The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project  

**SUSAN M. KLINGAMAN**  

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*  
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Q: To begin with could you tell me when and where you were born and something about your family?

KLINGAMAN: I was born in Albany, New York on October 2, 1937. We lived in a small town called Delmar five miles southwest of Albany. I was the youngest of three children; I had a brother two years older and a sister five years older. My parents were not from that area. My father came from Iowa and was a graduate of the University of Iowa. My mother was a graduate of Oberlin College and had a master’s degree in money and banking from Columbia University, which was very unusual....

Q: I was going to say in the 1930s, wow...

KLINGAMAN: Actually she received her bachelor’s degree in 1925 and her master’s about 1927. My parents met while working at the New York Telephone Company in New York City. They moved to Albany in, I believe, 1929. They moved to a new house in Delmar a few years later. We grew up in that house and I lived there until I went off to college.

Q: You were a child of the Bell Systems.

KLINGAMAN: That’s right, yes. We were an AT&T family.

Q: Could you tell me a bit about your schooling and all, starting with the elementary.

KLINGAMAN: I went to an elementary school down the street from our house and then to a combined junior and senior high school, which was a central high school for a trivillage area including many rural districts. It was a very good high school.

Q: What sort of courses did you particularly like?

KLINGAMAN: Well my main interest at that stage in my life was in physical education. I loved sports. But in my junior year in high school and then again in my senior year in
high school I was blessed with a wonderful social studies teacher who was I would say ahead of her times. I had found American history extremely dry and boring from my other teachers but this teacher, Gladys Newell, also introduced us to subjects like urban growth, transportation and communication, and some of the social issues involved. She gave us a taste of economics also. So that by the time I graduated from high school I was not any longer convinced that I wanted to be a physical education teacher, so I thought I’d best go to a liberal arts school where I could explore other areas. And that is what I did. I went to Oberlin.

Q: I was going to say with a mother coming out of Oberlin at home. In this period, women were sometimes being sabotaged. You know, you were supposed to stay at home or not have a real job or something like that. Did you get any of that?

KLINGAMAN: Not really. I should say, first of all, that because my mother went to Oberlin and my sister also went to Oberlin, I was determined for a long time that that was definitely not where I wanted to go. I wanted to be different and do my own thing. And, as I said, I was interested for a long time in physical education. I applied to several colleges in New York State because I was interested in getting a New York State scholarship. One of them was Cortland, which specialized in physical education. But then at the last minute I did apply at Oberlin. This was largely because of that social studies teacher. And that is in fact where I ended up going despite the fact I did not receive a scholarship there.

Going back to the women’s issue. It is true in those days that it was not the style for women to work and my mother did not work. I do remember in my I think sophomore, junior, maybe senior year of high school my mother wanted to work part time and my father just simply said no, that he felt this would reflect on his ability to earn for the family and so she didn’t work for a living. She did do a great deal of volunteer work.

Q: This was one of the hidden props of the whole American society, the women who normally would have been in the work force but were out in the volunteer world.

KLINGAMAN: Well that’s right although that began to change with World War II when many women went off to work during the war. But I will say that as far as education of women was concerned in our family that was simply assumed. There was never any question but what my sister and I would go to college as did my brother and when the time came for me to consider graduate studies that was also considered “yes this is fine,” provided I could find a way to finance it.

Q: When you were in high school what were your reading habits?

KLINGAMAN: I read a great deal. I do remember that in grade school I won a prize for reading the most books, or the most number of pages, or something. I always read a great deal. My interest focused on historical novels, American historical novels, and then in high school I started to get really fascinated with biographies. I remember reading a biography of Sun Yat-sen; that really started getting me interested in political history. I
also liked Drums Along the Mohawk which was about revolutionary days in New York state. We also had piles of National Geographic magazines stored up in our attic which I used for school research projects.

Q: You were at Oberlin from when to when?


Q: How was Oberlin constructed? Did you start out as a major or did you take general courses?

KLINGAMAN: We took required courses basically the first year. But we were encouraged to indicate a major. We didn’t actually have to declare one. I indicated physical education. As a result of that my advisor was a physical education teacher my freshman year. I did take a course in American government my freshman year as one of my electives. I think that as soon as I got halfway through that course I had changed my mind and decided that I would major in government.

Q: Oberlin is in the Midwest. Did the outside world intrude? This was the height of the Cold War and you had the Suez crisis and the Hungarian Revolution and other things like that. Did that have much of an impression?

KLINGAMAN: Oh, yes. Oberlin College has always been very interested in what is going on in the world despite the fact that it is located on top of a swamp where it rains all the time, and at that time students did not have cars. Our means of transportation was the bicycle. But the news certainly came in. We had a lot of speakers from the outside world and I very distinctly remember demonstrations in Cleveland, which actually I did not participate in but I do remember some students did go to demonstrate in Cleveland at the time of the Hungarian Revolution.

Q: You mean in October of 1956?

KLINGAMAN: Yes, in October of ’56 and my very favorite Professor at Oberlin was George Lanyi, who was a Hungarian and had come over in the late 1930s. He definitely introduced us in a personal way to the politics of Eastern Europe.

Q: Did diplomacy come across your radar at this point?

KLINGAMAN: No. Not at all. Oberlin was basically toward the left of center on the political spectrum as far as most students and most professors were concerned. I didn’t have any exposure that I can recall to the government except I do remember something now, and this is very interesting. I haven’t thought about this in years. A recruiter from the State Department Foreign Service came to Oberlin College to speak at a career day. I went to that session, it must have been my junior or maybe my senior year. This State Department speaker was a woman, probably from the personnel office. She said to the audience very frankly that the Foreign Service was not a place for a woman. She did not recommend it.
The State Department was not something I was seriously considering anyway. I was very much interested in either going to law school or into college teaching. I think before I graduated I had centered my focus on college teaching, primarily because there were no scholarships available to law school and there were some available for college teaching.

Q: I am just wondering. I have a son-in-law who went to Oberlin. It was very much into causes. Had civil rights begun to break through at this point?

KLINGAMAN: Very definitely. Oberlin was of course one of the stations on the Underground Railroad and had a long history...

Q: It was a religious school originally?

KLINGAMAN: Well, it was founded by a congregational minister and a former missionary, and it was named after a German protestant pastor, John Frederick Oberlin. But by the time I was there it was not affiliated, formally affiliated, with the Congregational Church. Although one of the largest protestant churches in the town of Oberlin was the First Congregational Church, and I sang in the choir there.

Now about Oberlin and civil rights. Yes, Oberlin students and professors were very active on the civil rights front. I have a very distinct memory which I do want to share with you and that is that I was a reporter on the Oberlin Review, the Oberlin College newspaper, when Martin Luther King visited Oberlin in 1957, I think it was. He came and gave a talk about non-violent resistance. I wrote a feature article reporting on his speech and then had an opportunity to interview him after the speech. I remember it very distinctly.

Q: This was really very early in his career?

KLINGAMAN: Yes it was.

Q: He really hit his stride, you might say, on the American scene in the early 1960s.

KLINGAMAN: And I have a very vivid memory of that as well. Let’s move forward to the summer of 1963 after I joined the Foreign Service. I distinctly remember one day in the orientation course, the A-100 course, when the course director announced to us one morning that he was going to let us take the afternoon off. He said that we did not have to go to the march, that was our choice, but he wanted to tell us this was going to be a historic day. So he gave us the afternoon off. I went to the march. I stood under a tree near the Lincoln Memorial and heard Dr. Martin Luther King’s speech and I can still hear him saying “I have a dream that some day...” and his voice just rang out across the Reflecting Pool and it was just a moment I will never forget.

Q: Well going back, you graduated in 1959. You said you decided that political science was kind of your thing. Where did you want to go and what were your options?
KLINGAMAN: I wanted to go wherever they would give me a full scholarship. But of course I wanted to go to a very good school and I applied at Harvard, Columbia, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. At that time I was primarily interested in American government and also had become increasingly interested in comparative government and international politics.

My first choice was really Harvard because I wanted to keep my options open as to whether it would be in the American government direction or in the international relations direction and they offered a general political science graduate program. As it worked out first of all I received a Fulbright Scholarship to Germany and then I also received a Woodrow Wilson national fellowship which was designated to be taken at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. That was a full scholarship. I received scholarships from Columbia and Harvard also but they were not full scholarships so my decision was to accept the Fulbright grant for one year and then return to the United States and go to the Fletcher School on the Woodrow Wilson fellowship.

Q: I seem to be on a kick for Fletcher. I was interviewing on Wednesday Winston Lord who graduated from the Fletcher School.

KLINGAMAN: Yes, just ahead of me.

Q: And then yesterday or the day before I was interviewing Niles Bond who was in I think the second or third class. He went there in 1937 or ’38. So here we are.

KLINGAMAN: Right. A small school with many people who ended up in Foreign Service.

Q: Well first you went to Germany for a year is that right? Where did you go and can you talk about what you saw in Germany? This would have been in 1959?

KLINGAMAN: Yes, right, 1959-60. I went to Germany in September of 1959 to the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz. That university was chosen because there was a professor there who was specializing in French-German relations which is a subject I had thought I would like to focus on. As it turned out he wasn’t there the year that I got there. But Mainz was really an ideal place for an American student because there weren’t many Americans there. It was a wonderful year. I studied what Europeans consider to be modern European history and I also studied international law, all this in German.

The most important thing was that I really had a chance to practice German. I had had only two years of German in college. I had taken German strictly as sort of a last minute fling at Oberlin. basically in order to learn the language of my father’s ancestors, and it led to the Fulbright grant. I read and spoke and wrote in German at the university in Mainz. I also did a lot of traveling during the two month semester break. And in the spring of 1960 they gathered all the Fulbright students together in Berlin and that is where I met Willy Brandt for the first time. He was the mayor of Berlin, and he received the American Fulbright students then. It was very impressive for me as a young student.
Q: Tell me, coming from the quintessential American liberal arts school, Oberlin, and going to a German university can you compare and contrast the styles of teaching?

KLINGAMAN: Well the basic contrast is that the German style of teaching is the lecture with very little questioning on the part of the students. I did have two professors there who actually did allow questioning. One of them was a Swiss professor of international law who was in that respect very different from German professors and very much adored by the German and American students. I also participated in a seminar in which there was some limited discussion. But basically German education is much more formal with no exams until the final state exam at the end of the student’s university career. So for me of course it was much more relaxed. I didn’t have to study for tests although I did have to earn a certificate saying that I had satisfactorily completed a seminar.

Q: Did you get any feel for German political movements in particular as pertained to students?

KLINGAMAN: Not too much at that time. The university in Mainz was not a real hotbed of student activism.

Q: I don’t think any were in the ’50s.

KLINGAMAN: Possibly in Frankfurt but I just don’t remember that international issues or German domestic politics were much on German students’ minds in those days. This was still the Konrad Adenauer post war period. Germany was concentrating on rebuilding itself in every way, economically and politically. I will note, though, that some of the German law students I knew were struggling with what their parents and professors might or might not have known or done during the Nazi period.

Q: Well then you came back and you were at Fletcher when?

KLINGAMAN: I was at Fletcher from September of 1960 until I left for the Foreign Service in June of 1963.

Q: Since you started in September of ’60 did you get caught up in the election of 1960? This was one that sort of invigorated many people, younger students and all that.

KLINGAMAN: Yes, of course. The Fletcher School had a television set right outside the dining room and there were students from many other countries as well as the United States and we were all very interested. I remember a very major focus of our attention during my period there was the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. And John F. Kennedy of course was giving his speeches, which were very inspiring to most of us, including me. Kennedy seemed to be speaking to us...”Ask not what your country can do for you...ask what you can do for your country.” I remember those words well.

Q: Can you talk about the Fletcher School in those days as an institution and how it
operated and what you got out of it?

KLINGAMAN: The Fletcher School was small. It was under the auspices of both Tufts and Harvard and was on the Tufts University campus. There were about one hundred students. About 20% of them came from other countries. Professors were from Tufts and Harvard University and some from MIT. A number of foreign services from other countries sent their young officers there. Some of my classmates were from Japan, Belgium, Great Britain, Pakistan, and Luxembourg. One of my female classmates, Collette Flesch, later became the foreign minister of Luxembourg.

Although Fletcher was on the Tufts University campus and was sponsored jointly by Tufts and Harvard it had a lot of autonomy and was its own entity for all practical purposes.

Q: Did you concentrate on any particular area as you moved into this?

KLINGAMAN: I took the basic required courses. You had to take a certain amount of international economics, diplomatic history, international law and organization, and some world politics. Fletcher had very little in the way of geographic area studies. My favorite courses were international law and international organization. The professor in that field was very good and quite a character, Leo Gross. I also very much enjoyed international monetary matters. I took more of that than was required.

Q: Were you seeing yourself in sort of the economic field?

KLINGAMAN: No, not really. My major interest was really international politics. And I decided I wanted to focus my master’s thesis and eventual doctoral studies on some topic concerning Germany and the United States.

Q: What was the dissertation you envisaged?

KLINGAMAN: Well it was going to be a dissertation on U.S.-German relations between 1933 and 1936 which was the first three years of Roosevelt and the first three years of Hitler in Germany. The basic question I was trying to answer was whether the American government, media and people as a whole had any idea of the threat posed by Germany to Europe and to American interests.

Q: As far as you got did you find that the American media and others hadn’t really taken the measure of Hitler by this time?

KLINGAMAN: Between ’33 and ’36, certainly by ’36 the American government had a good idea of what was going on. I read all of the published diplomatic dispatches to and from the embassy and our consular posts in Germany. The persecution of Jews in Germany was well underway by that time. Basically what I found out was that there was quite a bit of knowledge about what was going on in Germany and, I would say, a significant amount of concern expressed by Foreign Service officers reporting from Germany. But nothing much was being done about it.
Q: Well of course the United States really didn’t have very much of a role in the world until really after World War II.

KLINGAMAN: That’s correct. Times have changed.
Q: At what point did you opt for the Foreign Service?

KLINGAMAN: Basically I would say I opted for the Foreign Service some time in 1962 and the reasons were essentially two. One is that the scholarship money ceased to flow after I completed my course work in 1962. I had financed my second year of course work at Fletcher with a scholarship from Oberlin and also a scholarship from the National Soroptimist Association. So by June 1962 I had received both a master’s degree in international relations and a master’s in law and diplomacy, and a few months later I passed my oral comprehensive exam to qualify for writing the Ph.D. dissertation. But there were no scholarships for the purpose of writing a dissertation. I had been working as a teaching assistant at Tufts for two years and also working part-time at Mass General Hospital to pay for my room and board at the house I was sharing in Cambridge. I was working away on my research for my dissertation. But it became clear to me that it would take me a very long time to complete the dissertation as long as I was working. So one major reason why I joined the Foreign Service was I needed the money. My original intention was to join Foreign Service for two, maybe three tours at which point I would leave and go back with all of this money and complete my Ph.D.

The other reason why I joined the Foreign Service, though, I must say I also had not given up my hope of teaching at a university and I had begun to realize at Oberlin and it was confirmed at Fletcher that the best teachers were those who had experience in the real world of government and politics. I felt that experience in the Foreign Service would be a great asset to my teaching career. And having had a wonderful experience overseas on the Fulbright, it seemed like a good next step. The more I think about it now, the more I realize that if I hadn’t had the Fulbright experience I probably would not have contemplated joining the Foreign Service.

Q: It makes excellent sense. How did you get into the Foreign Service?

KLINGAMAN: I got in the same way everyone else does. I took the Foreign Service exam but I took it in 1961 when I still felt I was on a straight road to teaching. I took the Foreign Service exam because almost everyone at Fletcher was taking it and I thought I might as well take it for the experience. I had absolutely no knowledge of the Foreign Service. I had no ambition to go into it. I took it. I passed it. And so they invited me to the oral interview in Spring 1962 and I thought I might as well take the oral interview and so I took it primarily for the experience. It was quite an experience!

Q: I like to capture these moments in time. Can you tell me about the oral exam, your experience?

KLINGAMAN: The oral exam for the Foreign Service was the longest and most grueling
and most confrontational exam I ever encountered before or since. In those days the name of the game was to make the interviewee as uncomfortable as possible. The reason was simply to see how poised we were, how we would extricate ourselves from potentially embarrassing or awkward situations, and how well we could think on our feet.

There were three male examiners on one side of the table and I was on the other side. I had prepared myself as best I could. In those days the gossip around the Fletcher School was that you should read the New York Times for several months, you should know where Yemen is located, you should be prepared for them to offer you a cigarette and not provide an ashtray, all of those little tricks. I was prepared for those but I was not prepared for the length and intensity of the exam. I was not prepared for some of the questions that I received which quite frankly were very sexist.

Q: Obviously today it is different.

KLINGAMAN: It is totally different.

Q: But could you talk about it?

KLINGAMAN: Sure. One of the questions was one I was well prepared for and it was simply what are you going to do if you are accepted into the Foreign Service and then you decide to get married. And my answer was quite simply that I would have to resign. They asked me why and I said there was a regulation in the State Department that requires women to resign if they get married, no matter to whom. So I would because I would be required to. I would not necessarily want to but that would be the requirement. They accepted that answer as obviously the correct answer. They didn’t ask me, really, for my views on that.

The other questions were simply along the lines of this: supposing you are a general services officer at a small hardship post in Africa and the toilet in the consulate or the embassy backs up. What would you do? I said that I would do what anyone would do. I would go around to see if anyone had a plunger and try to get it fixed. They accepted that. Another question concerned the economic development of a small country in Africa. You see in those days Africa was big.

Q: Africa was the hot button issue.

KLINGAMAN: I didn’t know much about Africa, but it was certainly seen as a glamorous spot in those days for many people interested in international relations. So the question was supposing I was the Ambassador of a small embassy in a country needing some economic development and an American came in and wanted to establish a lipstick factory. How would I advise this potential investor? I tried to explain that I didn’t think that the production of lipstick would contribute greatly to the economy of this particular country. They asked various questions like that.

They asked me what was the most embarrassing situation I had ever found myself in. I’m
sure this was a question they asked male officers, too. I recalled my Fulbright days in Germany when I was in Berlin and went to cross the street in East Berlin with a number of students and was stopped by an East Berlin policeman for jaywalking. He gave me a hard time and I had to talk to him in German and it had been a little tense but “I managed to wiggle my way out of it.” Well, you can imagine, the examiners thought that was hilarious, but I had definitely not meant it the way they took it! So there I was in an embarrassing situation of my own making, but I managed to keep my cool, and the moment passed.

But basically what I remember was that the oral exam was very long, over two hours without a break, and that I had a master’s thesis due the following day which wasn’t completed and I was anxious to complete this exam so that I could run home and finish typing my thesis. Finally they excused me. I had to wait outside in the hallway wondering whether I had passed. They called me back into the room and I had the impression the panel had been divided. They sat me down and said that I had been quite nervous during the exam and they thought I seemed more interested in teaching than in the Foreign Service but nevertheless they had decided to pass me. They then asked me what my plans were for the Fletcher School. I said that I definitely wanted to complete another year working on my dissertation and they allowed me to defer entering the Foreign Service for a year.

Q: So you came into the Foreign Service in 1963?

KLINGAMAN: Yes.

Q: Can you describe the basic officer’s course that is known as the A-100 course?

KLINGAMAN: First of all I would like to say that I had a brief assignment in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) for six weeks because the A-100 course didn’t start until August. I entered on duty June 10, 1963 one of the important dates in my life. I went to work in the German section of INR.

I remember this very distinctly because they were involved in preparing the visit of President Kennedy to Germany. Of course INR wasn’t the major office doing the preparation; that was the German desk. The officers in INR were wonderful to me. There were two Foreign Service Officers and one Civil Service veteran, Phil Wolfson, who were experts on Germany. They took me on. They had me writing papers for them. It was really a wonderful introduction.

I remember listening with them on the radio to Kennedy’s speech in Berlin and all of a sudden they got very excited and one of them began jumping up and down and said “Wow, they’ve taken my line!” The line was “Ich bin ein Berliner.” As we know now, this was the expression that went down in history. This was quite an experience for me. Then I went from there into the A-100 course.

Q: What was your impression of INR at that time?
KLINGAMAN: I had a very good impression of INR. That particular office was the West European office. I didn’t know much about the rest of INR. The West European office was basically half Civil Service, half Foreign Service. The director of that office was a high-ranking civil servant who also was a professor of history at George Washington University. I felt that INR was a very hardworking center of expertise on Central Europe.

Q: They certainly had it, I think, in those days with lots of experienced people who had been involved from during the war.

KLINGAMAN: Exactly. The office director/history professor I was talking about had been in the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) during the war. He had some interesting stories about that.

Q: So you went to the A-100 course. Can you describe the composition and what you got out of it?

KLINGAMAN: There were 50 officers, as I recall, 25 new State Department Foreign Service officers and 25 in the U.S. Information Service (USIS). The course was taught in the basement of Arlington Towers, an apartment complex in Rosslyn. Our course was taught in an area that had once been the apartment swimming pool. We had a great deal of training in the art of diplomatic correspondence as set forth in the time worn Diplomatic Correspondence Manual. We had a lot of consular training. I think we had four weeks of consular training. Basically that is what I remember about it.

Q: How did you find the consular training?

KLINGAMAN: Consular training was excellent and stood me in very good stead when I went on to my first assignment. It covered the full range of citizenship and passport law, immigrant and non-immigrant visa regulations, and special consular services including the ways to assist Americans in various types of emergencies overseas. We studied the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 very thoroughly. It was primarily textbook training. At that time the course was not the case study and role playing approach that it is now. It wasn’t the ConGen Rosslyn approach. But it was a very solid, solid background.

One thing that stood me in very good stead later in Dusseldorf was the instruction we received about the authority of visa issuing officers. The instructors emphasized to us that by law the decision whether or not to issue a visa was the decision of the consular officer. If we were visa officers our decision on visa issuance was final. In other words the consular officer had the decision and we were warned against being persuaded by higher ups to give visas for public relations reasons. I do remember that because I had to pull that one out of my hat later on.

I also learned the ins and outs of the residency requirements for naturalized citizens and that became a matter of interest because that law was challenged by a naturalized
American citizen living in the consular district I later went to, which was Dusseldorf. It was the Schneider case. Mrs. Schneider came from the Dusseldorf area which was my first post. Although the case was decided before I arrived in Dusseldorf I did meet her and knew about the case.

Q: Did you find any sexism in the Foreign Service as a young woman coming in?

KLINGAMAN: Not really. I mentioned the Foreign Service exam questions. I mentioned the marriage regulations. I knew that at that time only about two or three percent of the FSOs (Foreign Service officers) were women; that figure was being tossed about. I also knew that most of those women, almost all of those women, were doing consular work, administrative work or cultural work. But at that stage in my career I was innocent about the issue of discrimination against women. I was just operating on the assumptions that I had grown up with. At Oberlin I had never felt any discrimination. I did have a taste of it at the Fletcher School when I applied in my second year there for a scholarship from Fletcher and was told point blank by the man in the administrative office of Fletcher that scholarships were for men. That had come as a shock to me and had left a very bad taste in my mouth. But in all fairness I can also say that Fletcher did eventually arrange for me to receive a scholarship from the National Soroptimist Association for my second year of study at Fletcher. But that was the only taste I’d had of discrimination.

I did, however, experience another taste of it when I came up for reassignment after Dusseldorf.

Q: You mentioned several times the regulations when a woman gets married. But actually I’m told by someone I’ve interviewed, Eleanor Constable, who asked to see the regulation that there wasn’t a regulation. She married a Foreign Service officer, and there wasn’t a regulation.

KLINGAMAN: Oh, really, so it was all a nasty rumor? I know that in the 1960s we were told that women FSOs who married were required to resign whether we married within or outside the Foreign Service. I never actually checked on it myself but I had thought this was a regulation and that it was later changed in the early ‘70s.

Q: I think also behind it was the custom of the day that what do you do with a male spouse when you travel around and that could prove to be a problem.

KLINGAMAN: Okay, Dusseldorf. Let’s just talk about that a little bit and then move later into the women’s situation. Actually that was a wonderful assignment for me because I was one of two vice consuls in the consular section which was headed by a consul who was part-time consular, part-time administrative. He was sick a good deal of the time. There was also a several months gap between the transfer of the other vice consul and his replacement so what happened was I really had a chance to do a lot of the supervisory work in the consular section. We had seven German FSNs (Foreign Service nationals) in the section. We issued non-immigrant visas and handled citizenship and passport cases and a variety of special consular services. We had to assist Americans who
got into trouble with the law or were sick, needed money, etc. So I was exposed to the broad range of consular work. I had really I think an unusual amount of responsibility for a junior officer. I benefitted greatly from the experience and good advice of the FSNs, who were very helpful to me.

I was the only woman officer in the consulate general in Dusseldorf. In fact that turned out to be true in every assignment after that.

Q: Actually on the interview I feel that the women’s role is an interesting one. But you were in Dusseldorf from...

KLINGAMAN: October of 1963 until December of 1965.

Q: Incidentally because of the timing what was the reaction in Dusseldorf to the assassination of President Kennedy?

KLINGAMAN: I remember it very distinctly. That is one of my vivid memories. The news came through on a Friday night, after work. I had been invited upstairs to one of my colleagues for dessert and coffee and when I got up there she said they had just heard over the news that President Kennedy had been shot in Dallas. We were very concerned and then when I later left and went back to my apartment news came over that he had been killed. This was on a Friday evening there. The next morning, early in the morning, I went next door to the newspaper kiosk to pick up my newspaper. The old woman at the kiosk had tears streaming down her face. I was amazed. This was a woman who was sour and had never spoken a word to me. She was muttering over and over that this was such a terrible loss to Germans.

The streets were quiet. You could hear a pin drop. This was a Saturday morning in Dusseldorf, usually a time when Germans would be bustling around doing their errands. On this Saturday morning people were walking up and down the street with tears running down their faces. We opened up a mourning book at the consulate general. People lined up for days to sign that book. It was a deep, deep shock for all of Germany and of course for us as well. But I was struck by the impact that it had on Germans.

Q: Can you describe some of the problems that you had to deal with as a consular officer?

KLINGAMAN: Well they were varied. On non-immigrant visas the problem was always to determine whether or not an applicant was a bona fide non-immigrant or whether they in fact were really intending to immigrate and were trying to circumventing the immigration laws. There were a number of Germans who wanted to immigrate and at that time there were also some foreign workers in Germany who wanted to go to the United States. We had to do a lot of interviewing to determine whether or not they were bona fide non-immigrants. There was also the issue of former German war criminals wanting visas to the United States for whom we had to apply for a special waiver from the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) Actually in both issues, the bona fide non-
immigrants and the waivers, I ran into some problems with the consul general.

The consul general was a very nice man, very enthusiastic and hard charging but he really knew nothing about consular work. He was a lateral entrant. He had been “Wristonized,” which meant he had been integrated into the Foreign Service from the Civil Service. I remember very distinctly having a major difference with him. One of his German business contacts wanted “a clean visa” a visa stamped in his passport that would not indicate that he had received an INS waiver. This businessman had been convicted of hiring prison labor during the war and consular officers were required by law to apply for a waiver in such cases. I had to present the consul general with all the regulations to convince him that I had no discretion in such a case.

