The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

ROY T. HAVERKAMP

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background
Born and Raised in St. Louis, Missouri
US Army Air Force, World War II
Yale University and Cambridge University (Law Degree)
Courier, Department of State
Entered Foreign Service in 1952

Pusan and Seoul, Korea 1953-1955
Motion Picture Officer-Pusan
Ambassador Ellis Briggs
Aftermath of the Korean War
Syngman Rhee
Political Officer, Seoul

Stockholm, Sweden 1955-1957
Soviet Relations
Attitude Towards US

Tokyo, Japan 1957-1960
US Interests
Ambassador MacArthur
China relations
Cancelled Eisenhower visit
Security treaty
Soviet relations
Okinawa

Department of State-Japan Desk, 1960-1961
Okinawa
Security treaty
Relations with the Department of Defense
Cambodian language training, 1961-1962

Phnom Phen, Cambodia
Sihanouk
"Neutrality" and Vietnam
Khmer Rouge
China relations

1962-1964

Phnom Phen, Cambodia
The Simbas

1964-1965

Leopoldville, Congo
US Problems and Interests
Environment
Ambassador Godley

1965-1966

Leopoldville, Congo
Department of State- Task Force/Congo Desk Officer,
Coup d'Etat-Mobutu
Deputy Country Director AFIO

1966-1969

Dahomey (Benin) -DCM
Interests and environment

1969-1970

Saigon, Can Tho & Chi Long, Vietnam
Cambodian minority
Duties
Khmer Rouge

1970-1972

Guinea-DCM
US interests
Soviet relations
Cubans
PaiGC
Ambassador Todman

1972-1974

London, England
Political officer-African affairs

1974-1975

Department of State- Office of Southern Africa Affairs
Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
SWAPO
South Africa

1975-1976

Senior Seminar

1976-1977
INTERVIEW

Q: Today is April 11, 1994. This is an interview with Roy T. Haverkamp being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. I wonder if you could start by giving me a bit about your early background--when, where you were born, family, education, etc.

HAVERKAMP: I was born in St. Louis, Missouri on December 10, 1924. I grew up there and went through high school there graduating in 1943. I went into the Army Air Force from June, 1943 until October 1945.

Q: What were you doing in the Air Force?

HAVERKAMP: I was a gunner on a B-26 in the European theater. I came back in 1945 and went to Yale for four years.

Q: Tell me a little bit about your family.

HAVERKAMP: I was an adopted child.

Q: Now, when you were in the Air Force you were flying mainly out of Italy?
HAVERKAMP: No, I got there towards the end of the war and flew out of France.

Q: Were these attack bombers?

HAVERKAMP: They started out that way, but it didn't work out, so they were used as bombers flying from 10-15,000 feet. There was one strafing mission in 1945.

Q: You got out of the Army in October, 1945. What were you studying at Yale?

HAVERKAMP: I started out to study economics and changed to history.

Q: Did you get any feel for foreign affairs while you were doing that?

HAVERKAMP: Oh, yes. Very much so. I think my generation was a very idealistic generation in a totally different way then succeeding generations. I think those of us who were interested in history who tried to understand what was going on realized that World War II was unnecessary. If we had had competent people running Western nations, Hitler could have been stopped when he marched into the Rhineland by France and Britain getting together and ourselves joining in. I think our idealism was very practical, that you had to deter people and force was a necessary part of doing that. Obviously the people who were threatening at the end of World War II were the Soviets.

Q: What type of history were you taking?

HAVERKAMP: English and American history.

Q: You graduated from Yale in 1949. What did you do then?

HAVERKAMP: I then studied at Cambridge University for two years. I studied law.

Q: What was your impression of the difference between the students at Cambridge and Yale?

HAVERKAMP: The students weren't too different. In Britain the people had to stay in the military much longer than we did so the majority of students had done longer military service. In both universities students were older and more mature than they would have been had we gone from school right into university. The first thing you notice about the system in England is that it is geared to study one subject and people come better prepared. Before reaching that level you would have done all the basics and covered the humanities, languages, etc. The tutorial system at Cambridge and Oxford allowed for much more personal interaction between students and professors. Studying in a foreign country also gives the opportunity to see ourselves as others see us, an indispensable tool for the foreign service.

Q: You were studying what kind of law?
HAVERKAMP: I was interested in public international law and they had the great authority at the time, Professor Lauterpacht.

*Q*: What was the thrust you were getting from international law at that time?

HAVERKAMP: That public international law was a way to bring order and predictability into international situations. Soon, I realized it was still in a primitive stage. Many people doubted that it was even law. Since there was little ability to enforce decisions of the International Court. One of the standard questions on my examinations, which was later included in my Foreign Service exam essay, was: International law is not law, discuss. But I remember later while I was in Korea talking to some law students I was suddenly stopped because I realized the standard that they used in the West in Public International Law as a standard of generally accepted principles in European civilization. It was a very Eurocentric view of the world.

*Q:* You took the Foreign Service exam when?

HAVERKAMP: In September 1952.

*Q:* What got you going towards the Foreign Service?

HAVERKAMP: Well, I was interested in the rest of the world, America's relations with the rest of the world, how military force relates to diplomacy and to asserting and defending interests. Probably because it had been such an obviously important part of my generation. The satisfaction that could be gained from representing the U.S. at that critical time seemed to us to be much greater than any other career I could pursue.

*Q:* What was the exam like then?

HAVERKAMP: It was a three and a half day exam. The half day was for language. In those three days you had general world history, American history, literature, economics, including statistics which I knew nothing about and you had to write an essay on an assigned subject.

*Q:* It was mostly written rather than multiple choice?

HAVERKAMP: Yes.

*Q:* Did you pass the exam the first time around?

HAVERKAMP: I passed the exam the first time around, but not the language part. I had to take that again. Then I realized that I would have to wait maybe a year before I took my oral exam, so, being very naive, I asked my congressman what I might do while waiting. Shortly afterwards I was offered a job as a courier. I did that between my written and oral
exams for about five months. I made three trips around Central America, the Caribbean and Latin America.

Q: How did the courier system work in those days? What would you do?

HAVERKAMP: You would carry pouches from one place to another. This was 1952 and before commercial jet planes. I took a DC-4 from Havana, late in the afternoon of one day, flew all that night and all the next day and arrived in Buenos Aires at midnight. People met you at the plane. You had the responsibility of staying awake and not losing any pouches.

Q: Did you sit on top of the pouches in the plane or were they loaded in and you watched the process before boarding?

HAVERKAMP: Sometimes, when you had too many they had to be loaded with the regular baggage and you had to watch them on and off. Somebody from the embassy was always there to meet you.

Q: When did you take your oral exam?

HAVERKAMP: I took my oral in June of 1952, passed and started my basic junior officer training in August, 1952.

Q: How big was your class?

HAVERKAMP: About 23-25. We just had a 40th reunion dinner last year.

Q: What was your impression of your training?

HAVERKAMP: It was three months long. It was a lot of talk about things a lot of us weren't interested in like shipment of effects, baggage, regulations and too little about what we would be doing, what the threats were to our interests, what the Soviets were up to, etc.

Q: Oh yes, nationality laws and all kinds of stuff.

HAVERKAMP: Obviously we were under a great illusion thinking we were going to be dealing with world issues, peace and war and not visa issuance, etc. When I met people that I worked with from the Agency, for instance, I found they came out with a very solid grounding in the Soviet Union and the threat it posed to the U.S. I regretted that we had so little of that.

Q: It was nuts and bolts.

HAVERKAMP: Yes, nuts and bolts.
Q: You finished your course when?

HAVERKAMP: The end of October, 1952. Sixty or seventy percent of my class were assigned to USIA, most of them to Amerika Hauses in Germany. Most of those people, I think, resigned after their first tour, including John Anderson, who later ran for President and is still around.

Q: Do you know why this happened?

HAVERKAMP: I think they felt they wanted to deal with governments on issues. Amerika Hauses were like little information booths which were useful, but most of these people were older, had had some military service, an advanced degree, and were very serious and more mature. They wanted to do something that they felt was more direct. I was assigned to USIA as a motion picture officer in Korea, which was a lucky assignment. It turned out to be a very interesting assignment.

Q: What was the situation when you got to Korea?

HAVERKAMP: I arrived in January, 1953 and the war was still going on. The truce came in July, 1953. When I first went there the embassy was in Pusan. We had a motion picture processing center near there. We made a local news reel and feature films. It was a great job because there was room for a lot of creativity. We had 16 United Nations countries there with fighting forces or the Red Cross, etc. So I went around and made movies of most of them and sent them over to USIA in their country. We made local feature films. I was totally ignorant of all of this when I got there so it was an exciting thing for me to do.

Q: How did they bring you up to speed on motion pictures?

HAVERKAMP: Well, we had a very unusual guy who ran our processing center there who had been a mechanic in the Army and married a Korean girl and stayed on. He did not have a degree but was a mechanical genius. He built this whole place up. It was way down in the south near Chinhae, a beautiful port area.

Q: It is now the naval academy.

HAVERKAMP: Right, the naval academy is down there.

Q: Did you get any feel for the embassy at that time?

HAVERKAMP: The embassy was located in Pusan. We had USIA offices in Taegu, Taejon, Kwangju and Seoul. It was an unusually close knit group and we worked and lived together under an outstanding Ambassador. Under these conditions new officers like me did learn what others in the embassy were doing. We also cooperated with each
other as a matter of course. An officer from another agency, for instance, taught us about political reporting.

*Q: By this time the Inchon landing had taken place and the fighting was to the north.*

HAVERKAMP: Right. We didn't want Syngman Rhee to move the government up to Seoul again because that would make Seoul more difficult to defend since the North would be more tempted to attack. To keep him in Pusan we kept the embassy in Pusan, although we had an office in Seoul and so did President Rhee. I used it a lot because I went up to many of the non-American military units up there to shoot films.

*Q: Who was the ambassador at that time?*

HAVERKAMP: Ellis Briggs.

*Q: He was one of the great names in the Foreign Service. How did you find him?*

HAVERKAMP: I found him one of the most competent, delightful people that I ever met. He was a very tough task master. He probably would have scoffed at the idea of a school of management or administration...but he was a superb manager in the sense that he let people do what they did well. For instance, we had a budget and fiscal officer who was a great friend of the Minister of Defense because they used to go horseback riding together. Ambassador Briggs coached the guy saying, "Now, if he wants to know anything about a variety of issues come and tell me and I will tell you or I will be very happy to see him." Most people that I met subsequently, would have cut this off as soon as they heard about it. But Briggs knew how to use people.

He wrote beautifully. He was very gutsy. At the time of the McCarthy era, he did a beautiful telegram on why you shouldn't take certain books out of the USIA library because they were written by people suspected to be socialists, etc. This telegram eventually, to my great shock, appeared in Joe Alsop's column. Somebody passed it to him, but I was very naive in the ways of Washington in those days. Ambassador Briggs had a very good, orderly, neat mind and, consequently, his messages were clear, unambiguous and to the point. He could also be a bit cynical.

*Q: What was your impression of the Koreans you were dealing with at that time?*

HAVERKAMP: Life for the Koreans was extremely difficult. Pusan, for instance, about a third of it burned down about every other week. Many people were living in shacks. The shacks burnt. It took some time for me to get use to what I was doing, but after a year or so it was obvious to me that the Koreans were highly motivated people with a great respect for education, a great drive and desire to succeed, not only for themselves, but for their family. I would like to say I foresaw everything that has happened since, but I didn't. It was very hard to see that. The first promising thing was the military. By the end of the Korean War the Korean military was manning about two-thirds of the line. They got a
very bloody nose just before the truce was signed. Economically, as I remember, their
main export earnings were about $20 million from tungsten, which we bought at an
inflated price. Despite our large aid program at the end of the war, I do not think anyone
foresaw the extent to which they would industrialize and modernize.

Q: I was in Korea in 1952 as an enlisted man and we were barracked with Korean air
force enlisted men. I found them so interesting I always wanted to go back because I
found that they were very straightforward people. The Koreans, I think, did impress
young people like ourselves at the time, despite all the hardships.

HAVERKAMP: They were very hard working. Speaking of the military, that is where I
really began to understand the role a strong military would play in the third world. I was
arrested as a Russian spy while making a film in one area of II Corps. The Corps
commander later became chief of staff and became a great friend. Eventually, I think I
knew all the top military brass including Corps commanders down to the division and
regimental commanders. After a year and a half I was transferred to the political section
and this was very useful for me. I agree they were straightforward to a degree, at times
amazing even to us.

Q: Were you in Pusan when Syngman Rhee let the prisoners go?

HAVERKAMP: That was at or near the end of the war. Later when there was an official
exchange I was where the exchange was taking place because we were filming it.

Q: This is one of those climatic moments in recent Korean history. What did you see?

HAVERKAMP: There was an Indian Brigadier, a man who was about 6 feet 4 inches
with a turban and a walking stick, walking at the head of this group. It was all very
orderly to everybody's surprise. The problem was with prisoners, Chinese and North
Koreans who did not want to go back and the threat they could pose to a truce. Those who
did go back to China and North Korea were intransigent and threw away their clothes
before moving out.

Q: Did you get any feeling about the Korean government, itself?

HAVERKAMP: Most of the young officers in the embassy were very anti-Syngman Rhee
because he was really rough on the opposition. He beat them up, locked them up,
threatened their lives. It was very dangerous to be in opposition. I had a slightly different
attitude. I think if I had been Korean I would not have liked foreigners continually telling
me what a bad guy this was because he was a leader of the opposition to the Japanese. We
were pushing him very hard. And rightly so. But I think you could only have done it so
far when you had a war going on and the immediate aftermath of the war. The American
government was divided. When the Eisenhower Administration came in you had Walter
Robinson, who was the assistant secretary for East Asia, who thought he knew all about
Syngman Rhee. He came to Korea and thought he had an agreement with Rhee to accept
a truce and not push north again. While he was in his plane en route to Tokyo, Rhee told the press there was no such agreement. So, while I certainly didn't like it because I also knew the leaders of the opposition, it wasn't anything that we should have condoned or put up with, but how you handled it was something else.

**Q:** You went up to Seoul in 1953?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, I moved up there. I had been up there a lot making films. We moved up permanently some time in the fall of 1953, after the truce.

**Q:** Is that when you went to the political section?

HAVERKAMP: Shortly after.

**Q:** Did you find Seoul any different than Pusan?

HAVERKAMP: Oh, yes. Seoul was a more elegant city. It was a real city. There was a lot of destruction in Seoul but you didn't have the fires you had in Pusan. There were still impressive government buildings there that the Japanese had left.

**Q:** When you got into the political section, who was running it?

HAVERKAMP: Arch Calhoun was my first boss there. In the USIS job I think I had about four bosses. Turner Cameron followed Arch Calhoun.

**Q:** What were you doing as political officer?

HAVERKAMP: I did all the political work covering both the government and the opposition. It was mostly domestic politics. There was a guy who came in later who did political/military work, but I still had the contacts in the military that other people didn't have. It was not just the technical exchange between the MAAG people and the Korean military, but also the political role of the military in Korea. Rhee demanded absolute loyalty and his military were and had to be, politically sensitive and astute. It was then evident that no government was going to be put in power or remain in power without at least the tacit support of the military. The Korean military were also well aware of their dependence on us and anxious to touch base and have good relationships with Americans in the military and the Embassy.

**Q:** What was your impression of the domestic political situation in Korea?

HAVERKAMP: It was very rocky. Syngman Rhee was much too heavy handed. He was out of touch. He was already an old man. He was by and large out of touch with how the kind of country the people wanted Korea to be. He was though still respected for his role in resisting the Japanese occupations. Basically, at that stage, as many oppositions in third world countries, the opposition wanted to gain power to do to those in government what
they said the government was doing to them. So I felt it was rocky and needed a lot of bolstering. We brought in our big aid program which was something like $700 million.

**Q: What was the feeling at that time, wither Korea?**

HAVERKAMP: I don't remember anybody foreseeing how Korea would develop. One, you didn't have much time to think that far ahead because you were continually trying to keep things on track from day to day. Particularly on the economic side because the place was in a terrible mess. They had to have an infrastructure and an industry that would not only earn them money but help them to modernize and get off the aid dole. People were working in that direction. Nobody assumed that it would not work. As usual successes in the aid program had to be tainted and even exaggerated to justify continued funding.

**Q: What was the feeling about North Korea? Was it going to be kept in its place? Was there a feeling it would eventually collapse?**

HAVERKAMP: Many of the Koreans felt that in terms of industry, modernization in North Korea was farther along than in the South. Originally North Korea had hydroelectric power and a base for some industry. The South was agricultural. Northern refugees mostly ran the economy. They were more aggressive and ambitious and successful than the southerns.

I don't think anybody thought there would be a resumption of the war because it couldn't be done without us and President Eisenhower promised to end the war not continue it. Our goal was to build South Korea up where it would be able to deter war. South Korea's obvious objective at that time was to push north. All during the war we had friendly demonstrations against the Americans to push north. We had a great demonstration in Pusan with all the women from the textile factory coming with signs offering their bodies to the UN if they would push north. And everybody suspected that as soon as he had a chance, Syngman Rhee would do it. But we failed very badly, as I understood it before my time, because we felt that the danger before 1950 was that the South would attack the North. In fact, the MAAG chief who left Seoul about a week before the North attacked the South in 1950, told the press the real danger was that the South would attack the North. This, although the North had tanks and the South had APCs and some 50 caliber machine guns and rifles as their main weapons. Of course, the danger for us was that despite the disparity in forces and armaments, the South might attack if they believed such an attack would precipitate our intervention whether we wanted to or not.

**Q: We were deliberately keeping them weak so that they couldn't attack. As you did internal politics, did you get a feel for the American missionaries and their influence?**

HAVERKAMP: They were very important in the whole country because of their role in education and medicine. They always associated themselves with the Korean people. They learned the language and many of them had children born there. There was one
A famous family I can remember, the Underwoods, who had several generations serving as missionaries.

**Q:** My son dated one of the Underwoods.

HAVERKAMP: One of them later came back and was the interpreter for the President of Korea when he came here.

**Q:** Dick Underwood, I think it was.

HAVERKAMP: I think they had a very positive and beneficial and good role in Korea.

**Q:** Were they one of your contacts?

HAVERKAMP: I think all of us talked to them, yes.

**Q:** Was there anything approaching a somewhat leftist movement or had whatever there was pretty well gone by then?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, there was a leftist movement, but no overtly, pro-communist movement. Of course, one of the things that Syngman did that was unfair was to try to attack all the opposition as helping the communists. There was a small remnant of a guerilla movement in a mountainous area in the South.

