Q: Here we are in McLean Gardens, Washington, DC. It is the 29th of September 2007 and Dan Whitman is interviewing Aman Khan, who was once a Foreign Service National at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. We are very honored to have this interview, because it is the first ever in our series with a local employee. We are way overdue in beginning this aspect of our research. Also present is Dr. Affiz (A). [Later in the interview we will be joined by Tom (T) (p. 103) and a voice (V)(p. 96).]

Mr. Khan, I’d like to start by asking you to give just a brief overview from the very beginning. Let’s start with your birth, but in a paragraph, may I know the basics, a synopsis of your curriculum vitae?

KHAN: To start with my date of birth, I was born on December 30th, 1939. If you asked me as to what prompted me to join the American embassy, I would briefly state that I had just returned from the UK (the United Kingdom), where I had done my degree in international relations. I came back and I came to know that there was this position as the political advisor at the American embassy. Somebody had read it, and I was told that I really perfectly fit it as per the requirements, because my qualifications were absolutely suitable to the job. My political science background---I had my political science degree with honors, and then this diploma in international relations from the UK---was making me a very good candidate. There were about 250 candidates, and I was that of ; there were more than 200 candidates. A proper interview was conducted, and I---it turned out that I was the one who then the American embassy selected.

Q: I am going to be like an American journalist and interrupt. I’d like to know---

KHAN: Go ahead.

Q:---what took you to the UK? I’d like to know earlier, earlier; I’d like to know the type of ---I’d like to know when you were ten years old and what took you eventually. I don’t know which university in the UK. I want to go back further. How did you become a person interested in political science?
KHAN: When you say about ten years, can we go back a few years, to when I was seven. Do you want me to?

Q: We can go back to the year zero, if you're willing.

KHAN: I’m not only willing, I would like you to know.

Q: I would like to know your first memory.

KHAN: I have a very interesting trajectory in my upbringing, in my life. It was in 1947 when I was only about---maybe less than six years old. We convoyed with the Muslims, hiking towards the Pakistani border. It had been planned by the local extremist Hindus that that convoy was to be attacked. It only consisted of women and children. When the convoy was attacked, I was with two of my sisters in that bus. I was sitting in the lap of my mother, and I can never forget that incident when our bus was attacked. Physically my mother and I were pushed out of the bus. I don’t know what happened to my two other sisters; two of them were martyred, one was saved (she was young). I was just clinging to my mother when these attackers came with the swords in their hands. They were just attacking me and my mother. In an effort to save me, she just came in front and you know they hit her here [indicates place] on the forefront and---

Q: ---she stepped in front of you---

KHAN: Yes, in front of me. There was a canal nearby, and it was the month of December, and it was cold, very, very cold. People were jumping into the canal and would cross [the canal], because these extremists, these would-be killers, these assassins were not on the other side of the canal. Maybe they had not planned that. My mother started bleeding profusely, and this is a scene that I can never forget in my life. It still makes me cry when it comes. It is almost sixty years to the day when this tragic incident took place. She was pushing me towards the canal, and I was clinging to her. I wouldn’t leave her just like that, and she kept telling me, “Go and jump into the canal!” When I would not leave her, she pushed me into the canal. There were some women in the canal, who could have taken me to the other side of the canal. I could see her lying down, maybe from too much bleeding and I could look back and see her falling. Again, I still hear that wise voice. She was shouting, “Go! Go! Go! Aman, go! Don’t worry about me! Don’t worry about me! I can go!”

The woman out there who knew me and knew the family had also jumped into the canal, so she took hold of me and she took me to the other side of the canal. I wouldn’t like to use the word holocaust, the way the massacres took place, the way innocent women and children were killed. I could see the dead bodies and the people crying with their wounds, mostly women and children. I am told there was a Brigadier in the Indian Army, whose name was Mohammad Usman, who, when he had heard what had happened, had come to [the scene, and he tried to save the rest of the people who were able to manage.

Q: Could you spell the name of the Brigadier?
KHAN: U-S-M-A-N. This name I came to know through my elder brother who had already---

Q: Again, for the benefit of people not familiar with your history, can you tell us: you were in a convoy leaving India---

KHAN: ---leaving Jammu, a part of Kashmir.

Q: Can you spell it?

KHAN: J-A-M-M-U.

Q: Jammu in Kashmir

KHAN: ---in Kashmir---

Q: ---which had been thought of as India, before---

KHAN: Yes. The maharajah had already declared Kashmir’s succession to the Indian union, against the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir state, because ninety percent of the population of the state of Jammu and Kashmir were Muslims. In Jammu itself, in town, the Muslims were in the minority, and the local organization convinced the leaders of the city, the Muslim leaders, that we want to take you out of Jammu and take you to Pakistan. So they brought the entire population of Muslims to the parade ground. They had lined up lorries and buses and trucks. They decided to first take the women and children and leave the men behind, and that was the convoy that I was in with my mother.

Q: Tell me---the Partition [between India and Pakistan] was when?

KHAN: The partition took place on August 14, 1947.

Q: So the convoy---

KHAN: ---it must have been four months after.

Q: People living in Kashmir, which by accident of history was India, were the people seeking to go to Pakistan.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Was the Indian Army attacking them as they left?
KHAN: Some of the Indian Army were spectators when the convoys were being attacked. Those people were hidden in the bushes; this side was the canal. On one side, the convoy was stopped.

Q: Was the canal a border?

KHAN: No. It was a local canal. The border between Pakistan and then Kashmir was, I believe, about less than 30 miles---very close.

Q: Now, what happened to your mother on that day?
KHAN: I can assume that she died.

Q: You never saw her again?

KHAN: I did not, I did not. The army came and put the people who were safe in a camp; that camp was without any tents or anything on their bodies or on their heads. They were in the cold under the open skies. It was seventeen days, and the people were kept outside in the very severe cold month of November in Kashmir.

Q: Who was holding the camp? Who was organizing the camp?

KHAN: It was just the local army, who had camped themselves in the houses of the village, and there was a [base] there—

Q: We are still in Kashmir; you’re still not over the border there?

KHAN: We are still very much in Kashmir.

Q: So you are six years old; this is a terrible memory and perhaps your first memory.

KHAN: First memory, and that is one thing that I think will never go away from me. One thing I can say: the raid was something that took me away from religion. When I was crying like hell as a child, I would ask my father and my God what sin had my mother committed? Why was she killed? This kind of question would come to my mind as a kid, as a child. Where are you, God? Why was she killed? Why am I alive? Why wasn’t I killed? So these things kept building up in my mind. I still think about this as the reason. I wouldn’t say that I was an atheist, but I’m not religious at all. This kind of thing kept me away from religion. I haven’t read the Quran, and I don’t pray. I know how to offer my prayers; I learned how to do all that, but, that being said, I still keep thinking that this massacre of such innocent people was through no fault of theirs, no crime of theirs, no sin of theirs.

Q: Would you say that you had a religious consciousness at the age of 6?

KHAN: I would not say that I think it was not that I was conscious at that age, but I very clearly remember that I used to ask all my ________ why is it that it had to happen.
Q: Had anybody---

KHAN: Let me speak to you now as to why all those poor children and women were killed just because they were Muslims. It is bound up with my personality and character because it had such an impact on me, on the development of my mind, the development of my character. It is why I have become so humane, why I can’t see violence, why I can’t see crime, why I just can’t commit any violence myself. I am so anti-violence; I am so anti-crime, individually and otherwise also. These things have gotten into my system. That is what I’m saying: that raid probably had an impact on my mind when I was growing that I was not attracted towards religion at all.

Q: But you came from a family that was Muslim.

KHAN: Yes. It was Muslim. My father, my grandfather, my great grandfather, they were all Muslims.

Q: You did not see your mother after that day. I think you gave me the date.


Q: The 6th of November 1947. So the Partition was August---

KHAN: 14th August same year.

Q: Were you with your father?

KHAN: No, no. My father and another elder brother were left behind. because, as I told you, initially their plan was to take away the children and the women and kill them. Then later on come and take the men.

Q: What happened to your father and your brother?

KHAN: That area was not too far from the city itself, and here they managed to come back to that parade ground where the remaining men were. They came and said that hell had happened. Hell had fallen on them. Then it became unmanageable for the authorities to keep control, so after a few days, those men who were left behind, mostly older men, were sent to __________ because then, of course, the authorities in Pakistan had also come to know about this tragedy and it was taken up. That included my father and my elder brother.

Q: That was a painful beginning for the story that you are going to tell and which must have been a tremendous motivation in the things that you studied and did subsequently.

KHAN: Yes.
Q: After the 17 days in the camp, then what?

KHAN: After seventeen days in camp, in that kind of a plight under which we lived, there was nothing to eat, there was nothing to drink. There was a barn meant for the animals, just close to that camp. Mind you the camp was not a camp of today, provided with shelter and tents and all that. It was just under the sky. We used to drink dirty water, from where the animals would drink. There must have been some wells in the village, but they must have belonged to the army of the place where we stayed. We were not allowed to go that way. We would go to them and ask them if they would give us something to eat. They wouldn’t give us bread, but they would give us roasted chickpeas because that is what the army had. They would get money from us. That elderly woman who had taken custody of me when she took me from the canal was carrying some money somewhere on her body, and she would give me a little money so I could buy some chickpeas.

Q: How many people were in this camp?

KHAN: Very honestly, I would say a few hundred, but quite a number of them were wounded. They were not getting any medical aid. I remember, if my memory serves me well, that quite a number of wounded women and children died during those seventeen days because there was no medical aid.

Q: What about those who had no money?

KHAN: They had nothing to do but starve. And they did—-to survive. Then the Muslim Kashmiri leader, Sheik Abdullah, came. Of course, he knew what tragedy had taken place. He came and he addressed the people and said that very soon they would be relocated back to the city—

Q: What city?

KHAN: Jammu City.

Q: In other words, to go back where---

KHAN: ---but not to go back to their respective homes, because they had probably already been occupied by Hindus who had resettled. I think there must have been a couple of hundred who survived, I don’t remember. Generally there were just men and women. I was mostly with that woman, and wherever she was kept, I was with her. That much I remember. It was probably a big house or big mansion where they kept refugees like us; so I was just with her until I was evacuated again.

Q: Back to Jammu?

KHAN: No, to Sialkot, Pakistan.
Q: Spell it.


Q: Which was?

KHAN: That was the bordering city in Pakistan.

Q: How did that happen? You say it was 30 miles; did you walk?

KHAN: No. After what had happened, after seventeen days when we were brought to the city, we were kept in different places. Then, under an agreement, as I understand, between the Pakistani authority and the state authority of Jammu, the remaining ones were transported to Sialkot.

Q: You talk about the Pakistani authorities and the state authorities---

KHAN: Yes. That’s what I think; that’s what I heard.

Q: When you say the ‘state’, is that the state of India?

KHAN: No. That is the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Q: Kashmir was disputed.

KHAN: Yes, which is still disputed.

Q: Right. So this was an area you couldn’t really say was Pakistani or Indian, and you still can’t say it today. Is that correct?

KHAN: Yes, but now the reality is very different. India has really occupied it, and they have declared it as an integral part of the Indian union. Pakistan claims its own territory, which it calls “Free Kashmir.” I just want you to know that the remaining refugees, under an agreement between the two authorities, maybe between the Indian and Pakistani authorities, were transported to Pakistan.

Q: To Sialkot.

KHAN: To Sialkot.

Q: Do you have any memories of that place from when you first arrived? Was it just past the border?

KHAN: We were handed over at the border of Kashmir and Sialkot. You know, the people who didn’t like my father and brother were listening for many days for the last Kashmiris heading for the border. They didn’t know if I was alive. So they were coming
to the border every day thinking that maybe today some refugees are coming. When I got there with that old lady, God bless her soul, my father and my brother were at the border. Since we were a small number of people, my father took me into his custody.

Q: So, the next chapter in your life was in Sialkot?

KHAN: No. The next chapter of my life starts from Lahore, where my brother was. He had already come to Lahore before partition to study. After completing his studies, he got a job in a newspaper. We stayed with him for the first few years.

Q: You were six; your brother was older.

KHAN: Yes. He was in his 20s. The difference between our ages was about seventeen years.

Q: He was a journalist in Lahore.

KHAN: He was a journalist, yes.

Q: I know nothing about Pakistan. I am told that Lahore is the historic-cultural capital. Tell me about Lahore. You were there for your primary education?

KHAN: I was in my primary education for three years. My brother sent me to a very good school. It was difficult for me to cope initially because the syllabus was different than what we were studying. Sending me to a good school did help me grow mentally.

Q: Private school?

KHAN: It was a private school, yes.

Q: Your brother was able to do this?

KHAN: Only he could do that.

Q: Journalists do not earn lots of money.

KHAN: Those were good days. With a low amount of money, you could afford living expenses; you could even rent a house or an apartment.

Q: So the household consisted of—Dr. Affiz is adding something.

A: There was a lot of volunteerism. There was not a lot of agreement, but anyone who could do anything could save the situation. Volunteerism. There were camps. Outside the camps, there were the civilians around the area in villages. I come from Lahore, and I have very fresh memories of the Partition but I didn’t see the slaughter, murder. I didn’t see the dead bodies.
Q: Because you were already in Lahore.

A: No. Actually, I was in Karachi and came back to Lahore. I was born in Lahore but I was away from those scenes. I was away from the border and the insect piles. At that time, anyone who had this much (indicating volume with his hands), can give part of it to a person who needs it. That was volunteerism.

KHAN: That was from a different angle. Ours was a really unique situation. No volunteers came to help us. We were absolutely without any help. It was just my father meeting me and bringing me to Lahore.

A: My uncle is from Jammu; my maternal uncle is from Jammu. They also might have been to your camp. They are called Singh [sp?] Gurka [sp?]. Was it the Sindh Barrage? [said in local language]

KHAN: No. The Chashma canal [said in local language]. Anyway. Yes.

Q: That’s interesting. The household consisted of the father and the two brothers? Is that correct?

KHAN: One brother. My other brother who had come had gone elsewhere to look for employment, or whatever, because he had to survive. He could not be dependent on my brother, because he was a grown man. So he went around and he got a job somewhere. I don’t know where he did, but it was not in Lahore. In Lahore it was only me, my brother, and my father. My father, again, being a very dignified, honorable individual, didn’t like to stay with my brother for a long time. He also thought of leaving him and looking for a job for himself. Then it was just me and my brother.

Q: Your father went to---

KHAN: He went away for some time, looking for some---

Q: ---and your brother became your caregiver.

KHAN: Yes. It was my brother who helped me in my upbringing. It was he who gave me the education, and it was he who encouraged me to go to good schools. He took pains with my education. He himself was highly educated, and before partition very few Muslims could go to university level. He had gone to the prestigious University of Bengal, and he did his Master’s in journalism. He himself was an educated person; he wanted me to have a real good educational background. I had been to these American missionary institutions. I then spent a couple of years in St. Mary’s, a very prestigious Christian missionary school in Rawalpindi; then I was in St. Dennis for a couple of years. I had to change schools because of my brother’s job. From Lahore my brother joined the government service. Because of his experience in journalism, he joined the government
of Pakistan in the Ministry of Information, as an information officer, which was a reasonably good position. He shifted to ‘Pindi [short for Rawalpindi], so of course I had to shift with him to ‘Pindi, too. He sent me to St. Mary’s, St. Dennis, and then later on to a very famous college [high school in Pakistan] called Gordon College of Rawalpindi, again, an American missionary college. I graduated from there.

I was a very good speaker; I was a student leader. In those days we didn’t know this word ‘activist’, but by today’s standards, you would say, yes, I was an activist. I was very progressive, very revolutionary in my speeches. So I became a student leader, by any definition, and kept on winning elections, any election which I contested. I never lost one election, right from day one when I joined the college. I was four years in college. Eventually, I ended up being president of the Gordon College Student Union. It was a very well contested election. So those were my student days.

Q: I would like to fill in a few things. Mission schools---a part of the reason they exist is to inculcate their beliefs into the students. Were most of the students Muslims?

KHAN: We used to have twice a week what we used to call ‘ethics class’. These were not compulsory; they were not mandatory. Students weren’t required to attend that class. I used to go there. They used to teach about the Bible, teach good things about other religions. Not that I was into it, but I used to go to these ethics classes regularly. I had been sent to school to learn.

Q: But you’re in Pakistan, here.

KHAN: Yes, we’re in Pakistan.

Q: The students came from Muslim families.

KHAN: Yes. Let me tell you in the missionary schools or colleges, I won’t say my brother was a rich man, but people from the upper middle class and middle classes with younger boys and girls would go to these schools. They did not go to the ordinary ones, because their fees were high; the education tuition fees were higher in the public schools.

Q: I was thinking of the irony that in a Muslim country the best schools were Catholic missions.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Did this affect the students in some way? What was the motivation of the people who taught? Did they succeed in drawing students to their way of thinking?

KHAN: No. I think their motivation was better education, a better environment for their kids, for their wards, because the mission schools were very disciplined institutions. Most of them were headed by American citizens, who had gone to Pakistan as missionaries. They were very good and fair people. Half of my professors were Americans; the
principal was American. They were very disciplined people, and yet very enlightened. Discipline-wise, they were very, very good.

Q: Now you say that in retrospect you were somewhat of an activist and a progressive. In the 1950s, what did it mean?

KHAN: These terms didn’t come into vogue until much later, but to be a student leader you needed to have two qualifications: that you are a good speaker, a good orator, and you are a good manager, a good organizer. You needed to be outspoken on student issues like on tuition fees, this facility or that facility. Another good thing I can say about Gordon College was that it did encourage the boys to found their own associations.

Q: The reason I ask is that when we say progressive sometimes we think of a certain objective, a certain social change or a certain political notion. Was that something that came later in your life?

KHAN: That came later in my life. When I joined the government service, I again joined the government service through competition and I thought half of Pakistan ________.

Q: It was about the development of an individual student, not a revolutionary movement.

Dr. Affiz wants to add something.

A: These missionary institutions were life savers, because they were relatively less affected by these riots. The riots were between the Hindus, Muslim, and Sikhs. The missionary institutions were coming from the British rule, and they were already well-established decades before that. Actually Gordon College and FC College, a former Christian college in Lahore, were older than the university itself. So these were very well-established institutions. They were the life savers; there was nothing else. There were no other resources.

Q: But this was a small number of elite student---

KHAN: Elite students, yes.

Q: Was this a large enough number to neutralize the---You said there were riots. Was this a small enough number to create---

KHAN: No, these were big numbers.

Q: ---small enough number to create some peace in a troubled community?

KHAN: ---create an educational atmosphere---

Q: OK.
A: They were the first pick. Anybody who wanted their kid to be in a school, their first preference would be to go to one of those schools. It is only when they were not able to go, that they would go to other schools---

KHAN: ---but that was subject to whether they could afford it.

A: Yes.

KHAN: ---because the tuition fees were much higher and average parents from an average family couldn’t afford it.

Q: That was a very dramatic beginning. The first memory is a traumatic, horrible incident with people being killed, and then we move to an incredibly insightful and generous brother, who gave you, who assured your education. This is an amazing story.

KHAN: Yes. I can say that had my brother not been there probably I wouldn’t have the ambition which I got. I can say that I was one of the pretty indulgent, capable young men. As I told you, you couldn’t have an ordinary student. I got to this being elected; you had to have something about you---

Q: Did you think at the time that it would draw you to a political career?

KHAN: I never did. I never did because at that time our main aim and objective used to be, OK, finish your education, join the service or join any other profession.

Q: The service---

KHAN: Any service. The civil service, private service, government service. Any good employment.

Q: Was the civil service a destination of prestige at that time?

KHAN: Yes, it certainly was.

Q: More than the private sector?

KHAN: Yes. The private sector was not respected then. It was always like that. To get into the common service in the entire Punjab, I would have to get myself selected for the one vacant position for a junior officer. It was not an ordinary occurrence for me to get into the civil service. The Punjab is three-fourths of Pakistan.

Q: We don’t have you yet out of college in Rawalpindi. Let’s go back. You are now in a mission school and a mission college in Rawalpindi.

KHAN: Yes. In Rawalpindi.
Q: Let’s go through the cycle here. You were in college for four years.

KHAN: I was in college for four years.

Q: Until what year?


Q: 1960, with the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree.

KHAN: Of course, with a degree from the University of Punjab.

Q: With a major in? Did you have a major?

KHAN: Yes, in political science.

Q: In political science. Well, that’s very relevant.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: It’s 1960, we’re in Rawalpindi, and you have just graduated with a major in political science. Before we leave college, tell us anything else about your educational experience. We can come back to this later, but it would be nice to get this chronologically. You have said a lot about the quality and the discipline of the missionary schools. What about your friendships? With whom did you associate outside of school? What type of social milieu were you a part of?

KHAN: You see, at that time, Rawalpindi was a military garrison; it still is. Most of the families, I mean the people, were employed by the army. The general headquarters was there. The other part of the city Rawalpindi consisted of traders and businessmen. There was no industry at that time in and around Rawalpindi so people generally would opt for going into government jobs with a government salary. The army was the favorite, the army, navy, air force, and so forth. It would be interesting for you to note that the few districts of the Rawalpindi district were known for producing the army soldiers and the generals.

Q: Oh.

KHAN: Oh, yes. That area was known for it. From the western Punjab the people would not join the army. From the northern Punjab, which I am talking about, people would take pride in the army. Then the policy of the general headquarters, I think, was, and even now, is to recruit people from this district. They were taller, tougher, and very keen to join the armed forces even, of course, with meager salaries or whatever.

Q: So you really came of age at the same time that this nation we call Pakistan did. It did not exist before 1947. Your consciousness grew as this nation took on an identity. Tell us
about your sense of the creation of this new political entity called Pakistan, at that time West Pakistan. Then we can talk later about the horrors.

KHAN: The way Pakistan came into being is itself a tragedy of history because hundreds of thousands of people were killed and massacred. Most people who were killed were Muslims because wherever there were more Hindus, or in those areas where there was a combination, there were a lot of Muslims killed. It was just for no reason. OK, he’s Hindu and he’s Muslim, killing. The Hindu is killing the Muslim, and the Muslim is killing the Hindu, or the Sikh is killing the Muslim, and stuff like that. So it was that kind of atmosphere at the time of Partition. It was senseless killing.

Q: So the birth of Pakistan was not a happy event.

KHAN: No, it was not. Beyond the senseless killing, there was the volume of refugees that came into Pakistan, with Pakistan, compared to India, being the smaller state of the partition. Then we also dealt with that part of Pakistan, which was called East Pakistan, and which is now called Bangladesh. So the refugees were coming from that part of India into then East Pakistan, northern Bangladesh. Refugees were coming from Punjab, Kashmir, like us, and other parts of India. They were all coming to Pakistan. The government of Pakistan was still very fragile. They didn’t have a civil service, so they had to put refugees here and there. There is nothing that they could provide them with, like jobs or something. The then-government wanted the houses that were left by the Hindus and the Sikhs; even then those properties were going in a haphazard manner. Later on, they did it in a systematic manner, but initially they just wanted the refugees to have shelter.

Q: Was the government doing the best that it could? Did the government get any help from the UK? The UK was in pretty bad shape after World War II.

KHAN: At that time, I could not be very fair in stating whether the government of Pakistan was receiving any American aid, or aid from Britain. I have no idea whatsoever. I think it was just on its own. Maybe some international agencies who were not really organized at the time were in a position to give some financial help and assistance to Pakistan.

Q: So you feel---Now there was a civil service---

KHAN: Of course.

Q: ---left behind by the British. Do you feel they were doing the best they could?

KHAN: They did. At that time, the civil service was scrupulously honest. They were committed and dedicated. One could say without mincing words that they were committed. They were committed; they had come from India. They could see the way the people came into Pakistan. They applied, and they were kind of---
Q: So this is another reason that the profession of civil service was prestigious.

KHAN: Yes, prestigious.

Q: The people perceived the civil service as an honorable cadre.

KHAN: I still think, despite whatever weaknesses and shortcomings we have, joining the civil service is considered to be a very prestigious profession.

Q: You have spoken very convincingly about being a man opposed to violence, a man of peace; it would be impossible not to have some emotions about India, where much of the suffering was caused. We can talk about this later as we talk about your career in the U.S. embassy. You are, in one person, you are representative of this terrible split between two countries stuck together under British rule and then violently coming apart. How did your feelings develop about the neighboring country of India?

KHAN: Both governments had always been against each other. They always created that phobia, and that’s why we went into two wars. If you ask me individually, despite all the sufferings I went through, with all the agonies which I went through as a child, I always thought that it would be good to have a better understanding with India. We should live in a manner so that we don’t have to spend that huge amount of money on raising an army. That money should be spent on the welfare and well-being of the people of Pakistan because the people of Pakistan, still the majority, are poor. We are probably not as poor as the Indian people are, but we are poor.

Q: This is a very reasonable and logical conclusion, but there could only be an emotional basis if you saw this horrible thing at the canal.

KHAN: It is emotional. The thing is that if you need any rationale India is ten times bigger than we are. Going into war with them is suicidal. One has to be realistic. One has to have the realities on the ground in mind. OK, there is a general perception that India is Pakistan’s enemy. Even if you grant that India is Pakistan’s enemy and that they don’t want Pakistan to live and survive, the hard fact is that India is ten times bigger and stronger.

Q: Do you think that many or most Pakistanis agree with what you are saying?

KHAN: No. I don’t think so. Some do; the people who think more rationally and more logically. Things are changing now. Understanding between the two countries is increasing. The exchange of---

Q: Trade.

KHAN: Yes. The journalists are coming. Other concerns, other groups are coming and exchanging. That is taking place. Nobody now is talking about going into war, neither in India, nor in Pakistan. We have the disputed area, Jammu and Kashmir. Both
governments are talking about a peaceful resolution of this dispute, which has existed for the last sixty years. There is a feeling that here should be a solution based on some kind of compromise. In my opinion, since I have been a student of history and political science for a long, long time, I think that perhaps that is going to be the only way to an amicable solution, sentiments apart, emotions apart. The present status quo, with a few lines here, a few lines there, will eventually be the solution of the general Kashmir dispute. That is my opinion. I think therein lies the success of both countries. Instead of spending, pouring I mean, so much money into Kashmir---

*Q:* *On both sides, I guess.*

KHAN: On both sides; on both sides. India has the depth. India has the depth to continue to fight, even if they don’t want to. I hope, I pray that doesn’t happen. They have the depth; they have the strength. They have the resources. Now India, you know the economy---

*Q:* *Oh, yes!*

KHAN: That’s sky high. That’s why they’re not talking more about a war and stuff. They are talking about a more peaceful relationship with Pakistan. I personally think that times have changed now. It was full of, “He will bear me out, my friend, for whom I have a lot of respect.” Now hundreds of thousands Sikh cadres come to Pakistan. The three major holiest Sikh shrines are in Pakistan, and the Sikhs have got 4-5 festivals in a year with thousands of them. They come, and they are given all the protocol, all the courtesies, all the facilities, trains, accommodations---

*Q:* *When did this start?*

KHAN: It started about twenty years back now, and over the last fifteen years things have improved a lot. The worship places, the Gurdwaras, are being taken care of by Pakistan, the executive department. The Sikhs come; they are very, very happy. They are very well looked after.

*Q:* *You are talking about pilgrimages, and then they go back.*

KHAN: Yes. Of course. They come and go back. I think they have four different festivals a year, when they come. The birth of their founder, for example.

*Q:* *So, on both sides, they’re willing to forget history long enough to celebrate---*

KHAN: Yes. I think that thing is growing up. The intellectuals are playing some role, the writers are playing some role, and exchanges of poets and writers and intellectuals are taking place. Exchanges between the parliamentarians about the government are taking place. So, that is happening. That war phobia, I don’t see that. It’s not there. I don’t see Pakistan/India going into war. I don’t see that happening now.
Q: Dr. Affiz looks very frustrated. You want to say something.

A: Not frustrated. Just backtracking to an earlier part to 1947-1948 from Lahore. If we did not have help from the United States and from the UK, we would have been wiped out. We would have been worse than some of the African countries. All the crops were destroyed. The irrigation system wasn’t very elaborate, as it is now. In ’47, ’48, the warehouses of finished products, from overseas or local, were still full. Nobody bothered. They started consuming those, and after six months to a year the warehouses were empty. Pakistan had zero resources, no industry. We had nothing. We didn’t have paper, we didn’t have a pencil, we didn’t have soap. It was Lever Brothers. The first soap that they brought in was Sunlight soap; we still have it. Then there was another one. Sunlight was for washing clothes. The other one was Lifebuoy.

At the time, I remember American wheat. We received a big supply of American wheat. If we didn’t get that we would have gone. There was an infestation of locusts. We used to have infestations of locusts. They would come in and raid the crops. We would have many kinds of those things. On top of that, we didn’t have any medicines. There were no antibiotics. Infections were rampant. Thank God, _______ and UNICEF (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund) came to our rescue. They started vaccinating kids. I got my vaccinations then. That happened in ’48, ’49. The rest of the world, and especially the United States, really came to our rescue, and we really appreciate it.

On the other hand, our friends east of the border, the Indians, Nehru, diverted one of the major rivers with a dam and diverted the Arkade River.

KHAN: Let’s not digress into these things. Let me focus.

Q: Dr. Affiz, thank you for the positive propaganda.

A: Yes. Yes.

Q: We need to get you out of Rawalpindi and to the UK. Let’s finish this thing. Have we covered your college years? Is there more to be added about your tertiary education in Rawalpindi?

KHAN: Yes. I finished my education in Rawalpindi.

Q: In 1960.

