The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

DONALD A. KRUSE

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 17th of March 1997. This is an interview with Donald A. Kruse. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Let's start at the beginning. Tell me when and where you were born.

KRUSE: I was born in Philadelphia in 1930.

Q: Could you tell me a bit about your family?

KRUSE: We were quintessential Philadelphians, I guess. My father and grandfather had

lived in Philadelphia. I was raised in the city for the first 12 years of my life and then we moved out to the suburbs in Media. I graduated from Media High in 1948 and then went onward to other places. My family continued to be based in Philadelphia.

Q: Did your father and mother have occupations?

KRUSE: In those days, of course, my mother was mostly at home. I had one brother. My father was trained as a Presbyterian minister, but he had left the ministry by the time I came along. He was a bank officer for most of the time I was growing up.

Q: You went to Media High School. What was that like?

KRUSE: It was a nice little high school. I must say, back in those days, I felt I learned in a rather peaceful environment. I thought that the education I got there was decent. It prepared me for my college. We had a sense of community. It was a small high school. It had not yet been overwhelmed by the suburbs, which were gradually encroaching then. In fact, the high school no longer exists. It's been amalgamated into some bigger one.

Q: You graduated from high school about 1948?

KRUSE: That's right.

Q: Whither?

KRUSE: Then I went out to college in Illinois at Wheaton College and majored in history. Those were the years--I was interested in foreign affairs. I was recognizing the aftermath of World War II. I think, probably, that began to get me my interest in the Foreign Service, just events that were going on around the world.

Q: In history, did you have any particular field of concentration?

KRUSE: Not essentially, although my interest was deeply in American history. I did take a lot more courses in that than I did in European or others.

Q: Did the foreign affairs raise any interest at Wheaton? You're in the middle of Illinois.

KRUSE: That's a good question. I think I was about the first in the post war era, except for one other officer that I discovered later on who took the Foreign Service exam. It's true that we had one earlier graduate of Wheaton, who many years before I got there had gone out as a missionary to Thailand. Ken Landon, husband of Margaret Landon who wrote "Anna and the King of Siam." He was the one graduate that we knew had been in the Foreign Service. In fact, when I first came to Washington in 1951 just to kind of look around, he was the person that I first saw. So, we had that kind of a connection. But you're right. There were not many people into foreign affairs, not many who were anything else but conservative Americans.

Q: So, you would have graduated from college in 1952. Then what?

KRUSE: Well, the Army was beckoning. So, I stayed it off for a year as I got my graduate work at the University of Pennsylvania. I got a masters in political science. Within a year, I was in the Army for a two year stint which did not take me overseas.

Q: What were you doing in the Army?

KRUSE: The Army in its wisdom decided I would make a wonderful psychiatric social worker. My friends jokingly say that was one way for a psychiatrist to keep an eye on me. But I learned things about Rorschach tests and that kind of thing, which was elucidating. I'm not sure how much of it ever stuck with me. But the Army gave me something that I wouldn't have done otherwise.

Q: Where were you doing that?

KRUSE: Mostly in the south. I had a succession of places from South Carolina to Texas. Eventually, I actually got married in the stint in the Army. I took my bride to the unlikely sounding town of Ozark, Alabama. We then moved over to Enterprise, which probably sounds a little better. It was an interesting town. This is the town that has a statue to the boll weevil. That's its distinction. The boll weevil made them switch from cotton to peanuts, some have been millionaires ever since.

Q: So, you're out of the Army about '55?
KRUSE: Yes. It was '53 to '55 that I served.

Q: Then what?

KRUSE: I came back to Philadelphia. As soon as I got out of the Army, I wanted to take the Foreign Service exam. I took it in '56. In the meantime, I had gotten a job with a municipal research institution in Philadelphia called the Pennsylvania Economy League, a taxpayer supported group that was for good government. I have to say that, although it wasn't unpleasant, I don't think I could have stayed at local government very long. It just seemed not interesting enough, not broad enough based. Actually at that time, it was very interesting in Philadelphia. Finally, the reform people had come in of Joe Clark and Dicky Dilworth and thrown out what had been called the corrupt and contented government of Philadelphia. So, it was an exciting time. But even with the excitement, I didn't think this was for me.

Q: Before you took the Foreign Service exam out of the Army, did you run across any more people connected or reading about the Foreign Service?

KRUSE: I think maybe a few more, yes. In fact, I guess one or two of my colleagues did take it, but I don't think any of them came in. I have not seen them since.

Q: Did you pass the written exam?

KRUSE: Yes, I passed the written and then got myself set up for the oral, which was an interesting experience. In those days, they gave you a two hour oral. There wasn't any "in box" business. It was just straight interviewing, as you know. There was another fellow with me. We came up from Philadelphia to New York for the afternoon they were giving it. The other fellow had gone first. I didn't know him, except talking outside as we waited. He came back out and he indicated that he had not really known a lot of the subject matter that he was being asked about, but that he had attempted to kind of talk around it. I thought to myself, "That doesn't sound like the way to go." I think you're better off if you simply go in and tell them you're dumb. I followed that scheme. It turned out when they called him in, they told him that they didn't pass him for the very reason that he seemed to be devious. In my case, they figured I may be dumb, but at least I'm honest.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions you were asked?

KRUSE: I do. They said, "You're from Philadelphia. Tell me something. Who do you think is the most important Philadelphian that ever lived?" I had never thought about it before, but I think I made a good choice in that I said, "Ben Franklin probably would qualify, even though he never was President. He seemed to do a pretty good job of everything he turned his hand to." They always asked you in those days why you were coming. I guess I did say something about public service. But it was clear that this was more a psychological test than it was a test of knowledge.

Q: You came in when?

KRUSE: Actually, they called me the last class in the fiscal year ending in 1957. I came in in July of '57.

Q: You took the basic officers course, A-100. Could you give me a little description of the type of people in your group?

KRUSE: Because it was the end of the fiscal year, it caught a whole lot of people. It was a larger class. There were about 40. Surprisingly enough for that year (We're talking 1957.), there were about six women, which is probably a higher average than certainly was in the Service in those days. I was impressed that so many of these other candidates or other young officers had not majored in political science or history, but had just gotten a general college degree. Maybe that gave me a certain hope that, even though I didn't think I was an expert in political science or foreign policy, maybe the Service would allow you to learn a little bit as you went along. It was a good class of fellow officers. I guess my age at that time, being 27, was kind of median, although there weren't any over 31 because of the age limitation then. I think there were some as young as 21.

Q: What was your impression of how the class was taught?

KRUSE: We had some good people that they brought in to brief us. I guess you felt kind

of that here was a class that you really couldn't flunk. They simply were trying to give you a little orientation. I thought, aside from the foreign language requirement, that it was a decent preparation. It gave us a sense of collegiality amongst us. The foreign languages turned out to be one of my, I won't say bitter disappointments, but I discovered that I really wasn't very good in foreign languages. I had a difficult time getting off probation, even learning French. My MLAT must have been very low. They didn't test your MLAT in those days.

Q: No. MLAT was your language aptitude.

KRUSE: It must have been down in the single digits, I guess. I learned later in life that if you were up in 60-70, you were probably well endowed for learning languages. So, the language was a problem. It turned out in my first two assignments that it took me actually a year over in Europe to get off probation.

Q: I had my problems, too. So, you started in July '57, about six months in Washington. Was it all training and language?

KRUSE: Yes.
Q: So, we're talking about the end of '57. Where did you go?

KRUSE: We took a railroad train to our first Foreign Service post. We went to Toronto, Canada. In fact, we took the Black Diamond Express from Philadelphia, where our parents saw us off like we were going on a steam ship. In the dark of night we left because it travels all night. You wake up and you're in Canada. We had a six month old baby. We had two berths up and down. But we did have three human beings, inconveniently. My dear wife had the baby and professed the next morning as I awoke from a fairly decent night that she had not slept too much because the baby had been all over the place. I don't know what you could call that. Her first sacrifice for the Foreign Service.

Q: Only one of many. You were in Toronto when?

KRUSE: From '57 to '60.

Q: What was your job?

KRUSE: I was the administrative officer. In fact, I tried hard to stay the admin. officer all the three years because the only alternative was the visa mill, which is essentially what Toronto was in those days. Out of the 20 or so officers, I would say 15, were doing visa or consular work. All of my predecessors had been rotated out of the admin. to consular at a certain point. Having observed that visa mill, I thought to myself, "You know, this is not a bad job up here as admin. officer. Let's just see if we can't stay there." So, I spent my three years doing admin.

Q: Who was the Consul General?

KRUSE: We started with Ivan White, who eventually became quite a senior officer as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for EUR in the late '50s. I'm not sure if he did get an embassy, but he got his own post, whether it was a consulate or just what. He was favorably looked upon by the Washington establishment because Livingston Merchant was the ambassador in Canada and when he left Canada took Ivan out and back to be his deputy in EUR. So, that was my first consul general. He was a good boss for younger officers. He paid some attention to us, gave us some good advice.

He was replaced by Bob Memminger, who was a different kind of officer, mostly a consular officer, kind of a southern, laid back fellow, who was pleasant to work for, but a totally different kind from Ivan, who was a political officer. Memminger was very helpful to me.

Q: What type of work were you doing? You say admin., but what does that mean?

KRUSE: It was everything combined, the GSO, the security. I was it. We had three Canadian FSNs working in the section with me. But I was the officer for signing everything. The only thing that, I think, may be remembered 40 years later is that we put air conditioning in the building in Toronto. This apparently took a great revolution in Washington's thinking that any place in Canada would need air conditioning. They kind of think you can keep that winter air all year long without recognizing that it's a pretty warm summer. So, we managed to install air conditioning.

Q: Did you get any feel for what relations were like with Canada at that time?

KRUSE: Yes. I guess this was my interest and I could do it kind of on the side. They sent me out to speak at a couple of Rotary Clubs. There were Canadian elections. In fact, it was rather exciting if you can think of U.S.-Canadian relations as ever being exciting, at least from the American standpoint. Every day it's exciting for Canadians, but very seldom is it for Americans, it seems. This was the time that John Diefenbaker was Prime Minister, who kind of made it his forte to put the jab in the Americans when he could. He had won a landslide victory. So, it was something that Washington became interested in. How are you going to deal with John Diefenbaker? Basically, that's what the consul general said: "Give me your impressions?" So, I wrote him some things. He seemed to think they were well-done. I guess he put some good words for me in Washington. I think my next assignment was really attributable to his reporting favorably on my progress.

Q: What did Diefenbaker think? What was our thinking at that time, that you were getting sort of internally, talking to your fellow officers and all, about this nationalistic anti-American stance? How did we react?

KRUSE: As you could imagine, we expected loyalty of allies in those days. It was the heart of the Cold War and we didn't like some of the Canadian rhetoric. We understood that the Canadians may have some gripes about our foreign policy and our actions, but when it came to defense and security arrangements, we thought that allies should be allies

and it was exactly on nuclear issues that we had our biggest problems. Walton Butterworth was the ambassador at that particular time. It became publicly known that he was carrying critical messages to Diefenbaker about American unhappiness. The Diefenbaker-Kennedy relationship was not a happy one at all. So, I would say those were not easy years, not that later years with Trudeau were that easy as well. I think it's necessary for Canadian leaders at some point to show their own electorate that they're standing up to the Americans. But when it came to these defense issues, we really thought that the Canadians and Diefenbaker were unnecessarily tough on us.

Q: How about in Toronto, was this an Ottawa-Ontario manifestation, too, or was this more from elsewhere?

KRUSE: I always think Ontario has the quintessential Canadian attitude toward us because they think of themselves as one of the reasons that Canada is separate. If you try to define a Canadian, it's not often easy to do that as an American. The Ontario situation is usually where there is perhaps the most intellectual argumentation against American foreign policy. I'll never forget seeing the Canadian protestors outside the consulate. I don't know what in particular the issue was, but one day the first fellow came with the sign "Dull." The second guy came with a sign that said, "Duller." The third one said, "Dulles." That was a fairly good imagination for a Canadian to come up with that, not that Canadians don't have good imaginations. But they tend not to be too demonstrative. They don't like to dramatize their problems with us because in the long run, they recognize that the ties are too close. Of course, in Ontario, Diefenbaker won very handsomely.

Q: You left there in 1960.

KRUSE: Right.

Q: Where?

KRUSE: Off to Europe for my first European assignment.

Q: Where did you go?

KRUSE: We went to the little country of Luxembourg.

Q: You were in Luxembourg from when to when?

KRUSE: Two years.

Q: '60 to '62.
KRUSE: Right.

Q: What were you doing in Luxembourg?

KRUSE: Having done my administrative swing, they gave me the Economic/Commercial office. This was a very small embassy in those days. We had an ambassador and a DCM and another agency type. Then we had an admin. officer, a consular officer. I don't think we even had more than that one consular officer. So, we're talking about something like five American officers. This was the start of the Kennedy era. Within a few months of my arrival (We came in the summer of '60.), we knew Kennedy had won the election and we expected a "New Frontier" ambassador, as we got in early 1961. He was a very charming and serious-minded man named James Wine. His claim to fame with the Kennedy troupe was that he put on that meeting in Dallas, where Kennedy faced the Protestant ministers.

Q: Kennedy being a Catholic. At that time, it was considered that the Baptists and others in the south would never vote for him. Wine was able to arrange a meeting with 50 religious ministers and answer their questions. It helped diffuse the issue.

KRUSE: It did lay it to rest. I don't know how many votes it got, but it certainly laid to rest the public issue. As a result, Jim Wine came out to be the ambassador. I must say, he turned out to be a good ambassador, certainly in wanting to make use of me. He had some problems with the DCM. I have to say, I think it was the DCM's fault. So, I got a little bit in the middle there between the ambassador and DCM. But the ambassador wanted to use me whenever he went to the Foreign Ministry. We negotiated a treaty of friendship and commerce with the Luxembourgers, which may sound like walking through an open door, but we never had one before. I got experience in doing negotiations.

Q: Anything like that gets very technical and time consuming. To get a feel for this, because I think relations at an embassy are always important- I take it our DCM was a professional career Foreign Service officer?

KRUSE: He had had previous career assignments, but I think, to be honest, his claim to fame was some very good family connections. He was, as I learned later, not held in great regard by most of his colleagues in the Foreign Service. In fact, there were those who said that he shouldn't have been sent to be a DCM. He had some problems in previous posts. I think probably providence was keeping me in its favor here because he could have done me a lot of damage. I don't think he felt very good about my role there. But again, the ambassador was able to, in effect, make Washington understand that what I was doing was what the ambassador wanted to do. I did my best to keep the DCM informed. That was probably the most tricky interoffice relations I ever had.

Q: This is one that occurs again and again of particularly a relatively junior officer being picked by an ambassador and sort of bypassing the system, maybe for perfectly good reasons. Resentments had be built up and the junior officer is sort of hostage to fortune. There's not a hell of a lot you can do.

KRUSE: That's right. You're the guy in the middle.

Q: Could you describe Luxembourg in the early '60s?

KRUSE: I'm not sure it's changed all that much, except it's probably gotten a little wealthier. They often say it's like the mouse that roared, that although in the case of the Luxembourgers, they didn't get help from the United States because of being difficult, but basically had an almost embarrassing love for the United States. This was only 12 or 15 years after World War II. Although it may sound like a lot of years Luxembourgers still remembered and appreciated what America did in coming back and liberating the continent, they acted as though we came only to save Luxembourg. There is an American military cemetery in Luxembourg where General Patton is buried. That became a virtual shrine to venerate the American effort to liberate Europe. They were not embarrassed at being absolutely grateful.

Q: There were ceremonies at Bastogne?

KRUSE: The Belgians, of course, had their effort. Bastogne is just across the border. But that whole Battle of the Bulge did encompass the northern part of Luxembourg and the eastern part of Belgium. I would go up to that area 15 years later and the foxholes were still there. You could run across a grenade if you were unlucky or not careful. In fact, Luxembourg would have escaped almost any damage from the war because in our initial invasion, we swept right through Luxembourg and the Germans retreated. But this, as you know, December offensive in 1944 brought the Germans back in. Lots of bombardment, lots of fighting going on in northern Luxembourg. Luxembourg City escaped it. One of the great institutions in Luxembourg in my days was the American-Luxembourg Society. They got very close to the embassy. They were very kind to us all. We certainly had many good dinners and banquets. Luxembourg wine flowed.

Q: Were there any stories still circulating about Perle Mesta, who had been Truman's ambassador? A very good musical was made called "Call Me Madame."

KRUSE: That was all well-known. Of course, they didn't understand why it would have been funny that they had such an important person come. There were jokes that never ended. They told one, for example, that a French general had just come back from Indochina and was talking about how difficult it was out there fighting the guerrillas. This took place at the dinner table of Mrs. Mesta at the embassy. She listened very carefully. She was quite surprised to hear all this and said, "You know, that is really just terrible, mon general. I'm going to report that to Harry tomorrow." As though this might be the first time Harry would have heard about it. Of course, Harry was Harry Truman. The first time that she left the post, she thought it was perfectly appropriate if her brother could just take charge while she was gone. She found it a little difficult to accept Washington's view that that really wasn't possible. She did do a good representation job for Americans in those days.