**Q:** Was the embassy trying to keep Syngman Rhee from getting too far out of hand on this totalitarian thing?

HAVERKAMP: The Ambassador and everybody in the embassy was certainly trying. We tried very much to bolster the image of the opposition by maintaining open contacts with them, by calling him out when he did something outrageous towards the opposition. We made no bones about it. DongA Ilbo was the main opposition newspaper, but it was very limited as to what it could say about the government. Embassy officers had close relations with the press.

**Q:** Were the universities back in operation? Later universities became the center of opposition and still remain kind of the tradition opposition to whatever government is in.

HAVERKAMP: They were living hand to mouth. They were functioning. I had a very interesting experience a couple of years ago at my last post. I made an official trip to Trinidad and a young officer from the embassy came out and introduced himself and said that his name was George Park. I said, "George Park, that is a very familiar name. I knew a George Park in Korea who was president of one of the universities. Are you any relation to him?" He said, "Oh, that is my grandfather." In Pusan they were in dismal makeshift buildings. The reverence for education was awe inspiring.
Q: You left Korea in...?

HAVERKAMP: In April, 1955.

Q: How did you think things were going to go?

HAVERKAMP: When I left Korea?

Q: Yes.

HAVERKAMP: With the proper framework for our aid program and the ability to be patient and adaptable it was worth the effort in a developmental sense. From the standpoint of our security interests in Asia, we had to stay to keep Soviet and Chinese influence from expanding into South Korea and Japan. The military were building up to the point where they would be able to deter the North with less support from us. Everything, though, would depend on two things: the type of government you had and secondly, how the economy developed or didn't develop. I saw nothing but some form of authoritarianism into the future. In fact, one of the last pieces I did when I left was on the role of the military. The military for the foreseeable future would be the arbitrators of what kind of government you would have. They might not want to impose a government, but if they felt it necessary to do so they would. Nobody would stay long in power without their approval, at least their tacit approval.

Q: Did you ever run across Park Chung-Hee during the time you were there?

HAVERKAMP: I am trying to think, my memory is a little hazy.

Q: This was the one who became president and was really responsible for the turn around of Korea in a way.

HAVERKAMP: There was one Brig. General who was the chief of artillery in I Corps and under General Lee Yung-Kun, who was then a very ambitious four star general and Corps commander...this Brig General had been exiled up there. He had been the leader of what they called the communist rebellion outside Taejon in the early 1950s. He had been a communist. He changed over and was accepted back, but everybody was afraid to know him. I think that was Park Chung-Hee. I called on him once at Corps headquarters and had a general polite conversation. At that time he did not appear very brightly on the political screen.

Q: Then you went from one extreme to another.

HAVERKAMP: I went to Stockholm.

Q: Did you go directly there?
HAVERKAMP: No, I had been in Korea a little over two years so I came back and had home leave.

Q: Were you married by this time?

HAVERKAMP: No.

Q: You were in Stockholm from 1955-57. What were you doing?

HAVERKAMP: First I was the general services officer.

Q: All those bills of lading, etc. that you hadn't wanted to learn about in the A-100 course.

HAVERKAMP: Well, more so. I had gone from home to the Army to college, to Korea, which was collegial living in shared houses. Here, I was living in an apartment of my own that the government was paying for. People were complaining about this and that. It was a really whiny, complaining kind of a place with a pretty dismal climate at times. I must hasten to say that I was a failure as a general services officer.

Q: Were you in that position the whole time you were there?

HAVERKAMP: No, for a short time I was in the political section.

Q: What was the situation in that period? The Cold War was in full swing and Sweden was a neutral country.

HAVERKAMP: There was the Suez invasion and the Hungarian uprising in the fall of 1956 and Poznan before that. The Swedes were very interested in all of this. At that time the Social Democrats had been in power since the early 1930s and were really fishing for something new to offer domestically. They had kind of become the conservative party, if you will, in the sense that they had developed social democracy to a point where they didn't know where to go next. They had made a very bad mistake during the war on housing believing there would be a depression shortly after the war....and then they would need to prime the pump with public works and housing could fit the bill. So they had very bad social problems that came about because of their miscalculation.

They were deeply interested in the Soviet Union, obviously. Every year or two you had some important case of Soviet espionage. They were interested in Germany, in the United States. One interesting thing, I met a lot of young people there and I don't think I ever met anyone who was studying Russian, except a few who were interested in going into the foreign office and dealing with Russia. After the Hungarian revolt, the Swedes are very good at accepting refugees. They didn't examine people to see if they had TB or anything else, they just let people in. The Swedes were watching very closely what went on in Finland to read Soviet investors for the Nordic countries in their treatment of the Finns.
While there were certainly some Swedes who were true believers in communism, Sweden's long experience with democracy left no doubt in my mind where they stood vis a vis the Soviets and the U.S. In Korea Syngman Rhee did not want any military volunteers from Taipei during the Korean war. The Swedes did not want a hot war or a cold war fought on their territory. Their neutrality was of use to both sides as long as it was real.

**Q: Did you find the Swedes easy to talk to?**

HAVERKAMP: I did, yes. But I think a lot of other people did not. The Swedes are very formal, very well educated, and in sociological terms their ideal person would always be somebody with high cultural and intellectual attainments. With the British you kind of reach a break through point and you are accepted like family. But the Swedes are even formal with each other.

**Q: Here is Sweden which has had a social democracy going for a long time. You are in the middle of the Cold War. Did you find them looking at the Soviet Union, which was a socialist democracy to the nth degree, for what it was, or did they wear rosy colored glasses?**

HAVERKAMP: They saw it certainly for what it was. All the political parties, except the Communist Party, were democratic parties. They have had a long tradition of parliamentary democracy. They didn't consider the Soviet Union as a social democracy in their terms. But living next door they were interested in what the Soviet Union was doing and what intentions they had towards Finland in order to interpret what intentions they would have towards Sweden. They saw them as a threat because they knew they would not be able militarily to repulse them if they decided to attack. I think they were living on hope that nothing would develop that would cause them to do it and the U.S. NATO would succeed in deterring them. Their own military were no match for the Soviets of course, but they did not want to be a pushover.

**Q: Were they at time making strives towards at least making themselves into a nut that the Soviets probably would feel was not worthwhile to try to crack?**

HAVERKAMP: Oh, yes. Every man was on the military roster from around age 18-55. All able bodied males of that age group had a rifle in their house and knew where to go on call up day, did regular and reserve service. If you are a Swede and you had a foreigner in your house overnight you had to register their name with the police. I don't think they were under any illusion that they could hold them off very long, but by making them pay a high price the Soviets would not be quick to mess with them. They had a simple but not inconsequential navy and air force.

**Q: What about university students? Were you able to make contact with them in those days or not?**
HAVERKAMP: There was no prohibition on contacting students or other Swedish nationals. Everything they studied, unless they were going into university teaching or research themselves, was directed toward their future careers. I didn't find any radical students, but then I didn't try to cultivate the students. USIS did that I presume. I never heard anybody say that they were afraid their son or daughter was going to become a communist. The Swedes are very nationalist.

**Q:** What about their attitude towards the United States? Later the Swedes took a very jaundiced view of the United States and looked always under the rocks of American life.

HAVERKAMP: That was in the days of Vietnam. The Swedes were very moralistic as well as nationalist and like to remind people of their faults. They very well, I think, understood the role that we were playing in maintaining security with NATO and its deterrent. They were also, I think at that time, following closely the developing move towards European unification. So I found no anti-Americanism outside the communist press. In Korea the Swedes had a Red Cross hospital unit in the South that treated UN troops.

**Q:** Was this the time that the Soviets had this great peace offensive and youth movements? People were flocking into various places.

HAVERKAMP: I can't remember. I think that took on later.

**Q:** It probably wasn't going that strong at that point.

HAVERKAMP: If some young people were influenced by it I don't think the people in the non-communist political parties, the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives, were under any deep illusions about what kind of society the Soviets were and what their capabilities were given their military posture and their previous history in central and eastern Europe.

**Q:** And of course the Swedes had fought a very long and bitter series of wars against the Russians anyway, which didn't exactly endear them.

HAVERKAMP: In Stockholm they have a famous statute of Charles XII pointing towards Moscow. There were two battles. The first, the battle of Narva, I think, they won, but Poltava they lost. The Narva battle flag still hung at the top of the stairs in the Royal Palace, I was told. Soviet espionage was real. The Soviet rape of the Baltic countries and central and eastern Europe was still remembered as recent. Refugees from these areas were living reminders of Soviet imperialism.

**Q:** What about the embassy. As the general services officer it is almost your fate to hear all the whining. But what was your impression of the embassy and the ambassador, who was John M. Cabot at the time?
HAVERKAMP: He was the only one who was there when I was there. I think the Foreign Minister at the time, Osten Undane, who had been professor of law at Uppsala before he became Foreign Minister, was a man who did not feel comfortable with American diplomats. Americans are semi-civilized, and dangerous people. He was never close to us, but other people in the Social Democratic Party were more open to us. In Sweden you had to watch your step because so many things that we could do and talk about in Denmark, Norway or Iceland, would have been taken the wrong way in Sweden. Any time a NATO plane strayed over Swedish territory, they made a great noise about it. At the same time they made a lot of noise over Soviet espionage in Sweden and followed closely developments in the Warsaw Pact countries. So, it was not an ineffective embassy. I mean embassies are there to understand and to report and interpret what goes on, but they are also there to understand what our interests are and to try to influence foreign governments. I don't think there was a lot that we could have done beyond maintaining our leadership in NATO and not do anything that would embarrass the government and cause them to react against us. To be sure by reaching out we could make our case. We were not blocked from access and there were those in all walks of life who saw it in Sweden's interest to have close and productive relations which is for a variety of reasons.

Q: I take it John Cabot was a contrast to Ellis Briggs.

HAVERKAMP: They were friends having served together in Latin America. Yes, very definitely, in the sense that Cabot was a man was careful to avoid controversy. He spoke and understood Swedish and he went and talked to labor organizations and adult education groups all around the country. But I don't think he saw the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister very often. Sweden certainly did not depend on us the way the Koreans did, had not been an occupied country and a modern industrial sector. Given these differences our relations and the way we could do business was radically different in the two countries.

Q: Also, I guess going from an embassy under crisis, which is always much more fun, in Korea where you are all working together and doing your thing, and then to go over to a neutral country sort of cold and dismal, I take it wasn't much fun.

HAVERKAMP: It was not, if your job is to understand how people view themselves and the world and to try to get them to understand your country's interests. Frankly, I was never in a position to see anybody. I don't think I was ever sent to the Foreign Office to see anybody. In that sense it was boring for me. I don't think we used all the opportunities available. I think by and large most people were unhappy at that post because of the restraints on our professional conduct imposed by Sweden's neutrality. In my case I had a boss in the political section who made it clear from the beginning he did not want me there, which made life unpleasant to say the least. Of course there was a large Soviet presence in Stockholm and it was a listening post for the Soviet dominated parts of the world. For those involved in that it was very interesting.
Q: You left there in 1957 and went back to the Far East?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, back to Japan.

Q: You were there from 1957 to 1960. What were you doing in Tokyo?

HAVERKAMP: For a couple of months I was in the commercial section doing world trade directory reports, trade complaints and things like that. Then I became very lucky and became special assistant to the ambassador which was above being a staff aid. For instance, he did things like send me with George Bush to see the Prime Minister. At that time George Bush was the son of an influential former senator and a businessman. I got involved in a lot of things that I thought were very interesting there.

Q: What was the political and economic situation in Japan then?

HAVERKAMP: Our main interest there at that time was a political strategic interest. Their self-defense forces were just building up, we had to begin to change our military strategic relationship in conformity with Japan's move to independence. We still had AID and the MAAG missions there. We still had large US military presence, the Fifth Air Force, US Forces Japan. On the economic side, the ability, aggressiveness, motivation to succeed of the Japanese was showing itself already. We had serious problems with textiles which were finally settled at that time when President Eisenhower agreed to the idea of voluntary quotas. We had the same problem with plywood, stainless flatware, umbrella frames, but not with automobiles or electronics, although the electronics business was just beginning. The basic problem of the Japanese was that they had a greater propensity to save than to spend, unlike us. They put too much money into increasing capacity. In other words, if plywood sold in the United States, never mind the Americans complaining about the effect on production and employment in the U.S., you put more money into plywood. Success deserves support. The trade problem had already begun.

We had no real answer to Japanese efficiency, their strong predilection to save and invest over spending. The most we could say to them was why don't you diversify and try exporting more to the Europeans and stop making so many problems for us. One of our main problems with Japan was that the Japanese on the one hand wanted to be treated as a budding, first world power in terms of it growing economic strength, but at the same time they wanted all of the concessions that were given to them during the period of occupation and recovery. There was also a highly active left wing in the press, the schools and universities and the labor unions as well as in the Socialist Party that was always ready to put on the headbands and demonstrate against anything American.

Q: There are a lot of countries that pull this. Poor little us, but treat us with respect at the same time.
HAVERKAMP: Or, give us all the concessions that we need to outdo everybody else.

Q: You spent most of your time there as special assistant to the ambassador. Who was the ambassador?

HAVERKAMP: Ambassador MacArthur

Q: Douglas MacArthur II. I have a series of interviews that I have done with him. Could you describe his method of operation? He has a reputation you might say.

HAVERKAMP: He was a very hard working, very loyal, dedicated Foreign Service officer. He did all of his homework and knew what he wanted and he liked to micromanage everybody. If you wanted to tell him something that you knew he wouldn't like to hear, you had to do it in an indirect kind of way. If you just went in and said it, he would dismiss it. But if you wanted to be effective, you thought carefully how you wanted to present an issue to him. He wanted to be on top of everything. You would go into his staff meetings with senior officers there with the rank of ministers of economic and political affairs; the MAAG chief was a Major General and we still had the aid program there...and he would tell them, for instance, to report things out of the newspaper. He had some outstanding officers like Phil Trezise, who was the number two in the economic section and some of the younger Japanese language officers. But Ambassador MacArthur's way was getting into the nittiest, grittiest of detail with people. At the same time, if he had confidence in you, he would let you do very interesting things. But he wanted to know everything that was going on. He did not want anything to happen in that mission that he didn't know about. When something unexpected and unfavorable happened he felt it was directed at him personally.

Q: Did you find yourself in the traditional role of a special assistant of going to people and saying, "The ambassador wants to know if you have finished this thing that you are supposed to do," and that sort of thing?

HAVERKAMP: Oh, yes. I would attend all the staff meetings and make note of his assignments and then follow up. But you also had an intermediary role. You had to make judgments at times that the ambassador probably had changed his mind. He had several very ambitious, very able, officers working on economic issues, on security issues...we were then negotiating the Security Treaty. With Ambassador MacArthur it was never "The Ambassador wants to know", but rather "The Ambassador wants, now."

Q: How effective was he and what was his style in dealing with the Japanese?

HAVERKAMP: I never went along on any of the meetings concerning the Security Treaty. He always met alone with the Vice Foreign Minister and they always met at some secret place and at night to keep the press from speculating what was going on and put it into the public domain which would have made progress impossible. To build a good relationship with people he would tell them things that sometimes they might not want to
hear, but you can't do this to the Japanese. Like, criticizing the Foreign Minister's staff. He didn't understand that their reaction was one of embarrassment and shame to be put on the spot this way. That is not the way that you dealt with the Japanese. Although he, himself, felt in relation to the military, and others back in Washington that he understood how to deal with the Japanese. I will say, however, that the Japanese had great respect for him and not only because they knew that he had access to the President when he needed it. I think his greatest accomplishment was the successful negotiation of the Security Treaty. He had information from some staff members and advice and at times, direction from Washington but he did all the negotiating alone. As you know the treaty is still the cornerstone of our security posture in Asia. Moreover, Washington's instructions usually reflected his ideas.

Q: He was very close to the President during the war.

HAVERKAMP: During WWII he went with the U.S. Army after the D-day landing in France and was later General Eisenhower's Political Advisor at SHAPE. He also served as counselor of the Department for Secretary Dulles.

Q: So, it was not just a residue of being Douglas MacArthur's nephew?

HAVERKAMP: No, although I think that some people in the Eisenhower administration may have thought that. He would have deeply resented that because he was well aware that he had the talent for the assignment. His father-in-law was Alben Barkley, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and later Vice President. I was told that Mr. Barkley was always very proud of him because he never asked for special treatment.

Q: He wasn't that close to his uncle anyway. In my interview with him it came out that he earned his own way. During the war he was interned and he was a war time adviser to Eisenhower and all that.

HAVERKAMP: He was a very hard worker. I remember I got into the office one day at 7:45 and there was a note on my desk: A diller, a dollar, a ten o'clock scholar. But he was somebody that I enjoyed working for in a support role because he knew what he wanted, would listen if you made the proper approach and certainly in my case, had me do things far beyond my rank. Many in the Embassy frequently viewed his way of dealing with the Japanese in a different way than he did. But on the major issues, security and trade, he did as much as anybody could have done.

When Professor Reischauer who went out to succeed him had written an article in *Foreign Affairs* before he went out criticizing the Embassy for not having any contact with the left wing Socialists and the students. Well, they didn't want contact...they wanted contact but to insult you sort of the way you would have contact with the Soviets in those days and exchanged insults. Reischauer didn't establish it either. He also knew, that the students, were going through a process, as students in France did and still do. When they
got their degrees and jobs, they were mostly as conservative and supported the Liberal Democratic Party.

One of the big things I found frustrating there was that we were not allowed to report the attitude of the Japanese towards China and the Chinese because Ambassador MacArthur was very much Secretary Dulles' man in a personal sense as well as a professional sense and Dulles probably did not want to hear that. The Japanese had to live closer to the Chinese than we do, had a sense of cultural inferiority toward them and saw no reason to antagonize them.

Q: And also you had Walter Robinson or had he left by that time? It was very definitely a topic you didn't raise in that administration and actually the next couple of administrations...any possibility of opening up China.

HAVERKAMP: Our instructions were to tell the Japanese that the Chinese were dangerous trading partners who would key into some critical sector in the economy and after building up a trading relationship would use it as a threat to get political support on issues dangerous to U.S. interests and U.S. Japanese relations. What that will be is hostile to our interests and yours. In my subsequent assignment in Washington in Japanese affairs, we always were saying long before the rapprochement and Kissinger, that when we recognize China we have to tell the Japanese at least an hour in advance before we do it or we will be in very difficult times there.

Q: What was your impression of the Japanese government and bureaucracy at that time?

