INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 3rd of October, 2014 with Barbara Harvey. It’s H-A-R-V-E-Y?

HARVEY: Correct.

Q: And this is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy and we are doing this in her apartment at Ingleside at Rock Creek Retirement Community in Washington, D.C. And you go by Barbara.

HARVEY: Yes I do.

Q: Well when and where were you born?

HARVEY: I was born on the 18th of December 1933 in Glasgow, Scotland.

Q: Alright, what were you doing in Scotland and let’s do your father’s side first and then we’ll do the mother’s side.

HARVEY: Both my parents were from Scotland. My father, Thomas Harvey, was from Invergordon, which is north of Inverness, and my mother, Barbara Martin, was from Campbeltown in Argyllshire. They emigrated separately to the U.S.

My father, who was born in 1880, came over before the First World War. According to Ellis Island records he arrived April 15th, 1907. He was a landscape gardener. When Americans got rich enough to hire gardeners from Scotland and England my father came over. He fought in the Canadian army in the First World War; he thought the Yanks were taking too long to get involved.

He was 50 years old when he married; he was working on one of the Ballantine family estates, Loudon Hill Farm, near Montrose, Pennsylvania, the northeast corner, between Scranton and Binghamton, New York.

Q: Do you know what the Harvey’s were doing generations before in Scotland?
HARVEY: Not for generations, but my father’s father, Donald Harvey, was also a gardener; he was the head gardener at Invergordon Castle, but I don’t know anything beyond that. His mother, Mary Ann MacLennan, had married Donald Harvey after the death of his first wife. I understand that my father was given an opportunity to work with one of his mother’s relatives, a Fraser, who was a draper (tailor). However, one day early on, a regular customer came in and selected a tweed in a fine fabric; when the customer left, Mr. Fraser found a cheaper material in the same pattern to make up the suit. My father said that if that was what one had to do to succeed in business, he wanted no part in it. He was then allowed to apprentice as a gardener, as he had wished. One of my father’s brothers immigrated to Montreal. He had two daughters, much older than my sister and myself. For many years I was in touch with them, but not with their children.

My mother was born in 1897, the youngest of eleven, so I have lots of cousins, although most are in Scotland or Canada. Her mother, Euphemia Sillars, died when she was nine, and she was raised by older sisters. Her father, Duncan Martin, was a ship’s captain.

Q: Did you ever talk about her experiences during World War I?

HARVEY: No, she was a nurse I think by then. Her older brother, the one next to her in age, was gassed during the First World War and he either fell or jumped out of a window when he got home; so he died relatively young. Of the older sisters, two or three had husbands also gassed during the First World War, which I’m sure is one of the reasons my mother always made such an emphasis on having to be able to take care of yourself. Her father set up two of the older sisters in a bookshop, which only recently closed, in Campbeltown, Martin’s Bookstore. That was a way for the women to provide for their families.

Q: Oh yes, the period of World War I and World War II plus the Depression built some tough women.

HARVEY: Yes and I think Scots tend to be pretty tough anyway.

My mother came to the U.S. in the late 1920s; I don’t have a precise date for her. She was a nurse and worked in a hospital in New York City; she couldn’t stand the heat in the summer. One of the doctors had a daughter with rheumatic fever, I think it was, and a summer place in Montrose. Mother accompanied that family to Montrose to care for the daughter. So my parents actually met in Montrose.

Their first child, a son, was stillborn, their second child my older sister, Sheila, was born in Montrose. My father’s mother (Mary Ann MacLennan Harvey) was still alive, and my assumption (while they are alive you never ask your parents enough questions) has always been that they decided to take my older sister back to Scotland so that my father’s mother could meet her newest grandchild. My mother’s oldest sister had a maternity home in Glasgow, so they apparently decided--no problem, this child can be born in Glasgow.

Q: When did you come back?

HARVEY: Again, I don’t have the precise date but the summer of 1934.
Q: What brought that about?

HARVEY: Well my father was still resident in the U.S.; my mother had just gone over to visit family there. My father had already been naturalized at that time which is how I have derived U.S. citizenship. Some of my consular friends had to look up the laws and regulations because six months later the law was changed, and I would have had to be naturalized had I been born six months later. My mother was still a British citizen at the time of my birth. One time after I was in the Foreign Service and knew a little bit more about these things I asked her why she hadn’t registered me at the American Consulate. She looked at me and said, “It never occurred to me.”

Q: You were how old when you came back?

HARVEY: Probably six months or seven months.

Q: Well then did you grow up in Montrose?

HARVEY: Near Montrose, five miles south of Montrose.

Q: What was Montrose like when you recall it?

HARVEY: It was the county seat of Susquehanna County, about 2,500 people.

Q: Let’s talk about early life. In the first place to get a feel where did you family fall religiously?

HARVEY: Well as Scots they were Presbyterian. My mother was a pretty regular attender, but I don’t recall my father going to church. We went to the Presbyterian Church in Montrose, at least until the Second World War. Because of gas rationing we then went to a community church in Dimock; I don’t recall the denomination.

Much later, when I was a student at George Washington University, Jim Adams, a fellow student who later was rector of St. Mark’s church on Capitol Hill, introduced me to the Episcopal Church. He took me and my roommate, Ruth Sanderson, to the Church of the Epiphany, on G Street downtown. The rector, Charles Kane was very much in the Niebuhrian mode; his sermons often dealt with the problems of “moral man in an immoral society.” We found his sermons drew us back, and we both attended Epiphany for a number of years. More recently I’ve become a parisioner at St. Mark’s.

Q: And politically where were they?

HARVEY: My mother always said that it was a secret ballot so we were not allowed to ask our father how he had voted. In later years I interpreted that to mean he was probably a Democrat, because this was a strongly Republican area. My mother was not yet a citizen; she was naturalized after my father’s death. When I then asked her why she had waited so long, she replied that whenever she had an appointment in Montrose with Judge Little to be naturalized, either my sister or I came down with chicken pox, measles, or some such childhood disease, and
she had to cancel. In an area where everyone knew everybody, it didn’t seem to make much difference—at least if you were a Brit.

Q: Yes. What was it like as a small kid growing up in Montrose and that area?

HARVEY: In many ways it was wonderful because it was unpolluted air, we played with friends, we climbed trees, and we rode bicycles. During the war when there was gas rationing a group of children would walk the five miles to a lake to swim. One of the children had a pony and we would take turns, we drew straws and you always hoped to get one of the later straws so you would get to ride when you were already tired.

Now being from Scotland, my parents both followed international news very, very carefully. We sent packages, clothes, to cousins one generation down from me. As my mother was the youngest of eleven, I have had a very large number of cousins, and the ones one generation down tend to be closer to me in age than some of the first cousins. In a sense although we lived in a very rural area; we were very much connected to what was going on in the world. Also, two of my cousins’ husbands came to visit. One who was in the RAF, Royal Air Force, was trained in Canada. One was in the Royal Navy and he spent time in Long Island. Another cousin, who was in the British Merchant Marine came over for a visit. His ship was torpedoed coming and going, so everybody was rallying around to get coupons because clothing was rationed in Britain, and even for your uniforms you had to have coupons. So, as I say, although we were living in a very rural area, we felt very connected to what was going on in the world.

Q: Was there much of a Scottish influence in the area? Some towns have rather strong ethnic ties.

HARVEY: No, more Pennsylvania Deutsch.

Q: Ah yah.

HARVEY: There was an English couple who lived in Montrose, and, in fact, they had introduced my parents. But I’m unaware of any other Scots who were there.

Q: What was your first school like?

HARVEY: We went to school in a town that has subsequently become quite well known because of fracking, a place called Dimock. It was a very small school--there were two grades in one classroom, so my sister and I every other year shared a classroom. At that time the school went all the way from first grade through high school. You just kind of knew everybody because it was so small. My sister and I had both gone to a kindergarten in Montrose that was connected with the Presbyterian Church. Then, of course, we were a family that read, so we had a very good background for school. In some respects, I suppose it wasn’t academically all that demanding, but my sister and I both came out of the experience fine.

Q: Well, talking about reading as a small child were you much of a reader?
HARVEY: Yes.

Q: Do you recall any books or series of books that really had an influence on you?

HARVEY: Well we loved Winnie the Pooh, and Now We are Six.

Q: Aw yes, Christopher Robin.

HARVEY: Cousins would send books from Britain to us to read. I can remember I was in bed being sick with something; of course we had most of the usual childhood diseases. We read a book, The Water Babies, about chimney sweeps in London, and that had a profound effect on me because it portrayed really disadvantaged children. The other one and this I don’t remember so much, it was about a horse, Black Beauty. Apparently, it was very sad and mother said I used to cry but I always wanted to have it read to me.

By the time I was in fourth grade I was reading the Nancy Drew mysteries, and by seventh grade more adult mysteries, I think the author was Mary Roberts Rinehart. Mother let us read whatever we wanted, so by that time I was also reading historical novels, such as Forever Amber and Captain from Castile.

Q: How did you find your classmates? Were they as interested...I mean you had this tremendous story of World War II going on, were your classmates in school very interested in it?

HARVEY: I don’t remember their being particularly interested, no, but it’s a long time ago.

Q: Of course it is.

HARVEY: I haven’t been in touch with the people from my childhood for a very long time, with one exception. I exchange Christmas messages with Sandy Struble Wilson, who was almost like a younger sister; she grew up next door to us. (One of Sandy’s cousins was married to my sister’s brother-in-law, so in a sense we are “shirt-tail relations.”) Sandy and her husband still have a cottage on Elk Lake, which is where we used to go to swim. I was able to visit Sandy and her husband at Elk Lake in September 2015, and we had a grand time reminiscing. Their cottage is not far from the cemetery in South Montrose where my parents are buried. Sandy goes over and checks to make sure the gravesite is neat and so forth.

Q: Can you recall any of your early teachers who were particularly influential?

HARVEY: The first and second grade teacher, Frances Thornton, married our doctor, and the third and fourth grade teacher, Anna Bush, we knew because her husband also had worked at Loudon Hill Farm, the Ballantine Farm. But the fifth and sixth grade teacher, Vinnie Peters, was academically the most influential; we probably were starting to get into history at that point.

Q: Well did the Depression, you hit it sort of at the end of it, did that make any impression on you at all?
HARVEY: Well, I would hear my parents talking about the fact that, I think, the salaries were frozen during that time. But partly, I suppose, because my father was the head gardener at the estate, we had plenty of fresh fruit and vegetables, and milk, which was part of his salary. So we didn’t certainly suffer in any way.

Q: What was the estate like?

HARVEY: It was a model dairy farm. It subsequently was sold, and I think, it is no longer functioning at all. The dairy barns were on one side of the road. On the other side was the mansion where the Ballantine’s lived when they came in the summers, the farm manager’s house, and then our apartment, which was over a garage for personal vehicles. Between our apartment building and the mansion, there was a working vegetable and flower garden, a rock garden, and a rose garden, all of which my father had constructed. Flower beds lined the driveway up to the mansion, and the lawn around the mansion. There were also a small orchard, a grape arbor, an asparagus bed, and a greenhouse.

By the time I was in junior high school we moved across the street to one of three town houses that had replaced a building that had housed single farm workers. The Strubles were in the middle unit, and one of the farm managers, later the sheriff in Montrose, Bill Hower, lived on the other end with his family.

The farm, and these houses, were at the top of a hill. Houses for the families of the farm workers were down the hill, on either side. But all the children played together, and we all took the school bus to Dimock school. If Ballantine grandchildren visited in the summer, my sister and I played with them. Because of my mother we spoke very grammatical English and had perfect manners. So we were used to interacting with people across class lines. I might also mention that my mother impressed on us that although we didn’t have much money, we were smart and would always be able to make our way in the world.

Q: What was the Ballantine fortune based on?

HARVEY: I don’t know if it was beer or whiskey but it was one of these.

Q: Well I think of Ballantine whiskey but that may be an English whiskey, I’m just not sure. In early school was there much in the way of ethnic groupings in the school or was this pretty straight sort of European stock?

HARVEY: I don’t remember ethnic groupings, but there were some children of, I think, Polish descent, and I remember other children used to tease those who couldn’t pronounce the “TH” sound.

There were very few people of color who lived in the area. I do remember one incident in Montrose. The DAR (Daughters of the American Revolution) traditionally gave an award to the highest performing student at the Montrose high school. One year the top student was an African-American girl. There were rumors that the DAR might not award her the prize. Her mother, however, worked for the doctor in town who took out everyone’s tonsils. The doctor let
it be known that if the student who deserved the prize did not get it, he would henceforth remove no tonsils of the child of a DAR member. The deserving girl did get the prize. My mother was one of those who applauded the doctor’s stand.

If I remember correctly, it was in junior high school when an African-American student first attended the Dimock school. He was very bright, and I remember being a bit concerned, and possibly a bit jealous, because until he appeared I had always been the smartest child in my class. He gave a terrific presentation at a student performance, while I had just brought my cat for a rather pathetic little skit.

Q: What subjects at an early time did you like best?

HARVEY: I always liked history.

Q: Did you find yourself any particular spot or part of history or something biographies or so?

HARVEY: No, I just remember being generally interested in what was going on in the world.

Q: Well it was a great time. The papers were full of you might say the events and the horrors of World War II and what lead up to it and all. Were you getting any reports about during the war, or the Blitz, about what was happening to your family back in Scotland?

HARVEY: Yes, because Glasgow was bombed, and so we did have reports of that.

Q: Did you continue to go to high school?

HARVEY: In 1948 the Ballantine’s sold the farm, and at that time our family went back to Scotland temporarily. My mother’s oldest sister, the one who had the maternity home in which I was born, at that point had a nursing home. Her daughter, the niece to whom my mother was closest, felt that her mother should have some assistance, and maybe we could move over there and my mother would take over. So we were in Scotland for about eight months in 1948. But it didn’t work out, partly because my sister and I would have had to go back four grades to be taking comparable subjects in school. Of course, that was when there were still pounds, shillings, and pence, and we could only do fourth grade math because we couldn’t cope with the non-decimal system.

But we then went to something called Skerrey’s College, which was primarily for students who had stopped their education at age eleven, which was the British system, but then later decided to have a more academic education. We took French, British history, and other academic subjects. We left the U.S. in February 1948, and came back probably in October. I don’t remember exact dates, but we hadn’t actually lost any time in school, and we were able to continue until my family got settled. My father then went to work at Sheppard Pratt Hospital, just outside of Baltimore in Towson, Maryland. My sister stayed with the Struble family, who had been our neighbors at Loudon Hill, until they moved to State College, when she joined my parents in Towson. I stayed with another family, the Sherwoods, we had known at Loudon Hill, who had moved near Tunkhannock, Pennsylvania. So I went to Tunkhannock High School for one year.
Q: What was that like?

HARVEY: They had a very interesting grading system. You were graded both on effort and achievement. I was very proud of the fact that I got a higher mark on achievement than effort in algebra because I never much liked math.

Q: Were you taking languages?

HARVEY: At that point it seems to me I continued with French. Dimock, the little school we attended before, didn’t offer Latin until later, whereas at Tunkhannock, and then later when I got to Towson, they both had Latin earlier. Then eventually when I got to Towson for my junior and senior years I took both French and Spanish.

Q: You moved to Towson, Maryland?

HARVEY: Yes.

Q: When was that?

HARVEY: My parents went there either late 1948 or early 1949 and I went at the end of the school year in Tunkhannock in 1949.

Q: Did you find this going back and forth were you losing ground in schooling?

HARVEY: No, it never seemed to bother either my sister or me very much.

Q: In Towson when you were going there were the schools integrated at the time?

HARVEY: No, Maryland had been a border state; it had not joined the Confederacy, but it was still segregated as far as school was concerned. I was very much involved in the United Nations Youth Association, which had chapters at Black schools. But we could never hold meetings at our school because the Black students wouldn’t have been allowed to attend, which I found very difficult.

Q: How was this played with the students? Were they feeling that they were the prisoners of an outmoded system?

HARVEY: Well, a lot of the students had grown up in Maryland. Those of us who came from the North found it a bit difficult. But as I recall, my mother had said to me, “Now don’t speak out--your father can’t afford to lose his job.”

Q: Your father was doing what then?

HARVEY: He was working as a gardener at Sheppard Pratt. My father was diagnosed with colon cancer during my senior year, and he died just after I graduated. The house in which we lived
was a Shepard Pratt house. There was a Quaker family who had some relationship was with Shepard Pratt who made their home available to us for the summer after my father’s death. I think they spent the summers somewhere else. So my mother, my sister and I stayed there over the summer. My sister was already in college, at Western Maryland, and I was going off to university too in the fall. Then my mother got an apartment.

Q: Did any of this gardening ability rub off on you?

HARVEY: Not as much as I would like, but I have a nephew, my sister’s son, who is a landscape gardener, so he seems to have the ability.

Q: How did being in both Pennsylvania and Scotland and all when you moved to Maryland did it strike you as a different world?

HARVEY: I’ve often said one of my greatest experiences of culture shock was moving south of the Mason-Dixon Line.

Q: What did you find different?

HARVEY: I found the segregation was really hard to put up with.

Q: Yes.

HARVEY: I suppose the other thing was people were still fighting the Civil War. Actually I had a wonderful history teacher, Miss Merrick, whose family was from the Eastern shore of Maryland, which, of course, had been a slave owning area. Her family had been split. Some had fought for the North and some had fought for the South, and so in her history classes it was clear that she had personal anguish about the whole thing.

I found, as I said to one of my friends here recently, that my instinct when I moved down to Maryland was, “You lost the war--get over it.”

Q: Well you know in 1939 we moved to Annapolis my brother’s tenures O_____ midshipmen were getting ready to graduate and my mother wanted to be near there; we had lived in California. Annapolis was very much old South to; old society. I can remember one time sitting there in the corner and some of the ladies were talking about the war and at one point my mother beamed up and said, “On yes, my father talked a great deal about the South he traveled extensively there.” They said, “Oh how nice, what was he doing?” “He was an officer with Sherman,” which he was.

HARVEY: That must have ended that conversation.

Q: That ended that conversation and our entrée into Annapolis’ society. I mean it is interesting we are talking about maybe the last generation of kids who remember how much people were occupied by the war people were really absorbed by World War II and the New Deal and all that; it really did change things.
HARVEY: Yes.

Q: While you were in high school did you have any particular clubs or activities that you were involved in?

HARVEY: Primarily the United Nations Youth, but I also worked on the school newspaper in Towson and was on the student council my senior year.

Q: Well then what year did you graduate from high school?

HARVEY: 1951.

Q: What were you pointed towards I mean in the first place did you feel any restrictions being a woman well I better not go into this field or that field or this school or that school?

HARVEY: No, my mother had always made it very clear that you had to be able to take care of yourself. This was, I think, based on her own experience. Several of her older sisters had husbands gassed in the First World War; one had a husband who had a debilitating disease. So the women were responsible for the families. So my mother always said: your husband could get sick, he could go off to war, he could run off with another woman. You have to be able to take care of yourself. Actually my sister married twice, but I was very focused, I guess you could say, on a career. In fact, in my high school yearbook it says “a future diplomat.” By the time I was in high school I was interested in the Foreign Service.

Q: How did you run across that because that’s not one of the things high school kids think about.

HARVEY: Well I was very concerned about the possibility of nuclear war. But then I read O. Henry’s Cabbages and Kings, and the hero is a consul in a Central American country.

Q: Oh yes, it’s a wonderful story.

HARVEY: So it was a combination of being seriously concerned about what was happening in the world, and then the book saying, “Okay, this is a career you can participate in.”

Q: Were you able to read beyond that and find out more about Foreign Service work?

HARVEY: Not at that point as I recall.

Q: Well then where did you pick to go to college?

HARVEY: Well, initially I went to DePauw University in Greencastle, Indiana. My parents really didn’t know much about the American university system and what was available, and we didn’t have very good guidance counselors at that time. But my Girl Scout leader had been a graduate of DePauw, and I thought I wanted to go to a liberal arts, co-educational college. So I went to DePauw. I got a scholarship, which covered tuition. It was actually my freshman
political science professor who recommended George Washington University for Foreign Service; at that time Georgetown did not accept women. DePauw was terribly conservative; there were not enough Democrats to have a mock convention and the mock Republican convention selected Taft.

Q: How long were you in DePauw?

HARVEY: One year.

Q: Was this professor encouraging you to think in terms of the Foreign Service?

HARVEY: Well, he knew I was interested in Foreign Service, and he also knew I would be leaving DePauw. So he recommended George Washington.

Q: Why was it that you would be leaving?

HARVEY: Well, partly financial because after my father’s death we were very short of money, but also it was just too conservative a location for me. I wasn’t comfortable there.

Q: Were you at this time in high school getting odd jobs and all of that?

HARVEY: Yes, when I was still in high school I worked one summer as a waitress in a little resort place in Northeastern Pennsylvania, Lake Como, not far from where we had lived. The summer after I graduated I worked in a drug store right in Towson. In high school, and college, I did a lot of babysitting; everybody in my generation babysat.

The summer between DePauw and George Washington I worked as a waitress in Ocean City, Maryland; my sister was working in another hotel with a group of her friends from Western Maryland.

Q: Oh Yes, even I babysat. Well then at George Washington you could afford it or was it...

HARVEY: Well my mother at that time was a private duty nurse to a wealthy woman in Baltimore, whose name I don’t remember. She said to my mother that it would be a shame if I had to drop out of school because I had been either first or second in my class at DePauw, and that she would guarantee to pay the tuition. Well, it turned out she was an alcoholic and couldn’t be relied upon.

So I transferred to George Washington in September 1952. At the end-- or sometime during--that semester the Director of Women’s Activities (which is the title they gave to the dean of women at GW), Virginia Kirkbride, asked me to be her secretary. (Her deputy had a brother who had been at DePauw, so, looking back, it is possible that she knew I was financially in difficulty.) I was her secretary for a year and a half, and took classes at night.

Q: This is one of the great strengths of George Washington in that it acts as the night school for the government among other things.
HARVEY: Well it used to, but now they’ve gotten sort of hoity-toity and they want full time students only, whereas in my day, a lot of us who wouldn’t otherwise have been able to get a college education could do so. The professors were required to teach at night as well as in the day time. So there was no difference in quality in the classes you were taking.

Q: What was Washington like in those days?

HARVEY: I wish I had taken more pictures. We went everywhere by streetcar or by walking. I lived at Strong Hall, which at that time was the only women’s dormitory. I joined Pi Beta Phi Sorority. The sororities and fraternities were really key to having a social life at GW because it was such a commuter college in those days. However, the sororities didn’t have houses, and particularly those of us who lived in Strong Hall had friends in many sororities. Also, it wasn’t like what you read about fraternities and sororities now. I’ve talked with friends, we have lunch once a month a group of us, we don’t remember any binge drinking, and I don’t remember anybody being sexually assaulted. It was just a totally different atmosphere.

Q: I might say that binge drinking in today’s lingo is where young people would see how much they could just drink. This obviously meant passing out and getting sick and dying sometimes. It’s horrible and as far as sexual assaults I guess the standards are such that having sexual intercourse is more accepted so that it’s harder for the guys to accept no for a real no, I mean there are a lot of real rapes and it’s a real unfortunate situation.

HARVEY: Yes; people are trying to get both sexes to understand that if you drink so much that you don’t know what you are doing, one, that’s a bad idea, and two, you shouldn’t take advantage of somebody who is in that condition.

Q: Were you able to use Washington as a big intellectual playground to get out and see the senate, the museums and all this sort of thing?

HARVEY: I only remember going to the Senate once; it was during an immigration bill debate, and it was very interesting. But working fulltime and going to school at night there wasn’t a whole lot of time.

Several of the students at GW worked on the Hill. I briefly dated someone who was from Nebraska, and I think his father had gotten him a position with the Nebraska senator. But I think he just ran an elevator; but, in any case, was part of the scene on Capitol Hill.

There were concerts on barges on the river near the Lincoln Memorial and we used to go down and sit on the steps there.

Q: It was called the Watergate in those days.

HARVEY: That’s correct. We used to go down there for concerts; also at Constitution Hall. I remember going to a number of Arena Stage performances, starting when they were down at
Mount Vernon Square, and then the old brewery, and so forth. There were lots of try-outs for Broadway musicals, and we went to a number of those at the National Theater.

*Q:* When you were working for the...well I guess could you call it the dean of women...

*What were some of the issues she had to work with? With your position it should be such that you were much more aware of the problems of young women in the academic world than...*

HARVEY: You know, I don’t remember particularly what we dealt with. The office was right across the street from Strong Hall, where the residential students were. Director Kirkbride must have dealt with disciplinary matters, but I would not have gotten involved in that at all. She was also involved in things like selecting people for Mortar Board, the women’s honorary, and so forth. I was later the president of the Mortar Board chapter, and in that position had to work with other members of the group on selecting the next year’s members. So having worked with Miss Kirkbride I had access to files on students to help make the recommendations as to who would be chosen.

*Q:* Well you went to George Washington for three years then?

HARVEY: Four--because going at night took longer. I worked full time and went at night from January 1953 through June of 1954. Then I decided I needed to get out of Washington as the summers were pretty awful when there was no air conditioning. So I counseled at a camp, Lochearn on Lake Fairlee in Vermont, in the summers of 1954 and 1955. I had learned to sail, with a couple of sorority sisters who were in the sailing club. I went back to school fulltime in 1954-55; I was able to get a couple of scholarships (one from GW and one from Pi Phi), and then with part-time jobs I could support myself. I was on the sailing team that year, which not being a particularly athletic person I always took great amusement in having a Varsity Letter.

*Q:* Oh Yes. Well whom did you sail against?

HARVEY: We sailed against Annapolis, the Coast Guard Academy, Princeton.

*Q:* Were you pointed towards the Foreign Service exam in the courses you were taking or was this...

HARVEY: Everybody knew about the Foreign Service exam.

*Q:* What sort of course were you taking at George Washington?

HARVEY: Well, U.S. and European diplomatic history, international law, international politics, international organizations, international economics; the foreign affairs major emphasized all of these. Within that major I took the international communications option.

*Q:* Did you continue your interest in the United Nations?
HARVEY: I don’t recall there was a particular student organization on the UN, but yes, I followed what was happening at the UN.

Q: Did you have any feel towards how things were going in the Soviet Union?

HARVEY: Actually, my roommate, Ruth Sanderson, was doing Russian studies and so to some extent yes, from her. I took a course on Near Eastern history partly because that professor, Roderick Davison, was one of the best history professors. That was just one semester. Then one semester on Near Eastern politics. But I decided I never wanted to serve in an Arab country.

Q: Well looking at the situation today I mean if one is interested in diplomacy they have a full time job for now and forever, I think. It’s a mess now and looks like it will continue to be. Did Asia cross your mind?

HARVEY: Actually, going back again to high school and the United Nations--there was a United Nations Youth contest for high school students in which you had to answer questions about UN activities. One question was on what the UN had done in Korea and one was on Indonesia, where the UN had a Committee of Good Offices, which had three members, with the U.S. being one. I won that contest for the state of Maryland. But I don’t remember if I had been specifically interested in those countries before, or if I really learned a lot just because it came up in the exam. I think because those were the issues that were big at the time I was interested, and of course the invasion of South Korea by the North, and the U.S. and UN involvement were dramatic news. Once I decided that the Near East was not a place where I would feel comfortable working, I basically decided Southeast Asia would be more comfortable. So when I went on to get a Master’s degree I focused on Southeast Asia.

Q: One of the stories I’ve heard I’m a product of an all-male college system but guys would tend to dominate classes and all. Did you find this or were you able to hold your own in answering questions and that sort of thing?

HARVEY: There wasn’t a whole lot of discussion during the classes, as I recall.

Q: The classes weren’t discussion?

HARVEY: No, mostly lectures and some discussion. But at that time I think families who could afford to do so sent their sons to Ivy League schools, and then their daughters could go to GW. So I don’t recall the male students being all that impressive.

Q: Was the male-female imbalance so far as responsibility a matter of discussion at times? Women’s Lib I guess...

HARVEY: One of my friends and sorority sisters was the first female to run for president of the student council, and that caused some discussion. She didn’t win, but certainly we all supported her. It was something of note for a woman to run for student council president.
Q: I would think that the Foreign Service at the time you were looking at it would have this very big downer and that was if you got married you had to resign if you were a woman. Did that come up?

