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DAVID E. LONG

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Mr. Long]

Q: Today is the 21st of July 2000. It's an interview with David E. Long. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies, and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Do you go by David? David, let's start at the beginning. Could you tell me when and where you were born and something about your family.

LONG: I was born in Washington, Georgia, on November 21st, 1937. My father was a Presbyterian minister. He and my mother met in Florida when my respective grandfathers went down to make a lot of money after World War I. They grew up together and ultimately got married. She trailed along with him with the then Southern Presbyterian Church. They moved a lot, I lived in Georgia, Oklahoma City; Marietta, Georgia; and in about sixth grade I moved to Palmetto, Florida, which is just south of Tampa in the southern end of Tampa Bay. That's where I went through junior high and high school.

Q: What was the background of your father and then of your mother?

LONG: My father's family were Scotch Irish, a typical story of Pennsylvania south. The original Long, whoever he was, came from Scotland. I think he was on the wrong side of the 45, 18th century, and went down the valley of Virginia, I-81, and ended up Morristown – family, going through several generations – ended up in Morristown, Tennessee. I understand the farm was under the water of a TVA lake. From there they branched into Alabama and into Georgia – this is a very typical story. His father grew up in northern Alabama, where my grandfather Hanson on my mother's side had moved from Denmark to Perth Amboy, New Jersey. He came down with a bunch of Danes to start a scientific farming community. The Danes couldn't stand the sticks and the wilds of Alabama and all moved home. He farmed this place with draft horses and no mules, which he said was one of the tourist attractions to come to see Mr. Dane back in those days. His grandfathers went together and placed 60,000 or 70,000 acres of woodland in Volusia County. He went down there, and when the sawmill business boom busted in Florida before '29; he was about 26. My father went to the University of Alabama for three years, Davidson College for two years, Southern Presbyterian Seminary in Atlanta, and began preaching at the inauspicious time of 1932, '33...

Q: Just when the Depression hit. How about your mother? She was of Danish...?

LONG: My grandfather was an enhanced Christian Hanson – probably a story not unlike a lot of immigrants who immigrated from Århus, Denmark in about 1901, somewhere along in there. He did very well in a grocery story in Perth Amboy. Then he moved with this Danish farming community to Jasper, Alabama, and then he was a farmer. Then he moved to Florida and made a lot of money, lost it, and did it all over again, in the land. He made fair success in the furniture business, and there was a run on the bank and he went broke again and went to Daytona Beach late in the '20s and started all over again in real estate. By the time he died he had provided a little rooming house for my grandmother for income. An ironic thing is that his youngest son, my uncle, grew up in Daytona Beach with a fellow named Brice Baggett. I met my wife at Chapel Hill many years later, and her uncle was Brice Baggett. I didn't put that together for quite a while, but it was sort of a coincidence.

Q: Where did your mother meet your father?

LONG: They grew up together.

Q: Oh, they grew up together. Did she go to college?

LONG: She went to Stetson, which was in Deland, which is not far away, and got a teaching certificate, which required only two years of college back then, and became a school teacher until she became an unpaid assistant pastor.

Q: What was it like growing up as a preacher's kid?

LONG: It's a unique thing that only PKs really understand. You know the term 'PK'? There are number of ways that you can raise a PK, none of them very successful, I think. One is you can shelter them and teach them through rose-colored glasses that 'Jesus loves me'. They find out about junior high or when they go through puberty that it isn't quite like what they had been taught. A lot of them slip the traces, and this is your wild kid. I, on the other hand, and my brother to a lesser extent, were not terribly sheltered. We used to sneak down and listen to my father pray over the parishioners in his office with my mother late at night, and we would find out all the dirt that was going on. Presbyterians are sort of upper middle class types. They were the bankers and lawyers of the town, and we called them whited sepulchers because they were very religious on the outside but as human as they next guy on the inside. So it was an education. Some people have said I'm a cynic; I think I'm a realist. A cynic to my mind is a person who's disillusioned, and I didn't really have many illusions at the start. So I sort of more or less accepted people through this jaundiced view.

Q: What was family life like? Obviously your mother and father were busy, but did you sort of sit around the table and bat around ideas as kids with you and your brother and your parents, or were you pretty much on your own?

LONG: Well, all of the above. They were very busy, and anybody who is a kid of somebody who is a public person is. On the hand, we were very much of a family, but it didn't require physical presence the way some families feel they have to be family. One thing we used to do every Sunday was pick apart his sermon, and I thought that was a perfectly natural thing to do. I probably learned more homilies than most preachers know today, because I learned how to critique a sermon: the delivery, the organization, the substance, the jokes, the whole thing, and I thought that was normal. Years later I realized what he must have gone through having this bunch of critics blow him away. Fortunately he was a very good preacher. But that really honed my critical faculties at a very young age.

Q: It also shows extreme tolerance on the part of your father.

LONG: Yes. Another thing he used to do, he would correct our grammar. I never realized that correcting somebody's grammar was not socially acceptable until I started dating, and the girls I dated took offense when I would correct their grammar. I thought that was just what everybody did and had to learn the hard way.

Q: About education, start in elementary school.

LONG: I went to elementary school in Oklahoma City, where we had tornado drills and all the kids would march out of the school and go into a storm ditch to practice in case of a tornado. There were a bunch around but none ever hit us. I went later to a school in Marietta – this was during World War II – Marietta, Georgia, and there was an airplane factory right by. It was called Bell Bomber Plant, and Bell was bought out, I think, several times and ended up Lockheed.

Q: They do the 130, C130...

LONG: Right. In those days it was the B29. So my father took in about 900 members. He started with a church of about 300 and ended up with a church of about 300, because people were coming and going and coming and going. It was a wild time, and the teachers more or less just tried to give these poor kids the basics, and those of us lived there were more or less on our own. It was sort of pre-Montessori Montessori for the rest of us, and you could get out of what you wanted to, and I had a great time with no discipline. I don't mean physical discipline, but I didn't have any mental discipline. We did it ourselves, and that set the standard for how I've been a free thinker, I guess, ever since.

Q: What about reading? What were your interests?

LONG: Our family has always read, yes, and still do, so I grew up reading. My other grew up reading to us until we could read, and I would check books out of the library before I could even read. Some of them I memorized the stories so I could "read" the text of Uncle Wiggly books by looking at the pictures and I knew the text by heart. We've always read.

Q: Any particular books, authors or something that particularly stuck in your mind in your early years?

LONG: Early, early years, Uncle Wiggly, Winnie the Pooh, Alice in Wonderland, and my father would explain to me the adult humor which I didn't understand at the time, but I did realize that it was really not a children's book. And, you know, you graduated to Fenimore Cooper, the usual stuff.

Q: How long were you in Marietta, through what grades?

LONG: We were there third, fourth and fifth grades.

Q: Were you getting a good dose of "the war?"

LONG: Yes, for a kid. Obviously the horrors of war were not borne upon us directly, but I remember other things such as when my uncle, who was a navigator on a B26 over Italy,

visited us in Oklahoma City. He was sleeping out on the sleeping porch, and it had these screens that had plastic on them that they had in those days. The wind blew, which was 24 hours a day in Oklahoma City. These things would bend back and forth, and he couldn't sleep because he said he would wake up thinking he was in the middle of a air battle with all the noise. That experience really brought me to the war, and I remember listening to the radio when Roosevelt announced VE Day, VJ Day...

Q: That would have been Truman.

LONG: Yes, Roosevelt and Truman...

Q: Roosevelt died just before the VE Day, so it was Truman for both..

LONG: Oh, I know; it was his death. It was on every station, and I had a crystal radio set that I had just made but all I could get was this one station. So I finally went in and turned on the radio to see what other stations were on and, of course, it was the same thing on every station. I thought something was dreadfully wrong with the set. Then I went into another room and my parents were listening to it and I actually stopped to listen to the words. I remember Roosevelt's death, and, you're right, Truman's announcing the VE and VJ Day. So I think I've had an inkling for a young child of the fact that the world was at war. I think everybody did in those days.

Q: You got down to – where was it in Florida?

LONG: Palmetto.

Q: When did you get there? What grade were you in?

LONG: Sixth grade; that would have been 1948-49.

Q: Well, that's sort of where you grew up, did a lot of your growing up, there?

LONG: That's where I went to Cub Scouts, Boy Scouts, high school and all of that.

Q: What sort of town was Palmetto?

LONG: It was a small town. It had been founded, I guess, in the 19th century by a bunch of South Carolinians, hence the name. They used to say there needed to be about 20 respectable funerals if it were ever to go, which they didn't want it to – and looking back they were absolutely right – and it still hasn't grown. It still looks pretty much the way it did back then, which is really a rarity in Florida. It was a small town; everybody knew everybody; and, as I say, Cub Scouts, Boy Scouts, school activities, church activities, friends and schoolmates that I've kept up with to this day. So it was a very formative time. My parents moved to Tampa, in October of my senior year. I played in the band and I was on the tennis team, the swimming team, and all that stuff. One day in band this

classmate of mine came up to me and said, "How would you like to live with us for the rest of the school year," and I said, "That would be great." His father was an engineer, and he had bought this old wreck of a house that was a mansion that had been built by Powell Crosley – you know, the Crosley cars – on Sarasota Bay in the southern part of Madison County. When I got home, my mother said, "I understand the Hortons want you to go and stay with them the rest of the year, and I said, "No" – you know how children are; said I with the wisdom of being in 6th grade – "that's just Allen talking." Well, it never dawned on me that it was Mrs. Horton who had called up my mother. From October to graduation I lived with the Hortons in this big, old place. It was right across the county line and the city limits from Sarasota, the next town down. They wanted company for Allen because there weren't any kids his age down there at all, and so my job, which I could choose which obviously I did, was bringing out Allen. They had this big swimming pool right behind the house, and the living room was about 40 feet long. It was a great house. His dad said, "If you guys will paint the pool, I'll let you have a pool party," and Allen quickly said, "No, we can't do that," and I remembered Tom Sawyer and said, "Wait, wait, wait." So I called up the head of the cheerleaders, who was the sex symbol of all boys in high school, and I said, "Martha, I want you to recruit the biggest and dumbest of the football players, and you all come down and I want the cheerleaders to make a lunch. We're going to have a painting-the-pool party and then those who participated, plus those who we agree on, we will invite to the senior prom and we'll have a party." So to Allen's utter amazement, these guys just rushed down to work in the hot sun and loved every minute of it. And so we had this big party. So I brought Allen out. He was a social success.

Q: Did you play Tom Sawyer while the football team painted?

LONG: Right. I got a bunch of directors' chairs and he was sitting in one of these, and big guys would come up, "Allen, what should I do now?" And he'd say, "Well, why don't you go down with the guys on the shallow end and paint a little down there." We basically just put paint on the pool. That launched Allen in his social success though. We had a good time.

Q: In high school, how about course, reading, or influence and all? Did anything particularly influence you?

LONG: No, not in particular. I took the usual college prep courses, and there were some very fine teachers. Fortunately for me, Palmetto High School and Bradenton High School were joined to make Manatee County High School in 1948, and that lasted until 1958 when they were separated again. I graduated in 1955, so I had the advantage of going to a larger school that had more course offerings, excellent teachers. So I took the usual, all the math courses, everything. I didn't work too hard at it, I guess. My mother was furious. She was a puritan-ethic woman, and when she found out that I got bumped out of valedictorian because I made a C in speech, because I wrote on my evaluation that I really hadn't learned very much, she was absolutely furious at me. But I got a very good high school education.

Q: How about international affairs while you were in high school? Did the world outside penetrate Palmetto?

LONG: A bit, mostly Latin America, of course, because it was near Tampa. Believe it or not, that's where all the Cubans were because they had come to make cigars for Jose Ivor back in the 19th century – this was before Castro. Then in my senior year Mr. Horton took Allen and me and his wife to Havana. His firm was working on a big luxury hotel down there – this was before Castro – and so we went down and drove all over. We took the ferry from Key West and drove all over the island. I can't tell you the minute that I became interested in foreign affairs, but I certainly loved it and certainly from that moment I was fascinated by the world outside me. I had no inkling of wanting to be in the Middle East until much later; but it sort of evolved more than was planned.

Q: I would assume that where you were brought up – it wasn't called that at that time, it wasn't considered that – in a segregated society. What was your appreciation of this at the time?

LONG: My anti-prejudice prejudices have been reinforced living in the Foreign Service. I think that the perception of segregation in the United States has been – how would you say it, the opposite of being romanticized – it's demonized. I think Americans have an underlying conviction that victims are morally superior to victimizers, and that ain't so. The opposite isn't so either. People are people. I used to get my papers down at a feed store, and there was a black guy who got his papers and we were good buddies. We talked about all sorts of things, and he was a good friend of mine – a friendship that would be much more difficult to have now because of the sensitivities of Afro-American and all this stuff that's come in between. I'm not romanticizing this. My father really did instill in us that we're all God's people and we're all equal in the sight of God. And even whether you don't believe in God, that concept was hammered home to us and was just not questioned. The vagaries of living physically separated was something one accepted because that was just the order of things. One of the fascinating things about Palmetto, when they made Palmetto High School on one side of the river and Bradenton High School on the other, they gerrymandered it so that the black section of Palmetto would go across the river. They didn't rename it Bradenton; it was Manatee High School, but it was no longer the county high school, it was the Bradenton High School, so that they could get the football players from that side. Now, that was after I had left, but I was not surprised at all at that kind of gerrymandering for particular purposes. Also, I remember we didn't have any particular views about Spanish one way or the other down in Palmetto. My mother started teaching school in Tampa. She finished her degree at Tampa U in order to help put us through college. Of course, she never stopped teaching after that, so I realized there was a little more to it than that. There was a clack of Cuban people that had moved into the Education Department of Hillsboro County and ran it, and she used to talk about "the Cubans, the Cubans," and I said, "Mom, you're a bigot." "No, no, no, I'm not a bigot." But it brought home that rightly or wrongly when people feel ethnically threatened, then they begin to demonize the people that threaten them. I think this is a

universal attitude, so I never localized it to the South or to the United States or to any one particular area. To me, this is behavior that's universal.

Q: That's tribal.

LONG: Right.

Q: So you graduated from high school in 19...

LONG: '55.

Q: Where'd you go?

LONG: Davidson College.

Q: Why Davidson?

LONG: Because they gave me the best scholarship.

Q: Well, Davidson is a Presbyterian college.

LONG: Oh, with a passion. Less now than it was then. It was also all men back then, which I couldn't stand.

Q: What was Davidson like at the time?

LONG: I once saw something that said that Davidson was an Ivy League wanna-be, which totally missed the point. They didn't 'wanna be'. They were pretty darn smug, satisfied with what they were, which is a Southern, liberal arts, very rigorous school, and they still are. The fact that they don't recruit very much from outside – they make half-hearted attempts to do so by getting Presbyterian churches all over the United States to say, "Hey, that's a great place to go." They really don't do it, but my education there, certainly course wise, was every bit as good or better than the quality of education I had in graduate school at Harvard or Fletcher or Carolina. It was excellent. The teachers were not required to research or publish; they were required to teach. Classes were 20, 15 in some of the upper division classes. You could always see your professor. It was an excellent education. The quality of the kids that went there was as great a bunch of guys – it was an all men's school then – which I ever met. I still keep up with lots and lots of them. All told, I had an excellent education, made some excellent friends, and hated that four years with a passion.

Q: Why did you hate it?

LONG: Well, I thought I was Southern, coming from Florida, which back then was still Southern. I didn't realize that Florida was not Southern in the way that North Carolina

was Southern. I was impatient with the mores, which were very high bound, very pied-piperish – you know, follow the leader – unwritten rules and all of that. I think it would have been a great place for somebody from the North or somebody from the Midwest to go, because they could have gotten some things that were wonderful about the culture of the school. The people who grew up there already knew them and didn't need them, and I had grown up sort of with them but smarted under the intellectual smugness, I guess you would say. There was almost like a political correctness – that's too a harsh a term for these days, but there was a correct way of looking at things. I remember one time one of my professors talking to my dad and he was trying to say something nice about me – I made A's in his course, too – and he said, "Well, they'll never pour David in a mold," and that was supposed to sound like it was a compliment, but it wasn't.

Q: Was it a Presbyterian mold that they were trying to use, or was it more sort of a Southern aristocratic mold?

LONG: Well, aristocratic is the wrong word, I think.

Q: Culture?

LONG: The culture, yes. People have studied Southern culture and it's a very complicated thing, but certainly the aristocratic past has influenced the South like no other here, so there is a sort of a *noblesse oblige*, there is a sort of a thing of honor. We had an honor system and it worked and it still does. There was a civility. There were a lot of things that I frankly now miss, living in the DC area. So it wasn't that I was a critic of the behavior as much as I felt straight-jacketed by it. It was also all men; there were no women. I liked girls, and it was almost like being in a monastery.

Q: Where'd you go, or could you go?

LONG: We left every weekend, and I quickly realized, having no money – I had a full scholarship – I got myself elected the social chairman of a fraternity. Now, in the fraternities there you didn't live in a fraternity. It's a little boys' school, so you live in a dormitory and the fraternities were really eating houses. The social life really was nonexistent except for, I think, they had three dances a year and stuff like that. So basically as social chairman I had an address book by girls' school, not by name, and everybody would come to me, "Hey, can you get us dates at 'fill in the blank' college, and I'd call up Susie Mae or somebody and say, "There are three of us, four of us or whatever. Can you get us dates?" Davidson was a place that girls all over the region wanted...

Q: They were supposed their MRS degree.

LONG: Right, so they didn't care who they dated as long as they could date somebody just to meet other people. So that's what I did, and every weekend we left campus. They didn't even serve dinner on Saturday night. They didn't even want you to be on campus, because they were afraid you'd turn into sort of a gnome or something.

Q: I come back to this mainly because of the year – it was '55 to '59. The South was going through the real desegregation of public schools. Did that hit Davidson, or had Davidson already made its accommodations, or how did that work?

LONG: Well, the act took a while to do, and it didn't really hit Davidson, I don't think. I think far more meaningful from any student's idea was the Civil Rights Movement, which was the early '60s. Chapel Hill was one of the places the sit-in movement started, and I think that raised consciousness far more than the '54 ruling.

Q: So in '55 to '59 there wasn't much going on in that way ?

LONG: There were the beginnings of it, and it was still more of an intellectual thing than a really 'hits me' kind of thing.

Q: Was the Presbyterian Church taking any sort of stand?

LONG: Oh, they took a stand. The Southern Presbyterian Church took a stand against segregation years before. People don't realize that, but the Church itself – I forget when but it was before World War II, it was way back – no, it wasn't institutionalized in the Church. Then again, I think people made – make still – a grave error in interpreting institutionalized pronouncements with social acceptance. You cannot legislate social acceptance, and it takes a lot longer for it to occur than it does just to pass a law. I don't mean judgmentally in one way or the other. It's something that takes time. Having spent most of my career in the Middle East, all this stuff about democratization – wave a wand and create a legislature – is not going to create what we consider democratization.

Q: What about foreign affairs at Davidson? Here you are in the middle of North Carolina. Did the outer world, particularly the international world, intrude much?