The other case concerned a woman who in my judgment intended to immigrate. I turned down her application for a visitor’s visa, and the next thing I knew the consul general called me up very upset about it. I remember going up to the consul general’s office and explaining to him that this woman was not a bona fide non-immigrant, that she did not qualify for an non-immigrant visa. The consul general argued that for public relations reasons, because she knew one of his contacts, she had to receive a non-immigrant visa. I remember that I stood up and pounded my fist on his desk. I said that if this was the way it was in the Foreign Service, if I had to issue a visa when I didn’t think it was legal, I didn’t want any part of it. I am amazed now to think I had the gumption to do this as a green vice consul. But I did it. The consul general just stared at me. He looked stunned. I think that probably after I left he called the embassy and found out that in fact I was correct. Anyway he called me up to his office the next day and said he wanted to thank me very much for bringing this to his attention as none of my predecessors had ever brought it to his attention. He said he had never really known what the criteria were for non-immigrant visas. So I think it was probably just plain greenhorn’s luck, or whatever, but I am very glad that I did that and he commended me for it on my efficiency report, which is what performance evaluations were called in those days. So this consul general was a major difficulty for me at first but we worked it out.

Q: Were there any problems with Americans in the area?

KLINGAMAN: Yes. There were a number of naturalized Americans, German Americans, who returned to Germany because their social security went farther there in their retirement. We had some that were on German welfare, some who were mentally ill who gave us problems. I remember one woman who was both on welfare and mentally ill who came in to my office and wanted yet another loan from our consular contingency slush fund. I declined to give it to her for various reasons and I distinctly remember her standing up, this is a woman giving another woman lots of problems, standing up, looking at me, saying “Have you ever had your eyes scratched out by a woman?” Obviously I hadn’t. I just looked wildly around me on my desk and saw the large, heavy black iron instrument which we used to imprint the seal of the United States on visas, with the long black handle. I stood, picked it up and said that no, I had never been scratched by a woman and didn’t plan to be now. She just moved right out of my office and I realized that I had the seal of the United States as my best defense weapon from
there on out!

I also handled some legal depositions, visited some Americans in prison, sealed the casket of an American citizen that was being shipped to the Philippines, and so on. It was interesting. I loved the special consular services’ aspect of the job because you never knew what was going to happen; you never knew what was going to walk in the door.

Q: I am a consular specialist by training. What about life in Germany in those days for members of the consulate?

KLINGAMAN: It was fun. The mark was four to one so our salaries went a long way. This was very fortunate for me because when I entered the Foreign Service I had exactly $100 to my name. I was able to buy a little Volkswagen Beetle after I had been there four or five months. I did a lot of traveling and I was able to start building up my household furnishings. I spoke German and enjoyed myself a great deal. My colleagues and I in the consulate went to Amsterdam on weekends a lot as we were near the border, and we enjoyed the old city sections in Dusseldorf and Cologne and other spots along the Rhine.

Also I think I should tell you that I became unofficially engaged to a German during this period, a German law student I had met during my Fulbright days in Mainz. So much of my social life was going back and forth to Mainz where he was. And he was coming up to Dusseldorf.

The marriage regulations, which we have mentioned, never really distressed me because I figured that if I married this German I would have had no intention of staying in the Foreign Service anyway. But I also want to tell you that the consul general wrote a very enthusiastic note in my efficiency report saying Miss Klingaman is a wonderful officer but she is now engaged to a fine German man and will be leaving the Foreign Service because of this. It was all very upbeat. Today of course you would not be allowed to mention something like this in a performance evaluation but he did, and it didn’t upset me at the time. As it turned out I didn’t marry this German. When I returned to Washington on home leave from Dusseldorf I saw that efficiency report in the personnel files and lo and behold that portion of my efficiency report had been underlined in red and flagged by the promotion panel. I was in fact promoted during my stay in Germany. I met one of the men who had been on that promotion board later and he said that they had decided to promote me anyway, despite the fact that I was going to get married. But the point is that a comment like that in my efficiency report could have kept me from getting a promotion and wouldn’t be allowed to be mentioned today in an efficiency report. But the fact that it was mentioned did not bother me at all at the time. Times have changed.

Q: You were there until 1965. Was there any sort of looking at politics in the Rhineland or anything like that?

KLINGAMAN: The consul general was the primary reporting officer on politics in the Rhineland. He never sought the assistance of the vice consuls in this effort. The closest I got to that was to be invited numerous times to his dinner parties. Why was I invited?
Because every once in a while at seven o’clock at night after I had returned home from work I would get a frantic call from the consul general. “Miss Klingaman, Miss Klingaman, one of the German wives can’t attend the dinner tonight. You know the Germans are very superstitious about having odd numbers at the dinner table so could you please come and fill in?” I went with mixed feelings, annoyance that my own plans for the evening had been disrupted but glad that I could be included at least to that extent with some of the higher ups. It was interesting for me although of course when the time came for after dinner discussions the men adjourned for their cigars and cognac and I went with the women into the sitting room. That bothered me at the time because I was interested in German politics, but it wasn’t something that I was going to make an issue of. I really couldn’t make an issue of it, and I wasn’t really so inclined.

Q: Also, it was a disciplined Foreign Service and it wasn’t just the women excluded.

KLINGAMAN: No, I guess the male junior officers were excluded, too. Actually they were not even invited to the consul general’s dinners because it was always a woman needed to fill in.

Q: I ran a big reception in Frankfurt. I ran the hat and coat concession. That was my job on a major event.

KLINGAMAN: Right. In those days junior officers didn’t question, and I was new and this was what you did and so that was that.

I was quite upset about one other thing though. Sometime during that period, I think probably in 1965, the embassy in Bonn invited the consulate general in Dusseldorf to send a junior officer to the embassy’s political section meetings. Our consul general sent the other vice consul in Dusseldorf, a male, who didn’t want to go. His interest was in becoming an administrative officer. He wasn’t interested in politics. He kept complaining to me that he had to go down to Bonn every week to these political section meetings. I said that I would really like to go but I never had a chance to go. I don’t know why I didn’t take it up with the consul general but I didn’t. It’s interesting when I think of it, because some time later I worked in the political section of the Embassy!

Q: Well, then, in ’65 what then?

KLINGAMAN: That was the big question. And then along came my first real introduction to problems facing women in Foreign Service. I was obviously going to stay in the Foreign Service for another tour. A man named Elwood Williams came out to Dusseldorf and other posts in Germany. Elwood was a Civil Servant on the German desk who was handicapped and was an expert on Germany. I think he had multiple sclerosis. He had for years taken a special interest in junior officers and tried to steer them in the right direction for their onward assignments. He came out to Dusseldorf and asked me what I would like to do next and I said that I really would like to practice using my French. He said that probably meant an assignment in what had been French West Africa, not Paris. I said that would be fine and so he went back to the Department and directed my name toward the African bureau.
At that time the personnel assignments were managed in the geographic bureaus rather than in a centralized personnel office in the Department. I went into the African personnel hopper and out came Monrovia, which of course is an English speaking post. So I was assigned to Monrovia. I went down to the PX in Bonn and bought all kinds of supplies for two years that I might need at that hardship post. Shortly before I was to leave in October of ’63 we received a dispatch by boat mail saying my assignment to Monrovia was canceled and news of my onward assignment would be coming soon.

I had no idea why the Monrovia assignment was canceled. I could not imagine and I was quite upset. So I had another few months in Dusseldorf. Then we received another assignment by boat mail, which was that my next assignment would be in the political section in Hong Kong. I thought that was interesting and certainly nothing I had ever imagined. I didn’t think I would be speaking any French but thought it was fine and sounded exciting. Why me, though? I wasn’t a China hand and had no aspirations in that direction, but okay. Then I sent off my air freight and was all ready to go on home leave and three days before I was scheduled to go we received another dispatch by boat mail which said the assignment to Hong Kong was canceled.

At this point I was very upset and word had also filtered through that the ambassador in Monrovia had not wanted a woman on his staff. In those days ambassadors could refuse any officer that they didn’t want for whatever reason. Rumors also came through that the assignment in Hong Kong had been canceled because the consul general there felt that that particular position, which involved working on refugee matters, would not be suitable for a woman. So I was about to say goodbye to the Foreign Service. I just felt totally disillusioned.

The consul general in Dusseldorf became very upset about this. He and my new immediate boss, Jim Hargrove, were very supportive and very encouraging. The consul general got on the phone with Bonn and the Department and what not and soon the Department came through, by airmail this time, with an assignment to Manila, the Philippines. So I left Dusseldorf in December of 1965, went back for six weeks of southeast Asia area studies in Washington and then went off to Manila.

Q: You were in Manila from when to when?


Q: What was your job in Manila?

KLINGAMAN: I was number two of two in the external political affairs section of the Political Section.

Q: Can you give me a picture of the Philippines in 1966 when you arrived there?

KLINGAMAN: That was the first two years of Ferdinand Marcos’s presidency. The
Philippines at that time, rather Manila, was known as Dodge City East. All the male Filipinos were packing their pistols, even on the golf course where I played. The domestic political scene was a very disorganized circus, I would say. Philippine politicians had lots of enthusiastic energy, and the parliament was very active. There was a lot of hope that Marcos would bring order and discipline to the country; that he would bring economic development.

Our embassy in Manila was large. The embassy worked very closely with the Filipinos on all kinds of issues. The Philippines had been a colony of the United States for 50 years so there was a long history of working with the United States. But there was also increasing anti-American sentiment on the part of students in the Philippines. The Philippines had rather a split personality when it came to the United States, a love-hate relationship. We brought a lot of good things to the country like education and English and economic development. But now there were some in the parliament and in the government who wanted the Philippines to assert its independence from the United States more. But they also weren’t quite sure where they were in Asia vis-a-vis other Asians.

The overriding activity as far as the American Embassy was concerned at that time in the Philippines was Vietnam. My job in the Philippines was greatly influenced by that. As the number two officer for external affairs I did essentially two things. One was to be liaison with the Foreign Office, primarily on United Nations issues. The person in charge of Philippine UN issues in the Foreign Office was a woman of ambassadorial rank, Ambassador Soriano. I had a very good relationship with her. Otherwise our embassy was very caught up with Vietnam. The Philippines did not send any combat troops to Vietnam, but they did send an army engineer battalion. Vietnam was a controversial issue in the Philippines.

I did a lot of public speaking to student groups on Vietnam. It was something that I personally struggled with a great deal. I was not convinced that the U.S. was on the right course in Vietnam. That sounds like very flip hindsight, doesn’t it? But it’s really true. I had taken a seminar at Oberlin on the relationship between communism and nationalism as political forces. We had done case studies of a number of countries including China and some in Eastern Europe. The conclusion was that both nationalism and communism were very strong forces. In Vietnam it seemed to me we had them combined in the North Vietnamese and in the Viet Minh. I was really struggling with this.

I thought that in Vietnam there was a very strong element of nationalism in the communist movement that would be hard for foreigners to beat. I was also skeptical that a communist victory would necessarily result in an expansionist Vietnam, that other countries would fall like dominos. I was really agonizing about this. I remember thinking about what I as an FSO should do if I thought U.S. policy was wrong. But I didn’t think that a junior officer like me could do anything that would make a difference. There didn’t seem to be any point in resigning over it. I remember once I expressed some doubts to a senior officer in the political section. He seemed surprised, and neither of us pursued the conversation.

I had to give speeches presenting the American position to some Filipino groups. I had
lots of material. This was “the light at the end of the tunnel” days. We had all kinds of
talking points on the history of the North Vietnamese incursions into South Vietnam, and
all kinds of figures. I knew at that time the history of Vietnam and U.S. and French
involvement backwards and forwards. When I talked with Filipino students I tried to
explain the reasoning behind U.S. government policy. USIS provided me lots of facts and
figures.

During that period we had the Seven Nations Summit meeting in Manila and I was very
much involved in the logistical backstopping of that. It was very exciting. It was my first
backstopping of a state visit and this was a seven nation state visit. It took place in
Manila. The city was painted up, literally, for the occasion. President Lyndon Johnson
and Lady Bird arrived; Dean Rusk, Secretary of State Rusk; and the chiefs of state and
foreign ministers of the other six nations which were Australia, New Zealand,
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Korea. It was a large event.

I have a very nice memory of that event. During that time I was called on to…I think it
was during that event, it might have been afterwards, in any event it was at a time when
Secretary Rusk was in the Philippines. I was the duty officer at the embassy and a
message came in for him and I was asked to deliver it to him. He was at the ambassador’s
residence at the time. I delivered the message to the residence and I had instructions to
await his reply that I was to hand-carry back to the embassy to be telegraphed back to
Washington.

I was just a mail girl, nothing exciting, but I delivered the message to the ambassador’s
residence and I sat down on a bench outside the front door of the residence to await the
reply. I waited and I waited and eventually the door opened and out came Secretary Rusk
and Mrs. Rusk with the ambassador and I was introduced. Secretary Rusk said that he
had heard the duty officer was a woman and that he wanted very much to meet me. He
shook my hand and he sat down and said he wanted me to know that he was very pleased
I was in the Foreign Service and thought we should have more women in the Foreign
Service. He wished me the best of luck. I was terribly surprised, very touched at how
very, very nice he was. It is a very nice memory.

Q: What was the reaction of the Philippine students when you went to talk to them?

KLINGAMAN: They were very, very anti-U.S. involvement in Vietnam. But they were
willing to listen. They always received me very politely. I explained to them that the U.S.
government believed that American military involvement was needed to promote a
democratic and economically viable South Vietnam. They listened to me. But they really
felt it was U.S. imperialism on the march. We had a lot of demonstrations in front of the
embassy, many, many student demonstrations. They were never violent. I mean they may
have thrown a few bottles but it was not violent. Filipino students never asked me about
my personal position. They probably assumed it was the same as the U.S. government
position.

I did have occasion to go up to the northern Philippines to give a speech on communism.
I was invited by a group of American Baptist missionaries. I think what they were expecting was a really strong anti-communist speech. I can tell you that my speech was very well received by the Filipino students in the audience. I don’t think the missionaries liked it very well. Basically what I said was that communism finds its mass base where there are conditions of economic and social injustice that are not being addressed. There was a guerrilla movement in the Philippines at that time…the Huks. They were quite strong in that area. I was really directing my remarks so that people would see that this was why the Huks were getting support…not so much from students but from people living in similar conditions that existed in the Philippines. The students really received the speech very well. The missionaries didn’t say they didn’t like it but I think it was not what they were expecting from the American embassy.

**Q: Who was our Ambassador while you were there?**

KLINGAMAN: Our ambassador was William McCormick Blair, a political appointee, a liberal Democrat. Very closely connected, I believe, with Adlai Stevenson. He was a very good ambassador. He traveled a lot in the Philippines. He took junior officers with him. He always treated me as if there were nothing special about me being a woman. I liked him very much and I thought he did an excellent job. He was very good at making speeches. We prepared talking points for him for his different stops. He made a point of visiting as many provincial capitals as he could.

The DCM was Richard Service who was a career man, the brother of John Stewart Service…John Stewart Service being an Oberlin graduate. We all know about his problems as a China hand during the McCarthy era.

I don’t know if we have time to mention it but I would just like to say that both William McCormick Blair and Richard Service supported me in my first two weeks in Manila. When I arrived I went into the political section. When I first arrived one of the junior officers who had been the ambassador’s aide for a year and was scheduled to go to the consular section for a year tried to shoot me out from under my assignment in the political section. So I was called into the DCM’s office the first week I was there and was told that there was another officer who would really like the position to which I had been assigned in the political section and how did I feel about that? I said I did not like the sound of that at all; I wanted a political assignment and this was why I was here. Service asked me to explain why I wanted political work, and I did. He supported me fully. I remember that.

**Q: What about Marcos? He was sort of the fair-haired boy wasn’t he as far as we were concerned at this period?**

KLINGAMAN: He was called “the great white hope in Asia.” People felt at that time that he was the one we could count on. He had an honorable record as a colonel in the Philippine armed forces in the military. He was considered to be talented, uncorrupted, and bright, and we placed high hopes on him. Now aren’t you going to ask me about Imelda?
Q: Yes.

KLINGAMAN: Because she was of course also there! In fact I did meet her a couple of times. It was Marcos’s wife who was the source of his political base because she was a Romualdez. The Romualdez family was a sugar family from the central Philippines and she was very early on known as the woman behind the throne, not necessarily in a negative way. Asian women, I guess for centuries, have been very strong behind the scenes and she was very strong behind the scenes. We knew that. We didn’t know how it would all turn out. But she was very prominent.

I met her a number of times. I never knew quite what to make of her. I saw her give public speeches. She was a very good public speaker. She was very good in going around to various cultural events. I do remember seeing her deliver a speech to a Filipino women’s organization. For some reason she had to leave early and I was leaving right behind her and saw her face change as soon as she was off stage. She became what struck me as a very cold and brusque woman who had been very good at putting on a pleasant face when she needed to for public relations.

I did meet her personally one time, again as a message-bearer. Hubert Humphrey sent her a message for some reason. He had met her and later sent a letter to her. I had instructions to deliver it to her personally. So we made an appointment and I went to Malacanang, the presidential residence, and I waited and waited and waited and finally she came to the reception area. She chatted with me for maybe twenty minutes. I was impressed to be in the presence of the First Lady of the Philippines; it was an experience, which I probably would not have been given if I hadn’t been a woman officer. As I recall she didn’t say anything much. It wasn’t a substantive conversation at all but I did meet her.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover in the Philippines?

KLINGAMAN: I just would like to mention that I started getting involved in international women’s issues there. There was a UN Conference that I participated in. I would like to talk a little bit about that.

Q: Great.

KLINGAMAN: I had the opportunity late in 1966 to participate in a United Nations regional seminar on the status of women. I think it was probably the first one of its kind in Asia and the Pacific. It involved a lot of countries. The United States was actually only an observer at this conference. A woman came out from the United States from the private sector and I assisted her. It was a very interesting conference. I frankly don’t remember a great deal about it but it was my first introduction to women’s issues and my first introduction to a multilateral forum.

I also wanted to mention that while I was in Manila I attended a Filipino protestant church called Cosmopolitan Church, which was about the only protestant church in all of
Manila with the exception of the British church where most of the embassy people went. I found it really a great opportunity to get to know Filipinos who were not in government. And there were also Filipinos who were active in the government in that church. One of them was the Ramos family. Foreign Secretary Ramos did not attend the church all that frequently at that time as I recall but his wife did and his children did. As I am sure you know one of his children grew up to be an army general who took hold of the Peoples’ Revolution in 1986 and is now President of the Philippines. I just find that interesting to look back on.

Q: On the women’s issue, when you came in, was there such a thing with the women who were in the Foreign Service that you were able to get together with other women and sort of sit around and talk about the state of things and all that or was each one kind of alone?

KLINGAMAN: Each one was pretty much alone although I must say my first two tours were overseas. In Dusseldorf I was the only female Foreign Service officer at the post and in Manila I was not the only one but there weren’t very many of us. The women’s issue was not really an issue at that time; it really hadn’t entered into the awareness of most women, certainly not really of myself except as I mentioned a little bit on the Foreign Service oral interview. I think that women FSOs pretty much felt that we’d do the best we could. I didn’t really have an awareness of being special, different or alone at that time.

Q: Probably it was healthier that way.
KLINGAMAN: Well I’ll get to that later. I mean in a way it was. It was healthy.

Q: There seems to be a tendency to put people in boxes now; it doesn’t work very well.

KLINGAMAN: I would agree and I want to get into that a little bit later but I really didn’t feel that I was being discriminated against in any systematic way. I didn’t really feel that my male colleagues treated me differently, so I was quite content.

Q: When did you finish off this tour so we get to your next assignment?

KLINGAMAN: Okay. Well I finished it up in February ’68. I just want to make one more footnote in light of today’s events. (May 15, 1998) One of my vacation trips from the Philippines in 1967 was a trip around Southeast Asia. I visited Indonesia almost immediately after the blood bath there that took place in 1965-66. I actually arrived there in ’67 and I have a very vivid memory of the streets of Jakarta at that time as being very peaceful, empty, nothing in the stores and Sukarno under house arrest in the palace and so on.

Q: This is when Suharto took over?

KLINGAMAN: Suharto had just taken over or was about to take over and Sukarno was under house arrest. I found Indonesia very interesting and I hoped that some day I could
go there on assignment but I was told Indonesia was just for Indonesia-hands and that probably I would never have a chance to go to Indonesia. But I did, actually, later.

Q: You are talking about Suharto taking over. Today as of May 15th Indonesia is in turmoil. Suharto is still in but sort of the tea leaves seem to suggest that he might not be in much longer.

KLINGAMAN: I’ve been listening to the news very steadily in the last couple of days.

Q: Well, then, in ’68 where did you think you might go?

KLINGAMAN: I knew I would go back to Washington. That was my plan and that is in fact where I did go. In those days as you probably remember the philosophy was pretty much that a junior officer was well advised to have one assignment in each functional specialty. In my case it had been consular in Dusseldorf, then an assignment in another specialty, which was political in Manila. So I felt the time had come to have an economic assignment since I had some graduate training in that. I did put that down as a preference for myself.

Just before I left Manila one of the officers in the political section, the assistant political counselor, Hugh Appling, took me aside and asked if I would be interested in an assignment in the Secretariat of the Department. He said it would give me a good overview of the Department. However, he then found out that the political counselor had already recommended another junior officer in the embassy for that job. That didn’t really upset me at the time. I really didn’t know what the Secretariat was all about and I think my next assignment came out fine. But it did introduce me to the idea that as a young FSO I should try to find out what assignments are available and also seek advice from an older officer who might try to steer me in the right direction. But in 1968 the personnel system saw to it that I received an assignment in E, the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department, which I started in March of 1968.

And another footnote here, before we turn to that. Just before I left Manila I got word that one of my Fletcher classmates, a U.S. Navy commander, had been killed in Vietnam. He was a navy pilot, and we had sat next to each other in international law at Fletcher.

Q: You were from ’68 until when in the economic bureau?
KLINGAMAN: ’68 to ’70.

Q: Did you run across Frances Wilson?

KLINGAMAN: Well yes I did and I didn’t. She was in charge of the personnel office of the economic bureau but I really didn’t know her.

Q: I was just going to say Frances Wilson was sort of a name to conjure with in the economic bureau. She kept very close track of who was an economic officer and made sure she kept her people together and they got assignments and she was a remarkable
KLINGAMAN: Right. She also had a reputation among some of the junior officers of being rather formidable. I really didn’t have much contact with her.

Q: What kind of work were you doing?

KLINGAMAN: I was assigned to a new office that turned out to be very frustrating. I guess you could say it was a very educational introduction to the bureaucracy because a new office has to carve out its own turf.

Q: Oh, yes.

KLINGAMAN: And that can be very difficult, especially for a junior officer who has never served in the State Department before. The office was called the Office of Commercial Affairs and Business Activities. I was in a section called the Division of International Business. It was new. A deputy assistant secretary who had come over to the State Department from the Commerce Department headed it. It was some kind of arrangement between State and Commerce. The State Department had just been given more commercial officer positions overseas, but the Department of Commerce wanted to keep its hand in it.

This deputy assistant secretary was a smart and experienced government official but he seemed to be rather contemptuous of Foreign Service officers. It was difficult at times but it turned out to be a really worthwhile experience for me. One of the functions of our office was to develop some regular channels of communication between the State Department and the business community. This was at the time, ’68 to ’72, when the United States had a balance of payments deficit. We were very anxious to expand our exports and our investments overseas.

I ended up doing quite a bit of speech writing about that subject. The good thing about it for me was that because I was writing speeches for senior officials in the State Department to deliver to businessmen I had to get around the economic bureau and find out what the issues were on the trade side and on the investment side. So it enabled me to meet a number of officers in the other economic offices and find out what they were doing. I must say that even though our office was a new one trying to carve out an area for itself these other officers were very helpful to me.

Q: What was your impression of American business and trying to do something abroad at that time. Obviously this is in mega terms rather than each individual.

KLINGAMAN: I didn’t really have any experience with American business in Dusseldorf or in Manila. Certainly American companies were there but I would say in general at that time that it was a much more arm’s length relationship between government and business than it is now. Businesses in general felt that the government was a necessary evil needed to maintain good relations with other countries and to
maintain a climate for American companies to do business, but they didn’t want government meddling in their affairs. I would say the converse was true of many people in the government. Sometimes businesses operating overseas were considered to be something of a nuisance, not always maintaining close relationships with the embassy and so on. I would just say it was arm’s length but cordial.

Q: In the last decade or so there has been great emphasis on change. I think one of our problems also has been that we were under instructions that we had to treat each company well; we couldn’t sort of choose between businesses. You could find yourself having to deal with a non-competitive climate...

KLINGAMAN: One of the developments that was beginning to come up at that time, and I do recall writing some paragraphs and speeches about this was the whole rise of the multi-national corporation. This was new. People were just beginning to realize that an American company operating overseas might actually be importing goods from the United States or that some of our imports might be from American companies located abroad, so that the whole issue of trade and investment became much more complex and interrelated. And also there were political implications for other countries that had American multi-national corporations operating in their territories.

Q: Well as you were writing these speeches and all did you find that any particular issues or products or anything crossed your radar as being a particular difficulty or problem?

KLINGAMAN: Not really. The big push at that time was just simply to encourage American business to get into the export business as much as they could. At that time the ratio of exports to our gross national product was very small. I think it was about four percent or something. It is much more than that now. We were also trying to encourage American companies to invest more overseas. The main thrust, as I said, was to try to improve our balance of payments situation.

I would like to go back for a minute to when I arrived in Washington in the early spring of 1968. This was my first tour in Washington. I was new to the city, to the State Department, and to government work in Washington. About two weeks after I arrived I was living in a hotel in Washington, looking for an apartment. I remember having dinner one night at the Roger Smith Hotel downtown, and I walked out of the restaurant after dinner and Washington had just gone up in flames! Martin Luther King had been shot. He was shot in early March of ’68. They imposed a 4:30 p.m. curfew in Washington for a number of days. Shortly after that Bobby Kennedy was shot. And all along we had the Vietnam protest demonstrations. It was a turbulent period.

Q: Did you get caught up in something called JFSOC? I can’t remember what it really meant but it was basically a junior officer sort of organization that was quite active in those days and sort of represented the era.

KLINGAMAN: Yes, sort of the young Turks! It was really a part of the Foreign Service Association, the junior FSOs. Yes, I do remember it. I wasn’t one of the activists in it. I
recall in 1970 or so when we bombed Cambodia...

Q: '69...spring of '69 when we went into Cambodia.

KLINGAMAN: I’m thinking of the time a group of young officers signed a petition questioning our policy.

Q: They weren’t only young but predominantly I think...did you get involved in that?

KLINGAMAN: I wasn’t involved but one of my young colleagues in INR was involved in that. I just remember that a few months after I left the economic bureau and went to INR one of the young FSOs in my office was called up to the seventh floor to a meeting with, I think it was U Alexis Johnson (then under secretary for political affairs). This FSO was one of a group that had sent a letter to Secretary Rogers opposing our bombing Cambodia. I found out later that President Nixon wanted them all fired but that didn’t happen. I guess it was also around this time that the Open Forum panel and the dissent channel and so on were established so FSOs could dissent if they did so responsibly and not have their careers ruined for doing that. I do remember that. 1970 was also the time of Kent State. It was a very difficult time for a lot of us.

Q: Kent State was a university in Ohio where the National Guard fired on some protesting students over Vietnam and killed a couple.

KLINGAMAN: They killed four students. This was a tragedy that hit me especially hard, because Kent State was close to the Oberlin campus and the Oberlin community was very much in grief over that shooting. The Oberlin college choir and some of the townspeople joined in and came to Washington and gave a concert at the Washington Cathedral as a memorial service for the students who had been shot. I attended and I remember it very distinctly.

Q: Were you caught up at all in the debates among fellow officers and all about Vietnam?