HAVERKAMP: I think I had a better chance to see them than many political officers did because I was frequently with the ambassador when he was with them, so I knew many of them. What was my impression? In the sense of responding to the new post-war generation, I don't think the Kishi government was quite up to snuff in the sense that the post-war generation wanted somebody, I think, not tainted by World War II and willing to assert greater independence in dealing with the U.S. That being said, the main support for the Kishi government came from farmers who had benefitted from the agricultural reforms during the occupation and from business people in the Kansai and Tokyo areas. Not the press barons, but others. There was a transition regime between the WWII generation and the post occupation regimes. They were people who were adequate to the demands of the time. The security relationship with the United States was critical for them. Trade with the United States was critical for them. They wanted to maintain internal discipline within government and society to move forward in an orderly kind of way. But I think the bureaucracy in the Foreign Office, MITI, Finance and the Prime Minister's office, were very effective. The Foreign Minister's position has always been a jumping off place to the Prime Ministership so he could be less reliable and disciplined at times.
Politicians and bureaucrats were accessible for everybody in the US embassy, from the Ambassador on down. Everybody was tacitly aware at least that in the background of our relationship was our security relationship which provided protection for Japan and was a real deterrent for them. That helped us. At the same time they knew trade was becoming a very important part of the relationship. We, at that time, operated on the doctrine that Japan will be allied with and have close relationships with countries with whom it can trade because Japan cannot afford to take any chances on not having sufficient foreign exchange. They had no natural resources other than a little bit of coal that was not of industrial quality and agriculture was mainly rice. So trade and the strategic relationship were the big things. At the same time it was also clear that the bureaucracy and the politicians were united, that it was not possible to drive a wedge between them and play one against the other to our advantage. We tried often. They were Japan, Inc., as they later began to be called.

Q: One has the feeling that Japan, even more than Italy...you have your political class who go running around but actually outside of making sure en masse they support you, they really don't have an awfully lot of power. The power seems to rest within the bureaucracy. Did you find that true at the time?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, very definitely, except that it is different in Japan in the sense that you have the Liberal Democratic Party which was the dominant party largely because of the land reform and other programs that were put in during the occupation. This gave land to farmers who in the fifties and sixties were becoming middle class people, with a higher standard of living than they had ever dreamt of before. The farmers and rural population were also traditionally conservative, had conservative values. The big business people, were also backers of the Liberal Democratic Party. So the Liberal Democrats did not have to worry about the Socialists or any kind of coalition government as the Italians always have to do. Then the Communist Party in Italy was, I believe, the biggest in terms of membership outside the USSR. In Japan the communists were nowhere near so important and had little if any influence in government. Their main threat was their support of the Chinese and the Soviets.

Q: One of the major problems while you were there was the cancellation of the Eisenhower visit and the Security Treaty. Could you give your impression of how this went?

HAVERKAMP: The aborted Eisenhower visit was after I was back here working on Japanese Affairs. I believe most Japanese knew that Japan needed a guarantor for its security at the end of the occupations and wanted the U.S. to play that role. They also supported the famous article 9 of the post war constitution which severely limited the right of the government to build an armed force. Some educated Japanese felt that they did not need a security treaty to have U.S. protection because in case of a threat from the Soviets or the Chinese we would come to their defense. A treaty on the other hand might oblige them to help us in a situation in which they would rather not become involved. Then there was the crisis created when the Kishi government pushed the Security Treaty
through the Diet in a sub rosa manner which was contrary to the Japanese way of seeking consensus before acting. The government did try to prevent disruption by opponents in the Diet. Mr. Kishi also came to Washington for the Treaty signing. I believe the main impetus for the riots that caused the postponement or cancellation, I can't remember which, of the Eisenhower visit was a desperate reaction to the success in completing the Treaty.

We did the right thing and I think it worked and is still working. I think we may be making a mistake when we tell the Japanese to take on more responsibility for their defense because one of the things that we get from their dependence on us for security is that we have access and influence that we would otherwise not have. It doesn't always show in our trade relationship, but it is there. Demonstrations protesting the Eisenhower visit were organized by the far left and dominated by them although there were other elements in there as well. The fact was Prime Minister Kishi got the Treaty through the Diet and then went to Washington to sign it was a rallying cry for opponents of the Treaty. Signing it in Tokyo would have made no difference.

Q: I am reading the memoirs of George Shultz in which he took issue with the Pentagon...we are talking now in the mid eighties...which was trying to get the Japanese to get more of a military. Shultz was asking the question of whether this would be a good idea and decided no. Does one want to build up an overly strong Japan for really short term American gains and military investment.

HAVERKAMP: I raised this with Bud McFarlane a couple of years ago, he was the National Security Adviser, and asked if this had been thought through. He said yes. As I said earlier there are benefits, strategic and other, as well as costs to our security effort in Japan. But the balance is heavily in favor of the benefits.

Q: Obviously Shultz mentioned that he felt the National Security Council and the Pentagon were wrong. What was your impression of our American military there in Japan? One of the difficulties always is when the American military get in they obviously want all the advantages....to keep their bases, to keep any foreign country from interfering in the way they run things. They are a difficult force to deal with for an American Ambassador. How did this work at the time you were there?

HAVERKAMP: Well, less so under Ambassador MacArthur than under other ambassadors because he never hesitated to assert his primacy. He made sure everybody understood that, and nobody would have touted him on it. The main problems with the military were not the big issues but problems such as when an old woman and a young boy went out collecting shell casings from an artillery range, despite warning signs, and were killed. One day a GI aimed his rifle at a train that was passing, fired and killed somebody on the train. A navy wife down in Yokosuka, who was a pyromaniac, set schools on fire. That kind of thing. The shootings were big incidents in the press and raised the question of jurisdiction. Who should try the accused, the U.S. military or the Japanese? Those were always big problems and obviously spilled over into political
relationships because the government had to do something and had to show that they were doing something that was effective in inserting Japan's new sovereignty over us in those cases.

I think most of them were settled to our satisfaction and accused U.S. military got off very lightly. They got off much more lightly than they probably would have had they been tried by American courts. Our SOFA with Japan was the first, I believe, in Asia and was precedent setting.

The land issue is always a problem. The government and I think most people knew what we were doing there and that it was in their interest as well as ours. Unlike many people here who seem to believe because we had troops there or elsewhere abroad we were doing other people favors and we were not getting anything out of it.

The main problem was Okinawa which was still under military control, where the Japanese wanted to take a more active role to assert their "residual sovereignty" and the military were adamant in refusing them. A request to fly the Japanese flag over the schools was rejected and became a big issue. The military even issued laissez-passe to Okinawans who traveled off the island. It was not recognized outside the U.S. Because the military occupied so much of the usable land and since there were so many of them, there were constant frictions with the local people and between the Embassy and the government in Tokyo.

Q: Did the Japanese in general have a pretty good idea of the problem of the Soviet Union and what it represented?

HAVERKAMP: Yes. I think the Japanese in general thought of the Russians as the Koreans did as people that they really had to be afraid of. I think they felt they knew us and what we had done during the occupation, etc. and they knew what the Russians had done in North Korea and above all they knew what they had done in seizing the Northern territories of Kunashiri, Iturup, and Habomai. I first ran into that, as a matter of fact, when I was in Stockholm. The then Prime Minister Hatoyama, after having raised it on a visit to Moscow in 1957, stopped in Stockholm on his return to Tokyo. I forget the terms proposed for a settlement but they were not occupied and the issue still unsolved.

Q: It continues today and has always struck me as an irritant that the Soviets could have taken care of a long time ago, but I guess because of their military priorities they wouldn't.

HAVERKAMP: Militarily that area is useful for them for moving in and out of the Pacific by sea and by air.

A funny case happened when I was there. One day the Soviet Ambassador, who was a very aggressive, very vigorous man named Federenko, was on a train coming back from Kobe/Osaka to Tokyo. He was in the dining car having a meal and a drunk came in and
went up to him and said, "I hate Americans" and hit him. He stood up and said in Japanese, "I am the Russian Ambassador." So he hit him harder and said, "I hate the Russians more."

**Q:** As the special assistant to Douglas MacArthur, I have to ask about Mrs. MacArthur. Mrs. MacArthur, who is now deceased, is renown as being one of the dragons of the Foreign Service along with Mrs. Henderson and a few others, and being an extremely difficult person which had effects on embassies and all. How did you find her influence, was there a problem there?

**HAVERKAMP:** There certainly was a problem for morale. Let me say first, I know neither Mrs. Armin Meyer nor Mrs. Loy Henderson, but the stories I have heard about them are not like those about Mrs. MacArthur. She didn't slap the servants. She did not criticize the U.S. or Americans, she was insecure and uptight. He spent so much time in the office that there was always tension. I think they were genuinely and deeply in love with each other. They fought like cats and dogs and I think they liked it. Her treatment of the embassy wives was very sad at times. I have seen perfectly delightful and wonderful women reduced to tears. One day a woman came and didn't have the list of people for luncheon and Mrs. MacArthur put her down and the poor woman burst into tears. She was at times crude in her handling of embassy wives and was insensitive to others generally.

I saw her slightly before she died and had been converted to Catholicism. She had an angelic expression and didn't have a bad word about anybody. Too late for many who suffered under her.

**Q:** Did she cause problems for you? Did you find yourself sort of in between trying to smooth feathers?

**HAVERKAMP:** Yes, because whenever she did something that was really awful I had to try and salvage her reputation. She threw me out of her house once because I was impudent enough to disagree with her on something. I went back to my office and packed my things thinking I was going to be put on the next plane. After about a half hour he called me in and looked at me and handed me back a simple letter I had done for him and said, "You did a really good job on this" giving me a look that said, "Don't be so dumb as to argue with her." Otherwise I got on with her. In those days given the role that the wives played it was not always easy.

**Q:** Wives got the equivalent to an efficiency report in those days.

**HAVERKAMP:** In a confidential section that people did not have to show. Non-embassy people may have heard what she was like, but she didn't do the type of things that Mrs. Henderson and Mrs. Meyer were said to have done.
Q: I have heard stories about Mrs. Henderson in India insulting the Indians in public places and that sort of thing. Is there anything else we should cover on this Japanese tour?

HAVERKAMP: Well, Okinawa was a big problem.

Q: Can we talk about Okinawa? You are talking about the issue of reversion.

HAVERKAMP: Yes, it didn't happen in my time but the pressure and tension was there both when I was in Tokyo and back here in Japanese Affairs. When I was in Washington, I was told General Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff of the Army, who had been Commander of US Forces Japan and UN Forces in Korea, he had a red flag on everything about Okinawa in the Pentagon. The military felt rightly that the Okinawans knew they had been treated like poor relatives by the Japanese and were just sort of pushed out of the way and never really accepted in the way Japanese on other islands were. The military felt they could play on this and the poverty of the island to try and foster an independent country under their control with Okinawan fronts. For instance, they gave them some kind of a laissez passer which couldn't be called a passport because few if any countries would accept it. Then they would travel to Europe or some place on the way to the United States or on their way back and couldn't get in the country because almost nobody accepted the document that they had. They did not really understand the real attitude, the sort of dual attitude the Okinawans had towards Japan. On the one hand they did not like their second class citizenship, but on the other they saw themselves as Japanese nevertheless and wanted no other citizenship even if we could have offered it. The Japanese wanted to fly the flag over the schools in Okinawa. There was a gentleman called Fritz Kramer working on Okinawa in DOD. He wore a monocle, spoke with a German accent and was solid as concrete. He was always telling me about Bosnia-Herzegovina and its relationship to the U.S. in Okinawa. His point was that I didn't understand Bosnia-Herzegovina and consequently couldn't understand Okinawa.

Q: He had been a Colonel in the army.

HAVERKAMP: You could just see him dazzling the Pentagon with his European manner and Germanic condescension. He used to tell me, "Flags over the schools are like camels noses under the tent."

Q: Did you find the embassy and the ambassador were trying to make the military understand that they really had to start working on this problem?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, certainly the Ambassador and the Embassy worked on it all the time. We had a junior officer from State on the Island. It was always a crisis atmosphere to keep Okinawa from becoming a further irritant in our relations with Japan. The attitude was very pragmatic--do what you have to do to keep things from getting worse. People in State did recognize that someday we were going to have to give up our control, but for the military that was inconceivable.
Q: Then you left there in 1960?

HAVERKAMP: In December, 1959.

Q: You came back to Washington and...?

HAVERKAMP: To the Japanese Desk.

Q: For about a year?

HAVERKAMP: From 1960-61, two years.

Q: Before we move to the Japanese Desk you mentioned one thing about Douglas MacArthur and his talking about the military. That he was always conscious and always saying that many people in the military, particularly back in Washington, did not understand that the occupation was over and that you deal with the Japanese in an entirely different way now than you did before.

When you came back, this was still the Eisenhower administration, who was running East Asian Affairs and what were your major concerns?

HAVERKAMP: The desk officer, Dick Sneider, and under him three officers. Above him you had the Bureau of Northeast Asian Affairs with a director and deputy director which had Korea and Japan.

My main concern at the time was Okinawa and various odds and ends of domestic politics.

Q: Was the desk getting involved in the abortive Eisenhower visit, which was very dramatic?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, we were involved in the planning of the whole trip from the beginning.

Q: Was it seen at the beginning as being a rather tranquil trip?

HAVERKAMP: I think people expected that there would be demonstrations against the visit, but that he would certainly come to no harm. I don't think anybody anticipated what happened to me, Hagerty and that the visit would have to be aborted.

Q: This is James Hagerty, Eisenhower's press spokesperson who along with Ambassador MacArthur were shoved and pushed around in a car at the airport looking over facilities and the demonstrations were such that they decided Eisenhower would not come in. It was quite unprecedented, particularly in a society such as Japan where face is
so important, where the President didn't feel he could visit. How did that impact on how things were being called in Washington?

HAVERKAMP: The main impact was on Premier Kishi and the Japanese government and they were pushing us to the end to go through with the visit. They kept saying they could guarantee his security. They felt that it was a definite blow to their prestige and status as the government to say that for this most important foreign visitor they could have they couldn't provide for his security...

Q: It would have been the first American president to visit there.

HAVERKAMP: Right. So, I think in that sense it made the government, Kishi himself, more unpopular. Eventually it led to his demise as Prime Minister. So I think it was very serious.

Why it happened? I don't remember seeing any reports from anybody that such a thing was a possibility, so I think it was a failure to be informed of something that certainly we should have been informed of by the embassy or intel people. That being said, even if we were informed it would have made little difference to the outcome. Kishi and his government were adamant in having us go through with the visit. An option to make up an excuse would not have been viable.

Q: I am not a Japanese expert, but I gather that one of the things was that the Kishi government tried to railroad the thing through rather than reaching the general consensus that is so traditional within the Japanese political system.

HAVERKAMP: That is true. He came here first to sign the treaty in January, 1960. What happened was the opposition in a very undemocratic way, tried to prevent a vote so the government outfoxed them and approved it. This was atypically Japanese on both sides.

Q: Who was calling the shots as far as to visit or not to visit? Was it the White House that was pretty much calling the shots?

HAVERKAMP: The White House.

Q: This caused a real blip in Japanese-American relationship, a political one rather than economic this time. What were you getting from the Japanese Desk about wither Japan and all that?

HAVERKAMP: As a result of the aborted visit?

Q: Yes.
HAVERKAMP: I don't think anybody anticipated any disastrous consequences other than the possible fall of Kishi as Prime Minister earlier than it would have came about otherwise.

Q: So this was an occurrence rather than an epic shaping event?

HAVERKAMP: Right. It was dramatic but the main issue, the Treaty, survived and still survives.

Q: While you were dealing with the Okinawa issue, were there any developments at that time?

HAVERKAMP: Labor problems, the things that had been going on, there was really no progress anyplace. I think eventually we did allow the schools to fly Japanese flags. There was mainly, I think, the restraining of the military and trying to get them to be more open with the Okinawans and their relationships with them. To try to understand their allegiance to Japan.

Q: Did you have any contacts over at the Pentagon while working on this?

HAVERKAMP: All the time.

Q: Real diplomacy is not between nations. Nations have interests, and fancy footwork really doesn't help that much. Real diplomacy is within Washington and particularly between two major dukedoms like the State Department and the Department of Defense. How did you find dealing with your counterparts over at the Pentagon?

HAVERKAMP: Frustrating because they were unimaginative people with one exception, who didn't want to see things as they were, who wanted to see them the way General Lemnitzer wanted them to see them--the Army is there and will be there forever, will control it and will keep the Japanese hand out of it. The only relieving factor, professionally there were not many relieving factors...there was a wonderful guy over there named Colonel King who liked to eat and about once a month he would take me to the Army Navy Club for lunch and discuss the issues. He was smart enough to know that what the military was trying to do was not very realistic. He had a good understanding of and great sympathy for the Okinawan people.

Q: You felt they were just saluting and taking their instructions?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, without any imagination. Kramer and the other guy I dealt with were naive, both had Ph.D.s but no understanding of how politics in Japan really worked or the nature of the relationship between Japan and the United States and how Okinawa affected that.
Q: That has always been one of the major tasks of the Foreign Service to explain that these countries are not simple and have their own dynamics and you have to understand them if you want to get somewhere. Dick Sneider, who some years later is my ambassador in Korea, what was your impression of his knowledge and feeling towards Japan and how he operated from where you were seeing it at this particular time?

HAVERKAMP: I admire Dick. He was very tough. He would go into a meeting prepared and if you weren't prepared you probably got slammed. Now that may not have been good, it may have been bad. But, after all, that is how the system works. If your job is Okinawa and you don't know about Okinawa the U.S. is in a bad way. He was very bright, aggressive, very abrupt...sometimes I would be talking on the phone the Pentagon and he would listen in. Half the time with the Pentagon I would put the phone down, walk away and come back again and here we would be on Bosnia Herzegovina. He was very ambitious. He knew exactly how to trim his sails to serve his ambition.

Q: I found this when we refused visas that he wanted to have issued. Did you note any change when the Kennedy Administration came on?

HAVERKAMP: There was a big one policy wise in that Dean Rusk understood what we were trying to do on Okinawa and stood up to the military on it. Early on there was one big issue on which he stood firm and we prevailed. In other words, before that State deferred largely to the military. With Rusk, State played its proper role in that relationship. Rusk arranged that with Secretary MacNamara early on.

We also had a new career officer who came in to be the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Jeff Parsons.

Q: And then Walter McConaughy came in.

HAVERKAMP: For a very brief time.

Q: Dean Rusk had been Assistant Secretary for Asian Affairs so that essentially in many ways, it was said later on, particularly with Vietnam, he became the desk officer for the Far East. Here was somebody who was Secretary of State who knew the turf.

HAVERKAMP: Right. I had contact with Dean Rusk subsequently on another part of the world. He took an interest in everything. He didn't say the third world is no concern to me until it becomes a crisis. He made decisions, not on nitty gritty, but if anything was a critical issue he wanted to know about it.

Ambassador McConaughy had served in Japan before the war. He was Ambassador in Korea and came back to be Assistant Secretary. It was a big change and I think there was even a bigger change when he left and Mr. Harriman took over.