LONG: Not very much. It did for me. I was interested in it, and I was very fortunate. I was actually very fortunate on a number of counts at Davidson. We had two years of Bible, one Old Testament, one New Testament, and it turned out to be among the best courses I had at school, because I learned more about American culture in those courses. Most Americans have no inkling, particularly ACLU. Even when they talk about separation of church and state, they don't really have an inkling of how much – I'm not talking about theology here; I'm talking about cultural anthropology – the Judeo-Christian heritage has molded our society. When you start getting into Old Testament and New Testament, you find out just how much our culture is based on this thing. Secondly, I had a certifiable nut case. My freshman year he was a visiting professor. He had four or five doctorates, and he was among other things an archeologist of the Middle East. He really taught us more about archeology of the Old Testament than he did about the kings of Israel and all that stuff, which I was vastly uninterested in. That gave me my first interest in the Middle East. I remember one of the things he said was that the reason that the Hebrews didn't have chariots and the Philistines did is because the Philistines lived down

on the plain where you could run chariots, and up in the hills you'd run the wheels off these things because it was too rocky. Well, this is exactly the same explanation for why the largest tank battle in the world happened in the Sinai and up in the Golan Heights they didn't have any tanks. Why? Because if you ran tanks up on the Golan Heights, they would run the treads off the tanks. Down in the sandy land of the Sinai, the Egyptians and the Israelis were going at it full blast with all these tanks. It's fascinating some of the things that we learn. I got far more out of looking at it from an archeological point of view, I think, than I would have from a theological point of view. In the New Testament Bible we had a pop quiz early on and I flunked it flat because I hadn't read the assignment. The professor said, "See me," so I went into his office and he wanted an explanation. I said, "Well, outside the God squad" – which is what we called the preministerial students–"I'm probably the only person that has any intellectual interest in this subject at all" – it was a required course; you had to take it – and I said, "I think this text" – which was written by some British divine of the Methodist persuasion – "is just god-awful." I said, "It's the boringest book I've ever read," and he looked at me for a minute and said, "I agree with you, but I'm a junior professor and that's what the department head said we were going to have, but I'll challenge you. I'll give you a tutorial, but you have to come to class, you can't tell anybody. We have a honor system, so when you have a pop quiz or midterm you just fold your paper over and write the honor code and hand it in. But I'll give you a tutorial if you think you can handle it." I said, "Sure, I can." It was a fantastic because he taught me all this stuff that he'd been dying to teach people and couldn't, and it wasn't all New Testament, which I got out of basically auditing the course. We read Reinhold Niebuhr and Martin Buber and Jacques Maritain and Ernest Renan and all these guys that was itching to teach somebody about. I basically got a modern theology and philosophy of religion course tutorial, and we spent once a week together. It was supposed to be two hours but we'd do two or three hours and have coffee. It was really intellectually one of the best courses I ever had in my life. It was all done sub rosa, because the gray-beards of the college administration would have absolutely had a fit if they'd known we were doing it. It was pure luck. In political science a CIA guy came down for one year and he was deciding whether he wanted to teach full-time, and he taught us political science. I was a history major because the political science department was a joke, but he was there so I took this political science course, and it was a fantastic course. He decided not to stay at Davidson because he was at a little tea party and he asked this little old lady if she were a native. She said, "No, I'm from Iredell County," which is about 300 yards up the road, the county line, from where we were. He thought, 'I'd better get back....' So I consider those three courses – I had a lot of other good courses, but those really influenced me. The Old Testament, in learning about the Middle East – not particularly much about the Old Testament except for archeology – the New Testament, by just being an intellectually expanding course, and the political science, which was taught by a guy who actually became a very senior guy in the DDI, an analyst, and was on the Hill a number of years ago, named Ford, a wonderful fellow: those were very influential in getting me where I got.

Q: You graduated in '59. What were you thinking about doing?

LONG: I didn't know. I was sort of formulating getting a doctorate and being a professor. I loved to teach. I applied to Yale and Harvard and Princeton and Duke and Vanderbilt and Chapel Hill and Denver – I don't know why – and the biggest fellowship I got was at Denver, which offered me $3,000 a year plus free tuition. Remember, my Foreign Service salary when I joined the Foreign Service was $5,600, so that's was a lot of money.

Q: That was a lot of money.

LONG: That was a lot of money. Harvard, Yale and Princeton offered me tuition scholarships, but I couldn't afford that. I really was sort of self sustaining, and Chapel Hill offered me $1,500 and free tuition and books. So that's the one I took.

Q: What course?

LONG: Political science. I had decided by that time I liked political science and I had decided against law. I had thought I was going to be a lawyer and go back to Florida and have a sailboat. I was interested in the Middle East and I took some Middle East courses at Carolina but along with a lot of other stuff, a lot of economics. I needed a thesis and I wanted to do it on the Middle East. The Sudan wasn't terribly well plowed territory. All the documents were in English, but it was the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and I figured here's something I can do and I won't have to read French and Spanish and German, all the docs are going to be in English. So I did it and I wrote a dissertation, or master's thesis, on the Sudan. So later on when I joined the Foreign Service and they asked me where I wanted to go, I said I'd like to go there because I'd never been there, and they were not falling all over each other in line to get there, and they said, "Okay, you want to go, you go," and so I went.

Q: While you were getting your master's at North Carolina – this was which North Carolina?

LONG: Chapel Hill.

Q: This was what, '59 to...?

LONG: '61, and then they changed the rules – I was going for a doctorate – and said you had to have either public administration or state and local government as one of your fields to get a doctorate in political science. I was by this time an IR guy, an international relations person, and the idea of taking state and local government or public administration totally turned me off. So I applied to the Fletcher School at Tufts and got a scholarship and went to Fletcher, '61-'62, and actually the grounding that I had gotten at Carolina made Fletcher a breeze. Fletcher was a great experience but I didn't feel it was terribly academic, so I went down to Harvard and said, "How about it, you guys? Could I get a degree and really concentrate on the Middle East?" because by this time it had sort of evolved. There was no decision but it sort of evolved. They said, "Sure." They looked at my record, and it was easier back then than now, and they said, "Yes, we'll make you

TA (teaching assistant)." I said, "Well, how long do you think it will be, ballpark figure, to get through the comps?" They said, "Oh, four, five years." I thought of four or five years of Boston winters, and I already had two degrees and three years of graduate school. So my roommate, who came from Chicago, and I had been interviewed by Continental Illinois Bank. They had just passed the Edge Act which allowed for off-shore banking, the first time for American banks, Chase and Citicorp. Back in America in those days you did correspondent banking and they had people but it was not widely done, so I thought this would be great to get in on the ground floor. They called me up and said, "We can't fly you out here," and I said, "Why not?" They said, "Well, you're from the South." "So?" He said, "Well, personnel doesn't hire anybody from the South because everybody that gets hired from the South, after about three Chicago winters, goes home. It's not cost effective." I said, "But I'm not going to be in Chicago. I'm starting this international branch and we'll deal all over the world." He said, "I know, but they don't because we don't have it yet and they're very domestic oriented." I was sitting around drinking a beer with my roommate, who had gotten an offer from them – and we had all taken the Foreign Service exam because everybody at Fletcher, all the Americans, did – and we said, "Well what the heck. Let's go join the Foreign Service." "All right." And that's how I got in the Foreign Service.

Q: You took the written exam, I assume, in what, '61 or '62?

LONG: The school year, '61-'62.

Q: Do you recall on the oral exam any of the questions that were asked of you?

LONG: Funny you should ask. I won't mention names but the chairman of the team that examined me evidently was a holy horror whose reputation – and if I told you the name, you'd probably remember it – went all through the Foreign Service, which of course I didn't know. I realized that I was losing on point in this interview because I guess as a preacher's kid I knew what oral interviews were all about. I knew I had to do something to turn this thing around and take charge of the interview. Also, my heart wasn't in my hand because I hadn't intended to go into the Foreign Service anyway.

[END TAPE 1 SIDE A]

LONG:...it was not a high-risk thing for me and I was loose as a goose, so I knew I had to do something to sort of seize control psychologically of this thing. Somebody asked me a question – I've always tried since then to remember the story and I couldn't – but it reminded me of this hysterical story, and I said, "That reminds me of a story. May I tell it?" These guys in their three-piece suits were sort of looking down their glasses at me, and the chairman said, "Well, yes" and so I told this story and it cracked them up. You could see even he was trying to keep his mean demeanor, and the others just cracked up. That enabled me to take control of the interview, and I'm convinced that, had I not done that, I would not have passed. It was like that question about Roosevelt and Truman, and I got all balled up. I do that. I'm a history major but I wasn't very good at dates. So, yes, I

remember my oral very well. And I passed. In those days they came out and told you right then whether you passed. And I said, "Oh, good," and the guy who was the chairman was irritated. I'm sure he wanted to vote against me because I didn't jump up and do cartwheels. He said, "You don't seem to be very excited." I said, "Well, I'm not an outwardly emotive fellow, but inside I'm just really overjoyed."

Q: Were you married by this time? When did you come in? Was there a long period of time?

LONG: No, I came in at the end of June of '62 having graduated from Fletcher in the spring.

Q: What was sort of the spirit of Fletcher? I know it took people from different countries and all that. Was there a pretty good mix of other countries?

LONG: It was much smaller than it is now, much more intimate, a lot of foreign kids, a lot of very outstanding people. There was one fellow who was from somewhere in Scandinavia. He was to be the proctor of the dorm, and he tried to run it like he was the headmaster of a prep school. I remember he called my roommate and me in for something, an infraction, and started threatening us with this very serious offense. If we didn't tow the line, there would be serious consequences. We basically told him where he could go with his threats, that "this is a graduate school, this is not a prep school, and this is absolute nonsense, so don't call us, we'll call you," and if he had any more to say, we would say it in front of the dean; and he collapsed, in terms of a threat. It was interesting, and it was a lesson learned, that very often people – and it's true in diplomacy too – who will try to bully you, and if they get away with it, then they keep it going, and if you call them on it, they'll absolutely fade into the woodwork. But that's not the experience of Fletcher. Fletcher was a tremendous experience. I had a great time, and people who've done well since and who are very well known, now it's fascinating remembering them back then. I saw an article in The Economist by Fred Bergsten the other day. You may know Fred. He's an economist and runs a little think tank here in Washington, the most competitive guy I've ever met both physically and athletically and every other way. He organized Fletcher School to be in the intramural program with Tufts. You know, we were graduate students and we didn't take that very seriously. He did. He had all this lined up. When we did football, he had football plays. And we won the trophy of trophies. It was coming down to the wire and there was some jock fraternity that was a little ahead of us. The last ones were done during exam period, and I remember one of them was wrestling and he wanted to field a whole team in wrestling. He asked me if I would wrestle. I said, "Heck no." He said, "Listen, nobody will challenge you because they're all studying for exams." I said, "If you can promise that nobody will challenge me, I'll do it," so I did. And in whatever my weight class was, I was the champion intramural wrestler of Tufts University because I was unopposed, and we won the trophy of trophies. So my roommate and I made this big, huge trophy – it was all a spoof, it was all in good fun – and a couple of faculty members heard about it and came down to see this award. But

that's the way it was. It was lots of fun and very stimulating and very, very bright people. It was a very enjoyable year. It was not academic; it was a professional school.

Q: Were you pointed at anything by this time? Were you looking at the Middle East?

LONG: Yes, I was pointed at the Middle East but I still wanted a doctorate and I still wanted to teach. I had left Chapel Hill because I didn't want to do state and local and public administration, I wanted to do international relations. This was the top international relations school in the country along with SAIS of Johns Hopkins. It was rigorous but more professional, and I wanted a more academic doctorate and that's why I went to Harvard. When I took stock of how long it would take me to start again, that's when, as I said earlier, we were sitting around deciding what to do and Plan B was maybe go into banking, and for me Plan C was the Foreign Service and I ended up with Plan C.

Q: You came into the Foreign Service in 1962?

LONG: Right.

Q: What was your basic officer course like?

LONG: A100?

Q: Yes, the people there and the course. Do you recall any of it?

LONG: Pretty good. The best and the brightest don't teach A100 to newly inducted Foreign Service Officers at FSI, they're off being ambassadors and things, and I realize that. I'm not besmirching them in any way, but they weren't the leading edge of the talent bank of the Foreign Service. I realize also that people got a lot of baggage very quickly and if you made it or didn't make it was not a sign of lack or presence of ability as much as attitude. I learned that very quickly, not that I took advantage of what I knew, but I learned that. Now, the quality of instruction, sure it's good, but it wasn't very difficult not to be.

Q: I'm just thinking mainly of your group of officers coming in.

LONG: They were a great group.

Q: Vietnam hadn't raised its head yet.

LONG: The CORDS (civil operations and revolutionary development) program was just starting up but it was not yet what it was to become. This was '62.

Q: So you asked for Sudan...

LONG: And got it.

Q: You went out to Khartoum when, in '62?

LONG: No, there was a travel freeze. Congress didn't give us any money, so everybody stayed in place for a year, and it wasn't until the summer of '63 that I went out to Khartoum.

Q: And you were there how long?

LONG: '65.

Q: Now, what were you doing in '62 to '63 when you were frozen in Washington?

LONG: I took conversational Arabic for six months, and then they didn't have anything to do with it. There were a lot of us, but there were all these positions that nobody could come and do them. It was a nightmare for Personnel. Two of the most formatively important assignments I ever had took place in that six months. One, the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, one of the very few that we have ever had that was really, really good – I can't remember his name now – he poked up his program where incoming FSOs could go up to him. So I raised my hand – didn't have anything else to do – and went up and worked for about for about four months for Sam Gibbons, who was my Congressman from Tampa. It was a fascinating experience. Every FSO should do it. It really gave me a feel for how the Hill works that visitors simply don't have. Then when I came back, the fellow who was in what was then known was POD, Personnel Operations Department, which was the assignments guys, died suddenly and tragically, and the guy who was to take his place couldn't come from overseas. So here was this brand newly minted guy, and they said, "You're going to do Africa until he can get over here." So for about two months I did, and that taught me how the Foreign Service really worked. We assigned everybody from DCM down. The ambassadors obviously are picked in a different system. But here's this brand new guy who is arguing for bodies – of course, AF wasn't a bureau then, it was still with NEA. But in Personnel there was an AF Bureau – and I was the guy trying to get the best I could, and everybody was trying to steal our best guys and nobody wanted to give them to us. We had a modicum of real Africanists and then we had to beg, borrow and steal the rest, whereas, say, EUR had their Europeanists and then everybody else is trying to get in there. So the negotiating conditions were not good for AF, and you really had to bargain hard. It gave me insight on how this thing really works. I did that for about two months. We were trading bodies and everybody was trying to unload, shall we say, their unproductive officers or less productive officers on me, and I was trying to sell this guy as the greatest thing since sliced bread to them and they all knew he was a dog and that was why nobody wanted him, and on and on and on. So I learned more about personnel than some people learn in 20 years, because if you're in the political or economic cone you're so busy doing political and economic work. Personnel is what the admin people do. Well, to their peril do they not know. I learned very early and, as I said earlier, with my PK cynicism I started learning how this operation worked, and it was a fascinating education.

Q: This was in the early days. Was there developing a good solid core of Africanists?

LONG: Somebody ought to do a history about this one. I wouldn't say solid – well, solid in quality but not in quantity. For one thing, with older guys, if you'd spent 10 years in ARA and you know Spanish, you're not going to give up that legacy and you're sort of inducted into the ARA priesthood and you know Latin America, and start from scratch over here. So there are nonsubstantive career reasons why this wouldn't necessarily be a good idea, unless you were just totally fed up, and so you got people that were fed up. But the people from the beginning who wanted to do it, yes, there were a bunch of people coming in or who had just come in or who hadn't been branded with a bureau persona so that they could do it, and that's where you got them. So it took a longer period of time for them to come in and have a few tours – my roommate was one of them – to become the Africa hands. I think this is natural. It takes time when you open up a new thing like that. But at the same time – Soapy Williams was the Assistant Secretary of State – it was absolutely incredible. He played the Administration, which was the Kennedy Administration, like a violin, and all of the hopes and the idealism for "this newly freed-from-imperialism-continent, and we are doing to do great things." One of the most talented group of people ever put together under Soapy was there, and Sudan was in AF, it was not in Near East. Of course, the idealism reigned over the realism because problems were not problems that you could just have a quick fix for and they're still searching, but nobody has ever really, in my opinion, done a real academic research paper on this extraordinary group of people who in the early '60s were forming as the African countries were getting independence. There was just a lot of talent running around out there. Some stayed, others drifted on somewhere else. Some were political appointees. I'm talking about the whole group at AF, but it was an extraordinary...

Q: It was a time of really high hopes. This was the new world dawning and particularly the Kennedy enthusiasm, and this was kind of where it was playing. We had a chance to get in there and mold things. The Peace Corps was going to make a big difference.

LONG: Yes, a combination of naiveté and a little bit of arrogance and a lot of ignorance, but it was a hell of a time.

Q: Having these quite interesting assignments of the Congressional and the personnel, you were off to the Sudan, and you were in the Sudan from '63 to '65?

LONG: Right.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

LONG: William Rountree.

Q: Who was an old hand.

LONG: Yes, he came up the admin route, but he had been Assistant Secretary for the Near East. He was ambassador somewhere, I think, in the Middle East, and then he went to the Sudan and from the Sudan he went on to South Africa and then to Brazil. He was a lovely person, a very shy person. I always thought he was miscast in the Sudan for his talent. He was a tremendous guy, but this was the frontier. I'm sure he did a marvelous job in Brazil and in South Africa. I liked him very much.

Q: What was the situation in the Sudan? How long had it been independent? You're a new boy on the block. What were you seeing in Khartoum?

LONG: Remember I had written my thesis...

Q: Yes, but you'd never been there.

LONG: I'd never been there, so I had a lot of book learning but I didn't have the touch and the smell and the feel. A Fletcher classmate of mine was the Assistant Director of the Department of Statistics for the Sudan government, which was not Cabinet but it was a fairly high civil service rank, and through him I met all kind of people. I was out meeting folks and reporting all sorts of stuff, and a lot of the people in the embassy read the newspaper and were sort of desk FSOs. As my first assignment I was to be the consular officer. I was supposed to be rotated after three months, but the guy who would have to come back from the economics section made sure that I was going to stay there until he was rotated out of Khartoum, so I stayed there not quite a year. But I used that period, since it wasn't a heavy consular load, just to go out and meet people, know folks, so I knew lots and lots of people. I had a great time there. Then they had a civil war and they had a revolution and a lot of stuff like that.

Q: Prior to the revolution while you were there, what was the government like from our perspective, and what were American interests?

LONG: Well, this is me talking, this is oral history, this is not official. I felt that probably it was a residue of the high hopes – I won't say 'residue' because they were still very much in evidence – for the newly freed continent. We were doing a lot of stuff there. The AID mission was one of the biggest in the world, and they were going to eradicate water hyacinths from the Nile – good luck – and we had all sorts of stuff going. I never really had a sense that we had much in terms of interest there at all except as a part of the new rising continent. That more or less wasn't challenged during my tenure. There were a lot of things that happened previously. It was run by a military government under a guy named Abboud, who was a lieutenant general; it was a bunch of generals that ran the government. And then the government fell...

Q: While you were there?

LONG: While we were there, yes. There was a revolution, and during that revolution there was some bloodshed but not nearly as much as when there had been a north-south

conflict. The southerners are African and the Northerners are Arab. They're all dark skinned so it's hard to tell them apart if you come from the United States. We had a civil rights guy who came out there to talk to the brothers, and he was talking to these Arabs and didn't realize they were probably more prejudiced than he was. They didn't look that way to him, but there is an ethnic distinction between the largely animists and some Christians in the south and Muslims in the north. There was an uprising along confessional, quasi-confessional lines, and then there was also a revolution. So there was a lot of upheaval, and out of that came a democratic government, but it never really made it. After I left, it was overthrown again, and they had a series of overthrows, of violent revolutions, which has always, I think, been a tragedy. But in terms of US interests other than furthering this struggling country, which is an interest of ours, and furthering democratization, although we had never heard of the term, I can't say we had any pressing interest there at all.

Q: This was a time when Nasser was riding high in Egypt. In the Sudan how was Nasser viewed?

LONG: They had sort of a love-hate relationship with Nasser, with Egyptians. It was the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the Egyptians looked down on Sudanese as jungle people, way down, and they took offense at that. On the other hand, Nasser was an incredibly charismatic person. But it's interesting: there is a branch of the University of Cairo in Khartoum – and to get from point A to point B you'd go by way of D, C, E, F, and X and Y and Z, the Egyptians, and they're always being caught out by the Sudanese, who go from A to B by way of A to B, and they couldn't figure out how come. It was because these guys are not as conspiratorial as they are. So there was this relationship. They really weren't under the spell of Nasser except as an individual and charismatic leader. But the Egyptianness was looked as much as imperialism as anything else. In fact, the memories of the British, although they were frustrated with imperialism, were by and large positive.

Q: Supposedly the British had their A-number-one civil service in the Sudan, so they give it a pretty good government. This was by reputation.

LONG: They had a first-rate university, Khartoum University. They had a first-rate civil service. They just, once they got independent, have not really had the ability to run themselves. It's a tragedy. And they still haven't, in my opinion, up to now. They've had a lot of trouble governing themselves, but they were left a darn good infrastructure with this university and this civil service. It's a tragic country in that they had so much going for them when they got independence.

Q: You were in Khartoum and you were up in sort of the Arab portion of the Sudan. Was there much observation, contact to the south, the Nile people, the Black Animist people and all? Was there much contact?

