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Interviewed by: Mark Rincon and Reagan Ashley
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Vassar College; University of Madrid, Spain
Harvard Graduate School of Education

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Mexico City, Mexico—Spouse of Foreign Service Officer; Teacher	1972–1975
Washington, D.C.—Spouse of Foreign Service Officer	1975–1976
Entered the Foreign Service	**1976**
Washington, D.C.—Office of the Director General, Policy Coordination Team	1976–1979
Rome, Italy—Assistant Environment, Science & Technology Attaché/ Visa Officer	1979–1981
New York City, NY—USIA International Visitors Programming Office	1981–1983
Washington, D.C.—Uruguay-Paraguay Desk Officer	1983–1986
Caracas, Venezuela—Administrative Officer/Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer	1986–1989
Washington, D.C.—Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science (OES)	1989–1993
Washington D.C.—Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)	1993–1994
Copenhagen, Denmark—Regional Environment, Science, and Technology Officer	1994–1997
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INTERVIEW

Q: We have the platform to ourselves. I think we're recording now.

KINNEY: Discussing the difference between the Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel systems: The ADAR Report (American Diplomacy at Risk) published by the American Academy of Diplomacy contains a good chart that compares and contrasts the two systems. The chart, in a very succinct and empirical way, helps the uninitiated understand how dramatically different the two systems are. What the chart does not convey is that the Foreign Service system was fundamentally based, starting with the FS

Act of 1946, on the Navy personnel system. The Civil Service system, which goes back, I believe to a circa 1950s reform, was not deliberately modeled on but certainly reflected what everybody knew at the time in terms of organizational hierarchy and functioning, and that was the factory floor. And so that's one reason that the Civil Service is basically focused on narrow, occupational skill categories and narrow, technical, specialization and the Foreign Service, which is an Officer Corps, was focused on the career intake and long term pipeline of talent to be apprenticed, developed, educated, trained, experienced over time to be able to then lead (in the case of the military, wear stars), when needed. So the concepts behind the two systems are radically different.

Q: I see. That's very helpful.

KINNEY: The controls and the evaluation approaches are night and day. In the Foreign Service, you're promoted for potential to serve credibly at the next level. It's rank- in-person and not in job. In the Civil Service, you don't get the rank until you get the job. And the job getting has become unbelievably arcane, corrupted, and contorted as history has accreted and times have changed, but the system hasn't. So at least when I was in the Department, and certainly by 2004 when I left, hiring was supposed to be based on " free competition" to find the best, but, in fact, most jobs in the Civil Service were pre-selected. And then you wrote the job description, and the people gave you a resume, including the four freckles on the left hand cheek and five spikes of gray hair, to make sure that the right person qualified and got onto the short list.

Q: That's right. It's a whole system in and of itself.

KINNEY: Well, it's a system, but it's also a process, and then more importantly, it comes down to a reality of current practice, good, bad, ill,or indifferent, but that's the way it works. And so I was interested that you excerpted my anecdote about tensions between the two Services at State. I had totally forgotten about Pat Miller and that experience that I had when I was the Executive Director for OES-DRL. I was quite amused when I read it, but I was also very interested in the fact that you had picked up on addressing this systemic difference and therefore institutional issue. The real question is, can two such vastly different personnel systems exist productively and effectively in a modern foreign ministry? I personally don't believe they can.

I think our current Civil Service system and culture are absolutely inappropriate for any serious diplomatic service because you have to have worldwide ability and service in an international diplomatic culture based on rank, e.g. first, second, third Secretary, etc. and appropriate levels of counterpart relationships. You have to have a certain amount of discipline.

I'm not saying that the Foreign Service works perfectly. It is flawed now in other ways. But it's like trying to turn the military into a factory floor of technicians rather than accepting that there are non-coms [non-commissioned officers] and commissioned officers and those commissioned officers have a different purpose. They have a different provenance, if you will, primarily out of military academies. They speak a different language, and they respond and have a very different career experience and path than a non-commissioned specialist. Both are absolutely necessary. One is not inherently, as

human beings, better than another, but as a system for making a military work and do the nation's business and the nation's bidding in a time of urgent emergency, a rank-in-person system is probably the only system that makes sense, and I think the same is true for diplomatic service.

I would argue that in a best case scenario, the Foreign Service personnel system comes much, much closer to being the appropriate model for modern day diplomacy. If we're going to have worldwide representation and embassies and take diplomacy seriously, this requires a certain knowledge, discipline and know-how. Or, as we are doing, we can turn diplomacy into o a short-term, "pay to play" proposition for campaign donors who know absolutely nothing, care less, and spend as little time as possible on the job so that they can get the title and then go on CNN and say they were "a former senior State Department official."

You can hear from my language that I have rather pronounced opinions and views on these things. Now the stakeholders and the vested interests on both sides and the politics makes addressing the need for institutional change productively a very challenging and very difficult proposition. We tried to do it once. In my comments, I asked if you all knew what Wristonization was. Did Tom [Boyatt] talk about this at all?

Q: He did not and in fact that was going to be one thing that I wanted to point out. That's precisely while we're here. I know that your opinions are—you're not alone in those. I think you've voiced a lot of opinions for many of us that are quite similar and we would love to hear more.

KINNEY: Well here is what the State Department's historian has to say about Wristonization:

"Wristonization"

While the Department struggled with McCarthyism, it also sought to modernize its personnel practices. Postwar growth produced what one historian described as "inertia, inflexibility, and loss of efficiency in the use of personnel." Stanton Griffis, a businessman who served as ambassador to several countries, later satirized the confused situation. Overseas missions, he noted, constituted "a fantastic network of men, women, and typewriters, who report [on] political, economic, labor, and agricultural conditions." These reports then went to Washington, where they were immediately filed away. Then "the home team, having properly disposed of the information from the field, proceeds to write its own endless reports to go forward to the same ultimate fate in the embassies throughout the world."

Henry M. Wriston

The post-1945 personnel problems of the Department of State attracted the attention of a commission created to investigate all aspects of government organization after World War II, which was headed by former President Herbert Hoover. In 1949, the commission called for reforms to eliminate one important source of difficulty—the negative distinctions between Foreign Service officers and Civil Service employees who staffed the Department's headquarters in Washington. In 1954, Secretary of State Dulles asked Henry M. Wriston, the president of Brown University, to undertake a study of the Department's personnel practices. Dulles drew attention to a number of concerns, among them poor morale because of managerial shortcomings, low intake into the Foreign Service, and inequities that stemmed from variations in the treatment of different categories of employees. After examining these matters, Wriston called for the integration of many Civil Service employees into the Foreign Service, a process that took several years and was known as "Wristonization." By the end of 1957, the Foreign Service had more than doubled in size to 3,436 officers. By August 1959, 1,523 Foreign Service officers were assigned to positions in the Department in an effort to improve communications between Washington and the overseas missions and to fulfill the legal requirement that Foreign Service officers spend a portion of their careers in the United States.

AND here is how Harry Kopp, who has written a history of AFSA, describes the personnel system dilemma at State:

The burden of two very different personnel systems, and a large and growing cohort of appointees exempt from the disciplines of either, is taking a real toll on the Department of State—and the Foreign Service.

BY HARRY KOPP



Henry M. Wriston, at right, the newly inaugurated president of Brown University, was introduced by former Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, at left, at the school's alumni dinner at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., on March 15, 1937.
Harris & Ewing / Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division

The U.S. Department of State is one of the few agencies—the Department of Defense is another—with large numbers of employees in different personnel systems. The two systems, Civil Service and Foreign Service, have different employee benefits, protections, rights and obligations.

Conflicts between the systems have long been evident. From the 1940s into the 1970s, a series of commissions, committees and panels of experts urged the department to move to a single structure. The department's leadership agreed with these recommendations, but time and again found reasons to delay or avoid acting on them.

State eventually abandoned the effort to integrate the two services, but not the search for ways to strengthen a sense of teamwork and unity of purpose. The dual system, with its administrative complexities and inevitable inequities, continues to burden the department's managers.

The Roots of a Dual System

The roots of the dual system reach to the 18th century, when Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of State, created different services to perform different functions: a diplomatic service to maintain political relations with foreign powers; a consular service to protect American seamen and other citizens, and attend to American maritime interests generally; and a home or departmental service to take care of matters in the capital.

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations," said President George Washington, "is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible." In line with this doctrine, the consular service far outnumbered the diplomatic service, which far outnumbered the home service.

As late as 1900, when the United States was an emerging world power with a two-ocean navy, a colony in the Philippines and a rising global financial center in New York, there were only 41 diplomatic missions compared with 318 consular establishments (not counting some 400 more consular agencies). To oversee and support this far-flung network, filled with patronage appointments, the department had just 91 employees, including the Secretary of State.

At the turn of the 20th century, according to historian Tyler Dennet, the Department of State was "an antiquated, feeble organization, enslaved by precedents and routine … remote from the public gaze and indifferent to it." For diplomats and consuls alike, salaries were low and allowances, other than modest sums for rental of office space, essentially nonexistent.

In 1900 the U.S. had 41 diplomatic missions and 318 consular establishments—and just 91 domestic employees, including the Secretary of State.

Business and shipping interests complained that the consular service, in particular, served them poorly. Wilbur Carr, then head of the department's consular bureau, began working with Representative John Rogers of Massachusetts in 1919 to produce a bill to "amalgamate" and professionalize the consular and diplomatic services.

The Foreign Service Act of 1924, generally known as the Rogers Act, passed after three years of debate, combining the two services into a single Foreign Service of the United States, with entry by competitive examination, promotion by merit, mandatory retirement, a pension system and other features that remain in place today.

Personnel Structure Under the Rogers Act

The personnel structure of the Foreign Service as conceived in the 1924 Act was a flow-through system, bringing new members in at the bottom and moving them through ranks that emptied with promotions or retirements, by reason of age or time in grade. The system was rotational, with members expected to move periodically from station to station. Officers in the Foreign Service would compete against each other, with the top performers advancing and the worst performers facing possible dismissal.