HARVEY: I don’t recall it coming up at all. Although, on reflection, I remember a conversation with Miss Kirkbride, the Director of Women’s Activities for whom I had worked, in which she noted that if I became a Foreign Service officer that might mean I would not get married. At that time, as far as I was aware, there was no one who was interested in marrying me who I was interested in marrying. So I replied that I would prefer a first-rate career to a second-rate marriage.

Q: Well then you graduated and got your bachelor degree in what year?

HARVEY: 1956.

Q: So then you decided to go on and get another?

HARVEY: No, it was much more complicated.

Q: Okay.

HARVEY: Sometime in 1955, and I don’t remember if it was June or earlier, I took the Foreign Service exam thinking it would be good practice, but I passed it. Since I only had one semester’s worth of classes to finish, and I couldn’t get scholarships for just one semester, I had already decided I would finish up at night. By that time I was interested in the work of the United States Information Agency (USIA), so I’d applied to them as a clerk typist because I could type. In high school I decided to take personal use typing instead of driver’s education because I realized I could always get a job if I could type, which turned out to be a very smart thing to have done.

Q: Oh yes.

HARVEY: I spent a second summer as a counselor at Camp Lochearn in Vermont in 1955. I had to wait for my clearances to start work for USIA. While waiting, as I was already back taking classes, I worked in the Registrar’s Office at GW (for 75 cents an hour), and shared a sofa bed with a friend who had been at GW. I postponed going in for the Foreign Service oral interview because my life was so unsettled. My clearance from USIA came through in November 1955, and I went in for the Foreign Service oral about a week before I started at USIA. I think I was very naïve. Among the things I said was I thought USIA work might be more interesting than getting drunk Americans out of jail along the Mexican border. So basically the examiners said, “Go right ahead.”

At that time USIA did not use the Foreign Service exam, but they required a master’s degree or equivalent experience to go into the officer program. As it happened, my clerical job at USIA was in the recruitment division. In the course of my first year there I used to relieve the woman who was in the reception office at lunch time. Well, one day when I was there, two of my sorority sisters came in, one of whom I knew had been the daughter of an ambassador. But I also
knew neither one of them had very good grades, and one of them was a home economics major. So I discouraged them from applying for the officer program. Well, it turned out that the director of personnel, L.K. Little, was a friend of the ambassador, of B.J.’s father. So the query came down, “who had talked to B.J. Johnson”? I said that I did and went up to talk to Mr. Little, and explained why I had given the two young women the advice I did. And he pretty much said OK. So then a year later when I was applying for leave without pay to go to Radcliffe to get a master’s degree, he knew who I was. So I had two consecutive years of leave without pay to get my masters, and then I went into the officer program.

Q: Okay you were at Radcliffe from when to when?

HARVEY: I went there in 1957 and got my masters in 1959.

Q: What was Radcliffe? This is when Radcliffe was technically separated but not really from Harvard.

HARVEY: The classes were Harvard classes and the professors were Harvard professors. I suppose the one difference was Cora Dubois, who was a female anthropology professor on Southeast Asia, and I took a course with her. But my degree is signed both by the president of Radcliffe and the president of Harvard. Some people who went to Radcliffe at that time talk about their degree being from Harvard but I think no, my degree is from Radcliffe.

Q: How did you find it? Was this a different experience than George Washington?

HARVEY: Oh very. I got a good education at George Washington, but partly because I had already done all the international affairs courses and partly because people at Radcliffe and Harvard didn’t care what you took if you were only a masters student--- they only really cared about the doctoral students---so I was able to take whatever I wanted. I’d never had political theory, so I took political theory with Carl Friedrich, who was wonderful. I took a number of courses with Rupert Emerson, who at that time was still doing Southeast Asia. I took a course on communism with Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was still teaching at Harvard at that time. I took Russian, or Soviet, politics with Merle Fainsod; I took sociology with Barrington Moore; I took American history with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. I took wonderful courses, and I also audited a number of things. John Kenneth Galbraith allowed auditors, but you had to do as much work as the people taking the course if it was a graduate seminar, but you could sit in on his undergraduate lecture courses; so I sat in on that. (I still remember his saying that the purpose of economists should be to comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable.) I sat in on a course with Paul Tillich on Christian ethics. So it was intellectually very stimulating.

I compare it though in terms of the atmosphere with Cornell, where I later went for a doctorate. Harvard was very competitive, and you didn’t feel that it was a community of scholars in the same way you felt at Cornell. For example, early on there was an Asian flu attack on campus. I never get flu so I was going to classes right along. In the Southeast Asian anthropology class I happened to sit next to a young man in the first few weeks. He was out sick, and when he came back I offered to lend him my notes. The look of amazement on his face told me that that didn’t happen very often at Harvard.
Q: Well how did you find the social environment? In the first place with George Washington and then move over to Radcliffe.

HARVEY: To Radcliffe? Carl Friedrich had people around for sherry periodically, and so you made some friends. I actually lived in a small house, called Founders’ House. We were told it had been found to be structurally unsound to be a museum so they were letting graduate women live in it. My closest friends were basically the women who lived there. I stayed in touch with one of them in particular, Barbara Fingerman Melamed, until she died a few years ago. I dated a few people but not that much. We were all focused on studying pretty much.

Q: How about Boston or Cambridge?

HARVEY: I think both years we had season tickets to the symphony rehearsal series; those were very inexpensive and you could get there by subway. We went to a number of museums and such, and you could get everywhere by the subway.

Q: Did you get any feel for Boston politics?

HARVEY: No, other than I still remember in one of the Southeast Asian politics courses, I don’t remember whether it was Rupert Emerson or his teaching assistant, who said, “If you want to know how politics in the Third World works, look at Boston.”

Q: I was wondering whether Sukarno was seen as a bright and shining light or what?

HARVEY: I don’t remember them talking about Sukarno. I do remember Rupert Emerson talking about Lee Kwan Yew, as the dangerous radical to whom the British didn’t want to turn over rule, which was quite accurate.

Q: Yes.

HARVEY: By the time I served in Singapore he was far from the dangerous radical.

Q: So you graduated in...

HARVEY: 1959.

Q: ’59 then what?

HARVEY: Then I went into the junior officer program that fall for USIA and was sent to Seoul. At that time USIA had one year of training, first some weeks in Washington and then at an overseas post. After one year in Seoul I was assigned to Surabaya, Indonesia.

Q: Okay, let’s talk about Seoul. What were you doing there?
HARVEY: The training program included working in a different section of USIS (U.S. Information Service, the overseas presence of USIA) for a month at a time. So I started out in the press section, and then the exhibits section, cultural affairs, and the cultural center. Interestingly a month with the personnel section was included, which turned out to be very useful because toward the end of my career I was deputy assistant secretary for personnel at State Department, and I knew how to write job descriptions, run wage surveys, and things like that.

_Q: Were you getting any useful or non-useful advice about careers in USIA at the time_

HARVEY: I don’t remember anything particularly on that. There were very few women officers at the embassy. I think at that time I was probably the only one, even though I was a very junior officer, either in USIA or the State Department. But we had an excellent local staff; in fact I am still in touch with one or two of them. A couple of the paintings here in my apartment were done by an artist who had been in the exhibits section, Bae Yoong. (Mr. Bae had been in an English class I organized for interested local staff members.)

_Q: Who was the ambassador?_

HARVEY: In 1959-60 it was Walter McConaughy and Marshall Green was his deputy (DCM, deputy chief of mission). The student revolution took place in the spring of 1960, so it was a fascinating year.

_Q: I have a long interview with Marshall Green and he talks about when he was charge and was announcing that we did not recognize military coups and our military was very unhappy with this because they had a rather ineffectual president so they wanted to see a change. But yet we had a policy but…_

HARVEY: I think that was the following year when Park Chung Hee came in to power in a coup. When I was there it was Syngman Rhee who was President. Marshall Green (I’m sure it was he) drafted the Embassy statement that said in essence that we understand the justifiable grievances of the Korean people, which was obviously a signal that we supported the demonstrators. But the U.S. military was always unhappy with the demonstrations.

_Q: What was the feeling in Seoul when you were there? Was it that there could be an attack at any time?_

HARVEY: Yes. There were several things. The North was stronger economically at that time than the South because all the industrial development under the Japanese had been in the north, and the south was purely agricultural. So people in the South were very nervous. Seoul is about three minutes by jet from the border. There was a feeling that the North could decide to march south again.

_Q: What was USIA doing?_
HARVEY: USIS was doing a lot of English teaching, book programs, book translation programs, cultural exchanges. There was a cultural center in Seoul and branch posts in Taegu, Pusan and Kwangju who were having cultural programs. USIS was quite active.

Q: Who was the head of USIA?

HARVEY: The first time I was in Seoul I think it was G. Huntington Damon.

Q: What was your impression of the Korean people and all?

HARVEY: When I was assigned to Korea I was really thrown for a loop. I had expected to go to Southeast Asia because that’s what I had concentrated on. The only thing I knew about Korea was that it was dirty, cold, and full of Americans-- and that’s not why I joined the Foreign Service. But, somebody introduced me to a man who had been cultural officer there, Marc Scherbacher, and after talking to him, because he had an appreciation for Korean history and had many Korean friends, I was prepared to enjoy Korea, and I did like it. The experience meant that whatever assignment I had subsequently, I felt I shouldn’t prejudge it.

Q: Yes.

HARVEY: You will find in every post there are things you find are wonderful and things you find you have to put up with.

Q: what sort of things did you have to put up with?

HARVEY: Kimchi.

Q: Oh Yes. I like kimchi.

HARVEY: One of the things people have often asked me about working as a women in Korea, which is, at least in outer appearances, very male dominated, was if that was a problem. I always felt it you were professional and did your job well there was no problem; people respected you and dealt with you as a fellow professional. So that was not a problem for me. I don’t know--I’ve always been able to get along with people who were honest and who were good people. I have problems with those people I think are devious, untrustworthy, or pompous, but otherwise I have no problems.

Q: Well my impression of the Koreans was they are pretty straight-forward but they try to dominate you.

HARVEY: They might try but if you don’t let them they can’t succeed. The other thing I found, and I think again being a woman you learn, is the very important role Korean women have. I mean, as in Japan, the men turn over their salaries to their wives, who dole them out an allowance. I had a wonderful Korean female secretary, Kim Boo-ja, (actually it was my second time there because that is when the Vietnam War was on) whose husband had been in the Korean military and was working for a contractor in Vietnam. While he was in Vietnam Mrs. Kim and
her mother-in-law decided to move to a different area so the children would be in a better school district. They didn’t have to consult her husband. That was her purview—to decide the children’s education, and where the family should live. (Of course the mothers-in-law are very important.)

Q: These societies are so easy to look at them from another perspective and judge them completely wrongly as in who’s doing what. I mean this is true in the Arab world the women, particularly the mother, of the sons really dominate. They are very important figures.

What was your impression of our embassy?

HARVEY: I thought it was good. One of the language officers, Vance Hall, was excellent. And Marshall Green was outstanding. His secretary Emma Johnson was very able. I thought we had good people in USIS. Irving Sablosky was press officer. Art McTaggart was Branch PAO (Public Affairs Officer) in Taegu (where he taught at a university after retiring years later). He knew and loved Korea and Korean culture. Gregory Henderson was the cultural officer; he was a State Department person assigned as cultural officer.

Q: Did you run across sort of any examples of the Korean-Japanese relationship?

HARVEY: Yes, and very interesting because it’s ambiguous. One of the students in the English class I taught at the Cultural Center was a Korean army officer; his mother was Japanese. You don’t often find in a colonial situation the women of the colonial power marrying the colonized people. On the other hand later on I was visiting British friends at the British Council in Kyoto, and Peter told me they were doing some renovations and he was discussing with his senior Japanese staff person about hiring someone to clean the toilets. The Japanese staffer said to him, “For what you are willing to pay we can only get a Korean.” Peter said, “So?” The Japanese staff person said, “Do you think we would use a toilet that had been cleaned by Koreans?”

Q: Oh God.

HARVEY: Yes. So that’s why I say I find this doesn’t compute.

Q: Yes. Well you had a year there.

HARVEY: I had a year there and then went on direct transfer to Surabaya, Indonesia, as the public affairs assistant. Fred Coffey was the public affairs officer there. He had been in Medan briefly and then been transferred to Surabaya. At the end of my first year in Surabaya I went on home leave, and then returned for another two years, 1962-64.

Q: Can you tell me a little about Surabaya? Where did it fit in to the Indonesian complex?

HARVEY: It’s a big industrial city and very different from Jakarta in that it has the sort of no-nonsense business-type atmosphere. Also people in East Java are not so refined and polite as people in central Java. So they are much more direct, which coming from Korea was helpful since, as you said, Koreans tend to be very direct.
Q: What were we doing in Surabaya?

HARVEY: The consulate was responsible basically for contacts throughout eastern Indonesia, although at that time the rebellions in the outer islands were just winding down so travel was restricted in many areas. The infrastructure was so pathetic that there were a lot of places you might be able to get to, but you couldn’t be sure you could get back, which was inhibiting. We had a very active mobile unit program, which had both libraries of books and magazines to lend, and film showings. We did that throughout East and Central Java even though this was the time when the Communist Party was getting increasingly strong. Eventually we had to stop that because it was too dangerous for the drivers and the people showing the films. We also had our own library in Surabaya, but the big outreach was with these mobile units.

There were two USAID (Agency for International Development) officers affiliated with the Consulate, Ray Wendell was an agricultural extension agent, and Reuben Baybarz was with the malaria eradication program. (I think I’ve remembered the names correctly.) USAID also had university-to-university programs at that time in which American professors taught at Indonesian universities while Indonesian faculty members were trained in the U.S. Surabaya’s Airlangga University medical faculty was in a relationship with the University of California, so there were a number of American medical people in Surabaya at that time. The consulate’s local doctor, Moeljono, a pathologist, had been trained under this program.

Q: What was the situation in Java but also all of Indonesia when you were there this time?

HARVEY: Sukarno didn’t care at all about economics and he didn’t care that people were really poverty stricken. In one of his speeches he had said, “My people will eat stones if I ask them to.” Surabaya people have a good sense of humor and their reply to that was, “But stones are so expensive these days.” Nearby there was an area with a volcano, Bromo, with an ethnic group that is still primarily Hindu, and they traditionally threw animal sacrifices into the volcano. At that time people said that chickens were too valuable and (this, I think, was apocryphal) so they would throw newborn children into the volcano instead of chickens. It may not have been true, but that people would say it is a sign of how desperately poor things were.

Q: What was the feeling that you were getting from the embassy from your fellow officers towards Sukarno and his government?

HARVEY: Well, Howard Jones, who was the ambassador at the time, felt that he had to maintain good relations with Sukarno. My impression is that many of the other officers felt he went too far in accommodating Sukarno.

Q: I’ve heard that in much of my interviews.

HARVEY: One of my favorite Indonesian phrases is one Sukarno used in a speech after he told the U.S. to go to hell with its aid. His speech in Indonesian was saying, “Why are they still offering aid when we have “sudah di-go-to-hall-kan” (already told them to go to hell with their aid). Sukarno just made “go-to-hell” an Indonesian verb.
Q: One only has to go to our oral history collection to read the comments of other people who served there who really became to detest our ambassador because they felt he was too understanding of Sukarno.

HARVEY: It’s important to be able to maintain relations, but you have to be careful that you don’t give up too much in order to do that. Now being in Surabaya we had a bit of distance and I’m sure people in Jakarta could see it much more closely. We had good relations in Surabaya with the local community. The mayor of Surabaya had been supported by the Communist Party (PKI—Partai Komunis Indonesia), and his wife was believed to be a member of the PKI, but among their best friends was an agency couple at the consulate. I remember going to a party at the mayor’s residence one time. I had to use the bathroom, and in the back hall there was a color photo of Doris Day—and this is the Communist-supported mayor of Surabaya.

Q: Doris Day being a very attractive movie star of the ’50s and ’60s.

HARVEY: Yes, but again things are often not as straight-forward as people would like. Certainly my own feeling was that Sukarno did not care about the well-being of his people. The one thing I will give him credit for is keeping Indonesia together as a united country. He did instill a sense of nationhood. That has continued to this day, with obvious problems in Aceh, which seem to have been pretty much resolved, and continuing to some extent in what they are now calling Papua.

Q: It really is remarkable that Indonesia is still essentially united.

HARVEY: They are very much helped by the fact they have a single national language that people throughout the country can use, and it’s not identified with any one ethnic group.

Q: What is it? Is it essentially a trading language?

HARVEY: Yes, it started out as what they call “pasar Melayu” (market Malay). Some people say it’s based on one of the languages of West Sumatra, some say on classical Malay. But you can get survival skills in a few weeks. There are no tenses; there is one word that means “already” and one word that means “not yet.” There are no plurals; if you are not using a number you can say the word twice. So one book is a “buku” and more than one are “buku-buku.” There are no honorifics, which was my big problem with Korean, sorting out the honorifics.

Q: Where did Surabaya fit in the Indonesian context? Was it a leading Communist or was it...?

HARVEY: Yes, very strong communist influence in East Java, partly because it’s one of the poorest provinces, or had been. East and Central Java were strongholds for the Communist Party.

I should mention that when I was in Surabaya the first time my mother came to join me in 1963. I had convinced her it was time to retire; she had been doing private duty nursing, particularly after my father’s death. 1963 was the year when demonstrators attacked the British Embassy in Jakarta, so I was a little worried that she might decide not to come.
Q: That’s when a bagpiper played.

HARVEY: A bagpiper aroused the crowd.

Q: That was a big moment.

HARVEY: Communication was difficult, phoning was not possible, so I sent her a cable saying it’s okay, come ahead.

Q: There was a movie called The Year of Living Dangerously and that was in the ’60s.

HARVEY: It had the spirit and had very much the correct atmosphere. So, in any case, my mother did come out. I flew up to Jakarta to meet her, and in those days you could meet people as they came off the plane. So as she got off the plane, I said, “I’m so glad you decided to come in spite of the burning of the British Embassy.” She looked at me and said, “They’re having riots in Birmingham and Philadelphia; I don’t see that this is any different.” So she was a big hit with my Indonesian friends. She had a wonderful time; she was very outgoing and made lots of friends.

Q: USIA and others but other people who are serving in that area was there concern about could the central government provide enough employment in other words to allow people to earn a decent living?

HARVEY: The central government didn’t have that ability. It was basically subsistence agriculture, and there were many beggars on the streets.

Q: Was there much tourism at the time?

HARVEY: No, not at all.

Q: I wouldn’t image there was.

HARVEY: A little bit in Bali, but the infrastructure was very lacking. Actually this story comes from after my mother came to join me in 1963. We had signed up for one of the Pan Am circle tours of Asia, and we were to leave Jakarta on a Sunday. There were to be three flights on Saturday from Surabaya to Jakarta. So I thought if we get reservations on the first flight that should be okay. So we went out and got on the plane, went out to the end of the runway; there was a problem and the plane came back. At that point the second flight took off. So then we got back on the plane and went out again, another problem, and came back again. So I went running up to the station manager and said, “You have to get us on this plane—we are leaving from Jakarta tomorrow.” He said to me, “I keep telling you people at the consulate to allow yourselves three days to get to Jakarta.” But he got us on the flight. I later found out it was an ethnic Chinese friend of mine who had been bumped so we could get on.

Another example: I had friends who were anthropologists, and one of them was in Kupang in Indonesian Timor, and invited a couple of us to go. Well, you could get there but you couldn’t be
sure you could get back. Because they had to have more aviation fuel when they left from Kupang, they could take fewer passengers coming back. So you have this mental picture of the number of people building up in Kupang waiting to get back to Java. So I didn’t go at all at that time.

Q: With that situation what about the Chinese did you feel that there was time of waiting for riots to happen against the Chinese?

HARVEY: No, not particularly. The ethnic Chinese are always unpopular because they are wealthy and have advantages that ordinary people don’t, and they are often arrogant. So if there are riots the ethnic Chinese are likely to be victims. But the mass killings of 1965-66 were not directed at the ethnic Chinese, they were directed at Communists.

At least in East Java, many ethnic Chinese have been in Indonesia for generations. During the colonial period, however, assimilation was to the Dutch, not the “natives.” As Ben Anderson once said, if you are going to assimilate to another culture, you choose “up” not “down.” So many more ethnic Chinese were Christian or Catholic, than Muslim, and many spoke Dutch. Not many, as far as I remember, spoke any Chinese dialect.

Tension between the PKI and Muslims was increasing at this time, particularly as the PKI began a campaign to institute land reform. There are not many large landowners in Java, but Islamic boarding schools often control sizeable land, which they have been given by devout followers.

Q: How did you find relations between the consulate and the embassy?

HARVEY: Being with USIS I don’t suppose I was as involved and, of course, communication was especially difficult. There was no such thing as being able to telephone Jakarta.

Q: Yes. How about did you feel the close ties of Sukarno to the Soviet Union?

HARVEY: We worked very closely with the man who was head of the education and cultural directorate for East Java, and his minister was somebody who was at least suspected of communist sympathies. But Mr. Noerbambang worked very closely with us and supported us in having our mobile film and library units out in the countryside. (Later on after I had left USIA and was teaching in Australia, he was the cultural attaché at the Indonesian embassy in Canberra, so we reconnected then.) There was a Soviet consulate general in Surabaya; relations were not close but not hostile.

The Indonesian navy was receiving ships—and submarines—from the Soviet Union at that time. One of my navy friends, a submariner, said that the Soviet subs were designed for artic waters, not the tropics, so were quite uncomfortable. Once during the confrontation against Malaysia, I asked him why he wasn’t out chasing the British. He replied that they didn’t have enough fuel to get to Jakarta, much less to chase the British.

The interpreter for the Soviet military working in Surabaya (which was the Indonesian navy fleet headquarters) was Ms. Larisa Efimova. We became friendly, and I got permission to invite her to
afternoon tea. (Years later I found an article she had written in Indonesia, the journal published by the Cornell Southeast Asia Program.)

Surabaya was headquarters for the Indonesian navy fleet and the air arm. The commander and several officers of the air arm were graduates of the Dutch Naval Academy, Den Helder, and had had their flight training in Britain. So they were included in receptions at the British Consulate, where I met several of them. A friend of mine at the British Consulate, Barbara Crewe, dated one of the pilots (as did I after Barbara was transferred to Rangoon). Several of the pilots, and in the case of the commander, Met Hamami, he and his family became life-long friends.

Q: How about Chinese?

HARVEY: There was no official Chinese representation. It was a time when there was a question of Taiwan or Mainland China, and the Indonesians avoided that, as I recall, by having relations with neither.

Q: Australians were they...

HARVEY: Not in Surabaya. There was a Japanese Consulate General.

Q: How were the Japanese relations with the Indonesians? They hadn’t been the greatest occupiers.

HARVEY: Officially there was still a lot of resentment from the time of the Second World War and the Occupation, but the consul general and his wife who were there at that time, Mr. and Mrs. Ishide, were a lovely couple, and they seemed to have no problems with the local people. Mr. Ishide, I think, had been in Chicago; they’d certainly been somewhere in the U.S. at the time war broke out. One time Mrs. Ishide told me that the FBI people who came to keep track of them escorted the women from the consulate out to do their Christmas shopping; she was very touched by the fact that they had been treated so humanely.

Q: Surabaya, what area did it have just Eastern Java?

HARVEY: No, we had East and Central Java, Bali and technically all of eastern Indonesia, except you couldn’t get there. But we did send books and packets of information materials out to Ambon or Kupang, and places like that. We actually had a branch library in Makassar, South Sulawesi. The Darul Islam Rebellion was still going on, but at that point it was no longer on the outskirts of the city. It had moved back up to the hills in the interior. Briefly there was a cease fire (1961-62), and the commander of South Sulawesi at that time, Lieutenant Colonel Andi Mohamed Jusuf, asked us to send a mobile unit over there to go up into some of the areas which had been under Kahar Muzakkar and the Darul Islam rebels. We did send a mobile unit; later, when I was back in Surabaya in the mid-1980s, the man who had driven the unit told me that it had been a frightening experience to be in what had recently been rebel-controlled territory. But the ceasefire didn’t last very long, and basically that was a one-time opportunity to get out into the countryside in South Sulawesi at that time.
Q: What sort of things were our mobile units presenting? There were films but what were...?

HARVEY: The films were not the greatest I would have to say. They were USIA productions, and some of them were pretty good. At one time USIA did some film production of its own. There was one film that had been made in Indonesia, by a USIS officer, Humphrey Leynse, called A House, A Wife, and A Singing Bird, which was supporting the malaria eradication program. It was beautifully done. We didn’t have enough good films, but people who had no films at all would watch anything.

Q: Did you run across academics from Cornell while you were there?

HARVEY: No, not the Cornell Indonesianists at that time. Actually, I think Ben Anderson was doing his research in Java at that time, but I never ran into him. Clinton Rossiter did come to Surabaya on a USIS-sponsored lecture program, but his field was American government.

Q: Did you ever meet Ambassador Jones at the time?

HARVEY: Yes, he came down to Surabaya, actually once with his granddaughter. (I have photos of her at the zoo: Surabaya had a very good zoo, which had a cooperative arrangement with the San Diego zoo.) Then Ambassador Jones came one other time when there was a ceremony at the Naval Academy. That was the only time I met Sukarno. Fred Coffey, the branch PAO, must have been on leave because I was representing USIS. Our Consul, Bob Black, was sitting up front next to Ambassador Jones. When Sukarno began to speak, Ambassador Jones said to Bob Black, ”Could one of you interpret for me?” Bob Black, whose Indonesian was worse than mine, said, “Barbara will be glad to.” I had been there less than a year, but I said, “Okay,” because I knew my Indonesian was better than Bob Black’s. So I hopped up to the front row, next to Ambassador Jones. Of course, Sukarno’s speeches were so predictable. If he used the word for chicken (ayam), you knew he was going to say, “Before the cock crows on the first of January 1962 West Irian must return to the arms of the Republic.” So that one word would give you this whole sentence. Anyway, we got through that, and then at the end of his speech Sukarno came to greet all the ambassadors, who were lined up. And, of course, here I am in the front row next to Howard Jones. Sukarno came and greeted Ambassador Jones, looked me up and down and said to Ambassador Jones, “Where is Mary Lou?” The ambassador, said, “Oh, she (his wife) is in Jakarta.” Sukarno gave a knowing smile, looked me up and down again and moved on. Somebody said that thinking that Ambassador Jones had stashed girls around the country, as Sukarno did, probably raised Howard Jones in Sukarno’s estimation.

Q: So you were in Surabaya until 1965?


Q: When was Sukarno overthrown?

HARVEY: The following year, 1965. By that time I was in Seoul.
Q: Were we looking upon Sukarno as a real menace I mean were we seeing Sukarno trying to turn Indonesia, which was the fourth largest country, into a Communist state?

HARVEY: That was clear from 1957 when there were interviews with John Foster Dulles at the time of the regional rebellions. Dulles actually said, “It would be preferable for Indonesia to break up than for it to go Communist.” That’s one of the reasons there was initial U.S. support for the rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi. So, yes, there was a long-standing concern about the possibility of Indonesia going Communist. The Communist Party in Indonesia was the largest outside the Communist Bloc, three million people, plus millions more in affiliated organizations—women, youth, labor unions, etc.

Q: Did we have any contact with the Communists?

HARVEY: Well, in Surabaya we did have official and social contact with the mayor and his wife. The mayor’s wife was a member of the Woman’s International Club, and came to all the meetings. But I’m sure that the agency had contacts with the PKI; one of the things one heard was they lost a lot of their best local contacts during the killings. I don’t know the truth of that but that’s just something one heard.

Q: So we will pick this up when you are off to Seoul.

HARVEY: In 1965. I had six months of Korean and then went to Seoul.

Q: Today is October 10, 2014 with Barbara Harvey and remember we are off to Korea. What are the dates you were in Korea?

HARVEY: The second time in Korea was 1965 to 1968.

Q: What was your job?

