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HENRY J. KELLERMANN

Interviewed by: Hans Tuch
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INTERVIEW

Introduction

Q: This is Hans Tuch interviewing Henry J. Kellermann on January 30, 1989 at his home in Bethesda, Maryland.

Henry Kellermann was born in Germany in Berlin, in 1910; attended school at the University of Heidelberg at Freiburg, and also, in this country, Johns Hopkins University from 1937 to 1938, as well as Columbia University in New York in 1942.
KELLERMANN: And Berlin.

Q: And Berlin, yes. Of course. That goes without saying.

Mr. Kellermann, Henry Kellermann, spent 25 years with the Department of State both in Washington and as a foreign service officer abroad.

What makes him and what he has to tell us particularly interesting in the context of public diplomacy is because I believe he was one of the originators in the post-World War II era of what we now call public diplomacy.

In my view, the whole post-war public diplomacy field -- and it really wasn't called that until quite recently -- emanated from two different sources.

One of them was the Cold War when, after President Truman's speech on his campaign of truth in 1950, we from then on, primarily, initially through the Voice of America, tried to have a world-wide public affairs program which would oppose the aggression of the Soviet Union and the aggression of communist ideology.

The other source, in my view, comes from our efforts after World War II in Japan, Germany and Austria to try to reeducate, reorient, the populations of those defeated nations in order to redemocratize or bring back democracy, or bring democracy to these countries.

In that effort we, for the first time, really got involved in cultural-education exchanges and relationships in order to promote an intellectual exchange between our two countries, which was then translated into the other countries of Europe which needed such intellectual input, together with their economic redevelopment in that period of time.

You, Henry, were particularly instrumental in that period, from, say, 1945, '46 to the early '50s in this whole reeducation and reorientation effort. As a matter of fact, you published a book in 1977, I believe. Is that right?

Entrance Into Public Diplomacy Work

KELLERMANN: Yes.

Q: Yes, which is called Cultural Relations: Instrument of Foreign Policy, U.S.-German Exchanges, 1945 to 1954. If you don't mind, I would like to focus on that particular period.

So the first question is: How did you get into this at all? How did you get involved in this?
KELLERMANN: Well, let me think back for a minute. After all, it's more than 40 years ago. While certain things are very vivid in my mind; others have faded a little into the background.

What happened was that after the termination of hostilities in 1945, you had a period in which the American government, together with the British, the French, and initially with the Russians, was, in a way, the quasi-government of Germany.

It performed functions which are normally the responsibility of any normal government. We were responsible for politics, for economics, legal affairs, administration affairs, and foreign policy all of which in the beginning were not very well defined, but which in the course of the following years became a well-planned, thoroughly organized program in which the United States inserted much of its prestige, manpower, and financial resources.

What you call "public diplomacy" didn't start as an integral part of military government. It was only after the State Department took over that certain functions were welded into the so-called public affairs program. It consisted of different, but related activities, cultural and educational programs on one side and public information on the other.

I was sitting in the Department of state in those days, at the long-arm of this policy. All the operations in Germany were supervised and directed by the Pentagon.

Q: Up to forty-nine ('49).

KELLERMANN: Yes, until State took over. The colonels under General Clay ran the program.

Now we found out very early in the game that while economics and politics figured very prominently in Clay's program, education and information were a stepchild of his operation. In fact, General Clay, who was a true believer in his own priorities, felt that he could not teach democracy on empty stomachs.

So for this reason, everything that had to do with food and the most important necessities of daily life came first; education and information took a backseat. When one day a group of German journalists appeared in my office in the State Department, they reminded me that we had promised them a democratic press.

I said, "We did, indeed."

They said, "Well, we are dead before we even get started."

Q: When was that?

KELLERMANN: That was, I believe, '46 or '47. I asked: "How come?"
They said, "We have no paper. There's no newsprint for newspapers, nor paper for textbooks. The general doesn't believe in spending money on what he seems to consider at this point to have a lower priority."

I said, "I tell you what I would do if I were you. You have been invited to attend a conference of publishers and press people in Texas beginning tomorrow. You go there and you tell them just exactly what you told me, namely that the press is a stillborn child of the occupation."

