

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

**AMBASSADOR HERBERT E. HOROWITZ**

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## INTERVIEW

*Q: Could you start off with something about your background--where you were born, when you were born, something about your education, background and family?*

HOROWITZ: I was born in Brooklyn, New York, and raised there in a first generation immigrant family. Both of my parents came to the U.S. as small children with their families from Eastern Europe as part of that very large migration of Eastern European Jews to the United States at the turn of the century. Although growing up in New York, and we always think of New Yorkers as being very cosmopolitan, in fact growing up in some of the areas of Brooklyn was about as provincial as one could get. Manhattan was a long way off and your impressions in childhood are affected by the people who live in your area.

*Q: Did you grow up in a Jewish neighborhood or an Italian neighborhood, or what? There were really different types...*

HOROWITZ: I lived in Crown Heights; now it is famous for other reasons. At that time it was mostly working class, middle class Jews, mostly of Eastern European origin, and Italians who had migrated from Italy earlier, in the 1860's or 1870's. I knew there were some synagogues around and a lot of Catholic churches, but it wasn't until I was older that I realized that the world wasn't filled with Italian Catholics and East European Jews. I went to a New York City elementary school, across the street, and then to the well-known Boy's High School in Brooklyn, the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn. That is where I met people of many different backgrounds.

*Q: It may have been a rather narrow neighborhood but it certainly had a European flavor to it, and then you moved into an extremely cosmopolitan group, would you say?*

HOROWITZ: No, not...let me just say that the high school embraced a larger area with many more ethnic groups. I wouldn't think of it as cosmopolitan in the same sense that I think of parts of Manhattan. It was a very good experience; I had an active high school career--played football, captain of the football team my senior year, president of the school--my grades were fair. Then I went off for two years to Alfred University, a small college in upstate New York. I had a scholarship and I thought it would be a good idea, and some of my teachers thought it would be a good idea, for me to get some exposure outside of New York City. After two years there I did transfer back and went to Brooklyn College and I graduated, got a B.A., from there.

*Q: When were you born?*

HOROWITZ: 1930.

*Q: So this was in the middle...*

HOROWITZ: I got out of high school in 1948.

*Q: So the Depression was over and World War II was over.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, but my childhood was very, very much colored by the Depression. My parents were poor and they had to work very, very hard. I remember the pennies being counted, remember times when our electricity would be cut off for a few days. I realized later that it was because the bill hadn't been paid. My father was a licensed plumber and my mother did the bookkeeping for him. Then toward the end of the thirties they decided that since my mother was in the plumbing shop all day doing the bookkeeping and answering the phones that she would do a little bit of retail business. She began to do a little bit of hardware and house furnishings and that grew gradually over the years. Both my mother and father worked very, very hard and a lot of their attitudes, and I think a lot of my thinking, was colored by the Depression. By the time I got out of high school times

were getting better, 1948. Then college--Brooklyn College was wonderful; Alfred was fine for a little bit of sports and dramatics but it was not heavy going at that time. Brooklyn College gave a really solid liberal arts education.

*Q: What was your concentration?*

HOROWITZ: I majored in history, mostly because that interested me and I thought I wanted to be a lawyer, but then changed my mind and wasn't sure what I wanted to do. I did go to a semester of law school after Brooklyn College, N.Y.U. law school, and decided that I didn't like it; it wasn't what I wanted to do. Then I started graduate school at Columbia with a focus on East Asian Studies.

*Q: Why?*

HOROWITZ: Simply because of an excellent teacher at Brooklyn College where I took a course in East Asia because I heard it was a good course. And then I took another course, China, at Brooklyn College and I said "this is interesting stuff." So I went to the Department of History and the East Asia Institute at Columbia. That was really where my interest in China and East Asia began. It was interrupted--two years in the army. I was drafted during the Korean War, but the armistice came about while I was in basic training. I spent my two years mostly in Augusta, Georgia. I remember they lined us up after we were drafted, I guess at Camp Dix--they took all the people that were in the barracks--and said, "You men have been handpicked to become military policemen." So I was trained as an MP, but really spent most of the two years working in an office. I think they realized I didn't have the makeup to be breaking up bar fights. Is this more detailed than you want?

*Q: Oh no. This is excellent. Just to give you a little flavor for it, the man who has just been made Secretary of State, Larry Eagleburger, was a lieutenant in the military police down in the south.*

HOROWITZ: I didn't like the army, but I met a lot of good friends. It helped my academic career because when I got out I was a much more mature, more serious person. So when I went back to Columbia I had a drive that I might not have had before that.

*Q: The military experience, I think, is very important for people of our generation. It sort of shook us up, got us out, changed us around a bit.*

HOROWITZ: It did. I think it is a good idea that a lot of young people today like to take off a year, get a job and work before they go back to graduate school or professional school. I think that is good although a lot of young people now have told me that there are no jobs out there so if they can they just stay in school. While I was at Columbia focusing on East Asia, I was not sure what I wanted to do; I was not certain whether I wanted to stay in an academic mode. I took various government exams like some of my friends did

and one of the exams I took was the foreign service exam. I didn't pass the first time but I did the second time.

*Q: When did you take it?*

HOROWITZ: 1955-1956 period. I guess it was early '56 that my oral exam came up. I took it in New York and passed.

*Q: What was the oral exam like?*

HOROWITZ: The impression that I had was that they were more interested in how I handled myself under pressure--being asked a lot of questions about things that they hoped I didn't know much about to see how I responded. The written exam was pretty comprehensive and I did fairly well. So I think they were looking at personality and character. As soon as they hit a subject that I didn't know anything about, they hit me again with the another question--like a lot of stuff about American geography, name three ports on the Mississippi River. We talked a little bit about the economy of the American south, they wanted me to expand on that which wasn't exactly my area. However, the interesting thing about the oral exam to me was that at the end they told me to come back in a couple of hours--they had a few other people to give orals to--and I took a walk, went to Macy's, and when I came back they congratulated me and said I had passed. They asked me when I was prepared to begin. At that time they were recruiting for people, the Foreign Service was taking in junior people and expanding. I said, "I don't know, I hadn't really thought about it seriously yet." They said, "Well, we will give you a little time; let us know in a few weeks." I said that I would like to think about it. Then one of the oral examiners called me aside and we went into another room--his name was Raymond Paul Ludden and he was one of the old China hands who had been one of those heavily criticized in the McCarthy years. He explained who he was and said, "You know I am very interested in China, I spent a lot of time there; it has been a terrible period we have gone through. Now they will send me to Latin America--they are not going to send me to China again. But if that is the reason you are hesitating, because of the McCarthy, period, I want to reassure you. The Foreign Service needs young people and we need people who are interested in China and East Asia and I hope that it is not the persecution of the McCarthy period that makes you reluctant to come into the Foreign Service." I was tremendously impressed by that. As a matter of fact that was not a reason why I was hesitating; I knew people who were affected by McCarthy, and of course at that point a lot of academics were. But I was very impressed by that, I have always remembered it. After a few weeks of pondering, I decided that I would do the foreign service.

*Q: So you came in when?*

HOROWITZ: The fall of 1956.

*Q: What did you have, about a 3 months or a 6 weeks training period?*

HOROWITZ: If I remember it was about 3 months. We had the basic A-100 courses; it included a lot of consular material, there wasn't a separate consular course as there is now. Then, for some strange quirky reason, the State Department had a policy at that time that those who were language probationers would have to get three solid months of one of the major languages regardless of what country they would be going to. They put me into French and I went through three months of French although through most of that period I knew that my first assignment was going to be Taipei. It wasn't enough French to bring me up to the standard needed by the Foreign Service so throughout my whole career there has been this little bit of French in the background--never qualified.

*Q: In 1956 the United States was certainly preeminent in the world and here were the young officers coming in to be diplomats. Do you have any characterization of this group, what they were like?*

HOROWITZ: I was twenty-six, there were a few older than me and some younger than me; generally speaking the classes at that time were younger than they are today. A lot of people coming into the Foreign Service in recent years are in their early thirties and have been out working for a few years. The class had quite varied backgrounds--not all from the Ivy League; they came from different parts of the country and had different kinds of interests in different parts of the world--some were interested in the Middle East, some in Asia, some Latin America. Interestingly I don't remember any of them being interested in Africa. There wasn't a separate Africa bureau at that time.

*Q: Africa at that time, outside of Arab speaking Northern Africa which was considered part of the Middle East, I don't think had any independent countries but Liberia and Ethiopia. There were a few consulates scattered around the continent.*

HOROWITZ: The class, politically, loosely hewing to the middle of the road. I don't know how many Republicans and how many Democrats there were, but they tended to be people who were cautious, calculating, center of the road kind of people. I guess maybe that is why they came into the Foreign Service.

*Q: How about male, female?*

HOROWITZ: There must have been about thirty of us in all and I think there were two women. Of course, very few women passed the orals in those days and if a woman married she had to resign, so it was not a very promising career. I do not remember any black officers. I think generally speaking the group thought of themselves for the time as being tolerant, liberal minded people.

*Q: Did you request Taipei as your first post?*

HOROWITZ: I asked for it. I asked for a China posting and at that time the only places were Taiwan or Hong Kong. We were putting Chinese language officers into southeast Asian posts, mostly as a place to put them because of the overseas Chinese populations. But I definitely wanted to go to east Asia and if possible to Taiwan or Hong Kong. At that

time an effort was made to accommodate the interests of the new officers, I think probably more so than now. I have a son in the Foreign Service now in his first tour and he didn't have much choice at all.

*Q: Where is he going?*

HOROWITZ: He is in Bogotá, but he is qualified in Russian. He has his Master's in Russian studies from UCLA, but now he is trained in Spanish and speaks Spanish. I think that is interesting; we were more flush in those days. In Taiwan I was, first, the low man in the three person consular section, then I was the most junior person in the four or five man economic section. Almost every post expected to have one or two junior officers around in one section or another. In addition to assigned duties they would answer routine letters and take care of some of the routine visitors coming in. It was a different type of learning experience. I think a lot of the young officers now are really plunged right away into substantive responsibilities. There was an expectation then of a learning period; I don't think it exists anymore.

*Q: You went to Taipei in 1957. What was the situation like in Taiwan at that time?*

HOROWITZ: First, as an anecdote; on my seventh day there, there was a huge anti-American riot and the Embassy was burnt to the ground. Martial law was declared. That was unusual, especially since at that point we had a mutual-security treaty with Taiwan, because of the Korean War we had decided once again to back the Nationalists and the seventh fleet was in the Taiwan Strait. So it was a bit of a shock to have that kind of an anti-American outburst; but I could see, after being there a while, that there were some reasons for it.

*Q: Could you explain what happened and what the Embassy people did?*

HOROWITZ: An American officer, maybe a sergeant, anyway an American soldier caught a Peeping Tom outside of his house and shot and killed the Peeping Tom. The American military person was court-martialed and tried right there in Taipei, in one of the American military areas. This got lots and lots of publicity. He was acquitted, or at least let go--released on sentence. There had been a lot of resentment about the presence of Americans who were there in large numbers; large numbers of military, large numbers of AID--then I guess it was ECA. One friend of mine joked that the solution to the two China problem would be that if more and more Americans and more and more American cars with tail fins came to Taiwan, eventually the island would sink under the sheer weight of American presence. People were poor, the economy was not in very good shape, and here were Americans being driven around town in jeeps driven by Chinese; it was almost like an overtly imperialist environment. This was one of those incidents that set off that sort of reaction.

