The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

LAMBERT HEYNIGER

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is May 19, 1996. This is an interview with Lambert Heyniger, known as Nick. Let's sort of start at the beginning. This is being done on the behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Nick, just to start with, could you tell me where you were born and something about your family?

HEYNIGER: I was born on September 20, 1930 in Dobbs Ferry, New York. My father at that time was working for General Motors, but a few years later he decided to leave the business world and become a prep school headmaster. He got a loan from Mr. Sloan and Mr. Kettering and bought what had been a Shaker community in upstate New York near the Massachusetts border. So I really grew up in the country in upstate New York in what had been a Shaker settlement.

Q: What was the name of the School?

HEYNIGER: Darrow.

Q: Was your father teaching there or was it running or what?

HEYNIGER: He was the headmaster, and he became moderately well-known in secondary school circles because even though he had a degree in civil engineering, after college he had gone to China in 1916 as a teacher. One of the things he did when he took over this Shaker settlement and turned it into a boys school was to start a course in Asian history, which very few schools in the States had at this time. I'm speaking about the mid 1930's. He also believed very strongly in the Shaker work ethic and wanted boys to have the experience of working with their hands and getting dirty and sweaty, so all of us at the...
school one afternoon a week got out of the classroom, got out of the library, and did hard manual labor.

_Q: Did you go there?_

HEYNIGER: I went there until the fact that I was the son of the headmaster became a complication for both of us, and then I was sent away to a totally different school in New Jersey which was very sophisticated and very cosmopolitan. I had an entirely different educational experience there. It is called Lawrenceville. I was there for three years and then was lucky enough to be admitted to Princeton.

_Q: That was sort of the treadmill, from Lawrenceville to Princeton.

HEYNIGER: Yes indeed. I matriculated in 1949. Our entering class was about 750, and there were 48 of us from Lawrenceville. I think if you took Andover, Exeter, Deerfield, and Lawrenceville together, it was about a third of the class.

_Q: I went to somewhat the same thing. I went to Camden and then to Williams. What did you take? What were some of your interests while you were at Darrow and then Lawrenceville and then on to Princeton?_

HEYNIGER: I would say at Darrow, the things that were the most fun for me were history, English, and languages and the things that were the most difficult were math and science. I think that is also true at Lawrenceville where I scraped through plane geometry and was lucky to do so, but won a prize in Advanced English.

If I could digress for a second, one of the things I think my two sisters and I gained from our childhood was that my mother used to read to us for a half hour every night before dinner including Sunday, and not just kid stuff. I mean we got "The Wind in the Willows" and the "Little Red Shoes" and "The house on the Prairie," but we also got Milton's "Paradise Lost" and most of Robert Louis Stephenson. The result was that when I got to high school, the teacher would hold up his hand and say how many people have read thus and such? I was the only one. He would say "for heaven's sake where did you read that?" I would say "I had it read to me."

When I got to college, I was also sent by my parents to Europe through the Experiment in International Living in Putney, Vermont, and I spent one summer in Switzerland, 1948, and another summer in rural southern France, 1951. Those two summer experiences were very significant for me, particularly being told by people in France that the First and Second World Wars had really exhausted France's capacity in world affairs, and it was now the responsibility of us in the New World to get more involved. As a result, I applied for and was lucky enough to be admitted to the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton and majored in politics, economics, history and sociology.
Q: Were there any sort of specialties during this time or emphasis like the United Nations or Europe or what have you that you got in the Woodrow Wilson School?

HEYNIGER: Not particularly. The Woodrow Wilson School was established to fulfill Woodrow Wilson's belief in Princeton in the Nation's Service. Every year we had to take one domestic conference or seminar and one international one and shift back and forth. I think the school was trying very hard to prepare people not only for service in Washington, but also at the State and local level. As is true at Princeton, there was an emphasis on being able to talk about what you were reading or what you were researching. At the Woodrow Wilson School, you also had to demonstrate you could work as part of a team.

Q: Did you find yourself specializing in anything particular there?

HEYNIGER: No I didn't. I knew I wanted to go into the Foreign Service if I could, but I didn't know exactly what. At Princeton one has to write a senior thesis, and being in the Woodrow Wilson School and not majoring in any definite academic department it was a little hard, but I interviewed with professors mainly in the History Department. There was one young professor who said that he was interested in the period between W.W.I and W.W.II, and, with my knowledge of French, that if I were interested, he would like to have me write my thesis on fascism in France, let's say between 1925 and 1939.

That's what I ended up writing my thesis on, and it was a marvelous experience because I did what I thought was a good bit of research and came into his office late in December and said "there you are, sir, 50 pages of glowing prose." I came back a week later and he said "Heyniger, my eight year old daughter can do better work than this." I was really terrified. I ran back to the library and stayed at the University during spring vacation. I went to the New York Public Library and researched French newspapers of the 1930's.

I also went to the French Consulate General in New York City and asked permission to go around their library and found books written by French Fascists which had not even had the pages cut. One of the senior librarians came around and said, "Mr. Heyniger, why are you doing this?" I said, "I am writing my thesis for college." She said, "I've been instructed to ask you if you plan to publish." I said, "no certainly not. I'm doing this to fulfill academic requirements." Even at that time, 1952-1953, the French were quite concerned about this particular aspect of their history. I also got a professor in the modern languages department to work with me on translating and polishing the translations of French texts. As a result, when I turned this paper in that spring with trembling hands and came back a week later to find out if I were going to pass, my professor said, "Heyniger, your thesis is being read for a prize in the History Department." It was just great.

Q: You graduated from college when?

HEYNIGER: 1953.
Q: The Korean War was just finishing up then.

HEYNIGER: Yes, all of us at that time had taken exams and gotten deferments to finish college. As soon as it was over, most of my friends went into the ROTC or the NROTC. Another thing that was very fashionable at that time was to become a Marine platoon commander, but my father, the stern headmaster, said "I'm not sending you to college to study military science, besides which you come from a family which has been around for awhile. You've had as good an education as you can get. Seeing that you plan to go into the diplomatic service, I think it would be a very good idea for you, young man, to go into the service as a private and have some sergeant push your face into the mud for a couple of years." I said, "Oh, okay," because we all did in that generation. I made out all right, though. I went into the Army as a private; I volunteered for the draft. I ended up getting into the Counter Intelligence Corps and being assigned to Austria as a counter-intelligence agent, which was actually a lot of fun. This was '53-'55.

Q: A little about that. What was your impression of Austria at that time?

HEYNIGER: I served both in Salzburg and in Linz. Salzburg was a fairly sleepy town which came alive every summer for the Salzburg festival. Linz, being a small town and not much going on in Austria during that period, we did various things. I was involved in refugee screening. I did some surveillance of Army people who were suspected of supplying information to the Soviets.

The Counter Intelligence Corps detachment in Vienna was supplied by Army sedans with false bottoms because we couldn't bring stuff into Vienna on what was then called the Mozart Train as there were both American, British, French and Russian MP's on that train. Instead, our detachment in Linz took turns every week driving these sedans into Vienna. You would drive up to the checkpoint, and they would take down the time exactly that you left the checkpoint. Then you drove from Linz through the Soviet zone to Vienna passing by columns of Soviet infantry and Soviet checkpoints and camps holding your breath. Then you arrived in Vienna and you were checked through to show exactly how much time you had spent. So, it was fun.

Q: You left Austria in 1955 was it? Had the peace treaty made any difference? The Austrian peace treaty.

HEYNIGER: Well, that happened after I left, and the only thing it meant was that I was lucky enough to be among the last American soldiers to serve in the Austrian occupation. I think less than a year later, we were all out of Austria.

Q: Well now, you came out in '55, whither?

HEYNIGER: The Army agreed to release me earlier than usual because I was still interested in getting into the Foreign Service, and I knew that to get into the Service I had to know more economics and statistics than I did. I had signed up for and been accepted
in summer school at Columbia University. They let me out a bit early, and I spent the summer of '55 in New York at Columbia.

Then I went back to Princeton for a year of graduate study at the Woodrow Wilson School, which was a mistake. I should have gone someplace else like the Littauer School or Fletcher or Johns Hopkins or someplace like that. But, at that point, I was proud, and I didn't want my parents to pay for my education anymore, and Princeton offered me a scholarship. With the scholarship and the GI Bill I could do it without asking them for any more money, so I went back to Princeton. I was there for about nine months, the first half of a two year program, and a very good Foreign Service Officer, I'll never forget him, his name was Albert Franklin, came up to Princeton and said I can't tell you why but get out of graduate school and get in to the Foreign Service now. So, I did, and entered on duty on the fourth of July in 1956, and the next month the State Department created two new classes, but since we had come in as 6's we were not bucked down to 8's.

Q: I want to ask when did you take the written exam for the Foreign Service?

HEYNIGER: I first took the written examination in 1952 when it was a 3 ½ day exam, when getting into the Foreign Service was really difficult. It was during the McCarthy era, and out of all of us at Princeton who were interested in a Foreign Service career only one passed the exam. That was George Andrews. Then I went into the military and spent two years mostly reading comic books, skiing in Austria and climbing mountains. I took the exam again in 1955 and passed and took the orals and passed.

Q: Could you tell me a bit about the oral exam? Do you remember any of the questions that were asked?

HEYNIGER: I certainly do. I remember how rigorous yet how considerate the examiners were. I was applying for admission from the State of New York, and therefore they proceeded to ask me a number of questions about the Revolutionary War history of New York State. I was really up against it because I never took any American history in college. You know, the usual two years in high school, but in college I had taken diplomatic history and world history, that sort of thing. I really did not do very well. They said for example, Mr. Heyniger you can't give us any detail about the Battle of White Plains? I said I'm sorry, sir. They also were interested in seeing how much economics I knew which was not very much, but they said okay we'll take a chance on you. Particularly since I was a veteran, I got in through veteran's preference.

Q: So you came in July of 1956. Could you characterize your class; what kind of people were they and sort of what impression the class made on you?

HEYNIGER: We at that time were the largest entering class that had ever come into the Foreign Service. There were a lot of us, 42. There were 41 young men and one woman which is sort of typical I guess for the times. It was a very broad class. There was one young man who had been an automobile salesman in St. Louis. There was another who
had been a high school principal in Alaska. There was another who had an absolutely brilliant career in the Foreign Service named Don Toussaint who had been working, this is long before the Peace Corps, working in Africa and had married the daughter of a British PC, a Political Commissioner in West Africa. So it was very interesting to be with these people. We had people from all over the country with all different kinds of university backgrounds and working experiences.

I think one of the most unifying things is that all of us had had military service, and most of us had been overseas in military service. We stuck together. Out of our class of 42 only seven were assigned abroad; all the rest were assigned to the Department. We kept in touch. I don't know if you remember there used to be a restaurant right across the street from the State Department that served blintzes. We used to get together once a month and have lunch together at Rich's Blintzes.

Q: Oh yes. Where were you assigned?

HEYNIGER: I was initially assigned, it was Eisenhower's re-election campaign time, and I was first assigned to the Passport Office on a special project to look for people who might have relatives abroad who might have claims to American citizenship. I spent about three months the summer of '56 and the early fall working in the passport office sort of researching these people.

Then I was re-assigned to the Visa Office. The visa office at that time was very largely civil service. I was one of the very few Foreign Service people there. The boss was a wonderful Foreign Service Officer named Roland Welch. He, I think, was a career minister and long time consular officer. We all had our little specialties. Mine was non-immigrant visas. We had a new category coming along called exchange visitor visas, and I was assigned to learn all about that. I ended up going back as a very junior officer to FSI to lecture every month on exchange visitor visas and the special circumstances for this special visa category.

I remember Roland Welch saying to me, Nick, the best fun is when you have a post of your own. I had great respect for him because he was the kind of officer who when in charge of an embassy or a consulate general, he knew that Friday afternoon was the toughest time in the consular section because you are trying to get your immigrant visas issued before the end of the working day. Lots of times he would go down to that section, roll up his sleeves and say, "okay, what needs to be done?" He would fingerprint people; he would do whatever part of the immigrant visa process needed to be done. Yet he was the boss. I really respected that.

Q: Did you have any feel for the impact of the McCarthy period? It was beginning to run out, but on what visa processing you were involved in, in Washington.

HEYNIGER: Well, the Visa Office was on the lower floors of an outlying building of the State Department. Above us was the Security Office with Scott McLeod. I was very
surprised about a month after I got to the Visa Office, I was summoned up to the Security Office where they proceeded to ask me about one of my fellow graduate students. I felt kind of uncomfortable about this. I didn't expect that I was going to be cross examined about the private life of a graduate school colleague of mine who had applied for admission to the Foreign Service. This was the time of the McCarthy period and John Foster Dulles and there was great concern about security and the Communist threat. That context was very prevalent. When we were young consular officers we worked under the McCarran Walter Act with its 21 categories of ineligibility, and having emerged from the visa office, when I got into the field, I suppose I was a little obnoxious having lectured at the institute about all the things consular officers shouldn't do, I was perhaps a little overcautious when I got to the field. There were many concerns about security that were reflected by that act and the way we were instructed to administer it.

Q: How long were you in Washington?

HEYNIGER: '56-'58, in the visa office.

Q: Was Frank Auerbach in the visa office at that time?

HEYNIGER: Absolutely. He was the legal counsel for them and a regular lecturer. He was the one who also did a lot of dealing with lawyers who were specializing in immigration questions, testifying on the Hill. I believe he wrote a book about visa law and practice. He was the senior statesman from a law and practice point of view in the office. My own boss was a woman named Hallie Mae Pryor. She was awfully good, too. She was in charge of non-immigrant visas and these people knew their stuff. A lot of what we did was to get OM's from consuls in the field requesting advice on how to handle particular cases, finer points of law and regulation. Our job was writing OM's, office memorandums, written form as opposed to telegraph, going by snail mail, back to Manila to advise an American consul there on whether to issue a particular visa.

Two things that I remember from that period that people might be interested in. OM's came in seven copies, and they had to be typed without error because you couldn't go back and make erasures on seven copies, and particularly during the summer months in July and August, we had no air conditioning, the temperature was about 95. One of the secretaries would get about to the last line of an outgoing operations memorandum and make a typo and have to do the whole thing over again. The other thing I remember was that when we wrote a more important dispatch or regulation or a letter to a Congressman. At that time on the top floor of the State Department there was a correspondence screening section with ladies who screened your correspondence for spelling, grammar, clarity, precision, and would send stuff back to you if they didn't think it was up to State Department snuff.

Q: In '58 where did you go?
HEYNIGER: In '58 all of us got our assignments. Mine was to Amman. I had just gotten married a couple of months before to a young lady who was quite well-traveled herself. I came back and said guess what, we're going to Amman. She said where's that? When she found out and spoke with her parents who were Washingtonians of long standing, they were really quite concerned. At that time, 1958, Amman, the capital of Jordan, was really a distant hardship post. I remember when we got organized, we not only took our clothes and furniture and soap and canned goods and all that kind of stuff, we were advised by the Embassy we should bring space heaters. We said what are they?

Q: I like to get this at the beginning of each post. You were there from '58 to...

HEYNIGER: To '60.

Q: When you got there what was the situation politically and economically in Jordan?

HEYNIGER: When I got there, the situation in Jordan was very difficult. In fact my wife was held up in Paris and never got to join me for the first six months. I was sent on to Cairo, and stayed there for about a week until they could figure out what to do with me. They got me on a plane for Beirut. The situation in the Middle East was in flames because young King Faisal in Iraq had just been assassinated July 14, 1958. At that time Jordan was preparing to join with Iraq. King Faisal and King Hussein were going to rule both countries together. This was particularly a great shock for Jordan. The American Marines were in Lebanon. There was a British paratroop brigade in Jordan. Lebanon was somewhat in a state of civil war, and here I am arriving at the airport in Beirut. The Embassy driver who was a local employee said Mr. Heyniger, I'm going to drive you into the Embassy, but would you mind lying on the floor of the car. I said sure but why? He said, well they have been firing from the apartment buildings along the highway just across the road. So I did, and I got there. I was held up in Beirut for about a week and then was put on a plane to Jerusalem. I got as far as Jerusalem and that was it. There were no aircraft going as far as Amman, so the Consulate General phoned up the Embassy in Amman and said we've got your new Consular Officer, but the only way we can get him to you is by taxicab. Will you pay for it? I remember the administrative officer who was a wonderful guy named Fred Cook growled back, "He better be worth it." So, I arrived in Amman in July or August of 1958 where I joined two other young officers. There were three of us arriving at the post; this is a fairly small post, at the same time. One of them was Bob Keeley who went on to have a very distinguished career in the Foreign Service. He was the Political Officer. Charlie O'Hara was the GSO, General Services Officer, and myself as the new Consular Officer. I remember one particular vignette. I had a superb staff working for me of Foreign Service local employees. They were wonderful; I'll tell you about them later. The first day I showed up at the Consular Section, my chief clerk Nadia Khoury, who had joined the Foreign Service as a local employee in 1928 in Jerusalem, and she looked at me and said, "If I had ever thought that when I joined the American Foreign Service that someday I would be working for somebody who wasn't even born yet, I would have given the whole thing up."
Q: Who was the Ambassador then?

HEYNIGER: We had no Ambassador. We were between Ambassadors. The Chargé, a very nice officer but one who had no previous experience in the Arab world and no previous experience in running an Embassy, was having a tough time. He had staff meetings daily. Everybody in the Embassy was supposed to be out in the souk, that is the market, with their contacts in their particular operational field looking for information because it was a very dicey situation.

Q: What was the evaluation when you arrived there and talked to the other officers about the survivability of King Hussein?

HEYNIGER: I would have to say that most of the senior officers at the Embassy were not particularly sanguine that the King was going to be around a long time. There were many problems that he faced, critical situations. In the first place he was a Bedouin Arab trying to rule a country in which the majority of the population were Palestinians. His father had been committed to an insane asylum. He was very young, younger than I was. He was married and divorced. The same type of political threat that had overcome Faisal in Iraq was facing him in Amman.