By contrast, the Civil Service system, introduced to the Department of State in the early 20th century through a series of executive orders, was static. Members did not necessarily enter at the bottom, and they advanced in grade only by moving to more highly

rated—more challenging and more responsible—positions. They had a high degree of job security and were not expected to move periodically from one assignment to another.

The principal difference, however, was that members of the Foreign Service expected to spend roughly 90 percent of their time overseas. Members of the Civil Service, with a few exceptions, worked only in the United States.

The exceptions were outside the State Department. Congress established a Foreign Commerce Service in the Commerce Department (1927-1939) and a Foreign Agricultural Service in the Department of Agriculture (1930-1939), and provided overseas postings for employees of the Interior Department's Bureau of Mines (1935-1943). Employees of all three agencies remained in the Civil Service when sent abroad. When austerity and war later shut both organizations down, their members were reassigned to the Department of State and welcomed into the Foreign Service. Congress revived the FAS in 1954 and the FCS in 1980, and both services adopted the Foreign Service system after passage of the Foreign Service Act of 1980.

Broken by War

World War II broke the Foreign Service, as it broke so many institutions. Recruitment was halted to avoid interference with the military draft, leading the increasingly short-handed department to implore its senior officers to stay on the job as long as possible. Under the Rogers Act, the percentage of officers in each of the top six (of nine) ranks was strictly limited: no more than 6 percent, for example, could be in Class 1, the highest rank, and no more than 14 percent in Class 6. The percentage caps, lifted finally in 1945, effectively blocked promotions. As officers grew frustrated, many resigned to join the armed forces.

In 1941 Congress addressed the shortage by authorizing the department to form a Foreign Service Auxiliary of people hired outside the examination process, to serve for the duration of the war. Auxiliary personnel were paid according to their civilian experience and sometimes outearned regular Foreign Service officers doing similar work. Many had skills in economics and finance that regular FSOs often disparaged as technical or "specialized."

By 1943 planning for a postwar world was already underway. The department's top administrative official, a career member of the Foreign Service named G. Howland Shaw, saw a need to retain the skills that the Auxiliary had brought into the service. Regular career FSOs feared that an influx of Auxiliary personnel into the career would inhibit their own advancement. A December 1943 *Foreign Service Journal* editorial defended the "versatility and adaptability" of the "trained Foreign Service officer" who is "better fitted to handle the coming postwar duties than any group of specialists or technicians recruited from civil life."

But the hiring freeze in the career service had made that thinking irrelevant. In January 1946, the 976 officers in the Auxiliary outnumbered the 820 officers of the regular career corps. Under the Manpower Act of 1946, the department held examinations that brought 360 new officers into the career service at all but the most senior grades. The new

officers came from the Auxiliary, the military and the Civil Service, or had been clerks and vice consuls in the non-career Foreign Service.

Despite repeated calls to move to a unitary personnel structure, like most other federal agencies, the State Department has refused to act.

A July 1945 *Washington Post* editorial called for "a complete overhaul and radical expansion of the State Department," including "democratization of the Foreign Service." The Bureau of the Budget urged Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to place the department's Foreign Service and Civil Service employees in a single system. Foreign Service personnel, said the BOB, would benefit from more time in the department, and Civil Service personnel would gain from tours abroad.

The bureau also recommended recruitment and hiring into the middle and upper grades of the Foreign Service, to break down its closed, elite structure. It argued, as well, for more attention to building leadership, supervisory and administrative skills through systematic training for all of the department's employees.

Seldin Chapin and the 1946 Act

Seldin Chapin, head of the department's Office of Foreign Service (a position roughly equivalent to today's director general of the Foreign Service), led a study group that proposed a 10-year transition to a consolidated service whose members would all serve at home and abroad. But consolidation, even over a decade, would surely have met resistance from the career Foreign Service, and likely from the home service as well.

State management did not want to deal with such friction, and turned aside Chapin's recommendation. Instead, it directed him to work on legislation to preserve a separate Foreign Service.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946 evolved from Chapin's efforts. It created a service that included an officer corps, a staff officer corps (providing a career for the non-career clerks) and a reserve. Reserve officers held commissions for up to five years and were often chosen for their specialized skills and knowledge.

Staff, reserve and regular officers were all on the same pay scale and received similar benefits. The foreign and home services remained separate, but members of the home service, the staff officer corps and the reserve corps with at least four years of experience (or three years for those over the age of 31) could seek lateral entry into any but the highest level of the Foreign Service.

Chapin, a career FSO, was a graduate of the Naval Academy. His legislative draft introduced several features of the Navy's personnel system to the Foreign Service, notably "promotion up or selection out"—mandatory retirement of regular (but not staff or reserve) officers repeatedly passed over for promotion or repeatedly ranked at the bottom of their class.

The 1946 Foreign Service Act created a service of great flexibility, able (at least on paper) to add and subtract personnel as needs changed. But the legislation left untouched

the managerial complexity of a Department of State with two personnel systems, and failed to provide overseas exposure for the home service or Washington assignments for the Foreign Service. Its passage turned out to be just the beginning, not the end, of a long period of organizational flux and debate.

Curing a "Cancerous Cleavage": Hoover to Wriston

A series of blue-ribbon panels, beginning with the Hoover Commission of 1947-1949 (chaired by former President Herbert Hoover) urged the department to restructure itself. Citing "a cancerous cleavage" between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service in the department, the commission's recommended solution was clear: "The personnel in the permanent State Department establishment in Washington and the personnel of the Foreign Service above certain levels should be amalgamated over a short period of years into a *single* foreign affairs service *obligated* to serve at home or overseas and constituting a safeguarded career group administered separately from the general Civil Service" [emphasis in original].

Dean Acheson, the former Under Secretary and future Secretary of State, was a member of the commission and "heartily concurred" with this view. But when he became Secretary of State in 1949, he fudged by appointing New Deal lawyer James H. Rowe to head a new commission to study the report of the old one. Rowe's report reached his desk in 1951 with another recommendation for merging the Civil and Foreign Services. It cited a survey that found that 81 percent of the department's civil servants and 59 percent of its Foreign Service officers supported an integrated service—albeit with caveats. Members of the home service wanted assurances they would not be penalized if they chose not to go abroad; FSOs feared loss of pension and retirement benefits and worried about a decline in standards.

Secretary Acheson was even more reluctant to act in 1951 than he had been in 1949. Senator Joseph McCarthy's witch hunt was in full cry, and the department was in turmoil. Acheson (referring to himself in the third person) later wrote: "It would seem understandable that the Secretary regarded a far-reaching and basic reorganization of the status of every person in the Department [of State] as General Grant might have regarded a similar proposal for the Army of the Potomac between the Wilderness and Appomattox." So, as had happened under Secretary Byrnes, the moment for uniting the services passed again.

For all its virtues, the Foreign Service Act of 1946 did not address key organizational problems.

President Dwight Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had far fewer qualms about disrupting the department. In 1954 he appointed a committee of eight under Chairman Henry Wriston, president of Brown University, to review past reports and recommend action that would be swift and decisive. Just five months after the committee's first meeting, its work was done, and Secretary Dulles accepted its main recommendations.

The Wriston Committee called for the integration of the Foreign Service and the home service "where their functions and responsibilities converge." Implementation would entail making some 1,450 home-service positions in Washington available to members of the Foreign Service, and admitting a like number of home officers from the Civil Service to the Foreign Service, along with a large number of new recruits. The Foreign Service officer corps was to grow from around 1,300 to nearly 4,000. Congress passed the necessary legislation in August 1954, and enacted related reforms the following April.

Although in surveys FSOs claimed to favor integration of the Civil and Foreign Services, in practice many objected to bringing in new officers at any but the lowest grades. And many considered members of the Civil Service unworthy of joining their ranks.

The country's most famous Foreign Service officer, George F. Kennan, certainly held that view. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in high patrician style, Kennan, then on extended leave from the department, referred to himself as "an antiquated spirit" who would prefer "25 really superior officers to 2,500 mediocre ones." He dismissed the Wriston Report as "a pamphlet."

Last Gasp of the Single-Service Impulse

Wristonization, as the process was soon universally known within State, was completed in just four years' time, but few found the result satisfactory. The incoming Kennedy administration found a State Department that still contained two personnel systems. An outside committee on foreign affairs personnel under former Secretary of State Christian Herter produced a report that Secretary Dean Rusk approvingly sent to the president. "Especially welcome," he wrote, "is the proposal for a single foreign affairs personnel system, instead of the dual Foreign Service and Civil Service system with which we now work."

Secretary Rusk's top management official, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration Bill Crockett, followed his chief's lead. Crockett, a lateral entry into the Foreign Service, was tireless and optimistic. "I was the Foreign Service's Don Quixote," he later said in an oral history interview. "I saw windmills to combat, and I never contemplated failure. I was naïve or inordinately optimistic about what we could accomplish."

Crockett enlisted the support of Representative Wayne Hays, D-Ohio, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In 1965 Hays produced a bill that would have placed nearly all employees in State, the Agency for International Development and the U.S. Information Agency in a unitary Foreign Service. The bill would have added to the regular, staff and reserve officers a new category, foreign affairs officers, comprising professionals who would serve primarily, but not exclusively, in the United States.

His bill passed the House but died in committee in the Senate. Hays blamed Senator Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations and a former FSO. Pell, said Hays, "didn't like the selecting-out thing." Crockett blamed the often-reported animosity between Senate Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., and his erratic House counterpart. Whatever the reasons, the legislative path to integration had reached its end.

William Macomber, a political appointee, took Bill Crockett's job as State's under secretary for management in 1969. Nominally a Republican, he had already been Kennedy's ambassador to Jordan and had served as Dean Rusk's assistant secretary for legislative affairs in the late 1960s.

Macomber used administrative measures to create a new Foreign Service personnel category, the foreign affairs specialist, to which members of the Civil Service and the Foreign Service staff corps could convert. The FAS corps was a hybrid, taking rank-in-person, selection-out and mandatory retirement from the Foreign Service system, but without a requirement for worldwide availability. Foreign affairs specialists were expected to serve primarily in the United States.