Speaking more generally, afterwards efforts were made to resolve the situation and both sides tried to make amends. The American Ambassador was very active.

*Q: Karl Rankin?*

HOROWITZ: Yes. The Chinese did their best because U.S. aid was crucial for them. The important thing, I think, was that this was a period when we were foursquare behind the Chinese Nationalists, notwithstanding the past disillusionment with them on the mainland. After the Korean War, the placement of the seventh fleet, the communist Chinese entering the Korean War, we were foursquare behind the Nationalists and this had an impact on U.S. policy in east Asia. Even as a junior officer I became aware of that; it was almost like Taiwan was of much greater significance and importance than it really needed to be. Later, when I got back to Washington, I became more conscious of it. For example, if we would do something in east Asia, one of the questions that would arise in our policymakers' minds was, "What would Chiang Kai-shek think of this? What about our alliance with Taiwan?" The impact of that small island, fifteen million people at most, on policy was much greater than it should have been.

*Q: What were you doing when you first got there?*

HOROWITZ: I would like to come back to the thing I was just talking about so that I don't forget it. One of the things that has concerned me in reflecting on my career is that it worries me that a whole bureaucracy can jump on the bandwagon of a policy and support it any way they can. The feeling of a lot of Foreign Service people is that, "Well, I may not like the policy but maybe in its implementation I can affect it somewhat; maybe in my reporting I can have some impact on the future direction of the policy." It concerns me. I guess the most grievous situation was Indochina, Vietnam; but the period of our out and out support of the Nationalists on Taiwan is another example. For a while the only China experts around in the U.S. government were Taiwan experts.

*Q: To put it in context--this was the Eisenhower period. One had the feeling that Dulles had almost said to the right wing of the Republican Party, "Our China policy is your baby," and he worked on Europe basically. At least that is sort of the feeling one had.*

HOROWITZ: But upon reflection I wish there had been more questioning. Obviously this happens to corporations; in a big company like General Motors, everyone jumps on board and supports the program. Anyway I think there should be more room for dissent and discussion. We can come back to that later.

Q. The McCarthy period had sort of died out, but it was still the great period of the China lobby. The Eisenhower group was looking toward Europe as being the main concern, with real problems in the middle east; but China had what was considered a virulent form of communism on the mainland and we were very close to confrontation over the offshore islands and the Formosa Straits. How did you feel as a young officer, did you feel that you had better not question things; what was the feeling at the Embassy?



Ambassador Horowitz. That is a very good question. I would say that most of the officers were supportive of the policy. I think if people questioned it, they sort of kept it to themselves. As the most junior officer in the Embassy I did not feel that I would have any input; maybe I should have had more courage at the time. There is also the problem that people at the junior levels did not see all the cables and messages; there was a reading file but not everything was put into the reading file. I think that most of the people who were there had supported the policy; some were new to things China, some had little contact with China before.

*Q: I came into the Foreign Service about a year before you did and I was serving in Europe as a young visa officer and my general feeling was that eventually we were going to have to recognize China, maybe not right away; the time didn't seem auspicious to do anything about China. Well you arrived just after this riot that burnt the Embassy down; people take these things pretty personally. I would have thought there would have been a feeling of "screw the Formosans" on the part of the officers.*

HOROWITZ: No, I think everyone sort of accepted the general policy direction which was that the relationship with the Nationalist government of Taiwan was important and we should do everything possible to bring things back to a normal situation. I think almost everybody was supportive of that. There was, of course, some questioning about some of the problems in Taiwan; the lack of democracy. At that point the Nationalist government and Chiang Kai-shek said, "We cannot not move from the period of political tutelage to democracy because we are not on the mainland; as soon as we get back to the mainland we will have elections and we can become a democratic country." There were very few Taiwanese--who are Chinese but their families have been in Taiwan for some generations--in the central government; there was a lot of friction between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders. In fact the mainland rule over Taiwan after 1945 was so abysmally bad that in 1947 there was a Taiwan uprising and a lot of Taiwanese were killed. A lot of that flavor carried over into the fifties when I was first there.

*Q: What were you doing during this period?*

HOROWITZ: Well first I was in the consular section for about seven or eight months doing visas and general consular work. Then there was an opening in the economics section and I was able to get transferred over to the economic side.

*Q: You were a junior officer, but as a consular officer you could see at least the reflection of how the administration of the Chiang Kai-shek government affected its citizens at the passport level and the police level; then in the economic section you were looking at the Formosan economy. What were your impressions at that time?*

HOROWITZ: On the consular side, I must say that I had a lot of sympathetic understanding for the visa applicants. Taiwan was poor, and there was a state of war with the mainland; one did not know how long that would continue. Given the Chinese society's tremendous emphasis on education the only opportunities for young people were

to get out and get to the United States for college, or university and professional training. This was extremely difficult for the mainland people because they had no family ties in Taiwan. In would come a visa applicant, brilliant, highly qualified, admitted to several American universities, able to get some sort of scholarship help and maybe some help from relatives; but you had to determine "will this person come back to Taiwan?" There was no chance, he had no family in Taiwan. If you said, "No, you can't have a visa," then in a way you were discriminating against this person because he was an unfortunate refugee from communism on the mainland. I must say that my own judgments were sometimes based on saying to myself, "If this person stayed in the United States and found some way to stay there permanently would he or she add to or detract from American society?" I can't help but admit that in the back of my mind, sometimes, this was a consideration.

*Q: This was, of course, true of most of us who were consular officers. You are playing a little bit of God there, but I can't get too unhappy about it. It is better to have that than an absolute rule.*

HOROWITZ: At that time there was no hope that the Taiwan economy would burgeon and grow. So that is what I remember most vividly about the consular work in Taiwan. At that point only one hundred Chinese a year were allowed into the United States as immigrants, so if they wanted to apply for the immigrant visa they put them on a waiting list, and the waiting list was maybe forty-five years.

*Q: I thought it was in the hundreds for somebody who came from what was called the Asia-Pacific triangle. The immigration law was very racist; I remember telling people of Asian ancestry in Europe that they only had a hundred and thirty years to go, it has gone down from a hundred and thirty-three. Then in the economic section what were you doing?*

HOROWITZ: I was doing general reporting assignments, often things that the other officers couldn't handle--answering correspondence, occasional commercial inquiries, but very few businessmen came to Taiwan in those days. I had a fair bit of liaison with ECA and oddly enough, notwithstanding the fact that I was born and brought up in Brooklyn, New York, I was the Embassy's representative on the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction. Because of that I learned something about what they were trying to do in the countryside in Taiwan; it was very interesting.

*Q: Were we looking towards what happened in Japan and trying to duplicate some of the process there?*

HOROWITZ: At that time the concept of our aid program in a place like Taiwan was to get in involved in everything. We had advisors all over the place; almost every ministry, every office, had an American advisor doing one thing or another. There was a lot of project assistance, specific plants or factories were being built; there was also a lot of non-project technical assistance going on. Later on in our aid programs we became more

selective, but at that point there were a lot of active Americans. The rural area was one of the more promising areas because they were able to conduct a land reform program in Taiwan. A lot of land had been taken over from the Japanese at the end of World War II; they also worked out a scheme whereby the people who gave up their land to the program were compensated with shares in companies that had formerly been state monopolies. So there were rather interesting things happening in the Taiwan countryside. But in the late '50's the judgment of a lot of the economists looking at Taiwan was that Taiwan was not going to be able to make it on its own; either it had to be a part of China or a part of Japan. The agricultural surplus was diminishing as population in Taiwan was growing; it just had too many problems. It was a basket case. It turned out that they were wrong.

*Q: I think this was the same judgment that was being made in Korea too. How did you find the "interface" with the Formosan or Chinese government there; what were your impressions at the time?*

HOROWITZ: The face to face contacts were very good; understandably, because we were providing a fair bit of help and assistance, and so if I would see someone in one of the Chinese ministries contacts were quite excellent. Many of them spoke English and if they didn't they used a lot of English terminology. The Chinese term for inflation is cumbersome, so hardly any Chinese would use it, they would say inflation. We had a lot of good feelings; a lot of them had been educated in the United States. At the senior levels there was a feeling that there were still too many older, sometimes corrupt, characters around, who were grudgingly accepting American assistance because they had no option, but they weren't necessarily pro-American. Some of the senior older people tended to resist some of the economic reforms. For example, I remember when we were encouraging the Chinese to try to attract foreign investment, create a favorable investment climate, but some of the old timers didn't think that was so good, there would be too many foreigners running around. I was in Taipei for a year and a half, total, and then had a direct transfer to our language school in Taichung, in central Taiwan. I did eleven months at the language school. Combined with what I had had at Columbia...

*Q: You did study Chinese at Columbia?*

HOROWITZ: Yes. I didn't need at that point a full year's time at Taichung. Then I had home leave and then came back to Taipei for another two years, in the economic section.

*Q: I don't know how much you kept up with your contacts in Columbia, but during this time were you getting any feel for what the professional China hands in the academic world--Columbia was a major player in this--were thinking about Taiwan at that time?*

HOROWITZ: I kept touch because I hadn't finished my Master's essay at that time, and I would see them occasionally when someone from the Department visited Taiwan. I think they were interested in Taiwan, many of them had a lot of contacts in the Nationalist government or in Nationalist academic institutions. At that point I don't think they were highly critical of U.S. policy.

*Q: Well there really wasn't anywhere else to go at that time, was there?*

HOROWITZ: Nowhere else to go.

*Q: What about the constant concern, and my dates are foggy, over the Taiwan straits, and Quemoy and Matsu and the other islands there. Did you feel that the mainland Chinese might be just over the horizon; was this a real concern or not?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, it was a real concern in Taiwan. The Nationalist Chinese felt very strongly that they did not want to give up the two important offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Since those islands were so close to the mainland, you could look over and see the communists on the other side of the water, they felt that symbolically they were a piece of the mainland and if they retreated completely to Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands it would be a permanent split. It was clear, even to us in the Embassy, that the United States was not going to get into a war on behalf of the Nationalist Chinese over the offshore islands. But we were supportive of the Nationalists. In the 1958 bombardment, when there was very, very heavy communist shelling of Quemoy, it was sort of an open question as to what extent the U.S. would support the Nationalist Chinese if the communists attacked these offshore islands. I think there was constant awareness among my colleagues in the embassy that these were danger points and in a way I think people were keeping their fingers crossed that there wouldn't be further hostilities. We later learned, of course, that the Chinese were upset because the Russians wouldn't support them in taking over the islands. The Russians didn't want to risk a wider war. This was one of the factors that was leading up to the Sino-Soviet split; we didn't know that then.

