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INTERVIEW

I. FAMILY, TRAVEL, EDUCATION, SUMMER JOBS (1937-1961)

Q: This is an interview with Winston Lord. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Win, let's start at the beginning. Could you tell me when and where you were born, and something about your family?
LORD: I was born August 14, 1937 in New York City. My father was Oswald Bates Lord of Tarrytown, New York, born in 1903. My mother was Mary Pillsbury Lord from Minneapolis, Minnesota, born in 1904. My brother, Charles Pillsbury Lord, was born in New York City in 1933. I married Bette Bao in Washington, DC on May 4, 1963. Our daughter, Elizabeth Pillsbury Lord, was born in 1964 in Washington, DC. Our son, Winston Bao Lord, was born in 1967 in Washington, DC.

Q: What sort of business was your father in?

LORD: My father was in the textile business, went in the family business, it was called Galey and Lord, and it eventually became part of Burlington Industries. When he left Yale University he took a round-the-world trip and got interested in world affairs, and also was interested in other issues, but felt an obligation to help the family business and went into that. I think he always frankly regretted it somewhat and never really enjoyed it.

Q: What about your mother? She's a Pillsbury.

LORD: She was of the Pillsbury Flour family in Minneapolis, but when she married my father and moved to New York she immediately began working in welfare programs, going out to Harlem and doing a lot of social welfare work, and then working for Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia. She then had a very distinguished career, both domestically and internationally. It included a lead role in the New York's World Fair in 1939. I don't know her exact title but she'll be in Who's Who of course. She was one of the top officers in the Women's Army Corps in World War II, WACS. I remember she was one of the first people to fly into Hitler’s bunker at the end of the war.

Among other things, she worked in Republican politics, she was a liberal Republican, was a supporter of Harold Stassen and Governor Dewey, also Wendell Wilkie. She was at the famous convention when Wilkie was elected in 1940. She was in the rafters helping to lead the cheers. So she spent a lot of time in Republican politics, culminating in the 1952 Eisenhower campaign. She worked very hard to round up delegates for that historic Texas convention where Eisenhower edged out Taft, and was crucial in helping secure the nomination for Eisenhower. Then during the campaign of 1952 against Stevenson she was co-chairman of National Citizens for Eisenhower which was designed to attract independents and Democrats to Eisenhower's cause.

After the election Eisenhower appointed her as a delegate to the United Nations under Henry Cabot Lodge who was the ambassador to the UN. She served eight years on the U.S. delegation. She was also the successor to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt as United Nation's representative for the United States to the Human Rights Commission. She had a whole series of other assignments. She was active as head the Junior League of New York, for example. She was president of the International Rescue Committee, a major U.S. nonpartisan organization designed to relieve refugees abroad and to resettle them in the United States. I'm now vice chairman of the International Rescue Committee, and joined it in large measure because of my loyalty to her and my belief in the organization. The
IRC was founded by Einstein to help Jews escape from Germany. We can go into that in more detail later when we get into my career. She was head of many organizations which I can't recall offhand, both international and domestic. She did a great deal of traveling throughout her life. She was on many boards, the Atlantic Institute, and many others, and I'm just beginning to scratch the surface. She had a very distinguished career. Who’s Who would have more details.

Q: How did this play on you? You were born in 1937, so by '45 we'd just entered the war. But your mother was in the WACS. How about you?

LORD: I might add that one of my earliest recollections, not the earliest but in terms of international affairs, was having a birthday party in Minneapolis where I visited my grandmother every summer; I visited my other grandmother in Beach Haven, New Jersey every summer. In the middle of the birthday party people came in and said that we had ended the war with Japan, it was August 14, 1945. And being a young kid then I didn't quite understand the full implications, I was a little annoyed that my birthday party was interrupted. But from my earliest childhood, when we had dinner at home, American politics and international affairs were often the subjects of conversations. That was one reason I got interested in public service. My mother's career certainly had a deep impact on me in terms of leading me towards public service and international affairs. My father was interested in all these issues although not directly involved, and had a very strong ethical sense, in the sense of serving one's country as well. So I think the dinner table conversations, my mother's career, and then a lot of early traveling with my parents and then on my own, all began to steer me toward a life of public service and international affairs.

Q: We'll come to traveling in a minute, but what about early on, reading often plays quite a role in the development of young people. I was wondering what type of books were you reading?

LORD: I'm not good at remembering these things specifically. In the course of my education, I went to Buckley school, a private school in New York, and then Hotchkiss Prep School in Connecticut, and then Yale University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy for a Master's degree. And, of course, in my early schooling I had the usual exposure to literature and history. On my own I would read both fiction and some history and biography. I had broad interests. I wouldn't say I was narrowly focused on international affairs at least in my early years, or my teens.

Q: I assume the family was a reading family?

LORD: My mother more than my father. My father would read mostly non-fiction, was not a great reader. My mother read a great deal in terms of keeping up with her career. She also was fluent in French and would read a lot of French novels.

Q: Did you have brothers, sisters?
LORD: One brother, four years older. He went on to do international business and then he went into education at the age of 40 and was headmaster at a couple of girls' boarding schools. Another brother, Richard, was born badly deformed and died after a few weeks in 1935 - this was a result of my pregnant mother being thrown into icy waters, surviving the sinking of the ship The Mohawk off the Jersey coast.

Q: Did you start traveling at a fairly early age?

LORD: We started traveling quite early. As I recall some of the early trips included a couple of vacations in Bermuda with my parents in the late 1940s. About that time, or maybe a little bit later, a Caribbean boat cruise. Then my mother and father went on a round-the-world trip on their 25th anniversary in 1954. I was at Hotchkiss at the time during Christmas vacation. I recall the silly attitude before I went with them for part of their trip that, gee I was going to miss all these Christmas parties in New York City. I realized once I went and after I got back what an idiot I had been, and what a terrific exposure to the world this began for me. We went briefly to Europe, including Paris, and then on to the Middle East, including Egypt, Syria and Lebanon and Turkey. Then my brother and I had to come back and my parents continued on their trip. That trip really began to energize my interest in foreign affairs and foreign cultures, and a sense of public service.

Just to continue on the travel, when I was at Yale University I took two major trips during the summers of 1956 and 1958. In 1956, I went to Europe - London, Paris and driving around France, Spain, running with the bulls at Pamplona, and then into Russia, both Moscow and St. Petersburg, and then down to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Alma Ata, Tashkent, and Samarkand, extremely unusual at that point. We were the second American delegation, I believe, to go to Central Asia. Justice Douglas had been there the year before. And then on into Afghanistan, not only Kabul where we saw the famous Jeshen festival but up into the beautiful Bamian Valley - riding in the middle of the night on the top of the trucks on wheat sacks, or camping out near glacier lakes, really quite a dramatic experience.

And in 1958 I went throughout Asia beginning in India including Kashmir, down through southeast Asia and out through Japan. Each of these trips took two and a half months, occupied the entire summer. I wrote very detailed letters back home to my parents. I felt an obligation to record every impression that I could, actually I put down too much rather than putting down a general perspective. I would get into too much detail in a sort of naive energetic way. I used to drive my traveling companions nuts because I would have a notebook wherever I went and even as we were driving along I'd be taking down every last sight that I could see and got hopelessly behind in writing these letters but felt an obligation to record it for my parents and I had a certain drive and energy. Then, of course, after I got into the Foreign Service I began to travel a great deal. We'll come back to that later.

Q: I'm going to come back to some of these travels later on, but you were educated where?
LORD: I started in Buckley School in New York from the first grade up until eighth grade.

Q: What was that like?

LORD: Well, of course, it was a very elite school; looking back on it in the '40s and '50s we're talking about a pretty waspish outfit. I don't recall any minorities there, and there were probably very few Jewish people. But it was excellent in terms of academic education, about as good as you could get I'm sure at that age. I managed to do well at the school, academically, in terms of being elected to officerships, and in terms of athletics. Sports have always been a major part of my life. I'm not a great athlete, but I'm enthusiastic as a player and spectator. So I was at or near the top of the class, and I went from there to Hotchkiss.

Q: Even in the early grades at the Buckley School, a lot of writing required?

LORD: A good deal of writing, a good deal of language training. We had French almost from the first grade, I forget when we started it but very early. We had the beginning of Latin as well as I recall, and I continued Latin, Greek and French at Hotchkiss. Also, I had some sense of public service even then because I would run for office, president of the class and some of the others.

Q: You were at Hotchkiss from when to when?

LORD: Hotchkiss from 1951 to 1955 which I recall very vividly included the McCarthy era. It was also the year my mother was at the United Nations, starting in 1952 up to 1960.

Q: Could you describe life and education at Hotchkiss?

LORD: I've worked hard most of my life but I never worked any harder than I did at Hotchkiss. Without sounding too pompous or self-important, I had a very hard driving and successful time at Hotchkiss. I recall being almost continually exhausted. I was first in my class most of the time. I was president or vice president of my class, and Student Council. I was editor of the school newspaper. I played three varsity sports, football, basketball and tennis. I was first in a Latin contest for the state of Connecticut. My education was in liberal arts. I had very little science much to my regret ever since. I have felt totally impotent and inadequate on anything to do mechanical or scientific, and I think it has limited my knowledge of practical things around the house when my wife has to do everything. Just generally I'm sort of mystified by how science and technology works. I never really caught up to that.

So my education there was heavily language, history and English literature. Languages included four years of French, four years of Latin as I recall, and three years of Greek, and I had already started Latin and French at Buckley. A very good and solid grounding
in English literature and composition. Its always helped me in being, I think, a good writer, not in the elegant fictional sense but in terms of writing good memorandum for the government, writing clearly, or being able to do decent speeches, being, in fact, a speech writer later on for Kissinger and Nixon, etc. We also took history, Bible study, math, and I did take geology and astronomy, but they were the only science courses I took. At graduation I was awarded many of the major prizes. I was voted by my classmates as having done most for the school, most likely to succeed, and several other categories.

Q: I went to Kent.

LORD: I saw that in your bio. I've always been grateful to Kent because we had probably the worst football team in the history of Hotchkiss. It must have been for me to be starting halfback and end on it for two straight years. The only game we won in two years that I was on the team was against Kent.

We had a very outstanding, and demanding head master named George Van Santvoord. He demanded excellence. His sense of humor was not extraordinary to say the least. He was very forbidding. But he could teach almost any course in the school, and he was very strict and demanded excellence. I remember in particular one incident that really impressed me and has stuck with me ever since. I was editor of the newspaper, and as I said it was during the McCarthy era, and we ran an editorial attacking Senator McCarthy. But in the course of that editorial, in addition to legitimate attacks on McCarthy, we included - implying it was fact - what was only rumor, namely that he had avoided the draft when he was younger. I don't believe this was actually true. In any event it was not fully substantiated. Mr. Van Santvoord, who probably hated McCarthy as much as anyone, being a scholar, and actually a Democrat, came down and talked to me as editor of the newspaper, and reamed me out, just lambasted me for irresponsible journalism, even though he himself detested McCarthy. He had a very clear sense of what was right and wrong. And I learned a real lesson then as I was somewhat carried away with my emotions in attacking McCarthy and allowing something in the editorial that shouldn't have been there.

Q: This was still a type of school that was producing what was to be for the next generation the sort of the ruling elite. Did you find that it was more conservative, reflecting the parents, or not?

LORD: I would say it certainly instilled a sense of civic responsibility. It was conservative in a sense of traditional disciplines and both social disciplines and academic disciplines. You only got off campus two or three times a year for weekends, and only then if you had good grades. They were very strict on rules. As I said I was one of the student leaders and we had a lot of controversy with smoking - I was among those who enforced a no smoking rule and there was a lot of tension. We had the first African-American ever to attend Hotchkiss, a man named Gus Winston, who was a great athlete, very smart. I was on cordial terms with him but I didn't get that close to him and now in retrospect I regret it because it must have been a difficult time for him. And I wish I had been more of a close friend. I was certainly not hostile and in the very beginning my
parents had inculcated in me a total sense of racial equality and tolerance. So I was friendly on that score, but I never really got to know him. But yes, it was conservative as all boarding schools were in those days. It was male only. I guess quite a few Jewish members but still pretty waspish. Most people went on to Ivy League colleges with a heavy emphasis on Yale in those days. As I say, Gus Winston was the first minority. But although conservative, Hotchkiss also preached the virtues, including civil responsibility and tolerance, and serving your country, and honesty and integrity. So I felt it was a good ethical as well as academic grounding.

I worked extremely hard and I did it partly out of a sense of obligation to my parents who I loved a great deal, and I felt I wanted to make them proud. In many ways I drove myself to get good grades more than learning intellectually. I mean I obviously mastered the subjects but rather than a pure intellectual curiosity, it was more I've got to get good grades. I used to drive my classmates crazy because I had an ingrained pessimism, including how well I'd done on tests. So I would always say, boy, did I mess up that test. They'd post the grades on the wall and I'd be first in my class and annoy everybody.

Q: I knew guys like you.

LORD: I might say that at Hotchkiss in particular, although it started at Buckley I had a sense of trying to do things as well as you could. I don't want to sound pompous here but pursuit of excellence and doing the best I could and working hard, including cramming whenever necessary.

Q: I think its interesting for somebody looking at this in later years, and I'm a bit biased because I'm a product of the same system. There was a sense of service. I mean a lot of them went on to become good merchant bankers to make a lot of money, but at the same time there was the feeling that public service was a good thing, in fact, a very honorable thing to do.

LORD: This was certainly an element. Again, I think I probably got a stronger impulse and an earlier one from my parents, and in particular my mother and to a certain degree from traveling. But the school re-enforced them.

Q: Somewhat off to one side, when you went to Minneapolis to your grandparents, was this a different world for you?

LORD: Not really. We were in a place called Wayzata, outside of Minneapolis on Lake Minnetonka. We'd always go there in July and then in August we'd visit my other grandmother, my father's mother in Beach Haven, New Jersey. I was not the most attractive person in those days in my pre-teens, in a sense I was a bad sport whenever I played games or athletics. If I would lose at monopoly, or lose at tennis I would turn over the monopoly set, or throw my tennis racket. So I wasn't probably the most popular person although I think I was a good son to my parents. It inculcated in me a very deep family feeling because I had, particularly on my father's side, a great many cousins. He had eight brothers and sisters, and my mother had two sisters and a brother and they all
had kids so I had lots of cousins in both places, particularly in Beach Haven. A real sense of family life which has stuck with me ever since. Above all, there was the wonderful marriage of my father and mother which lasted 48 years until my mother died in 1978. My father died in 1986.

Q:Was there any doubt in your mind about going to Yale?

LORD: No. My father, who was a very strong Yale man, all the Lords essentially had gone to Yale, his brothers, my first cousins, my uncles. So there was a heavy tradition. And my parents were living in New York City but they had a weekend house in Stamford, Connecticut and we'd go to every Yale football game, we hardly missed one from the time I began walking, up until when I went to Yale. Almost every home game I went with my father, so early on I was inculcated with the Yale spirit. So in addition to the Lord tradition, there was also the Hotchkiss tradition and many went to Yale. And given my record at Hotchkiss there was no doubt I was going to get into Yale, and that's the only place I applied.

Q:In '55 in sort of the middle of the Eisenhower period, in fact you were there during the Eisenhower period, can you describe your class at Yale? You were the class of '59 weren't you?

LORD: Yes. Let me make one other point about the summers because we talked about childhood in my family. Actually this ended in about 1950, my parents bought a house on Fisher's Island, New York so I went up there in the summers. I remember our very first summer we were there, we'd just arrived, in June 1950, and I still recall the North Korean invasion of South Korea.

Q: June 25th.

LORD: So during my teenage years we generally went up to Fisher's Island during the summer which I enjoyed a great deal and basically took a break from working very hard at Hotchkiss.

Q: Was anyone telling you in the family to kind of slow down, take it easy?

LORD: No. I remember coming home on Thanksgiving, or Christmas or spring vacations, and I remember one in particular when I was at Hotchkiss where all I wanted to do was sleep, and I literally would consciously catch up on my sleep from Hotchkiss and sleep during the day to 11:00 or 12:00 in the morning. And at Hotchkiss whenever I'd get a holiday or some free time, I'd often spend a good part of the time lying in bed listening to music and just trying to unwind. I don't want to make this sound torturous. It was very demanding and I enjoyed it in many ways, but I really did work very hard. So when I got to Yale, although I worked hard at Yale, I felt a conscious desire to have a little fun, a little release. Because not only do you work hard at Hotchkiss, you almost never got off campus. You never saw girls except an occasional dances on weekends. So by the time I got to Yale I was ready to unwind a little bit. As a result I did well at Yale,
and I worked hard, but I didn't have the kind of record that was expected of me. Yale had a listing of incoming undergraduates and projecting how they would do, and I was projected to be among the top ten or twenty in the entire class of over 1,000. I ended up being Magna Cum Laude in the top eight percent. I didn't work so hard that I got up to perhaps my potential. You had a question?

Q: I often had the feeling when I got out, looking back at it fifty years later, I really got my education at Kent. Williams, where I went, was good but the real groundwork was laid well before that.

LORD: That's an interesting observation. Others have made it to me and it's true in my own case. I can recall my teachers at Hotchkiss more vividly than my teachers at Yale on the whole. I had some particularly extraordinary ones, a man who taught us the basics of grammar and English composition. A man who taught Greek and Latin and greatly enriched my English vocabulary because in addition to teaching those languages he would point out the form of roots of the English language. So I've always had a very good vocabulary. It makes me fairly good at Scrabble against my wife. And Van Santvoord himself was an excellent history teacher, and even the math teachers were good although that wasn't something I pursued with as much enthusiasm as some of these others. There were great French teachers. So you're right. I felt that I had terrific teachers there and a great grounding. But that's not to denigrate Yale. And indeed at Yale you have access to some of the best teachers unlike Harvard and some other places where often they're engaged in research and not available to undergraduates.

Q: At Yale where did you point yourself?

LORD: I was already thinking well, would political science interest me, and international affairs interest me? But Yale was particularly strong on English and history, not as strong on political science and international affairs. So what I decided to do, and I had, of course, taken a lot of advance courses at Hotchkiss, so I had a leg up, I decided to become an English major over the last two years. You have certain courses you have to take the first couple of years. To take advantage of the strong English department. I had a sense that that was the best grounding for any career whatever you pursued, as well as the best grounding to become a developed and knowledgeable human being, and to be able to read, and to read a great deal, would be a terrific grounding for any career. To be able to write would be essential for any career. And although I wasn't sure of my career I thought of being in the international field but I felt it was more important to get a broad base, rather than getting a lot of specialized training from the beginning. But having said that, given the fact I'd fulfilled a lot of requirements and Yale was flexible, I could take a great many courses outside of English literature. So I focused on history, which is also a very strong department, and took considerable courses in political science and international affairs, as well as other areas like history of art. This gave me a terrific grounding, both to be interested in literature the rest of my life and to help me write well. It had a disadvantage that I didn't get off to a fast start in what became an increasingly important area of my career, namely economics, and I always felt inadequate in science and technology.
Q: When you were taking history, it wasn't terribly pronounced, at least in my experience, the history of the Far East.

LORD: That's correct.

Q: But Yale did have that Yale in China thing. I was wondering if there was any spill over there?

LORD: Well, China was to become a very important part of my life, including my married life. I had no particular interest in Asia at that time. So consistent with the curriculum of most of the schools and colleges at the time, most of the history we took was either American history or European history.

I might add a quick note on my languages. I continued French at Yale, I dropped Latin and Greek. But the problem was that teaching at Hotchkiss, for that matter Buckley before, and at Yale the emphasis in those days was on reading and writing, not on speaking. I got to the point where I could read in French almost as well as English, but to this day I can't speak it very well and I have an incredibly bad accent. Of course, Latin and Greek was all reading and writing in any event, not speaking. So as a practical help in my career, it was a real lacking here given the kind of approach they took. I could stumble through French, and get along, and I can still read it quite well but I never developed a good speaking habit, and I'm not particularly talented on spoken languages. I'm probably sort of in between. I did extremely well, I was usually first in my class in all these languages, but it was reading and writing, and not speaking.

Q: You were probably at the end of the line before they really started to take a hard look at how we were teaching languages. They weren't teaching languages in most of our schools, and the ones that did it were reading and writing because the teachers didn't speak the languages particularly, part of an old sort of lousy tradition.

LORD: Yes, it was unfortunate in many ways. Now, I can always say, and it's true, that at one point for example senior year, I guess, at Hotchkiss I was reading Molière, Virgil and Homer all in the original, which is pretty heady stuff. It also was a rather unbalanced curriculum to say the least in my senior year, because I had fulfilled most of my college requirements. It consisted of Bible study with Van Santvoord in this case, English, French, Latin and Greek, not exactly a well rounded approach but terrific for my vocabulary and for my sense of literature and history.

Q: You really got your education at these schools and from then on you could fly in any direction you wanted, except science.

LORD: That was my clear approach. Namely, get the broadest possible grounding both to become an interested and interesting human being the rest of my life, and as the best preparation for whatever career I pursued knowing that I could always go to graduate school and specialized training in whatever career I took to get more technically
Q: At Yale where were you concentrating? You said English. Did you have any particular field in English?

LORD: No, it was general survey so I don't recall all my courses now but in the course of taking an English major, you had to cover everything from Chaucer on through Milton and Spenser, up to more modern literature with a heavy emphasis on English literature and American literature but not confined to them.

Q: What about history?

LORD: History was, as I've said, essentially American history and European history. I don't recall taking Asian history, for example. And there's no question that there was a bias in our colleges and schools then.

You mentioned Yale in China. Before I forget, we'll get into this but in my senior year I suddenly thought I'd like to participate in Yale in China which was then in Hong Kong. By the time I focused on it I was too late for the application. I might well have gone and if I'd done that I would not have gone to graduate school and maybe would have missed my wife.

Q: You better explain Yale in China.

LORD: Yale in China was a program which still exists today in which, in those days, was essentially people going to Hong Kong studying Chinese. I guess it must have been Cantonese at the time, and studying things Chinese. Of course in those days we didn't have relations with China so they couldn't go into the mainland, so it was a little misnomer. Since the opening we've had Yale in China with teachers going into China and working in Chinese schools in various parts of China.

Q: I think it was initially a missionary impulse, wasn't it?

LORD: That's correct.

Q: Then it moved into more academic...

LORD: A couple more points on my parents. My mother had a very distinguished career but in those days, '30s, '40s, '50s, '60s, this is well before women's lib, she was under constant criticism because of her heavy public involvement and traveling, of being a poor mother, of neglecting her kids. I never felt this way. I'm sure my brother never felt this way. We thought she was a terrific mother, and we were proud of what she was doing. And my father was totally supportive, was not only content but proud to be known as the husband of Mary Lord. I've always joked by the way. I was always known as the son of Mary Lord, and just when I was coming into my own. I had a famous wife who was a best selling author, I became the husband of Bette Bao Lord. So one of these days I might
make it on my own.

Q: I'm afraid it's too late. I mentioned that I was interviewing you today and my daughter and her friend...I went to a party last night with them, and they said, it was all about your wife. Ambassador to China...

LORD: You might tell them, if they're fans, her latest book, *The Middle Heart*, a novel which came out a year ago, is going to be a Hallmark Hall of Fame, a television production.

So from early on I had an appreciation of the equality of women, including in careers and how they should have a fairer chance. I also had a good feel for the way my father took this without any ego problems and was very supportive. My father wrote a very amusing book called *Exit Backward Bowing* which chronicles all the travels he took with my mother. It's by him with the advice and dissent of Mary Lord, and it came out sometime in the '70s I guess. One amusing thing in that is that my mother was always very diplomatic, didn't like confrontations, whereas my father was more straightforward. He didn't like Nehru of India whom he thought was hypocritical and more or less he didn't like the fact he always sort of leaned toward the Russians. But my mother knew his daughter, Mrs. Gandhi very well and didn't want to alienate her in the book. So my father said some nasty things about Nehru in one of the chapters. My mother said, “you've got to take that out.” So my father resolved this by saying in the introduction, “I was going to write the following nasty things about Mr. Nehru but Mary said I couldn't do it so therefore I decided to take out the following paragraph”, and he left the paragraph in.

Q: Tell me, you were at Hotchkiss and Yale within commuting distance of New York, so I would imagine that the United Nations and other places were coming home to you every day.

LORD: It was, although I'm trying to remember...I'm not sure, enlightened as I was and admiring and proud of my mother as I was, whether I fully recognized the whole scale of her contributions, particularly as a woman in those years in the '50s, for example. I only saw her speak at the United Nations once or twice, and I've always felt badly about that. I don't feel somehow, maybe my memory is playing tricks, that I was as fully involved in her career at that point as I might have been. Of course up at Hotchkiss you're pretty well secluded, no question about it. By the time I got to Yale she was still in the United Nations and I was following it but I can't say it was brought home to me every day.

Q: You didn't have house guests, you'd come home and there would be Khrushchev pounding the table.

LORD: My parents had lots of receptions, my mother because she was at the UN for eight years as a delegate and she would entertain a lot of UN people at her home. So I was involved in that, and I think maybe my memory is playing tricks, I must have been more aware and exposed to it than I recall. I just recall that I didn't see mother speaking that much and I've always regretted that. There's another illustration of the strength of my
parents marriage, and their different approaches. It was during the time, I believe, of the Hungarian revolution being put down by the Russians in 1956. My mother was having a party, it was probably during the General Assembly at the time in the fall, I don't recall the exact dates now.

Q: It was October of '56 because you had both the Suez crises and the Hungarian Revolution.

LORD: In '56 Eisenhower's reelection I recall, that's right. So she was having one of these big UN parties which included the Russian ambassador and others. While she was having that party in our apartment in New York on Park Avenue, my father was outside the Russian mission to the United Nations carrying a sign and protesting their invasion of Hungary at the exact same time.

Q: At Yale, what about extra curricular things?

LORD: Well, I was in a secret society called Skull and Bones which my father had been in, and he was extremely pleased that I followed his footsteps. I was president of my fraternity called The Fence Club. I was an enthusiastic athlete but not good enough for Yale standards so I played a lot of sports at the individual college at intramural level, basketball and softball. And indeed I was proud, though that's clearly an inflated adjective, to be captain for two years running of the championship touch football team at Yale my junior and senior years which meant we played Harvard the weekend of the Yale-Harvard football game and unfortunately we lost both times. And one time I know we found out, he never let me forget it, that the captain on the other side was Tony Lake of the Harvard team. They beat us in the last play of the game. I remember I was playing defensive halfback and some guy caught a ball just in front of me in the end zone. Just before that I'd caught a pass diving in the end zone. I went from hero to goat. So I did sports, and frankly I did a lot of partying at Yale as part of this release from the discipline and the closure and hard work at Hotchkiss. I worked hard at Yale. I don't want to denigrate what I did, and I obviously did well, as I said magna cum laude, etc., but I also was determined to have a good time.

I was also in the Young Republicans Club so I kept up my political interests, but I didn't try out for the newspaper, for example, which I knew would take a lot of time, and I didn't try to kill myself on a lot of extracurricular activities.

Q: What was the social life like in those days?

LORD: Immature. I did more drinking than I should have on weekends, fraternity parties. We had a good time, it was good clean fun. You import dates for the weekend, or we'd go to girls' colleges. Yale, of course, was not coed at the time. Parties revolved in my case often around Fence Club which was a fraternity. Without going into the secrets of Skull and Bones, it was a very good experience in terms of being willing to open yourself up to others, and to talk about personal things and gain some greater appreciation of human nature by hearing about other people's experiences. So that was very useful as well.
Q: Was there any push for international affairs? I mean a national student organization, there are various organizations like a United Nations organization, or anything like that at the university level?

LORD: I guess I was also involved, in addition to Young Republicans, in a political science club, I forget what it was called then, which would be involved in having speakers come, etc. So I had an interest in that, but again I didn't kill myself in extracurricular activities. I really was determined to reserve enough to have a good time, as well as my studies and sports. I do recall major demonstrations on the campus during the Hungarian revolution in 1956. I mean I participated, we all felt strongly about it. And I continued to follow domestic politics and international affairs. It was a great interest of mine, and I was always a strong reader of newspapers and keeping up on international affairs and politics.

Q: Was there any questioning from whatever passed for the left at Yale at that time?

LORD: A pretty conservative era. The lines were pretty clearly drawn in the Cold War so one was suspicious, not only of the Russians but of course of the Chinese. I held a rather traditional bipartisan Cold War view, that we were in a global struggle with the Soviet Union. I was a liberal Republican even then, and not an extremist in foreign policy even then. My whole career I've been rather centralist in terms of domestic politics and foreign policy. So I would not classify myself among the raging hawks at the time. But I'm sure looking back I believed in a strong defense and suspicion of the Soviets, and the need to maintain our alliances. The need to contain Communist China, etc.

Q: Because at the time - its become very pronounced after Vietnam - there wasn't a particular questioning of government per se.

LORD: Eisenhower, of course, projected a pretty solid picture of integrity, riding off his World War II reputation, his general demeanor, the way he conducted himself in office. I don't recall very many scandals. There was a modest one by today's standards with Sherman Adams. So this was still the pre-Vietnam, pre-Watergate era of trusting government. People wanted to go into government. I would go on to the Fletcher School. When I went to Fletcher almost everybody who went out of there - not almost everybody, but a great many went into diplomacy, etc. That all changed in the '70s, '80s, and '90s, they began going into business and academia and other pursuits. So it was an era of essential trust in the government, admiration for the President, although the liberals, of course, disliked him in many ways.

I think I recall, again I don't want to have memory play tricks here, but I was a great admirer of Eisenhower but disappointed he wasn't more forceful on the racial question because I always was strong on racial equality from the very beginning. Although historians do credit him with enforcing the school integration decision.

Q: Little Rock, but it was obviously a very reluctant...
LORD: He did it on a constitutional legal grounds, rather than out of strong conviction. I'm a great admirer of Eisenhower, I think he was a great president, but I think that was his weak area, and I think I felt that way at the time. But to answer your basic question, I mean I would have been anyway interested in public service because of my parents and my travels, but also it was an attractive area to go into at that time. Washington was generally respected. You didn't have the scandals. You didn't have the disillusionment of Watergate and Vietnam. So it was a pretty positive era for that kind of career.

Q: Before we get to Fletcher, you had taken these trips, and when you were at Yale you took...

LORD: The first major trip I took in addition to some vacations was with my parents to Europe, and particularly the Middle East. If I had to pick one turning point in terms of my interests and my sense of where I wanted to go in my life, I would say that trip was as good as any. As I told you, I went in with some reluctance thinking of all the parties I was going to miss, and I felt so stupid afterwards having had that thought. I was so excited by what it felt like to be overseas with other people and other cultures, etc. So that really expanded my horizons and got me excited.

This was greatly reenforced by the two trips at Yale. In 1956 I went first with just one friend who was at Princeton and had been at Hotchkiss. We started out just the two of us, London, Paris, then driving south in France, going to Spain, the running of the bulls, other parts of Spain. Then joining his family and a man who had had dealings with the Russians and therefore gave us entree into Russia. Went into Moscow, St. Petersburg, and down to central Asia.

We had debates on that trip on politics because this man who was a friend of my friend's father was a liberal Democrat, was very pro-Adlai Stevenson, and the rest of us were very pro-Eisenhower. I remember a lot of debates on this. And then very exotic and dramatic places to go to, particularly Central Asia and Afghanistan. And again, this reenforced my desire to be involved in international affairs, learn more about cultures, in addition to my sense that I wanted to do public service of some sort.

Q: What about the Soviet Union when you went there? I mean was it what you had expected?

LORD: It's hard to put myself back in that era. But I think the answer is yes. We felt that we were somewhat constrained. We had a lot of distrust of the Soviet Union, of course. We had some rather simplistic and naive revelations; for example, in the course of this trip having met some Russian people, we made the obvious distinction between the Russian people whom we liked and the Russian government and system which we intensely disliked. One was struck by the relative poverty of the Soviet Union and the sense of surveillance, etc. But also enjoyed the sights of the Kremlin and St. Petersburg, and the dramatic historical and cultural richness of Central Asia.

Q: You took two trips.
LORD: That was 1956 and we ended up going to Afghanistan. In 1958 traveling with the same friend and his mother, and a girl who was actually a friend of my friend. We went almost three months through Asia beginning in New Delhi. It's the hottest I've ever been in my life. I can still recall that. We wouldn't even do sight-seeing between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. We just stayed indoors and drank limeade, go out early in the morning and late in the afternoon. Went to Kashmir which was beautiful.

An interesting incident in Kashmir. We were on a houseboat and there was a guest registry. I looked at it, and there was my mother's name and signature in this same houseboat. But what was interesting was that she had never been to Kashmir. So I've never figured out how that happened. I think the rather famous owner of the houseboat had probably taken his book with him on travels somewhere in India. But it was rather weird to see my mother's name and she hadn't even been there.

Then we went to Nepal, to Thailand. I can't remember all the places. I think we went to Singapore, and we spent a considerable time in Japan. And that again reinforced my interest in things international, this is between my junior and senior year at Yale.

Q: You graduated in 1959. What did you do?

LORD: Actually in the summer of 1959 I went to Washington on an intern program on Capitol Hill and worked for Senator Kefauver, who had gained notoriety in terms of combating the Mafia. So I spent the summer working for him which reflected my interest in domestic politics; he was a Democrat, of course, and he was a strong runner for the presidency. So that was actually a very interesting time. It was only a couple of months, but I helped him research. I sat in on hearings. I went around with him at times. I do recall riding in the car and he reached in the glove compartment and pulled out a bottle of Bourbon. I learned retrospectively that he did have a drinking problem.

Q: He also pinched ladies.

LORD: That's right. I didn't notice that either at the time. Again, I enjoyed that summer. I got a sense of Capitol Hill, but by this time I had applied and gotten into the Fletcher School.

Q: But also did it give you a feel...I mean you were very much part of the East Coast establishment and to be doing research for a Senator from Tennessee. I mean did it give you a feel for one, a different side of the political spectrum; and two, some things that were happening in the Mississippi Valley?

LORD: The answer is yes. Again, I don't recall with great precision but on both counts, first that he of course was of a more liberal persuasion, although he was not a very liberal Democrat, obviously being from Tennessee. But he was on social welfare programs. And secondly, that Tennessee was more rural and less elitist than New England, and it was interesting to see the different style and culture there. So I was exposed to that in the brief
time I was on Capitol Hill.

*Q:* When you applied to Fletcher, what did you see Fletcher doing, and where did Fletcher stand in the educational and political spectrum?

LORD: At the time, in fact to this day, there were three or four outstanding graduate schools in international relations. I didn't really think about the West Coast. There was John Hopkins at that time, SAIS in Washington. There was the Public Policy School at Princeton. There was Fletcher. I frankly don't recall whether I applied to all of them or just to Fletcher. Fletcher was very difficult to get into. It was quite small in those days, there was probably 40 or 50 people in our class, and I believe there was something like a thousand applicants. So even with my very solid record I don't know whether I could have assumed I'd get in. Although I was pretty confident. I'd done well at Yale and very well at Hotchkiss.

It appealed to me primarily because I knew there was an international student body. I think at least a third, if not 40 percent were foreign students as well as American. That appealed to me. I knew they lived in close quarters and that you got a great education outside the classroom as well as in it. I liked the idea of being in the Boston area which I had not been in to have a change of pace. I think instinctively I felt my career would take me to Washington at some point, so why not experience Boston instead of Washington at that point. And it had a very good reputation. So for all those reasons I decided to go there. And frankly also, I recall you could get a Master's degree in one year as opposed to two years which appealed to me. I had not finally decided exactly what I was going to do, but I did feel the need to get more grounding in international affairs and by then had decided pretty much that my career was going to be in that direction. But as I entered Fletcher I hadn't formally decided on the Foreign Service but that was an option. I took the Foreign Service exam to keep my options open I believe in the fall - maybe its later in the year. I arrived in '59 in the fall and graduated in June 1960. And I passed that exam and I passed the oral exam and I decided to go into the Foreign Service. Fletcher was a terrific experience.

*Q:* You were at Fletcher when?

LORD: The fall of 1959 to June 1960. If I had to pick out the happiest years of my life, this would be towards the top. First, I met my future wife there and I always joke that I first started becoming her friend because she took very good notes in economic classes, which she did by the way. So we began to get very close starting around December, then we graduated. Since we'd seen each other every day, we thought this is a little artificial so she went off to Hawaii to work - that's the furthest she could get away from me and still be in the United States. She was a Chinese citizen, born in Shanghai, didn't want to leave the country because she wasn't sure she could get back in on her passport so she went off to Hawaii. She actually left for Hawaii with $50.00, a one-way ticket, no job, and no contacts but she was determined to show that she could work on her own, survive and also to test our relationship and within a week she became executive assistant to the head of the East-West Center which was just starting up. So that was one reason I had a happy
Secondly, intellectually terrific teachers, and I learned a great deal and got more particular grounding in this field that I was going to pursue, Yale having been a broader foundation, and got economics and international law, international organization, regional studies. Had terrific teachers there, in international law, in economics, and diplomacy.

Then on top of the classroom, there's the education even outside the classroom that was even more extraordinary. We had a terrific variety of students, first on the American side of all ideological persuasions, whether African-Americans, or semi-racist southerners, liberals, conservatives, students from across the country. And then international students from around the world, comprising as I said, 30 to 40 percent of the student body. And we all lived in two small houses, saw each other at meals, and played sports together as well as studied together, and it was a tremendous experience.

Interesting, given the fact now I'm not a great one for small talk, or particularly a good conversationist, like my wife is. At the time I was eager to talk to people and learn, and engage with people, and soak up as much as I could, even to the point of driving my future wife crazy at the time. But since then those roles have reversed. It was a tremendous year from every standpoint, and I ended up being first in my class. I made a lot of friends, learned a great deal about human nature, about other cultures. I met my future wife! I just had a terrific time.

Q: Can you give me some of the feeling that you got about different approaches. I mean you say about 40 percent of the student body was from other countries. Were there different approaches?

LORD: I might add also this is the first time in my education that I was in a class with women. Yale, Hotchkiss and Buckley had all been strictly male, of course - not to mention a lot of minorities both in America and people from other cultures. So being inherently, I believe, liberal in these issues I was delighted to have this interaction and it enriched my education socially as well as academically. It's hard to answer your question. Obviously people from other cultures had somewhat different approaches. Everyone worked hard, you had to, it was very demanding but I believe those from other countries probably worked the hardest because they were selected and I'm sure in intense competition. Some of them were there in mid-career in the Foreign Service, or about to go into Foreign Service. Quite a few women from overseas which was also interesting. I think in every case they felt an obligation to their family, or to their nation, or to their government to do well. So I think that maybe was one distinction, although certainly the Americans on the whole worked hard as well.

Q: You were there '59 to '60. Did the beginning of the Kennedy-Nixon campaign intrude on your cloistered life?

LORD: I'm smiling because I was going to mention that. While we were there we were beginning to look toward the 1960 campaign, and being a Republican I was obviously
getting interested in this, and my mother, of course, had worked throughout that period, up until then, in the United Nations. I'm not precisely sure whether I was always for Nixon, given my persuasion at the time, I evidently should have been for Rockefeller. I frankly can't recall whether I was rooting for Rockefeller or not - I certainly favored him in 1968. Since Nixon was the Vice President to Eisenhower, and since my mother worked for that administration, I was very high on Nixon. So even though I was a liberal Republican I probably was for Nixon from the beginning. But I very much hoped when he got the nomination that he would pick Rockefeller as his Vice President. I thought that would be the best chance for the ticket, and I was very high on Rockefeller. I recall, even at the time, and I did keep a diary at Fletcher that I haven't even reread even for this process I'll go back and make sure I don't miss anything, but it was more personal. But I do recall, even then beginning to work on this issue of thinking about Nixon, reading everything I could on Nixon. Reading several biographies on him, both favorable and unfavorable, convinced he would make an excellent President, beginning to talk him up to my fellow students, many of whom were much more liberal and were very distrustful of Nixon, of course who had a reputation whether it was Alger Hiss which was at least very defensible in many ways, in Helen Douglas’ Senate campaign and others which were less defensible.

Q: California Senatorial politics.

LORD: That's right, when Nixon had been accused of slander his opponents. Whereas with Alger Hiss he turned out to be correct. So I remember writing in my diary and talking to others about how Nixon was going to be a good President. I even began writing some friends, although I'm not a great letter writer that might have been done more after I graduated and we got closer to the nomination. So yes, that election was already pending and beginning to intrude upon my life, and indeed I became a volunteer in the Nixon campaign after I left Fletcher.

Q: I was wondering whether in your association with Kefauver, who was a strong contender for the Democratic side, did you have reservations about him or not?

LORD: I didn't realize his personal faults, maybe I was naive but it wasn't clear to me either his drinking or womanizer problems, and being somewhat old fashioned that would have lessened my estimation of him. But I recall he was always courteous and his staff was, so I liked him. I did not think he was a giant, I don't think I ever thought of him as a possible presidential contender. I had to wrestle with some of my views on domestic issues, in particular against the Kefauver positions. But I don't recall being persuaded, I was still a Republican in the sense of limited government, although very strong on racial equality. I can't remember whether Kefauver was a strong candidate for the election in 1960. Maybe I'm wrong.

Q: It was the '56 election for Vice President.

LORD: I think his time had passed by then.

Q: As you were dealing with the world at Fletcher, were there any particular areas
where you began to focus? I mean, having a young lady you were very interested in China. Did that move you towards looking at the Far East?

LORD: It certainly did, although again it's hard to quantify from a distance. Clearly I got more interested in Asia but I think like most of us Europe and the Soviet Union was the major focus, and I of course had been to Russia, and I had been to Asia so I had an interest in Asia as well. So those are the two continents that intrigued me more than Latin America or Africa. Indeed, in my career I became a generalist, and more recently more Asian-focused.

Q: With your international group at Fletcher, did you find there was sort of a different view of our rather strong anti-view towards the Soviet Union and China?

LORD: I don't recall specifically. I know we had a lot of debates, both with Americans about domestic politics, and with foreigners about international affairs. But I believe most of the students came from countries that were pretty much on our side during the Cold War. There were several Pakistanis, several Thai students, some Japanese, Latin Americans, only a couple Middle East students as I recall. So I think most of them were from countries that were allies - it doesn't mean they personally would necessarily subscribe to their government's position. I don't recall a great challenge over my anti-Soviet position. There might have been some individuals.

Q: Just so I get the timing down. You got out in June of 1960. How much involved were you in the Nixon campaign?

LORD: I went immediately to Washington. What I had hoped at the time, and in retrospect it would have been much better was to be in the research end where I could do work on substantive issues. Instead I ended up where I was least qualified, in sort of the advance man/volunteer effort, organizing campaign stops and travel. This was frankly a very traumatic experience for me that summer because for the first time I suffered a real loss of confidence. I had pretty much sailed through life being at the top of my class, being rather popular and doing well, and just assuming that I would always prevail. I remember when I was quite young Joe Alsop, the famous journalist, once asked me at a party what I wanted to be when I grew up? And I said Secretary of State. So I went into that summer having just come out of Fletcher as number one. It was probably the most intensely competitive academic community in the country almost, and I was feeling pretty sure of myself.

So I was devastated when I got there. I was immediately assigned to Bob Haldeman, the future Chief of Staff to Nixon, sitting in an office near him. He was head of the advance men. These are the people who go out in front of the President and arrange all the campaign stops. He was also in charge of his basic travel and a good part of his strategy. None of which I was qualified for, as someone who had been spared, I say that sadly, the practical experience of running organizations, and not technologically or scientifically, skillful or experienced. Here I was supposed to help out on advance work, and I was just totally unqualified. But beyond that, even though I could have eagerly pitched in and I
was ready to do that, Haldeman was icy cold for reasons I never understood. He must have felt that I was forced upon him because my mother was so important in the Eisenhower administration, that they had to take me because I was the son of Mary Lord.

Q: He was also of the California contingent and felt like country cousins in the eastern establishment.

LORD: Either that or felt the eastern establishment was snobbish. I certainly was not one to project that image frankly in all fairness, and I was eager and ready to help but I did look over some of my jottings at the time that summer and starting out with self confidence, eagerness, wishing I was in a more comfortable place, namely research. But excited about seeing the inside of the campaign, working with someone near the top, and devoted to getting Nixon elected. So I started out thinking even by observation I would have an exciting time and wanted to do things. I remember sitting outside his office with nothing to do all day long. He would never even really say hello to me, gave me nothing to do. I was reading newspapers, clipping. He gave me one project but it was clearly just to keep me busy, to plan where Nixon should travel the next few weeks in terms of strategy, which of course was crazy, what would I know? So I sent him something, but I'm sure it was naive and way off the mark. I gave it to him but of course it was never used, nor should it have been. But I just was increasingly frustrated given nothing to do, and began that summer to lose self confidence, or just being angry that I wasn't employed. And then beginning to feel maybe it was my fault a little bit. I don't even remember the menial tasks I was given. I didn't mind doing menial tasks, but I didn't feel I was doing it then particularly well.

Finally, I was transferred to my relief to a man named Peter Flanigan, who also ended up working in the White House, a much more congenial person, a good person. These were the volunteers who worked with the advance men, but the in-job was not so much to provide all the logistics and security and strategy, but sort of the color, the parades and the balloons, etc. I got out occasionally to some of these events, but I was basically sitting back in Washington. We were supposed to plan how to get so many balloons, and so many people to various places. And again, I was very bad at this and I felt that I was screwing up, and I had a tremendous loss of self confidence. So even though I was excited to go to the convention and to some of the campaign events, and I kept writing letters to my friends about how Nixon should be elected, and I desperately wanted him to win, I was at first frustrated, then angry, and then lacking completely in self confidence. It was the first time in my life that I had ever really been depressed and uncertain. I was telling Bette all about this because we were already very close. So this was a real difficult time for me.

Q: In a way it's a classic thing. The achiever who has always achieved until they all of a sudden reach something where the elements that make you achieve, aren't there anymore and you're off into a different world.

LORD: I had an even more ominous interpretation, namely, I had lived my life in a Potemkin village. That's sort of a mixed metaphor, but maybe everything I had achieved
really had been sort of artificial in an artificial world. Now, for the first time, I was in the real world, not counting working for Kefauver where I did do well. And I wondered whether I was going to be inadequate, whether all my achievements were theoretical and academic, and within certain circles. And now that I was in the tough real world, and a practical world, was I totally unqualified? So I had a real loss of confidence.

Q: This happens. It happened to me when I graduated from college at Williams and went into the military as a private. They were working class people who were a hell of a lot better than I was in doing this. How long were you working on the campaign?

LORD: I went in in June and I worked through the campaign in November, and then - I'm not precise sure of the chronology - but I had to fulfill my military service. I was waiting for the Foreign Service, but I had to do the military. So I went in the National Guard, U.S. Army National Guard in New York. I applied for that but I had to wait a few months before I went in, and it was going to be six months of basic training, and then one night a week, and two weeks in the summer. As it turned out I got called in the Foreign Service and I was relieved of further duties after my six months basic training. But from November to March 1961, I was at home sort of in between waiting for the Army, still suffering somewhat from this lack of confidence, also trying to figure out my relationship with my future wife who was in Hawaii and running up huge phone bills. I spent a few weeks working for the Republican National Committee, essentially phoning people, given lists of phone numbers to try to get them to advertise in the annual year book. I was not particularly good at that, and it was only for a few weeks but to do something while I was waiting for the Army.

Then I went to Ft. Dix, spent six months there and hated it on the one hand, but knew at the time and knew since that it was a valuable experience precisely for the reasons you mentioned, namely that I was exposed to a whole slice of society that the son of a Pillsbury, New York Park Avenue, Hotchkiss, Yale, New Englander had never seen. And I like to think this broadened my horizons, made me even more aware of other peoples' problems. But I was always nervous whether I could produce back into the practical world again, and whether I was going to screw up in some way. I remember being a squad leader in some exercise and getting my squad lost, etc.

On the other hand, despite all this, I picked up sharp shooting medals, M-1 I guess at the time and the Browning automatic rifle. And then I was elected trainee of the post, which is the top trainee in my whole regiment. But frankly that's a little misleading because I was not a great soldier and this depended more on interviews and, of course, a Fletcher grad, a Yale grad, in interviews up against somebody who maybe didn't even get through high school, was not a fair contest. So it was a great thing to have and to get a major general to give me the certificate, and to be trainee of the post. But I have no illusions about how high a barrier I was jumping over. I was in the best physical shape of my life, and have never got quite that hard ever since.

Q: Did you get caught at all in the aftermath of the Kennedy-Nixon campaign on Kennedy projecting youth has arrived on the stage, you know, ask not what your country
can do for you?

LORD: I think the answer is yes. I mean, I was still eager to serve my government. I was disappointed Nixon had lost. I felt a lot of it was for superficial reasons, that Kennedy was handsome, and Nixon wasn't, the debates where he perspired on television, and Kennedy was self assured. I didn't think Kennedy had the experience or credentials to be President. I somewhat resented the fact that, because of his name and his wealth he was going to be President when he really had been sort of an undistinguished, in my view, senator. And Nixon, with all his experience, and he had been a good Vice President. It just seemed unfair to me, that the people had elected Kennedy for superficial reasons. Having said that I was inspired by Kennedy's words, as I recall. I was already embarked on a Foreign Service career in any event.

I do recall that while I was at Ft. Dix we had the Berlin crisis. I believe the wall went up in August when I was then in the Service.

Q: Kennedy had gone to Vienna and things hadn't gone well, talking about bringing up the reserves.

LORD: Exactly. Talking about bringing up the reserves is just the point because there was talk that all of us in the National Guard, as well as the reserves, might be extended for a couple of years. Frankly, I wanted to get the hell out of there, and also start my career. So I remember being very nervous that this might happen and I'd be stuck in the Army for a couple of years.

Q: Back to the Foreign Service. Could you tell me anything you remember about the oral exam?

LORD: Not really, only knowing that frankly I had a lot of self confidence going into it. I worked hard to get ready for it, studying newspapers and magazines with particular intensity, as well as going over history, etc., and thinking about the possible questions I might have. So I felt pretty self confident. I probably didn't really realize how small a percentage would make it all the way through. As I recall I felt comfortable throughout, it went well. I was still at that point where I didn't have any self doubt, so it was rather an easy experience for me.
II. FOREIGN SERVICE - WASHINGTON AND GENEVA. BETTE BAO LORD  
(1961-1967)

Q: Then you finished the military for six months. Then went into the Foreign Service?

LORD: That's right. My Foreign Service A-100 course, as they called it then, I believe started in October 1961. There were some people in my class, I forget who was in and who wasn't, that I've kept up with ever since.

Q: You were in October '61. Could you describe your A-100 course?

LORD: I don't have any vivid memories to be honest. I remember being eager, basically enjoying it. I don't think I was cynical and turned off by it. I think I basically enjoyed it. I enjoyed meeting my fellow Foreign Service officers. I guess somehow I put behind the whole Nixon campaign experience. I must have still had some lingering self doubts, but I was back in a more comfortable milieu, a semi-academic milieu, the international field, where you participate in class and studied and read and wrote, and didn't have to get balloons or parades working on time, that kind of thing. So I remember it as being a rather pleasant time. Also, wondering where my first assignment was going to be.

Q: How were relations with your future wife at that point?

LORD: Well, very good. She had come back from Hawaii and by then she was living in Washington. She worked for the Fulbright program. She was also a modern dancer at that point, developed that further. She had been a dancer in college, studied under Martha Graham. So we were in love frankly, but we just didn't make the commitment until her birthday, November 3, 1962 when I gave her about 50 presents, none of which were a ring, and she was going crazy. She knew I was sentimental, and symbolic and respected me. Because we'd been going on now for some time, both seeing each other every day, and then not seeing each other at all when she was in Hawaii, then seeing each other in Washington fairly regularly. I think she was about ready to give up on me. This is a traditional time when the man asked the woman. Then I arranged for a phone call to come in, just said happy birthday. And then after she had opened all the presents, I think expecting a ring, at the very bottom there was one last thing, it was a big piece of paper that was covered up, she unwrapped it, and what it was was a calendar projecting all the way up to the year 2010, or something I forget how long it went. And it said the future travels and career of Winston and Bette Bao Lord, a handy way of proposing. And then what I did was I listed all my Foreign Service assignments, where we would be so I did two or three years here, and I had us at this embassy, this continent, and back to State in this position, and kept going all the way up. I probably ended up as Secretary of State, I don't know how pompous or ridiculous I was. So that's the way I proposed. So we were dating each other, but we hadn't made the commitment as I went into the Service in October 1961.

Q: Again I refer to this Kennedy thing, it wasn't just Kennedy but he gave impetus to a spirit of public service. Did you find that your class reflected the same way you felt about
it, or not?

LORD: I don't know. You've got to remember that in the '50s and early '60s there was a
general disposition to give the government the benefit of doubt, to serve your country. So
I think Kennedy added to that. But I think that feeling was already there. I think Kennedy
reenforced it for me, I don't know about the others - I'm trying to think of the timing. The
inaugural speech would have been January '61, we came in in October. But you've got to
figure with the time lag that most people had decided to join the Foreign Service before
that election, usually you waited a year or two. So I don't think this particular class would
necessarily have been influenced by that.

Q: You were there about three months with the class?
LORD: I think it was October up to January, two or three months.

Q: How did you feel about the initiation as far as what you were going to be doing?

LORD: I certainly wasn't cynical or turned off. Some people say it's bureaucratic, and it's
giving you superficial stuff. There's always complaints about these things. I don't recall
having that reaction. I was just ready to get on with it. Maybe I'm glossing it over. Maybe
at the time I felt some of the stuff was not very helpful, but on the whole I took a positive
attitude and I wanted my first assignment. In those days you at least expressed your
preferences. I wanted to be in Washington for a couple of reasons. It was the personal one
of working on my relationship with my future wife, but also I felt before going overseas
it was useful to have the perspective from Washington. So when you went overseas you
could put that in that context, and in particular I hoped and I ended up being successful,
to get up on the Seventh Floor, rather than being buried down in the second, third, fourth,
fifth floor, figuring that would be the most olympian, more general view of what was
going on in the Service, and in the world. It would be a very useful way for a young
officer to start. And I was fortunate in being given a rotating assignment - they had
rotating assignments for junior officers in those days. And in the course of my next two
years I rotated between first Congressional Relations, and then Political/Military Affairs.

Q: When you say the Seventh Floor, could you explain the Seventh Floor?

LORD: Yes. The Seventh Floor, by that meaning the floor at the highest level, both in
terms of authority and seniority, as well as architecture in the State Department. It's
where the Secretary and the Under Secretaries reside. So if I could somehow get up there
and see the entire Department, and the whole view of the world, I thought this would be
the most exciting and the most useful way to start out, then I could put other things in
context rather than starting out with a bird's eye view either in an embassy abroad or
further down in the Department. So I was fortunate in being given a job with
Congressional Relations, which was on the Seventh Floor, and which by definition
covered all parts of the world, all issues that would come up in relation to Congress, as
well as to exposing me to the relations between the Congressional and Executive
branches which is always useful for a typical Foreign Service officer because in those
days Foreign Service officers didn't have that much experience either in public affairs or
public diplomacy, or in Congressional relations. Many sort of felt their job was in dealing with other countries and the domestic context of foreign policy was something you weren't that much exposed to, either in our training, or our assignments, something we've done a much better job with since. Just like economics wasn't as big a deal in those days as it has become. So I think in very many ways I was fortunate to be up there with global issues and to be working in a job that still had this relationship to the American body politic, and the interchange between the Department and the Foreign Service, the Executive Branch on the one hand, and domestic politics and the Congress on the other.

I also was working for a very dynamic individual and I've kept up with him ever since in one way or another although not close, named Fred Dutton who was a political appointment, very close to Bobby Kennedy in particular, but also to Jack Kennedy and was Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. He was always friendly and encouraging to me. That's the good news. The bad news in retrospect a lot of it was pretty much routine work as one would expect. I recall, at least in the early period there, I didn't even have an office except in a hallway. I literally had a desk in a hallway for the first couple of months. Also, Dutton's executive assistant, a young woman who later became his wife, sort of ran things. She wasn't much older than I was, and I've since become friends with her as well as Dutton, but at the time I sort of resented a little bit this young woman, also a political appointment, sort of telling us all what to do. I don't want to exaggerate that. I ended up doing a lot of Congressional correspondence, some of it fairly mechanical as opposed to writing letters. Just keeping track of letters that would come in from Congress, and then making sure they were farmed out to the proper places in the building, and then following up and making sure people met deadlines. But I also participated, went up on the Hill for various hearings just for observation purposes. I remember working on some draft remarks for Dutton, maybe in a semi-social occasion, or dinner, or actually making speeches. I contributed, I think, in useful ways in that. He told me at the time, and has told me since, that I did catch his eye as a very promising young officer. So it was a mixed bag, it was mechanical in many ways, particularly the correspondence part of it...

I was just saying that Dutton was very energetic and very politically savvy.

Q: Did you get any impression about the ability of the Department of State to respond to Congress? Was this a problem?

LORD: Yes. I remember at the time the culture still really was pretty retrograde among Foreign Service officers. I think the general feeling was that Congress could be sort of a pain in the neck, and why do I have to sit around answering letters to Congressmen and Senators, and why don't they let us get on with our business. I think that was sort of a general feeling. And in those days, pre-Watergate, pre-Vietnam, the Executive Branch had pretty good dominance over the Congress as I recall. So there would be a lot of following up with desk officers to make sure that letters were answered and the general feeling that sometimes these Congressional people were political, or they were just pleasing their constituents and causing trouble for Foreign Service officers. There's still frustration with the Congress even as we speak, of course, some with good reason. But I
think there in now a greater appreciation of the need and self-interest, if not in constitutional matters, to deal constructively with the Congress and be responsible.

Q: How about when you went up with Dutton as sort of a note taker?

LORD: I don't know how much I did of that or with his deputies I would do some of that. I don't have clear recollections of doing that a great deal.

Q: I was just wondering, what was your impression of Congress from hearing the questions from the staff?

LORD: Well, again, I think it was mixed. I think it was a feeling that there were some very able and dedicated men and women of integrity up there - mostly men in those days, but also some buffoons and people who were more politics and no statesmanship. It was bipartisan, Republicans and Democrats in each camp. People who were annoying and intrusive, and unhelpful to our foreign policy, and others who were just the opposite. Of course, it was interesting for me. I was always a centrist, and being a moderate-to-liberal Republican I was in the center of the spectrum, and I was never rabidly partisan. Nevertheless, I had been brought up in Republican circles and generally been for Republicans, and voted and worked for Nixon. So it was interesting to be with a fiercely quite liberal Democratic pro-Kennedy crowd, but there was no problem for me. I voted bipartisan. Of course I was in the Foreign Service and resolved to serve any president.

Q: You were doing this Congressional Relations work from?

LORD: Early 1962 until late that year - I don't recall exactly when I went to what they called then G/PM. I got married in May '63 and by then I had been in Political-Military Affairs for several months. I think in the two years about nine months was in Congressional Relations, and about a year and three months in Political-Military Affairs. But I'm not precisely sure of that, it would be in the records somewhere.

Q: You were in Congressional Relations during that critical time of the Cuban missile crisis.

LORD: Actually, I was in Political-Military Affairs by then. That was October 1962. So that's right. I probably went over maybe as early as August-September. It seems that I was in Congressional Relations longer than that, but it might only have been six-seven-eight or nine months.

Q: There's something about being out in the hallway too.

LORD: That is strange. I'll give you a couple of examples. I know I was in Political-Military Affairs during the Cuban missile crisis, October '62.

Q: When you went over to the Political-Military office, what were you doing and can you describe how Political-Military fit into the scheme of things at that point?
LORD: At that point it was called G/PM, G stood for the Under Secretary for Political Affairs who was Alexis Johnson at the time. The head of Political-Military Affairs was Deputy Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Kitchen. He reported directly on Political-Military Affairs to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Johnson. This is before the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which evolved somewhat later but it was the forerunner of it. It was an office, as I recall, of very able people headed by Jeff Kitchen. And I still recall remembering when I would deal with Kitchen finding this heady stuff to be dealing with someone as high ranking as a Deputy Assistant Secretary, although I'd dealt with Dutton as well. One of my first assignments I recall of substance was working on a negotiation with the British over securing Diego Garcia as a military base for the United States.

Q: It became very important obviously much later on.

LORD: That's right, much later on including the Persian Gulf and ever since and before. I remember that as being one of my early assignments. I probably did some work on export controls, we were in charge of munition lists and dual use items. I did some work on Asia but I don't recall...I remember being heavily employed and working hard, and feeling quite good about it. But I don't recall a lot of specific projects beyond Diego Garcia and export controls.

Q: Did you get involved cooperating or working together with the Pentagon?

LORD: Yes. I learned a great deal about that because we had exchange programs, we had some military officers working in our office, we had some State people going over to the Pentagon. So we had these exchange programs. Most of our issues would involve working with them. So it exposed me early on to the Pentagon which came in helpful a few years later when I went over to the Pentagon and worked with ISA policy planning. And I got exposed to things like our alliances and maintaining them, overseas bases, Diego Garcia being an example, military exchanges, and military issues. So this was a useful expansion of my knowledge and experience. I'd just gotten the Congressional dimension, and then I got the military dimension. Since most of my life I'd been studying political and diplomatic dimensions I felt this was a useful addition to that.

