September 1984 -- Going Nowhere

If anyone had asked for a description of U.S.-Mongolian relations in the fall of 1984, "going nowhere" would have been the words most likely to spring to mind. After decades of sporadic contact, and having tried and failed to normalize relations during the early 1970's, things were at a standstill. Like a jeep in the Gobi with four flat tires, things were not looking very hopeful at all.

Consider this: We had not had a single American diplomat received officially at the Foreign Ministry in Ulaanbaatar since Vice President Henry Wallace made his ill-starred visit to Mongolia in July 1944. (With regard to Henry Wallace: He actually spent the 4th of July 1944 in Mongolia. His trip to the Far East coincided with efforts by the Democratic Party leadership who wanted to replace him with Harry Truman on the 1944 Democratic presidential ticket. By the summer of that year, insiders could see that Roosevelt was unlikely to serve out his fourth term in office, and the party leaders considered Wallace far too liberal for their liking. Fifty years later, I arranged a photo exhibit of his visit, and was able to track down a Mongolian official who had participated in it. He recalled for me how on the morning of the Fourth of July 1944, a patriotic officer in Wallace's party had fired off his pistol in celebration of the day; for a few very tense minutes, the Mongolians had thought the VIP camp was under attack.)

In September 1984, while serving at the American Embassy in Beijing, I happened to look through our Embassy background material, wondering when the last trip to Mongolia had taken place. As far as I could determine, no officer from Beijing had visited Ulaanbaatar for years. A few may have transited the Mongolian capital on the Trans-Siberian railroad, but that was the size of it.

As it happened, the newly-arrived Political Counselor at the Embassy -- Darryl Johnson, who later served as U.S. Ambassador to Lithuania and Thailand -- had visited Ulaanbaatar from Moscow a number of years before. He had been received by officials at the Mongolia Academy of Sciences, but not at the Foreign Ministry. Furthermore, Darryl told me that he thought nobody else had traveled there from Moscow since then.
I asked him if it would be alright if I approached the Mongolian Embassy in Beijing, which was located only a few blocks from our own Chancery, to see if I could make a visit. If the answer was "no," so be it, and I would not bother him (or them) about it again. The Office of China and Mongolia Affairs at the State Department was duly consulted on the matter, and I have to say that the approval that I received was tepid at best. The China Desk's position might best be summed up like this: "We've been waiting for a response from Mongolia for years; if they want to move, it's up to them to send us a signal." There is no need to exaggerate the point -- there was just not a whole lot of interest in what I had proposed.

Tepid or not, the Department's approval was good enough for me. I got on my bicycle and pedaled the few short blocks to the Mongolian Embassy. I parked my bike, and presented my passport and my diplomatic card to the rather startled clerk at the entrance, explaining that I was an American diplomat who wished to apply for a visa to go visit his country. I got a "Please wait a few minutes" response, and the official disappeared. So I waited, and when the receptionist returned, it was to tell me that I would have to travel to Mongolia "as a tourist." I said that was perfectly all right with me, did the paperwork and left.

When I returned to pick up the passport, though, the visa was very clearly marked "Diplomat" in big Cyrillic letters. I thought that was fine too, got my tickets for the Trans-Siberian train, bought a couple of bags or boxes of vegetables to share with Japanese and British diplomats in Ulaanbaatar, and left Beijing at 7:40 AM on the morning of September 19, 1984. That notation was one of the first in the journal I kept of my trip; it has survived umpteen Foreign Service moves and is still with me.

Looking Out -- and Looking Back

I don't know whether it still does, but at that time the Trans-Siberian actually went under the Great Wall of China near Badaling, and then moved slowly across the yellow-brown landscape of northern China. I had never had a chance to see this landscape close-up from a train, and I was fascinated from the very start. It came as a huge surprise to me that earthen watch towers and stretches of wall much older than the Ming Dynasty Great Wall near Beijing could easily be seen all along the way.