There is a wonderful story. It brings tears to my eyes every time I remember it. I think some time about a year or so before I arrived, Hussein had learned that there was a revolt brewing at the main army base outside of Amman. He quickly made up his mind what he was going to do. He went out to this army base, drove himself out. When he got out there, he drove into the middle of the camp and climbed on top of a tank, and the soldiers and officers and everybody else came and gathered around this tank. There were thousands of these Bedouin tribesmen, many of them had been in Glubb Pasha's Arab Legion, who were the rank and file of the Jordanian army. Hussein, who is a very short man, got up on top of this tank and looked around at all of these soldiers and he said, "I am your king, either shoot me or follow me." To a Bedouin Arab, this is an incredible act of courage. The soldiers themselves ended the incipient revolt from these junior grade officers. That was the end of that. He secured his position within Jordan with that act at that time.

Economically, Jordan was in extremely difficult shape. You can imagine as Ambassador Richard Parker, who was the desk officer for Jordan at the time, told me. He said, "Nick, Amman lies between the desert and the sown." I sure saw that when I got there. It really is on the edge of the desert. They don't really produce anything. They were exporting a little phosphate and some other minerals, but it was a desperately poor country with sociologically speaking a number of different, powerful tribes. I don't think that most Americans are aware that deserts, while they can be extremely hot places, they can also be extremely cold places. Every year a number of these Bedouin tribesmen froze to death. It was a very tough life.

Q: Well now, what was sort of the spirit of the Embassy?
HEYNIGER: The spirit in the Embassy was very good I must say. Here we were, all of our wives and children were either stopped from coming to post or evacuated. It was just us men; there were no ladies in the Embassy at all. We probably worked all of us about 12 hours a day. We relaxed together, did a lot of things together socially. We were a very tight unit. We got along very well. I think in part because of the security pressures. It was very interesting service. I could bore you terminally with stories about being a Consular Officer there. In terms of what a Consular Officer does and what I was doing in a small far flung post like American Embassy Amman, Jordan, it was a fantastic experience because during my two year tour, I think that almost everything that can happen to a young Consular Officer happened to me. For example, not only were there lines outside my office every working day for the two years that I was there of young Jordanians and Palestinians who were desperate to get away and further their education in the United States and to try to make a new life for themselves, with endless possibilities for evading the quite strict visa regulations of the time. There were hundreds of thousands of refugees who were desperate to get to America to Canada or Australia or somewhere.

Q: You are talking about Palestinian refugees from Israel.

HEYNIGER: That's right. There were no immigrant visas being issued in Jerusalem so I was the Immigrant visa issuing officer for that region as well. The quota at that time, I think the regular quota for Israel was 100, then there was a quota for Palestine of 100, and a quota for Jordan of 100. We in the Embassy in Amman were issuing most of the visas for all three of those countries including Israel. The visas on the Israeli quota were being issued in Amman. Tremendous pressure as well on issuing refugee visas, so endless lines and endless efforts of people to bribe me or to do whatever they could to get a visa. That was kind of tough to deal with.

There was an American airline that crashed. Air Jordan at that time advertised itself to the world as the airline that flies below sea level because en route from Jerusalem or Damascus or Beirut to Amman, they would go down and fly by the Dead Sea, and actually fly below sea level. One of these flights did not make it back up over the mountains on the eastern edge of the Dead Sea. That was a plane with an American pilot and co-pilot and many of the passengers on the plane. It was my first experience as a young officer of going to an Arab Legion Quonset hut and seeing these people, this was in the wintertime, there was no heat in this hut, and here were the few survivors of this plane crash. I think there were about 40 people on the plane and about eight or nine of them survived, lying there in a Quonset hut with no heat. It was really tough.

Lots of times young Jewish boys and girls would go over from the United States to Israel to work in a kibbutz for the summer, and on their day off they would go out to walk around. Some of them sort of lost their direction and ended up walking over the demilitarized zone between Israel and Jordan and were promptly scarfed up by the Jordanian Army and transported to a Foreign Legion type of stockade out in the middle of the Arabian desert. I would be asked to go out there 70 miles into the Arabian Desert and arrive at one of these forts and try to comfort and provide assurance for one of these
young American kids who was really pretty shook up in that situation. I remember the officers who served at these posts were all officers who had served under Glubb Pasha in the Arab Legion. They were big chunky guys with mustaches. They said don't worry Mr. Consul; we have no bad intentions. Two or three days and your citizen will be back. That was fascinating.

Terrible automobile accidents out in the desert of tourists going back and forth along the circuit from Beirut to Damascus to Amman to Petra and other tourists sites. One time my Consular clerk came in and said Mr. Heyniger, we have a ship captain here. I said "good heavens. We are in the middle of the Jordanian desert. Show him in," and he came in. It was an American merchant vessel that docked at Aqaba with a sailor who wanted to get off the ship. American sailors abroad must be discharged before an American Consul, so we quickly got out that section of the manual.

Oh it was great; we had the full complement of stuff. I was issued a Consular Commission for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan which arrived and was sent over to the Royal Palace. In due course I got back an Exequatur signed by King Hussein authorizing me to administer oaths in his kingdom. I remember such wonderful stories. One time the Anglican Archbishop came over because he was going to the States and he needed a visa. We had a pleasant chat and issued him his visa. We looked as he signed his name on the visa application. He signed it Campbell of Jerusalem. That was his signature.

**Q:** While you were there, what was the attitude of the Embassy in Amman toward Israel and our Embassy in Tel Aviv too?

**HEYNIGER:** Well, it was difficult because the regulations of the time were that if you went to Israel and got an Israeli entry stamp in your passport, you would not be readmitted into Jordan. There wasn't much travel between the Embassy in Amman and Tel Aviv or Damascus or Beirut or Cairo or anywhere else. It was fun to go to Jerusalem and we all did from time to time and wander around the holy places and talk with our counterparts serving in the Consulate General there which at that time was both in the old and new city. There were many people living in Amman at that time who had lived in Israel prior to '48. I suppose that serving so close to Israel, we got a lot of opinions from local people about Israel which we tried to take with a grain of salt. It was not until our last two months at the post that I and another officer were permitted to go. I took my family car, and we drove over to Israel, and we had a wonderful time in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv driving around to all of the holy places up there. You got a bit of a different impression. This was back in the mid 50's, so the creation of the State of Israel and the trauma of the wars and the displacement of refugees, all of the problems and the challenges and the difficulties for everybody were still pretty fresh.

**Q:** Well did you feel an almost anti-Israeli bias in a way? You all in the Embassy looked at Israel here Israel was responsible for a lot of the problems you were having. Were you getting it from the other people at the Embassy?
HEYNIGER: Not particularly, no. We got a wonderful Ambassador when he finally arrived, Ambassador Sheldon Tibbetts Mills who was an old time, old line career Ambassador. I remember when his appointment was announced, Fred Cook the administrative officer sent a telegram to Washington saying, “Mr. Ambassador, who would you like to bring with you when you present your credentials?” He sent this telegram back saying, “I've always thought it was a beneficial experience, particularly for junior officers, to take part in these occasions. Therefore, I plan for every commissioned officer in the Embassy to accompany me when I present my credentials.” We all had to run out to the souk in Amman and have morning clothes tailored for us. But, he was a career Ambassador with several ambassadorships under his belt. He was coming from Afghanistan. Our DCM was a former labor attaché. Our political officer was an Arabist, I think quite balanced. It's just that I think in many instances there is a problem for Foreign Service people that you, after all, have to live in a society. When that society has been traumatized, as people in both Jordan and Israel were, after awhile I suppose some of this begins to rub off on you. As a professional, you try to do your best to represent the United States and know what you are there for.

Q: Well you left there in 1960. As we close this section where did you go?

HEYNIGER: I wrote back to a friend of mine in the Department who was in Personnel and said, "I've been a good boy and soldiered along in a very difficult assignment. I wouldn't mind having a nice assignment for a change; see what you can do for me." Back came my orders assigning me as a second secretary at the American Embassy in The Hague.

Q: All right, we'll pick this up the next time in 1960. You were off to go to The Hague.

Today is May 21, 1997. Nick, you were saying there was something you had left out about Jordan. Could you go off on that?

HEYNIGER: Okay. There is one thing that I wanted to mention because I thought it would be of interest to both people who are interested in the Middle East and people who are interested in how Foreign Service work is done. Oftentimes I think that we Americans tend to think of the Arabs as "the Arabs." I wanted to point out that as a young consular officer in Jordan, I had five employees working for me in the Consular Section. The first one, as I mentioned, was a Russian Orthodox lady, born in Jerusalem, who began working in the Foreign Service in 1928 before I was born. My number two was a Maronite Christian from Lebanon. My number three was an Armenian young woman from Palestine. My number four was a Greek Orthodox woman. My number five, my runner, was a pure blooded Bedouin Arab. The five of us got along like clams, but we were all culturally different, and only one of us was a real Arab.

Q: Okay. Well, you were in The Hague from when to when?
HEYNIGER: I was in The Hague from 1960 to 1962. It was more or less a direct transfer although we did go home for home leave. The point I want to make here is that I was assigned to a Foreign Service Embassy as a young political officer but got no training and no briefing whatever.

Basically my duties in The Hague were three: number one, to prepare the weekly summary.

Q: Known as the WEEKA.

HEYNIGER: Yes. I did the WEEKA or at least the political side of the WEEKA. Number two, I was responsible for the smaller, more conservative and religious parties in Dutch politics. The senior officer in the political section handled the Catholic party, and the number two officer handled the Labor Party, and I handled the smaller parties. Number three, I was the liaison with the International Court of Justice, the protocol officer and the Ambassador's Aide etc. There were 12 political officers at The Hague, of whom only three were real; the other nine were CIA types.

Q: You raised the question, and I know it was way back, but what the hell were nine CIA operatives doing in this small friendly country? I assume it was sort of a regional thing or it was liaison or something like that.

HEYNIGER: Yes. I really have no idea. There were a lot of people in that Embassy, probably a few more than should have been there. I think that probably in a firm NATO ally country, most of them were declared.

I'll give you one interesting vignette. Through personal family connections in Washington, my wife and I were invited to have tea with Joseph Luns, who was the Foreign Minister. When the Embassy learned that its youngest and most junior officer had been invited by the Foreign Minister to have tea, they were a little surprised. One of the first things that happened when we got to the Luns's house was the Foreign Minister sat down with me and said, "Well Mr. Heyniger, where do you work, and who do you work for?" I told him and he smiled and said okay, now I know what you are (i.e., a real FSO, not a CIA type).

Q: Who was the Ambassador during the '60-'62 period?

HEYNIGER: That is an interesting question, because I had the opportunity while there to serve for two political appointees, one Republican and one Democrat. It was interesting to see the contrast as well as the advantages and disadvantages of political appointees. The Republican was Philip Young, who had gotten to know General Eisenhower when Eisenhower was President of Columbia. Mr. Young, who had been a senior officer with IBM, became Dean of the Business School. When Eisenhower became President, he made Philip Young head of the Civil Service Commission and later on appointed him as Ambassador to The Hague. After the election of 1960 when Kennedy came in, he
appointed the Secretary of State of the State of Pennsylvania, to be Ambassador to The Hague. The advantage with both these gentlemen, particularly Ambassador Young, the one with Eisenhower, is they have direct access to the President. When a Dutch official, particularly the Foreign Minister, wanted to go to Washington and see the President, our Ambassador could always arrange that. Whenever our Ambassador called up the White House and said our Foreign Minister is coming to Washington and would like to have an hour with the President, the President said fine. The disadvantage with this is that although these were both very intelligent, well-informed, very hard working people, neither of them had any previous foreign experience or knew anything about The Netherlands.

To a certain extent, that was mitigated by our DCM who was one of the finest officers I've ever had the privilege of serving with. His name was Dick Service. He was the brother of John Stuart Service, born of missionary parents in China, grew up speaking Mongolian as well as Chinese, and a seasoned and thoroughly experienced Foreign Service Officer who later met with disaster in his career through no fault of his own.

Q: What would you say was the political and economic situation in The Netherlands in 1960?

HEYNIGER: From an economic point of view The Netherlands, like most of the Western European countries, was coming out of the wartime and post-war period. The Marshall Plan was pretty much over. The Netherlands was pretty much back on its feet. It was a remarkably unified and remarkably disciplined and, even to an American, remarkably regulated economy. For example, let's say you were living in Rotterdam, and you got a job offer in Amsterdam, you couldn't just move and take the new job. You couldn't get housing in Amsterdam until the government approved it. This is the way things were in The Netherlands then. It is a very highly populated country, and it is very highly controlled. But, it was doing well economically, and we had very good economic and commercial relations with The Netherlands.

On the political side, the number one problem was that The Netherlands had already been more or less pushed out of Indonesia. Indonesia had become independent. The only thing the Dutch had in the East Indies was New Guinea. They were quite willing to leave New Guinea, but they wanted to leave New Guinea under reasonably gracious circumstances and not simply be pushed out by Sukarno and his government. The United States was attempting to do what it could to help both sides with this difficult sort of rite of passage. The problem was this was a bit difficult to handle either in The Hague or in Jakarta or in Washington. What happened eventually was that the parties agreed to undertake direct face to face negotiations outside Washington, and it was Bill Sullivan, who later became Ambassador Sullivan in Iran, who was the key person arranging those talks. The negotiations were taken out of our hands in The Hague.
Q: Did you find there were repercussions to our participation in these talks? Were the Dutch sort of giving you a rough time, I mean in your normal contacts with people who were aware within the Dutch society?

HEYNIGER: Yes, I think that is fair to say. The Dutch had seen themselves as a world power. Don't forget this is a small Western European country which had immense possessions and influence in a whole different area of the world which they had had for hundreds of years. They were going through the difficulty of being pushed out of this and becoming again a small Western European country. While I was there, for example, the Dutch had an aircraft carrier stationed off New Guinea to keep the Indonesians away from New Guinea. I suppose it is a little bit like the Arabs and the Israelis. The Dutch felt that we were not sufficiently sympathetic to their position, and perhaps the Indonesians felt that we were not sympathetic enough to theirs as well, but I think that a lot of people in The Netherlands felt that the United States, particularly under President Kennedy, were somewhat overly favorable toward independence and self determination in the new world and not sufficiently considerate of the contributions which the empire countries had made to the developing world.

Q: I think that is a fair estimate. At the time, the spirit was in the focus mainly on Africa, of course. The Kennedy Administration came in bubbling over with expectations of wonderful things in Africa. Particularly Bobby Kennedy was a torch bearer. While you were there from your perspective, were there any sort of glitches or particular political problems during the '60-'62 period between the United States and The Netherlands?

HEYNIGER: Stu, apropos of the remark you just made, let me give you one vignette. We were all serving as professional Foreign Service Officers in The Hague, and a delegation came through from Washington led by Bobby and Ethel Kennedy. We had a meeting with them in the Embassy. Bobby said, "We're happy to have you join us on the New Frontier." We professional officers looked at ourselves and didn't quite know what to say because we were accustomed to serving whatever administration was in power whether it was Republican or Democrat.

Now, to respond to your other question, what happened with me was that after about a year and a half, I began to see that some of the people that I had come into the service with were doing much more interesting and exciting and rewarding things than I was. Officers who were serving in the Philippines and Africa, Nigeria and places like that were having much more responsible and absorbing and interesting careers than I was. I was having a good time, but being the protocol officer in a large US Embassy in Western Europe has its limitations.

I didn't have any guidance. We had two chiefs of political section, but neither one of them was a Foreign Service Officer. The first one was a civil servant who had been brought with him by Ambassador Young and returned to Washington and never served abroad again. The second one was a "Wristonee" who was faced with having his civil service career frozen or going into the Foreign Service, so he did. He came to The Hague, but he had no previous foreign experience and no experience really supervising a political
section. He went on to have a brilliant career, became an Assistant Secretary of State. My point is that I didn't really get the kind of guidance and supervision that I needed.

I decided after a year and a half that I should get out of The Hague and reorganize my career. I went to my DCM and to the personnel people and they said oh no, you have been assigned here for four years, be happy. Washington told me that the only way I could get reassigned was to volunteer for hard language training, which I did. I was selected for training in Swahili and returned to Washington in 1962 to FSI for hard language training. Let me say one other thing. I was a bit too young and too inexperienced to perceive what I could have done to make my work a little more interesting. What happened was that a month after I left, the Embassy was informed, not asked but informed, that the Department of Labor was assigning a Labor Attaché to The Hague because the Department of Labor had found the Embassy's reporting on Dutch labor to be completely inadequate. Had I had more experience or more direction, I might have been told, Heyniger, get busy with the Dutch trade unions and be our labor man here, but that never happened. So, in 1962 I returned to Washington to study Swahili.

Q: Let's go back to The Hague for a minute. What was your impression of the small political parties. You say you were looking at them from the religious right was it? Can you describe what their attitude was toward Germany, NATO, America, you know within the beginning developing European Economic Union, and also how the religious parties fit in to the Dutch political situation.

HEYNIGER: In the first place, these small parties represented different branches of the Dutch Reformed Church, the Dutch Protestant Christian Reformed Church. Religion is a pretty complicated subject in The Netherlands as it is in many places. I think you could fairly categorize all of them as being rather conservative, not particularly happy with what was happening to The Netherlands in Europe, not particularly interested in European integration, not particularly interested in either economic or social change, a bit sort of clinging to traditional classical Dutch traditions and culture. They were important in the general scheme of things because there were two main parties, the Catholic and Labor Party who usually led governments but frequently were unable on their own to organize a government. Therefore, whichever of the larger parties were in power sort of had to make arrangements and understandings with some of these smaller conservative parties in order to form an effective government.

Q: How were you received by these party officials?

HEYNIGER: I think that they were always pleasant and friendly. I don't think they had a great deal of time for me except that I could sort of give them entree, make sure that their views were being reported to Washington. I attended a couple of political conventions which I found quite interesting.

