The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

BETTY JANE JONES

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: March 8, 1993
Copyright 1998 ADST

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background
Born and raised in Wisconsin
Beloit College, American University
Internship, Department of State, International Organizations
Entered the Foreign Service in 1954

Venice, Italy 1954-1957
Vice Consul

Berlin, Germany 1957-1962
Visa/Economic Officer
Berlin Wall
U.S. support

Palermo, Italy 1962-1964
Consular Officer
Mafia

International Organizations 1964-1971
UN Political Affairs
China issue
Arab-Israel issue
Soviets
UN General Assembly

Calcutta, India 1971-1973
Economic Officer
India-Pakistan issue

Jerusalem 1973-1976
Deputy Consul General
Relations with Tel Aviv Embassy
**INTERVIEW**

Q: *This is an interview with Betty Jane Jones on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies, and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Betty, I wonder if you could give me a little about your background, when and where you grew up, and about your education and all that?*

JONES: Well, I was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and grew up in a suburb of Milwaukee, Shorewood, went through the schools there which happened to be a very good system. I graduated from Beloit College, Beloit, Wisconsin.

Q: *At Beloit, what courses were you in? What was the general thrust of your courses?*

JONES: I majored in government. I had started out with the intention of becoming a chemist, but I became very interested in international relations, and I switched my major and instead graduated in government. During my senior year, I applied for a so-called internship under the National Institute of Public Affairs which was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation at the time, and I won the internship and came to Washington as an unpaid intern in the government. I spent all but the first two and a half months while I was being security cleared in the State Department as a regular full-time employee although I didn't get any pay. I spent five months in what is now the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs, and following internship, they were able to...

Q: *This was when?*
JONES: That was '46, '47. I graduated from Beloit in 1946. I also took during that period a few graduate courses at American University, but I never worked for a degree. The State Department saw fit to hire me on a thirty-day temporary job, subsequently, a ninety-day temporary job, and then ultimately on an indefinite appointment. It was during this time that they were beginning to reestablish the civil service registers for appointments which had been more or less discarded during the war when we needed employees and hired without that system. So I began taking every exam that came along that would give me civil service status in the government and I eventually was hired off the clerk register. I did get an appointment out of that and I worked in what is now the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. It had a different name at the time. I had a clerical level job and then gradually worked up to the professional level. During one of the later RIFs, I was RIFed into the...

Q: RIF is a reduction in force?

JONES: That's right. During one of the budget cuts, I was RIFed, so-called, into the International Educational Exchange Program, which was then in the State Department and has since been moved to the USIA. While I was there, the Wriston program was introduced.

Q: About 1954, '55ish?

JONES: Right. I was at a level at which you had to take the written exam in order to qualify, which I did with great trepidation since I'd been out of college for some years, and I didn't really study much for it. But I squeaked through and was awaiting my oral exam when they called me up one day and said: "Can you have a medical and be prepared to be appointed?" So I did that, and my oral exam was canceled and I was sworn into the Foreign Service in the first group of officers under the Wriston program. There were two women and I think nine or ten men. I've forgotten now.

Q: I'd like to go back, before you do that. When you were in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, what was the concentration of interests there at that time?

JONES: Well, it was of course in the early days of the UN, and except in the Bureau, there was very little expertise in that area. I was not at a professional level during those early days, but I was very interested in the political side of things. I did serve on a delegation to the General Assembly in the early days when they were at Lake Success and Flushing Meadow. As a reporting officer, I covered the Third Committee on Social and Humanitarian Affairs when Mrs. Roosevelt was our representative. That was very interesting because we had these long drives back and forth to Lake Success from Manhattan and I often rode in the same car with her. On one occasion, she had everybody out to Hyde Park for a luncheon that was for me, particularly in my young naive days, very exciting.
Q: Oh yes. What was the impression of the people who were dealing with the United Nations affairs in the Department? You must have been picking up...

JONES: There was great hope, of course, for the future of the organization and what it could do, and I think in the country also at that time. The disillusionment came later. The Soviets were, of course, almost from the outset making things difficult, but there was still a great deal of enthusiasm at that stage. I can't recall the timing exactly, but of course there was the famous Soviet walk-out...

Q: That would be during the...about 1950, because they were out when the Korean war came which started in June of 1950.

JONES: Yes. I remember at the time of the Korean war, that those of us in that Bureau were very pleased that the UN was able to do something and that President Truman did make the decision to act in that case and send troops. We obviously from the beginning were a very key member of the organization and I think through the years have remained an indispensable supporter of the organization in our efforts to make it work.

Q: When you rose to the professional level, were you still in that Bureau?

JONES: Yes, I was. But I was a junior professional officer for, oh I don't know, two or three years before I moved into the International Exchange field.

Q: What were you dealing with?

JONES: I was what they called the Policy Reports Officer for a while which was a group which, geographic bureaus and our bureau, took the cables and other information, in the morning, and summarized it into a kind of digest, which was distributed to the top levels. Then we also got together later in the morning and talked things over and decided what items we perhaps should send out to various other posts which hadn't received the information. So that kept me in touch with, you know, the main events that were of concern to the Department. Then later on I was involved with the program. There was a great deal of criticism of communists in the UN Secretariat and in Secretariats of other international organizations, and in order to combat this, we worked out agreements with various (I mean American communists) organizations including the UN but also with the other specialized agencies, etc. whereby we would do a security clearance on American applicants for employment, and also those who were already on the rolls at the time. That was a fairly big operation at the beginning because you had all the people who were already on the rolls. So there was a very small staff, two or three of us who handled that in the Department. That's where I was working at the time I moved. That was not the happiest sort of job to have. It had a number of sort of sticky problems.

Q: What sort of problems?
JONES: There were a lot of short term meetings that came up. There was a seminar, for instance. They were going to invite a number of people to attend, and it was decided some of those things fell under this executive order and would have to be covered. Well, the security clearances sometime took too long so that they couldn't be completed before the event took place. So, we had to try and figure out how to deal with that and whether to exempt some of these things. Also for short term contract employees and so forth and so on. Of course, there were some people who just resented having to fill out lots of forms and get fingerprinted, and all that kind of thing. They were working for an international organization. That eventually sifted down. I don't frankly know whether it's still in operation or not. It was during that period when McCarthyism was strong and there was a scare about subversives, etc.

