The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

ALAN G. JAMES

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INTERVIEW

**Q:** If we could start off with your background. Could you tell us when and where you were born, and a little about your family?

**JAMES:** I was born in Brooklyn, New York in 1920. I went to public school in Brooklyn. At age 13, I went to prep school in Tarrytown, New York, at Hackley School where I stayed for five years. Before graduating I was accepted at Williams but did not go there until the next year. My father was a graduate of Phillips Exeter Academy and had long hoped I would go there. I was happy at Hackley and wanted to finish. He was quite understanding. We did agree, however, that it might be a good idea for me to take an extra year at Exeter before going to Williams. This I did. I entered Williams with the class of 1943 in September 1939, at the outbreak of war in Europe. Like our generation everywhere, we lived our college years under the shadow of war, first in Europe and then in the Pacific.

**Q:** Just to get a little feel about that, what was the attitude of the faculty and parents and others of the student body about this war in Europe? Germany and Britain were going at each other, particularly in France. Did you feel that this was something we could avoid? Was Williams internationalist or isolationist?

**JAMES:** Williams had a long internationalist tradition, a sense that the United States is involved in the world and cannot remain indifferent to major threats to the peace and
safety of our friends and allies. When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, the Williams community was by and large sympathetic to the allied cause. With the Battle of Britain, Williams became even more committed, believing that the British were fighting for our freedom as well as their own. The Faculty, certainly the most respected members, beginning with President Baxter, were outspokenly pro-British. If there were isolationists on the Faculty they were not vocal. The student body, drawn heavily from the internationalist eastern United States accepted, with little urging by the Faculty, that the British were fighting for the United States as well as themselves. The college newspaper, The Williams Record, reflected majority student opinion and adopted a consistently pro-British stance.

Q: I might add, for the record, that I went to Williams from 1946 to '50, so we're speaking about our alma mater. Just to get a little slice of this life, did you notice a division up to June 22, 1941? Were there young Communists or Faculty members, who subscribed to the Communist discipline, who were saying we shouldn't be involved because of the German-Soviet Pact? Or did you notice that?

JAMES: I do not recall that there were any young communists at Williams in my day. I also doubt that there were any communists on the Faculty. President Baxter took a very grave view of any teacher who was so ideologically committed to communism that he could not teach objectively. He probably would have seen to it that any teacher he suspected of being subject to communist discipline was sent packing. So it seems to me unlikely that any members of the Faculty or the student body took the position that because the Nazis and Soviets had appeared to make common cause, the United States should not support Britain.

Q: Did the military catch you before you finished, or how did it work out?

JAMES: Students had the option to enlist in the Army reserves and not be called up until after graduation. Probably other services offered a similar option. I can't remember. Enlisting and finishing college was considered an orderly way to feed people into the armed services which could not, as we were told by Dean Gregerson, absorb masses of recruits at once. I enlisted in the Army reserves in August 1942. Our class graduated on February 4, 1943, five months early, since we had accelerated by going to college during the summer. I was ordered to Camp Upton on Long Island in March 1943.

Q: Could you tell me a bit about what your military service was like?

JAMES: It was not very eventful; for the most part it was boring, except for the terrifying experience of being bombed by German planes off the coast of North Africa in October 1943 as our convoy was making for Tunisia.

I ended up in the 414th Squadron of the 97th Bomb Group (Heavy, B-17s). I was a clerk in squadron operations. I joined the squadron in North Africa in October 1943 and sailed with them to Italy in November to occupy a base closer to targets in Italy and Austria.
My boredom was relieved in part by a lively correspondence with my esteemed history professor at Williams, Richard A. Newhall, an eminent scholar and teacher who wrote elegant, informative letters which have since been published in a book titled "Newhall and Williams College: the Papers of a History Professor at a New England College." Mr. Newhall seemed pleased when I wrote him that I had read Carlyle's "French Revolution" during the 3-week sea voyage to Tunisia. He wrote that he had read Motley's "Rise of the Dutch Republic" on a troop ship that took him to France in 1918.

Q: Was that the 5th Air Force then?

JAMES: No, it was the 14th Air Force. And, curiously enough, I must skip ahead, the commanding officer of the 97th Bomb Group, of which the 414th Squadron was a part, became my boss some 20 years later when I was his political advisor at U.S. European Command.

Q: Then you finished up the war in Italy?

JAMES: Yes. I wrote to President Baxter who was terribly well connected in wartime Washington where he did some government work on leave from Williams (he won a Pulitzer prize in history for "Scientists against Time," a history of science and the war) to ask his help in getting transferred to the Historical Section of the Air Force. I did not anticipate being discharged very soon and I thought I could put my education to better use by transferring to the Historical Section. President Baxter delivered and I was assigned to a unit to work on a history of Air Force operations. I left Italy in July 1945, and once I got back to the States, I had enough points, because of the 97th Bomb Group participated in so many campaigns, to be mustered out almost immediately on my return. I felt somewhat apologetic, having been put into this, kind of shoehorned in, through President Baxter's intervention. But, nevertheless, I accepted my discharge and out I went.

Q: After you got out in 1945, what did you do?

JAMES: I went to Yale Law School. My father had long hoped I would be a lawyer, and I suppose I thought law school would be good training for whatever career I chose. I had had good grades at Williams and one of my history Professors, Charles Keller, gave me a good recommendation to his friend Ashbel Gulliver, Acting Dean of the Law School. I was accepted with no more formalities and spent two instructive and thoroughly enjoyable years under a number of great teachers.

Q: Charlie Keller was my mentor at Williams, too, in the history department. He had served, I think, at Yale in China for a while. You mentioned your father. Was your father a lawyer?

JAMES: No. He was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania, into a coal mining family. At a rather advanced age, I guess 22, he went to Exeter, and when he graduated he was 25. He
had to work his way through Exeter and graduated in the class of 1891. He wanted to go on to Harvard to study medicine, but had family obligations and had to go to work. He ended up in New York City and became a stock broker. Thanks to his acumen and prudence he rode out the Depression fairly well. We were modestly well off; at least we could afford to do a good deal of traveling, even during the Depression. We spent many summers in Maine. I was taken abroad, to Europe, when I was four years old, and again when I was seven. There were other trips to many in the United States, Canada and Mexico. My father especially was an enthusiastic traveler.

Q: At Yale, did you end up in specialities?

JAMES: No, not really. I had a general course. But I got interested in admiralty law and took a good course in the subject given by an engaging young partner in Lord Day and Lord, a leading New York admiralty firm. I got a good grade in that subject and acceptable grades in my other courses, and decided that I would like to join an admiralty firm. I applied to several, and was offered a job at Kirlin, Campbell, Hickok and Keating, a large successful firm with many clients, among them big shipping and oil companies. It was in this firm that Judge Woolsey, of James Joyce's "Ulysses" fame, was a partner before he was named to the federal district court. Woolsey held that the book was admissible into the United States after it had been confiscated by customs.

Q: This was based on the feeling that it was pornographic.

JAMES: Pornographic, prurient, yes.

Q: This was a landmark decision.

JAMES: I spent a couple of years at Kirlin's. I started out in admiralty, but I found it was not as interesting in practice as theory. I was put to work on cases involving spoiled South African lobster tails and ship collisions. I found the work technical and boring, and concluded, as did the partners, that that was not what I was cut out for. So I was apprenticed to a congenial partner who specialized in estate law and taxation. We hit it off well and the rest of my time at Kirlin's was most agreeable. After spending about two years in the firm, I decided to take the Foreign Service examinations.

Q: What inspired you to take the Foreign Service examinations?

JAMES: The idea of being a Foreign Service officer had long interested me. I suppose the wish was stimulated by the foreign travel I did with my parents. I enjoyed seeing foreign places, meeting different kinds of people. Foreign policy as a subject appealed to me more than, say, business. While I was still at prep school, I read with profit and interest the monographs on foreign countries and international problems put out by the Foreign Policy Association. One little event further stimulated my interest in foreign affairs. While still in prep school, I came down to Washington on some holiday or other and
wandered through the State Department which then occupied what was called the State/War/Navy building.

Q: It's now the Old Executive Building.

JAMES: There were no guards to check passes or to ask what one's business was. One could stroll unchallenged along cool corridors, past the louvered doors of State Department officials, noting names and important titles. The whole atmosphere fascinated me. George Kennan somewhere described the establishment atmosphere of the building more vocally than I could, but that brief visit to the Department of the 1930s made me fairly certain that I wanted to be involved in foreign policy.

Years later, after spending two years in the law in New York City, I decided to sit for the Foreign Service examinations, and did so in early September 1949. That ordeal over, my wife, our very young son Gray, and I went to Europe for nearly three months. It was probably an imprudent thing to do, because I had no job and even if I passed the exams, I would probably not be commissioned for quite some time. But we invested a bit of money in a lovely trip to France, Italy and Switzerland. It is interesting how far $5,000 would take one in Europe in the late 1940s. We did not backpack, but stayed in comfortable, bourgeois hotels as we made a mini grand tour of western Europe.

We came back in November 1949 and settled in New York City. We were expecting a child. I had no job, so I asked the partner for whom I had worked at Kirlin's whether I might be taken back. My former boss was skeptical; he said Mr. Keating (the senior partner) did not take kindly to people who had left and later asked to return. But he promised to speak to Mr. Keating, and lo and behold Mr. Keating was agreeable, so back I went. Our daughter, Anne, was born in February 1950 and I stayed in the law for another six months. The Korean War broke out in June 1950, and a couple of months later we decided to leave New York and go to Washington, there to await my commission. I was getting a bit frustrated for it had been over a year since I passed the entrance examinations.

We bought a small Georgetown house where we lived agreeably for the next seven months. It was then that I fell into a job I enjoyed immensely and look back on with a great deal of pleasure. When I reported to the State Department and inquired about the prospects of being commissioned, I was told that the process was going very slowly, but that there was a program that might interest me in the interim; Foreign Service "eligibles" (those awaiting appointment) were being favorably considered.

Somebody in Personnel suggested that I see Marshall Berry, a kindly southern high school teacher, who was organizing something called the Kreis Resident Officer program. This program was designed to facilitate a transition from military government to civil rule in the various countries or Kreis in the American zone of occupation in Germany. The concept was that officers would be resident in a Kreis where they would act in a variety of local government capacities, such as magistrates and licensing authorities for fish and
game and other licenses. They were to work closely with Burgermeisters, mayors, of the towns to facilitate rehabilitation and promote democracy. One team of KROs, as the officers were known, had already gone to Germany. A second was being assembled, and that was the one I was assigned to.

Berry asked me to assist him by calling FSO eligibles and assorted others who had applied for jobs in the Department. I was to describe the job to them and invite them, at their expense, to come to Washington to be interviewed by Berry. I was in effect Berry's special assistant, and am pleased to say helped him to put together a talented, congenial group of 35 to 40, of whom some 10 were FSO eligibles. Incidentally, one of those we chose was a Williams friend, David Peet, of the class of 1942. He was a fine addition to our group. One very distinguished member of the group was Bruce Laingen, who was Chargé in Tehran in 1980 when the Embassy was overrun by students and our people were taken hostage.

We KROs assembled in the autumn of 1950 and went through intensive training in German, German history and politics and United States policy toward Germany. We spent from September 1950 to March 1951 in this concentrated "Germanization." In mid-March we sailed to Germany on the French Line, like young princes, in first class accommodation, with our personal automobiles stowed in the ship's hold. After arriving in Germany, we were ordered to Bad Homburg where we all lived together in the faded splendor of that famous spa while awaiting assignment. The FSO eligibles were soon commissioned, which meant that we would have to leave our friends and the Kreis program and take assignments at various consulates in Germany. I went to Munich.

I was sorry to leave the Kreis group. Many had become, and remain, good friends. How close knit we were is attested by the fact that over the years we have, with some regularity, reassembled for jolly reunions. Many of our KRO group finished out their contract as Kreis resident officers. Some later went into the information program and a number became directors of an Amerika Haus.

Q: Which is basically a U.S. Information...within today's terms, but a library.

JAMES: That's right. But let me go on a bit about the KROs. They helped the local German authorities in their Kreis in a variety of practical ways. I recall being told, for example, that Jonathan Dean, later an ambassador who was our chief negotiator on mutual and balanced force reductions, and was in the first KRO group, made a major contribution to the rebuilding of the town where he was located by obtaining a quantity of scarce concrete for the Burgermeister. It would have been an incomparable experience to remain in the KRO program and help directly to rebuild Germany as a democratic state.

Q: I understand that they were often known as the Kreis fuhrers, but they really weren't. But that it was designed essentially to get the U.S. Army out of the running of Germany, and as a transitional program, and to put it in the hands of people who were not doing
things in the military way, although everyone in it practically, of course, was a former soldier or sailor of some sort.

JAMES: Oh, that is very true. As you say, ours was a totally different operation from military government. The KROs were to try to produce a more normal political climate. We arrived in the spring of 1951. The war had been over for six years. West Germany was beginning to recover with American help and to experience an economic miracle, Wirtschaftswunder, the Germans called it. I suppose that most people in military government were honest and did not try to take advantage of the plight of the Germans, there were quite a few who were greedy and unscrupulous. Our KRO groups were clean hands groups, and I think they made a tremendously favorable impression on most of the Germans with whom they came in contact precisely because of their probity. They were dedicated, responsible and idealistic. But they were not naive. As you observed, most had been in the military during the war. They had experience, skills, a sense of realism too.

Q: Just one backward glance. Can you recall anything about the entry exams--both the written and the oral--that you took?

JAMES: Yes, I can. The written exam, I think, was three days long.

Q: I think three and a half.

JAMES: Maybe three and a half. It was a tough examination but I was well prepared. There were largely essay questions, some true/false questions as well. I really can't remember. But it was essentially a written examination. I did rather well. My marks in math and reading comprehension were not impressive, but I think I got one of the highest marks in our group on the history part, which pleased Bob Scott, whom you undoubtedly knew at Williams and who, incidentally, was one of the tutors at the cram course I took.

In the early spring of 1950, I sat for the oral examination, going down to Washington by train from New York for the day. The Chairman of the panel of examiners was Joseph Greene, Director of the Board of Examiners. Who were the other two members of the panel I cannot remember. The interview which was cordial but put one on one's mettle, did not last very long, perhaps 45 minutes to an hour. I remember only some of the questions; one was about why I wanted to join the Service; another was what were some of the major international problems of 1950. I must have addressed those questions and others with some success. Toward the end of the examination, Mr. Greene put a question to me in French. It was something like "Avez-vous visite la France?" Having returned from that country only a few months earlier, I felt comfortable in the response I gave. Then the grilling was over. I was asked to step outside while another candidate entered the room. A couple of hours later I was asked to return and informed that I had made a good impression and had passed the oral. Incidentally, another candidate examined that day was Bill Graves, later Editor of the National Geographic Magazine, and a good colleague during several years in Germany.
Satisfied with my performance that day, I treated myself to a first class seat on the train and toasted my success with a long drink.

I stayed on in New York, at Kirlin's, for another six months. Since there was no indication that I would be commissioned soon, we decided it might be a good idea to go to Washington in the hope that by being on the spot I could get a job in the Department and perhaps speed up my commission.

**Q:** I spent 30 years in the Foreign Service, and until I started doing these interviews, I didn't really realize how important it is to hang around the corridors of the State Department and ask questions. If you want to get ahead, you find your own job, usually. Maybe I did know it, subliminally. It's one of the early lessons one really should know, but it's not necessarily passed on. You've got fancy personnel systems, but, gee, if they want somebody now, and if you're there and somebody knows your name, all of a sudden, you've got the job.

JAMES: Well, that's what happened. When I arrived at the Department I fell into an interesting job with Mr. Berry. I liked working for him and felt I was profitably occupied, even though my commissioning was nowhere in sight.

**Q:** You went to Munich in 1951.

JAMES: Right, we arrived on April Fool's Day, 1951.

**Q:** What were you doing?

JAMES: I began as General Services Officer of the Consulate General, a man of all work. The Administrative Officer, my boss, was a doughty, very capable lady, Lucy Lenz, an old line Foreign Service Officer who was one of the early women entrants. We got on quite well. She liked my wife, and that helped smooth our relationship. I was teased by colleagues who went to Germany with me for being the Consulate's chief light bulb changer. The experience was salutary, however; it helped one to keep a sense of proportion about one's indispensability to the foreign policy establishment.

I knew little about Munich, of course, although over time I got to know it well, its galleries, museums, palaces, shops, markets. My job was made infinitely easier by a kind, elderly retainer of the Consulate, Rudolph Messinger, who knew nearly every nook and cranny and purveyor in the city and could procure whatever item we needed at the Consulate. Messinger, who probably was in his 70s when I arrived, had been a consulate employee in the time of Robert Murphy. He told me how in the days before the war he would meet the night train from Berlin and pick up the diplomatic (classified) pouch which he would take to his office in the consulate for safekeeping until the next morning when an officer would open it. He was a nice man and generous. To him I owe a splendid 18th century map of Munich, "as it is to be seen from noon to midnight," with a profile of the city skyline at the bottom.
My assignment as GSO did not last long, possibly less than a year. I then moved into the Visa Section where I was an immigrant visa issuing officer. There was a separate program for issuance of visas to refugees. I issued visas for about a year, and then went into the Political Section where I worked for the rest of my Munich tour.

Q: Well, let's talk a bit about the visa business before we move on. I came in some years later. I went to Frankfurt, where I was a refugee relief officer to begin with, and then I did some other things. With the immigrants and all, it was a fairly complicated business, in a way, because we knew an awful lot about these people. We had the Berlin Document Center, and we had American investigators all over the place. So you had an awful lot of information, didn't you, about people?

JAMES: We did have a lot of information. I don't remember much about visa issuance. It was for the most part a terribly routine process and little memorable happened. I think I managed the interviews competently. We had had short but intensive German language training at the Foreign Service Institute and I felt comfortable in the language, more so than in French which I had studied for a much longer period of time.

I remember turning down one applicant for an immigrant visa. He had been a Nazi party member, as we knew from the BDC. I was determined not to give him a visa, although he was apparently qualified in other respects; he had not been a concentration camp guard or anything like that. He may have been a non-active Party member. I don't know. But I turned him down flat. I have not lost sleep over doing so, but I have wondered whether I did the fair thing.

The visa people who were really busy were my friends and colleagues in the refugee program.

Q: My class, which was July of '55, went out there. Herb Okun and others went there, and they were swamped in the refugee program. As a political officer in Bavaria, you were really doing political work from '52ish to '56.

JAMES: Yes, about that period of time.

But let me first talk about Sam Woods who was the Consul General when we arrived in Munich. Some years before, he had been in the U.S. Commercial Service and served in Berlin from 1937 to 1941 when he was interned and later exchanged. There was a story that through his extensive contacts he learned that the Germans intended to invade Russia in June 1941. If the story is true, Woods's discovery of the German invasion plan was a coup for him and helped his career. But he was astute as well as lucky, and was Consul General in two important posts after Berlin, in Zurich during much of the war, and later in Istanbul. He had excellent domestic political credentials, counting among his friends fellow Mississippian Catfish Miller, influential and long-time door keeper of the House of Representatives.
Q: Yes, for years he was the man who used to say, "Mr. Speaker, I have the honor to introduce the President of the United States." For years.

JAMES: Woods was married to Wilhelmina "Minnie" Busch, heiress of the Anheuser-Busch empire. She was an ample lady, who had been married several times before she married Woods in 1948, and had lived in a schloss south of Munich throughout the war, without herself or her immense trove of furniture and art being molested by the Germans. Being then married to a German (Nazi?) probably gave her immunity. She and Woods gave lavish parties to which came everyone of importance in Bavaria. I was once tasked as GSO to locate a missing shipment of yards and yards of organdy or taffeta which Mrs. Woods had ordered to be made into a dress for some imminent function, possibly their 1951 Fourth of July party. I was lucky and succeeded in tracking it down. But that chore made me the brunt of yet more jokes by my colleagues.

Woods was a jovial, likeable man. A few days after my wife and I had arrived in Munich, we were invited to his Munich apartment for luncheon. It was a comfortable, buergerlich place, crammed from floor to ceiling with art in the Bavarian genre--cows, peasants, alpine meadows. It was a pleasant occasion. Another guest that day was the widow of impresario Max Reinhardt, who, among other things, staged the Salzburg festival. She was representative of the company in which Woods moved. My wife and I much appreciated Woods' gracious gesture.

I served under Woods for roughly a year until he was replaced by someone who really livened up the Consulate General--Charlie Thayer.

Q: Oh, yes.