KLINGAMAN: Not really. No. I really wasn’t. I was concentrating on learning how to do my job and getting myself oriented to the ways of the State Department and the Washington bureaucracy.

Q: Getting speeches done. I assume there was quite an elaborate clearance procedure and all this?

KLINGAMAN: Well yes. On the economic speeches I went around to the different offices in the economic bureau. We’d seek contributions from them for the speeches and they also cleared my speeches, which is one way I got to know what the economic bureau did.

Also during that period, in late 1969 I think it was, I was called to serve on a promotion
board. I was the only female officer on that board.

*Q: At that point you had looked at economic, consular and political. Were you thinking about whither?*

KLINGAMAN: I was thinking about whither and I made my decision for political. People in the personnel office tried to dissuade me and others from going into that cone because it was a very popular cone and the handwriting was beginning to come on the wall even then that this might not be the best route to follow for promotion purposes. But I decided that I was single, had no dependents and this was what I wanted to do and so I was going to do it. So there! And they allowed me to do it and I did do political work most of the rest of my career.

*Q: ’68 to ’70 you were in the economic bureau.*

KLINGAMAN: Right.

*Q: And then did you get another assignment?*

KLINGAMAN: Yes. ’70 to ’72 I was in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research again, in INR, where as you will recall I had spent six weeks early on. I was again in the western European section of that working on the European Communities (EC). In many ways this was a combination of economic and political so it was ideal for me.

*Q: Oh, yes, very much, because particularly at that point it was almost exclusively an economic unit, wasn’t it?*

KLINGAMAN: Yes it was almost exclusively an economic unit at that time but before my tour was over by 1972 the European Community members were starting political cooperation in foreign policy areas. The big issue at that time was the application of the British to join the EC and much of my work focused on that, on whether or not the British would join. And if they did, what would be the implications for Britain and the United States? And the second issue that I looked at was whether the EC would integrate further economically and whether EC member countries would also move toward some kind of political union. What would this mean for the rest of Europe? What would this mean for U.S. relations with Europe and so on? It was a very active period in the European Communities.

*Q: You know we had, particularly in the ’60s, we had the George Balls and others who were Europeanists to the core. In fact in many ways you could say if there is anything besides being against communism, the other one is European integration so that these bloody people over there won’t get into another of their civil wars between France and Germany and drag us in. Those are sort of the two cornerstones.*

KLINGAMAN: The U.S. government gave a lot of lip service to western European integration. Yes.
Q: From your point of view can you capture the attitude that you were picking up and what you were promulgating at the time?

KLINGAMAN: Well actually between ’70 and ’72 there were more voices being heard around the country and somewhat within the government about whether this was really a good thing for the United States. I think the emphasis had been after the Second World War that yes, of course European integration would be a great way to encourage European recovery, Western European recovery. It was a great way to tie Germany, of course, which was divided, to tie Germany together with France in some way that would make them mutually dependent and hence, the theory was, peaceful. But people were beginning to think that well now, it looks like this is in fact happening but what is it that we have been giving all this lip service to? What is it going to do to us? What will it do to our trade interests?

Q: Particularly looking at a possible closed customs union?

KLINGAMAN: Right. Well the EC had moved very much toward a customs union and it had also developed a common agricultural policy among the six original members with common external tariffs and quotas and what have you that were shutting out American agricultural exports. The EC was also subsidizing its agricultural exports competing with us in other markets. So people were beginning to look at it in a much more differentiated way, I would say. I remember I wrote a major INR paper on the implications for the United States of British entry into the EC. I got a note later saying it had been used as a basis for a speech given by Under Secretary Samuels.

I was also called upon to give a speech in Morgantown, West Virginia, for some reason. There was some conference being held at the university there on European integration. Of course I presented the U.S. Government position which was yes, we favor this for various reasons that I have more or less just stated. Yes, it does have economic implications for us, but that we feel it will be in our long-term interests to support continued European economic integration and British entry into the EC.

Q: How were you looking at Britain because as I recall Britain was shilly-shallying and the French didn’t want Britain in at the time, was that it?

KLINGAMAN: The focus that I remember was on whether Britain would decide to join. I think it was pretty well decided by that time that if Britain wanted in they would get in. It was pretty clear that Britain would probably go in. Although Britain stood to lose in some ways, one of them being that it would have to contribute a lot of money to the European Community budget to support among other things inefficient German farmers and things like that, people basically felt it would strengthen the British economy and really force the British to undertake some needed economic tuning up of their own. This is in fact what happened. Of course in addition to British entry there were other applicants including Ireland and Denmark.
Throughout that period the U.S. official policy, and I think it was basically held throughout the government with perhaps some misgivings within some departments, was that we supported further European integration and British entry, the so-called enlargement of the EC.

Q: Did you find any debate within INR about the EC?

KLINGAMAN: Not within INR really, although there was a new economic office in INR that was beginning to look at the EC issues from a strictly economic perspective. But there was some ongoing debate between the INR analysts and the analysts on the research side of the house in the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). I think that to some extent this was simply reflective of the differing views held by the directors of the two offices involved. The CIA research office working on the EC usually had a comment at the end of its analyses that said that all of this was looking good and if we don’t have European union today, we’ll certainly have it tomorrow. Whereas our office would always have a comment, and it was my boss’s comment, which would be that you might think it looks like we are heading toward European integration but look out for the French, they’ll never stand for it.

People were speculating at that time about the possibilities for monetary union. There already was a plan. The French had put forward the Barre Plan for monetary union. We did point out, and I think rightly so…I know rightly so…that full monetary union has tremendous political implications because it certainly restricts freedom of individual countries to run their own fiscal policy, and their own monetary policy and all that entails domestically and politically within each country. At that time also the six member countries of the European Communities were also starting to consult on foreign policy issues. They did not always speak with one voice but they were beginning to try to do so. You were beginning to hear about an EC voice in the United Nations for example. I think to some extent within NATO, also. So there were the beginnings of political consultations on foreign policy issues at that time.

Q: How did INR and your particular field sort of integrate into the geographic bureau?

KLINGAMAN: I had a good relationship with the regional political-economic part of EUR (the European bureau) at that time. In fact it was made very easy because one of my predecessors in my job in INR, Terry Healy, had moved to the European bureau and was doing EC work in the European bureau. She was a female FSO also, not that that necessarily made any difference, and we had a good relationship. She knew where INR was coming from. It was a good relationship. I was able to write papers that the European bureau didn’t have time to write because of their daily operational responsibilities. They in turn gave me some insights that I might not have gleaned from some of the cables that I was using for my analysis.

Q: What was your feeling about where this was developing, I mean as far as the European economic...
KLINGAMAN: My feeling was that it was definitely developing further. They had a customs union by that time. I mean the internal tariff barriers among the six had been removed. They had common external tariffs. They had a common agricultural policy. They had a plan for monetary union. They were moving toward a common industrial policy, trying to harmonize their respective company laws, rules on subsidies, etc., and it also looked like they were determined to move ahead on consultations on foreign policy. I felt that it would be a slow process but I felt that it would move forward. At the time that I left INR in February of ’72, the British were about to enter the EC.

Q: Was there consideration of, and correct me if I’m wrong, two of the major problems which are real today and that is the social net or whatever you want to call it, unemployment, very expensive programs which particularly France and Germany have, and also in the subsidized agricultural side. I mean, these seem to be the two major problems being presented.

KLINGAMAN: The major social and political issues, yes there was attention being paid to that. The Germans insisted that the German farmers continue to be subsidized. There was an awareness as I said before that further integration within the EC could mean real problems domestically in the individual countries, particularly if they headed toward monetary union. There could be real problems of people being thrown out of work in certain industries in the less efficient countries. They had started an EC community social fund at that time. Now I don’t recall how large it was. The issue hadn’t really been joined because monetary union had not yet come about nor had there developed a common internal policy on industries. But there was awareness that this was a problem and a problem that is really not the same as it might be in the United States because there isn’t the social mobility among the countries that you have in the United States. It is even limited here. But there you are dealing with different languages. It is not that easy for an Italian worker to suddenly pick up and move to France.

Q: Well then in ’72 whither?

KLINGAMAN: In ’72…by that time I knew that I might have some influence over my next assignment so I had begun to make some contacts. I really wanted very much to go to Denmark. The reason I wanted to go to Denmark was that my family had become pen pals with a family in Denmark shortly after the Second World War. I don’t think I mentioned that earlier but it was an interesting and really quite accidental happening. This family had received a box from the Red Cross at the end of the war with clothing in it which had our name and address on the box…or had our name on a Christmas card, because the Red Cross had taken it off of the box that we had used to take clothes for donation. This little Danish girl, Inge Frederiksen, decided to write us a thank you letter. It resulted in a steady correspondence between the parents and children of both families. It was really a nice relationship between our two families because the Danish family had four children and their ages corresponded to me and my brother and sister. I had met this family when I first visited Denmark during my Fulbright year in Germany. So I really wanted to go to Denmark. I obtained the support of the Danish desk in EUR and presented my reasons and I was assigned to the political section in Copenhagen by way
of six months of Danish language training at FSI.

Q: So you went to Denmark in ’72 until when?

KLINGAMAN: Are you ready for this? August of ’72 until July 4, 1973, after six months of Danish language training. Six months of solo Danish language training from which I emerged as a 4/4 in Danish, a high proficiency level in both speaking and reading.

Q: Oh my God. Sounds like you were caught spying or something!

KLINGAMAN: No.

Q: Well we’ll come to that. But I take it with a 4/4 in Danish, this is a four speaking, four reading Danish you must have melded with the language.

KLINGAMAN: First of all I was the only student, which helps. Secondly Danish is in some ways related to German, and I had a good mastery of German. The lexicon of Danish is closely related to German. The pronunciation, however, is not so I did have to learn the pronunciation. The grammar of Danish is much easier than German. It is much more similar to English.

Q: They don’t put the verb at the very end?

KLINGAMAN: No, it’s much more an English subject, verb, object word order. The pronunciation is horrendous. That is where it was very helpful to be alone with a Dane. My instructor was not a language instructor as such. He was an elderly gentleman who was a portrait painter who had been brought in by FSI because he was a Danish speaker. I was highly motivated to learn Danish.

Q: Arriving there in ’72 what was the political situation in Denmark?

KLINGAMAN: Well the domestic situation in Denmark was stable but very interesting always because there are a number of political parties in Denmark, I think at that time six or seven. They run from the left wing socialist to the right wing conservatives with various shades of liberalism in between. At that time on the domestic political front there was a new issue. That was the rise of an anti-tax party for the first time which threatened to take a large proportion of the vote. It was led by a man named Glistrup who was not a veteran politician at all and that was the interesting aspect. When I was there they held elections and that party won as I recall close to ten percent of the vote. This was significant in Danish politics because it gave this anti-tax party some potential power as a king maker or coalition maker or whatever.

Q: They were anti-tax...was it full anti-tax or how did they come out?

KLINGAMAN: They wanted tax cuts. Taxes were very high in Denmark and one of the first things you notice there is that nobody but nobody wants to work overtime because it doesn’t pay. It is all taxed away. So there was strong sentiment that taxes were too high
but at the same time of course we do like our welfare state and Denmark is very much a welfare state...was at that time and still is, cradle to the grave you are taken care of. But there was an awareness that this was also stifling initiative, stifling anything that could require overtime work.

_Q: Who was your ambassador at the time?_

_KLINGAMAN: We had a political appointee named Fred Russell._

_Q: What was his background?_

_KLINGAMAN: I believe he was in the hardware business and had made large political contributions._

_Q: You are giving me that sort of shaking your head, rolling your eyes..._

_KLINGAMAN: Well let me just say this. Denmark like other countries is a very nice place to be and so it was a favorite for political appointees. The Danes were becoming increasingly tired of receiving political ambassadors who did not seem to know too much about Denmark. I say this with some hesitation because I know this is all open information here. The ambassador was something of an embarrassment at times because he was quite a womanizer at his own cocktail parties and he was also quite a drinker. So at times the Danes felt very uncomfortable with him and at times some of us felt uncomfortable with him also._

_Q: He sounds like a boor._

_KLINGAMAN: I admired our DCM greatly for being totally professional and managing the situation very well._

_Q: Who was the DCM?_

_KLINGAMAN: Tom Dunnigan._

_Q: Oh, yes, Tom does interviews for us._

_KLINGAMAN: I would say the situation was managed well, but the Danes really would have appreciated I think a career diplomat as ambassador once in awhile. Although, I’m sorry I don’t recall the name now, but there had been a female ambassador, a political appointee I think, who had been highly regarded by the Danes._

_Well, apart from the domestic politics in Denmark the main issue that was going on related very much to my job in INR previously. The main issue was whether or not the Danes would join the common market. They had applied along with the British and there was a public referendum on that issue when I was in Copenhagen. The Danish government’s policy was pro-entry, obviously, because they had applied for entry. The public was not wholeheartedly behind it. Denmark is a small country. It was once a large_
country but had become a small country, a very proud country, and there was concern among many Danes that this would really diminish Danish sovereignty. There was concern that membership in the EC might undermine the Danish social welfare programs and in general threaten Denmark’s freedom of action. So there was a referendum while I was there in ’72. The Danes did vote for entry into the Common Market at that time.

Q: What was their concern about Denmark and NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, at that time? It supported NATO?
KLINGAMAN: Denmark was a member of NATO. But the Danes were not always fully supportive of the U.S. positions in NATO. I don’t really think it was a public issue in the sense that there was any serious thought among most Danes that they should withdraw from NATO but the Danish people were not as pro-NATO as people in some other countries.

Q: What about making contacts? I’ve heard that the Danes are very charming, very nice people but basically very difficult to get to know.

KLINGAMAN: Well I didn’t have problems because for one thing I spoke good Danish. I was the best Danish speaker in the embassy, and the Danish family who had been pen pals with our family lived in Copenhagen and I spent time with them. As I said before I had met them when I was a Fulbright student in Germany and had gone up to Denmark and visited them. It was a really nice relationship between the two families because that family had four children and their ages corresponded to me and my brother and sister. So I had a good relationship with this family, and I saw them often. I spent Christmas with them. I really became quite well acquainted with Danish culture through them.

The Danes are relaxed, friendly, pleasant people. They are very family oriented and they treasure their privacy. They are perhaps not easy for most foreigners to get to know but even in developing political contacts in Denmark, I didn’t have problems. I think a lot of it had to do with the fact I spoke Danish. There were some women parliamentarians in the Danish Parliament and there were some women journalists I got to know. But I also had professional contacts with Danish men in the Parliament and the foreign office. One of the duties I had was to periodically visit the foreign office after they joined the Common Market to get a debriefing from them on the political consultations going on among the EC members on foreign policy issues.

Q: How were relations with the Danes and Germany at that point?
KLINGAMAN: Most Danes did not like Germans…with good reason. The Germans in the Second World War occupied Denmark. Danes didn’t like it, for example, if Americans pronounced the name of their capital city, Copenhagen, the way the Germans do, with a short “a” rather than a long “a.” That is what most Americans do, thinking it is Danish but in fact the Danes do not pronounce the name of their city the way the Germans do and the Danes preferred foreigners to pronounce it the American way. The Danes didn’t have much love for the Germans, but the two governments had good relations.
Q: Are there any other issues you were looking at, was the embassy looking at Nordic issues too? Were the Danes at that time really looking closely at the Swedes and Norwegians?

KLINGAMAN: They always had a close relationship with the Swedes and Norwegians. Of course Norway and Denmark were united for awhile as one country. They had a close relationship but Sweden of course is neutral and Denmark and Norway were both members of NATO. Only Denmark joined the Common Market, however. There always has been sort of a Nordic solidarity and a feeling and so on. But the Danes are very good at looking out for their “little Denmark”.

Q: Was their concern at that time about their almost close neighbor East Germany and the Soviet Union? Was this a preoccupation of the Danes?

KLINGAMAN: It probably was a preoccupation of the government. I never sensed that the public felt uneasy about it, although East Germany was just across the water and the Soviet Union wasn’t far off. But Denmark was in NATO. The Soviet Union had a very active embassy in Denmark and that concerned us. But when I was there the major issue for the people and the political parties was whether or not Denmark would join the EC. That was the main concern. Did they need to do this?

Q: How about exports?

KLINGAMAN: The Danish were active traders and their economy was doing very well at that time.

Q: I recall at that time Danish furniture was ‘the’ thing.

KLINGAMAN: And the Danish had good ties out there in Thailand, where it came from!

Q: The move on July 4, 1973, why?

KLINGAMAN: Why did I leave Denmark where I was having such a good time and speaking Danish? Well, I left kicking and screaming. My job was abolished. It came as a terrible shock to me. I had arrived in Denmark in late August 1972. I had a very tough time finding an apartment that I could afford in Copenhagen; I did not want to go out to the suburbs. So I lived in a hotel almost four months before I did manage to find an affordable apartment near our embassy. Then shortly after I moved into that apartment word came that my job was abolished. The reason for the abolition of my job was not that it wasn’t needed and it wasn’t that the embassy didn’t need to have a good Danish speaker, it was simply that the State Department had to abolish a number of positions in western Europe in order to staff U.S. government trade missions in eastern Europe. Remember I was talking earlier in this interview about promoting U.S. exports and so on? So it came to roost on my shoulders so to speak.

The European bureau had to provide those positions. They took positions out of western Europe to staff the commercial posts in eastern Europe and mine was one of them. I was
very, very upset at the time because I had Danish; the Department had invested six months of time and money and my time in training me in Danish. The embassy was very upset about it. I was ready to resign. I was committed to the Foreign Service but I wasn’t committed to being kicked around. So I sat down and wrote a letter; my boss told me who to write to. So I sat down and I wrote a letter to the director of personnel in the State Department and set forth why I felt I should stay.

Among other reasons I stood to lose a lot of money because I had had to put down a large security deposit on an apartment which was non-refundable, various amounts of money up to the tune of about $1,500 which I stood to lose.

Q: That is big money there.

KLINGAMAN: Very big money for me or anybody. Also I was looking for a promotion and I thought well, less than a year in Denmark and now I am going to go off to a new job and what is this going to do to my promotion possibilities? I should say that I had been really fortunate in moving up pretty rapidly. I had joined the Foreign Service as a 7, an 07 at that time, which was the second rung and had been promoted when I was in Dusseldorf to 6. Then I had been promoted to 5 when I was in Manila. I was looking to advance to an O-4. But by 1972 I had already been four years in grade, almost five years actually. I was very concerned about my promotion chances. And I was very concerned about the fact that I had learned this language that I could not use anywhere else and so on.

So out came the executive director of EUR (European bureau) to visit Copenhagen. Her name was Joan Clark. She was making a trip to various posts in Europe and she came to Copenhagen and talked with me. I didn’t know her. I just knew she was the executive director of the European bureau and was somebody important. But I didn’t care how important she was, I would tell her how I felt. She asked where I wanted to go next and I said I wanted to stay here in Copenhagen, and she got a very pained look on her face and said I could not stay here, so where would I like to go? I said I did not know but I would like to have a good job in a political section. She asked me how my German was and I said I was a 4/4+ plus in German. She looked sort of stunned and she said how about Bonn, Germany? And that is in fact where I went.

Looking back on it of course it was a very good opportunity. It was a wonderful opportunity. I was still not happy about leaving Denmark and the Danes were not happy either. One of the Danish journalists wrote an article in a major Danish newspaper saying here is an officer from the American embassy who speaks fluent Danish but she is not staying, she has been called to Germany. They did not like it. Germany of all places! It turned out to be a wonderful opportunity for me. I arrived in Bonn in July of ’73.

Q: You were there until when?

KLINGAMAN: I was going to be there for four years. I ended up being there until
September of 1975.

Q: What was your job in Bonn?

KLINGAMAN: I was in the political section. I was one of two officers reporting on German domestic politics, the number two of two on the internal side of the political section. It was a large political section. I would say there were about ten officers in the political section: the political counselor, assistant counselor, politico-military officer, external political officers, and two or three working on nothing but Berlin matters at that time.

Q: Who was the ambassador and who was your immediate supervisor?

KLINGAMAN: The ambassador was Martin Hillenbrand; the political counselor was Frank Meehan, his deputy was David Anderson and my immediate supervisor the first year was Chuck Kiselyak, and the second year Bill Bodde.

Q: It was a very strong section.

KLINGAMAN: Yes, it was.

Q: I know David Anderson. I supervised him as a vice consul in Belgrade, his first overseas job.

KLINGAMAN: Wonderful guy.

Q: Yes...it is too bad...he just died.

What sort of piece of the internal political pie of Germany did you have?

KLINGAMAN: Basically we divided it between younger and older politicians in Germany. In other words I was primarily responsible for establishing contacts with younger politicians and students and the youth wings of the parties. My supervisor was in charge of the more senior politicians. But it wasn’t that clear a division. Actually in the first year my supervisor was away part of the time on promotion board duty so I established contacts with some of the senior politicians also in his absence and attended the political party congresses. So it wasn’t an exact division but that is basically how it was.

Q: Talking about the student wings and all, ’68 was the big year of students all over. You had Red Rudy and others and student demonstrations helped bring down the De Gaulle Government in France and all...were the students pretty active when you were there?

KLINGAMAN: Well this was ’73 to ’75. This was later. It was not so much the students any more. Those who were really politically active had gotten into the youth wings of the parties and that was really where the young political action was taking place. At that time
it was the Jusos, the Young Socialists, the youth wing of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). That was the big focus of attention. Now the Christian Democrats (CDU) also had a youth wing, as did the Liberal Free Democrats (FDP). They all had youth wings and the youth wings were important within the parties because for one thing they were channels for the ideas of political young people. And they were also the reservoir and the training ground, if you will, for future political leaders not only for the state governments of Germany but also the national Parliament, the Bundestag. I spent a lot of time developing contacts with the leaders of the youth wings of the three parties.

I also developed good relationships with young parliamentarians in each of the three parties, and also with some of the younger functionaries in the party headquarters and some the staff assistants of some of the political leaders. I had good contacts with Kohl’s staff assistant in Bonn and I also knew Horst Teltschik, who was Kohl’s assistant in his office in Mainz.

At that time we were encouraging US-German youth exchanges. I worked with the German political parties in organizing some exchanges of young German and American political leaders. The Social Democrats were particularly interested in developing contacts with young Americans, and I worked with a man named Hans Peter Weber in the SPD headquarters on this. There were some visits back and forth with some American groups. I think one was called the American Youth Council and the other was the Young Political Leaders or something like that. They weren’t really the equivalents of the youth wings of the German parties but at least it was some sort of contact.

I also worked on nominating embassy candidates for the U.S. government “young leaders grants,” which was an excellent program for sponsoring orientation trips to the U.S. for people we thought might become future leaders in their countries.

I had a special opportunity to establish some new contacts with the Young Socialists. My predecessor had started this and I was able to continue it. The Young Socialists were much more interested in talking with the United States than they had been when we had been involved in Vietnam. When we disengaged from Vietnam it was then politically okay for them from their point of view to have contacts with American embassy people.

I was able to develop a very good contact with the man who had been the chairman of the Young Socialists in the early ‘70s. When I arrived he had graduated from that position and was very active in politics in the state of Hesse in the Frankfurt area. I was interested in getting to know him; and he was interested in getting to know someone in the embassy that he could present his views to. His name was Karsten Voigt. I met him in Bonn; I was introduced to him. He was not in the Bundestag at that time. I was introduced to him in Bonn and he invited me to visit him and his wife in Frankfurt for an evening, which I did. I think it was in the spring of ‘74. We had a good rapport with each other. One reason was that he had spent time in Denmark. He had studied for a year or so at the University of Copenhagen. So we had that common interest. But I really didn’t know much about him except that he was one of those young, left wing socialists. We didn’t really know what they wanted except they had been anti U.S. involvement in Vietnam; they were left
wing socialists. They wanted more government involvement in the economy of Germany and so on.

I did visit him in Frankfurt. I had dinner with him and his wife in their apartment in Frankfurt. In the course of the evening Voigt set forth all of his ideas about where he thought Germany should be going. His main interest was in foreign policy and he presented his ideas about NATO, the United States, and whither Europe. He had ideas about greater cooperation eventually between western Europe and eastern Europe. He wasn’t radical. He went to great lengths to say he wasn’t anti-NATO. He said he didn’t really like it but it would not be realistic to call for the abolition of NATO. He hoped eventually there could be a regional security organization including countries of both western and eastern Europe. He was not communist. But he was a left wing Social Democrat. He said he did see the possibility of greater eastern-western European cooperation over the long term; he saw the possibility some day for the enlargement of NATO.

Voigt’s wife mentioned to me that one of the reasons Voigt had not liked Americans over the years was because when he was a child in Germany he watched American planes bomb his neighborhood. So he had some very bad memories. Voigt also told me that he always held against the United States government the fact that as he put it we tilted toward Adenauer in the post war years. He really felt we had tipped the balance in favor of the Christian Democrats in the post war government of West Germany.

Q: Schumann was it?

KLINGAMAN: Kurt Schumacher.

Q: Kurt Schumacher.

KLINGAMAN: Right...who was a Social Democrat and a very strong political leader. Actually, I knew something about Schumacher so I was able to talk with Voigt a little about that period. One of the biographies I had read years before was about Schumacher. Now I don’t know enough about what we did or didn’t do in those post war years but Voigt’s perception was that the United States had been more comfortable with Adenauer and the Christian Democrats in the early postwar years and had tilted toward them rather than Schumacher and the Social Democrats. Well socialists conjure up communist images for many Americans. There are German socialists of different stripes and there were some very left wing socialists who did work with the communists. But in any case I had a very long conversation with Karsten Voigt that evening. He clearly wanted to present his views to the American embassy; he clearly wanted to stress that Young Socialists as a group and left wing socialists in West Germany were not communist and were not anti-U.S., in general even though they opposed some U.S. policies, that German Social Democrats were responsible and respectable.

Well of course I went back to my hotel in Frankfurt that night and stayed up late writing all of this down. I went back to Bonn the next day and wrote a very lengthy memcon
(memorandum of conversation) about Voigt’s views. Now I would like to tell you a little story about that memcon. My immediate boss at that time was Bill Bodde and he read it and thought it was extremely interesting. We hadn’t gotten anything like this before from a young, rising politician in the left wing of the SPD. My report was written as an airgram to Washington enclosing this memcon which was probably twenty pages long. Bodde approved it and then it went in to the political counselor for his clearance and the next thing I knew the political counselor was in my office. He sort of looked over his shoulder and he closed the door. I thought well now, does he like my report or what is coming off here?

The political counselor said it was a very interesting report and that the embassy hadn’t gotten that kind of information before. I should note here that on the memcon I just had listed Susan Klingaman and Karsten Voigt as the conversation participants. I had explained in the covering memo that I had been at the apartment of him and his wife for dinner, etcetera. Well the political counselor looked at me and he said that he saw my comments and he saw Voigt’s statements but where were the comments of Voigt’s wife? And I said she really wasn’t political and hadn’t made any substantive comments. Then the political counselor said I could get into a great deal of difficulty for this report, that people back in Washington might wonder how I had obtained the information.

Q: Oh, God!