Q: What sort of a change was there when McConaughy came?
HAVERKAMP: McConaughy was much less engaged. He didn't seem to have any real agenda that he wanted to fill or get involved in. I remember early on I was the duty officer one Sunday morning and he was going to see the President. This was the critical time of in Laos. I had been in early, seen the telegrams and put them in priority order. Finally, about ten after 10:00 he wandered in, didn't see any telegrams and went over to the White House. About five days later there was a rumor in the paper that he was being replaced, which he was. A very nice guy. He and his wife were loved by the staff wherever they were.

Q: But apparently with the Kennedy Administration they needed somebody...

HAVERKAMP: He was just not an effective operator in that atmosphere.

Q: You were there until 1962?

HAVERKAMP: Well, actually I left the desk around September, 1961 and studied Cambodian for some months.

Q: Were there any other issues during the time you were on the desk that you feel were important?

HAVERKAMP: Trade problems were increasing.

Q: Were there any Congressmen particularly interested in our relations with Japan during this time?

HAVERKAMP: We had no Congressmen or Senators from Japan as we did from Taiwan. When I was in Japan I spent a lot of time with congressional delegations. We had an enormous number of congressional visits. I didn't handle all these visits but I did Senator Hiram Fong's visit. A Chinese-American, because he was getting a lot of press, coming in on the first jet, etc. I remember one of the first questions the Japanese press asked him about was special interest in Asia, including Japan, and his answer was that while he was a Chinese-American, he was a Senator for the State of Hawaii and that included all the people of Hawaii. He was not the Senator for China or any place else.

Many, of course, were very interested. The appropriations people, the foreign affairs people, the members and staff of the Armed Services Committees. There was a great deal of interest, but nobody was aggressively pushing a contrary policy or putting any blame on State. The Japanese were then paying Dewey Balentine, Tom Dewey's firm, something like $300,000 a year to represent them and they were very active. But that was mostly on trade issues. The differences between the governments were not on strategic issues, the differences were on trade issues. There was a congressman from Illinois who took a close interest in Okinawa from the military point of view.
Q: In those days from the President and the Secretary of State on down, Congress was full of veterans of World War II, many of whom fought against Japan. You found that we were trying to take the long view on Okinawa, but the short view was the Pentagon view of we took Okinawa, let's keep it. Did you find that there were Congress people who responded to that type of thing?

HAVERKAMP: Yes. They had one man, Mr. Price, from Alton, Illinois, who was the Pentagon's man. He got a Bill passed that was not helpful in the end because it limited the amount of aid that we could give to Okinawa to, I think $5 million a year. That was a good figure at first but when more was needed, it was impossible to top. There were other Congressmen with whom they were in contact. As you know they, the military, are the only government Department allowed to have liaison officers on the Hill. People are actually stationed there and work on the Hill for the Department of Defense. However, I don't remember getting a great deal of pressure from Congress on this issue.

Q: Were you every called to testify or work with staffers in Congress on Japanese things?

HAVERKAMP: Other than telephone calls and preparing testimony and questions and answers, etc., no.

Q: Well, then I thought we might close and pick up with your Cambodian training.

HAVERKAMP: All right, fine.

Q: Today is April 28, 1994 and this is a continuing interview with Roy Haverkamp. Roy, we are at the period 1961-62 when you took Cambodian language. How come Cambodia?

HAVERKAMP:

Q: Where was this?

HAVERKAMP:

Q: What was the training like? How did you find the language?

HAVERKAMP: If you had a little talent and studied it was not complicated. It was not a tonal language like Thai, Lao and Vietnamese. Tense was not an important factor in the language. If you got into the Poli, the language of the Buddhists scriptures, and the Royal Family, it was totally different. It was important because even if you could speak a few words badly you had a different relationship. Many of our colleagues felt that all you needed was French. True, you could say things in French which would have been very difficult and complicated to say in Cambodian because they were still making up modern words. But you did not have the same kind of personal relationship as you had if you could speak their language.
Q: How many were taking Cambodian?

HAVERKAMP: Three of us.

Q: For the State Department that is not an inconsiderable number. Cambodia was becoming important in the early sixties, wasn't it?

HAVERKAMP: Well, it was becoming important always as a sideshow to Vietnam and in its relationship with China.

Q: You went out to Cambodia when?

HAVERKAMP: I went out in the Spring of 1962.

Q: You served there until 1964. What was the situation at the time you went out in Cambodia?

HAVERKAMP: When I first went out, of course, it was before the Tonkin Gulf incident, but it was after Prince Sihanouk had decided that the United States misunderstood the situation in nationalist terms in Vietnam and made probably a decision in his own mind that we, like the French, were not going to stay the course and that we did not have a viable government in South Vietnam. He believed there was not a government in Vietnam after Ngo Dinh Diem that was strong enough to bring unity and make an effective resistance to the Communists. Since he couldn't move his country he felt he could not get too close to us, but could use both our economic aid and our influence with the government of South Vietnam.

We had a large AID mission there. We had a large embassy there. We had a MAAG mission led by a Major General. We were very active all over the place. But Sihanouk was already beginning to denounce us and early on, I think late in 1962 or early in 1963, he made a proposal to the French, the British and the US to neutralize Cambodia and keep the Vietnamese war in Vietnam. After some time we went back with a very stilted, bureaucratic reply which in effect meant that such a thing was not possible and the answer was no. The French came back and said the same thing in very flowery language saying that this was another brilliant example of Khmer diplomacy, etc., however there are a few things we need to work out. Well, what we were saying was that the Vietnamese would not like us to do such a thing because the Vietnamese were telling us, and it was true, that the Viet Cong were moving in and out of Cambodia. Sihanouk could do nothing about this and didn't like it anymore than we did.

Later on there was a very widely read book which you may know called "Strategy" by Colonel Harry Sommers, about the Vietnam war. I think it is the best book I have read analyzing what happened to us in Vietnam. He said basically that an insurgency in a revolutionary type war should be fought by the local people. In other words, the
Vietnamese in the south should have been taking care of the Viet Cong. What we should have done was to use main force units of our own to prevent main force units from the North coming into South Vietnam. Although doing that, because of the terrain, would not have been an easy matter either. But I think Sihanouk felt that that was the thing that we did not understand in Vietnam and did not have going for us. He may also have drawn a parallel in his own mind with the role of public opinion in France in ending French intervention in Vietnam.

I don't know what we really accomplished having an embassy and all these people in Cambodia. Towards the end, early in 1964, Sihanouk said that he didn't want American aid. What the Chargé, Herb Spivack, a fine guy and very able, said was that we would stop all the ships at sea as well because there was a large pipeline. But that was all we could get out of it.

Cambodia certainly did not have the strength to antagonize, much less challenge the Vietnamese Communists. To survive with a restricted sovereignty, they could only pacify them and cross their fingers. Sihanouk knew the Communist Vietnamese were recruiting some of his own people. As unattractive a personality he was to us, he was the only one on the horizon who could maintain a reasonable unity in Cambodia. One of his worst mistakes was to keep his military weak and corrupt since he did not want to have a strong military force which he would have viewed as a challenge to himself. He counted on his support from the peasants, the Buddhists monks, and those in government and the private sector dependent on him.

Q: What job did you have?

HAVERKAMP: I was in the political section.

Q: Who was your ambassador?

HAVERKAMP: Our ambassador when I arrived was Bill Trimble who was a Europeanist. He left a couple of weeks after I arrived. Then Ambassador Philip Sprouse came from Brussels as our ambassador.

Q: Another Europeanist?

HAVERKAMP: No, he was a Far Easterner. He was a Chinese language officer and had been on the China desk in the days of the McCarthy era in the fifties. He was a Chinese expert, although he had also served a long time in Europe.

Q: How did the political section work? What were you looking at then?

HAVERKAMP: Well, there was one person who determined everything that went on in Cambodia and that was Prince Sihanouk who was then head of state. If you wanted to get anything done or wanted to influence policy, it had to be done with Sihanouk, directly or
indirectly. That at the time was no easy job, because our role was to gain support for what we were doing in Vietnam which was based on our understanding of what was happening in Vietnam which was contrary to Sihanouk's understanding of what was going on. You could of had somebody with the greatest persuasiveness, finesse, charm and language skills, etc., but as long as the Vietnamese situation was as it was in Sihanouk's mind, we weren't going to make much progress, unless we in some way would guarantee Cambodia's neutrality. This was much more evident after the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon. Sihanouk recognized Diem's unassailable nationalist credentials and his toughness. After Diem's fall he believed there would be a series of governments by generals coming to power by coups. This he believed would be to the advantage of the communists and weaken further our position. I believe these convictions led to his cancelling our aid program.

Q: You arrive there and are obviously the new boy on the block. What was your impression of how the embassy political section/ambassador viewed Sihanouk?

HAVERKAMP: One of our problems that you had to work against constantly was that Sihanouk had a personality and character that was very irritating to us because he would shoot off his mouth and let himself be carried away in nonsensical vituperation against people, countries or whatever. Once he said that all of his enemies are being killed by God. There was Thanat in Thailand, Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, and then President Kennedy in Washington, they are all burning in hell together. Something like that. He was shrill, wordy, vituperative, confrontational, and hysterical in tone. But behind it all was a shrewd understanding of what was actually happening in Vietnam and what effect it was going to have on Cambodia. His view was to keep what little was left of Cambodia, which he inherited, to keep it intact. But Vietnam under anybody was going to be a menace to his Cambodia. I think everybody in the Embassy agreed with this assessment. Washington was another matter. The administration always seemed to believe there was some clever way to change Sihanouk's mind. Since we were bound to prevail in Vietnam, it was only "reasonable" to believe we had an unassailable case to make. Mrs. Kennedy's visit to Angkor was one unusual approach we made later.

Q: The one thing that anybody who served in the area knew was that the Cambodians and the Vietnamese hated each other.

HAVERKAMP: Yes, there was no love lost. The Vietnamese looked down on the Cambodians and the Cambodians feared the Vietnamese. If you go back into history you will find that the southern part of Vietnam belonged to Cambodia until the middle of the 19th century when the French came in. Much of Central and Southern Vietnam had been given to the Vietnamese by sons or nephews of the king who wanted to anticipate their inheritance and to get the Vietnamese to cooperate with them in exchange for a little part of Cambodia. Other parts were captured by Vietnamese moving down from the North.

Q: What was the name of the empire?
HAVERKAMP: The Khmer empire.

Q: Is it in hindsight that you are saying that Sihanouk behind all this front and facade really understood the situation? Were we at the embassy seeing that maybe this guy has a policy despite all that was going on?

HAVERKAMP: I think, as I said, that the facade, the personality, was more of a handicap. The personality and the attacks against the United States were gratuitous, untrue and inaccurate, but most people tried to get by them. They were carried in FBIS and were reported to Washington. I think Washington understood but was absorbed totally on Vietnam. But again we were hampered because our policy was to defend what we were doing in Vietnam. He was convinced that what we were doing was not going to succeed because we had no government that could unify the people in South Vietnam in their effort against the North. The North was stronger, more unified and had, above all, good nationalist credentials because it didn't have foreigners fighting in Vietnam. It had foreign support, but the troops in the field were Vietnamese. If they felt Cambodia was a sufficient irritant, they would have taken it over one way or another, either through an enlarged cadre of Cambodian communists, who were their allies, or by marching in on their own.

Q: What would you do as a political officer if you weren't talking to Sihanouk?

HAVERKAMP: The Ambassador, rightly, was the only one who negotiated with Sihanouk. We reported on peripheral things, on what was done after it was done. One of the language officers who was the best at the language would listen to speeches and report them. Some did balanced exercise type analyses and commentary. We had an army attaché, a colonel, who was very good and coolly objective in reporting. When the South Vietnamese would make a charge that the Viet Cong were using Cambodia or if there was an incident where the South Vietnamese were accused by the Cambodians of coming into Cambodian they would take the military attachés down to see it. He was very honest and reported what he saw. For instance, "I saw tracks and there are no track vehicles in Cambodia that would make that kind of track, an American vehicle that we gave to South Vietnam would".

We were fighting off early at one point people like Ambassador Lodge in Saigon who advocated that we should consider carrying out aerial attacks in Cambodia. Herb Spivack, very cleverly and very graciously went back and said, "If you do, would you mind telling us first so we can get out?"

Q: How about the Khmer Rouge? Were they much at that point?

HAVERKAMP: They were not the force they later became and I don't think we knew very much about what they were doing. Some of them were still in Cambodia, some had fled. Sihanouk, as all dictators, was paranoid about people who were against him. He said
once he found that students that he sent to study in communist countries always come back good nationalists because they were appalled by what they see and don't want to be part of it, but those who go to the West, particularly to France or the United States, come back communists. Well, it wasn't true of those who went to the United States.

Q: And also, they were intellectuals and it was fun to be a communist.

HAVERKAMP: Also, communism had an answer to everything in a dictatorial framework. Yes, for intellectuals and for people who only understood government in terms of authoritarianism, not of compromise, sharing, etc.

Q: When you were there, what was the role of the French? Were we close to them or were they sort of off to one side doing their thing?

HAVERKAMP: I think social relations between Ambassadors and some people in the embassies were cordial. Where we had a common interest we might make a common approach, but it was one of those places where the French had a very special status and where they certainly were not going to give it up to us. I don't know of any real underhanded things that the French did to us like they had done earlier in Vietnam or some posts in Africa. There were also "non-official French" who were Sihanouk's advisers and who ran his party newspaper and had other advisory roles on his own immediate personal staff. You could talk to them and profit from their understanding and their knowledge of what was going on. They were also not unrealistic people. They were pretty shrewd by and large. President de Gaulle maintained a keen interest in Vietnam and was convinced that his relations with the government in Hanoi helped make him a world figure and hence a European of greater stature. It seemed to me he was waiting for us to withdraw so he could become the leading external influence in Southeast Asia.

Q: The big event while you were there was the impact of the killing and the coup that ousted Diem and also the Gulf of Tonkin and we were just beginning to put major forces into Vietnam. How did you all see it from your embassy and how was it reflected in Cambodia?

HAVERKAMP: In Cambodia, the death of Ngo Dinh Diem for the man who mattered, Sihanouk, was good and bad. He didn't like Diem because he realized early on that he had nationalist credentials as good as anybody else in Vietnam and he was effective. But as he began to lose control, Sihanouk was happy and unhappy. He was happy because a potential enemy was being weakened, but unhappy because it meant another more dangerous enemy, North Vietnam, was becoming stronger vis-a-vis the South. That was the point at which he probably decided that he had to move even closer to China to protect himself against an expanding North Vietnam. He had done some of this earlier on when somebody came in late in the fifties and moved a border marker further with Vietnam further into Cambodia. That was a critical turning point I think for Sihanouk for judging what was going to happen in Vietnam and according to our Ambassador at the time, the point at which Sihanouk recognized the Communist Government of China.
The Tonkin Gulf incident was just after I left Cambodia.

Q: Did you find when you were there that the attitude of our Far East Affairs in Washington...Harriman and Rusk and the desk officers...did they seem to understand Cambodia or did you feel that nobody really paid much attention to what happens in Cambodia?

HAVERKAMP: I think that they paid attention to what happened in Cambodia, but they worked on the assumption that we would prevail in Vietnam and our job in Cambodia was to keep Sihanouk from doing anything to harm us or the South Vietnamese or to aid the North. As I said earlier, Sihanouk by 1963 had come to accept the opposite assumption. Washington saw Cambodia as a sideshow and believed it was as much in Sihanouk's interest as in ours to keep the communists from taking over in Vietnam. Whereas Sihanouk's view was that he had to accommodate himself to whoever was likely to prevail.

Q: How about the media, the press? Did you try to get people to view what Sihanouk said with some perspective?

HAVERKAMP: I don't know that we ever made a conscious effort to do that. We were always interested in what he told them. He certainly would make an effort to charm them and appear to be very frank with them. Remember this was before the days of spin doctors. We tried to be objective while stressing developments and ideas favorable to us.

Q: I guess what I am trying to say is that after a while you got used to Sihanouk spouting off at the mouth. It certainly could raise the blood pressure in any red blooded American. The newspapermen would just come in and out and report this and make things even more difficult for us in dealing with Cambodia. Did you ever try to put the newspaper people or other media people in the picture and say, "Okay, you have to understand this man does this sort of thing but...?"

HAVERKAMP: Oh, yes. But it was hopeless. We were very aware that for Sihanouk the truth wasn't what happens, the truth wasn't what the newspapers say about it on him. He had people scanning newspapers from all over the world. If he ever found an article about himself he didn't like, he would get up and make a speech denouncing that country. It happened all the time. Sometimes people would, in an amusing kind of way, say that if you want to drive this guy around the bend all you do is plant newspaper stories around the world and he would go stark raving mad.

I remember one of the problems that came up while we were there was that his son Ranariddh, who seemed to be the most rational and intelligent of his children, went to the United States on an official visit. Some newspaper here said that this is the favorite son of the Prince who will succeed him. Sihanouk immediately became hysterical and said that
another son who was 12 or 13 years old was his chosen successor and he was sending him to live with the Zhou Enlais in Beijing.

Q: Did you feel you were in the center of anything?

HAVERKAMP: I didn't feel that the embassy could make any worthwhile difference. I think embassies have two functions, to understand and defend your country's interests any place you are. But you have to do that in a local context. When you misread the local context you are going to be less effective in trying to persuade people to do what we would like them to do in our interest and Washington would not be receiving accurate and realistic information on which to base policy. In other words, the war in Vietnam was not going to be lost because of Cambodia. Sihanouk had to judge what was going on in Vietnam, not for sentimental reasons or idealistic reasons or whatever, but on a very clear understanding of how the power equation in Vietnam was working out and who was going to come out on top and how he was going to have to accommodate himself to them to keep them from taking any more of his country. He looked to China as his big protector against the Vietnamese and not the United States, because he did not believe that we were going to win. To me at that time it would have been inconceivable that if we decided to go in with the number of troops and weapons and the commitment that we made there that we would not have prevailed.

Q: So at this point which you might call sort of a hinge time just before we really came in with full might, you left.

HAVERKAMP: When I was in Cambodia there were 16,000 Americans in Vietnam and they were advisers, although we had people flying in AT6s with Vietnamese "observers". Early in the Johnson administration after Tonkin we made our big commitment.

Q: That was an early Air Force trainer.

HAVERKAMP: Yes. They used them as attack planes in Vietnam. Kennedy was assassinated in 1963 and in 1964 Tonkin Gulf happened around the time I left.

Q: You went off to Africa which became one of your main concentrations. How did you end up going to Africa?

HAVERKAMP: Because I was assigned there after some of my colleagues in Phnom Penh spread the word that I couldn't draft. In a way that was true, I didn't believe I had much to say.