KHAN: I did try to study law. I couldn’t do that because at that time my brother couldn’t afford it because he was married then. My going to the UK for my education came a little later. I’ll be very honest with you on this score. Pakistan had by then been cut into pieces. It was already miles away. The ’71 war, which we lost, and very shamelessly we did, because of the false _______ and intrigues of the ruling junta. So the country was separated; it was already geographically separated, but Bangladesh came into being as a
result of the ’71 war. It was a very, very bad time for young people like us, who were very sensitive and who had seen Pakistan come into being. We had been student leaders, very outspoken, very well read. We were the people who had thought what to do and we were trying.

Q: I have to ask from complete innocence and ignorance---

KHAN: Yes, please.

Q: There was West Pakistan and East Pakistan. Why was there a war?

KHAN: OK. In 1970, the first free and independent elections were held in Pakistan, in both wings. We called them the Eastern Wing, and this was the Western Wing. As a result of that election, it was the party known as Awami Party, the Awami League---

Q: Spell it.


Q: Awami Party.

KHAN: Awami Party, the Awami League, I should say. Now, this party emerged with the largest number of seats in the National Assembly. Incidentally, this party was confined to East Pakistan; they did not have any representation in West Pakistan.

Q: And the parliament was where?

KHAN: Parliament, was of course, in the National Assembly.

Q: Islamabad.

KHAN: Yes. Islamabad.

Q: Yet the majority party came from East Pakistan.

KHAN: Yes. The then-General, Yahya Khan, refused to hand over power to the then-Awami League, headed by the then Sheikh Mujib.

Q: Please spell the names for the transcriber. General?


Q: General Yahya refused to cede power to---

KHAN: ---the elected members, the majority members of the Assembly.
Q: You mentioned a major figure, a major person.

KHAN: Ah. The leader of that party was Mujib. M-U-J-I-B.

Q: He is what you would now call a Bangladeshi.

KHAN: Now we call it Bangladesh.

Q: So the hostilities began when General Yahya---

KHAN: When the general refused to hand over power to the majority party, which he was bound to do under the constitution. The majority party leader should have been asked to found the government, but he refused. Against that there was a popular movement in East Pakistan. Since Yahya was dishonest, and he did not want to hand over power, he thought maybe through military action he could suppress them. Instead, we lost that way. That’s the brief history. He collaborated with the parties which were in West Pakistan, which is the present Pakistan, and asked them instead to found the government.

Q: Let’s assume that violence is always bad---

KHAN: Yes. I just missed one thing. When the violence, when the disturbances in East Pakistan were really growing, and were getting very violent, very bloody, then, for the first time, India invaded Pakistan. It was an open, naked invasion by India of Pakistani territory, because Bangladesh had not yet come into being. It was still East Pakistan. When---

Q: India invaded East and West?

KHAN: Yes. Of course, West Pakistan, too. With East Pakistan they just walked in because the forces in West Pakistan couldn’t support, couldn’t extend that much support to the army which was based in East Pakistan.

Q: And the motives of India, Doctor?

A: If I may, this problem started in the Ayub Khan’s era and the separation of Bangladesh.

Q: Yes.

A: The movement started in Ayub Khan’s era.

Q: Ayub Khan. Who was that?

A: He was the military man before Yahya.

Q: OK. OK.
A: He imprisoned the party leader from East Pakistan, Mujibur Rahman [Sheikh Mujib]; he imprisoned him. Then what happened was when he could no longer hold power, he gave the power to Yahya, and Yahya continued with the same. All of a sudden the situation started getting worse.

KHAN: I don’t want to add confusion to what he’s doing, so let’s not get into that.

Q: Mr. Khan, I am just asking for enough context so that later, when we get to the U.S. embassy, we have at least a context. We have tremendous context in the way you were brought over the canal. It was India’s. It was my fault in asking for your sense of the growth of your country when you were a student and, quite correctly, we don’t need to go into the historic details. That’s another story.

A: But it does deserve a mention.

Q: Absolutely. Yes, it does deserve a mention, and it is all part of the context. Now, this is yet another trauma. This was while you were in tertiary education.

KHAN: Yes, it was another trauma, but later.

Q: Let’s get you from Rawalpindi to the UK.

KHAN: This thing had happened. I just gave you the background of the breaking up of my country. I was one of the most hurt, as must be hundreds and thousands like me. It was very difficult in those days to get a visa for the UK, and that again for a young man. I don’t know what was written on my forehead, but after my five-minute interview they gave me the visa; they allowed me to go.

Q: On this forehead---?

(Laughter)

KHAN: I don’t know. Maybe at that time---

(Laughter)

KHAN: Nobody would believe it when I got the visa. Initially when I went there I had to support myself. My brother was not in a position to [do so]. It was easier than in the UK for a visitor like me and many others to get an employment and then to support himself.

Q: So you went initially to live in the UK. You did not go---

KHAN: I did not go to live there. It was just going and taking that chance whether I can do something or---
Q: You did not have a pre-arranged educational situation. That came later.

KHAN: That came later.

Q: OK.

KHAN: After a little time, when I looked around and saw that I could make some money, I thought why not improve my education. My brother got his Master’s, and my father had done his education, I thought I would do that. So I joined the University of London part-time. I turned out to be a good student and got my diploma in International Relations.

Q: Sorry, where? In the University of London?

KHAN: Yes. The University of London.

Q: Now at the time what was involved to be matriculated in the University of London. Did you just appear? Did you have to---

KHAN: No, my degree was from Punjab University. Perhaps, at that time, Punjab University was the only university recognized by the United Kingdom universities, because it was the most prestigious university.

Q: So, with this qualification, you were accepted.

KHAN: I was accepted.

Q: At the University of London.

KHAN: I was accepted without any problems.

Q: You did have to find a material support to keep yourself there.

KHAN: I was working---

Q: Working.

KHAN: ---working in a store. I still remember. I was working in one of the most prestigious stores in London; I was in their men’s department selling ties and shirts!

(laughter all round)

KHAN: Selling ties and shirts, wearing ties and shirts myself.

(laughter continues)
Q: You had a double life. You were working and studying.

KHAN: Working and studying. It took me almost a year to finish my education. I thought that’s enough now and I better head back.

Q: In one year?

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Well, wait---

KHAN: The diploma was for one year.

Q: You came with a bachelor’s degree and did you get a diploma of some sort?

KHAN: International relations.

Q: International Relations.

KHAN: Yes. That was the prescribed period of time for getting a diploma.

Q: Was this equivalent to a master’s?

KHAN: A little less than a master’s. [Transcriber’s note: In Britain, 2/3 of a master’s degree can be given in any subject and is usually called a diploma, and not a master’s degree.]

Q: What entered into your mind and told you it was time to go home? What year are we?

KHAN: No. No. That’s a very, very good question and very relevant, too. Actually, I thought that I was not the type who would stay in the UK and sell ties and shirts standing behind a counter. I thought I received a good education and would sell myself.

Q: Were you considering a more inspired type of employment in the UK?

KHAN: Even for an educated person, at that time, since my status was not legal, I couldn’t have gotten a good job anyway.

Q: OK. OK.

KHAN: I think in between the period which I am now missing, I must now tell you—

Q: Yes. Please.
KHAN: After completing my education in Pakistan, I applied to enter the civil service. I appeared in a competitive examination, which I briefly mentioned to you earlier. There was, at that time, only one seat meant for residents of Punjab. I had to defend having a domicile in Punjab. Unless I stood first, I could not have gotten into the civil service of Pakistan.

Q: The position was what?

KHAN: The position was of an officer grade, and I think I started as a publication officer.

Q: As a publication officer?

KHAN: Public relations officer.

Q: For the government.

KHAN: For the government in the Ministry of Commerce.

Q: With fierce competition---

KHAN: Oh, yes. Fierce competition.

Q: ---you gained this place.

KHAN: I gained this place and joined the government service with flying colors.

Q: Ok.

KHAN: I served in the government for five years. Just a little historical background between East and West Pakistan. You see---

Q: The years are?

KHAN: This is the 1960s.

Q: You graduated in 1960?


Q: This is 1961-1966.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: OK.
KHAN: I joined the civil service in 1961. I was there for five years. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who was then the president, wanted to appease the people from East Pakistan and keep them happy, so he introduced a system in the federal services, a parity system.

Q: Parity?

KHAN: Under the parity system for any promotion or any other appointment in the federal government, the preference had to be given to the Bengalis, or to East Pakistanis.

Q: To make a balance.

KHAN: Yes. To make a balance. It’s a painful thing and unfortunate also that sacrifices were required of the province of Punjab, because that was the largest province. The other three provinces were considered to be not as developed, like Sindh, for instance.

Q: Underdeveloped?

KHAN: Yes, underdeveloped provinces like Sindh, the Frontier, and Baluchistan. So the ax would fall on the Punjabi people.

Q: It was already a poor region, but preference was going to even poorer regions.

KHAN: Yes, to an even poorer part. It happened to me twice. Twice the time came for me to go to a higher grade, and an East Pakistani was given it instead.

Q: But you retained your post.

KHAN: Yes. That frustrated me.

Q: You were passed over for promotion.

KHAN: I was passed over, and someone else came. That was very frustrating, and it happened twice with me. I went to my boss at that time, and I said, “Sir, will you let me know if I am incompetent (nervous laughter) or I lack something in my efficiency, in my working or something? Why is this happening to me?” Then I very clearly remember his voice, I can quote him, he said, “Aman, because you are from Punjab, you have to sacrifice.”

Q: Admirable honesty on his part.

KHAN: “You have to sacrifice.”

Q: I’m not trying to be cute, but this was affirmative action.
KHAN: It was. He wanted to encourage me, and again I can quote him. He said, “Look here, Aman, when you are a government officer, you don’t leave a job of an officer in the government like this in the way you are thinking of leaving.”

Q: He knew you were thinking of leaving?

KHAN: I had discussed it with him.

Q: Yes.

KHAN: In fact, when I gave him my resignation, he would not accept it. He did not accept it for two months.

Q: So he was your mentor.

KHAN: Yes. He said, “You are being silly; don’t do it.”

Q: He cared about you.

KHAN: He did. He was very fond of me. He liked me immensely. Then, eventually, being a young man, I quit. I joined the private sector. I wasn’t a big success in that because of the internal---

(laughter)

KHAN: ---because of the internal intrigues and stuff. I couldn’t face those intrigues. That was the major reason for me to think and I decided to go to the UK.

Q: Private sector what?

KHAN: It was Siemens, the German [multinational], you know.

Q: Oh, Siemens. Yes.

KHAN: That famous [company].

Q: Yes.

KHAN: I joined them in a good position with good money, at that time.

Q: Too much intrigue.

KHAN: Too much intrigue forced me out. (Laughter).

Q: OK. So we are now in 1966 or something like that?

Q: OK.

KHAN: I wandered around for a good year looking at what profession I should go into. For two years I worked with Siemens, or less than two years, after leaving the government in 1967. Until 1969 I worked there, and then I left. I was wandering by the time of the breakup of the country, and the war and all that. At that time, you couldn’t think about anything. Luckily, my big brother was there to give me two meals and tea and coffee or whatever. He was as gracious as ever. He kept encouraging me, “No, no, this is a bad time of our lives for the country.” Blah, blah, blah. “You have to wait. You have to wait. Do something, do something.”

I was doing something. I was not just sitting at home on my backside. I was doing things here and there. I was putting my hands---

Q: He was nervous, as if he were your father, saying, “Get a job, get a job.”

KHAN: I started making a living from here and there. That kept me going till this tragic thing happened: The country broke. Then it was in late 1971, or early 1972, that I went to the UK.

Q: So, you saw and you lamented the separation of East and West---

KHAN: My god, I was one of the most hurt young men at that time, I tell you. I, along with my friends, went and met the then-acting prime minister of East Pakistan. Literally eight or nine of us went and right in front of him said, “What has happened to us? Why has it happened? What good is it doing for us?” He had come here as Foreign Minister. That is a long story, and I won’t go into those details. They are very tragic too, but that was the time. We really went through that trauma. I knew what had happened to my family. Seventeen people of my family gave sacrifice in the creation of Pakistan. My mother, three of my sisters, four of my nephews, two of my brothers-in-law (my sisters’ husbands).

Q: This is before?

KHAN: 1947 stuff

Q: 1947 stuff. Did you and your family make sacrifices again in 1971?

KHAN: No, no, no. I was reminded of what had happened.

Q: Prior experience.

KHAN: 17 people. Blood [relatives]: sisters, children, brothers-in-law, my mother! What else could a family sacrifice? They were killed just because they were Muslims. They
were killed just because they wanted to come to Pakistan or whatever. Two of my sisters were killed in that attack on the convoy. One was very young, about 14 years old, very pretty, my brother tells me. Then the other sister, who was married, was killed along with her children. Her husband was killed.

When that was happening in East Pakistan with people being killed, people wondered whether history was repeating itself again in 1971. Even having served with the Americans for a very long time, I still find Pakistan is a beautiful country. I have some very good friends [here], American friends, lifetime friends, and I don’t think I can go back to work now at this stage of my life. Maybe it’s my age. What can I do? I came a couple of years ago. Tezi Schaffer [Ambassador Teresita E. Schaffer] offered me a job doing think tank stuff. I said, “Tezi, I might as well go back and do something. I’ll tell you.” She was in Pakistan, and a very well-respected person, a very well-regarded woman. My position in the American embassy was very high profile, very, very high profile, prestigious also. I used to get concerned that maybe I was also working for the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) in this area, or that maybe I was working for USIA (United States Information Agency) too. My commitment and dedication to the U.S. Foreign Service was very well recognized and acknowledged. Colin Powell came and he gave me a real award for my years of service too.

Q: I have lost the thread here. You said that 1971 had an ugly reverberation of 1947---

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Then you said it would be difficult for you to work in the US. I don’t understand the connection.

KHAN: No, no. I came much later, now. I am sorry. When I was in Pakistan and I came into the US embassy, I held a very prestigious, very high position. After having worked for a good twenty-eight years it was somehow—I could not comprehend after I had gotten my immigration status, and especially when immigration status was given to my wife and my young daughter, that I was retired with all honors. Colin Powell came to present the Secretary’s Achievement Award, which is a very rare thing to get for a Foreign Service National. I was one of the only ones but I got it. Although it doesn’t say you have to be in the Foreign Service, it says Amanulla Khan, US Foreign Service. That award was bestowed on me by him personally in Islamabad. Then, after having served and retired honorably, the point that I was trying to make was that it would have been very difficult for me to come and work here.

Then, after a time, as I told you, I became pretty well-known and regarded, so I started getting offers of jobs from various international agencies. Those agencies wanted to establish their business, or whatever. Pakistan being small, and Islamabad being a very, very small city, I have lived most of my life out there during my service with the embassy. It was easy for people to know me to know who’s tough, so I started getting very good offers. Initially, I worked with an American oil company for two years as a country representative. It was a really well-paid job that I got. So that kept me going.
Then I started getting the odd consultancy jobs, which paid me good money, which kept me going. I was getting my pension in US dollars, which was not enough for me to live comfortably, but it was OK because now I have got only one daughter, who is to be married. I have my own house and it is a very good house.

Q: I think I see a motif here, now. In the UK, after one year, it was time to go back home, and after twenty-eight years with the U.S. Embassy, you flirted with going out, but in your heart you knew you needed to be back. Is that what you are saying?

KHAN: Yes. When I joined the U.S. embassy, some of my very good friends and my senior former colleagues said make a career, this is the job; you should do this because this suits you perfectly, vis-a-vis your experience: five years public relations, six years public relations officer, political science, contacts with politicians, members of parliament, the kind of stuff which suited me well, suited me the best. I delivered from day one.

Q: We haven’t gotten to day one yet. We have you in 1970 or 1971 in London.


Q: You felt that it was time to go home.

KHAN: It was time for me to go home. 1972, ’73---that was in ’73, I believe.

Q: And you explained why.

KHAN: Yes. I’ve already explained why.

Q: We’re about to go into the next chapter. I’m ready to go. Do you want to keep going?

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Let’s take on the next chapter which would be your return, this time---where? You went from the UK to---?

KHAN: Islamabad.

Q: Islamabad.

KHAN: Islamabad.

Q: Now, you had not previously lived in Islamabad, is that right?

KHAN: Yes. This house I built in Islamabad in 1975.
Q: So you came from London to Islamabad.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: What were your expectations when you returned to Islamabad?

KHAN: When I came back, in fact I was feeling pretty comfortable. I had added to my education, and I would be able to sell myself pretty well, vis-a-vis seeking employment with the kind of qualifications I had. Believe me when I came back and I started looking around and talking around, I thought the jobs were waiting. In fact, when I joined the American embassy, I had three other offers. One was in the government; the other two were in the civil government, reasonably respectable positions. Then, at that time again, I consulted my senior friends and colleagues, and they said, “That’s the job. You are in an embassy. You have already been selected; don’t be a confused person. You’ll make a career.” I remember when I visited—

A: That’s called destiny.

KHAN: That’s called destiny.

A: And the lady of the house must have been waiting for you.

(Laughter)

Q: Just mention ladies, whenever you want. You went to London by yourself, I think.

KHAN: Of course.

Q: You came back; you were in Islamabad; you had options. You believed you were a young man with options, and, indeed, you were correct. There were options.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Lots of people wanted to. You have an effective forehead, which got you a visa.

(Laughter)

Q: And the same presence, the qualifications. I think when people interviewed you they understood that you had something to offer.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Now, let’s talk about your decision to join the U.S. embassy.

KHAN: Yes, please.
Q: When was that?

KHAN: It was in 1973, February. They had advertised, and I had also heard so when I came back I applied. I was called for the interview. There were about 150 candidates who had applied, some with the backing of the Prime Minister.

Q: Public relations, did you say?

KHAN: Yes. Public relations, yes. In the American embassy, the position was that of the political adviser.

Q: Political adviser.

KHAN: Yes. Political adviser.

Q: Ok. So this is the job you went into in 1973—

KHAN: Yes.

Q: —and the same one for the twenty-eight years.

KHAN: Yes. Of course, initially I was the junior adviser, then the senior adviser. They kept on giving me higher and higher grades. Eventually, I ended up having the highest grade any Pakistani had ever gotten. I don’t think anybody will get it.

Q: (Pauses the recording machine) We are pausing for dramatic effect. That’s very moving.

KHAN: Sorry?

Q: That’s very moving. (pausing the recording machine momentarily). I’m going to give a second of silence, to dramatize it. Now you joined in ’73; you reported directly to the political counselor?

KHAN: To the political counselor and to the ambassador.

Q: OK. You were their adviser on Pakistani political affairs?

KHAN: This is a subject on which I would like to talk to you in a much, much lengthier way. This is something I can really give you, the political developments and the political history, the checkered history of Pakistan as you say. That’s the time I would talk to you at a greater length. I can say that I can speak with authenticity on the events, with authority and with having known personally the politicians on both sides of parliament, and as individuals also. This is the account which I would like to be recorded as to what did I see, what did I experience, what did I gain, what the Pakistani politicians do today, and what they used to do yesterday and day before, how much they are responsible for
bring all the ills of this society here in Pakistan. I would talk about the corruption, about the palace intrigues, about the military intervention, about the American influence. These are the areas on which I would like to speak a lot.

Q: Ok. We are in the same first interview. Dan Whitman interviewing Mr. Aman Khan. We had just gotten you into the U.S. embassy. You were beginning to tell us about the sweep of time that you spent there and the perceptions that you had and what you were able to contribute to the U.S. embassy.

KHAN: I earlier submitted that joining the American embassy itself was something great which happened to me, because it suited my aptitude. It suited my qualifications, my experience, everything combined. The background when I joined the American embassy was that Pakistan was dismembered. Bangladesh had come into being. The government in Pakistan, headed by Bhutto (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto), was trying to establish itself. They were in the process of getting more than 100,000 prisoners in East Pakistan, which was standard---

A: Procedure?

KHAN: Yes. This is history. Let me tell you that, if I am good at history, this was the first time in the history that any such big number of Muslim armies were deployed. That’s true. There were some Syrians____________, and there were some Indians, too. Bhutto was trying to establish his credibility. He was trying to make a constitution, which is now known as the ’73 constitution. It has become a controversial document, but it is still very well-regarded. Whenever a new regime comes in they go and change it, bringing some amendments. They go on screwing around with this constitution, which they have already changed through many amendments. That was the background against which I was joining the embassy. This is the scenario: the country was still going through political turmoil. Many who still were crying about the dismemberment of Pakistan were not compromising with Bhutto as being the Pakistani president. Things were still not stable. This was the background.

I joined the American embassy. It was a very, very, very interesting period I would like to say. They wanted to know each and every possible detail as to what was going on along the country’s borders, what was going on in the corridors of power, what the government was deciding to do to bring political stability, with the expectation that economic stability would follow. Things weren’t really going the way one would have liked them to go.

I think I was the most sought-after person because of my background. The elections had taken place. The new assembly had come into being, and I happen to know---I can boast about it---I happened to know more than half of the members of parliament personally. The reason was that I had studied with them either in college or university. They came from real good families, landed aristocracy; they were the people who came to the parliament as elected members. That gave me a very good edge, an advantage to create the kind of situation to take to my American colleagues, bosses for interactions, and
varied interactions with MPs. That was something amazing for them. They couldn’t believe that with just one telephone call they could meet a senator, a member of the National Assembly, or a minister over a glass of whatever at my house. I still am a very good host. I was enjoying complete support from the embassy. I was having people over to my house, having meetings with the foreign minister and the American ambassador, which was very rare. They wouldn’t have met the foreign minister otherwise because they had to go through a lot of formalities. These were the kind of high-profile activities that were happening. I was doing that and I was doing this. Events just happened in very quick succession.

Q: Most of this was because of being classmates and the education---

KHAN: Yes, and knowing friends and their friends, ok. That helped the American embassy in a number of subtle cases which I had. Maybe next time I will bring a few to show you, some pictures to show you. It was in order to acquaint the Americans, for them to know important politicians directly. Even now, the top political leadership, Benazir (Benazir Bhutto), Nawaz (Sharif), or any of the top political opposition leaders. This was the advantage I had, which really nobody would have. That helped the American embassy at that time to understand what was going on in the country.

A: The domestic sector, too.

KHAN: Yes. They always had the latest update. My ambassador, whenever he would have me over, he’d say, “How come whatever you tell us turns out to be true the next day?” (Laughter). At a think tank event, our two Ambassadors, Tezi Schaffer and her husband Ambassador Howard Schaffer, talked about the one year they were in Pakistan. They ended up having a meal with me, and this is what they told me once: “Last year, Aman, when we came, this was your prediction.” I said, “No, it was not my prediction; it was only my perception, only my calculation. It was my mathematics that it would happen.”

That way the embassy kept well abreast about the ongoing events, political events. I think the embassy received a great amount of appreciation from the State Department, and from the White House. They kept getting certificates, and recognition for their reporting. The man behind this was this humble somebody [voice indicates that he means himself] who was feeding them, day and night. There was no eight-to-five stuff. I used to work late, plus anytime I was called because they needed to consult, or something dramatic was happening: why had it happened, why had it not happened? So on and so forth. These are the general things that I have just mentioned.

I will be very specific in due course of my interview with you, sir, of what were the specifics of what happened. How did the first martial law come, and then what were the factors behind it? And, then the civilian government comes for a small period of time, and it was dismissed. Another comes, and is dismissed; another comes, and is dismissed. These two prime ministers were dismissed twice. They were never allowed to serve their full terms.
Q: As you get into this, let me ask a general question.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Events were happening. You were interpreting them to the U.S. embassy. Was it a factor that you had a personal stake in the history of your country? Was there ever a question of your own personal engagement in your country’s history and the need of the Americans to receive information? I am not suggesting that you ever gave a slanted view. I am saying that every person has a political desire, a political perception. Did you ever feel that you were faced with a dilemma in interpreting the events?

KHAN: No. I think I was more into interpreting the events. I was more into giving them a more objective perception and view. I wasn’t cynical in that sense. I just wanted them to know; I just wanted to keep them abreast of the fractured positions as to what was going on.

Q: Another general question. In giving good information to the American embassy, aside from the professional pride that you took---

KHAN: That I take.

Q: ---What other motivation did you have? Did you think much about the value of what you were doing in informing the American embassy accurately about your country? Did you see this as something that would benefit Pakistan?

KHAN: Yes. One great thing had happened to me during all these years: My conscience was 100% clear. I knew what I was doing. There was no being disloyal to my country; I was loyal to the U.S. government; I was committed to my job; but there was nothing which I was doing, which my conscience would reflect poorly on me. There was nothing wrong. In fact, I had almost become advisor to half of the cabinet ministers. They would call me and say, “Come and tell me what is going on.”

Q: This is the negative side. You weren’t guilty of any bias.

KHAN: No, not at all.

Q: Tell about the positive side. Can you articulate what it was that you were doing that was benefiting the bilateral relationship? Or do you want to talk about that later?

KHAN: No, no, no. Let me answer it since this is a direct question, and I should answer you that. Yes, I have always wanted, and I did want, and I did make efforts. I went the extra mile in order to improve the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. I generally felt that Pakistan and America should have an understanding, a relationship which Pakistan should benefit more because America was going to benefit anyway. The political leadership should understand it.
Now, Ambassador (Robert) Oakley. I’ll just cite one specific example, in answer to your question. When the nuclear program had become controversial, and it was subject of a discretionary period of Pakistan and the U.S., it was ironic that a sovereign ambassador did not have cordial relations with the then-prime minister of Pakistan, Mrs. Benazir. I enjoyed it. I use the word enjoyed, the full confidence of Ambassador Oakley (in fact, I would even use the words ‘his patronage’), who allowed me, he had so much confidence, “Aman, go ahead and tell the people who matter that this is what they can get out of this agreement of understanding” vis-à-vis the nuclear issue. They wanted Pakistan to hold onto its nuclear program. I still remember the words he said, “Ask them not to cross the deadline.”

Q: Not to cross---

KHAN: Not to cross the deadline, you know, to enrichment.

Q: Ah.

KHAN: Deadline. Ok. The United States government would give as many billions as possible of dollars and tanks and airplanes and whatnot if they don’t cross the deadline. I used to go and literally beg, crying, knocking at the doors of the ministers, “Look out, time’s not going in your favor. America wants you to do this. For God’s sake, do this for this country. Don’t do that. What you’re doing is going to head for total disaster.”

Q: It was extremely significant, the position you were in. You say that the ambassador and the prime minister did not have cordial relations.

KHAN: Yes, sir. Benazir Bhutto and the Ambassador at that time, Ambassador Oakley, were at the time not even on speaking terms. I’m history, I’m telling you.

Q: Thanks to you, there was communication.

KHAN: I was going at the highest level trying to tell them this is an opportunity, grab it. This is bloody good for Pakistan. This is good for Pakistan. For, God’s sakes, do it for Pakistan. Honest to God, in these words. I would cry. I said this is good for Pakistan; grab it, take it; you are not going to lose anything.

Q: When you said this to your compatriots, did they think you were saying this as an agent of the Americans?

KHAN: Yes. I would say, “I am speaking on behalf of the American ambassador. This is what he wants me to convey to you, and I want you to convey this to your prime minister and to anybody else. This is what is in the interest of Pakistan; they should do it.”

Q: Did they give you any problems?
KHAN: No, they---

*Q: You are speaking for these other people, not for us---*

KHAN: Actually, they wouldn’t give me problems, the reason being—I wouldn’t say that all of them were my friends, my good friends, but they were acquaintances. We knew each other very, very well. There were social taboos. We weren’t impolite to each other. We can talk to each other maybe in a very forceful manner, in a very emphatic manner, but it’s not the end. I had learned a bit of diplomacy, to be very careful, very discreet and then to put things across in a forceful manner. I think that was very, very important. Lots of times, my friends, my minister friends would say, “Eh, you, American agent, you come; you ta, ta, ta; you do this to us, you blow our heads off.” I said, “I want you to know what the factual position is.”

One thing, which I can take pride in, was when Nawaz was going to go for this nuclear test. This is where I could succeed. Believe you me, I can swear on my mother, which I do after the holy, after my yellah. I literally went back and told him, “Don’t do that; this is going to destroy you; this is going to take you nowhere; don’t do that.” You know at that time the offers were coming from the White House. Clinton was making telephone calls from Washington, and all that stuff. I said, “Don’t do that. It’s not going to help you. It’s not going to help Pakistan. Don’t act like you’re going to conduct the tests or whatever.”

*Q: You were begging them not to conduct nuclear tests.*

KHAN: Not to conduct the tests. I was doing that with conviction, I tell you that I was doing that out of conviction. It was not the Oakley staff behind me telling me, “No, just go and do this.” I personally was 100% convinced that Pakistan should not go and carry out these tests.

*Q: Unfortunately, you did not succeed.*

KHAN: I did not succeed because so much was going on between Musharraf (Pervez Musharraf) and Nawaz Sharif, at that time. Inside---

*Q: Musharraf and---*

KHAN: Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister. So much was going on.

*Q: So much meaning complicated relations.*

KHAN: Yes. Conflict.

*Q: Yes.*
KHAN: Of course, Nawaz Sharif had a very good reason to say to the people of Pakistan, “Since India has done it, why shouldn’t we do it? We are also quite capable of conducting nuclear weapons tests.”

Q: How did Pakistan learn that India had nuclear weapons?

KHAN: They already knew.

Q: How?

KHAN: They had conducted their nuclear test before us. They had done it twice. They did it in the ’70s.

Q: But no one ever announced them.

KHAN: No, no; we did it. We conducted the test after India had already done it.

Q: OK, so it was generally known.

KHAN: The first Indian nuclear test was in the 70s. That was just before Pakistan conducted its nuclear test, and it was in retaliation for what India had done. That prompted Nawaz Sharif. Then I was saying, “If India is doing something wrong, don’t point to what India has committed, because it is not going to help you in any case.” Since then, I think we haven’t gone forward. We did conduct a few tests. So what, so what? They say that it is a deterrent. I don’t think it is a deterrent in today’s world. Having a nuclear bomb is not a deterrent. Nobody’s going to allow you to throw a nuclear bomb. Hiroshima, Nagasaki are not going to be repeated in this area. I hope and I pray it doesn’t.