KLINGAMAN: I was totally stunned. I was in a state of shock, totally aghast. I got very angry and asked him what he was implying. It was obvious. I asked him if he was questioning my judgment or morals. He said no, he just was trying to protect me from the gumshoes in the security branch of the Department. I was really deeply upset and I thought that at least he could have said it was a great memcon before he had gone into this! Anyway as a result I did add Voigt’s wife’s name to the memcon. And I put a note at the end of the report that Mrs. Voigt was present throughout the conversation but had made no political comments because she herself was a professional architect and not politically active. Anyway, with that explanatory note the airgram was sent to Washington. The ambassador liked it, and the memcon was very, very well received in Washington and I received a commendation for it. That took some of the sting out of the incident. The political counselor was a fine person and he felt that he was trying to protect me at the time. But it was one of my experiences of being a woman political officer in the embassy and it put something of a bad taste on what did turn out to be a wonderful special piece of reporting.

I would like to note that Karsten Voigt soon thereafter became a member of the Bundestag, the German national Parliament, and later the foreign policy spokesman of the Social Democratic Party. And now, looking back on it, Voigt’s visions of a possible reunification of Germany, the eventual enlargement of the EC and NATO and so on turned out not to have been so far fetched after all!

Q: You know you can get into this more because I had this from some other women, the problem of dinners, lunches, particularly with foreigners and how to deal with them.
KLINGAMAN: Actually that is the only incident that I recall. Voigt was perfectly correct. He invited me to dinner at his apartment with his wife there. It wasn’t as if there was anything inappropriate or out of line.

I had begun representational entertaining in Copenhagen. I did some in the Philippines, too, but not too much, mainly in Copenhagen and in Germany. I never had any problems. I liked to cook; I liked to entertain. I did a lot of entertaining in my home. I always invited the wives of male politicians and the husbands of female politicians if they were married. Luncheons were never a problem. I invited men out to lunch in Germany and it was never a problem. They never thought anything about it; I never thought anything about it. They were professional lunches for exchanging views and information.

A number of people used to ask me how I got on with Germans; how did they take to a woman officer? Aren’t they very patriarchal? I didn’t experience this in the professional world. You know there were German women who were politicians; the President of the Bundestag at that time was a woman. In some ways women were more visible in some of the professions in Germany than they were in the United States at that time, particularly in the medical world. I never had any problems inviting men to lunches in restaurants in Germany or anywhere else.

Q: What government was in power in ’73 to ’75?

KLINGAMAN: It changed. When I first arrived the Social Democrats were in coalition with the FDP, the liberal Free Democrats. Willy Brandt was the chancellor and Brandt fell in the spring of 1974 while I was there. That was a very sudden, dramatic event. Of course I had met him once way back in Berlin when I was a student, just a handshake. He was the chancellor. He fell over the so-called Guillaume affair. An East German spy was discovered in the chancellor’s office.

Q: An affair with a staff assistant?

KLINGAMAN: Something like that….I don’t remember the details now. But Brandt fell and Helmut Schmidt, also a Social Democrat, replaced him as chancellor.

Q: In the political section was there a different feeling toward Brandt as toward Helmut Schmidt?

KLINGAMAN: Well many people in the U.S. Government worried about Willy Brandt a little bit; they wondered about his so called “Ostpolitik,” in other words his policy toward East Germany and eastern Europe. They wondered about his efforts for rapprochement with East Germany and eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; what did this mean and so on? Helmut Schmidt was much more conservative. Schmidt was a Social Democrat from the right wing of that party and for all practical purposes he could have been a member of the CDU as far as many of his policies were concerned.
I think that probably many in the U.S. Government felt more comfortable with Schmidt. At the same time I don’t think that they thought there would be any dramatic change in West German foreign policy. We watched Germany’s Ostpolitik very closely in those days, but there was really no strong disagreement within Germany about it. West Germans wanted to have some reasonable relationship with East Germany; after all they were relatives, and with the countries of eastern Europe they were neighbors after all. Our feeling basically, although I was not working on this issue in the embassy, but our sense was that a West German government would continue to explore the possibilities for rapprochement with the East no matter whether it was Willy Brandt or Helmut Schmidt. And as far as Willy Brandt was concerned his credentials as a democrat were very well established. No one ever questioned that he was committed to a democratic West Germany.

Q: While you were there were we looking for sort of right wing nationalist parties? This was a concern.
KLINGAMAN: It was. Everyone was always wondering if neo-Nazism would take root in West Germany and that is perfectly understandable. It hadn’t been that long since the Nazi period and there were right wing groups in West Germany. I think there was a party called the German Party, the DP, the Deutsche Partei as I recall. These small right wing splinter parties did not have great electoral support. Neo-Nazism wasn’t really a strong movement or a major threat at that time.

The major concern as far as extremists were concerned at that time was the Baader Meinhof Group. The Baader Meinhof Group was named after two of its founders. The Baader Meinhof Group was a group of extremists who were really anti-government, anti-establishment, anti-industrial state. You really couldn’t say they were extreme left or extreme right. They were at that point where the circle becomes one and they were terrorists. There were terrorist episodes during the time when I was in Bonn. The physical security of the embassy was strengthened at that time, and we were told to take precautions such as not taking the same route to work each day. There were kidnapings of some German industrialists and German bankers. There were some murders. That was the concern as far as extremists were concerned, much more so than neo-Nazism. The concern was also based on the fact that most of the Baader-Meinhof Group came out of the German upper middle class. They were, if you will, the spoiled children of the upper middle class who were looking for that perfectionism that Germans are so prone to look for. They were seeing that there were flaws in capitalism; there were flaws in democracy; there were flaws in this government that they had…therefore let’s abolish it all and start from scratch. It was that kind of a group.

There was also a terrorist incident in Stockholm at that time. U.S. government concern about terrorism was increasing and steps were being taken to improve the security of our missions overseas.

Q: The time you were there coincided with the Watergate period. I would think that Watergate would be a difficult thing. It forced Nixon to resign. I would think that this would be difficult to explain in a German context.
KLINGAMAN: Well I actually didn’t have that opportunity because I was on home leave at that time. I was in the United States when it happened. I recall I was on a trip to Maine with my parents. We drove into Maine with the radio going full blast in the car at the time of Nixon’s resignation. I was not in Germany when it happened, so I can’t give you a first hand account as to how the Germans reacted to it. Of course the transition was very smooth to President Ford and I do remember that President Ford made a trip to Germany very soon after he took office. I am sure it was designed to reassure the Germans. The Germans were always nervous about the American commitment and the commitment of American troops to Western Europe and to Germany in particular. Ford did make a visit to Germany that did reassure the Germans.

Q: Was there much concern about the Soviets at this point with respect to Germany?

KLINGAMAN: I would say that the Germans were always nervous about the Soviet Union but not extremely concerned because they were members of NATO and there were American troops stationed in Germany. We had that…what was the expression…the tripwire effect; that is if the Soviets moved from East Germany into West Germany they would hit American troops immediately. Our conventional forces were there of course backed up by our nuclear weapons.

Q: What about Berlin? Was Berlin much of an issue while you were there?

KLINGAMAN: Berlin was an issue in the sense that we had one Foreign Service officer in the political section who did nothing but Berlin matters. Also a great deal of time on Berlin was spent by the deputy political counselor, David Anderson and his successor, who was Bob German. There was the so-called Bonn Group of representatives of the British, French and American embassies who met regularly to resolve issues involving the postwar agreements on Berlin and agreements on what the Germans could and could not do and what the British, French and American responsibilities were. Therefore there was a lot of coordination on various issues involving those three embassies and the three governments. But there was no major crisis involving Berlin at that time.

Q: Are there any other areas that we should talk about during this time in Bonn?

KLINGAMAN: I think we should talk about the women’s issue because this is when it hit the fan. The women’s issue in the United States Government became a very popular issue in this period with the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEO).

Q: Gloria Steinem and Betty Friedan.

KLINGAMAN: There were the front page feminists. There was Gloria Steinem and the National Organization of Women and there were pursuant to the EEO Act new U.S. government regulations on affirmative action for women. We were not talking about quotas or anything like that. Basically consciousness raising about women’s issues was very much in the air. Now I didn’t feel it as much as I might have if I had been in
Washington at the time. I was in Bonn. But I did feel it because I was the only female State Department Foreign Service officer in the embassy in Bonn.

Q: How God and it’s a huge embassy!

KLINGAMAN: It’s an enormous embassy. I think at that time we had about 700 Americans all told, officers and staff and of course many other agencies—the Defense Attachés and USIA and Treasury and FBI and so on. But I was the only female State Department FSO, which was for me very much of a mixed blessing. The fact that I was the only woman when I arrived did not really affect my thinking or the treatment I received one way or another. I didn’t feel special; I wasn’t treated as being special. But when the women’s issue became the ‘in’ thing tokenism started.

One thing that happened to me which I was not happy about was that shortly after I arrived in Bonn we received a cable calling me and a few other officers back to serve on promotion boards in Washington. I was waiting for a promotion myself! Obviously I was being called back because they wanted a woman on a promotion board. Bear in mind I had had only ten months in Copenhagen, four of which had been in a hotel, and I forgot to mention earlier that immediately on my arrival in Bonn I was sent TDY (temporary duty) to Bremen for six weeks to fill in while that consul general had been called back for a promotion board in Washington. So I had been in Bonn maybe three months and boom, I was being called back to Washington to serve on a promotion board. I said hey, wait a minute, I just got here! I want to get going in my very substantive job here in Germany. I was being called back as a token and I was very upset. I said I did not want to go and the DCM in the embassy, Frank Cash, supported me. The embassy sent back a cable saying I had been moved around quite a bit in the last year and so why don’t you give her the opportunity for the promotion board at a later date. The Department said okay. But that was number one. I was wanted to be a female token on a promotion board.

Then the embassy received a request from the International Women’s Club in Dusseldorf to send a speaker on the women’s movement in the United States. That request came into the ambassador’s office and the staff assistant, of course one of my fellow FSOs, bucked it down to me and said Sue, here’s your opportunity to go give a speech on the women’s movement in the United States. I sent him a note back and said Jack, why don’t you do it? Actually another reason why I wasn’t too enthusiastic about giving a speech on the women’s movement in the United States was that I really did not know that much about it. I really didn’t. And what I was hearing about it was Gloria Steinem and abortion and let’s call ourselves Ms. and all of this didn’t seem to be Sue Klingaman somehow.

The reason the women’s club in Dusseldorf asked the embassy for this speech was that the club was headed by Joan Hennemyer, the wife of the consul general in Dusseldorf. I had met her, so I agreed to do the speech. I found that I had to do a lot of research on the situation of women in the United States. USIA had an ample supply of materials. So I did study up on the issue and in so doing I became very interested in it and I wrote a rather substantive speech, which I still have. The speech had a number of statistics about the problem of unequal pay for equal work; statistics about the number of women in various
fields and so on. I remember that in researching for the speech I became quite interested in the issue.

I did go to Dusseldorf. I spoke about the subject, and it was then that I began to sort out my own ideas about the situation of American women. Was there a problem? If so what was the problem? Where do I fit into this? One of the things which I said in that speech and which I still feel quite strongly about is that the issue is not whether a few very bright, very talented women can rise to the top in their chosen profession. American history and the history of other countries show that they can. The issue is really whether average and ambitious women can do as well as average ambitious men. That is really the issue, I think. And that is what seized my interest.

I offered my prognosis about the future of the women’s movement in the United States. At that time the so-called women’s movement was very dramatic. There was a lot of noise, a lot of rhetoric. It was very shrill. I felt that the issues that I wanted to be concerned with were the substantive issues about pay, about job opportunities, equal opportunities for job, for pay, for education. I was concerned that some of the rhetoric might create a backlash that might be harmful for furthering progress in those substantive areas. I expressed that in one way or another in that speech in Dusseldorf. I felt that the women’s movement would probably make better progress over the long term if it proceeded slowly.

What was the German women’s reaction?

KLINGAMAN: The German women were very interested in the issue. The German women were interested to hear me say that there were more women in politics in Germany proportionally than there were in the United States. They were interested to learn that there were more women doctors in Germany than there were in the United States at that time. I think that they were somewhat baffled, as I was, by the rhetoric that they were hearing about the women’s movement in the United States. They were certainly observing what was going on with the American women’s movement, but quietly I would say. As far as the women that I met in Germany were concerned, those who were in the professions were doing well in their professions and were taken seriously.

Q: I think your point is that much of it particularly in the beginning was really focused in the United States on well educated upper class women and not really much farther down the line. There was lip service but the main thing was that as a group this was not very representative and it was shrill.

KLINGAMAN: And as someone mentioned to me the other day in those days in the women’s movement the leaders in the public rhetoric really took on everything. They didn’t really choose their battles, you might say. They chose to take on these highly visible issues such as shall we call this person a fireman or a firefighter. Well I understand symbolism and language usage are important; that we call them firemen because they were mostly men at that time. Yes there is a point here but is this the main
issue that is troubling us? It wasn’t really troubling me and it certainly wasn’t troubling
the many women who were working who had to work to support their families and who
were not receiving equal pay for that work.

Q: Again it comes down to the fact that a great many of the people who were leading this
did not have children and were being heard because they probably would have been
heard anyway because they were very articulate.

KLINGAMAN: Well I’ll talk more about the women’s issue when I go through my
assignments, how I found myself relating to it or not relating to it.

Q: Well you were all by yourself in Bonn so you weren’t exactly…I mean any women’s
organization would have taken place in your mind!

KLINGAMAN: That’s right! Well, of course there were other women in the embassy,
but there was no other female State Department FSO in the embassy at that time. There
had been a few women FSOs in Manila when I was there. There were none besides me in
Copenhagen, and in Bonn at that time I was it. The American Foreign Service secretaries
were not mobilized in the women’s movement. I had very good relationships with all the
women staff in the embassy but they didn’t seem to be seized by the issue either..

Q: On the issue...could you address it as to how a woman officer, you alluded to it
earlier on, but in the mid ’70s we are looking at what were supposed to be the
regulations. They never really were but you had to be very careful. If you got married you
had to resign and all that. That must have been a great damper. If you wanted to go one
way or another this must be a problem.

KLINGAMAN: Well for me it was never a problem. As I said early on I had been
engaged to a German and at that point if I had married him I would have stayed in
Germany. I would not have stayed in the Foreign Service. I think that was my attitude
throughout. It really wasn’t a damper for me because I had decided that if I met the man I
wanted to marry I would leave the Foreign Service. I never felt like I had to have a career
for my fulfillment or whatever. I think if I had married, whether it had been a Foreign
Service officer or whether it had been someone outside of the Foreign Service I would
have raised a family and probably would have been very happy doing that. So it wasn’t
really an issue for me.

Q: I was just wondering if in talking to any others it was sort of an initial inhibitor in
normal relations or not?

KLINGAMAN: I don’t think so. I don’t recall a single conversation about it. Other than
the conversation I had on my oral exam for the Foreign Service I don’t recall that I ever
raised it or that anyone else ever raised it. It was not a live issue in my circle of women
friends in the Foreign Service at that time.

Q: Is there anything else we should talk about on Germany?
KLINGAMAN: In Germany I spent 95 percent of my time doing political reporting and having a marvelous time. It was a great section. Those were the days when we not only had a visit by President Ford but also many visits by Secretary of State Kissinger. Kissinger visited Germany a lot. He was very interested in Germany and Germany was very important to the United States so he came a lot. I was involved in some meetings as a notetaker for him.

Q: Could you talk about some of these?

KLINGAMAN: Well since my German was quite good I was often chosen to be present in case Kissinger started speaking German with the Germans. Kissinger liked to go off to meet with Schmidt outside of Bonn. He would take a helicopter to a castle near Bonn and I would get to go in another helicopter and sometimes I was used as the notetaker and sometimes not, but in either case it was fun. And sometimes Kissinger spoke German with the Germans and sometimes, usually, he did not. But we never knew whether he would or not, so I sometimes had the opportunity to participate on the fringes because of my German.

Q: Did you get any feel for how Kissinger was responding to Germans?

KLINGAMAN: He liked to deal with Germans. They were engaged in big issues that he was interested in, NATO issues, East-West issues. German views were important and they were intellectually acute conversational partners for him.

Q: Particularly Helmut Schmidt was world class.

KLINGAMAN: Absolutely. And at that time and for many, many years thereafter the foreign minister of West Germany was Genscher, and Genscher’s English was not good. It became better over the years but he started out with almost no spoken English. Genscher was very bright. He was not a foreign policy specialist but over the years of course became very, very familiar with the issues. He was a very shrewd politician. So I think that Kissinger felt that he had his intellectual…well I wouldn’t say match, because Kissinger would never, never, agree that anyone was his match intellectually. He didn’t have any problems with his ego. But he found the Germans good conversation partners and later when I was on the German desk that continued. It was always quite easy to obtain an appointment for a high level German visitor with the secretary of state when the secretary of state was Henry Kissinger.

Q: How did the Ford visit go? Were you involved as everyone else was?

KLINGAMAN: Yes. Everyone was involved. It went very well. I don’t remember too much about it. He was I’m sure received by the president of Germany and the chancellor of Germany. It was largely a ceremonial state visit. Mrs. Ford came also. It went very smoothly. There was no issue, no substantive political issue on the agenda for that visit, as far as I know. I think it was mainly a review of the areas that Germans and the United
States were working on. It was largely a goodwill visit.

Apart from Kissinger and President Ford, the embassy also had to host many U.S. congressional delegations. I can well remember being the embassy control officer for a visit by Senator and Mrs. Hubert Humphrey. That was an experience! They were both very friendly and pleasant, but as you may know the Senator was extremely energetic and enthusiastic, and also he liked to change his schedule on a moment’s notice. He kept me and the German security detail in a state of high alert, I can tell you!

Q: Were you keeping an eye on the Common Market, this having been your beat at one time. I mean how things were developing at least with regards Germany?

KLINGAMAN: I watched it with interest, but I really wasn’t involved in doing any reporting on it. The economic section did that. At that time the Common Market was inching along toward further integration. One of my American friends from Oberlin, a woman who was two years ahead of me at Oberlin had married a German who had been a Fulbright student at Oberlin. He became an official in the German economics ministry and he was in the office that was working on the European Communities. He was traveling to Brussels a lot and I got something of the flavor of the German involvement in the European Communities from him.

Q: Well then you left there in what, ’75?

KLINGAMAN: September of ’75. I could have stayed in Bonn two more years and I debated whether or not I would do so. But I was given an opportunity to take the job as Austrian and Swiss desk officer. The job opened up unexpectedly and it was in the office of Central European Affairs (EUR/CE) in the Department, the office that included East and West Germany as well as Austria and Switzerland. The director was David Anderson. I welcomed the opportunity to (a) have a desk officer job, and (b) work again with David Anderson. So I accepted that job.

Q: Great.

KLINGAMAN: I was the desk officer for Austria and Switzerland in the Office of Central European Affairs from September of ’75 to June of ’77.

Q: What was David Anderson there?

KLINGAMAN: EUR/CE was the initial of the office. David Anderson was the country director. There was a deputy director. And there were at that time three officers working on West Germany, one officer working on Berlin, one on East Germany and myself working on Austria and Switzerland.

Q: ’75 to ’77. Let’s take Austria first. Were there any particular issues dealing with Austria in that time?
KLINGAMAN: Not many. Actually about 90 percent of my time was spent on Switzerland curiously enough. But there were a few issues involving Austria. One was a trade issue that was of importance to the Austrians. We had imposed quotas on Austria’s specialty steels so that involved some back and forth with other agencies. As I recall I think we were able to work out something that satisfied the Austrian concerns.

The major event that I remember involving Austria was the visit to Washington of Chancellor Kreisky who was quite a figure on the international scene. He was trying to make the most of Austrian neutrality, “an active neutrality”, he said. For example, he was trying to be a mediator on Middle East issues. At that time Austria was also trying to persuade more international organizations and agencies to set up offices in Vienna; Austria wanted to make Vienna “a third UN city” along with New York and Geneva. Kreisky came to Washington and I was in charge of coordinating his visit.

Q: What was your impression of Kreisky?

KLINGAMAN: Very favorable. He was a very dynamic man. I remember him as a very friendly and down to earth person. I was invited to a very small dinner party at the Austrian ambassador’s when he was here. I have very fond memories of that evening because I sat at the end of the table where Kreisky was seated. On the other side of the table was Katharine Graham of the Washington Post. I think this was in the fall of ’76. Kreisky spent quite a bit of time talking to me. He was very interested in the fact that I was a female diplomat. He said he felt that Austria should have more women in its diplomatic service. I’m not at all sure right now whether they had any at all at that time. He just struck me as a very personable, genuine person. Katharine Graham struck me the same way. She was very down to earth, very interesting.

Q: She is the publisher of the Washington Post.

KLINGAMAN: Yes, of course, and she has just written her memoirs. I have read a portion of her memoirs but not the whole thing. I heard her interviewed on National Public Radio about a year ago after her book came out. It struck me first of all of course because I had met her on that evening, but secondly she was talking about the women’s issue during the ‘60s and ‘70s and how bemused in a way she had been by it, wondering where she fit into it all. That is in fact the portion of the book that I recently read.

Although Katharine Graham is at least ten, maybe twenty, years older than I am and in a totally different position our experiences were somewhat the same in the sense that she felt the rhetoric of the movement, which we talked about last time, was overly dramatic, overly hyper. Yet looking back on it she thought that the rhetoric was perhaps necessary for consciousness-raising, and I think she was probably right. She became more involved intellectually and emotionally in this issue earlier than I did. She became involved in the late ‘60s. I was off in the Philippines at that time and I didn’t know much then about the women’s issue.

She writes in her book about how she was asked to give a speech on the women’s
movement in the late ‘60s and she didn’t want to give it. I think I mentioned last time that in the mid-‘70s I was asked to do the same in Bonn and I didn’t want to either. In a sense all the rhetoric flying around at that time, in her case earlier and in my case probably seven or eight years later, did give us the chance to sort out in our own minds where we were on this issue.

Q: I think it is important as we do these oral histories to also pick up the social trends and all that because we are talking about the United States and an elite corps dealing with problems. I think it would be unconscionable not to cover these things. Who the people are and how they felt about things.

KLINGAMAN: I agree.

Q: So any time you want to move into that do.

KLINGAMAN: Sure.

Q: Were we trying to keep Kreisky from meddling in what we considered our affairs in the Middle East and that sort of thing?

KLINGAMAN: I think that Kreisky was tolerated. Let’s put it this way. Kreisky was a figure in his own right. He had been foreign minister. And first of all his democratic credentials were very good. He had left Austria after the Anschluss (the union of Austria with Nazi Germany) and went to Sweden. He was a good friend of Willy Brandt’s, I believe, and they were of the same political stripe. He had been Foreign Minister and then became Chancellor. Austria was neutral by virtue of the Four-Power Treaty after the Second World War and Kreisky felt that Austria should exercise “active neutrality,” that Austria should play the role of an active neutral.

Now maybe Henry Kissinger and others didn’t think too much of it, but they tolerated him. I don’t think he was a nuisance. Kreisky was somewhat like the German parliamentarian Wischniewsky, who was a Social Democrat who also was always trying to involve himself in Middle Eastern matters because in his case he had some credentials in the Arab world. I don’t know enough about what went on at the high levels to know whether Kreisky was considered to be a nuisance, but I would say he was tolerated and respected.

Q: Turning to Switzerland. What kept you going there?

KLINGAMAN: It seems strange when you think about it but Switzerland took 90 percent of my time and it was definitely a full-time job. David Anderson characterized this Swiss desk officer position as a sleeper position in the sense that it was more active and important than many people realized. Switzerland is of course a small, neutral country, but it has lots of economic and financial expertise and clout. The reason the desk was so busy was that the Swiss are extremely protective of their sovereignty and they have all kinds of rules and restrictions that other countries do not have. Every country protects its
sovereignty but Switzerland is hyper-protective. It was very difficult for U.S. government agencies to do anything in Switzerland. In fact it was basically against Swiss law for a U.S. government agency to go in there and try to do any kind of business whatsoever on Swiss soil without going through diplomatic channels and bringing the State Department into it.

While I was on the desk the issues primarily concerned the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC was going after a number of securities fraud cases involving Americans which in some cases involved serving process and so on, on people living in Switzerland, or having assets in Switzerland. You cannot do that in Switzerland without going through the United States Department of State and then through the Swiss government and so on. It got pretty complicated. I don’t remember the details of these cases. But I remember much of my time was spent in trying to sensitize SEC people to the fact that Switzerland was different and they couldn’t do things in Switzerland that they could do, for example, in Germany or almost any other country for that matter. So I worked a lot with our Office of the Legal Adviser in the Department.

Just before I came on the desk the U.S. and Swiss had negotiated a U.S.-Swiss Judicial Assistance Treaty which made things a bit easier. But nevertheless there were just all kinds of little thorny, prickly issues that we had to deal with and if we didn’t deal with them in the right way they could have become major issues between the United States and Switzerland. So my job really was to make sure that didn’t happen.

The Swiss ambassador here was very active. Switzerland also had bought some F-5E aircraft from us and there were issues about that because in connection with that purchase they had negotiated an offset agreement that was supposed to give Switzerland preference in U.S. government procurement to offset their cost of purchasing the aircraft. That doesn’t sound like a very exciting issue but it was the kind of issue that was important financially and politically to the Swiss so it involved quite a bit of back and forth with the Defense Department and other U.S. government agencies that might or might not procure items from Switzerland. So that was a major issue.

Q: In working with the Swiss Embassy, was there any concern on the part of the Swiss... I mean the whole thing has changed very gradually over the years...but were they concerned that they were seen as basically a safe haven for crooks, because of secret accounts and all that?

KLINGAMAN: At that time the Swiss were basically holding themselves up as a country that was very proud of its sovereignty. Swiss banking law, Swiss banking secrecy was part of their essence, I suppose you might say...their essence, their ego, their sovereignty. They were quite proud of it. Of course this was long before the current concern about Nazi gold and all that. The Swiss were aware that crooks used their banks. This did concern them. In fact with regard to one case involving the SEC and a Swiss bank, the Swiss were very cooperative. I don’t remember the details of this case now but the Swiss were very cooperative and very forthcoming as long as we went through the right procedures, as long as the SEC worked with the State Department. I had to go over to Switzerland several times with the SEC to negotiate these things.
Now in such cases in other countries the State Department would never have been involved. But in Switzerland we were. The State Department’s legal adviser’s office sent a lawyer along with me and the SEC officials on such cases. As long as the U.S. was very cognizant of Swiss laws and Swiss sovereignty, within that framework the Swiss tried very hard to be cooperative with us. On that particular issue the Securities and Exchange Commission came away very satisfied.

*Q:* Actually it was in the paper today, I think. But it has been an issue for the last two or three years about Switzerland during Nazi times of both bank accounts and gold and other things that the Swiss banks took advantage and profited by the Germans killing people who had accounts in their banks, mainly Jewish. Was this an issue at the time?

**KLINGAMAN:** Not at all. I’ve been interested in following this in the newspapers and I have a friend who has been working on that now in the Department going back through some of that history. But at this time, between ‘75 and ‘77, I never heard anything about this. This just was not in the air at that time. At that time the whole thrust was on the fact that Switzerland is neutral. Switzerland did not join the United Nations; on the other hand there were some UN agencies in Geneva and so on. Switzerland was very definitely pro-West and played quite an active role in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and that was basically the way we related to the Swiss. Nazi gold was just not an issue then between the United States and Switzerland.

*Q:* While I think of Switzerland and Austria as both being neutral countries being right in the middle of this huge Cold War that was still waging, did you get involved in you might say Cold War things, spy things or did that impact at all?

**KLINGAMAN:** Not really. Austria and Switzerland were different in their neutrality. As I said, Switzerland was sort of the neutral banker type and Austria was Kreisky the mediator. Austria was also of course geographically right there on the edge between eastern and western Europe and a gateway for refugees coming in and also abuzz with spies. I did have of course dealings with our embassies in Switzerland and Austria and our DCM (deputy chief of mission) in Austria at the time was Mr. Felix Bloch. But at that time no one knew of his alleged dealings.