LONG: There were a lot of them in Khartoum. I knew a lot of them. But one of the things that was fantastic for me: the ambassador we had previous to Ambassador Rountree

traveled all over that country. The country is as big as the United States east of the Mississippi River, a big country, and he had this huge travel budget. I was always bugging the DCM for orientation trips, and he'd basically say, "FSOs are supposed to be seen, not heard. When they're your rank, shut up" – not literally but that was the message. All of a sudden one day the administrative officer came in and said, "David, how would you like to take some trips?" I said, "I'd love to. That's why I joined the Foreign Service." He said, "I've been having a staff meeting with the ambassador and I pointed out that if we don't use up our travel money, we're going to lose it." Most of the people in the embassy at the time were sort of deskbound types, and nobody really wanted to get out there much except me. So the DCM called me up, he wanted me to grovel and be so thankful because they have decided as a special favor to me to let me take these trips. I had already known from the administrative officer they were doing this because they didn't want to lose the travel money, but I groveled anyway. I had some marvelous trips. I went all over that country. I went all over the place and just had a wonderful time. I wrote up all these reports that I'm sure were never read by anyone. I've still got copies of some of them.

Q: What was your impression of officialdom and the reach of the central government when you got down to Juba and other places like that?

LONG: In the early days work was still running fairly well, but then when the north-south thing blew up.... The civil war really started in the late '50s and early '60s and is still going on.

Q: But you were there in the early '60s. Was the civil war going on then?

LONG: It had quieted down. There wasn't any travel advisory or anything. No, it was quiet, but the underneath tension was there and boiled over subsequently in violence. When I went on these trips, there wasn't that much violence, there wasn't any. It was very quiet but you could sense, in the south particularly, the tension. I also went out to the west, which hardly anybody had gotten out to since the British. That was a different thing but very fascinating.

Q: Were there missionaries scattered around?

LONG: There were early on, and then they were all sent out. They didn't close down the missions, but they forced all of the foreign missionaries to leave, which was probably a mistake, because if there were a moderating influence in the south, it was these people. But again, this was ethnic, this was confessional. It's a very complicated situation, and I'm not sure whether our lack of interest or our overwhelming interest would have been a greater factor in understanding the country better, I'm not sure either one. I'm talking about Washington. The people out there did, sure.

Q: How well did you feel the Sudan fit into the Washington African mold? I would have thought that it was kind of off to one side and there would be much more interest in Ghana or Tanzania or what have you.

LONG: Well, as I said, this was all caught up in the enthusiasm of Soapy Williams, and it was still under that aura when I got there. The ethnic wars and the revolution made it a crisis area. Of course, when there's a crisis area, then there's a lot of attention placed on it. But by the time I left, I think, the bloom was off the rose. It's hard to say, though, because the bloom was off Africa. You don't sort of see it one day and it's gone the next. This is something that you see in retrospect more than you see at the time.

Q: Was there a feeling that the Sudanese really aren't doing the right things as far as running the government at this point, or were we still seeing the better side of things?

LONG: This is just a prejudice of mine. I think we were less judgmental in general back then than we are now. I personally decry the term 'democratization.' I think when you say 'democratization' subconsciously we think everybody ought to be a Jeffersonian Democrat. In fact, what we're really talking about is public participation in the political process, how does the public participate, to what degree are they allowed to participate, how effective are they and so forth. I think that by reducing this to little terms like 'democratization' we have oversimplified and made simplistic some pretty complicated things, and we don't have to think much anymore because we have a little slogan that we can use. I think that that has increased particularly in the last 10 years, and if you go back 30 years we were less judgmental. I think the people that worked in these areas obviously were highly aware of it. We were trying to look at the country for what it was through the eyes of the people that were there and see what we could do to help rather than judging where they stood on the scale of human rights or democracy or whatever else. I don't think it was out of ignorance, I just think it was less judgmental.

Q: Did the British play much of a role there when you were there?

LONG: A declining role. Habit factor was still there a bit, but after I left, by the late '60s, they had much more bloody revolutions and by that time even the habit factor had pretty much died out.

Q: When you were there, you say, there was a little revolution?

LONG: Abboud was overthrown, and they installed a democracy.

Q: What happened, and where were you on the day it happened or days it happened?

LONG: At times I was unable to get to the office, at times I was at the office. One time I was running around checking out the revolution and a mob started chasing me. If I'd been timed by the Olympic timekeeper, I would have probably won a world record.

Q: Why were they after you?

LONG: Well, it was a mob. Another time I called up my friend Sillaman, the statistician, and I said, "How are things in your suburb?" He said they were quiet and they were quiet in mine, so I induced my wife to go with me around to Sillaman's house. We were going to go way around, not through town, which was kind of hopping. I guess this was during the ethnic uprising. The mob surrounded us and were jumping up and down on the car. They'd been burning cars and houses and things. This big face stuck into the window and they were all yelling, "*Ai shishab*, long live the people." I have a very loud voice and I was yelling even louder, and he said, "Are you for the people?" I said, "Yes, I'm for the people." He turned around like Moses and said, "Stop," and they all stopped. He said, "He's for the people," and I said, "I'm for the people," and they all started cheering. He said, "Let him by," and they opened up like the Red Sea, and we drove down this corridor of cheering people, "*Ai Shishab, aywa*!" I got about two blocks down the road and had to pull over. I'd just turned to jelly. It didn't happen during the incident but after, and my wife has never let me forget it.

Q: You mention a wife. How did a wife appear on the scene?

LONG: I met her in Chapel Hill. Then I went to Fletcher, and then when I joined the Foreign Service we had to decide whether to get married for her to go to Sudan or wait till I got home. I said, "Your call. I can't guarantee how I'll feel when I come home. As of this moment I am 100 percent sure that we'll get married when I come home, but who knows what will happen when we're separated for that length of time." She very hesitantly said, "Okay, we'll get married." It was tough on her, it was really tough.

Q: I imagine it would be. Had she envisaged this type of career?

LONG: No, no.

Q: The Sudan is not the easiest place to start somebody out. At least you're Southern, but it's a moderate climate in Chapel Hill.

LONG: Well, it's not so much climate, it's society. She was by 10 years the youngest wife in the embassy. The next youngest wife was about 30 with three kids. She was 22. She skipped a grade, so she was a year younger. She graduated from college at 19 and she was going to Columbia Teachers College when she went overseas. A young married person with no children and the youngest American wife with three kids, that's tough. And then, of course, it's a male society. If you're going to learn how to go with the locals in the Arab world, you've got to be able to stay up all night long and drink tea with the men, which I did, and it was tough on her, very, very tough.

Q: Then you left there in '65. Where'd you go?

LONG: To Morocco.

Q: And you were in Morocco from '65 then to '67. Was this part and parcel of any plan, or was this just an assignment?

LONG: This was language. I had taken six months of colloquial Arabic, and the colloquial Arabic that they teach here is Lebanese. I went back for the full course. A full course of Arabic at FSI is 22 months, so I went to the Western Arabic Language School for the rest of that. I was supposed to pick up western dialect; I had the eastern dialect plus the Pusshah, which is the educated, literate language. I had a wonderful time learning Arabic.

Q: This was where?

LONG: Tangier. We had a great time. The cost of living was so cheap that I went broke taking advantage of all the opportunities. We had our first child born in Daytona Beach just before we left. But Barbara could get a lady to come in and help her, and it was very nice.

Q: I've heard sort of mixed reports about this school that was set to teach western Arabic, that it didn't quite reach sort of the standards of effectiveness on the one in Beirut. What was your impression?

LONG: When you say effectiveness, that's a far more complicated question than maybe you think you've asked. In Beirut they learn Lebanese, and to my way of thinking Lebanese is not the language you ought to learn or the dialect you ought to learn. Back in that day and time you should have learned Egyptian or, as we say, Egyptians – their 'j' they pronounce 'ga' instead of 'ja', so you know it's an Egyptian if he says 'ga' because there is no hard 'ga' sound in Arabic. So Gamal Apanasa is really Jamal Apanasa in classical. At any rate, that was the dialect that everybody knew. That was the dialect of Radio Cairo, of *Satal Arab,* blah, blah, blah, and they learned Lebanese. Having taken all this Arabic here and it was Lebanese, and I went to Khartoum, the first day I was in Khartoum I was in a taxi and I wanted the guy to stop at the embassy, so I said, " *wokte lehone,*" which meant 'stop here', and he kept driving and went by, because the word ' *wokte* ' is in classical '*wokte*, but the Lebanese pronounce a 'ka' like a hiccup, so instead of saying '*wokte* ' they say '*wokef*". Then the 'le' on the end of ' *wokef* ' means 'for me', 'stop for me'; '*hone*' means 'here', and the classical is '*huna*', so they say, "*hone*" but everybody else says, "*hene*." In Sudanese, that would be '*inaudible*'. When I said, "*hone*," he probably knew what I was saying, but he didn't stop. The dialect just is not widely enough used, and when it is and it's Lebanese, it's not the most popular dialect in the east. So even if the eastern school were excellent, which it was, I have always had my doubts whether it should have been in Beirut learning Lebanese. They should have learned something. Anyway...

Q: They're in Tunisia now.

LONG: Yes, which is in the west. Certainly in Morocco you learn Moroccan. We learned the dialect very well. But Moroccan dialect, even among the western dialects, is pretty far away from the western dialects. So quite apart from the quality of the instruction, you then have to ask yourself how useful was it. In my case they sent me to Saudi Arabia where it was of no use, the western dialect. Now, I learned the Pusshah. All the newspapers are in Pusshah, which is standard all over the Middle East. But for the spoken dialect I basically had to go back and resurrect my Sudanese, which was an overlay of my Lebanese, and then put in Saudi vocabulary and sounds to make it work. So from that point of view it was a total waste of time to learn the western dialect, but the reason was they thought I was going to be assigned somewhere in the Maghreb in the west, and they needed somebody really quick to go to Jeddah. I went kicking and screaming because, having spent all this time to learn the western dialect – this was like learning Portuguese and being sent to Madrid – but then that's how life is in the Foreign Service.

Q: I thought this would be a good place to stop for today. It's rather important when you left in '67.

LONG: Actually I left in December of '66. We went to Beirut, and I had to be retested again in Arabic because they didn't trust the testing over there – you know, bureaucratics. Actually I did very well there, and then we took leave and so I spent a couple of weeks in Beirut, which before they tore it up was a beautiful place, and then we flew into Jeddah just after New Years in '67, so the war had not happened yet.

Q: So we'll pick this up in January of '67 in Jidda – you say Jeddah, Jidda.

LONG: Classical is *Junda*, and they say usually *Junda* and vowels don't count in Arabic very much, so they don't hear the difference between *Jinda* and *Junda*, or 'ah' because it's sort of aspirated at the end.

Q: This is Tape 2 Side 1 with David Long. David, before we move on to Jeddah, you said you had a couple of Sudan things you wanted to say, so let's go back to Sudan.

LONG: Between the times that we did this recording, I thought of a couple of Sudan war stories that illustrate points. I guess any Foreign Service Officer can go on and on with war stories....

Q: That's what we want.

LONG: One is about when we talked about the British. They had left and the Sudanese are very proud people and did not shed any tears over regaining their independence. That didn't mean to say that they did not have a warm spot in their heart for the British. I mentioned earlier about the royal visits and how they turned out in large numbers for their queen. One story involves attitudes and habit factor. I was out in the western part of the country, out in Darfur, which was about 600 or 700 miles from the capital. I was by myself actually in a lorry driving around and inspecting the countryside and talking to

local people and getting attitudes and so forth. I stopped in a little town called Zalenja where they had a UN experimental farm. I met a fellow there from Khartoum from the Ministry of Agriculture, a friend of mine, and he asked me what I was doing there and I asked him what he was doing there. For the couple of nights that I was there we were together, and he asked me where my cook was, and I said, "I don't have a cook. I'm just running around the country." He was aghast that a Western person would be running around out there without a cook. So the day I left – we left about six o'clock in the morning and it was still not quite sun-up – I was shooting for the pot. I was shooting game, and as soon as I shot a gazelle, the people in the truck – and I never knew who was in the truck because the guy who was driving it around, one of his rights was that he could pick up passengers for an extra bit of money – they would run out and slit the throat of the animal and say, "*inaudible*," bless it so that they could eat it by Islamic dietary laws. I was thinking we're really now in the real unspoiled nature of the society out here. When we stopped for lunch, this guy got out and cooked the meal – and I hadn't seen him before – and it was a fast lunch. So we moved on, and when we stopped for dinner and camping – we were camping out – I wanted to sit down with the guys and see what was happening. Usually on these occasions you'd see a little dot on the desert and about 10 minutes later somebody would walk in and say, "*inaudible*" and you'd look around and wonder where in the world did they come from, because there's nothing out there in the desert, and how did they know we were here. By the time the meal was cooked, there would be about four or five of them around and we'd share our meal. Only this time it was the same guy, he was dressed in a white *djellaba* and he had a cummerbund on, and he'd set up this little table with a tablecloth on it. He found a case of scotch that I was giving to the local officials in the little villages where I went, which is totally against Islamic law, but they took it anyway. He'd found a bottle scotch and he had it on the table facing the sunset, a gorgeous sunset. It was the cook. The fellow from back in Zalenja, this Ministry of Agriculture fellow, had sent his cook along with me because he couldn't stand to see this Westerner out there in the desert without any cook. This was the Raj. I had never ever really before that, or since actually, felt as close to 19th century history, sitting in solitary splendor, not able to go and talk to the guy until I had my meal and a little glass of scotch following it to top everything off, and then I could go and sit around the campfire and talk to him. I was thinking, with all of the layers of civilization that have come through in the Middle East and even come through the Sudan, there is sort of a heartland area inside each individual and then there are these layers, and one of the layers they had picked up from the British imperial days and they stuck to it. It had nothing to do with their political attitudes or their societal attitudes, but it was certainly there in spades and I've never forgotten it.

Another instance I remember was during one of the revolutions we had. They had a lot of unrest in the Sudan. I had made friends with the senior member of the Sudanese Communist Party, much to the dismay of the intelligence people in our embassy who didn't think I should be talking to the opposition, but I did anyway. During the middle of one of the revolutions when they were trying to burn down the American Embassy and his people were in the middle of trying to do this, he called me up at my suburb. One of the things about revolutions in that part of the world is the phone system never is torn up,

so people can communicate with each other; now I guess they use cell phones. At any rate he was very concerned that I and my wife were safe while he was trying to burn down my embassy. It's a great example of sort of the affirmization or compartmentalization of attitudes in this part of the world. If you do not account for it, you generally misinterpret what's happening politically in those countries. His relationship with me was personal and he was very concerned about my personal safety, whereas his political position was to run down all Americans in the revolution and in violence. To a Westerner that would seem a total disconnect, but he saw absolutely nothing that was untoward or strange about this behavior.

Q: Shall we move on?

LONG: Let's move on.

Q: All right, we're off to Saudi Arabia in 1967, and you were in Jeddah.

LONG: Right.

Q: What were you doing there? You were there from '67 to when?

LONG: Till '70.

Q: What was your job?

LONG: I was the number two political officer in a two-man political office. When the head of the political section went home and then took early retirement, I was the acting head of the political section until we got a new fellow.

Q: Who was the first head of the political section?

LONG: Bob Stookey.

Q: Yes, and who was the ambassador when you were there?

LONG: Herman Eilts the whole time through.

Q: What was the situation in Saudi Arabia as we saw it, and what were American interests in this '67 to '70 period?

LONG: The same as they are, and nobody knows. The attitude, I think, in Washington was, well, they can't eat their oil and they're going to have to sell it to the West, so there's no reason to worry about this country since what else can they do with their oil, it's not threatened. They're very religious and very conservative, and there seemed to be virtually no Communist threat as seemed to be, at least in the minds of Washington, rife in northern Arab states. So, yes, they had all the normal concerns, but there was no sense

of urgency and there were no visitors to speak of. It was off the beaten track of Congressmen who wanted to junket through the area and wanted to have Israel as their hub and that they'd see Egypt or Lebanon or countries close to there, but they seldom if ever got down to the Arabian Peninsula.

Q: How did Herman Eilts operate as an ambassador?

LONG: I think that that generation of Arabists was unsurpassed and is still unsurpassed in quality, in judgment, in depth of understanding and the ability to deal with the problems of the area. When he became ambassador, I forget how young he was. He was a relatively young person, and that was in the days when you had to have white hair before you're considered for ambassador. He was a tremendous fellow. He was also a workaholic, which is the key to success in the Foreign Service. He thought that a good weekend would be spent going down to the embassy and knocking off a dozen or so cables. I think cable traffic when he was there quadrupled from his predecessor, and when he left I think it dropped about a half. He was tremendous. The problem was trying to find something to write on that he hadn't already grabbed up and written before you could get to it; not because he was trying to undercut his staff but because he just was such a dynamic fellow and had an intellectual curiosity to want to know everything that was going on about everything everywhere, that it was hard to keep up with him.

Q: Well, this is my question, and that is, as a political officer in a two-man political section where they don't have elections and they don't have loyal opposition, what the hell do you do and what do you report on

LONG: Actually that's a very good question. Most Foreign Service Officers think that if they don't have elections and they don't have all the trappings of government that we have, that nothing's going on – quite the opposite. The problem is if you don't know the system – and virtually nobody did know the system except for the senior Arabists like Eilts – it was very, very difficult to find out what was going on. I went with my boss, Bob Stookey, to a lot of meetings where he never opened his mouth, and he was criticized by visitors, the few that we ever had, not Congressmen but usually FSOs, because they said he was too shy and never talked to anybody. Well, you don't have to fill silent spaces with noise in that society, and you can sit there for 45 minutes and not say a word and it's not considered unseemly or rare or anything. In fact, they wonder why we rattle on. I learned a heck of a lot about the culture under him. Then I went out and decided if I tried to beat the ambassador I'm not going to do it. He's the ambassador and he has access to people and information and cables from Washington that say "Burn before reading" that I would never have, and, therefore, why should I lead from my weakness to his strength. I went out to find things that nobody was necessarily looking at at the time, which may or may not have been marginal, but it kept me busy. I learned so much about the country that academically I've followed the country ever since and have become, I guess, probably one of the leading Western followers of Saudi Arabia.

Q: What type of things would you tackle?

LONG: One thing I did, for example, Ambassador Eilts asked if I would go out and write a report about the *hajj*, which is the pilgrimage to Mecca. I think he thought I'd write about a one-page thing where we had a *hajj* this year and so many people came and this is what happened, it happens every year. There wasn't that much demand on my time, so I went out. Jeddah is the gateway city of Mecca transportation-wise, and they have a fascinating, sort of medieval guild system for administering the *hajj*. What King Abdul Aziz ibn Faisal Saud did when he took over the *Hejaz*, the western region, was he didn't create a government bureaucracy to run the *hajj*, he basically grafted on this guild system. He turned it into what in the United States would be sort of like a public utility, a privately owned but nevertheless totally regulated utility, because the government wouldn't have had the ability to do this anyway. So I met people that were pilgrim guides; they were basically like religious tour leaders, very well organized. In those days there were almost 1,000,000 – now there are over 2,000,000 – people that come every year, speaking about 120 languages and mostly old, and you have to get these out of the seaport and the airport and over to Mecca and around and about. You know, we couldn't even do Woodstock, and it's a miraculous thing. So I studied it quite at length and wrote a 30-page single-spaced paper on this, which I knew nobody in Washington would ever want to read, but it became sort of a source document for anybody going to the embassy being assigned there, because this was the major happening of the country. We always thought of oil, but to however many billion Muslims there are in the world the *hajj* is the most important thing. So I sort of became an authority on this thing, and later on I finished my dissertation, I finished my doctorate, and I needed a subject so I thought, hey, I've done all this research, and I turned it into a dissertation. To this day – and that was years and years ago – I get questions on the *hajj* from scholars who are studying it, that I have no idea what they're talking about because I haven't look at this thing in 25 years. That's one of the things that I did, and I did it in depth. Fortunately I had a boss, Bob Stookey, who was sympathetic, because most Foreign Service bosses would say, "What are you wasting your time doing this for? What don't you do the busy work that is normal?" Well, busy work is busy work no matter where you were. So I did stuff like that.

Q: Just for the transcriber and for readers, the hajj is basically the pilgrimage to Mecca.

LONG: Right, and it's spelled H A J J.

Q: Were we concerned at that time with the people coming on the hajj? Were we concerned that this might be a way of infiltrating God-knows-what Communist terrorists, subversives, or what have you?