Q: Well, she helped put Luxembourg onto the American map. It probably would have stayed with Liechtenstein if Perle Mesta hadn't gone there.

KRUSE: It's a tiny country of 300,000 people. One ward in Chicago.

Q: Did you get any feel for NATO while you were there?

KRUSE: Just a little. The Luxembourgers' entire military, the size of about 500 men, was totally committed to NATO and would join up and had exercises with American troops in Germany. Their duty would be to just get enveloped into an American outfit and assume their duties. So, there was just the beginning of a NATO connection. What was even closer to us in those days was the European economic communities. The European Iron Steel Community had its first headquarters in Luxembourg.

Q: As economic officer, you must have been up to your neck in that, weren't you?

KRUSE: We didn't do so much with the European communities. Remember, we had a separate mission to the European Community also. What I was doing was trying to help American businesses come into Luxembourg. The Luxembourgers were actively recruiting American companies like Dupont and Monsanto. That was kind of fun. The idea of being good for Americans to get inside the Common Market with their production facilities so they would escape any kind of an external tariff. But you see, the big business of Luxembourg then and, I think, even still today, is iron and steel. That's the one industry that kept them alive for decades.

Q: How about banking?

KRUSE: That was just beginning. As I suspect, that would probably account for a lot of their prosperity today.

Q: Did you have any problems getting data, information and all?

KRUSE: No, they were helpful. Iron and steel, china, and a certain amount of wine and agricultural products. So, it wasn't a very diversified economy. The only problem would be often that the government itself was slow in collecting data, but they were very cooperative.

Q: What was your feeling about the Luxembourger's relations to the Germans?

KRUSE: Certainly in front of us, they were very anti-German. They wanted it to be very clearly understood that they were Francophile, although their language or their patois was mostly Germanic. (You had these kinds of "Bonjour, mein Herr" combinations of French and German that they put together.) Even though this patois was mostly German, they were always with the French against the Germans. Of course, culturally and linguistically, they tried to stress as much as possible the French side. The interesting thing was, of course, that they had both French and German as official languages. I think they realized that they had to get along. They were, as were the other Benelux countries, very loyal to the concept of the Common Market. English became basically a third language. Luxembourgers were very, very good at learning languages.

Q: What about relations with Belgium?
KRUSE: Of course, they had these jokes about the Belgians, that to be a Belgian is not a nationality, it's a profession. They see in Belgians an unerring instinct for money. I think a little bit of that might be kind of projection. Luxembourgers weren't too bad at it either. They recognized that they were tied in the economic union with the Belgians. Belgian money was legal tender in Luxembourg. They just recognized it was a fact of life. They had to get along with the Belgians. Sort of like the Canadians and us.

Q: How about France under de Gaulle at that time?

KRUSE: I would say, officially, the Luxembourg government would be a little nervous about too much anti-Americanism from de Gaulle because Luxembourgers would never forget the fact that the most important Western power was the United States. They would not like to have seen the United States react in a huff and leave Europe or retreat into isolationism. That was always a fear that the Luxembourgers had. I think there was a certain satisfaction that de Gaulle stood for French pride. But I think they did feel that he went too far, particularly when our troops had to leave France, which would be a later chapter in my life. I wound up in France to help work on that issue.

Q: When did you leave Luxembourg?

KRUSE: We left in the fall of '62.

Q: Were you there during the Cuban Missile Crisis?

KRUSE: Actually, it happened just when I got back to Washington. I was assigned to work for Alex Johnson, who was then the Deputy Under Secretary. The very first issue that the office faced was this Cuban Missile Crisis when I got in the job in October of '62.

Q: You came back and were staff assistant to Alexis Johnson. Was he number two?
KRUSE: No, he was under Ball.

Q: Number three.

KRUSE: His designation was G, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Q: You were there from '62 until when?

KRUSE: I stayed two years. I left in early '65, so it was just a little more than two years.

Q: We'll come to the Missile Crisis in a minute. What was your job? Staff assistants do different things.

KRUSE: Right. Alex Johnson, I think, had a very formal view, though not unpleasant. His idea was that I was there to get the paper passed to him and serve basically an office function, not a substantive function. I think he was quite right. Not that I couldn't have

learned things, I'm certain, but I accepted the fact that myself and the senior assistant were basically there to keep his paper flowing. In my case, I rarely sat in on the substantive meetings that he held with colleagues from other departments or other bureaus. But it was in many, many ways a great education for me because I was reading global traffic, very sensitive stuff, as well as listening in on phone calls, as he asked me to.

Q: When you listened in on phone calls, what was your role?

KRUSE: Simply to take notes. Rarely would he call us back and check on something. But it was mostly to keep us informed of what he was doing. Alex Johnson was a superb officer, almost indefatigable. At eight o'clock at night, he was as on the ball as he would have been at eight in the morning. He never tired. He needed reminding sometimes to keep his staff posted on what he was doing. He tended to think that we'd just get it by osmosis. I remember, I was in the job about two weeks before I met him. He was in the middle of this Cuban crisis. At that point, he couldn't even say what the crisis was. But everybody and my predecessor, who was still in the first week of overlap, would say, "We all figure it's got something to do with Cuba, but we don't know anything about it." Alex Johnson was a member of the famous Ex-Com, which was meeting with the President regularly. But he could not, of course, brief us on that. So, I learned about the crisis and met him sometime soon after the crisis had become public.

Q: As time went on, what was the role of Johnson's office, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs? Each administration has its own dynamics. What were the dynamics there?

KRUSE: His job was very much the interagency coordination with CIA, with DOD, with the other foreign policy establishments. We had a staff unit, G/PM, which was the predecessor to the PM (Political/Military) bureau. That was run by Jeff Kitchen, which had a whole group of, as we called them, the prima donnas, or the experts on various things from nuclear energy to nuclear weapons to DOD budgets. Actually, the Secretary, Dean Rusk, depended on Johnson to do the day to day coordinating with these other agencies. So, we'd see, often, Dick Helms and others who would be coming in from the Agency and others like Bill Bundy from DOD.

Q: Did you find that you or your office would be tasked with making sure that EUR and EA did what they were supposed to do or coordinated?

KRUSE: Yes, we did. There would be times if they didn't act or coordinate that we would either go to S/S, the Secretariat, and tell S/S, "Look, the boss has asked various things." So, we would often use S/S to be the ones to remind the bureaus of what their responsibilities were. At my level, we'd be dealing with the staff assistant in EUR. We'd very easily be able to talk about what he would like to do or even what he had done. It was always helpful for the bureaus to know what the principals were up to.

Q: So, in many ways, the staff assistants represented a sort of a supporting but non-

egotistical thing of saying, "Look, we've got to get this. My guy is a little bit ticked off at that. Can you get your guy to do this thing?" Was this kind of a role?

KRUSE: That's what Alex Johnson wanted. The other principal, George Ball, I think, had some people with him that were kind of egos in their own right. Perhaps he would give a task to them on a certain question. The whole business of appointing ambassadors and senior level appointments was handled out of George Ball's office and the Under Secretary. So, one of his staffers (George Springsteen) was, in fact, his alter ego. In that sense, basically, the principal had delegated authority. I was not delegated any particular authority. It was mostly just to keep paper flowing.

Q: Did you have any feel for, I won't say the "ranking," but the esteem that the various bureaus had? How would you rank them? A staff assistant sort of picks by osmosis.

KRUSE: It's kind of a reflection, although it's a little subjective, depending on your boss. In the case of Alex Johnson, he was an East Asia person. In fact, he confessed to us that he had only been in Europe once in his life. So, there, clearly would be a man who would see the Asian side of things as being very important. But, yes, as far as bureaus themselves, reputation--clearly FE, (now EAP), was considered a solid one with career Chinese and the Japanese language officers. These were solid countries whether they were problems or not. Of course, in the Department as a whole, Europe continued to be considered the most important bureau, the "primus inter pares". ARA and AF would be down the line. This was the days of Soapy Williams when African countries were just becoming independent states. Everybody was hoping that this would lead to better things for African peoples. You could almost say there was a certain reverse compensation going on for AF to make up to them. ARA was, I suppose, considered the weakest.

Q: With Soapy Williams, in many ways, he was sort of a one of a kind character in that, unlike other bureaus, he personified this African centric focus that he had. Because of his political ties (He had been governor of Michigan and a strong supporter of Kennedy.), it gave Africa an extra clout. What was the impression of the African bureau as far as you were dealing, and Soapy Williams?

KRUSE: You really go back to World War II, don't you, with President Roosevelt assuming that this would be the end of all colonization. By and large, we worked hard to do that. We had troubles with the French in Algeria, as you know. The Brits were slow in some ways to give up theirs. Of course, there was a continuing problem with the Portuguese that lasted on into the '70s. But, I think, there was that feeling that this is one of the great outcomes of World War II, that we will now end colonialism and all its attendant evils. So, Soapy Williams, if he cried "Hey, you're not moving this fast enough," I think he'd get a lot of attention, especially in the White House.

Q: You were saying that you didn't think the Black Caucus existed?

KRUSE: No, we were having our civil rights movement in our own country. I think the Black Caucus was significant for black members of Congress.

Q: Could you explain what the Black Caucus was?

KRUSE: Back in those days, I'm not sure they even had a caucus. You had individual black people like Adam Clayton Powell of New York. But they were not in an organized way. What I'm saying is that our attitude toward African countries was very much based on "Let's get away from colonialism, let's have one country, one vote. We ought to have democracy." I think that's why Soapy Williams got support. There was a feeling of let's do what we can to reverse what's been done to Africans.

Q: What about George Ball? Sometimes if you're working for number three as a staff assistant, you pick up vibes of your guy against their guy or something like that. What was your impression of Ball and Johnson and Rusk and how they worked together?

KRUSE: All three worked pretty well together, I thought, from all I saw. They played cards together, although it was more golf with Ball and Johnson on Saturday. There was a collegiality there. My boss, Alex Johnson, had known Dean Rusk since World War II and from Rusk's earlier stint in the Department. Harriman was another Under Secretary. He was a bit apart. He had his political connections.

Q: He was Far East Asia.

KRUSE: He got involved in the Near East often also because of political connections. But I had great respect for him. Despite the fact that this team (Johnson, Ball, Rusk, and even Harriman) and all the foreign policy establishment was moving fast into the great crisis of Vietnam, by the time I left in 1965 that had not really overwhelmed the country yet. I left in early '65. Johnson himself was off to be the deputy ambassador in Vietnam. As he left, he said that he didn't consider this a career enhancing assignment. I thought that Dean Rusk was a tragic figure. I think he was an honorable, brilliant man who was wrong in some of his perceptions. He apparently felt that the Chinese and the North Vietnamese could work together and that, in fact, they represented a combined communist force, whereas I've learned subsequently that most people who knew anything about Vietnam know that you don't have Vietnamese and Chinese getting along very well together. I think he was a wonderful human being, Rusk, and Ball, too. Ball, of course, was the in-house devil's advocate against Vietnam. I didn't have any background in Southeast Asia history or politics, but I remember saying to a colleague as our Vietnam involvement accelerated that I couldn't believe that Vietnam was worth 500,000 American troops.

Q: You did have with Johnson and Rusk a heavy emphasis on the Far East, whereas Ball was Mr. Europe and Mr. European Integration Personified.

KRUSE: Absolutely.

Q: Did you get any of that feeling, that something would happen and both Rusk and Johnson would turn to Ball and say, "You take care of it?"

KRUSE: Ball had Europe, even if it was messy things. In those days, Cyprus had just become part of the European Bureau. That was George Ball's problem. Of course, handling de Gaulle was George Ball's issue, and all of the other things in Europe. I had a deep respect for George Ball. Frankly, his views on the Middle East, even though they were not ascendent in his time, were much more in our interest than our policy has been most of the time.

Q: What was the general feeling when the Cuban Missile Crisis became known? At one point, there was about a week there where everybody was sort of sitting and waiting for something. We thought World War III might start.

KRUSE: We staffers were all in the vacuum of not knowing any of this. Alex knew it, but didn't pass it on. I remember when that week finally broke and, in effect, Khrushchev's message indicated that, as Dean Rusk said, "the other side blinked," I was (It was a Sunday.) up in Philadelphia and I heard about it on the radio. It looked as though the Soviets were taking the missiles out. But the texts of all the messages that had gone back and forth, of course, I knew nothing about until much, much later. I guess for all of those who were in the know, you're exactly right. They started the week without knowing where this one was going to wind up. The one diplomatic principle I learned from the Cuba crisis was to take the positive points from the adversary's message and ignore the unfavorable portions.

Q: You were working for Johnson when Kennedy was assassinated. How did that hit your office?

KRUSE: It was just absolute shock. I remember particularly that it becomes a function of the State Department to notify and do certain things at the time of a presidential succession. George Ball was Acting Secretary because Dean Rusk was out in Asia. He sent out the flash message. It started, "It is my painful duty to inform you that President John F. Kennedy died." It was a colossal blow. I have to say that, looking back on my own, those two years of Kennedy were the most exciting of all my years in Washington, partly because we were still coming out of the second world war, we were establishing our dominance with our military and with other things, and yet Kennedy was trying to project an image of an America that wanted the best for the whole world. His American University speech on "Making the world safe for diversity" had words I never forgot. As a young officer, they were thrilling times. We may have all gotten caught up in a certain "Camelot" euphoria, but those years with Kennedy were fun. I've often thought that Kennedy, maybe, in terms of his place in history, benefitted from not being on for the full tour given what happened in Vietnam thereafter.

Q: One always thinks of Lincoln. Lincoln did not have to face the forfax of Reconstruction. Did you get any feel for Middle Eastern affairs during this time?

KRUSE: Not very much at all. The first thing I remember reading was a dissent piece written by Ed Djerejian. I knew Ed very well. We were junior officers together. He had

finished his Arabic training. I guess. I guess it was the Kissinger era when the dissent channel was established. Ed's message was that, "We're not going to solve the Middle East problems until we do something about the Palestinians." That was just something that I had never focused on. That would have been in the early '70s when I was back in a different job.

Q: Had de Gaulle made his move to get France out of NATO?

KRUSE: No, it was my next assignment after I left Johnson in the spring of '65. I went to Paris to be the deputy POLAD (political advisor) at the U.S. European Command in suburban Paris.

Q: Still sticking to the '62 to '65 period when you were with Johnson, did you get any feel for relations with France and particularly with de Gaulle at that time?

KRUSE: Yes, partly because of the traffic that we got to read. I think it's characterized by Lyndon Johnson's public comment. He said, "Whenever de Gaulle gets on the pitcher's mound, I step out of the batter's box." That clearly was what we were doing. We chose not to go to the mat with de Gaulle on our differences. We were not happy at his actions, but I think, as I then discovered in my next assignment in Paris, Ambassador Chip Bohlen felt strongly that, "What are you going to do? Are you going to fight France to keep our forces in here?" However much we tried to get our allies and others to convince de Gaulle and maybe isolate de Gaulle (and indeed he was isolated in the Alliance), we were not going to go to war. Congressman Mendel Rivers of South Carolina, the Chairman of the House Arms Services Committee, expressed American anger by saying something to the effect that, "Okay, if he's going to force our troops out, we're going to take the graves of American troops who died there for France. We'll show him." But of course in the long run we had to accommodate Gaullist thinking.

Q: I think that was proposed, not seriously.

KRUSE: No, the Congressman wasn't serious but he was mad.

Q: Did you get anything about Canadian-American relations while you were there? This is the time when Diefenbaker was riding high. Kennedy had had a meeting with Diefenbaker and found him impossible.

KRUSE: There was even that leak in the Canadian papers about Kennedy saying, "When is that bastard coming" or something like that.

Q: Actually, I think it was Kennedy who claimed, "I didn't write 'bastard' because I didn't know he was one at that point."

KRUSE: This was not an easy relationship. Diefenbaker was a prickly guy. I think it was a total difference in character. Here is the glamourous young President and here was the kind of crusty old Canadian from the mid west provinces in Canada. I suppose, to be

honest with you, I haven't thought back to why Diefenbaker was the way he was, except there is that strain not of anti-Americanism, but it's that standing off from America. There is that fear that some Canadians have that, if they go along with the Americans too much, they're all going to wind up being Americans some day.

Q: Well, they have a real problem. I mean, they still have it. They keep having editorials that I follow with a certain amount of amused interest, where they try to figure out what is a Canadian? I have never really seen it, except for the fact that they're not Americans.

KRUSE: As the French Canadians say in Quebec, "We're the only ones that have no problem telling you how we're different. We don't speak like those Americans." But for the English-speaking Canadians, it is difficult. It was Trudeau, who said something like, "Living next to the United States is like sleeping next to an elephant. Even if it doesn't want to hurt you, you can't be sure that it will not."