JAMES: Thayer had style and dash. He was a very vivid character, and as Consul General gave a bravura performance. He came loaded with ideas. Clearly, he did not intend to be merely a provincial consul general; he was going to have an active reporting program that would keep Washington well briefed on developments in Bavaria--political, economic and social. He was also determined to make his own personal contribution to policy making, based as it was on extensive experience of Balkan, eastern European and Soviet affairs. One example: when Stalin died in the spring of 1953, Thayer immediately sent a telegram to the Department recommending how to react to Stalin's death. His prescription was: don't say too much publicly about Stalin's demise; "let the yeast work," those were his very words, for, as he pointed out, there was not much the United States could do to influence ensuing internal developments, and outside interference would only help to keep the Russians united.

Thayer's reporting program called for the appropriate sections of the Consulate General to prepare studies of important institutions and trends in Bavaria. As one of the political officers, I wrote or helped to draft a number of such reports.
Thayer cultivated a wide circle of politicians, media people and business men. He gave excellent luncheons in a dining room he fixed up in the Consulate General nearly every working day, to which I or other officers were invited depending on the responsibilities and interests of the German guest. It was fun working for Thayer. He made the Consulate General into a small embassy.

Q: I'm a bit vague on details, but he was, in the first place, a brother-in-law to Chip Bohlen, was that it?

JAMES: He was Chip's brother-in-law, yes.

Q: And also he was under some fire because of McCarthy, wasn't he? He was sort of put there out of the line of fire, in a way.

JAMES: I cannot say whether Thayer was sent to Munich so he would be out of harm's way. He had been serving in Germany and it was logical for him to be sent to Munich after Sam Woods left. But he was certainly one of McCarthy's targets. In point of career, personality and private life, Thayer was suspect to McCarthy and his allies. He had served all his career under Democratic administrations. He had spent long years in Communist countries, Russia and Yugoslavia; had held an important post in VOA, an institution not liked by the hard right; he was slightly unconventional; and he had had a liaison with a Russian woman, a dancer, I believe. It appears that McCarthy's spy in the State Department, Scott McLeod, who was in charge of security, told McCarthy about Thayer's affair with the Russian dancer. In March of 1953, Thayer was summoned to appear before McCarthy's committee where details of his private life were sure to come out. At this time, Thayer's brother-in-law's nomination to be ambassador to the USSR was under consideration in the Senate.

Thayer was told that McCarthy had details of his Russian indiscretion and would likely use it against him. According to Bohlen, Thayer decided not to fight and was allowed to resign "to write books." I have just refreshed my memory by perusing Bohlen's autobiography "Witness to History" in which he gives an account of how Thayer fell victim to McCarthy. Thayer's motive in resigning, Bohlen states, was to spare his mother the embarrassment of a public airing of his morals. Personally, I think there was an additional reason for Thayer's resigning. Bohlen's confirmation looked like being a close-run thing. His chances of confirmation would certainly not be enhanced by revelation of Thayer's private life, given the evident closeness of Bohlen and Thayer. I have long firmly believed that Thayer also wanted to protect Bohlen and that that consideration played a part in his decision to quit.

He broke the news to the committee on March 26th when he called U.S. officers to his office. I do not recall that he elaborated much on the reasons for his decision, but I have a faint memory that he made some linkage to Bohlen's confirmation hearing.
Incidentally, I met Scott McLeod a few months after Thayer resigned. He came to Munich, possibly on a routine visit to consular posts in Germany. It was a Saturday and I was duty officer. I took some papers to him and he said something about troubling me on the weekend. The only riposte I could think of quickly was: "Dienst is Dienst and Schnapps is Schnapps." I am not sure he understood my attempt at sarcasm.

I immediately telephoned my wife whose pregnancy was about at term to tell her of Thayer's resignation. This shocked her into labor that evening. She delivered our son Alan Jr. the next morning. Everyone close to Thayer keenly regretted his resignation; was deeply saddened for him and Cynthia, his valiant wife; and angry because it was apparent, even if we did not then know exactly how, McCarthy was responsible.

Thayer left quickly and was succeeded by Allan Lightner, with whom my wife and I became very friendly. Lightner and his wife Dorothy were delightful, considerate and good company. Lightner had had an interesting career. He was Chargé in Seoul during the Korean War, and acquired distinction by the way he handled Syngman Rhee, to whom he stood up forthrightly. He was also noted for what I am told was perceptive policy telegrams he sent to the Department while Chargé about U.S. policy toward Korea. Lightner was our Consul General for the next two and half years.

Those were busy years. I had a range of fascinating reporting responsibilities. I covered internal Bavarian politics, with special emphasis on refugee and expellee affairs. In the early 1950s, American authorities were concerned about the direction the refugee and expellee movements might take. The essential question was whether those groups would remain militant and form a radical element in German politics, or whether they would assimilate, work through the established political parties and enter the mainstream of German political life. The Sudeten Germans were of particular concern.

Q: After World War II, the Sudeten Deutsche, as well as the East Prussian Germans and many of the Germans who had been in what became Poland, had moved back to Germany and were a distinct group.

JAMES: The Sudetens and Silesians were the largest of the expellee groups. They were quite distinct. The Silesians, who were led by a man named Hupke were less militant, but they had their grievances as well. The Sudetens were the potentially explosive crowd. I got to know some of them rather well by attending their rallies and visiting their settlements. I saw a great deal of one of their top people, a man named Becker who was a sort of assistant to old Lodgman von Auen, leader of the Sudetens. Through Becker I could, I thought, be pretty sure I had access to authentic Sudeten ideas and attitudes.

In the Consulate General we also observed closely the activities of the radical right and left. There was a Bavarian Communist Party and a couple of rightist, but not openly neo-Nazi, parties. It was instructive to see how tough the Bavarian authorities were in dogging the extremist parties and how determined they were that these minorities should not flourish because democrats slept. One high official of the Bavarian Interior Ministry, Dr.
Werner Kanein, became a friend and a most informative interlocutor. His brief was the extremist parties and he took his duties very seriously. He was determined to do everything necessary to keep the radicals from making headway in Bavaria, even if the government's control measures were something less than wholly democratic. The way the Ministry shut down communist rallies when the discourse became anti-state was a revelation. Kanein wanted no return to the 1930s.

In our political reporting we were assisted magnificently by a German employee of the Consulate General, Talitha von Heyden. Miss von Heyden had been in the German foreign service before the war and served in the Rome embassy. She was a splendid resource. She was well-informed and had wide contacts in the political parties and the press. She complemented our own efforts nicely, giving us briefs and comments on developments, reporting on her own talks with political types, calling our attention to matters that might have escaped us. She was completely loyal and most agreeable to work with.

And, of course, we spent a good deal of time talking with Bavarian politicians, assessing their programs and reporting on the activities of the main democratic Bavarian political parties, the socialists, SPD; the liberals, FDP; the provincial Bavarian party; and the conservatives, the CSU.

Q: It's not the CDU, but the...

JAMES: Christian Social Union, a peculiarly Bavarian party allied with the CDU, but proud of its own identity and Bavarian origins and dynamic. As the name implies, it is rather more liberal than the CDU, at least it was when it was founded. It is a political force in its own right.

Q: Strauss was the...

JAMES: Franz Josef Strauss was the leader of the CSU for a number of years until he died a few years ago. I got to know CSU people quite well, thanks to Strauss's friend, the late Dr. Ernst Deuerlein, who was chef de cabinet of Dr. Hans Ehard, Minister President of Bavaria for most of the time I was there. Deuerlein became a good friend. He lost a leg at Stalingrad and was a bit coy that Hitler personally awarded him the Iron Cross. Deuerlein was a noted historian and authority on the Catholic Church in Bavaria. He taught at the University of Tuebingen and died too young. He was an absolutely invaluable source of political information, about the CSU and other parties as well. It was immensely gratifying to enjoy a relationship of confidence with a man of such erudition, character and humor.

I might back up and say another word about the kind of reporting we did under Thayer. Among the basic factors we looked at was the separatist tradition in Bavaria. There was much less likelihood that in the post World War II period Bavaria would go its separate way from the rest of Germany than that the expellees might radicalize German political life. However, given Bavaria's past, it seemed important to spot and report on trends that
might set Bavaria apart from the other states of West Germany, at least make Bavaria less disposed to cooperate with her neighbors.

In a paper another officer and I wrote, we reached the conclusion, endorsed by Thayer, that the prospects that Bavaria would not be a wholly integrated part of Germany, politically and economically, were almost nil, although culturally the proud Bavarians would certainly try to continue to distinguish themselves from their neighbors.

I also collaborated on a study of the Catholic Church in Bavaria. The Church there has long been a major force in the lives of Bavarians, not only spiritually but politically as well. The long reign of the CSU in Bavaria after the war owed not a little to the "guidance" the church gave voters. Doing these Thayer-inspired studies was fascinating and instructive. For one who majored in history at Williams it was particularly gratifying. All this merely shows how intellectually lively it was to work for Thayer. As you know he wrote a number of books.

Q: One was "Bears in the Caviar."

JAMES: "Bears in the Caviar" was probably his best known. There was a sequel titled "Hands Across the Caviar." He also wrote one on unconventional warfare, "Guerrilla;" and on Germany, "The Unquiet Germans." After being forced out of the Service, he retired in Bavaria and died some time ago at age 59.

I keep wondering from time to time whether John Foster Dulles had a hand in forcing Thayer out. He and the Department did not behave well in the affair. I should note that Cynthia Thayer told us that in a Christmas card Dulles sent her parents, Ambassador and Mrs. James Clement Dunn in 1953, he added a note to the effect, "So sorry about your son-in-law." That to my wife and me seemed a bit hypocritical, considering that at the very least Dulles did nothing to stand up for Thayer.

Q: Well, I've heard stories about maybe it was Dulles, after the bitter hearings that went on, on Bohlen, saying never make me go through that again, or something like that. In other words, he didn't want to have problems. This is all very vague. Tell me, you were there during the McCarthy period, and obviously you weren't under the gun, as many of the junior officers, it was a generation ahead. But you were seeing one who was, if not a target, somebody kind of involved in being a political liability under the Dulles/Eisenhower/McCarthy period. Did you get any feel about the McCarthy period at all from that particular vantage point?

JAMES: We had another taste of McCarthyism when Cohn and Schine were swarming around Europe and came to Germany not long after Thayer resigned to investigate the loyalty of officials, particularly those in the information and cultural programs.

Q: These were two staff members of McCarthy.
JAMES: No one who was in the Service at that time could fail to feel directly or indirectly the hot breath of McCarthy. It was in the late spring or early summer of 1953 when these two henchmen of his came to Munich. They had visited a number of other consulates, summoning to appear before them officers much their senior and with records far more distinguished than their own, to grill them about policy and programs and I guess evaluate their loyalty.

They did not grill me; I can't remember whether they had Lightner on the carpet or not. If they did examine him, he came through unscathed. There was, however, one prominent local casualty of the McCarthy campaign to root out officials he considered disloyal. Lowell Clucas was head of the U.S. Information program in Munich, Bavaria. I remember that around the time Cohn and Schine were on their witch hunt in Germany, the Director of USIA fired Clucas. It is probably hard to prove, but my friends in the information service believe that Clucas, who was able and certainly loyal, was considered by the head of the Agency, for some now forgotten reason, a liability to the Agency which was then under McCarthy's scrutiny. You can imagine how the Bavarian press ridiculed the antics of Cohn and Schine, who behaved badly.

Let me give you an idea of the atmosphere created by McCarthy. In the spring of 1953, officers in the Consulate had to complete a form for renewal of one's security clearance. As I filled out the form, I observed to someone, possibly a security type, that I thought I would put down Thayer as a reference. "I wouldn't do that, if I were you," warned this forgettable person. I am afraid I did not list Thayer. But I did list two other esteemed friends which, as I recall, led to questions being raised about them. One was the late Joseph E. Johnson, then President of the Carnegie Endowment, who as much as anyone encouraged me to join the Foreign Service.

Q: Who had been a professor of both mine and yours at Williams.

JAMES: Was very, very...

Q: ...influential in setting up the United Nations.

JAMES: Exactly. Well, Joe had worked for Alger Hiss in the Department, and putting him down as a reference seems to have had repercussions. Possibly the sleuth who talked to him about me had the audacity to probe into Joe's loyalty as well. The same thing seems to have happened to Judge Edgar Nathan (Williams 1912, I think) who married me and my wife. A former Borough President of Manhattan whose forebears had been in this country for three centuries, Judge Nathan, too, seemed to some cretin like a questionable reference because he had been active in Russian war relief.

Finally, let me give you one more small but telling example of the climate created by McCarthy. After Lightner came to Munich, I came across an article that was particularly apt and condemnatory of McCarthyism. I cut it out and left it on Lightner's desk while he was out, leaving a note to the effect that this might please him. When he read it he
thanked me but remonstrated that I should not have left it unattended on his desk, for someone, you could not tell who, might come along and read it.

Q: Really, it shows an atmosphere.

JAMES: One could not help but be depressed. I toyed with the idea of quitting the Service and wrote to my friend Joseph C. Harsch, of the Christian Science Monitor, asking his advice. He strongly urged me to stay in. Lightner was staunch. He was a fine Consul General. He was loyal to, and expected loyalty from, his staff.

Q: As a political officer in Munich, at the time, did you have the feeling that what you were doing was of use up in Bonn, or did you report directly to Washington? How did it work?

JAMES: We reported directly to Washington, copying Bonn and other posts in Germany, as appropriate. There were periodic conferences of consulate political officers in Bonn which were enjoyable. There was always time for a detour to the French Club which had an excellent cuisine and cellar. These conferences were also instructive. Senior officers of the Embassy considered us political officers from the consulates part of the team. I remember during one conference the Minister "Red" Dowling, came to our meeting to fill us in on an important conversation Secretary Dulles had just had with Adenauer. Even before he drafted the reporting telegram, Dowling spoke from his notes and gave us a long account.

Officers in the Embassy's political section were always interested in developments in the various laender, states, and we were encouraged to make full presentations on significant trends in our regions. The political section in Bonn was, I recall, a strong one. Elim O'Shaughnessy, courteous and wise, was the Counselor and our host. Another able officer was Francis Williamson, a nice man. Jonathan Dean was there at the time, I think.

In the mid-1950's, as I have suggested, Germany politics was in flux. Probably more so than today, 40 years ago, the Embassy depended on the consulates to spot rising political figures, observe and analyze trends that might affect national politics. Always the big question was whether the German people wanted Germany to evolve into a democratic state firmly anchored in a united, outward looking Europe.

Q: Well, it was viewed with a great deal of care, since two wars had come out of this country. It was not accepted as a given that everything would be sweetness and light in the future.

JAMES: I think that's right, and that's why the reporting of the consulates was important in the development of American policy toward Germany. I had the feeling that I was doing something worthwhile. I enjoyed my work.
One had great scope under both Thayer and Lightner to develop contacts, be as active as one wished. My job was made more agreeable and rewarding by working with Chris Petrow, the other political officer, a fine officer who spoke excellent French and good German, and wrote elegantly. In my opinion, Petrow was one of the most accomplished officers I met in the Service.

I enjoyed talking with Bavarian politicians, who were affable for the most part and very accessible. I frequented the Landtag, State parliament, to seek out key members for a chat which often was accompanied by beer and wurst. Party conferences were informative and entertaining, especially the Bavarian Party's which were quintessentially a folklorique. There were characters galore on the political stage, but many politicians were high-minded, able and patriotic who wanted Germany to be a respected member of a new Europe. One man of notable good will was the head of the Bavarian socialist party, SPD, Högner, who later became Minister President of Bavaria. Högner had been a member of the ill-fated Reichstag that had voted Hitler into power in January 1933. In his wallet, Högner carried a paper, frayed and yellow with age, showing the tabulation of votes that were cast against Hitler, including his own. Högner was an unforgettable character.

Q: How did you find, in that time (enough time has passed so it's not any secret), the influence, as political officers, of the CIA? I remember, in Frankfurt, Joe Strange was the CIA type in there doing things. What was your impression of what they were up to?

JAMES: I did not really know much about what they were up to. I knew many of the officers in the Munich Station socially. Virtually all were from Ivy League colleges, with nice manners and a taste for parties and skiing. They were agreeable company. I could not comment on how capable they were, but there was no question about their loyalty. The Station Chief seemed like a real professional. And I became a close friend of one officer, now dead, Hiram Mallinson, a jolly, adventuresome man who, it seemed to me, took his job seriously. I can only add that the Station in Munich was probably keeping a close eye on radical movements in Bavaria and helping train German secret service people.

I had only fleeting contact with the CIC.

Q: This is the Army.

JAMES: The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps. They were running agents into East Germany from Bavaria with some frequency, and one day I was asked to give an opinion whether an agent should be sent across. Why I was asked and what I recommended I forget.

I was in the dark about most U.S. intelligence operations in Bavaria. But I did know about the CIA connection with Radio Free Europe, which operated out of Munich. For a while I filled in for the officer who was the Consulate's liaison with RFE, and sent assorted reports and intelligence to its Political Director, Bill Griffith. I am fairly sure that the CIA
station people read my political reports, for I received a number of compliments about them from CIA acquaintances.

Q: Just to get a feel for the time. You were in Munich. Czechoslovakia and East Germany were abutted on your lawn. What was the feeling towards the Soviet threat at that time? You were there from '51 until...

JAMES: Until 1956. To be frank, I was not, as I recall, deeply concerned about the Soviet threat. I did not lose sleep about having my family so close to the line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. There were people who were much concerned, but I wasn't one. Parenthetically, I should note that when I was recruiting the KRO group, one of the people I interviewed, a capable man we should have liked to have had join us, alleged he was privy to highly classified intelligence reports which led him to take the Soviet menace so seriously that he declined our invitation to join the KROs.

Of course, I was cognizant of the tremendous Russian capability, but I did not have the feeling that any time they might be so rash as to attack NATO. I suppose I was well aware of our nuclear capability and that deterrence was working. The Army organized periodic evacuation drills for civilians but none of us consular people took them very seriously. We were busy with our own work and problems and refused to let fear of a Soviet attack bedevil us. I might observe, however, that in June of 1953 when there was an uprising in East Germany, we felt some apprehension that the situation might deteriorate and a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact ensue.

Q: And in Berlin, too.

JAMES: We were, of course, concerned that something might go wrong there as well. But to repeat myself, I cannot remember being in any prolonged state of anxiety.

Q: I was in the Air Force as an enlisted man. I remember we were confined to barracks during that uprising, just for a few days, because we weren't sure what was going to happen. What about a very important institution, particularly for a political officer, but also for democracy... And everything was so new in Germany, it's hard to imagine, it was really a new country, almost. How did you find the media, the press particularly?

JAMES: The most important of the serious newspapers in Munich were, and I think still are, The Sueddeutsche Zeitung and The Münchner Merkur. Of the two, the Sueddeutsche was intellectually far and away the better. In fact, it was arguably one of the finest, most stimulating papers in Germany. The Merkur had a conservative, pro-business bias, while the Sueddeutsche was slightly left of center. The stars of the Sueddeutsche were its editor, Friedman, and principal political commentator Probst, who signed his column "Junius." Both were men of considerable attainment and influence. The Consulate cultivated them as well as journalists of the Merkur.

Looking back, I can fairly say that both dailies were objective in their reportage and editorials on the United States and American policy in Europe and Germany.
I should also say a word about Bavarian radio, the Bayerische Rundfunk; there was no television in my day, as I remember. The Rundfunk offered programs and commentary of first quality and to my recollection was objective but not uncritical of the United States. Its star was Erik von Cube, a Falstaffian figure, highly literate, with a sharp tongue who presented penetrating analyses of the issues of the day. He was also stimulating company.

Finally, I should note that the Bavarian press was constructive about the building of Europe and about Germany playing its part. The press unquestionably was a force for building a democratic German state. The Sueddeutsche in particular took a consistently pro-French line; it clearly believed that Franco-German amity was essential for the creation of a stable European order.

Q: Speaking of this, the French always play a role somewhat askew from whatever the United States is interested in. How did you find the French influence and French representation, and the German view of France from that area, which has been probably closer to France than some other ones, and French troops were in the area, too?

JAMES: French interest in Bavaria has deep historical roots. My paper on Bavarian separatism discussed the French connection in extenso. If I remember my history correctly, the French engaged in some machinations after the first world war to try to pry Bavaria from the rest of Germany, at least to encourage local separatist tendencies. By the end of the second war, France was realistic enough to abandon any idea of playing the Bavarian separatist card. Nonetheless, during my time in Munich, the French consistently had a high profile official presence. Even in the 1950s, the principal French representative in Munich had the personal rank of Minister. Before the first war, a French diplomatic mission was accredited to the Wittelsbach court.

I knew the French consular officers fairly well. With two in particular I became quite friendly. I found them well informed about the Bavarian political scene and agreeable.

