The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR ARTHUR H. HUGHES

Interviewed by: Raymond Ewing
Initial interview date: January 27, 1998

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background
- Born and raised in Nebraska
- University of Nebraska
- Entered Foreign Service - 1965
- U.S. Army - Germany

Frankfurt, Germany - Rotation Officer 1965-1967

Maracaibo, Venezuela - Consular Officer 1968-1970
- Economy
- Aid program
- Peace Corps

State Department - Operations Center 1970-1971

National Military Command Center - JCS - State Representative 1971
- Duties

State Department - Office of Under Secretary for Management - Staff Assistant 1971-1973
- Personnel issues
- Women and spouses
- William Macomber
- Terrorism

Bonn, Germany - Political Officer 1973-1977
- Berlin
- Guillaume Gunther affair
- Bonn Group
- Soviets
- Ambassador Hillenbrand
- Quadripartite Reserved Rights - QRR
- Group of Four

Live Oak
Rudolf Hess

State Department - Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary for European Affairs 1976-1977
Arthur Hartman

State Department - Spain Desk Officer 1977-1978
Spanish economy
NATO
Post-Franco

State Department - Staff of Executive Secretariat 1978-1980
Duties
Secretary of State travel
President Carter

Copenhagen, Denmark - Deputy Chief of Mission 1980-1983
Common Agricultural Policy [CAP]
Danish policies
Poland
NATO
President Reagan
Soviet submarine
Cultural exchange

The Hague, The Netherlands - Deputy Chief of Mission 1983-1986
Environment
INF modernization
Ambassador Bremer

Tel Aviv, Israel - Deputy Chief of Mission 1986-1989
Ambassador Tom Pickering
Peace process
Consul General Jerusalem relationship
Wat Cluverius
Embassy location issue
Prime Minister Rabin
Terrorism
Gaza
Politics
Intifada
Palestinians
Richard Murphy
Secretary of State Shultz
Congressional delegations

Visitors
Judaism
Population
Pollard case
West Bank

Defense Department - International Security Agency [ISA] - 1989-1991
Office of Secretary of Defense - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East/South Asia
Gulf War
Secretary Cheney
General Schwarzkopf
Saudi mission
Iraq
India-Pakistan issues
Egypt-Israel defense issues
Desert Shield
Desert Storm
Colin Powell
Safwan meeting
Wolfowitz
Kuwait troop evacuation
Skip Gnehm

Yemen - Ambassador 1991-1994
UN vote problem
Economy
U.S. aid
Peace Corps
Civil war
Saudi-Yemeni relations
Politics
Exiles
Aden
Oil
Environment
U.S. interests

State Department - Near East Affairs - Deputy Assistant Secretary 1994-1997
Sinai operation
Gulf States relations
Khobar Towers bombing
Saudi economy
Secretary of State Baker
Status of women
Oman

Bahrain
Human rights

[Left government in 1997]

Multinational Force and Observers (Egypt-Israel peacekeeping) -
Director General 1998-present

INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Mr. Hughes]

Q: This is an Oral History interview with Arthur H. Hughes. It's the 27th of January 1998. I'm Raymond Ewing. It's being conducted under the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program under the auspices of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. Art, good morning, welcome.

HUGHES: Thanks. I'm very happy to participate in the program.

Q: Let me start from the beginning. You came into the Foreign Service, I think, in 1965. Why don't you tell me where you grew up, where you went to school, and how you got interested in the Foreign Service?

HUGHES: Well, thanks. I grew up mostly in Nebraska. I was born in Nebraska, and although we spent three years down in Arizona because my father was an asthmatic, it didn't do him much good, so we went back to Nebraska. I went to Lincoln High School, graduated from there in '57, and the University of Nebraska, graduated in '61. I'm not quite sure when I became interested in the Foreign Service. I did a lot of reading when I was a kid, and somewhere along the line it just started building, I guess. In high school I took engineering prep and even took one semester of engineering at the University. Then I decided I wanted to go into liberal arts and study history and political science, a little economics, German, and so forth. In those days at the University of Nebraska there was no major in international relations, so I cobbled together my own by working with the various departments. Some of the professors were really puzzled about what I planned to do. I think maybe they were skeptical that I'd ever pass the Foreign Service test. Fortunately I did pass it in the fall of 1960 actually.

Q: While you were still an undergraduate?

HUGHES: That's right. Graduated in '61. I had gone through ROTC and was commissioned at the same time. I went to graduate school for one year at Nebraska. The Foreign Service offered to intercede with the Defense Department

or the Department of the Army and allow me to resign my commission to come into the Foreign Service in 1961. But I thought that that would have been a mistake in the long run, and so I did serve in the Army in Germany, was in for two years, and then into the Foreign Service, as you said, in March of 1965.

Q: Your service in Germany involved language study, or you had an opportunity to use some of the German you had learned in college?

HUGHES: I had a German minor, and I was able to use the German and expand it while I was in Germany. We had a kind of pre-language lab situation at the University. That was in the late '50s, of course. I think it was pretty rudimentary as far as language labs go. So my reading was pretty good, but my speaking was not much good when I got to Germany, but being there allowed me to improve.

Q: You then came into the Service, as you say, in March of 1965. You did the usual junior officer orientation and training, and then where were you assigned?

HUGHES: I was assigned to do four weeks of German, hopefully to get me over the hump, and then I went to Frankfurt, which was right across the street from what had been my Army headquarters. I was in Fulda actually, 65 miles away up on the border. But that was our headquarters right across the street on Seezmyerstrasse from the consulate general.

Q: So you knew how to get there?

HUGHES: Knew how to get there.

Q: And you did the usual first tour counselor work?

HUGHES: First-tour rotation, I think I had five jobs there. That was actually the most fun of it, the rotation. Because it was a pretty big post, there were a lot of us junior officers and we made lasting friendships. Still some of our best friends we met in Frankfurt in those days.

Q: It was a large post, of course, and it had probably a number of junior officers.

HUGHES: It was a real consular factory in a sense. Our main clients were actually service members. I spent a month or two doing nothing but registering births of almost all service members, a few businesspeople but almost all service members.

Q: And I suppose something with marriages too?

HUGHES: Marriages, adoptions, all kinds of interesting social situations.

Q: Citizen services.

HUGHES: Yes.

Q: And from Frankfurt you went to where?

HUGHES: Went to Maracaibo, went to Venezuela. My wife Pat had been a Spanish major, Spanish and English dual major, at the university, and we wanted to go to a Spanish-speaking post. Since we had served our first tour at a consulate general, I requested any Spanish-speaking embassy, which I thought was not too demanding for an FSO-8 [Foreign Service officer - class 8]. I might have been an FSO-8 still. I should mention this: I took a pay cut from the Army to come into the Foreign Service. I wasn't smart enough to negotiate to come in as a 7, so I came in as an 8. But in any event, they sent us to Maracaibo, which was a four-person post which was reduced to three people, and I was the middle person of three. But it was a great assignment. We were there for two and a half years, learned some Spanish, learned about Venezuela, learned about that part of the world, learned about developing economies, and made some good friends.

Q: Did you have some Spanish yourself before you went there?

HUGHES: I had 12 weeks. The course was shortened a little bit, because we were coming up against the Christmas holiday, and they decided, instead of having people go off for a week over the holidays and then coming back for a couple of weeks, they'd just shorten it, so we finished up just before Christmas. And then I took Spanish in Venezuela.

Q: And you had had some at the university?

HUGHES: Never.

Q: But Pat had?

HUGHES: Pat had.
Q: Ahead of you?

HUGHES: She was, indeed.

Q: Well, those small posts certainly gave opportunities for fairly new officers that a large embassy often didn't.

HUGHES: It was a wonderful post. Even going back to Frankfurt was a wonderful post. The principal officer throughout most of my time there was Jimmy Johnstone, who was finishing up his career, a career administrative person, a wonderful gentleman.

Q: This was in Frankfurt?

HUGHES: In Frankfurt. He really in many ways took me under his wing. We hit it off for various reasons. I remember once he teased me because as a new officer I had done something, I had exceeded my authority, for which the deputy principal officer chastised me. Jimmy Johnstone kind of winked at me and told me not to worry about it, that I had done the right thing. But then in Maracaibo I was also fortunate. I had great bosses. It was a very interesting time in Venezuela. It was the first time in Venezuelan history in the election of December '68 that power passed peaceably from one political group to another. Rocco Caldero won the election. There were five candidates, and he won it with less than 30 percent of the vote, but there was a peaceful transition. Now he's President again after Venezuela having gone through a crisis that we thought had been put behind him as a result of what happened in the late '60s and early '70s.

Q: Was the oil sector booming?

HUGHES: Absolutely booming. Bolivar was rock-solid currency. They were making a lot of money, and they made a lot of mistakes unfortunately. They poured a lot of money into Caracas and depopulated the countryside. Venezuela went from a country which historically had exported food to an importing country.

Q: Maracaibo is a post that is still open, or it's been closed some years ago?

HUGHES: It's closed again. It's been opened and closed about four times, with the inflow of the American population in western Venezuela. The nationalization of the oil sector law was passed just before I arrived in Venezuela, so I was there during the transition period, which was not a comfortable period for the American oil companies, for American business community, the international business community, nor to a large extent for the Venezuelans themselves. What's interesting now is just in the last few years the Venezuelans have reopened their oil sector to international investment, not only as operators but as equity partners. They had some extremely capable engineers. The middle class was growing, and very competent and capable people, but I think, although I have been away from them for many years, that probably it was more on the long-term investment and organizational side as opposed to the technical side where they might have problems.

Q: You had a broad range of responsibilities at the post and you were in effect the deputy principal officer?

HUGHES: Well, that's right. There were two officers and then a staff officer. Fortunately we had excellent people and we all got along famously. There were good principal officers who gave me some latitude. We had the five western states of Venezuela, so I was able to travel all around and go off to little towns. That's where I learned about what I think are still some of the most fun things you do in

the Foreign Service, and that is to travel around the country, go into towns, talk with the mayor, the labor leader, the newspaper editor, the university or upper school people, and really find out what's going on and show some interest. It's amazing what you can learn by being interested, being curious, showing sensitivity toward the culture, and just showing normal human politeness.

Q: You often get a perspective that's different than you do at the top levels of government in the capital.

HUGHES: The equivalent of outside the Beltway [highway system surrounding Washington, DC], I guess.

Q: Besides all of these aspects of listening and establishing a rapport and showing interest and so on, did we have programs that you were able to support or show interest in - the Peace Corps? There was not an aid program, I don't think.

HUGHES: There was a small aid program. It had to do with public safety. These were the days before the law that resulted after some problems in Vietnam in which we had public safety programs. We had a retired police officer from Phoenix actually, who was there working with the local police. The programs were basically forerunners of human rights in police work - proper procedures, transparency, and so forth. We had Peace Corps there, mostly in the countryside doing things such as proper nutrition, mother-child health care, which are still going on. For example, at my last post it's still active. It was interesting because that was my first direct contact with Peace Corps people on the ground, how they reacted to us from the consulate. Some were very happy to see us when we came to the countryside and were very happy to come to our homes for Thanksgiving, for example, or come by for a meal and a beer or two when they were in town. Others were absolutely convinced that any relationship between themselves and the official Americans would completely make it impossible for them to work effectively in the countryside. So I tried to be sensitive when I went out, to know what the attitude of the individual Peace Corps person was, and then behave accordingly.

Q: Ever since the Peace Corps was established, that's been a dilemma for them and in some ways for other aspects of the government.

HUGHES: Those were tough years - Vietnam, Cambodia. The consulate was attacked, cars burned. The big signpost out front was all burned down, a lot of glass smashed when I was there.

Q: Because of Vietnam?

HUGHES: Cambodia.

Q: The invasion of Cambodia in '69. 1970 I guess it was.

HUGHES: Yes, spring. We were in, as I said, for two and a half years, from winter '68 through July of '70.

Q: Where did you go from there, in the summer of 1970?

HUGHES: Well, we went for our first assignment in Washington and went to the Operations Center, which was a great assignment.

Q: For what, one year?

HUGHES: One year, and a part of that was as State rep to the National Military Command Center, part of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff].

Q: Which meant that you were actually...

HUGHES: On the floor at the NMCC [National Military Command Center] as a State Department representative.

Q: The Pentagon?

HUGHES: That was kind of an experiment. I don't recall now exactly how long a State representative was assigned there, but it ended shortly after my time in it, which was in the spring of '71.

Q: That was a shift?

HUGHES: Shift work, 24-hour day just like the Ops Center.

Q: And so there would be several other State Department officers who also were there. And you would advise as international foreign affairs issues affecting the State Department came up then?

HUGHES: That's right, or questions from the military there. There were also reps from the Agency, from the NSA and, I think, from the FBI. I'm a little cloudy on that. It seems to me there were four of us not from the Defense Department, not from the Defense establishment. The NMCC was headed up on every shift by a ne star, by a Brigadier General, and there were times when things would happen around the world and they would ask us, "What's the perspective from State? What are the ramifications from your perspective?" Sometimes you could answer from what you knew yourself. Oftentimes you'd get on the phone back to the Department and find out, get more expertise involved.

Q: Did the Department of State encourage you to keep people in the State Department posted about things of significance, of interest that were sort of

developing that the National Military Command Center was aware of?

HUGHES: Right, it was a two-way kind of flow of information. For one thing, the State rep would read in on important things happening around the world and try to maintain in their minds background, perspective, ramifications, implications, and by the same token were able to keep State informed of thinking over at the Defense Department regarding possible preparations for actions, preparations for deployments, give a heads-up that certain contingency planning was needed then and so forth. I thought it was very useful. It was finally terminated, I guess, just because of staffing problems, but I thought it served a useful purpose.

Q: In terms of career development, it was probably also useful for you - and this was your third assignment - to become aware. You had already been in the State Department Operations Center for a while, and you saw how the State Department looked from that perspective, and then to see the Pentagon and how it interacted with State and the White House and others.

HUGHES: I think that's exactly right. I had been in the Army, I had been in Germany, and one of my jobs was on the East/West German border of dealing with the illegal border crossers and managing some of those problems. I had been well immersed in the military life, military culture. I think serving at the NMCC also helped me later on, because I came into ongoing contact with the senior officers over there, which gave me inside understanding and sensitivity to how DOD works and functions. Of course, later on, when we come to that, I did serve over there as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. I think the ongoing contact was very helpful to me, very useful in professional terms and also in personal human terms.

Q: You, of course, had counterparts, serving military officers who represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, I guess, the Department of Defense in the Operations Center?

HUGHES: That's right, ongoing colonel-level, O6-level, staff around the clock.

Q: And I think that's continued.

HUGHES: That has continued, yes.

Q: Okay, so after you finished at the Pentagon, what did you do then?

HUGHES: Well, part of that one year in S/S-O [Staff Secretariat-Operations] I did a stint at the NMCC but also worked in a normal cycle in the Ops Center on the watch and as an editor.

Q: So this was just in effect part of your assignment during that period.

HUGHES: I think I was there about four months of that year.

Q: You weren't moonlighting? It wasn't a second job?

HUGHES: Well, it was moonlighting a lot of times, on the shift work. No, as I said, I think it was about four months of my one year there that I had that particular assignment.

Q: So when you finished that time, largely in the Operations area and partly at the NMCC, where did you go then?

HUGHES: Well, I went to work for the Deputy Under Secretary for Management as a staff assistant. Our colleague, Phil Wilcox, my predecessor, called me one day, and he said, "Come around. If you've got a moment, I'd like to talk to you a little bit," and asked me if I were interested in being one of the candidates.

Q: This was the summer of '71.

HUGHES: The summer of '71.

Q: Who was the Deputy Under Secretary?

HUGHES: Bill Macomber. So I was offered that job eventually, and I went there and worked there for two years.

Q: And you were one of the staff assistants, which meant you dealt with the Secretariat and with all the bureaus.

HUGHES: That's right. There were four of us on the staff: a Senior Foreign Service Officer; and then, because of the difficulties in the personnel system and legal challenges and so forth, Bill Macomber hired an outside lawyer who had been a lawyer at USIA in earlier life as a legal familiar with the foreign affairs community; and then a special assistant; and then I was the Staff Assistant. And so the job was working all around the building on issues and papers and preparations for things with a concentration, of course, with the Executive Directors of all of the other bureaus and inside the M Group, which is Security, Medical, Training, Personnel, Administration and also oversight over Consular Affairs.

Q: And you were with Macomber the whole two years that you were there?

HUGHES: That's right.

Q: Any sort of special, interesting issues that you personally got involved with in that period?

HUGHES: It was a difficult time, because the death, the suicide, of a foreign service officer because of selection out for low ranking put a focus on equities, fairness, administration of the system.

Q: Due process?

HUGHES: Due process, transparency, all of those kinds of questions. Also, the case of a woman who had brought suit for mistreatment put additional spotlight on those same issues. It was clear, and I think the record is very clear, that the system had not been working well, had not been working correctly, either for the individual or for the Department, as far as having a strong personnel system. So changes resulted. One of the things that I take a certain satisfaction in is personal involvement in drafting some of the policy on women and spouses in the Foreign Service, and working it around the building and helping to overcome resistance in some quarters.

Q: This is really the beginning of all of this attention to these issues that had been left unattended for a long time. Of course, you didn't resolve everything. Some of the lawsuits continued for many years. Some of this work was pulled together in the Foreign Service after 1980, eventually.

HUGHES: That's right. The antecedent to some of the events when I was there were the task forces for reform. So Bill Macomber and others did try to get out ahead of it. They looked at the system and understood that it was anachronistic in many ways, that it needed to be changed, and there was a lot of excitement, and a lot of good things happened in the late '60s before I arrived. I joked with Phil Wilcox that he was there during all of the up curve and all of the positive, the time of good feeling, and I was there during the time of not-so-good feeling. But it was an interesting time. It was an important time, and I think basically that it put things going in the right direction. A lot of conclusions were not reached and ideas fulfilled, but I think that things were clearly put in the right direction.

Q: You mentioned that you took some personal satisfaction from change of attitude, of policies, affecting women and spouses. I was in Rome at that time. I particularly remember the latter change, and my wife especially remembers it, but why don't you talk just a little bit about the situation before and then after and how much difficulty or resistance there was in making this change that did take place then.

HUGHES: First, with respect to women officers, the rule certainly seems crazy now looking back - that was in the late '60s, early '70s - that if a woman officer got married, she had to resign from the Service. It was clear that this was outdated although there were people in the personnel system at very senior levels who resisted changing that. But the rule was finally changed, that was abolished, and the thing that we worked on and that Macomber pushed through - much to his credit, I think - was to go back to every woman who was forced to resign for that

reason and offer her a job.

Q: To reinstate them into the Foreign Service.

HUGHES: Give them back their commission, so to speak, as a Foreign Service Officer, offer them a job, and offer them some catch-up. Now, to a large extent that was symbolic - no denying it - but there were women who were able, in the situation their own lives presented at the time, to say yes and come back in. I don't know how many. I think there is a program that has followed that, and that can readily be identified, but I thought that was an important thing.

Q: And some came right back - were prepared and anxious and willing?
HUGHES: That's right.

Q: As soon as the rules changed.

HUGHES: Then the other issue was the question of spouses. The issue was what are the rights of the U.S. government regarding spouses of employees. There was a certain logic involved that had been overlooked over time, and that was, well, the government has no right to insist on obligations from a non-government employee, which spouses were. But this was a little bit controversial too, because a good friend of mine said, "Well, look, if I'm smart enough to marry a woman who is going to help me in my career, then why should I be penalized in a way because my wife is not getting credit for her participation and her contribution?" I jumped ahead there, but basically a policy was designed and promulgated that said spouses are private citizens and the U.S. government can impose no obligations on them except that they should not disgrace the government, disgrace the United States. I don't remember the exact words, but that was the thrust of it. But there was ongoing study on this issue too, and one of the results has been that those women, and some men spouses, too, those spouses and their employee spouses oftentimes feel that their actual contribution, particularly overseas to the American community, to American policy, to American objectives, is undervalued or devalued. It's a kind of question for which there is no overall solution that will suit everybody.

Q: Some spouses have so concluded that their contribution is undervalued or devalued, and some have, therefore - or perhaps it's a rationalization - ceased to make a contribution.

HUGHES: I think to a large extent the Foreign Service reflects what's going on abroad or in society, although there might be a time lag. So you have a situation in which some spouses will tend to follow what is called a traditional role. They don't expect to be employed, either whether in the States or whether overseas, although that's becoming a smaller percentage obviously; and they play the traditional role of supporting their working spouse, and their working career is community and the broader community, and overseas that can be a very important

role not only as far as the morale and attitudes within the U.S. mission go but in the broader international community and in the national community. Other spouses go overseas with their working spouse and do absolutely nothing, make zero contribution to the broader community. Whether they're working or not sometimes doesn't make any difference. Other spouses will work to try to find a job and are successful in finding jobs. This is another thing the Department, I think, has done correctly, to try to negotiate bilateral work agreements for spouses with every country that will agree to do so; and, of course, there were a lot of informal arrangements too. Then there are other spouses who simply don't go overseas with their spouse. They have their own careers at home. This is a complication that the whole foreign affairs community is working through, and again there is no very good solution in that case.

Q: As you say, it is also part of broader changes in society in the role of women, childcare, second careers, and so on. And, of course, the other thing the Department has done - and I think this generally came after the time that you were working for the Under Secretary of Management - is to try to give some positive encouragement through things like the Family Liaison Office, Community Liaison Officers at posts, the Overseas Briefing Center at the Foreign Service Institute and so on, as well as some awards that have been developed both by AFSA and by the Department to honor and give credit to people who do make significant contributions, to try to encourage that.

HUGHES: Absolutely right. Those are all very important. I think the American Family Member Program, the consular program - I forget the exact name of it. People get kind of a temporary commission to do certain things in consular work.

Q: After a period of training.

HUGHES: After training. It was very important not only in meeting the real group requirements at post but also providing work opportunities and professional work opportunities for spouses overseas. So it's a win-win situation.

Q: What other major issues did you get just a little bit involved with in your period with Mr. Macomber?

HUGHES: Well, the whole selection-out issue, bottom ranking, equity, transparency, whether Selection Board results had been tampered with, names moved around or directed promotions; and that got really very unpleasant.

Q: Who was the Director General of the Foreign Service in that period?

HUGHES: Bill Hall. I think, from my perspective, it was a fascinating time to watch. It was not such a pleasant thing to be involved in on many occasions, because there was a lot of tension, but it was clear that that personnel system was not functioning at all correctly. Part of it was simply neglect over time. Part of it

was a lot of outdated thinking and approaches. A lot of it was, I think, based on a very proprietary view by people working in the system as to the system, resented outside oversight "interference," and a lot of it was just plain, pure and simple incompetence in my view. I can remember many, many hours of meetings after meetings trying simply to find out from the people in the system what had actually happened in the various cases, and it was like pulling teeth in many cases. But it wasn't necessarily because everybody were bad people or malicious. A lot of it was bad structure and incompetence.

Q: Was part of the problem also that there had been quite a growth in the Foreign Service beginning in the late '50s or early '60s that hadn't fully been absorbed?

HUGHES: During the, during World War II - the war is World War II, of course.
Q: I understand.

HUGHES: During World War II there was no intake into the Foreign Service, and so in the late '40s and early '50s there was a tremendous shortfall in people. I experience that firsthand when I was in Germany. During the occupation of Germany, in the U.S. occupation zone, there were officers [in charge of] the county. They were county officers. They were like a county executive. They were American civilians, or sometimes military guys who had a uniform on part of the time and took the uniform off and became civilians. Many of these people came into the Foreign Service. I worked with some of them in Germany, some excellent people. But anyway, there was a tremendous shortfall, and then in the '60s I mentioned already that the Department offered to have my commission canceled from the Department of the Army because of the growing wave of independence, decolonialization in the world. So, you're right. The numbers of the officers in the State Department and the responsibilities and the burden of budgets, people, staff overseas, new posts and so forth just exploded. You're quite right. This is another reason why there were problems later on.

Q: And, of course, there was an integration process that took place in the late '50s that brought many civil servants into the Foreign Service, some not totally willing but many, particularly at reasonably senior levels or at least mid-grade levels. They needed lots of junior officers. In the late '50s I think the intake was probably as great as it has ever been, certainly in the post-war period.

HUGHES: I think that's right.

Q: Bill Macomber is somewhat controversial, of course, but I don't know if his contribution, particularly as Under Secretary for Management, is fully appreciated even now.

HUGHES: I think that's right, and I think frankly it had a lot to do with his style, which could be rather brusque. It was a difficult time, and it's hard to say who might have done better, but I think that his style got in the way of a lot of the good

things he was trying to do. Working with him 60, 65, 70 hours a week, you get to know people pretty doggone well. He loved the Service. He was not a career guy. He came into the State Department as a staff assistant to John Foster Dulles. He had worked for Senator Cooper, John Sherman Cooper, before. He loved the Service. He considered himself almost a Foreign Service Officer. He enjoyed being mistaken for a career Foreign Service Officer. He met his wife working for John Foster Dulles. She was his personal assistant and a wonderful woman, absolutely wonderful. His brusqueness, his abruptness, his constant desire to prove himself and in a sense to prove his manhood on every case got in the way of his own love of the Service, his desire to try to do the right thing.

Q: On the other hand, he brought enormous energy and determination and enthusiasm to very significant issues that somebody else might not have taken head-on the way he did.

HUGHES: I think that's right. He had the stature, he had the trust of the Secretary of State. He knew Washington. He was in and out of the margins of politics his whole life. He once ran for Congress in New York State, which is his home state. That's right, and he was willing to challenge other agencies of the government, too, including the CIA on various things which before then had been basically put in the margins, and other agencies oftentimes did what they wanted, which was not in the overall interest of what the United States was trying to do overseas in each different country.

Q: On issues within the Department, some of these personnel issues that you've been talking about, he recognized there had to be change and tried to move in a better direction.

HUGHES: Absolutely. But unfortunately, because of his position, many of the lawsuits that were filed were filed against him *ex officio*. I can still remember the day when he was talking with Legal, "L," [Legal Advisor, Department of State] and Department of Justice about whether or not they were going to defend him. At first they gave him kind of a lawyerly, ambivalent answer, and he just blew his top, and rightfully so. His actions were official actions, and he was trying to work in the right way out of some very ugly situation. The thought that the U.S. government administration was going to leave him high and dry to hire his own lawyers was unthinkable. Of course, nowadays we do this and how much money individual government employees have had to spend defending themselves against sometimes totally baseless charges is pretty astonishing.

