the Pentagon and get the orders issued, "Don't do that anymore. Wait."

There was so much variety, I've forgotten what the compensation problems were on it. Basically, we surmounted that crisis and the Saudis got a lot of stuff which was to be very useful at such time as they had people trained to use it. You see, at this particular juncture, the Saudi forces were very small. Personnel-wise they had maybe 15,000 men with the National Guard with something approaching that in the army. But they had very little training under their belts in the handling of sophisticated equipment. This was in contrast to ARAMCO where the Arabia-American Oil Company had been training Saudis for years and years in the handling of much more sensitive equipment, such as refinery valves and oil drilling rigs. The Army had not had this kind of oversight and help. We got over the crisis.

Then it developed as the year 1962 wore on that the real crisis lay in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In fact, these got steadily worse and the bombardment of propaganda coming out of Ahmed Said on Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs," was heavy. In Dhahran Airfield we had a radio station which could be used, the king's men thought, for counter-propaganda against Nasser. In other words, the Saudis would not just take it all the time but would be able to hand back a few cracks at Nasser. They wanted us to manage this because they didn't have the personnel. Of course, we were not about to do that. That was making ourselves verbal combatants against Nasser. President Kennedy

was really trying to ride two incompatible horses in his Arab policy. One horse was trying to find areas of agreement with Nasser. The other horse was trying to protect Saudi Arabia, almost against itself, from making such tactical errors that it would be hard to rescue it from control by Nasser's aggressive political drive.

It was very hard to reach the king on this question. He had become so inflamed with anger toward Nasser that he began to turn against President Kennedy with whom he found he couldn't communicate the way he wanted to. He said to me, "As far as I am concerned, Nasser is a Communist. He is a threat to us all in this whole area. You should stop having anything to do with him. Get rid of him."

I said to him in the presence of Faisal, "I'm not defending Nasser. We understand the problems very well. We have problems dealing with him ourselves, but we don't think he's Communist. We don't think that is a correct depiction of the man. He has other problems but not that one."

Saud just snorted his derision at my statement. Faisal kept silent. This brings me to discuss Faisal's relationship.

When the king came back from Boston and Washington, renewed efforts were made by his entourage to try to bring the two brothers together. Apparently, the king was in a much better mood and less fearful and less jealous. He apparently agreed that Faisal should be his principal advisor in all matter, particularly foreign affairs. Sawayel was out, or if he was still in office he was very inactive. Faisal had always been Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia up until Sawayel's time. In foreign affairs, Faisal, under his father, had been the royal messenger from the time he was a teenager and sent to London. He was the ultimate authority under his father in this field.

When I went to call on the king with respect to this Dhahran radio station question that I mentioned, Faisal was there. I was very impressed by the way he handled the king. The king really had a mind that was that of a child in some respects. Complicated matters annoyed him because he couldn't understand them. I was trying to explain to him that this radio station was in any case not suitable for the kind of thing he had because of power and circuit questions. He rejected all this and tried to imply that it was just bad will on the U.S. Government's part. We were just protecting Nasser and not helping him, who was the aggrieved party.

Faisal understood completely what I was trying to say and very gently and quietly, he addressed his brother with the bedouin deferential term "tawwil 'amrak" ("[God] prolong your life"). He tried to explain some of the complexities without appearing to take sides against the king or against me. When he would talk to me, as he did occasionally to clarify the thing, he would address me deferentially, as he had the king. Never before in my life and never afterwards, did Faisal so address me. "Oh long life," is a phrase of great respect for the interlocutor but also great dignity for the speaker. It denotes the interlocutor's superior status. Later, when Faisal was king, of course, he never used this

form of address with anyone that I knew. Faisal, therefore, handled his brother masterfully and brought the temperature down. We got through this difficulty without a real blowup. The king, however, was really steamed up over Kennedy and I got all kinds of indications that to him Kennedy was something almost like a friend who had turned traitor. The euphoria that we had had right after his visit wore off completely within a few months.

Then the king became ill again. I guess he never really had some of his basic health problems resolved during his Boston visit. In any event, this time he went elsewhere, to Europe. I can't remember whether it was Greece or where it was. He decided suddenly that he was going, and this time it was worked out with Faisal--as a result of Faisal's careful handling of the relationship in this difficult period of the spring of 1962 up to the summer--that Faisal should act in his stead with complete authority "in his presence and in his absence." "In his presence" meant that Saud was ill and couldn't function and didn't want to go abroad, while the term "in his absence it" clear enough. Faisal accepted and became acting king.

Saud hadn't been gone very long--it may have been August of 1962--when Faisal asked me to come and see him in Ta'if. So I immediately went and he and I talked. He may have had Omar Saqqaf present because he had brought Omar into the picture rather early as a Deputy Foreign Minister. I probably had Isa Sabbagh with me, but I don't remember. Faisal said that he wanted to make a visit to President Kennedy and determine firsthand whether the United States still felt that it was bound as it had been by President Truman's pledge of October 30, 1950, to support Saudi Arabia against any threat to its integrity or its political independence as a matter of vital concern to the United States. Did the United States still regard its relationship with Saudi Arabia as it had in 1950? It was important for him to know and he wanted to meet the President personally to go over these matters.

I said, "I'm sure the President will be delighted to see you and I'll send a message right away and come back to you with the answer."

I did. It got a quick response and Faisal was off. It was decided that Isa Sabbagh would go along as interpreter for Kennedy and I would not go because it was felt better for me to stay and watch things in Saudi Arabia. So Isa went. To get the full story, you should really talk to Isa.

I'll summarize by saying that Faisal was given a luncheon by the President in the White House with a number of senior people. Faisal had great presence. He commanded respect instantly in any group, anywhere, with his bearing, his intelligence, his courtesy, and above all his princely dignity. After the luncheon, there was a good political discussion, a fairly free political discussion. Kennedy invited Faisal withdraw and talk with him privately. Isa was the interpreter and the only other person present. So they withdrew to a room upstairs. At this point Faisal got what he wanted from Kennedy which was a reaffirmation of the vital interest and concern that the United States had in the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. On the other side of the coin,

without making it a condition but clearly implying, two matters were inter-related. Kennedy got something from Faisal which was very important. That was a program of reforms in the government of his country which were badly needed and, in particular, the outlawing of slavery.

Prior to this time I had been very concerned about the slavery problem in Saudi Arabia because it gave the country such a bad name in the Arab world and gave such ammunition to Nasser to constantly try to stir up people in the country against the Saud clan, especially King Saud, as its symbol. Slavery was anachronistic in the rest of the Arab world for the most part and why shouldn't it be outlawed there. I had even had complaints by the ambassador of Mali who showed me documents in his office proving that slavery existed in Makkah with Malians as slaves, and they were Muslims. He said, in effect, "This is an outrage. Muslims being slaves to Muslims? They are coming to me and I've got my yard full of them. I'm putting up tents so that they cannot be recaptured by the police and taken back to Makkah to be servants of families where they've been abused. I've got to get them out of here and it's a problem because the police can come and grab them if they start to move out of my yard. The police won't invade my yard because this is Mali territory."

I had heard a lot about this scandal in the diplomatic community of Muslims. Faisal made an undertaking to Kennedy. He said he believed in these reforms and that he was going to try to do something about the justice system and reorganize it. He was going to try to promote an upward movement of talented people within the government of the country, to democratize, spread out responsibility. I don't believe he got into very great specifics. He couldn't have, but he gave something which, given his manner, his bearing and his sharp mind, Kennedy felt that here was a good leadership standing in the wings and now about to exercise some authority because the king was seriously ill and out of the country for a prolonged period.

Faisal came away from that interview, as did Kennedy, very pleased with the way it had gone. Kennedy reassured him and had the feeling that he had a kind of a national investment in Faisal.

Q: When was the Faisal-Kennedy meeting?

HART: This was in September of 1962. Faisal left Washington and went up to New York temporarily. While there he got the word of the revolt in the Yemen and the overthrow of the new Imam, Muhammad al-Badr, who had only occupied the throne for about eight days after his father, Imam Ahmed, had passed away. This was a violent overthrow, led by Abdullah al-Salal, Al-Badr's bodyguard and protector of the royal arsenal. Al-Salal had turned it all against al-Badr and tried to kill him, using artillery actually. Al-Badr, however, had escaped and gone into the Yemen's northern mountains.

Q: This was on September 26, 1962.

HART: Yes, and Faisal was in New York. He immediately sent word that he wanted to speak to somebody in authority. Phil Talbot went up with Isa Sabbagh. Faisal said, in effect, "This is a situation which we cannot let go by because it is basically a challenge to Saudi Arabia. It isn't a challenge just to the Yemen. The Egyptians really have in mind Saudi Arabia. The Yemen is just a stepping stone and we'll have to do what we can to resist in our own self-defense. Will you help us? Does your guarantee, your pledge of support apply in this situation?"

This presented immediately a dilemma of policy because the President had tried to see if the U.S. could find points of common interest with Nasser's Egypt. There obviously were points of divergence, but he had the policy of endeavoring to take a brand new look at every relationship in the Middle East. He was not trying to get into the middle of a local quarrel if he could help it. In general, Assistant Secretary Phil Talbot was able to give him sufficient indication that we would stand by Saudi Arabia's existence and its integrity against a direct threat. He must have tried to indicate that it was a guarded message of support, avoiding getting into the scrap. Nobody knew how far this would go or what would happen.

At any rate, Faisal came back with some reassurance. In the meantime, Saud had returned just ahead of him to Saudi Arabia and had resumed authority and had almost immediately authorized help to the royalists opposing the new republic of the Yemen of Abdulla Salal. As soon as Faisal arrived or very shortly after, Saud went abroad again for more medical treatment. Faisal was again in full charge and almost without interruption. There was very little gap. Faisal continued what his elder brother had started, which was aid to the royalists. That meant money and weapons as he could get them. At the very beginning I don't think he could have had very much in the way of weaponry to hand over, but he was going to give them some help and he did. So the issue was joined between Faisal and Nasser over the Yemen. King Hussein of Jordan joined Saudi Arabia in sending modest aid to the Yemeni royalists.

Faisal, however, didn't neglect the home front or his desire to have reforms which he had pledged to President Kennedy. One of his very first acts was to issue a proclamation abolishing slavery. This had never happened before. It had always been fudged. The king's position in the past had always been that slavery really wasn't in existence in Saudi Arabia. Some Saudis just had special arrangements to employ servants. They tried to fudge it that way. But now came a flat statement from Faisal that slavery was abolished. I can't remember the exact words but it was definite, and it was clear. Anybody having slaves was going to be in trouble.

This rang a good bell back in Washington and opportunely because things were clouding up pretty fast in this Yemen situation. Faisal also appointed a committee to study the judiciary and determine how it should be modernized, not to the derogation of the basic principles of Hanbalite Shari'a (Sunni Muslim jurisprudence) which is followed in Saudi Arabia under the banner called "Wahhabism." The Hanbalite school of law was founded in the 9th century of our era by Ahmed ibn Hanbal and is one of the most strict and

orthodox in the Islamic codes. Only Qatar, apart from Saudi Arabia, follows it. For us and for Saudi Arabia's image, the real problem with the Hanbalite school is the punishments--mutilation, beheading, stoning, things of that kind which are practiced. I would say that Faisal, whose parentage gave him a very special position, was stronger than any other person could be to put a clamp on some of these practices. His mother was of the family of the Al al-Sheikh which means "the family of the Sheikh" with a capital S, meaning Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab of the 18th century, who made a treaty of alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud. That alliance continues to this day. So Faisal had the prestige of being a very devout Muslim, and having a lineage which couldn't be improved upon. In fact, Saud had no such lineage nor had any of the other wives of Abd al-Aziz.

The electric effect of Faisal's emancipation of slaves I don't know how to measure in Washington but I'm sure it was very positive. Washington quickly recognized that we were up a very severe dilemma with respect to the Yemen, because Washington, and I personally had not been at all impressed with the rule of the late Imam Ahmed Hamid al-Din.

In the period of one year that I had been ambassador, I had also served as Minister to the Kingdom of the Yemen. Soon after I completed my initial courtesy calls and presentations of credentials in Saudi Arabia, I was off to the Yemen in September of 1961. I remember that about September 21 while I was there I had word that the Syrians had overthrown the Baath government in Damascus and thereby liquidated the " United" Arab Republic. The Imam Ahmad had sought insurance against revolution by membership in that Union. Nasser, who held the Imam and his kingdom in total contempt, had been conspiring against the Imam.

In any case, the Imam's government was a bad one. It was bad because it was corrupt, because the Imam took his corner on everything that moved from one town to another. There was a customs barrier, which was his personal customs barrier, and you couldn't go through the gate and leave a town like Ta'iz without having a permit which was called jukk al-hashab, "open, or loosen, the wood (gate)." You couldn't get that permit unless it was approved by the Imam personally. He must have spent a lot of time on this, because the system prevailed all over the country. I suppose he had trusted men who were authorized to act for him, knowing his demands, and who collected the permit fee, undoubtedly pocketing a share.

Q: Not necessarily. Having been in Yemen from the period 1957 to 1959, when I went up to Ta'iz, I could not leave the city or leave the country without his personal permission.

HART: Yes. I couldn't either, so I don't think things had changed much. In any event, I also had a negative impression of Crown Prince al-Bahr. It came about as follows.

I made two visits to Yemen within the first year. One was in September of 1961 when I called on al-Badr and the other was January of 1962. In January of 1962 it had been scheduled among the activities which our Chargé d'Affaires had arranged, for me to make

another call on al-Badr in San'a. The acting capital was Ta'iz at that time. Al-Badr traveled around quite a bit and it had been agreed that we would meet in the larger city, San'a. When I got to San'a, he wasn't there, had left no message, and some of his personnel and officials who worked for him were obviously embarrassed. They told me that they were very sorry but that surely I could meet al-Badr in another place, such as Umran, a distant town. There was no excuse, however, for his not being in San'a. Knowing from reports of the way in which the Imam had made it a practice to try to humiliate foreign emissaries, so as to show his power and his authority, I had in advance of my first mission there which was in September of 1961 arranged through our chargé that the Yemeni Government know that my trip would be to 10 days, and that I would be leaving on the dot, due to commitments at my other post--and post of residence--Saudi Arabia. Robert W. Stookey, the chargé, and I cooked this up together, as he had told me that the Imam loved to prove his stature to his people by keeping foreign emissaries waiting for days or weeks, no matter what the previous understandings had been. It had worked and I had been received promptly, if somewhat oddly, as I describe elsewhere.