Q: In 1965, you went to France. You were a political military advisor to NATO?

KRUSE: Actually to the U.S. Commander in Chief in Europe--EUCOM, as we call it.

Q: You were there from '65 until when?

KRUSE: I stayed in Paris and moved down to the embassy to take a Pol-Mil job in the fall of '66 and then stayed on in Paris essentially doing pretty much the same thing, although it's a little different down at the embassy where you are really back to a State Department operation.

Q: Let's talk first about the '65 to '66 period and EUCOM. Who was the commanding officer at that time?

KRUSE: General Lemnitzer was the overall Supreme Allied Commander. At his EUCOM headquarters, the American-only command in St. Germain-en-Laye, he had a deputy who was a four star Air Force general, Jake Smart. On a day to day basis, we worked with Smart.

Q: Where did this command fit into the overall...

KRUSE: EUCOM was the overall joint command that oversaw our Army, Navy, and Air Force in Europe. It is currently in Stuttgart, as all of our forces moved out of France in 1966. In that sense, it comes right from the JCS to EUCOM and then out to these subordinate service commands. It was at this time in my career, after my stint with Alex Johnson, which got me very much into political-military subjects. This was a desirable assignment for me to get out to Paris and to be able to continue to work on what was essentially NATO-related issues. EUCOM was U.S.-only forces. As you know, there are times when we use our forces in Europe not to do NATO things, but to perform unilateral tasks.

Q: What would be an example of a non-NATO thing?

KRUSE: A recent example was when our forces assigned to the Sixth Fleet attacked Qadhafi, that was clearly an American-only thing--not under NATO authorization.

Q: As the reaction to the Czech invasion by the Soviets and their allies, was there any sort of cranking up or was it just a feeling that this was something we couldn't do anything about and we just watched to make sure that something else wouldn't happen?

KRUSE: My recollections are that the NATO military asked for guidance, what to do. I think NATO authorized some minor steps, maybe more intelligence information collection and moderate increase in readiness, but certainly no alerting. Again, the Alliance looked to the United States for what lead we were going to give. It wasn't too long before it was clear that the United States was not going to engage militarily. It was not a close call. The Alliance did not want to go to war with the Soviets over Czechoslovakia however sympathetic allied countries were to the Czechs.

Q: At that time when you were dealing with NATO, what was the general feeling about Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, East Germany? Where would they go?

KRUSE: There was a question as to how loyal their forces would be if there was to be a real encounter between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, how much real fighting we'd encounter from some of the Warsaw Pact nations. But given the examples of East Germany and then Hungary being crushed earlier by the Soviets, most people in the Alliance were feeling that as long as the Soviets were calling the shots the Warsaw Pact would follow their lead. It would not be possible to free the Czechs from the Soviet Empire.

Q: You weren't expecting a dissolution of this Alliance?

KRUSE: No. I think we still were pretty much of the feeling that the Europeans had come to terms with communism in the East and that was probably the way it was going to stay. Subsequent to the fall of the Soviet Empire, even West Germans told me that when they finally got to East Germany for the first time, they were appalled at just the mediocrity of everything, if not worse. They said, "We thought we knew our brethren. We thought we knew East Germany. We were just abysmally wrong in knowing how bad it was."

Q: Did you ever find yourself while you were with the Secretary General's office having a problem wearing the NATO hat rather than the American hat?

KRUSE: We tried hard to wear the NATO hat. Jokingly, you were called "the American spy." This has been typically a job that Americans handled. There would always be a person in the private office of the Secretary General. George Vest and other officers had been assigned to previous Secretaries General. I guess you do your best to serve the Secretary General. He knows that you're a career Foreign Service officer. He knows that the American must write an efficiency report on you. He knows you've got to show that

you're doing things the Americans want. Everybody that works at NATO is seconded, if you will. There isn't any NATO nationality. Everybody has their national biases. But, sure, being the American and being in a strategic office, you do try to talk a more NATO line and understand the European situation.

Q: How did you find the Norwegians and Danes within the NATO context?

KRUSE: Not very strong militarily. We were always battling the Danes to keep their standards and equipment up. The Norwegians were maybe not quite so bad. The rhetoric was that they were strong allies. It's just that they didn't have much to contribute militarily. They had their particular views on nuclear weapons. Norway wouldn't allow nuclear weapons on their soil. That made them a little bit of a second class citizen. After all, the Alliance was based on nuclear deterrence.

Q: How about those two foreign friends, Greece and Turkey?

KRUSE: Well, they both liked NATO better than each other, that's for sure. There was a lot of question about whether they should ever have been allowed to come in--their aversion to democratic ideals. The Greeks have their great democratic traditions but during those years--the '60s--Greece was a military dictatorship.

Q: During this thing, the colonels were in the whole time you were there.

KRUSE: Yes. I often cite the examples, that both in Portugal, where a dictatorship was in force, and in Greece with the colonels, there was no doubt that the pressures of being within the Alliance helped eventually to destroy these dictatorial regimes.

Q: What was the attitude towards the Greeks and the Turks when you were there?

KRUSE: That they contributed to extraneous problems. I came to see that more in my later job when I was in Naples because we clearly could not conduct a regime of sensible exercises in the Aegean because of the Greek and Turkish views of what you can do there. So, it was a nuisance to us. More than a nuisance, militarily, it certainly meant we couldn't do things that we wanted to do.

Q: Were there any particular tensions at that time or were sort of the Turks and the Greeks treated with a certain (inaudible)?

KRUSE: The Turks were admired for their tough military. They contributed a lot of forces. Of course, it was essentially to protect their own country.

Q: They bordered the Soviet Union.

KRUSE: Right. The Greeks were not as formidable a fighting force.

Q: I don't think Cyprus did. It blew up in July of '74. The colonels came in in April of '67

and kept the lid on for that period of time. I was thinking that this might be a good place to call a halt for today. We've covered an awful lot of your NATO business at this point. We've covered really from '68 to '70 when you were assistant to the Secretary General. We'll pick up when you moved over from '70 to '73 at the U.S. Mission to NATO and talk about the differences there in your job and perspective and all that.

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Today is April 10, 1997. Let's go into NATO. You were there from '70 to '73. What was your job?

KRUSE: I was involved in this initiative that President Nixon took to get NATO involved in the "challenges of modern society." These would be environmental issues, quality of life issues. It had high White House support because President Nixon felt that we had to keep NATO active. It was kind of a strange idea to many people that NATO, which was seen as a mostly political and military organization, would get involved in what you might say were softer issues, issues maybe most people thought would be more for OECD or some economic organization. At this time, there was no UN body dealing with the environment to speak of. So, I was asked to take the job of being the action officer in the U.S. delegation to NATO for this Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS).

Q: Where was this, in Brussels?

KRUSE: In Brussels.

Q: How were you received when you appeared with this new portfolio?

KRUSE: I was received with some skepticism even within the U.S. delegation because there were lots of traditional people who wondered what in the world NATO was getting involved in. The other delegations probably had even more questions about what the U.S. was up to. But frankly, it did make a certain amount of sense, the way we did the projects. Our first representative to the plenary sessions of the committee Pat Moynihan, who was, of course, right in the White House at that time serving for Nixon. Continuing after Moynihan, the next several chief delegates were all very high level appointees such as Russell Train, the chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality. So, it was clear with that kind of high-powered delegation head that the U.S. wanted to make this thing work. So, we got into projects like oil spills, air pollution, road safety, disaster assistance. The idea would be to take advantage of NATO's ability to do things and to have a certain amount of technological know-how and, instead of burdening the NATO bureaucracy with a whole new staff, that most of the work would be done by individual nations. We called it a pilot project kind of organization where a nation or several nations would agree to be the pilot project leader and they would do most of the research and the work back in the home countries and then bring their results together for meetings with other NATO countries. But it would all be done with a very minimum of additions to the NATO staff. In fact, I suppose we had only one CCMS (Committee on Challenges of Modern Society)

officer in the NATO staff for the first 10 years.

Q: Some 20 years later, seeing the absolute disaster that the Soviet army and its satellites, the effect that they had on the environment where they were... Anywhere where they were, there were sort of vast cesspools of pollution from the motor pools on. Did this have a military component in it at that time?

KRUSE: Not a whole lot actually because these were conceived as projects that were good for the entire society and we would have mostly civilian experts working on it. But there was no exclusion of the military of certain countries. In a small country like Portugal, most of the technological expertise was found in the military. So, they would sometimes send to certain projects (air pollution or water pollution) military people. But by and large, the larger countries like Germany and France and England and Italy had civilians working on these projects.

Q: Was our army looking at the environment as it worked around, the motor pools and so on?

KRUSE: Yes. I'm not so sure it was a result of CCMS necessarily. At that time, the French were getting very green. They had just become aware of the need to start doing a lot more in terms of environmental protection. The Canadians, who were always very strong on the environment, were probably our best supporter in CCMS, thinking that this was a good thing for NATO to do. But other countries, the British, for example, were not terribly interested in seeing NATO do some of this business. But over the years, they became accustomed to it.

Q: How did you go about your tasks?

KRUSE: Essentially, I got the instructions from Washington of what we were trying to do and would prepare the agenda along with the Secretariat for these meetings that we had every six months. Delegations came from capitals. There was always a big effort to get high level people to match our high levels. Sometimes we were dependent on our embassies in London and Paris to produce big name people. But my job was very much a bureaucratic job. It was nothing to do with the research. Our experts came to the meeting on their agenda. I didn't present their business. The idea was that there would be action recommendations for the NATO council to take on oil spills or air pollution. To a certain extent, it got government awareness of many of these problems. For smaller countries, they got the best of U.S. expertise. For example, in road safety, at that time, the airbag was very new. Of course, for some countries, they saw it simply as another economic issue. Can we afford to put airbags in our cars if the Americans want to do it? But it certainly got a lot of attention, the idea of airbags. There were a lot of other technological things. Back in those days (It's hard to believe.), there were still little French deux chevaux cars traveling around with not even safety glass. All these new improved safety standards were a way for members of the Alliance to be aware of the way the U.S. was going in these subjects. So, I think CCMS had a value.

Q: Oh, there's no doubt about it. This was a case of really treating NATO as something other than a military Alliance.

KRUSE: That's right. I would contend that, as we might have talked about last time, one of the great values of NATO beyond its military capabilities was its ability to get high level attention in Alliance countries on political issues, whatever was going on. I always think of the arms control issues, with us dealing with the Soviets in SALT and in START. We truly kept the Alliance completely up to date on how these negotiations were going. There would have been no other forum that we could have presented the kind of sensitive, highly classified material than we could in NATO. While it was very much related to defense and security, it had nothing to do with improving NATO's hardware as much as it did in improving our allies' understanding of our political goals in arms control.

Q: How were the Germans responding to the environmental programs?

KRUSE: They came along later. Once they got on board, they were pretty good. But I think at the time CCMS started, the French were the best on the Continent.
Q: The Greens became a big thing in Germany later on.

KRUSE: That's true. In terms of German cooperation with this committee, it was good, but it came along a little slower than the French did. They may have had the question of their federal system. On some of these issues, the Lander didn't want the federal authorities to enforce standards.

Q: Was there any effort that you know of to reach out to the Soviets and the Soviet bloc and say, "We're trying to do something of this nature. Maybe it would be a good idea if you did, too."

KRUSE: There was maybe a little bit of language in that direction. But you do raise a good point in asking. We did have other countries that were not NATO members joining us. This was in 1970 when it was quite a change to think that we could work with neutrals. The Swedes came to some of our meetings. Of course, it was as big a thing for the Swedes to get involved with NATO as it was the other way around for us to have the Swedes. Eventually, we would have other non-NATO countries coming to these pilot project meetings.

As far as the East Bloc is concerned, we knew that many of the Eastern European countries were interested in what we were doing, particularly air pollution and water pollution. But they were not free to join. The Soviets, as long as it had the NATO label, were not going to get involved in CCMS.

Q: Who was your ambassador?

KRUSE: We had several, starting with Harland Cleveland. Then we had Bob Ellsworth, and the former Secretary of the Treasury, David Kennedy. The last one when I left was

Rumsfeld.
Q: Why was there such a turnover in NATO ambassadors?

KRUSE: Ellsworth was there at least two years, maybe three. Cleveland was leaving. He had already been there quite a few years. I think the most unusual appointment was David Kennedy.

Q: You were saying Kennedy was really an economic man.

KRUSE: Yes. It was an unusual appointment as he was never personally associated with military issues. I'm not sure what was the reason for that. But he stayed by my recollection not much more than a year or a year and a half. Most countries will send an ambassador for at least four years. We had the Belgian ambassador, Henri de Staercke, who had been there almost since the start of the Alliance. Some of these had tremendous continuity and wouldn't mind letting you know that, too. The Dutch also had a very longstanding ambassador. They were all high quality people. The Turks had Ambassador Burgi, who had been there for decades. So, for other countries, it was very much a continuity job.

Q: In your work, did you feel a little bit like the stepchild, trying to raise your agenda items when there were other things afoot?

KRUSE: I would usually in the staff meeting introduce CCMS items by saying, "The White House wants to do this or that." If they asked me who in the White House, I would say, "Pat Moynihan." So, that got you a fair amount of attention. But there were usually a certain amount of quizzical looks as to what this CCMS thing was, especially on the part of some of the uniformed military folks in the mission. You would have to ask Henry Kissinger. I don't know that he ever has revealed that in his memoirs, what was all behind this initiative. But it had something to do with, here we are in the middle of Vietnam, the fear in Europe that maybe we are really getting tired of NATO and maybe our attention was going elsewhere. The idea of the "Year of Europe," which was one of Henry's slogans. All of this was meant to somehow show that the old dog of NATO was still up to good new tricks. This, while half a million American troops were half-way around the world in Vietnam.

Q: How about the American military? This didn't have much resonance with them?

KRUSE: No. You know how the mission of NATO was organized. You actually have a military office of fairly large size with uniformed military people dealing with the weaponry and personnel and all the other things of NATO military commitments. Then you have a political section, which does all the political consultations. You had a Pol-Mil section, which was mostly having to do with arms control. Then you had an economic section because there was an economic committee in NATO. Then there was the usual admin. section, etc. But the defense staff (We called it the third floor because that's where all the defense uniformed people were.), had a lot of work. They went through these annual exercises of the U.S. responding to NATO questionnaires about force

commitments and all that. So, it was a big, big job. Lots of subcommittees, lots of things going on to keep the military busy. That was certainly still the guts of the Alliance. The American commitment was obviously what made it all stick together. So, I would not presume to say that, within the delegation, my CCMS activity was really much of the work of the delegation, except when it came to these meetings every six months when the gang from Washington came in and then everybody paid a little more attention.

Q: Where was your allegiance back in Washington? Was it to Pat Moynihan's office or to an office in the State Department, both in fact and also in reality?

KRUSE: Moynihan had a small staff to work on this. In State, the NATO office, the old EUR/RPM office, was where it was housed. They did put one of their officers on this job. But I think it was about the same order of priority there as it was out in the delegation. We bowed to the fact that this was a presidential initiative. We weren't going to let it fail. We were going to work at it hard. But 90% of the work of the office in RPM was something else. It was either political or military. You asked me where the power was. It was throwing around the name of the White House and Pat Moynihan and presidential initiative and that kind of thing.

Q: Were there any particular issues that you recall in this during this three year period?

KRUSE: Because of CCMS or elsewhere in the Alliance? There was an awful lot of stuff going on in the Alliance because it was just the beginning of detente, the whole idea of the Harmel report (the Belgian Foreign Minister) that NATO had to be more than just defense, it was to be emphasize detente also. So, there was really a lot of political activity keeping the delegation busy. In my case, we got a little bit of publicity, when we put forth this Oil Spills Resolution, which was to commit all NATO countries to cease deliberately spilling oil from tankers into the open sea. A noble goal, but it had some economic consequences which meant you had to build a different kind of tanker or you had to provide different ways that you were going to clean out the tanks of an oil carrier. Those were the kind of CCMS type things that kept us going. But in the Alliance itself, clearly, it was a very busy time. This was the early '70s. I have a feeling that the competition of the Cold War up until about this time, left us wondering how the Soviets were really going to do. Was this experiment in socialism going to improve the life of the Soviet citizen or was the Socialist just not going to make it at all? It certainly had some appeal to many Europeans. So, when we finally got into this engagement with them in detente, negotiations on security cooperation, on the question of confidence building measures and all the other things, many Western leaders were fearful that the Soviets could beat us. Secretary General Brosio often expressed to me his concern that the West, with its free democratic system and free expression of public opinion, might not be tough enough to face down the Soviets in a time of relaxing tensions. Militarily, the Soviets continued to grow stronger. But I think this was beginning to be the other side of the hill for them and that the West finally was getting to demonstrate the superiority of our way of life. Although at that time, I don't think we felt that. I know that many in the Alliance didn't want to have detente very much. They thought that to deal with the Soviets, you just simply had to stay tough and either make them collapse or let them collapse on their own.