LONG: To a degree, but I think Washington was more worried than was Saudi Arabia. This would be like sending John Paul II to the Vatican City for Easter. This is such a high holy day that it would not be tolerated, not just by the Saudi government but by the million *hajjis* that are there. In later years the Iranians tried to disrupt, and they did this – this was after the revolution...

Q: This would be in the early '80s?

LONG:... – yes, right – to try to demonstrate to the Muslim world that the Saudis weren't fit to be the custodians of the *hajj* and that they, the Iranians, should do it under the international committee. Well, it backfired totally, not because of anything the Saudis did but because the Islamic world rose up at the desecration by these Iranians. So, yes, that was a problem, just like crowd control would be a problem on the mall on the 4th of July, but it didn't have the dimensions that I think some people worried about because they didn't really go into depth about what's happening here. The Soviets always did send a delegation, but the Saudis were on them like white on rice and nothing ever came of it.

Q: Did you get involved, or was this at Eilts', the ambassador's, level, the personal relationships between the princes, the Saudi princes, because they formed essentially what, the majlises they called it?

LONG: They didn't have a majlis. You mean the lower-case majlis?

Q: Yes. I'm talking about whatever grouping you want to call it, but there was essentially a body that was representative of the various branches of the Saud family, wasn't it?

LONG: No, this is one of the mysteries. How does the royal family operate? And it's still largely a mystery. I was very fascinated with it and I did a lot of study of it informally. I talked to a lot of people. Now, I didn't talk to the important people, because I was too junior, because Saudis weren't all that interested in talking to Americans. So there was sort of the regular group of people that would come to the ambassador's parties, and he picked up some contacts and they were senior enough. You always submitted the people that you had at your parties to the protocol officer, who was myself because I was the junior officer. At the next party out he'd be at the ambassador's, so why should he come to my house when he could go to the ambassador's house? So I concentrated on younger people. I met their uncles, who were older people. I met a lot of people. It was very difficult to do, and I worked at that, but then I had the time, everybody had the time. This didn't change, this was constant, but the relationship changed in a major way after the '67 war, which happened in June after I got there.

Q: The June war between Israel and...

LONG:...and the Arabs. Following that, the importance of Western-looking Arab states became far more important. Many Arab states in that time broke relations with us, and they were not restored for a number of years. It wasn't noticed very much in the Foreign Service because as relations were restored, the more senior people with a lot of experience in the Middle East went right back into NEA, that's the Near East bureau, where they'd been all along. The junior officers, such as myself, were so junior that it wasn't going to hurt us very much to have a sort of gap there. In fact, because I was in Saudi Arabia and then I went back to Washington, the gap didn't affect me anyway. But there were a lot of junior middle-grade officers who got assignments in the Far East, in

Latin America, somewhere else, and had one or two assignments there. Then when the Middle East opened up again, they had to decide, 'Well, gee, I've now sort of gotten myself known in this bureau' – and, as you know, the State Department oversees this sort of group by area specialist more than functional specialist – 'why should I start all over again and go back into NEA, because I wasn't that senior there anyway, and why shouldn't I just stay here in Latin America or in the Far East or Africa or somewhere else.' It's fascinating. Nobody watched this except a few guys like me, I guess. I didn't do it professionally, but I was interested in it. It was not until that older generation started to retire that all of a sudden it was noticed that there was an experience gap of senior officers. By this time we junior officers were middle-grade officers. But with the senior officers there was a gap. Some of them came in from South Asia, which was part of the Near East/South Asia Bureau, but I think there was a definite quality gap. I'm not talking ad hominem here but in terms of experience, which was further compounded by what I in my personal – this is certainly not scientific but my personal – judgment is that about that time process began to win out over substance in experience terms. I don't think that the Near East has ever had the quality of people who were solid both substantively and in process – and you have to have both – as they were of that first group of people. I think part of it had to do with the fact that after the June war the junior middle-grade people who had to find an assignment out of the Bureau and then never came back created a gap that wasn't really noticed until years went by and they would have been the ones coming in to be DCMs and ambassadors. Yes, there were people more junior to them, but people that came in because they saw a nice ambassadorship – nice ambassadorship meaning any ambassadorship – were long on process and short on substance.

Q: Could you explain the difference between process and substance in your opinion.

LONG: Process means how the system works, how the Foreign Service system works, how the Washington system works, how the U.S. foreign affairs bureaucracy system works and what you have to do to survive, to get ahead, what you have to do to make a good record overseas, and all of these things, which are very important. If you're naive, you're not going to make it nor should you, because you should be aware of these things if you want to make an impact on policy. Substance means how well do you know the local people, how well do you know the language, the society, and how well do you understand really the politics that are going on. I don't think that the people in NEA now can.... Certainly there are individuals that, as in any period of time, are as good as you will ever find, but in aggregate I do not think that the Near East specialists of today measure up in their grasp of the region to the degree they did back then. But I think that in terms of their grasp of how to treat the system to make the system work for them, for America, for U.S. policy, they're probably far more sophisticated.

Q: How did the June '67 war impact on your observation on Saudi Arabia and our work there and all that? This was a devastating blow to Egypt particularly.

LONG: Well, it was one of these things that was more apparent in retrospect than at the time, because the Saudis did not really involve themselves more than in a token manner

in that war. Life went on. However, the energy crisis was to come soon thereafter, and this was sort of a hiatus period between the war and the energy crisis. At the time of the war Arab radicalism was at its height. When Nasser basically lost the war, you couldn't tell it at first but the charisma that he had – and he was one of the charismatic people, I think, in 20th century politics – the air went out of him. There was nothing to take its place. In time we discovered that what took its place, and what became the idiom for people to express their discontent with whatever, became Islam. I don't mean Islam the doctrine but the political Islamicism of today. That wasn't apparent immediately among many Foreign Service Officers of that time. I used to argue with them. They thought that nothing really had changed, that Arab nationalism was still at the center of attitudes of dissent and attitudes of frustration against the West, and so forth. At the time it was more with me a feeling than any real empirical evidence to prove this. The war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen went on throughout almost all of the '60s, and Nasser was keeping the war going by supplying the Yemenis...

Q: And they even sent troops

LONG: Right, and after the '67 war he had to withdraw those both for the '67 war and then because Egypt was militarily broken. It took another several years for that war to wind down, so as that was happening, there was still a lot of attitudes, both among the Saudis and the Americans, that Nasser was the big bad guy. Well, but he was a shadow big bad guy and nobody knew it, at first because there wasn't anything else there. So I think, at least in how I looked at it, that the '67 war was a major watershed but it was not fully realized until three to 15 years later.

Q: Were you getting from your Saudi contacts a certain dismissal of Nasser after the '67 war, because this was really his war, he had made all the moves?

LONG: No, not a dismissal. He lost face, he was humiliated, but not a dismissal because he was still Nasser. If you are concerned about people using an idiom to express whatever discontent – maybe they didn't like their mother-in-law, whatever – and using the language of Arab socialism and all of this stuff, and the Soviets were still there and they were still powerful, then this would be a concern. He sort of was a symbol of the language and the symbology used by people who wanted to be dissident, be against something, but he didn't rouse people and Islamicism had not flowered. I wrote a piece back then saying that it was a bipolar world, the East and the West. In Saudi Arabia particularly, because it's an Islamic country and classical Islamic political theory is a bipolar world, the Dar al Islam, the people under the law, under Islamic law, and Dar al harb, the people of war, bipolar. The bad guys are the people of war. Now, I'm not saying that they went and looked at the Koran to decide who was who, but this is sort of like proper Bostonians think that the center of the cosmos is the golden dome of the State House of Massachusetts. It's an internalized feeling. But nevertheless the Saudi view was that America was Christian and we were people of The Book, because Islam recognizes monotheistic religions including Christianity, Judaism and actually Zoroastrianism, the Parsis. So we were maybe not first class but we were people of the book against the

people of war who were the Communists, who were atheist. In that framework they could live with having good relations with the United States. I said, "If you don't watch out, they're not going to look at us as Christian people of The Book. They're going to look at us as secularist, consumerist, nonreligious people and our status can quickly change to people of dar al-harb, people of war." I really think that that is what has happened among the people who are dissident, the Islamist radicals. The interesting thing about it is that one of the early authorities that Islamic terrorists read to this day very carefully is the same guy who is the spiritual father of Wahhabism. It's the same stuff. He lived 1,000 years ago, a guy named Ibn Taymiyyah. But it shows you how attitudes can change but the structural framework, not that they'll ever mention this. It's very internalized but it's there, and I think that that shift from looking at the West as Christians against atheists in the Soviet Union began then. And the final end of that model was with the end of the Cold War, in which the members of the Dar al-Harb and we – guess what – at least by the extremists are considered no longer people of The Book but rather secularist, atheist America.

Q: When you went into private people's homes, were pictures of Nasser around, being sold, on thermoses, and that sort of thing?

LONG: No. First of all, you didn't go into private people's homes very much. Saudi Arabia is a closed society. Mutayr – that's a big tribe – if they socialize typically in some social function, 80 percent of the people there will be Mutayr and the other 20 will be everybody else. If you go over to a guy who is an Anayzah, same thing, and so forth. So they don't even interact socially all that much among themselves. For them to mix with Europeans is very, very rare. I knew some people and there were a few families that I got into homes, but many of my colleagues, not just Americans but the Western diplomatic community, there were some that during their entire tour had never been in a Saudi home. That was not rare, that was the rule. About Nasser, no, I think that he captured their imagination in the late '50s a little but, but particularly in the '60s and particularly after the Yemen War started, no, because he was giving succor to this Republican regime down there in Yemen that was a threat to Saudi Arabia. Also, the Saudi concept of Arabism is different from those other people. To be an Arab you have to be born one of a tribe that is Arabian that goes back to God, and if you're not, you will never be one. That's a very different kind of concept of Arab nationalism from what Nasser was selling. They were fascinated by him earlier on, but after that I think no. I think the old attitudes toward Egyptians, which is sort of said with a curl of the lip, continues.

Q: Was there any positive appreciation of Israel, or was this purely sort of a maligned country sitting out there?

LONG: Nothing's pure. Behavior is so complicated. I think the tendency of everybody is to try to simplify it, to bring it down to where it's comprehensible to the human mind, but in my opinion never came to me to do this. Their attitude toward Israel was as complicated as is ours, which is also very complicated but for totally different reasons. First of all, Judaism is one of the monotheistic religions that they recognize. They are

people of the book and they have a book. How do you square that with a total antipathy toward Zionism. Well, you can honor the religion of Judaism and oppose a political doctrine of Zionism, which is not even particularly religious. Now, you can call this a rationalization, but nevertheless Zionism is really a political doctrine, not a theological doctrine. So they would tell you what they oppose is Zionism. Now, don't take that out to its logical conclusion and find an inconsistency, because life is full of inconsistencies and, man, this is a big one, but that is sort of how they would construct their opposition if you ask them. If you didn't ask them, they were just against Israel, they were the enemy, just like we were against the Japs and the Germans. But if you were to intellectualize it, this would be probably – and I've asked lots of people about this, and this is really where we would end up – Zionism, which is trying to take over the Muslim world. Then the other unique thing about these people, because it is such an Islamic society, is that the third holiest site in Sunni Islam after Mecca and Medina is Jerusalem. It's not the Mosque of Omar that they think is the third holiest site; it's the al Aqsa Mosque, which is this little silver-domed job which sits over on the side on the temple mount, not the dome of the rock, and that to Sunnis is the third holiest site in Islam. So there is a religious element here that transcends politics, and I don't think we've ever fully understood that either. And then you would say, "Well, then how do they square that with the fact that there are Palestinians that are Christian and not Muslim?" Well, they don't, but this is the compartmentalization again that we talked about earlier. But there is that religious element that the dome of the rock, no, but the al Aqsa Mosque, yes, that being the third holiest site, that it to them must be under Arab/Muslim sovereignty, and that's an element that some more secular Arab states don't emphasize.

Q: Were you getting any reflections about King Hussein was being viewed there?

LONG: Very negatively. I did temporary duty in Oman back in the '80s and I wrote this piece about why the Saudis and Jordanians would never really get along terribly well, and the ambassador was furious that I wrote this thing and quashed it. So I just sent it in the surface pouch to people I wanted to read it and let it go at that. But the thing is the Hashemites come from Mecca, and King Hussein's great grandfather, if I've gotten my genealogy straight, was the fellow in World War I, Sharif Hussein of Mecca. He ran Hejaz, which is the western region of which Mecca was the capital, under the Ottoman Empire. Since the Ottoman Empire didn't have any real military power to deploy in the Hejaz, it was really quasi-independent. He was also very, very ambitious, and so he signed – you remember, back with McMahon, the British officer in Egypt – the McMahon correspondence. He agreed to rebel against the Ottomans, which was a huge step because the Ottoman sultan was also the caliph of Islam. If you're running Mecca, you don't do that. That's like if you were a very devout Catholic, you don't for totally political reasons decide, unless you're Henry VIII, to disavow the Pope. That is a big step, and he did it. Then at the end of World War I he declared himself King of the Hejaz. That irritated Ibn Saud over in Riyadh but he didn't say anything because he didn't have any money and was being supported in part by British subsidies. He knew that Hejaz was, because of Sharif Hussein's, now King Hussein's, support of the British in World War I, was one of their big buddies, so he didn't want to antagonize the British. But then when

Ataturk overthrew the Ottoman Empire, he also canceled the caliphate and said, "We're not going to be caliph of this land anymore up here." So King Hussein self-appointed himself the caliph of all Muslims, and that was more than Ibn Saud could take. So he invaded the place in the '20's and took over in 1925-26, somewhere along there, his armies took over Hejaz, and that ended the Hashemite rule in the Hejaz. But in the meantime the British, because they felt they owed a debt to old Hussein, had made one of his sons King of Iraq; another one of his sons, Faisal, was going to follow him to be King of the Hejaz; and then a third son they didn't have any place for him, so they went out in the desert on the other side of the Jordan and said, "We're going to call this Trans-Jordan so that you can have someplace to run." That is Jordan of these days. The son of this guy, Abdullah, wasn't king material. His grandson was King Hussein. So there's been bad blood between the Hashemites and the Al Saudis that go back to this period. It has a lot to do with Islam, claiming you're caliph, running Mecca and all this other stuff that very, very few Westerners know about. Back in the Cold War we thought, well, Jordanians are anti-Communist and the Saudis are anti-Communists, they ought to get together. In a pig's eye; they weren't ever going to get together. I don't mean they would fight each other, no. Their relations have always been correct, but there is very little love lost between those two countries.

Q: Was there a feeling in Saudi Arabia that you were able to monitor about King Hussein entering the six-day war and losing Jerusalem? Was he blamed for this, or was this strictly just the Israelis?

LONG: Well, they weren't happy at what he did, but at least he fought for the cause. If he had not fought for the cause at all, they would have looked down on that too. They do seek to assign blame and find scapegoats just like everybody else – a human behavioral trait, I think – but not in the way that we do. Yes, they blamed him but I don't think they blamed him to the degree that if we'd been in their place we would have.

Q: Were things happening, maybe you'd been getting from people who had been there longer than you by the flow of students to the US and then back?

LONG: When King Faisal, then Crown Prince Faisal, became Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia under King Saud, they stripped King Saud of his power. There were no more than probably a half a dozen or so college graduates in Saudi Arabia. Zaki Yamani, fabled Minister of Petroleum, was one of the earliest Western-educated college graduates in the kingdom. By the time I got there in 1967, more and more kids were being sent privately to Western universities, so there was a younger generation that had more of them. But it really didn't take off until the energy crisis and all the money that was flowing in. They sent thousands of kids to the West in the '70s, and that is really the period where Western-trained and Western-educated Saudis just really, really took off. There were thousands of them on any given day in the United States. We had the largest number, but then there were others in the UK, in France, in Germany, all over the place. Almost all were on government scholarship by that time versus the families that were sending their own. In the meantime they were building universities. King Saud University, which was

changed to Riyadh University and is now King Saud University again, in Riyadh was started in the '50s. It was just chugging along, and they basically hired whole faculties from the West. Then as Saudis came back with PhD's they took their place, so there were virtually no expats there anymore. What was called when I was there the Pet College, which was the College of Petroleum and Minerals over in Dhahran, became King Faisal University, which is their engineering and scientific university. Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah was started as a private university, and the government took it over and expanded it to a major university, and on and on. So the educational boom in Saudi Arabia occurred really more in the '70s and came to fruition in the '80s rather than in the '60s. People were worried that with all of these college graduates coming back from Saudi Arabia, what were they going to do to find jobs. In the early days you could go from college into a high government position. Well, by the time everybody in the government had a college education, then what were they going to do? Well, private business, which is taking most of them even now. Everybody is in business; even government people are in business. So worries that they had back then and they were beginning to have in the '60s didn't come to fruition. Now, the other thing I think one should mention is that they started a little moribund – it started off moribund too – thing called a Central Planning Office. The idea was to have some sort of modicum of central planning. Yamani and his deputy were two very, very powerful people, and it's hard to run a ministry of petroleum with two such very hard-charging guys in it. So Yamani's deputy was kind of shunted off by him to be the head of this. Well, he worked this into a Ministry of Planning and he got Hisham Nazer and he got SRI, Stanford Research Institution, to come over and do the first five-year plan, which was not like a Soviet one. It was more of a wish list, but it gave a sense of direction as to where they wanted to develop. They have had plans coming regularly ever since that. Now again, you can't read this like a Communist five-year plan, but it gave more direction than was going on before that. All that came to maturity in the '70s also when they had all the money. That has transformed the technological aspects of society in Saudi Arabia in a way that back even in the late '60s was hard to find.

Q: You were there when the oil crisis started, weren't you?

LONG: No, that came...

Q: After '72...

LONG: I was in Washington, but I was a Saudi analysis in the Intelligence and Research Bureau.

Q: By 1970, because of the war, had things changed in our relationship, would you say, with Saudi Arabia?

LONG: Superficially yes. We assigned a little more urgency to our relations than we had before. We took them for granted no more. All of a sudden we didn't have that many friends in the Middle East. They were a very powerful friend, but the relationship really did not change structurally until the energy crisis, for two reasons. One, back when I was

there the Israelis would tell Washington, "We want you to have good relations with the Saudis. They have oil, and you should really have good relations. And we don't mind, we're not anti-Arab." This was based, I guess, on a calculation that they were a zero threat to Israel. Well, after the energy crisis, I think it dawned on the Israelis before it dawned on anyone else, that maybe the United States might sell out Israel for a barrel of oil, and they became threat number one. The demonization of the Saudis did not occur until after the energy crisis. Before that, it wasn't that they were demonized; nobody ever heard of them. This would be like 'do you know who is the ruler of Fiji?' But after that, after the energy crisis, everybody knows where Saudi Arabia is. Just in a parallel way in the scholarly literature, which I also followed, there was virtually nothing on Saudi Arabia because they would not allow Westerners to come in and do research, social scientists. So there was none, and there's still a gap. But now if you look in any database about books on Saudi Arabia, you'll find hundreds of books on Saudi Arabia, most of them not any good but a heck of a lot of them. Before, you would find memoirs of early travelers and people like St. John Philby, very, very, very little at all. So it was a time when they were not a threat or perceived to be a threat to our interest or to the Arab-Israeli problem or anything of that nature. Westerners were not allowed in there except for business people – they didn't have tourists – and Muslim going on the *hajj*. It was important for oil but if viewed at all it was sort of viewed in a neutral way: well, they have oil, and we need oil, and that's nice. After the energy crisis, all that changed. One of the difficulties I felt personally after that period was that in my opinion the dynamics of the relationship had not really changed very much since the 1930s, but it's hard to see that because in the 1930s nobody ever heard of the country. In the 1940s we sort of heard of it because of World War II, and then we built Dhahran Air Base, and then there was the Cold War and they were anti-Communist, and there was sort of that among a few people who worried about things like that, and not terribly negatively. Then after the energy crisis all that changed and there was a lot of demonization and still is. There was a lot of misinformation and there still is, and a lot of it is the Saudi fault for not opening their country and allowing people in earlier. But that said, the dynamics that they've got oil and we need oil, that they are creatures of habit, that they realize that if the market dropped out of oil and we went to nonprofit fuels, what are they going to do with it, and they don't have very many other resources, so they have never wanted the price of oil to soar for fear we would go away from their oil and use solar or nuclear or something else. We've always heard about them jacking up the price when in fact they have always been price moderates. These kinds of things have not changed except for world energy cycles, price cycles, since the '30s.

