The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

CHARLES E. JOHNSON

Interviewed by: Melbourne Spector
Initial interview date: April 8, 1996

TABLE OF CONTENTS

National Security Council (NSC) 1961-1970

Special Assistants for Cabinet Coordination 1954
NSC Representative to the marine Sciences Council and Space Council
Liaison with the Atomic Energy Commission
Accounting for Defense Department Nuclear Weapons
Growth of the NSC Staff Under Kissinger
Need to Abolish the NSC
Responsibility for the Trust Territories
Kissinger and the NSC
Presidents and the Department of State

INTERVIEW

Q: This interview is being conducted under the auspices of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program for the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I am Mel Spector. Charles, or I'll call him Chuck because we're old friends, has had an extensive experience in the federal government but we will concentrate mostly on his experience in the foreign affairs arena. Well Chuck let's begin at the beginning. You went to Antioch, is that correct?

JOHNSON: That's correct.

Q: *And what did you major in?*

JOHNSON: I started off as an education major; about a year after I switched over to political sciences, social studies.

Q: *Why?*

JOHNSON: Well, I was disillusioned by the academic approach to education, as being a lot of vocational training on how to be a teacher without any substance to it. I strongly believe now that you must master a field, or common field of competence, whether it's English literature, chemistry, whatever it is, and you can learn the technique of teaching afterwards. I don't think you start off by learning to be a teacher and then pick up all the substance afterwards.

Q: *I see.*

JOHNSON: Unless you're going to be a Kindergarten teacher or specialize in first grade or something of that kind and I had no intention in that direction, so I switched over to social studies and political science. I could have been a history major since I've always had a very strong interest in history and the combination of history and of political science really appealed to me. Remember this was the early '30's. The University of

Chicago had a group of people who were doing some very interesting work on the psychology of history. Harold Lasswell wrote his book on the psychopathology of politics, which really was sort of an analysis of a lot of historical developments from a psychological point of view. Psychopathology is what he called it. There was a whole group of people who went into that school of history. They were doing some very interesting work and I was reading some of that as it was coming out, not necessarily as course material that I got at Antioch, although Antioch was noted for its free approach to education in that you didn't have any required classes freshman year and you could sort of write your own ticket in terms of what courses you wanted to study. It was almost like an English university.

Q: *And did Antioch have a work study program there?*

JOHNSON: It did, yes. Five weeks on campus and five weeks on a job. Or if the job was too far away, over, say, a thousand miles or several hundred miles, they would try to rearrange it so that it would be ten weeks on campus and ten weeks on the job. My last year I doubled up so I was on campus full time, so I was at Antioch five years. Ordinarily it would take six years to complete. I was graduated in June of '35 with an A.B. degree with honors and with distinction in my field. After that I got a fellowship in Public Administration at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.

Q: *Now, when you say you got a fellowship was that something which you wanted?*

JOHNSON: Yes, I had applied for that with the encouragement of Don Kingsley.

Q: *Who was who?*

JOHNSON: He was my professor the last couple of years, and he had come out of Syracuse. He'd gotten his Ph.D. at Syracuse.

Q: *And had written some famous textbooks.*

JOHNSON: Yes, well, he and Mosher and Kingsley wrote the first edition of the classic on public administration. In my senior year I was a student assistant to Don Kingsley, and I wrote a chapter on unions in the public service for that particular book.

Q: *Very good.*

JOHNSON: Its gone through I don't know how many editions by now.

Q: *It would be standard.*

JOHNSON: I don't know, its been revised and revised and revised.

Q: *I just want to be very sure. So you went to the Maxwell School on a fellowship?*

JOHNSON: On a fellowship, yes.

Q: *And you had decided then that you wanted to make your career in public administration?*

JOHNSON: Well, it was one of those, you know, Hobson's choices. That year, this was 1935, we were still in the throes of the last stages of the depression. The economy hadn't been speeded up yet by the orders of Great Britain and the Allies in preparation for the rearmament. Although it gradually built up, as you probably know, it was sort of a Hobson's choice. Anyhow, with the fellowship in my hand, which was good for one year, at two hundred dollars a month, no, I'm sorry, it was one hundred dollars a month plus my fees, which was very good.

Q: *It sure was.*

JOHNSON: That was from the Spellman Foundation. Well, to continue on that, I went to Maxwell and was well into the school year in the fall of 1935, when around the first of November Dr. William Mosher, who's the father of Frederick Mosher, who you knew I'm sure, came into class with smiles that lit up the place saying, "I've had great news gentlemen; I've just had word from the Spellman Foundation that they're giving this additional money as a grant to finance a second year of graduate study in public administration." Of course, none of us had anticipated having to spend more than one year at Syracuse. In fact Bill and Lois Parsons were engaged secretly and her family didn't know it. He was Roman Catholic and she was not. She was a social worker living and working in Cincinnati, waiting for Bill to finish up so that next May or June they could get married. So that fixed that. They got married joining Jay Verlee who was also secretly married.

Q: *You say secretly because you weren't supposed to be married?*

JOHNSON: No, no their families...

Q: *So you mean for some reason or other...*

JOHNSON: Yes, some reason or other...

Q: *It didn't have anything to do with the University.*

JOHNSON: No, not with the University, it had no policy on that although I don't see how anybody could carry on a normal married life and be in that public administration course. That was the most intense learning experience that I've ever been subjected to, really. I don't think that. I don't know that. I'm sure it hasn't been that way since the war, but in 1935 and '36 Mosher never hesitated to assign 500 pages of required reading for next day's class. Reading was all we did. We organized ourselves inventing something we

called "Moshering," and we literally divided up all this stuff. Then we would write good notes, have them dittoed in the faculty club on a ditto machine. We dittoed the notes and passed them around so everybody had a complete set of notes for every required reading.

Q: *Ditto.*

JOHNSON: Ditto, ditto machine, right.

Q: *People don't know that.*

JOHNSON: In the government they used to call them smear prints.

Q: *Smear, because they had to be smeared.*

JOHNSON: And they were purple, yes. Well, anyhow, I had all my notes that were dittoed on the public administration course right up until a couple of years ago, and I think that Manny DeAngelis probably still has all of his. He was in that class with me also and some of the other people that are well known to you were in that class. I mentioned Bill Parsons, Manny DeAngelis, John Hermansen who later was in AID but he's been dead for some years now.

