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INTERVIEW

Q: This is an interview with Robert Gerald Livingston. It’s being done for the Association of Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy and today is the sixth of February 1998. Gerry and I are old friends. We served together in Yugoslavia many years ago. Gerry, I wonder if you could first start off by telling me about when and where you were born, something about your family.

LIVINGSTON: Well, I was born in New York City on November 17, 1927. My father was a professor of industrial engineering at Columbia University and my mother was a Bostonian of the old school. I was brought up in New York City until I was 10 years old and then we moved to Long Island. My father continued to teach at Columbia and by the time he left, he was the most senior professor at the University. I suppose I would have gone into an academic field myself probably if my father hadn’t been a professor. I wanted to do something different. I went to prep school.

Q: Let’s talk about early schooling.

I went to private schools in New York, during the Depression. Of course, if you had a job, and my father had a job and by standards of those days he was a well-paid professor. He was a senior professor at Columbia already at a fairly young age. And by standards of the time was very well paid. I went to private school in New York city and I went to private school in Long Island. Then the Boston side of the family started to prevail and I went to prep school, a school called Milton Academy just south of Boston starting in 1941, when I was 13 years old, until 1946.

Q: Well, now, in this time what did the sort of the academic world, ... was this a dinner table sort of conversation?

LIVINGSTON: No, not really because, as I say, my father was a professor of industrial engineering. It was a field that was somewhat esoteric and a field he actually was one of the pioneers in. So there really wasn’t much stuff for an 11 to 12 year old boy to talk about. Then I went off to boarding school and didn’t really see him except in the summer time and then only sporadically because he was working very hard. Of course, obviously, what stamped me and my generation was the second world war, which broke out when I was 13 years old and extended all the time I was in prep school. I was just too young to be drafted but funny as it may seem at my age now, that was the one thing that irritated me most because all these guys in their good-looking uniforms would come back to prep
school and the girls would go for them. So, when I got through with prep school in 1946, even though the war was over, I decided I would enlist so that I could have one of those good-looking uniforms. The draft was still in effect. I told my parents if I don’t do this, I’ll be drafted anyway, which wasn’t, I don’t think, quite true. In any case, I was lucky and I think my father may have pulled some strings behind the scenes, so I got assigned first to the counterintelligence corps and then I got assigned to Italy at the most wonderful time for me anyway. I arrived there in December of 1946.

Q: Going back to your prep school time, many of the people I’ve interviewed, myself included, really were getting a magnificent preparation for the Foreign Service by “following the Warners.” I mean, we knew the map of the world with maybe the exceptions of southern Africa and Latin America, but the rest of it we knew infinitely because of the battles.

LIVINGSTON: Well, I mean, Milton was a very sort of public affairs-oriented place and prided itself on that. So, during my years there we gave a lot of attention in class and discussions, in all sorts of groups, to what was going on. Some foreign students were there. We had quite a few from Britain, because there were British kids evacuated to the U.S. We also had kids from France and other places and so there was that element. I mean there were family connections of one kind or another that got them there. We graduated in my class maybe 60, and of those we had maybe 10 foreigners.

Q: What about your reading? What were you doing in prep school?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I enjoyed foreign languages so I took German and I took French and I took Spanish and I enjoyed history so I spent a lot of time with history. I think it was a fairly rigorous prep school. They prided themselves on high academic standards and so we had a good deal of reading. I know I gravitated toward history because that showed itself later.

Q: When you graduated from prep school in ’46, you say you went into the Army. You were in the Army from 1946 to when?

LIVINGSTON: ’49. I enlisted for three years.

Q: Your first post was...

LIVINGSTON: My first post was Florence, Italy and I spent the springtime of 1947 there. I was there from December ’46 until about March or April of 1947. And I was in the CIC unit which was quartered in an absolutely lovely palazzo in the center of Florence. We didn’t have very much to do because the fascists had disappeared and we hadn’t quite yet focused on communists. In retrospect, I think it was quite surprising that already by the spring of ’47, you know, the targets of the CIC were communists and we were no longer trying to catch fascists of one kind or another.

Q: Well, we’re moving towards the crucial election of 1948 which was considered to
be...we poured lots of...

LIVINGSTON: Money...

Q: Money into it sub-rosa, not very sub-rosa.

LIVINGSTON: I remember when I was in the National Security Council years later, there were a few files that I couldn’t get access to in our own office, which handled Europe. One of them was a file on Italy, which presumably had all sorts of information on the support that we gave the Democrazia Christiana.

Q: In 1946/1947, what would a CIC guy do?

LIVINGSTON: We did basically background checks on women who were marrying GIs. I was the lowest ranking there, although one of the nice things was that so many people were being sent home that you got rather rapid promotions. Within nine months, I was a sergeant. Within a year and a half, I was a staff sergeant. Within two years, I was a sergeant first class. My dream was to become a warrant officer. I didn’t quite make that. That was the best job of all. It was a wonderful time. I remember riding around with a professor of art history from the University of Pennsylvania whose job was to put placards on all the Italian monuments for GIs when they were visiting. He had a lovely jeep, which he called “L’ammorata [Italian: ‘The Beloved’].” I rode around with him from place to place in Florence. Frankly, we didn’t do a hell of a lot. We really didn’t do a lot because the mission had not yet crystalized, particularly because we were handling things until the Italian peace treaty came along. I remember an embarrassing moment. It was the very first night. I went to an opera. It was right at the time that they decided to take Istria away from Italy. In the middle of the opera, the curtain came down, the lights came up, and the whole cast came out. They sang some national anthem, the gist of which was “Istria is ours.” I was in uniform and I didn’t know whether I should stand up or sit down because I didn’t know what the line was.

Q: Where did you go in 1947?

LIVINGSTON: Then we were transferred briefly to Udine. I had hoped that I would be assigned to Trieste, because there the CIC did quite a lot in counterintelligence work against the Yugoslavs, against Tito. I remember in 1946 when we had basic training, we had to crawl on our stomachs under machine gun fire. I said, “Why the hell are we doing this?” The sergeant said, “We’ll be fighting the Yugoslavs before long.” They had just shot down an American plane. It was the summer of 1946. So, I had hoped to go to Trieste, but instead we were transferred from the 428th CIC, which was the CIC in Italy, to the 430th CIC, which was the CIC in Austria. I was sent with a group of about five or six via Villach, which was in the British zone of Austria, where we stayed for a couple of days, and then up to Vienna. From Vienna, we were assigned to various places throughout the American zone of Austria, which consisted of Upper Austria, Salzburg, and a little, tiny chunk of Styria, which the Nazis had transferred from Styria to Upper Austria because the Gauleiter of Upper Austria liked the little place. I eventually ended
up there. I was in Vienna for a while. Then I was in a lovely place just outside Salzburg called Mondsee. Then I was transferred to another lovely place called Bad Ischl in the middle of the Salzkammergut. Then I was transferred to this tiny little place called Altaussee. I was one of two officers there and after a while the other fellow was transferred home and I was there alone.

Q: What were you doing?

LIVINGSTON: Well, originally I was doing the same thing. I was interviewing Austrian girls who wanted to marry GIs for background checks. Your first question was, “Were you ever a member of the BDM (Bund Deutscher Mädel)? Yes or no.” Then, “Have you ever had VD [venereal disease]? Yes or no?” and then “Have you ever been married? Yes or no.” (Laughter) We were checking with the Austrian police on their police checks. In the summer of ’47 already, we started getting defectors from the Soviet forces and from Eastern Europe, though I must say, not all of Eastern Europe but Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We didn’t have many from Yugoslavia, but mainly the countries bordering on Austria. Some from the Ukraine, from the remnants of the Benderovci movement, the guerrilla movement fighting against the Soviets, which the Soviets finally succeeded in dispersing toward the end of the forties. Some of them struggled across Slovakia into Austria and into the American zone. So, we interrogated these guys to get what information we could get out of them. There was much turnover among us Americans, people going home and anxious to get home. Those of us who were there were totally unqualified and took over these interrogations. I must say, in retrospect, there were doubtful characters of one kind or another who had been collaborators with some of the Nazi-installed regimes in Eastern Europe. We had Rumanians also. So, I started interrogating and then, I would say by the summer of ’47, we were already engaged in positive intelligence, we weren’t counterintelligence. We were engaged in positive intelligence and operating in effect as an intelligence outfit collecting information on the Soviets and on Soviet troop dispositions in Austria. I was required to develop sources and to run these guys, in effect, as a case officer. I must have had 5 to 6 or 7. We tried to penetrate the Communist Party of Austria. At the end of ’47, I had somebody who became too hot in Vienna, an Austrian. Actually, he wasn’t an Austrian. He was an ethnic German from the Banat from the northern part of Yugoslavia, who had been breaking in, had been doing some dirty work for the CIC in Vienna and he got “too hot” in Vienna. The Austrians said “Get him out of here!” and the CIC sent him down to me. He and I cooked-up break-ins into the Communist Party offices around Austria in the Western zone and I, in effect, gave him cover by taking him in a U.S. Army jeep, one of our jeeps. We painted the bumpers with a different insignia than our insignia and we went around to various places in Austria. I’d sit in the jeep and stay in a hotel and he’d break in and steal the files. The Communist Party got wise to it after a while, after about three or four months, but we did that for about five months. Once, we were almost caught actually by the British. We went down to Graz in the British zone. But that stopped after awhile. The British developed sources and I had guys who reported on Soviet train movements in the Lower Austria. Things like that. So, I did basic intelligence work as a 19 or 20 year old.

Q: Well, the Czech takeover was ’48?
LIVINGSTON: ’48, that’s right. Before that takeover, one of the favorite places to go on a weekend was Prague, because Prague hadn’t been damaged during the war. There was a train that went to Prague, through the Soviet Zone of Austria and up to Prague. Prague was a great place to spend the weekend.

Q: Were you getting close to a wartime footing, I mean, as far as one could?

LIVINGSTON: Well, yes, in retrospect, your memory is not that great. But I remember very distinctly that in ’49 we were told to get false identity cards and I got a false identity card made out in a false name. The idea was that if the balloon went up, you know, that you would use that card and, presumably, go out the way that subsequently it was revealed - the so-called “Rat Line” went through South Tyrol down to Italy. But you had to get yourself to Tyrol, which was the French zone of Austria. I had a false identity card made out to Mr. Lang, I think it was. So I used that. I mean I had that; I didn’t use it. So the feeling was that there might be a war. I think you are right. It started after the Prague coup. I’m repeating myself, but I think the rapidity with which we changed from being worried about the Nazis to being worried about communists was surprising. I remember when I first arrived, I guess I went to Salzburg after Vienna. It was Salzburg or Linz. I remember going to an office, and there on the wall, like your maps here, was something called automatic arrest categories. They had various categories, if you were a Nazi Party member, if you were Blockleiter or above, you were to be automatically arrested, but if you were a member of the BDM or some other Nazi Party affiliate, you had to be practically, you know, at the very top to get arrested automatically. I asked this guy who was sitting there - we had a lot of young Jewish boys, you know, because they spoke German - and he said “We aren’t paying attention to them anymore.”

Q: Did you have any dealings with the Soviets at your level at all or were they just not...

LIVINGSTON: When I was in Vienna we did, a little bit but I didn’t have any dealings with them. In fact, you know, I may be mixing the times up a little bit. But I went back to college in ’49 and then I went over to Austria and got a summer job in the summer of 1950 with what amounted to a predecessor organization of the CIA. I was stationed in Linz that time. There we were doing only positive intelligence. I stayed in that job for...well, I arrived in June 1950 and I didn’t leave until January 1951. I skipped a whole semester of college, in effect. And I was tempted to stay and so I can’t remember whether it was my last year in the CIC in 1949 or my six months in this predecessor organization of the agency in 1950, but we always took great care in Vienna because, unlike Berlin, Vienna’s central district, the First Bezirk, rotated each month into a different Occupation power’s hand, you know: one month the Soviets, then us, then the Brits, and then the French. And, you know, whenever the French or the Soviets were in charge, we had to be very careful because there were a lot of kidnappings. I don’t think they ever kidnapped any Americans but there were a lot of Austrians who were working for us who were kidnapped. And so one was really rather cautious.

Q: Why were the French a problem?
LIVINGSTON: In the case of the French, in the years after the second world war, the army and the intelligence service were heavily communist-penetrated. We were told “Do not exchange any information with the French,” because DeGaulle had communists in his government from 1945 until, I guess, 1947 or 48. The Deuxième Bureau, the French intelligence, was reputed to be heavily penetrated by communists, as was the French military. So we were very skeptical about the French. With the Brits, I got my knuckles rapped when we went down to Graz to try to make a heist at the Communist Party office down in Graz, which was in the British Zone.

_Q: The British didn’t like you poaching on their territory?_  

LIVINGSTON: Well, yes, they guessed what was happening.

_Q: Well, let’s move this chronologically. In ’49, you left this job..._  

LIVINGSTON: I was discharged in July of 1949 and I went for a summer course at the University of Zurich for a month and a half or two months. It was July and August of 1949 and then I went back and went to college at Harvard.

_Q: So you went to Harvard even with this interlude..._  

LIVINGSTON: From ’49, my class was ’53 because I entered in ’49 but I graduated in ’52 because I had a lot of this atmosphere, you know this, “Let’s get this over with and get going.” I must say what happened was clearly a result of my interests and my experience abroad which nobody in my family ever had. I don’t have any connections in Germany or Europe. My mother used to go as a young girl to France like a well-bred Bostonian girl would do. My father was in the Navy in the first world war and paid one visit, at the very end of the war, on a transport of some sort, to Brittany. But otherwise my family had no connections to Europe. So if it hadn’t been for my enlisting in the Army, I wouldn’t have had this experience. I may be projecting backwards, but I saw how little we knew about Eastern Europe when all these guys that I was running, Slovak Tisoites and Hungarian Arrow Cross people (and there was a Quisling governor of Estonia whom I interrogated) were strange to us Americans. I thought, “We don’t know anything about these guys.” The people who were at the head of the CIC in Austria were generally retreads from the FBI. Most of them had gone to Fordham Law School and places like that and they didn’t know anything about Eastern Europe. I didn’t know anything about Eastern Europe and nobody else practically did. We were played for suckers by these guys from Eastern Europe. Already at age 20 I could see that. And also by the Austrians, you know. We had to rely tremendously on the Austrians.

_Q: Well, the people you were mentioning, the Tisoites, the..._  

LIVINGSTON: The Tisoites from Slovakia, the Arrow Cross from Hungary, the Iron Guard is from Romania...
**Q:** These are all basically Fascist organizations.

LIVINGSTON: Yes. As came out of the Barbie trial, our basic line was that, “We won’t work with people from the SS, but we will work with people from the German military intelligence organization, which was the Abwehr,” you know the Wehrmacht’s Abwehr. But, you know, how the hell did we know who these guys were? And their line was, “We have sources in Eastern Europe.” It was exactly the same line with General Gehlen, who brought over the intelligence service of the German armies in the east to the Americans in ’46-’47 said he had this terrific network still in place in the east. We couldn’t prove it one way or the other, you know, and we bought this information. We paid. I had this not generous slush fund, but I would pay hundreds and hundreds of dollars to these guys for information. And so I realized, I mean I think I realized, that we knew so little about this area. We were being victimized by the émigrés and by the Austrians and I said, “Well, I think I should learn more about this area, number one. And number two, then of course, the Ford Foundation had a program, a very Cold War program, to train people in Eastern European studies and in Soviet studies and so on. So I saw, in addition to the GI Bill which I had I saw here was a chance to specialize and have my studies paid for. That was more the graduate level after ’53. So I majored in Russian, and Balkan, and Byzantine history.

**Q:** Could you give a feel for the atmosphere during this period of your work?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I mean, I just had the idea I’ve got to get this behind me. When I went back in ’50 to do this tour, I was tempted. I mean, the CIA was recruiting then and they were offering very good salaries. I said to myself, “If I don’t have a college degree, I’m not going to be anywhere,” so my idea was to get that college degree, get it over with as quickly as possible, you know, and then get back to this great fun. Also, we were all influenced by the national security state and the fight against communism and all this sort of atmosphere of the time.

**Q:** Well, the Korean War started in ’50.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, that’s right, I remember that very distinctly and the feeling was in Europe you know, that they’re going to strike across the German border as well.

**Q:** What was this interlude you had with this precursor to the CIA?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I’ll be damned if I can remember the name of it right now. It had some sort of funny name, like TAA or something. Anyway, it was run out of Frankfurt. It was an organizational effort. I mean, I was way down the line, so I’m not sure and the people in it were all (the reason I did it) ex-CIC guys most of them, of one kind or another, or some ex-OSS people, I guess, at the top. But these were CIC guys who had, you know, the same type of experience I had, maybe a little bit older than I. And it paid well, allowed you to stay in Europe, you know. It was run out of Frankfurt and it basically was gearing up for the Cold War. The CIA started to recruit people I guess actually started recruiting people around 1950. And this was a kind of transitional
organization, you know, with a lot of ex-military in it, of course. They paid my paycheck. I didn’t inquire too much about the organization, which was run out of Frankfurt.

Q: What were you doing?

LIVINGSTON: I was doing intelligence work. I had agents, you know, a lot of them over in the Soviet zone of Austria collecting information on the Soviets and I had defectors from Eastern Europe. Again, I can’t remember whether it was my last year in the CIC or the transitional period, but once of the great sources I ran was a guy who was, during the Nazi period, head of the government in Estonia and during the interwar period, he’d been minister of transportation for years. So he sketched, if you can imagine, the airport. That had tremendous interest. He was able to draw the entire rail system and road system of Estonia. He knew, or said he did, the heights of all the tunnels and the clearances and everything else and he spent months drawing this stuff with very exact drawings. Then I’d collect it all and send it in. And then we had sources and I remember one of the horrifying… again I want to stress I can’t remember when it was …I think it was during this period, six month period, but it may have been my last year in the CIC. I remember going down for a rendezvous in Vienna with one of my sources in a park in the American sector of Vienna. He didn’t show up. I had agreed to meet him in a certain place. After I stood there for a while, this woman came up and said, “They took my husband away this morning.” And you know they’d detected him. He was a railroad man and he’d provided information on rail cars going to Hungary. And she said, “What are you going to do for him?” I said, “I don’t know,” and I went to see my boss.