Q: Was there any particular problems or issues dealing with Diego Garcia that you recall?

LORD: Not offhand. We made some breakthroughs with the British while I was there but the final agreement wasn't signed while I was there, as I recall.

Q: How did the Cuban missile crisis hit the Political-Military office?

LORD: Well, very hard. First of all for those listeners or readers who didn't live through that period, the tension of that period has not been exaggerated in retrospect. It was extremely tense. There's no question in my mind that we certainly felt closer to nuclear war than we ever were before or since, and probably were closer to nuclear war than we
ever were before or since. So I still remember the palatable tension at the time, even to the point of having serious discussions with my future wife whether she should get out of Washington, figuring that if it was a nuclear exchange, Washington would be targeted. I remember she refused to do so, wasn't going leave where I was. I was saying, don't you think maybe you ought get up to New England, or even New Jersey with your parents, or something. Of course, she wouldn't think of it. But it was that tense.

Specifically, I don't know about how many nights this went on, but I had a rather heady although scary experience of spending all night in the Department, sitting right outside the office of George Ball, who was Deputy Secretary, the number two person at that time. And then the next night outside the office of Alexis Johnson, the number three person. They alternated all-night duty when this crisis reached its height. I frankly don't recall whether it was a night apiece, or a couple of nights apiece how long this went on, but it was during the time when we instituted the blockade and the issue was going to be whether the Russian ships challenged that blockade. So I was linked to the Operations Center. It was probably the Operations Center even then. If there was word that the Russians were challenging the blockade, or anything else which suggested the balloon might be going up we were really in a tough situation and their job was to alert me immediately and I would go in and wake up Alexis Johnson and George Ball who slept on their couches. So to this day I remember sitting outside waiting for that, keeping in touch with the Operations Center, and wondering whether we were going to go to war. It was a pretty dramatic experience for a young officer and obviously I was only just a messenger, but it felt like I was a rather important person, that I would be one of the very first people in the world to know whether we were heading into a real crisis.

Q: Did it happen on your watch when the ships started to turn around?

LORD: I'm ashamed to say I don't know, I just don't recall. The answer is probably no. I don't believe the basic positive breakthrough occurred on my watch. I think it occurred - we'll have to look in the history books - but during the daytime. So it wasn't at night when I was actually doing it.

Q: How were the more senior Foreign Service officers in Political-Military? How were they betting this thing would come out?

LORD: It's hard to recall frankly. I think everyone was nervous. I think there was cautious optimism that the Russians wouldn't be so reckless as to challenge us. I don't think it was total pessimism, we're heading for a crisis. I think there was a feeling on the whole that this was the right thing to do. That we had to do something on the one hand but an invasion or attack on Cuba was too far. On the other hand, I think this middle course was one that we generally supported, and I think most people felt it would work. But obviously given the stakes and the potential dangers, there was a great deal of tension.

Q: When you were working on sales of equipment...this was part of COCOM. Did you find yourself in between the Department of Commerce and the Pentagon?
LORD: Yes, there were the usual debates about whether something should be exported or not, and the State Department versus Commerce versus Defense. I remember I worked with a man named Colonel Robinson who was in that job for many years, decades afterwards, and highly respected. There was also a man named George Newman who was a step above him. These are the two people I worked with the most, they in turn reported to Kitchen. It was a very able group and there were others in that office whom I met whose paths crossed mine later in my career. It was a very good exposure.

Q: These first impressions are often important. Did you feel that Political-Military was much more a part of and accepted by the State Department than Congressional Relations?

LORD: I think the quick answer is yes for reasons I just mentioned. There was a feeling that, in the first place Congressional Relations had a lot more political appointees in it. Although these are not resented, people understood the game, you needed a mix of political and career, it was more of a political office in that sense, and it was doing less traditional Foreign Service work. There weren't that many Foreign Service officers even in the office and there was the question of whether Congress was being unhelpful and intrusive, etc. Whereas Political-Military was more traditional. Although even that had the element of working with the Pentagon which was slightly different from a traditional job. I was somewhat happier there. I wasn't unhappy in Congressional Relations, but some of it was pretty routine work. I had this office problem at the beginning. So I can't say I didn't enjoy Congressional Relations but I felt that I was beginning to hit my stride and doing more substantive and challenging and rewarding work in Political-Military Affairs.

Q: What was the background that you knew about the operating of Jeffrey Kitchen?

LORD: I recall being very impressed by him, but I frankly, now as you ask me, I can't recall his background. I believe he was either a civil servant or Foreign Service reserve officer. He was not a career officer, on the other hand, he wasn't sort of a strict political appointee. I could be wrong on that. I don't know whether he'd been brought in by Alexis Johnson, or not, but he reported directly to Johnson.

Q: What was the feeling - I realize you were pretty far down the key chain, about Alexis Johnson?

LORD: Oh, great respect for him. A feeling that he was one of the giants of the Foreign Service. Of course, by definition, he had risen about as high as you could go at that point. So I think there was universal respect for him.

Q: You were doing this until '63.

LORD: That's correct. Until the end of '63.
Q: Were there any reverberations coming out of Southeast Asia at this point? Laos I think was kind of on the...

LORD: Vietnam certainly hadn't really entered our conscience that much as a nation, as a society, or in my own mind that I can recall. I do remember the Laos crisis in '62 and the President getting up there with maps, but it's not precise in my mind. So Indochina was just beginning to edge into our consciousness.

Q: At the end of '60 were you there having this job, or working for the Department of State when Kennedy was assassinated?

LORD: Of course, it's a cliche, but everybody remembers where they were on certain events and one of those was Kennedy's assassination, November 22, 1963. I recall I was sitting in the cafeteria of the State Department having lunch when I first got the word. I do not recall whether the first word I got was...I think I got the word he was shot and seriously hurt. I don't think the first word was that he was dead. So we immediately went to our, I guess television even in those days. It always stuck in my mind. I also remember it was just before the Yale-Harvard game. I forget what day of the week it was, but whatever that Saturday was going to be, I was going up to that game. It struck me, as it did all of us, a heavy blow at the time and I remember being riveted as we all were to the TV sets at the funeral, and the heroic stoicism of the widow and the two kids and the young boy saluting the casket, and the horse without a rider, all the images that are so clear now.

Q: You got married at this point.

LORD: We got married in May 1963, an absolutely extraordinary wedding. First of all, I was very fortunate that we had a perfect in-law situation. I've always said, and only half jokingly, that my parents would have disowned me if I didn't marry Bette, and her parents would have disowned her if she didn't marry me. They each liked the others. It was not a foregone conclusion in those days that you would have an interracial marriage. My marrying a Chinese obviously wasn't as dramatic as if I'd married an African-American, but it was still very unusual. And indeed, the miscegenation laws were in force in Virginia and Maryland, so we had to get married in the District, which we probably would have anyway. Neither my wife nor I were religious in the sense of going to church very much, but we wanted a traditional wedding in a church. So we drove around Washington looking for a pretty church, and we found the Presbyterian church on Chevy Chase Circle, went in to the minister, who luckily was quite flexible and enlightened, and said, look we never go to church, we haven't, but we want a traditional wedding, would you marry us in your beautiful church? He said, on one condition, and that is we had to come in and meet with him several times and get to know him personally, which was terrific, a sense of his church and personally, but also he'd get to know us before marrying us.

We got married on an absolute perfect day, May 4, 1963. I remember being nervous in the week leading up to it because every day was absolutely perfect and I was worried that by the time it got to our wedding it was going to rain. It so happened it was absolutely
perfect that day, and the very next day it poured rain. So we just made it. It was a huge wedding, a thousand people in the church...well, a thousand people at the reception, maybe somewhat less than that in the church. The reception was at Twin Oaks, which was the Chinese Nationalist embassy at the time. Somewhat ironic, and I've always felt half guilty because the Nationalist Chinese ambassador, who was a good friend of my father-in-law, gave the reception and eight years later I snuck in secretly with Henry Kissinger to China and helped to upset Taiwan, to say the least. In a way I half-did my father-in-law out of a job because he was working indirectly for the Taiwan government, an export representative in New Jersey, but also their representative in an UN International Sugar Council. And he eventually lost his job when the UN admitted China and kicked out Taiwan. Of course, I was part of all of that but he never held it against me. In fact, being a realist, he thought we were acting in our own national interest.

In any event the wedding was spectacular. I remember I was very vain, I've always been very near sighted, my nickname in prep school was Mr. Magoo because I didn't want to wear my glasses so I was going around bumping into things, cutting in on the wrong girls at dances. So I got used to contact lenses because I wanted to see my own wedding, but I didn't want to be up there wearing glasses as a bridegroom. But in those days they were hard contact lenses and very irritating. So I finally got used to them and wore them to my wedding, but they were irritating me so my eyes were watering, and everyone assumed I was emotionally moved, which I was but that wasn't the reason my eyes were watering. So it was a terrific occasion. We were the last ones to leave our own reception, we were having such a good time. We honeymooned in the Virgin Islands.

Q: This is probably a good time, could you give me some background about your wife, because she became an important element later on when you...

LORD: First on, one further point on the racial marriage. It never seemed to us like it was a big deal, it seemed natural to get married but again in 1963 interracial marriages, even though it was Asian not African-American, was considered unusual. I remember my old nurse who had helped raise me when I was very young, a conservative Scottish woman, was deeply upset that I would have an interracial marriage and tried to talk me out of it, and of course had absolutely no effect. But we never felt at the time or since it was ever a problem. It was always smooth. Of course, my parents were totally relaxed about it, as were the Baos, and the wedding was a happy event. It really was a terrific match. We never really felt any problems, and we never felt since then that we've ever suffered. Indeed we've felt it a source of strength, it enriched us both and, of course, exposed me to Chinese culture and language and food, and dealing with her parents and learning more about China through my wife.

Q: She was about your age?

LORD: She is one year younger, she was born November 3, 1938 in Shanghai. Her father was born on November 3rd, her grandfather was born on November 3rd. Her grandmother, her mother, and she were all born in the year of the Tiger, so there was a lot of symbolism. And in fact when she was born her grandfather told her mother that she
had all the signs of a rich and happy life. Just the features and the timing, and everything was pointing towards a terrific life. And in fact she certainly would agree with that prognostication.

The Baos were moving around during the war. Bette was the first child of her parents who were married in 1937, and they left Shanghai. They were in various places, including Guilin, Hong Kong, and Chungking. Mr. Sandys Bao was an engineer and he himself was a remarkable person who was the debating champion of all of China. A great athlete, very intelligent and a great engineer, and he was building or rebuilding factories and power plants in China. And they kept moving around to stay out of the hands of the Japanese, and there were times when they had to go into air-raid shelters, etc. My mother-in-law, Dora Bao, was a gorgeous woman and very strong and intelligent in her own right. So they moved around went into the interior of China. The next daughter named Cathy was born in Guilin, and third third sister, named SanSan, means number three, was born in Chungking.

When Bette was eight in 1946 her father was assigned to the United States as an export representative for the Nationalist government. He assumed the assignment was for six months or a year so he was only going to take his wife and Bette, who by then eight, could learn the language at that time and that would be useful for her, and leave the four year old sister Cathy and one year old sister SanSan behind. Cathy cried so much that they took her as well. He went ahead of his wife and daughters and then she and Bette and Cathy came over in 1946, in the fall. I don't remember the exact month. But they left SanSan behind, only one year old and she would get nothing out of it and they figured they were going back in six months or a year. So they left her with an aunt and uncle to take care of her until they went back.

He kept getting extended in his assignment, Mr. Bao did, and then the Communists gradually took over and they couldn't get SanSan out of China. To make a long story short, she spent the first 17 years of her life in China. Until she was about 16 she thought her aunt and uncle were her real parents. Her grandmother who thought she was dying at the time, she actually died a little bit later, decided to tell SanSan that her real parents were in America. When she heard that she wanted to be reunited, or at least to see her real parents. Her mother wrote a letter pretending that she was sick, and was going to be in Hong Kong for convalescence and could her daughter come out for two weeks to visit her and take care of her. Luckily in terms of timing the Communists for some reason, mostly because there was a terrible famine at that point as the result of this Great Leap Forward, were letting some refugees get out. To this day we don't know whether they believed that the daughter was only going to go out for two weeks and go back in, or whether they realized she was leaving. But she took a train to Hong Kong. My father-in-law was very nervous because many Chinese families had tried this, the kids would come out and they were so disoriented they'd turn around and go back in again and not join their real parents. Mrs. Bao was determined to take a chance, the girl came out, and they were reunited and they went to Taiwan temporarily and came to the United States and she has been ever since.
And that story of her being left behind, growing up in China and how she got out, and her experiences, was my wife's first book to become a best selling author. SanSan arrived just shortly before our wedding and was a bridesmaid at our wedding before she could speak any English. So she was there just in time for the wedding in May ’63. I think she got out at the end of ’62.

That book was called Eighth Moon. My wife had no intention of being an author. She was a chemistry major at Tufts University where she went. She had gone to a New Jersey high school before that. At Tufts she was a campus leader, and a good student, head cheer leader for four years, a modern dancer, and just one of the most popular people on campus. She started as a chemistry major but as she said she wasn't very good at it, she did this because she felt that all Chinese kids should grow up to be scientists like Madame Curie. So she thought she was going to be an “ist” as a scientist or biologist or chemist. But she kept blowing up the lab. The head of the chemistry department told her that she could either stay in the chemistry department and flunk, or move on to another curriculum and pass. So she changed to international affairs and felt this was a matter of shame that as a Chinese Asian youngster she wasn't going to be an “ist”. Luckily it turned out later in life she was an “ist”, a novelist.

Anyway she took international affairs and then went to Fletcher and that's how we met up. So we met and got our master's degree together at Fletcher. We decided for reasons I've mentioned to separate and see how enduring our relationship was, having been in close quarters all this time. She went to Hawaii, as I've said, with $50.00 and a one way ticket, no job and no contacts and within a few days was the top assistant to the acting director of the East-West Center, just as it was getting launched and helped him launch the whole East-West Center operations for about a year. Then she came back and worked for the Fulbright exchange program in Washington, joined a modern dance group, the Ethel Butler Group which was the outstanding modern dance group in the city.

Early in my career, in addition to writing Eighth Moon, she was basically dancing and teaching dance, being supportive of me but didn't have her own career per se. She did run a major, successful arts conference in the early 1970s while Nixon was President. She had no plans to write anymore, and didn't realize that writing wasn't always that easy. She took on the job of writing her sister's life because her sister didn't speak any English. My wife spoke Chinese. She had forgotten Chinese until she became a teenager and then she relearned it, and felt she was the only one both with a personal connection and the language who could tell her story. So she had her sister dictate her life, and then she turned it into a book. It did extremely well, almost was a best seller, sold probably 30 or 40,000 hardbacks, was a Reader's Digest condensed book and was translated in 15-20 languages.

Looking back on her first experience in the United States, however, this is relevant to another book she wrote, when she first came to the States, when her family came over it was to Brooklyn, and she arrived the same year that Jackie Robinson broke into the major baseball leagues. The Dodgers were her passion and Jackie Robinson was her hero.
Q You might explain who Jackie Robinson was.

LORD: Jackie Robinson was the first black American athlete to play in the major leagues, and he broke into the major leagues in 1947. My wife was living in Brooklyn, he was playing for the Dodgers. So she was for the Dodgers in general, and for Jackie Robinson in particular. She had a very enriching time adjusting culturally, and always felt that you could be enriched by two different cultures, and that becoming an American doesn't mean leaving your native culture behind. She has always felt that she has had the best of both Chinese and American culture and history, and she had some adjustments like any immigrant would. They arrived on a Sunday, her mother had her in school the next day, a Monday. They went in to see the head mistress and she asked what age she was to figure out what grade she should go into. In China you're one year old when you're born, and you're also another year old when you get to January 1. My wife was eight, but when asked this question she put up ten fingers, and was put in the fifth grade, and she didn't speak a word of English and was put in the fifth grade. But she had to adjust, so she went on and always graduated early, she got out of college by the time she was 20, and went on to graduate school.

Anyway, her experiences were amusing and enriching, and she wrote a book for children called In the Year of the Boar and Jackie Robinson. It's symbolism in the title, its how you continue to be Chinese, but also become an American, and also how Jackie Robinson stands for the best of America, and how baseball symbolizes America where you're both an individual and a member of the team. This book has won all kinds of awards, it's a staple in classrooms around the country and has been extraordinarily popular.

The other books she has written, just quickly to go through this, It was of course dramatic and we'll get to this later, that I was with Kissinger on the first trip to China by any American official in 22 years. Kissinger kept going back in the succeeding years to advance relationships and on one of these trips, in 1973, my wife went back for the first time to China since she had left and saw many of her relatives, and visited her grandfather's grave, and was very moved by the whole experience, and came back deciding to write another book. The only book she had written at this point was Eighth Moon, which was published back in 1964. This was about nine years later.

She started writing about her relatives, and about China, but realized that if she published it that her relatives might get in trouble with the Communist regime. So she decided to make it a fictional account but realized that she had to go back into Chinese history somewhat, and went back into the end of the 19th century. Then began a novel which then really had no relationship to her actual relatives’ experiences, just an inspiration, although many people who read the novel assumed it was a true story of her family history. So she wrote Spring Moon, and this was her first novel. It was an absolute phenomenon when it came out, spread by word-of-mouth. It got fantastic reviews. It was on the New York Times, Publishers Weekly and every other major best selling list for 31 weeks. It got as high as number two in the country in hardback, sold a couple hundred thousand copies, a lot in those days. It was number one in paperback, sold over two million copies. And Alan Pakula, the famous director took an option on it for a movie.
although he never made it. Again translated into 20 languages, it was a main selection of
the Literary Guild, and was just an absolute phenomenon which is still her most famous
and beloved book, along with the children book which another generation has equally
loved. I mentioned In the Year of the Boar and Jackie Robinson, which was actually
published in 1984. Spring Moon was written...well, she took six years writing fiction. She
did Eighth Moon in a year, which was non-fiction. Fictions always takes longer, it took
about six years.

We went to China from '85 to '89 and based on her experiences and interviews with
various Chinese, she came back and wrote a book which was published in 1990 called
Legacies: A Chinese Mosaic, which is non-fiction, a combination of stories of Chinese,
particularly during the Cultural Revolution up to Tiananmen Square, and her own family
histories woven in, so it's both personal and historical, political and cultural. It was
chosen by Time Magazine as one of the top ten books of the year. It was a best seller in
its own right, I think for nine weeks. It was a Book of the Month Club selection and
translated in many languages overseas.

And then her final book was about a year and a half ago (1996), called The Middle Heart,
another novel on China, not a sequel but a more recent period in Chinese history,
essentially World War II up to Tiananmen Square. Again, terrific reviews. It sold very
well but was not a best seller like her other books. But the compensation is that in
addition to many foreign languages, it is going to be on television Hallmark Hall of Fame
(with her doing the screenplay - chosen after interview).

So that's her literary career. Bette also kept up her dancing and taught dance in Geneva
when we were there as well as performing in Washington.

And then, in recent years, she has developed a second career in promoting democracy and
human rights. She is currently Chairwoman of Freedom House which was set up by
Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Wilkie to promote freedom around the world and a sense
of international responsibility among Americans. She is on the board, appointed by
President Clinton, of the Broadcast Board of Governors, which oversees all non-military
Asia, Radio Marti, WorldNet, etc. She is on the board of Freedom Forum which promotes
freedom of the press around the world. She is on the Kennedy Center Community board,
the National Portrait Gallery board. She is up for election to the Council of Foreign
Relations board (elected after interview), and she will be on the Channel 13 board in New
York (WNET). So she is promoting freedom and human rights and democracy and that's
the other part of her career along with writing. Anyway, that's a quick sketch. (After the
interview Bette was awarded the first Eleanor Roosevelt Human Rights Award by
President Clinton at the White House.)

(I enclose a resume of my wife, dated after the interview.)

BETTE BAO LORD
Books:

*The Middle Heart*, 1996

Book of the Month Club Selection

Danish, Dutch, French, German, Italian, and Swedish Editions to date

To be made into a mini-series by Hallmark Hall of Fame


Chosen by Time Magazine as among ten best nonfiction books of 1990

Bestseller, New York Times, 9 weeks Book of the Month Club Selection

10 Foreign Editions to date

*In the Year of the Boar and Jackie Robinson*, 1984

Among others, American Library Association Award

*Spring Moon*, 1981

Bestseller, New York Times, 31 weeks

Nominated for the American Book Award

Main Selection, Literary Guild

19 Foreign Editions

*Eighth Moon*, 1964

15 Foreign Editions

Readers' Digest Condensed Book

Articles include:

*Los Angeles Times*, *Newsweek*, *New York Times*, *USA Today*...

National Television Appearances include:

*CBS Evening News*, *CNN*, *Face the Nation*, *McNeil Lehrer News Hour*, *48 Hours*, *Good Morning America*, *Larry King Live*, *Sunday Morning*...

Subject of *Barbara Walters Special*, 20/20, 1987
Consultant for Tiananmen Square coverage, CBS News, April to June 1989

**Co-Producer, The People's Art Theatre's Beijing production of *The Caine Mutiny*, directed by Charlton Heston, 1988**

**Appointed by President Bill Clinton to the International Broadcasting Board of Governors:** To oversee Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio and TV Marti, Worldnet TV and all U.S. non-military international broadcasting.

**Chairwoman, Freedom House:** Founded in 1941 by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Wilkie and dedicated to the promotion of democratic institutions around the world.

Chaired Freedom House's Conference on Rebuilding Bipartisan Consensus, October 6, 1995 at which President Clinton said, "I'm honored to be introduced by someone who writes so powerfully about the past and is working so effectively to shape the future."

**Boards of Trustees:**

The Freedom Forum: promotes free press, free speech, free spirit worldwide;

Council on Foreign Relations;

The Kennedy Center Community and Friends;

The National Portrait Gallery;

Advisory Council, Music Educators National Conference;

National Advisory Council, The Paul & Daisy Soros Fellowships for New Americans

**Former Boards:**
American Political Channel, Asia Foundation, The Aspen Institute, The Asia Society, Committee of 100, National Committee on United States-China Relations; White House Fellows

**Memberships:**
Council on Foreign Relations, Authors' Guild, PEN,

Organization of Chinese Americans

**Honorary Doctorates:**
University of Notre Dame, Tufts University,
Pepperdine University, Skidmore College, Marymount College, Bryant College, Dominican College
Awards include:
United States International Agency Award for Outstanding Contributions
Barnard College Medal of Distinction
The Women of Honor Award, The National Council of Women
New York Public Library's Literary Lion
Exceptional Achievement Award, Women's Project & Productions
The International Women's Hall of Fame
American Women for International Understanding Award
The National Committee for U.S.-China Relations
Qingyun Award, China Institute
Distinguished American Award
Woman of the Year Award, Chinatown Planning Council
National Graphic Arts Prize, Photographic Essay
Eleanor Roosevelt Award for Human Rights

Speaking Engagements include:

Education:
M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1960
B.A., Tufts University, 1959

Wife of Winston Lord, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, former U.S. Ambassador to China, 1985-89
Mother of Elizabeth Pillsbury and Winston Bao Lord

Q: We're talking about November '60. When did you finish your Political-Military tour?

LORD: I think it was the end of the calendar year, so I was due then to go overseas. I was assigned tentatively to go to Winnipeg, Canada. It may have been Windsor. I'll be very honest, this did not excite me. I love the Canadians.

Q: I was offered the Consul Generalship in Winnipeg at one point, and I just couldn't bring myself.

LORD: It was one of those two. It was a rather dry border consulate. You probably couldn't get away with this very much in the Foreign Service anymore, but at the time politely I said, “Well, my wife is pregnant, due in March 1964.” Elizabeth Pillsbury was born March 24, 1964. Our second child was Winston Bao Lord, born October 19, 1967. So it was 10 months after our wedding. We hadn't planned something quite that quick but by this time my wife was getting quite pregnant and so I said, could I have one more year
in Washington before we go overseas? Which I wanted to do because she was pregnant, but also I figured that was a clever way to escape going to a Canadian consulate border town, although hasten to add, I love the Canadians.

And my wish was granted because they were looking at that point for people for the Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations. Before going to Geneva to pursue the negotiations with other countries, there was a need to get ready for a year, there wasn't action yet in Geneva to do it. We were detailed, in fact, to the Office of the U.S. Special Trade Representative, USTR, although working in the State Department, essentially Foreign Service officers, but reporting to William Roth who was the top trade representative, and his deputy Mike Blumenthal. Therefore for the calendar year of 1964 I worked with the U.S. trade representative, essentially in the Economic Bureau, but detailed to USTR.

I was assigned to the team that was going to negotiate with EEC, it was then called, European Economic Community. Various teams, one for Japan, one for Canada, one for the EEC, one for the other free trade countries in Europe, one for the Latin American countries, etc. So my immediate boss was a senior FSO, Al Pappano, and I was sort of the executive secretary of the little team for the EEC. We spent that year getting ready to go to Geneva, getting ready for the real negotiations, compiling statistics, negotiating positions, strategy. I welcomed this because it got me into the world of economics. I'd taken some economics at Fletcher, but I basically had been very delinquent on that front. So I figured, even though frankly I was not as interested in economics as I was politics or political-military affairs. I figured this was good exposure for me, and frankly I thought it was going to be a year in Washington and then six months, or maybe a year in Geneva. So I welcomed the chance that we could stay in Washington and avoid Windsor/Winnipeg, have our baby, and spend the year getting ready and working on economic matters. It also allowed Bette to finish Eight Moon before we went abroad.

Q: What was the overall thing?

LORD: This was the negotiations under the GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. There had been every few years a general negotiation. The GATT was one of the post-World War II organizations set up to regulate trade among nations, and to try to free trade among nations. Every now and then instead of plodding along with various bilateral negotiations around the world, the feeling was to have a global negotiation with everyone who is a member of GATT getting together and try to have a global agreement. It had also the virtue of while you engaged in that, which usually took a lot of time, did hold off protectionist pressures in various countries because they were saying, well, we're now going into a negotiation and maybe we can free things up. So it had a way of freezing whatever tariff levels there were at the time, and tariffs were the most important although non-tariff barriers were beginning to get important, and keeping things from getting worse. So President Kennedy proposed that we have another one of these rounds and try to free up trade. There had been at least one before that in the '50s, I forget what it was called. We were in the process of getting ready for that.
Of course, it turned out that - and we'll get into this - it lasted much longer than we expected. When I went to Geneva thinking it was going to be about a year, it turned out to be two and a half years, and the only reason it was ever concluded was because American legislative authority to negotiate, granted by the Congress was going to run out on June 30, 1967. So that turned out to be a deadline which speeded up the negotiations the last six months or year.

Q: As you were getting ready on your team, were you, I mean you and your team, looking ahead to see what the problems were going to be with the European Economic Community?

LORD: Yes, it was true that year, but it became even more frustrating when we got to Geneva. It was a very slow pace in negotiations, and the primary reason was because the EEC could not get its act together, primarily because of France. Generally you had the British, the Dutch, etc, traditionally looking for fairly forthcoming liberal trading positions, and the French to a certain extent and I believe the Italians were dragging their feet. I guess the Germans also were for free trade. But they had to get a consensus and so we really spent a good part of certainly that year waiting, when things were still preparatory, so it wasn't so vivid. But once we got to Geneva it was much more clear that we were just waiting on the Europeans to come forward with decent positions. Since they were so central to the negotiations, they held up the overall Kennedy Round. The fact is that you were juggling several balls at once. The fact that nobody could negotiate with the EEC was holding up the overall negotiation. So we essentially treaded water while they battled within the EEC, and the French were always introducing a protectionist element. Getting ready in Washington consisted, as I say, of compiling statistics, figuring out what our objectives were, what tariffs and other barriers to trade we wanted to try to remove, what we were willing to give up, consulting I'm sure with domestic interests, dealing with Congress, and just generally shaping strategy for the negotiations. Then we went to Geneva and continued that, and began to interact with other countries but basically it was very slow going the first year or two in Geneva. This was terrific for my tennis game which I managed to sharpen. I won one of the major club tournaments there, and my tennis has never been as good ever since. We did a lot of traveling in Europe, it was very frustrating waiting around for the Europeans. So it was a slow period in 1965 and most of ’66.

Q: Let's stick to the U.S. preparations. Were you particularly aware of anything that was almost sacrosanct that you knew politically you couldn't mess around with?

LORD: It's hard to remember in detail now. Certainly textiles was always going to be tough. We had certain agricultural problems as well I'm sure in terms of U.S. protection. But I don't recall in further detail than that.

Q: You know you're talking about the problems with the EEC, and particularly France. This was more than 30 years ago. Today if you were to talk about anything, you'd still be saying the problems with the European Union, of getting anything out of it is mainly because of France.
LORD: That's true. In the first place you have a generic problem, and that is the following, although we were in favor of the EEC then, and we still are in favor of a united Europe now. We think on the balance that having a stronger Europe promotes our national interests. Nevertheless, it presents a negotiating dilemma. While they are constructing their own positions, and negotiating among themselves, they won't talk to you very much because they have to get their act together to present a united front. So you try to have some influence while they're shaping their common position but that's very difficult. They feel this is an internal matter, and they've got to reach some internal consensus. Then when they reach a consensus, and have a common position, it's very hard to get them to change it. Because they sweated and labored to get to their common posture, then you take them on and in effect they say, this is the best we can do having compromised among ourselves. It's very hard to get them to move backwards. So you have trouble negotiating with them before they have a common position, you have trouble moving them after they have a common position.

Then on top of that, of course, it means that since they have to have consensus the most recalcitrant and slow moving and protectionist in the group holds up the others. And this was invariably France, and, although I don't want to be unfair to Italy, it includes Italy as well. But certainly France was the major culprit - generally, and with particular emphasis on their agriculture problems. And that has been a common theme ever since. In fact, the French can be a difficult for us in diplomacy generally, not just on trade, but on many other matters where with de Gaulle and since they like to show their independence of the U.S. and the greatness of France, and they have continued to be difficult. I was at a meeting a few months ago where Mickey Kantor was having a retrospective on negotiating...

Q: He was our...

LORD: He was our special trade representative under President Clinton through his first term. He was asked who was the toughest negotiating partner country that we faced. People expected him to say Japan, or maybe China and he immediately said France. That was certainly true in Geneva as well.

Q: Do you recall any issues that came...in a way you were part of the internal negotiating procedures in the United States. We had to come up with a fixed position too, and we had our cultural interests, our industrial interests, etc.

LORD: That's correct. This did not really reach a serious stage until we were in Geneva. Not much went on while we were getting ready in Washington because there wasn't much movement in negotiations. And there was in fighting on an interagency basis I'm sure. I did not take much a part in that. And certainly while we were in Geneva that was done back here with Ambassador Roth when Ambassador Blumenthal headed our delegation in Geneva. And, of course, early on special interests don't want to tip their hand too much or make too many concessions even internally until they see what they're going to get from other countries.
Q: While you were gathering statistics was everybody sort of looking over the shoulder of these other groups to see what was coming up?

LORD: You mean other countries?

Q: I mean you have different groups within the State Department and other agencies dealing with Japan or with Canada or Latin America. Were you all working out your thing and just getting together?

LORD: That's right. I mean, you would work out your strategy versus your counterpart, in my case the EEC, but you had to relate this and talk to the other teams about how they were going to approach Japan and Canada and the others. If you made this concession to the EEC what would it do to your leverage vis-a-vis Canada and Japan, for example. So you had to meld this. I don't believe we did too much of that in Washington. I think the pace just hadn't picked up enough, it was more getting a lot of the statistical background and objectives with other countries in mind. I don't recall that we had detailed strategies at that point. It was probably somewhat premature.

Q: I must say that just thinking about the thing, it seems impossible just to get everybody to come on board. What was the trade-off?

LORD: Well, the American market is a big target for other countries in terms of our leverage, even more so today, but in those days as well we were a huge market for countries and therefore they wanted to get into our market. That, of course, was the trade-off we had with them.

Q: The Congressional side of things, was that taken care of at different levels?

LORD: Yes. I don't recall myself getting involved in that. And again, it wouldn't have been too frantic in the early stages while we were in Washington. Indeed, that would be done at higher levels, and particularly as we went down the home stretch it was done in Washington at high levels.

Q: Did you get any feel for the operation of the Department as far as the contributions of the various bureaus, all of the geographic bureaus, the Economic Bureau, for what you all were doing?

LORD: I don't recall right now great precision. Certainly there were no information problems. Whenever we needed information we could get it. But I don't have a clear recollection of exactly what we did day-to-day frankly, except as I say get a sense of all the negotiating areas, the barriers that we faced abroad, what our priorities were, and some sense of what we'd be willing to do and a lot of statistical stuff about trade patterns, and projections, etc. The overall team consisted of people seconded from other agencies. It wasn't just the State Department. So we drew heavily on Commerce and Agriculture, as well as the State Department bureaus.

Q: Did your team sit down and say how are we going to get the French, how are we
going to work with the French?

LORD: Well, again, this heated up more when we got to Geneva, but yes, a lot of it was how do we work in individual capitals to try to influence them. So we'd go with circular telegrams to the British and the Dutch, and the Italians and the Germans as well as the French tailoring our positions either to encourage liberalization by some, or try to encourage the French to be more forthcoming. But as I said, it's rather difficult because they felt that they had to sort out their own position before they could really talk seriously to us. So my clear recollection, particularly as we got to Geneva, was one of frustration that we couldn't speed up the process in the EEC. Every time we thought there was movement there would be some EEC meeting and the French and perhaps others would once again kill the possible compromise.

Q: Sometimes, of course, the French may have been almost a stalking horse because the Germans certainly have had a highly subsidized agricultural sector too.

LORD: It wasn't just agriculture that they were dragging their feet on. It was the industrial area as well, and I'm sure there were certain areas that the Germans or even the more liberal members of the EEC wanted to protect and sometimes they would conveniently hide behind the French. So I don't want to put this all on the French. But I distinctly remember, and I'm sure it's accurate, that the French were the real culprits.

Q: In '64 you went off to...

LORD: We went in January of '65, I remember in those days we had the luxury of going by ship, it was wonderful and I love boats. I remember I was crushed the U.S. shipping line, I guess it was the United States had a strike. So I said, oh my God we don't get to go on a boat. Well, it turned out to be a plus because we were then authorized to take a foreign ship. So instead of speeding across in the United States, the United States would cross the Atlantic in five days...

Q: The United States was our fastest ship.

LORD: That's right. We had to take an Italian boat, Leonardo da Vinci, which took ten days. So we had twice as much fun, and twice the time, it was wonderful. Wonderful food, and very pleasant. On that ship I met Bill Buckley, the famous Bill Buckley, a conservative commentator, TV, a Yale person. I expected him, by reputation, to be pompous and not to listen and to be didactic, and to be cold. He was just the opposite of all these things. He and his wife were extremely friendly and warm, and we have had a lifelong friendship with them ever since. Anyway, we went over there with our young daughter. My parents went with us, so we had a lot of fun. We had a terrific time.

Q: You were in Geneva...

LORD: January 1965 until June 30, 1967. So when I first took the job in Washington I figured at most I would be there six months or maybe a year. Even as we went over we
thought it would be about a year or so, and it turned out to be two and a half years with very little happening frankly until about the last year, and only then because of the impending deadline of the U.S. legislative authority running out.

Q: *It does point out this thing in negotiations that at a certain point you really have to say after this no more.*

LORD: That's right, and I don't know if these ever would have been concluded without this deadline. Obviously we were crucial to the whole operation. Everyone knew that we couldn't go back to our Congress and get new authority. That we had to wrap it up by then, particularly after so many years of negotiations. And thus it was this deadline that was used by the two heroes at that negotiation to complete it. One hero was Mike Blumenthal, who did an extraordinary job. The other hero was the Director General of the GATT, a man named Eric Wyndham White. And the two of them really pulled this off down the home stretch. We can get to that in just a minute.

Q: *Can you talk about developments from your perspective of this extremely important set of negotiations, because almost everything from now on was with built on that.*

LORD: That's correct. There has been subsequent rounds, and the Tokyo Round, and then the Uruguay Round patterned after that. They always take time because by definition it's complicated. You've got all the major trading partners, all the interests at work, and we were trying not only get tariffs reduced, but begin to take a crack at non-tariff barriers. But this was the last negotiation where the tariffs were the overwhelmingly important item, and the end result was very successful. At the time we thought it was somewhat less than ideal. It was good, but we'd hoped to have even more. But looking back on it was a remarkable achievement what was finally pulled off. I was again the secretary, or executive secretary for the EEC negotiating team up until the last year, so the first year and a half. For maybe the last nine months, I don't remember exactly, I switched jobs with Tom Simons, another distinguished Foreign Service officer who had been in my A-100 course, and has since has gone on to be ambassador to Poland and a very high ranking Soviet expert and ambassador to Pakistan right now. So he came over and took my job on the EEC team, and I went over and took his job as special assistant to Mike Blumenthal for the last nine months. But before that from early '65 until toward the end of '66, it was very slow moving. Terrific for my tennis game, and a lot of skiing and traveling. I worked eight hour days but no longer than that, and often we had to make work. We were sitting around running statistics, waiting for the EEC essentially to get its act together. Every now and then I would write a memo to Pappano sort of suggesting, here's a way we might break the deadlock. I once suggested, for example, that rather inching along with gradual trading off with the EEC, why don't we put all our offers on the table at once, conditional on getting a major response from them. It was probably a wrong approach, but I just wanted to try to think of things to try to get things moving, and what might speed up the process. So occasionally I'd write what I thought were some interesting memos like that, but most of the time we were doing statistics, and it was very hard to keep busy throughout the day. Very frustrating.

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Q: Were you in contact with other national groups at this point?

LORD: The overall delegation was, of course, but our job really was with the EEC and obviously in Geneva. I don't think I ever traveled to Brussels. Our job was to deal with the EEC. There would be long periods of time we didn't even have meetings because they didn't have a position. So socially we would run into Japanese, Canadians, Latin Americans, and others. But the other teams were doing the negotiating with them.

Q: What about during the last part, and really the active part at the time you had become the assistant to Mike Blumenthal?

LORD: That's correct.

Q: Could you talk about his background that you're familiar with, and his method of operation?

LORD: He was extraordinary. I've been fortunate in working for very dynamic leaders of very different styles, that includes Fred Dutton that I mentioned. Jeff Kitchen and Alexis Johnson were very impressive in their own way. Mike Blumenthal was extraordinary. Then I worked for Henry Kissinger at one point and many others, George Shultz and Warren Christopher. So it has been a real variety. Blumenthal was a Jewish emigree from Nazi Germany through Shanghai, a little ironic since my wife was born in Shanghai. He had taught at Princeton, a Ph.D., and a distinguished education background in economics. He had been head of Bendix Corporation.

Q: An important American manufacturing firm.

LORD: I don't remember who would have appointed him - Kennedy being assassinated in '63, I think he must have been appointed by Johnson. I just don't recall exactly. Ambassador Roth was the other special trade representative, and then became number one, I believe after Christian Herter died. He sat in Washington but occasionally would visit Geneva for negotiations, but of course Blumenthal was head of our delegation sitting in Geneva. He was very young for that kind of senior responsibility. At the time he must have been mid-thirties, late thirties at the most. He brought both a business and an academic background. Very dynamic, very courageous in taking on Washington when he wanted to get some concessions for negotiating purposes, very tough with the other countries as well, very demanding of his staff in a good way but demanding excellence, very hard working, and a very brilliant tactician. He realized that he had to use our negotiating deadline to try to finally bring this thing to a close, and worked very closely with the Director General of GATT, Wyndham White to try to do that.

As his special assistant I was responsible for making sure that various cables and other bits of information got to him. I'd be note taker in some of his meetings. I would do occasional think pieces for him. I would be a channel of communication for other members of the staff. I also had access to very sensitive cables, sensitive in the sense of a commercial negotiating position that we didn't want to leak out, so they'd be sent in
special channels with special code words. Even then we used NODIS and LIMDIS, but we had a code word, I think was “potatoes” for some reason. I’d be the first to learn that it had come in and only he and maybe one or two other people would see these cables. It meant, for example, you are authorized if you need it to make this concession on this sector, of this area, which would have been dynamite if it went out to the domestic industry. So this sounded like a nuclear secret but it was almost as sensitive.

I remember a couple of times I would even get woken at home - we were living at that time at Versoix which is about 15 minutes from our Geneva mission. We first lived in Annemasse on the other side of the lake. I remember a couple of times being woken in the middle of the night by the embassy's communications operator, getting an urgent message from Washington. I didn't mind doing it but I'd go in there and it would be some negotiating position which certainly could have waited until the next day. It had the requirement, if it's NIAct immediate, you've got to open it and act on it right away. Sometimes it wouldn't even be needed for a week or so, so I used to get furious with the White House. Francis Baton, who I have great respect for, was Deputy National Security Advisor in charge of economics and trade working for Walt Rostow at that point. Either he or his staff had the bad judgment in sending NIAct immediate occasionally in the middle of the night and make me drive in and it could have waited for a week let alone a day.

In any event, this was heady stuff. Finally we were on the move. Finally there was real negotiation of give and take, and of course sitting in the front office I could see all the negotiations, not just the EEC but with all the other major partners. I could also see the equally dramatic negotiations with Washington where Blumenthal was trying to get more negotiating flexibility. He'd often go back to Washington to press the various agencies and the White House to get more flexibility, and the kind of deals he was suggesting. So it was a tremendous education for me on negotiating in general, on economic negotiating in particular, on dealing with Washington on domestic politics, and the play of various interests, and juggling your interest with various interlocutors in Geneva, on how to play off the EEC, Japan and Canada, and other major negotiating partners, and how to gang up with some against others, to try to get movement. So it was a very heady, exciting period and the last nine months in many ways made up for the general drag of the first almost two years.

Q: Was the United States the driving force the whole time?

LORD: I think it's fair to say that, but clearly down the home stretch it was Blumenthal and Wyndham White, the latter, of course, being more neutral but working behind the scenes with Blumenthal. So we clearly were the driving force unquestionably. Blumenthal personally deserves great credit for the deal he brought off. Obviously Ambassador Roth was important sitting in Washington, but anyone would tell you that without Blumenthal on the scene there this never would have happened.

Q: What brought people together?

LORD: First the deadline concentrated the minds. We made concessions, they made concessions. People realized, even the French grudgingly, that it was in everyone's
interest to have this thing succeed. And that if we didn't the world probably would have slid back into protectionism, and it would have hurt everyone. Obviously there were some areas like European agriculture, and some other areas, where we never could make a dent. They probably didn't make much progress on textiles. I don't recall the details. So as you got down the home stretch, you began to see what things really had to be excluded from the final negotiations, or where you needed gradual tariff reduction on a much slower pace. And there'd be difficult areas domestically which you finally would make concessions on as long as you got something in return that you could use to justify the concessions you were making. So it was a multilateral process. I think it's fair to say that on the whole Canada was certainly reinforcing us. The free trade area countries in Europe, outside the EEC, the European countries outside the EEC, EFTA, was an important part, also for free trade on the whole. Japan, it's hard to think they were free trade, but I don't think they were as recalcitrant as the French-led EEC. Australia and New Zealand were for open trade. The developing countries had their own problems and generally weren’t expected to do as much. So you had a lot of multilateral pressure to get this thing done. There was the combination of deadline, people seeing the gains they would make by opening others' markets and the dangers of failure and sliding back into protectionism if we didn't succeed, as well as the possible political overtones and bitterness among friends. I think all this plus the negotiating skill of Blumenthal and the steering skill and leadership of Wyndham White brought this to a head.

Q: Where was the real negotiation taking place? I would think that the big table of everybody sitting around would be...

LORD: Absolutely not. They usually would ratify things, as you say, and be more be more for propaganda exchanges. So it would take place in small meetings, maybe one-on-one heads of delegations, Blumenthal seeing the head of EEC one-on-one, or maybe with me or somebody else taking notes. Or Wyndham White bringing people together, some key delegate heads, so it would be in small groups and sometimes bilaterally and sometimes small multilateral groups. But you're absolutely right, it wouldn't be a formal thing.

Q: I assume you were somewhat removed from the actual head-on-head with the other delegations?

LORD: Well, I was although when I became special assistant I sat in on some of those meetings. But it was more apt to be either Blumenthal alone, or the head of the negotiating team, the head of the EEC team or the Canadian team, etc., that would be sitting in there. So I don't believe I sat in on too many of those but I was in some of them.

Q: Was it table pounding?

LORD: Well at times. Blumenthal, like a skilled negotiator knew how to play his cards, when to reveal his own concessions, when to be tough, when to threaten to walk away. But he would liven it with humor and politeness as necessary. But he could be very tough, and there were times, particularly with the EEC, and occasion with the Japanese as
well, there would be table pounding. My recollection would be that the EFTA countries and Canada and the developing countries were easier to deal with.

Q: Were intellectual rights an issue?

LORD: Not at all. I don’t recall it being a major issue. They have become more and more important in American negotiations as we have gotten into the information age, globalization, American competitive edge. Whether its software, pharmaceuticals, or technological and scientific, or literary intellectual property rights, all that has become a major market where we have a comparative advantage in recent years. It has really moved up on our priority list of our negotiations. In fact, in the Kennedy Round it was not, it was more the traditional industrial and agricultural tariff areas that were our main focus then. Machinery, chemicals, grains, these kind of things were the major centerpieces.

Q: What about on the agricultural side? We had our subsidies, everybody else had their subsidiaries.

LORD: I don't believe much progress was made. I'd have to go back, I'm sure there are exhaustive records, the EC was not going to move very much in its policy. So I think there were some modest gains in certain areas. Of course, this was very important, not only for us but for Canada, Argentina, and for other countries. So it was hard for some of those countries, in particular. We had very great agricultural interests, but for the Canadians or for Argentina and maybe some of the other free trade area countries (EFTA) agriculture was absolutely crucial. So the EEC was dragging its feet, but agriculture was not only frustrating for us, but it threatened the overall negotiations. So there was some modest gains, but as I recall, the Kennedy Round did not make much progress on agriculture compared to the industrial side.

Q: Was it a last minute thing, or were you beginning to see light at the end of this particular tunnel as the negotiations progressed?

LORD: Well, again, this goes back as you say and this is 30 years, but you had ups and downs. It was a roller-coaster for the last nine months where there were days where you felt, well we're going to make it. And other days, how the hell are we going to make it by June 30, 1967. And I recall that it really went down to the wire. Even a week before the deadline we weren't sure we were going to make it, and it got very dramatic and very exciting the last few weeks, and I'm sure there have been memoirs by Blumenthal and others that will detail this. But I do know it was a roller-coaster for several months. There were times when we were very worried that we were not going to pull this off. Other times when we felt we had momentum. It really went down to the wire.

Q: I would have thought this would have been a difficult thing career-wise since there are Foreign Service cycles where you get assigned, and to be in something sort of open-ended as this you really couldn't feel you could bail out. I mean, most Foreign Service assignments come up in the spring and people move in the summer.
LORD: That's a very good point. That was an additional frustration in not having an awful lot to do and waiting for the EEC. There was the feeling that this was supposed to be a two year assignment. In those days in the Foreign Service your first three assignments generally were about two years each, and you rotated even within an embassy, and they tried to expose you in many areas. So I had a feeling that three and a half years on trade negotiations was more than I wanted to invest, and as a general principle early in my career. It was slow moving. Two years of economics and trade would have been perfect, but three and a half years in any job at that point was really slowing me down. After nine months in Congressional Relations, a year and a quarter in Political-Military affairs, I felt like the clock had stopped. Now having said that, I was very fortunate on promotions although I like to think I earned them. But I got three promotions in the first five and a half years. So I was moving as fast as you possibly could.

Q: But you were beyond the threshold at that point.

LORD: I forget what the system was then. I started as what they called a FSO-8, I remember my first salary I think was $5,200 a year. I went to 7, and then to 6, and then to 5. By the time I left Geneva I was an FSO-5. Which brings me to a career decision at that point, unless you have other questions on the Kennedy Round, this might be a good place to end it up at this point. We knew we would be finished one way or another by June 30, 1967.

Q: At least you...

LORD: For my next assignment I asked for a job that would be first political, and secondly in Asia. Looking at it in retrospect, the Foreign Service was forthcoming. My assignment was Malaysia in the political section. However, I was not that enthusiastic. First, I had, despite the excitement of the last nine months, the frustrations of the year and a half or two years before that. There was also my general observation of how slow it was to get real responsibility. Now, this was perhaps unfair. After all I'd been promoted three times, I'd gotten first Congressional Relations, then Political-Military, then economics and I had gotten the Seventh Floor, I had avoided the Canada assignment. So really objectively I really couldn't complain except for the slowdown in Geneva. And I ended up being Special Assistant there and one likes to think Blumenthal chose me because he thought I was doing well in my other jobs. So I was right in the center of affairs and it was very exciting the last nine months. So objectively you'd think on the whole I'd be pretty happy.

But here I was just about 30 at that point, just short of 30. I always said when I went in the Foreign Service that I would give it roughly three assignments, maybe one at home and two abroad, roughly six years, when I would be 30 and then I would make a strategic decision because I was determined not to just stay in out of habit and out of security, but to make sure I was getting responsibility and being intellectually and professionally challenged. And I knew when I went in there was some grumbling about it took a long
while before you did anything but stamp visas or you had real responsibility. And I was determined not to get bogged down.

So I faced a decision in June of 1967. The Malaysia political assignment looked like it was responding to my request, and I'm sure the Service felt so. On the other hand, it was the number four position in a political section. I was a little naive, the chances are that at least two of those positions above me were CIA. But I looked at it and said, wait a second. I've had three promotions, I've been in almost six years, I'm almost 30, and what is my next job? The fourth person, not in the embassy in Malaysia, but the fourth person in a political section in embassy Malaysia. With all due respect to Malaysia, how much political work could there be? This is back in 1967. So what's the number four guy going to do? Plus, it meant studying Malaysian, a relatively easy language, but taking a year or two out to study Malaysian. I wouldn't have minded Chinese, or French, or something that I felt was going to be useful, but I figured Malaysian was not going to be something I'd use throughout my career. So I figured I've already spent a couple of years in Geneva treading water. I've got to spend another year or two taking language, then I'm going to be the fourth person in a political section at a small post. I said, now wait a second, is this what I want to do? I was somewhat undecided.

And here's where my wife comes in. We've had a fantastic marriage and just for the record, we've been very lucky. Among the reasons it has been fantastic in addition to the emotional side is the professional side; at key moments in my career she has steered me in the right direction. I'll name three before I forget it. This was the first one. She said look, you're in danger despite the success you've had and this last assignment as Special Assistant, you are not gaining great intellectual advancement. You're in danger of becoming blunted in your enthusiasm and your intellectual maturity and even becoming a vegetable. She didn't put it quite that dramatically. You really ought to think whether this is the time to get out or not, and for all the reasons I've mentioned, the language training, for a non-useful language, the number four in the political section. And she had seen a lot of the frustrations in Geneva. So she was a heavy influence on me.

By coincidence, I believe it was literally the last day we were there, June 30, 1967, when I was still debating what to do, I got a phone call from Les Gelb. Les Gelb is now president of the Council of Foreign Relations. He was also in the Foreign Service as a political appointment, head of the Political-Military Bureau under President Carter. He has been a New York Times columnist. He had worked with Senator Javits. He was calling me because he was about to go into the Pentagon in the Policy Planning Staff in International Security Affairs under Mort Halperin, who was in his late twenties and the youngest Deputy Assistant Secretary almost in the government. He asked me would I be interested in going in as a civil servant into this new exciting office. I was debating it, my wife urged me to take it and leave the Foreign Service. I was half ready to leave. I had affection for the Service, I had no complaints about how I had been treated, in promotions, or for that matter even assignments. But the inherent frustrations of the slow moving up the ladder to real responsibility faced me with a stark choice, and I had told myself that at the age of 30, after six years and three assignments, I would make a strategic decision. My wife held me to it, and whether I would have had the guts to do
this move at that point without her encouragement, I don't know. But she certainly was decisive. I temporized on these points as I thought about it, and then as I went back on the boat again with my parents we decided I should do it. So I left the Foreign Service the summer of 1967.

Before I forget. The other two moments, and we'll get into it later in our history making here, that she steered me in my career. The obvious right courses that anybody else in their right minds would have pressed. One is when Kissinger asked me to be his Special Assistant in 1970. I was sitting in the Executive Office Building and Al Haig relayed the invitation and I turned it down because I didn't want to work that hard. And she said I was out of my mind to miss an opportunity like this.

And then the other one was when I was offered by the National Security Advisor, Bud McFarlane, and Secretary of State George Shultz to become ambassador to China in 1985. And I said I preferred a job in Washington. My wife said, you're crazy not to be ambassador to China. So in leaving the Service, then becoming Special Assistant to Kissinger, which was the turning point in my career, and then going to China as ambassador, in each case my wife was very influential in helping me.
III. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT (1967-1969)

Q: So you resigned from the Foreign Service. How was this done? Was it a problem going from a past service to the civil service?

LORD: No particular problem. I submitted my resignation, made it very clear that I had great respect and affection for the Service and thought I'd been treated well but wanted to take this opportunity to strike out on a new path. And as I said, privately my real reason was to try to be challenged more quickly. Plus, what I'd heard about the office being set up in the Pentagon made it sound like a very exciting place. The lead was going to be Morton Halperin, who was a brilliant young academic, had been at Harvard, worked with Henry Kissinger. At the time was only about 27-28 years old. Les Gelb, to be Mort’s deputy, was a very good friend of my wife from Tufts University and was to become a friend of mine. I knew how bright he was, and he was telling me about other people who were going into the office. This was in the era still of the McNamara hot-shots, although he had been in office for some time. And along with systems analysis, the bright young people were going into this policy planning staff. So for all these reasons I decided to take a chance. I don't recall the details. I just was appointed as a GS-level, relatively low. I had to take the equivalent to what I was as a Foreign Service officer, and I think it was probably about GS-11 or 12, I don't recall.

Q: It was called ISA.

LORD: International Security Affairs which is in effect, and it still is today, ISA, in effect the State Department of the Pentagon. It is the interface with the State Department and the White House, and anything having to do with diplomacy, Political-Military Affairs. It had been the counterpart of Political-Military Affairs in the State Department, a sort of semi-Pentagon of the State Department. So I had seen it from the other end. This was a policy planning staff set up reporting to the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs who was a man named John McNaughton, a brilliant person who died in an aircraft accident just as I was coming in. His place was taken by Paul Warnke. His deputy was a man named Townsend Hoopes who later went on to become Under Secretary of the Air Force. They wanted a policy planning staff. I don't know whether there had been one before, or whether this was a new organization being set up that could look ahead, that could challenge conventional wisdom, and it had a global mandate although it turned out to be heavily involved in Vietnam. And indeed, Les Gelb, the deputy to Halperin was the director of the Pentagon Papers which of course became quite famous a couple of years later.

Q: You went there in June ’67.

LORD: Technically I left June 30th from Geneva, went back on a boat with my parents, a couple of things intervened before I started actually after Labor Day. We took a little vacation, visited my brother and his wife in Guatemala where he was on business and both my wife and his wife were pregnant at the same time. My son was coming along and was born October 19, 1967. Then I had an operation. So I didn't start until Labor Day.
Q: ‘67. I wonder if you could talk because this had become sort of center stage, Vietnam. But using Labor Day of ‘67, one, did it intrude into the GATT negotiations. What was your feeling towards Vietnam when you arrived in the Pentagon?

LORD: While we were in Geneva from the beginning of ‘65 to the middle of ‘67 obviously America’s involvement in the war under Johnson and generally the controversy was growing. I think still by ‘67 the majority of the American people and even the Congress was behind what we were doing. This was as you recall pre-Tet. It was becoming more and more controversial. I recall distinctly in Geneva debates at dinner parties and cocktail parties about Vietnam. So it had already started and the debates were quite heated. My attitude at the time was I would say moderate hawk. I felt that our objectives were correct in the sense that we had to worry about the spread of communism in Asia. And certainly our motives were noble. I was well aware that the South Vietnamese government was not a pure Jeffersonian democracy. But I was also aware that North Vietnam and the Viet Cong were hardly model citizens either. And I felt that whatever our tactics, that our motives at least were enlightened both in terms of the self interest, and in terms of trying to protect people from invasion.

Therefore, like the administration and the President I was in favor of a somewhat middle course which in retrospect people all said was a big mistake, namely, we either should have gone all out to win, or we shouldn't have gotten involved in the first place. The President kept doing just enough to keep us going and stave off the defeat but never enough to bring it to a conclusion. And I certainly was not critical of that. So my position was generally defending our intervention. I felt it was essentially an invasion of the south by the north, not a civil war. And on geopolitical and even moral grounds our position was correct. But I was not an all-out hawk, win at any price. That's basically where I was in Geneva. I was as an American concerned about the growing controversy in our society, the growing drain on our attention in terms of our other global responsibilities. I was also concerned about the emerging racial problems. I've always been concerned about that issue. So that domestic dimension was bothering me. But I went into the Pentagon essentially as supporter of the administration policy.

Q: When you went in there, there had been probably something else, sort of the equivalent but not of the same stature or structure as the ISA, I assume the Pentagon had to have something to deal with State.

LORD: ISA had been around for some time, I believe. I don't know about the policy planning section.

Q: You were coming in...it was policy planning?

LORD: It was the policy planning staff of the International Security Affairs division which is an Assistant Secretary-led division in the Pentagon. So the Assistant Secretary, who I've named, would report to the deputy and the Secretary of Defense. The deputy at that time I believe being Paul Nitze, and the number one person, of course, being
McNamara. While I was there, of course, Clifford took over. So the ISA perspective on Vietnam was diplomatic, the negotiations such as they were, our relations with other countries, again working with the State Department and the White House. Whereas the Office of Systems Analysis in the Pentagon, which had a lot of the whiz kids, would be more responsible for how are we doing in the war, casualties, the effect of air power, strategy. Of course, you had other parts of the Pentagon that were also relevant. But as the name suggests, it was Systems Analysis, analyzing the objective progress or lack of it in the war, while we were more on the negotiation side, and the international dimensions.

Let me immediately point out that this was not the only thing that Policy Planning staff did. This was a global mandate. It so happened that since that was obviously the overwhelming foreign policy issue at the time, that particularly the leadership in our office, Halperin and Gelb, would be spending a great deal of their time on this issue. There were some very able people on the staff, both colonels and other military officers, academics who had come in. Professor Richard Ullman who is a distinguished professor at Princeton was there, a historian, many other names which I won't try to resurrect at this point. But we had a global mandate. I was asked to do essentially - I don't believe this is the only thing I did - but I essentially followed Asian policy in general which meant some work on Vietnam, but work on our alliances out there, our general Asian policy, and what our strategy should be for the region.

Q: As you looked at Asia when you came on board, did you have any ideas thinking back in your mind about different approaches we might take? Leaving Vietnam aside.

LORD: Well, I thought even then that Asia was of great importance to us. I don't think that even I could foresee how important it would emerge by the 1990s. But I was never guilty of being Eurocentric, I felt that Asia deserved a greater slice of our attention and our engagement. I've already said that I supported our general posture in the war, not only for our global position but for our position in Asia, and to give the countries in the region time to develop. I'd have to say that I was not vigorously in favor of an opening to China at that point, which is important to state given the fact that I was so involved later in my career. I was not Joe McCarthy-like in my dislike or my distrust of China. I must have been aware of Nixon's article which included China in Foreign Affairs magazine in 1967. I don't think anybody realized he was going to carry it to such a dramatic extent but he did indicate that we had to do business with China in that article which coming from him was quite interesting. But it would be dishonest for me to say that in the late '60s I was saying we should open up to China, that will free up our diplomacy in general. I was open to new approaches but I didn't envision the dramatic opportunities of the China opening at that point.

Q: Taking a little tour of the horizon. Asia, did that include India at that time?

LORD: No. Again, I didn't work just on Asia. I want to make that clear. But I recall that was mostly what I worked on, and I did some think pieces on Asian strategy in general. But we traditionally in the State Department, as you know, and that is also true in the Pentagon, we don't include the sub-continent in our definition of Asia, or specifically, East Asia and the Pacific. So I don't recall doing much work on India, it was basically
Q: Indonesia by this time was sort of considered a safe area. Suharto had been in for about two years.

LORD: Well, again as I've told you, I want to be very careful not to try to pretend more than I do remember about specifics and where we were on different issues and policies. I recall thinking that Indonesia was underappreciated given its size and potential importance. I don't recall how much we thought it had stabilized. Obviously, Indonesia together with the rest of Southeast Asia was a major concern for us as we engaged in Vietnam. I would have thought I'm sure that if we lose in Vietnam, if not an automatic domino impact there would nevertheless be an unsettling impact on Indonesia and the other countries in Southeast Asia. It is one of the reasons I generally supported our Vietnam policy. We'll get into this in much more detail as we go along, but in retrospect as one calculates the benefits and the losses of the Vietnam experience, clearly the losses outweigh the benefits. But on the plus side you have to say that we did buy time for Indonesia, for Southeast Asia in general to develop their economies with our having established a buffer against communist influence. And I do believe that the buying of time for Southeast Asia and Asian development generally is one of the pluses of our engagement. If we had never become engaged, and Hanoi had overrun all of Indochina without any opposition in the course of the '60s, I do think without having to subscribe to automatic domino theory, there might well have been other countries falling under communist influence. Our Asian friends agree that we bought them time to develop independently.