The FAS program was short-lived. Federal courts accepted the position of the American Federation of Government Employees that the program had no basis in law and shut it down in 1973. Still, it had been popular. Hundreds of civil servants, especially in the U.S. Information Agency, had converted to FAS before the court decision, and many, including the head of AFGE's USIA local, chose to remain foreign affairs specialists to the end of their careers.

The FAS corps was effectively the last time the single-service impulse took tangible form in the Department of State. (The *National Performance Review*, a study prepared in 1993 under the leadership of Vice President Al Gore, urged USAID to bring its Civil Service and Foreign Service employees into a single personnel system modeled on the Central Intelligence Agency, but that idea was not pursued.) In 1975, Foreign Service Director General Carol Laise told Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the drive toward a single-system model had failed and should be abandoned. Soon after, yet another blue-ribbon commission, this one convoked by Congress and headed by retired Ambassador Robert Murphy, came down in favor of a dual-service system, a position endorsed by Deputy Under Secretary for Management Larry Eagleburger.

Vive la Difference

When the Carter administration and Congress wrote the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and the Foreign Service Act of 1980, a merger of the two systems was never seriously discussed. (Creation of a single senior service, instead of the separate Senior Foreign Service and Senior Executive Service that emerged, was briefly under consideration, however.)

The American Foreign Service Association had favored a single-service system in the 1950s, but after the reformers known as the Young Turks took control in 1968, AFSA argued in favor of a "clear division" between the home (Civil Service) and Foreign Service. AFSA praised the Foreign Service Act of 1980 for its "reaffirmation of the distinction between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service." (The distinction was blurred for the director general of the Foreign Service, who under the legislation became responsible for all of the department's human resources, including its Civil Service employees, but had little to do with Foreign Service personnel in agencies other than State.)

The years since passage of the 1980 Act have not been kind to the position of the Foreign Service within the Department of State. In 1988, the department had 9,232 full-time employees in the Foreign Service and 4,677 in the Civil Service, a ratio of 2 to 1. By 1998, the department had cut its Foreign Service staff by 16 percent, to 7,724. The number of civil servants, however, had increased by more than 6 percent, to 4,977, so the ratio had fallen to 1.6 to 1.

Wristonization was completed in just four years, but few found the result satisfactory.

To repair the damage to the Foreign Service, Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Hillary Rodham Clinton undertook programs—the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative and Diplomacy 3.0, respectively—that secured congressional support for increased funding and additional positions for Foreign Service and Civil Service employees in the Department of State. Under these programs, the Foreign Service grew more rapidly than the Civil Service, but overall personnel data tell a different story. By 2009, State employed 12,018 members of the Foreign Service and 9,487 members of the Civil Service, a ratio of just 1.3 to 1.

Throughout this period, the emphasis that AFSA and other foreign affairs organizations placed on the unique characteristics of the Foreign Service clashed repeatedly with the emphasis of the department's leadership on teamwork and unity of purpose. AFSA and other organizations were quick to criticize Secretary Powell when he changed the annual Foreign Service Day celebration to a more inclusive Foreign Affairs Day in 2001 and renamed the Foreign Service Lounge the Employee Service Center.

More seriously, AFSA fought a long and litigious campaign to block certain high-profile assignments of Civil Service employees to Foreign Service positions overseas, and to inhibit such assignments generally. These and other efforts to defend the distinction of the Foreign Service did not reverse the Service's diminishing prominence in the Department of State and in the conduct of the country's foreign relations. Nor did such efforts sit well with the department's management, which tried under successive secretaries to make (in Secretary John Kerry's words) "each component of our workforce … work together as one cohesive and vibrant team."

The Foreign Service Act of 1980 is now 34 years old, the age of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 when it was replaced. The drafters of the 1980 legislation had no great admiration for the dual-service system, but like Secretaries Byrnes, Acheson and Rusk, they concluded that keeping it was preferable to attempting change.

With two very different personnel systems—not to mention a large and growing cohort of appointees exempt from the disciplines of either—the Department of State lacks the cohesion and vibrancy Sec. Kerry has called for. The department's managers, its Foreign Service and Civil Service employees, and its congressional committees of jurisdiction should start now to look for ways to harmonize the systems, with renewed dedication to merit principles, equal opportunity, and a fair balance of rights and obligations. Only fundamental change can give the Secretary what he wants and deserves.

Harry Kopp, a former FSO and international trade consultant, was deputy assistant secretary of State for international trade policy in the Carter and Reagan administrations; his foreign assignments included Warsaw and Brasilia. He is the author of Commercial Diplomacy and the National Interest *(Academy of Diplomacy, 2004) and the co-author of* Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the U.S. Foreign Service *(Georgetown University Press, 2011). He is now writing a history of the American Foreign Service Association, and some of the material in this article will appear in different form in that work.*

KINNEY: So here we are again, deeply in need of renovating and modernizing the Department of State and its Foreign Service to meet the challenges of the future, but 1) with little understanding of our past, 2) great uncertainty about that future, 3) and little or no definition of the mission and requirements of modern diplomatic service and we to navigate forward into that future. But looking at and understanding how we have gotten here would seem to be helpful in thinking about what we will need in 2030 and how that may differ from what we thought we needed in 1980.

Q: I guess officially for the recording, I will say it's June 30, 2020. We're joined by Stephanie Kinney, who has extensive experience in the State Department and has an oral history with ADST. We're looking at, in particular, the prospect of an effort to examine and maybe reform and modernize the Foreign Service. e. And I know that's happened before, or at least been attempted before, but you brought up some really interesting and valid points in your comments to us and we'd love to hear more—have the gaps filled, so to speak. I'm happy to turn it over to you in whatever way you want to lead the discussion.

KINNEY: Well, let me just start by saying that history matters. It makes us who we are, no matter who we are, and therefore the history of the Foreign Service institutionally and in terms of institutional reform are not without importance. Memories, particularly with people living so long, endure and they get, on one hand, forgotten and not passed on to a younger generation and therefore you risk not learning the lessons and not benefiting from the knowledge of the past. On the other hand, some memories get remembered too much, and they become obstacles to change because of people's vested interest, vested narratives, and inevitably looking back rather than facing reality and looking forward.

So in the case of the Foreign Service—certainly Harry Kopp's history of AFSA, Voice of the Foreign Service, will give you a more scholarly and, if you will, empirical read of Wristonization than I can, It happened before I came on board, but when I came in, in the mid '70s, there were a number of things that I heard constantly as a Junior Officer. One was Wristonization (usually in the negative); another was “Admin Officers” s (and that usually had a sneer with it); another was “, grand strategy” (which is no longer even permitted as a concept, much less a topic of lunch conversation, which is what it was when I came in), “power”(I presume we can't talk about it anymore now because it's not evenly distributed.), and “class” (because particularly in a Eurocentric historical moment,

you could not do diplomacy and policy and history in Europe without an awareness of, and an ability to manage “class” given that it was still explicitly central to many European cultures. In contrast, the US tradition (until recently) has been to deny its existence in favor of the myth that “We are all Middle Class.”)

My sense is that the America I grew up in was more egalitarian than now and that we kept “class” a deep, dark secret, by basically covering it up or distracting with color and racial divides. It's coming out now more and more, and particularly among the younger generation. I noticed this among many of the African American employees that I had even before I left in 2004, that they weren't aware of the concept of class because more often than not, things were interpreted in terms of color. And yet class can be overcome to a significant degree because many of the markings and indicators of “class” can be taught.

In 1971, when my husband entered the Service, FSI essentially had the old Wives Course to teach young American middle class wives new to diplomacy the dress, protocol, dining formalities and etiquettes and expected social behavior and conventions that governed international diplomacy then and to some degree still do today. It's not a given that “class” is immutable, at least in America. It may be a little more difficult if you don't have the Oxbridge accent in England today, but even people in England have learned to quote unquote "pass" from one class to another. Today, observations about “class” are not politically correct, perhaps because to do so acknowledges the role it still plays. Most people know that “class” can be learned, although it cannot always be “bought.”

In the mid-70’s when reform was in the air, the1971 suicide of Charlie Thomas was still a frequent subject of buzz and gossip and discussion, in part because his wife Cynthia, was not letting it go of the personnel issue (confused files leading to selection out) and, of course, Viet Nam created many issues within State. When Carter was elected, he brought in what were called the "Baby Eight". They were eight Foreign Service officers—I think it was actually six Foreign Service officers—who had resigned over Vietnam only to come back with the Carter administration as Assistant Secretaries. And if you don't think that rankled! And one of them, not surprisingly, was Dick Holbrooke, another was Tony Lake and another, Dick Moose.

So I came in in 1976 with the election of Carter, whose administration was stood up in '77. It was also the time at which the "Young Turks" had taken over and AFSA [American Foreign Service Association] was feeling its oats; people had a vision from within the Foreign Service of what they wanted. They knew the history, whether it was the Rogers Act in '24 or the Foreign Service Act of 1946. These Acts had been driven, if not written, by the active Officers themselves. The reform that was codified by Congress had always been formulated at the Department of State, and that is a huge difference with today when there appears to be little or no Active Duty involvement or activism on behalf of the future of the Foreign Service.

The State Department's history is full of reports, most of which get ignored, but every now and then Commissions or reports have made a difference. The Murphy Commission for example, was tremendously important. It led to the Mcomber Reforms in the very late '60s, early '70s. Given the sociology of the Department and human nature, you can

imagine how memories of Wristonization with its action by fiat still loomed large in the Foreign Service imagination, given its consequences. FSOs did not regard that reform with sweetness and light, and the divisive resentment was most expressed among policy officers vs. Admin Officers.