Fascination is one thing, but the international situation and context is quite another. I therefore think it useful to look back very briefly to consider what was happening around that time. Relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were not exactly warm. The Carter administration had been replaced in January 1981 by a Reagan administration that had embarked on a much tougher policy in dealing with the Soviet Union. By the fall of 1984, we were busy challenging the Soviets on at least three important fronts -- in Afghanistan, in Angola, and in Central America. We had put Pershing 2 missiles in Western Europe to counter the Soviet SS-20s. U.S. defense spending had been ratcheted upwards. Relations with China were as warm as they had ever been. Thousands of Chinese students were flocking to U.S. universities, and tens of thousands of American
tourists had rushed to "discover" China. Presidential elections were under way in the United States, but by late September 1984, it was clear that Ronald Reagan would win a second term as President, too.

For Mongolia, it could not have been the easiest of times. It was still the only country in the world completely surrounded by nuclear-weapons states. Ulaanbaatar was the only capital city in East Asia that could not be reached by regular air service from any other capital in East Asia. (And if one rules out flights from Irkutsk to Ulaanbaatar, there was no regular air service to Mongolia from anywhere in Asia. Not from China. Not from Japan. Not from Korea.) Which explains why I was sitting on the Trans-Siberian train.

The train reached the China-Mongolia border just before 9:00 PM, the entire train's wheels were changed from the narrower Chinese gauge to the wider Soviet/Mongolian one and the Chinese restaurant car was replaced with a Mongolian one, and we crept across the border to Zamiin Uud for another stop, where I was stamped into Mongolia just after midnight on September 20. Just after dawn that morning, we stopped at the town of Sainshand, and I still can remember how crisp and clear the air was in comparison to Beijing's. In my journal, I also noted "Goats running wild right across from the train platform."

Talking About Relations

The Mongolia that I visited in 1984 still had 50,000 Soviet troops posted there, scattered at bases all around the country. We took it for granted that the Soviet air bases dotting the countryside had nuclear weapons on them. One of these bases was easily visible from the train as we neared Ulaanbaatar; the combat aircraft could be seen by anyone who glanced out the window, as they were parked in and around the huge concrete bunkers at the edge of the base's runway. That too offered a sobering thought about where I was.

I was met at the Ulaanbaatar train station by a Zhuulchin travel guide, and after reaching the venerable Ulaanbaatar Hotel at the edge of Sukhbaatar Square at the center of the city, I swiftly made arrangements to deliver the rather wilted boxes of vegetables that I had brought for the British and Japanese Embassies. (My journal notes that the broccoli was looking rather the worse for wear upon delivery.) When my Zhuulchin guide asked what I would like to see during my visit, my journal records "Made request to see people at factories, schools, Academy of Sciences, and Foreign Affairs Ministry." The theory, I suppose, is that there is no harm in asking; I certainly was not demanding to see any of these. Nobody in the Department was insisting on this, either. My journal records the following: The Zhuulchin guide asked "what subjects I would raise," and my reply: "Mongolia's foreign policy, and particularly its relations with [its] two neighbors, the Soviet Union and China." Again, I suppose there is no harm in stating the obvious.

Let me now jump forward a few days, during which time I traveled by plane down to the Gobi Desert, where I actually bought a camel saddle (for hard currency) from an amazed but nevertheless hard-bargaining Mongolia camel herder.
On September 25, I was told that it "might be possible" for a meeting to take place at the Foreign Ministry. That was not exactly a commitment, so I continued with the planned visit to Karakorum. I reached Karakorum all right, but bad weather made it impossible to fly back, so I had to make a jolting nine-hour jeep ride back to Ulaanbaatar on September 27. My journal records that the following morning, on September 28 at 9:05 AM, I was told that I would have a meeting at the Foreign Ministry at 10:00, so I walked across the street from my hotel to the appointment. I had no briefing books, no Department-supplied talking points, but a good deal of curiosity.

At the Foreign Ministry, I was ushered into a meeting room, and received by First Secretary J. Choinkhor. I noted in my journal that "He came equipped with a stack of briefing books and a couple of gift books on Mongolia, and he had obviously been preparing to talk about the agenda items I had suggested before." He outlined Mongolian Foreign policy with some detail -- all recorded in my journal. He was very thorough, professional, and precise. (Quite a few years later over dinner, when we were recalling our first meeting, he told me that his meeting with me had been approved "by the Central Committee.")