HARVEY: I was the cultural exchange officer. I was given six months Korean language training at FSI (the Foreign Service Institute). I was the only student, so it was a one-on-one situation with the instructor, Mr. Park Pong-nam. I learned enough, together with an hour a day at the embassy after I arrived in Seoul, to be polite and to understand almost everything that was said to me. But Korean has honorifics in a very complicated fashion. The root of the word, the ending of the word (mostly verbs), and then you could have a syllable in the middle of the word that indicated the difference in your status in age or position or the status of the person to whom you are speaking or the person about whom you are speaking.

Q: You couldn’t cut out the honorific business and speak at them rather straightforward?

HARVEY: No, that would be very impolite. Now, they would make some concessions, and Koreans were delighted that anyone was trying to speak their language, but they couldn’t help their reaction particularly if you misused the honorifics. My mother was with me my first two years in Korea, and I can still remember at one time referring to her without an honorific and the
person visibly shuddered. You do not refer to your mother without calling her the equivalent of the honorable.

As in Surabaya in 1963, my mother made a lot of friends during her two years in Seoul. I’ve sometimes said that it was like having a wife, because Mother could make calls, go to afternoon teas, teach English, and so forth. She also volunteered at a hospital connected to an orphanage, and received a certificate of appreciation from the mayor of Seoul when she left, which I thought was very nice. After two years she returned to the U.S. to help my sister, who was having her second child.

Q: What was the situation internally in Korea at the time and then how were relations with Korea when you arrived?

HARVEY: I had left there in November or December 1960, and in the intervening five years the Republic of Korea had begun its economic takeoff. So they had become convinced that they actually had a strong future. In 1960 the South was still behind the North because they had been agricultural during the Japanese occupation. By 1965 South Korea had begun to develop, with a cement plant and so forth. So they were beginning tremendous economic growth, which of course, has continued since that time.

Relations with the U.S. were good. The Republic of Korea was still dependent on the U.S., particularly militarily; there was still quite a large number of American troops, probably around forty thousand, stationed in Korea. The younger generation was very much focused on unification. I think that has been a persistent theme, blaming, as is quite accurate, the great powers for the division of Korea at the end of the Second World War, because the dividing line was for the surrender of Japanese troops. But, of course, the division has persisted there longer than it has anywhere else.

Q: Let’s see, who was the ambassador? I can’t remember was Winthrop Brown or was that...

HARVEY: Initially it was Winthrop Brown, and then he was succeeded by William Porter. The DCM was George Newman, I remember him well because he had chaired the cultural exchange committee, so I worked more closely with him. (Also his wife was a Scot, and she and my mother bonded immediately.)

Q: Let’s talk about your job. When you say cultural exchange what did that mean particularly in the Korean context?

HARVEY: Well, we had both the international visitor program, which were short-term visits to the U.S., and then the Fulbright Program. I was sort of an ex-officio member of the Fulbright Commission selecting students for graduate programs in the U.S. Then we also had cultural presentations from the U.S. coming to Korea.

Q: What was the student situation in Korea at the time? Were they Koreans who had been getting good English training?
HARVEY: English was a problem. There had been enormous emphasis on education, which I think is true for many of the Confucian-associated countries. English facility continued to be a problem, although we had no trouble finding well-qualified students for the Fulbright program. Of course, for grantees on the short-term programs, interpreters would be provided in the U.S.

Q: How about normal students were you involved in the normal student you know somebody decides to send their son to get an education in the States did you get involved in that?

HARVEY: No. That was handled more through the Fulbright Commission who dealt with students.

Q: Were there any institutions in the States or in Korea that were particularly targeted by Korean students or the reverse American students?

HARVEY: There were very few Americans studying in Korea--a few under the Fulbright Program, but the Korean language is very difficult and for any American to know enough Korean in order to study at a Korean University would be very difficult. I do recall three American students, all from Harvard, studying in Korea at that time. One was a linguist, Marshall Pihl. One was an anthropologist, Vincent Brandt, whose wife, a Korean, stayed in Seoul, while he was doing his fieldwork in a village. She and I became friends, and stayed in touch for some years. The third was a Korean-American musician. He composed a very interesting piece combining traditional Korean instruments with Western instruments that was presented while he was in Seoul.

Even today Korean studies in the U.S. is dominated by Korean-Americans. Particularly if you are doing any history you have to know not only Korean but Japanese, and you also have to know Chinese characters to read the old documents. For most people learning either Chinese or Japanese is enough without basically having to know three difficult languages.

Q: Did you get involved in these exchange programs? Did we have goals in mind? In other words were we pushing electronic studies or what have you?

HARVEY: No, there was a very large USAID program and anything technical was handled by the AID program. Our program was much more general and much more long-term: the interest of the United States in having Koreans familiar with the United States and as graduates of American universities. Of course, Syngman Rhee, the first president of the Republic of Korea, had gone to university in the United States so there had been a precedent for that.

Q: When you were there was there almost the scheduled spring riot?

HARVEY: The “Student Revolution” that deposed Syngman Rhee was in 1960, but there were no riots during my second tour in Seoul. By 1965 it was relatively quiet. Park Chung-hee had taken over in May 1961, but things had calmed down very much by 1965.
Q: Speaking of Korean staff when I was there, this is in the late ‘70s, we certainly benefitted by the fact that most of Korean society still if a woman was married she didn’t work, she stayed at home.

HARVEY: It depended. If she were a professional she would work outside the home. The faculty at Ewha University, for example, was almost entirely women.

Q: A professional but I mean very few did particularly office work. They enjoyed working for the embassy because one we didn’t have the horrendously long hours and two the women were accorded fair salaries and were treated well. So we seemed to get a remarkably able workforce. Did you find that?

HARVEY: We had very good people working for the embassy. Kim Hwan-soo was one of the senior cultural people I worked with very closely. There was also a man Kwak So-jin, who mostly handled book translations. I stayed in touch with them, and the woman who had been my secretary, Mrs. Kim Boo-ja, for a number of years. In fact, I’m still in email contact with Kim Hwan-soo and his wife, Lee Sung-soon. But I would disagree with you about Korean women; I think many men have a wrong picture of Korean women’s role in society. Ewha Women’s University was full of very talented Korean women. Many of them were married, but they certainly carried on their professions. And in terms of the family, the women control the money.

Q: There’s no concern about that. I’ve served in Saudi Arabia and the wives of the Saudi businessmen and all really ran the place but in Korea at least we found sort of the normal what do we call it clerk or something, liked to work for the American embassy; this would not be at the top professional level. They found it was a safe environment I think.

HARVEY: Certainly in the 1960s there were not a whole lot of job opportunities for educated Koreans. For instance Kim Hwan-soo, who, as I said, was one of our very senior cultural people, was so able that a number of us felt he should have been in the Korean diplomatic service. But, many of the employees had begun at a time when there weren’t other jobs, and they had a loyalty to the embassy. And the embassy did treat them well.

Q: During the time you were there did you feel there was a danger from the North? Were things happening up North?

HARVEY: I was there during the Pueblo Incident.

Q: How did that play off?

HARVEY: Well actually at the same time there was a team of North Korean commandos who crossed the border and came…

Q: Got up to the Blue House.

HARVEY: …got within a very short distance of the Blue House (the residence of the Korean president), which is not far from Embassy Compound Two, where I was living with my mother,
who was in Seoul with me at that time. We heard the gun shots on Sunday night and knew something was wrong. All but one of the commandos were killed in the encounter with the South Koreans. They had marched much faster than the South Koreans had anticipated so they had penetrated much farther south than expected. There was just one who survived and he was soon taken to Myungdong (an up-scale shopping area), and quickly introduced to the attractions of capitalism.

Q: Were we put on high alert during the Pueblo business?

HARVEY: We were always kind of on alert and we had been advised to always have a small suitcase packed. I had the equivalent of “Ensure” (nutritional drink) in my cupboard and thought I could take some of that with me, and I’d wear my blue jeans. But that was about the extent of my preparation. There were lots of American troops between us and the border, and I don’t think we felt extremely nervous, but certainly there was the possibility of another North Korean intrusion.

Q: Were there any crazies in American–Korean relations during that time? I mean any scandals, problems, etc.?

HARVEY: Well there were always some problems between the troops and the local people, but that’s to be expected.

Q: Did you have much in the way of Congressional visits that came under your operations?

HARVEY: We had Lyndon Johnson visit as President, but I don’t remember Congressional visits. My first tour in Korea, Eisenhower had visited, and that went very smoothly, perhaps partly because Eisenhower was a military man and was used to delegating. I don’t remember that there was much of an advance team, everything was worked out by the embassy. Because of demonstrations in Japan, the visit was moved up a couple of days, but even so, everything went fine. For the Lyndon Johnson visit we had advance and pre-advance teams with conflicting instructions. It was one of the things that led me to decide to resign from USIS; I was never going to put myself through another presidential visit.

Q: What were some of the things that particularly irked you?

HARVEY: Well, the fact that we had to smooth over with people such as at the National Museum, because different people from the advance teams had spoken to different people at the Museum, and different people there thought they were handling things. (This was primarily for Lady Bird Johnson’s visit, in which I was involved, among other things in drafting some of her remarks.) One Korean, I don’t remember if it was a Cabinet minister or somebody further down, actually said to one of the advance people or one of the embassy people, “Whose country is this anyway?” The Americans were just pushing the Koreans around so much it was embarrassing.

Q: Yes, this is one of the real problems. What did you feel is particularly the strength of the Korean education system that produced really this economic miracle?
HARVEY: Speaking with some Korean friends, one of whom, Lee Hahn-been, was either still a graduate student or a recent graduate when he was brought into the government early on, he said they just thought education was good so they emphasized particularly primary education, which was very widespread. And building up from there, so you didn’t just have a very thin well-educated elite layer at the top, but you had the basis for a middle class. This man was a Seoul National University graduate, which as you would remember, is the premiere Korean university. He also said that many of his SNU-educated colleagues were a little skeptical about graduates of some of the not-so-great engineering schools that had sprung up. But, he said that in fact, it was the graduates of those maybe not quite first-rate engineering schools who went to Vietnam, who went to the Near East, who supplied the Korean labor force who earned a lot of the money that helped to fuel their own expansion domestically. So I have often quoted his views on that question.

Q: How about Vietnam, you were there when we were...

HARVEY: Just starting.

Q: ...just starting. How was Vietnam portrayed or what were the feelings about Vietnam?

HARVEY: Well, the Koreans saw a parallel between South Vietnam and themselves; the invasion from the North in their case and the threat from the North in Vietnam. So part of it was that they saw the South Vietnamese as being comparable to themselves. The other aspect was—and some were quite frank in saying this—that just as the Japanese had made a lot of money on the Korean War they saw this as an opportunity to make money on the Vietnam War.

Q: How about relations with Japan. What opinions were you getting from your Korean friends about Japan?

HARVEY: Well, as often is the case with the previous colonial power, I think attitudes are ambivalent. The older Koreans all had to study in Japanese; the Korean language was forbidden. So for many of them it was easier to read Japanese or even listen to Japanese television programs. But there was a great deal of resentment of Japan having controlled Korea, and Japan had not been a particularly kind colonial power. On the other hand, something I’ve never quite been able to explain, Japanese women married Korean men. One of the students I had in the language class at USIS, a Korean army officer, his mother was Japanese. That is very unusual in a colonial situation—that the colonial power’s women would marry men of the colonized power.

Q: Did you run across many people in the higher ranks of education and all who were basically Japanese trained or not?

HARVEY: I think quite a few were, yes.

Q: Were there any particular schools where the Korean students went in the States?

HARVEY: If I remember correctly, Harvard, Columbia, Berkeley, and probably Indiana University, which had a Korean studies program.
Q: Well then did you have much connection say with Ewha University or not?

HARVEY: Actually the woman who was my secretary, a very able woman, Kim Boo-ja, had a cousin who was at Ewha and Mrs. Kim had asked me if I could teach English to her cousin. I said, “Well I couldn’t do it one-on-one but I would talk to the Ewha administration about doing a class for graduate students there.” Ewha agreed; I don’t remember if it was the president of Ewha, Dr. Kim Ok-gill, with whom I spoke or someone else, but they were pleased to have me work with a group of their graduate students. Mrs. Kim Boo-ja’s cousin, Kim Haeng-ja, who became a good friend, and was later a member of parliament, was one of these students. (Haeng-ja stayed with me in D.C. in 1982, when she was on a USIS visitor grant, but died later that year of cancer.) I only had five or six students, but they were very able. One later went on to get a PhD from Harvard or Columbia. But I’ve lost touch with them.

Some said that Ewha was the largest women’s university in the world, with seven or eight thousand students.

Q: How did you find the teaching there?

HARVEY: The students were excellent. I knew the president, Kim Ok-gill, who was a lovely woman. The librarian, Lee Pong-soon was a very close friend, as was Hong Po-kyu (Mrs. Shin Tae-whan), who was a professor of English. They were members of a book discussion group under the auspices of the Korean Association of University Women, which I was invited to join. The teaching staff, I think, was very good; a number of them were American educated. By the time I was in Seoul there had been a chance for a number of Korean women to get graduate degrees from the U.S. Lee Hyo-jae, a professor of sociology at another university, was American-educated, and a good friend.

I think probably one of the problems in Korean education, as in many Asian educational systems, is the emphasis on rote learning, so that you get people who can memorize and repeat what they’ve been taught. But creative thinking is much more difficult, and I think the reason why Asians continue to want to send people to the U.S., particularly for graduate study, is to broaden out their thinking.

Q: You were unhappy with the Johnson visit and all that but these don’t happen all that often. Were there other things that you found the Foreign Service life was not for you or not?

HARVEY: Well, by that time I was in my mid-thirties, and I thought I wasn’t sure I wanted to spend the rest of my life doing what I’d been doing, being a Foreign Service Officer. I had always done very well academically, and had earlier been encouraged to do more graduate work. So I thought, well, if I went back and got a doctorate it would give me more options. So it was partly just making sure I had more options.

Ken Bunce, a wonderful officer, was the PAO, and he and the Deputy PAO, Harry Hudson, both knew that I was planning to resign. When the promotion list came out and I was on it, Harry came in to ask if I would reconsider. He and Dr. Bunce, who himself was academically inclined,
accepted my decision to leave for academia. I stayed in touch with Ken and Alice Bunce for a number of years.

Q: As you cast around, what were some of your options at least you felt you could study and what did you decide?

HARVEY: Well, partly because by that time I had spent four years in Indonesia, and knew the Indonesian language quite well, and the Korean language was so difficult, I didn’t consider a program on Korea as an option. So, I wanted to go where the best program on Indonesia was, which was Cornell. I also applied to Yale, but Cornell was my first choice, and that’s where I went.

Q: When did you go to Cornell?

HARVEY: I went there in 1968.

Q: And how long were you there?


Q: Well let’s talk about Cornell. It was strictly a Ph.D. program?

HARVEY: Yes.

Q: Did you find you were concentrating on any particular aspect of Indonesia?

HARVEY: At Cornell for the doctoral level you don’t major in area studies, so my major was government; for the three required concentrations I took comparative government, Southeast Asia, and international relations. George Kahin was chairman of my PhD committee, as a comparative government specialist; Benedict Anderson was the Southeast Asia person; and David Mozingo, who specialized in Indonesia-China relations, was the international relations person on my committee. On Indonesia I did a reading course with Ben Anderson, which seven or eight of us took; that basically involved reading all the classic books on Indonesia, and then discussing them. With George Kahin I did U.S. relations in Asia (I was later his teaching assistant on that same course). I did a language course, language and literature, with John Echols, who in an earlier incarnation had helped to establish the FSI approach to language learning. I took a variety of things. Oliver Wolters was teaching early Southeast Asian history, I just audited that course. He was a wonderful professor, although his specialty was basically before the 15th century.

Q: Did you get into Dutch aspects of the...

HARVEY: Mark Dion, a Foreign Service officer on an area studies year at Cornell (although he stayed for a second year to complete the course work for a PhD), and I took Dutch one summer. We had a wonderful Dutch instructor; she was the wife of a graduate student. Since we were used to the Foreign Service Institute approach, we began with the oral approach, and since you
don’t have a problem with script it was relatively easy to learn to read. And with my Scottish parents I could do the “ach” sound pretty well.

Q: Did you sense the term I think of is animosity between your department at Cornell and the State Department?

HARVEY: Later it was quite clear, but when I was there the big thing was that Cornell was one of the centers of anti-Vietnam War activity. And George Kahin was one of the academic leaders in that. I had not met him before I went to Cornell, but I had gone to a teach-in in Washington while I was studying Korean. George Kahin was on the panel, and he was one of the only people, pro or con, who, it seemed to me, relied on data, and I was very impressed with that. His approach was to say that this happened, then this happened, and so forth, whereas on both sides, both the left and the right, the others tended to be presenting ideological arguments. I preferred the more factually based approach.

In terms of the Cornell “Leftist” bias on Indonesia, it’s a bias I don’t share. I think the view of the bias is based on what has become known as the “Cornell Paper,” a preliminary analysis of the 1965 coup. Although the people writing the analysis knew a lot about Indonesia, and the PKI, I think there was a very basic fundamental misunderstanding, namely the assumption that since the Communist Party could come to power by parliamentary means, there was no need for them to stage a coup. Well, the army would never have let the Communist Party come to power, so that assumption was incorrect, and meant that everything based on that assumption didn’t follow. So I think there were very basic flaws in the argument.

Q: What were the events of ’65-’66?

HARVEY: Well, overnight September 30th to October 1st, 1965, six generals were killed, and the Communist Party was at least involved if not leading the action. There were certainly divisions within the army; there were pro-Communist officers within the army. General Nasution, who was chief of staff of the armed forces, was on the list to be killed, but one of his adjutants, Lieutenant Pierre Tendean, put on Nasution’s jacket and was killed in his place. Nasution’s young daughter was killed. Nasution escaped, but was injured, and did not play a major role in countering the coup attempt. Soeharto was head of KOSTRAD (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat), the army Strategic Reserve Command, and he rallied troops that were in Jakarta at the time (in preparation for Armed Forces Day on October 5th), and he basically put down the coup in Jakarta. For the army this was an opportunity to get rid of the Communists, who they thought were a threat not only to the country, but to the army particularly. So the reaction spread across Java and Bali.

Q: Did you see as things developed in Indonesia afterwards was there really a pretty much a cleansing of the Communists and Chinese influence?

HARVEY: Well you have to separate it. The New York Times often makes the mistake of saying it was Chinese who were killed; it was largely Javanese and Balinese who were killed; a few Chinese got caught up. But the Indonesian Communist Party had learned from the experience of the Malayan Communist Party, which had been dominated by ethnic Chinese,
which made it easy for the British to turn the Malay population against the communists there. The PKI had very few ethnic Chinese members, and certainly not in the leadership. The members were Javanese primarily. Another aspect was that under Sukarno there had been a regulation (in 1959) that ethnic Chinese were not allowed to be in the countryside; they had to live or have businesses no lower than the district level. The areas where much of the killings took place were in the countryside, and there were not a lot of ethnic Chinese living there.

Now in Bali it’s more complicated because, of course, there are very few Muslims living in Bali; the Balinese are virtually all Hindu. A lot of the killing in Bali, apparently based on some research that’s been done, dated back to who had been with the Dutch and who against them when they came in in 1910, and during the Dutch attempt to resume control at the end of the Second World War, during the national revolution. So very old antagonisms rose to the surface again. There were also class and caste antagonisms, as well as political party differences. I’ve also heard some people say that the army actually went to Bali to stop some of the killings because it was really very, very violent. Although, as in Java, Army attacks on the PKI were seen as a green light for others to attack communists.

Q: Did island ethnic nationalism play a role in some of the killings there?

HARVEY: No, it was Javanese against Javanese, Balinese against Balinese. It was who were Communists and who weren’t.

Q: Did you feel that contact with Communist China was exaggerated or was there much contact? What was the role of China did you feel?

HARVEY: At the time of the coup?

Q: Back in Indonesia.

HARVEY: As I recall, there was concern about Chinese influence, but Taiwan was still a factor. At the time of the coup there was an Indonesian delegation in Beijing looking to buy arms. It was, however, led by Andi Muhammad Jusuf, who was a strongly anti-Communist general. He left immediately to come back to Indonesia, but I think some of the members of the delegation who were more leftist stayed. At the time of the 1965-66 events some of the Indonesian Communists who were abroad stayed abroad for their own safety.

Q: Was there much of a flow of students from Indonesia to Cornell?

HARVEY: There had been earlier. But because of the reaction in official Indonesia to the conclusion in the Cornell Paper that the PKI was not involved in the coup, very few students came for quite a significant time after that.

Q: Did you feel that cut down on the intellectual vigor in the system?

HARVEY: At Cornell?
Q: Yes.

HARVEY: Not really. Some linguistics students still came from Indonesia, but in politics or history you didn’t see many. Cornell, and George Kahin in particular, encouraged an open atmosphere and lots of debate. You didn’t have to accept any particular point of view; you were encouraged to look at the facts for yourself and determine what the facts were.

Q: I had an interview a long time ago with Bob Martens....

HARVEY: Yes, I’m familiar with him.

Q: …and he talks about coming to Indonesia from the Soviet Union and he applied his you might say Kremlinology techniques to Indonesia in looking at newspapers. He has rather extensive files and he did not think well of Cornell.

HARVEY: I may have met Martens very briefly. I was on the desk when a woman named Kathy Kadane published something based on talks with him. Bob Martens felt his claim to fame was he had turned over names of Communist Party members to the Indonesian Army; his sources were Indonesian newspapers. The army knew who all the members of the Communist Party were; there was no need for Martens to provide names—especially from newspaper sources. To me that just showed he had very little understanding of Indonesia. The PKI was legal, an open party. The one thing the army was good at was knowing who the Communists were; they obviously wouldn’t tell Martens they didn’t need the names, but it was ridiculous to think they didn’t already have such information. Indonesia is very different, even under Sukarno, it was certainly very different from the Soviet Union or any Eastern European country. It would be like somebody coming from Saudi Arabia and thinking that because Indonesia is a Muslim country it would be very similar.

Q: Well then did you find yourself, well you had to I guess, what was your dissertation on?

HARVEY: My dissertation was on the Islamic Rebellion in South Sulawesi from 1950-1965.

Q: What was that, what was the Rebellion about?

HARVEY: This may get into more detail than you want.

Q: Probably anybody reading this they like details and this may be something that’s not spelled out very well elsewhere.

HARVEY: The southern part of the island of Sulawesi is very strongly Islamic. The interior was only taken over by the Dutch about 1910, and so after the Japanese occupation, when the Dutch attempted to return, anti-Dutch feeling grew again. Some young men from South Sulawesi went to Java to fight in the Revolution. One of them, a man named Kahar Muzakkar, became involved in fighting in a separate militia, composed of young men from the Outer Islands. (The army of the nascent Republic of Indonesia had very little control over all the independent fighting groups
during the Revolution.) At the same time in West Java, under the first agreement with the Dutch, the Republic withdrew its troops from West Java. However, a man named Kartosuwirjo, who had an Islamic background, opposed that decision. He remained in West Java, and formed the basis of what was called the Darul Islam (Abode of Islam) Rebellion.

After the Revolution Kahar Muzakkar was among those not accepted into the army. He went back to South Sulawesi, where he found a number of guerrillas who had fought in South Sulawesi, but who also were not accepted into the army, which was trying to trim down its ranks. Kahar became their leader there, and after a year or so they linked up with Kartosuwirjo’s Darul Islam, and fought quite successfully for a number of years. The Darul Islam in South Sulawesi was eventually defeated, largely by the local commander, Andi Mohammed Jusuf Amir, incidentally one of the early Indonesian military officers to be trained in the U.S. Jusuf was from South Sulawesi, and was able to command support against the Islamic rebellion. (The troops involved were largely from West Java’s Siliwangi division.) Kahar Muzakkar was killed and the rebellion came to an end in early 1965, not long before the big killings in Java.

I had also done research on the Permesta rebellion in North Sulawesi, which was part of the regional rebellions in 1957-1958, but I had so much material that my dissertation was just on the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi. Then I wrote a separate monograph on the Permesta rebellion in the North, both of which were later translated into Indonesian and published there by Grafiti Press, which was affiliated with Tempo magazine, the leading news weekly.

Q: Did you get any feedback from Indonesia over the years on these studies?

HARVEY: Yes, the one on the rebellion in the North was apparently assigned reading at the Indonesian military academy at one time.

Q: Was there a feeling at Cornell that maybe the country should be broken up into disparate parts?

HARVEY: No, that was John Foster Dulles who believed that.

Q: But wasn’t that I mean in a way it was a vast gubbies of various disparate islands and all that wouldn’t it have made more...I mean did you feel that the idea of keeping it together as a country made sense?

HARVEY: Once you’ve been there, and can travel around, you get a sense of Indonesia as a national entity. Not so much my first time there, in 1960-1964, but when I was back in 1984-1987, I was able to travel widely in Indonesia. Indonesia has very much benefitted from the fact that they have a national language, Indonesian. The nationalist movement basically decided they would have a single language, although it didn’t become widely used until the Japanese occupation. It’s based on a market language that was widely spoken throughout the islands. As a nation made up of islands there is a lot of communication by sea, so that the idea that they were isolated is not at all true, there was a lot of communication among the islands. Then the nationalist movement early on determined they would not have separate cultural organizations--
Javanese students, Minangkabau students, Batak students—they would have Indonesian students. So, from the start there was a determination to see Indonesia as a single unit.

Now one concept that I find very useful, and this comes from Ben Anderson, is of layered identity: that Indonesian is an overarching identity, but under that you may be Minangkabau, Buginese, Javanese; and then within that you may identify with an even smaller unit. I think possibly coming from a Scottish background where you have British, Scottish, and your clan and so forth, that idea made a whole lot of sense to me.

Q: Was there much in the way of connection with the State Department because Indonesia was considered an important country and this is a place you went to learn but were there many State Department people coming there?

HARVEY: For a number of years there had been. Ed Ingraham was one of the early people who was sent to Cornell for area studies. When I was there Mark Dion was there; I think David Kenney came subsequently. One of the last was Gene Christy, who was later ambassador to Brunei. Gene was very able, and, in fact, George Kahin told me that Gene had written the best paper he had seen on the coup. (Gene once promised to give it to me but seems to have forgotten.)

Q: Well you were there for the Soeharto period weren’t you?

HARVEY: Yes.

Q: How was Soeharto viewed at Cornell?

HARVEY: As an authoritarian ruler.

Q: But Park Chung-hee was used as an authoritarian ruler in Korea but is considered really to have been one of the founders of modern Korea. How about Soeharto?

HARVEY: Well, I don’t know that anyone at Cornell would have gone that far. But certainly the economic technocrats laid the basis for a very strong economic foundation; they were mostly Berkeley trained, Ford Foundation grantees. One of them at least, Widjojo Nitisastro, who was sort of the father of the group, had close Cornell connections and was admired at Cornell. I think some State Department people think Cornell had a more closed mind than it did.

Q: Did you relish this being back in the academic world and all? How did all of this suit your way of ______ to it?

HARVEY: I think because of George Kahin’s character and personality, Cornell was very much a community of scholars. There was a sense of sharing among graduate students, which I found certainly lacking at Radcliffe and Harvard, where the competition was stronger than a sense of community, at least among the people I associated with. Whereas at Cornell there was, I would say, a real sense of all working together, and if you found something interesting you would share it with your fellow graduate students. For instance, Gene Bruns, who had recently left the State
Department, was, I think, the first of us to read Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. He recommended it to us and we all read it, and found it extremely useful. There was a regular Thursday lunch, and this still goes on, where graduate students get together and somebody gives a presentation on what their research has been. But there were lots of opportunities for contact among the graduate students.

Q: By the time you graduated from Cornell you had passed your dissertation exam; when was that?

HARVEY: Well, I had done two years of course work at Cornell. Then I did approximately eighteen months of field work: a month in the Dutch archives in The Hague, and then a year and a half in Indonesia doing field research primarily in North and South Sulawesi. My initial research proposal was to study center-region relations by comparing how North and South Sulawesi related to the nation. The North is overwhelmingly Protestant, and the South strongly Islamic. However, I found data on the ethnic composition of government bodies was impossible to obtain, whereas participants in the rebellions—which I had thought would be a footnote or background chapter—were quite prepared to describe their experiences. George and Audrey Kahin happened to be in Bangkok while I was in the early stages of my research, and I flew up to get George’s authorization to change the focus of my research to the two rebellions. (Fred Coffey was PAO in Bangkok at the time, so I stayed with him and Jane.)