There was a lot of concern because I think a lot of my colleagues felt that the offshore islands were expendable; we understood why the Nationalists felt this way, but still these were tiny bits of real estate. I visited Quemoy two or three times when I was in Taiwan; the Nationalist Chinese used to like to take visitors there, so if I was the escort officer of some visitor I would have an opportunity to go. It became sort of a military showcase--all dug in, lots of underground trenches and bunkers. They would take us to some bunker where you could look through binoculars and see the mainland where those "villains" were. The Nationalist Chinese used it as a showpiece to try to persuade people as to why it was important and why it deserved support. In late 1985 when I was in Beijing as the Chargé d'Affaires, my wife and I went on a diplomatic tour, and one of the places we went was Fujian Province, to Xiamen, where they took us up on a bluff and gave us a pair of binoculars--and we looked at Quemoy. Of course it was a different time.

*Q: Also I think that on the American side there was a feeling that too much of the Nationalist military resources were put there. Tell me about the language training. How was it set up, how did you feel about it?*

HOROWITZ: For me, personally--I had had some rudimentary Chinese at Columbia and then while I was in Taipei for a year and a half I had an hour a day with a teacher with

extra time on weekends. It was coming along--I was a bachelor and that helped; I was moving ahead in spoken Chinese. Then to the school--I thought it an excellent program (some of the same teachers are still around). Most of the students were there for longer periods of time but I was one of those who came in with some background in Chinese. We focused on both speaking and reading. I certainly came out of it quite able to read political and economic articles in the newspapers.

*Q: You were studying Mandarin?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, Mandarin. I was very pleased when at the end of my four and a half years in Taiwan I went back to Washington and qualified at a 4-4 level. I was very gratified.

*Q: 4-4 is the speaking-reading level; 3 is the working level and 4 is the...*

HOROWITZ: I don't think I have ever been at that level again, but I got a good working level of Chinese. An amusing thing about the school--at that time Taichung, in central Taiwan, was really in the boonies; there were very few paved streets and things like that. There was big debate among the students of the school as to whether the school should be at Taipei where more Mandarin was spoken--at that time, Mandarin Chinese was not widely spoken in Taiwan; young people spoke it but older people spoke either Taiwan dialect or some Japanese--or whether the school should stay in Taichung. There was a foreign service inspection when we were there; the inspectors came and one of the things they did at the school was probe this question. They concluded that all of the married students wanted to stay in Taichung and all of the bachelor students wanted the school moved to Taipei.

*Q: So there was more to it than just the language possibilities. When you were there was there any political slant by the teachers? I know I took Serbian and we had strong Serb teachers who we resisted like mad.*

HOROWITZ: I would say that politically a couple of teachers might have been fiercely pro-government, pro Chiang Kai-shek; but you really get to know the teachers after a while--you see so much of each other in classes, discussions, you go to restaurants together--and I think most of them were neutral, tried to be objective about what the Nationalists had done or not done. Privately critical about some things. Now I am quite sure that they were all making reports to the Nationalist security office about us, but there was no effort to indoctrinate us. They usually answered questions very directly, frankly, and fairly. What did exist was a cultural thing, whereby all these teachers who were northerners, mostly born, or if not born raised, in Peking and speaking the Peking dialect, looked down upon southern Chinese. And that is a different thing.

*Q: You finished your Chinese training when?*

HOROWITZ: 1959-1960, and then I had home leave and went back to Taipei, in the economic section.

*Q: The Ambassador when you went back?*

HOROWITZ: It was Rankin and then it was Drumright.

*Q: What was your impression as a junior officer of Karl Rankin as an Ambassador?*

HOROWITZ: My impression of him was that he was cautious, conservative, soft-spoken. I remember him being soft-spoken and he struck me as a very controlled person. I didn't see him a great deal. Occasionally I would be included in some function at the residence, trying to learn a little about proper Foreign Service protocol. I remember Mrs. Rankin correcting me once or twice on a couple of things--smoking at the dinner table was one. I remember him very kindly; I don't recall being in any discussions with him about the political situation. I had a sense that it was a well run embassy.

*Q: Drumright--was there any difference with him?*

HOROWITZ: Flamboyant wouldn't be the right term because he was also a very cautious, conservative person. I remember him as being more outgoing in many ways. I think both Rankin and Drumright were good friends of the Nationalist government. I have a feeling that Drumright--I haven't thought about this in a long while--might have been even more pro-Nationalist than Rankin. I get that sense though I am not sure I could justify it.

*Q: Was there any feeling among middle grade and junior officers that we were too close to the government? This often happens in embassies; the junior officers tend to meet the people who are more at odds with the government and they pick up this attitude unlike the officers who deal with the government more closely.*

HOROWITZ: I think there was a fair bit of objective reporting. For example, on attitudes of the Taiwanese toward mainlanders there would be officers who wrote reports about that. But as far as overall policy was concerned, I think most people in the embassy were supportive of that--at least in a general way. The people at the mid-levels had more contact with the working level people in the ministries and that is where you found some of the people who were in favor of reform, and improvement, and change.

*Q: Were you getting any feeling for what was happening on the mainland? I am not sure if this was the time of the Great Leap Forward or not.*

HOROWITZ: Very little; there was almost nothing in the Taiwan media about what was happening on the mainland. The China watching that was being done by the U.S. government was being done primarily from Hong Kong, and our resources to do that from there were building up during that period. There was very little information in Taiwan about the mainland. The overlay of Nationalist propaganda was enormous--

billboards and posters about "how we are going to get back to the mainland," "those awful Chinese," "those bandits." Everyone was conscious of that all the time, nobody liked it but there was not much you could do about it. Censorship, for example: we knew that if **Time** magazine, or **Newsweek** was late in reaching the newsstand it was because there was a picture of a Chinese communist in it. In every copy the picture had the head stamped with the Chinese character "fei" for bandit. So they would sell the magazine but not without the character for bandit stamped across the forehead of the Chinese communist. They also did a lot of pirating of books in those days.

*Q: In the economic section wasn't this of concern? Like most Foreign Service officers I do have a little stock of pirated editions which I picked up here and there around the world and which all came from Taiwan.*

HOROWITZ: I would say that towards the end of my tour that was a rising concern in the U.S. Afterward, when I came back here, I was on the China desk and working on that was one of my responsibilities. At first there wasn't too much reaction because the quality of the printing was so bad that it was hardly exportable. Then it began getting better. One of my possessions, I must confess, is a pirated set of the encyclopedias Britannica, which was also censored; the sections on China were censored. They took out anything that would be complimentary of the People's Republic of China. Maybe it belongs in the rare book section.

*Q: What were you doing in the economic section?*

HOROWITZ: General reporting and, as I mentioned, liaison with the Chinese Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, which was originally set up as a Sino-American operation to spearhead rural reform. I also had liaison with AID people who were dealing with JCRR. That was very interesting because it was a very successful and efficient organization because it was not part of the traditional bureaucracy, it was out of the Ministry of Agriculture. It had a special mandate to supervise reform in rural areas. They had American economic assistance and support, and over the years, gradually, the number of Americans working on JCRR was reduced. In the end it was still called the Joint Commission, but there were hardly any Americans left.

*Q: You spent a fairly extensive time there, did you have any feeling by the time you left, 1962, of motion towards things getting better?*

HOROWITZ: No. Although they had reluctantly begun to adopt the idea of trying to attract foreign investment; a new USAID director thought the time had come to begin phasing out U.S. economic assistance--a lot of people doubted that he was right but he was pressuring and it worked out. I think in part that the prospect of U.S. withdrawal helped nudge them to pull up their own socks and do something about what needed to be done. The Taiwan economy had certain benefits going for it that other underdeveloped countries didn't have. In the fifty years of Japanese rule a certain amount of infrastructure had been built--railways, roads. A small but modest industrialization existed. It wasn't a

completely blank sheet when it was returned to China in 1945 or when the Nationalists came into Taiwan in 1949. Also, among the Nationalists who came from the mainland when the mainland fell were some prominent industrialists, business people, and they provided a measure of expertise. That, combined with a very large and generally speaking well-done American AID program, created the basis for this economic growth that we see.

*Q: So you came back to Washington in 1962?*

HOROWITZ: Early 1962.

*Q: (Interruption in tape)...the bureaucracy on Taiwan?*

HOROWITZ: In Taiwan, as I recall, some of the older officials, they might even have been retired, had the Kuomintang mentality, the Nationalist mentality from the mainland where the government dominated banking, the government dominated important sectors of industry and connections were tremendously important. Obviously what the Americans were trying to do was to introduce a bit more free enterprise and see if we could get some more modern manufacturing started, perhaps some foreign investment. The low level people were more amenable to these ideas.

*Q: When you came back you were in East Asian Affairs or Economic Affairs?*

HOROWITZ: I was at the China desk, handling economic things at the China desk. We didn't have cones in those days; although I hardly studied economics in school, I was to become an economic officer. I was junior officer at the China desk and I was handling a lot of liaison with AID and some other economic problems.

*Q: What was your impression of the China desk and how it operated? What were its concerns?*

HOROWITZ: I am trying to remember when a separate office was established; it was about that time that a separate office was established called Asian Communist Affairs. I don't recall the date, but that was a very good move because the idea was to take people who were focusing on the mainland and let them focus on the mainland and not let it get all bollixed up with our day to day dealings with Taiwan. At the China desk we had some dedicated people; there was tremendous motivation at that desk, not by every officer there, that our role was to support Taiwan. Every time a vote was coming up in the UN everyone would be very much involved and concerned.

*Q: This was the recognition of Communist China in the United Nations which absorbed the entire foreign service on a world wide basis for a couple decades.*

HOROWITZ: I knew one person in EA who spent a good deal of her career in keeping track of voting trends on the China representation issue, and then providing support at



UN meetings. I think people were quite dedicated. I remember one of the office directors who I thought was very broad and fair-minded in perspective, wrote very well and did a lot of policy oriented memos. My impression of the China desk was a favorable one, but I was conscious of the Administration's fix on the importance of Taiwan.

*Q: Did you become more aware of events in communist China intruding?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, certainly in the early sixties, in the wake of the Great Leap Forward failure and the famine that took place, an increasing amount of attention was being given to communist China--what had happened, what was likely to happen in the future. This was a period when there were a lot of refugees coming into Hong Kong from the mainland; a lot of information was coming out on what conditions had been like. It is also in that period of the early sixties that we became aware that there were Chinese in Peking who were trying to put the place together again, a recovery from the Great Leap. We were still very, very pro-Taiwan in our orientation and supportive of the Taiwanese.

*Q: Did Vietnam intrude on our affairs at that time?*

HOROWITZ: Not that early on.

*Q: You were there from 1962 to 1964.*

HOROWITZ: I don't recall the Indochina issue becoming important in that period. On economic things--because we had begun to phase out our AID to Taiwan, to gradually draw down our assistance--I was involved in a lot of liaison with AID over that effort.

*Q: Was AID resisting the draw down?*

HOROWITZ: At first there was a lot of resistance to it. "They will never make it; it is impossible." But once it became adopted as policy a lot of people were in support of it. I have mentioned this before, but it is my feeling that we ought to search and find systems of dissent, at least of open discussion. Maybe we ought to sit down in a secure room someplace and say, "This is off the record, no one is going to be held to anything, now let's beat this subject up, let's take a different tack."