Q: Well, this is, of course, one of the things that I think many of us in the later years, found ourselves getting the results of much of this not very professional types of getting information...

LIVINGSTON: Yes, I mean, I had no training for this at all, none at all. You know I had a little bit at the CIC, a little bit of counterintelligence training up at Fort Holabird in Baltimore, but I had no real training whatsoever. You know, the guy who trained me, if you want, is this former Abwehr guy, the ethnic German from the Banat, who broke into offices. He’d gone in the Abwehr as a young man like me. He was a German speaker, but his name, Radenkovich, was a cover name. He came from the Vojvodina and was a German ethnic who’d signed up during the war, at least as he told me. I never checked his credentials and the people who’d detected him said he’d signed up with the German Abwehr. He’d been an Abwehr agent as a young man. Luckily, he was about five years older than me and he’d learned the tricks of the trade. He was better trained than I was because he was trained to break in and all kinds of stuff, which I wasn’t. (Laughter) But whatever training I got, in some respects I got from him.

Q: Well, after this interlude, you graduated from Harvard and got your bachelor’s degree in ’52.

LIVINGSTON: That’s right and I got my M.A. in 1953. I really worked hard, accelerated, and went to summer school. Let’s see…in ’50 I was in Austria so I went to
summer school in ’51 and summer school in ’52 and I think I graduated, actually, in the fall of ’52.

**Q:** Your Master’s, again, was it in Eastern European history?

**LIVINGSTON:** Yes, right. And at Harvard, I fell in with a guy who was a professor who had been, at the very end of the war, in the OSS in the Balkans. He had been with the Allied Control Commission in Romania for, I don’t know, six months or something after the war. He taught Byzantine, Balkan, Ottoman, and Russian history. I became fascinated with that part of the world, and he convinced me to go on to graduate work. Just at that moment, the Ford Foundation came along with its program and they funded you. So I didn’t have to impose on my parents at all. That also made me feel good, I think. Not that my parents couldn’t have paid for my education, but the idea that I had a GI bill, didn’t have to take any money from them, or very limited amounts, then I got this Ford Foundation grant and I didn’t have to take any money. I mean, a little bit of this is a father-son type of thing. My relations with my father were a bit strained, but we weren’t antagonistic or anything.

**Q:** But you wanted to be on your own.

**LIVINGSTON:** Yes, that’s right, and I wanted to prove to him that I could do as I goddamn well pleased. I didn’t think of it in those terms then, but...

**Q:** One understands that later on.

**LIVINGSTON:** Yes, right.

**Q:** How did you find this course? Was it supported by the Ford Foundation?

**LIVINGSTON:** It was the Ford Foundation program.

**Q:** What did that lead to?

**LIVINGSTON:** Well, Ford gave me a grant. I remember vividly the guy who was running the program during much of that period. The relationship between Ivy League academia and intelligence was rather close, particularly between Yale and the CIA, but also Princeton. The guy who ran that program was a guy named Cyril Black, who was a big specialist, I think, on Bulgaria. He was a very clubby, Eastern type of establishment.

**Q:** I was at Williams. I graduated in ’50 and...

**LIVINGSTON:** Well, you know...

**Q:** I remember...

**LIVINGSTON:** You must be my age roughly.
Q: A year younger, I was born in ’28 and two of my fraternity brothers out of 30 ended up in the CIA for a while. This is just where you went.

LIVINGSTON: That’s right. The CIA recruited a lot of Ivy Leaguers. It was Allen Dulles and the whole Ivy League concept. He was a Princetonian. In any case, Cy Black, I remember that because I remember the panel interview. I can’t remember who, besides him, was on it and I can’t remember how many years the grant went on for. Maybe I had to renew it, but it was basically three years. I did my generals rather quickly. I got them through in a year, I think, or a year and a half. And the only place you could go, really, was Yugoslavia. And Yugoslavia had a grant program. Yugoslavia was gradually opening up in 1953. There was a professor at Harvard named Albert Lord, whose specialty was the epic poems of the mountains of Yugoslavia and their connections, if any, to the Homeric epic and the whole idea of the oral tradition. My minor was the south Slav literature so he got me then a grant to go through the Yugoslav government, I was the second American college student, I think, or the third, to go to Yugoslavia after the war. So I went to Belgrade as a student in ’53 because I was there when the central committee expelled Djilas. That was the spring of ’53, I think, and I remember they sealed off the student dormitory that I was in. And so I got interested in Yugoslavia. I had to pick a Ph.D. thesis, and I picked a politician of the interwar period in Yugoslavia who was assassinated on the floor of the Parliament. It looked like a nice compact life to study. He had only really 10, maybe 20, years of real political activity. He was a big exponent of... well, he wasn’t a big exponent of Croatia... he was an exponent of Croatian nationalism but his main thing was that he was able to do something that was rather unusual. He was able to organize the peasantry. Generally peasant parties like the Social Revolutionaries in Russia have not been very successful because the peasants are very dispersed, are much harder to organize than the workers which the communists could. But he was able successfully to organize a very strong peasant party and he and a guy named Stambolisky, who did the same thing in Bulgaria, were the main forces in something called the Green International in the ‘20s. So I got him as a topic, and when I got married, my wife and I went back to Yugoslavia, this time to Zagreb, to the capital of Croatia, and I did my research there on this guy. I haven’t been back to Yugoslavia in a long time but I imagine every town in Croatia has at least one street named after him. His name was Radi_.

Q: Radi_, yes. You were in Yugoslavia when?

LIVINGSTON: Basically, I was there from the fall of ’53 to the summer of ’54.

Q: What was life like for you?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I lived in the student dormitory, and I had a guy who even then I recognized as sort of an informer. He was a White Russian. There were quite a lot of White Russians in Belgrade who’d fled to Yugoslavia after the first world war from Russia. Of course, the Yugoslavs had a tremendous hold over these guys because they could turn them back over to the Soviets and they did turn back some. But they generally
didn’t. This guy was my roommate, and I was quite cautious. He was a helluva nice guy. Volkov was his name. My guess is that he was reporting, and I knew that then.

Q: Here you were an ex-CIC intelligence person doing studies there. Did you find either the Yugoslavs coming at you or the Americans coming at you for anything?

LIVINGSTON: No, I steered reasonably clear of the embassy although there was one guy at the embassy I saw from to time. I steered clear of it, as a general rule, and I tried to get to know the country and speak Serbian as much as I could and to get around. There were some other foreign students at the time, some Brits, a few Germans. I went around with a German girl. I remember going down and visiting all the monasteries in southern Serbia with her. There was a Dutchman. I think I was the only American, though there may have been other Americans. I hung around mostly with foreign students. There was some sort of an office for foreign students, and they liked to keep track of us.

Q: What about classes? What was your impression of what you were getting from the university system?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I spent a lot of time studying. My language wasn’t so good when I got there, although I’d studied Serbo-Croatian. I went to some classes, mostly language classes. I tried to learn Turkish because I thought originally I was going to do some work on 19th Century Serbia. So I thought I’d probably need Turkish sources. I went to some classes on Serbian history but basically I goofed off. I traveled around and I did goof off but I traveled around and studied the language. I tried to learn the language during this time, and I did learn the language.

Q: How were Americans received in those days?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I think in a rather friendly fashion, you know. I had a Serbian girlfriend who was a librarian at the university, and I remember going out on an expedition with her and her students to Pan_evo or maybe even beyond Pan_evo, somewhere in the Vojvodina.

Q: You’re talking about north of Belgrade.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, but it was out in the country and I can’t think of exactly where it was. I would say the students who were along were somewhat hostile to me. I think it was partly because they thought I was a rich American taking their girl. Then I had one connection there who was the family of an émigré who was a student and subsequently became a professor of Byzantine music at the University of Virginia. He was a student of Lord’s like I was and his family were anti-Tito. His sister and his mother still lived in Belgrade, and I saw a lot of them. That was about the only family I really saw a lot of. She was a woman of about 60 and her daughter was maybe 40 or something. I visited them a lot, and I also saw people in the Serbian Orthodox Church. There was an assistant to the Patriarch with whom I got to be quite friendly. I won’t say beyond that that I really saw many other families. My roommate never took me to his family, and I never saw
many other families. I spent a lot of time going to theater, going to opera, trying to study the language, going to movies, things of that sort.

Q: What about trying to do your research?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I didn’t have my subject then. That was ‘53-’54. I didn’t get my subject until I got back.

Q: I was just going to say that, Staepan Radi _, being a Croatian nationalist, I don’t know where he...

LIVINGSTON: Serbia wasn’t the place for that...

Q: This wasn’t the place for it and also under Tito, too.

LIVINGSTON: No, I hadn’t selected my topic yet. I don’t think I’d passed my generals yet. No, because I studied for my generals the first year we were married, the summer of the year we got married. We got married in May of ’55, so I hadn’t passed my generals yet. So I guess my time in Belgrade must have been ‘53-’54, not ‘52-’53. I got my degree in ’52 and I must have studied another year and went off to Belgrade in ‘53-’54. The Djilas thing was in the fall of ‘53, I think.

Q: How was the Djilas thing? Did you get any feel for it...

LIVINGSTON: Well, the authorities were totally wrong in that there was no particular sympathy for him among the students.....I remember reading his articles and trying to make my way through them. I was really surprised, he was quite critical. I didn’t detect, although I must admit that I didn’t have the feel for it, I didn’t detect any particular pro-Djilas sentiment among students. I think probably the students were careful with me and stayed away from me, except for this guy and one or two others. They were all communists or they wouldn’t have been able to get access to that dormitory. That was the best student dormitory in Belgrade, though it wasn’t so great. I assume that not everyone could have gotten in there unless they were loyal communists. Presumably they’d all been educated to be skeptical of Americans. So I think they stayed away from me probably.

Q: You came back in...

LIVINGSTON: I came back in ’54.

Q: ’54. Where did you meet your wife?

LIVINGSTON: I met my wife in Widener Library. It was probably when I was there the first time, it was already ’53 because when I went back to Yugoslavia I knew her. When I went to Yugoslavia for that period, I knew her, so I met her in ’53.
Q: So you went back by '55...

LIVINGSTON: By '55, I had finished all my course work and my generals. I haven’t recalled this for years. I must have been back at Harvard in ‘54-’55. It was the summer of ’54. I probably went back to summer school in ’54-’55 and I completed all my coursework for the Ph.D. We got married in May of ’55, and then I went down to Cape Cod and studied for the generals during that summer. I passed the generals in September of ’55 and went right away with my wife to Zagreb. That’s when I did the research. So I was there in ’55-’56. I went into the Foreign Service then in October of ’56.

Q: In ‘55-’56, what was Zagreb like at that time?

LIVINGSTON: Well, it was still fairly gloomy. My wife taught English. I went down to the archives to work on Radi_. It was a little hard on her. It was hard finding a place to stay. But by luck we finally found a woman, Jewish she was actually…and her daughter… who had a villa, half of which had been taken away. She was afraid that the rest of it would be taken, so she was happy to rent rooms to a foreigner. So, in that sense, once we hooked up with her, we had a great time. We had a very nice room and we lived with this woman and her daughter. She had been widowed. I think her husband may have been Serbian. Her name was Muršec, so I thought it was a Serbian name. She was a little vague about what happened to her husband. She was a widow and her daughter, named Miriana, had this apartment that was rather nice. They were obviously bourgeois before the war. He may have been a dentist, her late husband.

Q: Did you find a difference in attitude of the Croatians you were working with and the Serbs? Was it a different world?

LIVINGSTON: I don’t know. I was really full of steam. I had to try to get my research done and so we didn’t intermingle as much as we might have. In contrast to Belgrade, where I tried to learn the language, there I kept my nose to the grindstone because I already had the idea I wanted to get into the Foreign Service. So I wanted to get this done with as quickly as I could and do the research as quickly as I could. So we had this family that we saw everyday. My wife taught English. She taught English to a psychiatrist and she got quite friendly with her. We went out every night to a restaurant. So we ate out at restaurants; it was cheap. The city was reviving, but it was still dark and gloomy. Just two weeks ago, I was in Riga in Latvia. And it has a little bit the same atmosphere, Riga in 1998, as Zagreb did in 1955.

Except everybody in Riga in 1997 had cellular telephones. The street lights were not so strong and pavements were misty and dark but we went out. We went out in the country on weekends occasionally and that was fine. In Belgrade, I had the feeling I was being watched a little bit, anyway, whereas in Zagreb I didn’t have the feeling I was being watched. I did go down every day to work with historians at the historical institute of the university so I had a pretty regimented life.

Q: Did you find working on Radi_ was at all disquieting to the people you were dealing
with because Tito...

LIVINGSTON: No, I did not. I think they rather liked it. Radi was not anti-Pavelić. He wasn’t Ustaše. So I think that they tolerated it. I saw Radi’s family and his daughter, and as part of my research, I was able to verify some things. They had his passport. For example, there was a question, “When had he gone to Moscow?” That was one of the things the Serbs held against him, that he’d gone to Moscow and sure enough it showed in the passport when he’d gone. So I was able to talk to the family and get some information out of them. There I did, in contrast to steering clear when I was at the Embassy in ’53, there I did have fairly close contact with the consulate. There was a young couple at the consulate, a fellow named Peter Walker who still lives around Washington, if he’s still alive, and a rather old-fashioned type consul general. Martindale was his name. He was consul general in Zagreb, and they used to invite us quite frequently. We used to go, too.

Q: What sparked you towards going into the Foreign Service?

LIVINGSTON: I knew I didn’t want to go into the CIA. The CIA had tried to recruit me, I can’t remember what year it was. It was probably one year when I was at Harvard. They had rather amateurish ways of recruiting, like cops and robbers. After I got back, just before I joined the Foreign Service, three of them took me down to a restaurant on Maine Avenue looking out over the water and we had a three-martini lunch. I thought, “This can’t be right.” Then they tipped their hand, and I figured out what they wanted me to do. They wanted me to go back to Zagreb and be a student there again, working for the Agency. Not a very good idea. I thought these guys aren’t really very serious and they were all quite preppy types, as well. So I didn’t really want to lead a double life and not be able to tell my wife what I was doing. I am really grateful myself that I didn’t do it.

Q: I think I had somewhat the same thing and it was tempting but having been in intelligence in the military, I really didn’t want to get back. I was listening to the Soviet broadcasts...

LIVINGSTON: Radio interception…

Q: Radio interception. I didn’t want to be in any office where I had to have the shades drawn over the window sills. (Laughter)

LIVINGSTON: Yes, well, I had the same thing. These guys were really kind of amateurish. And it comes out as a book that Evan Thomas published, maybe you read it, The Four Good Men, I believe it was called. It was about these four guys, Frank Wisner, Desmond Fitzgerald, Richard Bissell, and one other who were the moving forces in the early years of the CIA. That kind of Ivy League, three-martini lunch, James Bondish comes through. That was the early ethic. I may have been Ivy League and eastern establishment and all that but, somehow, I didn’t think that was right. I thought it was really kind of childish. But I knew I wanted to do something. It was, again, the Cold War obviously and fighting communism or whatever. I wasn’t qualified for the military, and I
didn’t want to go into the military either. I had been in the military. But the in the CIC we wore civilian clothes. We went to the PX and got our gasoline from U.S. forces in Austrian fuel dumps. I did have a uniform and I was in the Army. But I really wasn’t in the Army. We wore civilian clothes all the time.

Q: When did you take the Foreign Service Exam?

LIVINGSTON: I took it in Vienna. So now, when was that? I’m trying to remember when I took it. It was a three-day exam.

Q: Three and a half days...

LIVINGSTON: Something like that, and I remember sitting there in the Embassy in Vienna and the secretaries were frolicking in the pool outside (laughs) down below. So, when was that? It was in Austria. So it must have been that year I was in Austria with the predecessor organization of the Agency. It must have been the summer of 1951, I’m guessing now.

Q: Yes.

LIVINGSTON: I put off going in… I know I put it off at least once.

Q: Do you recall anything about your oral exam?

LIVINGSTON: Yes, I’ll tell you what because I remember. I can tell you when the oral exam was because I was asked a question: I went in the morning Truman, who was still President, seized the steel mills or something?

Q: Yes.

LIVINGSTON: And the guy asked me, “What constitutional issues does this raise?” and then somebody asked me also, “What do you think about the Austrians? Would they still like to be with Germany,” and I said, “Well, I know it’s not the right thing to say but I’m not so sure they wouldn’t.” Yes, I remember that. I remember those two questions because I didn’t think I handled them very well, either one of them. I remember the written exam, though. It was a hot day for Vienna. The windows were open and the staff were outside down below sitting on the edges of the swimming pool.

Q: When did you come into the Foreign Service?

LIVINGSTON: I came into the Foreign Service in October of ’56. It was right at the time of the Hungarian Revolution.

Q: Oh, yes.

LIVINGSTON: And Suez. I guess it was right at the time Sputnik went up.
Q: It was around that period.

LIVINGSTON: The fall; it was October. It may have been September, but I think it was October of ’56.

Q: Can you characterize the class you came in with?

LIVINGSTON: Well, there’s only one person we still have connections with, a fellow named Lowenstein.

Q: Jim Lowenstein.