My journal records the following from near the end of that meeting:

"At the very end of the conversation, he asked about the American position on [bilateral] relations. I told him I had no instructions on this, but would be happy to convey any message or points that he might wish to give. He said he had none to give me, but then pulled out the December 1983 Background Notes on Mongolia and asked about the statement that the U.S. has never recognized Mongolia 'as an independent state' or the status of the Mongolian People's Republic. He said they had gotten the Background Notes from the United Nations library or information service. I told him that the Notes should be read to mean what they say, no more no less. He focused on the independent state language, and my guess was fishing to see if we were giving support [to] the putative Chinese claims to sovereignty over Mongolia, and also to see if there was any other message I could give him. He didn't get it, but I did tell him not to take the words and make more of them than they were. I also thanked him for his time (1 1/4 hours) and for the hospitality shown me in Mongolia. ... They saw me to the door, and another very curious Western official emerged about then, and watched as we shook hands and I went out the door. I walked over to the hotel, settled my bill, and headed out the door for the train station, with only about 10 minutes to train time."

It was an exciting and fascinating trip for me, and I dutifully reported on my trip as well as the meeting at the Foreign Ministry. The State Department did not send us instructions to follow up on the trip or probe more deeply with regard to diplomatic relations. I had traveled to Mongolia, been received at the Foreign Ministry, but that was that. Life returned to its normal rhythms. (It was only much later that I could establish that I was the first U.S. diplomat to be formally received at Mongolia's Foreign Ministry since the 1944 visit by Vice President Henry Wallace.)
The trip had taken place at my initiative, but a year later, in the fall of 1985, it seemed that pretty much nothing had changed as a result.

The "Big Veto" is Lifted

And yet, even if we did not know it, things were about to happen. American diplomats had long assumed that the silence from Mongolia -- and our inability to move beyond inconsequential contacts -- was the result of strong opposition from the Soviet Union. That opposition was made abundantly clear many years later in a memoir published by a senior Mongolian diplomat, D. Yondon. (D. Yondon, The Big Veto, English manuscript translated in 1997. Published by Monsudar Publishing, Ulaanbaatar in Mongolian in 2007.) Recalling a 1976 meeting with the Mongolian Foreign Minister, Yondon quotes Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko as follows:

"As far as I remember we touched this issue a year ago. We stated our position at the meeting between Tsedenbal and Brezhnev and this position has not been altered. It is extremely complicated to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. Do you expect to develop cooperation with the U.S. in particular fields? To my mind their plans are quite different. They wish to have an intelligence site in Mongolia. You will gain nothing by establishing these relations and more likely you'll get problems. Therefore there is no need to hurry with this."

No visit by an American Embassy First Secretary to Ulaanbaatar in September 1984 was going to get around that objection. And indeed it did not. Yondon states categorically that it was not until January 1986 that things changed. According to his account, it came during a January 24, 1986 meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Mongolian leader Batmunkh. According to Yondon's account, Shevardnadze took the initiative to say:

"I think the time for reviewing the matter and making it clear has come. We understand our Mongolian friends' concern on this matter. Our position we adhered to all these years was right. However, it seems not to fit the current time. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. has reviewed the matter and believes the matter should be reconsidered from these new points of view. The establishment of relations with the U.S.A. will correspond with our common interests. ... Relations with the U.S.A. can happen and must be established."

It was, as Yondon says, "the answer we had awaited for thirteen years." As far as I can tell, however, we in the United States knew nothing about it. Not even a glimmer.

The Tokyo Angle

At this juncture, I find that I face the painful duty to refute the inaccurate -- indeed, utterly preposterous -- claims by a former American official about her role in the process
leading to normalization. Put quite simply, this official claims that she was engaged in secret negotiations with a Mongolian Embassy official during the period of 1985-1986, having been specially picked for this task by Ambassador Mike Mansfield. The claims are made by Dr. Alicia J. Campi in a monograph titled "U.S. Embassy Tokyo Role in the Establishment of U.S.-Mongolia Relations," published in the November 2018 edition of American Diplomacy.

Dr. Campi deserves great credit and recognition for her efforts over many years on behalf of U.S.-Mongolian relations, but her claim to have played an important -- maybe even central -- role in the establishment of bilateral relations is both demonstrably inaccurate and a disservice to the historical record.