Q: Doctor. We cannot deny the Doctor a moment.

KHAN: Yes.

A: I was here in Washington at that time, and we used to watch TV channels, Indian channels. Pakistani channels were not even here at that time. The Indian channels had all this misinformation. They were giving so much disinformation. It was amazing. I stopped listening to those news because I used to get depressed. You would get all these chills; they were telling lies right and left. On the other hand, they were showing the Indian public after the explosion that India did. They were so jubilant; they were so happy. The common man in the street would say, “Go and nuke Pakistan. Let’s get rid of them. Forget about Pakistan; we need to teach them a lesson.” That was the atmosphere when Nawaz Sharif did his tests. If he didn’t do that, they wouldn’t be silent.

KHAN: I disagree.
A: The common man—that is the way they were presented over here. They would do it all the time.

Q: There is a comment about information disseminated over Indian television, the cable network. Let’s return to Pakistan. I interrupted you to get some general context. Let’s go back to ’73, when you started. Was it ’73? You skipped ahead to Ambassador Oakley, but let’s go back chronologically. Let’s go through, starting in 1973, what the issues were.

KHAN: As I had previously submitted, at that time the issues were the return of more than 100,000 Pakistani soldiers stranded in East Pakistan. Bhutto was trying, one would like to give credit to him. He was trying his very best to get the repatriation of 100,000 soldiers from East Pakistan, from Bangladesh to Pakistan. It was a huge task. The smart thing he did was he managed to hold the first ever Islamic Summit in Lahore (I would again like to give him credit for that). The entire Islamic world’s heads—-the kings, the presidents, the prime ministers—they assembled in Lahore. He was smart enough to get Sheikh Mujibur Rahman invited, which was a political risk on his part because quite a number of Pakistani hated him. They thought he was responsible for the breakup. Bhutto managed to have him over, and he participated in the Islamic Conference, first ever Summit. Eventually he managed to get the repatriation of the stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh. It was a great achievement.

Q: When you say Summit, how many countries were there?

KHAN: 37 or 39.

A: All of them. I was there in Lahore.

KHAN: All of them; all of them. I think this is the number of countries. I think 39. Maybe there were 49.

Q: Because of the huge number of Muslims in India, was India represented?

KHAN: No, India was not represented. India was still an enemy.

Q: I know, but it has this huge number of Muslims. No. OK.

KHAN: India’s claim has a point when they say now that their Muslim population is more than the population we have. They have a point, so they have now managed to get the status of an observer at the Islamic Conference.

Q: The Muslims in India are a minority even though they are a large number.

KHAN: India has a bigger number than we have in Pakistan. It is a large number. Muslims living in India, though a minority, of course, are the main minority in India, after Christian.
These were the issues at that time. This holding a Summit of Muslim countries was a great achievement. Bhutto got a lot of praise for that. It was something which one wouldn’t have normally imagined he could manage, but he did. That was because of his dynamic personality. I think he was able to convince most of the Islamic world that he was a dynamic leader, and he wanted the Islamic countries to have unity among themselves.

So this was the immediate issue at that time. I am talking about his coming into power. I was a part of the American embassy at that time. Beside the political issues, which were developing the opposition against him, people were disenchanted with him; they always thought that he was responsible for the dismemberment also. That was a very, very major issue, besides. Did they have ________? The economy was in very, very bad shape. The army had gone back to the barracks. The army was feeling very ashamed for what had happened, you know.

Q: What was the interest of the U.S. embassy in these events?

KHAN: I beg your pardon?

Q: What was the interest of the U.S. embassy in these events?

KHAN: The interest of the U.S. embassy was to keep themselves well abreast of what was going on in the corridors of power. My plus was that I had access during daytime and during the evening time, going and sharing drinks with them, going and talking with them and trying to know as to what is going on, what is the mood of the government. At time, people were also unhappy with America, because they thought that America, the 3rd Fleet, or the 2nd Fleet or whatever that is---

Q: The 7th fleet.

KHAN: ---the 7th Fleet, could have come and saved Pakistan from dismemberment. That was more of a fiction and very unreasonable and unrealistic, too. The general perception was that America had let Pakistan down again, as it did in the ’65 war.

Q: This is a common theme, is it not, in the bilateral relations?

KHAN: Well, yes. It has been in order to help the American policies be understood in the correct quarters. This was again one of the unwritten components of the job that I had. It was a difficult job. It really was difficult to sell America then in an effective manner. Intellectually you had to have something in your head to go and tell them; you can’t just go---I couldn’t have just gone and talked nonsense.

Q: So your position required you to interpret the activities of the corridors of power. It did not require you to advocate a U.S. position, and yet you did so. Is that correct?

KHAN: In a manner where I’m not just acting like an agent.
Q: Right.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: This you took upon yourself as a personal---

KHAN: This was my own putting things across, you know. I’m impressive, and I’m convincing. I am logically right. I make people listen to me. I’ll get into discussion. There were times that, say I am in some party, I am talking, and some intelligence guy is reporting. “Oh, look what Aman is talking about.” Oh, yes. That happened many times. You do not know the number of agencies—I was harassed, my children were harassed, my daughters were harassed. That’s the price I had to pay. The Russians, the Soviet embassy, were after me like hell. They wanted to---

A: ______________________.

KHAN: Well, they did, they did. I mean the way the agencies would chase me, when I was going with my wife to attend a reception. I knew I was being chased. It was a difficult time. It was not that easy.

Q: All the way through?

KHAN: All the way through.

Q: For all the twenty-eight years?

KHAN: For a longer period, yes. When things started improving, they improved. I was always under some kind of surveillance. Even in my private life (laughs). So, that part was pretty dangerous; you have some private moments of your life.

Q: This may be too abstract a question. We could skip it if you want. The motivation for doing this was not simply loyalty to the U.S. embassy. Perhaps, it was a wish to improve the bilateral relations for the benefit of your country, Pakistan. Am I expressing this correctly?

KHAN: You are.

Q: What was the motivation that made you willing to endure being under surveillance, being harassed, and being observed and perhaps questioned. What was it that kept your conviction firm?

KHAN: I think the very straight and honest answer to your question is that it never, never occurred to me that I was doing something wrong. You know, my conscience---
Q: That is the negative. What was the positive? What was the positive? What were you intending to achieve by making---Your life was complicated. Your life was difficult. You were willing to endure difficulties because you believed in doing something positive. What was that positive thing?

KHAN: Commitment. Second, I would be excellent in my job. I would perform my job in an excellent manner. Professionally I would be doing my job well. Plus I was not doing something wrong. I would also say, “Well, this is what my job is; this is what I am required to do; this is what I am expected to do.” That kept me going. Also, I knew that any harm coming to me physically or to my family, my embassy is going to protect me. And they jolly well did it. It happened a few times. Like when the late Ambassador Arnie Raphel [Arnold Lewis Raphel] was First Secretary, in the political section, Soviet agents came to my house. My wife was alone. That was very, very scary. Incidentally, the same evening I was supposed to go to Arnie’s house for a cocktail party. When I related the incident to him he said, “Oh, my god! We are going to make this an issue. This is going to be a bilateral issue.”

Q: This was not when he was ambassador. This was—

KHAN: No, no. He was First Secretary, political, in the’80s.

Q: Political. OK.

KHAN: The interesting part is---you can connect it wherever you would like---I was coming home late one Saturday afternoon. I saw a car with a foreign mission plate right near my house. Islamabad was very quiet then. I approached my house, and I see that---we used to have neighbors next door. Their daughters were young, and they used to have Arab diplomats over for fun and parties. I thought maybe some Arab diplomats had come to spend some time with those girls. As I got closer, I could see the Soviet embassy car number sixty-two. That was the number given to them by Pakistan. Our number was sixty-four. Oh, God. I parked the car hurriedly and I just went in. I saw my wife was totally shaken, and nervous, poor woman. I saw a young Soviet diplomat and a beautiful woman, very attractive. Any man would have fallen for her. I can tell you that. I can tell you that today. She was one of the prettiest girls I have ever seen. The way she was dressed up with her low neck, and all that stuff.

Q: Pakistani?

KHAN: No, no; from the Soviet embassy. There were two.

Q: A Soviet diplomat and a Soviet woman.

KHAN: That woman. They were in my house with my wife. They had gotten into the house by saying, “We have heard that a portion of your house is empty and for rent.” My wife said, “No.” (laughter) She knew that at that time, by law, we were forbidden to have
interactions with these Soviet diplomats, or the Chinese, or any communist, or, for that matter, any member(s) of a communist country. It was not done; it was not allowed.

I went in. I met them, and I said, “Do you know where I work?” She said, “Yes.” I said, “Do you know what position I work there?” She said, “Yes.” Then I said, “Then I am afraid you shouldn’t have come. I am a Pakistani. We have no further hospitality.” My wife had served them cold drinks by then. I said, “I am not supposed to be talking to you. Let me be very honest with you. I can’t be disloyal to my bosses; it’s just not on. If there is anything---” Then, they said, “No, no, no. We’re sorry we came. Dah, dah, dah---” Anyway, I don’t want to go into details. The man made the mistake of leaving his telephone number and name on the table. They went. I showed them respect. I went out to see them off and the girl says, “You are a very handsome man.” (general laughter) “Why don’t you think of coming over sometime, and we’ll have some drinks together.” I said, “Ok. I’ll think about it. Thank you very much,” (laughter) and off they went.

That evening was the cocktail at Arnie Raphel’s house. I went there and Arnie says, “Aman, what’s wrong with you? Are you ok? You are not normal.” And I say, “Arnie—and I relate this. Then he says, “No!” I say, “Yes!” Then he told me, and I remember, “We are going to make it a bilateral issue. You are the most respected, well-regarded Pakistani working with us, in a high position.

Next morning, when I went to the embassy, the first call I got in my office was: “The Ambassador wants to see you.” Arnie had already discussed with him what had happened. So he called me, gave me all that blah, blah, blah, and assured me that “no harm is going to come, and we’ll make sure that it doesn’t happen again. We will take it up at the highest level, and we’ll make sure that those two are declared persona non grata.” I am told the then-American ambassador managed to convince the Pakistani government that “This is the guy who is so close to us, who is a very, very respected official. So, we would not like this kind of a thing to happen again.”

Q: And were they PNG’d? [Transcriber’s note: Declared persona non grata by the host country or the U.S. Ambassador. When an individual is PNG’d, they have their diplomatic credentials cancelled and are required to leave. This affects both the diplomat and all members of the household who are in the country due to their relationship with the diplomat. Diplomats, as well as related family on their orders, who are PNG’d by the host country, are normally barred from further entry into that country for the remainder of their lives.]

KHAN: They were of course.

(Laughter)

A: There you are.

(Laughter)
Q: I think they live right here, now. I think I saw them the other day (said in a joking, conspiratorial tone).

(laughter)

KHAN: I’ll close this here, because---

Q: You may, but you need not.

KHAN: Well, maybe, another 15 minutes, so we can talk on this.

Q: Yes.

KHAN: Then, if we are talking about these kinds of incidents, with agencies harassing, calling my wife and trying to harass my daughters, and this and that, and all that, that is something.

But, otherwise, there are many such incidents which one can relate to, which are interesting incidents. The one, which I would like to relate now. It is Maulana Fazal Ur Rehman, the present leader of the opposition.

Q: Sorry, Aman.


A: He’s the bearded guy; you know you see him on the TV.

KHAN: Fazal – F-A—

Q: They all have beards.

A: (laughs)


Q: Uh huh.


Q: Sorry. The present, what?

KHAN: He’s the present leader of the opposition and the National Assembly.

Q: Ok. Thank you. We are going to---
KHAN: He was the one who was calling the United States all kinds of names; accusing America of—

Q: Sorry. What year here? What year, just approximately. In the ’70s?

KHAN: It should be---no, no, no. It should be in the ’90s.

Q: Whoa.

KHAN: It’s just an incident. You can place it wherever you want to. It is a very interesting incident. He’s calling. He was almost forbidden. I told the American ambassador and my political counselor. I said, “This is a man we do not need, because he is accusing you of abusing the elections of the 1990s, and it is not going to help. If we do need him, he is going to make political mileage out of it.” They agreed. But then, one ambitious First Secretary, a woman, (again, I saved her from being declared as persona non grata), Alice Wells was her name (I don’t know whether I should mention her name)—

Q: It’s fine, fine.

KHAN: She’s coming to me, twice a day knocking at my door. “Aman, what about Maulana? What about Maulana?” I said, “Alice, it is not right thing for you to go and see him. I’m taking you along with me. It is not good.” She was insisting. So, I started making my efforts.

Q: Sorry. Why was this inappropriate? What was the—

KHAN: Why? Because, as I just said, he was going to make political mileage out of a meeting, out of the fact that the American consular first secretary had come to see him. “Look, here, I am a very important man.” So, I called Maulana, and said, “OK, we’ll let you know.” I called again. “OK, we’ll let you know.”

Then, late one night---and I hate to receive calls at home---this secretary calls me, and says, “Maulana wants to speak to you.” Then Maulana. “Yes, Maulana sahib. What can I do for you?” He says, “Well, you have been calling me. We have been thinking. I have been consulting with my people. Will it be OK if we meet tomorrow morning?” I said, “No, Maulana, I cannot commit. I have to go to the embassy tomorrow morning and check with the person who wants to come with me and then I’ll let you know.”

The next day the time is set for the day after. We go, along with this woman. She had not gotten a clearance from the front office, nor had she gotten a clearance from the political counselor. Ambitious; some American colleague gave her that title; I don’t want to repeat that. We go to meet him. What does he do? He had a tape recorder right under the table like this. We both are made to sit here. He had already informed all the international media and had the cameramen and the local press. Then the interview starts. Wells was not good at Urdu, so I was doing the interpretation: he said this; she said that. I asked
Maulana, “May I, sir, ask you as to why you go on giving so many anti-American statements?” He tells me, “Aman (he called me ‘Aman sahib’ out of respect), this is for public consumption, but I wanted to meet you; you wanted to meet me. This is what it is, blah, blah, blah.”

When the interview finished, and we come down from his apartment, there was an army of—

**Q: Press.**

KHAN: ---reporters, photographers and the like. Oh, my! That’s a picture that I have kept. I put my bag here and she put her hand like this. The next day, in one of the major Urdu newspapers, this man gives a verbatim account of the interview. I said this, she said that. I said this, she said that. Aman said this; I said that. He had paid them a hell of a lot of money, and it was very anti-American, very anti. I told them this. He used the Americans.

We used to have a translator. The newspapers came in the morning. I asked the translator “Give me the whole translation of this.” I called the ambassador and the political counselor. Wells was called. She was asked, “Did you ask Aman to go and meet Maulana?” She replied, “Yes.” Did he advise you not to?” She replied, “Yes.” “Did Aman say that it was not the right thing for you to go and see Maulana?” Again she said, “Yes.” This thing had already happened upstairs in the front office.

**Q: This was the Ambassador?**

KHAN: Yes. In the Ambassador’s office. It happened when he asked her those three questions, which later on were conveyed to me by the political counselor, John Smith, who is here in the States. He is still in the Foreign Service. I am going to have lunch with him next week, when I come. After that was done, she came to my office, and she was crying.

**Q: I have known so many like this.**

KHAN: I said, “Alice, what has happened?” She said, “Aman, you were right.” I said, “So, what can I do for you?” She said, “I am going to be thrown out. Can you save me?” I said, “Well, I am not a mean person. I kept telling you, Alice, let’s not do it, but you were so insistent. I will do whatever I can. I don’t want any harm to come to you. You are a regular Foreign Service Officer. I am too humble a man. Whatever I can do, I will. I don’t know, Alice.”

I made it a point to talk to the political counselor. He said, “You are going to save her? You want to save her? She didn’t listen to you.” He added, “Well, you have to go to the Ambassador. Only you can go and convince him. She is on her way out.” Then I went to the ambassador, and I said, “Sir, maybe she is too ambitious, and she didn’t realize what she was getting into. I have come to request you pardon her, so that no harm comes to her
career.” She was tortured (not literally), and her husband was tortured too. She left soon. She had to. She couldn’t stay for a long time.

So this is one incident which I still recall, and I enjoy looking at it. I’ll tell more about such incidents talking about the leaders—the way they behaved, the way they conducted themselves. There is only one thing that I would like to add here: the amount of hypocrisy which our political leaders have is beyond me to explain. They are hypocrites of the highest order. I am not going to touch upon their corruption, but on their hypocrisy and their compromises.

With the Americans, I would like to confide more during the course of this transcript. With the Americans, their attitude used to be absolutely different, even when they were very anti-American, or whatever. It was very easy (I would use the word “convenient” sometimes) to make an arrangement or a meeting, with any top political leader from either side of the government, either side of the divide. This present American ambassador here these days, Mahmud Ali Durrani [the Pakistan Ambassador to the U.S. at the time of this interview], it would take one telephone call.

Q: How’s that? You were mentioning the hypocrisy, but the accessibility?

KHAN: Accessibility. I made it easy for myself. What I always did was to establish personal rapport over there. No Pakistani employee had ever—I was telling somebody the other day—ever gone to Americans’ residences for something. I developed a personal rapport when I had those people over for meals, for drinks, whatever. I did my job. I would never—and this is on record—I never claimed even a penny’s representation allowance from the American embassy. Once—two of my ambassadors scolded me, calling me in. “Why don’t you do that?” I said, “Sir, I don’t do it for the simple reason that when you come to my house, and I’ve got some senators and the MNA (Members of the National Assembly) and the minister, I have some friends as well. As per the rules, I am supposed to provide you the list of the guests. I don’t want my list to include my friends, saying that I entertained them with embassy funds. I am social, but I never did; I never spent even a penny of representation funds. What I am trying to tell you is that my personal rapport was more than a matter of accessibility, which helped me establish my contact with them and have discussions in a very congenial and very friendly posture.

Q: Do most Pakistani officials and parliamentarians find it advantageous—regardless of power, party or opposition—did they consider it advantageous to be in touch with the U.S. embassy?

KHAN: Yes. Through me. They always thought he’s the one we have been in contact with. The opposition would like to meet an American diplomat: To establish—to bust out against the establishment, against the government. The government would like to meet them too, to give the government viewpoint to the diplomats.

Q: This is totally fascinating. Do you want to start going through chronologically today, or shall we do this in the future?
Q: Next time. Let’s just close the tape and say it is still September 29th. This is Dan Whitman interviewing Mr. Aman Khan, freshly in from Islamabad, and we will continue this discussion.

KHAN: Dan, thank you very, very much for having me over. This is a great experience. I am glad myself that my memory is still serving me pretty well. I can recollect all those incidents maybe in a more elaborate manner when you interview me next time.

A: And, from my side, I really appreciate your allowing me to join in. Consider this absolutely confidential. What has transpired is absolutely confidential. I am quite familiar with maintaining confidentiality. I really do appreciate your allowing me to interject thoughts here and there.

Q: I appreciate it too, Doctor. You behaved yourself rather well. It could have been better.

(General laughter)

A: There is always room for improvement.

KHAN: Thank you once again.

Q: This is Dan Whitman interviewing Mr. Aman Khan, on October 8, 2007. This is our second conversation, and we are going to pick up at the point where there was a summit of Muslim countries in Islamabad.

KHAN: In Lahore.

Q: In Lahore, in Lahore. You were mentioning how this led to the creation of an organization called the Organization of Islamic Conferences. The OIC.

KHAN: OIC.

Q: Can you tell me, Mr. Khan, how this happened and what was the importance of the creation of this organization?

KHAN: Bhutto, being smart and a visionary---(though, if you were to ask me as a student of history, I would have a lot of political differences with him on his handling certain political situations in a very dictatorial manner). The scenario was that Pakistan was no more; it has been dismembered. East Pakistan was gone---out of the region, out of India. More than 100,000 soldiers had surrendered. Those included civilians, as well. It was a dilemma. It was the most important issue that Bhutto was facing at that time; how to get them repatriated to Pakistan. It was a huge task, and he could not have done it unless he
had foreign help and assistance in order to get those people repatriated from East Pakistan.

Q: He was the prime minister?

KHAN: Yes. He was the prime minister. This idea of his, to get the then-Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, to the OIC, was very, very smart. When this Islamic countries conference idea was conceived, he sent embassies and he got the support of the Saudi king at the time, King Faisal [Faisal ibn Abdelaziz Al Saud]. Later on Faisal was assassinated, some say by the CIA. I don’t know, but he was symbolic.

Q: King Faisal---let’s spell that.

KHAN: Who?

Q: King Faisal.


Q: Saudi Arabia.

KHAN: Yes. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. He had become symbolic of all the Islamic countries with all kingdoms, sheikdoms, and whatever. Bhutto managed to get this gathering, this congregation together. Later on it was given the name of OIC. I would call it an Islamic Summit, which it has now almost become, if not yearly, every second year. They do hold a summit through this OIC. In my opinion and in the opinion of many other people who believe in that, the OIC is a useless body. They sit, they talk, and they disperse. There is a Persian saying about it and it says: ne sistum, o guftun, o barhasta. This means they sit, they talk, and they depart.

Q: (snorts in laughter)

KHAN: This is what they do. They pass resolutions, generally about the problems the Islamic world is facing, condemning Israel for its occupation of Arab territories and Palestinian territories. They say they will do this and we will have the territories liberated, but it has not happened.

Q: If they sit and talk and disperse, then why was this such a stroke of genius to create this organization?

KHAN: It would have never taken place otherwise. You’re smart; you’re smart.

Q: But you’re saying that the organization is useless.
KHAN: One wouldn’t blame Bhutto for that. There is a platform. This is a platform where they can get together. If they did not become stronger, if they did not become useful, as they should have been—

Q: It is their fault.

KHAN: It is their fault.

Q: Bhutto created an enormous opportunity for them.

KHAN: Yes, to get together on one platform.

Q: Can you tell me your own role or your own observations, personally? What did you witness in the creation in the OIC? How were you involved?

KHAN: As an observer. I wouldn’t say, Daniel, that I was directly involved, but, as an observer, this conference did help Bhutto politically. This did help Bhutto internationally. It did help him also to be the leader of the Islamic world, right? Through this congregation, he was able to bring the then-prime minister of Bangladesh, who was most undesirable at that time. People blamed him as responsible for the independence declaration, though I personally don’t think he was. A special plane was sent, and he came over. He attended the conference. That created the basis for Pakistan and Bangladesh to recognize each other.

Q: I have to ask his name.

KHAN: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Q: This was a thaw in the cold war, so to speak, and the aftermath of the war.

KHAN: Yes. He paved the way to recognize Bangladesh as an independent country, so did Bangladesh. That helped the quick repatriation from Bangladesh to Pakistan.

Q: It could not have been easy for these two countries to become friendly so quickly.

KHAN: Yes. It could not happen after such a---

Q: There was terrible bloodshed.

KHAN: ---terrible, bloody war. If you ask me, as a Pakistani, emotionally, most of the Pakistanis were disturbed about what had happened.

Q: But you’re saying that the act of bringing him to Lahore accelerated the healing process.
KHAN: It certainly did in my view. It certainly did. I will be very fair with Bhutto on this. As I initially mentioned it to you, I did have differences with him as a student of history and political affairs, and later on with the way he handled situations. If we just focused on Bhutto, then I would cut a number of other things we talk about.

Q: Let’s do that. By the way, we are now in 1973, I think.

KHAN: Yes. So this is a good time for this conversation. Bhutto continues. He started the socialist program, which the people of Pakistan were averse to. Field Marshal Yesya Khan, who was the President of Pakistan before Bhutto came, had brought an economic boom to Pakistan. He helped develop the industrial sector. He helped develop private banking. He helped build the agricultural sector and brought modern technology.

Q: This was pre-Bhutto?

KHAN: Yes, pre-Bhutto. I’ll come to Field Marshall Yesya Khan, also. His were the ten years that we call the Golden Era. I’ll just first of all confine myself to Bhutto. I’ll finish it here.

Bhutto started the process of socialization and the socialization was what: nationalizing the banks and nationalizing the schools and colleges. The big blow was to the missionary schools and colleges, Christian missionary schools. They were all nationalized. They were made into government schools, and they were producing very good products as students. Then he started tilting towards the Soviet Union, not that the Soviet Union was very happy with him as such. I don’t know. I don’t want to talk on this. This new system, which he brought about, created a lot of dissatisfaction among the people, who, with their hard work, blood and whatever, had set up the industries. Overnight they became bankrupt. They didn’t have anything.

Q: Was there---

KHAN: The government took over the industry, big heavy industry.

Q: What about compensation for those---

KHAN: It was peanuts; it was not properly done. It was not the way it should have been done. I mean the banking system, in my view, was coming up so well. The system was providing employment to the young girls and boys fresh from university, graduates. The banking sector was growing very fast. That was in Ayub Khan’s time.

Q: So this was a miscalculation, you would say.

KHAN: This was a miscalculation on his part. And now he is sowing---

Q: Did he do this from ideological motivation or practical---?
KHAN: Though people say that he did it due to ideological motivation, I don’t think so. I think it involved this nationalization stuff. He had contempt for the industrial class because he came from the landed aristocracy. Most of the industries at that time were in Karachi, which was in Sindh, and he was a Sindhi leader. He was also against the centuries-old civil service, which the British had left as their legacy. He almost destroyed the system, the same system which India inherited, Sri Lanka inherited, as did a couple of other countries where the British ruled. They didn’t change their systems. They are still intact and they are benefiting from this.

Q: Why did he do this? Was it because of personal contempt?

KHAN: This again was out of the contempt and the hatred he had for civil service bureaucrats.

Q: Why? Because of the British creation of that service class?

KHAN: It was not because it was a British creation. It was personal whims. Why shouldn’t I break this bureaucracy? The bureaucracy was very strong. In India it is very strong.

Q: You said he was landed aristocracy.

KHAN: He belonged to the landed aristocracy.

Q: Did he define the civil service to be bourgeois, mediocre?

KHAN: Yes. Bourgeois. The bourgeois could create problems, whatever he would do. So he said, “Let’s break their back first.” I think this was the intention.

Q: Again, would you say this was a miscalculation?

KHAN: Both these things were miscalculations of the highest order. The country suffered because of this.

Q: Did this gain favor in Moscow? Is this what drew him to Moscow? Did they like what he was doing?

KHAN: I would not comment on that because I don’t know that. I wouldn’t know. I didn’t focus on whether the Soviets did or not. Bhutto did have these Soviet leanings and stuff, but he also brought the Chinese closer. They always were, but in his time, he did bring the Chinese closer.

Q: OK. On Bhutto. Other comments about Bhutto?

KHAN: Now we are coming to the three or four years of his dictatorial system. It was a democracy, there is no doubt about it. The good thing he did was he brought the famous,
now infamous, 1973 constitution. That was something great. It was framed by all the components in the National Assembly: all political parties, nationalists, religious and others. They all joined hands together in having this 1973 constitution, which every day, today, like the Koran and the bible, is mentioned in our country.

Q: What are some of the strengths of that constitution?

KHAN: We didn’t have a constitution. We had our constitutional assembly in the beginning when Pakistan was created. They created a 1950 constitution, but that was never implemented. This was the first ever constitution after the independence of Pakistan which had come into being. The good thing about it was the big leaders like Walid Khan and other national leaders, the opposition leaders, and the legal experts all thought the framing of the constitution was a great thing. We had to have a book under which you could rule the country.

Q: Give me some of the characteristics. Were there three branches of government? Was it a constitution reflecting---

KHAN: According to the 1973 constitution we had the four federating units. We have four high courts. We have four provincial elected assemblies, directly elected. The governors are nominated by the federal government. They are the agents of the government of Pakistan. The provincial setup is run by the chief minister.

Q: So four of everything. This implies more a federal system than a centralized system.

KHAN: Then, under the constitution, a good thing is a province like Balochistan and the biggest province, Punjab; they have the equal representation. They have, number-wise, 16 each or 17 each.

Q: 16 delegates—

KHAN: Senators.

Q: Did this neutralize any possible differences or conflicts in the four provinces?

KHAN: You see this is a body, though it does not enjoy as many powers as the National Assembly does. There are four federating units, and the representation is equal, which is good. I think they have added also some female members and all that. I think the number of the House now probably has gone up to a hundred---probably. I’m not very sure, but this is what the number is all about.

Q: So the constitution was a framework for a system which has flourished.

KHAN: The same constitution, but they started flirting with it. They started bringing more amendments one after the other as part of their suitability. I am coming to very
serious stuff. It is the most vocal and intelligent sect of society, which we call Ahmedhis. We’ve got two names: Ahmedhis or Qadianis.

Q: Spell them please.

KHAN: Ok. Ahmedhis. A-H-M-E-D-H-I-S. Ahmedhi is the name of the Prophet Ahmed but they have the sect because their so-called caliph’s last name was Ahmedh. Blah, blah, blah. You know---

Q: And the other group?

KHAN: No, they are the same group as they are called Ahmedhi or Qadiani. Qadiani is the name of the village in India where this sect was established.

Q: And the spelling of that village?


Q: OK.

KHAN: It is the name of a village, actually. It is in East Punjab. This sect, these Ahmedhis, because of their own unity, they were into education. They were into the medical; they were in the army. They were holding somewhat important positions. The religious element of the country however was very, very anti-Ahmedhis. They were never considered to be Muslims.

Q: So they were a kind of economic elite?

KHAN: Economic elite and, I would say, educational elite. They produced the only Nobel Prize winner, Dr. Abdul Salem, who was an Ahmedhi. The only Pakistani ever, in sixty years of history, to get a Nobel Prize.

Q: Spelling of the recipient of the Nobel Prize?

KHAN: Dr. Abdul Salem.

Q: S-A-L-E-M?


Q: Sorry. This prize was in what area?

KHAN: I think it was in physics.