Q: I think it's easy to underestimate the very possible effect, and later of course seeing these other countries strengthening themselves; they no longer had the same momentum later. What about the Philippines, was this a problem? Do you remember anything about Marcos?

LORD: I remember at that time, probably having a fairly high opinion of Marcos, I forget when he came into office. And indeed, Marcos did some good things early in his tenure. But like so many Asian leaders, or so many leaders in the world, he didn't know when to quit when he was ahead. So whether its the Shah, or whether its Marcos, or whether its other world leaders, sometimes they do good work for a while, and then greed or corruption, or ego, sets in and they begin to pay for it. So I imagine at that time the Philippines were one of our allies in Vietnam, along with Thailand, Australia, Korea, I forget who else was helping, and we had a pretty positive view of them. But again, it's hard for me to reconstruct 30 years later precisely how we felt about each country.

Q: How about the other two major powers, Japan and Korea? Were there problems at that time?

LORD: No, I think we felt Korea was a pretty good ally in Vietnam. At that point we were nervous about North Korean strength versus South Korea. Today, in the late '90s it's very clear who has won that race, South Korea has just dramatically outstripped and
outperformed the North, its gone ahead and the North has gone backwards. But, we tend to forget, that in the '60s in many respects the North not only posed a major military threat to the South, in some respects it looked like it was proceeding economically, at least on pace with South Korea. Maybe we were misled because it was an opaque society even then. So there was that concern, and this is before the miracle in terms of the South Korean economy taking off. But against that backdrop, they had been a good ally in Vietnam. As for Japan it was supporting our effort in Vietnam in terms of bases, etc. It was somewhat nervous. It wasn’t an economic power, yet.

Q: Moving back, you say you had Asia and you had other things, but were you looking at the Soviet Union and how it was dealing with both China and Japan?

LORD: I just don't recall. I'm sure in the context of Asia I looked at all those countries. I believe I did some work on NATO and Europe but I don't have a precise recollection. Basically, being a Policy Planning Staff, it was more think pieces, or comment on ongoing policies, than it was operational. So our job was to provide information and possibly policy recommendations. Having said that like myself when I was head of Policy Planning in the State Department later, the heads of our office knew that we had to have policy relevance, that if was just a white tower academic operation the leaders in the Pentagon weren't going to pay any attention. There was no question, and it wasn't just on Vietnam, but including Vietnam.

Halperin and Gelb, often with my support, or supporting paperwork, would get involved in some of the policy debates in the Pentagon on our Vietnam policy. And Halperin and Gelb were of the moderately dovish persuasion, probably somewhat more than I was although these were not major differences, we all wanted a negotiated settlement if it were possible. Nobody wanted immediate withdrawal, there was no radical view there. But there was a skepticism even before Tet that Halperin and Gelb had, I think, about how well we were doing. I had some of that and I must say once I got home from Geneva picked up more of it, both by working in the Pentagon and because, I had access to classified materials. I began to judge what we were saying versus how things were going. And then I had around me American society and the controversy hitting me full blast, and we were insulated from it sitting in Geneva. That was a major cultural change when we returned home having left the beginning of '65 and coming back in the middle of '67. This was a major change in how Americans were thinking and talking about the war. It hadn't reached the proportions of the end of the '60s and the early '70s, but it was clearly a change from very wide support when I left, and some controversy but under control essentially, to a major domestic division and trauma by the time we got back. So for all these reasons I began to get somewhat more skeptical but still basically was in the position of supporting the administration in what it was trying to do.

Q: What was your feeling about the information that was coming in, through both State and military sources and other places? I mean, were you beginning to view with a certain amount of suspicion?

LORD: A certain amount. I don't want to say that I was totally disillusioned or that my
view changed suddenly or completely. Just that I felt somewhat more discouraged and somewhat more seeing this as a long term problem than I had sitting in Geneva. So I was already edging toward - this is oversimplified - a somewhat more dovish position, but still supporting the administration, certainly hoping we could negotiate our way out of it. The traumatic impact on me came from a telegram from Westmoreland after Tet asking for 150,000 more troops. And that really tipped me. It didn't suddenly make me into Jane Fonda, first of all because I always felt our motives were correct. I always respected critics of the war who thought it was a geopolitical mistake, or even those who felt we should get out in terms of the national interest and in terms of healing of our society. But I never respected those who attacked our leaders as murderers and who felt that our motives were wrong, or who glamorized the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese. That to me was a clear difference among the critics. So I never moved even close to the latter camp, and I continued to believe that we couldn't get out without losing credibility in Asia and around the world, and forfeiting the sacrifices that had already been made in human terms and financial terms. I felt we should stick with it but try to find a reasonable negotiated end.

However, I do remember a dramatic reaction reading Westmoreland's actual request, the actual cable saying in effect - and I forget whether he was saying we're doing fine, or what he said in front of it - but the fact is he said, I need 150,000 more. So this was dramatic at the time. Of course the Vietcong knew that it was military devastation for their side. But the political impact on the United States was tremendous - we thought things were secure, we're making progress, and suddenly everything was up for grabs, including attacks on our own embassy. This really was a dramatic revelation. In those first few days we didn't recognize certainly what a military defeat it had been for the other side. This was almost irrelevant compared to the psychological and political impact on us. And right then I became much more skeptical, frankly close to cynical about how well we were doing, what our prospects were, how much we had hurt the enemy, how soon this thing might end. Because as I said, after all this time and these rather optimistic reports our military is now saying we need 150,000 more troops. What's going on here? So this had a tremendous impact on me. I want to hasten to add it didn't suddenly turn me into a unilateral withdrawal person, but it did bring home to me the need to really search if we possibly could for a negotiated solution, and to be much more skeptical of claims by our people in the field.

Q: What about the press? Were media reports - how were they treated? Let's say before Tet and after Tet. I mean were they treated with skepticism?

LORD: There are many other observers at the time that could be much more scientific about this. I had the impression that everybody sort of moved in unison, there was a shift as we went along in all quarters. And as each year went by, certainly until Nixon came in - just to take the '67 to '69 period - this was a dramatic period generally in our society. Then after Tet there was much more cynicism and skepticism among the press and therefore there tended to be in both television and print reporting more skepticism. Certainly the body politic felt the same way. Congress was beginning to turn. I'm sure that debates began to heat up within the administration, certainly when Clark Clifford
took McNamara's place. He was strongly in favor of a negotiated settlement. McNamara asked for the Pentagon papers to be drawn up. I forget when that request was made, whether it had anything to do with Tet or not. But he asked the Policy Planning Staff, headed by Gelb in this case, the deputy, to put together the Pentagon papers which of course were leaked some years later. But basically the Papers were quite critical about our analysis and conduct of the war, and how we had misled ourselves.

So, to answer your question, I think the media was shifting, public opinion was shifting, and everyone was having somewhat more doubt. Not everybody unanimously, and there wasn't a seismic shift overnight although Tet had a major immediate impact, but I think everyone was moving in that more skeptical or weary direction. That clearly was brought out by the fact that it became such a volatile issue by '68 that Johnson withdrew from running again for the presidency, that you had anti-war candidates like McCarthy, and I guess Bobby Kennedy and others, cropping up. And you had Clifford taking over from McNamara. You had riots in the street, and 1968 was probably the single worst year that I can remember in American society. The assassinations of Bobby Kennedy and Martin Luther King, the race riots in that year, and the growing controversy on the war and Johnson being called a baby killer and withdrawing from the presidency. It was a very painful period for all of us.

Q: After the Tet offensive and the request from Westmoreland for 150,000 more troops, did Halperin or somebody walk into your Policy Planning, and say, well, let's take a new look at this, how the hell we're going to get out of here, or something?

LORD: There's no question that this had an impact on all of us. For someone like myself my skepticism took a quantum leap. I think for the people like Halperin and Gelb, who were already fairly skeptical, this just reenforced their opinion. So there's no question in my mind throughout this period we were doing papers at least suggesting what might be done on the negotiating front. I'm sure Halperin in particular, and maybe Gelb would weigh in at higher levels verbally on certain matters. And Gelb by this time was fully immersed in the Pentagon papers. So there must have been immediate reaction after this telegram when Halperin in effect said something like you said, or we did it on our own. With his guidance, but self-starting. But I just don't recall the details.

Q: What sort of options were you looking at in Policy Planning?

LORD: Again, I don't want to have false precision here. I'm sure it would include what you would do militarily as well as what you do on the negotiating front. Because you couldn't really separate them. There were undoubtedly some joint efforts with Systems Analysis so that the combined strengths of the offices could be used to send papers forward. Although Halperin and Gelb had total confidence in me, and relied on me in many ways on Asian policy, they may well have made some suggestions verbally or close held papers that I wasn't aware of. I think if there was any paper work I would have seen it. But I don't recall specific proposals, I'm sure it had to do with trying to get negotiations started in Paris. It probably had to do with possible bombing halts to try to encourage negotiations which of course Johnson did do in '68. So the whole question of
how you relate our military pressure, or the temporarily holding back of that pressure versus the possible start of negotiation I'm sure was one of the avenues that was explored.

Q: One is struck by our use of bombing halts, reducing pressure, increasing pressure. About how we thought we could fine tune an approach to an intractable enemy who wasn't paying any attention to any of this. It sounds almost as though we were getting run by academics, who were trying to figure out how to send signals and this same sort of stuff that we got into at other times, at least in theory about nuclear exchanges, how many million people can be killed to make the other side...

LORD: I wouldn't draw that analogy, but I would agree with you certainly in retrospect. It sounds almost naive to think that you're going to get Hanoi to negotiate by letting up the pressure. In fact, it's just the opposite. They're more apt to negotiate as we found in later stages, if you keep the pressure on. Part of the bombing halts was aimed at domestic public opinion in order to show the American people we're trying to find a peaceful way out, and if in fact the war continued and negotiations didn't start despite our restraint, then it was Hanoi's fault, not our fault. That our President wasn't a war monger, he was trying to be reasonable but he's dealing with unreasonable people who wouldn't even respond to a bombing halt. So I'm sure those in favor of bombing halts had different motives, and some of them may have been a little more sophisticated as you suggested rather than thinking this would necessarily get Hanoi to the negotiating table. They figured it probably wouldn't work but it would shore up domestic support by making the president look reasonable, and would respond to international pressures. And he could say to the French, or to our European allies or to others, I've tried to be reasonable, I've given Hanoi an opening and they won't respond. So on that level you could certainly make a case even in retrospect, but in terms of the psychology in Hanoi there's no question that when you let up pressure on them, they get more unreasonable, and when you increase pressure they are apt to get more reasonable.

Q: Were you in consultation or in synch with the Policy Planning at the Department of State? Or were they even in this mode?

LORD: We did some work over there. I remember going to some Policy Planning meetings over there on other issues completely. I mean, I talk about working on Asia, but I remember working on a Cuban study in conjunction with the State Department Policy Planning staff, and some other issues which now escape me. But I don't recall continual close collaboration. It was more sporadic depending on the issues involved, and I don't recall their being ever involved in the Vietnam policy debate. I could be wrong on that. I will say that the planning and the activity of the Policy Planning office in ISA on the Vietnam issue really took off when Clifford came in, and Halperin and Gelb and the rest of us saw an opportunity to move the policy. I can't recall all the details, but I do know that Clifford obviously was wanting to move us toward a negotiation. I'm sure that our Policy Planning staff was right in the center of the decisions Johnson made on his efforts in '68 to get negotiations started. There was a speech also where he promised economic aid to Indochina if we had a peaceful settlement. So for moving it in a reasonable and moderate dovish direction, Clifford turned to the Policy Planning staff generally, as well
as I'm sure Systems Analysis, to engage in a debate and try to move the President as well as Rusk in a more negotiating dovish position.

Q: Was the ISA, particularly Policy Planning, fairly well integrated into the Pentagon war machine?

LORD: Absolutely. It was a very influential office. ISA consisted of other components, but the policy planning staff was very influential. The Assistant Secretary and ISA as a whole, including Warnke who was there at the time I was there, McNaughton having died just before I arrived, was very important with Clifford in particular, but also McNamara before that, on issues in general and Vietnam in particular. So ISA in general and Policy Planning clearly was sufficiently operational on policy, it wasn't just some ivory tower think tank. But we had the luxury of worrying about policy and being devil's advocate, and questioning assumptions because we didn't have to do day-to-day operations.

Q: How about Paul Warnke? What was your impression of him?

LORD: Very favorable, extremely bright. He was a lawyer. Very articulate, courageous, quite dovish but not in an irresponsible way. Very dynamic. I dealt with him quite a bit including working on some speeches that he gave, as well as some speeches that the Secretary gave. I would contribute to some of the drafting of that. I don't want to exaggerate that, they would be modest contributions that many others would massage and expand. So my interaction with him was relatively frequent, usually in the company of Halperin and/or Gelb. I was very favorably impressed with him as someone who could get to the nub of the question very quickly, and he was very articulate, dynamic and courageous.

Q: Was there an impressionable move on the part of the Pentagon regarding our role in Vietnam during the early years you were there, before Nixon came in?

LORD: Policy Planning was always the most forward leaning about trying to get negotiations going, being skeptical about the progress of the war, and trying to push a responsible more centrist position, if you will. I would say in the Pentagon it was the most in that direction. The building as a whole under Clifford's leadership shifted in that direction certainly, although there were probably people who still had different views and holdouts but they clearly weren't wrestling with the Secretary for his soul, so to speak. Clifford was looking for help to move in the direction essentially that Policy Planning wanted to go. So the decisive shift came after he came in, and after Tet.

Q: Was there a feeling after Johnson made his speech in which he said he would not accept the nomination, which came as sort of a shock, this was in the spring of '68 - did that send signals to you all about how things were probably moving?

LORD: Yes, that gave further encouragement to the responsible doves. These are not people who wanted to pack up and pull out, but they wanted to test the negotiations and
they were concerned about domestic opinion, concerned about the lack of progress in Vietnam. So I don't know when Clifford arrived exactly, but certainly Tet and Clifford's arrival and then Johnson's withdrawal all added momentum to looking toward negotiation.

Q: How about the military itself? Here are the people who have been out fighting the war, were you getting much of a feel for the warriors?

LORD: Not really. I don't recall much interaction with the people who had just come back. There were some colonels in our office, or adjunct officers, who had been out there. But I don't recall sort of an avalanche of cynicism or discouragement or disillusionment, if that's what you're getting at. It didn't have a major impact on me as much as the cable traffic.

Q: When you'd get cable traffic you would be getting essentially from the CIA, DIA, the embassy...

LORD: The Embassy MAGG through CINCPAC, CIA and DIA.

Q: Were these different wars that you were hearing reporting on?
LORD: I looked at it with a much more jaundiced eye after Tet than before. I want to emphasize again that by no means was the bulk of my time spent on Vietnam. I did get involved quite a bit but I spent probably more time on Asia in general. In a way Halperin and Gelb were focusing on Vietnam, and I was supposed to sort of look at the context and the other aspects of Asia, including what our policy was going to look like after Vietnam, keyed to various contingencies, etc. So I didn't spend all my time just worrying about Vietnam. However, working in the Pentagon, and being in Washington in the late 1960s it had a tendency to dominate your attention.

Q: I would think that much of your other activities dealing with Asia, particularly in the Pentagon, would be base driven.

LORD: I think there was some of that, military assistance, diplomatic relations, shoring up support from our allies, but also looking ahead as was the province of Policy Planning - what kind of presence, what kind of policies we ought to be pursuing, including beyond Vietnam.

Q: Were there any areas, policies, we were looking at beyond Vietnam that strike you now as being advanced, or more radical from the time?

LORD: Honestly, now I just can't recall with that kind of precision. I'm sure my views would have been that this was an area of great interest to America, that we should stay engaged, that how we came out of Vietnam would either make our job easier or harder. I'm quite sure I wrote papers on that if there was an ambiguous outcome in Vietnam, here are the likely implications and what we ought to be doing. If we clearly prevail here's what is apt to unfold. And if we suffer defeat here's how we do damage limitation and
stay engaged as best we can. I think I was doing those kinds of papers.

Q: One of the things in any government anywhere is the difficulty of writing a paper saying, well, in case we lose this one, this is what we should do. If this gets leaked or something all hell is going to pay and you're tabbed as being defeatist. Did you feel you could write something of that nature?

LORD: Absolutely. Again I can't recall precisely what I was writing and I'm sure it would be in the context of options or various alternative scenarios, that kind of thing. But Halperin and Gelb were the kind of people who encouraged total free thinking. Like most of my bosses I'm happy to say they would never stand for yes men, wanted to be challenged, wanted people to be unconventional if necessary, be devil's advocate, to think freely. So they would encourage that. So I never felt any inhibitions despite the tensions and the controversy at the time.

Q: Did you have the feeling that Policy Planning was getting a little more direct line to Clark Clifford? He was brought on really to bring about a change.

LORD: That's a perceptive observation. It was always important because it had very high quality people, and it was always the key engine for Warnke and his deputy Townsend Hoopes, etc. And respected by McNamara and Nitze. But there's no question when Clifford came then it was really direct together with Warnke. Warnke was very close to Clifford, in fact they were law partners afterwards. So it would be together with and through Warnke, but the Warnke, Halperin and Gelb influence on Clifford was extraordinary, and I think was probably the key policy influence, certainly on Vietnam. To the extent that policy was turned around in '68 with the bombing halt, the launching of public negotiations, and the emphasis on negotiations, the general scaling down of where we thought we could go, I think all of that was attributable in large measure to the advent of Clifford and the Policy Planning staff reporting to Warnke and Clifford.

Q: What was your reaction? I mean here you had been dealing with all sorts of things, but again, you couldn't avoid the Vietnam question when Johnson in the spring of '68 said he wasn't going to run again. You had the rather acrimonious primary campaigns which pitted Bobby Kennedy and Gene McCarthy, and Humphrey, no, Humphrey was out of it.

LORD: They were there running against Johnson. I think Johnson won in New Hampshire but McCarthy was very close. It was close enough so he saw the handwriting coming, and he was just discouraged. So I don't know when Humphrey was actually running in the primaries. Obviously Bobby Kennedy was campaigning when he got killed in California. So there was competition between them. He may well have overtaken Humphrey if he had won California. McCarthy never really had a chance to win but he was a troublesome factor.

To answer your question, I was very torn at this time as most of us were living in Washington in the late '60s, but on the Vietnam issue I still felt our motives were noble. I
still felt that there was domestic support and there were geopolitical reasons not to sell out, or unilaterally withdraw, undercut our friends. But my skepticism had gradually evolved and then took a quantum leap because of Tet. So by the end of '68 as I was about to go to the White House, I really had become much more dovish. Again, not unilateral withdrawal but a real effort to wind this thing down if we possibly could, and to negotiate a settlement if we possibly could.

Now against that backdrop, however, I had very complicated feelings about the political process. I have great sympathy for LBJ still, felt sad for him, both his visions of the Presidency, and what was happening because of the war. I greatly admired what he had done on the racial issue, and on education and some other matters. I thought he was tremendously able and shared a sense of tragedy that the war had brought him down. Therefore, I had little to no sympathy for the McCarthys, and even the Bobby Kennedys, and certainly the Jane Fondas, or the McGoverns who came along later.

Q: We're talking about sort of peace at any price.

LORD: That's correct. I don't want to lump everybody together here but the Jane Fonda types were certainly different from some of the others. She's a good actress, by the way. But, first I had no sympathy for those who attacked American soldiers. Who said that Johnson was a baby killer. Who glorified the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese, who saw this as a strictly civil war, who didn't recognize the invasion by North Vietnam, not only in South Vietnam but Laos and Cambodia. Who didn't recognize any of the geopolitical dimensions. And basically who saw this as black and white with the good guys being the Vietcong and Hanoi, and all the bad guys being American. So that whole crowd stirred my resentment. I'm not lumping all the candidates in that corner, I want to make that clear, but that extreme and the protests along those lines, and the burning of the American flag, and the insulting of the president, etc., I had no sympathy for even though I had become more skeptical and more dovish.

I respected those who felt we should cut our losses, get out. Who felt that our objective was desirable perhaps, but that we just didn't have the wherewithal to pull it off, and then what it was doing to us as a society, and what it was doing to us in terms of our responsibilities around the world, and the impact on our efforts and reputation around the world was too expensive and that therefore we should make a real effort to get out. I respected those who said we ought to make some concessions in the negotiations, etc. I would disagree with those who would go too far, in my view, in terms of undercutting our credibility as a world power, and bugging out too quickly. But as long as they didn't attack our motives, and didn't call us the bad guys, I could see, given a tremendous cost in human lives, given the skepticism I increasingly acquired, given the tremendous financial costs, and the other costs, why reasonable people could certainly disagree. So I always felt, let's have a vivid debate on policy, but let's not have a debate on motives or morality. Nobody has a monopoly on wisdom or morality. So therefore I was more sympathetic to Johnson than to McCarthy or Bobby Kennedy. And basically I respected Hubert Humphrey from what I knew about him. However, as Nixon came along I felt that he was a good alternative. I thought he had matured since the '60 campaign. I remember I
had some difficulty making up my mind who to vote for. It gives you a sense of my conflictive nature at the time. To the extent I was for Humphrey, it would be that I thought that he would be about where I was on the Vietnam question, and that he was a very decent, honorable man, a little bit too liberal on domestic issues for my taste although he had my full sympathy on the racial issues. To the extent I would be for Nixon it would be that maybe a new party, a new administration could make a clean sweep of this thing in a sense of a new approach, that Nixon had tremendous foreign policy experience, and that therefore he would be helpful.

I was torn. One day I'd be fighting at a cocktail party or at a dinner with somebody who was attacking American morality, and painting the Vietcong as heroes. And the next day I'd be telling the hawks they're crazy. I mean if we're doing so well why does Westmoreland need another 150,000 troops, and we've got to somehow find a way to get this thing over with. So I was in the middle, and it was a very painful time for all of us, and you throw in race riots and assassinations, it was the single worst year that I can recall.

Q: When the election of Nixon came about, I assume that the Pentagon saw this...I mean most of the people who were involved, the military side of it, viewed this with a certain amount of relief.

LORD: I don't recall there was any opinion across the board. I guess in principle the military thought Nixon being a staunch anti-communist would be firm. But you have to remember that Nixon was promising a secret plan to end the Vietnam war. So on the one hand he had hard and tough anti-communist credentials, but on the other hand he was taking advantage of weariness with the war and suggesting he had ways he was going to end it. He never had a secret plan. To the extent he had a plan, it was basically figuring he could use the Russians and maybe the Chinese to pressure Hanoi, to bring the war to an end by trying to improve relations with them, and cornering Vietnam in that way. But he didn't have any secret plan. Moreover the military wasn't all hard-line because some of them were dovish or at least disillusioned.

Q: ...when does one get the hell out?

LORD: In my own office, interestingly enough, although Halperin and Gelb were Democrats and relatively liberal, although both hard headed geopoliticians as well, Gelb had actually worked with Senator Javits who was a liberal Republican, and Halperin had worked with Kissinger at Harvard. So the victory of Nixon probably was - you'd have to ask them and others in my immediate entourage - greeted with ambivalence I would imagine.

Q: After the election, before Nixon came in and even shortly thereafter, I would have thought you would have been back in your early GATT mode waiting for a new group to come in.

LORD: Well, here's what happened. It was obviously the serenity and slowness of
Geneva and this had no relationship to the controversy and pace and emotions of Washington, so I didn't have any danger of getting into the GATT mode. The first person, I believe, that Kissinger turned to after he was chosen by the President to be National Security Advisor, was Mort Halperin. This was certainly as early as December 1968, I believe it was probably November 1968. It would have been within days when Nixon to everyone's surprise chose Kissinger, having only met him once casually at a party, I believe, certainly not knowing him very well. And Nixon deserves great credit for choosing Kissinger. After all here was Nixon from California, conservative, anti-communist Republican from the grassroots of America, coming in with the Haldemans and the Ehrlichmans, the California crowd. Distrustful and disdainful of the elite, the establishment, the northeast Ivy League, and frankly with a heavy dose of anti-Semitism. And who does he pick as his National Security Advisor but Henry Kissinger, a Jewish immigrant from Harvard who had worked as a close advisor to Nelson Rockefeller, Nixon's strongest opponent. So it was an amazing choice, and a brilliant one.

Anyway, as soon as Kissinger was chosen he asked Halperin to join his staff. Halperin immediately accepted. He also asked Halperin to start devising an NSC system so that he, Kissinger, on behalf of the President could control American foreign policy out of the White House. Halperin was a genius at this.

To get back to my situation, Halperin therefore decided early to go over to the White House from the Pentagon. These were civil service appointments but at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense obviously. And Gelb was therefore going to be acting head of Policy Planning, it wasn't clear how long he would stay on. He was willing to stay on if the next Secretary of Defense wished him to. As for Halperin, the first person he asked to join him with Henry Kissinger was me. Gelb came to me and asked me to stay with him at the Pentagon. So I had to make a choice. I respected both and I didn't know Kissinger, I had hardly even heard of him frankly, and I had never met the man. So I took a hard look and as always consulted with my wife. I don't remember it as an agonizing choice although I was closer to Gelb as a friend, and greatly respected him. But I think it was pretty clear to me - the opportunity to work in the White House as a general proposition in one's career at the NSC, and with someone as bright as Halperin and what I had heard about Kissinger and his brilliance, and frankly the first inklings that Nixon was going to run foreign policy out of the White House. For all these reasons it was a relatively easy choice, although it was a little painful to leave Gelb. He was very understanding. He wanted me to stay because he saw me as one of the more able people in the office but he understood. So I decided to go with Halperin. I actually went over, however, in February 1969, but not before I was interviewed by Kissinger. At the Pentagon, I was given an Outstanding Performance Award.

Q: We might as well move on.
IV. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL - NSC ROLE, STAFF, PERSONAL ROLE.
(1969-1973)

Q: I think it particularly important for the historian to capture sort of the birth pangs of anything. The Kissinger time and the NSC, this is a real earth change in foreign policy at that time, of the system. You know, you're the new boy on the block, you'd never met the man, can you talk about your interview with him and then about the staffing.

LORD: First, once I told Halperin I would go with him to the White House, then he, of course, recommended me to Kissinger. Kissinger insisted, as he should and I think with everyone else, on interviewing each of his staff. At that point it was only about 30 people on the substantive side, maybe it was less than that as he came in. So I went over there, it was probably February of 1969, it might have been late January, to be interviewed by Kissinger and I'll never forget the total chaos I saw. He was sitting in the West Basement of the White House. This is before he had his office upstairs. He was about to go see the Secretary of the Treasury, Connally. It was still very early and it was sort of his first courtesy call on the Secretary of the Treasury, so he was impatient. He was running late, I had to wait, and the usual tension and dynamism, and urgency and chaos of the Kissinger front office was well in evidence.

He finally came, I went into his office. We had about a 15 minute conversation. He basically, as I recall, indicated that obviously Halperin was very high on me and that was very important to him but he always wanted to check people out. And the dominant questioning I recall was on loyalty. Not in a cynical way, not in a preview of wiretapping, but it was basically, if you're working for the President of the United States, there will be times when you will disagree with his policy. In effect, I'm sure he said, you have every right, and I want you to argue your point of view, but recall that you're serving this President and you have to be loyal to him and be comfortable with it. Again, I'm reconstructing now, but I must have said in effect, I certainly want to put forth my point of view and argue my case. I'm in general agreement with what I know of the President's policies, and of course I will be loyal in the sense that if I lose an argument I'll carry out the policy. I don't think we got to this point in the conversation, but certainly my own view would have, been, even if I didn't articulate it, that if I get to a point that a policy is fundamental to me in moral and/or geopolitical terms and I think it is wrong, then of course I'll leave rather than being disloyal. And I've always felt very strongly that that ought to be one's approach.

Your obligation is to argue your point of view on policy issues and do it as vigorously as possible, even at the risk of being a pain in the neck, being a nag, and irritating your superiors. That is your obligation. You should do it intelligently, and not hysterically, but you have to put your point of view. On the other hand, you've got every obligation if you lose the argument, to faithfully carry it out on the understanding that generally you're going to be comfortable with policy lines. There may be some individual battles you lose. However, if you reach a point where a policy is so fundamental to you, and of course Vietnam could certainly be that in terms of our moral, geopolitical and emotional investment, then if you lose a battle, and you're really uncomfortable with
implementation, your obligation is to leave. You can choose whether to do it quietly, or to try to make a splash. But what you cannot do is subvert that policy by leaking to the press, or going around bad mouthing the President or the policy.

So this was my approach and it's important as we get to later events because I felt very strongly. It's my strong conviction, and I knew it was an emotional time, that you press your case, fight for your point of view, but faithfully carry out policy if you lose, and leave before leaking.

Now I don't know how I articulated all this to Kissinger at the time, but that would have been the general posture I would have conveyed, and it was clearly what he was looking for. But people have to remember, we'll get into Kissinger later. The thing about Kissinger that people don't always understand is that the last thing he wanted was yes men. Very few people survived him as long as I did, Eagleburger and Sonnenfeldt and a few others, and these were people who would talk back to him, and whom he respected. As long as you mounted an intellectually respectable argument. What he didn't like was people who rolled over. He could intimidate you with his intellectual prowess, so people often, because of his temper, or because of the strength of his mind, would recoil or would not engage him. These people he didn't respect. For a variety of reasons we'll get into, a good many of his staff resigned and left and the people who stayed on were those who could put up with him, and who would argue back. So it was about a 15 minute rather rushed conversation in which essentially he wanted to establish my loyalty. Then he left and I was immediately hired and I went over there by February of 1969.

Q: I was wondering, you talked about leaks, but was this part of the working atmosphere when you were in Policy Planning over at the Pentagon?

LORD: Not really that I recall. This became a major issue in the Nixon White House as I needn't add. I don't recall this being a problem in the Pentagon, certainly nothing that really touched me, or anybody in our office. I just don't recall that being a problem. Now, maybe I've got a faulty memory, but I just don't remember that.

Q: At the Pentagon that wouldn't have been particularly part of the modus operandi.

LORD: I want to make clear, I don't think Kissinger specifically said I don't want you leaking, or I don't want you betraying the President. I would have been insulted if he came at me in an obnoxious way. So it was a respectable presentation, in which in effect he said, this is an emotional time, we're going to have some tough issues, it's going to be hard work. I want your point of view, but I also want a sense that you feel you can carry out policies for this President whom you are serving even if you disagree with him. So that was the thrust. I didn't take it in any negative way. I thought it was a legitimate inquiry.

Q: What about the staff that you were meeting there and the people?

LORD: One of the attractions of going there was, it was clear, as I said, that Kissinger's
reputation, Nixon's experience in foreign policy and clearly wanting to run foreign policy from the White House, and the quality of the staff being assembled, all this meant that the NSC was where the action was going to be. I have been fortunate in my career that I've generally been where the action is. Certainly Policy Planning in ISA in the late '60s was one of the two or three key areas of U.S. government in foreign policy at that time. Certainly the Nixon White House was the central area of foreign policy when I was there in the early '70s. Then the State Department, under Kissinger, when I was head of Policy Planning, clearly was where the action was in the mid-1970s. So, in this early part of my career I was where the action was, and that was obviously important to me.

This was quite possibly the most brilliant staff ever assembled in foreign policy in the post-War era. Now, people will disagree with that. I'm sure George Kennan, and his very small first State Department Policy Planning staff was very impressive. I happen to think my own Policy Planning staff which we'll get into later, was clearly quite extraordinary too. It's the only one that I would put up against the Nixon-Kissinger White House. Certainly the staff I had just come from, Policy Planning in ISA, was a very able staff. So I've been fortunate to be with some very able people, and dynamic and ambitious people, and where the action was.

As for the staff, I can't reconstruct every name, but they included people like the following. Al Haig, the military assistant who would eventually would become NSC deputy, who went on to become head of NATO and Vice Chairman of the Army and also chief of staff to Nixon and the one who helped ease him out and make the transition during Watergate, and later Secretary of State, and Presidential candidate. You had Mort Halperin directing the NSC interagency system and policy planner who I have already mentioned, one of the brightest people in government, probably the youngest Deputy Assistant Secretary in the history of the Pentagon. Hal Sonnenfeldt on Soviet, European and arms control issues, who already had a reputation, knew Kissinger at Harvard, had a complicated relationship because they were both Jewish immigrants from Germany and although Sonnenfeldt never had the visibility or stature of Kissinger, he was very bright, very tough in talking back to Kissinger. They had a very complicated, mutually respectful, but also mutually prickly relationship. Bill Hyland, who was also a Soviet and European expert like Sonnenfeldt, who went on to be director of Intelligence and Research in the State Department, and editor of Foreign Affairs among other areas. Dick Sneider on Asian policy who was eventually ambassador to Korea, and a very able Foreign Service officer. Also, John Holdridge, on China and Asia, who became our ambassador and Assistant Secretary. Tony Lake who was special assistant to Kissinger in 1969 when I was sitting across the way in the Executive Building with Halperin, a bright Foreign Service officer who had been in Vietnam, went on to be head of the State Department Policy Planning staff and National Security Advisor. Roger Morris, another special assistant, an extremely bright, young person who went on to be a major historian and writer. William Watts, who also was a bright young officer. Jonathan Howe, only a naval commander then, went on to be a four-star admiral and actually headed our ill-fated operation in Somalia, and also was head of Political-Military Affairs in the State Department. John Negroponte, who worked with me on Indochina one of our outstanding Foreign Service officers, went on to become ambassador in several places. He wasn't
there at the very beginning. Fred Bergsten, who has gone on to be one of the top economists in this country, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and now head of the International Institute of Economics, Robert Hormats, who went on to become an Under Secretary as well as Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs. Pete Vaky, another outstanding Foreign Service officers in charge of Latin American affairs. Peter Rodman, a close, personal assistant to Kissinger who went on to be head of State Policy Planning as well as a senior person in NSC staff. Hal Saunders who went on to be a top person on the Middle East, both the NSC and at the State Department. Others who came from Systems Analysis at the Pentagon were outstanding, such as Larry Lynn, Jan Lodal, and Phil O’Deen who worked on arms control and Vietnam.

In addition, Larry Eagleburger was there briefly in the front office and went on to become Under Secretary of State, ambassador, Deputy Secretary of State, and Secretary. Also, Brent Scowcroft, who served as NSC advisor to Ford and Bush. So what you had was a combination of some of the best Foreign Service officers drawn from State, some of your brightest academics from Harvard and elsewhere. Some key people already in the government besides the State Department, like the Defense Department, or the CIA and top military people.

The list goes on and on: Robert Gates (became Director of CIA), John Lehman (Secretary of the Navy), Robert Oakley (ambassador), Walt Slocombe (Under Secretary), Stephen Hadley (Deputy NSC Advisor), Bud McFarlane (National Security Advisor), and Andrew Marshall (Pentagon guru). Some of these served when I was at State, 1973-’77.

What was also generally true, if you could generalize here, is that on the whole this was a fairly liberal crowd. Certainly from the standpoint of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Nixon. And there was always some suspicion and tension between the conservatives, the Californians, and the domestic political types, versus the academics, Jewish intellectualls, the elite, always suspect to Nixon. But to Kissinger's credit, he didn't worry about reputation, just tried to get the best people. He wanted them to be loyal within general parameters, but aside from that he didn't care about their ideology, he just wanted the best minds. And he got them. He also got some of the most skillful and dynamic bureaucratic tigers knowing how to operate the system. Nixon wanted to run foreign policy out of the White House. That's why he chose Kissinger. That's why he chose Bill Rogers to be Secretary of State, a close friend of Nixon's, but low key, little experience in foreign policy, a lawyer. His job was to be loyal to Nixon, keep the State Department running, handle secondary issues, keep things quiet, not cause any problems while Nixon, Kissinger and the NSC staff ran foreign policy.

This was particularly the case for the three priority issues as Nixon came into office from his standpoint, and Kissinger's standpoint - ending the Vietnam War on an honorable basis; opening up to China; and improving relations with Russia. In effect, taking care in his first term of the communist world, as well as the inherited war, clearing the decks so that in his second term he could build a structure of peace, if you will, on the momentum of the first term, and shore up other alliance relationships, although he worked on that in his first term as well, work on the Middle East, and attack some of the new issues
including the developing world. That was the master plan. He was poised to do it, of course, after his landslide victory in 1972 and then along came Watergate. So that's the general staff. I could get into the system if you'd like.

Q: Why don't we talk about the system.

LORD: I've already given the priorities, obviously Vietnam was a priority, plus China and Russia, and in all three of those there was a heavy dose of secrecy and clearly running it out of the White House. So from the very beginning you had control out of the White House, and that was accomplished in several ways. First, Nixon himself had tremendous strategic conceptual strength, a lot of experience as Vice President and since he was defeated in 1960 he had traveled around the world and met a lot of foreign leaders, gained a lot of capital and brownie points and respect around the world by his travels. He did a lot of reading and thinking and writing including his Foreign Affairs article on Asia which gave the suggestion that he might open up to China. So you had that strength coming from the President himself and his grasp of policy.

Then you had Kissinger with his brilliant approach and we'll get into him later but even though he had spent his life in academia he immediately had an instinct for the juggling and bureaucratic infighting, a good sense of what to do in a bureaucracy, as well as later on with the press and the Congress. Then you had underneath them this brilliant staff. Then you had Kissinger willing to work really hard as well as being brilliant and tough, and frankly Rogers not working that hard. Then you had Nixon insisting that Kissinger be in charge, and of course Kissinger not at all resisting.

As a result you had the makings of White House dominance. This was then cemented even before the inauguration. This is all in Kissinger's memoirs and other good works including Walter Isaacson’s study of Kissinger. Kissinger asked Halperin, before the inauguration, to devise a NSC system, how do you run a foreign policy, with the White House in charge. He worked with General Goodpaster, who was in effect Eisenhower’s NSC advisor.

As you look back, a quick segment here, different presidents have approached foreign policy in different ways bureaucratically. It depends on their style, their relative interest in foreign policy, their relative experience in it, the relative priority they give it versus domestic policy. So oversimplified, you have a couple of systems. One system is where the President, although in ultimate charge, essentially delegates day-to-day responsibility to foreign policy to his Secretary of State. And that pattern was certainly Eisenhower delegating to Dulles. This is not to denigrate Eisenhower's key decisions, and he was terrific on foreign policy. And this is not to say which system is better, it's just a different style. So he was an Army staff man, and he basically felt he would make the key decisions, but he did delegate and he trusted Dulles. He also had an elaborate NSC system, the forerunner essentially of the NSC with a lot of staff papers and bringing up to him single recommendations agreed upon as much as possible before it got to him. That was his style.
Also, in this general mode I would say Truman and Marshall to a certain extent, and Acheson, although Truman obviously was heavily involved in foreign policy as well. But again, he let Acheson and Marshall have a lot of the lead. This was also certainly true of Ford delegating to Kissinger when he was Secretary of State. The same was true of Reagan delegating to Shultz, with less powerful NSC advisors.

Now you have the other extreme where the President wants to dominate foreign policy. Nixon is the clearest example of that. And there are others where there is a balance where you had strong NSC advisors, but you also had fairly strong Secretaries of State, and therefore there's more equal balance. And there are several examples of that. With Kennedy, you had Bundy and Rostow, but Rusk was no shrinking violet. And you also, of course, had McNamara. With Johnson you had Rostow in the White House and you still had Rusk. So these presidents were more heavily involved than say, Eisenhower and Ford, but not dominate as Nixon and his National Security Advisor. Certainly with Carter you had pulling and tugging between Brzezinski and Vance; but as time went on the White House dominated more, but not because Carter had great experience in foreign policy. With Bush, you had Baker very important but also Bush heavily involved in foreign policy with Scowcroft, and even criticized for spending too much time on that and not on domestic policies. Clinton basically early on focused on domestic policy with Christopher and Lake fairly balanced. The same is true of Albright and Berger.

But to step back for a minute, on the whole you often have presidents with strong NSC advisors who want to run foreign policy, and spend a lot of time on it, and Secretaries of State that are more caretakers. Or you have Presidents with a National Security Advisor who is more of a technician coordinating the agencies, and the Secretary of State is in the lead.

So against this backdrop and coming before some of the examples I've given, Nixon clearly was the most decisive running policy out of the White House. Kissinger knew this, turned to Halperin and said devise a NSC system. Halperin was the key guy. He worked with some others including Goodpaster to devise a system before inauguration day so it would be launched immediately. It basically set up a series of committees all of whom, the key ones, were chaired by the National Security Advisor. And, of course, in the government if you chair a committee, you generally have the power. I won't go into elaborate detail now. There were one or two committees that were chaired by State, but the key ones on crisis action, or on arms control, or the higher groups in general were chaired by the National Security Advisor, or at lower levels by his deputies with State, Defense, CIA and, as appropriate, economic agencies represented, but the NSC in the chair.

This system was set up with two series of memoranda type operations. One called National Security Study Memorandum, NSSMs, which would be signed by the Assistant to the President, Kissinger, and ask agencies to prepare studies and options. Then you had NSSDs, National Security Study Directives, which were decisions by the President, signed by him or Kissinger. So this elaborate series of committees was set up; the details can be found in Kissinger's other books. But the main point was the NSC advisor or his
deputies would chair.

Now the other part of this system was that this President, unlike e.g. Eisenhower, wanted options. So he would ask for options which in effect would say, here's our objective, here's two-three-four-five ways you can go about it. Here are the pros and cons and the assumptions of each of these approaches. And here's how the agencies choose in terms of the options. Nixon liked to know different points of view. He wasn't against consensus, but he didn't want to fudge real disagreements by making people come up with a consensus when they should show up in the intellectual debate.

We used to joke because of this, since we always had to have options, that we would normally prepare a paper for the President, with three options. Option one would be go to nuclear war. Option two would be, surrender unconditionally. And option three would be, continue current policy. But on the whole the intellectual content of these papers that were turned out, was very high.

Within hours, I believe, of the inauguration of Nixon, Kissinger started issuing the first of these papers. The very first set up the NSC system as I've suggested. There was consultation with Rogers but he was somewhat naive bureaucratically, and with both the pace of events and Kissinger's skill, he didn't realize how much power he was giving away. So within a day or two the system was set up that was going to put Kissinger in charge.

Q: It sounds like this was a reflection on Al Haig when he became Secretary of State. He issued a directive really having learned his lesson, gratefully accepting all power to him.

LORD: You're absolutely right. He directly remembered this Kissinger movement right at the outset of the Nixon's administration and tried the same in the Reagan administration. But he came up against Jim Baker and others, Ed Meese I guess, whereas Kissinger was up against Rogers. Haig overreached and he was made to back off immediately. So he moved too quickly and too boldly.

Q: He never really recovered.

LORD: He never really recovered from it. But you're absolutely right, it came directly out of this experience. Al Haig was not that important at this point in 1969 in a transition period. It was really Halperin and probably Sonnenfeldt was involved as well.

Just to review a bit here. You have a strong President, experienced and conceptually strong on foreign policy. A strong NSC advisor, and bureaucratically it turned out, not just in conceptual terms, a very hard worker. A brilliant staff. And then a system that locked in the supremacy of the NSC. The other thing that was done in the first days in addition to issuing the decision memorandum setting up the system was the issuing a flood of study memorandums asking the bureaucracy to study all the major issues in front of it, certainly Vietnam but also arms control, and Europe, and I'm sure the developing countries and foreign aid, and CIA, whatever it was. It was a genuine effort to say, look,
we're a new Administration, let's review the bidding intellectually, to set our strategy for the next four years, and let's do this systematically and give everyone a chance to weigh in. And I think that was a genuine motive here. There was another motive, however, and that was to keep everybody so busy in the State Department, Defense Department, and elsewhere, that Kissinger and his staff could immediately get on with Vietnam, China, Russia, etc, while everyone was buried in this paper flow.

Q: One usually hears the motive was just the second one.

LORD: I talked to Kissinger, and for some reason we got on this subject just a couple of weeks ago. And he said that's the conventional interpretation, and I admit there's an element of truth there. But he emphasized - and he is right - that we were looking for intellectual answers. We did exhaustive studies on Vietnam, for example. Every kind of analysis on how things were going, various options. Ironically, one of the people brought in as a consultant was Dan Ellsberg. He helped to prepare the questions on Indochina for the agencies. We worked closely together. I was in charge of collating, summarizing all the responses and drafting memos to Kissinger and, I believe, the President. I probably did this on other issues, or at least worked with the staff specialists.

Q: Talk about leaks, Ellsberg made the leak of all leaks

LORD: That's correct. So this was a very dynamic, exciting productive time where a very lot of good work was done intellectually, even as Kissinger was grabbing the system, a lot of good intellectual work done on what we ought to be doing in the next few years.

Q: We're going to go to the issues next time around, but when you came on board were you told what area you were going to be doing?

LORD: Yes. Let me explain what my job was. I wore two hats essentially. I was working for Halperin. We were sitting in the Executive Office Building, not the West Wing of the White House. The West Wing on the bottom floor was where Kissinger was before he moved upstairs to where the National Security Advisor has always been since. The basement had room only for him and whoever was going to be his deputy, and his special assistant and his secretaries. At that point he had two special assistants, Tony Lake and Roger Morris. He didn't have a deputy at that point, and all these bureaucratic jungle fighters on the staff were beginning to aim to be deputy, particularly Halperin, Sonnenfeldt, and Lynn. Al Haig aced them all out, and ended up being the deputy, because Kissinger felt as a military man he would be loyal, and he thought very well of Haig who had done some tough things for him already. This was well into the first year. So it was an amazing performance by Haig who was a rather obscure colonel, to beat out some of the bureaucratic and brilliant giants, to end up being the deputy, partly because Kissinger saw him as less threatening, which is rather ironic given their relationship later. He saw with more concern someone like a Halperin or a Sonnenfeldt hanging around him.

So most of the staff was over in the Executive Office Building, and that's where I was
and Halperin was. Our basic function was to run the NSC system, namely all the issues. The paper work of the system, as well as some of the substance working with the key experts.

Our job was not any particular region, but to run the NSC system which meant we were in charge of the paper work, getting ready for these meetings, whether it was subcommittees, whether it was Kissinger's level, or whether it was the National Security Council itself with the President. So it was a fascinating place to be. We would be responsible, working with the experts depending on issues, for putting papers in front of Kissinger or the President collecting the views of the various agencies that had come in, setting forth the agenda and his talking points and what he wanted to get out of each meeting. Whether it was a crisis meeting of the WSAG, or whether it was a verification panel meeting on arms control, whether it was just a regular regional issue. We would be responsible for making sure that the agencies knew about the agenda, that their views got in and were presented to Kissinger, or one of his deputies running the meeting, and that his objectives for the meeting and his talking points on the agenda were in front of him. And then Halperin would go to these meetings, or I would go to the meetings, or we'd both go, and we would be responsible again working with the relevant experts to prepare decision memorandums if a decision had been made, to be issued by the NSC advisor, or in rare cases by the President himself to the bureaucracy. Or to prepare a memo to the President summarizing the result; maybe there was a consensus and no meeting would be necessary. Or we would begin to work again with the experts to prepare the options paper and the agenda for the President's meeting along the lines we'd done for Kissinger. This, of course, was fascinating stuff and a lot of hard work. So the running of the NSC system and the paper work was one thing that Halperin and I were responsible for.

The other hat I wore, with Halperin was to be mini Policy Planning Staff, and to the extent we had time and initiative, to play devil's advocate, challenging assumptions, giving policy alternatives, looking ahead - the type papers that you get out of Policy Planning whether it's at State, Defense, or the White House. So Kissinger looked to Halperin and me, particularly Halperin, he didn't know me that well, to write some of these papers which we did. I wrote some and to Halperin's credit, it wouldn't be just his taking over my name. He would make clear to Kissinger that I had written the memo, either it would be from me to Halperin, or Halperin would say, here's an attached paper by Lord. I don't think I ever directly sent a memo; either it would certainly be unvarnished or Halperin would edit or we would draft it together for his signature. I wrote several. Often critical of our policy, and this again was why I admired Kissinger because as long as it was well argued he didn't get mad. He might stomp around and challenge you and attack you, etc., but he welcomed this.

I distinctly remember writing a memo on Laos. It was very critical on what we were doing, I don't remember the details; others on Vietnam, at least some adjustments in our policy. I even wrote one on African policy and tried to make the case, somewhat naively with Kissinger frankly, that in addition to geopolitical reasons we should do some shifting of our policy towards South Africa, we owed it to our domestic audience.
Some of the papers I wrote, plus the work I did on this NSC system with Halperin, caught his attention. So when Tony Lake indicated he wanted to leave the job as special assistant in February 1970, Kissinger asked me to come over. That was a year later. But that's what I did the first year and it was pretty exhausting although not as exhausting as when I became special assistant.

*Q: Before we go the next time into the issues that came up, were the meetings for decision-making getting people together, with either Kissinger or his deputy, or somebody sitting there? I've been to so many meetings when people get together and things don't really happen.*

LORD: There were plenty of times, particularly early on, where you were just reviewing things and not necessarily trying to come up with a conclusion. Maybe saying, okay, we've brought the issue this far let's go back and do some more work on it. There were other times where you'd have disagreement and we need more work, bounce it back and come back again. Other times where you would have enough to go forward to the President. Other times where decisions were made. Sometimes there were crisis meetings to react, e.g. to the downing of an American plane by North Korea, or a quick meeting when there was a border clash between the Chinese and the Russians in the summer of 1969, a very important event which really brought home to Kissinger and Nixon why the opening to China would make sense. So there were different kinds of meetings; we didn't always have decisions.

The other thing I should point out is the advantage Kissinger had in his control of the system, in addition to brilliance, hard work, staff and the process set up, was proximity. This is always an advantage a National Security Advisor has over a Secretary of State, not that Nixon's door was always open but Kissinger could get in there although Haldeman tried to control him a little bit. He could pick up the phone and go in and see Nixon on a daily basis; he briefed him every morning. This is crucial before NSC meetings. In addition to the papers with the options and maybe tabs with the actual details, with State, Defense, and other agency positions. Kissinger always had the opportunity, and generally took advantage of it - and Halperin or I, or the expert on the staff did it - to put his own views on top. In fairness he would make sure the President knew other peoples' views. He had to, otherwise even he would be in trouble. He owed it to the President and he owed it for his own protection so it didn't look like he was cutting people off. But he would get the last word in, either verbally before a meeting, or in his covering memo saying, well look, Secretary Rogers thinks you ought to do this. Secretary Laird thinks you ought to do that. Here's why I think you ought to go this direction for the following reasons. He would even say on paper or verbally, here's how you ought to play it at the meeting.

Now I want to make clear Nixon in the NSC meetings generally did not make decisions in the meetings. I don't think he ever did. He basically would listen, give people a chance to present their points of views. It was usually led off by a CIA briefing and an overview of issues and options by Kissinger. Nixon would let everyone weigh in, and then go back and weigh his decision. And, again, Kissinger would have a crack at him after the
meeting. Whether it's right after or the next couple of days, he could go in there. So he had tremendous access and influence.

Furthermore, another strength Nixon and Kissinger had for foreign policy, and for the system being dominated by the White House, was the fact that they thought in generally similar terms. They both believed in strategic approaches, not just tactical day-to-day approaches. They both had a conceptual framework they were working in, they were both hard headed geopoliticians who clearly put an emphasis on what countries did in their foreign policies, not their domestic policies, who were clearly attracted to balance of power. And they usually shared views on specific issues. Each independently, for example, saw the imperative of opening up with China. They both deserve credit.

Finally, there was a shared strength because Nixon and Kissinger had a good division of labor. Nixon as President had to make the tough decisions. He had a strategic framework. He was knowledgeable, but he didn't get mired down in details. So he was a general strategist, and he kept informed and on top of things.

He generally left to Kissinger the actual negotiations, the tactics, a lot of the backgrounding of the press, the promotion of public perceptions, the bureaucratic chairing of committees, the infighting, and the traveling.

So I think that President Nixon of all of the presidents that I worked for struck the best balance between not getting into too much detail and not being sufficiently involved. Nixon was in between, say, the practices of Ford and Carter. President Ford was quite removed from foreign policy, although Ford had great confidence in Kissinger as Secretary of State. In fairness to President Ford he had to heal the nation after the Watergate Affair. The other extreme was President Jimmy Carter, who arguably got into too much detail. I think that President Nixon struck a good balance and had enough confidence in Kissinger, who held views parallel to his, and was sufficiently brilliant as a diplomat and tactician that President Nixon could leave the daily work to him.

Q: One also has the feeling, from what I gather, that President Nixon really didn’t like confrontations. Obviously, Henry Kissinger didn’t exactly shy away from confrontations. LORD: That is a very good comment as well. You are absolutely right. President Nixon hated confrontations. And if there was dirty work to be done, such as to tell somebody that their policy recommendation wasn't going to be accepted, or tell someone that they were fired, or tell someone that they were going to be left out of a trip or a negotiation, or pass on any bad news or any tough message, President Nixon would give it to Bob Haldeman or Kissinger, or Al Haig, as time went on. So President Nixon avoided confrontation. There's no question about that.

There's a lot more to be said about the Nixon-Kissinger relationship at some point. We don't have to do it now.

Q: We won't talk about it now, but I'll make a note about it. I realize that you were below the top level there, but did you pick up a feeling, early on, of Haldeman as being part of
the problem? You already had had that confrontation with him. You had worked for him as a volunteer. He was a pretty cold cookie. How did you feel about him?

LORD: Well, we felt very segregated from the domestic staff at the White House. As I look back and particularly at Watergate, how thankful I am that this was the case. However, I have to be fair here. Bob Haldeman was never insulting to me, personally. Nor was John Ehrlichman or any of the others. And certainly not Ron Ziegler or Dwight Chapin who were friendly. I had cordial relations with many of these people. I had to travel with them on presidential trips.

Equally, there is no question that Haldeman and Ehrlichman and the others came from a different culture and political background from Kissinger and the rest of us. They were, of course and above all, preoccupied with domestic politics and the domestic base of President Nixon. As time went on, they distrusted Kissinger, to a certain extent. They, like Nixon, felt that Kissinger was often going around, portraying himself as moderate and dovish, warming up to the Georgetown crowd, the Washington Post and the New York Times and painting President Nixon as a mad man. Or, Kissinger was getting credit for policies which Nixon should have gotten credit for.

Their concern was loyalty to President Nixon, making sure that the President kept control of things, that his political bases were covered, that he got credit in the history books, and so on. On top of that, their view was that the staff being assembled or suggested by Kissinger seemed pretty liberal, East Coast, and elitist. They had some suspicion of this.

So, for all of these reasons, they purposely set out to keep the NSC staff and the domestic staff of the White House pretty well separated. I don't know all the actual facts on this, because I'm not sure that Kissinger in fact went out of his way to help us on this. However, the NSC staff, except for Kissinger and then Al Haig, when he became Kissinger's deputy, never had access to the White House mess.

Q: This was very important.

LORD: It was very important. It was not so much a matter of prestige. It was a matter of convenience. Particularly when I was a Special Assistant to Kissinger, my average work day literally ended at about 10:00 PM. I would have to go into the White House mess, order a sandwich or something, and take it out and eat it at my desk. I would do this at about 7:00 or 8:00 PM. So we had carry out privileges, as it were, but never any real access to the White House mess and we never fraternized much with people on the domestic side of the White House.

None of us, except at the very top, had parking privileges, which were also important. Often I would finish work at 11:00 PM or midnight. I'd have to walk about 15 minutes to the place on the Ellipse south of the White House where I had parked my car. This didn't involve a security problem, but it certainly was a pain in the neck.

Now, I am told that Kissinger never really went to bat that much for NSC staff members
to be admitted to the White House mess, for example, because he allegedly didn't want us mingling that much with the domestic staff. I don't know how much truth there is in this, but certainly Haldeman and his team gave us second billing in terms of access, privileges, and perquisites. Actually, they were the people who got Nixon elected. They were the ones who had done the hard work and were the Nixon loyalists over the years. Whereas most of the people on the NSC staff were probably Democratic Party sympathizers or liberals from the State Department. They were somewhat suspect. There was always that kind of feeling.

Now, of course, Haldeman and Ehrlichman recognized the extent that Kissinger and his staff helped to pull off major diplomatic successes for President Nixon. They approved of what had been done, but there was always the feeling that we were not to be totally trusted and integrated in the operation. As I say, looking back, I would like to have had access to the White House mess and parking privileges, but I don't regret not having been further involved with some of these White House characters.
V. NSC - NIXON, KISSINGER. (1969-1973)

Q: I always put at the end of a segment where we finished up to help in picking up the narrative later on. We've talked about setting up the NSC staff under Nixon and a bit about relations with Bob Haldeman and others. However, we haven't yet talked about the issues. We haven't really talked about your observations on Kissinger and President Nixon...

LORD: You mean individually and the relationship between them?

Q: Yes. And particularly we haven't talked about any of the issues which were outstanding early in 1969. So we'll pick up the interview at that point.

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Today is May 14, 1998. Let's talk first about your impressions of President Nixon, particularly early on in his administration.

LORD: Sure. I had worked for Nixon as a volunteer in the 1960 presidential campaign, as we discussed earlier. I knew his dark side, of course, but also felt that he was very well equipped to be President, particularly as far as foreign policy matters were concerned. Therefore, I went to work for him with considerable enthusiasm, and I was also enthusiastic about Kissinger, his brilliance, and his potential.

I think that the best portrayal of Nixon that I've seen remains Kissinger's portrait in the first volume of his memoirs, in which he captures the complexity of Nixon. First, regarding Nixon's strengths, I should say that in terms of my exposure to him it was considerable but not intimate and certainly not on a daily basis. Kissinger generally liked to meet with Nixon alone, as opposed to having NSC staff people with him. This was both a reflection of Kissinger's ego, on the one hand, and his not wishing to have others there, which reflected Kissinger's insecurity. Kissinger sought to control access to President Nixon in many ways. This was true in the case of briefings, meetings, or, for example, at decision-making sessions after meetings.

However, I sat in on a great many meetings with President Nixon and some strategy sessions with him, as well. As we discussed previously, I was with Nixon on the plane to China. I sat in on all of the meetings Nixon had with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. I was with him at the Moscow Summit Meeting. I traveled with him as we went beyond Moscow on that trip to Romania, Iran, etc. I once went up to Camp David, Maryland, at a crucial moment, before the May 1972 Summit Meeting in Moscow, when Hanoi launched a new offensive in South Vietnam. So I had intermittent access to President Nixon. At San Clemente, CA, I was out there at New Year's, working on Nixon's annual foreign policy reports. There would be some interaction with the President on these occasions. Then, of course, I also had considerable exposure to Nixon, through Kissinger, in terms of his comments and his relationship with President Nixon. Occasionally, I would be listening on the phone with Kissinger when he'd be talking with Nixon, often in...
the evening. Sometimes, Nixon would be swearing in his special language, either because he was tired or he had had a few drinks. So that's just to give you a feel for my exposure to him.

Now, regarding the man himself, not only based on the previous evidence but on the observations of others, which reinforced my impressions. The good side of Nixon, in terms of sheer strategy and conceptual strength in foreign policy, was very good, indeed. He had had considerable experience in terms of travel and meetings as Vice President. He had done a lot of thinking and reading, and indeed writing, including his famous article in 1967 in "Foreign Affairs."

So he had a very clear strategy when he came into office as President. In particular, he had some basic goals. I want to add quickly that his strategy was very close to Kissinger's, but they came at it independently. They hadn't really known each other very well. I think that they had only met once or so before Nixon became President. They hadn't really discussed much, so Nixon had some courage in choosing Kissinger, despite this lack of personal contact and the fact that Kissinger was in direct contrast with Nixon. Kissinger was a Harvard educated intellectual, of Jewish immigrant origin, and an establishment, Rockefeller type person, whereas Nixon was from an anti-communist, California, modest income, American family background.

Clearly, what Nixon and Kissinger had in mind was first, and as the highest priority, to deal with problems involving the communist world. They wanted to have good relations with our allies and to get to issues like the Middle East. However, the three overriding challenges were to: end the war in Vietnam, open up a new relationship with China, and try to improve the relationship with the Soviet Union. These issues were, of course, interrelated. By improving relations with China and Russia they could put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate, since they were Hanoi's two major patrons. So Nixon had a clear feel for geopolitics. He had a sense, and we will get into greater detail on this, that by opening up to China he would loosen up our diplomacy generally and that he wouldn't have to deal with only Moscow in talking with the communist world.

Nixon obviously had a sense by then, and many Americans were slow to come to this appreciation, that the Sino-Soviet split was real. This became very clear after the clashes on the Sino-Soviet border in the summer of 1969. Nixon saw other advantages in establishing contact with China as the world's most populous nation. Above all he wanted to put pressure on the Soviet Union to get them to be more forthcoming toward us, by showing that we had an option by going to China. This was the so-called "China card," a term which was exaggerated. Nixon wanted to have good relations with Russia as well. He wanted to have better relations with each of these large, communist nations than they had with each other.

Nixon also hoped, and here he put more emphasis than Kissinger ever did on this point, that Russia would help him end the war in Vietnam. During the presidential campaign of 1968 Nixon talked about having a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam. He didn't really have a secret plan. I think that his main emphasis was that improving relations with the two communist giants, and particularly the Soviet Union, would help to bring pressure on
Hanoi to end the war.