*Q: There is a difference on this. Let us say that you decide early on that we should recognize communist China and maybe make Taiwan a part of it. At a certain point policies are decided up above and the foreign service is the implementing group. We are supposed to give all the information, but there is the problem of when do you become a loyal member of the team--and I am talking in the positive sense, not with hypocrisy--to implement policy. How long do you keep dissenting? At a certain point you are no longer doing your job; you have made your point but the policy is different.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, that is true. I personally never had a problem like that. There were times when I might have disagreed with some policy that we were doing and I would try

in my memo or conversation or discussion to point that up, but I would not try to subvert the policy. I never felt in a position where I had to resign because I disagreed so violently with the policy.

*Q: Well, did they decide that if you were going to be doing this economic work you had better learn some economics?*

HOROWITZ: The Department had decided that they had to get more officers with some economic background. This was before a good program was established in economics at FSI, so they were sending officers off to different universities. I guess at some point I must have put on my wish list, remember the April Fool list...

*Q: Yes, it was called the Post Preference List which was due on the first of April and so obviously became known as the April Fool list on the assumption that nobody would pay any attention to it, that it was a joke.*

HOROWITZ: At one point I put down that I would be interested in economic training and I was chosen. Three of us in that economic program went off to the Fletcher School in '64 to '65 for an academic year; the focus was on international economics. Also it was in this period that I was back that I got married and after that I decided that I had better finish that M.A. at Columbia. So I finished that thesis at Columbia; then I was selected to go to Fletcher and got another M.A.--two master's degrees.

*Q: How did you find the training? Here you had been at the working level in economics both in Taipei and in the Department, and now you were at the academic level. Did you find that these were two separate worlds or that they coincided rather nicely?*

HOROWITZ: From my point of view the academic approach was very helpful because I really had not had much economics before. It helped put into context some of the things that I had worked on. Fletcher was a very good place for that because it was Foreign Service oriented. People came out of Fletcher and went to the Foreign Service of the U.S. or other countries, or they went to international organizations. The program was a good one; it was not the sophisticated graduate school economics that you might get someplace where you had Ph.D. candidates. For someone interested in foreign affairs it was solid and I thought it was an excellent year.

*Q: Then you went off to the preeminent spot for looking at the other side of the moon. I have you going to Hong Kong from 1965 to 1969. What were you doing?*

HOROWITZ: China watching. By that time our China watching apparatus or organization had become more sophisticated and in Hong Kong at the Consulate, which was very large, there was a separate China mainland section which did no business with Hong Kong at all, it focused only on the China mainland. This section was broken down into two halves and I was in charge of the economic side.

*Q: Which was particularly important at that time. The tremendous concern was whether China was going to do something.*

HOROWITZ: It turned out that that was a tremendously interesting period. Hong Kong was an ideal place for China watching. People who at that point came out of China as refugees or escapees would come to Hong Kong. People going in to China for business or trade, for whatever purpose, would enter via Hong Kong and come out via Hong Kong. It was a gateway in and out of China. In part by Chinese design because the Chinese like the idea of restricted gateways. So we could pick up a lot of information about China. Some of the radio monitoring of China was done there, but monitoring that was done elsewhere was easily cabled to Hong Kong. There were lots of other China watchers there.

*Q: How did you interface with these people?*

HOROWITZ: Oh, there was a whole China watching community all to itself, and very little contact with other people in Hong Kong. A lot of informal exchanging of views back and forth, discussion, small groups getting together and exchanging ideas. You established relationships. I established a good friendship with a businessman in Hong Kong, a westerner, Caucasian, who was doing business with China. I got to know him well enough so that I could call him when he came back from the visit to Peking and say, "How's business doing? Come over, Herb, and have a drink." So everyone was picking up bits and pieces of information. The British were sensitive about it, but they were picking up a lot of information too and we were exchanging our take with them, and to some extent with others. Even with the non-governmental people; there was a missionary who put out a publication on analyzing developments in China, Father ..(?).. Some of the media people, newspaper people, who were in Hong Kong were good China watchers on their own. We would get together and trade stories, impressions. So it was a very vital place for China watchers.

*Q: What was your impression at the time of the Chinese economy? What were we saying and how were we looking at it?*

HOROWITZ: Our impression as of about 1965 was that the economy had substantially recovered from the Great Leap collapse, the Great Leap tragedy; that agricultural production had come back to the pre-Great Leap Forward level, where it was in 1958 or 1959.

*Q: Perhaps you could explain the Great Leap Forward.*

HOROWITZ: The Great Leap Forward, roughly 1958 to 1960, was a Maoist led effort to stimulate the economy by getting away from the Soviet model which the Chinese had followed in the first five year plan and which focused on heavy industry. Mao said, "We are going to walk on two legs, we are going to give attention to agriculture as well as to industry." In the rural areas communes were formed, the cooperatives were transformed into communes which were much larger units. The idea was that there would be this

massive application of labor; everyone would get out in the fields and work; private plots were abolished. In some communes there were dormitories, cafeterias, nurseries for the kids. By the sheer exertion of human labor and the proper revolutionary spirit they were going to build small industry--backyard steel furnaces, for example. It was a great failure! The gross national product dropped by more than a third. Unfortunately there was some bad weather over a couple of the years and because of the disorder generated by the Great Leap Forward, the regime was unable to cope with it in terms of famine relief. It was just a disaster; a starvation situation existed.

In the early sixties the pragmatists were in command. We didn't call them pragmatists at the time but they have now become known as the pragmatists. Mao had lost some of his influence over the party and the country; he was still the main person but had lost some of his influence. The people who were in charge of the government in a day to day way were trying to get the economy going again. We felt by 1965 that this had been achieved. Agricultural production was up again, industrial production was moving ahead and they had begun to buy some small amount of machinery and equipment from abroad which was a reflection of some of the growth. By about 1965 they were in better shape than they had been for a number of years.

*Q: What was our feeling...*

HOROWITZ: Let me explain about China watching, it was a very esoteric art. With the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese stopped putting out statistics. Since there were no data to deal with, a lot of estimating was by the seat of one's pants. For example, in the agriculture area we had an FAS, Foreign Agriculture Service, person who worked with my unit a lot. I used to write the reports; often he would explain the agricultural issue to me and I would write it up and then he would critique what I wrote. The experts knew what China's historical agricultural pattern had been--how much area was cultivated, how much rice was planted--and with that background of information and with fairly good communist statistics in the fifties and knowledge about weather in different parts of the country, the experts were able to make some sort of judgments as to whether the crops were going up a little bit or down a little bit. Then you could match this with what the communist propagandists were saying. If they said, "Oh, we had an excellent crop last year," that meant it was terrible; if they said it was a "super, bumper crop" it might have been better. So after awhile you were able to key what they were saying, the phraseology they were using, with the information that you were gathering elsewhere. The trouble is, the further you get away from the base year of reliable information the more right or wrong you might be.

*Q: Were we getting anything out by way of intelligence from people coming out, escaping?*

HOROWITZ: Yes. Along with other evidence that agricultural production had gone up, people coming out of China complaining about famine had decreased. It was clear from the refugees that the true situation had improved somewhat. So you had all these bits and pieces of information. Of course, one of the problems with the refugee information was

that it was mostly about south China, you didn't get too much about north China. In other areas of the economy it would be a similar kind of guesswork. Part of it was feel, part of it was impressions of visitors, part of it was what China was buying or trying to buy from abroad. On China's foreign trade, we would compile the data from China's trade partners. We knew which of the trade partners were most important, extrapolate the partners' figures for a whole year--e.g., if we only had eight or nine months--convert f.o.b. to c.i.f. and c.i.f. to f.o.b...

*Q: What do those mean?*

HOROWITZ: Cost including freight, or free on board. If you want to get a picture of what China's trade was, from their perspective, you have to do this. There was a lot of guesswork involved. Then we would come up with some estimate as to trends in China's trade and what this told us about China's economic situation. It was part data and part guesswork. On the political side there was also a lot of reading between the lines. A lot of the Chinese radio broadcasts or the China press reports would be standard, they would repeat the same thing. Then all of a sudden the slogan would change and it would be a hint that something was happening. A slogan doesn't change by the whim of a broadcaster. We also learned in due course, rather later, that this was what the Chinese on the mainland over the years were doing; they were listening to their own radio broadcasts and reading their own newspapers, and reading between the lines trying to figure out what was happening. It was a very specialized field this China watching.

*Q: Did you find that there might be somewhat different mind sets between say the British, who did have an embassy in Beijing, and the French, who by that time had established some trade? Did they have a different mind set than we did?*

HOROWITZ: To some extent and we benefitted by exchanging views with them. If China was interested in some equipment and some foreign technicians went in we might learn something indirectly about one industry or another and the French would pass it along to us, or the British would, and vice versa. We were very interested in what the Russians were saying about China because after all in the 1950's there were a lot of Russian advisors there. The Russians withdrew all of their engineers and technicians in 1960, the time of the Sino-Soviet split. Many Chinese before the split studied in Moscow and many Russians had been in China. We were interested in what the Soviets were saying in their encyclopedia about China. One of the interesting things we found is that after a while they were using our figures in a lot of sectors. But in some areas, like iron and steel and oil production, they had different figures. We gave credence to that in industries where they might have had some first hand knowledge. We were always interested when Embassy Moscow could get us a copy of the China section of the Soviet encyclopedia.

*Q: Here you all were, China watchers, and I assume that you were all talking to each other, the political and the economic side. One of the great questions in looking back*

*today--we wonder, were we right--was the extent of the Chinese communist threat to the area. How did you see this at that time?*

HOROWITZ: At that time, after the failure of the Great Leap Forward and during this period of recovery, we felt that China was very inwardly focused. They were having a lot of economic problems and we did not have at all the feeling that China was looking to expand her borders or get involved in problems outside. The Sino-Soviet split having occurred, this was the period when China was emphasizing an independent foreign policy that was anti-Soviet and anti-U.S. Sort of a pox on both your houses, we will do it ourselves. China was weak and even though the economy had improved we didn't see China as a threat in the sense of it trying to do something about Taiwan, at least in the immediate future. China seemed much more inwardly focused.

*Q: Well Vietnam was hot and heavy during this time.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, beginning to become important. A lot of people who were going to and from Vietnam--American government officials, American and other western reporters--would come through Hong Kong and stop there. And some of the foreign correspondents in Hong Kong also had responsibility for Vietnam and Southeast Asia; they would go over on visits and come back. So we were conscious of this and one of the things we focused on was: How important was Chinese assistance to the hostile Vietnamese? I do remember that many of us felt that a lot of Americans had exaggerated the cost to China of the help it was giving to Vietnam. For example, our estimates of the amount of grain that China was sending into Vietnam was only a fraction of China's total; even though China was not rich it was just a fraction of China's total resources. Obviously a certain amount of small armaments and other help from China was going to Vietnam but I think we felt then that the amount of Chinese aid was limited and the threat from China exaggerated. You remember that there was a period when the Vietnamese situation was being portrayed as "the real enemy is not the Vietnamese, it is those Chicoms." We felt that that was exaggerated. It is important to remember that while their economy may have recovered by 1965, the next year the Cultural Revolution began. There was another inward looking serious period.