Q: *Yes, I knew him.*

JOHNSON: Matt Lukens brought me down here. Matt Lukens was already in the Office of Production Management, and he brought me here to the Office of Production Management in the fall of 1941. He subsequently became the Director of the New York Port Authority. He was the one who built the Twin Towers.

Q: *And he was my boss during the war.*

JOHNSON: Oh, he was.

Q: *In the Pentagon.*

JOHNSON: Oh, I see.

Q: *And wasn't Scott Moore in that class?*

JOHNSON: No, he was not. He was in the year after, but Frank Zeo was in that class. You knew him.

Q: *Zeo's spelt how?*

JOHNSON: Z-E-O. Zeo was in that group that McNamara organized. Frank shared a desk with Thornton Wilder.

Q: *Thornton Wilder?*

JOHNSON: Yes. When he was down here. Frank went back to Boston and he's now retired, living in Marble Head. For a long time he was the head of the Massachusetts Taxpayers Federation.

Q: *Oh, I see.*

JOHNSON: And he's a very prominent Bostonian. He's on the Board of Directors of the John Hancock Insurance Company. He was head of the advisory committee to the governor when they established the Port of Boston Authority and the Port and the International Airport Authority up there. As a public administrator he's done very well. He's been an ornament I think to the profession if you want to call it that.

Q: *So after Maxwell, we can, I think, for the purpose of this interview skip over quite a bit until you came to Washington.*

JOHNSON: Let me give you fill-in between Maxwell and Washington because I think some of the experiences are pertinent.

Q: *Yes, of course.*

JOHNSON: I went from Maxwell to an internship in the office of the Director of the Budget in New York State. Dave Weber was the Director of the Budget under Governor Lehmann. There was to be a one year internship.

Q: *Lehmann. We have to do this for the transcriber.*

JOHNSON: It just turned out that there had been a classification study done two years before by Griffin, Hagen and Associates, which is a big private outfit. They had classified the entire New York State service, but they had not done anything about salaries. They had just classified jobs, without salaries. There was a bipartisan legislative study, called the Fels-Hamilton Act for the Standardization of Salaries in the State of New York, to be completed in two years. I was just available and I fell into it and when the Governor asked for a recommendation Dave Weber said yes, Chuck Johnson's available. He'll be the Staff Director. Wow! Here I was still wet behind the ears doing the standardization project for one of the biggest states in the country. We had a staff of, I don't know, about 7 or 8 people and we set up procedures and at the end of that period I wrote the final report. I did a little annotation of my own commenting and criticizing my own report. I submitted that as my Masters Thesis. It was accepted at Syracuse where I got my MS in public administration.

Q: *That's wonderful.*

JOHNSON: Funny thing about that--later on when I was out in Evanston, Illinois, I remember Professor Hatton looked at my thesis and said, "If you want to establish residence at Northwestern for a year, I'll accept that as a Ph.D. dissertation."

Q: *Yes, qualify you, great.*

JOHNSON: Which had been great, but, no, I didn't establish residence, I saw no point to that. By that time I was married. Well, anyhow, that's about the time that that project was finished. The city of Evanston held a nationwide examination for Secretary Chief Examiner, Personnel Director for the city. There were one hundred or more applicants for that, and I got the appointment.

Q: *The city was about how large?*

JOHNSON: 60,000. A major suburb of Chicago. There was a reform mayor who had just come in. The previous administration was a corrupt administration as far as civil service was concerned in the city, so he appointed a new civil service commission. Earl DeLong was the president of the commission.

Q: *Earl that has lunch with us?*

JOHNSON: Yes.

Q: *Oh, that's DeLong.*

JOHNSON: Right. And he was the one who organized, who really got the examination that held oral interviews for about 10 people. A number of participants later became well-known names in the field of public administration. Off hand I can't remember. I was out there, serving as the Personnel Director. Penfield, the mayor, used to come into the office and chew the fat so I ended up acting as his personal assistant, because he knew that I had training in the public administration field. I ended up doing things like drafting specifications for a new fire engine, conducting a confidential investigation of our chief of detectives who we had thought was "on the take" from Chicago, and stuff like that. A lot of little odds and ends. Well, anyhow, I was the target for the opposition in the Board of Aldermen. I was getting $200.00 a month and I had gotten married in October of 1939. The Civil Service Board tried to get me a raise in salary, but the Aldermen blocked it. In fact, they didn't even want me to take time off to get married. I had a hell of a time with some of those Aldermen. I've got a whole scrap book full of clippings from the opposition newspaper who represented the Republican opposition. Henry Penfield and they were using me as the whipping boy, and I really caught hell. Well, anyhow, by January, with a baby on the way, I realized that I was going to have to do something, so I worked for IBM and went to FAO School and became their regional representative for 3 states, trying to sell punch card systems for use in government. But then as the '40's went on I kept getting letters from Matt Lukens. He and other friends of mine were down here in Washington saying that it would be a good idea to come down and get into the U.S. Government one

way or another. I looked into various possibilities. TVA was one that offered me a job, and I got this offer from the Office of Production Management on the first of October. I reported for work the first of November.

Q: *Of 1941.*

JOHNSON: '41 the Office of Production Management and then by the following December, December 7, of course, it became the War Production Board.

Q: *Yes.*

JOHNSON: The War Production Board really was in high gear and I worked everyday, night and day, no weekends off for me until well into June of 1942. It got to the point where if anybody who showed up in uniform, saying they're going into the military, we would say they're slacking and getting out of the job.

Q: *They would get it easy.*

JOHNSON: Yes, right. Then there was an opening that developed with the National Housing Agency with Jack Blandford.

Q: *How do you spell it?*

JOHNSON: Blandford, John Blandford. He was appointed by Roosevelt as the first head of the National Housing Agency, to bring together all of the scattered housing agencies. There was the U.S. Housing Authority which was building low cost housing, there was the FHA and the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration. There were three major agencies, and Roosevelt said the National Housing Agency should develop a plan for war time housing for war workers and also for dependents at military bases. So that's where the FHA got into the Title 5 Housing and we got into this emergency housing. Well, anyhow, I was appointed as, I think my title was Organization Officer of the National Housing Agency. Bill Lawson was Personnel Officer, Lyman Cozad was in that group, I think the three of us...

Q: *Lawson, Cozad.*

JOHNSON: I was at the National Housing Agency, I don't know how long I was doing that job. Organizational Procedures Officer was my title. I was there until '44 before I went over to the FPHA as Associate Director of the Administrative Planning Division. We were setting up the...