You had the French playing their separate game. So, it was a time of a whole lot of important turning points, I think.

Q: In '73, you left NATO for where?

KRUSE: I came back to Washington to work in Canadian Affairs.

Q: You were there from when to when?

KRUSE: From '73 to '76, for three years.

Q: I've often heard people I've interviewed say that dealing with the Canadians and perhaps dealing with the French is certainly as difficult as dealing with the Soviets. Could you describe the Canadian Desk, where it was and how work was divided? Then we'll talk about the issues.

KRUSE: Of course, to start with, there is kind of an anomalous thing about Canadian Affairs. That is that we were dealing with them under the rubric of European Affairs. That had a history all its own. Suffice to say that there were those who felt that we ought to deal with Canadian Affairs more separately from Europe because they really weren't European. I guess the Canadians were among those who pushed that idea, that they deserved special attention. When I started, the desk was relatively small. We only had a director, a deputy, and two action officers. It grew in the next years because environmental issues became very big and we had to have an officer solely doing environmental issues. We continued to have someone devoted mostly to economic issues. We also had one doing political/military affairs. Then we had a deputy. But a lot of other issues came into play in the mid-'70s. Boundary issues became a big deal. Fishery issues became very big with the Canadians. So, there were a lot of issues which 99.44% of Americans would never know about and never care about. But only about one percent of Canadians didn't know about them fully and were prepared to fight to the last Canadian to get an advantage if they could. But that comes from the nature of the Alliance.

Q: You mentioned boundaries. I thought we had pretty well settle the boundaries.

KRUSE: You're right. We have pretty well settled them, but every boundary issue with the Canadians, whether there are any anomalies or anything that comes up, particularly when it involved fishing rights, are just as tough as dealing with the Russians. They fight tooth and nail, partly because they don't want to appear to be soft on their great friends, the Americans. In Canadian politics, the worst thing that can happen to you is to be considered a toady of the United States. On the other hand, if you're too tough and get in trouble, that also is dangerous for your political health. I think Diefenbaker maybe was an example of being a little too strong.

Q: Who was the Prime Minister at the time?

KRUSE: Trudeau. He was a special force also. He was looking forward to detente with

the Russians. You do have to realize that the other close neighbor to Canada is Russia, mostly over the pole. But still, in a Cold War situation, the Canadians always thought that if missiles would be flying from the Soviets to us, they'd go over Canada. They also just never were quite as hard line. I shouldn't say "never," but certainly under Trudeau, they were not as hard line anti-communist. They thought the Americans had kind of gone too far. So, it was an interesting time. There would be from time to time some Trudeau ideas which we thought were not helpful. I wish I could think of an example right now, but he was looking often to find ways of dialoguing with the Russians, sometimes on his own, which made us a little nervous. We thought maybe that he wasn't paying enough attention to this NATO solidarity idea, although we have to remember that, even to this day, Canadian forces are still based in Europe to be a part of NATO.

Q: What areas were you in?

KRUSE: I was mostly political/military because of my NATO background. When I became the deputy director, I had to be involved in the other issues. But here again, these are pretty routine issues for the U.S. In the great scope of American foreign policy interests, some of these issues with Canada just don't grab people's attention.

Q: What we're doing here is, we're trying to look in more detail. Obviously, Canadian-American relations in all its glory and difficulties go on no matter where the public attention is paid. So, we'll look at this. When you got onto the Canadian Desk, what would you say was the accepted psychological profile of Pierre Trudeau at that time? What was motivating him? What was his relationship to the United States?

KRUSE: It's a shame that my memory is failing me, but he had a slogan which implied that Canada was independent of the United States. It was meant to prove to the rest of the world that... He was pushing Europeanization of Canadian foreign relations. There were a lot of things that he pushed. But all of it was against this almost immovable and unchangeable fact that it was living cheek by jowl with the United States and that Canadian business and Canadian prosperity really depended on a good relationship with the United States. If you have a big multinational corporation based in the United States that has factories in Canada, if you're one of the American executive officers of one of these companies, and you dare think of closing a factory in Canada, you're going to have people in Canada screaming, "Why are you picking on us? What is this business? We thought we were all in this together." When the headquarters of companies were in the United States or were clearly American, Canadians always get a little nervous that somehow they're going to get the short end of the stick. The same way with culture. "Time Magazine" sells very widely in Canada. It's not a Canadian magazine. American television is widely seen all over Canada. Canadians have the desire to live close to the American border for practical reasons. It's a little warmer. So they all live about 70 miles from the border and all of these great American cultural scene pours over. There are periodic attempts to stop it, somehow make sure there is Canadian content. Even football teams, the Canadian Football League had to have a certain percentage of Canadians higher than the Americans. You just aren't aware unless you put yourself in Canadian shoes the force of this great American society and how it affects Canadian life in every

way.

Q: Let's talk about the military first. Were there any problems with the Canadian military during this '73 to '76 time? Nuclear issues, deployment, radar, or anything?

KRUSE: There were always ongoing questions. We had military bases still up in Canada--mostly for communications, early warning, things tied into our joint NORAD Command in Colorado Springs. Canadians were fully allied with us on this, but were not as zealous about a lot of it, let's put it that way. They clearly didn't have the resources. When World War II finished, Canada had the fourth largest air force in the world. By the time of the '70s, it was very small. It had some well-trained squadrons, but it was not big. That was, of course, the case in Canada in every phase of military. We're talking about a force that eventually got down to 70,000 personnel. It's a very small military. For a serious military man who wants to do the right thing for the security of his country of 25 million people it's constantly frustrating to find that there wasn't much public support for spending a lot of money. So, they had those problems within their own country. Then with us, of course, we tended to be always pushing, encouraging them to do more. The nuclear issues were always the most sensitive. The question of the use of nuclear weapons, that is, the basing of nuclear weapons, even planes on nuclear alert flying over Canada, these things always made the Canadians very nervous and sensitive. They did not want to appear to be a part of any U.S. nuclear initiatives which would embarrass them. Trudeau wanted the least possible reliance on nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were a particular problem for him and for a lot of Canadians.

Q: Did you have the feeling that Trudeau for both political and personal reasons rather enjoyed tweaking the nose of the Americans?

KRUSE: Yes. It always does a Canadian politician a little good in the country to appear to be able to do that. If you can do it with a little good humor and not appear too uptight about it... There is a certain amount that the U.S. knows it has to live with. Trudeau sometimes would do that quite well, but always within limits. He was certainly a strong figure on the Canadian political scene for a long time. So, his appeal was pretty strong in Canada for other reasons, such as keeping Canada together. Here I will express a very strong opinion. I think it would not be to our good to have a divided Canada. So, we were always glad when we had a Prime Minister who appeared to both the French and the English. Trudeau in many ways bent over backwards because he was a French Canadian who appeared to be putting the Anglos in a tight spot. But that's, of course, a constant concern of the Canadians.

Q: At this time ('73 to '76), what was the feeling on the Canadian Desk about whither the future of Canada? I'm speaking of the partition.

KRUSE: It was just beginning to be a big issue. I remember writing a paper on Quebec separatism. It got to the Secretary and he actually wrote something on it with his initials. The EUR Assistant Secretary Art Hartman sent it back to me. So, I know that the paper was read by him. So, there was that kind of level of interest in Quebec. It was beginning

to show this possibility of breaking away. But it was new. At that time, the question was whether separatism would grow or was it going to wither away? I am not sure I ever made a prediction, but I have been surprised that, in fact, it not only seems to have grown, but it came close to actually happening.

Q: I'm not an authority, but in 1997 after the last plebiscite, my feeling is, I think it's inevitable that Quebec will split off, but maybe I'm wrong.

KRUSE: Well, I'll put myself on record as saying that I still resist the idea that it is inevitable. I continue to hope that it doesn't happen. I think it would not be in our interest nor really in the interest of Canada and not even Quebec.

Q: What about fishing rights? Did you get involved in various fishing matters?

KRUSE: On the desk, we had to keep tabs on it. In fact, we had Roz Ridgway doing all of the fishery negotiations in those days. So, we were not the prime office for that. That was another interesting thing about the Canadian Desk. Most of the big economic issues with Canada were still being carried by EB. Jules Katz particularly was the man who kind of knew all the economic issues. Any day, something could come up somewhere in Canada which would be totally off our screen. We would know nothing about it. It would happen often between private entities on both sides. Then the governments would have to get involved. Often, the desk was the last to know what was happening. So, there was this kind of history of many of the substantive issues with Canada like economics, the environment, and fisheries. It was somewhat esoteric for the average generalist Foreign Service person. It was being handled by the more functional bureaus.

Q: Was this a period of time, if I recall, when icebreakers in the Northwest Passage were a big issue?

KRUSE: The bigger issue was our submarines and their playing around up north. The Canadians didn't like the fact that the submarines would somehow and sometimes come up in what they saw as Canadian waters. It was a problem. We did our best to kind of walk the narrow line between freedom of the seas and Canadian sensitivities. Except for the odd blow-up and incident now and then, we got away with it. There are a lot of little footnote stories, anecdotal stories regarding this relationship. Once, a Canadian ship was doing target practice out in the Puget Sound area, the Juan de Fuca Straits really. One of the shells went awry and actually hit an American ship. Nobody was hurt, fortunately, but you can imagine the jokes that this was a Freudian slip and that this was the Canadians' aggression coming to the forefront. Given the fact that we were one of the world's super powers and the Canadians just wanted us not to throw that around too much with them, I believe we managed the relationship pretty well.

Q: How about on the cultural side, cultural domination, too much American advertising and magazines and broadcasts, what have you?

KRUSE: Even to this day, there is always the threat of legislation in Canada to cut back

on the American content, somehow keep American T.V. down. I have to say that I have a sympathy for the Canadians. I think Canadian society is a very admirable society. There are many features of it that, I think, are superior to ours, particularly gun control and even their feelings of need to have more of a commonality about health care and other social issues. I think, in fact, the whole idea of community is still stronger in Canada than it is here in the United States, where individualism is so important to us. Individualism is honored and respected and practiced in Canada, but there is also the other side, the idea that we are a community. Maybe that comes because they've always had to make a statement to be seen as different from us. So, they're not as assured of themselves maybe as we seem to be. We had an earlier assignment in Toronto. I remember it fondly. I think there is a great deal for Canada to commend itself on. May they live forever.

Q: In '76, whither?

KRUSE: This was a great change. I was GLOP'ed.

Q: You might explain what "GLOP'ed" means.

KRUSE: I'm told it all came about when Secretary Kissinger was down in Mexico and asked one of the staffers down there what was happening in some other part of the world, and he knew nothing. Kissinger didn't like that too much. GLOP was the idea that you would be available for global service rather than being completely specialized in some area. So, here I had spent my entire career pretty much involved in European and NATO matters. I had been in almost 20 years. So, I saw the handwriting on the wall and bid on jobs outside the European area. The job as the deputy principal officer in Jerusalem was up. I looked at that. It seemed a rather fascinating possibility. I had no idea what was going on in the Arab-Israeli conflict. That had never been my issue. So, it was partly because of the name Jerusalem, partly because I knew it was going to be interesting politically, and partly because I knew the consul general, Mike Newlin. It seemed to me that we should try for it. Lo and behold, we were assigned. It was certainly, as Monty Python would say, something completely different.

Q: You were there from '76 to when?

KRUSE: To 1980, which were the years of the Carter presidency, just by coincidence, as you know. We had arrived in Jerusalem in September 1976 with the Brookings report just being completed, which talked about the need for a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, that is, that all Arab countries would somehow make peace with Israel. That Brookings report had great influence on Carter's thinking and on his administration's actions. We started with some of our own efforts to get this going. Then Anwar Sadat decided to, in fact, follow his own inclinations. As you know, after he talked about his willingness to go to Jerusalem, Prime Minister Begin invited him. And so there in November of 1977, he arrives at Tel Aviv Airport, the first Arab leader not only to recognize Israel, but to actually come and step on the soil of the state. So, that happened just a year after I got there. It was from there on in a roller coaster. We were busy.

Q: Let's take it when you arrived. You got to Jerusalem. The consul general was Mike Newlin. What was the role of the consulate general in Jerusalem at that time?

KRUSE: The district for the Jerusalem consulate general was all of the city of Jerusalem and all of the West Bank. It did not include Gaza. So, aside from handling the typical visas and passport needs and all that kind of business, we were charged with making contact with the Palestinian leadership on the West Bank and in essentially East Jerusalem. We also were dealing with the Jewish mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kolleck at that time. We were jokingly called "the outlaw consulate" because we did not recognize Israel's claims to territory in Jerusalem nor, obviously, in the West Bank. Therefore, we did not have exequaturs with the Israeli government. We were not recognized officially as our mission being responsible for dealing with the Israelis. All of that was done by our embassy which was in Tel Aviv. So, it was a kind of an anomalous situation, but it had existed since 1967 when the city was no longer divided. Although the Israelis, of course, wanted us to accept, their claims to all of Jerusalem, etc., we were not about to do that. So, we operated under Israeli benevolence, if you will. They allowed us to do our thing. But essentially, our thing was to deal with the Palestinian leaders on the West Bank in East Jerusalem. At that time, the political leadership consisted mostly of elected mayors. The Israelis had allowed municipal elections in '76, which had PLO supporters, but not identifiable PLO figures becoming mayors in all the cities of the West Bank.

Q: At that time, contact between the United States and the PLO was forbidden by Congress.

KRUSE: Not really Congress at that time, the prohibition stemmed from Kissinger's promise to the Israelis at the time of the '73 agreements not to deal with the PLO until it essentially accepted the fact of the state of Israeli and stopped the terrorism. So, it was first Henry who got this started. The Congress later on codified it. In 1976 there was absolutely no possibility of dealing with the PLO. As you may remember, Andrew Young dealt just quietly with a PLO representative in New York and that got him fired. Some other ambassadors got in a little trouble if they seemed to be talking to or were involved with the PLO. We would say in the consulate that, "If any of these mayors that we're dealing with are PLO, then it's the Israelis fault that they're still there. We're not in the business of deciding whether somebody is PLO or not. That's Israel's concern."

Q: Could you talk about the relationship between the consulate general and the embassy in Tel Aviv during this time?

KRUSE: As you can see, there would be certain different emphases in both places. We were emphasizing the desire to have the Palestinians become involved, particularly after the Sadat visit and the Camp David process, when finally the Palestinians were indeed given a part of the Camp David agreement. That is, we were to get the local Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to become a Palestinian negotiating partner for future dealings with Israel. This was the first time that we had really given- We said as we tried to sell this, "You're now given a ticket to get into the conference room." It's the first time Palestinians in any way had gotten such an invitation to join in the discussion of their

future. So, that was our prime interest at the Consulate General.

The embassy's interest, of course, as a typical embassy, is to continue a good relationship between the host country and the United States, to, in effect, help accomplish our goals with Israel, which always is to make it secure and prosperous and all that. So, we dealt with different people, different constituencies. Although we both were reading from the same policy script, we emphasized different things. We were trying to tell the Palestinians that this was a great opportunity for them. I don't know that the Israelis were that concerned that Palestinians joined in the negotiations. There was this built-in difference of emphasis. I think you could say that, personally, some of the officers at the embassy and officers at the consulate had different views. The officers at the embassy would tend to feel that the Palestinians would always resent the existence of the state of Israel and that it's almost impossible to see a peaceful resolution of the conflict. I think those of us at the consulate who had known the Palestinians better felt that there was a possibility. Of course, you can say that in retrospect 20 years later, we were maybe more right than they. But the game is not over yet. We still have to see. There are many Israelis who would certainly agree that it isn't possible to have peace with the Palestinians.

I'll give you an incident which occurred when we had a Congressional delegation out in which the members typically, if they were a serious delegation, wanted to hear both sides. They wanted the consulate to brief them and they wanted the embassy to brief them. We would usually emphasize the Israeli settlement building activity that was going on indicating that this was something that doesn't help the peace process. The embassy would agree with that because our policy was opposed to settlements. But I think the embassy would be able to put this in a context of why the Israelis were doing it because these were the ancient Biblical lands that were near and dear like Hebron, Jerusalem, Bethel, and other places would be where, naturally, Jews would want to live. So, sometimes CODELs would detect almost a policy difference. You can imagine that they would be more inclined to be favorable to the Israelis and would raise some questions back in Washington as to "Are these two posts really in line out there? It seems like we hear a little different thing from both sides." Of course, the Department would say, "They've all got the same policy, no change." There were times when there were complaints about the consulate being not pro-Israeli enough. I don't think anybody ever complained that the embassy was not pro-Palestinian enough. So, we had to live with that. I think you can easily draw the reasons why we were different and often times, depending on the zeal of people at the consulate or people at the embassy, you could have some pretty lively discussions.

Q: I would have imagined this was the time when, even before the Carter administration came in, Congress had mandated human rights reports shortly before. Then you had the advent of Patt Derian and the increased power of the Bureau of Human Rights. I would have thought this would have been both an opportunity for you and a track for the consulate general. The Israelis are not a benevolent occupying force. They have a difficult job to do, but they also are as rough-handed as probably any occupying power can be.