She claims that she was "assigned" by Ambassador Mike Mansfield to engage in secret negotiations with a Mongolian intelligence officer assigned to the Mongolian Embassy in Tokyo. Over and over again in her narrative she refers to "negotiations," going so far at one point to refer to them as "my negotiations." This is patently wrong. She no doubt was given permission to meet with Mr. Bold -- I take no position on that particular point -- but such diplomatic contacts are a far cry from being authorized to engage in diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the United States of America. Negotiations on behalf of the United States require approval by the Department of State, they leave a paper trail, and more than one person knows about them. Dr. Campi's failure to put forward any documentary proof to support her claims raises a very large red flag to anyone with a knowledge of the workings of the American foreign policy process.

For any experienced practitioner of U.S. diplomacy, the initial reaction to her claims is "Why?" Our Embassy in Tokyo is a very big place. It manages all aspects of an exceedingly varied and complex alliance. Why would a United States Ambassador bypass three or four levels of his large Embassy's structure -- Deputy Chief of Mission, Political Counselor, Chief of Station, Consul General -- and commission a junior officer to engage in "negotiations?" Where is the ambassadorial memorandum or Department of State instruction letter supporting this?

How would it be possible, as Dr. Campi claims, for the State Department to send her "instructions or commentary" without others in that Embassy being aware of it? The Director of the State Department's Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs at the time says he knew nothing of her activities. Why would the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs even want to? Who would have ordered that the American Embassy in Beijing be kept in the dark about these "negotiations"? Unless she is prepared to offer documentary evidence to support these claims, I am not prepared to give them credence. They simply defy belief.

Thus, her follow-on assertion that the U.S. Embassy in Beijing was watching her efforts with "growing concern" cannot be taken at face value. Neither I nor anyone else in the Political Section in Beijing knew anything about her activities in Tokyo. The United States Embassy in Beijing was not merely "technically responsible" (her words) for our dealings with Mongolia. It was responsible in fact, and the State Department internal
organization clearly reflected that reality. Her claim that "Ambassador Mansfield insisted the line of communication stay in Tokyo through me" is not supported by anything I have seen or anyone to whom I have spoken.

This is not the last of the problems. I was not "Beijing Political Section head" during this time frame. Darryl Johnson was. The claim that I "decided to go there to investigate the seriousness of the intent of the Mongols" is totally incorrect. I did not just wake up some fine morning in the spring of 1986 and run over to the Mongolian Embassy for a visa. My first trip to UB in 1984 was my initiative, but my second trip there was not. I was sent to UB in May 1986. I traveled with the full knowledge and approval of my immediate superiors and the relevant officers in the Department of State. The claim that "he did not inform me" prior to the 1986 trip is ridiculous. There was neither a requirement nor a necessity to check with her.

My May 1986 Visit to Ulaanbaatar

What generated my May visit? I had no plans for a second trip to Mongolia in the spring of 1986, but something happened in Tokyo that got Embassy Beijing involved and caused me to travel. A CIA analytical report, prepared in September 1986, says: "In April [1986], the Mongolians passed a message through the Japanese to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo expressing the 'strong hope' that relations could be normalized." Embassy Tokyo reported this to the Department of State as a possible signal from the Mongolian side. That communication reached (or was briefed to) the Office of Chinese and Mongolia Affairs.

That was where I came in again -- in late April or very early May, 1986. The China Desk told Embassy Beijing about the possible signal from Tokyo, wanting to get Embassy Beijing's reaction and comment. (My memory is that all of this consultation was handled through the Official/Informal channel through which the Embassy and the Department's China/Mongolia Desk consulted on a nearly daily basis back in those dim dark days before e-mail.) The Embassy Front Office sent this down to the Embassy Political Section for action.

I let Political Counselor Darryl Johnson know that if Washington wanted to send a positive signal, I was willing to make a second trip up to UB to give that signal. My trip was approved by the Embassy leadership and the State Department, so I pedaled back to the Mongolian Embassy to apply for another visa. This time, however, there would be no tourism, no trip to the Gobi Desert or Karakorum. I planned to call at the Foreign Ministry, visit the British and Japanese embassies, and return to Beijing on the southbound Trans-Siberian train to report.