So Nixon's greatest strength was his conceptual approach to foreign policy, his geopolitical feel, and his sense of strategy as he entered office.

Q: There you were, often the note taker. Were these points articulated by Nixon and Kissinger, or is this something that you are putting together later?

LORD: It's a combination of both. Certainly, these views were articulated by Kissinger in my presence. They were also articulated in annual, Presidential reports, which hold up very well in retrospect, by the way. Nixon put them out every year, usually by early February. We would draft them at President Nixon's home in San Clemente, CA, in late December to mid-January. They were highly conceptual statements of U.S. foreign policy. They often gave some sense of the direction in which we were heading, including the opening to China if people read these statements carefully.

So this version of Nixon's views is partly derived from secondary sources but partly from conversations in my presence. Certainly, they reflected the way President Nixon conducted himself in meetings.

I would like to add somewhat to the strengths of President Nixon, and then we’ll get to the weaknesses, particularly during the White House years. During the early years of his Presidency, and while I was in the White House, President Nixon did his homework before meetings and conducted himself extremely well at them. Later, it became noticeable, as the Watergate affair began to overtake him, that he was less meticulous about his preparations for meetings and so on.

The strategy papers that we helped to write for him reflected Kissinger's views. However, we knew that they were also consistent with the President's views. I've come to these conclusions, given my exposure to him in meetings and what I had read at the time and since. I think that most observers, including even harsh critics of Nixon, would say that this strategic approach was one of his great strengths.

Also, I think that one of his strengths, compared to other Presidents, before and since, was that he delegated just enough in the foreign policy field. He was a strategist, along with Kissinger, and they reinforced each other. But Nixon made the crucial decisions, whether they involved the opening to China, whether it was bombing Hanoi and mining the harbor at Haiphong, thereby jeopardizing the Moscow summit meeting, or whether it was the Middle East alert a little bit later on, at the beginning of his second term. He made a lot of courageous decisions. He was the conceptual thinker behind these decisions. However, he would not get bogged down in details. He had confidence in Kissinger to do the basic negotiating and moving forward. He clearly was in general charge of the strategy. Therefore, he was on top of it in a way that, say, President Ford never was in terms of detailed, strategic grasp. He didn't get bogged down in minute details, as President Carter tended to do. Nixon's involvement, on the one hand, but his willingness to delegate, on the other hand, were about in balance. He steered between
micromanagement, on the one hand, which no President really has time for, and detachment and lack of strategic impact on the other, which a President shouldn't have either.

In this sense Nixon and Kissinger worked well together. Of course, as time went on, this balance changed, particularly as Kissinger began to develop a higher, public profile, achieved more spectacular successes, and made more frequent trips and undertook dramatic initiatives. There was a real, mixed feeling or rivalry between the two men, and I'll get back to that. Nixon became somewhat jealous of Kissinger for getting some of the credit which Nixon thought he, himself, deserved.

So these were his basic strengths. Now, his weaknesses obviously include paranoia. Nixon always felt that the liberal press and the establishment were out to get him and didn't respect him. This is also reflected in the complex relationship similar to that which President L. B. Johnson had with the Kennedy legacy, and so on. Kennedy was the polar opposite of Nixon's style. This also fed into his suspicions, including all of the manifestations of the Watergate affair, which came to cripple Nixon's presidency.

Nixon had some unattractive elements, for example, of anti-Semitism, which Kissinger has recorded. I heard these a couple of times when I was listening in on the telephone. However, Nixon would often do this in front of Kissinger, so you wonder just how profound it was. I can't judge the degree of Nixon's drinking problem. I don't think that it should be exaggerated. It was clearly exaggerated in the Oliver Stone movie on Nixon. However, there is no question that he had a problem. I was on the phone a couple of times, taking notes for Kissinger, when President Nixon clearly had had a few drinks. But I believe he only indulged at night, not during the day. I do not think that this problem affected his presidency in any significant way. That is my clear understanding of the matter.

Nixon also could be devious. These are some aspects of Nixon's dark side, which have been well documented by others, and I really can't add much to it. He was a shy person, not particularly gifted with small talk. If you were standing around with him, it could be somewhat awkward. This is not necessarily a negative aspect of his personality, in point of fact.

As I said before, Nixon didn't like direct confrontations and so he would have Haldeman in particular to handle them as his hatchet man. If he had bad news for Secretary of State Rogers - cutting him out of something or a decision going against his recommendation - or against Secretary of Defense Laird or another member of the cabinet, the chances are that he wouldn't convey it directly to the cabinet officer concerned. He would have Haldeman do it or, somewhat later, Al Haig, as he became the First Deputy NSC Advisor and eventually Chief of Staff. There are more issues that I could get into, but I'm sort of giving you an overview now.

_Q: Could you mention, particularly early on in his administration, how Nixon treated his Secretary of State, William Rogers? He was an old friend of Nixon's. We'll get to
Kissinger later on. Did you have any feel for how Nixon treated Rogers?

LORD: Again, Nixon would never be directly rude with Rogers or anybody else. I have to stress that I obviously would not have been in very many meetings where there were just Nixon and Rogers. A good many of the meetings I attended with Nixon were just with Kissinger. For example, during the Nixon summit meeting in China, Secretary of State Rogers was off with the Chinese Foreign Minister. As has been discussed earlier, Nixon hired Rogers because he knew that he would be loyal, someone whom he looked to take care of the secondary issues while he and Kissinger focused on the big three issues which I mentioned before of Russia, China, and Vietnam and, to a certain extent, the Middle East. This doesn't mean that Nixon and Kissinger weren't heavily involved in Berlin, Europe, and many other issues. However, whether it involved Latin America, Africa, or perhaps economic issues, Nixon felt that Rogers could handle those while he and Kissinger dealt with the more urgent and cosmic tasks.

Nixon clearly wanted Rogers excluded from the discussions at times. I don't think that he was personally against Rogers, but it was a combination of his wanting to direct major policy areas without a lot of interference and because of his suspicion of the State Department, a flashback to his resentment of bureaucrats and what he thought of as their liberal bias. So Nixon would often exclude Rogers from a lot of the secret negotiations and trips.

Every now and then Nixon would feel a little concerned about this exclusion of Rogers. For example, and we'll get into this later, when Kissinger went on his secret trip to China, Rogers did not know about the trip when Kissinger took off. Nixon made it clear to Kissinger, even though Kissinger was worried about leaks, that Rogers had to know about this trip as it was taking place. I don't remember the exact sequence, but he conveyed the information about the trip to Rogers, through Haldeman, Haig, or someone else. Rogers was told that this invitation had come from the Chinese, sort of at the last minute, while Kissinger was traveling, and Kissinger was going to go on into China. There was the usual duplicity in the treatment of Rogers.

I would have to assume, from everything that I saw, that Nixon was perfectly polite to Rogers at meetings. He wouldn't humiliate him. That wouldn't be his style. But clearly, the outcome was to cut Rogers out of things.

Q: I was just wondering whether, while you were there and Kissinger was talking with Nixon, the President said: "Oh, Rogers. Forget about him." Did he say something like that?

LORD: It's hard to remember precise instances. However, that was the consequence. I don't think that Nixon would open up like that in front of other people. He might do it when he was alone with Kissinger, Haldeman, or Ehrlichman. However, if a member of the NSC staff, like myself, were there, I doubt that he would do that. I don't recall specifically his doing that. You could argue that he would not do that for reasons of decency.
The classic example of cutting Rogers out, and we'll get to it, was the Mao meeting with Nixon, which Zhou Enlai announced soon after Kissinger's arrival in Beijing. Nixon wanted just Kissinger to go with him to the meeting. Kissinger said in his own memoirs that, even though it was Nixon's desire, Kissinger now felt that it was irresponsible on his part in not telling Nixon that Secretary of State Rogers should be included in the party. In that meeting with Mao, and we'll come to it, they were at least sufficiently sensitive to Rogers' feelings that, even though I was at the meeting, I was cut out of the photograph and any reference to me in the communique. The reason for this - and the result was that although Rogers was already humiliated that Kissinger, as National Security Adviser, was with the President at the meeting with Chairman Mao, (and he was not) he would not be further humiliated by not only having the National Security Adviser with him but a member of the NSC staff as well, while the Secretary of State was not present.

I don't think that Nixon wanted to go out of his way directly to humiliate Rogers. However, the net result was that he did. Nixon wanted to control foreign policy. He wanted to keep it so that it wouldn't be complicated by the bureaucrats in the State Department, and Kissinger, of course, did not resist this, to say the least.

Q: We've been talking about how Kissinger set up his staff and so forth. What was your interpretation of the relationship between Kissinger and President Nixon?

LORD: It was very complicated and has been well described in Kissinger's memoirs and, to a certain extent, in Nixon's own memoirs. On the one hand, there was obviously some mutual respect for each other's geopolitical savvy and conceptual strength. Nixon and Kissinger generally saw things the same way in terms of how to approach foreign policy issues, including a greater emphasis on geopolitics rather than on matters like, say, human rights, trade, and other problems. They agreed on the broad lines about ending the Vietnam War, how to go about the opening to China, how to go about dealing with the Russians, using sticks and carrots, incentives and pressures. So there was general agreement between them and genuine, mutual admiration. Nixon appreciated the way Kissinger carried out his policies, as well as his conceptual ideas. Nixon realized that Kissinger was brilliant as a tactician and negotiator. Even if Kissinger would get a lot of the credit, this would also redound to Nixon's Presidency and to Nixon personally. If Kissinger could end the Vietnam War, open up relations with China, make progress in détente with the Russians, and make progress in the Middle East, even though Kissinger was the day to day tactician and would get a lot of the credit, this would also help Nixon. So all of this was the plus side of their relations.

The minus side of their relations presented a totally different side of Nixon's personality, as I've already said, whether it involved anti-Semitism, the distrust of Harvard intellectuals, and so on. There was cultural tension between Nixon and Kissinger. There was never any intimacy on that side of things. As time went on, Nixon was increasingly resentful of the credit which Kissinger would get. Sometimes Nixon would take responsibility away from Kissinger or even supersede him on some matters. Nixon deeply resented the fact that he and Kissinger were chosen jointly as Men of the Year by
"Time" magazine. Kissinger claimed that he was sufficiently nervous about that that he tried to talk "Time" out of it and give credit to Nixon only. I never quite decided whether to believe that or not.

Nixon also felt, and frankly with some justification, that Kissinger would go around to the press and to Georgetown parties and, at times, portray himself as the reasonable, moderate, dovish, liberal influence in the Nixon administration. He portrayed himself as trying to rein in this hawkish and unpredictable President. It would be done subtly, but there was no question that Kissinger was very skillful with the press. As time went on Kissinger gave the impression that he was more restrained and moderate than Nixon. Kissinger was equally good with hard line conservatives and right wingers, making it clear that he, Kissinger, was a very tough guy as well.

Kissinger was very good at talking to different audiences, using different nuances, and we'll get into that. So you couldn't catch him in actually contradicting himself by comparing transcripts of interviews and speeches. When people talked to Kissinger, they had the feeling that he empathized with their point of view, even if they were ideologically at different poles. Whether they were conservatives or liberals, each one felt that Kissinger at least understood their point of view and may have been sympathetic with it. This was a tribute to Kissinger's brilliance as well as his deviousness.

Anyway, to return to the relationship between Nixon and Kissinger, when there would be columns, perhaps by Joe Alsop, James Reston, Joe Kraft, or others, which were favorable to Kissinger, and sometimes, by implication, they would be critical of Nixon. Nixon suspected that Kissinger was burnishing his own image at the expense of the President. I don't think that this was necessarily misplaced paranoia on Nixon's part.

Having said that, I must note that it worked the other way at times. When they got down to the home stretch of the Vietnam agreement, I believe that Nixon, with the help of Al Haig and probably some of the White House staff, were giving the impression that Kissinger had made some tactical mistakes, and there was some doubt about the agreement. So this process worked both ways. You had this very complicated mix of egos and so on. Each man had recorded tremendous achievements and had great self-confidence, on the one hand, but also insecurity, on the other hand. This made for a very complicated relationship.

Kissinger would claim, and again, I think, with some justification, that there were times when he would receive orders and instructions from the President which he considered really crazy. He would feel, at times, that these were influenced by the President's alcoholic intake, especially in the evening. Kissinger would often sit on such instructions and ignore them. He thought that Nixon would come to his senses or forget about them or wouldn't come back to them. Kissinger said that he would let these instructions die of their own weight. At other times Nixon would keep coming back to them, and Kissinger would have to implement them. However, he did it in a way that he thought would moderate the damage.
On the other hand, Kissinger, in private, in public, and in his memoirs, gives Nixon full credit for his geopolitical grasp and his courage in making the difficult decisions.

**Q:** At the time of the Vietnam War Nixon himself seemed to be deliberately playing the madman at the helm who was capable of doing anything. Did you see anything like that?

**LORD:** That was more calculated. Nixon himself wanted to get that impression out. He wanted Hanoi, in particular, to figure that they couldn't count on Nixon being restrained in terms of military action or any other way. That kind of image tended to be put out in collusion between Nixon and Kissinger. That wasn't an image which Nixon necessarily objected to. I think that it was of tactical benefit to him, actually.

**Q:** But there was this late night impression of irrationality that would come out.

**LORD:** That's correct.

**Q:** Did you ever see any of that?

**LORD:** I heard a couple of conversations where Nixon was making comments on some people. In any case, I didn't hear that many conversations between Nixon and Kissinger. NSC staffers were just asked to listen in on some telephone calls and to take notes for action purposes. In retrospect, I think that Nixon kind of assumed that someone was listening in, but it probably would have been better if Nixon had been told that Kissinger had one of his staff persons taking notes on the phone call. In all honesty, it was not meant for any devious purpose. Kissinger was extremely busy. When he received instructions from Nixon, he wanted to be able to follow up on them.

**Q:** In these conversations that you were aware of, did Nixon ask "How will this play in Congress or how will this play with the media?" In other words, Kissinger was supposed to be the foreign affairs expert. Nixon was obviously the politician. You can't get anywhere in the U.S. Government unless you figure out how you're going to make something work with Congress, the press, and all of that.

**LORD:** It's fascinating to talk about that, but I don't want to exaggerate the number of times that I heard Nixon and Kissinger on the phone or even in person. These phone conversations I listened in on wouldn't have occurred more than a handful of occasions.

I want to make it clear that I was not privy to the overwhelming majority of Nixon-Kissinger conversations, either bilaterally or with other persons present. But one can assume that they would talk often about how to handle Congress, particularly on issues like Vietnam and what levels we could authorize for troops, foreign aid, support for bombing, and, as the war continued, heading off damaging resolutions restricting our military activity in Vietnam.

I think that, probably in terms of domestic politics more generally, and the press and media, Nixon would talk more to Haldeman, Ziegler, and others. However, he would certainly discuss these kinds of things with Kissinger. No question about that.
I believe that Kissinger himself never gave any press conferences on the record until his famous, peace is at hand press conference in October, 1972, when Hanoi released the details of the agreement we were negotiating with them. This was the first press conference he gave on the record, instead of on a background basis. For an academic like Kissinger who had never previously served in government he showed an amazing understanding, not only of bureaucratic infighting but of handling the press. That was one of his strengths.

In some ways this helped Nixon because it helped explain to the press the conceptual framework for Nixon-Kissinger policies and also helped build support for what we were trying to do on various fronts. However, to the extent that the press began to praise Kissinger and he got more attention and profile, at times this began to feed Nixon's paranoia and sense of envy.

In terms of substance one of the main disagreements that I can remember between Nixon and Kissinger was that Nixon wanted to extract more from the Russians on Vietnam, as opposed to other issues in the Russian-American relationship. There were times when Kissinger would be moving on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] or some other, bilateral matters with the Russians. Nixon would want to slow things down unless the Russians did more to pressure Hanoi. Kissinger was clearly in favor of the Russians leaning on Hanoi, and the Chinese also, for that matter, but I think that Kissinger felt that we had very important business to handle with the Russians, whether this involved negotiations on Berlin, arms control, or other matters. Nixon wanted to hold the Soviet-American relationship somewhat more hostage to the Soviets providing help on Vietnam. So that was one area of difference between Nixon and Kissinger.

At times, in the home stretch, the hectic home stretch of the Vietnam talks, there were some differences between Nixon and Kissinger. However, I think that some of this was fed by Al Haig, who was somewhat more hard line on Vietnam than Kissinger was.

There were certainly other, tactical disagreements. However, I think that it's fair to say that Nixon and Kissinger were generally on the same wave length on the broad outlines of policy. This was certainly the case on China. There were never any significant disagreements there. On Vietnam I think that it's fair to say that Nixon was generally more suspicious than Kissinger as to whether the North Vietnamese were negotiating seriously to end the war. Kissinger, without being naive about North Vietnamese intentions, tended to see more hope in that secret negotiating process than, I think, Nixon did. I think that Nixon felt that the North Vietnamese would dig in. In retrospect, I think that Nixon was right, up until the break-through in October, 1972. Every time that Kissinger and I thought that we were making some progress, Nixon tended to be more skeptical. In retrospect, I think that Nixon was entirely right. The North Vietnamese did not come around until they saw that Nixon was going to be re-elected over Senator George McGovern.

The basic point that I am making is that on substance, conceptually, and even in terms of
tactical execution, Nixon and Kissinger were pretty close in outlook.

One other thing that I should say is that Kissinger genuinely, and he said this in his memoirs, believed that Nixon deserved lots of credit for the successes that were achieved and his courage in making lonely decisions on major issues. After all, Nixon sent Kissinger into China alone, and really without anybody else knowing about it, risking a tremendous backlash from our allies and, above all, from his conservative base in the Republican Party and elsewhere at home. In retrospect, historical revisionists like to say that the rapprochement and opening with China was inevitable, that it made Nixon popular, and so forth. However, in all fairness when he authorized this opening to China, he couldn't be sure of that in advance.

Nixon took courageous decisions in bombing Hanoi and mining Haiphong, risking the 1972 summit meeting with Moscow, where there were a lot of agreements lined up and ready for signature. I think that Kissinger always felt, despite his mixed feelings toward Nixon, that the President deserved credit for making these tough decisions, which only a President could make. Kissinger admired Nixon's strategic grasp and the fact that he generally backed up Kissinger. Of course, Kissinger liked the fact that Nixon wanted to run things out of the White House and cut out the bureaucracy. Kissinger had no objection to that.

At the same time Kissinger tended to reciprocate Nixon's views toward him. Kissinger was suspicious as to whether Nixon was bad mouthing him to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, behind his back. In fact, Nixon was doing this. He was constantly doing this, as we know now from the White House tapes. He told Haldeman and Ehrlichman to keep their eye on Kissinger. I don't think that Kissinger thought that Nixon was reflecting any profound anti-Semitism which some of his comments suggest. I think that Kissinger always admired Nixon for having the courage to choose him, Kissinger, even though Nixon hardly knew him and even though he knew that Kissinger was very different from the rest of the White House staff.

Nixon also gave Kissinger wide discretion in choosing his own staff at the NSC, although over time I think that Nixon began to suspect that this staff was a little too liberal for his taste. He suspected that some of the White House leaks were coming from that NSC staff. Kissinger had genuine admiration for Nixon's strengths but, of course, he saw Nixon's dark side as well. There is no sense in my going into great length on this subject because I think that Kissinger has described this very well in his own memoirs.

Q: Well, let's move on to you. When you were first hired to be on the NSC staff, what was your role, and how did it evolve? Then, we'll move...

LORD: During the first year of the Nixon first term [1969] I was sitting in the Executive Office Building. I had two jobs: helping to run the NSC system and writing policy planning memorandums, including some that were critical of policy.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: You talked about some of it. You didn't discuss the
LORD: Well, I will do this at the risk of some repetition. I know that we talked about my initial interview with Kissinger and his emphasis on loyalty, and so on. I believe that I mentioned that the one thing he never wanted was yes men. He could intimidate people, and we'll get into that in a minute, with his intellectual brilliance and even his temper. However, he genuinely wanted good, counter arguments.

During the first year I was working for Mort Halperin, sitting in the Executive Office Building. We had two, basic roles: one was to help to run the NSC system, that is, the various meetings and how they were run, with the National Security Adviser chairing almost everything and then putting decision memoranda together. I was responsible for helping to prepare the agendas, talking points, and strategy for those meetings, as well as following up on their results. I helped to package the memoranda from the various agencies, plus our memoranda for the President, looking toward NSC meetings and Presidential decisions.

The other role we played was that of a mini Policy Planning Staff, in which Halperin or I would write memos to Kissinger, pointing out issues that would be coming up and which he ought to be thinking about. We would also play devil's advocate on some current policies which we thought might need adjustment.

It was particularly in the latter role of devil's advocate that I caught Kissinger's attention. Of course, I had been sitting in on many of the meetings in the NSC system. He had seen the work I had done with Mort Halperin in preparing material for Presidential speeches on Vietnam and sending ideas to Kissinger. I think that what particularly caught Kissinger's attention was the fact that I had written some memos which Halperin passed through directly, making clear that they came from me, including some which were critical but well-reasoned enough to earn Kissinger’s attention. I remember in particular a memorandum on Laos. I remember another one on Africa, regarding which, I felt, we should be more responsive to the racial dimension there, both because it would help us geopolitically, vis-a-vis the Soviets, in terms of influence in the African continent, and because it would respond to domestic concerns and constituencies toward which, I felt, we weren't sufficiently sensitive.

The point I'm making is that Kissinger welcomed challenges, even if he didn't agree with the thrust of these challenges. I think that these memoranda which I had written caught his attention.

The role of Special Assistant to Kissinger was generally played by Tony Lake and, to a certain extent, by Roger Morris as well, who were sitting over in the West Wing basement of the White House. These people were privy to the most sensitive material, which I was not, such as the beginnings of the opening to China, the secret Vietnam negotiations, the Cambodian bombing, and so on. These were some issues that I wasn't quite cut in on. I can't remember which issues I knew nothing about and which issues I only knew something about. I was exposed to a very great deal, through running the NSC
system with Mort Halperin, but I didn't know everything.

However, Tony Lake made clear to Kissinger that, mostly because of exhaustion, and not so much out of substantive disagreement, he was planning to leave the NSC staff in early 1970. It is true that the incursion into Cambodia, which took place in the spring of 1970, was the proximate cause of Lake's resignation, along with those of several others. The fact is, he was going to leave the NSC staff anyway. This event speeded up the process and also gave it a certain cachet. I'm not challenging Lake's sincerity in leaving out of disagreement with this policy. I also disagreed with this policy, but Kissinger liked to point out that Lake was going to leave the NSC staff anyway.

So when Lake was leaving, he needed a replacement. Al Haig came to me on behalf of Kissinger. I don't remember the exact date, but it must have been in January or February, 1970. Haig said: "Would you like to take Lake's place as Special Assistant to Kissinger?"

I still can't believe that I did what I did. For some reason I at least strongly indicated to Haig that I would decline, before checking with my wife. I have a terrific marriage and I consulted her on all major issues, because I genuinely value her opinion. I feel that this should be a matter of principle in a marriage. I just dreaded the office hours I would have to keep if I replaced Tony Lake. I knew what he had gone through. Not that my office hours were all of that relaxed, but I was working from about 8:00 AM to 7:00 PM. I knew that Lake was working from 7:00 AM to 10:00 or 11:00 PM and spent most of his weekends on the job. I am enough of a family man that I knew that I just didn't want to keep those hours.

I went out to have dinner at a restaurant with my wife, which was somewhat of an unusual occurrence, given my work schedule. I told her what I had done. "Exploded" is too strong a word, but she said that this was absurd. It wasn't so much that she was mad that I hadn't consulted her, although she must have considered that puzzling. She thought that this was a stupid decision. She told me, in her usual, straightforward way, that I had an opportunity to be a close associate of Kissinger, whom she considered the most brilliant man at the time on the Washington scene and someone who was on the verge of accomplishing great things. So just from the point of view of my own, personal exposure, career, and learning curve, she thought that I had made a crazy decision. Beyond that, in terms of public service and trying to help my country, she felt that I had an obligation to take this job, work with Kissinger, and do great things, including ending the Vietnam War. She handed me a quarter - or was it a dime? - to get right back on the phone to Haig and say that I had changed my mind and would accept the job.

By the way, this also reflected the fact that, despite the incredible hours and everything else, she was totally supportive of me. There was a pattern throughout her comments that she thought that this was an historic opportunity for a young person, barely 30 years of age, to be exposed to great issues and great men, as well as her feeling that this was an opportunity to serve my country.

In retrospect, I'm sure that I must have said to Haig that my answer was probably "no"
but that I wanted to talk over the offer with my wife. After talking it over with her, I realized that I had made a rather impetuous decision. I called Haig back later that night. I can't remember whether I said that I wanted to think about it further or whether I immediately accepted the offer. In any event, I accepted very quickly. Of course, this was the wisest thing I ever did. I would have missed an historic opportunity to be in the middle of dramatic events and help to advance what I think were positive causes. Even though things didn't always turn out the way I liked, I at least had a chance to make my case. Also, of course, I was stretched incredibly, both intellectually, emotionally, and in every other way. It was a breakthrough for my career, and we did accomplish some major goals, so it was clearly the right decision.

Without jumping forward at any length, I should say that this happened on several, other occasions, where my wife steered me in the right direction. I had been a Foreign Service Officer but left the Foreign Service in 1967, despite my affection for the service. I had been well treated by it, on the whole, but basically my wife considered that I was on a very slow road to real challenges and responsibilities. After five and one-half years in the Foreign Service, she urged me to leave and take a job in the Department of Defense [in 1967]. There was a later time, in 1985, when I was offered the ambassadorship to China. We'll get to that. My initial reaction was: "No, thank you, I'd rather have a job in the State Department, say on the seventh floor," [where the Secretary of State and his principal assistants have their offices]. There really wasn't a good opening then, and she said that she thought that I was wrong. I had turned down the ambassadorship partly for family reasons and so on. She again corrected my course.

So at each of these crucial junctures in my career she was very influential in steering me in the right direction.

Anyhow, I accepted the job of Special Assistant to Kissinger, knowing what I was in for. Of course, it was the best thing that I ever did. So I moved into the West Wing of the White House, in the basement, right near Kissinger's office, in what used to be the men's room.

I don't think that the hours have ever been matched, certainly in my career, and probably in very few careers. I didn't start the day off all that early. I got into the office at 7:30 to 8:00 AM, because I insisted on having breakfast with my young children and at least see them then. I knew that, by the time I got home again, they would be in bed, and I wouldn't see them. I sort of made it a point that I wouldn't arrive at the office at an ungodly hour. It might well have been 8:00 AM or even 8:30 AM when I got in. On the average, I left the office somewhere between 10:00 and 11:00 PM, and sometimes at 1:00 or 2:00 AM. On Saturdays I would say that I arrived in the office roughly at 8:30 or 9:00 AM, getting home in time for dinner, and then usually spending half a day in the office on Sunday. This was in addition to about 13 secret trips to Paris and elsewhere for Vietnam negotiations as well as all the public trips with Nixon and Kissinger. It involved weekends and holidays when I would pretend that I had time off, when I actually had been out of the country. This is not to complain. It is simply to give you a sense of the pace and demands of the job. It was an exhilarating and a fantastic experience.
My job was essentially to be Kissinger's global sidekick in the following sense. He had experts on the NSC staff for every major issue and region. He wanted one person who had the overview to put this all together for him. Therefore, I would pair up on China with John Holdridge. I would pair up on Vietnam with Dick Smyser and later with John Negroponte. I would pair up on Russia with Hal Sonnenfeldt and Bill Hyland. I would pair up on the Middle East with Hal Saunders. So there would be a regional expert and then a person who had a more general view. I was more of a generalist. I would help Kissinger integrate these issues, so that in devising overall strategies he had someone who could relate these various issues.

For example, one question was how could we use Russia and China to put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War? This meant, of course, that it was a fantastic opportunity for me because I sat in on the strategy meetings and helped to write the memoranda, together with the experts, on all of these issues. I went on every one of the trips related to these issues involving Russia, China, and Vietnam. So my job was to work with the experts to make sure that Kissinger was ready for these meetings and/or trips. I would help to write the memos to the President, setting out the strategy for these meetings and/or trips, policy meetings, or NSC decisions related to them. Then I helped to implement the decisions, I would sit in on meetings as a note-taker. I would help write reports to the President after the meetings, whether in Washington or, more usually, when we were traveling. I would also help to prepare the transcripts of the meetings. All of this was completely the case for China and Vietnam, much less so on other issues. On some occasions I was instructed to prepare two versions of reports or transcripts of meetings, leaving out some material for the other agencies.

By the way, Kissinger liked verbatim transcripts, including his jokes. It was easier to do this when a translation was involved, as there was in the case of meetings with the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Russians. There were pauses for translations, and you could keep up a verbatim transcript. I would also sit in when Kissinger was meeting with European leaders, who spoke English. Then keeping up a verbatim transcript was really a frantic job. I was of course more than a note-taker, and others shared this task. I helped to devise strategy and to prepare policy papers and analytical reports to the President afterwards, as well as to suggest where we go from here, especially on China and Vietnam. Of course, I would work closely with the various experts on the NSC staff who knew more about many of these subjects than I did.

The bulk of my time was spent on China and Vietnam, although there was quite a bit of time spent on Russia and on some of these other issues. Then the other main area that I worked on was drafting in general, including memos, reports, transcripts, and recommendations. If the President were giving a speech, whether at the UN, on Vietnam, and so on, Kissinger would turn to me and some others, including the experts, and ask us to give him either the raw material for the speech or some rough drafts.

He would then turn this material over to the speech writers. Our job was to get the substance in there, and their job was to package it, as speech writers do, and give it a lift.
Nixon had three, very effective speech writers. Each of them fit a certain, ideological mode. The more liberal of the three was a man named Ray Price. If the President wanted an inspirational speech at the UN, for example, chances are that Ray Price would take it on. The most conservative by far was Pat Buchanan. If the President wanted a hell raising or tough speech for the silent majority or attacking the press, he had Pat Buchanan. Then in the middle was Bill Saffire, who is certainly conservative in outlook but in this spectrum of speech writers was sort of in between Price and Buchanan. All three of them were really accomplished wordsmiths, and all of them would greatly improve the rather leaden prose that I would pass up to them.

I helped to get Kissinger ready for press backgrounders. I would help to prepare sample questions and answers, suggest lines of attack or defense, often working with the other NSC staff experts.

We turned out annual Presidential Reports. There were four of these for 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973. They were generally composed in San Clemente, California, at Nixon's vacation White House, but sometimes also in Washington. These were drafted in the December-January time period, with the final product coming out in February. These were really quite remarkable documents. However, almost invariably, when they came out, the only questions at the press conferences when they were released were about Vietnam. The press would ignore rather important stuff on what we were doing with China or with our allies, in the Middle East, or even with Russia. So it was exasperating that the focus would always be on the immediate problem of Vietnam, as opposed to all of the other elegant, conceptual stuff that was in them.

At some point we'll get into these because, as I went on, I became a speechwriter and then I orchestrated speeches for Kissinger when he was Secretary of State. That, in itself, was an exercise in the agony and ecstasy, but mostly agony.

So these were my basic roles. Most of my time was spent on Vietnam and China. A lot of time was spent on drafting, but some time was spent on Russia and other issues.

Q: On these memos and notes that you helped draft for Kissinger to go to Nixon on various issues, was there much paper going back and forth on this? Would Nixon come back to Kissinger? Did he have anybody writing for him?

LORD: We're talking mostly about either strategy memos before meetings or trips, or reporting memos and analysis afterwards. Certainly, on Vietnam or China, I think that it's fair to say that throughout this period in the White House, I certainly did major reporting on the results of these trips. I want to make clear that I did this, in conjunction with the NSC staff experts. It's fair to say that I had a certain flair for drafting, even though I didn't always have the expertise. I had enough of a sense of the substance, when I got into it, that I could do that. I don't want to exaggerate this, but whether it was on Kissinger's secret trip to China, on which we prepared a 40-page, single space report, or the strategy for upcoming, secret talks on Vietnam, I would certainly do these more or less, in conjunction with others on the staff. In reporting on the results of trips, I would prepare
the reports in conjunction with them. It’s fair to say that I was a dominant drafter, together and equally with them and increasingly with Peter Rodman, as time went on, on the actual transcripts of these meetings.

Almost single-handedly I did the drafting, in consultation with others, on the 1970 Laos statement, on the 1970 report of the President on Cambodia, and so on. In most cases the feedback was probably verbal from President Nixon, that is, from Nixon to Kissinger. The one example that was different was on the trip to China. We’ll get into this in more detail, but Nixon did an extraordinary amount of homework. I was in charge of putting the briefing books together. I think that we had at least six huge briefing books covering every conceivable issue. The President underlined and wrote comments on almost every page of the six books. He kept asking for more information, even as we flew out to China, stopping on the way in Hawaii and Guam. Even as he was flying into China, he was asking for more information. He really did his homework and performed very well there.

Q: Why don't we approach this thematically?

LORD: I was just wondering if I should give you a portrait of Kissinger. I don't think we've done that yet...

Q: No, no.

LORD: And my relationship to him. And then, if you like, we can get into subjects like China...

Q: Yes.

LORD: It's hard to sum this up. There is no question that Kissinger is the most brilliant person that I've ever met. I was clearly his closest associate in terms of friendship and, along with Al Haig, in terms of substance, during the White House years. Our relationship was still very close and intensive during the State Department years, but there was a much bigger bureaucracy to deal with in the State Department and a much wider circle of people. On a day to day basis during the State Department years, Larry Eagleburger as executive assistant was more closely involved with Kissinger than I was. I was head of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department. It's fair to say that at least during the early and middle 1970s, I probably knew Kissinger better than almost anyone else.

Like anybody who's been close to him, I had some mixed feelings about him. Even in these semi-private discussions I don't want to be disloyal to Kissinger but I would also want to give a valid portrait of him for the sake of history. I want to say from the beginning that I'll always be very grateful to him. This is not just for the record. It's a genuine feeling, in terms of what he did for my career and what he did for my intellect in stretching my mind. He was very good at understanding people's strengths and weaknesses. He drove people very hard. He drove himself very hard, in the pursuit of
excellence. However, he wouldn't drive someone if he knew that he couldn't do something.

For example, he knew that I was a good writer. So he would drive me crazy, improving memos and speech drafts, knowing that I was capable of doing even better than I had done and that I could respond. He would not drive others who, he knew, were not that good as drafting officers. They might have other strengths, but he wouldn't hit them that hard because he knew that they couldn't do it. So he had a very good sense of what people were good at and what they weren't good at.

Of course, other portraits of Kissinger have been made, and so I won't be adding much in this regard. I would say, even though he would be upset at this, that Walter Isaacson's book, although sometimes unfair in certain parts, gives Kissinger credit for his strengths and points out some of the warts. The book has a very nuanced feel for the strategy and tactics and style of Kissinger. That doesn't mean I agree with all of it. Kissinger critics are often given more space than supporters. There are some books on Kissinger which are total hatchet jobs and are really unfair. Then, there are others which are close to a whitewash of him.

Q: Isaacson's book is called...

LORD: "Kissinger." It shows a very sophisticated grasp of substance in terms of what Kissinger was trying to achieve conceptually, strategically, and tactically. In terms of personality and operating style as well I would have to say that it is the best book on Kissinger that I have seen, even though I fully understand why Kissinger was upset about this book. If someone wrote a book about me that was 90 percent favorable and 10 percent critical, I would be upset about the 10 percent. In Isaacson's case, the critical percentage was higher. There is no question about that. There are some aspects where his comments about Kissinger are unfavorable and/or unfair.

Kissinger had the following strengths. In terms of pure intellect Kissinger was absolutely brilliant. He was a tremendous strategist and conceptual thinker as a geopolitician. He was also a terrific tactician in terms of implementing this strategy. He was a superb negotiator, one who was able to adjust his negotiating style to his interlocutors and their cultural history. He didn't know much about China before he started his negotiations with the Chinese leaders. He didn't know much about Vietnam. He was more of a European expert.

With the Chinese, and I am oversimplifying this, and their style has changed since then, I might add, their basic approach was first to lay out general principles which they felt strongly about. They would set forth what they really needed from their standpoint and stick quite closely to this to the end. This was in opposition to the Russian negotiating style, which involved inflating their objectives for bargaining purposes. Then they haggled like rug merchants. Or the Israeli style, which reflects their sense of insecurity, understandably because of their history, geography, and so on. The Israelis behave like meticulous lawyers, concentrating on every last detail in negotiating documents. They are almost like Talmudic scholars. Kissinger would go to the Israelis and get 10 requests for
agreements that the Israelis wanted him to get out of Anwar Sadat [of Egypt]. Then he would go to Sadat and get agreement on nine of these requests. He would return to the Israelis, and they would complain about the one request that he wasn't able to obtain from Sadat.

With the Arabs he recognized their emotional quality and Anwar Sadat's heroic courage, and so on. With the Vietnamese he understood that they were revolutionaries and really had no instinct to compromise. They were just using the negotiations in an effort to wear us down.

So Kissinger had a sense of each of these negotiating styles. He was very good at trying to understand what the other side needed, as well as what we needed. He was very good at mixing sticks and carrots, pressures and incentives. He had a terrific sense of humor, which people don't always realize, which he would introduce at meetings at moments of tension. These would leaven the meeting and would make the other side appreciate him more and help the personal relationship. He was never naive enough to base his negotiating style on personal likes or dislikes. He did this in terms of national self interest. However, around the edges you can build up trust in some cases that help you get through some difficult points.

Kissinger was extraordinarily good with the press. Journalists genuinely appreciated his conceptual discussions on background, when he would explain policy and strategy. It really was an education for the press.

From the very beginning of his time in Washington he was extremely effective in bureaucratic infighting. This was all the more impressive since he was a scholar and had never served in government, except occasional consultant. Armed with Mort Halperin’s memos, he set up the NSC system and established absolute control, e.g. chairing all the key committees. He would engage the bureaucracies by issuing orders for all kinds of studies to keep them busy.

One reason that he was so effective is that he worked extremely hard. Kissinger swallowed up Secretary of State Rogers, partly because President Nixon wanted to run foreign policy out of the White House, partly because Kissinger was a lot smarter and more ruthless than Rogers, but partly because he worked a lot harder. Of course, he assembled an extraordinary staff, to help him. The only staff to rival it in my whole career was the one I assembled as State Department Policy Planning Director (1973-77).

He was an extremely fast reader; this would have been an advantage to anybody. He could get through things very quickly. Often, I would prepare speech drafts. I would be upset that he would reject them so quickly, and so I would test to see whether he was really reading them carefully. Once, for example, while we were preparing one of the President's reports, we had a 30 page chapter I prepared on Cambodia. On page 15, right in the middle of a paragraph, as obscurely as I could place it, I constructed a sentence that was perfectly grammatical and which consisted of the title of every book that Kissinger had ever written. I mentioned the troubled partnership, the necessity for choice, and I don't remember what else, but I put it all in there. Sure enough, he read the whole chapter
in about two minutes and caught that sentence.

He needed very little sleep. I would say that he slept roughly four to five hours a night. So, since he often worked for 20 hours a day, read very fast, worked very hard, was brilliant and had a wonderful staff, he got results. Even though he mistreated his staff in many ways, he was very good at assembling a good staff which could magnify his influence. Although he lost many staff members because of the hard work he demanded, his deviousness, and his temper tantrums, he kept the hard core of his staff because he inspired them by what he was doing and what they could participate in. He respected intellectual exchange, so those of us who were tough enough and had enough of a sense of security to go back at him flowered under this system, even though there were times when we would get upset. So for all of these reasons, he was inspiring.

He was very articulate, sometimes in a ponderous way. When he was working on a speech, he was a very good editor in many ways. As one has seen from his books, he was a very good writer. So these are some of his strengths.

Of course, his down side is well known. Many of these characteristics he would acknowledge, including his deviousness, in that he would at least bend the truth or say different things to different people. These conflicting statements often caught up with him, including remarks he made to members of the bureaucracy. He himself has admitted his sense of secrecy which President Nixon wanted as well. Nevertheless, it was a rather crazy system in 1969-73 and, indeed, was rather humiliating to people like Secretary of State Rogers, who wasn't included, e.g. in the meeting between Nixon and Mao Zedong. You could lose some knowledge and expertise by not being able to draw on the experts in the bureaucracy. I should add quickly, though, that as he would point out, and has done so with some justification, whatever the secrecy and deviousness of those White House years, there were some major accomplishments. This gets into the question of means and ends, perhaps.

For example, I don't think that the opening to China could have been accomplished without secrecy. I don't think that the negotiations with Vietnam would have made so much progress toward the end without secrecy. There were other major accomplishments such as the Berlin negotiations and the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreements with the Russians.

People can disagree whether these would have been possible without secrecy. I'll give you one example, dealing with China. The secrecy certain cost us in terms of our relations with Japan, and that should have been better handled.

Q: The Japanese called the announcement of the Kissinger agreement with China, the Nixon Shocku.

LORD: And Japan is a key ally of the United States. However, if Kissinger's going secretly to China had been known in advance, a number of things would have happened, and these were some of the arguments used for secrecy.
The Chinese indicated that they wanted some degree of confidentiality as well, but I think that the emphasis on secrecy was certainly as much from our side as theirs. If it had been known in advance that Kissinger was going to China, first, you would have had the Washington bureaucracy weighing in with specific, and, in Kissinger's and Nixon's view, second level concerns, that we had to get this aspect of trade, cultural exchanges, or whatever. Or that we had to be careful about Russian sensitivities. This would have hamstrung the early discussions.

Secondly, we would have had our allies weighing in, in advance, trying to bind us, whether this involved our South Vietnamese allies, the Japanese, or the Europeans making demands and limiting us in our discussions with the Chinese.

Thirdly, there would have been a firestorm among the conservatives and many of the Republicans domestically in the U.S. about the President's even considering making this dramatic move toward China, causing an uproar and hamstringing him in advance. All of this would also have put off the Chinese.

Fourthly, all of this would have been exacerbated by the understandable anguish of our friends on Taiwan.

This can be endlessly debated, and we'll come back to it, but there were at least some plausible arguments for the initial secrecy in connection with the China trip. I might just point that out generally, before I get off track.

There was no question that Kissinger would lose his temper. Isaacson has put out the theory, which may or may not be true, and I think that there may have been some element of truth in it, that Kissinger treated me better than others. I think that this is true, although I got my share of yelling from Kissinger and on many occasions. No question about that. However, I always felt that Kissinger was less outrageous with me than with some others. I don't particularly buy Isaacson's view for the reasons he cites. I think that this is rather a case of psychobabble. There is the fact that I came from an establishment background, my mother was a member of the Pillsbury family, and I came from Park Avenue. Kissinger was an immigrant, looking for greater social status. I think that is a little bit too complicated for me. Moreover, Nelson Rockefeller surely gave him all these elements. Without wishing to sound pompous or self-righteous, I think that Kissinger felt that I had a certain degree of integrity and principle. He respected that and thought that I was less devious, even though he himself was devious on bureaucratic matters. He felt that I was a little more open. He may have seen some contrast in my approaches versus others and was somewhat more hesitant to scream and yell at me. Frankly, I did good, hard work for him which, I am sure, he appreciated. So, although I had my share of mistreatment, it was not as bad as some others suffered. And he generally would come back more gently after some outburst.

I was put off by the way he would yell and scream at others in front of me or just generally. I was put off by his deviousness, although not so much with me because I
knew pretty much everything that was going on. I didn't particularly like the extent of deviousness he displayed with others, which I felt was unnecessary.

Kissinger and I used to joke that when we studied philosophy, as we did in our younger days, he would study logic, and I would study ethics. As was pointed out in one of his books, which he gave me for Christmas, an Andrew Wyeth set of paintings, he inscribed it to my “conscience,” or being his conscience. So Kissinger and I had a complicated relationship. There is no question that, on a personal level, he had high regard for me and my wife, whom he greatly admired, as he liked strong women. My wife is charming and is strong and smart. She talked back to him as well and gave him good advice on China. We were his closest social friends on his staff. He generally didn't socialize too much with people on his staff and never got close to people like Al Haig, for example. Whether at dinner parties, just alone, or at a Chinese restaurant, or whatever the occasion, he saw quite a bit of us. We were one of a small handful invited to his wedding to Nancy. Later on, after Kissinger married Nancy, we saw a good bit of her as well. So it was a good, close relationship.

Of course, there were times when I got mad at him. There were weeks when I would come home, screaming only half in jest that I was ready to quit. My wife would always say: "Knock it off and go back to work." At the time of the Cambodian invasion [in 1970] I was very close to quitting, and we'll get back to that. So I did have some mixed feelings about Kissinger. I would get impatient at the hard work and the constant demands and the deviousness in his treatment of other people. However, at the same time, nobody is perfect, everyone has faults, he was under tremendous pressure, he was working harder than anyone else, he was brilliant, and he was doing, on the whole, things that I thought were very important and constructive. Therefore, you tend to get into the whole question of means and ends.

So I clearly saw Kissinger's warts. Without being condescending, because I have my own faults, I felt that he was someone who was doing very important things. I felt that you had to forgive people, particularly those under pressure, for certain faults. He was an incredible mix of ego and insecurity. On the one hand, he was extremely self-confident, willing to take on all of these negotiations, juggle a lot of balls at once, go off on trips, and do all of these things with a small staff. He had to have an incredible ego to do all of that. Intellectually, he knew how dominant he was.

However, at the same time he was insecure. He was insecure in terms of President Nixon and the Haldeman crowd, whether they really distrusted him or not. He was insecure in that he did not want people to have direct access to Nixon. We will discuss the phone tapping episode. That clearly was evidence of Kissinger's being in the twilight zone on some of these issues.

He had a tremendous sense of humor, which also was a saving grace. There were constant examples of that. He was self-deprecating. Often Bill Hyland, Peter Rodman, and I would send false memos to him. For example, we once prepared a memo from Kissinger to Nixon suggesting, somewhat irreverently, a meeting with God. We talked
about 12 people being present. Supper would be served. A ten-point plan, and so forth. 
We prepared phony communiques for Guatemala and for Ethiopia in which we would do 
parodies of meetings just concluded.

I once gave him a picture of a big gorilla, inscribed to me from him, saying: "When I 
want your opinion, I'll beat it out of you," and that kind of thing. I'm not giving very good 
examples here, but the point is that this leavened things up and made working for him 
worthwhile. During meetings, sometimes tense ones, or after them, we would often swap 
humorous asides.

As he came from Europe, he had a sense of history and tragedy. In looking at the course 
of events he never had the American sense of optimism. He always had a feeling that 
things might go wrong. He was greatly concerned with stability and geopolitics. On the 
one hand, this was an advantage, because he had a sense, as the Europeans did, and as an 
historian, of the balance of power. This served him well in dealing with China, Russia, 
Vietnam, and the Middle East. So he had a strong, conceptual and historical background 
which served him well and worked well with Nixon.

On the other hand, it was a weakness because it meant less concern about human rights 
and values. This got him into trouble with the right and the left, for example, in 
connection with the search for detente with the Soviet Union. On human rights generally, 
he never had a full appreciation of the need for public and Congressional support, which 
might come more naturally to people born in the United States. In many ways he was 
more comfortable dealing with authoritarian leaders who could make decisions than in 
dealing with messy democracies and parliaments. And he did not fully appreciate, in my 
view that democracies elsewhere helps on national security goals

On the plus side again, I have to say that he got the best out of his staff. I think I have 
mentioned that he really stretched me. I learned from him an incredible amount of 
history, conceptual approaches, and geopolitics, as well as negotiating skills and skill in 
dealing with the press and the bureaucracy. I will always be grateful to him for that.

I might add, in passing, that any stories about his being a secret swinger and a ladies' man 
are totally made up, or exaggerated.

I should also point out, on the plus side, that he was a very steady friend. There would be 
times when he would yell at me and so forth. However, there were times, in the crunch, 
when he stood by me. A good example, and we'll get to this later, is that my first 
assignment as a Special Assistant in 1970 was to prepare a long, White Paper on our 
historical involvement in Laos. Through misleading reports by one agency or another and 
for other reasons, a mistake, or an alleged mistake, was contained in that White Paper. 
There was a phrase in that paper that no American had ever been killed in combat in Laos 
over the previous 20 years or so. There was a lot of controversy about how much we had 
been involved in Laos secretly. This paper was designed to clear the record. In fact, we 
didn't have combat soldiers getting killed in Laos. We had people who went into and out 
of Laos. One group was ambushed and, in self-defense, a few had been killed. This was
not really combat. So literally the statement we made was true but, of course, it was somewhat misleading. Given the suspicions about our Laos involvement, the statement that in this 20 year period only six or so Americans had been killed, and it wasn't really combat, people could have said: "that's a lot less than we suspected." However, on the day this paper was published, this secret was revealed, so to speak, and made it look as if we were being devious. It was hugely inflated - why would we cover up such a small number? But the agencies misled me in providing information.

Anyway, it was a horrible introduction to being a Special Assistant to Kissinger. The press went crazy, and the White House faced a barrage of questions, day after day. President Nixon was furious at Kissinger and his staff for screwing this up. Throughout that period Kissinger was rock solid personally with me and for me. He said: "It was not your fault. You were just misled by the bureaucracy," which was basically true, by the way. Secondly, while he said this to President Nixon in my defense, it would have been very easy for Kissinger to have laid the responsibility for this statement on me. He basically said: "Look, we should have double checked this around. That's my fault." That is, it was Kissinger's fault, not the fault of his staff. It was a very tough moment for me. I hadn't worked for him for that long. I was new to the West Wing and a brand new Special Assistant, so it wasn't as if he owed me for years of hard work. He stuck by me solidly.

Another good example of his being a good friend, although it was also in his own self-interest, was when Zhou En-lai invited President Nixon to meet with Mao Zedong and said that Kissinger should come along. Kissinger then asked me to come along as well. This was partly so that he wouldn't have to take notes, leaving this task to me. However, in all fairness I had basically done the hardest work on the China visit from the beginning. I had been responsible for overseeing the briefing books. It was obviously an historic moment, and Kissinger included me in on that meeting with Mao, for which I'll always be grateful.

Also, he has been generous to me in his books in referring to my contributions and my character, as well as in paying tribute to me in public forums.

The down side is that I know that in more recent years there have been times when he has bad mouthed me for some of the policies that I have been involved in. As always, this was not stated publicly, but you always hear about it.

There was the wire tapping episode. We can get into that later on, if you like. However, briefly, his argument was that there were serious leaks in our international security structure, and he was right. As I said earlier, my belief is that if you have a disagreement on policy, you should debate it and generally try to force a policy change. If you lose out on that debate, either you carry the policy out loyally and don't leak, or you quit your job, if it's that fundamental an issue. I was always against leaks. I never leaked, in fact. During that period I was very shy with the press because I knew that I could get into trouble, but also because that was my style. Kissinger, in effect, was saying that these were damaging leaks, and Nixon, Haldeman, and others were suspicious of this liberal staff, anyway. They knew that some of these leaks had to come from a very small circle
because the information was so sensitive, and only a few people knew about it.

Therefore, Kissinger said he couldn't say that they could wiretap others but that they couldn't wiretap his staff. He was assured by Attorney General Mitchell and others that the wire tapping was perfectly legal. Kissinger genuinely was concerned about the leaking. A good example of one of these leaks is that just before the secret trip to China, the Pentagon Papers were published, based on selected, secret documents. Daniel Ellsberg, who had been a Pentagon official, put them out without authorization. If anything, these papers were damaging to the Johnson administration, not to the Nixon administration. On purely political grounds you could say that the publication of these papers was all to Nixon's advantage, since they dealt with the Johnson era. However, Nixon and Kissinger went through the roof on the principle that you don't leak these highly classified documents. They were also concerned that the Chinese, who wanted confidentiality in dealings with the U.S. at that point, would feel that the U.S. Government couldn't keep any secrets. So this was Kissinger's reasoning on the wiretapping episode.

Having said that, I would have to add that you cannot square a personal friendship and total trust and intimacy with his authorizing of tapping your phone, as you go along. I am sure that many people felt, and I can understand that, that my sense of outrage was too much under control. I was unhappy with the wiretapping and I said so. I also thought that it was an ineffective way to run down leakers. However, I understood some of the rationale for it. I myself thought that the leaks were unfortunate, even when they involved leaking material to pursue some policy option that I agreed with. I just think that that isn't the way to operate. You can't run a government that way. I understood that I had access to all of the most sensitive information, so that only a few people could be suspected. I would naturally be one of them, because I knew virtually everything. Very few people in that secretive White House knew everything in terms of secret negotiations and policies.

It turned out that I didn't know that my phone was being tapped until just before I was about to leave the White House staff in May, 1973. I wanted to take a break because of total exhaustion and wanting to see more of my family and my kids grow up. The Vietnam War was over, we had opened up to China, we had a degree of détente with the Russians, and it seemed a good time to leave. I learned about the phone tapping when I had already decided to leave, and I had an exchange about it with Kissinger.

So that is some of the down side of my experience with him.

Kissinger, of course, was very disorganized in many ways. He didn't have a clean management style but, nevertheless, got things done. I don't think that I have anything else to raise at this time, but we may pick up other things as we go along. That is pretty much my recollection of this period.

I want to leave it on a positive note, both in terms of my personal gratitude and my admiration for Kissinger's achievements, his hard work, his brilliance, and his essential patriotism in trying to serve the United States. I'll always be grateful to him and I have
affection as well as respect for him. This doesn't mean that there weren't times when I was exasperated or that there were not elements of Kissinger's character that I didn't and don't fully approve of. However, nobody is perfect.

Q: Before we move to cover the China trip, what about Alexander Haig? I was wondering if you could talk about his role at this time, because he became a major figure later on.

LORD: Well, Haig rose amazingly fast in the federal bureaucracy. He was recommended by Secretary of Defense McNamara and maybe some other people to Kissinger, who wanted a Military Assistant. He came to the NSC staff as a Colonel with the task of maintaining liaison with the Pentagon and as a Military Assistant to Kissinger. At the time he was no more important than about 15 others on the NSC staff, in terms of either rank or access.

There was fierce competition to see who would be Kissinger's deputy in the early months of the Nixon administration. The major contenders were Mort Halperin, who left partly because of Kissinger's duplicity on various matters and partly because he didn't get to be Deputy National Security Adviser. Another contender was Hal Sonnenfeldt, who had complicated relations with Kissinger. Both were immigrants from Germany. Sonnenfeldt was very smart but was always poking around and making Kissinger nervous. So there was a love-hate relations between the two of them. To a certain extent Larry Lynn was also a contender. He was an assistant to Kissinger from the Defense Department. He did a lot of analytical work, systems analysis work on defense, Vietnam, etc.

Of course, none of these people became Kissinger's deputy. Al Haig became Deputy National Security Adviser, which was quite an extraordinary achievement for someone who didn't even know Kissinger and who had rather obscure beginnings. He worked his way up, finally becoming Kissinger's deputy. He managed this partly because he was a very hard worker, loyal, and tough. He was willing to take on tough issues for Kissinger. It has also been surmised, by Isaacson and others, that Kissinger felt that Haig would not be much of a challenge intellectually, compared to Halperin, Sonnenfeldt, and so on. I think that Kissinger felt that Haig would be a deputy who could do some tough work on his behalf and make the trains run on time. I think that Kissinger felt that he wouldn't always have to be looking over his shoulder at Haig, although that was rather ironic, given their complicated relationship with President Nixon later on.

No matter how you look at it, though, Haig emerged as Kissinger's deputy. He managed to do it, certainly in the early days of the Nixon administration, without alienating the rest of the NSC staff. I mean that he not only reached that position but he did so without leaving a lot of bloody bodies behind him. He sort of did this smoothly. I can't speak for others about their views of Haig at the time. However, I have the impression that, at least in the early going, he was respected and managed to become Deputy National Security Adviser without alienating a lot of people. That was quite an extraordinary achievement.

Now, Al Haig had many strong qualities. No question that he was courageous. He would
talk back to Kissinger, which was always important. He was willing to undertake tough assignments, whether this involved giving the bureaucracy bad news or going out to Saigon and trying to persuade President Nguyen van Thieu and the South Vietnamese Government to go along with the Vietnam Agreement of January, 1973. Or going to China in January, 1972, after our secret trip in October, 1971, to help to prepare the final logistics and some of the other details for the subsequent trip by President Nixon. So Haig was someone whom Kissinger could count on to do tough work. He handled some of these assignments very well. He was always outspoken and a very hard worker. He was a genuine patriot, whatever one thinks of all his subsequent views and actions.

As some suspected, Haig would often play good guy with the NSC staff, in distinction from Mad Man Kissinger. He would sometimes be friendly to the NSC staff and say: "I'm on your side. We've got to keep Kissinger under control." I wouldn't put too much emphasis on that, but that was the view of some members of the NSC staff.

On the whole, Haig was more hawkish, if you can put it that way, more suspicious of the North Vietnamese, and more grudging about the Vietnam Peace Accord of January, 1973, although he went along with it. Generally, Haig was on the side of more military pressure in Vietnam, if necessary. He was somewhat more suspicious on how to deal with the Russians. I don't want to suggest any major divergences from established policy. Certainly, he was in full agreement on China. There were no significant differences there. Haig deserves a lot of credit for taking on tough assignments and working very hard. He would cover effectively for Kissinger when he went on secret trips in connection with Vietnam or China. He was very effective in helping to cover up when we were gone from Washington. So he brought many strengths to the job.

He, of course, didn't lack for his own deviousness at times, which played in with Kissinger's style as well. As time went on he more and more gained the confidence of President Nixon for, as we were traveling, he would be the Acting National Security Adviser to the President. He appealed to some of Nixon's more hawkish qualities, his suspicion of the bureaucracy, and so on. He gave Nixon some sense that, perhaps, Kissinger wasn't being tough enough on the Russians or with respect to pressuring Hanoi; or he was being too anxious for a deal with the North Vietnamese. As time went on, Kissinger felt that Haig was playing on some of these issues and trying to gain President Nixon's confidence at Kissinger's expense. I think that there was some evidence for that. The relationship between Kissinger and Haig became very complicated. This is well documented in Isaacson's book and in Kissinger's memoirs.

The most classic example is the effort to try to sell the Vietnam agreement, which we had worked out in October, 1972, to President Thieu of South Vietnam. We went to Saigon after the breakthrough in Paris. Thieu was giving us trouble on that. Kissinger and I kept writing cables back to President Nixon and getting tough cables back in return. Kissinger always felt that Haig was influencing these cables, not always showing all of Kissinger's messages to the President. In the home stretch of the Vietnam negotiations after that, there were some unpleasant articles in conservative columns which took cracks at Kissinger. He always felt that that might have been Haig's influence back in Washington.
I'm not saying whether these feelings were correct or not, but they did reflect the rather complicated relationship that Kissinger and Haig had.

There was mutual respect between them. Haig saw all of the strengths of Kissinger that I have enumerated and particularly admired him for those. However, Haig didn't lack for ambition himself. Kissinger saw the value of Haig and leaned on him very heavily, typically in connection with some of the tough work that was needed.
VI. NSC - CHINA. OPENING AND KISSINGER SECRET TRIP (1969-1971)

Q: There are three major themes now: China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. Why don't we take the China theme now?

LORD: Right.

Q: Here you have a wife who was born in China, although China was not your particular field. Although you were working...

LORD: Certainly, the single most dramatic event that I've been involved in had to do with the opening to China in the early 1970s. In my entire career the question of relations with China has been the most important, including not only the work I did in the 1970s but also as Ambassador to China and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. So China has been the single, most important aspect of my career as it has evolved.

It's been given a special dimension by being married to a woman born in Shanghai who, I think, understands China better than anybody that I know. She has always been very prescient on that, although we haven't always agreed on every last policy prescription.

There is some irony about the centrality of China in my career, because I was a Foreign Service Officer in 1962, when my wife and I decided to get married. In those days you had to get permission to marry a foreign citizen. Not just because she was Chinese. She could have been Irish or, say, Congolese. I would still have had to get permission to marry her. The State Department gave this permission, but they said that I would never work on Chinese affairs. This was because many of her relatives were still in China, with the exception of her mother and father and second sister. (Her third sister was still in China at the time.) Her father worked for the Taiwan Sugar Company, which is government-owned, so he was close to being a diplomatic representative of Taiwan in the United States. In fact, he represented Taiwan in the international sugar negotiations. So the State Department said that this combination, and my having a Chinese wife, meant that I would never work on Chinese affairs. I, of course, said that I could find other issues to work on but couldn't find another woman like this, so I would go ahead, with this restriction.

Partly for that reason I never studied Chinese in the State Department. I might never have studied Chinese anyway, given the pressure of time. My wife didn't have the patience to try to teach me Chinese. So I never learned to speak Chinese and never thought that I was going to work on China. Of course, I ended up going with Kissinger on his secret trip to China and was the central support mechanism for Nixon and Kissinger on China throughout that period.