Q: Anything else that we should say about this, basically your initial three years in Washington at the Ops Center and then the work with the Under Secretary for Management?

HUGHES: Well, one of the other things I remember most clearly from the Ops Center is the weekend that there was an anti-Vietnam War protest and an attempt

by anti-war protestors just to shut down Washington, the planning that went into it and so forth. Of course, fortunately it didn't amount to a lot of conflict or injuries and that kind of thing, but it really brought home in many ways to somebody in Washington sitting here, a young person, the depth of feeling in the country. Also, being on the seventh floor gave me a lot of insights into how the upper levels work and how the interagency process worked or didn't work and how sometimes unpopular beliefs and unpopular positions ended up in disasters. One, I remember very specifically, during the war in Pakistan, with East Pakistan, later Bangladesh, and there were reports in the private press of famine and food shortages, rampages, and all kinds of atrocities in East Pakistan. The Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor denied that there were any problems. Our Consul General in Dhaka sent a cable, and the opening line was, "The specter of famine hangs over the land." This individual was really one of the top officers in the region, expected to do all kinds of great things, and I think he went from there to one of the service colleges, war colleges, and was never much heard from again.

Q: So policy was shaping perceptions.

HUGHES: Policy was shaping perceptions. I also had some insights into individuals, both career and non-career, tended to be more non-career, by the kind of cable that they would write. I remember one ambassador writing in great detail about his conversations with the local prime minister including long discussions about the qualities of their respective dentists, and thinking this is really weird stuff.

Q: What does this have to do with?

HUGHES: I took care not to do such things myself, and later on in life I had to advise a political ambassador who had been not well served by his career staff that telegrams reporting his dinner parties were not a good idea.

Q: Rogers was Secretary of State the entire time that you were in the Department in Washington?

HUGHES: But Kissinger was later.

Q: Was he taking much interest in these management issues that Macomber was seized with? Not so much.

HUGHES: No. As I said, Macomber had been involved in Republican politics his entire adult life and had the confidence of the Secretary of State and others in the Administration.

Q: He had already served as Ambassador to Jordan.

HUGHES: That's right.

Q: Under the Democratic Party?

HUGHES: Yes, and he served out his time in government service as Ambassador to Turkey. And then when President Carter was elected, that ended his tour out of Turkey.

Q: Was terrorism a major issue of concern, security, in the period that you were i Washington?

HUGHES: It was just the beginning of Palestinian terrorism. I was actually working on the night shift at the NMCC when the airplane was hijacked by Leila Khalid and her cohorts and they landed at a place called Dawson's Landing and used a World War II strip in Jordan. So it really exploded onto the scene during that time.

Q: Where were you when that incident took place?

HUGHES: I was at the NMCC on duty that night. I remember looking it up. Where might they go. Dawson's Landing, I found it on large-scale maps.

Q: Were U.S. government personnel involved with that as passengers on those planes? There were three planes, I think.

HUGHES: You know, I just don't remember.

Q: It didn't last very long.

HUGHES: No.

Q: As it turned out, it was dramatic because of the scale, but the numbers - I think there were three jumbo jets.

HUGHES: Yes, burning in the desert.

Q: Okay, anything else about that time?

HUGHES: No, except I really enjoyed the opportunity to work in the Management Bureau of the Department, that even more than the time in the Operations Center. Made a lot of friends and learned a lot about what goes on.

Q: Certainly you had an exceptional opportunity to work with the whole Department of State, certainly all of the management bureaus but probably the geographic bureaus as well, because executive directors were...

HUGHES: Usually through the executive directors but occasionally on some

things directly with DAS, country directors, and that kind of thing, Deputy Assistant Secretaries.

Q: And from Washington where did you go?

HUGHES: Went to Bonn, the Political Section.

Q: Back to Germany.

HUGHES: Back to Germany.

Q: And the Political Section in Bonn in those days was pretty good sized.
HUGHES: 13 officers.

Q: What was your responsibility?

HUGHES: I was working on Berlin. I replaced John Crumdum, who is now our Ambassador in Germany, a great person, great friend. There was an organization in those days called the Bonn Group which was made up of the Americans, the French and the British as the occupying powers, and then which also included the Germans when we needed to coordinate operations or coordinate policy with them regarding the occupation of Berlin, the maintenance of quadripartite reserved rights as a result of the victory in World War II. It was very important to maintain the quadripartite status with them, that is the occupation of the three Western powers and the Soviet Union, because that guaranteed the access and denied the East Germans from exercising sovereignty over Berlin. The Soviets also saw it in their interest to maintain their authority over Berlin and to restrain the East Germans, usually but not always. It was really a tremendous job, a wonderful job. Great bosses, starting with the Ambassador, Martin Mellenbran, who was really one of the greats of the Service. Frank Meeting, the Political Counselor, also one of the greats, later served as Ambassador including Czechoslovakia. And David Anderson, who was the Deputy Political Officer, just passed away last year unfortunately. I worked mainly directly with David.

Q: Were you the U.S. representative on the Bonn Group, or did you support the U.S. representative?

HUGHES: David was usually the U.S. representative, and then we did a phase-out of him as I got into the thing and the work adjusted. There were other things going on that demanded his time. And then he left the last year. The plan was for his replacement to do other things and for me to be the representative to the Bonn Group. That didn't quite work out because the new man was fascinated by the work, and regardless of the wishes of our respective bosses, he didn't want to let go, so I left after one year to go back to Washington, to replace you actually.

Q: Yes, well, we'll come to that again. So Berlin was your main bag in Bonn?

HUGHES: That was it, ranging from Berlin access, contingency planning, again working with the military, to responding to complaints from the Russians, drafting responses to the Russians, drafting our own complaints about Russian activities, working the Germans in implementation of the state treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union which had been signed just prior to my arriving in Germany. So it was an absolutely fascinating time. We had such issues as Huntage Adventure, who was then the Interior Minister, who for political purposes went to Berlin and on the steps of the Shernabager Othaus announced that the Umvelt Undus Ospit, the federal environment office, was going to be moved to Berlin, which from his perspective was permissible under the treaty between Germany, West Germany, and the Soviet Union. This caused a major confrontation, a major issue, a major political issue. Brogenoff never was working for him, but hundreds and hundreds of hours trying to coordinate policy on our side and trying to deal with the Russians, because, of course, from our point of view- (end of tape)

Q: Huns Degenture was a jury minister and tried to establish the Environmental Affairs Office in Berlin to move the domain of his ministry into Berlin. Why don't we back up just for a minute and talk generally about the situation in Berlin. Was it a period of crisis other than these incidents or issues that did come up, and what was your relationship with the United States mission in West Berlin and perhaps with the Embassy in East Berlin, which I think had been established by then?

HUGHES: Yes, well, it was established actually while I was in Bonn. It was not a period of crisis. There had been a crisis in the early '60s in which President Kennedy deployed additional forces to Germany. In fact, the unit that I went to Germany in in the Army initially was what was called a Berlin round-out unit. When they went home, I worked in another unit while I was still in the Army there, but the crisis was past, largely because of the efforts of Willie Brandt and the state treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, which did allow West Germany to develop ties with Berlin. That was the area of contention, that West Germany took risks and wanted to establish all kinds of ties, logically enough, reasonably enough from their point of view. The Soviets, of course, didn't want that, and the East Germans certainly didn't want that. But it was the probing and pressing mainly of the West Germans regarding the development of these ties that became the focus of our efforts and the focus of our work for the reasons I just mentioned. There were various federal activities that did develop and did take place in West Berlin. Also, the Bundestof, the federal parliament, got involved by holding meetings there, and there was a certain level of meetings that were allowed. I remember one time what is called the Ebsinrot, the council of elders of the parliament which is a steering group, steering body, scheduled a meeting in Berlin. Of course, it was announced, it became public, and then the question of Soviets complaining, and then the three Western powers. What were we going to do? Were we going to tell the Federal Republic that they

should do it or should not do it? Would we prohibit it, and all the political fall-out that that would cause within the alliance and our relations with the West Germans? I can remember I went to work with Ambassador Hillenbrand down to meet with one of Chancellor Willie Brandt's senior advisors, Elgin Barr, and I remember the Ambassador asking him if they would take the initiative to just keep postponing that planned meeting and announced meeting so that it in fact would never happen. He gave a one-word reply, "Teinesex."

Q: No way.

HUGHES: No way. But in fact the meeting did not happen, because the Germans also had their own interests and not provoking things excessively with the Soviets. There were pressures back and forth. The West Germans understood that that and other cases like forcing the environmental office would have been more than the traffic would have borne, and so they just managed the issue. And then, of course, the Gunther Guillaume affair intervened, the spy for the East, one of Brandt's closest advisors on his staff. It was the proximate cause of Willie Brandt's leaving, but I can remember within the embassy and with German politicians and observers for several months prior to that, it was clear that Willie Brandt was not having fun, that he was a better politician and campaigner, and that he felt constrained by the chancery. Of course, the treaty had been completed, and then it was the day-to-day work in the trenches of implementing, maneuvering and so forth, which was not, I think, to his taste at all.

Q: In keeping the coalition together.

HUGHES: Yes and, of course, the Germans have a wonderful word to describe that, Ansmidikite, the fatigue of office, which described it. I think it's a wonderful word. So there was some speculation we talked about. It was clear he was not having fun, he was not enjoying it. After the treaty, of course, what do you do for an encore? But it is clear that the Yom affair was the proximate cause of Brandt's departure. For a long time then that meant that a lot of things - or for awhile - were a bit frozen, and there were no new initiatives in that arena.

Q: Either initiatives that you would take or could take or that you needed to react to and handle that would be taken by the government of the Federal Republic?

HUGHES: Right. And, of course, the federal government was trying to expand its own linkages and ties to the GDR [German Democratic Republic] and to the Soviets and occasionally would do things that were inconsistent with our responsibilities or our desire to maintain a certain political control for bigger reasons. For example, I remember the two Germanies reached an agreement regarding freight and train traffic, which, of course, in connection with the quadripartite reserved rights, QRR, was in the domain of the Allies, and they we had to reach this agreement without telling us. What were we going to do? Were we going to assert our authority in some way? Were we going to say, "Okay, fine,

it's no big deal," in so many words? I think in the end we basically accepted it but insisted on certain little modifications in order to demonstrate our right of review.

Q: So those consultations, discussions, would take place among the three Western occupying powers, Allies? And then, of course, we'd have to bring the Soviets in too, because they really are a fourth power.

HUGHES: Well, there were four powers in two ways. In the West there were the meetings of the Three, and then there were the meetings including the West Germans. But the normal process was issues the Three would discuss, the Three would report, the Three would get instructions, and then you'd bring the Germans in. But there were a lot of informal discussions too. We had really good people there, and I think on all sides there was a clear tendency to assign very good people to this because of the importance of it. And there were a lot of informal discussions and conversations and so forth. But then there was the Group of Four in Berlin, the three Western powers and the Soviets as the occupying powers, and there were periodic meetings there with the ministers in Berlin dealing with the issues. Now, we in Bonn never participated in those meetings in Berlin. Those meetings were handled by our mission, although our mission in Berlin took guidance both from Washington and from us. But it was a very collegial kind of thing between ourselves and Berlin. There were some things we didn't see eye to eye on, and sometimes discussions would get animated, but we were all colleagues. We knew what the overall objectives were. There was no difference in what we were trying to do, what we were trying to maintain, but just a little bit different perspectives on how to deal in specific cases.

Q: Would you visit Berlin periodically?

HUGHES: I'd go to Berlin quite frequently, sometimes for several days, sometimes on one-day turn-around. I'd go to the Cologne Airport, fly for the morning, do business, and then fly back in the evening - horrible way to do things.

Q: To come back to the Bonn Group...

HUGHES: The Bonn Group. The Germans called it the Vier Group, the Group of Four.

Q: The Soviet Embassy would be representing the Soviet Union presumably, and that would be one of the main things they would be doing.

HUGHES: We never dealt with the Russians in Bonn. There were certain discussions from time to time with the Soviets in Bonn on other matters, but we never dealt with the Soviet Embassy in Bonn regarding Berlin. That was the purview of our respective representatives in Berlin.

Q: Okay, so the main thing you would do in Bonn would be among the Three and

with the West Germans?

HUGHES: Yes.

Q: To what extent did the American Embassy in East Berlin get involved in anything to do with Berlin or with you generally in your area of responsibility in Bonn?

HUGHES: John Sherman Cooper was our first ambassador in East Berlin. Before we had the embassy, one of my duties was to watch the GDR, so I actually traveled to the GDR before that and went to the Leipzig fall fair, which is a historic, traditional affair. It was kind of interesting because we intentionally made reservations late so that we would be compelled to stay in a private home because there were not enough hotel rooms in the city. I took Pat. There were four of us, myself and Pat from Bonn and then two officers from Berlin. We drove to Leipzig in a black Dodge with Yoosburg license plates with a two-way radio and antenna. As far as we could tell, nobody paid us any attention in Leipzig - I assume because they were completely overburdened by watching other targets from the Eastern security services point of view. We ended up staying in a private apartment.

Q: Your reason for making late reservations wasn't because they wouldn't notice you or wouldn't be aware that you were there, because you were very obvious about it by the car you used, etc.

HUGHES: We thought it would be interesting, because we knew from previous experience, or others knew from previous experience, and because of the shortage of hotel rooms and just the crush of events, that the great likelihood would be that you'd be farmed out to a private apartment. And so we were. We stayed with a family, which was fascinating, absolutely fascinating. We never did go to the fair; that was the least of our interests. One of the days we were there, we were talking at breakfast with the people that were in the apartment. They were both retired, and we were talking about going down to Dresden, and the woman of the house, with the strong personality of the two, said, "Oh, Dresden, you don't want to get lost. Why doesn't my husband go with you to show you the way." So we said, "Fine." He was totally nonpolitical as far as we could figure out, but we thought it would be interesting to have somebody in the car. We could talk with him and just ask him his perspective on things, you know.

Q: And also as well as being a bit of a guide on what you were seeing as you went along.

HUGHES: It turned out we got in the car, drove away and so forth, and we said, "Now which is the road?" He said, "I don't know. I have not been there in 30 years." But we drove along and we came to a little bridge and we crossed the river, and he said, "We'll never forgive you for this." And I was sitting in the back

and I couldn't hear and said, "Pardon me?" He said, "We'll never forgive you for this." We said, "What?" He said, "That was the Muldef River. That's where you stopped."

Q: You should have kept coming, huh?

HUGHES: "If you had kept coming, Leipzig would have been in your side." And then, of course, we went to Dresden and the famous museum there. The first display you see as you go through the door is the fire bombing of Dresden. That was really an extremely interesting trip overall, because we learned people were living on three levels. They were living on the public level in which they didn't say much of anything to anybody; and then they were living on the level of their colleagues at work or people who lived in their building, which was a little bit more open level; and then they were living on the level within their own families or their closest personal friends about whom they mostly no doubt about loyalty.

Q: By staying with a family, you at least were aware of that third level. You perhaps weren't intimately brought in, but at least you could sense it.

HUGHES: You could see what they had to eat, what they were buying, because we ate breakfast there, just what their lifestyle was.

Q: Did you pay them directly for the room and the accommodations and the food, or did you have to go through whatever office that placed you.

HUGHES: In the East you always have to go through something, some bureaucracy, but we also paid them.

Q: When the embassy was opened and established after John Sherman Cooper to the German Democratic Republic, presumably that kind of a trip was less feasible. It would have been done from East Berlin.

HUGHES: That's right, although for something like the Leipzig fair, if there were true commercial interests, one could go, but that's right. I remember when he came, he also went to East Berlin to present his credentials and so forth. He also came to Bonn, and we had some consultations in Bonn with him. I remember taking him down to the Foreign Office and meeting with senior people down there to talk about the GDR and so forth. But our mission in East Berlin had absolutely nothing to do with QRR or the occupation of Berlin. It was a very clear firewall that was built there. I went occasionally to the embassy in East Berlin for consultations and to talk about things so they would have a perspective and understanding of what was going on.

Q: Was there an issue at the time you were there about whether the embassy should be located in East Berlin? I guess once we had in effect accepted that that was the capital of the German Democratic Republic, then the embassy pretty

much had to be there.

HUGHES: Well, legally we never accepted that it was the capital of the German Democratic Republic, as they proclaim on every signpost, stamp cancellation on their letters and everything. We never accepted it legally, but as a practical matter, particularly after the state treaty between West Germany and the Soviet Union, certain things were going to happen. This was, as one could see, part of the overall deal, implicit if not explicit. We made all kinds of disclaimers, but as a practical matter we decided that we needed an embassy there, and the West Germans were certainly happy to have us there. But it was a depressing site.

Q: About the time that you arrived on Bonn in 1973, what was the year of the state treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union?
HUGHES: Either '71 or '72.

Q: It was a year or two before you got there. So all this was pretty well entrained and you really weren't involved in issues related to that except the implementation, I suppose.

HUGHES: Well, the implementation because the treaty had been signed, but there was enormous pressure, political pressure. Willie Brandt was trying to, with our approval, achieve a treaty. So there were areas that were left intentionally vague. There were areas that could not be resolved and they were big. I remember the first time I read it, I read it through and I said, "Well, here are the spots that are going to be hard," because they were so apparent. You said, "Only the difficulties of implementation." I would take out the "only."

Q: What else should we talk about in terms of this period, this assignment in Bonn? Did that pretty well cover it?

HUGHES: Yes, I think. It was really a wonderful time. We thoroughly enjoyed Bonn. We were privileged to have a little house up above the river across from Draffenfelt Dragenflack, only about a seven-minute commute to work. I could get on my bicycle and be in open countryside in five minutes. Good schools. The only downside was the mothers driving the kids to school in Buddersdorf.

Q: You had to watch out for them?

HUGHES: No, the wives just disliked it intensely.

Q: Oh, that they had to do it?

HUGHES: In the main commute artery up the river, to go up to Buddersdorf, they would take them to school. But it was a wonderful time and the ambassador was just a great man really. We all had just tremendous respect and affection for him, and, as I said, Frank, me, and David.

Q: Your work was very much the negotiation, diplomatic. You were dealing with all of these various parties. The reporting by contact and reporting in kind of a traditional way was probably - you probably didn't do much of that.

HUGHES: Well, it was a 13-officer political section.

Q: There were others doing that.

HUGHES: So there were two people doing internal, there were people doing multilateral, people doing all different kinds of things. But to give you an idea of the rhythm, there would probably be tripartite meetings a couple times a week at least, and the agenda would be anywhere from one very tough issue to 12 or 15 issues. So meetings would oftentimes go on for four or five, maybe even six hours on occasion, but usually they would go from three to four hours, working their way through the agenda items. Of course, you're dealing with very tricky issues, issues in which there are a little bit different perspectives. There could be some very lengthy discussions and debates. What we strove for was ad referendum agreement, ad referendum agreement with capitals. So we'd go through those things, then I'd go back, or we would, go back to the embassy, see if there were any traffic or phone calls from Washington, but we would get on the phone. Those were the days when the KY3 [secure telephone] wasn't worth a dime, so it was hard sometimes to have telephone conversations. Then I'd go home and I would write anywhere from one to five or six telegrams.

Q: At home?
HUGHES: At home, after dinner, sitting at a little round table in a room that looked out over the valley and over the Rhine - sometimes, I confess, with a glass of wine in my hand.

Q: Writing in longhand?

HUGHES: Writing in longhand on a yellow pad, and then the next morning going - and I was really glad to have two wonderful secretaries at the time I was there. Eve Foster had been an executive secretary; her husband was an attache. She had been an executive secretary, just a wonderful person, just magnificently competent. And I'd hand her the full sheaf of paper, and within an hour or two she'd have everything. And those were the days when the optical character machines [typewriters] were just coming into being with all of the problems - you remember that very well. But she was fantastic. And then when she left, the subsequent woman was also really very, very good. And then we'd begin the cycle again, with answers to previous cables from Washington. If there were problems, you had to get on the phone or go see somebody bilaterally and say, "Washington's got this problem. I think we can work it out between us before we have the next meeting." And then we would have a meeting including the West Germans and go through these same issues. The West Germans would make

proposals: "We want to do this, we want to do that." We would give responses. Sometimes we would give pretty definitive responses. If they wanted to do something very badly, we would agree to ask for instruction or we would work, and our objective there was to try to find, again, a position that everybody could live with. Sometimes on some issues everybody agreed instantly; it was so clear, a matter of principle and so forth. On other things we never did reach full agreement, which meant, of course, that nothing happened unless the Germans wanted to force the issue and take it to the highest political level, which they did on occasion, very rarely.

Q: Were you getting a lot of detailed guidance from Washington, or were they letting you do much of this work on the spot in Bonn?

HUGHES: Both. We were never very far apart, because the principles were very clear. While we were working our way in the implementation of the agreement, of the treaty, the principles were cleared, so largely the work was managing issues on the ground. So there was not a lot of guidance from Washington in that area, because they understood and they did have suggestions on occasion, but there was not a lot of input. They'd tell us how to manage the situation on the ground, but we were in a much better position to make those judgments ourselves. But the people who were in Washington were people who had come out of Bonn.

Q: Who were very familiar with the issues.

HUGHES: Nelson Ledsky, for example, and John Kornbloom were very familiar with the issues. Occasionally there would be a real difference of view, and if we couldn't resolve it at, say, my level, Dave Assen and occasionally Frank or we'd get the ambassador to become involved with writing a cable, and the ambassador would get on the telephone back to the Assistant Secretary or the Deputy Assistant Secretary. But because of Ambassador Hillenbrand's stature and his knowledge - he was Mr. Berlin, he ran the Berlin Task Force. He was not second-guessed by Washington, but he did suffer because after Kissinger became Secretary and Kissinger had his own channels to the West German government, occasionally he would send somebody out without even telling him about it. That was a real burden for Hillenbrand; it was sometimes a burden for us in policy in an implementation way. I mean, how can you know what you're supposed to be implementing and what you're trying to work for when you don't know what the hell Washington wants to do? And there was no reason in the world why Hillenbrand could not have been used. Hillenbrand was certainly not loose-lipped nor did he have his own political agenda. But I think it was a certain sign of the times and sign of the personalities, which was not constructive.

Q: How would you summarize what were our basic principles or objectives during this period as they related to Berlin - to not upset the status that had been achieved in the post-war settlements and so on?

HUGHES: Essentially it was to maintain the QRR, or quadripartite reserved rights and responsibilities over all of Germany until there was a settlement. Because of the leverage that existed or potentially existed by the Soviets regarding East Germany and leverage consequently over West Germany because of Berlin, political currents in West Germany and also their leverage over Germany and Berlin as it also played out on the other Eastern European states, it was a very important subject, very important issue.

Q: Let me come back again a little bit more to the Allied consultations, the tripartite meetings that you said sometimes took place a couple or more times a week. Would the chairmanship of those rotate, or how did that work?

HUGHES: That's right. The chairmanship rotated.

Q: On a monthly basis or something, six months?

HUGHES: Let's see, I'm trying to think. The chair rotated in Berlin quadripartitely with the Russians. I think we tended to rotate in the same sequence. It's a little hazy in my mind now, but it definitely rotated. I think we guided on that. And in the Group of Four, the Germans also participated as chair.

Q: The West Germans?

HUGHES: Yes, the West Germans also rotated through the part of the chair.

Q: And the French and British were represented by your counterparts and officers in the embassy. Generally was it fairly easy to reach agreement among the three, or was that difficult often because of the French, as it is on some other issues over time?

HUGHES: Actually it wasn't. There were a few exceptions, but actually it wasn't because all three, again, saw a basic principle. On occasion our European friends sometimes wanted to accede more willingly to certain ideas or initiatives of the Germans. On occasion we did. But this was a time, of course, when the EC was building and expanding. I can remember telling my French colleague there about the EC parliament, and, of course, the French were very skeptical. I can remember a colleague saying, "You know, the idea of having a parliament with no power is nonsense. If you use parliamentarians, they're going to want power, they're going to want authority, and you watch and see what happens."

As I said, there was a clear tendency by all capitals to send very good people there, and our British and our French colleagues were. Well, Jean Claude Payee was the French member of the Bonn Group for part of the time I was there. He later became the Secretary General of the OECD. His younger colleague was more my counterpart, Pierre deGrassier. His family was connected with President deGaulle, General deGaulle's family, brilliant guy, and I found both of those

gentlemen personally very helpful. One of the rules was you could use your own language. German for me was no problem. You could speak your own language. I didn't try to negotiate much in German, but they could speak German and I'd speak English. But I didn't speak French. Both of those French colleagues were personally very thoughtful and kind to me, including when they had volunteered to do a draft. We'd have a discussion and say, "Okay, you do the draft to try to memorialize what we've agreed in principle here or agreed ad referendum, and then send it around and we'll all take a look at it." For example, when the French would do a draft, they would give it to me in English. And some of my colleagues were absolutely astounded at the courtesy that they showed.

Again, those were really fascinating years, and I learned a tremendous amount, sitting in a room with representatives of four countries trying to reach agreement, and the negotiations, and what one can learn about body language, about personal style. I won't mention the country, but one of the representatives from another country gave himself away usually when he was going to concede a point. We'd have a tough issue and they'd been holding out, and I could always tell if he was going to concede by the way he introduced the subject and by the way he reviewed the subject before conceding. At the same time you learned in whom you could place more trust. Occasionally when we'd have an agenda of ten, 12 or 14 items, it was simply impossible to get fully up to date on every one of those issues in a day or two, particularly if it was a relatively new issue. But I knew who among the whole group I could trust to relate the facts correctly.

Q: Who really did the homework.

HUGHES: I knew, if Mr. X had done the homework and made a presentation, that these are the facts, that he could be trusted, that it was absolutely reliable, that those were the facts. He might draw a different conclusion, but that's another question. I knew that he was going to give a straight story. And I knew who would be a little lazy, and maybe not even intentionally unreliable, but somebody who would be a little lazy and imply that they knew things or imply that such and such was the case when it wasn't. I remember I could always tell when Ambassador Hillenbrand was getting a little bit fed up with proposals or what people were saying to him, because he would start to rub his hands. I remember going in with one of my colleagues. My colleague was making a pitch that I told him I just didn't agree with but we'd do this, and Ambassador Hillenbrand started to rub his hands like this, and I knew what his views were. So I said to my colleague, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, I think we've taken enough of your time. I think we should leave." He agreed, and I pulled my colleague, and I said, "He was just about to let you have it. I don't know if you realized that." But those were the things, things like that.