Q: *FPHA stands for what?*

JOHNSON: Federal Public Housing Authority. We were setting up a system of decentralized regional administration, trying to speed up the program because it was

really bottle-necked in Washington. I left there in '47 and went over to the State Department. I got to the State Department because Stan Orear, whom I had known in Albany when he was with the New York State Civil Service Commission and I was working on the standardization thing had come to Washington as the head of classification for the U.S. Housing Authority under Straus. He had subsequently gone over to State as Director of the Division of Organization and Budget. Stanley Orear. I hadn't been in the Department but a couple of months and had barely gotten my feet wet when Chris Ravndal and Jack Peurifoy, who was the Assistant Secretary for Administration, wanted a study made of what other countries did. So I was assigned to the study but Carl Strom...

Q: *Strom.*

JOHNSON: Yes.

Q: *Can we go back a little? Chris Ravndal. Was the director...*

JOHNSON: The Director General of the Foreign Service.

Q: *Chuck, stop just a minute and amplify on the Foreign Service and what it was in those days. What was under the Director General for example?*

JOHNSON: Well, I'm not sure I can remember all the elements. There was one called Foreign Service Personnel and they had charge of the whole examining process, the recruiting of officers and so forth...

Q: *The Foreign Service.*

JOHNSON: The Foreign Service and they had...

Q: *Foreign Service planning.*

JOHNSON: Foreign Service planning.

Q: *Tyler Thompson.*

JOHNSON: Yes, Ty Thompson, right, and then there was Foreign Service buildings under Fritz Larkin.

Q: *The famous Fritz Larkin.*

JOHNSON: Yes, he'd been in that, he was the guy who'd built most of the embassies around the world.

Q: *He spent hundreds of millions of dollars after the war.*

JOHNSON: That's right. Then I think there was Foreign Service Administration. I think they were the ones who were in charge of the nuts and bolts of the embassies, as I recall. I don't know if they had a separate budget division or not. My memory is a little hazy on that but they had a pretty much a full plate.

Q: *Pretty much the General Director ran the Foreign Service.*

JOHNSON: He ran the Foreign Service, right. It wasn't an advisory job that its become since.

Q: *Well right at the moment that we are speaking, 1996 the Director General is really the Director of Personnel for the Foreign Service and that's all. But go ahead please. So you were sent abroad?*

JOHNSON: No, we didn't go abroad at all.

Q: *But you studied?*
JOHNSON: There were three of us, Karl Strom who was subsequently a career ambassador, and there was a Bureau of the Budget representative who didn't contribute very much, but I can't remember who he was now.

Q: *Oh, could it be Al, oh, I know, Juan Lega?*

JOHNSON: We drafted a Foreign Service circular that went out to a number of the posts asking a number of questions as to what they saw. We sent it to all the major European countries. Then we concentrated on Spain, did historical research on Czarist Russia, Great Britain, Switzerland, France, not Germany, I can't remember what...You have a copy of our report on that. It's on Johnson's report. We conducted our interviews. We talked to the Ambassador, Head of Mission or the DCM of most of these major countries that had been selected. I think that our procedure was pretty well spelled out in that report that you have and that's a long time ago so my memory now is pretty fuzzy on that. Well, anyhow, we pretty well concluded that it was practical to merge the classified service with the Foreign Service. There are some people who had served their entire career in the foreign office. They're called foreign office johnnies and they are the guys who really are the institutional memory of the foreign office, and it's darned important. It's the thing that the State Department is missing, institutional memory. Because this business of turnover and the so-called career management which to me is career mismanagement has been responsible for a lot of mistakes that the departments made administratively, as I look back on them.

Q: *Well, even then, though, Chuck, you had people who never went overseas who were career and later you had the Wriston program which then forced them to go overseas which then led to even more of what you are talking about. Then it lost any institutional memory that it had.*

JOHNSON: Those people who were career as civil servants originally...

Q: *Went overseas.*

JOHNSON: Yes, but before this thing. Before the Wriston program, and they were looked down upon especially the EUR types, the so-called diplomats, as being paper clip counters and that sort of thing. They were somewhat declasse. But, nevertheless, they were the ones who did an awful lot of the Department's work. There were a lot of good scholars whose status was not really recognized adequately by the Department, because they were not Foreign Service types, and I must say there was a certain amount of racism and snobbery in the Department. Built in. A network of self-perpetuating people of privilege because their father had been ambassador or grandfather had been ambassador, they had certain entree denied to other people.

Q: *Your study was mostly about the Foreign Service then.*

JOHNSON: Oh, yes. The Foreign Service is very self protective.

Q: *Yes. So this study and again your recommendations came out of this study?*

JOHNSON: Well, that there should be a merger.

Q: *A merger. By that did you mean that you would actually...that you would change the rank inherent in the person and make it the rank in the job rather than the person?*

JOHNSON: As a matter of fact I even drafted some legislation for the Foreign Service Act. You know I'm going to have to go back and look at that report now. But I think that at some point we had rank inherent in the person but with the same kind of thing with about the selection if they don't...

Q: *So that part you would have kept?*

JOHNSON: Oh, yes, oh, yes.

Q: *But the people in the Department who were not in the selection out process could stay because their rank was inherent in their positions but not in themselves.*

JOHNSON: That's right.

Q: *Well now after that study did you work on some others?*

JOHNSON: No, about that time it was the beginning of a push for the major reorganization of the Department. I was a special assistant to Jack Peurifoy working off and on on that. He completed that study and you have a copy of the Peurifoy plan of

which I was a major author. You could say I'm the father of the bureaus in the Department.

Q: *Now tell me a little bit about that. What did we have before and then what did we have after the Peurifoy report just in general terms?*

JOHNSON: Well, the Department was split functionally before. Economics and the political offices which were largely political offices, EUR were largely political offices, largely manned by diplomats that came out of the diplomatic group, and then you had the lowest grade of area and then you had the public affairs, what it's called and I can't remember what...it was divided into major functions with assistant secretaries heading them up.

