

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
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**ALLISON BUTLER HERRICK**

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**INTERVIEW**

*Q: This is an interview with Allison Butler Herrick who served in AID for how many years?*

HERRICK: Twenty-one.

*Q: When did you retire?*

HERRICK: In October 1990.

### **Early years and education**

*Q: Let's start off by hearing a little bit about where you're from, where you grew up and anything about your early family life that you want to put on the record. Then we'll go on to your education.*

HERRICK: I grew up in Minnesota. Both sides of my family had university educations. They had gone East to college--my mother to Smith College and my father to Princeton and then on to Harvard Law School. I was exposed to the existence of Foreign Service as a child because my mother's older brother was a Foreign Service Officer. He served mainly in Europe, once in Tangier, and was in Bern during World War II--not in the kinds of places where one works for USAID. When I was ten years old my mother took the three children to Switzerland for the summer--her brother was then posted in Geneva. It was the time of the League of Nations--the time of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. We had two cousins there who were about our age, and I remember as children hearing about the sessions of the League of Nations, which their father was attending, and our mother observing. That was the period when Haile Selassie made the speech that made him the "darling" of the Western world, and of the failure of the League of Nations to prevent Italy's incursion into Ethiopia. We ended up staying for a full year. I had my first real foreign language exposure there because we went to a school in the Bernese Oberland, which was a German-speaking ``Schweitzerdeutsch" region, but the school was French-speaking. There were a number of Americans in the school; we were given two weeks to stop speaking English.

*Q: That's fast. How did you find that?*

HERRICK: We did pretty well, but I do remember my dear little brother, 5 years old, being put in the corner for hours because he had been heard in the bathroom saying something in English. Of course, when we went home he couldn't speak English.

*Q: So you spoke French in school?*

HERRICK: We spoke French in school, we did French grammar in class, we did French history. I remember being out on lounge chairs, "taking the sun", memorizing lists and dates of the Kings of France. [laughter] Which, of course, I don't remember now. We

certainly had an excellent founding in grammar, they were very strict about that. I suppose there may have been English lessons but I don't remember them. What I remember mainly is the French language lessons, the history, and some sort of sociology or civics. It was pretty much a classic French education. We would rise when the teacher came in the room, be punished for the slightest tardiness, etc.

*Q: This was through what year?*

HERRICK: That was fifth grade. Otherwise, I was in the same private school in St. Paul, Minnesota, from kindergarten through graduation. Then I went East to college, to Smith College. There, I did a good bit of language--I didn't need to take French grammar so I took courses in French literature and some beginning courses in German, but I majored in science. My major was bacteriology although there weren't enough courses in bacteriology to carry the full number of required hours, so it was bacteriology and chemistry.

*Q: Why that subject?*

HERRICK: I don't really know, and I didn't know when I had finished. At the end of senior year I saw that I had programmed myself to go into, probably, a basement laboratory to wear a little white coat and deal with other people who were in that basement laboratory, the things under the microscope, and the incubators, and that was about all. I knew that I had had excellent educational training. And I did believe from the beginning, and certainly had heard around home when I was growing up, that learning how to use your brain is the best part of education. So in the long run the science courses were very helpful. I did some English literature and some history but I didn't do much in the way of philosophy, and had not one course in sociology. Anthropology was not offered at all at that time.

*Q: Economics?*

HERRICK: I had one course in international economics, the only course in which I did not receive a very high grade. I recall a devastating comment about a paper I wrote about Edouard Beneš of Czechoslovakia. I wonder, now, why I was writing about such a political figure in that course; in any case, he had become a hero to me, I think, and the comment referred to the fact that I had probably not read the critical side of the story. So that is my memory of international economics from the early years.

*Q: What year did you graduate?*

### **Graduate work in anthropology - 1947-1950**

HERRICK: In 1947. Late that spring I applied to Yale University to the Department of Anthropology. I decided that I needed to get into the study of man rather than the study of bugs, and they admitted me for the Ph.D. program; they did not admit for Masters

Degrees at that stage in that department. I went into the program feeling very ignorant, very far behind. Many of my fellow students had done a summer or two of archeology and some had studied elsewhere and were part way toward a Master's thesis, however, which they later completed, so they earned both Master's and Ph.D. degrees. They were very good to me, helping me study and become familiar with the literature and the approach of anthropology. It was all new, and I enjoyed it tremendously. I was there for three full years of course work and in my last year one of my courses was dedicated to identifying a thesis subject. I never did do a thesis, never did field work, don't have "my tribe". I met my first husband while I was at Yale and we were married in June 1950. I acquired an immediate family because he had had a war marriage, and the mother of the baby born shortly after the war had left when the baby was a year old. So that little boy became a part of our family right away. I thought I might do some field work among ethnic groups in Baltimore, as my husband got a job in Washington, but that didn't work out because the work would have had to be done mainly in the evenings.

*Q: Any professors or courses that you found particularly impressive during that four years?*

HERRICK: Yes, those of Irving Rouse on new world and old world archeology, of Wendell Bennett on Latin America, Ralph Linton on ethnology and on psychology and culture, and George Peter Murdoch on social structure. It was Pete Murdoch who published the first comprehensive book on the ethnic groups of Africa. He used his graduate students to help carry out the research. Each week we turned in a report, following his outline, on three ethnic groups.

*Q: Which ones did you do?*

HERRICK: The ones I recall mainly--and these were quick research things, relatively shallow--were in Central Africa. The groups in Zaire, Angola, and Congo are the ones that I recall. I think perhaps some East Africa. I also did a course with John Fee Embree on the ethnic groups of Southeast Asia and, since this was post war, the United States had begun to become aware of the importance of understanding other cultures around the world. Of course, at that time, Ruth Benedict was writing for the military and for the State Department as well as the academic world and the public. Publications sponsored by the State Department were continuing, so I was one Embree's co-authors, along with another graduate student named Musgrave, of a publication on the ethnic groups of the northern highlands of Southeast Asia, those often referred to as the hill tribes..

*Q: What was this series called?*

HERRICK: I don't know if I have a reference to it. Our title was Ethnic Groups of Northern Southeast Asia.

*Q: We can add it later.*

HERRICK: The linguistics courses were also of great interest to me. I recall an exercise we were given one time by our, then, fellow student and, later, renowned ethno-linguist, Floyd Lounsbury--to analyze the structure of a language from sample segments (no translation, of course). Most of us finally got there. The language turned out to be Japanese. The exercise was useful in demonstrating what can be revealed about a culture by the structure of the language, as anthropologists have demonstrated with some American Indian languages, for example, working with an older informant who still knew the old language. Let's see, what else do I recall really enjoying? We covered the whole range of the discipline and passed comprehensives in seven areas: Old World and New World Archeology, Physical Anthropology, Ethnography, Social Structure, Linguistics, and Psychology and Culture. That was quite a challenge in the third year of graduate work; I did get through. Then I married and moved to Washington, where my husband, a student in comparative government, had a good job offer.

*Q: What year did you come to Washington?*

HERRICK: 1950. I've been here a long time. I did a little part time work for Pete Murdoch, continuing some work at the Library of Congress on the ethnic groups of Africa and doing a bibliography on North American Indians for him, which he later published. That was the extent of my direct use of that graduate training, at that point. Mainly I spent the next 13 years as a housewife and mother (I had two more children) and as a community activist and generalized volunteer.

*Q: Were you living in the District?*

HERRICK: In Northern Virginia. Then in 1957, we went overseas, my husband had an assignment at the American Embassy in London.

*Q: Was he in the Foreign Service?*

### **Life in London in the late 1950s**

HERRICK: He was with the CIA. He was on the intelligence side and his job in London was in the section of the Embassy they called Political Liaison. It was an "open" job of intelligence liaison with the British. His work was in the Embassy building and I was part of the Embassy wives group and so on. The Ambassador at the time was Jock Whitney. He and his wife Betsy Cushing Roosevelt Whitney had hung a fabulous art collection, mainly of impressionists, in the residence in Regent's Park. A college friend of mine was there at the same time and we really were a little impatient with some of the Embassy wives stuff: cutting up hose into little bits and stuffing it into shapes to make animals for the International YWCA sale and things like that, making cookies. Fortunately, foreign affairs life was beyond the stage of having to take the senior women's laundry out to the shop. [laughter] Mrs. Whitney was a very fine hostess and did her job as Ambassador's wife very well. But organization of the Foreign Service wives was left to the wife of the

Political Counselor, as the DCM at the time was Walwourth Barber, a bachelor. The two of us, my college friend and I, who were pals, escaped into our own thing.

*Q: You were under a lot of pressure to provide the cookies and to do those things.*

HERRICK: Right, so we had to get busy--and we did. One of the things we completed was a updated handbook for people coming to London and England. We tried to expand beyond the clues to shopping to include more basic cultural information, an attempt to foster a broader understanding of the English milieu. The other thing we did was to take over management of the American Embassy Wives Speakers Bureau. We had an office in the top of the USIA building and went there most mornings, so we were too busy to make cookies. Groups like the Women's Councils of the various neighborhoods and counties and towns all around England would ask us to provide a speaker for their monthly meeting. Usually they simply asked for something on "the American way of life", but we tried to offer different kinds of programs. One we were excited to offer was never taken up. Jimmy Symington, later a Congressman, was in London at the time as a Special Assistant to Ambassador Whitney. His wife Sylvia is an accomplished composer and pianist. We suggested that Sylvia could talk about music in America and give a piano program but the ladies just didn't know enough to accept that offer.

*Q: Were these English women?*

HERRICK: Yes, they were English women.

*Q: What did appeal to them?*

HERRICK: They often just wanted us to tell them about life in America. They wanted to know why we had such large refrigerators, and we told them that it was because the temperature could change 40 degrees in one 24-hour period in our country for one thing. We had some very good people, some motherly and friendly, others more sophisticated; it was kind of fun to try to match the program to the speaker. Occasionally one of us was able to accept an invitation outside of London. That gave us an opportunity to see more of the country and benefit from local hospitality.

*Q: Did you do any speaking yourself?*

HERRICK: Oh yes. We had to pitch in when somebody didn't come through but we also took assignments.

*Q: About American life generally?*

HERRICK: Yes, mostly, and about history and geography (the American Library, and the small volumes published by Compton's or World Book Encyclopedia were invaluable).

**Return to Washington and work on the "Area Handbook" series - 1961-1968**

*Q: How long were you there?*

HERRICK: We were there for three years. When we came back I knew that I really didn't want to get into the amount of volunteer committee work that I'd been in when we went off. I was already jaded with that when we went away. After a year back in the Northern Virginia community, we moved to the city. I didn't see myself spending the rest of the afternoons of my life driving children to their extra-curricular activities. They could walk to school--it was about a mile to the elementary school--and they could have taken the bus to high school, but for other things there was no public transportation, and it did not seem a good idea to send them off on bicycles. So, we moved to town; I wanted them to learn how to get around and use buses and that worked out pretty well.

*Q: You were in the District then?*

HERRICK: Yes, in the District.

*Q: What year was this?*

HERRICK: That was 1961.

*Q: Then what did you do?*

HERRICK: The main events were family difficulties, and a divorce in 1963. I was taking piano lessons--I had started that in London. I had studied with a wonderful teacher who himself had studied with Arthur Schnabel, and I continued when I got back. In early 1963, my husband and I separated, and that year in the fall I went to work after our divorce. That's when I first began to use my graduate training very directly and full time.

*Q: What was your first job?*

HERRICK: I went to work for what was called the Foreign Area Studies program at American University, which prepared publications called "Area Handbook for Guatemala" or "Area Handbook for India" and so forth. The group was funded by the Department of Defense and was housed at American University. It had started there because American University was one of six universities in the country that had a collection of what was known as the "Human Relations Area Files". I had been involved in the start of this program to establish authoritative card-file references to the cultures of the world through some part time work at Yale. The "H-RAF" was established at Yale, Chicago, Yale, American University, probably Harvard and Columbia; mainly in the schools that had strong anthropology departments at that time.

The area handbooks were the outgrowth of this same general interest in recording ethnic and cultural information about the rest of the world that had begun during the war: the Ruth Benedict studies, the series I contributed to with John Embree and so on. The books

were organized according to a general outline, an introductory chapter, a geographic chapter, one or two history chapters, two or three political science chapters, two or three economic chapters, a chapter about the arts and some social chapters--the social structure, the family, the religion and the values system. Oh, and of course we had chapters about agriculture, as part of the economic section usually. Each book also had a classified annex about the military of the country in question which was published completely separately. The general books were, and still are, published by the Government Printing Office.

Similar studies were prepared by the CIA, for their National Intelligence Surveys, drawing on experts from other government agencies for certain chapters, on the Department of Agriculture, for example. But distribution of those volumes was controlled by security classification. In fact, in those days, their very existence was classified. Our books were completely unclassified; part of the challenge, particularly in the political arena, was to find the information in unclassified sources. It was interesting how much could be found.

*Q: All the research was done in the U.S.?*

HERRICK: Yes, unfortunately. All of the research was done in the United States; there was no traveling. The research was done by six teams, each with five or six professionals and a team leader. I joined a team as writer of social chapters and then a year or two later became one of two leaders working mainly on sub-Saharan African countries.

*Q: What was the motivation? Why did the Department of Defense want these kinds of studies? What was the situation that would have generated this series?*

HERRICK: Well, I think actually their motivation was probably quite a strong interest in psychological warfare. In those days, the cold war motivation was pretty strong. We wanted to understand the cultures of the countries in which we might have a political influence. I know the books were made available to a psychological warfare training place in the Southeast, to various Pentagon offices and to the State Department. Otherwise the books were available from the Government Printing Office. When I started, the books were professionally respected. They had excellent bibliographies and they had footnotes. In the first year or so that I was there, the Department of Defense said that they didn't like this footnote business, that it was annoying to the reader. So from then on the books were no longer reviewed in the *American Anthropologist*, or the journals of professional economists and historians. They were no longer seen as respectable academic books; though they still were as far as we, the authors, were concerned.

*Q: The quality went down, or simply because they weren't strictly academic?*

HERRICK: I think the quality stayed up because we required the footnotes in the draft. We checked sources and were very concerned about subliminal plagiarism, so we always did a spot check on that. As team chair I found that you get to know which of your people have a strong verbal memory and might, without knowing it, simply repeat a whole



sentence they had read five weeks ago somewhere. I never allowed anybody to see anything from the National Intelligence Survey, nobody on the team, ever. We had the ability to get hold of a classified document, but access was strictly limited. After we had completely written a book, I would look at the National Intelligence Survey just to see if we had missed some interesting angle; in fact, I never found any indication that we might have approached an issue differently from the way we had, or that we had failed to find useful information.

*Q: Do you have a sense of how these were used? Either specifically or more generally?*

HERRICK: I have no idea how the military used them, but I certainly see them on desks myself at Embassies and sometimes at AID Missions. Academics and contractors working on development issues or contracts also use them as references for countries they are working in. The books are now being produced in a shortened form by the Library of Congress. They have grouped the chapter substance into three major sections, and now have a picture on the cover and a few photographs or illustrations. The graphic work, particularly on the maps of the Handbooks was always excellent. Our graphics team was headed by a man from Minnesota who was very skillful and worked well with the various authors.

*Q: This was country by country?*

HERRICK: Yes.

*Q: How many countries did you cover during that time?*

HERRICK: I worked on a number of countries--India, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria--then chaired the books on the three East African countries, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. Later we did the two major Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique. Then they asked me to do the Soviet Union and I said NO! I thought it was ridiculous for one of our teams to do a secondary research job on the Soviet Union in the context of State Department research efforts and the work of several intelligence agencies. It was time to leave Foreign Area Studies; the most fun had always been the reading-in and planning of the book, but the effort seemed now to be more and more repetitive.

*Q: The country selection was done by the Defense Department?*

HERRICK: Yes, but we made suggestions. I was anxious to do Cameroon, a West African country with a triple colonial past--French, English and German. I put the suggestion in year after year, but the country was never on the list, in my day.

*Q: Were there any particular criteria as to why countries were selected?*

HERRICK: It was hard to know what drove the Pentagon interests, and the negotiation was always carried out by the retired colonel who headed the agency. The criteria must

have included such factors as gaps in the literature and U.S. strategic interests. The Portuguese African books would have fit both those criteria. They were very interesting to do, and ten years later they turned out to be very helpful to the U.S. foreign affairs community. The political scientist of the team and I did a little early morning tutoring in Portuguese. We learned enough from our tutor to read documents, and used her as an informant, as she was the daughter of a General who had been assigned to Angola. Portuguese, as a Latin language is closer to Latin than is French or Spanish, and closer to French among the modern languages of Latin origin. Since Fred Eisele and I each had strong backgrounds in Latin and we knew French, we were able to get a good handle on grammar and structure, and of course could guess a lot of vocabulary from cognates. A lot of the material for research was in Portuguese. We recruited as economist a woman who was the daughter of a Foreign Service officer who had served in Brazil. We also brought on a young man who had come here from Portugal as a graduate student. He was very helpful in providing context and could do some interviews for us; his written work had to be reviewed with care, however.

When Angola became independent in the 1975, the main source the State Department had about Angola was our book of the late 1960's. I was in the combined State-AID Office of Central American Affairs as the Deputy for AID when independence came for Angola. The State Department Deputy in that office was detailed to help organize the U.S. response, which included finance and airplanes for the evacuation of Portuguese nationals from Angola. Although the Portuguese had been more tolerant of inter-racial marriage than the other colonial powers, and had accepted into Portuguese society a number of Africans who "knew how to use a knife and fork", the colonial regime had been repressive, and extremely exploitative economically. Do you remember how we helped evacuate the now-threatened white European population?

*Q: I remember that.*

HERRICK: That Area Handbook for Angola was the only source available on the province, now a country. Politically, the ethnic situation, the dynamics and the main characters were the same as when we had drafted our chapters: Holden Roberto of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), Jonas Savimbi of UNITA, and Agostinho Neto, physician and poet of MPLA, and first president of independent Angola. Our analysis of their ethnic backgrounds and sources of strength was still valid. It was fun to see that the book had been useful.

*Q: That's a good example of being very useful. Were they aiming to do all countries?*

HERRICK: Probably, with the exception of our major Western allies. We had not done much on Eastern Europe, but I see that those countries are now covered.

*Q: You don't know how many countries all together have been done?*

HERRICK: I haven't seen the list but could get it off of the Internet. The books are available there now.

*Q: I see. This is still going on with the Library of Congress?*

HERRICK: It's still going on but in shorter versions.

*Q: Updating the older versions?*

HERRICK: Yes, referring back to them and doing new ones.

*Q: You outlined the kind of chapters and subject cover, was there any sort of main theme or thought that was trying to be conveyed?*

HERRICK: No, there wasn't. The books were supposed to be objective and to be straight forward descriptions of the situation in the country. Now, on the Portuguese territories we had a little problem on the team because the younger people on the team chafed at having to refer to Angola as a "province" of Portugal. But that's the way the Portuguese referred to it and since this was a U.S. Government publication, and in view of our relationship with Portugal a friendly sovereign nation, we were instructed by the Pentagon to use the term used officially by the Portuguese. That caused some discomfort.

*Q: Did you get any reactions from the Governments themselves, who had books written about them?*

HERRICK: Not that I know of. Once in a while we had a reaction from the Pentagon but we usually won our battles. We briefed our chief, who dealt with the people in the Pentagon and he usually supported us. For example, again the Portuguese territory, our economic chapters described how the territories were used for the economic benefit of the metropole and I think they thought we were a little strong on that, but we got out our sources and demonstrated our analysis.

*Q: So you were quite free of pressures to come out with any particular...*

HERRICK: Yes we were, really. We treated the job as an academic exercise. Most of our team members were people who had taught in their field or were active in research; others were young people, often recruited from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. That school is an excellent training ground for research and writing.

*Q: Yes. Having been so intensely involved with that, was there anything to come out of out of it that stood out in your mind of what sort of themes or thoughts or concepts that you got from having to do these things in several countries and several places? Were there any particular sets of issues or sense of what was happening in these countries that stood out in your mind?*

HERRICK: I think that the main thing that happened for me was my desire to get more directly involved with countries. Not to sit here and write a book without travel. Certainly, ever since graduate school I had seen myself eventually as being involved in further understanding other countries and perhaps being active in what was going on. Several of my colleagues from graduate school had begun to go into what in those days was called "Applied Anthropology" a field that some academic anthropologists sneered at. But I was aware that some very useful things could be done. For example, one colleague was working a good deal in Guatemala, in particular in health related research and programs.

*Q: You must have developed a considerable appreciation of the whole range of disciplines, not just in terms of the political, economic, social, ethnic and on and on. Right?*

HERRICK: Yes, I have on occasion described myself as semi-literate in economics, and my training began, really as I supervised economists as they wrote their chapters. As team chair, I was responsible for the product of political scientists, geographers, economists and social scientists. In political science I had had some exposure; my first husband was a political scientist and many of my friends at Yale had been in the government field. Social analysis was my own field. And geography is a field that attracts me; a good geographer shows the links among environmental, demographic and economic factors.

*Q: Your name was in the book?*

HERRICK: Oh, absolutely, and is still in some of the recent updates, as, for example, the Area Handbook for Tanzania of 1990, which was very useful to me when I was there on a World Bank Mission on the Environment in 1993, responsible for an institutional analysis.

*Q: But you were obviously not discipline bound, only from a political--you got a sense of the whole complex of the relationships and disciplines?*

HERRICK: Yes and I think one of the things that I came away with was a profound--I was going to say admiration but I'll have to think about how I want to say it--for the discipline of geography in its broad sense. Human geography deals not only with physiography but with human beings and with economics of the situation.

*Q: Why the emphasis on geography over one of the others?*

HERRICK: It's just that I hadn't been exposed to the field of geography.

*Q: I see. But what is it in the field of geography that seemed to stand out?*

HERRICK: It has to do with the relationships between human beings and their environment.

*Q: I see.*

HERRICK: And the economic exploitation of the environment or the influence of the environment on the economic possibilities. That kind of thing.

*Q: That work and experience should have given you a tremendous background for work in international development. Was "development" a concern, in the loose sense of the word, when you were doing these books?*

HERRICK: Oh, absolutely. Because we were writing about development status. We were writing about the status of health, about economic status; we were writing about the political structure and we always wrote a chapter on the political dynamics. All of these things were in the context of development and what the country was about. They would be brought together in the Chapter 1 summary about the country. What is this country? Where did it come from? What is it doing? What is its status? I think to some extent there was also the question of "What can be expected from the country?" and that was always the prerogative of the team chair to do, to pull this all together.

*Q: Did it cover what the development philosophy or policies of the government were at the time and what the orientation was?*

HERRICK: Not in the sense that we consider in preparing a strategy for USAID, no not in that sense. But for example, take Tanzania. With independence in 1961, and the Arusha Declaration in 1967, obviously we were dealing with development philosophy. I recall reading every one of the papers that constituted the Declaration and papers of other socialist thinkers, including the English lady, Joan Clark, who was always so close to Julius Nyerere. We went back to read Nyerere's earlier writings; we were interested in his development as a person, his education, his early background, what had brought him to this kind of philosophy and what the philosophy meant for the country. We also got into the issues of what would happen under something like villagization (what a horrible bureaucratic word, but it was a horrible program). Because we knew that in East African cultures the settlement pattern was one of scattered homesteads, we figured there would be problems (but did not say so directly in the Handbook).

*Q: You were then able to give a little bit of interpretation of what was going...*

HERRICK: Enough of a background so that, hopefully, someone who was informed and interested could begin to read into it.

*Q: To whether the situation was going to work or what the prospects were?*

HERRICK: That's right. In some instances you had to be quite careful doing that. For example on Saudi Arabia, "What are going to be the challenges to the House of Saud?" You have to give it in the background. We certainly gave the history of how they came to

power and what the dynamics were of the marriages with the Sudairi family and other things. But because of our government sponsorship we had to watch for the sensitivities. But I don't think that the financial backers in the Pentagon were sufficiently concerned about our social chapters and our chapters on values to be worried about what we had written. I doubt that the leadership of the countries that were subjects of the books ever read them. I have never heard of a protest. One of the fascinating chapters of course, is the chapter on social values.

*Q: You had a chapter on values?*

HERRICK: We always had a chapter on values. On some teams the chapters on values were not very good, but on others, especially where there was a good anthropologist and a variety of sources, the chapters were very good and very interesting. We would, for example, get a hold of children's books and children's comics to look for clues as to values--what family values are emphasized, what is praised and what is ridiculed. Religious teachings and political speeches gave other clues. But the main value of the chapters like that is to indicate what has to change if development is going to go forward. Understanding of values can give perspective to some of the trends identified sufficiently to appear in a demographic or economic chapter, because certain things may not go very far until the related values begin to change a little faster than they have heretofore.

*Q: Interesting. Did you feel any pressure that you really ought to go out and visit the country?*

HERRICK: Absolutely. It was frustrating to work almost entirely from written sources.

*Q: I'm sure you would have been anxious to get some first hand information.*

### **First assignment with USAID in the Africa Bureau - 1969**

HERRICK: Then I heard from a friend, another college friend--isn't that the way life works--who was working at USAID. She told me there might be an opening in the Africa Bureau.

*Q: What year was this?*

HERRICK: Well, approximately 1968. A friend with whom I had become acquainted when I was active in the World Student Service Fund and the National Students Association in my college years was at that time the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa and AID.

*Q: Peter Strauss was the Assistant Administrator?*

HERRICK: Yes, and Bob Smith the Deputy. He said that "Yes, it would be very nice if you wanted to come to AID, and we have some openings there right now." Well, I had to

face the problem of how to get into AID. The intern program designed to recruit younger people into foreign service did not seem likely. And, I didn't have the Civil Service rating that would have qualified me for entry as a GS employee.

*Q: This was on the Civil Service side?*

HERRICK: It was in the Civil Service side. I was in my 40's. I wasn't coming in as a Junior Officer Trainee, or any such route. I did a whole bunch of paperwork for the Civil Service personnel system. Since I didn't have a graduate degree I didn't qualify for a "this or that or the other." In the end, as I said, after the chief at Foreign Area Studies asked me to do a book on the USSR, I decided that wasn't really appropriate for me. It was nothing that I knew anything about and I believed it was inappropriate for the organization to attempt to do that kind of a book on the USSR when there was so much else going on in this town. I concluded that it was time to move on.

As it happened I got a job with the Bureau of the Census under the Department of the Interior working on chapters for the National Intelligence Survey, doing the same work, not as team leader but doing social chapters. I did that for about a year and got a Civil Service rating out of it. Their hiring system must have been somehow different because I got in on that when I couldn't get into AID. Ultimately I had a GS-13 Civil Service rating, far better than my rating of record as CAF-3 (Clerk, Administrative and Filing), which I had had during the summer of 1945 when I was in college. In June 1969, somehow we worked it out and I went to AID. My first job there was appropriate to my background, as I had chaired the book on Uganda. I became the Uganda Desk Officer So that's how it started.

*Q: This was as a Civil Service position?*

HERRICK: As a Civil Servant, yes.

*Q: How long did you work on Uganda?*

HERRICK: About a year.

