The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

LEWIS D. JUNIOR

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: May 21, 1991

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Addis Abba, Ethiopia	1963-1967
Organization of African Unity	
Soviet influence	
Ambassador Korry	
Haile Selassie	
African problems	
Political/Military Bureau	1967-1969
Operations	
Dealing with the Pentagon	
Military aid and sales programs	
Personnel	1969-1971
Personnel policies	
Computers	
Senior Seminar	
Lubumbashi, Zaire	1972-1974
Consular Officer	
Belgium influence and dominance	
Sheba invasions	
Corruption	
American missionaries	
Rome, Italy	1974-1977
Political Officer	
Ambassador Volpe	
Italy's Foreign Ministry	
Africa Bureau; Central Africa	1977-1979
Director	
Mobutu	
Angola	
Andrew Young and his UN Staff	
"Secret Mission" to Angola	
Liberals in African Bureau	
Zaire	
Mobutu's visit to U.S.	
Personnel	1980-1982
Senior officer placement	
Problems in placement	
Time-in-class problems	
Rotterdam, The Netherlands	1982-1986

Consul General
Closing of Consulate General
Ambassador Paul Bremer

INTERVIEW

[Note: This transcript was not edited by Mr. Junior.]

Q: Don, I wonder if you could give me a little about your background: where you were born, where you grew up, and where you went to school.

JUNIOR: Briefly speaking, I was born in a small town in Kansas, Hutchinson, Kansas, in 1925. My father, shortly after that, joined the federal government in a series of jobs which essentially were with the Department of Justice and the Department of Health. Interestingly enough, two of those jobs were the first federal national efforts to deal with narcotic addiction, in a combined Justice/Health Department effort which in effect established two prison farms, one in Washington, Kentucky, and the second, later on, in Fort Worth. And my father, in effect, was the chief custodial officer in both of those. So I moved with him from Leavenworth, Kansas, where he had begun his service with the Department of Justice, to Springfield, where there was this psychiatric prison hospital for the criminally insane, to the farm in Lexington, and then on to Fort Worth, at which time I was eighteen and went on into what was then the Army Air Corps. I had one year of studies at the University of Kentucky before I joined the military.

Q: Where did you have your military service?

JUNIOR: Various training sites in the States, but I ended up in the back of a B-24, flying out of southern Italy. And our targets were southern Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, and occasionally some targets in the Po Valley in northern Italy.

Q: You worked out of the Foggia airfields?

JUNIOR: Yes, very close by. Do you know that?

Q: Oh, that was my old consular district, Naples, yes. Well, after the war, what happened? You got out when, and what did you do?

JUNIOR: My one year of undergraduate work had been with the idea of going on to medical school eventually, but the experience abroad told me that there were things beyond those horizons that were of interest to me. So I, at least, shelved the idea of going to medical school and went into a holding pattern at Texas Christian University, because that's where my family was, in Fort Worth, at the time, and double-majored in French and Spanish while I was trying to figure out how I could find some kind of valid employment

in the international-theaters field. And it was there I first heard about the career of Foreign Service, and, eventually, after many efforts, passed the exam and joined.

Q: When did you join the Foreign Service?

JUNIOR: I joined as a staff officer in 1950, if I recall correctly. I had almost, at the time, been selected to become a Kreis officer in Germany, but that was when...

Q: Kreis being a county-type officer we were using as a transition from the American military occupation to turning it over to the Germans. The State Department took that over.

JUNIOR: That's right. And it was at that point in the transition when they decided that they wouldn't need any more Kreis officers. But they did need consular officers (they didn't have enough FSOs who would go to nasty places), so they invited me to take one of those jobs, and I did.

Q: How did one get into the staff corps back in 1950?

JUNIOR: It was not a competitive process; it was application, some interviews, the security check, and then a yes or a no. So it was a staff vice consul position.

Q: Where were you assigned first?

JUNIOR: Lagos.

Q: Was it called Nigeria then?

JUNIOR: It was the Colony of Nigeria. It was on its way toward independence, under British tuition. But the consulate general in Lagos was different, although certainly not unique, in that we reported directly to Washington. We had no embassy, as such, to report to, so it gave it a somewhat different coloration. Not that anybody in Washington cared about that part of the world at the time.

Q: What was the situation in Lagos and Nigeria at that time?

JUNIOR: The British were making what then seemed to be, and in retrospect certainly was, a major, valid, honest effort to get out of Nigeria without leaving total chaos behind. The tribal tensions were something that they had to deal with most carefully, and they were trying to develop a governmental structure which would give them some flex and which would absorb a lot of that stress. And of course later on we saw that it didn't quite work, but it almost did, and the structure is still essentially there, accommodating the needs of the north, east and the west.

Q: It was a consulate general?

JUNIOR: A consulate general, yes.

Q: What was the staffing like? Who was in charge? How did it operate?

JUNIOR: We had a staff of five or six Americans, two of whom were secretaries, one an administrative type, two vice consuls, and a consul general. The consul general was named Archie Childs, and he was one of those, happily few, persons who have been brought into the Foreign Service under the so-called Manpower Act. Other than being a nice man, he was totally unqualified for the job, and was succeeded later by another officer, by the name of Keeler, who was a professional, but not a nice man. However, he was certainly more competent than his predecessor, and the consulate general worked better under him.

Q: What were you doing, you and the consulate?

JUNIOR: As the junior consular officer, the vice consul, I did almost exclusively consular work: visas, immigrant, non-immigrant, and passports, and other kinds of citizen services. Later on, I did some economic reporting and some political reporting. There was what we now call a USIS post there, with two officers, the second of whom was Rudy Aggrey.

Q: Oh, yes.

JUNIOR: Rudy was, for a good part of our tour there, my roommate, so we worked a lot together, and I benefitted when I did political reporting from the fact that he was certainly a persona grata among practically all of the Nigerians in the political world.

I think it's worth noting as a sidelight here that Aggrey, the American-born son of *the* Aggrey of West Africa, a well-known educator here and in West Africa, was assumed by the major politicians, and minor politicians, to be loyal to West Africa and to Nigeria because his name was Aggrey, and they had a long, hard battle to take on board the fact that his primary loyalties were to the United States. So my recollection is that he spent a good part of his time peddling backwards, trying to get out of their clutches lest he be co-opted into their political schemes.

Q: Was there much consular work there, Americans? Because there wasn't the Nigerian immigration that later developed, was there?

JUNIOR: There was a substantial volume of consular work. I'm sure that we didn't do it very efficiently, because these were the times when the Xerox machine didn't exist (there was some kind of a copier), and documentation was difficult; there was a certain amount of fraud that had to be checked out. Communications in the country were very slow, things got lost in the mail and so forth. So it took a number of man-hours just to process a

non-immigrant visa. An immigrant visa, of which there were relatively few, took some days, man-hourwise.

Q: What was the atmosphere like? Here was a country that was getting ready to become independent; and particularly in the earlier days, in interviews I've had with people who served in Africa, they found that they really had very little contact with the black population, and this sort of thing was frowned upon often by the head of the post and certainly by the British colonial authorities. How about this in Nigeria at the time?

JUNIOR: It's a mixed bag. It would have been very easy to have had minimal contact with the Africans, with the Nigerians, but fortunately the senior vice consul was a man with one or two Foreign Service tours behind him, and he appreciated the fact that we were in a country in transition, and he quietly led us and his superiors to a greater degree of contact with people we identified as being those likely to emerge as leaders.

I can recall one evening when we had... leaders, plus two or three of the newly designated members of the Nigerian Supreme Court to dinner. The British sort of blinked their eyeballs at this, because even they, at that point, hadn't got around to deciding that these people were proper invitees into their parlors, so it was fairly progressive.

Q: You sort of alluded to it, but what was your feeling towards the interests of the Department of State in whatever one was reporting, or just in an African post in general?

JUNIOR: Remote. There was very little feedback that I could ascertain from Washington. We had our...whatever they called the CERP requirements at the time.

Q: That's an economic...

JUNIOR: Regularly scheduled economic reporting form. And if you didn't get one of your SERF reports in, somebody, a minor bureaucrat in the Commerce Department, would trigger a telegram sort of saying, "Where is it?" But when it came to charting out the British progress in establishing a kind of structure that might survive--the problems among the various tribal groups and so forth--I think if we had done half the reporting that we did, Washington would never have minded a bit.

Q: There were no delegations coming around to see what was going on that you can recall?

JUNIOR: So far as I can recall, there was never one congressional delegation, and very few others.

Q: You were in Lagos from 1951 to 1953, and then you went to Palermo.

JUNIOR: I was fired in Lagos.

Q: You were fired in Lagos? Was that a RIF, a reduction in force? How did that hit you? What happened?

JUNIOR: Well, I had been offered a staff job in Nigeria, and I had hoped that since I had done a decent job there, that they would see my sterling merits and offer me something else. But... I had adjusted to that... status, reluctantly, but not without great difficulty. So we had a round of farewell parties... job for you. I said, "Yes, if you want a...

Q: Well, I think it was pretty much the pattern, that the RIF went out and then, immediately, cooler heads prevailed, sort of put it back together.

JUNIOR: I don't like people who have conspiratorial views on how things work, but I had a conspiratorial theory here. I can't fail to believe that the powers that be in Washington, specifically the Department, knew that they had to come up with the numbers to satisfy the Eisenhower pledge about cutting the ranks of government. But I also think that they could not possibly have failed to see that the newly passed Refugee Relief Act would require large numbers of the officers they were concurrently firing. But these guys didn't count, because they were under special legislation and would be "let go" when that expired. So I considered it was a total flimflam.

Q: Which wouldn't be the first time; it certainly won't be the last. Then you went to Palermo. What were you doing there and what was the situation?

JUNIOR: That was a very interesting situation; we could talk about that for a long time.

Q: I'd like to get a feel for the atmosphere there.

JUNIOR: Well, briefly speaking, the department said, "Get your tail up to Palermo right away, they're in desperate need." And you can imagine what happened when I got to Palermo.

Q: "Who are you?"

JUNIOR: Yes, "Why are you here and what are we going to do with you?" They suggested I take some leave, which I did immediately. They were busy in Washington taking young officers out of the Foreign Service officers course. What is that, 101?

Q: Yes.

JUNIOR: And distributing them around the Mediterranean to man the Refugee Relief Act mechanisms. And, of course, these were newly minted officers who had no Foreign Service experience at all, with the exception of one or two who were Foreign Service brats, and I was the only officer there for a long time who had any consular experience. But eventually, other, more experienced consular officers came along, and we geared up for that major visa-mill effort.

Q: Could you explain what the Refugee Relief Act program was all about?

JUNIOR: It was a program that I think became law in 1956, if I'm not mistaken. It's ostensible stated purposes were...

Q: I think it was either '54 or '55.
JUNIOR: Maybe so.

Q: Because I was working on it in Frankfurt in '55. So I think it probably was '54ish.

JUNIOR: It could have been as early as '53.

Q: It could have been, yes.

JUNIOR: At any rate, the stated objective was to take various refugees and displaced persons and one other category similar to those, to screen them thoroughly, and to send them off, with families, to the United States if they qualified under the grounds that they were in great trouble and economic misery, some political difficulty perhaps, in Europe. Again, conspiratorially. My view is that it was a purely political effort on the part of certain influential congressmen to get many, primarily Italians, but also Greeks and others, into the United States, to suit the demands of American constituents.

Q: Well, to add to this, I did an interview with Maxwell Rabb, who at that time was sort of the secretary or counsel to the president, and Gasperi, the Italian prime minister, according to him, had come to Eisenhower and said, "You've got to do something; I've got a lot of Italians who need help." And so Eisenhower sort of turned to his staff and said, "Do something." And this was the genesis of this. And Emanuel Celler, I think, was a strong proponent of this. It was this Italian bribe, but it ended up being a refugee..., and of course it was almost impossible for somebody to be a refugee and to be in Italy, by definition.

JUNIOR: Well, we found some very... definitions during this whole period. You might recall, too, that during this period the famous henchman of McCarthy, Scott McLeod, took over in Washington and... the whole security...

Q: He was chief of security and Consular Affairs in those days.

JUNIOR: Yes, and he was beating like crazy on consular officers to be careful about security. That was on the left ear. And on the right ear, they were getting hit on the head by irate congressmen who wanted their constituents' relatives... to the United States. So it was not always an easy kind of life, to send those thousands of people off to the States. Of course, I mentioned the Italians, and you know this better than I, the Act ended up sucking an awful lot of people out of Central and Eastern Europe.

Q: Also from the Netherlands, too, because I think the ranking member on the Republican side of the Justice Committee or something was from Holland, Michigan.

JUNIOR: ...

Q: Well, no, it was a woman. But this is my recollection, that there were a lot of refugees found also in the Netherlands, who can move from one side to another.

JUNIOR: This was a real hodge podge.

Q: I think anybody who wants to look at the use of government instructions should look at the immigration advisory opinions for this period, particularly dealing with Italy--what constituted a refugee in their own country. Did you feel, in Palermo, the fine hand of the Mafia?