Q: What sort of thing were you doing in the exchange program? What were you dealing with?

JONES: I worked initially on the college-level exchange and dealt with a few countries in the Middle East, but that was kind of a paper pushing operation. Then the bulk of my time. I worked on what was called the German teenager program which brought German teenagers to this country to attend high school for a year and live with an American family. There were several organizations which the State Department contracted with to handle these. We dealt with them in arranging for the students who were coming to be placed in homes and while they were here, handled problems that might arise while the students were here, some minor, some serious. There was a girl, I remember, who was out, I think, in Seattle, Washington, somewhere in the state of Washington, who had a mental breakdown and tried to commit suicide and you know, then you had to arrange for her to be sent home and be accompanied by a doctor, and all that kind of thing. But a lot of it was fairly routine too, but it was the beginning of a program which still exists today, and which I am now doing some work with as a volunteer at YFU (Youth for Understanding). It's now called the Congress Bundestag Program, because it's financed by the U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag and it is a two-way street, Americans going to Germany and Germans coming here. Out of that relatively small program has grown this other program, and there are many, many students from all over the world who come here on non-scholarship bases as well, and Americans who go abroad also, and it has really grown into quite an industry almost.

Q: So, you came into the Foreign Service in 1955 and were sent right out. Where did you go?

JONES: Yes, I actually was sworn in in September, 1954, and I went to Venice, Italy.

Q: Sounds like a crisis post?

JONES: At that time, they didn't have the extensive training that they now have at FSI and I went without any consular training at all. I had taken some Italian, and I had what was then called the mid-career course, but it wasn't anything like the present program. So,
when I got to Venice, I arrived on a Friday, I guess, it was rather late, so I went over to the Consulate on Saturday morning to meet the Consul. One of the local employees was on duty also, Saturday morning. He came and asked me if I could do a notarial, because someone had come some long distance, and needed an "acknowledgment." Could I do an acknowledgment? And I looked at him and said: "What's an acknowledgment?" So, he very carefully explained what was involved which of course was nothing at all complicated, just witnessing a signature. So, that was my first service for the government of the United States. Well, I learned a great deal during my two years and three months there, because it was a small post. In fact, it no longer exists. We had three officers, a Consul and two Vice Consuls, an American secretary and sort of general administrative assistant, and nine local employees. I was called upon to do a little of everything and I learned a tremendous amount about what goes on in a consular office.

Q: What were the major types of consular problems you had there?

JONES: Well, we had lots of tourist problems, especially during the summer. Lost passports, lost travelers' checks, that sort of thing. But also, there were a fair number of Italo-Americans who had retired, after being in the United States, had retired to Italy, and they had various and sundry services they needed to have performed. Passports, citizenship services. At that time, naturalized American citizens, in order to retain their citizenship had to return to the United States periodically to show they hadn't abandoned the United States. That no longer is the case, but at that time, the principal reason that people gave for not going back, and for which they were then permitted to remain, was health reasons.

Q: You're talking about the problems of medical...?

JONES: That's right. Naturalized citizens who wanted to continue to reside abroad and most of them, as I said, claimed ill health, and came in with medical certificates, and so forth. We also had some complicated citizenship cases, although I had many more of those later on when I was in Palermo, Sicily, of Americans born abroad who had some claim to American citizenship. But it was a miscellaneous assortment of consular services to American citizens.

Q: Any horrible protection and welfare cases?

JONES: Occasionally, but not too many. Oh, claims, you know, when you purchase something abroad and it comes broken, there is a term we use--trade complaints. Because of Venice being a tourist place, and there is lots of glass for sale. We had quite a few of those to deal with. I never had a great deal to do with it, because the Consul pretty much handled it, but Venice did have in its consular district one of the political disputes, what the Italians call the "Alto Adige" and the Austrians call the "South Tyrol." We did some reporting on that situation. I was also the administrative officer, so I handled that routine. I remember, I felt a great triumph one day when I had to write a contract for the building of a new boat dock, because we were on the Grand Canal and we had a motor boat, and
the dock needed to be repaired or replaced. I didn't know anything, of course, about writing a contract, and I looked in the Regulations, and did what I thought was right. There was a question whether it ought to be a numbered contract or an unnumbered contract. So I read everything six times and decided it should be one or the other. Then I had to send it to the Embassy in Rome for approval. They wrote back and said it should be the one that I hadn't chosen. So I looked at all the Regulations again, and I still thought I was right, and I wrote them back explaining why I thought I was right, and they came back and said: "Sorry, we were wrong. You're correct." I felt that I had won a great triumph.

Q: Such things one remembers, I mean these are small victories.

JONES: Also, those were the days when you wrote out, long hand, new passports. The local employee who handled that was very adept at doing this. We had some rather interesting cases. I remember, we issued a passport to Truman Capote. I once was in an airplane, and the man next to me said: "Did I remember him," which of course I didn't, and he pulled out his passport and it was one that I had signed. So you never know when things like that will turn up.

Q: Well, you left Venice and you went to a, at least in those days, much more of a hot spot?

JONES: Yes, I went from Venice to Berlin.

Q: Served there from 1958 to 1962?

JONES: Yes, I left Venice in the fall of '57, went on home leave and went to Berlin in January of '58. I spent my first tour there as a Visa Officer. Then went on home leave and when I came back I was an Economic Officer.

Q: What sort of visa work did you do?