*Q: Do you have any recollection of the issues that you were dealing with at that time in Uganda?*

HERRICK: Yes, this was 1969 and 1970, the last years of the rule of Milton Obote. There was unrest throughout the country but mainly in the central areas of the Buganda people, whose historic dominance Obote had been breaking systematically. In 1971, Idi Amin overthrew Obote's government.

*Q: The Director then was Vern Johnson?*

HERRICK: No, Jerry Knoll was heading the Office of East African Affairs.

*Q: Over in Uganda?*

HERRICK: In Uganda it was an officer named Will Mueller who, I think, retired shortly after his posting there.

*Q: Vern Johnson was there later.*

HERRICK: Yes, when I went out in 1972, Vern Johnson was Director and Bob Huesmann, I think, was there also. Bob became Director later.

*Q: Were there any particular issues?*

HERRICK: Of course the political situation was what was interesting there and it was my year to learn a little bit about how AID works. I think I did a few things that were perhaps a little naive at the time. I was in correspondence with the Program Officer a good deal and I certainly got the flavor of the job in a Geographic Office as being a job that looks both ways. It requires supporting what's going on in the Mission and at the same time understanding and fulfilling the needs of Washington. The program was one to be proud of. It included assistance to the Tororo Girls' School, a model of what could be offered in female secondary education, establishment of the institute of management at Makerere University, some excellent agricultural research in the northeast, and effective work with cooperatives. The East African Community was still alive then, and Uganda was exemplary in its assigned roles, as host to the regional development bank and high court of appeals, and in charge of building the faculties of the university in the areas for which Uganda was to be responsible: medicine and animal sciences among them. Of course, as time went on, each of the three countries wanted to have its own medical faculty, law faculty and so on.

*Q: Did you find sometimes that you got into sort of a bind?*

HERRICK: As Desk Officer I did not get into any particular bind as between the interests of Washington and the field. Later in AID, however, I certainly understood the bind that a Desk Officer can get into, as between a strong Mission Director and a strong geographic Office Director. I did some work on Tanzania that year also, because the Tanzania Desk Officer, with whom I shared an office, had died in a small airplane accident. I remember being interested in the issues of Somalia and Ethiopia, those two countries in which the Soviet and U.S. influences ebbed and flowed, though I had no direct responsibility. Anyway, I did find myself under-occupied. I started writing Christmas cards in the office and told myself that if I was able to do that, I would have to tell my supervisor that I needed more to do. When I did tell him, he "Yes I know, I was thinking of asking you to take on thus-and-so, but the Office of Development Programs has a need and they have asked if I would release you to go there." So I was only in the Geographic Office for about a year.



*Q: You went over to the Development Program Office?*

HERRICK: Yes.

*Q: That was in 1970?*

HERRICK: 1970, I think, yes. The job I took there was one of dual responsibility--to prepare the Congressional Presentations, which turned out to be extremely time consuming and detail oriented, and to be the person seeing that the evaluation programs for the bureau were moving forward.

*Q: They had an evaluation program at that time?*

HERRICK: In theory, yes, but the policy to emphasize evaluations was not well implemented in the field. It was in that period that AID entered into a contract with PCI, Practical Concepts Incorporated, to develop a systematic way of looking at program design for purposes of evaluation. The Logical Framework which is still used by AID was developed under that contract. I felt then, and still do today, that the Logical Framework is an extremely useful tool. One of the things I was involved with during that period was the introduction of the Logical Framework to the Missions overseas. There was a major conference of two weeks duration in Addis Ababa to introduce the concept to Program Officers and others of the Africa Bureau. I helped work on the case studies that would be used and in elements of the conference. A few countries had not been covered by regional meetings of that sort and so I did one or two individual trips. One I recall was to Morocco to work with the Mission to introduce the Logical Framework and to work through a project.

*Q: In a sense this was a major technological orientation change in the way of doing business for AID.*

HERRICK: Absolutely.

*Q: What was your experience with people accepting this process? Was it easily accepted or was there resistance?*

HERRICK: There was some resistance. I think that the most resistance was at the higher levels of the AID Mission. I think it was the AID Directors who thought "What is this? This is another dollop of jargon and I don't know whether it's going to mean anything for me or not." One of the things I think that helped to bring them around was the use of the tool as an example. I recall in Morocco, for example, we went through a dry farming wheat project with people in the Mission and the contract team implementing the project, and then made a report to the Mission Director. It was very interesting what the use of the tool could bring out. For one thing there was a complete lack of mutual understanding between the people in the AID Mission and the contractor as to what the purpose of the program was. The use of the tool causes people to try to understand their program and to

argue about it. People argue about whether something is important at one level of the framework or not. Well those arguments I think are wonderfully useful, because they are causing people to think about their program. The main conclusion (by me, as an outsider) of that exercise was that the project was not going to go anywhere, and the government was not going to be committed to it, until the United States stopped bringing in free wheat under Public Law 480 Title II, the food grant program. The Mission Director knew that basically, but the exercise brought it out in a more explicit form as an issue for the Mission to deal with.

*Q: It brought out the question of the project and the details because they were not facing the facts.*

HERRICK: I think it is wonderful that this tool is still being used and that people like yourself have helped to introduce it to other AID programs. I think the Germans are still using something very much like our Logical Framework.

*Q: It's world wide. The only donor that's holding out is the World Bank and I believe it's beginning even there.*

HERRICK: It's marvelous.

*Q: Everybody else uses it.*

HERRICK: Then in the meantime there were all sorts of management tools being created, or touted; many of them came out of the Pentagon. What were they, the PPPS and the...

*Q: Program Budgeting System and things of that sort?*

HERRICK: Yes, various program budgeting systems, various daylight budgeting systems and other things that organized information into boxes but didn't work the way the Logical Framework does. Those go by the board and then they come back every 15 years, and another one comes in.

*Q: Do you have any sense as to whether the Logical Framework was ever used with the country?*

HERRICK: I think one of the intents at the time the Logical Framework was introduced was to ensure that program review and project evaluation would take place in consultation with the country. Some Missions were willing to do that and did it from the beginning. Other Missions were reluctant to share their thoughts and findings with the people of the country. If there were problems in the project they wanted to keep them to themselves. If there were sensitivities in the working relationships they couldn't figure out how to bring them out into an open discussion. I think they therefore didn't use the tool to the full extent of the original intention and to the full extent of its potential. By the time I left AID, my general awareness of the use of the Logical Framework was not as broad

because I was at a Mission. I would guess that the story was still mixed but perhaps the tool was being used more as an internal tool and less as a tool to help a dialogue between AID and the Government.

*Q: Were there certain types of projects for which it was more useful for than others? Distinction between technical systems and capital projects or so on? The capital projects people tend to think of standard cost benefit analysis and things of that sort as being a principal tool.*

HERRICK: I think it's easiest to use for a straight forward and more old-fashioned technical assistance delivery project. It's much more challenging to use for a project that has to do with policy change.

*Q: Policy change?*

HERRICK: Now these days in AID, technical projects almost always have--well they should almost always have--a policy element. Yet, they don't literally always have one. I think sometimes the policy element is glossed over and even faked. As far as capital projects are concerned my own experience is limited, well no it's not. In Southern Africa we had a large number of transport projects, capital projects. I think the tool is equally useful, especially as it causes one to think about the purpose of the project in broader terms, not to stick with the outputs only. But I think the question was whether there's more resistance on the part of those who implement capital projects. I suppose to some extent yes. The challenge in using the tool (and I like to think of it as a design and evaluation tool) is for somebody on the team or somebody in the Mission to bring the process beyond the economic return or the simple delivery of specific inputs. I believe that can be done but I think sometimes the officer in charge of the delivery who has a history of using other tools needs some stimulus to think about things that way. The outputs have to be related to some ultimate purpose that's beyond the outputs, and that's not easy in any kind of a project.

*Q: We can come back to that later if you want. You were also in this position involved in doing the Congressional Presentation and of course there was a lot of very detailed editorial type things. Do you recall any particular argumentation that was being made as far as what we were trying to say to Congress in the documents and the presentation and what the justifications were that we were trying to make at that time?*

HERRICK: Yes. What I recall from that work, and similar work for the Latin America Bureau a few years later, particularly before the Appropriations Subcommittees, was an almost total lack of interest on the Congressional side in a broader view of what USAID was up to and a concentration on small project-oriented questions prepared by the staff. Particularly in those days on the House Appropriations side, Subcommittee Chairman Otto Passman, seemed to be driven by a desire to ridicule witnesses, to make "those people downtown" look inadequate and silly and to make himself look good. Ultimately, however, he wanted to prepare a Foreign Assistance bill that would pass, that was what

made his reputation. His relationship with the witnesses was adversarial, and particularly when Sam Adams was head of the Africa Bureau at AID, his behavior was absolutely unforgivable as far as I'm concerned. Sam Adams, an African American, was ridiculed in direct and indirect reference to his race, with implications that he could not be intelligent, could not tell the truth, and so on and so forth.

*Q: You attended the hearings?*

HERRICK: Oh yes. I sat behind the Assistant Administrator and I had fat notebooks with detailed information--we'd had a series of briefings before hand, and there were very specific questions coming from the Congressional side. I remember Otto Passman saying "Now Reverend Adams (this was one of his insults) I don't want you turning to that clerk behind you. I don't want anybody giving you the answers." In human terms it was an incredibly disgusting performance. I remember going on another occasion to Otto Passman's committee when the witness was an urbane individual who understood that the Subcommittee Chairman was interested in watches and went through a routine of taking off an interesting timepiece to put in front of him to watch the time and got the Chairman interested in talking about a collection of watches. It was at that level. On the Senate side it was similar, though in human terms not so denigrating, but similar in the sense that the hearings didn't concentrate on broader issues.

In a similar situation in our hearings at the Office of Management and Budget where the bright young analysts, one of whom later became the Deputy Administrator of AID, asked questions that were driven by the numbers. Not totally, though. At those hearings we were more challenged about our ultimate purposes in a certain country for example or in a region or subregion as a whole. At the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees which were the authorizing committees, where the subcommittees were organized on a geographic basis, the questions were broader, at the country or regional level. The strategy then becomes one to give ammunition to the African sub-chair that he can use in bargaining for more funds opposition to those for the Near East. It's that kind of thing. There's a lack of reality about the whole thing, a lack of debate on the basic interests of the United States in foreign aid.

*Q: Was there a particular political or development line that we were taking in the rationale for why we were providing assistance to these countries? Very often these Congressional matters started off with the objective of the U.S. or something of that sort. What was the particular line at that time? Do you recall what we were trying to do? Was it a Cold War rationale primarily or was it poor countries?*

HERRICK: The strategic rationale was quite strong in our rationale, I think. Each time, if I recall, in the basic country presentations the strategic rationale was mentioned in the first paragraph. Progress in economic development was another theme and there was certainly a strong element of interest in the well being of the individual. That theme was picked up a few years later very strongly by the Congress when leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in particular sponsored the "New Directions", a major revision

in the authorizing legislation for AID. Was that, perhaps, except for new legislation for security assistance, the Economic Support Fund, the last actual passage of new policy language?

*Q: I don't know. What was in the New Directions?*

HERRICK: Its strongest element was concern for the well being of the majority of a country's population. This became known as a requirement that AID assist the "poorest of the poor", though that phrase does not exist in the legislation. The interest lay in the well being of the majority of individuals in the society: their well being in health, their well being in family planning as it relates to health, their well being through the ability of the agricultural system to provide food for people, their well being in their access to education that would enable them of course to contribute to the well being of their society through their work. The Cold War element remained strong in the legislation as a whole, however. I think that the Cold War arguments were probably--in Asia, the Near East and Africa (I'm probably getting a little ahead of my own experience)--the fall back arguments when there was ever a threat to AID to a certain country. For Latin America it was more an argument about our neighbors in the Western hemisphere. Nelson Rockefeller had led a major review of policy toward Latin America and the Alliance for Progress had been created. Every year the combined State-AID Latin America Bureau had to review progress against each of the elements of the Alliance for Progress. The political theme was strong; initially the emphasis was on fighting the influence of Communism which came from Cuba. Worldwide, political issues have certainly become much stronger since, as in interest in governance has grown, and the AID program has been viewed as a vehicle for promotion of democracy.

*Q: In the African countries where you were first posted, that was not as strong? What would you say?*

HERRICK: The democracy side of it?

*Q: Well, democracy but also fighting Communism.*

HERRICK: I don't think it was in Kenya, which, though it had one-party and one-man rule, was not a communist threat. But in Ethiopia and Somalia, as I have mentioned, the United States had a strong program when anti-communists governments were in power, and withdrew when the Soviet interest became overwhelming. In Somalia, two different ports were developed at various times (and then allowed to deteriorate), one by each major power.

*Q: The independence movement in Africa in the 1960's generated a lot of enthusiasm for Africa and it was still strong at that time?*

HERRICK: Yes, but I don't think we had gotten to the point of thinking that the "big head", the "father figure", the "one-man rule" in Africa were factors we opposed. I don't

think that we were there yet in the early 1970's. We were more interested in stability in those first five to ten, maximum of 15 years, of independence

*Q: You moved out of the African Bureau?*

### **Move to the Latin America Bureau - 1972**

HERRICK: I moved out of the African Bureau, not because I was no longer interested in Africa, but because I wasn't getting equal pay for equal work. I had an offer from the Latin America Bureau offering equal pay for equal work.

*Q: What does that mean? Were you under-graded?*

HERRICK: Yes, under-graded. Appeals to the system and rewrites of the job description had failed. I got quite interested in this problem and at one point we copied the job description that was common to two of the other Bureaus and sent it through the system. I was at GS-13 and the incumbents in the other Bureaus were at GS-14, but the position came back from the review graded at GS-12.

*Q: Do you think this might have been a gender issue?*

HERRICK: I think it was definitely a gender issue. The issue was in the system, I don't think it was in the Bureau, but no one in the Bureau would have been concerned about the issue, if I, as incumbent example, had not brought it up. There were a few ironies in the situation. I recall that the head of the Office of Development Programs for Africa was very supportive of my attempt to get this thing straightened out, and tried on his own. Then he alerted the Assistant Administrator, Sam Adams, who he had initiated a very strong program to bring young African Americans into the Bureau. I remember my supervisor saying to him "You know, Sam, it would be ironic if we had a discrimination situation on our hands. Allison has an offer from another Bureau and she may go there if we can't work this out." A few days later I ran into Sam Adams in the hall and he said "I'm so sorry we've lost you." He had carried out his agenda to bring in African-Americans, but that was one the system did not, in good conscience, try to stop. My supervisor's alert to him had told him it was bad news, but did not convince him it was something that he ought to pick up the phone about. A fight with the system was not a battle that he personally was going to undertake. I was sorry to leave. I would not otherwise have moved in order to do the same kind of work somewhere else.

*Q: The same type of job?*

HERRICK: The same type of job.

*Q: But at a higher grade for the Latin America Bureau?*

HERRICK: Yes, at the same grade as men carrying out similar jobs in other geographic bureaus.

### **Working in the Latin America Bureau**

*Q: How would you characterize the difference between working for one Bureau and the other? What was it like working for the Latin America Bureau compared to your experience in the African Bureau?*

HERRICK: The Latin America Bureau of AID was very strong in skills and in management. It had the cachet and the political support of the Alliance for Progress behind their work. It was staffed by people who knew the region and had long work experience there. It had a history of strong Assistant Administrators who offered strong support for their staff and encouraged development of the younger staff into loyal contributors to their program. The Bureau was well organized. In my day, the Assistant Administrator operated through a mini staff system that was very effective. He met perhaps daily with his staff chiefs for program planning, project development and management, and less frequently with the geographic office people.

*Q: Who was the Assistant Administrator?*

HERRICK: It was Herman Kleine, who later moved to the Inter-American Development Bank. Since establishment of the Alliance for Progress, the State Department and AID geographic offices were combined. All but one Geographic Office was headed by a State Department Foreign Service Officer, but the Office of Central America and Panama was headed by an AID Officer. Thus, the top staff reporting to Herman Kleine only were those heading the staff offices rather than those of the operational offices.

*Q: Why was it structured this way?*

HERRICK: I don't know whether the predecessor Assistant Administrator had worked with such a structure but it was certainly effective for Herman Kleine. His management chief took care of organizational matters and personnel assignments. His program development function had brilliant leadership. His Office of Development Resources was responsible for project development, financial analysis and expertise in the technical fields in which the projects operated. That office was a training ground for officers who moved in and out of Washington assignments and were almost invariably sent to Latin America when overseas. It was an excellent training ground in several ways. For one, it created loyalty, but it also taught rigorous analytical work, clear writing of views and opinions and the ability to identify issues and organize those issues in order of priority and relative importance. I found most officers who came through that office to be very effective and productive--in the context of a system of loyalty.

One of our responsibilities in the Office of Development Planning was to attend project reviews to identify issues in the context of Bureau policy for program strategy, special

Congressional interests, evaluation, economic viability and other factors. In a region which had had a large capital development program in the past, the issue of the relative mix of technical assistance and capital projects for a given country arose frequently. A project review meeting typically began at 2 p.m. following a strategy session between the Office Director and the Assistant Administrator. The meeting covered the issues raised within the Bureau and those raised by interested representatives of central bureaus involved in technical programs, training policy or support for private voluntary agencies. Often there was an in-depth discussion of financial, technical and economic issues. But there was some tendency to postpone final decisions on troublesome issues raised by persons outside the Bureau until late in the day, when those persons had returned to their home office or departed to meet their car pools.

*Q: Where there any particular development themes that ran through these in terms of the issues of concern?*

HERRICK: Capital development had been very important in Latin America. In the days before I joined AID there had been a period of "program assistance" in the Latin America Bureau: assistance directed more toward policy change and toward the offering of cash rather than project transfers. In Brazil in the mid 1960's, for example, the United States had put in vast amounts of money and had a very strong and I think generally beneficial influence on the policies of the government--economic policies as a whole, and certain political policies that affected the development of the country. In Colombia there had also been large transfers. I think in retrospect the program may have been less successful there. Then there were Peru and Bolivia, where the statistics on frequency of changes in government were mind-boggling, even at times averaging one or more per year. In the Latin America Bureau, one always had to be concerned with stability of government.

The countries of Latin America were to a certain degree the constituency of the political side of the Bureau, the State Department side. Support for the individual economists and others of the countries who were dedicated to development, many of whom had been educated in the United States, became terribly important for the AID side of the Bureau. When things happened that we might not like politically in terms of our own political philosophy--dictatorships, suppression of the rights of speech and the press, military coups and so on and so forth, we tended to explain them as acceptable because the country leadership was keeping Communism out. In that sense I think the Cold War aspect of things was very important.

*Q: More tolerance for authoritarian government?*

HERRICK: That's right and certainly tolerance of totalitarian governments but also tolerance of high inflation rates which were making the assistance ineffectual.

*Q: We were tolerant of high inflation rates?*



HERRICK: Oh sure, to the extent that recipients of our loans could not earn enough in real terms to repay them. But that was not unique to the Latin America program. When I was in the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (PPC) in the mid-1980's we had a terribly difficult time persuading regional bureaus to accept a policy paper that insisted on positive rates of interest. Well, in the period that I was in the Latin America Bureau came a time of interest in graduating countries from the AID program. Argentina was one of the countries; I recall observing that people in the field were reluctant to accept the fact that there was going to be a graduation. That's a theme that I've seen in other places. AID has determined several times to graduate Tunisia, but there is always one more project to continue to its originally planned end, and then the situation changes enough to justify another set of new projects. I think it's very difficult for AID to graduate a country.

*Q: You made a reference to Argentina being one of those countries.*

HERRICK: Yes, that was one of the first. Of course AID has had graduates; Korea and Taiwan are well-known graduates of AID that are cited frequently. But in Africa and Latin America it's been very difficult.

*Q: What was your understanding of the criteria for graduation? Why was Argentina and others being selected for this?*

HERRICK: Because at that time Argentina didn't really need capital assistance to help build infrastructure; it could afford to do that by itself. It had an education system, it had a training ground for economists and various other things and was deemed to be able to afford its own development. Of course shortly after that came political turmoil and record-breaking hyper-inflation that undermined all of that.

*Q: Do you recall anything in Costa Rica at this time?*

HERRICK: No, from the point of view of Office of Development Planning, I think we saw Costa Rica as a stable technical assistance recipient..

*Q: I asked because this was one of the themes that we were after.*

HERRICK: Of course, okay. Well why don't we move into my time in the Office of Central American Affairs.

*Q: Yes, we can come back to that. You were in Development Planning for three years?*

HERRICK: No I was in Development Planning for two years. In addition to the Congressional Presentation work, I became involved directly in some evaluations. I recall one cross-country evaluation of a series of education credit projects. This kind of project had been undertaken in several places in Latin America: the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and, I think, El Salvador. I found that no one had done a simple cash flow spreadsheet with sufficient care to discover that these programs were going to

become de-capitalized in about five or six years. Where was that skill in analyzing capital flows? Was it applied only to capital projects? Those projects were intended to provide loans to students who were going to be subsidized to the extent that they paid no interest while they were students, then typically did not have begin repayments until a year or so after they had finished their training, and then repaid at a subsidized interest rate. The programs were supposed to expand, but how in the world could they expand when they had nothing coming back in? In effect they were all becoming de-capitalized and were crying for more AID money. The experience alerted me for the future in AID always to look carefully at subsidized interest rates.

*Q: With all of that care, were the issues overlooked or were these situations that developed in the country?*

HERRICK: It's difficult to know how it happened because there were simply unrealistic tables in the project papers in the first instance. Then of course there were things that happened in implementation--the students aren't able to pay back as soon as you thought they could. There were problems in the design in that sense.

*Q: Were there political or cultural factors that led people to believe that they didn't really have to pay them back or politically we didn't want to pressure them?*

HERRICK: There was that, but there was also the original basic problem that it wouldn't work even if they did pay back. That was what I found to be very curious. There may also have been a misreading of expectations in the societal context. After all, in this country we have one of the worst problems of the entire world, of students not repaying their loans--especially in the Federal program. In private programs I think they are more apt to repay.

*Q: This was a bad analysis at the beginning?*

HERRICK: Yes it was and it was a pattern.

*Q: Was it because the people that were doing the analysis weren't sensitive to this sort of thing?*

HERRICK: I don't know what it was but it was certainly an alert to something to look for. In those years, AID and World Bank did a big study on agricultural credit and the conclusion was that you should not subsidize credit. It was a new thought to many people in development, that farmers will repay their loans, and can repay at full official interest rates, but the study was conclusive, and it all fed back into what I had seen on that evaluation. Ever since I have been very, very strong in insisting that interest rates must be at commercial rates or a sound equivalent, and that subsidized interest rates don't work. They won't work in terms of husbanding the public funds we are putting in and they won't work in terms of the recipients and teaching them what an economic system of credit is. And they're not necessary.

*Q: Not necessary? Some people argue that they're necessary in order to get something started.*

HERRICK: They do indeed so argue, but I'm convinced that the subsidies generally are not necessary because people are borrowing on the informal market at very high rates that we don't know anything about because the banks don't know about it and don't tell us about it. I have very strong views on that subject.

*Q: Interesting. Were there other things like that which had come up, that you became sensitive to, such as development issues or how it works?*

HERRICK: There were management issues. I also was involved in a traveling task force on behalf of the Assistant Administrator to try to find out what was going on in Washington and in the field in the way of paperwork requirements in the AID system. So that he could take a look and see what there was in the general system that he might have a view on or work toward changing. What there was in his own system that he might change.

*Q: Was there growing concern about...*

HERRICK: That was the beginning of something that's going on today--we're always trying to figure out how to cut down on paper requirements. It's very clear that many of the reporting requirements that AID is following have been imposed piece by piece by the accretions on the Foreign Assistance authorizations and appropriations. Commitments to special interests must be followed and must be tracked and this requires attention to the kind of detail that is often quite peripheral to the development purpose of the program in a given country. That's one whole area that the agency will probably never get rid of because we only dream of a brand new Foreign Assistance Act, a clean authorization. We got terribly excited in the 1970's when Hubert Humphrey tried a major reform but it didn't come through as he had intended it. There have been other attempts since and a lot of very conscientious work on the part of AID lawyers working with interested staff on the hill. Inevitably there were political factors on the Hill that postponed the effort.

*Q: Did anything come of this task force that you were on?*

HERRICK: We made our report to Herman Kleine and basically told him that there were some things that he wasn't going to be able to do much about. He made a few changes in terms of the reporting for internal bureau purposes. But that all changed back when another round came in AID. In the mid 1980's under Dwight Ink, the new Assistant Administrator for the then, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, was very keen on management reporting, to the detriment, I think, of broader development planning.

*Q: Management by Objective.*

HERRICK: Was the term Management by Objective that time?

*Q: Yes, it required very detailed reporting.*

HERRICK: That's right, it spawned all sorts of reporting systems. I think--I'm not certain, because I wasn't in the Bureau then--it became particularly onerous for Latin America. In PPC we took the view that each operational bureau had to manage its own system, but we ourselves were concerned with tracking--how to track the special interests of the Congress and how to ascertain whether new policy emphases were being implemented in practice. I think the African Bureau treated Management by Objective quite sensibly and tried to make a useful management tool out of it.

*Q: Right. It came out of the Development Fund for Africa and a system for reporting on results. Anything else about that particular period in Latin America DP in terms of what the program thrusts were or policy issues?*

HERRICK: I became concerned about the extent to which that Bureau continued to support almost without question (as did the other geographic bureaus) a number of older programs that had begun in collaboration with an outside U.S. group in good faith but had really lost a lot of their development purpose. Some organizations received over 95 percent of their funds from AID. One was the group of programs with the AFL/ CIO, one for Asia, one for Latin America and one for Africa. There was another particularly Latin American one that had had some good successes but, in my view, had too much government support. That was the Partners of the Americas through which a number of United States corporations were involved in helping develop businesses, particular agribusinesses in Latin America. In Guatemala, I remember, people were beginning to grow garlic for export, and other crops were under development. The program was designed to cover the cost of failure, quite legitimately, I believe, because it was trying to innovate and introduce change. My problem arose when the subsidy continued to cover the costs when things were going well. In Africa and North Africa we tried a private sector-oriented large scale agriculture program, but it never went far enough beyond the stage of the U.S. government financing the failures..

*Q: This was called the Large Unit Agriculture Program?*

HERRICK: Yes.

*Q: There was one in Ghana and Liberia.*

HERRICK: They went better, on a smaller scale, in Latin America. Then a third group that was established by AID was that of the international wings of major cooperatives and, again, I think there is a mixed story. The overseas operations of at least three major cooperative organizations, including the National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association (NRECA), essentially established with AID money. In some instances they did pretty well. I understand now that in Uganda, for example, there's a revival of some of

the cooperative organizations that were sponsored there by what was then ACIDI (Agricultural Cooperatives Development International).

*Q: Do you know why they didn't do well?*

HERRICK: In some countries our effort to sponsor or improve cooperatives didn't do well because cooperatives didn't exist in the sense that we understand them in the United States. For example cooperatives in French West Africa are top-down organizations established by government; they were seen as one element of control of the labor force. They aren't really cooperatives in the sense of membership organizations as we understand cooperatives. In other instances I think that the programs became the creatures of the United States technical operators who were insufficiently sensitive to or interested in what was going on in the country and thus failed to see what needed to happen in order for the country to take over and do it themselves. But there were some very good successes.