JUNIOR: I'm glad you asked me that. Although we had American investigators assigned under the program from the United States, investigators many of whom had police background experience, somehow or the other I became the liaison officer between the consulate and the Sicilian police authority when it came to Mafia matters. So I knew quite a bit about what was going on, and quite a bit about what the police saw as being the role of the Mafia. It was there, and it was extremely strong. It was pervasive. And I'll tell you a story in a moment about how it could reach into the heart of the consulate... At the same time, I was in fairly close contact with the narcotics guy in Rome, a fellow by the name of Charlie Siracusa, I think it was, who was just absolutely overwhelmed. He could not possibly deal with all the narcotics problems in Italy as a whole, or even in Sicily, so I did a little bit of work on the narcotics problem.

The story. We began to pick up shreds of hints and rumors to the effect that people who were coming in to get their immigrant visas under the Refugee Relief Program had to pay in order for the letters of invitation to arrive in the Italian mail. We tried in every conceivable way to find out what was going on and break it up, with the cooperation of the police, who perhaps themselves were corrupted, with the cooperation of the postal authority, who probably were corrupted. We had plants inside the postal offices, the branch offices, we had people watching a post box where occasionally you could put mail in. All to no avail. And we continued to hear that people had to pay very substantial amounts of money on the grounds that the consulate will not send you your letter until you pay up. It made us look like co-conspirators, as though we were beneficiaries of this. In the end, the only way we could break that up was to send every letter, in effect, Registered Return, Receipt Requested, so that you had a paper trail behind it. That stopped that. But what other scams they were running, I don't know.

Q: After working with this program, did you find that you and the officers dealing with it developed a certain skepticism about the administration of the law? I found this was true in Frankfurt, in that here we had a law which said this was for refugees, and yet much of the time, although we were dealing mainly with refugees, the political pressure was so

great on us that we knew we had to issue, and we had to issue in a hurry, and lots of the safeguards of the law were overridden towards the end because of this. Did this sort of develop as part of a learning experience on your part?

JUNIOR: Absolutely. It was the first emersion in cynicism. Because, as you said, the advisory opinions and other messages coming out of Washington made it very clear: "Issue the goddamned visa." Even though the fellow you were dealing with was a poor Italian peasant who'd never been out of his home, and he had his family and five kids, and he was a refugee from nothing except poverty. You know, that was not even questioned anymore. That was an okay case, and if there was no adverse security, you gave him his visa and sent him on his way. You know, it was a scam, I guess a scam required for domestic political purposes.

Q: I know, it prepared me very much for our later dealings in Vietnam. What was the consulate general doing besides this? Did you get any work dealing with sort of the regular running of the consulate general?

JUNIOR: No, I was isolated, stamping out visas; I never had a chance to do any economic or political work. That was not necessarily the case with all of the officers, because, under whatever criteria, the management of the consulate reached into the consular section from time to time and pulled people out to do specific non-consular jobs, some political, some economic, most of whom were very bright and very competent, and many of whom later went on to become ambassadors. We had a very bright crew of people there, new FSOs. Sam Gammon, Bill Harrop, ... Hill.

Q: What was your impression of the Italian authorities that you had to deal with?

JUNIOR: I dealt with municipalities, mayors and prefects and police authorities. They were charming, and I wouldn't trust them as far as I could throw them. Because while many of them may have been honest, you never knew when the Mafia had got their hooks into them. And I think it was perfectly valid to assume that they were all Mafia. Which didn't mean you couldn't cooperate with them; you had to in some circumstances.

For instance, at one point, when the politicians in Washington were screaming that we weren't moving enough people, and when we said, "It's not our problem, the Sicilian government and the Italian government in Sicily is not turning out their passports fast enough," Washington said, "Go talk to the authorities." So I got a car and made a trip around the island of Sicily, stopping to talk to the ten major..., to ask them to kindly speed up the issuance of their passports to suit our purposes. It was entirely inappropriate. We didn't care; our security people were very resentful of the fact that they had to work with the Italian police at all. They felt that, by God, Scott McLeod had sent them to do a job, get out of our way.

Q: Well, you moved to a little more rational situation then, after that, and went to Hamburg, where you were from '56 to '59. Where were you integrated into the regular FSO corps?

JUNIOR: I passed the written exam when I was about to leave Nigeria, and was sworn in shortly after I got to Palermo. But I never had, of course, the 101 Course; it was assumed that I knew enough at that point that I never had to take it.

Q: You didn't miss anything.

JUNIOR: I don't think it was much..., certainly even going back...

Q: What were you doing in Hamburg?

JUNIOR: Again it was the Refugee Relief Act, but that's also where I first broke out from under that. I had had some high school, not college, but some high school German, and that led me, after a few months there where I picked up German to a point where I was fairly conversant with it, to the one job in the consulate which dealt with nasty cases--nasty security cases, nasty cases involving prostitution, war crimes, war criminals and that kind of thing. So I did that for quite a while. And at one point, the consul general, Ed Maney (a very old and venerable name in Foreign Service, particularly on the consular side), called me in and said, "What do you know about administration?"

And I said, "Not a thing."

He said, "Congratulations, you're my new administrative officer."

I said, "How is that?"

And he said, "Well, you don't bring any prejudice to the job. If you get those books, you can read them."

So I was the administrative officer there for a while.

Subsequently, I was in the embassy in Bonn on administrative business and was asked if I would take a letter from the ambassador, David Bruce, back to the consulate general. I said, "Of course," so they asked me to go pick it up. And I found it strange that instead of... By picking the letter up from the secretary, the secretary asked me to go in and see him. So we chatted for a few minutes, and he gave me the letter and thanked me for taking it back to Mr. Maney. And Mr. Maney opened it when I got back, and he said, "What have you been up to?"

And I said, "I don't understand what you're talking about."

He said, "The ambassador tells me you're his new staff aide."

So I went down to the embassy and became a dog robber for a while.

Q: Before that, did you get involved in something about the Hungarian Revolution?

JUNIOR: Yes, that's when I was in Hamburg and before I took the staff job. I spent, I guess, on the order of three months, roughly, in Vienna during the Hungarian Revolution.

Q: This was in October of '56.

JUNIOR: Fifty-six, right. Down there with a group of officers from all over Europe, churning out visas for the refugees. And when we ran out of visas, then we did paroles, shoulder-to-shoulder with INS officers throughout. And that was a very interesting experience. I was absolutely bowled over by the qualitative aspects of the Hungarians who were coming out at the time. They were just so smart and so quick, and so determined to get out... just... I had kids who said that they had stood in the streets and thrown rocks at the Russian tanks, and others who had witnessed it who... So that was quite...

Q: What were we doing... with the Hungarian refugees? Was this an all-out push basically to do something... hold the fort...

JUNIOR: ... obviously... political components... But we were all happy to...

Q: Well, you came back to Bonn, where you worked for about a year or so, '59 to '60 or so, as a staff aide to Ambassador Bruce. Now Ambassador Bruce is one of these names that's always thrown out as...he was ambassador all over the place... How did you find him? How did he operate?

JUNIOR: He was in many ways the renaissance man. He was a man with... , innate courtesy, incisive, quick, smart, fantastic memory, and perhaps above all, an inner calm about him that just gave him an air of great statesmanship. He was a pleasure to work for. I always tried to outstrip myself, because he deserved as good as I could give him.

Q: What was the atmosphere in our embassy at that time? It was a huge embassy, and we were still, I guess, trying to adjust from having been the occupying power, although this had been some time away, but the United States certainly played a preeminent role in the country. And I was wondering, because you were in sort of a unique position to look at it.

JUNIOR: From my position as dog robber for the ambassador?

Q: Yes.

JUNIOR: I can't claim that I saw much of the work of the embassy, I just saw that selected group of messages that came in and out for the ambassador's attention. I didn't

get involved in administration, what little consular work they had. All I saw was the economic reporting coming and going.

But this was still a very tense time in American relations with East Germany and with the Soviets--East Europe generally speaking--and at any particular point in time you could expect to see some kind of difficulty deliberately engendered by the East Germans or the Russians.

For example, blocking perfectly legitimate travelers who wanted to go into Berlin on the ground, either by train or by automobile. That happened, as a matter of fact, once, when I and a group of friends from Hamburg, consular people, tried to go to Berlin. We were stopped, and it was the beginning of one of these crises that took a number of weeks to work out. Because obviously the Russians were standing behind the scenes in the little booth at the border, telling the East Germans not to let these people through. Which was a violation of the Accords, of course.

So it was a tense political scene. And many a time the crackerjack senior officers that Bruce had working for him would gather in his office and they would work out some very tough questions. They had Bill Tyler as chief of the political section, Henry Pleasants was station chief, Henry Tasca was head of the economic section, and so forth. And these were very powerful guys, and they would get together and plot out major strategy, with the ambassador always in the lead, listening, but he was clearly the man who made the decisions. Occasionally, Washington would try to push him, and he would smile and say, "Send them a holder." He would not be rushed.

Q: Did you have any feel for how he got along with Adenauer? Was he still the chancellor?

JUNIOR: Oh, yes. He did not overly exercise his relationship with the senior Germans; he went when he had to, and he did what he had to do on the protocol side and entertainment side. But anytime he wanted to see Adenauer, he, of course, could. Any senior Germans.

I think it might be well to point out that as part of the relationship between East and West--we and the West Germans on the one hand, and the East Germans and the Russians on the other--the West German government provided a three-car train for the ambassador. And they were actively interested in having the ambassador and other embassy officials go to Berlin and come back from Berlin not by air but by train, because they felt that the right under the Accords to go back and forth in this rail corridor would atrophy if it was not used. So one of the results of that was that we used that train a lot. But it was not limited to that use; the train was available, paid for by the German government, staffed by the German government, with a U.S. sergeant as the train captain, and it went anywhere in Germany that the ambassador wanted it to go, with various members of the embassy staff if there was sufficient room for them. So we exercised that quite often.

Q: What was your impression of, one might say, the Soviet menace there at that time?

JUNIOR: I think it's fair enough to say that at no point did the embassy or the ambassador ever consider that we were about to be attacked. But consistently the operating assumption was that the Soviets, with the East Germans and other East Europeans, were going to make life as difficult as they could for us. Does that answer your question?

Q: Yes, that does. Another one just occurred to me. I know, talking to somebody who was serving with James Conan, who was the ambassador before Bruce, ... a problem in the Washington-Bonn relationship... Americans... relations was... Dulles. Conan... Berlin... was the sister of the secretary of state, later the former secretary of state, she kind of went her own way. Was Eleanor Dulles a particular problem or not?

JUNIOR: Well, I don't want to defame the lady. My memories are dim on that score, at any rate. Did you say a burr under the saddle?

Q: Yes, a burr under the saddle.

JUNIOR: I think that would be an appropriate description for the way at least most embassy senior officers looked at it--sort of a problem, an inconvenience, an annoyance.

Q: How about Berlin? Did Bruce pay much attention to getting to Berlin and conferring there and looking at the Berlin problem? Or was that left pretty much to the minister we had in Berlin?

JUNIOR: You know, I've forgotten, for the moment, the name of the minister who was there, a well-known, well-respected guy. And I would say that Bruce's relationship with him and with Berlin was "just right." Enough attention, enough opportunity to hear their voices, but no micro management. And, of course, he had the military component there, too. He respected the thing in many ways as having the status of an embassy.

Do you collect humorous Foreign Service stories?

Q: Yes, I do.

JUNIOR: When Ambassador Bruce called me in to his office, I think toward the middle of 1960, he said, "I don't want you to tell anyone just yet, but I'm going to resign as ambassador and go back to the United States." And later he told me that he intended to work for Jack Kennedy. One consequence of that was his request that I work with my opposite number in Berlin to set up a big cleanup party so he would have a chance to say farewell to the Berlin communities. This meant some 750 to 1,000 people at a big reception. I had very little to do with the actual organization of it; Pete Smith, who was the staff aide to the minister in Berlin, organized it and selected the personalities to be invited and so forth. Those who know the site of this reception, Harnack House, may recall that when you came inside, if the reception was in the major room in the right wing, then normally, given the bad weather in Germany, the husband would take the coat from

his wife, she would wait in the antechamber there while he took the coats down below to the coatroom, then he would reemerge, pick up his wife, and move off toward the reception line. On this terrible, terrible night, when there was bitter sleet outside and cold and blowing, I was helping Pete move people through the reception line. But he knew them by sight; I knew very few of them by sight, so he had the principal responsibility for introducing them to the ambassador and the minister and the general. And after the first crush subsided, I saw, hanging back and sort of toward the end of the room, a small lady, all dressed in black, looking very nervous and wan. And since I had nothing to do at the moment, I thought, well, I'll go over and chat with her until her husband comes back from down under and picks her up and takes her through the line. But nobody arrived. And so I went over and chatted with her and said, "Isn't it a terrible night?" My German was quite good, so we chatted in German for a while. And she was still rather nervous. I didn't know why she was hanging back there, but I saw it was time for me to go back to the line, so I said, "Excuse me. Don't be concerned, your husband will soon come back from down under." And she almost fainted. She turned ashen, and she sort of staggered a little bit, and she said to me, "Aber, ich bin Frau Reuter." She was the widow of the famous mayor of Berlin, who had been dead for less than a month--and I'd just reassured her that her husband would soon be back from down under. What can you say? That was my worst moment in the Foreign Service, I could have died.