One of the important things to learn as a young officer is to get out of the Embassy, and even get out of the Capital and get to where real life is going on. These conventions were
often held in the evening and were often held in places like Amsterdam, Enschede, Arnhem or places like this. There you did meet both the professional politicians and volunteers who were very concerned about who was going to lead their party and what their party stood for etc.

One more thing that I was proud of and that I would offer as a suggestion for junior officers is, particularly because I am Dutch by ancestry myself, I made a real effort to learn Dutch. We had an excellent teacher in The Hague, a wonderful woman. I did learn, and because I did, after about a year or so, I was offered membership in the Dutch Junior Chamber of Commerce on the condition that I get up on my feet and give a speech in Dutch. I did. At that time I was the only diplomat who had been permitted to join the Chamber of Commerce. It was a whole lot of fun for my wife and me because through that we sort of got out of the diplomatic circuit and we were really with young Dutch post-war businessmen who were not involved in foreign affairs, who were not involved in diplomacy, who were involved in trying to build up the country economically and commercially and who had an entirely different take on life. It was interesting.

Q: Coming back, you took Swahili from when to when and where?

HEYNIGER: I took Swahili from late 1962 to early 1963 at FSI which was then in the basement of a big apartment building near Rosslyn.

Q: It was called Arlington Towers.

HEYNIGER: Right down in the garage. Full time language study for six months. African languages were rather new for the Foreign Service at that time. I emerged with I think a 2-2 in Swahili after six months. FSI was trying an experiment and they gave some other friends of mine 10 weeks each of four different rather obscure African languages like Ki Luba and Ki Rundi. At the end of 40 weeks, these poor officers were totally confused and often didn't quite know what language they were speaking.

I enjoyed learning Swahili, which I think is a beautiful language. It is the native language of very few people. It is a lingua franca; it is a trading language. It is the language by which different tribes in East and Central and Southern Africa talk with each other, and in Zanzibar and around the coast in Dar es Salaam and places like that there is classical Swahili, there is Swahili poetry. It is a beautiful language. Every word ends with a vowel, so it runs together very nicely.

Q: How were you taught? Did you have a Swahili speaker and all?

HEYNIGER: We were taught in the then-classic Foreign Service Institute system which was to learn dialogs. There were no books; you didn't read anything. You sat down with a native Swahili speaker. Most of our instructors were young students from East Africa who were taking undergraduate or graduate courses in Washington and were doing this part time. They taught us to memorize these dialogs by heart. We spent months
memorizing dialogs and learning the basic structure of Ki Swahili, which is a concordial system somewhat like Latin in that there are five different classes of nouns, and the pronouns and the verbs and the adverbs all have to concord with the noun. We learned to repeat hundreds and hundreds of words of Swahili before we ever saw them in print.

Q: Well now, were you pointed toward somewhere?

HEYNIGER: I went over to the African Bureau after I had been in training for three or four months. I had a friend who had been a year ahead of me in college named Frank Carlucci who ultimately went on to become Secretary of Defense among other things, head of the Peace Corps. At that time he was the Assistant Desk Officer for the Congo. Not the Desk Officer but the Assistant Desk Officer. Frank said, "Nick, we need a man in Stanleyville. How about it?" I went back and spoke to my wife. Her parents were Washingtonians, rather conservative. We decided that Stanleyville, it was after all, Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness. We felt that might be a bit of a stretch especially since at that time we had two young, small children. It might be kind of tough and her parents might be kind of concerned, so I went back and talked with the Bureau and said is there any other place? They said, "we also need another officer in Elisabethville in Katanga. How about that?" So, we said, "fine!" In early 1963 my wife and two young children and I all set off for Elisabethville.

Q: You were in Elisabethville from when to when?

HEYNIGER: '63-'65.

Q: Incidentally Elisabethville today is called...

HEYNIGER: Lubumbashi.

Q: Who knows what it may be called in the future.

HEYNIGER: Yes at the moment it is Kabila's Headquarters, but who knows.

Q: How did you get there?

HEYNIGER: You have the feeling that you are flying over this sea of green for hours. We went Pan Am and flew Washington to New York, New York to Rabat. We had our two young children with us, also our dog, a Cairn terrier that we had in The Netherlands. We flew from Rabat to Liberia, Nigeria and a couple of other spots in between until we got to the capital of the Congo. At each stop, our daughter insisted on getting off the plane and going back to the cargo hold and making sure that the dog was there and all right. We stayed several days in, [it is now Kinshasa] Leopoldville being briefed, meeting the Embassy team there, and then on again via Pan Am from Leopoldville to Elisabethville. It took a good three hours in a big intercontinental jet just to fly from Leopoldville to Elisabethville. It is a huge country.
Q: We are going back to when you were back in Washington getting ready for this job briefing and learning the language. Can you give me a little feel from what you were learning about the AF bureau and others about “Whither Africa”. This was in the early 60's.

HEYNIGER: Yes. I think it would be more interesting to the listeners if I talk more about it after my assignment to Elisabethville. At that time, the African Bureau was really struggling because Africa was going through this traumatic period of independence and self determination. It was a new bureau; there wasn't that much background in African countries or officers with experience in Africa. The leadership of the bureau was political rather than career. In terms of the internal workings of the Department of State, at that time, the Bureau of European Affairs was rather predominant particularly because of our long standing ties with Europe as well as NATO. Parts of Africa were still either colonies or had barely become independent. The European Bureau had very definite interests in what our policies were toward parts of Africa, and their view usually prevailed which was kind of denigrating.

Q: When you were going out to the Congo, it was still the Congo then, what were you told to expect, and what was our concern that you were getting before you went out there?

HEYNIGER: Again, Stu, I have to say that it wasn't much. People sort of said "you have had several years in the service; you know more or less what to expect. Good Luck!" At that time you have to remember that going to Elisabethville was very difficult because Elisabethville had been the capital of an independent Katanga. I don't know if this independence was supported by the Belgian Government, but it was certainly supported by Union Minere and the Societe Generale de Belgique. America at that time had backed the central government in Leopoldville and was against this Katanga secession strongly. So, to some extent, my wife and I were moving into a hostile environment.

I remember particular little vignettes: my wife would go to town to buy food and would go to a store that would sell, for example butter, the lady in front of her would get a half kilo and then my wife would step up to the counter and the proprietor would say we don't have any. My wife would walk away and then the Belgian woman behind her would get her half kilo. Both the Africans and the Belgians were not happy to see us, and they were far from welcoming. It was a difficult environment.

Q: When you were in Leopoldville, you were sort of briefed before you went out, what sort of briefing were you getting?

HEYNIGER: Not too much. They were mostly focused on what life would be like at the post. They assumed you knew what American policy was. It was assumed that you knew all about the history and the background of the secession. I think that at least at that time and probably even more at this time, officers were expected to be familiar, to have read
books, magazine articles, and newspapers, and to be abreast of the situation and the background of the situation before you left for post. We only stayed in Leopoldville for two or three days. It was mostly to get briefings from Embassy officers on what they would like me to do, what kind of reporting they needed and what they would like me to do when I got there.

Q: Could you give a quick summary of what happened. You mentioned a secession attempt at Katanga.

HEYNIGER: You recall that the Belgians decided to leave the Congo in 1960, and they left it in absolutely terrible shape. I think at the time they left there were less than a score of Congolese who had university educations. The entire economic and commercial structure of the country had been in the hands of the Belgians. There weren't even many high school graduates. There was no middle class. There were a lot of people who were trained for manual labor, machinists, plumbers, carpenters, things like that, but very few people who had any experience or training with management, running things or organizing things, so it was a very difficult time for the Congo. Things went very slowly in terms of nation building and economic and social development while I was there.

Q: When you arrived, what was the situation in Katanga at the time in 1963?

HEYNIGER: Well to go back for a second, you recall that when the Congo became independent more or less under a coalition government, the government was taken over by a young and fairly wild-eyed radical named Patrice Lumumba who installed or tried to install a semi-socialist government and economy in the country. When he did that, the southeastern portion of the country, Katanga, didn't want to do this and seceded. The UN came in with thousands of troops. When I arrived in Elisabethville, for example, there were several battalions of Indian infantry; the MP's I think were Danish. There were wild-eyed Irishmen who were running the transport system. The airport control tower was being run by Canadian soldiers. This was a full fledged, flat out UN running of the entire province. There was very little if any political government at all, just the UN.

Q: Well now when you went there could you give me a little bit of the structure? Who was at the Consulate General, what were you doing, what were the jobs?

HEYNIGER: It was a small Consulate. There were no Consulate Generals in the Congo. There were only two State Department officers at Elisabethville. From that point of view it was a wonderful job and a wonderful experience because to use a term that I later learned in the Pentagon, we were a little "over challenged." We did everything, and we had twice as much to do as we could do. It was very interesting. For example, we had no courier service or classified pouch service with the outside world, and so the cable traffic between Washington and Elisabethville was greater than the cable traffic between Washington and Moscow. We did everything. We did political reporting, economic reporting, political military reporting, labor reporting. We did representation. I was a Consul, I was the number two at the post. I did whatever consular work needed to be
done, taking trips around the African bush to meet with tribal chiefs. It was a wonderful experience.

Q: Who was the Consul?

HEYNIGER: I had two officers that I worked for, both of whom went on to notable careers in the Foreign Service. One was Jonathan Dean, who was basically a European expert, who ended up in Vienna with multi lateral diplomacy in Western Europe at which he was very good. The second was Arthur Tienken who ended up as Chargé in Ethiopia and Ambassador to a couple of African countries. These at this time were mid-career officers who were being broadened and were learning management and supervisory skills. Both of them very interesting officers with whom to work.

Q: During this time was the UN there more or less the whole time you were there '63-'65?

HEYNIGER: No. When I first got there the UN was there in force. There were thousands of UN troops, but by '64, it was pretty much over. The situation had returned to Congolese affairs. I remember a couple of really lovely vignettes. One time a delegation of Africans came to the Consulate, and I happened to be in charge. They said, “Mr. Consul could you help us in organizing political parties because we really don't know how.” I sort of laughed and sat back in my chair and said, “I don't think that we diplomats are supposed to do that.”

There were also really "hairy" times because while I was there and actually while I happened to be in temporary charge of the Consulate, there was the Simba rebellion in the Eastern Congo, the Gazinge rebellion. I was in Elisabethville and Mike Hoyt was in Stanleyville, and we sort of wondered which of us was going to get over run first. Both of us made contingency plans to get out. Unfortunately my wife happened to pick that particular time to back our car into a telephone pole just when we were counting on it on an hourly basis to get out of the country and get to Northern Rhodesia.

Without any question the political and economic power in Katanga at that time was the Belgian mining company, Union Minere. Without the mines there would have been no Katanga. In fact, Elisabethville was never an African center. It was created by the Belgian mining interests because that is where the copper was. I went down and talked with Union Minere every day. We sort of had a pact that I wouldn't leave if they didn't and they wouldn't leave if I didn't.

I think the impression that I'm trying to give is that this was an extremely interesting period. It was extremely good training for a young officer, where I learned a number of aspects of Foreign Service work, but it was perhaps a little too "hairy." We had a third child born at a very rudimentary Belgian nun's clinic there, and it was a very nervous time. I remember one time for example I had been there for about six months or so and a Scandinavian couple came over to visit with us at our home. They said "we are leaving
and you are staying, and we thought you should have this." They laid this parcel on our living room coffee table. We said "what's that?" They said "open it up and see." We opened it up and there was a full-fledged Thompson submachine gun, that fires .45 caliber slugs, and about 500 rounds of ammunition. I picked this thing up; it weighed a ton. They said, “you may need this.”

Q: I'm trying to get a picture of were there any Congolese people you had contact with at that time?

HEYNIGER: Yes, starting in 1964, because then the government really became African again. You have to remember there were very few Congolese businessmen. The political, public officials were very poorly educated and poorly trained. We had a great deal of contact with the Congolese military; we were often in touch with them on a daily basis. We maintained contacts with the expatriate community there. The two basic things that were going on in Katanga during that period were number one, mining and number two, trying to emerge from a very turbulent post independence environment and situation and just sort of get down to the business of trying to develop a country with very few trained people.

Q: What was you impression of the Congolese military?

HEYNIGER: Very poor, but to be fair, not their own fault. For example, I had previous experiences as Vice Consul in Jordan becoming familiar with the Jordanian military who I thought were terrific. Well trained by the British, had been sergeants and sergeant majors and subalterns and junior officers for the British in Palestine and the Near East. Whereas, these men who were trying to be captains and majors and colonels had been perhaps corporals under the Belgians. They had never had any training, had never had any experience, had never been taught how to run a battalion, how to manage a garrison, how to patrol or to administer a territory. They had no idea, no training, no education.

Q: Was there concern, picking this latter part after the UN left with what the military might do? I mean among those things about troops that are not well led, looting and raping seems to be on the agenda if one isn't careful. These guys have got guns.

HEYNIGER: I don't think that was a particular concern then, but has become endemic in the Congo since then. At that time I happened to be in the Congo and in Katanga when there were thousands of UN troops there who effectively maintained order. Thereafter, I think people were too tired and too traumatized to get involved in overthrowing the government and looting or anything like that. The Belgian mercenaries had all left. Many of the European expatriates had left. The Congolese military were from the Western Congo, from Leopoldville, who were on unfamiliar ground and certainly had no interest in rebelling against the central government. Without the mercenaries and without backing from the Belgian expatriate economic and commercial structure, there weren't any Congolese who were going to rebel against Leopoldville. That was over. It was just that
there was a great deal of social upheaval and trauma, and things basically needed to settle down.

Q: How was the economic function working? In many ways I would think when you are down in Elisabethville, you were really looking at the Rhodesians or whatever they are called. Southern Rhodesia was not independent; it was a white run country. Was this sort of the center of gravity there and also the extraction of minerals.

HEYNIGER: Very good question. The answer while I was there is that before and after the Simba rebellion, Union Minere continued its mining operations relatively undisturbed. They let me go down and visit some of the mines which I found absolutely fascinating. There were mines under Elisabethville where the mine shaft went down thousands of feet, and there were huge underground chambers with huge Belgian turbines working in them. Then they took me along some mine shafts and showed me what they were bringing out. The ore which they were extracting was so rich in uranium and other sexy minerals that the ore on the conveyor belt was giving off sparks and flashes as it went by. Just the ore; it was fantastic. But, the economy of then southeastern Congo and what was then northern Rhodesia was the copper belt. It was in the business of mining copper and other minerals and exporting them mainly along the Benguela railroad to Angola and from Luanda out to Europe. That continued. Northern Rhodesia was a British colony.

The British were having a particularly difficult time because their post in Elisabethville had both career British officers as well as colonials from Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia. There was an officer from Southern Rhodesia who maintained absolutely stolidly that Southern Rhodesia would never become independent, and that this self determination trend would stop with the Congo. So, there was a lot of discussion and tension with that.

We got a lot of our supplies, we used to send a van or station wagon or pickup truck from Elisabethville down to Kitwe every week to pick up supplies. We got a great deal of our supplies from the Northern Rhodesian copper belt.

Q: Could you talk about your perspective and what it was, the Simba movement?

HEYNIGER: I think it was basically a combination of two things. A great factor in African politics at that time was tribalism and the centrifugal force of tribalism as a feature in African politics coupled with sort of the socialist versus capitalist approach to the economy. The Gizenga Simba revolt as we saw it was an attempt by eastern and socialistic Congolese to gain a measure of self determination from the, at that time, [I'll tell you a little later on how Lumumba was killed], more western, more capitalist government under Kasavubu. It was primarily an effort by the eastern Congo to become more independent from central government control.
Q: How did you view the Simba movement? On the ground, Gizenga was the man's name, How did you see this? Was this a normal political sort of movement or was this as far as you were concerned, you were talking about getting out.

HEYNIGER: Yes. I think the Embassy was very concerned about the Gizenga and Simba movement and saw it as a real threat not only to the country but to us Foreign Service people. Definitely it was my understanding that if the Gizenga forces really approached Elisabethville, we were not going to stay. The entire staff of the American Consulate would have evacuated to Northern Rhodesia without any question. We weren't just going to sit there and attempt to deal with the Gizenga forces. The Embassy had instructed us not to do that.

Q: I talked to Mike Hoyt and he was told to stay.

HEYNIGER: I think Mike was told to stay partially because there wasn't anywhere really that he could go except for getting on a river boat and trying to make it from Stanleyville back to Leopoldville. We in Elisabethville had the option of getting out of the Congo and getting to Northern Rhodesia in about an hours drive. I must say I don't think we got a lot of instruction from the Embassy as to what to do. I think that they sort of said "look, you are in charge." I was a young and junior officer but I was in charge. We were between Consuls. They just said "Nick, use your best judgment. You do what you think is best for your post."

Q: Essentially you were just sitting there. The people you could talk to were the Union Minere. This was sort of the other power there. Were there many other Consulates there, and what was their attitude?

HEYNIGER: When you talk about other powers let me just interject for a minute and say that we were also in very close touch with the Congolese military who were very nervous. They did not know what to do. They were in the process of psyching themselves up for a last ditch defensive effort. The British were the main ones there and they were also quite concerned and were planning to evacuate if Elisabethville were threatened. The Union Minere people, as I say we conferred every day. They were going to shut down operations and move their people out.

Q: What was the concern about the Simba movement?

HEYNIGER: In the first place that it was using violence to achieve its ends, and secondly that it sort of represented militant socialism. Union Minere was a very capitalistic enterprise. In effect, it was African rural revolution. At that time back in the early 60's, difficult to cope with.

Q: We had an interview and he's written a book where Mike Hoyt talks about this when he was taken over in a Consulate and they were lined up and threatened with death.
These are pretty scary people. They finally had to be rescued by a military operation by the Americans and Belgians.