They did, and what I expected happened. The following morning the front pages carried headlines: "German press being starved out of existence."

General Clay, had a great deal of respect for public opinion and the press. In less than a week the paper was shipped in from Sweden and other places. That was the first time we put a foot down.

**Origin of Licensing System For German Newspapers**

*Q:* Of course, at that time is when the newspapers were licensed.

**KELLERMANN:** They were licensed. Incidentally, the licensing system was a scheme I had worked out when I was still with OSS preparing the occupation. I wrote a guide book for Military Government which proposed the licensing system, which had its good effects and some bad effects as well. The British must have adopted the same system.

*Q:* Oh, yes. It was adopted all over Germany.

**Reformation of The German Educational System**

**KELLERMANN:** Now you mentioned the word reeducation. I really never quite like it. It has a certain flavor of arrogance and, at the same time, naivete. It suggested that we were trying to make Germans all over again, from scratch. This is not what we had in mind.

Neither did General Clay, I have to say in his defense. What Clay had in mind, and what we supported, was a change of the educational system.

*Q:* Right.

**KELLERMANN:** ...that is to say, of the institutions, and particularly of the nefarious so-called two-track system, which separated the poor kids from the rich, which enabled a privileged minority to go to high school and to the university. The rest of them stopped being educated at the age of 14 or so.
We thought this was a low down, highly undemocratic feature of the prevailing system. We came out in favor of free text books and free tuition and equal educational opportunity for all.

Now those were all unheard of things in Germany, and there was, of course, resistance. Many didn't like us out-landers who would come in with newfangled ideas and try to revamp a system that they felt was second to none, that had had a rich tradition with well-known standards of excellence and had to be defended against any kind of interference from the outside.

Well, as I said, General Clay had his problems. In certain parts of Germany reforms did succeed. Berlin was one notable example. Bremen at least for a while, was, and Hesse. But in Bavaria we had to face Alois Hundhammer, Minister of Education, who had been a strong and devout anti-Nazi, but who was also one of the most reactionary traditionalists. He even insisted on the ritual of corporal punishment.

I met him, a very well-groomed, almost elegant man with an Andreas Hofer beard. His excuse for reintroducing corporal punishment ("Pruegelstrafe"), was: "Bavarian boys wear leather pants. They can take it."

Coming back to General Clay's school reform efforts, it has always been questionable whether such esoteric things as education and culture can be taught by military force. The military operate by fiat, by order. This is --

Q: Just a second. I'm going to change the batteries on this because I think maybe they're getting a little weak. Just a moment.

KELLERMANN: Okay.

Q: Continue.

KELLERMANN: Beyond this, there seems to be a self-contradiction in trying to teach democracy by military command. Now when the State Department took over in '49, we had to give up most of the controls which permitted us --

Q: Who's "we"?

KELLERMANN: All western allies.

Q: Yes.

KELLERMANN: Previously, under military government we were able to enforce our policy in political and economic areas and in education and information as well. In 1949 we proposed to let go of our controls in the latter two areas.
The French didn't like our abandonment of controls. They considered it premature. I remember I was at the time in Paris attending the conference of foreign ministers. I was called in the inner sanctum of Mr. Sauvagnargues, who later became ambassador to Bonn, and also foreign minister.

He kept saying, "What is your hurry? Why do you want to get rid of controls in education? We are not ready yet. We still have a job to do; we want to hold on to the controls as long as we can." There was a real difference in our policies between us.

The French, undoubtedly, were the most tenacious, or I might say, the most consistent of the western occupiers. They wanted to hold on to every bit of control as long as possible. The British were the most relaxed. Timing didn't mean much to them. We were somewhere in the middle.

What happened was that when in 1949 the State Department took over, we decided that we had to have a change of methods. The military was no longer an acceptable instrument of occupation policy. We had to make do without it. There were two key arguments or key pillars of this new policy. One was that we had to hand the responsibility for "reeducation" over to the Germans. Actually a beginning had been made earlier when Secretary Byrnes made his speech in Stuttgart in 1946.

Q: Secretary of State, yes.

KELLERMANN: Secretary of State, yes.