KRUSE: They seemed to have learned their lessons well.

Q: So, how did this play out for what you were doing?

KRUSE: The human rights thing was a very big part of our reporting. Reporting on settlement activity and reporting on human rights, as well as representation for the Palestinians were the three major political issues that we dealt with. Human rights, we tried to report as objectively as we could, mostly based on hearing stories from Palestinians who had been affected by Israel's occupation policies. We had opportunities often when we interviewed Palestinians wanting to get visas to hear why they have a police record. Usually, it was because it was some political accusations by Israeli authorities. In the course of the interview, often, the visa officer had occasion to ask, "What was the charge? Why were you convicted? Why did you admit your guilt?" In many, many cases, if any infraction at all, it was some nationalist manifestation of some kind, but hardly a bloody, terrorist effort. You got the convictions either because the client had no way of understanding what was going on because the whole thing was conducted in Hebrew or our recognizing that he'd get a little better treatment if he just admitted to something. So, you had that kind of perversion of justice. It was such a consistent pattern. You heard it time and time again. You heard about how they were initially questioned and they were kept incommunicado and had hoods over their faces and made to stand for long periods of time, sometimes doused with water and put out in the cold. I guess you could say that not much of this was really life threatening, but some of it was pretty painful or uncomfortable. So, we would report these things. Then, Washington, of course, wanted to be sure that all of this could be proven. In some cases, it wouldn't have been easy to prove it. Every human rights report was a negotiating process. Of course, it was always the consulate that came in with these reports. Although the embassy was responsible in Gaza, they didn't get the same level of stories that we did. So, it was really the consulate that always was reporting the Israeli bad things.

Q: I would think that you would have, I won't say a problem, but you're up against really not a policy power with which, close on, a young Foreign Service officer would not be comfortable with. This type of activity and all. It would naturally stir up the underdog juices of a reporting officer and yet you kind of know that the reporting can be accurate as all hell, but it would immediately get leaked to the Congress, which would immediately leak it to the Israelis. It's not completely the Jewish lobby, but it's damn close. I mean, there are other allied groups to it, but essentially, the most politically powerful lobby in the United States during this whole time. Yet you've got these young officer whom it would be very difficult to control. They've got a story and they want to get it out.

KRUSE: Yes, it's clear to them as the truth and they feel it should be reported. In many cases, that's what we tried to do.

I was going to say that I had been in the Service 20 years in the late '70s and I never had expected that what we reported from Jerusalem was so liable to become public so quickly. Maybe it was the issues I had dealt with before weren't as volatile or the subject was not of as much deep interest as reporting on Israeli violations of human rights and

Israeli settlement activities. The one great criticism in retrospect that, I think, one can levy at American policy was its refusal to talk to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. We inhibited ourselves from going down the road to a solution with the Israelis and the Palestinians because we basically said, "We don't believe that the PLO is a legitimate party." Our reporting from the Consulate General made it clear that Palestinians on the West Bank would never substitute themselves for the PLO. Our contacts always said, "You must talk to the PLO-only it can represent us." So, we delayed almost 20 years before we began a dialogue with the PLO. I have to think that, if this was a policy that could somehow have been set free from domestic pressures and Congressional pressures, we would not have waited so long. We would not have had the painful burdens of so many people lost on both sides.

Q: Did you have to work to, one, to a certain amount, restrain your young reporting officers and, two, to protect them?

KRUSE: We were aware of the need to make sure that individual officers didn't get singled out. Of course, when we sent in the human rights reports, it was the post leadership that took the responsibility. There was an occasion of one of the junior officers named Alexander Johnson, who prepared reports on her interviews with Palestinian visa applicants, which showed the pattern of human rights violations. We allowed those reports to go forward with a covering memorandum that this represented the effort of one officer and that we accepted this as a valid effort on her part. That report apparently became public. We had to go through a season of phone and other inquiries from press people about, "What's this Alexander Johnson doing?" To make it clear, unfortunately, Alexander had a lot of problems personally and in her work otherwise and we felt was not really the best candidate for advancement in the Service. Eventually, in fact, she did not get her tenure. I believe that she quit the Service a few years later went public completely with her book called "Jerusalem 1500," as I remember because that was the number of the airgram that we had sent in with her reporting. That got a little publicity. It was the same time that "The Sunday Times" in London had done a very thorough report of Israeli practices with prisoners in the West Bank. So, a lot of this stuff was hitting the West Bank at the same time and the Israelis were getting very sensitive to all this. Getting back to the point of what we did with the officers who felt they had to report this, we tried to do it as matter of factly as possible and tried to protect the names of individual officers. I think, to a great extent, we were successful, not that it changed Israeli practices, unfortunately.

Q: Were you concerned about the Israeli secret service doing disinformation on your officers to discredit them and all?

KRUSE: Yes, it was an issue. It is true that, from time to time, Israeli officials (high ranking) would say something to the ambassador in Tel Aviv.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

KRUSE: Sam Lewis, as you know, a career officer. He was there a long time, although at

a certain point, he did resign as a career officer and then was reappointed as a political appointee. There would be times that Israeli--I heard once or twice about Israeli officials complaining to the Embassy about Consulate officers being anti-Israeli. I think the embassy had quickly rebuffed those kinds of accusations. But I will say that I never felt in any way that the Israelis would do anything to us in any physical way because that wouldn't be in their interest to go that far. But they did think of the whole consulate as being anti-Israeli, I'm afraid. Many Israeli politicians would say that.

Q: What about your contacts with Teddy Kolleck, who was the mayor for many, many years in Jerusalem, who seemed to try to bridge the gap between the Arabs and the Jews?

KRUSE: We tried to have a correct relationship. He was the Israeli mayor of Jerusalem. However, we get immediately to this question of where Israeli authority should go, where the Israelis thought it went. They had annexed all of Jerusalem, including the part they took in '67. Without going through all the details, suffice to say that we never accepted that nor did any government in the world. Certainly, the people who lived in Arab East Jerusalem, never thought of him as their mayor. But Teddy Kolleck tried to present himself as the mayor of all Jerusalem. He was a humane person in terms of not wanting to unnecessarily offend Arabs. His vision was to have Arabs in Jerusalem living happily under a Jewish mayor who would be willing to dialogue with them and attempt to treat them, if not equally, because there has never been an attempt by Israel to treat its Arabs equally, at least as humanely as possible. This was a very difficult and, I would say, impossible job that Teddy may have thought he should try. We had some difficulties with him from time to time. We had two separate receptions on July 4th, one for the east side (the Arab side) and invited only the Arabs, and one on the west side for the Israelis and essentially only invited them. This was a great offense to Teddy, who thought that we were attempting to continue the division of Jerusalem. We said that, in fact, we're just trying to fulfill what our policy is. So, we did not ever, in my time, combine the receptions. But this made him very unhappy. To finish off on Teddy, he would constantly tell the United States Consulate General and the other five or six consulates that existed in Jerusalem with our same non-status (the Brits, French, Italians etc), "You consulate people don't get the picture at all. You are helping contribute to the division of this city into Arab and Jew. What we're trying to do is make us all live together." The implication was that if only we would get on board the program of a single Jewish administration, the Arabs would eventually be happy, would accept it, would be quiet, and that would be the end of it. At the time I was there (I left in 1980), the Arabs had still not risen up in the way that we thought, eventually, they would. But with the Intifada, which started in '87, it was clear to me that Teddy has his answer, that he was the one who was wrong and we were the ones who were right, that there were two cultures in Jerusalem, and that they weren't going to mix unless there was a basis of equality.

Q: What about reporting on the settlements during this time? As we talk today, a settlement is causing civil disturbance and deaths in Jerusalem. The Israelis are putting one up in Arab Jerusalem. It's on the front pages. During this '76 to '80 period, what was going on in the Jewish settlements on the West Bank in Jerusalem?

KRUSE: Well, a lot was going on, but I think the most important thing was going on here in Washington, where we had a President who effectively said that settlements are illegal. It was very clear cut and very simple. They were not obstacles to peace only, but they were absolutely illegal. Now, that did disturb the Israelis. When the new administration came in in '80 under Reagan, they changed that formula to just being obstacles to peace, not illegal. So during my time in Jerusalem we had a lot of backing here in Washington for reporting fully on the settlements. We did that. We interviewed settlers. We talked to those who were organizing the settlements. This was one issue where we actually talked to some Israeli officials--if not talking to them, we were quoting them because the settlement issue was, of course, a West Bank and Gaza issue, but mostly the West Bank and Jerusalem. Washington welcomed this. It was a big effort going on in the intelligence community to keep completely up to date on this. I suspect and hope that it is continuing. It looks like it is because I see maps from time to time that show the growth of these settlements. It goes back to what Hodding Carter said in these days. When we objected to the Israeli settlements, Hodding Carter said, "It's like two men negotiating over a glass of water and one picks it up and starts drinking from it. This is what Israel is doing with its settlements. It's simply trying to prejudge the outcome." That's true to this very day.

Q: Were you getting a fix on who was going into these settlements?

KRUSE: Yes, we would interview settlers. In fact, at one point, one of our officers actually got stopped inside one of the settlements and was challenged as to how he got in. He said, "I just drove in." But he was detained briefly and questioned because he had been asking questions of the people that were there. This was, of course, before the big settlement push in the early 1980s when Shamir simply advertised cheap living on the West Bank. These were mostly zealots, pioneers, putting up settlements, in some cases wildcat settlements with no authorization and defying the Israeli authorities to get them out. On the other hand, there were some completely approved settlements by Israel that were going ahead. They had a master plan. You knew what they were hoping to accomplish--implant as many Israeli settlers as possible. Particularly around Jerusalem, they had pretty well accomplished that. They have encircled Arab East Jerusalem with these high rise settlements, basically suburban high rises, that now have about the same number of Jews living there as Arabs living in the core of East Jerusalem. When I was there, this was just a gleam in their eye. But they've accomplished it.

Q: I would have thought you would have had problems because you're the American consulate general. When you talk about zealots, from what I assume, a disproportionate number of zealots are actually American Jews who come to Israel are reinforcing their faith and, like a convert to Catholicism, are more Catholic than the Pope - that they would come, get involved, and then if things got bad, scream and yell for American help.

KRUSE: You're right. Of course, many of them continue to carry their American passport and therefore had a parachute if they wished to get out. They were usually unhappy with the American consulate and particularly when we expressed our policy. But, in retrospect, they probably thought that it didn't matter what we said or did, they were just going to go ahead and build settlements. Sometimes they did defy their own government.

But eventually, most of those wildcat settlements were authorized. It's called "creating facts on the ground." It's like so many of the Israeli soldiers or settlers who have shot Palestinians. We go through the whole business of the Israelis bringing them to justice and meting out some kind of punishment. Unfortunately, usually, that is followed in a few years by a pardon granted to those offenders by the President of Israel. So, it's very clear that Arabs are treated much differently from the Jewish population. House demolition is standard treatment for a Palestinian charged with a security offense-- no Jewish Israeli has ever had this treatment, not even the assassin of Prime Minister Rabin.

Q: What was the impact of Sadat's visit to Tel Aviv and the Camp David process?

KRUSE: When the Camp David Accords came out with the idea of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza, we finally had a program to present to the Palestinians as something that they should look at and hopefully find it greatly more attractive than their current situation under occupation. We essentially tried to sell it as being the end of Israeli occupation. The question of what it would lead to was open. We never could promise them a state, but we did say that, "You can participate in your own future." So, our sale was, "This is better than you've ever been offered. It's better than you have now. Join in." We had a very active program. Washington expected us to sell this to the mayors of Nablus, Bethlehem and Hebron etc. We tried that. But the essential answer, which, I have to say, is very understandable, was that, "You've come to the wrong party. We are not representing the Palestinian people. The PLO represents that Palestinian people. We are like prisoners in a cage. We can't talk for the rest of the Palestinians and we don't have any strength. So, we choose not to be involved." I think there were some Palestinian leaders who would have joined in if we had made more clearly what the end result would be. They just said, "We're not going to take a leap off into the dark. We don't know where you're going to lead us. The idea of a ticket to the conference table is not enough for us. We want to know what the end is going to be." You see, we were not prepared to tell them what we wanted the end to be. Frankly, to this very day, we're not prepared to tell the Palestinians what we think they should have at the end. This continues to be one of the great failings of our policy.

Q: As you looked at this policy, did you see any solution?

KRUSE: Frankly, I didn't. Back then, I had the fear that the Palestinians would just be ground into the dirt, unless we changed our policy toward dealing with the PLO. So, I'm half way encouraged that it does seem that whatever happens now in the future, the Palestinian cause is not a completely lost cause. There were many who thought that it would become a lost cause. How the Palestinian cause can be fulfilled properly and happily is still not sketched out by our policy. I could say that the outcome is uncertain. When Golda Meir was around, she said, "Who are the Palestinians? Where are they? What are they?" Nobody says that now. The whole world now knows who they are. Whether they're treated justly or not depends largely on Israel and the United States.

Q: You had not grown up in this particular atmosphere. Coming into it, reflections from your memory of how we treated the blacks in the South?

KRUSE: I think there was very much that feeling although I thought more of the South African experience, where there was a very definite racial difference that was policy. In Israel, that's a little more nuanced than outright apartheid. I remember from my time in the South before the civil rights movement got moving that... The thing that strikes you is that a lot of people, even when the blacks were treated so poorly in the South, there were a lot of people who thought this was wrong. It was just a question of how you're going to change (inaudible). In the case of Israel and its treatment of the Arabs, what I can never answer a Palestinian is why we give Israel four or five billion dollars a year. It's one thing to let human rights abuses go and not blow a whistle or stop it somehow, but it's another thing to wound the party who is doing all these unjust things continual unquestioned support no matter what it does.

Q: As a Foreign Service officer, to see the power of domestic politics on something that may not, in your opinion, be in American world interest, not only you, but the young officers, was this something you sort of had to work on to keep people from getting too discouraged and too cynical?

KRUSE: It is a problem. I guess all of the young officers had come to realize that, in many ways, our relationship with Israel is not a foreign policy issue; it's a domestic issue. Certainly, our French and British and other colleagues in Jerusalem would say, "We just can't understand why you do these things. What is the reason for your support of Israel, your vetoing resolutions, etc." Then in the second breath, they'd say, "But then we know about your lobby." It is unique. There is no other country that finds itself so under the control of such a powerful lobby. Recently, there has been reporting about the President's reaction to Netanyahu, which is generally a mild one, even though clearly there is disagreement with him. The newspapers are quoting unnamed administration officials, suggesting that how else is the Democratic party going to pay off its debt? But this whole issue of Jewish and Israeli supporters and their contribution to the campaign seems to stay outside the whole ongoing debate on campaign funding. In my view, Israel's influence on our political process and our foreign policy is the most egregious and dangerous example of the influence of a foreign country on our government.

Q: In 1980, where did you go?

KRUSE: I went to the Sinai Desert for a year. I was the deputy director of the Sinai Field Mission. That was kind of a follow-on to my years in Jerusalem. The Sinai Agreement came and the reason they had this American team out there, the Sinai Field Mission, was because of the peace agreement that Henry Kissinger brokered in '73 and '74 between Egypt and Israel, which called for the U.S. to monitor the forces in the Sinai. So, we were out there monitoring, we with our helicopters and Cheny Blazers out among the Bedouins and the camels. So, we were right in the middle of the Sinai Desert.

Q: What was the status during '80 to '81 during this period you were in the Sinai?

KRUSE: It was half way into the terms of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt;

their peace treaty in '78, which called for a complete withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the Sinai within a certain period of time. The period of time was, I think, eventually to end in '82. So, while I was there, we were still half way there. We still had some Israeli forces in part of the Sinai. It was a confidence-building measure for the Egyptians and the Israelis to have us there, particularly for the Israelis. They insisted on us. They wouldn't take the UN. So, we paid the price to do that. It was a fascinating experience. It was unusual because it was the only time in my career when my family could not be with me. In that sense, I would wake up in the morning and look at myself in the mirror and say, "What in the world are you doing out here?"

Q: Tell about how it progressed while you were there first.

KRUSE: This was the first time I had dealt directly with the Israelis in an official sense, and Egyptians; dealing with each of them. When you would go into Cairo, you'd have an agenda for the meeting. You had a lot of tschai (tea), coffee, soft drinks, lots of jokes, lots of laughs, get through the agenda, come back in a month or two and not a thing had been done. But we had had no arguments. When we would go in with the Israelis, there were a certain amount of refreshments and that type of thing, but every item on the agenda, every jot and tittle, would be argued over. You would set deadlines for this or that. You'd have courses of action for every one of the items. When you came back in a couple of months, it was all done. Everybody had done their work. So, it was a difference between the way the Israelis acted and the way the Arabs, in this case, the Egyptians, acted. The Israelis were such sticklers for every phrase of that agreement they signed with Egypt. That's why I was so appalled when it comes to the agreement that Israel signed with the Palestinians, they don't care at all about keeping any parts of it, no deadlines, no nothing. No apologies. Just forget it. If we had tried that with the Egyptians, we would have been frayed by the Israelis.