Q: Now the U.S., of course, as you have said several times, had forces in Germany at the time and still does, as did France and United Kingdom and in Berlin, West Berlin, as well. To what extent were all of you involved with the

military, or were a lot of the issues of no interest to them?

HUGHES: Well, quite extensively, because there were the contingency plans under the moniker [name] Live Oak. So there was planning going on, and there was also an annual Live Oak exercise which took representatives down to Belgium, where we would carry on the exercise and usually meet with SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe], who during part of my time there was...

Q: General Haig.

HUGHES: General Haig, and very impressive there, very impressive. His appointment took some of our allies by surprise and caused a lot of dismay, of course, if you want to know the history of his appointment. But I don't know how military historians will rate it, but I found him from our perspective, the Live Oak and Germany and so forth, really was quite impressive. So in a nutshell we did have ongoing relations and quite intensive contacts with our military counterparts.

Q: Did you have a military person that would attend the Bonn Group regularly?

HUGHES: No.

Q: But to the extent you needed to have liaison on issues affecting the forces in Germany, you do it how, not through the attaché and the embassy, or was there a representative of the U.S. forces in Germany in the embassy?

HUGHES: Yes, there were liaison people at the embassy, so there were representatives. There was ready communication. One other thing I should mention also, one important context of the program on oral history, is the importance of records in embassies. You've been in embassies, I've been in embassies where you try to find what happened four years ago and everybody's new, and there's simply no record and you simply can't lay your hands on it. You just don't know, and you go back to Washington, and maybe it's in Greenbelt [records depository near Washington], maybe somebody remembers. I think this is an awful thing, I guess particularly since I was a history major at the university and want to go back to the original documents whenever you can. At least that's my predilection. But in Bonn and Berlin there were exemptions to the retirement of records rule. There was a vault that was basically 85 percent Berlin, and it was there that I learned the importance of creating files called permanent documents, or basic documents I usually call them, basic documents, both classified and unclassified in one place so that one could go back, you know. We'd have an issue in the Bonn Group. What happened? How were the rates of the trains crossing East Germany to Berlin determined?

Q: The rates? The speed?

HUGHES: No, the cost.

Q: The cost, okay.

HUGHES: The rates, and what were the responsibilities of East Germans to provide locomotives? What kind of reimbursement did they receive? Well, you could go into that file, and between us there and in Berlin you could find out. What were the original discussions between ourselves and the Russians or the Soviets? What were the discussions between the West Germans and East Germans, because they're the ones that actually interfaced to make things happen in that regard. It's just an example, but the importance of these basic documents was proven time and time and time again.

Q: Did you get involved in the Bonn Group in some of the shared institutions in Berlin such as Spandau Prison and I think there was an air traffic center and there was a document center?

HUGHES: Yes, we did, very much so. We had hours and hours of discussions on Spandau and hours and hours of discussions as to what to do with the last prisoners there.

Q: Rudolf Hess?

HUGHES: Rudolf Hess - what to do, what to do with his remains. The Russians wanted to have his remains cremated when he finally died and his ashes scattered to the wind to preclude any monument, neo-Nazi monument or whatever to be constructed. That was the argumentation. And there was some sympathy for that in the West. We had hours of discussions with legal studies, and basically in Western jurisprudence the penalty is against the person, not against his remains. And so we determined there was no legal precedent or no legal authority for disposal of the remains outside the wishes of the family. And, of course, at the end of the day, because Hess's health was going up and down, I remember half seriously, half jokingly but more seriously, hoping that Rudolf Hess did not die when the Soviets were in the chair in Berlin, because then that was also their month to have the guards at Spandau. If that happened, then you might have an issue that West Germans would come to us and say, "You've got to turn the guy's body over to the family." We believed that also legally, but we'd have to go to the Russians and say, "Huh-uh, the body has to be turned over to the family." Of course, that's what happened.

Q: When did he die? I know he was still alive in 1980, because I saw him from the air from a helicopter walking in the courtyard of the Spandau Prison.

HUGHES: What were you doing in 1980 in a helicopter over Berlin?

Q: That's my story. Let me back up for a second. You just talked about some legal issues, and, of course, a lot of what you were doing was not just diplomacy or

negotiation but interpreting in a legal context. Was there a lawyer in the embassy that worked with you?

HUGHES: Right, there was a lawyer who worked almost full time with us. He'd get occasional side tasks. And also there was a lawyer in Berlin.

Q: So he would not necessarily be exclusively working on Berlin issues or on the Bonn Group?

HUGHES: In a practical matter that's usually what happened.

Q: And he would be a State Department lawyer assigned to...

HUGHES: He's still working for the State Department, first rate guy. We were very fortunate.

Q: Okay, anything else about these three years in Bonn? Great assignment, I think.

HUGHES: Oh, it was, absolutely tremendous. Well, only to say that I've jokingly said since then that we must have been doing the right things, because now it's totally unimportant.

Q: Well, obviously lots of things have changed. Did you talk a lot about the [Berlin] Wall in those days?

HUGHES: Oh, yes, but the Wall was more the articulation, so to speak, the situation made manifest as opposed to the policy of what we were trying to do. And, of course, we visited East Berlin quite frequently, but went through the processing at the Wall. There were very strict rules about how we were supposed to relate to the East Germans, because our politics and our theology was, we related only to the Russians, the Soviets, because they were the occupying power. But as a practical matter we had to deal with the East Germans. That was a great assignment.

Q: Well, in 1976, as you said before, you came back to be special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, and you did that for a year or so. That was Arthur Hartman, I think.

HUGHES: That's right.

Q: I remember when we met.

HUGHES: You said, "I'm out of here."

Q: That's right, except I continued in the Bureau and so I was aware generally of

what you were involved with.

HUGHES: Well, it was a great job, first of all because it was an opportunity to work for another great person, another great man, Arthur Hartman. That in itself was worth it.

Q: You were also there for the 1976 election and for the change of administration, change of parties.
HUGHES: I ended up working for George for a few months to complete my year. But when I came back, it was actually John Columber who had called me from Washington, who had been my predecessor in Bonn, and said, "I know from your circumstances in Bonn, maybe you'd like to leave. Ray Ewing is looking forward to his next assignment, and could you come back?" I said, "When do you need to know?" He said, "By Monday." I think he called Thursday or something like that. So I took my family down to Moselle, and we had a family discussion and voted three to one to go back. Actually it was kind of two-one-one.

Q: You were in favor or you were opposed?

HUGHES: I was in favor. But one of the first things I did when I went back was to go up on the seventh floor and talk to friends and on the sixth floor and talk to friends about my new boss, about the Secretary of State, about the people on the Secretary of State's staff; and what I heard just confirmed what I had already assumed. I heard very specifically by a senior person on the seventh floor who saw this firsthand that it was his view in the Secretary's staff meetings that Arthur Hartman was the only one who spoke his mind. Also in the Secretary's staff meetings when Arthur Hartman spoke was about the only time that Secretary Kissinger made any pretense of listening. Maybe I'm too harsh, but that's what I heard. I also heard throughout the building tremendous respect for Hartman in his leadership and as a person. So I really considered myself privileged to work with him.

Q: And then, of course, when the new administration came in, he was selected to be ambassador to France, and George Vest, who also had a strong reputation, came in to replace him. And you were with him for a few months, you said?

HUGHES: About three months, I think, because Hartman was nominated it must have been about March, pretty quickly actually, if I recall correctly. In March or April he was gone. I connived. I worked there till about the first of July, and then I was able to take a whole month off and drove out to the West Coast and back to DC before I [began]. But a couple of stories about Hartman: One morning - I don't know what time it was - about 7:30, I was there and he called and said, "I'm still at home. What's going on?" and I said, "Well, not much, a little traffic here but nothing that really demands your attention." He said, "What are on the schedule?" I said, "Well, you have Secretary's staff meeting 8:00 or 8:30." He said, "Is Jim there?" I said, "Yes, Jim Austin," the principal deputy, "yes, he's

here." "Well, look, have him go to the staff meeting. I'm busy. Guess what I'm doing." And I said, "Don't know. What are you doing?" He said, "I'm sitting here watching tremendous numbers of birds on our lawn. We inadvertently left the sprinkler on all last night, and a tremendous number of birds are out there, all kinds. It's just fantastic. So I'm just sitting here watching the birds." I said, "Okay, well, enjoy it." I thought here's a guy who's got a certain sense of balance in life. Here's a guy who has a certain sense of perspective on things. This is going to be okay.

Q: Watching birds, huh? I can believe that.

HUGHES: First of all, as a gentleman, as an intellect, as someone who can see through the trees to things that were important, be led by example. It was a real privilege working for him.

Q: And you did the liaison with the seventh floor and with all the offices and the Bureau and helped him and supervised the staff assistants. Why don't we maybe go on unless there's something else particularly in that period.

HUGHES: No, except one of the things I felt very unhappy about was the way that sometime she was abused by the Secretary.

Q: Was the problem primarily with Secretary Kissinger or more with sort of other people representing- (end of tape)

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Okay, this is the second tape of a Foreign Affairs Oral History interview with Arthur Hughes. It's the 27th of January 1998. I'm Raymond Ewing. Art, we were talking about your period of assignment as special assistant to the Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, Arthur Hartman, and you were particularly, I think, talking a little bit about how much of your challenge in that job was, I suppose, trying to help the Assistant Secretary get along with the Secretary and some of the other senior officers on the seventh floor. Kissinger was well known for deep and abiding interest in Europe, and I suppose there were a few others who probably had that interest as well - the counselor, for example.

HUGHES: The counselor, Hal Sonnenfeldt. There was a kind of a competition, but it was, in my view, totally unnecessary. Occasionally Sonnenfeldt demonstrated a very proprietary view regarding some particular issue and wanted to do it himself without any coordination or discussion with the Assistant Secretary. This counselor tended to be pretty secretive, and he was supported in that kind of approach by his staff, and so one of my responsibilities was to try to work with the staffs up there to figure out what it was that the Secretary wanted to do not only policywise but operationally and to keep my boss and the Bureau informed. And that got pretty difficult on occasion. I remember thinking about

how unnecessary it all was, because the problems had very little to do with policy or achieving objectives but mostly to do with personalities and attitudes and approaches. It was a learning experience but one that was not altogether encouraging.

Q: How involved were you in the transition period between the two administrations? The new Secretary, Secretary Vance, came in in January of '77 or so, in February.
HUGHES: Very much so, because, of course, the relationship with the Soviet Union was the key foreign policy issue of those times. I worked very closely with the transition group at State and the transition group over at the NSC [National Security Council] staff. One particular thing I did personally was to work very closely with someone who was working the transition with Vice President Mondale on his trip around the world. I recall that shortly after the administration came in, Mondale took a major trip as Vice President. I can remember the staffer who had worked during the previous administration was hoping to stay on. I can remember him telling me, "If this trip works okay, I think I've got a future here." Well, it turned out it worked out okay, and he had a future.

Q: He was able to stay on with the new Vice President?

HUGHES: He was able to stay on. But I also remember so visibly after there had been some very careful work and a letter from President Carter to then Secretary Brezhnev and the letter had just been dispatched. The President was giving a press conference, so Art Hartman and I went into the EUR [Bureau of European Affairs] conference room. For some reason it was on a television set in his office at that time. We went into the conference room. We were sitting there, and in the context of the press conference President Carter said, "And I have just sent General Secretary Brezhnev a letter setting out certain plans." And I remember that Ambassador Hartman and I looked at each other, and both of us just shook our heads and said to each other, "That's the end of that issue."

Q: Because it probably hadn't even been received by the Soviets.

HUGHES: Not clear if it had been received by Brezhnev, but even if it had been, one way or the other, to talk about it from the Russian point of view, Soviet point of view, would have meant that it was totally a ploy, propaganda.

Q: Let me ask you something about the early days of the Carter Administration, about an area that I'm particularly interested in, and that's Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Now Sonnenfeldt, counselor of the Department under Kissinger, was very interested in things to do with the Soviet Union, with Germany, with NATO, Allied matters in Europe. Vance asked the new counselor, Matthew Nimitz, to particularly take an interest in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and I'm just wondering from your point of view, or Arthur Hartman's and then George Vest's point of view, did that turn out to be the same problem as it had been in the

previous administration except in a different geographic area, or do you remember anything in particular about that?

HUGHES: Well, my mind is not altogether clear on it, but I would judge from that, having then become a friend of Nimitz and his people, that it wasn't, it was a different situation, because there was a greater sense of collegiality and a greater sense of we're not in competition. The counselor's office and EUR were not in competition but were trying to do something, trying to achieve something. So it seemed to me, from this remove and just what I recall, that things worked pretty well.

Q: That's certainly my impression.

HUGHES: It worked what should have been normal, in a normal way.

Q: I was directly involved, and I think that is a fair description of the situation. I was just curious, as you were sitting in a slightly different place. I wondered if you remembered it the same way.

HUGHES: But, you know, one other thing that does try to go with the transition is that it was the first time I was able to observe a transition at that level. There was a lot of us- and-them by the new guys that would come in. Of course, there had been eight years of Republican administration, but there was a totally unwarranted view by too many of the new people coming in, particularly at the staff level - I don't know if at the senior level that held true - at the staff level since you were physically there, you must have been with the old guys, that your own personal domestic political views and philosophy must be a part of their philosophy. I remember one fellow in particular who was working in the Secretary's office, but I knew the Secretary understood what was happening and moved him to S/P just because he was causing all kinds of unnecessary problems by making this assumption. There was a lot of us-and-them kind of answers.

Q: I went through two transitions in this period. One is the one you were just talking about, and I was involved in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and I think there we felt that a change, a new administration, was probably a good thing simply because it allowed some new initiatives and new approaches to ideas that were difficult to deal with. But I also remember another transition four years later where there was certainly a lot of that "We have to change things completely, because we're new and we have different ideas, and if you were part of the old, those were bad ideas and old ideas."

HUGHES: I was overseas during the second of those transitions, and I was over there. I was the DCM and remember the brusque way that the administration sent out the word that the political appointees were going to be out of there. I think they gave them two or three weeks. Of course, then I called up Washington. I'm sure that my DCM colleague called Washington and said, "This is just insane. It's

physically impossible almost," and got an extension of time, which was the way it was done. It was very graceless.

Q: Well, why don't we come back. Let's see, is there anything else we should talk about in terms of your special assistant year? You worked as special assistant in the Geographic Bureau, the European Bureau. You had been in the Operations Center. You had been in a staff position with the Under Secretary for Management, and you finally got a real job, and what was that?

HUGHES: Wait a minute. Bonn was a real job.

Q: Oh, I mean in Washington.

HUGHES: Well, I went down to become Spain Desk Officer, and that was also a great job, because Franco had just recently died and Spain was just begun to transition. There were a lot of questions about Adolfo Suarez. What kind of a person was he? There were a lot of questions about Juan Carlos. What kind of a person was he really? Was he a person of substance?

Q: The king?

HUGHES: The king. Was he a person of substance or was he not? What Adolfo was, had been the head of the Falange Youth, which is not a great credential probably, to be conceived to be a modernizer or to be a liberal in historic context or a democrat. But it turned out that both of those individuals served tremendously important historical purposes, Juan Carlos in his day, but Adolfo Suarez also as well. We had the luxury of having two of us on the Spain desk at that time. Had a number of concerns; one was economically. What was the situation? Was it going to make a basket case because of uncertainty or investments that would be dried up? Was it in the capital flight, and so forth?

I can remember one of the first things that I was asked to do was to do a paper on that subject including questions of debt service ratios and so forth. The facts were that Spain was actually in pretty darn good shape. Some difficulties but that was with decisions being delayed, but not much in the way of capital flight. The debt service ratio was very low. They were quite able to meet their important commitments. Reserves were good. Another area was the question of separatism, because the Basque terrorists were very active. I remember Westinghouse was building some nuclear power plants, and there were some demonstrations and attempts to attack the nuclear power plant construction sites.

Q: In the Basque region?

HUGHES: Yes. And then, of course, there was the whole question, which was extremely important, where would Spain fit into the Western security concept? During the Franco years, of course, Spain was anathema to most of the Western

Europeans and certainly part of the U.S.'s body politic as well. U.S. policy under both Democratic and Republican administrations has been to work bilateral defense relations, which was being parallel to NATO, but since Spain was not acceptable to other NATO partners, they had to be strictly U.S. bilateral. One of our national objectives was to get Spain into NATO for a number of reasons: to make them a part of the alliance but also to professionalize the military, to modernize the military in the sense of being able then to play a national security role as opposed to playing an internal domestic pacification role. That was the main task of the time I was on the Spain desk, and one of our initiatives was to put together a seminar, State and Defense - might have been an NSC representative also - to go to Madrid for two days to meet with Spanish military, defense, one of those officials, and tell them what NATO membership meant in all of its ramifications. Jim Vicky, who was a Basque and UR leader of that effort and also a wonderful person, extremely competent person - it was great getting to know him and working with him. So we went off to Madrid, and it was the tangible beginning of real engagement between ourselves and the Spaniards on this issue. Then I went up from there to NATO and met with Pat Bennett, Ambassador. I had known him before. I visited him when he was in Southeast Asia, together with Bill Macomber.

Q: Oh, on a trip?

HUGHES: A trip. But he was rather skeptical about the whole enterprise. Years later I told him that things had worked pretty well in any event. But the people on the staff there in NATO were also working away at it within NATO, because some of the partners were much more skeptical than we about the direction of events in Spain. I'm glad to say that American judgment - not just mine but the American judgment - turned out to be right regarding Suarez, Adolfo Suarez, and the initiative transition.

Q: When did Spain actually apply for NATO membership, or enter NATO? It was a little bit after you were on the desk, but the preparatory work was underway.

HUGHES: I was just there a year. It was underway. I also took advantage of being on the desk to go to Spain, to rent a car and drive around Spain for several days, in the south of Spain and traveling throughout Spain, going up to Barcelona for several days. It was exciting times in Spain, exciting times. This change was palpable.

Q: Spain was entering the world after a long period, re-entering.

HUGHES: Re-entering the world. Well, they had simply been put off from this by most of the world, and with some justification, although once we go back and say, "Well, did that help or hurt Spain? Did it really help broader policy issues?" maybe since they've been so successful in the transition, maybe those were academic issues without relevancy. The one thing in that context I should mention

- I think it's important - and that is the isolation that was imposed on Spain particularly by moderates and liberals had, I think, one very negative effect that I saw, and that was the depth of ignorance in the attitude throughout Spain. I had academics call me, I had think tank people call me, and they really knew nothing about Spain, knew nothing that was going on in Spain. They had basically written Spain off for so long and rejected it, intellectually and psychologically, they had no idea what was going on there. I exploited the possibility of a desk officer to go out there a couple times and to spend some time on the ground or travel around and talk to a lot of people, politicians who were becoming active. We had a great embassy at the time too, first-rate people.

Q: Who was the Ambassador?

HUGHES: Paul Stabler, first-rate guy - well, you worked with him, because he was a DAS [deputy assistant secretary] in European Affairs. It was a first-rate embassy, particularly one mid-grade officer who was just a fantastic contact and street man, an analyst still in the service. They really knew what was going on.

Q: You had mentioned several of the key Spanish figures, the king and so on. How about the depth of modern Spaniards being able to kind of reach out and take advantage of these new opportunities that were presented? Were there a lot of capable people that kind of came forward that were sort of buried before?

HUGHES: I'll tell you a story that will reveal just what was happening in Spain. One of the fellows who works with us on the seminar for Spain - I can't remember if he was in EUR or PM [Political-Military Affairs], but one of the guys on the project - his previous experience had been largely in Latin America. He went to Madrid for those few days. His comment was after day seven: "Spain is a country you can take seriously." His image of Spain, I guess, was the Franco years, a dictatorship in which people wore gaudy uniforms and big epaulets and were poor and kind of - I don't mean to criticize Guatemala, but maybe it's a state of development - as Guatemala or someplace like that, and he saw Madrid. We went outside of Madrid for little trips. Spain is a country you can take seriously - a lot of very, very capable people.

Q: And the opportunity to travel for the seminar and otherwise was important for you as the desk officer?

HUGHES: It was important to get a real sense. I went down south to Seville, Granada, north to Barcelona, to Dolago, and we had a consulate in Seville - I think it's still open, I'm not sure.

Q: I don't think so.

HUGHES: Had a good principal officer there and real live people. The Spanish, of course, wanted to meet with the Americans. All doors were open all across the

spectrum. I met in Barcelona Henry Peugeot, who is now the head of the regional government of Patagonia. It was great fun and fascinating, but it was also important because it really gave us some insights into what was happening and what people were thinking, which is much of what Foreign Service work is all about.

Q: Let me go back several years just for a second. We never talked about travel in connection with your work with Under Secretary Macomber. Did you travel with him quite a bit around the world? You mentioned one trip to Southeast Asia. Was that pretty much it with him?

HUGHES: That was pretty much it in those two years. He didn't do much traveling himself. He'd occasionally do a trip to go out and talk to people in the field about what was going on in Washington for himself. So I went with him on the one trip. We were gone about a week and a half, I believe. The proximate reason was the East Asian Chief of Mission Conference in Hong Kong. But we also went to Saigon and to Cambodia, went to Thailand and went to Tokyo.

Q: That was in the early '70s.

HUGHES: That was the Watergate week. I can still remember. In Hong Kong he said he had just talked to Washington. There was some crazy burglary or something had hit the paper and what it was all about.

Q: In a part of the building not too far from the Department. Okay, as you said, you only were the officer in charge of Spanish affairs for a year or so. You had been in Washington now a total of two years. What happened next?

HUGHES: Well, I got a call from David Anderson, who was the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department, and he said, "You've got to come up and let's talk about it." So he asked me if I were interested in becoming a director of the line, that is with S/S-S, the Secretariat. I guess S/S-S *per se* no longer exists, but the Secretariat does. I said, "Well, I'm having fun here. How do you see the job, and so forth?" and asked about it. There could be quite a bit of traveling. So I said, "Well, when do you need to know? I'd like to talk to Pat." He said, "Well, tomorrow would be okay." I went back downstairs. He called me up and said, "I need to know in about half an hour." Well, they had a personnel situation they needed to deal with, and they wanted to make a move and they wanted to make it fast.

Q: How long after that did you actually take over in this new position?

HUGHES: Well, I remember I went to see George Vest then, who was Assistant Secretary, and I said, "George, I know you've helped me here and so forth. I don't want to abandon you, but they offered this and I think it's a great opportunity." He said, "Sure, you've got to do it. When do they want you?" I said, "Monday." So I

did change on Monday.

Q: And this conversation was when, Thursday or something?

HUGHES: I think it was on Thursday.

Q: Why don't you say a little bit about what the secretariat does and if there were any highlights of that period. I think this has probably been discussed by various people in this program.

HUGHES: Well, just quickly, on the seventh floor there's the Executive Secretary of the State Department, who was the main coordinator for all the seventh floor activities for the rest of the Department. As a part of his staff and support, there are the archives for the seventh floor, and then there are the executive offices, which is the administrative support for the seventh floor, and then there's the Secretary's staff, which is a common staff for the principal officers of the State Department and the office which tasks, coordinates and delivers papers from the rest of the building up to the principals of the State Department, except some things that go outside the system because of sensitivity questions and so forth. So another responsibility is to prepare overseas checks, to advance [plan] the trips, to travel with the Secretary on the trips to staff and make sure the papers arrive and the papers were prepared correctly, formatted and even edited correctly, and so forth, and providing other general support as necessary. So there's a domestic role and then the role that carries on the times when the Secretary does travel. I cut five jobs when I was there. I think we went from 28 to 23 [persons] while I was there, and then my successor added eight and it went back up to 31. Part of it's the personality of the Secretary. What are the demands of the Secretary and the people around him? How do they see the staff serving him or her best? Cyrus Vance was a gentleman. He wanted quality work, but he wasn't a shouter or a screamer or someone who made demands that were terribly unreasonable. Maybe there were other Secretaries who have, but in any event we felt quite comfortable that we could meet the obligations, requirements, support him and the others correctly with the staff of 23.

Q: Did you travel with the Secretary on occasion yourself, or did your 22 other people do quite a bit of that?

HUGHES: Well, I did. I thought it was important for the Director to make sure that everyone on the staff had options to travel, because the travel was seen as a real bonus or the best part of the job.

Q: Plus good ongoing assignments afterwards.

HUGHES: Plus good ongoing assignments. So it was important to make sure that their morale was maintained, both the officers and the support staff, by being assigned a fair amount of trips. But there were so many, there were enough that I

would assign myself an occasion trip. Also, it was a kind of oversight activity, to see how it was being done, if the people were really doing it, and then on those trips I would talk to.... The Deputy Executive Secretary usually went along to talk about how things could be improved, to talk fairly rarely with the Secretary about his degree of satisfaction. And also, it was kind of fun myself to get out of Washington and to travel.

Q: Now you were working primarily for Secretary Vance and Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher. Were you there at the end when Vance resigned and Muskie came.

HUGHES: Yes.

Q: That must have been a difficult period.

HUGHES: Well, it was. As far as the secretariat - of course, he didn't travel, I don't recall that he traveled in those few months.

Q: Muskie?
HUGHES: Yes.

Q: Well, I know he went to Turkey for the NATO meeting in June of 1980.

HUGHES: If anything, it was more domestic support. He was very well versed in much of the work of the Department because of his role in the Senate. There were normal transition papers prepared and so forth. But I found it extremely interesting because of three main areas of work there. One is, of course, the mechanics of support, but another was the substantive aspect of it, because any staff doing their job correctly is also reviewing the material coming up. Some people would like to accuse staffs of reviewing only about formats and due dates, but what's in the papers? Did it all hang together? Is there a logical progression? Does the Secretary have the information he needs? If a recommendation is made, is there enough support there to justify that recommendation with the alternatives. So those things played in. And while I had spent, outside of Venezuela, most of my time in Europe, the job in the secretariat really exposed me in quite important ways to the important issues of the rest of the world. So that was beneficial. And the other side was just human relationships and watching the interrelationships among people, and that's where I met Arnie Raybolds.