*Q: Do you remember where?*

HERRICK: I've mentioned Uganda, of the pre-Amin days, of course.

*Q: How about in Latin America?*

HERRICK: In Latin America some, indeed, but I'm going to have trouble naming countries. I seem to recall Central America and promotion of membership credit schemes that were successful.

*Q: We can come back to that. Why did you say AFL/CIO Labor programs were less relevant there? Or whatever the phrase was that you used.*

HERRICK: Irrelevant to development.

*Q: Yes.*

HERRICK: I have not been in a country anywhere in Latin American and Africa where I have seen a substantial development contribution from one of those programs. We tended to apply the American approach to the organization of bargaining units and to emphasize training in how to run a union. Eventually the programs made some headway in skills training, but it was very difficult to ensure that the training included women. In African countries the AFL/CIO representatives had been far more interested in talking to people at the Embassy than at the AID Mission. There was never enough of a project design to be able to evaluate effectiveness. The periodic description of the program would mention collective bargaining and contain a bit about training programs, but I never saw enough in, say, vocational training, to justify the expense of resident in-country staffs.

*Q: After your two years there what did you do?*

HERRICK: After my two years in Development Planning I moved to the Office of Central America and Panama where I remained for only about a year because of a reduction in force in AID, which itself brought the next episode of gender discrimination. It was 1974 and 1975, the time of a major earthquake in Nicaragua and continuing border disputes between Honduras and El Salvador. My position was Assistant Director of the Office and supervisor of the AID Desk Officers for the five countries in Central America plus Panama. The Director of the office was an AID Officer and there was also a State Department Deputy Director who was the supervisor of the State Department Desk Officers. It was an interesting situation. There was really quite good communication among the State and AID offices.

*Q: How did that work?*

HERRICK: I think it worked quite well in that office. In some of the offices in Latin America there was a real separation between the State Department Officers and the AID Officers, but in Central America Affairs it was not that way. They worked quite closely together, sharing cables and keeping up to date with what was going on. The fact that as Office Director, it was an AID Officer who went to the high level State Department meetings was useful for the AID Officers, to give them a view of the total context of the Bureau's strategic approaches. The group of AID Deputy Directors from all of the Latin America Offices would get together for lunch about once a week. We would share information, especially on the politics of the region and the dynamics of inter-relationships within the Bureau.

*Q: This was during a time when the Geographic Officers were less prominent in the Bureau operations, is that right?*

HERRICK: Yes that is so, as in all regions, the technical specialists were grouped together; none were any longer attached to geographic offices, as they had been for Africa, for example, in the past.

*Q: Is that also true for Central America?*

HERRICK: Well it was definitely true in the Latin America Bureau where the great strength lay in the Office of Development Resources.

*Q: So what did this leave for the desk people to be concerned with?*

HERRICK: Thinking on a country level, response to disaster, political factors, and a certain amount of project detail. Then there was forever and ever and ever the question of whether ROCAP, the Regional Office for Central America and Panama was playing an important role or not. I understand that question is up again today. In Guatemala there were two AID Missions and two AID Directors, a bilateral Director and a Director of ROCAP. There were Officers of ROCAP in each of the countries: the regional lawyers in one, the experts assisting the regional development bank in another, agricultural officers

in several. During my period there our Director and the Director of ROCAP instituted a regular quarterly meeting of all of the AID Directors of the region (you could almost commute to Central America in those days, taking a direct flight from Dulles on Sunday going down and coming back on Friday without going through Miami) to review program plans, discuss projects (both regional and bilateral) and spell out responsibilities. It was really very constructive.

*Q: What was the rationale for having it at ROCAP?*

HERRICK: Originally the rationale was the Central American Common Market and the fact that the community was developing regional institutions, and ROCAP initially focused on programs with the regional institutions. Infrastructure development was often financed by the regional development bank and AID put a lot of money into that. The regional center for nutrition, INCAP, developed a cooked cereal for infants. Remember we used to have a cereal called Farina? Well they had Incaperina--the Latins love acronyms. The regional business administration college trained a lot of people for the budget offices and development ministries around the region. There was regional agricultural research, a program through which the United States helped developed several outstanding institutions that are part of the International Agricultural Research Center group today. There was a regional training program for economists. Thus a ROCAP made sense for programs that were designed for the economic development of the region and for certain agricultural pilot projects that could later be spread to other countries. Eventually, for mainly political reasons, the regional community began to fall apart, but originally they were much farther along than was the East African Community toward the classic definition of a common market. They had not yet gotten to a common currency or the free movement of labor but there was pretty good movement of goods, reduction of internal tariffs and exploitation of the advantages of a trading bloc.

*Q: Were our programs effective?*

HERRICK: I think some of the ROCAP programs were as good as any of the programs that I've been aware of. But there's always administrative and turf tension when two organizations are covering the same territory for the closely related purposes. I think the existence of ROCAP may have been a good thing in that its presence was consistent during a period of much political upheaval in Central America. When Guatemala was in its very bad stages of military coups, the ROCAP program continued. It lasted through the Nicaraguan revolution and aftermath and the U.S. involvement in El Salvador and Honduras during the days of the Contras. You asked about Costa Rica. Costa Rica always just sat there as a star of stability. A country without a standing army, with only an internal police force, a country of democratic process (even though the power at the top tended to rotate among a certain group). A country whose leadership has been willing to try to step into allay the problems among its neighbors and actually to get the peace process going between Salvador and Honduras.

*Q: Was there a program in Costa Rica at that time?*

HERRICK: I have to think about timing here. The era of major economic reform, with major U.S. assistance and influence (during part of which Dan Chaij was AID Director) was later, much later.

*Q: Prior to that there was a move to close out the program when Herman Kleine headed the Bureau*

HERRICK: It wasn't as strong as the attempt to close out Colombia. I've never seen such a fight in my life as I saw one time between the Colombia Mission Director and the Assistant Administrator.

*Q: What was the issue there?*

HERRICK: Closing out.

*Q: Why did we want to close out?*

HERRICK: The same thing--the country had progressed economically. I don't recall a close out in Costa Rica. I also don't recall the Costa Rican Desk Officer being very busy. Our crises were the Salvador-Honduras War and the Nicaragua earthquake. The Director from Guatemala was moved over very quickly to take charge of a reconstruction program. It was a very large program, heavy in rebuilding, infrastructure, and general financial assistance, together with a huge housing guaranty program. Those were the things that were our focus in that year that I was there. Then AID had a reduction in force and as a GS employee, I was down-graded and moved around.

*Q: What year was this?*

HERRICK: 1975. A reduction in force, or RIF, in the Civil Service works on a "by the numbers" basis of preferences. Absolute preference is given to any veteran of military service; beyond that preference is given to seniority in government service, and that's the way it is.

*Q: You mean by the number of years?*

HERRICK: Yes, the number of years of seniority. There was a lot of nervousness about the reduction in force, whom it was going to affect and how. I knew I was vulnerable, because I had not been in government very long and had a high rank, so I was liable to being "bumped" by someone of my same grade, GS-15, who had higher seniority. When the RIF eventually reached me; I received a letter that said "You've been assigned to position number so and so." So I went down to the management office to find out what that position was. It was a Junior Desk Officer for the Philippines reporting to the Desk Officer for the Philippines who was reporting to the newly placed Deputy Director in the office who, himself, yesterday, had been the Costa Rica Desk Officer reporting to me. I laughed, and went around telling all my friends, "look what hit me."



I thought I had kept my sense of humor about it until I came home that night and had stomach pains that I could not get rid of. When my husband phoned me from another city that evening, I could not sit or stand still to finish talking to him on the phone, I was so uncomfortable. Something was telling me that my pride really had been hurt in spite of my understanding of the "numbers". Now, later I discovered that the person who replaced me had been put in my job at a lower grade level, as a GS-14. That did not follow the rule, under which I would be replaced by a GS-15 with higher seniority than mine. So, I appealed within the agency and got nowhere. I believed there was a gender factor in this, as nothing similar had occurred for any GS-15 position held by a man. I therefore took my appeal to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). My lawyers hired a man who had been head of the review commission for such things in OPM. He thought the action was egregious, that we had a very good case. And in fact we won the case. In the meantime I had been placed in another job at a GS-15, but my pay was to be cut to that of the lower level to which I had been sent. The OPM instructed the agency to destroy the record of my down-grading and to restore me officially to a GS-15. The Office of Personnel did restore my grade but reduced my pay by the equivalent of three steps, one gained through longevity and two steps earned through achievement award. Again no action on behalf of one evidently considered to be an uppity female. So I had to get my lawyer to write them a letter saying that he was going to report them to somebody or other--his letter, like those of his earlier work on my behalf was loaded with the jargon of the system, and was effective. The mistake was fully rectified.

*Q: Not unusual. Where did you end up?*

**In AID's budget office in the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (PPC) - 1975-1979**

HERRICK: I ended up in the Budget Office of the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination. I ended up as the Deputy Associate Administrator for Budget, in the job of a man who had been there as a GS-15, was without military service, had been hit by the reduction in force and had chosen to move to OMB instead of to take a lower ranked position in the same office where he had been the Deputy.

*Q: Starting when?*

HERRICK: In 1975. And from 1978 to 1979 I became the head of that office.

*Q: So that was three years.*

HERRICK: Yes, three years. I hadn't realized it was so long.

*Q: What was this position, what was its responsibility?*

HERRICK: It was planning and budgeting. This was the office that helped prepare for the Assistant Administrator of PPC, and therefore for the Administrator, the strategic focus of the AID program and then prepare the budget that was intended to carry out that focus. The office was in charge of final content of the presentation to the Congress, though many others made contributions. The office also was responsible for defending the program strategy and the budget to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) of the President. We dealt regularly throughout the year with the analysts concerned with the international agency budgets. They often were invited to strategic planning sessions and they held regular formal reviews of our budget request. It was during this period that the Congress decided to change the dates of the fiscal year in order to give itself time to complete the appropriations in a more orderly fashion (it didn't work). The fiscal year was now to begin on October 1 instead of July 1. The major budget review process would now take place in the autumn and the President's budget would be finalized in January and presented to the Congress on February 1. Somehow, the system never became more rational; budget preparation continued to be an almost constant process, with "pass-backs" from OMB to be dealt with over Thanksgiving weekend, and changes in approval levels required new arithmetic during the Christmas holiday. In this period we began to computerize the system so that the results of changes could be seen much faster than before. That process ultimately got us out of the nightshade era, but the transition was painful, and full of "glitches" that had to be repaired.

For people in the office the exciting part of the business, and the challenging part, has to do with the internal allocation of an overall AID budget within, first, the Administrator's request (and the tactical questions as to how large his request should be) and then, step by step, the reduced levels approved by OMB. There is an element of superficiality in this process, but we try to make it as substantive and to make the choices for the Administrator as meaningful as possible in terms of his policies, State Department priorities and program factors. In the partial absence in those years of special appropriations for particular regions, how do you allocate the funds? For many years there had been a special allocation for Latin America and from the late 1960's or perhaps it was early 1970, there had been a special allocation for the Sahel programs in Africa which were eventually phased out. Later they were replaced by another special designation, the Development Fund for Africa.

Some of the officers in the office were assigned to watch over the programs of the Geographic Bureaus and the Central Bureaus of AID and to the extent that they could they tried to understand the programs and to work with the program offices of those bureaus to establish a rationale that would be useful for the AID Administrator and would be persuasive to the Congress. Inevitably there were tradeoffs and in the budget office we worked very closely with the Assistant Administrator of PPC who was at that time Alex Shakow and with his Deputy, Philip Birnbaum, who later succeeded him. Often we would pop upstairs in the private elevator, the one that goes through the back of the PPC front office into the Administrator's office, to deal with issues of conflict between one bureau and another. This would happen in the evening after the phones were off. Decisions made often involved a rather large amount of money and sometimes were intended to have a

major effect on certain programs, but the ones that were intended to have a major effect on programs never quite worked out that way. Because when the bureau receiving the budget allocation faced its cut it usually pared a little here and trimmed a little there but didn't take the steps that analysts outside of their bureau had thought might be useful.

*Q: Do you have an example?*

HERRICK: Yes, here's one, at a lesser level of magnitude. We might have thought the results of evaluation, say of education credit programs in Latin America, should be acted upon, that the programs should be curtailed and cut out. We would therefore make an illustrative reduction in the total budget, but since the geographic bureau could then establish its internal budget, it was likely simply to shave a bit off of several programs to absorb the cut, perhaps including education credit. But the big issues lay in the trade-off in the total AID budget as between the strictly security related programs and the more developmental oriented programs. There was established at that time a separate appropriation for the strategic and security related programs, the Economic Support Fund (ESF).

Our decisions on the size of a technical assistance program often were made in consideration of our view of what a total country level should be. Thus, if a large amount of ESF was available for that country, some of its "regular", or developmental budget could be allocated elsewhere. Or, each program was established at the highest possible level in order to achieve a high grand total. In the early stages of the budget process one could propose to OMB different mixes of the security and the development sides of the program. The decisions on the security side were made in close consultation with the Department of State, sometimes after a big fight. AID did not always agree with the Department of State as to how much should be allocated to certain countries. Whatever the final result, the next challenge was to see that the ESF funds were used as much as possible for development purposes.

*Q: Do you have a sense of what the primary issue was or the difference in the pattern?*

HERRICK: Well, there was one particularly huge issue, one that could never be won, on political grounds. This came to a head once, a little later, but we can put it in now. The analysts in the Near East Bureau took a crack at analyzing how well Israel was using the money and whether Israel's economic policies were such that they would under other circumstances have merited large transfers of AID money. That challenge to the size of the Israeli program, which was a cash transfer by check of one and one quarter million dollars per year was supported by the AID Administrator but, of course, did not succeed. I wonder if I can remember a time where an AID Administrator really fought down to the wire, and I mean through to meetings with the heads of Policy Planning, Political Military Affairs and the relevant geographic office in the Department of State and together with the Geographic Chief in the Department of State and up to the Secretary of State. I'm thinking of instances related to Latin America, which came later. The Administrators in this period of 1975 to 1979, Daniel Parker and John Gilligan, were not strong enough to

take on a fight with the Department of State. But the subsequent Administrator in the Republican Administration, Peter McPherson, was strong enough to take on that kind of fight, and won a few.

*Q: But generally we were trying to cut the program? Or raise it?*

HERRICK: Generally we were either trying to save the program in a country that was politically out of favor, as we believed that decisions on economic assistance should not be made from a short-term outlook. Or we were trying to cut the amount going to a country that wasn't using the funds for development benefit, one we thought was using the funds poorly.

*Q: Their policies were not acceptable?*

HERRICK: Yes, right. Or their implementation.

*Q: The State Department felt that the political effect was what?*

HERRICK: The State Department was arguing the size of programs on the basis of political necessity in terms of U.S. interests. Also, the State Department was ever reluctant to reduce or eliminate an AID program, as that program was important to the image of the United States in a country.

*Q: But generally we lost those battles?*

HERRICK: Generally we lost; we won a few battles but we lost the war. AID is always left with the challenge to divide the remainder of the total Foreign Economic Assistance budget among the rest of the world after the security allocations have been made.

*Q: You spoke about some meetings with Secretary Kissinger in this process?*

HERRICK: Yes, I recall one time Kissinger was to testify before authorizing and appropriating committees on the Foreign Affairs budget as a whole. The budget for the State Department itself is in a separate bill, but the budget for AID Programs, the Military Assistance programs, Peace Corps and our contributions to international agencies are together in the so called Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act and are enacted separately. This was a meeting for AID and the military assistance people to brief the Secretary for his testimony. The AID Administrator was Daniel Parker. I recall Philip Birnbaum, head of PPC, being with him, and I was along as head of the Budget Office and note taker. As you may recall Secretary Kissinger always wanted a note taker at meetings, never a recording but a note taker. He used those notes in books published later. The Secretary clearly had little respect for the AID Administrator and, we found out later, may have been in a hurry to have lunch with his wife. In any case, he was continuously rude, and managed to cut the meeting short. At one point, when Parker was answering a question and said, "But, so-and-so of the State Department has gone through all of this and has approved it." Kissinger leaned over his desk and said, "If I don't

understand it, it doesn't exist." The meeting went on in similar vain until he became so impatient that he stopped the meeting and said, "You'll have to set up another time." So we finally did meet again another time and I wrote up the notes the way I would have written the notes for the AID Administrator--what was the issue and what was decided and who was going to take action. No. What I had to record, verbatim, and very nicely, was the Secretary's jokes. In that second meeting he was in a better mood and had made several jokes, always at the expense of someone or another. There was a good deal of back and forth about those notes. It was a new experience.

*Q: You had to have your notes cleared in effect?*

HERRICK: Oh yes. They weren't just notes to put in our files, they had to be cleared by the Secretary of State. He looked at them, first his staff looked at them and then he did. He was very careful about them; those notes became part of his personal file--they're owned by him, not by the system.

*Q: What were the changes in the notes?*

HERRICK: They all had to do with his ego. How he looked and how he came through at the meeting, not for substance. He obviously had little respect for the AID Administrator and Philip Birnbaum is a man who is much taller than Secretary Kissinger, so when he spoke he looked where his eyes landed, at about Birnbaum's breast bone. When he was introduced to me he looked at the notebook in my hand and put out his hand, but he didn't look me in the face at all.

*Q: Interesting. Did he express any interest in the AID Program?*

HERRICK: None at all.

*Q: There was no interest.*

HERRICK: No. You see it wasn't the kind of meeting that was "help me to defend your program." It was "if it isn't part of me, if I don't understand it then it doesn't exist". I was not at the hearing so I don't know how it went. I imagine that AID was probably a small part of it all. Speaking of hearings--of course one of the things one does after a hearing is to review the transcript, clarifying here and there. We could correct a date or cross out unnecessary language and the er's and um's and fix it up a little bit but could not change the basic substance or the direction of the discussion. One of the things I remember Otto Passman saying was, "I don't want your clerk to revise everything that you have said when you get back home," But his own statements had to be cleaned up a good bit, and we often....

*Q: You often took out things...*

HERRICK: He often took out his altogether, and he knew that we changed ours somewhat. On occasion one of our witnesses said something that he wished he hadn't said or perhaps that his staff wished he had not said, but you can't change the subject of the discussion, especially if the Congressman has responded. But sometimes we tried to make it look a little better, perhaps by adding a sentence to add a little context. Nothing like the complete revision of remarks that the Congressmen request permission for each time they speak--one sees the stock phrase repeated on C-SPAN, "without objection my remarks can be revised..."

*Q: Congress expected fairly immediate impacts from development assistance and the New Directions policy. How did AID react?*

HERRICK: Yes, they expected quite immediate evidence of impact, which was not possible, of course. The agency prepared a report. It was a major effort, as we had to establish ways to measure, or at least to indicate, the before and after of impact on the poor majority, and we needed reports from the field. The report was not completed as soon as the Congress had expected, but was finally delivered. In that report we were able to describe processes and intentions much better than we were able to describe actual effect, and that caused some frustration on the hill and continuing dialogue for a number of years after that. The requirement did help to focus our attention in program planning and evaluation, however.

*Q: What was your own view about the New Directions policy at that time?*

HERRICK: My own view was that the New Directions were well taken, in their time. The subsequent push, for attention to the policy environment in which the AID programs were operating, was probably more important in the long run. In Latin America we used to sometimes say that we should not be responding as much as we had in the past to what we referred to sometimes as the edifice complex of the leadership of certain small countries. That the building of a new cornice along the waterfront or a lovely new road to the airport or whatever visible physical infrastructure was not all that useful and that we should aim our sights to the greater majority of the population. The frustration is always that the AID Program was designed to be a program between governments and is carried out under the authority usually of a so-called bilateral agreement between the two governments as to what the AID office in the country shall be doing while it is there.

I think it is much less difficult today for AID to do things more directly with provincial or state governments within a country and to do things more directly with the private sector. The view at the time of the directions was that that was not possible. These were government to government programs and they were seen as having to relate to the central government. Therefore the big challenge was to persuade a government that their society would benefit from AID projects and programs that were more likely to reach the majority of the people. That, in many countries, was a very large change. One of the problems was, I think, that we were pressed by certain Congressional interests, who were pressed in turn by voluntary agency groups, to define the poor majority in micro terms: the poorest, micro-enterprise, etc.

*Q: Was this a major shift from what we were doing before? If it was a shift what did we not do in the new program that we were doing in the old program or visa versa?*

HERRICK: This whole view and change in direction was contemporary with a relative diminution in funds available for Foreign Assistance. We no longer had the ability to do as many large capital projects in as many countries as we had before. In addition to that, the number of AID recipient countries had increased almost geometrically with the independence of almost all of the countries in Africa. Before that there had been fewer AID recipient countries. Therefore it was not possible to do as much in the way of capital projects as it had been in the past. In the more distant past in the 1950's and up until the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, there had actually been two agencies--one for capital projects and one for technical assistance projects. In Latin America I would say that the necessity to make the change had to go deeper than perhaps in Africa. I can't speak really of the Asian Programs. There were good technical assistance projects, like the Basic Education Project in Guatemala that was directed to rural families, but the relative importance of the capital side larger.

*Q: Maybe we can come back to that question when you talk about your Kenya assignment.*

HERRICK: Yes.

*Q: Then we can see how it manifested in a particular situation. In the budget review process which you were directly concerned with, when reviewing fund allocations were there specific criteria that related to testing whether a program was moving in the direction of New Directions? Do you recall?*

HERRICK: Yes. In the Budget Office we tried to establish criteria for review of budget requests in the light of the New Directions. This was one of many instances in which I saw, and was partially involved in the agency's attempt to implement new policies. It is not easy to do; it's not easy to implement new policies, because AID projects have a life and they don't change immediately. New projects can be begun only to the extent of availability of new budget, and new projects don't begin right away, for at least a year or more likely 18 months after they have been authorized in the first instance. So the agency does try but it can't move things very quickly. The second part of it is that it's very difficult to measure change, though we tried to establish ways to do so. We tried to establish systems through which the Missions, then the country Geographic Offices and the Geographic Bureaus as well as the central bureaus doing world-wide projects would report their progress so that we could feed that information into the reports to Congress. We were just beginning to use computers, and to establish systems on mainframe equipment. We didn't have personal computers or desktop computers at the time so we had the whole problem of having to centralize data input, with all the errors that can engender.

We also had the problem, which will be with any agency forever, of motivating people to report on things that were not really as much a part of their life as a part of the life in Washington. One cannot establish systems through which numbers will speak and can have something significant to say unless the original sources of the numbers are interested and conscientious.

*Q: Did you find that there was much resistance to making the change within the agency?*

HERRICK: There certainly was resistance.

*Q: Mostly just momentum?*

HERRICK: Part of the resistance was inertia. Part, though, came through identification with past programs, things that people were proud of, that they wanted to continue doing. People have a tendency to want to do again the things for which there had been approval and rewards in the past. Because of course they were seeking recognition.

*Q: Was there any particular area that you recall where people were the most resistant? Or was it just covered across the board? Of course the capital projects areas was one that you were cutting back on.*

HERRICK: That was one area. A recurring theme was the desire of an AID Mission to respond to a country's request for financing of tourism infrastructure.

*Q: When you were reviewing budgets was there anything particular that you were looking for in terms of what was a satisfactory or unsatisfactory country program? Do you remember anything in particular?*

HERRICK: Well, in those days we had to look for descriptions of how the poorest of the poor or, less specifically, the poor majority, would be affected by the project. But one finds that bureaucrats develop a certain skill in the use of language and in the use of hypotheses about how the projects would affect poor people. We let a lot of that go through. We didn't know any better than they did. I think in some instances the attempt to make the connection was genuine and in some instances it was superficial. This dilemma led to PPC's first formal definitions of requirements for what we called social analyses in the project development process.

*Q: But there may have been less change in fact if there was change in the rhetoric of how it was presented or by what was emphasized. Was there any other dimensions of your PPC work at that time? I think we did discuss a little bit about this work in relationship to allocating budgets and dealing with the State Department so we don't need to go back over that. Was there something more in that area?*

HERRICK: Yes, Alex Shakow and Philip Birnbaum as leaders of PPC had a very strong interest in trying to ensure that programs that had not originally been designed from the point of view of assistance to the majority of people in a country could be altered so that



they would indeed have a developmental effect. One of those programs was the Public Law 480 Program, the Food Aid Program of the United States. I became involved in an attempt to make that program more developmental. We did not totally succeed at that time, the success came later. I think the final success in legislation didn't come until the mid 1980's, which was eight or ten years later. I chaired an interagency task force to think about PL 480 and we developed the concept for what eventually became Title III of Public Law 480, that food aid would be offered on grant terms on condition that the country undertook policy changes that would further its development.

There had been two sides to Public Law 480. One, under Title I, offered credit for purchase of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities. It was the food that was actually delivered to the country. The other, under Title II of the Act offered food as a contribution to the needs of the country, whether in response to food shortages or in school lunch programs or in nutrition programs of health clinics. In the agreement between governments, in consideration of the grant of food aid, the country agreed to take certain developmental steps. But in fact through the years, the language of the agreements had become boiler plate language with little or no meaning. In some instances the government was able to accrue local currencies for use in their own budget.

*Q: You allowed them to sell the commodities under PL 480 Title II.*

HERRICK: That's right, the funds they received from the ultimate distributors of the food grains were to be used for developmental purposes. But in fact, often they were not. The program had become a relatively empty financial transfer from the United States to the other government. So we tried to work out ways in which a program would genuinely have a developmental effect. It took a long time because we proposed legislation that was not acceptable to other agencies of the U.S. Government: OMB, Department of Agriculture, Treasury. The strongest actor in this group outside of ourselves was the Department of Agriculture (USDA), which owned the foods (these were purchased under our own U.S. program to subsidize surplus production) and made the final proposals as to what foods, in what quantity, would be available for food aid. USDA had a marketing section responsible for marketing U.S. food products overseas.

I recall an instance involving Malawi as an example. When Malawi was hospitable to refugees from Mozambique and did not have sufficient food to feed them, the United States offered to help. We were supplying surplus United States wheat to Zimbabwe at the time, on commercial terms. Zimbabwe needed our hard Durham wheat for bread making. We proposed a three-way swap: Zimbabwe would get U.S. wheat and would send an equivalent value of their own surplus white maize--the staple grain of the region--to Malawi. After a year or so, USDA said, "No, we will not do that swap any longer. Those Malawians must get to like American corn," which, as you know, is yellow and is generally detested in Africa--they think it is an American trick to make them sterile.

*Q: What were the main changes on the program that the task force was trying to bring about in terms of trying to make it more developmental?*

HERRICK: I don't recall the details of the mechanisms we developed at the time. But when the program was finally instituted, the third wing of the Food Program, the Title III, the Food Program was to be administered by AID rather than USDA. It was, however, circumscribed by requirements for review by OMB and USDA. The program would operated through a very specific agreement as to how the equivalent value of the food would be used by the government to support development. The government did not have to distribute the food itself, but could pass it on into the market system, or grant it for eleemosynary purposes.

*Q: This addressed those policies and active projects? So there was a policy reform mechanism?*

HERRICK: Yes, when the new program was finally enacted, the idea of policy reform was very important.