While doing my research I stayed with Indonesian families: the Damopolii family in Manado (an older sister, Norma, had married an American, Mat Charles, who was a fellow graduate student at Cornell), and the family of the Mayor of Makassar, M. Daeng Patompo, who wanted me to converse in English with his wife—which we did dutifully. Staying with Indonesian families improved my conversational Indonesian, and also provided opportunity through informal conversation to acquire information about people and events I was researching.

Several people who were writing their own accounts of the recent history of the two provinces also shared their manuscripts with me, and I was able to locate some documentary evidence at the Army History Centers in Bandung and Makassar.

After my field work I was back at Cornell writing up the dissertation for close to two years, also working as a teaching assistant for much of that time. I passed the dissertation exam in December 1973, and made the requested revisions before leaving in early 1974 to take up a position as lecturer in politics at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.

Q: Well you do your dissertation and you got in so you became a doctor but then what?

HARVEY: Actually, I received my degree after I had already started teaching at Monash University; the degree was awarded in June 1974. Herb Feith, chairman of the Politics Department at Monash at the time, was one of the leading scholars on Indonesia, a Cornell graduate but an Australian. He came to the U.S. looking to hire somebody basically to work with him on a course on Indonesian politics, but to teach other things as well. I was the person they chose. So I went out to Monash, and I taught for four academic years at Monash.
My mother came with me; we went out by ship, a freighter of the Farrell line (which I think no longer operates) with only twelve passengers. After the intensity of completing my dissertation I really needed a break—and an opportunity to prepare to teach at Monash—so the three-week voyage was ideal. We sailed from Newark via the Panama Canal and across the Pacific to Melbourne. In the mornings I completed checking the footnotes in the dissertation, and the afternoons I read through the books likely to be used in the courses I would teach. Initially I thought I’d be able to read mysteries in the evenings, but found I needed the time for the academic books. On Sundays I did allow myself to work on a jigsaw puzzle (a recreation I still enjoy).

_Q: Well when you came out of this by the time you were teaching about the politics and all of Indonesia what was your impression of the government and what it was doing?

HARVEY: The Indonesian government?

_Q: Yes.

HARVEY: Doing pretty well economically but lots of questions about their human rights record.

_Q: Where were the problems?

HARVEY: The problems were some lingering from the 1965-66 events: lots of political prisoners, including people being held on the Island of Buru, members of families who had any Communist connection had a difficult time getting a job. Also controls on the press; so in a sense the usual series.

_Q: By the time you got to Australia how did the Australians look upon Indonesia. I would think this is still the time it is probably trying to keep Australia white.

HARVEY: They were just beginning to change under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam.

_Q: You have this teeming group of non-white Australians just to the North. They really must have been very concerned or not?

HARVEY: One of my Australian colleagues, Jamie Mackie, wrote in an article about Australia seeing their relations with Indonesia as a “surrogate” for their relations with other parts of Asia. Although they had begun to open up a bit more, yes, there was a concern about, as you say, this very large country just north of them. But at that time the Indonesian language was taught in Australian secondary schools, so they were trying to be a good neighbor.

_Q: How did you find Australia?

HARVEY: I had wonderful colleagues at Monash. It was the center for Southeast Asian studies at that time. John Legge was the head of the program; in many ways I see him as a comparable figure to George Kahin. An excellent administrator, an excellent scholar and a thoroughly decent human being; he was a wonderful man. Then Jaimie Mackie was the research director of the
center; very good, very able scholar. And then Herb Feith, whom I mentioned earlier, was one of the leading scholars on Indonesia. So there was really a center of very good people working on Indonesia.

My fourth year at Monash I was asked to be the acting research director of the Center while Jamie Mackie was on leave for a semester. The Center’s very able administrative assistant, Pam Sayers, was a great help. We’ve stayed in touch on and off over the years.

Q: How did you feel about the Australian educational system? I mean was it different from the American system?

HARVEY: I don’t know much about the secondary level, but at the university level several things seemed a bit odd. For instance, first year politics students took three politics courses in a semester, but the grade they got in each of the three was averaged to give them one grade for the semester. This meant that a lot of students would game the system by doing well on one course and then if there was one they were having trouble in, they would try to just slide by. The big thing for me, however, was I had an enormous problem with plagiarism, which I hadn’t expected. The most disappointing thing was that by my third or fourth year if I got a really good essay I was suspicious of it, and I didn’t like that feeling.

Q: Was it that plagiarism permeated the system or were you allowed to come down hard on it?

HARVEY: Because I hadn’t expected it to be a problem, I hadn’t made any statement about plagiarism. I taught in three different courses: one was a first-year course on Third World politics, and the second was a second-year course on Indonesian political economy (which I co-taught with Herb Feith), and then I had my own third year-course, “ Tradition and Revolt in Asia,” in which we dealt with China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In that course I was the lecturer; I had a wonderful teaching assistant, Mike Connolly, a Jesuit from Boston, who eventually got a PhD from Monash, based on research on church lands in the Philippines. About half of the essays I got in the first assignment in my third-year course were plagiarized, copied right out of the books on the reading list. When I called in the first student, he said, “Well, when we moved from exams to having to write essays I had a lot of trouble until I developed this technique.” So clearly he had been doing it for a while. The first three or four pages would be copied from one book on the reading list, and the next few pages from another one, and so forth. It wasn’t subtle--it was blatant.

Q: Did you find that your fellow professors saying so shrug it off?

HARVEY: Well, for some reason they apparently hadn’t detected as much of it. But my first year, since I hadn’t warned the students, they were all allowed to redo all their papers. There was only one student who really messed up on the re-do, he just copied an article on the reading list in its entirety, so I just failed him. But after that I made very sure in all the written material handed out at the start of the course, to state what plagiarism was, and warn that you will not get credit for plagiarized work and you will not be allowed to redo it. So then I had somewhat less of a problem.
I remember one case in the first year course, there was an essay in which it wasn’t quite so blatant—it was just sentences here and there, but not in quotes and not attributed. I remember my co-teacher saying, “Oh, but her older brothers are both honors students.” I said, “If she didn’t know enough not to plagiarize she shouldn’t be in an honors program.” By the time of my last year there I think people became more sensitized. One of my colleagues identified somebody as having plagiarized, and I also had found plagiarism in his work. In fact the comment I made earlier about Indonesia being a surrogate, that was a sentence he’d used without quotes. So then I checked everything in his paper. What he had done was to put one sentence in a paragraph in quotes and cite it properly, but in fact the whole paragraph was copied exactly. So he was dismissed from the honors program.

**Q:** Were you considered sort of I was wondering if your fellow faculty members felt you were a bomb thrower or something?

**HARVEY:** No. There had been somewhat of a division within the department, and Herb Feith, with whom I taught, was very much on the Left, and in Australia the political spectrum is quite wide. Politically I was quite liberal, but very tough on marking and on the students. I think my colleagues respected my position dealing with the students, and were somewhat surprised. They thought that if you were a liberal you went easy on your students.

My last year at Monash the students put out a “Counter Faculty Handbook,” in which they evaluated the faculty. I still keep it; I think it was one of the best evaluation reports I’ve ever gotten. On the Third World course it said I was “sane and sensible,” which I thought was really nice to have in writing. On Indonesian Political Economy, the second-year course, the student handbook said that between us Herb and I knew “a lot of interesting information” about Indonesia. (In fact, we usually invited Jamie Mackie to give the lectures on the economy.) Then on my own course the handbook said that although Mike and I were “friendly and approachable,” I was “an incredibly meticulous (and hard) marker and can spot plagiarism a mile off.” So the idea that they didn’t know what plagiarism was…

Although plagiarism was a problem there were many good students. Two especially I remember were women who had come to “Uni” after being married and whose children were in school. They were at university because they wanted to be there—and motivation makes a big difference.

**Q:** Were there varied opinions about…because we are still talking about you were teaching during the, you might say, high Soeharto period. How was he viewed in Australia by the academics?

**HARVEY:** Oh they were pretty critical; it would be very similar to the attitudes here.

The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 occurred while I was in Australia. Australian public opinion was overwhelmingly opposed to the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor. In part this was a reflection of general disapproval of the Soeharto regime, but many Australians felt a special connection with East Timor because Timorese guerrillas had aided some Australian military commandos who had been trapped in East Timor when Japanese troops
landed on the island in early 1942. There was also a somewhat murky incident in which a number of Australian journalists were killed by the Indonesian military during a fire-fight with the leftist Fretilin forces. The Australians had a consulate in Dili, the capital, and the last consul, Jim Dunn, was a vocal opponent of the Indonesian takeover. (I later learned that then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had given at least tacit blessing to the Indonesian plan to invade East Timor.)

Q: Did you have much contact with the American establishment?

HARVEY: No. I had to go in to the consulate in Melbourne to renew my passport, and then when I decided to come with State Department I had contact with the consulate to arrange for travel and shipping.

Q: What made you decide to go back to the State Department?

HARVEY: I missed being closer to policy and what was going on. I think the whole plagiarism thing bothered me. As I said, I didn’t like the fact that if I got a good essay I was suspicious of it. And I felt in four years I had given teaching a good try. Then in practical terms, I had over thirteen years toward a U.S. Government pension, whereas I was starting out in my forties in Australia.

I was still in touch with Mark Dion, who I had known at Cornell, and so I wrote Mark and said I was thinking I wasn’t sure I really wanted to stay in Australia. Australia is also the end of the world—nobody stops off in Australia on their way anywhere. At that point the Department had the mid-career entry program, so Mark immediately sent me application forms and all the information on that program, so then I applied to that program.

Q: And how did that work out?

HARVEY: It worked out fine. I had to pay to go back for an interview.

Q: Were you given an oral exam?

HARVEY: An oral interview? Yes, I was.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions asked?

HARVEY: They were mostly what would you do in such and such a situation which, of course, was relatively easy since I had been in many of those situations. One I remember actually had to deal with consular work: it was that a consular officer had turned down a visa to the son of a high-ranking official, and how did you deal with the high-ranking official. My first response was you have to deal with your consular officer as well as the high-ranking official. In fact, I had a comparable situation when I was DCM in Jakarta, but by then we had email and that was easy. If I got a phone call about a visa case I just sent an email to the consul general, “can you tell me what is going on with this?” Most of the time it was perfectly straight-forward, and the consular officer should be backed up, which I did. There was just one case where I wasn’t prepared to
back the consul up. So I said, “Okay, you can call and tell so and so and give your reasons for the denial.” (He decided not to pursue the denial.)

Once I had the application to the State Department underway, I took the precaution of applying for sabbatical leave so the university wouldn’t count on me to be teaching in the spring of 1978. I also had my mother, who had come out to Australia with me, return to the U.S. in the fall of 1977 to stay with my sister and her family.

In about December there was a question about whether I would in fact be able to teach in the spring, because Herb Feith had been injured while he was riding his bicycle. I said I would find out. So I sent a cable back and I got this wonderfully bureaucratic cable back that said, “We are not at this point in a position to offer you…. I said that just means they’re waiting for clearances. So Herb looked questioningly at me, and I said, “I speak bureaucratis.” In fact, by the end of December I got a cable saying they were offering me a position as political officer in Singapore, and I should report to the Department on the first of January, which gave me about two weeks to clear out.

**Q: When did you go to Singapore?**

HARVEY: That would have been February 1978, because I did the A-100 course starting the first of January.

**Q: So you went out to Singapore. What was your job?**

HARVEY: I was political officer, a position that had just been re-established. Apparently some earlier inspector had said there was no politics in Singapore so they didn’t need a political officer.

**Q: You were in Singapore from when to when?**

HARVEY: I got there in early 1978 and left in May or so 1980, so just over two years.

**Q: Who was the ambassador?**

HARVEY: John Holdridge was the first ambassador.

**Q: Well John is a good China hand and all that. I’ve interviewed him.**

HARVEY: I’m still in touch with Martha, his widow.

**Q: What was the situation in Singapore? Lee Kuan Yew is in power still?**

HARVEY: Oh, yes, very much so. People ask me if I found Singapore interesting. My reply is that one reason I found it interesting was because (and I still have the notebook) when I did Southeast Asian politics at Radcliffe (or Harvard) when they talked about Singapore it was about the British being reluctant to turn power over to that radical lawyer Lee Kuan Yew. So to find
out how the situation had gotten from that to Lee Kuan Yew being such a paragon of the establishment was very interesting. For me it was also a very good entry post to the Foreign Service, because there was a very strong Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore and I could go to a lot of the seminars there. In fact, it was very useful for my job to find out who the academics working on Southeast Asia were, and what their views were.

Q: *What role was Singapore playing in the great game in Southeast Asia?*

HARVEY: Well, to use a cliché, they’ve always punched above their weight. In a lecture I have given in the past on Singapore, I think Singapore is comparable in its relationship with the rest of Southeast Asia to ethnic Chinese in each of the countries. They are smart, rich and they are resented.

Q: *Internally were things pretty well in hand or were they...*

HARVEY: Oh, very much in hand. The newspapers were very careful what they said. There were some of the old Socialists or Communists in prison and not likely to get out. There was one labor leader who disappeared while I was there, and some thought maybe he had gone off to Bangkok, because he was seen as a threat. Devan Nair was still there, of course. He later fell out with Lee Kuan Yew and was humiliated in public. But somewhere in my files I think I still have an exchange of letters with Herb Feith when he was being very critical of Singapore, and I said, “But in Singapore for your authoritarian government you get a lot of benefits in return: high employment, good health care, etc.”

Q: *There is quite an American manufacturing or business presence there.*

HARVEY: A fair amount, yes.

Q: *What was your impression of the Singaporeans? Were they interested in what was happening elsewhere or were they pretty much self-absorbed?*

HARVEY: I think they are very much connected internationally, but again most of my contacts were academics. Through the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies I became good friends with Chan Heng Chee, who was later ambassador here. Heng Chee was a Cornell graduate; she had left just before I arrived so we hadn’t known each other there. She is a very impressive person.

Q: *What was she doing?*

HARVEY: She was a political science professor at the university at that time.

Q: *Were there any issues you had to deal with? Did Malaysia offer any problem?*

HARVEY: Things were pretty calm. As I think back, the one report that I recall that got a lot of attention in Washington was something that I had entitled *Ripples in the Pond at Walden Two.* I had an anthropologist friend, Margot Lyon, who was in Singapore at the time. Margot was very interested in one of the spirit temples. So I went with her to see a whole side of Singapore that
ordinarily one wouldn’t see. It was the old Chinese and not very much into the modern era sort of thing. One of the temples was being threatened with being removed, and there was quite a bubbling of discontent there. There was an incident at the university that had also caused a little bit of student discontent, and I’ve forgotten what the third thing was. So underneath this very calm surface there were little ripples going on. But my conclusion was that everybody preferred stability and it wasn’t really going to come to anything.

Q: So these strict social controls did you see areas where this type of social control caused problems?

HARVEY: Well it was more the urban renewal sort of thing, which we are familiar with in this country also. Yes, gentrification is fine but what do you do with the people whose houses are being torn down.

Q: What was your impression of the officials in Singapore? Did they resent the United States or have problems with us?

HARVEY: I don’t think so. I got to know a number of my foreign ministry colleagues very well and there were no problems there. But the U.S. had a relatively light hand in Singapore. It was after I left there that we negotiated to have access for our naval ships on the north side of the island. The Singaporeans were tough negotiators, but there was no resentment.

Q: Yes, Yes. Was there any flow of Chinese from Malaysia into Singapore?

HARVEY: No, but there were a lot of Vietnamese and a lot of them were ethnic Chinese. In fact, one of the big things we dealt with was the outpouring of the boat people from Vietnam. Singapore would not accept any of them for settlement there, and before any boats were allowed to be off-loaded the refugees had to have the guarantee of resettlement. So I worked very closely with John Ratigan, who was our consul general at the time. Our interviews were to get what information we could from the boat people, but also to speed their transferring on to refugee camps.

Q: How stood relations with Vietnam?

HARVEY: Well we didn’t have relations with Vietnam or Cambodia at that time.

Q: How did the Singaporeans?

HARVEY: I don’t recall about Vietnam, but I know they did with Cambodia because I interviewed one of their foreign affairs people who had been in Cambodia. I thought if we had access to information about what was going on in Cambodia or Vietnam we should report it because we had limited information. I also was still in touch, for instance, with a friend, Christine White (she is now known as Kristin Pelzer), who had done her dissertation at Cornell on Vietnam, and she had just visited Vietnam. So I actually flew up to Bangkok to meet her, partly just to see her, and partly to see if she had any interesting information on the situation in Vietnam. Then a well-known and highly respected French scholar gave a seminar at the
Southeast Asia Institute. I don’t remember if it was Devilliers or another French scholar, but in any case I wrote up a message based on the seminar and my discussion with Dr. White, specifying very clearly that this was information from people who were sympathetic to Vietnam, but I thought it might be of interest to the Department. Well, our new DCM, Mort Smith, didn’t want it to go in as a telegram, but it could go in as an airgram. I said I didn’t care what form it went in, I just thought the information would be useful.

Q: How did you find being back in the State Department?

HARVEY: Well again, it was an easy transition because I was able to keep a lot of academic contacts. And, of course, friends from Australia came through Singapore pretty routinely.

Q: How are we doing on time?

HARVEY: We are okay, but we also probably need to talk about Ambassador Kneip.

Q: Absolutely, all right.

HARVEY: Kneip had been governor of South Dakota, was a political appointee. He turned out to be abysmally ignorant of Asia. His initial DCM, Ed Ingraham, had protected him—which Kneip didn’t realize—from most of the embassy staff being aware of that. But then when Kneip returned from a trip to Washington, he felt Ed was too slow in briefing him on what had happened in his absence. Soon after his return, his secretary, Stella Hatala, came in to my office, which was right next door. She said, “The ambassador wants to see you. His car will take you to the residence.” I asked, “What’s it about Stella?” She said, “I don’t know; he will tell you.” She was obviously kind of--very uptight. So I went over to the residence, and Kneip said to me, “I fired Ed Ingraham and I want you to be DCM.” I said, “You can’t fire somebody,” and we talked for quite a length of time. It was quite clear he was not going to change his mind that he didn’t want to have to deal with Ed. I said, “You will have to let me talk with Ed.” He said, “Okay, but I don’t want him to come in to the office.” So I went over to see Ed, but by that time Ed had actually gone into the office. So I went in to Ed’s office and told him what had happened. Ed said that Ambassador Kneip had left a letter to that effect on his desk, but had not spoken with him. Ed and I agreed that after one year in the Department of State I really wasn’t prepared to be the DCM. We agreed that Ed would stay at home and I would ferry papers or whatever back and forth, which we did for about a week.

Q: What was the problem? I mean you are looking at everybody has explanations but what do you feel was the problem?

HARVEY: Well, at the time Ed immediately said, “He thinks I haven’t kept him current.” But Ed added, “When I try to see him after lunch, he’s already had his two or three martinis, and he doesn’t absorb what I’ve told him.” Later on I found out from the man who had been executive director in EAP (East Asia and Pacific Bureau), that when Kneip was back in Washington, Dick Holbrook and Robert Oakley had said to him, “If you are not happy with your DCM you can have another one, and we would like to introduce you to Mort Smith. (I had known Mort during my second tour in Seoul, when he was Deputy PAO).” So it wasn’t totally Kneip’s idea.
Q: No.

HARVEY: The next week there was to be a meeting of chiefs of mission in Jakarta, to which Kneip obviously would go. I told Kneip, “I cannot be charge; you will have to make Ed charge.” He said, “Oh, if I’m not here that’s all right.”

The man who ordinarily would have taken over as DCM, Art Bauman, who was a wonderful officer, was on home leave in the U.S. The only other reasonably senior person was somebody who I think would have been worse than I was, and wouldn’t have been able to handle things. I was able, working with Ed and Stella Hatala, to keep things pretty smooth, so that some of the people in the embassy, I think, didn’t really realize exactly what was going on. We’d just say, “Ed’s not in right now; we’ll get a message to him.” In about a week the Department sent out Dan Sullivan (who was deputy on the desk at the time) to be the acting DCM until Mort Smith or Art Bauman or somebody could get back. In the meantime, Ed and Susan Ingraham went to Indonesia to visit friends there until arrangements could be made for their return to the U.S.

But talking about difficult weeks: while that was going on, I was coping with the illness of Karl Pelzer a professor from Yale, and father of my friend Christine. Pelzer had been in Indonesia, and we got a cable saying he was returning to Singapore for a seminar but that he was not well. John Ratigan, our consul general, knew that I had hosted a dinner for Professor Pelzer, and asked me to be the contact with him, which I was glad to do. Well, Pelzer arrived; and, indeed he was not well. He ended up in the hospital in Singapore, but he refused to let us tell his wife what was going on. Fortunately, one of his former students from Yale, an Indonesian-Chinese good friend of mine, Onghokham, was at the Southeast Asia Institute, and had no such constraints as we did. On his own Ong sent a message back to Yale. Eventually Mrs. Pelzer, an actress who was appearing in a Broadway play, came, and stayed with me for a couple of days until she was able to take Professor Pelzer back to the U.S.

Then one of my friends, who had been a Foreign Service national in Seoul, was visiting, and staying with me that week. So, juggling….

Q: Okay first you had a temporary DCM coming out and then s permanent replacement. What position does that put you in?

HARVEY: Well, I think Dan Sullivan left before Art Bauman came back or Mort Smith arrived. So I was acting DCM again for about a week. During that time, one of my friends at the Singapore ministry, when I was over for something, looked at me and smiled and said, “Who’s your DCM this week?”

As I said, Ed had really protected Kneip, which Kneip didn’t realize. Early on I went in to Kneip’s office at his request; he was looking through cables that had come in and out that had been saved while he was away. I had been told he had trouble telling which were incoming and which were outgoing. Among the cables was a report on a meeting Kissinger had had with Lee Kuan Yew. In it Kissinger or Lee Kuan Yew, I don’t remember which one, had said that the Vietnamese were much better at fighting than they were at governing. So Kneip said to me,
“What does that mean they were better at fighting?” I said, “Well the Vietnamese had been fighting since 1945 or ’46 when they started fighting the French.” He said, “The French? Why would the Vietnamese be fighting the French?” I said, “Vietnam was a French colony.”

Of course, then in one of the staff meetings Kneip didn’t know there was a North and a South Korea. It was very difficult.

Q: Was there a drinking problem?

HARVEY: I think he’d cut back, but that wasn’t the basic problem. The basic problem wasn’t that he was dumb, he was ignorant, he just didn’t know. At one point the American Chamber of Commerce, which had regular briefings at the embassy--which John Holdridge used to handle beautifully--told Kneip they wouldn’t come unless the staff did the briefing instead of him.

Q: Oh God.

HARVEY: So that was quite an initiation to the Department of State.

Q: Oh Yes, well other than that...

HARVEY: Other than that how was the tour…

Q: Were there any other developments while you were there?

HARVEY: That was about it.

Q: Where did you go next?

HARVEY: I came back to the Department on the Vietnam desk.

Q: Okay well we will pick it up then. When was that?

HARVEY: That would have been 1980.

Q: 1980 okay we will pick it up then, great.

Q: Today is October 27, 2014 with Barbara Harvey. So let’s have at it. What period are we talking about?

HARVEY: I think we ended with my leaving Singapore.

Q: Yes. All right so where should we pick this up? When you left Singapore?

HARVEY: Yes, I think we had pretty well finished with Singapore, as I recall.

Q: Okay, we can always fill this in.
HARVEY: We can go back if we need to. I had been offered a position either on the Indonesia desk or Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia. I didn’t want to be pegged as somebody who only knew Indonesia, and so I opted for the Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia office. Desaix Anderson had been in Bangkok and was going back to head the desk, so he came down to Singapore to interview me and make sure we would get along well, which we did. Since the only one of the three countries where we had an embassy was Laos, I went up to Laos for a quick visit before going back to the Department. I also went to Bangkok, and visited the Cambodian border with Tim Carney, who was following events in Cambodia, and met several Embassy people concerned with Indochina and POW/MIA (Prisoner of War/Missing In Action) affairs, including Mike Eiland.

Q: What did you see in Laos when you went up to look at it?

HARVEY: We couldn’t go outside Vientiane at that time. Probably the most interesting thing that happened was that I met a woman with the Mennonite missionary group who made a very useful suggestion. We were having trouble getting access to sites where American pilots might have gone down. She suggested that if we offered to do ordnance removal at those sites the Lao government might be more favorably inclined to allowing Americans to come in and search those sites. In fact, when I got back to Washington I worked very closely with the Pentagon, of course, and John Fur, a wonderful man who had been a POW, was my main contact. When I mentioned this to John he said that they tried that once, but because of liability issues the Pentagon at that point hadn’t been prepared to offer such a proposal. But John continued to work on it, and after both of us had left our jobs, in fact, we eventually got access to sites where American’s had been killed in return for ordnance removal.

Q: I interviewed Terry Tull whom I had known in Vietnam. Actually it was her cats had a Siamese kitten that became my cat. But she was either Charge or...

HARVEY: Yes, she went back to Vientiane as Charge.

Q: ...and was involved in much of the searching for missing airmen who were killed in a crash.

HARVEY: Yes.

Q: You were on the desk from when to when?

HARVEY: For two years so that would have been 1980-1982.

Not long after I arrived on the desk I was assigned to be the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) Bureau’s representative to our delegation to the United Nations, to augment coverage during the annual meeting of the General Assembly, September to December. The issues with which the EAP Bureau was concerned at that time were Indochina, North Korea, and East Timor, and I was familiar with all three. Those of us assigned to augment the delegation attended sessions of the General Assembly and drafted daily reports on what had occurred on the topics with which we were concerned. In later years officers were specifically assigned to join the delegation, not just
be seconded from a desk job, and recently, I understand, retired officers have been re-employed to fulfill that function.

Initially I was Vietnam and Cambodia desk officer. Then another officer, Bob Porter, joined us; he spoke Khmer and knew a good deal about Cambodia, so he took the Cambodian desk. He replaced Mike Gelner, who had been handling Laos and POW affairs. So we switched around, and Bob handled Cambodia and Laos, and for my second year in addition to Vietnam I dealt with POW/MIA affairs, which was still a very difficult and contentious issue.

Q: What was happening in those countries during the time you were the desk officer?

HARVEY: In Cambodia it was still the Pol Pot regime, and we didn’t have a whole lot of information about what was going on. When I was in Singapore, through people in the Singapore foreign ministry and also through refugees coming out of Cambodia, we’d been able to acquire some information about the terrible things that were happening there. As I just mentioned, when in Bangkok on my way back to the Department from Singapore, I went to the border with Tim Carney, who was one of our great Cambodia experts, to see the floods of refugees coming out of Cambodia.

Q: This morning I was interviewing Ken Quinn who was talking about he happened to be in Vietnam, this was during the truce; there had been a treaty a hiatus. I was sitting with his then fiancée looking over to Cambodia and seen all these fires burning out and discovered later by interviewing various refugees and all that this was the Cambodian government, which up to that point had seemed quite benign, and was seen to be part and parcel of the Vietnamese Communist Party and all. But they were taking a radical change and they were burning their villages.

HARVEY: They were emptying the cities too.

Q: It was all part of having to rebuild and all. It really was a horrendous thing. Up to that point the wisdom was okay it’s a Communist regime but they’re not going to take a radical swing to the Left but apparently they did.

HARVEY: Well, the leadership were intellectuals trained in France, and I suppose some people had some misconceptions that because of that Western experience they wouldn’t be so radical. But they wanted to destroy the old society.

Q: Where were you getting your information?

HARVEY: Well we relied a lot on FBIS, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. They monitored local news media abroad, and in countries where we don’t have embassies we were more dependent on them than we were in others. We got some reports from various intelligence services. But, in fact, working on Vietnam at the time one spent a great deal of time working with the League of Families of POWs and Missing in Action; Ann Mills Griffiths was a very effective executive director of that organization.