France always made a strong cultural showing in Bavaria. Oh, incidentally, no French troops are stationed in Bavaria. French forces in Germany were and are now in Baden.

The French mounted superb art shows. When we arrived in the spring of 1951, we were greeted by one that we would now call a blockbuster, "From Poussin to Ingres," at the Haus der Deutschen Kunst, one of Hitler's architectural extravaganzas. The French also sent top-notch performs arts companies to Munich.

Q: Did we see, at the time, much of a difference between the CSU and the SPD, and was it one that we were nervous about?

JAMES: Washington distinguished sharply between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. It seems to me that for President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, the CDU/CSU stood four square for integration of Germany into Europe, a strong defense within NATO,
including stationing of U.S. troops and weapons in Germany, and a staunch anti-communist position. On the other hand, the SPD had neutralist tendencies that I think worried Washington, even though by the mid-1950s the socialists had, thanks to Carlo Schmidt, dropped much of its "Marxist baggage." So in Washington the conservative parties were regarded as more reliable than the socialists. I guess we in the Munich consulate shared the views of our masters in Washington as to which of the two main parties best promoted U.S. interests.

I must add, however, that in the Bavarian SPD there were many moderate, responsible, broad-gauged people, and we developed good connections with them.

Q: Well, Konrad Adenauer was certainly the leading figure in Germany at the time.

JAMES: Oh, yes, very much so.

Q: How was Adenauer viewed from Bavaria? He was very much a creature of the Rhineland and all that.

JAMES: I think he was more congenial to the Bavarians than a protestant from the former Prussian lands would have been. After all, Adenauer was a Catholic and Bavaria is overwhelmingly of that faith.

He was an extraordinarily effective leader, and the CSU so regarded him. I do not think there was any realistic expectation among CSU politicians that as long as Adenauer was able to carry on anyone else in the CDU/CSU could replace him. He was a commanding figure, a powerful speaker, as I can attest having heard him speak several times to thunderous applause at CSU conventions. In a word, he was the right man at the right time for Germany, the right blend of democrat and authoritarian. Most Bavarians in the CSU probably felt that way.

Q: Today is December 29, 1994, and we're back to 1956. You came back from Munich in 1956. What did you do then?

JAMES: I was assigned to something called the mid-career course. I'd been in the Foreign Service only five years, but nevertheless I went to the mid-career course. It started off in Front Royal, Virginia, under agreeable circumstances.

Q: Oh, yes.

JAMES: We spent a week, ten days, something like that, being lectured to. The thing that stands out in my mind most of all is that we devoted a good deal of time to problem-solving. Our mentor was a management consultant from real life, who posed management and administrative problems which we worked on in committees. We made presentations after we had developed solutions. That's about all I remember, except that it was spring in
the Shenandoah, and the surroundings were beautiful and the company congenial. Later we returned to Washington to wind up the course at the Foreign Service Institute.

Q: Let me just ask a question about this, because I took this course, oh, maybe ten years later. This was the first time I was a professional back with my fellow professionals, sitting around from various places and solving problems, real theoretical. I was not impressed by the way we went about things. Maybe it was because of my background as a consular officer, where you had 30 seconds to make a decision. I thought we dithered a lot. Did you have any feel about that or not?

JAMES: No. I wasn't as far along in my career as you were, and I didn't have that impression. I thought it might have been a little esoteric, but I didn't have difficulties with it. I rather liked the process. I might have been less patient or compliant had I taken it another five, ten years later. I just don't know.

Q: Where did you go after this?

JAMES: After the mid-career course and before I received an assignment, I ran into a Williams classmate who was in the staff secretariat who told me how interesting the job was--he was just about to set off for Europe, I think, with the Secretary of State--and suggested I might like to work there.

Q: Ben Reed?

JAMES: No, Bob Gilman, a good friend who is now dead. He encouraged me and possibly even helped me to be assigned to the S/S, as the secretariat was known. I worked there for three years. My first assignment was editing the early morning telegram summary. This entailed leaving our Georgetown home about 12:30 A.M., on a bicycle if the night was fair, and barreling down to the Department to edit the summary.

Q: Oh, boy.

JAMES: I reviewed the night's telegram take and assigned the important ones to two officers to summarize. I then edited their work and saw that the summary was put to bed by 8:00 A.M. Copies were sent to the White House and to the Secretary and his principal assistants. Doing the morning summary was fatiguing but instructive. One had a daily briefing on all major foreign policy developments of concern to the United States.

I worked on the early morning summary until around the autumn of 1956 when I was assigned to what was known as "the line." As one of several officers, I reviewed staff studies and other papers sent by the various bureaus to the Secretary and Under Secretary. The number two who had the title then of Under Secretary, not Deputy, was Herbert Hoover, Jr. This was excellent training for a junior officer. To ensure that papers were complete, recommendations properly documented and cleared, that submissions were responsive to the wishes of the Secretary and Under Secretary, and above all, neat and
free of typos sharpened one's skills and inculcated a habit to think about all aspects of a problem and produce a complete solution.

I was on the line for a year, perhaps a bit longer. Then I became one of the deputies in the reports and operations section of S/S. I supervised some, possibly all of the line officers, gave public briefings on U.S. foreign policy and accompanied the Secretary on a number of trips. I went mainly on those to Europe and some in the U.S., as I remember. I especially enjoyed giving foreign policy briefings. Looking back I am struck by how central to all our foreign policy was our preoccupation with communism and the danger of its spread. This was the red thread that ran through all my briefings as I faithfully, but not very critically, expounded the Dulles line.

Q: What was your impression of how John Foster Dulles operated and how he used the secretariat?

JAMES: He operated very independently. He did not believe in using committees to formulate policy recommendations. With the total support of the President, he clearly was the architect of foreign policy from 1953 to his death in 1959. He was often secretive about what he was doing or going to do, and would periodically seclude himself at his family property in Lake Ontario with his famous long legal yellow pad and sketch out policy initiatives.

Q: Duck Island?

JAMES: Yes. In this retreat he sorted out his ideas and how he wanted them implemented.

As I remember, he depended on a small coterie of advisers. The Department's top professional, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Robert Murphy, was in this circle. Dulles had great respect for Herman Phleger, the Legal Adviser, a distinguished San Francisco lawyer. On Asia he relied heavily for advice on Walter Robertson, a real hawk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary for Europe, thoughtful, gentlemanly, a former banker was also in the inner circle. It is my impression that these were a few of the limited number of people whose advice and competence Dulles most respected. I have little clear recollection about how Dulles regarded the Foreign Service. Although he operated independently and made only small groups of officials privy to his thinking, he respected professionalism. I think of Joe Sisco who was a leading adviser on U.N. affairs. Philip Farley who presided over nuclear matters in the Department was another professional whom Dulles clearly respected.

As I look back, I remember Dulles as decisive, assured of the correctness of his own judgment, righteous in his convictions and totally loyal to President Eisenhower.

Q: How did he treat the staff, from your perspective?
JAMES: If you mean the secretariat staff, I would have to say that I don't think he paid much attention to us, at least when he was in Washington. On trips abroad there were fewer people in his entourage and we saw him more frequently as we provided regular staff services. On one trip I remember him walking through our offices and inquiring if everything was satisfactory. During my time he had several personal assistants. When I went to S/S, it was Bill Macomber who was later Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs and President of the Metropolitan Museum. He evidently had high regard for Macomber who clearly felt very loyal to Dulles. But I rather think Dulles took the secretariat for granted. He was always so preoccupied with foreign policy crises, Suez, Hungary, Matsu and Quemoy, Berlin, the division of Germany, that he never seemed to have time to be anything but a foreign policy machine. However, I remember a Christmas party he gave for his office staff and the secretariat at which he was most gracious.

Mrs. Dulles was a kindly lady who stayed in the background. She did not, as I recall, accompany the Secretary on foreign trips very often.

Incidentally, foreign travel in those days could be grueling. A flight to Geneva took 18 hours; to London or Paris 13 or 14. And coming back the trip was even longer.

When he thought about it, Dulles could of course be considerate. And after he became fatally ill he seemed to me and I guess to my colleagues on the secretariat, very human. One could not fail to feel much sympathy for him and admire his fortitude and efforts to carry on.

Q: Were there sort of almost hallway instructions? In other words, not official, but, "Oh, the Secretary doesn't like to see this sort of thing, but he's particularly interested in this sort of thing." Because the people who filter the stuff to him, or to any principal, sometimes know that it's not always an automatic process. Sometimes there are particular hobby horses or what have you that one becomes aware of. Did you have any thought of that sort of thing?

JAMES: There certainly were what you call "hallway instructions." And I assume that we in the secretariat knew what the Secretary was interested in and what not. But I must point out that our function was to ensure that papers and studies sent up from the bureaus were complete, properly documented and cleared. If they were, we had no authority to "short stop" them, even if we were sure the Secretary might not then be interested or want them. We might make an appropriate notation on the document when we sent it to the executive secretary. He might decide not to forward the paper to the Secretary's personal assistant, but surely would have explained why. The Secretary's personal assistant had the last word, knowing intimately the Secretary's immediate need or interest, unless, of course, someone like Murphy insisted that a paper go to Dulles.

On conference trips, the procedure might be slightly different. If one were in charge of the secretariat, as I was on several trips, one might make a more independent judgment, but always between the S/S officer and the Secretary was the latter's personal assistant; on
most of the trips I took with the Secretary that was Jerry Greene, a sharp, meticulous and capable professional.

*Q: Yes, I've interviewed him. He's up in Connecticut now.*

JAMES: That's right, yes. Greene stood between the Secretary and papers that he didn't think the Secretary needed to see or would consider incomplete or didn't need to see at that time, or should be sent to Hoover. So there was somebody who was much, much closer to the Secretary than we who would be making the final decision on the flow of paper. Now if it was something the Secretary had asked for, then we would jolly well make sure that it got moved forward. We wouldn't exercise any kind of independent judgment, but simply get it forward as fast as possible.

*Q: Did you in the secretariat, at your level, act downward? In other words, go to the EUR Bureau and say, "We need more, this isn't complete," or that sort of thing?*

JAMES: Oh, yes, we would do just that. We tried to build cooperative relationships with the staff assistants of the various assistant secretaries. I think we were successful, and believe me it made a big difference in the flow of paper and the quality of submissions.

*Q: Could you explain how you would work this? You'd go to the staff assistant and say...*

JAMES: Well, we would usually call him up (I don't recall that there were any women staff assistants then), or go down to see him. Staff assistants were our channel to the assistant secretaries. It would be rare for us to talk with an Office Director. We would explain what was the problem with a study or action paper and suggest how it might be cured. A happy example of the smooth relations we built with staff assistants is the one we enjoyed with Ted Long, staff assistant to Livingston Merchant. We got to know Long very well because there was so much important business going on in our relations with Europe. The cooperation we enjoyed with Long was, I think, very productive as well as most agreeable.

*Q: Were there, at times, problems with officers within the secretariat who sort of enjoyed being able to say, "The Secretary wants this," or "The Secretary wants that," and sort of throwing their weight around? Or was this pretty well kept under control?*

JAMES: Ours was a disciplined, collegial group. I think we worked with the bureaus very well. And I must say, without flattering myself, that most people in the secretariat were carefully selected and worked as a team. I do not recall any secretariat officer "throwing his weight around." It would not have been condoned precisely because it would complicate relationships with the staff assistants by generating resentment.

*Q: It's often said that real diplomacy is not with other countries, but within your own organization, or at least within the United States. To get things done, you have to exercise much more care in that. And I have noticed that the secretariat seems to be a major source where talent is developed, allowed to ferment for a while, and then go out*
again on this. You were on the line in the fall of '56, where all hell broke loose, being the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis. Do you recall anything about that particular time?

JAMES: The Suez and Hungarian crises dominated my first year in the secretariat. Both created a heavy volume of work for us.

The first thing that stands out in my mind about the Suez crisis is the vast number of telegrams we summarized in the summer of 1956 dealing with Dulles's plan to create a Suez Canal Users Association or SCUA after Nasser nationalized the Canal. I do not recall that the traffic we had access to after SCUA failed was particularly enlightening about British and French plans, with Israeli cooperation, to seize the Canal. The reason is simply that so much traffic around that time was supersensitive, or if not, it was not informative because our Embassies in the affected capitals were not being told what was afoot. So I then learned about as much about the Suez problem from the press as from the telegrams. But I was struck by one telegram from Ambassador Aldrich in London one weekend when I was the S/S duty officer. It forwarded a message from Macmillan.


JAMES: Macmillan's message was for the eyes of the President and the Secretary of State only. I was not supposed to see it. Dulles's personal assistant, or the director of S/S was handling it, but I caught a glimpse. In it Macmillan begged: "Give us a fig leaf to cover our nakedness." I don't know what was the precise context in which the request was made, but it seemed to me to illustrate how abjectly the British felt about their misadventure in trying to grab the Canal and how desperately they wanted to rehabilitate themselves with the Eisenhower administration which, as you know, took a very negative view of the Suez operation and forced the British and French to stop. Years later, when I served in London, I was introduced to Macmillan, then Lord Stockton, nearly blind and close to 90, in the vestibule of the Carlton Club, the favorite watering hole of Tory politicians. I don't think I can honestly say that upon meeting "Super Mac" my mind suddenly went back to 1956 when I saw that revealing telegram he sent the President and the Secretary, but I would like to pretend it did.

I, and I am sure colleagues close to me, felt great sympathy for the Hungarians whose revolt against communist rule was brutally crushed by the Russians. I had fairly recently returned from Germany where I had gained a fair appreciation of central European affairs and how people in the Soviet sphere chafed under the communists. So the Hungarian uprising and its subsequent repression seemed very poignant. While in Munich I had, as I have mentioned, had dealings with RFE in a temporary liaison capacity and so paid close attention to rumors that RFE was egging on the Hungarians. If the reports were true, it seemed to me pretty hypocritical when the west was not going to fight for Hungarian independence. Some KROs with whom I had gone to Germany and I and our wives organized a party to raise money for Hungarian relief, a modest gesture but about all one could do on a personal or national level. The United States and NATO were not going to
chase the Russians out of Hungary no matter that Dulles had once boasted that the Eisenhower administration would roll back the Iron Curtain.

More about these unhappy events I do not recall. I was doing an essentially mechanical job, important perhaps in a way, but nonetheless not substantive. One did not then have the leisure to study telegrams and staff papers and think deeply about the meaning of these crises.

Q: What was your impression of the coverage of the State Department, particularly under pressure from abroad?

JAMES: You mean the work of the posts abroad?

Q: Yes, the posts abroad. Was there a gnashing of teeth, of "Why don't they tell us this?" or that sort of thing?

JAMES: I think the Department was as well served in the Suez crisis as circumstances allowed. We had able ambassadors in London and Paris, Aldrich and Dillon, respectively, and they had first-class staffs. I do not recall who was our man in Tel Aviv, but believe that Embassy acquitted itself well. Our Embassies were, however, handicapped. The UK, France and Israel clammed up and their secretiveness made it difficult to know what was afoot and how the U.S. could play a responsible role, at least until hostilities broke out. It was difficult for even these able representatives to ferret out the precise intentions of the conspirators.

I have the impression that our Embassy in Budapest and others in Eastern Europe covered the extinction of the Hungarian revolution more than adequately.

Q: Did you get any feel for the aversion that John Foster Dulles had towards President Nasser of Egypt? Was that anything that permeated down to your level?

JAMES: I do not recall personally hearing Dulles deliver judgment on Nasser, but it was no secret to anyone reasonably well informed that Dulles was enraged by Nasser's nationalizing the Suez Canal and turning to the Russians to buy arms. I suspect that Dulles also felt personal antagonism toward Nasser.

Q: You left the secretariat when?

JAMES: In 1959.

Q: By that time, Christian Herter had become Secretary.

JAMES: He had been Secretary of State since about January 1959. When Dulles's illness became totally debilitating, he pressed President Eisenhower to accept his resignation. The President finally acceded and named Herter to succeed him. Dulles died in May 1959.
Herter was courtly, naturally affable and considerate of others. I served in the secretariat under Herter for about nine months, and saw him a bit more personally than I did Dulles, frequently taking telegrams to him at his house on P Street in Georgetown when I had weekend duty. On one such occasion, Allen Dulles was there, conferring with Herter. Ever the perfect gentleman, Herter asked me, "Do you know Allen Dulles?" No, I did not know him nor he me. But that was Herter's style. He was the epitome of gentility.

I saw quite a bit more of him in the summer of 1959 in Geneva during a long and futile meeting of western and Soviet foreign ministers on the division of Germany. Herter's presence made life pleasant for us on the secretariat of which I was officer in charge. One Sunday my S/S colleague and delightful friend, Jim Carson, alas now dead, and I escorted two secretaries to Lake Annecy to lunch at the famous restaurant of Pere Bise. There was Secretary and Mrs. Herter in a distinguished company, including Ambassador and Mrs. Bruce. Herter greeted us with his customary grace.

I remember one day in Geneva we got warning that an urgent telegram was coming in, presumably important, being marked personally for the Secretary. Herter had finished for the day, but I asked him to stay in the office for what seemed an hour or more, waiting for the telegram, which, when it arrived, proved not to be very momentous. A less considerate man would have blown up, but Herter was understanding and didn't carp. The people around him, however, seemed to think I was presumptuous. But this just gives you a measure of the man, how understanding he was.

Herter did not have Dulles's powerful intellect and supreme confidence in the rightness of his judgment, but he was a sophisticate in foreign affairs and kept a steady hand on the tiller from the time he took over from Dulles until the Kennedy administration came to office.

Q: When you left the secretariat, where did you go?

JAMES: I went into the Office of European Regional Affairs, EUR/RA, as it was then known. Our brief was U.S. political-military policy in western Europe, mainly in a NATO context.

Q: You were there from '59 to...?

JAMES: From '59 to '62.

Q: Who was in charge of NATO affairs at that time?

JAMES: Russell Fessenden was the Office Director. He was another esteemed colleague who, I thought, was able, steady and thoughtful.
The office had a range of responsibilities, among them supporting the U.S. delegation to NATO, sending instructions and guidance on political and political-military matters; supervising negotiation of atomic agreements with NATO countries on the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories; working with the Pentagon on the negotiation of military base agreements with NATO countries. RA also reviewed for political acceptability matters like NATO air rules of engagement and innumerable military studies with political implications.

I spent a good deal of time on atomic agreements, drafting instructions to embassies for negotiations with host governments. In RA I came to know many Pentagon officers, military and civilian quite well and to respect them. This association was excellent background for my later assignment as Political Adviser at U.S. European Command.

A temporary duty assignment I much enjoyed was acting as political adviser (twice) in a logistical command post exercise at Fort Bragg. I advised the general to whom I was attached of sensitive political issues in the country where the mock battle was taking place. This too was good preparation for my later assignment with the military in France. I also once substituted in late 1961 or early 1962 for my friend V. Lansing Collins, political adviser at the headquarters of Admiral Robert Dennison in Norfolk. Dennison was Commander-in-Chief Atlantic and Atlantic Fleet, as well as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. An intelligent, savvy, friendly officer, Dennison would have commanded U.S. forces had we invaded Cuba in October 1962. A close friend of the Admiral was Secretary of State Dean Rusk. While I was at Norfolk, Rusk spent the day at Dennison's headquarters. The Admiral kindly invited me to the briefings and lunch given Rusk as well as Rusk's tour d'horizon for senior staff. The Secretary's command of policy issues was impressive and his judgments refreshingly candid. I particularly remember him referring to Haiti as "the cesspool of the western hemisphere."

I made a very instructive trip in 1961 as the representative of the European Bureau on a State-Defense team to Greece, Italy and Turkey to inspect U.S. nuclear weapons sites. Our brief was to assess non-strategic aspects of the deployments of those weapons, such as security and safety. The timing of the trip was fortuitous. For a year later came the Cuban missile crisis. The team's report, which I recall raised questions about the security and safety of those weapons, may have enabled President Kennedy to rationalize the removal of long range weapons from Italy and Turkey in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. For even though the inspection trip was highly technical, it may have led policy makers in the new Kennedy administration to think hard about the utility of strategic weapons in the unstable southern tier of NATO. Anyway, I suppose that the Thors and other strategic missiles were approaching obsolescence as submarines began to play a bigger part in our system of deterrence.

Q: This became one of the issues, that we had missiles in Turkey, and this was related by Khrushchev to their missiles in Cuba. Eventually, they took theirs out of Cuba, and we took ours out of Turkey. Then there's a debate of whether this was actually a quid pro quo or was already in the works.
JAMES: I suspect that we would sooner or later have taken our strategic weapons out of the southern tier. We did not touch those in Greece which were battlefield and air delivered, I believe.