The action of al-Badr struck me therefore as based on his father's practice, which had not been applied to me--as yet. Considering the well-confirmed arrangements that had been made for our meeting and the clear embarrassment of his aides and their lack of any excuse for standing me up, I told them politely that I would not go on to Umran, but would return to Ta'iz when my San'a visit was finished and would hope to see his highness on a future visit to the Yemen. Importunities by the aides were at once pressed on me that I should go on to Umran, but from their manner I could sense that these members of his staff were not even sure that al-Badr was in Umran. I refused.

Absolutely, no real progress was possible in the Yemen from within as long as Imam Ahmad reigned. It seemed unlikely, from intelligence reports, that al-Badr would place his country's welfare above his own. He was no Faisal, as I indicated many times to the Saudi prince in the months that followed overthrow of the Imamate.

The death of Imam Ahmad and the overthrow of his successor, Muhammad al-Badr, caused the United States more worry than did the Imamate in life. The latter was a minor frustration. The birth of the Yemeni Arab Republic, on the other hand, put to the test President Truman's 1950 pledge of support for the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia, by far the possessor of the greatest resources of oil under one sovereignty on this globe. Faisal, defending Saudi Arabia's independence, saw the necessity of blocking Nasser in the Yemen, of ensuring there was resistance to his control of a stepping stone to subversion or conquest of Saudi Arabia. The only effective vehicle was the royalist irregulars, camped in various fastnesses of Northern Yemen, from Sa'da to the Saudi border. As these forces were tribal, this meant gold as well as arms. In they went, through an outpost I was to visit, Nejran.

Nasser, meanwhile, had pre-positioned in depots in Egypt, support elements for the Republicans. Almost immediately, these were sent to Hodeida, Yemen, on ships with supplies and by Soviet-built aircraft. As weeks wore on, training teams from Egypt grew

into cadres for command of Republican troops, then to Egyptian combat units, ground, naval and air. An indirect war with Saudi Arabia--a duel of wills--was on between two strong leaders and between two countries with which it was U.S. policy to maintain good relations. It was a local war, but the USSR was close to Nasser, while the U.S. had an enormous stake in an independent and friendly Saudi Arabia, and in Faisal as its prospective leader.

The U.S. saw this developing conflict as posing a real threat to the survival of the Saud regime, which was going nowhere under King Saud, but which could be strengthened by reforms to resist a take-over by surrogates of Nasser. Such a take-over, flavored heavily with anti-American propaganda and Soviet political backing, was not in the U.S. interest. Against Nasser's efforts to subvert Saudi Arabia from within and attack it from without, Faisal had as his defenses only the high regard the Saudi people had for him and their hopes; no real organized defense force; and he had the U.S.

For about two months, Washington held discussions within the government and with the governments of NATO Allies, notably the United Kingdom and Canada, France, Germany and Italy, over the question of recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic. Conversations proceeded with Faisal and with King Hussein of Jordan, as both sought to discourage such recognition. Both Faisal and Hussein were deep into assistance to the Royalists, who were divided, in northern Yemen, into several commands, at least two of which were headed by princes, sons of the late Imam Ahman. Al-Badr was reported not to be in command, but rather a coordinator and a symbol of resistance. He was in a cave somewhere near Sa'da or Hajja. Repeated bombings of his supposed location by Egyptian aircraft discharging lacrimogenic gas canisters failed to flush him out. The war became dirty. The gas, nicknamed "ghurab" (raven) by Egyptian forces, became deadly when very concentrated, so that loud Royalist complaints were publicly raised. In one case, a bombing hit a Yemeni crowd in a village on market day, with large casualties. Our impression of the situation of the warring parties was about as follows:

- 1) Both our Chargé, Stookey, and King Faisal had some information we could accept:
 - a) The Royalists held no large town or city and few, if any villages of size. The Republicans, with Egyptian bolstering by tanks, armored cars and aircraft dominated all main centers and the air.
 - b) The northern mountain fastnesses, beyond roads, were unsafe for Republican and Egyptian troops. Here Royalists could pick off isolated units.
 - c) Almost no large engagements were reported.
- 2) But, Faisal's optimistic forecasts of Royalist reconquest of Yemen were not supported by any reliable data or consideration. The best Royalist future was stalemate, lasting for years, costing Saudi Arabia and Jordan more than either could afford.

Nasser had his prestige heavily invested and would fight for it, especially just after losing Syria in September 1962, from the United Arab Republic. He would make as much trouble for Faisal as he could.

He, in fact, did. He bombarded from the sea two small Saudi villages north of the Yemen border. He bombarded the Nejran area from the air. He bombarded by air a hospital in Abha, killing 21 patients. He dominated the air over the Hejaz coast, all 1000 miles of it. Three Saudi pilots, with their fighter aircraft (old F86 training craft) defected to Egypt. The Saudi Royal Air Force headquarters was moved to Dhahran, for safety. Only 7 Saudi pilots had been trained for combat and now loyalty was in question. Fortunately, there were no further air defectors.

Then, in February, 1963, Nasser's air force dropped by parachute 108 bundles of automatic weapons, ammunition and mortars on the Saudi coastal area from approximately Rabigh to Yanbu, a distance of circa 100 miles. The yellow parachutes were discovered by an American pilot-instructor with a Saudi student-pilot in a two-seater trainer, out on early morning exercise. As they circled to identify the yellow object they saw a truck about to load the bundle, but as the plane dropped lower, took off, unloaded. More parachutes were quickly discovered as the pilot and student flew northwest. Returning to base, the pilot let his student report to HQ while he came urgently to report to me. He was outraged--because, I at first thought, because it was a hostile action. Not at all. He was outraged over the unprofessionalism of the drop. "What, in God's name, did that guy think he was doing: 100 miles long! We consider a 100 ft radius an absolute limit for any drop at a target."

Well, those bundles were gathered with help from the badu, long indoctrinated from the days of King Abd al-Aziz, that what is not yours, found anywhere, had best not be touched--or else, you might lose that finger, or hand. They reported in and the bundles were taken to the barracks (gishle"--old Turkish quadrangle two-story fort) at Jeddah. Later, arranged and labeled, they were put on display for embassies, dignitaries and the press and I went. Right out of Egyptian stores in the Suez Canal base area: tripod-mounted Belgian machine guns, mortars, rifles, ammo. For what and for whom; and was 108 the total? No one could answer, but we knew something from Cairo: The drop was intended for Saudi insurrectionists, to kill all the leading princes, headed by Faisal, Khalid, Sultan, Fahd and others, shortly to assemble in Jeddah for meetings. Nasser was as furious over the mismanagement of the drop as was the American pilot-instructor. "Next time, " he had said, but there was no next time. No reliable Saudi insurrection movement existed.

The botched operation nonetheless galvanized Washington.

But I must backup a bit and tell about recognizing the YAR. The Department of State and the White House, apparently realizing that they could not dissuade Faisal and, fearing more drastic action by Nasser, worked to forestall the latter by a deal with Nasser, made in its essentials in December 1962 without full, parallel consultation with Faisal. It

consisted in a U.S.-Egyptian understanding that U.S. would recognize the YAR and Nasser would agree not to undertake hostile action against Saudi Arabia and would be prepared to start a gradual withdrawal of his troops as soon as Faisal stopped all aid to the Royalists.

I was instructed to take this bitter pill to Faisal, whose reaction was as predicted: "First concocted with Nasser and then I'm expected to concur, and to stop all aid while he takes his time about or fakes a troop withdrawal."

[Here I refer to Appendix #1, attached, a copy of "Faisal-A Perspective of 1945-1965" which I wrote for delivery about April 24, 1978 before a large audience deliberating on Faisal's reign at the University of Southern California's colloquium in Santa Barbara. It tells the story as I recalled it then, and it goes on to the next item, the Ellsworth Bunker Mission.]

The one-sided treatment by Washington, favoring Egypt and Nasser in the procedural matter of what Faisal certainly felt to be the highest security interest of Saudi Arabia, put the U.S. rather on the defensive and in an awkward spot regarding its pledge of support.

We sent, at the Saudi request, some "green beret" officers schooled in unconventional warfare to instruct the Saudis in counter-insurgency in case an insurgency should start in Saudi Arabia provoked by the Egyptians or even manned by them. So they came over in small teams and started working. I think that was about as far as it went at this point.

But after the air drop Washington came to grips with Kennedy's pledge and instituted action first, in the United Nations, then by the shuttle diplomacy of Ellsworth Bunker.

U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, was approached by our delegation to the UN and he sent out, from duties in Cyprus, Pier Pasquale Spinelli, Italian Diplomat, as his Special Representative. This was early in 1963. Spinelli impressed me as a very sensible person. I had him to my house for a conversation, and offered him all the information and advice available in a very cloudy situation. In the course of general conversation, I asked him about events in Cyprus, and he expressed considerable worry over the number of minority Turk Cypriots killed by the preponderant Greek Cypriots, a situation which threatened area peace. Little did I realize that within four years I would be heavily involved in this problem at an even more acute stage.

U Thant did not appear to take the Yemen situation very seriously, and it was eventually decided in Washington to call upon Ellsworth Bunker to act as mediator, shuttling between Cairo, Jeddah, Washington and the UN.

The choice was excellent and the mission imperative. Neither John Badeau nor I could function in such a capacity, for our duties were limited to our countries of accreditation and focused sharply upon our ability to evaluate the situation, political and personal, that drove the respective heads of state to take the positions they were taking and to try, where

possible, to influence those positions. The selection of Bunker was a wise one from several angles. He had demonstrated effective mediation skills in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West Irian. His personal credentials included ambassadorships to major posts: Argentina, 1951; Italy, 1952; and India and Nepal, 1956. In all of these posts he had distinguished himself for his sensitivity, perceptiveness, mastery of detail, persistence and a quiet dignity and good-humor which demanded respect and at the same time set the interlocutor at ease. He was not a career diplomat but a businessman; he had been Chairman of the Board of the American Sugar Refining Company. He had started therefore as a political appointee, and had done so well that regardless of the party in power in Washington he had become one of the elder statesmen of the Foreign Service, assimilated to its senior ranks and universally respected. The timing of his selection was personally agonizing for him; his wife, Harriet, was dying of cancer, slowly, staying with one of their children in Rio de Janeiro. Ellsworth's sense of duty was of the highest, and he readily accepted the President's call to the mission.

Bunker was a delightful person to work with, and we had a fine relationship, to be picked up many years later when we were both retired from government and were members of the board of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy of Georgetown University. On Faisal he made an instantly favorable impression, as I believe from reports, he did on Nasser. His mandate was, of course, primarily to effect a disengagement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt over the Yemen and prevent an all-out clash damaging to both sides, but particularly to Saudi Arabia and to Faisal's leadership in what was expected to be modernizing reforms and a dedication of oil income to the public weal. It was feared that the logical outcome of a full confrontation by armed forces would bring about chaos in the Kingdom and the loss of prestige and the fall, in defeat, of the Saud clan. This, in turn would probably give rise to a radical, socialist satrapy of Nasser, accompanied by Soviet influence and policies inimical to U.S. interests. Saudi Arabia was virtually defenseless, except for its vast deserts and distances. It had no friends, really, except the United States, while Nasser had a tremendous following, especially by the youth, across the Arab world. It was not White House policy to indirectly bolster, at risk of wide and damaging area repercussions, retrogressive regimes, such as the Yemeni Imamate.

Bunker was therefore under general instructions to bring about a withdrawal from the Yemen of Egyptian forces while ensuring a prompt and final cessation of Saudi aid to the Royalists. The proposition, of course, lacked symmetry. Faisal would be asked to terminate aid at the start of Egyptian withdrawals; and to this it was already clear Faisal had the strongest objections. Bunker would offer the temporary presence in Saudi Arabia of an armed squadron of U.S.-piloted fighter aircraft as a deterrent to further intrusions or attacks by Egyptian forces. Bunker would offer U.S. influence in the UN to obtain a UN observer force, to be stationed in the Yemen and on the Saudi border, to verify both the withdrawals by Egypt and the cessation of Saudi aid. (Quite a task, if one knew anything at all about that mountainous region.) To sweeten the proposition, the U.S. was prepared to send to Saudi Arabia an air unit to give concrete evidence of its sincerity in assuring the security of the Kingdom and the preservation of its independence. This would be a temporary presence of U.S. Air Force pilots and equipment, with as little publicity as

possible, and would be labeled a training mission. The big question mark throughout was what happens if Nasser, after agreeing, does not carry out his pledge of withdrawal of all his troops.

Discussions lasted several months, Bunker returning frequently after visits to Cairo, Washington and the UN. U Thant was adamant that the UN had only debts in its budget for international peace-keeping, and that money would have to be found from somewhere to fund the observer force.

I have forgotten exactly when Ellsworth Bunker made his first visit but it probably would have been within a few weeks after this incident in February. He took it at a very measured pace which Faisal seemed to appreciate. The two got along very well. Talcott Seelye came out on one of those visits. The program was basically to restore some simultaneity to withdrawals, the lack of which had antagonized Faisal. It had depended on Faisal's making the major concessions first and then Nasser promising to get out. (Nasser proved in the end that he really didn't mean to get out. He had had all the concessions made on the other side and then he would do as he liked.)

The essence of the deal which was finally worked out was that the Saudis would stop aid to the Royalists as he started his withdrawal of troops. The monitoring of the withdrawal, which was to be total over a period of time not specified but was supposed to be "expeditious," would be done by a UN observer mission. The financing of it, which U Thant was always sensitive about, would be by the two parties. Nasser would pay and Faisal would pay. The observers would be stationed only in the Yemen but all over the Yemen where needed to watch the embarkation or debarkation of Egyptian troops; and to attempt to watch movements of the tribes in the north that might mean more arms coming in from Saudi Arabia. That was not really feasible or fully effective. The terrain in the north just made it impossible. They would have had to have an army in there of some size, and even then the bedouin would have gotten around them. So that part of the observation was never really satisfactory.

When they finally concluded the agreement it was entered into effect sometime around June of 1963.

Meanwhile, the U.S. had de facto recognized the Yemen Arab Republic and Robert Stookey, our Chargé, was able to carry out his duties without serious harassment and effect some liaison with reformist elements in the country. His reports were most valuable.