Q: Physics, yes. OK. You were leading towards a point about the Ahmedhi group.
KHAN: The Ahmedhi have always been there. Now, I am coming to the point. Under pressure, I am coming to ’76 - ’77, the period when Bhutto had already started losing his grip on the government. The rug was slipping. He was getting weaker. The religious parties were getting support from the people. They were exploiting it. Bhutto, who I don’t think should have come under that kind of pressure, did come under pressure and he decided to declare the Ahmedhis as non-Muslims, one of the worst things which could happen to my country.

Q: This was to---

KHAN: To please and appease---

Q: The religious---

KHAN: ---the religious groups.

Q: And to undermine the educational—

KHAN: And to get cheap popularity and support. Look here. This is what he had always been wanting them to be declared---as kafir, as we say. He did that, but he didn’t have to. No, no. I am going further. Nothing is helping them.

Q: We should explain for the reader the word “kafir” has different connotations in different places. I believe the original meaning was a person who is not Muslim.

KHAN: Non-believer, yes. We call it non-believer.

Q: Because in Africa it has a different meaning.

KHAN: It has a different meaning. I know that.

Q: So, ok, non-believer.

KHAN: Non-believer. In our translation, kafir is a non-believer so you don’t cast any aspersions on other religions. Non-believer means “who does not believe in Islam,” so you are not casting aspersions on other religions.

Q: Right.

KHAN: Things are moving. Then Bhutto decides to go for holding early elections, because he thought he still was very popular. In order to gain the support of the people he decided to hold elections. One could say that his popularity was not that bad. What he did he could have gotten other ways, also. Then come the infamous 1977 general elections.

Q: Now, he was gambling on having the support of the religious sector.
Khan: That was different. By declaring Ahmedis as non-Muslims---

Q: That was his intention, to get the support of the religious---

Khan: Right.

Q: OK.

Khan: Then he goes to General Alippos (sp?) to strengthen his position. What does he do? He indulges in massive rigging.

Q: Sorry, he did---

Khan: Massive rigging of elections.

Q: Massive rigging?

Khan: Yes. which he should have not, in my opinion. He could have otherwise won the elections.

Q: Did everybody recognize this?

Khan: As a result of the rigging of the National Assembly polls, the opposition decided to boycott the polls of the four provincial assemblies. The polls were to take place after two days of general elections.

Q: OK. General elections first and then elections for the provincial assemblies---

Khan: After two days---

Q: Was that second election subjected to a boycott?

Khan: It was a total boycott. There was not a soul on the polling station on the polling day. I had been going and seeing with my own eyes. The call of the opposition was so effective because most of the political parties thought that the elections had been stolen.

Q: In another country when something like this happened once, they said, “He stole the election which was already his.” Would you say that’s what happened in Pakistan in 1977?

Khan: Sorry, I couldn’t catch you.

Q: He stole the elections which were already his.

Khan: Yes. This is my observation. I think they were already his. He should not have done it. He could have managed it otherwise, maybe won a few seats less. He could have
because the opposition at that time was not as organized as one would have liked them to be.

Q: So things went sour in 1977.

KHAN: Things went sour. Not sour. Things became pretty precarious as a result of this rigging and the boycotting of the provincial assembly seats, and of the provincial assembly elections. Countrywide agitation, which later turned into the shape of a movement, started throughout the country. It was so massive; it was so massive. When we would go and cover the public meetings and the rallies, one would not believe where these people were coming from. That movement, dangerously, was turning into a religious movement. They thought Bhutto was being socialist, progressive, which gave a religious aspect to the movement.

Q: Did the people feel that a president who is a socialist cannot be a religious person?

KHAN: No, no. He never called himself a socialist. No, no. He never did that.

Q: They perceived him that way?

KHAN: It was perceived. I mean the kind of measures which he was taking were leading him to socialization. Like nationalization. What is nationalization? It is socialization.

Q: Did he understand this?

KHAN: I think that he was a very smart man. I don’t know where he was making a mistake. As a result this massive movement resulted in the deaths of some people, and the perception, rightly or wrongly, that the American CIA played a very important role. You asked me why, and I am coming to that as well.

It was on the nuclear stuff. I am glad my mind is working today. The Pakistani nuclear program was Bhutto’s baby; it was his idea. One has to give him that credit, whatever. The Americans were not for it, of course. Anti-Bhutto efforts had started in Washington and elsewhere. It’s a popular perception that they [the Americans] sent tons of money in order to fund that movement, because, as I was telling you, there were people, hundreds and thousands would come, and they were coming and the movement started gaining momentum.

Q: You’re saying that people believed that the U.S. government was backing---

KHAN: The CIA, or the American government, whatever you would call it. He had sensed it. The Secretary of State then, Cyrus Vance, sent him a letter. “Mr. Bhutto, don’t do what you are doing.” Again, in order to get cheap popularity, he goes to a ‘Pindi urban, downtown area, and he shows to the people the letter written by Vance and tears it in public, and says---
Q: Secretary Cyrus Vance?

KHAN: He says, “We will not, I will not, bow under any pressure.” Now, here’s a very interesting thing you can add somewhere. The political counselor of the American embassy and the Deputy High Commissioner of the British High Commission were talking over the phone, and the political counselor of the American embassy, who’s here these days. I can introduce you to him. He’s Political Counselor Howard Bruner Schaffer; he tells his counterpart, “I think the party is over.” This is a historical remark. Their telephone was being taped. The same day Bhutto had to deliver a speech in the National Assembly. I, along with my colleague, were regular visitors to the parliament to cover proceedings. We had taken this responsibility on our own because we would build a lot of credibility going. Going there in the cafeteria and meeting the ministers, the MNAs (elected Members of the National Assembly) and the senators and all that, built credibility. That day Bhutto was to make a very important speech. I was sitting there when he said, “The party’s not over. I would like the powers that be to know that the party’s not over.”

Q: Making it very clear that the telephone conversation had been---

KHAN: And believe me, Daniel, I was shivering, sitting there. I said, “Now, something is going to happen.”

Q: Are we in 1977 now?

KHAN: ’77, yes. At the time, things were already---I mean Bhutto was still in government. I mean he had not yet gone for the rigging of polls and stuff and the movement. It was just before that.

Q: After the general election, after the boycotted provincial elections and after a mass movement showed support in the streets, people believed that this was backed by the U.S.?

KHAN: That movement, yes. I think this was the popular perception. One may not believe it; one may not like it, but this was the popular perception.

Q: And the president was feeling pressured---

KHAN: The prime minister.

Q: ---by the UK and the U.S., and he responded to this.

KHAN: Yes. He responded to that. I rushed to the embassy to report what he had said. Political Counselor Schaffer, in very diplomatic fashion, was asked to leave. He went to India. He wasn’t declared persona non grata---that I know for sure. He eventually rose to the position of ambassador. His last position was as American ambassador to Bangladesh.

Q: Sorry. So he went to Bangladesh.
KHAN: That gentleman who said---

Q: Yes. Schaffer.

KHAN: Yes. [Ambassador Howie Schaffer.]

Q: Yes. I thought you said India.

KHAN: No. No.

Q: He was not PNG’d, but he was asked to leave.

KHAN: Schaffer was asked to leave and then he was sent to India. He went to India. He was not sent back to the State Department, but he was sent to India to hold the same position as political counselor.

After this scenario a back note: Bhutto didn’t know, the poor thing, that the Army general that he had appointed as the army chief of staff was looking for an opportunity to come and capture power. The story is that when Bhutto appointed Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq as the army chief of staff, he superseded several generals senior to Zia-ul-Haq. According to army tradition, if a general is superseded, he resigns. The seven generals whom he superseded left the army. Again, the perception is that he was appointed because he was not a son of the soil. You know what a ‘son of the soil’ is, right.

Q: Son of the soil?

KHAN: Son of the soil. He was not born in Pakistani. He was a refugee. OK? Like Musharraf is, for that matter. Bhutto thought, “Zia-ul-Haq doesn’t have any background here, no family, nothing, so he’ll be loyal to me.”

Q: Easy to manipulate.

KHAN: Yes, and loyal to him, that was more. Then the same ‘loyal’ general, in view of the prevailing situation, which was getting worse day by day, arrests him, the elected prime minister, and declares martial law. With this promise, with the nation of Pakistan, the generals keep on lying, for which I am very bitter. This general has also lied many times. He lied to the nation when he said that he is going to hold elections again as a political institution within ninety days. He never did it. It’s sad. He ruled that country for eleven years until he died in a plane crash in 1988 with Ambassador Raphel and an army brigadier general, who was posted at the American embassy. I will come on that little later.

After the arrest of Bhutto, the army junta wanted to try him and blah, blah, blah; they didn’t get much about him. Then something very weird happened: an old opponent of Bhutto’s son claimed that his father was killed with the connivance of the agents of
Bhutto. The case was registered in a police station in what we call a FIR, a first information report.


KHAN: First Investigation. This is our hysteria—they say that once a FIR is registered, then even God Almighty can’t change it. This is what the system is. The FIR was registered, falsely, or whatever. Under that FIR, Bhutto was arrested on the charge of murder, and Zia-ul-Haq manipulated it through the judiciary---

Q: This is the son?

KHAN: No, no. The case had been registered. The charges had been leveled. The case went to the High Court, then it went to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. It was something unique in the history of Pakistan. The trial went on for seven months. We were covering each and every minute of the proceedings of the Supreme Court trial of Bhutto. I was doing that. I was going to the Supreme Court almost every day.

Q: Do you feel that the trial was judicial or political, or both?

KHAN: Not both. It was political. Zia-ul-Haq just wanted to get rid of him. He could have exiled Bhutto, you know or whatever. Quite a number of Islamic countries intervened, but Zia-ul-Haq didn’t listen to them. Then, one day, Bhutto was hanged on the charges of murder. That again was unprecedented in the Pakistani history.

Q: Do you remember the year?

KHAN: Yes. Bhutto was hanged in 1979, if my memory serves me.

Q: So, major, major event.

KHAN: I am just narrating major events. I am not being as elaborate as I could be. So people thought here Bhutto’s legacy ends, but it never did. Bhutto’s legacy is still alive. His Peoples’ Party, which is being run by his daughter, is, I can safely say, one of the most popular political parties.

Q: Benazir Bhutto.

KHAN: Yes. Having its roots in the masses.

Q: This is very significant for the present time, because of the so-called troika or whatever it is we are about to see. It is now October 8th and things have been happening this very week.

KHAN: Yes, yes. Then, as I have narrated, Zia-ul-Haq continued and he held a referendum. He created an Advisory Council, which we call in Arabic a shura. He picked
people, doctors, lawyers, so-called intellectuals, and made this Advisory Council. This, of course, is a mockery of everything. He couldn’t afford to—but he went on. What does he do? As a result that movement, which started against Bhutto, gained the color of religion. Zia-ul-Haq decided to go for the Islamization of Pakistan.

I skipped something on my view of Bhutto. When the agitation was at its peak, Bhutto decided—having already gotten the Ahmedhis declared non-Muslims—he decided, in his wisdom, to go and announce to some mayors his so-called Islamization. What is that? The centuries-old Sunday holiday was finished and Friday was made as a holiday, a weekly holiday. Pakistan was then a wet country. Bhutto declared prohibition throughout the country: airlines, army messes, everything, hotels, everything, and clubs. It was a complete prohibition. A couple of other steps which he did here were very half-hearted. He just wanted to cling to power, but it was too late. When he was declaring these so-called Islamic Mayors, I would call them Islamic Mayors, he was pissed drunk.

Q: Laughs.

KHAN: Literally, I am telling you. Anyway, this portion I missed.

We are coming to Zia. Zia started from where Bhutto had ended. He went for stronger measures for the imposition of Islamization, though they were not very clear about what that meant. Prayers were declared a must in the offices, and this and that. Some of the mayors that Zia chose suited only the Sunnis of Pakistan, not the Shias. The Shias had the support of Iran. In Iran the revolution was taking place, and everything was in place and blah, blah, blah. Enjoying the support of the Iranians, the Shia community, which had been very docile, started gaining strength and power. Again, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, the Pakistan civil secretariats were surrounded by the Shias for three long days.

Q: Sorry, who was—sorry, say that again.

KHAN: During Zia-ul-Haq’s time, when he was introducing the Islamic mayors, they suited the Sunni majority better, appeased them more, than the Shias. because Shias thought it was against their faith, against their belief. They had become Zia’s real enemies. They were really against him.

Q: And you said, “three long days,” I forgot.

KHAN: What happened was, in protest against what Zia-ul-Haq was doing, Shias from all over the country gathered in Islamabad in the hundreds and thousands. They gathered these civil servants for three long days and they did not let any government servant in to see them.

Q: They occupied them?

KHAN: No, no. They stayed there. They stayed overnight for three nights.
Q: A sit-in.

KHAN: Oh, yes.

[Transcriber’s note: There may be a misunderstanding here: in a previous remark Mr. Khan says the Shias surrounded the building. Mr. Whitman understands it as a sit-in, and Mr. Khan does not clarify what a sit-in is and agrees to it.]

Q: So the sit-in was in what building?

KHAN: Outside the Civil Secretary. Pakistan Secretariat we call it.

A: We call Sit Com.

Q: The head of the Civil Service, is that correct? The Secretariat.

KHAN: It’s the secretariat building, where the entire government sits. They were surrounded by them, and they didn’t let the government function. Then comes the crash. It is by a Shia, allegedly. My very authentic (I can say that; I can claim it) report to the embassy [believed that the crash was sabotage]. FBI agents came and they talked to me for several hours, and we were of the consensus that the crash certainly was sabotage.

Q: Consensus of those advising the U.S. embassy? Consensus of the police?

KHAN: No, no. The agents also thought the way events unfolded---

Q: The agents---you are talking about American FBI agents and yourself.

KHAN: Yes. Myself.

Q: We are not talking about Pakistani authorities.

KHAN: No, no. Well, Pakistani authorities they also had---

Q: ---But you have no doubt that this crash was sabotage.

KHAN: No, I think it was sabotage.

Q: You think it was sabotage.

KHAN: Of course. It was done by a Shia, who was an engineer, a bearded man.

Q: Ambassador Raphel was a victim---

KHAN: Ambassador Arnold Raphel and a Brigadier General---
Q: ---were victims of this.

KHAN: They were killed along with him.

Q: Are we still in ’79?

KHAN: This is ’88.

A: Some situations come into the situation about Afghanistan.

KHAN: I am not going to Afghanistan. I am just confined to Pakistan.

Q: The crash was what year? The plane crashed when?

KHAN: It was ’88.

Q: ’88. OK.

KHAN: 17th of August 1988. The date I can’t forget.

Q: Big tension. Big tension.

KHAN: Zia-ul-Haq was enjoying the full support of Americans then. Because the Soviets had launched its invasion of Afghanistan, a lot of money was being dumped into Pakistan. The mujahedeen (Arabic: freedom fighters) were being supported or created, or whatever. In that crash, five or six very important generals, including the chief of the ISI, General Rehman, were killed also.

Q: This intentionally or unwittingly was an act in favor of the Soviets. The Soviets benefitted from this plane crash.

KHAN: I don’t think so, because the army was fully backing the American campaign, and what was going on. The Pakistanis were being trained. They were being sent there, and all that stuff. The Soviet Union by that time was already at the stage of the break-up anyway; though, the last nail to the coffin was the---

Q: You’re saying Zia was being supported by the U.S. because he was assisting the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan?

KHAN: Supporting, assisting, sending its own troops, blah, blah, blah.

A: The Islamization---

Q: Are you saying that this process continued even despite the death of Zia.
KHAN: Yes. But I think---I don’t recall when the Soviet Union was dismembered or when they were defeated.

Q: ‘89-’90.

KHAN: Yes. So, it was after that. In ’88, then, after his death, elections were held and Benazir came into power. In between there is one incident which I would like to mention. Like Musharraf, Zia-ul-Haq also wanted to have what you call this ‘problem’ of the generals to have the legal cover of the state.

A: A legitimate wife.

KHAN: To have two legitimate wives, as we say. He did hold elections in ’85, a general election, as with Zia-ul-Haq. Again it was his created party which came into power, but then again it was he who dismissed his own government in a very shameless manner. Then the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Khan Junejo, was fired while he was coming home from a foreign tour. The plane had not landed. He was flying towards Islamabad and he was gone.

(Laughter)

KHAN: It was a very interesting part. Then comes ’88. In ’88 the Pakistanis hold general elections. Since there was not much interference by the army in those elections, Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Peoples’ Party installed a new civilian setup that comes into play. She runs the government, but after more than 20 months, she faces allegations and charges of corruption of her government. The charge was because of her husband (Asif Ali Zardari). Again, the army maneuvered and manipulated it so that her government was dismissed. New elections were held as part---

Q: Dismissed?

KHAN: Yes. The Assembly was dissolved and new elections---

Q: Who dissolved the Assembly? Was it the army?

KHAN: The president (Ghulam Ishak Khan), of course, with the backing of the army, because she wasn’t listening too much to them. We then go for another election. This is in 1992 (actually 1993). This time there is a young man, who is the chief minister, by the name of Nawaz Sharif. He emerges as the leader of his party, and he becomes the prime minister. He has a brute majority, so he tries not to act as a democrat, as he should have. He starts bringing amendments of the constitution. The powers, which I told you about the other day, all lay with Musharraf as the president, but per the amendments, the powers now come to the office of the prime minister. They should have been there as a matter of fact: the appointment of the chiefs of the armed forces, the appointment of the supreme court judges, and so and so forth.
Q: In the press, we are reading that this may possibly happen next year in Russia. The prime minister may be the more important person.

KHAN: I have heard that. Somebody in Houston told me about that. Peter Muffat (sp?), who is Tom’s friend, said, “The news is that Putin (Russian Head of State Vladimir Putin) would like to become the Prime Minister and have all the power.” That’s what I heard.

Q: So this would be analogous.

KHAN: Yes. But this was vis-a-vis when we were talking about Pakistan; this happens in this background. He runs the government.

Q: Just a comment. Because of the possible return soon of Benazir Bhutto, I am not asking you to be the prosecutor or the judge, but possible corruption is much discussed. Describe the importance of this. Is this the real reason that the army dissolved parliament and moved on to the next---

KHAN: No. This was one of the reasons, I would say. The military and Benazir were not getting along well with each other. That was also a problem.

Q: Transparency International has said that Benazir Bhutto is one of the five most corrupt individuals in the world.

KHAN: That’s true.

Q: But do you think there is objective truth to this?

KHAN: I beg your pardon?

Q: Is this still to be revealed or is the jury still out, as we say?

KHAN: To a large extent, I think her husband was more responsible. She was really too much under the influence of her husband and he was known to be corrupt. He was known as Mr. Ten Percent, the commission on any deal, international or whatever.

Now we are coming to the end of Nawaz Sharif, and, unfortunately again, history repeats itself. Nawaz Sharif’s government is dismissed again, on different irregularities and charges and all that. Again the army was playing its role. Mind you, the army was always behind all this stuff.

Q: Again, as an American, I have to ask you---

KHAN: Yes, sir.
Q: ---when you use the passive voice (the parliament was dismissed). I need to ask you who dismissed it?

KHAN: The president.

Q: With the backing of the army.

KHAN: Yes. Because the first president dismissed two parliaments. Oh, my god. He dismissed two governments.

Q: That is quite an achievement: to dismiss two governments.

KHAN: Two elected governments.

Q: It is quite something to dismiss two. That is a remarkable achievement.

KHAN: And then the interesting thing---

A: Benazir twice---

KHAN: I am coming to that. Then the interesting thing happens and history repeats itself. The third election happens, and this time Benazir gets the majority and she becomes the Prime Minister. OK. It was the time when I was telling you that Ambassador Oakley and she were not on speaking terms. I said that.

Q: Why?

KHAN: I think that it was one, nuclear, and two, that he had the guts, the cheek, to bring it to the attention of the prime minister in person. He told her that, “Your husband is indulging in corruption,” which, of course, she didn’t like.

Q: What do you think that Ambassador Oakley was hoping to achieve with this confrontation?

KHAN: I think that he was playing the role of the American ambassador that Pakistan should not be allowed to have nuclear capabilities. It was simple as that.

A: He was acting in good faith.

KHAN: No, as a diplomat, whatever he was doing he was acting.

Q: Do you think he was acting in accordance with policy established in Washington?

KHAN: Yes, of course.

Q: And it had to do with nuclear development?
KHAN: Yes.

Q: Now, you said last time that you played a personal role in that episode of nuclear development. We can go back to that. You said that you yourself went to one of the ministries.

KHAN: Actually, I was assigned by Ambassador Oakley. It had not happened before that the American ambassador would take a senior Pakistani national employee into his confidence and ask him to go about. He knew that I was so very well connected at the higher up levels that I could go and meet anybody without an appointment. I could go and knock at anybody’s door. I was in that kind of situation. I told you that I could even sense from the American embassy when the U.S. government was not in favor of what was going on. It had become hostile in its policies towards Benazir. I thought something was going to happen---

Q: Are you able to say what Ambassador Oakley asked you to do?

KHAN: Yes. Very clearly. He told me that “You have to go and meet all the relevant people and tell them that---I can still recall very clearly---"Please ask them not to cross the red line, and if they don’t we give them X millions and millions of dollars in aid both in economic and in military---”

Q: It is remarkable that the ambassador or his political counselor would not deliver this as a demarche [special memo from an ambassador to the ministry of foreign affairs].

KHAN: The reason was that they did not have the access. They would have to get an appointment, and how would they do it?

Q: So this is quite unique---

KHAN: It is unique. It certainly is.

Q: ---that an American ambassador would entrust a local employee to deliver---

KHAN: Oakley is still alive.

Q: ---the most important bilateral message that we had to deliver.

KHAN: Yes. I am sure that they must be using their own sources also. I am only narrating what was assigned to me. I wouldn’t say that I was the only person. I am sure that they were using other channels, too. They must be sending people here and there, and all that stuff.

Q: But you say the ambassador and the prime minister were not on speaking terms.
KHAN: Yes. For quite some time.

Q: So, whatever channels there might have been, they would have been with someone other than the prime minister.

KHAN: Yes. Like the defense minister, like the army chief of staff and other people. The Americans have always considered it a plus to have an interaction with the armed forces.

Q: Well, that’s quite dramatic. So, you made this case. You did not succeed. What was the result?

KHAN: I am coming to that. Then Bhutto’s government is dismissed, again. It is the second time. (Laughs). She served again, for about three years or so. Her government goes rolling. Again the elections are held after three months.

Q: Sorry. Did the army do this because they felt that the United States was dissatisfied with her? Why did the army dismiss her?

KHAN: This is a very good question. I think they’re backing---I don’t rule that out. Why not get rid of her? She was in very bad odor for quite some time.

Q: Was there another stated reason? Was it corruption? What did they say was the reason?

KHAN: More corruption and political instability; things were not going in the right direction. There were quite a number of things that led to this situation. The factor that we must not overlook is that the opponents of Benazir played a very vital role. They were shouting all kinds of allegations against her in the government and all that stuff. They were playing their role.

Q: I have done this already four or five times. When you say she was dismissed, who had the power to dismiss her?

KHAN: The president; only the president. There is a clause in the constitution under which the president has the prerogative.

Q: But in the real world, he could do this only if he knew if he had the support of the military.

KHAN: Yes. He wouldn’t do it otherwise. So now, the Benazir government goes away. Again, the general elections are held within the period of three months. And again, for the second time, Nawaz Sharif has a very strong political position.

Q: So every time this commotion takes place, Sharif emerges over and over again.
KHAN: Yes. He emerges this time and, as I already have submitted, he brings about the amendments of the constitution, having all the powers that lay with the presidency. He got them transferred to the prime minister’s office. He starts with a bang. A lot of development projects he introduces. He goes on. Because he himself is a big industrialist, he focuses a lot on the industrialization of the country. Of course, many wrongs were also done. These things do happen.

Q: This was not through nationalization, it was through---

KHAN: No, no. He was very anti-nationalization. In fact, quite a number of industries that were industries that had been nationalized, he de-nationalized.

A: Including his own.

KHAN: Including his own. Their industry had been nationalized, too.

A: Bhutto had nationalized the dairy industry and the foundry.

KHAN: That was de-nationalized by Zia-ul-Haq, not by Nawaz Sharif. It was done by Zia-ul-Haq. He was very progressive in that sense.

Q: This is Sharif?

KHAN: Yes. Now we are going---

Q: He did this with the support of the military?

KHAN: No. He was trying to act very independently. He was becoming a threat to the army, let me tell you that. During his tenure, I wouldn’t like to use the word dismiss, but he sent home the army chief of staff over certain differences. He said, “You don’t have a right to behave like that.”

Q: This took guts.

KHAN: He showed his guts.

Q: It is not easy to go to the military and send them packing.

KHAN: He sent the army chief of staff packing because of his utterances at the Naval War College, I think we call it, in Lahore. He had uttered something which as an army chief of staff he was not supposed to. He sent him home.

Q: Was it something like Truman dismissing McArthur?

KHAN: Yes. McArthur was too big. Anyway, he sent him home. He was really sending signals to the GHQ, the general headquarters, as we say, blah, blah, blah.
Now, comes the appointment of Musharraf. This is a very interesting part. I am party to it. There was a lot of PR (public relations) going on as to who was going to be the next army chief of staff. Now, since the prerogative and the authority were with the office of the prime minister, it was he who had to decide on the appointment of the army chief of staff. OK. Now the lobbying started. It’s interesting for you to note that Nawaz Sharif’s father had a lot of influence on his sons. One son was the prime minister; the other son was the chief minister of the largest province of Punjab, he’s Shehbaz Sharif. They had a lot of respect for this father, so any word coming from his throat, they would accept it. So the lobbyists, one of them a very dear friend of mine, now the roaming ambassador to Africa and Sahara, 42 countries—

Q: Ambassador to 42 countries?

KHAN: Yes, because he is a roaming ambassador to Africa and Sahara. Again, he was a friend of Nawaz Sharif, who had helped Nawaz Sharif get rid of President Farooq Laghari. He had dismissed his government. This gentleman brought about allegations of corruptions against President Laghari.

Q: Spell this, please.


It’s a tribe, a close tribe, settled in Punjab. Anyway, to cut this story short, he helped him get rid of Farooq Laghari, and Nawaz Sharif brings his own man, a retired supreme court judge, as the new president of Pakistan.

Q: And that is?

KHAN: His name is---I don’t remember. I’ll tell you his name. I know it and I think his name is Tartar, but the first name. [Muhammad Rafiq Tarar 1998-2001]

Q: So in this case you had the opposite situation. You had a PM (prime minister) actually designate a president instead of the reverse.

KHAN: Yes. Because you had to put up a candidate and you had to have the brute majority in the assemblies and obviously you get your candidate elected. Period.

I was coming to that interesting part of that point with Musharraf. Now this lobbyist friend (I call him a friend) goes to the court of Nawaz Sharif’s father, who was commonly known as Abbaji – A-B-B-A-J-I. Abbaji is calling on your father in a respectful manner. He goes to the court of Abbaji, and he tells him, “Sir, is he the right man for your son to have as the army chief of staff.”

Q: Musharraf.
KHAN: Musharraf. The Abbaji tells him, “Look here, man, he’s a womanizer, he’s a drunkard. You want me to recommend to my son that he have a womanizer and a drunkard as the army chief of staff.” The gentleman tells him, “Abbaji, what is wrong? You need loyalty and he would deliver it for you. I can assure you that he will.” So, that paved the way when the word went from Abbaji to Nawaz Sharif, “This is the guy; you appoint him as the army chief of staff.” Believe you me, there was no hesitation, I would say. I know for sure this is exactly what happened.

Q: The higher value here is loyalty, and the secondary value is behavior.

KHAN: Yes. Loyalty is more. Benazir also believes in that.

Q: Shall we say ‘alleged’ womanizing and alcoholism. This is ‘alleged.’

KHAN: This is very legal language (laughter generally).

Q: You are willing to go further than that.

KHAN: What I am telling you---there is no doubt it. He is known for that. Anyway, then he becomes the army chief of staff and things go on.

Q: You said earlier you were personally involved in this.

KHAN: Because---

Q: This man was your friend.

KHAN: A friend. I was getting the firsthand information from the horse’s mouth; that’s what I say.

Q: You were receiving, but maybe not giving---

KHAN: Yes.

Q: ---the information.

KHAN: Yes. I was getting on. This is the appointment. Then Nawaz Sharif goes on and on doing all kinds of development stuff and whatever. Now the dramatic day comes that Musharraf goes to Sri Lanka on an official visit.

Q: What year?

KHAN: This---we are talking about what ---2000

Q: We can figure it out later.
Q: But, if it is a dramatic day, we should figure out what---

KHAN: I’m just trying to give you a dramatic event. I can give you the exact date because now he’s in the 7th year probably.

Q: Sorry. I didn’t mean to derail the story.

KHAN: Yes.

A: He was about two plus years at about 9/11/01.

KHAN: I don’t want to bring 9/11 into it.

He went to Sri Lanka at the invitation of the then Sri Lankan CNC, who, later on, interestingly, in Musharraf’s time, was appointed as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner to Pakistan, after this has his as the army chief of staff in Sri Lanka. This is very interesting. He had gone to Sri Lanka on an official visit and there is where he is making the biggest blunder of his life.

He---the courtiers had prevailed upon him and impressed him that Musharraf is hatching plots against you and it is high time for you to get rid of him. What he does is, he appoints his own man as the army chief of staff.

Q: Musharraf?

KHAN: No. Nawaz Sharif.

Q: Sharif. Sharif appoints---

KHAN: ---the new army chief of staff while Musharraf was still army chief of staff. He removes him while he is still coming back.