Q: Did you find that our interest in these countries was tremendously diminished?
HARVEY: Well, you’ve probably heard from others the attitudes towards Vietnam, as I recall, were still quite ambivalent. I remember in part because I had been involved in anti-war activities as a graduate student at Cornell; Desaix knew my background on that--that I had opposed the U.S. involvement in the war. But a point I made when we were doing any public statements, press guidance, and so forth was that at some point we were going to be reconciled with Vietnam. It might take a long time because of the trauma of the war, the antagonism, the anger and so forth, but anything we do or say we have to keep an eye on the long term. Desaix and Ray Burghart, who was his deputy and later ambassador to Vietnam, had no problem with that kind of approach--with keeping a long-term view even though there were still a lot of difficulties.

I don’t know if this is an accurate comparison or not, but whereas the Cuban refugees in the U.S. have had a very strong role in any U.S. policy toward Cuba, I don’t think that the Vietnamese who came to the U.S. have had the same sort of influence on U.S. policy toward Vietnam. In fact, I was just reading there has been a U.S.-Vietnamese nuclear agreement. The U.S. and Vietnam seem to have been able to reach a relatively cordial relationship considering some of our history.

Q: We didn’t have diplomatic relations at that time?

HARVEY: No.

Q: With Laos we did?

HARVEY: We did with Laos, but not with either with Vietnam or Cambodia at that time.

Q: I take it at that time there wasn’t any particular movement to bring the countries closer together was there?

HARVEY: Not particularly. I think this happened really before I was involved. There had been some movement toward better relations with Vietnam, but we were then moving toward better relations with China. At that point China and Vietnam had just had a border clash, and so moving forward with Vietnam was kind of put on the back burner while relations with China were being established.

Q: Yes. Who was your audience for the information you were developing?

HARVEY: We did press guidance every morning; that was one of the main things. But again, a lot of it had to do with POW/MIA affairs, and to some extent what was going on in Cambodia, though Vietnam was always more of a focus.

At one time we dealt with press accounts of Vietnamese being forced to work on railroads in the Soviet Union. From some of the political appointees in the Department there was pressure to make this an anti-Soviet story. However, Dottie Avery, our excellent Vietnamese analyst in INR (The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research), cautioned that part of the story was
lack of employment opportunities in Vietnam at that time, not just that the Soviets were forcing Vietnamese to work on their railroads.

*Q:* Was Congress a factor in pushing you and others dealing with it to some conclusion of searching for missing in action?

**HARVEY:** Some in Congress, Dornan, who I think was a former POW, a California Congressman. But a lot of the pressure came from the family’s organization; as I mentioned, Ann Mills Griffiths, was very effective as their executive director. She had a brother who had been lost in Laos. One of the things I agreed with Ann about was that there were some instances where there were photographs of American pilots having been captured but there was nothing known about their eventual fate. Ann said we should start with those cases where we knew that somebody had been captured alive. I thought that was the way to go, and, in fact, I think that the Pentagon came to agree with that approach.

One of the problems was that the families, of course, hoped that people were still alive and that people were still being kept prisoner. But we had no information to substantiate that. The only person that was known to have stayed behind was a man, I’ve forgotten his name, who had done so willingly, and people knew where he was. There were rumors and, in fact, some of the people in Vietnam, or refugees, or people in Thailand--there was sort of a business of selling information about the possibility of there being live Americans who had been left behind.

*Q:* Fake IDs, bones ______ it would turn out to be animal bones.

**HARVEY:** There was one instance where there had been aerial surveillance over Laos, and the family’s organization felt that this was a camp where POWs were being held. So the decision was made that the U.S. government would send a small unit in to investigate and find out if there was anything there. It turned out that no; it wasn’t any kind of camp or such. Years later I heard on the radio somebody saying, “Well, if there hadn’t been any truth to it the U.S. government would never have sent in a force to investigate.” So, you are damned if you do and damned if you don’t. You couldn’t ignore the rumors, but then if you follow up on them, then people say there must have been something to it.

*Q:* Well it became very much a political issue.

**HARVEY:** Yes, it did.

*Q:* Even today various organizations fly the missing in action...

**HARVEY:** The POW/MIA flag, yes.

*Q:* ...and nothing has turned up. We’ve had good relations but it is something that people won’t give up on.

**HARVEY:** Yes, Yes.
Q: In a way it is sort of like proving the negative.

HARVEY: Yes.

Q: And one which has a significant number of people, mainly because of the politics, would not accept...

HARVEY: No, it wasn’t just the families; there were politicians who were making an issue of it too, that’s true.

Q: Were there any particularly egregious cases that you can think of that seemed to be significant evidence of Americans being held captive?

HARVEY: No. Everything was investigated, but there were no accounts that really gave any of the professionals much hope that they were more than a rumor or a tale told in bars in Bangkok.

Q: Did you have to meet with the relatives?

HARVEY: Particularly with the League. If they had a function I always went. I forgot who said, “Half the job is showing up.” If the League had any kind of memorial service I would always go. Even if you didn’t think, or you had no evidence, that there were still Americans being held in captivity, you had to feel sorry for the families and you had to understand their pain and what it meant to them.

Q: Did you feel that your financial support from the State Department was gradually beginning to be withdrawn? I mean you have an office were you getting...

HARVEY: We weren’t directly involved in investigating the rumors, that would be the Pentagon and they always have plenty of money.

Q: Well then how about Laos was anything happening there?

HARVEY: It took time--it was really after I left the desk when the agreement that the Mennonites had suggested for ordnance disposal and access to crash sites, was worked out with the Lao. Again, I think John Fur had also left his job in the Pentagon by the time it got underway, but he was the one who really said “We’ll try again.” It had been turned down once at the Pentagon, but John Fur felt that it might be possible, and eventually they did move ahead and tied the ordnance removal with looking at crash sites. In fact, they have found a number of remains.

Q: Well then when did you leave this job?

HARVEY: I was there for two years and then in 1982 I went to the Office of Korean Affairs, and was the North Korean desk officer. David Lambertson was office director and Bill Breer was his deputy.
Q: North Korea must have presented quite let’s say in diplomatic terms, a challenge.

HARVEY: Oh, yes. I handled South Korean relations with communist countries and North Korea. The first year was relatively quiet; the main thing we dealt with was that a member of the North Korean staff at the UN, a Mr. Oh, had fondled a female jogger in Central Park and the question was whether he should be PNG’d, (declared persona non grata), or what would happen to him. Jeanne Kirkpatrick was our ambassador to the United Nations at the time, and some of us, I was one of them, felt we should ask the female jogger if we just PNG’d Mr. Oh would that be adequate. Well, Jeanne Kirkpatrick didn’t want to go that route; she wanted to use it as an anti-Communist big deal. So this dragged on for most of the year. Then we PNG’d somebody else from the North Korean mission, to put pressure on them. Then somebody finally did ask the female jogger, and it turned out that she would feel quite happy if the man who had fondled her was just PNG’d and not permitted to come back to the country. So that is what we did. Mr. Oh, his name was; I can’t remember the rest of his name.

Q: Were you or anybody else appointed to give Mr. Oh a lecture?

HARVEY: That would have been at our mission to the UN (USUN); we dealt directly, and very closely, with USUN on the Oh affair. But it was not terribly time consuming. And, in fact, for me it was a good thing because during that period my sister was in the terminal stages of lung cancer and I was able to take a month off and spend time with her.

The following year, however, we were terribly busy. I hadn’t really anticipated it so I had agreed to be an adjunct faculty member at American University, filling in for someone who was on leave, teaching a course on politics in Southeast Asia. That year on Labor Day weekend a Korean Air Line plane was shot down by the Soviets.

Q: Oh Yes, KAL 007...it was shot down over the Kamchatka Peninsula.

HARVEY: Yes, right, and that was very intense, trying to find out what had happened, who was responsible, so on and so forth. One of the first things we discovered, and I can still remember that it was Mr. Eagleburger, who was undersecretary for political affairs at that time, who was dismayed to learn that there was a large section of the Pacific Ocean where there was no radar coverage. So between the time the plane left Alaska until it was shot down people didn’t know where it was. But it pretty soon became apparent that it was the Russians who had, in fact, shot it down. I worked closely with people on the Soviet desk, and then we set up a memorial service at the National Cathedral. It turned out the dean of the Cathedral at the time had friends who were on board that flight, so although he obviously didn’t want the service to be used for propaganda purposes, he was sympathetic to having a service at the Cathedral. There was also the brother and sister-in-law, or some relatives, of someone at the South Korean embassy who was also on the flight.

Q: And a Congressman too.

HARVEY: Yes. I was very much involved in working with the Cathedral, and working with people in the Department and embassies who had people on board the flight, and getting the
service organized. The Soviet Affairs Office dealt with the policy issues, which mainly concerned U.S.-Soviet relations, and the impact on them of the Soviet shooting down of a civilian airliner.

**Q: At the time did we have a pretty good picture of what happened?**

HARVEY: It took a while, but we did eventually, yes. There were more conspiracy theories than proved true. I think a lot of it was the plane was off course, probably the coordinates on the flight computer were one digit off, and that was enough to send the plane into Soviet airspace. The Soviets seem to have reacted without really thinking this was a passenger jet, and shot it down. (In 1986, Seymour M. Hersh published a detailed account of the incident, *The Target Is Destroyed*.)

**Q: Did you get involved on anything nuclear issues?**

HARVEY: I don’t remember at that time being involved in nuclear issues.

The next thing that happened was when President Chun Doo-hwan and his cabinet were visiting Rangoon, in Burma, the North Koreans tried to assassinate him. They missed Chun, but they killed the Korean foreign minister, Lee Bum-suk, and one of his advisers, a wonderful man, Hahm Pyong-choon, whom I had known from my earlier tours in Korea, and a number of other people. Our concern at that time was that the South Koreans might react by marching north, which they didn’t do, but I think we made promises to them of support that we didn’t necessarily fulfill. There was concern that the Burmese government, which was closer to the North Koreans than the South, would not conduct a good investigation. One of my friends, Mark Dion, who was DCM in Rangoon at the time, said that because an attack on a guest was an insult to Asian hospitality he was quite sure that the Burmese would do a thorough investigation, which they did. And they were able to pin responsibility on the North Koreans. So that, after a bit of time, was resolved in the sense that the North was shown to be responsible for that act.

**Q: What did we think of the North Korean leadership?**

HARVEY: Well, to have a hereditary dynasty in a Communist state is odd. North Korea is a state that is so opaque, and where it is so difficult to find out what is going on. But from what you do know it’s very brutal. There is a woman who lives here who visited North Korea; I can’t imagine anybody who is not professionally involved wanting to go.

**Q: Yes.**

HARVEY: I worked fairly closely with Bob Carlin, who at that time was at the agency. He subsequently came to State Department and has written a number of very good things on North Korea. We all tried to be realistic and not to be ideological, but to see what was going on.

**Q: Were there any glimmers of real knowledge about North Korea?**
HARVEY: Again, FBIS was a good source, we relied on them a lot. NSA (National Security Agency), I think, was picking up a lot of their communications. In fact, I’ve forgotten the name of the man who said they had so much information coming in from their taps that it was hard to have the time to pull out what was significant.

Q: Yes.

HARVEY: Of course the problem with what was coming out from the South was that the U.S. military there had a “vacuum-cleaner” approach: any scrap of information no matter how improbable would get reported. The first year, when I had more time, every time we got one of these improbable reports I would call my counterpart over at DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency). I would ask, “Do you have any confirmatory information?” He’d say, “You know…” I’d reply, “As long as you send in these dumb reports I’m going to call you up and complain about it.” At that time, in fact, in INR’s daily intelligence summary they didn’t use embassy reporting, they only used intelligence reporting. I said to our INR contact, “That’s crazy. The people in the embassy evaluate the information they are getting. If we have an embassy report that casts doubt on an intelligence report you shouldn’t just report the intelligence item as though there is no question about it.” I was glad to find out subsequently that INR does now use embassy reporting in addition to the raw intelligence data when they are putting out an intelligence summary.

Q: Having served on the Vietnamese and other and then the North Korean desks and all that you’re dealing with opaque regimes and you are getting these things and they may be something but the present ruler of North Korea you are getting a lot of information about the fact that he walks with a cane; a young man could have turned his ankle.

HARVEY: But he disappeared from view for over a month.

Q: That would be very frustrating; don’t you want to get a hold of a live country?

HARVEY: I was happy to move on to countries with which we had diplomatic relations. But it was interesting. You know I served in Seoul twice so I had some background on Korea. At that time there were very few defectors from North Korea; now there are many more. So there is much more information available now than there was at that time.

Q: Well then when did you leave?

HARVEY: The North Korea desk? 1984; I went out to Surabaya as principal officer at the consulate.

Q: You must have been delighted.

HARVEY: I was, although initially I thought that because I’d already served in Surabaya it would be more interesting to go to Medan, in Sumatra, but somebody else was already assigned to Medan. In Surabaya I was quite determined that I would never say “we used to do it this way.” Of course, when I’d been there before I was with USIS, I wasn’t with State in the earlier
assignment. But I still had a number of friends there; I knew some of the people still working at the consulate, some of the local staff. I’ve always been very fond of Surabaya. As a commercial city it has a realism about it that a capital city doesn’t have. People in East Java are much more frank and open than people in some other parts of Java. Of course, the consulate covered basically Central Java, East Java, Bali, all the islands to the east as far as Timor, and also Sulawesi. When I first came in 1984, our consular district included East Kalimantan, and Jakarta had Maluku and West Irian. But the consul general in Jakarta, Sue Wood, and I decided it didn’t make sense, partly because the oil companies were the main Americans operating in East Kalimantan and their headquarters were all in Jakarta. So we traded: she took East Kalimantan and consulate Surabaya got Maluku, which was Ambon and the Spice Islands. Because of the political sensitivities in West Irian and East Timor, those provinces remained under Jakarta. (Sue and I visited East Kalimantan before we made the switch. The daughter of old friends from Surabaya, Jessie Anwar, was in Balikpapan, where her husband was a medical doctor, and she helped show us around.)

Q: This area that you had were there any on-going revolts Muslim or otherwise?

HARVEY: At that time no. In the 1950s there had been Darul Islam rebellions in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh, with varying origins but which all evolved into support for an Islamic State. They were defeated by the mid-1960s. In the 1970s there had been some radical Islamic groups who had attacked the Borobudur in central Java, the old Buddhist temple. Then, during my time in Surabaya, there was an attack on a Catholic Seminary in Malang, a town to the south of Surabaya. Then somebody from—and I’ve forgotten what the radical Islamists were calling themselves at that time--was on a bus on his way to Bali to attack a tourist site, but he wasn’t very smart. He had his bomb already ready to go off under his seat on the bus and, on a bumpy stretch of road on the way to Banyuwangi, it went off, killing him. Fortunately nobody else on the bus was injured. But those were the incidents that happened, as I recall, during that time.

Q: Well then were there still problems with tourists visiting or being attacked?

HARVEY: Not at that time. Probably the main thing we dealt with was tourists in Bali getting in trouble—and motorcycle accidents were probably the big thing. We had a consular agent in Bali who was very good, Christina Melcher, and she dealt with most of the routine matters. But we went over regularly, called on the governor, the military commander, the police commander, immigration, all the people we might have to deal with if there were any incident. As I recall we didn’t have Americans picked up on drug charges. The Australians had a consulate in Bali. They had far more problems, largely because so many Australians holiday there and unfortunately often do get into difficulty.

During the time I was in Surabaya one Australian who had tried to escape from prison in Bali was then transferred to a prison in Madura, the island just east of Surabaya. We got a request saying his sister and brother-in-law were coming to visit, and could we help them get to Madura. Of course, we were happy to do so. Then when they came back after seeing the brother--I still remember the sister saying the prison was cleaner than the hotel they had to stay in. The hotel was so scruffy--Madura is a relatively remote place where tourists never went in those days. So
we managed to get them nice hot vegetable soup and a good strong cup of tea, because they had hardly had anything to eat during the time they had been in Madura visiting her brother.

Q: Were we looking at any elements of dissolution of Indonesia in the component parts or was this pretty much a dead issue?

HARVEY: In our consular district it was pretty much a dead issue. Papua, which is still an issue (at that time it was still called Irian Jaya), and Aceh were the two areas where there had been ongoing rebellions and revolts. By that time North and South Sulawesi were pretty well integrated back into the national scene. No, we were not really dealing with regional disturbances.

Q: How did you find the staff in Surabaya? Was travel the main thing that kept them interested?

HARVEY: We did not have a very strong American staff, I would say, and it was very small. There was one other State Department officer who was responsible for economic reporting and administration, and one American officer who supervised consular affairs. We had two very good Branch PAOs during my time in Surabaya: Nick Mele and Karl Fritz. Our local staff included an excellent consular assistant, Ms. Lily Wibisono, and a protocol assistant, Ms. Titi Harsono.

Because of the extent of the consular district, we did a lot of traveling. One of the things I did because of our small staff was to have people from the embassy in Jakarta come with me on a lot of the travels. This was partly because I felt it was good for people from Jakarta to get out and see other parts of the country, but it also helped with the reporting. Pamela Slutz, who was in the political section, traveled with me quite often. She and I had decided that the transmigration program, in which people were moved from Java to areas in the outer islands, would be a theme we could follow.

Q: This is a policy of the Indonesian government?

HARVEY: The policy started under the Dutch, and the Indonesian government continued it. It was partly because Java is so densely populated, but in some cases the justification was to provide labor in some of the outer islands. But the main purpose was really to decrease the population on Java. So we visited a number of locations. We visited transmigration sites in both North and South Sulawesi; we may have done both of these on the same trip. The one in the north was a place called Dumoga, which under the Dutch was a place where they sent people down from the Christian area of Minahas, which was more densely populated. Dumoga was in a less-densely populated area called Bolaang-Mongondow. (My Indonesian staff in Surabaya found it very odd that I knew all these places that they never heard of. When I had been doing my research I had gone to all of these places.) But in any case when we visited Dumoga, whose inhabitants were largely Balinese who had been moved at the time of the Gunung Agung eruption in 1963, we asked people if they were they doing better. Their initial response was no, but then with subsequent questioning you found out their children started school at an earlier age because they were in better health, many people could afford to go back and visit their family in Bali, one of them had been elected to the local parliament, and so forth. But the reason they
didn’t think they were doing better was they missed Bali, which is a spectacularly beautiful island.

We also visited a site in Luwu in the northern part of South Sulawesi. That was particularly interesting because as we were driving through the area we went into a market place, where a man came up and invited us back to his home. He was a Javanese transmigrant from Jogjakarta, sort of the leader of the group. His wife sent a child to cut down a couple of coconuts from the tree in the backyard and gave us fresh coconut milk as we chatted with them. They were able to go back and visit their family yearly; they were well enough off that they could do that. Our impression was in general, people were doing quite well and probably better than they would have done had they stayed in their original homes in Java or Bali. Of course, in some areas the local people resented the transmigrants.

We also took one of the economic officers, a man named Lou Warren, on several trips, including to Luwu. We took the science officer on a trip to North Sulawesi; Pam and I were on that one too. There was an expedition in Bolaang-Mongondow from the British Museum marking the centenary of the Wallace Expedition, which had drawn the line between Asian and Australian flora and fauna; so that was very interesting. The Bupati (district head) at that time was Drs. Jambat Damopolii; I had stayed with him and his family in Manado when I was doing my dissertation research in 1971-72.) The science officer had never had a trip outside of Jakarta, I think, and was delighted to get out to a place that was so different from being in Jakarta.

One other thing I might mention from that time in Surabaya, and again I was traveling with Pam Slutz and Lou Warren. We went to Buru, which was the island where many political prisoners had been sent after the 1965-66 incident. We had actually gone to Ambon, to Maluku, and we were offered by the deputy governor to go over to Buru. We went, but we were a little nervous about what he might say about embassy people being at this politically sensitive place. It was a ceremony where the prison area was being turned over to the local government and would be made just a regular part of the local government structure. To our great pleasure and relief in the ceremony the deputy governor said that there were people from the embassy there to make sure that everything was being done properly. So as I say it was a great relief to us to have him say that. A number of the prisoners had been members of the Communist Party; and I think that was quite accurate because the Communist Party was a legal party so the membership was known. It wasn’t as though people were being wildly accused of a membership that wasn’t true. Some may just have been members of affiliated groups, however. But many of the former prisoners, because they had been in Buru for so many years that they cut ties with family back in Java and they felt there was no future there, and they stayed on in Buru as farmers there.

Among the very impressive local officials that I met while in Surabaya was Ben M’Boi, who was the governor of Nusa Tenggara Timor, and his wife, Nafsiah, who was later the minister of health in Indonesia. A Balinese friend of mine, I Gusti Berata, whose son-in-law was a civil engineer working on roads in the province, told me that Ben M’boi was known for showing up at work sites to make sure the project was being carried out properly. Nafsiah had done much to revitalize traditional textile production, for which the islands of Nusa Tenggara are famous. During the trip our group, which included Lou Warren and Karl Fritz, visited such a project in Flores, Ben M’Boi’s home island. We were shown several textiles, and of course we were interested
in buying them. When Lou indicated a particular piece that he would like to buy to take back to his wife in Jakarta, the young weaver giggled with embarrassment. A friend explained that she had planned to wear it herself to a party that evening. However, they were able to find a similar textile for Lou.

A year or so later Ben and Nafsiah won the Magsaysay award for their activities in local government and community development. We have stayed in touch over the years.

Another interesting trip that I made with an officer from Jakarta was to “pesantren” (Islamic boarding schools) in East and Central Java. Gene Christy, who had served previously in Surabaya, was deputy in the political section. One question that came up repeatedly in our visits was why the pesantren no longer received Aneka Amerika (American Miscellany), a magazine produced by USIS in the 1950s and 1960s. Our visits included a prominent pesantren in Situbondo, East Java, and one in Jember, whose leader was at that time the head of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, the Nadhlatul Ulama (NU). He had recently been profiled in the weekly news magazine Tempo, as a progressive ulama who listed to tapes of Michael Jackson while using his exercise bike. The pesantren we visited in Madura, the island to the east of Surabaya, had a young volunteer from Stanford’s Volunteers in Asia, teaching English to both male and female students. In Kediri, East Java, famous for its clove cigarette factory, the “kiyai” (religious leader) had recently been widowed. He asked me so many questions about myself that I asked him, “Cari calon isteri” (are you looking for a candidate to be your wife)? I had dared to ask such an impertinent question because he had quite a twinkle in his eye. Indeed he laughed heartily. Gene and I also visited the famous modernist pesantren Gontor in Ponorogo, East Java. Students were allowed to speak only in English or Arabic, and the curriculum was designed to prepare students for non-governmental careers. A distinguished graduate of Gontor, Nurcholis Majid, did a PhD at the University of Chicago, and later founded a well-regarded university, Paramadina, in West Java.

One of the important East Java pesantren I visited several times, not only with Gene Christy, was Tebuireng, in Jombang, East Java. I went to Tebuireng the first time with Chuck Morris, then the desk officer for Indonesia, who had previously served in Surabaya. The Nadhlatul Ulama was founded in Jombang in 1927; Abdurrahman Wahid, later president of Indonesia, was a grandson of the founder of the NU. Once I went to Tebuiring to represent the Consulate, and the U.S., when a government minister was visiting. I had arrived early, so was chatting with two of the women associated with the pesantren, Abdurrahman Wahid’s mother and the wife of Kiyai Mahfudz, whose son I’m I had come to know in Surabaya. (I had met Abdurrahman Wahid through the Japanese scholars Mitsuo and Hisako Nakamura, who had been fellow graduate students at Cornell.) When the Jakarta delegation arrived I hesitated, not knowing whether I should remain in the women’s section. The two ladies gave me a good strong push in the back, indicating that as an official I should sit with the other officials, all men.

Q: This is one of the tasks that principal officers have in places where you try to get the various other officers in the consulate general or something just to get out just to get to see something.

HARVEY: Yes. I don’t think my successors did as much with the embassy people in Jakarta, but I felt it worked well for me, and it seemed to work well for them.
Probably the major thing that happened while I was in Surabaya was the April 1986 visit from President Reagan. He had had to cancel an official visit earlier, but the rescheduled visit was only to Bali. The then DCM, Dick Howland, made most of the original arrangements. This was just as Paul Wolfowitz was coming out as ambassador. My understanding is that in the past, for some reason, the Americans had not used their own interpreter, and had relied on Soeharto’s interpreter, Widodo, who indeed was very good. But Paul Wolfowitz felt it was important that we had somebody in the meeting between the two presidents. At that time I had the best Indonesian of anybody in the country, so I was assigned to be interpreter, or as it turned out note taker, because Widodo did basically all the interpreting.

In fact, it was fortunate that I was present. Our instructions said that after the meeting between the two presidents, they would join the plenary where Secretary of State George P. Shultz and the Indonesian foreign minister and other officials were meeting. The presidents would not leave by themselves—they would join the group. Well, at the end of the discussion between Reagan and Soeharto, Soeharto started to leave saying, “Well, rather than join the others I think we can just leave.” I knew we had these other instructions and I knew one, we only had one motorcade, and two, the Secret Service wasn’t expecting President Reagan to leave at that point. So I slid forward in my seat and said in my best and very polite Indonesian, “I’m very sorry Mr. President but I think our side has made some mistake. We were told you would be joining the plenary meeting.” I learned later from Widodo, Soeharto’s interpreter that Soeharto sent him in to find out what was expected. Widodo came back and whispered to Soeharto, who again said, “Well, I think we can go.” I again protested, and again Widodo (as he told me later) was sent back out to get Sudharmono, who was the cabinet secretary. When Sudharmono came in I stood up and said directly into his ear, again in Indonesian, “General, we have only one motorcade and if President Reagan leaves at this time everybody will be confused.” I knew if you told a general there would be confusion, he would know that there was a problem and things needed to be done differently. So at that point, Sudharmono went back into the plenary and apparently asked whether or not the two presidents should join them. According to Widodo, Secretary Shultz said, “We’ll do whatever the presidents want to do.” Sudharmono returned to the room where Reagan and Soeharto were meeting and said, “Why don’t you just join the group?” With Sudharmono’s having spoken to the plenary group, I felt that at least our side knew there was some problem. The two presidents did then go back and join the plenary, and things got smoothed over. To his credit Paul Wolfowitz made sure that the incident was written up in my performance evaluation—that I had managed to handle the situation smoothly. Other things, of course, happened during the meeting but that was the one that I was directly involved in.

I only recall two congressional visits during that time, a very impressive senator from Oregon, Daniel Evans, and the also very impressive Senator Richard Lugar, long-time senior Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Both visited Central but not East Java, and both visited USAID projects, including a very successful micro-finance project. We took the Oregon senator to a modernist pesantren near Jogjakarta, where I found myself interpreting theological terms I barely knew. We also arranged meetings with Indonesian intellectuals; Gadjah Mada University in Jogjakarta is one of the best in Indonesia. Senator and Mrs. Lugar had particularly wanted to see the Borobudur, and we had arranged for them also to visit the Prambanan, a nearby Hindu temple complex. Although by that time the Senator was rather tired, when he learned that
special guides were waiting for his visit he insisted on continuing. I’ve always remembered how considerate he was.

Q: How about with Bali? Was Bali still the major tourist spot?

HARVEY: Yes...

Q: What was happening there anything?

HARVEY: At that time nothing out of the ordinary, no. In subsequent years the proliferation of tourist shops and hotels has been so great that the original beauty that drew people to Bali has been marred. So you have to go somewhere else now to find the unspoiled beauty. But the culture there, the dancing, the arts are still extraordinary.

Q: Did you see an improvement in the caliber of the government officials?

HARVEY: To some extent. One of the things I might mention is that Bali was an area where the family planning program was very successful. A couple of illustrations. First, one of the elementary schools in Ubud had closed by the mid-1980s because there were fewer school age children. Second, something I learned from a friend of mine, actually a dentist but he was very active in all sorts of medical things, an ethnic Chinese originally from Malang in East Java, who practiced in Singaraja in North Bali (Halim Indrakusuma is his Indonesia name). Dr. Halim told me that the first year when they started the family planning program, they worked with the women. All of them were interested but said, “My husband would never agree.” So the next year they worked with the men, and once they got the men to agree, then the program worked very smoothly. In general, Indonesia was very sensible in their family planning program; they went about it not in terms of limiting the number of children but improving the health of the family. So the emphasis was all on family welfare, health of the mother by spacing children, being able to provide better education if you have only two children, and so forth. So that was the general thrust of it and that worked well.