Q: Up to '46.

KELLERMANN: He indicated then that this was the way things had to go. When we took over in 1949, we started on it in earnest.

The other pillar of the new policy was money. We decided that democratization couldn't be done on a starvation budget like the one Clay had for education. It had to be a big program or it made no sense having any program at all.

Q: You're speaking when we say "we" for the State Department?

KELLERMANN: Yes, the State Department.

Q: Right.

The Great Expansion of The Exchange of Persons Program

KELLERMANN: I remember that I was discussing the problems with my staff. We were planning the future of the exchange program. Until then the exchange program had been a
mere trickle of, at best, a few hundred people. I said, "If you really mean it, it has got to be not a hundred but a thousand -- not only a thousand but I would say three thousand people per annum." I remember one budget director, Irving Schwarz spoke up and said, "Why not 3,600?" I asked, "Do you think we can do it?" Somebody said, "We've never done anything like this before. We have no idea, but we can try." So we started. Eventually we moved thousands of people back and forth during those critical first years of the McCloy High Commission.

Q: That was 1949 to 1952?

KELLERMANN: Yes. In those years we moved a total of about 14,000 people. In other words, it was a sort of "Cultural Marshall Plan." We had a budget which by today's standards may not be too impressive. It was between 50 and 60 million dollars per year. If you translate it into present monetary values, it would probably be ten times that much.

Q: For just one country?

KELLERMANN: For one country. Other countries benefited from it --

Q: Yes.

KELLERMANN: -- because later we extended the program to France, to Switzerland, to Sweden and to other European countries to make it --

Q: The lower countries, Spain?

KELLERMANN: -- to get them into the act. The point was that instead of us telling Germans what to do we invited them to come over here and to look for models that they might want to use upon their return to Germany. That was the secret of our success. It worked.

Q: Now the exchange program was one element of this program?

KELLERMANN: Yes.

Q: We also at the time -- I know because I was involved in it myself -- had a number of cultural centers. America always had these, with libraries and speakers and exhibitions and various different seminars, etc.

KELLERMANN: Right, yes.

Q: Which also were -- do you think that they were also an important element?

KELLERMANN: Oh, yes, they were an essential part of it. So was Radio Station RIAS in Berlin.
Q: Right.

KELLERMANN: So was Die Neue Zeitung, a daily newspaper which we published in Germany.

Q: In Frankfurt and Berlin.

KELLERMANN: And in Munich. These were also like Huete and Neue Aus which we published in addition. All this was part of what was called the public affairs program under the direction of Shepard Stone. A publisher Ralph Nicholson was the first director. He was followed by Shepard Stone.

Q: Then Mickey Boerner.

KELLERMANN: Yes, then came Mickey Boerner. There were many others who followed. But there was another thing which turned public affairs into public diplomacy.

The Complete Integration In The Department State of Political, Economic and Public Diplomacy Programming

You see, in Washington as well as in Germany, the key elements of our administration consisting of politics, economics and public affairs, were not isolated operations, but worked as a team. That was true in Germany, where Shep Stone belonged to the inner counsel of High Commissioner McCloy. But that was also true in Washington where I, as one of the directors in the Bureau of German Affairs, formed a team with my political and economic colleagues, all under the guidance, first, of Robert Murphy, and later on of Hank Byroade.

Q: Here in Washington?

KELLERMANN: In Washington.

Q: Yes.

KELLERMANN: Then came Jimmy Riddleberger. The German Bureau was a team. I was as much involved in general policy discussions as the political and economic officers were in public diplomacy.

Q: You know, that was really quite unusual for the Department of State.

KELLERMANN: It was absolutely unique; it was the first time it ever happened, and I'm afraid it was also the last time.
Q: Well, tell me, why did this kind of thing happen and who were the motivators of this? I mean there has to be some kind of -- because normally the Department of State was politically, or they weren't even economically oriented at that time -- they became economically oriented.

Now here you have one operation that really combined the essential elements of diplomacy. How could that have happened?

KELLERMANN: It was largely a result of personalities. If we hadn't had a man like Robert Murphy on top ...

Q: Yes.