Faisal was extremely sensitive to any form of pressure during the talks, and at one point took offense and nearly broke them off when Bunker used the word "on the condition" (Arabic: ala shart) in seeking a Saudi commitment. As all interpreting was done by Isa Sabbagh, the only way out was at his expense. Somewhat to Isa's consternation (for he is a perfectionist in his command of nuances in Arabic and English) Omar Saqqaf interjected that there had been a mixup of terms (ishtibak al kalima) and I suggested that

in English the word "condition" was less strong than in Arabic and perhaps a better translation would be "on the basis of." This, with regard to Isa, was effrontery of the first order, particularly as Isa was not only my back-up interpreter, but my coach and advisor on all questions of Arabic usage. However, he grabbed the situation and did not insist on his own, perfectly valid translation. In retrospect, I am inclined to think that Faisal understood every word of our discussion, and wanted to make clear that he could not be pressured. He accepted "on the basis of" (Arabic: ala assas), and this was our formula from then on.

Words were always important to Faisal, to the point of fastidiousness. Many times during this crisis period I received direct messages from the White House (repeated to State) saying that the President desired, "if no objection was perceived," to transmit the following message to Faisal, etc. and I would carefully utilize that qualifier to edit the text to make it more cordial and fraternal in tone. Invariably, President Kennedy accepted my suggestions, sometimes with minor changes. It made for closer White House-Embassy relations, but more important, it created a better impression and a greater willingness by Faisal to cooperate in the proposed step.

We had a rough passage when it was finally agreed that the Bunker-carried proposals were acceptable and the U.S. air unit to demonstrate support for Saudi Arabia was ready to take off and that, thanks to successful diplomacy, a UN observer force would be placed in Yemen to monitor mutual disengagement. Funding for the UN force would be by Egypt and Saudi Arabia equally. The air unit was code-named Operation Hardsurface and was ostensibly a training unit only. However, it was to be armed. It consisted of a small squadron of F-100 D's (eight, as I recall) plus logistical backup. The latter were to be installed in Dhahran and the fighter aircraft to be flown from there but could be refueled at Jeddah. A certain number of U.S. Air Force personnel were therefore to be temporarily posted to Saudi Arabia for this special mission. For a long time the American Jewish Congress and other groups on Capitol Hill had been pressing various U.S. administrations for a commitment that any and all American organizations carrying on operations in the Kingdom would ensure that there would be no discrimination against the hiring of Jews for duty in the Kingdom. Knowing the policy of the Kingdom to be firmly against such hiring (requests for visas involved filling out a questionnaire which included statement of the applicant's religious affiliation), the quiet policy of all hirers had been to not encourage such applicants. Now, on the very threshold of the departure for the Kingdom of the promised air unit from its base in Tampa, Florida, Emmanuel Celler, Jewish congressman from Brooklyn, was alerted by American Jewish organizations that here was an opportunity to ensure that non-discrimination be put into effect. He demanded and received from the Department of Defense assurance that there would be no discrimination and he announced to the press that he had been also assured that there would be Jews in Hardsurface.

I was summoned on an emergency basis by Faisal who, with Saqqaf at his side (and I with Isa Sabbagh to assist me) informed me of this challenge to Saudi authority and was told in oblique Arabic that "if the vessel is to contain the wrong materials it may be best not to

have the vessel delivered at all." I sensed that while Faisal was incensed at this invasion of Saudi prerogatives by the Department of Defense his rather elaborate metaphor meant that he wanted us to find a way out. So also, ran the thoughts of Saqqaf, who, after some discussion, proposed that this matter be discussed between him and me and a report made to Faisal, who concurred. Saqqaf and I met immediately after and agreed that I should seek "clarification from Washington." (It was quite obvious that the matter was beyond White House recall.) A few days later, Saqqaf made it clear that the storm had passed and that the air unit could proceed. It had been stopped from taking off 10 minutes before scheduled departure.

Subsequently, I asked the commander whether there were in fact Jews in his personnel. Implying that records did not show religious affiliation he said that he thought there might be one. All of the unit was allowed in by blanket visa without designation of individual particulars. We had no further problems with this matter, which was fortunate, for Cairo Radio could easily have trumpeted that Faisal was calling upon international Jewry to support his desperate help to a corrupt, backward and defunct Yemeni (and Saudi) regime subservient to "Western Imperialism." For some reason Cairo did not. Perhaps the "Voice of the Arabs" just missed this one.

Operation Hardsurface was deployed by way of Turkey and Iran to Dhahran, thus avoiding troublesome clearances for use of the airspace of intervening Arab states which would certainly have preferred to stay out of this inter-Arab squabble, notably Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan. Israel could not be asked without clearing with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which would then put both in the category seeking traitorous cooperation with Israel. The operation was therefore deployed via non-Arab, friendly states which, at the time, were not overly concerned about Egyptian reaction. Later, while I was in Turkey, it became clear that Turkish policy, under the newly elected Justice Party, had become quite sensitive to Arab opinion and would not allow use of its airspace for non-NATO purposes, closely defined.

Once the green light had been tacitly given by Faisal to the launching of Hardsurface, I obtained orders for consultation and brief leave in the U.S., leave which had been interrupted by the crisis. My family had gone on ahead and was in Washington. I immediately was scheduled for appointments with President Kennedy and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I have described in subsequent pages. These consultations provided up-to-date liaison authority which were of great value in coping with the air unit's problems as soon as it arrived.

The arrival was dramatic. By pre-arrangement, Saqqaf and I witnessed it together on the roof of the Foreign Ministry. Several 100-D's swung low over the city, baking in the midsummer heat, and circled several times at low levels preparatory to landing. Saqqaf became quite excited. Here at last was a concrete demonstration of U.S. support of Saudi Arabia under the 1950 Truman pledge. "Tell the pilots to break the sound barrier!", he shouted in my ear. I replied that this was most inadvisable. Many windows could be

broken. He was unimpressed, but I let him cool off, rather than hasten to attempt communication with the commander.

It now became important to privately lay out, with the commander, the program for the unit, ostensibly (and actually) a training schedule for senior Saudi pilots, but intended, of course, to provide a deterrent to further invasion of Saudi air space by Egyptian military aircraft which had been overflying the Hejaz coast at will to and from the Yemen, and had occasionally bombed southern targets, such as Nejran (a Saudi basing point for military aid to the Royalists), and the Abha region. It was essential, in view of the President's instruction to me, to make the deployment an effective but not an unnecessarily provocative deterrent. At first, my follow-up instructions stated that Hardsurface flights should not go further south than 100 miles from the Yemeni border. I objected that this could leave open--once Egyptian forces began to understand this limitation--several vital targets to Egyptian bombing raids, to wit, Jizan, the main southern port, and most of the Nejran and Abha areas. The White House and State then reduced the flight limitation to 40 miles of the Yemen border.

We worked it out so that flights would never have the same pattern one day after the another. It would always be changed. Our aircraft would fly up and down the Hejaz Coast over land or right close to it. Their pattern would vary.

I should back up a little bit. I mentioned that I obtained consultation in Washington during the summer. This was before we really had the deployment. I was able to get to see President Kennedy to talk to him about rules of engagement. At one point I remember he said, "We want to avoid any clash with the Egyptians. Clearly that would not be desirable."

I said, "I'd like to contest that point a bit if I might." The President at once became very attentive. "If we make it too apparent that we are going to avoid a clash," I said, "Nasser will take advantage of it. I've served in Egypt, know Nasser a little, and I think that's the kind of guy he is. We shouldn't make it too clear. In the rules of engagement if he shoots at us and we don't shoot back, we'll lose credibility."

He said, "Of course, we would have to defend ourselves. I just don't want to have anything done, without my consent.

So I was following his instructions when I worked this out with the commander, and we never had a real violation of the border after that except once when they apparently dropped a bomb a mile or so north of the Saudi-Yemen border trying to hit what they thought were Royalists. In effect, Hardsurface stopped the over-flight situation and calmed things down.

As far as Egypt and Saudi Arabia disengaging from Yemen was concerned, it was a mess. Over and over again, every two months, I had to obtain the agreement of Faisal to renew his share of funding for the peace-keeping operation. Faisal was less ready to renew than

was Nasser. Nasser would go ahead and put up the money, but Faisal would say that Nasser was not withdrawing his troops, that he was simply rotating them. In fact he was indeed rotating them. United Nations observers confirmed this. I don't mean that Nasser didn't take some out. He did reduce, but he never drew down enough to make it a major withdrawal. He would rotate in some new units, ground or air, and his forces in Yemen remained major.

It was hard for me to keep Faisal from resuming wholesale help to the royalists, and he did resume a little in spite of everything I could say. However, the situation between the two countries calmed down, and so it went on for a good six months.

While I had been in Washington on consultation, I had gone to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and talked with a group of them, including General Curtis Le May who was chairman at that time. Le May didn't like this operation at all. He didn't see any good reason to deploy that unit. He was opposed to it but he had been overruled by the President. He exploded at one point in the course of a meeting saying, "Why can't we just tell Nasser to get the hell out of there?" [Laughter]

He had an unrealistic view of what was really possible out in that area. The unit stayed and then he finally won his point toward the end of the year, just after the assassination of President Kennedy in November. He said, "Absolutely no more after this two-month term."

I had to go in January to the authorities to tell them that we were going to pull the unit out and that we felt it had accomplished its mission. They took it quite well. It coincided, fortunately, with Nasser's call--Nasser didn't know we were going to do this--for a conference of all Arabs to confront Israel over the "stealing of Jordan water." It was a manufactured crisis. It was a means by which he could get off the hook that he had gotten himself on in the Yemen. He also wanted to get Faisal to come to the meeting because Faisal couldn't well ignore a call for a political confrontation with Israel. So, Faisal went. So, also, was softened the impact of withdrawing our unit.

Q: There was a code name given to the presence of the F-100s. What was it?

HART: Operation Hardsurface. The end of "Operation Hardsurface" (January 1964) didn't mean the end to the problem of the Yemen. Nasser's troops were still in the Yemen. They were being rotated almost as much as they were being withdrawn, and I don't recall any significant changes in 1964 with respect to the Egyptian presence in the Yemen, but while they hadn't gotten out, something else had happened. Inside the Yemen there had been a metamorphic change in the structure of the confrontation. Abdullah al-Sallal had become somewhat discredited. He had been a very noisy dictator, a puppet of the Egyptians, fulminating against the United States, against Saudi Arabia, and against the British who had remained in Aden and would not recognize the Sallal regime. The UK refrained from reestablishing diplomatic relations with that government of the Yemen.

In this period of 1964 there was an effort made within the Yemen to summon principal tribal leaders to a conference. It was held abroad but I'm not sure where it was held. This conference was to reach, if possible, a consensus which would dissolve the civil war, provide a government of general consent, terminate inter-tribal conflict, and in effect make the Egyptian presence and the Saudi-backed royalist presence irrelevant while the Yemenis sorted the whole matter out for themselves.

The details of that I do not have, and I've never had them. To me the scene shifted now toward the new government of Faisal, released from immediate concern over the Yemen and working very hard to put into effect economic, political and judicial reforms which he had undertaken to accomplish. He would probably have done this anyway, but he had mentioned them to President Kennedy as his big objective during his meeting with him in 1962.

Q: Are we talking about the period before his formal takeover from Saud which was on March 23, 1964, or about the period after his formal assumption of power?

HART: I'm not quite sure about that March 23 date. In effect Faisal was boss. He was running things from October of 1962. There was no one challenging Faisal's authority. If this March period is a turning point of some kind, I think it is more a formality than it is a matter of any great significance because that came later in 1964. (Saud abdicated in November 1964.)

Faisal turned his attention toward getting his cabinet going. He had in his cabinet some significant people from the top ranks of the collegium of princes and one was Prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz, Minister of Defense and Civil Aviation. Another one was Prince Fahd, the present King, who was made Minister of the Interior, a very important position. There were other half-brothers and several came from the Sudairi Seven, that is, from a Sudairi mother.

Outside of the framework of that royal family, there were ministerial selections which were rather meaningful from among seasoned veterans of the business world and the legal world whom he put in power and of whom he kept close track.

These changes developed in 1964 into a program which came to our attention in the form of economic planning. The king never tried to restore the U.S. economic aid or Point Four Program which Yussef Yassin had terminated back about 1953. Instead, Faisal, in what I would call a rather characteristically graceful way, suggested that we could participate in Saudi development through our business firms in such a way as to make a profit. An illustration is the following:

One of the things Faisal wanted very much and asked me about quite early was television. He wanted to set up a television and radio station to provide information of all kinds to the people. Television was particularly on his mind as a tool of education. This was very

significant to me because it wasn't so many years before that such things as television were absolute anathema to the ulema.

I knew also that he was working very hard to upgrade the educational facilities of the country, which were deplorable. There was none for women except one school, Dar El Hanaan in Jeddah, which was founded by Faisal's wife, Queen Iffat, who was Turkish-born but of Saudi as well as Turkish extraction. She was born near Adapazari, east of Istanbul. She was a strong-minded woman, well educated and very determined, and she was his fourth but definitive wife, so to speak, and she commanded the household. Of his previous wives, none competed with her and she had vast influence. She had established this school as a private school and it was untouchable by the ulema, in spite of their objections, because of her position and, of course, her husband's backing. He believed in education very strongly.

His budget allocations to his various ministers were something on which he kept a very close watch. Schools began to spring up in unlikely places such as Al Ula, up near Meda'in Salih, a place we got to know in the late winter of 1964 when a group of us in the Diplomatic Corps formed a convoy with some Saudis, including Hassan Yassin, the son of the Syrian-born deputy foreign minister, to visit these very isolated communities. There were others that were even more isolated in other parts of the vast country. These schools included the establishment of a school for girls. They were segregated, but an effort was made to try to get some really good teaching and a curriculum which would be comparable to what the boys were getting at the elementary and secondary levels.

This did cause a reaction among the ulema. I had experienced in my earlier service in Saudi Arabia back in the 1940s samplings of the sensitivity of this question. The ulema followed the school of Sunni jurisprudence called the Hanbalite School. Ahmad ibn Hanbal lived in the ninth century. His school is one of the most strict and tough in the whole panoply of Sunni jurisprudence. There are four Sunni schools as you know. There is the Shafe'i, the Maliki, the Hanafi, and the Hanbali. The only other country that uses the Hanbali is Qatar, but they use it in a different way than the Saudis. In Saudi Arabia Ahmed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the so-called Unitarian movement, nicknamed Wahhabism, lived in the mid-eighteenth century and became a friend of Muhammad ibn Saud, leader of the Saud clan of that period. They formed an alliance which was religio-political and which is the foundation of the country even today. The descendants of Abd al-Wahhab are called the Al al-Sheikh, the people of the Sheikh. Faisal had the unique position of having a mother from the Al al-Sheikh. This strengthened his position against complaints by the ulema. Furthermore, he is a very devout man himself. There is no kidding about that. It is not politics. He is really devout and it is known.