Q: Well, several interesting things, important things, were going on in the period that you were there. I think Camp David was one, and the take-over of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

HUGHES: Well, it had run up to that. I think a lot had been written about it and there will be more written about it, but the thing that sticks in my mind the most was the confusion within the U.S. government and the different views within the

U.S. government, the lack of good coordination in the U.S. government about what needed to be done. There were contending views running around doing things without any coordination at the top.
Q: With regard to the Shah?

HUGHES: With regard to the Shah, and a lot of personal agendas being pursued. There was not a firm grip or any kind of structured discussion with a conclusion about what needed to be done. And going back before the takeover, and, just as [was] said, I think that's one reason that the NSC system with the Principals Committee and the Deputies Committee was really a valuable addition later on.

Q: Because in this period, Brzezinski was National Security Advisor, there wasn't much of a system for coordinating?

HUGHES: There was a kind of a system, but it wasn't structured as well and there were the tensions between NSC, the National Security Advisor, and the Secretary of State. It was hard to read the President, and from my own observation about what the President was doing, I quite honestly felt that he was not being served well at the White House, and I'll give you a very specific example. The secretariat was also the interface with the NSC, so the papers that we would send over to the National Security Advisor for the President would come through us, and the responses would come back. I saw papers every day with no comment from the President to the Secretary of State or to Brzezinski and so forth. On maybe the majority of those papers, I thought, first of all, that piece of paper should never have gone to the President. It was way below his pay grade. There is no reason to burden the President with this stuff. And then I thought, well, why does the President continue to read this stuff and accept that he is the one who is going to decide on it.

Q: And make comments.

HUGHES: And make comments, you know, "It's big," "Sigh," whatever. But over that period of time with so much of it, I just shook my head and said, "What is happening over there?" Now, I think that President Carter, whom I respect enormously as a person, I think part of it was that was the way he worked. He has acknowledged himself that he got himself immersed oftentimes in all kinds of trivia and minutia, which did not serve him or his presidency or the country as well as it could have. When I think about it, you can tell I'm still struck by it.

Q: Yes, that's certainly an observation you're not unique in making. As you say, President Carter has certainly acknowledged that. I guess one can try to understand whether it was a matter of his style, personality or staff or feeling that he was kind of coming into Washington and wanted to do things his way and wasn't going to become a captive within the Beltway.

HUGHES: There's a story about another that George Vest tells in a kind of quasi-

public forum about when he was the spokesman of the Department for Henry Kissinger. George went in and asked the Secretary to approve the list of traveling press who could go on the plane with him on trips. Kissinger interrupted and said, "No, why should I have to decide this? You're the spokesman. You deal with the press. Why do you burden me? I've got to decide everything." George said, "Okay, I'll take care of this, Mr. Secretary," and started to leave, and then the Secretary called him up, "Well, George, maybe I'd better look at that."

Q: I don't want so-and-so to go.

HUGHES: But assuming good faith, there is an internal ambivalence sometimes in this kind of a question.

Q: I was way down in the Department in those days, but remember preparing evening reading notes and sometimes seeing comments that came back and sort of wondered about if that was the best way for the President of the United States to be spending his time before he went to sleep. Well, there are probably a lot of good stories we could tell about this period. Is there anything else that you want to say generally about this time as Director of Secretariat?

HUGHES: Well, just one thing: that it was very easy - that's probably not right - but that job also put one in a position to reach certain conclusions about the quality of various bureaus. And I don't mean not only in format and timeliness but actually the content. I remember in one case before a Summit meeting to a part of the world, the Bureau delivered the briefing books to us, and I started reading them before I sent them on ahead, and they were awful. So I called up people in the Bureau and I said, "Let me come down there." Well, I went down there and I met with the Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary had not bothered to look at those books himself. I thought here's something going to the Secretary, going over to the White House - and we all knew that the NSC staff also prepared books for the President - but this is stuff that was going to the Secretary. There were no parallel papers, a few maybe counsel or something, but the Assistant Secretary had not arranged his own time to read so that he could be sure that his Bureau and he himself gave the best possible work he possibly could to his Secretary. Now, knowing that Assistant Secretary, he probably figured he was going to be on the plane and he would sit and tell the Secretary what he needed to know. But to my way of thinking, that was the only direct experience I had that way, but I thought that revealed a certain lack of seriousness about how do you - because we knew also that Secretary Vance did, in fact, work through that stuff.

Q: And you're talking about more than typos?

HUGHES: The substance.

Q: Okay, so this was the culmination of your - you've had all sorts of staff activities in the Department. By then - and this is 1980 - you had seen the

Department of State.
HUGHES: And it was clear it was time to go overseas.

Q: And it was time to go overseas. You had been back for how long, four years or so?

HUGHES: Four years.

Q: Where did you go then?

HUGHES: Went to Denmark.

Q: As?

HUGHES: As DCM.

Q: Deputy Chief of Mission, and this was 1980. Who was the Ambassador then?

HUGHES: Warren Manchione.

Q: He was a Carter appointee?

HUGHES: He was a Carter appointee. His connection was Senator Frank Church.

Q: Senator Frank Church. He was not from Idaho?

HUGHES: No, he was from New York City, and he was also a co-founder of *Foreign Policy* magazine, a periodical, along with what's his name from Harvard - Classic Civilization.

Q: Sam Huntington.
HUGHES: Sam Huntington.

Q: And he probably didn't stay very long? You say he got the message that he had to leave in two or three weeks, and you called back.

HUGHES: He got a very terse message.

Q: At the beginning of the Reagan Administration.

HUGHES: I had told him what was going to happen, and I told him what the routine was, what the drill was, but when the message came, it was even more terse than I had thought it would be and also the time period even shorter than I thought. I had been in the EUR front office during the last transition. I remember personally changing and editing a message that went out to Bill Macomber in Turkey, knowing of his antecedence, his feeling about the service and so forth and

his long service in the Department for the country. Even then, though, I heard that he was very unhappy when he got the message, but I thought I had actually made it very nice.

Q: Probably better than it was originally.

HUGHES: But just a word about Juan Manshow. He was a serious guy, worked hard, was a good representative of the United States, but he made one mistake from which he never fully recovered from Washington's point of view, and that was after the NATO decision on modernization of intermediate nuclear forces. The Danish Prime Minister, Awker Yurensen, expressed some very serious reservations, and Manshow in discussion with him implied that maybe there were some compromises that could be made. Of course, Washington answered that they were wrong signals then to Awker Yurensen. So Manshow never fully recovered in Washington from that, although, as I said, he was a serious man, he was a hard-working man.

Q: Was he in Denmark during most of the Carter years?

HUGHES: Yes.

Q: Had you met him? Did he interview you before you became his DCM?

HUGHES: No. My intermediary, the person who asked me was Peter Tile, who was Executive Secretary of the Department then and had known Juan Manshow earlier. I don't remember the exact connection, where it came from. He was from New York City, of course, also. Might have been - well, I don't know, so I won't speculate. But Peter called me one day and said, "I'm looking for a DCM, and Manshow is skeptical about all the people that the system was proposing, and you're friends," and asked me for a recommendation and said, "How would you like to go do it?" So I did. I should say something here too which I considered a great big deal and disappointment and that is I found when I got there that Manshow was not being well served by the career staff of the mission for one reason or another, and it might have been a self protection and a reaction when he first got there. The basic attitude was obsequiousness, and nobody was giving him the hard advice that was necessary. I mentioned an example earlier on when they were reporting his dinner parties, and not substantive conversations that might have occurred at his dinner parties about issues of interest or importance, but like table decorations. It was just awful. At the first dinner party after I got there, the normal person without any instruction cranked out a message that came up to me as DCM. I took it in to him and I suggested that this is not what Washington is really interested in.

Q: Doesn't help them understand Denmark?

HUGHES: He understood immediately. But that's the first time I thought I was earning my pay as a DCM.

Q: The staff was doing their job professionally but not really serving him and giving him good advice?

HUGHES: Again, when he got there, he was rather skittish - new system, new life for him. Wasn't sure in whom he could place confidence. He had rejected proposals for DCMs from the Department and taken an individual and put him back in DCM who was not well suited. He was a good professional in his particular specialty, very good.

Q: This was before you were there?

HUGHES: But he personally wasn't particularly suited to be a DCM. It was clear that the [message] from Washington was misplaced to some extent, because he simply wasn't getting good advice from the people who should have been giving him good advice. The main issues were two: IMF [International Monetary Fund] modernization and U.S. access to the Common Market, fighting all the common agriculture policy in particular, the old perennial tax.

Q: Not so much a bilateral issue between the U.S. and Denmark but Denmark as a member by then of the European Community, and trying to get them to take into account our views and our interests.

HUGHES: Also a lot of public affairs, trying to gain broader Danish understanding of American defense policy, national security policy. Actually we and the Danes were not much at odds on the common agriculture policy [CAP], because Danish agricultural interests and ours were to a large extent parallel. The CAP was basically a policy that would help the least efficient producers, whereas the Danes were among the most efficient producers. They were making contributions into the CAP.

Q: And not getting very much out of it.
HUGHES: No. They had a net outflow of resources because of the CAP. But there was a lot of public work with just a lot of anti-skepticism. Of course, President Reagan came in and the majority political attitude in Denmark was very negative regarding President Reagan.

Q: In which way?

HUGHES: Regarding his national security approaches, his cold, hard line, so there was a lot of work to do with respect not only in public affairs, media, editors, but a lot of work with respect to the political institutions and the government, which was labor.

Q: Whom did President Reagan send as ambassador?

HUGHES: Well, we had six months between ambassadors, and then he nominated John Loeb, who came out in September.

Q: Of '81. He kept you on?

HUGHES: I stayed my full three years.

Q: Was that an issue, that you were seen as the DCM for the predecessor?

HUGHES: No, he was quite content. In fact, he called me sort of after he was nominated and said he would like me to stay on. I said, "Thank you for asking."

Q: His background was in business, I guess.

HUGHES: Yes, his family was brokerage investment bankers. There used to be two Lobe brokers, two different Lobe families actually. His grandfather was born in Frankfurt and immigrated here through Saint Louis. I think it was [an American metal firm] that he worked for, a very, very capable guy, and that owned the company or most of it.

Q: Was it hard for you, having worked for Manshow and then being chargé for six months, to kind of get in step with him from the beginning, or did that work pretty smoothly?

HUGHES: Oh, I think that worked pretty smoothly. I was under no illusions what my function in life was supposed to be. It was fun being DCM, fun being chargé, but I'd been overseas in embassies before and, as I said, I was under no illusions who was ambassador.

Q: The priority areas pretty much continued, the two that you mentioned?

HUGHES: INF and BC.

Q: Access.

HUGHES: There was probably more emphasis on the whole defense policies, INF modernization, NATO, security issues because of the- (end of tape)

Q: I think we've been particularly talking about the latter part of that period during the Reagan Administration and its more robust defense policy, as you said. Things were happening in Poland and certainly in the Soviet Union not far from Denmark. To what extent did the embassy in Copenhagen get involved either in travel or observing what was going in your near neighborhood?

HUGHES: Well, not so much there, but the Danes were very nervous, because their perspective or their perception on a majority basis was that the

Administration was being overly confrontational and that war was going to end up being blown up. They saw what was happening in Poland too and believed that that would add to a situation getting out of control and being even a greater likelihood of conflict. They, I think, to a certain extent were relieved - I was relieved - when the Polish army carried out the coup against the Polish government, the Polish Communist Party, because it diffused the issue. It was unclear at the time. I remember talking with Danny Sawyer in Washington about what the prospect was for amelioration of human rights and political systems in Poland as a result of that. It was really unclear. One thing that I found interesting in the Danish context, so it's analytically inconsistent but very understandable in psychological and human terms: on the one hand the Danes were loud in protesting the lack of human rights and due process and democracy in some parts of the world. We were being criticized all the time for Central American policy - and rightfully so in many cases - and at the same time they were afraid of any attempts to liberalize, in Poland afraid that that would blow things up. So I used to talk with my Danish friends about this contradiction, which I said analytically was one thing, psychologically it's another.

One thing that interestingly enough was a big assist to us in this whole situation was Soviet submarine penetration into the Stockholm archipelago, and when the news of this hit the Swedish and international press, the Danes seemed to adjust their thinking and reassess somewhat what was going on. Who was the provocateur? What was going on? Who was being confrontational? What possible benefit was it to the Soviet Union or use to the Soviet Union? Was it to provoke Sweden? I think that there was a greater understanding that the situation was more complex and more complicated than many Danish observers or politicians or citizens liked to believe. Now, there were many Danes who were from our perspective very clear minded about the situation as well. But there was a need for an awful lot of work in public affairs and editors, politicians. I made some very good Danish friends and have wonderful memories of many of our discussions, in some of which I ended up disagreeing on politics but not in human terms and many we agreed on a basic outline.

Q: They were afraid in the case of Poland that the Soviets would intervene there.

HUGHES: They were afraid of intervention and then fighting, and then what do you do? Look what happened in September 1939. What about refugee flow? Would they be trying a pursuit? And, of course, as a Danish island right off of Poland, would there be refugees coming, and then what would the rules of engagement be by the Danish Coast Guard in case there was pursuit by the Polish or Soviet vessels and aircraft? These all were real questions or potentially real questions, and they were worked through. And then, what about NATO as an institution? There was a NATO command of the Baltic forces in Denmark.

Q: With U.S. personnel stationed there?

HUGHES: Well, in the headquarters, but there were no troops there, no foreign troops in Denmark in peacetime. Exercises, yes, and some staff. The commander of combat practice was first rate, first rate.

Q: Danish?

HUGHES: Danish two-star general, first-rate general, first-rate guy.

Q: Okay, what else should we say about your time in Denmark? Great country.

HUGHES: Yes, in human terms it was great. There was a tradition of celebrating the Fourth of July over in Jutland - Danish Americans, Americans, Danes, a day in the countryside, a celebration. The first year I was there I was chargé d'affaires.
Q: Did a visitor from the United States usually come for that?

HUGHES: That year it was Pat and Shirley Boone, who turned out to be really a very decent guy and a guy who got in the spirit of things and would do what was right under the circumstances, ask for advice from the Danish hosts. It was funny, his image. I remember when I was growing up, I enjoyed some of his popular songs, but never thought much about that. His image was kind of a goody two-shoes, but one of the things you do in Denmark is drink Schnapps Atravete among other things. At the celebration you would eat herring, marinated herring, and drink Atravete, and you sing the Schnapps song. And here's Pat Boone sitting and eating herring, drinking Schnapps, chasing it with beer, singing the Schnapps song. So it goes, "The hell with your juice and teas. Schnapps is the drink for me." And then the next year we had, from the New York City Opera...

Q: Joan Sutherland.

HUGHES: No, a soprano. Maybe her name will come back to me. She also, of course, was quite good. She didn't prepare her remarks very assiduously unfortunately. And the third year we had Vice President George Bush. That was the first opportunity I had to meet him and to meet Mrs. Bush, a wonderful person, so gracious. I remember NSC staff was with the Vice President, and Rick Burry, our Assistant Secretary. So Rick brought it to me and said, "Here's the speech that's been written for the Vice President. Read it and tell me what you think." So I read the speech and I said to Rick, "You know, there are two things here. One thing, it's too defensive in tone, I think. I know as well as you that the problems with respect to Danes and this part of the world we are too defensive. You don't want to put the Vice President of the United States in a defensive tone or defensive posture." And then I said, "And there's another part that I really wonder if it's relevant for here. You're talking about southern flank or something" - I don't remember what it was - "and this is Denmark. Are you sure he doesn't want to talk to [the person in charge]?" But I really wanted to say it was too detailed. It was kind of like the reaction would be "huh?" Well, Rick hadn't told me beforehand, but he had written the speech. So he said, "Well, okay, let's go

down and talk to the Vice President." So we went down, and Rick said, "Mr. Vice President, here's the DCM you met before. He's got some comments about this draft." And so I told him, and he said, "Yes, I see your point on this. It is a little defensive. I shouldn't be taking that tone. Would you rewrite that part?" But he said, "On this other point I want to make the point." I said, "Well, Mr. Vice President..." He said, "No, thank you. I want to make the point. I'm going to make the point." I said, "Okay, fine." So then I took the speech back and just rewrote a little bit and did some editing. That was the first time I ever met with...

Q: So he made the second point even though you weren't sure...

HUGHES: Well, I take it back. I met him once when he was Ambassador to the U.N. and did come down to say hello to Bill Macomber, and I was in the office and we chatted for a few minutes. Well, I should in all fairness say a little something about the Ambassador. He did not have a successful tour. He wasn't well prepared for it. He tended to see his role as a kind of a spokesman, a kind of a presenter. But he didn't prepare himself either before or as he went along adequately to be able to explain policies or articulate policies. He was not a great reader. We would read them orally, I and all the other people in the embassy would read them orally; but, for example, he really found it difficult even to read the President's speeches, which would at least have given him or brought out the things we're talking about. His personal life was very controversial too. He had a number of relationships that became a bit notorious in the Danish press. The Danes are very open-minded, but they're also monogamous. So he had a difficult time. It was not successful.

Q: Was he still there when you left in '83?

HUGHES: I was being transferred to become DCM in The Hague with another officer. But we had the Vice President coming, and both the Ambassador and Washington thought it would be useful if I were there during that visit, so I took early home leave, came back to the States, and then went back for the Vice President's trip.

Q: Which was around the Fourth of July?

HUGHES: Yes. And then shortly thereafter, a Sunday morning, my wife and I threw our luggage in the car and drove to The Hague. That's a very civilized way to have a transfer. I recommend it highly.

Q: That sounds like a good way. It probably only took, what, seven or eight hours?

HUGHES: Well, one day.

Q: One day to drive.

HUGHES: Easy day, easy one-day drive.

Q: You took a ferry?

HUGHES: Yes.

Q: So, you were DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission, in The Hague, and who was the Ambassador then? This is in '83.

HUGHES: Jerry Bremer, whom I had worked with twice before actually. We were in the Ops Center together. He had just come back from Africa, and I had just come back from Venezuela. It had been toward the end of my time. Well, I guess it was the last year. In the Secretariat, he was one of the Deputy Executive Secretaries. He had been DCM in The Netherlands, DCM in Norway, and he had found it harder to come back and be one of the Deputy Executive Secretaries. Jerry had been a special assistant to Henry Kissinger early on, so he knew the seventh floor very well. And he was being named Ambassador in '83 to The Netherlands. Actually he had a mutual friend call me and ask me if I would be interested.

Q: So he was already there when you arrived?

HUGHES: No, I arrived first.

Q: You got there before he did.

HUGHES: I arrived first. In fact, we worked it out with the Ambassador and the DCM there if they minded if I would come down on the QT [quiet] a little bit, come down to The Hague and work with the DCM a little bit.

Q: This was what, in the spring?

HUGHES: No, this was in July. But the Ambassador, the sitting Ambassador, didn't want to leave for a little while. And they said, "Well, okay, come on down. Be cool and...

Q: And so your predecessor was still there?

HUGHES: So I overlapped for about a week, I guess.

Q: And then that person left?

HUGHES: Then he left, the Ambassador left, and then Jerry came in.

Q: And you were the chargé for a couple days?

HUGHES: A couple days was all. Well, Jerry and I were still very close personal friends. We knew each other very well. We had a great staff. He'd pick people very carefully, not only the front office folks but elsewhere in the mission. But he was so young and looked so young that he presented copies of his credentials straight away as soon as he'd go to work. The first event - I think it was a Brazilian national day - so we went up together, and we went in, people said hello. Jerry's the type, he would not come in and say, "I'm the American Ambassador." He'd just say, "Jerry Bremer. Hello." I kind of circled back around him, and I said to the Brazilian, whom I had not met before either. I had only been in the country then about ten days or so. I introduced myself as the Deputy and said, "You know, my Ambassador is so happy he was able to get copies of his credentials so we were able to come to your National Day." And the Brazilian's jaw dropped. He said, "The American Ambassador is here?" "Yes, we just came through the line." It was kind of funny.

Q: How many times has there been a career Foreign Service officer serving as chief of mission to The Netherlands? Probably not all that often.

HUGHES: Not very many times. Also, Denmark was seen as a place where you can send a non-career person. They like to go to those places, and some very good people have gone, non-career people too. Well, actually Jerry's predecessor was a career person.

Q: He was also a career person? Who was that?

HUGHES: He'd been spokesman for the Department.

Q: And Bob McCloskey was there too at one point.

HUGHES: Early on. Well, the main issues there were really the same - the national security policy, NATO, INF modernization, and US-EC relations, U.S. access to EC [European Community] market.

Q: And like Denmark, the bilateral relationship was healthy and noncontentious, noncontroversial.

HUGHES: On the economic side, Dutch and American economic interests were very much in parallel. I think one of the interesting things there was: I oftentimes went down to see the Dutch and inform them of what the EC Commission was doing which the EC Commission had not informed the member states about. Again, the Dutch were very efficient agriculture producers and also a very important role as economic entrepot to the rest of the EC. They wanted it; they lived on trade. They could compete very well with nonproduction. Also, the Dutch were very interesting in a couple of ways. They saw themselves as the leader of the smaller states in the EC. They are serious people and extremely

capable and competent people. I think that probably Prime Minister Lubbers is the smartest person I've ever met in my life - I've met President Clinton, by the way - and also a very decent man. Hans Vondenbrook, who was the Foreign Minister, was also extremely capable, and other people in the government. And the Dutch will speak out. So, on the economic side it was interesting, it was fun. You were usually on the same philosophical lines, although their membership in the EC had to take them in different directions on occasion. On defense policy it was the Dutch who had made a formal reserve on INF modernization in NATO. So our main objective was to get the Dutch reserve lifted, and that took the majority of Jerry Bremer's time. Managing the mission was obviously also very important. First, we had very good people.

Q: The only thing about The Netherlands is that The Hague is the capital, I guess an important city, but Amsterdam, Rotterdam, certainly in terms of business and cultural life, were far more important and not very far away.

HUGHES: Of course, The Netherlands is probably the most densely populated country in the world, about 15,000,000 people, and all three of those major cities - of course, the capital is in Amsterdam, the government is The Hague, and Rotterdam at that point was the biggest port in the world. But because the country is so compact, it really lent itself to a lot of travel, which I enjoyed very much. Picking up on some things I did down in Venezuela, we'd go off and arrange a little trip overnight, maybe a loop somewhere, a couple of towns or cities, and try to hit university, editors, labor leaders, local politicians, city officials, business leaders; have lunch or dinner with a small group, and talk to them about what American policy was about, what we were trying to do, ask for their views. It was just really fun and interesting, and that's the fun work. Remember the line from *Animal House*: "road trip"? Well, this became kind of a joke. I was working in the embassy and I'd be managing the mission and all kinds of stuff. "Time for a road trip. Let's go off and have some fun, have some good traditional Foreign Service fun, do some field work."

Q: In a country the size of The Netherlands, you could also take a road trip and come back and not even spend the night.

HUGHES: That's right. Well, in that regard, one of the most marvelous experiences that I had - and I think Jerry also would say he had and others in the embassy - was the 45th anniversary of the liberation. Of course, it was preceded by the 45th anniversary of Market Garden [military operation in World War II] too far. Jerry decided that we would refuse no invitation to participate in any event connected with those celebrations, so he and I divided up most of them and also asked other people from the embassy to participate so that the officialdom in the United States was represented in everything that happened that we were aware of or invited to. It wasn't about us, of course, but it was about the veterans and the people. How many conversations we witnessed or we heard about people, airmen, Allied airmen, dropping food in the western Netherlands which the Germans had

sealed off, dropping food, and the people on the ground talking about how they were there. They remembered one at the racetrack north of The Hague which they used as a dropping zone, but people kept swarming out as the planes would come in, and they couldn't drop the stuff, and they would go back around and then they'd say, "Try to get people off the infield of the racetrack." Or during Market Garden, the Allied troops had been dropped by gliders, and they had these little boats, and they came across the river and were trying to attack a German position and stand there where there was a monument and where the German position was. In daylight these guys came across this river in little boats, and some of them made it, but, of course, it was a total disaster.

Q: And, of course, many of the veterans were able to be there for these various events.

HUGHES: And many of them, of course, were on in years and understood that maybe they were not going to make it to the 50th so they'd better come now. And then on the major issue then, the INF modernization, the Dutch government was able to work out a way to do that in spite of a lot of local opposition. On one Saturday morning, we had over a million Dutchmen march by demonstrating in front of the embassy. The only damage was a cracked windowpane on a basement window along the sidewalk.

Q: So they were not destructive; they just wanted to be heard and seen.

HUGHES: They wanted to be heard. But one of the fascinating things about it: we kept trying to work this issue, work this issue, work this issue, and the way Prime Minister Lubbers and his government did it was in a way that none of us had imagined that he would be able to do it. He was able to finesse it in the parliament and get the votes that he needed. I remember we all felt a sense of accomplishment and elation when it finally happened, and Jerry said to me, "Okay, how do we make sure it can't be reversed?" And half jokingly I said, "Go out to Voonsdreck and cut down trees." Voonsdreck was where the INF base was to be, the grounds cruise missile was to be. Only The Netherlands and Germany were to be the deployment places, and we knew if the Dutch would not deploy, then the Germans would not deploy. They would not be the only one. So I said half jokingly, "Go out to Voonsdreck and cut down the trees," half jokingly, because in The Netherlands cutting down a tree is a very serious issue. In fact, you need a permit to cut down a tree in most places. But that would show determination, that would show that the process had already begun in real terms.

Q: Right, and couldn't be reversed.

HUGHES: Couldn't be reversed.

Q: It was properly authorized.

HUGHES: But again here this was a case where the policy was criticized in many quarters around the world and in the United States as being overly confrontational. It did have the right result, and that was the Russians, the Soviets, decided that they did not want to get in a race. It was a losing proposition, so they withdrew the FF20s [Soviet missiles] and the ground launched cruise missiles were not deployed and the FF20s were dropped. I think there Roz Ridgway, as Assistant Secretary in EUR, and Paul Mitsa deserve the lion's share of the praise - the way that they worked that issue, the intelligence that they put into it, insights, persistence, just absolutely incredible. I hope someday that the full story and credit to those two people is publicly given.