Then, I wound up being American Ambassador to China. So, to my dismay, I didn't speak Chinese when I went to China as Ambassador. I took lessons, but you can't learn Chinese on the basis of an hour a day. There is some irony in all of this, but China has been a special part of my career and my personal life, for the reasons I have mentioned.
One amusing footnote which I might mention, in retrospect, is that my wife was interviewed in the course of my obtaining permission to marry her. In one sense, this interview was outrageous. She was interviewed by someone who was about a mid-level GS civil servant, named Mr. Szluc, I believe. I had accompanied her to the State Department, but Mr. Szluc sent me away and said that the interview was going to take some time. In fact, it lasted for about two hours. He asked her a series of incredible questions which you wouldn't expect native-born Americans to be able to answer, let alone someone born in China. She was not a recent immigrant but had come to the United States at the age of eight. In this interview she was asked to name the starting lineup of the Green Bay Packers football team, who is Vardis Fisher, what's a "Death in the Afternoon" cocktail, what's the difference between a minuet and a pavane, and name the original 13 colonies in the order in which they became part of the United States.

Q: I couldn't have answered any of those questions!

LORD: No, and neither could I. I don't know how many she could answer, but I always told her that Mr. Szluc was just having fun. She had a master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, not to mention an undergraduate degree from Tufts University. In addition to her academic training she is very smart, so obviously the interviewer was just having some fun. He asked the questions very seriously. If she didn't have self-confidence and ego, this process could really have upset her. At the beginning and at the end of the interview he said: "I have the power to deny your application for marriage." He said that with a straight face. On the last question he said: "This is the most important one of all, more important than any other that I have asked so far. What will you do if I tell you that this application for marriage is to be turned down and that your husband cannot remain in the Foreign Service?" She said: "Well, that's very clear. He can get another job but he can't find another person like me to marry." That's what I would have said. So the marriage was approved. It's amusing in retrospect but, in many ways, it was quite outrageous.

Q: I wanted to say that, as a Foreign Service Officer, I never dealt with China. I entered the Foreign Service in 1955 and always had the feeling: "Damn it. It doesn't make any sense not to have diplomatic relations with China." No doubt there were reasons, but I just wondered if you were carrying any particular intellectual baggage with you in this respect?

LORD: Well, as I've already discussed, in the early part of my career in the State Department I worked on Congressional Relations, political-military affairs, and trade matters. When I went over to the Pentagon, I began to work more on Asia and, of course, thought somewhat about China. I have to say that, as I came onto the NSC staff, I certainly was not like Senator Joe McCarthy or Congressman Walter Judd on China. I was not hysterical about this matter. But I also have to say that I wasn't champing at the bit to have a brand new, revolutionary policy toward China.

I was rather open minded. I felt that Mao's Communist China was a pretty unpleasant
place and had been pretty unfriendly to the U.S. I was certainly receptive to trying to improve relations, but I was sort of in the middle. I certainly wasn't dug in as a hard right, anti-communist. However, I wasn't one who said that we were absolutely crazy about our policy toward China. I didn't ask why we weren't dealing with the population of 800 million people at the time. So I wasn't a real revolutionary then. It's hard to remember what I felt. I'm sure that I read Nixon's own foreign policy piece in "Foreign Affairs" magazine in 1967, which included the need to deal with China. I think that I was receptive to moving toward China and I saw geopolitical advantages to doing that.

I think that it's fair to say that American analysts, and there might have been some exceptions, on the whole were quite slow to see the Sino-Soviet split. As we look back on it, the Chinese and the Soviets were going through real tensions, certainly by the early 1960s. By the time I joined the NSC staff in the late 1960s to work on Asia, I understood that there were tensions between Moscow and China. I don't think that, even then, we saw how profound they were. We were not under the illusion that the Sino-Soviet bloc was a monolith. Indeed, I am sure that I understood instinctively that what President Nixon and Kissinger intended to do was to attempt some exploitation of the tensions between the two communist states. I would have to say that I didn't appreciate fully the extent of the divisions between Russia and China, even in the late 1960s. The border clashes along the Sino-Soviet border were a dramatic event, of course.

Q: Along the Ussuri River...

LORD: Along the Ussuri River, in the summer of 1969. That, obviously, brought home the reality of this split. Once we began dealing with the Chinese and with the Russians, you could see that there was tremendous tension, so it was very clear, of course, by the early 1970s. I would say that I was very slow in coming to realize this, as most people were. I was not naive about a monolithic approach to the two countries, of course, but I didn't realize the full depth of their hostility toward each other.

Nixon and Kissinger each came into office placing a high priority on making an opening to China. They had independently come to this conclusion. Nixon had indicated this in his article in "Foreign Affairs." We know, in retrospect, that he felt that this was a high priority. Kissinger felt the same way, primarily because of the Soviet dimension, but for a variety of other reasons.

Kissinger's rationale, and Nixon's, included the following. First, an opening to China would give us more flexibility on the world scene generally. We wouldn't just be dealing with Moscow. We could deal with Eastern Europe, of course, and we could deal with China, because the former Communist Bloc was no longer a bloc. Kissinger wanted more flexibility, generally. Secondly, by opening relations with China we would catch Russia's attention and get more leverage on them through playing this obvious, China card. The idea would be to improve relations with Moscow, hoping to stir a little bit of its paranoia by dealing with China. Never getting so engaged with China that we would turn Russia into a hostile enemy but enough to get the attention of the Russians. We'll come back to that. This effort, in fact, worked dramatically after Kissinger's secret trip to China.
Thirdly, Kissinger and Nixon wanted to get help in resolving the Vietnam War. By dealing with Russia and with China we hoped to put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate seriously. At a maximum, we tried to get Russia and China to slow down the provision of aid to North Vietnam somewhat. More realistically and at a minimum, we sought to persuade Russia and China to encourage Hanoi to make a deal with the United States and give Hanoi a sense of isolation because their two, big patrons were dealing with us. Indeed, by their willingness to engage in summit meetings with us, with Nixon going to China in February, 1972, and to Moscow in May, 1972, the Russians and Chinese were beginning to place a higher priority on their bilateral relations with us than on their dealings with their friends in Hanoi. This might begin to make Hanoi nervous.

Much less important for Nixon and Kissinger but a longer range consideration was the potential of economic relations with China. This was less important over the near term, but they saw this in long term dimensions, unlike most American policy makers. They could see a day when China could be an important economic partner of the United States, as well as in terms of cultural exchanges and some other aspects.

Q: These aspects were more or less spelled out in conversations...

LORD: In conversations, memos, strategies, and so on.

Q: All of this was laid on the table.

LORD: Yes. This is not just retrospective recollection. This was clearly laid on the table. We also wanted to promote general stability in Asia as well. We had fought a war with China in Korea. There was the problem of North Korea. We thought that generally if we wanted to see a more stable region in East Asia, we would have to deal with China.

These were some of the main reasons for opening up relations with China. Nixon and Kissinger each, and independently, had these reasons on their agenda and, of course, they reinforced each other.

Nixon sent Kissinger a memo on February 1, 1969, approximately one week after his inauguration as President. I can't reconstruct this memo verbatim, but basically he instructed Kissinger to find a way to get in touch with the Chinese. This was one of the earliest instructions that Kissinger got from Nixon. Of course, Kissinger was all in favor of doing this.

We had the following challenge, among a lot of other challenges. You have to remember that we had had 20 years of mutual hostility and just about total isolation from China. We had no way of communicating directly with the Chinese. A lot of Americans were still very suspicious of China, even of an anti-Russian China, including a hard core of Nixon's conservative base. The American public really wasn't attuned to an opening to China as yet, although there were different attitudes on this possibility. We had allies who would be nervous about such an opening to China.
So there were many challenges facing us: how would we get in touch with the Chinese and how would we move, when we knew that they would always put the status of Taiwan up front as the dominant issue? There had been some sporadic talks with the Chinese Communists in Geneva and Warsaw, going back to 1955, but Taiwan, as well as other things, had always been the hang up to an improvement in relations. So the question was: how would we get in touch with the Chinese and how would we move past the Taiwan issue? How would we prepare our allies and the American public for this, particularly the conservatives?

So with all of the obvious advantages that Nixon and Kissinger saw, there were these challenges in the way. Here's the way Nixon and Kissinger went about it. First, in terms of communications, the only way to get in touch with the Chinese was through third parties. I don't have all of the details at hand, although they are available elsewhere. There were various channels that Nixon and Kissinger tried to use to get word to the Chinese. In a general sense, they were looking for a new beginning. One involved using De Gaulle and the French, another was Romania, and we finally, of course, settled on Pakistan.

So we began with indirect negotiations and communications. These warmed up, and we'll come back to that later on. We finally settled, as I say, on the Pakistani channel. Pakistan had the advantage of being a friend to both sides. There was no danger of Russian involvement, as we might have had if we had used Romania. France was a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally of the U.S. and not necessarily the best channel to use to contact China. So, for a variety of reasons we settled on Pakistan. That was one challenge, namely, getting in touch with the Chinese, which we worked out over a couple of years.

**Q:** May I interrupt? Why Pakistan? The British had had uninterrupted relations with China.

**LORD:** First of all, we would have been willing to use any of these channels. However, it was clear that the Chinese weren't picking up on any of them until we got to Pakistan. The British, of course, because of the Opium War [1839-1842] and their history with China would have been a bad channel for the Chinese. The Chinese didn't pick up on the British. If they had picked up with France, I think that we might have continued with the French. The Chinese also didn't pick up on the feeler through Romania. There might have been a couple of other intermediaries which Nixon and Kissinger tried out, but those were the main ones.

Also, under the general heading of communicating with China, another way that we communicated with China was through taking some unilateral steps at home, by relaxing some economic restrictions. This course did not require reciprocity on their part but was designed to show that we were interested in moving ahead. It was also designed to begin to condition our public and our allies that we were moving ahead in this direction. So several things were done. There was a toast which Nixon gave to President Ceausescu of Romania, in which Nixon used the phrase, the People's Republic of China. This sounds
unexceptionable now, but at the time no American official and certainly no President ever used that official designation, which the Chinese Communists wanted. We had always said Red China, Communist China, Mainland China, or something like that.

Even then we knew that the Chinese were very subtle. The Chinese would take aboard our just using that phrase, the People's Republic of China. I remember that at one point Secretary of State Rogers gave a speech in Australia which contained some positive signals to China. We selectively relaxed some Treasury restrictions and some travel restrictions, I believe, for travelers, academics, and perhaps humanitarian representatives. I don't have the details of this but I'm sure that they are in Kissinger's book. We also ended our regular naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait itself, cut them back at least.

The Chinese, in turn, quietly let go free the American yachtsman who had drifted into Chinese waters. Previously they would have made loud noises.

In effect, we signaled the Chinese, in concrete terms, that we were taking certain steps, however modest, and that we wanted to move toward a new beginning with them. These steps were modest enough, and enough in our interest, that we didn't require reciprocity. We didn't want to start to do something which they would have to respond to, tit for tat. We wanted to signal to them, even as we tried to get in touch with them through these indirect channels and messages of a private nature, through these unilateral steps where we wanted to go.

Finally, in the President's annual reports on our foreign relations of 1970 and 1971 we put language on China in them which would suggest to any careful reader that we were moving toward a new kind of relationship with China. By the time the report for 1972 was prepared, this point was quite obvious. So that was designed, not only to send a signal to China and other countries but also to condition our public opinion, which was the other problem, that we were moving toward China. Obviously, all of this, in retrospect, may be clearer than it was at the time. Despite all of these signals nobody was prepared for Kissinger's secret trip to China. A close observer, looking at President Nixon's toasts and statements, statements made by Secretary of State Rogers, as well as the unilateral steps, would surely have seen our tendency, and our goals, but I don't think that anybody could have predicted the dramatic step of Kissinger's secret trip to China and the Nixon trip. However, the fact that we were trying to move toward a better relationship with China was pretty clear.

The clashes along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 underlined the urgency of doing this. We saw the clear evidence of tensions between the two countries. Obviously, China's security concerns on that border, vis-a-vis the Russians, ensured that they would be particularly receptive. I don't have the exact chronology of these various moves but I'm sure that we stepped up our efforts after the border clashes.

Q: Was there also a feeling that things had reached such a point in China that we might be able to open up relations with that country? This is your field, but there had been this tremendous Cultural Revolution, its offshoot in terms of the Gang of Four, and all of that.
China really didn't seem to be ripe for an improvement in our relations.

LORD: I want to be careful here that I don't retrospectively put perceptions and views in place which are now clear to me and say that we held these views at the time. What was clear, of course, was that China, because of the Soviet threat, might well be interested in improving relations with us. The Soviet Union was clearly their biggest security threat, and the border clashes had made that clear. We sensed that already before then, and then those border clashes brought it home. So, in that sense, we figured that China would be receptive to these overtures, and for the same reasons that we were. The Soviet factor applied to both countries, in addition to more esoteric things, like dealing with the strongest power in the world, security considerations, and so on.

In addition, the proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968, after the Soviets put down the Prague Spring, Czech dissent, had a major impact on the Chinese. Naturally they were very concerned about Moscow’s asserting the right to intervene in other country’s domestic affairs for the sake of socialist solidarity.

You have to remember that, although the most extreme manifestations of the Cultural Revolution were in the late 1960s, it really went on, officially, until the end of 1976. So the Chinese were still sorting this out at the time. In addition to the Soviet factor we also thought that the Chinese might think that, if they could improve relations with us, that might open the door to relations with other countries. Japan was certainly holding back on its opening to China. The French had made some movement toward China, but the British and others, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, were generally holding back in developing relations with China because of the U.S. posture, whether this involved admission of Communist China into the UN or just generally dealing with it. We figured that the Chinese would calculate that if they could open the door with us, that would mean that they could break out of their isolation more generally with all of these other countries. Not to mention getting into the United Nations and beginning to establish at least unofficial, if not official, relationships and breaking out of various kinds of embargoes and isolation with Europe, Japan, and elsewhere. So we figured that that would be another incentive for them which would have a multiplier effect if they opened up with us.

I think that we had some sense that China must have felt somewhat beleaguered at this time. You may remember that the Chinese Government recalled all of its ambassadors during the Cultural Revolution, except for Huang Hua, who was Ambassador to Egypt. So they were isolated. However, frankly, we didn't know much about what was going on in China, as far as the full depth of the Cultural Revolution. We couldn't be sure at the beginning of our effort to establish better relations with China that Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai would have the vision and courage to open up with us. However, the Russian factor and the perceived Chinese need to break out of their isolation more generally by opening up with us were two of the reasons why, we felt, they would be receptive to our efforts.

Q: These are all oral histories, and we are focusing on the perceptions of the individuals
interviewed. You had been doing more general work for Kissinger. How were you clued in on the policy at that point?

LORD: During my first year on the NSC staff, from February, 1969, until February, 1970, I was not aware of the fact that we were doing private things to establish contact with China. We took some unilateral steps, as I have already mentioned. When I say that I was not aware that we were trying to establish contact with China, let me make it clear that I was not aware that we were trying to pass secret messages to the Chinese. I was aware of some of these unilateral steps because they started in 1969. These involved action taken by the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Commerce, maybe USTR.

Q: You mean the travel restrictions. Had the ping pong diplomacy business started?

LORD: No, that was later, in April, 1971, and we'll get back to that. It happened just before Kissinger's secret trip to China. When I became Special Assistant in February 1970, I was aware of the fact that we were searching for a new relationship with China. We were easing these unilateral restrictions, and I learned that we were starting to send some signals to China. I sat in on some of the discussions about what to do during the Sino-Soviet clashes along the Ussuri River, how much to intervene, what steps to take, and so on. So I was aware of that and the geopolitical desire to improve relations with China. I wasn't aware of that memo from President Nixon to Kissinger of February 1, 1969. I was not aware of the efforts to get in touch secretly with China. I was already aware, of course, that we had talks going on with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw. At the time those talks were being reported through official State Department channels. They were generally just sort of propaganda exchanges. Once I became Special Assistant I was privy to all these moves, of course.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: These were not actually resumed until 1970. There was an effort to try to get them going again.

LORD: Then they were broken off again after the incursion into Cambodia by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in the spring of 1970. When I became a Special Assistant to Kissinger, I was immediately told about the secret Vietnam negotiations and the secret China negotiations. I was more generally aware, then, of our dealing with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on the Russian front. I was involved in some of these issues but I didn't become fully involved, particularly with the message passing to China, until I became a Special Assistant to Kissinger in 1970.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: You mentioned that you took part in meetings on the clashes along the Ussuri River.

LORD: That's right.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Was there ever a discussion of the United States taking a clearer position on these?
LORD: As I've said from the beginning of this, I don't want to mislead anyone with a memory precision which I don't have. Again, I think that Kissinger's book would be the most detailed on this. There was certainly a feeling by Kissinger and, I assume, by Nixon, that in the geopolitical picture it would be dangerous for America if the Russians were to humiliate China. Also, these clashes gave us an opening with China; they really brought home their concerns and maybe made them more receptive to our overtures. Therefore, the issues were what signals could we send, either by restraining the Russians or what we might say publicly or on background, and how could we get word to the Chinese that we didn't want them to be humiliated? I don't recall the details of any actual debate about whether we would move military assets around, how much we would threaten the Russians, or how much we would say on background.

Kissinger’s main interest was the fact that there was tension on the Sino-Soviet border and that this gave us an opening to China.

So in 1969 and in 1970-1971 there were these public signals and attempts to get through to the Chinese through various channels. Again, the great detail would be in books by Kissinger and others, including Isaacson and so on.

This effort began to be more pronounced in the spring of 1971, of course. There was the ping pong diplomacy business and there was also an interview which Chairman Mao had with Edgar Snow. This interview indicated some receptivity to better relations with the United States. Nixon, of course...

*Q: Edgar Snow was a...*

LORD: Biographer of Mao and a journalist who had spent many years in China.

*Q: He wrote Red Star Over China.*

LORD: Yes. This book spoke admiringly of the Chinese Communists and of the Chinese revolution. We saw this interview as part of a signal back to us. I can't recall the precise chronology. We didn't get much back from some of the channels we opened up through the Romanians and the French. These wouldn't necessarily consist of verbatim messages passed back and forth. There would just be Nixon telling Ceausescu or De Gaulle that the next time they were in touch with the Chinese they might say that the U.S. was interested in better relations with China. It would be at that level.

I don't remember the precise chronology, but it became clear, certainly by 1971, that the Pakistani channel was the one to follow. We began to do it through Hilaly, the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington, who would come to us with hand-written messages from the Chinese, passed through Islamabad to him. He would bring these messages into Kissinger’s office, and we would prepare hand-written messages back. Often, I would draft them, or Kissinger would. Then he and I would go over the draft and send it back through Ambassador Hilaly. The issue became how do we move this relationship forward.
and how do we get beyond the issue of Taiwan dominating the agenda?

There was one exchange in Warsaw, in which the Chinese indicated, more or less on the record and through that channel, that they would be willing to see an American emissary come to China. This was phrased in general terms. Meanwhile, we picked up on that in the private messages through the Pakistanis. Again, I can't give you an exact chronology here. There were gaps in the contacts, sometimes lasting for months. Then through the Pakistani channel the Chinese began to talk about a possible American visitor to China.

There were two issues facing us. One was who would go? Also, what would the ground rules be? These were matters which were dangerous for both sides. So a lot of these messages were designed by us to get Chinese agreement. For us the issue couldn't just be Taiwan. Their initial position was, more or less: "Send someone over here. We can talk to you, but you must resolve the Taiwan issue before we can do anything else." We wanted to maneuver it so that while we were willing to talk about Taiwan - of course, we would have to do that or we wouldn't get anywhere with them - there would be a broader agenda as well. We finally got to the point in these messages where the Chinese agreed that an American emissary would come and talk about a possible trip to China by President Nixon. The emissary would not only talk about Taiwan but about other matters as well. This was the breakthrough, in the spring of 1971.

Once we had established that this was not just a single issue agenda, that they were willing to consider a Nixon trip, and that they were prepared to receive an American emissary first, then we could begin to get concrete. Right about this time, in the spring of 1971, we had the incident of ping pong diplomacy. This essentially involved an American ping pong team in Japan, which the Chinese invited to visit China. The ping pong team agreed. They went to China and had a warm reception. This was a major development. In fact, we hadn't had a group like that going to China throughout this period. We, of course, understood this event, particularly against the backdrop of our secret channel, that this was a clear signal by them to us that they wanted to move ahead and that they were beginning to prepare their own public for some movement on relations with the U.S. The invitation to the ping pong team was a very carefully calculated move by the Chinese.

So we had the secret channel getting more receptive regarding an American emissary and the fact that the agenda would be broader than Taiwan. We had the public comments by Mao to Edgar Snow, although I forget the date of this interview. Then we had the ping pong diplomacy incident. Meanwhile, we had taken some unilateral steps, so things were beginning to move.

**Q:** You were talking about China. You had John Holdridge, who was a China expert in the State Department. Here Nixon and Kissinger were trying to puzzle out China, which they obviously had no intimate knowledge of. Where were you getting the input for the messages you were drafting? Did it come from the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], Holdridge, or someone else about what the Chinese were probably thinking?

**LORD:** That's a very fair question. First, Holdridge knew quite a bit about China and
spoke Chinese. I want to make clear that I am talking about my own role, but Holdridge was clearly crucial here and throughout this period. He brought a lot of knowledge on the China issue to Kissinger and, through him, to President Nixon. In addition, we would ask the bureaucracy for various studies on China, not saying what the real purpose was, in terms of setting up a secret or dramatic breakthrough. However, these were legitimate study memoranda about China and they were very useful. Also we were moving ahead with these unilateral, economic steps. We would ask for analysis of the economic situation and other background material, as required.

Quite a bit of material was submitted by the State Department, CIA, and other government departments, in a legitimate exercise of looking at policy options, generally informing the President and so on. Then, in addition, Kissinger began consulting, on an individual basis, with outside scholars and experts on China. This included Allan Whiting, a Far Eastern specialist, and Andre Malraux, from France, who had written the book, "Man's Fate," and knew something about China. Malraux saw President Nixon as well. I'm sure that these consultations included others but I just can't recall them all.

I assume that President Nixon began to read up on China, as well. I certainly did the same. So there was a combination of Holdridge on the NSC staff; official memoranda from the bureaucracy, requested from the White House; intelligence reports in the normal course of events; and consultations with outside experts. I'll get into the preparations for Nixon's trip later. Does that answer your question?

Q: Yes.

LORD: One of the criticisms of the secrecy of this whole operation was that we couldn't fully take advantage of the people in the State Department, on the China desk. We included them finally, as we went along after the 1971 Kissinger trip. However, for a long while people would say that we didn't have the full advantage of their knowledge. Having said that, I would say that we would often get this knowledge by asking for memos. As we went forward on trips, we began to take this material with us. Kissinger went on nine trips from 1971-76. I was on every one. He brought along with him State Department people like Al Jenkins and Marshall Green, of course [Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs], in addition to others who could provide supplementary information and views. You're right. We didn't have the intimate, day to day exchanges that some of these people might have provided, had they been included.

Q: Did you have any idea who was sending the hand-written notes from the Chinese side?

LORD: We assumed that they were prepared by Zhou En-lai personally, after checking with Mao. There was no question that something of this magnitude was probably from Zhou En-lai. We didn't know whether Zhou En-lai personally drafted these notes or somebody who was the equivalent of Win Lord on his side. Clearly, these notes had Zhou En-lai's personal touch.
Q: One other question on the beginning of this opening to China. In a way, Pakistan seemed like an unlikely choice. Was there concern about a possible leakage? Were there any quid pro quos for the Pakistanis?

LORD: Well, as I said, we sort of tried various channels to see which ones the Chinese were most comfortable with. They chose the Pakistanis. I think that they did it because Pakistan had been friendly to them. China was having its problems with India. They had a war with India in 1962, so China had always leaned toward Pakistan, supporting it on the Kashmir issue, for example. The Chinese generally had a solid relationship with Pakistan. In fact, that has continued all the way through to the present day.

Meanwhile, on our side, we also would lean, on the whole, toward Pakistan. First of all, because we felt that India was lined up with the Soviet Union. Although India was head of the Non-Aligned Movement, it kept doing things that annoyed us. Even under previous American administrations, and more especially under Nixon and Kissinger, we tilted, to use the famous word, toward Pakistan. So Pakistan was a country which was friendly toward both sides, the United States and China. I think that's probably the main reason that the Chinese settled on Pakistan. There was little danger of leaks to India or Russia, which were two of the main concerns in terms of the opening to China at that point.

The other issue, of course, was who was going to go to China? There was some debate, as recounted in Kissinger's book. President Nixon was ambivalent about anybody going because it might take away from the drama of his going to China. Of course, by then he had this complicated relationship with Kissinger in terms of ego and sensitivity. However, he also wanted someone who could handle this trip effectively, and Kissinger was the best person to do that. He also recognized that he just couldn't go to China cold turkey and without preliminary preparations. He realized that it was necessary to prepare the way. We weren't even sure before the Kissinger trip whether the Nixon trip would even be possible. The purpose of the Kissinger trip was to set up the Nixon trip. We had to see whether there was enough to go on, to protect our flanks, and to see whether we could get around the Taiwan issue. So it was a tricky thing.

There was some debate whether we should send Ambassador David Bruce, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and I forget the other names that were discussed. I think that at one point Nixon just suggested to Kissinger that maybe Secretary of State Rogers should go. I don't think Nixon ever seriously considered that. Of course, from the beginning, Kissinger wanted to go. He thought that he was the best person to handle it, and I think that he was. Not to mention Kissinger's ego, sense of history, and so on.

Finally, they settled on Kissinger but, even then, there was some debate about where they, Kissinger and the Chinese, would meet. I think that there was some discussion that perhaps they didn't actually have to meet in China and that they could meet somewhere else. I think that there was a feeling that Nixon preferred that rather than have Kissinger go to Beijing, which had a certain drama. Maybe they could just meet over the border in southern China, across the border from Pakistan, or something like that. Again, it wouldn't be the same thing as going to the capital city of the Middle Kingdom [traditional
Kissinger, of course, was all in favor of making this trip as dramatic and as central as possible. He also felt that with the Chinese, in terms of psychology and face, a willingness for the American emissary to go to the capital of the Middle Kingdom would be useful. Another consideration was that Kissinger could meet whomever he needed to meet much more directly. This would be no more complicated, in terms of secrecy, than some other place in China. So eventually, and I don't recall the exact chronology or the number of messages that went back and forth, they settled on Kissinger going. They settled on the agenda including issues in addition to Taiwan, and on holding the meeting in Beijing. Then they agreed that, with the cooperation of Pakistan, they would make the trip to China through Pakistan.

Before getting to the secret trip itself, are there any questions that you want to ask, as background at this point?

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I have a question if it qualifies as background. Otherwise, postpone it. You mentioned the Taiwan issue several times. I was wondering if you could say anything about the attitude of Kissinger and Nixon, perhaps, toward Taiwan? What did they think of Taiwan at this time and how significant did they feel that it was as an obstacle?

LORD: I think that you have to be careful in retrospect. I think that it's fair to summarize their position as being friendly to Taiwan. Their feeling was that, in terms of American national interests however, you have to take some risks in that relationship, in order to move ahead with China. However, this must be done carefully, both out of loyalty to Taiwan and always conscious that, if you mistreat your friends, other allies and friends are going to get nervous about your steadiness. For example, that was a clear motive for our trying to get out of Vietnam honorably, and not undermining our credibility in terms of how we treat our allies. This point applied to Taiwan. Clearly, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to square the circle. They wanted to open up with China without having to go too far in destroying our relationship with Taiwan and, in the course of doing this, not only hurting our international reputation for steadiness and friendship with our allies, but also stirring up domestic opposition to mistreating an old friend.

So it was a cool-headed, hard-headed, and calculated sense of geopolitics which drove our desire to open up with China for all of the reasons that I've mentioned. We desired to do this with minimum disruption on the Taiwan front, but knowing that we were going to have to do some fancy footwork with the Chinese. From the very beginning, and this is reflected in the Shanghai Communique, the strategy was, in effect, and I think that it was effectively carried out, to postpone resolution of the Taiwan issue, try to appeal to Beijing's sense of geopolitics and fear of the Soviet Union and its desire to break out of it isolation, and to try to override its preoccupation with Taiwan. So we needed to devise an approach, and eventual language, that would preserve Beijing's position and preserve our interests. The idea was to keep working on the Taiwan issue, but we would kick it down the road for later resolution. So that was the basic approach.
Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: One other factor. You also mentioned relationships with allies and the importance of secrecy prior to this. There have been some suggestions, in some of the books written about this episode, that Kissinger didn't like the Japanese very much and that some of the secrecy involved in this trip was intended to send a message to the Japanese.

LORD: I wouldn't go nearly that far, because Japan is an important ally, and he wouldn't want to disrupt the alliance. I think that it is fair to say, and this continues to the present day, that Kissinger always had a certain suspicion of Japan, even as he had of Russia, versus a predilection to go easier on the Chinese. I've discussed this with him, and this view still persists. But surely he did not wish to hurt our ties with Tokyo or send any message.

Kissinger was genuinely concerned about leaks out of Japan, feeling that the Japanese were particularly prone to leaks in their media. He was aware of the Japanese-Chinese love-hate relationship, because of World War II and other matters. So it wasn't as if Kissinger wanted to hurt our relations with Japan. He was certainly too calculating in terms of American national interests to go out of his way to annoy Japan. That wasn't the point. However, he was prepared to run some risks to pull off the China trip correctly and not be pressured, whether by Japan or others, to lock ourselves into a position with the Chinese before we even set out.

Now Kissinger would be the first to admit that, as we moved to improve relations with China, we didn't handle the Japan side very well. The dilemma we faced about pre-briefing other nations is that we might be pressured by Japan and others to take positions before we even sat down with the Chinese. Kissinger and Nixon had the feeling that this was totally uncharted territory. It may look relatively easy and inevitable in retrospect, but it was very uncertain at the time. Making this trip to China was not without its risks, despite our feeling that the Chinese would be receptive because of their fear of the Soviets and of their isolation. Therefore, we wanted as free a hand as we could get when we sat down with the Chinese.

I don't know whether Kissinger would agree with me on this, but, in retrospect, I believe what we should have done to square this circle was to have someone, not very prominent or noteworthy, like myself or Holdridge, go to Japan, perhaps a week before the secret trip to China, or something like that. Such a person could have gone personally to Sato, who, I think, was the Japanese Prime Minister then and informed him in advance. In this way, as a minimum, when this news broke, he could have said that he had been informed in advance by the United States. We could have informed him and sworn him to secrecy. I think that it would have been worth taking that risk of a leak to have done this shortly before the secret Kissinger trip to Beijing.

I don't think any of us proposed this then, and I doubt whether Kissinger would have agreed to this. I think that he would have felt that this wouldn't work because Prime Minister Sato would have to tell his cabinet colleagues or be considered complicitous
himself in holding back this information. Then it would leak out, and all the down side of advance publicity I have talked about before would have occurred. We surely gave a shock to Japan, not to mention to some of our NATO allies and others. You could make a case for tipping off Japan more than Europe, since this was an Asian event. We might have informed the Japanese leader so that he could at least say, as a matter of saving face, that he knew in advance, as opposed to admitting that he knew nothing. The fact is that Japan had been holding back in its relations with China, primarily at our insistence. The Japanese were very anxious to move ahead, at least a little bit, in their relations with China. They held back because we kept urging them not to do that. So they felt betrayed when we leap-frogged them.

Q: Was this a matter of any debate beforehand in Washington, when you were making the preparations for the Kissinger visit to Beijing?

LORD: It must have been, but I can't recall any vivid debates, believe it or not. We must have talked about whom else to tell about this trip. These arguments about secrecy or not must have been explored. However, I don't recall this as being an ongoing, vivid, and raging debate. I certainly don't recall myself or anyone else, pressuring Kissinger to tell our friends of this trip in advance. I want to be fair about that.

Q: Particularly because of the impact on Japan, was there anyone in the NSC or in the immediate circle of people dealing with this trip who was really a Japan expert and who would understand the impact on Japan?

LORD: I think that almost anybody would understand that. You wouldn't have to be a genius or a Japan expert to realize that this visit to China by Kissinger would have a major impact. In retrospect, I don't think that we fully appreciated the depth of the shock and perhaps, a Japan expert would have brought this home. Certainly, John Holdridge knew enough about Japan to understand this. It's not as if we hadn't been dealing with Japan. We had a recently completed agreement on Okinawa, which was quite significant. We had some sporadic textile negotiations. I want to make clear that Kissinger, whatever his belief that Japan some day may go nuclear or become nationalistic again, certainly, as a friend and ally wouldn't want to go out of his way to cause trouble for Japan. Of course, Kissinger had certain priorities and was worried about leaks.

So I think that Kissinger and Nixon probably didn't fully appreciate the totally devastating blow which the announcement of the Kissinger visit to China would be in Japan. They certainly were aware that this announcement was going to break some crockery. They weighed carefully these considerations. However, I don't recall any raging debates about this, although I could be wrong. I certainly don't recall my pressing any other course than what we did, even though, in retrospect, I would have done it differently.

As we got into May and June, 1971 and with messages transmitted through the Pakistanis we settled on the dates, places, and everything else. I know that we had to bring our Ambassador to Pakistan, Farland, into the preparations, and the CIA, about how we
would do this. Farland came to the US, I believe California, for consultations. We got some special briefcases from the CIA with locks on them, and we began to get ready for the Kissinger trip to China. Together with Holdridge, I began feeding Kissinger with lots of briefing material, some of which we would get from the bureaucracy in innocent ways and other materials which we produced ourselves.

Kissinger chose three people to go to China with him. Myself, as a sort of global sidekick, Holdridge as the Asia and China expert, and Dick Smyser, as the Vietnam expert. The Vietnam issue would be a significant factor in the discussions in China. Those were the four, including Kissinger himself, whom he chose to go into China, as well as two Secret Service agents. Kissinger began reading extensively on Chinese history, culture, and so on. I, of course, did the same. I fed him other materials. We began to prepare strategy papers and talking points on various issues or formulations, some of which we would get from past State Department papers. Our famous formulation on Taiwan, that the U.S. acknowledge the view of Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, etc. I believe it drew upon earlier State Department think pieces and so on. Whether it was history, culture, or personal portraits, I'm sure that we requisitioned some of this material from the CIA and the State Department, although carefully, to disguise our real purposes. I can't recall just how much I drew upon my wife at that point, in terms of what she suggested reading.

So Kissinger began to bone up on this material. I think that we met with the CIA and Farland in California at some point to go over some of the secret logistics of how to get in and out of China secretly. At one point we went down to Key Biscayne, Florida and spent a few days game playing the trip, thinking about it, and preparing memos. So we began to get ready for it.

Now, as you recall, there was a publicly announced trip that Kissinger took. It included Vietnam, Thailand, India, and Pakistan. Then Kissinger was supposed to return to Washington through Paris. That was the public itinerary. However, the game plan was to go off secretly to Beijing from Pakistan and by pleading illness and the need to go to a Pakistani hill station to spend a couple of days allegedly recuperating while, in fact, Kissinger was secretly going into China. Ironically, Kissinger came down with a real stomach-ache in India, and so he actually was sick in advance of this secret trip. He covered this up as much as possible, because he wanted to save his real illness until he arrived in Pakistan. I should point out that for the public trip the key U.S. Air Force Special Missions aircraft were taken up for one reason or another. We had a rather poor aircraft. It had no windows and was quite noisy, as I recall. [FYI: This was a KC-135 tanker aircraft with fuel tanks removed and passenger accommodations installed. These aircraft have one fairly small window over each wing. END FYI]

I had the rather incredible job of juggling three types of briefing memos and schedules. There were three groups of people on this flight. In one group were Kissinger, Holdridge, Smyser, and myself, who not only knew that we were going into China but also were privy to the talking points, the strategy, and all of the stuff that we needed to get ready.
Not to mention the logistic details on when we would sneak out of Pakistan and how we would do it. This was all on a tightly constricted aircraft, I might add, on which we were going around to these other places. So I would have to keep those briefing memos up to date, including the logistics, the schedule, and the substance. There was the constant harassment by Kissinger of keeping them up to date and in not too gentle a fashion. I had to make sure that only Kissinger, Smyser, and Holdridge would see certain briefing books. I'm talking about people sitting right next to each other on the plane, some of whom knew of the secret trip to China and some of whom did not.

Then there was another group. I know that it included Hal Saunders, NSC Specialist for Near Eastern Affairs, who was along because we were visiting India and Pakistan. People in this group knew that we were going into China, because they had to help cover for us. However, they had no need to know what our strategy and talking points were with the Chinese. So Hal and a couple of others had another series of briefing books. These were sanitized or excerpted copies of the other memos.

There was the third group of people who didn't even know that we were going to China. They had to get a completely different set of logistics and non-substantive memos, as well as substantive papers on matters with which they were concerned.

So there was the usual harassment of Kissinger always looking for excellence and always revising things and asking me repeatedly to update things, complicated by the fact that I had to do three different versions of these revisions. This was one of the more hectic times of my life. Of course, it was so exciting and dramatic that I never begrudged any of this. However, it was a challenge. Kissinger himself has said in his memoirs that it was a rather extraordinary performance on my part. So all of that was quite exciting.

Q: I was wondering, what was the take that was coming through the system that you were seeing on the leadership in China at that time?

LORD: Before answering that, there are a couple of things that I want to recall before I forget them. There are a couple of amusing vignettes. Of course, of all the secret things that Kissinger did, along with the Vietnam negotiations, this was the most secret of all. Kissinger swore me to secrecy, as he always did. However, he also understood that I had a very open relationship with my wife and that I was telling her everything. At least Kissinger suspected that. I never quite admitted or denied it. I just trusted her. That's the kind of marriage I have, and I also wanted to get her advice, particularly on China. She was born in Shanghai and is of Chinese ancestry.

Kissinger has said in his memoirs something about the agony of preparing for this trip. He recalls that he told me that I couldn't even tell my wife about it because she was Chinese and would be suspected if there were any leaks. She knew a certain amount about our China policies. However, I was careful. I let her know that we were trying to open up relations with China. I wasn't precise with her about the details of the secret trip but I wanted her to know that we were going to go to China. I also wanted to keep my pledge to Kissinger. So the night before we left Washington on the publicly-announced
trip, I called her over to the window of our house and said: "Look out there. I think that I see a ‘Peking Tom’" and smiled. Of course, she understood what was going on.

Another thing is that I called her parents, as I always did, to say good-bye before setting off on this trip. I'm very close to my parents-in-law. I'll never know why, but my mother-in-law said: "Hope you enjoy your 'Peking Duck.'" I almost fell off the chair! I don't recall whether there was any public speculation about Kissinger going to China. I don't believe so. In fact, I'm sure that there wasn't. So I don't know how she had this instinct. Certainly my wife had not told her! I was very careful about leakage, of course, and I totally trusted her. Even in this connection I was a little vague, but I know that I wanted her to know where I was going.

The other point I want to make before we get into your question is that, during this period we were trying to improve relations with Russia. We had a mixed bag of results in this connection in 1969 and up to the summer of 1971. We're talking about July, 1971. We had been suggesting for some time that there should be a summit meeting between President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev. The Russians were dragging their feet on this proposal, as well as on the issues of Berlin and arms control. We clearly got the Russians' attention after this secret trip, and things began moving immediately. The point is that we were still prepared to have a summit meeting with Russia and, indeed, before we had a summit meeting with China, if we could arrange one when we went to Beijing.

We wanted to get our sequence straight before we landed in China. So there were instructions for Deputy National Security Adviser Haig to call in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin while we were traveling and to make one last suggestion of a Summit Meeting with Moscow. Haig was supposed to let us know the outcome of this proposal as we traveled. Anyhow, Haig made the pitch, Ambassador Dobrynin turned it down on instructions, or at least put it off. Haig called me at 3:00 AM local time in Bangkok. He got me out of bed. We used double talk on the phone, but Kissinger said that this wouldn't have fooled a kindergarten kid. Basically, he was saying that the Russians had turned us down.

We then made a clear decision that we would have a summit meeting with China first, assuming that we could arrange it, as opposed to a summit meeting with Russia. Of course, the Russians couldn't know how they were screwing up, because they certainly would have accepted a summit meeting first in Moscow, had they known that we were considering a summit meeting in Beijing. So that is of some significance.

Now, to get to your question. I don't recall all of the information we got on the Chinese leadership at that time. I'm sure that we drew on the resources of all of the U.S. Government agencies, including the CIA as well as the State Department. I just don't recall what these various sources said about the Chinese leadership. Clearly, I don't think that we could have appreciated the courage and vision that we saw in Mao and Zhou Enlai before we began to interact with them. I would quickly add that we saw these qualities, along with all of the other terrible attributes of both of these people, particularly Mao Zedong. I don't want my views to be taken out of context.
We weren't aware of the full extent of the Cultural Revolution, and certainly the horrors of it. I don't think that anybody was. It was clear that Zhou En-lai was a very skillful leader, but the impact that he made on all of us was much greater than we'd been prepared for. We obviously knew that he was a significant figure and that Mao was a major figure. We had no illusions; we knew that these were ruthless people. There was no question about that. You don't get to the top in that system without being ruthless. We knew about the famine, the Great Leap Forward, and what we knew about the Cultural Revolution, not to mention their intervening careers and so on. They talked about nuclear weapons; at that point they not only were in favor of having them themselves but were also relaxed about nuclear proliferation. They were opposed to us on all fronts and they used hostile rhetoric. I mean, this was not an easy crowd to deal with. However, we also knew their incentives in wishing to improve relations with us, and I have talked about them.

We obviously had detailed CIA and other reports on Mao and Zhou.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Was there any sense of factionalism? Did you have any sense that Mao and Zhou were doing anything that was dangerous to them?

LORD: I want to be careful about this. I am sure that we assumed that approval for broadened contact with us had to come from Mao. Obviously, it came through Zhou, because he was the man who was signing off on the communications. It was obvious that they were working together. I don't know whether we knew who might be hostile to us or the opening. But we knew that broadened contact with us would be very controversial in China, even as improved relations between the two countries were in the U.S. We didn't know how much they were keeping the fact of our contacts on a close hold basis in their bureaucracy, as we were in ours. One of the reasons for secrecy, in addition to the ones I mentioned, was that there was still opposition in China to what they were doing.

I have to say that, as I recall, we didn't have a particularly sophisticated sense of Chinese factionalism. Whether Lin Piao would be opposed to this course, for example, or how Mao and Zhou related to each other, although we probably knew that Zhou had survived by being loyal and always being Number Three in the Chinese Communist hierarchy, if possible, and not Number Two. We had the general sense that Zhou was more pragmatic and moderate than Mao, and things like that. However, I just can't recall how perceptive and how sophisticated our analysis of these Chinese leaders really were.

Q: But you did say that you had no idea of the magnitude of the disaster which the Cultural Revolution was.

LORD: That's right.

Q: We had this program for years of interviewing people coming out of China through Hong Kong, reading papers, and so forth. But still, you say, you did not know that the Cultural Revolution was such a disaster.

LORD: Well, we knew that this was a terrible system and we knew that the Chinese
people had suffered. I knew this personally because my sister-in-law, my wife Bette's sister, had escaped from China in late 1962 through Hong Kong, just in time for our wedding. At the time the Chinese authorities were letting some people out because of the terrible famine. She joined her family and was at our wedding in 1963. My wife wrote a book, before we went to Geneva [in 1965], called "Eighth Moon," based on my sister-in-law's living in China and getting out. So we knew first hand from her of the horrors of the system and the economic problems, as well as the repression. We, of course, knew of the burning of the British Embassy in Beijing and other acts of fanaticism and the isolation of China. So we were aware of these things. I don't think that we had a full sense of just how pervasive and devastating all of these developments were.

Even though we knew that the Great Leap Forward had been a disaster, I don't think that anyone knew of its extent. Even by Chinese Communist admissions, it was 30 million dead, or something like that. Yes, we knew that this was an unpleasant and terrible system. The Chinese leadership was composed of tough people, and the Chinese people had suffered under them. However, I think that the situation was worse than we realized. Of course, this was somewhat balanced by the emphasis of President Nixon and Kissinger, that the opening up to China was in America's national interest, even though the Chinese leadership was composed of an unpleasant group of people.

Q: Then how did this trip to China proceed?

LORD: A lot of material has already been published about how this secret trip to China worked out. However, this is how the secret trip worked.

We went publicly to Pakistan. There was a public banquet the first night. We went back to the government guest house. We packed and, at about 3:00 AM we were driven to the Islamabad airport by the Pakistani Foreign Minister I believe - Sultan Khan. It seems that they're all named Khan. I've seen him since. We went to President Yahya Khan's plane. Apparently, there was one reporter from some news service who thought he saw us and reported this to his editor. The editor said that the reporter was crazy and spiked [rejected] the story. I wonder what happened to that guy's career.

The plan was to be gone on this secret trip to China for 48 hours. We got on Yahya Khan's airplane. Let me talk about the cover story. We took off for China and we left about 4:00 AM. On that morning the story was put out that Kissinger was not feeling well and, at the invitation of the Pakistanis, he was going up to a hill station [mountain resort] to recuperate for a day. There was a Secret Service agent in a car, slumped over. It wasn't supposed to be an impersonation but he played Kissinger up to the hill station and, I believe, Hal Saunders was with him. So there was a motorcade going up to the hill station. All of this was done fairly early in the morning so that there were no journalists around.

Arrangements were to be made for a Pakistani doctor to attend to Kissinger at the hill station. This doesn't make much sense to me but the way I heard this story, the Pakistanis asked one doctor: "Do you know what Henry Kissinger looks like?" He said: "Yes." They
said: "We're sorry, but you're the wrong man." So they get another one. In addition, a couple of Pakistani cabinet ministers who were in on this charade went up to the hill station as if they were paying a call on Kissinger.

Meanwhile, of course, we were in China. At the end of that day the Pakistanis put out a communique saying that Kissinger still didn't feel very well and was going to stay another day at the hill station. This meant that our whole, public schedule in Islamabad had to be slipped because we were supposed to leave Pakistan for Paris on the following day. So the rest of the schedule had to be slipped a day. So that was the cover on that front. I don't how many people besides Hal Saunders knew about this, but he and Ambassador Farland were the key men in this respect.

Returning to our travel, Smyser, Holdridge, Kissinger, and I, plus two Secret Service agents, named Reedy and McLeod arrived at the airport in Islamabad. Reedy was the senior Secret Service agent, and he knew where we were going as we went to the airport. The other Secret Service agent had no idea. We boarded the plane and found four Chinese already seated there. I may be exaggerating this in retrospect but I believe that McLeod went to draw his pistol, because he was so surprised to see these Chinese on the airplane.

One of the four Chinese in the plane was Zhang Wen-jin, an Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of American affairs and a key negotiator with us, just below the Foreign Minister level. He helped to draft the Shanghai Communique. He was a very cultured man. He was later Ambassador to the United States. He was the senior Chinese official in this group which was already on the plane. There were also a Chinese Protocol Officer, a grand-niece of Mao named Wang Hai-rung, and Nancy Tang, an interpreter. There were six of us in our party.

During some of the plane trip Kissinger was studying his briefing books. During some of the time he was talking to Zhang, and he switched back and forth between these two occupations. I've always made a lot of jokes about this, but Kissinger was genuinely upset by the fact that he had no extra shirts with him. He had a special, personal assistant named David Halperin, who had packed his suitcase but didn't put any shirts in. So I've always said that, instead of worrying about this historic trip and what he was going to say to Zhou En-lai about geopolitics he was fuming about his missing shirts. He really was upset about his shirts. He borrowed a couple of shirts from John Holdridge, who stands about 6' 3" in height. Kissinger is about 5' 9", so he looked like a penguin walking around in one of John's shirts. He really was upset. Here it was, an historic moment, and he felt that he was would look ridiculous. He was really mad at a time when you would think that this would not be a big deal. However, in human terms you could see that at this most important and dramatic time, when he was meeting Zhou En-lai, he would be upset to look ridiculous in this shirt. And, of course, the shirts he borrowed from John Holdridge had a label that said, "Made in Taiwan."

Anyway, we were sitting on the plane. I forget how long the flight was. Perhaps seven or eight hours or maybe less than that. Here is a well-known story from this trip. I've always
tried to make it sound better than it was. I should tell it as it actually happened. Dick Smyser and I were sitting ahead of Kissinger in the back of the plane. The air crew, of course, was composed of Pakistani cabin attendants and Pakistani pilots, navigators, and flight engineers. No American official had been in China since 1949, so we would be the first American officials to visit China in 22 years. By my good fortune Smyser was called to the back of the plane by Kissinger for consultations just before we got to the border between China and Pakistan. All of the others, in addition to Smyser but not including me, were in the back of the plane with Kissinger. So, as we crossed the border, I was in the front of the plane. So I've said ever since then, in case the question should ever come up, that I was the first American official to visit China since 1949! I've said, on some occasions, that I deliberately raced to the front of the plane to do that, but that's slightly gilding the lilly.

Obviously, there was a great sense of drama. As the sun came up, we were passing K-2, the second highest mountain in the world. It was right outside our window, with the sun on it. Remember, we were in a Pakistani plane with the usual windows. We had left the nearly windowless KC-135 jet back at Islamabad. There was a sense of drama that we were going to the most populous country in the world, after 22 years and there were all of the geopolitical implications of that. There was the anticipation of meeting with Zhou En-lai, this great figure, and there was the excitement and anticipation of those talks. There were James Bond aspects of this trip, since it was totally secret. For me, personally, there was the realization that I was the first American official to visit China in 22 years and that I was married to a woman from Shanghai. I'll never top this experience in terms of drama.

Of course, we spent a good deal of time on the plane, discussing what the strategy would be in talking with Zhou En-lai and the Chinese. I had read very carefully the materials we had prepared over the previous several months. I don't have the precise time with me, but we landed at the military side of the airport outside of Beijing. We were met by Marshall Yeh Jien-ying, a well-known Chinese general from the Long March. I don't know whether he was on the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, but he was a very important figure. So that was a fairly high level reception. Also there to greet us was Huang Hua, who was later Chinese Foreign Minister. We entered limousines with curtains drawn, so people couldn't see into them. Then we drove into Beijing through Tiananmen Square and past the Great Hall of the People to a place called Dayoutai, which is the guest house compound for very important visitors. We were then secretly ensconced there.

I don't recall how soon it was before Zhou En-lai came over to greet us, but I'm sure that it was right away. We had a banquet that night, sitting around with Zhou En-lai. We had discussions with him which, according to Kissinger's book, lasted for 17 hours. We were in China for a total of 49 hours.

The major challenge, of course, was to work out an agreement that President Nixon would visit China and to develop some rough sense of what the agenda would be. We agreed in principle that there would be just a brief announcement, which both sides
would issue simultaneously, after we got back to Washington.

However, the real negotiating, and this went on for hours, was about the following. We wanted to make it look essentially that the Chinese wanted President Nixon to come to China. The Chinese essentially wanted to make it look as if Nixon wanted to come to China and that the Chinese were gracious enough to invite him. So we went through our first, agonizing process of negotiation on that issue. At one point we broke off the negotiation, not in a huff, but just recognizing that we were at an impasse. We thought that the Chinese were coming back to the negotiations within a couple of hours. Kissinger and I and the others walked around outside, because we knew that we were being bugged, and we couldn't discuss strategy and tactics unless we walked outside. Probably the trees were bugged, too. Who knows? I remember that we waited for hours and hours. The Chinese were probably trying to keep us off balance and were probably working out their own position. Most likely, Zhou En-lai had to check with Mao Zedong.

Finally, the Chinese came back, and we resumed the discussion and worked this issue out. I forget the exact language used in the brief communique which was made public. The formulation used went something like this: "Knowing of President Nixon's interest in visiting China..." And in fact he had expressed an interest in visiting China in general. The formulation went on that the Chinese had invited him. So it wasn't as if the Chinese wanted Nixon to come to China and were going out of their way. They used the formulation that they invited him because they had heard about his interest in visiting China. On the other hand, Nixon wasn't begging to go to China. So it was a fair compromise. This matter was covered in a few sentences, essentially, but it was tough to work out.

In the midst of this negotiation we also did some sightseeing. The Chinese closed off the Forbidden City of Beijing to tourists so that we could visit it privately and on our own. We had the head of the Chinese Archeological Museum and an expert on the area take us around personally as our guide. I'll never forget it. It was a very hot, mid-July day. I was carrying either one or two of these very heavy briefcases. We had to take them everywhere with us. We didn't dare leave them anywhere for security reasons. Of course, it was dramatic to see the Forbidden City all by ourselves. It was also very hot, carrying those damned briefcases around.

After that we had a Peking Duck luncheon-banquet hosted by Zhou in the Great Hall, I think. The main topic of conversation was, in fact, the Cultural Revolution. Here we saw just how clever Zhou En-lai was. We know that he, himself, was aghast at the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, which had been unleashed by Mao. At one point he himself had been imprisoned in his office by Red Guards. However, he hadn't survived this long by suddenly being disloyal to Mao and on an issue of that importance.

The way Zhou recounted this experience was basically as follows. He went through how he had been locked up in his own office. He talked about some of the exchanges he had had with the Red Guards, in a very clinical way. He then used some phrasing like the following. He said: "Chairman Mao is, of course, much more far-seeing and prescient
than I am. He saw the need for the 'Cultural Revolution' and all this upheaval and destruction to 'cleanse' the revolution." I don't recall exactly how he phrased it. Zhou continued: "I wasn't so prescient. I saw the excesses, the problems, and the down side." He said something like that.

If Mao read the transcript of what Zhou said, he couldn't have complained, because Zhou En-lai was saying that Mao had a better vision than Zhou did and saw the need for the Cultural Revolution. At the same time Zhou was signaling to us that the Cultural Revolution had gotten out of hand, had become rather brutal, and there were excesses. So it was a typical example of cleverness by Zhou En-lai. He was keeping his flank protected with Mao but was also making sure that the people he was talking to knew that he was a much more reasonable and pragmatic person. It was a fascinating performance. I'm sorry that Smyser missed it because he was sick.

When we finished drafting the communique, we got back on the plane and returned to Pakistan. We successfully re-inserted ourselves in the charade which had been worked out in Islamabad. We then went on to Paris the next day. It so happens, and we'll get back to this, that while we were publicly in Paris, we secretly snuck off and met with the Vietnamese Communists. Indeed, this was one of the more forthcoming meetings with them. Afterwards Kissinger and I thought, somewhat naively, that we had pulled off two, historic encounters in one trip: the opening toward China and moving toward settling the Vietnam War. That latter idea was a wildly premature judgment. I remember that we debated which was the more historic and important, getting the war over with or arranging for the opening to China. We said, wasn't it a great achievement to do both in one trip?

Q: Back to the meeting with Zhou En-lai, how were these negotiations carried out? Was it basically Kissinger and Zhou?

LORD: It was basically Kissinger and sometimes Zhou En-lai. Sometimes it was Zhang Wen-jin or Huang Hua serving as the negotiators on the Chinese side. Correct me here if your own research comes up with a different view, but Zhang Wen-jin and/or Huang Hua seemed to be serving as surrogates for Zhou En-lai. As I said before, in his book Kissinger says that there were about 17 hours of meetings with Zhou En-lai. I think that there were 17 hours of meetings but I can't believe that Zhou En-lai was there that long. Maybe if Kissinger adds in the luncheon and the other contacts with Zhou, the total time of his discussions with Zhou would add up to that. It was a long negotiation, but a lot of the time was taken up with waiting around for the Chinese leaders. We were not really meeting with them for all of this time.

Now, we didn't just talk about the communique. And each side set forth its positions on many of these key issues. There was considerable geopolitical exchange between Zhou and Kissinger, the beginning of one of the most remarkable multi-year dialogues ever conducted in diplomacy. I was privileged to be present throughout the hundreds of hours of talks between these two giants.
We also clearly, of course, talked about the agenda for the Nixon visit. We made it clear that, although we would talk about the issue which was the most sensitive and important to them, namely, Taiwan, we also wanted to talk about Russia, the Middle East, South Asia, Korea, and the beginning of bilateral contacts. So we began to set forth the agenda that we wanted to talk about. I'm sure that the Chinese kept emphasizing Taiwan but also agreed that there would be a broader, geopolitical discussion. In retrospect, I don't know how much time was spent on this. When Zhou En-lai was there, a lot of time was spent on these kinds of issues. Negotiating the communique would have been carried on with his subordinates.

Q: What would you do? Go through a certain amount of proposals, and then everybody went back and huddled?

LORD: Well, regarding the agenda, we weren't negotiating about a specific agenda. We just wanted to make sure that there were enough common interests and enough to talk about beyond Taiwan that a Nixon trip would be worthwhile. The Chinese, in turn, wanted to make sure that we were sufficiently flexible on Taiwan that they could get around their domestic problems with this issue. It wasn't a matter of negotiating or reducing to specific language these other issues. There was just a philosophic exchange. Indeed, we carefully crafted Kissinger's opening remarks and his talking points both to be sensitive on the Taiwan issue and to put the bigger picture forward and why it was in the interest of both countries to overcome decades of mistrust and hostility. So there were a lot of exchanges. This is where Kissinger was immediately impressed with Zhou En-lai in terms of his sophistication, historical sweep, and eloquence.

Regarding the negotiations on the communique, I don't recall exactly how they went, but I'm sure that we had prepared in advance a draft communique which we presented to the Chinese. The Chinese came back with their draft communique. We were far apart and began to haggle about the details, particularly this issue of who invited whom. I can't recall whether we decided, from the very beginning, to keep the communique very brief or whether both sides reached the point where we agreed that this was the only way to do it, that is, to announce the fact that Kissinger had been in China and that Nixon would be going to China in the spring of 1972. I believe this was the first time that the Chinese used their formulation that they knew of Nixon's interest in China and that they had invited him to come.

I don't recall whether we initially talked about other issues for the communique. I seriously doubt it. We felt that this communique would essentially be an announcement. It was dramatic enough in itself. It would be premature to negotiate on other issues. It would make other people nervous if we said that we had been talking about other matters. I am sure that, from the very beginning, the idea was just to have an announcement that Kissinger had visited China and that there would be a forthcoming Nixon trip. It was agreed that we had to maintain secrecy until we returned to the US. Certainly, President Nixon wanted to make the announcement himself, given the drama surrounding the matter. That was understood, and the Chinese went along with that.

Q: I take it then that there was considerable discipline on both sides in avoiding political
diatribes or simply setting out well known positions and all that sort of thing.

LORD: I would have to go back and look at the transcripts. Since Zhou En-lai was as sophisticated as he was, he would be firm in their positions on all of these issues, including Taiwan and other, geopolitical matters, but he also indicated his desire to move ahead with the relationship of China and the United States. His rhetoric would have been carefully modulated, so that it wouldn't turn us off. We, in turn, would be firm but clear that, despite our differences, we wanted to move ahead. Kissinger, on behalf of Nixon, was forthcoming on Taiwan even as he sketched the broad agenda. Indeed he began to set forth some important assurances on our Taiwan policy that impressed the Chinese side.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Dick Solomon has suggested, in some of the work he has done on negotiating with the Chinese Communists, that Kissinger so much enjoyed talking to Zhou En-lai that he would tend to go beyond his talking points and range more broadly.

LORD: Absolutely.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: In this particular instance of the secret trip to China Kissinger may have said some things that, perhaps, would not have been said had they been pre-rehearsed, in the sense that it was good to use the Chinese-American relationship as a joint U.S. and Chinese way to keep Japan under control. Or that Kissinger gave more ground than he might have on...

LORD: I would have to go back and review the transcripts. There is no question that in the discussions between Kissinger and Zhou En-lai they would range more widely, on this trip and on subsequent occasions when they got to know each other better. There would be a tendency to sit back and get away from the immediate questions at hand. This was in contrast with the practice when we were negotiating with Zhou En-lai's subordinates on specific language. Kissinger would have prepared talking points and positions on all of these issues.

At times Kissinger might push the envelope or use ambiguous formulations which might tempt the Chinese. He was forthcoming on Taiwan. As for other issues, he might have said things on certain issues that he would probably be embarrassed about if they were shown to the country that he was talking about.

On Japan, for example, Kissinger's basic thrust would have been to tell the Chinese that the U.S.-Japan alliance is in our interest and is in China's interest. So he would have said that Japan has an impulse toward nationalism and rearming. However, if the Japanese feel secure under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or our security alliance, then they won't go in that direction. Therefore, Kissinger would say, it is in China's interest for the U.S. to have good relations with Japan. We worked on them in that connection.

In the initial meetings the Chinese attitude was: "We don't like your alliance with Japan. We don't like alliances in general and we also don't like foreign troops on another
country's soil. You are just building up Japan and making it more dangerous." We would counter by saying: "If we didn't have this tie with Japan, they might go nuclear and rearm and be a greater threat to your security. So you ought to be in favor of this alliance."

Frankly, that argument made an impact on the Chinese over the following years. They reached the point where they clearly agreed with us. They have held this position ever since, until the last few years, when they have become more ambivalent about Japan.

Let's just continue with this particular episode, and then we can go back again. Obviously, we were very excited when we got back to Washington. I recall the awkwardness, and I did feel bad about that, when we were flying out from Washington to meet with President Nixon at San Clemente, California, a day or two before the announcement about the Nixon trip, and I was sitting on the plane with U. Alexis Johnson, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. He didn't know anything about the trip which we had made to China. He was an old China hand and had participated, I believe, in the Geneva and Warsaw talks with the Chinese Communists.

Q: Yes. He was one of the first to negotiate with the Chinese Communists, apart from the talks on the Korean armistice.