Q: Were the Javanese a particular branch of religion or were they more prolific?

HARVEY: Well, when I was there we never heard Sunni and Shia. The terms that were used basically came from the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz who wrote of the “santri,” who are the more devout Muslims, and the “abangan” or “prijaji” who are more influenced by Hinduism and traditional religion. Indonesians now say there are, in fact, Shiites and Sunnis but it had never been an issue before. There is a sect now, Ahmadi, which has been banned there and in Malaysia, which I gather is considered Shiite. But in general Islam was much more open, much more accommodating to local traditions. There were extremists who attacked the Borobudur, and much later attacked Bali, and so forth. So, yes, there are extremist Muslims in Indonesia. However, in general there is more tolerance, probably partly because there is a significant proportion of the population, probably at least fifteen percent who are Christian, either Protestant or Catholic. There is a Catholic Cardinal from Java.

Q: How did the Indonesians respond?
HARVEY: Well, they are always very concerned about what is going on in the Near East. One of the main criticisms of American policy usually has to do with our support for Israel.

Q: Of course.

HARVEY: If you do a comparison of votes in the UN, so many of the votes in the UN have to do with Israel and the Palestinians, Indonesians don’t vote with us very much. But in terms of Islam, many Indonesians will say that much of what Americans or Westerners find objectionable in Islam is actually Arab culture. It is not really an inherent part of Islam as a religion.

Q: When you think about it our involvement with Israel all of a sudden we are tangled up with the fourth largest country in the world in population and we are dealing with essentially six million Israeli’s or Jews but there we are. How was your Indonesian by this time?

HARVEY: According to FSI I had a 4-4 (fluent reading and speaking). I speak a fairly formal Indonesian; I don’t do Jakarta slang or street talk. But I always felt you were better off, since you were dealing mostly with officials, to speak a more formal Indonesian.

Q: Oh Yes. Is there much of a difference?

HARVEY: Oh, yes. Speaking Jakarta slang or street talk is like talking to a teenager here. You might have a lot of trouble with the particular vocabulary or they’ve shortened words.

Q: Do they use a lot of abbreviations?

HARVEY: They use a lot of acronyms. Indonesian is an easy language in which to get survival skills. I don’t know if we talked about this earlier, but it’s based on a market language so it’s designed for ease in communication. So there are no tenses: there is one word that means “already,” and one word that means “not yet.” There are no plurals: you say a word twice to indicate more than one. There are no honorifics, which, of course, in contrast to Korean, makes it very easy. There are some slight differences in the word you use for “you,” but those of us who learned our Indonesian long ago use one word, “saudara,” which was popular during the Revolution, which you can use to anybody. I was speaking to an Indonesian friend, Yanti Spooner, a widow of a Foreign Service officer who is a little younger than I am, and she said she uses the same word for the same reason: you don’t have to worry about the status of the person to whom you are speaking.

Q: Who was president?

HARVEY: Soeharto the whole time I was there. My first time it was Sukarno but when I was back it was Soeharto.

Q: What were we getting Madame Soeharto, Madame Ten percent or whatever it was?
HARVEY: Well, Ibu Tien, but many people called her Ibu Twentig, which is the Dutch for twenty.

Q: Oh boy. Where did you go after there?

HARVEY: Well from that time in Surabaya I went to the Foreign Service Institute as director of political training.

Q: Well why don’t we talk about that a little and then we will stop for this time or we can stop now.

HARVEY: If we could stop now I think it might be better.

Q: Okay and we will pick up when you are going to FSI. Great.

Q: Today is the seventh of November 2014 with Barbara Harvey. Barbara we left you off when you were going to go to the Foreign Service Institute to be in charge of political training. It seems to me this would be difficult could you go into it. In the first place how did you get the job and then what were you trying to train?

HARVEY: The job was to train political officers. We were responsible for training mid-level political officers, trying to improve their analytical ability and political skills.

Getting the job was a bit confusing. I had bid on a number of positions, and then one came up unexpectedly as deputy in the office that handled Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore. But that was taking time to work out and in the meantime, FSI asked me to bid on the political training position. I didn’t handle it very well. I thought I preferred to be in the bureau because I was used to being in a regional bureau, but then I was convinced by people at FSI that I should go ahead and put in a formal bid on the political training position. So I did, and I was immediately paneled to that job, somewhat to my surprise because I thought my career counselor would be working things out in Washington, which did not happen. But anyway I ended up at the Foreign Service Institute and it was a very good experience.

Q: This is from when to when?

HARVEY: That would have been from 1987 to 1989. I worked with good people. Sylvia Woodby was one of the civil servants in the political training section, an excellent woman with experience in training. We stayed in touch for a number of years, but I’ve now lost touch with her. Mark Eaton was handling training for the most junior political officers; I knew him because he had been on the desk when I was in Singapore. Harriet Lancaster was the deputy dean of professional studies; and I worked pretty closely with Harriet. The incoming dean of professional studies was a very good person, Don Leidel. There was an excellent woman on the staff, Dee Hahn-Rollins, who was a psychologist, whose emphasis was on how to deal with different personality types. We used the Myers-Briggs analysis. Then one of the things we did was to have discussion sessions with the political officers after they knew their personality type, and what were their strengths and what were some of the problems they might encounter in doing their
job. Many political officers tend to be introverts, and many of them found it difficult to make the contacts that are essential if you are going to be a political officer. Since I also happened to come out as an introvert on the Myers-Briggs scale, I was able to give them pointers on things you can do to expand your contacts. I think my background, having been with USIA, where that was a very important part of your job, helped me to give them suggestions.

Q: I’ve done a long time ago the Myers-Briggs thing but it is pretty obvious for all of us as we see people in different specialties have different strengths and all; I was a consular officer. What were some of the problems of an introvert dealing with political?

HARVEY: The main thing was making contacts--introverts tend to find it very difficult to go out and meet people. They loved doing the analysis part, but you can’t just analyze what you read in the newspaper or from written sources. You have to get out and talk to people if you are going to know what is really going on in a society.

Q: How did you get them to go out and talk?

HARVEY: Well, I don’t know what they did after they left the training, but I had several suggestions. When you first get to post volunteer for door duty at receptions. You get to meet a lot of people, but you don’t have to spend a lot of time talking to people you barely know, and it helps you to get to know who some of the people the embassy deals with are. One of the other suggestions was to find an interest group, most people have hobbies or something, you can find local people who are involved in that and then you will be able to meet people who are interested in the same sorts of things. If you see an interesting article in the newspaper, go meet the person who wrote it and that will give you an entrée to the contact and to get more of what’s going on behind the actual story. So there are just a few of the things that we were able to recommend to them.

Q: What were the strengths of somebody with analyses?

HARVEY: Well, this comes more from later experience with somebody I worked with in Jakarta. For analysis I think you start with questions and look for answers. We had a person later on in Jakarta who started with his conclusions and looked for supporting data. If you do this, you get all kinds of skewed analyses. I think you have to start with an open mind; you know what the questions are, and what the important topics are. But then you have to look at a wide range of sources: written, radio, television, if you have access to it, people across a wide spectrum. You have to be open to all the information you can gather, and consider everything, not just what supports what might have been your pre-conceived notion. That’s the only way you can have any kind of full understanding of what’s going on.

It is also important to ask open-ended questions when you are doing interviews. You must never ask, “Do you agree that…?” You are signaling the answer you would like to get, and particularly in parts of Asia, it would be very impolite to disagree.

Q: How do you go about teaching this?
HARVEY: I’m not sure how well we did it but it we certainly tried.

Q: Would you go through a variety of drills, not drills so much but situations and see how they worked?

HARVEY: We had a number of courses that involved simulations of particular situations. One of our most successful courses actually was one on Congressional relations, and for that we did do a simulation. Jim Montgomery, who was a very good officer, retired at that point, but he had done a lot of Congressional relations work, designed and ran the course. We had officers pretending to be Congress people, and they had information on their district, and officers acting as a State Department person to brief them on specific topics. A number of the officers taking the training said things such as, “Well, I never realized the importance of domestic politics on how the Congress acts toward trade issues,” until they had been through this sort of simulation. We also conducted a well-regarded course on negotiating.

Q: What was your impression of the administration of the FSI?

HARVEY: The people I worked with immediately were good.

Q: Was there much pressure coming to you say from the desks and all?

HARVEY: No, not really. My later association with FSI has been going there to lecture in the area studies programs. There the people I’ve dealt with have always had very good relations with the desks and they want to get people from the desks to talk about what some of the current issues are in the countries to which people are being assigned.

Q: Yes, sometimes one of the problems is put out that there doesn’t seem to be much connect between what we are training people to do and what we are consuming. Each individual is put out there, trained and we hope things work out. This is over simplified but…

HARVEY: There is a great resistance in the Foreign Service culture to training.

Q: Why is that? Is that Myers-Briggs wise?

HARVEY: Well, partly people think they don’t need it, and partly they feel they are out of promotion consideration for a year or two. This is unlike the military, where I think there’s recognition that for each promotion you have to have fulfilled a certain amount of training. There was an attempt at FSI to do that with a Foreign Affairs Leadership course, designed by Carol Wzorek. This was intended for FSO-1s before they were promoted into the Senior Foreign Service. That course also included a lot of simulations. I took that while I was at FSI and it was quite interesting. Although I started out skeptical of simulations, I came to believe that they really did help people. I was lucky that among the people who were in the group I was with was Marc Grossman, who was a terrific officer and who later held very important positions.

Q: He was number three in the State Department top-ranking professionals.
HARVEY: I can still remember one of the simulations we did, in which Marc stopped and asked if he was doing the right thing. I was one of those who said, “Yes, this is the right way to go.” Then later he asked me, “Did that make me look weak?” I remember saying, “No, that made you look strong, that you consulted with the people on your team.”

Q: Did you find some people I mean say there had been a political officer for some time but when you started looking at them at their strengths and weaknesses was it pretty obvious they were in the wrong cone? Their shyness or what have you?

HARVEY: There were some. But this wasn’t from my FSI experience, or someone I had worked with directly. This came from experience on a promotion panel, where we considered an officer who should have been in INR, not serving overseas. A very good analyst, but had no people skills whatsoever. To be in INR you don’t really need people skills, you need analytical skills.

Q: Sometimes people say Joe Smith really needs to bring his get out there and meet the people skill up to snuff or not or that wasn’t part of the puzzle?

HARVEY: No. I don’t think when people were assigned for the training--I don’t recall-- some of them might have had onward assignments, but I don’t think they all did.

Q: Did you find looking at the political operations could you recognize places where you were improving? In other words were you picking up mannerisms, approaches really to prove you as a political officer?

HARVEY: I think in some of the simulations. I don’t know if it was from that or from natural inclinations, but I’ve always been a good listener. And I think as you move into more senior administrative positions that’s very important. The people you are supervising have to feel you have listened to their point of view whether you decide in their favor or not.

Q: Yes. Were you looking at sort of the foreign affairs headlines of the day and feeding the issues into your course of study?

HARVEY: This was so long ago I don’t really remember much about that.

Q: I can understand that. Well, what were you looking towards doing for your onward assignment?

HARVEY: Actually after FSI I got the job that I had been considered for before that, the deputy in the office that handled Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore. The office director was Dick Teare, an exceptionally capable officer and a wonderful person. He and his wife, Jeanie, became good friends.

Q: When you were saying you have run that off Brunei is sort of off there by itself. What and I really have talked to only one person who’s served there Brunei really is often in a different world isn’t it?
HARVEY: Well, it is part of the Malay world. Had it not had so much wealth it would probably have been just another of the states within Malaysia when the British pulled out. Brunei is independent but it has very close relations particularly with Malaysia and Singapore, and to a somewhat lesser extent with Indonesia.

Q: You were on this desk from when to when?

HARVEY: That would have been 1989-1991.

Q: What were some of the issues that came up?

HARVEY: One of the big issues was negotiating an access agreement with Singapore for repair of U.S. Naval ships. We worked closely with a very good officer, a commander or lieutenant commander in JMAG, from the Pentagon who handled most of the negotiations. I’ve forgotten his name, but he was excellent. We also had a very good desk officer, Shari Villarosa, who was on the Singapore desk when I arrived. She had primary responsibility for following the negotiations for State. She was later Ambassador to Mauritius; she was a very fine officer.

With Indonesia there were always human rights questions. There was what has come to be known as the Santa Cruz Massacre, where demonstrators at a cemetery in East Timor were shot by the Indonesian military in November 1991.

Q: What happened there?

HARVEY: Well, not all the details are clear because you get different stories. But apparently one of the demonstrators knifed one of the Army officers present at the demonstration, who happened to be from South Sulawesi, an area whose Buginese and Makassarese inhabitants are known for having hair-trigger tempers. He was also, as my defense attaché later said, “A 40 year old second lieutenant, so you could tell he was not one of their best and brightest officers.” But in any case, the Indonesian military present shot the demonstrators, and quite a few were killed. Some of the bodies were not found, and there was some concern they may have been dumped at sea. So that was all very nasty.

Q: What did we do?

HARVEY: Protested, but there was not much we could do.

Q: Were we able to get in there and look at what happened?

HARVEY: In general we had no problem getting to East Timor, but I don’t know whether in the immediate aftermath we were able to get people in or not. U.S. military aid to Indonesia in the form of IMET (International Military Education and Training) was cut in 1992, largely as a result of Congressional pressure following this incident, as I recall.

Q: How were relations with Indonesia during that time?
HARVEY: Well, Indonesia has always been…we’ve had ambivalent relations, I guess I would say. It’s a very large important Muslim majority country and a relatively moderate Islamic country. It has always been strongly nationalistic in terms of its economic policies, which sometimes cause us problems. As a majority Islamic country it almost never votes with us in the UN, since so many of the votes deal with Israel, and Indonesia is sympathetic to the Palestinians and usually votes with the Arab Bloc. But in terms of our interests in the Pacific area, and in terms of things like the South China Sea (which had not been an issue then, it’s coming up much more now), they have very much favored working out a peaceful arrangement. They support the other ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members in saying they are not going to negotiate individually with China, they will negotiate as ASEAN. Indonesia has also been a very strong supporter of UN Peacekeeping operations and has sent troops, small units, to a number of places under UN auspices, including to Cambodia. The reputation of the Indonesian military when they are with the UN is very good. Our defense attaché in Jakarta in the 1990s, Colonel Don McFetridge, used to say to his military contacts, “Why don’t you pretend you are with the UN when you are in East Timor, and treat the people there as you do when you are on a UN assignment?”

Q: Yes. You mentioned the economic issues came up between us. What were the problems with the Indonesians and the United States in economic terms?

HARVEY: They were not ones that I had to deal with very directly, although I think there were some issues with textile quotas. Fair treatment of U.S. firms was something that came up from time to time. For me it’s easier to talk about what happened later when I was in Jakarta. One of the major American investors in Indonesia is Freeport McMoran, the big copper and gold company, which has a big mine in West Irian (now called Papua). Mining is inherently destructive to the environment, so there are always problems having to do with such things as the tailings being put into rivers; well, that’s the way mines operate. There were also, because of the mine’s location, in what was then called Irian, an area that had not been developed by the Dutch. Levels of education were very low, levels of sophistication were very low, there were strong tribal divisions, very poor infrastructure, very mountainous terrain, and very hard to get anywhere. In fact, later when I was in Jakarta there was an outbreak of fighting between one of the ethnic groups that was indigenous to the area where the mine is and a group that had moved in looking for opportunities—and the fight was with bows and arrows.

Q: I would think that being on the desk dealing with the tribal distribution in Indonesia as you were saying every valley has a different tribal allegiance that it would be extremely complicated to understand and certainly to explain what the problem was for a political officer trying to figure out what the hell’s going on.

HARVEY: Well, in fact a lot of this sort of more anthropological information was not of great interest to the Department of State, so it wasn’t dealt with. There were, however, continuing rebellions. Aceh was one which was only relatively recently solved, and so there was concern about how the military was treating civilians in Aceh in the northern part of Sumatra. But on more economic issues—there were questions such as textile quotas, questions of fair treatment of foreign investors. There was still a fair amount of American investment in oil, so whether the
Indonesian oil company, Pertamina, was getting more favored treatment, drilling rights, all of that in the economics sphere were things that had to be dealt with.

Q: I was watching a TV show just the other day about Aceh.

HARVEY: Yes, there was one about how well they’ve survived the tsunami.

Q: And the tsunami basically ended the fighting.

HARVEY: That’s a bit of a simplification, but it certainly helped. There had been negotiations going on for years. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, when he was a Coordinating Minister in Megawati’s cabinet (he was later president), had come up with a plan for a resolution of the insurgency, which was part of the negotiation. But certainly the tsunami helped to force everybody to reach an agreement.

Q: Were you doing this work before the tsunami?

HARVEY: Oh, the tsunami was after I had retired.

Q: I was thinking that. What was happening regarding Aceh separatism or whatever?

HARVEY: There had been a Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh from 1953 to 1962, when the fighting ceased. Then a Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka—GAM) began in 1976.

Q: Was this of concern when you were on the desk?

HARVEY: Not particularly at that time. The Darul Islam rebellion had been settled in both West Java and Aceh in 1962 and in South Sulawesi in early 1965. The Darul Islam rebellion was not threatening the integration of the country, but the place of Islam in Indonesia was a nagging problem that the Indonesian government had not been able to solve. The GAM, on the other hand, was a separatist movement, wanting to establish an independent state.

Q: Were any other powers involved or was this pretty much it?

HARVEY: No, the Acehnese independence group GAM was based in Sweden, because Sweden was neutral. They had some ties with radical Islamic groups in Malaysia, but there was nothing like the current international concern about Islamic extremism.

Q: What was happening in Malaysia? Was there any spill over between the troubles in Indonesia?

HARVEY: Not particularly at that time, as far as I can recall.

Q: What were we concerned about in Malaysia?
HARVEY: I don’t recall that we had any particular problems with Malaysia. It is also a generally moderate Islamic country.

Q: Was it Singapore or Malaysia or both that we were looking for basing there?

HARVEY: Singapore; not Malaysia at all. For Singapore it was not basing, but access for ships to be repaired. This was the first time since the British had left their bases in Singapore that Singapore had considered having any foreign navy have access. The Singaporeans were quite clear this was not to be a base, but just access for repairs.

Q: Was this a design or strictly for money or was this also to develop an industrial base?

HARVEY: Singapore already had developed their industrial base. We were interested because we no longer had Subic Bay in the Philippines, and so we needed somewhere else where we could repair ships in Asia. Singapore still had the old British base on the northern part of the island, and also had technical ability. As in many places, what you spend a lot of time negotiating is your Status of Forces Agreement.

Q: I’m just thinking you bring a ship in and it may take six months or something do we send the crew elsewhere or do we leave them?

HARVEY: I don’t think there were any repairs that were that lengthy. We did have a few Americans who were housed on what had been the British base, basically supervising the repairs. I don’t want to say based because it wasn’t a base, but there were some Americans living on what had been the British base, and they were authorized to be there to supervise repairs.

Q: When you say it’s not a base how did the U.S. and the Singaporean’s consider those?

HARVEY: Well, a base you would have a fenced off area where Singaporeans could not enter; there was nothing like that.

Q: Did we find ourselves at odds with the Singaporeans on Pan-Asian situation?

HARVEY: I don’t recall there was anything like that. And they didn’t cane anyone when I was on the desk.

Q: I remember talking to the political appointee who thought he had an ideal assignment as ambassador there and then all of a sudden a caning. Was there any particular division between the various elements of what do you call the area you were dealing with?

HARVEY: Southeast Asia?

Q: Southeast Asia over or did they even see China as being a menace?

HARVEY: That, I think, came later. When I was on the desk ASEAN was very important. Indonesia is by far the largest country in Southeast Asia and the largest member of ASEAN.
They’ve always been very careful not to dominate ASEAN, and they also tend to follow a tactic of what they call “leading from behind.” They exert influence without trying to push people around. Singapore, although very small, has more of an inclination to lead from the front and to make its wishes known. Singapore has very capable people—a highly educated population, very sophisticated. and it gives them a great advantage in dealing with their neighbors.

Q: Were we working to build up their military capabilities which may be the wrong term but police capabilities...

HARVEY: No, no. Not at all. Singapore didn’t need any outside help.

Q: What about pirates?

HARVEY: That wasn’t as much of a problem at that time; it didn’t really register on our radar screen at least.

Q: It’s interesting how that grew and all off the coast of Somalia.

HARVEY: Yes, and I think it had been more Thai pirates, but by this time the outflow of Vietnamese refugees had certainly slowed. That was more of a problem when I was posted in Singapore, and at that time there was concern about pirates preying on the Vietnamese.

Q: Did you find that your area of responsibility ran across Thai problems too?

HARVEY: Not particularly, no. Periodically there are flare ups along the Thai-Malaysian border, where an area along the border was a separate kingdom, Patani. The border had been switched back and forth depending on whether the British or the Japanese were in control. But it was quiet at that time, so we didn’t really get involved -- there was nothing to get involved in.

Q: Was Vietnam at all an influence in the area?

HARVEY: Well, Indonesia had always felt relatively friendly toward Vietnam because they were the two countries in Southeast Asia that actually had anti-colonial revolutions; they weren’t just given their independence. So even during the Vietnam War there was quite a bit of sympathy in Indonesia for the Vietnamese, who were seen more as nationalists than as Communists.

Q: You mentioned a massacre were there any sort of incidents or situations that dominated at least a significant amount of your work?

HARVEY: We were always concerned about the human rights situation in Indonesia because there were always incidents flaring up, particularly in East Timor and Papua, but elsewhere too. There would be instances of police or Army brutality but on the whole things were relatively calm at that time.

Q: Well then were there any high level visits presidents or secretaries of State?
HARVEY: We did have and I don’t remember who it was. I remember staying very late with our very good secretary, Dee Hawkins, making sure all the briefing books were in order. Subsequently, the East Asia Bureau had a regional affairs office which handled all the meetings of ASEAN and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and so forth, but at that time the desk for the country where the meeting was held was responsible for putting together the briefing books.

Q: How effective did you feel ASEAN was?

HARVEY: I thought it was effective and had quite a potential for the future, not necessarily so much at the top levels, but there were very many committees where mid-level bureaucrats from the different countries got used to working with each other. Because of the colonial past, a lot of the countries’ ties had been back to the colonial powers and they didn’t know their own neighbors all that well. ASEAN, I think, strengthened the sense of working together, and over time that has been very important.

Q: Were there any inclinations on the part of some of the powers particularly your areas of concern to be at odds with each other?

HARVEY: Well, sort of at a low level. Indonesia and Malaysia have some unresolved border disputes, but it doesn’t affect their overall relationship; occasionally there is a little flare-up and so forth. Also between the Philippines and Malaysia: the old Sulu Sultanate still claims part of Malaysia, but again it’s a low level. Of course, in the southern Philippines there have been lots of problems in Mindanao, because it’s an Islamic area, in opposition to Manila. Subsequently, as we’ve seen the growth of radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, the southern Philippines has been a place where a lot of training has gone on. So you found Malaysian and Indonesian extremists going there, but that’s much later.

Q: How did let’s say the southern Philippines not end up in Indonesia?

HARVEY: Because it was a Spanish colony. The borders are pretty much colonial borders.

Q: Were we looking at all at terrorism?

HARVEY: I don’t recall that being an issue at that time.

Q: This is a great way to get ready to deal with Indonesia as a country again wasn’t it? Where did you go after this?

HARVEY: After being on the desk I was promoted to officer counselor and an opening came up as a deputy assistant secretary (DAS) in personnel. Ed Perkins was the Director General (DG), and he interviewed me. His principal deputy, Larry Williamson, and I had gotten to know each other partly as a result of my experience at FSI. Larry had organized a panel for the career development counselors. He wanted people who had been on a promotion panel to give an indication of what made an impression on people on the promotion panel. I was asked to be one of the people on the panel for the career development officers. I think Larry was impressed with
me because I’m always very straight-forward and honest. The other aspect was that the man who was then handling senior assignments, George Knight, had been administrative counselor in Jakarta when I was in Surabaya as principal officer. He knew me and knew that I, unlike some political officers, was interested in administration and had shown in Surabaya that I could deal with administrative problems.

Q: How long were you doing this?

HARVEY: I did that for two years.

Q: What were the issues you mainly had to deal with?

HARVEY: It changed. Initially we had Ed Perkins as DG, Larry Williamson as principal deputy, and Ken Hunter the DAS dealing more with civil service and performance issues. I dealt with Foreign Service recruitment and examinations, performance evaluation, retirement, and Foreign Service National (FSN, local staff) issues. The following year we got another DAS. Ruth Whiteside joined us, so we divvied up responsibilities. By that time, if I remember correctly, Genta Hawkins Homes was DG, and Peter Burleigh was principal deputy. Ruth Whiteside took over FSN issues among her responsibilities, and I added career assignments, except for senior assignments, which Peter Burleigh handled, and kept the other FSO career things. I was also the liaison with the Medical Division (MED).

Two things I would mention about Ed Perkins, who I thought was a very fine officer. First, he often said that he could find any number of people who could follow regulations, but very few who could exercise judgment. Another of his mantras was that if it’s a law obviously we obey it, but if it’s a regulation and it doesn’t make sense—-we write the regulations so we can change them. There were a couple of things that we worked on when I was there. One was that there was no way for someone who was a generalist officer to convert to be a specialist. Ed Perkins had met a consular officer who had become fascinated by technology and wanted to go into the technology side of things, but as a generalist he couldn’t convert to be a specialist. Well, we started working on it, and a couple years later, after both Ed Perkins and I had moved on, the regulations were changed and people could convert from generalist to specialist.

Q: What was the reason that this had become imbedded? There doesn’t seem to be any particular reason or rationality to make people once they are in one’s area they can’t move to another.

HARVEY: Well, as you yourself are aware, I’m sure, there has always been this great, almost class, distinction between generalists and specialists. Generalists had passed the Foreign Service exam, which has an almost mythic status within the FSO corps. So I think it was the idea: how would anyone who is a generalist want to become a specialist? You had to break down that kind of thinking.

Q: Of course those things we’re talking about an era and I suppose it continues but it was getting particularly exciting about moving into one’s specialized area because of technology particularly and the opportunities were case out there.
HARVEY: One of my favorite examples of the problems of what could happen with this kind of thinking was a man named Dick Shinnick, who ended up as a very senior administrative officer. He initially applied to be a regional security officer (RSO), but he didn’t have a college degree. To be an RSO you have to have a college degree, but to be a Foreign Service officer you just have to pass an exam. So he passed the exam. He had been a fireman in New York city and read the *New York Times* every day. If you want to pass the Foreign Service exam reading the *New York Times* every day is probably the best preparation. As I mentioned, he became a very senior, and highly regarded, administrative officer. Those of us who knew Dick and knew the background were always quite amused that he couldn’t be a regional security officer but he could be an administrative officer—who supervises RSOs. (I knew Dick through Anne Hackett, a wonderful person and gifted administrative officer, who died way too young. Anne’s father was a fireman, so she felt a particular connection with Dick.)

*Q:* Were there any specific things that you were dealing with in this period of time?

HARVEY: There were questions, as there always are, about the exam, both written and oral, and changes to the oral to try to make sure that you are getting the best people possible. I had argued, but not strongly enough obviously, that I thought we should try to do some sort of assessment to compare how people did on the written and oral exams and what their subsequent careers were, to see if the exam was, in fact, able to predict who would do well. But I find many Foreign Service officers, at least in the past, were so wedded to the written exam that they didn’t want any question about whether it was valid or not. I understand that the written exam was brought in as a way to make the Foreign Service more open— that it couldn’t just be an old boys club of the Ivy League, but anybody who could pass the exam would be eligible for the Foreign Service. That’s certainly admirable, but things change and I think you need to consider whether the exam is still the best instrument or not.

We were beginning to get cases of people who had used drugs when they were in college; this was in the 1980s. There was a question of whether that could be overridden, were they a security risk or not? So there were discussions about that.

*Q:* I would think that kids are kids and...

HARVEY: But this was new, this was the first time anybody had to deal with that.

*Q:* How did you feel about it at the time?