It took a long time for Administrative Officers (Admin Officers) to become Management Officers. And that may be within your memory, I don't know. It happened around the year 2000 with Powell, in part, because by that time, Pat Kennedy and Dick Shinnick and, um, Bill Eaton and quite a number of other strong Officers—Andrew Winter—had had it up to here with the policy officers and anti-admin attitudes. As Dick once said to me in 1979 in Rome, "Ya hired us to iron your pants, and we're gonna end up wearin' 'em!" Because his generation did understand about the inextricable relationship between institutional resources—both financial and human—and policy. If the institutional infrastructure is weak, there is no way you can have a strong policy impact and institution.

Wriston essentially forced a marriage between Civil Service and Foreign Service. There was something called FSRs (Foreign Service Reserves). And for a while, the net result was that all of the Civil Servants became Foreign Service officers, but with an "R" and they were supposed to spend some time overseas, but they would be primarily domestic. And that just turned out to be a theory that had never been applied to human nature and American political appointee short-term leadership.

There are two very famous cases of officers who rose to the absolute highest ranks, Joe Sisco in the Middle East and Hal Sonnenfeld doing Europe with Kissinger, whose great pride was that they were Foreign Service Officers, but they'd never served overseas. And it was because they had come across as part of that effort to make a single personnel system. However, because there was no follow-up or enforcement, because there was no persistent implementation of the new rules, those who stayed in place were able to create the bureaucratic power base to eventually get control. And if you stay in one place long enough, you have a decided advantage over those who move around.

So the word Wristonization is probably unknown to most of the younger generation today, but the resentments on both sides of Civil and Foreign Services have a long standing history.

I'm a very strong advocate of a single, personnel system for what is essentially our foreign ministry, and I believe that that system needs to look much more like the Foreign Service than the Civil Service personnel system. I also believe that the conditions of work and the requirements for any employment at the State Department need to change because history and the global environment in which we will have to compete as a country have changed so much.

For example, I see absolutely no reason why anybody at the Officer-level in a modern State Department should be hired who doesn't speak at least one UN language or other language other than English. This is doubly true for the 300 or so FSOs we hire each year! Why are we going to hire people who have no demonstrated facility in any language other than English? Why are we wasting taxpayer dollars to teach people a first

foreign language, including Spanish??? This is just nuts. It's bad economics; it's bad diplomacy; it's bad personnel management and wretched talent filtering. Why should anybody who's going to work long term, whether it's primarily domestic or not, at the State Department not have to serve at least one or two tours overseas? Why should anyone in a modern State Department not actually know what an Embassy is and how it operates and why, not to mention knowing how the international Diplomatic Corps and the international diplomatic order operates? And if all professional level employees had to spend at least one tour abroad that might also help staff our increasingly overburdened non-immigrant visa functions. Why should any State Department Officer today (except political appointees, I suppose) never have to leave the nice comfort of the Washington suburbs?

Now that we are once again talking about major reform, one of the big questions inevitably is going to be how can we best streamline and rationalize the accreted layers of tinkering over the last 30 years? Having two such different personnel systems is bad enough--, but let's be honest. We've got a heavy political overlay that knows little or nothing about the institutional infrastructure underlying our foreign policy process and diplomacy, and they have no real interest in fixing it. For the most part, with all due respect, political appointees—even the good ones—are short-timers, only there for two years and a title. And then we have a contractor personnel system that has been devised because the other two systems work so badly, people don't want to get stuck with losers and so try them out as a contractor, and if you like them, then you can bring them in, special privileged, backdoor, special program, you name it! There are now multiple ways to make that happen if both parties want it to happen. Then, of course, you have also got the overseas foreign nationals employment system for those foreign nationals who are employees in our embassies overseas, as well as a growing number of ways that employment of USG family members can be arranged. No wonder State Department personnel and talent management is a mess! Oh and did I mention the numerous special access programs for entry into the Foreign Service now?

Systemic or institutional change is the hardest and most thankless task in the world, and nobody has ever wanted to tackle the institutional accretions and increasing inefficiencies and dysfunctions at State as history has moved on but State’s entrenched bureaucracy has not. Better the devil you know, than the devil you don't!.

History of past reform efforts and their consequences are important because of the memories and impacts they have left on employees past and present. They are not dispositive, but you all [younger generation] at least should be aware of past history because it may explain some things. But the younger generation does not seem to be very engaged right now. That may be a misjudgment on my part. Also it must be said that among the older folks now deeply concerned about the future of the Foreign Service, there are many who helped bring you the current situation because they didn't care about anything but “doing policy” and tending to their own careers. Now many of those same people are all upset because the future of the Foreign Service is threatened. It seems like everyone has a little network working on Foreign Service reform, but none of them are working together and there is certainly no common set of priorities or agenda besides “Do something!”

So it's going to be very interesting to see how all this plays out, whether in fact there is something, a precipitant, that manages to create some sort of weight and consensus about how to rebuild for the future that can be organized and drive a reform agenda forward for longer than it takes to publish another report. But, I still believe, you gotta start with knowing the past, and that's what's so important about what you all at ADST are doing right now. Your mining of the oral histories is really remarkable. I think somebody could get a fine dissertation out of it by the time it's finished.

Q: There's definitely plenty. There's plenty with the oral histories. Reagan, being one of our colleagues who went through your oral history, and I know he had some questions as well, but it's already very comprehensive. So that's why we're here.

KINNEY: Well, why don't I turn it back over to you all, because I don't know what you need to know. I don't know what you're interested in. And certainly, if there are any questions arising from any of my comments, I'm happy to address them. So why don't you all take the reins and just let me know what might be useful.

Q: Sure. Reagan, did you want to kick it off or—?

INTERN: Sure. It stood out to me in your oral history, and there wasn't a whole lot of follow up on it, but it seemed like it could be important since we're talking about privilege and the role, these days anyway, the role of institutions kind of weeding out people they don't like. This is sort of topsy-turvy because it's about State weeding out what would normally be considered a group of people of privilege. But you talked about Joe Merseman and the admin cone higher ups "[setting] out to" do in the Southern gentlemen," and that really stood out to me that you [State] would be out to doing any kind of group of people. So if you could elaborate on that and how they go about weeding out a group of people they don't like, and then why that was.

KINNEY: Well that derives from is an anecdote that I related from very early in my career. As I said, no Junior Officer (that's what Entering Officers were called in those days!) should ever be exposed or learn as much as I did at such a tender stage of your career because there may be such a thing as knowing too much too early.

The experience was as follows: As an 07, I was put in an 02 job (that was the old system before the 1980 Act). I was put into an 02 job in the Director General's Policy Coordination Office (DG/PC), an enormous stretch for a JO after less than one year. And what that taught me was that everything and anything is negotiable at State; that everything is a question of will and your power position—rules mean nothing, or very little. And in many ways that was something important to learn early on because that IS closer to how much of the world actually operates.

Be that as it may, the rules were broken for a good reason: the DG had a problem, which I had largely instigated and gotten lots of other women on board with creating for her. I knew what the answer to the problem was, and the DG needed a solution. She very much wanted to tackle the larger managerial mess that the Foreign Service and State were already becoming, but her judgment was--, and it was quite correct-- that major managerial reform was never going to happen on her watch as Director General.

However, the modern spouse thing could be dealt with. It was in line with the Carter Administration's emphasis on family, and the ladies who had put this together had built a pretty damn clever mouse trap from which no one was going to be able to escape, so why not get them to solve the problem?

Once installed in the DG's Front Office, I had a very large office on the sixth floor, which was unheard of for a JO in those days. And I was wielding, as one Admin Officer who became my boss once admonished me, "… hard power with more confidence than is appropriate [for] a Junior Officer. You must learn soft power." He wasn't wrong, but when you get hard power and you get the moment, you do what you can with it, and I knew what I wanted and went for it.

The story you are asking about involved Joe Mersman, a leader among the Admin Cone Officers, who unexpectedly walked into my office one day and said we needed to talk. Specifically, I needed to know who HE was and he wanted to know exactly what I thought I was doing?

I didn't know who Mersman was from Adam's house cat. He announced himself, like I was supposed to know, and started by asking if I was "Stephanie Smith Kinney?" In those days the men always said "Smith" with a bit of a sneer, you know, because, "how dare you have three names! I actually had a boss in Rome who informed me that I could pick, but he only learned two names.

Learning, during the course of our conversation, that I had come in as an Admin Cone Officer, Mersman started being very frank with me because he was essentially recruiting me into the "Admin Off Club." And the next thing I know, he's telling me that the problem with the Foreign Service —quote unquote— are the "Southern gentleman." Now he was from New York, as were many of the Admin Officers. There were to my knowledge, few, if any, Admin Officers who were from the South at that time, but I could be wrong about that. And he proceeded to explain that the problem with the "Southern gentleman" was that they were presumptuous and overly entitled. They were effete, dressed too well, and were too nice. And they didn't know how to fight.

What he didn't know when he was telling all of this to me was that I was a thirteenth generation Southerner. So, I found all this very interesting and tried to draw him out. Part of it was class, part of it was regional difference, not unrelated to the South as racist and too gentlemanly, but mostly it was that they were too gentlemanly. I think it was basically playing into the myth that the Foreign Service was a bunch of pinstriped, effete snobs, who couldn't get their hands dirty and therefore, presumably, the Soviets were going to eat our lunch—I don't know. But there was a strain among the Admin Officers also, since many of them were from urban settings and particularly the North East, that they were proud of being resource and management smart and good "street t fighters. They knew how to wield the knife, thank you very much, and they were often in a position to do it with great effectiveness.

I can't answer your question about "how did they do it?" except to say there is such a thing as "corridor reputation" to this day. I'm sure you're familiar with that. When I came in, it was just a given, and you could destroy people by corridor rep because often it was

much more reliable, much more honest and much more accurate, than anything you would ever read in an evaluation report. And because it was a relatively smaller club in those days, and everybody did know each other and you did have to get along, you didn't have to sit on the Seventh Floor to have power, particularly if you controlled budget flows, personnel assignments and services, the specialty of any Admin Off. If you were of the Admin Cone, the Administrative Cone, you controlled positions, you controlled budgets, you controlled services, meaning general services because you spoke Admin and understood how the system worked (and didn't) operationally. Many PolOffs I later found did not even know what questions to ask, nor did they think it was their job to care. Since I could and did operate in both worlds, it made sense to me that you have to be able to "speak" both policy and management and understand how both worked.