Q: *The emphasis was not geographic?*

JOHNSON: That was the major thing that we did. We tried to divide the Department geographically with the assistant secretaries at the head of each of the areas. We really thought about this one, really agonized over what the heck we would call these areas. They didn't want to call them offices but that was discredited, and it was just by luck that somehow or another I was reading back on some of the early history of the Department and I found that the Department had been divided into two major bureaus. Also we went back to the early 1800's and it wasn't. Who was the other Secretary? Well, anyhow, Jack Peurifoy was the first one saying, "Oh, bureaucrat, you're not going to have a bunch of bureaucrats?" So then I read him this thing. This is really going back to the early history of the Department; we're just reviving what the Department used to use, and I sold him on the thing, and then we sold the under secretary. I can't remember, he was Dave Brown's father-in-law.

Q: *Oh, Lovett.*

JOHNSON: Lovett, oh he was a son-of-a-bitch on this one. He didn't want to have anything to do with bureaucrats, but we sold him on that and then sold Marshall on the idea.

Q: *Let me ask you, Chuck, I have a piece of personal information. About that time I was in the Department. I was in the Foreign Service planning, working in classification. I ran into Tex Thornton. Tex Thornton was in town and Tex told me he was a part of the group working on the reorganization. Now do you remember outsiders being brought in? Because Tex was very close to Mr. Lovett.*

JOHNSON: We had a working group on what was to be left at each of these major functional areas like economics and so forth, and there were working groups at each one of these, and then we were putting together a lot of that stuff. So he probably was on a working group.

Q: *Or he was working directly for Lovett.*

JOHNSON: Lovett may have been having somebody taking a second look at it from his own standpoint.

Q: *So essentially the Department we're talking about in 1996 is basically the organization that you all came up with in 1947?*

JOHNSON: Yes, that's right and we also cut way back on the administrative area. The administrative area had to work through the bureaus really. That was our concept. The bureaus were supposed to be self sufficient in so far as they could be.

Q: *So they would have their own administrative staffs, they would have their own capabilities?*

JOHNSON: They would have administrative and they would have political and economic and public affairs within each bureau.

Q: *Within each bureau. Very interesting.*

JOHNSON: Under an assistant secretary, and they would get functional supervision and help out of the functional offices which were an advisory and not functional supervisory position.

Q: *Now then at one time in the State Department there was this division of organization and budget, what happened to the division of organization and budget in this reorganization?*

JOHNSON: It became a division of organization by itself, with organization and procedures. I kept my foot in that door. I had a director, two directors, I can't remember whether we had both of them in from the Foreign Service in the field and neither one of them knew what they were doing. Anyhow, we were reviewing all forms being developed, we had to approve all forms that were being used and sent to the field. Very similar to the kind of things that the Bureau of the Budget tries to do for the whole government, and we had some specialist there who could draft forms and a lot of that know-how on forms drafting which is coming in now and boxing and controlling response and space utilization and how to eliminate the unnecessary stuff and the paper and subsequent filing and a lot of things which had never really been looked at hard, eliminated an awful lot of trash. We had control over all internal procedural memoranda. We reviewed them from the standpoint of legibility, intelligibility and necessity, a lot of stuff like that.

Q: *So even though you delegated a lot of authority to the bureaus you still retained some kind of central review?*

JOHNSON: That's right.

Q: *Let me ask you for example, I'm just trying to recollect for myself. Herman Pollack was in the Department in those days?*

JOHNSON: Yes, he was on my staff for a while.

Q: *I see.*

JOHNSON: Herman and I were always very good friends and when I was over in the National Security Council, I used to be in touch with Herman. Herman finally was Assistant Secretary, wasn't he for Science Affairs?

Q: *I don't know if he ever made it. I hope he did.*

JOHNSON: He was Assistant Secretary, because I remember we worked on the Law of the Sea a lot. I was with the National Security Council where I was again re-claiming my marketing history! I developed the phrase which appeared in one of the presidential speeches, which the State Department has been suffering with ever since, and that's "that the oceans are the legacy of all mankind." It's true, and the President used that in one of his speeches and that became policy. The military hated that because they wanted to run submarine detection stuff all around, and the State Department didn't want to fight all these guys who wanted to do deep, deep mining. You see, they wanted to catch all these cobalt nodules that are on the ocean floor. They wanted to go out and grab those because other guys were looking forward to this technique, technology of deep drilling for oil, which is now being done in some of these places that are way the hell out in...

Q: *That was something you worked on later?*

JOHNSON: I was with the NSC.
Q: *So in the State Department you stayed there how long then?*

JOHNSON: Well the last thing I did after, I stayed with Jack Peurifoy because we were working...

Q: *He was the Assistant Secretary for Administration.*

JOHNSON: For Administration and the thing that happened there is that the Hoover Commission, the first Hoover Commission was set up and Marshall didn't want to approve the Peurifoy Plan as such because the Hoover Commission was going to...so we worked for the Hoover Commission in the sense the Hoover Commission adopted our plan. Then that was implemented.

Q: *I see.*

JOHNSON: But in the course of that, there were a number of projects I worked on where doing some amendments to the Foreign Service Act, the Rogers Act were done in around '49 and '50 and I can't remember the details on those but I know I worked on a number of things. Jack and I were up talking to a couple of committees on revisions in the Foreign Service Act. He had a very good entree to the Congress.

Q: *Yes, Peurifoy was very well liked on the Hill.*

JOHNSON: He had started off as an elevator operator on the Hill.

Q: *Oh really?*

JOHNSON: He'd come up here, I can't remember who his sponsor was from South Carolina?

Q: *It could have been Strom Thurmond?*

JOHNSON: Possible, yes.

Q: *Thailand.*

JOHNSON: Thailand as the Ambassador. There was one more project I'd had when the State Department was anticipating the signing of the final peace treaty with Japan. This meant that we were going to have to convert; we were going to have to set up an embassy in Tokyo. It was staffed by Foreign Service officers. Niles Bond was there.

Q: *Alexis Johnson.*

JOHNSON: Alexis was in the Department still.

Q: *Oh it was? I don't know why we're even using this thing?*
JOHNSON: He became the first ambassador. John Foster Dulles was our negotiator. He was negotiating the final peace treaty and that was being done pretty much sub rosa, secretly. MacArthur was not involved in the final peace treaty negotiations at all. It was John Foster Dulles and part of it was done in Washington and some of it done actually in Australia. Carl Humelsine asked me to head up a departmental committee and we had representation from all the areas.