JONES: I did non-immigrant visas, and that was interesting because we issued some to East German residents. Most of the visas that we issued on the whole were either visits to the United States to relatives, or business trips to West Berliners. The ones we issued to East Germans were either visits to relatives or invitations to conferences, scientific conferences or things of that nature, that it was decided was in our interest to let them attend. Many of these people needed waivers of some sort because they were members of some kind of communist organization. But in most of those cases, it was deemed more or less harmless and in some cases they claimed involuntary membership, that they had to join in order to retain their job or something of that sort. But it was interesting because we had a chance to talk to some of these people, which most people didn't have an opportunity to do. They were able to come across into West Berlin of course without difficulty at that time. Later on, when I was in the Economic Section was when the wall was built of course and that complicated things.
Q: *Were you there when the wall was built?*

JONES: Yes.

Q: *What was the feeling before the wall was built? What was the political situation in Berlin?*

JONES: Well, the number of East Germans crossing into the west was increasing rapidly, and there were many coming over every day. I was not in the political section, I didn't get involved in those discussions whether there was any feeling the East was going to do something to stem this. It was certainly recognized that there was a problem for them, but I don't think that there was any anticipation of the building of a wall, I mean of the complete closing of the border that occurred. It happened on a Saturday night, Sunday morning. I was awakened about four o'clock that Sunday morning by one of the local employees who's beat in effect was transportation, and he had lots of contacts in the railroad, and he said they had called him up and told him they were tearing up train tracks and putting up barriers, etc., and he just wanted to alert me (to be aware of this), and he was going to go out and tour around and try to learn what was happening. I assumed that, by that time, others knew about it as well, but I did call the duty officer to make sure, and he was not home, he had already gone to the office. So, I waited until six thirty or seven to call the office and find out whether there was anything I could do. They suggested that I come in about eight. They were gathering a lot of people to try and figure out what was happening. I did get another call back from this local employee who gave me more details about what was happening at what place, etc. That Sunday we spent a great deal of our time just trying to find out, because you really had to go out and see what was going on, and reporting to Washington. I never wrote so many flash cables in my life as I did that day.

Q: *What was the feeling at the mission? Was there a feeling that this was a prelude to a conflict?*

JONES: There certainly was a lot of concern that something could happen, because initially there were a lot of troops in East Berlin because they weren't able to have a wall immediately. Many places they just put rolls of barbed wires, but they also had, I remember, a row of East German Volkspolizei (Volpos so called) just standing within a few yards of each other all in a row across where the Brandenburg gate is, and there were Soviet tanks not very far from the West Berlin border. We were still able to drive in if we had the tags for the Mission, and that afternoon I did drive over into East Berlin and toured around a little bit. It was bristling with military at that time certainly. Later on, the Soviets pulled back to the outskirts, but there certainly was a feeling that if we made a move, why, they weren't just going to let us knock the thing down, or eliminate the barbed wire.
Q: What was the feeling, you know I'm trying to go back to the time, about the administration, which was then fairly early on in the Kennedy administration, towards the wall?

JONES: I think there was a strong feeling that we had to support West Berlin and the West German government in resisting any encroachment. I'm sure there must have been debates about whether to try to go in and eliminate it, but I think there was certainly good reason for concern that that could precipitate a conflict. We instituted a program for West Berlin to try to support its economy. General Lucius Clay came over and was sort of a supernumerary who was looking at all the things that could be done to support that economy. About a week, six or seven days after the wall went up, then-Vice President Johnson came over, and we sent in another brigade of troops. I remember going out to where the autobahn enters West Berlin to see this cavalcade of army troops coming in. There were Berliners all over the place cheering and you had a good feeling inside. The Vice President had a very successful morale booster visit. There was a parade and thousands of Berliners came out cheering him. You could feel it gave them a tremendous boost, because they were really very concerned of course.

Q: What was the reading of the economy of Berlin? Were you doing East Germany too?

JONES: No. We had a section that dealt with East German affairs, but the Economic Section was not involved with East German economy per se. We did concern ourselves with access to Berlin, and I did do some work on East-West trade in terms of trying to figure out who was shipping things through Berlin to the east that were prohibited, that sort of thing. But we didn't really try to evaluate the East German economy. As a matter of fact, at the time that the wall went up, which was of course the month of August when generally business is down and many concerns close, everybody goes on vacation at once. We had a four-person Economic Section, that is, four officers; two of them were on home leave because "nothing ever happens in August." We also happened to be the chairman of the Allied Control Council at the time, so we were very busy, the two of us, until one of our colleagues returned.

Q: What was our impression about Berlin, from your particular point of view, as an economic entity? Was this a tremendous liability that had to be subsidized?

JONES: Berlin of course had been the major industrial city in Germany, and it still had some major industries in the electronics field. I can't remember the details now, but it still was a very important entity for Germany as a whole. The German government provided certain incentives for Germans to move to Berlin, because they were afraid that young people particularly would move out, feeling that there was not as much future there as elsewhere. We, at the time, internationally, were pushing our own exports, but it was agreed that this was not a suitable program for us to push in West Berlin and instead we were trying to promote investments, etc. I don't think it was considered a liability, it was just felt that given the circumstances it needed some extra help and assurance that it wasn't being deserted.
Q: Were you there when President Kennedy came and made his speech?

JONES: No, I wasn't there.

Q: You left in 1962 and went back to Italy?

JONES: Yes, I went to Palermo in Sicily.

Q: What were you doing there?

JONES: There I did basically all the consular services except visas. We had a lot of very complicated citizenship cases at the time because of a court decision that had made it possible for various people who had not thought that they had a claim to American citizenship to possibly make a claim. There were adults who had been born, grown up in Italy, and who suddenly discovered that by virtue of a parent they might have a claim to citizenship. Of course, when they learned this, many of them came in to try and do that, and it was fascinating because it was a complicated business of trying to ascertain the history and what they had thought or known about their possible claim to American citizenship. I remember there was a family where there were four sons, and they all were married and had children. They all got American citizenship, and all of their families therefore were eligible for non-quota visas, and this whole group got passports and visas and all went to the United States. It was about sixteen or twenty people. They were all really solid types. These fellows were hard workers, they all had jobs, and I thought: 'This group is going to do well in the United States.'

Q: Did you feel the problem of the mafia there at that time? Was it much of a presence?