*Q: Agriculture policy changes.*

HERRICK: Yes, the changes may have been tied to agricultural purposes. Another thing we tried to do in PPC at the time, as part of our planning function, was to devise a systematic way of allocating relative amounts of budget to country recipients based on specific criteria. One criterion would address the degree of democracy in their government, together with degrees of corruption or central control. Another would have to do with successful use of past amounts of aid. Additional criteria would refer to the quality of life in the country as it stands today and therefore, the need of the country for aid. To need was linked the absolute size of the population, and the country's attitude toward controlling its population growth rate.

Attempts to use systems like this tend to fall afoul of topical political events and strategic interests. For example, we tried, hypothetically to give a large weight to the criteria of population size--poor majority--and of need. That caused India to show up as extremely seriously under-financed in terms of USAID money. But...The situation between the United States and India at the time was that India was permitting the United States to offer aid, but India was assuring that the aid went only where they wanted it to go. The Indians had a very sophisticated budgeting system, developed under the British. They knew how to establish their priorities. They were among a few countries at the time who were able to say to the United States, "If you come in here and you tell us that vocational education at the secondary level is what we need, and we find that in our own established budget we have not increased allocations for such a purpose, then, in effect you are telling us that our priorities are wrong. We want to stay with our priorities." So that was our situation. We were not a donor that had any influence on the policies and programs of the Indian Government itself. And no allocation criterion was going to cause us to increase our AID program to assure a higher per capita contribution there. For a while we played around with a measurement of need that was developed at the World Bank, the PQLI, Personal Quality of Life Index. Scholars argued about the inclusion and exclusion of

various factors in the index. It was of some interest, but we had to conclude that such an index could not be used systematically to indicate the relative sizes of our programs.

*Q: Apart from India what countries do you think went to the top of the list? I suppose this was a ranking system?*

HERRICK: It was a ranking system, but it could go only so far. It always had to be modified in accordance with the current situation. Let me think of a country that was receiving very large amounts of aid and according to any of the ranking systems should not have been. I guess Israeli is the prime example. After the Camp David accords of 1976, Israeli and Egypt were promised very large, and equal amounts of United States aid, most of which came from the AID budget. For Israeli it was the \$1.25 billion annual cash transfer in addition to military aid. In Egypt, in addition to military aid, the economic aid was equivalent but it was partly cash, partly project aid, partly commodity aid and partly food aid. But the amounts for neither country could be changed without changing the other; they had to remain equivalent.

*Q: But outside of those major countries of Egypt, Israeli, and India, were there any others?*

HERRICK: Yes, there were a lot of things that looked wrong when you looked at an index like this. Botswana, for example, with its population of only about one-half million, and income from diamonds, should have been buying expertise from us rather than receiving it as a gift. So, to the extent that we could devise a credible system we made proposals to the leadership of AID. I remember that the Deputy Administrator of the period, Bob Nooter found it very, very difficult to accept the use of a ranking system that was based on numbers. Because, invariably, when he saw a country for which the total aid of the proposal didn't look right--as, for example, Liberia, a country he had served in--he began to wonder whether the system was going to be of any use at all. I think in the long run the hypothetical proposals we made were of some use. Although no system was adopted formally, our suggestions raised some questions that should be addressed. I think these attempts may have helped particular regional Assistant Administrators see some issues that they had not seen so baldly before and therefore did slowly but surely influence some changes. In the meantime, however, every Assistant Administrator screamed about egregious examples of ignorant and arbitrary views on the part of PPC.

*Q: What would be the alternative? How was it being done otherwise?*

HERRICK: The dilemma faced by the budget group always rests on the existence of past programs and one of the things that drives the budget for the following year is the so-called mortgage, the amount that is necessary to keep current projects alive. In my view AID has always erred on the side of putting too little into a project in the first instance. There is always a conflict as between the need to finance a project adequately in the first instance and the need to report to the Congress and within the Administration--to OMB and Treasury--on how funds are being expended. The challenge comes when you look at the so-called pipeline of a project that has been obligated at the level of, say, \$4 million

and has spent out only \$300,000. It looks like a poor project. So you have to know why your project is moving slowly and what the expectations are for the project to move faster. With OMB we had developed some formulas that were acceptable: for a technical assistance project, assume a low expenditure the first year, so much in the second, and so on; for a capital project, similar kinds of assumption.

The Africa Bureau was the absolute worst in the Agency in the matter of forward budgeting. The Africa Bureau would authorize a \$2 million project for five years. At the least, therefore, the project would require commitment of about \$400,000 a year for each of four years. But the bureau would put only half that into that project in the first operational year and perhaps little more in year two; therefore the mortgage was large, and growing. Year after year, the budget for Africa accommodated almost no funds for new projects because so much was needed for the older ones. Had there been very severe cuts in the annual appropriation for the region, the Bureau would not have been able to carry out its current obligations.

Let's go back to the question of country allocations. In theory, such an approach was attractive, and it attracted the new leadership of the Agency in 1979. The Congress had created IDCA (International Development Cooperation Agency), a super agency that included AID and the Trade and Development Program, one that had stronger responsibilities for the food aid program than the AID Administrator had had before. The first IDCA Administrator was Thomas Ehrlich, and the new AID Administrator reporting to him was Douglas Bennet, who had moved over from State Department. Ehrlich brought in a small staff to help him carry out his responsibilities, which included review of the AID program in terms of legislated policy. An aside: Carol Lancaster, who later became Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa in the State Department, and even later after a return to Georgetown University, the Deputy Administrator of AID, was on Ehrlich's staff. Ehrlich wanted to rationalize the allocation of AID on a country basis. He thought that some countries should not have AID anymore and that the allocations for some countries were much too small. So once more we tried an allocation system and this time in the allocation system we tried to emphasize the success of a country in using development aid. Not only ours, but the aid from other sources. Our expectations were that a country should be able to make good use of aid for purposes of the New Directions. We devised a system and established some criteria, reviewed those criteria with Bennet and Ehrlich and were asked to go ahead. The results were very unpopular in the regions, of course. My involvement in this work was known, so it got to the point that derogatory remarks about our formal report referred to the "Herr-lich" report.

*Q: I'll be darned. [laughter]*

HERRICK: That negative epithet did not follow me very far, thank goodness. Very soon I went overseas to an assignment in Kenya. The report was not implemented as such. Although again, some of the changes that had been suggested by the allocations identified in that report may have been implemented to some degree.

*Q: Do you remember what the criteria were?*

HERRICK: I don't remember details of the criteria, but I think I've given you the flavor.

*Q: But you were emphasizing successful use of aid.*

HERRICK: Yes we were. We were trying to help the agency move toward programs with the greatest potential for success in New Directions terms. I do recall being thanked by Tom Ehrlich for the work and I do recall that he thought the substantive part of it was adequate for his initial purposes. In the political maneuvering that came after he didn't use it as such and a similar report was not prepared the following year. And, by the way, it was not long before the AID Administrator himself assumed the role of head of IDCA.

*Q: Well, wrapping up on the work in PPC, there were a lot of other initiatives taking place. What were some of them that you recall?*

HERRICK: Well we've been talking about PPC in terms of overall planning and its effect on allocation of resources, and the various pieces of the budget, but the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination was very broad in its function. There was a project review function for example. Through that function combined with the function of establishing specific assistance policies, and that of overseeing evaluation in the Agency, PPC was able to establish some intellectual leadership in regard to the shape of the programs and their constituent projects. Shakow brought in Alan Hoben, an anthropologist who has been at Boston University for many years and for different periods has been the head of the Center for African Studies there. He came into PPC to help think about evaluation. Under his leadership a number of global evaluations were initiated to cover more than one country and look at certain types of assistance or certain development themes. He organized brown-bag lunches to discuss the results of studies of this sort. He brought in experts to have an exchange with AID practitioners, to expose their views and help develop ideas. He also worked on the outline for conducting social analysis to identify the needs of the majority of the people of a country. Such analyses could also be used to predict, to an extent, the effect of the programs on the social and economic development of the various groups in the population. Ed Hogan who was a regular AID Officer was in charge of the Program and Project Review section at the time. I worked with him very closely, and with Bob Berg...

*Q: He was the head of Evaluation at that time?*

HERRICK: Yes, he was the Agency head of evaluation. Together, under the primary leadership of Ed Hogan, the three of us worked on a system for establishing a strategic focus for a country-oriented AID program. Our product was an instruction for the Country Development Strategy Statement. This document was intended to provide an analysis that would be the first step in identifying the programs that the United States might be carrying out in a country. The final decisions about the programs would be based on analysis of the need in the country, historic factors such as the relative expertise of AID in

a certain sector in the country, an economic analysis, a social analysis and an administrative analysis; further attention was to be given to the context of other donor aid, in order to identify what the United States didn't have to do, or shouldn't be doing. I believe this is an excellent system, if it is used rigorously. In most instances that I am aware of--these are mainly in Africa because that is where I spent my next years overseas--when it was used seriously the Country Development Strategy Statement analysis was very helpful. The strategic planning system has now been modified to some extent, but a requirement for analysis in order to establish programs, and especially in order to predict their effect, is still the rule in the agency.

A second outsider of this period was John Mellor, who had in-depth experience in India and believed very strongly--and could demonstrate analytically--that for most developing countries the engine of development would be the agriculture sector. Growth in agriculture would lead to higher incomes, which would lead to a greater demand for goods and services, which would lead to the production of goods and services and so on. This structure was very useful in the context of the New Directions, because agriculture is something that takes place on the ground and can be carried out by small producers. Ironically, some of the studies that were carried out at this time showed that it is very, very difficult to get to the smallest of the agricultural producers. In India and the Philippines for example, two major examples of countries using the newly developed "miracle" rice and wheat varieties developed at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) of the Philippines and at CYMMT in Mexico, respectively, it is the better off farmers who can benefit from the new varieties because these varieties require the use of fertilizer, of irrigation if there isn't sufficient rainfall, and of pesticides. Only the better off farmers of the community are able to afford those things in the first place. So, in effect, greater production sometimes provokes a greater spread between the incomes of the better farmers and those of the poorest in the community. Thus the dilemma of the New Directions will be with the world for a long time.

*Q: Right.*

HERRICK: I think that's about it for PPC.

### **Assignment to Kenya as USAID Mission Deputy and Director - 1979-1984**

*Q: Your assignment overseas to Kenya was in what year?*

HERRICK: That was in 1979. Up until that time I had been a Civil Service, GS, employee. More and more it seemed to me that to make my best contribution in a foreign affairs agency I should be a Foreign Service Officer and should be able and willing to go overseas. At the same time, my second husband had retired from government and had set out his shingle as a Labor Management Arbitrator and so he had his own schedule. All the children were grown and educated. Thus we thought it would be quite possible for me to go overseas and for him to stay at home in Washington, schedule his hearings at their various U.S. venues, and then schedule writing up time at my post overseas. I think my

husband expected me to be assigned to Central America because that was the region I had traveled to most often from AID. Africa was a little farther than he had bargained for, but it was interesting for him to go out there. His first visit coincided with Christmas and with the arrival of my household goods which had been delayed since August. One of my daughters was there too, so I had good help unpacking. Unfortunately, it was Terry's last visit, because he was diagnosed with lung cancer when he returned home, and died shortly thereafter.

The Kenya Program at the time ran somewhere between \$5 and \$7 million per year, as I remember, and was basically a technical assistance program. There had been a time shortly after Independence when there was a larger element of financial transfer in the program. But when I got to Kenya it was technical assistance, primarily in health delivery--particularly rural health and primary health care, family planning, agricultural education, agricultural research and some private voluntary organization training programs. There was also a food aid program--a food grant program for school feeding and a few food-for-work projects.

I went to Kenya as Deputy Director for the bilateral AID program. The structure of the AID organization in Kenya was somewhat larger than usual for an African post, because Nairobi was the home of several regional offices. Among these were a Regional Economic Development Support Office (REDSO), a Regional Housing Office, a Regional Controller and a Regional Inspector General's Office. The Director for bilateral assistance was responsible for all the management functions, providing support for all of the people in all of the offices there. At the time there were about 85 Americans and over 100 local staff. During that first year there the AID Director systematically involved me in everything that was going on and included me in all his deliberations. He also asked me to review the operations of the management staff and make recommendations for improvement. So, I had a good introduction to the program and management operations of an AID Mission.

*Q: Who was the AID Director?*

HERRICK: It was Glen Roane, who was thinking about going on to something else. I think he really made a deliberate effort to involve me in everything on the assumption that I might become the Director when he departed. That's not necessarily an assumption in AID because most often another officer is brought in as the new Director. In fact, within a year Glen Roane did move on--he took a position partly financed by AID at Virginia State University--and I did move up to become the AID Director. I must say that I found a very keen and instant difference being Director. As much as Glen Roane had asked me to advise him on what to do, as much as I felt I had been involved in everything at the Mission, when it was my desk and my final signature, I really felt the change. I found that I was very glad to have a senior controller at post who was the head of the Regional Controllers Office servicing a number of Missions in the area but was also my advisor on financial matters. The REDSO had a staff of lawyers and I was very glad to be able to call on counsel.

While I was in Kenya, the character of the program changed, as program assistance in the form of financial transfers was added, perhaps in 1980 or 1981. The United States made an agreement with Kenya that gave us access to Kenya as a base for military exercises and for access in the event of strife in the Middle East, and specifically to the port of Mombasa as a liberty port for U.S. Navy ships stationed in the Indian Ocean for which the islands of Diego Garcia were the only accessible port. The establishment of that base-access agreement, as it became known, was awkward for the American Ambassador. A delegation of people from the White House, the National Security Counsel, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Pentagon had come out from Washington and had asked for an appointment with the Chief of State, President Daniel Arap Moi. The Ambassador was not told the subject of the meeting.

*Q: Who was the Ambassador?*

HERRICK: He was Wilbert Lemelle, not a career foreign service person but someone who had been very active in other countries as representative of the Ford Foundation. He was put in the position of having to listen to his colleagues propose a security agreement to the President, not having heard of the proposal beforehand. He protested later to Washington, and apparently never received a satisfactory explanation. As some of us heard later, there was some head shaking back in Washington about his protest: "Well, you know, he's an outsider and he doesn't know how to play the game." Soon after, Will Lemelle was asked to leave, and a career Ambassador came out to Kenya. In my view Lemelle had very good relations with the Kenyans and was very much respected by them. Some of the diplomatic group was a little surprised that his wife didn't do as much as some wives on the social and committee circuit, but she was pursuing a master's degree. She certainly did her job as a hostess at the residence and that kind of thing, but she wasn't available for all of the little charity things. A situation about which I was very sympathetic.

*Q: Who was the Ambassador that replaced Wilbert Lemelle?*

HERRICK: Bill Harrop, a career Ambassador, a Foreign Service Officer who had been Ambassador to Guinea before. He was a man who knew about the AID Program, one with whom I had attended a workshop to expose senior officers to issues of population growth and family planning. He was very liberal in his understanding of gender and labor issues, supportive of his staff, straightforward in his dealings with the Kenyans--altogether, I think an effective Ambassador. His strong interest in the AID Program led him sometimes to rely more heavily than we might have wished on his economic staff to keep him informed. The Peace Corps Director had a similar problem, resenting the role of the Economic Counselor, saying "I do not report to the Economic Counselor at the Embassy." But we were both included as contributing members of his Country Team. I think of one the important aspects of an AID Director's job is the ability to adapt to the styles of different Ambassadors. It is important to assure oneself of the Ambassador's understanding and support. When the time came to negotiate conditions for our program



assistance, which took the form of expanded food aid the first year, and of grants for purchases from the United States in subsequent years, Harrop was very supportive. He added his views to our internal discussions regarding how far we could go, stood firm on our negotiating stance, and put his own prestige on the line.

*Q: Did you meet with him regularly about the program?*

HERRICK: Oh, yes, at regular meetings and in separate sessions. In the beginning he had senior staff meetings, including the AID Director, every morning, though he reduced the frequency later. One day each week he included a larger group of staff--adding the other members of his Country Team: the Peace Corps Director, Public Affairs Officer, Regional Agricultural Attaché and, later, the military representatives. Less frequently he called in the heads of all the regional operations in the country to bring them up to date on topical questions and hear what they were doing. Harrop was concurrently Ambassador to Seychelles, and during that time the United States began an AID Program for Seychelles, which was the responsibility of the Director of the REDSO. Because of that he developed more of a relationship with the REDSO Director than is usual for an Ambassador where regional offices are located.

*Q: Who was in that position?*

HERRICK: It was Ray Love, who later became Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, and after that Counselor to the AID Administrator. Love had gone out to that position shortly before I went to Kenya, and we ran into a curious thing. He also had been a GS employee for many years, though he certainly had some overseas experience, particularly in Asia. After I arrived in Nairobi the representative of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) in Kenya sent a message to Washington one behalf of the AFSA members protesting that when people are being brought into senior positions in the Foreign Service from outside, this puts downward pressure on the ability of employees of lower rank to earn promotions. They may have had a point, in the context of the class rank system of the foreign service, but it was one that was statistically not very significant considering our relative rank and the ranks of the protesting members.

There had been a period when the relations between the Directors of the REDSO and the AID Mission had been very poor. The relationship was competitive and combative and had disintegrated to the level that one of the Directors told his staff not to speak to members of the staff of the other organization in the elevator--we shared offices in the same building and had a common elevator. Issues converged in the management arena. One of the most keenly disputed matters was the assignment of housing. Members of REDSO staff invariably felt that they had been discriminated against and that members of the AID Bilateral Mission staff had been given undue preference. In some instances that may have been the case, but of course it wasn't the general intent and it wasn't as common as the view at the time would have indicated. So Ray Love and I were two new people and neither of us were of the kind of personality that would want to continue such a thing. I established a management committee that included the heads of all the resident AID organizations. We met regularly to review issues and make decisions in common. We

dealt with questions of economy in operating expenses, of the degree of physical security to be provided to residents, of adequacy of the portfolio of housing, and so on and so forth. We went over the budget together, and generally managed to have an open forum to deal with issues. I think it went very well.

*Q: That was one of the first times in the long history of that Mission that there had been peace and cooperation. There had been terrible problems.*

HERRICK: Well, yes, but there factor of competition in program development, as occurred in the Central America situation, was lacking. The function of REDSO was a service function and REDSO served the AID Mission in Kenya as well as other Missions. Our lawyers were on that staff. There were economists whom we could draw on. There was a social scientist who helped with our social analyses when we were developing projects. But there wasn't the competition about whether the Agricultural Research Program should be in their portfolio or in ours. The REDSO did manage some regional projects, elements of which took place in Kenya. In retrospect, I would say that the effectiveness of those projects was difficult to assess, and as far as the Kenyan element of certain of the projects went, somewhat problematic.

It is more difficult, I think, for a regional office to make tough decisions when dealing with some of the common problems of a technical assistance project. I think of one project that remained dependent on AID funds long after the time projected for the countries benefitting from the project to support it themselves. Such a problem is common in many projects, but for a regional project it frequently happens that the project managers simply carry on, because the idea of the project is still a good one. Even when a separate decision can be made about the operations of a regional project within a particular country, I think it is generally a little easier for an AID Mission than for a regional office to come to difficult conclusions and to deal with host country disappointments. I also observed that the staff of REDSO, who were on the road up to 50 percent or more of their work year, were always pleased to be able to work with a project located in their country of residence. It was something that helped them to get to know Kenya better. If I could digress, I think many Africa-wide projects that were managed from Washington were kept alive long beyond their usefulness. Sometimes they become the "baby" of the project manager, who wants to hang onto them whether or not they fit within the context of the country development strategy.

*Q: Did you draw on technical people or central bureaus from Washington very much in supporting your program?*

HERRICK: Not very much, because we had services from REDSO. In the later years of my time there, when policy emphasized assistance to small business, and more involvement of the private sector in all activities, it was helpful to bring out some expertise from Washington. But, back to the central bureau projects. One of our concerns was that we simply did not know of, much less understand, all the things going on in country that had been initiated in Washington. The staff of the Program Office, shortly after I arrived in Kenya, tried to develop for me a list of all activities that any part of AID

was engaged in. They were not sure they had captured them all, but they found over 100 centrally managed projects.

*Q: Over 100?*

HERRICK: It was 103 one day and 117 the next day.

*Q: In all sectors?*

HERRICK: In all sectors. We were uncomfortable because we didn't understand them all. We didn't know what they were doing, or why, or whether it was effective. When the time came that the regional bureaus were required to check an AID Mission overseas before starting a part of a project in that country, we found that was done sometimes conscientiously, and sometimes not. If we had an opportunity to comment on a project proposal, and our response was negative, our view did not necessarily prevail. We would find on reading the next Congressional Presentation that Kenya was one of the countries listed for the project. Yet, there had been no communication after we had expressed our view. That was common.

Some of the programs managed from Washington in Kenya were very useful. One that I recall, and want to talk about because it illustrates something else, was a radio education project originating in the Technical Assistance Bureau (perhaps by then in its next incarnation with another name). Radio education was something that had been in the Kenya bilateral program some 10 or 12 years earlier in the late 1960's, or early 1970's perhaps. That project had been completed in perhaps five or six years, but the Kenyans had not carried on afterwards as had been expected. The regional project was actually able to build on what had gone before. The institution set up to run the program still existed, and the chief person trained to manage the project was still around and could be brought back in. The situation in the government was a little different, the U.S. technical team was excellent, in substance and in ability to pass responsibility to the Kenyans, and the project was working well. But I think that the situation illustrated a fact we must always in mind and that is, that new things take a long, long time to be established. The technical expertise and the financing that come in at first (no matter how hard you try) are not going to be embedded in a few years. It's going to take longer.

*Q: This project worked well?*

HERRICK: The second time it was going much better.

*Q: What was it supposed to do?*

HERRICK: The project was producing lessons that the teachers in rural areas, (in basically one room schools) could use by turning on the radio in the classroom. These were teachers who were barely trained themselves, perhaps not even a full secondary education. In many subject areas they simply were not literate. Through a system of

feedback, and visits at the schools to help the teachers use these programs, the team had been quite successful. An additional factor was that the Kenyans had learned how to develop the curriculum, and it was appropriate to the national syllabus and the capabilities of the teachers. It was going to founder eventually, I'm sure, on the question of equipment--the radios were going to be stolen or in schools without electricity there was not going to be money to buy batteries. It was an excellent idea that was going to work only as long as there was enough local budget to continue it.

*Q: Do you know how many schools this program reached?*

HERRICK: I don't recall.

*Q: Was it in the thousands?*

HERRICK: No, no. This was part of a demonstration project in the manner of the central bureau, still in a sense a pilot project that was taking place in certain schools of the 42 districts of the country. I think it had a good chance of continuing under Kenyan auspices after the technical assistance team departed. That was partly due to the personalities of the two key expatriates on the team, who were very much loved by the people they were working with.

*Q: Were they Kenyans or Americans?*

HERRICK: They were Americans. They were technical experts that America can be very, very proud of. They knew their work and were able to deal with the Kenyans in a way that would help them understand and enable them gradually to take over full responsibility. To hand over responsibility is something that's often hard for an outside expert to do.

*Q: These were contractors?*

HERRICK: Correct. That was one regional program that was working very well. Other projects did not work out so well. Very often I think the Kenyan entrepreneurial spirit really came through under these regional projects. An agreement of sorts was drawn up, the money came out, and the local person in charge benefitted nicely by the use of a vehicle and the ability to establish an office from which he could maybe start a little import/export business, or something else.

*Q: What about the main lines of your program?*

HERRICK: Oh yes, what about the bilateral AID program? We learned a number of things as we implemented the program and it evolved somewhat during the five years I was there. An early focus was on the livestock development project, one of several the Kenyans had asked various donors to do. They had more or less parceled out parts of the country for those livestock projects, and later had done the same for their arid and semi-arid lands development program. AID's livestock project was in the far northeast, in a

very arid part of the country. The project was intended help the nomadic herders of the area by providing watering points for their camels and cattle. It was not working. If the watering points--the bore holes--required pumps, the pumps were not being kept up. If the Ministry staff had vehicles, they had abused them by speeding over poor roads, rolled them into ditches and failed to maintain them. The watering points were overused so that the area around was trampled and overgrazed to the point where it took a day to get the cattle to water from where they had decent feeding.

But the more basic problem stemmed from the lack of understanding of how nomadic livestock growers managed the land themselves and the imposition from the outside of structures that didn't work. The local people did know how to move their cattle seasonally, reserving the grazing of areas near their watering points until other areas were too dry. They were not nomadic in the sense that they moved from one part in the country to another, but they did move with their cattle within certain designated territories, clan territories. The plan for watering points had ignored the clan territory lines. One bore hole had to serve up to four traditionally mutually hostile clans, and that caused conflict. Machinery was rotting on the landscape and in the yards.

During my first year in Kenya, with the highest level officials from several Ministries--those of Agriculture, Livestock Development, Rural Development and Water--we reviewed the project. We went out to the project location in two small planes provided by the police in order to save the time required to drive, and received some hospitality from the local District Commissioner. We were able to come to a mutual decision that the project was costly, to government and the donor, and wasn't working as it had been designed.

*Q: What was the regional purpose? To improve the livestock production?*

HERRICK: The purpose was to improve livestock production and, eventually, the marketing of livestock to improve the incomes of the herding groups. It was, of course, another faulty assumption that these people would cull their livestock for purposes of sale for beef. Such faulty assumptions were affecting other livestock projects in Africa, like the one directed toward the Masai people in Tanzania that was specifically designed as a marketing project. The fault lay in the basic lack of understanding that livestock in those cultures is the wealth of the people; livestock are not slaughtered for money--not until the modern sector economy is impinging heavily on the pastoralist areas, and the population has grown too heavy for their traditional ways to support. Then the people may see a need for participation in the monetary economy and may be prepared to lead a more settled existence, and make other changes.

We concluded that, in their current state, the pastoralists of northeastern Kenya were not ready for the project that had been offered to them. At the same time AID was finding similar problems in livestock projects in West Africa, in the Sahel and in Southern Africa. Together with World Bank, I think AID did a major report identifying the issues

that would have to be addressed before undertaking new livestock projects. I believe someone called Haven North was involved in helping AID think about that (laughter).

*Q: What other thrusts were there in the program?*

HERRICK: There was an agricultural education program. We had been helping to develop an agricultural college in the Central Highlands of Kenya called Edgerton College. It has now become a university, but at the time our aim was not to create a university level institution but to improve the ability of this diploma granting institution. The diploma was granted after three years of study for a person who had come from the Ordinary Level of secondary education. Almost all of the graduates of the college were employed by the government as agricultural extension agents and some of them went on later to higher education and perhaps became involved in agricultural research. It was a large effort, to expand the physical plant and teaching facilities of the campus, to train Kenyans to teach at the college, and to provide American teachers in the meantime. When I reached Kenya there were 28 Americans on the campus, including a chief of party who did little teaching himself and one procurement specialist whose entire job was to oversee the building and the procurement and installation of equipment from the United States. From the American side the project was managed by a consortium of American universities. I recall that it was a person from Louisiana State who was doing the procurement.