In contrast to Saud, his elder half-brother who had a reputation for violating Koranic principles: for example, drinking and doing a lot of things, probably exaggerated, and derived from the kind of company he kept and which trailed along with him. In addition to his notorious extravagance and wastefulness, the ulema frowned on him for his personal disregard of Hanbali principles.

The founding of girls' schools hit some rocks. One was up north of Riyadh in Buraydah, a very conservative place. I went to call there on a visit. It had all been arranged that I would be met at the little gravel airport and taken a few miles into town. Nobody met me. When I went to finally get the attendant who was sitting there with a telephone, I asked him if he would be good enough to check into what had happened because I was arriving on schedule for a courtesy visit. He called, and then with great embarrassment told me that nobody seemed to be around who knew anything. I realized, of course, that this was the Wahhabi way of an ultra-orthodox community of getting out from a jam. Somebody had made the arrangements with my people and then somebody else had said, "You never should have done this. This man is an infidel."

I am sure that that was what went on although I never got the full explanation. I did register it with the foreign ministry when I got back. In any case there were communities like this. Buraydah all of a sudden woke up one day and discovered it could have a school for girls as well as a school for boys. Well, the ulema of Buraydah rose in arms and went to see Faisal. They were loaded with complaints and were going to register them in the typical Wahhabi way, totally without fear. This is an independent judiciary, believe me. I don't care what people say. The Saudi judiciary is ready to defy the Saudis or anybody on religious principles. This troop arrived and I heard about it from Saqqaf. They were to visit Faisal the acting king and to register their complaint. He listened to them quietly, with respect and treated them with great consideration. He kept the temperatures from flaring. He then began to fire a few questions at them individually. It was not long before they realized he knew a great deal about their personal habits and backgrounds and they began to get a little bit uncomfortable. Finally, he said, "Why should you object to women having the same education as men?"

Of course, they registered the expected responses that women were the weaker sect and they couldn't be trusted with such matters. These should be decided by men. They shouldn't be involved in questions of politics, economics, government, etc. He said, "Well, I don't agree with all of your points of view. We will leave it this way--those who want the girls' school shall have it. Those who don't wish to send their daughters to the girls' school, don't have to, but I want this population to have available this opportunity for education if it so desires."

The ulema went away in a huff, but within a year the people of Buraydah were back asking for a second girls' school. I never went back to Buraydah so I never saw what happened. I understand it is totally changed and it was changed rather soon after the girls' school was built. I assume this got around the ulema and that, as a result, there was no further impediment that came to our attention about women's education. Of course, Queen Iffat played her role in it behind the scenes, as it went along. I should say that Queen Iffat never got out in front. You heard about Queen Iffat only through the grapevine. She was a very discreet queen. She behaved as a Saudi wife should, but she was strong in the background of the most intimate councils of the realm, of her spouse and the immediate members of her family.

Education, therefore, took a quantum leap as quickly as they could staff it. This meant bringing in a lot of Egyptians. Egyptian-Saudi relations had been very bad and Saudis had been very suspicious of some of their Egyptian teachers and employees as being "Fifth Column." I told you about the dropping of the arms by parachute. From then on, this was a very bad period for Egyptians. They were under great suspicion, but they were very necessary if they could be kept under control. I think the Saudis found out rather quickly that most of these Egyptians didn't want to get into politics anyway, and that if any of them had been accused of espionage or attempted sabotage, they were few. The majority were quite harmless. Teachers were otherwise not easy to get. Saudis had Palestinians and they had Lebanese as well. They began to try to staff these elementary and junior high schools. It wasn't until a little bit later that they began, through private efforts in Jeddah, to develop the King Abd al-Aziz University. Businessmen led in that effort with the Faisal's blessing. Once it got started, it moved very rapidly. I watched it and I visited it. I was rather thrilled at what they did there, establishing good laboratories for biological sciences. They had a very dedicated young director, Muhammad Fida', who unfortunately died of Hodgkin's disease a few years later. He did a beautiful job of developing this school.

There was suddenly a new dimension, whereas before there had been nothing. Really, the women of Saudi Arabia from the 1940s on up until this period of twenty years or so, if they had any schooling, it was by a sheikh who came to their own homes, sat behind a screen, and got them to memorize and recite. It was an extremely poor curriculum and very limited.

Along with this went an effort to try to reform the judiciary, not to reform the ulema or to cancel their power and authority. It was rather to make more coherent the structure of the religious authorities--for lack of a better term. As I recall it, they never had a very good term for it. They established a minister of justice who was from the Al ash-Sheikh family, one of the more enlightened members. His job would be to oversee the application of Hanbali law with due respect to Hanafi, Shafe'i or Maliki cases. The country prided itself in having a system which recognized the other three schools of Sunni jurisprudence. If a man from the background of one of those legal systems--and there were many in the country--would come forward with a case in law, as defendant, or plaintiff, this would be taken into account.

The older ulema were beginning to die off at this point. I met a number of them one evening prior to the Pilgrimage, Faisal invited me to the palace which had been Saud's palace taken over by the government by this time for state purposes. This was an entertainment of Hajj (Pilgrimage) leaders from all over the world including Nigeria. The old ulema were seated at dinner at a special honorary table and each one of them had someone to help him eat. All were blind. Every one of them had a young boy by his side, guiding the spoon to his mouth, because they wanted to eat properly and not in the old Bedouin way with the sleeves rolled up on the right arm. Anyway, they couldn't see what they were doing. It was easier to have boys feed them. I thought to myself, "Well, this is

an end of an era because this whole judicial system is undergoing a review. A lot of these people wouldn't know how to fit into it."

I mentioned slavery as being outlawed. How quickly that really took effect I can't say, but I never heard anything more from the complaints of Mali. I just gathered that the heat must have been off on a lot of their complaints. As was the case during our post-Civil War period here in the United States, there were a lot of people who had been labeled "slaves," for lack of a better term, who really thought of themselves as lifetime servants of the family and friends and who had no place to go. I heard reports that freed Saudi slaves came back and wanted to be brought again into the household under any circumstances that the master chose. How the abolition of slavery was applied, I don't know. It seemed to go smoothly. As far as I could see, Faisal carried out his pledge whereas Saud, knowing the sensitivity of the matter, just fudged and tried to pretend there was no problem and no slavery at all which, of course, was patently false.

The other thing was economic development. I mentioned television. Faisal said, "I would like very much to get assistance from your government in building for me a television station. I would like to be able to say to all the eager merchants and businessmen around here that, if they want to get into this project, they have to see the Americans. I've given the whole project over to them and I don't want to be bothered with interventions to try to get special privileges here and there in this contract."

I said that I would immediately see what we could do and that I was sure that our people would be interested. Sure enough they were. The first thing they did was to send someone out from the Federal Communications Commission who was a technician. We had a long talk before he saw Faisal or anybody else in the government. He said, "In this country, there are already two systems. One is the European system of 50-cycle, 220-volt current, direct current. Then you have the American system. In building a television station, they have to decide which they want, and one of their decisions should be whether they want to have equipment which will receive the broadcasts of neighboring countries. Recently they have had problems with Egypt. Do the Saudis want to see Nasser and Ahmed Said on their television, fulminating against Saudi Arabia.

These were questions which put to them. As far as the Saudis were concerned, they realized that they had a system already in ARAMCO which was American, based on American voltage and current. That station was for the entertainment of ARAMCO's American camps all around the eastern province. It was set up on Jebel Dhahran so it could have the necessary reach. The whole camp was on American voltage.

The Saudis decided just to leave that alone and to concentrate on the one in the west. They finally decided to go for the European system and disregard the possibility that their people might be affected somewhat by anti-Saud propaganda. It was an expression of self-confidence by the Faisal regime.

The U.S. was asked to go ahead and build it. We told them, "Look. The U.S. Government doesn't build such things, but the U.S. Corps of Engineers will give it under contract to a firm."

The Corps quickly RCA. They sent out some very capable people whom I talked with a great deal. I spoke with the Saudi minister of communications, Faisal al Hejelan, who later became ambassador in Washington. He was the man in charge as far as the Saudis were concerned. Very soon RCA started construction.

Prince Faisal then raised another question with me. He said, "I would like to have a big road built from Jeddah down to Abha. I'd like to have the United States build it."

Washington again was not willing to say that U.S. Government should go out and build a road. I think it presented a problem of whether they should try to get the Corps of Engineers or whether they should try to get someone else. The Corps of Engineers were brought in as supervisors of the RCA job of building the television station. To build a road in Saudi Arabia was something which didn't fit with the Corps of Engineers' capabilities and interests at that time. In the end, we didn't take that one on.

Faisal, I could see, was puzzled as to why we didn't because he knew that I knew--without our discussing it--that what he was trying to do was to make up for their abrupt termination of American economic aid back in the 1950s, some ten years before. He was also trying to express his appreciation of our help for security assistance. After all, the threat to Saudi Arabia had subsided. The results of the 1964 conference in Cairo between Nasser and Faisal had quieted everything as far as direct confrontation between the two countries was concerned. In a typical Saudi way, he expressed thanks not in words or letters, but in a more concrete way.

I was a little disappointed, frankly, that we couldn't build that road. I thought it would be a darn good thing and people would learn a lot. The Corps of Engineers would learn. After all, we had undertaken very modest road building in the Yemen and we knew something about the terrain. It turned out to be a project given to the Italians.

In any event, Faisal was off on several big economic-development tracks. One was roads to link the principal urban and agricultural centers, thereby saving a lot of wear and tear on vehicles as well as providing a much more rapid, safe and economically effective communication network. He was also out to try to improve the radio-telegraph and other communications network which was very primitive.

The other thing was water. Here he divided the country into three sectors. A. J. Meyer was invited to come out when Faisal indicated that he wanted a good counselor and economic advisor on a development program. We sent A. J. Meyer from Harvard University who was an economist who had specialized in the Middle East. He brought with him a colleague and they made two or three visits to Faisal. There was another man

before A. J. Meyer who tried to head up a mission of some advisory assistance in economic planning in Riyadh and it did not succeed.

A. J. Meyer arrived and his advice was attentively listened to by Faisal. He and his colleague reported directly to Faisal and I was there each time it happened. They went through the administration of the economic development program that existed in Saudi Arabia and then gave a critique. They told Faisal that it was chaotic. They used the word "jawadh" and that it had to be overhauled extensively and changed or they would never get anything done. Faisal listened very closely. Out of this and out of his own experience was born a deep interest in the search for water.

As you know, we already had a man who knew the geology very well and that was Dr. Glen F. Brown. He arrived in Saudi Arabia just about the same time I did in the summer of 1944, and had accompanied the U.S. agricultural mission to Al Kharj. These were three highly educated farmers from Skull Valley, Arizona, who worked to develop a demonstration project of desert horticulture. They were Cart Quast, Rahleigh Sanderson and the leader, David Rogers, plus a mechanic. Glen Brown never got out of Arabia except for visits back home or short tours because the Saudis respected so much his integrity as well as his knowledge. He knew where the water could be found.

There were some very good ARAMCO technicians, including Tom Barger who also was a great geologist as well as a mining engineer by training. He became the head of ARAMCO, eventually. Between them fossil water was found and one of the places was Buraydah which made a big transformation in that community possible. People in the past had been drilling wells into the replenishable aquifer and overusing it and causing salt to seep through which destroyed land. One of the big problems was to get them out of that habit and to teach them the proper use of water. Some of them began to learn rather quickly because they had as their bosses very intelligent land owners. I remember one of them was the son of Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, Ahmed Sulaiman, who has become one of the great businessmen of Saudi Arabia. I visited his plantation of vegetables and wheat in the area of Anayza which is in that Qasim sector, a very fertile area in the Nejd.

Things began to move also in Aflaj down in the south. This was tied in with an ARAMCO project which was on the railroad from Dammam to Riyadh located in a big bend to the south. The railroad could pick up products from this agricultural station which was one of the early outgrowths of the Al Khari mission, done by ARAMCO. In the Aflaj area it was found that conditions were right for growing a lot of crops and beginnings were made at that time of a major agricultural effort in that region along with the search for ground water. In many cases the water was found at great depths and it was fossil water. It was still usable and, in some cases, still drinkable, although it had been laid down 10,000 years ago. Glen Brown is the man to talk to about this.

In this period--and some of what I'm talking about began even in 1963 when Faisal was struggling with the problem of the Yemen--some of this was beginning in that period and a more intense effort was made when he could put the Yemen on the back burner.

Q: I may have had that date about his formal succession to Saud wrong. I see I've got two dates here. It could equally well be November 2, 1964.

HART: There you have it. I have to tell you a little about that. In the summer of 1964, we had to make a decision in the family about the education of our two daughters. Our oldest, particularly, had graduated from the Parents Cooperative School in Jeddah which had been run by TWA for their own people but we were using it. The eighth grade was as high as you could go and she had completed that work. The younger daughter had not, but we really had the problem of improvising her education. Jane, therefore, took the two girls home and I was to join them on leave when I could. Jane took the girls home in the summer and I was alone in Jeddah for a period of perhaps two months or more. Then I was asked to come back to chair a promotion panel for senior promotions. I was a career minister so I was selected to chair this particular panel. I was very glad I was not in Jeddah during the fall of 1964 for a special reason. The Saudis deposed King Saud during this period. I knew that, if I had been there, there would have been rumors all over the place that the United States Government had something to do with it. It was generally known by this time that we much preferred Faisal's style of administration to Saud's. We couldn't disguise it. It was a general feeling of the public in Saudi Arabia itself.

During that fall Saud came back to his country and tried to recapture all authority. He challenged Faisal's administration. One thing he tried to do was to make sure that the royal guard was solidly with him and that they would pledge their allegiance to him. To do this, he went out into the desert and held Mejlis. You know the way they used to do this in special places. They would select a small rise of land and lay down carpets and place a chair. The king would sit up there and people would come forward with their petitions. Saud started resuming this formality. Faisal just kept quiet, but around him his half-brothers who were long since convinced that they had to have Faisal as their chief became angry. It looked as though there might be an armed confrontation in Riyadh. I got details on this later from Omar Saqqaf. It was touch and go.