HARVEY: There was one case of a young man who had gone I think it was to Reed College, which is very progressive, and I think probably all the undergraduate students had experimented with drugs. He had subsequently worked, I think it was for USIA, and had a sterling record and strong endorsements from people with whom he had worked there. I felt he should be given a chance, so overrode the negative decision of the recruitment division. However, for the most part relations with the examination and recruitment office were fine.
On evaluations I worked with a very good officer, Keith Wauchope. I believe it was my second year there and Keith’s first. But in any case, during tax time I said to Keith, “If people can file income tax by computer, why can’t we do evaluations that way?” He said, “We should be able to do so.” So he started working with our IT (information technology) people. Again, it was long after I had moved on before performance evaluations could be done electronically. Keith and the IT people did the actual work, but I take some credit for having asked the question that set people along that path. It took a couple of tries before the electronic submission of evaluations was easy to do, but I’m sure now all of the performance evaluations are done electronically.

(Again, I am reminded of a quote usually attributed to former Secretary of State George Schultz: “You can accomplish a lot if you don’t care who gets credit for it.”)

One particular case I worked on was a retired officer, Douglas Ramsey, who had been captured by the Viet Cong in Vietnam, and moved around in the jungle while being kept in a small bamboo cage for seven years. He resumed his Foreign Service career, but a few years later he retired. He passed his retirement medical, but soon thereafter experienced circulatory problems, which his own doctor thought was because of having been confined in a small cage for so long. Ramsey had applied for disability retirement, which would have made his pension tax exempt. However the Medical Division had maintained that because he had passed the medical exam at the time of his retirement, he could not be granted disabled status. This didn’t seem fair to me, so I worked with Larry Brown, then deputy in the Medical Division (who had been the doctor in Jakarta when I was in Surabaya in the 1980s) to see what might be done. MED eventually agreed that if a current medical exam showed that the officer’s disability was directly related to his experience of having been confined in a small cage while in Vietnam, he could be granted disability status. Ramsey’s doctor provided the certification, and he was granted disability status. I’ve always felt that Mr. Ramsey was motivated as much by the desire for recognition of what he had undergone in Vietnam as by a wish for tax relief.

Q: Yes. Well then again you left this job when?

HARVEY: I left to go out to Jakarta as DCM in June 1993. Two things happened. First, we decided in personnel that we wanted to cut back on the number of deputy assistant secretary positions throughout the Department; we felt there had been a proliferation of DASs, and that the personnel office should set an example. At the same time, I had been in the job for two years, and although I wasn’t necessarily due for transfer, that is the usual tour of duty in the Department.

Not long before this, Bob Barry, who had gone out to Jakarta as Ambassador, had been advised to come talk to me before he went out because I had long experience in Indonesia. So I did talk to him, in part discussing in my view what the strengths and some of the problem areas of some of his predecessors had been. As I finished I said, “I’ve been very frank so I hope this will be a confidential conversation.” He said, “Yes, of course.” I think it made an impression on him that I had been very forthcoming and very frank.

So then when Rich Wilson, who had been his deputy, was due to be transferred, the list of people who had bid on the job was sent out for Ambassador Barry to choose a new DCM. After
receiving the list Bob sent back a message asking, “Why wasn’t Barbara Harvey’s name on it?”

Well, I hadn’t bid because at that point I wasn’t eligible for transfer and we were still in the process of figuring out what we were going to do about the number of DASs. So then we sent my name out, which took care of two problems: we got rid of one of the DAS positions, and I got the job in Jakarta as DCM.

Q: Who was the ambassador for most of the time you were in Indonesia?

HARVEY: The first half it was Bob Barry and the second half was Stape Roy.

Q: Well these are two very strong people.

HARVEY: Yes.

Q: So when did you go to Indonesia?


Q: And you were there for how long?

HARVEY: I was there until September 1997.

Q: When you went out in 1993 what was the situation politically? Then we will move on from there.

HARVEY: Well, Soeharto had been in power since 1965, or actually early 1966 when he formally took over. Although initially he had listened to his advisors, particularly his economic advisors, by the 1990s he had been in power so long that he wasn’t taking advice from anybody. One of the main problems was his children, who had grown up believing that the way one did business was to get commissions because your father was president; you didn’t rely on your own efforts. So there was considerable corruption, particularly connected with the Soeharto children. The economy was still doing reasonably well, but politically things were kind of stagnant. However, two things were happening which I think boded well for the future. One was that although there was considerable political control, two political parties had been established under Soeharto in addition to Golkar (Golongan Karya—Functional Groups), which was the regime’s political and electoral vehicle, but which they always described as not a political party. So Golkar and the two parties, PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Indonesian Democracy Party) and PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan—United Development Party, which comprised four Islamic parties), had developed experience in running for elections. It might be noted that Soeharto was very clever: Golkar never won more than about 65 percent of the vote; it was not one of those places where the regime got 99 percent. So the parties developed some experience in how you operate in a political system. Also, Parliament had actually become more significant. Ministers would go Parliament when they were asked to report to a committee about what was going on.
The other was that there was a proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGO): there was a legal aid society, there were a couple of environmental groups; such groups developed experience in operating as civil society, which was very important later on after Soeharto’s fall. I credit our AID program with much of this civil society development through their support of such organizations, but the Germans and some others also provided support. A talented USAID program officer who worked with NGOs, Mark Johnson, recognizing that problems with financial accounting had been a problem for some NGOs, included money to pay accountants in their grants.

There were also two very large Islamic organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama, which was more traditionalist, and the Muhammadiyah, which was more modernist. They were marginally involved in politics; at one time they had each had their own political party, but under Soeharto all the Islamic parties had been combined into one party. So these organizations became not political parties, but maintained their existence as social organizations with schools, hospitals, women’s groups, labor groups, and so forth. So they also had an organizational structure outside the government. Islam has always been an outside-the-government critic, something that could maintain independence from the government and that has been important.

Q: I would think that this would…I mean the ________ call themselves non-political but it is political.

HARVEY: Well they obviously had influence and the head of one of them, Abdurrahman Wahid of the NU, was president later on.

Q: How did you find the embassy when you got there because your job was to run it?

HARVEY: We had a very good staff. Barbara Schrage was the political counselor; we had not worked together before, but we kind of knew each other, and one of our mutual friends, Desaix Anderson, had told each of us we’d get along fine, which we did. She was excellent: a very good analyst, managed her section very well also.

Q: What is she now?

HARVEY: After she left Jakarta she got caught in one of the promotion crunches, but she ran the Washington office of the AIT (American Institute in Taiwan) here for years; she retired about 2013. If you haven’t interviewed her, she would be well worth interviewing.

Her husband, Bruce Tully, was the regional security officer, also very good. Our economic counselor was Bob Fitts, who had served in Indonesia before, and again a very strong officer. His deputy was Dan Clune, who was new to the economic field, but had done the economic course at FSI and had done it very well. He was subsequently ambassador to Laos; an excellent officer. (I have two of his wife Judy’s paintings; she is a very talented artist.) My first administrative counselor, Gerry Manderscheid, was one of the best administrative officers in the Foreign Service, just superb. I’m still in touch—but now it’s mostly his wife, Bea, who replies to e-mails. (They retired to Tucson, Arizona, so when I went out to be diplomat-in-residence at the University of Arizona I saw a good bit of them there.) The first Consul General was Penny
McMurtry, who again was a very strong officer; she had taught the consular course at FSI. Actually, before I went out to Surabaya I took the seven-day course and it was Penny who taught it. She was succeeded by Bill Barkell; so as I say we had a strong, good staff. During my four years in Jakarta I had three secretaries/office managers, all very capable: Ginny Crawford, Freddie Barron, and Wendy Gralneck.

The head of USIS initially was Wes Stewart a good officer, whose wife was social secretary for the front office, and then Steven Monblatt. The head of USAID, Fritz Weden was succeeded by Vikka Moldrem., both very good, and we worked very closely with them. So we had a good staff.

Talking about staff, I should also mention that the first defense attaché was John Haseman, Colonel John Haseman, who had been there before as an assistant Army attaché: a very strong officer. He was succeeded by Don McFetridge, who is a superb officer. I’m still in touch with both John and Don. Don and his wife, Cinda, became very close friends; unfortunately Cinda died in 2013. Both John and Don had attended the Indonesian Army Staff College so they had very good contacts in the Indonesian military. But both were very realistic, I felt, about the problems in the military and were very committed to trying to improve the Indonesian military’s treatment of civilians.

Some of the local staff were people I had known since I was in Surabaya in the 1960s, such as Rien Lubis in Personnel. The senior FSN in the Consular Section was Hartati Kertonadi; I had hired Hartati for USIS in Surabaya in the 1960s. She had transferred to the Embassy in Jakarta on one of the occasions when USIS Surabaya was threatened with closure. Both very able women.

When I arrived in Jakarta there were two inter-agency committees, both of which I thought functioned very well. The first was on the environment; USAID had a good program on the environment, headed by an excellent officer, Alfred Nakatsuma. Tropical forestry and peat fires in Kalimantan, were among the concerns.

The second was a human rights committee that included all sections of the embassy that had any possible concern with human rights. One of the things the military members of the committee wanted to do when we started with combined training operations with some of the Indonesian forces, particularly their Special Forces, was to include a segment on proper treatment of civilians. We saw the combined training as an opportunity to promote human rights. Such combined operations have been criticized by some people as working too closely with a military that has human rights problems. But we felt the way to deal with the situation is to try to train the people who are committing the abuses, not to ignore them. If you just condemn from afar you are not doing anything to change the situation that leads to abuse. (I might mention that the Jakarta representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], Henri Fournier, also devised training programs for the Indonesian military to inculcate respect for civilians.)

In addition to the usual array of U.S. Government agencies, during my time in Jakarta there was a Naval Medical Research (NAMRU) laboratory. Initially set up for research on malaria during the Second World War, the laboratory had expanded to include research on AIDS, and other
current medical issues affecting both Americans and local people. At some point NAMRU had come under criticism from Indonesian government health agencies—and years later was ousted—but I was able to call on old contacts to host a luncheon with relevant players, and the problem was resolved, at least temporarily.

Q: Where there any problems within the embassy or between the embassy and the consulates around?

HARVEY: I don’t recall that we did have. During the time I was there USIA closed their operation first in Surabaya and then in Medan, although the embassy protested in both cases because we thought USIS programs were very useful. Then subsequently the Department closed the consulate in Medan, which again the Embassy protested. There was still the insurgency in Aceh, and Medan was the nearest place to try to keep up with what was going on.

Q: It was sort of hard.

HARVEY: The department tried to close Surabaya twice and both times I sent in protests. Somebody in M (Undersecretary for Management’s office) once said to me, “Well, you know it does make a difference, because sometimes if nobody protests when we propose to close a post, we feel that we can go ahead and do it.” But Surabaya still handled all of eastern Indonesia. You can’t just operate in the capital city you have to know what is going on in the rest of the country.

Q: __________ and do it more likely in Paris then. Did you find that our coverage of the various areas of Indonesia was spotty or not?

HARVEY: Well, inevitably because this was just such a huge country. We did get people out a bit. At one time the man who was at that time deputy in Bappenas, which was the national planning institute, Mubyarto, was someone I had known for years. I had known him from Australia because he had done his doctoral work there. When I was in Surabaya he was heading an institute concerned with rural development that was affiliated with Gajah Mada University in Jogjakarta. He was a wonderful person. At my request he took Dan Clune around to visit some of the regional development programs that he was overseeing; I’ve always felt that often it is hard for people in the Embassy to get out and to see things in other parts of the country. I know Dan appreciated that opportunity very much.

Q: Were you able to get travel funds?

HARVEY: It wasn’t too much of a problem.

The Embassy sent officers regularly to East Timor because of concerns about the treatment of East Timorese under Indonesian occupation. Political officers and the Defense Attaché went regularly; I went once with Scott Butcher, then the office director in the Department. During our visit we met with Bishop Belo, the senior religious figure in East Timor, and a critic of Indonesian rule; Catholic schools and orphanages; as well as the governor and military commander. The military commander when I visited was Johny Lumintang, a Menadonese
Protestant, who had a reputation for being strict with his troops to prevent abuses. Bishop Belo told us that Lumintang was tough on his troops, but, he said, was also tough on the Timorese.

When Ambassador Bob Barry returned from a visit to East Timor he told the country team that one of the problems of Timor was poverty, and he asked the USAID Director, Fritz Weden, if there was anything the U.S. could do to help alleviate poverty. Fritz said that he would ask a well-known USAID contractor, Sam Filliachi, to go to Timor and make recommendations. (Filliachi had set up a very successful furniture factory in Central Java, using mahogany that had been cut down when roads were widened.) On his return from Timor, Filliachi recommended a project to produce organic coffee. Timorese farmers had stopped fertilizing or spraying their coffee bushes because the army monopoly didn’t pay enough to make it worth their while to grow coffee. Based on Filliachi’s recommendation, and under his guidance, a coffee growers cooperative was established, and was very successful.

Q: Now how stood Indonesia in its foreign relations during the time you were there?

HARVEY: Similar to what I’ve discussed before. Generally supportive unless it was something that involved the Palestinians or the Near East. As an active member of the Organization of Islamic Countries, (OIC) Indonesia was always very much pro their positions. Indonesia did not have relations with Israel, although it was not as anti-Israel as some other countries are. In terms of working together in Asia I think there were no particular problems on the foreign policy front. The Indonesians somewhat resented our tendency to be critical of what was happening in East Timor and Papua and elsewhere, but no major problems.

Indonesia has played a very important role in ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Although by far the largest country in ASEAN, Indonesia has been careful not to dominate the organization. The ASEAN Secretariat, which moved to Jakarta during my time there, and the frequent meetings of ASEAN committees, provided a means for Southeast Asians to get to know each other. The development of personal relationships has enabled the ASEAN countries to work together on trade and national security issues. These relationships have helped to overcome the isolation of the countries from one another, which had developed because of historic ties between the colonies and the respective colonial powers, rather than to their geographic neighbors.

Q: Today is the 18th of November, 2014, an interview with Barbara Harvey. We are a little unsure of where we left off so let us talk about the Clinton visit. This is when?

HARVEY: That would have been in November 1994 for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting. Bob Barry was still ambassador, and Don McFetridge had already come as defense attaché.

For Embassy staff, much of our attention had to be diverted to coping with a group of 29 East Timorese who had jumped over the wall into the Embassy parking lot on the eve of the arrival of the Presidential party. The Timorese were demanding to meet with the President, or Secretary of State, and refused to consider meeting with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to discuss alternatives, such as seeking asylum in Portugal.
Initially we asked Marta Barkell, wife of the consul general, who was from Brazil, to come in to speak with the Timorese in Portuguese. However, the four Timorese in the group who spoke Portuguese also spoke English, so that proved not to be necessary. We moved the group away from the front wall—where they had been holding what amounted to a continuing press conference, and ordering hamburgers from the local McDonald’s—to a sheltered area at the side of the USIS building, and provided them with food, water, and bathroom facilities. The political counselor, Barbara Schrage, who had been very much involved in setting up the program for the President’s visit, remained at the Embassy throughout the visit to deal with any problems that might arise with the Timorese.

The ambassador, Bob Barry, who naturally was focused on the presidential status visit, may have been concerned that the Indonesian military might not respect the sovereign status of Embassy property and try to remove the Timorese. However, early on Defense Attaché Don McFetridge got in touch with the deputy for operations of the Jakarta military command, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (later president of Indonesia), who assured Don that the Indonesians would not enter Embassy property—unless we wished them to remove the East Timorese.

A week after the Presidential party had departed, one of the Timorese became ill on a Sunday afternoon, and we determined that he should be hospitalized. After phoning a number of contacts, I reached Hariman Sirigar, a doctor and former student activist, who put me in touch with a doctor, who had studied in the U.S., and who was prepared to take the sick Timorese to the government hospital with which he was affiliated. The regional security officer, Bruce Tully, convinced the leaders of the Timorese group that they must allow their sick comrade to be taken to the hospital, by calling on a Catholic doctrine of sin and responsibility. We agreed to have an Embassy officer present at the hospital at all times, to ease the Timorese fear that their ill comrade might be spirited away by the Indonesian military. Don McFetridge, the defense attaché, informed his contacts in the Indonesian army of what was going on. He and Tom Green, the army attaché—both fluent in Indonesian—had done much to maintain communication with the Timorese—which caused some negative comments from their TNI contacts.

While we were busy making these arrangements, a phone call (just like a crisis management exercise scenario) came in from my old friend, General Andi Jusuf. He wanted my advice on seeking medical treatment in Australia, as his medical condition was too serious for him to travel to the U.S. I told him I would get the information and get back to him. Don McFetridge knew the appropriate member of the Australian defense attaché office, and asked him to contact General Jusuf to make the necessary arrangements.

Eventually the Timorese did accept the offer of asylum in Portugal, and with the help of Henri Fournier of the ICRC, left on Thanksgiving Day. One of our junior officers—one of the best—Kamala Lakhdhir, who had been helpful on many fronts during the visit, and I ate turkey sandwiches in my office as the final departure went off smoothly.

Q: Okay. Well were you given Hillary Clinton as your...
HARVEY: We were asked to set up a tea with women leaders for Hillary Clinton. The ambassador’s wife, Peggy Barry, and I worked on that together. The ambassador’s residence was being used for meetings that President Clinton was having with various people, so the tea was in my residence, which was right next door. Peggy and I were in agreement that we would have women who were interesting in their own right, not just wives of ministers or some such. They had to be women who were prepared to speak up and they had to have some fluency in English. We started out with a longer list but the White House kept adding staff people they wanted to have included, so it got whittled down a bit more than we would have liked; but we ended up with a very interesting group.

The tea began with Hillary Clinton making a brief statement about her own interests, and then asking the Indonesian women present to speak about their concerns. As we went around the room, Mrs. Clinton listened carefully to what each of the Indonesian women had to say, and had an appropriate comment for each.

There were only two of the Indonesian women who said very little. One was Herawati Diah, who was the first Indonesian woman to do graduate work in the United States, and was owner of one of the principal newspapers. The other was a woman who Peggy had gotten to know, who worked with street children. We wanted, in a sense, to make a statement by including this woman in the group.

Among those included were the head of the woman’s studies program at the University of Indonesia, Dr. Saparinah Sadli, a psychologist; Nafsia M’Boi (who just recently stepped down as minister of health), at that time she was still leading an HIV-AIDS program; Pia Alisjabana, prominent both in academics, at the woman’s studies and American studies programs at the University of Indonesia, but also publisher of Femina the first Indonesian magazine for women. Also Widarti Gunawan who was editor of Femina, and whose husband, Goenawan Mohamad had been editor of Tempo magazine, the Indonesian equivalent of Time magazine which had just recently been banned. So in a sense Widarti was a twofler—we were inviting her in her own right, but also were making something as a statement about the banning of Tempo. We also included the wife of the editor of one of the other banned journals; she was a prominent lawyer, so again she was interesting in her own right, but she and Widarti also had a connection with press freedom issues, so we included both of them.

We included a young woman who was an environmental activist who had translated Al Gore’s book under a USIS contract; AID was one of the people who had recommended her. We reached out throughout the embassy community to get recommendations on people to include. USIS had recommended a young sculptress; we wanted to include the arts.

A woman active in the women’s organization affiliated with the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama, Lili Munir, was modern and progressive. She had been an English teacher as well as coming from a prominent Islamic family and being prominent in the NU. So she was an excellent representative. She wore a headscarf, as did an American Field Service returnee, who Peggy had come to know. Mely Tan, a prominent sociologist, was also present. Mari Pangestu, an economist with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), was
invited, but was unable to attend because she was attending an APEC meeting. I may have forgotten one or two, but I’m including those I can remember.

We included a prominent female entrepreneur, Martha Tilaar, head of Sari Ayu, a beauty products firm, who I had met years before. In fact, as we went through the line and I was introducing Martha Tilaar, she said to Hillary Clinton, “I used to cut her hair”; which was true. Martha had accompanied her husband on a USAID grant to study in the States, and she had taken a course in whatever you call it--cosmetology. When she first went back to Indonesia she had her own beauty shop. When I was doing research in Indonesia in 1971-72, a friend of mine had recommended Martha Tilaar to me to have my hair cut. In the meantime, in the intervening twenty years or so, she had become a big entrepreneur and I thought she’d probably forgotten. But no, she remembered, so we had a bit of a chuckle about that.

We needed also to include somebody from the government, and there was a wonderful woman who was in the woman’s affairs ministry named Sjamsiah Achmad, who had been head of international affairs at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) at the time I was doing my research in the ‘70s. So Sjamsiah and I had stayed in touch; she is from South Sulawesi, the area where I did my research. Sjamsiah ended the tea with a comment that summed everything up: she said to Hillary Clinton, “We all very much admire how you have been able to combine your own career, being a mother, and also being the wife of a prominent person in your society.” So everybody gave a round of applause and that ended the tea.

Q: Where would you put the feminist movement in Indonesia at this point?

HARVEY: Historically, in Indonesia, women have had a relatively important role. It varies, of course, because there are so many different ethnic groups. One of the prominent ethnic groups, the Minangkabau of West Sumatra, is matrilineal, so descent is reckoned through the female line. Although the men hold many of the titles and positions, they don’t get their position from their father, they get it through their mother’s line. There is also a tradition of the men leaving to be involved in business in other parts of the archipelago, so the women really hold that whole society together. The other society I know of where women have traditionally played a very important role is in South Sulawesi, where there were a number of very small kingdoms. In a number of them the chief was female, so there were female rajas. In one case, with which I am familiar, a woman was chosen over an older brother because she was thought to be more capable. Indeed she earned her spurs right after the Second World War when she told a visiting Australian military officer to take his feet off the coffee table; that was a story often recounted.

So traditionally women have had an important role. All political organizations have woman’s groups associated with them. Of course, as in any society, there are class differences. At the lower end of the scale people are poor, not very well off, and women have to work. At the upper end of the scale women have prestigious careers. In the middle class here in the U.S. you get—perhaps not quite as much as you did here in the past—a feeling that if a woman works outside the home it indicates that her husband is not able to take care of her. I really didn’t find that in Indonesia. Most women that I knew had some role outside the home, a role in society. Of course,
they were relatively well educated, and in the Foreign Service one does tend to meet more the upper levels of society.

Q: Did you feel the American Embassy was a driving force behind changes or were we playing catch up or were we going along? How would you fit the...

HARVEY: I think it would be a mistake--and, of course, I have a view that the U.S. pushes people around too much. I think you should be supportive, and support those people who represent the values that we in the United States have, but I think if we get out in front we damage the indigenous people who are trying to do something. There is a strong strain of nationalism in Indonesia, as I suspect there is in many countries, so you have to be careful not to taint the people who are leading change domestically by letting their enemies throw out the implication they are simply American puppets. So I think one has to have a light touch.

I do think particularly our AID program in Indonesia did a lot to support the development of the middle class, and that everywhere is the basic support for democracy. There had been a lot of AID educational programs. Indonesia at the time it became independent had about 230 college graduates in a population of over 60 million. So they had an enormous amount of catching up to do. So American programs for education were very, very important. But the U.S. was also important in supporting things like the legal aid institute, providing support to environmental groups and to other non-governmental organizations. We weren’t the only country doing this; the Germans, the British and the French also worked with the non-governmental groups. We also worked to some extent with parliamentary staff, partly through the Library of Congress (which had a representative in Jakarta, Will Tuchrello) and the Congressional Research Service. I think that was also very important in an attempt to make the legislature more functional.

As I mentioned earlier, we had a Human Rights Working Group within the Embassy, which considered both long-range efforts to strengthen the rule of law and civil society, and action on particular cases of concern. We usually sent an Embassy representative to any trial with human rights implications, or contacted Indonesian government officials to express concern if we heard of some infraction. I might mention an instance when I was accompanying a congressional staff group on a call on the chief of the general staff of the Indonesian army, General Mantiri. A member of the delegation raised the question of human rights, and General Mantiri said, pointing at me, “She calls me up and tells me not to shoot the demonstrators.” I tell her, “I won’t unless I have to.” (I had met General Mantiri when Ambassador Barry insisted that I be included in a group of dignitaries invited to land on a visiting aircraft carrier. A cousin of General Mantiri’s had become a good friend when I was doing research in 1971-72 on the Permesta rebellion, in which the cousin was one of the prominent civilians involved.)

One other thing I might mention is that USIS worked with the journalists and with the Press Institute also to try to strengthen the independent press. Although certainly there were licensing requirements, and there were controls, and there was a lot of self-censorship, it was still the case if you read the newspapers regularly you could read between the lines and you could figure out a lot of what was going on. This was particularly true of the English-language Jakarta Post, which didn’t seem to attract much attention from the censors, but was read by the Indonesian elite, as well as by foreigners.
In 1994, the prominent news weekly *Tempo* was banned, for reporting on a dispute within the government on the purchase of used naval vessels from the former East Germany. According to many knowledgeable Indonesians, the minister of research, B. J. Habibie, the main actor in the purchase of the ships, wanted to take *Tempo* to court, but President Soeharto decided to ban the journal instead (along with two other journals that had run afoul of the government, *Editor*, and *Detik*). Subsequently, in at least two public talks, one to the American Studies Association and another not long before I left Jakarta in 1997, I mentioned *Tempo* as having been important in building a sense of nationhood because it was read throughout the archipelago, and reported news from throughout the archipelago. (Mild, perhaps, but I’m told that Jacob Oetomo, editor of the leading daily, *Kompas*, thought such a public reference showed courage.)

More directly, I spoke about the banning of *Tempo*, at a meeting at the ministry of defense, with a delegation from Washington that hoped to sell to Indonesia F-16s whose delivery to Pakistan had been blocked by the Congress. (I must have been charge at the time.) After the American presentation, an Indonesian officer, who I did not know, asked, in Indonesian, if there were any guarantees that the sale would actually go through. All the Americans looked at me, so I replied, in Indonesian, that there were no guarantees. If there were human rights abuses, or restrictions on the free press, such as the banning of *Tempo*, it was likely that the Congress would oppose such a sale. At the conclusion of the meeting, the officer who had asked the question, Agus Wijoyo, came over, and introduced himself in perfect English. He had benefitted from IMET training, and was, in fact, one of the leading reformers in the Indonesian army. (We stayed in touch for a number of years.)

Also while I was charge, not long after *Tempo* was banned, I accompanied a delegation from one of our Southern states, where Habibie hoped to locate an airplane factory (similar to his factory in Bandung), to a meeting with President Soeharto and Minister Habibie. Before going in to the meeting, I told the American delegation that I would not speak unless Soeharto mentioned the banning of *Tempo*, and then I would find it necessary to say something. As usual in such meetings, Soeharto spoke of the economic advances Indonesia had made during his presidency. Then, as the meeting was nearing conclusion, he mentioned the banning of the three journals. I spoke up to say, this time in English, that the U.S. very much admired the economic development that had occurred under his rule, but that we also cared about press freedom, and therefore it was not surprising that there should be criticism, not least in the U.S. Congress, of the banning of *Tempo* and the other journals. Soeharto nodded; Habibie looked uncomfortable, and as our group left the room Soeharto’s interpreter, Widodo, give me a two-thumbs-up sign.

I might also mention the Human Rights Commission that was established during my time in Jakarta. A number of leading human rights activists initially declined to become members of the commission because it was established by the government. They didn’t think it would be independent, and joining the commission might compromise their reputations. But I felt that this was an opportunity of which we could take advantage—that our support could help to make the commission a real force to advance human rights. There were a number of respected members on the commission, Asmara Nababan, for example, who was chairman. One highly regarded member was a police general, Rukmini, the highest ranking female officer in the police. Another, and another indication of how little was clear-cut in Indonesia, is that the secretary
general of the commission, Baharuddin Lopa, was not only a law professor, but director general of prisons in the ministry of justice.

During the presidential visit for APEC, we arranged for a high-ranking member of the delegation (it may have been the Secretary, I don’t remember) to meet with members of the commission. There may subsequently have been some USAID support for the commission’s secretariat. Indeed, the commission did become a respected institution within the human rights community, and played an important role in promoting respect for human rights.

Q: Did you feel that there was if not a new wave a continuing wave coming from colleges in the U.S. and all for women?