LORD: He was a very decent man. I sat outside his State Department office during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. I had dealt with him in Political-Military Affairs and I always respected him. To be flying out with him, knowing that in the next two days there was going to be an announcement on China, and he didn't even know about it, left me feeling very awkward indeed. I still remember that.

We got out to San Clemente and worked on Nixon's announcement. Nixon's inclination, and I think that he was entirely right, was to keep his remarks very short. It was so dramatic that he didn't need to elaborate. He could get away with a few sentences or a few paragraphs. The eventual announcement was only a few hundred words long.

Nixon announced in advance that he would be making a statement. Most of the press speculated that it was going to be on Vietnam, as they figured that almost anything would be on Vietnam. None of them knew that it was going to be on China. So we had some tense moments during the 24 hours or 48 hours out in San Clemente, putting together this announcement and, also, the game plan for informing, rather belatedly, countries around the world, not to mention our own government. We did this at the last minute. So that was a dramatic time.

Then, of course, Nixon went on TV and made the announcement. Everyone knows what a dramatic impact it had.

   Meanwhile, I had brought back with me for my Chinese wife a small sampling of Chinese soil.
VII. NSC - CHINA. NIXON TRIP (1971-1972)

Winston, we now have you back in the U.S. The announcement about the forthcoming Nixon trip has already been made. Did the NSC have occasion to deal with some of the repercussions of the Kissinger trip? We always talk about the Nixon Shock in Japan and other places in the world. Was there a certain amount of cleaning up, consulting, and letting everybody know about the developments?

LORD: There certainly was. On the whole, there was an overwhelming, positive reaction abroad. Of course, Japan was upset at the fact that we had leapfrogged them and hadn't kept them informed, given our complicated, historical relationships and the loss of face. Some of our allies in Europe would like to have been consulted as well. However, on the whole the reaction was that this was a dramatic development, it was courageous, and it was a geopolitical earthquake. It was considered basically in the U.S. national interest and was greeted with applause.

This was certainly true at home in the U.S. as well. I'm sure that there was some conservative sniping at the time. No question of that. However, on the whole, this announcement stunned everybody and was basically greeted as a major, diplomatic move. So I think that the malaise about the shocks and the lack of consultation was dwarfed by the positive reaction that was received.

This trip really catapulted Kissinger into fame. He already was achieving a higher profile, but you have to remember that until now, and still for some time, he didn't hold on the record press conferences. I'm trying to remember whether there was a follow-up interview with Kissinger at San Clemente. I can't recall. Basically, his meetings with the press were on background, but he was getting more and more famous. This really, as it were, put him on the map.

Yes, we were dealing with various countries. I'm sure that the State Department had to take the brunt of this, even though they didn't know about this development in advance, either. Japan presented the most serious problem, but I don't recall the specific details.

Q: The thing was that this visit went over so well that it overwhelmed what might have been the conservative opposition in the United States.

LORD: That's correct.

Q: So there wasn't any particular battle about it that I recall. Let's continue on the China theme.

LORD: Okay.

Q: So what were you doing at this point? Getting ready for the Nixon trip?

LORD: Yes. Then we had to work out the exact timing of President Nixon's trip to China.
and how we got ready for it logistically and substantively.

Let me pause and say that the most immediate and the most important impact was with Russia. We'll get back to Russia later, but let me say very quickly that we obviously got the attention of the Russians. As I said earlier, we had not been making much progress with the Russians. They hadn't agreed to holding a summit meeting, the SALT negotiations [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] were going slowly, the Berlin negotiations were not moving ahead, and we had up's and down's in the two previous years. Basically, we were trying to move, and Soviet-American relations were better than they had been in 1970, when we had several crises at once, but on the whole, we were just treading water.

Then, within weeks, the whole Soviet-American relationship started moving forward. This was very concrete evidence that the opening to China would help us with the Russians, which was one of the purposes of the Kissinger visit to Beijing. Within weeks, or months, the Russians agreed to holding a summit meeting as well, in this case in May, 1972, just a few months after Nixon would go to China. Of course, the Soviets realized that they had miscalculated and that they should have agreed to a summit meeting before the meeting in China was announced. The Soviets were totally caught by surprise. We then made a break through on the Berlin negotiations. I don't remember the dates, but that began moving very quickly, as we moved toward a very significant agreement. We made progress on arms control, so that we set up the SALTC1 agreement by the time we got to Moscow in May, 1972. We began to talk with the Soviets about economic and other arrangements. Of all the reactions to the announcement of the Kissinger trip to China, I would say that the most important one by far, of a positive or, indeed, any nature, was the reaction in Moscow. The most negative impact, of course, was in Japan, where the announcement caused severe embarrassment to the Japanese Government. However, the progress made in relations with the Soviets was very helpful.

It's hard to judge now how nervous this trip made Hanoi. It certainly didn't make the Vietnamese communist leaders immediately flexible. However, we figured that the combination of the announcement of both of these summit meetings was certainly going to put pressure on Hanoi to be more reasonable. We hoped, of course, that this would give an incentive to both Beijing and Moscow to put such pressure on Hanoi.

For example, in Beijing there was an ideological embarrassment in moving ahead with the U.S., which was fighting with their Vietnamese compatriots. We didn't realize fully at the time the extent of the Sino-Vietnamese hostility, either. We assumed at the time that, if they were not like lips and teeth, as they had once likened their relationship, at least the Chinese and Vietnamese communists were friendly. It was awkward for the Chinese to have American troops fighting against their ideological compatriots in Vietnam. Therefore, it was in the Chinese interest to try to get this war behind us.

Similarly in the case of the Russians, it was awkward, while they were trying to improve relations with the United States, to have their friends and allies engaged in a fight with us. In a little while I can get back to the Chinese view of Vietnam and how we dealt with
that.

So the most immediate impact, I'd say, was on Japan, Moscow, and, to a certain extent, Hanoi.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: The Russians had tried, at times, to play the relationship off. In other words, argue to the Americans that they would be better friends of the United States than the Chinese communists would be.

LORD: That's right.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Were you aware of that?

LORD: Oh, yes. This was a constant pattern with the Russians. They certainly didn't say: "We white men have to stick together." However, you also got the feeling that there might have been a cultural and racial undertone to this. I can't document when the Russians made their moves and at what time. They often floated proposals, including an arms control deal which, they thought, would unnerve the Chinese, as well as NATO. The Russians made references to their view that the Chinese couldn't be trusted, and so on. Of course, this was always deflected by Nixon and Kissinger.

So we began to think about how to get ready for the Nixon trip to China. I don't remember exactly when we fixed the dates of February 22 to 28, 1972. The announcement only talked about the following spring, I believe. We knew that there would have to be follow-on, advance trips before Nixon went for this visit to this unknown terrain. We had to decide on the specific cities that President Nixon would visit. So we scheduled another trip to China for Kissinger in October, 1971. Al Haig would go to China in January, 1972, and President Nixon would go in February, 1972. When we went to China in October, 1971, I don't believe that we knew that Haig was going to go to China in January, 1972.

The purpose of the Kissinger trip in October, 1971, was two-fold - substantive and logistic. We needed to prepare substantively for the summit meeting. Regarding the agenda, we needed to get a sense of each side's positions and see what might be said in any outcome, whether a statement or a communique. There would also be further, substantive exchanges between Kissinger and Zhou En-lai, in particular, to prepare the ground for Nixon's conversations when he came to China. Secondly, there were the logistical arrangements to be made. That is, what the schedule would be like, where Nixon would go and where he would stay, what his itinerary would be like, and the security and public relations preparations that would be needed. We wanted even to arrange at that point for satellite ground stations to support international coverage of the visit, although this was rather early in the game for satellite coverage.

We took along with us a lot of people from the White House staff to deal with the security and press side of the visit. I know that this was when Dwight Chapin and Ron Ziegler went to China. So we had a dual purpose in visiting China in October, 1971.
Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Why October?

LORD: Well, we had been to China on the secret visit in July, 1971. It took us some time to get our act together and get ready to go back in order to prepare for a Nixon trip that was coming in the spring of 1972. There was no magic aspect of a second Kissinger trip to China in October, 1971. It was just the natural rhythm of the calendar.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Some people have suggested, and there is some logic to this, that the secret trip was badly timed in terms of the United Nations and the votes there.

LORD: In retrospect, and to be honest about it, I don't think that we paid much attention to that. You're absolutely right that the timing of the secret trip was awkward in terms of the UN vote on Chinese representation. Our objective was to prepare for a Nixon visit to China. However, as we got on the airplane and were flying out of Shanghai - we flew from Beijing to Shanghai and then flew out of Shanghai en route back to the United States - we learned that we had lost the vote in the UN on the admission of the People's Republic of China. We had still been holding out, trying to ensure that, at least, Taiwan could stay in the UN as well. Of course, China would only accept one representative for China's seat. That was an embarrassing finale, to say the least, because it drove home the realization that we were causing pain to our friends with this opening to China.

You're absolutely right, and that's a good question. Why a second visit to China in October, 1971? In retrospect, we should have had a better sense of timing, and I just don't recall whether anybody said: "Do we really want to go to China in the middle of this UN debate?" I just can't recall whether we took this matter into our calculations. This was a tactical mistake. On the other hand, once we had made this dramatic breakthrough in July 1971, the UN sentiment was going to shift. We had to go sometime in the fall, during the UN General Assembly session so there was always going to be some awkwardness.

Q: You went on all of the trips in connection with preparations for the Nixon visit?

LORD: I went on all of the trips during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. There were nine trips to China. There were separate visits to China by President Nixon and by President Ford. Kissinger made seven other trips to China, not including the Nixon and Ford visits. I went on all nine trips. I did not go on the Haig January 1972 trip.

Q: How about the trip to China by Al Haig?

LORD: Haig went on his own to China in January, 1972. I don't know whether he ever went to China again, to be honest. However, as he was Kissinger's deputy, he wouldn't travel with Kissinger. He would mind the store at home when Kissinger went abroad.

Q: During the period between the time you came back from the first trip to China to October, 1971, you obviously had other things that you had to do, in connection with the Vietnam negotiations...

LORD: And moving ahead with the Russians.
Q: Yes, so things were really moving. However, you were also fleshing out an agenda that President Nixon would be taking with him.

LORD: That's right. As we did for Kissinger trips but obviously also for a trip as important as the Nixon visit, we did a lot of homework to get ready for that. First, we arranged by subject matter excerpts from Kissinger's conversations with Zhou En-lai and other Chinese during his first trip. So in terms of Vietnam, to take one example, we had everything that was said on Vietnam during the 17 hours of our meetings. That material would be excerpted from those conversations and put under that heading. These excerpts would be set out in terms of The Chinese Position and The U.S. Position. We set out goals and talking points and also defenses against Chinese attacks in certain areas. In other words, what's their offense and what's our defense? And vice versa. We did that on all of the issues.

We carefully drafted Kissinger's opening statement. We had the transcripts fully recorded both by excerpts and in terms of specific issues. We provided further background material both from CIA as well as from the State Department on Chinese personalities and their positions on various issues, plus the domestic situation in China. We prepared memoranda on Chinese relationships with other countries and what our goals were. Then we drafted a possible communique to be issued at the end of the Nixon visit. So we prepared the talking points and provided background on the various issues that might come up in Kissinger's conversations. We also set out goals for the summit meeting.

Then there was the whole logistic side, which was managed by Dwight Chapin and others. There would need to be agreements with the Chinese on how many press representatives they wanted to allow. Of course, the Chinese were shocked by the numbers we had in mind. Other matters involved security arrangements and logistics, personnel needs, and issues of this kind. So there was a massive amount of work to be handled.

Q: I would have assumed that the NSC staff would have been almost overwhelmed by virtually every Embassy in Washington and every Congressional political leader in our own country. They would be asking: "What did you people see in China and what are you doing" to make sure that you make this or that point?

LORD: I'm sure that this was the case. I don't recall specifically. In my own case I had my hands full with my own in box. My job was basically working with Kissinger and, with him, for President Nixon. Together with John Holdridge and others, I prepared analyses, talking points, and getting ready for the summit meeting. External activity with other countries would have been handled, either by the State Department or by the experts on the NSC staff for the region concerned. So if someone on the NSC staff had to see the Japanese Ambassador, short of Kissinger it would have been John Holdridge, or Sonnenfeldt with a European Ambassador, for example. There was a lot of that contact work going on, but it doesn't stand out vividly in my own mind.
Most of these contacts were handled by the State Department, which was getting up to speed itself, as well as by the White House. Kissinger was very careful about his staff talking to many people, and certainly not to the press or Members of Congress. So we wouldn't have spent much time dealing with external contacts. Certainly, I didn't. Others may have. However, you're right. There were a lot of queries, questions, and suggestions as to what we ought to do.

Q: The major issue before you, as you prepared for the Nixon trip, was Taiwan, wasn't it? As you prepared to set up the agenda, in a way you had to be coming up with what answer you wanted. Was there a debate raging within the White House over what was to happen with Taiwan?

LORD: Here, again, my memory is not clear, and I don't want to try to be overly precise. We began, of course, since the situation was now public, to draw in the State Department, including experts like Marshall Green, Al Jenkins, and so on. There were also people working with them who, I assume, had been working on China. I realize that they had been working on China at that point for some years. So we began to get previous formulations about what we had said about Taiwan and other issues in Warsaw and Geneva, also drawing from internal position papers. At least now, since this matter was public, we drew very heavily on these resources. We had drawn on these resources before, but always somewhat under false pretenses, at least about the immediate objective.

Now, of course, the subject was open. President Nixon was going to go to China. Kissinger was going back to China in October, 1971. He took some State Department people with him this time. So we could draw on these sources. These would include formulations on Taiwan. I can't remember exactly how all of this was thrashed out. I was the one who worked primarily with John Holdridge, getting Kissinger ready for the meeting. We had formulations on Taiwan, on the communique to be drafted, and so on. Basically, our approach on Taiwan was going to be trying to square the circle. We had no intention at that point, of course, of switching relations or anything that dramatic. The issue was essentially: "How can we kick this issue down the road?" And leave the Chinese enough face so that they could live with it, not solving this issue, certainly not trying to bite any bullets ourselves. We were very sensitive to the impact on our friends on Taiwan, other allies, and our domestic audience. So we came up with words which would be reassuring to the Chinese but which would not get us into too much trouble.

Kissinger had given some important assurances to the Chinese on Taiwan in July 1971, but then and thereafter our formulations were designed not to undercut Taiwan or our ties with it in any fundamental issue.

I don't remember any raging debates on Taiwan in our government. I remember that we put together some massive briefing books on this and the other topics.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Even early on, did you have a scenario on how long our process of normalization with China would take and that it wasn't leading to diplomatic
relations...

LORD: Not really. We did not have any precise time tables. My guess is that the general assumption was that we wouldn't bite that bullet of normalization until after the reelection of President Nixon in 1972. That was sufficiently controversial, not to mention the shock to Taiwan and so on, and also the political fallout. So we didn't want to bite that bullet at that time.

Now, I don't recall whether we ever sat down to the Chinese and said: "We'll do this in President Nixon's second term." I recall that when President Ford was in office, we made it clear that we would move ahead on normalization of relations with China during Ford's second term, if he was reelected. However, I don't believe that we were ever that precise, even among ourselves, beyond a working assumption that we weren't going to try, nor would the Chinese expect, to be able to pull off full normalization during President Nixon's first four years.

However, in February, 1973, after one of Kissinger's visits to China, we set up Liaison Offices in the two capitals. This step amounted to de facto embassies and normalization and was a major step forward. It also showed Chinese flexibility, since they had said firmly they would never have an embassy in Washington while the Republic of China was still there.

That's a good point that you raised. Without being precise about normalization of relations, we did have to figure out how we were going to communicate between China and the United States, since we didn't have Embassies or, at that point, even Liaison Offices. We ended up doing this two ways. One was through General Vernon Walters [the Defense Attache] in our Embassy in Paris. He talked to the ambassador named Huang Chen in the PRC Embassy in Paris, who eventually became Ambassador to the United States. Once the People's Republic of China was admitted to the UN, we communicated through the first PRC Ambassador to the UN, Huang Hua, who subsequently became their Foreign Minister.

We set up a communications channel through Ambassador Huang Hua in New York. Kissinger and I, or sometimes myself alone or Al Haig, depending on whether we were traveling, would go up to New York and meet Ambassador Huang Hua in a secret apartment, a CIA safe house about two blocks from where my parents lived, and where I had grown up.

We would have exchanges with the PRC in that apartment, and through Paris, whether it involved looking forward to the next trip or talking about the crisis in Bangladesh which concerned India and Pakistan, for example. We had exchanges with the PRC on such subjects. Or we just generally kept in touch. We had to work out communications, and these were the channels that we used until we agreed to set up Liaison Offices in Beijing and Washington in February, 1973.

We didn't have a precise timetable for normalization of relations. I don't recall the
formulas we used about saying to the Chinese that some day we looked forward to having
diplomatic relations and full normalization. I'm sure that these references were somewhat
guarded and certainly were not specific in terms of a timetable. Even as other issues came
up, we had to try to be as careful as we could, whether this involved our troop presence
on Taiwan, and so on.

So, from the beginning, you are absolutely right, Taiwan was the most sensitive issue,
obviously, even as we tried to keep in play all of the more positive issues.

Q: Regarding the agenda, you arrived in Beijing in October, 1971.

LORD: That's correct.

Q: The Chinese knew that you were coming to Beijing. Did you find that there was a
different atmosphere? Did you find that you were dealing with apparatchiks? Or was the
atmosphere one of, "Let's get down to business." Was there any euphoria?

LORD: No. Three things happened in connection with this trip. First, there was a
continuation and a great enrichment in the conversation over a whole range of substantive
issues, between Zhou En-lai and Kissinger. There were really remarkable conversations
between them. By the way, Kissinger has said that, of all the people he ever met in the
diplomatic field in his life, the two most impressive were Zhou En-lai and De Gaulle.
Since Kissinger spent infinitely more time with Zhou En-lai than with De Gaulle, he
probably would put Zhou En-lai in first place. Maybe De Gaulle would have rivaled that
if Kissinger could have spent as much time with him. However, Kissinger has always
said that Zhou En-lai was one of the two most impressive people he has met. Kissinger's
conversations with Zhou En-lai were always interesting.

There was a continuing process of feeling out by each side as to where our strategic goals
could converge and how we could handle difficult issues. That was one aspect of the
Kissinger trip and an end in itself, with Kissinger going back and talking to the Chinese.

Then there were the two goals of setting up President Nixon's trip to China. On the
substantive side, and related to the one I just mentioned, we were beginning to see what
the leaders would say on these issues when they met, together with mine fields to be
avoided and areas of possible convergence to be explored. Specifically, and I'll get back
to this, there was the communique, which turned out to be The Shanghai Communiqué.
This would be the concrete result of the Nixon visit and obviously very important.
Further, there were the logistic preparations on where the President would go and what he
would do. If you like, I could discuss both the communique process and the public
process.

Q: Yes.

LORD: Let me discuss the public process first. I don't recall how much of this was fixed
before we went to China and how much was fixed when we were there. It was agreed that
we would arrive in China on February 22, 1972, and remain through February 28, 1972, Chinese time. President Nixon would go first to Beijing, then to Hangzhou for its natural beauty and just to go to another place. Then we would go to Shanghai and leave China from there. There would be roughly a day each in Hangzhou and Shanghai and four or five days in Beijing.

The way the Chinese handled this, and they were very clever in helping to get ready for the Nixon visit, involved getting their own public used to the fact that the American President was coming after 22 or 23 years of total hostility and isolation. During this time the Chinese Communists had demonized America in their own propaganda. So, although we found out that there was underlying respect and affection for the United States by the Chinese people, despite this propaganda, and which was quite remarkable, nevertheless, both in terms of high ranking cadre and even some of the Chinese leaders, and in terms of the general public, the Chinese had their own need to begin to condition the Chinese audience as to what was coming. This renewal of contact was a shock for us, but it certainly was quite a turnaround for the Chinese, as well. So, in effect, we did a dress rehearsal, wherein Kissinger and the rest of us would go to places that President Nixon would be going to, both to check them out, but also gradually to reach wider Chinese audiences.

The most restrictive were the private meetings with Zhou En-lai with a handful on each side. Then there were broader meetings with more people on each side, substantive and logistic. We went to see a cultural performance of some sort, even on that trip, to which high Chinese cadre were invited. So the next circle of people we saw and were seen by consisted of fairly high level party officials who had been specially invited and were exposed to Kissinger and us. Then we went to the Summer Palace and the lake, which is a famous tourist attraction, including for ordinary Chinese citizens. So we were there, not only checking out this site for President Nixon but also exposing the Chinese people to the Americans and the fact that Nixon was coming. We went to these places, both to check out the logistics, the security, the attractiveness, the symbolism, and the photo opportunities, but also to begin to condition widening circles of the Chinese people that Americans were coming and that this was to be accepted, and so on.

Q: I assume that there was rather intensive, TV coverage of all of this.

LORD: For the trip in October, 1971, I don't believe so. This is partly because the Chinese weren't physically set up with satellite TV, as we were later on for President Nixon's trip, and partly because Nixon, with his ego, didn't want his thunder stolen. So I don't believe that there was TV coverage on the October Kissinger trip, or Haig’s trip.

Q: I meant internally, in China.

LORD: No, I don't believe so even then, either. The Chinese didn't have much television. For example, and I just saw this figure the other day, as late as 1978 or 1979, which is, after all, five or six years after our first trip, something like 10 million Chinese had access to television. I'm not talking about 10 million TV sets, but access to television. Today, the
figure for access to TV is over a billion Chinese. So you can see how far they've gone.

I don't know how much press coverage there was of the October Kissinger trip to China. We may not have had any press with us. President Nixon would have been very annoyed, had we had much press with us. Kissinger would have been sensitive to this point. He got enough drama out of his secret trip to China that he wasn't about to upstage Nixon by getting all kinds of photo opportunities. You should remember that it wasn't just us there at this time. There were also Dwight Chapin, the security people, and Ron Ziegler, the press spokesman. They'd make sure that President Nixon wasn't going to be upstaged.

We checked all of those sites out. We did not go to Hangzhou and Shanghai. We stayed in Beijing. We managed pretty much to put together the arrangements for the trip. There was a lot of haggling, I'm sure, as there always is, particularly with the Chinese. But it's also true with the Russians and others. There is the question of security and whose security officers are going to ride in whose car. Nixon had to use Chinese cars, and the Secret Service people resisted that. As far as the press arrangements were concerned, the Chinese probably expected a few score press people, at the most. The Nixon press people asked for credentials for 200 press, or whatever the figure was. The Chinese just gasped. However, the Chinese were quite forthcoming, certainly on the media coverage. They probably saw that this was to their advantage, despite their nervousness and being totally aghast at the number of journalists who would be coming for the Nixon visit. Regarding the entourage of the American President, the Chinese were relatively forthcoming. Kissinger used to joke that the cultural shock was extraordinary when the Chinese talked to the advance party about publicity.

Among other things which probably was done on this trip, or maybe on Haig’s trip, was that Kissinger laid the groundwork for the President and him to meet with Zhou En-lai and others to discuss the political issues, including the particularly sensitive issue of Taiwan, and the communique. Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministers, William Rogers [Secretary of State] and his Chinese counterpart, Ji Peng-fei would deal with things like trade, cultural exchanges, blocked assets, and economic and other bilateral issues. This was arranged so that they would have parallel conversations and keep the State Department out of really important negotiations. This was nothing that anybody was proud of.

Q: Was Mao Zedong a factor in any of this?

LORD: No. We didn't expect to see him in October. Again, that would be upstaging President Nixon. Mao really only saw national leaders. He was a factor, and I'll get to the communique in just a minute. He was a factor on that. Zhou En-lai was always deferential to Mao and would always invoke him. So, in the course of conversations Mao’s name would come up. We were sure that, for something of this magnitude, anything major would be approved by Mao. However, we didn't see him, and he wasn't directly involved. I am sure that Zhou En-lai was keeping him posted as we went along. So I think that that covers the logistics of the visit, as far as I can recall.
Q: Was Deng Xiaoping involved?
LORD: No. At that point, no. He made a couple of comebacks, but at that point we had never heard of him. I know that. At that time he probably would have been in one of his down periods and still hadn't recovered from the Cultural Revolution as yet. You have to remember that the Cultural Revolution went on until 1976. People really started to be rehabilitated in 1977-1978. Deng went up, went back down, and went up again. We didn't meet Deng for the first time until he led a delegation to the UN in New York in 1974.

Are there any other questions on logistics? I can get to the communique and the substance, but I think that's about all I can remember about logistics.

There were quite interesting aspects with regard to the communique. We had in mind a rather typical communique, in which we would try to get in there as many points of convergence, agreement, and parallel policy as possible. Even if we had to stretch it, given the fact that the two countries had been isolated from each other and mutually hostile, and we agreed on almost no issues on the international scene. In the course of our conversations with Zhou En-lai we handed him a draft communique.

Q: We're still talking about the trip in October, 1971.

LORD: Yes. The whole idea was to get as much as possible in the communique negotiated on that trip, so we wouldn't leave it until the last minute and under the pressure of the summit meeting in February, 1972, and last minute deadlines. So we wanted to try to get the communique squared away. Ideally, we would have liked to have everything negotiated. As I will describe, we ended up getting the great bulk of it done, except for the Taiwan issue, where we made some progress but still had some outstanding problem areas, which had to be negotiated at the summit meeting.

So, of course, we had this rather well-done, standard, diplomatic communique covering a lot of issues and suggesting that the meeting was very friendly, marked by convergent perspectives, but without being stupid about it, or going overboard.

At the next meeting it was obvious that Zhou En-lai had checked with Mao. He came back and just tore into us with revolutionary fervor, in effect stating that we had given him an amateurish and ill-advised draft communique which was basically useless. I'm not trying to reflect what Zhou En-lai said in a verbatim way, but what he said, in effect, was that we had fought against each other in Korea, the U.S. had intervened on the Taiwan question, and we disagreed on many world issues. He said that the U.S. had some allies, and China had some allies. We had totally different social systems and views of the world. We had gone through 22 years of mutual hostility and isolation. He said that your people, our people, and our mutual friends around the world are not going to understand this kind of communique, which suggests that we are like two, normal countries getting together for a regular, summit meeting. He said that this is absurd.

Furthermore, and I don't know that he put it this way, but the sub-current of his remarks would be that some of our respective allies are going to be nervous. If we are this
friendly, this might mean that we are selling them out. In addition, he said that the
description of the world situation in the draft communique wasn't sufficiently
revolutionary from his standpoint. He indicated that it was in a bourgeois pattern, and so
on. So he said that the whole draft lacked credibility, candor, and, furthermore, couldn't
be defended by the Chinese ideologically, in their own party circles, with their own
people, and with their friends. By implication he suggested that we might have some of
the same problems that certainly the Chinese had. As far as China was concerned, there
was turmoil under the heavens, and we shouldn't pretend that there weren't significant
differences. He went on for some time, just ripping us apart.

Instead, he suggested, and this was at his initiative, that we have a different kind of
communique, which was unprecedented in diplomatic practice, in which each side would
state its own position. He said that in those areas where we do have some agreement or
some parallel interest we can state those as well. However, he seemed to be saying that,
having set out our differences, we would each have protected our domestic flanks,
relationships with our friends and allies, and made more credible those areas of
agreement when we stated them, because we had been honest enough in the rest of the
communique to make the points. We had been separated, we had been hostile to each
other, and we had these continuing differences. So when we get to agreements, people
will believe us because they have seen our candor beforehand.

Frankly, this was a brilliant idea.

Q: Oh, yes!

LORD: It was unprecedented. I don't know of any other communique quite like the
Shanghai Communique. The fact is, not only is it invoked routinely and so on, it still is a
governing document in some ways. I don't believe that I can think of another such
statement, lasting so long in significance. I'm not speaking of something like the Treaty
of Versailles ending wars. However, in terms of a summit meeting, I can't recall any
summit communique in history which has lasted this long, still having some significance
and being invoked by both sides continually and being recognized by the public. This is
because of the unprecedented nature of it.

So we had our work cut out for us because, by this time, we only had about two or three
more days left in China. Indeed, we may have extended our trip by a day or two in order
to negotiate the draft communique. This may have led to this terrible timing at the UN in
connection with the Chinese representation issue.

Kissinger and I went back to the guesthouse. I don't recall whether we immediately saw
the wisdom in this approach or not, but we had no choice in any event. Certainly,
Kissinger soon saw it, as did I, but at first we were disappointed that we weren't going to
have some nice document that would record the major achievements at this forthcoming
summit meeting. We were a little bit worried about justifying this visit to our domestic,
U.S. audience. But I think that we fairly quickly saw the wisdom of the approach which
Zhou En-lai had advocated.
After we went back to the guesthouse, we spent a frantic night, although we spent some more frantic nights during the negotiations on Vietnam. We proceeded to take the draft communique which we had received from the Chinese. I can't remember whether they gave us a full draft of the communique. Certainly, they didn't set forth our positions. However, they set forth their position, on the world in general, ideology, revolution, and whether justice is more important than stability in dealing with the strivings of the poor around the world. Then the Chinese described their friendship with Vietnam, with Pakistan, their backing of the Arabs, and their backing of North Korea, etc, and their related positions on key issues. They mentioned all of these things where we more or less disagreed, certainly in philosophy and ideology. They probably included one or two sentences that the two sides hoped to improve bilateral relations, or something like that.

So we had a challenge of how to accept the Chinese approach. I think that we recognized, to a certain extent, that it was probably a good idea. However, at that point, given the time pressures and the fiery nature of the Chinese rhetoric in their draft, we were pretty concerned. We would never admit to panic, but we were under pressure. We worked in shifts in dealing with this task.

Kissinger went to bed first. I can't give you the exact time. I would say that it was at about 10:00 or 11:00 PM. I spent the next few hours doing a redraft of the Chinese draft communique. In doing this I tried to accomplish three things. Tone down the Chinese rhetoric. This was somewhat presumptuous - trying to tell them what they could say. We said to them that they could very well stand firmly for their positions, but it was not in their interest to excite our own, domestic audience. This would tend to undercut the President's initiative. There needed to be some restraint in the fire eating rhetoric contained in the Chinese draft communique. We needed to tone down their draft because what sounds like natural rhetoric to them sounds pretty polemical and hair-raising in American ears. So one of the parts of our redraft was to take the Chinese positions and try to tone them down, without overdoing it in terms of our chutzpah, because, after all, it's their view of the world, not ours.

Then I set out to state our positions. We decided to do this firmly and honestly, both to balance the Chinese position to a certain extent, to reassure our friends and allies where that was appropriate, to be firm as a matter of general principle, and also to deal with our domestic audience so that it would look as if we were firm as well. We would not, however, employ the kind of rhetoric that the Chinese communists did. So, setting forth our positions would consist of both of us surveying the international scene, ideology, and so on. We also put in principles of international relations on which we felt we could agree, even if we could not agree on the analysis of whether revolution was afoot or whether justice was to prevail over stability. We, the Chinese and the United States, put in several principles, such as non-interference, which they liked, and the view that both sides oppose hegemony, which was a code word for the Russian threat. We liked this, and they liked it as well. It was the single most important agreement in the communique. Neither Moscow nor the world missed it. There were some other principles added to this. Then there were contrasting statements on specific international issues, such as the ones I
Then we had to have language on Taiwan. The Chinese had set forth their position, so we had to set forth our position, maybe finding some areas where we could agree on Taiwan.

Finally, toward the end, we needed to beef up bilateral areas where we already converged and where we could make progress. So we beefed up things like looking forward to an exchange of persons and more economic exchanges. And so we prepared this redraft of the communique. I’m not sure we put all this in during the first draft but we at least headed in these directions.

This is the kind of material I was working on. Then, about 3:00 AM, I woke Kissinger up and gave him my redraft of the communique. I went to bed until 6:00 or 7:00 AM. During this time he redrafted what I had prepared. Then we went back to the Chinese that morning. We gave them our counter-draft, and then both sides kept preparing counter-drafts. We made considerable progress in terms of most of what became known as the Shanghai Communique, except on Taiwan, where we still had significant differences on which we couldn't close the gap, although we would like to have done this.

By the time we left China, in terms of the communique, we had about 80 to 85 percent of the communique done, including pretty much what they were going to say on these issues up front, internationally and on specific issues, and what we were going to say. I think that we had agreement on most of these international principles. There were four or five of them, including the one on hegemony. Although we still wanted to beef up bilateral cooperation in future, positive directions, we had at least some of that in the draft. However, there was still a considerable gap on Taiwan. So that's where we were as we left.

Q: On the technical side, who was looking at the language on both sides? Were the Chinese looking at the English language and you looking at the Chinese text?

LORD: That's a very good point. Frankly, we relied on their interpreters in the conversations. As I mentioned, Nancy Tang had been on the plane from Pakistan. She had also done some interpreting for Mao. Ji Zhao-chu was actually Mao's interpreter in the interview with Edgar Snow and had been an interpreter as a young man. He had attended Harvard University. He was also a key interpreter in this context. Tang and Ji did the checking on the Chinese side, obviously translating it for the Chinese leadership, as well as sending it up to the Politburo and Mao, or whoever was reviewing it.

We just worked in the English language. John Holdridge spoke Chinese but not, I believe, well enough to be precise. I'm sure that when we got back to Washington, we checked out the texts with our expert translators and interpreters, in terms of precision in Chinese. You are right. We had to make sure that the Chinese language version matched our English language version.

It was our general experience that, unlike the case with the Russians, the Chinese were
fair on translation matters. In their translations they wouldn't try to sneak in a Chinese word that was more to their advantage than what we meant in English. Sometimes, you have two or three choices. You can take this word or that word. The Russians could always be counted on to take anything that they could find in the dictionary that would serve their cause, even if it was a real stretch of what both sides genuinely meant. In this way they were picking up loose change all the time. This is one reason why Kissinger began to prefer dealing with the Chinese, rather than with the Russians. This was partly because the Chinese were always fair on translation issues.

For example, in the Shanghai Communique, after we issued it, and we more closely examined what they had done after we got back to Washington, we found a few instances where the translation of a given phrase could have gone either way. They actually gave us a word that was more favorable to us than it might have been.

The other reason that Kissinger preferred dealing with the Chinese was that they were more up front about their basic position. When you got a position from them, it was pretty close to their bottom line, even from the beginning, rather than inflated, as was the case with the Russians. As I said earlier, you never knew where the Russians’ bottom line was. You always had to slice down to reach it, which means that you, yourself, have to pad your own position. We preferred the Chinese, principled approach.

So, on the issue of language, we were pretty much at their mercy, but this didn't turn out to be a problem. There was no problem in the conversations, because several people on the Chinese side understood English, and John Holdridge knew enough Chinese to double check anything that we needed. The Chinese really had no incentive to distort the translations. Zhou En-lai himself understood some English. He would often laugh at Kissinger's jokes before they were translated.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: What was the reason for not taking your own translators and interpreters with you?

LORD: By then the trip was public knowledge. In the first place we didn't have too much talent, certainly in the U.S. Government. I guess that Chas Freeman was about as good as you could get at that point, but he certainly wasn't up to the Chinese standard. However, it was mostly a matter of Kissinger not wanting to have extraneous people around for sensitive discussions.

Q: So when you got back to Washington with the Shanghai Communique...

LORD: It was an advanced draft of the communiqué. (End of tape)

Q: You were saying that you had accomplished a great deal.

LORD: We had accomplished a great deal in terms of the communiqué. I think that we began to see more clearly why this was a good, though unconventional approach. I remember that we were also still concerned about the Taiwan issue. Obviously, it was so
sensitive to both sides and very sensitive in terms of the President's domestic support for this opening to China. So we knew that we had a lot of work already done on that, but we also did a lot of homework over the next few weeks, trying to figure out how to bridge the gap.

Al Haig went back to China in January, 1972, primarily to pin down the logistics of the Nixon trip. He worked with the advance security and public relations people. I think he also tried to make further progress on some aspects of the communique, but I don't recall that he made much progress on it. However, he did a good job with the logistics.

Q: Then you returned to Washington in the fall of 1971.

LORD: That's right. We had the embarrassment of the UN defeat on the Chinese representation issue as we were flying home. We had gotten on the plane, quite excited on the progress we had made for the Nixon trip. Then we had this immediate downer and shock of the UN vote.

Q: The UN vote being...

LORD: The People's Republic of China was admitted to the UN and Taiwan was kicked out. Obviously, we knew in our heart of hearts that was probably coming soon. We fought hard to keep Taiwan in, together with China, without success. To have it come just as we were leaving China was really quite embarrassing to Kissinger and Nixon.

Q: Why were we making a stand on this, because we had been fighting on this issue for a long time? This had been a sort of major occupation of the Foreign Service for 20 years or more. We tried to get all of these countries to vote for Taiwan and against Communist China. We had expended tremendous, diplomatic capital on it, but as soon as we began to open up to China, we must have known that, in effect, we were trying to hold back the sea.

LORD: Of course, we knew. What we tried to do was to promote a two China approach, even though we did not recognize the PRC officially, in an effort to allow Taiwan to keep its seat in the UN. I can't remember whether we opposed Beijing getting into the UN at all or whether we were saying that if the PRC gets in, Taiwan should also remain a member.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: This was called “dual representation.”

LORD: Yes, dual representation. However, getting back to the incentives to the Chinese to move with us, one of them was to get into the UN. They knew that this would be part of the fallout of their breaking out of their isolation and establishing relations with other countries. So we honestly lost all of our leverage with the July Kissinger visit, and it was inevitable that the PRC would be admitted to the UN. The Chinese hung tough on the point that Taiwan had to leave the UN. So I think that we knew that the PRC would be admitted, but the real issue was whether some honor and credibility could be preserved for our domestic position for this initiative by keeping Taiwan in the UN as well. This
would certainly mitigate the blow. The UN vote was not only on admitting the People's Republic of China but making clear that there couldn't be dual representation of China and that Taiwan had to get out of the UN.

There were some ironic overtones in that outcome for my family. My father-in-law, Sandys Bao, as I said earlier, represented the Taiwan Sugar Company in the United States. Sugar was Taiwan's major export in those days, though it has since diversified its exports. He was also Taiwan's representative on the International Sugar Council which would meet periodically in London. The council included representatives of all of the major sugar exporting and importing countries and was connected to the UN. So you could argue that I did my father-in-law out of a job. But he hung on in that job, and Taiwan remained a member of the International Sugar Council for what I think was a couple of years after the UN admission of Beijing as a member. This was because of his own capabilities and skills and the fact that he was held in such respect by his fellow delegates. They went out of their way to try to preserve his position. Basically, I cost him one of his jobs.

The other ironic thing was that when my wife and I were married in 1963, our wedding reception was at Twin Oaks, in Washington, DC, which was the residence of the Chinese Nationalist Ambassador at the time and until 1979. The Chinese Nationalist Ambassador gave us a wedding reception. Then, eight years later, I snuck into China with Kissinger and greatly shocked Taiwan.

Let me say that my father-in-law fully understood what we had done. In fact, he told me that the opening to China was in the national interest of the United States.

_Q: When you came back to Washington after the first Kissinger trip in 1971, were you pretty well concentrated on the preparations for the Nixon visit during the period from October, 1971, to February, 1972?_

LORD: A lot of other things were moving, too. Of course, we were concentrating on preparations for President Nixon's trip to China. However, you have to remember that the pace of contacts with Russia also picked up. I spent nowhere near as much time on Russia as I did on either Vietnam or China. However, I was certainly involved in contacts with Russia. That meant negotiations on the status of Berlin, SALT-1 [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks - 1], and beginning to move toward the holding of a summit meeting in Moscow, as well. Again, these preparations did not take much of my time. I was fully deployed on China and Vietnam.

The situation in Vietnam was also moving. I don't have the dates in front of me, but we were still making secret trips to Paris during this period as well. And in a major speech in January 1972, the President revealed our secret negotiations and our forthcoming negotiating position. So it was an extremely busy time. Indeed, the following year and a half was one of the most dramatic times in U.S. diplomatic history and certainly in my personal life, because we had the Beijing Summit Meeting, the Moscow Summit Meeting, the ending of the Vietnam War, and assorted other events in the course of that
However, to return to the China front, first we had to get ready for Al Haig's trip to China in January, 1972, making sure that he was prepared, and working with the White House domestic staff on the logistics, as well as trying to make further efforts on the draft communique for the Nixon trip. I think that Haig also raised Vietnam a great deal, to try to get the Chinese to continue to pressure Hanoi, and so on. So we were preoccupied with that. I recall being in Florida when we were launching Haig right at the time of the Super Bowl. I am a fanatic Redskins fan, and they were in the game. Kissinger gave me about a six-hour drafting assignment about three hours before the kickoff. I did the job in 2 hours, 55 minutes.

Then, of course, when Haig returned to Washington, we only had a few weeks before President Nixon's trip to China. I was put in charge of the preparations for the President's trip, which meant that I had to orchestrate the whole thing. I had lots of help, of course, particularly from John Holdridge, who was crucial and much more of a China expert than I.

This was the most meticulous process of preparation, as Kissinger has said in his memoirs, which has probably ever been undertaken for a summit meeting, both because it was so important and because of its historical significance. So, as I've already mentioned, we put together six black briefing books about so high.

Q: Looks like about eight inches thick.

LORD: Yes, six or eight inches thick. These briefing books were filled with everything from Chinese history to Chinese culture and poetry; personal portraits of Mao Zedong, Zhou En-lai, and the other, principal Chinese leaders; all of the transcripts of conversations during our trips in July and October, 1971, and Haig's trip in January, 1972, arranged by subject matter as well as the full transcripts on their own; the Chinese positions and objectives on every issue; our positions and objectives on every issue; our offense and defense; further elaborations of the draft Shanghai Communique, particularly with reference to the Taiwan issue; Chinese popular sayings. We had chronicles and excerpts from articles by outsiders.

We just had an incredible and rich array of material. To this day, and I have worked for several Presidents, I have never seen any President work as hard for a single event or trip as Nixon worked for this trip. As I mentioned earlier, quite literally, there was proof of his having read every page of these briefing books, because there would be his marks and annotations on almost everyone. Often there would be questions and requests for further information. When we finally went to China with Nixon, he kept asking on the airplane, as we flew toward China, for more information. This resulted in a good performance by President Nixon with Zhou En-lai, Mao, and the other Chinese leaders.

Q: You were talking about the preparations for this Summit Meeting in China. I don't know how it was then, but now one has the feeling that when a Summit Meeting comes
up, the major preparation on the White House side is for photo opportunities. The public relations people almost take over. They are concerned about the time of day the television coverage will be available, headlines, backgrounds, and all of that. Were they melded into your preparations?

LORD: Certainly. There was the major focus on substance - this was after all a truly historic event and exhaustive talks were held during the trip. But the public impact in the US, China, and the world was key and integral to the substance, so the public dimension was clearly a key part of the trip, which was heavily televised. It had a tremendous impact back here in the United States. In fact, this coverage led to the almost instant romance and euphoria that was overstated. After all, horrible things were still going on in China. We swung from one extreme to another, from picturing China as an implacable enemy to a new friend, so to speak. This reflected somewhat a sort of built-in respect and affection for the Chinese people, and also an appreciation for its geopolitical and historical significance.

Q: This goes back to the beginning of the United States as a republic. I have a history of the United States Consular Service. We couldn't get consuls in places like Germany and such countries. However, back in 1790 or so Congress immediately approved the appointment of a Consul to go to Canton. China and the China trade have always...

LORD: That's right. There has always been a genuine liking for the Chinese people, a sense of this huge market, as well as the Christian missionary connection. This feeling has been reciprocated on the Chinese people’s side, as we found during our first public trip in October, 1971. The Chinese were amazed and stunned at the sight of these Americans walking around. However, they were certainly friendly and not hostile. It was clear, as we went along, that the Chinese people, despite all of the years of propaganda and enmity, genuinely liked Americans. Partly by comparison with all of their other neighbors.

In the case of Japan, even the young Chinese who hadn't experienced World War II had heard stories about the Rape of Nanking, and so on. There was a clear dislike and distrust of Japan. Also a real concern about and dislike of the Russians, as we learned more and more since then. The Chinese have expressed to us their distrust of the Vietnamese. This was also true of their attitude toward the Indians and, to a certain extent, the Koreans. So, as the Chinese looked around their periphery, these feelings were evident. And they didn't like the Europeans, and particularly the British, because of the history of the Opium War [1839-1842], in addition to other depredations by Germany and so on. So, even though the U.S. may not have had a perfect record in our relations with China, we certainly looked more benign and friendly than others.

So, on both Chinese and U.S. sides, there was a generally positive feeling. Of course, Chinese public opinion was under tight control and supervision there. I think that it's fair to say that the Chinese public welcomed this opening of relations. There was undoubtedly debate about the opening to the U.S., maybe among the Gang of Four, and perhaps Madame Mao and Lin Biao didn't like all of this. There may have been some debate at
the highest levels of the Chinese leadership.

In the U.S., in turn, there was a tremendous outpouring of affection for China. Part of our problem is that we haven't had a steady gaze toward China. American emotions have run the gamut from the evil Fu Manchu to the noble peasant depicted by Pearl Buck. If we just take American attitudes from the last 50 or 60 years, our perceptions have ranged from regarding the Chinese as staunch allies in World War II to enemies, starting in 1949, when Mao Zedong took over the country, or the Korean War, when we wound up fighting each other. We were appropriately horrified at the Great Leap Forward, the ensuing famine, and the Cultural Revolution. Then, suddenly, now there was this opening to China, the tremendous romance and euphoria, and the feeling that we are going to be friends again. Subsequently, Deng Xiaoping came along with capitalism and the view that the Chinese were going to become market economists just like us.

Then, in the 1970s, we began to hear stories about the Cultural Revolution as we had more journalists more or less permanently stationed in China and began to see the warts as we began to have a more normal relationship with that country. In the later 1980s, the relationship was at its most positive though the bad dimensions of the Chinese system were clear. Then there was the Tiananmen Square massacre [in 1989] and the image of the man in front of the Chinese tank, and we went back to a negative perception of China again. Also, the Soviet threat, key to our ties, disappeared. Now we are slowly moving back again, with somewhat more mixed feelings. At one point the Chinese were referred to as yellow hordes, Red Guards, and blue ants. Now they are capitalist men and women. So there have been these great swings in American perceptions of China.

Certainly, at the time of the beginning of the opening to China, including the Kissinger and Nixon trips, the reportage out of China was pretty positive and euphoric. People were sort of swept up in this. There were few people who were negative. Certainly, Bill Buckley [conservative columnist and publisher] was one of those who went to China and returned with clear reservations. Marilyn Berger of the "Washington Post" was skeptical. They began looking beneath the surface in China. But almost everyone else was swept up in this euphoria.

That was a very windy response to your question about the preparations for the Nixon visit. Of course, a lot of preparations were made, including arrangements for the press and photo opportunities. However, those preparations were essentially made on the other side of the White House. We were concerned with the substance of the Nixon visit.

At times Nixon, Kissinger, Haldeman, Chapin, and Ron Ziegler might have debates. Kissinger would always be worried about being crude with the Chinese. After all, we were visiting their country, and should we be rearranging their furniture? (This was literally done once in Canada in Prime Minister Trudeau’s office.) We needed to have some sensitivity toward China's own culture, as China was the host for the Nixon visit. Of course, the President's advisers on the public relations and political side were much more concerned about the images and popularity at home of the President. So there was always that kind of tension. However, it worked out very well.
We, of course, were focused on the communique and the substantive issues and how we would handle relations with other countries which were watching this trip as it developed.

Q: Did you have a feeling that Nixon was trapping himself, not so much in a contest, but in a display of his intellectual virtuosity in dealing with Zhou En-lai? He had heard about how great this man was and he may have wanted to show, by God, that dealing with him was part of Nixon's makeup. Do you think that was a factor?

LORD: I think that that was an element. I mean, any of us, as human beings, when we go up against a heavyweight, want to do our best. So I'm sure that there was that element. However, in all fairness, I think that during those early years of his administration, particularly before the Watergate Affair began to preoccupy Nixon, he prepared very carefully for the major meetings that I also attended, including the Russian summit meeting. In effect, Nixon would commit to memory his basic positions. He liked to talk without notes, whenever possible, to impress people. So this tendency was really carried to a super level on this historic trip. Nixon was very careful in getting ready for these meetings. He really did his homework. Foreign policy issues were his primary passion, even though he became concerned more with the domestic front. People now realize this more clearly than they gave him credit for at the time. He was actually quite progressive on many domestic issues.

So there was that element of ego in Nixon's makeup. He knew, from Kissinger's recounting of his conversations with Zhou En-lai, that this was a formidable interlocutor and that he had to be up to that. However, this was also an historic trip, and it was very important to Nixon in terms of substance, in gaining Chinese confidence, in projecting firmness, inducing them to cooperate, and pointing out the advantages of cooperation.

In addition to substance, Nixon also wanted to have a good sense of Chinese culture and history, what he could say in his toasts, how he could work in little Chinese sayings and poetry in his toasts and in some of his remarks at the various meetings. And Nixon was genuinely interested in China, as most Americans are. He wanted to learn more about China himself.

So Nixon had all of these incentives, in addition to the historical and geopolitical significance of it. Furthermore, he knew that, although the meetings would be off the record, he nevertheless would be watched with tremendous attention on the world stage, including American television.

However, all of this preparation didn't do the President much good when he got to the Great Wall. I can't say that I blame him. There he was at the Great Wall, and the press came up to him and said: "What's your reaction to this?" He answered: "It surely is a Great Wall," and that's about all he could come up with after all of his preparation for this visit. That was the only - and very minor - incident where Nixon did not perform splendidly.

Q: On the domestic side, what were you getting from your wife and your wife's family? We were going through a sort of euphoric time in terms of relations between the United
States and China. Were you getting advice from the pillow, "Don't trust these people?"
What were you getting?

LORD: No, not at all. First, as far as my wife was concerned, it was very exciting that the Nixon visit to China had taken place. She recognized that it was in the U.S. national interest. She felt some pride and excitement that I was personally and directly involved in this. She had a sense of irony that a person like me, who was directly involved, had a Chinese wife. She had, of course, a real feeling of love and respect for the Chinese people and a willingness and desire to overcome a feeling of isolation from the Chinese people, including her relatives in China. So all of these feelings were basically very positive.

The same thing was true of my parents-in-law, even though the Nixon visit had a direct impact on my father-in-law. He was working indirectly for the Taiwan Government. It's hard to exaggerate how responsible he was in his comments to me. There never was any sense of "Why did you do this" or, "How dare you?" In effect, it was just the opposite. He said to me, although he wouldn't want to be quoted in Taipei at the time, "I fully recognize that this trip is in the American national interest." So the opening had no impact in our family except excitement. Even my in-laws were excited that I was involved in this event. There was absolutely no problem in that connection. Of course my wife was very helpful to me - and Kissinger at times - in interpreting Chinese culture, history, and style. And she was aghast about the political system. She also was the only person I remember predicting Deng Xiao-ping's come-back in 1974-75.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: What about the China Lobby?

LORD: You have to remember that the NSC staff, and particularly myself, in my position as a Special Assistant to Kissinger and being responsible for this particular portfolio, had very little contact with the outside world.

I rarely got out of the damned office. Sometimes I attended dinner parties, for example, in the Georgetown area of Washington, including with Kissinger and, I would see, some of the movers and shakers in social settings. But I would always be late. I had no contact with the Congress, no contact with the press, no contact with foreign diplomats unless I was sitting in on a meeting, for example, with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin or going up to New York with Kissinger for a UN contact. So I wasn't personally exposed to this. I don't recall any tremendous pressures from the right wing, or China lobby. I'm sure that there was some concern expressed to Nixon and Kissinger. Certainly, the overwhelming reaction from the media was positive, as was the overwhelming reaction from everywhere. American public opinion and Congress were an easier sell politically than, we thought would be the case.

I'm sure that Nixon, in particular, was somewhat nervous about public reactions as we went along including his conservative base. This initiative did take some courage. I'm sure that Nixon was pleasantly surprised at how limited the negative reaction was. At least, that's my clear recollection.
Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: In your position on the NSC staff you were talking about being protected or isolated from the outside world. Do you think that was a good or a bad thing?

LORD: Given the office hours I kept, this lack of outside contact probably was inevitable in any event. It also fit in with Kissinger's style. However, it also was a reflection of the fact that I was a Special Assistant to Kissinger. The quick answer is that this situation was probably bad. It would have been better to be exposed to the outside world, including Members of Congress, foreign diplomats, the general public, and even the press, to ensure that I wasn't so insulated. Having said that, I must say that I had so much to do that I wouldn't have had much time for such contacts.

Secondly, I had more sensitive information than anyone else in the NSC staff, except for Al Haig and Kissinger, since I was involved in all of these initiatives. I'm not saying that other NSC staff members didn't have as much information on particular issues, but nobody else had this kind of information on all of the issues. So there was that factor.

However, to deal with outsiders, we had NSC staff people for specific countries or regions. They would have their own clients. So the European expert on the NSC staff would meet with a European diplomat or businessman, etc. I wasn't involved in that because I was a Special Assistant to Henry Kissinger. So for all of these reasons I was insulated from such contacts. I think that it would have been better if I had been more exposed to such contacts.

Q: Shall we move on to how the visit went and all of that?

LORD: As I look back on my career, I think that the secret trip was in first place in terms of drama. The Kissinger trip to China in July, 1971, was secret and it was the first such trip, I had a Chinese wife, and so forth.

The Nixon trip has to be up there, probably tied for second place, if not in second place. Certainly, the trip which brought peace to Vietnam is also up there, and would be in second or third place. Then, next would be the Moscow summit meeting, in fourth place.

The Nixon trip to China was obviously a tremendous event. I run out of adjectives in describing its drama. There was a big buildup to it, and we started it going. It was massively busy getting ready for it, of course, for all of the reasons that I've mentioned.

We got on the President's plane. I can't remember how we moved from my office to the airport. At one point we were on the South Lawn of the White House. President Nixon took off on a helicopter. I remember being with my kids and my wife. I thought that it was on that trip that we were waving goodbye to the helicopter. But how I got to the plane in time is a mystery. Something is screwed up in my recollection of it.

I remember getting on the plane at Andrews Air Force Base. There was a TV on the plane, which we were watching from right outside the President's cabin, in the senior
staff quarters. On the TV people were saying goodbye to the President and us taking off from Andrews Air Force Base. As we took off, we still were watching it on television. I was saying: "If this plane explodes, we can see ourselves explode on television!" This was a case of sick humor.

In any event, we made two stops: one in Hawaii and one in Guam. On the trip to China with Kissinger in October, 1971, we had stopped off in Hawaii (the Big Island) as well. We stayed at the most beautiful hotel there on Mauna Kea. That's the good news. The bad news is that, by being closer to Kissinger on this trip I got to stay instead in a guest house up in the mountains. I would much rather have been in the hotel, as we were working very hard on the visit.

As I said, on the way to China we were very busy, revising talking points and getting more information for Nixon. That is all I can remember.

Q: A technical point. You say that he was going through these huge, briefing books on the plane. You say that Nixon wanted more information.

LORD: The work continued on the plane. I want to make that point clear.

Q: I was thinking of your statement that, during the flight, Nixon wanted more information about this or that, in a plane over the Pacific Ocean. How did you get more information from Washington?

LORD: We would prepare more elaborate talking points, as opposed to our having to do the research on them ourselves. The people in Washington could give us more positions, I think. If it was more information wanted, there were people on the plane, in addition to myself, who probably knew it right away. But if it was information on the Paris negotiations on Vietnam, we had the briefing book. If it was a matter of Chinese history, culture, or something like that, hopefully someone on the plane knew the answer. I can't recall how well our communications worked with Washington, whether we wired back for more information or not. We certainly did this during our later trips with the President and others.

I don't want to exaggerate this. I'm not saying, for example, that we turned out 500 pages of text on the plane. However, continually and throughout the trip, even on the last leg of it, there were requests coming back from the President for more information. I don't recall - as I did in all of my trips with Secretaries of State and other Presidents - that I ever sat around with Nixon and others, kicking around strategy and tactics. I don't recall precisely. There were probably a couple of conversations that I had with the President in the cabin. It was mostly working on papers.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Was this when you sat around with Nixon and talked freely about China?

LORD: We did that on a few occasions, but not very often. This was partly Nixon's style,
perhaps due to his shyness. He probably didn't want a lot of people around him. Certainly, it was part of Kissinger's style. He didn't want to have a lot of the members of his staff with direct access to Nixon.

Once or twice I went up to Camp David [in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland], when I sat around with Kissinger and Nixon. There were other times when he handled matters differently. Unlike subsequent Presidents and Secretaries of State with whom I have worked, I don't have any recollection of a lot of strategy sessions or directly briefing Nixon, and so on. I want to make clear that Nixon was always friendly and cordial to me. I'm sure that I've already mentioned this, but basically we were isolated from the domestic side of the White House. However, during the October, 1971, trip, and the Presidential trip, we tended to converge a lot more. So too on the Moscow trip.

However, we always sort of felt that we were being treated as second class citizens by the White House staff. As I said previously, we were never admitted to the White House mess and didn't have parking privileges. I don't think that Kissinger made any heroic efforts to get us into the White House mess or have us mingle with the domestic side of the White House. Looking back on it, given Watergate and everything else, it's just as well that we were pretty well isolated. But I would have liked White House mess access on all those late nights in the West Wing basement.

So, anyway, there was a great sense of drama when we went to China with Nixon. I remember that when we landed at Beijing Airport, maybe naively I was somewhat disappointed at what I considered the strained nature of the Chinese reception. We had expected thousands of people in cheering crowds, after 22 years of hostilities. There was a very small crowd, including a Chinese Army honor guard. Looking out the window at the welcoming ceremony, I thought that it was a fairly grey day, too. This didn't look like a monumental event, as it ought to have been.

Of course, everyone was wondering how the first encounter would go between the President and Zhou En-lai, who was at the airport to meet him. They all remembered that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had snubbed Zhou En-lai in Geneva in the 1950s when he refused to shake his hand. That initial handshake this time was clearly going to be important. Nixon left the plane, walked down the steps, and went over and shook Zhou En-lai's hand. This was a famous photograph. I have a copy in my house of just the hands shaking. This picture is dedicated to the New China Hands. Then there was a restrained reception at the airport, with the band playing, the national anthems, review of the honor guard, and so on. There were not many people there. The reception was very cool. Then there was the motorcade to Tiananmen Square and on to the guest house. There were no crowds in the streets, except the usual ones. No one had been lined up specially. Again, I was somewhat disappointed. The press noted that the reception was rather restrained.

Q: I think that this point came out in my interviews with others. John Holdridge, for example, mentioned the coolness of the reception. Chas Freeman mentioned the same thing. It was almost humdrum as far as they were concerned.
LORD: It was, considering the buildup and the drama of the moment. It was sort of anticlimactic. There was the inherent drama, but there wasn't the color and excitement that one expected. I can't say that I was depressed by this, just that we felt that there was not quite the elation we expected to feel at the time.

We got to the guesthouse. I think that Zhou En-lai briefly said goodbye to the President to allow him to freshen up and relax. About one hour later Zhou En-lai came back to the guesthouse and asked to see Kissinger. He said that Chairman Mao wanted to see President Nixon right away. Before the trip we had never pinned down when the President would see Mao Zhedong. Obviously, we assumed that he would, of course. This would be a meeting with the highest Chinese leader. The Chinese indicated that Mao would meet with the President, but they never said precisely when this would be. This was a typical example of the Chinese style, where the Emperor used to keep visitors on edge, and the schedule was never fixed until the last minute. This was true of other trips that we had. This was partly intended to keep us off balance, and partly to make us feel grateful when the actual meeting took place and that it did take place.

The immediate reaction was, not being mad, that they just sort of said, "Come on over and see the Emperor." Obviously, there was instead excitement. Also, there was an immediate recognition that, whatever the restraint of the initial reception, the fact that Mao was going to see President Nixon within the first couple of hours of his arrival was very significant. It was going to send a clear signal to the world and to the Chinese people that Mao personally was behind this visit and the historic importance of the event. So this was obviously very good news, even if it was a somewhat unorthodox way to proceed with the leader of the Free World.

Nixon asked Kissinger to go with him. That was his intention, to have just the two of them at the meeting. Nixon didn't want Secretary of State Rogers along. We also thought that there might be more than one meeting with Mao, since this was so early, and Rogers could go to a later meeting. Indeed at one point Zhou had suggested that there might be two meetings with Mao. Kissinger, to my everlasting gratitude, asked me to go as well to this historic meeting. Basically, on the one hand, it was a reward for all of the hard work that I had done, generally for Kissinger and specifically on the China initiative and that, together with Holdridge, I had been in overall charge of the major preparations for the Nixon visit and the drafting of the Shanghai Communique. However, it was also in Kissinger's self interest to have a note taker there, so that Kissinger could concentrate on the conversation.

So I got to take notes at the Nixon meeting with Mao. Also, Kissinger knew that I was one of the world's great note takers. I always got meetings down verbatim, even the jibes. There was that element to it.

And so, with great excitement, we went off to see Chairman Mao in the leaders' compound. We walked past a hallway with a ping pong table and into Mao's modest study, which was lined with books. Mao already was somewhat frail, physically, but nowhere near as much as he was during later meetings he had with Kissinger and with
President Ford. I tied for first place among Americans with Kissinger in meeting with Mao five times. That is, once with Nixon, once with Ford, and three times with Kissinger alone.