*Q:* Have to keep saying ‘alleged’ because the man has never been convicted but it was under highly suspicious circumstances that he was doing something.

**KLINGAMAN:** Well he was the DCM during part of my time on the desk. I had known Felix before that, vaguely. He had served in Dusseldorf before me. We had some mutual friends so I had met him as early as the late ‘60s. As I say he was DCM. As for the East-West spy game in Vienna, I didn’t have much knowledge of it from my vantage point on the desk. I’m sure those in the embassy in Austria did and in the CIA and so on. But I personally was not informed.
Q: It is highly compartmentalized, which it has to be. I was just wondering whether anything blew up in your face?

KLINGAMAN: No. You mean in terms of spy game things? No. No. Going back I guess to Bonn...I was never really involved in spy issues. But as I said Willy Brandt fell because of the Guillaume affair, the East German spy in his office. In Bonn I was called upon once to be sort of a message carrier regarding an East-West spy exchange. When the political counselor was on home leave he left that portfolio to me for reasons that are a mystery to me; I guess it was probably because of my German proficiency.

You may have heard of Wolfgang Vogel?

Q: He was sort of a Sol Barak of spies.

KLINGAMAN: Vogel was an East German lawyer, and both sides used him as a go between so to speak. Anyway I just have a memory of meeting him by appointment in a restaurant some place in Bonn, passing on messages exploring the possibility of an East-West spy exchange. I was not substantively involved and I really don’t remember any details. That was the closest I ever got to the spy world.

Q: How about in Austria, Jewish migration? Was that an issue that you had to deal with? I’m really thinking of the Soviet Union.

KLINGAMAN: I do remember. I’d totally forgotten about this until you mentioned it. The Jews coming out of the Soviet Union through Austria. I was aware of that but not deeply involved. The office I worked in, EUR/CE, was directly across the hall from the Soviet desk in the Department. It was the Soviet desk that dealt with that issue for the most part. We followed it but it was their portfolio.

Q: You straddled two administrations, the Ford administration and then the Carter administration. What about the care and feeding of political ambassadors? Austria and Switzerland are renowned places where you stick your political appointees.

KLINGAMAN: That actually took a good portion of my time at different periods on the desk. I nurtured the process of seeking agreement (acceptance by the foreign government) and Senate confirmation for one ambassador to Austria by the name of Wolff. He was a businessman in the construction business from Ohio. And there were two to Switzerland. One was career Foreign Service officer Nathaniel Davis. A businessman succeeded him by the name of Marvin Warner. All of those took quite a bit of time.

Of course the desk officer traditionally briefs the incoming ambassador on the country. Ambassador Wolff, ambassador-designate at that time, was very interested in Austria. He really studied the issues. He was particularly interested in trade issues and he was really a pleasure to work with. Ambassador Davis was a little difficult. Not personally, I don’t mean that he was difficult personally. I mean that obtaining agreement for him was difficult, as was the process of Senate confirmation because he had been ambassador in Chile when Allende was overthrown.
Q: I was going to say that in many ways this was trying to get him out of the line of fire.

KLINGAMAN: Out of the hot seat, yes. But the Swiss were reluctant to accept him. The left wing in Switzerland was not happy with his coming. In any event he did become ambassador there. Marvin Warner was a businessman and very personable. I don’t remember briefing him very much on Switzerland. His swearing-in ceremony was on the Hill, which gives you some idea of where his political base was. He became ambassador to Switzerland in 1977, shortly before I left the Swiss desk, and he served there for about four years. Later he was convicted of some fraud-related charges and sent to prison for awhile. I don’t know anything about that.

Q: I can understand. You might just explain briefly...what when we mention Chile, for someone who might not understand, what was the issue with Chile for Davis?

KLINGAMAN: You may have to help me remember!

Q: He had been ambassador when Allende was overthrown in a coup and killed by a military coup in Chile. There had been lots of accusations that the United States had been behind it and all this. I mean it had become very much a cause of the left and certainly of the socialist parties in Europe and all. So it made anybody who was really tarred with that brush automatically unpopular.

KLINGAMAN: Davis was accused personally of if not actively assisting, of at least not having done as much as he could have to prevent the coup. I mean who knows, it was all highly classified. I never knew the ins and outs of that but I know it was very upsetting to him and he thought he had been treated unfairly.

A few other words about the desk before we move on. During this time of course the women’s issue was again percolating and I remember being hauled off again from what I considered to be substantive work to go off on a recruiting trip for the State Department, a trip specifically targeted to recruiting women and minorities. I did it and I had a good time but once again I felt here I was once again being fingered as the only woman in the Office of Central European Affairs, an office which was doing lots of interesting work. So, boom, the personnel system says let’s send her out to recruit women and minorities! But that is just an aside.

Q: While we’re on that how responsive did you find your audiences?

KLINGAMAN: Not very. I said to whomever it was who asked me to do this that, fine, I would go, I didn’t want to go but I would go if I must. But I was going to go where I wanted. So I chose to go back to my alma mater, Oberlin in Ohio, and I spent some time there and then I went to other colleges in Ohio including Ohio State and Dennison.

At Oberlin I made contact with my favorite professor, George Lanyi, my international relations professor, and that was a nice reunion. I had meetings with students at Oberlin. Most of them were really skeptical that the State Department was truly interested in
recruiting minorities, at Oberlin primarily black students. They of course listened to me politely. At the same time I was a white woman and most of the minorities in the colleges that I was visiting were blacks. I would say that they listened to me politely but with considerable skepticism.

You know there were also other times when I was pulled away from substantive work to do things I really didn’t want to do at the time. When I was in EB (the economic bureau) I was called to be the sole woman on a promotion board. And then later on the German desk I had to go up to Boston for two weeks to be an oral examiner for the Foreign Service applicants. But you know looking back on it now those assignments were good experience for me, and I must say it was also more than about time that women were included on those important boards.

Q: This time you were back on the desk, talking about women’s issues, did you find yourself in sort of a lonely position or was there a network? How would you put it at this particular time?

KLINGAMAN: Let me sort of expand the time frame a little bit so that it includes not only the two years I was on the Austria-Swiss desk, but also the following three years when I was on the West German desk in the same office, so that means we are dealing with ’75 to ’80. This was a very difficult period for me in many ways on the women’s issue and my place in it.

In 1976, I think it was, a female FSO named Alison Palmer filed her case against the Department. I went through a lot of soul searching about that because it was a class action suit. This was in the early days of such suits. She was alleging that the Department had discriminated against women all the way through, in recruiting, assignments, promotions, etc. Some time during that period, probably around ’77 or ’78, women in the Department had to choose whether to opt out of that suit; otherwise women would be automatically included in it, or something like that. I frankly did not, despite some of the incidents that I have recounted before, I frankly did not feel I had been discriminated against in any way that would justify a suit. So I remember thinking a great deal about it.

I went up to see Joan Clark about this. Joan was at that time executive director of the European bureau.

Q: A very powerful job.

KLINGAMAN: Yes. I had come to know her through my unfortunate experience of having my position abolished in Copenhagen and ever since then Joan had taken an interest in me. She had visited me when she visited Bonn. Back in the Department she was instrumental in my getting the Austria-Swiss desk job in the first place. I never worked for her. At that time I stood in great awe of this senior female Foreign Service officer. But I went up to see her and just asked her what she thought about this class action suit, and what should I do? I didn’t care what she personally was or wasn’t doing, but what should I do? I just felt very confused. Joan, in what I now know was basically
true to form, sat and listened to me and didn’t say much. Basically she did not tell me what to do. She left the decision up to me. But I remember that she said something like this: I think women should continue to do what they have always done. She didn’t describe what that was. She said something like women should get along the way we always have. I think she meant that we women should work hard and do our best and move up that way.

So in any event I went back and thought some more about it. I actually opted out of that case. Later as the case went on and on for years and years we female FSOs kept getting all these legal documents, piles and piles of stuff. I never knew whether I was really in or out of this case. At some point they said you have to actively opt out or actively opt in. I got so confused; I never really knew whether I was in or out of the case. But in the beginning when we were told that we had to make a decision to opt out or we would be included, I opted out.

**Q:** Was there the equivalent of a network?

**KLINGAMAN:** Of women?

**Q:** Was it more a network of people dealing with Germany...male or female?

**KLINGAMAN:** Well, yes, there was definitely a network of German hands. I would consider myself to have become a part of it, although it was predominantly male officers. Actually, now that I think about it, I can’t think of any other female officers working on Germany in those years.

Regarding a women’s network, well there was the Women’s Action Organization in the Department which was an Alison Palmer organization. I think I went to a couple of meetings. I never was active in it. At that time I was very busy on the desk and I saw that as what I wanted to do and I just was working my tail off on the desk. I was working long hours and didn’t pay much attention to the women’s movement in the Department. I was listening to it, as I said earlier. I was trying to figure out where I fit in. But basically I was just not really in contact with other women other than Joan Clark about the class action suit and so on. In the first place there weren’t that many of us. Most of us female officers who were in the Department were busy working hard on our jobs.

I did say earlier that this became very difficult for me. I would say it was later, when I was on the German desk, ’79-’80, when you had a real rumble of a white male backlash developing in the Department. I felt it from one of my colleagues who was a wonderful guy. He also worked on Germany and we got along famously together. I never felt or took it personally but I know he was extremely concerned about the whole women’s issue because he felt that this was going to jeopardize his chances for promotion, that women might be favored for assignments and promotions.

During the Carter Administration it was the day of human rights generally, women’s rights in particular. You had Patt Derian there in the Department in a high level position.
as human rights coordinator, trying to make sure that human rights considerations were factored into U.S. foreign policy, and during this time they started some affirmative action programs in the Department. There were not quotas but more attention was being given to putting women into more visible positions and so on. For example, we had two female staff assistants in the European bureau front office, and that was a real groundbreaker. Those jobs had been unofficially off limits for females before that. Well more visible positions are the kinds of positions that get you promotions. So some white males started grumbling. I felt this and I also thought that some of this feminist rhetoric was getting out of bounds and that it might lead to a backlash that could hurt me. I had been treated equally I felt, very much as a colleague, and I didn’t want people to start to look at me and say that I was getting ahead because I was a woman. I wanted to get ahead because of my abilities and my merit. So I saw it beginning to cut both ways.

Basically it was, I would say, a rather stormy time in the sense that I didn’t know where this women’s movement was going. I thought it might hurt me. I thought it might hurt me vis-a-vis my male colleagues. Up until that time as regards my male colleagues, I was always treated very well.

Q: Was there any problem on your part, was there concern about the leadership? Alison Palmer and I think Cynthia Thomas was another person and all, was there some disquiet on your own part and others about the leadership because they seemed to be carrying the banner in a direction that wasn’t exactly the way you wanted to go?

KLINGAMAN: As I say, I and the few female FSOs that I knew, were concentrating on our jobs. I really didn’t have any time left over. There was no real attempt to engage Alison Palmer on the issues. The Women’s Action Organization was primarily an Alison Palmer organization with other people sort of looking on. The other women I knew just were not really involved in it; they were like I was. We felt, I felt, I joined the Foreign Service because I liked foreign affairs, I liked my job and it was more than a handful for me just keeping tabs on what I was doing. I think the other women that I knew felt the same way. So there wasn’t really any power struggle going on in the Department of State about who would take the leadership of women’s issues.

I would say now that I think that in our own way our leadership consisted of leadership by example, in a sense. We were doing our jobs. Joan Clark was up there doing her job. She was one of the most senior women at that time. She went on to much higher positions. Roz Ridgway was at one point during this period counselor for political affairs in the Department doing her job. There were women such as Eleanor Constable in the economic bureau and Terry Healy in EUR at the time. Our leadership consisted in performing well in our jobs. We were in the women’s movement in a different way than those who were engaging in the rhetoric and the litigation.

Q: So your were ’77 to ’80 on the German desk, when you say the German desk can you explain what that means?

KLINGAMAN: If we could just take a brief detour there are two things I want to talk
One other little side trip that I took when I was on the Austria-Swiss desk was to the United Nations for three weeks. I was sent up as the European bureau’s representative to the General Assembly. Once again…it’s beginning to get tiresome probably…but I went up there kicking and screaming. I wasn’t chosen because I was a woman. I was chosen because Joan Clark told David Anderson that his office had to send someone up to the United Nations. I don’t know if she had me in mind or not, who knows. Things were probably very busy on the German side and so he sent me up to New York for three weeks. I thought it might be interesting. It turned out it was a very dull General Assembly and there wasn’t that much for me to do substantively.

The regional bureau representatives usually went up there to assist in the lobbying and lining up votes of other countries on issues. There wasn’t much of that going on at that particular time. But it turned out to be a delightful experience for me because, probably because I was a woman, I was assigned the job of being the assistant to one of our delegates to the General Assembly whose name was Pearl Bailey!

Pearl Bailey was a black woman entertainer who was a Republican evidently. She was very well known in the entertainment world and not really in the diplomatic world. Pearl Bailey was a woman who just waltzed through the hallways of the United Nations just exuding happiness, love, good cheer – put her arms around everyone – made a big hit in the General Assembly. I was her assistant, accompanying her through the hallways of the United Nations. She always went around draped with all these furry animals flowing off her shoulders and they would slide off. One of my jobs was to pick them up and trot after her and make sure that at the end of the day she had her furs, although if she didn’t have them I don’t think it would have fazed her in the slightest. It was really a delightful experience. I got to know her a bit and when I left she autographed a whole handful of her books for me.

Q: She also went to Georgetown and got a degree.

KLINGAMAN: That’s right. She did. She was a very nice woman, very genuine. I still have some of the books that she autographed for me. I was looking at one the other day and right across the top she had written “Dear Sue, you care, thank God, love Pearl.” It was a great experience for me.

Q: What was her particular role at the United Nations?

KLINGAMAN: Her role at the United Nations was basically to be Pearl Bailey, an American black woman who loved the United States and wanted other people and other countries to love her country. That was her role as I saw it. She spoke on some of the issues. I don’t remember what they were. Some of the issues at that time at the UN were North-South issues. I don’t remember. Basically her presence was her role. She was one of the most genuinely loving, caring people that I have ever met. It was just really and truly a wonderful experience for me.
Before moving on I would also like to say a few words about David Anderson. David was deputy director of the political section in Bonn when I was there and then he became the director of EUR/CE. David Anderson had an innate ability to manage people. I have never seen anything like it. It was almost like he was an athletic coach. We never had scheduled times for staff meetings under his leadership in our office. but we had ad hoc staff meetings all the time. He’d come in the door, clap his hands and say okay, everybody, let’s get together. And we’d all come together and David would tell us what had happened in his meeting with the assistant secretary and the other office directors. The flow of information to us was superb. He got information from us on what we were doing. Everyone felt like they were involved, participating. He played to people’s strengths. It was just something he had that I never saw before or since. Everyone worked very, very hard and absolutely loved every minute of it. He was a wonderful guy.

My first year on the German desk he left our office, I guess it was 1977, David left our office and went up to be a special assistant to the secretary of state where he was for a year or so and then he went off to be the director of the U.S. Mission in Berlin.

Q: David was an immigrant from Scotland.

KLINGAMAN: And he still had a little Scottish brogue and he used to talk about his “boots.” I was confused; he wasn’t wearing any boots. It took me awhile to realize he was talking about “books”. He was truly a great guy. I really enjoyed working with him.

In the summer of ’77 I moved over to be the officer in charge of the West German desk. That desk had three officers: myself, an economic Officer and a political-military officer for West Germany. Again in the same office there was another officer working in a separate entity for Berlin Affairs. That was John Kornblum at the time. Then one person for East Germany and then the deputy director and director of EUR/CE.

Q: Then you moved in the summer of ’77 with a new administration beginning to find its way around; beginning to find its legs with political appointees coming in and all. Did you have any feeling of a change toward Germany with the Carter administration?

KLINGAMAN: In the Ford Administration Henry Kissinger had been secretary of state. Although I was working on Austria and Switzerland at that time I was quite often called on to assist on some German matters as well. I had also done some memcons of Kissinger’s meetings with foreign leaders at the United Nations. Kissinger knew Germany very well. The counselor of the Department when Kissinger was secretary of state was Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who also knew Germany very well.

Q: It was basically two German Jews who had left there.

KLINGAMAN: That’s right, and had this strange relationship with each other. It was just like they were constantly snapping and sniping at one another but nevertheless these two German Jews knew Germany very well. I have a distinct memory of doing quite a few
memcons of conversations of Germans with Kissinger at that time. Probably because there were so many of them we all had to get involved in the act. It was easy to write memcons for Kissinger. They were verbatim memcons because he wanted everything in the exact order it was spoken. You didn’t need to sit down and try to make sense of it or organize it, just take notes quickly and have a good memory and you had it made. I did it quite often because Kissinger, as secretary of state, would see German parliamentarians coming in. So the knowledge about Germany at high levels in the Department was very substantial during the Kissinger period.

I might add that two of my male colleagues on the desk were excellent mimics of Kissinger, complete with his German accent. The German desk worked very hard, but we also had a lot of fun in that office. Morale was very high.

Then when the Carter administration came in we had Secretary Vance. There were a lot of visits in both directions at high levels. Chancellor Schmidt came over a number of times during that three year period as did Foreign Minister Genscher. It seems like we always had a Schmidt visit or a Genscher visit. Carter went to Germany during that time. However the knowledge about Germany, interest in Germany, at the high levels in the Carter administration was nowhere near as great as it had been when Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt were there. In a sense it was good for me and good for the desk because we were the only ones in the Department who really knew in depth what was going on with Germany. On the other hand it was difficult because during this period there were really important issues going on involving the Germans…the West Germans and the United States. A lot of them involved domestic political considerations for the Germans that President Carter and Secretary Vance perhaps weren’t as sensitive to as Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt would have been..

Of course it was our job to make them aware of it. But this was also a period when Germany was becoming much more assertive. Germany was important, it was economically very strong and very active in the European Communities. It was very active in NATO. It was a time of obviously close alliance with West Germany but also of friction.

Q: Apparently Carter and Schmidt...

KLINGAMAN: …didn’t get on.

Q: I’ve had other people talk of this. I’d like very much to get particularly the early feeling and then the later feeling of whatever you can tell from the desk perspective about this.

KLINGAMAN: Well personality wise I don’t think you could find greater contrast. My impression of President Carter…obviously I didn’t know him and I wasn’t involved in his meetings. I did meet him a couple of times in connection with Schmidt visits. Jimmy Carter was a very gentle man. He struck me as gentle, unassuming, very much into details. His White House was very difficult to work with but he was personally a very
gentle, kind, thoughtful man. Helmut Schmidt in my experience behaved true to his reputation for arrogance and could be quite nasty; he acted as if he knew it all. Those two personalities aren’t going to get along too well unless they are very close together on the issues but they were apart on some issues and so it was difficult. I think that Schmidt was just not very well liked in Washington generally, although he was respected. He was a very smart man.

President Carter did go to Germany. I prepared all the briefing memos. I didn’t go on that trip so I can’t tell you how the trip in Germany went. The embassy could tell you that.

Q: The issue that comes to mind right now was the so-called neutron bomb issue. Did you get involved at all?

KLINGAMAN: Everyone was involved in that.

Q: You might explain what the issue was.

KLINGAMAN: The issue was whether or not a European country would agree to deploy the neutron bomb if the U.S. decided to produce it. It was kind of a circular thing because the U.S. didn’t want to produce it if nobody in Europe would agree to have it on their soil. The Germans didn’t want it. Nobody in Europe really wanted this thing deployed and it got all tied up in German domestic politics. Schmidt’s government was a coalition government of his party, the SPD, and Genscher’s party, the FDP. Schmidt was a center/right man in the SPD. The left wing of the SPD and I think also some in the FDP opposed the neutron bomb. And the CDU, the Christian Democrats who were in the opposition, was criticizing Schmidt for being indecisive on this issue with the United States. I think there were a number of misunderstandings between Schmidt and Carter on this issue.

I can’t remember the details but I think Schmidt would come to the United States and speak with U.S. officials and then of course would have to go home and speak to the Germans and it didn’t always come out quite the same way with quite the same accents. But the neutron bomb issue…this was political/military alphabet days of course, with TNF (Theater Nuclear Forces) and MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) and also SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) negotiations all going on. The neutron bomb issue was enmeshed in all those issues.

The German desk had to keep abreast of all those issues. Anytime Schmidt was coming or Genscher was coming or Vance or Carter were going there we had to pull together briefing papers. There was one person on our desk who worked only on political military matters and our office deputy director and director also were well informed about them. But the people who were really deeply involved and on the front line of these issues were the regional political military office (RPM) in the European Bureau and in PM (the Bureau of Political Military Affairs) which was a separate bureau in the Department. So there was a whole host of officers who were experts on these particular issues.

The role of the German desk was primarily to highlight the domestic political
considerations in Germany and what Schmidt might want to try to do to satisfy those considerations. We weren’t technical experts on these arms control issues. There were many people in other offices in the Department who were engaged in those issues, as well of course the Defense Department and ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). The job of the German desk was to make sure that the secretary of state and the White House were aware that Schmidt had a domestic constituency that colored and shaped his rhetoric on the issues as well as his substantive positions. Schmidt was in a difficult position.

The Germans were saying that they didn’t want the neutron bomb on their soil but they would do it if they weren’t the only ones, if for example the Belgians or Dutch would do it. Those countries wouldn’t do it though. Well I think that eventually Schmidt lined up support in the Bundestag (Parliament) for accepting the neutron bomb if it became clear that there was no progress with the Soviets on arms control issues. Anyway the whole issue became very complex and it was costing Schmidt a lot of political capital at home.

Q: There was this episode where, as I understand it, Carter was pressing Schmidt to accept this. I’m told by Vlad Lehovich who was in Germany that there were a number of niggling little comments that were coming really directly from Carter pushing, pushing, pushing on this issue and then all of a sudden Carter, I don’t know whether it is a late talk with his daughter Amy or something, that maybe we shouldn’t do the bomb and...

KLINGAMAN: He backed off. Vlad Lehovich at that time was working in the embassy in Bonn during that Carter visit. I don’t know the details of that or who pulled the rug out from whom. I think Carter was upset that Schmidt didn’t go along with this thing. I don’t think Carter ever really understood the domestic political factors that were causing Schmidt to say yes, he would do it to the allies and no, he wouldn’t do it because of his political problems at home. You have to remember that I think we were constantly telling Secretary Vance and the White House that Schmidt was in a coalition government; and that Schmidt had a foreign minister named Genscher who came from a different political party, the Free Democratic Party.

The Free Democratic Party was a very small party but it held the balance of power in Germany. It had some rather conservative businessmen in it; it also had some very left wing people who were more left wing than anyone in the SPD. It was a very strange situation. Without the FDP Schmidt would not have been chancellor of Germany. Even though the FDP was this little tiny party with only six or seven percent of the popular vote it was a swing weight. Genscher, the head of the FDP, was foreign minister for years. He later became foreign minister in a coalition government with the CDU and this was exactly the kind of shift Schmidt did not want to see happen. So the desk was constantly saying look, this man Schmidt has political problems. That was our role more than being experts on MBFR or SALT or any of that. It was to bring that element to bear.

The Carter White House was really difficult.

Q: Could you talk about that for a minute?
KLINGAMAN: It was difficult in the sense that I guess it sort of mirrored Carter’s personality. He started out well in a public relations sense with the American people. Remember he had these town meetings on radio and television. That was all nice public relations, nice folksy touch. And Carter really studied the issues but he studied them in great detail for a long time. Consequently in a sense the NSC (National Security Council) that we dealt with, the NSC people in the White House dealing with Germany, moved very slowly. I’m thinking of little procedural things that to Germans made a big difference. For example, Schmidt would come over for a visit. This was the head of the government on an official visit. But we wouldn’t know until the morning of a proposed event whether or not President Carter would agree to have lunch with Chancellor Schmidt that day!

Germans want to have things lined up, in advance, well in advance, and on their schedules. But we could not get a timely decision out of the White House. We would send over papers recommending that Carter have lunch with Chancellor Schmidt on ‘X’ date. ‘X’ day would come and it wouldn’t be until the morning of that day that the White House would say that yes, the President would have lunch with Chancellor Schmidt. This did not set well with Schmidt. It was one of those atmospheric things that for us might seem not all that important. For Germans, for a German like Schmidt, it made a lot of difference. And when you add to that the substantive issues that were involved, it did not make for a good combination. It was very frustrating to us to have to wait until the last minute for decisions on procedural matters.

So some of that probably spilled over into the policy area in the sense that it annoyed Schmidt.

Q: There is this role that the desk often plays in any country of trying to explain the country with which we are dealing; of sort of the political facts of life from that country’s side. Sometimes you get accused of being too much a client of the other state when what you are trying to do is to explain the atmosphere in which you are working. Did the White House say to the NSC staff... I mean were they aware of your role or was it just that they were hamstrung...they just didn’t seem very effective.

KLINGAMAN: We were never really accused of ‘clientitis’ by the NSC people …to my knowledge. Germany was important enough and the political situation in Germany was dicey enough in the sense that it was a coalition government that we were able to make our points. The NSC staff members were aware of the German situation. First of all, obviously, of Germany’s international role but also of the domestic political situation. Basically I think they were more or less hamstrung. Who in the end was going to decide whether President Carter was going to have lunch with Helmut Schmidt? President Carter will in the end decide and his office just didn’t move that quickly. I think it was because he became enmeshed in the details. Carter was very well informed on the substance but procedural matters seemed to take a long time.

I’d like to talk a little bit about the “clientitis” charge that people tend to level at the State Department in general and the country desks in particular. The role of our German desk
was to keep abreast of all the bilateral and the multilateral issues we and the Germans were engaged in together. That meant all the NATO and the EC issues, arms control negotiations, economic problems, and specific foreign policy issues like Greece and Turkey. The German desk in the State Department was the only office in the entire U.S. government that knew about the entire range of issues and relationships we had going on with Germany. It was our job to put that perspective in front of other offices and departments and agencies dealing with the narrower specific issues.

Q: What was your impression of Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State in dealing with the problems?

KLINGAMAN: He was very methodical, very substantive. I think he was sensitive to the issues. He wasn’t considered an expert on Germany; and I don’t think he pretended to be either. The Germans did not have anywhere near the access to him that they had with Kissinger. Of course Schmidt and Genscher saw Vance, but many of the other high level Germans who came to town saw other people in the Department. Phil Habib was under secretary for political affairs during much of this time and he often met with the Germans on issues such as the Middle East that the Germans wanted to be kept informed on. They weren’t involved in them but they wanted to know about the Middle East, Greece and Turkey and of course Iran. The whole Iran situation was boiling over at this time. Phil Habib and sometimes Deputy Secretary Christopher rather than the Secretary met with visiting Germans.

Q: In November of ’79 and December of ’79 two major things happened. One was the seizure of our embassy in Teheran and then there was the Soviet attack in Afghanistan. First let’s talk about the Iranian situation. Did this concern the desk much?

KLINGAMAN: No, the desk wasn’t involved in the hostage situation. We were all of course emotionally involved in it. One of my predecessors in the political section in the Philippines had been Ann Swift and she was one of the hostages. I had met her only briefly when I went to Manila and she was leaving Manila. I remember my clock radio waking me up to the news of the failed rescue attempt. I also remember gathering with everyone in the diplomatic lobby of the State Department applauding Secretary Vance when he left the building the day of his resignation in connection with that issue.