Q: Well then, you left Bonn and you went to, what, Political/Military Affairs?

JUNIOR: Yes, back in Washington.

Q: In Washington, where you were from '60 to '63, what were you doing?

JUNIOR: We worked NATO Affairs almost exclusively, and it was the most interesting, challenging, productive, and significant workload I've ever had in my life. We were working such things as renegotiating the jumble of individual bilateral agreements for the maintenance of our nuclear facilities in Europe, renegotiating an overall common treaty for NATO Europe. We were working on various kinds of relationships with NATO as a whole, or NATO countries, for example, to base the so-called BMEWS (ballistic missile early warning systems) in England and elsewhere. And in the end, I turned out to be the leading oar when it came to all kinds of infrastructural problems. I also had responsibility for negotiations such as, for example, the effort to make a Dutch advanced research facility into a NATO facility. They did that, and I found it interesting, when I was back in Rotterdam on my last tour, to visit it, and all that business about when it had been Dutch rather than NATO had already been lost in the mists of history. And I was involved in the establishment of an Italian port as being a multilaterally funded infrastructural facility for submarines in Italy. On the infrastructural side, it was I who tried to work out the methodology for reducing the percentage that the U.S. paid into NATO infrastructure funds.

Q: Infrastructure, in this case, for the most part, means what?

JUNIOR: The philosophy of NATO was, and I suppose still is, that if you build an aircraft hangar and revetments and so forth in Norway, for common defense purposes, that that should be commonly funded. And that's part of the so-called infrastructure. And that is very broadly defined: it has to do with fuel pipelines, with a lot of communications facilities, practically anything that is constructed in NATO Europe and gets some kind of multilateral funding through infrastructure. It was a multibillion-dollar operation, so if you could reduce your share, your contribution to it, by one percent, you were making big bucks for the United States. Which was no news to our NATO allies; there was always a bloody fight.

Q: What role did the Department of Defense play, particularly from early '61 on, when the Kennedy administration came in and you had the managers' manager, Robert McNamara, as secretary of defense? Was there an attempt to sort of push the State Department to one side, and did you find yourself battling Defense?

JUNIOR: It's important to note that my look at this was like through a keyhole; I saw a very small part of the action. Although State had a very good team in place and would not be muscled aside, McNamara's underlings were always anxious not to be reined-in by the bureaucrats across the river, so it was in fact a process of trying, with very few people and not a hell of a lot of influence, to find out what Defense was doing, and make sure that they talked to us, and make sure that they didn't do something quite silly. And we were only partially successful at that.

I'll give you one example. The Defense Department had developed, or it had in one stage or the other of development, an early warning missile system which was designed to catch missiles coming out of Russia or Eastern Europe early on, so as to give you an extra thirty seconds of warning before the thing hit. And they told us they wanted to go negotiate with the British for the establishment of a ground station for this system. And we said, well, that sounds okay. You won't make any commitments, right? And they said, oh, no, we won't make any commitments. And any commitment we make we'll clear with you in writing and so forth.

Not too much later, a fellow from the British Embassy came in, and what he described to us was a fail-proof, absolutely established, in-being system, and all the British had to do was sign on and they would be guaranteed this additional margin of safety. This was through a warning system against missiles that did not yet exist. Bob McNamara's salesmen in the Pentagon had wanted to get the British to participate in the funding of this system, so they just flat lied.

And that happened time and again. We had to go around cleaning up after the...

Q: Was France still in NATO at this time?

JUNIOR: Yes.

Q: Were whatever activities you were doing with the French a problem more than other countries at that time?

JUNIOR: Going into a major new enterprise you always had to consider in the first instance whether you would try to work with the French or work around the French. It was always a consideration, but it was not a major problem.

You ready for another Foreign Service story?

Q: Yes.

JUNIOR: From what I've told you so far, you'll note that my first substantive job was when I went back to Political/Military Affairs in the department. I'd never really had a so-called substantive job before, and I didn't know how to write a position paper, and I didn't know the methodologies and so forth. Nevertheless, one learns, doesn't one? And my first assignment was to write a briefing paper for President Eisenhower, who was going abroad to talk to Charlie De Gaulle, amongst others, and my assigned subject was the fairly recent withdrawal by De Gaulle of the French fleet in the Med from NATO control. Well, I had read about this in the newspapers, but that's all I knew about it. So I did extensive research and extensive writing, and I took my paper in to my boss, and he said, "Oh, that's pretty good, cut it in half." So I looked puzzled, and went off and cut it in half, and took it back, and he said, "You're getting there, cut it in half again." So I cut it in half again, and it was looking very flimsy at this point, and he said, "Well, now squeeze it a bit more. Maybe you can get it onto two pages, and let the secretariat work from that."

I said, "It won't squeeze."

He said, "Squeeze it."

So I squeezed it. He said, "This looks pretty good." And we sent it upstairs, and it got fired back by the secretariat, and they said, very nastily, "If you will read the relevant instructions, we said, `Two pages, on the presidential typewriter.'"

I said to my boss, "What the hell is a presidential typewriter?"

He said, "Oh, I forgot. Eisenhower is so vain that he doesn't like to wear glasses, so he's got this typewriter with letters a half an inch tall. So you're going to have to accommodate to that. Squeeze it."

As a result, my position paper, which was not very inspiring, I must say, said: "The problem is: De Gaulle has pulled his fleet in the Mediterranean out from under NATO control. Our position: This is a bad thing. You should say to De Gaulle: `Please reverse this.'" Really profound.

Q: Well, anyway, if nothing else, it was a learning experience; you were able then to deal with the French fleet problem after that.

JUNIOR: It was just the first of many layers of scar tissue.

Q: Did you have any feeling that Secretary Rusk was a major player in this, or was he pretty much occupied in Asia, and was George Ball sort of the European man?

JUNIOR: Yes, I had that impression. I'll tell you a vignette here.

Being a regional, functional bureau, Political/Military Affairs, we were not necessarily always in sweet accord with the Bureau of European Affairs. And I can't recall what the specific issue was, but we were in a major hassle which required the Seventh Floor to straighten it out.

Q: Seventh Floor being the office of the secretary of state.

JUNIOR: Yes. And George Ball was appointed to be the referee. The contenders went into Ball's office, and he was not in at the moment, so we sat, staring at each other, for a while. Ball came in and asked us to sit down at his conference table, and he said, "Gentlemen, I don't yet know what this issue is, but I want you to know what the determinant is going to be. We are here to assist in the creation of a united Europe, and what we are going to do is going to contribute to that larger end. Now tell me about the problem." That struck me.

Q: Oh, yes. I'm sure this must have been something that was said again and again when these problems came up.

JUNIOR: Sometimes I wonder if, however, ten years from now, we'll regret having gone down that road.

Q: Now, for the record, we're within a year of the integration of Europe into a single entity, at least economic entity, and somewhat politically. Well, is there anything else we should talk about on this, do you think?

JUNIOR: No, I don't think so. That pretty well takes care of that stint.

Q: Then you moved from those rather lofty concerns down to another country which had much more basic problems. You went to Ethiopia, where you served from '63 to '67, is that right?

JUNIOR: I believe that timing is right, yes.

Q: What were you doing there?

JUNIOR: As an aside, I've had three on-continent tours in Africa. And if I knew to select three countries to go to, I would go to the three I went to, because they were important and different and interesting. There was Lagos, West Africa; we had Ethiopia, which is barely African at all; and then, of course, there is the heart of Africa, not only Zaire, but southern Zaire, Lubumbashi. That leaves out, of course, the important southern tier, but I was never tempted to apply for a job there because I wasn't sure I could abide apartheid; I'm not sure I could have lived happily with it.

I had a unique job in Ethiopia. I went to fill a job newly created, because Haile Selassie, it appeared at the time, and appeared correctly at the time, had managed to steal the "capital of Africa" from everybody else. That is, the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity. That was later confirmed. It was still tentative at the time the department had decided that we needed another officer in Addis to follow that exclusively. So I was, at least technically, and in many ways functionally, not involved in Ethiopian problems at all; I was trying to work out a relationship with the secretariat of the OAU. Which was not easy.

Q: What was the American attitude towards this new organization?

JUNIOR: It was nebulous but friendly, because one didn't know what the new organization was, what it would do, what attitudes it would take on, whether it was beast or beauty, and whether it was friend or foe. So that the initial job was to establish good lines of communication. And for those who tried, that far back, to establish friendly relationships with the haughty Ethiopians, that was a tough job. Because at that point every member of the secretariat, including the secretary general pro tem, were Ethiopians. A number of those people are now in the United States, in refugee status; but, then, they were not at all pleased to see this imperialist power showing some interest in what the OAU was up to.

Q: How did you deal with them?

JUNIOR: Gingerly. It took a while for the staffing to change, and eventually a number of other nationalities arrived to take over some new jobs. The first secretary general was from Guinea, and that was the famous (or the infamous) Diallo Teli, who was no friend to the United States. Then we had Nigerians and Moroccans and Tunisians and so forth, and when they began to arrive, it became easier to communicate with them. But it was always tricky, because a number of those folks were no less suspicious of American motive. So when you went around and tried to present a position on an upcoming agenda item for a meeting of the OAU, they were loath to take careful note as to what you had to say.

Q: Did you find that the Soviets had more of an entrée? Because this was certainly at the height of their sort of opening to Africa and all of that, as fellow anti-colonialists or something like that, despite what they did at home.

JUNIOR: Were you to ask the then U.S. ambassador, Ed Korry, you might get a different answer than I would give. I don't really think that they had much influence on the organization, as an organization; I think they had considerable influence in the constituent countries. But the emperor, who had pulled off this coup of getting the "capital of Africa," was determined that nobody else was going to find any reason whatsoever to steal it away from him, so I'm sure he fended off the Soviets as effectively as he did us. I don't think that they had any particular influence at the time.

Q: What about your relation with the ambassador? Edward Korry was a fairly strong character, wasn't he?

JUNIOR: He was indeed.

Q: And how did he treat you and the OAU?

JUNIOR: He was a man of great passion and vigor and intelligence and ego. He had worked very hard. I think that a number of his efforts directed at the Ethiopians might have been self-defeating, in that they didn't necessarily cotton up to that open, aggressive approach that he had. But he was influential, and he managed to shake the tree of American assistance vigorously enough to produce some aircraft and other things that the emperor wanted. I think maybe the country was too small for him, but he made the most of it, and he was always making something happen.

He was not averse to picking up good ideas, no matter what the source. And any number of his staff commented, then and later, that they would come up with an idea which he would immediately pooh-pooh, but within a discernible period of time, that idea would emerge in something that he would write himself. Rarely would he say thanks, or that's a good idea, but he was listening.

On one occasion he called me into his office to rip me apart for something I had done or had not done, so I went over to the door to the office and closed it, and we had at it for about ten minutes. After that, he treated me with considerable respect. I think that if he saw someone who was unable or unwilling to fight back and to stand their own ground, then he would crawl all over them. So it was okay after that.

Q: At that point was the height of the importance of Cagnew Base in Asmara, which was basically a listening post/
communications base which we had there. Did that make it awkward as far as dealing with the rest of the African states, from your point of view? Here we had this base in Ethiopia, was that a problem?

JUNIOR: It was more a problem for the emperor than it was for us. And if someone taxed us with that, we'd say, "Hey, we're here by invitation." But the emperor handled it right. It didn't get much publicity, and I don't think we...

Q: The man who basically overthrew the emperor was overthrown himself today, on May 21.

JUNIOR: Oh, I hadn't heard that.

Q: Yes, Mengistu supposedly left for Zimbabwe or somewhere like that. So things keep changing. But what was the view of the emperor's position, and were we looking towards outside of the emperor's immediate circle, or were we under constraints for contacts?

JUNIOR: That was *the* game in Addis: What happens after the fall? Or after the succession. I don't know of anybody who really got it right.

Q: I was the INR officer for the Horn of Africa, from '60 to '62, '61 or something like that. I was playing the game of what happens after that. He'd been around since 1913, and I think people... up to then, and it was really into the seventies before something happened.

JUNIOR: My colleagues did what they could to understand what was going on, but it was difficult indeed, for a whole number of reasons. One is the perception of our office in Asmara, which is not... We had little or no outreach, and it was important... importance to be able to talk to people... country. What was going on in the..., potentially Somali country. People just couldn't get there. It was understaffed... there was no way... But the... tribe... the emperor... horror... very... to even associate with... contact... It was hard to find anybody... And others were loath because of the emperor's... So we reached out... church and its role...

Q: The Coptic Church...

JUNIOR: But so far... I tried, I failed.

Q: Were there any major sort of internal developments that impacted on the work you doing, either in Ethiopia or outside Ethiopia, that caused you concern?

JUNIOR: Well, we had the crisis in the Congo, which was in part played out in Addis wherein they had special meetings of the OAU there. And that illustrates a point I was making earlier: we had things we wanted to say to the OAU, and to selected member states, about what was going to happen and why we airdropped over Kisangani and so forth.