JONES: Palermo of course is one of the places, and it still is, where they are pretty active. During the last year I was there, they were having a bit of a family warfare. There were a number of incidents of blown up cars. I remember there was another one of our people who lived a couple of blocks away from me, and there was a car blown up in front of her apartment building. None of this was aimed at us foreigners. They were really fighting each other for control. But it was disturbing in a way, but I was never afraid, because it was not something that was aimed at Americans or any other foreigners, but it was certainly something that you didn't expect.

Q: Then they threw you back into the UN pie, didn't they? When you left Palermo in '64, you went back to your old stamping ground?

JONES: Yes. Then I came back to the Office of UN Political Affairs, and spent almost six years there.

Q: From '64 to '71?
JONES: Yes, February '71. I worked on many different problems there. That was the period when we were keeping the Red Chinese and North Koreans and East Germans out of the UN and all its associated organizations. I spent a lot of time writing position papers for delegations to various and sundry meetings on how to deal with this issue.

Q: We spent a tremendous amount of political capital, particularly on the Chinese.

JONES: Yes, over the years, we certainly did. I remember, one year when it was getting very sticky, I was on the delegation to the General Assembly in New York when the Canadians made their two-China proposal. There was considerable anger among some people in the State Department, that the Canadians had gone on and done this terrible thing. It all seems very strange now. Of course, nothing ever came of the two-China proposal although it seemed at one point that that might be the solution.

Q: What was your personal feeling, and some of the officers', dealing with this? The politics were very clear. No, no, no, as far as the admission of Red China, but personally was there the feeling that maybe we ought to take the step and get on with it, or not? How did you all feel?

JONES: I think there were a lot of people who would have been happy with a two-China solution. They didn't feel that we should dump Taiwan. At the same time it seemed unrealistic to keep a country the size of China out of the UN, and I think it was felt that inevitably sometime they would be admitted, but the difficulty was to try and find how to do it without going back on your ally. Of course, the main problem there was that neither side wanted two-China; neither the Taiwanese nor the People's Republic were prepared to accept that kind of a solution. I think if they had, why, it would have been resolved much earlier in that way. It was pretty clear that neither one of them were going to give in on that score.

Q: What sort of replies were you getting from the field? I assume part of your job was to go out and get people, our Embassy in Chad, to side with us in the UN, and the people in our Embassy in Chad couldn't care less?

JONES: We of course sent many instructions out about lots of issues, but that was certainly one of them. Before General Assembly sessions, instructions go out to all Embassies to discuss the upcoming agenda with the government to which they are accredited. Most of them...you know...many countries understood our position on China and they cared enough about relations with the United States, that they would go along with it without much difficulty. You mentioned Chad. Well, I don't know about Chad per se, but for a lot of the small countries, it was not a great issue and if it made us happy to have their support, why, they were prepared to give it. There were others of course who disagreed. India I remember particularly of course was not with us on it. Some of the western countries were getting restive as indicated. The Canadians made this two-China proposal because they felt it was an unrealistic policy to keep this large country out of this organization.
Q: How about with Vietnam? Did you get concerned with that?

JONES: At that point, I don't recall that there was any strong feeling one way or the other.

Q: How about Israel? Was this a problem? Later they got the Zionists as a racist issue.

JONES: Yes, that happened later. The Arab-Israeli dispute has always been a major issue in the UN, and it's one on which it spends a great deal of time, and we spent a great deal of time as a result. I think over the years some support for Israel has eroded as indicated by the passage by the General Assembly of this resolution on Zionism as racism. It became more and more difficult for us in the General Assembly (for the Israelis with our support and with others) to keep from having things like that adopted. The Security Council is a different animal of course, and there, we have most of the time been able to keep things reasonable. We have of course been highly critical of Israel ourselves on some occasions and have voted to criticize them for various actions. But I think as Israel became stronger, it didn't have the sort of sympathy as when it was first founded and there was a lot of spill over from what had happened during World War II and sympathy for this young struggling country. Now it is of course strong, and there is more sympathy for those, particularly the Palestinians in the occupied territory. It's a very, very difficult problem, and I hope they can make some progress.

Q: What was at the time in the bureau the view of the Soviets in the United Nations? Was this the enemy, or somebody to be worked with?

JONES: You couldn't really work with them. I don't know if you can say it was the enemy, but certainly they were obstructionists, and very difficult of course, particularly in the Security Council where there is the veto. In those days, we had never used our veto. As a matter of fact, I remember I was in IO the first time we used our veto. But now of course, we've used it many times. Many times on Arab-Israeli matters, which is indicative of the fact that that was the only way we could stop certain things, whereas earlier it hadn't been necessary to veto. There'd been enough support to prevent certain actions without a veto. The Soviets were very, very difficult. We could talk to them, but it was very hard to come to meeting of minds on things.

Q: How about with the French? They always seem to be odd person out, sometimes. Did you get involved in getting the French lined up?

JONES: I don't remember. I don't have any strong recollections about them during that period. Later on when I was at our Mission, we had good cooperation with the French. We might not always agree entirely, but certainly there was a very good relationship.

Q: During the time you were dealing with international affairs in Washington. You were there mainly during the Johnson and then. Nixon administrations. Did you get any feel
for the difference between Johnson in the UN and Nixon in the UN? How they felt about it?

JONES: No, I can't really say. I don't think either one was eager to deal with our problems through the UN, except, you know, when it seemed we could gain some advantage, but they were not what you would call strong UN supporters, I don't believe. Kissinger of course was the National Security Adviser, and I don't think he felt that the UN was a very useful body in many respects. I don't know. I can't recall anything particular about the Johnson administration's attitude.

Q: How did you feel about the UN?