Q: Where did you go and when?

HAVERKAMP: My first assignment in Africa was the People's Republic of the Congo, capital Brazzaville. It was just across the river from what was then called Leopoldville, the capital of the ex Belgian Congo. I arrived in October, 1964 and left in June, 1965.
We were having very difficult times there. While I was en route going through Paris they arrested one of the AID officers and kept him in jail for three days. The ambassador was called back and I was held up and had three weeks of "TDY" in Paris.

Q: Well, you have to take the bitter with the sweet.

HAVERKAMP: We had a large embassy building in Brazzaville because earlier on there were many regional offices there. It was during the time of Abbe Youlou, who you may remember was the priest who held press conferences and served champagne as the "only drink fit to drink". He visited Washington early in the Kennedy days, uninvited, just turned up wanting to see the President. We had very little contact with the government when I was there because Youlou had been overthrown and replaced by a Marxist government which was supporting the Simbas, the people we were working against in the other Congo.

Q: The Simbas were?

HAVERKAMP: The Simbas were a rebel group in the other Congo supported by the Russians and the Cubans among others and were trying to overthrow the government in Leopoldville.

I think I went to the Foreign Office once or twice. Much of our effort there was asserting our rights not to be harassed and arrested and trying to iron out a few little things. Very little effort could be made to try and tell our side of the story because Massamba-Debat, the president, was in an hysterical Marxist phase. They had the pioneer youth, kids ten and eleven and twelve, going around with loaded weapons patrolling the streets, walking up and down the steps of the stadium when they opened the first African Games there.

I had two memorable experiences in Brazzaville. One was on New Year's night, I think it was. I went with one of the secretaries out to dinner at the local hotel. A group of people came and sat at a table next to us including Che Guevara. The Cubans were helping with training the Simbas. He sat chatting with a big cigar and paid us no attention.

Another time I received a call on a holiday and a voice said, "Are you the political officer at the embassy? Could you come down and see me at such-and-such a bar?" I hadn't had anything interesting to do since arriving, so I went down to the bar and was led into a little house in the back and I thought, "What am I doing here?" I went in and there were a group of people there. One was a leading Simba who was trying to get out of the country but said that he owed some money to the other people standing around in there. His brother was a minister in the Kasavubu government in Leopoldville and he asked if I could get a message to him. The message was sent.

Later on in June...Mal Whitfield, who was a regional adviser for USA and the greatest middle distance runner we ever had, came with the Ugandan team, on an Ethiopian plane,
for the African Games. He said that he was going back and I ended up getting a free ride
to Uganda and then went down to Kenya. On my way back I had to go through Salisbury,
then Rhodesia, to get back to Brazzaville. I got paged at the airport. I couldn't imagine
how anybody knew I was there because I didn't know I was going to be there. It was Hank
Cohen, who was the duty officer at the consulate general and who later became assistant
secretary for African Affairs. He said they had a telegram saying I am not to go back to
Brazzaville. I hadn't a clue why. It later turned out that they had arrested another embassy
officer and it was decided to fold up our tents and get out. So I never went back. I was
there for only seven or eight months. I then went to Leopoldville.

Q: You were in Leopoldville from 1965-66. What were you doing there?

HAVERKAMP: I was deputy chief of the political section. At first I was supposed to go
to Stanleyville as the consul, but a guy who was in Leopoldville wanted that job and by
the time I got there he had it. He wasn't resident there, but he went out there. It was still
very interesting because you had the Simba rebellion going on and the mercenary hoard
was chasing them.

I tried to follow general politics in Leopoldville and also cover Brazzaville. People would
come over from time to time from Brazzaville and I would talk to them. I did some
Foreign Office reporting.

Q: To finish off Brazzaville. Did we just write it off? Were there any American interests
there?

HAVERKAMP: They called the ambassador back. By the time he got back they had
already decided to close the embassy, so they never had his input. Why have somebody
there if you are not going to consult him?

In the two cases that brought about the decision to withdraw, U.S. officials came
improperly documented but we were assured by the Congolese Embassy in Washington,
that they would be allowed in. One was an AID officer and he was arrested and thrown in
with a bunch of criminals. That happened while I was en route. The other one was a new
economic officer. The ambassador went out with most of the embassy to meet him and
before he reached the group there to meet him he was hauled off by the police because his
visa was dated for some time in the future, two weeks later or something. But they had
assured him back here that there would be no problem.

In addition to challenging a Marxist government and its role in the other coup, here was
one other American interest. There is a large potash deposit there and American Potash
together with a French firm, Potasse d'Alsace were going to invest in developing it.
Moving the Potash, however, was a very costly procedure. When we closed the embassy
American Potash backed out. Well, we found out subsequently that the French went
ahead and in the end it didn't work out. They lost something like $70 million. So by
accident we served an American company.
Q: What was your impression of how the embassy in Leopoldville was run?

HAVERKAMP: I thought it was a very good embassy. We had Ambassador Mac Godley, who was very able, very shrewd, a good judge of people, was quick and had a very good understanding of what the situation there was like and what you could and couldn't do. He had the discipline and foresight, the quickness to do what could be done without trying to achieve something that was unachievable given the situation at the time. The Congo, later Zaire, was important because of its size and location and its relationship with some of its neighbors, particularly Angola and Sudan, not to mention its mineral wealth.

Q: Did you feel that you were part of the Cold War?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, but also trying to reduce chaos, to bring some order into a chaotic, violent, dangerous, disintegrating society.

Q: Did you feel the Soviets were meddling or was their influence by that time pretty much dissipated?

HAVERKAMP: Their presence was felt in the sense that many of the Lumumba people had been supported by them. There were still Congolese being trained in the Soviet Union. Zaire was certainly a prize that either the Soviet Union or ourselves would have liked to have on our side. It is as large as the United States east of the Mississippi. The copper mines then were still going and there were diamond and gold mines. Things were moving into chaos but the copper mines were the big thing at that time.

Q: You were in the political section?

HAVERKAMP: Yes.

Q: What was your impression of the Congolese government and what was the Congolese government at that time?

HAVERKAMP: When I first went there it was the Kasavubu government that had been elected. Tshombe was Prime Minister.

We had a MAAG mission there, we had an AID mission there. We were trying to help the government organize itself into some degree of efficiency and to build up a military that could handle the rebellion without wanting to take over the government. Through our AID program we tried to help in economic growth and development. But the big problem was that there was chaos in the countryside. The government's writ did not run outside of Leopoldville. You had an alternative government in Lubumbashi, as it was then in the Katanga area. That is where the riches were and where the Tshombists were. You had two urban islands with chaos in between. But there were things that were working like sugar mills, rum distilleries, palm oil plantations, etc., in addition to some of the mines.
Q: What was the role of our consulates at that time?

HAVERKAMP: We had one in Stanleyville, but the consul lived in Leopoldville traveling frequently to Stanleyville. We had one in Lubumbashi and one in Bukavu. They did critical work reporting on the various rebellions, especially the role of the foreign mercenaries, in doing what they could to look out for and counsel American citizens, especially the missionaries or the activities of the anti-government rebels.

Q: Were they under the gun there?

HAVERKAMP: They were always under the threat of chaos. Later when I came back to Washington and worked on Central African Affairs, they had to evacuate Bukavu.

Q: How did we see the Congo developing at that time? We were aiming for peace, but in your heart-of-hearts, what was the impression that people had at that time?

HAVERKAMP: I think people were so busy patching things up, keeping it going from day-to-day...sure you thought in the long term, training a military and the AID program, but propping up the government from day-to-day and hoping that chaos didn't break out even worse in Kinshasa...there were drunken soldiers setting up roadblocks, shaking down people. One amusing incident. They stopped one of the European ambassadors one night and said they were going to shake him down and he said, "You can't do this to me. I am an ambassador, a diplomat." The soldiers were supposed to have said, "Ha, ambassador, diplomat, we have too many of those around here."

And nothing ever really worked. There was one good hotel where they put up visiting firemen and business people, but in the middle of the night they might throw all the guests out because some delegation from some place in the provinces that the president wanted to be in that hotel arrived. This happened fairly often. I can remember going to the Foreign Office and the plate glass of the door was out. They hadn't bothered to open up the door so you just walked through. Then you had to step across sleeping messengers who had their feet stretched across the corridor.

Later, when I was in Zaire for a couple of days, the embassy had a note that had gone around to all embassies asking them to tell the Foreign Office how much money the Zaire government owed them because the Foreign Ministry didn't know. Everything was in a mess.

You also had mercenaries fighting against the Simbas at the time. They had some AT6s and were also undisciplined. They were people who if you told them the bank hadn't taken the money out of a town up ahead would advance, otherwise it might be a little difficult.
You were just trying to save the place from going into more violent confusion. The nearest thing to chaos that you could imagine.

**Q:** Did you feel Washington properly recognized the situation?

**HAVERKAMP:** Yes. As I said, we had a crackerjack ambassador who knew what he could do and worked very hard at getting it done. He had influence and entrée and an effective relationship with General Mobutu and President Kasavubu. Through our AID program and MAAG program we did have influence with Mobutu and others. The ambassador was also respected in Washington. He was an extremely honest man in reporting without going overboard. He never ridiculed what was going on. He is one of the few people in the Foreign Service who even put his own career on the line to do what was right. There are not many people like that.

**Q:** What did he do?

**HAVERKAMP:** This came about because the ambassador had been instructed to tell then president, Mobutu, something that Mobutu did not want to hear. Mobutu subsequently told another embassy officer that Godley might as well go because he, Mobutu, would not see Godley again and he would have no role or influence in the country. When that officer told that to Ambassador Godley, Ambassador Godley sent back a message saying that he would have to be recalled because he could no longer be effective. He was recalled and went to EA and later became Ambassador to Laos.

**Q:** Yes. You left there in 1966.

**HAVERKAMP:** Yes, I was called back here to work on a task force on Zaire. The guy who was there was transferred and I joined the task force.

**Q:** The Simba rebellion at that time, what did that consist of?

**HAVERKAMP:** That consisted of the remain of the Lumumbists and some younger recruits. They were in several areas. There were rebellions going on around the Albertville area, Lake Albert; around Stanleyville area, and in the South Central part of the country. I visited the headquarters of the government army elements fighting the Mulélists. The colonel gave me a briefing but had a lieutenant standing by to move his arm when he wanted to point to some spot on the map.

**Q:** Was this before Operation Dragon Rouge or afterwards?

**HAVERKAMP:** I can't remember.

**Q:** This was when the Belgian paratroopers went in. That was probably before your time. How did you find Washington? Did they have a pretty good idea of what was happening or were they living in a different world about the situation?
HAVERKAMP: No, I think there was a clear understanding because most of the people had been there and because, I think when Ambassador Godley was there he sent a very clear picture of what was going on back to Washington.

Q: *Was there much you could do within the task force?*

HAVERKAMP: No, it was keeping the Secretary and the White House informed about what was going on, sending instructions to the Embassy, dealing with the press. It dissolved shortly after and we went back to a regular operation.

Q: *And then what did you do?*

HAVERKAMP: Then I was the desk officer for the Congo. While I was in the Congo, in fact, Thanksgiving Day of 1966. Mobutu took over, there was a coup about 5:00 in the morning. Soon after he changed the European names of the country and the principle cities to African names. Congo became Zaire. The people were also made to change their Christian first names to African names.

Even after the task force was dissolved you still had incidents. I remember at one point there were rebellions still going on in two or three places and the question of evacuation of foreigners came up and we were back again in a task force mode on a Saturday afternoon. We were discussing evacuating civilians with our allies. Secretary Rusk came in and very straightforwardly said, "Look, we will take out our people. They have planes and can take out their own people. We are not going to be responsible for everybody when they can do it themselves."

It was a patchwork job. At the time you had the Cold War going on and the situation generally unsettled in much of Africa. It made sense to do what we were doing which was to try to prop the place up and keep it nominally as a country until they could make it on their own.

We made some big mistakes there at that time. The GRAE, nominally a resistance group working for the independence of Angola which was still under the control of the Portuguese, was quartered in Zaire. Angola was equally or more important than Zaire in terms of natural resources, it had large deposits of oil in addition to other resources. GRAE was a totally ineffective corrupt organization as it proved later on when the Portuguese decided to pull out. I was also the liaison with the GRAE people.

Q: *Was Soapy Williams the head of AF at that time?*

HAVERKAMP: When I went to Brazzaville, Soapy Williams was the Assistant Secretary. By the time I came back here it was Joe Palmer.
Q: Did you find that Joe Palmer was realistic about wither Africa?

HAVERKAMP: Joe Palmer was a very cautious man. I had a very disillusioning incident there. I thought what Zaire needed most was a trained, disciplined, modern bureaucracy establishment. I suggested to my boss that what we should do is convert our $2 million per year military aid program into scholarships for both military people and civilian administrators and managers. The Zairian government could pay for the military equipment from their own resources. The idea was taken up to Joe Palmer and my boss said, "But the Belgians might not like this." Palmer said, "Oh, yes that is very important." My view was that they were our allies, couldn't we ask them? It was decided that we couldn't go any further than that. So that was the end of the idea. I don't know if it would have made any difference, but they certainly haven't progressed in their ability to govern the country.

Q: You did that until 1969...

HAVERKAMP: Well, actually I didn't have a job after a while because you had an office director, a deputy office director, and then a Congolese desk officer and various other desk officers. The office director and deputy wanted to do everything involving the Congo because it was the only game in the office. So I then became the deputy country director of AFW, which included Mali, Guinea, Senegal, the Gambia, and Mauritania. After being there for a while I was asked if I would like to go out as DCM to Dahomey, as it was called then.

Q: So you went out to Cotonou in 1969.

HAVERKAMP: Right, around July, 1969.

Q: What were the American interests there?

HAVERKAMP: They were minimal. It was a state so therefore they had a vote in the General Assembly. They played a certain role as a state in the Organization of African Unity, the UN and other organizations. There was some interest in oil exploration off shore by American companies. And that was about it. But at that time it was a very pleasant and delightful place. There was a very good ambassador which was very important in that small isolated country.

Q: Who was that?

HAVERKAMP: Matt Looram. It was an extremely pleasant experience. The people were delightful. They were very poor. Palm oil was their largest foreign exchange earner. They had a military with a couple of tanks and APCs and artillery pieces as well as a small group of officers overtrained in a more sophisticated French military culture. The ambassador and I went out to call on them and met all of the military. It was obvious that they had not much to do and lots of time to meddle in politics. They had a terrible
political history there of coups. While I was there, again it was a fairly short time, they
decided to have elections. They had three principal candidates. The elections were going
to be in three stages. Well, the second stage was so bloody they called them off. Some
people had been killed. They were going to have the three rotate, but it didn't work and
the colonel took over. We assumed this would happen because these guys were just
sitting there 20 miles outside of town and had nothing much else to do.

Dahomey suffered a lot. They had a very intelligent population. There were something
like 300 physicians from Dahomey practicing in France. You could use 300 physicians in
Dahomey, but you couldn't pay them.

Q: It was a nation in which the upper pursuits were prized.

HAVERKAMP: Yes, education. They were very friendly people. But there wasn't much
that you could do really. There were issues such as votes in the UN and positions on
various issues but then they didn't carry all that much weight. They had good people in
the Foreign Office that you would talk to and do business with, who didn't exaggerate
their self-importance or the importance of Dahomey on the world's stage. So it was a
delightful experience.

Q: How about the French? Did they sort of view us with suspicion?

HAVERKAMP: Don't they everywhere? We had good relations with the French. The
Ambassador and the French Ambassador had good professional and personal rapport.
There was none of the kind of rivalry that we had earlier in Madagascar and Gabon with
the French. After all the French had no great stake there. There were the usual French
shopkeepers and professionals who worked there.

Q: Did you have any AID or Peace Corps there?

HAVERKAMP: We had Peace Corps and also had AID. AID did some very good things
with crop storage and agriculture. It was not a big program. It was under a regional AID
office in Abidjan. It was an interesting time for the Peace Corps because there were the
big student protests over Vietnam at home. The ambassador had a daughter who had just
graduated from college and worked for the Peace Corps. We had very good relations with
the Peace Corps because of the ambassador and his wife and daughter. In many places the
Peace Corps was antagonistic to the embassy at that time. But we got on very well with
them. One thing I learned was that you don't ask them, "What are you going to do when
you finish this?" The future was later.

Again, because of the ambassador and his wife it was a delightful place to be, as Zaire
was and Korea was for me. In such posts, leadership from the top, both the Ambassador
and his wife, made all the difference.

Q: Oh, indeed it does. Well, then it looks like you got yanked out for Vietnam?
HAVERKAMP: My name came up around the time of the invasion of Cambodia. Some names came up and a friend in the office of the Director General happened to be an old friend from Kinshasa and said, "Oh, Haverkamp would like that." So I was sent to Vietnam.

Q: This was from 1970-72.

HAVERKAMP: Yes. I did not like to go because I felt I was letting the ambassador down and he had been very good to me in taking me there even though he didn't know me very well., and I enjoyed it. Anyhow I went. It was kind of funny because the Dahomians would ask, "Oh, are you going to be the ambassador?" But I learned a very interesting thing. One Dahomian newspaperman said to me, "You know it is too bad, you are going at the wrong time. Foreign diplomats always think they are looking at us, but we also look at you to see if we want to know you and can trust you. And it takes about a year to do that and now you are leaving."

Q: When did you get to Vietnam and what did you do there?

HAVERKAMP: I got there in 1970 just after we invaded Cambodia and after Sihanouk was overthrown. It was in the summer after some training at the Vietnam Training Center. It was August or September of 1970. I was supposed to be an adviser to an office which was to look out for the welfare of what they called the Khmer Krom, Cambodians living in what was then the south of Vietnam. In several provinces they were a majority of the population. They had a special office in the government which was supposed to look out for them. Believe me, trying to talk to the Vietnamese about treating the Cambodian minority compassionately and with consideration was like going into Mississippi and telling Senator Bilbao that he was doing the wrong thing to the Blacks in the South.

Q: We are talking about Bilbao's figure during the thirties and forties, particularly in the South.

HAVERKAMP: It wasn't a ministry, it was an office and not in Saigon but in Can Tho, which was the site of the IV Corps headquarters in the Delta. It was run by an old fuddy-duddy, nominal colonel in the Vietnamese army who was often tipsy and who had almost no influence. He lived in constant fear of the Vietnamese government. As the Corps advisor, it was my job to try to persuade the government to give the Cambodians their fair share of aid goods and reach out to them. But getting a high up decision really to engage the Cambodians in support of the government was a dead loss. Many of the Vietnamese rangers were Cambodians. At one time I saw a group of military prisoners in a Ranger camp. I was walking by and they were speaking Cambodian. I looked around and I said to one, "Oh, are you Cambodian?" He said that all of them there were Cambodians. I don't know what they did or why they were there.
The Vietnamese government gave up on them. They wanted to use them but not accept them. They wanted them to fight for Vietnam. Strangely enough, several Vietnamese generals I met had Cambodian bodyguards because they were very rarely Viet Cong supporters.