That story you picked out for the 1980 Act Research about Pat Miller, my Civil Service Personnel Officer in OES-DRL/EX, was exemplary. My Civil Service admin staff didn't want to have to "kowtow to those [FS] policy officers across the hall," so they made themselves into points of control. The only way you got anything done was to make nice and kowtow to THEM, if you wanted anything done operationally. If they did not like you and you didn't have a good personal relationship with them, you weren't getting toofie. This was the organizational culture of the day in OES-DRL until I changed it. But by that time, it was 1998!

Not that much had changed since Mersman's visit in 1977. State was just a bit more bureaucratic. It was more complex. There were more factors to take into account. It wasn't as easy to do some of the things that you used to be able to do just by "fixing things." So, does that help at all? It's not a straight answer, but it was not – and is not --a straightforward corporate culture, ironically, not unlike the larger global environment in which diplomats must function when abroad.

If there was a moral to my experience or lessons that I learned, very early on I became convinced that the FS cone system was toxic, a big part of the corporate culture problem, because all it did was divide the Service into warring clans!! Plus, it made no sense to me: we were recruited for our potential to do anything, to be "generalist line Officers" and eventually institutional leaders. Instead, once your Junior Officer Rotational position (JORP) assignment was over (during which you served in several different functions in your first Embassy assignment abroad), you were effectively turned into a narrow-gaged "Conal Specialist," which ensured that PolOffs and EconOffs never learned to "speak", much less operate like Admin or ConOffs and vice versa, although at several points, the personnelists tilted favorably toward slightly broader multifunctional (conal) experience.

What I observed over most of my career was a growing tension and tribal identity among "Coneheads", which only created tensions rather than synergies. This is why I became opposed to four cones, much less five when USIA was integrated, and did and still do believe that we should have two main streams – policy and management--in which ALL Officers major or minor. I believe this would 1) reduce internal conal tensions and tribalism 2) force everyone to "speak" and be able to handle both policy formulation and management AND financial and human and technological planning and management and 3) for once, incentivize the FS to become more than the sum of its parts rather than less, as has been the case for the last two decades now. Only by being fluent in both policy and

management and leadership will younger Officers and policy mavens outside of State begin to understand that policy formulation and influence can only be as strong as its institutional infrastructure, which is now practically dysfunctional.

INTERN: Right. No, I think that was a great answer to my question. That also stood out to me because I am Southern. [Laughing] So that kind of peaked a little interest there, but I did think it was also important.

KINNEY: But, back to the Southern Gentlemen accusation- let me say this. When Mersman said that, I had only been in the service a short time, maybe six to eight months. So I didn't have a real clear sense, but certainly by the time I finished my tour in Rome, which involved going to London for a Chief of Mission meeting and hobnobbing with the DCMS of Europe—our European DCMS and our European ambassadors—I had a much better sense of what Joe must have been talking about because there were a number of Southern gentleman in that group! [Laughing]

We're talking about post World War II, but my theory is that the new South only gradually began to emerge in the late \Forties, and it didn't really break with the old South until Civil Rights and "integration" became a new fait accompli in the South, but there were loads and loads of Southerners and lots and lots of literary greats who found their futures outside the South. There were many people in the South both of goodwill and of progressive mind, and many, many people left. They went to New York;they went to California.

If you were of a well-educated, traditional, proper family, in the South, "class" was much more pronounced and a part of life perhaps. I mean, I grew up with cotillions and concerts and a level of formality in all things that I just thought was the way everybody lived because that was just the way life was. It may have been that the Foreign Service was not a bad fit for a lot of people who wanted to see a larger world. Diplomacy then and now IS an elite endeavor, not because anyone in it is better than anyone else but simply because only so many people are allowed to play the game; as anyone posted abroad knows, only certain people can be accredited, no matter how many may work in an Embassy.

Perhaps the infamous "Southern Gentlemen" in Mersman's cross-hairs were attracted to diplomatic service because they already had a feel for "the class thing" that governed in Europe and in so many other countries and lay at the heart of diplomatic discipline and protocol; perhaps they were already comfortable with the etiquette, the diplomatess/the finesse, if you will, that especially Euro-centric diplomacy demanded in those days. And, of course, many of them had gone to college or university outside of the South or to some of the South's best schools such as Duke, Georgetown, UNC or UVA. (Many of them went to Princeton, it seemed to me.) So you could be Southern but, shall we say more liberally educated and, in fact, have a pretty good preparation for the Foreign Service in those days.

And the Foreign Service was, in fact, a way out of what was still an essentially segregated South in the post-World War years. Diplomatic service may well have offered a more interesting and challenging life than staying where you were, and government

service was relatively secure, by comparison. It didn't pay a lot, but the South was essentially an “underdeveloped country” up through my childhood. If you were white, that was not a major problem because you might be poor, but you could be well-educated, you could be “well-bred,” in the parlance of the day. And I suspect that there was something of a draw there, because even in the late ‘80s and ‘90s when McKinsey came in and did some questioning about why people wanted to join the Foreign Service for Bonnie Cohen (M), there was a significant number of Officers who answered, "because it was more upper class," because it gave them social mobility or because they could live a lifestyle in the Foreign Service that they couldn't have at home.

So if you think about the South of '48, '49, '50, and who was joining the Foreign Service, there were a number of Southerners. So what that tells you was that post WWII, the Service WAS expanding its reach, it actually had embraced a broader population beyond the Northeast stereotype, it had embraced and taken in people from the South and other regions of the country as well. I was always surprised how many people I met who hailed from Iowa, Kansas, Texas, Arkansas and California.

But to the Admin guys when I came in, who were proud of their management know-how and urban street smarts and attitude, many thought “gentlemen” were not up to job, particularly from an institutional standpoint—meaning standing up to Congress, standing up to the neigh-sayers, standing up to the people that were always wanting to cut your budget and give you a hard time. You can see how the more genteel, conflict avoidant character of the Southern gentleman might not have been Mr. Mersman's idea of an ideal officer.

I'll give you another insight to that from the same period, around 1979 or '80. State got its first official “shrink,” psychiatrist, in O/MED. His name was Dr. Pat Haynes. The Foreign Service also started bringing in Myers-Briggs experimentally in the Short-lived Mid-Level Officers Training Course, which raised Holy hell! People were just, I mean, you would have thought the world was coming to an end! I thought Myers Briggs was the greatest thing since sliced bread because it finally explained to me why certain people drove me crazy: It wasn’t that I didn’t like them as people, it was that the way they processed information was so different from mine. I just didn't like their preferences and the way they thought about things and that was infinitely liberating. ESTJs drove me crazy because I'm an ENTP. We could receive the same information/input and predictably handle it in very different ways. So I asked Pat at a certain point -- because he had created the Minnesota 16 Multiple Personality Test profile that to this day determines who gets hired as an air traffic controller—what he thought the profile for FSOs was. By then, I had learned that, unlike the military officers, who were highly STJ, about 25% of FSOs were ENTPs, when ENTPs made up only about 4% of the overall population. (At least those were the stats in the early 80’s.)

At that time, a number of people, especially in the Admin Cone, felt that we needed more STJs, like the military. We had too many ENTPs in the Foreign Service and that's why nothing ever closed, nothing ever got decided, and they were always looking around the corner for the next possibility. So I asked Dr. Haynes what he thought the Foreign Service profile was and whether it needed to be something else. “Who are Foreign Service officers from the shrink's point of view?" He said, "Stephanie, I've never seen

anything like this population of people." He said he could only tell me three things about Foreign Service officers. “They have a rich fantasy life. They are the most un-introspective group of people I have ever encountered in my life, and they're conflict averse."

Well, the last is pretty obvious if you're going to be a diplomat—probably not totally a bad thing. Non-introspective really threw me, but it was absolutely true. How else did you explain the sheer terror with which any kind of “shrinky,” introspective, Myers-Briggs’ work or the T groups of the early 70’s gave FSOs a case of the hives? And as for “rich fantasy life,” but, of course, because in those days there were very few ways to live overseas, much less have automatic status and importance because of your association with the American Embassy, even if you were a more Junior Officer. (On my first tour abroad to Rome, because of my mandate to follow the new heroin epidemic and take the lead on the USG response, I met regularly with the Minister of Justice and had more than a couple of encounters with the Bishop of Rome, better known as Pope John Paul.)

In contrast, today, every Tom Dick and Harry goes off to Europe before college and then to more exotic climes from China to India to Burkina Faso or the Amazon. It was unusual for most people to even go to Europe in the '70s, much less Africa or Asia. So a rich fantasy life was a pretty logical indicator that the Foreign Service might be something you would be interested in. But the fact that Dr. Haynes couldn't pin the group down with any more than that I always found fascinating, especially given the accusations that the Foreign Service was too homogeneous. Curious.

I guess it depends on how you define diversity, but what he was telling me is that this is a collection of the weirdest group of individuals he’d encountered , and yet they're functioning and they've done great things. They made the post-World War II international order. They sacrifice themselves and their families for reasons that make no sense to most people. Given the increasing maladministration of their institution, they may even be a bunch of masochists. Why would anybody else put up with this place? And that was back in the early 80’s!

Haynes was very critical about the Department and it's personnel management and systems, because, one, he was looking at some of the sad cases in which people got mauled pretty badly. Charlie Thomas, for example, although he was before Pat’s time. It was amazing we only had one suicide, but the amount of alcohol, adultery, drugs and even child abuse, including incest, and spousal abuse to which I became privy because I had a rather talkative group of Senior Wives as good friends, as a result of FLO [Family Liaison Office]—again, I learned things that most Junior Officers didn’t know and perhaps shouldn't have been allowed to really know so early if we wanted them to stay in the Service. The Service had an abnormally low divorce rate prior to the Declaration on Spouses, but that didn't mean that all the marriages were great. It just meant that if you couldn't manage your marriage and you were going to have to get divorced, it would reflect badly in your OER, hence other bad behavior!