JONES: Well, it was very frustrating at times. Sometimes, you were up there at the UN, you got very wrapped up in some resolution or some problem you were dealing with, it was a world unto itself. But even though you were frustrated and more realistic about what it could do, in the earlier days, you still felt that this was something which did serve a purpose and was helpful. As many people said, if it didn't exist, it would have to be created. The General Assembly, of course, became larger and larger, and one of the things that we really deplored at the time was the creation of the mini-states, and the great enlargement of the organization so that the Assembly became so unwieldy. But as time has gone on, you can see that this was inevitable. There were proposals at the time of how to limit membership, but that became an unrealistic thing. What happened I think is that it became clear that the General Assembly was largely a place where you let off steam, you debate, pass some resolutions, and of course, they do some important things like assessing contributions of member states to the budget and things of that sort, but the power really shifted to the Security Council which always was stronger. But we had earlier tried to give more power to the General Assembly and then I think we shifted away, decided we'd rather depend more on the Security Council for the major political issues. We always recognized that the UN can only do what its member states want it to do, and unless they elect to do something, it's not going to happen. Today, when we talk about the UN doing things in Bosnia, Somalia, etc., people talk about it as though it's some magic entity that on its own can do something. Well, it can only do what its member states are prepared to have it do.

Q: You went from the UN, after a fairly long spell there, you then went to your next post which is Calcutta, where you served about two years?

JONES: Yes. I was there for a year and a half tour, then went on home leave, and went back for another six months or so.

Q: What were you doing there?

JONES: There, I was the Deputy and I was in charge of the Economic Section.

Q: You were there during a pretty active time, weren't you?
JONES: Yes. While I was in Washington, we had the '67 war, and then, when I was in Jerusalem, we had the October '73 war. It was strange in a way, when I got there after the '67 war...

Q: *We're talking about the October war. This is between Israel and Egypt and Syria and Jordan? Which war are we talking about?*

JONES: What I was saying, when I was still in Washington in '67, that was June I think. There was a great feeling that something could be done after that war. The Israelis seemed to be open to negotiations, and prepared to do something to resolve the question because of the great danger of another war. And gradually as things did not work out, things had stalemated considerably. I'm sorry I'm skipping something ...

Q: *As long as you're back in the Department, let's talk about the '67 war. You were in the United Nations Affairs.*

JONES: There was real hope I think. Abba Eban, in particular, spoke in a way that made you feel there was a real chance for movement. But as you know nothing came of it. Israel retained territories it had occupied during that time, Gaza, and the West Bank, and part of the Golan Heights. As thing moved on, it became less and less likely, and it was pretty much stalemated. What I was thinking about is when I subsequently went to Jerusalem. I skipped Calcutta, I'm afraid.

Q: *Well, let's get back to Calcutta. You were there during the period when East Pakistan peeled off from Pakistan proper. How did that play at the Consulate General level?*

JONES: We were in a very interesting position because, of course, the Bengalis in West Bengal, where we were, were very sympathetic to East Bengal. We also had all of the thousands of refugees in our consular district. They poured over from the east mainly into West Bengal, and it was a tremendous job to deal with them, to house them and feed them. I rather admired the Indians, how they handled it. Because we would have felt that they had to have much more elaborate set ups for this, whereas the Indians were prepared to do it in such a way that provided the minimal, but did take care of them. In Calcutta, I was head of the Economic Section, and in that connection got involved in some of the aid that we provided during that period. We would meet with the Indian officer who was in charge of assessing the requirements. There were other consulates there who were involved also. We would report what the situation was. I went to the airport many times to meet shipments when they came in to be sure that they were received and dealt with adequately. I also toured the refugee camps with many visiting VIPs. The upheaval was tremendous. Of course, after the war, the Indians made no bones about it. They wanted these people to go back. Many of course wanted to go back, but there was no question that West Bengal, which still had refugees from the days of partition, didn't want any more. We were not very popular at the time, because the government supported Pakistan as an ally. The U.S. was quite supportive of Pakistan to the extent that the Indians felt that
we were one-sided and although our personal relations with people were OK, you did hear about it periodically. There were some demonstrations at the USIS library, but nothing that ever caused us any real difficulty.

Q: *Were you given any instructions from our Embassy in New Delhi on this? You were doing your bit with the refugees...*

JONES: Yes. We also had a window on the situation because there were many correspondents and journalists who came to cover this, and of course the border was a sieve. They would go over and we had no means...

Q: *Our Consulate had closed in Dacca at that point? We evacuated...*

JONES: I know we evacuated some people because some of them came. I don't remember if it was closed entirely. It may have been. I think it was. Because we had two evacuations. One from Chittagong by ship, and one when they flew people out from Dacca to Calcutta. We took care of them before they moved on. These journalists would go over, and then they would come and talk to us, and we could then report on what they had to say on what the situation was. So that was an interesting aspect of it. But sympathies certainly were all with the Bengalis. It was felt that the Pakistanis had stolen the elections and that the right was all on the side of what became the Bangladeshis.

Q: *You left Calcutta, and that war just in time to go to Jerusalem. People must have been thinking of you as Typhoid Mary?*

JONES: Even funnier than that was the Ambassador in India was Ambassador Keating and he moved from there to Israel. In fact, he said to me one day: "Everywhere we go, they seem to have a war." Yes, I went on a direct transfer to Jerusalem.

Q: *When did you arrive?*

JONES: In July? I think it was July '73.

Q: *And stayed there until '76?*

JONES: That's right.

Q: *How did you see the situation in the summer of '73?*

JONES: As I alluded to earlier, things were very stalemated. Nothing was happening in terms of resolving the problem, the Arab-Israeli problem. There didn't seem to be any chance of movement. Then the war came and that all changed, and again as in '67 there was hope that this would lead to something that could help resolve the problem.

Q: *How did the war hit Jerusalem where you were?*
JONES: Well the war itself didn't really affect us very much except that, you know, they call up so many people. A couple of our local employees got called up. One was let go fairly soon after. He was in his fifties. Both of these were drivers and the younger man did stay in for the course of the war. It's a very funny situation where people there go into the army. They go off to war. They come home. They can one day be off somewhere fighting, and the next day be home on a pass, and then two days later be back fighting again. It's a very odd feeling. It's so different from what we're used to where people go miles away and it's a totally separate situation. There was a lot of tension of course, concern. But Jerusalem itself, I don't think ever felt, the city per se, was in danger. Similarly in Calcutta, we never felt any danger during the war, even though we had a blackout for two days but it was pointless, because there was nothing happening in that area. Following the war, we got terribly busy because of the shuttle diplomacy, and because they came to Jerusalem, and were at the King David Hotel, which is not very far from the Consulate, and used our facilities, our communications. So that we had to have a twenty-four hour operation, and we ran messages back and forth between the Consulate and the King David Hotel.