Afghanistan was always an item in the briefing books and the sanctions against the Soviet Union. The Germans didn’t like that idea, nor did most countries like the idea of sanctions. The Germans questioned the effectiveness of sanctions and so on. But that didn’t matter we went forward with them anyway. We kept trying to have the Germans go along with economic sanctions. I can’t remember really whether they did or didn’t. I don’t think they really did.

Q: How about the Olympics? Does that come up during your time or was that later?

KLINGAMAN: That came up also, boycotting the 1980 Olympics in Moscow because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was another item for all the briefing books. But I
think the Germans really were more focused on MBFR and all of those issues than boycotting the Olympics. In the end though, they did join us in the boycott I think. This issue was not something the desk really got involved in other than yes, of course, it had to be cranked into briefing books and so on.

*Sue, as a desk officer how did you find working with the German Embassy?*

KLINGAMAN: It was fun, it was great. Before that working with the Austria-Swiss embassies was also very enjoyable. The German Embassy was large and I worked very closely with them particularly on visit preparations because we had Codels (congressional delegations) going to Germany and they had parliamentary delegations coming to the United States. As I say we had foreign minister visits and chancellor visits often. On visits I worked very closely with one of their officers and we had a great time; we kept each other in good humor laughing about all the inevitable glitches that occurred. The political counselor of the German Embassy…there were two different ones during my tenure on the desk…were very fine people. I worked very well with them. The German Embassy people that I worked with were all men. That never was a problem either for them or for me. They entertained me at lunches and restaurants or in their homes.

Now access to the ambassador was very different on the German desk with the German ambassador than it had been as Austria-Swiss Officer with the Austrian and Swiss ambassadors. I had good working relationship with the Austrian and Swiss ambassadors here, particularly with the Swiss ambassador.

The reasons for this were that when I was on that desk the higher levels in the Department, both in EUR/CE and then at the assistant secretary and the secretary level were all highly interested and involved with Germany. This meant that on many issues the Swiss desk officer was the most frequent link of the Austrian and Swiss Embassies to the Department. So I was invited to many dinners and social functions hosted by their ambassadors and DCMs as well as other embassy officers. In the case of Germany, however, it was of course a larger embassy, a more important country, and very status conscious. So the German ambassador very rarely included the German desk officers in his social representational functions. Sometimes he invited the director for EUR/CE, but usually his invitations went to the deputy assistant secretary level and above. But below that at the level of the German Embassy political counselor and below the German Embassy had a lot of representational lunches and dinners for the German desk officers. The German embassy officers were good to work with, always well informed, always practical, reasonable and enjoyable.

The German ambassador at that time was Berndt von Staden who was highly regarded. He was basically a supporter of the FDP, the liberal party. Therefore his line would have been through Genscher. If I’m not mistaken his wife was quite close to the Social Democrats. Anyway they were pleasant people although I didn’t have as much dealing with the German ambassador as I did with the Swiss and Austrian.
Q: Did you find that you were at all involved with Congress or were the German, Swiss and Austrians well acquainted with how to get the Congress...

KLINGAMAN: They were learning. They were learning that Congress played a role and the Germans became increasingly good at it. They weren’t great at it but they became increasingly good at it. These countries really didn’t understand the American government system that well, even though I am sure they had studied it on paper. Of course Germany and Austria were parliamentary systems and so their chancellor, whether or not in a coalition government, had a majority in parliament. Foreign diplomats usually only slowly became aware that the U.S. Congress had a life of its own, a political power of its own independent of the president and had to be dealt with separately and had to be lobbied separately. The Germans did become better at this in the late ‘70s. It took a long time.

Q: I think this is one of the great failings of most embassies. They sit down and think if they have a good contact with the Department of State...

KLINGAMAN: …they’ve got it made. And you don’t...

Q: You don’t.

KLINGAMAN: You absolutely don’t. That’s not all there is to it in our system. An embassy’s good contact with the Department of State doesn’t guarantee good contact with the Defense Department or the White House. I think the Germans and the Austrians…the Austrians became aware of it because on the steel issue they had to deal with the economic agencies; that just the State Department alone was not going to do it for them. The Germans became slowly aware that even the executive branch is not this monolithic, highly disciplined entity. You’ve got the Defense Department, which has different ideas sometimes than the State Department and then you have the White House that has different ideas yet.

Then they became aware of this animal called Congress and even then I’m not sure that they were truly aware that our parties are not disciplined, that the Republicans and Democrats go all over the place on issues. But by the time I left there were the beginnings of German and American congressional delegations traveling in both directions meeting with each other.

Going back to Karsten Voigt, the young man I interviewed years before, the young left-winger of the SPD, he became aware of this. He did become elected to the Bundestag soon after I left Bonn in I guess ’77 or so. He became elected to the German Bundestag. He is still in the Bundestag. He has been in the Bundestag, their parliament, for twenty years. He became the foreign policy spokesman for the Social Democrats. He started developing congressional contacts and there were the beginnings of congressional exchanges of our congressmen going to Germany, German parliamentarians coming over here and getting to know each other. I think the German Embassy started becoming quite good at that in the late ‘70s, early ‘80s.
Q: Were there any other issues during this ’77 to ’80 period?

KLINGAMAN: There were all the arms control issues that I mentioned. There was CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). There were also economic issues. That was the beginnings of the Group of Ten or Seven...the beginning of the periodic meetings of the developed countries. There was talk about North-South issues. There were trade negotiations. There were discussions about whether to give generalized preferences, trade preferences, to developing countries. All of those issues involved the Germans. There was also an issue with the Germans about their plans to export enriched uranium to Brazil. There were issues in Latin America, Salvador at that time. There was the issue of economic aid to Turkey and pressure on Germany to assist more. Germans were important in Europe and NATO and the European Communities. They were also becoming...we wanted them to become...increasingly involved worldwide in giving aid. They were not too keen on the idea but they wanted to be informed of what was going on, particularly in the Middle East. Those topics were always on the agendas of meetings.

Q: Did you during this time get involved with liaising with the Germans over the Camp David Accords with Israel and Egypt?

KLINGAMAN: They came in to the Department to talk about it, to keep informed of what was going on. Our desk was not actively involved in this; that was NEA (the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs). As I said, the German Social Democrat Wischniewsky was very interested in the Middle East. He had contacts with the Palestinians and with the Israelis. His credentials were apparently quite good with them, and he visited Washington every once in awhile.

To what extent he was involved in any serious Middle East discussions I really can’t tell you because it would have been very high level. But his views were heard and he kept the U.S. government informed, I think, of what he was doing.

Q: His position was what?

KLINGAMAN: He was a parliamentarian. He was a member of the Bundestag, and a member of the Social Democratic Party. He was respected in Germany, he was well informed; he was serious. He was not a gadfly by any means.

Q: What about East Germany? Was the desk involved there?

KLINGAMAN: The West German desk was not involved. EUR/CE had an East German desk, which was one officer doing nothing but East Germany. I do recall that the U.S. was in the process of setting up an embassy in East Berlin. German reunification was considered something that would never happen. It was something we were all in favor of, of course, and you could be in favor of it, but it was not going to happen.

Q: Was it ever a topic...what would happen if Germany unified, is this really a good
thing for us?

KLINGAMAN: It was never a hot item. As I said, John Kornblum was on the desk part of the time I was there. He was working on Berlin matters. John Kornblum thought conceptually and long range. I remember that John loved to write policy recommendation memos and he was quite seized with the subject of CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was the dialog between the countries of Eastern Europe and the countries of Western Europe. At that time it was just a dialog but it was becoming a sort of a framework that John Kornblum saw as something important, something potentially important. I think he could see the East German-West German relationship in a large, long-range context. That said while CSCE was something the United States was involved with it was not something that many people at that time took as all that serious a matter. It was discussion and talks about how we might cooperate, how East and West might cooperate on environmental issues, human rights, and so on.

But it was a forum for discussions between the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, if you will, the countries of Eastern Europe and Western Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union. It was there. But I never saw any U.S. government memo considering the possible implications of a reunified Germany. It didn’t seem realistic to focus on that.

But John Kornblum later went from the Office of Central European Affairs to the Office of Policy Planning. He was very well suited for that. He was a policy thinker. I think much of his focus on the policy planning staff later was on this kind of an issue…whither Europe down the road. I always admired him for that. You know it is very difficult to get anyone to focus on anything more than a year away. Of course that is why we had the policy planning staff, because it was their job to do so. But even they didn’t really get much beyond five years.

Q: Were Germany’s borders at all an issue while you were there?

KLINGAMAN: That was pretty well settled by the time I was on the desk. That was not a live issue at that time.

Q: Well by 1980 you had spent five years dealing with this, so where did you go then?

KLINGAMAN: I went somewhere totally different. In 1979 I had been offered the job of going to Bonn to be the senior officer on German domestic politics but I instead had chosen to extend on the German desk for another year for family reasons. So by the summer of 1980 I decided that I wanted to explore new territories. I had been working in Germany and Washington on German and Central European affairs for nine years. In the back of my mind I had Indonesia…remember, I had visited there. I had visited Indonesia after the fall of Sukarno and found it a fascinating place. Thinking of my next assignment, I was thinking I wanted to go and do something different. So I started talking to colleagues in the Asia bureau and started going around to see what was available. I was interested in having my own post somewhere or being head of a section in an embassy.
I really don’t remember what all I bid for. At that time the bidding system was underway in personnel assignments. I went around to the Indonesian desk and talked to Bob Fritts who was country director then of the office of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. I also knew another officer on that desk. I was just interested in seeing what was available. And Bob Fritts said Medan would be available; the principal officer job in Medan was coming open and that would be a really interesting job for me. The officer in charge of that post at that time was Al LaPorta and before him had been a woman officer, Harriet Isom. Fritts said it was a great post and really interesting and I smiled and said it sounded great and thanked him for the idea. I left his office and thought, where is Medan? And how do you spell it? Well, I looked into it and found that it was actually a large post in an important area in Indonesia.

I applied for it and I had some help, I think, from George Vest. At that time he was assistant secretary for Europe and I just remember him saying to let him know what job I was interested in and he would see what he could do. I wrote him a note that my first choice was this post in Indonesia. I don’t know whether he had any influence on the assignment or not but in any case I was assigned to Medan. It was a language designated position so I went into Indonesian language training for eight months, from the summer of 1980 to the spring of ’81 at FSI.

Q: How did you find the language training?

KLINGAMAN: Mixed. Mixed reviews on the language training. One of the best things about the language training was that the army colonel who was designated to be defense attaché in Jakarta was in my class and so I got to meet him. We became good friends and when he went to Jakarta and I was in Medan, we had a nice relationship and I was able sometimes to travel on his airplane to visit other provinces in Indonesia.

Indonesian language training was good in some ways and in other ways it was not so good. We started out with a small class…maybe seven or eight of us. I was the only one from the State Department. There were several people from USIA and this man from the Defense Department. The training was conducted during a period when FSI linguists were experimenting with methodology and that is always a little tricky in language training.

I had actually been through the French language training at FSI, not because I was going to a French speaking post but I took the early morning French just to get a 3/3 level in French. I had been exposed to their very systematic method of teaching French. They weren’t using that method in Indonesian. They had books but they weren’t really well developed and the linguist had decided the books were old-fashioned so they were experimenting with new situational methods of teaching language which were okay…it was sort of you tell us what you are going to need to use and what kind of situation you think you will be in and we’ll give you the language to go with it.

This is a perfectly reasonable method and way of teaching language if the students go along with it. But the students from USIA, nothing to do with USIA but those particular
students, did not like this approach and they were not going to cooperate with it so they didn’t always come to class. The man who was going to be defense attaché did not have a high language aptitude score and he wanted a more traditional structured approach. The teachers were wonderful, nice, gentle Indonesians who just would do whatever the students wanted. And since the students were here, there and everywhere the course was lacking in direction.

I got very frustrated because I had to pass the language test at the 3/3 level to make my assignment stick. I was going to a so-called language designated position. The linguist in charge of Southeast Asian languages did not know very much Indonesian. And so the whole thing was not very successful until I went to the linguist and said look, I’m not going to learn this language unless something happens and so they broke me out of the course in the last three months and I had solo language training. I was able to work very well with the two Indonesian teachers. One of them in particular, the woman Indonesian language teacher named Jijis knew a great deal about how to teach Americans about Indonesian culture and the interplay of the language and the culture. She was very, very helpful to me in helping me and the other students understand the Indonesian mentality.

The problem that I found when I got to Indonesia itself was that those two Indonesian teachers were way out of date on their Indonesian language. They had been in this country for twenty years. Indonesian had evolved as a language very considerably and they were not really up to date on how Indonesian was being spoken. Also I went to a different part of Indonesia than where they were from. I went to the rough, tough part of Indonesia, the island of Sumatra, where Indonesian was spoken differently both in terms of the accent and in terms of some of the phrases used. But, you know, it worked. I did emerge from language training with a 3/3+ in Indonesian.

When I got to Medan I did have to use the language. I had to learn a lot on the ground and I did. I had to use it all day long. I was in a part of Indonesia where English was not spoken much and even the journalists, the government officials and even the military commanders who were very important did not speak much English. So I used my Indonesian a lot.

Q: You were in Medan from 1981 to?


Q: 1984. Can you describe the situation first in Indonesia and then in Sumatra, sort of political, economic, what was happening there then, particularly when you arrived?

KLINGAMAN: In 1981 Indonesia was under the presidency of Suharto who had come in as president of the country in ’67, ’68. When precisely he became president I’m not sure. His predecessor, Sukarno had been overthrown in a coup, a very complicated coup and massacre. He had been the charismatic leader of Indonesia. He had led Indonesia since it had achieved independence from the Dutch in 1949 and then was overthrown at the end of ’65. There had allegedly been the threat of a communist coup. To this date no one
knows if this had been a real threat or not. But in any case the army took over and Suharto was the colonel who took over and took command of the country. Sukarno himself was placed under house arrest and was not really relieved of the presidency for something like fourteen months. So I think it was somewhere at the end of ‘67 or early ’68 that Suharto became the president.

Indonesia was a very large country spanning something like 3,000 miles and umpteen thousand islands and over two hundred million people. Basically by the time I arrived in 1981 it was doing quite well economically. Indonesia was and is blessed with many natural resources. It had developed economically. Still there was a lot of poverty, particularly on Java, the island on which Jakarta is located and where most of the population of Indonesia is located. But the country was united; the central government was very strong and highly centralized in Jakarta with many provincial governments. It was a country basically controlled by the military that was very, very important at that time and has continued to be.

The military numbered only about 300,000 troops in a country of over two hundred million people. It was a unique institution in the sense that it was what the Indonesians called a dual-functional military. This meant that they were engaged in not only traditional military functions but also in what in most countries were traditional civilian functions which is to say they had roles in the government executive branch both in Jakarta and in all the provinces. They had roles in the economy. In other words, an Indonesian military officer could expect to spend probably half of his career in “civilian” type jobs. One tour of duty might be in a military function, and then in the next tour of duty he would put those military clothes in the closet and out would come the civilian clothes. He might be governor of a province, mayor of a city, or head of a company.

At that time most of the companies in Indonesia were government owned. And that remained true throughout my tour of duty. After I left they had more and more private companies. But Indonesia was basically united by a strong central government in Jakarta that was essentially military but with civilians in it as well. Not only military in civilian functions but also civilians in civilian functions spreading out throughout the whole archipelago. It was united also by a common language, which was the language that I had studied at FSI but which was the second language for all Indonesians. Indonesians had to learn this language in school and it was very much a unifying factor. This language had been adopted because of a student movement in 1928.

Student nationalists, nationalists against the Dutch, had decided this student nationalist movement needed to find a language for this country that they hoped would become independent. They had a big debate back in the 1920s on whether they would choose the language of the predominant ethnic group, which was Javanese, or some other language. They discarded Javanese because it was a very complicated language, very status-oriented, very complex linguistically and they wanted to find a language that all of the ethnic groups could adopt. There are over 250 some ethnic groups in the country and languages so they adopted what came to be called Bahasa Indonesia which is market Malay. It was the language spoken by the traders.
Q: Sort of like Swahili...which was the traders' language...

KLINGAMAN: Yes, analogous. It was the traders’ language of the traders moving along through the Malacca Straits between Sumatra where I was stationed and Malaysia, in that whole area. It was market Malay and that became the Indonesian national language. So Indonesia at the time I arrived in 1981 was definitely a united country, with strong central government, economically rich, with the beginnings of a middle class... largely because of all these natural resources, most of which were located on the island of Sumatra where I was.

Java was rich in terms of its soil; it was agriculturally rich because it was volcanic. And so the country was rich. Even then, though, Indonesia was incredibly inefficient. It was at that time a rice importing country, despite the richness of its soil. It got over that during the period that I was there. But on the island of Sumatra there was oil, natural gas that had just started to be exploited shortly before I arrived, and rubber. Goodyear Rubber Company was there and Uniroyal was there. There were also palm oil plantations. Off on the eastern side of Indonesia there was copper and gold. A rich country. There were also spices, a lot of which were exported so if I wanted certain spices I was better off importing them from the United States. It was just like when I wanted shrimp in Denmark I had to get it out of a can because most of the fresh shrimp was exported.

So Indonesia was very rich and doing well. Of course there were many underdeveloped aspects. Roads and electricity were lacking in many of the areas of the country. There was a huge disparity of wealth and much corruption. The Suharto family had established its companies and so on. But there was the beginning of a middle class.

Q: When you arrived was it a consulate general?

KLINGAMAN: It was a consulate, actually. The ambassador and the embassy in Jakarta had recommended that Medan be a consulate general and indeed it should have been in terms of its size and its importance but it never got through in the Department. That was the beginning of the days of thinking that we needed to downsize and downgrade everything for budget reasons. The whole idea was that some people in the government wanted to close down some of the of the small consulates general in Europe like Bremen, a one-person post. Some of the Department’s administrators were willing to abolish those, and they didn’t want to consider raising the classification of Medan to a consulate general even though in fact it filled all the criteria for one. Medan was a large post. I was the consul and the so-called principal officer, the officer in charge of managing the post and also doing political and economic reporting. There was also an economic officer, administrative officer, consular officer, a USIS branch public affairs officer, an American secretary, twelve FSNs (Indonesian nationals) and twenty five contract employees. We also had an American telecommunications officer, and we had classified telegraphic facilities direct to Washington and all overseas posts.

Q: What did your area comprise? Was it Sumatra basically?
KLINGAMAN: It was one of the largest consular districts in the world actually. It comprised the entire island of Sumatra, which was about a thousand miles long. In addition to that it also included part of what the Indonesians called Kalimantan, in other words what we called Borneo, the western part of Borneo. So it was a huge, huge area.

We had about 1,200 Americans at that time living in the consular district. 600 of them were in my immediate environs around Medan where Mobil Oil was very big and also north of Medan in Aceh province where Mobil Oil was exploiting natural gas. The area was very important to Mobil Oil and to the United States. Most of the Americans in our consular district were either with Mobil Oil, Caltex, Uniroyal, or Goodyear. There were also some missionaries.

Q: Peace Corps?

KLINGAMAN: No Peace Corps. The Indonesians would not allow Peace Corps in. They were still, I wouldn’t say xenophobic, as they had been under Sukarno. They weren’t like that. But they were very protective of their culture and they saw anything like Peace Corps coming in as spreading American ways of doing things. They wouldn’t even allow Americans or British to come in and teach English in Indonesia at that time because they felt, and rightly so, that with language comes culture and they didn’t want that. We did have an American couple running the English program at the U.S.-Indonesian binational center in Medan but they were administrators and teacher trainers, not teaching students directly.

There was of course an USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) mission in Jakarta and then there were AID contractors. The AID contractors were primarily doing road-building projects in Sumatra and rural development. I did go around and visit those projects. They had contacts with Indonesians in those areas and so they helped me also to develop contacts, as did missionaries who also were very helpful later on in some really difficult consular cases that I had to deal with.

I don’t know in what direction you’d like to go. Medan was a really interesting post and the city of Medan was large but it didn’t seem large. It was 1.6 million people at that time and really was a microcosm of Indonesia in the sense that almost every Indonesian, every major Indonesian ethnic group, was represented there in some way. The people native to that area were called the Bataks. Many were Christians, and they were about as unlike the Javanese as you can possibly imagine. They were very direct, blunt people. The Javanese were very indirect, polite and circuitous. So you had the Bataks there and you had many Javanese because most of the military who came up there to do either military or governmental functions were Javanese.

There were also a lot of lower class Javanese living in that area who had come up to work on the plantations, fifty years or so before. There were also a number of people from central Sumatra who were from a group in central Sumatra that was very highly educated and had produced many of the Indonesian central government leaders. They were very
active in the retail trade and so on. Also of course there were the Indonesian ethnic Chinese. There were a good many of them in Medan since many of them were in commerce and so were in the big city, which was Medan. They were also involved in plantation businesses. So it was a very interesting area.

I would like to emphasize that I was really glad I had Indonesian language training. Indonesians love ceremonies, and I was often called on to make speeches and I did my best to make those speeches in Indonesian. My Indonesian was very far from perfect but the Indonesians appreciated my efforts. And it was also absolutely necessary. Most of the Indonesian government officials, military, police, journalists, and business people I dealt with did not speak much English and I simply had to converse in Indonesian with them.

Medan was an interesting city and the whole consular area was just extremely interesting because of the ethnic variety. There were nine different provinces, nine different provincial governments. I had to make the rounds and go call on the governors and find out as much as I could in the way of what was going on in those provinces. Now politically Suharto and the military essentially ran the country. Nevertheless, we wanted to learn as much as we could about these military leaders and about what the people in the provinces were doing and thinking. There were interesting and knowledgeable people to talk with in Medan and in the other provinces, and the economic infrastructure in the provinces was developing.

My language training also helped me gain access to some of the so-called opposition elements in Indonesia, that is those who were associated with the Muslim party (PPP) and the nationalist party (PDI). The PDI affiliated newspaper, *Waspada*, interviewed me in Indonesian about US-Indonesian relations and ran it on the front page. I also became acquainted with a PDI-affiliated professor at the University of North Sumatra, who invited me to lecture in Indonesian about American government in his political science class. Without Indonesian, I just would not have had some of the contacts that I did.

I would also like to mention that both the embassy and our consulate in Medan had contact with members of the Indonesian “Legal Aid Society”, which was a group of lawyers trying to get the Indonesian government and people to pay more attention to human rights issues. They got some financial support from USAID (the U.S. Agency for Economic Development) as I recall. The Indonesian government kept close track of this group. In those days the so-called opposition groups were kept under firm wraps by the Indonesian government and military. But now here we are in May 1998 with Suharto on his way out and student unrest boiling over...

But when I was there the country was politically quiet except for an occasional demonstration and some incidents in Aceh between the Indonesian military and some of the Aceh freedom fighters. The provinces were developing economically and the economic officer and I did considerable political/economic reporting on various economic projects underway: roads, bridges, harbors, dams, hydroelectric projects, as well as small rural development projects in the villages.
**Q: What about Borneo? What was going on there?**

KLINGAMAN: Not a whole lot. We had missionaries there and I went up and visited. There wasn’t much going on in that section of Borneo. In fact to the extent that there was consular work that needed to be done with Americans resident in Borneo, much of it was done by the embassy simply because the flight connections to and from Kalimantan all went through Jakarta. I never quite figured out why it was part of our consular district anyway. But there wasn’t much going on there at that time that needed my attention or the embassy’s.

**Q: You mentioned missionaries, yet at the same time you had a government that was very resistant to foreign influence. How did that work?**

KLINGAMAN: Well it worked with great care on the part of the missionaries. There were Baptist missionaries in central Sumatra who had been there for quite a long time. It worked because they didn’t proselytize. They ran hospitals. They did medical work. They were medical missionaries. They were well received for that. I don’t believe they made many converts; they weren’t allowed to. There was a Methodist missionary couple in Medan and there was an active Indonesian Methodist church in Medan.

The ethnic group that was native to the area, the Bataks, was Christian, so there were Indonesian Christians there. I’ll say a little bit about Indonesia’s religion in a minute. In Medan, the Methodist missionary couple did two different things. The woman was a physical therapist in the Methodist hospital in Medan. So the Methodists were doing medical work. Her husband was involved in rural development work, village development, building irrigation ditches and so on to improve the lot of villagers. They had been in Indonesia for quite a long time and they knew Indonesians well. But there were tensions.

The American missionaries had problems at various times getting their residence permits renewed. It was always a delicate relationship with the Indonesians and the Indonesians did have a hold on them in the sense that they could refuse to extend their residence permits and this did happen a couple of times. That also was a problem with some of the Americans who were there to train Indonesian teachers in the English language. That was the same kind of a problem. But it worked. But it was what I would call a rather tenuous relationship.

On religion however Indonesians are pretty laid back. It is the largest Muslim country in the world. We’ve heard a lot about that recently. The Muslims in most areas of Indonesia are rather relaxed. The mosques and the minarets sounded the calls to prayer. They had the ritual and the ceremony and the mosque on Fridays but in most areas it was not a conservative, orthodox Islam. Indonesians are a very tolerant people, by and large, when it comes to religion. I think the term that has been used to describe them is syncretic.

They have absorbed lots of foreign influences in layers and the bottom layer is animism, superstition, and mysticism. If you scratch an Indonesian it won’t take you too many layers to get to the superstition and mysticism. Religious influences moved into Indonesia
from South Asia down through the straits of Malacca; it all came in with the traders. The religious influence of Hinduism anchored in Bali. You have Borobudur in Java, a marvelous Buddhist temple. And then came Islam and it really took hold in Indonesia. Then came the Dutch with Christianity. And then you have some of those ethnic groups that don’t like Javanese very well becoming Christians. That included many of the ethnic Chinese Indonesians and the Bataks on Sumatra. So you have a country in which Good Friday is a national holiday; Christmas is a national holiday, and which also observes the Muslim fasting period of Ramadan. It was all very tolerant and relaxed.

But there was also an area in my consular district, the province of Aceh, that was orthodox Islam. It was the northernmost tip of Sumatra and geographically closest to Malaysia and the Middle East, and orthodox Muslims lived in that area. It was also an area rich in natural resources. That was the area where the natural gas was discovered. There was a separatist movement in this area which was fed by (a) the orthodox Islam, and (b) resentment that revenues from their natural gas resources were going to the central government in Jakarta and were not being plowed back into developing Aceh itself. The Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) reflected political/economic grievances as much as it did religious differences. But that was the main area in Indonesia where there was orthodox Islam. Even at the time I was there there were some separatist demonstrations even though the Indonesian military was in control. It was important for the consulate to keep informed about what was happening there. In addition to all the natural resources of the area it was and still is an area of potential separatism and violence. I went there a number of times. The State Department, on our recommendation, awarded a “young leaders exchange visitor’s grant” to one of the young PPP (Muslim Party) national parliamentarians from Aceh. I became acquainted with his family in Aceh.

Q: Were you concerned at that time about the influence of Iran? The Shiites in Iran and the Sunnis in Saudi Arabia, were they contesting the area?

KLINGAMAN: The government in Jakarta was very strong and the military command on the island of Sumatra had a very strong grip on that whole entire island. Anything resembling Iranian influence or any kind of foreign infiltration of the orthodox Muslims in Aceh would have been nipped in the bud in a big hurry; it was not a real issue. It was something that was seen as a potential problem but it never really came to pass.

Q: There must have been rather close relations with Malaysia, or not?

KLINGAMAN: Oh, yes, there were. You mean back and forth, trade-wise?

Q: Yes.