_Q: Going back to that time, can you recall what we felt about the political situation in Turkey and in Greece, from your perspective, as far as what might happen? That would be the greatest concern, I would think._

JAMES: Greek-Turkish enmity made the U.S. uneasy, I think, about having our nuclear weapons in both those countries. But Turkey was the greater worry. In 1960 there had been a military coup and the Prime Minister was executed. We had only tactical weapons in Greece, and that country was fairly stable, at least compared with Turkey. The Turkish junta's intentions were unknown. There was the perennial Cyprus question and it was possible that a military junta had aggressive intentions that would lead to war with Greece.

I suppose most of our NATO allies also deplored what had happened in Turkey. I had one vivid illustration of the attitude of our NATO country, Iceland, when I made an orientation trip there in 1960 or 1961. Our Ambassador gave a reception for me to which he invited Icelanders in public life, media and the university. I was impressed by how well informed those people were about events in Turkey which was much on their minds and how indignant they were at the military coup.

But let's finish up on the motivation for removal of strategic weapons from Turkey and Italy. Probably the military coup in Turkey made the incoming Kennedy administration ask some hard questions about Turkey's reliability and so accelerated the withdrawal of long range missiles. Whether our action was truly a quid pro quo for Khrushchev's removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba may be moot. There is little doubt that it was in our interest to take ours out of the southern tier for political and technological reasons. We probably would have done so sooner or later had there never been a Cuban missile crisis. I venture to guess that Kennedy was not disappointed if he thought Khrushchev believed he was getting reciprocity when he took his weapons out of Cuba. By not discouraging him from so thinking Kennedy could save Khrushchev's face with his friends and enemies in Moscow. Finally, I assume that including Italy in weapons withdrawal, which we also probably would have done in any case, made it easier for the Turks to swallow the removal of weapons from there.

_Q: What about some of the issues that you were concerned with, say, with Germany, Great Britain, France, the Benelux countries, as far as nuclear arms?_  

JAMES: I do not recall any serious problems with the British about atomic matters, storing weapons there. Our relations with the British in the nuclear weapons field had been smooth for years and continued to be in the early 1960s. And we had with the
British what we both considered satisfactory arrangements of long-standing regarding consultation on release of the weapons we had in Britain.

I had a hand in making agreements with Belgium and the Netherlands on stationing tactical nuclear weapons on their soil. Both countries accepted the placement of tactical nuclear weapons without any memorable public furor. I do not think we had nuclear weapons in France, at least I do not recall working on an atomic agreement with France. If we had had weapons there, de Gaulle, who came back to office in 1959, would have made that an issue one would not forget.

In Germany, of course, we had masses of nuclear weapons, all tactical. Under the CDU/CSU Germany cooperated with the U.S. splendidly. I think Washington was contented with arrangements we had for stockpiling of weapons and their safeguarding. The Adenauer regime and its CDU/CSU successor seemed content with control arrangements that did not give them a say in release. But I remember being told by my friend Deuerlein shortly before I left RA that Franz Josef Strauss, then or recently Defense Minister, wanted some sort of joint release arrangement and that it was important for the U.S. to accommodate the Germans on this issue. During the time of which I speak there was, however, no serious pressure from the German authorities for dual control of these weapons.

In short, during the early 1960’s our European allies were very cooperative about plans and programs for deployment of our nuclear weapons.

Q: As you were dealing with nuclear matters in Europe, were you picking up, either from our own military or within the State Department, disquiet over--it's a great idea to use these things, but how good are they? I remember, back in the '50s, watching these atomic cannons going around that could lob a shell maybe 25 miles or so, and you wondered, well, that's all nice, but what if the wind's going the wrong way? Just nuclear devastation in a heavily population area. Was this a concern?

JAMES: Oh, I'm sure it was a concern to all allied military and civilian leaders. The devastating effects of nuclear detonations on military and civilian, allied and enemy alike, the early use of which NATO relied on to stop aggression, could easily be imagined by any officer who had had the standard nuclear briefings for officers dealing with nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons policy.

But I do not recall the State Department people, in RA or other concerned offices, were preoccupied by such a worry. I suppose one reason was that we needed these weapons to deter, and if deterrence failed to offset superior Russian conventional power. My colleagues and I did not stay awake nights fretting about possible use of nuclear weapons. I suppose we were rather confident that they would not have to be used, so the matter seemed a bit academic.
That said, given the heavy deployment of nuclear weapons on both sides of the dividing line, one did feel very uneasy whenever a confrontation took place with the Russians over, say, Berlin, for it could escalate through miscalculation rather quickly. So those confrontations in Berlin in the early 1960s were cause for worry.

Q: In June of ’61, shortly after Kennedy came in, he met with Khrushchev, who tried basically to bully Kennedy over Berlin. And Kennedy called up the Reserves. Do you recall any effects where you were on what this meant?

JAMES: I do not clearly remember those events. However, I do remember subsequent confrontations over Berlin caused by Russian pressures, and provocations which occurred while I was Political Adviser at United States European Command. In my mind the confrontations that took place in the early 1960's were overshadowed by the Cuban missile crisis.

Q: Which was in October of ’62.

JAMES: By that time I was in the National War College.

Q: So you went to the National War College, I suppose, for the normal year, from September to...

JAMES: No, August of ’62 to June of ’63.

Q: Which war college did you go to?

JAMES: The National War College.

Q: How did you find the course?

JAMES: I thought it was splendid. As in everything, one got out of it what one put in. Academically, the course was not as rigorous as I understand it is today, but the faculty, a mix of military and civilian academics, was excellent, and the lectures were stimulating. Nearly every week some distinguished personality, American and foreign, would give an address. President Eisenhower spoke to us, as did Willy Brandt, George Meany, Margaret Mead, Edward Teller, and other people of note.

I usually put in a full day, meeting in committee to work on a political/military problem, reading, or writing a paper. I wrote two I thought rather good on U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe and a classified one on command and control of nuclear weapons, my thesis for the course. I was pleased that Ambassador Win Brown, the civilian deputy commander of the College, cited me and a couple of other officers from State as outstanding students when he reported to the Department at the end of the course.

In the spring the College divided into several groups, each to make a three-week trip to a major area of the world. I chose the trip to the Near East and South Asia which was led by
Win Brown who had been Minister in India. This trip was for me the high point of the year. We met leading figures in the 7 or 8 countries we visited. We talked with Nehru in the Indian parliament building. He looked tired and unwell, I thought. He did not make a presentation but invited us to question him. The brave King Hussein, who had just had one of many close calls when his airplane had been attacked by some dissident elements, made a big hit with our group. Our Ambassador, Bill Macomber, whom I had known when he was personal assistant to Dulles, obligingly arranged our call on the little King, who insisted on being photographed with us. In Pakistan, we were entertained at a splendid dinner by Ayub Khan after we had toured the Northwest Frontier. Nasser was too busy setting up the United Arab Republic with Syria to see us, but his subordinates gave us instructive briefings and excellent hospitality. In Israel we met the doughty Foreign Minister Golda Meir and Prime Minister Ben Gurion.

I remember asking Ben Gurion what he thought of the UAR, the recently announced merger of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic. He had no time for the term UAR; Egypt was Egypt, he said, not the UAR. In a briefing on Israeli security policy I asked what contingency planning for outside assistance Israel had done in case of another war with the Arabs. The simple, straight answer was that Israel counted on the help of no outside power, only itself.

The year at the War College was a singular experience. Of course, lectures and committee work were broadening, but the principal boon for both military and civilian students was our close association for nearly a year, studying, arguing, relaxing with people whose careers were so different from one's own but who shared a commitment to public service. I gained a better understanding of the military ethos. My military colleagues say they gained a better appreciation of the civilian outlook. If many of us entered the War College with preconceptions or biases about other services, the year changed or at least modified prejudices. The course was really about integration of power and diplomacy, how integration of civilian and military effort were essential to advance national security objectives. I think most of us absorbed the lessons well, and considered that our year was truly formative, even though we were all in our 40s and at mid-career.

After that, I was posted to the United States European Command as Political Advisor and had an opportunity to put into practice what I had learned at the War College.

Q: Now where were you the Political Advisor?

JAMES: At United States European Command. Let me explain the command structure. In 1963, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces Europe, was General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, a capable, avuncular soldier-diplomat, known affectionately to his staff as "General Lem." Lemnitzer had been Chief of Staff of the Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I saw General Lemnitzer frequently and enjoyed his hospitality. He was a fine man and soldier. He was also Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). His NATO headquarters was designated Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). Since General Lemnitzer, like his predecessors, devoted most
of his time to NATO business, his deputy, a four star Air Force officer de facto ran, U.S. European Command, EUCOM. However, if a major crisis arose in the EUCOM area of responsibility, Lemnitzer would come over to EUCOM and take command. His NATO and U.S. headquarters were only some 10 miles apart. This he did during the Congo crisis of 1963 or 1964 when EUCOM aircraft airlifted Belgian paratroopers to the Congo to protect and evacuate Europeans.

General Lemnitzer had his own political adviser at SHAPE who was called Foreign Affairs Adviser in deference to allied sensibilities. His adviser in 1963 was John Burns, an accomplished Foreign Service officer who later was Director General of the Foreign Service. Lemnitzer was fastidious about not mixing SHAPE and EUCOM business.

I was POLAD to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief at EUCOM who was known as DCINC.

Q: Who was that?

JAMES: When I arrived at EUCOM the DCINC was General J.P. McConnell who a year later became Chief of Staff of the Air Force. McConnell was a tough, smart officer who had survived a number of crashes and did not at the age of about 60 when I met him, land an airplane very gently, as I can attest having been his passenger several times. McConnell was proud of his service with Lord Mountbatten in the CBI theater during the war.

As POLAD my principal responsibility was to ensure that the DCINC and his senior staff (on which all services were represented) were apprized of significant political and economic developments in the EUCOM area, which was more extensive than that of SHAPE; it included parts of Africa in addition to NATO Europe. From the Embassy in Paris I received a broad selection of telegrams daily which I used to brief the DCINC and senior officers. I gave briefings on political issues of concern to the Command, for example, in contemplation of moving the headquarters from France to Germany after President de Gaulle ordered U.S. forces to leave France, I gave a talk on the German constitution and political system. I also accompanied senior officers on inspection trips to Morocco and Libya, where the Command had special interests, and of course frequently to Berlin.

In addition to keeping my military principals informed on political issues, I sent frequent reports to the Department about the political concerns of the Command. That was a time when there were pressures in Congress to draw down forces in Europe because of budgetary concerns. I represented to the Department the apprehensions about draw downs of McConnell and Lemnitzer. Burns showed Lemnitzer one of my letters to the Department which the General thought a cogent analysis of the military's objections to a significant draw-down.
McConnell left EUCOM around the middle of 1964 to be Air Force Chief of Staff. His successor was another four star Air Force general, Jacob E. Smart, who had commanded the U.S. Air Force in Japan and, as I mentioned earlier in the interview, commanded the bomb group in Italy during the war of which my squadron was a part. Smart is a courtly South Carolinian, gracious and cosmopolitan. He had a distinguished war record. He planned the first air raid on the oil fields of Ploesti and later won a DSC for gallantry. He was shot down in 1944, I think, and was a POW until the end of the war. He was delightful to work for. My wife and I enjoyed his company immensely.

Q: You were just outside of Paris?

JAMES: Yes, near St. Germain-en-Laye, at a base called Camp des Loges, where, it was said, there had been a military encampment since the time of Caesar. That's where I was from the summer of 1963 to the spring of 1967 when U.S. forces left France and the headquarters moved to Germany. Smart was DCINC when President de Gaulle decreed in March 1966 that U.S. forces and NATO should leave France.

Our Embassy in Paris had advance, but very brief, warning of de Gaulle's ultimatum, a fact incidentally, that Ambassador Bohlen did not mention in his autobiography "Witness to History." A night or two before Foreign Minister Couve de Murville called Bohlen to the Quai d'Orsay to receive a note formally requesting the departure of U.S. forces, a senior officer of the Foreign Office called the Minister, Robert McBride, and Political-Military Counselor, Jack McGuire, to the Quai d'Orsay to inform them of the General's plans. With such advance warning, Washington could at least be prepared to make a quick riposte to the French demand to withdraw. April 1, 1967 was the deadline for withdrawal of U.S. forces and EUCOM. NATO was allowed somewhat more time.

For the next year, I shuttled between EUCOM and the Embassy constantly, attending Ambassador Bohlen's staff meetings, being briefed by my friend McGuire on Embassy contacts with the French, and generally gathering as much information as possible to be useful to Smart and officers at EUCOM. McGuire, who had preceded me as POLAD at EUCOM, was splendidly helpful. He was bright, precise and ebullient. I enjoyed a most agreeable association with him. I was supposed to replace McGuire in the Embassy sometime in 1966 but Bohlen did not want any of the players to change. So he froze McGuire's and my transfer for a year.

I passed to General Smart information I got from McGuire about French requirements for withdrawal and other information that would assist EUCOM in executing withdrawal of U.S. forces and the long, complex line of communications that stretched across France from the Atlantic to the Rhine.

This was a lively if depressing time, for being expelled from France was not a happy prospect for our military friends or us civilians close to them. John Burns at SHAPE, and McGuire and I arranged for our principals, Generals Lemnitzer and Smart and Ambassador Bohlen to compare notes regularly. Bohlen was a tower of strength during
this trying time. Often these consultations took place over luncheon at Bohlen's residence. He had a talented chef and our political-military camaraderie was made closer, more congenial and I hope more productive by sharing the pleasures of the Bohlen table and cellar.

Q: Had there been any intimations that this was going to happen before you got this leaked word? Were you thinking, well, de Gaulle, we better start thinking about getting out of here? Or was this pretty much a bolt from the blue?

JAMES: I recall that it was a complete surprise to us all.

As I have said, McGuire and I were very friendly and talked regularly even before this crisis. I know he would have told me if he and his superiors had an intimation or were predicting that this would happen. In retrospect, it seems clear that given de Gaulle's vision of France, his obsession with fear of domination by the United States and NATO, and his insistence that France should not allow her independence to be diluted, it was only a question of time before he sought to dissociate France from the military side of NATO and order U.S. forces out of France. But when the blow fell we were all shocked and surprised, military and civilian alike.

Q: You're talking about the French military.

JAMES: No, I mean the U.S. military. I would not venture to guess whether the French military were surprised. Our military plan for all sorts of contingencies and presumably they had a plan for just this sort of emergency, that is, for winding up the line of communications, LOC, moving stocks from France to other NATO countries, and withdrawing headquarters and subcommands. But I do not remember any officer at EUCOM saying, well it has finally happened. General Smart I can attest was taken aback by the news.

Q: What about the reaction of our military? You got two days and all of a sudden, you know it's going to happen. Military being military, although it's NATO, it really must have been, "Goddamn the French!" or "What the hell!" or something. How did you work on this?

JAMES: At EUCOM, de Gaulle's decree was regarded as an arrogant act. Expelling U.S. forces and NATO would, it was generally felt, make defense of Europe more difficult because, among other things, the LOC henceforth would have to run parallel and not, as military doctrine required, at right angles to the potential battle line. And there was resentment; we had after all gone to the rescue of France twice in this century. However, senior people at EUCOM were sophisticated and knew how to conduct themselves without much, if any, tutoring from me.

I have the recollection that not a few French officers were chagrined by de Gaulle's decision. Those we knew at EUCOM seemed to be. The French civilian officials I knew
deplored our eviction. I think particularly of the French liaison office for assistance to allied forces, headed by a distinguished civil servant, Pierre Dambeza, and his deputy, Louis de Beauchamp, a Proust scholar. Both were friendly to me and senior officers at the Command beyond the demands of protocol. They were too correct to criticize the General's decision openly, but I thought they regretted and were saddened by it.

Dambeza gave a splendid farewell party in his Paris apartment for senior Embassy and U.S. military officers. Lemnitzer and Bohlen both attended. Smart was sick, I think, and did not attend. It was an imaginative affair that showed genuine esteem for the United States and its representatives. Dambeza created, in miniature, the LOC which ran, as if from the Atlantic to the Rhine, from one room in his apartment to another. In each room were laid out the specialities, the cheeses, wines, pates, pastries, of the particular region of France through which the LOC actually passed. It was a lavish affair and a Lucullan delight, but most of all it was a gesture of amity that we all deeply appreciated.

Whatever their feelings about the decision of the French Government, the American military got on with the job and did it smartly. The word went out from EUCOM that the General's timetable would be met. There was little time to bemoan the fact that we would have to leave.

Q: Did you have to help put out brush fires of resentment, such as, well, if we're going to pull out of here, let's do this or that, or make it hurt, or anything like that? Was that a problem?

JAMES: I did not detect a disposition in the U.S. military not to uncooperate (sic) or to drag their feet. Ambassador Bohlen and Generals Lemnitzer and Smart would not have tolerated it. They made sure that the evacuation went smoothly and that the public attitude of U.S. forces was politically correct throughout that difficult year.

General Smart left EUCOM before we moved to Germany. His place was taken by another four star Air Force officer, David Birchinal, who had been Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He obviously was a capable officer, but I did not enjoy with him the close rapport I did with Smart. He was a bit of a cold fish. I don't remember much about my dealings with him, except that I took an instructive trip with him to Madrid where he went to talk with the Spanish military. Birchinal was keen on Spain joining NATO, and didn't seem to accept the force of what I told him repeatedly that as long as Franco was alive, Spanish membership of the alliance would be politically unacceptable to the Europeans.

I made a couple of trips to Stuttgart before the headquarters moved to reconnoiter, meet our Consul General and get a line on any political problems the Command might encounter. On one visit to Stuttgart, I was introduced to the Minister President of Baden Wurttemberg, Kiesinger, who later was Chancellor of Germany for a brief time. Kiesinger was most cordial. He liked Americans. It seems his daughter was married to an American and lived in the United States. Kiesinger welcomed the prospect of EUCOM being in his
state and I think saw to it that things went smoothly from the German side. We spoke in German, mine being a bit rusty but Kiesinger was tolerant.

We moved out of Camp des Loges quickly and smartly. Actually, we beat de Gaulle's deadline by a couple of weeks. EUCOM was operational in France until late one afternoon, decamped over night, and the next morning was operational in Germany. We occupied a former panzer kaserne where an American army unit had been based, known as Patch Barracks. This place was a few miles outside Stuttgart.

I stayed with the Command for a couple of months and then returned to France.

Q: Then you moved to be Political Counselor in Paris.

JAMES: No, political/military counselor

Q: You were there from when to when?

JAMES: From May 1967 to September 1968. Ambassador Bohlen left in January 1968, by which time most of the elements of the LOC had been removed and surplus stores sold to the French. Technically, removal of the LOC did not occur within the time de Gaulle allowed. The French were understanding, however, about the difficulty of dismantling the LOC within 12 months and gave a de facto extension. I think their main interest was that EUCOM leave within the time set. After Bohlen left, the Minister, Woodruff Wallner, became Chargé. President Johnson did not appoint a new Ambassador until around May 1968 when he selected Sargent Shriver, President Kennedy's brother-in-law.

Shriver was in office only a week or so when Robert Kennedy was assassinated. He immediately left Paris to return to the States to be with the Kennedy family. In his absence, I was designated to represent him at D-Day commemorations that year. But I am getting ahead of myself. We should talk about that event later.

Q: That was '68.

JAMES: And three months later I was transferred to London.

Q: Let's talk now about your time as political/military counselor at our embassy in Paris. What was your main responsibility at that time?

JAMES: I must preface my response to that question by noting that the fifteen months I was political/military counselor in Paris were far less hectic than the preceding ones had been for Jack McGuire. I cannot say that I was frantically busy.

My brief was to deal with the political/military office of the Quai d'Orsay. One activity on which I spent a good deal of time was arranging for overflights of French air space by the USAF after U.S. forces were withdrawn. I presented the annual plan with rationale to the
director of the political/military office. A month or so later I was called to the Quai to receive the approved plan which was considerably scaled down from what the USAF had proposed. I assume our Air Force people were not too upset, at least I was not asked to go back to the French and argue for a more generous schedule.

When I returned to Paris in May 1967, closing the LOC was progressing well. The U.S. military presence in France was fast disappearing. As I mentioned, closing of the LOC, removal of equipment and stores, was not completed by April 1, 1967, but the French had granted a de facto extension. They seemed satisfied with progress, at least there were no complaints at the political level. I made a number of inspection trips to LOC facilities to assess progress. At none of the bases I visited did American officers I met express any feelings of wanting to get back at the French. All were carrying on correctly. It was particularly interesting to note how many former U.S. installations were being converted into industrial operations by French companies or American subsidiaries.