Q: What were you doing in Jerusalem?

JONES: That's what I was saying earlier. I was the Deputy there, and I was Deputy in Calcutta too, but I was pretty much in the Economic Section, whereas in Jerusalem I was supervisor over the political and economic officers and the consular and administrative sections.

Q: Who was the Consul General?

JONES: It was Pete Day. Arthur R. Day, during the first two years, and Michael Newlin the third year that I was there.

Q: You know, there's always been the problem of Jerusalem which has been in a way the thorn in the side of the Israelis because of the reporting on Palestinian affairs, particularly on the West Bank. How did that work during your period and what were the pressures on you?

JONES: Well, the Israelis of course resent the fact that we have not recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Jerusalem is an independent post; it's not a constituent post of Tel Aviv, in order to maintain this policy. Its consular district includes the West Bank and the city of Jerusalem, both west and east. That gave us an opportunity to have contact with both sides which is an unusual situation in that area. We were able to report on events in the West Bank and to travel freely, and observe things. And also report on events in Jerusalem and have contacts with city officials. We didn't have any official contact with the Israeli government. That's the province of the Embassy. But we did cover the city and we did have contacts with the mayor and other officials there. It's a very sticky situation because little events would happen. When a congressman came to visit, the Israeli government wanted to, or the mayor's office wanted to give him a tour of East Jerusalem,
whereas we felt he should go with us not with West Jerusalem officials. Little things like that. Mostly our relations with them were good, but as I say, they were unhappy. There was a feeling on their part which I don't think is correct, that the consulate in Jerusalem was full of people who were anti-Israeli. That was not fair I think, and I think it was not a feeling that those who had contacts with the Consul General held, because they knew that he was not biased in that way, and in fact had many good Israeli friends, and was very sympathetic to their problems.

Q: Were you ever given any, if not instructions, heavy breathing from our Embassy in Tel Aviv, and even from the Department saying: "Cut out talking about Israeli procedures in the West Bank" or anything like that?

JONES: No, I don't think so. There were occasional problems of jurisdiction between the Embassy and us, but nothing that I can recall that was ever significant. We would talk to them on the phone frequently, and usually work things out.

Q: There weren't any incidents? In that time where a consul would go out and find that an Israeli had been beating up on some villagers. You'd report it and then it would get into the New York or the Washington Post and cause heartburn?

JONES: I don't recall anything of that nature. You know, you're required to do these annual human rights reports and the Embassy sent in a combined one covering Israel and the occupied territories because Gaza is under its jurisdiction. But we drafted the one on the West Bank and we sent it to them to include, and there might have been a few minor editing changes, but basically, they sent what we had prepared. I don't recall...There may be things I don't remember, but at the moment I don't recall any major difficulty we had.

Q: Well then you left Jerusalem in '76 and went back to the UN Assembly?

JONES: Yes. I served on the General Assembly delegation in '76 as the NEA liaison officer. They have one for each geographic area, which is basically to maintain contact with delegations from that particular region of the world and follow those problems.

Q: Any particular concerns...?

JONES: I don't remember anything special during that three months. There probably were some interesting cases but I...

Q: Well if anything comes back you can add it later. Then you went?

JONES: Then I went to the Royal College of Defense Studies, the former Imperial War College in London, from January to December, 1977. That was a very pleasant experience. We had about twenty nationalities represented in the group, about half military, half civilian, about half British, and half others. We had an Egyptian, and a Saudi Arabian, and an Israeli in the course. During the time I was there was when Sadat
made his trip to Jerusalem. We were due to go off on some excursion the day that he arrived in Jerusalem, so most of us went to the College a bit early. We were all going by bus from the College to the airport and watched on television just before we left this event and it was of course a really historic moment. I just couldn't believe it. I was so amazed. Subsequently the Egyptian and the Israeli would talk a bit, not a great deal, but they at least were on speaking terms. The Saudi Arabian would never have anything to do with the Israeli. The Israeli was an Army Officer who had served in the '73 war. I don't know if he'd been in the '67 war, but I know he'd been in the Sinai in the '73 war. Anyway, it was a very interesting period, as much because of the contacts I had with these people from other countries as from the course itself. They have an outstanding group of lecturers that they bring to the College. It was very worthwhile I felt.

Q: Then you came back, and you went back to the United Nations. You were doing what?

JONES: I went to the US Mission to the UN.

Q: Back to New York? You were part of...it was basically an Embassy there?

JONES: Yes. I started as the Deputy in the Political Section, and then when the Deputy left I moved up after several months to become the Political Counselor.

Q: You were there from '78 to '80.

JONES: Yes, from January '78 to July 1980.

Q: What were the main concerns that you were involved with?

JONES: Well, let's see, we had lots of things during that period. One of the things was the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. That was fascinating in a way because of our work with the Chinese. During the period I was there we established diplomatic relations with China and the Chinese just became so friendly you could not believe it. They invited us all to a big dinner to celebrate, etc. They wanted our help. They did not really know much about how to operate tactically in the Security Council. They of course were very interested in the Cambodian question and they consulted us all the time about how to do things. Unfortunately of course, we didn't always agree with what they wanted to do, but it was interesting to have this contact. Prince Sihanouk came at some point and I met him. We had several meetings with him. We also at one point dealt with the hostage situation in our Embassy in Iran. As you know, the government was trying to do anything it could to try and get some contact and resolve that. We did try to work through the UN and through delegations there, and we had some support. The Secretary General tried to assist also, but to no avail at that time. We spent many long hours working on that. The Arab-Israeli dispute of course came up periodically. Cyprus. I'm trying to think. It seems to me there were some other major questions. Oh well, in connection with the Arab-Israeli dispute, there was the problem of Lebanon and it was during that time that we established what is known as UNIFIL, UN Interim Force in Lebanon. We worked closely with the
Secretariat, mainly Brian Urquhart and his section who dealt with peacekeeping operations.