Q: Were we at all concerned at that time when you were in Jeddah about Iraq or Iran?

LONG: If you recall, Iran was pro-Western, the Shah, and, as we mentioned earlier about, well, there ought to be a love-in with Riyadh and Oman and there ought to be a love-in between Riyadh and Tehran. The fact is that even though there was a marriage of convenience because both countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, were very anti-Communist, nevertheless there has never been love lost between any Arab and any Persian, and particularly Sunni Arabs and Shia Muslims is a sort of a confessional thing that you add

to the mix there. So the relations between those two countries were never as warm as we expected or even was calculated that they were. They were there and they realized that they had to get along because of the worse threat, which was the Soviet Union, but relations have never been good between them. They can't even agree on the name of the Gulf.

Q: I was going to ask, because when I was in Dhahran we kind of called it the Arabian Gulf. Is that still going on today?

LONG: We call it 'the Gulf' now. I call it the Persian Gulf in English and the al-Khalīj al-Arabī in Arab.

Q: Were we trying to do anything about relations with the Trucial States, which became the Arab Emirates? Were they a factor at all?

LONG: Back in the 19th century a Saudi emir had overrun an oasis that belongs to the UAE now...

Q: Buraimi or...

LONG: Buraimi, and that was a bone of contention for years and years and years. The Saudis got an American scholar who worked for the government relations department of ARAMCO to do a memorial for the world court on...

Q: Who was that?

LONG: Rentz, George Rentz. George wrote the memorial for the Saudis, and the Brits, J. D. Kelly, is attributed with having written the memorial for the Brits. We'd never heard of Buraimi over here, so we didn't understand what was going on. It was finally settled. Actually, King Fahd, when he was Crown Prince, finally put it to rest. I remember when we put it to rest I wrote a paper on this historical dispute which had really made it very, very difficult for them to get along on anything. I wasn't even allowed to publish it because nobody cared because supposedly it didn't have anything to do with the real world. But to me this kind of trivia isn't really trivial, because in their mind, by gosh, it's just as real as it can be.

Q: When we were in Dhahran in '58 to '60, it was very real. As a matter of fact, at that time the British did not even have diplomatic relations with the Saudis over the Buraimi dispute, and we used to sort of represent the Brits in Dhahran.

LONG: It was a big deal, but memories are short. The problem is their memories are not short. This is a major problem we've had in understanding these people. I'm not saying that you should just do this as a collector of historical trivia, but when the trivia matters to them, it's not trivial anymore.

Q: You have to understand the Battle of Kosovo if you're dealing with Yugoslavia. It may be sort of a historical peculiar little battle, but it has caused us in the long run to conduct a major air offensive against Yugoslavia because of that damn battle in 1379.

LONG: Exactly. And how many Americans had ever heard of Kosovo much less the Battle of. Now, you have to pick and choose which ones race people's engines and not just go scouring around for minutia, but certain things, like the Battle of Kosovo, and the Buraimi Oasis dispute which went on almost 100 years, to them are very, very important.

Q: Just as with Mexican-American relations the Alamo is still something somebody can push buttons with that now. It's sort of fading from view but it can come back again.

LONG: Sure.

Q: By the time you left, how did you feel? Did you feel you were able to contribute to the general knowledge of Saudi Arabia back in the States?

LONG: I probably wasn't that optimistic. It's very hard to contribute to the knowledge of anything to anybody. I guess I'm more self centered. I certainly contributed to my knowledge of it, and I hoped that it might in a marginal way contribute to the knowledge of people that would follow on. But I've never been terribly sanguine that that process would happen or that more knowledge makes for better decisions anyway.

Q: Was there a center of learning in the United States that one could look to that was turning out good solid scholars and others on Saudi Arabia, not just Saudi Arabia but that area, at that time?

LONG: The first American academic institution to really have a first-class capability studying the Middle East was Princeton. That was when Professor Hitti was there, and his focus was on the Fertile Crescent. There were a lot of Presbyterians, missionaries, in Lebanon going way, way back to the 1820s, and there was a Presbyterian school at one time, and so there was that link. Many, many Arab Americans were Lebanese or Syrian before there was a Lebanon, and that was their interest. Then Nasser came along and that became a major policy interest of ours. But in the meantime (a) the Saudis would never let social scientists into their country to study, and (b) the Brits ran the Gulf. So there were a lot more scholars looking at the Gulf in England than there were in the United States. So Gulf studies, if you will, particularly on the Arabian Peninsula side, never got that much attention in the centers that grew up when the government started funding various regional area studies, the National Defense Education Act or whatever it was. Again, most of the Middle East studies had to do with the Fertile Crescent region, and Maghreb but you had to learn French to go there. The Arabian Peninsula was pretty much incognito. I maintain that if I do have pretensions to be the leading scholar on Saudi Arabia, it's not because of my scholarship, but rather in the land of the blind the one-eyed man is king. And that is not that far off even now, even today. There are a number of

young guys who have come up, not so young anymore, who are very good scholars of the Peninsula, but there's no center that you could...

Q: When you're looking at Indonesia, you think of Cornell, and there are other places that seem to have gathered together like this. When you went there, did you get any feel for the Arabists? There's been something that's quoted around for a long time that the Arabist is ipso facto anti-Israeli, therefore somehow not quite truly American and anti-Semitic and all that. You were one, but do you talk about this breed of cat called the Arabist as you saw it? – and let's stick to the time you were in the Sudan and in Saudi Arabia.

LONG: This distinction is an American distinction and it's pretty largely an American Jewish distinction. It goes back to the fact that the Middle East specialists in 1948 did not want to partition Palestine, which had a majority of Arabs, and certainly not without giving them the right of self determination. You remember the famous statement by Harry Truman about how he has many Jews in his constituency but he doesn't have any Arabs in his constituency back then in the election and, therefore, he was going to be pro-Israeli. And that's trotted out by pro-Arab people on the other side of the coin. I came across that a lot subsequently in the United States when I did a lot of lecturing for the State Department all over the United States, and I was vilified all over the place by people who held that view. But when I use this, I use it just the way you were talking about a Sinologist or a Latin Americanist, as a person who knows the culture and the language and has personal experience there, period. Now, if you do that, the first people that came into the Foreign Service – I should say the first people in the Foreign Service who made up most of the Arabists – were people who had some kind of background, and this is limited almost entirely to kids who grew up in oil company families or missionary families, and this is not uncommon with the Far East specialists also. So there was that group, and many of them studied at Ivy League universities, so there was sort of a patina of preppiness that was also applied to them, whether or not justly you can have your own opinion. By the time I was in the field in the '60s, Arabists, such as myself, were from every walk of life and the only thing we had in common was a sort of weird failing that we liked to go to places like this, not because we were exotic but because they were intellectually fascinating. I still think it's a far more fascinating area to be associated with than Europe, which to me as a political watcher, maybe not as an economic watcher, but as a political watcher it was just pretty dull. So the people that I have been discussing as Arabists were specialists. They had had many assignments, that was where they spent most of their career, and they knew the area like the back of their hand. Were they anti-Israel, pro-Israel? They were Americans, and among any random group of Americans you're going to find pro and anti on about any subject you will. I don't think that they were anti-Arab, no, but my feeling is that we weren't pro-Arab the way many groups in this country are. In fact, giving all those lectures that I was talking about, and I did a lot during the '70s and the '80s, people would come up to me and identify me as a fellow pro-Arab and "what we've got to do is this and this and this," and I said, "Wait, wait, wait. We're pro-American here. My job just has to do with furthering American interests, and my colleagues from the Middle East will be furthering their interests." So the tar rush

that is rather commonly heard about, State Department Arabist one word with hyphens in it, is to me something that was done to demonize people that were perceived to be a threat to the creation and existence of Israel, period.

Q: In my brief experience with Saudi Arabia but looking at it, and the whole Middle East, is that it can be a fascinating place, but it's pretty hard to fall in love with this group, whereas...

LONG: Well, I think that's pretty good. Once you've fallen in love with people, then you've probably lost your effectiveness because you've lost your objectivity.

Q: But I mean there are countries where our people get in there and all of sudden kind of fall in love with either a romance or something. I think some of the Brits get carried into...

LONG: The old Orientalist.

Q: The old Orientalist got into this. This didn't seem to infect the Americans. The romance of the sands and all that, going across the Rub kali and all just didn't seem to...

LONG: There are individual, I suppose, there have got to have been individuals who had that notion, but the Foreign Service is a professional corps of people. It's like you don't have a liberal colonel and a conservative admiral – there are probably officers – but, you know, you're not a Democratic colonel and a Republic colonel, you're a colonel and you go lead into whatever war, Kosovo or wherever, you're told to. I think people believe that (a) regional specialists, not just Arabists, are pro-their countries to the degree of being anti-American, and to me that is just not so. That is not professional, and I just don't believe that they do this. Now, do they disagree with US policy? I pretty much disagreed with US policy in the Middle East as long as I served there, but that had nothing to do with my not trying to write the most effective policy papers that I possibly could to push whatever policy we were pushing. The other thing is that there is an assumption when a new administration comes in that the people in the old administration are against their changes of policy, but we're not. We are paid to be professional implementers of whatever the head guy wants, and I think that by and large, with exceptions I suppose and with what I consider legitimate differences of opinion, that's what we do. And that's what the Arabists did, and I think they did it better than the people who were politically inclined to follow that administration's policy, because they understood the people better and they knew how to sell the policy better even if they thought it was a bad policy.

Q: Shall we move on then? You left there in 1970. Where did you go?

LONG: I went back to Washington.

Q: To do what?

LONG: To be an analyst for Saudi Arabia.

Q: And you were doing that in INR from '70 to...?

LONG: Let's see. I did that from '70 to '75.

Q: That's a long tour.

LONG: In the meantime, in 1972, my boss, Phil Stoddard, who was the Office Director, persuaded me to finish my doctorate, which I had never finished. I did this at George Washington on the purely academic reason that it was two blocks from my office. I got interested in the academic side of things as a complement to the operational side of things. So they came up with really a cockamamie of making people FSRUs, if you remember, and I think I was probably the only FSO that switched to being an FSRU, so I could stay in Washington. So I stayed there, and then in 1975 I became a Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, which I did here in Washington, and wrote a book. Then the next year, let's see, '75-'76 – no, no, I got.... You can see how good I am at numbers. I remember the appointment came right after the '73 war, and I didn't have time to take it then, so I guess I took it in '74-'75. Then I took a year of leave of absence in '75-'76 and became the first Executive Director of the Arab Studies Center at Georgetown University. So I took two years off basically to be an academic.

Q: Let's talk about the time you were in INR dealing with Saudi Arabia. As an analyst in INR, what were you seeing and how were you being used? We're talking about the '73 war and the oil crises and all this. This must have been a fairly hot spot, wasn't it?

LONG: Well, the timing was great, because from '70 to '73 it was pretty dead, and that's when I got my degree. I did it in two years going at night

Q: By the way, what was your dissertation?

LONG: The *hajj*. I took that 30-page single-space paper, and I needed a topic, and this was all original research. No Western researcher had ever been able to get in and do this, and I had reams of stuff, and I turned that into a dissertation and then had it published by SUNY (State University of New York). Press in New York. It was in print for years and years and years. That's why people keep calling me up, because this is probably the only book in print on the subject. Then comes the 1973 war and, of course, all hell breaks loose about that time. I was actually working on the Arabian Peninsula, not just Saudi Arabia. The British were getting out of the Trucial States and the Emirates at this time, so things in my area were beginning to pick up. So it was a fun time to be there, and there was not all that much expertise going. It's interesting, the NEA Bureau always had a rather jaundiced view of INR...

Q: For the reader, INR, Intelligence Research, is a completely separate bureau from the geographic bureau.

LONG: And more than that, it's not an intelligence bureau, but that was the name that it had before there was a CIA and they kept the name, but it was basically the research bureau. It's function was to write analysis, and the policy bureau NEA's function was to write policy. In other words, they were advocates and we were not. So you can see the tension between an analytical paper telling it like it is on the one hand and an advocate of a policy on the other hand. So the term, and it's still the term, is it has to be policy relevant, which, depending on which bureau you were in, means you want to give the policy maker the straight scoop, but on the other hand it means you want to receive analysis that backs up your point of view. So there was that, and that's the kind of milieu I love. What I would do, I realized once a battle is engaged you can't win it, particularly from where I was sitting. So we would dream where we thought the next battle would be. We would write papers, if we could get them through, that nobody thought were terribly threatening. They were on subjects that were not urgent. Our theory was that when they became urgent, and that was one of our calculations, having spread these papers around and having enabled them to become the conventional wisdom of something not terribly important, when they became terribly important, as is the will-of-the-wisp way of policy in the State Department, no matter what they did, they would be playing in our ballpark. I really feel that the years I was there we had as much input on policy making in a way that NEA never really knew about except some of the more discerning – and, in fact, some of the discerning would come to us and ask us to write papers because they'd say, "We think this is going to blow up, and we can't get anybody's attention. Can you write a little paper? Since it has not captured anybody's attention, we think you can probably get away with publishing it. Then when it comes out, at least we've set some parameters for how we think the policy ought to work." And we did that. It was a lot of fun doing this stuff. And a lot of things were happening in the Gulf with the British getting out and then with the energy crisis. I remember that in the '73 war a couple of us really thought that there could be war in May, not in May but by May of '73, we were convinced that war was a very likely prospect.

Q: War between whom?

LONG: Arabs and Israelis. And nobody in government was buying this. "Oh, no, no, there was not going to be a war." Well, a colleague of mine wrote a paper, and it went plunk. Then he left and I took the mantle from him and kept it going. Well, I won't go into the reasons, but there were certain analytical reasons of things that were happening that people were not putting much weight on but we were, that we thought it was a good chance that they could actually go to war. By that spring those factors that we had weighed were themselves decreasing, but not to the degree that we changed our position. I'd like to say that we were more prescient than we were. In-house we had retreated a little bit but not to the extent of pulling back our view. And then the war happened, and we were one of the very, very few people around who had gotten into print saying, "You'd better watch out." Well, people gave us more credit than we really deserved as a result of that, because we really didn't deserve all that much credit. We were just looking at a situation back before it had become a crisis, but it was indeed the factors that we

looked out, we felt, that led to war, not that we knew they were going to. We just said there's a higher chance of war than you guys are giving any credit to. Well, that's kind of right. So I had to put off the Council on Foreign Relations thing all that got through, the war, and then I went and I did at CSIS, the Center for International and Strategic Studies, which was at that time part of Georgetown – it isn't now – and I wrote another book there on Saudi Arabia. No, no, I think I wrote that book on the Gulf. I wrote an introductory book on the Persian Gulf, because there was nobody who knew anything about the Gulf at that time. I remember the Council was very upset at me because my project was going to be to write a policy book on the Gulf, and as I got into it I realized that it's very difficult to write a policy book for a foreign affairs-aware audience if they know nothing about the Gulf. So I decided to write an introductory book on how the Gulf works and have the last chapter be a policy-oriented chapter, which is not what the Council wanted it to be.

Q: What was the role and what was your part of the Council of Foreign Relations at that time?

LONG: There was an international affairs scholarship which they gave to comers. You had to be 35 years old or younger, and I turned 36 before I actually took it, but I was still 35 when I was awarded the thing. And it was for people who they thought were up and coming, and I was awarded an international affairs scholarship. I didn't want to go to New York, so I did it at CSIS and sort of commuted back and forth to New York and wrote the book.

Q: While you were dealing with those, both in INR and with the Council of Foreign Relations, did you feel the hand of the American-Israeli lobby?

LONG: All the time.

Q: Could you talk about it a bit. What's the name? It's the...

LONG: AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee).

Q: AIPAC, yes.

LONG: Well, the people here were good friends, professional to professional, and that's not where I felt the hot breath as much as when I went lecturing. That in itself is a fascinating story, because I kind of got into it by accident. The senior people always like to go lecture in Miami Beach and San Francisco and Hawaii. Then if somebody wanted a speaker in Fargo or Plainview, Texas, or someplace like that, then they would go ask if there's anybody who wanted go, and very often nobody ever wanted to go. Well, I did. Why would I ever be in Fargo, North Dakota, on my own money as a tourist? So I thought it would be interesting to see those parts of America that I would never otherwise see. Then I got a call one day from a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Near East Bureau saying, "Would you like to go to New Orleans?" and I immediately smelled a rat. "Why don't you want to go to New Orleans?" He said, "Well, I'm very busy and I agreed to go

but I can't really go. They've got to go tomorrow. Could you go tomorrow? NEA will make all the arrangements for you to go. No problem." I said, "Sure, I'd love to go to New Orleans." Well, it was the Zionist Organization of America, which is a very emotional group. He'd learned about who they were, and he basically was chickening out. But I did it for him, and the fellow that took me around was a lovely fellow. He'd been in the Holocaust. He took me to all these restaurants in New Orleans and insisted that he order the food for me, and he would have chicken soup. That was all he would eat, and it was horrible to have all this stuff on your side of the table, but that's what he wanted to do, and I kept saying, "You know, we don't have to..." "No, I want you to do this." So when I got back to State, evidently they liked me down there and they said I did a good job. The person in Public Affairs Bureau sort of figured I would make a good pinch hitter because most audiences in the United States they want to get the most high ranking person they can find, and the higher the rank the more undependable you are.

Q: And a lousier speaker.

LONG: And very often a lousy speaker. These people would fink out all the time, so I became sort of a designated hitter when the high and mighty would fink out. I have a speaking ability that I can't claim is anything I ever learned, I just have it. But at any rate, it was a kind of serendipitous thing. I got to speak all over the United States when people would fink out.

Q: What were you talking on?

LONG: The Middle East and then later on terrorism when I was doing an anti-terrorism tour. But I've been in every state in the Union. It's funny, you join the Foreign Service and see America. And it was during these tours, not in the cities and not among the professionals, but the people in the back woods would blow me away. One of the tactics that I came across very often was some Jewish community or synagogue where I'd be going would try to sandwich me between some Israeli expert that they brought over and their local expert – and very often there's a local expert. What would happen would be the local expert would give all this emotional stuff and then the Israeli would look at him and say, "That's a bunch of baloney," because the Israeli lives there. This is not nostalgia, this is not romanticism, this is real life. And they expected him to blow me away, but he wouldn't. It wasn't that he was agreeing with me, but I wasn't taking a side either way. And he was saying, "You've got to understand the situation on the ground before you can deal with it. You have to know your enemy before you can deal with them. And by inventing all this stuff, it isn't helping." This happened to me quite often, so that's where I experienced that. I'd never thought about a State Department Arabist as being a derogatory term until that.

Q: Had you been to Israel?

LONG: No, not until I got to INR and then I went because we were in Oman, another guy and I. We were driving Beirut to Jeddah, off road mostly, and we were going to go over to

Jerusalem. This was in May of 1967. I said, "No, I want to do this when I can bring my wife." Well, then the war happened and I never got to do it until I was in INR. I was making a trip to Yemen and I was in the Arabian Peninsula and I came back through Israel. I thought we were going to talk about Yemen, but what they wanted to talk to me about was Saudi Arabia, because they'd read some of the stuff I had written. It was fascinating that I think more people in Israel have read my stuff than people in this country. I had some very good trips to Israel but not while I was in Saudi Arabia.

Q: This is one of our problems often. It's changed considerably but it used to almost be that our Arab country Middle Eastern hands for various reasons did not serve in Israel or have much of a grasp of Israel or if they had a grasp of Israel they didn't get to go into Arab countries because Arab countries wouldn't let them in and it was sort of a built in thing that meant that you're a right handed expert or a left handed expert and you really weren't a switch hitter.

This is Tape 3 Side 1 with David Long. How did you feel about our policy, when you had to get up and talk about Middle Eastern affairs? There's always been this split between an American government authority dealing with the Middle East realizes that Israel is not the center of the universe and that there are a lot of Arabs, we have real interests there, not just oil but strategic interests in the area and all, and it's very difficult to get this across to groups, and the only groups around the country that are really terribly interested in it are Jewish groups. I would think this would be very difficult to sort of reconcile this.