Q: You mean the Israelis.

KRUSE: Well, if we had let the Egyptians get away with violations. If the Egyptians hadn't met a deadline, boy, we would have never heard the end of it. So, it all depends on who's is a superior position.

Q: I've talked to some other people who have been involved in this and they say that, as you said, things were a little bit haphazard and sloppy and all. But the Israelis were always testing. They would try to get things they weren't supposed to have--overflights or get arms in or something. It was almost a game of doing this. People I've talked to say it was basic, almost hostility there. Did you feel that or not? Was that unfair?

KRUSE: I think what you've got is this dual strain in the Israeli psyche or makeup. You've got the one that identifies with the Labor party, where indeed, they strive and believe that a Jew can make it in the world on his own, that he doesn't need to worry that everybody is after him. The Likud is the mentality that it doesn't matter what the Jews ever do, they would never accept them as normal people. Therefore, according to Likud, if Israel wants something, it's going to have to fight for it and don't worry if the world

objects. I think that kind of paranoia is, to a certain extent, in every Israeli. Given the history of the Jewish people, it is understandable. Of course, the history of the Middle East has not been one where their arrival and setting up their state has been wildly welcomed. So, I understand that they may not feel that they are completely a normal state in the region. But I think the Labor people felt that normalcy was a possibility. I'm afraid Likud doesn't think it ever is going to be a possibility.

Q: Were there any incidents or any particular problems that you might want to recount?

KRUSE: No, just the fact that we almost had the helicopter crash one time with our director and a whole gaggle of Egyptian officers. I wasn't on it. It had taken off with a full load of fuel. They had forgotten that they were at an altitude of about 4,000 feet. It was somewhere near Mt. Sinai. That makes a little difference in your lift. So, the thing got up and bounced a whole lot, turned over, but did not catch fire. It was a scary thing. If a tragedy had happened, I must say, it would have marked the Sinai Field Mission in people's minds forever.

Q: I thought we might stop at this point. We're in '81 after you left Sinai. Where did you go after that?

KRUSE: I came back to Washington to attend the National War College.

You had asked earlier about the differences between the consulate and the embassy. I think that there were times when the embassy went very much along the lines of protecting Israel, even when it might not really have been in our interest to so protect them. As an example, the formula that we used for settlement activities in the Carter days was that they were illegal. This was something that the Israelis found very difficult to swallow. Complications to peace and all that, that's all right, but illegal? I know that Jeane Kirkpatrick when she came into the Reagan administration very much was of a mind that we had to change this formulation. The President got it in his mind to say that he didn't think they were illegal. I'm not sure that was a very informed opinion, but it was spoken publicly. As soon as it was said, pro-Israeli types among whom I suspect was Ambassador Sam Lewis, picked it up because it certainly made their business in dealings with the Israelis on this issue so much simpler when you don't have to accuse them of illegalities. I think that was unhelpful because I think settlements are totally illegal. Everybody else in the world thinks they're illegal and I think it's wrong for us again to be out of line and protect Israel when it is doing things opposed to international law. So the Embassy in Tel Aviv was delighted with this new formulation while the Consulate was discouraged..

Q: We'll pick it up the next time in 1981 going to the National War College.

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Q: Today is June 13, 1997. You went to the War College. You were there from '81 to '82. Which War College was this?

KRUSE: National War College here in Washington.

Q: What were your experiences there, particularly dealing with the military, having been in the State Department so long? How were you used and what did you get out of this?

KRUSE: A lot of my assignments were political/military, so I had dealt with the military a lot. When this opportunity came, I was rather glad to have a year off. It was a rather pleasant year, coming out of the Sinai. It's a nice change and a nice way to readapt to the Washington culture in a more relaxed manner. I enjoyed being brought up to date on where the military were at the start of the Reagan administration. It was clear that the military felt they were coming back into their own after the Vietnam problems. They were very happy to see the money coming into the budget, which they felt they hadn't been getting. This was a good time for the military, feeling that they were again being appreciated. I think that began to play out in a new sense of the American military's role, even though this was still, of course, the Cold War. You might even say this was the heart of the Cold War still because there was Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan still. In the first Reagan term, he made a point of, in effect, trying to talk the Soviets down in other parts of the world like Angola. There was, I think, a wrong perception that the Soviets were taking advantage in the Middle East militarily. To be honest with you, there were some things going on in the Reagan administration that I did very much disagree with, this whole idea that particularly Secretary Haig in his short tenure as Secretary of State, was pushing the idea of strategic consensus in the Middle East, that you could somehow get the moderate Arabs and Israel to be clearly anti-Soviet, kind of disregarding what is the fundamental problem in the Middle East, which had nothing to do with the Cold War, but had everything to do with the question of Israel and the Palestinians. But, to sum up, I enjoyed my year very much.

Q: Were you there during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon?

KRUSE: Actually, that was just after I had left the War College.

Q: And then you left. What was your impression of the various services? Did you come away with some way you could characterize the Army, the Navy, the Air Force?

KRUSE: In a gross sense, yes. I think the Army has always been more associated with the people on the ground. The Army is a land force. Great numbers of American Army officers had spent time in Germany or Japan in the post-war era actually living in the countries they were assigned. The Army gets closer to the foreign environment. It was different from the Navy, which by and large was always at sea. The Air Force also thought of themselves as not too closely related to the foreign environment. It's not easy to make those distinctions either. The draft was over, so all of them were volunteers at that time. It's very true also that the Navy officers who came to the National War College felt that they hadn't quite gotten the best senior training because this was, after all, not just with the Navy. This was with everybody else. The Navy really did think that Newport, where their war college is, is a lot more career-enhancing than the National

War College. That may be changing as a result of legislation such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Q: How did the State Department people fit in? Were you used as a resource for helping these people on their way up to senior ranks understand about the world?

KRUSE: I think it's true that you're presenting the way the world looks in the eyes of a Frenchman and the way it looks in the eyes of an Israeli or an Arab. Those kind of background skills that we pick up along the way clearly are not as easy for a military officer to ever pick up, even when he or she may be assigned overseas. I think the State Department is well served by sending people over to the War College, not only in terms of what that individual gets himself or herself, but what it presents to the whole War College environment. It's good for us. We need to think about the importance of the military to our overall foreign policy. It's good for them also.

Q: Did you get any feel for how the military looked at the Soviet Union at that particular point?

KRUSE: I did indeed. There is no doubt that the doctrine or the fear of the Soviet military threat was still very high. We saw the Soviets as our equal in intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. These were the most horrific weapons in the history of the human race. We saw the adventuristic nature of their foreign policy in Afghanistan and other places. There was this concern that maybe the Soviets were delaying a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem by encouraging the Arabs to be anti-Israel and to think they had a military option. So, I'm afraid that there was a lot of overestimation of what the Soviet threat really represented. I confess to be guilty somewhat in that regard. I accepted the general evaluation of the Soviet threat. Now, in retrospect, I think we do have to recognize that we overestimated the over-all strength of the Soviet Union.

Q: I think all of us did. Also, it's one of these things that, in a case like this, it's probably a lot better to overestimate than underestimate. You're not going to be caught by surprise.

KRUSE: I'd rather be safe than sorry.

Q: Yes. In '82, where did you go?

KRUSE: I stayed in the States for one two-year assignment and that was in Personnel, which was something completely different for me. I was the chief of the Political Officers Division of Personnel. I had two officers working with me doing all of the political officers at the less than senior level.

Q: You were doing this from '82 until when?

KRUSE: For two years, until '84. This was an interesting time, you might even say, a rather dramatic time, for some of the officers, particularly the political officers at the new

01 level, which was the old 03 level. The new Foreign Service Act had created the Senior Foreign Service, and the 01 was then the top of the non-Senior Foreign Service. There was this new idea of the senior threshold, that you had six years to open your window and get across that threshold from the new 01 level.

Q: This was the Foreign Service Act of '80 and then '81, wasn't it? It took two turns to get it right.

KRUSE: It just turned out that when I got into the job in '82 and then in '83 and '84, these were years when those who had opened their window at the very first crack (that is, to start their competition immediately) were half way through that competition and were beginning to recognize that their chances of getting that promotion into the Senior Service were diminishing every year. The number that were getting promoted was getting less every year. To a certain extent, the Service did not properly prepare a lot of 01s in 1980 whenever the Act came into effect, to recognize that a six year crack might not just be enough, particularly when (and this maybe wasn't even known by the Service at the time) that there were going to be diminishing promotion numbers. We got down to one year where only 15 political officers at the 01 level got promoted into the Senior Foreign Service out of a class of like 400. The effect on morale became very serious because people saw that they would be going off the gang plank in a few more years and thus have a much shorter career than they had thought.

Q: Were you in Personnel looking at what effect this might have not just on the career of an individual, but let's say, Korean-speaking officers or Arabic-speaking? I mean, we have resources within the Department. We promote by the individual, but at the same time, we have to make sure that there are solid career tracks in geographic or functional specialties, consular officers, economic officers, what have you. But particularly in the political field, where you have such a multiplicity of specialties (political/military, geographic, international organizations). Could you talk about that?

KRUSE: Of course, the criteria for promotion into the Senior Foreign Service, as you know, downplayed those great Foreign Service unique skills of language and area capabilities and very much put the emphasis on management skills, on executive capabilities, even on running a budget and a program, all the kind of things that you might get best at a DCM level. What it meant was that everybody was running after a DCM job no matter where it was. They recognized that you could be the chief of the Political Section in Paris and it wouldn't mean as much to you in promotion opportunity as if you were a DCM in N'djamena. So, that skewed people's bidding and it made them feel very insecure because to get a DCM job isn't just a matter of the system assigning you, you've got to get the ambassador's approval. So, this was not an easy time. I have to say, during those years, more and more of the O1 political officers who were coming to me and saying, "I think I'm facing the end of a career and I'm not even 50. What can I do?" The best I could tell them was, "Do your best to get an interfunctional job, a job that shows your executive and managerial talents."

Those that did have these skills and had the opportunity to show them were by and large

able to escape extinction, but there were not that many of them. There just weren't that many jobs that could get you across the threshold. What happened is that in succeeding years, those who came into the 01 level realized that they must think hard about when they started the competition, opened their window for competition. In many cases, they would wait, which again goes against the whole earlier Foreign Service concept that you're going to compete immediately, that you have great confidence in your abilities, and you kind of charge in and, as soon as you are eligible for promotion, you start competing, rather than waiting for several years, in effect, to line up your six year window with your 22 year TIC (time in class) window. It's affected the Service. Frankly, as I talk 15 years later with the officers at the 01 level, there is still some of that residual problem. That is, your geographic and language specialties are still not enough to get you into the Senior Service if you don't show some of these broader abilities.

Q: What about other concerns which have become almost predominant today after the last few years, women moving in the senior ranks, and minorities?

KRUSE: That became and I know it is an issue that is thought by many officers, particularly the traditional male white officer, that he has been disadvantage by these either affirmative action programs or efforts on the part of the women and their class action suit to be placed into these promotable jobs like the DCM jobs. I suppose there are legitimate horror stories of people being adversely affected, but the Service is supposed to reflect what the society wishes, the general desire to provide more opportunities for women and minorities. There is a certain sense of what you could say is making equal some of the earlier injustices. It's a problem that society wrestles with throughout.

Q: Did you have the feeling when you were there that there was pressure on you to try to make sure that women were given a more than equal crack at the jobs that were promotable?

KRUSE: I think it was too early for that. When I took over the job of 01 political officers, which would mean officers in their '40s for the most part, the Service profile for those officers still did not show a high number of women officers. I think I probably had less than 10% women in that class at that time. Of course, that's changed now drastically. It didn't represent a big problem because we didn't have many women at the 01 level to place.

Q: Did you find the system at that time was, if an assignment came along which was less than desirable, people protesting? Was it difficult to fill spots?

KRUSE: Not really. You really can't grieve an assignment. You can grieve a lot of other things.

Q: The term "to grieve" means to make an official grievance complaint which goes before a board and all that.

KRUSE: I suspect that the process is still the same way. It is still a rather civil process.

That is, if you know that someone is simply not going to take an assignment and you can't change that by saying, "Well, it's going to be good for your career" or "You're doing something that the Service will repay you for." I can't think of many forced assignments that we did in those days. I think in the later years, there has been more and more of an effort to assign people into hardship posts, less desirable posts, early in the assignment cycle so that you aren't left at the end with the fair haired types having gotten their assignments and gone and you have left over the less easily assignable people as your only pool to handle these hardship jobs. I'm quite certain that that's the way it now works, that hardship jobs are assigned early in the cycle to prevent this problem of having people continue to avoid hardship. I suppose you think of the hardship jobs... I often thought it was not hard to get an 02 or an 03 officer to bid on a hard to fill 01 job, but the problem was that there were always a lot of 01s sitting around unassigned and the system said, "We have got to get somebody at grade for this job. Go get these people and talk them into it." There were times when simply those 01s would not bite, would not take it. I think that's probably still the case, although maybe more forced assignments are occurring.

Q: Would you give a reader of this in some decades ahead or even more, for a senior officer... We're talking about an 01 in those days was the equivalent to a colonel in the Army. What would be a less desirable job, some of the more difficult jobs you had to fill during this '82 to '84 period?

KRUSE: There were a lot of deputy director jobs in those days, some bureaus had more than others. EUR, for example, took pride in having an office director and deputy, both of which were senior officers. The deputy would often be an OC job. It was hardly ever filled by an OC, but by a stretch assignment for an 01. Those were considered very desirable and, I think, probably were. But a regular desk officer job, even if it were at the 01 level, became hard to get people to take because they thought they were taking less than they should take. There were other overseas jobs. It seems like Lagos political counselor, even if it were an OC job was very hard to fill.

Q: OC being like brigadier general.

KRUSE: The first rank in the Senior Service.

Q: Did you see any geographic bias? Was it harder to fill Africa than Europe? Latin America, ARA, were they people who had always served in ARA? Could you talk about the geographic flow from your perspective?

KRUSE: In the case of NEA, Near East Affairs, and EAP, Asian Affairs, you do have a lot of language officers. In most cases, you're either dealing with Arabic or you're dealing with Chinese and Japanese. There were some complaints. I remember, the Japanese language officers were always complaining that they would fill all of the grunt jobs in the embassy and posts in Japan. That's certainly also true for a Chinese language officer. You can use a Chinese language officer in many other places besides Mainland China. They would complain that they would have to fill those jobs. Then when it came to senior jobs

like a DCM in Tokyo, often times it would go to a generalist who may or may not have had experience in Japan. As far as the attitude toward bureaus in general, I suppose, if I were completely frank, I would say that ARA and AF were considered places that were just less strategically interesting to the United States, even though in the Reagan years, ARA became, in the eyes of the Reagan administration, a battlefield of the Cold War.

Q: Certainly, particularly Nicaragua and El Salvador.

KRUSE: Right. So, there were officers whose career was enhanced because they got visibility as a result of the White House interest in Central America. EUR was popular because it had still the most number of posts and European living was considered by most people pleasant. The one kind of down the road disadvantage to EUR is that it's not that often that EUR officers get embassies in EUR. The political appointees like to take them. Everybody thought of AF as the chance where maybe they could get an embassy, even if they hadn't served much in AF. Those kind of caricatures, I suppose, exist even still today.

Q: How did you feel about the Director General and up the line in this early Reagan administration were looking at the personnel system?

KRUSE: I guess the most egregious thing was the fact that every bureau had to take a political appointee Deputy Assistant Secretary. It may not have been written anywhere, but we all knew it. That person, even if he or she might turn out to be fairly competent was considered the White House spy. So, you always thought a little bit about what you said around that person, particularly if it came to domestic politics. I think the Reagan people came into town thinking that most of the establishment in Washington were traditionally Democratic or at least sympathetic to continuing things as they were. Many of these Reaganites had come in with the idea that they were going to really capture the town and turn the bureaucracy around, if not reduce it greatly. There is no doubt that there was a feeling that the White House people didn't like much the Foreign Service. I think that was reflected also in the kinds of people who got assigned to NSC jobs. We didn't get the same number of jobs in the NSC staff that we had under previous administrations. They were looking more at CIA types and military types. Of course, I think the NSC suffered greatly for it. You had some very strange selections for the NSC, including people like Poindexter and the ex-Marine, Bud McFarlane. These were people that should not have been named.

Q: Yes. Then down below, you had Oliver North. It practically collapsed the Reagan administration.

KRUSE: I think it's a mistake to have an active duty uniformed military officer running the NSC because it skews judgements and it puts pressure on the individual to still be an active duty military and yet, presumably, acting in the whole national interest. Zealots like Colonel North never have a place in policy-making jobs

Q: Also, they're trained to be short-term result oriented. It's just a matter of...

KRUSE: Unfortunately, that's a White House syndrome in any case.

Q: I know, but it just plays to it. You left Personnel in '84. Whither?