*Q: Do you remember which consortium?*

HERRICK: It was SECID, the Southeast Consortium for International Development. The Americans teaching at the college while Kenyans were in the United States to earn advanced degrees developed curriculum in areas that had not been offered at the college before and helped supervise the teaching farm. By the time this project was coming to an end, in about the middle 1980's, Edgerton College was a premier diploma granting institution in Africa. The curriculum was excellent, the staff was qualified and the students--who were mainly Kenyan but included a few from other African countries--were well trained in what was offered at the college. But of course what happened then was that the College wanted to go onward and upward; the staff became ambitious. The professors should have Ph.D.'s instead of Master's degrees and the College should be able to offer an agricultural degree.

One of the problems structurally in agricultural education in East Africa, and it was the case in southern Africa also (and even perhaps in French-speaking Africa, though I don't know), was that the person holding a diploma in agriculture who wanted to go on for a university degree had to start over again. An education to the level of diploma was equivalent to the last two years of a British-style A(for Advanced)-Level secondary education plus one year of university education. A university degree required three years. To have to repeat what was, in effect, one full year of university time was very expensive for the country and for the student, in both time and money. This issue was one we tried to work on in Southern Africa later. We tried to find a way for the universities to grant a

credit equivalent. But it is not easy for relatively young institutions, such as those universities, to change the standards they had adopted in emulation of European universities.

*Q: Was there another agricultural college at the time?*

HERRICK: There were other agricultural schools that did not grant a diploma, but covered two years and granted a certificate.

*Q: But there was no agricultural university in Kenya?*

HERRICK: There was, yes. There was an Agriculture Faculty of the University of Nairobi, located on a separate campus. That Faculty trained students toward research careers as well as well as for government positions. A person graduating from Edgerton College, and going out to work a few years, rarely had the opportunity to go back to the university for further training. And since almost all employment was in the public sector, there weren't private employers who would finance an agricultural education.

*Q: Did you think that was a successful project?*

HERRICK: In my view, yes, emphatically yes.

*Q: Was it eventually turned over to the Kenyans?*

HERRICK: It was not totally turned over to the Kenyans. The next challenge--after the project ended--was to find a way for Edgerton College to continue its relationships with the American universities of SECID which had been involved in the project, as well as other U.S. universities where Kenyans had been trained. The U.S. institutions wanted to continue their relationship and the Kenyans wanted to continue to send faculty to the United States, to upgrade and maintain their expertise in their fields. The challenge to an AID Mission is always to try to design a way for institutions to maintain a linkage, but to ensure that they will finance the major part of that linkage. After my time in Kenya, I believe the Kenya Mission did extend the project for Edgerton College in order to help maintain linkages, but the drive to bring Edgerton up to a degree granting institution was so strong that the AID Mission eventually supported that move as well.

*Q: I gather that there was a considerable contention within the Kenyan government about whether there should be a university or not.*

HERRICK: I think there was probably competition from those in Nairobi who didn't want to see a university competing with them. No doubt.

*Q: That's a classic example of a diploma level school moving up, it happens all over.*

HERRICK: And a classic and very understandable ambition on the part of the Principal and the professors.

*Q: I do recall that the Principal was very effective.*

HERRICK: The Principal at Edgerton College was energetic, dedicated, well connected and astute. He was politically savvy in his own country so that he was able to maintain his government support for his institution. He was smart and effective in his relationships with his American advisers. He was a good Administrator; he knew what his faculty was doing and he inspected the building program himself daily and knew what was going on. He was personally concerned about his students; on an annual trip to the United States he visited all the Kenyan students. In that way he began to establish relationships with other American universities, because his students were not all at members of SECID. When his students told him they were engaged in courses that they didn't think were going to help them back home, he spoke to the university and negotiated a change. He was a truly effective Administrator of his program. He needed a lot of help, he got a lot of help, and he knew how to use it.

*Q: I don't remember his name, but I recall that he was very effective.*

HERRICK: I can't remember his name at the moment. He was educated at Makerere University in Uganda in livestock sciences, I believe.

*Q: Do you think these graduates were really able to be effective?*

HERRICK: The graduates with U.S. degrees, yes, though they were not paid very well in their posts at Edgerton. If you are asking about the new diplomats, I would say that most of them ended up in frustration, because they were posted to a district agricultural office where they had insufficient support to get out and to do the work of extension that they were supposed to do and had been trained to do. They didn't have a vehicle, or they didn't have fuel for the vehicle or they didn't have paper, or they didn't have a typewriter. They were also frustrated in the Kenya scene because Kenya is divided ethnically, and a new graduate is often sent to a rural district that is foreign to him ethnically, where he does not know the mother tongue and where he might not be accepted as readily as someone from that district. Those were discouraging situations for them. And, as I mentioned, there was practically no private sector employment. The few large farmers would hire family member, or perhaps a certificate-holder, whom they could mold to their liking, rather than an educated agriculturalist.

*Q: Did AID have role in the extension program?*

HERRICK: We had had a very heavy role in helping develop the extension service itself. In the past agricultural officers placed by the Office of International Cooperation in Development of USDA were in Kenya, working directly with farmers. We also had supported the Kenyan Ministries of Agriculture and of Livestock Development by allocating funds generated from food aid credits and direct financial aid. The funds were



used in the districts to build schools, to build farmer training centers. You could hardly move around Kenya without being shown some kind of a building that had been financed with local currency brought in through the earlier AID programs. In addition, several of the major world-wide agricultural research programs carried out by U.S. universities were active in Kenya, helping the research and extension services.

*Q: Was there one on pest control?*

HERRICK: Yes, we had a pest control project, but it was bilateral. We had a central project on small ruminants and we had...

*Q: This was CRSP? Cooperative Research Studies Program.*

HERRICK: Yes, or was it Cooperative Research Support Program, pronounced "CRISP". In any case, that was a major program of AID's central agricultural group, established in response to an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to call for support for the land-grant universities and historically Black colleges of the United States.. I was in Washington when the program was established, and I remember my surprise to discover that "cooperative" referred to cooperation between AID and the U.S. institutions, not to cooperation between AID and cooperating governments overseas.

*Q: That's right.*

HERRICK: Those programs operated in certain districts in Kenya, in Western Kenya a program to develop a multi-purpose goat and in the Central Highlands one to improve nutrition. The programs raised some issues that I think were common to other overseas AID programs. The Nutrition CRSP was doing some interesting work. They started by analyzing the nutrition level of the people at the local level and then began an education program to show the people how they could use their local resources to provide more nutritious meals for their families. Because it was a research program requiring recurring visits to homes in the district, the CRSP called for a large number of research assistants. I think the research protocol was well designed, and would bring interesting results, BUT... The program was not designed to continue until the research results had been effectively adopted by the local people. And, in addition, the program had provided income to the local community--by paying the research assistants and by financing demonstrations of food preparation. When the researchers left, the income they had provided through their program would leave with them. The U.S. professors managing the program were aware of the issue; I don't whether they could resolve it. It happens too often, that we send U.S. experts to a place to stay for three to five years, and when they leave, the local community is not totally prepared to continue any development improvements they have introduced, and cannot replicate the increments to income that had been provided.

*Q: I recall one of the key issues in the CRSP was that it was strictly a research program--and therefore they had no institutional development responsibility and therefore they were just to carry out their research. That was a controversial feature.*

HERRICK: In Kenya, there was a well-established agricultural research organization which AID had assisted, through the East Africa Regional program in the old days, and the bilateral program later. For the small ruminant research program, the Kenyans insisted that it be part of their system, and I think that was important. The major issue that I recall was one revolving around the assignment of American personnel. In one instance, a Chief of Party who was a retired American professor did not put forth on the job as the scope of work intended. More generally, a number of the Americans sent out were graduate students whose role appeared more to be one of gathering material for a Master's thesis than one to help the Kenyan in research. We were concerned in the AID Mission, but the wonderful thing is that the Kenyans were also concerned, so, at their behest, we had some very serious discussions with the leadership of the CRSP. It was uncomfortable for them, and unhappy for them, and we had a number of self justifying communications from the home office of the lead institution in the United States, but in the end they were able to understand and to make a change.

*Q: What about pest control?*

HERRICK: We called our project a grain storage project. We worked In Western Kenya to develop ways in which farmers could diminish the damage from pests after the harvest was gathered. We were especially concerned about disease from the aflatoxin mold. I think our statistic was that about 20 percent of the maize in storage on the farm was subject to aflatoxin. It was a matter of health as well as one of income, because the farmers were losing a large part of their harvest. The project was intended to understand local practices and to design some changes in the grain storage that would reduce the damage from pests. The project was conducted in conjunction with Kenyans. There were workshops at local farmer training centers to present to the farmers the new way of building their storage, to show them how it would work and send them back to introduce the new practices. But it was going slowly. It was not happening very fast.

A change in something as traditional as the way the homestead is organized around grain storage is one that is not easily made. The local grain storage system originally was directed by the spiritual beliefs of the people and so changes in shapes of storage units had to do with changes in values. It was going to take a long time before it took effect. I have a feeling, I'm guessing, that in Western Kenya, where the agricultural land is pretty good and where the farmers can produce a decent amount (more than they need for their own consumption), that they have by now made some changes in their storage system and have better control over the pests. I doubt if you could go out with the drawing that was produced by that project and find an example of that very design, but I'm quite sure that the project started something.

*Q: It got people thinking and weighing alternatives?*

HERRICK: Yes, so that the local culture could take over and develop something in the end.

*Q: What about the population area? That was an area of importance I would think.*

HERRICK: That was an area of great importance to us and to some people in the Kenya Government. It was a difficult area. Kenya along with Burundi and Rwanda, statistically broke the bank for a known population increase rate. It was something like 3.7 percent per annum, which meant a doubling of the population in 17 years. The government had a family planning program but that program was the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and much of the leadership of the Ministry of Health was not truly committed to the program, nor were many of the individual health practitioners.

The cultural values in Kenya did not promote small families. One of the important aspects of the value system was the classic traditional need for a large family in a rural area to help work the farm. That does not mean that the labor is needed all year, but when labor is needed at harvest time the family can't afford to hire helpers. There is more than that--in Kenya, among most of the ethnic groups and certainly among the larger ones, it is very important to name one's oldest son for the father's father and one's second son for the mother's father, similarly with the daughters. Then you have to name a child for the father's oldest brother, and the mother's oldest sister and the father's oldest sister and the mother's oldest brother. By thus naming your children you will ensure that the souls of those important family members continue in the afterlife. Therefore the Kenyan couple has to have eight children before completing it's family obligations.

*Q: That's right. I never thought about that.*

HERRICK: That was very important, and the older women, the mothers, really watched over whether this was going to happen, whether the wife of their son was going to do the right thing and was going to have enough children. I recall a conversation with a very senior official in government, the Cabinet Secretary (there was a period of time when we were meeting with him every week on some policy issues). One time I congratulated him, because I had heard his wife had just had a baby (she was sharing a room with the wife of an American on our staff). He just shook his head and said, "Oh yes, and thank goodness it was a girl. I already have a family, with this wife I only had two children: we had two boys. We were perfectly content with our two boys but it was just murder when one of our mothers came to visit. Her mother and my mother, we didn't have a child to name after them. Finally my mother-in-law put on so much pressure we decided we would try again. We've named the girl after both of them." [laughter] Now this was a modern man, in the modern world, in a very high government position, with an educated wife who had an advanced degree. He said that until all of the old grandmothers were gone we were not going to be able to change the value system.

In effect, the story of family planning in Kenya today is a very good one. It is not so good that they have achieved zero population growth, but the World Factbook for 1995 published by the CIA estimates they have gotten down to less than two percent annual growth. That is remarkable, because as we all know, in a population with a large number

of young people, if each woman among those young people has only two children, the population as a whole is still going to grow.

The use of modern contraceptives in Kenya had increased remarkably. (I'm going to refer to some documents for the actual figures.) In 1977, only seven percent of Kenyan married women in their fertile years used any contraceptive method, and only five percent used a modern method. In the early 1980's the rate of modern contraceptive use was creeping up to six percent, but the total number of births to each woman averaged about eight. Some thought that rate might continue to go up, as the traditional practices encouraging the spacing of children were abandoned--such practices as sustained breast feeding and polygamy. These things are measured through a project AID has sponsored, the Demographic Health Survey. In 1989, five years after the project started, a remarkable 27.3 percent of women were using modern contraceptive methods, and the population growth rate had moved down to 3.4 percent. By 1992 the desired family size was smaller, and according to World Bank estimates the growth rate was down again, to 2.7 percent.

I believe one thing that helped to stimulate such a remarkable change in Kenya was a pioneer project that we developed. It was the first example in Africa of a private sector family planning program. It was designed to offer family planning services through the clinics organized by employers at the place of work, and also through some private clinics. The place where it really took off was the workplace. Six years after authorization of the project, its 50 employer-run sub-projects had reached a full 10 percent of Kenya's population. Project services accounted for 14 percent of the total contraceptive usage rate of 27 percent measured in 1989.

That Family Planning Private Sector project has been duplicated in many other African countries, and around the world. In fact, when I got to Zimbabwe, AID's central Office of Population was helping develop such a program through a central project, the Enterprise project. I found that the Zimbabweans were inviting my friends (Kenyan women) to come down. They came down three times while I was there, to help the Zimbabweans organize their private sector family planning program.

*Q: Why did you take this track in Kenya?*

HERRICK: Partly because the family planning through the health system was not working. The nurses were not being given sufficient training and they were not convinced that they should be talking to parents about their family size, even for health reasons. We found that the private sector employers were interested. We interested them first through a financial analysis that responded to their basic humanitarian instincts. Then we had to deal with their reluctance to do something the government would disapprove.

The tradition is that a large employer provides housing and provides health services for employees. The health services had always included services for all employees and for the families of employees. None were providing family planning counseling. The arithmetic showed that if they had female employees and had less need to give long maternity leave,

they would save money. But if they had only male employees and they were providing services to the family as a whole, they would still save on health services for the women if they offered family planning counseling. And the health of the children would be better. So we started negotiating with government about a project that would train the staff of the employers' clinics in family planning counseling and in contraceptive services. Basically we required the employer to provide a space that allowed privacy for counseling.

We were also going to provide some assistance and the contraceptives to a few private clinics we found in the country. There weren't very many private health clinics that could really make a go in the country. Some missionary health delivery points which had not been doing very much were now ready to do more in family planning. The government was very resistant to this project. I recall one conversation with the top civil servant in the Ministry of Health who said to me, "Mrs. Herrick, those women aren't going to want this family planning counseling. They're not going to come and talk to that nurse until they have had so many babies that they hurt." He simply did not understand. We were able to put the program through finally with the help of a Family Planning Council established under the nominal leadership of the Vice President of the country, Mwai Kibaki, and the actual leadership of Philip Mbithi, then Vice Chancellor at the University of Nairobi, a sociologist with excellent political connections. The Council included representatives from the university, from government, from the major church groups, with one or two from the private sector. In the end however, it turned out that the Council had to back off from its promotion of our project.

On the final day, when I got a signature from the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Health, I went to the meeting by myself. We signed. We had agreed with the Ministry of Health on the training, which would have their supervision, and on other specific aspects of the project, but we had not really won the larger general support that we were seeking. The Permanent Secretary said, "Well Madame Director, I hope you succeed in this project, but I think you will fail." [laughter] I went back to the AID Mission, and the word began to go out. It turned out that the whole group of our supporters, from the head of the largest women's organization to Philip Mbithi, had given up on the project. They flocked to the office to congratulate us, and we had a big hug and a tea party. They were surprised that we had gotten it through.

That project took off with a bang. A separate office was established by the implementing contractor, and that office has now become a Kenyan entity registered to do business as a registered non-government organization. The statistics are showing the changes, and last November the project won an award from the Association of Professional Anthropologists here in Washington DC

*Q: This project was to do what?*

HERRICK: It was to provide family planning services through private organizations. Some individual health clinics and church missions were assisted, but the main effort was at places of employment.

*Q: So the non government organization was servicing the private businesses?*

HERRICK: Yes, the organization, which began as a separate arm of an American firm, John Snow Incorporated, implemented the project. I should say that we spoke earlier of the importance of analysis in the design of AID programs, and in this project the social analysis was very important in identifying what would or would not be appropriate and in estimating the response of the women of Kenya. Ned Greeley of our staff, who developed the project, was an anthropologist who had done his graduate work in Kenya and had stayed there teaching for some years after that. He knew from his research that the women of child-bearing age in Kenyan households of Kenya were ready to see some change. Of course, if AID is to do something in the private sector, it must be assured that there is demand for the service to be offered. So, another terribly important part of our analysis covered the question of demand on the part of the employers and on the part of the women. Obviously, we concluded the demand was sufficient, and the project has proved us to have been right.

I might use the family planning situation to talk about something else which is a general issue in AID, and that is donor coordination. We always think it is important for donors to coordinate what they are doing, not to stumble over each other, not to do things that are similar but somewhat in conflict in the same rural area, to get together to agree on issues to discuss with government. It's very hard to make donor coordination work beyond the abstract, however. We tried very hard in Kenya, and we Americans were usually the leaders in getting the donors together on a regular basis, even though the World Bank considered that the responsibility was theirs--in Zimbabwe, the UNDP insisted on controlling the coordination, and was not at all effective.

It's always a threat to government when they hear that the donors are getting together: "Oh dear, they're going to gang up on us." We established two forums, one in which we invited government to join us, and one which our own informal luncheon get-together. What we did was to kind of remind each other, maybe once a month, "Don't you want to have a lunch and have some of us over?" So the donors would get together and discuss some issues that we shared in common or simply tell each other what we were up to, what was happening at our respective headquarters and our legislatures. Then we also made sure that we participated with government on more formal occasions.

*Q: But the government was not enthusiastic about this?*

HERRICK: The government thought that it was important to coordinate the donors, but their way to coordinate the donors was to give us each a district to work in, as they had done with livestock, with integrated rural development and with arid and semi-arid lands projects--ours was in Machakos and Kitui Districts, south of Nairobi. I think their worry that we would gang up on them and ask them to do things that they weren't ready to do was stronger than their confidence that they could influence a combination of our resources positively. They had been through some very searching and uncomfortable

reviews of the World Bank's integrated rural development project, and were wary of multilateral approaches.

*Q: This was the donor coordination in general or just on the population program?*

HERRICK: This was in general. I started by saying that I would use the population program as an example. There came the time in Kenya when the World Bank was going to renew a major, large health and family planning project. They wanted to develop a multi-donor project through which they would offer some basic financing as other donors put up funds for specific aspects of the program; the Bank would be the financing organization of "last resort" if there were some gaps. We were included in the total reckoning through our public sector family planning project. The Danes were involved, the Swedish, the Norwegians, the British in a very small way as I remember, and perhaps others. The bilateral donors had some issues with government. We wanted to see a greater effort to get contraceptive supplies out to people who wanted them, and we wanted changes in the rules affecting eligibility for family planning services. No woman was eligible for family planning counseling until she was at least 34 years old and had already had four children. Initially the World Bank mission from Washington was not going to insist on any changes, but we donors gained the support of the Bank's Regional Representative and were ultimately able to persuade the visiting mission.

*Q: Was this mainly on the age issue, or a whole set of issues?*

HERRICK: On a number of issues affecting the way the government would handle the delivery of family planning services. The most important changes were in the area of training for the staff of local clinics--the medical assistants as well as the nurses--and other steps that could institute a real dedication to the program in the way it was intended.

*Q: Was there any opposition for the Kenyan medical society?*

HERRICK: There's no such thing as a medical society. Almost every doctor, unless he worked at a Mission, was a public employee. But there was the classic opposition of the professionals to giving responsibility to nurses or to medical assistants. In any case, this was an example of effective communication among donors. The Swedes and the Danes were smaller in financial terms in their assistance to the sector than we were, but when they had a concern they would call me and ask me if I would please get in touch with the Regional Representative at the World Bank to ask for a meeting on the issue. That always worked very well; we were able to have a meeting and discuss the issues.

At this time the AID Administrator, who was keen on donor coordination, had begun a series of annual consultations with the Japanese. In the field, the effect of those consultations was minimal. After all the chiefs had met and had learned once more about each others' various spigots of aid, and how the commercial business works, the local person at the Japanese Embassy would call on the AID Director, but communication usually was not very effective. We knew of several aspects of the Japanese program that

we hoped might be a little different. They were increasing their program to Africa and wanted to commit \$50 million a year but did not have much in the way of overseas aid staff to develop a program. We were, at the time, much concerned about grain storage policy--about the monopoly control by government, the ownership of storage facilities by certain people in government. We thought there should be a much greater role for private sector in the handling of grain. The major donors to Kenya were all working on this issue--the World Bank, the Germans, the British and the Americans. Then the Japanese made a commitment to build some new public sector grain storage facilities, to our disappointment.

*Q: Anything more on the population program? Was it a big program dollar wise?*

HERRICK: I don't know what's big anymore.

*Q: Several million dollars a year?*

HERRICK: Oh yes. In that sense it was big--\$8.4 million in the first six years of the private sector project, plus perhaps \$2 to \$4 million for the public sector..

*Q: We were providing most of the contraceptives?*

HERRICK: We were providing most of the contraceptives. Which brings us to another issue which I'll talk about when we get to Zimbabwe.

*Q: Okay. Were you also involved in health at the same time?*

HERRICK: We were involved in rural health delivery in several ways. It was really very interesting because we were investigating ways to deliver basic health education and basic health services at the local area at low cost. I don't think we ever found the way to do it at truly low recurrent cost for a government. But we were supporting programs that were taking varying approaches in the local communities of Kitui District. One was through the African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF), which is known under one of hats as "the flying doctors", another was through the Ministry of Health, and a third through another non-government organization.

We were learning that in order to establish a local delivery program of that sort you have to spend a lot of time getting to know the community. AMREF was working in other districts as well. In one they found they could use young people, but in another district the health assistants had to be mature people or they weren't acceptable to the community. So, you had to know what was acceptable. The local health assistants in the AMREF program were very careful to ensure that the health assistants were selected by community members. The Ministry of Health program did that somewhat, but they were more apt to appoint somebody who was already known, maybe to a local health worker in the area.



The local health assistants were supposed to be remunerated, as they were spending time away from their own household or farm work, and they had to ride a bicycle or walk to the other communities they were serving. The local community was, in principal, supposed to support them. But, in effect, the local community never supported them sufficiently, and that's the dilemma for a public health delivery system. Because even at a low rate of remuneration for the local assistants, there is a continuing recurrent cost for the government, and a need to train the local assistants and provide regular refresher courses. But I think our various experiments were indicating that delivery by local assistants was acceptable to the community and that was important. Because if your interest is in primary health care, in preventive health care and in health education, that's the best way to get it out.

*Q: Of course you said earlier that this was a time when there was a major political interest in Kenya and it resulted in increased aid.*

HERRICK: Yes, and then we had money!

*Q: What did this lead to?*

HERRICK: What did we want to do with money? It was about \$6 million the first year and then \$10 million per year subsequently, on top of a \$5 to \$6 million dollar technical assistance program. Well, we didn't just want to drop the money on the government, we were very serious about agricultural policy. We chose to concentrate on two major areas of the agriculture sector. One was grain storage and grain marketing issues, and the second was the provision of fertilizer. On the grain marketing issue, it was curious to me at the time, and it's still puzzling in retrospect, how extremely rigid the government was in its determination to maintain absolute control of the buying and selling of grain. That kind of rigidity begins in Africa because a newly independent government continues the monopoly practices of the colonial power, which was controlling production for its own economic purposes. It continues, in many instances, because somebody is making some money off it.

Grain marketing was so centralized in Kenya that no person was able, by law, to transport more than one bag of maize across a district line, and there were 42 districts in the country. So you couldn't even take one pickup truck load to your aging grandmother who lived in the next district. They enforced the regulation strictly through road blocks and an informant system. The system to establish the annual prices of grains was ancient; its results ran counter to market wisdom. We know it's not easy to estimate the size of next year's harvest, or predict the weather, but here we observed a system totally lacking in flexibility. A group of private farmers who were invited to advise the government on the price to be paid to farmers for their grain had historically been much better forecasters than the government, but their views did not prevail. We took various approaches to government and one year after another we managed to negotiate a small change in the way things were being done. Each step was very small, and each was taken reluctantly

and was not always implemented quite in the manner in which we had anticipated. So, we took the opportunity the next year to refine the step.

*Q: What kind of steps are you talking about?*

HERRICK: One step we thought was minor, but they did not, was to allow free distribution of grains across district lines in a small selected group of districts, just to see whether or not the consequences were as dire as government anticipated (and we did not, of course). We suggested certain parameters for establishing floors and ceilings on grain prices (hoping to move toward eventual removal of controls). We wanted them to reduce the proportion of production that a farmer was required to sell to the central grain marketing organization. These were all very small steps toward a larger goal.

The second issue to gain our attention was the handling of fertilizer. There was a nice connection, here, because the fertilizers required in Kenya were available from the United States. Thus, the program funds we were offering to provide could be used by the government to purchase from our manufacturers. The government was acting as the sole importer of fertilizer and was establishing the price of resale to the farmers. We thought that they should permit the private sector to bid on the right to bring in the fertilizer and sell it themselves to the farmers. We knew of more than one company, and one major agricultural cooperative, in the country that were capable of handling fertilizer imports and distribution, so we thought that market competition would be possible. There had been an unfortunate episode about ten years earlier involving corruption in fertilizer imports, and everybody in government was afraid the same kind of thing would happen again.

In the end we managed to obtain agreement on some private sector role, but the government insisted that the Ministry of Finance should process the bids from the private sector importers and would deal with the suppliers overseas. This put the Ministry of Finance into the position of being the technical manager, a ridiculously unnecessary burden for them. But that was, indeed, one first small step. There were others, affecting pricing, and the monopoly role of an agricultural cooperative in the distribution chain. That cooperative became very unhappy and mounted an intensive campaign against the changes and against USAID by name. In fact, they did lose some of their former role and the result was worse for them than we had anticipated, because, as it turned out, they had been dependent on certain government patronage, much more than we had realized.

Shortly after negotiating these policy changes, I left Kenya for an assignment in Washington. I recall three years later hearing the, then, Director in Kenya report how slow the process of policy reform can be, and how much time is required before real policy change is implemented. His example was the private sale of fertilizer. He was still working on it, and two years after that it was the same story. That was an effort that probably required eight years before the move was truly complete.

*Q: What about the marketing of grain? Did you hear anymore about that?*

HERRICK: I'm not sure how that finally worked out. I imagine it was a series of forward and backward steps, and that President Moi's cronies were able to hang onto their profit schemes.

*Q: It was the same sort of problem?*

HERRICK: Yes, the same sort of problem. Because there were very direct connections between power in government and profits from grain storage.

*Q: I think we need to continue a little bit about the program, and also your relations with the Kenyans and some important people.*

HERRICK: Another element in our program assistance, in our negotiation of conditions in conjunction with the annual financial transfer to Kenya, was our desire to see some basic macro-economic structural adjustment in Kenya. The IMF was a regular supporter of Kenya and the World Bank as well, with some ups and downs in the size of their support as they found that the Kenyans had or had not complied with the program agreements. The Kenyans were prepared to launch an austerity program and to try to restructure their budget in ways that, at least to their outside advisors, made economic sense. We wanted to support those moves. Our economic analysis certainly supported that of the multilateral agencies, and we had done a good deal to train economists and to help place economists in government who would be advising on fiscal and monetary policy and the general role of government in the economy. After several years the views of these people was beginning to percolate through government.