*Q: And this lasted for how long, about five years or so?*

HOROWITZ: No, the worst years were 1966 to 1969.

*Q: Which were the years you were in Hong Kong.*

HOROWITZ: But technically the Cultural Revolution didn't end for a decade. It was declared at an end in 1976 after Mao had died and the Gang of Four had been purged.

*Q: Were you getting reflections of this Cultural Revolution, or was there a lag there?*

HOROWITZ: I think there was a lag in our understanding of it. The analysis that we and others were doing was pretty good, but there were a lot of things that came to light later on which we did not quite see in the same light at the time. For example, before the Cultural Revolution there was a big propaganda campaign called the Socialist Education Campaign, one of the big political emulation campaigns. We didn't fully understand at the time that it was Mao and some close associates who were trying to reinvigorate the revolutionary ardor of the country and to win back some of the influence and control from the pragmatists who were running the country on a day to day basis. Only later on, by what developed in the Cultural Revolution, did we realize that those people were indeed pragmatists--people like Deng Xiaoping who still lives and is active in Peking. At the moment we didn't perceive it, it was only later on reflection. Many elements of the Socialist Education Campaign became important elements of the Maoists during the Cultural Revolution.

*Q: Looking back on this what would you say was the problem with trying to conduct something like this when you can't get on the ground but have to rely on emanations from the country?*

HOROWITZ: It is hard because you have to rely on data and information from a lot of different sources and make seat of the pants guesses. I think it is important to have an open mind and be prepared the next year to revise your estimates or your judgments from the year before. It is difficult. Later on, and I think this is interesting, when we were in Peking at the time of the Liaison Office from '73 to '75--and I think we did some good reporting from Peking but it was very Peking centered--in many ways the people in Hong Kong were getting a better view of some of the things that were happening in China. There were still travelers coming out through Hong Kong that they could talk to, they were getting information from provincial newspapers. In some ways some of the reporting and analysis in that period from Hong Kong was better than some of the reporting we were doing in Peking.

*Q: You have what we call in Washington an inside the beltway viewpoint.*

HOROWITZ: That is possible, yes.

*Q: Were you getting any feeling of concern then about the reversion of Hong Kong to China?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, there was. Hong Kong has always gone through these phases of great worry and concern followed by huge optimism. In 1967 there was a period when the Cultural Revolution was spilling over into Hong Kong and there were pro-Mao activists and there were some demonstrations. The British had to reinforce the border; they brought in some Gurkhas. Some bombs were going off in the streets, mostly propaganda bombs; also bodies were floating in to Hong Kong waters, the result of Cultural Revolution fighting. The people in Hong Kong got worried and began looking elsewhere. All of a sudden there was an overabundance of office space and apartments. (Even we

moved during that period; we got a better apartment and lower rent.) Chinese families were laying out the future. One son would be sent off to Singapore to open a branch of the shop, another would go to the U.S., another to Taiwan. So there was a period of agitation and concern in Hong Kong during the Cultural Revolution. But that passed when the worst part of the Cultural Revolution was over.

*Q: Looking over the people, were there any that stood out in your mind as being really good as China watchers or was it mostly a collegial effort?*

HOROWITZ: I can think of a lot of people who were outstanding reporting officers and good analysts but it was really very much a collegial effort. I think we all benefitted from this going back and forth and discussing and reexamining. During the Cultural Revolution, for example, so much was happening--there was the Chinese media to look at, there were wall posters and pamphlets that people were smuggling into Hong Kong because there was a market for this stuff, there were some Cultural Revolution type publications that were coming out, there were refugees that might be interviewed. So in our China mainland section we would have a meeting every morning, first thing in the morning, and sometimes another meeting at the end of the day, and we would decide for that day who was going to do what. Who was going to follow up this lead, who was going to contact the British about that, who was going to look at that new editorial that just came out, and then we would fan out and come together and decide what we...

*Q: It must have been a very exciting and stimulating time.*

HOROWITZ: It was. It was also a little unreal sitting in an office and doing all this analysis of a country when you are not there.

*Q: It reminds me a little of being an astronomer during a meteor shower.*

HOROWITZ: After Hong Kong I went back to the Department in Washington and was in the Office of Aviation.

*Q: What were you doing in the Office of Aviation? This was in 1969. By the way, just for the record, today is March 23, 1993.*

HOROWITZ: I went to the Office of Aviation because I was an economic cone officer in those days. I had a deputy title in the Aviation Negotiations Division; this was the division that negotiated route agreements with other countries. That is the only time I have done something like that; the only time I have ever been in the then E Bureau which then became EB. It was a very useful experience because there is no country in the world where we don't have some sort of aviation problem.

*Q: Did you get into the KLM problem, trying to get greater landing rights?*



HOROWITZ: No. I was doing some of the backup for the European negotiations and our big problem areas were Ireland and Aer Lingus. We needed landing rights at Shannon at the end of World War II as a stopping off place for planes going to Europe, so Ireland got rights from Dublin to places in the U.S. and they did well. American carriers were very upset as to how well they were doing; but we never made much progress in those years negotiating with the Irish because when the negotiations would reach a critical point some Senator, or our Ambassador in Dublin, would phone up the White House and call off the pressure.

*Q: About eight or nine years ago I remember being dumped in Shannon which is out in the middle of nowhere.*

HOROWITZ: It was a good experience. I have one favorite story from that period. We had almost constant pressure from the U.S. carriers to do more on their behalf. The U.S. carriers were angry at Iceland because Icelandic Airways was flying from the east coast to Europe via Iceland at bargain fares. We finally called for consultations under the agreement and the consultations were held in Washington. On the American side of the table were people from the State Department, the chairman who was from the E Bureau and our head negotiator, and myself and people from the Iceland desk, and then there were people from the Department of Transportation and the Civil Aeronautics Board and two representatives of different American industry associations. Some of these people had an assistant with them, so on the American side of the table there were at least fifteen people with briefing books that were about nine inches thick. On the Iceland side of the table there were three people, the Ambassador (who was simultaneously Ambassador to Canada, Mexico, and several countries in Latin America), his First secretary, and one person who flew in from Iceland. It was a display of super power pressures; it was truly incredible. It was also a lesson because the Icelanders were sensible and logical and friendly, and charmed the American delegation. The negotiation worked out very nicely; Iceland didn't do badly.

*Q: Sometimes you can play this "poor little me" business quite successfully.*

HOROWITZ: It was a good experience. While going to the aviation office was not something I wanted to do, it was helpful later in my career.

Then I went to the National War College for a year.

*Q: That would be 1970 or 1971?*

HOROWITZ: '71-'72. That was a wonderful year. It was not a high pressure program at that time, it left a lot of time for reading. I had had some misapprehensions about the military; I thought all military officers had served in Washington and here for the first time I met military officers who had never been in Washington at all. My best friend that year was a submarine commander. Also, because of the particular time period, almost every military officer in the class had done a tour, most of them had done two tours, in

Indochina. It was a very sensitive subject. I really admired the program because in due course people relaxed, and they were encouraged by the faculty to search and examine and discuss. It was a very interesting year.

*Q: We were beginning to phase out of Vietnam at that point, did you find initially that as a State Department representative you heard from the military about how "you guys got us into this mess in Vietnam"?*

HOROWITZ: No, I don't recall that at all. I recall that there was a wide spectrum of views once we started talking about it. A lot of these men had been good soldiers who had done their service and assumed their responsibilities. Some were frustrated that we hadn't done better, but many had begun to question some of the premises: should we have been in there at all? were we over committed? should we have done more? should we have put in the force to deal with the situation? There was a lot of questioning. I admired the War College in that much like a University they encouraged us to be open; no one felt that they were going to hold anything against you.

*Q: How about interest in recognizing and dealing with Communist China?*

HOROWITZ: At that point we had no official contacts with China. There was interest in China and what was happening there, but it was mostly a perception that China was providing a lot of support for North Vietnam and the Viet Cong; it was this concern. The issue of possible U.S.-China relations never came up. It was never an issue. I truly must say that the opportunity to get out of the bureaucracy for a year and into that kind of academic atmosphere is very, very commendable.

We were encouraged that year, for the overseas trip, to choose a segment of the world we hadn't been to. I chose the Africa group; that was my first introduction to things African. It was memorable trip. We were in a U.S. military aircraft, had our own plane for the trip. We visited about six different countries. We didn't have the usual transport problems in Africa because we had our own aircraft. At most places we saw high level leaders and we had excellent briefings from our embassy. Of course, what helped was the fact that we had to do a lot of reading about the area before the trip as preparation. Ironically, the tenor of most of the briefings that we received at that time was that African countries, after the first flush of independence and related disruptions, were now beginning to settle down and deal with their problems. In fact, what occurred was that in the year or year and a half after our visit there were upheavals in most of these countries. In Nigeria General Gowon had talked to us and he was overthrown; in Mozambique the Portuguese gave us a full day of briefings on counterinsurgency--it was like something out of the Vietnam briefing room--with charts and tables and how they were dealing with the insurgents; in Ethiopia, we had champagne with Haile Selassie who invited us to the palace and served Moet champagne at eleven o'clock in the morning; and in Uganda we had lunch with Idi Amin who had just come to power. It was quite an experience; I learned a lot but things didn't turn out the way the briefings had indicated they would.

*Q: When you got out of the War College in 1972 what did you do?*

HOROWITZ: A brief stop at the China desk as deputy there, which was really the Taiwan desk; a separate office of Asian Communist Affairs covered communist China. Not long after I arrived it was announced that there would be a U.S. Liaison Office in Peking and a Chinese Liaison Office in Washington, and I was among those chosen for the first group to Peking.

*Q: What were you doing when the news of the Kissinger visit to communist China came so suddenly?*

HOROWITZ: I was at the National War College when some of these things were happening, and then at the Republic of China desk. Most of that was kept very closely and at a high level; not too many people were involved. When that Kissinger visit occurred where they announced that there would be a Liaison Office, I just ruled myself out because I had just started a new job. We went to a farewell party for the advance team that was going to Peking, and I was politely informed there that I would join the first group; within hardly any time at all, my wife and I were packing.

*Q: Before we get to that--you were at the Taiwan desk: What was the perception of our people dealing with Taiwan just as this whole new world was opening up? Where did they think this was going to go?*

HOROWITZ: I think most of the officers who had studied some Chinese and had had some experience in the China area were very interested in the opening to Peking and were hoping that this would provide an opportunity to visit communist China--we used to say communist China, now we say mainland China. There was also some concern about the relationship with Taiwan; but at that time I don't think anyone perceived that it would advance to the point of breaking formal relations with Taiwan. After all, for a lot of years we had a close tie to the KMT, the Kuomintang, in Taiwan. After 1949 we had given them a lot of support, a lot of military assistance, a lot of economic assistance; it was hard to imagine that this would change in the way that it subsequently did change.