LIVINGSTON: Jim Lowenstein. He and I came in the same class. Mike Sterner, I think was in the same class. Well, I think it was fairly heavy Ivy League, but not preponderantly. There were some women in it. There may have not been very many, three or four, maybe. They were always making an effort to get out of the Ivy League mode, and so there were Midwesterners. It was preponderantly male. I thought they were quite well-educated, generally speaking. I think they were mostly younger than I was. They were taking them younger then than they have subsequently. That’s my impression. It was obviously much easier to get in the Foreign Service. They were expanding; they were scrambling. They weren’t taking everybody, but they were taking a lot of people. No blacks. I wouldn’t have even thought about blacks, but now, looking back from the perspective of 1997-98, I don’t think there were any blacks at all.

Q: Where did you want to go when you came in? Did you want to become a Yugoslavian...

LIVINGSTON: I wanted to be in Eastern Europe, obviously. A little less Russia, but I wanted to do Eastern Europe because that was my thing, and I remember the first assignment. The training didn’t last all that long in those days… maybe a month, two months?

Q: I think around two months.

LIVINGSTON: So let’s see what happened. Hang on. It must have been January… No, that’s not quite right. What happened there? I’ll tell you what happened. I got assigned to the Bureau of Research and Intelligence working on Yugoslavia as a matter of fact, and I worked on Yugoslavia. It must have been for a year or so. That was ’56-57 and I worked on Yugoslavia and I remember writing NIEs and how terrified I was because I was too academic. They really had to be absolutely right, you know. That was during the great NIE phase…

Q: NIE is National Intelligence Estimate.

LIVINGSTON: …and I guess the Agency was responsible for them but they farmed
them out and I remember trying to do one on Yugoslav workers’ councils. I remember agonizing in the spring of ’57. You know, it wasn’t going to be the “last word” and there weren’t enough sources and I looked at it very academically. It really has to be accurate… I didn’t have enough perspective to say, “Nobody’s going to give a shit about this at all.” (Laughter)

Q: It was true. We were creating the “great American encyclopedia.”

LIVINGSTON: Yes, exactly right, but I wasn’t smart enough to realize that. I was kind of New England, academic, Harvard, dedicated to doing well, and I was also worried because I hadn’t finished my dissertation. I thought, “My God, you know, I’m doing this thing and I should be trying to finish my dissertation.” So I worked there for about a year; then I was assigned to Salzburg. Many people in the old Foreign Service may have gotten exactly assignments that had nothing to do with their expertise but, I must say, the State Department assigned me to areas where I had expertise. They assigned me then to Salzburg, where I’d been with the CIC, and I worked on paroles and background checks for Hungarians who had fled from the revolution and were under parole provision and were being admitted to United States. I wasn’t actually the visa officer. I was a guy doing background checks on these guys and I was there for a year.

Q: This would be ’57-58?

LIVINGSTON: Yes, that’s right.

Q: What was your impression of the Hungarians you were checking?

LIVINGSTON: Well, there I realized that we couldn’t find anything out about these guys. You know we were supposed to do background checks on these guys who’d fled from Hungary? You know, I didn’t know where they’d been. How could we possibly find out? We turned to the Austrian police and they gave us some information whether the guy had any criminal record in Austria, but what the guy had done in Hungary, they hadn’t a flying clue, you know. That’s the first time I became involved with these relief agencies, the Catholic, the Lutheran Relief...

Q: And HIAS...

LIVINGSTON: Yes, HIAS and it came to be clear to me how big they were in lobbying for their own people. They were in the same building, some of them, as we were. We had a lovely villa on the banks of the Salzach River. It was a great year, and my daughter was born just before we left to go to Salzburg. I left, went ahead. My wife came after with my daughter.

Q: Was INS there with you, too, or not?

LIVINGSTON: Not that I can remember. I can’t say there wasn’t an INS person there but I can’t remember.
Q: Because I was in the refugee relief program in Frankfurt for a while, which was a little bit different; but we were getting tremendous dossiers on people because they’d had many more years to accumulate them, but in these refugee camps.

LIVINGSTON: We had people who’d come over after. And then, after October ’56, I don’t know when they closed the border again, but, you know, maybe November ’56, December ’56, or January. The Austrians put them first into a refugee camp outside Vienna. Then they moved along further west because it was too close to the Hungarian border. They wanted to distribute them along the Laender, so most of them ended up in refugee camps around Salzburg and Linz, those two places.

Q: Do you recall whether the Hungarians were headed in any particular areas in the United States?

LIVINGSTON: I don’t remember that. As I say, I didn’t really do the visa interrogation. I did the background investigations. They put me exactly into the right type of work in that sense, you know, because I had had experience doing background checks for two years before in Austria. So I did background checks on these guys, whatever that was, to make sure the background file was as much as we could get together. I can’t recall specifically, but I dealt with the Austrian police.

Q: This was a couple of years after Austria ceased to be occupied, ’55 I guess was the Austrian treaty?

LIVINGSTON: That’s right, ’55.

Q: Was Austrian gelling into a nation now? It had gone through an awful lot of trauma.

LIVINGSTON: I can’t answer that. I really don’t know. Obviously, yes, I mean, I think my answer to the Foreign Service exam guy was probably wrong. The Austrians wanted to distinguish themselves from the Germans politically and, therefore, I think there probably wasn’t much feeling for an Anschluss. I think I came to that idea because I remember talking to Austrians. The German economy was already starting to revive and doing quite well. I think Austria lagged well behind. The difference was that Germany’s industrial regions except for Silesia were under the West, well say Silesia and Saxony, whereas the Austrian industrial region around Vienna was in the Soviet zone. So the Austrian economy, except for some industry near Graz was basically tourism and dairy farms and God knows what. So their economy was lagging and I think, in retrospect, I had heard a lot of people bitching about, “God, why are we not still with Germany? Our economy would get better.” I don’t have a very high opinion of the Austrians. By and large, they were collaborators. I can understand that because they were a small country after the empire. I knew that they had welcomed Hitler when he came in in ’38. We were able to cooperate with them alright but, you know, those working with the Soviets, cooperated with the Soviets in the Soviet zones. So, being a background checker, I took some interest in local politics and so on. In order to advance my career in the Foreign
Service, I did some separate reporting you know, voluntary reporting. I reported on Austrian political parties and I remember having a first interview with the then head of the FPOE, which was regarded as a successor party to the Nazis. That’s the party Haider now heads. I remember now going down on my own to interview a man named Peter, who had been an SS man as a matter of fact, and was the head of the FPOE. I can see it now, you know those purple reports, what do you call that reproductive process?

Q: Oh, yes, it wasn’t... It was before that. You cranked them around.

LIVINGSTON: It was white with purple writing.

Q: Mimeograph.

LIVINGSTON: It wasn’t mimeograph. Anyway, it was white with purple and I remember it did attract the attention of some in the Department, and I was very proud of that, because I did that on my own time in addition to doing my visa background interviews.

Q: What were you aiming for? You were getting a little feel but in sort of an obscure corner of the Foreign Service. What were you looking towards doing?

LIVINGSTON: Well, there was a war against the communists, and I wanted to be a specialist for Eastern Europe.

Q: Where did you go in ’58?

LIVINGSTON: That’s where things changed. I went to Hamburg and there I did first visa work, I think, and then I went to the economics section and there, you know as well as I do, in the early years in Germany when we had such a huge establishment. Wait, don’t let me forget, you said when we talked that, what, a third of the American Foreign Service...

Q: Went through...

LIVINGSTON: Yes, how did you know that?

Q: That’s just a guess on my part.

LIVINGSTON: A guess, I see.

Q: But we had huge establishments.

LIVINGSTON: We did, that’s right, and the AFL-CIO had labor attachés at almost every post. But by the time I got there at the end of the ’50s, the union people they’d had there were all gone practically. They may have had a union guy in Bonn, but they still had the slot and so I was quote, “the labor attaché.” That got me in touch with all the Social Democrats and the labor unions, and I did my reporting on the opposition and the Social
Democrats and the labor unions. I got to know a lot of labor union guys in Hamburg including one person who is still my friend to this day, who subsequently became the chairman of the board of Lufthansa, a man named Heinz Ruhnau, who was a young labor union leader. The labor unions, of course, and the SPD were anxious to show, right down to this day it’s the same thing, that they were friendly with the Americans. They weren’t anti-American, at least not the right-wing of the SPD. And these guys I saw were all right-wing, so they were happy to have me and I remember being outside the room while they were negotiating. It was very smart of this guy. He took me down to wage negotiations at the Kiel shipyards because he knew an American coming in with this trade union guy kind of pre-empted the management, the state management, but still it was management. And so I got to see a lot of interesting people. Basically, I always had the feeling in Germany even then, that the State Department dealt with the CDU, CSU; and the government and the CIA dealt with the opposition. I dealt with the opposition, too. There was also a big CIA office in Hamburg.

Q: You were in Hamburg from ’58 to...

LIVINGSTON: ’58 to ’60 or ’61, I can’t remember which it was

Q: Hamburg is in Hanover. No, Hamburg is a city-state.

LIVINGSTON: It’s a state itself, yes, a city-state.

Q: Was this a CDU state?

LIVINGSTON: No, it was definitely an SPD state. There was, I think, maybe even during the time I was there, a brief period when they had a CDU governing mayor, head of the government, but he only lasted for a short time. But otherwise I think they’ve had SPD guys right down to the present day.

Q: Who was the consul general in those days?

LIVINGSTON: I’m sorry you asked that because I can’t remember who it was. I do remember where he came from, though. He’d been head of the Consular Section at the State Department. My wife will remember who he was. I can’t remember his name. I can see him in front of me, but he was definitely a consular official, and I think this was kind of his farewell post. It was interesting, going back just briefly to Salzburg. The Consul General there was a man named Rieger, who was a protégé, had been in the security part of the State Department.

Q: John Rieger.

LIVINGSTON: John Rieger, and he was a protégé of whoever the guy was that was head of security...

Q: Scott McCloud.
LIVINGSTON: Scott McCloud. He was a Scott McCloud protégé and he’d been given this job as kind of a reward because the State Department and McCloud, you know, a lot of bad blood... Anyway, he had gotten this plush post as consul or consul general in Salzburg. He was very nice to me, you know. I think, in retrospect, although I was probably too naïve at the time. This was a farewell posting for the consul general in Hamburg and as I say, I can see him in front of me. My wife will remember his name. I can’t remember his name.

Q: Did you find that, as the economic officer... I would imagine being in an SPD place, you were really talking...

LIVINGSTON: Yes, I got to see a lot of people, you know and by that time my German was reasonably good and so I started giving talks and I remember the first talk I gave. The CDU had a left wing which comes out of the Catholic trade union movement. They were very weak in Hamburg because there aren’t that many Catholics in Hamburg, but they asked me to speak for them. I remember I was kind of embarrassed that they placarded it all over Hamburg, you know, and I gave a talk for them, something about America or whatever. Then, I started getting invitations from the SPD, you know, and I gave talks for them.

Q: But you’re saying you found the SPD really was a different type of socialist party than, say, maybe the labor movement?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I dealt with the right wing, obviously, with the SPD though I didn’t quite recognize it at the time. As I say, the right wing, right down to the present day, is that way. I went to a conference three weeks ago in Berlin, where I gave a talk on the SPD with a funny title of “What Should We Be Doing For Our Relations With America.” I really thought that was kind of a subservient, funny title. But right down to the present day they want to show to the German electorate that they are not anti-American. They can’t be “tarred with that brush” although the CDU has always tried to “tar them with a brush.” To some degree they had that on their left wing guys like Bahr with lots of connections to the East. But the right wing of the SPD cozied up to the Americans and cozied up to the Agency, particularly.

Q: Were you sort of aware of our labor unions passing out money and things like that?

LIVINGSTON: I didn’t know that. Again, I didn’t know that at the time. Again, I may have been too naïve, but in retrospect, sure. We occasionally got visits from various labor union people, not very many, but some and - good old’ Foreign Service where you had to entertain all the time - I had to entertain these guys and invite the local trade union people in. I did that and obviously they maintained connections with these guys. In retrospect, the answer is yes, sure. But I didn’t know it at the time.

Q: Were there any, in this sort of ‘58-60 period in Germany...I can’t think of any outstanding events...
LIVINGSTON: Well, that was the beginning of the Berlin Crisis. I was trying to think of who the ambassador was. I think he was the great man who was ambassador in Britain, France.

Q: Oh, yes, Bruce.

LIVINGSTON: Bruce, right. I think Bruce was ambassador because I remember him coming into Hamburg. And it may have been Dowling, too, I’m not sure. But anyway Bruce was ambassador part of the time. It’s funny now in retrospect, the Berlin Crisis, which Khrushchev unleashed in ’58. Somehow or other, I can’t even remember it from my service there and maybe, again, I was too narrow-gauged and wasn’t paying attention.

Q: The real Berlin Crisis came, I guess around ’61 because Kennedy came in.

LIVINGSTON: It’d started already in ’58 because that’s when Khrushchev gave his ultimatum and then he sort of backed off the ultimatum. So it was sort of “hanging fire” for quite some time. In ’58, Dulles was still in before he died and I guess Herter became Secretary of State in what, ’59? Dulles developed the “Agent Theory,” remember? We could treat the GDR people on the access routes to Berlin as agents of the Soviet Union. Some lawyers’ ploy. I remember the Germans were appalled at that, you know, the idea that the Americans would deal with the East Germans. I must say, in retrospect, there may have been a Berlin Crisis, but I didn’t really feel it at all, doing my labor reporting and all.

Q: Did you feel the hand of the Department of Labor and was it Jay Silverstone?

LIVINGSTON: No, not that I can recall. There was a guy named Meyer Bernstein. What union did he come out of? He basically interested himself in the international affairs. Maybe it was the International Department of the AFL-CIO. I’m not sure. He came over a couple of times. He lived in the Watergate, as a matter of fact, in his later years. I remember visiting him. He was a bachelor, an odd-duck, one of these Jewish, intellectual unionists who knew the German union movement quite well. Again, in retrospect, one realizes how naïve one was and how little one knew and how unsophisticated one really was. While I was there, they replaced the Labor Attaché in Bonn with a Foreign Service officer and he did some reports about the union movement which were more, quote “objective,” and I remember the AFL-CIO descended on him like a ton of bricks. I can’t remember the details but whether it was the fact of dealing with the East, I remember saying, “Ah, ha.” The AFL-CIO really put a spoke in this guy’s wagon. It must have been ’60 or so.

Q: Well, how did we feel in Hamburg? Was there much concern about the quote “Soviet Threat?”

LIVINGSTON: Yes, there was. One of the typical things which we still believe, was if there was an attack from the East, one of the first cities they’d take was Hamburg and
there was a question of blowing up the bridges over the Elbe and things like that, so we operated under that as late as the late ‘50s, under the idea of a possible Soviet attack. I believed that and, in retrospect, that lent the frisson to serving there. We were really on the front lines.

Q: Oh, absolutely. So you left there in late ’60?

LIVINGSTON: Yes. We had home leave and then I went to Belgrade from there. I think it was in ’61.

Q: ’61 to when?

LIVINGSTON: ’61 to ’64. And George Kennan was the ambassador…the first ambassador was Burke Elbrick. By the way, you’ve got to see this movie Four Days in September.

Q: He came after Kennan.

LIVINGSTON: Did he come after Kennan?

Q: Yes, he did.

LIVINGSTON: Who was before? Was it Riddleberger?

Q: I think so.

LIVINGSTON: There was some ambassador there before. And it must have been the very last days of Riddleberger. Was there anybody between Riddleberger and Kennan?

Q: I can’t remember.

LIVINGSTON: Well, anyway, whether this is a story I heard or whether it was one of those blends in your mind, or whether this is a story that I experienced myself, I remember Riddleberger, who spoke excellent French. My wife, who is French, she and I laugh about this because at some party or another, he would say in a say in a loud voice, “Eh, oovray la fenetre la ba, Jacques (Open the window over there, Jacques.).” He deliberately spoke French with a kind of Kentucky accent. (laughter) I can’t remember whether that was a story that was told to me or whether I experienced that. Then, Kennan was the next one and then Elbrick. I guess I experienced Elbrick, too, at the end.

Q: Well, we might as well talk about the Ambassador. What was your impression of Kennan?

LIVINGSTON: Well, you know, Kennan was a bad ambassador, I thought. He was lovely; so was his wife. I wouldn’t say he took a shine to me, but he had this project of getting officers to write up little studies, and I think I was one of the few that took it
seriously. Again the academic background. By that time, I had my Ph.D. The great thing about being in Salzburg was that I didn’t have to work too hard and I was able to finish my dissertation and I got my Ph.D. in ’59, when I was already in the Foreign Service. In retrospect, I’m glad I did because it gave me an out from the Foreign Service in the end. So I took this seriously and I enjoyed it and I wrote a study of Nineteenth Century Serbia, a couple of the Obrenovic kings or something and Kennan liked that. I was in the economics section; I was not in the political section so I really still wasn’t part of the quote “elite,” but I was getting there. Usually, it went consular then economics, then finally, when I got to Berlin, I was in the political section. It was a good economics section, though, because Larry Eagleburger was in the economics section. He and I were together in the economics section. Kennan was marvelous, but he was emotional, very emotional. Even I could tell that. This is partly gossip form the people in the political section including Jim Lowenstein who was there then. But he reacted very personally and he felt almost betrayed by Tito personally when the Soviets violated the Test Ban stop and Tito didn’t condemn them.

Q: This was, of course, particularly bad because they’d had this nonaligned conference...

LIVINGSTON: That’s right.

Q: …of all the top… Sukarno.

LIVINGSTON: Were you there?

Q: No, I wasn’t but we all heard about it and all these nonaligned people and all of a sudden the Soviets set off a massive explosion and...