We included provisions in our ESF agreements each year that were consonant with the provisions that World Bank was putting into its agreements and with the aims of the IMF program in the country. In fact, the amount of our program aid each year was part of the IMF arithmetic when they estimated how much external support the Kenyans could expect for their reform program. An evaluation of the ESF program in AID completed a few years later indicated that that kind of provision didn't really add much force to the AID agreement. As I recall, the conclusion of the evaluation team was that there was too much detail in the agreement, that it was very hard to verify whether things had taken place as intended or not, and that in spite of our care to word things that were already part of government thinking and were understood by government it was difficult for the two sides to interpret whether the commitments under the agreement had been carried out or not. It was just too much to keep track of. We had thought that we were being very careful, but it's even more difficult then we had realized.

*Q: There were too many provisions?*

HERRICK: One of their comments was that there were too many provisions. One of the things we were trying to do was to identify, and to piggyback on, specific elements of the program that IMF and World Bank were recommending and that we thought were likely

to move forward. Perhaps we should have gone for larger, more general provisions. Yet, at the same time, we were under a prohibition laid upon AID by the Congress. We could not refer to World Bank conditions in our agreements. So, we were trying to refer to specific actions, that's how we got into having too many provisions.

*Q: We were under an injunction not to be carrying out the bank or IMF's provisions, because it was too heavy handed or something?*

HERRICK: We were under specific legislative injunction. I'm not sure of the origins of that injunction.

*Q: I think there were some countries that objected to those and perhaps were trying to divorce itself from those...*

HERRICK: Yes, they would have objected to the donors ganging up. There also may have been on our own Congressional side, some people who didn't think that World Bank and IMF were on the right track. Of course we only selected things to put into our provisions that our economists thought were a good idea and also that we thought were possible. There are things that a government may be ready to do in future years but is not going to be ready to do this year.

*Q: The Kenyans had already agreed to do or were committed to doing anyway?*

HERRICK: We did try to identify things that they were likely to do, in the belief that a push from us might bring about the action. Some World Bank conditions struck us as unrealistic. I'm thinking of certain budget allocation conditions. Donors always try to get the government to raise the percentage of budget allocated to health, for example. But, in my observation in Africa, a total budget may be increased, and the total funds for health, but the relative allocation to health never seems to go above 6 to 7 percent.

*Q: Was there a Consultative Group for Kenya at that time?*

HERRICK: There was.

*Q: Did you attend any Consultative Group meetings?*

HERRICK: Yes.

*Q: What was your sense of that experience or that practice?*

HERRICK: I think the Consultative Group was somewhat effective in pulling the donors together into almost one voice on some of the bigger policy issues. The Consultative Group meetings themselves, which are chaired by World Bank in very nice quarters in Paris, were sometimes a "shadow play" on the surface. The country representatives would make a speech that had been prepared at the last minute by their expatriate advisers, one

that was a mixed apology and brag about what they were doing. They would then make a plea for greater donor assistance and would very rarely, at the public meeting, make any commitment to change. If you just took the surface of the meeting you could go home quite discouraged. But at several of the meetings I attended, the "smoke filled" room sessions involving only the heads of delegation were quite effective. So the result any one Consultative Group meeting, and the pressure to prepare for the meeting (the pressure on the donors and the pressure on the recipient government as well) did bring some forward movement.

*Q: Did you get a sense of how the Kenyans reacted to the Consultative Group process?*

HERRICK: I think that the Kenyans thought the Consultative Group was a necessary process--that their external assistance would be less if they did not participate in that process. They didn't prepare easily for the meeting. They found it difficult to pull together the kind of presentation the donors were looking for, and they usually gave the task to their outside advisors, who were financed either by us or by the World Bank. They didn't do it themselves.

*Q: What were their problems with it? Was it technically difficult or did it open up too many issues?*

HERRICK: It required the precious staff time of competent officials, and opened up a number of difficult issues on which there might not be agreement within the government. I also think that internally, it was easier for those in the Ministry of Finance and Planning who agreed with the advice of the donors to say, "Our advisor's tell us that we should go to the meeting with this point of view." It was better to put the blame on somebody else, because of the internal relationships within government.

*Q: Do you have a sense that they felt these meetings were productive in the sense that their expectation of what the donors were going to respond with?*

HERRICK: In terms of quantitative results, I think they were satisfied.

*Q: Sometimes governments are resentful of them. They feel that they have to go through the ringers and then they don't get much from it. I guess in this case you found that it worked.*

HERRICK: I think that they were fearful that they would get less if they didn't go. So in that sense even if there wasn't a tremendous increase in aid, they needed to fulfill IMF expectations for their total budgetary resources, because they were already at the point where repayments to the IMF would have exceeded disbursements from the IMF if they didn't have new funds coming in. I imagine they had concluded that the meetings were necessary. I also think, quite frankly, they were getting plenty of external assistance. They were managing at their current levels.

*Q: At that time Kenya was a fairly favorite and popular country to provide assistance to. Why was that?*

HERRICK: That's right. I think Kenya was a good place for donors to live, let's face that one right away. Secondly, Kenya was a place where, after independence, there was a cadre of individuals with sufficient education to be able to benefit from the kinds of technical assistance that donors were bringing in. I think Kenya was a country, (up until the more obvious and systematic erosion of democratic processes), that outsiders were very proud of for having managed its independence. I think the donors were sympathetic to some of the problems the Kenyans faced, stemming from colonial times and the structures that had been established under the British. And the British, themselves, were loyally supportive of their former colony.

Kenya is a beautiful country, multi-ethnic, and very interesting for outsiders. Jomo Kenyatta, the father of the country and first President until he died in 1978, although he gave most privileges and give government responsibilities to people of his own group, the Kikuyu, did include some people from other ethnic groups of the country. Daniel Arap Moi, in his first two cabinets, had been very, very skillful in establishing an ethnic and geographic distribution. Then came his systematic exclusion of the Kikuyu, beginning with his moves to drum out of government the former right hand man of Kenyatta, Charles Njonjo. There were many interesting, and still effective, people to work with in the country.

*Q: It was quite private sector oriented, wasn't it?*

HERRICK: It was, in a way. The people of the country seemed to have an entrepreneurial spirit. Some private sector business had been built by foreign investors, British and American in the main. But the "Asians", the descendants of Indian and Pakistani imported workers and immigrants, who had not been permitted by the British to own land, played an important economic role. They had become the service providers. And in Kenya, in contrast to Tanzania and Uganda, they had not been deprived of their capital and their businesses after independence. I believe there were something like 700,000 Asians in a total population at that time of 10 to 11 million. African Kenyans and white British or Kenyan citizens (depending on whether they had changed their passport or not) and missionaries serving in the country were able to establish real working relationships and some very real and true mutual friendships. There was a tradition of people being able to work together in the country, that enabled assistance programs to be workable.

*Q: How did you find it working with the Kenyan Officials?*

HERRICK: I found great satisfaction in working with Kenyans as individuals in government and in getting know some Kenyans privately. Some of them I still keep in contact with. It was possible to get to know Kenyans, to a degree. That was generally not the case in Zimbabwe, where I was posted in the late 1980's.

*Q: Were there many social relationships or exchange?*

HERRICK: There was some social exchange, but more often among Europeans (whites) than with Africans. We Europeans lived in very nice houses and were accustomed to entertaining at dinner, whereas the Africans lived in modest places and were not accustomed to entertaining in our manner. Sometimes one would be invited out to the home area, or to participate in a full two days-worth of a local wedding, or something like that. That was always a great help in learning to understand where people were coming from, where their ideas were coming from. We also had some well educated and very productive Kenyans on our staff with whom we met socially.

*Q: Did you meet the President?*

HERRICK: Oh yes, I met the President in his very formal manner. Relationships with President Moi were totally within his control, as he waved his mace and called on his cronies to do his bidding. One time I was present when he reprimanded our Ambassador for something or another, I don't remember what it was for, but it was not very pleasant. As time went on the President's group of friends and advisors, his "bag men", became very powerful and were very unpleasant to deal with. They progressively took over, on his behalf, the profitable enterprises of the private sector of Kenya. Any large thriving business found itself in one way or another bought out by a nameless firm and put into the portfolio of the President, and found its top management changed. Places that were resistant to that kind of thing found that the rules had changed. One well known example was the casino in Nairobi, the only one licensed in the country at the time. The rules were changed to require the use of foreign exchange in the casino; the casino's income went down; it was "sold" at a loss; and then local currency was permitted once more. It became more and more difficult for companies with some foreign ownership, for instance with American ownership, to keep expatriate staff in the country, to repatriate their profits, and to keep their originally negotiated share of the capital.

*Q: Were we involved apart from your family planning example, in promoting private sector development at that time?*

HERRICK: Not private sector projects, *per se*, but our efforts toward policy change in the agriculture sector were designed to promote the private sector. In every new project, I insisted that there should be private sector elements: trainees were not all to become government employees; private clinics were to be included in health projects, and so on and so forth. We also created a project to support the small business efforts of non-government agencies. There were some small projects of AID's central bureaus, designed to promote small enterprise, but these usually did not work very well. The least successful were those that created enterprise funds that went through a government agency. These became de-capitalized because the loans weren't called back in.

One of the most successful things that happened in small enterprise in the country came through an alternative energy project of the AID Mission. The project conducted a study

of the construction of the small stoves used by people in their cooking huts in rural areas, stoves from Kenya and elsewhere, provided a demonstration at the big UN conference on energy in Nairobi in 1982. The winning design was one developed by a Kenyan, Mr. Kinyanjui, and that design, of what they called an "improved" *jiko* (stove) was promoted by the project. The *jiko* is of simple construction in a kind of hour glass shape, made of metal and clay. It can be made in a garage or shed with simple tools and can be sold by a vendor at his little house or workshop in any rural or urban area. The stove was designed to save fuel, to heat water most economically, to be less dangerous to the babies who fell on it, and to be less work for the housewife. It was definitely a low technology, low cost item that has taken off. It was featured in an article on cook stoves for the developing world in *Scientific American* in July 1995.

*Q: Was that one of our projects?*

HERRICK: Mr. Kinyanjui deserves the credit for inventiveness and persistence, but our alternative energy project was able to help spread the word and the technology. The basic intent of the energy project had not been to promote small business. When I was in Ethiopia last April, I saw the improved *jiko* all around the country and little models of it for sale to the tourists in shops. It was that very East African improved *jiko*.

*Q: Did it use wood?*

HERRICK: Yes, wood, but it could be charcoal.

*Q: Anything more on Kenya that you want to bring up?*

HERRICK: No, I don't think so.

*Q: What year was it that you finished in Kenya?*

**Assignment as Deputy Assistant Administrator  
in the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination - 1984-1986**

HERRICK: That was the summer of 1984. After one year as Deputy Director and four years as Director in Kenya it was time for a change. There was a possibility that I would go back as Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Africa Bureau, but I ended up as Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC). I was Deputy to a political appointee, who had come in relatively recently, having been very active as the lawyer for the Republican platform committee at the Convention. He was from the so-called Howard Phillips wing of the Republican Party, very conservative. In fact, I understand now that Howard Phillips has even broken off from the Republican Party because it wasn't conservative enough for him.

This new Assistant Administrator, Richard Durham, was learning his way around AID, but brought some very strong views about what he saw as his role as a Reagan appointee,



to ensure that the Republican platform policies were carried out. He was very much concerned (as is often the case when new people come into AID) about what the views of bureaucracy were going to be and whether people were going to try to frustrate the policies of the new administration. He told stories frequently about what he called the "good" AID employees, the ones who were sufficiently flexible and the "difficult" AID employees who were, in his view, determined to carry on as before. In the end I think he found that his staff was highly skilled and well able to carry out the analyses and prepare the policy positions he was expecting, although there had to be a good deal of back-and-forth before some of the papers could be accepted by the operating bureaus of the Agency. Privately, there certainly were differences of view.

Some of the most controversial were in the area of family planning. This was 1986, the year of the second U.N. mega-conference on population that was to take place in Mexico City. The AID Administrator, Peter McPherson, was negotiating within the U.S. Government, particularly at the White House, on the wording of the United States position, which, as first drafted, was extremely negative in its view of family planning programs, not only on abortion, but on other aspects of a program. McPherson drew on his contacts with James Baker, with whom he had worked in the Ford Administration, and others at the White House, to soften the U.S. stand at the population conference. Many people were unaware of how much he had accomplished, because they didn't know how stringent the position was before it was softened.

Subsequent to that, the Administration had to make a decision whether it was going to continue to support family planning programs that included advice on abortion as a method of family planning. The decision was relatively simple in regard to support for the IPPF, the International Planned Parenthood Federation, because that world-wide organization supported programs that actually offered abortion services. The decision was far more difficult in regard to the United Nations Family Planning Association because the UNFPA had a program in China, where the policy of one child per family is enforced in many ways. One of those ways is to apply strong social pressure, if not physical pressure, for abortion should a woman become pregnant for a second time. Although the China program of UNFPA did not advise on abortion or offer abortion services, but only offered help in organizing training of midwives and other matters related to the health side of the family planning picture, the final U.S. decision was that we would no longer contribute to UNFPA programs at all. That decision was subject of much debate both within and outside of AID.

*Q: Were there other views of Mr. Durham or an agenda that he was trying to follow?*

HERRICK: He was very strongly committed to McPherson's policy to direct our programs more toward the private sector, and to introducing market principles. He held certain conservative views on reduction of government, reduction of income tax, and so forth and so on. We had a big push, in those days, to review and revise the policy directives of the Agency. I recall one time, actually during my first week, he told me he was very proud that he personally had rescinded the AID policy on land reform. What

happened was, he had looked at the policy and had read that productive resources in Africa are often collectively owned. So, considering that he "did not come to AID on behalf of the Reagan Administration to support collectives", he decided we needed a totally new policy. That was very upsetting to some of the staff who had hoped he would gain some understanding of the African situation.

*Q: Was collectives the right word?*

HERRICK: That was the word that he used, having read that ownership of productive resources in Africa is sometimes held on a collective basis. He read the words in cold war terms and took it very seriously. In another area of contention, PPC did not succeed in completely a new policy on cooperatives during the two years I was there. The staff worked very hard to develop something that was acceptable and Durham produced his own draft at one point, but that one attracted a very strong negative reaction from the U.S. cooperative organizations working in international development.

In the meantime, AID's evaluation function which had been given a big boost under the leadership of Douglas Bennet, continued to move forward. I think that was very helpful and was educational for a number of the new people who came in. Perhaps not as much as might have been hoped in an ideal way, but it certainly gave them a much better basis for understanding what AID was up to. This was a period during which, for the first time to my knowledge, not one Assistant Administrator position (seven positions at the level just below the Administrator of AID) was held by a career officer. There had been a mix in past years, when career employees took their turn heading the regional bureaus and usually headed PPC.

*Q: Also served as Deputy Administrator.*

HERRICK: Right, and this time there was a political appointee as Deputy Administrator. Eventually, Peter McPherson established the position of Counselor to the Administrator, which was designed to be the highest position for a foreign service career officer. The position of Counselor was held by several individuals, each of whom played the role somewhat differently because it was never formally defined. An individual with a strong, mutually respectful relationship with Peter McPherson was more effective than someone who wasn't able to develop the same the kind of relationship. With subsequent Administrators the story was mixed.

*Q: Where there any other tasks that you were responsible for as Deputy for PPC? I think there was some big issue about procurement that I recall.*

HERRICK: There was a strong push for adherence to the established Federal rules for competitive procurement, starting at OMB and implemented by the Agency, with some oversight by Congressional committees. And a further push to enforce the preference for procurement from American firms. This caused the regional bureaus to refine their justifications for procurement from the local level, from the recipient country itself and

from other developing countries, when such procurement was more practical and less costly. I think the Africa Bureau did well in drafting blanket waivers on behalf of its overseas missions, one for instance to permit purchase of foreign vehicles for countries that drive on the left (because the United States does not manufacture right-hand drive cars). Ironically, some of the outsiders brought into PPC to organize policy studies and help draft new policy found it most difficult to comply with the rules requiring multiple competitive bids. There was a special procurement issue related to Israel, which was anxious to expand its development assistance--I think as a means of expanding its presence in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and, particularly, Latin America. Israel, defined as a "developing country" as a recipient of our assistance, sought eligibility to bid on U.S.-financed projects. One sidelight here: I recall meeting with Durham and some high level visitors from Israel on one of my first days back in PPC. The two delegates from Israel knew my name and knew that I had recently come in from Kenya. As I walked them to the elevator they commented about my last meeting with the Israeli delegate to the United Nations Environment Program in Nairobi (he was their only official representative in the country, as they did not have diplomatic relations with Kenya). I must have shown some reaction; the Chief Delegate looked at me and said, "You shouldn't be surprised that I know all of this should you? After all, I'm an Israeli."

The question they had raised had to do with procurement of engineering services. The American engineering community was strongly opposed to competition from the Israeli engineers. At the same time, the United States Government really wanted to help Israel and knew that Israel had highly developed capacities to help other countries, particularly in arid lands agriculture and water research as well as other fields. Eventually the issue came to a head in relation to a particular firm. We developed a series of questions for AID lawyers to pursue in Israeli. It turned out that the firm was not eligible because it had been established by the Israeli government, and although its annual operations were profitable, it had never repaid its original subsidy.

*Q: Give us a little bit of feel for McPherson as Administrator. What kind of person was he? What kind of policy was he pursuing given that he was in the Reagan era? What was he trying to do?*

HERRICK: McPherson, I think, was an excellent Administrator for AID. A paper of his, published if I remember in *Foreign Affairs*, began circulating when we heard rumors that he would be appointed as AID Administrator. He maintained the views expressed in that paper throughout his administration; his interest in technology transfer, in institutional development, in the importance of policy change, in promotion of the private sector--those were the "four pillars" of his policy--and in training. He was personally deeply committed to the mission of economic assistance overseas. He worked on AID matters day and night. If he woke up in the night with an idea, he stayed awake and brought it to the office early, always early in the morning.

I recall when he first came in, some of the traditional leaders in AID were a little frustrated when their first meetings with the new Administrator were postponed, because

they had all planned to excite him about what they were doing, in Latin America or in humanitarian assistance, or whatever. But in fact, what McPherson did was to give his first priority to shoring up relations outside the agency, and this was an excellent move. I've mentioned his relations with the White House as being very good on the personal working level. He invited members of Congressional and Senate staff to come to the agency to meet with him in very open sessions. He was very sharp in understanding policy and where the "give" was and where he needed to tread lightly. He carried forward the mission of the agency in a very sincere and dedicated manner. He met daily with his Congressional relations and public relations staffs to identify issues that were coming up and decide where it would be good to try to influence views.

McPherson was committed to what he referred to as technology transfer, to helping developing countries achieve the skills and acquire the technology that donors like the United States were able to offer. Much of that kind of work fell into the traditional technical assistance mode of AID. The emphasis, especially considering some of the results of evaluations of the past several years, was more on the successful transfer itself rather than on the mere sending of United States expertise overseas for a period of time that was, perhaps not long enough for a successful transfer of the technology. One of the things McPherson did was to ease the long-standing policy that a project should not last for more than five years. He understood that technical transfer can take longer than that, and that policy change can take a long time, that the building of institutions, which was another one of his themes, takes time. So he opened things up. From that time forward, it was possible to plan projects for a longer period, and to commit financing at first for five years on the assumption was that there would be another five years or more to complete the process. He was able to talk to the Congressional leadership and to allay some of the concerns about the so-called pipeline of unexpended funds that I referred to earlier. He was steadily supportive of commitments that would continue long enough to complete the job.

At the same time, McPherson emphasized the need to follow the strategic planning approach which we had recently developed. He wanted us to make informed choices about what we could do best in a country and stay with those choices for a period of time. He was ardent about the need to develop the private sector in the countries with whom we were cooperating. This I think was a particular part of a Republican platform, but it was something that he also believed personally and a policy that I believe was very timely for AID. We had been an agency working on transfers in government-to-government programs and we had not stretched our imaginations very much to think about how we could help the private sector.

The private sector thrust has to be accompanied by attention to country policies. McPherson was constant in his insistence that we seek to reform country policies, especially those policies that maintained strong government control of the economy and limited the free operation and growth of the private sector. The Congress was also interested in private sector development. In its continuing interest in the lives of the poor majority of a recipient country, the Democratic-controlled Congress enacted provisions to

promote the private sector at the lowest level. These were the years of "small is beautiful". This was the time when the Congress legislated called on AID to development small enterprise and even, what was never really properly defined, micro-enterprise. I think the programs directed to policy change, in the long run, are going to have had a greater effect on private sector development, than the particular technical assistance or financing projects.

*Q: This was the time when they created the Private Sector Bureau or the Private Enterprise Bureau wasn't it?*

HERRICK: They did create a bureau, the Private Enterprise Bureau.

*Q: Its function was to provide direct loans and equity participation and enterprise wasn't it?*

HERRICK: Their mission was to develop the means to do that. It was not easy to do, considering AID's legislation but, with the help of their lawyers, the Bureau did devise some mechanisms for U.S. participation in investment, through debentures or whatever. Their work enabled us in Kenya to participate in an interesting tannery project sponsored by an Agha Khan investment group and financed by IFC and others.

In that era the Trade and Development Program (TDP) gained more support and became more visible, and eventually was separated from AID. That program is one through which the United States can finance feasibility studies for major projects that foreign countries are proposing to undertake. When there is a sufficient assumption that the U.S. private sector has a good chance at getting the contract for construction of the project, TDP will finance the feasibility studies and, if a feasibility study is sufficiently positive, the subsequent engineering studies. The program went much better in Asia than in the other parts of the world, perhaps also quite well in Latin America. In Africa it was much slower, because the countries weren't developing feasible projects at the same rate, because their economies were not as developed. One of the areas in which the United States was interested in competing in Africa was telecommunications, which was being financed mainly by the Japanese and the French. Even though we saw an opportunity to develop our competitive edge, we did not have any early success in identifying projects for which United States contractors might win the bids in the end.

*Q: McPherson was also of course, I gather during this time, interested in health programs of some sort or initiatives of that kind?*

HERRICK: Very strongly involved in health programs, in immunization and other actions that would improve the lives of children in the developing world. McPherson worked very closely with Jim Grant, who was leading UNICEF at the time, to promote a program to achieve universal immunization of children in a few years time. Certain parts of the program and the drumming up of interest and commitment in the particular countries became the particular role of UNESCO. AID implemented individual projects, among

them a multi-country immunization project in Africa. Programs to combat diarrheal diseases through very simple rehydration techniques became the most visible program for AID. In fact, we used to be amused sometimes because if McPherson was scheduled to make a policy speech on any particular issue, he almost invariably finished his comments with reference to immunization and diarrheal diseases and the significance of this kind of program--the phenomenal results in terms of child health.

The Congress legislated special attention to what they termed "child survival". Typically, PPC was charged with developing, in conjunction with the central technical bureau of AID--called the Science and Technology Bureau at the time--, ways of tracking how well we were doing in committing ourselves to child survival programs. We defined results in terms of lives saved, among children at one year of age and children under five years of age.

*Q: Why do you think there was such a great interest in this program during an Administration which didn't seem to portray itself as being particularly concerned with poverty and poor but more concerned with private sector and business and so on?*

HERRICK: The Democratic-controlled Congress had a big role in this because of its interest in the well-being of the poor majority of people, but there was also a very strong commitment on the part of Peter McPherson himself. In that context, I recall that when there was a controversy about whether the United States should give food aid to Angola, whose first independent government was much too far to the left for us, McPherson was able to establish the policy that "a hungry child has no politics". That decision had to go to the White House for resolution of conflicting views. I don't think it was possible for the Republican Administration to oppose a humanitarian response to children. It was a "heart strings" issue. Yet the policy aspects of AID's work were of serious interest to many in the Republican Administration who did not want our assistance to go to countries that continued to have a strong socialist orientation.

*Q: Were you required to testify often in this position?*

HERRICK: I was not required to testify but I did help prepare testimony for McPherson. I testified, I believe, on some private sector things a few times, and perhaps once on some arcane matter of definitions of tied aid within the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.

*Q: Anymore on your work with McPherson and in that period of time, in terms of interesting initiatives or issues?*

HERRICK: No, I think that about covers the major issues.

*Q: So when did you finish up in PPC?*

**Mission Director for USAID/Zimbabwe**

## **and the Southern Africa Regional Program - 1986-1990**

HERRICK: After two years in PPC, I was appointed as Mission Director for Zimbabwe, and for the Regional Program in Southern Africa.

*Q: What year would this have been?*

HERRICK: This was in June of 1986. Then there was a political event in Zimbabwe which caused some concern in Washington. At the annual celebration of our Independence Day in Harare, on the 4th of July, the United States reception was held in a hotel. The relationship between the United States Mission and the Zimbabwe Government had not been easy in recent times and there was very little communication. It had been very difficult for the Embassy to find somebody in the Foreign Ministry to talk to about how they were going to organize this particular reception. There finally were meetings, and it was agreed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs would come to the reception and that both he and the American Ambassador would make very short remarks. They knew that former President Carter, who was on a trip to Africa to promote the river blindness and agricultural programs of the Carter Center would be in Zimbabwe on the 4th of July. He would be invited to the reception but not to speak. This was all very much at the last minute.

As it turned out, the Foreign Minister did not come but sent a Junior Minister of Government, a younger man who was then Minister of Sports and Culture, to represent the Government and to present the Government speech. That speech went on and on, for a total of about 40 minutes, and it was rife with insults to the United States. At this time the Congress had not yet passed any anti-apartheid legislation, and the United States had not condemned apartheid in South Africa. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe was very upset with the United States and Margaret Thatcher and the British Government for not taking steps to isolate South Africa. The speech condemned the United States; it was pejorative and contained personal references--all-in-all a nasty speech.

President Carter walked out of the reception. The American Chargé d'Affaires and the British, French, German and other Western Ambassadors walked out with him. The young Minister of Government continued his speech to an almost empty room. After this event the Chargé d'Affaires, Gib Lanpher, spent several days awaiting an apology from the Zimbabwe Government, which of course did not come. The speech had been given deliberately. So, for a while, the United States decided to delay the appointment of a new Ambassador in Zimbabwe, to have a Chargé only. My departure for Zimbabwe was delayed for a few weeks.

For a few years the program for Zimbabwe was continued only to spend out the "pipeline", with no new commitments except for funds brought in from a combination of 10 to 15 centrally-funded projects supporting family planning. Later the a program of new commitments was reinstated, but only at four, five, or six million dollars annually.

*Q: Compared to what?*

HERRICK: The United States had made much larger commitments to Zimbabwe in the past. This was an interesting story. The black majority people of Rhodesia had had a long war of independence against the regime of Ian Smith, who had proclaimed a unilateral declaration independence from Britain in 1965 and ran a country that was, in my view, well on the way to being worse than South Africa in terms of segregation and tension between the white colonial type rulers and the majority of the population. Independence came finally in 1980. Unlike many countries which have participated in consultative groups organized by the World Bank, Zimbabwe organized its own donor conference. The United States was there, and was the first donor country to make a commitment. We pledged \$75 million a year for five years, and did live up to that pledge.