I also saw Dambeza a good deal and talked with him about the sale of surplus U.S. equipment to the French. That, it seems was a business that both sides considered profitable.

Among my other duties was a certain amount of reporting on matters peripheral to the closing of the LOC, such as French attitudes toward cooperation with NATO after leaving the integrated military structure.

Q: What about dealing with the Quai d'Orsay? How did you find relations were at that time? The French professional diplomats, are they difficult to deal with? How did you find them?

JAMES: On a personal plane I did not find them at all difficult. However, I found Gaullism uncongenial politically, and thought it much harder to represent U.S. interests, present U.S. positions to the French than was the case during my subsequent posting in London where I dealt with officials more attuned to the United States. As political/military counselor I dealt mainly with two or three officers at the Quai, the principal one being the official who at risk to his career alerted the Embassy in March 1966 to de Gaulle's impending demarche to the U.S. and NATO.

I found these men intelligent, well-informed and precise. The Office Director, in particular, exemplified the exquisitely trained French bureaucratic elite. Quai officials were always cordial to me. They spoke good English but insisted, as you can imagine, that official business be conducted exclusively in French.

I cannot generalize about attitudes at the Quai, but I sensed that those with whom I talked and negotiated were Atlanticists at heart, not dyed in the wool Gaullists.
Q: I've never served in France, but my understanding is that the "intellectuals" play a major role in French social and political life. What was the attitude towards the French intellectual at that time in our embassy? Did you have any feel for that?

JAMES: I cannot offer much enlightenment on that subject. The French intellectual establishment was considered brilliant in the 1960s, and Embassy officers acknowledged that fact. Ambassador Bohlen cultivated French savants, along with other segments of French society. You know, he learned Russian at the prestigious Ecole des Langues Orientales in the early 1930s. So he knew his way around French intellectual circles.

There was an excellent U.S. cultural center in Paris. I forget the name. In those days it was popular with the French generally. Whether an "intellectual" or an academecien would have frequented it I don't know, but it was more intellectual and aesthetic than a simple library. In addition to a wide range of books on the United States, the center mounted excellent art exhibits and had a serious lecture program. I was impressed by the Maison...

Q: Lafayette or something?

JAMES: Maison Franklin or Center Franklin. We had talented, literate officers who were able and did communicate, linguistically and intellectually, with French writers and political thinkers. Among the latter I think of Raymond Aron.

Q: Were you there during the embarrassing episode when one of our planes was taking pictures of French nuclear facilities, and the French caught us at it?

JAMES: I don't think I was. I think that happened while I was in London.

Q: You were there when the generals' revolt happened in Algeria, weren't you?

JAMES: No, that was a little earlier.

Q: So, by the time you were in as political/military counselor, de Gaulle was well in power. There was no problem.

JAMES: Oh, that's very true. Algeria gained its independence in 1962. By the time our War College group visited Algeria in 1963, I can attest that the troubles there had ended. When I entered the Paris Embassy four years later, civil unrest in France caused by diehard former French settlers in Algeria was over and de Gaulle was firmly in power. That is, he was until the so-called evenements of 1968 when France was almost paralyzed by a student rebellion and subsequent industrial action by the unions.

The events of 1968 were outside my area of responsibility, but all of us at the Embassy were affected in one way or another and were concerned. The political, economic and cultural sections were most immediately concerned and did the main reporting. The student takeover of the Sorbonne and spreading strikes slowed down French public life.
for several months. The situation deteriorated to the point where it looked as though there might be anarchy. The state seemed to be in danger.

There was widespread malaise and defiance of the established order. Not having had his subtle, conciliatory Prime Minister, Pompidou, on hand at the outset of the troubles to counsel moderation and find a way out, de Gaulle took a hard line and refused to deal with the students and strikers. Matters worsened and use of force by the government seemed possible.

By late May a crisis atmosphere prevailed in Paris. Tanks or armored personnel carriers surrounded the Elysée Palace. Then de Gaulle disappeared from public view. I remember that Vernon "Dick" Walters, our Defense Attaché, and later Ambassador to Germany and Deputy Director of CIA, was trying to find out where de Gaulle had gone but wasn't having any success. My eldest son Gray, who was locked out of the Sorbonne where he had been attending classes, occupied himself by taking painting classes offered by Madame Debre, wife of Defense Minister Michel Debre. Gray was at Madame Debre's the afternoon de Gaulle disappeared. When he came home that evening he told me he knew where de Gaulle was; he had gone to Germany to talk to the troops, Gray said. It appears Madame Debre had told him the secret. Her husband had gone with de Gaulle.

I was patronizing and refused to credit Gray's account, but later could have kicked myself for not having dashed off a telegram to Washington and beaten Walters to the punch.

A day later it was revealed that de Gaulle had made a tour des ra potes, a swing around the army messes, to sound out French commanders in Germany and eastern France on whether they would back him if he refused to step down and stayed firm against demands of the students and strikers. He obviously got the assurances he wanted, for shortly after returning from Germany he made a masterly radio address to the nation. I remember that Wallner called the staff to his office to hear the speech and watch the crowd that was massing in the Place de la Concorde and side streets which grew to close to a million. The air was figuratively electric. Then de Gaulle spoke, his voice being piped to the crowd by loud speaker.

I do not remember his exact words, but they were something like: "Je ne retirerai pas. J'y reste." At that declaration a tremendous roar came from the crowd, Gaullist to a man (and woman). After the speech, the crowd began marching triumphantly out of the Place de la Concorde up the Champs-Elysées. It took several hours for the last marchers to reach the Arc de Triomphe. We had just witnessed a brilliant display of de Gaulle's charisma. His bravado carried the day. Student and union resistance soon collapsed.

A couple of weeks later I represented Ambassador Shriver at D-Day commemorative ceremonies, as I mentioned earlier. It was an "off-year" but the Gaullists made it a special event to celebrate their recent victory and show their strength by gathering massively at the landing beaches. Thousands of bemedaled French veterans came; virtually every Prefet from northern France was there, resplendent in full dress uniform. There was a sea
of Tricolours. I made a little luncheon talk at the Mairie of St. Mere Eglise which the accomplished linguist Dick Walters thought not bad. I spoke again at Utah Beach. I can't remember what I said but my brief remarks went over well with the crowd which was ready to cheer anything one said.

Q: What was the atmosphere in the embassy at this time? Because here you had de Gaulle, who was both a towering figure, but did not view the United States with the kindness that we might have expected. Did you consider it a divided embassy on how to view de Gaulle at that time?

JAMES: The embassy was not divided under Bohlen. Embassy officers regarded de Gaulle for what he was, a towering figure, as you say, a leader under whom France had begun to grow into an industrial power. From the late 1950s when de Gaulle returned to power, France entered the modern technological age and we all acknowledged de Gaulle's accomplishments. But we thought him frustrating and his political and military policies misguided. We deplored his suspicion of the United States and his shortsighted view that France should stand apart from the military side of NATO.

Bohlen did not impose his views of de Gaulle on embassy staff. He did not need to do so, for one naturally accepted that Bohlen's attitude was valid and sensible. We took our lead from him. He was the consummate diplomat and dealt with de Gaulle as effectively as anyone could. He showed us all how to live with Gaullism. Patient, dignified himself, he was an example to us all. I believe de Gaulle respected Bohlen, who assuredly played an important part in preventing U.S.-French relations from getting any worse than they were made by de Gaulle's actions.

Q: Did you see a splitting after that, when Wallner was the Chargé when Shriver came in? Did the inspiration at the top sort of go and then any sort of... it's too extreme to say Gaullists and anti-Gaullists within the embassy, but something of that nature.

JAMES: There were no Gaullists among embassy officers. After Bohlen left, Woody Wallner became Chargé and carried on in Bohlen's style, insisting on absolutely correct dealings with the French and avoidance of provocative or critical public statements about the General or the French government. Wallner was a most estimable man, witty, and dedicated to the Service. I enjoyed him and admired how he dealt with Prime Minister Pompidou on a number of complex problems.

I cannot say much about the morale or attitude of the embassy under Shriver. I was there only a short time after he arrived. He had big shoes to fill after Bohlen and I doubt that he filled them with any special distinction.

Although I found Gaullism uncongenial and misguided in many respects, I confess to feeling great admiration for the General. He gave France much to be proud of and restored a fair measure of its amour propre after years of defeats and national weakness. He had extraordinary personal courage. He tried and in a good measure succeeded in
reducing internal divisions. I felt honored to shake his hand at the 1968 reception he gave at the Elysée for the diplomatic corps.

**Q:** So you left there when?

**JAMES:** September of 1968.

**Q:** And you went where?

**JAMES:** I went to the embassy at London.

**Q:** What were you doing in London?

**JAMES:** I was assigned to the Political Section where I dealt with British external policy. I observed and reported on British views of developments in various areas of the world and on important multilateral negotiations on such subjects as a partial nuclear test ban treaty, nuclear non-proliferation.

David Bruce was the Ambassador. The Minister was Philip Kaiser, who had been Secretary of Labor in New York under Governor Harriman, an Ambassador in Africa and after London was Ambassador to Hungary. Ronald Spiers, who later was Minister in London, Ambassador to Pakistan and an Under Secretary in the Department, was Political Counselor. Not long after I arrived, Spiers gave a luncheon for me to which he invited half a dozen officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Alastair Buchan, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. This was a gesture I appreciated for it introduced me under the right auspices to some of the most important FCO officials with whom I would deal, and to the Director of the UK's most influential national security think tank.

Labor was then in office; the late Harold Wilson was Prime Minister. The embassy had easy access to and excellent rapport with Labor ministers, thanks in no small way to the fact that Phil Kaiser had gone to Oxford with many of them.

**Q:** He went way back. He was particularly close to the Labor Party, wasn't he?

**JAMES:** He was indeed. He had studied at Balliol College, Oxford, with many ranking people in the Labor Party. Denis Healey, then Defense Minister, for example, was one he knew well. And he was on good terms with the PM and Mrs. Wilson too. I remember one day after I arrived I had been to the FCO and chanced to meet Kaiser near Number 10 Downing Street. Along came Mrs. Wilson, a cheery, friendly lady, evidently on her way to shop, who stopped to chat. I was introduced. Imagine seeing Lady Bird Johnson pop out of the White House, sans bodyguards, to go shopping and being introduced to her on Pennsylvania Avenue. I found the informality of it all refreshing.
I was struck too by the easy access one had at my level (I went back to being a First Secretary) to British ministers and ranking officials. That seemed to be Labor's style, but I should add, being a representative of the United States helped too. I recall that not long after I arrived in London one of the political/military officers, also a First Secretary, and myself were instructed to call on the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Fred Mulley, later Defense Minister and now Lord Mulley of Sheffield, to make an important demarche about some cooperative weaponry arrangements. Mulley received us cordially. There was no fuss about receiving us rather than the Ambassador or Minister, in contrast to the protocol that the French follow rigidly. I got along famously with Mulley, a sensible Socialist and a very likeable man who was captured by the Germans at Dunkirk and spent five years in prison camp.

Q: *Was what's been called the "special relationship" well in place at that time?*

JAMES: I think it was pretty healthy, despite the fact that the British were not as important to us as formerly because their power and influence in the world were continuing to erode. Or, I might put it this way: because British standing in the world was diminishing, they clung to the special relationship tenaciously. The British government under Labor was prepared to mute its objections to our war in Vietnam and try to work closely with the United States to preserve as much influence in the world as it could.

David Bruce, who was widely respected, kept the relationship healthy. Unfortunately, I served under Bruce for only about 6 months. He and his wife were very friendly and invited us frequently to the Residence, Winfield House. We had known the Bruces slightly in Georgetown, and this made things additionally agreeable. Bruce was winding up his illustrious career and spent much of his last months in London working on his memoirs which have not been published, as far as I know. If and when they are, they will make fascinating reading. Bruce left the day-to-day running of the embassy to Kaiser who delegated well.

Two months after my arrival in London came the 1968 elections which brought Nixon to the White House. After Nixon visited London in the winter of 1969, Bruce departed. Nixon's early trip to London suggests that there was vitality in the special relationship at that time.

My first few months in London were devoted to getting to know key figures in the foreign policy network, but I also did a good deal of substantive reporting.

Q: *Who became ambassador?*

JAMES: Walter Annenberg, a multi-millionaire. I assume he is now a billionaire. Annenberg remained for some four years. He was succeeded by Elliot Richardson of Watergate renown. Richardson was in office only about 10 months, resigning in December 1975 to become President Ford's Secretary of Commerce.
Q: So you were there a very long time.

JAMES: I was indeed; from September 1968 to February 1976.

Q: Did you have the same job all the way through?

JAMES: No. I started out as Chief of the external affairs unit in the Political Section. When Ron Spiers was transferred, his place was taken by the Deputy Chief of the Political Section, Bill Galloway. I then became Galloway's deputy. After he was named special assistant to Ambassador Annenberg, I became acting chief of the Political Section and later Political Counselor. In my final year in London, I was Counselor for Reports and Analysis. The latter job was one I created with the approval of Ambassador Richardson and Spiers, who returned in October 1975 as Minister. I would like to talk more about my last job later in the interview.

After about a year as Counselor for Reports and Analysis, I left London in February 1976 and returned to Washington for my last Foreign Service assignment. I think we should break off about now.

Q: All right, why don't we. And then I do want to talk about your time in London. Some of the major issues you dealt with, and about how both Annenberg and Richardson operated.

JAMES: Well, this is more recent and much more in the forefront of my mind, so this, I think, would be important to do. I'd be glad to do it. I think we can wind it up in one more interview.

Q: We want to do the Law of the Sea, too, so I don't want to push. We'll see how it goes. One other question, so I don't forget it, is your impression of, at that time, whither Britain? Was it going downhill, uphill, what it was about. Okay, we'll stop it there.

Today is January 9, 1995. Last time we were just starting, as I noted on the tape, Great Britain and your time there. You were there from when to when?

JAMES: I was there from September 1968 to February 1976. I served under three ambassadors: Bruce, Annenberg and Richardson; and under five ministers: Phil Kaiser; Jerry Greene, whom I had known when he was personal assistant to Dulles; Tom Hughes, who succeeded Joe Johnson as President of the Carnegie Endowment; Earl Sohm, subsequently Director of Personnel in the Department; and Ron Spiers.

May I make an introductory observation about my 7 and a half years in London? I could not have had a more fulfilling, interesting, demanding, agreeable, memorable posting. As my colleague Bill Galloway once aptly put it, political counselor in London is the best job in the Foreign Service.
I must say a word about Galloway, who at that time had served in England longer than any recent Foreign Service officer. He knew the country and its politics intimately. He covered the Conservative Party and did it with consummate skill. He knew every important Tory figure and wrote authoritative reports and analyses about the Party, in and out of power. The Tories thought highly of Galloway. To me he was extraordinarily helpful and encouraging. I am grateful to him for his advice and for recommending me for two awards which I duly received—for political reporting, and representing U.S. interests during the UK-Malta negotiations.

When I arrived in London the Czech crisis, the Russian repression of the Prague Spring and occupation of the country, was worrying Britain, as it was the United States and our other allies.

Q: That was '69, I think, wasn't it?

JAMES: No, the Russians occupied Prague in August 1968. Like us, the British were very steamed up about Russian actions, the implementation of the Brezhnev doctrine. My first assignment was to do as much useful reporting as I could about British attitudes and possible retaliatory actions.

My job was made easier, at least I did it more intelligently, because just a few weeks after I arrived in London I attended a conference on the Czech crisis at the University of Sussex, sponsored by the Institute for the Study of International Organizations of the University. Conferees were senior British officials, diplomats and academics; foreign diplomats; and some Czechs who had gone underground in Prague to keep the spirit of resistance alive. One of these was Kamil Winter, an articulate radio commentator who courageously defied the Russians. This conference was an ideal introduction to the British foreign policy establishment and to some able foreign diplomats. The head of the Institute was Robert Rhodes James, now Sir Robert, a brilliant historian and biographer, who for some years was an assistant to Waldheim and later MP for Cambridge. A couple of years ago he retired from public life. Robert and his wife Angela and I and my wife became good friends.

I should interject that a month later there was another instructive conference at Wilton Park. Housed in an ancient manor house near Steyning in Sussex, Wilton Park was established during the war as an orientation center for German POWs, to inculcate some democracy in them. After it served its indoctrination purpose, the Foreign Office converted it into a conference center, country weekend style, and placed in charge a valuable, Anglophile and a refugee from Germany, Heinz, later Sir Heinz, Koeppler. In November 1968, I was invited by Koeppler to join a couple of dozen diplomats from NATO and friendly eastern Europe countries to discuss some foreign policy issue or other, possibly the Czech crisis. The memorable part of this meeting was the talks I had with some of the brightest members of the London diplomatic corps with whom I formed friendships which I enjoyed throughout my tour in London. I returned often to Wilton Park to make presentations on U.S. policy.
Q: This Czech intervention was a very important phase. Up till then, life had been kind of stagnant in the Eastern bloc. And here was a country, Czechoslovakia, that was trying to reform itself and get out from under. The Soviets, using force and pushing its other bloc countries, crushed it. And Czechoslovakia was really put back into deep freeze again. How did the British officialdom and American officialdom view it? Was there a divergence of nuances or anything like that?

JAMES: The British and Americans saw the Czech crisis from the same perspective. Like ourselves, the British took the Russian occupation very seriously, but of course realized that there was little of a practical nature that the western powers could do without provoking a potentially dangerous confrontation. British policy, therefore, was to be cold officially toward the Russians and leave their representatives in no doubt about British disapproval. They suspended some exchanges and took other marginal retaliatory actions. Contacts at the Foreign Office believed that clear expressions of British disapproval, both official and in the press, were getting through to the Russians and that they understood that their invasion was unacceptable and realized that they would have to pay some price.

I recall being propagandized about the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia by one Soviet embassy official, a KGB officer, who was kicked out of Britain in 1970 when the British declared persona non grata most of the embassy staff, all KGB officers. This fellow, who later was caught shoplifting, peddled the Soviet line earnestly. I think I left him in no doubt about how despicable we thought Russian actions were.

Q: What was the effect of this from your point of view? You were charged with reporting on the politics in Great Britain. I've never served in Great Britain, but I have the feeling that the Labor Party, particularly in those days, had a very strong left-wing, knee-jerk attitude: we're all internationalists, singing the Internationale, with a red banner forever, and that sort of thing. It was almost a benign look at the Soviet Union. Did this have the effect that, say, the German-Soviet agreement of 1939 did, which jerked an awful lot of people out of the Communist and Socialist left-wing around the world? Did this have any effect on them that you saw?

JAMES: I don't think that the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia made the far left of the Labor Party less appreciably pro-Soviet or less anti-NATO. The Trotskyite element, which is hopelessly red and neutralist, did not change perceptibly because of this Soviet aggression. Main stream Labor, which was staunchly pro-NATO and pro-United States, was clearly strengthened in its conviction of the need for strong cooperative defense arrangements in Europe and partnership with the United States. Prime Minister Wilson, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart and Defense Minister Healey were staunch throughout the crisis in condemning Soviet actions.

Q: Did we have much contact with this extreme left wing, which was centered particularly in some of the unions, wasn't it?
JAMES: The Embassy had very little contact with the extreme left of the Labor Party; there was not much sense or profit in making the effort, for the far left was more a nuisance than a threat to mainstream Labor which was internationalist, pro-NATO and firmly pro-U.S. Our Labor Attaché knew many of the leaders of the leftist unions, such as Scargill of the Miners Union, who I guess is still their leader.

Q: You had a rather large political section, didn't you?

JAMES: It was indeed quite large. The Section was divided into several units. One dealt with internal British politics; its officers concentrated on the three main parties, the Tories, Labor and the small Liberal Party. We had an experienced Labor Attaché who was a part of the section and reported on the politics of the unions. Another unit handled political/military affairs. And there was an external affairs unit which included specialists on African and Near Eastern Affairs.

Initially, I was in charge of the unit dealing with British external affairs. When I became Deputy Chief of the Political Section, my mandate broadened and I began to get involved in internal politics. Finally, as Political Counselor, I supervised the entire range of embassy reporting on British domestic politics and foreign affairs. Having developed a good relationship with key people in the Foreign Office, I gradually came to know leading politicians in the three main parties as well. One who became one of my best friends and whom I still see occasionally was Michael Fraser, now Lord Fraser of Kilmorack. He was the professional in charge of the Conservative Central Office and held a position rather like that of chairman of an American political party. Naturally considerate and gregarious, Fraser was a fount of information and generously gave me and other embassy officers his time. He had an organizing hand in every general election from 1952 when Churchill returned to office and 1976 when Labor won only to go out two years later. A good friend of all the leading Tories of his time, Fraser was an indispensable source and awfully jolly company.