Q: This was Dragon Rouge? This was when there were the breakaway provinces?

JUNIOR: That's right. In the easternmost province there was a very dire threat of slaughter of various Westerners.

Q: This was Simbas?

JUNIOR: Well, the Simbas were in the south, that was in Lubumbashi. There was unrest there, but at this point the problem was around Kisangani, upriver. And you recall that's where we supplied airlift. And I think...was it the Belgian troopers?

Q: Belgian paratroopers.

JUNIOR: ... And some of our people..., but it didn't turn out to be a major bloodbath. Well, concurrently, there were meetings in Addis, where we tried to influence African views on this, and point out that what we were doing was looking after human life and not trying to be imperialists. But you can imagine the kind of beating we took there.

Q: I was in Yugoslavia at the time, and the neutral nations were making a big thing about our interference in Africa. What sort of reaction were you getting from within the OAU?

JUNIOR: Very negative. Almost universally negative. I think there were some people who did understand what was going on, but there was no particular reason for them to take up our cause.

Q: Could you sell them on the protecting of lives?

JUNIOR: To be cynical about it (and perhaps pretty wrong about it), there were so many African lives being sacrificed, at African hands, that there was very little interest in white lives who happened to get in the way. No, you couldn't tell them... That's the point of view you had to take in this, but they didn't really care.

Q: Well then, you left Addis and you came back to Political/Military Affairs, is that right?

JUNIOR: Yes.

Q: From '67 to '69. Did you notice a change in how this Bureau of Political/Military Affairs fit in the department when you came back? It's not a geographic bureau, which is fairly sound; you just know it's there because if it's in Europe, it's European Affairs. But political/military can mean a number of things. And this was the Johnson administration, with Vietnam and all that.

JUNIOR: I misspoke a little while ago. I think I said that we were in a regional bureau, I should have said a regional office. Because the first time I did Pol/Mil, when I came back from Bonn, was in what was then called EUR RPM, Regional Pol/Mil. That was subsequently... when I went back there was the... and... office. When I went back the second time... to what was...

Q: What were you doing?

JUNIOR: A good variety of things there. I guess the most important development when I was there was that the administration, with its entire military systems program... Without

getting too technical, at the time I arrived, AID, believe it or not, had major responsibilities in terms of military assistance. Pol/Mil had an advisory role. The thesis was, of course, the smart thesis that could be made to work, is that when you deal with country A, B, or C, or region A, B, or C, you ought to be able to look at our AID programs as being an integrated whole and complementary to each other; therefore you couldn't separate them. That's the reason it was in AID. But it didn't work, for a variety of reasons. Livy Merchant was then...was it...?

Q: The under secretary.

JUNIOR: The under secretary, and he got increasingly unhappy with the inability to make this thing work out of AID. So there was a presidential finding, or the equivalent of it, which brought responsibility back into the department and put it into P/M. Which meant a major new responsibility in P/M., and no chirps.

So my then boss, Joe Wolf, asked me to try to help him put together a new office that would take on this responsibility. And that was really grungy and hard work, to get it back from AID, and to make DOD pay attention to where the new responsibility was, and to persuade people that we really had a policy grip on this, and to try to watch all the operations going on, and to veto things that were done, and so forth. It was really hard work. Eventually it became a very large office, but it took literally months to find some people to staff it.

And it's typical of the Department of State to take on a major responsibility like that and then just absolutely dog it when it comes to putting sufficient resources into it to do a good job. And the reason is, we collectively, as FSOs, figure that the harder it is, the harder we'll work, and, by God, we'll make it go and I won't complain.

Q: Which doesn't always work. In fact, it usually doesn't work.

JUNIOR: That fatuous reasoning, I think, is one of the principal debilities of Foreign Service officers as a collective.

Q: What were you doing? Were you mainly monitoring what sort of military sales or purchase arrangements were being made?

JUNIOR: Well, every year there was the budgetary cycle, and we had to come up with an annual plan as to who was going to get what over the course of the subsequent year and so forth. And then you had to clear it with the various bureaus of the department that were involved; you had to clear it with AID, you had to clear it with Defense. And while this was going on, in the meantime, you're watching all the cables, and trying to sit on top of the administration of various programs, to see to it that they were going okay, in the back of the budgetary process. And you'd have the various bureaus coming to you and saying, "Oh, my God, we've got to have at least five F-5s, maybe as many as many as twelve."

Q: Small fighter planes.

JUNIOR: Yes. They were asking for increases or changes in the kinds of military materiel, plus training assistance that went to the various countries. And it was almost impossible to do a good job, because we had too few people, and too many of those were not qualified, including myself, to start with.

Q: At this particular time, what was the philosophy? One can look at this, defense is one thing, but for poor countries (and most of the countries we were dealing with were relatively poor), every dollar, or the equivalent, that went into a piece of military equipment was that much less food going into the mouths of its population.

JUNIOR: Well, no, not at the time. Are you talking about U.S. dollars? Obviously, we had to work with AID in countries where we had economic programs, but I don't think that there was any pretense that the two programs together in country A or region A necessarily made total sense. That was the downside of having moved it out of AID. I'm sure there must have been a major policy paper that was supposed to be our piece of guidance, but I can't recall what it might have been. I think we were largely ad hocing it.

Q: Well, when you're ad hocing, how'd you look at this? If Chile asks for thirty F-5s, how would one look at this? Would you say, well if we do that, we've got to worry about Argentina or Peru or something like that? Did you get into that? Every time you put a piece of equipment into a continent, the other surrounding countries are going to say, hey, what about this?

JUNIOR: In that specific respect I might note that there was what is now a long-forgotten amendment to the Military Assistance Law, and that was called the Conte-Long Amendment. And this said that in administering our military aid program to any developing country, you can't include "sophisticated aircraft" in our program. And the U.S. government went nuts trying to define sophisticated. The answer always seemed to flow out of context with the Congress, and if they didn't like Chile, then a Spad would have been sophisticated.

Q: A Spad being a World War I airplane.

JUNIOR: Yes. That was really very difficult, to not grapple effectively with that kind of a problem.

Q: Did you have quite a bit of leaning over your shoulder on the part of congressional staff on what you were doing?

JUNIOR: Oh, yes. And they were insistent that we rein-in the Pentagon. And when we failed, they beat us about the head and shoulders.

Q: Well, how did you deal with the Pentagon?

JUNIOR: Well, in the Pentagon, in the relevant branch of International Security Affairs, ISA, when they had a problem, they would push a button and a hundred officers and men would rush into the breach and start churning out major military sales and grant programs. And by the time you'd read through it, they were in Version Five, and by the time you got through Version Five, they were already administering the thing, unless you had ground them to a halt somehow or the other. And frequently we had to go to Livy Merchant and say, "Tell those guys to back off. Our policy responsibility will be as of nothing unless we have control of the operational side as well, at least the details." And that was our biggest problem.

Q: What was the thrust of the Department of Defense? That the more of this the better, going out, because the more production you have, the cheaper a unit costs?

JUNIOR: Very perceptive. I may have misspoken again a little while ago. They had the primary responsibility for developing the next-year budget; we had responsibility policywise to vet it and change it, move it up and down for particular countries and so forth.

Their motives are hard to divine. Among other things, your reference to unit costs is right on the mark, because when it came to things like the M-1 tank (I'm sure it's the M-1, even back that far, which was so slow in development), they figured that if they could sign up various countries for the M-1 tank, it would reduce their own unit cost--longer production runs and so forth.

In some instances, selling an M-1 tank to a country was just obviously prima facie nuts, because they couldn't maintain it, or they'd have to buy spare parts and it would drain every bit of military aid we gave them for the last ten years.

In other instances, God knows what they were up to. They seemed to feel that they could influence that government's military attitude toward us if we were generous toward them with military assistance.

So ISA is its own little State Department.

Q: Not so little.

JUNIOR: That's right. It's probably much larger, at any time, than the Bureau of Political/Military Affairs is. So unless you get a lock on the Pentagon and ISA (and it frequently requires really high-level intervention), these guys are going to do things that the State Department isn't going to like. On the other hand, State Department leadership frequently doesn't give a damn about that, and doesn't try to exert its influence very much on what they consider to be marginal issues.

Q: Were there conflicts in reporting from the field? Did you have cases of the ambassador saying we should cool it as far as military aid; whereas yet the MAAG mission, the military mission there, was pushing to get military aid? Did you have to resolve this type of conflict, or were the ambassadors and the military sales people pretty much in accord as far as getting equipment into a country?

JUNIOR: Let me plead lost memory; I don't recall much in the way of conflict. That having been said, rare and brave is the ambassador who will say less is better. Like Ed Korry..., had he not rattled the aid tree and shook out those F-5s, he would have had almost no influence on the Ethiopian government once they had the idea that he had the capability of producing those airplanes. And had he not, wouldn't have been effective. So many ambassadors (and I'm not talking necessarily about only non-career, I'm talking about career people) perceive as one of their very few arrows in their quiver military aid. That most of them are, "Right on, let's give them everything they want and more," maybe with a little persiflage to cover up that...

Q: Did you have concerns about putting too much into a place and developing regional conflicts that would come back to haunt us at a later point, or was this a factor?

JUNIOR: Yes. But let's take as a baseline the idea that this year's program is largely a function of last year's program, and that probably, unless there are major overriding political pressures involved, what you get next year is going to be a reflection of this year. There are changes... Let's take a look at the Horn of Africa. The status changed there radically, didn't it?

Q: Yes, it went though a couple of switcheroos on that one.

JUNIOR: But generally speaking, another factor to take into account is that we're not talking about large amounts of money or a lot of military materiel for Africa... It looks pretty good to the Africans, but rarely were you talking about goods and materiel in quantity or quality sufficient to change the status quo.

I might note that one of the most satisfying things that I did when I was in the P/M job was to note, in vetting an ongoing... program, I think it was for Ethiopia, I looked through the detailed list of materiel they were planning on giving to Ethiopia, and there, by God, was napalm. So I asked the guy in the Pentagon, "What are we selling napalm for?"

He said, "Well, we always sell them napalm."

I said, "But that's not a smart thing to do. If they use napalm, they're going to use it on most other Africans and probably on other Ethiopians."

He said, "What's wrong with that?"

So I took..., and it escalated real quick, and napalm got... as far as I was aware then, then or thereafter, not to be given or sold to anybody. Now that may have been...

Q: Napalm, for the record, being sort of a gasoline jelly which is used basically against people, and it burns them.

JUNIOR: Fried them. Which is bad news anyway.

Q: Today is June 24, 1991, the second interview with Don Junior. We're not sure whether we duplicated it or not, but before we move to your next assignment, to Personnel in 1969, would you talk about a special office that was set up?

JUNIOR: Okay. I believe I mentioned last time that because the then Johnson administration had had the idea that it made sense to coordinate aid on the economic developmental side and the military side, that they had lodged in AID responsibility for the military as well as the economic assistance programs, which resulted in a lot of unhappiness and was not a terribly efficient or effective structure. So it was decided on high that that authority should be removed from AID and put back in the State Department. And they lodged it in what was then P/M, the super boss being..., the assistant secretary for P/M was Phil Farley, and my immediate boss and office director was Joe Wolfe.

In brief, it was one of those typical government operations where they make some changes on paper, but don't put resources into the new structure. And in this case, I was already working in P/M, and Phil and Joe decided that I would "head up" a new office which would be responsible for this new undertaking in P/M. It was literally weeks before I got a second person to help me out, and literally months before I had any secretarial assistance, and almost a year, as I recall, before I had three or four other officers working in this field. Which even at maximum strength was a ludicrous endeavor, inasmuch as riding herd on the various military assistance programs--grant and sales, and most important, riding herd on the massive Pentagon bureaucracy intent on remedying our balance-of-payments problems by massive military sales abroad, and riding herd on a Pentagon which had the responsibility for preparing a congressional presentation annually for the proposed upcoming military aid program, drove us nuts. We were very, very busy, and I'm afraid to say that we didn't do a very good job, except when you consider the number of resources we had available to take care of all this.

One happy outcome of that, as far as I personally was concerned, was that I got a Superior Honor award out of it, which was very glowing and flattering in terms of all these things we were engaged in at the time.

But the lesson I would draw from all that is the evident one: that if you're going to take on substantial responsibility, you've got to have the authority, which we had, and you've got to have the resources, which we didn't have.

Q: Can you give an example of the sort of things that you were dealing with? What were you trying to do?

JUNIOR: Well, we were trying to monitor, and in a sense place policy judgments on, the various regional bureau proposals for military grant and sales programs in their particular areas and countries, to see to it that they made sense, to make sure that the split in available resources was equitable, to make sure that the programs were in accordance with policy as then articulated, and to make sure that things didn't happen that we didn't want to happen.

I'll give you two examples.

One was that on one occasion, believe it or not, we discovered that we had been flim-flammed by the sales people in the Pentagon, a largely civilian contingent at that point mandated to sell a lot of weapons abroad so as to help our balance-of-payments problems. We found that they had almost signed a definitive agreement with the government of the U.K. to put up a ground read-out station to take signals from a satellite warning system which didn't even exist, and which they had not told the British did not exist except on paper. We caught that at the last minute.