KELLERMANN: -- who was fully familiar and in complete sympathy with all aspects of his Bureau including public affairs, and later his successor, Hank Byroade, who had the same philosophy; and if you hadn't had a man like McCloy in Germany, to whom we gave a package of recommendations when we went over there to plan and organize our operation in Germany, we would not have had the success which we had.

Q: People like Benjamin Buttenwieser and --

KELLERMANN: Buttenwieser, Bob Bowie and Allan Lightner.

Q: -- and Shep.

KELLERMANN: -- and Shep Stone. They all were part of the team.

Q: Right. That's interesting.

KELLERMANN: Later on, when we drifted apart again, when USIA was created and took over the public affairs program, I was asked at that time what I thought of the transfer. I always felt and said then that we would never reach the same impact which we had in those critical five, six, seven years in Germany. We operated as a unit, as a family really.

We all respected each other and felt mutually responsible.
We were lucky to have some outstanding men in European-German affairs. I mentioned Bob Murphy. There were others. There was Hank Byroade; there was Perry Lautoff; there was Jack Reinstein, there was Cecil Lyon. Those were the people who worked in unison.

Q: Was there any consideration at that time both in Germany and in the State Department -- you agreed that there were things that we ought to be doing in the field of public affairs -- educational exchange, cultural centers, libraries, newspapers, other publications, exhibitions. Was there any talk about to whom we should direct our
programs? You couldn't possibly talk to the whole German population. Was there a consideration that we ought to concentrate on specific elements --

KELLERMANN: Well, we were lucky again, lucky first in terms of personalities. We were lucky to find a man like Adenauer with whom you could have the necessary dialogue. His relationship to McCloy was outstanding.

We found a man in Berlin like Ernst Reuter, a most courageous man that was in charge of Berlin at a very critical moment.

You had a man like Erhard, who was the economic miracle worker. We were lucky to find many talented people in the press, in the radio, in education. They were the ones who served first as the sounding board, and later as allies in our common enterprise.

Difference In 1945-52 Policy From Allied Policy
In 1920's After World War I

All of them subscribed to the same general philosophy. I think I ought to point that out because there was difference, a very significant difference between the '20s and the '40s.

In the '20s, after World War I, the allies moved into Germany. The key to their policy then was reparations. Germans were expected to pay astronomical sums, allied troops marched into the Ruhr and the Rhineland.

Q: We were --

KELLERMANN: The difference between the '20s and the '40s.

Q: '20s, yes.

KELLERMANN: Yes. On the other hand, the '20s also witnessed the first genuine attempt of Germany to become a democracy and a republic, to boot. There were reasons why it collapsed, lots of reasons. When Hitler came to power, he found fertile soil for his conquest: reparations, occupation, inflation, you name it, had prepared the ground -- it was a miserable existence for most Germans. But those were not the only reasons for the collapse of the Republic. I think one of the elements that played a part was the fact that the German democracy and the Weimar Republic never got the kind of support and understanding from the outside that it needed in order to prevail. I think that was a contributory element to the downfall of the Republic.

Now those of us in the '40s who remembered and resolved that the mistake of the '20s must not be repeated. This time, we had to do our level best to give all the support we could muster to the upcoming new democratic Germans.
We had to find them, naturally. The idea of helping to build a democratic Germany rather than to exact reparations that Germany couldn't pay, was one of the guiding motives of our policy, and you might say of our public diplomacy because in order to do it you had to go down to the grass roots.

Q: This was contrary to the policies at that time, at least initially, of our allies, wasn't it?

KELLERMANN: No, I couldn't say that.

Q: Certainly, the Soviet Union, but --

KELLERMANN: Well, that goes without saying, yes.

Q: How about the French and the British?

KELLERMANN: Well, their methods were different. The principles, and the principal policies, which became a tripartite policy after the quadripartite policy collapsed, when the Russians walked out of the Control Council. They were united in their policy, but there methods were, I have to admit, quite different. As I mentioned earlier, the French were doing a number of things that were different.