Q: It's hard to believe how, how much we have gone forward and evolved in a positive way, but of course there's still work to be done. And I'm wondering if you could talk a

little bit about—and I'm mindful of the time. I know we have a few more minutes, but I'm curious about—our intern colleagues and some of the active duty officers, especially this past year and this year have been more aware of the Foreign Service in the spotlight, given, for example, the testimony around Ukraine and we had colleagues from the NSC, from the Foreign Service, as well, testifying, but yet Reagan is doing this interview in Texas, and , I'm in California right now, the average person doesn't really understand or know what our diplomatic corps does. And part of it—

KINNEY: May I stop you right there? It is not a diplomatic corps. Yes, it is a corps of diplomats. I grant you that, but I am trying to stamp out the use of "our diplomatic corps." Let's say our diplomatic SERVICE—.

Q: Our service. Yes—

KINNEY: Because it is a Service, and I much prefer to hear people being forced to think of it in terms that are real. It is a Service and the work it does is in service to the nation. Service ist what we do; "a corps" is what "we be." And a "diplomatic corps" is all about being. Also, it is a conflation with the legally defined, internationally defined "Diplomatic Corps." The reason people are using the phrase now to refer to the Foreign Service is because they think it sounds cool or higher class, or who knows? The term explains little or nothing to the average American, who, if they have heard the phrase before, probably think of diplomats in New York who don't pay parking fines and get to live tax free in luxurious housing. Remember, the Diplomatic Corps in Washington does not include a single American!! The Diplomatic Corps has an international legal meaning. Our Foreign Service is our diplomatic SERVICE!! We are and should be known for serving the country, its people and their interests, but how often have you heard the Foreign Service described in those terms in recent years—at least until Wikileaks, when some people were impressed with our reporting, or the recent impeachment hearings.

Q: That's right.

KINNEY: So just remember, The Diplomatic Corps, in Washington, for example, is a legal collective that refers to the accredited representatives by rank and in order of their arrival from all of the other embassies recognized by the United States. It bothers me that Foreign Service Officers have allowed themselves to fall into this misappropriation of the phrase because "diplomatic corps" undercuts and only adds to our image problem, as I said. Too many associate "diplomatic corps" with people who are scoff-laws, go to parties all the time and think they are better than the rest of us. Not helpful.

Q: Right. No, and I think maybe I've spent too much time overseas. I say it in the French, "corps diplomatique" as a foreigner. But I think that's a really illustrative point because it gets to the heart here in the US amongst even Rotary Clubs or outreach in the community, sometimes I say, "I'm with the State Department," some people say, "what state?" or, "oh, okay. So you do voting in Texas. That's the Secretary of State's office." So it's an uphill battle, and I'm wondering what advice you have or what thoughts you have around these efforts—I know you talked about [audio interrupted] in this ongoing information campaign in the general public.

KINNEY: We have been trying to improve communication, educate the American public, educate the Congress since forever. I don't have an easy answer for you, Mark. The easy answer is we have got to have not only strategic communication to the world on the policy side, but we also need a five to ten year purposeful, persistent communication and messaging campaign to the American people equal to that of the Marine Corps, the Army, the Navy. Why do people think so well of these institutions and they think so little of us?

Well, some of the reasons you might consider are State's PR budgets and how they are spent and also Hollywood and TV, the media in general, especially places like Fox News and other conservative outlets. I mean, how many Foreign Service heroes have you seen in Hollywood? In Seven Days in May, in the book, it's actually a Foreign Service officer who finds the briefcase and carries it to Washington, but in the film, it gets changed. But mostly with the exception, maybe, of Argos, the Foreign Service Officers are portrayed as the weak wristed patsies and fops of the local American Embassy. And so I think we need a first rate television show like Cops; , we need movies like Argos; , we need public service announcements and advertising campaigns like the Marines. But here's the problem—that will only increase the number of applicants for about 300 job openings a year who feel bad because they were not selected. You cannot imagine the festering resentment that then bubbles up even years later from people who did not pass the exam or were not put on the list.

No, we have to figure out a way to actually explain what service FSOs do for the country and its citizens in terms many skeptical, cynical citizens can understand and come to appreciate, Yes, we must continue to cultivate the converted as we have for years via colleges, the World Affairs Council, the Council on Foreign Relations, and foreign exchange programs, but we also have to tackle the media and Hollywood. What has influenced people is the larger media environment that we have allowed to grow uncultivated and become overgrown with weeds. We must also appoint Secretaries of State who actually know something about and care for State and our diplomatic service as institutions and not just defend them but also actually spend time on trying to renovate and improve them. I cannot really think of a Secretary since Shultz who thought he or she was there to care about the institution they were charged with leading. Colin Powell wanted to be "our COO as well as our CEO," as he said, but he got short- stopped by 9/11.

Turning things around institutionally is hard and takes time, and technology has not made the task any easier. When I came in, information was the diplomatic coin of the realm. Today, the problem is too much information from too many competing sources with too many conflicting agendas and motivations. When the Foreign Service Act of 1980 was drafted, one, we didn't have the internet; two, we didn't have social media, and three "public information" was what USIA was for. USIA had the skill sets, but when it was created their fear was about another Goebbels and government controlled propaganda, so there was a legislative mandate that prevented USIA from talking to the American people; it could only talk to and convey its products to foreigners. When USIA created its magnificent film of Kennedy's funeral, "Years of Lightning, Day of Drums," they had to get special legislation to allow it to be shown in the United States . Your question is a

very good one. Amateurs and pecuniary budgets are not the answer to whole PACs and political parties intent on undermining both the State Department and its Foreign Service. In my view, we have to stop acting as though the accusations don't matter, because after decades of the same silliness, too many people now regard the negative narratives as gospel truth, even some who should know better.

Q: Right. No, that's insightful. I recall the number of movies that I've seen, where you see embassy interaction with an American in trouble overseas. Our Consular Officers are often portrayed as aloof. Yeah.

KINNEY: Yeah. They are rarely responsive to human need. And it's all about the embassy as a barrier and barricade, but Mrs. Cox's experience was such that she created the Foundation because she was so grateful for the way that a middle rank Foreign Service Officer had saved her in—was it Madras?—I can't remember, someplace in Southern India.

But we have been asked to do more and more and more and more with less and less and less. I think one of my comments on this was pointing out to you all (the editors of the ADST research on the 1980 Act) that when I was the Executive Director for OES and DRL Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) DRL alone had 72 unfunded Congressional mandates!! I counted them because I got so pissed off. I was so angry. I said, "okay, we're going to make a case of this." Seventy two unfunded mandates from Congress, and State did nothing! Yet, at the same time, DRL had NO internet terminals for its Officers to use, when by 1998, every Human Rights NGO was using it to report abuses, progress and examples. I finally had to get permission from L to go to a private foundation for funds to pay for 40 internet capable computers for the Bureau, and that's how DRL got connected to the Internet in 1999. Pathetic!

So, the mismanagement is long-standing. It comes from the fact, I think, fundamentally, that foreign policy is a long-term proposition. There is nothing accomplished geo-strategically and in terms of impactful foreign policy that takes place in two years. If, for some reason, it appears that that's how fast it happened, I will almost guarantee you, short of a cataclysmic earthquake of some sort, that there was a prepping of the battlefield and relationships and long, long term efforts to cultivate and persuade and move the various pieces into alignment over an extended period of time.

And nobody has ever persistently explained this to the American public, and I think this is the kind of thing we have to go out and help them understand. First of all, I'm not going to tell you about the State Department. Rather, we need to listen more and respond to what they want to know and why they want to know it. Make them ask the questions because they'll reveal what's behind them. And THAT's what you have to get at. In the course of that kind of exchange, that's when you have the opportunity to say, "do you have any idea what was involved in making it possible for your son or daughter to get home when X happened or to go to school in China or opening up Japan to your grapefruit and your beef?" You have to find something that they can relate to, and then help them understand how it is and why it took so long to make that benefit possible.

Q: Yes. In fact, that's really helpful. It helps frame how, in a sense, we—within ADST sometimes we talk about personal diplomacy where every interaction with a member of the public, with our family members, with friends, is part of that campaign. And more generally what we do in terms of, when I go back to ADST, capturing, preserving, and sharing our stories. The story of American diplomacy is what we're—

KINNEY: I mean the post WWII, 20th century international order was a miracle, and we also have to explain to Americans what it took to bring this about. Our President has made things worse. Too many Americans have taken late 20th c American preeminence and prosperity for granted, thinking that they have been entitled to the preeminence, the power and the prosperity that even our working classes enjoyed without question up until about ten years ago. But what no one has explained or reminded them about is that the reason for our inordinate power and influence and prosperity t was because we had no competition coming out of World War II. First of all, we built the post-war international order designed to play to our strengths and benefit us. The rest of the world was flat on its ass and had no industrial plant left, and we did. We invested in our people through the G.I. Bill, and you know what? When you educate people, they do amazing things way beyond what one would have expected by their status of birth. They invented, they created, they worked their hearts out, they made the modern world safe, not just for democracy, but for business and health, also for people who had nothing (and I'm thinking of whole countries).

When I went to Spain in 1964, it was a dirty, filthy, tortured, underdeveloped country and look at Spain today—and South Korea. It's not that we succeeded every place, but, even where we failed, the modern world that we created and the stability and the international diplomatic order that made it possible has advanced even the Rwanda's of the world into the modern world. The problem in the Middle East is that the young people want to be modern, but they are weighted down by an antediluvial l, too long in the tooth patriarchy that is desperately clinging to a past that is never, ever going to be acceptable again.

And if people could only hear what it really took and how—but what do they hear when they talk to people from the State Department? What they hear is "State Speak," not a language they can relate to or understand. This is my obsession with language right now. It matters.

Q: Absolutely.