The AID Mission in Zimbabwe, first under Chuck Grader who was there less than a year before going off to manage the bauxite mines in Guinea, and then under Roy Stacy whom I succeeded, established a program that was intended to be managed by a small staff. The country was sufficiently well developed economically; many things could be done by the Zimbabweans. But they had been isolated by the world under economic sanctions and they needed certain kinds of help: updated technology and financing to bring new machinery into the country. This was an excellent place to demonstrate the kind of sector program that Peter McPherson had been promoting around the world.

I will use the agriculture program as an example. The total commitment in the agriculture program was, I think, \$75 million. Fifteen million dollars were intended for a technical transfer program to develop the Agriculture Department of the University of Zimbabwe into a viable degree-granting Faculty and to develop a graduate program. This program was carried out by two U.S. universities: Louisiana State University and Michigan State University. Professors came from the United States to teach at the University of Zimbabwe while Zimbabweans received training in the United States. There were some funds in the \$15 million to finance development of laboratories. The veterinary faculty was also assisted with equipment that had to be purchased abroad.

The other \$60 million was made available through the Zimbabwe Government to the private sector of Zimbabwe for purchase of American goods. The private firms, farmers and farmers' associations of Zimbabwe had to borrow money from their bankers and deposit the equivalent of the cost of the American machinery, in Zimbabwe dollars, into a special account held by the Zimbabwe Government. The American machinery included farm machinery and processing machinery. For grain storage silos all around the country, Danish aid provided machinery and the Government provided the local funds (generated through our import program) for the cement and for the construction. The local funds had been paid to the government by private sector importers of the U.S. goods we had financed. About 90 percent of the value of the import permits went to the private sector, but 10 percent was reserved for the Cotton Board, a quasi-governmental organization which had the monopoly right to purchase all cotton grown in the country. That exception to the private sector policy was justified because of the changes that were underway in the



cotton growing sector in Zimbabwe. Whereas about five percent of all cotton had been grown by small holders at the start of independence, four years later the small grower share of all cotton production was 65 percent. The cotton, very high in quality, is sold to loyal buyers in Asia. Thus, the United States could support the program in spite of legislation prohibiting support for agricultural products that will compete with our own production.

At the University of Zimbabwe, construction of a new building for the Faculty of Agriculture was carried out completely by Zimbabweans with monies raised from this program. The architects were Zimbabweans and the construction firms were Zimbabwean. This in contrast to Edgerton College in Kenya, where we provided a full time supervisor for procurement of goods and supervision of the construction.

Zimbabwe, in its isolation from the world under sanctions, had developed a manufacturing industry. When you went through the supermarket it was like going to a market in England in about the 1930's. There were all sorts of custard powders and tinned fruits and sweets. They had developed their agriculture to earn money from exports (mainly tobacco and cotton, and in some years also maize) and to provide the kind of foods that the European sector wanted to eat. The country had business skills in addition to its well developed agricultural skills. The commercial agriculture sector was dominated by white growers, who used labor intensive methods to produce high quality goods.

As the years went on, however, Zimbabwe was having difficulty competing in the world because its manufacturing industries had been protected. The clothing industry, for example, was manufacturing shirts for Zimbabweans but could not sell shirts in competition with other world producers. That kind of problem still faces Zimbabwe. The Government is still reluctant to release controls on prices, although some major steps have been taken with encouragement and finally financial assistance from the World Bank.

When I arrived in Zimbabwe in 1986, the World Bank, in its indicative country program, in its internal planning, was prepared to make \$120 million available to Zimbabwe almost immediately if the country was willing to make some policy changes about the way the economy was run. I left Zimbabwe in 1990, at that time the Government was preparing its final draft of an economic adjustment program--one which they insisted must be their program, not a program imposed by the World Bank. That program was not fully adopted until 1991 or 1992, but then some major changes were made. Although I saw an article in the *Economist* just last week indicating that the marketing of grains is not yet completely free, that some of the major agricultural boards like the Cotton Board are only now being commercialized to the extent that they are supposed to making a profit. The Cotton Board itself was ready to operate on a commercial basis back in 1988, but could not do so under the government's price control system. Full steps to privatization apparently have yet to be implemented. The President of the country basically does not agree with a market approach to the economy, although personally he is very strongly committed to helping

individuals. His early Jesuit education gave him a very powerful sense of the value of individual human beings.

*Q: This is Robert Mugabe?*

HERRICK: This is Robert Mugabe. He's a committed socialist, though he would understand market oriented economic principals, if he really tried. One time an advisor whom we had financed to help organize some tax reform, and later to prepare proposals for reducing controls on the parastatal bodies, told me of a series of informal seminars he had prepared for the President. He and the Chief Secretary in government were talking about a question that was vexing the President--why is it that no one seems to want to invest in Zimbabwe? There was a telephone call; the President wanted a briefing. There followed a series of briefings about economic principles and what kinds of change would promote a positive response on the part of the private sector, both internal and external. Mugabe didn't trust the private sector, partly because of his fundamentally strong socialist commitment, and partly because it consisted mostly of Whites, and he had had a long part in a war against a very repressive White regime. So the story continues.

*Q: Did you meet with Mugabe yourself?*

HERRICK: Yes, I met with Mugabe, accompanying the Ambassador a few times. There were also times on public occasions when I was the acting Ambassador, when he came down the reception line. On occasions like that he was a person totally withdrawn. Zimbabwe is still one of those countries that requires the diplomatic community to be present when a Head of State comes in and out of the airport. So you stand in line, and he comes along with his Chief of Protocol and his eyes completely glazed over. On occasions when I really saw him talking, he seemed to be a very shy person. He seemed to have very few cronies, or none. He didn't have a kitchen cabinet, he didn't sit down and drink beer at the end of the day and talk about what was going on in the country. People found it difficult to tell him what was going on. In 1990, a new American Ambassador, an African American, was able to make personal contact with him. Both of their fathers had worked as carpenters, they had both gone to Jesuit schools and there were other things like that. He could open up, but he needed something to help him open up. He's a withdrawn person. He isn't a scary person like Daniel Arap Moi, who is tall and impressive and uses his mien to intimidate people.

*Q: What were you as Mission Director trying to accomplish during that time, given that there was a cut in aid but you had a fairly large pipeline of resources?*

HERRICK: We did, we had a very large program to continue implementing. The \$90 million education sector program continued until about 1990, and the agriculture sector program was about completed in 1989. We had an interesting time with the family planning program because it was supported by a number of world-wide programs that were operating in several countries, including Zimbabwe. We did bring in several millions of dollars a year in technical assistance in family planning programs. I've spoken

of the private enterprise family planning program. There were programs to train midwives, there was continued support for the family planning operation of the Ministry of Health which had been nationalized after independence. Zimbabwe, like Kenya, was already showing the statistical effects of education for females and the availability of family planning services. The numbers of women evincing a desire for a smaller family was growing, the number of women using modern contraceptive methods was increasing, and the population growth rate was beginning to go down.

In the last two years I was in Zimbabwe, the United States saw enough change in the Zimbabwe Government's ability to work with us to come to the conclusion that we could have a small AID Program of four to five million dollars a year of new money. Since the two major sector programs were coming to an end and since we were deeply concerned about the continuing controls on pricing and the monopoly controls in most sectors of the economy, we wanted to use our new funds for purposes of policy change. Therefore, we used the funds to bring in expertise that was acceptable to the Zimbabweans, including a professor who was still a Zimbabwean citizen but had been teaching at the University of Washington.

We also financed studies carried out totally by Zimbabweans who might be influential in the government. Some of these individuals had been abroad as long as 17 and 18 years during the struggle for independence. They had gone overseas, or to other countries in Africa to finish their secondary education, sponsored by missionaries or by an AID project administered by the African American Institute to educate Africans of countries that were not yet majority ruled. As sponsorship continued, many of the students managed to earn university degrees and were teaching in the United States and in Canada. They returned home after independence. There were tensions between those who had spent the years of war against Rhodesia in Zambia or Mozambique or carrying on the internal guerilla war and those whose families and churches had helped them get out of the country. Most of the appointees to the highest level in government were individuals with a guerilla war history. But there were others, at other levels, particularly in the Ministry of Finance and at the University who were influential. One of the places of influence was the golf course. Golf seems to be one of the first sports in which Africans participated on a desegregated basis--of course there is no body contact in golf.

*Q: What were the results of these initiatives on the policy and reform?*

HERRICK: We were beginning to see some slow results. The country did establish its own Economic Structural Adjustment Program. Since 1990 (since my departure), they have devalued the currency several times and freed up the controls on the currency. They have reduced the government deficit. They have commercialized some operations and generally freed up grain marketing. There is one large remaining political question, and that is whether the government will take agricultural land from the commercial white farmers for purposes of resettlement. The history of resettlement after the independence war was not very positive. The lands were subdivided too far, so that the amount of land (especially if it was a semi arid area) was insufficient to support a family. The persons

who had been resettled on the land were not farmers, did not come from a good strong farming tradition. Furthermore, the government had not actually used all the funds made available by the British to settle people on all the acreage that it had acquired after the war. This whole subject is a continuing controversy, with the result that the commercial farmers are not investing in their operations.

*Q: Were we involved at all in the small farmer tribal trust lands issue in that aspect of development?*

HERRICK: Not with the formal resettlement program--that was the realm of the British. But we were involved in helping small farmers through the programs made possible by the government's acquisition of local currencies under our sector assistance program. For example, with a very small amount of foreign exchange we brought over an individual through the Volunteers in Cooperative Assistance, our agricultural Peace Corps, to help improve the operations of producer cooperatives whose members are small farmers. It was fabulously successful. The American individual who came over established excellent working contacts in the government of Zimbabwe and with the White commercial farmers, who committed themselves to teach local cooperative organizations how to manage wholesale purchases of fertilizer, and distribution systems, and accounting systems, and how to manage distribution of pesticides, even how to establish a small retail store that members of the cooperative could use. It was a remarkable program.

We also helped finance, with the Canadians, a training institute where the small farmers could be trained in growing cotton. For example, one of the things they have to do in Zimbabwe, is to control pests; that includes burning the entire cotton crop at the end of the production year, every year. We also supported the farmer training institutes, the ones that train people up to the certificate level or diploma level. The change in the role of the small farmer in agricultural production in the ten years following independence was tremendous. The United States program had a large amount to do with it, but not because we brought Americans over. Except for that one instance of a volunteer whose hotel and airfare were paid by the government from local currencies generated by our program.

*Q: Through the local currency program?*

HERRICK: Yes, through the local currency program.

*Q: We had a say in that program, I suppose.*

HERRICK: We did, as advisers, but we did not have formal sign-off privileges as AID Missions have had in some countries, under which the AID Mission literally signs off on every small project. The Zimbabweans had the capacity to implement their own programs. If we had ideas we would go to the people in the appropriate Ministry to offer our suggestions. I don't recall a good idea ever being turned down, or stone-walled.

*Q: So essentially we were supporting programs that they had developed?*

HERRICK: Yes, and that they were ready to develop themselves. Sometimes we could help finance their studies through local consulting firms or their own consultant from the University as to whether something would work or not. It was a very interesting experience, and remarkable. The country was so young as an independent country that it was not remarkable in economic terms in comparison with the "tigers" of Asia, or some countries of Latin America...but its history was entirely different.

*Q: They had a lot of talent?*

HERRICK: They did.

*Q: Compared to other African countries?*

HERRICK: Yes, but there remains a problem, in that many of the White citizens who remained in the country have been slow to recognize the amount of talent that the Africans have. They have, after all, a very strong history of prejudice to overcome. None of them had ever worked side by side with an African, as many White Kenyans had. The commercial farmers in general are the most liberal that way. The small shop keepers are the least liberal.

*Q: What about working with the Zimbabwean Government people? You obviously had good relations with many of them.*

HERRICK: Excellent relations with individuals. As in Kenya we had an excellent working relationships in the Ministry of Finance, with the second level in the Ministry, and at the top.

*Q: Who was that?*

HERRICK: The Minister was Bernard Chidzero. He had worked for the UN, as head of UNIDO at one time. He was one in government who had not been in the guerilla war. He was a fine economist and he had the respect of the President. He had to find the line between what he believed might be done economically and what he thought would be acceptable. Our observation was, however, that when he had found it, he did not pursue it very aggressively. He was not a highly political person and he had perhaps been stung on occasions when he tried to go farther than the political consensus would allow. Things had to move relatively slowly.

Zimbabwe was a place where the ethnic situation was very different from that of East Africa, which is subdivided into many linguistic groups. In Zimbabwe 80 percent of the people speak Shona, a Bantu language, and consider themselves one people, although different large clans appear to have varying degrees of political influence, and 20 percent of the people speak Ndebele, which is a Zulu language. The languages are not mutually intelligible. There were rivalries among the pre-independence groups that continued after independence. Joshua Nkomo was the leader of the Ndebele group and was kicked out of

government by Mugabe after a cache of arms was found on his farm, until about 1988, when Mugabe brought him back into government and engineered a union of his party, the Popular Front, with Mugabe's ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union). There had been some insecurity in the Western part of the country where the Ndebele lived, and that insecurity--occasional killings of tourists, murders of White farmers, burning of villages--was attributed through the years to South Africa. However, after Mugabe made his deal with Joshua Nkomo and brought him into government as the second of two Vice President's and offered amnesty to guerrillas who wanted to turn in their arms, the troubles stopped instantly.

Mugabe is absolutely dedicated to one-party rule, though under pressure he has permitted formation of alternate parties--and then has harassed them. It is very difficult for other parties to secure meeting rooms or gain permission for gatherings, and it does no good locally, in terms of small economic advantages and disadvantages, for an individual to be a member of an opposition party.

*Q: Do you have understanding of why he had this view? Or was it just personal power and control?*

HERRICK: I don't know. It's hard to guess about him. But I think it's only partly a question of personal power, for Mugabe. It is not totally the situation that Africans describe, saying, "We don't know what happens. We have this 'big man' thing that happens in our countries. After somebody has been head of government for awhile he wants to remain head of government forever and to be the single leader of the country."

I think with Mugabe, it started with a very strong conscientious view that he is responsible for the good of his people who had had a struggle and needed things done for them. He believes that he can do it and that the best way to do it is through a party that he can control. Because then he can control the way that people are helped out in the regions. Zimbabwe has very isolated areas, but it relatively good distribution systems. The road system is better than that of most African countries, and the independent government was organized to get relief to the disabled and the needy veterans of the struggle. (Furthermore, the first U.S. program grant, before the sector programs, was dedicated to rebuilding schools and clinics destroyed during the war and building new ones for villages that had never had them.)

The capabilities of Zimbabwe were demonstrated in their response to a major regional drought of 1991. I was involved in an evaluation of the United States response to that severe drought, a relatively rare occurrence in Southern Africa. The Disaster Relief Office and the Humanitarian Assistance people of AID in Washington were very surprised, and in fact upset, when the then Mission Director in Zimbabwe recommended that the relief foods sent from the United States should be distributed through Zimbabwe's own system. Usually such a program would go through non-government organizations, the major international non-government organizations and perhaps some local ones. The representatives of those international organizations in Zimbabwe were not interested in

doing food distribution; they didn't have the infrastructure and they were involved in developmental activities. And local organizations were not capable of doing much more than to help distribute from the government's depots to the most isolated communities. In fact, Zimbabwe managed very well in response to that drought. Once more, that's a difference about the country.

*Q: Did you find working with the Zimbabweans at the political level difficult?*

HERRICK: Yes. In many ways the Zimbabweans were still fighting their guerrilla war--the Shona people in particular. They are not easy yet with outsiders, not easy with Caucasians and not easy with donor representatives. The World Bank Representative who arrived there in 1986 did a tremendous job of improving the deteriorated relations between the Bank and the Government. There is still a sense of reserve, however, especially among the Shona. It's hard to make personal friends with them; at least that's what I found. The White people in Zimbabwe don't have African friends--they never did have African friends. Whereas in Kenya you might have prejudices, or you might get remarks that show lack of understanding, there were always people who had worked together. The Ndebele people I found to be more open, easier to talk to. When I went each year to the big industrial fair held in Bulawayo, the second largest city and the capital in Ndebele region, I always found the people easy to talk to and politically very open. They were willing to talk about politics in a way that the Shona were not.

The Shona were apt to get behind the wagons--I know, that's an Afrikaans term. An American couple who had been at the University since before independence had a very hard time. They were committed socialists who believed they were part of the local scene. But, came the time when the husband, who was teaching at the law school, or the wife, who was an economist, were heckled at their seminars, and they were no longer welcomed socially. They were hurt because they thought they were working for the same goals as the people at the University. In the end, they left the country. There was another instance, of a professor who had studied at Colorado College and was enlisted to help organize a presentation by a USIA-sponsored visitor. At the preliminary session, all was friendly and positive, but at the evening presentation at the University, there was an organized "clack" of criticism, not controlled by our "friend". The visitor was not able to finish his presentation.

*Q: This was not so much the ideas, but the fact that it was an outsider?*

HERRICK: The USIA sponsor didn't know what was going on, except that a vituperative anti-American attitude had burst forth. Somehow, the sense of political oppression lingers among the Shona people.

*Q: This was against the visitors for being White or being foreigners?*

HERRICK: I don't know.

*Q: But not so much the political ideas or concepts that were being taught?*

HERRICK: The form it took was criticism of our political concepts, but the objectionable part was the way it was done. Many at the University held socialist views. That's often true in a developing country University, and that's why we want to talk with them, to share our differing views. In Zimbabwe, the departments of government and political science, the law school and the economics department were particularly doctrinaire in their socialism. But the people we worked with in agriculture and veterinary science and health were not as politically oriented.

*Q: Looking back over that period, this is a very formative period in Zimbabwe, how do you see the Foreign Assistance Program that you managed affecting our U.S. interests or our interest in Zimbabwe? Our development interest as well as our political interests?*

HERRICK: I think our presence in Zimbabwe needs to be considered in the context of our Regional Program as well as our bilateral program.

*Q: Then let's go on to the Regional Program and come back to this.*

HERRICK: Our Southern Africa Regional Program was designed to help the nine majority-ruled countries of the Southern African Development Coordination Council, SADCC, which consisted of the more recently independent countries of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, the three countries still in the customs and monetary realms of the Republic of South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho, and Zambia and Tanzania which had helped in the recent struggles for independence; the ninth was Malawi, which was a bit of a pariah because of its close friendship with South Africa and its reputed hospitality to the Renamo rebels of Mozambique. SADCC was established originally to promote the development of these majority rule countries in cooperation with each other and as a buffer against the economic giant of South Africa to the south. SADCC now, since the end of apartheid, includes South Africa as a member and has slightly changed its name.

In those days SADCC had its own internal political dynamics. There were those who were dedicated to a political struggle against South Africa and sought donor assistance for counter measures against what were seen as the "de-stabilization efforts" of South Africa. There were others, as for example, the President of Botswana, who were committed to promoting change in South Africa quietly. Of course he was practical in recognizing the necessity to continue to cooperate with South Africa for things that were important to life--such as electricity, water and transport, all of which came to Botswana from South Africa. Robert Mugabe was actually the "hold out" on many of these things. There was one question, whether SADCC member countries should ban all flights to and from South Africa, on which Mugabe was adamant, but he was the only one. Even his own African businessmen could not persuade him that such a move would be economically disastrous. Finally President Kaunda of Zambia organized a meeting with Mugabe to tell him, "We really must cooperate on this particular thing. We cannot live without flights from South



Africa, and we can't live if South African Airways doesn't bring our necessities to us." In fact, South African Airways did continue to come into Zimbabwe but they parked down at the end of the field. [laughter] They weren't nearly as visible as the weekly American cargo plane that came in.

It was important to Mugabe that the United States was supporting the efforts of SADCC. Therefore, I think Mugabe was willing to see a continuing presence of the United States in his country. Our financial assistance to the country was not large enough to be persuasive and at the time the World Bank assistance (before the structural adjustment was finally organized) was more than ours, but was not large in comparison with most countries of Africa. I think Mugabe thought it was important to continue, relations on, shall we say, a barely even keel with the United States, but that did not involve much courtesy. If we became too friendly he always had a little dagger to throw out. For instance, the time he went to the annual meeting of economists at Davos, Switzerland, and managed to answer an American journalist, "Yes, I am a Marxist." Other times he snubbed an American visitor or otherwise made unwelcome comments when he was visiting the United States. At the same time, he resented our trying to give him advice, or to influence his vote on a candidate for a UN post. He maintained a "prickly" exterior but I don't think he wanted to kick us out.

*Q: So do you think that foreign assistance had its direct developmental contribution but also it preserved the political linkage despite the disruption?*

HERRICK: I think so.

*Q: You said that you were also in charge of the Regional Program, what was your role in that?*

HERRICK: That was really our growth program there. Following presentation of a "New Initiative for Southern Africa" developed on a visit of Peter McPherson to the region shortly after I got there, the Congress provided a special appropriation of \$50 million in new funds each year to support the programs sponsored by SADCC. The program was very heavily concentrated in transport projects, some of which were carried out relatively promptly and easily, and some of which required a lot of coddling and supervision. Railroad projects were a major part of the program, and there were road projects. The road between Zimbabwe and Zambia was one of the first. Open economic relationships between Zimbabwe and Zambia had been cut off during the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia, so the road had deteriorated. On the Zimbabwe side the road was built very promptly, under Zimbabwean contractor using imported U.S. equipment. On the Zambian side it was much slower.

As it happened, all of the railroads in Southern Africa were of the same gauge, the only exception being the internal National Railways of Tanzania. All the locomotive equipment in Southern Africa was of American design, although not necessarily American-built, as some locomotives of General Motors design had been built in Brazil.

This was an area in which we could provide assistance upgrade transport capabilities and at the same time give business to the United States. In addition to new locomotive projects and projects to bring in parts for repairs, we had one to rehabilitate steam locomotives owned by the rail systems of Mozambique. That one was implemented in Zimbabwe, where the highly skilled people of a shop in Bulawayo were able to take the locomotives apart, analyze their structure, and put them back together. There was a continuing issue about maintenance of locomotives in Mozambique; our project included maintenance training programs in Bulawayo and rehabilitation of repair shops in Mozambique. Unfortunately, I think some of those newly refurbished locomotives were lost pretty quickly. At the time, Mozambique was not at peace. All of the railways were not all open because of internal warfare and disruption by the South Africans. But land-locked Zimbabwe committed itself, at great cost in military personnel and railway staff, to keep open its lifeline, its shortest way out through Mozambique to the port of Beira. There was also a cost in health, as the commitment of personnel to the corridor promoted the spread of AIDS.

We supported several regional agricultural research efforts, but one of singular success. That was a project to promote varieties of small grains--millets and sorghums--that could substitute for imported wheat in the diets of the region and would survive drought conditions better than maize. Those small grains were the original staple grains of the region; maize came from the New World, and wheat was the staple of the north, around the Mediterranean. The project was carried out by one of the international dry lands agricultural research centers, under the guidance of an American scientist, on a site in Zimbabwe. They were adapting the grains to the conditions in the Southern African countries, developing varieties that matured in shorter growing seasons, and testing programs to persuade householders to use the grains. Indeed when the severe drought came in 1991, affecting crop yields in 1992, that facility was able to produce seeds for distribution to the countries of the region--those that were ready to use them--for quick planting so that the next year, after the rains began again, there would be food. The challenge in agricultural research always is to get the results out to the national research agencies and then the next challenge is to get them from the national research agencies out into the field. That part of the program was beginning to go very well.

At the request of SADCC, we became interested in agricultural education. The post-secondary institutions of the countries wanted to develop degree programs and graduate programs in agriculture. I was very leery of an effort that would emphasize graduate degrees for institutions that were not yet, except in Zimbabwe, granting a first degree in agriculture. Some of the countries did not even yet have a university. At the same time, a number of American universities were interested in helping Southern African institutions to develop graduate agricultural education. This is something they've done world-wide and they were interested in doing so in this region. They believe that an individual is not well trained until he's been through the rigors of a graduate degree program.

We tried to analyze the demand for agricultural training in the region; this was something that the institutions of SADCC didn't understand, but it was part of our market approach.

Why should we spend money if there wasn't a demand for graduate degrees in agriculture? My sense was that employers of the graduates were not looking for the more advanced degrees, and it was clear that the governments did not have the budgets to employ agricultural researchers in the public sector. Our survey's confirmed this expectation in some countries, but in other countries it was not possible to conduct a useful survey. For example, in Tanzania the survey team couldn't get anything except some very general statistics from of the Ministry of Agriculture; the country was still so socialist that anyone trained in agriculture would work in a government position.

The private sector respondents, where they were available, wanted only a certificate holder, a person whom they could train in their own milieu. In Zimbabwe we found that the producers of high quality tobacco were negative about the idea of a person with a new graduate degree coming out to tell them how to do what they were already doing very successfully. We finally made a proposal for a regional program in agricultural education, but during my time in the field it was not approved in Washington. I'm not sure SADCC would have been able to sell a program of lower level agricultural education to its members, either. I know that Botswana, for one, wanted to establish a university by developing an agriculture department first and then a few other departments. They wanted the old fashioned, very expensive, American technical assistance program--but then, they could afford to pay for it if they wanted it badly enough.

*Q: The private sector?*

HERRICK: Yes. The next thing we tried to do was to develop a program to promote private sector development and private sector trade among the countries of SADCC. That too was very difficult to do on a regional level. And the pay-off was elusive, because at the time the trade among the countries of SADCC represented only about five percent of the total trade of the country members. If we had raised inter-country trade by 20 percent we would have raised it to all of six percent of the grand total. On the other hand, there were other aspects to the question. We wanted to promote cooperation among private sector people and improve their ability to communicate with their governments on business issues. The business people of Zimbabwe, for example, should have been able to cite examples of the benefits of the freer economic regime in Botswana when they talked with their own government.

At the annual SADCC meeting in 1987, we made private sector development an important theme. It was in Administrator McPherson's speech and was raised in his private meetings. SADCC did begin to urge its member countries to establish business associations that could then be joined in a regional business association. The question then became political within SADCC. Could SADCC dictate what kind of a business association would be established in one country or another. There was a tremendous difference between the more socialist countries and the more market oriented countries as to how they were going to go about this. In Zimbabwe, for example, after feeling out the government, the private sector representatives were convinced that they had to invite the government to be a member of their SADCC-related business association. In Swaziland

the government designated as the SADCC association the weaker of two relatively weak associations. In Zambia and Lesotho existing chambers of commerce, the only thing going, were moribund from lack of member support.

We found also that it was difficult to design a project of technical assistance that could be deemed regional and yet would have to take place in the separate countries. We did not, in my time, succeed in developing a private sector or trade project that was acceptable to SADCC. One of the questions my successor was puzzling with after the end of apartheid in South Africa was how much the regional program should continue to be tied, as it was in the Congressional mandate, to programs of SADCC, and how much we should continue to consult with SADCC on activities we were proposing.

At the time I was there, the Executive Secretary of SADCC, Simba Makoni, had good credibility with the United States Congress. He managed to assure that the appropriation came through every year, but also managed to express his criticisms of things he thought we had done without his personal approval. He ran his Secretariat very tightly; all decisions were made at the top. We managed to find our way through most of those things. On one occasion the Africa Bureau proposed that the regional program should finance a range management sector program in Lesotho that could hardly be considered regional in its intent. In my next quarterly meeting with the Secretariat of SADCC, it was my role to sell this U.S. commitment to SADCC as a regional program. I couldn't find anything in their program list under which I could put this program. But I made a kind of wild suggestion as to where it might fit. To my surprise, Makoni went along with the suggestion, apparently because Lesotho, being completely inside South Africa, was, for him too, a difficult country to include in regional programs. However, the next year Makoni complained on the Hill, and representatives from the Africa Bureau were called in to explain how they had allowed regional funds to be allocated to a bilateral program.