Q: Just to get a little feel for how we go about things, a young Foreign Service officer comes there on their first tour, as a political officer. Where would you normally put them? I assume the regional experts come out of those areas, so those are not as open, because regional experts know more about Latin America or Asia or somewhere. But a young officer trying to get started, where would you put them?

JAMES: That's a rather hard question to answer. The fact is that we had no one in the section at that time who was not at least a middle grade officer. If a junior officer had been sent to us, I would have put him/her to work in the internal affairs unit where he or she would have the guidance of an experienced officer and could serve an apprenticeship, learning the basics of British politics and the sources of British interests in the world.

You are correct. A junior officer probably could not creditably discharge the duties of one of the regional specialists on Africa or the Near East. The African and NEA bureaus had
pretty much a free hand to assign the regional specialists to London and sent us seasoned officers.

This might be a good point to talk about the substance of the work I was doing.

The Conservative Party won the general election of 1970. Edward, now Sir Edward, Heath replaced Harold Wilson as Prime Minister. During the 4 years the Tories were in office, I broadened my knowledge of British internal politics and wrote several appreciations of the Conservative Government, which at the beginning at least looked like being very successful. Heath was determined to make a new beginning for Britain, economically and politically. The Tories tried to improve industrial productivity, to make Britain more competitive. And they might have been successful, but the unions were still very powerful and not helpful in encouraging market forces. In foreign policy, Heath was determined to lead Britain into the European Community, and in 1972 succeeded. I was in the gallery of the House of Commons in February 1972 when the key vote on British entry was taken. It was a dramatic moment, a turning point in British foreign policy. The Tories prevailed with the aid of the Liberals. After the vote was announced, some Labor MPs rushed Jeremy Thorpe, Liberal leader, and tried to throttle him for voting with the Tories. There was an unseemly scuffle on the floor of the House, but order was quickly restored.

Let me make an aside. Thorpe was a clever, witty politician; he is no longer in politics. He was a lively dinner companion. One night at dinner at Spiers, I think, Thorpe asked my wife if she could sing all the stanzas of the "Star Spangled Banner." When she said no, Thorpe boasted that he could sing them all, but declined an invitation to do so.

Heath was less ardently pro-U.S. than others in his cabinet. The reasons are complex. I suspect it was in part because he thought Britain was overly dependent on the United States and that Britain's true interests lay in closer association with Europe. Heath was from the first the most avid Europhile among the Tories. I guess he saw too that U.S. interest in the special relationship was inevitably waning.

In the Embassy we began to see signs of a weakening of the special relationship as Heath's premiership continued and he pursued his European policy. The Tory government was not as emotional about Vietnam as Labor was but Conservatives were upset by several initiatives of the Nixon administration.

I have in mind our opening to China, and Nixon's new economic policy. Those were matters the British considered of importance to them and they resented not being taken into our confidence through prior consultation. These developments did nothing to enhance Heath's attitudes toward the United States. I suspect, but could not prove, that he has some personal anti-U.S. bias.
I did quite a bit of analytical reporting on the foregoing developments and Tory policy. The reports I wrote during the first year of Tory government contributed to my winning the Director General's award for political reporting in 1971.

Our British foreign policy crisis that directly involved the Embassy and me was the British negotiations with Malta over renewal of the UK-Malta base agreement. In the summer of 1971, British defense arrangements with Malta were about to end and the big issue was whether the British would renew the agreement. The Maltese said that unless new and better arrangements were made they would kick the British out.

Q: This was Dom Mintoff and his people.

JAMES: Mintoff was Prime Minister of Malta at the time. The United States was concerned that the British might quit Malta. We did not want the Russians to get a foothold in the middle of the Mediterranean. We wanted the British to stay. NATO collectively wanted the British to remain. The British government was disposed to renegotiate the terms of their lease of facilities in Malta; they too saw the strategic importance of remaining there, but they were not going to do so at any price. Their line was that if the United States and NATO thought it important for them to remain, they should share some of the cost to renew the base agreement.

My own involvement began one Sunday afternoon in August 1971 when Galloway and I called on the competent FCO official in his Chelsea garden to present U.S. views on the Malta question. From then until March 1972, I was engaged in an intensive period of observing and reporting, making recommendations to Washington, explaining U.S. views to the FCO. In that time I must have drafted something like 200 telegrams to the Department. In March 1972, the British concluded an agreement with Malta which renewed the base agreement for another 5 years. But the negotiations were a real cliff hanger and progressed from one crisis to another. The chief negotiator for Malta was Mintoff himself, a volcanic man. Lord Carrington, Defense Secretary, and exceedingly accomplished minister, led the British team. Much of my time during those nine months was devoted to the Malta question. The basic U.S. approach was to coax the British to remain in Malta because of the strategic imperatives involved. We in the Embassy were instructed to make that clear to the British. At the same time, we considered it essential that Washington should realize that the British would not stay at any price. We constantly stressed the importance of avoiding actions which would place an unreasonable strain on U.S.-UK relations. While faithfully representing U.S. positions to the British, we underscored repeatedly to Washington that constant, timely and candid consultation with the British was essential. I think we were successful in impressing the British with U.S. views and at the same time making Washington appreciate the limits of British tolerance of Mintoff’s demands.

We had excellent support from Washington, Scott George, the UK office director was superb. Marty Hillenbrand was very helpful.

Q: He was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
JAMES: Alex Johnson, then number three in the Department, followed the negotiations closely. I was frequently on the phone with him to get fast, authoritative guidance.

Ambassador Annenberg paid close attention to the base negotiations and gave the Political Section strong support and latitude in talking to the British and reporting to Washington. Of course, we cleared with him every message which had an Embassy recommendation. Usually, he approved those messages without change. On one occasion, however, after Mintoff had demanded a higher base rental from the British than the sum that had been on the table, Annenberg blew up when he saw my telegram reporting that fact. He added a comment to the effect that while he appreciated the strategic considerations involved, it would be unwise to accede to Mintoff's new demands. Otherwise, we and the British, he said, would only be subjected to more and more demands. He resisted the temptation to put the thought in the telegram, but Annenberg muttered something about how qualified Mintoff was to deal in rugs.

I look back with satisfaction on my part in the negotiations. I think I served our interests well, and helped keep U.S.-UK relations on an even keel. I was flattered to learn later from Galloway that Lord Carrington told him I had made a difference, a major contribution to avoidance of misunderstandings between our two countries.

Q: How well did you feel we were supported by our embassy in Malta? Malta, from time to time, has been used as a rewarding post for career people, but it's not a front-line post. How well were you served by Malta at that time?

JAMES: Frankly, I don't remember that there was much informative reporting from the Embassy in Malta, that is until near the end of the negotiations when my friend and War College classmate, John Getz, arrived as ambassador in early March 1972. Then there was good reporting, for John was very able.

What we learned of Mintoff's positions we learned from the British, and also from the Italian Ambassador, Raimondo Manzini, an ambitious, thrusting man in a hurry. (Incidentally, like de Gaulle, Manzini was one of the world's fastest eaters. Once my wife, daughter and I dined with Manzini, I think John Getz and his wife were there too. Manzini quickly devoured the first course--succulent smoked salmon. Before my daughter, who was sitting below the salt, could pick up her fork, her plate was spirited away.) Manzini was well connected with the Italian establishment. His brother was a high Vatican official and a close friend with the Director General of the Italian Foreign Office.

Manzini evidently considered me someone useful to talk to about the negotiations, a handy channel to convey to Washington his ideas (and he had a lot of them) about how to induce Mintoff to agree to a deal with the British. He and his political counselor, who was a bit of a ferret, invited me to see them frequently, sometimes at strange hours to impart confidential information about the Maltese position, or to try out on me (and through me to Washington) some of Manzini's ideas. I should add that Manzini may have been
ambitious and eager to make a name for himself out of the Malta negotiations by appearing as the catalyst who clinched a deal, but I credit him with honestly trying to protect Italian and NATO interests and keep the British on Malta. The British had code names for those of us who were involved in the negotiations or were observing them. The Italian Political Counselor was called "running dog." I forget what mine was, but I am told by my FCO friend that it was more flattering.

Dealing so extensively with Manzini was rather delicate business because I was privy to so much of the British negotiating position. I obviously had to be very careful to protect confidences I had been given on condition that they were only for Washington. I handled matters discreetly, I believe, at least I got no complaints from the FCO.

*Q:* It does show that here we had something very delicate, and obviously we did not, for one reason or another, have our own information coming out of Malta at that time.

JAMES: As I said, I've gone over my papers again, and I recall nothing about it.

*Q:* I think that speaks for itself.

JAMES: I think so. As I said, until Getz arrived. By then, the drama had pretty well been played out.

*Q:* Was this strictly a matter of the British wanting us to give them more money? Was that the issue, or were there other things?

JAMES: The British were prepared to pay what they considered a fair base rent to the Maltese. Early in the negotiations they made clear that they would not go above a certain figure, 10 million pounds a year for 5 years, I believe. Remember, this was a time of economic stringency for the UK and they were determined to watch their pennies. They did not, for example, want Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, to get any ideas about jacking up rent on the British bases there. The British said that if the U.S. and NATO considered it important for them to stay in Malta, the U.S. and NATO should help.

In the end, NATO and the U.S. did come up with a package that supplemented the British rent with cash, infrastructure help and technical advice.

Reaching the figure finally agreed upon was no easy matter. Negotiations were difficult and stormy from beginning to end. Carrington lost patience with Mintoff several times and threatened to break off. I think Mintoff also did so. Finally, Prime Minister Heath had to get involved. After one of a number of meetings with Mintoff, there was a break in the negotiations, helped of course by a package from NATO. Agreement then followed fairly quickly.

*Q:* How serious was the threat of the Soviets establishing a base there, at that time?
JAMES: We perceived it as serious. That's why the highest levels in Washington wanted to keep the British there.

Q: This was the time when Kissinger was National Security Advisor, I believe.

JAMES: I think that's right. He became Secretary of State in September 1973.

Q: After Nixon came in. So what role was the National Security Council playing, and what role was the Department of State playing, from your perspective, in this thing?

JAMES: I think the State Department clearly had the lead. I assume this was so because our "immediate" telegrams were answered immediately. Had the Department felt it necessary to consult the National Security Council, or get some other White House clearance, there would have been a delay. But we got our instructions quickly. If we needed guidance faster we could use the telephone and call for it. Or, if Washington perceived some urgency, some (on occasion, Alex Johnson) would ring us.

Q: What was your impression of the British foreign affairs establishment and how it worked in this?

JAMES: The British foreign affairs establishment comprehends, of course, more than the FCO. Many institutes, councils and foundations also contribute to the formulation of British foreign policy. I will come to the FCO in a minute, but let me first comment briefly on the extra-government part of the foreign affairs community. In my time (and I am sure now too) it was made up of some of the most articulate, studious, best informed organizations to be found in any country. I think foremost of the renowned International Institute for Strategic Studies (I and several other Embassy officers were members) and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, known as Chatham House, cousin of our Council on Foreign Relations. The Ditchley Foundation convened intensive meetings on international affairs which drew prestigious U.S. and foreign participants as well as from the UK. All three produced papers of intellectual merit. The Royal United Services Institute presented lectures and discussions on political/military subjects of a high caliber. There were other, somewhat less intellectual but influential groups like the British-Atlantic Council and the European-Atlantic Committee, the names of which suggest their fields of interest. Retired officials of the FCO and ex-ministers were active in these organizations. Active ministers and officials regularly attended their meetings, so there was a beneficial interplay between the non-governmental foreign affairs community and government. We embassy officers were welcome at meetings of groups like these and tried to participate actively.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office was very strong during my time in London. The ministerial level was competent and well informed. The official level with which I usually dealt was stellar. All officials with whom I dealt were real pros, hard headed, hard working (they spent long hours in the office, but weekends tended to be sacred). They
were always on top of their briefs. They were broad gauged. All had been superbly educated, at least 70% or more came from Oxford or Cambridge. In short, they were an elite corps of men and a few women. Not many women in the FCO or Foreign Service in those days.

Knowing so many FCO bright officials was a delightful experience. I enjoyed going to the FCO whenever the opportunity came up to deliver views of the Department or merely keep abreast of British views. I was always cordially received and never experienced British hauteur. I cannot mention as many officials as I would like but I must note several who were especially pleasant and useful to deal with.

Sir Thomas, now Lord Brimelow, kind, calm, with an imposing command of all major foreign policy issues, was Permanent Under Secretary of the FCO, the top professional. He was the soul of consideration and helpfulness. Charles, later Sir Charles Wiggins, alas dead, was the FCO official to whom I felt the closest. He had been head of the North American Department, and, when I dealt with him on Malta, was an assistant under secretary supervising Southern European Affairs. He ended his career as Ambassador to Spain. More about my dealings with him on the Malta base negotiations in a moment.

I had extensive dealings with the Western Organization Department, which was concerned mainly with NATO, and I became friendly with successive heads of that Department whose confidence I enjoyed. John Waterfield was for me personally quite special. Our official intimacy became such that after a lively discussion of U.S., and UK views on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Waterfield invited me to prepare an informal, personal paper addressing U.S. criticisms of the British position. There were differences but not major ones. He proposed that if I wrote such a paper he would send it to the then Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart. I wrote the paper, gave it to Waterfield who showed it to Stewart, who thought it well done and useful.

The North American Department was another office with which I had much business. It was presided over consistently by competent, helpful officers. Hugh Overton, who was knighted after a difficult (much Irish-American harassment over Ulster) but successful tour in New York as Consul General, was one head of department who made a special contribution to understanding between the U.S. and the UK. I regretted his early death.

In my time in London, there were several peers in the FCO, all outstanding officers. Lord Thomas Bridges I saw frequently after he succeeded Waterfield as Head of Western Organizations. Son of a famous secretary of British cabinet and grandson of Poet Laureate, Robert Bridges, Tom was a first class professional. Another congenial type was Lord Nicholas Gordon Lennox, an able director of North American Department who claimed direct descent from Charles I.

Now as to my dealings with the FCO during the Malta crisis. I flatter myself that at an early date I had developed good rapport with many FCO officials and enjoyed a favorable reputation. My friend Wiggins once told me that my reputation at the FCO was golden.
All this made my business with the FCO on Malta easy and smooth. As I mentioned, I dealt almost exclusively with Charles Wiggin, who had establishment credentials--Eton, Christ Church, Oxford. He had been decorated for gallantry while serving in the RAF. He loved his work and was always on top of his briefs. He had previously been private secretary to Lord Carrington (I guess when Carrington was a minister at the FCO in the 1960s). So his access to Carrington and others working on Malta in the Defense Department was excellent.

Wiggin was always current on the Malta negotiations of which he gave me vivid blow by blow accounts. He readily confided in me, and I in him. It went without saying that each expected the other to treat the sensitive information we exchanged correctly. Wiggin voluntarily called me to the FCO when he had something significant to tell me. If I wanted to see him, I had only to call. He never left me cooling my heels. I had to be available to see him at all hours and occasions, even holidays. I recall sending out telegrams on Christmas eve 1971, during Christmas week and on New Year's day after meeting him for lunch to be brought up to date. Wiggin and I transacted much useful business over civilized lunches, at his clubs (he belonged to two of London's most exclusive--White's and Boodles) or mine, the comfortable, now defunct St. James. Those lunches were no less productive than our office meetings for being long and enjoyable. Wiggin had a droll sense of humor which made being with him fun.  

Q: This was the high Nixon administration period. What was the feeling within the body politic and public about the Nixon administration? The Vietnam War was on.

JAMES: The term of office of the Nixon administration (1969-1975) coincided roughly with that of the Tories, 1970-1974. Philosophically in politics and economics--the two administrations were not so dissimilar. They should have enjoyed cordial relations. The Conservatives were far less emotional than Labor about our war in Vietnam, and I think generally welcomed a conservative regime in Washington. Labor, of course, was very much against the Vietnam war and unsympathetic with many policies of the Nixon government.

Although the Tories as a pro-business party was on the same wave length in many respects as the Nixon administration, some things that the Nixon administration did, upset the Tories and put a strain on our relations, as I have already observed.

Prime Minister Heath was an outspoken nationalist, who repeatedly declared he intended to stand up for British interests. He also believed that the British, who still had worldwide interests and perspectives, if less power and influence, should be accepted as partners by the United States and consulted about initiatives in foreign affairs which the British considered affected them too. It must have hurt British pride that we were so casual about consulting them. Those lapses rubbed in the reality that they did not count as much as they did in the calculus of world politics. Our bombing of Cambodia also upset the British government which considered it unwise, at the least. Labor, of course, condemned it.
Q: This was in the spring of ’70 that it at least became an issue. A little before that. It had been going on for some time.

JAMES: Well, that's right. And then there was the war of the autumn of 1973 which put a further strain on Anglo-American relations. The British government wanted to distance itself from the Americans who were supplying Israel. The Conservative government did not share our views about the threat to Israel from the Arabs. Moreover, they felt more sympathy with the Arabs and did not want to prejudice their position in Arab countries by being perceived to be helpful to Israel. They were, for example, concerned that the United States not supply Israel from stocks we had stored in the UK. I was called to the FCO in mid-October 1973 by John Thomason, an assistant Under Secretary supervising the FCO's Defense Department, a brilliant officer, son and grandson of Nobel Laureates. Thomason said that Prime Minister Heath would be asked in the Commons the next day whether the U.S. was in any way involved in resupply of arms through the UK to Israel. The British wanted absolute assurances that we were not drawing down our stocks to send to Israel or that U.S. aircraft were not transiting the UK with supplies en route to Israel. We were instructed to give the requested assurances.

I guess the same kinds of concerns were expressed to some other U.S. embassies in western Europe by host governments. For such attitudes led Kissinger to describe publicly the conduct of our NATO allies during the war as "craven." The British press was replete with rumors about a rift in NATO and with the British. British officials and ministers, however, studiously tried to play down speculation about damage to U.S.-UK and U.S.-NATO relations. But I know personally that for the Heath government Washington's (read Kissinger's) gratuitous expressions of indignation at the Europeans placed an unwelcome strain on Anglo-American relations. The British resented our acerbic public comments, but consistently avoided adding fuel to the public debate.

In the Embassy we found this state of affairs deplorable. Of course, we fully appreciated Washington's chagrin about the attitude of the British and other Europeans; it was selfish and overly cautious. However, we feared that Washington might lose sight of some broad considerations. The Europeans may have behaved badly but it was important, we thought, not to allow our rancor to have a deleterious effect on NATO and basic U.S.-European and U.S.-UK relations. We took this position in a number of telegrams which the Ambassador approved. Simultaneously I called again and again for better communication, better consultation between our two countries, and within NATO as well. I think this exercise reflects well on Annenberg. He appreciated fully that the framework of inter-allied cooperation and understanding should be repaired as quickly as possible.

Q: Talking about Annenberg, as I recall it, the British gave him quite a difficult time when he first came in. I think there had been some problems with his background, and he was considered just another one of these big-money people who came in, and was sort of considered somewhat uncouth. How did you see him, particularly his early time, how he came in, how he used the embassy, how the embassy worked with him and all?
JAMES: You're right. He did have a rough ride at first, due in part to some verbal gaucheries that were ascribed to him, which apparently slipped out when he presented his credentials to the Queen. I was not political counselor then, and did not accompany him to the Palace, but he was supposed to have expressed himself clumsily, and the press laughed at him. They also took note that he was fabulously wealthy and had obviously been appointed in return for his contributions to the Nixon campaign.

The Embassy behaved well toward Annenberg, I believe. We were determined to work with him closely, not to be patronizing; had we been, Annenberg, who is no fool, would not have tolerated it. We did our best to school him on the British scene. He tried to learn. Over the years he came to know well people in many walks of public life. I doubt he became a close friend of many politicians. And after Labor came back in 1974, I didn't think he felt very comfortable with them although he always conducted himself correctly with them. I remember being in the company at the farewell dinner Foreign Secretary Callaghan gave for him in October 1974. Callaghan's remarks about Annenberg and his ambassadorship were warm and felicitous. If I remember correctly, Callaghan was a Labor politician Annenberg admired. At bottom, Annenberg was an Anglophile. I should add that he became a good friend of the Queen Mother, an astute lady who would not have warmed to Annenberg had she not perceived in him admirable qualities.

Q: The mother of Queen Elizabeth.

JAMES: Yes, the present Queen's mother. I understand that when Annenberg goes to London he visits the Queen Mother.

Annenberg was disposed to give the Embassy its head. I think he respected the professionalism of the officers who served under him. And, as I recall, no one gave him cause to feel any lack of loyalty.

He took his job seriously. He read diligently reports coming into the Embassy, and we passed to him outgoing messages we thought he should see or ones we knew interested him.