Another example was a very famous amendment to the legislation at the time which provided that the United States would not provide "sophisticated" weapons to developing countries under these sales and grant programs. We went out of our skulls trying to find some generally acceptable definition of what kind of weapons were sophisticated and what were not. And we were never successful. Never successful because of the evident difficulty, because sophistication lies in the mind of the beholder, and those congressmen who felt that anything more than a bayonet was sophisticated would not even entertain the idea of forestalling massive, let's say, French sales of Mirages in the Andes.

Q: Mirage being a very advanced fighter/bomber jet.

JUNIOR: That's right. To forestall the Andean nations spending lots of money with the French on buying those things by making available to them a fairly simple, inexpensive, and reliable American jet aircraft, which was right at the bottom of the range of sophistication, in the sense that this airplane was a jet aircraft...

Q: Was this the F-5?

JUNIOR: The original F-5, not the advanced F-5.

So that was the kind of battle we were constantly engaged in.

So, in the end, I felt badly handled by the system, because despite the fact that I had been given the Superior Honor award, they decided that instead of making me permanent chief of that new division (which I had established and which was beginning to function

effectively), they would bring in another Foreign Service officer, with relatively little experience but one grade senior to me. So when the time came to rotate out, I did it gladly, and went like a lamb to the slaughter into Personnel.

Before we go to PER, let me put one more thought on record. When we leave the Foreign Service and move to other endeavors, we think back from time to time on whether or not we made any difference. And I think one thing where I really made a difference was one that was so evident that it was almost ludicrous. I received a proposal from the African Bureau for a sales and grant program, a mix, to Ethiopia. And I was rather routinely going through the list of the things they proposed to provide to the government of Ethiopia, which was then headed by the emperor, and I discovered that they were proposing to provide a substantial amount of napalm to the government of Ethiopia. Now who are the Ethiopians going to use napalm on? The Sudanese? And the Somali? And the Kenyan?

Q: And their own people.

JUNIOR: Or their own people. So, happily, when I raised this question as to the morality and the wisdom of doing this, it went skyrocketing upward, and, as I now recall, we got a general policy pronouncement applicable to the entire grant/sales program that no, we were not going to provide napalm under any circumstances to developing countries like that. I don't know how many people didn't get fried because of that routine bureaucratic screening process.

Q: That was excellent. Well then, you went to Personnel, where you served from 1969 to 1971. What were you doing there?

JUNIOR: What I went down there to do and what I ended up doing were two quite different things. I was invited to go to PER by a much-admired gentleman by the name of Adrian Middleton, who was then running the equivalent of foreign career assignments. And he was not happy with the way the whole assignment process was going. And he was not happy about some sub-functions, including, for example, the training proposals which were developed in PER, the identification of what kind of training was needed, not so much in FSI, but more broadly, in the universities and in training with other government institutions and so forth. And Adrian promised me a free hand to look into these problems and to come up with a series of recommendations that he promised to adopt if they were at all sensible.

So I was not on that job more than a relatively short time--a few weeks, a few months--when he was unfortunately wiped out in an automobile accident.

Q: Yes, I remember that.

JUNIOR: There came after him a series of changes at the upper reaches of PER. And, in short, I was put in charge of an office which I was unqualified to lead. Because it turned out that it was responsible for planning, based on whatever statistical facts we could

evolve, whatever mathematically sustainable databases we could put together in terms of what the Foreign Service was all about, who was in it, rates of advancement, rates of attrition, promotional opportunities, the whole schmear. And I was extremely fortunate in that I had a number of very bright people who came to work for me, and we turned out a number of proposals and suggestions of which I was extremely proud.

This would not have been of much import except I would have to be in this job during the two infamous epics of BALPA (balance of payments) and OPRED (operation reductions), which were mandated from on high, and a sense of panic in the highest levels of the department coming off the Seventh Floor, proposals to do drastic things in terms of cutting back the Foreign Service, new-officer input, stopping the higher secretaries and so forth.

And Mack Gerlach, who was my principal deputy, and I and some other officers were able to at least ameliorate some of the greater stupidities that management was planning to carry out, but not all of them.

We did some hard studies, for example, not strictly on the subject of balance of payments and reductions, but we looked into the so-called political officer surplus, and we established, to my continuing satisfaction, and to the satisfaction of anybody else who looked at that study, that the problem was not that we had a surplus of political officers, but that we had a misnomer in "political officer." Because if you looked at the jobs in which "political officers" were serving, they were all over the lot, in program direction, in other agency assignments, and even in some other functional cones. The problem was that the political officer was the generalist, with perhaps a little more emphasis on writing than the other three cones, and people would look at the numbers and say, "We've got X number of political slots, and we've got 2X number of political officers, let's get rid of all the political officers."

Those efforts were, predictably, in vain. And you have seen subsequently our efforts to get rid of the political officers, to "bring them into balance" with the jobs and so forth. And only today do I think that they are gradually getting around in the Foreign Service to accepting the idea that perhaps the generalist is not such a bad idea at all.

Q: That's always been there, but...

JUNIOR: They hide it.

Q: They hide it, yes. Well, you were also there during a time when a couple of things were going on. One, of course, was the Vietnam War. The other was the time that you had an organization called JEFSOC, a junior-officer group. And this was an era where people were listening to younger people. This was sort of ingrained; it was an outcome of the sixties, and somehow junior people were considered to have more of the eternal truth than their older peers. Did this play on you at all, the Vietnam business, the youth culture and all that, within the officer corps?

JUNIOR: I think it would be pretty fair to say that that peaked after I left PER. There was some of it going on, and a good deal of attention being given to the junior officers. We had, of course, various ways of identifying junior officers to go into the COORDS program and things like that, in Vietnam, whether or not they wanted to. Some were absolutely drafted. But it didn't impinge much on what I was doing, and I wouldn't be able to say much authoritatively about it.

Q: What about AFSA, the American Foreign Service Association, which was developing into the union at that time? I don't think it had reached that point yet, but was this having any effect on the planning at that point or not?

JUNIOR: No. About that time, Lannon Walker was probably president of AFSA, and he was, of course, an activist, but AFSA didn't have much clout with PER, and was, I think it's fair to say, looked upon by senior officers of PER as being a burr under the saddle more than anything else.

Q: Well, this is very helpful to get a feeling for the timing at that point, that one wasn't looking over one's shoulder and you could make decisions. You then left Personnel. I have you going to Zaire. Was it called Zaire at that time?

JUNIOR: Did I not then go to the Senior Seminar?

Q: Maybe you went to the Senior Seminar, and then after the Senior Seminar, from '72 to '74, you went to...

JUNIOR: Lubumbashi.

Q: Lubumbashi, in Zaire. What were you doing there?

JUNIOR: In Lubumbashi?

Q: Yes.

JUNIOR: Let me just mention one other thing back on the PER side. I mentioned a little while ago that there are some changes you can see that you've made that were of some permanence. Again, thanks largely to people like Mack Gerlach and Ted Parsons, we did some things that did have some lasting influence. And I will, in brief, point out that we were making major, major efforts to correct the computer database on personnel. And when we first shared with the Foreign Service officer corps what the computer thought it knew about them--their backgrounds, their education, their service...

Q: The computer, I might add, was a pretty new thing there, certainly as far as the State Department was concerned.

JUNIOR: We knew that the only way to correct the massive lack of information, and misinformation, in that relatively simple computer database was to print out what we had, distribute it to the Foreign Service officers involved, and say, "We're sorry this is not good. Would you kindly edit, correct, and amplify." And for the next three weeks, we who were responsible for that wore red beards in the department, because every time we were found in the halls, people would drag us to one side and laugh and complain about the stupidities in the database. But that's the only way you can begin a corrective process. And now I'm told that the database, after all these years, is probably on the order of ninety-five percent right, which is not bad for evolving, transitory persons such as ours. That's one point, and a fundamental one, because without a good database, you can't do much in the way of projections as to the future of personnel when you are thinking about changing policies.

We did two other things. The so-called Personnel Audit Report was connected to the thing I was talking about. That is the one that comes out annually, around your birthday, and you're asked to look at it and correct it. That is the fundamental mechanism by which we get good feedback into the machine as to all our personnel records. That's also important because it's used in a number of ways during the whole assignment process, sellers and users. There are assignment officers and people in the bureaus that use PARs to learn more about officers whom they are considering for assignments. And a version of that has been used for many years. A sanitized version has been used by the promotion panel, and we hear consistently that panel members say that this is the most useful single tool for them to work with when they're going through this excruciating process of reading files and evaluating individuals.

So all of that has stuck, and it's been improved, obviously, in many ways. But that made a difference, and I will remember that for a long time.

Excuse me, that's a diversion.

Q: No, no, we want to get this. Well then, you went to Lubumbashi. What were you doing there?

JUNIOR: It was a consulate. Why it was not a consulate general, I never knew. But it was not important on the ground, because the American consul was certainly, in all respects, the equivalent of, or in a sense senior to, all the other consular officials simply because of American clout in Zaire. The Belgian consul general, in his own way, was better plugged-in because of the Belgian community, but it wasn't necessary for the American principal officer in Lubumbashi to be a consul general.

Q: What was the name of Lubumbashi under Belgian rule?

JUNIOR: It was Elisabethville.

Q: And it's way off in the...

JUNIOR: It's in the finger of Zaire that points down into Zambia, very much in the center of...

What did I do there? Had I wanted to sit on my hands, I would have improved my golf game considerably more than I did, but in fact there was a very substantial American commercial opportunity, in the sense of vast mining enterprises there.

Q: This was the old Katanga Province, wasn't it?

JUNIOR: That's right, where they have copper in vast quantities, and where, by the way, the uranium for the first atomic bomb was originated, also in the mines of Shinkolobwe, which is not far from that end of the country.

In short, I saw a number of opportunities to try to crack the Belgian monopoly on the total exploitation of the copper. That is, the sales, the purchases of large trucks and all kinds of equipment, air compressors and so forth. But that was all monopolized by the Belgians, and sort of shared by the Belgians with others, such as the Swedish, who had some very fine air compressing equipment.

After much kicking and screaming and some help from the embassy in Kinshasa, we finally got a fairly substantial American trade mission that came out and gave it a good shot. But in the end, the longstanding relationship between the Belgian colonials and the Zairian authorities prevailed, and we didn't ever get any major sales opportunities in that part of the country.

That's essentially what I did. But of course there was a certain amount of looking after American commercial interests, looking after American citizenship interests, and some visa work, some consular work.

Q: Well, what about dealing with the Zairian authorities, how did you find them?

JUNIOR: They were rather relaxed, friendly, and had a good deal of respect for the United States. But we were unfortunate in having a governor of the province who was extremely erratic and didn't really do a hell of a lot in terms of moving the province along in any particular direction. And he was long suspected of having tortured various individuals who might have crossed him in one way or the other, but I could never establish that as being true.

But there wasn't a hell of a lot going on, and Washington was not terribly interested in the post at that particular point in time, because all was relatively calm. Later on, when we had the second invasion of Shaba...I was there between the first and second, and we Shaba Two, which was a rather major international fracas wherein mercenaries came out of Angola and were advancing toward Lubumbashi, to the great panic of a lot of folks, particularly the Europeans, who in the end provided forces to go in and chase the

mercenaries out, and the U.S. provided the airlift for them to get in there and to perform the military operation.

Q: Can you characterize sort of the feeling of the Belgians and the Americans and the other Europeans who were there towards the Zairian authorities and all? How did they get along?

JUNIOR: I'll preface what I say by pointing out that generalities are always tricky and not much to be relied upon, and there were many highly ethical and moral individuals in that part of the country, of all nationalities. But the fact was that the Belgians had a commercial lock on that part of the world, and their contract with the government of Zaire for running the mines, which were owned by the government of Zaire, was said to be far more profitable than had been the enterprise when it was Belgian-owned and Belgian-operated.

Corruption was rampant. It took bribes everywhere to get anything done. Except for us, because our own mass, our own political weight, allowed us to get things done without paying bribes. We never paid bribes. At least as far as I know, I don't think we ever did.

The white resident in that part of the world at the time, excluding at least most of the missionaries, was there for exploitative reasons. He was there to make as many big bucks as he could make, and had no concern whatsoever for the physical, political, or other aspects of the well-being of the Zairois. He didn't give a damn.

And the Zairois have an unmeasured capacity to suffer. I was just totally amazed that they could suffer under the white man and the colonial exploitation and, worst of all, the exploitation of their own leaders, without rebelling. I continue to be amazed, because Mobutu and his cronies have ripped them off and done every conceivable thing to keep these people miserable, impoverished, starved, uneducated--the most backward, primitive kind of society--and yet all they want is to be left alone and to have enough money to buy some cassava and a bolt of cloth and their bicycle tire, and if people just stay away from them and let them do that, they apparently will live forever without rebelling.

Q: How about the American missionaries, what sort of role were they playing, from your perspective there at that time?