*Q: Even though he had approved it?*

HERRICK: Oh yes. He had been very friendly at that meeting. I was so relieved, as I had thought I would have a real battle to get our point of view across.

*Q: Why did he switch?*

HERRICK: Well, one political game does not call for the same tactic as another.

*Q: I see. Did he have any particular strategy or view?*

HERRICK: Makoni was strong on the socialist, "We must fight South Africa", side in SADCC. He sponsored studies to estimate the costs of de-stabilization efforts by South Africa. He was a young man, a Zimbabwean, ambitious, who had become Minister of Industry shortly after independence. But when the Zimbabwean who had been appointed as Executive Secretary of SADCC died suddenly, the Zimbabweans were invited to replace him. So they sent this young man over there to SADCC headquarters in

Botswana. His staff was recruited from the member countries but he worked most closely with one Botswana citizen of his staff and, in the early years, with one of the expatriate advisers financed by the British. All details had to be approved by Makoni.

*Q: And institutional development?*

SADCC was organized in such a way that each of the member countries was responsible for coordination in a particular sector. For example, for Angola it was mining, for Mozambique it was transport, for Malawi it was forestry, wildlife and tourism, for Botswana it was agricultural research. Zimbabwe had agricultural production as well as the Secretariat for early warning on drought and the food security program.

My predecessor had organized some technical assistance for the SADCC operations in Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and the central Secretariat, in addition to assistance to the agricultural research group in Botswana and the food security group in Zimbabwe. The last two went well, but the other sector secretariats were not ready to use our assistance. After I got to Zimbabwe, my Deputy went down to Lesotho to see what was going on, as there had been no expenditures. She found there was another project, described in almost exactly the same language as ours, but financed by one of the Scandinavian donors, and it wasn't moving either. We terminated that one. In Malawi the project had moved slowly and hadn't been very effective, but it was winding down. We found another way, later, to try to help Malawi manage the wildlife sector, through our regional resource management project. In Swaziland the project just dragged; there was always another proposal for to keep it alive, but it seemed to go nowhere. The people who were given regional assignments had regular jobs in government and really didn't have the time to work on regional matters. The AID Director there was reluctant to let the program go, and so while I was in the region it continued to drag. The funds in the project for the Secretariat were still available, as AID had not yet been asked to provide expertise.

We made good use of those funds to finance studies related to our new program ideas: one on private sector revolving funds, one on the outlook for expanded intra-regional trade, and another on regional agricultural education. It was useful for us to have the studies, and also to have a resource for cooperation with Makoni. He liked to keep our relations on the prickly side, here and there, in the Shona manner, but in general they were positive.

*Q: There were some issues with the AID Missions in the country because they had bilateral programs and regional money, how did that go?*

HERRICK: There is always an issue when you have both regional and bilateral programs. In Southern Africa the issue never became as keen as it was for 30 years with ROCAP in Central America. But there was always the matter of who was going to implement a program, and the question whether the Mission Director in a country with a bilateral mission was going to be responsible for a regional project which he or she may or may not have helped design. Of course, we always tried to involve the Missions of the region

as we developed new regional programs. They may or may not have had the interest and the staff resources to participate in the design, but ultimately the project was going to take place in their country, and problems could become their diplomatic or administrative headaches. We had formal meetings a few times a year. Many questions revolved around issues of visibility and resources--"...so much money has gone to Zambia...why isn't more money going to Botswana"--things of that sort. Yet often we were able to concentrate as a group on questions of real substance.

In the transport program there was no absolute rule as to how things would be administered. The Zimbabwe-Zambia road project for example, was administered entirely by the Zimbabwe staff. For the Zambia railway project there was a project manager in the Zambia Mission, in accordance with the desire of the Mission Director there, who was very interested in the project, and its importance for the economy of Zambia. Once a month an engineer from the Zimbabwe staff spent three or four days in Zambia on the technical aspects of the project. In Malawi, under one Mission Director the management of the railway project was entirely the responsibility of the Zimbabwe Mission. Under the next, the responsibility became more divided, because the Director wanted greater involvement, even though the country program strategy for Malawi didn't accommodate transport as such. Food security was, of course, more likely to be of interest to all the Mission Directors, but the food security program was run mainly by the Africans. Much of the success of that program (which Michigan State University was involved in) stemmed from the international seminars which promoted interaction among the nationals of the region and from their being able to go back home and talk about lessons that they had learned in one place or another.

*Q: Let's go back to the question, both in terms of Zimbabwe assistance and also in terms of the larger regional program, was this effective in supporting U.S. interests in the area? Was it effective in helping this regions deal with the South Africa issue?*

HERRICK: I think the programs served our interests in assuring the viability of developing economies in Africa, in the world. Particularly helpful were the transport projects, but also the agricultural projects. I think the Southern Africans would say, "We couldn't have done it without the United States."

*Q: You're talking specifically about development issues?*

HERRICK: Yes. They respected us for our interest. Politically, some people of the region actually feared that South Africa could cause overthrow of their governments if their economies were not stable. It is political fact that we are a country to whom the educated people of these countries look at as a model. They may sometimes resent our advising them to imitate our political institutions, but as a general economic model and a model of a place where people are educated and where skills are developed, I think its been very important for us to have had a development presence in Southern Africa.

*Q: At the political level it was a presence that through the program sort of reflected that presence, and this therefore is that the U.S. was with them.*

HERRICK: In the confrontation with South Africa, definitely. And particularly, though, after we passed the Anti Apartheid Act. I think Southern Africans were more aware than Americans, who were not aware in general, of the fact that the Anti-Apartheid Act included \$30 million that first year, and in later years a lot more, of assistance to non-government organizations and private sector and community groups in South Africa itself. I think they were aware that we were helping people who were working toward democratic change in South Africa. Even though they had before that time, resented us for not taking stronger measures against South Africa.

*Q: In program or developmental terms, what would you say were the most significant results as far as your time there?*

HERRICK: An important aspect of the program in Zimbabwe was the demonstration of what can be done with a small staff in a country that is sufficiently developed economically and educationally to implement large elements of the program on its own. From the regional program, I think the experience illustrates the continuing challenge to develop something that has a truly regional effect. Except for something that's infrastructure, like transport, the experience is problematic. For example, we developed in my last year there, a regional natural resources management project. The project was to involve four countries and, after its independence, we hoped that Namibia would be added. The project included technical assistance for the sectoral Secretariat in Malawi so that it could organize ways in which both participating and non-participating members of SADCC could learn from what was going on in the field to program viable community management of natural resources. The project was administered at the country level. In Zimbabwe it was administered by the Department of Parks, the Center for Applied Social Sciences at the University and a non-government organization called the Zimbabwe Trust. In Zambia, where the project under the aegis of the Park Service, it was overseen at first by the Zimbabwe Mission, but I think that changed later. In Botswana, the sub-project design did not illustrate the principles of the project as much as we had hoped it would. In fact, a colleague has recently spent a few weeks in Botswana at the request of the Mission to help identify ways in which the sub-project there can have significance for the region. When I suggested that I thought probably very little, he said, "Yes, probably less than my report would imply."

Similarly, if we had actually developed an agricultural education project, it would have taken place in a country, in a country university, and in a countries educational system, and so there is always the puzzle of what the real significance is, in regional terms. Ultimately, the Southern Africa Regional program will have to stand on its transport projects and its role in signaling U.S. support for SADCC.

### **Observations on the effectiveness of foreign aid**

*Q: This raises some thoughts about your views about the effectiveness of external assistance, of Foreign Aid, you've had a rich experience and you've served in many countries as well as in the policy making parts of AID. How would you characterize the significance of the Foreign Assistance Program or AID Program in terms of both developmental and foreign policy concerns? What works? What do you find that is successful? What are the things that clearly don't work? What would you say to someone that's going out as a Mission Director or thinking about getting policies for AID?*

HERRICK: Well, from both points of view, developmental and foreign policy, the significance of the Foreign Assistance Program rests basically on the promotion of growth. Growth in the developing world brings benefits all around, I believe. Benefits to the welfare of the people of a developing country, to the economic and social status of the country, and to the mutual relations between developed and developing worlds. The AID program, as we have been discussing it, has used a number of approaches to promote growth and improved welfare. Successes of one approach or another are not always transferable to different circumstances, but I guess I could generalize a little.

But first, in today's world we have to accept the fact that the foreign aid budget will be used heavily to support U.S. political objectives--the visible and more short-term objectives of the day. The foreign aid agency will have to continue its work with a relative paucity of resources for development aid and will have to be selective in the distribution of those resources for the development of countries that actually need U.S. assistance and are ready and willing to use it effectively. The need test may have to be applied rigorously. And readiness will usually imply a degree of openness in government and the ability of citizens to become involved in improving their economic and social status.

Now, what lacks can be addressed by U.S. foreign assistance? One is the gap in availability of technology, and the skills to use the technology. The program can offer expertise to introduce the technology and training to use it. An additional benefit comes by ensuring that individuals of a cooperating country are exposed to the United States through training programs. Exposure to the United States is always good, but I think when it comes through training the effect is deeper and more lasting.

*Q: What kind of exposure are you talking about?*

HERRICK: I mean the bringing of young people from the developing country to the United States for higher education and technical training.

*Q: What do they get exposed to?*

HERRICK: They live in the United States and see our way of operating. Sometimes they become a little bit radicalized, but so do our own students. In fact, in Zimbabwe the most anti-American radical socialist in government had gone to Princeton. I think an exposure of several years' duration in the United States has a lasting effect when it is combined



with training, and I think most constructively when the training is in a particular discipline. I don't believe that an AID Mission should try to analyze (as we have done in the past) the whole human resources status in the country and to figure out what the country needs--this many economists and that percentage increase in health practitioners and so on and so forth. Such analyses often turn out to be mere guesses, in the United States as well as overseas.

I also happen to believe personally in the importance of the discipline of education, of learning to use the mind. I believe that kind of training can be transferred to other fields. We should not get stuck thinking in project terms. If an individual trained under a project in, say, health administration, fails to continue to work in that field when he returns home, we should not worry. We have trained his or her mind and developed skills that can be used to the person's or country's benefit in many ways.

In a number of AID Missions, in addition to organizing project-related training, the staff have developed what they refer to as "general training projects" through which they have tried to offer training to persons with high potential for effective contributions to society. Those persons may be trained in one field, and move into another field later, but will retain their effectiveness. Find somebody who is going to benefit from training and if she wants to be trained in chemistry that's fine, if he wants to be trained in health that's also fine, or economics, even perhaps the humanities. As long as he's going to come back to the country. Through the years I think AID has had good success in assuring that the trainees returned to their countries. That is what we want.

*Q: Do you think the results of this are positive in both relationship to the contribution of the country's development and also positively with relations to the United States?*

HERRICK: I do. I think both--very strong in relationships to the United States and in continuing ties. Many individuals, particularly if they've done graduate work, have had a mentor in the United States with whom they continue to correspond and exchange professional papers. Such individuals are likely, later in their careers, to be willing to call on people from the United States to come out to advise them. I don't think that the people who have been trained have to go back to work in the public sector, as used to be the case. I think it's equally important for them to go back and work in the private sector. Then you have to face the questions, how will the training be financed, is it worth an investment to a private sector entity, and who is going to employ the individual upon her return. But those can be worked out.

*Q: You're confident that they do make a contribution when they return?*

HERRICK: I think they make a stronger general contribution toward the development of their society than individuals who have not received similar training.

Moving on to other gaps and other approaches. I believe, as I said earlier, that AID's commitment to private sector development is a very good direction for AID. It does

present challenges in a publicly financed assistance program. The private sector should be competitive in our view. I subscribe to that view. Therefore, one should be careful about how the private sector is subsidized, and whether or not there is demand for the product or service to be promoted. I think there are ways in which there can be an initial subsidy to get things started, although many attempts to do that sort of thing have not worked very well. The Trade and Development Program is a positive example through which we do subsidize feasibility studies and engineering studies but we hope that something else will come out of it, in that instance, something for U.S. business. In regard to demand, we get stuck sometimes, not knowing how to measure demand in so-called "soft" sectors. Often, however, a good proxy for demand is the willingness of a private sector project participant to expend some of its own resources.

*Q: What do you think AID's contribution can be to private sector development? Where can it be most effective?*

HERRICK: In the first instance I think AID can be most effective by promoting policies that will themselves remove dampers from private sector development. As I've said before, that kind of effort is long term in nature. We have to stay with it and it can be very discouraging. Because it needs to be slow. There are strong political interests in any country that will see change as threatening to their political and economic position. Policy is the single most important thing to do to promote private sector development, but I also think there are technical contributions that we can make; we can offer technical, financial and organizational expertise.

*Q: Any areas that you found particularly successful in that, or is that general across the board?*

HERRICK: I think I'm really talking about the industrial and manufacturing sectors, as well as the agriculture sector, when I'm talking about policy reform and technical expertise to promote private sector development. Policy is likewise an essential area of interest in education, family planning or health programs, of course. In relation to the productive sectors, AID can succeed, slowly, in promoting small steps toward diminution of government regulation. Very particular things, not necessarily the great immense policy steps that IMF and the World Bank are going after, but the smaller regulatory steps that will implement the actual changes, once the idea of a policy change has been adopted. Speaking of Africa only, I know that AID has done some studies to verify the effectiveness of policy conditions in the various program assistance efforts. I suspect we would find that when AID was imposing macro-economic conditionally, we were usually piggy-backing on the conditions established, or about to be established by World Bank and IMF programs. In Costa Rica, on the other hand, it is my impression that AID was THE major actor in pressing the government for reforms, especially in the realms of fiscal and monetary policies.

Getting back to the private sector, I think that when a small change has a positive economic effect in an industry or other productive sector, it also has an effect in

establishing confidence on the part of private sector people, that government will be willing to listen and to make further changes. That's a very important thing for AID to keep in mind and a way for AID to operate that brings less disappointment than a push for macro-economic change. Not only that, it is a way to ensure that policies are implemented. I recall, when I was in Tanzania on a World Bank mission a few years ago, becoming aware how few of the official sector policies, that had been nicely drafted with the help of external advisers, could be implemented. They were not even been endorsed into law; so there was no way for implementing regulations to be drafted.

There is another approach that has its place in our strategic thinking, and in a way it is a backward approach. Whenever AID is involved in a program, if it's a government-to-government program, say, in the health sector, I think an AID Mission should watch very carefully to see that we don't promote excessive numbers of additional regulatory steps along with that program. Because inevitably, as we promote change, then we and the government bureaucracy are going to be worried about the effectiveness of the change, and are going to want to control it. When you have additional control you have an additional frustration and you also have an additional opportunity for corruption.

Speaking of corruption, it is part of our work in promoting private sector investment, and private sector provision of services, to diminish the opportunities for centralized control, and corruption. But you can't work against that by going to a government and saying, "We want to do this big thing, which is going to cut you corrupt people out of the circuit." You have to go about it in other ways, ways that will eventually persuade people who are now maintaining their power positions through government that they will, after all, be able to do very well in an open, competitive private sector climate. That's a long term effort, but I think it's an important one for AID to be involved in.

I also think AID should continue to offer family planning assistance and remain active in the very strongly linked areas of education and employment for women. Education and employment for women are, of course, additional areas for attention to policy. These are areas that are very sensitive to cultural and well-ensconced political constraints. Sensitization of the power structure, at all levels of society and administration, is necessary. But there are ways in which we can support the kind of sensitization that will promote change.

For example, in Kenya when the private sector family planning program started, the program office designed and produced a "*kanga*", one of those cloths worn by women around their hips or used to hold her baby, or to cover her head. The *kangas*, there traditionally have pictorial designs and a motto on them. This particular *kanga* is about family planning. The motto says it is good to plan your family and the design pictures a three-child family. One of the important messages in that picture is that the little girl is carrying books--she too is going to school. That's a small sensitization kind of thing. AID needs to work broadly on all policies that effect the decisions about family size. I think it's a very good idea for an AID Mission to use a local consultant to analyze the legal and regulatory systems of the country and all the ways in which they affect those decisions, be

it by free education and other subsidies for each child, or restrictions on the kinds of savings schemes that would provide a monetary form of social security, or import tariffs on contraceptive supplies.

*Q: Do you think the AID has made a significant contribution in this work, to date?*

HERRICK: I think we have, yes, although some areas of pro-natal policy are particularly difficult to deal with. Try persuading Germany that university education should no longer be free, for example! But France, I think, has reduced the subsidy on children past the first few (one, two or three?). You don't just go in and recommend elimination of free education, but you can support the decisions to more educational fees that are being driven by budgetary constraints. Things of that sort are as important in the family planning area as the technical programs service delivery programs and the training of family planning educators.

One of the things that I believe AID has been far too slow to do, has been to wean countries off reliance on the United States for contraceptives. Under a competed world-wide contract AID can purchase condoms and pills relatively inexpensively, and we have financed the distribution of vast numbers of these family planning supplies in developing countries, at a still significant total cost. The leadership of the AID's family planning program operated for many years, especially under Dr. Ravenholt, on the theory that if the contraceptive supplies were readily available, the population would use them. That theory has not always held up, as we have begun to observe the importance of social values and the role of education and motivation of women. Furthermore, that kind of program was almost one hundred percent a government program. Now we are thinking much more about how to promote private sector sale of contraceptive supplies. In Zimbabwe before I left, we were beginning to recommend that the government look for other sources of inexpensive contraceptives (these exist in Europe), and that they get those products to the private sector at market prices. Then the diminishing amount of U.S. funds could be used for aspects of the program, such as persuading insurers to include family planning in health coverage.

*Q: Any other areas?*

HERRICK: We're getting into my personal views here.

*Q: That's fine.*

HERRICK: I have not had much direct experience, but I've been of the view that in education AID can reach a better outcome relative to its resources at the post-secondary level than in primary education, and maybe even secondary education. I think it's very difficult for outsiders to be effective in the cultural context of another country, unless it's to use local currency to build school buildings in a rural area where nobody has access to a school, that kind of thing. Although high levels of literacy and basic education are terribly important for a country, I'm just not sure that it's the best use of U.S. resources to be involved at the lower levels of education.

*Q: The training of teachers?*

HERRICK: The training of teachers, okay; that should be a post-secondary affair. But we should ensure that the curriculum is developed with full participation by personnel of the country. In Africa, the level of training of teachers at elementary schools is very low, sometimes they have had only two years of high school education. They do need help. But we must avoid creating conflict when we try to introduce what we think is the right curriculum. There are other views, but that's my view. The question of admission of girl children to school is one that I'm more keenly interested in than the actual teaching and the curriculum.

*Q: Have you seen that done in some places?*

HERRICK: When I was in PPC, I was aware of some things that were going. Nepal, I think was one place, where AID had a program very specifically to promote attendance of girl children at the elementary level. Janet Ballentine was involved. I'm not sure how that turned out.

*Q: In a global sense how would you balance this question of U.S. national interests and foreign assistance, both in terms of political interests and development interests? I raise this question because of course the whole question of the Foreign Assistance has always been associated with what our Foreign Policy interests are.*

HERRICK: That's right and sometimes we've had tremendous challenges, as in Egypt, for example, which has a very large security-driven AID program and the AID Mission is challenged to design the program elements in such a way as to ensure an economic and social development effect. I think that our security interests provide several challenges to AID. In some instances we make commitments to a country for strategic regions and the commitments are simply a financial transfer. In some instances they should just remain that way; we shouldn't fret it. When we have a development program in a country and then security assistance is added on for strategic reasons (as happened in Kenya, and as was the case in Somalia some years ago), AID has to avoid a possible predicament.

AID cannot insist too strongly on developmental criteria if the government is not willing or not able to comply, because AID cannot say, "If you don't do your part, we're not going to fulfill our commitment." To avoid such a conundrum, AID Missions and Embassies have to work together with their eyes open to discuss and probe alternative game plans. There have been instances when issues have had to be taken to Washington to be fought out between the Department of State and AID, and on occasion with the National Security Council. As more and more of the funds available to AID are directed to political and security purposes, it behooves AID to go with the flow, but to try to identify ways in which the funds can be used that, at the least, will not be detrimental to developmental efforts.

*Q: Did you find on balance that the specific or immediate political security interest is helpful to the AID Program or unhelpful?*

HERRICK: It's helpful in the sense that the program increases and you always want to have a bigger fund to work with because that means, at least at the surface level perhaps, more influence with the government. I would guess that evaluation would show that the conditionality of an economic security program has been treated more gently than it has in programs funded with development assistance money, or has not been invoked as severely. The issue is whether the United States is going to renege on what basically is a political commitment. AID Missions have been known to say, "Well, yes, on paper we could say they've met the condition." even though the fundamental intent of the condition perhaps had not been met. I think that's always going to be the case, as no AID Mission wants to see its intentions fail.

*Q: Over this period of time that you were working in the Foreign Assistance Program, how do you think this has been a benefit to the United States? How has it been most useful? Could the world have gotten along without it?*

HERRICK: Well, it may be that some parts of the world could not have gotten along without our AID program. Certain countries perhaps, right after independence, really needed external funds just to keep the basic things going. To a degree, we assured the fundamental viability of some countries. Now, how does that serve our interests? I believe in global terms the United States wants and really needs to see stable economies and peaceful relations among countries around the world.

I think, on balance, our AID Program has helped to promote those stable economies. We certainly have not been able to prevent political conflict. In Africa in particular, we don't understand the basis of those myriad political conflicts. We don't understand how much they stem from the traditional ethnic subdivisions, how much from events in colonial history. Similarly, in Bosnia, we don't understand what's happening; that again, is historically an ethnic situation that may have been exacerbated by subjugation to outside political powers. We do see instances of people pulling themselves out of that kind of conflict, as the people of Uganda did. In the long run, I think the assistance we gave to Uganda before it was in deep trouble was useful in having helped create a base of educated people and provide a vision of a peaceful development process that people would want to go back to afterwards.

In terms of international economic interdependence, I think the United States needs to deal with viable economic nations around the world and I think that our assistance is helping them achieve that economic viability. Our policy assistance, not alone, but in conjunction with the policy assistance of the major multilateral donors and other bilateral donors is having its effect; it's not instant but it's there.

I don't think that the United States should operate on the principle that it owes any economic transfer to another country. I recall when President Nyerere, toward the end of

his term in Tanzania, saw his country in deep economic difficulties and his socialist experiments not working. He told the donor community that we owed it to him to pull him out of the problems because we had supported him in what he was trying to do originally. I don't think that is what should drive us.

On the humanitarian side the United States has taken on a large responsibility, for food aid and for financial assistance in instances of humanitarian need. I think we should continue that role. "A hungry child has no politics." I think it's something that speaks to us as individuals, it's something that the American people understand, and it's something that we are particularly good at mobilizing. We can get our humanitarian aid out more quickly than most other people can. We certainly did so in the Southern Africa program that I helped evaluate two years ago. We were the prize operators, the fastest off the block, and we were the best at helping the local people organize how they were going to handle the food and the transport; we excelled in breaking "bottlenecks".

### **Personal views on the foreign assistance program as a professional career**

*Q: What about your own role, your personal role in all of this? How do you view the experience? How do you think you were able to contribute to this? How did you find the experience?*

HERRICK: I would do it again, and I would have started younger if I'd had the chance. For me, the experience of working with other people, trying to understand where they're coming from and being able to create working relationships that are effective--the kind that can evolve into a joking relationship because of the mutual understanding that has evolved-- is a tremendous challenge and very satisfying. In terms of a personal career, I think being an AID Mission Director overseas is one of best things that I could ever imagine doing. Because it combines the administrative responsibilities--and I'm pretty good at organizing things, the intellectual aspects of analyzing problems identifying solutions, and a wide breadth of subject matter.

I enjoy the opportunity to meet and work with the best people in the country to which we are posted, and to get to know interesting people at the university and in the private sector; all that intensifies one's ability to understand the cultural setting and how things operate. I look at the government, yes, and the politics, but also how they're working in the countryside, how they're organized in their urban neighborhoods, how the poorer people make their living, what happens in the informal economy, in order to try to make something of the AID program that will be effective. For me, it was very challenging, very exciting, and very satisfying, especially the newer moves related to private sector development. For me it was extraordinarily fulfilling to have succeeded in putting just the right American economist in touch with the right country colleague to get some good thinking going on in the government so that there could be improvements in the operating climate for the private sector.

*Q: What would you say to a person who is going out to a first Mission Director function? What guidance would you give that person?*

HERRICK: That's a difficult one. For a current AID officer, there would be a few things to offer. For an outside appointee, one would have to start at the beginning. But, for the ambitious officer, there is one thing about being a Mission Director that I had not anticipated. It is somewhat isolating, on a personal basis. I mentioned earlier the difference I felt when I had been a Deputy Director then became a Mission Director at the same mission--the difference in the degree of responsibility that I sensed, when I was actually signing off on behalf of the United States Government. There was something else, though. When I was the Deputy Director I was one of the "troops"; we were all working for the Director and we all had our views about the direction we hoped he would go on certain matters.

*Q: Or she.*

HERRICK: Yes, touchée, although that particular one was male. After I was Director, and also since my husband had died I was personally on my own, I felt a difference in my relationship with the troops.. I think one of the things to mention to a newly appointed Director going out is that it's like any situation in which you are the chief. You don't want to be one of the "boys" or "girls" if you are the college president. Maybe you want to signify your sympathy and understanding by inviting them to call you by your first name but you don't want to behave like a co-ed. You want to develop an atmosphere as conducive to communication as possible, but at the same time you have to reserve space to carry out your very large responsibility.

That responsibility extends also to the relationships with other donors and participants at the consultative group meetings in Paris or, in a regional program or large international program, the Ministers of Government and Heads of State of several countries. It's curious to recall, that I dealt more directly with Heads of State in the regional program than I did in Zimbabwe, because of course the chief U.S. representative there was the Ambassador. In relation to cross-country regional projects, I was the primary overseas U.S. representative. It was interesting when the Office of the Inspector General of the State Department conducted its periodic inspection of the Embassy in Zimbabwe, the State Department Foreign Service Officer conducting the inspection, who had served as Ambassador at more than one post, was visibly concerned to find that no Ambassador was responsible for reviewing my regional program.

*Q: Out in the region?*

HERRICK: Yes. If we were deciding to do such and such with the agricultural research program in Botswana, the American Ambassador in Botswana of course was informed, and expressed his views. Either directly or through the AID Director there, I always kept him informed about anything that would affect Botswana, or anything related to the SADCC Secretariat (which was located there) that he might hear about from the



Botswana Government. But the my direct negotiations were with the chief SADCC people, or the head of the agricultural research organization. The Inspector said to me, "Who was overlooking you?" That was a dilemma he never resolved, and something I'm sure he took home in his report.

*Q: Any other last thoughts?*

HERRICK: I don't think so, maybe later.

*Q: Okay, thank you for an excellent and interesting interview.*

*End of interview*