Q: *And Carl was the executive secretary of the Department?*

JOHNSON: Yes, we had this committee headed up out of the Far East area with representation from all of the functional areas and we were planning for the creation or the transition, the conversion of the diplomatic section to uphold the embassy. Then as a part of our planning I was going to go over and try to create an opposite number committee in Tokyo with representation from MacArthur's economic section and others,

so that we could end up with what looked like a plan for an embassy. Well actually my trip wasn't really necessary, it could have been done by cable but Gerry Warner, who was then Far Eastern Affairs and I went to Tokyo by Northwest Airlines about...

The Korean War was going on and we went on as high priority freight, the two of us plus a plane load of ammunition that was destined for Korea. Actually what we were doing was that Gerry and I were providing cover with an assimilated rank, both of us of 3 star generals. He was carrying the penultimate version of the peace treaty to talk over with Foreign Office people. Well, I'll tell you an interesting thing that happened on the way, that maybe should be recorded for history. The morning we came in from the airport - from the old airport - and early in the morning, just after dawn, we saw a bunch of workmen up ahead, and Gerry looked up and said, "hey, wait a minute, stop the car, this is something we want to watch, this is interesting, this is an historical event." They were taking down the big sign that said, Doolittle Field or Doolittle Park. They were putting back up the old pre-war sign which says Hybia Park or Field, this is the transition and he said...

Q: *That was very symbolic.*

JOHNSON: Yes, they had saved that sign from the time of the surrender and put it away someplace. So there they were all these workmen in their conical hats and their short kimonos climbing up and putting that sign back up. Then we went on to the old Imperial Hotel. We were housed in the suites, suitable for 3-star generals, in the part of the hotel which had not been bombed. It was a beautiful place.

Q: *Well it was designed by Frank Lloyd Wright.*

JOHNSON: Frank Lloyd Wright, it was a lovely hotel but it has been torn down.

Q: *Yes, unfortunately.*

JOHNSON: That's the way they built it. Well, anyhow, we had a very delightful period, a week in Tokyo while I was going along and just carrying Gerry's bag in a sense while he was talking to the Foreign Office. We got the full treatment, beginning at dinner and it just happened the Imperial Chamberlain held his annual Kabuki dinner for the diplomats in the Imperial Detached Palace which is a beautiful palace off on the edge of town, where they had old Kabuki. They had (unsure) Mongol mutton on big braziers and they had the whole sheep, everything, oh, it was wonderful! I got a lot of pictures of that, slides. Well, anyhow, I did some more work for the Department on the way home. I stopped off at Manila to check in. They had a very large printing operation in Manila that somebody in the Department wanted me to look at. We were printing all the stuff that was being used in the Far East. All that stuff on how to build a toilet, how to fish, and how to do this, and how to raise children, and how to have a baby, and all that kind of stuff. We had all kinds of how-to-do-it's.

Q: *The State Department did?*

JOHNSON: Well, the State Department yes you know, it was part of the Office of Public Affairs.

Q: *Really?*

JOHNSON: Yes, it was political stuff. It was politically motivated.

Q: *This is a kind of technical assistance.*

JOHNSON: A lot of...recruiting stuff. Then they had a lot of psy-war stuff.

Q: *Psychological warfare stuff?*

JOHNSON: I mean it was a lot of printing which was being used in the Korean theater. I mean leaflets that were being dropped on them that some Air Force guy said the only time that they ever did any good was when the leaflets didn't open up and they hit somebody. Then I went down to the Mariana's very briefly, then came back in through Hawaii, but that was the first time I'd been in the Mariana's, and I went out there later on when I represented the NSC. Well, then about the time that we wound up that operation in Tokyo, Karl Humelsine called me and said that Gordon Gray needed some help.

Q: *Spell that please.*

JOHNSON: Gordon Gray. He was at that time President of the University of North Carolina. He'd been in and out of the government. He was subsequently, I can't remember if before that or later on, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Army. President Truman issued an executive order creating the Psychological Strategy Board in 1951, incidentally, in this resume you'll see that I was the Special Assistant to the Executive Director of the Far Eastern Affairs. That's the title they gave me for purposes of organizing the prototype of the Embassy for Tokyo. So then Gordon Gray for President Truman edition of the executive order creating the Psychological Strategy Board in the spring of 1951 and in the press release from the White House, Truman had called it his Headquarters of the Cold War.

Q: *This was separate from the State Department?*

JOHNSON: Oh, yes. The Psychological Strategy Board was composed of the assistant secretary, the secretaries, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was composed of the representation of the major departments that were involved in the Cold War. The head of the staff was reporting directly to the President and that was Gordon Gray. Gordon appointed me as Deputy Executive Officer and later on I was Executive Officer under him of the Psychological Strategy Board and what happened was that he was given this executive order and the

publicity went out and he was not even in Washington. He was still down in Chapel Hill and mail was coming in from all over the country. Everybody had ideas how to win the Cold War. There was a room full of letters that had not even been opened. He came up, we met, we went around, we had to figure out what we had to do. First we had to find some space. We had to beg, borrow and steal some staff. We had to get some kind of a letter-answering operation going and we did all of this. Fortunately, the buildings on Jackson Place, the three buildings right on the corner of Jackson Place and Pennsylvania Avenue were either vacant or about to be vacated.

Q: *When you say Jackson, just near Blair House, or Jackson Place?*

JOHNSON: Blair House is next door. We had the corner building and the next two buildings.

Q: *I see.*

JOHNSON: That's right. Right up Jackson Place. We borrowed staff from all over the place. Everybody was put on the CIA payroll because they were able to operate without any limitations whatsoever.

Q: *And they probably had the funds.*

JOHNSON: And they had the money and the slots. Then we got a lot of the people out of the (unsure) side work group out of the Pentagon, the guys who had been foaming at the mouth practically looking at opportunities to do this and that. All these psychological warriors were showing up and the State Department, I think very reluctantly, assigned some people over, but they were really holding back on it. This really was the CIA and defense operation in many way.

Q: *So this was psychological warfare?*

JOHNSON: Well, sure, actually it was more than that. We were developing contingency plans for all kind of...we had working groups on all the major political issues and we had a contingency plan for the death of Stalin. A lot of this stuff has been declassified now so now it's available, but it was very secret.

Q: *Now what was the relationship of that to the National Security Council?*
JOHNSON: Well, in many ways it was a kind of free-wheeling outfit. Truman felt that we could operate more freely. That question is one that particularly came up as a matter of fact in the Presidential campaign. Eisenhower made a speech at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco in the summer of that campaign when he talked about foreign affairs organization, and he talked a little bit about the need for integrating some of these outfits. Immediately after he was elected the Psychological Strategy Board was abolished and the staff was transferred into something called the Operations Coordinating Board.