LIVINGSTON: Tito didn’t condemn it.

Q: Tito didn’t condemn it and basically said, “Well, Soviet explosions are peaceful and American ones aren’t,” or something like that.

LIVINGSTON: Something like that and Kennan was just…well, he took it personally. That’s something that struck me, even then about Kennan, that he took these things personally. And I remember…Is that coffee or tea?

Q: It’s tea. Do you want some?

LIVINGSTON: I remember something happened… I remember he was personally insulted. It was maybe Adlai Stevenson and Mrs. Katherine Graham came on a yacht. Katherine Graham’s husband must have been alive then. They visited Tito on Brioni and Kennan wasn’t invited - was either invited later or something… I don’t remember the details, but he took it very, very personally. But I had some wonderful times with them. I remember going to a luncheon there because I spoke Serbian and he’d invited some genuine Serbian peasant to a luncheon. We had a wonderful luncheon. The peasant really conducted himself like a little king sitting at the ambassador’s table in his Serbian outfit.
and he wasn’t humble or anything. He told the ambassador right off and... So, I don’t think I was the ambassador’s favorite or anything but he made me feel, and Jeanne, as well, that we were closer than some other people. It may have not been true.

Q: Could you comment...I was chief of the Consular Section during part of this time and so I was off to one side but there was a thing where Congress was taking...could you explain what that was?

LIVINGSTON: Well, my recollection had to do with Most Favored Nation treatment of Yugoslavia. Kennan, before he left Washington, Kennedy had said to him as he had to some other ambassadors, “You be in touch with me anytime you have something. It doesn’t have to be just your country.” And I remember Kennan at the time the Berlin Wall was built, which was August of 1961, sent stuff in commenting on the German situation. It wasn’t paid any attention to, and we knew that it wasn’t paid any attention to, you know. He, I think, was wounded by that. This must have been ’62 or something like that when Most Favored Nation thing came up.

Q: Yes, probably ’62 or ’63.

LIVINGSTON: Something like that and I remember, this is my recollection. Memories are faulty, but he put in a call to Kennedy on the open line to the White House. Kennedy took the call from him and Kennan said “You’ve got to do something about this MFN thing.” And Kennedy said, “Well, George, I’ll have this call transferred to Wilbur Mills.” He didn’t say anything but, “I’ll have this call transferred to Wilbur Mills.” And he switched to Wilbur Mills. Kennan deliberately talked on the open line to show the Yugoslavs how much influence he had, you know, talking to the president and getting things done. Of course, he showed he had no influence. And then, not only did that happen, but he convened a staff meeting, in which I was at sitting in the very back row, I think; and he told us about this, in his office, you know.

Q: I think I must have been at that meeting, too. I remember having it explained to me that this MFN thing... there was something, a Kennedy round of negotiations and all, and this was some ‘red meat’ to toss to the conservatives, the Neanderthals of the right about taking Yugoslavia off the Most Favored Nations but nothing would happen because of procedural matters, it took so long and so it was just a charade in order to...

LIVINGSTON: You know better than I do.

Q: Well, that was just the way it was put to me and that Kennan was taking this very personally when he didn’t really understand American politics and nothing was going to happen to Yugoslavia. It just was a rough patch and he should be explaining it.

LIVINGSTON: Well, that doesn’t contradict with what I remember. I don’t remember those details but that would fit, that would fit very well.

Q: But I had the same impression you did that he really didn’t understand America, I
mean the political system and he thought he was bigger than…

LIVINGSTON: Yes, I think he had a great ego, and he was the great foreign policy expert, you know. His X article had already been published and so on. I mean, Kennedy was not honest with him. We know now that Kennedy was a master politician. He told that to Galbraith and some others, “Anytime you want to call me on anything, fine,” and Kennan believed him, you know.

Q: Kennedy had sort of at least three, if not more, Reischauer in Japan, Galbraith in India, and Kennan in Yugoslavia who were great figures in sort of the intellectual university world and it helped add the glamour to the Kennedy aura which really was more in looks than in substance.

LIVINGSTON: Galbraith was smarter because Galbraith… I’ve just finished marvelous memoirs, because they’re so catty, by Gore Vidal called Palimpsest and he (I don’t think he likes Galbraith.) was briefly part of the Kennedy court, Vidal was. He says what Galbraith did was write Jackie letters, long letters about India. He didn’t write the President, he wrote Jackie! And numbered them all, and Vidal says, rather cynically, “Yes, yes, as soon as Ken gets back, he’ll turn all these letters into a book. The numbers are just chapter headings. (Laughter) They were. Kennan wasn’t smart enough to do that or wasn’t hypocritical enough or whatever. Nice man, but also something else about Kennan… Jim Lowenstein believed he was quite anti-Semitic, you know, and I’m not Jewish so I can’t...

Q: Jim was Jewish.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, and he probably felt that. I think there is something to that. In fact, I know there’s something to it through the fact that his middle daughter married Jewish. In fact, the middle daughter was the second wife of somebody who owned our house who a had been a Jewish advisor and Bobby Kennedy’s staff man in 1961 when he was attorney general. So, there’s something to that, and Lowenstein probably felt that. In fact, I’ve heard him make anti-Semitic remarks, myself.

Q: What was the situation, as you saw it, in Belgrade in the ‘61-64 period?

LIVINGSTON: In retrospect, I think it was absolutely incredible… Who was the ambassador then, in 1948? I think it was Allen… you know, that he could get the Congress to support this communist country at the height of McCarthyism when it wasn’t by any means sure. I remember from my student days, they were still communist as hell; in fact, they were more communist. So when I got there, we were still doing the same thing we began doing in ‘49, giving them support to keep them out of the hands of the Russians. So I think that policy was still part of it. I was in the economics section and we had an AID mission, too. So, we were giving some aid. I think it was a relatively large AID mission, in retrospect, and so I was able to travel around the country a lot. So we were supporting Tito. We thought he might go for the Russians. So I think it was a continuation of the policy that we began in 1949.
Q: What was your impression of the Yugoslav economic system?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I must say, I did realize, because I started to work on worker’s councils again, that there was a vast difference between the north and the south. And to some degree the worker’s councils in Slovenia, because they had certain traditions, social democratic traditions that came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, there may have been something to them, but otherwise the councils were a total sham. The economic differences in per capita GNP between Macedonia and Slovenia were wide. I think one had very much the feeling that there were tensions in the country between the north and the south particularly between Slovenia and the others on economics. The Slovenians felt they were being exploited for the benefit of the south. Not that one could, say, foresee the breakup of Yugoslavia. Again, I may be projecting from what has happened since, but I think we were aware of the nationalist tensions, particularly between Serbs and Croats. While we were there, Tito got rid of Rankovic, the head of the UDBA, and that was really a move. He was a Serb. I must say I had a certain amount of admiration for Tito.

I personally had admiration for Tito as a tough, ruthless politician who was quite successful. Now, I don’t think one could say we were, as outsiders, aware of the extent of nationalist tensions, but there were nationalist tensions. I think we were aware of that. I did get to travel quite a lot throughout the country with the then head of the economics section, a guy named Cleveland, who was at the same time head of the AID mission.

Q: Well, those were the glory days, in a way, of the Foreign Service. We covered that country like a blanket. We went to every little village, minor place that you can think of.

LIVINGSTON: I think we regarded it as and it really was - a great victory that we had been able to quote “detach” Tito. I’m sure historians have looked at this, but I really think it was a remarkable success of a kind a realpolitik that we were able to do that.

Q: I agree. My attitude and I don’t want to ascribe it to others was that Tito was taking this disparate group of nationalities and maybe forging them into a real nation and the youth would understand that they’d intermarry and they were too civilized to really go to war against each other.

LIVINGSTON: I don’t think I ever contemplated the prospect of there ever being war again. I must say, you realize how little you know about a country. Most people didn’t talk to us about things like the Ustashe massacres and things of that sort, you know. I knew they’d occurred and I knew more of that when I was a student in Zagreb and even in Belgrade. In Zagreb, I did feel, when I was a student there with my wife in ’55...there I did feel a lot of Croatian nationalist feeling.

Q: The only real nationalist feeling I got was from our language teachers who were Serbs and I learned all about the Ustashe and St. Francis and the burning of the Serbs in the cathedral in Glena and that sort of thing. I got that prior to my arrival, but when I got
to Yugoslavia, you never heard that.

LIVINGSTON: Well, I didn’t take language there. I knew Serbian before I went into the Foreign Service.

Q: What was your impression of how well the embassy interfaced with the other embassies. I mean, where were we as far as...

LIVINGSTON: We had a lot to do with the Brits. Probably our best friends were a first secretary at the British embassy, who subsequently, I think, may have even become ambassador in Peking. We went out to the countryside with them lots of times. Morgan. Her name was Julian and he was Michael, I think. And, in some respects, I think we were closer friends with them than we were with anyone in the American Embassy except maybe Jim Lowenstein. And we went out to the country with them quite a lot and, again, I did what I did when I was a student. I tried to get out in the country a lot and, as you say, we were able to move around pretty freely. We went everywhere. I always had the feeling, you know, the way I did with the SPD, that there was a hidden sort of branch of the Yugoslav government that dealt with the Russians, you know, and with the East, that they bifurcated. The guys that we dealt with were the “western” guys, you know, and they were sort of cleared to be with us and they came to our dinner parties and our luncheons, but that there was another group who dealt with the Russians. Tito kept these two things separate.

Q: Well, there were good, solid visits when I was there from ’62 to ’67 both with Khrushchev, and later with Brezhnev.

LIVINGSTON: That’s right. When Khrushchev came, we were on vacation. I think I recall being in Bled with my wife when Khrushchev came. I may be wrong on that.

Q: He had been there, obviously, before but Khrushchev had stopped that Stalinist separation and Brezhnev, himself, and they were getting closer.

LIVINGSTON: Well, I really felt that there were, as I say, two tracks on which they were operating.

Q: How about when Burke Elbrick came as ambassador? Did you get any feeling for him?

LIVINGSTON: No, not really. We’d go to these ambassadorial dinner parties. I can’t say one way or another.

Q: I was wondering if you’d care to comment on the staff of the American embassy?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I did think, and that probably is a product of the fact that I’d been there twice already; I did feel that they were somewhat insular. Larry was in the throes of getting divorced from his first wife.
Q: Muriel, yes.

LIVINGSTON: ...and his girlfriend, now wife, was our secretary in the Economic Section.

Q: Marlene, yes.

LIVINGSTON: Marlene Heineman, yes. And I remember coming in one Saturday morning to find her - and she was a fairly tough woman - crying over her typewriter and I thought, “There must be something here.” (Laughter) I couldn’t figure out exactly what it was. I was a product of my era, and of the Army, and the Cold War and I tended to admire hierarchy, to not think much about the people above, and do my duty - maybe in a rather narrowminded way. As you get older, you may think differently, but I did not question things particularly. I did not think highly of the head of the head of the Political Section, a guy named Alex Johnpoll. I did have a run-in with him because I was friendly with the New York Times correspondent David Binder, who I see right down to the present day. We just saw the Binders on New Year’s Day. When the Skopje earthquake occurred, the Economic Section was primarily involved, and I went down to Skopje quite a lot.

Q: This is June of ’63, because I lived in a tent there for three weeks.

LIVINGSTON: Larry was there in spring.

Q: Yes, Larry went after me. I was with the hospital, the MASH unit.

LIVINGSTON: Right, well, I remember I saw quite a lot of Binder and the New York Times got the story that we were sending an Army engineer unit. The Russians were sending some sort of demolition team to blow up the buildings that were teetering, and our propaganda line was, “We’re going to build; the Russians may destroy.” And we sent an engineer company from somewhere in Germany. Binder got the story and Johnpoll thought that I had leaked it to him. Maybe I had, I don’t remember. (Laughter) It came out on the day before the company was due to arrive, but in any case, I didn’t think highly of Johnpoll. Let’s see, who was the DCM?

Q: It was Eric Kocher, and Ray Lisle before that.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, Ray Lisle. I didn’t think much of either. He was a bachelor. He was very much of a traditional, old fashioned Foreign Service officer. Eric Kocher, I liked. He was an intellectual, actually, quite an intellectual, and I think he wrote novels after he left the Foreign Service.

Q: Oh, yes.

LIVINGSTON: And he liked my parents-in-law, who were European. I can’t tell how
good he was as an administrator or anything of that sort. I generally think we had this feeling, which was misplaced probably misplaced, you know, “We’re on the forefront, brave band of brothers in this almost Iron Curtain country, almost Iron Curtain. We aren’t suffering as much as those in Sofia, you know, but we’re really suffering, and it’s really tough here.” I guess there was a hardship allowance. Ten percent. (Laughter)

Q: Yes, but it was a great...very fun.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, it was great but it wasn’t really hardship, but you had the feeling it was hardship.

Q: You were part of the elite.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, that’s right. There was a lot of that feeling. That came from the successful policy in Yugoslavia, and you really could get around. You weren’t cooped-up the way I assume they were in Bucharest or places like that. And you’d go to Budapest on weekends, places like that. So I do remember it as a very pleasant time, and a little bit of suffering, well not suffering but a little bit of hard conditions. One thing I do remember. There was a Foreign Service inspection and we had the chief inspector, Perry Something, Perry Culley, I think.

Q: Yes, Perry. He later ended up in Paris.

LIVINGSTON: Could be, yes. He was really, you know, “Enjoy your life.” I remember him seriously saying to us, “Look, you should get out of this European Bureau. You should go and specialize in Latin America because in Latin America, you can get all the servants you want.” (Laughter) That was his argument, you know. Anyway, we had four in Belgrade. But that was his argument, you know. Maybe they were trying to get people to work in Latin America. I thought, “My God, what kind of argument is that!” That was my puritanical, New England background. I thought it was terrible. (Laughter) Anyway, I thought it was, quote, a “good embassy,” a lot of fun and I remember great things happening like some motorcade with Tito right in front of the embassy let loose a peace dove and the dove flew through the window and-

Q: Actually, they were pheasants...

LIVINGSTON: Were they?…and fell dead on the desk of the embassy security officer.

Q: We had two that broke windows. They let these damn pheasants go. And those pheasants are big. One got through to the apartment where I lived and one in the embassy (Laughter).

LIVINGSTON: Let’s see…well, you’ve corrected my historical memory. There were pheasants in that pigeon coop.

Q: Oh, I remember those...(Laughter)
LIVINGSTON: So, there were a lot of fun incidents like that. You could get out into the country and you could meet the Serbian peasants. I had a friend who was an anthropologist at the University of Massachusetts doing a study at a Serbian village, you know, and I was able to go down and visit with him.

_Q: Well, I remember, speaking about the Skopje earthquake, I went down there the day after the earthquake with some other British colleagues and all, and I ended up about three weeks there with this hospital. Tito came down about two days later on his Blue Train and he made a very perfunctory tour and the people did not cheer him. He just kind of came in, took a look, and took off again. He was there about an hour or two which, in my mind, I always kind of wondered about. He didn’t seem to have that “touch.”_

LIVINGSTON: Well, in Skopje, there are some anecdotes that are interesting. I do remember Larry visiting there, and he made a big splash. He lived in a tent but he wore a white scarf and always wore a beautiful suit and maybe even carried a cane, did something like that. Let’s see… anecdotes… I do remember the Secretary of Agriculture…

_Q: Freeman._

LIVINGSTON: Orville Freeman… coming to Belgrade and going to Skopje. I remember a speech where he said, “We Americans are very happy to have contributed to your disaster.” (Laughter) That was one of the better stories I remember. I remember also going down six and nine months afterwards to see some of the housing that the engineer unit had set up. There were Gypsies camped in the housing and their campfires in the middle were burning a hole in the middle of the floor. Remember that?

_Q: Oh, yes. That turned out to be not a place you’d want to take anybody, to Gypsyville._

LIVINGSTON: That’s right. I remember that, and were there any other stories about Skopje? I remember flying down in the Air attaché’s airplane, which was a DC-3. I got on the airplane. This was 1963, and I poked the guy next to me and said, “Look at that.” As you came up the steps into the plane, there was a plaque saying, “Reconditioned 1946.” (Laughter) And I knew that the pilot deviated from the corridors in order to take photographs from the plane angled down into Bulgaria. I thought, “This guy’s stupid.” I don’t know how I knew but I knew he wasn’t following the Vardar River, you know. He deviated as much as he could, and I’m sure he got to sneak some pictures of Bulgarian troop deployments or some damn thing.

_Q: I have to tell my Skopje story that I was told when they sent the hospital down, an American military hospital, which did some work. Some Yugoslav said, “The story is, the Americans sent a hospital down and the Soviets donated to the library a complete set of the Collected Works of Stalin.” (Laughter)_

LIVINGSTON: It was still very much the Soviet-American rivalry, that was what the
name of the game was. That was the name of the game of our policy throughout the world, you know, and that’s why Yugoslavia was fun because we were successful at it. That’s one, by God, where we’d succeeded. That’s what made it so good, you know.

Q: Well, I think, also, too and I’d like your opinion on this. I sort of have the feeling that Yugoslavia was a real flash point that if, like Berlin in a different way, if Yugoslavia broke up, that, sure as hell, the Soviets would come in and we wouldn’t stand for it and we would send troops in. I’ve thought that, if it didn’t hold together for Tito, it could become a battle ground.

LIVINGSTON: I can’t recall that. I’m not saying I never thought that Yugoslavia was in danger of splitting up. I never thought that the Soviets were going to invade by that time. The Political Section may have written reports on this. We were competing for their kind of allegiance and loyalty or whatever. That’s certainly true and I did feel, I think that we were being taken advantage of by them. The non-aligned conference was exasperating - Tito’s behavior.