Mao had a couple of nurses around him and clearly needed some help. He was an old man but not a dying man by any means. He was just somewhat frail, physically, but not shockingly so. Indeed, he struck us with his presence. It is hard to sort out how much you expect when you see a great man, given his reputation. I say great, not in a positive sense but, in the sense of impact. Mao was obviously a very bad man in most respects. As for the physical force of the man, how much was I making this up and how much Mao really made this impression? Both Kissinger and I felt that if we walked into a cocktail party and had no idea who this guy Mao was, his very presence would still have had an impact on us.

So it was Nixon, Kissinger, and myself on our side, and Mao, Zhou En-lai, Nancy Tang as interpreter, Wang Hai-rung, and perhaps one or two others on the Chinese side. I'd have to look at the picture to be sure.

The meeting lasted for about an hour. I remember distinctly, coming out of the meeting somewhat disappointed. I was impressed with the physical impact of Mao. It was also clear that this man was tough, ruthless, and came from a peasant background, in contrast to the elegant, Mandarin quality of Zhou En-lai. However, I thought that the conversation was somewhat episodic and not very full. Kissinger had sort of the same reaction as I did. Mao was speaking, as he usually did, in brush strokes, whereas we were used to the elegant and somewhat lengthy presentations of Zhou En-lai. Mao would just throw in a few sentences, a few brush strokes. He went from topic to topic in rather a casual way.

As we left, however, we were obviously happy. We had had this immediate, friendly meeting with Mao. I can't remember which meeting discussed which topic. However, I am sure that we both talked about the danger of the polar bear, the Soviet Union. Mao certainly said, in one of these meetings, and I believe this was the one, that we could wait to settle the Taiwan problem for 100 years. In one of the meetings, and it may have been this one, when told that he had made a major change in China, he said: "No, I've only changed a few things near Beijing." So we had these sometimes rather epigrammatic comments. It seemed at times that he sometimes did not quite know what he was talking about. He was rather casual about what we would be getting at, in what order, and what was his agenda. So his comments seemed somewhat disjointed, not particularly elegant, and a little disappointing.

However, we changed our mind on Mao’s deftness as we thought about it, and I don't think that this is a rationalization, and as the trip went on we realized just how important this meeting was. It was important because, immediately on arrival, and for the reasons I mentioned, he had indicated to the world and to his own public, his backing for this strategic move. It was also important because Mao was setting out the main lines, however thinly and in brush strokes, for Zhou En-lai to elaborate on in the coming days in the various conversations. So maybe there were only two or three sentences on the
polar bear, but there was the whole line of anti hegemony and the fact that we had to get
together against the Soviets, not as allies, but as a matter of common concern. It was
there, authorized, and for Zhou En-lai to fill out. On Taiwan, as I said, Mao said that
China could wait. It was there in the communique, in which they could take a tough
position, but we could take our own position. We didn't have to resolve this question
now. We could move on and kick it down the road.

I'm not saying that these remarks made everything easy. They just authorized the lines of
instruction which Mao was setting forth in a strategic way. He had covered these two,
key issues, Taiwan and Russia, and he raised some other issues which I cannot now
recall. The transcripts of all these meetings, most of which I produced, are publicly
available now.

Q: Vietnam?

LORD: I don't recall whether Mao mentioned Vietnam. The Vietnam issue probably
came up, but I just don't recall. We only spent an hour in this meeting, and there were
translations to be made, so there wasn't that much time available. There was some
personal banter and also the fact that both Nixon and Mao recognized the other's vision
and courage in taking this important step.

However, as we thought about it, and certainly by the end of the trip, we realized in fact
that Mao had put in a very skillful performance. In his understated and unorthodox way
he had set forth the main lines of Chinese policy, he had made clear the features that he
considered very important, and that other things could fall into place. Mao was self-
deprecating, even though he had a tremendous ego. He had some humor. He had gotten
through his agenda purposefully, even though it seemed casual and episodic. He had
managed to cover the main points. I still don't think that it was one of the great
conversations of all time. However, I think that Mao was much more purposeful and
skillful than we gave him credit for at first. We realized that within a few days.

Q: I was just thinking about what you said about not having pinned down in advance
when President Nixon was going to see Mao. They could have put a really unpleasant
twist on it if Nixon had only been allowed to see Mao at the very end of the trip.

LORD: Well, it would have been much worse if we hadn't seen Mao at all.

Q: But if you had only seen him at the end of the trip, it would have indicated that Mao
was saying: "All right, I'll see Nixon, but..."

LORD: Not necessarily, and I'll tell you why. During most trips, and our subsequent and
more recent trips to China, usually we worked our way up the scale. We started by seeing
the Foreign Minister or even the Vice Foreign Minister. Then we saw the Premier. And
we ended up seeing the President or the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. So it
would have been somewhat natural, to see Mao late; certainly the meeting would have to
take place in Beijing. However, on the last day in Beijing, we could have had a sort of
climax meeting with Chairman Mao, blessing what had happened. It would not have been a put down. On balance, having the meeting right at the outset was the best outcome. By putting the Chairman’s immediate stamp of approval on the trip for the world to see, as well as sketching the key Chinese position for Zhou to flesh out. But having the meeting with Mao as a finale would have been fine.

Q: I see.

LORD: However, it was rather unorthodox and even more significant to have the meeting with Chairman Mao first.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Did you really get on the plane at Andrews Air Force Base, not knowing whether President Nixon would meet Chairman Mao?

LORD: Well, we knew in our gut that Mao would meet Nixon. Conceivably, he could do the unthinkable and not meet Nixon, but he didn't. However, when we left Andrews Air Force Base, we did not have an agreed time for the meeting with Mao, and they never explicitly promised a meeting. I don't remember what the Chinese formulation was on this point. They certainly gave favorable indications but I don't know whether they actually said: "We can give you 100 percent assurance that President Nixon will see Mao." I'll bet that they didn't. I know that we made unilateral statements that Nixon would, of course, be seeing Mao. We said that we would like to know when this would be, but we knew that this was going to happen. It would have been unthinkable if it didn't.

So we were sure that Nixon would see Chairman Mao. There was just that one percent uncertainty, perhaps to keep us off balance, in not confirming the schedule for the President, which was mildly annoying. However, it was typical of the Chinese Emperor indicating that he was the head of the Middle Kingdom and that we were showing obeisance. So we honestly did not know the timing of the meeting with Mao and were surprised that it took place that quickly. We expected the more traditional meetings with Zhou En-lai and then a meeting with Chairman Mao toward the end of the visit.

Q: On several occasions you made reference to the practices of the Chinese Emperors. I've heard this kind of comment from other China experts or people who have dealt with China. You mentioned that China regards itself as the Middle Kingdom. Was it very much in everybody's mind that the People's Republic of China may be a communist regime, but we're still dealing with something like a Chinese court?

LORD: Well, hopefully not in a subservient or obsequious way, but out of respect, yes. We were dealing with tough, ruthless, Communist Chinese leaders. However, we were also dealing with people who were heading the world's most populous nation which, we were sure, even then, would be a major world power in the next century. And a nation which had the world's richest civilization and culture. And a nation which had been Number One more than any other country in history.

One of the complications in dealing with China is that the Chinese have had so little
experience dealing with the outside world as equals. For 4000 to 5000 years they were Number One in the world, at least in their view. Everyone else was either invisible, irrelevant, distant barbarians, or tributaries. Then China had a bad century or two. They were dominated by outside powers from roughly the mid 1800s on. They probably began to lose their technological dominance to the West and Europe by the 1600s or 1700s. Then China was actually humiliated by the British and other Europeans, the Japanese invasion [1937-1945], fighting against us in Korea [1950-1953], and other experiences in the 19th and 20th centuries. So after 4000 to 5000 years as Number One and 100-150 years of being humiliated, this is where we found them when we went there. We are still dealing with the consequences of that, although for the last 15 or 20 years, since the reforms started, the Chinese have sort of stood up as equals. They are getting used to dealing with other countries as equals. This combination of arrogance or self-confidence, derived from being the Middle Kingdom and Number One for so long, plus the more recent humiliations and slights by foreigners and xenophobia, and very little experience in dealing with other countries as equals has made it particularly complicated to deal with China.

So, when we went to China, Nixon and Kissinger in their toasts and their statements were careful to say, and with genuine sincerity, that China was a great civilization and a great country. They said that as China had been in business for 5,000 years, we've only been in business for 200 years. We paid careful attention to Chinese face and were polite. Also, we believe that this is true. Frankly, as a world superpower, much stronger than China, we can afford to be magnanimous. We could be generous and sincere, as I said, because militarily, economically, and in every other way we were totally dominant of China. So for all of these reasons we were aware of this historical, cultural background and we paid due deference to it.

The Chinese are also geniuses at protocol, in making you feel at home, and are very careful with you. Their whole idea is to inculcate in outsiders coming to the Middle Kingdom a sense of obligation for their hospitality and friendship. In effect, they seek to create ties of alleged friendship. They want us to feel that friends do favors for other friends. For example, if the Chinese were taking Nixon or Kissinger to the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, the Temple of Heaven, or the Summer Palace, and they have two hours to cover the Summer Palace, what they would do is to break up two hours in their planning into 20-minute segments. They never want to give a visitor the feeling that he or she is rushed. In going to the Summer Palace, to take that example, if you stop for longer than they expected to look at the Empress's Jade Boat, or something like that, instead of pushing you and saying that we're not going to get through everything, they just agree among themselves, without telling the guests, "All right, we'll cut out the next 20 minute segment and go to the next one." So you end up getting through on time in terms of what the schedule says but you never feel rushed.

The Chinese food was terrific, at least in the early visits. However, it got worse as we visited China in subsequent years. The food during the Nixon visit, particularly the banquet in Hangzhou, was very good, indeed. So the Chinese have tried to create this sense of subtle superiority, Middle Kingdom great host protocol, and so on. All of this is
designed to make you somewhat more amenable on substantive matters and deferential in spirit.

Q: I must say that the one scene that sticks in my mind is of Nixon making a toast. And the band played "America the Beautiful." I never heard this song played so much, which I have always thought should be our national anthem, anyway. It was magnificently done.

LORD: Before getting into the substance, I would like to mention some of the public events. I don't have these in order, but among the things Nixon did was to attend these banquets, where the Chinese PLA [People's Liberation Army] band played "America the Beautiful," "Turkey in the Straw," and other melodies, all of this on television. I can still recall the vision of the two leaders toasting each other in a huge dining room in the Great Hall of the People. There were about 10,000 at this banquet, or something along those lines. That was one public event. Another event involved going to a dreadful, Cultural Revolution type ballet with Madame Mao. Another one that we went to was a major, gymnastics exhibition in a gymnasium. Nixon also went to see the Great Wall and the Forbidden City. Kissinger and I were busy working on the communique at that point, so we missed that. Of course, we had already been there. That was the point where poor Nixon went to the Great Wall and said: "It surely is a Great Wall." Those were the major, public appearances during the Nixon visit to Beijing. He went on the lake in Hangzhou, and, I believe, visited an industrial exhibition in Shanghai.

To get back to the Nixon meeting with Mao, if I can. One amusing, personal highlight, which you've probably heard, was that, as we concluded the meeting, the Chinese came in with the communique announcing the meeting and photographs of it. The photographs had all of us in them. The communique said that Mr. Nixon, Mr. Kissinger, and Mr. Lord were present. Nixon and Kissinger looked at each other and said to the Chinese: "Please cut out Mr. Lord from all of the photographs and out of the communique and keep secret that he was at this meeting."

The reason that they did this is that even they were embarrassed that Secretary of State Rogers had not been at the meeting. They figured that it was humiliating enough that the National Security Adviser was with the President at this historic meeting, but the Secretary of State was not. To add on top of that the fact that the Special Assistant to the National Security Adviser was there as a third person but the Secretary of State was not was too much, even for them. The Chinese clearly must have been puzzled by this, but they readily went along with this request.

So the official communique just said that Nixon and Kissinger were present on our side. The pictures cropped me out of it. I was on the right side of the picture as you looked at it. I, of course, was disappointed, because I wanted worldwide fame, but I was sworn to secrecy. Very few people knew about this. I don't even believe, in fact I'm quite sure, that the State Department didn't know that I had been present at the meeting, either. I just can't remember now that anybody knew.

I will now confess that when I got back to Washington, I told my wife. I wasn't about to
keep this secret from her. However, for a couple of years this secret was kept from the entire world. Then, just to show you the Chinese style, when I went back to Beijing with Kissinger when he visited on his own, in 1973, when he met Mao on his own, we were sitting with Zhou En-lai. Wang Hai Rung, the same grandniece of Mao's, who was close to Mao but also sat in on our meetings, as part of Zhou En-lai's staff, came in with a piece of paper for Zhou En-lai. Zhou En-lai read it out and then said to Kissinger: "Chairman Mao wants to see Dr. Kissinger and Winston Lord." Now, Chairman Mao wouldn't have known me from Mel Gibson or Woody Allen. I was sitting there with several other US officials, all higher ranking. In protocol terms I would have been the last person going with Kissinger to see Mao, because you can only take one person. The Chinese knew, first, that I was the closest person to Kissinger and, perhaps, the most important in terms of the China initiative. Secondly, I had attended a Kissinger meeting with Mao, but this occasion was secret, and nobody knew about it. Thirdly, the Chinese knew that Kissinger would want to take me for general reasons and because of my note taking and advice. So they thought up the gimmick of Mao wanting me to be there, along with Kissinger. This gave Kissinger the pretext, despite protocol, of taking me with him. I went to this meeting. It was a very nice gesture on their part. On a subsequent trip they gave me a picture of the Nixon meeting with Mao, with me in it, to prove that I had been there. Since then, of course, it has been well publicized, but that was an interesting sidelight.

Now we ought to get to the substance of the trip. We had a series of meetings with Zhou En-lai and also some meetings, particularly to negotiate the language of the communique and other, loose ends, with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose name was Chao Kuan-hua. He was a very able vice minister. He subsequently got into trouble because he bet on the Gang of Four against Deng Xiaoping. He made the wrong bet. His wife, who was a translator, was close to Madame Mao.

So we had two kinds of discussions. There were meetings between President Nixon and Zhou En-lai on substantive issues. On our side were Nixon, Kissinger, Holdridge, and myself. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, and other State Department people were meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Ji Peng-fei. They were dealing with bilateral issues only, such as economic and cultural exchanges, and so forth. They may have touched on some international issues, but their discussion of them would have been superficial. In any case the Chinese Foreign Minister, Ji, was less important than their Vice Foreign Minister, Chao. Of course, Nixon was relying on Kissinger as his adviser.

So the real discussions were between Nixon and Zhou En-lai, and they ranged over all of the issues that one would expect, whether it was on the general, historic nature of the opening to China or Russia, South Asia, the Middle East, Vietnam, Korea, Taiwan, and bilateral relations. There was discussion with Zhou En-lai of general principles and major issues and particularly Taiwan. The specific negotiating session on the language of the communique took place with Vice Foreign Minister Chao, with great assistance from Assistant Minister Zhang Wen-chin. There were some loose ends unresolved on the communique generally, apart from Taiwan, but mostly this was directed at trying to beef up the positive sections toward the end. These sections weren't particularly contentious.
We had really tough negotiations on Taiwan, day after day, right down to the wire. They finally ended up on our last night in Beijing, when we were to take off the next day for Hangzhou. We reached agreement. I still remember this. I don't think that I went with Kissinger to tell Nixon, late at night, that we had reached final agreement on the communique. Of course, you know the formulations agreed on, and I won't go through all of that. Basically, it was a rather historic formulation which has held up to this day. The Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party approved the communique that evening. Of course, we had approved it.

We took off for Hangzhou on the following morning. When we got there, Secretary of State Rogers and Marshall Green saw the communique for the first time. That is no way to do business. Either on the plane to Hangzhou or in Hangzhou, they said basically that this communique was a disaster. They probably did not use that phrasing, but they were disturbed.

Q: Did they say something close to that?

LORD: They were very critical, particularly on Taiwan. They said that President Nixon was going to get killed at home and around the world and that we had given in too much to the Chinese. We thought that this view was nonsense, in substantive terms. Each side had declared its positions. In fact, we had negotiated the communique pretty skillfully and we thought that most of their comments on the communique were - frankly understandably - piqued at having been left out of the negotiations. The process was lousy and State should have been included. But the communique turned out to be excellent.

So Nixon had a terrible decision. On the one hand, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party had already approved the communique. On the other hand, he risked having Secretary of State Rogers and Marshall Green, if not on the record, then leaking out on background that they had not only been excluded from the negotiations but that we had also sold out on Taiwan. So Nixon had the humiliating experience of sending Kissinger back to Hangzhou to reopen the negotiations on the communique.

I still remember an amusing sidelight on this. I happened to be in my underwear when Kissinger somehow came into my room to ask me about something. Just after that President Nixon came into my room and made some stupid joke because he saw Kissinger with me in my underwear. That isn't the point. This was a poor attempt at humor. Then Nixon asked seriously what we were going to do about the views of Secretary of State Rogers on the communique. He said: "I can't afford to have the State Department undercutting what we've accomplished." So he then said: "Henry, you've got to go back to the Chinese and get some of these concessions which Rogers and Green have given us on specific language." Some of these were impossible to get. Obviously, State never could have gotten them either, but you can't blame the State Department for being irate. So clearly they were going to ask for many changes, both because they'd like to get them, but also because they figured that it would be more embarrassing to
Kissinger if we didn't get them. Some of their suggestions, however, were minor nuances, or nitpicks.

Kissinger, of course, was very resistant to this. I don't remember exactly what the conversation was. But he dreaded going back to Zhou En-lai and saying in effect: “I've got a small detail here. We know that your Politburo has approved this, as well as Chairman Mao. Here we are in Hangzhou, and the Politburo isn't even around, and Chairman Mao is back there in Beijing. However, by the way, we'd like to reopen some of the sensitive issues on Taiwan that we've both agreed on after months of negotiations.” This was going to be embarrassing, to say the least. It was our own fault for having cut out the State Department in the negotiations on the communique. So we reopened the negotiations on the communique that night. It was very humiliating. Kissinger explained our bureaucratic and public relations situation. We suggested some changes but didn't try out all of the changes that the State Department wanted, particularly the ones that were really dramatic in their import. Zhou En-lai handled the matter very skillfully. He tried to avoid making this situation any more awkward and embarrassing than it really was.

There was one key point, I believe, that Green made and was adjusted. We had language that reaffirmed all our alliances except Taiwan. It was meant to reassure allies, but the omission of Taiwan would have been glaring. Thus State suggested and we got Chinese approval not to mention the alliances. And Kissinger in his press conference on Chinese soil verbally reaffirmed our commitment to Taiwan. That change was important.

Zhou also gave in on a few secondary points. I don't remember the details, which improved the draft in a couple of places but didn't touch anything fundamental, nor could they, since the Politburo and Chairman Mao had already approved it, and Zhou En-lai was operating on his own. He threw a few crumbs to us, which we then included in the communique.

We went on to Shanghai the next day, and Kissinger presented a press briefing on the communique, including reasserting on Chinese soil that we would continue to have our defense relationship with Taiwan. This was a very sensitive point. It is one thing to say this in the United States, but to say it in Shanghai was quite extraordinary. Kissinger, as it were, was doing a high wire act, and he wanted to protect the President's domestic flank and his international reputation, as well as fears on Taiwan, without overly alienating the Chinese. This was a very skillful performance.

We were not 100 percent sure, particularly after the State Department had spooked us a little bit, what kind of reception the trip and the Shanghai Communique would get, both immediately and when we returned to Washington. Even as we flew back to Washington, with the euphoria of the trip, we were still a little bit concerned about what the reaction would be. Well, once again we underestimated the popular dimension of this initiative. There may have been some carping at the time, but, on the whole, everyone not only welcomed the trip as a tremendous success, with this romance and euphoria. They also said that the Shanghai Communique was very well done.
Q: As I recall it, and, Nancy, you might remember, Marshall Green's main point, in the Oral History interview I did with him, was that there was some sort of reference or drawing a parallel to Secretary of State Dean Acheson's leaving South Korea out of the U.S. defense perimeter in the Pacific, when he made a speech to the National Press Club in January, 1950, not long before North Korea invaded South Korea in June, 1950. He had outlined U.S. interests in the Far East but didn't include Taiwan as one of them. Does that ring a bell with you?

LORD: Well, in the first place I want to make clear on the record how much respect I have for Marshall Green. He handled himself, as did Secretary of State Rogers, with tremendous dignity when they were really cut out of things that they really should not have been cut out of. I'm sure that whatever concerns Marshall Green had were genuine, though he felt understandable annoyance at the process. I don't recall that particular comment by Marshall Green, if that's what it is. But his concerns were almost entirely focused on the Taiwan portion of the communique. As I said I believe there was a reference to various allies which suggested an omission of Taiwan and therefore all references were taken out, so that is probably what Green was referring to.

Q: His comments were on Taiwan...

LORD: But we couldn't have possibly stated in the Shanghai Communique that we were going to defend Taiwan. We certainly had the expectation of a peaceful resolution of this matter. Regarding the arms sales question we talked about continuing them, which was dicey. We didn't break our defense treaty with Taiwan at that point. At some point in the communique we used the formulation to the effect that we were willing to reduce our forces on Taiwan as tensions in the area subsided. This was really a reference to Vietnam. We said, in effect, that if the Chinese helped us to end the Vietnam War, they would see us reducing our forces in Taiwan. Since a part of the rationale for our forces in Taiwan was regional stability, including Vietnam, we could justify it on those grounds because it was a subtle way of meeting their concerns on that point. It also could suggest that a peaceful approach by China in the area, and to the Taiwan question, could also help the withdrawal process.

Marshall Green may well have made a comment of this kind, but I just don't recall the details of what his concern was. I'm sure that it referred to Taiwan.

Q: During all of this what was the impression of Nixon, Kissinger, and yourself of Madame Mao? Where did you feel that she stood in the Chinese structure at that time?

LORD: We didn't see much of her. I think that she was probably at one of the banquets. She was the escort to the President and Mrs. Nixon at the ballet. That was the only exposure that we had to her. I never talked to her in any way. I was standing around when she made some small talk with President Nixon. It was my impression at the time that she didn't seem particularly friendly. I think that, even then, we suspected that she was less enthusiastic about this opening than Chairman Mao. We weren't aware as yet, that I can
recall, of the Gang of Four mentality and where she stood on this spectrum. However, either at the time or since then we thought that she was less enthusiastic about this opening. Maybe not resistant, but certainly less enthusiastic.

I should have mentioned the Lin Biao incident during the trip to Beijing in October, 1971. There was tightened security for reasons that we didn't know about at the time. It turned out that two weeks earlier, in September, 1971, Lin Biao, partly, we believe, revolting against the opening to the United States, made a grab for power. He became involved in a struggle with Chairman Mao, tried to escape China in an airplane, and crashed in Mongolia. The world knew nothing of this at that point. This incident was covered up for some time. However, this resulted in a rather tense security situation, and we saw a lot of security precautions in Beijing.

I'm not saying that Madame Mao was linked up with Lin Biao, but she was probably in the more skeptical part of the spectrum with him on the American connection. I can't remember how much we knew of this at the time, but she did strike us as less friendly in the brief encounters we had with her.
**VIII. NSC - CHINA. ISSUES, TRIPS (1971-1973)**

**Q:** During these discussions in China, what was the view of the Chinese of the Soviets at that time? Were they trying to get any information from us or were they saying that we both know that the Soviets are bad people?

**LORD:** Let's get into some of these other issues. Regarding the Soviets, that clearly was a major theme throughout the Nixon visit to China. Kissinger and Nixon would play on this threat to China and us. They were always a little careful so that, if these remarks were transmitted to Brezhnev, they wouldn't be too embarrassed. They were fairly heavy on the dimensions of the Soviet threat. When we would talk to the Soviets, we would never say negative things about China, but we also would try to improve relations with Russia.

The Chinese were the same way on the Soviets. Certainly, Mao was the bluntest about Russia. The higher up you went in the Chinese hierarchy, the blunter they were about Russia. This was true of Deng Xiaoping later, with the talk about the polar bear and the threat. This attitude held true for 20 years. Even during my last meeting with Deng Xiaoping in 1988, or whenever it was, he was talking about the Russian as well as the Japanese threat to China. So that theme was there a lot.

Early on we began briefing the Chinese on our relations with the Soviets. We worked on improving relations with the Russians, but we were also using the Chinese to induce the Russians to improve relations with us. With the Chinese, on the one hand we wanted to reassure them that we weren't being feckless and naive in seeking detente with the Russians. However, on the other hand, we had to spend a certain amount of time letting the Chinese know that we were moving somewhere with the Russians, too, to get them a little excited. So it was a carefully nuanced game here.

Kissinger was always meticulous, and Nixon was on his trip, to brief the Chinese about what our strategy was toward the Soviet Union. Basically, we would say: "Look, we want to improve our relations with Moscow. We don't deny that. They have nuclear weapons, and we don't want to get into a war with them. However, we have no illusions. The Soviets are tough and expansionist. And by the way, they are more of a threat to you than to us, given their geography, history, and capabilities. We don't really trust the Russians, but it's in our national interest to try to improve our relationship with them on a hard-headed, pragmatic basis. We'll use pressures, but we'll also use some incentives. We know what we're doing." The sub-text to this was: "We are making some progress with the Soviets, and you Chinese should be sure that you keep up with us and improve relations with us, so that we don't get ahead of you in relations with the Russians."

Indeed, we had a much more concrete agenda with Moscow than we did with China, where we were just launching a relationship. With Russia we had topics like arms control, Berlin, trade, exchanges, etc. With China it was essentially geopolitical dialogue in the early years.

The Chinese would be flat out in talking about Soviet pressures and threats. I don't know that they even went through the motions of saying that they wanted better relations with
the Soviets. They might have, but they would talk about past Soviet perfidy and future concerns. I don't know that they complained that the Soviets did not help them with nuclear weapons, but they certainly referred to the border clashes and continuing Soviet pressures on China. At times, and this was truer in subsequent years, particularly in the mid 1970s, the Chinese would say: "You Americans are getting a little naïve with the Soviets. Detente is really an illusion. You're getting too soft and you're trying to stand on our shoulders to reach the Soviets. You're trying to use us and you're being naive with the Russians." We got some of that flavor, particularly from Deng Xiaoping later on, but not so much from Mao and Zhou En-lai earlier on, as I recall.

So this was a heavy theme in our talks with China. Then there was the anti-hegemony reference in the Shanghai Communique. We were careful to brief the Chinese on what we were doing with Moscow. For example, after President Nixon's trip to China in February, 1972, we went to Moscow in May, 1972. Then, in June, 1972, Kissinger, myself, Holdridge, and so on went back to China for two main reasons. One was to debrief the Chinese on the Moscow Summit Meeting and fill them in, which we continually did. Secondly, we tried to get them to help more on Vietnam. Those were the two main reasons. So that was an example.

Through these trips, and more and more as we went along, we briefed the Chinese generally on policy and the status of negotiations with the Russians, always giving them a hard edge twist that we were not naïve and that we would make sure that the Russians did not take advantage of us. We began to share intelligence reports with the Chinese. Often Jon Howe, who was a military aide on the NSC staff, and I would go off and brief the Chinese on Russian troop deployments. We would also give them information on Soviet capabilities, both to show that we were friendly and that we were trying to share information that might be useful to them. And also, frankly, to make the Chinese a little nervous about Soviet intentions.

So the Russian dimension was very important. It was not the only reason that we opened up with China. That's been proven since the end of the Soviet threat to the US in 1989-90. Over a 20, 30, or 40 year period we will have a large agenda with China, which is going to be a major power. Certainly, our joint concern about the Soviet threat was the glue in the early going, but we've shown, and we will show that we have other reasons for dealing with China, even without the Russian threat. That was the primary reason then, but there are all the other factors which I have mentioned, including the Vietnam issue, the attempt to try to stabilize regional stability in Asia, North Korea, and the Taiwan Straits, to a certain extent. If the Chinese have good relations with us, they'll have less incentive to attack Taiwan and wreck their relations with us.

Eventually trade and cultural exchange and other exchanges have become our other reasons for good relations with China. However, the Soviet theme was the dominant theme in the early 70s and 80s.

Q: What about North Korea? Did you sense anything approaching distaste among the Chinese for the Kim Il Sung regime in North Korea?
LORD: No, not at that time. This aspect has become clearer in the last few years and as we speak, here in 1998. However, the Chinese didn't show much daylight on North Korea, and I'll get back to some of the other issues. On North Korea I didn't detect any opening. They had no interest in South Korea at that point. Even then, however, they probably made it clear to us, and in fact, I know that they did, that they had no interest in seeing the North Koreans attacking the South Koreans and perhaps dragging them into another war against us. I'm sure that the Chinese said that they hoped there would be stability on the Korean peninsula. However, they showed no daylight between them and North Korea. Certainly, their references in the Shanghai Communique and other talking points would be pretty solid in their connection with North Korea.

I would like to make clear that Zhou En-lai was so sophisticated that he wouldn't use terms like lips and teeth and the usual garbage which you get out of the Chinese. It would be much more elegant than that, but substantively he would still be very solid with the North Koreans, I am quite sure. I should say that the conversations between Zhou En-lai, on the one hand, and Kissinger and Nixon, on the other hand, were the most interesting and impressive, diplomatic conversations that I have ever witnessed.

On Vietnam, which is an important subject, we didn't fully realize then how much the Chinese disliked the Vietnamese, and vice versa. In fact, the Chinese invaded Vietnam a few years later (in 1979). We still saw the Chinese essentially as a patron of Hanoi, along with Moscow, somewhat competing with Moscow and somewhat constrained in terms of the degree to which they could help us. This was because they might lose influence in Hanoi to Moscow if they were more forthcoming with us than Moscow was.

The same consideration applied to North Korea. Chinese concern about Russia reflected not only the bilateral pressures between the two countries but their impact around the world in places like North Korea and Vietnam where China was in competition with Russia for influence. So this infused all of their views. Some of this is retrospective and some of this we saw at the time. The Chinese recognized that the Vietnamese could be pretty stubborn. They basically wanted to get on with their relationship with us, and the Vietnam War was a real annoyance, as I said earlier. The Chinese felt that it was a distraction to have fighting going on near their border. The Chinese did have some support troops in Laos, I believe. They never went in force into Vietnam, which adjoined their border, and they still had their ideology and history to deal with. They had to look as if they were close with Vietnam and they did want to compete with the Soviets. So they had all of that working.

However, they clearly wanted to get the Vietnam War settled. They would appeal to us in these conversations and would say: "Look, you're bogged down in Vietnam. Your domestic situation is terrible and there is a lot of uproar. More importantly, you're getting distracted from your other, geopolitical responsibilities. You can't face the polar bear around the world effectively, and even your position in NATO is hurt because you're so preoccupied with Vietnam and you're alienating a lot of countries."
They would use their ideology in this context. Again, Zhou En-lai would be somewhat elegant in referring to a civil war in Vietnam and say that the Vietnamese people demand justice, and all of that stuff. Basically, whatever they put in public communiques, in our private talks they would appeal to our national self-interest, more than ideology and references to lips and teeth. It would be more like: "You guys are bogged down. It's in your interest to get this war in Vietnam over with." Of course it was in Beijing's interest too to end the fighting near its border and also end the irritant in our bilateral relations, which were more important to the Chinese than their ties to Vietnam.

I don't think that the Chinese ever heavily pressured Hanoi. I think that they were helpful to us in their own self-interest. We think that their attitude was: "There should be a military settlement. Hanoi shouldn't be requiring America to humiliate itself by also deciding the political future of Vietnam." We'll get into Vietnam later, but basically the North Vietnamese position for years was that the U.S. not only had to withdraw unilaterally but, as we left, we had to overthrow the government of Nguyen van Thieu and replace it with a coalition government. We made our position clear as early as the fall of 1969, when we suggested a cease-fire in place. And we followed this up concretely in May, 1971, with a specific, seven-point proposal in the secret talks. I'll go into this in greater detail when we talk about Vietnam. We made clear that we could live with a unilateral withdrawal as well as a cease-fire, a return of POWs [Prisoners of War], and international supervision, as long as the political settlement was left for the Vietnamese people to decide.

We made clear to the Chinese that it is one thing to have a military settlement along those lines, but it's another thing to ask us to overthrow an ally and to decide for the Vietnamese people themselves their political future. We said that we're not going to do that. We kept stressing to the Chinese and asked them to relay to Hanoi that we were prepared to reach a reasonable settlement but that the military and political issues should be separated and that Hanoi couldn't ask us to overthrow an ally. We also appealed to the Chinese. We said that if you want us as a balancing force in Asia, the world, and particularly against the Soviet Union, as well as a restraint on Japan, you should support us. If the Japanese felt insecure, they might feel a need to remilitarize and develop nuclear weapons. We said that if the Chinese want us to play this geopolitical role, which was in their interest, they can't have us humiliated in Vietnam, making all of our allies and friends around the world think that we are totally untrustworthy. It is one thing to withdraw. It's another thing actually to overthrow the Thieu Government and put in a coalition government.

We kept pounding that theme with the Chinese, hoping that they would reinforce it with Hanoi. We hoped that we could get a military settlement only, which was what our objective was. We believe that the Chinese, probably somewhat carefully, because of the Russian factor, conveyed this view to Hanoi, although I can't prove it. I think that Zhou En-lai actually went to Vietnam after one of our trips to China. I'm quite sure that he did. There were high level Chinese emissaries who went to Hanoi. We can't prove what they said - I don't think that we had any documentary evidence through intelligence channels. However, we are quite sure basically about what Zhou En-lai said carefully in our
discussions and superficially from his trips and so on. There were some signs of Hanoi's annoyance with its Russian and Chinese patrons. The Chinese, in their own self interest, kept this issue out of the way between us. However, we believe that they were leaning on Hanoi and probably saying something like: "Get the U.S. out of South Vietnam and settle for the military side only. You can't expect the Americans to overthrow the South Vietnamese Government. Time is on your side. Once the U.S. gets out of South Vietnam, the country will fall into your lap within a few years. You can afford to wait. In the meantime, get rid of the American presence and let the chips fall where they may in your favor in the coming years."

We think that the Chinese were talking to the North Vietnamese along these lines. In any event, in their conversations with us, the Chinese never pressed us to accept the North Vietnamese political proposals. They put the stress on America’s getting out of South Vietnam and getting the war behind us. So by avoiding getting behind the overall North Vietnamese seven-point or nine-point plan or whatever it was, over the course of the years, it was clear to us that the Chinese were probably sympathetic to a military solution only.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Can I ask you, in connection with North Vietnam, but going back a little bit further back in time, in terms of the Chinese-Vietnamese relationship, how much did you think about it as a limiting factor in pursuing our policies in Vietnam? For example, in a conversation with Allen Whiting which Stu Kennedy had Whiting warned about a possible Chinese intervention in Vietnam. John Holdridge rejected that possibility as being distracting and silly and that the Chinese would never have intervened. Do you have a sense of how seriously that was taken?

LORD: I would like to make clear also that, as we talk about these issues now, we're not just talking about the Nixon Summit Meeting in China but the tenor of the conversations with the Chinese over a two or three-year period. This is the only way to handle it. I can't be precise.

I think, and this was more relevant during the Johnson Administration, although it may also have been relevant to Nixon, that we had to keep in mind the possibility of Chinese intervention. Short of that, there was also the danger of making it really awkward for the Chinese by escalating near the Chinese border, even if they didn't intervene and therefore affecting our bilateral relationship. In my opinion, the possibility of Chinese intervention in the Vietnam War was not a major factor. Certainly, by the time we got through the early 1970s and the opening to China, I don't believe that we were really concerned about the Chinese directly intervening in the war. There was nothing in our conversations with the Chinese which ever threatened that. The Chinese would often say that hostilities in Vietnam were awkward near their border. They never threatened that they were going to intervene. Again, we'd have to look at the history books. I think that there's some evidence that the Chinese had some forces in Laos and Vietnam in a supporting role, e.g. anti-aircraft or construction.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: There were actually Chinese troops in North Vietnam in the
mid-1960s, in a supporting role. I was thinking more in those terms as to what degree, in that earlier period, was this something that all of you had in mind?

LORD: In terms of Vietnam policy I think that there was some concern but that it was more relevant to the Johnson administration in the 1960s, than it was when we got to China in the 1970s. One of the arguments against going into North Vietnam on the ground, as well as even escalation like heavybombing, was the Chinese reaction. That clearly was a factor. Reasonable people can disagree on how important it was. Maybe it was fairly important in the 1960s, when I was less directly involved in Vietnam policy. In the early 1970s I never recalled, in dealing with the Vietnamese or the Chinese, that this was a major factor then. I think that the significant considerations were domestic public opinion and the cost-benefit ratio of military pressures. However, others may disagree, and maybe correctly, that this was more of a constraint than I recall it as having been. I think that it was more of a constraint in the 1960s, particularly with respect to sending American troops into North Vietnam and getting closer to the Chinese border.

Q: After the Korean War you can't help but re-fight your last war.

LORD: Exactly right. I almost mentioned that the feeling was: "Well, if we go too far in Vietnam, we may make the mistake we made in Korea." I'm sure that that was a factor. People can disagree on the relative weight to attach to it. It was probably significant in the 1960s, but my recollection is that it was not significant in the early 1970s.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: No.

LORD: Let me raise one other issue. I can't give you a lot of detail on it, but this was the India-Pakistan issue. The Russians were essentially lined up with India during the Cold War, and the Chinese were lined up with Pakistan. On top of that, Pakistan had done a favor to China and the United States by serving as an intermediary and as a launching pad for our opening to China. So when the crisis in Bangladesh broke out, and so on, I recall that this was regarded as a significant issue for some time, although my memory is very bad on this. This included talking to Huang Hua, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN in New York, and coordinating our moves to warn India about not attacking Pakistan. I think that we may have had some U.S. Navy ship movements in this connection.

Q: USS ENTERPRISE, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, was sent into the Bay of Bengal, I think it was, at that time. This was regarded as a tilt toward Pakistan. The Indians still remember this.

LORD: Of course they do. Kissinger finally went to India a few years later (about 1975) and tried to restore our relations with India, to a certain extent. There is no question that, for a variety of reasons, Kissinger and Nixon wanted to tilt toward Pakistan. It's a huge exaggeration to say that we did this solely as a favor to the Chinese. It was a factor that Pakistan had been an intermediary, that the Chinese and we were on the same side, and this would reinforce our new opening to each other. However, in my view, it would have happened anyway, given the general, geopolitical attitude of Nixon and Kissinger that if a
stronger power is opposed to a weaker power, you help out the weaker power in terms of balance.

Also, and for some time, frankly, we had been tilting toward Pakistan. There was nothing new about this, in the sense that the Indians were generally closer to the Russians, with the Pakistanis on the other side. So during the Cold War it was natural for us to line up with Pakistan, at least in Kissinger's and Nixon's view, representing geopolitics at the expense of human rights. There were clearly a lot of atrocities in Bangladesh and so on. We didn't pay a great deal of attention to them, which is an understatement.

There was a genuine concern, and some suggestions from intelligence sources, that India might go after Pakistan (West) aggressively, beyond its support of Bangladesh. This, of course, would also affect peace and stability in the world. It is unconscionable that one country should invade another country. So we wanted to deter that. We had a variety of reasons, including the opening to China and the Pakistani channel in support of that. However, that was not the exclusive or predominant reason. During this period we had close discussions with the Chinese, in our mutual interest, but also to underline again our parallel, geopolitical convergence, having the Soviet dimension wrapped up in it as well. We knew about China's concern about India and Chinese friendship for Pakistan. This was an issue that we could cooperate on early in the course of this opening of our relations, when we were trying to establish mutual trust and confidence, in the sense of shared interests. So that was another issue.

The Middle East was not a significant area. We would keep the Chinese posted on what we were doing. What we got from the Chinese was essentially a pro-Arab position, an anti-Israeli position. This is ironic because, later on, Israel started giving the Chinese military aid, and so on. However, there wasn't fire breathing rhetoric in China against Israel. It wasn't as if you were sitting in Iran or Saudi Arabia. The Chinese view was that justice was on the side of the Palestinians, so they took the side of the Arabs.

Q: Japan.

LORD: Let me mention Japan. I think that we touched on that briefly before. I know that we did, but we may benefit from a little repetition here. China and Japan had a love-hate relationship, of course, given their history, culture, and other things. There was the Rape of Nanking, and the Chinese are still resentful of the Japanese invasion and thereby suspicious of the Japanese. They are worried about Japan remilitarizing and/or going nuclear in the future. During the first few visits to Beijing the China chided us about building up Japan, our security alliance, and the presence of U.S. troops there. In their various meetings Nixon and Kissinger made the counter-argument about our security alliance with Japan and our nuclear umbrella. They made clear that the Japanese were secure and that they didn't have to build up their own military forces or nuclear potential, because the Japanese were safe, being allied with the U.S. They said that it was not in China's interest that Japan worry about the loosening of its alliance with the U.S., because they then might remilitarize, go for nuclear weapons, and fulfill China's greatest fear.
This is one, concrete example of the impact of extensive, geopolitical discussions. People may say: "Hey, that's interesting, but what good is it going to do?" In fact, these discussions had an impact. The Chinese began to understand our arguments and dropped their attacks on our alliance with Japan, and therefore created somewhat less mischief between us and Japan. So that was important.

Of course, once we moved to reopen our relations with China, Japan followed us again and even went further with China, as they had every right to do for we had held Tokyo back and then leap-frogged it. They normalized diplomatic relations with China more quickly than we did.

Meanwhile, we were increasing our communications through two major channels - our embassies in Paris and at the United Nations in New York. These were our channels until we established liaison offices in early 1973.

I've mentioned that we went back to China in June, 1972, primarily to brief the Chinese on the Soviet Summit Meeting and to press ahead with Vietnam, which was still a major concern for us. On that trip we also went to Japan, one of many Kissinger trips to Japan over the years. I sat in on a private meeting with Prime Minister Sato, the only other American present. The trip in February, 1973, was the next one after June, 1972. Again we also went to Tokyo. I've talked about the flavor and substance of all of these trips. The subsequent trips were just to Beijing, except for ones where we went to Suzhou and Xian. Also, we occasionally went to see the sights outside of Beijing.

I want to mention the trip in February, 1973, since it is the last one I made when I worked in the White House. It was a very successful trip, the best during the whole Kissinger period. Until then we had awkward channeled communications with China. We were building more trust with every trip. In fact, the Shanghai Communiqué said that, from time to time, there should be a Senior Visitor from the United States to China, which shows the mentality of the Middle Kingdom. We were going there. They weren't coming our way. According to them, they couldn't come to the United States, because there was still a Taiwan Embassy in Washington. We were communicating through Huang Hua, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN in New York, and through General Walters, our Defense Attache in our Embassy in Paris.

By the way, we would always drop in and see the Chinese Ambassador in Paris after we had finished our secret negotiations on Vietnam with the North Vietnamese. We would go over to the Chinese Embassy and give them a read-out on what had happened. This was a courtesy to maintain contact. We would also talk about other issues, but the primary object was to keep them up to speed on our Vietnam negotiations and, hopefully, get their help in leaning on Hanoi.

The trip to China in February, 1973, was the single most successful trip we ever made to China, to develop convergence, at least. First of all, we had begun to build up mutual trust and credibility through extensive discussions over several trips. Kissinger had made three trips by then, in addition to the trip with President Nixon. So there was mutual
respect on the personal level and some mutual confidence that we reinforced each other regarding South Asia, and so forth. We had this perennial Russian factor, and all of that stuff. Secondly, Nixon had just been reelected in a landslide, and China knew it would be dealing with him for four more years, and that he planned to move towards normalization.

Thirdly, we had just ended the Vietnam War. So this irritant on the Chinese border, this ideological awkwardness, and the fact that their so-called friends were fighting us in a war were now behind us. They also knew that this would free up our attitudes and resources, whether it involved countering the Soviets or maintaining general, geopolitical balance and assertiveness. So this removed a problem and a complication in our bilateral relationship. Also, public opinion in both China and the U.S. was getting more comfortable with the relationship.

For all of these reasons, this was a very positive context in which to go to China in February, 1973. As a result, it was the first time that Chairman Mao saw Kissinger on his own, and that put the stamp on how important this was.

We agreed in the February 1973 visit on getting over hurdles in terms of communications. We also made an agreement on further economic progress and cultural exchanges. On Taiwan the rhetoric was relatively restrained, I think. However, the most important thing was that we agreed to set up Liaison Offices in the two capitals. This was a clear indication of Chinese pragmatism as well as their feeling more comfortable in terms of this relationship. They had said that there would never be a Chinese Embassy in Washington as long as there was a Taiwan Embassy. This was not acceptable to them, as this amounted to a Two Chinas solution to the problem.

We had tried on previous trips to suggest maybe setting up Trade Offices. We were trying to come up with some formulation under which we would have direct communications with the Chinese, even as we maintained our diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The most forthcoming formulation which we had, and which I think that the Chinese actually suggested, was a Liaison Office. I forget where that phrase, Liaison Office, came from. So the Chinese agreed to the establishment of Liaison Offices, which were Embassies in everything but name. They were big and were going to get bigger. They could do any business that an Embassy could do. So the Chinese could still say that they didn't have an Embassy in Washington while Taiwan had an Embassy. However, in fact, the Chinese did have an office in Washington simultaneously, and that was a major breakthrough. In addition on this trip we secured the release of two American prisoners, CIA pilots, that the Chinese had been holding since the Korean War.

This trip therefore was extremely successful. The discussions were very rich. It was on this trip that there was another example of Zhou En-lai’s style, which was very impressive. There were other reasons for being impressed with his style, including his manner of speaking, elegance, his strategic and tactical skill, his sense of history, his sense of humor, and his charisma. He was an attractive person. The way he expressed himself was always elegant, as opposed to being polemical. He once sent over his
personal doctor to look after one of our secretaries, who was sick. He had heard about this in casual conversation. So he had these nice little touches, although obviously he was ruthless in being able to get and stay where he was.

Let me relate one interesting anecdote in this regard. By this time, Zhou En-lai and Kissinger had built up a very warm relationship. Each of them defended his own national interests, but they had great respect for each other. They had tremendous conversations in which they would digress to talk about history, philosophy, or whatever they wanted to discuss. So it was a very warm relationship.

Every time we went to Beijing we stayed at the Diao Yu-tai guesthouse. Kissinger and I, Holdridge, and sometimes others would walk around and talk strategy, just to get a breath of fresh air and some exercise and get away from bugging devices in our guesthouse. On this trip every time we would try to go over a certain bridge, we were stopped by guards. We didn't know why. It turned out later that Norodom Sihanouk or some other sensitive guest was staying there. At the time we were sort of annoyed, because the whole compound, in which the guesthouse stood, was sort of screened out and private. We could cross other bridges, but we just kept getting blocked away from this particular bridge.

Kissinger was puzzled. He either mentioned this matter to one of the Chinese - it wasn't Zhou En-lai himself, but somebody else - or he was overheard in the guesthouse. In any event, to make a long story short, on the final night, when we finished our discussions, Kissinger and Zhou En-lai genuinely didn't want to break up the meeting because they enjoyed each other's company so much. So we went on for another couple of hours, talking about all kinds of things outside the formal agenda.

Then we finished. We were going to leave the next morning. It was a cold night. Zhou En-lai said: "Well, why don't I walk you back to your guesthouse?" So he took Kissinger and the rest of us back to the guesthouse, which was very friendly in protocol terms. And lo and behold, we walked over that bridge! He didn’t say anything about it. But that was, of course, his gesture to Kissinger on the personal level.

Now, do you have any questions?

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Chas Freeman, in his oral history, suggests that Henry Kissinger was resistant to the idea of a Liaison Office in Beijing.

LORD: For what reason?

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Particularly because Kissinger reportedly felt that, once you had State Department people based in Beijing, that he would lose control of the relationship.

LORD: Again, memory plays tricks. That sounds like nonsense. We, including Kissinger, wanted direct communications with the Chinese. I only remember that Kissinger wanted
to have the most ambitious arrangement that we could get away with, without calling these offices Embassies. I clearly remember that he and I felt that a Liaison Office was a trade off which was better than other possibilities. Any office that you would set up was going to have State Department people in it. Kissinger certainly might be suspicious of other bureaucrats. However, to think that you could have any kind of de facto Embassy without State Department people in it is absurd. Kissinger wanted to have negotiations and direct contact with the Chinese, not to mention the signal this sent around the world, including the Russians and the Vietnamese, that we were advancing in our relationship with China. By that time the Vietnamese probably felt that this issue was irrelevant. It's absurd to say that we didn't want a Liaison Office. I am puzzled by that reference. I don't know how Freeman could come up with it. To be sure, since we set up Liaison Office, Kissinger exercised tight control and was always the key link in our ties with Beijing.

Who else suggested this resistance?

_Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Roger Sullivan._

_LORD: He may have come up with a formulation; I don't remember where it came from. By then we were involving the State Department and asking for ideas. Someone may have suggested using the name of a Liaison Office. I don't deny that. I just don't recall where this term came from. And I really have trouble believing that Kissinger would have resisted setting up a Liaison Office. It just doesn't make any sense. We were delighted to have a Liaison Office, and we knew that any such office would have State Department people in it._

Now, of course, there was also the matter of heads of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing. One of the first two people heading it up was John Holdridge, one of Kissinger's NSC staff members. The other one was Al Jenkins from State. So clearly, Kissinger wasn't going to let these people operate on their own. I don't deny that. It's absurd to say that he wouldn't want a Liaison Office. It just doesn't make any sense.

_Q: We'll stop at this point. The next time we'll cover Vietnam from the NSC perspective. I would like to note that we have covered the Chinese connection and also the Chinese role in Vietnam, India, the Soviet Union, and Japan in this interview._

_LORD: We've gone through the Kissinger secret trip to China and the preparations for it, the rationale for the opening to China, the Nixon and subsequent trips, and some of the discussions and considerations we had on various issues, as well as some personal anecdotes and some on styles._

_Q: So we'll pick this up, starting with the beginning on the Vietnam side. Then, after that, comes the Russian side._

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_I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. This is June 23, 1998. We will continue to follow the China_
thread. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker is also participating in this interview. Win, you said that there are a couple of things that you wanted to add to the material on your experience on the NSC [National Security Council] staff.

LORD: Yes, we're still covering China during my days on the NSC staff. I want to go back over a couple of the trips to China, after the trip by President Nixon [in February, 1972]. It may be repetitious, but I want to make sure that it is covered.

In June, 1972, and I don't know whether we covered this in depth. Kissinger went back to China on the first trip after President Nixon's trip in February, 1972. We made further progress on the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States, generally. Two main items on the June, 1972, trip were to debrief the Chinese on President Nixon's trip to Moscow and the Summit Meeting with the Soviets, and we also wanted to keep working on the Vietnam issue. We particularly wanted to get Chinese help in the negotiations with Hanoi.

As always, there were broad ranging discussions between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. There was a whole variety of issues on the agenda, most of which we discussed in our previous session. There were some nice, warm touches here because, obviously, the relationships between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai and the relationship between the two countries, although they were in their infancy, were obviously beginning to become more friendly. There was a very pleasant meeting with Zhou Enlai. I think that Zhou Enlai was there personally on the boat trip, the visit to the Summer Palace, and the trip to the hills surrounding Beijing.

There was also one difficult issue, which was handled with some restraint by the Chinese. Zhou Enlai showed us pictures of some bombs which had accidentally landed on Chinese soil. These must have been connected to the fighting in Vietnam. I don't recall that this ever became public knowledge or that the Chinese made a big deal out of it. It was quite interesting that they didn't make a major issue out of it.

Q: Were flights over Hainan Island prohibited? This is something that has come up from time to time. People who were with the Office of the Political Adviser to CINCPAC [CINCPAC POLAD] have told us that there were problems with overflights of China during the Vietnam War.

LORD: I don't recall. I remember that the Chinese on this occasion were concerned about bombs actually falling on Chinese territory. I don't imagine that our aircraft went out of their way to overfly China. I don't know whether we accidentally did so or not. Anyway, the Chinese did not raise this issue as such. It was the reference to bombs falling on Chinese territory that seemed to concern them.

This was also the trip where I was greatly embarrassed because of a table tennis exhibition. Kissinger had rashly told Zhou that I was a good player. A few days later the Chinese sprung a match between me and the Chinese champion on one side and Dick Solomon and the world champion on the other. I played badly. The results remain
Without being specific on the chronology, how did we keep in touch with the Chinese after the Nixon trip [in February, 1972]? We had no direct contact at all with the Chinese before the Kissinger secret trip [in 1971]. We had to go through Pakistan. After the first Kissinger trip, we had two basic channels. One was through the Chinese UN Ambassador in New York, a man named Huang Hua, who subsequently became Foreign Minister of the PRC [People's Republic of China]. Kissinger and myself, sometimes I alone, sometimes Al Haig and I, in various combinations, would go up to New York and meet, usually in a safe house, right near where I had grown up as a child, on Park Avenue and the 70s, to discuss various issues. I remember that we kept in touch in this way during the 1971 South Asian crisis, although my chronology is not precise.

In these meetings in New York we continued to talk about bilateral relations, our respective relations with Russia, and, of course, Vietnam. I remember specifically that I went up to New York on my own in April, 1972, when Hanoi launched its offensive just before President Nixon went to Moscow for the Summit Meeting with the Soviets.

The other channel was through Paris. The Chinese Ambassador there was a man named Huang Zhen, who subsequently became chief of the PRC Liaison Office and Ambassador to the U.S. That was a secret contact. Every time that we met with the Vietnamese in secret negotiations, which we'll get to later, we would go over and debrief Huang Zhen, at least during this period, to keep the Chinese posted on how we were doing with the Vietnamese. Obviously, this was done in the hope that they would try to be helpful in encouraging Hanoi to take reasonable positions.

At these meetings with the Chinese in Paris we would also discuss bilateral matters as well. There was a portrait of Mao Zedong in the PRC Embassy. There was incense burning. We had good, Chinese food when we went there, and so on. So those are some incidental points.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Could I ask something? You were briefing the Chinese on what you were discussing with the Russians. Was there a sense of confidence on the part of the Chinese that you were telling them everything, or how did they...

LORD: Well, it was not in the style of the Chinese to tell us that they didn't think that we were telling them everything. Nor would they show gratitude at our being forthcoming in briefing them. They listened to us with interest. I don't recall that they probed us with a lot of questions; they would not want to show their eagerness. Mostly, they just listened to what we said.

Indeed, I don't recall whether this began with the trip in June, [1972], but certainly by February, 1973, we began to brief them on Russian deployments [on the Chinese border]. Often I would go off with Jon Howe or some military expert to talk with the Chinese. We would discuss Russian troop levels near the Chinese border and related things. By this means we sought to gain the confidence of the Chinese and to show that we were willing...
to enter into a new relationship with them.

In their dealings with us they did not reciprocate greatly in terms of their relations with Russia. On the other hand, they did not have much to offer. Relations between Russia and China were pretty frosty at this point.

_Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I was going to ask at what point they began to provide us with information as well._

LORD: Well, whether it was Russia, the Middle East, or Vietnam, for a long period of time we generally gave them a lot more than they gave us in terms of these intelligence exchanges, although these began to be more mutual as time went on. We didn't consider the intelligence exchanges as a zero sum game. First of all, we thought that we knew more than the Chinese did on most of these issues. Secondly, we hoped to get more out of them, and we encouraged them to do so, but we didn't get a great deal. However, we felt that even the unilateral, intelligence briefings would give them a greater stake in the emerging relationship with the United States which, after all, was still somewhat fragile after some 22 years of hostility between our two countries. We hoped that our efforts would show them that we regarded them as a more friendly, strategic partner.

Specifically, if there were any arguments in the Chinese Politburo about the opening to the U.S., we hoped to help those in favor of such an opening, like Mao and Zhou En-lai. We also hoped generally to indicate to the Chinese that we were not naïve about the Russians but were willing to share information about the Russians with the Chinese. Furthermore, we also made it clear that we wanted to improve relations with Russia as well. We made it clear that we would not do this at Chinese expense but that it was in our national interest as well. We said that we were not about to form a tight, anti-Soviet alliance with China, any more than we would gang up with Russia against China.

We wanted to strike a balance, making it clear that we were as suspicious of the Russians as they were. After all, this was one of the main reasons for the opening to China. We also wanted to keep the Chinese sufficiently on edge so that we might improve relations with Russia, right after improving relations with China. This was to give the Chinese an incentive to improve relations with us. This was the usual triangular game.

_Q: Could you talk about the use of a weapon which we seem to have used quite a bit during that period and subsequently? And maybe before, as well. That is, the use of satellite pictures and photo interpretation. This seems to have become a major tool in our diplomacy, in the sense of telling another country, see what we have to show you from our bag of tricks. Nobody else was in a position to do this._

LORD: Some of this material is still in a twilight zone of classification. I would not be shocking anyone any more than it would have shocked Rick, to use the line from the movie "Casablanca," when he was told by the French Chief of Police that there was gambling going on in his night club. We began to present verbal and written briefings. As time went on, there were pictures added, and so on. We will also go into this later.
However, of course, this began in earnest during the Carter administration, when more strategic cooperation was undertaken with the Chinese with respect to tracking Soviet missile activity, not to mention sharing intelligence and cooperation on Afghanistan and other areas.

Yes, satellite pictures were used as we went on. I don't think that we had reached that point during the period I am talking about.

The only other thing that I have to cover before we go on, unless you have other questions, would be to review what we covered during the trip to China in February, 1973. I really would not want to repeat all of that. I think that we covered most of it, but I ought to mention the meeting with Mao.

As I said briefly, the meeting with Mao in February, 1973, was Kissinger's first meeting with him. I remember that we were sitting late at night with Zhou Enlai at about 11:00 PM. Wang Hairong, I might repeat, was Mao's grandniece. She kept coming in and going out, bearing notes to and from Zhou Enlai. Finally, Zhou said something to the effect that Chairman Mao would like to see Dr. Kissinger and that Mr. Lord was invited as well. Or Zhou said that Dr. Kissinger could be accompanied by Mr. Lord, or words to that effect.

This is typical of Chinese, partially Zhou’s, style. The Chinese knew, of course, as we discussed earlier, that I had attended the first Mao meeting with Nixon but that I was cut out of all of the pictures and the communiqué because of the sensitivities of the State Department. The Chinese also knew that Kissinger relied on me the most on Chinese matters. There were other very, very important people in our delegation, but I had been involved the most on such matters and was Kissinger's closest assistant at that point, both generally and on China. Therefore, the Chinese knew that Kissinger would probably want me in any meeting he would have with Mao.

On the other hand, there was a protocol problem. There were other American officials sitting there, whose names I cannot immediately recall all of whom were higher ranking than I. Therefore, it would be very awkward to include me as one of the more junior people if Kissinger could only take one person with him. So what the Chinese did to avoid any possible controversy was to say that Mao wanted to see Kissinger and that I might accompany him to this meeting. This was absurd in substance because Mao would not have known me from Michael Jordan [star basketball player for the Chicago Bulls professional basketball team]. This meant that Kissinger was relieved from having to choose who would go with him to the meeting with Mao. He got the person that he wanted to go with him. I was rewarded with being included in a public meeting with Mao to make up for the fact that nobody knew that I was in the private meeting with Mao. I had been in the other meeting between Kissinger and Mao, but my picture had been cut out of the official photograph. That was a nice, grace point by the Chinese.

We went over to meet with Mao. I think that the meeting lasted about an hour and a half. It ended at 1:30 AM, in any event. The conversation was wide-ranging, and I'll get back to that. For the first time Mao used the expression: "I'll soon be receiving an invitation
from God." I hadn't realized that Mao used this expression that far back but I double checked it in Kissinger's book. This was Mao's way of saying that he was quite sick and did not expect to live much longer. He said: "God," and not Marx. This phrase was used in the visit between President Ford and Mao a year and a half later.

Also, Mao kept mentioning that women were causing problems in China or at least saying that China could send the U.S. 10 million women. This was not just playing around with the phony story that Kissinger was allegedly popular with females. At the time we couldn't figure out what Mao meant by this statement that he could send us 10 million women. When we got home, I asked my wife, a Chinese woman born in Shanghai. She immediately said that Mao was having problems on policy issues, including perhaps the opening with the U.S., with some of the Chinese radicals, including his wife, Mme. Mao. In effect, he was saying that he was having trouble with the radicals, including his wife. Mao spoke, using allusions, metaphors, and similes. His Socratic dialogue manner of expressing himself was never very explicit on some of these things. My wife’s view seemed to make sense to Kissinger and me.

Mao's basic thesis at this meeting was that China and the U.S. had been enemies and that we would probably continue to fire propaganda shots at each other. However, these slogans really didn't mean anything. What really counted were longer range, national interests and far sightedness. Neither side should maneuver for petty advantage. We should put national interests above ideological differences.

Even this early the Chinese began, through Mao, although I don't know whether Zhou En-lai did this as much, to warn us about fake detente. The remarks didn't have sharp edges of the kind we heard later in the mid-1970s, particularly during the 1974-1975 period up to and during the time of the visit to China by President Ford. Mao's point was that we should not be hoodwinked by the Russians. This theme was introduced. There was also emphasis by Mao that there was a need for U.S. leadership in the world and that we should pay attention to our allies, including Europe, Japan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. So that was that.