LONG: Recall that when I finished my doctorate and the two master's degrees that I had gotten previously I had studied the Middle East academically. When I got to INR I always felt that if you're going to deal with a country, you'd better know something about it. So when I was in Saudi Arabia I brought a bunch of literature and I talked to ARAMCOans about petroleum economics and geology, about what a Teutonic plate was in the Arabian plate and why there's oil there and what a dome is and stuff like that. I felt the same was necessary about studying about Israel. A fellow who has been a lifelong friend of mine, who is Jewish, Bernie Reich, who as a professor at George Washington and was the head of the Political Science Department there for a number of years, we have a textbook called Long & Reich. We used to go out on hustings, not from State Department, but audiences would ask us to get the Jewish opinion from him and the State Department opinion from me. Actually the Arab-Israeli problem is a very finite subject, and you know all the questions and all the answers after a while. I don't know why we did this but one time we were I forget where now, some rather large audience, Jewish audience – it must have been a congregation – and I have the Israeli point of view and he gave the Arab point of view. There was this guy in the audience who was waving his hand to be recognized – there was always a guy in every audience, you know, who is perpetually at 211 degrees Fahrenheit and all you need is just to blow on them and they blow up – and he says, "I want to ask Dr. Long blah blah blah," so I stood up. "No, no, no, not you, Dr. Long," and I said, "I am Dr. Long." He said, "But you're not Jewish." I said, "No. Did I say anything about Israel you disagreed with?" "Well, you shouldn't be talking about

Israel." And everybody was roaring with laughter by this time. So I don't feel that it is necessary to be only a left-handed or a right-handed person. Later on when I was the Near East Division Chief in INR for the Near East, Israel was in my parish and I studied even more. On the trips that I would go on over there, they would always want to talk to me about Saudi Arabia and I'd want to talk to them about Israel. This was not just in the government, this would be at the Cherou Center, this would be at Tel Aviv University, all over the place. So by no means do I claim that I am an authority on Israel, but I feel that I have a nodding acquaintance, at least a minimal nodding acquaintance. For anyone who pretends to be a specialist in the region, you have to, and I did. I didn't feel that not having served there per se was a handicap.

Q: One of the things that often happens to Foreign Service Officers who served in countries and developed and expertise and all, and they sort of get out on the hustings and lectures, they find that there is not a good mix with the academics who get up and talk about this. It's obviously a prejudiced point of view. You're talking about the real world, and they're talking about another one. Did you find this was a problem?

LONG: I breached it by having published, having taught. I taught at area universities here at night. I was the head of an Arab studies center at Georgetown. Later on I was at the University of Pennsylvania and taught a year there. I was at the Coast Guard Academy and taught two years there. I went back to Georgetown as a Pearson fellow and taught two years there. I am a member of the Middle East Studies Association, which is the academic Middle East watchers association. And I think I have enough patina, shall I say, of academia that I can hold my own with them in their own bailiwick, which is good and bad. It's good because I have more of a feeling for where they're coming from and less disdain for them; bad in that it can be threatening to them too, particularly when they have a point of view that they want to express. And I generally don't express a point of view if I can get away with it. I do feel that we, probably because of the size of our population, have always felt that we have had the luxury of having separate business, academic, and government regional experts and that they never talk to each other. I think that is wrong, and I always compare this to Israel, which is a small country which does not have the luxury of doing that. So their business people and their economic people and their government people and their academic people are interchangeable, and they can go in and out of either, and we can't. I have met a lot of academic prejudice against me, as they want to say, "Well, you know, you're a government person, so you don't really understand academia." Yes, that is a huge prejudice, but it's also a prejudice with businesspeople. "You're a government person, you don't really understand this mess." It's a three-legged stool, not just two, and I think that the United States is losing a tremendous amount of expertise and understanding of regions because we don't talk to each other.

Q: You've had historians and political scientists who don't talk to each other. They speak different languages.

LONG: Yes. One of the great things when I was at the Coast Guard Academy, the head of the Humanities Department stepped down and they asked me to take it over until the search committee could get another guy. I knew I wasn't going to stay, so I could burn all the bridges and use up all the chips and not have to care. One of the things that I did was I demanded that the sections, for history and government and sociology and blah blah blah, I said, "We are going to write across the curriculum. I don't care what style you use, whether it's Turabian or Chicago, whatever you want, but whatever it is, everybody will use the same standard." Oh, they were furious. If I'd been the full-time guy I couldn't have gotten away with it, because I would have had to answer to them forever; but because I was leaving at the end of the term, I got away with it. And this is a problem in academia.

Q: Did you find that as you were dealing with this and the Council of Foreign Relations and other things that there was a beginning of Arab awakening to the fact that they'd better start grabbing some academic high ground? The Israelis have done this. Actually their friends were members of the educated elite in the United States anyway. But the Arabs were beginning to send their people to college and all. Was there Arab money coming in to support Arab studies? Were you seeing a change?

LONG: Yes, but you have to go back to the fact that the people who had the big money were the people who had the newest Western educational tradition. In countries such as Egypt or Syria they have an old Western education tradition. They've known this for years and years and years and never did anything about it, but then they didn't have any money either. So, yes, there was that. But at the same time, education was prized in the Middle East. It's more honorific to be a doctor than it is to be an ambassador. I was over in Saudi Arabia just a few months ago and I was going by 'David', and inevitably somebody would call me "Dr. David." As soon as the people heard the 'Doctor', they would no longer call me 'David'. Even if I was trying to be informal with them, I became 'Dr. David'. This is because in their culture education is prized and always has been, without getting into what that means and all that – I don't want to do that – just to say this: As a general proposition, they are very proud of their educated people and how many PhD's they have in their cabinet, whereas here if you have a PhD you try to hide it unless you're either at the Pentagon or in academia. Even at Princeton everybody's called 'Mister'. It's sort of a reverse snobbery. Not there. It isn't so much as we've got to catch up, really there is a basic respect for formal education.

Q: Were you seeing a penetration of – I hate to put it this way – the Arab point of view, Arab history, into our academic institutions? And were the oil countries contributing by developing...?

LONG: Well, oil companies contributed to the Middle East Center, yes, and banks and other folks and Arab states, but academia is not where you look for change in attitude. Some of the biggest and, in my opinion, most bigoted pro-Arab voices in this country are in academia. Public attitudes are public, and this means media. I have always felt, and I felt this way when we started the Arab Studies Center, it was not to be a pro-Arab studies

center but just to educate people about what they were like with all the wars, but at least you're getting not misinformation but information, and then you can make up your own mind about what you think about them. Maybe that's naive, but I have always felt that we would be better off if we knew more about them even if at the end of the day we were still biased against them, but at least your biases are founded on some degree of information and not just prejudices and misinformation. I have always lauded the fact that we have expanded academic centers studying the region, but then the same is true of any other region. But I don't think that that's the place to try, or would even succeed if you did try, to change basic attitudes. I certainly through the years have known enough people from the Middle East coming over here to know... I could go on and on and on about just the petty slights that they are subjected to at Tysons Corner or anywhere just because of public opinion.

Q: Well, David, I think this is a good place to stop. If you want to make some mental notes to yourself if there is anything more we should talk about sort of as and academic or public period, but then we'll pick this up. When did you sort of come back on board?

LONG: After the two years that I was gone at Georgetown, I came back to be the chief of the Near East Division in INR, and then I went from there to the Policy Planning Staff in, I think, 1982.

Q: Well, we'll pick this up in 1980.

LONG: Let's pick it up after I came back from Georgetown. At the end of the '70s when I was a division chief, State in its wisdom did not replace the Iranian analyst. So I went to the Division Chief for Iran and said, "I'll be your *ex officio* Iranian analyst, since I've handled the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, until you can get one." And the two of us were very, very deeply involved in analyzing Iran before the revolution.

Q: So we're talking about '78.

LONG: Yes.

Q: All right. Well, we'll pick it up then.

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Today is the 7th of August 2000. David, you had something more to say on the academic center before we move on to INR.

LONG: Right, I just had a lead-in to what I did after I got back. I wanted to mention that in Islam in general and the Arab world certainly and particularly in the Arabian Peninsula, education is a very prized thing, even when Arabia was Arabia-Deserta ideas which freely flowed throughout that stretch of desert. There is to this day more prestige attached to being a PhD than there is attached to being an MD. The time that I was with the Council

of Foreign Relations and I was Dr. Long and I had written a couple books, and I was teaching at night from time to time at Georgetown and George Washington and American, I met a lot of Arab students who were getting their doctorates. I was on a number of doctoral dissertation defense committees. Then when I went over there on an extended trip as the Council fellow, I met a lot of these people and doors opened that had never opened for me as a diplomat. And I also, it seemed to them, succeeded in getting a number of people from the Arabian Peninsula into graduate schools at various times, to where they had this naive and very mistaken idea that, if they just called up David Long, he could put their kid or cousin or whoever it was into graduate school. As a matter of fact, the latest phone call was last week when a person from the Gulf called me and asked if I could help get his son into a graduate school. So the time after that, after the trip when I was with the Council on Foreign Relations, gave me a new dimension in my job in the State Department. I was known far more by people who would never had known me at my modest rank had I not done that, and I would be called on the telephone. I remember one time the Foreign Minister of Sudan called up and asked if Barbara and I would come have lunch with him, and the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was there. He was wondering how in the world does this guy know that guy. So I wanted to lead in with that, because as we will go on in conversation, you will see this relationship with these people, which was serendipitous and it was accidental mostly, added something to what I think I did contribute to foreign affairs during that period.

Q: So you then went to INR and the Near East dealing with not only the Gulf but also Iran from 1978 to when?

LONG: Well, I was there until I went to the Policy Planning Staff. Well, I went to University of Pennsylvania for a year and taught. I think that was in '82. So up until that period I was in INR first as an analyst for the Gulf, all the Gulf States including Iran, and I took Iran on. It was not really part of my job description, but as I said in the last session, I took that on because we needed somebody and I plotted with the division chief for South Asia. Then I became the division chief for the entire Middle East and North Africa subsequent to that, so I got a promotion in the middle of it.

Q: Let's talk a bit about INR from your perspective. INR plays different roles at different times. How was INR being used in this '80 to '84 period from your perspective in the Near East.

LONG: My perspective is that INR has historically been under used. It was a mixture of full-time civil service people and Foreign Service people. I was a Foreign Service Officer who decided to stay full time because I wanted to teach and write and do things on the side. Because of my background both in the Foreign Service and knowing what the Foreign Service needed or Foreign Service people needed in the Policy Bureau, and also have gotten a degree, having taught, having written, having a different perspective on political analysis than the usual Foreign Service Officer, I felt that there was a way that we could increase our contribution. There were a couple of like-minded people, a couple of whom I helped recruit from the outside as civil servants to come into INR. Basically

what we tried to do, rather than to compete with the policy bureaus, Near East Bureau in particular, about crises, when they, or of course everybody, wanted to be on the leading edge of whatever was in crisis. I felt that by the time the crisis started there was no way you could influence it, because people already had their mental images of the nature of the problem and what solutions were best. This was then melded in with what the political leadership wanted to do about that problem, good, bad or indifferent in our professional opinion, and then that was the party line and everybody had to hold to the party line. To try to say, "Hey, guys, I think you're barking up the wrong tree," was futile. So what we did, what I did as an analyst and then later on as a division chief, was to try to look ahead and see what kinds of potential problems were on the horizon that nobody was paying attention to, because everybody, as you know, was putting out a fire and were so busy working 24 hours a day putting out today's fire that nobody was looking at tomorrow. I don't mean this in an *ad hominem* way at all. It's just the nature of the work. We would look at situations and grind out papers, very short papers, that would give a constructural framework – I was very big on constructuralization – that people would more or less buy into because there wasn't anything riding on it anyway. It was no threat to them, their careers, their promotion or anything to say such and such looked like it was in bad trouble, whereas if it were in bad trouble, you would already have your concept of what it was and what should be done about it. So by the time, if the time arose, and it didn't all the much, but we were fairly good at, among the thousands of wasted things we did, finding the ones that would be the next crisis, like Iran. There wasn't much of a crisis going on when I joined up with George Griffith, who was the division chief, but there soon thereafter was. I think we were able to make a tremendous mark, because when a crisis did arise, they were playing in our ballpark even though they were playing the way we would play it. We did this on numerous issues, particularly the issue of the Shah. That one particularly – now this is all later – I'm convinced that we turned around the State Department which was keeping to the party line that, bad as things were for the Shah, he had staying power and he would stay. Now, we never said he wouldn't, because if we knew that, we would be in the stock market, not in the State Department. We were saying probably the situation is retrievable, but we had serious doubts that the Shah was capable of retrieving them, not because of his cancer, because none of us at my level knew that, but for a bunch of reasons. I remember in October before the revolution we had a conference and we stacked the deck. It was at all objective. We got scholars who we knew thought the Shah had bit the dust already. George wrote a paper, George Griffith, the division chief, full of gloom and doom, and we made it look like it was an academic paper but the academic didn't want to sign his name to it because, you know, academics don't like their name on anything inside government, so everybody bought that. We never actually said that; we just implied it. I remember that the assistant secretary for Near East, Hal Saunders, a great guy, driven guy, he came down and he was going to put in his perfunctory 10-minute opening-up-the-conference stint and then he was going to go back and do some real work. But he stayed; he stayed for the whole thing. We knocked their socks off. At the end of that conference, we were the only part of the Department of State that said this guy's in serious trouble and we'd better start looking at what may follow him. And sure, the security types, CIA, those people were already doing – that's their job

– but at the policy level we weren't. So that's perhaps a more dramatic example. There were a lot of less dramatic examples.

Q: The information that you were getting from Iran, I gather, was quite tainted, because there were almost..., you were supposed to think right. The CIA was certainly trying to push the Shah is there, he's going to stay in, and we weren't supposed to talk to the opposition. I've talked to Henry Precht, who said he was practically frozen out because he was saying, "You know, this guy might not last." It wasn't they didn't want to hear it; they wouldn't hear it. It was a very unhappy situation at the time.

LONG: This comes back to the nature of analysis and the nature of intelligence as a source of information for your analysis. What I was teaching my guys to do and what I was doing was saying, "Don't take anything at face value, even if your mother tells you." Always say, 'Why did the person say that? What was the person's motive? What are the empirical facts here, and what's opinion, and how plausible is it?' – you know, that kind of approach." So sure, the information was tainted, but the tainting was in how it was interpreted, even by the people who reported it, the agents if it were intelligence. We didn't disbelieve it, we didn't believe it, we analyzed it. We wrote analytical papers that the policy people could not find where we were pro or anti any policy – we were just saying, "Bang, bang, bang, here are the facts, here are the views, here is the plausibility...." An example is that in Iran every 40 days after somebody dies there's a memorial event – I'm oversimplifying this thing...

Q: [Inaudible.]

LONG: Right. There's a long history of martyrdom as a part of Shia Islam.

Q: Ali and all that sort of thing.

LONG: Right. So after the third 40-day uprising, it became pretty clear to us that these were not isolated events. A big, tough thing for analysis, when you're not trying to do the long run 20 years from now that nobody cares about, is when do your isolated events constitute a trend. This is not easy to do except being a Monday morning quarterback, but we said, "This may not be but it looks like a trend. If it is, it ain't good, it's bad, it's getting worse, and we might be on the final slippery slope here." We didn't say the Shah was going to go, we didn't say, "Your policy's bad." We just commented on a series of empirically observable facts that suggested that they might not be isolated, that they may actually be a trend and the next 40-day one is going to be even bigger than the last one. That's how we did that. Sure, they didn't like what we were saying, but we were the only group that could get into print. Henry Precht more or less agreed with us, although from where he was sitting on the policy side he was fighting us, because he was paid to. So there were plenty of people that thought that, but no one could get into print. One of the great things about INR in that period was we could get into print. Our boss said, "If you can verify your analysis and make it reasonable and make it convincing and don't take a

policy stand on it, we'll print it," and he did. So that was just one case of many where we raised a little cane and where I think we made a minor impact perhaps, but a difference.

Q: What about, say, on the Gulf States? How about Iraq? How were we doing in Iraq at the time?

LONG: Our view of Iraq, if you remember – during that period – went through a series of changes, and it was basically pretty low on the scope, because, yes, it was a confrontation scene against Israel and that made them bad guys. They were steadfastly against us as a competition state. We had no diplomatic relations with them at the time. Therefore, they didn't come up very much, and when they did, they were bad. They were demonized as they became currently, but they were bad guys and not that much attention was placed on them because they weren't perceived as that direct a threat except the ongoing position that they held. So we didn't look at Iraq per se but rather as a security threat to other people, Israel I've mentioned, but also the Gulf States. And the Gulf States, which had become independent in 1971, were scared to death of Iraq. So our main concern with Iraq, even back in the '70s, was as a threat to the oil fields, which was a major strategic vital interest of the United States. That remained so into the '80s when there was a fall, in part because of the Iran-Iraq War. Then they were bad guys again, and at the end of the Iran-Iraq War we tried to convince them that they should act civilized. We told them there was more in it for them if they were civilized than if they were uncivilized, a policy we'd try over and over, but high risk, and it didn't, as you know, didn't work. But that came in the '80s; that was not during this period.

Q: I would think that some of the goals of.... You had what was going on in Iran, but other than that I would have thought the Gulf would have been in a rather quiet period, this '80-'84 period – no, '78 to '82 was it?

LONG: We're talking '76 to '82. But, yes, pretty much except for the Dhofar War. Dhofar is a province of Oman, and there was an insurgency that we got into, a Communist insurgency, well, it was, but it was a lot of things. It was ethnic, it was ideological, it was all sorts of things. It was pretty complicated, and the British were mostly fighting it. But because it was Communist, this made it really, really, really bad.

Q: Because of the connections in North Yemen, wasn't it?

LONG: South Yemen, yes, right, and a lot of the people who were insurgents had been in South Yemen, which when it was run by the British was at a high level of education. A lot of these people were workers over there or they were workers up the Gulf. Then as the Gulfies, their economy, struck it rich with money, they started laying off the Dhofari and hiring locals or cheaper other people. And a lot of them became unemployed. A lot of them had been in the police force. So it's a complicated thing. Suffice it to say that, if seen in Washington, it was a Communist thing, which it was but it was a lot more. The Shah sent a group of, I think, 150 Iranians over for the war effort, which probably stirred up more concern among the Gulfies than the insurgents themselves. These guys came

with every piece of equipment that you could possibly put on somebody's back. Washington couldn't figure out, never admitted, that these people were not welcome because, after all, the Shah was anti-Communist and they were anti-Communist, and this is a Communist insurgency. They should be welcomed with open arms. Well, the Iranians were not Arab. The Arab-Iranian gulf (i.e., divide) – and I'm not speaking of a piece of water – was far broader than was ever given credit for back then. This is a good example of how, if you just look at something in a superficial way and put a label on it, out there 99 times out of 100 you're not going to catch what's really going on very well.

Q: Did this Dhofar War, did that end while you were there?

LONG: Yes, it ended – I'm trying to think now when it did end. You can see my sense of historical dates is terrible. It ended in the '70s and it ended when the British drew out – it may have even ended before that, so I might even be talking about an earlier period, but I was still covering it. I'll have to look at a history book, my own – I have a book on it. But at any rate, the dynamics lasted throughout the period. The dynamics of this started when the British left the Gulf and they announced in 1968 they were going to leave and then in 1971 they did leave. That forced the UAE, which had been the Trucial States, Qatar and Oman, to fend for themselves. There was a major policy call, a two-pillar policy in Washington. The two pillars were Iran and Saudi Arabia. That was one of my failures. I couldn't get it through to anybody, because either they knew and wouldn't say or they didn't know and didn't care, but these two guys really didn't get along with each other. So that's the dynamics. We had a pro-Western Shah and we had a pro-Western Saudi Arabia who were not pro-each other terribly much at all. In fact, there were some incidents during the '70s. There was an oil rig incident where the Iranian navy took a Saudi four-rig because it was in a disputed area, even though it was on part of the disputed area that even the Iranians could see would eventually be Saudi, and they took this boat, or this rig, into Kharg Island. This was in the earlier period, but it shows there just wasn't any love lost between these guys. That lasted all the way through the Shah's regime, and we would not recognize this. So the major change then, of course, was the Iranian revolution, which changed the whole dynamic. All of a sudden the Iranians were the bad guys to us and we demonized them. The Cold War then ultimately got over, and that brings us up to date. But these dynamics, I think, are as important or more important than looking at the topical details year by year, and they really didn't change very much during that whole period.

Q: When you were there, were there any things, aside from the obvious of Iran, in Saudi Arabia or the Gulf States? Were issues coming up such as military equipment and all that? Was this something...