HEYNIGER: I happened to be in Leopoldville at the time. A new Consul had arrived, Art Tienken, and Ambassador Mac Godley wanted us officers who had been out in the field to come up to Leopoldville periodically to inform the Embassy about what was going on out in the bush and to get informed as to what was going on at the Embassy. Mac was very kind and put me up in his residence.

It was while I was at his residence in Leopoldville that the Belgian paratroopers, flown in by the American Air Force, landed in Stanleyville and freed Mike Hoyt.

Q: Along with a number of Europeans, and missionaries.

HEYNIGER: Exactly.

Q: Some had already been killed. They were all under great stress and great danger.

HEYNIGER: The Ambassador and the Embassy were under great strain too because they had told Mike that he should stay there, and then seen him taken prisoner and threatened with execution. When the paratroopers went in and found Mike alive and freed him and the other missionaries and expatriates, I think an enormous weight was lifted from Mac and the Embassy's shoulders. They said, "Nick, we're going to have a party tonight."

Q: What is made, because you know as we talk today a former Simba has just taken over the Democratic Republic of the Congo which has just been named in the last ten days or so, we are talking about current history of 1997, a man named Kabila. Much has been made of news analysis and all that we supported the Mobutu government during much of the intervening years because of the East-West conflict, and we were concerned about the Soviet influence. Could you talk a bit about the atmosphere? What were your concerns about Soviet influence here in the heart of Africa?

HEYNIGER: I'm not the best person to talk about this because I was a fairly young officer serving at a fairly isolated post, but the context, as you recall, was very much a Cold War context. An East-West struggle which was going on not only in Europe but in Africa, the Middle East, the Subcontinent, and in Asia. It really was a situation of us “westerners” versus them “easterners” in many different respects in terms of foreign aid, in terms of votes in the UN General Assembly, in terms of the education and outlook of the people who were beginning to take over the administration and the economy of these developing countries. Whether they went in a generally Western and free enterprise and pro democratic direction or whether they went in a more Easterly or socialistic, collective direction was extremely important. It was important in the Congo for decades. This was happening in many parts of the developing world.
Q: Were any reports coming in while you were down in Elisabethville of Communist agents working in there with the miners etc.

HEYNIGER: No I don't believe that was a factor in Katanga at that time. Union Miniere was too much in control for that. The context again is that shortly after the Congo's independence, Katanga seceded with strong support from European financial and business interests, and defied the central government for several years necessitating massive intervention by the United Nations with military force. The United Nations was fighting in Katanga, and the United States strongly supported that. Thereafter, it was mainly a question of local Katangans, who had been politically powerful and important prior to the UN experience, who after the UN left were trying to reassert themselves and their interests, but without much success because the Leopoldville Congolese military and public officials were determined that there was going to be no further dissenting voices heard in Katanga and in Elisabethville. This is also in context you have to remember that this is the time when the Biafra war was gearing up in Nigeria.

Q: I think that was a little later.

HEYNIGER: Okay, but there were problems coming along in Nigeria. Although I never served there, Nigeria is a good example of a country with millions of people who belong to different and very strong tribes, thus creating political and social problems, difficult to deal with.

Q: Would you say and really correct me on this, I'm throwing something out and I want you to go back to the time and how you as a budding Africanist would feel in what you were getting from your colleagues. Would you say a strong article of faith of those dealing with it in Africa, that the boundaries may be awful, there may be all sorts of countries, but any attempt to try to realign the boundaries which had essentially been colonial boundaries would just result in such chaos that one, it would be bad for Africa and two, it would make for pleasant fishing for the Soviet Union.

HEYNIGER: I don't think at that time the American people or the American government and hence their representatives abroad were particularly interested in rearranging boundaries even in the interest of bringing tribes together. I think in some countries in West Africa half of the tribe is on one side of the border and half is on the other. Unlike Southeast Asia and Vietnam, I don't think the United States had that interventionist or even that active a foreign policy in Africa. We wanted to be there; we wanted to be represented; we wanted these countries to develop and to develop in a free and democratic and free enterprise way. I don't believe the United States ever had any real interest in playing post-colonial national politics in terms of re-doing countries.

Q: But on the reverse was there a feeling that we'd better keep it as it is and in opposition to any change in the boundaries by civil war or other methods.
HEYNIGER: Definitely. I think that this has been a significant feature of American foreign policy for a long time, sometimes honored more in the breach than not but I think that it is one of the basic tenants of American foreign policy, non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign countries, number one. Number two, being in favor of peaceful and orderly change rather than revolution, even though our own national history was based on the opposite, and of having politics in Africa be peaceful, democratic, and gradual, rather than violent and traumatic. I may be wrong, but I think this was true at that time almost everywhere in Africa. The exception is, as I mentioned, that under the Kennedy Administration, and I'll never forget President Kennedy was assassinated while I was in the Congo, we were strongly in favor of African independence and self determination. The independence of Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia and the difficulties that might have caused the British or the South Africans, we favored and they just had to deal with.

Q: Is it Moise Tshombe, was he a factor while you were there, or had he sort of passed from the scene?

HEYNIGER: By the time we got to Katanga, the more violent part of the secession was over. The UN was in control, and Tshombe had fled to Europe. Also you recall that the UN Secretary General at the time had been killed, Dag Hammarskjold, flying from Elisabethville over Northern Rhodesia and his plane crashed. But, in one of these twists of foreign politics, after I had been at the post for about 18 months, Tshombe came back, but he came back to Leopoldville, and in fact, became Prime Minister of the Congo.

Q: What was your impression of local government there?

HEYNIGER: Again I think that you have to look at this with some discretion and some experience in that the context was that the Belgians had not really anticipated independence. They hadn't prepared for it; they hadn't trained Africans in many areas. If I could make a contrast, not that this is an invidious comparison, but the British either in East Africa or in West Africa, whether we are talking about Kenya or we are talking about Nigeria, had trained many Africans as school teachers, as mid level public officials, as police officers. These Africans had been trained in their fields, and they thus had been public officials and administrators or lieutenants or captains in local armies.

There is a world of difference at that time between the King's African Rifles in Kenya and the Congolese Army. The same thing was true with regard to the educational system, the public service system, medical people. There were African doctors, nurses, pharmacists in East Africa. There weren't in the Congo. They just weren't there.

Q: What about corruption?

HEYNIGER: This has been something that Africans have struggled with perennially. It is a problem, you know, all of us struggle in life with different things. I can talk more about this when we get to Tanzania and Dar es Salaam, but it is a very difficult factor.
Q: We are talking about now when you were in Elisabethville.

HEYNIGER: Yes. Local officials were eminently corruptible. Not as much as I understand has become true now in places like Nigeria and Somalia. You have to put it into context. These were people who were very poorly educated, poorly trained, poorly paid, and they were trying to gain some measure of economic security for themselves, and they saw the way to do it was by using their office to make some money.

Q: This is true in many places including the United States where the office is poorly paid, and you are expected for services rendered to receive a fee. This is your first exposure to Africa. Keep strictly within the Elisabethville context, what about tribalism? As you were dealing with the Congolese, what was your impression of where loyalty lay with officials, military, others?

HEYNIGER: Yes, [and Stu, there are two things I want to mention before we leave Elisabethville, one of them involving my opportunity to get to know some African liberation movements, and number two, the dismay that I ran into in trying to help the Congolese toward economic development despite AID and US economic laws and regulations.]

Certainly tribalism was an extremely significant factor in African and particularly Congolese politics at the time. You always talked with people within the context of where they came from and what tribe they belonged to. The interesting thing was that, as I mentioned earlier, Elisabethville, unlike many other large cities in Africa, was entirely created by Europeans. It had never been even an African village, so it was not a tribal center.

You always knew when talking to a Congolese where he was from and what tribe and what allegiance he owed. For example, of the Africans who had led the Katanga secessionist movement, one was a particularly sinister man named Godefroid Monongo, one of the most chilling foreign officials I've ever met in my life. When Lumumba was overthrown, he (Lumumba) was drugged and put on a plane and flown to Elisabethville. My understanding is that Monongo met the plane, hauled Lumumba off the plane, and personally threw him in a vat of sulfuric acid at one of the mining processing centers. This is a man you wanted to be quite careful with! Tribalism really mattered.

Q: His position was...

HEYNIGER: Interior Minister of Katanga. On the other hand, I remember when President Kennedy was assassinated, without any invitation or any warning, Monongo and the other senior officials of the Katangan Government arrived at the Principal Officer's residence and said, "we've come to express our regrets," and proceeded to sit down in his living room. He offered them some refreshment, would you like a beer or a whiskey or what? They would only take fruit juice. They sat there for several hours with
the Principal Officer and his wife, not talking, just sitting. So tribalism did not rule everything.

Two things I wanted to mention before we leave Elisabethville. One was at that time Elisabethville was either a headquarters or a branch headquarters for several African liberation movements, particularly in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique. As the junior officer, not the Principal Officer, it was my responsibility to get to know these people and to represent the United States to the extent that was permitted. It was very interesting for me because I was able to get in on the ground floor with some of the young people who perhaps a decade later would become national leaders in various parts of southern Africa. It was very interesting; it had to be handled carefully because even if I invited them to my residence for a dinner or something like that, it had to be done quite discreetly.

The other thing that I want just to mention is that as a Foreign Service Officer, to the extent that we could we were trying to help the Congolese to develop. There were no AID personnel in Elisabethville at all. The program was entirely administered from Leopoldville, so we were supposed to be the eyes and ears and hands of USAID in Katanga and in Elisabethville.

I remember one time a middle-aged, up and coming Congolese businessman came to me and said, Mr. Heyniger, we grow rice. We refine it and sell it. At the present time, we are importing rice from the United States. It seems to me that this is too bad. I would like to be able to import some better, more efficient rice milling equipment from the United States. I will buy it from the United States under the AID program and set up a better rice processing factory to produce and manufacture and sell rice here in the Eastern Congo. But I've run into some kind of opposition from AID in Leopoldville, and I wonder if you could help me out with it. I said, sure I'll give it a try.

I contacted the Embassy and the AID people in Leopoldville and said, look, here is a guy who wants to develop a private business, who wants to make some money, who wants to help the country, all things we are trying to promote. He seems to be running into problems. What's going on? The word I got back from Leopoldville was that because of the influence of certain American Southern Senators...

Q: Oh yes. Rice. Louisiana particularly.

HEYNIGER: No rice refining equipment was eligible for sale or export through the AID program. To me this was a very difficult lesson to learn about America's foreign aid efforts.

Q: You mentioned the police. Was there a problem in trying to aid or help the police?
HEYNIGER: No. Unlike Jordan where the police were absolutely terrific, incredibly good police in Jordan, the police pretty much in Katanga and Elisabethville, didn't exist. I don't have any memory of them.

Q: If anything, it was the military.

HEYNIGER: Yes. Particularly since the police would have been Katangan, and the military was Congolese, and there was a big difference.

Q: Where did you go when you left Elisabethville?

HEYNIGER: I was reassigned after that back to Washington in 1965, and I was lucky enough, I think, to be assigned to one of the best jobs for a junior or mid-career officer in the Foreign Service, which was to be a desk officer.

Q: Which desk was that?

HEYNIGER: I was in charge of the Portuguese African territories, in the African Bureau.

Q: Okay we'll pick it up there. This will be 1965. One further question, what did your wife think of all of this?

HEYNIGER: Well, plus and minus. My wife was a very intelligent, very well-educated person. Very good at functioning as a Foreign Service Officer's wife, very good at functioning in a difficult foreign environment. We had one child born in Jordan under extremely difficult circumstances. It was just a terrible experience. We had a second child born just after we came back from The Netherlands, and we had a third child born in Katanga. I don't want to make any excuses for myself. I think that by the time we got to the Southern Congo, she really had begun to feel that pouring tea and doing the other jobs of a Foreign Service wife was not what she had in mind, particularly in the context of the emerging women's liberation movement. Our marriage ran into problems. She wanted to be able to do things; she wanted to be a person on her own.

Q: This is always very difficult. Okay, we'll pick this back up again in 1965, you're back in Washington.

Today is May, 23, 1997. Nick, let's start with 1965. You are in Washington; what are you doing?

HEYNIGER: Okay, we pick up the story in 1965 when I finished a two year tour in the Congo and was reassigned back to the Department of State. I was lucky enough to be assigned as a desk officer in the African Bureau.

Q: You were there from when to when?
HEYNIGER: I was in the African Bureau from ’65-’67. I was desk officer for the Portuguese territories, that is to say what is now Angola, Mozambique, Bissau, but were then still colonies of Portugal. I think the first thing I'd like to say to younger or even not so young officers in the Foreign Service is that if you ever have a chance to be a desk officer, grab it, because I think it is one of the most interesting and most fun and most challenging assignments you can have in Washington. You know, it may not be among the most important countries in the world; it could be Iceland or Paraguay or what have you, but still, you are Mr. or Mrs. Paraguay for the foreign affairs community.

Just to tell you one wonderful story that predates my time by a year or two. The only woman in my Foreign Service entering class, after serving in Curacao and I think Nassau, came back. She was a specialist in economic affairs, had a graduate degree in economics. She was assigned as officer for economic affairs on the Canadian Desk. This was about 1963. She was just about to go out for lunch one day, and her secretary came running in and said, "Miss Erdkamp go back to your office right away. You are going to get a call from the President." She said, "the president of what?" The secretary said, "The President the President!" So, she quickly put down her handbag and went back to her office, and sure enough about 15 seconds later President Kennedy came on the line, as usual affable and charming. He said, "Miss Erdkamp, I understand you are the one in Washington who knows all about the Great Lakes Regional Cooperative Agreement, and I wonder if you could just tell me a bit about it?" Which she proceeded to do for about five minutes. It is that kind of thing. How often does a class five officer get called by the President of the United States?

I was assigned to the Office of Central African Affairs. At that time the Assistant Secretary was Soapy Williams, G. Mennen Williams who didn't have much background in foreign affairs or in Washington but who had been a major Democratic political figure, Governor of Michigan. The principal Deputy Assistant Secretary was a man named Wayne Fredericks who had been sort of Mr. Africa for the Ford Foundation for many years. While Kennedy was alive, the African Bureau had been a rather exciting and interesting place. Many changes taking place, countries becoming liberated, many challenging economic and social problems. Unfortunately, after the Kennedy assassination, the White House became less interested in foreign affairs, less interested in self determination. I think that President Johnson was more interested in domestic affairs, and of course, Vietnam and Southeast Asia were becoming more important internationally. So, a bit of the bloom was off the rose of being a desk officer in the African Bureau.

Q: During the ’65-’67 period, what was the situation in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau?

HEYNIGER: The situation basically, and I think part of the reason I was assigned to the position, was that there were beginning to be revolutionary activities going on. You will recall that in Elisabethville, I had gotten to know a number of these insurgent people and their movements. There wasn't full fledged warfare going on, but there was insurgent
activity and that was the most interesting thing. What was Portugal going to do about this? How was the situation going to be handled? How could we be helpful? This, of course, gets you into the entire business of who determines policy in Washington.

Q: Did you find yourself in the middle of that great battle, the African Bureau versus the European Bureau?

HEYNIGER: Funny you should say. That's exactly what I was leading up to. It soon became apparent to me, I'd never had a substantive job in the Department before, that the African Bureau particularly in these areas of still-to-be-liberated Africa, was fighting an uphill battle against the Bureau of European Affairs which was by far a stronger and more influential outfit than we were. It got very difficult and very exasperating and very frustrating because back in those days, I don't know whether the same is true now, but as the Desk Officer and even as the Director of Central African Affairs, we couldn't even send a telegram to our posts in Luanda or Lourenço Marques without clearance from the European Bureau. They were sort of unenthusiastic about a great deal. We couldn't even send out an information message, not an action message but an information message, to our own posts without EUR clearance. This was a bit hard. Also, when it came to interdepartmental or interagency discussions, the European Bureau's weight carried a great deal more emphasis than we did. I remember particularly I participated in a lot of discussions concerning munitions control, what weapons we could sell to the Portuguese as NATO allies and seeing to it that those weapons were not diverted by the Portuguese to their African possessions. It was very difficult. I lost almost all of the discussions in which I took part.

At one time the Portuguese Government decided to purchase a squadron of B-26 bombers that were surplus in Arizona or New Mexico. These planes were flown from the American West right through Washington, right over our heads and on to Portugal and then on to the territories, and we never even knew anything about it at the time.

Q: Of course the B-26 at the time was so outmoded it wouldn't have any value in a NATO context, but it was a very handy operational plane, medium bomber against the rebels in Angola.

HEYNIGER: I'm not trying to put down the European Bureau. They are very able, and I have many friends there. I'm just talking about institutional dynamics here. I think what has been true in American Foreign Policy and the organization of American Foreign Policy was that Europe, our oldest and strongest allies, NATO, are far ahead of most other parts of the world in terms of the attention and the importance that is given to them.

Q: When you had to clear everything with the Portuguese desk and all, how did the system actually work? I mean that is the official thing; you've got to clear everything, but there must have been a way. This is before fancy telephones, fancy Internet, E-mail or whatever, fancy communications. How did you keep in touch with your countries and others despite this Portuguese filter?
HEYNIGER: Well, I think you have to go back and put this in context because this was 1965 and 1967 before computers and before really good electronic transmissions. On my level you could write letters to the post back and forth without clearance. Sometimes if an issue were important enough, usually not me at the Desk Officer level, but the Country Director could speak on the telephone to the officer in charge of the post. But there was an inordinate amount of time and effort devoted to the telegraph clearance process.

I'd like to come back to this at a later time if I may because following this assignment, I went over to the Pentagon and served on a military staff. I want to draw a comparison between the way the military does staff work and the way the State Department does staff work. When you are down in the trenches as a Desk Officer or working in a State Department bureau, at that time, there were not many ways to get things done. For example, you would go to a meeting and spend all your time arguing about what our policy would be, without result. Policy in the Department of State actually was often made through official public comment to the press. In other words, if an issue came up, you prepared guidance for the Office of Public Affairs, and if you could succeed in having that guidance read out in public to the press, that became US policy.