Now, you see, this is not the historical stuff, let me tell you that. The army chiefs of staff have always been from the combat units, combat forces, either the gunners, or as we say the artilleries, or cavalries, and the third armed forces are the infantry. The tradition is that from these three fighting forces there have always been the generals chosen for the chief of the army post. Now what mistake is he making? He is picking a guy from the engineer corps (laughter) to appoint as the new army chief of staff. Generally engineers are considered not to be the fighting staff, and blah, blah, blah. They are not really considered.

Q: Secondary.
KHAN: Secondary. Yes. Everything Musharraf manages with all the other corps commanders, and the other army units, especially stationed in Rawalpindi, which is the most important headquarter of the corps commanders. The Rawalpindi corps commander has always played and probably always will play a vital role whenever the army takes this control of the country. This time, again, it was the corps commander of the Rawalpindi corps that played a role.

So while they were not allowing his plane to land, the army had already prepared a coup against the elected prime minister of Pakistan. So the army takes over the prime minister, the army takes over the radio station, the army takes over the television headquarters, and blah, blah, blah. He is allowed to land in Karachi in a very dramatic manner, and ta, ta, ta. The elected prime minister is arrested and put under house arrest. There is where the drama begins. He takes over as the chief executive of the country. He keeps his uniform. Nawaz Sharif is tried for hijacking the plane, which is tantamount to treason, or whatever. Serious charges are leveled against him. He is put into one of the worst jails----we call it the 4th jail----he is put there. A lot of agitation goes against his arrest, but he doesn’t take much notice of it. They strike a deal and the entire Nawaz family, including the father, is bundled off to Saudi Arabia.

Q: Just made to leave----expelled.

KHAN: Expelled.

Q: And Sharif himself.

KHAN: Yes. All. All.

Q: So, at least he’s out of jail now.

KHAN: His family, his father, everybody. Their property and industries were confiscated. I would consider them to be progressive industrialists, let me tell you that. When they are packed and gone he becomes the absolute ruler. They are sent to exile, as it is generally believed, for ten years.

Q: Is there any basis in the judicial system for exile for ten years? It sounds like---

KHAN: No, no. It was just between them and---the government---

A: It was off the record---

KHAN: It was nothing legal. No legal stuff about it.

A: Just there was the danger that he may be hanged or he would be killed---

Q: “We’ll let you go.”
A: We’ll save his life; we’ll let him go.

Q: Get rid of him.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: So the shift of power goes where at this point?

KHAN: No. He takes absolute power at this point. He starts ruling. Then he decides like any other---

A: ---dictator---

KHAN: ---dictator, to support the Founding Father’s Party, which is called the Muslim League. All the generals have taken refuge under this party’s name. And then, the elections were held in 2002, which according to the Americans and the internationals and all that, were massively rigged. His party, becomes the majority party, but lacked support to found a government.

Q: A personal comment, if you would. You say that a friend of yours was a lobbyist in favor of Musharraf becoming the chief of staff of the military.

KHAN: Yes, sir.

Q: Nobody could foresee, I think, what would come of it. Has your friend had any comment about having created this situation?

KHAN: No. He was a friend of Musharraf’s. He still is a friend of Musharraf’s. That is why he is enjoying this position as the roaming ambassador for Africa and Sahara. It was his personal friendship with Musharraf. Then his position of being a friend of Nawaz Sharif’s played a role.

Q: Musharraf’s seizing of absolute power later---perhaps that was not the agenda. Perhaps he was not expected back at the time when your friend advocated for him.

KHAN: That was of course at the time of his appointment.

Q: Yet, when Musharraf’s political presence changed in nature that friendship remained.

KHAN: His friendship with Musharraf remains.

Q: Ok. Yes. I think that’s important.

KHAN: He was initially sent as Pakistan’s High Commissioner to Kenya. Generally, that position is for three years. When Musharraf came, this gentleman was still High Commissioner in Nairobi and he let him continue to stay as the High Commissioner.
Then after a short period of time, he calls him back. He’s not only the ambassador; he is one of his very close advisers.

Q: Mr. Khan, what of your own reaction to the manner in which Musharraf took power. Again, you are not the prosecutor; you are not the judge. Do you have a personal reaction to this? Were you surprised? How did this dramatic event affect you?

KHAN: Affect me?

Q: What is your judgment of that dramatic event?

KHAN: I think, as I earlier said, Nawaz was making a blunder. He should not have done it. He could have just let---having the power of removing and appointing a new chief. He had the power---constitutional, legal, lawful. He should not have taken a decision in that kind of haste. He should have just let him come in. After a couple of days he would have called him, and then, as it happened, tell him, “Ok, off you go and I am going to appoint this guy. Thank you very much.”

Q: You see this as some sort of miscalculation on his part.

KHAN: Again.

Q: That’s the prime minister.

KHAN: I think the prime minister---that’s the silliest thing he did.

Q: Now, what about Musharraf?

KHAN: The way they did it! They way they did it. He was now within his authority doing what he was doing---the appointment of the new chief, but the way he was doing it---that is wrong; that is not smart. Right? He provides a good opportunity for the armed forces, the army, to jump into the conflict.

Q: So, he brought it upon himself.

KHAN: I think I would hold him responsible for that, but the way the army did it. Not that I would call him on it. I will never say that what he did was something right. It was just his own self. The Prime Minister was making a mistake, but his removal was not unconstitutional, not illegal. He could have removed him, but the way he did it was silly.

Q: The western press sometimes says that Musharraf seized power in a way that defied the constitution. Is that what you are saying?

KHAN: Yes, he did.
Q: Does he take some responsibility? Should he be held responsible for violating the constitution?

KHAN: Well, people say—the constitutional experts say if you go by the book, he can be tried for treason for violating the constitution.

Q: Musharraf?

KHAN: Yes. But anybody, for that matter, who violates the constitution. He should be tried under the charges of treason, but then this is an argument. In practice—I don’t think so. Has he violated the constitution? Yes, I tell you that. He had. He’s done it.

Q: Now, it is very reductionist and simplistic to say right and wrong in a moral sense, in an ethical sense. I just want to understand what you are saying. The prime minister miscalculated by unseating his chief of staff—

KHAN: ---In that way---

Q: ---the way he did---

KHAN: ---in that manner---

Q: Musharraf then benefited from this miscalculation and seized power in a way that was not in conformity with the constitution. Was this a drama in the sense of Shakespearian or Greek drama, where it is just simply two forces pitted against one another or do you see one of the two as being loyal to himself and the other person being loyal to Pakistan? Is that too simplistic a question? Were they simply---?

KHAN: I think the pity is and the dilemma is that in my country most of the politicians and the journalists with their personal interests have always been supreme above the national interest and that hurts me as a student of history—because I have seen history making.

Q: If this hurts you, Mr. Khan, what scenario would you have hoped for instead of the one that happened? What would you have liked to have seen?

KHAN: What I would have liked to have seen was the army would remain subservient to the elected government. It is the civilian government who are the elected representatives to decide as to whom they think should have chief or whatever or head the armed forces. Of course there are certain criteria. There is the board—the selection board. They sit and they say who—and it is very tough stuff to select, because he has to unless there is political intervention, but he has to be a very good career-wise general, navy, or air force or whatever.

Q: You made a personal reaction. You said this was hurtful to you. What was your reaction during this coup?
KHAN: Well, my reaction, as I just said, is that it should not have happened the way it happened. I am not exonerating Nawaz of the silly thing he did but, at the same time, the army’s over-reaction was not justified either.

Q: Now, if you are willing to share with us at this crucial time, this drama, what was the U.S. embassy asking of you? How were you advising the U.S. embassy through this complicated situation or were all the decisions made in Washington?

KHAN: I would like to make things a bit clear here. I am not in the American embassy now. Whatever the humble assistance and advice they were getting from me was because of my experience. Until Ambassador Nancy Powell, we were on a personal relationship, but by time I had retired.

Q: I’m sorry. You had retired---


Q: ---in 2003. So, the elections, which were rigged, were one year before your retirement in 2002?

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Let’s focus for a moment on your own functions within the embassy, during the last year of your career.

KHAN: Very eventful.

The Afghanistan thing had started again, and the entire world was focused on Afghanistan and the events out there. The Americans were much more concerned. They wanted, again, to be fully involved. They wanted to be involved in the way the European and the American media were present in Pakistan to cover the events in Afghanistan. I was very much there. The way things were happening, blah, blah, blah, it was---I think whatever Pakistan did at that time was perhaps something right, because they had no other option. The government of Pakistan had no other option but to go with the U.S. They had no choice, no option.

Q: Some people say that Al Qaeda was created in Pakistan by Pakistan.

KHAN: It was, but by Pakistan and by America. Bin Laden is the creation of the CIA. Mind you that.

Q: During the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. Bin Laden---

KHAN: Bin Laden and all the Taliban stuff---they were created by the American agencies. They were trained, provided weapons and all that to fight against the Soviets.
Q: And this was done in Pakistan with the cooperation of the Pakistan government?

KHAN: Yes. That bordering area has now become a bit untamed for both the U.S. and Pakistan. These are the bases and they were the camps where they were being trained and sent across the border.

A: There were one or two other areas that I would like to talk about. Musharraf. There was this big incident with India and the Kargil. Everybody must have known about it. It was the high mountains north of Kashmir and territory that Pakistan claims is theirs and India claims is theirs and Musharraf masterminded an attack over there at Kargil.

Q: Sorry. Spell it.


Q: Yes. Kargil.

A: The prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, was not privy to that. Musharraf did it and then India started making noise about it. Nawaz Sharif got all the blame because he was the prime minister.

Q: And in fact this happened without his knowledge.

A: Without his knowledge. It was Musharraf who did it. And that was also in the background when he wanted to get rid of Sharif. There was another issue of nuclear explosion. Nawaz Sharif did that too. It was too much to handle. Pakistan was getting isolated politically. So, because of these events---

KHAN: You see, the Kargil adventure turned out to be a total disaster for the Pakistan army. It again was a miscalculation of the highest order at the highest peak of the world. They went across---(uses a map of Pakistan as a reference.) this is a peak, right?

Q: Um huh.

KHAN: Indians are here. Pakistanis are here. Pakistani posts are littered on the lower height; the Indians are on the higher side. Part of their mutual understanding was that during winter they would retreat to a much lower position as the snow makes it unbearable to live.

A: Because the height is such that you can’t even breathe.

KHAN: During that time---this was Musharraf’s grand idea too---because by then Nawaz Sharif was getting very popular, Musharraf had had the Indian prime minister, Atal Bihariu Vajpayee, over to Lahore---
A: Why? Because he was trying to build friendships with India.

KHAN: ---which was one of the most historic events to take place between India and Pakistan. Then, this Kargil thing happens. As a result, thousands of Pakistani soldiers were killed---not hundreds. Because, when they assaulted, Pakistan took squat on a much weaker position.

Q: So, as the prime minister was trying to create friendship with India, the chief of staff---

A: Yes.

KHAN: So, they---the army---did not like Nawaz Sharif, an elected prime minister, to have friendlier, more cordial relations than the army did.

Q: So they sabotaged---

KHAN: Of course they did. They surely did. That is what I said. That the people around Nawaz Sharif had convinced him that this man “is not being loyal to you. He is playing his own game and Kargil is one of those incidents.”

Q: You said before that Pakistan had no choice in the Afghanistan situation but to go with the U.S.

KHAN: But to side with the U.S.

Q: Is there a certain irony in this? Al Qaeda was created---

KHAN: No, it is not irony. We didn’t have any choice because the Americans had told them, told Musharraf, in a very, very clear manner.

Q: Was this the Armitage [Richard Lee Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State under George W. Bush] visit?

KHAN: Yes. He’s known as Arm Twister, anyway you know that.

Q: Yes. Armitage the Arm Twister.

KHAN: He was told. He took some time to make a decision. Eventually, I think whether he was thinking in his own personal interest, or Pakistan’s interests, but it was an interest where you have no other choice, no other option.

Q: Do you think that this was Musharraf’s perception even before the Armitage visit or was it the Armitage visit that made it?

KHAN: No. I think the Armitage visit also played a very important role.
Q: If Armitage had not done this, what was Musharraf’s---

KHAN: No, I think Musharraf probably would have---I think there was general belief that he had no other choice but to side with the U.S.

Q: To combat the movement that had been created in his own country---

KHAN: Yes.

Q: prior to---

KHAN: Yes---and created---

Q: ---Al Qaeda. They say it is now still on both sides of the border, but in Pakistan---

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Sorry. Let’s go back. You were saying in the last year of your career, 2002-2003 the U.S. attacked the Taliban and this was your last year in the U.S. embassy in Islamabad. Tell me more about the events of that last year while you were in the embassy. How were you guiding the American diplomats at that time?

KHAN: I think at that stage it was not that there was anything political which was going on within the country which had always concerned me. They would always like to have my input on that. It had become something very military stuff and war stuff. On these issues I had no expertise; I had no experience. So, instead of me doing your country bulletin, or anything---it would have been very foolish on my part---I could only give them an account of the political scene, the feelings---the political scenario, as to how people were viewing, or how people were perceiving. This is exactly what I was doing.

Q: Musharraf may have taken power---you mentioned the word treason earlier---that’s a pretty serious notion.

However, the reality was that Musharraf was there and the political question was no longer primary; it became military.

KHAN: Yes, it became military and he was delivering for the United States in the so-called war against terror. He had become the blue-eyed boy of the Americans. Every important visitor from Washington was going to Islamabad. Let me tell you. When Clinton [President William Clinton] came to Pakistan again on that very controversial and historical visit---

A: He wasn’t even _______.

KHAN: As many days in Islamabad as Delhi, in India.
Q: Oh, yes.

KHAN: He had no plan to come again---I played a very important role---now this is much.

Q: Sorry. What year here?

KHAN: The Clintons’ visit to Pakistan.


KHAN: Was it ’99?

Q: Well, Clinton was out at the end of---


KHAN: Yes.

Q: It would have been at the end of the Clinton Administration.

KHAN: I also happened to meet them as the Chairman of the Pakistani Association, but that’s my different cap.

Q: So, Clinton planned a visit to Delhi---

KHAN: There was news; there were rumors that he was not going to come, and blah, blah, blah. I would have long hourly sessions in the ambassador’s front office, and I said, “Sir, do what you can. If he doesn’t come to Pakistan, it is going to be something. Look here, we have done so much. We have been friends, this and that. Again there is always the perception is that you lean on Pakistan and Pakistan stands---”

Q: Sorry. The Ambassador was who at that point? That was not Oakley.

KHAN: No, it was not Oakley. I’ll give you the names of all the ambassadors I have served. I was thinking today to have a list.

Q: Had Clinton departed already for Delhi, or was this before?

KHAN: No, no. He had done that and he was to come.

Q: At what point did you prevail on the ambassador to get President Clinton---
KHAN: Well, when he not even started from America. People knew he was not coming. He was having six days there and maybe a few hours in Pakistan and stuff.

A: He didn’t even want to shake hands with Musharraf.

KHAN: ---which he never did.

A: Yup.

KHAN: No, he never did.

A: He said, “I’m---.

KHAN: He came and I know the amount of security. I am a witness to that. I was at the airport. I was supposed to be introduced to him as my so-called high-profile position and --- ta, ta, ta---the only Pakistani probably to shake hands with the President and the Secretary of State. The amount of security at Islamabad International Airport (IIAP) for the President’s visit---it was totally deserted---not a soul, for the ________ ---for the Clinton visit. Then Clinton comes, but he doesn’t even meet Musharraf. He doesn’t even---Clinton had the idiocy or the cheek to address the people of Pakistan on radio and television and sermonizing to us about democracy and other stuff while Musharraf was there.

Q: Well.

KHAN: This was the situation at the White House, vis-a-vis Musharraf, then. Yes, please---

Q: But this was enormous.

KHAN: This was enormous.

Q: Clinton went to give precedence to Delhi and meant to give short attention or no attention to Pakistan. Partly, because of you, Mr. Khan, the itinerary was adjusted so that Clinton did spend some time in Islamabad but did not meet Musharraf.

KHAN: I don’t want to take any claim, or credit about it, but I very humbly would like to submit during my interview with you, that I think I did contribute. My humble contribution was there to prevail on different offices.

Q: When Clinton did come, you said he delivered a sermon---

KHAN: Of course, it was.

Q: ---and it made a negative impression.
KHAN: It was a sermon.

Q: This was patronizing.

KHAN: He addressed the people of Pakistan on the television and the radio. Come on!

Q: This created a negative impression in the public.

KHAN: It certainly did. It went against Musharraf. Also it showed that the Americans didn’t want an army general to rule Pakistan.

Q: What was the point—-to assert power or to create friendship? If the point was to create friendship, would you say that trip was a failure?

KHAN: No. I think the point was to assert and to tell Musharraf, “Ok. Look here, we don’t like what you’re doing—-”

A: ---To continue relations but it is not the big chief’s party that we like.

KHAN: ---but we want the civilian setup to be restored.”

Q: Was there any realistic hope or was this a gamble?

KHAN: It was.

Q: Perhaps Clinton---(I don’t know)---may have thought that the speech could weaken Musharraf and bring democracy back to Pakistan.

A: It could have happened.

KHAN: It should have happened.

A: It could have happened but then 9/11 came.

Q: Aaaaah.

KHAN: That’s what saved him.

Q: That changed the whole thing.

KHAN: That’s what saved him.

Q: Saved Musharraf?

KHAN: Yes. Of course it did.
A: The same favorites, Al Qaeda and all that. They were everybody’s favorite. They were patronized. Overnight things turned around. Now---

Q: I return to the theme of Pakistanis being accustomed to America letting them down. In what ways did this theme continue during this period, with the Clinton visit and then with the sudden reversal, later, under the Bush administration?

KHAN: I answered this question. There were quite a number of commentaries on the Musharraf government’s decision to join hands with the Americans. The comments were:
- has he insured the future of Pakistan, while the war is going on there?
- has he not taken into account the experiences the government of Pakistan has been?
- having with the U.S. deputation?
- are you going to support them?
- will the U.S. let you down again, as they have done in the past?

Yes, sir. This debate went on in the media, in the columns, in the television and in the private.

Q: We are talking about the Clinton visit now, right about after 9/11 [voices speaking over each other].

KHAN: No, we are over that. We are now about to decide---

A: U.S.---Pakistani relations.

Q: So you are saying that even post-9/11, (phone rings, he answers it quickly, asks caller to call back later, hangs up and returns to interview)---I lost my train of thought---the people of Pakistan believed that America was using them, that the U.S. was not genuinely---

KHAN: It has always been the perception, my dear sir, that the Americans have used Pakistan (tape is changed) for U.S. advantage whenever they wanted to. Pakistan however played its role, by not taking into account Pakistan’s own national interest. Here I don’t blame the Americans; I blame my own administration, my own government, because they should have always kept their national interests supreme. The Pakistani ruling junta, or the Pakistani ruling elite should have kept its national interests supreme, which they never did. It was always, as I said, personal stuff.

Q: So you are willing to say that the American interests were opportunistic, but that the government of Pakistan was also opportunistic?

KHAN: Yes.

Q: ---and the people of Pakistan were not helped.
KHAN: You know because the United States embassy has always played with the armed forces galleries, they always were very comfortable dealing with the armies, with the establishment. It was easier for them to have interaction. It was easier for them to convince themselves as to what should be done.

Q: Why was it easier? Because of the hierarchy?

KHAN: Because of hierarchy and also it has always been the armed forces which have benefited from the American assistance. The economic aid to Pakistan didn’t come to me; it didn’t reach my common man in the street. I wouldn’t have the tanks, F16s, and the guns and whatnot. It was always the army, which was the beneficiary, not us.

A: The United States, in a way, is considered, is perceived to be on the wrong side of the equation, alienating the common man and going with the hierarchies. Pakistan is just one example. People quote other examples.

KHAN: Army hierarchies.

Q: Yet it is said that military support for Pakistan was unequal to the military support for India.

KHAN: Oh, yes.

Q: So what---

KHAN: India---they were not there at all, as far as the armed forces were concerned. The military assistance to India is considered only as yesterday’s stuff. The U.S. cessation didn’t have anything to do with the Indian army, or armed forces; they didn’t have any program; they didn’t have any campaign. They didn’t have any agreement.

Q: So it was easier to deal with a hierarchy that was very clearly defined. What other reasons do you know of as to why the United States gave so much support to the Pakistani military?

KHAN: I think the answer to your question is very simple. It was always the army, which I submit has been the beneficiary as a whole, as an institution. So that is why.

Q: But why did the U.S. make the army the beneficiary?

KHAN: I won’t answer that question. Why did the United States do that? I think they always thought that it was in their interest to have a close rapport with the army, with the armed forces.

Q: For the sake of stability?
KHAN: Pardon me?

Q: For the sake of stability?

KHAN: No. The American policy makers are not so naïve. They have always known, all along, that the armed forces of Pakistan, especially the military, will continue to have its influential role in the day-to-day affairs of Pakistan.

Q: So, it was a recognition of reality.

KHAN: Yes. Can we stop here for a minute?

Q: Yes.

[Break]

Q: Mr. Khan, after a brief interruption, this is part two of our second interview, on October 8, 2000. I’d like to ask you about your interactions with Arnie Raphel, who was in the ’70s a political officer in the U.S. embassy in Islamabad and fifteen years later was ambassador. Can you tell me about your friendship, and your professional relationship with Arnie Raphel.

KHAN: I will start with this. He came to Islamabad as a first secretary in political affairs, looking after the domestic political scene. A pleasant man to meet for the first time. He knew Urdu; he had already learned it. When he came to the embassy, he was told that I was the person with whom he should have a close rapport.

Q: Who told him that?

KHAN: The front office, the ambassador’s office---that he should have a very close rapport with me. I found him to be a wonderful friend, a very pleasant person---married for the second time. His wife, Robin Raphel---I think one of the most beautiful women I have ever met---American. Jewish, as she was and so was he.

The beautiful thing about him was, besides being professionally very competent, he loved to meet politicians. On just one call, I’d make the arrangement for him to meet one of the top politicians from both sides of the divide, which is making him feel very comfortable professionally to report back. Do you remember the term ‘cable’? Told “Do this cable,” and he would do it. And if they were not classified, I would be shown also: “Aman, look at it.”

With Pakistanis he had learned---even before he came---the local taboos, the local social norms as to how to go about, how to meet. He generally would ask me a few things, but not many: was he ok? how to go about, how to conduct himself? He would always---then he came to know that it was good to call somebody a sahib---Amin-sahib, Aman-sahib;
(Urdu: honorific - sir or mister; short form of Sahib; also used in India). So, he had learned that.

I would like to narrate the main part of two incidents, one of which is personal. I came to the office very disturbed. “What’s wrong with you?” he said. I told him, “My only child is very sick in the hospital and the hospital people have told me that I have to keep him in an air-conditioned room.” I said “Arnie, I am very sorry, I don’t have air-conditioning in my house.” He kept quiet. The next thing I hear, when I go home, is that the embassy people were there fixing up an air-conditioner in my bedroom where I was supposed to keep my son. This was not what he was supposed to do, but he did it. He told the people that this is what has to be done because my son was very sick. He was a couple of years old and had a very serious stomach problem. After staying in the hospital, I was advised that he must be kept in an air-conditioned room. Arnie couldn’t believe that I didn’t have air-conditioning in the house in that period.

Q: How could he do this? He wasn’t a management officer.

KHAN: He just told the management people, you know, “Do it, just do it.” I went home and saw the embassy people fixing up the air conditioner and blah, blah, blah. I was then living in a joint family house with my brother. They didn’t have any idea of what was happening, but they all loved my child, my son. I was never asked as to when that air-conditioner had to be returned to the embassy, which of course I did after a very short while when he recovered. That’s one personal incident, which I will never forget.

On my person. He thought that I was too good in performing my job. He wanted me to go as number one to Peshawar Consulate, to work as political advisor there. He said, “Aman, I don’t like you to be in a second position here. Probably it is going to take you time to go up. We are seriously considering sending you to Peshawar, because that position is becoming vacant. You go there.” Then I told Arnie, “I don’t think that I would be as good for the U.S. government, for the U.S. embassy, as I am good here, out here in Islamabad, because I belong here. I know Pashto; that’s no problem.” “You’ll be ok,” he said. “but I may not be able to deliver what I do here,” I said. The result of that---whatever. He eventually helped me to get a small piece of land where I could make a house where I could live. The only property on this planet that I have. (Emotion in his voice.)

Then about my daughter, the picture you saw? She was a little, little child. She was studying at Jesus and Mary Convent School, and she got the first prize in painting, somewhere in Rome, where the exhibition took place. Her school had submitted her drawings and she got first prize.

Q: At what age?

KHAN: She was probably six years old or seven years. She got the first prize in an exhibition by the school children which takes place in Rome. I didn’t know what that was. I know people. I just called one of the newspapers and said, “Sir, come on. Take a picture of the whole thing and that certificate which she got.” It appeared in the
Islamabad English newspaper then. He saw that and he goes, “A brilliant daughter; a not very brilliant father.”

Q: He said what?

KHAN: “A brilliant daughter; a not very brilliant father.” He was joking.

(General laughter).

Then there was a letter, which he wrote to her, and which she still has hung in her room. The letter says, “Your father is a man who has produced a child like you. You should take pride in this.” Even these things he would notice. Anyway, these are a few things.

I am coming to the second aspect to his life. The main side. Ambassador Raphel had a Christian couple working for him as a cook and maid servant. Like many, many of the poor, they produced a lot of children. So the cook had too many children. Unfortunately, most of them were dullards. Amb. Raphel knew the number of things Pakistanis get, the amount of food the family goes through. He took the responsibility of sending all his cook’s daughters to school and of paying for the tuition fee.

Q: How many daughters?

KHAN: Four, sir. Right. The duty was assigned to me that I should get the money, trusting in me as he did that I’ll send those tuition fees to the Abbottabad Christian School (which is meant only for girls), a very good school. I had the responsibility of money coming and then sending monthly the tuition fee and talking to the principal, and blah, blah, blah, blah. He goes away after his tour was over, and he tells me, “Aman, the money will keep coming.” I said, “Arnie, each and every penny will be accounted for. I am very bad at mathematics; I am very bad in accounts, but I’ll make sure that each and every penny is accounted for and you know where the money is going.” He goes on, and I go on paying. Sometimes it was delayed. I would call the principal of the college and I’d tell her and say, “Madam, it was delayed.” The children are going; Arnie is gone.

He comes back after about fifteen years. The children by this time had grown up.

Q: Now, he’s ambassador.

KHAN: Now he comes as ambassador and the first thing he asks me was, “Have you been in touch with them?” I said, “Yes, sir. I have been.” He said he would like to meet one of them. I said, “Fine. Ok, I’ll do that.” The cook had done all ______ of course. He, being ambassador, was entitled to the ambassador’s staff and all that. To cut it a little short, the tragedy takes place and his last wife, Nancy Raphel, when we were together, was crying and putting her head on my shoulder at the ambassador’s residence, says, (speaker shows emotion in his voice) “Aman, do you know, he wanted this arrangement to continue and has nominated you as their guardian; I am the one who will continue to send the money till they graduate from school and they go on to certain employment.”
One of them turned out to be a nurse, another a teacher, blah, blah, blah. All of those four girls by Pakistani standards are ok. I kept contact with them and they are ok. They have a lot of love for me and respect. And it continues. Nancy Raphel, his last wife, continued to send the money, until their education was over. I don’t know who, in the Foreign Service, would do such a kind, such a kind thing. This was his humane aspect.

Professionally, his competence—I don’t want to say it again. Then he comes as the ambassador. The word was that every week the ambassador and I would have lunch together at the cafeteria.

Q: (Phone rings---interviewer answers quickly and hangs up.)

KHAN: My problem was—I wouldn’t say dilemma—my problem was that in order to go and meet the ambassador—there were others before me: the first secretary political, and the political counselor. The political counselor was supposed to be my supervisor, because I was part of the political section. For me it became very difficult. So I—

Q: Difficult, because the ambassador (speaks over the interviewee)---

KHAN: ---he’s a friend. The others knew that he was a friend. The political counselor at that time was Edward Abington, who retired as Consul General, Jerusalem and he is until now a lobbyist for the Palestinians. He was the political counselor. He knew already that Arnie was coming as a friend. I took him into confidence. I said, “Look here, Ed, I would like to go by the book, I don’t want to go over heads. You know that Arnie is a friend (blah, blah, blah), but I don’t want to misuse my---this relationship. You continue to be my boss. I am supposed to be reporting to you. I am not going to report to---.

Q: Edward Abington?

KHAN: Abington. Edward Abington. So this weekly stuff continued. Everything was going well. I got the __Embassy__________ award, the political section award, and the best reporting award. My name was mentioned in that. We were doing so well, vis-a-vis rapport. The cable thing was working well.

Then comes---The ambassador had also developed very good personal rapport with Zia-ul-Haq, who was then the president. Zia-ul-Haq always called the Ambassador Raphel---sahib and his last name. When we were together, we would call each other Arnie and Aman, but when I would meet him otherwise, I would call him Mr. Ambassador. Then we would smile at each other.

I and Ambassador Nancy Powell, who was first secretary then—whom he used to tease a lot, but just jokingly---

Q: Raphel was first secretary---

KHAN: No, no. I am coming to the last stage of his life. His second tour.
Q: I understand, but now you have Nancy Powell, first secretary, who later became ambassador.

KHAN: She was the first secretary when he was the ambassador.

Q: Right. So it is the same pattern. Right?

KHAN: Right. Same pattern.