First of all, they catered to the intellectuals, and to a high-brow middle class taste. They sent artists, philosophers and authors into Germany at an early stage. They had Andre Gide come over to give lectures. They set up in Mainz a elegant academy bench for the learned members of German society, which actually never got going. I still see that marvelous room they had planned to use for conferences, beautiful high-backed chairs, and nobody sitting in them except we, the visitors.

The British operated more by hit and miss. I talked to some of my British colleagues and kept asking them, "Now when you were sent to Germany to do your stuff, reeducate or whatever, what instructions were you given?" They said, "Instructions? We didn't have any. We were told to go ahead and play it by ear."

The British, as you know, are very good at playing by ear. They have a tradition of ad hoc decision making that stretches over centuries. They did not do a bad job altogether. Above all, as I said, they were far more relaxed, and were not quite as systematic in their approach as we were. We got together with the British, and we worked out certain programs with them. We extended our exchange program to their zone. American Houses were set up there as well, and our newspapers got distributed there. So, for all practical purposes, it was a unified operation.

Q: When you referred earlier to the fact that we were going to do things differently in 1945 from what we had done in the 1920s, vis-a-vis Germany, you said "We". Again, I'm interested in personalities. Were there specific people that you know of or remember that were particularly instrumental in this yourself?
KELLERMANN: Well, before the end of hostilities you had a number of groups, people
-- one was headed by Archibald MacLeish -- who were working on plans for reeducation
and democratization of Germany. I was asked somewhat recently by German journalists
whether we had a unified plan served on a silver platter when we started. No, we did not.
We, too, worked by, I wouldn't say hit or miss, but by inspiration and by trial and error.
The program which we started was different from the one that evolved towards the end.
We extemporized and improvised as we went along. But there was an overall plan for a
public affairs program that we proposed when McCloy took over, and that we revised in
step with political developments.

Q: The approach was entirely different, and the approach was --

KELLERMANN: The approach was a different one.

Q: -- to bring people back into the universe of a sort of democratic society.

KELLERMANN: Yes. After all, Germany had been cut off from the rest of the world for
about 12 years.

Q: Now how did the Cold War, which also really started at about the same time, how did
that impact on our program in Germany?

KELLERMANN: Well, it had a fairly decisive impact. There's no question about it. The
Cold War as well as the war in Korea.

Q: Then, of course, the Berlin blockade.

KELLERMANN: --and the Berlin blockade.

Q: Yes.

KELLERMANN: It accelerated a process which we had envisaged in the beginning
would take 10, 20 years, who knows? In 1948-49, it became quite clear that things
wouldn't work out the way we had envisioned them; Germany would not continue as a
unified country. There was the cleavage between East and West. The question was:
Would the West Germans go east, or would they stay west? It was a real problem for a
while. Later, we found out that most of our fears were unfounded. The Germans had
made up their mind that they were going to stay in the West. As a result, we took them
into the family. We did something for which we were criticized for a while, here as well
as in Germany. We put them back in uniform. Nobody had expected that this would
happen at such an early date.

Q: Back then in 1956, '55-'56?
KELLERMANN: I don't remember exactly the date. NATO came into existence earlier; Germany was put back into the European community. Then came Berlin, and Berlin turned most Americans toward Germany once again.

Q: When I was speaking to Michael Weyl on the same subject a few weeks ago, and I had also mentioned that from my perspective this whole discipline of public diplomacy, and the two sources that I mentioned earlier, he also stated that the two strands came together in 1947-48, when suddenly, because of the conditions, the East-West conditions, that had arisen from the Cold War, suddenly the program for public diplomacy -- public affairs in Germany -- received more resources because we felt very strongly that we needed to have the Germans on our side. Therefore, more money was given to this kind of program than theretofore.

KELLERMANN: Yes, I would agree with him. That's quite correct, although it was not part of our original policy. I would add one more thing. To me, public diplomacy lacks one additional dimension -- namely, inclusion in our overall policy. I mean the active inclusion and participation not only at the governing level but of all strata of society. This was mirrored again in our exchange program, which included everybody from teenagers to cabinet officials, including future chancellors and presidents who thus became graduates of our exchange program.

Q: That is my definition of public diplomacy.

KELLERMANN: Well, that is the legitimate one.

Q: Yes.