KINNEY: And I didn't realize until I got out of State how much it had affected me. I was talking "State Speak," even when I was trying not to, because the environment in which I worked was such a closed and special world. Diplomacy and diplomatic service IS an elite activity. Not everybody can do it; not everyone would want to if they knew its real costs. And that's just a fact; there's nothing right, wrong, good, bad, ill, or indifferent about it. These are truths that have to be shared. If you share them truthfully and respectfully, explaining to people why not everybody can be an ambassador and why not everybody can even be an accredited diplomat, but that somebody has to do the work and it's not just about us. It involves more than a hundred other sovereign powers, and there is an international diplomatic order with a language, a vocabulary, a world of protocol and law and rights and privileges so that, to the extent possible, you only offend on purpose,

not out of ignorance. The costs of offense and the costs of conflict are so great, so you don't want to make mistakes.

If you talk to people in terms that they can appreciate about things that they've never thought about before, they'll appreciate it. What won't stick with them is repeating for the sixteenth time, the ten talking points on why the State Department matters and why we need more money and why nobody loves us and the military gets too much and we don't have enough. Not persuasive.

Q: Amen to that. Why, I very much appreciate your—I'm conscious of the time and I see we've run over slightly, but I just want to thank you. And I know—

KINNEY: Well, are there any other—you mentioned something about the "Group of 44." Has anybody else talked about it? Did Tom Boyatt talk about it?

Q: He did. He mentioned.

KINNEY: Because Harry Kopf says that it's 47.

[unintelligible crosstalk]

KINNEY: Well, just the fact that it was there—that was really the last well-organized, Officer involved reform initiative until 1998, when we did the "SOS for DoS" movement. But change in the Foreign Service used to take place about every ten years, which is correct because that's about every decade you've got to update. The fact that there had been nothing since the 1980 Act tells you the nature of the problem. It's not that people didn't try. It's not that people weren't complaining. It's not that people didn't have ideas and make efforts.

I remember Dick Moose, when he was Undersecretary for Management. He had been a Foreign Service officer and was one of the "Baby Eight," under Carter but he then became M under Clinton. He messed around and— [laughing]—the famous story of his wife, Maggie, who was a friend of mine. She was part of the "Lunch Bunch" with Gay Vance and all the women who helped get FLO going back in the mid-70's. But Maggie took his moose head from home and threw it out at the front of the C street entrance [of the Harry S Truman Building] as protest for his affair with his sweet, young thing in the building.

But Dick tried to do a strategic reform, but strategic change is the hardest thing in the world. Institutional change is the least sexy. Nobody wants to do it. It's rarely, truly successful.

And because his strategic plan failed, from the 1990's on, it became a given that you could not call for strategic change in the Department of State. It all had to be tactical. You just do a little thing here and a little thing there and hope it adds up or makes some things better. But all it produced was what we have now. I remember when Dick Shinnick was up in Graham Green's office (M) in 2000, as his ear whisper, and Dick and I used to go round and round because my point was, "Dick the SOS was calling for strategic change. We need real transformational change. It's been too long." His response

was always, "Stephanie, it won't work. We can't do it. There's too much opposition. So we're just going to try to fix every little thing as we can." And my response was always, "Dick random tactics do not add up to a strategic result."

But speaking of things that you cannot talk about in the State Department today, real strategic thinking is one of them. The military is brought up on strategy, tactics, and operations, and eight out of ten Foreign Service officers have no blinking idea what you're talking about. Because why? Because they're stupid? No. Because we have not educated them. We have not formed them. We have not prepared them to do a job for which there is no school, no library. Since the beginning of time, diplomacy has been an apprentice profession, a progression from apprentices to journeymen to masters, to master practitioners, to ambassadors, essentially. When the old club was broken up, I think there was a certain amount of intention to divide and conquer. One, we're a very small service anyway and now we have been fragmented to death. First by cones—

Q: Right.

KINNEY: —and then by gender and then by ethnicity, which, by the way, overlooks white ethnicity which is just as virulent as the other kind. And then more recently sexual orientation and handicapped—not to mention geography, I think geography is now back in the mix. We did the geography thing at one point, but somehow or other or by default we're now back to Utah/ Brigham Young, Georgetown, and UVA and AU— maybe Columbia providing the bulk of people selected into the Service.

At this point, I think there's a lot to be said for a permanent undersecretary for operations at State. And it would be a Foreign Service Management Officer with backbone and gumption and a mandate for change. In other words, you can't be a yes man and see your job as just making the politicos happy. We need somebody knowledgeable who needs to be permanently in charge of mobilizing engagement, ongoing reform and transformation and then ensuring that the institution actually evolves with the times. The position should have a six -year tenure so that it crosses Administrations. George Schultz was the last one who came anywhere close to it and look what they did to him. They attached his name to a begotten acronym that is embarrassing, "NFATC" [National Foreign Affairs Training Center].

He's going to be a hundred years old December 13! And my dream is that there will someday be a George P. Schultz School of Diplomacy, Leadership and Management since he was identified with all three and took pride in them. And it would be a worthy legacy for him. But the National Foreign Affairs Training Center as short term, random training, most of which is remedial? I wouldn't want that to be my legacy!

Q: It doesn't have the same ring!

KINNEY: So you know—we're back to that professional education and formation. It's not that you don't need training. Of course, you do. Some things are short term. Language. You learn it in six months or two years or a year. That's short term. But it's not continuing, because then it's up to you to go out and use it and remember it and all of that. A new computer program is going to be short- term-- if you don't know how to do

Excel and you need to do it, go take a course. But random, short-term courses are not going to make practiced, experienced, confident, insightful, creative diplomats any more than if that were your recipe for the line officers of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Coast Guard. Why do they have Academies for the military and nobody complains about their eliteness? Have you checked out the number of minorities wearing four stars these days? Or three stars or even two stars? No, they pick on us. And we let them.

Q: Yes, it's unfortunate. It really is.

KINNEY: So, let me ask you a question. What would it take for active duty officers to decide that they would be the best ones to design their future?

Q: No, I mean, that's a brilliant question, because as you mentioned before, these discussions do take place over lunchtime and I lamented with Tom Boyatt saying, "I don't think we have a 'Young Turks' movement," and that's what's unfortunate is those voices are there, but they're spread out.

KINNEY: Why is that? Is that because you all have been so divided and so fragmented, I think intentionally, that you have no power? Yes. And you know what? You're the only ones who can fix it. You all have to bring yourselves together and say, "do we want to be the stickee or the sticker"?

Q: Right, right. No, I think that—

KINNEY: Do we want it to be done to us or do we want to use our experience, our vision, and our creativity and our ideas to build a new future rather than just trying to destroy a past? Because nobody is talking about replacing. They're just talking about destroying.

Q: Yeah. Rather than act out of fear or reactively, it serves our interests to be more proactive. And as you say, "be a doer, not a reactor."

KINNEY: But if you're all just chasing your own careers and you've got your little group of hyphens and another little group of hyphens and this little group of hyphens and the hyphens are all fighting among themselves for a smaller and smaller piece of the pie, guess who's going to win that game?

Q: Not us.

KINNEY: You said it.

Q: This is, if anything, a call to action and take it as inspiration and motivation.

KINNEY: Because you all can do it, but I don't know why you don’t. Well, I do know why. I came along at a very fortuitous, pregnant moment. I had a vision. I managed to define it as a problem people could relate to—and it wasn't feminism, you'll notice, because that was anathema! The wives were a management issue. Well, this rebuilding of State and the Foreign Service and American diplomacy is a national security issue. Who better than our grandchildren, than our children, to start standing up to us older folks and

saying, "You all did a great job, but it's time to get the hell off the stage. You've overstayed. You're now just in trying to hang on to a past that can never be repeated. We've got to build a future that is good for this country. It's not about us. It's about the US! We'll take the risks. It's for the country." SOMEBODY has to do this because we've got global competition now, and I'm here to tell you, our competitors play no holds barred.

Q: Good point.

KINNEY: It's not going to be a gentleman's game, but it can be because there is an international order. And we used to have lots of friends. If we can gain the trust back, that has to be the first thing, and then we have to show that we're going to stick with it. That's the second thing—hard for Americans to stick with anything right now, more than five seconds. Then we have to have a vision that is more appealing than that of China or Russia or India or Brazil or Mexico. Half of those people are Western and can be brought—Turkey, another one—can be brought into a consensual modern world. And those that want to stay in the past and want to live in medieval serfdom, we'll show them that there are ways to get out, but we'll also keep reminding them that, "that's your problem;" we can't fix it but you and your citizens can. . So does that sound like the Foreign Service right now? The Foreign Service is a microcosm.

Q: A big movement in awakening a national and an international—

KINNEY: Yeah, but I mean, in one way the Foreign Service is dangerously representative because the Foreign Service right now is where the US is.

Q: We don't want to get left behind and that's the reality.

KINNEY: Well, you can't get ahead by saying, "oh, I'm here and I deserve to be first and only."

Q: That's right.

KINNEY: You have to have a vision. You have to have a plan. And mostly you have to have a united front. And you all have been so divided, I think deliberately and bureaucratically, because who holds the strings for your personnel future? People who really don't like you.

Q: Right. That's a challenge.

KINNEY: Who fundamentally don't like you. No, it's not a challenge. All you have to do is start fingering them, call an ace an ace, call a spade a spade and say, "no, we're not taking it anymore." I think something like that just happened in the streets of the United States!

Q: That's right. Tom Boyatt, his advice was to—he says it's perfectly within your rights to speak up yourselves, go to Congress, talk with people. We have to speak out.

KINNEY: Uruguay got two gifts that kept on giving when they got back to democracy because of me—because I figured out who the one person in the US Congress was that

had been Peace Corps in Uruguay. His name was Doug Bereuter from Nebraska and I went and called on him, even though the new policy by some fool in H was that, "Foreign Service officers can no longer go up to Congress and talk to them on their own." That was part of the problem. You had to come through H! And we all knew what that meant: zip. So I just went up on my own. Anyway, I was a Foreign Service officer. He received me. I told him what my problem was. I asked him what he thought about Uruguay's return to democracy and whether he shared the concern that the issue was not returning, it was staying returned. I asked him what he knew about Uruguay, whether he had kept following it since his Peace Corps days, which he had, and what ideas he had about what might make sense.