Q: *Oh.*

JOHNSON: C.D. Jackson was the President's right arm on that particular thing. Sorry, I can't remember his name, he was a Bostonian. They used to draw a diagram. Bobby Cutler, was special assistant to the President. Bobby Cutler really was the mastermind on this reorganization on this NSC thing. He would say the OCB, no the NSC, we have a triangle. The NSC makes policy up to the President, then the policy is turned over to the OCB for implementation going down the other side.

Q: *Operation's Coordination Board. So that was set up under Eisenhower?*

JOHNSON: Yes.

Q: *And the Psychological Strategy Board was abolished?*

JOHNSON: Along with the staff, including me, was transferred to the OCB and we stayed in that same building quite a while.

Q: *Great location.*

JOHNSON: Oh, wonderful. My office was on the second floor right next to Blair House and at that time it was an open porch with a New Orleans type of iron railing around it. It has since been closed up. I was at lunch one day and I came back about 10 minutes after the attack on Harry Truman.

Q: *Wow.*

JOHNSON: And the guy...

Q: *He was killed right in front...*

JOHNSON: He was still on the sidewalk there and I looked right down and there he was.

Q: *Good Lord.*

JOHNSON: Best seats in town for all the inaugural parades.

Q: *Couldn't get any better than that.*

JOHNSON: Admiral Kirk was head of the PSB at one point there and he had all of his pals in.

Q: *PSB stood for what?*

JOHNSON: By that time it was Operations Coordinating Board. The first director of the Operations Coordinating Board was a guy named Allen. Dr. Allen and then Admiral Kirk who had been our ambassador to Moscow. He succeeded him.

Q: *His son and I worked together in New Delhi. He's now an ambassador, maybe he's now a retired ambassador. The son.*

JOHNSON: Yes.

Q: *So Kirk was the second chief of the OCB.*

JOHNSON: Yes, I think as I recall that's...

Q: *Now tell me some, give me some details about the OCB, about what its function was? And maybe if you could give examples of things they did?*

JOHNSON: I think we just have to defer to the fact that all's been declassified and it's all in the public domain now. The Freedom of Information Act got all that stuff pried out. And the OCB documentation is now available.

Q: *Yes, but for the purpose of this Oral History, one or two examples...*

JOHNSON: Most of my experience in the OCB at that time was keeping up on the nuts and bolts. We had working groups. In fact the only things that I was not involved in were the working groups, except to keep track of them and make sure they were meeting. The OCB was also the same kind of detailed planning that PSB used to do. They had a working group on practically every major issue. Some of them were standing groups and some of them were ad hoc.

Q: *Why did Kennedy, or his people I suppose, abolish the OCB?*

JOHNSON: They thought that there was just too much machinery. We had something like, I don't know, 50 working groups at one point. An awful lot of working groups, just too much; he just thought, let's clean all this junk out. Kennedy abolished the OCB, the OCB staff, a lot of which was absorbed into the NSC.

Q: *But this function Chuck, what I'm trying to get at is as one who was on the fringes, as I understood it the National Security Council would help the President decide on a policy and then he would say this was it. Then the question was how was that policy going to be implemented? Who saw to it that that policy was carried out once the President made his decision?*

JOHNSON: Well that was the theory of the OCB. The OCB was composed of Under Secretaries of State, and here's the last meeting of the OCB of the Pentagon January 19, 1961 after it had been abolished by Kennedy, and on the back of it you can see the names.

Q: *Why don't you read off the names.*

JOHNSON: The last meeting of the OCB, held at the Pentagon, January 19, 1961. Riddleberger representing ICA, Squitner representing Treasury, Douglas representing Defense, Livingston Merchant representing State, Gordon Gray, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, that was the second go-round, Bromley K. Smith who was the Executive Officer, I was his Deputy. Bromley Smith was a graduate of the State Department. He had been a Foreign Service Officer, had resigned from the Foreign Service. Allen Dulles with the CIA, Gates Defense Department, another Defense Department, Karl Harr who was the Assistant to the President for security, coordination, and Abbott Washburn representing the USIA. I don't know how Riddleberger happened to represent ICA, well, I guess ICA was then a part of State.

Q: *No. Riddleberger was the head of ICA.*

JOHNSON: At that time?

Q: *Yes. He was my big boss. Well now looking back on it, do you think it was a good idea to abolish OCB?*

JOHNSON: I think so. I think that a lot of the planning after a while became sort of pro forma and I think the boys in the back room are still making the major decisions.

Q: *Well what about this function, Chuck, of seeing to it that the President's directives were being implemented. Quite aside from all these study groups.*

JOHNSON: I think that again it all comes down to the question of the relationship between the President and his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. If he's got somebody who has the sources of intelligence and the information and the facts so that he can find out what's on the back channels just as well as what is being formally reported and can tell the President about it, then I think the thing will work. But if the President is being shielded from the facts as I think, I hate to say this but I think that Walt Rostow shielded Johnson from the facts on what was going on in Vietnam to a large extent. I think Walt was an old warrior who was refusing to face the facts. I think when Bundy left, I think Bundy had decided that the jig was up as far as Vietnam was concerned. He didn't want to be part of hanging around.

Q: *When the Operations Coordinations Board was abolished you stayed on with the NSC?*

JOHNSON: Yes. I stayed on as the administrative officer for the NSC but also they moved me over into substantive areas. I got out of the administrative side of it pretty quick. I knew people there and they wanted me to do some of this. I ended up doing really sort of a utility infielder for Bundy and the NSC. Since then I've learned that under Nixon

and other Presidents there have been about five guys doing the same kind of stuff that I did by myself. I didn't do anything in depth, because that wasn't my job. I was trying to stay above it and keep on moving the stuff up to Bundy but I can give you an idea on the kind of substance. Robert Gray who was secretary to the Cabinet in Dec. 2, 1958 put out a memorandum called the Directory of Special Assistants for Cabinet Coordination and that was an implementation of a cabinet aide memoir August 13, 1954, and it lists special assistants. As he said, the attention of all recipients is called to the fact that this group of officers exists to facilitate a staff capacity in any department White House or interdepartmental transactions deserving attention at the cabinet level and by using this staff system fully at the time of cabinet officers personally as save that those assurance that those officers will be notified...blah blah blah, so on. I think Bradley Patterson has written a book in which he'd described this whole operation. I only mentioned the fact that was one of my assignments on the NSC.