KELLERMANN: It seems to me, that is the public diplomacy par excellence.

Q: The one additional element, at least in my estimation, in my definition of the term, is the reciprocal part. In other words, that as we convey information about our society and our policies to all strata of, say, another country's society, we at the same time learn it is a two-way street.

KELLERMANN: It is.

Q: Unless we understand what drives another society, we can't possibly be successful in projecting our society to them. In other words, it's an absolute two-way street. This is, of course, one of the problems that USIA has faced over the years.

Now I think that it's more and better understood than it was in earlier times with the earlier directors of USIA, who felt that their only interest was to give information to, you know, to send out data and information and people, and not to take into consideration the culture, the history, the traditions of the people with whom we're communicating.
KELLERMANN: Yes, but we, too, made this mistake in the beginning. It was really never State Department philosophy. We always looked at it in terms of a reciprocal, bilateral or multi-lateral relationship.

Q: Well, the exchange program was a bilateral --

KELLERMANN: That was supposed to be, yes.

Q: Actually, also in our cultural centers, in our libraries, in our communications process it was always a dialogue. It was not a lecturing process; it was a dialogue that we tried to implement.

KELLERMANN: At the same time we never lost sight of what we were there to do. I mean we had a job to do and we did it. Of course, the only question that remains to be asked, and I don't think any one of us can answer it yet with any amount of assurance, is, "How well did we succeed". That is, after all, the nutshell of all our efforts. Unless we can come up with some positive answer -- and we should be able to do it by now -- we would have wasted an awful lot of time, money and man-power.

I remember one thing. We were in France not so long ago, on the Riviera. My wife and I were sitting in a restaurant one evening and a young couple was sitting next to us. We didn't know at first what language they were speaking. It turned out to be German, and so we talked to them. It turned out that they both were journalists and it also turned out that the husband had formerly been a member of our editorial staff on the Neue Zeitung. I told him that was a program I was connected with at its heyday. He said, "I'm so glad to hear you say that, and I want to say one more thing which I always wanted to say to somebody who worked on it, namely that your program has formed my generation, literally." I was quite moved. Here was a bit of evidence that we had done something useful. The man had remembered.

Q: On this note, unless you have anything else that you might --

KELLERMANN: I could go on forever. I mean I have so much to add. I wrote a book, and I'm trying to peddle it to publishers, in which I've put in a great deal of this material.

(Main interview was concluded)

Addendum to Transcript of Interview

Conventional wisdom and traditional diplomatists insist -- and will forever -- that PUBLIC DIPLOMACY is a contradiction in adjectu, irreconcilable components of an equation that simply is not solvable. Diplomacy, again according to traditionalist members of the trade, is by its very definition a private, generally secret one-on-one encounter, an activity conducted in camera by experts who depend on the secrecy of negotiations for the success of their business. That the results of their efforts eventually may become public, by indiscretion, leaks or the passing of time, and [the fact that] that
they may ultimately, though not always benefit the public is a consequence not necessarily germane to the function of diplomacy nor to the original intent of the action per se. So far Nicholson and the rest of his school have actually suggested that not only secrecy but duplicity are criteria of diplomacy.

In recent years, quite in contrast to and even in defiance of the traditionalist wisdom, diplomacy has gained new attributes and objectives and also different dimensions of which "public diplomacy" and "multilateral diplomacy" are prime examples. The latter, of course, is the prerogative and the instrument of multilateral relations as conducted in multilateral agencies, such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies and affiliates. The former, however, is the functional offshoot of policies aimed at involving non-governmental groups and individuals actively and responsibly in the policies of their government through government to people and eventually people to people contacts.

An example par excellence has been the program initiated and operated in Germany in the aftermath of World War II. After the termination of the occupation and the OMGUS regime policy by fiat, the Office of German Public Affairs of the State Department, which I directed at the time, endeavored to get the German populace directly and personally engaged in the democratization (misnamed reeducation) process, thereby paralleling and actually undergirding the political and economic twin policies to let Germans restructure their governmental apparatus from the bottom up by first rebuilding local and state authority and eventually the federal government.