Q: Well, they were doing the normal non-aligned thing of essentially beating up on the United States when they were all together but when they would talk to us individually, it would be a different face.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, but, as I say, and I’m repeating myself, I always had the feeling that we were talking to one bunch of guys and then they had another bunch of guys to talk to the Soviets.

Q: Well, why don’t we stop here and we’ll pick it up next time. In ’64, you go where?

LIVINGSTON: I go to Berlin.

Q: All right, so we’ll go to Berlin in 1964.

LIVINGSTON: All right.

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Q: Today is the third of March 1998. Gerry, you’re off to Berlin. You were in Berlin from ’64 to when?

LIVINGSTON: ’64 to ’68.

Q: What were you doing in Berlin?

LIVINGSTON: I was first Deputy Head and then I was head of the Eastern Affairs Division which was basically the division that dealt with East German Affairs. We called it Eastern Affairs. It was not called the GDR section, because we had no diplomatic relations with the GDR.
Q: In ’64, could you describe what was the situation with Germany when you arrived.

LIVINGSTON: There was still, three years later, the echoes of the crisis of ’58 to ‘61 that ended more or less with the building of the Wall. You still had the feeling that everything you did was monitored on an hourly basis by Washington and that this was still potentially the flash point of East-West confrontation. Soon after I got there in June of 1964, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with the GDR which, more or less, in our interpretation (those of us in the Eastern Affairs Division headed by Frank Meehan, who was an old Soviet hand), put an end to the uncertainties, which made it clear that the Soviet Union was signing on to the status quo and was not going to try to change it. You got the feeling, you know, that the Soviets, prompted by the East Germans, otherwise might try to make a grab for East Berlin.

Q: When you say the status quo, what had been the concern?

LIVINGSTON: The concern had been, as the Kennedy tapes during the Cuban Missile Crisis show now, how, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis which was the Fall of ’62, the feeling had very much been that Berlin and Cuba were tied together, that Khrushchev was using the Cuban Missile Crisis to force us out of Berlin or, if we reacted in a hard line, this is what the tapes show, with some sort of a strike against Cuba that Khrushchev might respond with an attack on West Berlin. Of course, we were very clear that this was militarily not to be held, that it was very vulnerable. There was still a feeling that was very much - though it diminished as time went along - of the beleaguered city, the outpost of freedom and all that business. It could all be traced back to the Berlin Blockade.

Q: In Berlin itself, when you arrived in ’64, what was the spirit? Was it a mission?

LIVINGSTON: It was called a mission, a U.S. mission. Basically, it was a military mission. In theory and, I think, in international law, the city was still under occupation status. We rather emphasized that because we also emphasized, against the facts on the ground, that this was a four-power city and that, even though there was a wall, we had access - we being the American occupying authority - to East Berlin on the basis of so-called four-power rights, and we did not have to deal with the East Germans. One of the sort of hang-ups, big hang-ups, was, “Do not have any dealings with the East Germans.” That would tend to undermine this four-power, I wouldn’t say fiction, but certainly only a de facto status. And I remember riding over to East Berlin with the then ambassador, who was the chief of mission in Berlin when he came to Berlin since he was the heir to the position of the military governor of Germany and the heir to the position of the high commissioner of Germany. We were riding over to East Berlin with George McGhee and his wife and daughter in their limousine and the East German guard came up to us and McGhee pulled out his passport, and I said, “Put that damn passport back.”

Q: Well, were you able to sample the feeling of the Germans in West Berlin at the time?
LIVINGSTON: Well, that wasn’t part of my duties. I mean, we obviously had acquaintances. I think, generally, one did have the feeling that, even then, I mean this is all hindsight, that the city was drained and that the people that remained were second-raters. Brandt, by that time, had left. He had already been candidate for chancellor once. German industry had left, of course, right after the war. The city existed on subsidies from Bonn. There was a great deal of artificiality about the situation. The people who were there, even lots of my friends, and who wanted to get ahead in their careers left Berlin and went down to the Federal Republic and made their careers there. Even though they may have been Berlin patriots and swore they would come back and even though the Parliament went through this routine of holding committee meetings in Berlin from time to time still you had a feeling that it was a lot of bravado and a lot of Chamber of Commerce hype but beneath it the city was not in too good shape.

Q: How about our mission? Was there concern among you and others who were dealing with this at the political level about the ultimate survival of Berlin, of West Berlin?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I don’t know. I guess my perspective was too narrow then and I wasn’t concerned with West Berlin. One of the interesting things with a large mission was that you had a lot of interaction with the military. This was very much in the tradition, which even dates back to the Second World War, of political-military affairs and a big effort to maintain cordial relations with the military. You had the feeling that the U.S. Army sent some of their very good people. There was a commandant of Berlin, who was an Army major general. By the time I got there, they were no longer destined for four star rank, so it was clear the Army wasn’t sending their very best people. I still think there was a feeling that the Russians might try to grab this one day. An interesting aspect of it was that you were involved in a lot of details of city administration, you know, and concerned with public safety and working with the Berlin police and things like that. I wasn’t but my colleagues were.

Q: Let’s talk about how you dealt with your area of competence which was both East Berlin and East Germany.

LIVINGSTON: In theory, yes, but in point of fact, it was for us still the heyday of Kremlinology, which by that time was much less used in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe where you could get around, because of our attitude that, “We don’t have any dealings with these guys, these East Germans.” There was very little official contact with the East Germans. So it was Kremlinology in the sense that we spent a lot of time reading the East German newspapers. The only operative work we did, basically, was in relation to Americans who had been arrested in the GDR and there we dealt through German lawyers to get them out. Frank Meehan started that. He was involved already in the Abel-Powers exchange which I think was ’62.

Q: This was Colonel...

LIVINGSTON: Abel, the Soviet spy and Gary Powers, the man they shot down…
Q: The U-2 incident.

LIVINGSTON: ...and they were exchanged on the Glienicker Bruecke, the bridge that ran from West Berlin to Potsdam. That was one of the first of several exchanges. Frank was one of the first people involved in that. We got involved then with an East German lawyer who had been cleared by the East German government and was working with the East German government to handle these exchanges and handle prisoner exchanges. When a young American would get thrown in jail, his family would hire a lawyer over here, and they would come over and he’d deal with the East Germans. So we were kind of facilitators when we dealt with one West Berlin and one East Berlin lawyer. Subsequently, one of them became quite famous actually. This East German had a monopoly on prisoner exchanges.

Q: Well, I would have thought it would have been a difficult job and sort of frustrating to be,,, at least the Kremlinologists in the Soviet Union could talk to officials one way or another there and here you are looking... it’s almost like being inside North Korea, and not being able to talk to anyone.

LIVINGSTON: It was rather hard but Berlin is a very pleasant city so you had plenty of diversions. That did change, and I guess I was the person that sort of fell into it. I don’t know how it happened. I started by 1966 or 1967, meeting fairly regularly with a man who made it clear that he was sort of the confidant of the Minister-President of East Germany, Willi Stoph. We met periodically every two weeks, every 10 days or whatever for a chat about politics and economics and this and that in the Opera Cafe Unter den Linden in East Berlin. I’d write a report and he’d get back and he’d write a report. It’s sort of curious. I just received a letter three days ago from the archives of the East German secret police files that I have a file of 160 pages and that I can now come over and look at it, so I’m sort of curious what this guy wrote about me (laughter).

Q: It does sort of sound “spy vs. spy.”

LIVINGSTON: Well, the Agency, the CIA, was very big in Berlin. They had operations going over there, at least they liked you to think they had operations going. We did go a lot to the theater in East Berlin and try to follow the intellectual world. We could meet and did meet with intellectuals and writers to the degree they it wasn’t dangerous for them. I guess, in retrospect, I wish I’d done much more of that. I did have a very good friend who was a leading actor at the Brecht Company, you know, and we used to see him and his wife quite regularly. Jeanne, my wife, and I used to go over. He was this kind of a “golden boy.” We used to go touring on the lakes. We occasionally got out of East Berlin on those lakes that are on the borderline, you know, and in retrospect, I suppose we could have done a lot more. We were conscious we were being watched. This was partly my experience from Yugoslavia. You didn’t want to endanger somebody by being too pushy. So I sort of took the attitude that they would let us know if it was any danger for them. A couple of times that did happen, and we didn’t see the people again. I really felt, maybe exaggeratedly, I didn’t want to endanger anybody by having contact with a person who might get in trouble with the authorities.
Q: Were you getting the feeling that the people in East Berlin were pretty well informed about what was happening in West Berlin?

LIVINGSTON: Oh, yes, sure, because there was radio and television throughout the entire existence of the GDR. Television became fairly widespread in the late 1950s. The East Germans were incredibly well informed about what was going on in West Germany and in the West because they saw West German television and they heard West German radio. We had this radio in the American sector, RIAS, which was, I guess, an American-owned radio station and rather important at the time of the 1953 uprising. By broadcasting factual bulletins about what was going, RIAS let the people in Magdeburg know that there were people on the streets in Berlin and people in Leipzig know people were on the streets in Magdeburg and so on.

Q: Did you ever have to be concerned about being set up?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I was a little nervous about that but one’s attitude was, “If you’re going to get in trouble, don’t talk to an East German, demand a Russian.” There were a number of people before me who, if not cowboy-like, were at least daring fellows. One had a girlfriend in Warsaw, who in effect did what he wanted to do. He’d drive down to Warsaw from Berlin through the GDR.

Q: Were you allowed to do that?

LIVINGSTON: No, theoretically not, and I guess he was showing his passport to the East Germans. We went back and forth to Berlin. If you didn’t go by air from West Germany, which the East Germans didn’t control, you went by Army train. There was this great Army train every night. It was still the Cold War, a little bit this James Bond type of stuff and, as I say, the Agency was very present in Berlin. Berlin was, during the Cold War along with Vienna, THE spy capital. They had all kinds of operations against each other, the western and eastern spy organizations.

Q: Were you getting anything useful from the Agency?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I must say, I always had the feeling, having been in that type of work earlier, that you didn’t see everything, not by a long shot. I must say that what I was permitted to see was not very enlightening, as a general rule, but they certainly had a lot of operations. That may have been bureaucratic. We talked to a lot of West Germans who were working on the GDR, and the SPD had had a big net in East Germany right down to the wall and even after the Wall. I already then had the feeling, which I subsequently found out was so, there was a hell of a lot more going on between the two Germanies than we knew about or that the West Germans were telling us about. We did have regular meetings with the West Germans who ran the so-called inter-zonal trade operation. How much they confided in us I don’t know, but it was a regular meeting to impart information. It was once a month or so about how trade between the two Germanies which still had the sort of quaint occupation status name of “inter-zonal trade.”
**Q: Were you watching the economic side of East Germany?**

LIVINGSTON: Yes, we had one guy. This was the heyday, as you know. The large, overstaffed mission in Eastern affairs. Working on the GDR, we had four maybe five people. We had Frank Meehan. We had William Woessner. We had Richard Smyser and we had one or two other people from time to time so we had four or five people all the time working on East Germany.

**Q: And, at the same time, you really weren’t able to talk to anybody.**

LIVINGSTON: Well, I mean we did talk to some people. We talked to West Germans who were working on the GDR, the newspapers, men who had contacts with some East Germans. Generally, I tended to stick with intellectuals, because we thought they had a little bit of carte blanche to talk to foreigners. There were then some opera singers who had permission to sing in the West. The great German theater, the Brecht Company, was still stronger than subsequently. Even then it was becoming somewhat routine but it was still quite creative. Then there was the jewel in the East German crown, which was the comic opera “Felsenstein.” We went to a lot of performances there. Basically, we thought this was a West German problem. We didn’t want to get ahead of the West Germans. We didn’t recognize East Germany until well after the West Germans and after the British and the French. We always were in the wake of the Federal Republic, believing, “This is important to the West Germans. It’s not important to us, particularly.” There was some minor American interest but even there not a helluva lot.

**Q: I think one of the scenarios that I used to hear around this time and really for the next 30 years or so, was that something might happen in East Germany whether it be riots or something, the West Germans might get involved and then all of a sudden we’d have World War III.**

LIVINGSTON: Well, yes, looking back on it maybe it was stupidity, but I never thought that that was very much of a real possibility. I think that was colored a good deal by the 1953 uprising and then, of course, there was the ’56 revolutions in Hungary and Poland. But by my time, I don’t think we ever operated on the premise that there was going to be an East German uprising.

**Q: Were you able, or was it your responsibility for looking at East Germany as country dealing with other countries because East Germany had a rather aggressive stance?**

LIVINGSTON: Oh, yes, sure. We followed that through the paper. I should say one other quote “source,” though, I would really put with some question marks, was a military one. There was a military mission is Potsdam which was a vestige of the four-power occupation of Germany. There was British one, a French one, and an American one in the GDR. And there was a Soviet one in each of the former Western zones, a Soviet one in Baden-Baden, a Soviet one in Moenchengladbach, I think, and a Soviet one in, maybe, Heidelberg in the former American zone. They were kind of authorized spies. They
traveled around in uniform. It was kind of a cops and robbers game. They’d try to observe some Soviet military units wherever they could. Sometimes they’d get caught and get into trouble. It was headed by a colonel, usually a Russian-speaking colonel, and five or six fellows from military intelligence. They went all over East Germany. There were forbidden areas, but they went all over in their jeeps. We used to meet with them fairly often and talk about East Germany. Then, of course, there were analysts at RIAS, the radio station in the American sector, because, of course, their job was to broadcast to East Germany. Also, they had some sources, and we’d talk to them. So, we didn’t have much if any contact with official East Germans, and not too much with East German non-officials. We never got out of East Berlin, which was another big drawback. We did have indirectly other sources than the newspapers, and we did follow the diplomatic activities there.

Q: I was going to say the diplomatic activities, the East Germans had made quite a name for themselves. I’m not sure if it was this time or a little later about setting up some secret police activities to support some rather nasty people.

LIVINGSTON: Oh, yes. Germans are good policemen right down to the present day and their main objective right down to the very end was to gain international recognition outside the Warsaw Pact. The West German response was the so-called Hallstein Doctrine which said that they would break relations with any country that recognized East Germany. Then, they started making exceptions when they started founding trade missions in East Europe.

Q: Right.

LIVINGSTON: They started making more exceptions. And they finally - I can’t remember when it was - the East Germans achieved some breakthroughs in Egypt and elsewhere and they gradually expanded their diplomatic presence. They were quite active in the Third World. Most of West German aid to the Third World, it was then called the Third World, had one aim in mind and that was to prevent other countries from recognizing the GDR. India used that very effectively against West Germany and got a lot more aid than they probably otherwise would have gotten. East German aid was technical aid, since they didn’t have any money. Among the technical aid they provided was aid to the police in South Yemen, and in a number of other countries, I’m not sure which ones they were, but East Germans were there all right. And they gave, as time went along, training to Palestinians.

Q: What was the general feeling about the East German economy at that time?

LIVINGSTON: Again, I think we exaggerated but we thought that they were much stronger than they evidently were, you know. That was partly, I think, because we compared them to the Soviet Union. Most of the people who worked on the GDR came out of a Soviet specialty in the Foreign Service. Meehan was a good example. I think they tended sub-consciously to compare East Germany to the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe. By that comparison, the East Germans were considerably
ahead, you know, and I think that distorted our views right down to the end. It distorted
the views of the West Germans, too. In retrospect, the West Germans were not good
analysts of East Germany, they were poor analysts of East Germany.

Q: Was there concern about East German espionage within elements of the West German
government while you were there?

LIVINGSTON: Yes, I think one did have the feeling that it was fairly easy to penetrate. I
know the Agency felt that way. You’d talk to Agency people about the West German
government, particularly the Social Democrats. There was in 1963, maybe, something
like that, one well known case of an SPD Bundestag deputy who was an agent for the
Czechs and there have been several since. There’s a guy that they just sentenced recently
on the basis of materials uncovered subsequently in the GDR. I think there was a
tendency to not fully trust them, the Social Democrats. There was also concern, I think,
that the East Germans had penetrations of the U.S. Mission among the local employees.
There were a lot of Agency-sponsored organizations, Committee for Free-Jurists or
something like that, which, during the ‘50s and on into the ‘60s up until the Wall, put a
spoke in their wheel, but even beyond, which had been actively working in East
Germany, though not carrying on sabotage, gathering information and helping people to
escape and that sort of stuff. So, such groups were a prime target for intelligence. A lot of
that continued afterwards. There was a lot of intelligence work going on.

Q: During this time, were there any particular incidents that come to mind, of tensions or
problems?

LIVINGSTON: We were mostly concerned with the prisoners, American prisoners, you
know, and there were some colorful episodes with colorful prisoners, people would get
out of jail, and so on. I guess the other thing we were watching, although the people that
worked on West Berlin were watching it more, were the beginnings of the effort by the
Social Democrats, who were, of course, in the government in Berlin, to initiate contacts
with East Germany. When the Wall went up, they initiated what they called a policy of
small steps, passes for Christmas visits and so on. I think we were uneasy about that.

I do remember when Kiesinger came in, in 1966, when Erhard fell and they constituted
the “grand coalition,” i.e. the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. We also
had the Berlin Document Center, which was a hot potato because it had a large number of
Nazi files. There was quite an effort to find out whether Kiesinger had been a member of
the Nazi Party, which he had, and whether he’d been any more than that. I remember a
friend of mine who was a reporter for the Washington Post, who, in effect, offered me a
bribe if I could go in there and discover if Kiesinger had been an SS man or something.

Q: Who was the mayor of West Berlin when you were there?

LIVINGSTON: I think Brandt was mayor down to just when I got there. I think it was
then Klaus Schutz, but I couldn’t absolutely swear to that.
Q: He wasn’t a major figure, then, was he?