*Q: You were with the first team to go to China. Could you talk a little about the composition of the team, what you expected you would be doing and your experiences when you got there?*

HOROWITZ: We had little in the way of expectations because the idea of a Liaison Office was a new one. We knew that technically we would not have diplomatic status so the head of the Liaison Office was to be called the Chief of the Liaison Office, the head of the political section would be the Chief of the Political Unit, and I would be the Chief of the Economic Unit. We didn't know to what extent we would have access, how easy or difficult it would be to collect information. It was a new thing; we really had very little time, it had happened so quickly, to prepare. Part of it was to feel our way. David Bruce wanted the office to be small.

*Q: He was the first Chief?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, the Chief of the Liaison Office. He resisted pressures from other agencies to send their representatives at that time. I know that because in Washington I accompanied him on calls on different economic departments such as Commerce and Agriculture. Those departments were anxious to have people at the Liaison Office. But Bruce put everybody off saying that we don't know what it is going to be like, we have to keep it small and feel our way. So he resisted; he wanted that office to be small. I remember him telling some anecdotes about his past experiences, e.g., being Ambassador to London where there were so many people in the Embassy he didn't know who many of them were or what they were doing.

*Q: Well he had been Ambassador in London, in Paris, all the places where you never get to meet your staff.*

HOROWITZ: So he was anxious that it be small and compact, and that is the way it was. We started off with Bruce, two deputies (if the Liaison Office was unlike any diplomatic mission, it was also different in that it had two deputies; John Holdridge who had been at the NSC and Al Jenkins who had been at the China desk), two officers in the political section, two in the economic section, and communicators and administrative staff. It was really quite a small operation to begin with.

*Q: And you were the Chief of the Economic Unit?*

HOROWITZ: Yes. One of the things that I did which did not endear me to some of my colleagues in the State Department, was to decide that we be called the "Commercial/Economic" section. I did that because at that point there was a lot of interest in the American business community, and we began to cover the Canton trade fair where American businessmen for the first time were allowed in. We got lots and lots of inquiries about trade. Also, I was not sure of how much economic China watching we could do from Peking so I thought it would a good idea to call it a Commercial/Economic section. My successor changed that.

*Q: Why would there be a problem with our colleagues back in Washington by calling it Commercial/Economic?*

HOROWITZ: I was trying to put the emphasis on the commercial. This was the period when Commerce had begun asserting its independence and State was trying to hang on to its turf. I really felt that "commercial" was appropriate. Incidentally, we also had a very good desk officer in Commerce at that time, and with his help managed to disregard burdensome Commerce procedures and forms; we improvised as we went along, the best we could. We had a lot of cooperation and support from State and Commerce.

*Q: When you arrived there how did you set up?*

HOROWITZ: We all lived at the Peking Hotel. Some of us had little children and they were running up and down the halls in the Peking Hotel. We had a couple of rooms at the Peking Hotel that we used for office purposes. My first secretary came on direct transfer from Saigon and she was bright enough to put in her suitcase some paper, some carbon paper, some envelopes and pencils and that is what we had at the beginning. At that point, the Chinese were putting up the building in the diplomatic area that was to become the Liaison Office and behind that the building that was to be the residence of the Chief of the Liaison Office, but it was a few months before we were able to move in. Those buildings are still there; the building that we used for our office is now the USIS building and the residence is still the Ambassador's residence. The Embassy is spread out in some other buildings in the neighborhood. We had no files to begin with, that was the second time in my career that we had to do reporting without any files, and it is amazing what you can do. We all knew something about China so if you were doing a reporting message you drew on your memory, what you had read about, what you knew about, and drew some comparisons.

*Q: Did you find there was a quantum change by being at the center--you had been on the periphery before--or not?*

HOROWITZ: Yes there was a change in that what we benefitted from was a sort of first hand, visual kind of feel, and having for the first time working level contacts with Chinese counterparts, which in Hong Kong you don't have. However, our lives were very circumscribed; the lives of all diplomats were circumscribed--though technically we were not diplomats. We couldn't travel very much; Chinese officials were very withdrawn and circumspect about what they talked about. During that period, I was there from 1973 to 1975, I think the reporting we did was a contribution, but in many ways the reporting from Hong Kong was better. They had more people, they had files and they were getting bits and pieces of information from different parts of China--people who left China, travelers, provincial radio broadcasts. So there were a number of things that they in Hong Kong saw in better perspective than we did sitting in the Liaison Office. I think what we did was a contribution but it didn't supplant the China watchers in Hong Kong.

*Q: China is such a vast place and there are so many provincial aspects that being in the center is not necessarily the best vantage point.*

HOROWITZ: It was a wonderful personal experience.

*Q: Let's talk a little about the commercial side. The Chinese were more responsive on the commercial side--they have always been a commercial people. What are your comments on this?*

HOROWITZ: You have to remember that at that period China had not yet opened up. In the sixties, there was limited trade with the western world; then the Cultural Revolution. In this period when we were there, in the seventies, there was more foreign trade but the

power struggle in leadership was developing between the Gang of Four and the pragmatists.

*Q: Yes, the Gang of Four was on trial.*

HOROWITZ: No, they were making a bid for power and resisting the expansion of contacts with the West. The pragmatists, then led by Zhou En-lai, were trying to bring Deng Xiaoping back; they were trying to make their place in the sun. So it was not a time for great commercial opening. There was a limited commercial opening; they were interested in beginning to sell some things to the west and they were interested in American wheat and some other products, but they were still rather skittish about it. The Chinese officials were not very open; they were afraid to be in many ways. What we learned was mostly what our businessmen would tell us; we would digest it and then give advice, without revealing any secrets, to other businessmen. There were so few business visitors to Peking in those days--that's where businessmen wanted to go because it was the headquarters of the state trading companies--that they would come to see us. American businessmen would come to Peking and the first thing they would do is contact the Liaison Office. We would tell them what to expect and how to conduct themselves and very often they would come back later and give us a report. So we were able to build up a body of knowledge on doing business with China, at that time. We did a similar thing at the Canton trade fair, a twice a year vehicle. That is where the Chinese did most of their selling, but also a lot of their buying too. The Canton fair was an important first step for an American or other foreign businessman in dealing with China. So if they could get a visa to go to the Canton fair they might have some hope of developing a relationship and later on maybe traveling to Peking or other parts of China. What we did was to take a suite at the hotel opposite the Canton fairground to serve as a mini-office. We would man it through the whole month of the fair with one or two people. We would give advice and help, and learn from the experiences of American businessmen. The Chinese still published no data and gave you very little information.

*Q: Did you kind of wonder what you were doing?*

HOROWITZ: No, we were quite busy and I think we did help a lot of American business people as intermediaries, as providers of information. I can think of a number of instances when we were helpful to American businessmen at that time. The commercial side was interesting and active but it was different than a usual commercial operation.

*Q: On the economic side, as there wasn't much published much of that work could have been done better from Hong Kong, could it not?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, but we were able to pick up some information that would be part of the input; some impressions, what the Chinese were buying, what they seemed to be interested in. If they really were in the market for a lot of wheat we knew that something did go wrong with their crop, for example. So we were able to provide certain inputs. But for the broad economic China watching that could be elsewhere.

*Q: Did you feel at all the problems that plagued us serving in the Soviet Union where the KGB was trying to entrap you. Were there any of these games or were there just restrictions on you?*

HOROWITZ: We always felt watched but so did other foreigners, I don't think we felt more watched than other people. I don't think they ever tried to entrap; they listened, we were positive our apartments were bugged and to the extent that they could bug our offices they probably did that too. I remember that when we finally moved into some apartments, the elevator operator must have been the head party cadre because she seemed to be the font of all information. We were watched quite carefully, what we did and where we went. We had to request permission to travel outside of Peking--we learned the technique of asking to visit five places and hope they'll approve two. When you went to another place you had to check in with the police when you arrived and you had to check in when you left. That was true for all foreigners. So they kept close touch, but I didn't sense they were trying to entrap us.

Some of the politics did get into the trade things. I remember very vividly that one of the problems we had was the Chinese complaint that in American wheat which they bought there was a type of wheat smut which they didn't have in China and they were afraid that this would contaminate their wheat. We had to bring out experts in from the Department of Agriculture to look into this and explain that there was no danger. The issue was more political than it was economic because at that time the Shanghai papers, and in Shanghai the radicals had a dominant voice, were criticizing Chinese officials who bought poisoned wheat from abroad. There was a political conflict going on and it impinged on our commercial operation. At the Liaison Office we did not have much contact with the radicals of the party, the Gang of Four crowd. Most of the people we saw and had dealings with in the government were the pragmatists, the ones who were trying to get the country back on the road again and working and to get the economy improved. Occasionally we would have some contact but generally speaking we did not.

I remember we had a visit from the Philadelphia symphony, Ormandy was the conductor. It was a great cultural thing. One of the things they did was to play a Beethoven symphony, I think it was the sixth. We later learned that Madam Mao had requested this. They had to scurry all over China to get the music, because the orchestra didn't bring it with them. Not long after that a political campaign was launched, the anti-Beethoven campaign. It was a campaign, initially probably aimed at Madam Mao, but it got twisted and became a leftist vehicle. So we did get marginally involved in some of these things.

*Q: Were we concerned about the transfer of technology? Not just military technology but also that they might get our techniques and copy them.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, but it was not a serious problem then. We visited factories where there would be one piece of Western machinery, very old, and then several more that were copies. At that point we still had very stringent controls on export of technology to China as well as other communist countries, and copying of new technology was not a serious problem. Their economy was not very advanced at that time.

*Q: What about intellectual property problems, basically copyrights and that type of thing?*

HOROWITZ: Not a serious problem then because they had total control over publications. Very, very little material had been published in China in any language since before the Cultural Revolution. There was no free market anywhere so it was a totally controlled situation; it became a problem later on. To illustrate the atmosphere about books: There was an international club, it is still there, which was designed for foreigners: tennis courts and swimming pool and things like that. It wasn't really a club, it was the Chinese conception of what the foreigners might want. There was a very nice room that was called the Library; it had a lot of windows, easy chairs, a lot of shelves, most of which were empty. The only books on the shelves were Mao's works and three or four communist publications, that's all.

*Q: How were we reporting on political events? How were we getting our knowledge?*

HOROWITZ: Conversations with other people, impressions--there was always a big exchange among people in the foreign missions--some little bits and pieces that the Chinese would tell us, what we would see in the newspaper. It was limited. We knew when there was a big meeting in the Great Hall of the People from the number of limousines that would be pulling up and one or the other of us would bicycle by a few times to see what was doing--that type of thing. I think we did a fair bit of reporting but it was limited to what we would have exposure to. It was frustrating to some extent; Bruce stayed about a year and then George Bush came and I think they were both to some extent frustrated that they could not deal more with Chinese officials. The Chinese were very uptight in those days, very reserved; they would not speak in a relaxed way or off the record. I know that Bush tried very, very hard. He was great to work for; he read our briefing papers and listened to what we had to say. I remember going with him to pay calls on Chinese officials--the economic minister or the head of their civil aviation or someone like that; we would do a briefing paper, he read it, we talked about it in the car, and he really tried to get some information, to break down the barrier. It was very, very frustrating because the Chinese officials would only reveal or say what they felt authorized to do.