The key element of this "reorientation" effort, but by no means the only one, was the so-called exchange of persons program which moved within the span of less than eight years 14,000 persons to and from Germany, the bulk going from Germany to the United States and, the rest to other (European) democracies. The critical criteria of the program, as I pointed out in my book, were that it was massive, target oriented, stratified, innovative, interzonal and, above all, participatory. Germans not only were the principal beneficiaries but they were directly involved in the selection and follow-up. Moreover, by its very pervasiveness, the program included representatives of all key strata of German society, from the cabinet, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, academia to the professions, farmers, labor, students and teenagers (the last group, teenagers, continues to this very day). In effect it was a "Cultural Marshall Plan." Furthermore, instead of enforcing a change of institutions and reforming the (educational) system by direct intervention, as had been the practice of Military Government, Germans who came to the United States were given the opportunity to seek and find their own models of democratic institutions and practices for application, after appropriate adaptation, to their domestic needs.

When we speak of "public diplomacy" today, the German public affairs program of the late forties and early fifties meets the test. It was designed to give the democratic elements in Germany another chance to prove their mettle by instituting democratic reforms on all levels of public and private life, that is to say, by rebuilding a government of law, by restoring an educational system open to all, by reviving a democratic press and by assuring free citizenship participation in all these endeavors. This is precisely what the
allies failed to do after the end of World War I when they did not come to the aid of a fledgling democracy that was attacked every day of its short life by enemies from within and without. But this was also the first major breakthrough in public diplomacy of note and depth unprecedented and so far unequaled in the annals of American history.

BIOGRAPHIC SYNOPSIS
HENRY J. KELLERMANN

Born: Berlin, Germany, 1910

Education:

Humanistic Gymnasium, 1916-1928

Universities of Berlin, Heidelberg, Freiburg i/Br.

1932: First Bar Examination

1937: Doctor of Jurisprudence (Berlin)

Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore

1937-38 Fellow (by courtesy) Political Economics Columbia University (School of Social Work), New York

1942: Social Work Diploma

Career:
In Germany:

Law Clerk

Youth Leader

Journalist (Editorial Staff)

In USA:

Social Worker (National Refugee Service)

Faculty Assistant (New York School of Social Work)

Study Director (Welfare Council of NYC)

Civil Service: 1942-1945
Propaganda Analyst (Foreign Broadcast Service Intelligence Service)

Political Analyst-Office of Strategic Services (OSS)

Chief of Research and Consultant to the Office for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nuremberg

**Diplomatic Service: Department of State/Foreign Service 1945-1970**

Area Chief (Educational and Information Policies for Germany and Austria)

Director, Office of German Public Affairs, Washington

U.S. Permanent Representative to UNESCO, Paris and Advisor on United Nations Affairs, Washington

Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'affaires American Embassy, Bern, Switzerland

Consultant to Policy Planning Council, Washington

Special Assistant for Environmental Affairs (Bureau of Scientific and Technological Affairs)

**After Retirement:**

National Academy of Sciences, Director, Committee for International Environmental Programs

Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, Adjunct Professor

**Additional Data: Outside Activities:**

Consultantship with RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California: public speaking and writing

**Publications:** (list not complete)

"Cultural Relations as an Instrument of Foreign Policy"-Published by the Department of State.

Historical studies: Number 3 (The Educational Exchange Program between the U.S. and Germany, 1945-54) (LC Catalogue Card #78-600002)

"Party Leaders and Foreign Policy" in West German Leadership and Foreign Policy, published by RAND Corporation.

Various articles and studies published in the State Department Bulletin and other periodicals.

Civil Affairs Guide on post war information media in Germany.

Doctoral dissertation on Criminal Law.

**Awards:**

Superior Honor Award, Department of State.

Great (Commander's) Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany

**Special Assignments and Missions:**

Chairman of (White House) Committee on International Environmental Affairs, Federal Council on Science and Technology.

Member of White House Task Force on Population and Environment

Chairman of U.S. Delegation to European Conservation Conference

Member of U.S. Delegation to Conference of Council of Foreign Ministers

Member of U.S. Delegation to various UNESCO conferences

Member of State Department Missions to Germany, etc.

*End of interview*