KLINGAMAN: There was a direct flight from Medan to Kuala Lumpur. Medan was an international airport. There were direct flights to Kuala Lumpur and to Penang, which is part of Malaysia, and to Singapore. Now Indonesia had economic ties with Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. They were together in ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. When I was in the Philippines it had started out as ASA, the Association
of Southeast Asia. At first the Indonesians during the Sukarno era were not in this. During Sukarno’s period Indonesia and Malaysia were in a very confrontational mode. That was all over border issues on Borneo. That was in the ‘60s. And that had all been pretty much resolved.

Q: Did Australian play any role there?

KLINGAMAN: Australia certainly was very interested in Indonesia, but they didn’t have any official representation in Medan. I’ll get to that briefly. We did have quite an active consular corps in Medan. The Soviet Union had a consulate general there. That was one of the reasons we wanted to be called a consulate general. The Soviet Union had a consulate general; Malaysia had a consulate general; and Japan had a consulate general. Singapore and the United States had consulates. There were also honorary consuls representing Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and the U.K. The honorary consuls were long time residents in Indonesia who were very knowledgeable. One was a priest and the others were plantation managers.

There were some Australians in Sumatra doing rural development work. But the country playing the most important economic role in that part of Indonesia at that time were the Japanese. They were investing a lot there. They had built a huge hydroelectric dam in Sumatra. They were also involved in harbor development projects and so on. They were well informed about what was going on in that part of Indonesia.

Q: Did you see the United States as a competitor to the Japanese in market development?

KLINGAMAN: Well the Japanese had a real economic foothold in the sense they had all these economic projects. As far as developing the Indonesian markets was concerned in terms of getting American exports accepted or American investment accepted, one of the major U.S. problems in Indonesia was, of course, that in order for foreigners to get a foothold in Indonesia they were under pressure to bribe the appropriate officials. We had some laws against that. Companies can often find ways around such laws. But the Japanese government and business are so closely tied together that Japanese business just went in along with Japanese government and was able, I think, to get a better foothold. But that said Goodyear, Uniroyal, Caltex, and Mobil Oil had done very well in Indonesia. Still, the Indonesian government controlled the economy.

Q: It was basically Suharto...

KLINGAMAN: …Suharto and Suharto’s family, even then. I mean that Suharto family enterprises were going strong. The foothold that American companies had was mostly in exploiting natural resources and that had to be in cooperation with the Indonesian government. Caltex was in southern Sumatra doing the oil exploitation in partnership with the Indonesian oil company, Pertimina. Mobil Oil was doing the natural gas exploitation in Aceh, also in partnership with Pertimina, and doing very well. But basically it was not so much getting a foothold in the Indonesian domestic market as getting a foothold for American companies exploiting Indonesian natural resources and
exporting them.

In fact at that time I was told that Mobil Oil was reaping about 25 percent of its annual total world profits from natural gas in Aceh.

Q: Did the corruption problem cause difficulties for you?
KLINGAMAN: For me?

Q: For the American business community?
KLINGAMAN: Obviously the U.S. Government was opposed to bribery and corruption. Mobil Oil managed the best they could. They had to work with Indonesians and they had Indonesians on their staff. I imagine it was probably the Indonesians on their staff who handled whatever money needed to be passed. But let’s not forget that the Indonesians needed companies like Mobil Oil and Caltex. They had the technology to exploit the natural resources and so it was not a situation in which American companies had to bribe their way in so that they could do what they wanted to do. They were the only ones who had the equipment, the expertise and the money to exploit those resources.

Q: What about consular cases?
KLINGAMAN: There were some really difficult ones. We could take as long or as short a time as you want on those. We had two very difficult consular cases that took a great deal of my time. Before those cases came up the consular work was pretty routine. It consisted mainly of processing non-immigrant visa applications, and this was handled by our consular officer who was assisted by an FSN.

Q: Lots of students?
KLINGAMAN: Yes. Many Indonesian students wanted to go to the United States to study. There were also some businessmen going to the United States, visitor visas, just tourists going...some, not too many...and passports renewals and so on and special consular services. We didn’t have that much in special consular services until all of a sudden we did. We had two missing persons cases which were extremely time-consuming.
The first missing persons case involved a professor from California named John Reed.

That started out with the consulate in, I think, ’82 with the consulate receiving a circular cable sent to all diplomatic and consular posts in Southeast Asia informing us that a Professor John Reed was on a trip around Southeast Asia and he hasn’t come home to California. His wife is worried. His itinerary was unknown but has anyone seen him? No. Nobody had seen him. We of course checked whether we had any record of him. No. But Americans weren’t required to register with embassies or consulates and Medan, was not a tourist attraction. There was a large volcanic lake in North Sumatra, Lake Toba, which some foreigners visited but most foreign tourists wanted to go to Bali or Jogjakarta on Java. Indonesians had no record of Reed entering through the Medan airport. So we
reported this to the Department.

Professor John Reed had been due home two weeks before we received the circular cable. So the case was already quite cold. And then I received either a cable or telephone call from the embassy in Jakarta saying that his wife had arrived in Jakarta. She had flown to Indonesia because she had had a postcard from him. The last postcard from him was from the town of Bukittingi in the central part of Sumatra, which was a nice little tourist town about three or four hundred miles southwest of Medan. Mrs. Reed had a postcard from her husband some weeks before from that town.

To make a long story short I got in touch with the American missionaries, the Baptist missionaries in this little town. Mrs. Reed was also in touch with the missionaries. And together they went looking around this little town and lo and behold they found Professor. Reed’s suitcases in a very rundown type hostel that you or I would never have gone to probably. It was listed in the hippies’ guide to Indonesia on the cheap. Anyway they found his suitcases. I notified the Indonesian military commander in Medan in charge of Sumatra about this and then I flew down to Bukittingi. Mrs. Reed and I met with the military stationed in that area. Well the suitcases had been in that hostel for about a month.

The military started making inquiries in that area and I went around with them. The military combed the area. No trace. Nothing. Nobody had seen him; nobody knew anything. Mrs. Reed returned to the United States, understandably very distraught. She was in frequent contact with the State Department’s special consular services division requesting updates on embassy and consulate efforts to find her husband. We kept making inquiries with the military but we couldn’t find any trace.

For the Indonesians this was a major embarrassment because they wanted to present Indonesia as a peaceful place and an attractive place for tourists. And here an American tourist had disappeared in Indonesia and nobody could find him. And what had happened? The Indonesians could not understand why this professor had not registered either with the embassy or the consulate. I doubt that Reed had come in through Medan; he probably came in through Jakarta. In any case we had to explain to the Indonesians that the United States does not require Americans to register with embassies or consulates. In sum, in the case of Professor Reed nothing was ever found. No trace was ever found.

Q: It became quite well known in the papers, I think.

KLINGAMAN: Well, probably in California. Our second missing persons case was reported in the New York Times, but I am not aware that the Reed case was. But we couldn’t find him. You know if a man disappears... Bukittingi was a charming resort town and there was a little trail that he might have taken to look over a canyon like area there. He might perhaps have been robbed and killed, because the hostel where he was staying was a place frequented by some very unsavory types. He had been carrying a lot of money, we did ascertain that. He might have been killed or he might have fallen and
been injured. You know if someone dies in an area like that in the tropics there would be no remains left after 24 hours. We could never find any trace of anything.

Our embassy in Jakarta and we in Medan kept urging the Indonesian military and police to keep pursuing the case. At one point the DCM in Djakarta and I and the Indonesian military went to the area and went up and down the trails on foot asking people if they had ever seen this man. The Indonesian military also conducted several search and rescue missions. Nothing was ever found.

The final problem was that Mrs. Reed could not settle the estate. Her husband had been a resident of California and under California law a person had to be missing for seven years before he could be declared dead. So what we did all along, continually, was to write very detailed reports of everything that we did to attempt to determine what had happened to Professor Reed. We wrote very detailed reports of all our efforts to find him and cabled those reports to the Department which in turn passed them on to Mrs. Reed. In that case I don’t believe…I don’t know…but I don’t believe she was able to settle the estate for seven years.

Then, on the heels of that case we had another missing person case. This one we were able to latch onto a little bit earlier. The consulate had learned from the first case what the Indonesians could and couldn’t do for us. The second case involved Professors Huss and Allen from New York City. I have to think now how that went. That was in 1984. Professor Huss and Allen were reporting missing.

Q: These were two professors?

KLINGAMAN: Two professors from New York City. I am trying to recall how we were notified of that case. But again I believe it was a cable from the Department saying that the nephew of one of the men was concerned because they had not returned on schedule to New York City. Again there was a time lag between the time we knew about it and the time they had disappeared. But I believe we had something of an itinerary for them.

In any event we contacted the Indonesian authorities at the Medan airport. Foreigners did have to have a visa to get into the country and the Indonesian authorities did come up with entry records for Huss and Allen into Medan. We then started an intense search in Medan. They hadn’t registered with the consulate, but again very few people did if they were tourists; there was no requirement. Once again the Indonesians could not understand why they didn’t register.

We had learned a few things from the Reed case one of which was that the Indonesian police were, at that time, not very competent and not very efficient. They were very unorganized. The Indonesian police is a branch of the military but definitely not the most efficient. The police were very corrupt and very poorly trained. So we had learned that we could not expect them to do much for us in the way of investigating whether or not the two professors had been in the Medan area, if so, where had they stayed and so on. All the consulate knew was that Huss and Allen had entered Medan on such and such a
date about two weeks earlier. So we started really doing what in other countries would be police work...myself and the consular Officer, my Indonesian driver and the Indonesian consular assistant. We got out there and started beating the bushes.

We went around and checked hotel records. Guests were required to register in hotels even if they were just low quality hostels. We put it in the newspapers...all the local newspapers. We put out a press release. The consulate really broadcast this problem. We went to the two tourist areas near Medan. One is about an hour and a half up into the mountains, called Brastagi, which is where the consulate had a rest house, so we knew that area. The other further away was Lake Toba. My driver and I and the consular officer went up in our car and just started going all over Brastagi, going to all these rundown hostels and making inquiries. We were doing what in most countries the local authorities would do, not foreign diplomats.

I remember we were looking around, looking at hotel registers, not finding too much and then an Indonesian came riding up on his motorcycle to the consulate rest house where we were having lunch and he asked to see ‘Miss Susan’. That was my name in Sumatra, I was Miss Susan. This young man, Jimmy was his name, had seen a newspaper article about this case and he said he had seen the professors, he had been their guide one day and they had stayed in such and such a hostel. So we went to this really rundown place, my driver and I and the consular officer. I remember going in and an Indonesian woman was running this place. We looked at the guest book and I noticed that a page had been ripped out of the guest book and it was on one of the crucial dates. We asked her if she had seen Huss and Allen. She said she had not. We asked her why the page was missing and she indicated she had no idea whatever. I remember walking out of that hostel and my Indonesian driver, Usman, turned to me and he looked at me and said she was lying.

We and the embassy really weighed in hard and kicked up a lot of dust with the Indonesian authorities about this. Once again, a tourist area, and American tourists missing...two this time...and the embassy in Jakarta pushed whatever buttons it could down there. This was another very embarrassing case for the Indonesian government; they took it very seriously. The Indonesian central government in Jakarta...and this was really indicative of the importance the Indonesians attached to this case...the central government in Jakarta sent an Indonesian military police detective up to Medan. He set up an Indonesian investigative team. He worked very closely with us. This Indonesian detective was very good, very tough, very sharp. We told him about the missing page in the hostel registry, that my driver said the innkeeper was lying, etc.

A day or so later this detective called us from Brastagi.

You were saying that the policeman called you?

KLINGAMAN: Yes. He said that they had searched this hostel and found the suitcases of the two professors. Then how did it go next? I don’t know...this guide Jimmy had...let’s see, Jimmy had told us that he had taken the two professors on a little hike up to the volcano in that area but hadn’t seen them since. As far as I know, that was true. Then suddenly this police detective from Jakarta informed us that they had arrested seven
people in Brastagi in connection with the disappearance of Huss and Allen. So we were very encouraged by this news. We thought that probably Huss and Allen had been robbed and killed. Of course the Indonesians did not want to hear any suggestion like this.

This was at the tail end of a period in that section of Sumatra where there had been a brief period of significant law and order problems, of outbreaks of violent crime. In fact there had been outbreaks in different parts of Indonesia during this period, which were significant enough so that we had reported it to the Department. By the time Huss and Allen disappeared the Indonesian military had stopped this crime wave, sometimes quite ruthlessly. There were a lot of “mystery killings” in those days. Criminals were supposedly shooting one another, but there were rumors that the Indonesian military had come in and taken care of the criminals in the only way it really knew how to, which was to shoot and kill them. At that time really there was not a well-developed police system; there was not a well-developed court system. So if there was disorder it was dealt with violently. Anyway it was the tail end of this period, and there was still some crime around.

In any event seven Indonesians were arrested in Brastagi. Seven were arrested and then four were released and then three were under intense questioning. Of course we were reporting all of this back to the Department. And in the meantime the nephew of one of the professors came to Indonesia and was with us at the consulate. He was giving us very helpful information on the professors and their habits, etc. The Indonesian police detective from Jakarta was questioning several people in Brastagi. Then all of a sudden he packed up and returned to Jakarta. We never knew exactly what happened but I believe…I have no way of proving it but my hunch is that the police team found out what happened to Professors Huss and Allen. I believe that they were killed and I believe that the Indonesians found out who did it and took care of that person in summary fashion. This is just my hunch. I can’t prove it in any way at all.

The Indonesians made much of the fact that Professors Huss and Allen did not register with the American Consulate. The case made the front page of the New York Times because they were from New York City. They were professors at, I think, NYU. It was on page one of the New York Times several times. We continued to make inquiries. The Indonesians of course never said they had solved the case and taken care of it. In the meantime the Indonesians were saying well, what can you expect, these American tourists come in, they don’t register with the American Consulate and they go off “into the jungle”.

Well they weren’t off in the jungle. In both cases, the Reed case in central Sumatra and Huss and Allen in northern Sumatra...both cases were cases in which the disappearances occurred in tourist areas which were not jungle. Granted they were on the edge of jungle because everything is on the edge of jungle in Indonesia. Brastagi was a resort area, a hill station type of place and so was Bukittingi in Central Sumatra. But the Indonesians were truly embarrassed by these cases of disappearances at a time when they were trying to promote tourism.
In the Huss and Allen case, also, we did a lot of detailed, play by play reporting which I did most of. That of course went to the Department and the Department was supposed to send the reports on to the families involved. However, in both the Reed case and the Huss and Allen case the Department did not forward the information on to the families as promptly as it might have.

In the Huss and Allen case the consulate received a letter from Professor Allen’s nephew, the one who had come out to Medan while the case was going on. He wrote that he needed detailed reports about what we had done to try to find his uncle. Well the Department had all these reports but for some reason, perhaps a secretarial backlog, had not sent them on to the family. Finally it was done. And in that case it turned out to very important to the family, not that we found him or were able to tell them what happened. But because we had documented our efforts in such detail, every step of the way, the attorney for the family was able to take it to a New York State court. On the basis of our reporting the attorney was able to satisfy the need to establish that all measures possible had been taken by the Indonesian authorities to find these men, and the court, on the basis of our reporting, declared them dead so the estate could be settled. That appeared in the New York Times, that they had been declared dead finally.

Q: I would think the other shoe to drop in a case like this would be the Department of State saying, giving a travel advisory about Indonesia which of course would be highly unhappy.

KLINGAMAN: Yes that of course was something that the Indonesians did not want to have happen under any circumstance. I’m trying to think. I believe there was some consideration of a travel advisory, but none was issued. Ambassador Holdridge, John Holdridge was ambassador in Jakarta at the time, took a lot of interest in the case. He visited Medan at some point in 1984 and one of the calls on his agenda was on the Indonesian police commander in Medan,

Now the police commanders were highly competent military people. It was the rank and file police under them who were not well trained. It was a different police commander than had been in that position at the time of the disappearances, but they rolled out a chart and video show for the ambassador to show all that they had done. They reiterated that it was too bad the men had not registered at the consulate and had gone “into the jungle” on their own!

I must say that in those two cases those three American tourists were not following good sense for travel in Indonesia at that time. In both cases they were carrying a lot of cash according to our information; they were carrying cash on money belts and they were staying in hippie hostels. And so my feeling is that they were probably excellent targets for unsavory elements and criminals. These cases were very frustrating and very time consuming and took me away from political and economic reporting. Obviously assistance to Americans in distress always has to be top priority. I can also say, though, that these cases gave me a lot of insights into the Indonesian police that I would not have had otherwise. The corruption…what else is new about that…but the ineptness of so many of the police was very evident. This ran through my mind thinking about the events
in Indonesia that have taken place recently this year. When I was there most of the police were not well trained, not highly motivated, and very poorly paid.

Q: Bad combination! Were there any other developments we should talk about? We could pick it up again.

KLINGAMAN: Just reflecting on Indonesia in general I always felt that the county was not living up to its potential. The corruption was well known. I was struck at the difference between Indonesians and Filipinos, a totally different group of people. The Indonesians had a much deeper sense of who and what they were as a nation, whereas the Filipinos never seemed quite sure who and what they were despite the fact that in the Philippines the ethnic diversity was nowhere near as great; the size of the country was nowhere near as great.

But Indonesia seemed to me to be very inefficient, very lackadaisical in the way they went about things. It just seemed to me that they were coasting on this large comfortable cushion of their rich natural resources. This was enabling them to get along in apparent stability. The economy was developing. Roads were being built...footnote on that in a minute...but roads were being developed, dams were being built, a middle class was developing. There were enormous inequalities and corruption. But people at the bottom weren’t starving. All of this was because of the vast riches of the country; there was enough trickling down. Expectations were rising but not so high but what the trickle-down was working and the lower classes were able to buy their mopeds and their radios and maybe even a TV. But it wasn’t working as it should have. There was just this natural wealth that enabled the country to remain stable under the rule of the military.

I did a lot of traveling. I flew a lot on Garuda Airlines. There was no other choice. Garuda Airlines was always one in which you took your life in your hands because the pilots flew by mystical radar and so on. It was a white knuckle experience many times, and twice I thought for sure we would crash. I also did a lot of traveling over potholes and mountain dirt roads in our four wheel drive vehicles. The economic officer at the consulate and I and one of our Indonesian drivers took a truly memorable trip from Jakarta bringing back a new four-wheel drive jeep from Jakarta all the way up the island of Sumatra to Medan. This trip was a thousand miles on what the Indonesians called the Trans-Sumatran Highway, which was not a highway as you or I know it. It was mostly dirt roads, washboard roads; in one place we were flooded out and had to really go all the way around three sides of the square to get to where the road connected again. But it was truly a wonderful trip. There were no luxury hotels along the way to put it mildly but the Indonesians we met were very friendly and interesting people. The only disappointment was that we did not catch sight of any Sumatran tigers.

Q: Why don’t we pick it up next time in 1984. Just to put at the end, where did you go?

KLINGAMAN: Back to the Department.

Q: To do what?
KLINGAMAN: Inspection corps.

Q: All right. Well we’ll pick this up when you go back to the Department in the Inspection Corps.

Q: Today is the 3rd of June 1998. You wanted to add something about a trip you made?

KLINGAMAN: No actually I think I have said enough about the trip but I wanted to add just a few footnotes about Medan and Indonesia. I think in light of current events in Indonesia and the resignation of Suharto and so on it might be interesting to ask the question whether American diplomats had any contact with the opposition in Indonesia at that time. The answer is yes, to the extent that there was an opposition we did, or certainly we did in Medan and I assume that they did in Jakarta and Surabaya also.

There were essentially three political parties in Indonesia. One was the large one called Golkar, which was Suharto’s party. That was strictly a rubber stamp of the Government. There were two smaller parties. One was called the PPP, which was the Muslim Party and still exists. The other was called PDI, which was the Democratic Party of Indonesia and also still exists.

I had contact with someone in the PDI who was in the newspaper business. It was a woman named Mrs. Anni Idris. She was the editor of a very nationalistic newspaper in Medan. I had met her in Washington before I left for Indonesia. She was in Washington visiting her son, who was the army attaché in the Indonesian Embassy here. I paid a courtesy call on her here in Washington. When I went out to Indonesia she had returned to Medan and she had one of her journalists interview me. They gave me a very large and favorable spread in that newspaper. I was interviewed about U.S.-Indonesian relations, U.S. foreign policy and so on. It was a PDI newspaper. I just wanted to note that.

The other person in the PDI that I had contact with was a professor from Jakarta who came to Medan once a week to lecture on political science at the University of North Sumatra. He came to the consulate and initiated contact with me. I think he wanted to have contact with someone in the United States. We had some interesting conversations together and then as I think I mentioned earlier he invited me to give a series of lectures in Indonesian at the University of North Sumatra on American government and the American government system. Looking back on that I find it rather interesting in light of current events. Not that I had any direct influence, I’m not suggesting that, but it was very interesting to me to read in the newspapers six weeks or so ago that the first significant anti-Suharto student rioting occurred in Medan at the University of North Sumatra.

I also mentioned earlier that we knew members of the Legal Aid Society in North Sumatra, which was a group of young lawyers who were certainly oppositionists in the sense that they were very interested in pursuing human rights cases in Indonesia.

The other comment I would like to make about my Medan years relates to the American
women’s movement again and how it came into the Foreign Service. At this point there was a movement on the part of Foreign Service wives that you are no doubt familiar with. Mrs. Holdridge, the Ambassador’s wife, was quite involved in this and this was a suggestion, I believe, led by Larry Eagleburger’s wife, Marlene Eagleburger. The idea was that Foreign Service wives should be paid. Do you remember this?

Q: Oh, yes.

KLINGAMAN: I was quite skeptical about this. Mrs. Holdridge talked to me about it. It was something that was on her mind. Of course you know in the old days Foreign Service wives were expected to perform like military wives in the sense that they were expected to do representational activities and other activities in the community and in the old days this was mentioned in the husband’s performance evaluation, with all the pressure that implies. By the 1980s wives were not required to do this and it was completely off-limits in performance evaluations. And then some of the wives started to suggest that they should be paid for the representational work that they did.

I remember discussing this with Mrs. Holdridge and saying well, now, just a moment here. I am single and yet when I come home from my eight hours or so in the consulate I, too, do representational entertainment at home. I have servants who help me. I hire people from the outside to help me. But I am the one who arranges the menu, who arranges all of the details and makes sure that we have flowers and so on. And so, I ask, could I be paid also for my work outside of the office? I was struck by the response of Mrs. Holdridge which was “But that is different.” I asked how it was different. I just throw that out as grist for the mill.

Of course I could and did pay other people to help me. But I did a lot of representational entertaining on my own not only in Medan but in Germany and at other posts and it never occurred to me to request extra pay for that after hours work. Not that we were paid overtime anyway since we were on salary. I certainly sympathized with the problem that wives faced overseas in wanting to work professionally. It was difficult for them to find jobs overseas. But that was a different, separate issue. The issue of assisting their spouse with representational entertaining and requesting pay for it seemed to me to be going beyond the bounds.

Q: Well it is a hard one to resolve because the point is if you are a single person, male or female, you have to do it yourself. Often what you do is to hire a caterer. So equity would say that a married man or a married woman would brush the spouse aside, hire a caterer, and maybe or maybe not invite the spouse to come to the party! But the problem is that we know that in sort of the old days, I won’t call them the good old days, there were plenty of wives who were probably far more effective than their husbands. Everybody knew it, too, because they got out and around and entertained extremely effectively. The problem is that breed is kind of gone and I doubt whether you would recreate it by paying.

KLINGAMAN: Right. And then the issue is if the male Foreign Service Officer is the
one who says he will hire a caterer, and that caterer just happens to be his wife, okay, but who decides how much she will be paid? And then you get into very complicated conflict of interest issues. It was just something that bemused me at the time and since we have been talking throughout this oral history about women’s issues I just thought I would add that at this time. I don’t know whatever happened to that idea.

Q: I don’t either. At one point I was chief of the consular section in Belgrade and Marlene Eagleburger, then Heinemann, was a consular assistant and David Anderson was vice consul, both under me.

You were in the inspection corps from when to when?


Q: What was your impression of the inspection corps at that time? You had obviously been around for awhile; you had seen various inspectors and all that. Did you find it a changed breed?

KLINGAMAN: This was not a job that I had actively applied for. Let’s put it that way. I had decided that after three years at a hardship post I wanted to return to Washington rather than go for another overseas assignment, so that limited my options on assignments right there. I had in fact been offered the job of consul general in Dusseldorf when I was in Medan but it was 1983 when I was in the middle of my assignment in Medan and I said no thank you. In fact Medan was a much larger post than Dusseldorf at that point. But in any case when I was up for reassignment in the spring of 1984, I applied for jobs in the Department. Unfortunately my mentors in the European bureau had moved on overseas and my contacts in the Asian bureau were also elsewhere and so I didn’t really have influential contacts in those two bureaus.

Bill Harrop was the inspector general at that time. He called me on the telephone when I was in Medan and said I was just what they wanted. He said they wanted to have more women in the inspection corps and they were also looking for someone with experience in various areas...consular, political and economic. So I did accept the assignment in the inspection corps although not very enthusiastically as I knew it would involve a lot of traveling. But it turned out to be an interesting assignment.

Harrop and his deputy, Lannon Walker, were undertaking a new inspection approach which was basically an approach that said we are not out to get you, although of course we will criticize you if we find serious errors, but we are “here to help you.” It was a definite emphasis on management counseling. The inspectors were instructed to look not only for problems but also for the good things that Foreign Service posts or sections in the Department were doing; seeing what they were doing well, and advertising that to other posts, other sections in the Department.

It was also management by objective. In other words we were looking to see if Foreign Service posts had well-defined objectives, if bureaus in the Department had well-defined
objectives. So in other words before we inspectors asked whether they were doing their job well we had to ask the question whether the job was worth doing. Are they pointed in the right direction?

I would say that looking back on it the two years that I had in the inspection corps were the best management training that I ever had. I was able to carry a lot of what I learned from that assignment out into other things when I left the Foreign Service. We received a lot of training in first of all what management by objective meant. We received training by outside management experts in personnel issues. They developed a wonderful book of real case studies of various personnel issues in the U.S. Foreign Service that we studied and did role plays with. We took a special course on interviewing techniques. It was definitely a new inspection approach. My experience with it was very favorable; I thought the approach was very effective.

Q: I think it has turned a little more adversarial, more accounting and spot inspections and all that.

KLINGAMAN: I don’t know what happened to the inspection function after I left the Department. There was always a debate of course as to whether it was a good idea for the Department to essentially inspect itself. You can make a lot of arguments pro and con about that. In our inspection groups we did have what you might call outside inspectors. We had a number of people on the administrative and fiscal management side, who had come into the Department lateral entry from either the Government Accounting Office or the IRS (Internal Revenue Service). They were the people who inspected the financial side and the strictly administrative operations at our posts. I think that was appropriate. They were trained to find accounting problems and possible fraud. But on the broader management issues, I think if you really want people in an organization to change, you have to develop a rapport with them. People don’t change and organizations don’t change unless they want to. I was basically working on inspecting the political and economic reporting functions and in some cases consular. Having done those jobs myself I had some empathy for the individuals who were doing them. I had some awareness of the problems they faced. I felt that if suggestions were to be made they were more likely to take them from me in a sort of teamwork approach rather than this adversarial “we are out to get you” approach. You can develop many recommendations about you shall do thus and so. That may work for a year; the recommendations will be carried out maybe for a year. But then people will tend to slide back to where they were before unless they themselves really understand and agree with the reasoning behind the recommendations.