Q: It's also an area where diplomatic representatives, but Defense Department representatives as well, everybody worked together, and Ambassador Bremer and others in Europe also should get some credit too.
HUGHES: Oh, absolutely. I think that their management of the overall issue of security relations within NATO and security issues with the Soviet Union was awfully important, because the image that President Reagan had at that time in so much of Europe was almost insuperably negative, almost insuperably negative, and even hostile and Paul Mitsa came to Europe very frequently, came to The Netherlands very frequently to meet with small groups. I can remember I hosted a lunch one day. I jammed as many people as I could in the dining room, very, very senior Dutch politicians and government officials and editors. His credibility was just overwhelming, and the same way with Roz Ridgway and, of course, Dale Ruthers, too. But those were the main ones as far as it played out in The Netherlands.

Q: Was Jerry Bremer there the three years? You were there together?

HUGHES: Yes, we were there the whole time. In fact, I left just a little bit earlier than he did. He went back. Secretary Schultz asked him to be the anti-terrorism coordinator.

Q: In '86?

HUGHES: In '86. He went there, and I went to Israel.

Q: That was a new area of the world for you, it looks to me. You had spent a lot of time in Europe and Venezuela, but the Middle East was new area, new terrain.

HUGHES: That's true.

Q: Who was Ambassador there at the time?

HUGHES: Tom Pickering was Ambassador, and Arnie Raphel was the principal deputy in NEA [Bureau of Near East Affairs]. This was basically an idea that Arnie had. I said that I had met him earlier on when I worked on the seventh

floor. I had actually met him earlier but got to know him only then. It was something that Arnie basically engineered. I had met Tom Pickering before, didn't know him very well. He was a Deputy in PM when I worked for Bill Macomber, and we'd come into contact on various things, not very intensely or profoundly. Well, you're right, that just changed the whole direction of my career. I was blessed with having a couple of options. I had always wanted to go back to the Germanic world, and I was asked to go to be DCM in Vienna, which was very attractive in some ways, particularly since the East-West conflict was still on. Vienna had some real significance in that area, not in the bilateral sense, but to go to Europe on one of the major political issues of our time and to work for someone of the stature of Tom Pickering was just too much to even hope for, too great an opportunity to pass up.

Q: The DCM in Vienna really wouldn't have been all that different from being in Copenhagen and The Hague - the size of the embassy and some of the same issues.

HUGHES: Not at all.

Q: It wasn't an opportunity to get into something new and challenging.

HUGHES: That's right.

Q: So, this was 1986. What was the situation? This was a little bit after the Lebanon period, but it was before the peace process got underway, before Madrid certainly.

HUGHES: The peace process had been in the doldrums. There was a national unity government in Israel. I arrived there in August of '86, and this was toward the end of the first half of the national unity government. The agreement had been reached in '84 between Likud and Maraf, labor, to form a national unity government, the first two years under the prime ministership of Shimon Perez and the second two years under Yitzhak Shamir. I arrived in August of '86, and in November '86 the national unity government transition took place.

Q: So Shamir became the Prime Minister?

HUGHES: Shamir became the Prime Minister. But the political process in Israel was pretty much frozen as part of the peace process. The major issue really domestically in Israel up through a little bit earlier that summer was the economy and hyperinflation almost, and new policies which brought inflation into control. There had been daily devaluations of the Israel economy, and they went to the shekel, of course. But the peace process was basically frozen. There was a lot of thinking going on about it, and a little bit of probing behind the scenes and so forth, but nothing was happening. I can remember in August two things specifically in my first days - well, three things. First of all, Tom Pickering and

Alice Pickering came out to the airport to meet Pat and me personally, which I thought was a wonderful thing for them to do. And then Tom said, "Well, I've got to go to Jerusalem," so he had another car take him, so in his car Alice took Pat and me to our temporary quarters, which was a wonderful gesture, wonderful way to be welcomed to a post. It was not only a human thing, but I also think it was a very nice signal to the rest of the staff that Tom Pickering said, "This is my guy."

Q: "And I think enough of him and his position to make this gesture," and all the others saw that.

HUGHES: Let me digress right here. Something happened in Venezuela that was very important. The ambassador, who was Maurice Sprandow, a career guy, a wonderful guy - we were on the Maracaibo. There was a lot of contempt, I'm sorry to say, for Maracaibo and Puerto La Cruz in the Embassy in Caracas.

Q: Contempt of the American consulate in those two places.
HUGHES: Yes, well, these are kind of second rate places, and probably the people that are assigned there weren't good enough to get assigned to embassies. I'm sorry to say that. I still feel this, you know, 25 years later or whatever it is. So I would go to Caracas occasionally with the bag, with the pouch, of course. We rotated. And I would have a hard time getting anyone to talk to me. I would go to the front office in the embassy. I'd go see the DCM. We'd talk about what was going on and I'd buy Western staples at the commissary. And I always tried to make sure I saw the Ambassador personally. Well, if the Ambassador was there at all, he would say, "Art, have you got time for a cup of coffee?" And I'd say, "Yes, Sir," and we would go down to the cafeteria of the Embassy, Ambassador Birnbaum and Vice Consul Hughes or Vice Consul the other guy, and sitting there with the Ambassador having a cup of coffee, and I thought that was tremendous, that was tremendous. Anyway, I digressed a little bit, but the second thing Tom said, "I'm going on home leave in three weeks. Learn fast." And the third thing, he said, "Anytime I go up to Jerusalem up the hill, I want you to go with me so I can introduce you to all these people I'm dealing with." So we did, and Tom had a habit which, I must say, drove some people in the embassy crazy, because sometimes it left them little work to do. When he'd go to Jerusalem, he'd see everybody from the Prime Minister, the Second Deputy Assistant, U.S. Desk Officer in the Foreign Ministry, and take care of all the business.

Q: In very capable fashion.

HUGHES: Well, with his intelligence, his energy, his imagination, his creativity - all of that, you know. But that was one of the issues that I found I had to deal with. Then what are the roles of all the other guys? And to try to insure that the others understood that this was not a vote against them, that there was real work to be done, that there was plenty of serious work for everyone, but how to deal with that.

Q: At least he wasn't secretive.
HUGHES: On, no, not at all.

Q: He was very open that he was doing these things, because that's a problem sometimes, when you don't know what the front office, what the Ambassador is doing.

HUGHES: Well, he had another great habit that I learned from him, and I carried it on when I became Chief of Mission later on, and that was he would do cables, and he would say, "Art, read them through, and if they make sense, go ahead and send them. If you need to fix a few things, fine. If there's anything really consequential, let's talk about it." But he never sent anything out without saying somebody else ought to get it. And I did the same thing later on when I was a DAS at Defense, Chief of Mission and a DAS at State. I'd say to somebody else, "Take a look at this. This is what I've done."

Q: Look at it seriously. Don't just...

HUGHES: What Tom Pickering was doing was not pridefulness or anything. It was, "Hey, these are opportunities. I can get some stuff done." But anyway that became something that I had to deal with as a DCM and make sure that the rest of the mission also understood that. So we went up and we called on then Foreign Minister before the rotation, and Shamir. And I can remember getting a little bit of business. The RP was just arriving and the Deputy and I'll be gone. I hope you'll treat him as you treat me in my absence. We got into an argument about whether or not Israel would ever go to a peace conference. For Shamir it was a matter of Likud policy never to go to a conference, because they would be overwhelmed, they would be outmaneuvered, they would be outnumbered - all kinds of reasons they did not want to go to conferences. I said, "You're going to need to go. It's the only way things are going to work." "Well, I don't know." We went back and forth. Tom was about a foot and a half taller than Shamir. They were sitting there, Tom and Shamir sitting on the edge of the chair in the Foreign Minister's office. The first meeting I went with Tom and Dick Murphy, representative in Israel for the peace process. That was the result of Secretary Schultz's urgings to Murphy to somehow try to do something more with the peace process. They had walked [and] went down to Tel Aviv. So we went up to see Prime Minister Shimon Perez, who had just been over to Cairo to see Mubarak, President of Egypt. So Tom was leaving the next morning for home, so we went up there, and the Prime Minister was feeling very good. He was very responsive and, of course, one of his objects in life was to try to figure out how to break the national unity government to go to elections before the transition when he would go back to being Foreign Minister. He was trying to figure out ways to use these meetings with Mubarak and what the Egyptians had said to break the NUG, the National Unity Government. That was his objective. So he started talking about these meetings. I don't know if you've ever met Shimon Perez, but he's very loquacious, very articulate.

Q: I've read his book.

HUGHES: Very smart. Goes off to all kinds of literary illusions and refers to people and so forth. I'm a notetaker, right. I've been in the country about three weeks. I've done a lot of reading and studying, but there were some personalities I didn't know, and he would name somebody and sometimes he'd use their first name and sometimes their last name. I wasn't sure if he was talking about one person or two people. So the next morning Tom said, "Okay, write this up. Wat Cluverius will help you, and then get it off. I'm going off on a five a.m. flight, or a four a.m. flight, but go to the house. I'll be doing some work. I'll leave you some notes in the safe. So I go to the house and want to get in the safe. The first thing on the top of that was a note said, "Arnie Raphel called. You've been promoted. Congratulations." But I thought that was also really very nice of Tom. So anyway I worked on that cable. Unfortunately Wat, of course, knew all the people and helped me put it into shape to send it in.

Q: Let me understand a little bit more what his position was. He had been Counsel General in Jerusalem. I know he was there in '84, because I visited him. And this is now '86. What was his position?

HUGHES: Well, how I understand it is that Secretary Schultz had told Dick Murphy that somehow we needed to beef up something regarding the peace process.

Q: Murphy, then the Assistant Secretary.

HUGHES: He was the Assistant Secretary. In talking with Tom, Tom is like a brigade in himself, so it wasn't really necessary to do anything. I seem to recall at some point there was even a mention that maybe Dick Murphy should go and set up camp in Israel to be the Secretary's personal representative to the peace process, which would have been an awful idea. So Murphy managed this request by Secretary Schultz by saying, "Okay, I've got a good guy who's been Ambassador after he's been a DAS in NEA, he's been consul general in Jerusalem, he understands both sides of the issues, he's *persona gratis* to both sides, so we'll have to put him in Israel, but he will be my representative to the peace process."

Q: And he came under Pickering?

HUGHES: He came under Dick Murphy.

Q: But he lived in Tel Aviv?

HUGHES: Lived in Tel Aviv, had an office in the embassy, and he was also a good friend of Tom's and a good friend of mine, and so it all worked quite well, partially because of the personalities involved, I guess.

Q: Would he travel in the region? Would he see the Palestinians?

HUGHES: See the Palestinians and see the Israelis, and try to just see where there was any overlap.

Q: How long did he do that?

HUGHES: He retired, I think, in '88 to become the Director General of the MFO [Multinational Force and Observers].

Q: Maybe two years or so?

HUGHES: It must have been. I think he had just come down in '86 before I got there.

Q: And he's still in Rome?

HUGHES: Still in Rome.

Q: I heard him speak recently.

HUGHES: Yes.

Q: Yes, it was last fall. You talked about relationships with the embassy in Venezuela years earlier. The relationship between the embassy and Consulate General in Jerusalem is unique.

HUGHES: Jerusalem is one of only two Consuls General, the other in Hong Kong, with direct reporting authority to the capitol, to Washington. But, again, I think from my perspective there were very good relations, both personal relations and policy relations, because we all understood what the issues were, we all understood what the principles were and what we were trying to achieve, and what the limits were on us.

Q: As you said, the Ambassador, you, other members of the embassy staff from Tel Aviv were in Jerusalem leading the government people all the time.

HUGHES: Constantly. We'd often go by the Consulate General to talk about what was going on or to use their secure telephone or between meetings to go and write up notes in a secure environment. Also, somebody from the Consulate General is always welcome to join the big staff meeting.

Q: Otherwise the people in the Consulate General, the Consul General and the staff, were primarily concerned with the people in Jerusalem as opposed to the government as such and certainly the people on the West Bank at that time. Now

this was before there was any kind of Palestinian authority.

HUGHES: The division of labor with respect to the Israeli occupation of the territories was the Consulate General in Jerusalem was responsible for the contacts reported on the West Bank. We were responsible for contacts reporting to Gaza, which took me to Gaza fairly frequently. An aside there: I'd like very much to have Gazan and Israeli politicians both right and left at dinner, breaking bread at the same table. That was interesting, our discussions.

Q: And you were able to do that?

HUGHES: I was able to do that, yes. I don't think there was any kind of strain or misunderstanding in the relationship between the Consulate General and the Embassy, and I think part of the function of what we were trying to do and the fact that good people tried to go to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, so the Bureau in staffing requests usually has the pick of the best.

Q: You had a very good staff in the Embassy at Tel Aviv in the time you were there. Who was the Consul General in Jerusalem?

HUGHES: Phil Wilcox during the second two years, and Maury Draper the first.

Q: Any other major issues involving U.S. and Israel at the time?

HUGHES: Well, maybe two things. My main substantive area of responsibility as the DCM there was working with the defense establishment. So I worked directly with then Defense Minister Rabin and Dr. Melman and we became personal friends. He was very gracious to me when I left and had events that were hosted for us. And also his people in connection with the occupation. We dealt with Israelis. The Consulate General did not deal with the Israeli government. I dealt with them also in the context of the opposition of the West Bank as well as Gaza.

Q: On issues including settlement, for example?

HUGHES: Settlements, human rights.

Q: From the Israeli government point of view, all those issues?

HUGHES: All those issues, intelligence, military intelligence. I worked with the Prime Minister as a terrorism advisor along with the station on some of those issues. But that was very intense, and rewarding in some ways. I think we were able collectively to make some progress on some things. One specific project was getting the Jordanian banks reopened in the West Bank, a lot of their work. I was in a sense a go-between between the Israelis and the Jordanians on this particular issue. I went over to Jordan and talked with the central bank and finance minister and prime minister about traditions and personalities and so forth. But the whole

question of human rights and the occupation and so forth was very depressing. On the mission management side, there were a lot of problems, understaffed on the American side, long-term problems.

Q: In the embassy?

HUGHES: In the embassy at that time. Major fraud. The biggest disappointment there was, I think, the fact that visa fraud was more broadly known among the Israeli employees in the mission, who took no action to report it.

Q: This is a continuation of a oral history interview with Arthur H. Hughes. Today is the 6th of May 1998. We're conducting this at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. When we finished last time, Art, I think we were talking about your assignment from 1986 to '89 as Deputy Chief of Mission in Tel Aviv. That was obviously a big job with management, security, lots of issues, political, peace process, and the relations in the defense area, trade. I guess I would suggest you first maybe remind us who was the Ambassador at that time and what were your most difficult challenges and main responsibilities?

HUGHES: Well, thanks, Ray. The ambassador was Tom Pickering, and he had been there a year before I arrived. The other senior officer there was Wat Cluverius, who had been assigned there by Assistant Secretary Dick Murphy, to be his personal representative for the peace process. Wat had been in Jerusalem as the Consul General, and at the urging of Secretary Schultz to Murphy to become more actively engaged in the peace process, he asked Cluverius to come down. So it was Tom Pickering and Wat Cluverius supposedly reporting directly to Murphy, although they had a very close and good relationship, and then myself. I had been in Europe as DCM in Copenhagen and The Netherlands, and actually the Tel Aviv job was worked out between Arnie Rafel and Tom Pickering. I knew Tom only slightly from some times in the Department. It was clear to Tom, of course, and to Arnie that I had no deep background in the peace process or the Middle East. I had never served in the Middle East. And I think he was looking to me mainly initially to do the traditional inside job of DCM. But I remember when I arrived, he and Mrs. Pickering, Alice Pickering, very graciously met Pat and me at the airport and picked us up on the tarmac from the airplane, and he said, "Learn fast. We're going on home leave in four weeks."

Q: Learn about everything.

HUGHES: Learn about everything. He was great in making sure that I was involved in everything including, between my arrival and when he left on home leave four weeks later, his almost daily trips to Jerusalem included me, to introduce and present me to all the players, all the Israeli players, in which he always said, "Art's my new deputy, and when I'm gone, he acts for me, acts for the U.S. government." Those meetings included people like the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, and everyone else in Israel with whom he

was meeting between those times. When Tom did go, Wat was wonderful in also giving me advice. We talked as actually colleagues, and so I think I was able to "learn fast" as Tom had enjoined me to do. But the issues were across the board, of course. The peace process was pretty moribund at that point. As usual, Tom Pickering was chipping away, working at all angles, pushing wherever he could. Secretary Schultz at that point, I think, had decided that there was not much progress being made, and so he was not very active himself at that point. But we had, as you indicated, the full gamut, defense relationships, the question of security, terrorism, economic relationships. We had the free trade agreement with the Israelis, who were very slow in implementing parts that would have opened up their market to us. This continues a bit to this present day. Of course, they had a very protectionist economy, a very statist economy, which they still do to a very large extent. And managing the mission, which is a very large mission with a lot of agencies and a lot of technicalities regarding the occupied territories, regarding who we dealt with in various places and who we did not deal with, where did we not go, and that took a good bit of coordination and keeping track of what was going on and, if necessary, making sure that the various arcanery were in fact followed. We had a good staff and leadership by Tom Pickering, of course. I think the embassy was a darn good embassy.

Q: The staff, I see on a note from you, was about 390 at that time. I assume that's American staff, or American and Israeli?

HUGHES: American and Israeli, yes.

Q: One of the other coordination aspects of the DCM in Tel Aviv is dealing, I suppose, with the Consulate in Jerusalem. Do you want to say anything about that?

HUGHES: Well, that was really a coordination role and a collegial kind of arrangement, because, as you know, there are, I think, still just two independent Consulates General in the U.S. Foreign Service, Hong Kong and Jerusalem, so Jerusalem reported directly back to Washington, although we had excellent relations. Almost always when I would go to Jerusalem, and very frequently when Tom would go to Jerusalem, we would stop by the Consulate General to consult with the Consul General and other people there, and actually we'd use their secure phones and use their place to do up notes and write cables while we were waiting between meetings with the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem. There were differences of perspective, of course, to a certain extent borne by with whom one was talking and the kind of information one was getting, but there was no disagreement about the independence of the Consulate General and the basic policy lines that the U.S. government was trying to pursue at that point.

Q: It was certainly always clearly understood by the Consul General and others in the Consulate General in Jerusalem that, where it came to dealing with the government of Israel, which happened to be located in Jerusalem, in most

respects that it would be the embassy, the Ambassador, your responsibility.

HUGHES: That's right, and during most of the time I was there, Phil Wilcox was the Consul General, who was a close personal friend and also an excellent man.

Q: How about the whole issue - you mentioned security and terrorism. Was that a particular problem in this period of '86 to '89 for you?

HUGHES: No, it wasn't, as a matter of fact. It was something that we always had to keep on top of and keep ahead of. A major concern we had was the location of the building, which is fronted between two main streets along the shoreline in downtown Tel Aviv. Of course, it was just a few years before that - I don't remember the exact year - when the Palestinian terrorists blew up a truckload of bottled gas near the American Embassy in Kuwait City. Every time I would see a truckload of bottled gas - they'd come down the street literally ten feet from the front of the embassy - I couldn't help but having a certain thought in my mind. But, of course, as history showed, nothing did happen. The Israelis understood that it was very important that nothing happened, not only for us but in their cities. Of course, later on there were a number of terrorist incidents but not directed at U.S. facilities.

Q: It's a location that is very cramped, very tight, but also, as you say, between two main streets which, unlike Pennsylvania Avenue at the White House, could not be closed off.

HUGHES: No, the way Tel Aviv was laid out, to close off either one of those streets would have just caused chaos in Tel Aviv. Let me maybe just interject here. One of the specific and special responsibilities of the DCM there had been to maintain the relationships with the Ministry of Defense. That was really a fascinating part of my portfolio, because it ranged from Ministry of Defense activities in the occupied territories to Defense relationships including various kinds of cooperation, materiel, training, coordination, joint exercises, and all those things, and that brought me into almost everyday contact with people in the Defense Ministry and probably every few days with Defense Minister Rabin. That was a particular, interesting, and maybe important and also enjoyable and very stimulating part of my job there.

Q: Was the Defense Ministry also in Jerusalem?

HUGHES: No, Tel Aviv. When the state of Israel was declared, the government initially was in Tel Aviv, of course.

Q: Which is why the Embassy was there?

HUGHES: And that's one of the reasons why the Embassy is still there. When the government moved to Jerusalem, the Defense Ministry, for national defense

reasons mainly, was kept in Tel Aviv. Other ministries have offices in Tel Aviv, and at least in the days when I was there, there were periodic, if not Cabinet meetings, intergovernmental intradepartmental meetings in Tel Aviv almost every week, the Prime Minister and the members of the Cabinet.

Q: In terms of your liaison responsibility with the Ministry of Defense, you also, of course, had to work with the Defense attaché and other U.S. military people who were part of the mission.

HUGHES: Right, and we were blessed almost entirely with really first-rate people, excellent people who were very sophisticated, very well trained and just good, solid people as human beings as well. So that was an enjoyable part of my responsibilities and, I'd say to a very large extent, a successful one largely because of the kind of people that we had in the Defense attaché and the individual attaché offices.

Q: Did you anticipate that Rabin would become the prime minister? You probably did.

HUGHES: Well, he had been Prime Minister before, of course. The problem was that Shimon Perez controlled the party apparatus and Rabin, given his personality and his own inclinations, had a lot of contempt for party pacts, apparatchiks, and he did not suffer fools gladly. He wore his feelings on his sleeve to a certain extent, I think, as everybody knows. So it was really problematic at that point whether or not he would ever become prime minister again. As it turned out - just to jump ahead to make a comment - the main reason that he did become Prime Minister was that people in the Labor Party were able to push through a rule change to require a party primary for their prime ministerial candidate, and in that primary Rabin did win, then became the candidate and won. In the general election the reason he won was because the body politic of Israel trusted him with the future and the security of Israel, whereas ironically the public did not trust Shimon Perez with the security of the country. They saw him as being a little bit too intellectual, a little bit too remote from certain realities. I say it's ironic because Shimon Perez was the father of the Israeli military industry and even of their nuclear program when he was Director General of the Ministry of Defense early on during the days of Israel. So in spite of all the history of having done those things for the security of Israel, he simply wasn't trusted. Of course, he's got a perfect record of never winning an election. But to go back to your question, it was just a real unknown in that period.

Q: Was there already congressional and other pressure that the embassy ought to be in Jerusalem instead of Tel Aviv? That certainly has been the case over many years.

HUGHES: Yes, there was indeed, and it was successfully managed. I know that Tom Pickering spent a good bit of time on that before he went to Israel and then

when he would go back on consultations to go to the Hill and talk with folks there and try to hold things off. Interestingly enough, we went through a period of trying to find a new location for the chancery in Tel Aviv. That was a task that Tom and Washington basically gave to me to manage and to be very active and involved in, and we spent maybe a year working with the Israeli government in trying to find a new location. The reason that it relates to your question about the Hill is a deal had been reached under which we would find locations in both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem for new buildings, and the new building in Jerusalem would be constructed so that it could become an embassy, a chancery, at the right time. That deal basically fell apart. My suspicion is that at the end of the day the Israelis decided they had no interest in following through because they showed us some awful properties in Tel Aviv. At one point I told a senior Israeli with whom I was on very friendly terms, I said, "Look, I don't think it's the job of the U.S. government to build an embassy to be a part of an urban renewal project in blighted areas of Tel Aviv." But at the end of the day, as I said, I think the Israelis decided that it wasn't in their political interest domestically to follow through. So finally a lot of money was spent on rehabing the building in downtown Tel Aviv, where it still is.

Q: Was there also a problem perhaps on possible location sites in Jerusalem?

HUGHES: No, in fact, I looked at property that was located in Jerusalem, and there was apparently clear title. There was a claim later on by some Palestinians that they still had title to the land, and frankly, since the deal fell apart, I lost track of what eventually happened to that. But my understanding at the time was that there was clear title to a quite attractive parcel in Jerusalem.

Q: In East Jerusalem?

HUGHES: No, my recollection is that it was kind of south central, southwest Jerusalem. I think it was a part of a British military camp originally.
Q: When did Tom Pickering leave? I think he left late in '88 maybe, early '89?

HUGHES: He left at the end of December of 1988. Let me come back and just mention the Intifada [uprising] before that, because the Intifada did change that political dynamic among the Palestinians on one hand and among the Israelis and the interaction between the two. Again, another point of irony was that the Intifada was totally accidental as it started, as a traffic accident down in Gaza in which some Palestinians were killed. It was clear it was a pure accident, but it sparked off local demonstrations, rage, and they continued on. Why it was important at the time was that what eventually happened was that the Israeli strategy of preemption and intimidation to create the psychology among the Palestinians that they were incapable of really acting on their own behalf, acting to have an impact on their own future, fell apart. That strategy fell apart, because events as they unfolded showed that the Israelis were not ten feet tall, that the Palestinians were not totally incapable of having an impact on their own future,

and it caused some rethinking on both sides about how to proceed. It also had some very unfortunate consequences, of course, in the deaths that were occasioned and the new life it gave to splinter groups of Palestinian terrorists. But I think one can say that in overall terms of history it was a very important event and it maybe had a positive impact on the political dynamic because it caused people to rethink their strategies and their situations and resulted in movement in the peace process.

Q: At what point at the embassy did you all sort of see it that way? Obviously it must have taken a little while to realize that this was a significant change, and to what extent did it impact on embassy operations, activities, perspectives?