LONG: Yes, again, that's an old dynamic. The Gulf States, particularly the smaller Gulf States after the British left, wanted us there to defend them. They needed us, be it fear of Iran, Iraq, the Soviets or whomever, but they didn't want us to be there until we were needed. So they rose to the concept of over-the-horizon. They didn't want us visible, they

wanted us over the horizon, and the military kept saying, "We can't be over the horizon and get there in time." This is part of the reasoning that P. X. Kelley used to...

Q: Head of the Marine Corps.

LONG:... – yes – to introduce the concept of a rapid deployment force. If you're not stationed in the country and they need you quick, how do you get there quick. That was really the origin of that whole train of thought which has led to, well, the way CENTCOM is set up right now. It's supposed to be rapid deployment. Which now, back during the Kuwait War we had the luxury of having six months to set it up, so I'm not talking about how well it worked. But the idea of it was not even thought about until then. It was because these people didn't and still don't want us visible, they want us over the horizon. This has always been true in that part...

Q: Well, these are actually very small populations, and bringing a bunch of American military in can be very destabilizing.

LONG: Oh, yes. There are a thousand war stories or, I guess, sea stories about this, about how some aircraft carrier skipper wants shore leave for his ship in Dubai. Well, God, if they all got off that aircraft carrier, all 5000 strong of them, in Dubai, they'd sink the place. You're right, these are small little places, and they can't handle that big a..., plus their national pride and not wanting visibility, and this was even an issue during the Gulf War. So, yes, the two-pillar policy, which never really worked very well, of the '70s then was replaced, of course, when the Shah was overcome. But up to that time – it was something that had been done way earlier and had kept on, I guess, by its own momentum. A word here: During this period Jimmy Carter came in as President and this is when Governor John West of South Carolina became ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He had been Governor of South Carolina when Carter was Governor of Georgia. I think Carter wanted him to be Secretary of Commerce, and he really wanted to be Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He had induced Kuwaitis to come and develop Kiawah Island in South Carolina. He liked Arabs and he wanted to do this, and he wanted to expand American trade in the area. So when he came to town, I was delegated to lead the group of people that were going to give him his ambassadorial briefing, and it was a god-awful briefing. It was terrible. It was the kind you give to political appointees that you really wish would disappear and go away. He was seen also, I think, by some as one of the Southern pride cornpone governors, mainly by people who didn't know what kind of smarts it took to be a Southern pride cornpone governor. And I thought the briefing was terrible. I dutifully gave it because that was my job. But I talked to a mutual friend and said, "You know, we owe it to this guy to give him a better briefing than he got." So, totally sub rosa, although I did tell the Assistant Secretary for the Near East about it and he said, "Sure, go ahead," I met West for lunch downtown and told him how the country really worked. It was kind of funny because my college roommate was from South Carolina and so I drew on this. Talk about *chutzpah.* I sort of used by analogy the way politics in South Carolina worked – it was really kind of nervy on my part – and I said, "It's all done by interaction. The name on the door doesn't indicate anything. It's all eyeball to eyeball, and so you really have to

know who the players are and why they're players and not just assume that because they're a minister or a deputy minister that they're a player, or because they're a member of the royal family either." I gave as an example a fellow named Edgar Brown, who way back when I was in college in the '50s ran South Carolina for about 50 years, never had an elected office in his life. And West laughed and laughed and said, "Let me tell you a story about Edgar Brown. When I was a state senator, I was instructed by the then governor to go down to Barnwell, South Carolina, and ask Mr. Brown if he would give up his license plate, which was SC1, because the Governor thought that the Governor should have it, not just himself but any Governor. So he went to Barnwell and he saw Mr. Brown, and Mr. Brown said, "Son, I've seen a lot of governors come and go and this one's pretty good but tell him the answer's still no " and I said "John you're gonna do okay in Saudi Arabia" because it's a very esoteric communications system, it's very much like the American South, you very much have to hear the grass grow.

Then when the Shah looked like he was leaving, the autumn before the Shah fell, when we gave a little conference I mentioned earlier, Hal Saunders, who was Assistant Secretary for the Near East, called me up and asked me if I would go over to Saudi Arabia and write an in-depth report on stability, and I said, "Why? Everybody in State knows the state of stability in Saudi Arabia." He said, "I know, but we need something, in case it gets really bad, that can show that we are on top of things." I was on temporary duty over on the intelligence community staff, having been recruited by Ambassador Steigman. There were these two State Department people over at Langley, and I talked to him about it and he said, "Yes, sure, go." So I was on a temporary duty TDY from another TDY from where I really should have been. I was there for about four or five months. We wrote this in-depth report about Saudi's stability, and all these doors that had opened back earlier when I was Council of Foreign Relations fellow or when I was teaching these guys or helping with the dissertation committee or whatever came to put me in very good stead. And I went all over the country.. I used what is called the ambassador's plane but it was really a C12, and I went all over the place. Prince Turki al-Faisal, now the head of Saudi Intelligence, would make me appointments with regional governors all over the place. It was a researcher's dream, it really was. Would that some poor graduate student could have the access to all these people that I did. And I wrote this 120-page report. Powell said, "Write it in-depth. We really want to send it on up to the Hill." I figured nobody would read this thing, so I slugged it secret on the theory that if they saw secret documents, they might be induced read it. And the message was this was a very, very stable country. Just because it's religious and Iran was religious and because the Ayatollahs look like they're getting off the reservation over there doesn't mean that there was a similar situation in all monarchies. There certainly was not one here. Well, up on the Hill, the supporters of Israel were trying to tell how horrible this Saudi government was. I think they were afraid that we might sell out Israel for a barrel of oil – this happened during the oil shortage. They pounced on this thing and it disappeared, because it was secret and nobody could read it. A little later on there was a book by a fellow named Emerson called *The American House of Saud.* He devoted a whole chapter to this. What happened was the Shah did fall and the Saudis wanted AWACS. The supporters of Israel did not want them to have AWACS. The US military did want them to have

AWACS because if they didn't get it from us, they would get Neptunes from Britain and we couldn't talk good to Neptune like we could talk to AWACS. So we wanted an AWACS in place in Saudi Arabia. In case the balloon went up and it needed to be used by us, we could use it. The Saudi military knew that too. If you recall, the supporters of Israel had collected enough votes in the House and the Senate to shoot down this idea of the sale. You know, with foreign military sales, you have to get approval. Things were looking bad, so I called up a friend of mine who was at CSIS, the Center of Strategic Studies, where I'd been earlier. He had just finished this long economic study on Saudi Arabia, so I said, "Why don't we pare these down, put them together, and publish it." So we did, and it came out about four weeks before the vote. It was absolutely a smash, not by pleading but just by analysis, rebutting the idea that this place was seething with unrest and was unstable. That was what Emerson pounced on. His thesis was that my secret version, which if you're a reader you can't read because you're not cleared, showed how decrepit and terrible and horrible these people are. Then in the second version that Long did with the other fellow, it said that they're very stable. But he did such a stupid job that what I'd done in the first I didn't have to be diplomatic, I just said, "So-and-so has a drinking problem," whatever, and in the next version I would said, "So-and-so has health problems." So I cleaned it up, but the conclusions – and he showed about five different conclusions where the language had changed – but he shouldn't have put in the conclusions, because in every case the conclusions were word-for-word the same in both versions. They were reviewing this in the *Wall Street Journal* and they called me up. I said, "Look, I'm not going to defend this, but I suggest, before you jump to conclusions, you look at my conclusions and see how I doctored them, because Emerson gave you the conclusions in the book." They did, and the guy, after he saw that, gave it a bad review, and that made them mad. So they went to the Washington Post and Hehos was one to review it and he looked at it and he refused to. That was the end of that, but it illustrates sometimes the pressures of Israel, or supporters of Israel, in the Gulf in areas which have absolutely zero to do with the Arab-Israeli problem or Israeli security.

Q: It's basically an anti-Arab bias.

LONG: Yes, but in this case it was because of Saudi Arabia and it was because of its premier position in oil, and it was a fear that if we had an oil shortage and we had to choose which way we would go, all of which was hypothetical. That book is not in print anymore but people still quote from it. To my mind, that is one of the best pieces of original academic research that I ever did, because I would just fly into wherever and go into the royal majlis or the governor's majlis or whatever and we would have a nice long talk, and it was wonderful.

Q: You left INR where and went where?

LONG: I left INR in I believe it was 1982 and took a year off and was a visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania and taught a course on the Middle East. It was lots of fun. I had about 120 people sign up for the class, and this is an Ivy League, private university, and you should not have 120 people in any class. So I told them they were all

going to have to memorize the Arabic alphabet and the Hebrew alphabet, and I said, "We'll give you extra credit if you can learn the Greek alphabet." I was just making up stuff to try to scare these people out. I got it down to 80, and I had one teaching assistant. This fellow walked in the door and said, "I'll be a teaching assistant." He had just finished his comprehensive examination of PhD. I divided the course into thirds, and I lectured two days a week and one day a week we each had our own little group, which made it small enough where there could be interaction among the students. I took the graduate students and some of the upperclassmen, and they took the others. One of them was an Australian diplomat, he was the real TA. The other fellow, a fascinating guy, was a lawyer in Philadelphia and got bored. He was going on his PhD, had passed his comprehensive, later went out to Beirut to write a dissertation on using a free-floating exchange rate as a political indicator – when people lose faith in the currency, you know the country's dead – and got chased out by Islamic Jihad. I called up CIA and said, "Can somebody get word to this guy to get the heck out of Dodge." He did all sorts of other things. Then he went and worked for Chase Bank and he pioneered in commodity hedging, called commodity stops. He made another big bundle there, an oil contract – I won't go into that – and then he joined a bunch of guys down in Houston in a little oil company, a gas company, but they sold a refinery to Papua, New Guinea and he made another bunch. Now he's a college president somewhere. He may turn up being Secretary of State for one day for all I know.

Q: What's his name?

LONG: Galen Banker. He was from Michigan. Galen and I, I don't know, our paths keep crossing in the funniest places, in the Middle East, in New York, all over the place. I threw that in because it's another example of how when you're doing something totally different and you meet a different group of people than you normally would associate with, they keep popping up. This added another dimension to my being able to be effective in the Department. Another fellow was the President of Shell Oil Company USA, which is, you know, a wholly owned subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell. He was in Saudi Arabia – this was during the petrol dollar period – and Shell USA doesn't have much crude in America. So they were worried about their crude supplies and they wanted to do a joint venture with the Saudis not in order to make money on the joint venture but mainly to guarantee that they could get crude if they needed it. So he was over there with his Vice President for Near East, and I had just flown in for one of my periodic visits to Governor West. Governor West called me up and said, "Come on down to the residence. I want you to meet these guys. One of the guys is head of Shell USA." So I walked down and here was this guy with a silver mane of hair and immaculately dressed. So I figured the guy, the CEO, looks like a CEO. This other guy, whom I assumed was the economic counselor, whom I'd never met, was well dressed and everything but he didn't look the picture of the other guy, and he kept saying the stupidest things. I'm thinking, my goodness, this CEO is going to think we're a bunch of klutzes. So I would say, "Well, that's a very good point, but if you look at it this way," and I flat contradicted him about six times in a row. It turned out I was wrong. He was the CEO and the other guy, who looked like a CEO, was the economic counselor. Well, don't tell me why, but this guy

kind of liked me. So he called me down to Houston, asked if I could come down to Houston and talk to them from the State Department, which, you know, we can do if we don't take any money for it. Again, it really did, talking not just to him but to his people, it gave me a whole new dimension in understanding world petroleum affairs and global pricing and all of that. I probably never would have had this experience as a political type just working at State or overseas. So I really had a lot of these kinds of things happen in my time.

Q: During this time when West was Governor, you mentioned that he would call you over to talk to you. How did he use you?

LONG: He used me, I think – this is just my theory – he used me the way a governor would use a person who knew the politics of South Carolina and was trusted and whose opinions were trusted as a sort of counselor/advisor, informal. He'd take me around on meetings too. I was with him and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they made the decision to ask us for the AWACS. It was really funny because the Saudis wanted us to ask them if we could send an AWACS to them, because they didn't want to get people off the reservation in their country, and we wanted them to ask us to send it to them for the same reason. So it was going back and forth, and it was all but done but the King had not agreed. The King was Fahd. The day-to-day operations of the country were run by the Crown Prince, who was there with us. The King had gone to bed, he had gone to sleep, so they were saying, "No problem." I sort of nudged John and said, "The opera ain't over until the fat lady sings. He might not do the day-to-day operations but he is the king in this country and until he says yes, it is not done. The next morning he woke up, the King, and he was in a bad mood, I think dyspepsia in the evening, and he said, "Oh, no, no, I know what happened." They called him at two o'clock and he was in a bad mood and he said, "Hell, no," and went to sleep. So we all had to wait until he woke up the next morning and he was in a good mood, and he said, "Sure, we'd be happy to do this." It was that kind of thing that I used to do with him a lot. He really was good with him. He and Fahd got along very well together. They'd lied to each other like a bunch of Southern politicians. I remember the Ambassador had a junior officer who was sort of his flunky, and he'd take notes and he wouldn't have a clue what was really being said. He would write down what they literally said, but you don't listen to the words, you listen to what the guy is trying to say, whether you're in South Carolina or whether you're in Iraq. And they knew exactly what they were saying to each other, they really did, but if you were a literalist or if you weren't used to that kind of communication, even if you knew Arabic, you really won't understand it. Later on West brought me in to see Fahd because I administered a master's degree to Prince Bandar, the current ambassador, which is another story. At any rate, he introduced me as the greatest scholar since Aristotle, blah blah blah, and you knew it wasn't for me. He was making the point of 'we've done all this just for your nephew', which is 'just for you'. Of course, Fahd wasn't fooled a minute. He knew what West was doing, and so when it was his turn to reply, he said, "I don't have a doctorate. My only education is what I've learned dealing with people," which is not true, because all that generation were tutored. He said, "But we hire a lot of doctors in our country," and he quotes the Koran where it says, "*[Arabic, inaudible]*,"

which means so many of them are like donkeys carrying encyclopedias on their back. But because it's from the Koran, everybody just cracked up laughing. And the note taker was writing this down. He thinks that he was insulting us. He wasn't insulting us. They knew exactly what they were saying.

Q: I've often heard – not often but from time to time remarked – that American politicians who become ambassadors often develop a rapport that no Foreign Service Officer could have. The King of Saudi Arabia is a politician, the same way the Pope is a politician. You have to be elected by a conclave of your peers, and this is not invalid. Politics played a part in this. So basically politicians know how to talk to politicians, and diplomats often don't speak the political language because that's not their background.

LONG: It isn't. There are those who are naturally good at it, if you just have a natural bent for it. Herman Eilts was terrific there, and a number of other ambassadors that I've known were terrific, but it wasn't something that they got at the Foreign Service Institute. It wasn't necessarily even something they got on the job, because that wasn't their job. Their job was to implement policy, not to make it up. Some political appointees are dreadful, but others, if they have this talent that you're talking about, are tremendously effective.

Q: And can key it to a foreign culture.

LONG: Yes. Going back to when I was talking about South Carolina politics. There are a lot of similarities there, and he fit in just perfectly with this indirect, never come right out and say something, tell this long rambling story, but, bingo, the other guy knows exactly what he's saying without him ever having to say it. He was very, very effective. The Bandar incident was interesting. He came over to go a year of War College – I think the Command Staff School – and he wanted to get a master's degree because he wanted to show all the people in Saudi Arabia, who were all getting doctorates, that he wasn't just a dumb foggle. Well, this shows you how important maybe not the education but the degree is. He was going to get in at Auburn University at Montgomery. And West wanted to make sure that he got a good education and that the US government was helping him. So he called me up and said, "I want you to get this guy a master's degree." They all thought I could do this. I called up the Dean of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, whom I knew – he was a wonderful guy – and I explained the problem to him. I said, "I don't know whether you can do anything about it or not, but this guy is a real comer. He's a nephew, but not just a nephew," because the King's got God knows how many hundred nephews – but the King really depends on him almost more than his own father, who was the Defense Minister. So he thought about it a while and he said, "Yes, we have a master's degree program for foreign people like that. I said, "His problem is he's got to live in Montgomery. He's got a residence problem." So I worked out with him whereby he would fly up twice a month and he would have four tutorials of four hours each over two days. That's a lot of intensive stuff. He agreed, and then he stepped down from the deanship. A new fellow came in who was under tremendous pressure, because the board of governors or whatever it was, SAIS, had heard about it up in Baltimore and

the Jewish members of the board did not want this to happen at all. I had to go tell him, "I think you really should do this because I have in writing from your predecessor that we're going to do it, and I'm assuming the President is taking a personal interest in this, so I really think you ought to do this," and he got the point. So we gave him this master's, and I told Bandar, "They're not selling you a degree. You're going to have to work your butt off if you want to do well, and you don't want to lose face by not doing well," and he did. Very, very bright. I tried to keep it quiet – I don't mean secret quiet but just not making a splash. I don't know whether you know much about Bandar, but it's impossible for him to keep a low profile. He was on the air and he was just everywhere, in all the gossip columns. I said, "Oh, my gosh." Finally I would fly my whole crowd down to Montgomery just so we'd have at least a reasonably lower profile. We used to talk politics and stuff. His uncle would call up. Bandar called him 'the CP', Crown Prince. You could hear both ends of the conversation, because he would shout through the phone. What a tremendous year I had. I'd been working in the State Department. I had nothing to do with SAIS but fortunately, because of the foresight of the former dean, I was able to pull this off. So again, that was another thing that I did. Bandar used to play handball with the Secretary of Defense and he wanted me to come down and play handball with them. I said, "Get real, Bandar. There's no way a guy my rank is going to...," because if I wanted to, I could have done it, but I said, "There's no way you want to have a guy, a little ranking guy, with the Secretary of Defense and the sensation of the diplomatic community here playing handball with them. Tell me anything you want to tell me about it, but I ain't going." But it was that kind of thing, and he's a perfectly charming guy, smart as a whip.

Q: You'd gone to the University of Pennsylvania...

LONG: In '82.

Q: And then you'd come back.

LONG: I went to the Policy Planning Staff.

Q: Let's talk about the Policy Planning Staff. You were working there from '82 to...

LONG: '84, I think. My memory.

Q: Okay, but this is early on in the Reagan Administration. What was the role? In INR, these various jobs but particularly Policy Planning can mean a whole different thing in different times. I guess Shultz would have come on board about that time.

LONG: He was on board.

Q: How did Shultz use Policy Planning?