I did not remain "in UB for one week waiting contact with the Mongols" as Alicia Campi claims. I know, because I still have my diplomatic passport from that time, and the entry and exit stamps for China are quite legible. My Diplomatic Visa for Mongolia was issued on Monday, May 5, and I entered Mongolia by train late on the night of Wednesday, May 7. I arrived in Ulaanbaatar in the late afternoon of Thursday, May 8. The Japanese
Embassy in Ulaanbaatar knew of my arrival in the Mongolian capital that afternoon -- because I called them to tell them of that fact and to deliver the box of vegetables that I had carried up from Beijing with me.

I discovered the following morning -- Friday, May 9 -- that the Foreign Ministry was closed in observance of the end of World War II. I learned this when I again walked across the street from my hotel to knock on the door of the Foreign Ministry, intending to leave my card and make known my availability for a meeting. I found the building closed tight. While I was standing there, a window in the Foreign Ministry opened and (as I now recall it these many years later), someone stuck his head out and called down to me in Russian, "Zakrit" (Closed). I went back to my hotel, thoroughly perplexed: Why would I have been issued a diplomatic visa in Beijing only to get the cold shoulder once I reached Ulaanbaatar?

I am certain that I let the Japanese Embassy know how things stood. If the Mongolian side had told me "We can't see you right now because of the holiday, but please wait until Monday or Tuesday, and we will have a chat," I could have remained in Ulaanbaatar and taken the Friday train back to Beijing. I had the flexibility to do so. But when it became clear that no message or meeting in Ulaanbaatar was going to occur, I caught the next available southbound Trans-Siberian train, which left Ulaanbaatar on Sunday, May 11 or very early on Monday, May 12. For the record, I have no memory of having met a Mr. L. Davaagiv during my 1986 visit as Dr. Campi claims, or having any substantive discussion with him at that time.

Dr. Campi's account also contradicts what Amb. Yondon says about my May visit. He claims that he was contacted by Japanese Ambassador Ota, who told him I was in Ulaanbaatar. I have no idea whether the Mongolian Foreign Ministry knew of Dr. Campi's contacts in Tokyo, but they definitely had every opportunity to know of my return visit to Mongolia. After all, I had applied for a visa in Beijing, and been granted a diplomatic visa. Such visa requests were pretty unique in 1986, and it is inconceivable that such a request would not have been reported to the Foreign Ministry.

The statement that I "believed that the information coming out of Tokyo about Mongolian interest in diplomatic relations likely was a ruse or a game being played on naive" Alicia Campi is another complete inaccuracy. Let me be clear: I was quite willing to receive and pass along to the Department any friendly signal from Mongolia. In the absence of such a signal, however, there was nothing to do except return to Beijing. I therefore caught the next available train back to Beijing, disappointed at what had apparently been a giant waste of time. On the long train ride back to Beijing, there was plenty of time for speculation: Had we misread the situation? Had the Mongolian side decided to pull back for some reason? Had the Soviets stepped in yet again to put the kibosh on further progress? Upon my return to Beijing, I reported on the failure of my efforts, and that the ball was clearly in the Mongolians' court.
That was apparently the China Desk's view of things, too. Shortly after my return, the China Desk sent a needling back-channel "Official Informal" message slugged for me. It was set to the tune of a Simon and Garfunkel song and began:

"Hello UB my old friend,
I've come to talk to you again,..."

And ended with:

The sounds of silence."

Embassy Beijing received no further instructions from the State Department for follow-up with the Mongolians prior to my departure that summer. Nevertheless, I believe hindsight allows me to conclude several things regarding the state of play as of May 1986. First, the Mongolian side was not yet ready to move on relations with the United States at that time. Second, the Mongolian side knew that the door to diplomatic relations with the United States was open. And third, they did not act until they reached an internal consensus and double-checked with the Soviets to make certain that the green light they had received from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in January remained in effect.

I left Beijing that summer, went on to another foreign assignment, and I heard nothing more about my trip or relations with Mongolia until the following January of 1987, when Washington and Ulaanbaatar made the joint announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations. But I offer this summary of subsequent developments: During the summer and fall of 1986, contacts shifted to New York. My understanding is that senior Chinese officials (and possibly Japanese and others) urged very senior American officials to make another effort that summer. In August 1986 U.N. Ambassador Vernon Walters was instructed by the State Department to make yet another approach to the Mongolian side. He did so in a meeting with Mongolian U.N. Ambassador Nyamdoo. This time, the Mongolian side was ready to move, and things proceeded from there.