LIVINGSTON: No, Brandt was the last major figure. Then he left. All talent was drained away, because if you wanted to make a career, you couldn’t make a career in Berlin. And when it was no longer in the public eye, I think, it was kind of a pain in the neck to the Bonn government in lots of ways. Right down to the present day the quality of the political talent in Berlin is still second-rate, even third-rate.

Q: Well, you left there in ’68.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, that’s right. Then I went to Bonn. I may have left in ’69. The guy who has the Foreign Service list will have that information. I think I may have left in the summer of ’68 and then came to Bonn in the fall of ’68, as I recall.

Q: Approximately, from ’68 to when were you there?

LIVINGSTON: I was there until ’70 or ’71 and there I was the Number Two in the Political Section and worked mainly on the continuation of Ostpolitik and what the Germans were doing with the East because we still, I think, were somewhat suspicious of what the hell they were doing.

Q: The West Germans.

LIVINGSTON: The West Germans, yes. Have you interviewed Jonathan Dean?

Q: I’m doing it now.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, well he came in toward the end of my time and basically preempted me. He outranked me, had much more experience. He also a lot of experience in Germany, and this was clearly a big career jump for him. He preempted most of my work. He was a very hard worker and wrote incredible reports. It was clear to me that I wasn’t going to get anywhere in Bonn with Dean there, so I was just as happy, then, to leave in ’70. Then I went to the Council on Foreign Relations, where I ran a study group for a year on East Germany.

Q: Let’s talk about ’68-70. What were we concerned about with the West Germans and East Germans? You say we were concerned that “things might be happening.”

LIVINGSTON: I think our general feeling was that they weren’t telling us everything. Our whole position in Berlin was based on a continuation, odd as it may seem 20 years after the war, of these Four-Power rights. Dealing with an anathematized communist regime like the East German was based on the West Germans telling us, “You mustn’t recognize these guys; you’ve got to uphold your position in Berlin.” We were basically trustees for West Germany in Berlin.

At the same time they were telling us, “Don’t recognize East Germany. Hang on to your
Four Power status.” We had been used to having the “big word” there. Behind our backs, the Social Democrats were dealing with East Germany and, goodness knows, did they tell us everything?

Q: Was there a concern of the West Germans going “soft,” that if there could be some sort of amalgamation between West Germany and East Germany, they might opt for that?

LIVINGSTON: Yes, we saw this happen in 1990. This was of much greater concern to the Brits and the French than us. They were concerned that the Germanies would get together and united Germany would be a big power again. They conveyed some of that to us. 1990 proved the case, but we weren’t as worried about that as the Brits and the French. And, of course, the other factor was the party politics of it. While I was in Bonn, in September of 1969, of course the Social Democrats actually didn’t win the election but they were able to pry away the Free Democrats from the coalition with the CDU. We had a lot of people in Bonn on election night and they made a big mistake. They looked at the returns which showed that the CDU may have even picked up a point or two. Nixon sent a congratulatory telegram or made a telephone call to Kiesinger. The FDP jumped ship and the Social Democrats formed a new coalition with the FDP. St was an exciting time. It was the first real change in government since 1949, so in that sense it was an exciting time to be there. It was kind of a fresh start. Brandt had made it very clear. Although we didn’t know this, they started backchanneling with Kissinger. This is not something I knew at the time. I always had the suspicion that there was a helluva lot more going on. The CDU, with whom we’d been dealing all these years, and gotten used to, and all our friends were feeding our suspicions about the Social Democrats. After all, in the ‘50s the CDU had run against socialism as well as communism. The Social Democrats were just a tad different than the communists, not much, you know. This divide was very big. The other thing that happened during that period which we did not deal with very well was the whole turmoil connected with two things, with the student revolt and the real effort by young Germans to shake some of the patriarchal, if not autocratic structures of society along with opposition to the Vietnam War. Most of our friends, even on the moderate left, thought Vietnam a mistake. One of my friends, Richard Loewenthal, who is now dead, a professor at the Free University, jumped all over us and said, “You guys, with this Vietnam focus on containing communism in Vietnam, you are losing your focus, you are losing your European focus,” and, of course it was true. Our troops in Germany were run down in quality and also in quantity in order to fight the Vietnam War. ’68 was a year of upheaval everywhere, you know, in Western Europe and in the United States, too; so that combination of domestic upheaval and opposition to the Vietnam War was the first, how shall I say, active anti-American outbreaks in Germany we had ever had since ’49.

Q: Was Red Rudy one of the...

LIVINGSTON: Yes, he was a student leader.

Q: Of course, there was not only what was happening in the U.S., but also in France.

LIVINGSTON: It began in ’67, maybe, when the Shah of Iran visited Berlin and there
was the big demonstration, partly a combination of students plus exiled Persians living abroad against the Shah. It got out of control somewhat, and a student was killed by the police. That unleashed a storm of unrest in West Berlin, which had been the great bastion of freedom. The Free University turned, I wouldn’t say anti-American, but there was a lot of anti-American sentiment on the campus in West Berlin and to some degree I suppose the East Germans helped it along.

**Q:** What about when you were in Bonn? Were you able to get the spirit of the German universities in West Germany?

**LIVINGSTON:** No. Again, in retrospect, you think of all the things you should have done. But I was a good Foreign Service officer; I stuck to my list, which was an interesting list because it was a developing policy, but I really had the feeling, I knew there was more going on with the East. I’ll tell you how I knew: in the summer of 1970, it must have been just before I was due to leave, I remember going down to the foreign office and getting from the Soviet desk officer a memo which had listed points that Brandt had brought up directly with, I guess it was Brezhnev, and I said, ”When was this?” and he said, “This was in March.” So I said, “You’re just telling us now?” I realized that they must have given it to Kissinger or given it to the Ambassador, or something. They were just going through the motions of quote “informing” us at the time. I was, I suppose in retrospect, rather naïve at the time. There were a lot of very important points that were in there, eight points or whatever they were. And I thought, “Here it is, what June or July, and you’re just giving us this thing now? What is this anyway?”

**Q:** Did you have any feeling... of course, Henry Kissinger was National Security Advisor, both German born and a born participant in back channel operations. It sounds like the sort of thing he would have enjoyed.

**LIVINGSTON:** Well, I have got to be careful and try and just talk about my own recollections. Last November, I was invited to a conference in Vienna on the beginnings of Ostpolitik and I had to give a panel contribution. I did a little bit of research on this you know, with Kissinger’s memoirs and Bahr’s memoirs. So I know now things I didn’t know then. So I’m a little worried about projecting backwards. I don’t think we were really aware in Bonn, at least at my level, about this back channeling between Kissinger and Bahr. I’m almost sure we weren’t but I wasn’t sophisticated enough to recognize from the conduct of the Germans, except from this example that I gave you that something was going on. I want to put a bookend here because this is stuff I know now because of having done this research for this talk I gave. Kissinger and Nixon were very suspicious of Brandt and his Ostpolitik at the beginning when Bahr came in to see Kissinger before the government was even formed. This is, again still with the bookend. When it was formed, they sent Bahr over here.

**Q:** Bahr being who?

**LIVINGSTON:** Egon Bahr, who was really Brandt’s right hand man. Negotiator, both in Berlin and in his formal job later as head of the planning staff of the Foreign Ministry
when Brandt was Foreign Minister. Then he became - I don’t remember what his title was - sort of a national security advisor in the chancellery when Brandt became Chancellor. I know now that he came over here before the government was even formed and told Kissinger, “This is what we’re going to do, we’re going to let you know about it, but we’re not asking your permission. We’re going to go ahead and do it.” Then, by early ’70, there were already signs of success. That made Kissinger very nervous. He worried that the Germans were negotiating with the Russians because that brought all kind of recollections - and this is still within the bookends - of the Rapallo, the Stalin-Hitler pact, etc., and the old tradition of German-Russian connections. I guess I can close the bookend now. My own point as kind of a middle-ranking diplomat in Bonn was that I was not aware of any of this back channeling at all. You’ll have to ask Jock Dean how much he was aware of it.

Q: Had there been anything in Willy Brandt’s background or writings that you were looking at to see whether they were going to take a different point of view?

LIVINGSTON: Oh, yes, they made it clear. Brandt, himself, made it clear. The whole policy of small steps was that they were not going to be inhibited in dealing with the East Germans and then he made it clear they were not going to be inhibited in dealing with the Soviets. When he was Foreign Minister, they’d already opened relations, they modified the Hallstein Doctrine when Kiesinger came in. They modified it when they opened up trade missions. I think already under Erhard they opened up trade missions. So that’s why I had an interesting job. This was the revival of traditional German interest in the East, which had been cut off in ’49. Adenauer, was not interested in the East, but only interested in reconciliation with France. So this was a restoration of traditional German interest in the East and, therefore, very worth reporting on. I think there was suspicion among people that “Ah ha, it’s going to be an old German-Russian deal again.” The Russians held the cards. We knew that. We still felt East Germany was totally in Soviet thrall. Obedience to Soviet direction and command. We felt that the Soviets would sell out East Germany to Bonn for concessions. The old bugaboo was that maybe West Germany would go neutral in exchange for unification. Even I thought that was possible. We thought the Social Democrats might do it.

Q: What about relations between West Germany and the Czechs and the Poles?

LIVINGSTON: Well, there was a period, I think it was the very beginning of the Brandt government when they tried to do the small East European countries first, then the Soviet Union. The Soviets made it clear to them, “With us first, or not at all.” It was right after the Soviet entry into Prague. There is one interesting story I can tell you. It was August of ’68, and I was already in Bonn then, and there are two anecdotes that are sort of amusing. Number One, in the safe we had all sorts of contingency plans. When this happened, we said, “Ah ha, we’ll go look for the contingency plans.” You know, “What do we do when the Soviets march into the Czech Republic?” And, of course, there was no contingency plan, none at all. We had no idea of what to do and that was amusing. That was the first thing. The second one was amusing. We got a phone call from Franz Joseph Strauss. I didn’t take it but I think the DCM took it. And Strauss was in a state of panic. He thought
that the Soviets might not stop at the border. He was, I guess, Minister-President of Bavaria. He no longer was in the national government. He was pushed out as a result of the Spiegel affair in ’63. I take it back. He may have been in the government. He may have been the finance minister in the Kiesinger-Brandt government. Anyway, he called from Munich or he called from Bavaria; I can’t say he called from Munich. And he was absolutely panicked. I didn’t take the call so this is second hand, but he said, “What are you guys going to do? How are you going to save us?” Well, we had assurances from the Soviets, we got them during the day, that they weren’t going to come over into Germany. So there were some assurances that were given us somehow. I remember it was a kind of exciting day.

Q: Oh, yes.

LIVINGSTON: That was the very beginning of my Bonn period because I must have just gotten back from summer vacation in August.

Q: While you were in Bonn during the ’68-70 period, I would assume you were always looking at East Germany. Was there any sign that East Germany was becoming more independent? Any feeling that, you know, we always think of Tito and other places.

LIVINGSTON: No, I think we operated, and this is probably to some degree projection of our “legal” standpoint, that, “The Soviets are responsible, and we’ve got to stick with that view.” I think a projection onto East Germany. Certainly they were satellites compared to Czechoslovakia’s or particularly to Poland or the Hungarians. After ’53, there was no real East German effort to defy the Soviets. There was a little bit, and that happened after I was back here. That must have been ’72, I guess. When the Soviets deposed Ulbricht, allegedly that had to do with differences, because he opposed Soviet detente policy with West Germany. But generally, to answer your question, we certainly were projecting our legal standpoint onto the situation. We felt that the East Germans were very dependent on the Soviet Union, very much under the Soviet thumb, and this really was a satellite that was totally under Soviet control partly because, and maybe again this was a product of Berlin, we looked at things maybe too much from a military point of view. We said, “My God, they’ve got 12 divisions there in East Germany!” We also looked at it in this way: that if there were an uprising in East Germany - that’s what they did in ’53, you know - send in the tanks. I think we believed that the Soviets would send in the tanks and the East Germans would never get anywhere. The Soviets did send the tanks into Prague after all in ‘68.

Q: Oh, yes. After the Prague Spring came the Prague August and East Germans went in with them.

LIVINGSTON: I’m not sure how much the East Germans really did; again it’s a little murky. I think what they did was send some small signal units just over the border into Sudetenland. They certainly didn’t go into Prague and how much of a penetration they actually made, I don’t know. And I’d guess the Poles did something, too, but I think that was very minor. It was a Soviet operation.
Q: In 1970, you left Bonn and you went where?

LIVINGSTON: I went to the Council on Foreign Relations. That’s something I cooked up myself. I guess it was a kind of reflection of the fact that I wasn’t getting anywhere in Bonn. I knew that when Dean was there that I wasn’t going to get anywhere, that he was holding everything to himself. Because of Ostpolitik, there was an interest in the United States and I think maybe it was even at the recommendation of Kissinger, I can’t remember, that I got a fellowship to the Council on Foreign Relations. I had leave without pay. The Council paid my salary. It wasn’t a government thing. The State Department didn’t send me. I did it myself. I was there I would guess from October of 1970 until December of ’71. I wanted to stay longer but the Department said, “If you don’t come back, you won’t get a promotion.”

Q: What were you working on at the Council on Foreign Relations?

LIVINGSTON: I ran a study group on East Germany. It was the first thing they’d ever done on East Germany. I was supposed to write a book, but I never did. I gathered material for a book. The year changed my life I suppose. You know, I’d been abroad all those years from 1956 until 1970, a little more than 14 years. I’d had an exaggerated view of the Foreign Service’s role in foreign affairs. Then I suddenly got to the Council and saw that there were all these bankers and lawyers and ex-Foreign Service officers who were running the big insurance companies in New York and scholars from Princeton and Harvard and Yale and all this East Coast elite establishment who really were running foreign affairs (laughter). And their views of the Foreign Service, to say the least, were somewhat mingled. There was still an air of “gentlemanliness” about the Council on Foreign Relations, which there is right down to the present day. I just had a letter published in Foreign Affairs and they edited out all my polemical language before they published it. So they’re still gentlemanly.

Q: Could you explain, what, at that time, the Council on Foreign Relations was?

LIVINGSTON: Two things. First, they were torn by Vietnam.

Q: Who were they?

LIVINGSTON: The President was a guy named Bayless Manning. Its building was there on the corner of East 58th Street. They still regarded themselves as really the center of the American foreign policymaking establishment. And, all these figures like Jack McCloy and George Ball, all these people would come in for seminars, and I mingled with them. They were, however, going through a very traumatic period because William Bundy was the editor of Foreign Affairs. There was, just before I arrived, a kind of uprising among some of the members, the younger members, who were opposed to the Vietnam War. Bundy particularly had been a big advocate, as the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Asia, of the Vietnam War. His memoirs are due to come out soon
as a matter of fact. Are they out already?

Q: I don’t think so.

LIVINGSTON: They are due fairly soon because I’ve talked to him on the phone a couple of times. He [William Bundy] was the *Foreign Affairs* editor. Bayless Manning was the president. He didn’t last too long. They still regarded themselves as the place where real policy was made and also provided a recruiting ground and a reservoir of talent to send down to Washington. Kissinger, 12 years before, had begun his career there. He was the quintessential CFR person. I guess Rockefeller got him the slot, and there he wrote his book on nuclear weapons in foreign policy. He was the sort of typical example of the kind of guy who went from academia to the Council then to the government.

Q: When you say this was sort of the heart of American foreign policy...

LIVINGSTON: They thought they were.

Q: They thought they were. How was this transmitted from their perspective and what you were seeing into actual policy?

LIVINGSTON: Well, they would bring all these people up from Washington. Later, they set up an office in Washington, a few years ago, but they felt very much very in the tradition of the Second World War. Simpson and Bundy and all these people who went from this complex, all these people played a role in foreign policymaking in Germany. McCloy was the quintessential Council on Foreign Relations man, you know, head of the American foreign policy establishment. He was one of the main figures at the Council. We had all kinds of study groups on important issues of foreign policy. When it got down to the real, most important issues like Vietnam, they clearly were beyond their depth. Still, there was this belief that, “This is the place where the real issues are discussed and we provide outside,” but not really outside, “input into the deliberations of government.” That’s how they still think down to the present day.

Q: I know. I see all these discussion groups and I’ve often wondered how...

LIVINGSTON: After I leave you, I’m going to a meeting down at the Council on Foreign Relations with a typical figure on the Council, General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Commander of NATO, and he’s going to talk about restructuring NATO for its new mission. A very Council on Foreign Relations type topic.

Q: Keeping to the ‘70-’71 issue, you can have people talking about things but then you have very busy people in Washington who are responding often to what’s in the paper today or you have Congress which is responding to their constituency.

LIVINGSTON: I was a visiting fellow there and I wasn’t in any sort of inner circle. You always had the feeling there were inner circles, though. There was this great rabbit
warren at the corner of 68th and Park Avenue. You were given the feeling that upstairs the Under Secretary for Political Affairs was meeting with the Soviet ambassador, chatting about arms control. But it was an exciting period, because it was the Nixon period, though Nixon himself hated the type of figures the Council represented. The Council was very pleased that he’s one of two people that they expelled for not paying dues. He wanted to be expelled. (Laughter)

*Q: What about your German expertise? How did that play in this?*

LIVINGSTON: They’d had quite close relations with Germany going back to the ‘20s. Originally they were New York bankers that established it. Of course, the New York banking community in the ‘20s in the Dawes and Young plans had been quote “pro-German” and very anxious to help Germany. People forget that right down to the ‘30s, John Foster Dulles and his law firm were very, I wouldn’t say pro-Nazi, but continued doing business with Germany right down to ’39 or ’40. So they were really the center, I think, of the effort to rehabilitate Germany after the Second World War. McCloy was the exemplar of that. It was very much East Coast Establishment. If you look and see who was involved, you see Clay, who really was a Southern boy in many ways but still part of it, but then there was McCloy and there was Conant. Both of them were East Coast establishmentarians.