Q: *But this was '54?*

JOHNSON: This was '54.

Q: *And this went on quite a while?*

JOHNSON: When I was the staff contact point for the Operations Coordinating Board I was listed as the Executive Assistant. At that time we had been moved over into the Executive Office Building so I'm listed here in September. That was one of the assignments, that was a weekly meeting that I attended. What happened there was a meeting that took place every time there was a meeting of the Cabinet. Then Robert Gray would have a meeting of the Cabinet assistants that afternoon or following on the Cabinet meeting in which Robert Gray would brief us on what decisions had been made in the President's Cabinet and so that we would be informed and be able to help our principles in getting whatever implementation action was necessary. So that practically if our boss is asleep at the time that the President said, let's do it that way, or forgot to make a note, there we would have it, so we would be able to say, well boss here's...you're supposed to do this, and this and this.

Q: *Now how long was that in existence, that organization?*

JOHNSON: I think probably until Kennedy came in, I'm not sure. I think you'll have to go to Brad Patterson's book because he'd written this up at some length.

Q: *Sounds like a very good idea.*

JOHNSON: It was a very good idea. Good piece of machinery. Then there was something called the Marine Sciences Council which was set up with Hubert Humphrey as the head of it. This was under Kennedy.

Q: *Under Kennedy?*

JOHNSON: I can't remember if it was under Johnson or Kennedy, anyhow, this was an effort to use the council approach to bring a lot of these government agencies together that had something to do with Marine Affairs. Ship subsidies, fisheries, (unsure) law of the sea kind of thing, all of it together. I was the NSC representative on that and the Space Council was set up too. I can't remember, but it seems to me that Humphrey was the director of that too, and space included CIA, Defense, Commerce, I can't remember all of the other agencies. All had something to do with space and part of that one was an effort to preserve the secrecy of our satellite system, our reconnaissance satellites. The CIA was very jittery about that. There were a lot of things being done to provide cover for the CIA's program and some of that's pretty vague in my mind at this point. There was another thing where I had some responsibility, I was liaison with NSC to the Atomic Energy Commission and I used to go over and sit down with some of those guys, with the Atomic Energy Commission, but also I attended sessions of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in Congress which is a Senate-Congressional Joint Committee. A very important Joint Committee. They actually in many ways ran the nuclear...

Q: *Under my Senator Clinton B. Anderson. Anderson was a powerhouse.*

JOHNSON: The guy from California was the congressman. He was also the powerhouse on that one and the staff director for that. Really he had as much power as the members of the Atomic Energy Commission did. But Seaborg, when they cracked the whip, Seaborg jumped. So I had a lot to do on nuclear energy stuff. In that connection I was tied in fairly closely with Spurgeon Keeny who was then on the staff of the President's committee on PSACT, President's Science Advisory Committee. President's Science Advisor, Staff of the President's Science Advisor and we worked on a number of nuclear projects but one of the things we were very successful in knocking in the head was nuclear propulsion of airplanes which CIA and Defense were working on. That really was a terrible waste of money and talent and a dangerous kind of thing. There was a fellow in the Atomic Energy Commission who was determined we were going to dig another canal in Nicaragua using bombs and we had an awful time on that one. But I think we were able to put the lid on that one. On the nuclear weapons, I had something to do with that one. I was working with the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on nuclear weapons, because the President at one point, this was Johnson, wanted to know where the hell are these things and how many of them do we have? Which was a good question. Defense had no system for getting that information regularly. It took us all of six months working very closely with those guys over there and, of course, they had to work then with the Armed Services, and Armed Services were very reluctant and they were hard to handle on this. Defense had to really crack the whip on them, and the President had to get hard. So we finally got a system set up and I developed this. Actually this was one of my real accomplishments in life. This system was set up, whereby the President was informed regularly, I think on a monthly basis of how many we had, where they were, what the types were, what were in storage in the United States, what would be reprocessed, what was en route and so forth, how many were at sea, in the hands of the Army and so forth. Whether they were strategic

and tactical. So the President could see the whole thing. They'd never had that before. Never. The Secretary of Defense didn't have it.

Q: *And you know a lot of the campaign between Kennedy and Nixon was based on the Missile Gap, which didn't exist. We were way ahead of the Russians. We had no problem with that.*

JOHNSON: Didn't exist at all. Well I mentioned some of these things. You can see some of these things now have been occupying the services of several of the senior officers in the NSC. Because what happened under Nixon was the NSC became a rival State Department and just ballooned out of all proportion.

Q: *Under Kissinger?*

JOHNSON: Yes. The NSC staff really under Eisenhower was concentrated. We were not trying to make policy we were just trying to make sure that the President was informed and got the stuff. I think what we were trying to carry out and really truly implement the act and the idea. NSC now has it's own spokesman, it's own press officer. That's completely inconsistent with the concept. The NSC shouldn't, I mean Bundy used to have some off-the-record discussions with members of the press, but the idea that the special assistant to the National Security Affairs should hold press conferences is wrong.

Q: *That's a long way from a passion for anonymity.*

JOHNSON: It's terrible. I mean it's completely inconsistent and then that's when I reached the conclusion some time ago that nothing can be saved from the President's director. The whole thing's got to be abolished.

Q: *Really?*

JOHNSON: We've got to start all over again. We've got to abolish the NSC as such. Expand the White House staff in some way or another, but abolish the NSC because it's just a temptation to people like Kissinger and Brzezinski and the others to become rivals of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, to second guess them on major foreign policy on defense. Instead of holding the Secretaries of State and Defense responsible they give them an out so that they can weasel out of something and say, "NSC did that and I didn't know about it."

Q: *Which I guess was the thinking that was behind Kennedy's wanting to put the responsibility right on the secretaries rather than with an implementing mechanism between the NSC and the departments.*

JOHNSON: Yes, I think so.