Q: Peacekeeping?

JONES: He was the head of peacekeeping activities in the Secretariat and the establishment of that force. So that was a major question. The Security Council was very active during that period. We worked closely with the Lebanese Ambassador. The Kuwaiti Ambassador. He was at that time on the Security Council. They were quite reasonable men. We worked as well with the Israeli Mission. And of course, the British and the French, we usually consulted initially with them about things. I don't remember who else was on the Council. It was a very interesting period. That was of course the period when Ambassador Young got fired.

Q: He was your Ambassador. How did you find Andrew Young? How did he operate?

JONES: I think he was quite effective. He is very good with people. He was well-liked and he was quite active in keeping in touch with other delegations. I personally liked him. He's a very personable man, I think. Not the best organized sometimes, but that can be said of a lot of us. But he was, I think, as with many political appointees, a little uncertain about us professionals when he first got there, but we had a good working relationship with him.

Q: He came a cropper for dealing with the Palestinian Liberation Organization?

JONES: Yes.

Q: Did you see this coming, or was he aware, or not?

JONES: No, I don't think we saw... It is a little bit typical in that he would get an idea in his head and sometimes go ahead. Sometimes he would ask someone about it, and they would give him some advice and he would back off. Well, this time he just decided to go and do it. It was unfortunate, I think, because he was a good Ambassador and I think was very well-liked which was very evident. He happened to be president of the Security Council at the time and the last meeting that he chaired, there were very many warm tributes to him. He was very much liked by the other delegates. They were sorry to see him go. His successor, Don McHenry, was also very popular. He is a very talented fellow. I happened to have known him many years before when he too was in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, way back when. So we'd known each other for many years. He is very, very bright, a very smart fellow. He did an excellent job there I think.

Q: Did you ever have the feeling that Andrew Young, obviously coming out of the civil rights movement was equating the American experience of civil rights with the problems of Africa and was making too much of a transposition to that? Did he see things in those terms? How did you find that?
JONES: I don't know that I can really answer that. As far as the Arab-Israeli dispute, the irony was that he was really very supportive of Israel, and sympathetic certainly to the Palestinian viewpoint, but also very sympathetic to the Israeli side. I think he just felt he should talk to somebody on the Palestinian side. As far as African problems, my Deputy followed them much more than I did. One of the things that was going on at the time was the question of Namibia. At that point, we almost got... You know, we were so close to an agreement that it seemed inevitable that it would come. In fact, we did a lot of work with the UN in setting up the UN observer force there, etc. We had a couple of military people come up to discuss various aspects with them. In fact, at the time that it finally came to pass--Namibia got its independence many years later--I tried to call Don McHenry who was very, very much involved in that situation to congratulate him on the event that finally took place. He'll be able to tell you a lot about that. Of course he worked with Ambassador Young on it also, but he was the point-man. So on a question of that sort, of course, Young was very supportive of the Namibian cause, but then that was US policy across the board, so there was no problem about that. I don't know that... He was sympathetic to situations of that sort, the situation in South Africa, in Namibia, generally, but I think he also tried to see both sides of the issue. He's not a wild man. In the civil rights movement, he was I think in many ways, the sort of intellectual in Martin Luther King's entourage.

Q: You're right. He was mainstream civil rights. What was your impression of the support for the United Nations in the United States? We're talking about the '78 to '80 period.

JONES: I think it was less than it had been in the early days of the UN certainly. There was more disillusionment, frustration, but I think there was still considerable support and hope for it, and there was a lot of activity on things of major interest to us, like the Arab-Israeli dispute, the situation in Lebanon, the Cambodian affair, what it would try to do on the hostages, etc. I think it was later on that things got ... that the support waned, and I think the US government became more frustrated and disillusioned and did less to support it and use it. Now, of course, things have turned around again.

Q: It has its times and its non-times. You left the US/UN and went to arms control and disarmament, where you served from '80 to '82. What were you doing there?

JONES: I was in charge of an office which dealt with the multi-lateral aspects of arms control primarily. The Geneva Committee on Disarmament, I think they changed their names... We also handled...there were negotiations on chemical weapons with the British and Soviets. That treaty finally was agreed to much later. We thought we were pretty close at the time. In the General Assembly, there is one committee that deals almost exclusively with arms control matters. We handled the instructions for... I mean, not us alone, but that office works with the State Department and the Department of Defense, primarily those three on that matter. The comprehensive test ban treaty, there were negotiations on that that we were also involved in. At the time of the great germ warfare claim in Vietnam I guess it was...
Q: *It was really in Cambodia?*

JONES: Yes, in Cambodia. We thought we had evidence that they had used germ warfare. I think ultimately now it has been decided that it was probably not the case, but at the time it looked as though it were. In our office was a chemical expert, and he was skeptical, very skeptical. There was a great push politically to...

Q: *This was the Reagan administration too, wasn't it? There was an ideological push towards it?*

JONES: There was publicity and claims about this at an earlier stage that we thought was unwise, but, in any case, that's long water over the dam. At the time, I went into ACDA just before the election... Let's see, I came down here in July, after some leave and went to work. The new administration came in of course at the beginning of the year and everything came to a screeching halt because they wanted to review all policies. We had great difficulty because we couldn't stop the meetings. The multilateral meetings of course went on, and we had to have something to say, and take a position on resolutions, etc. It was very, very difficult for a period of about six to eight months, because to get any instruction to our representative was very difficult. I sympathized with Chuck Flowerree who was sitting there trying to...

Q: *We're talking now about there's a new administration. The Reagan administration...*

JONES: Yes, they were reviewing all policies, and the review was taking time...