*Q: By the time you left in 1975, what was the political situation?*

HOROWITZ: It hadn't changed much. Actually after we were there and set up the Liaison Office and the radicals had been on the counterattack, things tightened up. Relations were not so good. As a matter of fact, I think the second year we were there there was a drop in the U.S. trade with China; instead of an increase, it fell. Our relationship with the Chinese was in many ways tied to what was happening in China and the political struggle that was going on. But we had made some contacts and knew some of the people and gotten some information.



*Q: How about developments in Vietnam, as things were going from bad to worse; did that affect what you were doing or was it pretty much over the horizon?*

HOROWITZ: It was pretty much over the horizon. The Chinese at that point were primarily concerned with the Soviets. In the 1950's they leaned toward the Soviets, in the 1960's there was the Sino-Soviet split, and in 1969 there was the border clash in Manchuria and the Chinese got socked. It finally dawned on them that the Soviets had really built up considerable military strength all along the Sino-Soviet border. All the Soviet buildups in Europe were balanced by Soviet buildups in Asia. So the Chinese were very concerned about the Soviets. This was one of the reasons for their opening up to the West and the United Nations. They wanted to gradually build some sort of normal relationship with the West. As I recall, that seemed to be their main concern in that period.

*Q: Did you have any contact with the Soviets when you were there?*

HOROWITZ: Oh, yes. The Soviets in Peking felt very isolated; they wanted to be friends with us because they knew it would aggravate the Chinese if we were friendly. The Soviets would invite us, and frankly we wanted to keep the Soviets a little bit away; if we got too close it would harm our relations with the Chinese. The Soviets had magnificent embassy grounds and they would open up their place--they had a pond--for ice skating and hockey on the weekends, invite our kids to go there, invite us to films. Bill Rope, who was my colleague on the commercial/economic side, and I, along with our wives, would be invited by our Soviet counterparts; they would give us vodka, drink and food. They wanted to be our pals in the worst way. They were helpful too in that they would explain to us how Sino-Soviet trade was carried out. Also the other East Europeans who were there were friendly; we heard a lot about the trade patterns of China and the rest of the communist world. To the extent that we could, we would compare notes with them. The Soviets were very anxious to be friendly.

*Q: You left there in 1975, and what did you do then?*

HOROWITZ: I went to INR. It was my hope that maybe at that point in my career I could get to another part of the world. That is when Kissinger started a program that got the acronym, "GLOP".

*Q: Global...something or other. It meant to move people who had served too long in Latin America to move somewhere else, to mix it up a bit, so that they had different global outlooks.*

HOROWITZ: Bruce and Bush both wrote letters in my behalf. But the best job came up in INR, and to me it was a step up. It was the head of the East Asia Office in INR. I was there for three years; it was a great experience, I learned something new everyday.

*Q: How were we seeing developments in Asia then? Japan was already well on its way, Korea was beginning to come up; also there were the ASEAN countries.*

HOROWITZ: Normalization in China was proceeding slowly; Zhou En-lai died in 1976, Mao died, the struggle went on, so we were all doing a lot of China analysis. So China did take up a lot of our time. Korea also required a lot of our attention because there was constant tension between the North and the South; there was a lot of concern about what North Korea might do, aside from periodic political instabilities in the South. In Southeast Asia, in the wake of Vietnam, the area was still getting sorted out; ASEAN then was perceived as being a very weak organization. It has developed extremely well and the ASEAN countries have developed a lot of common ideas and positions, but at that time it was not seen that way. In the Philippines there were the Marcoses, we were still friends but there was growing concern about stability there. There was a lot of concern, particularly in Southeast Asia and to some extent in Japan and Korea, about what the United States would do in the wake of Vietnam. Would we pull up stakes and leave East Asia or not; this was a constant concern. It was a period of transition and change.

Most Foreign Service officers hate to be assigned to INR--a dead end. In fact it is a fascinating place. One doesn't have the fun of being in an operations office, it is mind stretching, and analytical. Also, you interface with other people in the intelligence community, and find out what people are doing out there. There is a lot of talent and expertise. So it was a challenging post.

*Q: Then you had a short stint with Treasury?*

HOROWITZ: After INR Dick Holbrooke, who had become Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, asked me if I would come over and head the Office of Regional Affairs in EA, which I did for a while. That was a mixed bag--regional affairs at that time consisted of the things that didn't fit anywhere else--labor, military, human rights, a whole bunch of miscellaneous functions. We did a bit of drafting of policy papers, we drafted some speech materials, Congressional testimony, it was sort of a grab bag of different things. Then I went to Treasury. There was an agreement with Secretary Blumenthal, then Secretary of the Treasury, who grew up in China and was interested in China, that Treasury would have a hand on the economic side of normalization of relations with China. But Treasury didn't have many China people, and Dick Holbrooke, who was glad to get his people in there, encouraged me. It was worked out that I went to Treasury and headed an office called East-West Economic Policy. I personally was interested because that office also handled the Soviet Union and East Europe and I thought it would be a chance to broaden my horizon. It was an interesting experience. I encourage Foreign Service officers to go to other agencies.

*Q: What was your impression of Treasury, pretty high-powered?*

HOROWITZ: I don't know; a lot of very good people were there, mostly economists. Sometimes less astute about international relations and more narrow in focus than we in State, but some very, very good people. They were much more open, and not so protective, or conscious of classification of documents, for example. Many colleagues there had little contact with foreign embassies, and couldn't see why they shouldn't speak openly about certain things. I enjoyed the experience at Treasury and continue to maintain good friendships. Two things happened there, however, that amused me. The first thing that happened, Blumenthal got fired in a cabinet shakeup and without him, Treasury lost some of its interest in and clout on things China. The second thing that happened shortly after I moved to Treasury, was that just as we were getting ready for our periodic talks in Moscow, Afghanistan occurred. So I never made it to Moscow.

*Q: This was in December of 1979; everything got shut down.*

HOROWITZ: I spent a huge amount of time when I was in Treasury going to meetings on sanctions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. I did handle a number of China visitors and participated in some delegations to China, and participated in a trip to Poland. It was another of the interesting Foreign Service experiences.

*Q: Then you went back to China again?*

HOROWITZ: No, to Australia. At that point I had been back in Washington about four and a half years or so, and Treasury hadn't quite worked out to be the center of things I thought it might be on China or on the Soviet Union. I thought it was time for me to go overseas. Australia became available, I was posted to Sydney as Consul-General, and was there for four years.

*Q: From when to when?*

HOROWITZ: From '81 to '84.

*Q: What were our prime interests in Australia and what were you dealing with?*

HOROWITZ: Sydney was primarily a commercial post. Yes, we did political reporting and I did most of that myself; we did some economic reporting; we ran a big and busy consular section but most of that took care of itself. It was a big commercial post because we had a large commercial unit in Sydney and we also had the regional trade center. At that point Commerce Department had set up trade shows in different parts of the world; the center for the south Pacific was in Sydney. Also, the Foreign Commercial Service was organized and the first Senior Commercial Officer for Australia went to Canberra. He was in Canberra for about six months and realized that there was no business there, so he moved to Sydney. I then had three segments of the Department of Commerce in the Consulate: I had the commercial unit for the consular district, I had the trade center for the South Pacific, and I had the senior commercial officer for Australia. They didn't get

along; they reported to different people in Commerce. I spent a lot of time with them, and with the American Chamber of Commerce, to keep our commercial program in focus.

*Q: Sort of bring them together?*

HOROWITZ: Yes. Also, the IRS had its regional office in Sydney. And, we had an excellent and very effective USIS office. So it was a fair size consulate. I enjoyed the political reporting a great deal, but there is a limited amount of interest in Washington in political reporting from one of the states of Australia. In Australia, New South Wales is really important, but what I had to do was find what was important to the United States. We had a very good embassy in Canberra, received good support from the embassy, and vice versa. It was a very good experience.

*Q: Then you went back to China?*

HOROWITZ: Then I went back. I was asked by Art Hummel to go back to Peking...

*Q: He was Ambassador.*

HOROWITZ: He was Ambassador...and be his deputy. His deputy at that time, finishing his tour, was Chas Freeman. For me, with a long interest in China, I was thrilled at the opportunity. I was in Peking for a year and a half or two years. Hummel's tour came to an end and there was a gap before Winston Lord came because he had trouble getting Congressional approval, so I was Chargé for several months in between. And then I stayed with Winston for several months until he got his feet on the ground.

*Q: What was the political situation like when you were there in Peking this time?*

HOROWITZ: Totally different.

*Q: This was basically 1984 to 1986?*

HOROWITZ: Yes. Totally different from '73 to '75. In 1977 to 1978 the radicals lost out and were purged, tried and put in jail; the pragmatists really came back in; Deng Xiaoping rose to be the principal character; the Chinese were fully involved in the program of economic reform. There was more openness; it was easier to travel. Chinese officials had titles and they had calling cards; in 1973 to 1975 an official might be identified as "a responsible person"; they had no phone books, no rosters. Now, they would speak more openly; we just had a lot more contact all up and down the line. We had a full slate of officers; it was a full-fledged embassy with even a Science and Technology Counselor, a very big S&T exchange program--lots of students were in the U.S. and Americans were coming to China to teach and study there.

*Q: Was there a full consular network?*

HOROWITZ: We had consulates in various cities; it was a very, very different kind of picture. And China seemed to be doing okay. There was no question that the economy was improving, compared to the seventies there was much more food in the market, more clothing and things to buy. They were making good strides, but there was still a certain amount of political reaction from time to time. The Tiananmen affair of 1989 was not the first effort on the part of some Chinese to pull back and reassert controls. But the main point was that they were making a lot of progress.

*Q: Were there any great problems that you had to deal with at that time?*

HOROWITZ: No, nothing that was out of the general range of issues. On the management side there was sometimes a problem in trying to keep things under control. Some of our people had become very enthusiastic on the military exchange program, "we want more exchanges," or "the S&T is terrific, let's go all out." People become committed to those issues and I felt one of our problems was to try keep things measured, under control, to know what we were doing and why we were doing it.

*Q: It has always seemed to me, from a historical point of view, that this inordinate enthusiasm about China has permeated our history. In 1790 we had a hell of a time getting consuls anywhere--it took years to get a consul established in, say, Madrid, or other cities--yet Congress voted within two weeks to send two to Canton. It has gone on ever since.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, but also periods of disenchantment and suspicion. For the most part since 1989 we have been in a period of disenchantment and suspicion. There is a tendency to go overboard. Over these years, from the seventies, even while I was in INR and the Treasury, I participated in delegations that visited China as an escort officer and I was just amazed at how people would fall all over themselves when they were now in China. "This is the greatest thing that ever happened." "This is the most fantastic place I have ever gone to."

*Q: These great bursts of enthusiasm. Even during the worst of times, one would see these pictures of small Chinese children and everyone would fall in love with little Chinese children whereas we didn't do the same for children in other countries.*

HOROWITZ: That is true; there is still a certain infatuation with China and things Chinese.