Balochistan technically was part of the Karachi Consulate. The embassy in Islamabad had nothing to do with it. Whatever would go on in Balochistan, it was Karachi which was reporting to Islamabad or to the State Department. I tried to convince the ambassador. I said, “Come on. I will introduce you to the senators from Balochistan and the ______ they all come here. They don’t go to Karachi. For gods’ sake, Balochistan things should come here to the American embassy.” While this debate was going on, I managed (this is something very interesting) to arrange a visit for the first secretary political counselor, Nancy Powell, to make a trip to Quetta (Q-U-E-T-T-A), capital of Balochistan. The chief minister of Balochistan was Zafar Ullah Khan Jamali (Z-A-F-A-R U-L-L-A-H K-H-A-N J-A-M-A-L-I) who eventually became the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He was a personal friend of mine. I convinced Arnie Raphel, and he said, “Ok. Your visit is granted, but on one condition—-that somebody from Karachi also join you.” I said, “That’s fine.”

Nancy Powell, Ambassador Powell, and I took this maiden trip to Balochistan unique for any American diplomat from the Islamabad embassy. The visit turned out to be terrific; it turned out to be such a success. The USIS (United States Information Services) was trying to create an outlet there. They were not getting the permission. They were sitting in the hotel, not getting permission through Karachi. I managed to get them to have a USIS office open in Quetta. That’s my doing. Ok. I mean the USIA (United States Information Agency) chief had gone there; he had been sitting in the hotel for the last three or four days and nothing was happening. Then Nancy says, “He knows the chief minister”.

A day before we left, Arnie said, “Aman, the day after you come back from Quetta, you and I need to have lunch.” I said, “Yes, Arnie. Yes, sir.” “Keep that in mind. You are very slippery at times. You get me that. I need to talk to you about something very serious.” I said, “Sir, is there anything serious with me?” He said, “No, no.”

We went to Quetta. We were supposed to return the same morning when I was supposed to have lunch with him. Our flight gets delayed, so that means that we wouldn’t have been able to make it to lunch. Arnie went to my colleague’s office and told him, “Aman’s flight is delayed. I don’t think we are going to make it to lunch today. Tomorrow I am going to go to Bahawalpur for this demonstration of American tanks. Tell him that the day after, he should be available, and we’ll have lunch together since today we can’t make it. Tell him ‘don’t slip,’ because sometimes he is very slippery.” That day never came. He went to Bahawalpur the next day and he perished.
It was the weekend and I get a call from Nancy Powell. She says, “Aman, we need you badly.” I ask, “Nancy, are you ok?” and she says, “No, nothing is ok. Just come over.” I say, “I am coming.” She says, “There is something I can’t tell you---”

Q: This is in Islamabad.

KHAN: No, I was in my home; it was the weekend.

Q: Yes. Yes.

KHAN: This is the Islamabad stuff.


One thing I would like to share with you, my dear friend. I have been a very disciplined staff member. (Aside in Urdu.). For the first time in my career, I was going to take a holiday in America with my children because they had never been to the United States. We had planned, after having put in about fifteen years of service, that my children and I were coming to the United States and have holidays. I was told, “Aman, no, you can’t go. We need you more here.” I said, “Nancy, please. I know this is a tragedy. I am not going to leave tomorrow. I’ll go maybe after a week or so, but this was the first time in my lifetime that the children would have gone. I don’t think it will ever happen again.” It never did happen. It never did. I would never come with my children to have holidays. I had to forego, this first ever thing in my life that I, with my children, would have spent together in the United States.

That is that part of Arnie Raphel. His last wife---we continued to have a relationship---friendly relations. The interesting part is that Robyn becomes, because of Clinton, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia. Oh, my god, she comes to visit Pakistan. She was to address the Pakistanis and the Americans; she was already serving as the Assistant Secretary when Arnie was the Ambassador. Of course, I met her when she came. I had dinner with her also; in fact, she came to my house. For a secretary of state for South Asia to have a meal with me demonstrated the amount of respect she had for me! She wanted to tell the audience that there is a gentleman for whom my ex-husband had so much love and respect. So do I. I was his wife then. Then she said, “Where are you, Aman.” And I said, “I am here, Madam Secretary.” I shouldn’t have called her Robyn. She called me. She is a very liberal kind of individual. She really was. So I go to her. She gives me a big hug. She gives me a big kiss on my cheeks and says, “Aman, I am very proud that you are still here and you are doing what we expected you to do.” So, that’s Robyn.

Her liberal part was that she wanted to have---Daniel, this is an interesting part---she wanted to have a child from Arnie. I don’t know---maybe it is the Jewishness or

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whatever---but he didn’t want to. He had one daughter from his previous wife. Robyn, by all dictionary measure, was a good-looking woman. She really was. She wanted to have a child and he didn’t. Would you believe me---that led to the split, and eventually, their divorce. Oh, yes, sir. Then---let’s not get into that and whatever had happened---tragic stuff. She’s still in the Foreign Service and she ends up having a live-in relationship with a man in South Africa when she is holding some position as a counselor. That is Robyn Raphel, second wife; third is Nancy.

That is the Raphel thing which I really have been wanting to talk about. I get pretty emotional about it. He was a wonderful man; very loving, very caring. I would like to record it. You know there is a movie being made and my interview has been recorded on that. So, that is Arnie Raphel’s side of my story.

Just one thing which I would like to add before I finish on Arnie Raphel. It was a reception at the ambassador’s residence. There was a very prominent federal minister, Mulana Kousar Niazi, who was a minister of religious affairs.

Q: Spell it, please?

KHAN: M-A-U-L-A. Kousar K-O-U-S-A-R. Niazi N-I-A-Z-I. He was very close to Bhutto, who was the prime minister then. Maulana wanted to put a word to the ambassador for a visitor’s visa for the son of a retired general. Maulana had asked me, and I had advised him, “Maulana sahib, please don’t do that. You are here as a guest, and ambassadors don’t get into this visa stuff.” He says, “You know him so well---.” I said, “Yes, but---” The moment the minister brought up the subject with the ambassador, the first thing he did was say, “Aman, can you please come over? I go there. He tells Mulana, “Maulana sahib, I am very sorry. I’ve got nothing to do with visas. Aman knows it very well. Maybe he can help me. I can’t.” (Laughs)

Q: He doesn’t make it very easy.

KHAN: He just went away to talk with the other guests. I got hold of Mulana, and I said, “Sir, didn’t I just tell you not to talk visas with the American ambassador?”

Another incident, which I already narrated to you, perhaps you can fit it in. There was a party going on at the house of the first secretary political. It was the People Party’s government. Benazir Bhutto’s father-in-law was also an MNA (Member of the National Assembly). All the top prominent MNAs and the senators were there. The word comes. Arnie comes to me and asks me. Taking me aside, he asks, “Aman, I have to go to the ambassador’s residence; is it ok?” I said, “Yes.” He said, “I’ve got a call and I have to go.” “What’s to answer? The party is going on. You are the host and I am the co-host.” He said, “No, you have to take over the party.” He continued. “Don’t you know?” I said, “What?” He said, “The prime minister likes to stop by at the American ambassador’s residence once in a while as a casual call for a drink. Are you not aware of it?” I said, “Arnie, I am very sorry. Properly I didn’t.” He said, “Ok. He is going to be there. The ambassador wants me to be there. You take over the party.”
Q: With no advance warning.

KHAN: No, no. The call comes, and---There used to be next to the ambassador’s residence the club of the U.S. marines and it used to be flooded by the young women from all the foreign missions based in Islamabad to have fun with the marines.

Q: Friday nights.

KHAN: Friday nights, yes.

Q: Marine Night.

KHAN: Yes. Marine night. They would have their hands under each other’s shoulder. Islamabad was very quiet. Embassy Road used to be very quiet. The moral. Then they would go to the Marine club and see the fun. He comes back. I said, “What happened?” and he answers, “Damn good. Everything went smoothly. They both were not as high as they generally are. I made sure the prime minister leaves in a good state.” I said, “Ok, Arnie. You see, I am running the party. It’s going very well. Everybody is enjoying their drink.” This was Arnie and that was my relationship with him.

Unless you have a question, I think I would like to finish, or else I would go on and on.

Q: I think this is a good place to have a book end to this chapter. We will continue. We’ve now talked about some to the historical events---

KHAN: Very important.

Q: ---of that period. We’ve now talked about your relationship with the late Ambassador Arnie Raphel. Any final comments for this evening before we arrange for the third interview?

KHAN: I think the comment is that, with you, it’s very comfortable with me talking to you. I feel pretty much at home. I don’t know: is it your personality, is it your behavior, is it the way you have treated me? You do---to me it looks like things keep coming---really. My memories--- whatever they are---to me look as clear as ever. I don’t think I’m missing anything. If I do, I will definitely let you know. I thank you very much, my dear friend.

Q: Thank you, Mr. Khan. Thank you, Doctor.

A: Thank you, sir.

Q: Thank you for a remarkable second interview. We are here on October 8th, interviewing Aman Khan and getting his recollections of his work at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad in previous decades. We look forward to a third interview later this week.
KHAN: Yes, sir.

[Third Interview with Aman Khan, October 12, 2007.]

Q: Here we are. It is Dan Whitman on the third interview. Today, Friday, October 12th, we are interviewing Aman Khan, former Foreign Service National at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad.

In our last session we talked about a synopsis of the history of the U.S.-Pakistani relations '70s, '80s, early '90s. Now we’d like to go back, Mr. Khan, and ask more about the particulars of your own activities during that period.

KHAN: There are numerous incidents I would like to mention and quote. I would like to confine myself to the behavior of politicians, giving a scenario as to how they behave when they meet the American diplomats, and what they say in public compared to what they say in private. It might be of great interest to you to note (I think I did mention it to you earlier) the hypocrisy of the Pakistani politicians. When they meet the American diplomats, they are very polite. They say, “We like Americans; Americans are our good friends,” and all that. Publicly they go and they accuse and they abuse and blame the Americans for every damn thing on this god-damned earth, unfortunately. This is how---

Q: When you say ‘publicly’, do you mean in the media?

KHAN: In the media, addressing public gatherings or talking otherwise. This is what I have experienced---not that I am saying anything. If I come to quoting an example, there are probably hundreds of them. I will probably mention a couple of them. They might be of some interest to you. So you see, this has been a general guide, I would say, to the behavior of the politicians.

I can just give you one example, a glaring example, that probably should be of some interest. It is Qazi Hussain Ahmad, who is still the chief officer of the religious party which is known as Jamaat-e-Islami. He has been the president of the party for the last many, many years now. He has always been a prominent Jamaat-e-Islami leader – outspoken, blunt. He is one of the very few educated religious political leaders---and that he is. He was out on rampage against America. Oh my god---America is this, America is that, America is anti-Pakistan and blah, blah, blah. America wants this and America wants that. The front office, as we call the ambassador’s office, decided to ban the political officers from meeting him. The guy wouldn’t stop; he just went on and on. Then, one day at a meeting with the ambassador, I suggested, “Sir, in order for us to know what his problem is, I should set up a meeting with one of the senior political officers to go and meet him.”

Q: This is Qazi Ahmad.

KHAN: Yes. So, after heated debate, the ambassador said, “Ok, Aman, you go ahead.”
Q: Sorry, which ambassador was it?

KHAN: It was---who was the ambassador?---I have 8-10 ambassadors’ names I have to give you separately, anyway.

The advantage I had was that calling any top politician was not a problem for me. I just call and ask for an appointment and they are happy to do so. I call Qazi and he says, “Oh, yes Aman, why not.” I say, “Where do we come and meet you, sir?” He answers at such and such time. Ok, time done.

We used to exchange notes before going into a meeting to determine who is going to initiate the talk, who would initiate the conversation, either the American or me. This time, this American friend of mine, because he was my immediate supervisor, said to me, “Aman, I think it is good if you take the initiative.” I said, “That’s fine.”

Q: Is this the political counselor?

KHAN: Yes. He was the political counselor.

So we go to meet Qazi and the first thing I ask him was, “Qazi-Sahib” (as we address them respectfully) “may I, if you don’t mind, ask you this question: Why do you go on issuing anti-American statements all the time and why are you so very critical of the Americans? You get to know the American policies. You get to know the American diplomats. Only then I said, very humbly again and respectfully, too, ‘Sir, to me it looks like you are very prejudiced when you make such statements.” Quote---unquote (said to indicate accurate reporting of comments).

He said, (Aman copies Qazi’s behavior and changes his tone of voice, sounding the opposite of bombastic, sounding very humble.) “Oh, no, you know, I am a friend of America. I like Americans. Americans are my friends. I like to be friendly with America. (Quote---unquote); whatever I say is for public consumption, otherwise I am the friend of America. Period.”

I am not finished here.

Many years pass. Chamberlin is the ambassador.

Q: Wendy J. Chamberlin.

KHAN: Yes. She was the ambassador. Many, many years have passed. Now we are in 2000+ and we were at a political counselor reception cum cocktail party. And mind you this Hamid Khalil (sp?) was also there with his jeans and drinking beer and all that. That particular evening we had invited all the American correspondents who were based in Islamabad and were covering the war going on in Afghanistan. There came the ambassador and sat next to me. The first thing she asked me was, “Aman, where’s your
beer, where’s your beer?” I said, “Well, sir, I was just going to fetch it.” She says, “I just wanted to ask you.” Then I said, “You had gone to Lahore and I understand that you went to Mansoorah.” (Mansoorah is the headquarters of Jamaat-e-Islami.)

A: A few miles outside of Lahore.

KHAN: I say, “You went to Mansoorah and you met Qazi.” She said, “Oh, yes. I did.” I said, “What did he tell you?” She said, “I am going to tell you anyway.” I said, “But before you do, Ambassador, can I narrate this small incident?” She said, “Go ahead.” So I narrated this incident. Believe you me, as you know, the ambassador is the daughter of a general and she is very proper. I was sitting in a straight chair next to her and was having my beer and she was having hers. After I had narrated this incident to her, she literally said, “Aman, that son-of-a-bitch did the same as you have just told me.”

(very loud laughter.)

Q: How many years later was this—ten years later?

KHAN: Chamberlin was there when I got my award. It was 2002, I think. The war was going on in Afghanistan. 2002.

Q: So, 15-20 years later. Same lines.

KHAN: Same lines. This is an example of the hypocrisy of our politicians.

Q: You said you had a hundred examples; we don’t need to go through the hundred of them, but what’s the point? Why were politicians doing this? Were they trying to strengthen their domestic base? If they were hypocrites, they were giving opposite stories. Which story is true?

KHAN: It has been a very common perception and that perception still is that the Americans have now, that they have had in the past and that they will have in the future, a role, in one form or the other, in future Pakistani party politics. This is what my experience is.

Q: I don’t understand. Is this to say—we are talking about influencing the public, I think. Is that what the subject is, politicians trying to strengthen their democratic popular base by slamming the U.S.?

KHAN: Yes. Also most of them did want to have rapport and wanted to have interaction with the American diplomats.

Let me tell you this. I don’t want to say goody-goody things about myself. I was a kind of very special unique individual in what I was doing, I realize now. In order to arrange these meetings with the top politicians, members of the parliament and the cabinet ministers, my aim and goal always was always trying to create some kind of
understanding, and also to dispel certain impressions which the politicians carried about the Americans. At the same time, I also wanted my American bosses to understand how political leaders belonging to different schools of thought perceived and viewed them.

Q: This was a most difficult position for you to be in.

KHAN: Yes. I was unconsciously and consciously doing that sometimes—such as with the Benazir and Oakely stuff. I tried to bridge—to fill the gap.

Q: This was in the period when they would not speak to each other.

KHAN: Yes. That’s one of the things. With no politician—I can say, no politician—repeat—with no politician did I ever have a problem while calling him or her. I would say, “Look here ma’am” or “Look here sir, I want you ---” Sometimes I would say, “I want you to meet such and such a person. Sometimes I would say, “Sir, we want to come and pay a call on you.” Mind you, we would always keep the ambassador’s office well-informed when we would go to meet top leadership or politicians. I would also see to it that these meetings happened in a way that the press did not get any publicity.

I had been arranging meetings of the foreign ministers of Pakistan at my house, sir. Not one has many foreign ministers. I would have the ambassador over. I am sure you know, being a diplomat, that in order to meet somebody like a foreign minister, the routine is that there has to be a request going from the embassy to the foreign office saying we want—even the ambassador—I’m not just talking about the political counselor.

Q: A diplomatic note.

KHAN: A diplomatic note goes to the foreign office saying that the ambassador would like to pay a call on a minister, on a federal minister or such. I would bypass that procedure and would arrange not only meetings of the ambassador, but also of my political counselor. They’d use a name of a federal minister whom they wanted to meet; I would get it done just with a telephone call. Sometimes I would have them over for a drink to my house. I am very hospitable. I was and I still am and will be. As I told you, I never ever had even a penny from the U.S. government for the entertainment, which, of course, I would love to have---.

Q: It is time for us now to move along.

KHAN: Under the law I had an allotment that there was X amount of money—indeed, the United States government gave us a certain large amount of money meant for diplomatic functions but I never used it—not a penny, not a penny.

So coming to the politicians and the diplomats meeting the politicians and discussing the current situation, again my utmost endeavor used to be to keep them abreast of the
current situation, current subjects, burgeoning budget, situations---political, economic---both.

Q: Did you brief them every day?

KHAN: Yes. Every morning we would have a meeting in the political section where I was supposed to give them a brief every day. We would see what really had happened and what was likely to happen. A week ahead we would call such people. So that will help them draft their cable well. While I was there, I think we got the award from the State Department for the best reporting three to four times. Oh, yes; we did.

Q: Sorry. I interrupted. You were telling a story about the work you were doing in giving the correct information to the front office. Sorry I interrupted you. You were about to tell about Stephen Solarz (U.S. Representative from New York)?

KHAN: Yes. I was just telling you a very interesting part. I think it probably might fit in here.

Zia was the president, and Solarz was known to be very anti-Pakistan. The Pakistani community in New York was also very unhappy and angry and so was the Pakistani press. He was on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Congress, so he had a platform. In fact, he had become so biased that he would give very pro-India statements and very anti-Pakistan statements---whatever you may term it. He came to Pakistan, and at the invitation of Zia---not official, but it was with Zia’s blessing that he was there.

Q: Like Clinton, did he go to India first?

KHAN: Yes.

Q: First India, then Pakistan.

KHAN: Pakistan was eyewash, the way he visited. That’s history. That’s the story.

Q: But he visited both countries?

KHAN: Who, Steve?

Q: Yes.

KHAN: At that, I don’t know whether he had visited India or not, but he had come to Pakistan. He was staying at the ambassador’s residence, and I got a call from the ambassador’s residence. Hinton was the ambassador then (Deane Roesch Hinton). They say, “Congressman Solarz is staying here with me and he wants to see you.” So, I go to the quarters to meet him. I say, “Yes, Mr. Congressman.” He said, “Would you tell me who’s that tailor from where Zia gets his long coats made.”
Q: [Chortles.]

KHAN: I said, “Sir, of course I will. I know ‘Pindi, Rawalpindi and of course I know the tailors very well.” I said, “Yes, sir, what’s that about?” He said, “I want to have that long coat made for me.”

We call it --there are two words. Achkan

Q: Spell it.


Q: And this is the name of the coat?

KHAN: Yes. The long coat. We can call it by both names. This is a fact.

So, I called them and the next day I brought those tailors---pretty well-regarded tailors in Rawalpindi city and they brought a lot of material to show to the Congressman. So, he goes on, and he says, “Oh, my god, it is very expensive.” And I say, “Ok, sir, no problem, you can--,” and he says “No, no.” The matter rests there. I come down. I had a little shot with the ambassador, who was very fond of me. And then, off I go. I come home in the evening---the same evening and I get a call from the MS (Pakistani Military Secretary to the President). My wife picked up the phone. I got scared. Oh my god what---

Q: Sorry, a call from---?

KHAN: I got the call from the MS, the Military Secretary to the President. For me it was scary. So, the call comes. My wife answers it and says, “There’s a call from the President’s house.” So, I think I don’t know what have I done. So then comes the MS on the line. “Mr. Khan, I believe you are associated with a congressman.” I said, “Certainly. What exactly do you want to know? I work in the American embassy, and I have to be very careful whatever I say or tell,” which is what I always did. He said, “No, no, no---nothing to be upset about. I think the congressman wants a sherwani made.” I said, “Yes, sir, he does, and I got the tailor from where the president gets his sherwanis made.” He said, “I am now speaking to you on behalf of the President of Pakistan. Would you convey to the congressman that the sherwani, both the stitching and the cloth, is going to be a gift from the president.” Done.

(laughter)

KHAN: The next day, I told the ambassador. I said, “Sir, this is the message I got last night from the president’s house.” He said, “Aman, No. You should convey it yourself. Are the tailors coming tonight?” I said, “Yes. They are coming to see me.” So, they came over and this time they brought the stuff---very good stuff. They had instructions from the president but, before they came, I spoke with the congressman. I said, “I want to
convey a message from the President, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, that this cloth and the stitching included, is going to be a gift from the president. You choose whatever cloth you want.” That day he picked out the most expensive.

(Laughter)

He’s so ______. I am not finished here yet. Then he told me---by that time, of course, he knew my name---he said, “Aman, doesn’t he have a different color of the sherwani, as you told me, during the daytime?” I said, “Yes, Mr. Congressman. In the evening there is a darker side, and during the daytime the lighter colors because that goes better with the day outfits.” Then the congressman said, “I would like to have one made for daytime.” (laughter) and the tailor winked at me, so I said, “Yes. Go ahead; no problem.” The matter finished there. They pack up. They go.

I came down from the quarters and Ambassador Hinton was sitting downstairs. He said, “Aman. Come on, come on; have a drink. Where are you going?” I say, “Sir, I have finished my job.” He says, “No, come on, come on. Have a drink.” So, I went and sat on the couch. He said, “What went on upstairs?” and I said, “Sir, shall I tell you what really happened upstairs?” He said, “Why not? You’ve got to tell me.” I narrated this incident in all earnestness---let’s put it that way. Ambassador Hinton said, “Oh, that greedy son-of-a-bitch!”

(laughter)

_Q: Referring to the congress---_

KHAN: ---the congressman.

(laughter)

So this is one incident. I don't know what it would reflect on. This time he went back very happy.

I took him to Pakistani Kashmir and the Kashmiris had decided to line up and protest his arrival---not against his arrival, but against his policies, and all that. It was well planned by the Kashmiri government. So I was with him sitting in the helicopter. When we landed there we were going in the same car, he said, “What’s happening outside?” I said, “Can’t you see that, sir? That’s what you do to Pakistan.”

_Q: You said that?_

KHAN: Yes, sir! Yes, sir! I said, “This is what you do. You are not going to be garlanded here. They are the people who are the most affected as far as the Indo-Pakistan dispute is concerned--- that’s Kashmir.” Anyway his visit went very peacefully and---

_Q: Sorry. What did he say in response? Was he silent?_
KHAN: He just smiled. He knew that. He had been very anti---What was anti-Pakistan? It was more on the Kashmir dispute---that is what it has been, always. I think that trip, his visit to Pakistani-held Kashmir---I don’t know whether the sherwani had any positive effect on his thinking, but he did kind of change his stance. He toned down his stance; I would use this word.

Q: This is very, very important. He received two coats from the president; he saw a demonstration staged against him---

KHAN: That’s in Pakistani-held Kashmir.

Q: So, from your interpretation of the demonstration he understood that this was a reaction to him.

KHAN: Yes. Yes. They were there because everybody knew that---

Q: So, he toned down his anti-Pakistan stance in Congress.

KHAN: In Congress.

Q: What were the signs of this? You mean the rhetorical part---

KHAN: ---yes---

Q: ---or the legal parts?

KHAN: No, the rhetorical parts. That’s what I would say.

Q: Did you see a difference immediately, or did it take time?

KHAN: No. It took some time. Actually, the U.S. Congress Foreign Relations Committee would meet every now and then. Only when a meeting would take place, only then would a statement be issued. You know the procedure. Then---

Q: So you think he sold his opinion for a coat?

KHAN: Mmmm. Two.

Q: Two coats.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Did he sell his opinion for two---
KHAN: Yes. I wouldn’t know that. I wouldn’t make that kind of a comment. The interesting part is, by then, the Pakistani community in his constituency had become a little wiser. They raised funds and they supported a democratic woman, a congress person. They made sure that this guy is defeated and Solarz was defeated. I think he had been elected to the Congress probably three times. I have no idea. Maybe a few times. This time he lost his election to a woman who belonged to the democratic party.

Q: Because of his toning down of his anti-Pakistan stance? Is this---

KHAN: I think he was building up the whole thing and some people must have convinced the Pakistani community, “Look here, damn you, why don’t raise some funds and support a candidate who is against him and get him defeated? If he continues to stay in the Congress---”

Q: In favor of what? A harder stance against the government of Pakistan?

KHAN: Against Pakistan. We wouldn’t say the government of Pakistan.

Q: So, Solarz softened---partly because of this experience---and was politically defeated---

KHAN: It was later on when he was politically defeated.

Q: ---partially as a result of his softening.

KHAN: No, no. Not a result of his softening. As a result of the Pakistani community living in his constituency who decided why not support his opponent---

Q: ---for a harder stance---

KHAN: No, no. For having a pro-Pakistan stance.

[V]: Well, the Pakistani community got involved.
Q: ---in his con---

KHAN: ---in New York, where he belonged. Yes.

Q: Ok. Very interesting. So a domestic.---Yes, Doctor.

A: Really. A lot of things were happening on this side too, while this was happening over there ---chit-chat in the community. Friends used to say, “Look here. What kind of Congressman do we have? He gets a sherwani and a cap as a gift from there, and trousers too! He goes to India and wears those clothes and talks against Pakistan. So, people were chit-chatting about it.

Q: So, evidently, hypocrisy is equally spread in all countries.

KHAN: Well, I don’t know.

A: There were other issues. One was that our community was divided. For example, there was a very primitive outlook, not very resourceful. Their outlook was also not very mature. Everybody said, “Well, Stephen Solarz. Let’s not even talk to him; he is so anti-Pakistan.” I and a few other friends countered that. We said, “Supposing he is your enemy? It is important that you know him well and you have a good communication with him. You help him understand your viewpoint. If nothing else, at least you may be able to soften him up and maybe take the sting out. He may not be as pungenent. So against the wishes of all the community, we arranged for a get-together in the community with Congressman Stephen Solarz. The meeting went very well, but he still kept on having a very pro-India attitude. That never changed. Ultimately, this is what happened. The community organized to have someone else, who was his opponent, support that, so that we could defeat Stephen Solarz.

Q: The Pakistani community in this district was actually able to change this election. Ok. Let’s go back to Islamabad, Mr. Khan.

KHAN: Yes, let’s go back.

A: Sorry.

Q: No. That was very useful. It shows both sides. An ambassador will normally want to be friendly with the country’s leader where he is. That’s the natural tendency. The congressman may not have had the same concern. So, when the ambassador said, “that s.o.b---,” this shows you that dichotomy. You were in the middle.

KHAN: Any ambassador, for that matter, if he’s smart, which they generally are---they are not dumb. They know (and they are supposed to know) the popular feelings and sentiments of the people in the country they are serving in. They know the issues, and they know what the people of that country where they are serving---what they are sentimental about, what they are concerned about, what they are serious about. I am sure
Ambassador Hinton knew that Pakistanis were very concerned about what Solarz kept saying against Pakistan. I don’t think that there was anything very extraordinary about what I told you. It was just Hinton’s expression when I told him as to what conspired upstairs. Stop.

Q: I think my colleague might have examples, as I do, where the executive branch of the U.S. government and the legislative branch do not always seek the same thing.

KHAN: Yes. That’s true.

Q: There you are, an employee of an embassy, stuck in the middle.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: You are a Pakistani citizen. You are, when you are on duty, working. You are representing the U.S. embassy in a foreign country, which happens to be your country. A comment, if you would. What goes through your mind when you have---

KHAN: Let me tell you. As I earlier mentioned to you, mine was a very difficult position where I was working. I was under the surveillance of all the three major intelligence agencies of Pakistan. Even my social activities were being watched. I wouldn’t like to say anything light about it (laughs), but you know. There was surveillance to the maximum. There were times when my children, my daughters, along with my wife, were being tracked. They got threatening calls from the intelligence agencies. That was very scary; it was very scary.

Now, I can give you an example from 1977. There was agitation, a movement going on against Bhutto. The general perception was that the American CIA had put a hell of a lot of money in that, because they were not in favor of Bhutto, and of what Bhutto was doing. Probably I mentioned to you---

Q: Yes.

KHAN: I was living with my brother then, and the telephone was in his room. The telephone (call) came at about five---that’s morning prayers time---and the local police chief says, “Would you tell your brother that we will not hesitate to arrest him and take him away to the tribal area where he will never be able to come back, if he doesn’t stop whatever he is doing.” At that time I was covering the agitation going on in ’Pindi, and Islamabad and around. I was even covering other cities, because I wanted that the embassy should be fully informed. The Embassy should be well informed as to what the hell was going on around. Then my brother calls me, and he says, “You are not going to the embassy today; you are going to resign. I want your safety. To me that is more important.” My brother was like my father to me. I said, “Look here, sir. Please let me go to the American embassy
this morning. Let me go and inform them as to what has happened. If they are not going to provide me with enough security, I’ll leave the job, if that comes to it.”

I went and reported to the front office. They had all the sympathy and everything. They said, “You just don’t worry about it. You’ll be fully protected. You will be given all the security that you need. You just stay cool. We’ll just take it up with the government of Pakistan.” They did the same day. They said, “This is a very valuable staff member, and if any harm comes to him, we are going to hold you responsible.” I knew the chief---there was no problem.

Q: Aaah---

KHAN: The next day or the day after, everything was ok at the Embassy. Nothing physically had happened, except they had taken me into custody. Then I met the chief. I said, “Sir, you and I, we have known each other for quite some time. What prompted you to give such a threatening call to my house and to my brother?” He says, “Aman Khan, you don’t know. I was under so much pressure. We all knew that probably you are doing everything, no matter what was going on in Pakistan or the agitation which is going on against Bhutto.” I said, “Sir, this is not what I am doing. These are the people of Pakistan who are doing it and I don’t think that American money is going into it. If the American money was going to Pakistan it’s not through me. It hasn’t happened. They don’t pay me, except my salary.”