Q: *And the people weren't in place for a long time either?*

JONES: We had a career man who was our representative in Geneva which was the permanent arms control forum, not the later talks with the Soviets. I'm not talking about that. This is an international group. He had to take positions, you know, and when the United States doesn't have a position on some of these things, it makes it all rather meaningless, so we would at the last minute get an OK on something. Anyway, we got through it eventually.

Q: *What was your impression of the Soviets in their dealings with us? Were they trying to reach an accommodation, to their own advantage? Were they really interested?*

JONES: Oh, I think they were interested; yes, in their own interest, as you say. Arms control is something which I think was in their own interest as much as ours. We of course would emphasize things like inspections, etc. But some of our military people got a little uncertain about how much inspection we wanted to submit to. It was always hard negotiations, I think, but as it turned out, agreements are possible when it is to the advantage of both sides.
Q: Then you moved to EUR for a couple of years, is that right? What were you doing there from '83 to '85. And you were in the BEX for a year, was that about then?

JONES: I was at the Board of Examiners for a year and that was interesting to see the applicants and interview them. I also got a couple of trips to Austin, Texas, and to Los Angeles, to spend a couple of weeks there examining people. I was impressed by the change from when I got out of college. People who were going into the Foreign Service at that time, I think, were younger, had fewer graduate degrees, etc. Now, I realized that the average age was higher and that many of them had some graduate degrees or outside working experience, etc. The competition was tremendous, and I admired those who made it through, because out of the thousands that take the exam, there's a relatively small number that are accepted.

Q: Was there a push even at that time to try to get more women in to the Foreign Service?

JONES: When I first went there, there was a special program for women and minorities. Subsequently, the women side was dropped because it was clear that they were getting adequate number of women applicants. There had been of course a fairly small number of women, so there was an effort to bring some in at the mid-level under the special program. Now, there's no question. As a matter of fact, when I got out of college, I was somewhat discouraged from trying for the Foreign Service then, because it was so difficult for a woman. That was one of the reasons I didn't apply at that time.

Q: Then you went to EUR? What were you doing?

JONES: I was in the Office of Regional Political/Economic Affairs which handled our relations with the EEC, both economic and political, handled east-west trade, and the Council of Europe. It seems to me there's something else. Oh yes, the OECD. We did COCOM, east-west trade. I concentrated more... I was the Deputy and sort of helped run the office, as Executive Officer, and dealt more with east-west trade side and political aspects of the EEC and Council of Europe.

Q: What were the major issues that you dealt with? Any major issues?

JONES: The EEC was beginning to move toward the integration of Europe. I've been surprised they've moved as far as they have. There were many, as there always are, I guess, trade disputes which we were involved in with them. On the east-west trade side, there's a considerable difference of opinion within the government about whether we should relax some of these things because we were losing out in competition with some others. I think, of course, now that situation has changed considerably with the break up of the Soviet Union. Super-computers, I remember, were a big item. I can't remember precisely what the trade disputes were about, but there were some really big ones which came very, very close between us and the EEC, and we would go right to the very edge and then they'd...
Q: I'm not sure if it was at that time, but there was oil pipes, or gas pipes, and special turbines that could be used for submarines.

JONES: There were some agricultural products that we had problems with. We dealt with the Office of the Trade Representative, and the Agriculture Department if they were involved, and it was often difficult to come to a US government position on some of these things where there were differing interests pulling one way or the other.

Q: The Defense Department too, I assume, got into the act, didn't they?

JONES: Well yes, on east-west trade, very much, yes.

Q: Well, your final step was from '85 to '87 in personnel?

JONES: Yes, I was head of the Office of Performance Evaluation, which administers the program. They didn't evaluate people, but at that time, we had both the Foreign Service and the Civil Service. I think they've reorganized things a bit, but we set up all the selection boards for the Foreign Service, for instance, and we prepared the instructions on how to write an evaluation, and we collected them all, and we tried to persuade people to get them in. Of course we serviced the boards when they were in session, prepared all their reports, checked and double-checked them, then we published the names. We did the performance pay board. The senior executive service has special awards also which we handled, and the Civil Service performance evaluation system changed a bit during that time. So that needed new instructions. It's a very taxing job, and people in that office work very, very hard.

Q: I'm sure.

JONES: Their work is very tedious, but terribly important. We handled cases where people were unhappy and they would come in and talk to us about something, and then they'd sometimes file a grievance. They also have the junior officers coming in. The tenure board was also handled there, in order to be tenured. We were also in the process of being computerized at the time I was there, and hadn't gotten too far along. I hope it has now, because we were dealing with many little cards, and if that could be computerized, it would make life a lot simpler, because keeping a card on every person and keeping it accurate was not always the easiest thing.

Q: Then you retired in 1987. I would like to ask one final question, Betty. You came in shortly after the war. Now, in the last junior officer class, about 50% were women. The integration has happened. When you came in, how did you find it, particularly in the earlier days, being a woman was a problem or not?

JONES: I, personally, had a pretty good experience. There were times when I can remember people making remarks. During my intern days, it was a State Department official who advised women to get jobs as secretaries and then move up, which is of
course the wrong thing to do. You know, you would never have told a man to do that. There was a time when I was supposed to have an assignment, and the Consul General didn't want me, because he didn't want a woman. He was able to say that. He said it in such a way that he didn't think it was a good idea for a woman to come for this position considering so and so and so. But nevertheless that wouldn't happen anymore and actually I went to the same post a year later. But on the whole I got along very well with people. I worked of course with lots of men, and mostly men bosses, but not always. I had a couple of women bosses too. I have no real complaint. I know one fellow I knew at the time said: "You'll get along alright as long as you do your job, that's what matters, that's what people care about."

Q: Well, OK. Thank you.

JONES: That is not to say that others didn't have problems.

Q: No, of course not, but I'm trying to sample some as we go along. This is for the historical record. Things have changed considerably.

JONES: Oh yes. Tremendously, and I think all to the good.

Q: I too.

JONES: Oh, my parking meter has run out.

End of interview