*Q: Conant was president of Harvard.*

LIVINGSTON: Yes, that’s right. So they felt that they had been part of the tradition of building up the Atlantic Alliance and bringing the Germans in. Part of the tradition of NATO and the European unification movement. Connections with Jean Monnet and all that business. This was very much of a trans-Atlantic league in action. So they were obviously very interested in Germany. My little thing was kind of an aberration because there was the fear, particularly by McCloy. I heard him say himself (he was an old man by then.), “There are two souls in the German breast: one of them looks east and the other looks west and you’ve always got to watch out that they’re not going to cook up a deal with the Russians.” Of course, the CDU and the CSU were feeding these guys stuff about, “Watch for these Social Democrats. They’ll make a deal with the Russians, and you guys will be out; because, after all, they’re really Marxists, you know.”

*Q: While you were looking at Germany from the New York Eastern Establishment perspective, was there such a thing as “the Germanophile” or something like that because we have the Anglophile in the United States. We have a very large community of people with German heritage, myself included. Lochner was my mother’s name. I’ve never really heard of much of a German lobby.*

LIVINGSTON: That’s one of the things I’m looking at. Of course, when you look at numbers, it is true that the Germans are, by far, the largest group by ancestry in this country. Particularly in the First World War, but also in the Second World War, their willingness to maintain a pro-German attitude was suppressed. There was a really a strong wave, stimulated by the British, rather cleverly, I think, in the First World War
beginning about 1916, a wave of anti-German hatred, hysteria. Every street in Baltimore that had had a German name before 1917 was renamed. I remember once being on a platform with Senator Lugar and I said, “Well, Senator, did you know that in Indiana,” (he was talking about friendship with Germany) “They passed a law in 1917 that no school should teach German?” And they didn’t change the law until 1923, years after the war.

Q: My mother’s family had rocks thrown at them. He was a German-American lawyer in Chicago.

LIVINGSTON: Oh, yes. So they started to lower their heads for some reason, which I think has to do with German willingness to accept authority. They always assimilated much more rapidly; is true, except for the religious dissenters like the Moravian Baptists and the Amish, they tended to assimilate much more rapidly. This was given a big push back in the First World War and to some degree a push by the Second World War, but much more in the First.

Q: There was no particular German Lobby or anything like that?

LIVINGSTON: I think to some degree what happened was they didn’t dare lobby like the Irish and the Greeks did. Right down to the present day, that’s true. But the people in the New York establishment were quite pro-German for strategic and business reasons. Then interestingly enough they had something which comes out here in Washington quite strongly because there were German Jews, including some who’d emigrated as late as the ’30s, who felt that they had a job to rebuild relations with Germany. Kronstein, who was one of the big donors at Georgetown, was an example of that. He was a lawyer. He was trained in Germany. He practiced law in Germany, emigrated here in the ’30s. His son still works for one of the big firms in Washington. And he was very active. He was the guy who got Adenauer over here and got Adenauer his first honorary doctorate at Georgetown in about 1950. The Jesuits. So they did have certain lobbies and did have certain policy lines, and I’ve heard it from the German ambassador in the 1970s that, “We are not going too be like the Greeks and the Italians and Irish and the Jews. We are going to be like the French and the British. We are going to operate as part of that club, of the “Trans-Atlantic Elite” and we are not going to play the ethnic card.” They don’t play it right down to this day. I’ve told them that now, 50 years after the War, they should be more willing to do that. The other thing, of course, is that during the Cold War, there was a willingness, even on the part of the American-Jewish community, to downplay the Holocaust. That only really, interestingly enough, started to change in the 1980s. I think it has to do with generational change among American Jews. The Holocaust survivors are dying out. Two-thirds of Jewish girls marry non-Jews. I think that the leadership of the American-Jewish community is concerned about this since the Holocaust has assumed a much bigger role since about 1980. Because we needed Germany as an ally, I wouldn’t say it was a conspiracy, that word is strong, sort of a Hillary Clinton type word, there was a kind of unwillingness to really raise this issue at all. It didn’t play a role in American-German relations as much as you might think.
Q: This raises a question, during the ’64 to ’70 period when you were in Berlin and Bonn, did the Holocaust...

LIVINGSTON: It never even crossed my mind. I must say I think the Germans got a bum rap. Even as early as when I was in Hamburg in the 1950s, German television and German publications like the Spiegel carried quite a lot of exposes. We didn’t let it affect policy because we needed the Germans. I can’t remember, looking back, that I ever wrote a report on it or that it ever concerned me at all. As I say, it’s an interesting phenomenon that started to come up really strong in ’85 when Reagan went to Bitburg. From then on and now, there are all of these Holocaust museums, of which there must be about 10 now. They didn’t get started until the ‘80s either.

Q: In ’71, you left the Council on Foreign Relations and then where did you go?

LIVINGSTON: Then I went down to Washington and I briefly was in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs working for Ronald Spiers and working on conventional arms control. That was the height of the Nixonian-Kissingerian policies with the Soviet Union and China. Henry Super K was appearing on the cover of Time every week. I got an opportunity to go work at the National Security Council soon after I came back about three months after I came back.

Q: I was thinking this might be a good place to stop, because I’d rather do things in a unity so we’ll pick this up the next time when you’re going to the National Security Council and was it still ’71 or was it early ’72?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I got back in the fall of 1971. It’s all in the Biographic Guide, although that’s not quite accurate. I was only at Pol-Mil for maybe a month, so it must have been the very end of ’71. I was there through the ’72 elections, until ’73. I got out before the Watergate roof fell in. (Laughter)

Q: Okay, we’ll pick it up then, Gerry.

LIVINGSTON: Great!

***

Q: Gerry, last time we just had you going where?

LIVINGSTON: Going to the National Security Council as the junior person in a three person section that dealt with Europe when Henry Kissinger was the National Security Advisor and Al Haig was the deputy. The three sections of the National Security Council consisted of Hal Sonnenfeldt, who came out of the State Department, William Hyland, who was the Soviet Expert who came out of the Central Intelligence Agency, and then I was third person. Both of them were Soviet experts. Hal had had the Soviet Section of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Hyland had been working on Soviet affairs at the CIA for at least 15 years before. So I just picked up all the scraps.
That is what it boiled down to. It was a very small operation. I was happy to go because at that time in 1972, reading the newspaper, Super K was being praised as the person who along with Nixon was making foreign policy and the State Department was pushed out of it. So that’s what was the inducement was for me to go to the NSC because that seemed to be where the action was. So I went, and it had its pluses and its minuses.

Q: Let’s talk a little, before we talk about issues, about the atmosphere there, the working conditions at your level.

LIVINGSTON: Well, we worked at the Old Executive Building. The offices were elegant in the sense that they dated back to the Grant Administration, I guess. We had very small offices, but they were in a historic building. The feeling that you were close to the White House, close to the President, even though we were across the “magic dividing line,” which was the Executive Office parking lot on a little street between the White House and the Old Executive Office Building. And in the White House itself were Kissinger, Haig, Winston Lord, and maybe one or two others of the NSC Staff. There can’t have been more than four or five actually in the White House.

Q: I would have though that, given the situation at the time, i.e., ’72-73, Henry Kissinger’s opening China, the Soviet Union was a big deal, Vietnam was a big deal and so was Europe, France, Germany, some of the others would almost be pushed down the line.

LIVINGSTON: That was probably true. The irony was that they, the Europeans, felt that very much in 1972. Then in that year or in ’73, Kissinger proclaimed the year of Europe. One of the things that was sort of fun was Kissinger’s effort, which began already in ’70, to lay out basic guidelines for foreign policy. It was very cleverly done in an academic and systematic way. It was a report prepared entirely by the National Security Council on the President’s foreign policy. It was sent to the State Department for clearance, though we didn’t really pay any attention to that. That was Kissinger’s way of laying down guidance for the entire government through this unclassified, quasi-academic document. In any case, the Europeans were sort of unhappy. The were unhappy because the U.S. was dealing directly with the Soviet Union. Then Kissinger proclaimed “The Year of Europe,” which, I guess, was ’73, and which, I think, turned out to be kind of a joke, a kind of public relations scam, that he was going to focus on Europe “this year.”

Q: I realize that you were pretty far down the line, but did you get any feel for how Kissinger operated?

LIVINGSTON: Yes, it was a small staff, but it was virtually impossible for me to get to Kissinger directly except on rare occasions. That was partly because my boss was a very bureaucratic operator and very jealous of prerogatives. In some respects, I think he regarded himself as a rival of Kissinger initially and an old friend of Kissinger’s. But once the hierarchy was established, it was clear that Hal was being relegated to a very subordinate position. And, as you go up the line, you can see that from the studies of [the] Kissingerian operation that have been done by Issacson and the whole Thatcher book on
Kissinger’s foreign policy. Kissinger himself, of course, protected his relationship with the President against people like Sonnenfeldt. And, they, in turn, reacted the same way and protected their relationship with Kissinger. I think when I look around, probably East Asia, Africa, and Latin America were less important. With the exception of the opening of China, his policy was very much a European policy or one of our relations with the Soviet Union. So in some ways our section was the most important, if you want to put it that way. But, of course, it was a one man bravura performance by Henry. My impression was that Henry was focusing on what he wanted to focus on. He was not a person of bureaucratic procedures. We were just there to support him. The only way one could really get things done was to enlist the help of Al Haig. When you needed decisions on certain things - the countries I worked on were all the smaller ones Italy, Britain, France, Germany, Austria, and all these small countries - and occasionally there was some decision, a purchase of missiles or something like that that really had to have Kissinger’s okay. You never could get any action. When I first got there, the idea was that priority cases should bear a red tag. So when I had something I thought was important I’d put a red tag on it. I remember when I was first there I went over to Haig’s office and I looked in his “in box,” and there were something like 40 folders with red tags. So I realized that the priority system really didn’t mean very much in the end. Haig is certainly not the lovable character. He shares a certain amount of chutzpah and arrogance with Henry, but he was a good staff man. In his military career, one of his great fortes was that he was a good staff man. You could either get Al to get Henry to take action or he would take action himself. So to a large degree, and I don’t think this was sufficiently brought out, it was Haig that really held the operation together, not Henry, who couldn’t have cared less about who was working for him.

Q: Were there any particular issues dealing with Eastern or Western Europe that came up during you time?

LIVINGSTON: No, I just did subordinate work. I recognize that. Sort of helping with the backup, picking up all the minor sorts of things. Certain types of things had to have NSC action, particularly things that involved a relationship with the Pentagon, such as military aid of one kind or another, or where the State Department needed the NSC stamp to either put through a State Department decision, override the Pentagon, or whatever. So I tended to deal with those types of things. The only quote “major” issue, if you could call it major, was an effort to re-establish the American Consulate General in Salzburg which was done because Nixon needed a place to lay over on his trip to Moscow to get his jet lag under control. But I dealt with all the military aid decisions and things of that sort. I just kind of picked up the scraps. I recognized that pretty early on. To some degree, I was a bit of a backup. I got into certain arms control negotiations on SALT but again I had two people above who were expert in the field, Hyland, whom Henry trusted a good deal, and Sonnenfeldt, whom I don’t think he trusted but whom he respected in terms of his intellectual capabilities and his knowledge of the Soviet Union. That’s why he was there. Of the countries I worked on, Henry fancied himself the expert, particularly Germany, for example. A low ranking NSC member was not someone he would be inclined to listen to on these issues. The Europeans, the Germans, with whom I associated most closely, they knew this perfectly well and they made efforts through Egon Bahr and others to deal with
Kissinger. Half the time I really didn’t know what was going on. The difficulty, if you want to call it that and it was unpleasant in a certain way, was that it was made clear to us that you should not inform your colleagues at the State Department about almost anything. You were told to keep those guys in the dark. So I’d get friends on the Polish desk or the Italian desk, or I’d get ambassadors abroad. Graham Martin, who was then ambassador to Italy, was very good at this. He would call up and say, “Now I know that file is right in your ‘in box,’ Gerry; what are you doing with it?” He called from Rome, once, I remember. I’d get quite a lot of people like that calling up on various things. Basically we were told: don’t tell them a damn thing.

Q: I would have thought that there would have been a lot of trying to do something about not getting the Italians or the Germans or French noses out of joint because something would happen and the State Department would call and would say something like, “For God’s sake, don’t you realize that, in doing this, you did not consult with the French, or something and they’re very unhappy.

LIVINGSTON: Well, yes, that did happen. Certainly there were issues. There was a big conference on oil during the period at the start of the Middle East oil crisis that took place. The French were extremely unhappy, but our attitude was, “Henry will do it with the President, and that’s the relationship that counts, and Rogers and these guys can rage all they want, but we don’t care about some damn ambassador.” Then, of course, what would happen was there would be a telephone call from the prime minister to Kissinger about it. So it was a deliberate and well-known way of concentrating all foreign policy decisions in Kissinger’s hands. We had to bear a lot of bitching and complaining, but the attitude was: Don’t worry about it. The French prime minister will call Henry if it’s really important.”

Q: Was there any concern at that time either by you or others at the lower level about, “Kissinger’s off on the wrong track?”

LIVINGSTON: The only issue on which I’d say I got myself into some trouble is related to the German Ostpolitik, which by that time was pretty far advanced. In doing some reading, because I had to give a lecture on the subject last November, I realized how far behind the curve I had been. I tended to be favorably inclined to Ostpolitik and Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt, at least initially in 1971, were very distrustful of it. So I would write memos to the President. I would write a cover memo. When the State Department would send things over, we’d always put a cover memo on it. I generally would tend to give a positive spin to it. Usually that would be blocked by Sonnenfeldt but sometimes he wasn’t there and then I would be able to move the thing ahead. The President would underline things and put things in the margins. That’s how you’d get the feedback, or Henry would put things in the margins. Haig used to move things to the President directly and bypass Kissinger sometimes. I’d get things back on Ostpolitik. Where I disagreed with Henry on some of these things and I thought the Germans were more to be trusted, so to speak, than he trusted them. That would be dismissed as sort of a Foreign Service nativism. Because most of the people in the section were Foreign Service. I think Hal finally “lateraled” into the Foreign Service about that time, you can look at the book. But
he was basically a Washington-based guy who’d worked his way up on the civil service side. Though he may have been formally Foreign Service, he never served abroad or anything. There was still, in retrospect, a little bit of the Foreign Service mystique, and I had served abroad. Hyland never had served abroad. He had served all this time in the Central Intelligence Agency. The counter to that was that, “You guys who work in the State Department have been co-opted by the countries in which you served.” In my case, I had been co-opted by these German Social Democrats. You worked long hours. There was lots and lots of stuff coming at you both from the Pentagon and from the State Department, constant memoranda and calls for action. You did have to move them ahead and you did move them ahead. When the President started traveling a lot, you did the briefing papers for his trips to the Soviet Union or his trips to Germany and here and there, and I did some of that.

Q: I would think that what you’re saying is that all these problems and issues would come to the NSC small staff and that they pretty well had to be decided. They required decisions...

LIVINGSTON: Yes, either by the President or by Kissinger.

Q: …and this sounds kind of overwhelming.

LIVINGSTON: Well, yes… that’s where things were decided. It was deliberate. Kissinger initiated that system when he got there in ’69, and it was a deliberate effort to concentrate, of which Nixon approved. To concentrate the important issues of foreign policy in the NSC. The President and Kissinger would make those decisions, not the Secretary of State, not on everything, but on anything they wanted to and, of course, on the big things with China and the Soviet Union, things of that sort. Germany’s Ostpolitik was a big issue in the sense that it had the potential to either reinforce or, not to eviscerate, but to diminish the effect of the Nixon-Kissinger detente policy, which was basically to build a relationship with Russia to help get nuclear weapons under control. So that was the kind of policy nexus that was most interesting to me and I was a little bit involved. I wouldn’t say I was involved in any big way. I would sit in on conversations with the President, occasionally, usually when someone like Sonnenfeldt wasn’t there. When the German chancellor came (He was then Defense Minister. He was soon to be chancellor.), Helmut Schmidt came. I would sit in and take notes on the conversation. That was sort of fun, you know.

Q: Well, with this concentration you say the “major issues”…but somebody’s got to determine what are “major” and what are “minor.” I would think it would bring an awful lot of things that really should have been decided at a much lower level to the NSC.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, that’s true, but you get a different view of priorities. For example, there was all of Africa - totally of no interest at all. Latin America was not of much interest either. And there the State Department hoped you did decide things. They got the wind, too, as to what was important, what was going on. There were certain areas, I like to think European areas, at least those that had any relationship with Russia, that the NSC
did take the action on. And they, the State Department, played the counter game. They would flood you with a lot of stuff. That was their bureaucratic response. The attitude was, “If these guys are going to decide everything, we’ll flood them.” Then they’d flood you with stuff; and then you’d send something up to Haig, and he’d say, “What the hell is this?” Whether the president should visit Monaco. For the Monaco desk officer, it was damned important, you know, but the idea of Nixon visiting Monaco? The NSC attitude was, “That’s crazy.”

The other aspect of it that was interesting and probably also naïve and a product of my Foreign Service experience was the ’72 campaign. We were called on to do two things. Number one was to help draft speeches, elections speeches that had a foreign policy angle. Of course, Nixon liked to emphasize that, which was his sort of cachet. He was the “Foreign Policy President.” The other was to meet with certain foreign policy constituencies and I drew the East European ethnic constituency, which the Republicans were cultivating. I refused to write any election speeches. I said, “Look, I’m a Foreign Service officer, I’m non-partisan and I’m not going to write speeches for the president,” which, in the light of 25 years, I realize sounded fairly naïve and stupid. Also, during election year in ’72, we would sit in on a lot of strategy sessions with the domestic side of the White House. And I voted for Nixon, even though I’m a Democrat.