Q: Did you ever...were you too low down, I mean within the AF Bureau, I assume there would be a relationship between a country desk officer who wanted a policy written as a guidance, and a media person. Why don't you ask a question about Angola or something like that?

HEYNIGER: Yes. That could be done. It just didn't happen on my level. I was still a fairly young officer. It was my first real assignment in doing substantive work in the Department. It was enormously frustrating. Let me tell you, for example, one time, one of the men who was going to become a senior minister in the independent Mozambican Government came to Washington. I had known him in Africa, and I said let's have lunch. I mentioned this to my colleague on the Portugal Desk and we were told that the European Bureau had decreed that this individual would not be admitted to the Department of State. So, my office director and deputy director and I had to see this gent in a restaurant downtown.

Q: What was the situation as you saw it during the '65-'67 period in these Portuguese territories?

HEYNIGER: Somewhat the same as the Congo and in considerable contrast to the situation in let's say in East Africa or West Africa where I think that the British and French had been preparing a number of local people in these countries for at least middle echelon positions.

Both in the former Belgian Congo and in the Portuguese territories, that did not happen. There were not educated, trained, experienced African people in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. Don't forget the government in Portugal was not a democracy
either; it was a benevolent dictatorship and a very poor country, too. In my opinion, very little attempt had been made by the Portuguese government to accommodate and to foresee the future and prepare for it and begin the kind of transition which would have been constructive and positive and helpful.

_Q: Were we trying to nudge the Portuguese to do anything in this nature?_

HEYNIGER: Not really, because Portugal was a NATO ally. Nudging foreign countries to do things they feel very strongly about is hard work. Let me give you one aside which I think was interesting. Whereas the United States and Portugal didn't seem to be getting anywhere about the future of Portuguese Africa, Brazil, at that time, fancied itself in the position of gradually being able to take over the leading position from Portugal in what the Brazilians referred to as the Lusitanian community. They were young; they were energetic. I'm talking now about the Brazilians in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry and the Presidency.

They got interested in seeing what role they could play in this transition process. They even came to Washington, but the discussions were held in this meeting place south of Washington, Airlie House. I was invited to go down there, and I spent an entire day briefing these senior Brazilian officials on the situation in Portuguese Africa as we saw it and what the possibilities and the difficulties might be in bringing Brazil into the mix. I was very excited about that. Eventually I don't think it came to very much because they became more preoccupied in domestic affairs. So nothing ever came of it.

_Q: Here you are in an African Bureau with Soapy Williams still in charge, Wayne Fredericks. I mean these people were true believers. Africa for the Africans and all. Then you've got this big hunk of non-liberated territory owned by Portugal. What were you getting from your Bureau?_

HEYNIGER: Well, there were a lot of things going on. And a great deal of frustration. To put this into context, I spent one very busy year in the Office of Central African affairs working for an officer that I will not name, but that I want to come back and talk about. He was an officer who ultimately became an Under Secretary of State. But then for administrative reasons, Portuguese territories were transferred to the East African area where I worked for an entirely different Country Director. That office was struggling, for example, with Rhodesia. This is when we were going into the UN Sanctions with regard to Rhodesia.

_Q: This is the UDI?_

HEYNIGER: The Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

_Q: This is Southern Rhodesia. What had happened to Northern Rhodesia?_

HEYNIGER: Northern Rhodesia had become independent as Zambia. You remember when I was back in Elisabethville, there was an officer at the British Consulate who came
from Southern Rhodesia and who said this self determination is going to stop with us. So, we, the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, got very much involved in how to deal with the UN sanctions on Southern Rhodesia, what to do about South Africa, and the Portuguese territories became part of the problem of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and the whole southern part of Africa. Independence and self determination had sort of ground to a halt there.

We spent a great deal of time in meetings with other parts of the Department and with other agencies talking about what to do about Southern Rhodesia. If you look at the map, you will see that both Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, both of them export minerals, very important to their economy. They either in the case of Southern Rhodesia export them to the east to Lourenço Marques in Mozambique or from Zambia west on the Benguela railroad to Luanda which is through Portuguese Africa. Whether it was possible for the United Nations to effectively administer an embargo on an interior country without blockading ports like Cape Town or Lourenço Marques in Mozambique is very difficult.

Q: What was the Portuguese attitude toward this since they were sitting on two major outlets for Southern Rhodesia?

HEYNIGER: The Portuguese attitude was pretty inflexible. It was that these colonies were part of Portugal, and that is the way it has been, and that is the way it is going to be. There were continual statements and promises and assertions coming out of Lisbon, development projects that were going to be started. There were changes that were going to take place in the way the territories were governed and the admission of many more children to schools etc. very little of which actually took place at all.

Another interesting thing was that oil was discovered in northwestern Angola and in Kabinda. An American oil company became very interested and very involved in that situation and did not want any political change. Oil companies have a lot of influence.

Q: You were feeling this during your time.

HEYNIGER: Oh yes.

Q: Was there any pressure on the African Bureau and on down to you ultimately regarding UN sanctions to do something ultimately since obviously the Portuguese are the key players if you are going to do something about Southern Rhodesia. Was that being played out in your area?

HEYNIGER: It was being played out very strongly, and again I come back to this familiar situation of how you clear policy. Very often these issues would come up in the United Nations, either in the General Assembly or the Security Council, and then it became a question of how we were going to vote; what we were going to say or do in New York. It wasn't just the African Bureau or the European Bureau but it was also the Bureau of United Nations Affairs. We had many long, difficult meetings and discussions about
instructions to be sent to our Ambassador and his or her staff at the United Nations. It wasn't just Portugal. This was policy toward South Africa, and policy toward Southern Rhodesia. We in the State Department and the entire United States were struggling. For example, how stern should be the sanctions against South Africa? How much could we try to influence the future of that situation? It was a very interesting time to be working in the State Department.

Q: Did you get a feel about the relative clout of the African Bureau during this time?

HEYNIGER: Oh yes. I think we were pretty much at the bottom of the totem pole. I think everybody realized that. The European Bureau had the ear and the attention of the senior levels of the Department. A great deal of concern and attention surrounded our policies in the United Nations. What the European Bureau felt was important and what the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs felt was important in terms of overall US policy carried a lot more weight than Soapy Williams and Wayne Fredericks. The predisposition of the administration at the time toward Africa, we were definitely the lightweight in this fight.

Q: What was the status of the liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola during the time you were there?

HEYNIGER: Mostly they were on the outside. The headquarters of many of the African liberation groups was in Dar es Salaam where I later served as the political officer. We'll come to that in due course. Other offices were in Lusaka in Zambia. But, at this point there were much more speeches and press releases and lots of talk and not a great deal of actual on the ground insurgency, as in Vietnam or earlier in Malaysia, not at this time, not in Africa.

Q: Did Zambia play much of a role because if you are looking at the map, Zambia sits between Angola and Mozambique. In the first place were the liberation people talking to each other from the two different areas? Was it sort of a joint thing, or were each working under its own dynamic as we observed it?

HEYNIGER: A couple of points there. One, again if you look at the map, while the leadership of the Zambian Government might have wanted to do all that it could to assist the southern African liberation movements, you can see that Zambia's access for its products and anything it brought in lay through routes controlled by colonial powers. Everything that goes into Zambia comes through Angola or Mozambique or South Africa via the rail system. Of course, that's one of the things I will talk about later on when I served in Tanzania. Fifteen thousand Chinese troops, dressed in civilian clothes, came to Tanzania to work on the Tanzam railroad from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka. Before that Zambia was a bit inhibited in its desire to be helpful by the fact that its economy was in the hands of colonials.
The second thing is that I didn't see a great deal of coordination and mutual effort on the part of the various African liberation groups, even perhaps with the assistance of the Organization for African Unity in Addis Ababa. These groups all had their own agendas and personalities and viewpoints. It was far from being a united front.

At the time Portuguese Guinea did not figure in any significant way. It is a small area; it has not much economic importance, so there was not a great deal going on there then. Later, after I had left this assignment, Portuguese Guinea became in fact the place where the struggle between the Portuguese and the Africans came to a head and where the insurgency became the strongest and where a Portuguese general for the first time decided that self determination was the way of the future. He was the general who went back to Lisbon and eventually overthrew the Portuguese Government. Portuguese Guinea or Guinea Bissau was very important then but not at this particular time.

Q: You mentioned the first time you were under an officer (Country Director for Central African Affairs) and you indicated he was a problem, at least to you. I'm trying to get the dynamics of this; how did that play out?

HEYNIGER: He wasn't a problem for me, fortunately. He gave me two very good efficiency reports. I felt very lucky to be working for him. He was an extremely able and brilliant and hard working officer, but I learned a hard lesson because we had at that time in our office the Desk Officer for the Congo who had previously served in Elisabethville as a Principal Officer. His name had practically become a household word because the Katanga secession was going on; newspapers were reporting from Katanga every day, and they always mentioned this officer's name and what a brilliant job he was doing.

He came back to Washington covered with roses and became the Desk Officer for the Congo. Two years later I walked past his office one day, and he wasn't there. I asked the secretary, “where is he?” The secretary said, “Mr. Heyniger, he has been transferred to the office that writes regulations pending selection out.” I said, “Oh wow.” Just like that from being one of the stars of the Foreign Service to being out of the Foreign Service in less than two years.

We also had a very nice, very pleasant officer who was doing economic affairs for Central Africa. He really had a background in Asian affairs, spoke Chinese and had missionary parents. That was his primary interest, but he was "broadening." I don't think he was particularly happy working in Africa. At any rate the same thing happened to him. Here was an officer, these were not junior officers; these were mid career officers with 20 years under their belts but not eligible for retirement or a pension. He also in about 18 months was out of the service.

Q: Do you know what was behind this?

HEYNIGER: What was behind it was the Office Director wanted people working for him who were real get up and goers and doers and hustlers and people who were really getting
with the program. If you weren't, you could get in very serious trouble very fast. That was the lesson I learned.

There are a couple of other vignettes of my service in the African Bureau which I think might be of interest to younger Foreign Service Officers. One was that we had a senior FSO as the another Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and he became more and more frustrated with the paperwork that we were doing for him. Finally he said I've had it with the product that the officers in this bureau are putting out, and he sent every one of us on a rotating basis to FSI to learn clear, effective drafting. Every one of us regardless of background was exposed to Strunk and The Elements of Style. That was good. We all learned to run "fog indexes" on our own drafting.

Q: What's a fog index?

HEYNIGER: A “fog index” is a very interesting thing. It is a tool that you use to examine your own writing in terms of clarity and effective communication. You take the number of words in the average sentence you have written and multiply it by the number of polysyllables in that sentence. For example, “working” is not really a polysyllable because it is only two and it is an extension of “work”, but words that have more than two syllables, you multiply these by the total number of words and that gives you a figure. Effective and clear drafting rules say that in your correspondence this index, this multiplication should not exceed a certain amount. If it does, you are using too long sentences, too big words. One way to do this is to look at Winston Churchill's writing. Churchill has written a great deal and he has written huge, enormous books. But, if you take a look at his average paragraph, the writing is succinct. His fog index is quite low. So, that is one thing I thought was quite fun.

Another thing that happened while I was there was that a Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management believed strongly that there was a lack of effective communication among people working in the State Department and that this was hampering the department from doing the work that it could do. So over a period of time in '64 and '65, all of us who were working in the African Bureau on a rotating basis were taken away from our jobs and put together with officers from other parts of the Department and sent away to Salisbury, Maryland, for a week of sensitivity training. We often sat around in silence for hours until we began to feel and perceive that we really needed to level with each other. Some of the masks had to come off. We had to be talking about how we really felt rather than what we thought people wanted to hear. It was, of course, a great revelation to many of us.

It was an experiment that failed because some of the experiences were a little too difficult for some people to handle. There was one officer in my group who checked into a hospital immediately after he came back from this experience, and the word got around on the Hill that this is what we were doing. Senators began to say they didn't think public officials should be more or less required to bare their souls at three o'clock in the morning. I remember one time we were all together in our sensitivity group at three
o'clock in the morning carrying somebody around the room just so that he would feel accepted and cared about. That initiative was short lived.

Q: Just a last question. You didn't serve with others and we'll come to that, but what was the impression you were getting when you were dealing with this area one of the major figures in that area, Nyerere.

HEYNIGER: Of course I will talk about him when I get assigned to Tanzania where I had an opportunity to observe and read about Nyerere every day. Julius Nyerere will forever stand as one of the most interesting and, I'm struggling as to how to phrase this, I was going to say democratic, but Tanzania under Nyerere was not a democracy. It was a "one party democracy." Here was an African leader who had been educated and was very thoughtful. He was trying to use a great many ideas and approaches to economic and social development, but not in a strong-arm way. Nyerere was one of the few leaders of the time who held elections and even announced that he was not going to stand for election, that he was going to step down.

Another one who at the time I think attracted a great deal of sympathetic attention was Kenneth Kaunda who became President of Zambia. Here was an immensely likable person, unafraid to show his emotions. He gave speeches, and he would break down in tears frequently in the course of his speeches. He was a person with a great deal of charm and appeal.

Q: Was there any impact from events in Zaire on Angola in the '65-'67 period?

HEYNIGER: Not too much because this particular period was one where there was a fairly strong central government in the Congo and Tshombe himself while he came back from Katanga and became Prime Minister of Zaire (what became Zaire), did not last very long. I think he only lasted from six months to a year as the Prime Minister. Then Mobutu took over in '65. The Congo at that time was pretty much focusing on domestic issues.

Q: Then you left this desk in '67, whither?

HEYNIGER: First I just want to say that in everyone's career there are ups and downs, but I think the decision that I made as to where to point my career at that time, 1967, was the greatest mistake I made. But, it was my decision; I was responsible for it. I have no regrets other than wishing I'd been a little smarter. I was offered two opportunities as I came to the end of my tour as a desk officer. One was to go to FSI and take 26 weeks of training as an economic officer for broadening on the career track towards becoming a DCM. The other was to become a specialist in political-military affairs and have a chance at an assignment in the Pentagon. At that time, in the context of the growing importance of Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and the attention of the American Government toward insurgency and fighting Communism in that part of the world, I made the decision to go for the political-military route and was assigned to the Army General Staff in the Pentagon.
Q: You served there from when to when?

HEYNIGER: ’67-'69. When I got there, I was given the temporary rank of Lt. Colonel, and ended up serving in the Asian Branch of the Political-Military Division of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the US Army General Staff.

It was an extremely interesting assignment, but the problem was that it was a bit too interesting. I was not directly involved with Vietnam. I was responsible for the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, all of the ASEAN nations, SEATO. I was in an area where there were a great many demanding but difficult issues going on, problems being struggled with. Just the strain and the tension and the difficulty were really great.

I want to say two things. Number one, I had the greatest respect for the officers I was serving with. As an FSO who had the chance to have a good education and graduate school, etc. learn foreign languages, I found myself working alongside about 20 career army officers mostly Lt. Colonel. Every one of these men had a graduate degree, and every one of them spoke a hard foreign language. The officer that was next to me had a degree from the University of Tokyo in Japanese. He had served as aide to the Military Governor of the Ryukyus and was probably going to become the Army Attaché in Tokyo.

Other men spoke Arabic, Russian; these were very able guys working very hard. The tension was just incredible. It's when I learned how difficult these problems were because in order to get ahead and succeed in the military service you had to have both commands in the field and staff work somewhere. Most of these men had been battalion commanders in Vietnam. These were men who had to sit down on Sunday night and write the wives and mothers of men in their unit who had been killed that week and write as to how they died and why. This is a really searing experience. Here they were back in Washington working under very difficult conditions. There were three of us trying to work in an office that was probably from the end of this table to the wall.

Q: We're talking about 10 feet.

HEYNIGER: Yes. There were three of us trying to work, talk on the phone, draft papers for the Chief of Staff of the Army, all this stuff. The tension was high. I remember one man came back and he took his entire briefcase and portfolio and just threw it across the room at the wall because these problems were so difficult. I had great respect for these officers. There are in the US military many people who have great talent.

The other thing I wanted to say is that it was a revelation to me and I think worthwhile to learn and experience how the military does staff work. I had the privilege while I was in the Pentagon of working for two different Chiefs of Staff. The first one had been a prisoner of war of the Japanese during the entire Second World War and had not had a lot of field experience, but he was an excellent staff officer. Here we are in the Army Staff in
the Pentagon at the height of the Vietnam War and he was continually asking for studies and papers on a wide variety of issues. I think the way the State Department operates is a little more vague.

His staff would assign a topic or a paper to a specific officer with a time limit. Either that, or you got assignments as a result of operations of the Joint Staff. In other words, let's say the Chiefs of Staff were going to discuss US policy toward Thailand. Well, the Army had to have a position on that so the Army Chief of Staff could go into what was called "the tank" with the other Chiefs of Staff to create what was going to be US military policy toward Thailand. You were assigned that paper and they told you exactly when it was due. In other words, "Heyniger, we want a paper on thus and such. You've got two weeks. Get hopping." You knew that paper with its policy recommendations had to be prepared and cleared and ready for the Chief of Staff at thus and such a time. You might have to stay up all night if necessary, but you had to have it ready. The Army and the Chiefs of Staff had to have a position at a certain time.

In contrast, at the State Department some issues either don't get addressed or get addressed very gingerly and it may take a great deal of time. I think there is a great deal of frustration on the part of the White House in that they either cannot get policy positions out of the State Department at all or they can't get them expeditiously.

The way the system works in the Pentagon is that let's say you are a LT. Colonel and you are working on a paper. You find out that other echelons of the Army don't like this paper or that another service like the Air Force is totally opposed to the position you have taken. What happens is that at a certain given period, the paper is lifted out of your hands and referred to more senior officers. These are usually full colonels and are called “planners”. They read your paper and get together with other colonels, senior planners in other offices and they agree. If that doesn't work, it goes up to generals. But, the paper doesn't just sit there because people have questions or doubts about it. The paper gets prepared. The policy may not be the best one, or the most carefully thought out, but the system works, and it works well, and it produces reasonably good stuff expeditiously.