And I shared with him my observations from my trips down there that people used to ask me all the time, "what had happened? Why don't you want our wool anymore?" To which the answer was, "we're not having any more northern wars. I'm sorry. The wool thing is not gonna really work for you because we're not going to need blankets." And the same thing for beef. We got more beef of our own than we can shake a stick at. So you're going to have to think about things and innovate , but we CAN help you do a transition.

And so Doug and I cooked up two pieces of legislation, for which he asked me for the draft. It was an earmark, which was anathema in H and definitely not to be done. But he said, if you'll draft it, I'll put it in because I think this makes sense. The new democratically elected President is going to need help. We don't want them to go back to an authoritarian, military regime. So let's give them a cheese quota and let's—he was from Nebraska, so he would, you know—and let's give them a textile quota under the Multifiber Trade Agreement, along with some ESF(Economic Support Fund)..

Because the White House couldn't do anything else at the time, they agreed to a state visit as the best way to show our support for Uruguay's return to democracy and send a signal to the rest of South America. . So we had a state visit and of course you had to have deliverables. So I had three deliverables already lined up with Congress. And the day that I took the legislation up, I got cold feet. I told my Office Director where things were, and we both had a little chit chat with the PDAS [Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary] at the time, Bob Gelbard. Bob essentially winked at Melton and said, "why don't you go up with Stephanie just to make sure she doesn't get in trouble." And that was the senior supervisor's way of saying, little girl, I'm going to give you some cover, see what you can do with it, because we all know we need this.

And that's how one of the most successful state visits during that period materialized—the White House sent over a very nice note saying it was the finest design and operationally and substantively effective state visit that they had seen in five years. Thank you, State Department.

Q: That's fascinating.

KINNEY: But that is possible if you don't take the rules too seriously. But if you cower at the bureaucratic dunderheadism of the people who are putting them in place, whether they are domestic know-nothings who love their bureaucratic power or political appointees, you get where we are.

Now it's all a lot more complicated than it was in the '70s, I'll grant you that, but it's not impossible. Just gotta have your own vision. You have to have your own vision.

Q: No, that's right.

KINNEY: I can design one for you or Tom Boyatt can design one for you and those people up at Harvard are gonna give you more recommendations that aren't going to change anything, so why don't you create your own vision?

Q: And that's the thing, Susan said, "you know what? We will share it for their informational awareness, but we really ought to make this our own. It's our own treasures from our own oral histories and we can kind of work on it in house." The next steps are, we're going to take this recording and we'll have a transcript over the next few days and Reagan and I can work on making sure that that is intelligible. And we may have questions. I know this is not, maybe, the last step, but just wanted to let you know that we very well may be coming back to you for clarification or we'll share it with you. If there are things that we missed, we'll make sure we get it right.

KINNEY: I have talked quite freely, but I think there is more of a need for this kind of exchange and truth telling and encouragement because old people can't fix the future. The only people who can fix the future are the next generation, but it will help them if they have some lessons learned.

Q: Well said. Well said. But we can learn and that's part of the beauty of history.

KINNEY: Learn from our mistakes!

Q: Well, thank you. No, thank you for being so open and candid and we really appreciate it. Reagan, if you have any other final words, the floor is yours, but I think we can leave it at that if you want.

INTERN: This, this has been really, really great. I think you've kind of touched on it and I don't want to keep everybody here, but the only other thing that comes to mind is, how do we get to that point of unity and coming over that first hurdle of, "well, I'm not sure that this is our place to start uniting across cones and reforming things." How do you get the institutional buy-in and instill it in people that, "yeah, this is your problem and you have to address it!"?

KINNEY: Have you met ten other people who have some similar ideas and really care about the future of US diplomacy? Only takes ten.

INTERN: That's true.

KINNEY: And then if each of them knows one other person you've got twenty. And then if each of those twenty can find two more, you've got sixty. And if you've got sixty, you can write a letter, a resolution, seventy two tenants on a door someplace. But you know, you have to have an idea. You have to have a vision. You have to have people who care— really, really care— and want to do something other than feather their own nest and who believe that if we do this, it can be better for everybody because there is—I

mean, go study, the Founding Fathers for heaven's sakes! The question is, are we going to hang together or separately? If we do not hang together, we shall surely hang separately. And the other is, you've got a republic if you can keep it. We haven't been doing very well.

Go back and read the Declaration of Independence, start with that and then do your own declaration! When in the course of human events—I mean, if ever there was a more downtrodden bunch of people than current FSOs, I don't know what there are!

It only takes ten.

We had eight for SOS and we got 1600 signatures and that's why the day that Colin Powell walked in the building, everybody was wearing—and this was Tex's [Tex Harris] idea—everybody was wearing a little blue ribbon, like the AIDS ribbons only it was cut. And what it meant was "No more blue ribbon commissions!". We know what the problems are. We're tired of studies. We want action. And but for 9/11, I think Powell and Armitage would have made—not transformative, because Dick [Shinnick] was hell bent for leather to do nothing but tactics—but they would have made some significant changes and progress in the right direction. 9/11 changed everything.

I was the first Project Coordinator for what is now the new museum. I'm very sorry it's not still called the US Diplomacy Center because museum is so fusty sounding. That's what I wanted to do in 2000, in part, because FSI [Foreign Service Institute] was not doing its job, and how were young Foreign Service Officers going to have a fig newton of an idea about the history of US diplomacy if they didn't have a goddamn museum to tell it to them because it wasn't going to come from FSI!

Q: Yeah, we had nothing at the time.

KINNEY: You need a George P. Schultz School of Diplomacy, Leadership and Management! Go for it! Quickly, because he's going to be a hundred years old on the 13 of December. He's not going to be here very long. We don't want him to die first.

Q: Time's of the essence.

KINNEY: Just try standing up and demanding something. They'll be so shocked they won't know what to do, first of all. And then they'll try threatening and bullying, and you just take your glasses off and calmly say, "are you finished? The problem's still there. We have the idea, what are you going to do?" And they'll get all flustered and some of them will get angry. But we all know what anger produces: ineffective action. So stay cool and be the diplomats that you were hired to be! You're diplomats! Be clever, be sneaky! Be Machiavellian!

Q: Do what we have to do. That's a good lesson there, Reagan!

KINNEY: No, you don't do what you have to do. You do what you ought to be doing because you are diplomats! And because you are more concerned about the future than the past and you are more intent on serving the country than yourself. If you're not in the

business for that, you don't belong in it. Get out, go find a salary someplace else because the conditions of work are no piece of cake. Trust me.

Q: Exactly.

KINNEY: Not until you make it better.

Q: That is the truth. Wonderful. Well, thank you. Thank you for sharing such wisdom and truth.

KINNEY: That and two bits will get you a cup of coffee. But no, seriously, if there's any way any of us can help—but we can't do it for you. You're going to have to do it for yourself. Mommy and daddy, they're long gone. You have no responsible adults. You were latchkey kids. You figured it out. So go figure this one out.

Q: We have to do it. Yeah.

KINNEY: All you have to do is want something better and say, "no, we're not gonna settle for what you're dishing out. It's crap". We have got to leave the 20th century. We have got to enter the 21st. We have to be honest. We have to tell some hard, painful truths. We have to exercise creativity. And when it comes to our theories, let's see if we can test them a little bit first before we leap and say, "Oh, the SES (or the SFS) is going to be the answer to everything!" But then there's no follow-through. There's no follow up and there's no execution. Today's SES-- in case you've not noticed--, does not move around as promised. Never has, never will because it is the nature of the Civil Service to stay rooted as it can and thereby accrue power and influence.

Q: Yeah. They stay put that's for sure.

KINNEY: The thing is, you have to distinguish between the GS personnel system and the people. The people are not the problem. The people are not bad people. They have been as badly treated in the Civil Service and its personnel system, as members of the Foreign Service have been in theirs. , Neither the GS nor the FS is currently in a corporate environment, culture, and personnel system that makes any sense for the challenges of 2030. And in order to be ready for 2030, you have to start now because it's a ten-year slog.

Q: And make up for lost time too.

KINNEY: Well, you know, lessons learned.

Q: Absolutely.

KINNEY: But you know, this is not a short- term fix. Mr. Biden can't do it for you. One Secretary that happens to be better than the rest is not going to be able to do it for you because they don't know squat about the institution when they arrive, and they don't really care about anything but the President's foreign policy agenda. They just want to travel around and be Secretary of State and do all the things that Secretaries of State do. But it's the people who do the day to day work. It's just like the workers in the factory used to be. They unionized. You all have a union. You don't use it for anything and you

demand less of it. So follow the "Young Turks," and take it over and make it work for you. You have a voice by law, but you don't use it.

Q: Well, that's a wake up call for sure.

KINNEY: And Eric's [Eric S. Rubin, president of the American Foreign Service Association] a good man. His daddy was a union man.

Q: He seems very good.

KINNEY: If somebody went to him with an idea and a vision and a demand, you know, you might even have a receptive President, unlike the ones who have just been sellouts to M in the past, waiting for the next Ambassadorship.

Q: That's true. I get the sense he really wants to do it.

KINNEY: He wants to do something, and he cares, but a leader has to have followers, and you all can't be leaders collectively if you don't get your act together. I'm not speaking to you personally, but I mean the whole Officer cadre. You ought to, by mutual agreement, agree that there will be no more damned affiliation groups. Time has passed, boys. It's too late in the game. No more hyphens. We're all going to come together and we're going to envision together and we're going to move forward together because otherwise the hyphens are going to do us in. We're Americans. We're American diplomats, let's act like it!

Q: Amen to that. Wonderful. Well, great. We—

KINNEY: I didn't mean to turn this into a sermon and a soapbox but anyway—

Q: We will be in touch as we follow up. I'll just say thank you. This is great. Have a good night.

End of interview