HUGHES: Well, in operations first, it made Gaza a little bit more difficult place to go. Coming back to the division of labor between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the Embassy and the Consular General, the Consular General had responsibility for the West Bank with respect to aid programs, relations with the Palestinians. The Embassy had responsibility for Gaza for the same kinds of things, and, of course, the Embassy had responsibility for dealing with the Israeli government on all of the occupied territories. Initially nobody was sure what the impact was going to be. What did it mean? Was this another incident that was going to be tamped down and then go back to the business as usual before. But because of our contacts with the Israelis across the board and the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces], the MOD [Ministry of Defense] and private individuals, individual military people, and analysts on the Israeli side and also the Palestinian, I can't say, from this remove without having thought about it too much, exactly when, but it became clear that this was a different situation. One thing that sticks in my mind is - well, two things: one, because of my own age when I was there, I had a lot of private Israeli friends about my age whose children were just finishing high school and about to go into the IDF, and they began to talk among themselves about Gaza. When we'd spend time with them, go to dinner or lunch, play tennis, whatever, just in a normal friendly relationships, they'd talk about their concerns about their kids and the purposelessness and the worthlessness of occupying Gaza and the fear that their kids would be sent to Gaza for the occupation. They would rather have them go to Southern Lebanon or be in an elite unit up in the northern part of Israel as opposed to going to Gaza. Then as it went on, they also began to fear the change in the psychology. It was clear that Israelis were being put in a position of true occupiers and oppressors because of the way they had to deal with kids, not in an occasional incident as had been the case for many, many years, but in an ongoing day-to-day basis. I can remember one Israeli friend saying, "You know, it's not what we ought to be doing." And editorial writers started to write that Israelis should not be occupiers. We have been oppressed for centuries. Now we should not be put in a position of being the oppressors. One friend said to me, "I can imagine my son or daughter being down in Gaza and just simply losing an eye from the stones. For what?" There was all of that going on. Then I can remember talking to an Israeli major who was in Gaza, and he came back and he said, "One of the problems we have is that we cannot get any officers of quality to

be willing to go to Gaza, so we take the bottom tier of officers, and that compounds the problem." You have people who are not as competent or capable on the one hand dealing with a difficult situation, so you get into over- reaction. Morale is down, so everybody is in a basic hair-trigger kind of psychology.

On the other hand, the Palestinians started taking heart. They also had contacts with certain Israelis. They could read the Israeli press. Everything is always in the Israeli press. There are no secrets in Israel, or maybe one or two. They started to take heart. How could they organize this? Because this happened by the people in Gaza, not by the leadership. So the leadership started to think, how can we take control of this and organize it or shape it into bigger political ends. This was all a gradual process, but it became clearer as days went by that this was a new situation. Plus, just to go back, there was one other point. Toward the end of the first term of the National Unity Government in the latter part of 1986 - the change-over took place on November 1 when Shimon Perez passed the baton to Yitzhak Shamir - Shimon Perez was trying to figure out ways to change the political dynamic in order to break the National Unity Government-enforced elections. Of course, Likud understood that and they were not going to have any of that, because they wanted their two leaders in office. So one of the things that Perez did was to try to work out deals, to see what he could do with President Mubarak of Egypt, but also to try new ideas.

One of the things obviously was Gaza first, which met with some degree of ridicule. Of course, this was way before the Intifada. Gaza first, Gaza first. Historically Israelis, Israel, the biblical Israel, had never really had ongoing control of Gaza, and so forth. This is not a part of the historic part of the land of Israel. We can give it up. Plus, it's nothing but problems. What do we gain by it? And there was a mixed reaction, but later on, of course, we know what has happened just in the last few years.

Q: You mentioned before that the Embassy had the responsibility for Gaza as opposed to the West Bank, Jerusalem. To what extent did you as DCM have contacts with the Palestinians before the Intifada, after the Intifada began? What difference did that make? Was that taking up much of your time, or how did you handle that aspect?

HUGHES: Well, I traveled to Gaza periodically. We also had two officers in the Embassy, one in the economic section to oversee all of the aid programs, because we had no aid people in Israeli-occupied territories. We did everything through NGOs [non- governmental organizations] and PVOs [private volunteer organizations], and then there was an officer in the political section who was responsible for Gaza. I would go down with them periodically. Ambassador Pickering went down occasionally as well. I would invite Gazans to the residence actually to attend receptions and dinners in which I would have people from Gaza together with Israelis, and that made for some very interesting conversation, needless to say. But I thought it was a chance to bring Israelis and Palestinians

together in an environment that might be conducive to some thinking and some talk and just to get to know each other for perhaps future purposes, to raise the comfort level in dealing among certain people. I don't know to what extent it had any impact on later events. It's hard to tell. But it was important to go down to Gaza to show the presence, and then eventually before I left we were able to open a small storefront kind of office down there under the Economic Section.

Q: No flag?

HUGHES: Just a little storefront.

Q: At that time, though, Arafat and the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization were still in Tunis. To what extent was there real leadership being shown by the Gazan Palestinians, and to the extent there was leadership being expressed in the occupied territories, was it primarily in Gaza as opposed to the West Bank?

HUGHES: No, it was in both places, and the names, which have become prominent now, as far as the insiders were prominent names there, but in Gaza probably the leadership wasn't as strong as it was on the West Bank, because there were other West Bankers and Jerusalemites. When we would go to Gaza, when I would go around and talk to people, for example, the head of the lawyers' association and other people, it was clear that these people were PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]. There was absolutely no doubt about it. We knew it, but we'd never talk about it in those terms, because we were forbidden from dealing with the PLO, but these were local personages who had influence on the situation.

Of course, even then there was some difficulty, but not to the extent as later on, between the insiders and the outsiders. Of course, today this is one of the real grievances of the people on the inside, the Palestinians who had stayed in Palestine, stayed in the territories. When Yasser Arafat did come back, he brought people with him whom many Palestinians believed were second and third rate people and to the exclusion to a certain extent of people on the inside. But this reminds me to come to your question of a few moments ago. As I mentioned, the peace process was more at the beginning of my time. Secretary Schultz was not active, but he was actually present. As I understand it, Murphy had become more active, and that is why he's quavering about Tel Aviv as a way - if I can say this - to a certain extent to manage Secretary Schultz, because Murphy understood that if the Secretary of State was not going to be active, for the Assistant Secretary to be active had no particular purpose. Tom Pickering was actually indefatigable regarding trying new ideas, trying to move, trying to press, trying to move things ahead - just always a million ideas in his mind. Finally when Secretary Schultz did come to Israel a couple times toward the end of '88 or '89, I always thought of Tom Pickering as George Schultz's conscience on the peace process, because he would almost badger him about doing things, trying things. Schultz didn't like that very much frankly. Now, it's got to be said historically Schultz left a wonderful

gift when he did depart office, and that was his actions that made the PLO a legitimate discussion partner. That was a tremendous breakthrough, a tremendous gift. But before that, he didn't like Tom's pushing, and I often thought that was one reason that Schultz insisted that Tom leave exactly on his third anniversary as ambassador to Israel. You asked when Pickering left. I remember when he left, because I as on leave in the States for Christmas, and I left Wisconsin on the 26th of December to arrive back in Israel the 27th of December to talk with Tom, to take him to the airport, accompany him to the airport on the 28th of December to leave, and later that day to meet Bill and Helen Brown, who were coming in as the new ambassador, who was a recess appointment, by the way.

Q: So you were not chargé for more than a moment.

HUGHES: Not on that occasion. But my point is I think that was Schultz's way of telling Pickering he hadn't appreciated this being badgered, and even though Schultz was leaving, the administration was changing, he insisted that Tom leave after three years.

Q: But he also went to New York?

HUGHES: Well, but that had not been arranged. But I was coming to that. Before I had gone on leave for Christmas, Tom was winding up things, and one of the things he liked to do was drive in the desert. He is an accomplished amateur archaeologist, and he was off in the Egyptian desert with the Army attaché and two four-wheel-drive vehicles out wandering around taking a look at things. So I as chargé got a call one day, "This is the office of Vice President George Bush. He'd like to speak to Ambassador Pickering," and I said, "Well, he's in the Egyptian desert. I'm Art Hughes. I'm the chargé. Can I help you with something?" He said, "No, no. The Vice President wants to speak with Ambassador Pickering. Can you find him?" I said, "Yes, it might take a little while, but we can track him down." So I called Jack Coby, who was the DCM in Cairo, and I said, "Can you find Tom?" He said, "Oh, yes, the Egyptian Army knows where he is." I said, "Well, he should call this number." Well, it did take him a day and a half, I think. In my mind's eye I see Tom pulling up to a phone booth in the middle of the Egyptian desert and going in and dialing. But he did tell me that they were basically off in the boonies somewhere but did have a phone, an Egyptian Army phone, I guess. He did call, and the Vice President offered him a job in New York. From his experience in New York he thought more could be done, he wanted somebody who had energy and was bright and would like Tom to do the job.

Q: But this was after he was already committed to leaving?

HUGHES: He was already on his way out, right. So then they talked and agreed that Bush would notify him in a few days or a week definitively. At that point he was taking soundings with him. We happened to have CODEL [congressional

delegation] in town, and there was a reception at the residence. The phone rang in the library, and I went in and picked it up, and it was the Vice President's office. So I went out and found Tom, who was mingling with his guests, of course, and I said, "Tom, there's a phone call." So he went in and it was the Vice President, who said, "I'd like you to do this job." So Tom came out, and I said, "Is it a go?" and he said, "Yes," and I said, "Do you mind if I make an announcement since it's official?" He said, "No," so I asked everybody's attention and I said, "I'd like to present to you the next American Ambassador Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Thomas R. Pickering," and people were just stunned for a moment and then everybody grinned and applauded and said, "Gosh, when did this happen?" He said, "Well, that was the phone call from Vice President Bush."

Q: You didn't scoop the White House on that announcement?"

HUGHES: Well, I don't know how Bush dealt with the White House. That was his. Washington deals with Washington.

Q: You mentioned that there was a congressional delegation visiting. Certainly probably more visitors, high level from the Executive Branch, Congress, go to Israel than anywhere else in the world. Was this a major dimension of your time there, or was it something that was fairly routine?

HUGHES: No, it was a major dimension. Not only the official CODELS but also the number of congressmen and senators who were invited privately by Israeli organizations. Israel very astutely organized over the years what they called study missions and study visits to Israel, basically to tell their story to American opinion makers and politicians. And they were very, very effective in it. We would almost always be invited by the Israeli sponsoring organization, which was usually a quasi-governmental organization, to attend a dinner or make a presentation or so forth, either at the embassy or at a hotel where they were meeting, and usually that task fell to me. And that was very interesting, also seeing the reaction of various American groups and hearing their questions and so forth. I thought it was important that we be very honest about the American commitment, the American support, and also the problems that we had with Israel on certain areas of human rights, the differences in our legal positions regarding the territories and so forth, and to be very comprehensive and very honest and very straightforward, but to give a comprehensive picture.

The fact that the Israeli organizations kept inviting us back, I guess, meant that they felt we were doing it in a fair way, and the questions that we got from many Americans, I think, also showed that some of the things that we said were new to them, were things that were not always covered in the American press or not covered in other briefings while they were in Israel. But, of course, there's no doubt about the American commitment, and that's where one always began. On official CODELS, you're right, an enormous number. I can't remember that a congressman or senator ever came to the embassy in Tel Aviv. They were always

in Jerusalem. They had come down maybe to deal with the defense ministry, but I cannot remember that a single one ever came to the building. I take this back. There was one, who's now active in the Seeds of Peace, from Utah.

Q: Wayne Owens.

HUGHES: Wayne Owens.

Q: How about the President or Secretary of State? Did they come during this period?

HUGHES: Well, the Secretary of State did, but again, he never came to Tel Aviv. He was always in Jerusalem.

Q: Did you always drive back and forth between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem?

HUGHES: Oh, constantly. In fact, a couple of times I actually ate both lunch and dinner in the car on the way the same day.

Q: Back and forth.

HUGHES: I always carried my lunch because I never knew when I was going to have to go to Jerusalem, even if it was scheduled sometimes. I'm in the car for almost an hour. Why don't I use it? I'll take stuff to eat, and I'll eat lunch in the car, which was just a way to save time. Then, as I said, a couple times I actually ate two meals in the car.

Q: You never used to helicopter?

HUGHES: No, no. When there were visitors, if they were landing in Tel Aviv, or coming in at Ben Gurion, they may take a helicopter up to Jerusalem to the helipad by the Knesset or maybe to the MOD just as a time saver for a visitor. One of the interesting visitors we had was Senator Gore. He was one of the most serious and well prepared visitors that we ever had. He came alone, not as a part of a group. I happened to be chargé at the time, so I accompanied him to see Prime Minister Shamir and the foreign minister and others. That was the first time I had ever met him, and I must say I was really impressed with how serious, because frankly a lot of the visits were basically domestic politically oriented and were not very issue oriented at all.

Q: You also had many governors come, I suppose.

HUGHES: A few governors, yes, but they were usually a part of a private study group, so they were taken care of by the Israeli organizations. If we knew they were coming, we'd try to reach out and call them and say, "Would you like a special briefing? Come by." Usually their schedule was so full, they didn't. They

just were included in the other briefings.

Q: Did the governor of Arkansas come while you were there?

HUGHES: No, no, unless he came as a part of a private group which was not announced to us, but I know that he did go to Israel as part of a study group, but I don't remember the dates. I remember just reading it later. One of the interesting asides on the domestic politics. I won't mention - well, I will. It was Gary Ackerman from New York. He came with his mother and his aunt. I happened to be chargé, so we went up. We arranged an appointment with the prime minister, Shamir, and so we went in to the prime minister's office and Congressman Ackerman said, "Mr. Prime Minister, I know you're very busy. I don't want to take much of your time, but I really feel honored and delighted to be here. Would you mind if we took a photograph?" He pulled a camera out of his pocket and handed it to me. So I took photographs, about three or four snapshots of the Ackermans and the prime minister, and then the Congressman said, "Mr. Prime Minister, I want to thank you very much for your time. It's been delightful. I know you're very busy, so thank you very much. I won't bother you any longer," and left. But he got mainly what he was there for. He got photographs of himself with the prime minister of Israel.

Q: By a semiprofessional photographer.

HUGHES: Actually Ackerman came back later too. And he's a serious guy. He knew the issues. He had certain well known views, but he was a serious guy, and I also testified before him later on the Foreign Relations Committee. He's, as I said, a worthy congressman.

Q: I think we're probably coming to the end on Tel Aviv, but is there anything you want to say about your period with Ambassador Brown and the beginning of the Bush Administration in '89?

HUGHES: Well, I was not very happy that Pickering was - his term was held to three years, let me put it that way. I thought it was unnecessary. It was clear there was a change of administration and so forth. But as it turned out, of course, Tom went off to New York, where he did great things including the Gulf War. And Bill Brown was a quite different personality and had a quite different kind of approach, but I also enjoyed working with him and I learned some things from him as well. So the seven months or so we were together - six and a half months, I guess - I found personally interesting and personally rewarding as well, and very useful. Bill, of course, had been DCM under the long reign of Sam Lewis, and so Bill had great familiarity with the players. In fact, we'd made arrangements for him right from his arrival to get in the car from the Ben Gurion airport and go to Jerusalem to present copies of his credentials to Misha Aarons, who was the foreign minister then. We had arranged the very next day for him to present his credentials to the president.

Q: Only in Israel would you do both those.
HUGHES: Well, they wanted an active ambassador, of course, and we knew everybody and everybody was accommodating. It was wonderful of them to be accommodating, and there was a mutual interest in getting going. But in the car on the way to Jerusalem Bill reminded me that the last time he had seen Misha Aarons was when Bill was chargé, and Aarons came to him to renounce his American citizenship so he could be appointed ambassador to the United States. All kinds of histories, all kinds of histories, all intertwined between ourselves and Israel.

Q: The interconnections are myriad. We're at the end of your time in Tel Aviv. Is there any sort of general reflection you want to make on the assignment or anything that we haven't covered, before we go on to your next assignment?

HUGHES: I think probably in many respects the most interesting part of my time there was watching up close and being a part of discussions with Israelis about how they grapple with really fundamental question that they're facing, which are existential questions, and talking with people across the whole range of political and philosophical thinking and even theological thinking about where they are, how they got there, and what do they do about the future. That was a real education for me not only on the facts of the matter but into human psychology. One can't help but be impressed with what they've done, be empathetic with their situation, and also very frustrated at times. People ask me often how I look back, what my assignment in Israel was like, and I say, "It was a total experience, a total experience in every way, emotionally, intellectually, physically, stresses and strains, inspirationally from enormous admiration on one hand to pure frustration and irritation on the other." But it was a great experience and great time.

Q: One of those existential issues certainly involves how they relate to their neighbors, the Palestinians and the West Bank, Gaza, and so on, but another relates to who is an Israeli.

HUGHES: Who is a Jew.

Q: Who is a Jew, the whole question of the secular, orthodox and so on. I don't know to what extent that was...

HUGHES: It was very much. This was the first time the issue came up in a very direct way, because the compromise that Ben Gurion had achieved and the concessions - some people call it concessions now - that he made early on, which he apparently thought would wither away over time, that the secular Jews, secular Israelis, would completely overwhelm the religious group, has turned out not to be true, and the compromises that were met are actually being expanded by the religious. But when I was there, there was legislation introduced or discussed to define who was a Jew, and basically they were very, very rigorous rules. I can

remember talking to American Jews who came to Israel and particularly understood Jewish law, and only children of a Jewish mother are Jews. "My son married a non-Jew, but these guys are going to tell me that my grandchildren are not Jews." I can remember several elderly Americans, grandfatherly types, talking in this vein. Now, of course, it's come around again. But it was already clear then - and this was 10 years ago - that 12 to 14 percent of the religious Jews had an inordinate degree of influence. Among some secular Jews there was an acknowledgment of the importance, because I often heard from secular Jews that if it had not been for the real religious Jews, maybe Jewry would have been lost over the centuries in time. It was the more religious Jews who kept the main thinking of Judaism alive and Hebrew and so forth, although cultural traditions are still very strong and very rich as well, of course. But there was a lot of argument then about if you're in the study, you're exempt from the military. Secular Jews had the feeling that there was abuse of that, a disproportionate amount of funding to religious schools and to religious purposes as opposed to other purposes. There's quite a bit of antipathy in Israeli society and not much communication. I can remember a fellow who was a deputy minister, a very important guy in the Labor Party - I won't mention his name - who said once to me, "We don't know these guys."

Q: Okay, we were talking about the whole question of who is a Jew in that debate. Finish off your thought on that.

HUGHES: As I was saying, this individual said, "Who are those guys with the black hats? We don't know them." And my reaction to that was, yes, one of the problems is that Labor had never really made an effort to get to know them, and how you can deal with them and how you can reach accommodation or agreement or understandings or compromises if you don't know them.

Q: If you think of them always as the other, the opponent.

HUGHES: Us and them. You're quite right.

Q: Had the great surge of immigration into Israel which, of course, certainly occurred as the Soviet Union ended - was that happening in the late '80s?

HUGHES: No, and another irony: I can remember talking with Prime Minister Shamir, and it was clear that his idea of the demographic ace in the hole was American Jewry. The last untapped reservoir of Jews in the world, largely untapped, untapped to a certain extent, were American Jews in his view. When we were in Israel, there was a lot of study regarding the demographics and birth rates and so forth, and even then there was the projection that maybe by the turn of the century there would be more Arabs between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean than Jews, so they'd be a minority in their own territory, so to speak. I can remember Prime Minister Shamir thinking, boy, American Jewry, work on American Jewry, and that's the ace in the hole. There was almost no thinking at that point that I'm aware of, or discussion, about Soviet Jewry. Of

course, there's the discussion now that maybe some of these folks are not Jews really, but that's another problem.

Q: Shamir's thought at the time as expressed to you was that American Jewry would increasingly come to Israel?

HUGHES: Would come to Israel as the economic situation improved, as the national security situation improved, and so forth, that he could attract more American Jews to Israel.

Q: Not just send funds but actually come?

HUGHES: Right.

Q: But there were a large number of U.S. citizens in Israel at the time you were there. Was that an issue for the Consular Section of the embassy, a major problem, or not really?

HUGHES: No, not really. A lot of them were dual nationals, and because of court rulings, the technicalities of dual nationality went away. When you and I started in this business, there were very strict rules about how you retain or how you could lose your nationality, but because of a court ruling in the United States - actually it had to do with an Israeli - it's almost impossible to lose your American nationality now, so those questions basically disappeared. We had a couple of cases of people committing crimes in the United States, and in Israel as a rule they will not extradite one of their own citizens. A couple were even wanted for murder, and they got complicated too, because in one case they were off in one of the settlements in the West Bank, and so what was the jurisdiction and a lot of complications in that regard. Those were fairly few although we did have another one in the aftermath of the spy case, Pollard. Some of the people who had helped Pollard with his spying were in Israel, dual nationals, and we were trying to get access to them for either depositions or one thing or another, or try to get them back to the States, but there was no inclination on their part to go back to the States obviously and there was very reluctant cooperation or engagement by the Israelis on these cases regardless of what was said publicly.

Q: Okay, anything else? A fascinating, great assignment for three years.

HUGHES: Well, just one other thing: One of the things that I think that the embassy could take credit for was the coordination that we did between the Palestinians, the Jordanians and the Israelis on the issue of defense to reopen the Jordanian banks on the West Bank. I had scores of meetings with the head of the civil administration in the ministry of defense for the West Bank and Gaza to help work that out. I'd say that I think the Embassy can take pride and satisfaction, and that is because it did change to some extent the economic dynamic in the West Bank.

Q: Were the issues primarily technical, banking, economic, or was it at least in part political in the sense of what should Jordan's role be?

HUGHES: It was more political than anything. There were always questions or objections raised or sometimes even delays caused by the technical things, but it was basically political issues.

Q: But that served also to in a sense re-engage Jordan a bit?

HUGHES: Yes.

Q: Okay, where did you go from Tel Aviv?

HUGHES: Well, I went to DOD, to ISA [International Security Affairs] to be the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA for the Middle East and South Asia, Near East and South Asia, NESA.
Q: This is the International Security Affairs.

HUGHES: Right, and so it was basically managing security defense relations with all of the countries of the Near East and South Asia; the office normally said from Morocco to Bangladesh.

Q: This was your second time to work at the Pentagon, I think. You had been in the National Military Command Center. Is this an assignment you sought, or did it sort of happen; and other than the management were there any particular things that stood out for you? You were there, I guess, at the Gulf War period?

HUGHES: Let me come to that in a minute. Well, I was very happy to have a job. I knew the incumbent, Skip Gnehm, who is now the Director General of the Foreign Service, and we'd been friends. He was DCM in Jordan part of the time that I was in Israel. My recollection is I knew about the job coming open only relatively late in the assignment cycle, but I remember I got the job offer only in May before leaving Tel Aviv in July. But they had just come in in Defense.

Q: This is the new administration, the Bush Administration.

HUGHES: Paul Wolfowitz had only been there a few weeks. I remember when I went to see him; and again, this was largely due to Bill Brown's introduction to Paul Wolfowitz. They had worked together as DASs in EAP [East Asia/Pacific Affairs] earlier on before Paul went to Jakarta and Bill had gone to Bangkok. Bill, happily for me, told Paul, "You've got to talk to this guy before you make a decision," so John Kelly, who was the new DAS at State, even paid my way to go back to Washington to have the interview. Paul always thought very carefully before he made up his mind on just about everything, and he usually made up his mind right about things, not only in this case but in others. We had a good

interview and kept going on and on, and he finally said, "Well, okay, I'm really very interested but I really can't decide now," and I said, "Paul, right from here I'm going to go see Larry Eagleburger, and I know he's going to offer me a job, and if I don't have a job, if Larry tells me he wants me to do something, I've got to say yes. There's no question about it." Paul said, "Really?" and I said, "That's right. I'm telling you, right from here I'm going to see Larry Eagleburger." He said, "Well, okay, do you want this job? I'll offer you this job." I said, "Right, okay, I'll take it." And that's what happened. I went to see Larry. Larry had been on my calendar. I knew he was going to ask me to do something, which he did, and I said, "Larry, I've just come from Paul, and he's offered me this job and I'm taking it." He said, "Well, you're right. That is a better job, so godspeed."

Q: He was the Deputy Secretary at that time.

HUGHES: Right. It was a great job. As I told Secretary Cheney, Dick Cheney, later, I said, "Mr. Secretary, this would have been a great job even without the war," because it took me into our defense and security relationships and in that way into some aspects of our political relationships with the whole region, all of the Arab countries, and Israel. Of course, Israel is our biggest defense collaborator in the area, and Egypt is second and then, of course, the Gulf States. That became more important as the second Gulf War occurred. A lot of travel in the region; understanding of the Washington bureaucracy; working not only within the Defense Department and JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] but also with the Agency (CIA), with State very closely on a day-to-day basis, hour-by-hour basis in some cases; the NSC [National Security Council] system, the NSC staff and part of that was attending a lot of the deputies' meetings in part of the NSC system, which was shared by Bob Gates at that time as the Deputy National Security Advisor. So it was a fascinating experience not only to have been a witness to some of that but to have been a participant and also to have had the opportunity to make some inputs in my office. Of course, when the Gulf War started, then we were completely focused and directed at that event, and as a result we were oftentimes meeting on a day-by-day basis with Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell and others. Norm Schwarzkopf was here or out there in the field.

Q: I assume you were perhaps less involved with the U.S. preparations for Desert Storm and more perhaps with the coalition, working with the other Gulf States who are our allies and partners.

HUGHES: Well, there were two things that we were mainly coached on. One was policy justification of what we tried to do. Secretary Cheney once told me that the testimony that we prepared for him on the Hill was probably the best single statement of why we were doing what we were going to do. Even immediately after the invasion, the President was going out to Colorado, and Paul and I talked and he asked us to do, my office to do, a couple paragraphs of things that could be included in the President's speech, which we did. Secretary Cheney liked it, and

he faxed it over to Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, who was on board the plane, for the President to use. It turned out the President didn't use it, and there's some history about what was in his mind at that case and his conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher and so forth. So from the very beginning my office was asked to put this together. What should the policy background be? What should the historic and the U.S. national interest justification be? We had some really outstanding people in that office, and we were able to pull up very quickly. Of course, this had been a part of our discussion too. What is our interest in the region? The U.S. national interests in the region weren't created on August 2nd of 1990. This was a part of our daily bread and butter. What were our interests, and how would we react on our interests? So there were those kinds of things for the NSC system, the testimony and other things for Secretary Cheney, for his news programs, for his interviews, for his meetings and so forth, and as a part of that too, his coalition for getting people on board, I was one of those who were with Secretary Cheney on his trip to go see King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdul and the others.