Saud's son, Prince Muhammad bin Saud, during the period when Saud exercised full authority, had been his minister of defense. He stayed loyal to his father even though his wife was the daughter of Faisal. Her name is Sarah and she is well educated, much more educated than Muhammad. She is a graduate of Wellesley College and a beautiful girl. We met her. It was an extraordinary arrangement to be made in those days. We were informally invited to meet at the home of a friend of Muhammad's. They appeared to be a devoted and were certainly a very handsome couple. There were a lot of rumors about his job as defense minister, charges of corruption and that sort of thing. In this instance he had the difficult choice to make as to whom to give his loyalty and he gave it to his father. I believe the two were separated for a while, that is the wife and he, but I think they never were divorced and eventually got back together.

In any event, Muhammad's job as an ex-minister of defense was to see what he could do to round up forces on his father's side. He did not succeed. Even the royal guard which was charged with defending the palace where the king reinstated himself began to waiver

during this period. Finally, it became ineffective as there was no pitched fighting. It was done quietly. Again I was told that Prince Muhammad bin Abd al-Aziz, the King's half-brother, played an important role in convincing Saud that he better go or he was going to get killed and maybe by Muhammad himself. He believed in direct action.

However that may have been--you know how the Saudis play their cards very close to their chest and we'll never know the full story--this was the version that I was given and I never had a better one. But I was away, and in view of the electricity that must have been in the air and the rumormongering that would have been inevitable, as well as the fact that I had been very close to Faisal and to many of his people, I figured it was better that I was away. Nobody tried to break me away from the selection board that I chaired and send me back to Jeddah in a hurry. I was glad they didn't. They never even raised the question, and things happened fairly quickly and from the U.S. Government's standpoint, in a very satisfactory direction.

I got back at the very end of the year because it always takes selection boards a lot of time to read and reread personnel dossiers and to, adjust figures and the promotion pyramid. I didn't get back until after Christmas.

Q: By that time Faisal was firmly in.

HART: Yes, firmly in. Saqqaf privately told me what he felt he could.

Q: Did Saud leave the country?

HART: Saud then left the country and his palaces, with the exception of one in Riyadh, were taken over as government property to be used for whatever purposes the chief of state ordered. Faisal would never live in these places under any circumstances. He disdained them. In this way he was somewhat of a chip off his father's block. I told the story earlier of how Abd al-Aziz had objected to Saud's having had built for himself in Riyadh, a reinforced concrete building as a personal home. Faisal showed his disdain for using these palaces for personal residence by the very fact that he would not occupy the one that his wife had built for him out on the shore just a short distance from the American Embassy. You remember that. That building stayed in semi-completion for a long time and was vacant and wide open. Jane and I used to walk up there occasionally and take a look at it, admire the gypsum and the inlay work that had been done in the main room. I thought, "Well, this would be quite a nice place for him to live because here he's got, for all of his officials and aides, plenty of space for their quarters, offices, and his own office use. It would also be nice for his entertaining."

I raised the question with him once. He looked at me and said, "It's my wife's idea. I don't like it. I won't even go inside."

That's all he would say. Of course, later on I know that he had a very fine place in Riyadh but I never was in it. Isa Sabbagh was in it and he knows what it's like.

The injunction of the late King Abd al-Aziz that Faisal was passing on to his people was, "I am one of the original Bedouin stock and I am going to hold it that way. We have modernized, but we don't modernize in our values. We modernize in technology, in education. We broaden our horizons. We develop our country, but we don't forget the simple beginnings of our lives."

This message got through to the people. I think Faisal had always projected some of that image but not as much until after Saud was out of the way.

Saud, nonetheless, was very good with the tribes. He may have displeased his father but he got around among the tribes and they liked him. Of course, they also liked him because he handed out money very liberally. His retainers would carry, as his father's had done, sacks of riyals. Saud had married the way his father had, a sequence of marriages and divorces (having never more than 4 wives at one time) all around the country to unite the kingdom. His father had truly united the kingdom by a process of family bonding. It really wasn't necessary for Saud to do the same thing all over again, but he did. He had over 60 children. I don't know if he had quite as many as his father. His father told me he had over seventy children, but he didn't know just how many because he never counted the girls!

Q: I once counted 78 princes.

HART: I used to get the story from people in 1944 to 1946 that King Abd al-Aziz had 37 princes and that the balance were girls, but nobody knew what the total balance really was, since the king himself didn't know.

In any event, this was a different era. Faisal had twelve children that I know of and he had had four wives. His last wife, Iffat, was the one to whom he adhered most closely, but he did not forget the earlier ones. He always made sure they were comfortable and well off. This was particularly true of one whom my wife got to know very well. She was the daughter of Saud al-Kabir, one of the great figures of Central Nejd, a very noble Arab, famous all over the country. Her name was Johara bin Saud al-Kabir. Jane got to know her quite well. From her and her friends she learned that Faisal visited her often. He visited her not for sex but for sharing of information because this was a very shrewd woman who was a Bedouin by pride and lineage of the highest in the realm. She was very religious, very generous. Her house was full of hangers-on, Palestinians included. Nevertheless, she was very sharp and never wasted words. Faisal respected her opinions very highly. Jane can tell you a lot more about this. She may have done so with Penny Laingen, I don't know. It was an interesting glimpse into the life and attitude of Faisal which came our way.

Jane had to stay in the United States from the summer of 1964 until I finally came home in 1965. She had to have surgery in May. By that time I had served four years on top of two earlier assignments to the Kingdom and I was ready to make a change. I had reached

27 years of duty and could retire. I didn't know whether I would stay in the Foreign Service or not. It just depended on whether there was anything attractive and useful.

Q: There was some sense of satisfaction that there had been a fundamental change in Saudi Arabia and it was now launched on a different course, a progressive course.

HART: Yes. It was launched on a good course and I felt that things were out of my hands now, that there wasn't very much more for me to do there. Faisal had charted his course. He had the country with him. Nasser had dropped all direct efforts to try to unseat the Saudis as a clan and put in a substitute regime. In fact, two years later as we know, he had to withdraw everything from the Yemen. As a result of the disasters of the 1967 war with Israel, he became one of Faisal's clients in a sense. He had to take money from the man he had tried to overthrow.

Well, this had not happened yet. This was 1965. We used to get some reports of the meetings of the tribes in different places in the Yemen and of changes in the regime. Bob Stookey came out of the Yemen in 1965 and joined us briefly in Jeddah before he went on. We had a very good debriefing session. I think it was Harlan Clark who went back to the Yemen for a tour. Harlan visited us in Jeddah with his wife, Patty. Harlan had initiated our first official contacts with the Yemen way back in 1944, whose ruler was the late Imam Yahya. It was nice that he could return (1964-1966) and pick up again in the Republican period, as Chargé d'Affaires.

[Note: William R. Crawford, interviewer, was the first U.S. resident ambassador to the Yemen Arab Republic, 1972-1974.]

Q: In our last interview we spoke of the termination of your assignment with some satisfaction to Saudi Arabia and your transfer to Turkey. Would you elaborate on that.

HART: This was a post which I was most happy to be named to. I had had it in my mind for many years that Turkey was a country which I particularly wanted to serve in. I approached Turkey as did my predecessor, Raymond Hare, from experience in the Arab world, we'll say the former colonial empire of Ottoman Turkey, with a background in Middle Eastern affairs. Turkey has for a great many years considered itself as a part of Europe or at least headed toward Europe. Even if it doesn't have both feet in Europe, it has a political drive going back to the time of Mustafa Kamal called Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. As its first president, from 1923 to 1938, he decreed that Turkey should head west. It should be Europeanized, in a sense, and shake off its Middle East cultural connections and customs because they had brought it to ruin. They had brought the empire to ruin and a great deal of what he felt was the backwardness of Ottoman Turkey at the end of World War I could only be overcome by a direct, intimate, and organic association with Europe. Even though Turks are 99% Muslim, it was still a secular state. It is a state without a state religion. In fact, state religion was forbidden

under one of the pillars of the Atatürk reforms. I felt that this was a particularly interesting country to serve in, coming out the Arab world. I found almost immediately some parallels, one of which was U.S. bases.

I've mentioned already in discussing Saudi Arabia the sensitivity of the Saudis over the Dhahran Airfield as a U.S. base. Actually, Dhahran Airfield was turned over by the United States Government to the government of Saudi Arabia as their base formally in 1946, when it was completed. It was always considered to be a facility belonging to the king which we had built for him as a sign of our friendship and interest in his country. The fact was that for quite a few years the Saudis didn't have anybody to run that base. They had nobody trained. We were in a section of Saudi Arabia which was Bedouin and which had not yet become urbanized in any sense of the word. There wasn't at the beginning any middle class.

A sensitivity was in the air, all over the Arab world, about foreign bases, as you well remember. The French, the British, everybody had this problem. We had it in a pale reflection down in Dhahran Airfield where, locally speaking, it was not an issue. It was only an issue because of the attitude of third countries like Egypt and other countries where, as in Syria, the Baath Party was also championing the idea that there should be no imperialist remnant left, now that World War II was over, of any European power in the Arab world and no symbol of such imperialist presence such as a base belonging to someone else.

In Turkey there was a sensitivity also. We had at that time a number of facilities which we used. The sovereignty of Turkey was never in question. Who was running the facility? That was the thing that counted. Some American technical forces operating under the general supervision of General Lyman Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, got accustomed to thinking of it as an American base. I remember going to Diyarbakir. I visited all of the principal sites. When I got to Diyarbakir, there was a big sign over an arch of the driveway going into the facility which said, "Best U.S. base in Turkey."

You can understand how American soldiers feel about that sort of thing. They like to fly the flag. They like to listen to American music and they want to think they are back in the States. They get pretty lonesome out in some of these places. However, that kind of sign wouldn't go and I insisted the sign be changed. I had to go around and inspect all of these bases from the political point of view as well as to find out what they were really doing. By and large, as is generally known, they were part of an intelligence collection system, electronic intelligence, or listening in on communications which were important coming out of Soviet forces or space personnel. We had a string of them across the northern shores of Turkey, the southern shore of the Black Sea. They had grown over a period of time, not by any particularly coordinated plan. In fact, they belonged to different branches of our service. In every case, there was an effort being made to train Turkish officers and men to do the technical work. The information obtained was shared with the Turks as an ally in NATO. Nonetheless, it happened that my arrival in Turkey came at a time when

this sensitivity came to the fore. That was because it was an election period under a new constitution. The Republic of Turkey's original constitution, established in the days of Atatürk, had been superseded in 1960-1961 after the 1960 military coup d'état had taken place against the government of Celal Bayar. He was president and rather a national hero, but the real power was in the hands of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes who was a very adept politician and who knew how to handle the United States so as to get the maximum of aid possible. He spent it in ways which increased his popularity. His was the first really elected government under conditions of open contest in the Republic of Turkey. He had headed the first opposition party to the original founding party of the Turkish republic, the Republican People's Party of Atatürk which had been led since Atatürk's death in 1938 by Ismet İnönü, his principal lieutenant and a great military leader, as well as a great diplomat in the closing period of World War I. He negotiated the Treaty of Lausanne which replaced the Treaty of Sèvres.

When this coup d'état took place in 1960, Adnan Menderes' popularity had led him toward a kind of republican and democratic absolutism. In other words, he had gotten to the point where he wouldn't tolerate any opposition to his ruling party which had originally been an opposition party. For ten years he had had everything his own way. He was not only re-elected when he needed to be, but by crashing majorities, and he was spending the country into bankruptcy, some on good projects but many that were not so well considered. He had used strong-arm tactics against people who had objected to his policies. Students began to agitate. He cracked down on the students very hard, with armed forces, and the officers didn't like that at all. Finally, he made the big mistake of arresting Ismet İnönü who was making a speech against him. They even instituted a kind of star-chamber proceeding of judging and convicting the opposition in the parliament. All of this had just preceded my arrival but the military had gotten a new constitution prepared and put in force. They had handed back the reigns of authority to a civilian sector which was the Republican People's Party headed by İnönü. They had declared the Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes to be outlawed. They had put on trial all of the parliamentary members of the Democrat Party.

Q: The military had done this.

HART: Yes. The military had done this. On the grounds that the military in Turkey is by custom and by Atatürk mandate the guardian of the republic against all threats from within as well as from without, they felt that these men were very guilty (Menderes and some of his people particularly) of violating the fundamental tenants of Atatürk and of what we call the pillars of the republic, more fundamental than any constitution in Turkey. The constitution in Turkey is a mechanism for governing the country, but its obedience to the principles of Atatürk are written right into the document and they may not be amended. One of the pillars is secularism. Another is code of dress--no more tarbush, or fez. Another is that the country shall always remain a republic and never go back to being an empire. The royalty and all of its trappings are gone. Women are to cease wearing the veil and have equal rights.

In any event, the military tried a lot of these Democrats. They had imprisoned most of them on the island of Yassiada which is in the Marmara Sea. Menderes and his finance minister, Polatkan, and his foreign minister, Zorlu, were all hanged after being judged guilty of violating the fundamental tenets of the republic. Then they had prepared a new constitution which provided by what they call the d'Honte (Belgian) system of proportional representation a national remainder system of utilizing excess votes to broaden political representation in parliament and to provide checks against excessive authority. The checks and balances written into this constitution were such that the Turkish Labor Party, which was really the Turkish Communist party in disguise (communism being totally proscribed and Communist party outlawed) was allowed to function even though it was a cover for the Communist effort in Turkey. It was able, through the national remainder system to utilize excess unused votes, obtained in an urban center such as Istanbul, and distribute those excess votes to unsuccessful candidates in different parts of Turkey where the Party had been defeated. Thereby, more TLP candidates would acquire seats in the national assembly.

The result of this was that the Turkish Labor Party was given a tremendous momentum that it didn't really earn in the electorate. It provided a platform for agitation. One of its biggest charges was that the United States was really the boss of Turkey. "Turkey is not a free country or a free democracy. Everywhere you go, there are American bases into which no Turk can enter. They don't even know what is going on in there, but certainly what is going on isn't for the benefit of Turkey. It is for the benefit of the United States and it is anti-Soviet. Why should Turkey always be anti-Soviet? Here is our big neighbor who wants to be a friend. Why should we call it an enemy? Why should we belong to NATO? It is wrong."

The propagandists gathered tremendous momentum because they had a newspaper that was important, "Aksam," which means "evening." It was strictly a Turkish Labor Party organ and it was well written, carefully edited, and began to gain a lot of influence. In fact, its influence penetrated into the middle spectrum of the Turkish press and political opinion. Another paper known as "Cumhuriyet" which means "The Republic," which was very strong and was influenced by Leftist propaganda. I found, therefore, that I had a real problem with a gathering strength of political opinion in the parliament (more than in the general public) which was critical of an American presence in so many facilities on the Black Sea and in the heart of Turkey.