KRUSE: Off to Naples to be the political advisor to the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces South.

Q: You were in Naples from '84 to '88. I left Naples in '81 as consulate general there, so I'm familiar with some of the things. Could you talk about, first, the job? Then we'll get into some of the details.

KRUSE: As you may recall, I had had a lot of NATO experience in my earlier career in Brussels, as well as many of the other Pol/Mil jobs I had. So, I felt very comfortable seeking a NATO assignment. I knew about this southern region command because I had worked in the NATO structure both military and political. There was no doubt that things were heating up in the Mediterranean even though they were not specifically the concern of NATO. As you know, NATO and its members tended to want to stay out of what was termed "out of area" issues. That is, geographic areas that were not in Continental Europe--what was considered the original NATO area. What we had in Naples was a four star American admiral running NATO's southern region for NATO. But in his other hat, he was running all U.S. naval forces in and around Europe, including the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. So, you had day to day operational responsibilities on the U.S.-only side and the NATO planning functions. By and large, all that NATO forces in the south were doing was planning and exercising. Until much later when they got into Bosnia issues, NATO never fired a shot in anger in all the years of the Cold War. This four-star admiral actually had two POLADs, one of whom resided in Naples at his NATO headquarters, where he also lived, and one was up in London, where his headquarters for the U.S.-only side, U.S. Navy Forces Europe. So, I really was not officially an advisor to the admiral on U.S.-only things--i.e., when we decided to launch an attack on Libya, that was done by Sixth Fleet forces solely as an American operation. That was not my business to be involved in, although proximity to the boss always gives you an opportunity to put in your comments.

Q: I was going to say, after all, somebody up in London talking about what to do about Libya when you're sitting down in Naples. This seems to be one of the problems of the chain of command anyway. The military is continually faulted for this.

KRUSE: In actual practice it wasn't all that often that the Sixth Fleet or U.S. forces were conducting operations in anger. Whenever that happened, the admiral would simply go up to London and be at the headquarters to be seen and to be directing things in person. I suppose electronically, he could have done all this from Naples. He didn't really need to be on the spot. But the kind of communications equipment that was modern and state of the art was not in Naples, it was in London. That's where the U.S. had put it. Just optically, I think, Washington wanted the CINC up at his U.S. headquarters when American forces were involved in action.

Q: I'd like to do sort of a geographic tour before we get to events. Let's stop and talk about Spain and Portugal first. During this '84 to '88 period, what were the prime concerns and developments from your perspective? In the first place, who was your admiral or admirals?

KRUSE: I had quite a number in those four years because we started with Admiral Bill Small. He left within a year and he was replaced by Admiral Lee Boggett. Admiral Moreau replaced Boggett who went on to become SACLANT. The illness and death of Moreau changed everything. It's kind of a sick joke, but the Navy doesn't plan for one of its four stars to die. They don't have contingency plans for replacements. It had to kind of yank people out of their career path. We then had Admiral Busey. Then, finally, Admiral Howe replaced him after a couple of years. So, I had four admirals in the course of... What you had in Naples, and it is worthwhile to emphasize the NATO side because that really was my job (It was not the American side.), we had a command structure in Naples that had other nationality officers. The chief of staff at the command was an American Army three star, but his deputy was an Italian two star. We had, throughout the staff of that headquarters, officers from Greece, Turkey and Italy as well as U.S. and UK officers. France was still not a part of the integrated structure. It had a liaison mission which was very active and very helpful to us. One of the little secrets of the southern region of NATO is that France was the second largest contributor of naval forces to all of our exercises, all without making any great public show of this. So, you had a very integrated and international command. The problem was that the Greeks and Turks barely spoke to each other because of their national concerns about territory and borders and areas of operation.

You've asked me about Spain and Portugal. They are considered part of the southern region. Spain was just getting into the military side of NATO at that point. It had joined the Alliance politically as the last and 16th member after we had only 15 members for all those earlier years. Spain has come along with an interest in participating militarily, but I think the interest is described less in a Cold War sense, even now that it's over and there isn't any Cold War. In those days, the Spanish saw it as needing to keep an eye on what is going on in the Mediterranean. They felt that the North African situation was very volatile, could turn out bad for them, particularly if something went wrong in Morocco. They were more concerned with the Western Mediterranean than anything out toward the east in the region of Greece and Turkey. Portugal, although part of the Southern Region, is so Atlantic that its participation in alliance military stuff was really more with SACLANT than Atlantic. So, we didn't really have a whole lot to do with both of those countries. Portugal did have a liaison office at our headquarters. Spain was just developing one when I left. I think we come to France.

Q: Yes, let's talk about France.

KRUSE: France was key because the French are a Mediterranean power as well as an Atlantic power and a world power. I love the French and I even love their "orgeil" because from the French you get a genuine "what you see is what you get." They'll give

you an answer. If they have reasons they don't want to do it, you may not understand them, but you know they're going to hold on. Their interest in this command has been reflected these recent events in the last couple of years where they have wanted to have the four star admiral in Naples to be a French admiral. Of course, we're saying, "Over our dead bodies. We don't do that." Eventually, Chirac has kind of dropped off that demand. But it does demonstrate the feeling that the French see the Mediterranean as vital to their interests. This is not only because of oil, but because of Algeria and because of the Maghreb countries and the concerns for immigration, concerns for upheaval in their own country, and just generally, concerns for trying to get some kind of peaceful resolution of problems in the Arab world and the Muslim world. France feels that it has a role from its long history of dealing with North Africa and Lebanon and it should be recognized. So, politically, they're interested. Militarily, they have been very cooperative.

Q: Could you talk about this cooperation? What does this mean? We're talking about the time you were here.

KRUSE: We would have an annual schedule of NATO exercises involving naval forces. For example, there would always be an amphibious landing somewhere in Sicily or in Southern Italy, where we would practice what we might have to do in Turkey or Greece if there had been a Russian or Soviet attack. For those exercises, we got a lot of activity from American naval forces and Italian forces. The Brits would play sometimes, although less and less. They had few ships available. The Germans were beginning to send forces down to participate for military training purposes. The Greeks and the Turks would send over some forces. But more and more, and as I said earlier, it came during my time, the French participated even with an aircraft carrier and were second only to the U.S. It made them completely familiar with the way NATO does things so that, if we ever did have a real life situation that France would agree to participate in, they would know how to do it.

Q: What about communications and all this? For the military, communications are key. If you have somebody who is out of NATO, how did that work?

KRUSE: They completely accepted our way of doing things. They learned NATO communications. There was no hangup for them to do things NATO's way, although I'm sure Paris and the political side of France would not advertise this. But they were complete team players.

Q: Was Mitterrand still the President?

KRUSE: This was Mitterrand.

Q: Which was a socialist regime which had for years sort of bad mouthed NATO and all that.

KRUSE: Possibly, although they always accepted NATO and its political configuration to an extent. What they objected to was any automatic French military response--they didn't want any American general or the NATO Council to tell them when they were

going to go to war. That was a Gaullist principle which all succeeding French leaders have accepted, that France will decide when it goes to war.

Q: What was your impression of the Italian role in NATO?

KRUSE: The Italians were the ones that wanted to have peace. They hated to see the Greeks and the Turks squabbling. They were always ready to be mediators. They were providing more and more military forces. They were modernizing their navy and their air force and their army. They were good team players because they wanted to be a good, strong, solid member of NATO, even if sometimes the appearance went beyond the actual capabilities. This is not to downplay their good military capabilities. These have been superlative in recent peace-keeping operations. Italians were excellent hosts to our NATO headquarters. Naples was a beautiful location for NATO to have this headquarters, even though Naples was chaotic.

Q: Looking at Greece and Turkey, I remember, when I was in Naples, asking Admiral Crowe, who was at that point the NATO commander there, about the role of the Greeks and the Turks. I had served for four years in Athens at one point. He just sort of shrugged his shoulders and said, "They're always at each other." What was the feeling there?

KRUSE: There was great annoyance and sometimes great anger at the way particularly the Greeks would try to use NATO to advance their position vis-a-vis Turkey. They were very sensitive to any possible perceived slight. If the Turks overflew a Greek island that happened to be three miles off the Turkish mainland, this would be a virtual causi belli. They simply didn't let anything go that appeared to give Turkey some advantage. It's a rather vulnerable position that the Greeks had because here were these Greek islands that were far closer to Turkey, sometimes within eyesight. I remember, when I visited Ephesus that I could look across the harbor and see a Greek island. Of course, Cyprus had been a live example of what the Greeks considered an invasion by Turkish forces. That was way back in '74.

Q: July '74. I know it well.

KRUSE: You were in Athens?

Q: I had just left Athens. I think it was the fourteenth of July. What was your impression of the caliber of the Greek officer assigned to NATO that you observed and the Turkish officer?

KRUSE: I think we have to go back just a little bit to talk about the political situation. We had Papandreou. Throughout the whole time I was there, he was the Prime Minister.

Q: This was Andreas Papandreou.
KRUSE: Andreas Papandreou. He and his Pasok Party, the socialist party in Greece, was having great fun with the U.S. I say "fun" because, to a certain extent, I really thought the Greek position was rhetorical in trying to pretend that the Cold War was a thing of the

past and that we should learn to deal with the Soviets in a more natural manner. He would make overtures toward the Soviets and also toward the Bulgarians and other Balkan countries, in effect, pretending, as I say, that the Cold War was over and we were now back to a situation which we kind of have now in 1997. But we didn't have it back in 1984. He insisted on Greek terms for everything, Greek terms for the Common Market, Greek terms for its participation in NATO. I'm not going to get into details of the essential squabble with NATO, except to say it was a question of the areas that would be under the control of the NATO officer involved in the defense of Greece. The Greeks because they were unhappy with the NATO proposed solutions to these problems basically stayed out of NATO exercises. It made it very difficult for my admiral to go over and have a decent, normal conversation with Greeks. There were some things you could talk about, but the question of reestablishing a NATO command, a subordinate command in Greece and in the Aegean, was not solvable in our time.

Q: Were you, in effect, during this '84 to '88 period, almost writing Greece off?

KRUSE: We didn't want to write them off. We didn't have them with us to participate in the exercises. We did our best to convince them that they should. To some extent, we could get them to do some things. They were very hospitable when the admiral came. He would be taken and shown Greek military potential. He would go up to the north in the Macedonia area of Greece and see how the forces were set up to counter any possible attacks. They tried to be pro-forma cooperative and hospitable. But there were these underlying issues, all of which stemmed from their concern that Turkey was going to get some advantage over them. That issue was clearly more important to them than cooperation with NATO.

Q: But I would have thought that in this thing, in a way, we could play the Turkish card in NATO, say, "All right, fine. If you don't want to join our exercises, that's your prerogative. Of course, we'll just have to pay a little more attention to Turkey."

KRUSE: We didn't want to do that. That's not the NATO way. It doesn't like to play one ally off against the other. We all hoped for the better day. The situation that holds today, I would presume, is somewhat different because of the end of the Cold War.

Q: Let's talk about the perceived Soviet threat to this southern flank at this '84 to '88 period.

KRUSE: That's a good question. It was, I think, a misconception. Often, I would talk to the admiral about it. Washington would continue to talk about the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. The issues involving the Soviet presence were how many ships were there, and the U.S. Navy, as you know probably, spent inordinate sums of money to track every Soviet ship everywhere in the world. I have no idea of the cost of that operation, but I know that every four star officer in the U.S., every day, is capable of learning where every Soviet ship was--its long range ballistic missile submarines, and every other kind of warship. We worried about the facilities that the Soviets were able to use, such as from time to time, they would go into Libya. There was a "Soviet base area"

in Syria. To my mind, the Soviet naval presence in the Med was almost inconsequential in terms of a military threat. I think any honest U.S. naval officer would have to admit that if hostilities had started, before the end of the day, every Soviet ship in the Mediterranean would have been wiped out. Of course, the Syrians wanted to play up their close relationship with the Soviets so that this would make Israel think twice before it tried to do anything. You asked me about the Soviet threat. I never took the peacetime Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean as a great threat. The long-range ballistic missile submarines, presumably were as capable as ours, and could have threatened us. The whole idea of the Russians trying for the first time to develop a worldwide fleet the same way we did worried us a lot. But when you look back, you wonder how they even developed what they did, given the economic condition of the Soviet Union.

Q: Also, I would have assumed that, when you're talking about the Mediterranean, I think you're talking about the Straits of Gibralter and the Bosporus. I can't think of two more horrendous problems for a Soviet naval threat to the Mediterranean. They have to practically pay a toll to go through, in order to fight their war. They're both controlled by our NATO countries.

KRUSE: Particularly the Bosporus, where the Soviets, to get any ship through, had to get Turkish permission because of the Montreaux Convention. That was another issue as to how the Soviets appeared often to be putting pressure on the Turks. When the Soviets finished the aircraft carrier that they were building, there was a question of whether the Montreaux Convention would allow them to take this ship through because of its size. We were always checking with the Turks to say, "What do you think you're going to do?" Fortunately, the Cold War ended before the ship was finished.

Q: I think they finally went through, but more or less to be junked up in Murmansk or something like that to kill off in Kiev.

KRUSE: Well, there was a Kiev class and then they named one after Brezhnev. I wonder where it is today?

Q: What about, as you were sitting in NATO headquarters, the land threat into the southern flank?

KRUSE: There was always the concern about Yugoslavia, whether, in fact, the Soviets would get upset enough with Yugoslavia that it might do something, or use Yugoslavia as a pathway to get into northern Italy. So, the Italians were always keeping a close eye on what was happening in Yugoslavia. The land threat was really not considered great. The Turks, of course, were concerned about their situation. They from time to time would call attention to the threat they thought they had from Syria, although, I think, most of it related to the Kurds. At this time, the Turks were not even admitting that they had a Kurdish problem.

Q: "Mountain Turks," I think they were called.

KRUSE: That's right. The land threat was not considered great. We did not expect that the Soviets would be coming. It was a Central Europe scenario that NATO was most concerned about.

Q: You mentioned Israel several times. Although this would not be under the NATO hat, Israel had been touted and continues to be touted in the United States as being our firm ally in the Middle East. From the vantage point of NATO South, how did you look upon this?

KRUSE: I think the one issue that came up regularly, in the NATO context, was whether we could have some of our ships visit Israel when they were under NATO command. We had an on-call force in the Mediterranean, which would bring together allied ships just for a period of time every year as an exercise. Whether they could call at one of the littoral ports in the southern Mediterranean... No one in NATO suggested Israel as a place for such a call, but we were thinking about going to Alexandria or to Tunis. So, to that extent, there was a recognition that it would be good to be familiarized with the southern Mediterranean and the eastern Mediterranean. Because NATO itself in Brussels, at headquarters, had no dealings directly with Israel, the only thing that I did get involved in, even if it wasn't really my duties, was the U.S.-Israeli cooperation that the admiral was engaged in under his U.S. hat. He went to Israel one time for a visit. This was a time when we were trying to find ways that our forces could do more collaboration with Israel militarily. It was during this period of the Reagan years when they signed the Memorandum of Understanding with Israel about military cooperation. Also a standing body on the political side which P/M (Bureau of Political/Military Affairs) staffs met regularly with the Israelis. I'll toss in my reaction. Israel was the most powerful, even though it's a small country, military force in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. From a U.S.-only standpoint, because of our political concerns about Israel, we were seeking ways to collaborate, cooperate with them more militarily. I think, depending on who was in charge at the time and depending on how much pressure came from the White House, you'd find different admirals giving you different answers as to whether Israel was a strategic asset, or whether it was basically something that would give us problems down the road. My own view is that unless and until, Israel comes to terms with the Palestinians and Syrians we should be very cautious in our military cooperation with Israel.

Q: In your dealings with this command, obviously, there was always the Soviet threat, but no matter how you sliced it, you were sitting in the Mediterranean. Essentially, I look at Algeria, I don't know what the situation was there, but then you move to Libya. Then you have Syria, Israel, and Egypt, who are sort of joined at the hip and don't like each other.

KRUSE: It really goes back to what does NATO think its role is in those out of area situations. There is nothing in NATO's history or the wording of the treaty that implies we should have anything to do with these areas outside the basic Cold War area. To be honest with you, I don't know what in the post Cold War era, in which we now find ourselves, what NATO has done in terms of its doctrine regarding "out-of-area" issues. Generally, our European partners recognize that instability down there in North Africa or

in the Middle East is going to have an impact on not only their oil, but on their citizens who happen to be in those countries and just generally for regional stability. The individual members of NATO are concerned, but I still think NATO is only very reluctantly going to take on any duties in defending countries in the south of Europe against attacks that come from outside the area. The Bosnia example, which has shown NATO to be involved now, indicates that there is change. Back in my day, if there had been unrest in Yugoslavia, NATO would have been very slow, if at all, to do anything about it. But now, NATO, because there really isn't any Soviet bar to what we are doing, has been invited to become involved in Bosnia. So, I think this is all going to be new history to be written.