Q: *It probably wasn't a bad idea.*

JOHNSON: Just to complete a round-up of the kind of things I did. I, incidentally, had to keep an eye out on the Trust Territory of the Pacific. That was my only territorial assignment in the NSC. All the rest of the guys had France or Germany. I had the Trust Territory of the Pacific which included the Marianas and Palau and Ponape and so forth. So I went out there at one point as Kennedy's representative to deliver a speech at the inauguration of the first native born Governor of Guam, Manual Gerrero and I wrote the speech and went out there and delivered it. They made me an honorary Chomoro which is a native of Guam and that gave me an opportunity to go up to Tinian, to Kenya(?) and the other islands up there and take a look at what was going on there. I found that half the territory of the island is off limits to the natives because they had so much unexploded ammunition there. The worst thing was the Japanese ammunition dump in the north end of the big island, and when we captured the island we also put a big ammunition dump there ourselves. At the end of the war there was a Marine General in charge there who was given orders to stand down, and he thought the easiest way of getting rid of this dump was to fill it up, which he did, with the result that he blew live shells all over this northern half of the island. Well the young people were going around picking up this brass stuff and getting themselves all blown apart and they had a hell of a time. The Interior Department had responsibility over the island, and I worked hard to get the Defense Department and the Navy Department to accept the responsibility for cleaning up that thing. We could never get the President to really bear down on them. What was behind it actually was they wanted to hang on to the Trust Territories for strategic reasons. They didn't want to give up the U.N. mandate for military reasons. Part of the Trust Area subsequently, as you know, is split apart now so that part of it is independent and part of it is, I don't know, quite the same. I don't know quite how that works. I see that they are now talking about trying to close down the bases in Guam. It's probably justified from the bottom line point of view. That would be too bad since Guam's entire economy is tied to the military there. The military presence is 95% of their economy.

Q: *Some of the people in Guam really want it done though.*

JOHNSON: Well, they do, and they don't necessarily. They're like Puerto Rico: they'd like to have their cake and eat it.

Q: *They want us out of Okinawa and that would ruin Okinawa's economy.*

JOHNSON: That wouldn't be the same in Okinawa, I don't think.

Q: *No?*

JOHNSON: No, the Japanese would take care of Okinawa. You know Okinawa as far as Japan's concerned has always been like the Okies, they've never thought of Okinawa as being truly Japanese. They've always been a source of cheap labor and the Mariana's under the Japanese were very productive. Sugar producing, but the labor was all Okinawan and when we were about to seize the main island they took their kids and their

wives and jumped off the cliff. Mass suicide. Oh, 6, 7 hundred of them. They were told by the Japanese... The Japanese actually had a little narrow gage speed railroad, they ran around there servicing the sugar plantations. I saw pictures of the way it looked before the war; it was beautifully manicured, completely under the thumb of the Japanese.

Q: *So these were your major responsibilities when you were with NSC and you retired when Chuck?*

JOHNSON: When Nixon came in. Haig was then a colonel, a chicken colonel. He was brought over by Henry Kissinger. I must say that Henry Kissinger... We had known Henry Kissinger under the Kennedy administration as a Professor from Harvard and he was very close to Nelson Rockefeller and the Kennedy administration was cultivating Nelson, and they were being very nice to anybody who was close to Nelson, so, therefore, we had to put up with Henry. So Henry was, of course, a colleague of Bundy's from Harvard. About every month or 6 weeks Henry would come down with another paper he had written on some issue in which he was going to pontificate. We would sit in the staff room, situation room as it's called, and listen to Henry read the paper, at the end of which Mac would say, "Very interesting Henry, thank you very much." Then Henry would get up and go out and we would go about our business. Well, Henry was mad as hell, obviously he must have been seething that we were not taking him seriously.

Q: *Well he got his chance.*

JOHNSON: And also I think that...

Q: *So we're coming at the beginning of the Nixon administration and you say Kissinger brought in Al Haig.*

JOHNSON: Yes, Al Haig had been his assistant in the Pentagon when Kissinger had some kind of assignment over in the Pentagon, I don't know what that was. But he brought Al Haig over and Al Haig was his hatchet man. Al Haig was the one who came around right after, well it was a day after Inauguration, telling those of us who had reemployment rights who were on assignment from State or Defense or CIA to go on back home. The others of us who had been around, I had been there so long, I'd been there 17 years, had lost reemployment rights in the State Department. They'd asked me to give them up actually, so they'd said, well, take an early retirement, which I did. It worked out fine for me. I retired in 1970 and took up my next career. So that was my...I think that that was a good thing that happened to me because I think I'd been in the NSC too long and as I remember saying to somebody, if you sit on the point of a needle long enough you no longer feel it, and I think that that's true. You live in an atmosphere of major issues all the time, you become bored.

Q: *Yes, bored and calloused perhaps.*

JOHNSON: Yes, exactly, you forget really how important the stuff is that you're dealing with.

Q: *Let me ask you Chuck too then...*

JOHNSON: It's not a form of burn out, it's a form of unknown callousing, of getting calloused, I guess.
Q: *Let me ask what do you think is the proper relationship between the NSC and the State Department?*

JOHNSON: I don't think you can isolate that from the larger question, what does the President want, and what does he need. Every President comes in with a different background and different information and a different attitude. If he's the man that thinks the State Department is a bunch of cookie pushers, he's going to avoid them. He'll avoid them and he'll create some other mechanism of his own. Also I think a lot of it depends on the President's concept of foreign affairs and what foreign affairs are all about, and I think also the country's feelings about it. I think that, oh, in the early federal period we could draw a pretty sharp line between foreign affairs and domestic affairs, but they're so absolutely interwoven now that the President's going to have to have some concept of how to handle his foreign affairs. If he feels that say the Council of Economic Advisors is more important than the State Department, we're going to have one kind of administration. If he thinks that the State Department is being just sort of a post office for how to deal with other countries and that's sort of obsolete anyhow, because why don't we just get on the telephone, why do we need ambassadors, much easier to just get on the telephone and talk to John Major at 10 Downing Street. We don't have to go through all of the formalities of the Vienna Convention which were developing a connection with sailing ships, no direct personal contact and also that diplomacy was intercourse among gentlemen.

Q: *Yes, and gentlemen didn't read each other's mail.*

JOHNSON: Right. Coolidge wasn't it? It wasn't Coolidge, it was Kellogg?

Q: *Maybe it was Kellogg.*

JOHNSON: Well, anyhow, it was fun in the State Department, Secretaries of State.

Q: *Hull, it was Hull.*

JOHNSON: You're right it was Hull.

Q: *Well, you've had a fascinating career Chuck, it was very good.*

JOHNSON: I was hoping that Al Gore's reinventing government would have dealt a little bit more with how to reimplement foreign affairs, foreign policy. It really didn't get into it.

Q: *Well maybe if he's reelected maybe they will.*

End of interview