I think this is known. If I recall correctly, it was a Sunday morning, and we knew something was going to happen and so we all came in to work on that Sunday morning and we brought luggage with us. We weren't sure what was going to happen, but we knew something was going to happen. So I was meeting at the White House, and Secretary Cheney came back. He was a little uncomfortable, and so we said, "What happened?" He said, "Well, they decided that the President was going to send somebody to Saudi Arabia. We've all been talking with Prince Bandar, and he's been talking with them, and it's clear the President is going to send somebody. It looks like maybe it's going to be General Schwarzkopf, Arnold Schwarzkopf." I said to the Secretary, "Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, that's the wrong guy. They're not looking for a military guy; they're looking for a policy guy, they're looking for a guy who can speak for the President on policy and a commitment level." I said, "It's got to be either you or Brent Scowcroft." He said, "Well, I don't know." It was clear that he was a little uncomfortable with the decision when he came back from the White House too. So we encouraged him in his discomfort. Paul was there, Harry Rowen, who was the Assistant Secretary, and so Cheney said, "Yes, I think you guys are right, I think this is right," so we picked up the phone and called Scowcroft and said, "You know, Brent, I'm not so sure that's right. I know the direction it was going, but here are some considerations maybe to think about," and so forth, and Brent said, "Okay, I'll call you back." So in the meantime Norm Schwarzkopf was there, so the Secretary had a meeting with Schwarzkopf, a couple of his guys, Wolfowitz, myself and a few others, and he said, "Well, right now we've got to plan if Norm is going to go," so Norm said, "Okay, I've got my plane, but I need to fly back. I came up here in a small plane. I need to go back to Tampa to pick up my own plane. All my coms [communications] on that." Cheney said, "Look, Art Hughes is my guy on this trip. He is my representative. Everything you do, he's got to be there, Norm." "Fine, okay." I had known Schwarzkopf before. Well, I had made it a point to meet him right after I went on board, because it was clear from some of

the issues we had that ISA, NESA and CENTCOM [Central Command] were naturally allies vis-à-vis JCS, vis-à-vis the Navy, so it was important to have a very good relationship of mutual trust and good communication. I think Schwarzkopf found it very useful too. Norm said, "Fine, okay," so we went out and Norm was talking to these guys about giving orders and so forth, so I went back into Cheney's outer office to use the phone. Cheney saw me and looked out and said, "Art, don't miss the plane. Is Norm gone?" I said, "No, no, sir, he's standing right here." So literally we piled in the van and were on our way to Andrews [Air Force Base], and then we got a phone call that the President had changed his mind and was sending Cheney. So we got in the plane. Cheney came out in a helicopter a few minutes later, and then we took off.

Q: Was Cheney on the same plane?

HUGHES: Yes, well, we all got on Cheney's plane.

Q: Schwarzkopf, too?

HUGHES: Yes, so there was Cheney, Bob Gates, from State, Dick Clark, Norm Schwarzkopf, Paul Wolfowitz, some others and myself. After we got settled in, Cheney called for a meeting in the conference room of the airplane, going through what the approach should be, how it should be done, what the commitment was on behalf of the President. Cheney said, "Okay, I think we've got it now. Who's going to write this up?" And everybody just automatically looked at me, because I was the relatively junior guy at the table, for one thing, plus I guess they thought I was able to do it in decent form. So Cheney said, "Okay, you write this all up. We're going to get some sleep." So I started putting all this stuff together and, of course, the secretaries typed it up. When everybody woke up X hours later, they had copies of stuff, and everybody looked at it and there were some edits and fixes and changes and so forth, and a clean version was done, and that's what the Secretary used.

Q: Do you want to say anything more about the Saudi dimension, and on that trip or in other respects were you dealing with other Gulf States? Were they important?

HUGHES: Of course, the Saudis were the key to the other Gulf States. They are first among equals. There's no question about it. It was clear that they had to be approached, they had to be brought on board before the others would make any kind of commitment. As I mentioned, there had been a lot of discussion with Prince Bandar here in Washington. He had been talking with his father and with King Fahd as well. So a good bit of it was prime, but it was important for the President to make a commitment and the commitment would have two parts. One, we commit ourselves to doing what is necessary to undo that; and secondly, to commit ourselves to leaving the kingdom when the job is done and you ask us to go. Both parts of those commitments were made. Afterward, maybe too rapidly in

some respects, we were prepared and we did withdraw, and then we reached accommodation early on [how the] Saudis [would] maintain certain things there, too. But after the meeting in Saudi Arabia, Secretary Cheney went to Alexandria to meet President Mubarak, who was also very key to this obviously, and then to go home to appease the President. But he asked Paul Wolfowitz to take a small group and go around to the other Gulf States. So Paul and a JCS, a J3, 5 from JCS - I'm sorry, from CENTCOM, not JCS - a J5 from CENTCOM and myself and a couple of others hit four countries in one day and then went back to Washington, G5.

Q: Roughly when was this trip?

HUGHES: It was in August 1990. I think we left on Sunday, August 5th, and arrived there on the 6th.

Q: This was just a few days after the invasion?

HUGHES: Which occurred on August 2nd. It was August 1st our time; it was August 2nd in Europe.

Q: One of the remarkable things is that this was all put in place very quickly and then implemented over some months.

HUGHES: I remember on August 1st there had been a meeting at the State Department in Bob Timmit's office that day, with principals or deputies talking about is it going to happen or is it not going to happen, and instructions were given. NEA was going to do another message from the President to Saddam. I remember I went home and it was about - just sitting down to eat dinner - I guess it was about 7:30, and I got a call from Harry Rowen who said, "It's happened." I said, "Okay, I'll be there." You know, there's a closed circuit classified TV system set by the U.S. Government to have meetings. We were all at the Pentagon, and a list of things had been drawn up to do then, to approve at that meeting, and Scowcroft came on. Well, there were a couple of meetings by that TV system. I don't remember the exact number, but on such things as freezing all the assets and messages to partners and all the staff, and Scowcroft said, "Well, at the right time, I'll get the President to sign these orders and freeze all the assets," and that was done very, very well, because that did make a difference - just one of the examples that sticks in my mind. Of course, once the Saudis were on board, the Egyptians were on board, all of the other Gulf States were extremely good and positive and very helpful. In some cases they said, "Okay, what do you need?" "We need ramp space, we need water, we need accommodations for air crews. We've got to get air crews in there right away to demonstrate the commitment. It's going to take awhile to get many of the ground troops in. We've got to get forces here right away." And in many cases they didn't say, you know, "Gee, we don't have a status-of-forces agreement or who's going to be the contracting officer or who's going to pay this." They said, "Okay," and they did it. Some of them had

considerable means, liquid assets, and others did not. Okay, that's good.

Q: If you want to sort of step back for a minute, you had been in the Department of Defense about a year when all this began to happen. To what extent during that first year were you spending a lot of time on things related to Iraq or the Gulf or the potential for this kind of thing happening?

HUGHES: Well, we were, because, as I said, CENTCOM and ISA, NESA were natural allies against Navy and JCS. We were fighting a rear guard action to keep a decent-sized presence in the Gulf. The Navy wanted to reduce the number of frigates out there. JCS was supporting the Navy position, and we kept arguing, CENTCOM kept going, "Wait a minute. Our national interest demands on ongoing presence are not that great out there. Things are not all that stable out there. If there's a reduction in presence, that's going to be read, it's going to be interpreted in certain ways that are going to be inimical to our interests." As I said, it was a bit of a rear guard action. We were somewhat successful, but it was that history of going into, for example, the nature commitments being made going back to President Truman and going back to President Roosevelt. Told Kegan Hasaad Abdul Aziz on board the Quincy [U.S. Navy ship] on Great Crater Lake and what subsequent Presidents, both Republican and Democrat, had said about the Gulf region and the nature of the commitment that was either expressed or implied in various communications. So that was all something we had been working on and put together and had it ready at our fingertips, so to speak, when the real crisis occurred. Because of that too, there was a good sense of who we were, where NESA was coming from and who the other players were. We had been involved in this enough, and I think probably some of them thought, okay, NESA from our discussions, they do know what they're talking about. They are suitable players in this game, so to speak, here in Washington.

With respect to Iraq, frankly we thought it would be useful to try to open up some access to the Iraqi military and the Republican Guard. State and we were pretty much in line on that. Others were as well. There was some caution, but we were trying to find ways in which just simply to have access, to know who these guys were and where they were coming from. Of course, nothing ever came of all that.

Q: How about the South Asia part of your area of responsibility? Did that take much time - Pakistan, Afghanistan, India?

HUGHES: Well, it did, because we had the nuclear certification issue with Pakistan. In fact, the first one my office prepared, and made a recommendation, and this was a real problem because of things that we knew were going on, and yet we had broader political interests. We tried to put together a package to change the dynamic, change the basis of discussion here in Washington. In fact, we talked to some congressmen, and we had several discussions with Secretary Cheney and we talked with some people in Congress about what do you do about the Pressler Amendment and is this really in our U.S. national interest. Another

thing that sticks in my mind: we prepared a package and recommended Secretary Cheney send it over to General Scowcroft with some ideas on how do you deal with Pakistan, the Pressler Amendment, and South Asian nuclear questions. He signed it over to Brent Scowcroft on August 1st, 1990, never to be seen or heard from again. Of course, with the Indians we had no defense relationship. Well, that's another whole story about what that all meant. But the U.S. was trying to expand its defense relations with India for a number of reasons. One of the projects was a light new fighter. Harry Rowen and I went to India to pursue some discussions across the board, and I can remember the Indians were very tenacious, as they are, in pursuing their own national interests. Fine. They were pressing like mad not only for expansion of this program but also expansion of the technology release. Not only would they get certain things, they would be taught how to make them. And we went, "Now wait a minute." At one meeting with the Minister of Defense, the science advisor, who was a very serious, important guy in that context, kept pushing for release of this. Finally I just said, "Excuse me, wait a minute. Maybe we're trying to be too ambitious here. Maybe we need to just walk away from this whole project and think about something that we can agree on in order to get some kind of motion going." They understood exactly what I was saying.

Q: You ask for too much.

HUGHES: They understood exactly what I was saying. But for other reasons that in the end did not go ahead. During the first year we spent quite a bit of time, plus with the Moroccans with whom we had longstanding relationships going back to World War II, the Algerians trying to begin certain kinds of cooperation. When our Navy passes through, you do something like a joint exercise like a rescue at sea, very benign kind of things but to begin to develop certain kinds of relationships. Our basic approach was to develop certain kinds of windows into military establishments and institutions was very important not only on a defense basis but for politics because of the roles that the militaries played in most of those countries. We spent a good amount of time with those kind of issues as well as the major ones, the defense relationship with Israel and the defense relationship with Egypt.

Q: Was Libya a major preoccupation during this period?

HUGHES: No, not really. That was dealt with more on a political level, because that was after, of course, PanAm 103, that was after the sanctions regime and so forth. In a certain sense only when we had ships transiting the Gulf of Sidra and that kind of thing that we would make sure people were aware of what were, from the U.S. side, the Navy's intentions, plans and so forth, but that was a very small part of it.

Q: You mentioned the defense cooperation relationship with Israel but also with Egypt. In the case of Egypt, we were involved in producing tanks and all sorts of

things. I guess my question to you is: Was it because it was really important in terms of our defense cooperation relationship, or was it more kind of post Camp David politically necessary to use up some of these large amounts of funds that we were prepared to give Egypt?

HUGHES: Well, a bit of both really. First, we had a commitment made on the part of Camp David, and as a part of that commitment, of course, to maintain it was credibility, was follow-through so as to engender, maximize, ongoing Egyptian cooperation, ongoing Egyptian commitment. There was not only the Egypt-Israel dynamic but also the fact that Egypt is the single most important Arab state and plays a tremendous leadership role in the Arab world. As Egypt was able to demonstrate that the Camp David agreement was not only in Egypt's national interest to make Egypt stronger militarily and economically, but somehow worked through to showing that it also had a relevancy and importance and a positive effect with respect to broader Arab interests. That was a tougher sell, of course, and that was only gradually accomplished. But it was for both of those reasons, Egypt's importance as Egypt even apart from the Israeli-Egypt dynamic.

Q: How about Lebanon? Did that take much of your efforts?

HUGHES: No, because we had no defense or supply relationship, because there were legal restrictions on it. There were some nonmilitary kinds of things, or nonlegal kinds of things. There were some sales, but this was very small.

Q: You were primarily involved in all of these countries with the policy issues not so much. There is a Defense Supply Agency, or whatever it's called, that would actually handle the nuts and bolts.

HUGHES: We needed to work very closely with DSAA, because levels and delivery was a part of the relationship, part of the commitment, and so forth. As a matter of fact, the DSAA Director also reported to the Assistant Secretary of ISA, and we worked very closely with DSAA on an ongoing basis.
Q: Okay, is there anything else we should say about this period from '89 to '91 in the Department of Defense?

HUGHES: Well, just to say with respect to Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as a part of USDP, the Under Secretary of Defensive Policy, operation, it was our responsibility to make recommendations regarding activities, actions and policies not only in coalition building but how do you end the war and where do you want to be at the end of the war and how should the United States behave, what should the United States do in order to maximize its position after the war, where do we want to be. So we did a number of papers and had a number of discussions with Secretary Cheney. By the way, I'll mention here we asked Secretary Cheney if he'd be interested in having a number of discussion groups regarding Iraq, that part of the world and so forth, and he agreed. So we invited some scholars and

writers and so forth and held a number of seminars with Secretary Cheney in which he participated - most of them he participated in. That was very educational for all of us, and I think it also bespoke his deep interest in learning more and getting a better grasp so that, when he met with the principals and met with the President, he had a greater understanding and a greater level of comfort about what he was proposing from the Defense Department's point.

Anyway, we did a number of papers regarding how the war should end and so forth, ranging from making sure that when Kuwait is liberated that there is an Arab participation, there is a Kuwaiti participation in liberation of their own country and so forth, and it would not be an American show. Also, we did some work with respect to where do we want to be, what are the aims of the war, and we were very frustrated about that. My whole office was frustrated by that, and USDP was frustrated, because essentially JCS, the Chairman, did its best to lock out the civilian side of the Defense Department. I don't want to exaggerate that, but it was clear that they were looking at this mainly from a military point of view, and as the thing progressed from a military to a military-political and then to a political-military, they were not willing to entertain other ideas essentially. And I think part of it was that Colin Powell, for whom I have enormous respect and personal affection really, his experience, of course, as National Security Advisor, I think, subconsciously gave him a sense that he understood all the issues, he knew all the issues and he didn't really need any outside kibitzing. We did a number of papers regarding end of war including using the Euphrates River as the war border, not a political border but a war border, and to destroy all equipment south of the river, that nothing should go back across the river except people on foot, for a number of reasons: to keep them from reconstituting, to have a certain psychological impact. I remember we wrote in one paper for the Secretary the mental image we want to try to create is that of the German troops being defeated after Stalingrad, marching east over the snow. I think we all when we were kids saw those clips - you know, devastating in a sense. It was clearly a beaten army. If you take Iraq’s Army Republican Guards as well as the regular Army, and send them across the Euphrates only on foot, this is going to have some impact. You never know what the impact will be, but try to maximize the possibility for problems inside the regime. Frankly, below the very top level there was almost no discussion about bringing the war to a close, and for those who have read Norm Schwarzkopf's books, it will show that Norm was surprised too. There were a couple of books particularly that I would suggest. One is Michael Gordon and Bernie Trainer's book *The General's War*, and another one called *Into the...* written by Tom Clancy together with General Fred Franks, who was the 7th Corps Commander, who was up there in that area. He was surprised by the end of the war. So the popular understanding is that the war was brought to a close because of the politics of the road of death and what they achieved, that the troops were out of Kuwait. But there was not adequate thought given to the next political step.

I recall that even the meeting at Safwan, the JCS tried to keep it from the civilian

side of the Pentagon. We found out about, my guys, through personal contacts - not my guys, the NESA guys through their personal contacts found out about it and said, "Did you know that General Schwarzkopf is going to a meeting in Safwan with the Iraqis tomorrow?" I said, "No, for God's sake!" So I went up front, and they didn't know it either, the Under Secretary of Defensive Policy. He actually was out of town, and so I talked to my boss, Harry Rowen, the Acting, and I said, "They won't tell us what the guidance is, but here are a bunch of things," so we did up some guidance to Schwarzkopf covering a lot of things, aircraft, chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction, prisoners, all kinds of things. We tried to get it to Schwarzkopf and the JCS. I don't know if Powell ever saw it, but I know that the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs, a Three-Star and a J5 who I talked with, they saw it, and it came back to me, "No, these things are already curbed in guidance, which of course simply was not a fact. You can tell I feel some exasperation on this, and the books that I pointed out also pose serious questions about how the situation on the ground and the future was characterized to the President. The Gordon Trainer book pointed out, from a person at the meeting in the White House, that the maps that were taken over by Chairman of the JCS weren't even taken out of the cases, so there was not even any explanation to the President in any kind of clear way what was going on. But I think that was a real failure that was unnecessary.

General Franks, who was the 7th Corps Commander on the ground out there, said - and I talked to him, too - "We did it, we did use the Euphrates as a border." It's a real river. It's not something that you drive Jeeps across or tanks across. We could have bottled up, we could have kept all those folks out, we could have kept all that equipment. Now I'm not making any claim that following the recommendations we made would have made a 180- degree difference in what happened in Roth, but you've got to try to maximize the chances for things happening in American's national interest.

Q: Was Secretary Cheney kept out of the loop in some of these matters, or were you able to get up to him, or was he kind of kept to the side as well in that period?

HUGHES: No, but things were happening very, very fast, and there was very strong proclivity, an understandable one, absolutely understandable one, to listen very carefully and then accept the advice of the JCS, the Chairman of the JCS.

Q: This was seen as a great victory, and why prolong where there would be chances of losses?

HUGHES: Well, there was this fact too quite frankly, and I saw it up close even at the very beginning, the next day after, on August 2nd. Secretary Cheney never served in the military. He had a series of student deferments. I think that plus the fact of who Colin Powell was, who Cheney selected to be Chairman - recommended to the President, that is, to be Chairman - meant for a great amount of care and work on making sure that the relationship was a positive one that

worked and that was a collegial one. But I can remember that first meeting on August 2nd when Cheney called in Powell, Wolfowitz, and Wolfowitz took me along, and there must have been about six or eight people in his office. He said, "Okay, where are we? What do we know?" And he kept asking Colin Powell, "What are our military options?" and Colin Powell kept saying - this was all a very free-flowing, informal conversation - "Tell us what you want to do, and we'll see if we can do it." Cheney said, "What are our options? We owe it to the President to tell him what the options are." And Powell said, "No, you tell us what you want to deal with," and finally Cheney said, "Look, I need to have those options, and would you please give me those options?" And Powell sat back and said, "Yes, sir, Mr. Secretary," and that ended the meeting. That was the first time in that meeting that he said, "Yes, sir," or "Mr. Secretary." Before that, it was all very informal. I mean it wasn't a Colin and Dick kind of thing, but it was, "Yes, sir, Mr. Secretary." This has got to be seen in the historical context too of Vietnam and all the things that had happened and the fear of the military being pushed out ahead and then look behind them and no politicians are back behind them. That's all understandable, so I'm not making a judgment here, I'm just saying that's what happened.

At the end, to come back to your question, everything was happening very, very fast. I think JCS wanted to do certain things. They surprised Schwarzkopf. I think when they went to Cheney, my judgment is that he was probably a little surprised. The guys, the commanders on the ground, were surprised. I also had a very interesting, very lively meeting with Colin Powell when I heard that he wanted to try to get the troops out of Kuwait just as soon as possible. Skip Gnehm, who was the ambassador without a country, was in town, and I called and I said, "Skip, we've got to go see Colin Powell. I don't think I can do this alone. I've got to have you there too. I think maybe we can do it together." So Skip and I went to see Colin Powell. We said, "Mr. Chairman, this is absolutely wrong. This is absolutely wrong. We'll talk about the political aspect. We'll suggest it also is wrong militarily. You can ask your own guys. We can't pretend to give you advice on the military side, but politically it's absolutely wrong." And we let out hammer and tongs. In fact, Powell's military assistant, who was a colonel and to the general officer, said, "I've never sat in a meeting like that with the Chairman." As it turned out, I think the fact that Skip and the Ambassador were there was key, was absolutely critical. Colin would have listened to me, but you know. As it turned out, what we were trying to do became the policy, the schedule. When I went to go see Colin when I left the Defense Department, the first thing he said was, "Well, Art, we always didn't see eye to eye on things, but we got some things done anyway, didn't we?

Q: When was the session with Skip Gnehm?

HUGHES: Well, it must have been just several days after the fighting stopped, because Skip was still in town.

Q: He went into Kuwait pretty soon?

HUGHES: Yes, he went very soon and raised the flag back. It must have been just before he left.
Q: But there was an inclination on the part of Powell to pull our troops out of Kuwait right away even though they had just gone back there.

HUGHES: That's right, and, of course, we had talked about part of the President's commitment to leave when the job was done, to follow through, to be seen to be following through. In fact, what Defense wanted to do - the military planner - quite rightly, they wanted to get the front lines out and put in new troops behind it. We said, "Well, wait a minute, don't bring troops over from the States to do that, because then this will undermine their belief in the President's commitment. Can't you rotate some people in theater?"

Q: Okay, this is a continuation on May 6th of the interview with Arthur Hughes. Art, I think we've just about finished your assignment to the Defense Department. Is there anything else that you want to add? Or if not, why don't we go on to where you went next.

HUGHES: Just to say that that was really a wonderful experience from a personal point of view because of the quality of the people that I was working with over there. I mentioned some differences of view that we had with JCS, but really a first-rate bunch of people there and under USDP. I really enjoyed that from a human point of view too.

Q: And as a Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State, do you think it made sense for you to have that kind of a position? They appreciated having an FSO?

HUGHES: I just for the life of me can't understand the State Department's giving up jobs like that. I mean, nowhere else would a Foreign Service Officer get the kind of experience that those jobs offer. I mentioned earlier on what Larry Eagleburger said, "Yes, you're right, that's a better job. Take it," because Larry had that kind of a job himself at one point in his career. Yet there's a proclivity at State to give those kind of jobs out.

Q: And I think some Foreign Service Officers prefer to be in a lesser job at main State where they can bump into the Deputy Secretary in the cafeteria or whatever, or feel that they're out of the loop if they're across the river, and so on. That was not your experience?

HUGHES: No, well, we had some really outstanding people in that job too, Bob Pelletreau and Skip Gnehm, of course.

Q: Okay, where did you go next, and how did that come about?

HUGHES: Well, I was nominated by the President to be Chief of Mission to Sanaa in Yemen. I think they didn't quite know what to do with me when I was leaving Defense, and I told them I wanted to go overseas, and so they said, "Well, do you speak French? Maybe we could send you to North Africa." "No, I don't speak any French." So Pat and I went off to Yemen.

Q: I've never been in Yemen, so you're going to have to help me a little bit on this. What were your main responsibilities? What were your challenges? What kind of mission did you have? What were our interests and what were some of your objectives?

HUGHES: Well, it's the poorest Arab country probably. It's down in the far corner of the Arabian Peninsula.

Q: Without oil?

HUGHES: Well, a little bit of oil, but the main importance had always been, or seemed to be, the Arabic Straits, controlling the entrance from the Arabian Sea into the Red Sea, and the fact that, because of poverty and instability and in South Yemen the Peoples Democratic of Yemen was a Soviet client, also meant that Yemen played a certain part in the great East-West conflict arena, although by the time I got there in '91, there had been unity between the two parts of Yemen, mainly because the Soviet Union collapsed and the South Yemen economy collapsed and they had no better options at that point.

When I got there, the main tasks were (a) to try to get Yemen to distance itself from Iraq and Saddam Hussein, although there had been a historical relationship between Yemen and Iraq even before Saddam and a bit of a client relationship between Iraq and Yemen in later periods because of Iraq's tremendous oil wealth and subsidization of even Yemen's national budget, for example, from Iraq as well as private individual payments to parties and individuals. Yemen had, they would say, the misfortune of being in the Arab seat in the Security Council at the time of the outbreak of the Gulf War, that is to say, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and didn't quite know how to behave or how to react. So on the very first vote, the condemnation of the invasion, Yemen did not appear. They are on the books as having abstained, but actually they did not vote. Abdul Ashtar, their permanent representative, just could not get instructions from Sanaa, and so he decided the better part of it was not to go to the meeting, which he didn't do. Their voting record throughout on a number of Security Council resolutions was mixed at best, and Secretary Baker was furious after his meetings with the Yemenese including President Sala at Thanksgiving time 1990 in which he had hoped to least get the Yemenese to abstain on the most important resolution, that is, authorizing all necessary means to the international community to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait, and the Yemenese voted no along with the Cubans.

Also, putting the Yemenese together with Cubans didn't do the Yemenese any

good either. But by the time I arrived and the effort was made to continue to get the enemies to distance themselves from Iraq, they had not offered any material support, just to do it, and to distance was allowed anyway, but it was more of a political support and sympathy. There was that. There was also the effort to see if Yemen, for its own best interests, would adjust its policies and positions to be more in the moderate Arab mainstream. The South Yemenese in particular but also North Yemen had been a bit of a haven for various and assorted terrorists over the years. At the time of unity, though, we had to discuss in Washington. I attended a meeting for the Defense Department as to whether or not to continue them being on the terrorism list. The South was, the North was not, and because of assurances which Ambassador Charlie Dunbar got from the Yemenese at the time, we agreed to continue relations with the new Yemen as if they were from the old, and not put the new country on the terrorism list.

They fulfilled that obligation very satisfactorily if not absolutely one hundred percent, but very satisfactorily including providing information on various people and giving out and taking out a few other things. So there was the terrorism. There was also American increased business interest, the discovery of oil by Yemen Hunt Oil Company, desire to create business conditions welcoming investment flows, repatriation of profits, that kind of thing, and also a humanitarian interest in improving their economy, assistance improving health, and so forth. Their position during the second Gulf War had led to the expulsion of about 800,000 Yemeni workers mainly from Saudi Arabia and from other Gulf States, which had a tremendous and negative impact on their economic well-being, per-capita GNP. So part of our efforts were aimed at certain humanitarian and developmental objectives as well.

Q: We had an aid program of some size?

HUGHES: Well, it was a total of about $35,000,000 a year before November 1990, and after November 1990 it went down to about $3½ million a year. There was a decision to continue a couple of projects, strictly health and also the IMET folks could complete their course work after that. Then it went back up to about $12½ million a year, which is still very modest, and then AID decided to phase out the program and to concentrate just on a few, and that's being revisited now.

Q: Peace Corps?

HUGHES: The Peace Corps was there in quite significant numbers, left to run up to the Yemen Civil War, and did not go back, but I understand from talking with David Newton the other day, who just left there coming back here as Ambassador, that the Peace Corps has decided to go back.