When I got to Vietnam they said I was going to be in Saigon because they didn't know where the office was. The Cambodian monks in Vietnam were demonstrating and they were having trouble with their Cambodians.

Q: I remember in Saigon I got caught in a traffic jam and everybody was screaming about the damn Cambodian monks who would get out in the middle of the road and sit down or something.

HAVERKAMP: The only method the Vietnamese had was to buy them off or suppress them in some way or other. I traveled around the various areas with a significant Cambodian population and met with the U.S. advisors. Then the U.S. general in IV Corps, Major General John Cushman had me sent to Chi Lang on the Cambodian border where the U.S. military had a Special Forces training camp training Cambodians and a special element of an advisory team coordinating military operations across the border and also training Cambodian officers in map reading and other skills, elemental skills. There were also officers from the Cambodian Army participating in air operations in Cambodia staged in Vietnam. It was a center where U.S. military coordinated all of our operations in the adjacent Cambodian Corps area. We had meetings between the Vietnamese and the Cambodians to try to promote understanding at least to the extent where they could operate together. That was all pretty interesting and a little more effective than working with a government not intending to make any changes in the appalling treatment of its Vietnamese minority.

So, I had those two jobs but spent most of my time at Chi Lang.

Q: How was our military commander, John Cushman, who I knew later in Korea. He used to do a lot of war gaming and he struck me as somebody who is innovative and thinking ahead. How did he strike you as the commander?

HAVERKAMP: Well, he was a man who left a very strong impression. He was very able, very hard working getting up at 5:00 in the morning to study Vietnamese. He was indefatigable. I got on very well with him, liked him and with his support was able to do things that I would not otherwise have been able to do. He was extremely hard on his military staff. His staff meetings were excruciating because if anybody tried to bull his way through or made a statement without any back up or threw out some numbers without checking them, he was merciless. He brought several military careers to an end and was not exactly popular but was feared and I must say it worked. As IV Corp commander he was adviser to the Vietnamese general in charge of IV Corps, General Ngo Van Truong who was one of the most honest and able officers in the Vietnamese army. He is now living in the United States. He was very hard working, he wanted to get on
work with the Cambodians. I could talk to him and General Cushman would go with me to see him. But Cushman saw his relationship to his Vietnamese counterpart as one of a management consultant. He would send a weekly or monthly report letter of things that went right or things that went wrong. The letters I saw were clear, direct and unvarnished. That that was not quite the best way to deal with the Vietnamese who were not from an open society and operated in a society where loyalty was uppermost and trust hard to gain. With us, these kinds of open communications are understood. That being said, after my experience with other Vietnamese generals and Americans who worked with Vietnamese generals, Cushman and Truong were the best. At the end Truong was in II Corps. After the 1972 offensive by the North he had to fold because the general in the Corps above him, I Corps, which was on the North Vietnamese border, bugged and his troops ran. But it was a very good experience working for Cushman.

I also worked for John Paul Vann.

Q: What was your impression of him?

HAVERKAMP: Since I read the book, I didn't know...

Q: It's called the "Bright and Shining Lie" by Neil Sheehan.

HAVERKAMP: Yes. Sheehan interviewed me for the book.

John Vann was sharp and had a better understanding of what was going on in Vietnam than any American or foreigner that I knew. He had influence with military, with politicians. I can remember going to his office to see him and sitting from maybe 10:00 at night to late at night or early in the morning when he would come in and put his feet on his desk and say, "Well, if you came here to bullshit I haven't got time. What do you want?" And then he would talk for an hour and a half or two hours. But while you were there the telephone would be ringing and it would be his girlfriend who owned a pizza parlor, or some general, politician, correspondent or some governor or another girlfriend. The Vietnamese knew that Vann understood them. I never saw the Vann that is portrayed in the end of the book, somebody who allowed himself to be disillusioned or became disillusioned into thinking they could win. One thing I can clearly remember him saying to me was–we don't know how this thing is going to turn out, but one thing they can't say is that we didn't give them every chance.

He was a guy who was a hands on manager. He would go to an outpost that was being attacked. Sometimes I think he must have worked 36 hours without stopping. But he really knew the situation on the ground. He knew the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. He was very, very well informed and a very influential man with the Vietnamese, the U.S. government and the press. Yet, he was a great guy to work for. Bill Colby, who was then head of CORDS was his boss. I went to Colby through Vann. If Vann thought your idea was worthwhile he would make a good presentation for you and you would get an answer. You never lacked an answer. He was never afraid to take up something out of
fear of the reaction of the person above him. If he thought it was worthwhile, he would suggest it and make a good case for it.
A great boss and a truly unique and brilliant man in Vietnam. I know of no one else whose views were more sought after or listened to.

Q: How were things going at IV Corps, the Mekong Delta, at the time?

HAVERKAMP: Well compared to I Corps, II or III Corps things were pretty well under control. Cambodia was very worrisome because the Cambodian army was ineffective and much of their leadership was hopeless. To be sure, like the Vietnamese there were outstandingly loyal and brave officers who operated successfully despite handicaps on their own side that would have discouraged most. We also had outstanding professionals in CORDS, the U.S. military and other agencies. One Foreign Service Officer assigned to CORDS as his first post was captured and held as a prisoner in a cave for years.

Q: And it was pretty much run by the Vietnamese wasn't it?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, with U.S. advice and help.

Q: This was not a place where we had to put many resources.

HAVERKAMP: In the military sense U.S. troops were mostly in an advisory role. There was a large civilian effort and commitment of resources. There were still areas of strong Viet Cong control in the U Minh forest area and considerable activity in areas such as the mountains in Chow Duc province.

Q: Was there any liaison with the Cambodian army at that time?

HAVERKAMP: Yes. When I was a liaison man in Chi Long the Cambodian Army had six or seven officers who flew with the U.S. light fire team. I lived in a hut with them. The US 9th Division Advisory team was there. We were officially a part of the team but separate because we had official liaison with Cambodian III Corps which was on the other side of the border. The U.S. military brought Cambodian officers down to train them in map reading and on how to use U.S. air assets available to work with them. Requests from III Corps for B-52s or Cobras or air strikes of any kind of support came through that center. They were very naive and would ask for B-52 bombing of some village because Cambodian military prisoners were believed to be there. They would be told, "Well, we have already learned in Vietnam that it is not a good idea to do that to your own people." These Cambodians from the Cambodian military would go along on C&C ships to be the liaison with people on the ground. I did that from time to time myself.

There was a special training camp for Cambodian troops who had been sent down to be trained by our Special Forces. They would round up people and send them down. There
would be some little kid there and if you asked him how old he was he would say, "I'm fifteen" in a high pitched voice.

There were also meetings between the Vietnamese and the Cambodian military to try and get them to plan and work together. The Cambodians were always accusing the Vietnamese of robbing and raping and pillaging, burning and looting. Some of which was probably true. At the top level, the generals got on all right.

Early on when General Cushman asked, "Well, what do you think?" I said, "Well, with the Cambodians we are lucky in some way that the enemy is the Vietnamese". This was before we really knew the extent of what the Khmer Rouge was doing. The Cambodians had tremendous confidence in the U.S. military. It is really heartrending when they end up as the Cambodians did by being killed for having worked for us. But they were very loyal and very supportive.

I tried to get our military intelligence people to take what the Cambodians said seriously and to teach them how a good intelligence officer was demanding, objective, and suspicious.

**Q: Did you get any feel about our embassy and how it was taking information, or was this just another world?**

**HAVERKAMP:** After the invasion in of Cambodia in 1970 it became, I gather, within the embassy, a source of disagreement between the MAAG team and the ambassador on the one hand and the DCM and the Cambodians about how much equipment to give them, particularly sophisticated weaponry. But when you look at what they were doing, when Lon Nol was running their war for them, the way he was just leading them from one mass ambush or defeat to another, it was very sad.

**Q: Did you have much contact with the embassy?**

**HAVERKAMP:** Only through the military attaché when he would come down with the Cambodians for meetings that we had at Chi Lang. At times an Embassy political officer would come with him. I went up there once to see the deputy prime minister, a man named Son Ngoc Than, who was a leader of the resistance to Sihanouk, at one time. Then we had something called CIDG forces that were trained by our people before we went in, before seventy. They were very effective. They were well trained and disciplined. They had some of their pay with the rest of it going to the monks in charge of the pagoda in the area where they lived in South Vietnam who gave it to their families. They were used for various penetration operations, etc.

When Sihanouk was overthrown we gave up that support. Son Ngoc Than had headed all that group. I met him when I was in South Vietnam and then some time after the invasion he went up to Phnom Penh to be deputy prime minister. When I went up to see him at his invitation, I went to the embassy first and nobody I asked for was available to see me.
Afterwards I came back to tell the embassy what had happened and the Political Counselor went wild. "How dare you do this without seeing us beforehand?" That was my only contact.

Q: How about our embassy in Saigon?

HAVERKAMP: I used to go and see the people there. They were always very helpful. They moved in a different world, I think, than those of us in CORDS because they were dealing with the national government. I gather they were having some trouble with the military because according to my friends in the embassy General Abrams censored everything that went out on the military and if it was critical it was most likely edited. And I saw the ambassador from time to time. He was interested in hearing from Foreign Service Officers in CORDS and was always open and cool. He seemed to be a man who knew how to go from the details to the conceptual and to concentrate on what was important. With his entre to Presidents Johnson and then Nixon, he was unusually influential at home and in Vietnam.

Q: The ambassador at that time was who?

HAVERKAMP: Ambassador Bunker.

Q: You left there in 1972. What did you feel about Vietnam when you left? Wither Vietnam in your opinion at that time?

HAVERKAMP: Well, again I didn't see it ending up the way that it did. From the beginning I never felt comfortable with the idea of all of us running around telling province chiefs, district chiefs, and others, how to run their country. Some of whom had been fighting the communists for years. Moreover, in a nationalist war you have to have nationalist credentials and I was always uncomfortable about the effect this had on the Vietnamese government's nationalist credentials. Not so much what we were doing with the Vietnamese and Cambodian military, but with the civilian government in Vietnam. At the same time it was exciting telling people how to run their government rather than reporting on how they were doing. I could never figure out anything in all of Vietnam that was worth the price we were paying. I still can't. We had absolutely nothing there that made it worthwhile for us to make the effort that we made. I wasn't disillusioned when I left. I didn't think it was hopeless for the South Vietnamese.

I would like to say something about the build up of the Khmer Rouge while I was there. We had intelligence reports from various sources on the Khmer Rouge. And the things they were doing were startling. For instance, killing monks which would have been inconceivable even in a novel in Cambodia a bit earlier. Khmer Rouge control was spreading. Reports began coming in from places all around the border areas with South Vietnam and farther north. The loss of control of the countryside was so quick. The terrible mismatch was that you had the incompetent Lon Nol government and you had a ruthless enemy who was taking advantage of his incompetence to reduce the area he
controlled. The whole time I was there the dominance of force was on the side of the government, but they were outmatched in tactics and dedication by the enemy. There were, of course, some outstanding, brave and loyal officers whose units performed very well.

Q: So why don't we stop here and pick up in 1972-74 when you went to Conakry.

HAVERKAMP: Okay.

Q: Today is June 9, 1994 and we are continuing this interview. Roy, we have finished Vietnam. Shall we go to Conakry?

HAVERKAMP: Okay.

Q: You went to Conakry from 1972-74. How did you get that assignment?

HAVERKAMP: I was very interested in Africa and asked for an assignment in East Africa and they had the gall to tell me that they had something I would want that was near, but not all that near. So they sent me to Conakry. Actually it was a very good assignment because at that time they were not going to send an ambassador and I would have been Chargé. But they changed their minds before I got there and sent an ambassador, who was a very good man and it was by far and away the right thing to do. I don't think it was lack of confidence in me, but rather the realization that President Sekou Toure might refuse to deal with a Charge for very long.

Q: When did you arrive in 1972 and what was the situation in Guinea at that time?

HAVERKAMP: I arrived around August or September of 1972. It was just after the Portuguese allegedly tried to invade Guinea and the Guinean president, Sekou Toure, who was ruthless and an autocratic dictator, had arrested and killed a lot of people, particularly people he felt were close to us, who really weren't any threat to him. He took advantage of the invasion scare to do away with some of his enemies, real and otherwise.

Q: Who was the president?

HAVERKAMP: Sekou Toure, who had been president since independence. Practically everybody was afraid to deal with us because so many people had been arrested and were being arrested for participation in the alleged invasion. It was just too dangerous to get close to foreigners. We had important, but not vital, interests there. The Guineans have, among other things, the richest bauxite deposits in the world that were being developed by an international consortium, which included Alcoa, Alcan, and French and British companies. Alcoa was the largest partner, I believe. That was up in the northern part of Guinea. We had contributed something like $60 million in aid counterpart funds to help build an infrastructure to make this viable. Guinea also has rich deposits of iron ore, gold, diamonds. It is a beautiful country with the possibility for tourism.
Q: How did we at that time interpret how Sekou Toure was running the government and particularly towards the United States?

HAVERKAMP: He was in charge. We were not out to overthrow him. We knew we just had to settle down and ride out a difficult period because there was no sign that he was going to allow a free election or loosen his hold. I can remember, for instance, going to meetings with him and he would sit in his office and talk for five or ten minutes or a half hour or two hours and suddenly he would say, "Well, bring in the boys," as he called them, and a servant would open up a side door that looked like a door to a closet but was to the back steps, and up would come the cabinet who were standing there the whole time waiting to be called in.

But he was very keen on one thing. Once his government made a promise he would fulfill it, particularly with the big bauxite companies. He stuck to that.

The country's finances were in a mess. They had a currency that was called the sillie and in terms of international value it really was a silly. I don't think any currency trader was dealing in sillies outside of Guinea. He had really ruined the country economically. The money was worthless. He had controlled prices which didn't make it worthwhile for farmers to produce and sell in town, if indeed they could ship their goods into town and know they would arrive in saleable condition. So farmers produced for their immediate families or if they lived on the border they could go into Senegal or Liberia and trade crops for things that they needed like cloth, food, transistor radios, etc.

Q: Was the Cold War still a factor in how we looked at things in Africa at that time?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, it was. But again it was a lesson in not taking an ideological view of the world because while he was a Marxist, trained and influenced by the CGT in France, which was dominated by Marxists, he was very pragmatic in dealing with the bauxite companies. It was far and beyond his main source of foreign exchange and he wasn't about to destroy it.

Q: CGT is your General Federation of Workers in France, which is a Communist trade union.

HAVERKAMP: Yes. From independence he had help and advice from the Soviets. Yet, he gave the best bauxite concession to a Western consortium. The Russians had concessions that our people said were not economically exploitable. In other words you couldn't recover your costs when you sold the bauxite or converted it into alumina. The Russians were desperately trying to recover money they had lent him or the price for goods that they had given to him. They did have one thing that was disturbing and that is they had pretty easy access to the port and to the airfield in Conakry. Mr. Toure undoubtedly charged port fees. They had submarines, guided missile frigates on other
ships that would come in there and stay for a time. They didn't have a base, but access. At
the same time he let our regional military Attaché plane come in.

Q: So I suppose there was a great game of spying and counter spying at the port?

HAVERKAMP: Yes. I remember going with the military Attaché plane up to Bamako,
Mali. This Attaché in his old beat up C-47 flew about fifty feet over the deck of a couple
of Russian naval ships in port.

Our relations with the Russian Embassy by that time were not like it was early on when
you and I came into the Service where you insulted each other and other people kind of
stood around watching for a show. You knew what they were going to say and they knew
what you were going to say. You weren't going to do any business with the Russians,
their military especially was unapproachable. I remember trying to talk to a Russian
admiral once at a reception and his lookouts saw me coming fifty feet away and he was
never where he was when I spotted him. It was a good spot for Soviet spotting. The
Cubans were also there in numbers along with the Chinese, North Koreans, etc.

Q: Were they using the fields for ocean surveillance?

HAVERKAMP: Later TV-95 Bears stayed from Conakry for awhile.

Q: Was this a transshipment point for things to Cuba?

HAVERKAMP: Not that I know of. It was important for the Cubans in the sense that the
PAIGC was there, which was the liberation movement for the Portuguese colony of
Guinea-Bissau. They were trained and supplied by the Russians and the Cubans and
operated from Guinea. The PAIGC, though, did not want to be tied exclusively to the
Communist states. I think Guinea was one mission in the Foreign Service where the
ambassador got authorization before he came out that he and I would be allowed to meet
with them. It was his idea which was a superb idea. They were friendly, wanted us to
meet with them and took help where they could get it. They were easy to talk to with no
ideological hang ups in conversations with me. Later when I was in London, negotiations
for independence were held there and I saw several of them.

Q: Who are the PAIGC?

HAVERKAMP: It stands for the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese
Guinea and Cape Verde.

Q: What were we interested in doing with them?

HAVERKAMP: We were interested in having contact with them because they were very
effective. In the end the Portuguese revolution really started there because General
Spinola, who had been Governor General went back to Portugal and understood that the
government could not continue to control Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola as they had for centuries and had to make some changes. He started the revolution in Portugal in 1974. While I was in Guinea the situation in Guinea-Bissau was rather like parts of Vietnam at times. There were areas where the Portuguese could go on the roads in convoys during the day, but the guerrillas controlled them at night. The PAIGC were beginning to throw bombs in cafes and public places in the capital. Our interest was to know and understand their ideological convictions, if any, and to avoid leaving the Soviets and the Cubans as their main foreign influence.

Q: Did we cover Guinea-Bissau?

HAVERKAMP: Officially it was Portuguese territory and Lisbon covered in that capacity from the Embassy, we covered what we could of the PAIGC from Conakry. The leaders were sophisticated people. I think they like most of the African liberation movements first came to the West for help and then turned to the East when they didn't get any. Interestingly, VOA could not or would not send correspondents to Guinea-Bissau as the fight really got going, but I listened to reports from the capitol by a BBC reporter.

Q: While you were there were the Portuguese still in Guinea-Bissau?

HAVERKAMP: Yes, they were. I left after about a year and a half in 1974 and the Portuguese were still in control.

Q: Who came out as ambassador?

HAVERKAMP: Ambassador Terry Todman.

Q: He is one of the major figures in the Foreign Service. Could you explain your impression of how he operated and how effective he was?