Final Thoughts

I believe that a couple of points are in order here. First, with regard to the writing of history. I am quite prepared to admit that my own role in the normalization of U.S.-Mongolian relations was quite modest, but it was also real. That is why I react so strongly to claims that I find both immodest and unsubstantiated.

Second, and far more important, is my belief that what came after normalization is far more significant than arguing over shreds of credit for bringing it about. The work of people like Amb. Joe Lake, our first resident Ambassador in Ulaanbaatar and the man who helped Mongolia navigate its first steps in the democratization process, comes quite readily to mind. Even more important was the interest that Secretary of State James Baker showed in Mongolia before and after his service as Secretary. Secretary Baker's interest was key to obtaining the United States' support as well as assistance from other
countries in the critical early years of Mongolia's democratic transition. He came back to Mongolia in the summer of 1996, traveled around the country to monitor national elections, and was able to tell the stunned losing party in those elections how to accept defeat graciously.

It would also be ungracious and inaccurate to fail to mention the work of a number of far-sighted Mongolian diplomats. They understood the constraints imposed upon them by geography and politics, but they always kept looking for opportunities to expand Mongolia's contacts and enhance their country's standing in the world. Diplomats such as Nyamdo, Yondon, and Choinkhor and others all worked tirelessly on their country's behalf, and all deserve recognition.

The list could go on, but I will not. For my part, I know that I was immensely fortunate to have had the chance to visit Mongolia before and after establishment of diplomatic relations. It was also my honor to follow Amb. Lake as the second resident U.S. Ambassador in Mongolia. Mongolians attach great significance to karma and numbers, especially the number 9. Almost exactly nine years after I met Choinkhor for the first time in Ulaanbaatar, I presented my credentials as U.S. Ambassador to Mongolia. In retrospect, the fact that I became Ambassador to his country, and he became Mongolia's Ambassador to the United States, seems both amazing and immensely auspicious.

*End of Memoir*

Donald C. Johnson served as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer for over 34 years (1974-2008), and held three ambassadorial assignments, the first of which was to Mongolia from 1993 to 1996. Besides his ambassadorial assignments, he served on the National Security Council staff at the White House, as Head of Mission for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Moldova and as the U.S. Commissioner on the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning in the Irish peace process.

**Addenda**

Images and their captions below were provided to Ambassador Donald C. Johnson in 1994 by the Mongolian National Archives, for use in a U.S. Embassy exhibition commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Wallace visit.
Saying farewell to Vice President Henry Wallace at the airport. From right to left: Vice President Wallace, Professor Owen Lattimore, Minister of Internal Affairs, Marshall Choibalsan, press representative Ts. Damdinsuren.

The American delegates talking with Mongolian officials at the Nuhtyn Am Residence.

Америкийн толгойд Нухтэн амны байрынхан дорох Монголын албани хямарттай ярдчал буй нь.
Saying farewell to the American delegates. From right to left: Ambassador Ivanov, Vice President Henry Wallace, Marshall Choibalsan, Luvshin.

Upon their arrival at the airport, the American delegates are taken to a special tent to have airag. From right to left: Yu. Tsedenbal, John hazard, John Carter Vincent, Owen Lattimore, Vice President Henry Wallace, Marshall Choibalsan, Ambassador Ivanov from USSR.

Америккийн төлөөлөгчийн угтаж азав, тусгай балдарын хошуу, ооруу ж их байгаа бай.

Баруун гарваа: Ю. Цэдэнбал, Жон Хазард, Жон Картэрг Винспит, Овен Латимор, Дамба, Лод Ерөнхийлөгч Х. Улдас, Маршал Чойбалсан, ЗХУ-ын Захин сайд Иванов, пар сүүлдэг байна.
Mr. Wallace coming out of the residence wearing a deel, hat and boots that had been presented to him.

Ноён Уолкэс, түүнэ багтгагсэн Монгол дээд, мэгдэл, гутгийн омогч. Нүхэн аманд байрлах байсан оргонноосоо гүрч нэр байгаа б.
Mongolian and American flags in front of the Nuhtyn Am Residence.

АНУ-ын толондохдуйгийн бусад Nuhtyn Амд нь оролтын явдлын өмнө байгууллагын хойр орны төрөлдөг.