I think the State Department could profit from this system. It gets us away from the miasma of clearances and people who have a certain position and don't want to go along and say well, I'm the special advisor for Russia, therefore on State Department policy on Russia, I have to clear everything. The military doesn't work like that.

Q: Were there any issues you dealt with? You are talking about ANZUS powers, Indonesia, really everything but Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Were there any issues in the '67-'69 period that really focused your attention or were challenging that were different from the State Department that you can think of?

HEYNIGER: Well, let me give you two “for instances” that I think are worth mentioning. One of them is again the way the military operates as opposed to the State Department. In the State Department let's say you are a Desk officer or an Economic Officer or in one of
the functional bureaus. You prepare a paper and give it to your boss, the Office Director. He makes whatever comments or changes he wants and sends it up toward the Sixth Floor and the Deputy Assistant Secretaries. Either you may never see this paper again or when you do see it, you may not recognize it.

In the military, the officer at the mid-career level, let's say a major or a Lt. Colonel or a navy Commander who prepares a paper stays with it all the way, and a meeting is scheduled where the Chief of Staff of the Army is going to be briefed on this issue because in the afternoon he is going in to the Joint Chiefs to make a decision for the next morning. You as the action officer are the one who handles the paper and at a certain time, the people running the meeting say, “Okay Heyniger, you're on.”

You walk into this room where this four star general, the Chief of Staff of the Army is sitting, and around you are maybe 15 lieutenant and major generals listening. You sit right next to the Chief of Staff of the Army. He says "well son what have you got here." I'd say "well sir, this is a paper on our policy toward Thailand. You are scheduled to go into the Joint Chiefs this afternoon and discuss this. Now briefly this is the background, these are the major issues, and these are our staff recommendations to you." He reads it quite quickly. Asks questions directly to me. Any points that are unclear, or he needs further explanation, or where he has questions or doubts about this policy that has been prepared by the staff, he asks them right then of me as the action officer. They are handled then. This is exhilarating. It is exciting staff work.

Probably the most interesting issue that I was asked to address was one of the ones that got me into trouble. As I say this was an interesting assignment; it was probably a little too interesting. It was about midway through my tour so let's say this is 1968. The Chief of Staff of the Army said "I want to know why we are in Vietnam." This came down to the Political-Military division; we had a meeting and they said the Chief of Staff wants a background study on how we got into Vietnam, why, why we are still there, and what we are supposed to be doing.

All of the military officers said "I won't touch this with a ten foot pole." So, they said "Heyniger, you are a State Department type, you do it." I said, "okay," and I was assigned to this study. I went back and researched the Geneva Accords, the agreements when the French got out of Indochina, and what our policy positions had been at the time. There was a UN oversight of Indochina. You remember the Canadians and others were involved in Hanoi. They were supposed to be making regular reports to Geneva about what was going on in Indochina.

One thing the military love. They love papers that have a lot of charts and diagrams. I decided to put a big chart in my paper which showed over time public statements which had been made by the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the CINCPAC, the commanding officer in the Pacific, and the head of our military in Vietnam. These things were said in 1962, and these other things were said in 1965. What
became painfully clear, this was during Rusk and McNamara, was that these people were saying different things, and that these things were changing over time.

I took this paper around to be cleared by the various directorates and everybody said "Heyniger, go away. We don't even want to touch that paper." I said, "well sir, I have to have your chop". ("chop" is military slang for approval, or no objection, i.e., clearance.) They would sort of scribble something illegible. It went up and it was read by the Chief of Staff. It came back to me with the comment at the bottom, "Very interesting" and then his initials and 10:41 P.M. I guess he had read it fairly late at night.

I credit the Army for at least having examined the issue and asked the questions and studied the whole situation, whereas in the Department there wasn't any discussion, or officers like Paul Clayenburg who spoke out, they were being sidelined. This was a very difficult time in American diplomatic and political military history.

I got in trouble because I became something of a reluctant warrior, and that's not good. I would suggest to younger officers that whether or not they are in an exchange assignment or whatever, if they don't feel that they can put out 100% every day, then they ought to be doing something else. I just wasn't old enough or experienced enough or smart enough to understand that what I should have done was to go back and talk to the people who had assigned me to the Pentagon, my cone and rank counselors, and say "hey look, this really isn't working. It isn't working for me; it isn't working for the Army, and reassign me to whatever you can."

Q: What is the issue we are talking about? You mean you are just not going along with Vietnam policy after examining the issue?

HEYNIGER: Yes. I found that I really wasn't happy in what I was doing. I mean the Army was hard charging ahead to win the war in Vietnam. They were doing everything they could to achieve the objective. I more and more to myself began questioning the objective, especially what we were doing and why. I talked with my wife and said what do you think we should do. As I recall she said maybe the best thing is to keep your head down and stay out of trouble and complete the assignment and then we'll look for something you'd like to do.

But, when you are in a small and active and hard driving unit, and that unit is over-challenged and dealing with very difficult problems on a daily basis, it is hard to say "well, I don't want to play on this team anymore." So I got a less than enthusiastic efficiency report.

Another piece of advice I would give officers, particularly junior officers, is to be smart enough to look and see what is being said about you. A team of Foreign Service Inspectors came over to inspect us toward the end of my tour, and we all talked with them, and then they left. I never saw what the Inspector had written about me, and I did not have the sense or experience in the bureaucratic field at that time to say "hey, I want
to see what the Inspector said about me." I don't exactly know what the rules are, but I believe usually when a report is prepared on you by a superior or an inspector, you have the right to see the report. It was not shown to me and I didn't hear about it until another State Department officer I was serving with, he was due out also, he said you better go over to the Department and see what the Inspector has written about you, because what he wrote about me was not particularly flattering."

So, I went over there, and it was a report which said "Heyniger is doing okay but he is less of a team player than he was or he should be, and he is not performing his work with enthusiasm." At the time I should have said "this report is based on one man interviewing me for half an hour and spending three days in the Pentagon," but I didn't. By the time I heard about it, it was six months later and it had a very bad effect on my career.

Q: Well in '69, you were reassigned. Where?

HEYNIGER: This time I was assigned as Chief of the Political Section in Dar es Salaam. I served in Tanzania from 1969 to 1972. It was without a doubt the most interesting and enjoyable and rewarding assignment of my career. I was the Political Officer for a small American Embassy. There were very interesting things going on. We talked a little bit about Nyerere; we should talk some more. The focus on the political side was on self determination for Africa and for Southern Africa. Many of the liberation movements were in Dar Es Salaam.

On the economic side it was fascinating because Tanzania is an extremely poor and backward country. It has one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world. It was sort of a laboratory for development. Everybody was there. The Americans were there with AID, with Peace Corps. The British were there. The Germans were there. The Scandinavians had a huge operation going. The Soviets were there. The Chinese were there. The North Koreans were there. Everybody was involved in their own approach to development.

Beyond that, I had the good fortune to work for two or three of the real stars of the Foreign Service. When I arrived in Dar es Salaam, the number two, the DCM was Tom Pickering, who three years before had gone to Zanzibar to be Consul as an FSO-5, and three years later was going back into the Department as an FSO-2 to be a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. He had been promoted every year. I also worked for Paul Kreisberg, who was a Chinese specialist who was being broadened, but who was very much involved in developing US-Chinese relations, but we didn't have any relations with China at the time although there were many thousands of Chinese living and working in Tanzania. My third DCM was Jack Matlock who also had been American Consul in Zanzibar and then had come over to Dar es Salaam to be DCM and as you know, went on to be Reagan's Soviet expert in the National Security Council and a distinguished Ambassador in Moscow.

Q: When you arrived in '69...
HEYNIGER: One of the reasons I liked it was it was a small Embassy. There was plenty
to do. The previous Ambassador, whose next assignment was Director General of the
Foreign Service, was John Burns. I never had the opportunity to serve with Ambassador
Burns, but most of the people that were serving under him in this little obscure African
country went on to have very distinguished careers.

He wanted to have somebody out traveling around through the country all the time. That
practice continued, and we officers in the Embassy took turns making trips around
Tanzania by Land Rover. Our drivers were former Sergeant Majors in the Tanganyika
Rifles. We would load the Land Rover up with C-rations, gasoline, two or three spare
tires because the paved roads ended about 30 miles outside of Dar es Salaam. We would
go off for a week and visit outlying towns, see what was going on in terms of rural
development. We went all over the country. The Tanzanians did not want us down in the
southern part of the country; it was close to the developing insurgency in Mozambique,
but we were out everywhere else.

This is where I really used my training in Swahili, not so much in Elisabethville but in
Dar es Salaam. We were out in country where nobody spoke any English. It was just the
driver and you day after day going through what the British called MMBA, "miles and
miles of bloody Africa". We would sometimes be out 500 miles west or northwest up
toward Lake Tanganyika from Dar Es Salaam. This is really the way to find out what is
going on. The Tanzanians were a little nervous about this. They didn't want American
Embassy Officers traveling around too freely, but they were usually willing to give us
 clearance to go anywhere but the southern part of the country. We were close to Zambia,
we were close to Rwanda and Burundi, we were close to Zaire, and close to Kenya again
and again on these trips.

Q: As you saw it when you arrived there as the political officer, in a way the politics was
Nyerere wasn't it? I mean was there a political system to deal with?

HEYNIGER: The situation was pretty much Nyerere and his political party which was
called TANU for Tanganyikan African National Union. TANU was the only political
party which was permitted. Tanzania was practicing what a British professor at the
University of Dar es Salaam called in a book, "One Party Democracy." In other words
there was only one political party, and if you wanted to get anywhere in Tanzanian
politics, you had to be a member of that party.

On the other hand, the party was ostensibly open to anyone who wanted to join. Don't
forget that at that time at least, Africa was still very much involved with tribes and tribal
politics, but Tanzania did not have the difficulties, for example, that Kenya had and has.
In Kenya there are several really large important tribes like the Kikuyu, the Luo and
others each of whom wants to have its own political party. Things can get very difficult
between these big tribal groupings. But tribalism is not nearly so much a factor in
Tanzanian politics.
The country was desperately poor and desperately in need of everything, but there were trained teachers, skilled workers. When I got there, a great deal of the middle class, particularly the commercial middle class, were all East Asians. They were Indians who were in the process of leaving Tanzania in droves because they didn't see that they had any real future there, and the Africans were just beginning to come in and take over the stores and businesses and that kind of thing. Tanzania was also struggling with the fact that Zanzibar, with its very particular political background, and Tanganyika were trying to work together, and there certainly was a great deal of lack of agreement between the Zanzibaris and the Tanganyikans as to what the policy should be. Tanzania was very self consciously trying to be an independent, non-aligned, socialistic third world country.

Q: In a way the economics played a larger role than the politics wouldn't you say? It is somehow a thing that comes through in a good number of my interviews dealing with the third world that Fabian Socialism has probably had a more pernicious effect than Marxism or anything else. This is something I've heard. Now, please refute me, Tanzania is shown as an example of where a well meaning person destroyed a country. But I'm trying to capture the period. We are talking about '69-'72. How did we view this? We view it never to talk about the British and the Scandinavians.

HEYNIGER: Yes. First as a political officer, I learned fairly soon there wasn't much point in following discussions in Parliament because there weren't that many with a one party government. We made our usual representations to the Foreign Ministry and to other ministries in terms of bilateral politics as well as multi-lateral politics, UN votes, all that kind of stuff. You couldn't really do very much. I mean the Foreign Ministry was going to do basically what Julius Nyerere wanted and the senior officials in the party. You went there and did your work and did your job, but that was it. Also, the newspapers, both the English language and the Swahili language newspapers, and I was trying to read both, did not have a great deal of discussion or debate about domestic or foreign policies.

One thing that I did find out, and younger officers might keep an eye out for this, is I learned after I had been there for awhile, that every day on the Swahili radio, after the news, there was a story. Swahili speakers all over Tanzania listened to this story very carefully because while it was ostensibly about life in African villages and animals, a great deal about the giraffe talking to the elephant and the hyena talking to the lion etc. there were things being said through these stories about the outlook on issues and problems. You had to be able to not only get it in Swahili, but you had to be able to decode it. That was one of the main ways to get information, and then again as I say, a good way to do political work in a country like Tanzania is to get out of the capital, to talk to regional commissioners, to talk to regional party officials, to talk to regional business people and tribal leaders. When you are 250-400 miles away from the capital, they will talk to you about their concerns and what is going on.

But, you are absolutely right, the country was much more interesting economically than politically. What Nyerere and Tanu and the Government were trying to pursue was called "Ujamaa." This is a Swahili word; roughly it means "working together." It was an
economic and social experiment in taking people who were living in small villages and bringing them together in new, artificially created villages.

Now by doing this, you can accomplish a number of things. It is easier to set up a good school in this more centrally located village. It is easier to deliver health services. It is easier to deliver social services. What everybody was supposed to do was they were supposed to work on common "shambas." A shamba is a farm. So the village, let's say they had 25 hectares planted in peanuts and 15 hectares planted in cassava, etc. All the villagers were supposed to go out and work these plots of land together. The Swahili word for this is “Kujitegamaya” which means doing things together.

The idea was to see if you could take people who had been living in very small, very isolated villages, and bring them together so you could provide services to them. In effect, what you were doing was transforming the agriculture of the country, and you are getting people to work together.

It was very interesting to go out and look at these villages and see how they were doing. Of course, the government wanted you to go and visit the "Potemkin villages" where special attention had been made toward setting up services, and everybody was having a nice time. What we were trying to do was go to the villages that were having a bad time and see how and why this very interesting experiment in rural development was not working. Tanzania was a vast laboratory of rural development.

The things that came out were, for example, that it was hard to get people to work on the collective plots because everybody wanted to work on their own plots. And as usual, the women did most of the work and yet the men claimed most of the money because when all the crops were harvested and taken away and the money received through these cooperative marketing schemes that the Scandinavians were particularly interested in, then the village got the money. Here were all these women who had been out sweating in the sun for months, but the money went to their husbands. The women were really not happy about this, so there was a lot of tension and dissension about that.

Then there were a couple of really difficult situations while I was there. There was one very bright and very ambitious but rather dictatorial government official who was a Regional Commissioner. He came around and was pushing people to do what he wanted them to do in terms of this "Ujamaa" villaging. The tribal leaders told him to back off, and he didn't, and he was assassinated. That's very rare in a country like Tanzania. Most likely it was just that in a number of these villages, in the first place rural people in developing countries do not want to be relocated whether they like it or not. They don't. Different men and women have different ideas about what crops to raise and not to raise. There is tension about this all the time.

I think that the net result over a period of 10 or 15 years that this experiment went on, with great interest from other developing countries and developing nations, not so much the United States, but other countries that are really interested in rural development like
the Scandinavians and perhaps some of the Eastern Europeans, was that it wasn't working.

Q: Nyerere was really the golden headed boy of particularly the socialist parties in Germany and Scandinavia. Vast amounts of money were going in. Looking at this which in many ways it is right back to what happened in the Soviet Union. The collectivization at one point there was done with maybe not completely benign, but I mean this was a very good way, and you had people who looked at planning and thought this was wonderful, but it was absolute disaster.

HEYNIGER: Not just that but there were also UN people there. A lot of UN people who had their own ideas and own agendas, and they were trying to boost these.

Q: In fact there was sort of, I don't want to be nasty about it, but it seemed to be a little bit like a socialist playground. Did you have that feeling while you were there, or was this something that when you are involved, you don't really see that force that is developing?

HEYNIGER: Well, yes, I think we certainly did see that. It is helpful to put it into context. In the first place, Nyerere was not a dictator as perhaps was the case in the Soviet Union. Nyerere, I believe he is still alive, is a person of great charm and great sympatico, he is very low key.

Q: A great intellectual too.

HEYNIGER: Right. But he was not a driver. He was not someone who knocked heads together. He was not a very controversial and contentious figure. His nickname was “mwalimu” which means "the teacher." He was trying to lead his country by teaching them how to do things. Now, when you get out in the field, then what you begin to see is that what you are told in Dar es Salaam is that this is all voluntary and that it is all consensual, and that all the decisions are made by the villagers collectively, and that everything is peace and happiness and joy.

The way it really worked out on the ground is that sometimes people were pulling together voluntarily, and sometimes they were pushed. Sometimes the Tanzanian police and the public officials went around and told the people to put their stuff on the truck because the village was going to be burned down in the afternoon, and they were just forcibly relocated. Sometimes the villagers genuinely got together and decided what they were going to plant and who was going to do what, and it was really an effort at trying to live in a cooperative, harmonious, understanding way, and in other instances, it was a much more authoritarian approach where village elders plus Tanu people plus government officials came in and said okay, this is what you are going to do, and this is how you are going to do it.
I think that is what ultimately, long after I left Tanzania, led to the failure of the "Ujamaa" movement. In the first place rural people want to grow the crops they want to grow, and secondly, this was an attempt which required a great deal of patience and understanding and flexibility in terms of people's willingness to get along with each other, in terms of cultural change, social change, your whole approach to life, and it doesn't happen that fast.

Q: What was happening at the Embassy level? This social experiment was going on which basically was contrary to the beliefs of most of the Americans as opposed to the beliefs of the social democratic parties in Europe. I wonder if you could talk a little about, we had this extremely low keyed, charming man at the head who was everybody's darling pushing this system. With what you were doing and the rest of the Embassy, could you talk about the dynamics there?