Alas, he had a stutter which made him shy about public speaking. He did not go on the speaking circuit as many Ambassadors would do. So I and other colleagues did a great deal of talking to a variety of groups, from the English-Speaking Union which I addressed once in an annual conference, to Sixth Form conferences where a couple of diplomats from other NATO countries and I appeared on a panel called a "brains trust" to talk about NATO to high school seniors. I also traveled frequently to speak at meetings organized by my friend Bill Davies, Director of the Welsh Council on International Affairs. Another forum where one could get across profitably U.S. views was the London Diplomats Group, organized by the Quakers at William Penn House. There, at a frugal, healthy supper, every other month, a prominent British politician or other public figure would speak. Not only did one get fresh insights into British politics but also came to know well some agreeable and talented diplomats.
Let's return to Annenberg. His benefactions were many, and included gifts to Cambridge and, I think, also to Oxford. After he mounted an exhibition of his magnificent impressionist paintings, which was a great success, it became clear to Brits of goodwill that he was much more than just a moneyed ambassador, that he had an aesthetic side as well.

Now, he could get pretty worked up about things he read in the press that he found derogatory of the United States. As a former publisher, he read the newspapers compulsively. I remember one Saturday morning Earl Sohm and I were at the Embassy when the Ambassador called us up, indignant about an article he had read in The Times critical of U.S. policy in Central America. He wanted to bawl out the editor, William Rees-Mogg, on the phone or in a letter, I forget which. Well, the matter seemed too trivial to Sohm and me to warrant a blast from the Ambassador but we, or at least Sohm, had a hard time talking Annenberg out of giving Rees-Mogg a piece of his mind. This simply underscores how great is his pride in the United States and how prone he was to call foul when he spotted something he thought wrong or unfair.

While Annenberg was ambassador, a number of important international treaties were concluded, among them the NPT, the Seabeds Denuclearization Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and treaties on Biological and Chemical Weapons. For his part in ceremonies marking conclusion of some of these agreements, I prepared statements which he read well and found appropriate.

Toward his officers he was cordial and gracious. My wife and I often enjoyed the elegant hospitality he offered at the Residence and looking unhurriedly at his stunning pictures.

Looking back on the years with Annenberg, I believe he grew in the job. He surely became engrossed in it. He respected career people and we reciprocated his respect. I think that in the end the British foreign policy establishment regarded him as well disposed and helpful. Plainly he was not an envoy in the mold of other non-pros like David Bruce, Douglas Dillon or Jock Whitney, but he was astute. He could pick out capable people and then delegate a lot of responsibility to them. Most of all, he really did care about good U.S.-UK relations and did his best to foster them.

**Q: How did you find the British media?**

**JAMES:** In my opinion, the British media (I speak of the London press, for outside London the media has had little influence on national affairs), was articulate, lively, well-informed, independent, robust. As to radio and television, well, the programs of the BBC were objective, comprehensive and a bit staid, but I found them entertaining and instructive.

It was with the "print" journalists that we in the Embassy had most to do. We read the national papers diligently, for they reliably supplemented information we picked up
through our own contacts. The Embassy had an open door policy toward journalists, that is, the responsible ones. We were constantly asked for interviews which were granted, for they offered welcome opportunities to explain U.S. policy to advantage. Many journalists were worth seeing and talking with regularly. I think with affection of my late friend, the affable Diplomatic Correspondent of The Times, A.M. "Sandy" Rendel, who served during the war with Greek partisans and had expert knowledge of Balkan politics.

Among others whom we respected and knew quite well, was David Watt of The Financial Times, regarded by most journalists and politicians as the pre-eminent British political commentator of the time. Erudite, comprehensively informed about British politics, Watt later became Director of Chatham House and, sadly, died young a few years ago. Another journalist whose writing was a must was the late Peter Jenkins of The Guardian. The influential Economist was also essential reading. Its scholarly political editor, Brian Beedham, became one of my fourth estate friends.

In those days, British papers reported more extensively on the American scene than on developments in any other country. Of course, one topic on which they continually reported or commented, was the war in Vietnam. With exceptions, like the conservative Daily Telegraph, most papers were critical of our war there. Most also astutely discerned in the Heath years an incipient attenuation of the U.S.-UK relationship, as Britain began to focus more heavily on Europe.

British journalists could not (in my time in London, at least) reach their full potential, for there were numerous restraints which handicapped them in pursuit of the truth. British society then was not an open one. The constraints on investigative reporting were considerable. Uncovering misdoing in government was one thing; exposing it to the public another. It is hard to imagine that British journalists would have been able to print the kinds of revelations that Woodward and Bernstein were able to do about Watergate. The laws of libel, privacy, parliamentary privilege, and contempt, and the doctrine of prior restraint and the Official Secrets Act all stood in the path of the investigative journalist.

Harold Evans, the intrepid crusading editor of The Sunday Times, whom I admired and knew slightly, was an indefatigable exponent of freedom of information and open government. In the early 1970s, Evans published a series of articles demanding compensation for thousands of British children who had been born deformed because their mothers had used the drug thalidomide during pregnancy. In doing this obviously justified public service, Evans was found guilty of contempt (litigation on the matter was before the courts), but advanced the cause of freedom of information magnificently. In a paper I wrote at the Embassy I explored in depth the issues connected with freedom of information and the press in Britain.

Q: Early on when you were there, this was a time of great protests about the Vietnam War. Were you sort of any part of the point person who had to go out and meet these demonstrators and all that sort of thing? How did we handle that?
JAMES: I was in the Embassy on several occasions when protest marchers went to Grosvenor Square. I don't recall receiving petitions. I guess the duty officer who had to be there on the weekend, would have received them. We tried to avoid having senior officers receive petitions or protests. We had no discourse with these groups with whom argument would have been futile.

Some marchers were obviously there to raise hell, not because they felt morally outraged about the war in Vietnam. Some may have been agents provocateurs or from the Trotskyite wing of the Labor Party. Many, I will grant, may have been sincere. I saw a number of unprovoked assaults on the police which were started by marchers who jabbed mounted policemen or their horses with the long poles on which they carried their slogans. In the face of this kind of provocation I thought the policy police showed a great deal of restraint. They only struck back when the attacks got severe.

Q: Shall we talk about Elliot Richardson as ambassador? Were you with him for very long?

JAMES: I was with him all the time that he was in London.

Q: How long was he there?

JAMES: Annenberg left in October 1974. There was an interregnum during which Ron Spiers returned to London and became Chargé d'Affaires. Richardson arrived in March 1975, departed in January 1976 to return to Washington as Secretary of Commerce.

I was with him all the time he served in London. As political counselor I was responsible for planning a good deal of his orientation program, to ensure that he got a quick, informative introduction to British public life. He made what is traditionally the first ambassadorial speech to the Pilgrims. It was a good speech but rather too long (I didn't write it), as he later realized. But that didn't bother the luminaries present who were delighted that such a distinguished American public figure would now be ambassador.

Shortly afterwards Richardson presented his credentials to the Queen. As one of his counselors, I went with him one morning to Buckingham Palace in a gilded coach wearing white tie and tail coat, traditional dress for such occasions. I thought the Queen a charmer. When it came my turn to be presented, I overstayed my time, I am afraid, but I was determined to give her a complete answer to her question how I like Britain.

Richardson's arrival was a splendid occasion for me to do favors for many of my own contacts by getting him to attend their functions. He was terribly good about doing this. I took him to the House of Lords where Lord Fraser talked about Westminster. I went with him when he called on Foreign Secretary Callaghan. As a lawyer and former Attorney General he was very interested in the British legal system. I arranged for him to attend a sitting of the Court of Appeals in December 1975, just after his appointment as Secretary
of Commerce was made. This was laid on by Lord Scarman, an eminent jurist, and firm advocate of freedom of information, open government and a written constitution for Britain; Scarman was another eminent Briton I was fortunate to know.

When Richardson and I went to the Law Courts, we were received by the Master of the Rolls who invited Richardson to sit with the Court as it heard an appeal. Richardson was very pleased by this courteous gesture, as he had been when he was earlier made an honorary bencher of the Middle Temple, one of the Inns of Court.

Under Richardson, as under Annenberg, my work was varied and consistently interesting. How unusual it was is illustrated by our part in the rescue of some American students, from Stanford I believe, who were captured by bandits near Lake Victoria. This must have happened in the summer of 1975. Richardson was out of town and Spiers was Chargé. Lord Sheffield, who as Roger Makins was British ambassador to the United States in the 1950s and in 1975 was an officer of Wells Fargo, called at the Embassy one day to ask our help to raise the ransom demanded by the bandits. The sum they wanted was 200,000 pounds sterling, in small used bills, ones and fives, maybe tens. Sheffield said that the parents of the students (clients of Wells Fargo) were trying to raise the money but that was taking time and time was of the essence. I suppose it was hard to find such a large sum in so many small bills anywhere but London. So until the parents could raise the money, he asked could the Embassy work out a solution. Well, what it came down to was that we had to turn to the Bank of England for assistance. Matters came to a head on a Friday. The money was wanted in Nairobi that weekend, on Sunday, I think. I told Spiers about the problem.

He telephoned Sir Gordon Richardson, Governor of the Bank of England, and asked him for help, which was readily forthcoming. I went down to the Bank of England on Saturday and withdrew two hundred thousand pounds sterling in small bills. There wasn't time to mark them. They filled a very large suitcase. I guess I was pretty sure that the parents of the students were good for the money, for I did not demur when I was asked to sign a personal note for 200,000. I then left the Bank of England with a Scotland Yard escort, and returned to the Embassy. That evening we sent the money by diplomatic courier to Nairobi where our Ambassador Beverly Carter speedily arranged for it to reach the bandits who released the students unharmed. The Bank of England returned my note a few days later after Sheffield paid it off. I could then relax. I would not be bankrupt. I recall that Henry Kissinger was not happy about paying a ransom to the bandits, and Carter, a most capable officer, caught flak for it. I did not. As far as I was concerned, our action was wholly justified. It was not as if we had given in to terrorists to save the skin of some government official. It was very gratifying to be thanked in person by one of the students' father.

London is a permanent magnet for official visitors from the United States, of both high and low station. I was often control officer for such visits. Although often a bit tedious, that duty gave me the opportunity to meet and talk more than casually with some interesting and eminent people. One memorable visitor was Averell Harriman who spent
a week in London in the spring of 1975. I took him telegrams and briefed him on important developments over breakfast at Claridge's. Harriman was then in his mid-eighties but was keen and asked sharp questions. He was especially interested in developments affecting our relations with the USSR. A few months later Vice President Rockefeller came to London to talk with the British about the bicentenary. Richardson asked me to accompany him and the Vice President to call on Prime Minister Wilson. I arrived early at Number 10 Downing Street, was admitted, and immediately ran into the PM. We chatted amiably while we waited for the VP and Richardson to arrive. Such was the informality of British officialdom, at least under Labor

The VP presented to Wilson, an avid pipe smoker, a box of pipes with garish, multicolored bowls. Wilson professed to find them unusual and a welcome addition to his collection. The talks were detailed and substantive. The VP was well briefed on British policies, and the call on Wilson evidently was gratifying to both of them.

Rather like my boss of 20 years earlier, Charlie Thayer, Richardson was determined that the Embassy should have an impact on foreign policy. He asked me and our economic minister, Bill Miller, to collaborate to develop some ideas he had wanted to propose to send to Kissinger. There must have been one dealing with economic matters, but I don't remember it clearly. Two that I do remember dealt with security issues like guarantees for Spain (before entry into NATO was possible) in order to keep our bases there; and the Indian Ocean. Kissinger professed to be impressed by Richardson's recommendations which he found "most stimulating," as I have noted from my records. He said he appreciated Richardson's initiative.

As the year wore on, Britain's economic situation worsened. There were strikes again in the cold mines which caused blackouts. There was widespread malaise. After I left London in February 1976, conditions worsened. Wilson resigned later that year and was succeeded by Callaghan who was in office only about a year. In the general election of 1977 the Tories obtained a majority in the House of Commons. Mrs. Thatcher became Prime Minister and inaugurated a new era in British politics and economics. Slowly, British fortunes began to improve, but life became very expensive in contrast to my years in London when one could live quite comfortably on a modest income, gracious living was not too expensive.

Q: You're looking at this as an American, and so from a different perspective. What, in your opinion, was the main problem with Britain at that time?

JAMES: Britain was not competitive.

Q: And why not?

JAMES: Much of industry was inefficient. Labor union practices were restrictive, anti-innovation, anti-streamlining. There were too many strikes which a few bosses could call too easily. Probably the unions had too much power for the good of the nation. Witness
the trouble they caused for Heath in 1974; strikes in effect brought down his government. I suppose that the class system also played a part; too few bright university graduates were going into industry and business. The government was living on capital, as were many Britons. Friends and acquaintances would regularly and quietly sell valuables to maintain a style of living they considered necessary and proper.

As I said, for me and for my family, it was an exhilarating period, because we felt we had some impact or effect. Brits were friendly and agreeable. We had a terrific time. I couldn't have worked harder. But it was not a happy time for Britain. Whether it became happier after Margaret Thatcher came in, I don't know, but Britain was in much better shape afterwards than before. The market economy reigned.

Q: It was a strong dose of medicine, which is still having its repercussions.

JAMES: Well, that's very true.

Q: Then you left in '76.

JAMES: Yes, I did. However, before we leave London I would like to talk a bit about the last job I had there. I referred to it earlier in the interview.

For some time I had thought that the Embassy was spending a disproportionate amount of time doing day-to-day reporting and not putting enough emphasis on analyses of major forces of change at work in Britain. There was not enough time for busy political and economic officers to do thoughtful, thorough studies of political, economic and social trends that would shape the UK in 5 to 10 years. I thought it would be desirable to have a process to identify and explain such trends, not only because of the effect they would have on Britain's future, but also because the United States might profit from British experience, good or bad, from the success of innovation or the consequences of failure to innovate.

I therefore proposed to Richardson and Spiers that there be established an autonomous position called "Counselor for Reports and Analysis." They agreed and I was given a secretary and an office. From the summer of 1975 to February 1976, I worked on two reports: freedom of information in the UK, and industrial democracy or worker participation in industrial decisions. Doing these studies was highly instructive and brought me in contact with many stimulating, informative people. For example, research on freedom of information introduced me to Lord Scarman, Harold Evans and Lord Devlin, the latter a senior judge and accomplished author who wrote a scholarly study of President Wilson's neutrality policy. When I told Devlin that I wanted to talk to him about freedom of information he graciously invited me and my wife to have luncheon with him and Lady Devlin at his home in the country. I had not only an instructive talk but a most enjoyable one in a country house setting. I also met many people in government and out who were disposed to talk quite frankly about how closed British society was and about the restraints on open government. Elliot Richardson was most helpful in my endeavors.
He agreed with alacrity when I asked him to take me to talk with Roy Jenkins, Labor's Home Secretary in 1975 and an ardent proponent of more access to official information by the press and public. For my study on industrial democracy I not only had a number of informative interviews but also visited a couple of industrial establishments, a spinning mill in the midlands and a small, very competitive and profitable machine tool factory.

The paper on freedom of information was well received in Washington and by Richardson who read it after he left London. Monroe Leigh, the Department's Legal Adviser, was complimentary.

Two reports of some length and substance were all I could write in the six months I had left in London. However, I prepared a list of additional reports to be done by the political and economic sections after I departed, and some general guidance for their preparation. Two or three of those on my list were written. Ray Seitz, later Ambassador in London, wrote an excellent one of the British Foreign Service. I forget the subject of the other.

The project lapsed after I left London. Carol Laise, the Director General of the Foreign Service, apparently was favorably impressed by the idea, after Richardson sent her and Larry Eagleburger, then Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, letters explaining it. I don't recall that we heard from Eagleburger. Ambassador Laise didn't take any positive action, however.

After I returned from London to an assignment in the Department, I tried to boost the idea, but there was insufficient interest and it never caught on.

I might close the London chapter with a final comment about Richardson. He probably would have been an outstanding ambassador, had he had a longer run, for he had the empathy, enthusiasm, imagination and intellect of our most successful representatives. The British keenly regretted his departure after only 10 months in office. He had been favorably received everywhere from the Palace, Westminster, and Whitehall, by the professions and especially by the press, which thought he was great because he was so articulate and well-informed. Then too he was the hero of Watergate and to many Britons the model of probity. I know he deeply regretted leaving London, but he believed he was duty bound to respond to President Ford's request to join his cabinet.

Q: From London, you came back to Washington, and what were you doing?

JAMES: I was brought back to be the Executive Assistant to T. Vincent Learson, who was the President's Special Representative to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

Q: Had you had anything to do with the Law of the Sea prior to this?

JAMES: No, not really, although I had some nominal exposure when I talked with the Foreign Office in London on the seabeds demilitarization treaty.
Earl Sohm, who was then head of personnel in the Department after being Minister in London, thought I might be the right person to be executive assistant to Learson because I knew something about Washington in general and about the Department in particular. So, I was ordered back to Washington to help him with the bureaucratic side of his job, organize his office and the delegation. Although I knew little about the law of the sea, the prospect of being involved in such a vast undertaking, of some 125 countries, so important to the United States and with the subject matter 3/4s of the globe was exciting. Unfortunately, Learson and I did not hit it off. I was slow in getting oriented. The negotiations were terribly complex and it took time for me to get even a basic understanding. Learson himself was not much help in orienting me, and in getting across what he wanted me to do for him. He had been Chairman and CEO of IBM, and like some businessmen who come to government after a successful career could not deploy his talents effectively. He did not understand or try to master the bureaucratic process. He was not a lawyer and could not intervene in the negotiations when his authority was needed to move them ahead. And I couldn't help much. I made mistakes. All I can say is that I am thankful my tour with Learson lasted only 10 months. In due course, he and I got on better terms, but it was only after he left government and joined Richardson's public advisory committee on the law of the sea.

Shortly after assuming office, President Carter appointed Richardson to be his special representative to the LOS conference. This was a brilliant stroke for many obvious reasons, not the least being that the appointment continued the salutary bipartisanship which marked U.S. involvement with LOS from the beginning. Carter and Secretary of State Vance gave Richardson every support, and effectively left it to him, in consultation with other affected departments and agencies, to develop U.S. LOS policy.

Richardson brought with him two of his closest collaborators at Commerce, Richard Darman, a brilliant economic theoretician, later Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and Director of OMB, and J. T. Smith, a thoughtful, talented Washington lawyer. These two were for a year or so Richardson's principal negotiators on the most difficult issue of the Conference setting up a seabed mining regime. Richardson asked me to remain as his executive assistant. Needless to say, I was delighted to work for him again. It was hard to believe my luck.

With Darman and Smith as his deputies, Richardson had a team of exceptional talent. Among the other stars were Professors Bernard Oxman and Thomas Clingan of Miami Law School; and Professor Louis Sohn, of Harvard Law School, who, it was estimated, had taught law to something like a quarter of the heads of delegation to the conference. George Aldrich, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department, joined the team after Darman and Smith resigned and became the chief seabeds regime negotiator.

My first assignment was to go to Baghdad in February 1977 to observe the conference of the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee. Although the AALCC had other legal business on its agenda, its work of special significance to us was discussion of the law of
the sea and what that discussion revealed about the positions of the developing countries. Some 70 countries, most from the developing world, the so-called "Group of 77" were represented at Baghdad. Some of the most influential delegations to the LOS conference were there. My brief was to get to know as many delegates as I could, to gauge their attitude toward the resumption of negotiations and to represent U.S. views as far as one could do so at that point in the Carter administration.

After luncheon at the residence of the British Ambassador, John Graham, whom I had known in London when he was private secretary to the Foreign Secretary, I typed out a short statement to read to the Conference which was favorably received. I stressed that the U.S. would go to the forthcoming session of the conference with a new spirit; we would make every reasonable effort to reach a mutually acceptable, comprehensive treaty, including a regime for the seabeds which would meet the needs of the developing and industrial countries; and that under Richardson we would communicate better with other delegations and listen to their concerns.

The trip to Baghdad was a useful tutorial for me on issues facing the forthcoming session of the conference. I met some of the most influential heads of delegation like the Justice Minister of Malaysia, Kadir; the head of the Indian delegation, Jagota; and the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar.

The Iraqis with whom we had no diplomatic relations were correct toward me, in fact a couple of Foreign Office lawyers were rather friendly. I was included in all the hospitality the Iraqis offered the AALCC. However, it was off-putting to see so much anti-Israel propaganda carefully put out in one's hotel bedroom.

Q: What was the state of the Law of the Sea when you got involved in it in '76?