HAVERKAMP: He was one of the most effective people I have known because he had kind of a lawyer's sense of what was important and what he could and couldn't do and how he could do what he felt he could do and had to do. He wasn't afraid to say in a very convincing way what the strengths and weaknesses were and how we had to play them. I think he sized up Sekou Toure immediately and for him it couldn't have been personally very satisfactory because there wasn't very much that anybody could do. But he had access because he was shrewd, intelligent and trustworthy. He had sound convictions and the good sense not to be preachy or uselessly confrontational. In Guinea he had a disciplined approach in which he distinguished between a needy people and the persons and policies that put them in that position. He operated on the sound assumption that it was not right nor in our interest to let people go hungry because we did not like their leader.

Q: Did we see Sekou Toure as a independent or a tool? This was in the high Nixon/Kissinger period where things seemed to be seen in the East-West confrontation.
Were we trying to put Sekou Toure into the Eastern camp as far as Washington was concerned?

HAVERKAMP: I don't think Washington really cared all that much. He was already there having been established early on. He came to power in the days of President Kennedy, I think or certainly late Eisenhower. While he was allowing the Russian supported PAIGC to use Guinea, they were no thorn in our side. Remember in one of Kissinger's books, he talks about the inevitable progress of decolonization and notes that in NATO the only member with significant colonies was Portugal and Portugal's role as a colonialist were numbered. As long as Russian use of Guinean territory was minimal and the bauxite operation was working, Washington was calm. They had no great expectations from Sekou Toure and I believe recognized that Portugal's days as a colonial power were running out. There was concern over Russian military staging and concern on human rights grounds over the arrests and assasinations following the alleged Portuguese invasion.

Q: Were there Americans working on the bauxite operation?

HAVERKAMP: Yes.

Q: Were there any problems with them?

HAVERKAMP: No problems as Americans. As long as they went about their business running the bauxite operation, the Guineans were very happy because they needed the money. The reason Western companies got that concession was because we paid his share in foreign currency that he could use as he wanted. The Russians wanted to get their money back from their operation. Early on, before I was involved in Guinea, Washington did a very good thing. They insisted before the Western consortium negotiate they should make sure the Guineans had good lawyers to represent them because they had nobody who really understood how international conglomerates worked. The Guineans hired Coverington and Burling in Washington to look out for their interests. So we had a foil between us and the Guinean government, which worked well. The Americans handled things very well. The head of the operation was an American. There were also quite a few French Canadians and other foreigners.

Q: In this period were there any other major issues going on? You said it wasn't quite as interesting because it was sort of a status quo operation going on.

HAVERKAMP: Nothing more than I have already mentioned, i.e. Russian military doings, the PAIGC and the bauxite.

Q: Was France playing any kind of a role at that time there?

HAVERKAMP: No, their relations were very tense, they had no French mission there. There were some French people still in jail as a result of the alleged invasion.
Francois Mitterrand had been an old friend of Sekou Toure from Toure's times in France and came down to try and negotiate for the release of French prisoners. Terry Todman and I spent about an hour and a half talking to him at one time at the airport. Mitterrand had just come in, he had access to Sekou Toure, one of the few French people who did, to see what he could do about the French prisoners.

**Q:** How about the problem of UN votes. Did that come up or did we just sort of write Guinea off.

HAVERKAMP: I can't remember ever being instructed to go in on a UN vote. It was probably done in New York. We may have, but I just don't remember it.

**Q:** It sounds like it wasn't the most fun place to be. Sounds like you were constrained in a way.

HAVERKAMP: Well, you were and what you could do, I think, was just to lie low and use professional discipline to keep everything moving without causing any unnecessary conflict. Terry Todman kept pushing, for instance, to get permission to go out of Conakry because we were restricted to Conakry. The countryside was beautiful, but there was nothing in the way of facilities out there. Morale was very important because the exchange rate was set by the government making an onion cost $2 or a tomato a $1.50, if you could find them. So we had to bring our food in. It was cheaper to fly our food in from Brussels because Sabena still had landing rights there. But they had trouble because when there was fog they didn't have any kind of GCA equipment. You would go out to the airport when Sabena was due to land and everybody from the foreign community, except the representatives from the communist countries, was there with wives and children waiting for the food to come in. If the plane didn't land or the food wasn't on it, life was pretty difficult.

But I think we did the right thing. We lasted it out and eventually Sekou Toure died a natural death. I haven't followed it to see what has happened since.

**Q:** Then you went where after that?

HAVERKAMP: Before I finished my tour there I was transferred to London.

**Q:** You were there how long?

HAVERKAMP: I was in London for a year, after which I was probably put into the nut file because I asked to leave.

**Q:** So you were there from 1974-75. What were you doing in London?

HAVERKAMP: I was in the political section following Africa, the Commonwealth Organization and Latin America.
Q: I take it wasn't to your liking there.

HAVERKAMP: Well, the people in the embassy were very good to me and it was a fascinating place and all that kind of thing, but there wasn't anything moving in any of those places. It was before Kissinger decided he was going to become interested in the Rhodesian issue. Many of the liberation movements were there including the ANC. It was charming and delightful and there was almost never any overtime. I felt that it would have been much more interesting working with something where the British were more directly involved and more interested or on British politics. In fact, the whole embassy didn't really function at top efficiency because it had a political ambassador who really didn't give two hoots in hell about conducting government business. A charming and delightful guy and very generous.

Q: Who was this?

HAVERKAMP: Ambassador Annenberg. The British did most of their high level stuff back here. Kissinger and the Foreign Secretary communicated directly with each other. So we could go in and do the normal things that mid-level and junior officers do, but there was no contact at the highest levels when Annenberg was there or when he was away. And he didn't become pals with the Prime Minister or the leader of the opposition or the leader of any party. He just didn't seem to be interested.

I read part of Phil Kaiser's book recently and he had been a Rhodes Scholar in England before the war. While he was there he became friends with Ted Heath, who became head of the Conservative Party, he met Harold Wilson who was teaching at Oxford then and he became head of the Labour Party. Both of them became Prime Ministers. And he met people in the Liberal Party and the labor unions as well. So when he went back there as Minister, he had an entree which was promising. It must have been difficult for him. I think Walter Annenberg had him transferred out. But Annenberg's idea of a DCM was not a very active character. We had outstanding officers in the political and other sections who were first rate. The missing link was contact with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and leaders of the opposition, which should have taken up the time of the Ambassador. Elliot Richardson replaced Ambassador Annenberg and established relations with the country's political leadership.

Q: But this was after your time?

HAVERKAMP: Just at the end of my time.

Q: Well, then you went back to Washington where you served from 1975-78. Where were you serving?
HAVERKAMP: From 1975-76 I was the Director of the Office of Southern African Affairs, which included South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

Q: Those areas sometimes have strong interests and sometimes they don't. How were they during your time there?

HAVERKAMP: Zimbabwe and Angola were of top level concern. When the Portuguese pulled out of their African colonies there was chaos. In Angola, the Soviets had helped a Marxist group for years and had been moving in a lot of military equipment. Over the years they had been training the MPLA, which was the Marxist liberation movement. Washington decided that we were going to help the UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi who was a competitor of the MPLA and who had as good nationalist credentials and actually a larger number of people, larger area where they were supported than the MPLA did. This led to our covert but inevitably well known support for Savimbi. I believe that what may have persuaded Washington to support Savimbi was that the Soviet challenge in Angola, which had been going on for years, reached a climax at a time when our policy of detente came under criticism from elements in Congress who saw detente as weakness. A corollary to detente developed proclaiming it existed and had to be applied everywhere, not just in U.S.-Soviet relations. There was little understanding of how the MPLA and UNITA were developing and what needed to be done, if anything could at that late stage, to assure the triumph of UNITA.

Q: What were you and your colleagues thinking about our policy say within Angola? What should we be doing?

HAVERKAMP: Our interests in Angola could be considerable because Angola is a large country located between Southern Africa (Namibia, Botswana) and Zaire in Central Africa. It is rich in minerals, agriculture, and oil. Not all their resources had yet been discovered. One of its neighbors, Southwest Africa from Namibia was then part of South Africa, was also in the throes of confrontation between the SWAPO independence movement and the South African government.

The Soviets were very active with the MPLA for years and it was certainly in our interest not to let them get by with smuggling in arms in quantity to impose a Marxist government as successor to the Portuguese colonial government which was losing control rapidly. But, I did not see it in our interest to do that by doing the same thing the Soviets were doing. As I said earlier I think the Nixon administrations policy of detente towards the USSR was reasonable and the best we could do. That is identify and build on points of agreement and differences to avoid confrontation. Angola raised the issue of whether detente applied only in Europe or also to regional balances of power elsewhere as well. The administration decided on the latter option and to challenge the Soviets by supporting an opposing liberation movement, UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi and to join South Africa in arming and training UNITA forces. Most of my colleagues and I were convinced that our effort which was to be covert would not be hidden for very long. The press was going
to get hold of it. Congress had to be informed. It all came out, but we went on doing it for a long time afterwards.

I felt that what we really should have been doing in Angola was bringing pressure on the Soviets and working with our allies in the UN to end the conflict. As it was the MPLA-UNITA war still drags on and the MPLA were still in power if not in control of all Angola. There is no doubt that our relationship with the Soviets and managing that relationship was critical and of primary importance. We all knew that. But it was a question of how best to do that in Angola. That is, you do not devise policy toward Angola without understanding the dynamic of what is going on there. What was going on was an insurrection controlled by the Soviets who had been helping the MPLA for years which was challenged not by the Portuguese, who were bugging out, but by UNITA to which we gave major support late in the game. The prospect was a prolonged war by proxies in which the support of the Congress, the press and the U.S. population was most unlikely, coming so quickly on the heels of the debacle in Vietnam.

Q: I often have the feeling that some of these issues, as you are sort implying, get settled for reasons...the people who understand these countries are almost out of the decision process because you have to show you are tough to the right wing of the Republican Party at that time. Kissinger was Secretary of State by that time and he had never been very interested in Africa. This was part of a global thing rather than taking a look at how it was on the ground.

HAVERKAMP: Yes. There was a difference I think between clientitis and a globalism which ignores the reality in a particular area of the world that is affected by a larger relationship. I think that was the case in Angola.

Q: How were we looking at the situation in South Africa at that time?

HAVERKAMP: It seemed to me there was a vacuum between the Secretary's office and the working level. Shortly after I arrived, the Assistant Secretary for Africa was replaced. There was little or no guidance from that level to my level, or at least to me. I heard that Secretary Kissinger was not interested in Africa as you say, and people told me that you could hardly talk to him about it. One meeting I sat in on with him and the then Foreign Minister, later President of Mozambique, he handled with professional and personal skill. Otherwise I don't know how he felt or how great his interest was. I only found that out late.

South Africa was the most industrialized area in all of Africa. It is one of the richest areas of the world in terms of natural resources and in terms of resources that only they, and at the time only the Soviets had, and we needed. Chromium, for instance. Eventually, when it became obvious that the White government of Rhodesia was not going to prevail, the Portuguese were bugging out of their African colonies and Soviet supported Marxists were taking over in both. Secretary Kissinger travelled to Southern Africa and began to
take greater interest. I cannot say more than that because I was never told what he was doing beyond what was in the press.

_Q: So, while you were there was Rhodesia on the front burner?_

Haverkamp: That was on the front burner because the liberation movements there, particularly the movement that was headed by Robert Mugabe were really making headway against the White government. I think it was like South Africa. In Rhodesia the Ian Smith government was more vulnerable than their South African supporters. The Black-White population ratio in Rhodesia was too much in favor of the liberation movement and Robert Mugabe, the leader of the strongest movement, had support in hordes and was a very shrewd and clever tactician. Ian Smith was naive and hopeless.

_Q: What could we do about it, anything?_

Haverkamp: I think what we did there in the long run was right. We worked with the British who eventually had a series of meetings involving representatives from members of the British Commonwealth and the liberation movement leaders that brought peace and a settlement in which the Ian Smith government left Rhodesia, there was an election and Mugabe came out on top.

I think what we could have done we did, but it took the Nixon and Ford administrations to become interested and do something about it. But I think we did the right thing.

_Q: While you were there what was your impression of reports coming in from both the field, the CIA and maybe elsewhere on those areas of Africa that you were dealing with?_

Haverkamp: I thought they were pretty good. One thing that a good intelligence agency can do is that they can give their government an objective understanding of problems that it has internally with its own people that it would never acknowledge publicly. Foreign intelligence agencies that are good can pick this up and so can embassies. On issues of Blacks and Whites in Southern Africa there were also ideological zealots in Washington who tried their best to obscure reality, but the reporting by intelligence agencies was realistic.

_Q: I get somewhat the impression that as has happened you have always had this very strong right wing which is powerful in Congress and elsewhere, particularly in the Republican administration and sometimes will toss a whole area to let them have more say. This happened during the Eisenhower Administration with Asia. Asia was turned over, you might say, to the right wing so he could go ahead and do his thing in Europe. I don’t know if this would be fair to say or not.__
HAVERKAMP: I don't know. I never saw it in that context in Africa. Obviously, the right wing predominated policy wise, but the left wing prevailed. In Asia our security interests with Europe were much more closely linked, for example China and Russia.

Q: Perhaps not even consciously, but it seems that at least in part Africa was left off to one side, so that if someone took a strong interest, say in Congress, they weren't up against a hard policy.

HAVERKAMP: By relating what went on in Africa to what the Soviets, the Chinese communists and their acolytes were doing, these hard policies developed quickly, e.g. North Africa, Zaire, Angola and South Africa. Also there was a great deal of ignorance or lack of understanding particularly towards South Africa. Some liked the policy of apartheid, while others, they considered themselves "realists", were convinced that numbers did not matter. What counted was that the government had the only organized disciplined force and could not only maintain law and order, but also contain any Soviet supported insurgency.

Q: You were in Washington until 1978. Did you move to something else for a while?

HAVERKAMP: They were dissatisfied with my services, I heard hints that I was supposedly talking to the press, which was totally untrue. I think I was one of the few people who didn't deviate from policy and promote myself. I kept being interviewed by the security people or called asking, "Did I talk to...?" But I was suddenly sent off to the Senior Seminar for a year. And then I went to Jamaica after that.

Q: You went to Jamaica from 1978-81. What were you doing there?

HAVERKAMP: I was the DCM.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

HAVERKAMP: The first one was Fred Irving and later it was Loren Lawrence, both career officers.

Q: What was the situation when you arrived in 1978?

HAVERKAMP: In 1978 the government of Jamaica had been run by Michael Manley and his party since 1970. It was a nationalistic government, a government with socialist ideas of the general welfare. While it had friends and supporters among the rich and famous, it was also a very class conscious government. It reveled in excess going so far that it not only drove out speculators and the idle rich and many of the working rich but also people like carpenters, plumbers and skilled and trained people in a wide variety of occupations. The economy was in a mess. There was a serious shortage of foreign exchange. They had tremendous problems of over population, poverty and economic slump. There was much talk by the government to solve all these problems, but little was
done. You had education for everybody, but when children went to school there were not always enough teachers. There was medical care for everybody but a large number of physicians and medical professionals had left the country and there was no money to buy all the medicine and things needed.

We had an AID program there at the time which increased to the "enormous" sum of $6 million a year. Carter and the Democrats were very friendly to Michael Manley and he certainly did not return their friendship. He was going all over denouncing the United States, blaming us for everything that was wrong with the world. But Carter continued to believe that this was one of our friends who was telling it to us straight. Manley preferred the Cubans.

**Q: Where was this coming from? Was this Carter himself or somebody around him?**

HAVERKAMP: I don't know who it was directly influencing him on this, but the whole administration I believe were strong supporters of Michael Manley. Manley was very cozy with Castro and the Cubans and said "I will go to the mountain top with Castro". He did things like taking a couple of thousand of his young teenagers and sent them to Cuba to learn socialism. He had Cuban advisors in each of his ministries and his security services. Well, if you favor a socialism that includes the essentials of a democratic society like Manley inherited, there are many socialist countries to which you could send them and you would not send them to Cuba where it was tied in with an authoritarian government. But Cuba was Caribbean and all Jamaican leaders look at Jamaica first of all in relation to their neighbors in the Caribbean. But Michael Manley was using us as the bogeyman to avoid blame for the disastrous economy. He was, I believe, genuinely concerned to improve the lot of the poor who were mostly Black, through education, jobs, and social services. His heart was generous, but he did not know how to manipulate the economy and the society to bring about the changes he wanted. He also did not know how to get what he needed from those outside who could help.

**Q: At the embassy how did we view Michael Manley? You had an administration which had a rosy eyed view of things.**

HAVERKAMP: When I went there I think they went too far. Our interest in Jamaica is in supporting their democratic system of free elections, an independent judiciary and all the other trappings of democracy. There are legitimate things that you could do that would not interfere in any overwhelming way in their society that you should do. But some in the embassy had gone too far, I think, in supporting Michael Manley because I think they felt that was what the President wanted. Criticism of him was anathema.

The leader of the opposition, a man named Edward Seaga...the opposition party was the conservative party although it was called the Labour Party... In the Westminster system, the leader of the opposition is usually the number three ranking person in the country and has a place in the hierarchy and protocol. Mrs. Carter came down and they did not schedule any appointment with Seaga. I can't remember the Ambassador ever seeing
Seaga. After the first Ambassador left I tried to establish relations with Seaga and it took me months because he didn't want to see anybody from the embassy. Like elsewhere in the third world, politics was a winner take all competition. Add to that, die-hards in both parties had armed supporters willing to fire.

We also had another unfortunate thing. Also before I arrived, an Embassy officer, a cynic, left a description of Seaga which was highly detrimental, where it was found by a Seaga henchman. Naturally, this did not help.

We had access to Manley. He would see the Ambassador and listen, but he did not change. When he first ran as head of his party in the 1960s, he had a Foreign Service officer who wrote speeches for him and traveled around with him. That was early Manley.

Q: You mean one of our Foreign Service officers?

HAVERKAMP: Yes.

Q: Good God!

HAVERKAMP: This was in the time that he sang a different song.

Q: This lack of dealing with the opposition, was this coming from the ambassador, from Washington?

HAVERKAMP: Oh, I think this was coming from the Ambassador. It wasn't the whole opposition, it was just that the Ambassador avoided Seaga.

Q: How did you see Fred Irving?

HAVERKAMP: A very bright guy, a very able guy. I respect and like both him and his wife. But I think he felt that he had been sent there and had been told that there is a close relationship between Carter and the Democrats and Manley and his People's National Party and to do everything we can to help them. Since there was so much antipathy between the party members and the leaders, balance was hard to achieve, nevertheless, it is done all the time in Embassies around the world.