Q: You mentioned the Yemen Civil War. Remind me when that was. Was that while you were there, or one phase of it?

HUGHES: The background - just a little capsule of it - is when unity occurred in May of 1990, it was basically on Northern terms because the South had no options basically. They were no longer needing the subsidies from the Soviets and their friends. The same thing happened there as happened in Cuba, but worse. So they agreed to unity without a lot of hard agreements on things, the government in Sanaa, the former leader of the South would be the Vice President, and alternate ministers, Deputy Ministers, and divide up everything. But it was clear that President Sala from the North had the upper hand and was slowly but surely marginalizing the guys from the South and particularly the leadership, Aza Abib, who also had problems within his own party, with his own former colleagues from the South, many of whom were trying to marginalize it too. It came to a head in 1994, and basically Abib decided that he had to roll the dice and go for broke, because if he didn't, he was going to be out or simply a figurehead. He was becoming a figurehead along the way. He had taken a trip to the States in which his erstwhile number two within the party had done some negotiating with Sala, which got out.

Q: While he was gone?

HUGHES: While he was in the States. My mental image is of a - he did go to Disneyland, and so here's Ali Sadam Abib in Disneyland while his number two is negotiating behind his back with the President of Yemen. I think it's a great kind of mental image. Anyway, so he never came back to Sanaa. He went back down to Aden and plotted and so forth. The United States did not want to become an intermediary, but we thought it was in our interest to play the role of good offices for the sake of stability in the Arabian Peninsula. So I did some mini-shuttles back and forth between Sanaa and Aden, a number of meetings, and on and on, in which I basically told Ali Sadam Abib that if he tried to push it to the ultimate, that is, attempt to break away, that he would have no international support. I should have been more explicit and said from the United States, because at the time I didn't know that the Saudis and others were telling him that they would offer him support. Well, he did try it and, of course, he lost and he's now in exile in Oman. A lot of other Yemenese are in exile in other places.

Q: You tried that while you were there, or was it after you had left?

HUGHES: No, I was still there as Chief of Mission in Sanaa.

Q: Was there fighting then?

HUGHES: Well, the war started in May with an air raid. There had been a skirmish in Kasern in which both Northern and Southern units were stationed just north of Sanaa, a tank battle within the confines of Kasern, and my Defense attaché was there, because one of the things that we tried to do is we set up a military commission to try to reestablish continence between the Northern military and Southern units which had not been fully integrated. So our Defense

attaché and a few of the others, the Jordanians - and the Jordanians actually sent some people from Oman - would visit and try to keep things calm to keep from something starting even accidentally or maybe a plot that would work. I think it was useful, because I think it delayed things awhile, and I think it did probably lower casualties because of the way things had moved around a little bit, so there wasn't that confrontation, but there was that tank battle, but the actual war did start with an area on Sanaa from the south, so we woke up to an air raid and bombs being dropped and anti- aircraft. It's a very interesting alarm clock.

Q: Well, it is, and it's also quite a responsibility for an ambassador these days.

HUGHES: Well, we got everybody out, courtesy of the U.S. Air Force. No Americans were hurt, and every American that wanted to get out got out. We drew down about 65 percent.

Q: And it was largely official Americans? There probably weren't too many non-official U.S. citizens?

HUGHES: Not too many, because some had left earlier on, but there were about five or six gunboats, but there were a few hundred.

Q: You stayed and the other key people did?

HUGHES: Yes.

Q: When you were conducting this informal shuttle, good offices, trying to avoid this happening, were you doing it pretty much on your own as the United States Ambassador or were other countries - you mentioned Jordan in the military area - were others also concerned and involved or pretty much just us?

HUGHES: It was more us than the others. Others, I think, occasionally would try to preach moderation and that kind of thing, but there was not much in the way of direct contact with either Abib or Hosala. There was some, there was some, and we were all using the same sheet of music.

Q: But the Saudi role in this instance was to stir things up.

HUGHES: Well, their view was that their interests were served by having two Yemens which could be played off against each other rather than one united Yemen with 14 or 15 million people. There was a tremendous amount of antipathy between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Of course, the Saudis were on the side of the Royalists during the Yemen Revolution, '68 and '67, and Egyptians came in on the side of Grecians, so it became kind of a Egypt-Saudi war. But an enormous amount of popular antipathy, because in 1934 the Saudis had taken three historically Yemen provinces in the North because of some claims and confusion in Yemen. Historically Yemen had been less a strongly governed

country than [a tribal society], but still there's the historic identification of being Yemen. But the three provinces, which were quite good provinces, were taken by Saudi and are still Saudi. So there's a lot of popular resentment against Saudi Arabia. And the Saudis have a policy of direct involvement, pay subsidies, and there have been occasionally allegations of plots by Saudi Arabia. But as it turned out, the Saudis did buy them such things as MIG 29s, the Southerners, and sent them a fair amount of supplies and so forth, and this all went to an air field in the South called Arvion, which is down by Kulla. When there was almost no resistance, that all collapsed very quickly after Aden collapsed, and the forces from the government captured file cabinets with all the records of deliveries, where they came from, who paid for them, all that stuff. I think it's a mark of a maturity of judgment that they held all this stuff to negotiate with the Saudis and other Arab States which supported their breakaway, to negotiate arrangements and *modus ovendi* as opposed to just releasing it and attacking. That was very wise on their part frankly.
Q: Who was the government getting most of its support at this time?

HUGHES: The government in Sanaa?

Q: Yes.

HUGHES: Well, I think the most important thing is that the kind of government which Allis Ali Abib and the others ran in the South was not a popular government. Even though it was the People's Democratic Republic, they did some awful things, absolutely awful things, and there was a popular feeling, "Why should we fight for Abib?" Now, then you get involved in some tribal stuff, even a bit of fundamentalist, nonfundamentalist stuff. I talked with a military commander from Wadi Hidramow, and he said, "We had no interest in fighting for Abib, but when the Northern troops started sacking [others], then we had to defend just our homes, so to speak." And that was pretty well understood by Sala and people in the North that came in. But that's the main thing. One of the things that was useful too was right when the war stopped I told the Yemenese I wanted to go Aden immediately. I wanted to see what really happened, because there was a barrage of propaganda and information that Aden was really just treated horribly and so forth, and even during the war it was shelled. So I got a call back - this was the Minister of Interior whom I was talking with - and said, "Okay, Sala will give you his helicopter to go down there." I said, "Okay, I'll go tomorrow, because I'm going back to the States to tell Washington what's going on and decide what we're going to do, also to get my daughter married." I felt a little trepidation, because they had a lot of Soviet helicopters, which sometimes had a tendency to fall down. So I went out to the airport. I was glad it was a Bell helicopter and I knew the American company that maintained them, and so I had a sigh of relief actually.

So we flew down to the airport and right over the main stronghold base that the Soviets had built north of Aden on the plain, which took a lot of pounding. It was apparently just full of underground warrens including underground airplane

machine repair shops, and so it was clear it was a kind of a point of power projection in mind for the Soviet strategic interest. But anyway, we landed at the airport in Aden. The main terminal which had been built, I think, by the French had collapsed. There were damaged planes sitting there, ammunition boxes strewn all over the place, rocket boxes - just total chaos - bullet holes all through all the big hangars and so forth. There was still a little shooting going on, so we drilled in what had been the headquarters of the Northern army and talked with people there. And Turnishk did come down the next day too, so I stayed an extra day. I met with some of the Adenese whom I knew, people who had been in the government jointly and knew the government before and some private people, a couple lawyers. Some of the Southerners were very bitter, but some of the Southerners also were not happy but also understood that to a certain extent this was a continuation of their own internal coup that had occurred in '86, because - what's his name - the fellow who lost that coup was in exile in Damascus, but three of his brigades had actually gone to the North and were very instrumental in the civil war of 1994. His name has just escaped me. But there was a lot of complaint in the international press and propaganda media that people were being evicted from homes and so forth. Well, a lot of this was people who had been evicted from their homes in 1986 came back and knocked on the door and said, "Hey, remember me. This is my house. Out." In fact, many Adenese confirmed that to me. Well, you'd see these Toyota pick-up trucks heading north with furniture, television sets, refrigerators, anything they could get their hands on. The Northerners claimed that they were taking food down, and, of course, the Adenese said, "Keep your food, but we would like to keep our furniture."

Fortunately most of the crimes that were committed were against property, very few against people, very few, and the claims about indiscriminate shellings and bombings simply weren't true. There were some short rounds that fell in areas, but there was very little damage done. The only real damage I saw in certain areas were a few blocks right around the airport, and even there it was a couple houses damaged but that was all. The North won, Sala won. Sala's power was consolidated. The problem now is how do you pull the whole picture together, and they haven't done very well at that. There's a lot of carpetbagging going on, and Sala has given a certain carte blanche to people to go down to be the director of this, the director of that. Corruption, carpetbagging, as I said, and our message to the Yemenese all along has been to Sala personally. From others, [this] has been, this is not going to serve you on a long term; it's not going to serve Yemen well. There is an exile community that's active and trying to take over. I think Sala cut a deal with the Saudis. The Saudis would not subsidize actual physical attempts but will continue to subsidize the living expenses of people in Saudi Arabia.

Q: So there were exiles in Saudi Arabia but also in Oman and still Syria and other Arab countries?

HUGHES: Syria, Egypt, Oman, UAE [United Arab Emirates].

Q: United States probably?

HUGHES: The United States. Some have gotten exile status - refugee status, I'm sorry.

Q: This was roughly the situation not long after the war at the time you left?

HUGHES: I actually stayed more than three years. I stayed through November in order to give the next guy, David Loop, very experienced, well qualified. Had served in Yemen before, had been chief of mission before he was ambassador to Iraq.

Q: I did recall as you were talking about Aden in particular that I actually have been to Yemen, or at least to Aden.

HUGHES: Were you in the Navy?
Q: In 1965, a flight from Karachi to Nairobi stopped there for refueling. I remember getting off the plane and looking around.

HUGHES: That's before the Brits left. The Brits left in November '67.

Q: Yes, they were still there, and I guess it was a prosperous, important, strategic location for them.

HUGHES: A strategic location. The Brits came to Aden in numbers in the 1830s, and then after the opening of the Suez Canal, they reinforced because they thought that the French would be trying to come down the Red Sea, trying to down Suez, and put pressure on the British Empire. Aden became a very important point for the lifeline into India and then the lifeline into the Gulf as well. As petroleum began to develop, that was important early on. It was extremely prosperous, but two things killed Aden. One was the Communist government, and the other was the closure of Suez because of the '67 war and the development of different ships, different trading patterns and so forth.

Q: Supertankers.

HUGHES: Really killed Aden. But later because of the Communist government, it never recovered, didn't know how to recover. When I first went to Aden, I had the same feelings I had when I first went to East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The system had the same results in two entirely different cultures, just neglect, decay, lack of any kind of individual responsibility. Yet the Adenese in particular, but the South Yemenese, they felt a little bit more comfortable maybe because there was a system. The Brits have their system, and then the Communists have their system. It had a structure to it, and there was law and order except occasionally when the leaders of the party did whatever the hell they wanted to

do. But there was law and order. Traffic laws were obeyed. Certain things happened, whereas in the North there is no real system. There's tradition, there's co-option, accommodation, floating alliances, arrangements, everything's very subtle, in flux; and that was another thing that drove the Southerners crazy. It was very educational to watch this. The Southerners would come up, and they didn't know how to get a handhold on anything. If Sala's doing this with respect to a ministry there, "Well, how do you do it?" Or if there was an instruction came, something just happened. "Why did that happen? How do you counteract, where do you get a handhold to make it work your own will?" And they couldn't figure it out.

Q: You don't speak Arabic. How did you get along in terms of conversation, language? English?

HUGHES: Well, it was clearly a bit of a handicap. I'm glad that Newton went. He speaks Arabic. And I'm glad President Nasser speaks Arabic, because on one or two occasions I was alone with the President and yet I could not carry on a real conversation with him. Well, I'm glad that the government sent me there. I'm not going to criticize that judgment. There are an awful lot of Yemenese who speak English, mainly because there were no educational institutions in Yemen, and a lot of the Yemenese, even Northerners, went - walked literally - to Aden to go into the British school system to get an education, and then a lot of them went to Cairo for university education. Some went to Beirut to AUB [American University in Beirut] and elsewhere in the U.K. Then for the Southerners, a lot of them during the time of the Soviet empire, so to speak, went to Russia and other places, and a lot of times they studied English there. There were a lot of Yemeni engineers and technicians who speak Czech, German, Russian.

Q: We had a consulate, I guess, in Aden for a while.

HUGHES: Yes, we were thrown out in '67. Excuse me, it wasn't '67. In '73 we were thrown out.

Q: Did we have an embassy then?

HUGHES: There was an embassy. In fact, I was the first American official to go to the building after unity or after we were thrown out in '73. We were looking for the building. We knew it was on the waterfront down there, and there was another building that was just covered, overgrown, with bushes and all that stuff, and there were a bunch of guys there with machetes cutting and sweeping and all that stuff, and said, "No, no, this was the American Embassy," because I was looking for the port master for Aden. I wanted to talk to him. They said, "Well, the Southern Minister of Transportation - he's going into your old embassy. You'll find him. They're just opening it up." They were sweeping and cutting down stuff - nice little building, though. But I went in, and I went upstairs to the office, the outer office where the secretary was sitting, and I knew and I said, "Yes, this is

the embassy." The reason I could tell is there was an American four-drawer safe and one of those steel gray metal desks - remember those? - sitting there. I said, "Yes, I'm in the right place. This used to be the American Embassy."

Q: Anything else we should say about your period as United States Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen?

HUGHES: Well, there is some oil now, but it's probably about 600,000 barrels a day on a population base of 14 or 15 million, maybe even 500,000 barrels a day. Even in Oman, which is not seen as a terribly wealthy state, they've got a population base of about 2 million, and they're pushing a million barrels a day - just to give you an idea of the comparison - but extremely poor. I don't think anybody goes to Yemen without being captivated to a certain extent by the people, their charm, their wit, their courtesies, just the historical situation in which they find themselves. One doesn't have to go overboard to understand the historical situation in which cultures, people, countries find themselves and how they try to deal with it - Israel to a certain extent too, one could make that same kind of comment about. The Yemenese are really marvelous, marvelous people, exasperating at times like we ourselves are, but I found a kind of openness of spirit, a readiness to talk about anything, a willingness to listen if approached correctly. I think Ambassador Newton, Charlie Dunbar, people who have been there over at times - Skip Gnehm had a tour there - wish them well and wish that they will take wise decisions in their own long-term best interests. One of the questions I continuously pose, I'd say, "Well, okay, tell me how does what you're doing in this instance support your long-term interests, either domestically as a regional country or whatever." Now I suppose the same question could be asked here in the United States sometimes. But still I don't think generally one goes away without having a certain affection for a lot of people that they meet and a certain affection for the people and wish them well.

Q: Was access up to the highest level pretty easy for you?

HUGHES: Yes, it was. Well, it had not always been that way, of course, and I think they decided that it was in their best interests, particularly after what had happened in the second Gulf War, in Iraq, their poverty, and feeling isolated in the Arab world to a certain extent, to be seen to be working with the Americans was in their national interest.

Q: And even though we resented the position they took at the Security Council in November of '90 and took it out in a sense by cutback, cutdown, reduction of aid, we were willing to try to work with them in the period that you were there, try to get beyond that?

HUGHES: Well, get beyond that but based on adjustment in our own position, which, in fact, they did do. They did adjust their own position. This was made very clear from the very beginning, my very first day there when I went to present

my credentials, that this was an issue that had to be dealt with. We were very frank about that and very clear about that. The Yemenese would say, "Golly, our position's misunderstood, and I'd say, well, you know, from my job in Defense, I used to read what your official newspapers and official radio would say." I said, "I think I understand perfectly well what you were saying. I think basically you made a misjudgment." And to the Yemenese, as I got to know them, I'd say, "Maybe your calculus was right early on. What was the United States going to do but win? By about the 17th of August when our ground forces started to arrive, you should have a reconsideration about what you were going to do." We had a lot of very frank discussions. There was no doubt that this was an issue, and this was well known. There was an American interest in stability. If you can't engage and try to convince them to adjust and get them to understand why it would be of interest to do so, why bother to have anybody on the ground there?

Q: Did we also have an interest in liberalization, political, economic?

HUGHES: Well, that was the other aspect. I mentioned the economic side, but also political liberalization. They put a good constitution into effect. They had parliamentary elections, which we supported by grant to arrange, and they were pretty darn good elections actually. The second time around on the parliamentary elections maybe weren't quite as good as the first ones, but they were, I think, essentially free and fair and honest, a good turn-out at the polls, and even Yemenese who hadn't bothered to register to vote indicated that they, by their actions, understood that this was something important that was going on, that they should be a part of it. Unfortunately the civil war set back that whole thing, because during the crisis the government put certain measures into effect to put pressure on the universities, for example, on dissidents and so forth, and that caused a real setback, which I think to a large extent the Southerners must accept certain responsibility for pushing it to a crisis which allowed things to go into effect which otherwise, if they had stayed in the government, would not have.

Q: Okay, anything else you want to say about Sanaa?

HUGHES: No.

Q: Okay. You stayed till, I think you said, November of '94, and then where did you go?

HUGHES: Well, Bob Pelletreau asked me if I would become one of his deputies in ADA, which I was extremely pleased to do, of course. I replaced Dan Kertzer, who is now Ambassador to Cairo, in his office, so to speak, in a seat, although Bob rationalized the portfolio, so I ended up not doing the peace process, which I had really hoped to do, but ended up doing the Gulf, Gulf security from the friendly side, the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt and then the global affairs. Then later on we had a reorganization, and I took over the Mauger as well, but I did not do the peace process, of course, which is a big piece of our relations toward

Egypt.

Q: This was November '94 or thereabouts, and you continued in that position until just last year, '97?

HUGHES: The end of September '97 when I left service.

Q: When you retired, and then you're going back. What will your position be, Director General?

HUGHES: Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers. The Sinai peacekeeping operation that was set up as a result of Camp David and the accords and the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. When it became clear that the U.N. could not set up a peacekeeping operation because of Soviet and Arab objection, the United States took the initiative as committed to the Israelis and Egyptians to set up a freestanding. It's an international organization in accordance with U.S. laws while a special act is being passed and registered, however that's done, with the U.N. The headquarters is in Rome. There's a headquarters agreement. The main operation, of course, is in the Sinai.

Q: To come back to the period in NEA, what would you say was your biggest challenge and task or accomplishment? You were not involved in the peace process, so maybe your level of frustration was not as high as it could have been.

HUGHES: Well, the biggest single area of focus, of course, was the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and U.S. security interests in the Gulf and what to do about Saddam Hussain. As I said, I did Gulf security from the friendly side. I did not do Iraq and Iran, but I did, again, the alliance, the coalition, and worked with Defense and JCS on our defense posture in the region, which is located, of course, in the Gulf States. That was the single biggest issue, focus, and relations with the Gulf States, because how we interrelated with them also was a function, and their attitude regarding some of our defense, our security, our military activities there. But as you know, as to now we still don't have a satisfactory resolution at all to the situation in Iraq - some false starts on our part, some events in the region that are beyond our control. Terrorism also became an enormous issue, particularly after the Khobar Towers bombing and the bombing before that at the [U.S. led training facility] building in Riyadh itself. A tremendous amount of effort on the security side, antiterrorism side, including very difficult negotiations with the Saudis regarding costs and move of our forces down to Prinselltown Air Base down in the middle of the Arabian Peninsula, a very remote area. But in addition to that, working with the Gulf States on economic reform as well to liberalize their economies because they are largely stagnant, and the situation is worse because of the falling oil prices.

People don't realize that the per-capita GDP in Saudi Arabia is about 7,000 dollars a year. As a comparison, Israel is about 17½ thousand dollars a year, and the U.S.

is about 27½ thousand dollars a year. Saudi Arabia is 7,000, Egypt about 4,000 - just to give a sense of the conditions. But those economies need liberalization if they're going to grow and become diversified. Another major effort was working with Egypt on the same thing. Vice President Gore and President Mubarak have set up what's called the Gore-Mubarak Initiative, an institutionalized arrangement for economic reform which has had some achievements. It includes a very important private sector element both from Egypt and from the United States, but probably the most important thing is the direct personal involvement of President Mubarak. Then other issues, such as MPT renewal which Egypt led the fight against for various reasons, took enormous amount of time and effort. Policy development with respect to the evolving situation in Algeria was something that I did in the last half of my time there. Also a very difficult situation, one deserving of a lot of effort and attention, and I think we made some headway there. And then Western Sahara, just as a very uniquely localized situation but still very important to the parties involved and very important in that subregion as well also.

Q: Former Secretary Baker is involved with that on behalf of the United Nations, but I assume we work closely with him.

HUGHES: Very much so. In fact, frankly because of the difficulty of the issue with that same possibility, some of us were surprised that Secretary Baker agreed to take it on. We were very pleased that he did. He did a wonderful job and helped move the thing forward a bit. In fact, some of the work that he did now is still continued by Charlie Dunbar, who is now there as the Secretary General of the United Nations representative, to try to follow up on some things that Secretary Baker had moved ahead. What we had tried to do is to clarify certain issues in the minds of the parties, and Baker laid a groundwork for new initiatives, and so like to think anyway that some of the work that NEA did earlier on helped lay the groundwork for what, helped support what, Secretary Baker was able to do.

Q: I heard a talk the other evening by Frances Cook, who is our ambassador to Oman and is the first woman ambassador from the United States or, I think, from any country in the Gulf area, I believe. Were you involved in her nomination or appointment? I know she gave credit to Assistant Secretary Pelletreau for having that vision or courage to see that it would work, and I think she feels it has worked.

HUGHES: Oh, yes, I don't think there's any question. Well, this was well entrained when I got back and reported for duty. Actually we [reported for duty] in December of '94. But, first of all, Frances Cook is a very capable person, extremely capable person with experience as the Chief of Mission, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of PM at State.

Q: Experience in the Middle East.

HUGHES: Had some experience in the Middle East, so she is just extremely capable and competent. I think for people in that region, that's the first test. We informally observed that, for example, the Yemenese treated Western women kind of as honorary men. Certain events that were male only in the local context also included Western females.

Q: Because of their position or because they were from the West?

HUGHES: That's right. And the Omanis, of course, are also very experienced, very subtle, very sophisticated leadership and people, and there are women in their advisory assembly, national assembly, advisory national assembly. There are women in ministries. When I was there the last time, I had a meeting with one of them in the advisory assembly. So Oman is a place where there are more women active, visibly active, than, say, in Saudi Arabia.

Q: How about Bahrain? Do you have anything to say about Bahrain in the period you were in NEA?

HUGHES: Well, Bahrain has been one of the closest partners of the United States in the region going back to World War II, and we've had a Navy facility there, a cooperative facility with the Bahrainis since that time. It's an administrative support operation, and the admiral in command is with the 5th Fleet which operates in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea is located in Manama. They've been good hosts. They've been good partners. They've had some domestic difficulties with Shia in the majority of the population because of demands for the implementation of certain political rights and also better economic opportunities in that there has been a considerable amount of unrest including violence and loss of life, and what some people charge as repression by the government on these groups. This has been an item of some very important discussion between- (end of tape)

Q: Let's finish up on Bahrain.

HUGHES: As I was saying, the Bahraini government is trying to negotiate and to accommodate the more moderate elements and demands of the Shia majority in Bahrain while retaining authority and assuring the present ruling and government arrangements remain essentially intact. One of the problems, of course, too has been a certain amount of disinvestment in Bahrain, which adds pressure on the economic side of things. But it's clear that they also have a corruption problem in the government, and many of the demands this year are quite legitimate, although one element in the background always is Iranian interests. Iran had long considered, well before the present government in Iran, Bahrain a part of Iran. Bahrain [had] clearly chose[n] not to be a part of Iran. Iranian Shia trained, are educated, schooled in Iran, so there's always this fifth-column element which does have some basis in fact.

Q: Okay, is there anything else you want to say about your period as Deputy Assistant Secretary in Near Eastern Affairs?

HUGHES: I did mention the global affairs and terrorism, human rights, democracy and so forth. On democracy, I think NEA can be proud that we were the only regional bureau that worked with DRL [Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Bureau] at State to create a certain budget line for democracy building in the Near Eastern Bureau, certain budgetary line item that we can use to support things like free elections, political party development, and so forth, and I think NEA did a real good job, and it was NEA/PPR that had the lead at the working level and following through on that. Human rights, I must say, is a very depressing area. As the DAS I read every human rights report for the last three years for every country in the region, even did some editing on some and had discussions on some, but the human rights record is one of the depressing aspects of that whole region. Rule of law has not yet arrived by a long shot. Human rights in the sense of not only freedom of speech or expression but even just the reliability of the person at the helm and so forth is nowhere really firmly fixed in the region. Some countries are much further than others. In some countries the ruling regime is rather benign and the economic conditions are good and there's a very high satisfaction and a very low level of dissatisfaction, because these are more traditional regimes, things are done in traditional ways. But in others there is extreme heavy-handedness and constant excesses on the part of the government.

Q: Of course, the cultural difficulties and role of women.

HUGHES: Yes, all of those things as well - female genital mutilation in some places, really just awful stuff. Then, of course, there's terrorism, and that's also linked with popular dissatisfaction in some places, also religious extremism in some places, but a very difficult mission, an important mission and one that took up a lot of hours, a lot of effort, which needed it, deserved it. We worked very closely, of course, with the Antiterrorism Office.

Q: Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

HUGHES: Phil Wilcox and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and throughout the whole interagency system. But I was very appreciative that Bob Pelletreau asked me to be there as the DAS, and in a way it was rather improbable given the fact that I'm not an Arabist. The one tour in Sanaa, but having had a tour at Defense, and then having come to that part of the world by Israel is also a very unusual way to do it, but I was very pleased that he asked me.

Q: You pretty much stayed with him throughout his entire period, because he retired about the same time you did.

HUGHES: Well, no, he retired the last of January of last year, the last day of January, and then there was a period, a long period, of acting David Welsh, of

course, as the principal DAS, and the Martin Dick actually came on after I retired.

Q: Okay, maybe we should stop at this point.

HUGHES: Well, thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity, and I hope that this serves some usefulness or has some interest.

Q: I think it will, and I've certainly enjoyed our conversation and wish you well as you go to Rome and look over the Sinai.

End of interview