HEYNIGER: Yes, I think we in the Embassy, everybody in the Embassy was trying their best to further American interests, you know, which classically involve freedom, democracy, individual liberty, peace, political and economic and social justice, etc. We had several really significant problems to confront. The first one probably was that the government, not the people in the country, but the government officials in the capital were deeply suspicious of the United States, and did not want to have much to do with us. My wife and I and the Ambassador and the DCM and others time and again would organize cocktail parties, dinner parties or other things, and we would ask people to come. They would say, “sure, fine next Thursday about 8:00, fine,” and they never came. We went through a lot of painful experiences sitting in the Ambassador's residence where he was looking forward to a dinner for 12 or 16 people and five would show up. It was difficult.

It was hard to get access to Nyerere. He didn't particularly want to see us. It was tough to get access to the Foreign Ministry people, who didn't want to be seen talking to American Government officials. Our access and the availability of people to deal with was really difficult. Of course, all this in the context of Vietnam and local demonstrations against American policy in Vietnam. People were shouting at us all the time. All of the liberal professors at the university when you'd go out there for a dinner party, if they found out you were working at the Embassy, they would come and shout at you at the dinner party and all of this stuff. So, that was hard. We were trying, I think, all of us, to pursue classical diplomatic work in terms of advancing American interests either on the economic or the political or the public affairs fronts with a people and a society that had very big problems they were facing of their own domestically, and they just weren't particularly interested.

You'd go over there and urge the Foreign Ministry to vote a certain way on a UN vote or on another international issue, and they were going to make up their minds about that not so much by what you said but by what the non-aligned world, of which Nyerere and Tanzania were leaders, felt, by what the OAU, the Organization of African Unity, wanted to do. It was a very self consciously and self righteously socialistic government.
Q: Who were your Ambassadors while you were there?

HEYNIGER: John Burns had left. Incidentally, I learned after I got to Dar es Salaam, and I recounted this unfortunate experience with the Inspector at the Pentagon, I was told that a year before, that Inspector had announced that he was coming to Dar es Salaam to visit the post. Ambassador Burns said "Oh terribly sorry, won't be convenient. I won't be here."

Q: Burns having been an Inspector and he really knew the system. He was my Consul General in Frankfurt when I first came in. He knew the inspection service up and down.

HEYNIGER: The first telegram that went out to Washington said "I'm awfully sorry, it is not a convenient time. I won't be here." The next telegram that went out from the Embassy went to the post in Lusaka saying "I need to come and visit you right away. I hope that's all right." It was marvelous. Well, back to who were the Ambassadors. Most of the time. I served under Tony Ross who was and is a distinguished career officer and an excellent example of coming up through the service by getting your ticket punched all over the place. Ambassador Ross had been a consular officer, a political officer, and administrative officer, an economic officer. He knew every classical function that an Embassy does. So, he was interesting to serve for because he had a great deal of experience. Dar es Salaam was not his first Embassy. I think he had been Ambassador somewhere else. He was there most of the time. You know his son who has been Ambassador to Damascus for the past five years was a USIA officer.

Q: How were your relations, you speak about the rather dismal official relations, what about the relations of the Soviets, the Chinese, etc. Were they at some distance to?

HEYNIGER: I think we all were. I think that the general atmosphere was that everybody was welcome to come, set up an Embassy, set up an AID program, and get involved in helping in whatever way they wanted -- which became a nightmare for the UNDP people because here was a Nigerian who was head of the United Nations Development Program office in Dar es Salaam supposedly trying to coordinate the development activities of 25 different countries with a startling lack of success. The Chinese when they arrived, since they were building the Tazara Railroad from Dar to the Lusaka, they were there on the ground. As I say, 15,000 People's Liberation Army soldiers working on the railroad. They had terrific access to the government. Other socialistic countries probably had more than us, the British because of their previous position, I mean Tanzania had first been a German and then a British colony. None of us had very good access.

Q: 15,000 People's Liberation Army Chinese wandering around. Did that cause unrest with you all?

HEYNIGER: With us Americans? No. In the first place the Chinese were not in Dar es Salaam. Oftentimes when Britain or France or the US comes in with an enormous presence, you see them everywhere. The Chinese came in and they moved their people
from the port right out to the railhead. They were in mufti with their conical straw hats, but they were all Chinese Army engineering people. They were out 200-300 miles from Dar.

**Q:** You didn't see them as a political problem.

**HEYNIGER:** No. They were doing their job. Obviously the Chinese had a lot of clout. To the extent that Tanzania had a navy, it was a navy supplied by the Chinese. The Tanzanians were always very nervous about other people going down to the port or looking too closely. I remember at the time I loved to play squash. I climbed Mt. Kilimanjaro with a team led by the commanding general of the Tanzanian Army, who was a wonderful guy, a number of years younger than me, who had gone to Sandhurst and had been a captain when Tanzania became independent. Now, he was a two star general. He led a team up Kilimanjaro every year. That was a wonderful privilege to be able to climb Mt. Kilimanjaro with them. I started playing squash with him once a week. We kept it very low key. I drove out to the military headquarters and base. The guards knew me. I went directly to the squash courts; we played and chatted for a bit and went our separate ways. Eventually the security people and the political people heard about this, the fact that the political officer of the American Embassy was seeing the commanding general of the Tanzanian Army, they weren't too happy about that.

**Q:** Were there any tensions between the core of the Embassy, the political and economic seeing all of this aid coming in. Your reports from the field that this really wasn't. I assume by this time, you were somewhat dubious about the effectiveness of much of the program and with an AID program which tends to go running out and off in its own directions. Was there a tension there?

**HEYNIGER:** Let me put that in a bit of context for you. You will probably recall that Tanzania was one of the first countries to get Peace Corps volunteers. In the early ’60s we had a large and hard working AID mission in the country, but again because of the concern by the Tanzanian Government, Tanu, about American imperialism, by the time I got to Dar es Salaam in 1969, the Tanzanian Government had asked the Peace Corps and AID to leave. It was very sad, but personally the mistake I think we made was we started off with about 50 secondary school teachers who went out into the boondocks and taught Tanzanian kids. Things were going so well that with typical American exuberance, at one time I think we had 350 Americans teaching secondary school. That was such a presence that the socialistic people in the government said the Americans are beginning to indoctrinate our youth. It was too big, so shortly after I arrived, the Peace Corps ceased to operate, and also there was not much of an AID presence either. There was some, but it was really minor. The United States had been relegated to a fairly small player. Our activities and general thrust had been taken over by the West Germans, by the Canadians who were there in massive numbers. The Canadian Embassy was bigger than ours. The Scandinavians. I think that a lot of the basic policy interests of the United States were being advanced; they just weren't being advanced by us.
Q: Well, was there anything else that happened during that time?

HEYNIGER: Yes. As the political officer, I was the contact between Washington and the Southern African liberation groups. The ANC, African National Congress, was in Dar es Salaam. The PAN African Congress, I think that they were in Nairobi. The Mozambican independence movement, FRELIMO, which was by then conducting an insurgency, was in Dar es Salaam. The head of the Mozambican liberation movement, a man named Eduardo Mondlane, had been assassinated in Dar es Salaam about a year before I got there with a package bomb probably sent to him by South African security forces.

That was interesting; that was a lot of fun. You had to keep it fairly low key because these liberation groups didn't want to be seen talking to you too much, and they didn't want the Tanzanian Government to become concerned, so it had to be handled rather discreetly. For example, you would organize a dinner party for 8:00 PM and they'd come along about 10:00 P.M. and chat with you for an hour or two.

Q: So this was really more or less for you to keep abreast of what they were thinking.

HEYNIGER: Well, I was doing a lot of reporting to Washington on what was going on with these independence movements because that's the only contact there was. I don't mean to claim that I was Mr. Liberation Movement. There were probably things going on in Lusaka but I think it is fair to say the greatest single focus of Southern African liberation presence and activities at that time was in Dar, and that was part of my beat.

Other things though, we had a first child born in Jordan, a second child just after we came back from the Netherlands, and a third child born in the Congo. My kids just loved it in Dar es Salaam. It was summertime all year round. We had a large attractive house on the beach. My kids went swimming in the Indian Ocean every day year round. They all went to a great international school. There was enough going on so that my wife could get involved in volunteer activities. She went out a number of times with visiting nurses who would go out in a Land Rover, set up in a village, and give out medicines and injections and stuff like that. We did a great deal of traveling. We visited all the game parks; it was marvelous. I kept saying to the kids please pay attention and please look at this because when you grow up, this may not be here, it may be gone. Here is a pride of 12 lions only five yards away. We had a Volkswagen Microbus, and we'd be sitting in one of these game parks with all of these lions snoozing within five yards of us. It was lots of fun.

Q: Let's pick it up the next time in '72. Where did you go?

HEYNIGER: In '72, my marriage was really falling apart. My wife had decided to go back to Washington with the children, and we asked Washington where they wanted me to go. They wanted me to go and be principal officer in Zanzibar. My boss, Ambassador Ross said, no I don't want any single officer serving in Zanzibar because it is too isolated, it is too lonely, and it is too difficult. I was also offered the job as DCM in Burundi, but there again, I was a bit shaken up domestically myself and I didn't know if it would be a
good idea to go off and be DCM in a rather small isolated African Country. The upshot was the Department on fairly short notice had to find a job for me back home. I was assigned as a branch chief in the Africa division of INR.

Q: Today is May 27, 1997. Nick, you were in INR from when to when?

HEYNIGER: Stu, I was in INR from 1972 to 1974 working for Tom Thorne. I was branch chief for Eastern and Central and Southern Africa. It was a big area. I had two officers working with me. Mainly we were drafting country assessments and forecasts. Another aspect of INR work was that we had access to both intercept and overhead material. I briefed the Country Directors and the Deputy Assistant Secretaries in my area. It was interesting. When I was a desk officer for Portuguese Africa, my boss had arranged for me to have access to that kind of information because there was really so little we knew from the posts. I enjoyed that. I enjoyed going down and briefing the country directors and the Deputies. This was a time, I believe, when Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State. The head of INR was Bill Hyland, who had come over at Kissinger's invitation from CIA. The focus was clearly on the post-Vietnam world and US diplomacy in Europe and the Soviet Union in that area, so that Africa was not particularly an area of interest. It was a rather slow period, but I was having a bad time in my personal life, and I really enjoyed the opportunity to serve in INR for awhile.

Q: I was wondering whether you could catch the impression you were getting of INR dealing with Africa. Did you catch any of the diminishing of the order that many people in the Foreign Service were looking for toward working on Africa, because I think there was an awful lot of idealism during the 60's. In the '70s we were ending up with a lot of one man, one party rule. Did you sense any feeling that there wasn't the same elan?

HEYNIGER: I think that's true. I mentioned that when I was in Tanzania, we had such terrific officers to work for as Tom Pickering and Jack Matlock and John Burns, but those were officers that had gone to Africa for broadening and other experience. They didn't stay there. Matlock and Pickering did not remain in the African area. I think there was a certain amount of disillusionment. Had I been a young officer at that time, I think I probably would have been more interested in some areas which were major focuses of American Foreign Policy interests.

Q: In this area which you were concerned with, were there any events, which seized efforts of the Soviets to play games within that particular area?

HEYNIGER: Not as I recall, not at that time. I think that came a bit later. You know the time when we began trying to help the Portuguese and the Angolans toward liberation, and the Cubans were in Angola in a big way, I think, that came a little after me. Southern Africa, South Africa was in difficulties with sanctions, embargoes, things like this, but the situation was not moving too much. There were many causes of concern, particularly countries like Somalia, Ethiopia, The Sudan, Uganda, but I think it is probably fair to say
these problems in these areas were probably not as high on the State Department's list of priorities as other areas.

Q: How about Idi Amin? Was he doing his thing while you were there?

HEYNIGER: I think that Milton Obote had been overthrown either while I was in Tanzania or shortly after I came back, but there was a transitional period and there wasn't too much going on then.

I might mention one thing that kind of shocked me and upset me for awhile that I think we need to talk about. It wasn't during this specific period, a little before, I think, the Africa section of INR had been traumatized somewhat earlier during the Biafran War '67-'70. INR is and I strongly believe should be a place where somewhat independent assessment and analysis can be done. I've always thought it might be an interesting idea to combine the Policy Planning Council with INR. If I were Secretary of State, in addition to having the geographic bureaus and the functional areas, I think it would be interesting to have somewhat of a quasi-independent area which would offer both long term forecasts and spotlight possible future areas of trouble as well as perhaps offer a different slant on things. In the Biafran crisis, the Africa section of INR had produced a study on Biafra, the background, the difficulties, and what the policy options were for the United States. The then Country Director for Nigeria in AF simply stepped in and said "I will not allow this paper to circulate, even internally within the Department." I think that is a shame because I don't think we should be afraid of at least talking and discussing and writing about things internally within the Department and perhaps with other interested agencies. That was just one example.

Q: Feelings ran very high over Biafra. In retrospect, it is an anomaly to think of how strong emotions were in Congress particularly among people on Congressional staffs and sort of what passes for the intellectual and celebrity community in the United States and also the media on Biafra which is basically a tribal conflict and not that deserving of American interest. It certainly had it at the time.

HEYNIGER: Yes. Again I don't want to belabor this point; I don't think it is that important. I think it is interesting, though. Before going over to the Pentagon, for example, a few years before (1967), I had served briefly in the Policy Planning Council as an administrative officer. I remember that the White House assigned a former journalist, Ernest K. Lindley, to the Policy Planning Council to make sure that nobody raised any ideas that differed from the official policy.

As I described in some of my earlier remarks, I thought it was really refreshing and healthy that in the midst of the terrible trauma of Vietnam and the terrible difficulties of American policy, here was an Army chief of staff who said "I'd like to take another look at the whole thing within the Army staff in the Pentagon and really see how we got here" and to use the military's expression, [I love these military expressions], this one was "are we all singing from the same sheet of music?" Obviously we weren't. I just think it is
good to see INR, from an operational standpoint perhaps, attend staff meetings of the
country directorates and have their input, but also be able to draft and to publish studies
that don't necessarily follow US policy.

Q: Shall we leave INR now?

HEYNIGER: Sure.

Q: So you left in 1974.

HEYNIGER: Well, I left in 1974 and was reassigned to the Office of Personnel from
1974 to 1976 which I found a very absorbing tour of duty. It is always stimulating to be
part of the Foreign Services' operational machinery. I was assigned to Personnel's
Training Office, and I was in charge of mid career training and things like assigning FSOs
from class 4 to class 6, to the twenty-six week economic course and to longer courses at
FSI, to grad schools, to exchange programs.

I was also the keeper of the LDP flame. What does that mean? Well, LDP is language
designated positions. By this time, we had gotten to the stage where there were positions
in most Embassies and Consulates around the world which were designated to be
occupied by officers who had facility in the local language. This did not mean that
assignment officers did not frequently attempt to assign officers and then say "Oh Gee, I
forgot." My function was to go to all the assignment meetings for mid career officers and
see when an assignment was proposed for a hard language position, the officer had the
required training or else step in and say no, that's an LDP position and he either does not
have the language or has a one-one so he can't do that. It was controversial, but I think we
were trying to do something positive.

I worked for two very good officers. One was Barrington King and the other was Sam
Frye. I thought at that time the personnel system was working pretty well. Just after I
came in, the Director General at the time who was Ambassador Carol Laise ordered a full
review of the way the Department and the assignment system and all of it worked. King
was one of the few officers who took part in that. It was an excellent study. I think the
willingness to review the way things were running and to try to come up with better ideas
was really helpful and positive.

For myself again, you know I mentioned early on I thought I had made a serious mistake
by going over to the Pentagon when I did because the work I was doing was just a little
too interesting. By the same token, during my two years in personnel, I was offered three
really good jobs, all of which I turned down. This was the time when I had a chance to be
DCM in a small post. For example, I was offered the post of DCM in Madagascar. The
incumbent had unfortunately been killed in an automobile accident.

Q: It was Fred Helpings(?) a friend of mine.
HEYNIGER: I was also offered DCM in Malawi, and later Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland but I was involved in my private life and getting remarried and all three times I said "I'd like to stay here a little longer." My friends and mentors in personnel said "Nick, you've been in Washington for almost four years. You are on your own. We need somebody to go to Antananarivo on about two weeks notice. You know the area, you've had experience. We need you to go there. You cannot turn down these assignments and expect to thrive in the service." I said, "I understand; I know you are right. I understand perfectly. I am responsible for my own life." I had a good time in personnel under Dick Fox and people like that, we were doing good work. I was really happy to see that on a day to day and assignment to assignment basis, the Foreign Service was functioning quite well.

Q: So you are up to '76.

HEYNIGER: Yes and in '76 I was just about to be remarried, and I was looking for a post abroad. The assignment officer for the Arab world came around and said "are you going to marry that tall dark girl that you've been chasing around the halls?" I said "yes." He said ''does she speak French?" I said "yes, she is a native of Quebec." He said "Oh have I got an assignment for you." His problem had been for a number of months that Dick Parker, our Ambassador in Algeria, wanted the constituent post in Oran staffed by two officers, two FSO's, but there was only one house. The two officers assigned to the post were going to have to live and work in the same building, and this is pretty tough. So, when Charles Matheson, the assignments officer, learned that we were going to get married, he was just delighted. The assignment went up to the Director General. It had to be approved. This is interesting just as a vignette. It had to be approved by Ambassador Laise herself. This was the very first tandem assignment in the Foreign Service where one half of the couple was in a direct supervisory position over the other half of the couple.

The way that we solved the problem, and I think it was a very good one, was that both of our efficiency reports would be written by the DCM in Algiers so there would be nothing in either of our files about the other one.

So off we went to Oran from 1976 to 1978. It was fun for me because it was an opportunity to have my own post as a Principal Officer. I remember Roland Welch, who was director of the Visa Office when I first came into the Service, saying the most fun is to have your own post. The main reason why we had a consulate in Oran was there were some very large American businesses like Bechtel and Foster Wheeler who were building gas liquefaction plants for the Algerians right near Oran. ITT was building a huge factory to produce electronic appliances in the old headquarters town of the French Foreign Legion in Sidi-bel Abbes. It was more economic than political work. My new wife was my deputy principal officer. We had one clerk, so we were a small, happy family.