(general laughter)

KHAN: So, that’s what you get. There was another aspect I wanted to tell you, under the kind of circumstances I tried to survive.

Q: The chief in a sense apologized to you.

KHAN: Well, it’s not the Pakistani police style to apologize. He said, “Well, I was under pressure, so I did it.” It wasn’t an apology at all; no, not in that sense. Anyway, that was just more of a thing.

Q: Somebody interpreted your presence at the demonstrations as support for the demonstrations?

KHAN: Yes.

Q: when in fact you were only observing.

KHAN: Yes. I go as an observer, like when Bhutto’s trial was going on at the supreme court. I’ll be the first person to be there at the supreme court, to cover the proceedings. In fact, at that time, for the first time the State Department’s reporting was far ahead of the reporting of the Voice of America.
Q: You must have been in this type of dilemma many, many times, even if it wasn’t threats. There must have been some strange reactions.

KHAN: Strange reactions. My wife and I were coming from a diplomatic party, a reception-party. I didn’t have a driver; I was driving myself. My car was being stopped. My car was being chased with my wife. Thank god. I used to be in a normal state of mind, so I could face them and all that. Then, of course, on different occasions, whenever we would meet them, (I would explain) this is what my duties are all about. I have to go far.

Q: Did this affect your friendships, your social relations outside of the government itself?

KHAN: To a large extent, with the army officers and the civil bureaucrats.

Q: With the army?

KHAN: They would ---Yes---they would---I wouldn’t say they would avoid me, in that sense, but if they would come to my house, they would like to know, “Is there going to be any American? Is the American ambassador going to be there?”

Q: Laughs from recognition.

KHAN: Is the American consul going to be there?” (said with a lowered voice to indicate a conspiratorial whisper to the ‘officer’ asking the question.).

Q: What about---not to probe into your personal life, but you must have had friends---Pakistani friends, who must have had questions about where your loyalties were.

KHAN: Those questions were always in their minds, but they would never ask me. I would always tell them, “I am doing my duty. I am working for the American government. I am working in this position and I am supposed to be doing whatever I was doing. PR (public relations) was a very important factor of my duties. If I were not good at PR, I probably would not have been able to do what I did. In order to do your PR job in a skillful manner, in a smarter manner, you had to have a real personal interaction. What I really had done was add a personal touch to my relationship with the politicians. That really did happen. I would have them over. They would have me over. That kind of stuff. That really did happen.

Q: Why shouldn’t it? Isn’t that part of the job?

KHAN: Yes. Well, it really helped me a lot, vis-à-vis---well, sometimes we would be together sharing some evening activities, as we called the work. We would have something very informal and we would kind of talk about work. There wasn’t anything personal if they were discussing. Of course, the next day, I would go and report this in
private, “This is what I heard last night, and this is what the thinking is all about.” So it was a difficult position.

Q: Do you think that they knew that and did they say certain things, knowing that you would---?

KHAN: Aaaah, no. One thing good which I can say is that most of my friends, they respected me. They had a lot of respect for me.

Q: Do you think that people came to your house partly because of your position in the U.S. embassy?

KHAN: No. They came because of my own social status also, which they always did. I enjoyed a social status as I was here. That I had earned. I was a government officer before I joined the American embassy. I held a reasonably powerful position in the government and so I had my friends over. In fact, that position of mine, when I joined the Embassy having served with the government of Pakistan as an officer for a good five years, that position helped me have good rapport and contact with my friends who were in the civil service and or the army, for that matter.

Q: In the previous interview, we talked about some of the historic events really beyond your own activities. Now we have begun to talk about your activities in the ’70s, and the early 80s. When you think back to the mid-late ’80s, the early ’90s, do any particular events come to mind? Were there situations where you were suddenly in the middle, and actually able to influence the outcome? You mentioned an incident earlier, where the Pakistani government decided to test nuclear weapons. You personally intervened. I am thinking of that sort of situation. You were an embassy employee for almost thirty years.

KHAN: About.

Q: That is a long period of time, and there was a lot of drama, a lot of history. What comes to mind in terms of the things you observed and where you were actually an actor in these situations.

KHAN: As I mentioned it to you, there was---

(tape change).

You know, when I joined the embassy, history was in the making. As I mentioned to you, East Pakistan had gone; Bangladesh had come into being. I’ve told you the way I saw developments. These were very important historical events. Then Bhutto came in, with the framing of the constitution, the opposition, blah, blah, blah. That era of Bhutto was---I don’t think that Bhutto ever got a chance to stabilize himself politically. He was always doing something which could strengthen his position, which could strengthen his rule. As I mentioned to you he promoted actions like nationalization, and this so-called Islamization. Then, as a result, the imposition of Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law resulted.
During martial law, Bhutto had his own advisory council, which we call Majlis-i-Shoora (Urdu: Council of Advisors, Parliament). He just picked people from here and there. He also went on with Islamization.

At that time, the war had started in Afghanistan; the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan and Americans, very, very badly needed support. There was Musharraf and his entire team and they said, “Here we are, sir.” They offered unconditional support to the U.S. operation for the separation. That’s the time, sir, when you are creating the Taliban. That is the time you are creating Osama bin Laden’s---

Q: Sorry. Are you referring to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan?

KHAN: Afghanistan. Yes. That was in the ’80s. That was during Zia’s time. The money was going into Afghanistan like hell. There was the time we got F-16s; we got this, we got that, and all that. Zia was delivering what he was expected to. Those were also very difficult times, mind you, Daniel; they were very difficult times, for me to go about, because people weren’t really very happy as to the way things were being conducted and the way these religious groups or parties were being financed. That’s something very important. The U.S. administration was putting in a lot of money. I know for sure that that thing was happening.

In the process, we were creating the core of the Taliban. Do you know what Taliban is? It is the plural of talit and talit is student and taliban means students. So that’s how they coined this term ‘Taliban’. The students were being produced by madrasas, the religious schools, bordering---mostly bordering---the frontier province. So they---the young people, who’d be trained and---became _______corps---and what not---they would be sent into the so-called Jihad (Arabic: Holy War) against the Soviet Union.

Q: In retrospect, this seems like an enormous mistake to create this movement. Later the U.S. went to war against this movement. Was it clear to you, at that time in the ’80s, that this was a mistake?

KHAN: No. I wouldn’t say that. The reason was because the way things were building up, one couldn’t foresee, one couldn’t predict what was going to happen after five or ten years. The way things were moving fast made it difficult. How could---I don’t know; you are a better person to tell. How could one predict that the Soviet Union could break up? I don’t know. This is not my subject.

Q: The higher objective seemed to be to contain the Soviet Union.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Not necessarily to contain a radical religious group.

KHAN: No, Zia was---
TOM [Only identified as Tom]: No, wasn’t it ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence, thought to be Pakistan’s largest intelligence agency) that particularly favored the Taliban, over some of the other groups?

KHAN: They did. They did. They did, absolutely. They created Taliban. It is not unsupported.

TOM: They created this corps. They may have been using American money to some extent ---

KHAN: They had been using American money. No, no, no---of course they were---

TOM: but ISI is a genuine---.

KHAN: They were using American money and it was ISI. You’re absolutely right. I was coming to that. It was the ISI which created this corps of Taliban army.

A: There was no other alternative force.

KHAN: They still are very active in Afghanistan. That’s why Ahmad Qazi keeps on crying that there are Pakistani ___ISI is ______ still involved in whatever goes on, whatever goes wrong in Afghanistan. They created these people with a lot of money. Let me tell you: it’s very easy to buy the people in the tribal area with money; it’s easier. Playing with their guns is part of their life. I don’t know if you happened to go there, but I remember them carrying their rifles right behind their shoulders. It was easy and they were able to send hundreds and thousands of people into Afghanistan, and with the local support or whatever.

That was the era of Zia-ul-Haq and then, after Zia goes, with that unfortunate crash, where I lost my friend, Arnie Raphel, we entered the political era--sorry, the so-called Democratic Era of Pakistan. Zia’s gone. The elections were held. Benazir came. She was there for three years or so and then she was toppled with the support of the military on charges of corruption. She went. Nawaz comes. He also served three years and was toppled. Then Benazir comes back again and she is toppled for one reason or another, and then Nawaz comes and then Musharraf comes.

Q: An amazing confusion of events and there you were: responsible for interpreting to the front office what was happening.

KHAN: Oh, yes.

Q: How might they have seen this, if you had not been there?

KHAN: I wouldn’t boast about myself, but I think I was instrumental in keeping the front office and the political section pretty well abreast about day-to-day events. Because I would get the feedback, I’d know. On Benazir’s toppling, I warned them when I said,
“Look here. Your leader is not doing what she is expected to do. Ask her to behave. Not to do that.” Believe you me in these words. “Ask her.” That is not the right thing that she is doing. She shouldn’t be playing into the wrong hands. She just shouldn’t be doing what she is doing, neither the corruption nor the nuclear development. The Americans have all along been, as you know and I know, very much opposed to the nuclear program of Pakistan. That eventually terminated in the explosion by Nawaz. I think their fears were correct. If you let Pakistan go even though it was in retaliation for what India did—-If India had not gone on conducting the nuclear tests, probably Pakistan would have never done it. They would have never done it.

Q: It sounds as if the U.S. embassy and Washington had increasing and decreasing amounts of control. It sounds as if perhaps during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the two governments were rather close together. At other times, it seems as if the U.S. government had no control at all over what was happening. How would you trace this from your vantage point? The U.S. had objectives. It had to do with the Soviet Union, with Afghanistan, with India. Do you feel that Pakistan was a pawn in all of this, or was it a central---

KHAN: I would put it in a different way. You see Americans equal anti-communism. Pakistan is by and large anti-communist because the perception in Pakistan was, and still is, that communism is against religion. To be against religion in Pakistan is to be against Islam. Pakistan turned out to be a natural partner for the U.S. to fight against the Soviet Union. They were fighting against communism. They were fighting against non-religious forces. That really helped ISI, as my friend has just pointed out, to recruit people from the tribal areas who are very religious. By and large, they are very religious as compared with the other areas of Pakistan. They are very much into religion. That helped them recruit people in hundreds and thousands by paying them money.

Q: That was in the ’80s.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Would you say that this same natural alliance continued into the late ’80s and ’90s?

KHAN: Sir, this is the dilemma. As I told you, Pakistan and U.S. relations have seen a lot, a lot of ups and downs. America is perceived to have led Pakistan on every now and then. A glaring example, for me as a student of history, is that soon after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, America just abandoned Pakistan completely, completely. Sanctions were imposed on us (economic sanctions, military sanction, this sanction, that sanction). It went on and on.

V: The USAID (United States Agency for International Development) program---

KHAN: The USAID program was wound up.

Q: So, in other words, the only thing that kept us together was the presence of the---
KHAN: ---the Soviet Union, of the common enemy.

Q: As soon as that enemy disappeared we had no natural---

KHAN: You literally abandoned us. That Pressler amendment came. I mean the U.S. government abandoned us. Then comes the Pressler amendment. (An amendment proposed by Senator Larry Lee Pressler. This unique single country law, or amendment, prohibited Pakistan from developing nuclear arms. In the case they did, it prohibited the U.S. from providing Pakistan with any aid. It was triggered in October 1990. In September 1995, Ambassador Raphel, when addressing Congress, strongly suggested this amendment be revised to improve U.S. – Pakistan relations)

A: There you are.

KHAN: My good gracious. You went on and on and on, hammering us for one reason or another. Don’t do this and don’t do that.

A: It’s really a lot of the same pressure which also defeated the Pressler amendment.

Q: What’s that?

[Several voices speaking at once. Dr. A explains something about the defeat of the Pressler amendment, but there are too many voices speaking at once to make it out.]

KHAN: There comes the Pressler Amendment. Under that amendment so many sanctions are imposed, for what we did for you when the situation was---you did it for yourself too. Probably we didn’t as much.

Q: Pakistan felt betrayed at this time?

KHAN: Yes. It certainly did.

Q: What about you, as an employee of the U.S. Embassy? You must have had conflicting---

KHAN: I was embarrassed, feeling as small, as awkward---feeling as (I don’t want to use male slang in this interview)---feeling absolutely frustrated as to how the hell I should go.

Q: Did you have any sense that you could influence? Were these decisions made?

KHAN: Well, my friends, my contacts would abuse me left and right and say, “Why can’t you do something? Why don’t you tell your American bosses? Why don’t you convince them that whatever they are doing is wrong? Which is true. I was convinced myself. The Pressler amendment is not at all something which should have happened.
Q: What did the amendment do? The Pressler amendment?

KHAN: I think under that amendment, the so-called—whatever they called that law—economic and military sanctions were imposed on Pakistan.

Q: Why? What was the rationale?

KHAN: The rationale was, again, the nuclear stuff.

Q: I see.

A: The aid was activated. The President of the United States had to certify every year that Pakistan---

[Comments made by Mr. Khan to Dr. A.]

KHAN: What else then? Ask that question.

Q: Maybe I’ve asked too much, but I see you in the middle here. I see you as a person extremely familiar with your environment in Islamabad. Here you’re working for an alien, a foreign power of some significance. Again, I see you in the middle here. That must have been a very difficult period. The Pressler amendment was when? After the nuclear tests, is that correct?

KHAN: Yes. This Pressler amendment had become almost a household name. Believe you me! (Laughs) There wasn’t a house---what is the Pressler amendment---

Q: It is like the reign of ---.

KHAN: Because you know, the vernacular press and English press would discuss every day: “Why did this happen to us? Why not to India?”

Q: No, did you? You said that you felt very frustrated. Was it possible to argue with your American colleagues and with the American ambassador, or were these initiatives taken purely in Washington?

KHAN: I think we used to believe many good things about the Americans. I used to have very candid, very frank discussions. I was bringing to their information and notice as to what the general public was perceiving and what they were talking about. That was a part of my job too. I didn’t have to tell them all that damn goody-goody stuff. I had to tell them what was going on against you; how people are perceiving you; the resentment is growing.

Q: Did you see any reaction to---
KHAN: No. Actually, I think the times were such that there wasn’t any political agitation going on against this particular thing. It was more in the press. The press was very, very critical about what was going on, and that was the medium.

Q: You were telling the American officials that the Pakistani public was turning against the U.S. Did you sense your American colleagues reacting in any way, or just were they merely observing?

KHAN: Well, I think, No. I think probably they were conveying everything to the State Department, as to what was going on. They were not---

Q: Could you detect in them their own wishes? Were they kind of poker-faced or---?

KHAN: Well, in a way, yes. With some of the fiery type of politicians for whom I would arrange meetings they would be very vocal. They would be very critical as to what the American administration was doing.

Q: No, I mean the Americans.

KHAN: Americans, at times, would agree, but they had to toe the line of the U.S. State Department.

Q: Right. Was there any sign that the reporting going to Washington actually influenced the policy in Washington?

KHAN: Daniel, my dear friend, I don’t know if I am in a position to tell you. I had access to semi-classified information. I didn’t have full access to the classified. I was probably the only Pakistani who had access to the semi-classified stuff I was given to read. I was asked to give comments, but I wouldn’t know the classified stuff which they were sending. What kind of stuff they were sending? I wouldn’t know. I am not in a position to say. I’m sure they must have been if they were sending cables, vis-a-vis, the good stuff. They must be.

Q: Based on your observation of U.S. policy coming from Washington, did you detect any changes, or was it simply, “Beat up Pakistan! Beat up Pakistan!”

KHAN: Yes, but, then after the Pressler amendment was further amended, things changed. Then, of course, there is some very pro stuff, and blah, blah, blah. That’s something.

A: On this side, on the Hill (reference to the U.S. Congress), it was a down time for Pakistan. It was a terrible, a very difficult time for Pakistan. Pakistan was virtually isolated. In the rival forces the biggest opponent was India. They were on the up-beat; they were on the rise. They had more influence on the Hill than Abu Quinty (sp?) had, and that was very tragic, very sad. That was also the guiding force and the determining force as to the policy.
KHAN: I don’t think that was tragic or sad. India was---

A: Not from your side, but---

KHAN: No, no. Indians are smarter. Come on, Sir, Indians are smarter; they are much smarter than we are.

A: Well, you can keep on defending them. That’s fine, but---

KHAN: They are much smarter people. Their lobby is very good on the Hill.

A: That’s what I am saying. They are getting more powerful.

KHAN: They have the ears of these people and our lobbyists---

A: There are no lobbyists---

KHAN: They don’t do any homework; they don’t have your system that goes with a lobby, lobbyists or lobbying or whatever. We have always lacked in this department. We have not done our lobbying part at the Hill the way it should have been done. To me I think that is more of the inefficiency and negligence on the part of the Foreign Office, or the people responsible.

Q: Then we went into the other side of the pendulum. After 9/11, we attacked Afghanistan.

KHAN: Again.

Q: This is at the time of your retirement, I think.

KHAN: No, I still had not retired. When you came there, I was still there. That’s why I say I really am history in that sense. I saw all these events taking place while I was on the job.

Q: Was it all antagonism, antagonism, until 9/11? Did that turn everything completely around?

KHAN: After 9/11 things did change. The way Musharraf---there was also a lot of debate, but I think most of the people at that time were of the view or they perceived that Musharraf’s action was correct. This is what the general---that Pakistani---probably I mentioned to you---they did not have many options, and that was the right thing for Pakistan to do. Because there was a little threat from the U.S. Administration, “You know, Musharraf, if you don’t do that---”

Q: Mr. Armitage.
KHAN: Yes. but I am nobody. I would keep my mouth shut on that, but I believe there was.

**Q:** You’re already on the record for that.

(General laughter.)

KHAN: Whatever. I am not scared. I am saying what I really want to say. I am not saying anything which prevents me saying and stating what the factual stuff is.

**Q:** Again. It seems as if the relationship was formed much more on circumstance than it was on cultural understanding.

KHAN: Yes.

**Q:** There was a common enemy; we were together. There was no common enemy; we were apart. Then if there were a common enemy and we were together again. So this seems to be the politics of---

KHAN: No, I will tell you. I will interrupt you here.

**Q:** Please, please.

KHAN: You know when this invasion of Afghanistan thing came, and the United States administration wanted Pakistan’s participation, there was a lot of stuff said. There were a lot of debates that went on in the press and in the private meetings and public gatherings that Pakistan must think ten times before joining the Americans in Afghanistan because of what America had done to us in the past. We should learn that lesson and we should make sure that this time we are not let down again.

Look at the irony. The way things are happening now in Pakistan; let’s talk of today. Still the U.S. administration is putting on a hell of a lot of pressure, not that I have any love or sympathy for Musharraf. If you ask me as a Pakistani, “I say, come on. You go on putting us under pressure all the time, in the name of the war on terror.” The words generally being used are “it’s not enough.” Come on, what is that? What is not enough? We are sacrificing; our people are being killed. The so-called suicide bombers are attacking the poor civilians; they are attacking the buses, the markets. Who is being killed? It is just poor innocent Pakistanis. Again, I would say that there is a lot of hate and resentment against Musharraf, but at the same time, there is a lot of hate and resentment against the U.S. policies, too. Come on; what are you doing to us?

**Q:** Does this help Musharraf become popular?
KHAN: No, it does not and it has not; his popularity has gone down. I tell you, if he had not manipulated his electoral rolls, his election rules, he would never have had himself in this position.

Q: The public is very unhappy.

KHAN: Yes. They are.

Q: They are unhappy with us; they are unhappy with their own president. What makes them happy?

KHAN: Ok. I don’t know---

A: That time hasn’t come yet.

(Laughter)

Q: That time hasn’t come yet.

A: They are still waiting. How come a great country like the United States, the guiding light of civilization, freedom, treats the Pakistani common man and treats Pakistan as a nation so badly. They always have an alliance with the higher ups for convenience, but not---

Q: You are saying, Doctor, that American policy has dealt with the elites, not with the people.

A: It’s not country to country; it is country to people.

Q: That is traditionally what diplomacy does.

KHAN: Yes. I think another factor which is adding fuel to the fire is the economic factor. We must not overlook the financial side. During the past half a decade or more, even though the government keeps claiming an improvement in the overall economy of Pakistan, it is the other way round. You ask me how the common man feels the pinch, how does my wife, being a housewife (though I am a so-called middle class) how does she feel the pinch of the inflation? They have not done anything we ought to check that. They are more into themselves. They are more into buying the latest sophisticated planes for their personal use; more helicopters for their personal use; more bullet-proof Mercedes.

When it comes to the last few days, prices of flour are the main thing. Every Pakistani needs to have two breads or three breads. We eat breads maybe with a small bit of curry or something. That’s what an average Pakistani eats. 70-80%. One chapati and one naam (Urdu: bread) or one bread is beyond his reach now. Bread is five rupees. In the past couple of months the prices of essential commodities have shot up more than 100%. I
was telling the State Department today, “You aren’t looking at that. This effectively is contributing to the dissatisfaction, unhappiness, resentment and disenchantment of people. You go on saying, “Ok, we are good.” For the last year and a half (now I am going to be a little bitter) is the uniform the only issue for the people of Pakistan? Whether he should or should not continue to wear it? Come on! We have got many serious problems. We have health problems. We have serious diseases in the country. We recently had one of the most terrible earthquakes in the world with about 80,000-90,000 killed and millions still homeless. Nothing is being done about that. They take a plane and off they go. “Ok, we are going to Switzerland. We are going to go to Holland. We are going to have a very important meeting.” They took a plane, and off they went. They couldn’t care less what’s happening to the common man.

A: Cultivating dependence, dependence, dependence in everything. The mindset is the slavery of the mind. There’s no focus on self-reliance, and no focus on doing some things for themselves. No development, no industrial development, no technology development. Nothing.

Q: This is a very dark image.

KHAN: Can we have a break here?

Q: No, because I have one big question and then the ministry awaits. Robert Kaplan defines a failed state as a country in which you must bribe someone in order to get your municipal water. By that definition Robert Caplin defines Pakistan as a failed state.

KHAN: It is.

Q: Do you agree with that?

KHAN: I do, because when the common person doesn’t even get clean drinking water, and he can’t even buy bread two times, not even a meal, for his family, what is that all about? They are all into big pomp and show stuff and doing here and doing there. They like to, unfortunately, solve this problem, the problem which the people of Pakistan face, outside of Pakistan, by going and holding conferences, and going to seminars and making speeches, with their designer suits and stuff and having the latest plane at their disposal. Keeping them there; taking about 100 cronies with them; bribing them, blah, blah, blah; giving them a lot of money, “Ok, buy for your wives.” and all that and go back. They come, sit in their hotel suites, drink, eat, and shop for their wives and go back.

Q: Isn’t that what our diplomats do?

KHAN: I don’t know that.

Q: Congressmen. You wanted to take a break.

KHAN: Yes.
Q: You wanted to take a brief break or--- ?

KHAN: I think we might as well do that. I’ve talked too much, haven’t I?

Q: Noooooo.

KHAN: Give me a break, Daniel.

Q: Only a brief break, Mr. Khan. This is the end of the third interview. It is October; I can’t see anymore. The 12th and we are going to take a brief break.

[Recording device is started again and the third interview continues.]

KHAN: Is it primary education, and that again?

Q: The third interview continues. The question is posed: How can U.S. public diplomacy assist Pakistan? Fancy scholarships, Fulbrights and other---the question was: Is this the right way to help the situation? Mr. Khan is about to answer.

KHAN: I think this is not the right way of addressing the issue. It’s not going to help Pakistan in the long run, or even in the short run. I think the basic problem in Pakistan is that of providing primary education, and that more so for the female. In my country, 70-80% of the population live in the rural areas, sir. There these poor little girls don’t have the proper facility to go to schools. This is the dilemma; this is the tragedy. They don’t even have the basic health facilities. How can we talk of hospitals? More deaths take place in the rural areas among the women at the time of their delivery because they go through centuries’ old stuff. Things haven’t changed.

I was at the university, in one of the very good universities in Houston, not Rice, and I was talking to the vice chancellor of the university. He said, “What do you think we can do for Pakistan; we have got a lot of funds.” I said, “Mr. Vice-Chancellor, please raise funds for providing education at the primary level, especially to the girls. They are the ones who need it more than the boys do.” He immediately took note. I will give you his name.

Q: Was that on this visit?

KHAN: Yes. On this visit. I was just trying to tell him. This meeting was arranged for me with this vice chancellor, thanks to a very nice gentleman. He says, “Oh, my god, what are we doing?” And I said, “This is the area, come on.”

My difference with USAID has always been, when the embassy was State/USIS/USAID---I am coming to USIS also---we used to work together; we were three different entities. The USAID funds, or the money, was not visible. You spent
millions in the eradication of malaria yet it is not visible. If the Japanese established a children’s hospital in Islamabad, it is the talk of the country. You don’t do that.

V: American voice: We finally changed things.

KHAN: I know. I am coming to you, Sir. The United States Information Service, USIS, was something, an institution, a platform from where you were sending good signals, providing good books, and a good environment. You were creating a good understanding between the locals and the Americans. It was very welcome. You closed that institution, ended the policy and merged it into the State Department. Then you closed down those centers. Oh my god, what a tragedy! It is a tragedy. You shouldn’t have done that.

Q: You are speaking to the victims.

V: American voice: When I was there, they had just, the previous February, moved into the embassy compound from the city.

KHAN: What does that mean? There is no access. No student can go there, no scholar.

V: American voice: Anybody.

KHAN: Anybody, I know that from your telling me---

V: American voice: They had to send us their name, and their license plate number and the name of their driver.

KHAN: their driver, too!

V: American voice: Then we had to send that out to the Pakistani police at the gate of the diplomatic entrance and it had to match up and it took---

KHAN: And who’s going to go there and do what?

A: You see, with this new era, you are all diplomats. I’m not, so I’m free to say whatever I want to say.

Q: Oh, yes you are; yes you are.

A: You see, with these changes, the extremists, the reactionaries are creating situations. The perception that is theirs, especially in Pakistan and in our community here, is that education is also very selective. If someone wants to come in for a higher education, they will not be accepted for a technical education. They will be accepted for accountancy or CPA, or something like that. That’s the perception they have. They quote you case after case after case of students who get accepted in the fields but they don’t get their visa on time. Their visa expires and a lot of other things. The last few years have really been a downfall. I have always focused on self-reliance. You cannot be exporting everything and
everything can’t be American style. It is a lot cheaper, a lot easier, if something can be done to help them be on their own feet. Focus on self-reliance. You don’t have to export the bricks and the cement and everything from here; a lot of local resources can be used. Know-how is needed. What you need is a master plan for that country.

KHAN: I was talking about the U.S. aid and assistance vis-a-vis the education of children, mostly, I repeat again, for the females. The system in which we live is basically the landed aristocracy. They control 70% of the rural areas of Pakistan. In this cycle, they don’t want the children of their areas to be educated. This is a tragedy. No, this is a dilemma, a dilemma. I’ll just give you one small example. I had to take the Consul General to Lahore and the Political Counselor of Islamabad on a trek. Generally, we’d go and meet the top people, and get to know and meet the MNAs, the senators, and all that. This was just to have the sense of what was going on then. A big, big landlord, coming from a very fertile district of ours, which is known as Sergoda, we were their guests for lunch. He had a beautiful colonial house about—I don’t know how many acres of lawn—very well maintained, very well done. We were very well received, made to sit on that huge, beautiful lawn; it was very lovely. We were getting chilled beer to drink, following the beautiful, sumptuous lunch.

Now comes the other part I want to narrate. Both are American-educated---husband and wife. First, they take us to the village, their village to show us what the hell they are doing. Dirty village, we go through stinking, smelling and they take us to a house where some women are sitting and stitching and whatever. The Americans are looking at me and winking. So, we go from there and all that.

The second assignment was that the landlord wanted to take us for a shoot; he had the best available guns to beck (as from the expression ‘his beck and call’) in the Commonwealth. I don’t want to get into guns or whatever, but he had some very sophisticated stuff. Both the Americans and I said, “I have never fired a gun.” They said also, “We are not into shooting.” He took us around.

Then the third thing I wanted to come to in particular. I was told by this gentleman that he was going to take us to a school which he runs. That incident I will never forget, never ever forget. Ok. He takes us to a small room. The teacher is sitting on a broken chair; the poor kids, male and female, are sitting on the ground. There were not even mats available there. I don’t know why the hell he did that to us. Perhaps to show what was there for him to show it to us. What was he trying to show? There were about 20-25 kids sitting, poor things. I got a chance to talk to the teacher in my language, and I said, (we are very respectful in addressing our teachers) I asked him, “Statsi (which is ‘Teacher, Sir,” that’s what we say), what do you do here? What do you teach to these children? They are sitting on the ground; they don’t even have a mat to sit on. You don’t even have a proper chair to sit on. What do you do?” He said, “I don’t do anything. They just come and spend a couple of hours and off they go. I’ve got nothing to teach them about. They don’t even have enough books.” This is run by this landlord, this gentleman. “Can you just whisper in his ears,” he asked me, “Sir, could he provide some books to these children?” He didn’t talk about his salary, which must be very meager, I know. Stop.
This one aspect of our society, the society, where (I am going to repeat again---I hate repetition) 70%-80% of the population of Pakistan lives, where they don’t have clean drinking water. What to say of other stuff, about the cleanliness and all that. These are the really sad aspects. That’s what I said. You know, when our USAID friends would go and meet some official in Quetta, Karachi, Lahore or Peshawar, or whatever, they wouldn’t go into places and see what they need to do, see where the money is going.