Q: Where did you inspect?

KLINGAMAN: My first inspection was a very interesting inspection. It was illustrative of the new inspection approach. It was an inspection of the so-called economic function of the Department of State. It was new in the sense that we were not only inspecting the economic bureau but also the economic officers on the desks, the regional economic offices in the bureaus. It was a very intensive inspection, headed by Ambassador Sayre who had been in the inspection corps at various times. He had inspected Embassy Bonn
when I was in Bonn.

In any case it was pursued both in the Department and in the field. I would like to note that by this time the economic bureau had changed its name, it was no longer E, it had become EB, the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. This is an interesting footnote to my assignment in the late 1960s when the office I worked in, the Office of Commercial Affairs and Business Activities, was a brand new office in the Bureau of Economic Affairs. I think the change in the name of the entire bureau reflected the fact that by the 1980s the business component of foreign economic policy was very well established.

In any event we began that inspection in September of 1984 and it went through December. It immediately took me off on a ten-day whirlwind trip to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, and Delhi. Why those countries? Simply because I was assigned to do that part of the world and those embassies were important in economic reporting. Some of my colleagues went to the Far East, Latin America and Europe. Our job was to talk with the economic officers in those posts and the ambassadors primarily to find out if they were satisfied with the economic policy guidance that they were receiving from Washington and if they were satisfied with the guidelines they were receiving for their reporting. And also if they felt that the feedback from the Department on their reporting was helpful and useful. That was the point of that.

Back in Washington we were interviewing the relevant economic officers in the Department, especially EB itself. I also accompanied Ambassador Sayre when he interviewed high level officials at the Treasury Department, Commerce Department, CIA and STR (Special Trade Representative) to get their views on the State Department’s performance in foreign economic matters.

_Q: What was the impression that you got from Commerce and from the Treasury?_

KLINGAMAN: Our purpose was to find out how they viewed the Department of State’s role and performance in this foreign economic policy picture. For the most part I would say that their view was favorable. Of course they assumed that they rather than State had the leading roles, and that in fact was true. I mean the Treasury Department is or was at that time and I assume still is the place of expertise on monetary issues and the Commerce Department is the place of expertise on export promotion and investment promotion, and the Agency (CIA) on some of the intelligence gathering activities. But I never heard any suggestion that the State Department should not play a role in foreign economic policy and in fact they gave particularly high marks to our Japan desk which was of course very active in those days on trade issues that we had with Japan. I would say that they felt if anything that the State Department should be even more assertive in its role.

The Department had an assistant secretary for economic and business affairs and by that time also an under secretary for economic affairs. Now having somebody in a high level position on the seventh floor overseeing economic matters had actually started in the late 1960s when I was in the economic bureau but at that time I think it was a deputy under
secretary for economic affairs. Anyway the people holding the economic policy position at the top level, on the seventh floor, were always political appointees and I think over the years that the under secretary position was either more or less effective depending on the person holding the job.

I frankly don’t remember who it was at the time of our inspection but I do remember that there was a problem between the assistant secretary for economic affairs and the under secretary. It was not a policy issue. As I recall there was a feeling that the under secretary could and should have been more assertive in the inter-agency meetings; that often the State Department was represented by lower level people. I think that one of our recommendations was that the Department should try to represent itself at a higher level in inter-agency discussions.

I really don’t remember what all was in our inspection report of the economic function, but I am sure we pushed the idea that the Department’s really unique contribution in this foreign economic policy process is to bring to bear its knowledge of other countries and its knowledge of the political as well as the economic situation of those countries and to highlight the range of our relationships with individual countries. That is a perspective which the strictly economic agencies do not have.

Q: What was your impression of the NEA (bureau for Near Eastern affairs) group of economic people? Was it hard for them to get out and do their job?

KLINGAMAN: You are speaking of the posts that I was visiting in Egypt?

Q: Yes, and Saudi Arabia and Israel.

KLINGAMAN: Well I was there very briefly and my inspection wasn’t focusing on that issue. It was basically focusing on how they viewed their working relationship with the Department. In 1984 there was a lot of terrorist activity going on and I was acutely conscious of that threat since I was flying around in that area but I really can’t speak specifically to your question.

Q: The economic officer is one of the ones who are most vulnerable to having all sorts of requests handed out...you know, I want a report on blacksmithing and so on. You know Congress does it, each agency, were you looking at that sort of thing?

KLINGAMAN: Yes we were, but with limited power to do much about it. But, yes, I remember it myself in the field. Every U.S. government agency wanted to impose all these reporting requirements on embassies and consulates, and the next thing you know this poor economic officer in the field was supposed to do all these esoteric reports, especially for the Commerce Department, and at the same time the number of economic officers and positions was dwindling. So, yes, it was an issue and we did what we could but the Department couldn’t do a great deal about reporting requirements levied by other agencies. It was a problem.

Q: Did you do any other inspections during this time?
KLINGAMAN: Yes. I was in the inspection corps for two years. After that I went on a three-month inspection trip to west Africa. Now I should say that talking about my trips overseas, they were always preceded by a couple of months in the Department in which we were interviewing the Department desks associated with the embassies overseas. So I spent a couple of months in the Department preparing for inspection of posts in west Africa and then we went on a three-month trip to west Africa. We divided up the countries there. I personally went to Nigeria, Togo, Benin, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mauritania and the Cape Verde Islands. It was a very interesting trip.

I had never been in that part of the world before. I had prepared for the inspection by interviewing the desks of those countries, although when I got out there it turned out that two of the inspectors had to go back to Washington for personal reasons. So my portfolio was then changed when I got out there. But basically I was working on assessing the political and economic reporting in those countries.

Q: What was your impression?

KLINGAMAN: I don’t remember finding any enormous problems. My impression was that we had an awful lot of embassies in very small countries. Of course that goes back to John F. Kennedy’s decision to have the American flag raised over each and every capital in Africa. So we had embassies in Togo and in Benin, which were practically across the street from each other. The ambassador in one of those embassies had the gall to ask for more positions even though that was really the beginning of the great emphasis on the elimination of posts and reducing the size of posts. The climate was not yet right for recommending abolition of embassies in those areas, but I and others certainly had to wonder if having all those embassies was an efficient use of our resources.

Q: Did you find yourself getting involved in personnel issues?

KLINGAMAN: Some, yes. One of the interesting things that we learned in our inspection corps training was how to interview people. How, when interviewing different officers and staff in a particular section of an embassy to look for patterns of perceptions and complaints. Recognizing that one person says X and another says Y and particularly if they are critical of one another or of their boss and learning not to say well if one person says so that this is not necessarily so, there may be other angles to this. So we were looking for patterns of perception. We did find them sometimes and we realized if you have a pattern of a number of people saying that they don’t like X because he or she does this, then we might feel that we have a problem here, let’s pursue it.

We found serious morale problems in several posts. Some of them were related to people. Most of them were related to hardship posts, particularly in Mauritania, which was a really difficult post. The embassy literally had to be bulldozed out of the sand every couple of months. That was the period of the drought. The desert had literally moved in. Even though the embassy was located on the coast it was a pile of sand and it was absolute hell for anyone with sinus problems, respiratory problems, whatever. So that
was an issue.

On personnel matters I remember one issue involving women. It was the first and only time that I ever came upon anything that would today be called sexual harassment. It wasn’t in those days. The term sexual harassment did not exist in everyday vocabulary. But it did come up in a post in Africa. There again it was a pattern of complaints, of younger female officers complaining about an economic counselor who liked to slap their fannies. So we felt there was a problem here. It was brought to me and I took it to the senior inspector in charge of our team.

As far as I could ever figure out, it was the case of an older man who just really didn’t realize that times had changed. There was nothing malicious about it that I could see. And yet times had changed and so the senior inspector discussed it with the DCM and they together took this man aside. This was a good example of a management consultant role of the inspectors in which, you know, we didn’t write an inspector’s recommendation down in black and white. I mean how embarrassing and how counter-productive that would be. It was an example of saying hey, look, you really don’t mean this do you? This is a different time and you can’t do this anymore. I think the problem was taken care of very effectively.

Q: Well you are pointing to the way that problems should be taken care of for the most part. Sometimes things are so serious that you can’t. But I think today there is much more of an adversarial thing and so something like this could end up sort of on the front pages of the Washington Post or something.

KLINGAMAN: We did not find any serious, terrible problems at any of the posts that we inspected. But we did find things that could be done better across the board, political, economic, consular, and administrative. I think that if you adopt an adversarial position people dig in their heels and they find it difficult to retreat. Very often people didn’t know there was a problem at their post, and they just needed to have it brought to their attention so they could fix it themselves. For example people don’t necessarily know that their staff is unhappy with them about something. Lower ranking officers will think two, three, four times before they will complain to someone who will write their performance evaluation. And yet the boss may be totally unaware of their concerns for that reason. In that sense an inspector can be very beneficial to the boss. Saying look, you could be doing this; or there is a junior officer here who is chafing because he or she would really like to get out and do a little political reporting.

I do remember a few instances of that at a small consulate. So bringing things to the attention of people, things they may be unaware of, can solve the problem. Whereas if you criticize them and say you are doing this wrong, it puts them in a defensive posture and I think change is much less likely to occur. Of course, flagrant violations of law, of security violations etc. are another matter, but we did not find any such problems at the posts we inspected.
Q: Is there anywhere else that you went?

KLINGAMAN: Yes. That was west Africa. This was a very busy traveling year for me. This was the spring of 1985 and I spent three months in west Africa. Then in the fall of 1985, I went on a two-month trip to southeast Asia. Again there were two or maybe even three inspection teams which divided up the posts and the countries. I went to Malaysia and Indonesia. Of course I did not inspect Medan, but I was involved in the inspection of the embassy in Jakarta and the consulate in Surabaya. I also went to Australia and to the Fiji Islands.

On that trip we found that at some of the smaller posts there were communication problems among officers. This was very interesting to me and it was again an example of the management consultant role that we could play. I remember one very small embassy in which we found a number of officers in various sections of the embassy saying to us well, we really don’t know what the ambassador is doing and we don’t really feel like we know what the other sections are doing. It was simply a case of the embassy’s being so small that the ambassador assumed that of course everybody knew what he was doing because there were only about four or five officers. I remember I initially had that same problem in Medan. I thought that of course everybody knew what I was doing but then a couple of officers came to me and wanted to know more about what I was doing. So I started having more frequent staff meetings. So that was an issue that we were able to resolve very quickly at this embassy just by suggesting to the ambassador that he hold a staff meeting once in awhile.

Another emphasis of mine on the inspection of the Asian posts was to inquire as to how much integration there was of political and economic reporting. This was really one of my pet themes, you might say. I had been both a political officer in the field and an economic officer in the Department and I had long felt that the two functions really needed to be integrated much more than they were. That was something that I pushed in my inspection reports. I remember for example in Australia there was very good political reporting, very good economic reporting, but not much on issues which combined the two fields. For example in Australia there had been a decline in the real wages of Australian workers. This was a country with very strong trade unions. There were enormous potential political implications as well as economic ones. I recommended more combined reporting about this development. The embassy’s reaction was okay, fine, let’s do it.

Also in Malaysia there was emphasis being made on the need for economic structural reforms in Malaysia and reporting was being done on this. Yet almost no reporting was being done on the political implications of structural reforms and the potential political problems involved. There was some reporting about it but the point is it wasn’t integrated; the reporting didn’t lay out the political and economic pros and cons in one integrated report. Also in Asian posts and in African posts where there was a large AID mission we were looking to see to what extent the State Department economic officers were talking to the AID officers and the Peace Corps and to what extent there was inter-
agency coordination on those issues. Very often there was inadequate coordination.

Of course this is also a big bureaucratic problem because AID directors can be powerful people and AID directors and ambassadors don’t always get along well together. I am talking about policy differences, not personal. In one post…actually I think it was Malaysia but I don’t recall for certain…there was very good inter-agency coordination. There were periodic inter-agency meetings. In addition to the usual country team meetings of heads of sections there were also very meaningful periodic meetings of the working level people in the economic Section with the AID section and Peace Corps. These economic inter-agency meetings were very good. That was an example of something that was being done well and that we advertised. I think we sent an airgram to other posts recommending that they adopt that procedure.

In 1986 we inspected Mexico and all its constituent posts. I was present for one month in Mexico City and then I inspected the consulates in Mazatlan and in Merida. In Mazatlan and Merida the only inspectors were myself and one of the people who had come over from the IRS to look at the financial aspects. So we were pretty much working together inspecting all of the functions of those small posts that were doing very well. We were able to help them out on ways to enhance the security of small posts at low cost and there were some consular functions that needed to be spruced up a bit, such as consular receipts that weren’t being handled properly. There were some coordination issues and that was basically it.

Later in 1986, in the summer of ’86 I went to London for six weeks. We inspected the embassy in London and then the consulate general in Belfast.

Q: In London did you find there was a staffing problem? I know I was a personnel officer back in the late ’60s. We found that there was a tendency on our part, if we had a problem case, London was often a handy place to put them, or a Canadian post. They spoke the language and if they didn’t get along well with people you figured, well, hell, it’s a big post, you could put them in. But the cumulative effect was that you ended up with a lot of problem people, drinking and personality things or people kind of burned out. I was wondering whether you saw that.

KLINGAMAN: I didn’t run into any such cases. I was inspecting the political section and the economic section in London. They were very, very strong sections.

Q: Mine was consular and that was one of the places that we could put people. There and the Canadian posts.

KLINGAMAN: I didn’t inspect the consular section in London. I frankly don’t remember anything in the written report but problems like that might not find their way into a written report. They might have been dealt with in other ways. I just remember that the political and economic sections were staffed with really topnotch people. The ambassador was Charles Price. The ambassador was a political appointee and the DCM was a very high ranking career Foreign Service officer, Ray Seitz.
The ambassador had a very experienced Foreign Service secretary. The Ambassador was very active and I think was doing a very good job and the DCM was very, very solid. The embassy was doing very well.

I remember that there were a lot of morale problems of Foreign Service officers in London, and this is probably as good a time as any to bring up that subject. This was the summer of 1986 and this was the period when “the six-year window” established in the Foreign Service Act of 1980 was in effect. This had changed things in terms of getting over the threshold into the senior Foreign Service, and it brought serious morale problems which frankly I was sharing myself at this time.

A lot of people were talking not only to me…and of course I did not publicize my own situation …but a number of FSOs in London were talking to the inspectors about their anxiety as to whether or not they would be promoted into the senior Foreign service. So this was something that we met up with in London. As I recall it was one of the economic officers who was in a high state of anxiety about this. So that came up in London and we had also seen it at other posts that we had been inspecting.

Q: What about Belfast? Were they feeling under siege there?

KLINGAMAN: You mean under IRA terrorism? Yes, very much so. I was there for only a week. It was a very interesting post but very definitely a tense environment. We lived in a hotel around the corner from the consulate general and there were security barricades at our hotel. There were also tight security checks involved in getting into the consulate general. It was a period of a lot of terrorist activity in Belfast at that time. That said the morale of the post was fine. I suppose if you lived there long enough…I am referring to the morale both of the Irish FSN employees and the Americans working there…despite the fact that they were literally in a barricaded environment the morale was good. As I recall, the morale issue for the Foreign Service nationals was that they were afraid that some of their positions might be cut in the worldwide exercise the Department had embarked on to reduce the number of positions of both Americans and Foreign Service nationals.

Q: How did you find the Foreign Service national situation was in west Africa? I think it would have been somewhat difficult to get a competent local staff there.

KLINGAMAN: I think it was. In west Africa there were a number of PIT positions, Part-time Interim Temporary positions, for American dependents. That was one way of solving two problems, one the problem you mentioned of getting competent staff and the other problem of finding meaningful employment for spouses. I think there were problems getting honest staff in places like Nigeria where there was so much bribery and theft going on.

Q: In ’86, by the time you were getting ready to leave there, had the inspection corps started to change? Had Sherman Funk and the new sort of Inspector General’s group
come in yet?

KLINGAMAN: No, not by that time. I left in August of '86 and it was still under the leadership of Bill Harrop and Lannon Walker, two senior FSOs. So the other group came in after I left. I know that Bill Harrop and Lannon Walker had really done a superb job of bringing in this new inspection approach. I also know that they were really being put in a very defensive position by those outside the Department of State who were charging that the Department was inspecting itself and therefore finding no problems.

I have always wondered whether the inspections we had conducted during my tour in the inspection corps would have come out substantially differently if they had been conducted by people from other agencies or people taking a more adversarial investigative approach. First of all I don’t think they would have come out that differently, but to the extent that they had I wonder if the changes that they would have recommended would have been as long lasting as ours. But, who knows? That’s hypothetical.

Q: Well in '86 what?

KLINGAMAN: In 1986 I felt like I had an ax over my head because I needed to have a promotion in September. I had been living under the ax for several years.

Q: This was because of the new law and time in grade?

KLINGAMAN: It was because of the new law and time in grade. I was living under what you would call a two-headed ax. I was living under the edge of the twenty-year time in class ax and the six-year window ax.

Now the six-year window was one in which if you decided you wished to be considered for promotion into the senior Foreign Service you had to “open your window.” In other words you had to submit a piece of paper saying that you wished to be considered for promotion into the senior Foreign Service and then you had six years in which to make that promotion and if you didn’t make it, that was the end of your career. And the first year that one could open a window was 1981; that was the first effective year for opening a window.

The twenty year time in class rule was an older regulation. Under that rule, an FSO had twenty years to progress from FSO-5 to the senior officer rank of FSO-2 which in the meantime had been re-labeled as “OC” or Counselor. So I was one rank below that and needed to be promoted to OC in 1986.

In my case it was six of one and half a dozen of another. I had been promoted to FSO-5 in 1967 so my twenty years would be up in 1987, and so I opened by six year window in 1981 because what was the difference? The irony was that I would have been much better off if I had not been promoted to FSO-5 so quickly, four years after entering the Foreign Service! Then I would not have needed to open my six year window in 1981.
The problem was that by 1986 the number of available slots at the senior level had been drastically reduced through elimination or downgrading of positions. And at the same time the number of senior officers retiring had declined because the mandatory retirement age had been raised from age 60 to age 65. In addition, the Department’s personnel system had been liberal in granting time in grade extensions to senior officers.

So in 1986 I felt myself under a lot of pressure and one reason I had not wanted the inspection corps job was that I knew it would be a multifunctional job and I was competing for promotion in the political cone. I’ve heard that there is a multifunctional cone now but there wasn’t then.

I thought that my chances for promotion were very slim even though I had been recommended for promotion three times in Indonesia by the DCM and the ambassador and I was also recommended for promotion both years in the inspection corps. Nevertheless I had not been doing straight political reporting, I had not been involved in negotiations, and there were very few political cone promotion slots available. So I thought that if and when the ax fell I didn’t want to be overseas in the inspection corps while I was trying to figure out what to do next. So I decided to end my assignment in the inspection corps with two years and I took an assignment in the Office of Management Operations (M/O).

Q: And you did that from when to when?

KLINGAMAN: I did that from August of ’86 until July of ’87.

Q: What did that consist of?

KLINGAMAN: That consisted of being involved in deciding which positions were to be downgraded, which positions were to be abolished and which Foreign Service posts were to be shut down. I was asked to do this with regard to the European bureau. It was very difficult for me to do this because I had had wonderful experiences working at home and abroad for the European bureau and now was being asked to trim them down and abolish positions. I was considering the various posts and trying to determine which positions could be abolished and of course the European bureau was being totally uncooperative. We asked the bureau to please present us with their proposed list of positions that could be eliminated. Of course they took a very hard line. They refused to give us any list whatsoever. So I had to come up with the list. Needless to say it was not stimulating, upbeat work!

But actually the job became rather interesting because I was soon called upon to become engaged in something else involving a major European post. I was asked to become involved in major problems concerning our embassy in Moscow. As you may recall it was during this period that overnight the Soviets decided that they would not allow Russian nationals to work in the American Embassy in Moscow, and Embassy Moscow woke up one morning to find they had no national employees.
This was really a problem for the European bureau to deal with and to decide what to do. The two offices in that bureau seized with the issue were the Soviet desk (EUR/SOV) and EUR/EX, the administrative office of the European bureau. And lo and behold it turned out that those two offices were rivals of one another and seemed unable to work together. Also in the picture of course was what had formerly been known as SY, the Department’s office of security which had been upgraded and renamed the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, referred to as DS.

It very quickly became apparent that there was total gridlock among EUR/EX, EUR/SOV and DS. The responsible elements in the Department were in total disarray on this issue. So as a result the under secretary for management, Ron Spiers, became seized with the issue. M/MO was under Ron Spiers, so he used us as his staff for all such odd ad hoc issues, and this one was in fact a crisis. I did not make the promotion list in September 1986 and so my morale was definitely at very low ebb. At the same time having this thing, this crisis…and it was a crisis…come along did two things. For one thing it kept me very, very busy and for the other it made me not all that unhappy to be leaving the Department at that time. The bureaucracy was not performing well on this Embassy Moscow problem.

My immediate boss was Ambassador George Moose, who was the deputy director of MMO. Ron Spiers asked George Moose to take this problem on and George Moose took me on as his assistant. For a number of months we were engaged in trying to bring together EUR/SOV, EUR/EX and DS within the Department and it was one meeting after another.

What essentially had happened was that the Soviet desk (SOV) had been allowed to become a little empire within the European bureau and had played not only a strong role but also a really determining role in the assignment of officers to Moscow and had become really dominant over EUR/EX. Yet officers in SOV did not work with EUR/EX which had the detailed knowledge and authority in administrative matters. This was turf fighting within a bureau at its worst. And then you had DS, the security people, who were focusing on beefing up security at Embassy Moscow. So it was one meeting after another, a laborious and difficult process of the Department trying to pull itself together and get some kind of a handle on this serious problem.

In the short run we urgently needed to get personnel to Moscow to do everyday jobs that had been done by Soviet nationals. We were talking about drivers; we were talking about janitors; we were talking about cooks. Who was going to do this work? For awhile embassy officers were doing this work. Basically what we did was to go to the Defense Department and work with the Defense Department in getting military over to Moscow to do some of these jobs, such as military staff people to be drivers. We also needed electricians and people with maintenance expertise. We received some short term assistance from the Defense Department and then we started to set up a program to recruit American civilian contractors to go to Embassy Moscow, all of whom had to have security clearances of course.
Q: What had precipitated the Soviet withdrawal of their support?

KLINGAMAN: I frankly don’t remember if there was a specific issue. I think they just decided this was an easy way to make life really difficult for the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. They did it and they didn’t change their mind. The Soviet position seemed clear and non-negotiable.

Q: Was there any discussion about essentially shutting down our operation there and shutting down the Soviet operation?

KLINGAMAN: There were discussions within the U.S. government about imposing more limits on the Soviet operation in Washington and I do believe that was done. But shutting down Embassy Moscow? No. In fact at that time there were plans, had been plans, continued to be plans to build a new embassy in Moscow and that also was going on. That was complicating issues of needing to enhance the security of the existing embassy while not wanting to do too much of an expensive nature since we were going to build a new one. I think that restrictions were placed on the Soviet Embassy in Washington but there was no serious talk of shutting it down that I know of.

To me it was really disturbing to see how poorly the Department of State was able to respond within itself to this personnel crisis.

Q: Wasn’t there anybody sort of at the top who it finally got to who said come on kids, get together?

KLINGAMAN: Well it was Ronald Spiers. Now I don’t know why…well, someone should have told the EUR Assistant Secretary, who was Roz Ridgway, how great a rivalry had developed between EUR/EX and EUR/SOV; how they were not working together. I don’t know whether she was aware of the situation or not. But that aside, the security people in DS were also involved and there needed to be coordination with them. That was difficult because their coordination within their own bureau was so poor and that was another reason why the under secretary of state for management had to seize the issue. Now he couldn’t get enmeshed in all the things that had to be hammered out at the working level so he assigned it to the deputy director of M/MO, Ambassador George Moose and it was being handled at the George Moose level, and I was working with him.

I mentioned that we needed to work with the Defense Department on this. They did send some sergeants to Moscow to be drivers and also some military cooks. Part of my job was to work out a Memorandum of Understanding with officers in DOD (the Defense Department) on this. I had really a good relationship with my counterparts in DOD but there again you had all of this pettiness within DOD and their rumblings that, well now the Defense Department does not want its people to be emptying the trash for the State Department people in Moscow kind of attitude.

Ultimately Secretary of State Shultz and the Secretary of Defense had to sit down with
this issue at one of their weekly breakfast meetings or maybe it was lunch, I don’t know. In any case they had instituted a weekly meeting with each other and this problem was taken up at that high level. And it was resolved and it worked and an agreement was worked out with the Defense Department and Defense Department personnel were sent to Embassy Moscow and I believe ultimately civilians were also sent to Moscow, though I’m not sure because I left the Department basically in the summer of ’87. But it was really an eye opener to me that something like that had to be handled at the Cabinet level.

Q: Who was the head of EUR/EX and EUR/SOV? Do you remember?

KLINGAMAN: EUR/EX… I believe it was Ken Peltier. The head of EUR/SOV was a young, very bright guy who had been a staff assistant when I was on the German desk. His name was Mark Parris. But in any event the problems between EUR/SOV and EUR/EX were not personal animosities. It was little bureaucratic fiefdoms that had built up and SOVs had become very powerful. Somebody should have knocked their heads together.

Q: Well then you left the Foreign Service what, in 19...?

KLINGAMAN: Well I left M/MO on the 1st of July 1987 to go to the ninety-day course.

Q: Could you explain what that is?

KLINGAMAN: The ninety-day course was a new program. In fact I was in the first ninety-day program which was a career transition program for FSOs who were retiring. It was designed to help them find other jobs, if they wished to become employed further, and to just basically prepare themselves for retirement. The part that was most useful to me was the training we received in how to develop a resume, which helped us to translate what we had done in the Foreign Service into meaningful language for other kinds of jobs.

In my case I had already decided on what I thought I wanted to do and I had already begun training for it. So the ninety day course basically gave me an opportunity to keep my foot in the Department while going about my other business which was to study for a master’s degree in linguistics at George Mason University. In the spring of 1987, when I was still in M/MO, I had taken one course in linguistics at George Mason to see if I really wanted to pursue this and then I continued taking graduate courses in the summer of ’87. My purpose in doing this was that I wanted to teach English as a Second Language (ESL). I also did some volunteer work in this field in order to get some experience on the ground, and I did this in the Arlington County ESL program for refugees and immigrants.

Q: So to follow through a bit on this, you got your master’s?

KLINGAMAN: Yes. I got my master’s degree in linguistics at George Mason University with an emphasis on teaching English as a Second Language. In fact I had become interested in that field when I was in Indonesia because there was a large English
program in Medan. It was headed by two Americans who were specialists in ESL and that is when I first learned about the field. So I started my master’s program in the spring of ’87 and I completed it in December of 1988.

Q: What did you do after that? Did you start teaching somewhere?

KLINGAMAN: I started teaching right at George Mason University in the English Language Institute there. It was a program for teaching English to international students at George Mason, most of whom were planning to return to their countries after doing undergraduate or graduate work at George Mason. Most of them had a fairly good background in English but needed training in academic English. I had done a teaching internship in that institute and when the time came they had an opening and I stayed there and taught a variety of ESL courses there for seven years. It turned out to be an excellent way to stay involved with interesting people from different countries and cultures. I am now teaching ESL to adult refugees and immigrants in Arlington, Virginia, where I live.

Q: Well, great. Why don’t we end at this point.

KLINGAMAN: That’s fine. Thank you.

End of interview