LONG: Policy Planning is, even more than INR, what the Secretary wants it to be. INR, quite apart from it being what the policy bureaus want it to be, does have continuity of the civil servants there who stay, and so they know more about a country than some brand new desk officer who's just getting used to his new country. Policy Planning Staff can be a power of influence or it can be nothing. Steven Bosworth was the head of it, a very nice guy. One of the early things I did was to write a critique on our policy with Lebanon, which I thought was really stupid. Again, I didn't criticize the policy; I took all of the public policy statements that Shultz made – they were written by Peter Rodman, who was on the Policy Planning Staff, because that's one of the major things they do, they house the real speech writer for the Secretary. I took them one by one and I smashed them. He would say in some public speech, "We must do this in Lebanon. Here are our aims and goals and blah blah blah." And then I would show why that was nonsense. I never mentioned the policy. I only looked at the argumentation. I didn't know whether I could get away with it or not, but we were not discussing, we weren't criticizing policy, I was just using logic against the argument. I thought, well, it's worth a while, let's see what happens here. Bosworth evidently fretted for about a week over it, and he let it go and it went through. I don't think it had that much influence on Lebanon policy. I think the Lebanon policy collapsed of its own weight soon thereafter, but at least it provided a new rationale for when we had to change our policy, why it was absolutely vital that we do so. Again, I was in conceptualization. The ironic thing was that Peter Rodman, when Bosworth left, became the new head of the Policy Planning Staff. We got along very well. It was a very prestigious place to be. It was kind of boring, because it was to be long-term policy planning and there is no such thing. You don't have time, nor should you because things can change so that most long-term policy planning is irrelevant. So you either did very little or you would try to find things – I would anyway – where I thought it might possibly make a little difference. I think I had a marginal impact there, which marginal is probably as good as one could expect to have. One day I saw Bob Oakley down in the lunch room. I said, "What the heck do you guys do in antiterrorism?" because he was the ambassador at large for antiterrorism, and he said, "Well, you know, we don't really have a good Arabist. Why don't you come on down here?" So I went up to Peter and I said, "What if I jumped ship and go down and work for Bob?" and he was, I think, pretty overjoyed not to have this thorn anymore. So I went down there, I think, about '84 or '85, and I hadn't been there more than about three days when all hell broke loose. This was when Jeremy Levin – you remember the name – he was a journalist, and he was kidnapped in Lebanon. He had escaped, so our office was supposed to make all the arrangements. Well, the military guy who was on the staff, a colonel, was off on a war game, or maneuver. He was the guy who knew all the people in the Pentagon and everybody. So Bob came and said, "Hey, David, take care of this," so I called up the Pentagon and I got this colonel and he said, "What's your fund cite?" and I said, "Fund cite? We don't have a fund cite? We don't have any funds at State." He said, "No, you're basically no ticket no laundry." So I said to Oakley, "What do I do now?" He said, "Call Ollie North." I said, "Who's Ollie North?" He said, "He's the guy that does counterterrorism over there at the White House." I didn't know him. Nobody did. This was before anybody knew him. I called him up and I said, "Hi. I'm Dave Long. I work for Bob Oakley. There's a problem. We don't have any money to pay for this plane." They

wanted to fly this plane over to Germany with his wife on board and then pick him up and bring him back. He said, "No problem. Call this number and ask for...." I didn't get the name. I asked twice and still didn't get the name. But things were breaking very fast, so I had to call the number. I hoped that the NCO or whoever it was on the other side would usually answer "So-and-so's office, Sir." He said, "[Inaudible] office, Sir," and I still didn't know and I said, "This is David Long. I'm with the Office of Counterterrorism at the State Department, and this is an urgent call. I need to talk to him right away." So he came right on the line and was very helpful. Within about two minutes the colonel called back and basically said, "Is there anything more I can do for you?" I figured I don't know who this guy is but he's got to have some rank. Well, he was the deputy to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was a three-star general, a lovely guy. Well, that period in the middle '80s, as somebody said about history, it was just one damn thing after another. We only had a staff of, I think, eight or nine people. We were running all over the world, we were doing all sorts of things, we were task forces. I led a couple of emergency support teams, one on the Achille Lauro and one for the TWA hijacking. We were everywhere. It was totally exhausting but it was probably the most exciting time, I guess you could call it, in my whole career, because there was no standard operating procedure. This had never happened before in such a concentrated way. We were flying by the seat of our pants.

Q: The whole thing got quite sour on the operations over Lebanon, and it was sort of the Iran Contra affair as it impacted on terrorism in the Middle East. Did you get involved in that, and if you did, could you talk about it?

LONG: A little bit. Ollie was not a freelancer. He was a good Marine in that respect. The problem was that you don't give an unguided missile a blank check. So when he goes to his superiors and they say to him, "Ollie, don't tell me what you're doing. Just get the job done," you're asking for it. In my opinion, it wasn't Ollie's fault. I'd love to have a guy like Ollie working for me, but I'd want to know what he did every second of the day, because he would carry out what he thought was what he'd been ordered to do. I remember one time we had a group of relatives of one of the hostages and there were two contacts for them, me and over in the Near East Bureau another fellow. The two of us would trade off and trade off and nothing was happening and nothing was happening, and they got more frustrated and they wanted to see Bob Oakley. I was very much against this, so then, well, maybe they wanted to see the Assistant Secretary for the Near East, and he was very against it. We held out as long as we could, and finally they went to see Bob Oakley. It was a terrible visit, because they didn't want to see him, they just wanted to bellyache. I don't mean that snidely, because they were very frustrated. What I was afraid was going to happen happened. After they saw him, who are they going to see when they want to see the President, because that's where this is going to go. They don't see these hostages getting out any time soon, and sure enough, they saw the Assistant Secretary, they saw the Deputy Secretary, then they saw the Secretary and that wasn't the happiest meeting. Then they saw Vice President Bush and then they saw the President. In the hall the President said to Ollie, "Ollie, we've got to get these boys out." I though 'uh oh', and sure enough those were orders. I am convinced that what he did in the Iran Contra thing

was not done just as skullduggery for the pure heck of it. By gosh, his Commander in Chief said, "We've got to get these people out." Now I thought that whole thing was the most cockamamie idea I ever heard of. We were not officially told about it, so officially I don't know anything about it. Only a fellow whom I recruited to work for me – I was Deputy Director of the Office for Regional Affairs, we had a Deputy Director for Functional Affairs and we had a Senior Deputy – we figured it out. I won't go into detail, but we figured it out, what was happening, and we told Oakley. Oakley was not officially informed either, so he couldn't complain because he wasn't officially informed, which I think is why he wasn't officially informed. So he sent a letter to the Secretary but it never went through the normal channels. He just handed it to him in a staff meeting one day. Later on, when it came out and the FBI found a copy of that letter and they asked the Secretary, "What about this?" he said, "I don't remember ever getting that letter." Well, he never did officially. He knew what was going on too. I can't really go into much detail except that that gives you a flavor for Ollie North guy. He was a live wire.

He worked like a devil, and he would come up with a cockamamie scheme a day and he usually would run it by us, and usually I would tell him why I thought it was a cockamamie idea, although some of them were brilliant ideas. And if it were, he'd say, "Yes, I guess it was a cockamamie idea," and that would be the end of it. But on this one, I think here was a way he thought that he could really get these people out.

Q: Were you picking up things about tow missiles being sent from Israel to Iran?

LONG: I have no official memory.

Q: You're raising your right hand.

LONG: We were never told.

Q: But looking back?

LONG: Well, one can find out almost anything in the government if they know someone.

Q: How about on terrorism, how was Qadhafi seen at the time?

LONG: Demonized, we demonized people. I've studied this as a political scientist, and I've never really satisfied myself as to why we demonize one guy and don't demonize another guy. You can come up with 'we hate Arabs' or this or that, but that doesn't do it, I don't think. We demonized Saddam and, God, if there's a demon around, he's it. We demonized Idi Amin and we demonized Qadhafi. Once we demonize someone, rightly or wrongly, then that person is a demon and then we act toward them accordingly. I would like to assume that we do it cynically, but I think that many of us don't, that actually it's more comfortable to us in our conscience to believe this crap than just to do it not believing it. Qadhafi was demonized. I once was in a meeting with Stan Turner, Admiral Turner. He was the DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) guy. That was the time when

Ambassador Steigman got me on this staff job not at CIA but on the Intelligence Community staff. Somebody heard that I knew something about Saudi Arabia, so I was invited to one of their pre-briefs, which is a wonderful idea. I wish the State Department would do it. The only people who really know in-depth what's going on in the country are the lowly desk officers. When they have these things – this was before the DCI briefs the President – they bring in people who know something. It has nothing to do with rank. You can be a GS-12 or you can be director of a clandestine service, you can be anybody. They're very structured and somebody writes a paper, everybody reads it, and you go in and it's a 15-minute session and that's it. So you've got to say what's on your mind and say it quick and get out. It's fascinating. And rank does not matter. I don't know how I got invited, but it was on Qadhafi. Somebody had something, "What do you think?" because they knew I was in the State. Being a Southerner, I said, "My ole daddy he taught me, he said that when you see a hornets' nest there are only a couple of things you can do. One is you can burn it until all of the hornets are dead, or you can just walk away and leave it, but the thing you don't want to do is poke at it and leave them alive, because they're liable to sting you." That was not appreciated by Stan Turner. But that's what we were doing. We were creating a superpower out of this guy, because his biggest enemy was a superpower. To my way of thinking, he was not a threat to the national security of the United States. He was an irritant, a very big irritant, yes, but not a threat to our whole security, and in terrorism the same. He was demonized at the time, so when we were dealing with his terrorism, it was hard to do.

If you remember when we bombed Libya, that's an interesting story. In the previous December two airports, Rome and Vienna, if you remember, were attacked by Abu Nidal's group and a lot Americans were killed. I had sort of anticipated that the previous summer, because we had not noticed, not confirmed but we believed, that Abu Nidal had moved from Syria to Libya. I asked CIA if they would write an unclassified paper about the Abu Nidal organization, about which nothing was known. Well, they can't do that, because they deal with so much classified stuff that they just can't. So I wrote one, and it had not been cleared by anybody. I was going to wait till after the holidays and call a meeting and see if I could beg them to clear this so we could get it out to the public. I thought we needed the public to know more about this group in case something happened. Well, something happened before I could get this done. I think it happened on the 30th of December. So Oakley came and said, "Have you got anything on Abu Nidal?" "Well, the only thing I have is this paper, but it's not cleared." So it showed up in the press the next day. Abu Nidal was connected with Libya. So there were big meetings – I wasn't privy to them – at the top levels about what could we do about it. There were those who wanted to take action against Libya because he had really gotten off the reservation on this and we were able to trace this directly to Qadhafi. Cooler heads prevailing, we told Qadhafi, "We know what you're doing. You do it one more time and you're going to pay." So instead of taking any kind of military action, we were told to put more sanctions on them. Well, the problem was we had invoked every law that had sanctions in it already against them except one, and this was the Emergency Powers Act, which says that if a country is a national security threat to the United States, which obviously he was not, you could institute a total embargo on them. And we did, and this meant that if you have a

totally British firm that was owned by an American owner and the American owner could not deal with it and they went to the British firm then you had a problem "what do you do"? and I remember the deputy secretary, a very savvy guy said, cause people wanted to go after those firms, so he said, "no, we don't want a lawsuit, we'll go with an open mouth policy".

We'll tell everybody which companies are having their foreign subsidiaries do business with them, and that will be such a black eye that they're going to lose market share and they won't do it; and sure enough it worked. Then the Berlin disco happened.

Q: Would you explain what that was.

LONG: This was a discotheque in Berlin that was bombed by Libyan saboteurs, terrorists. Actually we were right behind them, and we almost got them before they got hit. He had tried several others times. In fact, we were successful against him, but this time they got through and they did it, and you knew they did it. So, again, what do you do about it? It was clear that we were going to have to use military force because we said we would if he did any more. He had done more and we knew he was doing more, but he had not succeeded in any of the other ones and he did here. So there was a big to-do in the public media about whether or not the President was a cowboy and blah blah blah. The fact was we really didn't see that we had any choice. If you make a threat and you don't carry it out, then it's 'Katie, bar the door'. So we did it, and the fascinating thing about the response was – there were two things – one, I was asked to write letters from the President to all the Arab leaders telling them why we had to do it, because we knew that, even though they couldn't stand him, they would have to stick together as Arab brothers and criticize us. What happened was that they didn't say a word publicly, but privately they said, "Why didn't you knock him off when you had the chance?" But the good that that did was not against Qadhafi so much as it finally got the Europeans to pull up their socks. They were making money in Libya and they didn't want to admit that terrorism is everybody's problem, not just somebody else's problem, and they were always saying, "This is the Americans' problem. We are not involved in this." Well, this happened in Berlin and it happened in several other places. Their intelligence services knew it, but it didn't come out in public because it was...

Q: Had some shoot-outs in Paris too, I think.

LONG: And in Turkey. So the decision was made on our part at the highest level to let folks know why we knew he did it. Some intelligence folks were very upset about that, but we did, because the Europeans were trying to say, "We don't know what the Americans are talking about. They're just a bunch of cowboys over there." Well, they knew full well what we were doing and they didn't think we would spill the beans as to why we knew. We did, and it forced them to pull up their socks.

Q: These are some intercepted calls, telephone calls, I think.

LONG: Yes, right, which to this day I couldn't even talk about except it came out in *Newsweek*. It was a calculated decision to make, and the Europeans as a result of that got real serious for really the first time, I think. They were serious sporadically – but really got serious in intelligence cooperation and sharing and law enforcement against terrorism. So the effect of this was salutary, not necessarily on stopping Qadhafi per se but on increasing our cooperation with the Europeans. When they would have a meeting of the Economic Seven, or however many there were back then, they discussed it, and Oakley would be going along with Shultz to discuss this. So when you look at a single case such as this one, the implications of it go like dropping a block in a pond and seeing how far out the ripples go.

Q: Except for the PanAm 103, Qadhafi pretty well moved out of that business, didn't he?

LONG: There's a story told about a fellow who has a flat tire in front of an insane asylum. He was changing the tire and all the lug nuts fell in the moat which was between him and this island, and he didn't know what to do. This guy over on the other side of the wall on this island said, "Why don't you take one nut from the other three wheels and then you'll have three nuts on each wheel and you can drive somewhere where you can get them." He said, "That's a good idea. If you can think that up, why are you on the other side of the wall?" And the guy said, "Well, I may be crazy, but I'm not stupid." And that to me sums up Qadhafi. Every time he would be confronted not just with a bluster or a show of force but what he thought was real…he'd gone too far. He'd back off and disappear into the woodwork until he thought nobody was looking again, and then he'd come back. That's what he did, but I think the sanctions and the loss of business and everything else that has happened to him since is what finally made him agree to send these two guys to be tried.

Q: For the PanAm 103 bombing, which is going on as of now in Holland.

LONG: Yes, as we speak. And he held out all these years.

Q: But there have been a couple other times, particularly in the Reagan Administration. They had a so-called line of depth, the Gulf of Sidra – and "don't go over this," and we went over it with a carrier force and he had the stupidity to set up some planes, which were immediately shot down.

LONG: And he stopped. Now, I am not a supporter of just carrying a big stick and flying it and that will teach them a lesson. The Israelis have been trying to teach the Arabs a lesson since 1947 and they've never succeeded, and the Arabs are trying to teach the Israelis a lesson. They don't succeed in teaching each other lessons very easily. So just to say, "As a matter of principle, you've got to teach them a lesson," to me is pretty bad policy, but there are times – and the ones we are talking about, I think, are excellent examples – that there are times when teaching a guy a lesson will work, if he hurts bad enough.

Q: How did you feel when you encountered terrorism? Were we developing a pretty good intelligence system of getting information about what was going on?

LONG: I think we have a good intelligence system, we've had it before and we've had it since. The problems are, there are two areas here. One is what you target your resources to collect. During the Cold War the bias was so heavily aimed at the Soviet Union that anybody else had a hard time getting resources to collect for them. But something happened, and it wasn't just these incidents per se, but over a period of time, if you want to put a date on it – I don't think that putting dates on it is necessarily important, as you can tell, because I can't remember myself – I would say the Munich Olympics was the beginning of...

Q: I think that was '68 or '70.

LONG: 1972, somewhere around there. This was the beginning of a process by which we began to look at terrorism not as a subset of some other policy, like Middle East terrorism or the IRA terrorism in Ulster or something, and began to look at terrorism as a generic unit of policy interest of which the IRA or Middle East group were subset of a global issue. It's the same things are happening but we're looking at it differently now. This happened while I was there, I think. I don't think anybody consciously was thinking along these lines. It evolved. But by the time I got there, there were so many terrorist incidents that happened in the middle 1980s that it became, I think really for the first time but not just automatically, it evolved to the point for the first time that terrorism became a global policy rather than a set of nonrelated subjects. As a result of that, we began to look at terrorist incidents all over the world in a different light. The Office of Counterterrorism was started after the Munich Olympics. The precursor to the military's Delta Force went way back then. That didn't constitute an antiterrorism policy, but all of these things over a long period of time evolved into that, and we still have that. And the strength of it when I was there, and a remarkable thing to me, was the degree of cooperation, consultation among the 20-odd US agencies and departments that had a piece of the action. I remember one time I was going to Paris and I wanted to talk to their sleuths and their military and their diplomats about a common problem, and I was told by someone in Paris, "Well, they won't talk to you," and I said, "Why not? We talk to them every day." "Oh, no, no, no, they'll talk to you but not with the other guys in the room." And we never had that problem, and when you think about how much turf fighting goes on and how much oversized ego is involved in federal bureaucratic politics in our country, it is rather amazing. And now they call the head of the Office of Counterterrorism at State, they call it Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and he does, he coordinates with everybody, the Census Bureau, with the INF, with everybody who has a piece of the action. I think this is amazing, and it works better than any alternative that we could come up with. Now, the other side, however, is that there has long been a school of thought in the United States that, 'by God, if you want it done right you've got to do it yourself.' In later years a version of this is 'we're the only superpower, so we're going to have to stop terrorism.' The latest statement I saw of that was from Jerry Bremer, who spoke about a study they made just recently – you may have seen it – a few months ago. They studied

terrorism and the United States' responses to it. He was saying that we need a more military capability to fight back and we need better intelligence to fight back. It was interesting to me, because everything he said I could agree with. When you have a rash of terrorist incidents, then the Congress gets all energized and they want to spend money whether you want to or not. This happened to us in the middle '80s and we tried to turn down money from the Republicans in the Congress who wanted to give us more money because they wanted to be able to tell their constituents that, by gosh, they were on top of it. Then, of course, we were the moving target. If anything went wrong, it was our fault. We couldn't absorb that kind of money that fast. That was when the Bureau of Diplomatic Security was established back then. Now, though, with this thing that I found about this report of the committee that Jerry Bremer...

Q: Jerry Bremer being who?

LONG: Ambassador Bremer followed Oakley as the head of the Counterterrorism Office, and now he works, I think, for Kissinger up in New York. Ambassador Bremer's statements about what we needed were correct, but I was struck more by what he did not say than what he did say, because everything he did say had to do with unilateral action. Terrorism, at least international terrorism, is not a problem that any one country can handle. Like it or not, you have to have cooperation with other countries, because most of it happens in other countries, not all of it but most of it. He never talked about strengthening diplomatic ties, about having more cooperation with "rude" states – a stupid concept anyway to me – because that's where the bad guys are, and if you want to get the bad guys, you want to at least try to lower the cooperation of states who put up with them. This is not a bureaucratic or even an implementing policy problem of the State Department or the other agencies or the counterterrorism policy in the United States. This is a political decision as to whether we're going to send in the Marines or the Delta Force or whoever we're going to send in, or whether we're going to try not to send in some hot-shot diplomat when the balloon goes up to think he can do anything – it's too late then – but over an extended period of time try to increase general cooperation of the kind we got serendipitously when we bombed Libya. To me that's the only way you're going to solve this. We do this sporadically, we do this as people are interested in terrorism, when it comes up on the scope, which is usually when some horrible crisis happens, and then the rest of the time we're off looking somewhere else. So the weakness to me is not an organization, institution, or bureaucratic weakness – I think we do very well on that – but I don't think that we have or even want to admit that the United States cannot go it alone, build bigger and stronger embassies and thereby somehow lower the threat of terrorism. It's not going to happen.

Q: You left Counterterrorism when? Again, I'm looking for a date.

LONG: I think around '86.

Q: And then what did you do?

LONG: I taught for two years at the Coast Guard Academy, but not taking leave. I was exhausted from the time that I spent in Counterterrorism, and they gave me a fellowship to go to Georgetown. I wrote a book, called *The Anatomy of Terrorism*, to try to figure out what I'd been doing for the last couple of years, because we never had time to even think about what we were doing. In fact, funny, just before I retired I sent out...

Q: You retired when?

LONG: Not retired, but I mean left the office. Just before I left the office, I sent out a little certificate that I made up. It said, "Veterans of Terrorist Wars," and it said, "Be it known that" – and we then filled in the name – "is honored..." and we made all this stuff up, and it was signed, "Muommar Qadhafi, Grand Dragon." Then we invited about 15 or 20 guys, anybody around, because we had so many task forces that everybody almost knew their seat – you know, "Hi, Dale. Hi, Joe," because we just had these things one after the other. So I got as many people as I could think of and they could think of, and we had about 15 people and we had a no-host lunch and we just all went and just sort of a reunion of the veterans of terrorist wars. The funny thing about it, I started getting messages from all over the room. "Why didn't I get my diploma or my certificate or whatever you call it?" It was just a joke – and they knew it, they knew it was in fun – but we sent about 40 or 50 of these things. It never dawned on me that there were that many people that were not just involved in this but were really seriously involved in these things, and there were.

Q: Shows the extent.

LONG: It really did. So I was exhausted, and they sent me to Georgetown and I taught two years there. Then I taught two years at the Coast Guard Academy, and then I went to Fort McNair, to INS, and actually was a senior person at the Institute for National Strategic Studies. Then they told me I had to come back to State and I retired.

Q: This may be a good place to stop. When we get the transcript of this, please fill in more, because I'm sure there are parts that we didn't cover that I should have.

End of interview