When I was the chairman of the Pakistani Association, and I was heading all these three agencies for six times. I used to fight with the USAID people in the meeting. “Sir, you get a lot of money, but it’s not visible. Why don’t you set up hospitals; why don’t you set up schools; why don’t you set up a university? You have got one university in Beirut and that’s a known American University, isn’t it? You did that. And there isn’t anything like this here. I don’t know where the money is going. They haven’t really been focusing on the issues which are the basic issues. They were supposed to be addressed; they were supposed to be resolved; they were supposed to be sorted out. Their money could have gone to the grass root level; it would have reached the common man, as my friend was saying. It was not just an American diplomat going and talking to a villager, but this is how you do it. Your money should be rooted to a channel where it affects, its usefulness reaches, the common person.” He says, “Yes. Oh well, that’s what’s coming because of the American aid assistance.” I am finished. Thank you.

Q: Mr. Khan, thank you for your remarkable comments and thank you for your keen perceptions and for sharing part, but not all of your fascinating career. This is Dan Whitman concluding the third interview with Aman Khan.

[Fourth Interview. October 14, 2008]

Q: This is Dan Whitman. This is the fourth session with Dan Whitman interviewing Aman Khan. It is now October 14, 2008. Mr. Khan is going to travel back to Islamabad tonight, so this is a very valuable opportunity for me and for the readers to get some more of his reflections. We spoke last time about the current situation in Pakistan, and the lives of ordinary Pakistanis were becoming more and more difficult. I want to allow you, Mr. Khan, to go in any direction you want. So, may we start?

KHAN: Thank you, Mr. Whitman, for letting me in again today. I know that you're very valuable time, and you’re spending that time with me. Thanks again.

This particular incident which I wanted to narrate would be the burning of the American Embassy.

Q: In what year?

KHAN: This is in 1979, if I am correct. The Iranian revolution had taken place.

Q: Right; right.
KHAN: Ok. There was a lot of political turmoil going on in Iran. Some revolutionaries took over Mecca, the holy shrine, which was unheard of. They may have gone into the basement and started issuing threats to the Saudi Government for the release of some of their friends and colleagues by Tehran Radio, in its Urdu version, accusing the United States of taking over the Shrine and Kabbah. That news bulletin, like fire in a jungle, spread. The religious forces, the traders and whoever was downtown in ‘Pindi decided to go to the American embassy to protest.

Q: When you say ‘Pindi, that’s Rawalpindi?

KHAN: Rawalpindi. Yes.

I would like to point out that the same day I had reported at the embassy, after having visited the university, which is in the neighborhood of the diplomatic enclave. There were quite a number of Palestinian and Iranian students studying there. There were very well-organized student bodies at the university.

On the one hand, they instigated the students to go and attack the American embassy, and on the other, the general public, led by religious leaders, formed processions and they all started heading towards the embassy.

Now, just a few hours earlier, when I came back after having visited the university, I had reported (this is very important) I had reported to my bosses, “Look here, Sir. Things are not good today for us (when I say, “for us”, that means the American embassy). I think I would like you to bring to the attention of the RSO (Regional Security Officer is the State Department Security Officer assigned to an embassy) and the other people involved for the security that there is going to be something very serious today.” My prediction turned out to be so prophetic, so precise because I had sensed it when I heard the Iranian and Palestinian boys shouting at the university: “Let’s go and attack the Americans. They have done this thing.”

Q: Mr. Khan, what gave you the idea to visit the campus on that day?

KHAN: The reason is that I knew that the campus was a very volatile place where students---I had many teacher friends there, and in order to keep the embassy well-abreast about what the Palestinian and the Iranian students were doing there, I might stop by to see if they would hold rallies there. This is, you know, to keep the backdrop of the Iranian revolution, ok?

Q: When you went to the campus---

KHAN: This was not the first time. I used to go on a regular basis.

Q: Did people notice you? Did they know who you were?
KHAN: No. Well, I am coming to that later on. I would always be in the company of the teachers. Now, I am coming to that. After having reported the whole thing, I asked permission from my boss if I could go out for a little while to get some books for the ambassador. The ambassador had gone to Washington and had served in the Islamabad embassy as political counselor. They wanted some Pakistani stories in English for their children, because two of their children were born in Pakistan. I was gone for just about half an hour to an hour. When I came back, after having visited London books, from where I had purchased the books to be sent to Washington, I could see the people were rushing in mobs to the American embassy. So, I thought this is the best time for me to get into the building. When I came near the British High Commission, I was stopped and my vehicle was attacked. They were going to take me out and lynch me. My driver turned out to be smart and I took refuge in the campus of the Canadian High Commission. From there I called my then-immediate supervisor, Rick Sherman, to tell him this is what is happening. He said, “Aman, we want you to be safe. We want you to be out. Don’t come in. Don’t try to come in. To hell with the vehicle, you save your life.”

Q: Did they target you because your vehicle had an U.S. embassy tag?

KHAN: U.S. embassy plate, of course. The people there knew me. So what happened is I went and left the car at a friend’s house. The friend is in the Foreign Office and couldn’t resist coming over and seeing what was happening. I came to the embassy and by then the embassy was fully attacked and had been fully attacked. It was fire all over. I could hear the sound of bullets shot.

Mind you this is another interesting part which I would like to narrate here. That particular day Zia-ul-Haq had chosen to have a ride on a bicycle in the downtown area of Raja Bazaar. As I said, while he was having a joy ride, the American embassy was being attacked. No army help. No police or local organization came to help. I think and I think I am right in my observation: he just wanted to let it go, to let it happen.

Q: This place you mentioned?

KHAN: Raja Bazaar, in downtown Rawalpindi.

Q: Rawalpindi.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: International rules of the Geneva Convention oblige the host country to defend an embassy under any conditions.

KHAN: It certainly does, sir. You are right; it certainly does, but they did not. Just one army helicopter came and flew over and probably saw what the damage had been done. In the process, three Americans were killed; three Pakistanis were killed---three Pakistani employees; remember three American employees. I think about as many in the crowd. So
the casualties were nine I remember. The whole embassy was burnt and the remaining people---

Well, I was in there in the crowd, trying to go round and probably trying to stop them. There comes an intelligence guy and he catches hold of me by my neck. He says, “If you want to save your life, run away from here. Otherwise, you are going to be lynched because the agencies know who you are.” I said, “No. I will not leave. I don’t want to hear tomorrow that all of my colleagues were trapped inside the building, Pakistani and Americans. I can do something for them while I am outside.” The ambassador at that time was at the Foreign Office, trying to fight. While he was doing that I was doing on the ground, whatever little I could. Anyway, I stayed on. I couldn’t care less about their agencies’ guys giving me this kind of threat.

Q: Were they threatening, or were they helping you by warning you?

KHAN: Well, in a way, yes. In a way, they threatened and were helping, too, “You know, you are going to be lynched if you don’t leave this place and all that you are doing.” So, I stayed on the inside until the crowd had dispersed with no efforts by the army or the police force. They were in that---what do you call it---a safe room?

Q: Safe Haven.

KHAN: Safe Haven in the building. They were trapped there and after things, then, I helped them, not all, but few. They came out, one by one. Mind you the entire campus, including the residential quarters of the American employees at the embassy compound, was all burnt. The interesting part is CNN or some other television station then covered live people stealing valuables from the club or the embassy and carrying a lot of liquor from the club.

Q: In Tehran, they took the embassy and stayed there. In Islamabad, they burnt the embassy and departed. Why do you think they departed?

KHAN: Because it was very late in the evening; it was cold. If I am not wrong, it was the month of November and it started getting dark.

Q: So, their work was done.

KHAN: As far as they were concerned. It was a mob; it was a crowd. They thought they had done their job. Of course, they had done their job. They didn’t know there was a safe haven. They thought that everyone in the building would have been burnt. Of these three Americans who were killed, two were by gunshot and one got burnt in the apartment, in his residential apartment. The three Pakistanis were burnt inside the building. One of them was my very good colleague.

Q: So, the whole building was burnt---
KHAN: Absolutely. Totally gutted.

Q: ---and people who were in the path of the fire perished.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Well (sighs)---

KHAN: No, this is one tragic incident of my service with the embassy which has deep scars inside my body. It will remain as alive and fresh in my mind as---

Q: You are convinced that these people who attacked the embassy were egged on by false information?

KHAN: Exactly. And then, the Palestinian and the Iranian students---do you know what I witnessed---they were carrying the first aid stuff with them to help their students who were falling in case they had some problem.

Q: So they expected---?

KHAN: I saw with my own eyes. Yes, Sir.

Q: They expected that---

KHAN: that that was going to happen. They were so well-organized. This was in my report which I gave to the Embassy.

Q: So, what did-- the embassy shut down.

KHAN: It shut down; then, Zia-ul-Haq announced that he was very sorry about it. Then as per the agreement which you mentioned, the Geneva Convention, a huge amount of compensation money was given for the rebuilding of the embassy and the rehabilitation of the building. I think it was a huge amount of money that the government of Pakistan had to pay. We then moved in.

Q: You believe that he---well, he sent no police or militia to protect the embassy; he was on his bicycle.

KHAN: Bicycle riding in the Raja Bazaar in Rawalpindi.

Q: It seems that he was perfectly satisfied that this should take place.

KHAN: Yes. I wouldn’t say ‘perfectly satisfied’. I think he just let it go, deliberately.

Q: Ignored it.
KHAN: Ignored it.

*Q:* Ignored it deliberately.

KHAN: Yes.

*Q:* Ok. Yet he recognized his obligations under international treaty---

*KHAN:* That was at a later stage. Yes.

*Q:* ---to pay compensation.

KHAN: Yes.

*Q:* When did the embassy begin to function again?

KHAN: It took a couple of years. We moved into the USAID building. We had some space located there. Initially for a few months, we worked at the American diplomats’ residences; we would go there and work there. Those were very difficult times for us; they were very difficult times for our American colleagues.

One thing in which I can take pride is that I used to entertain each and every colleague, American colleague, in my house, to give them all kinds of assurance that no harm will come to them. I very well recall that the families were evacuated after some time—though there were no such threats to them individually nor they were targeted. There was no such thing, but of course this incident had terrified them a lot. I personally was always under the threat that anytime I may be picked up by the agencies and taken to an unknown place. Somehow that didn’t happen and I remained unhurt.

*Q:* This is a huge task to repair the emotional and political damage.

KHAN: Oh, yes. A lot of emotion. There was a wave of anti-Americanism. Within, I think, the next twenty-four hours, if I correctly recall, the whole thing was clear. It was not the Americans who were involved in that Mecca incident. The State Department issued a very strong statement that we are not at all involved. Also the Saudi government had said that they were the revolutionaries who had taken over the shrine in Mecca.

*Q:* Was there any reaction by the Palestinian and Iranian students of regret?

KHAN: Well, I wouldn’t know that. As a result of this tragic event, gradually the number of Iranian and Palestinian students were reduced at the university. The time came that none of the Iranian and the Palestinian students were allowed to study at _____(most likely Quaid-i-Azam) University. That was the action taken by the government. They did it gradually; eventually---

*Q:* What does this tell us about the Palestinian and Iranian communities in Pakistan?
KHAN: Actually, we have a reasonably---I wouldn’t say big---reasonably small Iranian community living in Pakistan. By this I am talking about the students who had gone to study in Pakistan on scholarships. I wouldn’t know whether they had their families over there or not. I don’t think they did. They were living in the boarding houses. They were students; not the members of the families who were living in Pakistan.

Q: On the basis of either disinformation or misinformation, they quickly turned to violence. They expressed no regret even when the three governments---American, Saudi and Pakistan governments---stated that this was a false report.

KHAN: That wouldn’t have amounted to anything, even if they had regretted it. The damage had already been done. The innocent lives had already been lost. That really didn’t matter even if they had, not that I recall they did.

Q: They were looking for a pretext to express---

KHAN: They were looking for an excuse to attack an American installation and the embassy was the closest and the nearest target.

Q: Now, the students who did this were not, in large part, Pakistani. They were---

KHAN: No, they were

Q: They were Iranian and Palestinian.

KHAN: No, no, no. There were a large number of Pakistani students whom they had incited ---I told you that.

Q: incited by those others. How did this affect the next two years while you were in the AID mission?

KHAN: It had become rather difficult for us to go about, but with the passage of time---By and large, the Pakistanis. the sensible Pakistanis, the responsible Pakistanis were very, very sorry about this incident. They really regretted it. They blamed Zia-ul-Haq for letting this happen. They said, “This situation could have been avoided.” Whomsoever I was taking my American colleagues to meet, if Pakistani, they all would, first of all, they would express their regret over what had happened. They were more on how the---I wouldn’t use the word regret---how that unfortunate incident could have been avoided if the army would have taken action well in time.

Q: You are saying it is possible to pick up the bilateral relationship after that and to proceed. to go forward, because there were a large number of sensible Pakistanis who regretted this.
KHAN: Yes.

Q: Did Zia ever express an opinion about all of this, other than paying the reparations?

KHAN: No. Of course, he expressed his regrets. The government officially sent its regrets. I think it was officially conveyed to the U.S. government, as well. Now we were getting into the era of the cold war; keep that in mind. Then there was Zia-ul-Haq’s and his comrade’s involvement. Things, however, instead of going against Zia-ul-Haq where any outside interference might have happened, any intervention would have toppled him or would have led to his being toppled, didn’t happen. Instead, it was he who started delivering. It was he who started getting aid.

Q: You are referring to the Afghanistan situation.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Yes.

KHAN: The war against the Soviets.

Q: Suddenly, because of circumstances, he became our close friend.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: He understood, or he believed, his support say against the Soviets was there.

KHAN: Oh, yes.

Q: Whether this was inspired by loyalty, good sense or opportunism is not important. The fact is he was instrumental in combating the Soviets in Afghanistan.

KHAN: Absolutely right though I think ‘opportunism’ is more appropriate.

Q: Um huh. Some people love to play the ‘what if’ game. What if the Soviets had never gone to Afghanistan? Do you play that game?

KHAN: The situation would have been entirely different. I can’t foresee what would have happened, but I think the scenario would have been entirely different.

Q: Meaning, Zia would not have lasted.

KHAN: He wouldn’t have.

Q: You have this huge event, the burning of the U.S. embassy, and within one year of that time or less, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.
KHAN: Yes.

Q: And Zia became---

KHAN: He was still there. He was there as---

Q: This is very bizarre.

KHAN: It’s very bizarre, yes.

Q: A man who permitted the burning of the U.S. diplomatic mission then became our close ally.

KHAN: Of the U.S.

Q: Within a few months afterwards. Tell me how that evolved and how you read the meaning of it. This is very strange, this sudden reversal. The big factor was the Soviet Union, I guess.

KHAN: I don’t know whether I am competent enough to make any comment on this particular question of yours. In my opinion the circumstances were such, the situation was such, that there was huge support from the American people for what was going on in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion. They got Pakistan as a natural partner in order to fight this war against the Soviets. Also, I think there was some appreciation on the part of the State Department that this was that misinformation, that disinformation, which led to this unfortunate incident. Probably they didn’t want the government to be held responsible entirely. I’m telling you that; it’s my own observation, but that’s the factual stuff also.

Q: You are saying your own observation of the behavior of the students?


Q: The president. Yes. A pretty sad episode.

KHAN: It’s very sad; I lost some of my very good friends: Pakistani colleagues, American friends. It saddens me a lot when I think and talk about this incident. As I earlier mentioned to you in my interview I can’t stand violence. I can’t see blood. This is something which is in me. This whole incident had a traumatic effect on me. This tragic incident I wanted to relate to you in all earnestness really had a lot of effect on my mind. To go through the agony and the pain afterward was also something at times unbearable. I remained under surveillance of the agencies for quite some time. I was scared all the time that some harm may come to my small daughters.

Q: Um huh.
KHAN: I would say I was lucky enough. I had some connections higher up and they thought that probably no physical harm would be done to me and my family.

Q: Thank you for putting this on the record. Now, this tragic incident led to a period of confusion and strife. The next big tragic incident, I think, was the airplane.

KHAN: That’s the second one.

Q: Tell us. You’ve gone over this a bit, but if you have anything to add about the period between 1979 with its confusion and the conflict in Afghanistan, up until the tragic loss of the---

KHAN: Zia’s government had very good rapport with the U.S. administration, and he was enjoying their full support, both militarily and economically. There wasn’t really any serious political turmoil till the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, MRD, was formed, especially in the interior of Sindh province. That eventually led to a big-time movement, we call as MRD movement against the dictatorship. That led to an election which was more of a farce, but still we had then a functional democracy. The National Assembly election had taken place.

Q: Sorry. The year? The year of the elections?

KHAN: This should be ’85. I probably would say pressure was most on the MRD stuff, which also contributed a lot. I think there must have been pressure from the U.S. to go for some kind of sham democracy or whatever. It wasn’t that bad because the person who headed the government then was known to be a man of good repute and honest.

Q: That person was?

KHAN: Mohammad Khan Junejo. Junejo is J-U-N-E-J-O. Junejo, Muhammad Khan. I have already narrated to you that this is happening. This is very interesting, too: that there were UN papers signed in Geneva on something nuclear. There was something, if you recall. I wouldn’t know, if you recall.

It was the differences which Junejo developed with Zia, because Zia didn’t want the government to do that, but they did it blah, blah, blah. Anyway, he was on a---the interesting part I want to tell you is that he was dismissed while he was on a foreign tour. He was coming and his plane was flying over Islamabad when President Zia-ul-Haq announced the dismissal of the prime minister and the assembly both. (Laughs) That’s a very interesting part: the poor prime minister was dismissed while in the air. His plane was not even allowed to land.

Q: Is this because he was cooperating with the international---?

KHAN: Because he had differed with Zia-ul-Haq. Then---
Q: Was this on his way back from?

KHAN: This must have been in ’87 or early ’88 and the new elections had not yet taken place as yet. I think the new election was in ’88 when Benazir Bhutto became the prime minister. Arnie Raphel was still the Ambassador til ’88, of course, until the 17th of August and the tragic incident when he died with Zia-ul-Haq.

Q: That was 17 August, ’88?

KHAN: ’88, yes.

Q: When the plane went down. You have commented in detail.

KHAN: Enough on that.

Q: About that. Yes. We are going back over things we have discussed before. Is there anything else you would like to add from your experience? You’ve described the whole trauma of 17 August. You remain in your career till 2003 or 2004.

KHAN: To be precise, I think, until early 2003.

Q: Just at the time of the U.S. action---

KHAN: ---the second war had started in Afghanistan, again.

Q: Time to retire.

KHAN: I thought, gracefully.

(Laughter)

Q: Because this is a subject, which we hear about all day, every day, this was the end of your working experience at the embassy. Looking at it geographically it’s not too far away. At that time did you have perceptions or did you see what was going to happen in Iraq? Was it evident to you?

KHAN: What was going to happen in Iraq?

Q: The U.S. action.

KHAN: Well, I’ll tell you. I happened to be in Washington, and I shared my thoughts with some of my American big bosses at the State Department, about how anti I was about going into Iraq. I was very clear about it and I said that it was going to take them nowhere. People like---I can mention his name---like Ambassador Mark Grossman, agree with me that it was something we should not have gone into. Maybe it was in our private conversation or whatever, but he did. You know Mark Grossman?
Q: Yes. I do. I do know him. So you had discussions with American colleagues in Washington.

KHAN: Yes, I did.

Q: Did they give the sense that this is of some historical value. It is said now by some that the war was preconceived, that the decision was made long before March.

KHAN: Long before, yes.

Q: When you spoke with American colleagues in early ’03, late ’02---

KHAN: It was probably before you were preparing. I mean before the American administration was preparing to go into war. The war had not been declared as yet. When did you go into the Iraqi war?

Q: March ’03.

KHAN: March ’03. I am probably talking about 2002.

Q: What was your sense when you spoke to Grossman and other U.S. officials? Did you feel that they had the freedom to inject their opinions into this policy, or was this driven from outside?

KHAN: Mr. Whitman, I don’t know how to do things in the State Department, as far as the official work is concerned, but I did express my serious concern, my observations and the reaction which was likely to come about as a result of the invasion. And---

Q: What reaction was that? Public strife, religious---.

KHAN: ---religious parties and the groups going against it. There was already a lot of stuff going on in Pakistan against America going into war. It was a big-time pressure on Musharraf’s government not to be a partner of the U.S. in the Iraq war. If you recall, the Pakistani government had declined to send its troops to Iraq, because there was a lot of pressure within Pakistan. So, they did not. That was something.

Q: Pressure by the public and also by the media?

KHAN: Of course, by the public. No, no. By the public and by the media. “Don’t do it! Don’t be a part of America for invading a Muslim country. That was the thing. I think if Zia had sent troops, there would have been very serious consequences. A great uproar, and whatever, in Pakistan.

Q: Musharraf had many issues to deal with. There was Afghanistan, which was at war and still is. It is said that Pakistan has a tremendous influence over what happens in
Afghanistan, but perhaps less so in Iraq. Musharraf had to be in the middle, balancing between pressures to assist the coalition in Afghanistan, pressures from the U.S. government to assist him in Iraq, and pressures from his own public to just stay out of the whole thing.

KHAN: Yes. I---

Q: In retrospect, this is very difficult. It seems as if everything in Pakistani history is either tragic or very difficult. Can you evaluate Musharraf’s behavior at that time? Is it too early to give historic judgment?

KHAN: I think, probably it is a little too early.

Q: Yes.

KHAN: It’s too early.

Q: Yes.

KHAN: But overall, I think his not sending his troops to Iraq was a kind of welcome and smart decision, on his part.

Q: Did it create antagonism with the U.S. administration?

KHAN: Not really.

Q: No.

KHAN: The reason is that America was all determined to have this sport and just go for the invasion.

Q: The things that have happened in Iraq, is this what you foresaw? You were advising---

KHAN: To quite some extent, I would say that. To quite some extent.

Q: Yes. Now, Mark Grossman listened to you. Did others? Did others appear to react? Were they grateful for your observations?

KHAN: Well, they were very appreciative that I was being very candid, very honest, very straight about my opinion. This probably is not going to help the U.S. for going for these so-called weapons of mass destruction.

Q: Now this was when Mark Grossman was deputy secretary---

KHAN: Yes. Yes.
Q: ---Undersecretary for Political Affairs.

KHAN: Political Affairs, yes, yes.

Q: Then the other people you saw were people in the South Asia Bureau.

KHAN: The South Asian Bureau and others, like my American friends who had served in Islamabad, and those with a think tank like Tezi Schaffer and Howard Schaffer and also like Professor---

Q: We’ll bring it in later.

KHAN: Yes. Also a think tank and a list at the State Department.

Q: What was the occasion of your visit? Had you come in order to---

KHAN: No, actually. Actually I would come more or less on my own, but the embassy would always send my schedule to the State Department and would strongly recommend that I should go and meet people at the bureau. Of course, I had a number of friends at that time to meet. So whomsoever I would call, I would never have a problem for them having me over for a meal or whatever or a meeting.

Q: Then, at this point, as Shakespeare would say, “Exit stage left.” This coincided with the end of your employment, certainly not with the end of your observations.

KHAN: Yes.

Q: Now, you’ve been retired for four years.

KHAN: Yes. You know, after my retirement, as I had earlier mentioned, I continued to have rapport with the embassy because Nancy Powell had come as the ambassador. She was a very good friend of mine, and still is, I think. So I continued in my humble capacity to contribute my part to keep the ambassador well-abreast about the events. Incidentally, again, when Nancy was there, the prime minister of Pakistan was Zafarullah Khan Jamali. I had introduced her to him when she was a First Secretary. So that’s what history is.

Q: It seems there’s an extraordinary number of Americans going more than once to Pakistan. Let us say, the ambassadors you dealt with how many of them had previous experience---

KHAN: Yes, quite a number of them, like Nancy, like Ada Bankton (sp?), Jerry Feierstein

Q: ---Arnie---
KHAN: Arnie Raphel, of course, God bless his soul. I think a few others, but in the senior positions, these were the people who came for the second time.

Q: It seems there was something in the State Department which inspired an affection for Pakistan. If you went once, you might want to go for a second time.

KHAN: Yes, I think that this was something very good. Most of the diplomats who served in a senior position had developed an affection for Pakistan. They wanted to come back again and serve.

Q: Mr. Khan, you maintained an informal contact with Ambassador Nancy Powell.

KHAN: For a good three years. She got the best out of me those three years of her tour to Pakistan—probably less than three—I continued to contribute in my personal capacity.

Q: So, did you see her regularly once a week?

KHAN: Yes. Once in a week, almost every second, or sometimes once in a week I’d have her over to my house for a lunch or I’d go to the residence for a meal. She ensured that, at every important section visitors’ reception held at the residence, I was invited there. That was something good. Later on, the Crocker guy (Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker) did not maintain it, so I said that was fine with me. I am not the imposing type anyway.

Q: Do you have any comment about Ryan Crocker, since he has become the---

KHAN: No, I think I will keep my mouth shut on that, because---since---I met him a few times socially, but I wouldn’t say that I knew him well enough that I should make any comment.

Q: Well, it may be time to---

KHAN: ---break till we go to another session.

Q: That may be months from now. I would say. Might I ask you to look back over the whole experience and draw any conclusions that you might have about the comportment of U.S. diplomatic efforts in Pakistan? You have mentioned the hypocrisy of some leaders in Pakistan. You’ve mentioned opportunism as a factor that sometimes bolstered the relationship. You’ve mentioned that Pakistan—a motif seems to be the sense that the U.S. will let you down when it’s convenient to do so.

KHAN: Yes. I said that kept on happening right from 1960-1965 wars to----I mean the Americans didn’t support Pakistan in 1965 war, though Field Marshall Juhan was a very good friend of the U.S. The U.S. was not in favor of Pakistan going to war with India. Then it happened in the ‘70-‘71 war and then again in the two Afghan wars. People feel disillusioned about it (U.S. support) and there is a perception that whenever American wants to use Pakistani soil for their own purposes, for their own good reasons, they
always find it very easy to have the Pakistani government play as their immediate partners.

Q: Let me finalize this.

KHAN: Go ahead.

Q: I’ll give you two questions, but I want to give you a minute to think about them. The first question for me would be what advice you might have for Americans serving in Pakistan and Americans making U.S. policy towards Pakistan. The second question would be: you are a single individual of great perception and great dedication, but you were also an observer of historical events much larger than yourself. Looking back, what do you feel that you were able to accomplish? Would you be willing to address either of these two questions: advice for Americans and your own feeling of what you accomplished?

KHAN: They are two different questions. I don’t know how fair I would be, but I shall try to be as fair as I possibly can be in my summation to you.

As far as my personal accomplishment is concerned, I would be dishonest if I say that I was not enjoying the position which I had. The reasons being, one, there was job satisfaction; two, there always was a huge amount of appreciation for my work. Three, this position, though initially I’d contributed quite a bit *vis-a-vis* establishing or helping establish the American diplomats’ contacts with the then-government and the opposition leadership, also helped me enjoy a particular status socially, because I never was considered to be one of those ordinary people. And four, the one thing that I can take pride in was that I kept myself out of any controversy despite this very sensitive position, even sometimes being called a CIA agent. Had there been anything, something otherwise, either the agencies would have gotten me killed or would have done irreparable harm.

Q: The Pakistani agencies?

KHAN: Yes. Because it was a position like that, you know. I maintained myself as an honorable man, as a respectable person without getting into any dirty silly stuff. The parties which I would hold at my house were known, because of the participation of the American diplomats, including American ambassadors, and the elite coming from the government and opposition.

I remember one Federal Minister gentleman, Mujeev Mullek (sp?), once had said, (some analysts had come from the State Department and he was telling the chief that came there) “There’s Aman who could do that.” Eleven cabinet ministers were present at that dinner at my house that evening. So, that was an achievement, I would say. That, of course, gave me a lot of satisfaction that I was doing something. Maybe I was not required to go to that level, but I think eventually they started expecting that I should be keeping that level. This was the high level that would provide them a good platform, a
good opportunity to come and meet the top people they were interested in meeting. That really did happen.

Q: Remarkable. Now, if you had the U.S. policy team here in the room looking at future U.S. policy with Pakistan, what might you tell them?

KHAN: Yes. No. I would like to make a very frank and candid comment on that and that is that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship should be based more on a concrete basis with very clear understanding. It should not be the U.S. always or that Pakistan should be blamed in their head. The U.S. administration should take into account the psyche of the Pakistani people, the canvas of Pakistani society. I am sure the Americans are not so naïve that---this is the kind of thing which they should take into account in order to frame the future policies towards Pakistan, which should be based on a mutual benefit and an understanding. They should try and make an effort to dispel certain impressions which are prevalent in Pakistani society about the U.S. role in different times of our checkered history of sixty years now.

We started very well in the ’50s with that shake of hands of the U.S. and Pakistanis all over the country. The aid was coming in and so. Then, in between, so many events have taken place. There have been so many---I mean so much mistrust or whatever---there have been events--- there have been so much mistrust and distrust about each other. I personally think that---I can only say about the U.S. that the U.S. administration should make sincere and serious efforts to remove some of the misgivings which Pakistanis have about the U.S. policies. I still think that the Americans are the kind of people who people don’t---I wouldn’t say that people hate them. No. No! I can say that very loudly, but people dislike and resent some of their policies. There isn’t any such thing in my career, or until now unless things have changed that the Americans are targeted as such.

Q: And I’ll ask one---another final question---

KHAN: Sir.

Q: ---and it is a very unfair one. Any predictions about bi-lateral relations, U.S. – Pakistan? While I ask the question, I say that it is an unfair one, but if you would be willing to predict.

KHAN: You know, since by nature I am an optimist, I wouldn’t like to predict something which eventually is going to go against Pakistan. I certainly would say that the U.S. should continue its serious and sincere efforts to bring democracy in the country and to help strengthen the democratic institutions, which, I think, are essential for the healthy economic and political growth of Pakistani society.

Q: Mr. Khan, thank you for your remarkable perceptions and your generosity in sharing them with us.
KHAN: Thank you very much, Sir. Thank you for spending some precious time. Thank you, Sir.

*End of Interview*