Q: Did the Turkish military not feel that they were sharing the benefits of our presence?

HART: Yes. I never heard any complaints from Turkish officers. Now, one of my first calls was on General Sunay, who was the chief of staff of all the forces, i.e., the chairman of the chiefs. I called on and became very friendly with the chief of staff of the Army, General Tural, and with the heads of the Navy and of the Air Force. None of these men nor any of their subordinates--and I went to innumerable functions at the Ankara Turkish Officers' Club which was quite a gathering place. I would go to them to bolster the fraternization between our own military people in Turkey and the Turkish military

leaders. I met Ismet İnönü at one of the early functions. Never, at any time from any of these people, did I hear a complaint on this score, but I could begin to feel it in the foreign ministry because of the parliament, particularly because of the criticism that there were bases all over Turkey into which no Turk could enter except, perhaps, the sweeper or janitor.

I set out early on to try to abate this kind of criticism, first of all to check into some of our problems. Another problem, apart from the type of thing that I had run into in Diyarbakir, was the use of the post exchange, the AFEX, in Ankara. I found that this was causing real problems because Turkish officers were allowed to use it as well as Americans who had very good friends among the Turkish military community. They would order--and place big orders--for things that were just totally unavailable on the market in Turkey, not only foodstuffs but cosmetics for their wives, cameras, tape recorders, things of that kind which were impossible to find on the Turkish market. They would sell them and we knew that there was a trade going on, sometimes by Turks who would come out with their baskets absolutely loaded with goods and sometimes by Americans who would then turn them over to Turks and be reimbursed. This was becoming a scandal and it was a problem for the Turkish government.

Another problem which had happened to be very acute not long before I got there was the misreading of the Turks by some of our non-commissioned officers and men who were a part of the American military establishment. Some of these people should never have left home in the United States. Their children had formed gangs and sought fights with Turkish children. Some parents were aiding and abetting this sort of thing.

Still another problem was that we had a provision in our written understandings with the Turkish government that, should an American soldier run afoul of Turkish law--commit some act which would involve his arrest--he should be immediately turned over to the custody of his American commanding officer. If he was found to be on duty when this alleged offense took place, then he would be tried entirely by American law. But if he was not on duty, then the Turks had charge of the case.

One day (before I came) an American officer, driving a van from the officer's club in Çankaya (which is up near the presidential palace and also near the American and some other embassies such as the British), ran into the change of the guard at the presidential palace, marching with band and formation as they did every day up right past our place. He ran into the procession with this truck because he was drunk, and he disabled a number of Turkish soldiers, some of them very seriously. I don't think that any died, but some may have been unable to pursue their career because of the injuries they obtained. Then it was ruled by the American senior officer that he was on duty at this time. Everybody knew he was drunk. Our people had great doubt that he was on duty, but that was the way he escaped Turkish justice. He found himself quickly transported back to the United States. What happened to him, I don't know, but it was a scandal. It burst upon the scene at a time of great American-Turkish good will, and put a tremendous cloud over it.

There were other problems, too, particularly the problem of Cyprus. As I mentioned in the manuscript which you've just read, in 1964 when things were going very badly for the Turk Cypriots on the island, the Turks made up their mind that they were going to land forces on the island to protect their own community. Getting wind of this, Raymond Hare, my predecessor, asked for 24 hours to consult Washington because he knew this might involve hostilities between Greece and Turkey. Greece had placed on the island, above the treaty limits of the London-Zurich Accords, quite a few thousand regular Army Greek officers and men to bolster the national guard. They were there presumably to deter the Turkish intervention. In any case, President Johnson signed off on a letter prepared for him in the State Department which was a very tough letter, indeed. One phrase in that letter caused us a great deal of trouble which was, "you will have to realize, Mr. Prime Minister, [that is İnönü], that your allies would not have had the time to determine whether they have to come to your aid in the case of a Soviet intervention."

This really was saying in so many words, "You may not be able to count on us if the Soviets come in and try to break up this fight."

It was a great mistake, in my opinion, to have introduced that phraseology. In any event, it hung like a cloud in the background of people's minds. We had had demonstrations, as my deputy told me when I arrived, the previous year against the United States for the very first time. It had never happened before.

The combination of the Turkish Labor Party efforts to defame the relationship and to spoil it in any way possible, plus some actual things that had happened which I have described in my book "Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War," did cast a cloud over our relations. When I came in by way of Istanbul, I was prepared that people were likely to question me on the state of our relations. Sure enough, one Turkish correspondent got to me during the period when the plane refueled before going on to Ankara. He asked me if I would comment on the state of Turkish-American relations which he said were not so good. I told him, "I think they are fundamentally sound and good. I intend to pursue every effort to make them better."

He didn't push it any further as an American correspondent might have.

Q: What month in 1965 did you arrive in Turkey?

HART: We arrived in September. There was an election held in late September. This resulted from the fact that the İnönü government, which was the Republican People's Party government, really had not come to grips with some more fundamental things that the Turks needed. Basically, this was an improvement in the economy. The Turkish Republican People's Party was a statist party. By that I mean that they believed that all of the "high hills of the economy" should be in the hands of the government, that private industry could be trusted only with peripheral production and services. Well, private industry existed, and there were several very important industries in the country; but basically it was a small part of the economy at this time. The old traditions of Turkey had

not been that commerce and trade be conducted by Turks. These had been handled in previous decades and for centuries before that by foreign elements living in Turkey--especially Greeks and Armenians, both of which were not necessarily foreign but they were foreign to the Turks in the sense that they were of another religion and another fireside language. There were also large bodies of Europeans who carried on trade. The Turks were administrators and soldiers.

This was beginning to change. Above all, there was a feeling by 1960-1961 that the Republican People's Party was an elitist party which was not close to the people of Turkey. It was time for a change. The leader of the opposition, who had really stepped into the shoes of Adnan Menderes, transferred the people who had always been the supporters of the Democrat Party into supporters of a new party called the Justice Party. It was called "justice" to imply that there had been an injustice, which was the hanging of Menderes and his two lieutenants, and that the trial and proscription of the Democrat Party was unjust. The symbol of the Justice Party was a white horse. As explained to me by Turks in Washington before I left to go to Turkey, democrat was derived from the Turkish demir kiri, an iron-grey horse. It was really a white horse, and it was a way of bringing to the attention of the Turkish people that the popular Democrat Party was not really dead. The leader of the Justice Party was a man of technical background, an engineer named Süleyman Demirel, who was very friendly to the United States. He was a great protagonist of free enterprise and was against state-ism. He did not intend to abolish all state-operated industry, but he would attempt to emphasize the private sector. He won the election. I was there just in time to see it. Certainly, the shortness of the interval between the time that I arrived and the election was such that the American ambassador could not be accused of intervening in the politics of Turkey. The sensitivity of our relationship lay under the surface.

Q: My notes show that the Justice Party won the elections on October 10 or October 11.

HART: I guess that is right. They won an absolute majority. It was not a crashing majority, but it was a substantial majority which gave for the first time under this constitution--which was, as I said, filled with checks and balances, including the national remainder vote-counting system of proportional representation. This tended to give a lot of little parties such as the Turkish Labor Party and others un-won seats in parliament. The system tended to favor a coalition governments, and this was later to be one of the great problems of that constitution. At this juncture it didn't operate. Demirel won a full working majority. He could sit there in parliament and get votes to pass laws favoring his programs. It turned out to be a very decisive period of change toward emphasis on free enterprise, private enterprise, and away from state enterprise. It gathered momentum later over the 1970s. It then gathered tremendous momentum from 1980 on, when the current President of Turkey, heading the new Motherland Party took power in 1983 in an election under a new constitution.

The period of my duty in Ankara was very interesting to me because I could see that it was a time of change. Demirel was a very dynamic man. He surrounded himself with

dynamic workers who as ministers would help him in identifying opportunities for private enterprise. He was getting a lot of aid from the United States. In 1965 to 1956, he was receiving yearly about \$150 million of grant military assistance and about \$150 million of grant economic assistance. This meant a lot to Turkey. Turkey was a very poor country, obviously, with great poverty in the villages. There were about 35,000 villages scattered all over Turkey, many of them in almost inaccessible places--up in the mountains, without roads, just tracks and trails. However, under previous American aid programs, they had started a network of basic highways to link the different parts of the country. Up until fairly recently, before my arrival, back in the 1950s, there was hardly a highway that deserved the name in Turkey.

By 1965, I could see, for example, a new surfaced blacktop between Ankara and Istanbul, I could see the old narrow road right along its side, which had hardly room for more than one car. Part of it was blacktopped and part of it was just rutted dirt. The situation in Turkey was that they had a long, long way to go but they were getting up momentum. As Demirel used to tell me, "About this business of the high hills being only in the hands of the government, where are they going to find real experts to do all these jobs? What do you have in the parliament? You have people trained in political science. You have people who speak foreign languages. That isn't going to get your roads built."

I found very soon that this new wave of emphasis was accompanied by a new type of person sitting in the parliament. These were people from the towns and the larger villages, mostly the towns. They were rural people. They came in without any knowledge of foreign languages and they sat there in the parliament and they were looked down upon. The elite was very pleasant for the Europeans and for the Americans because they spoke English, French, German, they played bridge, they were sociable, world travelers, etc. They didn't represent Turkey. Now came the Turks, the real Turks, the Anatolian Turks. Foreign diplomats now had to learn Turkish and we all worked very hard on it, I can tell you. I tried to set an example. I found that interest in Turkish was high, particularly in some quarters of the embassy. I took Turkish lessons every day and sought every occasion to use it. It is a difficult language. It paid off to have even a little of it, because everywhere I went, it was needed. You just couldn't do your job very well if you had to have an interpreter on your right hand all the time. This emphasis was aided by the fact that the Turks welcomed your efforts to learn their language. They help you and they don't look down on you for not being already proficient. They are very glad to see you try.

In the parliament, there were vigorous exchanges of language and sometimes of fists in the corridors and in the back rooms of the parliament between this new crop of village or town-raised countrymen and the urban elite who were disparaging. Insults gave way to fist fights. Demirel and his people, with his preoccupation in development saw much of James P. Grant, AID Mission Director, and his boys. Grant was very dynamic. Rodney Wagner came in as his deputy for a while, but after about a year he went on to Morgan Guarantee Trust where he has been ever since. I think he is now one of their senior vice presidents. We had a superb group of people. Grant is particularly effective in working up Turkish participation in programs of development training in the United States. When

they returned, Grant would have special receptions to support them in their work in the various villages and towns. I used to fly with Grant to these assemblies in order to just bolster the feeling of partnership between our people and the Turkish people, working in the provinces on various programs wherein we supported Demirel's long-range planning.

I mentioned some of the problems and these problems were tackled in the following way. For instance, for the AFEX problem we had meetings right away to establish strict rules about access to products and the amount that could be purchased by any one person at a time. This was to avoid a commercial enterprise circumventing the Turkish customs. We had to work on the APO problem a little bit, too, because that had gotten out of hand. We tightened the rules about the use of the armed forces postal system which was important to us all in our work and in our lives, but it could easily be abused.

On this business of an offense committed by an American soldier while on-duty status, or not on duty status, this was a matter which I felt very strongly about. We had a lot of meetings, and we tightened the rules so that no superior officer was going to loosely give a subordinate a duty certificate when it was clearly not warranted.

With regard to the anti-Turkish attitude of some of our non-commissioned people and even of some of officers, I made it clear that I expected a reverse of that attitude or a transfer out of Turkey. I had as aide Frank Cash, who was the capable political military counselor of the embassy, a veteran of World War II and a very fine guy. We had a program of regular meetings with commanding officers, including such organizations as JUSMAAT which is the U.S. advisory and military assistance mission, and the commander of TUSLOG which is The U.S. Logistics Group (that's what TUSLOG stands for) which is the American cadre which would be activated and reinforced in time of war. TUSLOG stands there as a readiness unit of several thousand which would be swelled immediately in time of crisis by a lot more people. It would be able to hit the ground running in any major operation.

I insisted on a course on Turkey to be introduced in the American schools. We had a complex of schools just outside of Ankara, in Balgat; The George C. Marshall High School, and the lower grades leading up to high school. At a certain level, we all agreed that we were going to have an obligatory host-nation course so that all American students would learn about Turkey, recognize its flag with respect, and become acquainted with its history. This course would be conducted by a Turk. If I found that anybody was making it his business to talk against the Turks, out he goes. He would be transferred right away, whether it was an officer or a non-commissioned officer.

We had other problems which were not so easy to resolve. Previous AID missions had helped the Turks build a labor movement, a free labor movement so that they wouldn't just develop an organization which could be captured or directed by Communist elements. Türki was the name of it and it was the big confederation of free labor in Turkey. Not only was it free, it was combative. It believed in strikes and it believed in picketing. We really had trouble because the biggest target it could strike against was the

TUSLOG. They made life pretty miserable for some of our people in certain bases in Turkey, particularly down at Incirlik near Adana. Turkish strikers who were striking against TUSLOG used some pretty rough tactics against our families down there. The commanding officer came to me in a high state of dudgeon and wanted something done about it right away. I did what I could. I went to see the ministry of foreign affairs right away and made my objections. I found the ministry really not inclined to do very much against the Turkish labor movement. I had a lot of problems. Fortunately, it didn't last too long but it was a severe test of the limitations of diplomacy in the case of a labor movement which we had helped give birth to.

We had a lot of problems of that kind. I mentioned the bases and the complaint that the Turkish Labor Party was putting out. It was beginning to take hold on the other side of the spectrum, in the extreme right, which was just as chauvinistic about this matter as the Turkish Labor Party could be. It was, for the period that I am discussing, a matter almost of a complete parallel of criticism between the extreme right and the extreme left. I organized with the minister of foreign affairs and his deputy, a tour of all of our bases by such Turkish leaders as the Turks decided to send. They went into our facilities and were given a full briefing, as if they were authorized American officers coming out from Washington. They were told exactly what was going on and given a full treatment of classified information. It went off very well. They did quite a tour. When they came back, I probed to find out whether they felt that they had been dealt with openly or whether they felt that essential things had been withheld from them. They had no complaint. I felt that we were making a little headway in a sensitive matter.

There is a certain parallel with the Saudi case of Dhahran Airfield which was one single facility, but we had a lot of them in Turkey. It was an experience in which I think we had enough success that the Turkish Labor Party lost that part of its argument. There were other arguments on which they kept up a drum-fire throughout the time that I was there. The most successful thing they had from their point of view was to arouse the students who were beginning to be very volatile anyway.