JUNIOR: Well, first, there were not very many in Katanga. Those I knew best were actually in Lubumbashi and were American and Irish priests and monks. And their primary role, almost exclusive role, was doing good, and not proselytizing; helping medically and helping with education and so forth. But there were so few that they made very little difference. There were Protestants, who lived out in the bush, largely also devoted to the same kind of medical aspects, and not doing much proselytizing. But, again, I'm not aware that they made much of a difference at all in that part of the world, made no impact at all except maybe for a few nominal Christians.

Q: At that time, was Sheldon Vance the ambassador?

JUNIOR: Yes.

Q: Was the embassy just plain far away, or was there much contact with it? Did you feel much direction from it, or, things were quiet, let it stay so?

JUNIOR: The consulate in Lubumbashi was about as far away from the embassy in Kinshasa as Miami is from St. Louis, and the road connections were almost impossible--were impossible during the rainy season. The only non-radio communications between the two cities was a single--repeat, one--skinny little telephone line that led all the way across the country, and was therefore broken or static-laden or busy all of the time. We had a Collins single-sideband radio to communicate with the embassy, but the atmospherics were such that it didn't work most of the time. So I was left pretty much on my own. Rarely did the department have anything urgent to say to me. Probably just as well, because I remember once, inadvertently, a flash telegram was sent to Lubumbashi and some other posts, and it got to me five days after it was sent. So most of the things with any time flags on them that were sent to me were overtaken by the time they got to me in the first place.

Q: Well then, in 1974, you had what, a direct transfer to Rome?

JUNIOR: Yes.

Q: Where you served from '74 to '77. What were you doing in Rome?

JUNIOR: I had a number choices, the others of which I don't recall, but I went to Rome because I felt it was good for my family; and it was indeed good. But I didn't delude myself that being a "deputy" in the political section was much of job; and, surely, it was not. Then later I went over to a subsection of the political section to work on political/military affairs, which is where I spent most of my time in Rome.

I was sort of the working-level liaison with the Foreign Office, the Farnesina, when it came to certain functional problems, such as the persistent efforts in the U.N. to debar Israeli participation from this, that, and the other thing. My geographic beat was the Far East, the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Europe, and when problems came up that were bearing on those particular geographic regions and we had to communicate at the working level with the Foreign Office, I was the legman. It wasn't very exciting.

Q: The ambassador for most of that time was John Volpe, wasn't he?

JUNIOR: Yes.

Q: A political appointee out of Massachusetts, mainly a contractor, wasn't he?

JUNIOR: A major constructor, yes, buildings and highways.

Q: In fact, much of Washington in the era was built by Volpe, wasn't it?

JUNIOR: Volpe, and I think he had one or more brothers that were associated with him.

Q: How did you feel about his being ambassador, just from your vantage point?

JUNIOR: Ambassador Volpe and Mrs. Volpe were very nice people. I feel that under different circumstances we could have been good friends. That is, my wife and I, with them. But he illustrates many of the traps and pitfalls and fallacies that go along with putting a political ambassador in a situation like that, the fundamental having two aspects: one, his background did not prepare him for diplomacy in any way; and two, his Italian ethnic background deluded him into the idea that he would naturally fit in well with the Italians and that they were as one. Not that I'm questioning his loyalty, but he didn't perceive that simply being able to speak your brutal form of primitive Italian was not the key to all Italian offices. So he was gauche, lacked the sophistication that senior Italian political and diplomatic leaders had, and was, in fact, an object of laughter on their part, of derision. So it was very, very hard to stay quiet and be loyal and be highly supportive when this fellow was at the head.

The whole town was shaken on one particular occasion. This is just illustrative. Apparently the very distinguished, aesthetic Aldo Moro was greeted by Ambassador Volpe, who did the American bit of grabbing the arm and bending it up behind the guy's back, and slapping him on the shoulder, and making a few loud comments. Everybody present who saw this was just absolutely shocked. You didn't treat Aldo Moro that way. It just showed Volpe's total lack of perceptivity of the culture he was dealing with.

Q: Well, did you have the feeling, I'm talking about you within the political section, that you were doing a lot of sort of explaining and, whatever the message was, trying to support your ambassador, but at the same time trying to smooth ruffled feathers and this type of thing?

JUNIOR: To a certain extent. But, of course, as a mid-ranking FSO, I didn't have access to the people he was busy insulting. There was not much I could do, except for the ripple effect in dealing with it further down in the bureaucracy.

Q: What was your impression of the Italian Foreign Office? This was your beat, more or less, dealing with these things. What was your evaluation of it, both the people within it and as an organization?

JUNIOR: That will be a complex answer. But let me go back to one other point about dealing with the Italians with Volpe as the ambassador. In the end, it didn't matter a hell of a lot, because this was the era of Henry Kissinger. Anything of any import whatsoever

between the U.S. and the government of Italy was handled in Washington, and the embassy was very largely cut out of the loop.

And I remember on one occasion a deputy assistant secretary from EUR came to Embassy Rome and said he'd be happy to meet with staff. So the entire political section met with him, and we said, as politely as we could, that it was a constant embarrassment to go to the Foreign Ministry and learn from them what the U.S. was saying to Italy in Washington, where we had no clue about it. Could we not at least get information copies of reporting telegrams and so forth? And the deputy assistant secretary drew himself up and looked haughtily at us and said, "We can't share that information with every Tom, Dick, and Harry." There were two other officers, one of whom is still in the Foreign Service, and so one is Tom, and one is Dick, and I'm Harry, because we will never forget being told that it was none of our business.

Q: But probably, as a matter of fact, that information wasn't shared with the deputy assistant secretary.

JUNIOR: It may well be. It may well be.

Q: In fact, in one of his books, Kissinger mentions going to Italy on one of his trips was more ceremonial than anything else, because there was no real person to talk to.

JUNIOR: Yes.

Q: Which brings us back to your impression of the Foreign Ministry.

JUNIOR: The Foreign Ministry was staffed with some very bright and capable Italians, some really brilliant people. A great many of them are from great Italian families; they are aristocrats. Others are not, but don't lack sophistication. But they frequently don't like to work very hard. They worked quite late at night, because they took a long lunch break.

But they also, at the level I was dealing with and even higher, were reluctant to advocate within their own government any kind of a leadership role for Italy inside the EEC or apart from it. And as a consequence, you knew that when you went in to request an Italian vote on a U.N. issue, or any other multilateral issue, that your counterpart in the Farnesina was going to listen politely, perhaps take notes, perhaps not, but you knew that at the end he was going to say, "We've taken note of your government's position, and we will be consulting with our partners in the EEC, thank you very much, good night."

I guess I'm not entitled to comment on whether or not that was a good thing or a bad thing, but certainly the Italians did not distinguish themselves by taking principled, leadership positions.

And when challenged on this, they would frequently say, "But we're just a small country, and we've been very poor, and we're just recovering from the war," and so forth. And then

you said, well if you look at the Belgians, who at that time were powerful beyond all proportion to the population in national wealth and so forth, the Italians didn't have a leg to stand on. But they just didn't feel that they wanted to lead. I suppose that could be challenged by anybody else who knows the scene, but I think most observers would agree with that.

Q: No, I understand that and support it. Did you have any feeling, from the outside, about the constant change in government? You were only there about three years, so you probably only saw four or five, as they called them, crises. Which aren't crises, they're just...

JUNIOR: Musical chairs.

Q: Musical chairs. Did you feel, at your level, whatever you were dealing with, this made any difference at all?

JUNIOR: If I work hard at being fair in these judgments about the Italians and the Italian government, I would have to say that that rapid rotation in Cabinet-level positions was probably, at least in part, the reason that they didn't feel that they could take a leadership position. Because if they did, the next day they might come to the office and discover that they had a new foreign secretary who didn't agree with that leadership position. So it was safer not to stick your neck out.

Q: Well then, you left Rome in 1977 and came back to the States, where you then were within a geographic bureau.

JUNIOR: Africa.

Q: And you were there from 1977 to 1980. What were you doing there?

JUNIOR: I was director for Central Africa.

Q: At this time, what did Central Africa consist of?

JUNIOR: Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, Congo, Angola, and a couple of the smaller states, like São Tomé and Príncipe, and so forth. We also had Cameroon, on the northeast flank, and the Central African Republic.

Q: [tape end] ...was during this '77 to 1980 period.

JUNIOR: Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. That has a flippant component, that answer, but Zaire is by far the largest, potentially the wealthiest, and certainly in strategic terms the most important country in South Central Africa as far as the U.S. was concerned. And given my prior experience in Lubumbashi, I probably emphasized that, I don't think unduly.

But because Mobutu was so well-entrenched with the U.S. government, so well-entrenched with economic interests in this country, so well-entrenched with the Central Intelligence Agency, and because the country was and had long been so important in terms of "Don't rock the boat in Central Africa," beginning with the formation of Zaire, that there was little you could do with or to Mobutu.

But I did what little I could to try to keep urging Mobutu and his henchmen, directly and indirectly, to try to develop some productive enterprise, to cut down on the corruption, to stop raking off from the top, to stop ripping off their own people, to get themselves organized into a governmental structure which could in fact, for example, do the most important thing of all, which would be produce enough food to feed all the people of Zaire.

In the event, the biggest crisis was, as I mentioned earlier, the second invasion of Shaba, which was over in something like ninety days, as I recall, but which featured a large-scale American airlift of Belgian and French troops into Shaba to allow them to chase out these mercenaries.

An interesting component of that, after the fact, was that, in brief, we had indications from the Angolans that they wanted to reduce the state of tension that had arisen from the fact that they sheltered these African mercenaries who went into Shaba, and wanted to parley. And on one occasion alone, and on another occasion with Don McHenry, we did secret trips into Rwanda to talk to the Angolans.

Q: At that time, we didn't have relations with Angola, being a Marxist regime.

JUNIOR: That's right. And despite the efforts of the African Bureau and all the leadership at the time, people like Brzezinski simply would not countenance the idea of having any kind of institutional relationship, even though they acknowledged that we really should be in a position to talk with the Angolans. I spent a lot of time as country director trying to figure out a way to set up that kind of a link, without success.

But on the second of these trips, I went in alone on the air attaché's plane from Kinshasa.

Can I diverge for a moment and give you a little nugget?

Q: Sure.

JUNIOR: I was going into Angola to say, "We understand that you would like to work out some modalities whereby you could settle the state of tension with Zaire. And if that's the case, what are you proposing?" That, in essence, was it. And I would take that message back to either Washington and/or Mobutu.

So I stopped on my way, in Rwanda, because the only feasible way for me to sneak in there was to go to Kinshasa and then use the air attaché plane to fly into Rwanda. And, of

course, I checked in with Ambassador Cutler and told him what this was all about. And he and I went up to see Mobutu, to tell Mobutu what was in the wind. In the end, when I told Mobutu what I was going to do, and what did he want me to say, if anything, to the Angolans, he said, "I'll talk, any time, any place. Just let me know and I'll be there, and I'll have my people there."

But before we got to that, on the way up to the palace, Walt Cutler turned on the Voice of America to pick up the morning news, and he heard that our distinguished ambassador to the United Nations had made the pronouncement to the effect that he didn't know why the U.S. government complained about political prisoners in other states when they had so many political prisoners in the United States.

Q: This was Andrew Young.

JUNIOR: Andrew Young. That very morning he had said it. And Walt blanched, and he said, "Oh, we're going to catch it from Mo." And sure enough, we went in, Mo greeted us, and asked us to sit down. He had on house slippers, and he took off one house slipper, and he said, "Mr. Junior, before we get into this, I want to say something to your ambassador here." And he started slapping his house slipper on the palm of his hand. And he started, and he said, "Mr. Ambassador (slap, slap), you come up here at least once a week (slap, slap) to lecture me on political prisoners (slap, slap), as though we had any in this country (slap, slap). Now I just happened to notice today..." He went on for about seven to ten minutes just giving it to Walt. And Walt just sat there, stony-faced, waiting it for it to end.

It did end, and Mobutu sat back in his chair. And he's a very charming guy, and he smiled and he said, "Now I feel better." And he turned to me and he said, "Mr. Junior, what can I do for you?"

So at any rate, I got to Angola through Rwanda. That's a separate story in itself. A really weird situation. In a hotel with East Germans, Czechs, Russians, and God knows what else.

Q: Cubans, I assume.

JUNIOR: Cubans. This melange of Socialist states, and me...

Q: This was supposedly a secret mission?

JUNIOR: Yes.

Q: It doesn't sound very secret if you...

JUNIOR: Well, it was certainly not a secret to the Socialists. But they didn't know what I was there for.

So I told the foreign minister, we had some long seances, but I said, "Mobutu says, `If you want to talk, any time, any place.'"

And they said, "Thank you very much, we'll let you know tomorrow."

The next day...interesting. He came to the hotel, a man from the Foreign Ministry, and he invited me out.

Q: This was who?

JUNIOR: A man from the Foreign Ministry. I've forgotten what his title was, a fairly senior fellow. He took me out of this hotel, which undoubtedly was bugged top to bottom, and walked me down to the nearby beach. And when we were walking along the beach, he said, "This is Tuesday. Do you think Mobutu would meet with us in Brazzaville on Sunday?"

I said, "This coming Sunday?"

He said, "Yes."

I said, "I can only tell you that he said any time, any place. And if you want me to tell him that, I will."

So he said, "Well, that's our proposal."