HARVEY: Before 9/11 there were very large numbers of Indonesian students studying in the U.S. After visa restrictions were imposed and it became more difficult for people with Muslim sounding names to enter the U.S., the number of students dropped off quite dramatically. I understand that has begun to recover.

Q: What about developments of colleges and universities in Indonesia?

HARVEY: Every province, at the time I was there, had a state-run university; they varied in quality. The best university is the University of Indonesia in Jakarta. Also excellent is the Institute of Technology in Bandung, which had been founded under the Dutch and has turned out some very good engineers. Then Gajah Mada University, which is in Jogjakarta, is also an excellent university. Among the others, Airlangga University in Surabaya had a good medical faculty. In the 1960s there were university-to-university contracts under AID sponsorship, which I think were very effective. The University of California had a contract first with the University of Indonesia and then with Airlangga to build up their medical faculties. American professors were sent to teach at the Indonesian universities while Indonesian professors were studying in the U.S. These programs turned out some very fine doctors and professors, and also made changes in the curricula. For example, under the Dutch system, students at the medical faculty could take their exams any number of times, and stay on the rolls without graduating. Under the American system, you pass or fail and if you fail a limited number of times, you leave, making room for new students. This change had a significant effect in increasing the number of medical doctors. Later, during the Soeharto years, medical school graduates were required to serve at community health centers (known by the acronym PUSKESMAS) throughout the country. Graduates willing to serve in isolated areas served for shorter periods than those assigned to major cities. A friend of mine in Surabaya, Dr. Nana Tamin Radjamin, a Dutch-trained ophthalmologist, told me that she thought her daughter would be a better doctor than she was by having had the experience of working in a community health center and observing the health problems of the ordinary people.

The USAID university-to-university affiliations also included public administration programs, including one at Gajah Mada, and there were agricultural programs, particularly at the Agricultural Institute in Bogor, West Java. I think these programs were very effective. A number of Indonesian scholars also studied in Australia, particularly in agriculture and rural development economics. When I was there, not many Indonesians went to the Netherlands to study. During
the colonial period a few Indonesians had the opportunity to study in the Netherlands, but contact was pretty much broken off by 1957-'58.

There were also, of course, private universities, including some Christian and Catholic universities. (The Indonesians follow the Dutch practice of seeing Christian and Catholic as two separate categories.)

Q: What about the military academies? Had we sent many people to our various staff colleges?

HARVEY: We did until IMET was banned after the Santa Cruz incident in East Timor. Previously we had sent quite a few. The immediate past president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was a graduate of at least two American military training courses. Prabowo Subianto, who just lost the election for president, also was a graduate; I think he was the top student in the Staff and Command College. He was very smart, but had a somewhat mixed human rights record. I’ve said all the reformers in the Indonesian Army that I ever ran into had American training, but not everybody who was American trained was a reformer. It didn’t work both ways. The Indonesia Military Academy in Magalang was set up with a lot of advice and support from Colonel George Benson, who was a legendary figure in Indonesia. He had been an assistant army attaché in the 1950s and was later the defense attaché; he helped them to set up the Military Academy at Magalang pretty much on the West Point model.

Q: Did you feel at this time that the United States was kind of the model to look at on various things or were they shopping?

HARVEY: Ever since the 1945-49 revolution there had been a debate within the Indonesian Army about professionalism: whether to have a modern army or a people’s army. During the revolution against the Dutch, basically the Indonesians had to fall back on guerrilla warfare. However, most of the men in charge of the military had been trained by the Dutch, actually at a Dutch academy in Bandung for “native” troops, so the leaders opted for a professional army. Men who didn’t meet educational requirements, or height, weight, etc., were not included. This led to a number of problems with people who had been guerrillas during the revolution and were good fighters, but many of them were illiterate, for instance. The emphasis throughout, I would say, within the army command was on building a professional army. There were always a few dissenters who felt if the army was putting down rebellions, what they needed was an army that could deal with guerrilla-type warfare in some of these scattered islands. But the professional people, I would say, have won out. The Indonesian military has had a very good record in participation in UN forces in various parts of the world and I think that also has given an impetus to those who favored the professionalization of the military.

Q: Was there much flirtation at all with the Chinese philosophy or Chinese?

HARVEY: No, most of the Indonesian elite believed that the Chinese had been complicit in the so-called coup in 1965. Of course, many Indonesians believe that the “coup” was led by the Indonesian Communist Party (and there is substantial evidence that the PKI leader, Aidit, was involved). Having just destroyed their own Communist Party, the Indonesian elite had very little attraction to Chinese communism.
Q: Where stood the technological revolution which was beginning to really hit China, India, Thailand and all that?

HARVEY: Indonesia is one of the most wired countries; I understand everybody texts. I went in 2012 for a visit, and I had to buy a phone when I got to Bali so I could communicate with my friends and send texts to people saying where I was going to be and when we would meet and so forth. So, as everywhere, young people pick up very quickly on technology.

Q: I agree it’s frightening. Was this making a difference in how our embassy operated?

HARVEY: I’m sure it has since I left. We were still at the beginnings of the computer revolution when I was there. One thing I think was sort of unfortunate was that USIS went overboard on getting rid of books and just having computer terminals. They weren’t really libraries anymore. They had computers where you had accesses…

Q: Information centers.

HARVEY: Centers, yes, whereas I think people still like books.

Q: Yes, oh. How did you see the American government reach Indonesia at the time?

HARVEY: In some ways back in the 1960s we had greater reach, although there were obviously a lot of political problems at that time. My view may be influenced by the fact that I was in Surabaya in the 1960s, and you are much closer to the ground at a consulate than you are at an embassy. In Surabaya at that time we had mobile units going out with mobile libraries, mobile film units throughout the countryside in East and Central Java. There was also a magazine American Miscellany, which had an Indonesian version Aneka Amerika, which USIA abandoned when they decided they were going to stick with the elites. But those magazines reached high school students and that’s when you reach people who are just forming their opinions. When I was back in Surabaya in the ‘80s and we would visit the Islamic boarding schools and so forth, they would say, “We used to get this wonderful magazine and we haven’t seen it for a long time.” We would reply, “Unfortunately, it is no longer published.”

Q: Before you left were there any movements afoot to do anything about that?

HARVEY: No, those decisions had all been moved to Washington. That was one of the impacts of the communications revolution--it has taken a lot of independence away from embassies and people overseas.

Q: Were there any I won’t say independent but movements regarding education or society or anything that were beginning to develop in Indonesia that hadn’t been there before that we were particularly ahead of the curve on social movements or educational?

HARVEY: It had been a gradual process and had been going on for some time. We were involved at every step of the way, but very much in a supporting role not leading I would say.
Q: Where would you say the United States stood in contrast to the Western European powers? I mean various ones were we very much in the forefront or say the French, the Dutch or someone?

HARVEY: No, the Dutch were still recovering from their colonial past in Indonesia. I think there would be very few countries for which their most important relationship is not with the U.S. I think the Indonesians certainly felt that we were their most important relationship.

Q: What about Australia?

HARVEY: Australia is a close neighbor; they sometimes had rocky relations, but generally good relations. However, Australia is not a world power. On the other hand Australia, at least at the time I was there, taught Indonesian in secondary schools. Australia recognized the importance of Indonesia very clearly. Particularly after military training in the U.S. was cut off, more Indonesian officers did train in Australia. When visas became more difficult to get to come here, the number of Indonesian students going to Australia for tertiary education also increased. Of course, it is cheaper and closer to study in Australia, which is also important.

Q: Any other major developments regarding your work or our embassy’s work?

HARVEY: I might mention one thing because we talked a bit about staff earlier. When Barbara Schrage left, she was replaced by another political officer, Ed McWilliams. We had a difficult relationship, I would say. There were two basic reasons for that. One was Ed’s approach to political reporting, which was to start with his conclusions and then look for data to support them. I actually had to send a memo to the political section saying you start with questions and look for answers, considering all the information you can gather. Ed’s tendency was, as I said, was to start with his conclusions, and he would disregard any information that did not fit his conclusions. That gave a totally skewed picture of what was going on. The second aspect was that he acted as though nobody had ever done anything in support of human rights before he arrived at the embassy. He had no knowledge of what had happened before, but for Ed history began when he arrived, and he was not interested in finding out what had been done before. That created a lot of problems within the embassy because a number of us had for many years been in close contact with groups who were working for rule of law, for press freedom and so forth, but Ed tended to discount that. Ed was a prolific reporter, although he paid more attention to quantity than to quality. He didn’t check his reports for accuracy; one other section head complained to me that he had to spend so much time correcting errors in Ed’s draft reports that it was cutting into his time to do his own reporting. (In fact Ed didn’t even proofread his reports.) Also, despite his commitment to advancing human rights, Ed tended to ignore the Embassy-wide human rights committee, which had done useful work under his predecessor. He had to be encouraged to call meetings of the group.

I’m sure one of the reasons Ed was suspicious of me and of the defense attaché was that we had relatively good relations with the military. It was Don McFetitch’s job as defense attaché to have contact with a wide-range of Indonesian military people. This was helpful not only during the occupation of the Embassy parking lot by a group of East Timorese (as described above), but
in Don’s quietly urging proper treatment of arrestees or prisoners such as the East Timorese leader, Xanana Gusmao.

It happened from my long experience in Indonesia that I was on a first name basis with three formerly very senior generals. One, Andi Jusuf, at the time a lieutenant colonel, had been military commander in South Sulawesi when I was in Surabaya in the ‘60s. We had a USIS library/reading room in Makassar at that time and so we all got to know him. He was very supportive of the American presence in Makassar and in working with the university at that time. He was later minister of defense. (I remained in touch with Jusuf and his wife, Elly, for many years.)

Another, General Soemitro, married an old friend of mine from Surabaya; I knew him strictly through his second wife, Oetary. The third, Benny Moerdani I met through George Benson.

I might tell one anecdote about General Soemitro because I find it still quite amusing. This happened when I was back in Indonesia doing research in the early 1970s. At that time I was contacted by an old friend Oetary, whose first husband, Dr. Moeljono, who had some support from communist intellectual groups to become dean of the Faculty of Medicine at Airlangga University, had died while in prison in 1968. In arguing on her husband’s behalf, and securing his temporary release Oetary had come to know General Soemitro, then military commander in East Java. After Moeljono’s death she had married General Soemitro, by then in Jakarta as head of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB). When Oetary contacted me I was just leaving Jakarta to continue my research in Sulawesi, stopping off in Bandung because I heard that the Army History Center there had some useful archives. So we agreed when I came back to Jakarta we would get in touch again. So I went up to Bandung, met with a young lieutenant colonel who had written a paper about Kahar Muzakkar, the rebel leader I was interested in, and arranged that when I came back I would be able to do work in the archives. I was gone for about six months, came back, got in touch with Oetary, and she invited me out for dinner with General Soemitro at the Nirvana, a very nice restaurant at the Hotel Indonesia in Jakarta. In the course of the meal, General Soemitro, who was always very gracious to women, said, “If you ever have any trouble just let Oetary know and I will be able to help you.” I said, “I have all my papers in order and I’ve made arrangements, so I don’t think there will be any need, but thank you very much.” So a day or so later I was back in Bandung at the army archives and the very nice lieutenant colonel who had helped me before came out and said, “I’m so sorry but they need a recommendation from somebody in the Army.” I phoned Oetary and said, “I need to call his wife. Who should General Soemitro call?” So he phoned Oetary and said, “Remember Pak Mitro said if there was any difficulty to let you know? Well they need a recommendation from somebody in the Army.” She said, “He is coming by tonight (she was one of three wives) and I will ask him to call the head of the Army History Center.” So the next morning I arrived in my faded batik dress and sandals and was saluted. Obviously General Soemitro had phoned; so I had no difficulty in the archives. So that was my connection with General Soemitro.
Then Benny Moerdani, who was minister of defense when I was in Surabaya in the mid-1980s. I had written a monograph for Cornell on the Permedia Rebellion, which is one of the regional rebellions in the 1957-1959 period. It had just been translated into Indonesian and George Benson had been in talking to Benny and Benny asked, “Who is this? How does she know all this?” George knew I was about to come through Jakarta on my way to be consul in Surabaya so he said to Benny, “Well, would you like to meet her?” We checked with the ambassador (John Holdridge), and he had no objection. So I went with George Benson on my way to Surabaya and was introduced to Benny Moerdani, and we had a nice chat about the Permedia rebellion and so on. Well it also meant in Surabaya— and there were always lots of military things and the consul always attended–Benny Moerdani would come over and chat with me. This meant all of his military people were also free to chat with me, and if I needed to contact anybody in the military they knew they wouldn’t get in any trouble because Benny had given the blessing so to speak. By the time I was in Jakarta, Benny had retired, but was still a person of considerable influence. But anyway, I think, the fact that I knew these very senior military people also made Ed McWilliams suspicious.

Q: It’s so important to have this returning, it’s a different thing but it does create familiarity and all.

HARVEY: Yes.

Q: Sometimes we miss that.

HARVEY: Yes. Now I sort of blame Henry Kissinger with his GLOP (a policy to require officers to serve in a variety of countries, not too long in any one country). I think it was a good idea that people should have broader experience, but I think we’ve lost some of the depth of experience that one built up in the old Foreign Service.

Q: Particularly there are certain places like Indonesia where it’s got such a you might say so many islands and so many peoples and it’s so important that it’s really well worth it to build up a strong cadre.

HARVEY: I think Japan has been able to build up a cadre of specialists to some extent because the language is so difficult, and China to some extent. But the Indonesian language is relatively easy.

Q: How did you feel about the influence of Cornell?

HARVEY: Cornell has produced a number of very good scholars on Indonesia, including a number of Indonesian scholars, and quite a number of Japanese scholars. I have a Japanese friend who was at Cornell when I was there, Mitsuo Nakamura, who is an expert on the major Islamic organizations, Muhammadiah and Nahdatul Ulama. I’ve learned a lot from Mitsuo over the years, and met a number of leading Muslim figures, including Abdurrahman Wahid, through Mitsuo and his wife, Hisako.
Cornell still has the best library on Indonesia, partly because of John Echols, who was one of the language professors, and a devoted library person. Every graduate student who went out to do field work was requested to pick up any materials they came across. I certainly gave the library a lot of materials I came across, and I think everybody did that.

George Kahin, of course, was the founder of the Cornell Modern Indonesian Project (CMIP), and one of the first scholars in the U.S. to really study Indonesia seriously. His book on the revolution, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, is still the classic; you have to read that if you want to know anything about Indonesian history. Cornell is still respected in Indonesia. In 1990 George Kahin was awarded a medal, Bintang Jasa Pratama, for his contributions to strengthening friendly relations with the Republic of Indonesia. The medal, awarded by order of Indonesian President Soeharto, was presented to Professor Kahin by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas in a ceremony in Jakarta on July 30, 1990.

A lot of people in Indonesia, particularly in the government, complained about the Cornell Paper, as the document, authored by Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, (published in 1971 as a monograph, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia) came to be known. However, a younger scholar, Mary Callahan, who studied with Ben Anderson, told me that when she went out to Indonesia to do her dissertation research on the Indonesian military, even members of the military all asked, “Do you know Ben Anderson?” (I should add that when Ben Anderson died in December 2015, while visiting his favorite temples in East Java, there was an outpouring of grief among his admirers in Indonesia, and Tempo, the respected news weekly, devoted most of an issue to Ben and his contributions to Indonesian scholarship.)

So even though many Indonesian disapproved of the Cornell Paper, they knew the authors’ understanding of Indonesia and its culture was quite deep. Although the conclusions of the Cornell Paper were not welcome in Indonesia, the general knowledge of Indonesia of its authors was respected.

Q: Is Cornell still sending people? Was there a good strong back and forth between Indonesia and Cornell?

HARVEY: There weren’t as many students coming from Indonesia when I was at Cornell, although we did have a number in linguistics and languages. As to American students going to do research in Indonesia, the Indonesian authorities were a little bit skittish about people doing history and politics, although I had no trouble getting a visa. My original proposal was to study center-region relations, but I ended up studying rebellions in Sulawesi, which in a way is an aspect of center-region relations. Somewhat later, Audrey Kahin, George’s wife, now widow, did her dissertation research in West Sumatra. I think they may have called on some old contacts for help in getting a visa for Audrey. But in general no, although it was a little bit touchy, but certainly contact didn’t cease.

Q: When did you leave Indonesia this time?

HARVEY: September 1997 just as the financial crises was hitting.
**Q:** What brought about the financial crises was it Madame Soeharto?

HARVEY: Well, the children more. Domestically the children had become too rapacious. But they could have probably continued on if it hadn’t been for the international crisis. There was too much easy money coming in and going out very quickly.

**Q:** Was this one connected to the Japanese particularly? It was Thai and...

HARVEY: Thailand was the first to go, and then I think international bankers got worried and Indonesia was very much exposed. They learned a lesson from that, so in the more recent financial crises Indonesia hasn’t been as badly hurt because they didn’t accept as much easy money.

**Q:** Was our economic section seeing this?

HARVEY: I don’t think anybody saw very much in advance. We did a lot of reporting on what was known of the graft and such in the system, and the way the system operated, and also on monetary policy. When Soeharto first came in he relied on what came to be known as the Berkeley mafia, the economists trained at University of California in Berkeley, and Indonesia had been known for following sound macroeconomic policies. But there were lots of problems at the micro level, and as seems to be the case wherever human beings are involved you get corruption.

**Q:** By the time you left what were our concerns about the economy?

HARVEY: The financial crisis was just really getting underway when I left. I think our econ counselor…I’m trying to remember if Bob Fitts had already left, and whether Judith Fergin had taken over. Both were excellent officers, and on top of what was happening. Stape Roy was by then the ambassador; he had been ambassador for about a year and a half at that point.

**Q:** Where did you go?

HARVEY: I went to the University of Arizona in Tucson as a Diplomat-in-Residence.

**Q:** You were at the University of Arizona from when to when?

HARVEY: That would have been from September 1997 until May 1999.

**Q:** What were you doing there?

HARVEY: The Diplomat-in-Residence program by that time had been designated primarily as a recruitment effort, and so I spoke to a lot of groups and went to a lot of career fairs. But partly because of the financial crisis and the interest in what was going on in Indonesia, I did a lot of public speaking at World Affairs Councils and similar organizations in Tucson and Phoenix. I also was invited (at the suggestion of Dan Lev, a Cornellian, then a professor at the
University of Washington) to take part in a CARE conference in Seattle, more generally on U.S.-
Indonesia relations.

At the University of Arizona I lectured to a few classes; I did not teach my own class, I wasn’t
asked to do that, but I was sort of a resource person. Then the head of the international affairs
program at University of Arizona suggested that I speak to a couple of high school classes,
which I thought was a very good idea; which I did. I think you really have to interest people
while they are young and get people to think about what some of the opportunities are. Then
there are regular career fairs at universities, so I did a lot of traveling, primarily in Arizona, but
one time they needed somebody to go to Oklahoma, so I went there.

Q: I always feel that the place to really grab people for the Foreign Service was at the high
school level because there the adventure is strong, they are very strong.

HARVEY: I agree and in high school young people are just beginning to think about what they
might do for the future.

Q: They can get very “sophisticated”; I put quotes around sophisticated and college and I think
it’s a shame so many of our best and brightest end up in the…

HARVEY: Wall Street?

Q: Well Wall Street, basically money manipulation which really doesn’t…it’s nice to have it
going but it’s really to make money. That’s one of things we are doing with our oral history
program is reaching more and more younger people by bringing out nuggets of excitement and
adventure and interest from our really extensive oral histories now. But, what was your
impression of the student body at Arizona?

HARVEY: I didn’t have really close contact with a lot of students, but they seemed to be very
good; I think it’s a good university. There were a couple of students who worked in the
international affairs program and I got to know them better, and they were very good. Of course,
that part of Arizona was one of the last bits to become part of the U.S.-- it was purchased from
Mexico, as you probably remember, the Gadsden Purchase. I had hoped I would revive some of
my old high school Spanish while in Tucson but I didn’t. There are many bilingual people there,
and a lot of people with relatives on both sides of the border.

Q: Did you pick up any of the politics of Arizona and all while there?

HARVEY: Of the state as a whole? Not really. There was a member of the faculty in the political
science department who ran for mayor while I was there, a Democrat. As in many states the
university centers tend to be more liberal than the rest of the state around them, so Tucson tended
to be a more liberal community.

There were quite a few Foreign Service retirees in that area. Gerry Manderscheid, who had been
our wonderful admin counselor in Jakarta; he and his wife, Bea, were in Tucson. Initially I
stayed with them when I arrived, and they helped me find my apartment; wonderful people.
Gerry was, I think, the best admin officer I ever worked with. Then a friend, Eleanor Pruitt, who had been in Surabaya with me in the 1960s had also retired to Arizona and I saw a good bit of Eleanor, and met some of her friends while I was there. Myrtle Thorne, who had been a very senior, very able woman with USIA, she was there at that time. (She and Eleanor subsequently died.)

Q: Well what did you do after that?

HARVEY: I retired while I was there and then came back to Washington.

Q: Have you been very much involved? Is there an Indonesian mafia here?

HARVEY: Well there’s a U.S. Indonesian Society (USINDO) that former Ambassador Ed Masters founded, actually while I was in Jakarta. I worked with him on that end, and I am still on the board of advisers. They have quite an active program; they have meetings maybe two or three a month. They used to have more, but now it’s more like one or two a month. I don’t go to things at night anymore, so it has to be daytime things. As you probably know, in Washington you could go to programs every day of the week. There are things at CSIS, at Brookings, at the Sigur Center at GW, and I get announcements from most of them. In addition to things on Indonesia, I quite often go to things on Korea, Vietnam, and Burma. I’m also in the Far East Luncheon Group, which meets monthly at DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired). It is composed primarily of Foreign Service retirees, but also includes some academics, journalists, a few business people, and others who have an interest in Asia.

Following my retirement I was invited by David Steinberg, then head of Asian Studies at Georgetown University, to teach a graduate seminar on Indonesia in the spring semester of 2001, and a sophomore research seminar on Southeast Asia the following spring, as an adjunct associate professor. In 2002 I wrote a monograph for the CNA (Center for Naval Analysis), The Future of Indonesia as a Unitary State: Separatism and Decentralization. I edited the memoirs of an Indonesian friend, Des Alwi, who made the Banda Islands a target of historical and scuba tourism: Friends and Exiles: A Memoir of the Nutmeg Isles and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement (Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 2008), and A Boy from Banda: A Story of Spice Island Childhood (Banda Naira Culture and Heritage Foundation, 2010).

Q: Do you find that there is much connection between the retirees and the active duty? In other words you have a long history going back you and others on your Indonesian careers or something. Can you exchange ideas with people who are serving on Korean affairs or something?

HARVEY: For several years after returning to Washington I was invited to the Foreign Service Institute to lecture on Indonesian history to the language students as part of their area studies program. (I think the last time I did that was in February 2014.) I was happy to do that, but I don’t keep up enough on the ins and outs of current politics; it’s better to have someone from the desk in any case. So I’ve met a number of the officers going out, and in some cases there are people I knew as more junior officers who are now in a refresher course and going back to Indonesia.
The summer after I retired I was asked to fill in at INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) for a couple of months after Judy Bird retired, and Charlie Zensie was waiting for his security clearance. I went back to the Department to help out on the desk after the December 2004 tsunami, which devastated parts of Aceh. Of course, by the time my clearance was updated most of the crisis was over, but the desk was facing some official visit so I stayed on to help with some of the position papers. I also helped to clear up some of the old Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. For people on a busy desk FOIA requests often fall to the bottom of their heap of things to do. So I was able to help them with a few things like that. Angela Dickey was head of the office at that time; a very capable officer. Her able deputy was Brian McFeeters, who had been a junior officer in Surabaya when I was in Jakarta, and was subsequently DCM in Jakarta.

Q: What was your impression of the Indonesian response to the tsunami and the State Department response?

HARVEY: The Indonesian response initially, I think, was that they were just overwhelmed, and it was difficult for them to accept some of the foreign offers of help. But I think that once they recognized how really dreadful the situation was, they did accept assistance. Actually, my Godson’s brother-in-law is a Marine who was in one of the units that was involved in going in to Aceh after the tsunami. I was able to talk with him about their experience. He felt they were very much appreciated and warmly received. Also a USAID officer Alfred Nakatsuna, a terrific officer, had volunteered, and was back helping. I’ve only seen Alfred once since then, but he mentioned also that once the Indonesians got over the initial shock of what had happened and recognized how much help they needed that everything worked well. Then the Indonesians appointed a very capable person to head their reconstruction effort, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto. He was known for being honest and there was no taint of corruption. He only accepted the position, I’m told, if he was given the authority to hire and fire anybody who worked for him. He did a very good job.

Q: Sitting back here in your Washington apartment looking at this whither Indonesia?

HARVEY: Well, Indonesia, of course, is dominated by Javanese culture because that’s the overwhelming proportion of the population, and Javanese culture is not pushy. In fact, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono always spoke about “leading from behind.” However, as President Obama found, that’s not necessarily a posture that gets you very far, or gets you recognition for being a leader.

Indonesia has been hampered by the fact that they started with such low levels of education. It takes a long time to build up from 232 college graduates to staff a bureaucracy, staff universities and so on and so forth. Initially, of course, when you have any rapid expansion the quality is not great. But I think now they are turning out good graduates, capable people, and I think they have a good future.

Dealing with the fissures within Islam, I think, will be a problem for Indonesia, although not as much as it is in the Near East, because Indonesia has a more tolerant culture. Many Indonesians,
in talking about some of the aspects of Islam that Westerners object to, say that is not Islam, that’s Arab culture, and they make quite a distinction between the two. Certainly the fact that at least fifteen percent of the population of Indonesia are not Muslim and have played a significant role in the country, the majority has to be more tolerant than if they were 99 percent Muslim, or if you have a situation as in Malaysia where if you are Malay you are Muslim. There are very few Malays in Malaysia who are not Muslim, whereas in Indonesia you have Catholic Javaneses, you have Hindu Balinese, and you have Christians in North Sulawesi, Catholics in Flores; there is a mix. When the current president of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, was mayor of Jakarta, his deputy, known as Ahok, was a Christian ethnic Chinese. When Joko Widodo was elected president, his deputy sort of automatically stepped up to become mayor. There were protests from radical Islamic groups about having a Christian ethnic Chinese as mayor of the largest city, but those protests died down and the constitutional court has ruled that this is the way it works and we are going to support this procedure. (Subsequently Ahok ran for mayor, but was defeated in a racially-tinged election, and was imprisoned for blasphemy.)

Q: What about the China-Indonesian relationship?

HARVEY: I think there is still a lot of tension in the relationship. There is diplomatic representation now, which for many years there was not. Indonesia has tried to play a mediating role in the South China Sea; they have no claims in the area that China has been claiming, although they have been wary of China coming too close to the Natuna Islands. Indonesia has urged that ASEAN stick together in negotiating with China, so China can’t pick off one country at a time. But the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam are the counties with whom China has overlapping claims in the South China Sea.

Q: India-Indonesia, are there any problems there?

HARVEY: India was not a major player when I was there. Certainly there is Indian cultural influence, but it’s pretty deep, it’s been buried under several other layers, except for Bali, which is still Hindu. The current prime minister of India seems to be reaching out more; I don’t know what will happen with that. There has been an effort for Asian leaders’ meetings to now include India and Russia in some of them, as we’ve just been reading in the press the past few days.

Q: Is there a Russian-Indonesian tie?

HARVEY: No, not since 1965, except for formal diplomatic relations. Before then, yes, there were. There were Indonesians who studied in the Soviet Union, and Indonesia received some military equipment from the Soviets.

Q: And Japanese-Indonesians?

HARVEY: Always a bit of ambivalence, because of the Japanese role during the Japanese occupation. Subsequently, the Japanese didn’t have a very good reputation as employers, but that may have changed since I was there.
Q: Well I guess we will end here. What will happen is you will get a transcript. You can do whatever you want with it the normal editing and all that but also you can add incidents or something he never asked me about this or that or you can put a question in. The whole idea is basically it is your story and your experiences that we are trying to get out there on display. I think it’s gone very well but we are kind of like a vacuum cleaner here we want to scoop all things and also if you have any stories about people or anything else like this put them in.

HARVEY: Okay.

Q: Well I thank you very much.

End of interview