*Q: Did you find the Chinese the same as to American things or were they more reserved?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, I think there is a lot of interest in the United States, in part because we are a big power, a great power, a strong country, also because they know about its economic opportunity. That is why you still read about boat loads of Chinese trying to get into the country one way or the other. They are all aware of America. There was a lot of interest in VOA, listening to Voice of American broadcasts, even back in the seventies

when we were there. Sometimes you would meet a Chinese who spoke some English and you would ask him how he learned it, "Oh, I listen to Voice of America."

*Q: I was talking to the head of the Voice of America and am still conducting an interview with him, Richard Carlson, and he was saying that even at the height of the cold war there was still an implicit sort of cooperation between the Voice of America and the Chinese. The Chinese were reproducing our English broadcasts and publishing papers, instructional sheets for this. This was going on even at this very peculiar time.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, I think there is a lot of interest in the United States. Probably in South China even a greater awareness because so many of the early Chinese in this country came from there.

*Q: At this time there was a very large group of Chinese students in the United States studying. At the embassy were you looking at this and saying "when all these people come back this will be not just an exchange program but a real revolutionary thing"? Was this of concern?*

HOROWITZ: To me it has not been a concern because I think in the long run it is going to have a beneficial impact. I can't see how it will not in a country like China with the amount of trade, the amount of travel to and from abroad, the students studying abroad coming back sooner or later, have some political impact. You can't do all that and maintain a totalitarian regime forever and ever. It is not something that worries me, I think it is good.

*Q: Were we concerned though at the time that maybe we were introducing a revolutionary element? Did we know what we were doing by encouraging this?*

HOROWITZ: No, I don't think we were worried about it. That was not a concern; that we would be creating the basis for change was not something that we were worried about.

*Q: You were there during the Reagan administration. How did you feel that administration handled China policy? After all Reagan came up when China was the great enemy.*

HOROWITZ: I felt all through that period that we were, as a government, determined to continue the process of normal relations, of wanting to bring China into the world political and economic community. I don't think there was any reluctance about that. I think when Reagan first came into office and talked about Taiwan he created some ripples of concern, but I think there was a commitment on the part of the administration to continue the process.

*Q: How about the Soviets at this time--were they trying to find out what we were up to, still feeling frozen out, or were things beginning to relax for them?*

HOROWITZ: By the mid-eighties the Chinese had moved to a situation where they had a more independent foreign policy--not lining up again with the Soviets but trying to have more normal relations with the Soviets and a more normal range of contacts with them. They were interested in the changes that were beginning to take place there; they were watching it closely. They were not anymore so much worried about imminent Soviet attack as they had been in the seventies when they imagined the Soviets might attack them at any moment. That had all disappeared--back in the seventies they would show you the air raid shelters they had been digging in the villages.

*Q: Are there any more areas that we might cover on this particular period?*

HOROWITZ: No, for the most part U.S. relations with China were on course, only little problems here and there. There was interest in U.S. investment coming in, a lot of exchange students going to the United States, people coming back and forth, a much more open kind of situation than we had experienced there before. One thing worth mentioning, I think, is that that was a period, the mid-eighties, of considerable growth in Chinese agriculture, the rural sector, and in the small towns and medium size cities--they just really took off. As part of the reform efforts one of the first things that the Chinese did was to try to remove some of the stringent controls in the rural areas. The communes in effect had been taken apart; it became possible for people, not to own land, but at least have land that was theirs. Incentives were built in and agricultural production went up, and along with that a tremendous growth in small-scale local industry. I think this is important because it is one of the things that is different about China from Russia and East Europe; when there is food in the market and clothing to be bought and there is not a serious inflation situation in the economy, then you can begin to experiment with other reforms.

*Q: As an economist looking at this, it seems that the Soviets destroyed all the infrastructure that would support the individual farmer--maybe it was because the countries and climate are different--so that when you removed the restrictions Soviet agriculture didn't blossom. If you had cows you couldn't feed the cows or get fertilizer or anything else, whereas in China when they let go...*

HOROWITZ: The villages were intact. When the Great Leap Forward failed in the late fifties and they had to retreat from the advanced idea of communes with communal kitchens, they made what in the commune they called the production team as the basic accounting unit and the production team was basically the old village--or there might be two production teams in one village. Also, during the communist period agricultural production was not stagnant, it did continue to improve. They introduced more and more chemical fertilizer and other ideas; they improved the infrastructure, communication and roads to rural areas. There was a better situation in China for the reforms. Now of course in China they still say they have socialism, socialism with Chinese characteristics. They won't call it anything else but in fact it is a very vibrant, semi-free market economy.

*Q: Just a last question: Could you comment on Art Hummel as Ambassador and Winston Lord as Ambassador; what you saw of their effectiveness, how they worked in China? Both of these men had roots in China, Winston Lord was married to a woman from China and Art Hummel had served with the partisans as a young kid who grew up in China.*

HOROWITZ: Art Hummel knew, and knows, a lot more about China than Winston Lord did at that time. Winston was interested in China and as an aide to Kissinger had played some role in those early days but was not a China expert; he has become knowledgeable about China because of his work experience over the years, whereas Hummel has a better feel for the country and the culture and society. I know Hummel a lot better than I know Winston Lord because I was only with Winston Lord a few months to help him get settled. Hummel down deep had a great love for China but I also think he was a very tough diplomat. He was very rigorous in defining the issues and understanding what the issues were and could be a tough negotiator with the Chinese. Winston Lord was more cerebral; he certainly was extremely intelligent with a very good analytical mind. He was always analyzing, trying to see what was happening in China, to understand, to get a feel for it. Very different personalities. I really can't comment on Winston's period as Ambassador because I was not there long enough.

*Q: You left in 1986 and then what?*

HOROWITZ: I went to West Africa and became Ambassador to The Gambia. I think this was all worked out because I was departing as DCM, and people in Washington were looking for a post for me and this came along. They called me while I was still in Peking and said, "Would you be interested?" I said yes.

*Q: At last you were getting to see something else.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, finally.

*Q: The place you saw as a War College student.*

HOROWITZ: That's right. Another great Foreign Service experience. The Gambians were extremely nice people, very soft-spoken, tolerant, open-minded. A strange country, a long and narrow country up and down the Gambian River. It was one of the earliest western colonies in Africa; it was a British colony. Later it was surrounded by what became French West Africa and now has Senegal to the north and parts of Senegal to the south. There is an interesting contrast in that the British did not put a huge amount of investment into The Gambia as they did places in east Africa. In fact there was one point about the eighteen seventies when the French and the British discussed the possibility of trading off colonies so that they could get all of their possessions contiguous. The Gambian atmosphere today is sort of a free trade, open port, kind of place; a lot of import and export and buy and sell, re-export to Senegal and other parts of Africa. Whereas Senegal, with the French influence is more controlled, with state investment, higher tariffs, more infrastructure; very different. Various tribal groups have families on both



sides of the border. The Gambians sometimes joke about their relatives on the Senegal side. They say that one difference is that in Senegal all of their relatives come home from work and speak French at home, here we come home from work and we speak whatever our tribal language is. A delightful country; good members of the British Commonwealth; very, very poor. Not very efficient in its operation, but getting better.

*Q: What were the American interests in The Gambia?*

HOROWITZ: Not many. Very little American trade. We certainly had an humanitarian concern for the poverty there, as elsewhere. There was a sizable Peace Corps group that was active there. I would say that most important for us is the fact that The Gambia has a moderate voice in Africa and among Moslem countries, and has a vote in the U.N. They often, very often, will support positions that we are interested in and they are not afraid to stick their necks out on certain things. The President of The Gambia is active in the OAS, in the Islamic Conference, and a variety of other organizations. He has often been appointed as a mediator; he is a moderate voice in the councils of Africa and the Islamic countries.

*Q: Did you find yourself explaining how we felt about things and hope for their support.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, and I would always get a good hearing from the President or the Foreign Minister. When they could, they would respond and be helpful. There were some times when we really wanted their vote on one issue or another and we didn't have trouble getting it. I can think of some examples. A Gambian Minister that I know was appointed to be on the first committee of the Islamic Conference to draw up confidence building measures, human rights kinds of issues, but they didn't know where to go. So he came to me for information; I called Washington and they sent me packets of materials on human rights, on confidence building measures. I was passing all of this to him who was using it in his committee. It is an example of a small way in which we might be able to have some influence. The Gambians were also very, very concerned about Libya; there was a dissident Gambian group that had been there and trained there. There was no trouble getting the Gambians on our side if we needed their help and support.

*Q: How did you view the Libyans at that time; why were they messing around in The Gambia?*

HOROWITZ: I have no idea except that a Gambian group that had tried a coup d'etat at one time in The Gambia and had escaped to Libya. There was a group of dissident Gambians there in Libya getting training. I can't say why The Gambia would be of principal concern to Qadhafi. In any event it is a nice country and we are concerned about their poverty and they have been helpful to us. They are good members of the British Commonwealth.

*Q: Were the British the main aid givers?*

HOROWITZ: They still had a principal role and were concerned; they felt responsibility there. All the international organizations were active; the World Bank was very active and was handling a lot of projects. The British and Americans were providing key support in certain areas. There were a lot of donors; it was one of these countries where there are a lot of donor organizations, governments and private voluntary organizations.

*Q: Were there any security concerns there as to what Senegal or one of its neighbors might do? Or were the boundaries pretty well fixed?*

HOROWITZ: Well they did have this agreement with Senegal, a sort of confederate idea, but it broke up while I was there. There were some misunderstandings, but President Diouf of Senegal seems to be a pretty sensible person. Perhaps he assumes that some day in the distant future The Gambia and Senegal will become one, but even though there were frictions between the two there was no apparent danger that it would break out into any serious problem.

*Q: Did you get any feel for the AF Bureau as far as its direction and all that? After all it was a new bureau for you.*

HOROWITZ: I was favorably impressed. There were a lot of people who knew a lot about Africa. I remember when the Africa Bureau was born, there was hardly anyone... I had one friend when I was going to undergraduate school who was thinking of doing graduate study in African studies, this was back in the 1950's. At that point there was no university in the United States that had an Africa program. You could get a course in anthropology or something like that, but no program.

*Q: You had to go to London.*

HOROWITZ: Or Paris. So I was impressed by the number of people we now have who have focused on Africa, know a lot about Africa, speak some African languages. They are very realistic, conscious of the fact that Africa was not the center of our national attention. Some of those people have come via the Peace Corps route. You know even in a small post like The Gambia I had one officer who had a Ph.D. in African studies, another who had a Master's Degree in African studies and had spent a lot of time in different African countries. I was impressed by the support of the Bureau. I had no trouble getting the ear of the AF front office if something would come up.

*Q: Well you then retired in 1989?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, after thirty-five years of service.

*Q: Briefly, what sorts of things have you been involved in since you retired?*

HOROWITZ: I am an adjunct member of the George Mason U. faculty where I teach Chinese history and I am active at State (inspections, freedom of information, special projects).

*Q: Very well, we will stop here then.*

*End of interview*