A plane came in, picked me up, took me back to Kinshasa, and I told Mobutu, "Brazzaville on Sunday."

And he said, "Brazzaville, Sunday, two o'clock. We'll do it."

So then I went across the river on the barge and talked to the Congolese, and said, "I don't want you to feel that we have obligated you in any way, but here's an opportunity for you to exercise the good offices that you have proffered before. And if you could provide a venue for these folks to get together, they'd like to meet this coming Sunday at two o'clock."

And they said, "You've got it. We're going to do it."

And they did it. And the Angolans and the Zairois came to a resolution of the problem, which has stuck until this day. With the really good help of the Congolese who chaired that meeting.

Now some of the facts are off--Sunday versus Tuesday and so forth--but that's the thrust of it.

Q: At the time you were there, who was in charge of African Affairs? Was it James Moose at that time?

JUNIOR: Not James Moose, Dick Moose, who was a fine fellow. I enjoyed working for him.

Q: This was the Carter administration, which was a real sort of change. In a way, one can almost call it an experimental administration, in foreign affairs; they were trying some things, many of which have stuck and all. Did you have a feeling that things were more in a flux as far as American foreign policy then than maybe at other times, in things you were dealing with?

JUNIOR: In regard to Africa?

Q: In regard to Africa.

JUNIOR: Moose, whose background you know, was very liberal and very progressive. He thought largely in the same terms as Andy Young. The head of policy planning, I think, was Tony Lake, who was very liberal. And Moose's deputies, while not liberal, were certainly not highly conservative. Bill Harrop, for one. So there was a major effort in the African Bureau, with considerable assistance, I guess it was from Cy Vance at the time, from the Seventh Floor, to induce a little flexibility so that we could go and talk and begin to get some of these problems in Africa resolved--like in Southern Africa. Big debates about whether or not we should boycott and so forth. At the time I left, the point of the chisel had been inserted, but it hadn't really begun to bite. Only lo these many years later have we seen the success of the Cohen operation, which is founded upon all those earlier efforts.

Q: What was sort of your attitude, and that of maybe the people around you, about Andrew Young, who had come out of the black civil rights movement in Georgia and was a national figure? And being ambassador to the United Nations, to the outsider he seemed to be somewhat of a loose cannon. And as you described what happened with your time with Mobutu, how did you all regard him over the period of time you were there?

JUNIOR: As a loose cannon, but one that was pointed in the right direction. He felt that you simply had to confront *The* problem in South Africa, apartheid, and do something about it, and be identified as being on the side of the good guys. We'll see, in the next ten to fifteen years, maybe, what the eventual payoff is, but at least that has gone a long way toward inducing the flux in the South African white society which is producing so many changes these days.

Q: Well, was the feeling among the professionals that you were dealing with: "Oh, God, this guy. It's all very nice, but it's hard to have normal relations. We have these

pronouncements and all coming there, and it's a little hard to get sort of the message that whatever we've been preaching was kind of the same"?

JUNIOR: If you talk to the people who were involved, my colleagues at the time still pretty much at the working level, I think you'd get a variety of answers. But I think everybody might agree that we wished that he weren't so much the American domestic politician, and that he would sort of shut up and tend to his business of being a professional diplomat. But in the sense that his ability to operate was largely based on a domestic constituency and the support of Jimmy Carter, I'm not sure that he could have been more closed than he actually was. But there were times when he opened his mouth and he simply shouldn't, like the pronouncement about American political prisoners. On balance, I think up until the time he got sacked, he was a constructive force for change. Without him, we probably would have been much slower in inducing the change that we've brought about in Africa, south of, let's say, the Central African Republic.

Q: I take it, though, as far as...we'll call it human rights, that there really was very little effect on Zaire and Mobutu.

JUNIOR: No. No. He just became more adept at concealing his machinations.

Q: You mentioned one other thing that I wonder if you could explain. You said that his ties to the CIA were so good. How did this play, as far as you saw our relations with Zaire?

JUNIOR: Well, as you know, the whole intelligence game is so layered and so structured that I, even at the time and certainly today, was not persuaded that I knew everything that was going on intelligencewise in Zaire and based in Zaire with impact in surrounding areas.

But to answer your question. In brief, the CIA, and people who had been with the CIA, and people who might then have been in contact with the CIA had access to Mobutu and they could deliver if they promised Mobutu something. Unfortunately.

Q: So was it your sort of impression that whereas the Department of State might preach our concern about human rights and all, that to some extent that was being undercut by the CIA having its own agenda?
JUNIOR: I think you would have to say that, as phrased, that's correct. I wouldn't advance the idea that the CIA people I knew were contravening U.S. policy, or undercutting the ambassador, or anything to that extent, but you had the right phrase: human rights was not part of their agenda. And to the extent that pushing the U.S. human rights plank sawed on the sensitivities of senior Zairois, to that extent they made themselves less effective. So they didn't. They had other fish to fry, and they wanted to get on with these jobs, many of them relating to what was going on in Angola and Southwest Africa, obviously linked with the South African issue and so forth. So they had a whole complex of problems to

deal with, and the human rights thing simply got in their way in Zaire, so they worked around it and didn't push this as being part of their program.

Q: You then left Central African Affairs in 1980 and went back to Personnel. Couldn't get you out of Personnel, eh?

JUNIOR: God help me, it was so dumb. So dumb.

Q: I take it this wasn't something you really were thirsting after.

JUNIOR: I went voluntarily. As my time in the Central African office was beginning to come to an end, Harrop and Moose asked me what I wanted to do, would I extend for a year? I talked to my family about it, and my answer was, "Thanks, but no thanks." At about that time, when I told Moose that I thought I'd better move on, he did not say, "I've got an embassy coming up for you." He did say, in words which I don't recall explicitly, that if I were to stay on for a year, he felt that I would be a very good prospect for a modest-sized embassy in Africa.

But I had to say no, for two reasons. One is, I just barely escaped with my professional skin from my involvement with Mobutu. (I'll get back to that.) The other thing is that my children were of such an age that had I at that point gone to Africa, under any circumstances, I would have had to leave them behind. And they were an age when I didn't want to leave them behind. So I was not really tempted to hang on and see what might happen.

The other aspect, which I just referred to, is that I had substantial professional policy differences with, particularly, Lannon Walker, who was my boss as deputy assistant secretary in the African Bureau, about what to do about Mobutu. In short, I tended to try to use the stick more than the carrot, and he was somewhat more subtle in his approach. And had Lannon Walker and Bill Harrop and Dick Moose not understood that I was doing what I thought was right, and fighting the good fight inside the bureau, and saluting and complying when I lost these battles, then it would have been easy, with a lackadaisical adjective, to have shot me down in flames, because we had major policy differences. In fact, they wrote me up extremely well for the job I did.

Q: You're talking about the efficiency report.

JUNIOR: Yes. And as you know, it doesn't take much to blight a career, intentionally or otherwise. But I came out of that quite well, and I thought that there was no point in continuing the situation where Lannon and I would continue to differ about how to deal with Mobutu.

Q: I wonder if you could talk a little, sort of in practical terms, about where some of the issues might have lain, or some examples.

JUNIOR: Mobutu, at one point late in my stay there, made it very clear that he wanted to come to Washington, and he wanted to come on an official visit, and he wanted to be invited to the White House, and he wanted to talk to the President of the United States. And I was successful for a while, not alone, but I led the fight to say not only no, but hell no, because we have certain respect for human rights, and you don't; so when you straighten up, we'll think about it. And there were others who had their own fish to fry in Mobutu's camp, Americans who had their own fish to fry, including, I think, some CIA contacts, ex-CIA contacts, and people like the diamond merchant, Maurice Tempelsman, who were trying to accommodate Mobutu. And they hired American PR companies to beat the drums for Mobutuism. And I eventually lost that one in the bureau; the bureau eventually conceded and said they would recommend that Mobutu be invited to the White House. I'm not sure that that's exactly accurate, but they didn't try the way I thought they should.

Q: How would a public relations firm develop a visit and have an impact on the recommendations? Did you have any feel for what they were doing?

JUNIOR: Well, they worked higher than my level, you see. They went to Congress, and there were a number of congressmen who felt very warm toward this staunch fellow who had always been anti-Communist, and they developed some congressional pressure. They went to the White House, and they went to the National Security Council, and I think surely they worked with CIA to develop backdoor recommendations that Mobutu could not be ignored this way and that the president ought to see him. And they came in and they talked with Dick Moose and Tony Lake and people on the Seventh Floor of the department, and eventually developed the idea: "Well, we might as well go ahead and invite this guy." I've forgotten what the company was, but they were extremely good about it.

Q: Well then, so off you went to be in charge of senior officers, is that right?

JUNIOR: I was not in charge. I went down there because it was a four-officer office and I knew three of the four guys down there, and I thought that they needed help. And this was...do you have the year there?

Q: Yes, you were there from 1980 to '82.

JUNIOR: Okay. You see, the new Foreign Service legislation had just been passed, the Act of '80, and nobody knew what the implications of that were. I didn't go down to the Senior Officer Division to get directly involved in that, but I saw a time of flux coming up. And George Andrews, who headed the Senior Officer Division, and Bob Winslow, who was deputy, asked me to come down, because they wanted me there and felt that, given the collegial way in which that office operates, I would fit in well. And I thought, given my prior experience, once again I might be able to help out the personnel system. In fact, the personnel system was, in effect, beyond all help, but I didn't know it when I went in there.

So I worked for a couple of years there, doing the best I could to put the right senior guys in the right senior jobs. But, of course, as you know, there are the ongoing complications: the power of the functional bureaus and the geographic bureaus to reach out and get whom they want; their ability to anticipate their openings and make quiet arrangements behind the scenes before Personnel even focuses on it; their ability to bring weight to bear on the director general and get lower-level decisions overridden and so forth. And in terms of ambassadors, and even DCMships, high-level committees and political considerations made the Senior Officer Division only marginally relevant to those selections. We tried to be of good cheer, but there was not much we could do to help the situation.

Q: Well, you were also at a time when, for a variety of reasons, including probably the over promotion to senior ranks at the time there, I would think, you had a considerable number of senior officers without real jobs, didn't you?

JUNIOR: Yes.

Q: I might add that our paths crossed at that time, because I was one of those who came out from a post and didn't have a job, and did odd things. I was not alone in this. And this was probably in many ways one of the worst times, wasn't it, as far as what to do about senior officers and find them significant, appropriate employment?

JUNIOR: Yes, that's right. Incidentally, I also had been in that walk-the-hall category before I went into Central African Affairs.

I don't want to get very far into discussion about personnel positions versus people and so forth. But what was happening to us at the time very largely arose because the department, then in particular, but as always, was thinking in micro-terms. The department is afraid to acknowledge its vast range of responsibilities and the things it has to do--within the department, in the Foreign Service, other agencies, the National Security Council and so forth. So when it goes to Congress for money, it always tries to say, "See, we've got this minuscule number of slots, very few people." Which is easy to do, by bureaucratic bean-counting and so forth. But what you can't do, if you've got four hundred senior officers, you can't say you've got three hundred and twenty-seven. So this surplus was created not because they had a surplus of officers, but because they had refused to acknowledge that there were a number of jobs that needed doing that senior officers could do. And only later on were there ways found to sort of rectify that (some that are not very satisfactory) and acknowledgment that there is legitimate work to be done. For example, the so-called short tour, the one to accommodate people in awkward situations in the job for nine months or a year, that's been legitimated now. At the point you're talking about, that was sort of a non-job, and it was very hard to get any recognition even if you did a stellar job in that interim assignment.

Q: What about the pressures from Congress? Was there a lot of pressure coming from on high: "My God, you've got to do something about this?" Because the situation had become public, in a way, and at least on the surface there seemed to be a significant number of high-ranking people without so-called jobs, although almost all of them were working.

JUNIOR: In my position, that was not an immediate problem. I saw some repercussions of that, but not much. Strangely enough, in my earlier stint in PER, I saw more of that, because it was my office that kept going up to the Sixth Floor to then-Director General Barnes and then-Director of Personnel Howard Mays to suggest ways by which the then-real problems could be dealt with. And from that level I could see a lot of complaints from Congress, so I became aware of them.

Incidentally, on one occasion, we went up with a statistical analysis and proposal, which we presented to Howard Mays, which would have solved an awful lot of problems in a very just and fair way. And that, anecdotally, was never destined to fly, because we had looked at the rules for time-in-class, and the provisions for senior officers were so generous, they were excessively generous, and still are. And we said, "All you have to do is to pare back on time-in-class for FSO Twos and FSO Ones and you will have solved the senior officer problem in three years."

And Howard said, "How are we going to do that?"

We said, "Well, for example, here's how long an FSO Two, or his equivalent, would be allowed to stay in class."

He looked at that and thought, "I'm one of those." And he said, "No, no, no, no, no, no!"

Q: You talked about the Foreign Service Act of 1980, and you came in about that time. It took about six years, I think, to have its real impact, particularly on the senior officers, and also on mid-career officers, because there were things built-in to this Act which were just what you were saying--real time-in-class limitations: one had to be promoted, even as a mid-career officer, to senior ranks within a certain time. Were you all focusing on that at all, or were you pretty much concentrating on getting people assigned?