This led us to studying the educational system in Turkey. They inherited their system from France and Germany. It was the great lecture-hall system. Students and faculty never get together in a typical Turkish University. I know there have been big changes now recently. In those days, there would be 300 or 400 students sitting in an auditorium listening to a lecture. When the lecture was over, they went home to memorize what he had said, to get it under their belts. They would then use it in the examination. The one examination at the end of the course at the end of the year was the thing that counted. If they didn't pass that, they were out of luck.

I mentioned the parallel, in certain respects, I identified between problems we had in Saudi Arabia and problems in Turkey. I think I should say that sensitivity over relations of this kind where you have a great power like the United States using facilities and quite a bit of real estate in a much smaller and less developed country, is heightened by disparities and living standards between the two, i.e., the way Americans lived in Turkey

or in Saudi Arabia at the time that I talked about, not the present period. This, in itself, had built-in problems. When you find American officers walking around with expensive cameras and all sorts of nice automobiles to take them wherever they want to go, living in good houses, and being able to travel when they want a little vacation, along side of them were Turkish officers who may be good friends but who--[Discussion interrupted.]

The difference in living standards is a problem. The occupation and use of terrain is a very serious one. In Turkey at this particular time that I am speaking about, manufactured consumer products in local markets were pretty meager in terms of choices offered. There were some nice things to be bought, but there were so many other things that were absolutely unavailable. The Turkish currency was non-convertible. It was worth, as a unit, a lot more then than it is now. It is about almost 2,000 Turkish lire to the dollar now, whereas at the time I was there it was officially nine to the dollar. Later it became 15, which is more realistic, but you couldn't transfer the currency. In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, we had a hard currency but we found very little on the shelves. It was a very primitive country compared to what it has now become. The unavailability of commodities which people liked was a problem at Dhahran Airfield where the APEX was misused.

So we had a certain parallel situation, but a great many differences. Turkey is a much larger country in terms of population and has a much more complex history. I must say that the friendliness of the Turks, in spite of all of these problems, was the thing that impressed me the most. As I traveled around the country, I realized that, in most of the countryside, these problems about parliament, voting, anti-Americanism, NATO, and matters of that kind didn't affect people very much. For the most part, they were only vaguely acquainted with them anyway. They felt very strongly that their friendship with the United States was fundamental. Having fought in their own history 13 wars with Russia, there is a gut feeling which penetrates all of Turkey about the Russians. Efforts to try to generate good will toward the USSR by the Turkish Labor Party and by many students and to speak against the United States, passed right over the heads of these people. In fact, those who talked most about those things had the least influence outside Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul. Their influence was primarily confined to larger urban centers and a few other places where there was a growing labor force.

The matter of Turkey's capability to play its proper role in NATO and have a defense establishment adequate to the mission that had been established for it in NATO's Supreme Command was one of our big preoccupations. Turkey had a ground force, when fully mobilized, that made it the second largest force in NATO. But Turkey did not have an adequate supply of up-to-date equipment. When we arrived, it was still flying the T-38 as a trainer aircraft. It really didn't have much of anything in the way of fighter aircraft, but it had well-trained pilots.

During the early part of my period, we got a delivery of Northrop aircraft which were F-4 fighters. They were flown in by Turks. I took a flight with one of them when we had a little ceremony at Bandirma to turnover these aircraft to the Turkish Air Force. They had

been ferried across to England, and then the Turks picked them up there and flew them the rest of the way.

The Turks had an armament establishment at Kirikkale which is outside of Ankara about an hour and a half drive to the east. This was quite a large complex built many years before for metallurgy and for manufacture of explosives. Most of its capacity was idle. Some of it was usable for making tractors. They had some good machinery, and they had some people who knew how to use that machinery to grind the gears and make the fine parts fit. They manufactured a certain amount of explosives in shells of various calibers which were sold mostly to West Germany. Since they had just opened a new steel mill at a place called Eregli up in the north on the Black Sea, I knew they also could make plate steel in various forms and thicknesses.

U.S. Military aid was being handled in such a manner that twenty-five per cent of all of our military assistance in dollar amounts was going into shipments from the United States to Turkey. This was the cost of transporting, and I felt that this was a terrible waste, particularly for such items as armored cars, tanks, etc. Tanks are complicated and armored cars are simpler to solve because the tanks they had were Korean War tanks, M-48s, which were being retrofitted a little bit here and there. They were still pretty out-of-date. Armored cars were another matter. I felt that something should be done there because, with Eregli steel laminated, strengthened, and reinforced in whatever way necessary, and with their capacity to build engines and gear systems at Kirikkale, they should be able to confine shipments to those special high-technology items which go into armored cars and do the assembling in Turkey. Thus, the heavy-weight, space-occupying elements should be manufactured right in Turkey. This would save enormously on shipment costs.

I began to preach this as I could. Things happen slowly in Turkey and not a great deal was done during the time I was there. I do know that our people in the military, who understood this a lot better than I did and who followed up on these efforts, did make a change eventually so that we wouldn't have quite that amount of military-assistance money used up just for shipment.

We also undertook at Eskisehir a facility to repair jet engines which helped a good deal in the new effort to bolster the Turkish Air Force.

What you had, therefore, was a picture of a very large army, most of the officers of which had not had American training and were rather wedded to tradition. They had a traditional command structure. It was good. In many respects, the discipline was superb. In contrast to much of the Arab world, they always kept their equipment in order. They were good at maintenance, and it didn't matter how old the equipment was. They kept it running one way or another.

I visited a number of Turkish bases, strictly Turkish. In every case where the vehicles parked, they were parked in beautiful order. They all looked as though they had just been

oiled and shined, no matter how old they were. Also, all over the place were trees planted with white coating up the trunks to protect them from insects. Every tree was the charge of one Turkish soldier. Atatürk's reforms: Reforest your country! The Ottomans denuded and ruined it. You are going to replant it. You, the young Turkish soldier just arriving from the farm, are going to learn two things. One is how to take care of a tree. The other is how to read, write and do arithmetic. They would get some basic education. They couldn't get it in many little villages because there were no schools.

The next stage is that the soldier is going to do civic work for the community. He is going to build schools, water systems, drill wells, build feeder roads. Built into the Turkish Army system are positive elements of improving the life of the people among whom they were quartered.

Problems. One was the Kurds, Kurdish communities were basically under the control of Aga. The Aga owned those villages. He owned, sometimes, a multiplicity of villages. If you tried to help the people of the village and you didn't go through the Aga, you were getting yourself in trouble, but particularly you were getting in trouble the people you were trying to help. The Aga was extremely jealous of his power and his authority to control everything that went to his people.

Q: The Agas, themselves, were Kurds.

HART: Yes. I didn't really get a feel for this until I made a trip down to Mardin. There a high-ranking Turkish officer who was my escort told me, "We have got to get rid of those Agas. They really are holding back a whole quadrant of Turkey in the southeastern area where the Kurds predominate. You just can't do anything for them. You want to do all kinds of things for them. We were able to help them in practical ways. If we do it without going through the Aga, you just get those people into serious trouble. If we do go through the Aga, he simply siphons off any money that is involved and just takes it for himself for his own purposes. He distributes his favors as he wishes."

It was quite a serious problem and still is.

In any case, with the Army we had very good officer relationships at the top level, but they weren't as close as they were with the Air Force and with the Navy. Why? Because those fellows had more exposure to American training. A lot of their men had gone to the United States and had been trained for periods of a year or more in the United States. Some had been there longer than that. They usually picked up a lot of English as well as technical education. They were more technically trained than the average officer of the Army.

In the structure of the forces of Turkey, one felt a certain discrepancy between these two branches of the service, the Navy and Air Force on the one hand, and the Army on the other. However, the Army and the other forces were all very distrustful of Russia. I would say particularly the Army. The Army tended to be more conservative and more religious,

and they were less likely to feel the winds of change than the Air Force and the Navy. They had good programs going in all three services, but there was a great deal of work to be done.

One of our biggest problems was with the Pentagon. At that time, Robert McNamara was trying to see what he could do to cut down on the amount of aid, for budgetary reasons. An evaluating team had just gone out before I arrived, headed by General Bonesteel, to evaluate Turkish requirements under the NATO framework. They made their report and made it to the Pentagon, but they never checked with Lyman Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander who was in Paris at that time. He was furious when I visited him. He said, "Here they go out and do what is my job to know about--the adequacy of the Turkish contribution to NATO and what is needed to make it more effective. They went and made this check and rigged it so that it would please the Pentagon and be acceptable to McNamara."

This was a problem because it didn't take me long to realize the Turkish forces needed everything. There wasn't anything they didn't need. With a small economy such as they had--their total exports were less than \$450 million mostly in hazelnuts, dates, figs, tobacco and some cotton products. That was their export. They didn't have a real industrial export capacity. Today, I believe Turkey's exports are 75% free-enterprise industrial and commodity exports. The whole picture has changed. But in those days, there was practically nothing. How could you then be a well-equipped member of NATO with a mission as big as Turkey has--the longest frontier with the Soviet Union and with the Iron Curtain of any of the NATO countries--and support this effort on that kind of an economy. It didn't even loom as a possibility. It looked as though Turkey forever would be counting on major military assistance from the United States and, to some extent, from Germany. They would have to continue this way indefinitely when we were one of those periods of budget cutting which frequently descend on our government.

This is a rather long-winded way of describing some of the major issues that we had to face which kept us very busy. I have not discussed Cyprus because I wrote a book ("Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War - Cyprus a First-hand Account of Crisis Management, 1965-1968," Duke University Press, 1990) on it and felt it was rather useless to go into that in great detail here. But that was the major crisis of my time. If you want to deal with it briefly, I could.

Q: I think it is pretty well covered by your book. Any other reflections, however, would be welcome in terms of what you think 1974 showed about underlying Turkish attitudes or where they expect the problem to go now. Are they there to stay?

HART: Shortly after the Turkish military intervention occurred in 1974, a high-ranking Turkish political figure came to Washington. He was an old friend of mine. I referred to the Cyprus problem, and he said, "Pete, there's no problem any more. It is settled."

Well, I knew what he meant, but it is still a problem. It is a problem for Turkey because of public opinion which is constantly being whipped up by Greek and Greek Cypriot political leaders who believe the only method of trying to pressure Turkey is through the United States. They are very active in pressuring our Congress to penalize Turkey for keeping troops on the island of Cyprus.

It all goes back, of course, to the basic syndrome between Turkey and Greece. You all know that. I don't need to go into it. There has been an effort in this recent period to try to break the crust of that syndrome and see what the realities really are. There is no reason, in my opinion, for continued hostility between Greece and Turkey. During the period that I was in Turkey, however, the Greek effort was directed toward Enosis, union with "Mother Greece" by all Greek-speaking communities. The biggest community is really the only one of importance and it is Cyprus. Their effort there, as I learned even before I left Washington from the Greek ambassador, was to have it generally accepted that the London-Zurich Treaties of 1960 were a dead letter. They wanted to start all over again on the basis of Enosis. They felt that they had the Greek Cypriots with them. They knew they didn't have the Turk Cypriots with them, but they felt they could ride that one out. Greeks had massive superiority on the island in terms of numbers and military force.

The problem was with us in the embassy in Ankara as it was in our embassy in Nicosia and in Athens to try to see what we could do to avoid a head-on collision. It was a problem that hung like a cloud over our international relationships. We knew that it was dangerous. We didn't know how it would develop, but we could see some flash points turning amber toward red. Sure enough, in 1967 it came within a whisker of war between Greece and Turkey. It was very close. Anybody that says that that was not a close shave, is wrong in my opinion because even in 1974 it wasn't as close as in 1967.

In 1974 you had the breakdown of the Greek government in the face of the Turkish invasion. In any case, you had a discreditation of the military regime in Athens with its own people and even with the Greek Cypriots. In 1967 it was different. The military regime had a different leadership. It was a Papadopoulos-led regime in Athens. They hadn't yet given up entirely on their relations with the Greek public. The Greek public, however it may have felt about the regime at that particular juncture, was pretty well under control. The press could not function freely. There were no demonstrations possible in the streets. There was no parliament functioning. King Constantine was still there. Papadopoulos had been plugging for Enosis but it was proven by the crisis of 1967 that, as a soldier, he was not willingly going to go to war with Turkey. He knew Greece couldn't win and that it would be a disaster. What was needed was a face-saving way of getting out of the fix. The confrontation was unraveled by Cyrus Vance because both sides really needed him. Both sides really wanted his help. Public opinion was a bigger problem in Turkey than we had in Greece, whereas normally it would be the other way around. Greece was the place where there were notoriously volatile party politics and street demonstrations. These were absent, but they were not absent at all in Turkey. So we had a problem with public opinion, but the willingness of the Turkish government to conduct secret diplomacy with Cyrus Vance as the mediator was demonstrated over and

over again in his visit which lasted from November 23 to December 3, as described fully in the book. Only about seven days during this time were actually spent shuttling between Athens and Ankara.

The Turkish leaders made it easier for him because they, themselves, kept the journalists from invading their premises. They couldn't keep them away from the door, but they could keep them outside. They could call a number of meetings at times when the journalists didn't expect it and didn't know where it would be. They called them deliberately in a place where the journalists would be caught absent. It worked. It permitted a calming of the atmosphere and further discussions to proceed on the issue of war or peace, even though the fundamental problems, the problems of governance of Cyprus, were not resolved. They still haven't been resolved successfully because you have got, in effect, two working democracies now on the island which have not yet found the key to a federation.

Federation was outlawed in the mind of Makarios when I was there. He wouldn't go for federation at all. He still thought that he was going to be able, somehow or other, to be the single master of Cyprus by what seemed to us to be a policy of making life discouraging for the Turk-Cypriot youth. If they went abroad, he made it hard for them to come back. Yet, since there was so little opportunity for them on the island of Cyprus under the circumstances, the Turk-Cypriot youth had every reason to try to find work abroad. The economy was about 100 years behind that of the Greek Cypriots. I think Makarios hoped that, eventually, Turk Cypriots would just simply migrate away so that the residue would be a lot of old people staying on with no influence and unable to do anything. The young people would be gone. I believe that was his policy at the time leading up to 1967.

Also, he had tremendous influence over the government that preceded the military government in Athens. In fact, he seemed to have more influence than George Papandreou. He probably had more influence than most of the top Greek politicians of that time.