JAMES: Negotiations had been underway for many years, since 1967. By 1976, progress had been made on a number of issues, but on a regime for mining the deep seabed, the conference was at sixes and sevens. Kissinger, who plainly regretted putting Learson in charge of the negotiations, took a hand himself in the late spring and summer of 1976, flying to the UN in New York on a number of occasions to try to get agreement from the G-77 on principles for seabed mining that the industrial countries could accept. The last session of the conference in 1976 broke up with disagreement over the seabeds mining part. The U.S. insisted that there be a system that was fair to the industrial countries, which had the resources to mine the seabed as well as to the developing countries, which could only exploit the seabed through some kind of international body. Despite Kissinger's efforts, the industrial countries had not got an equitable seabeds regime before Richardson entered the picture.

When the spring session of the conference opened in May 1977 in New York, Richardson went to work determined to get a text on seabed mining acceptable to the United States and its industrial country allies; and, of course, to build on gains made in other, more important, areas of the treaty, such as those affecting our national security and economic
interests. Generally, we were successful. Shortly before the session ended, seabeds language was agreed upon which equitably balanced industrial country and G-77 interests, although clearly more progress in developing a seabeds regime would have to be made to satisfy all U.S. objectives. Confident that real progress had been made on a seabeds regime, Richardson and the heads of other industrial country delegations were shocked by the text that appeared from the drafting committee. Instead of incorporating principles agreed upon during negotiating sessions, the text was blatantly tilted in favor of the developing countries. The Chairman of the seabeds negotiating committee, Paul Bamela Engo of Cameroon, an Olympic long jumper, and a few G-77 ideologues who constituted the drafting committee repudiated the prior agreements and produced a text the U.S. and its allies could not live with. Richardson was furious. For the next three years, the U.S. delegation and like-minded countries worked hard to "negotiate back" to where the conference had got before Engo and his wreckers went to work.

By the end of the last session of the conference at Geneva in the summer of 1980 (it was Richardson's last) a text had been agreed upon which, with some exceptions with respect to seabed mining, met United States requirements. By Richardson's count, only about four principal deficiencies in the seabeds mining text required fixing, a task he considered doable. The rest of the treaty dealing with national security, economic, scientific and environmental matters, subjects vastly more important to the United States than seabeds mining, had been agreed to our satisfaction. By the time Richardson resigned in October 1980, we were in pretty good shape. As Aldrich took over from Richardson as head of delegation, we looked forward to one more session of the conference at which, we believed, a final text could be concluded that would meet our requirements with respect to seabed mining as well as all other ocean uses.

Shortly after Reagan took office in 1981, ideologues in his administration, hostile to any kind of seabeds regime that allowed for international control of seabed mining, even with provision for private companies to mine as well, persuaded him to denounce the seabeds part of the convention that had been drafted at Geneva the previous summer. Reagan issued a statement in March 1981 calling the seabeds text unacceptable, although he declared that the other parts did protect U.S. interests and the U.S. would be bound by them. On the eve of the spring session of the conference, Secretary of State Haig dismissed Aldrich; and other delegates, John Temple Swing, Vice President of the Council on Foreign Relations; me; and George Taft, Director of the Office of LOS negotiations. The U.S. delegation was to be headed by an official who was no friend of the convention, James Malone. The delegation was instructed to take no positions at the conference, merely observe, pending a review of U.S. positions. Reagan's action was personally disappointing, but more importantly it made a partisan issue out of an undertaking that from Johnson to Nixon to Carter had been generally accepted as nonpartisan. It also seemed regrettable that at the 1982 session of the conference the U.S. delegation was not allowed to try to improve the seabeds text. The 1982 session produced a final text which was signed by most of the participating nations except the United States, the UK and Germany and perhaps a few others.
Twelve years later, the required number of sixty states had ratified the convention, and it went into effect in November 1994. Meanwhile, the United States had resumed working with other states to try to improve the seabeds text so that it would meet Senate approval. An agreement amending the seabeds text of 1982 was signed in the summer of 1994 by all parties and the U.S. and other non-signatories which the Clinton administration considered met our essential requirements on seabed mining. Accordingly, the convention was sent to the Senate early this year for its advice and consent to adherence; the convention already having gone into effect, the United States may only adhere not ratify it.

Let's talk a bit about Richardson's negotiating technique. First of all he relished the job. He told me and others countless times that it was the toughest, most exacting, and satisfying work he had ever been engaged in. I might add that he had held no official position longer.

Richardson was a master of multilateral diplomacy. Indeed, he persuaded Secretary Vance to commission a study of multilateral diplomacy and laid out some guidelines it should follow, based on his experience at the LOS conference. He quickly mastered all the complex issues involved and managed a talented delegation skillfully, giving his deputies considerable latitude, only intervening in their work if he felt he could help significantly to advance the negotiating process. He was indefatigable. For three and a half years he lived and breathed law of the sea, going to two sessions a year, talking with, consulting other delegates, entertaining them and traveling around the world between sessions to get their views and present our own. He understood well the dynamics of the Group of 77 as well as the interests of our industrial country allies. He was logical, reasonable and persuasive in exposition.

Much of his success is due to the fact that he won the confidence of every delegate or UN official who counted. He trusted them and so elicited their trust.

Richardson had a world-wide reputation. He knew many foreign ministers and other high officials in various capitals. Distinguished visitors to Washington sought him out. I remember Lee Kuan Yew called one day with a posse of hefty bodyguards. Such relationships obviously had a positive effect on Richardson's standing with the delegations from those countries.

Both at home and abroad, Richardson responded favorably to any and all serious invitations to speak about the law of the sea.

The conference was fortunate to have as its president (until 1981) a wise, amiable, conciliatory diplomat from Sri Lanka, Shirley Hamilton Amerasinghe. The Special Representative of the Secretary General to the conference, Bernardo Zuleta, a polished Colombian diplomat, eased negotiations along with quiet skill. Another delegate whose work contributed mightily to the success of the conference was Tommy Koh of Singapore, who was unanimously chosen to be president after Amerasinghe's death. A
brilliant lawyer, articulate, respected by all delegations for his fairness, astuteness, and knack of clarifying complex issues, Koh came as close as anyone to being the catalyst that produced a widely acceptable treaty.

I found the conference exhilarating too. I was fully engaged. I organized Richardson's office, managed the flow of paper to him from members of the delegation, recommended people he should see and entertain. I drafted most of Richardson's official correspondence. He said we had a good symbiotic relationship. Although I had no negotiating role, I saw other delegates frequently to talk about the issues and sound them out on the state of the conference. At conference sessions in New York or Geneva, I oversaw the administration of the delegation, supervised reporting to Washington, sat in and took the record of Richardson's countless bilateral and larger group discussions.

Between conference sessions, Richardson traveled a great deal, to consult key delegations and lay the basis for progress at the forthcoming session. I went with him on just about every trip he took abroad. Actually, it was only when I joined the Law of the Sea delegation that I really began to see the world; hitherto my service had been confined to western Europe. With Richardson I traveled to a score or more countries from Japan to Cameroon, India to Norway, Canada to Chile.

Richardson undertook this travel with clearly defined purposes in mind. For example, before the first conference session of 1977, he went to Saudi Arabia, which he considered a leader among the Arab bloc. With Oxman, Admiral Max Morris, a competent naval member of our delegation, and me in tow, Richardson called one Sunday morning on the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, at his home in Riyadh. Richardson's object was to persuade the Saudis to use their considerable political weight at the forthcoming session to encourage the Arab countries to support a reasonable position on seabed mining and to stimulate the Saudis to get out in front (something they seem congenitally unable to do) on issues like freedom of navigation and overflight. We got some vague promises of support, but the Saudis did not really play a prominent part in the conference, as it turned out. From Saudi Arabia, we went on to India, the USSR and Norway.

Another interesting trip took us to South America in the summer of 1978--to Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Ecuador. The Latin bloc was very influential at the conference and Richardson wanted to build on progress that had been made at the spring session that year on seabeds, and to a lesser extent some other issues. Some officials of the Carter administration were unhappy about his going to Chile, for he would be the highest ranking U.S. official to go there since the assassination of opposition leader Letelier by Chilean secret service agents in Washington in 1976. His visit, it was argued, might send a wrong signal--American indifference to the assassination. I was called to the Old Executive Office Building just before we left to be told by an NSC official why we should skip Chile. But our ambassador in Chile, George Landau, an experienced Latin American hand, thought we should go, on the grounds that Chile was a leader at the conference, and on the merits it was appropriate to consult its LOS officials. So we did go to Chile and the other countries I mentioned. When we got to Santiago, Pinochet asked to
see Richardson. Landau advised him to agree. The three of us called on Pinochet in his
fortress-like office and spent about an hour with him talking only Law of the Sea. He did
not raise the U.S. cool-treatment policy and, as I remember, merely referred obliquely to
the fact that some unidentified forces were disposed to make trouble for Chile. The
controlled Chilean press did not exploit Richardson's visit, but generally played it
straight—as an important LOS consultation.

Q: A multinational agreement would have problems, but I would think that almost more
important would be the domestic side, with the mining interests, but particularly the
fishing interests. Fishing was a very important element in this. And they were divided
between the eastern fishery people, who basically wanted to keep their part of the
Continental Shelf theirs, whereas we had the deep-sea fishing people, coming out of San
Diego and all, who wanted to be able to fish anywhere they bloody well pleased. How did
you find the domestic side's influence on what we were doing?

JAMES: As far as I can remember, the provisions of the treaty as finally worked out were
acceptable to both of the fishing interests you mentioned. Of course, these groups had
optimum positions they wanted promoted, and I suppose they made their views known to
Richardson. But by the time he entered the picture the fisheries provisions were well
advanced and he did not have to spend much time on such issues, as best I can recall. In
any event, any difficulties the fishing interests had were far less serious as those of the
seabeds mining crowd. Elliot Richardson would, of course, be a far better source than I to
comment on pressure exerted on him by domestic constituencies like the fishing industry.
You will want to interview him I am sure.

Q: Who were the seabed miners? It must have been a fairly limited group of people.

JAMES: Not many companies were interested in mining the seabed, a dozen at the most,
among them were Kennecott, and International Nickel. Richardson labored long and hard
to get the seabed miners on board. He ensured that they were well represented on the LOS
public advisory committee which he made into a real consultative body. Other domestic
constituencies were also represented on the Advisory Committee, the fishermen,
environmentalists, scholars, scientists, and so on. He did not show up, make a little talk,
and then go away. He stayed hour after hour patiently explaining, discussing, answering
questions.

Richardson had regular meetings of the Committee, particularly before each session of
the conference so that all these interest groups would know precisely what the United
States planned to do and, of course, so that Richardson could try to persuade them of the
wisdom and efficacy of positions we planned to take. He used the committee and bilateral
conversations to try to bring the seabed miners around to accept the position that U.S.
interests would be adequately protected under a system of mining that involved both an
international authority and private mining operations.
I doubt that the potential seabed miners are happy even now with the text of the convention on exploitation of the seabed. In my view they are economic troglodytes, incorrigible and shortsighted, opposed to anything, however reasonable, that does not give them a completely free hand to mine the seabed. The irony of the matter is that seabed mining is far down the scale of priorities of national interests of the United States. The issue is given greater weight by ideologues, who recoil from any kind of international restraint or involvement, than it merits. Our major interests concern mainly but not exclusively freedom of overflight and navigation through and over territorial waters and exclusive economic zones and protection of the resources of our own exclusive economic zone. These and many more interests are adequately protected by the treaty. And it will be a decade or two before it will be economically feasible to try to exploit the seabed.

From the first, Richardson realized how important it was to build constituencies for a good LOS treaty among informed public groups and the Congress. He eagerly accepted, indeed sought, opportunities to make speeches on LOS. He diligently cultivated Congress. Unlike many bureaucrats who find it a bore or painful to go to the Hill, Richardson relished doing so and seized every opportunity to explain what he was doing. Without exception Members and Senators before whom he testified were deferential and interested, whether they were pro or cool toward a treaty. And he sought out individual Senators to talk about LOS and gain their support. I remember one particularly intensive round of talks he initiated in 1977, I think, when he went to the Hill with me to take notes to talk about the national security interests we had in the treaty to Senators Tower, Hollings and Javits, perhaps others. He worked closely with Members of the House, like John Breaux, now Senator Breaux.

Q: He was Senator from where?

JAMES: He represents Louisiana. Breaux, I recall was somewhat critical of the treaty in 1980, as it was evolving. Where he now stands I don't know. Then there was Senator Pell of Rhode Island, a staunch supporter of our work. He and a number of others from the Congress, including Ben Gilman of New York, also a supporter, regularly attended conference sessions as guests of the delegation. Richardson set store by having as many congressional visitors as possible go to New York or Geneva and he took care to make time to receive and talk with each one.

Around the time he resigned in September 1980, Richardson established a broadly representative, private group, initially called Citizens for Ocean Law, now Council on Ocean Law. The objective of the Council was to build support for a LOS treaty among influential constituencies. I helped him organize COL and have been involved ever since. The first Chairman of COL was the late Carlyle Maw, a prominent lawyer, former Legal Adviser of the Department and an Under Secretary. Richardson succeeded Maw and is still chairman. The group did its work pretty well and reached a wide range of groups with its message, but is now quiescent, due to lack of money. But the interesting point is that even as a private citizen Richardson felt he had a continuing responsibility to build support for the treaty.
Q: So you left that job when?

JAMES: I retired from the Foreign Service in September 1980, but I continued on a contract basis as Executive Assistant to George Aldrich who succeeded Richardson as Chairman of the LOS delegation.

About that time, Richardson was asked to be Chairman of a commission whose members were Jens Evensen, head of Norway's LOS delegation; and Hans Anderson, head of Iceland's. The mandate of the commission was to delineate a part of the seabed between Iceland and Norway which both claimed because it seemed to have oil deposits, and agreed on a division of the disputed part. Richardson, with the agreement of Evensen and Anderson, made me secretary of the commission.

In March 1981, I was fired from the LOS delegation. My job as secretary of the commission was not very onerous. I kept the record of its meetings and generally acted as an aide to Richardson. The substantive work of the commission was highly technical and was done largely by Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Laboratory. This consisted of mapping the seabed and identifying likely areas of oil deposits. When the report was prepared, I saw to its reproduction. This was pleasant work, for I knew Evensen and Anderson at the LOS conference and enjoyed their company.

Evensen and Anderson reached agreement rather quickly on what Richardson proposed after the seabeds was delineated. In May 1981, Richardson and I flew to Iceland and Norway to present the report to the two respective governments, who accepted it without demurring.

This was a delightful trip. Among the highlights was a call on the charming President of Iceland, who received us in her residence, a house of pleasing Nordic simplicity. We also saw the Norwegian Foreign Minister and then spent an hour with the dynamic Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Bruntland, who grilled Richardson about U.S. LOS policy and a dozen other matters.

I was then at loose ends for about nine months. In February 1982, I was asked by the Legal Adviser of the Department to be Chairman of the Board of Appellate Review, a position I still hold as a re-hired annuitant.

Q: Could we talk a bit about this Board of Appellate Review? What is it and how does it work? I think the administration of the Department of State at any particular time is of interest to certain groups of people who are looking at these interviews.

JAMES: The Board of Appellate Review was set up in 1967 in order to combine in one body the functions of several appellate bodies in the State Department.
The Board has jurisdiction to hear appeals by persons who, the Department decides, have expatriated themselves by performing a statutory act of expatriation; appeals by citizens who are the subject of adverse action with respect to a passport, usually because they are subject of a federal warrant of arrest; appeals in certain contract disputes; and appeals from such other administrative decisions of the Department as the Secretary may designate.

Since it was established, the Board had heard mainly appeals from expatriation decisions and a few appeals from adverse actions with respect to a passport. In 1967 there were 10 statutory expatriate acts; now there are six. The Supreme Court has progressively cut back the number of acts performance of which may cause loss of citizenship. The number of people who expatriate themselves has remained fairly constant over the years since I became Chairman of the Board, say, 800 on the average annually. Until about 1992, the Board heard annually about 60 appeals from loss of nationality.

The Board now consists of one permanent member, myself, the Chairman. There are 6 ad hoc members, senior officers of the Department who hold other positions and are not compensated for serving on the Board. All members must be lawyers in good standing. When the Board receives an appeal, I choose two ad hoc members to sit with me to make the required panel of three.

An appellant is entitled to have an oral hearing. When the Board was hearing a high volume of appeal, about 25% of the appellants requested a hearing.

The law that governs the Board's proceedings is the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended. It prescribes six acts as expatriative: obtaining naturalization in a foreign state; making an oath of allegiance to a foreign state; serving in a foreign army; serving in a foreign government; making a formal renunciation of citizenship abroad or in wartime in the United States; committing treason. Merely doing one of those acts will not result in loss of citizenship, however, unless the citizen does the act voluntarily and with the intention of relinquish citizenship.

Under the statute, it is presumed that a person who does one of the expatriative acts does so voluntarily but the person may rebut the presumption. There is no presumption that an expatriative act was done with the intention of relinquishing citizenship. Proving intent is a burden that the Department must bear.

In the time I have been Chairman, the Board has decided nearly 400 appeals. I wrote about 90% of the opinions on those appeals; the other 10% were written by Edward Misey, a predecessor of mine as Chairman, who until recently served as the other regular member of the Board.

In 1984, I initiated the practice of publishing as a matter of public record selected opinions of the Board.
By federal regulation, the Board is independent. No officer of the Department, not even the Secretary, may review our decisions. I am pleased to state that the Board is regarded by lawyers familiar with our work as fair and impartial.

The Board has heard many interesting and unusual cases. Some have been high profile appeals, like that of Rabbi Meir Kahane who lost his citizenship because he became a member of the Israeli parliament. We affirmed the Department's decision. A federal court restored his citizenship. Elizabeth Taylor's son, Michael Wilding, appealed from a decision that he lost his citizenship by formally renouncing it. We dismissed the appeal because he was late in appealing. Melinda McLean, American wife of British spy Donald McLean, appealed and won. She had lost her citizenship because she obtained Russian naturalization. Harold Harvey Webb, a Korean War deserter, who became a Polish citizen long after he was released from prison by the Chinese, won too because the Board felt desertion, without more, was not probative of his intent to give up citizenship.

We also heard an appeal by ex-CIA officer Philip Agee from denial of a passport on the grounds that his actions and statements abroad constituted a threat to national security. We did not reach a decision but sent the case back to the State Department for technical reasons to reformulate the government's case.

The Board's case load was quite heavy until a few years ago. In 1990, the Department issued a guideline establishing a new evidentiary standard to determine whether a person lost United States citizenship as a result of performing an expatriative act. Under the new standard, in most cases, except formal renunciation of citizenship, a person who performs an expatriative act will be presumed to intend to retain, not relinquish, citizenship, unless there is clear evidence at the time the act was done, that the person really meant to give up citizenship.

After this guideline was issued our work began to fall off markedly.

The few cases that now come to the Board are mainly from decisions based on formal renunciation of citizenship. Although the Board's case load has diminished, we still have some cases. It is my view and, I believe, that of the Office of the Legal Adviser to which the Board is attached for administrative support, that the Board should remain in being. There is still a law of expatriation, and an aggrieved person ought to have the recourse to administrative review and not be forced at great expense to seek relief in federal court.

As I became familiar with nationality law, I thought it would be useful and instructive to write some law review articles on various aspects of our work. Three were published by the San Diego Law Review: "The Board of Appellate Review: the Right to Appellate Review of Administrative Determinations of Loss of Nationality" (1986); "Expatriation in the United States: Precept and Practice Today and Yesterday" (1990); and "Cult-Induced Renunciation of United States Citizenship: The Involuntary Expatriation of Black Hebrews" (1991). I also did a jeu d'esprit titled "A Notable Naturalization: How

*Q:* Do you have any approximate percentage of appeals where you find for the person who is making the appeal?

JAMES: In roughly 30% of the nearly 400 cases appealed to the Board since 1982 we have reversed the Department and restored citizenship. That figure includes those cases where we have held that the Department erred in deciding a person intended to relinquish citizenship. It also includes cases where the Department asked for remand because, after the appeal was entered, the Department concluded that it could not carry its burden of proving that the person intended to relinquish citizenship, and decided it should restore citizenship. I think, and others interested in our work agree, that the Department of State issued the new guidelines precisely because the Board reversed the Department's holdings of loss of citizenship so often that the officials concerned did some serious thinking about whether they were making soundly based, intellectually defensible decisions on loss of nationality.

I have enjoyed being Chairman of the Board of Appellate Review. It was stimulating and personally satisfying. I don't think we made many bad decisions. In only a very few cases where we agreed with the Department that the person intended to relinquish citizenship would I now vote differently. I regret none of the cases where we reversed the State Department and restored citizenship.

*Q:* Well, I want to thank you very much for this.

*End of interview*