JUNIOR: There were a number of people in PER who spent a lot of time on this, including the director general, Harry Barnes, and some of his immediate staff, and some others.

Q: Andy Steigman, probably, about that time, maybe, became involved.

JUNIOR: Andy was involved, and then we had the fellow who was sort of the planning director for Harry Barnes.

But I had shot off my mouth (which I had done all through my career in the Foreign Service), on a couple of occasions, about the Act and its implications and what ought to be done, so they drafted me. They said, "Well, okay, if you've got such strong opinions, you'll join the team and you'll start helping write the regulations." Which I did. I was not intimately involved in it, but very substantially so. Deciding, for example, about how you go about going from the old status to the new status when you had to take one cluster of mid-rank officers of the same grade and essentially the same time-in-class and spread them out in cohorts over a period of time so that you'd get a cyclical, regular, annual rotation in years to come. You had to try to figure out what an equitable, effective means would be to handle the enforced probable departure of seniors through the setting of new time-in-class limits. And that required, in turn, that you make some assumptions about how, under the new Act, you would go about offering limited career extensions (LCEs) to some part of those officers who otherwise would be bumped out and so forth. And in many ways these answers could not be solved until you came upon it at that point in time, when you saw what your problem was. You couldn't accurately hypothetically figure out what was going to happen unless you made some command decisions, like, for example, six years from now we are going to offer one out of three officers LCEs and so forth. It was all very misty, very vague, and not susceptible to mathematical solutions.

In addition to which, going back to something I said earlier, it was unfortunately not then, and to my own belief not today, possible to do that which a number of other organizations do, which is computer personnel modeling, whereby you say if we change the time-in-class requirements here, or if we change the new-officer intake to this extent, what effect is that going to have over the next ten years. You can't do that because we've never developed a sufficient database, never put the personnel against being able to develop that kind of program. So it was unfortunately by guess and by gosh when you did a lot of this stuff. It was sort of Kentucky Wendy's when you decided, you know, how many years in class should the new FEMC have before he's faced with out or a limited career extension.

Q: Now we come to your final assignment. You served for four years in Rotterdam, from 1982 to 1986, as consul general. Was that an assignment you sought, or was this sort of luck of the draw?

JUNIOR: It was largely luck of the draw, and certainly not a gem to be sought after. As I recall, I got into the bidding fairly late in the game, because I had assumed, up to a certain point, that my second daughter, who was just going into her second year of high school, would not want to go abroad until she got out of high school, so I was thinking about finding a domestic assignment. And I found I was wrong, that she wanted to go abroad. (It turned out that she was talking about *Paris*, but I didn't know that at the time.) But Rotterdam offered one thing primarily, and that is, an excellent American school in The Hague, which was readily available from Rotterdam which is only a half-hour away. And that worked out very well; she graduated from that school and learned a lot.

I noted, when I was briefing in EUR to go to the job, a certain a lack of interest, on the part of people in the bureau, in Rotterdam and anything that had to do with Rotterdam,

and very little news about any reporting coming out of Rotterdam. CA (Bureau of Consular Affairs) knew a lot about the consular activities in Rotterdam.

Q: CA being Consular Affairs.

JUNIOR: Consular Affairs. And what I was seeing then, but didn't identify, was a certain lack of interest, in the bureau, in Rotterdam because "nothing ever happens there." I mean, their politics were predictable, their economics were predictable. The biggest thing in Rotterdam, of course, was the world's largest, busiest port. But, you know, so what?

Q: Yes. And really, in Consular Affairs, it no longer plays much of a role at all.

JUNIOR: No.

Q: It's all taken care of by agents.

JUNIOR: The old shipping problems, you know, I didn't have any shipping problems. In all four years in Rotterdam, there was not one, not one case when outside of office hours I had to respond to a shipping problem. Not one.

In fact, the eventual closure of Rotterdam was a mistake, in at least one sense. Some inspectors came to Rotterdam (in retrospect it seems to me quite evident that they came in order to develop a rationale for closing the post), and they ran up some numbers on the back of an envelope which were intended to illustrate that it would be economical to close Rotterdam and shift some of the functions to the embassy in the Hague and some to Amsterdam. And even though the ambassador, Jerry Bremer, and I agreed that those numbers were wrong, fallacious, he perceived, and did not want to fight, the fact that the bureau wanted Rotterdam closed, and there was no point in trying to argue the numbers. So he gave up before I did, and of course when he gave up, I had to try to fight the good fight and keep Rotterdam open.

The reason the numbers were fallacious was that when you shifted your consular burden to Amsterdam, you shifted more work there, and you shifted the staff there. And the staff had to be paid as they were in Rotterdam. Moreover, in the larger staff structure there, you created the requirement for some new American jobs there and more senior positions among the locals, who were more expensive.

But that was all irrelevant. The bureau wanted Rotterdam closed, and we closed it.

A year before, we had moved into a building which had been given to us by the government of Rotterdam in return for our ceding a prime site on the inner harbor of Rotterdam, which they wanted, in part, for a park. Part of the deal was that once we had agreed on the building identified to us, they would rehab it, and that we, the U.S. government, would do the necessary internal security building, the hard walls and so forth. So a good part of the time I was in Rotterdam, I was overseeing the work on the

new consulate. We moved in there; a year later they closed us down, and that building is still the property of the U.S. government, because there is no way to get rid of that because nobody wants to move in there and spend the money necessary to tear out all that steel structure, in a not-very-desirable section of town, for, let's say, a bank. That was part of the fallacy of the numbers the inspectors worked up, because they said, "Well, we'll sell the building; it's worth about $500,000."

Anyway, have I diverged too far?

Q: No, not at all. This was a period of time, or maybe a little later, that our consulate general in Amsterdam was being egged, and there were continual demonstrations against it. I guess it was Central America at the time, but whatever it was, there seemed to be a very volatile group in Amsterdam. Now, Rotterdam was a different world?

JUNIOR: It's extraordinary, they are almost like in two different countries. Rotterdam is quiet, phlegmatic, hard-working, hardly sophisticated. Within a very small segment of the country, developed something like twenty, twenty-five percent of the gross national product. Has culture, has art, but nothing to the extent of Amsterdam. Amsterdam and Amsterdamers are effervescent, artistically inclined, liberal in their outlook, inclined to take in refugees. This has been true throughout history; when the Huguenots were driven out of France, a great many of them went into Amsterdam and were welcomed there. How long that will continue, I don't know, but during four years I didn't see any change in the balance. Amsterdam is bubbling; Rotterdam is not.

Q: There were serious considerations given to shutting down our consulate in Amsterdam at one time because of the constant demonstrations. Was there any talk about having Rotterdam pick up Amsterdam because we were getting harassed, in sort of a slap at the Amsterdam government for not controlling the situation?

JUNIOR: Well, we did close the consulate general in Amsterdam for quite some time. We just went out of business there for a while, until the Dutch authorities said, "Okay, well, we'll do the necessary to protect," and then we went back into business.

And of course the Rotterdamers were delighted that Amsterdam had egg on its face, so to speak, by having not protected the consulate general there, and by having people come from all parts of the country to Rotterdam to get consular services.

But so far as I know, there was never any really, really serious question about closing down Amsterdam. Amsterdam replaces seventeen passports lost or stolen to every one that Rotterdam used to replace, because it's sin city, and that's where people go for fun, and they tend to get rolled and to loose their passports and get their money stolen and need all kinds of attention from a consular officer.

Never happens in Rotterdam, to speak of. As I mentioned before, I never had a complaint from anyone, private or governmental, in my consular jurisdiction, about a drunken sailor.

A sailor would wreck a bar, the agent would come down, write out a check, and the police would roll these guys up and put them on the ship, and off they would go.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover in Rotterdam?

JUNIOR: Because there was little interest, in Washington, in Rotterdam, it would have been easy just to sort of sit there. When I first arrived, the ambassador was Bill Dyess, who did not use his subordinate posts at all well. As far as he was concerned, if we showed up at the staff meeting every week, that was all he really expected of us.

A little while ago, you were mentioning the demonstrations in Amsterdam about Central America and so forth, and that was indeed the cause, but the big cause of civil unrest in the Netherlands at the time was the plan to put Hawk missiles into southern Holland. Bill Dyess was sent to the Netherlands with instructions to facilitate that emplacement when the time came.

He went about his business in such a way that my understanding is the word was quietly passed from the Dutch back to Washington that Mr. Dyess might better make his contribution elsewhere. So Dyess was replaced by Jerry Bremer. Dyess would have been able to maneuver much better had he assessed what was happening and how people were reacting to his initiatives and so forth by asking the constituent posts to measure the temperature and velocity of political movement in the constituent areas. But he didn't. He was a one-man show, and he didn't use us for economic or political reporting or assessment.

Q: I might mention that Dyess was a professional career Foreign Service officer.

JUNIOR: Yes.

Q: So this was not an amateur doing this.

JUNIOR: Well, if you look at his record, you might want to question that slightly. Because, as far as I knew (and I never read his file), he had a not-very-distinguished career until he got into the job as deputy spokesman, and then spokesman, for the department. And apparently he did so well in defending the interests of the incumbent administration that they felt that he should be awarded with an ambassadorship. I don't think he'd ever really been tested in that sense, as a Foreign Service officer, before.

Q: What was Jerry Bremer's background?

JUNIOR: This is *the* Paul Bremer; he's called Jerry. Somebody might want to research this some time. Jerry Bremer is arguably the smartest guy I ever met, certainly one of the two smartest guys. He's got all sorts of computers going in his head: current problems, past history, advance problems, anticipating problems. He was totally on top of that embassy within six months after he moved in. He was ahead of everybody.

Q: What was his background?

JUNIOR: Well, he had not been much of a manager previously. He had been DCM in Tanzania at one point, I think DCM Oslo at another point--relatively little foreign experience. But this is the point I think needs researching: I think there has been no person in the Foreign Service who has been, in effect, special assistant to four different secretaries of state. He was so smart and personable and poised and well-presented, that every time he came back to Washington, and before he ever went abroad in the first instance, he was sucked up to the Seventh Floor and became very close to the incumbent secretary of state, including Henry Kissinger.

Q: Where is he now?

JUNIOR: He's working for Henry Kissinger in New York, he's a deputy to Kissinger. Eagleburger left Kissinger and came back to the department, and Bremer, in effect, took his place.

Q: From your vantage point, how did you see him work sort of the Dutch scene regarding, particularly, the Hawk missiles, and other matters?

JUNIOR: To be clear, but unfair to Bill Dyess, his problem was that he is ham-handed, and he handled this problem ham-handedly. And the Dutch, who don't pretend to be sophisticated, really are quite sophisticated, and they did not appreciate Dyess's public speeches which endeavored to tackle this problem and to enlist Dutch public opinion on the site, by right. He was much too unsettled.

Bremer, when the history of the Hawk emplacement is written, will get very high credit, because he worked invisibly. He worked behind the scenes with the Dutch leadership, understood what they were trying to do, never made life more difficult for them, and let them take the lead in finally getting the problem and to approve it--under very risky circumstances; the whole thing could have gone down the tubes, given one false move. So Bremer was brilliant in the job, but invisibly so.

Incidentally, before the assignment, Bremer had never spoken a Germanic language, although I think he did speak some Norwegian. Before he left Holland, he was doing live interviews in Dutch on TV, on issues of the day.

Q: Good God!

JUNIOR: And he did that by studying his Dutch every morning intensely, when he wasn't running the embassy and when he wasn't running marathons. He was a marathon runner. A remarkable man.

Q: Well, you left Rotterdam in 1986, is that right?

JUNIOR: That's about right, yes.

Q: And then you came back for a relatively short tour in the department again.

JUNIOR: When I went to Rotterdam, I had an indefinite future when I came back. I was approaching a point where, "Let's give him a limited career extension," I would be forced out of the Foreign Service. So I thought, briefly, that probably I should look forward to maybe moving to California. But I didn't intend to do that until I came back here and saw what the job prospects were. They were very dim indeed and I had just about decided that I would wait until the good weather of spring arrived before I retired.

But I got a telephone call from an acquaintance (not a friend), Mark Dionne, who was senior deputy in the International Narcotics Bureau, who asked me to come see him and his boss, Ann Wrobleski, a politically appointed assistant secretary in INM, about a job that had just been created.

In short, that job was to be an interim job, a short-term job, highly challenging, but not one that would occupy my attention over the longer term. It was highly classified; it had to do with intelligence matters. And my job was to get an intergovernmental structure together and to make it work.

I did that, and when it came time for me to retire, they had no one to staff it on behalf of Ms. Wrobleski, no one with the seniority and the clearances and the time to do that, so they asked me if I'd like to do it part-time. Because it was a part-time job. I retired and stayed on as a consultant, or, when-actually-employed person. And I stayed in that until the new team arrived. Wrobleski and Dionne left, and new people came in, and they didn't share my interest and enthusiasm, so I thought it best that I not simply hang on for the sake of hanging on. So I conveyed that to them and actually retired.

Q: Well, Don, I want to thank you very much. This has been very interesting; it really has.

End of interview