I can remember one White House official telling me at a meeting later on when they were having elections in 1980 that I should go to see Seaga and tell him not to do anything that would politically hurt Manley. That was absolutely insane. If you went into any country in the world and told them not to criticize the opposition, they would say, "Don't come back and see me, see your doctor." So we were all mixed up in those things.
It was important to help preserve the democratic structures of Jamaica, to know and encourage our friends. In the 1980 election I did everything possible to stay neutral. This was not courageous on my part as it was evident people wanted a change. Seaga was certainly better able to do something about the economy and was friendly toward us, although we learned he was no pushover on any issue. In the end his record on the economy was mixed. It was exciting to be there during the elections in 1980. It was a dramatic demonstration of democracy working in a poor country. The Jamaican Defense Force played a critical role by remaining neutral.

_Q: When did this happen?_

HAVERKAMP: This was 1980.

_Q: Who was ambassador then?_

HAVERKAMP: It was Lorrie Lawrence.

_Q: Well, when he came could you describe how he operated?_

HAVERKAMP: Well, he prepared himself very well for it. He was somebody who had great interpersonal skills. He was very intelligent. He brought in the balance that we needed. To see a balance in that type of democratic society does not mean that you ignore things that either side is doing that you think are detrimental to us.

_Q: Was the CIA playing any role that you were aware of?_

HAVERKAMP: Any dirty tricks role?

_Q: Yes._

HAVERKAMP: None that I was aware of. Guns were one of the problems. Both Manley and Seaga had their armed youths in ghetto areas of town. There were certain areas of Kingston where you could not go unless you were accompanied by, introduced by and supported by a Seagalite or in the other case a Manleyite. If you did, you were liable to be shot. And there was one very bizarre case where the military carried out an operation which they botched up. They got a bunch of youths in one of the ghettos which supported Seaga and killed five of them and some escaped. There was a big to-do, but nothing ever happened. The killers and the victims were the poor, never the big shots in either party. It was a real tragedy.

_Q: Were we seeing that things were going to be changing as we looked at this 1980 election?_

HAVERKAMP: Yes, I think the general expectation was that in a free election Manley would be voted out and that there would be a change of government. But, I don't think
anybody expected a great improvement. People felt Seaga better understood what you had to do to revive the economy than Manley did. Some people felt he was a fascist. He, like Manley, left quietly when he was voted out of office. He was a tyrant within his own party and ruthless. But towards the end the Manley government was very touch and go. People were very concerned that there would be a big shootout. The defense forces once they got rid of a corrupt commander were under a new commander and were pretty gung ho types, committed to supporting the government and its democratic structure. The police were less reliable. You needed an organization that was going to maintain order or deter extreme violence and that was going to be the JDF and they played that role very well and constitutionally. Manley, to his credit went out of office without causing any disturbance or behaving in a disruptive way.

**Q:** Was the Carter Administration, at least from the White House and what you were getting, still sort of Manley supporters or were they beginning to change?

**HAVERKAMP:** I think in the end they saw two things. Number one, Manley went to a meeting in Cuba where he really castigated us, including Carter. Then they began to see that this was a bit much. It was one thing to have your friends tell you about your faults, but to tell the whole world and lay the whole world's faults at your doorstep is going a bit too far. Particularly since we felt ourselves to be their supporters. And to their credit, when Seaga came in the Carter administration did raise the AID program a bit.

During the election campaign the Republican National Committee sent down a guy who made contact with the Seaga people. I don't remember the Democrats sending anybody down. If they did, they did it sub rosa. Manley really needed the AID money and he wasn't getting it on terms that he felt he had to have it from the Carter Administration. I made it very clear to everybody in the embassy that our job was to stay out of the way. To know what was going on, but to stay out of the way. I think that if we had evidence that the Cubans or the Soviets were giving any kind of covert support to the Manley people, depending on the circumstances, we should have exposed them. It was clear that people wanted a change and they turned out and lined up to vote.

**Q:** Was there a Jamaica lobby in the United States or in Congress? A lot of Jamaicans had immigrated to New York.

**HAVERKAMP:** The Black Caucus was very interested and were strong backers of Manley. Seaga wanted to send somebody to meet with them, but they wouldn't meet with Seaga's people. They were out and out Manleyites.

**Q:** Was Seaga Black too?

**HAVERKAMP:** No, Seaga was of Syrian-Lebanese decent.

**Q:** So that played a certain element there.
HAVERKAMP: Yes, but probably more back here than there. While race and class are problems here and there, racism is much less a problem in Jamaica.

Q: It is funny because I had the impression that Manley had gone far too far and it was a relief to get him out of there.

HAVERKAMP: Oh, he had very definitely, but Manley had White supporters and some rich White supporters and Seaga had poor and middle class Black support.

Q: But within the Democratic Party up until close to the end they got involved with his cause.

HAVERKAMP: Oh, I think they stuck with him all the way through, the Black Caucus and his other supporters back here. He had convinced them of all of these horrors of the opposition. Seaga was a man without much warmth or personality, but he had a lovely wife, a former Miss Jamaica, who was party Black and partly European. She was a beautiful person who greatly improved Seaga's image and acceptability. But he never used that or bragged about it. Their eldest child was a Black child that he had adopted after a fire in the area that he controlled in the ghetto. Race was never an overt question, although I am sure that there were some Black Jamaicans who would not have voted for Seaga and some White Jamaicans who wouldn't have voted for Manley. But early on the Manleys had all of the upper classes as supporters. Manley's father was a very famous lawyer and a man of great character who lost his position as Prime Minister because he insisted on having a referendum which he did not have to have on a West Indies Confederation. Michael Manley was always compared with him and found lacking. His mother was a very famous sculptor.

Q: You were there when Seaga took over?

HAVERKAMP: Yes.

Q: For about the first year?

HAVERKAMP: I was there for about a year and a half, I guess.

Q: How did that go?

HAVERKAMP: The transition was very smooth. I used to meet with Seaga once a week, having breakfast with him well before the elections. One of the things that the government needed was some up front money to bring in consumer goods...not the way he did it in the end, but that is beside the point...to bring in medicines, spare parts, and things that would help the economy to get going. One way to do it was for us to buy bauxite for the stockpile. We needed bauxite in the bauxite stockpile like I need a hole in the head. We didn't need it, but for political reasons it was a good thing to do. Well, we
did it. It took almost two years to get it because it had to go through committees of Congress, the General Services Administration, and a whole host of interests. This was started under Carter. Then when Seaga came up and met with President Reagan, he was assured we would do it, but it still didn't happen right away, it took time. Anyhow by the time he got the money the bottom had dropped out of the bauxite price and it really didn't help him to do what he wanted to do at all, which was unfortunate. Our purchases made up the loss in foreign exchange income, but did not give them the extra addition of cash they needed.

But I think the Seaga people had the impression that he was elected because he wasn't Manley and understood how to manage the economy in a way that would restore economic activity and bring jobs to people.

Q: Well, you left there in 1981 and went where?

HAVERKAMP: I went to Dillard University in New Orleans as a diplomat in residence.

Q: Was that a year's assignment?

HAVERKAMP: Yes.

Q: And then what?

HAVERKAMP: I came back to Washington and didn't have an assignment. I did odd jobs and then went to a course that the military had just started called Capstone for newly promoted general and flag officers. Before that, nobody above the rank of colonel was assigned to training courses. This was to give new general officers and admirals, a commander-in-chief's eye view. It was set up after the Goldwater/Nichols Bill. You had a whole new structure in the military. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became the President's personal advisor on military issues. His deputy could act in that role when he wasn't there. They did not have to have the consensus of the Service chiefs before giving advice. It also made the Commanders in Chief of the unified and specified commands...unified being more than one Service, specified being one Service...authority to fight the troops in case of conflict.

Q: So you did that for how long?

HAVERKAMP: I did that for three months and then I went to the Senior Officer Division in Personnel.

Q: How long were you in Personnel?

HAVERKAMP: Not very long, a little less than a year.
**Q:** How did you find the senior personnel business? Were the Bureaus pretty much running this?

HAVERKAMP: I found it very enlightening and very disappointing and was actually looking for an opportunity to leave. It was a purely staff job. Some of the files that I read and some of the people who were my clients in Personnel had performed truly outstanding feats, yet I realized that if they were going to become ambassadors there was nothing that we could do if the Secretary, the Director General or an assistant Secretary had a candidate for the job. Their record did not matter. Some of the things that people did in the Foreign Service were outstanding. They showed extraordinary intelligence, moral courage, physical courage, analytical ability, and above all, negotiating skills. But that was not enough if you did not have a sponsor. That part was depressing. Things were done in Personnel, but not in the Senior Officers Division. All the clerical work was done there. I would go through the file, write up recommendations, but the decisions were made elsewhere.

**Q:** So where did you go after that?

HAVERKAMP: I asked to go to Grenada.

**Q:** How did that come about?

HAVERKAMP: A friend in Personnel realized I wasn't happy...I appreciated getting the job, because there were a lot of people without jobs, and I am not deprecating that part...and said, "How would you like to go to Grenada?" I said, "I would love to go."

**Q:** What did you do there?

HAVERKAMP: They told me I was going to go and be Chargé and then the hot shot assistant secretary at the time, Ambassador Motley decided we needed somebody with the title of ambassador. So they asked Lorrie Lawrence to go. Lorrie said he wanted me to go as his DCM. He did a favor for me because I would have been without an assignment. So I went down with him and was DCM. He left after about eight months.

**Q:** What was the situation there when you arrived? This was when?

HAVERKAMP: I got there in January/February, 1984. We still had some of our military there. You still had the government that had been set up after we took over. The big thing coming up was an election. We had a big AID program there. I think we spent something like $60 million in two years. We built roads and finished off the famous Cuban airport. We did all sorts of other things like training. The task was to restore a functioning democracy in a society that got off to a bad start after independence from the UK.

**Q:** For the historical record could you give a brief summary of the incident that had brought our military there?
HAVERKAMP: What brought about United States intervention was the murder and overthrow of a popular Marxist Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, who himself overthrew an elected but terribly corrupt and unstable government led by Eric Gairy, a very peculiar character. Gairy was thoroughly corrupt and a very despicable character and had aroused the wrath of just about everybody in this tiny country. When a young socialist, Maurice Bishop, and a small group of revolutionaries...I forget the numbers but it was around 20...took over the radio station and a couple of other places one day and threw him out, there was general rejoicing. Had Bishop run for election within the first year of his coup he would have been elected unanimously but he didn't. He did not hide his Marxist convictions. He set up his new army and his great friends were the Cubans, East Germans, Soviets and the Czechs. All these people came in. The Cubans built an enormous airport there which they said was for tourists. After four or five years, one of the left wing people in Bishop's own party staged the coup against him in which he was killed along with several other people. Fear and panic spread. Bishop was popular despite his Marxist friends and one party rule.

The President of the United States said that he received a request for help from the Governor-General, through a regional Eastern Caribbean organization. So we sent in our troops. And, indeed, when we did get there we found that there were certain things about the airport that made it less useful for tourism than for troop transport. The fuel tanks were for the kind of fuel that is used on jet prop planes, but not on jet planes. The messing facilities in the airport were the reverse of a normal restaurant which has a smaller kitchen but a large dining area for customers. This had a large kitchen and a very small dining area which meant it was something that you could use to feed troops passing through who did not need tables and chairs. The Cubans had to stop off going to Angola...they were sending troops to and from Angola. They didn't have planes that could fly directly, their Soviet jet props had to refuel to make it to Angola.

When I first heard this I happened to be in a taxi cab coming back from the Hill to the Department and I thought, "We have invaded Grenada?" But when I got down there the people were extremely grateful for the intervention, every American walked on air. They were afraid and didn't know what was going to happen after Bishop's murder. They felt it was a real godsend for them that we came, of course they also expected we would put them on the road to peace and prosperity.

Q: How long were you there?

HAVERKAMP: Two years. It was a delightful, beautiful little place. It was interesting because it was the big foreign policy victory of the Republican Party going into the 1984 election, so you did have high level interest. The Secretary came, the President came, the Vice President, the National Security Advisor all came. You had a big AID program to get through. And the people were delightful and of course it was good to be in a country, no matter how small, where we were so well liked. Professionally, it was a good learning experience dealing with a failed Marxist state after the end of Marxism.
Q: How many people were there?

HAVERKAMP: I think there were about 90,000 people. It is not the smallest state in the world in terms of population, but nearly.

Q: What would you do for the President, Bush and others when they arrived?

HAVERKAMP: When President Reagan came he met with the leaders of the other English speaking Eastern Caribbean who all came to Grenada. He had meetings with the Grenadian Governor-General, the Prime Minister and addressed an enormous crowd where he was very well received. He was a real hero in Grenada. The others followed the same path only without meeting the other Eastern Caribbean leaders.

Q: But other than that, what was there just sort of smiling and be nice to people?

HAVERKAMP: Well, it was helping prepare for the elections, talking with members of Congress and the press, keeping the AID program on track plus following useless rituals we had to maintain. Things like persuading the government to reduce the civil service, to claim and take back land from squatters for more worthy projects, etc. Obviously, if I was going to go and do all the political reporting, the political officer would have asked for a transfer. I handled visitors and helped the AID people run interference with the government. A Presidential visit in a place like Grenada is not easy. There were not even enough hotel rooms for the advance party that they wanted to send down. But it all worked very well because the government was very friendly, the White House was able to arrange the local scenery to their satisfaction and the President was at his best with the regional Prime Ministers with whom he met. The new freely elected Prime Minister of Grenada fumbled badly with then Vice President Bush by calling our AID program "chicken feed". I can say I advised him against any criticism the day before the meeting, but he was feeling his oats with all the high level attention.

U.S. Special Forces were training special service units, small military units for Grenada and other countries in the area. We gave them their equipment and their weapons and their training. Training for the islands was done in Grenada, I don't know if we still do, I hope we do because none of them could afford it. One of the big things we were always working with the government was to reiterate that these Special Service units had to be controlled and maintained by them.

Q: So once it disappeared from being on the visitor's route, that was it?

HAVERKAMP: The sharper press people were all convinced that our presence and role were passing phenomena and soon after we left attention would focus elsewhere. Grenada would then struggle with the usual problems of tiny island countries, security development and overpopulation, etc. They were right.
Q: Well then, after that what happened?

HAVERKAMP: Then I went as political advisor to the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic who was also NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic.

Q: Well, you served when to when?

HAVERKAMP: From 1986-89.

Q: What were you doing?

HAVERKAMP: I was stationed in Norfolk, Virginia. My job was to support the CINC on political/military developments or political developments that would affect the military in areas for which he was responsible. In his role as one of three NATO Supreme Allied Commanders Atlantic, his responsibilities included naval forces from the U.S., the UK, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Bases in Iceland were also under his command. As you know, France does not participate in the integrated military commands. Nevertheless, French forces do participate in exercises with NATO and the French had an admiral as liaison with SACCANT.

Q: Canada?

HAVERKAMP: Canada, right.

Q: How did you find that you related? You had already gone to this Capstone program which must have been a help.

HAVERKAMP: Oh, yes, very definitely.

Q: How responsive was the military to your advice, counsel?

HAVERKAMP: I worked directly with the Commander in Chief Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and with anyone else in both commands who was interested or involved with issues which were my responsibility. My first Chief, Admiral Lee Baggett was open, interested, shrewd in understanding political issues, particularly in his NATO role where he had direct access to NATO defense ministers. He was also responsible for naval and other forces in his U.S. command. He went down three or four times. The main interest there was the military assistance programs. Haiti was always an issue of importance almost above everything else in a sense because after the overthrow of Baby Doc, there was always the threat of conflict, of chaos breaking out to the point where you would have to evacuate Americans, which would be his responsibility. One of my main jobs was getting some of our colleagues to understand that when you pull a string the troops will not come to save you. There are ships and troops that are doing other things in other places. The Secretary of State may make the decision, but he is not going to come down and get you out, it is going to be the Army, Navy and Marines.
Q: Did you find yourself sort of looking for trouble spots and keeping an eye on them? Sort of in a way acting as the emergency, evacuation man?

HAVERKAMP: Not particularly. A lot of people view our i.e. State's relationship with the military as one where you have to look out for potholes, but they are far beyond that. If you look at the military now and some of our colleagues in terms of issues like Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia, the military view is they are anxious and willing to work with us at all stages from planning to execution. Some in State and elsewhere believe the military should just do whatever the civilian authorities over them order them to do. And this is true up to a point, but in America troops are not like Jack in the box. Vietnam showed above all that getting in a conflict that requires sustained conflict without the support of the people and the Congress and where the price in human lives being paid is greater than the interest being pursued, will not have public support and cannot be sustained.

Potholes were not really a big problem. The more interesting parts of the job were helping the CINC in coordinating what he did with State and in getting what he needed from NATO governments.

I was very lucky. It took some time to build my confidence with the CINC, because he was a very busy man. He had about a quarter million sailors, SSBNs, SSNs, aircraft carriers, other ships as well as international and US staffs. You had to make yourself useful to him and that takes time. When I did, he took me with him almost all the time when he met with foreign leaders to talk about almost every aspect of his commands. But as far as understanding and being interested in the political aspects of his command, my first admiral was very, very interested, very savvy and a delight to work for. He was a tough guy who took no B.S. from anybody. He didn't mind laying you out. In fact, I really worried until I got chewed out. Only then did I feel I really belonged. Here all these other people were being laid low and I thought he felt as a civilian I wasn't worth the effort. I was also lucky because most often State was well informed on issues that concerned him.

From my viewpoint that was one of the best assignments I had.

Q: Who was the second admiral?

HAVERKAMP: The second admiral was Admiral Frank Kelso, who later became Chief of Naval Operations. I was with him only a short time.

Q: Was there a big difference working for him?

HAVERKAMP: There was a difference. Admiral Kelso knew the Navy and was a bright guy, but not all that interested in political issues. He wanted to have good relations with ambassadors and NATO defense ministers and he did. As with his predecessor, I had entre whenever I wanted to see him, which was frequently and he included me in meetings on a wide variety of issues.
Q: Just a different focus.

HAVERKAMP: More a different way of dealing with some aspects of his command.

Q: Were you there during and did you have any concern with the Panamanian exercise where we went in and took out Noriega?

HAVERKAMP: No, once it gets on the ground in Central America it belongs to what was called SOUTHCOM, which was a command in Panama headed by a 4 star Army General.

Q: But you were there during the time of the Panamanian thing. I can't think of any place where they needed a political advisor more and apparently they didn't have one.

HAVERKAMP: Well, they did, because SOUTHCOM has a political advisor.

Q: But at the time they didn't have one.

HAVERKAMP: I do not know.

Q: I think it was an interim period. Whatever it was, from the political/military side it was very badly done.

HAVERKAMP: I was not aware of that.

Q: Well then you left when?

HAVERKAMP: I left there in July, 1989 and that was the end.

Q: Why don't we stop at that point.

HAVERKAMP: All right.

End of interview