Q: There were several events. There was an attack on Libya. Did that happen during your tour?

KRUSE: Yes indeed, 1986.

Q: Could you talk a bit about the background of this and your perspective on that?

KRUSE: I may be wrong on what incident set it off, but think it was the bombing of the disco in Berlin.

Q: Where some American troops were killed.

KRUSE: Right, there were Americans killed. There was evidence that perhaps Libyans were behind that. I confess that I wouldn't swear to that being what raised our level of anger against Libya. They also kept threatening to extend their "zone of death," as they called it, into the Mediterranean.

Q: The Gulf of Sudra and all that.

KRUSE: Right. So, we had some aerial conflict where their planes had come out and challenged ours in an area that we considered to be international waters. We shot a couple down. I remember, that happened while I was in the War College. So, that happened earlier in the '80s. I think it was the disco thing that led us to decide to attack Libya. Frankly, I was not privy to the kind of attack planning, that was done in Washington and at U.S. Navy Headquarters in London. You remember, they brought the Air Force into this as well.

Q: From the United Kingdom.

KRUSE: Right. But most of the attack was carried by carrier planes from U.S. Sixth Fleet aircraft operating in the Mediterranean. From the military standpoint, we lost a U.S. Air Force plane. I forget the circumstances. But the Navy attack went off with no casualties.

Q: I think one American was killed and one captured or something like that. I may be wrong.

KRUSE: I think that was Lebanon. I don't think the Libyans ever got one of our people. But the attack then took place. I guess it really was after Qadhafi himself. From what I read in the papers, they attacked where he often spends time. Personally, if I had been asked about that, I would certainly have thought that would not be a wise thing to do. You'd make a martyr out of him. You'd inflame people who otherwise didn't like him. I'm sure the Egyptians would have had to be unhappy. You have to be careful when you're throwing bombs around at people. I suppose you could say, "So, what's the harm? The Libyans aren't going to hurt us. They're not going to shoot our planes down. The Arabs are not going to turn against us on behalf of Qadhafi, whom they consider to be crazy." So, he was a fairly easy target. One could argue that the attack has deterred the Libyans from doing it again. I hope maybe it did, but I still question the wisdom of going after another country's leader.

Q: Was your headquarters involved in this?

KRUSE: No, Naples headquarters was not involved at all. It was all out of London. The CINC went back to London to be there during the attack.

Q: The timing I'm not sure about, but was the Achillea Lauro hijacking during your time there, or was that later?

KRUSE: Yes, it was during my time.

Q: That at least impinged on Sicily and Sigonella and all that.

KRUSE: Very much so.

Q: I was wondering if you were involved on that.

KRUSE: Again, because it wasn't a NATO operation, I was not directly a participant in anything there. That was a tough issue because it was an outrageous hijacking of a ship and then the killing of the American, Klinghoffer. There was no doubt who did it. They were seen and heard. The Egyptians attempted to end the affair. You might remember that the ship came into Egyptian waters, I think, in Alexandria, and was still under the control of the hijackers at that time. The Egyptians felt that what you should do at this point was get the hijackers off the ship so there would be no more blood and then deal with them later on. We took a harder line. We wanted those hijackers so that when the Egyptians got the hijackers off the ship, ended the hijacking event, then they were going to attempt to fly the hijackers out of Egypt. I forget where they wanted to actually take them, but in effect, get them out of the area. We forced the plane down that was carrying the hijackers, forced it to land in Sicily. We had this very unhappy thing where the Italian air controllers at that airport in Sicily were refusing to allow our forces to go into the plane and get the hijackers. Eventually, it led to the hijackers being taken by Italians to Rome and, soon thereafter, being allowed to go. We were very unhappy with the Italian response on this. We wanted these hijackers.

Q: What did that do in your perspective in NATO headquarters during this period?

KRUSE: People have personal opinions. I would say that there were some military who said, "These guys are bastards and so anything bad that happens to them is good." There were others who maybe were a little more sympathetic and would say, "Let's just end the thing as soon as we can. These are Palestinian terrorists. They have their reasons for conducting terrorist activities. Just end it." The more interesting place would have been up in Brussels out in the NATO Council. Frankly, I never heard that the issue was raised by anyone in the Alliance. We would probably have said, "This has nothing to do with NATO. This is a U.S. action." We had other things. There were some terrorists off Lebanon who somehow were taken out on a boat and wound up, all of a sudden, with the U.S. capturing them and actually flying them all the way back to the United States and the terrorist actually being tried here. So, that was all Sixth Fleet activity.

Q: So, the line between the Sixth Fleet and NATO was fairly firm.

KRUSE: That's right.

Q: And necessarily so. In a way, we had the NATO side, but then we had our own independent arm, which could get pretty nasty to people at times.

KRUSE: You have to understand that in NATO terms, U.S. forces anywhere, be they in Germany or the Sixth Fleet, are under U.S. command always until they are, as the military would say, chopped to NATO for either exercise purposes or for real time purposes. So, most of the time, the Sixth Fleet lived out there in a U.S.-only posture.
Q: Were we going through the insertion of Pershing and cruise missiles into Italy during the time you were there? This would have been NATO.

KRUSE: That indeed was, yes.

Q: I wonder if you could talk a bit about the background, why we were doing that and some of the politics about this and NATO and what you saw at the time.

KRUSE: The whole thing came about because of the Soviets in the late '70s-early '80s, developed and deployed intermediate range ballistic missiles whose range would cover all of Western Europe.

Q: I think these were the SS20s.

KRUSE: Right. As a result, in the United States, I think it really became a very hot issue with the Reagan administration. I remember talking to EUR people in those early 1980s, which essentially said, "Look, this is what we're all doing. What we're trying to do is get the Alliance and its member countries in Europe exercised about this threat and counter it by means of the emplacement of equivalent missiles from our side on their territory." So, it became an issue from the top down. From the President on down, this was the EUR

issue for that period. It was to get agreement for INF deployment of American missiles to be accepted by European allies. We got the Germans in early on. We got the Belgians to accept aircraft. I don't think that they accepted any of the actual ground missiles. We really put a lot of pressure on the Italians. It wasn't easy. The Italians have a neuralgia about nuclear weapons, but eventually, the Italians agreed to it. The base at Comiso in Sicily became one of Italy's great marks of fidelity to NATO and being a good ally of the United States. I went down and visited it once with the admiral before the missiles actually arrived. They put the whole structure of the base in there. It was like an American town. The Air Force had built everything. I don't think I saw the golf course, but I was told that would be coming. We had the community center, the chapel, the housing. Here it was out in the middle of nowhere in eastern Sicily, Comiso. Where did we in the Southern Command fit into it? Not very much. Control of all of these missiles and aircraft was out of SACEUR, the senior NATO military man back in Belgium.

Q: I assume the politics were carried on by the ambassador.

KRUSE: Absolutely.

Q: I mean, this was a political thing.

KRUSE: Completely. It turned out because, by the time we got them in, we were in the process then of negotiating an end to INF missiles. In effect, we did away with this whole class of missiles. So, eventually, we never kept the base. It would be interesting for you and I to go to Comiso and see what's there.

Q: I'd love to! Can you talk a bit about relations where you were in Naples, living, problems as you saw them?

KRUSE: Living in Naples is an adventure--"inconvenience rightly considered." Lovely physical location. We had a very charming villa that was up on the Posillipo, which looked out of our window directly at the rising sun every morning over Vesuvius. So, it couldn't have been more Lord Byronesque. But living in Naples had its problems. The corruption and crime and mob and traffic and lack of municipal services were all pretty evident. They tell the joke about two German officers, who had never been to Naples, coming down to visit our command for some reason and sitting at a seafront restaurant having their dinner. They were overheard to be commenting on the chaos. They were saying, "How could you possibly live in a place like this?" The other one said, "But what's even worse, they're so happy!" It was the favorite assignment of my wife partly because the kids were grown up and gone so she could have fun. My wife, it's her favorite assignment, partly because the kids were grown up and gone so she could have fun. But she did a lot of things with the allied officers' wives. For example, they were giving assistance to Mother Theresa's people. Because she learned her Italian pretty well, she had a ball. She'd go back to Naples in a flash. We made a lot of Neapolitan friends. But I have to tell you that, if I were in the government in Rome and responsible for economic and other activities in Naples, I'd tear my hair out. When you go south of Rome, the northerners of Italy are exactly right saying, "You're entering the Middle East.

It's a different world."

Q: I was told when I was in Naples (This was '79 to '81-ish.) that there is not a single registered glove factory in the Neopolitan area and Naples is the prime producer of gloves in the world.

KRUSE: That's right.

Q: Italian politics and the continual obsession of our embassy and all with the infinitesimal number of gains or losses of the Communist Party, which runs around 30% and goes up or down maybe one or two points and has been doing this since 1948, was this going to lead to disaster or not, did that impinge on you at all?

KRUSE: Fortunately not. The great game of Italy, no, it did not. I should mention though that you might have noticed a change in the job or at least the amount of time that your successors have to spend involved in U.S. military interests. One reason is that the U.S. Navy decided to change the whole configuration of its presence in Naples. In addition to the NATO headquarters, we had all these Americans assigned to the NATO staff, as well as U.S.-only staff because the Sixth Fleet was up in Gaeta. The U.S. Navy has modernized a great deal of its infrastructure in and around Naples--this has required careful dealings with local Italian authorities.
Q: They were also a very large Sixth Fleet responsible area just outside of (Inaudible).

KRUSE: These were all U.S.-only. The American Navy community in Naples that was devoted to U.S.-only activities was in the thousands. So, they were beginning to try to rationalize this because of all the crime and the problems that people were having. They first put people out in a place called Pintatamare, where a lot of them were living. But the real dream, which I understand is now being fulfilled, is to have a U.S. housing area sufficiently out of town that, when you go home, you're not going to be bothered by the problems of Naples. They changed a lot of the hospital and school, even the PX facilities, which, as you know, were somehow located either within a volcanic crater or on the rim.

Q: It's all in a crater, yes.

KRUSE: It was going to be moved out to the airport area and they were going to enlarge it. That involved a lot of dealings with Italians. Of course, the Consulate General was deputized by the embassy to follow that issue. Then the big thing was this space down in the south that NATO was going to put in when we had to move our aircraft out of Spain, a place called Crotone, which involved lots of dealings with Italians and local authorities. It really came into full fruition in Erickson's time after Lou Galtz. He was spending an awful lot of time on political/military issues. Those are chapters that, I think, are closing, except for the Naples presence.

Q: In '88, whither?

KRUSE: I told the admiral that I would have to leave Naples after my four years came

up. My counterpart up in London, Art Woodruff, was leaving the job there as the political advisor to my same admiral. Frankly, that looked to be the best and most attainable assignment for me. I was working with Personnel trying to get something better, but nothing was working out. So, I told the admiral, if he wanted me in London he would have to ask State. It was certainly not against my interests to go and spend a year in London. So, with his request in the Department, they agreed to have me move over to this U.S.-only job and go to London in the fall of 1988.

Q: You were there from '88 to '89?

KRUSE: Right. It was at the end of that year that I retired.

Q: What were you doing there?

KRUSE: I became the political advisor to the admiral, in his hat as USCINCUSNAVEUR and to the U.S.-only staff in London on U.S.-only stuff, which essentially would be what the Sixth Fleet was up to on any given day.

Q: Did you find that it was handy coming from where you were because you had been looking at the Mediterranean to get up into the London atmosphere, where I'm sure that there was a difference in attitude. They were looking at the Fulda Gap and everything else like that.

KRUSE: That's right, although it's true that U.S. NAVEUR, the headquarters in London, recognized that Washington was most concerned about what the Sixth Fleet was doing in the Mediterranean. During that year, we had more problems in Lebanon. The hostage taking was in full bloom. So, we had naval forces around and about. We're talking about '89 at this point. It was still hostage time, so we had forces poised to support any kind of a rescue operation if we were to do it. As it turned out, we didn't do that. But the focus was clearly... The Sixth Fleet was concerned primarily about safety and protection of Americans in the region and also any security threats that might come from either the Arab world or any other part.

Q: At this point, was the Iraq-Iran War still being waged?

KRUSE: It had ended, as I remember, in about '88. We then had about a year before Saddam took his interest in Kuwait. But it was soon after the end of the Iran-Iraq War that we got into this other problem of preparing for our Gulf War. That really didn't begin to heat up until after I left in '89. As a chronological point of reference, the Intifada had just begun in '87.

Q: This was the Palestinian uprising in the occupied part of the East Bank.

KRUSE: Which led to many changes. It led the King of Jordan to cease to claim his rights in the West Bank. It led to, I think, a whole relooking at the question of Palestinian nationalism and what was going to be the final outcome of this struggle between Palestinians and Israelis when you had such a clear spontaneous rebellion against the

occupiers.

Q: Wearing the Sixth Fleet hat up in London, was this your concentration basically?

KRUSE: I think every paper I wrote was about this concern, how the Eastern Mediterranean was going to be affected by the Arab-Israeli struggle.

Q: Were you able to tap into American Middle Eastern experts when you were doing this or were you sort of drawing on the cables and all?

KRUSE: Whatever came along. I did not attempt to bring people over to the headquarters who were experts. It was mostly just conversations with the Admiral. This was mostly Admiral Busey, although Admiral Howe came later. Admiral Howe came from the NSC, so he was totally wired into what the U.S. was really going to do whether it made sense or not. He was going to do it because he had to. There were slow changes in our policies. We did recognize the PLO very briefly, finally, in 1988. It was the last year of George Shultz's tenure. So, that gave me an entree to begin to speak about dealing more naturally and normally with Palestinians rather than, "We can't even talk about it because we can't deal with the PLO." But when the CINC in London running the Sixth Fleet gets the order for the use of military force from Washington, he isn't going to say, "Now, wait a minute. I really think long term this is going to give us trouble." That's not what a four star is going to say at that time. He's going to figure out how he can do what he's ordered to do.

Q: Right. Going up to London in this '88 to '89 period feel within the headquarters up there, although you were Sixth Fleet looking at the Middle East, which was hot and got hotter, did you feel a feeling of sort of almost a let down or a relaxation or something about what was going on? We had Gorbachev and Reagan and then Bush were practically in bed with each other during that year or so. The Soviet threat was obviously dwindling away.

KRUSE: I remember writing a paper a year after Gorbachev came in in which I said, "Let us really look at what he is doing." He was still being dismissed in some quarters as "the drugstore cowboy." You remember that famous comment of Marlin Fitzwater, Bush's press secretary. I wrote something like, "If this continues, if the Perestroika and other policies continue (We already were beginning to see the start of the pullout from Afghanistan.), this could be a fundamental change in the Soviet Union." What did we feel up in London? There is just no doubt that operational interests were all in the Eastern Mediterranean. But there was also the recognition that, if indeed our Cold War opponent was going to disappear or change, then this is going to change everything down the road.

I might just say (I haven't mentioned this.) that there has been a big question over the years as to why U.S. Naval Forces Europe is still headquartered in London when, in fact, all of its forces by and large are in the Mediterranean. When the Commander in Chief NATO Forces South, became also double-hatted to be Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, something which occurred just before I arrived in 1989, then people began to say, "Look, why do we have two separate headquarters? Why are we still

up in London when that's far away from where we're going to go? Maybe we should bring those guys from London down?" I'm told this was John Lehman's idea when he was Secretary of the Navy, to actually bring the headquarters out of London. That sent waves of fear into the heart of most naval officers--that they would have to leave London. So, it didn't happen, although a lot of people would say that there is really no great overriding reason that it continues to be in London in terms of what the U.S. Navy is doing with the British anymore. But I wouldn't bet on that headquarters ever leaving London.

Q: Then you retired in '89.

KRUSE: I retired in '89.

Q: Just briefly, then what did you do?

KRUSE: I came back to the U.S. and settled in Washington. My wife accuses me of being addicted to Washington. I guess, at the moment, I don't see any other place. I have been working a day or two a week as a WAE (When Actually Employed). Most of my time in that capacity has been spent in the review of classified documents. In my personal time, which I like to think is over half of my time, I very much continue to be interested in the Middle East and, in particularly, American attitudes toward the Israel-Palestinian problem and American attitudes toward the Arab world in general and the Moslem world also. This is something I do more in private efforts having to do with church activities. But I think it's vital for our national interests, let alone for the cause of justice and peace, that Americans do a better job of getting informed of what our policy, as well as just the facts of the Middle East. I think our press and media do a horrible job of attempting to inform Americans of what the real facts are. I don't know how we can change that. No other Western country sees the Middle East the way we do. I have been leading pilgrimage groups to Jerusalem each year, in which I try to have American church people recognize a more factual understanding of what is happening, particularly in and around Jerusalem. I believe I owe that to my faith and my conscience on behalf of justice. In our Foreign Service careers, we base much of our actions on what is perceived as the national interest. I am persuaded however, that, at their roots, all of mankind's problems are spiritual. That is part of a much larger game which we ignore at our peril.

Q: Okay. Thank you very much.

End of interview