Oran and Algiers are tough places to serve. Oran is quite isolated; the people are not particularly friendly. We had a small circle of friends and not many opportunities for recreation and culture. I don't think we did too badly. One time I went up to call on the
mayor of Oran. He said, “Mr. Consul how are you doing? How are you enjoying life?” I said, “well not bad at all, beautiful weather, beautiful scenery, a chance to be on the Mediterranean, but jogging up and down the streets the little boys run along with me. They find this amusing.” “Oh,” he said, “I'll make arrangements for the National Stadium to be opened for you and your wife.” A week later I drove the Consulate vehicle up to the main part of town, and the gates of the National Stadium were opened, and we were ushered in. My wife and I had two full hours to run around in this gorgeous sports arena, which had been built possibly as an Olympic facility with a track that was like cork, totally by ourselves.

We got around a lot. It is a very interesting place to serve with these little, small towns like Mascara which is where the make up comes from. A couple of times we got to go down fairly deep in the Sahara Desert. We were always a little fearful because here we were in our little Consulate Plymouth. Algeria is a beautiful country, but it has experienced an enormous amount of trauma particularly getting liberated from the French and the tremendous insurgent effort that required. I think the Algerians, who are very intelligent and very capable particularly in business, just need to be left alone for awhile so that a lot of this stress can subside.

Q: What was the political situation in '76-'78 in the department where you were in Oran?

HEYNIGER: At that time there was none of what is going on now where there is this drive for Islamic fundamentalism and killing of people and atrocities which are just making Algeria a tragic place. Things then were relatively peaceful. The government was by and large a quasi-military government. The Governor of Oran district was an Algerian colonel. The focus was on trying to build up the area economically and commercially. Some rather sad things were going on. I think for cultural and religious reasons, Algerians were tearing up a number of the vineyards in this western part of Algeria. I don't know if you know this, but there was a very significant amount of wine that was produced in Algeria and shipped to France where it was mixed with other wine for table wine. This was a considerable produce and trade, but for religious and cultural reasons the Algerians didn't want to be producing alcoholic beverages, so they were pulling up and burning the vineyards.

They were doing other things, too. One of the reasons why my wife and I decided to try to learn written Arabic was that the government started to go around and take down all the road signs in French. This made traveling a bit tricky because you could get 50 or 75 miles out in the country, and you wouldn't really know how to get back home. We learned at least to read Arabic, enough to say Ah, we better go west.

There were only two of us. I was really concerned in terms of the operation of the post. I thought the post was not equipped the way a Foreign Service post should be. We had no secure communications whatever. We had no real communications; we just had a telephone. The post had been trying to get a telex machine for about eight or nine years and not succeeding. I talked long and hard with the Ambassador and the DCM. We
finally got a used Algerian telex machine which enabled us to at least send routine unclassified Consular and Administrative messages to the Department. Otherwise everything had to be reported by telephone to the Embassy in vague terms and then sent on by Algiers. Either that, or write airgrams and dispatches which my wife or I would put in a classified pouch and take up to the embassy every two weeks.

Another thing was that we had an emergency E and E radio which we were supposed to test every week so in case the balloon went up, we would be able to let the Embassy in Algiers and the military forces in the Med know to come and get us. In all the two years I was there, we never really had any clear successful radio contact. I felt that if the United States government was going to open and maintain a Foreign Service post anywhere, it should have a basic level of equipment and ability to operate. These are tales from the Foreign Service.

Q: Who was the Ambassador while you were there?

HEYNIGER: The first year it was Dick Parker for whom I have enormous admiration. During my time he was one of the foremost Arabists in the Foreign Service and served all over the Arab world, had and has a marvelous sense of humor, a wonderful guy. He was reassigned, and we got a political appointee, believe it or not.

Q: Sort of an odd place for a political appointee.

HEYNIGER: Very. He had been an executive for a number of years of Cummings Engine, had worked for about five years in Tehran. I guess he wanted to be an Ambassador and was offered Algiers and took it. He was there for the rest of my tour in Oran and I think a year or two after. I don't think he really enjoyed it too much. He was a black Ambassador. Of course while the Arabs claim to be totally raceless, I think that he felt that they were not being as welcoming to him as he might have otherwise expected.

One of the main things, to come back to the question that you asked me earlier, that was going on was there was an insurgency in Morocco, particularly southern Morocco. We wanted to find out the extent to which these insurgents were being supported and supplied by the Algerians. They were certainly giving King Hassan a headache. It would have been valuable to learn the extent to which the Algerians were aiding, I think it was called the Saraoui Independence Front. One time my wife and I did go down about 400 miles along the border between Morocco and Algeria and monitored a significant route that led west. But you can only hang around so long because you are so conspicuous. We never were able to find out too much about it.

At that point the Algerian central government really had the domestic situation pretty much in hand. There was no insurgency. People were trying to get their lives back together and to improve. Algeria was going through a period of very serious cultural change. It was the country that France had thought it could keep while it granted independence to Morocco on one side and Tunisia on the other. There were many native
born Europeans, born in Algeria, called Pied Noir who had been there and had been a
great portion of the middle class. Now the Algerians were having to fill all that in.

_Q: What was the attitude from your perspective of the Algerians toward the Americans
and the United States Government?_

HEYNIGER: I think somewhat the same as in Tanzania. I consider the Algerians to be
politically very sophisticated people. This was a time, you may recall, when Algeria was
trying to play an intermediary role between East and West. Algeria was a very socialistic
country, very centrally organized, but particularly with things like airplane hijackings and
other terrorist acts, it was frequently the Algerians who stepped in between the terrorists
and either the Germans or the Israelis or whoever and tried to settle the thing. They were
strongly interested in being an active, vocal participant in the third world socialistic
approach.

Now I think they are focused more on their domestic situation, but at that time, I never
served in the Embassy, but I don't think it was easy for our people to have access to senior
Algerian officials. I certainly had rare access to senior officials in my Consular District,
but it was possible to do business. The fact that the Algerians had chosen these large
American firms for these major projects--each one of these gas liquefaction plants cost
about a billion dollars--and they had three of them going up at the same time, showed that
they were not afraid to bring in large scale American assistance. Morrison-Knudsen was
there building electric plants.

_Q: Did you see any parallels between what you observed in Tanzania, indeed a more non
petroleum enriched society, and Algeria in the socialist path they were going down?_

HEYNIGER: I think certainly you could draw some parallels between what the
Tanzanians and the Algerians were trying to do in forums like the United Nations or the
OAU or the Arab League or things like that. They were both, as opposed to let's say
Morocco or Tunisia, the Algerians were trying to be much more activist, much more
outspoken, much more energetic on an international level.

They had a great deal of difficulty in their relations with France. On the one hand, they
were very involved with France economically, with the currency flows going back and
forth across the Mediterranean from Algerians who were in France and sending money
back to Algeria or Algerians who wanted to buy stuff in France and they couldn't get it in,
so they were smuggling it in. On the other, diplomatic and political relations were cool
and fraught with problems.

I did not see, during my period there, any real Algerian interest or activity in rural
development as compared with Tanzania. It was more stimulating business, trade, and
building up the economic infrastructure.
Q: What about dealing with the local officials? Did you find them fairly open, or were they... You mentioned when you were in Tanzania, you were treated with a certain amount of caution.

HEYNIGER: I found it much more difficult in Algeria. Again it was a situation where most Algerians did not want to be seen with American government officials. They basically wanted to have as little as possible to do with Americans. It wasn't just us. They didn't want to have much to do with the French. At that time there was still an enormous French presence in Algeria, enormous French aid programs. All the young French men and women who didn't want to do military service went into the French Peace Corps. Many of them were assigned to Algeria as educators or helping to train people in skills, so the French still had great interest in what was going on in that part of the world and yet great difficulty. The French consul General had a very difficult time communicating with host officials. We had a somewhat easier time on the level of commercial relations and business. Although you have to remember that in a country like Algeria at that time, many of the business officials you were dealing with were in effect government employees.

This is why I said that opportunities for recreation and culture were fairly limited. We had a very small circle. We tried to do what economic and commercial reporting we could, but oftentimes it would come in the form of frequent visits to American businesses and then just picking up from them how things were going from their contacts with the Algerian people.

Canadians were functioning quite effectively working for the American businesses. The who were in Algeria all spoke fluent French, and therefore were employed a lot by American businesses to sandwich between themselves and the Algerians. My wife being a former Canadian, the Canadian Embassy people would come down and stay in our house, and we had very good contacts with them, and they were very helpful.

Q: Were you seeing any glimmers of the fundamentalist uprising that has certainly occupied the Algerians in the last 10 years?

HEYNIGER: On the surface, no because the situation was so controlled by the military and the sort of quasi-military government of Oran and other districts. So, on the surface, things were calm; however, there were a number of indications. In the first place there was tremendous unemployment, particularly among young men. Thousands of young men on the streets of Oran with nothing to do and no opportunity to earn a living. Digging up the vineyards, taking French off the road signs, all these are signs that the country was trying to assert its Arab and Islamic character and become less of a French colony.

I remember a not very attractive story. My wife after awhile, decided whenever she went out, to wear a raincoat. I said "beautiful climate, beautiful day, why have you got your raincoat on?" You know, when she went out to do shopping or to do errands or things like that. She said "because people spit at me because I'm not wearing the haik [overall head to toe cloak of Arab women]. It says something about the way you as a foreigner are
looked at if people are going to spit at you as you walk down the sidewalk. I guess they feel very strongly.

Q: Well you left there in 1978.

HEYNIGER: Right. It was a two year tour. I would say without question that Algeria was my toughest tour in the Foreign Service. It just is not a country that is easy to serve in. Our answer was, we took a number of short one-week vacations. We visited Castile in Spain; we visited Provence in southern France. There is a little Spanish enclave.

Q: Ceuta.

HEYNIGER: Mellilia. Ceuta is another one. Mellilia is closer to Algeria. You could go over there and stay in a Parador and be involved in a different culture. It is absolutely amazing after these hundreds of years, the Spaniards still have territorial enclaves with Spanish troops in the middle of Morocco. We'd go over there for a long weekend.

I went to Rome for a Consular conference, spent some time on an aircraft carrier while the marines and the navy all assured us that if the balloon went up they would come and rescue us. I remember getting a bit seasick visiting an aircraft carrier that was anchored. One of the officers said to me, “are you feeling all right?” I said, “it is a little funny. I'm embarrassed to be seasick; this ship isn't even moving.” He said, “that's all right, you are in the officer's mess which is up in the forward part of the ship, and while we may be anchored, we are going up and down in a 40 foot arc.” So it was perfectly understandable.

I also went to a Consular conference chaired by Barbara Watson in Rabat where I made myself obnoxious to her I'm sure by asking her about the need to have in each cone, including the Consular cone, opportunities to reach the senior level. I've been in personnel. There are a lot of consular jobs in the FSO-6 or 5 or 4 level and even some consular supervisory positions at the 3 or 2 level, but if you really like consular work or you really like administrative work or commercial work and you want to make a career out of it, your opportunities for becoming a senior officer are very restricted in those cones. I was pressing Barbara to talk about what might be done about that, but it's tough. In 1978 my wife and I opened negotiations with the Department on what next. For me, they suggested head of the political section in Port-au-Prince or in Nassau, or possibly being DCM for Nancy Ostrander, a Consular officer, who was Ambassador to Suriname. I was going to go down there and be her DCM, but there were no good jobs for my wife. By that time, we had made the basic decision that I was going to retire when I turned 50 and was eligible for retirement, so we decided to go back to Washington.

My wife, for her part, got a job that she just loved because she is very much involved in international social issues, particularly women's issues. She got a job in IO on the staff of the office that supported the US commission for UNESCO. Right down her alley, and she just loved it.
They really didn't have much to offer me, and I ended up being press officer for Tony Quainton, the current Director General. He was head of the Office for Combating Terrorism. I spent a great deal of my time drafting and coordinating press guidance for Hodding Carter and Tom Reston with regard to terrorist incidents in the Arab world, Latin America.

We had, as you can imagine, some really hairy times. I'll talk just briefly about two of them. Strange how history repeats itself, but I think about 1979, an Embassy in Bolivia was taken over by an insurgent group, and it included the American Ambassador. That hostage-taking lasted two or three months and a few of us deployed up at the operations center to keep an eye on that. I think we must have done fairly well, because the entire unit got a commendation out of that.

Of course the other traumatic one was the takeover of our Embassy in Tehran. I vividly remember being in the operations center at about 3:30 A.M. drafting press guidance for Secretary Vance to use with the BBC and other organizations that had time deadlines that had to be met right then. Poor Secretary Vance was not particularly happy with my press guidance, but there it is. The Embassy had been taken over and 50 or 60 of our people had been taken prisoner. It was a very bad time, and that hostage-taking went on for 444 days. It was terrible. That's the kind of thing we were involved in. I had a very minor role in all of these things, but you know, it was fun working for Tony Quainton.

From a strictly operational standpoint, I know I mentioned this earlier, one of the ways that the State Department or other government agencies do create or change policy is by preparing press guidance. If it is prepared and it is cleared, and if the question is asked and the guidance is given, that becomes US policy, at least for the time being. That was quite interesting for me as a press officer.

Q: Did you find your office at odds with some of the other bureaus on matters pertaining to terrorism at all? I mean they want to go one way and you want to go the other.

HEYNIGER: I found myself always at odds with the geographic bureaus, and this is because of the nature of the beast. Terrorist incidents take place in various parts of the world. Whatever geographic bureau it may be, whether it is ARA or EUR or AF or NEA or whatever it is, the people in the geographic bureaus feel with some legitimacy that they should do the press guidance. Let's say you are the desk officer for Uganda and an El Al airplane has been captured by Arab terrorists at Entebbe Airport. This is a very difficult situation. If you are the desk officer for Uganda, you feel that this is your turf, and if there is going to be any press guidance prepared, it should be prepared by you. Along comes somebody from the Office for Combating Terrorism and says "here I've prepared this press guidance which I'd like you to clear for the Department spokesman to use at the noon briefing." We ran into this all the time particularly with NEA. The incidents in the NEA area were so frequent that they all got kind of used to this.

Q: They'd been around the block.
HEYNIGER: They'd been around the block many times with these incidents. A lot of it could be avoided if you just made a couple of early morning phone calls and said I'm preparing press guidance. I hope that is all right. I'll be around well before noon so we can get it cleared.

I do have to say that on an inter-agency basis for some reason the State Department had been appointed the lead agency for terrorism for the United States Government, particularly in regard to international terrorism. Tony Quainton was Mr. International Terrorism for the United States Government. And on two or three occasions, I and other people had rather bruising experiences because the FBI feels pretty strongly that if it is going to participate in something like this, it is going to be the lead agency. They weren't too happy with the fact that Foreign Service people, State Department people, were in charge and drafting press guidance and this kind of thing. Most inter-agency stuff went pretty well, but the FBI is not easy to deal with when they feel it is something they should be involved in.

In general I think that the Department's efforts on terrorism are working well. I'm sure they are doing better now than 17 years ago. A great deal depends not only on having the good sort of intelligence analysis which then was being done by the office of security, but also on bringing in, we brought in a number of outside consultants, particularly from Rand and other places like this, to talk with us and have seminars more in depth analysis of bases for terrorism, where it was likely to come from, why, a question of anticipating, trying to anticipate where the attacks are coming from.

Q: You were with terrorism from '78 until when?

HEYNIGER: "78-'80. Then I retired.

Q: While you were dealing with the terrorism problem, did you find that the National Security Council, the NSC... The reason I ask about sort of the White House involvement is that I talked with other people with similar problems either in the field or in Washington during the Nixon-Kissinger White House. One sort of has the feeling that there is a lot of posturing by both Nixon and Kissinger to show that they were tough and all. It was not very helpful in trying to settle the problem as opposed to showing how tough you are in public statements. You did not find that.

HEYNIGER: Let's take a couple of "for instances." One thing I should note parenthetically is that while I was in the terrorism office, Carter had become President, so we no longer had Kissinger. I'll come back to that because I think many of us in the Foreign Service were deeply disappointed by what the Carter White House decided to do about the Tehran hostage-taking.

I think in general, sure there is always a desire on the part of the senior levels of the State Department or the White House to say “we don't negotiate with terrorists” which is very
firm and very strict US Government policy. But when it comes down to the nitty gritty, we were involved in a number of instances where private Americans whether businessmen or students or other people who had been visiting family abroad were taken hostage. Latin America, Yemen, many places. Sometimes these occurrences did not get a lot of press play, but certainly the families and the communities that were involved were very upset, very concerned, and wanted the State Department to do everything we possibly could for their family members.

So there was great pressure to negotiate. You have a public policy that states very firmly and clearly we do not negotiate with terrorists, but then the wife or the father of an American citizen who has been taken captive comes in and says "look I really need your help, who are these people and what do they want, and what can you do to help me?" Then that's difficult. We faced this situation time and time again. In the final outcome of many of these incidents, there is some kind of arranged agreement. So it is not helpful, in my opinion, for the White House or senior State people to step in and make pronouncements while the people that are attempting to deal with the situation on the ground and on an operational basis are trying to get American citizens freed and back with their families.

Another specific instance, I think what concerned us in the terrorism office was when the Embassy in Iran was taken over in November of 1979, the United States Government said we won't negotiate. President Carter came over to the Department of State and there was a huge meeting in one of the entrance areas of the Department where President Carter stood up and promised the Foreign Service that nothing would be done that would endanger the lives of the hostages. Then six months, nine months later came the abortive US military attempt to capture the hostages and to rescue them. We all felt that this was something that the White House had promised us they would not do.

**Q: Of course this led to Vance's resignation.**

**HEYNIGER:** Right. You know as a career officer you have to expect that you do your job to the best of your ability, but you don't run the government. But there is or should be such a thing as loyalty up and loyalty down.

**Q: Why don't we call it at this point.**

*End of interview*