We had a very close relationship between the three area ambassadors--Phil Talbot in Athens whom I had known when I was working in Saudi Arabia and he was assistant secretary; and "Toby" Belcher in Cyprus whom I had known since 1959 when I had first visited the island. We three got together as best we could to try to see what we could do before the situation got out of hand. When it did begin to get out of hand, we were very close in our evaluations, and we trusted each other's judgements. Neither of us went off at too great a tangent on his own particular track. We tried to keep the main problem in focus. When Cyrus Vance came along, I'm sure he felt that he had good support from all three embassies, and certainly magnificent support in New York.

This was a very intense part of our three missions, working on this problem. It interrupted everything else that we might have been concerned with. I believe that I came to the conclusion that was better expressed by Elie Ledpiroe in one of his writings. He said that

rule by the majority--a sort of sacred principle in our part of the world--works only if the composition of that majority and its outlook can shift and change with issues and with people's feelings freely expressed, so that the majority and the minority not be permanent. Permanence invites fear of oppression by the minority. Where the majority is hardened because it is ethnic and because it is looking out for its own interests first and foremost all the time, the situation threatens the minority of a different ethnicity. Then you've got the makings of real trouble. Until that problem is resolved, the rule of the majority over the minority simply doesn't work. It is the stuff out of which revolutions or civil war are made.

Q: Let's turn briefly to your return to Washington in 1968 and your brief tenure as assistant secretary in NEA and, subsequently, as director of FSI before retirement.

HART: I had felt before my time came to leave Ankara--perhaps even a year before--that this would probably be my last post overseas. To my way of thinking, the best way to conclude a career was in Ankara. I knew that back in Washington the number of jobs at the political level would be few and eagerly contested. They probably would not be available to me because I had been abroad too much and I wasn't bred into the political scene back here in Washington. In any case, being in my late fifties, I had to think about how to spend the rest of my life with two girls to educate in college. Did I want to be thousands of miles away from them during this critical period? I began to feel that the best thing for me to do was to cast around for opportunities.

I wrote to Loy Henderson about it. He was a little distressed that I was thinking of leaving the service because Loy's point of view always was, "You stay with it until you have to retire."

He used to feel that one should never try to move out until he was at least 65. I didn't quite feel that way.

In any event, I didn't line anything up while I was abroad, but sooner or later I knew the time would come when this fine experience of being in Turkey would have to come to an end. It did. I came home on leave with the family in the summer of 1968. I checked into the Department of State before going back to see Rusk, the Secretary of State. He wanted to know what my plans were in general. He obviously had things on his mind, but he didn't tell me what they were. I said, "Well, I think that probably I am getting toward that time when I ought to think about stepping out because I have reached that point where it doesn't make an awful lot of sense to still hang on."

I told him about my family situation and that the kids needed educating in the States. One of them was already enrolled in the University of Chicago. He said, "Have you ever been an assistant secretary?"

I said, "No."

He said, "Well, we'll keep that in mind."

That was about all he had to say. He was very laconic, as Rusk often was.

When I got back to Ankara, I hadn't been back there more than a couple of weeks when a phone call came in. It was Ben Reed who was executive director who said that Luke Battle was leaving as assistant secretary and going into business. They wanted to appoint me in his place. This was, of course, the end of the Johnson period. This was already September of 1968, and Johnson had already said that he wasn't going to run again and the election was coming up. I said that I would like to think about this a little because I wasn't sure it was a good idea and that it might not last very long.

I talked it over with my wife, and we decided that, if that was what they wanted to do, we were going to have to leave here anyway. We had better accept. I wasn't persuaded that it was going to be very meaningful at the end of an administration. We accepted. Having just gotten back to Ankara, we had to pack up, say our good-byes and go.

Before I left, I received the instruction from the Department to ask for a clearance for Bob Komer as my successor. I knew Bob from having worked with him a little bit during the Kennedy period when he was a Middle East advisor to President Kennedy on the Security Council Staff. I knew he had been in the intelligence framework in the previous period, and I had some feeling that this might not set very well in Ankara. I did my duty and went to the acting foreign minister, and said that I had received instructions to ask for the Agrément. They wanted to know all about him. I couldn't tell a great deal about him except my own personal experience. More or less automatically, they said, "Fine." They gave their Agrément.

When I got home, I was met by Rodger P. Davies who was an old friend, my deputy assistant secretary. We found a place to settle in temporarily. I began functioning almost as soon as I arrived. This would have been about October 5.

During the next two months, I saw the election of Nixon and it was a lively couple of months of just working into the job. There was nothing special to report that I can think of about it except that, on the Arab-Israeli front, we were trying to see whether we could do anything to advance Resolution 242 in its application. We had visits from Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel, and others.

We made groping efforts to try to reestablish contact with the Egyptians who had broken relations with us in 1967 on a claim, which was unjustified, that we had participated in the 1967 war. These efforts to try to reestablish some kind of contact with the Egyptians did not work at all. I visited with a man who had been an old colleague and friend in Egypt, Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad. He gave me a very cold, official reception in his New York quarters--no cup of coffee, nothing. I received icy stares and abrupt remarks. It wasn't like him. He was under wraps, obviously. Rusk had the same experience with him. He went up to see him later.

In December, there occurred an incident which I think affected my future--although I am not sure how much difference it would have made. There was an assassination in Athens of an Israeli at the airport by people not identified. I have forgotten who the Israeli was, but it aroused a great deal of feeling in Israel. They decided it was done by a Palestinian from Lebanon and went after Beirut airport with an air strike. They came in and strafed the field, which was strictly a civil airport, and then landed some commandos and blew up several planes. Do you remember?

Q: Yes.

HART: The reaction in the outgoing administration in Washington was quite strong. It was put in my hands to call in the Israeli chargé at the time and tell him what we thought about it, which I did in no unvarnished terms. That hit the fan as far as Tel Aviv was concerned and Jerusalem. It hit the fan automatically with the American-Jewish community. They were all for getting that guy Hart out. I was criticized for not making a big fuss over the assassination but making a big fuss over the airport attack.

Some kind of expression of regret for the assassination had been made. Rodger Davies told me it had been done at some level, but it wasn't enough. So it was an unbalanced picture from the Israeli point of view. From our point of view, the fact that the Israeli commandos didn't kill a lot of people was sheer luck because they had strafed the place.

Q: Do you think that incident had an effect on your future career?

HART: I think the die was already cast. The incoming secretary, Bill Rogers, I think had already made his choice. He had been associated with Joe Sisco in delegation work in the United Nations and had decided that he wanted to have him as his assistant secretary for the Near East and South Asia. That was eventually conveyed to me. In the meantime, I had started looking around and had gone to California to look in on a World Affairs Council job there as a possibility. That eventually did not work out because we did not meet each other's terms. It would have been too expensive a shift, as far as I was concerned, for an insufficient remuneration.

I was checking on other possibilities when it was made known to me that they wanted to put me in the administrative branch somewhere. I didn't know where, but finally in early February they offered to make me chief inspector. I didn't want to get started on that because it would sidetrack me completely from the thing which filled my mind and my experience totally--the Middle East. I knew that at least I wanted to be free to speak, lecture, and write on that area. I declined the offer and asked to be retired. However, I wanted a short interval in which to look around some more intensively before I signed out of the building entirely.

Right soon after that, there was a summons to come to the White House and participate in the briefing of President Nixon on the Middle East and I was to talk about Turkey. While

there, Bill Rogers urged me to take on the job of heading the Foreign Service Institute. I said, "I'd like to talk to my wife about it because I like to do forward planning with her."

I went home and talked with her and she urged me to take it. I went over to the Foreign Service Institute as the director. I was there from February of 1969 to the end of September of 1969.

I found that Howard Sollenberger, who was the acting head of FSI, really knew everything and was doing a beautiful job. He had been there for years. He was a China hand originally, a trained linguist in Chinese.

Q: He was not a Foreign Service officer, was he?

HART: No, he was not a Foreign Service officer but a superb administrator of the Foreign Service Institute. I felt that there really wasn't a great deal for me to contribute there. They were an awfully nice group of people and I liked them. I enjoyed meeting them and seeing what they were doing, but basically it wasn't very satisfying to me because I couldn't talk. I couldn't write. Everything would have to be cleared. When Ray Hare came around he said would I take on the Middle East Institute because he'd had his time there for three years and felt he should move along and go into real retirement.

I began to give it some real consideration, but there were two or three other possibilities that I was considering at the time which would have meant more financially. I had to think about the college education of my girls. The institute certainly wasn't paying much, so that was something of a deterrent at first. As time went on and the time for retirement of Ray Hare got closer, one of the members of the board of the institute came to me and said that he thought he could raise some more money which would make it a little more attractive. It would also provide more money from the standpoint of the programs of the institute. I would have more to work with as well as being able to take a little more home myself. I wasn't looking for anything big, but I had to have a certain minimum. That threw it into a more serious possibility.

About this time along came John Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations and he asked me if I would do a book in New York up at the Council on Middle East.

So I combined the two. I took that position in the Council. I got a place to stay and became a New York resident for tax purposes. They gave me enough to cover what I would otherwise be losing. I took leave without pay from the Department of State. I talked to Sollenberger. I knew they really didn't need me since he was running everything very well. So I took some time off for summer. During the summer, the thing ripened up with the Middle East Institute and I accepted their offer and wrote a letter of resignation and retirement to Rogers. I came back from the Council. September 30 was my last day in the Department. That evening they had a Middle East Institute reception in which the baton was passed from Ray Hare to me.

It was an interesting thing from a personal standpoint because I had followed him in previous periods of our careers. I was a subordinate of his in Cairo in 1944 for a brief period when he was political officer. I was his subordinate again in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, when I was consul general and he was ambassador. Back in Washington, I was a deputy assistant secretary and he was deputy under secretary for political affairs. He was ambassador to Egypt and I was his deputy from 1956 to 1958. As consul general in Damascus--it was the United Arab Republic which we had recognized and, therefore, he was my chief because he was ambassador to the United Arab Republic in Cairo. I then followed him to Turkey directly. So we have had a personal history that has been quite intertwined. Taking over from him was an interesting experience and I enjoyed it.

That pretty much brings us to the end. I had three and a half years running the Institute and then went with the Bechtel organization in San Francisco with which I had an old connection from the days when I was consul in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Q: From my calculations, that marked 31 years in the Foreign Service, a remarkable span in which the Middle East really thrust itself forward as very much central, from a start of almost nothing to a very central position in American concerns. Your career spanned that whole thrust of it into it.

HART: It was a time of fascinating change in Saudi Arabia because, I can assure you, it was really almost an untouched country. It was not quite as untouched as the Yemen in those days, I found out later, but very, very primitive in living conditions--practically no roads, communications and facilities. We know what a vast change that has taken place since. It was true down in the Gulf and the emirates that I visited several times.

Turkey was nowhere near as primitive as that, but it really had quite a simple economy when I arrived. The standard of living has taken a quantum leap in Turkey and industry, private enterprise, unrecognizable to me, almost, when I keep meeting Turkish businessmen from firms I have never heard of. They are without number. Some of them are very wealthy, very successful, doing big contractual jobs of a technical nature--architecture, engineering, construction, in the Arab world. They have the advantage in a place like Saudi Arabia, being Muslims, they can go to Mecca and work or they can go to Medina and work if that happens to be the contract. They have developed a place for themselves. I have never heard any reflections against them. Some of the other firms of other countries have come in and rather blotted their record, but not, so far as I know, the Turks, up to know. So there has been a good relationship there. Turkey has been fed foreign exchange from that quarter and from Germany where they have always had a very large force of labor for many, many years. This has made profound changes in some parts of Turkish society. A lot of village people have gone to Germany and come back with a degree of education that they would never have otherwise obtained and experienced, some with skills to start their own business.

The changes have been very dramatic. I think back on the posts, and I have never had any regrets, really, about the posts that I have had because they have all been very significant

in terms of development and change. The ambassador's job in those posts has always been a significant job. It has been a job that really called on your skills. If you ever had any, that was the time you were going to use them.

I have often thought that in some of the very large European posts or maybe even in Tokyo--I don't know--but certainly in many of the larger European posts, the ambassador is the head of a very large structure, very hierarchical but very compartmentalized and an awful lot must go on underneath that he doesn't even have much contact with. He is not called upon for the same type of hard work and decision making that is necessary at a small post where the ambassador is the man who is going to make the difference in a situation. It is particularly true where the host country has an ambassador in Washington who isn't being kept very well informed. In my time in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi ambassador in Washington was not really part of the process. He gave parties. He entertained visiting princes from Saudi Arabia. He was occupied a lot with the affairs of the royal family. We call them the "royal family" for lack of a word that means first among equals, in a tribal sense. It is the governing clan. They make tremendous demands upon an ambassador here. Up until Prince Bandar bin Sultan became Saudi Ambassador in Washington, the substance of the diplomatic work has been handled in Riyadh between the American ambassador and the king and his advisors.

In Turkey it wasn't quite that way, but still I felt that the weight of work was much higher in Ankara than it was in Washington. Yet, who is going to say where the weight is and what the responsibilities are in some of these very large posts of Europe.

I remember one ambassador--I won't name him--he was posted to a big, major European ally of ours. He said to me: "You have got the best post." This was when I was ambassador in Turkey. He meant that that's where you could do things that count. I think I was lucky in this respect. When I see young fellows who want to know what the service is going to be like, I am always tempted to say, "Go where your efforts make a difference. Then you will have the greatest satisfaction and enjoyment. Whether you win or lose, whether you are lucky enough to have a situation which works out well or where you have a situation where you get thrown out persona non grata, you never can foretell. At least you know you have been doing something that has counted in the balance.

Q: Pete, thank you very much. May I say that, between you and Ray Hare, you have served as inspiration over those thirty years to many of the rest of us who worked in the same area. One of the things which both of you showed us was the importance of understanding the cultural environment in which you are working, and the ability to put yourself in the other fellow's shoes.

HART: If we did succeed in doing that, that is perhaps due to early experiences at a time when the societies were such that it was a challenge and an adventure of the spirit and the mind to try to put yourself in their shoes, and you could, to a degree. The best people of all, though, were the missionary educators that I knew in the Gulf. I must say that, to them, I owe a lot. Just listening to them and hearing them talk, knowing what they were

doing, especially in the medical field, was a great experience. They crossed the cultural lines. Those who were trying to convert Muslim to Christians were totally frustrated. Their lives in many ways were misspent. Those who were working in constructive lines such as building schools, educating people, and taking care of the sick were a resource that Ray Hare and I and others could draw upon with good results. Marvelous, great people.

End of interview