Q: Well, he was running against McGovern. I voted for him, too. I hated the bastard, but McGovern was just beyond the pale.

LIVINGSTON: So there was a lot of high pressure stuff. That was sort of exciting. One really felt that you were there where action was taking place, even though you weren’t always sure what it was.

Q: Here you were in the Foreign Service, what about military men who were seconded to the NSC? Were there many there?

LIVINGSTON: Yes, there were quite a few and there were quite a few people from the Central Intelligence Agency. That’s the way the NSC got around budgetary limitations. Because they weren’t on the NSC payroll, you know. They could say we’re not building up the NSC, but they had all these guys on detail. The State Department was paying my salary and the CIA was paying Hyland’s salary, and the military was paying Haig’s salary. We had a fair number…we had a lieutenant commander who subsequently did quite well…it wasn’t Poindexter but he was a National Security Council type guy, he was a submarine commander. He made admiral. He was later in Somalia. Jonathan Something.

Q: Crowe?

LIVINGSTON: Who?

Q: William Crowe. He was submarine.
LIVINGSTON: No. That was the guy that became Ambassador in London. No. This was a younger man, who must have been about 35, 38 or so when I was there. He’d been in nuclear submarines. Then he had been commander on a nuclear submarine. Obviously on of the Navy’s fair haired boys. Nice guy. He, also, was over in the White House. I can see him now. I wish his name would come back to me. I can’t think of whether we had any Army people. I was trying to think of who we did have in the Army or Air Force. I can’t remember who they were but we must have had a certain number. There was an atmosphere of secrecy. I wouldn’t say it intimidated me but it made me very cautious. You weren’t encouraged to go around asking questions about what someone else was doing. It was sort of drilled in, “Just do your work and don’t ask too many questions.”

Q: You’ve mentioned the ethnic groups during the election. I would’ve thought that you might find, sort of, little policy deviations to make sure that the Polish-Americans voted.

LIVINGSTON: Nixon was never as successful with that as Reagan was. It was a hand-holding operation, basically. Nixon was dealing with Russia. That’s obviously not something that’s going to please the Polish-Americans very much, and they had traditionally been democratic. Reagan succeeded in winning them away. They had something in the Republican National Committee called the Heritage and the people were pretty far right, very far right. They weren’t Hungarian Fascists, but they were getting up there so that Nixon was never very close. I don’t think the Republicans under Nixon ever really pursued that strategy. It was Reagan who pursued it.

Q: Well, then you left there in ’73.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, I left in ’73. I was pushed out, really, basically I think because I wasn’t an enthusiastic supporter. I was too much a supporter of German Ostpolitik and probably I was a bit naïve and so on. In the ’72 election campaign there was some mumbling about keeping staff lean. So then they dumped some people. I wasn’t replaced, I don’t think; I may be wrong. I wasn’t replaced, at least not right away, with the idea that the section would just be then Sonnenfeldt and Hyland. They were heavily involved with SALT. I replaced a guy named Art Dowling, who was my predecessor. He was a Washington lawyer and he told me, “Don’t take the job.” I had asked him, and I ignored his advice. He left to go into private practice. And I don’t know who succeeded me. I didn’t pay much attention. Then Sonnenfeldt took a dislike to me and I didn’t get on with him even though I respected a lot of his things, his intelligence. When I got back to the State Department, in early ’74, I was only there another six months. This job came up with the German Marshall Fund. During that six months, I recognized it was a side alley. It was the inspection corps and I had a wonderful time. We went on an inspection trip to the Persian Gulf. I had never been to the Persian Gulf, and it was a real eye-opener. Then this job came up with the German Marshall Fund. It doubled my salary. Even though I wasn’t of pensionable age, I decided, “Well, I’d better jump at that.” The main reason I did that though was because I did hear that Sonnenfeldt had blocked me from a couple of posts that I knew would have been good, DCM somewhere or other, maybe Belgrade, and DCM in another place. When was it that Kissinger became Secretary of State?
Q: About that time.

LIVINGSTON: It must have been early in ’74 because he was already over at State and took Sonnenfeldt over with him. He was counselor, so he had a fair amount of influence and Kissinger couldn’t get Sonnenfeldt confirmed on Capital Hill to do anything else. I think he was hopeful of being ambassador to Russia, the Soviet Union. Kissinger couldn’t get him confirmed because there was this so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, which was a bum rap, I felt. In some ambassadorial conference Sonnenfeldt made one mistake. He said, “We want the Russians to develop an organic relationship with these satellite countries.” I always thought that had something to do with the fact that English was not his mother tongue. The German word “organisch” means something strictly different than the American word organic. What he said was misinterpreted by the ambassadors or some right wing press people there. Nowak had a column. It was at a time when the conservative Republicans were gunning for Kissinger and gunning for détente policy and they might have thought, “Ah ha, here’s Kissinger’s right hand man…selling out these satellites. We’re selling them out to the Soviet Union.” So, anyway, they couldn’t get Sonnenfeldt confirmed. So they took him over to the State Department as counselor and in that job, he had a fair amount of influence in the Department and he blocked me at every turn. At least that’s the gossip I picked up. So I said, “What the hell, why should I hang around here,” and when this job offer came along, I took it.

Q: Why would he take this so personally, do you think?

LIVINGSTON: Well, you know, it’s just bureaucratic politics. You reward your friends and punish, if not enemies, at least those with whom you don’t agree. I had a few fights with him - and I don’t want to blacken his name or anything because he’s very well informed and a very intelligent analyst and he knows European politics very well. The Germans like him a lot because of his German background; he had good connections to the conservative camp in Germany. I think, basically, he didn’t like too much independence, too much independence of judgment. That’s the way I would view it.

Q: Before we talk about the German Marshall Fund, what was your impression of the Persian Gulf when you went there?

LIVINGSTON: Well, supposedly our issue was, “Should we beef up these posts out there?” This was at the time of the oil crisis. Again, in retrospect, you realize how naïve you were. Clearly, that’s what they wanted to do. But we were supposedly sent out there to look at it, and what I discovered was that in a lot of these countries, the British had already reduced their presence considerably. These are all former British colonies, British protectorates. The British still had the number one man in all the security services in all those places such as Oman, Dubai and places like that. Bahrain less, because Bahrain was already very American-dominated. That was the base of our ships in the Persian Gulf.

Q: COMIDEASTFOR.
LIVINGSTON: Yes, that’s right. That’s exactly right. I guess what I was surprised to discover was that there were Jordanian military units present, military police units. Some actually were combat units. They were kind of there as stabilizers. I had with me a guy who was a Middle Eastern specialist, who just died about a month ago, named Marshall Wiley. He had been, I think, DCM in Iraq for a while and then subsequently became ambassador in Oman. He was a real Near Eastern hand. We basically came down very differentiated. We did not urge a buildup of American presence everywhere, you know, and I think that’s not what they wanted to hear back in Washington. They wanted to hear, “We should build it up.” It was fascinating for me because we went to all these countries. Saudi Arabia wasn’t within our brief. We stayed at Bahrain because it was on the Persian Gulf and we did all the small countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, Dubai, Oman, Iraq. We stopped in Lebanon on the way in, but the Persian Gulf proper was our mandate. I was there as sort of the outside non-expert.

Q: How did you get onto the German Marshall Fund?

LIVINGSTON: Oh, that happened simply because the Fund had been established in 1972 formally. Being good Germans, they started to plan ahead. They wanted to give a big gift to the United States on the Bicentennial in ’76, and they started already in 1971 to start planning for what they were going to do. Somebody named Guido Goldman had set up the European Studies at Harvard. His father, Nahum Goldman, had been head of the World Jewish Congress and had negotiated in the 1950s with the Germans on the reparations agreements for Israel and military aid for Israel as well. His son, Guido, had and he still has very good connections with the German establishment. The other political aspect to it was the distrust in the early 1970s on the part of the eastern establishment led by Jack McCloy of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, given the fact that he’s a Social Democrat. I remember McCloy and George Ball all talking about this mad rush to Moscow. So the Social Democrats wanted to do something to show that they were just as pro-American as the CDU opposition. So they came up with this idea, which Goldman encouraged. The SPD government had a conservative minister of finance. The Social Democrats cooked this up behind the back of the CDU opposition and they brought it to Parliament. Of course, the CDU couldn’t vote against it. It was a big pro-American gesture. And so the first head of it was a fellow named Ben Read, who had been executive assistant to Dean Rusk in the Department and then had become the head of the Woodrow Wilson Center. When the Democrats went out in ’69, he built the Woodrow Wilson Center up from nothing. Then gradually Republicans started to put in a very conservative board headed by, I think, Barooty, who was sort of the genius behind American Enterprise Institute. Ben was a classical liberal, noblesse oblige, rich, Philadelphia liberal, you know, a very nice guy. But very much a Kennedyesque, Johnsonesque liberal in the old fashioned sense of the term. So they made Ben’s life very uncomfortable and he wanted to get out by 1971-72. Then when they picked him up to be the head of the German Marshall Fund, he picked to be his number two a fellow named Moe who had been at the NSC also before me. Kissinger had wiretapped him or approved a wiretap on him along with a bunch of other guys including Sonnenfeldt, as a matter of fact. When some leaks came out of the NSC, Kissinger and Nixon put wiretaps on a whole bunch of people, among them this guy Moe. When this came out, then Moe sued Kissinger, as did Halpern and a
couple of others. The GMF Board, which consisted of Guido who was very close to Henry and a number of other Harvard types, said, “We can’t have somebody as vice president of the Fund who is suing Kissinger, who was Secretary of State then by that time.” So they were desperate. By that time, the Fund wanted to get off the ground, you know, in ’74. So they were desperately casting around for somebody who really did know something about Germany, who cared about it. They were desperate. The Germans were bitching, you know, that there wasn’t anybody paying attention to Germany, and Germany had given all this money which was quite a lot, with no strings attached which was a wonderful gesture. Only Brandt could have done it. It was 10 million a year with no strings attached. So they were desperate for someone who knew Germany. I happened to know Guido Goldman and he knew me, and so they offered me the job. Not that I knew anything about the foundation world but they basically needed someone who knew Germany. They doubled my salary.

Q: Well now, it is part of our brief here, because we’re talking about foreign affairs, not just State Department things, during the time you were with the Marshall Fund, you were there from when to when?

LIVINGSTON: I joined in 1974, a month before Nixon resigned because I remember going with Ben Read to watch him speak on his resignation in July or August 1974, and I must have joined in June and July of ’74. I was there from then until 1982. I was there for four years as vice president, I guess, three years? Then Read went back in the government in ’77, I guess. ’78 or ’77?

Q: ’77, I think.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, and then I became president and I was president for four years, five years almost. The GMF was set up very much under the impress of the thought that the 1968 unrest, student unrest and other unrest in this country and in Europe, had sort of created the idea that industrial countries have problems in common. The way to go for an international foundation was no longer arms control area studies, which the Ford Foundation had financed all those years (and, you know, the Fund was one of the few foundations that works internationally, and there are very few that do anything internationally). When you look at the aggregate figures of foundation giving in this country, the percentage that goes to international stuff of all kinds, including disease eradication in Africa, is just, I don’t know, about three percent or something, very small. The GMF idea was that you could transfer common experiences. If the Germans run their cities better than the Americans, which they do, can’t we learn something from the way the Germans run cities? If Americans treat women better in the labor market than the European countries do, which we did and still do, then can’t they learn something from us? Can’t they learn something from our environmental movement? Which they have. That was the basic idea, transferring experience on the common problems of industrial societies. The impetus was given to us by the Ford foundation which was still in those days under the dominance of Mac Bundy. So we were kind of an adjunct initially to the Ford Foundation. That was their sort of spiritual guidance. There were some cross links among some members of the board who had been close to the Ford Foundation. So it was
a great opportunity. It was interesting work doing something new and different.

Q: I would have thought that you would have been breaking a lot of rice bowls in various countries including the United States bringing in, as I say you know, a son of a bitch from out of town and you would be bringing people in from the United States to inform people in Europe about how better to treat women and you’d be bringing German officials in to try to clean up the mess in many of our cities.

LIVINGSTON: Yes, there’s something to that. I mean, we tended to not do it directly. We would go to, let’s say, the National Association of Governors and say, “Hey, we want you to make a project and submit it to us.” So we weren’t in the forefront. You know, there are two types of foundations. There are operating foundations that operate their own projects. We were not an operating foundation. And there are grant-giving foundations. We were a grant-giving foundation. We’d give grants to others to operate the project, so we weren’t really in the forefront of that. We did a lot of encouraging and, you know, there were various techniques. In holding a conference, let’s say, on city management. That was too broad a subject. But if you took all the guys over to Europe and put them up in a small hotel in a nice place and brought your German experts in there, they would talk to each other much more than they would in the United States probably and they’d also talk to the Germans more easily. That was just a matter of technique. There was a lot of that. I tried to put through a program of women in the work force and it was not successful. What was successful was an exchange of environmental experience. The Germans did learn a lot from us. In some respects, the genesis of, and I’m going to exaggerate this, but in some respects the genesis of the Green Party in Europe, in Germany, I’d say you could trace it back to the German Marshall Fund. A lot of the people were very interested in U.S. environmentalism and the Sierra Club and all these lobbying groups, none of which they had in Germany before. Greenpeace is only 20 years old in Germany. Environmentalism, I think, was the most successful GMF program, and we discovered that things where you could quantify the content, catalytic converters and things of that sort, worked more easily but where you got into deep-seated cultural differences, it was much harder to translate than you thought. The best transfers were done by international institutions or businesses within the business. American companies, with some exceptions obviously, were just becoming globalized and it was clear that by shipping managers back and forth and you could transfer ideas within the corporation much more effectively than you could it through non-governmental organizations, which is how we operated.

Q: Did you have anything to do with the Department of State, AID, or anything like that?

LIVINGSTON: No, we tried to operate with NGOs and to some degree we tried to advertise the virtue of being NOT a government organization. We tried to convey that to the Europeans as well. I know as part of our effort now in Central and Eastern Europe to promote democracy and free markets, they are big on precisely that - building the non-governmental organization sector. That was our attitude as well. And, of course, in Europe, particularly in France but in other countries as well, where the state does much more than it does in this country, that took a long time in taking. And then we funded
some traditional academic projects, you know, European study centers and this and that. And then we funded some conferences, outright political things. One of the first things I did at the foundation was right after the Portuguese Revolution in ’74. I put together a big conference in Lisbon on the Portuguese economy. We brought a lot of American economists over to talk with the Portuguese. You tended to operate, you had to operate, in that case we operated with the biggest foundation in Portugal, the Gulbenkian Foundation. So we tended to operate not with governments, but with any NGOs we could find or with other foundations. Germany has a fair number of foundations. We operated with foundations in France and operated with foundations in Britain as well.

Q: Okay, Gerry, we’re just about through. I would have thought that the fit between the European system, where there really weren’t many voluntary type agencies at all and the American one where these sort of pressure groups, volunteer groups like the Sierra Club and Save the Whales and all are quite strong, I would’ve thought it would’ve been hard.

LIVINGSTON: Well, yes, it was, true. But in good old American fashion, we thought we had an American message for the world. We were missionary. There’s no doubt about it now, in 1998, there are a lot more organizations, environmental organizations particularly, but in all kinds of fields, voluntary NGO organizations of all kinds. You don’t say it’s the American way. We’re not the only ones, and obviously in Britain there’s always been that. In Germany in the early 1970s as part of the re-making or the “de-hierachising” of German society, you know, and moving away from patriarchal society, there arose lots of so-called citizens’ initiatives on the local level against, you know, highway planners. Already in Germany as early as ‘72–’73 you couldn’t do what you could 10 years earlier. When the government would decide, “We’re going to put a highway in through there, and that’s it,” you know, there was lots of local resistance. That has grown considerably. Now it’s almost too strong in Germany. Environmental organizations and citizens’ initiatives can block almost any project. So I like to think we were on the beginning of a wave or if that’s too strong, at least a movement. The state is obviously less important, even in Germany, and that’s the country I know best. But in other European countries as well, even France. And citizen protests and citizen initiatives in informal organizations are a more accepted part of society than 25 years ago. There’s no doubt about that at all.

Q: Was there much of a German hand, from your point of view, in how you operated?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I was the Germanist there. To some degree, I mean, Brandt and the SPD gave us money with an all-American board. There were no Germans on it at all and the Germans had nothing to say once they gave us the money. What they did was give 10 million marks. They committed for 15 years, 10 million marks a year for 15 years and then they extended it for 10 more after I left in 1985 or 1984. So that it was an all-American board and there were not too many people who knew Germany. There were some but not too many. There were several people who didn’t like Germany on the board. So the Germans, on the other hand, once they’d done it, I think they regretted it. One year later they set up a similar foundation, capitalized at a much lower amount, with Great Britain called The Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Societies,
which is basically what we could have been called had we not affixed the Marshall Plan label. In the British case, they were very careful that there was a binational board with binational chairmen. Prince Philip was one and the president of Germany was the other or something. So I think they realized they’d lost control in the case of the GMF. That they didn’t want. Some of the early projects we did the Germans didn’t like at all. And I got criticism for doing, you know, “Why did you do that in Germany?” The Germans have this need to be massaged and told we love them all the time, and comforted and reassured. From the German point of view we should have done more reassuring. That was their feeling. We took the charter to say we will do projects anywhere in any country that was involved in the Marshall Plan. Subsequently, after the fall of the Iron Curtain they extended that to any country that would have liked to be involved in the Marshall Plan, so they do something now in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and so on.

Q: So, why don’t we stop at this point?

LIVINGSTON: Fine. Thanks very much.

Q: Great!

LIVINGSTON: I will send you a letter with my book and if you...

End of interview