Q: We're still talking about the China thread and the period of your service on the NSC staff. There was a lot of euphoria, and this was all very exciting. Was there an undercurrent, discernible to you, about a build-up of the old China Lobby in the United States, including people from the Right Wing who really didn't like China? Was this a factor in Mao's thinking?

LORD: Actually, no. In fact, just the opposite. In our relations with China and our perceptions of that country, we have a history of swinging from one extreme to another. This goes back to American missionaries and the Boxer Rebellion [in the early 20th century] in reaction to the American missionaries. Even during the last 50 to 60 years the Chinese have tended to be portrayed either as evil, Fu Man Chus [a fictional character] or as noble peasants depicted by Pearl Buck in her novels. During this same period we were staunch allies of the Chinese during World War II. Then the Communists took over China, and we actually fought against them in Korea. We had images of the Chinese as
yellow hordes, red guards, and blue ants working for Mao. The Cultural Revolution greatly enhanced these negative images. Then we had the dramatic opening of our relations with Kissinger and Nixon. The press coverage of China, on the whole, and the general reaction back in the US during the opening in the early 1970s attracted euphoria and tremendous support for the opening to China, much to our relief, despite 22 years of hostility and bad images of China. There still were people concerned about China, but there was great popular, Congressional and media support for the opening.

If anything, in visiting China President Nixon not only did something which was geopolitically correct but exceeded any of our expectations to domestic support. I think that the opening to China was very popular. I think that we all recollect it that way. So we all did not feel very much constrained in terms of the Right Wing or people being overly nervous about this process. There was tremendous support for what Nixon did. And this policy has always been cited as Nixon’s most significant achievement as President. Of course, this swinging back and forth in American opinion has continued ever since then. A few journalists at the time, such as Bill Buckley, Marilyn Berger, and some others, had doubts about the opening or whether China was as relatively benign as some visitors portrayed it. We didn't realize at the time how bad the Cultural Revolution was. As Americans began to work and live in China as journalists and academics and businesspeople, we began to learn about the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. Actually, this didn't officially end until 1976 but the late ’60s saw the worst excesses. These accounts began to come out. Then we had the Deng Xiaoping take-over in 1978, the reforms, and the normalization of Chinese-American relations. Once again, we had accounts that China was going capitalist, and many became overly sanguine. Then, just as things were developing in a positive direction, we reached the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, which greatly set back Chinese-American relations and still is a major problem in our relationship, not to mention the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Even as we speak, President Clinton is about to go to China again.

But to repeat, we didn't feel any constraints about the domestic impact of our policies toward China. Of course, we were still very careful about the Taiwan issue and the matter of friendship with Taiwan. That was and is still a very important issue in terms of our domestic politics, as well as our reputation as a friend and ally. On that issue we were careful, especially during the Ford years. However, on the whole, we didn't feel much political constraint on our relations with China.

Another out of sequence footnote: during the October, 1971, trip, there was the embarrassing issue of postponing our departure for China from a day. President Nixon was concerned about the timing of the UN debate on the Chinese representation issue. [That is, whether the China seat at the UN would be occupied by representatives of the People's Republic of China or the anti-communist Republic of China on Taiwan.] I forget why President Nixon wanted us to postpone our departure from China. In any event, we learned about Taiwan being kicked out of the UN and the PRC being admitted to the UN even as we were flying out of Shanghai in October, 1971. That UN vote was awkward on the domestic front.
Q: Do you have other questions before we move on?

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: No.
IX. NSC - INDOCHINA, GENERAL (1969-1973)

Q: This is December 8, 1998. We've agreed not to go into the profiles of major figures in the Clinton administration in this portion of the interview. We'll stick to people in the NSC [National Security Council], especially those working on Vietnam, and Indochina. When were you in the NSC?

LORD: I came to the NSC in February, 1969. I spent the first year of my time there on the Planning Staff in the Executive Office Building, working directly for Mort Halperin but also with direct interaction with then National Security Adviser Kissinger. Then, in February, 1970, I was appointed Special Assistant to Kissinger, at a time when Tony Lake and Roger Morris, who were performing those functions, were planning to leave the NSC. They were in their final months on the NSC. So I became Special Assistant to Kissinger and moved over to the White House basement and worked out of there during the remainder of my time on the NSC, until May, 1973.

Q: Let's talk about your involvement in Indochina, using that term, to begin with. That covers all three countries, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. At the time when you began your employment on the NSC, how did you feel about the whole business?

LORD: That's exactly where I thought we should start. During the 1960s we as a nation obviously became more and more involved in the Vietnam War. I was essentially on the moderately hawkish side, not on the extreme, hawkish side. From 1961 up till 1967 I felt generally hawkish as a Foreign Service Officer. Then in the Pentagon, where I worked from 1967 till 1969, I essentially defended the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. I'll come back later to how my views changed with time. I believed that, whatever the excesses, our involvement in Vietnam was obviously in support of a noble cause, in the defense of South Vietnam against North Vietnamese aggression. I was not overly hawkish in the sense of advocating the flattening of Hanoi or going out of our way to inflict damage on North Vietnam. However, in the evolving debate I generally defended the U.S. involvement, essentially for the reasons set forth by the administration. That is, in the defense of our security interests, the defense of freedom, and so on.

That was my basic view when I was in Geneva from 1965 to 1967, for example, as a Foreign Service Officer and as I entered the Pentagon. In the debate then raging I was strongly against those who would accuse the U.S. of carrying on an immoral war and who glorified the Viet Cong and/or the North Vietnamese. I would have respectful debates with those who understood the nefarious nature of the Viet Cong and North Vietnam but nevertheless felt that in defense of American national interests and holding together American society, our involvement in Vietnam was a mistake. I could debate honestly with those who felt, on grounds of hardheaded national interests, that we shouldn't be in Vietnam, that our involvement was distracting us from other important priorities around the world, that it was undermining our social cohesion at home, and so forth. However, I was in violent disagreement with those who called our involvement in Vietnam immoral and who tended to elevate the enemy in relative virtue.
When I worked at the Pentagon, I did some work on Vietnam. I was on the Policy Planning Staff, as we discussed before, and I covered a lot of ground, including Asia generally. We did some extensive work on what our policies in Asia should look like after the end of the Vietnam War, on the assumption of various outcomes, such as a clear-cut American and South Vietnamese victory, an ambiguous outcome, or a loss. We were just looking ahead after the end of the Vietnam War.

I recall working with my colleagues, including certainly Mort Halperin and Les Gelb, who were heavily involved in following the Vietnam War. Indeed, Gelb headed the project called "The Pentagon Papers," which looked at our past involvement in Vietnam. They were on the dovish side but were not extreme doves. They felt that the American military and others were too optimistic about how things were going in Vietnam and that we should step up our efforts to negotiate with the communist side. They strongly supported Clark Clifford, when he came in as Secretary of Defense, replacing Robert McNamara. He began to turn our policies around and worked on President Lyndon Johnson in calling for bombing halts and in starting negotiations.

To the extent that U.S. policy on Vietnam began shifting under the Johnson administration with Clifford, the policies advocated by Halperin and Gelb had a lot to do with it. I was not central to that effort, although I do recall having exchanges of views with them in the preparation of papers in support of what they advocated.

By then I was more moderate in my position. I began to see that the struggle was taking a lot of time and heavy losses abroad and at home, and that some of our estimates of the situation were overly optimistic. I certainly was in favor of serious negotiations, although not in favor of a sell-out or a unilateral U.S. capitulation to the communists. I felt that negotiations were important. I think that it is fair to say that in 1967 and 1968 I began to moderate my views but still defended the U.S. involvement, although I felt that we should pursue negotiations with the other side, if at all possible.

Then came an event which had a major impact on my perspectives on Vietnam. That was the Tet [Vietnamese lunar New Year] offensive [beginning in January, 1968]. Most people agree in retrospect that, in strictly military terms, the Viet Cong [Vietnamese communists in South Vietnam] in particular and the North Vietnamese suffered a military defeat during the Tet offensive. Many of their troops were wiped out. Whatever gains they made were temporary, they were thrown back. However, virtually everyone I spoke to also agreed that the Tet offensive had a tremendous, psychological impact on the American public and on many American Government officials, in the sense that it demonstrated that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese could mount significant attacks, even in the heart of Saigon and in other, major cities of South Vietnam. Even though they were defeated, it showed that our previous, optimistic scenarios had been less than accurate.

What had a particular impact on me (and others) was a cable coming in from Saigon in which General Westmoreland [Commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam or COMUSMACV] requested a further, major reinforcement of our forces. I
don't remember the exact date, but it came in after the Tet offensive. We'll have to go back and check the figure, but it was for 150,000 troops, I believe.

This request had a major impact. We had previously thought that things were going along quite well in South Vietnam, but I was beginning to moderate my view on that. I now began to think that the situation in South Vietnam was very serious, when a communist offensive of that size could be mounted. At the time we didn't realize how much the Viet Cong had suffered, but still, the psychological and political impact in the United States was substantial. When General Westmoreland, who was fairly optimistic himself, reported that he needed another 150,000 troops, I began to wonder what was happening in Vietnam. I really took a turn toward a more critical position. I began to be more dovish, although not with an extremely dovish position.

This was also around the time that Clark Clifford came in as Secretary of Defense. I think that it's fair to say that in 1968, especially after the Tet offensive, I moved toward a more dovish position. What I mean by that is that, if I had been serving outside of the government, I would have been considered more centrist, essentially defending American policy but urging a negotiated solution if at all possible. I was still in fundamental disagreement with those who considered American policy in Vietnam as immoral and our enemies as heroes. Within the government I would certainly have been on the dovish side of the debate. We'll see that further as we go ahead over the following years.

As I went to the White House and to the NSC [National Security Council] in February, 1969, my position essentially was that we ought to try to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War but on honorable terms. In the coming years, I had some internal debates along the way in my own mind and with Kissinger about tactical moves, military escalation, and the Cambodian incursion. We'll get into points where I disagreed with some of the policies followed. However, I have to say that I was sufficiently comfortable with the Nixon/Kissinger strategic approach including Vietnamization and the search for a negotiated solution that I never left my job in protest, as some of my colleagues did. I will go into that in more detail as we go along.

The essential Nixon/Kissinger approach was as follows. First, they had inherited this war and the American involvement in it from their predecessors in previous administrations, which had been controlled by the Democratic Party. As they came into office, we had about 585,000 troops in Vietnam. Whatever the intentions behind that escalating involvement over the years, Nixon and Kissinger were presented with a fait accompli, which they could not undo.

So, on the one hand, it was possible, politically, for President Nixon to admit that our involvement in the Vietnam War had been a huge mistake made by his predecessors in the Democratic Party. He could have said that he was getting out of this involvement, limiting the damage as much as possible and blaming it on his predecessors.

However, by genuine conviction Nixon and Kissinger felt that this would be a huge mistake which would undermine our credibility in the world generally and would dismay
our friends and allies. They would come to question our staying power and credibility as a friend. This course of action could lead to the spread of communism. I don't know whether they subscribed automatically to the domino theory, but they felt that a clear-cut communist victory and U.S. capitulation in Indochina would spread throughout Southeast Asia and would generally undermine our credibility in the world. They felt that, whatever the shortcomings of the South Vietnamese regime, there was North Vietnamese aggression as opposed to a simple, civil conflict, and there were international rules about how to settle conflicts as well as a feeling that we would be leaving people in the lurch who had opposed this aggression. So Nixon and Kissinger had no sentiment, and this was the view in the cabinet generally, that we could just announce the we were going to get out and go home.

On the other hand Nixon and Kissinger, as well as others, certainly felt that the Vietnam War was tearing our society apart and that we had other obligations in the world the resources for which were being drained by our military, financial, and diplomatic defense of South Vietnam. There were many things that they wanted to do in the world. Therefore, if our withdrawal from Vietnam could be accomplished with honor, it would be in our interest to do so.

As I think that I mentioned elsewhere, I think that President Nixon felt in particular that the Russians could be helpful in ending the Vietnam War. He mentioned that he had a secret plan for ending the war, which he talked about during the 1968 presidential elections campaign, and involving the Russians was what he was referring to.

Kissinger believed that Russia and China, and Nixon felt this as well, could be helpful in at least isolating North Vietnam psychologically, if not in terms of military aid. They felt that improving our relations with Russia and China might help to put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate reasonably. Also, Russia and China might have a greater stake in improving their bilateral relations with us, rather than standing by their so-called friends and allies in Hanoi. But Nixon always put more emphasis, and hope in, Russia’s help than Kissinger did. He was more inclined to tie other elements of our dealings with Moscow to Vietnam than Kissinger was.

The basic strategy that was devised during the early months of the first Nixon term in 1969 involved two threads. One key element was the Vietnamization of the war. That is, turning over to the South Vietnamese the major responsibility for their own defense. It was a Nixon/Kissinger strategy, but it had the strong support of Secretary of Defense Laird, Secretary of State Rogers, and others. For several reasons they concluded that we should begin to Vietnamize or De-Americanize the war. This involved turning over responsibility for the conduct of the war to the South Vietnamese, but at a pace that was bearable. We had spent a lot of time and effort, as well as American blood and treasure, in helping the South Vietnamese.

First, Nixon and Kissinger felt that it was time for the South Vietnamese to assume more of the burden, in terms of justice and American domestic support. Secondly, they felt that, if this process were accomplished gradually, it was doable. We would strengthen the
South Vietnamese through the provision of training and military aid. Gradually, American troop withdrawals, military assistance, and training would make it possible for the South Vietnamese to assume more of the burden.

Third, this process would show the American people that there would be an end, at some point, to our involvement and that we were at least heading in the direction of ending our involvement in an honorable way. It was felt that, in this way, we could maintain American domestic and Congressional support for continued American involvement and aid to South Vietnam. We could say that South Vietnam was taking on more of the responsibility, while American involvement and casualties would gradually be reduced. So this was a way to maintain domestic support for our Vietnam policies. That was one track, and a very important one at the time.

The other track was simultaneously to try to negotiate an end to the conflict and by applying military pressure, if necessary, to show Hanoi that they couldn't win and that negotiations were in their interests. We sought to couple that effort, as we went on, with Russian and Chinese help. We also believed that by making progress on the negotiations, Hanoi would see that it was in their interest to bring the war to an end. This was a version of the carrot and the stick, as it were.

I did not become aware of the serious aspect of the secret negotiations with North Vietnam until I became a Special Assistant to National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger in February, 1970. Prior to that time, I was not aware of the secret talks with North Vietnam. There had been only one round of secret talks (August 1969) before I became a Special Assistant to Kissinger. There were three more (February, March, April 1970) that Tony Lake handled. I was involved in every one of the secret and semi-public talks with the North Vietnamese after that. I took part in all of the discussions from September 1970 to the signing of the peace agreement in January 1973. Some of those in 1972-'73 were announced right after we held them; the total was nineteen, with most of the later ones lasting several days.

Q: When you were taken on board at the NSC [National Security Council]...

LORD: Let me complete this conceptual description of the situation. It seemed to me, even in 1969, when I wasn't aware of the secret negotiations, that the combination of Vietnamization and the drawdown of American involvement in Vietnam, as well as our public efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict, was a reasonable approach to the problem. It was one that I could live with, despite my somewhat dovish tendencies. It promised an end to the conflict. In any case, it was done at a pace that did not sell out our allies. It would mean a decline in American casualties. I still was sufficiently in the center that I did not want to see America collapse or see American credibility undermined. I recognized that, however imperfect the South Vietnamese were, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese were even nastier.

The problem with this two track approach, which Kissinger himself acknowledged, was that there was some tension and contradiction in it. This mainly involved the question of what incentives Hanoi had to negotiate seriously with us when they saw, in any event,
that we were reducing our involvement and that Vietnamization meant that we would be pulling our troops out. So why shouldn't Hanoi just wait until the Americans had sufficiently withdrawn so that the South Vietnamese were on their own and sufficiently weak so that North Vietnam could win, anyway? What incentive did North Vietnam have to give up positions to get U.S. withdrawal, when they were going to get a U.S. withdrawal, anyway?

The analytical response to that was that the withdrawals would be fast enough to maintain U.S. domestic support but slow enough to allow the South Vietnamese time to adjust and take on the North Vietnamese. Therefore, we would hope that North Vietnam would calculate that American domestic support wouldn't collapse. They would see that there was support for this approach and therefore that it was against the North Vietnamese interest over the long haul to continue to fight but not negotiate seriously. Secondly, with our help South Vietnam would be formidable enough to take on North Vietnam. Therefore, North Vietnam would be better off trying to get a negotiated deal. However, there was always this tension concerning our major bargaining chip, the U.S. troop presence, which was being withdrawn as a result of Vietnamization, no matter what happened at the bargaining table.

Q: I wonder if you could tell me whether you felt that you were being put through a litmus test about where you stood on Vietnam when you took this position on the NSC staff? What about your fellow officers on the NSC at this early time? What was the atmosphere as this debate went on?

LORD: We have already covered the situation when I was interviewed by Kissinger for the job on the NSC. He focused on my discretion and my loyalty to President Nixon. We did not get into substantive issues. This was somewhat of a rushed meeting. In fairness to Kissinger, the one thing that he did not like was yes men or yes women, for that matter. He wanted debate, as long as it was intellectually adroit and not just pap. I'll get to this in a minute. So he did not apply a litmus test to me or to others on his staff. I'm quite sure that he knew then that some of the staff that he was hiring, including Mort Halperin, were quite dovish on some of these subjects, as were Tony Lake and Morris, who were among his key people. So in fairness to Kissinger, he just didn't hire hawkish people. Indeed, some of President Nixon's White House staff were suspicious that the NSC staff was overly moderate and liberal. There was just no litmus test in use. Indeed, along the way and in verbal discussions, I would argue with Kissinger on some of our policies, usually coming at him from a dovish standpoint. But this took place within a framework that an honest effort was being made to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War, particularly when I became involved in the secret negotiations.

With respect to others, I think that it's fair to say that people like Mort Halperin, Tony Lake, and Morris, as I think that I mentioned, were somewhat more dovish than I was. I think that we may be parsing words here, but they were essentially in the same position as I've described. They were a little more dovish than I was. Other people on the NSC staff were more hawkish. Al Haig, who was a military officer and eventually became
Kissinger's deputy, was more on the hawkish side.

Regarding a few of the Vietnam experts that I worked with in the course of these several years, I would say that Dick Smyser was about in the same position as I was. John Negroponte was more hawkish. Then there were people like Larry Lynn, who was essentially involved in systems analysis, program budgeting, and so forth. He would look at issues from a systems analysis aspect. In other words, how well were we doing on the ground? He was somewhat detached. He didn't get overly emotional about the issues under debate. He would look at them in a hard headed way as an analyst in terms of how we were doing. It would be hard to type him.

There were different people on the NSC staff. However, the key people working on Vietnam were either about where Kissinger was or were somewhat more dovish, with the exception of Al Haig, who was somewhat more hawkish.

Q: I'd like to go on with your narrative. It seems to me, as you describe the situation, that there were two, critical elements regarding how to end our involvement in the Vietnam War. One was, how well was the process of Vietnamization working? Secondly, there was the matter of understanding what was really going on in the Politburo in Hanoi.

Regarding Vietnamization, it was pretty well accepted that one of the problems that appeared later was that we were training the South Vietnamese Army to be an American type army, with a tremendous, supply tail and which was road bound and all of that. Were you getting good reports on how well the South Vietnamese Army, or ARVN, was developing, as opposed to the North Vietnamese?

LORD: Okay, let me make some general comments on this. Then, when we discuss it chronologically and get into more detail about negotiations and so forth, we can consider other aspects.

Depending on one's point of view, one could say that the strategy outlined worked fairly well, although it took a relatively longer time to implement than envisioned. It maintained a sufficient level of support in the public opinion polls and enough domestic support in the U.S. that we were able to maintain our involvement in South Vietnam while we were negotiating in Paris. American casualties and involvement were reduced successfully, from a high of 585,000 troops, which we inherited from our predecessors, over the next couple of years. We were successful in buying time for the rest of Southeast Asia to avoid becoming dominos and to become tigers instead. We finally managed to negotiate a settlement in early 1973 which protected U.S. credibility and gave South Vietnam a chance.

On the other hand, you can certainly take the point of view that this strategy did not work and that it led to several more years of war. I don't know how many more casualties were involved. I think there were perhaps 20,000 more Americans killed, out of a total of some 50,000 killed, although I do not recall the exact figure. We ended up with an agreement with the North Vietnamese which, although better than most thought possible, basically didn't hold up. Within a couple of years the Saigon Government had disappeared,
whether it is your point of view that this was due to Hanoi's perfidy, the weakness of the
South Vietnamese, dastardly actions by the U.S. Congress, or the impact of the Watergate
Affair. Or all of the above. Take your pick. For whatever reason, after four more years of
the expenditure of treasure and debates within American society, as well as the loss of
American and South Vietnamese lives, we achieved an agreement that only held up for a
couple of years. On the other hand, it was not a sellout and we bought valuable time for
all of our friends in Southeast Asia who went on to become tigers instead of dominos.

The question is whether we would have been better off accepting one of two extremes
from the beginning. One of these extremes is that we should have cut our losses and
unilaterally withdrawn from South Vietnam in 1969. The more hawkish extreme which
some people, in retrospect, believe, is that we should have gone all out in military terms
to support our troops. Rather than either extreme, we in fact muddled through, with all of
the losses involved. The tough choices avoided were a very determined military effort on
the one hand, and the most dovish pullout on the other. This is basically the view of a
very good book written by Les Gelb and Richard Betts.

Presidents Johnson and Nixon always seemed to follow a medium course. They were not
really brutal enough to sock it to Hanoi enough and get them to be more reasonable at the
negotiating table. They weren't dovish enough to pull out and cut our losses. They always
felt that an additional, moderate increment of American troops - here I'm talking about
the administration of President Johnson - would do the job. Or some additional bombing
of Hanoi and Haiphong, or work in Cambodia and Laos, in the case of President Nixon,
might be decisive militarily.

So there are different views. However, to the extent that our efforts didn't produce a
lasting settlement, there were a couple of miscalculations made, in retrospect. First, there
was the view that the South Vietnamese would be able to take on the bulk of the fighting.
In fairness to the South Vietnamese, the successive cut off's of American aid and the
removal of the threat of bombing, after early 1973, when the peace agreement was
reached, encouraged Hanoi and severely undercut South Vietnamese morale. It was
pretty tough for the South Vietnamese to take on the North Vietnamese when they were
getting only limited support from the American Congress. I think that Congress is guilty
in that respect. Nevertheless, corruption and other shortcomings on the part of the South
Vietnamese were also clear. One could make the case that the South Vietnamese were not
capable of taking on the North Vietnamese on their own, even with American support.
This was an element in the South Vietnamese collapse.

So one miscalculation might have concerned how able South Vietnam was to handle this
struggle, largely on its own. Another misjudgment might have concerned the willingness
of Hanoi to negotiate seriously. The North Vietnamese were revolutionaries who didn't
like to negotiate and compromise. They wanted to win everything. They were very tough
about negotiating in secret and, of course, in public. This was partly because it's not their
custom to compromise and they play for the long run. This was partly because Hanoi
probably felt that the South Vietnamese were fairly weak on their own and that Hanoi
could take them on and take them over at some point. Partly also because Hanoi may
have concluded that American domestic support for the war was fading fast. Although
there was a solid public majority supporting our efforts in Vietnam, there is no question that in Congress and in the media support for our involvement was souring fast. Hanoi may have concluded that it could wait until the American administration no longer had enough support for our involvement in Vietnam.

So these were the elements that didn't work. You can judge the record in terms of what occurred and the impact of Congress and the Watergate Affair. Or you could say that President Nixon and Kissinger caused the loss of a lot more American and Vietnamese lives and greater casualties than were necessary and that there was an inherent contradiction in our policies. You could say that we should have withdrawn much sooner than we did.

But on this latter point, there is one other retrospective theory that I want to shoot down. I'll make this clear as we go through the chronology. That is, the proposition that the deal we made with the North Vietnamese in 1973, negotiated at the end of 1972, could have been achieved much earlier through a unilateral, U.S. withdrawal, and not what we negotiated, which involved withdrawal of American forces, a cease-fire, return of prisoners, and international supervision of the agreement reached. There are some revisionists who claim that, if we had just offered a unilateral withdrawal at some time in the period from 1969 to 1971, we could have had an end to the war at that time.

This view is absolutely wrong, and I will show why it is. In fact, beginning on May 31, 1971, we offered such an arrangement in the secret talks. The basic problem was that Hanoi's stipulation for an agreement to end the war was that there would have to be a military and a political settlement at the same time. Nixon and Kissinger said, and I agreed with them on this, that we would only agree to a military settlement. The political future of Vietnam would have to be worked out by the Vietnamese themselves. More concretely, Hanoi's position was that the U.S. should get out of Vietnam unilaterally. However, as we left, we would have to overthrow the South Vietnamese Government under President Thieu and help to install a coalition government in South Vietnam. Then we would get our prisoners back. That was their consistent position in the negotiations until October 1972.

Almost from the beginning of the negotiations [in 1969] the American position was that we were willing to resolve the military portion of this agreement. This was foreshadowed very concretely in a Presidential speech in November 1969, and particularly in May 1971, when we secretly indicated that we were willing not to insist on a North Vietnamese withdrawal. We said that we would withdraw from South Vietnam, there would be a cease-fire throughout Indochina, we would get our prisoners back, and we would insist on international supervision of the agreement. We would continue aid to South Vietnam so that they could take on the North Vietnamese by themselves if the cease-fire broke down. What we declined to do was that, as we withdrew, we would overthrow the current government in Saigon and form a coalition government, as Hanoi demanded. It would be one thing for us to withdraw our forces and then support South Vietnam to carry the fight itself, if necessary. Hopefully, given the cease-fire, this would be a political struggle. However, we would not overturn an ally as we left, both because
this would be immoral and because we had enough leverage so that we did not have to do that and because we would undermine our credibility around the world about how we treat our friends, and we would have made a mockery of all the sacrifices to date.

That was the basic dilemma underlying most of the secret negotiations throughout the period from 1970-1972. It was not until the fall of 1972 that Hanoi realized that President Nixon was going to be reelected and that it wasn’t going to be dealing with Senator McGovern [the Democratic candidate for President in the elections of 1972, who was totally disposed toward Hanoi’s conditions]. Hanoi realized that it was going to have to deal with Nixon, a mad man in the White House who would not have to worry about being reelected. Therefore, Hanoi had an incentive for negotiating seriously, and in October 1972, they finally dropped their political demands and were prepared to settle for an agreement that they could have had a couple of years earlier.

So it would be absolutely wrong to say that what we finally got was something that we could have had earlier. I think that it is useful to make these general observations before going into further detail.

Q: I suppose that we could move into greater detail. I always try to keep the focus on what you were seeing.

LORD: That's right. I want to set out the conceptual framework in which things happened, as I saw them. As you will see, I had some disagreements along the way on tactics and specific actions. I had a very strong opinion on the Cambodian incursion [in spring - 1970]. I will get to that. However, I was very comfortable with our basic strategy of not overthrowing the South Vietnamese Government and not acceding to the political demands made by Hanoi, while reducing American involvement in South Vietnam through the process of Vietnamization, plus serious negotiations. I felt that this was an honorable path to follow. It matched up with my now somewhat more dovish outlook.

Q: As you're doing this, I hope that you will keep in mind something that we were talking about while the microphone was turned off. That is, the atmosphere within the NSC [National Security Council]. How much were the discussions within the NSC an internal discussion by people who basically were thinking that the North Vietnamese Politburo will do this, and the South Vietnamese should do that. We're talking about people who were sitting in the White House, trying to figure out what foreigners are going to do and how they're going to react.

LORD: Well, of course, we had the whole apparatus of the American intelligence community, the State Department, our embassy in South Vietnam, and so on reporting on attitudes in Saigon and Hanoi. So it wasn't just the NSC staff which miscalculated what was going on, even though the State Department wasn't involved in the secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese. I think that it's fair to say that there was general support within the administration for the policy line which I have outlined and which was followed by Secretary of State Rogers, by Secretary of Defense Laird, and by the other key figures. This was not a case like the one we had in the previous administration with
Deputy Secretary of State George Ball clearly contesting the policy advocated by Secretary of State Rusk. Sometimes Laird (and Rogers) was more eager than the White House to speed up Vietnamiization and the pace of our withdrawals. But there was a general consensus on the policy approach to be taken. I don't think that there was any real debate on this. I've already indicated the range of views within the NSC staff itself.

Now, the first thing that President Nixon and Kissinger did on Vietnam after entering office [in 1969] was to have the government undertake a total review of our Vietnam policy. I think that the very first National Security Study Memorandum, or NSSM, that was issued was to inaugurate a very extensive, interagency study on Vietnam. This included how we were doing militarily, what the South Vietnamese economic, military, and diplomatic situation was, and the various options that might be considered in terms of policy. This was a genuine attempt by Nixon and Kissinger to gather information.

Q: Was this one of these studies intended to tie the government up while the administration did what it wanted to do?

LORD: I'm going to give you a mixed response to that question. This was a genuine attempt to get information. Contributions to the response were made by CIA, DIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our people on the ground, the State Department, and others. In other words, all of the relevant actors in Washington and overseas. Those contributions were assembled to make up the response.

Secondly, this was one of a series of National Security Study Memoranda. They were designed to do what was done on other issues, like the Middle East, Europe, and elsewhere. It is also true that contributing to these memoranda would keep the bureaucracy busy. But there was a real search for data and ideas. Some of the operational responsibilities on key issues would be taken by the secret negotiations through the NSC and Kissinger. However, in all fairness, in the very first months of the Nixon administration when these NSSMS were issued, there were no secret talks with the Chinese Communists and with the Vietnamese Communists. I am sure that in the case of Vietnam secret negotiation was an issue for very early consideration, although I was not in the front office and was not involved in trying to arrange secret contacts with the Vietnamese Communists. So-called negotiations - in reality propaganda exchanges - were already taking place publicly in Paris, under arrangements made by the previous administration. There was a general feeling that we had to get more information. Also, there was a feeling that we needed more ideas. I do not want to be cynical here. Nixon and Kissinger probably had a rough outline in their minds as to what they wanted to do, but they wanted to get other people's views and additional information. They also wanted to get other people's support for whatever strategy they pursued.

Participating in making this study were not only all of the other agencies I mentioned previously, but also outside consultants, including a man named Daniel Ellsberg, who later leaked the Pentagon Papers. Of course, he was very dovish, even at that point. He had been one of the most extreme hawks. Other people were consulted on this matter. I
was involved as a part of the planning staff in the Executive Office Building. And then I collated and summarized the agency responses for Kissinger.

I don't recall the precise sequencing of memoranda, decisions made, and deadlines. I think that it's fair to say that this was a very good, solid, intellectual process. It was genuine and not just a cynical cover exercise. It helped to shape the views and decisions of President Nixon and Kissinger. It helped to construct and gain support for the two-track strategy that I mentioned. Namely, Vietnamization, or turning over additional responsibility to South Vietnam, and serious negotiations with Hanoi at the same time.

Everything was looked at, whether it was pacification efforts, military efforts, or the diplomatic situation. Negotiations were then taking place publicly in Paris. Hanoi's strengths and the positions of allies were looked at very exhaustively. I think that this effort was well done.

In any event, out of this emerged pretty much of a consensus on pursuing Vietnamization and negotiating an end to the conflict. To be sure, the State Department was kept out of the secret negotiations. In retrospect, it is quite astounding that the State Department was also kept out of a lot of the secret exchanges with the Chinese, in addition to a lot of the negotiations conducted by Kissinger with the Russians. But we've been through that already. In addition to secret meetings we used extensively backchannel telegrams through the White House Situation Room.

As I've said, during this period there were two roles that the Planning Staff of Mort Halperin and myself, sitting over in the Executive Office Building, had to perform. One was to help to run the NSC system and to prepare agenda papers for NSC sub-groups and the NSC itself on various subjects. In that respect I helped Halperin put together the various papers, including those on Vietnam, which set out our options and so on.

The other role was to write think pieces for Kissinger on various subjects, in which I sometimes acted as devil's advocate in challenging some aspects of foreign policy. On other occasions it involved just looking ahead, noting that there was a problem coming up which we had to get on top of. During this period I sometimes helped Mort Halperin write these memoranda, although he would often write them on his own as well. Sometimes, I would write memos of my own. I wrote a series of memoranda, sometimes on my own and sometimes helping Halperin, to Kissinger on various subjects. At least a couple of them were on the Indochina situation.

I recall specifically a memorandum from me (through Halperin) on Laos in which I questioned aspects of our involvement in that country. I led off by quoting Kissinger himself, in which he said that sometimes it is more important to ask the right questions than to have all of the right answers. So my memo on Laos did not necessarily say that we ought to change our policy. In effect, it raised a series of questions as to whether this policy was working or whether there were some real problems with it. It was a definitely dovish memorandum, although I don't remember the details.

On Vietnam I believe that any memorandum went forward under Halperin's name,
although I often helped him with memos of this kind. Again, without fundamentally challenging the policy on Vietnamization and negotiations, I might well have weighed in on the dovish side or the more skeptical side on what we were doing or how serious we should be about negotiations. What I am pointing out is that, without being uncomfortable with our overall approach, I would question the tactical side, at least in the case of a couple of memoranda to Kissinger. He would either see what I had done or knew what I had done with Halperin.

So I made my views known to Kissinger. This shows that he did not want a yes man and did not react violently to my views, saying, in effect: "How dare you challenge our policies?" He took just the opposite view. Indeed, this was important also, because this is what brought me to his attention. He saw me working with Halperin in NSC meetings, in the NSC system in general, and on specific papers. I think that he was impressed by the arguments that I made in some of these papers. They were not just on Indochina. There were other papers, on African policy and so on. Kissinger welcomed, indeed sought, disagreement so long as it was well argued.

Without my being immodest, I guess that these papers showed that there was a pretty good mind at work, not to mention some courage. Even if Kissinger was not always persuaded by the arguments, he at least thought that they were well presented. I think that it's fair to say that by participating in drafting these memoranda I derived a more general exposure to Kissinger and the NSC system. These memoranda brought me to his attention, so that when Tony Lake decided to leave the NSC staff, where he had been Special Assistant to Kissinger, I was asked to take Tony's place.

_Q: When did Lake leave the NSC staff?_

**LORD:** He was already planning to leave. Early in 1970 he made a decision to leave, and that was when Kissinger asked me to take the place of Tony Lake. When Lake made the decision to leave, and I don't remember the exact time, it was not on substantive grounds, although you'd have to talk to Tony Lake on this. I don't want to mix this up, but it was essentially a matter of the hours of work, pressures, and the imposition on family time. Tony Lake was dovish in outlook, but he was not by any means fundamentally ready to leave the NSC in a kind of protest. Indeed, as evidence of this, he told Kissinger well in advance that he wanted to leave the NSC staff. Kissinger put me in the position of his Special Assistant, but Lake stayed on a few more months, more in a policy planning role, and not as operational as we were. He and Morris were just sitting off to the side, drafting memoranda.

But Lake's ostensible reason for leaving Kissinger's staff, and I think that this was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back, was the Cambodian invasion in spring, 1970. Lake left the position of Special Assistant and was sitting there in Kissinger's suite of offices from February to May, 1970. Lake was planning to leave in the summer of 1970, anyway. So, in retrospect, Kissinger was always somewhat cynical in saying that when Lake and Morris left his staff shortly after the Cambodian incursion, (it was called an "incursion" and not an "invasion") they were leaving Kissinger's staff anyway and were just grandstanding on the way out. They were going to leave anyway, for other
reasons. Lake or Morris would say that, up until then, although they were getting increasingly uncomfortable with our Vietnam policy, they weren't ready to make an issue of it when they left. They were leaving Kissinger's staff for other reasons, but they felt that the Cambodian incursion was so outrageous that they not only wanted to leave right away but wanted to leave on a matter of principle.

So it is a fact that Lake, and I'm quite sure that the same consideration applied to Morris, had already decided to leave before the Cambodian incursion occurred.

I was still in the Executive Office Building in 1969. Another aspect of my involvement in Vietnam affairs at that time was my helping Halperin to prepare Presidential statements and/or speeches. I remember particularly working on the President's November, 1969, speech on Vietnam. I can't recall the first speech when President Nixon first announced the Vietnamization policy. It might have been that speech or it might have been on another occasion.

*Q:* Wasn't Guam involved in that speech?

LORD: I believe the Guam, or Nixon Doctrine, statement wasn't really a speech. It talked about our allies in Asia being on the front lines and America increasingly in a supporting role - clearly akin to Vietnamization. But it didn't mention Vietnamization specifically. What was significant about the November, 1969, speech is that it had some tough Pat Buchanan-like rhetoric in it, but it also called for a cease-fire in place. Now, maybe this was too subtle for many Americans and even for Hanoi. However, a cease-fire in place represented an evolution in our position. Up till then we'd always insisted on mutual withdrawals as part of any cease-fire. In effect, when you say, "Let's have a 'cease-fire in place,'" that, by definition, meant that North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam would remain in place. This would have been only for a temporary period of time. We were still not saying that there would be a unilateral withdrawal. However, we were basically saying that we could have a cease-fire even if North Vietnamese troops stayed in South Vietnam. So that was a more forthcoming and flexible element of that speech which is generally overlooked when people focus on some of the tough rhetoric against Hanoi, which was also in the speech. If that was not the first time that the principle of Vietnamization was announced, it may have been one of the first announcements of American troops actually leaving Vietnam. I just don't recall the sequence of these announcements.

You mentioned Guam. President Nixon was in Guam at some point in the summer of 1969. I think that it was part of a trip through East Asia...

*Q:* I think that he was going to the Philippines in connection with a SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] meeting, or something like that.

LORD: We had allies helping us in Vietnam, like Australia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Nixon's press conference in Guam was not a scripted, carefully prepared statement of U.S. policy. President Nixon made some comments on East Asia. I assume
that he had thought about them in advance. However, as I recall it, this was not a prepared text. President Nixon made some statements which the press immediately gave some weight to and called it the Guam Doctrine. This was probably more than Nixon intended at first. This then evolved into the Nixon Doctrine, which essentially said first that the U.S. would remain a world power and an Asian power. Nixon may have said that it would remain a global power. He said, in effect, that we would maintain a nuclear umbrella for our allies.

Second, however, in a conventional conflict, (such as in the case of Vietnam) we would expect that the major burden of the conflict would be borne by the countries involved themselves. Third, we would provide military and economic assistance so that our friends could do this. So there were the ideas that we would maintain a nuclear umbrella, that the conventional fighting would be done essentially by our friends, and that we would help them with aid.

This attracted quite a bit of attention. Then, Kissinger, and others of us said: Let's build this concept into a more articulated strategy generally for our foreign policy. So we worked hard on this. I spent a great deal of time helping to elaborate the Nixon Doctrine. For example, I think that I have mentioned that in February of every year we would put out a Presidential statement on foreign policy. We began there and in speeches to turn the Guam statement into the Nixon Doctrine. On the one hand we said that we were going to be a reliable ally and that we would be in the Pacific area to do what we should do. However, we added that our friends had to pick up more of the burden, mostly because it was their conflict, after all. For the sake of American interests we had to maintain a world role and we had to help our friends with assistance. By sharing burdens we would reflect a more multipolar world after two decades of almost unilateral American exertion. And we would maintain American domestic support by showing our friends were doing more.

So we developed this new approach to security responsibilities around the world, with particular reference to Indochina and Vietnam. That was conceptually some background music for the Vietnamization approach.

Q: I keep returning to this theme but I think that it's important. You had General Alexander Haig on the NSC. Vietnamization of the conflict in Vietnam was one of the twin pillars. Perhaps I should point out that I was in Vietnam during part of this time, as Consul General in Saigon, from February, 1969, until June, 1970. You know, if the American military are told that they have to accomplish something, they'll try their damnedest to do it. However, they'll also report that it has been done, whether it's really done or not.

Then there was Congress sending people out to Vietnam, particularly members and staff from the Committee on Foreign Relations, Lowenstein and Dick Moose, to go out there and sniff around. I would think that, if you're on the NSC staff, you would want somebody to go out to Vietnam and really look at Vietnamization and not simply rely on the reports coming in through regular channels. Did you have something like that?
LORD: Of course we did. I don't recall the names of all of the various people who went out to Vietnam for this purpose. Al Haig went out to hold South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu's hand, and so on. People from the NSC staff who went out to Vietnam included Larry Lynn, who was taking a hard look at how Vietnamization was doing. I'm sure that Lynn went out there. Halperin didn't, and I didn't go to Vietnam. I don't recall whether Dick Smyser went out to Vietnam, during this early period. Other visitors, including Congressmen, would report their impressions as well.

Someone like Kissinger would grab anybody that he could for their perspective. This included Daniel Ellsberg during the early period, former military officials who had visited there, or Congressmen who had been out there. He would try to get their views, as well as the official views on how Vietnamization was faring. So an effort was made to learn how Vietnamization was doing. Some of the people brought in included John Paul Vann, who was consulted, although I forget the dates. People like that. So there was a real effort to find out what was happening in Vietnam.

Within the U.S. Government, although they'd have to speak for themselves, some people were more optimistic about the Vietnamese ability to take over responsibility for the war than others were. I don't recall the American military objecting to this. They wanted to get American involvement and casualties down as much as anyone else. They also wanted to win the war.

The most vigorous proponent of Vietnamization was Secretary of Defense Mel Laird. Indeed, I hate to draw distinctions between dovish and hawkish, but Secretary Laird was very concerned about domestic support for the war. Of course, he had been a member of the House of Representatives. He really put a lot of emphasis on Vietnamization. As I recall, there were times when Secretary Laird wanted to withdraw more troops in the next increment of U.S. withdrawals under the Vietnamization program than President Nixon and Kissinger did. I don't want to exaggerate this, but Laird was a very strong proponent of Vietnamization. I don't recall General Westmoreland, the members of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], or other people being as vigorous as Secretary Laird. My guess is that maybe they were more cautious about how fast the South Vietnamese could take over more of the responsibility. Secretary Laird pushed the American military to speed up the Vietnamization process, to a certain extent. At least, this is my general recollection.

Secretary of State Rogers, who seemed somewhat more dovish, was probably also in favor of moving along the process of Vietnamization more quickly than President Nixon and Kissinger. The latter two, while recognizing the need to advance Vietnamization to lower casualties and maintain domestic support for the war, also wanted to make sure that the traffic would bear it and that the South Vietnamese would take on more responsibility effectively.

You asked me for my perceptions on how well the Vietnamization program was going and how well the Vietnamese Army was doing in taking over responsibility for the fighting. I guess that I felt confident, on the whole, that we were moving at about the right pace. I would read the reports, whether they were internal reports by people like
Larry Lynn and others, or Pentagon or CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] reports.

I was, of course, super careful about optimistic reports about how we were doing, after my disillusionment with the Tet experience [in 1968]. This was partly out of conviction and partly because I saw the need to maintain credibility and domestic support for our Vietnam policy. Finally, I wanted to see a reduction in American casualties. I certainly hoped that we were proceeding with Vietnamization at the right pace. There may have been an element of wishful thinking as well as cold, hard analysis. However, my instinct was that we were moving at about the right speed. The South Vietnamese had to take on more responsibility, and the increments that we were announcing did not seem unreasonable.

I certainly was never uncomfortable with the pace of Vietnamization. I certainly never raised the issue that we can't do this or that we are going too fast. This was partly out of conviction on my part but, perhaps, in retrospect, this also involved some wishful thinking on the part of all of us. I felt that the pace of Vietnamization was about right. The military situation in Vietnam certainly did not deteriorate during this period.

Q: During the 18 months that I was in Vietnam, which was during just this period, things looked pretty good.

LORD: Yes, that was true. At worst, we were probably holding our own but, in fact, we were also probably making some gains. Meantime, once we announced the Vietnamization program, American domestic support for the war solidified. Most Americans believed that they could see the end of the tunnel, however murky the time and distance were. Therefore, I was comfortable with what we were doing.

Now, on the specific issue of whether we were training the South Vietnamese to fight a more conventional war as opposed to what was needed, I don't recall fundamentally disagreeing at the time with the strategy being pursued. Others who have given this matter more thought would have to comment on it. I certainly didn't feel that we were doing everything wrong. I don't know whether the conventional wisdom is totally accurate, whether in fact we were training the South Vietnamese to fight World War II type tank battles. I'm not sure that is a fair assessment of what we were doing. Certainly there were other elements, like the heavy use of helicopters, pacification, etc.

Q: It ended up basically with fighting that kind of struggle, when the North Vietnamese finally made a massive commitment to the campaign in the South.

LORD: The struggle turned out to be more conventional than a domestic conflict, when the North Vietnamese could blatantly cross the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone at the 17th Parallel].

You have to remember that we had other pacification programs going on, including ideological programs to win over the people's hearts and minds. So it wasn't just a strict
World War II or Korean approach. That would be an unfair characterization.

Q: What about the real home front for you and what you gathered from your colleagues? Here you came out of the intellectual community and all of that. I've heard people say: "Here they're working away on the war, and their kids were out protesting outside the building." Was this having much effect?

LORD: Absolutely. I was debating whether to mention this next or come to it later. Let me discuss that now.

This was a very emotionally trying period for me personally. Beside some of the reasons you mentioned, almost without exception, most of my good friends outside the government felt that we should get out of Vietnam quicker rather than later for hard-headed reasons. They wouldn't have been good friends of mine if they felt that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were outright heroes and we were all somehow depraved. Most of my friends were of the responsible dovish variety. Their views were essentially those of the "Washington Post" and the "New York Times." Namely, they weren't in favor of totally capitulating to the communists. They recognized that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese were bad. However, they felt that there were some real problems with the South Vietnamese Government. And in terms of the American involvement in Vietnam, they felt that we ought to get out of Vietnam sooner rather than later. They were not so much in favor of total capitulation as for a much more forthcoming posture toward the communists, so as to cut our losses - both casualties abroad and the social impact in America.

So it's fair to say that most friends and acquaintances of mine were fairly dovish. Very few, however, would ever accuse me of being immoral or wrong by working for the Administration. At least, this was the case with people that I knew and so forth. They understood that I could work for the government in good conscience and they wouldn't say to me: "Why don't you leave your job immediately?" They were more sophisticated than that.

I might add that my working hours were so extreme - about 80 hours a week - that I didn’t see many people outside the office! Beyond that, of course, was the general, emotional context of demonstrations outside the White House, which made people more and more upset. And we have to record that the 1960s were a very difficult decade anyway. We had seen President Kennedy assassinated [in 1963]. We had the assassinations of Bobby Kennedy and Martin Luther King [in 1963]. There were race riots and the general angst of the 1960s, all of which was taken up most violently, of course, in the Vietnam debate.

All of this was emotionally wrenching for me. On the one hand I basically supported what the Administration was doing. However, I was somewhat more dovish, at least on tactical grounds. A further dimension of this angst, arose when I became a Special Assistant to Kissinger, and became involved at the center. Then I knew that our secret negotiating positions were much more reasonable than the American Congress, public,
and media knew. And that Hanoi was absolutely unyielding.

I knew, for example, that we were making negotiating proposals to the communists that were as dovish or flexible, using a more appropriate adjective, as the "New York Times" or the "Washington Post." These proposals were essentially to have a cease-fire and get out of Vietnam and get our prisoners back, leaving it to the Vietnamese to handle the war on their own. I'm not talking about the extreme, Jane Fonda or Daniel Ellsberg positions. I'm talking about the mainstream "New York Times" and "Washington Post" positions. In effect, we were doing as much, and sometimes more, than what they were calling for in their editorials. However, we were doing this secretly, because you couldn't negotiate this in public, and thus we received no credit for our efforts.

In fact, Hanoi was rejecting terms which the "Washington Post" and the "New York Times" thought would end the war and which, they thought, we should be proposing. In addition to my general feelings of angst, I was sworn to secrecy on the negotiations and on our positions. I had to put up with attacks on the administration and on me personally at cocktail parties and so on. Not that I went to so many cocktail parties! I knew and I couldn't say that in fact we were doing what the more reasonable doves were suggesting. This added a dimension to the problem which made it even more painful - in effect, if they only knew how reasonable we were and how intransigent Hanoi was, they would have been somewhat more sympathetic to the administration and, frankly, to me.

There were also examples where Hanoi would appear to be reasonable in the public negotiations in Paris - they would put forward a six-point plan or a nine-point plan. I forget how many points their plans had. But in private they wouldn't stick by these plans but would be much tougher. So they were playing the old game of appealing to American public opinion through contacts with Jane Fonda and American Congressmen visiting Hanoi. They generally were putting out the line that they were being reasonable. However, their real position in the secret negotiations was much tougher.

So this double level of public awareness versus private reality made it even more painful for all of us during this period. This made it a very tough and complex period for us. On the one hand, it was exhilarating to work in the White House to try to help end the war on an honorable basis, to be caught up in the secret negotiations and the excitement of them, and also to work on other issues, like China and Russia. But on the other hand there was also the emotional context - not to mention the continuing loss of life in Indochina.
Q: I'm interrupting you while you're describing the atmospherics of the negotiations. Would you move on to the chronology of events?

LORD: Sure. I think that the next step was when I became a Special Assistant. I've talked about my involvement in the policy planning process and my preparation of memos. I helped to draft speeches for the President and his public reports, as well as statements on Vietnam.

Right after I became a Special Assistant in February, 1970, came one of the most painful experiences in my entire career. If I had to list four or five of the worst moments of my career, one would be the Bush banquet and Fang Lizhi in February 1989. Another such moment will come later, in October, 1972, when South Vietnamese President Nguyen van Thieu rejected a draft agreement with North Vietnam which had been worked out.

However, another one of the worst experiences of my entire career was in March-April, 1970, regarding Laos. The first, major assignment that Kissinger handed me, when I became his Special Assistant, was to participate in and supervise the drafting of a major White Paper on our involvement in Laos. Some questions had been raised in Congress and in the media about whether we had been more heavily involved militarily in Laos than we had publicly admitted. Other questions concerned whether we had combat forces in Laos, what was the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] doing, had there been American casualties which we had covered up, and what had we been doing in Laos in recent years.

The purpose of this White Paper was actually elevated, meant to be forthcoming. In other words, it was to come clean on our total involvement in Laos, keeping in mind that this was what the previous administration under President Johnson had done, not Nixon. In fact, we sought to dispel exaggerated rumors about secret American involvement. I was in charge of pulling together the facts from the various agencies and drafting a statement which the White House would put out under President Nixon's imprimatur. I forget which agencies were involved, but they certainly included the State Department, the Pentagon, CIA, DIA and other military agencies, our Embassies, and every conceivable source. So I assembled this material and wrote the report, although I had help from others.

I did this under pressure. This was my first, big job under Kissinger as his Special Assistant. It was obviously important in view of the involvement of President Nixon and our public position. I distinctly remember a feeling of great accomplishment in producing what I considered a fair report which explained the dilemmas and the policies underlying U.S. involvement in Laos. It was factually constructive. It made clear that there were no ominous revelations to be had. I felt: "Boy, I really pulled this off!" It was my first big challenge and it was a major and tricky one. Kissinger was very happy with it. The White House was also happy.

I distinctly remember going to bed on a Saturday night, I think that it was March 5 or 6,
1970, feeling a sense of personal accomplishment for the nation and for President Nixon and Kissinger.

At about 5:00 or 6:00 AM on Sunday I received a phone call from Al Haig. He asked if I had seen the "Washington Post." I hadn't. I don't believe Haig told me the issue; he just said, “Go get a copy” - rather cruel in retrospect. So Bette and I went to the drugstore with great trepidation to get an early edition.

It was a devastating shock.

In this issue of the "Post," there were blazing headlines which, in effect, said that American soldiers had been killed in combat in Laos. The article said that the White House "White Paper," in effect, had lied to the American people. We had a sentence in the report, as published, which said: "No American has ever been killed in combat in Laos." It turned out that there was one incident in which some American troops who, I suppose, were training the Lao, were reportedly asleep in some encampment. They were attacked, I guess, by Lao communists. The American soldiers hadn't gone into Laos to engage in combat. That wasn't their role. In self-defense against this ambush, they fought back, and a few Americans, I think that there were about a dozen, were killed.

No one in the bureaucracy had ever told us about this incident. Either through evasion or through narrowly construing the incident as not being combat, none of the agencies contributing to this study had reported that any American personnel had been killed in combat in Laos. Sounds like President Clinton narrowly construing something that happened. These forces were trainers, they were asleep, and they fought back when they woke up when they were attacked. So the fact that they were killed in this incident does not really negate this sentence in the report.

However, the press had a field day over this incident, claiming that the White House was covering up. The irony of this is that if I had known about this incident, I would surely have included it. If the various agencies had been forthcoming, this issue would not have come up as an evasion. I don't recall whether it was CIA, DIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or some combination of these agencies which was at fault. However, if we had put in the report that in the 10 or so years of U.S. involvement in helping Laos against the communists, only a handful of Americans were killed on one occasion in this way, there would have been little attention paid to it. Because the media and Congress had been claiming extensive U.S. military action in Laos had been covered up. In fact, these soldiers were killed because they were defending themselves. If we had described this incident, given the exaggerated notions of American duplicity and secrecy and combat involvement, this would have been accepted with little comment. People would have said: "Boy, is that all that happened during all these years? American involvement was much less than we thought."

So the idiocy and the irony of this incident is that, if the agency concerned had only told us about it, we would have put it in the report and preempted the controversy. This incident was the only case of Americans killed in combat, and maybe they weren't even
in combat, depending on how this is defined. However even though this was only a handful of people killed in the course of a decade, we were sharply criticized for duplicity in not reporting this incident.

For the next few weeks, I, of course, felt personally responsible for not having uncovered these facts, although the reality was that the error had been committed in the reporting agency or agencies. Nevertheless, I had to wonder if I had asked the wrong question, if I had followed up on that sentence to make triply sure that the account would hold up. I had trouble sleeping after that. For some time after that, when I would get up in the morning, I would vomit in the bathroom because of my nervousness and my sense of something like despair over what had happened. I felt some responsibility, although I had been deceived. I had the sense that I hadn't followed through precisely as I should have. I felt that the Administration was being unfairly attacked and tested on this issue. The White House staff was grumbling about the NSC having made a mess with this white paper.

I must say that Kissinger handled this very well, in my view. First of all, he totally and completely defended me with H. R. Haldemann [Presidential Chief of Staff], Ron Ziegler [White House Press Spokesman], and everyone else on the White House staff. He said that this incident was not my fault. The agencies had not been sufficiently forthcoming. He said that if there is any responsibility, it was his and not that of his staff. He was absolutely solid on this. It showed that he could be loyal in a crunch. Of course, he could also be devious with his staff, but he also treated me better than others. On this issue he went out of his way to make clear that he would not downgrade me, or criticize me, not to mention fire me. He was just terrific in his behavior toward me. I’m sure he received many tough calls from the White House staff.

Q: As people reviewed this paper, was there some finger pointing at a particular person or somebody who didn't include this incident?

LORD: No one ever got into specific trouble for it. As I recall, the agencies involved said that either they had literally answered my question, or didn't know about it. I don't recall the exchanges between the various agencies on this matter. I distinctly remember that I was misled, but also felt that I was partly responsible for this. If I had been more meticulous, I would have gone to almost everybody concerned with Laos in the Pentagon and the CIA and asked them specifically whether the sentence involved (re: combat) was accurate. They all cleared the sentence as part of the report. I felt that I hadn't been quite as careful as I should have been.

However, in this fairly long report this was the only thing that was ever found to be wrong or at least misleading. I thought that everything else was well done, well written, and well put together. We made our case that our involvement had been less extensive than many people thought. Also, this had happened under the previous [Johnson] administration, so we had even less motive for a coverup. I thought that the criticism of the report included a great degree of unfairness.
I don’t recall that we pinpointed any single person who had misled me. I recall that both verbally and in memos there were exchanges between Kissinger, the Pentagon, and CIA on this study.

*Q: That was natural enough. After all, this was their bailiwick.*

LORD: I didn't get into any trouble, except for my emotional trouble. I don't believe that anybody in CIA or the Pentagon got into any trouble on this matter either. I don't recall what their defense was. I think that they might have said that we didn't check that sentence carefully enough. However, we never uncovered exactly what had happened to make this mistake possible.

*Q: This is the kind of thing that rankles you and troubles you even today, when you recount this story. However, did this incident have any effect on you and your operations later on? One would think that the bureaucracy would make you much more aggressive to make sure that all aspects of a report are right. Also, what was the attitude of the press about this error?*

LORD: It certainly did not affect my relationship with Kissinger. In many ways, as I said, I appreciated his loyalty. He felt that I had been unfairly treated. He may have felt that I had not checked out this report carefully enough, but Kissinger never said that. In terms of my responsibilities as his Special Assistant, they continued to grow. I became very close to him, certainly personally, as well as in terms of substance. I got more and more involved in matters concerning Vietnam, not to mention Laos, Cambodia, and China.

In terms of my views I thought that the press had been unfair and that they had blown this error out of proportion. Give me a break. If this was all that had happened, it was unfair to blow it up to this extent. In fact, this was a very credible and full report, so I was resentful of the media.

In my job at the NSC, in succeeding years, I didn't do many reports like this. Dick Smyser and John Negroponte, as Vietnam experts, were the essential point of contact with the other agencies. My job was on negotiations on the Indochina countries. It was focused not so much on Vietnamization and the military aspects of the struggle, but on the negotiations to end the fighting. By definition, since the negotiations were secret, other people didn't know much about them anyway. So I didn't have much need to rely on the bureaucracy.

The only major case which I was involved in connection with the fighting concerned a report on the Cambodian incursion which I prepared. I can hardly believe that I did this report fairly soon after the Laos incident. It came out in June 1970. So, once again, I had to rely on the bureaucracy in preparing that report. I can't recall the details now, but I had to be super careful then, having been burned once. There were major reactions to the Cambodian incursion, but there was no major flap about alleged inaccuracies in the long report I prepared. There were of course sharp disagreements on whether the incursion itself was a good idea or not.
So that was a painful beginning to being a Special Assistant to Kissinger. Some time around then there was a leak about the secret bombing of Cambodia. I can't recall the date, but a story on this matter appeared in the New York Times. It was an article by Bill Beecher, who later went on to work for the Boston Globe. I only mention this now, because when I worked over in the Executive Office Building, I didn't know about the secret bombing of Cambodia. I can say with total honesty that I never leaked anything about this or any other subject throughout my tenure at the NSC. I mention this because it was that particular leak, in fact, that got President Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman up in flames about leaks in the sense that they were undermining our national security policies. Therefore, this led to their instituting the phone tapping. I can talk later about why this happened.

Q: Then let's not do it now.

LORD: I don't think that we should do it now. Wait until another time. I mention this now because I think that this was when telephone tapping was really going on. I just can't recall the timing of it. My phone was tapped, and I'll get into that later on in our discussions. I was suspicious of it because there seemed to be a humming sound on my phone.

Before I arrived in the West Wing as special assistant, there had been secret meetings with the Vietnamese, which Tony Lake had attended, in the summer of 1969. The next, secret contacts took place in the spring of 1970. My first secret meeting was in September 1970.

Let me now give you an overview of how the logistics of these trips worked. Along with the first, secret trip to China, which still ranks No. 1 in terms of drama, the secret trips to Paris to negotiate with the Vietnamese communists and try to negotiate an end to the anguish of this war were clearly dramatic highlights in my experience. There were the national interest and the James Bond aspects of these contacts, the secrecy and the high level of the negotiations, as well as the emotional aspects involved of trying to end a long and bloody war with all the domestic trauma as well.

(Since the interview in January 2003, Kissinger has published the definitive account of the Vietnam negotiations, “Ending the Vietnam War.” I edited the manuscript, and Kissinger cites me as “my closest associate during the events recounted here.” I commend the book to historians and everyone else interested in those issues.

Q: I might just mention for the historian of the future that James Bond is the hero of a series of spy novels by the British writer, Ian Fleming.

LORD: There were some variations on how these meetings worked. I believe that I participated in 19 rounds of secret and semi-public negotiations. Toward the end of this series, a few of these contacts were secret at the time and then made public after they had been held, and I'll get back to that. However, earlier on in this series of contacts, in 1970
and 1971, and in January, 1972, these meetings were secret and never announced. People didn't even know that there were secret negotiations going on - not only the public but also other agencies. Meanwhile, there were sterile public talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris that were essentially propaganda exchanges.

In January, 1972, President Nixon made a major speech in which he revealed that secret negotiations were going on with the Vietnamese communists. After that, we didn't announce in advance that we were going to meet with the Vietnamese communists, because we didn't want to have people locking themselves into public positions and raising expectations. However, once we had announced in January, 1972, that a secret channel was being used, from then on immediately after meetings, we made an announcement that we had met again with the Vietnamese communists and made some general statement about making some progress...or the lack of it.

I went to Paris with Kissinger to negotiate with the Vietnamese communists. Generally, the negotiating team consisted of Kissinger, myself, a Vietnam expert (Dick Smyser, in 1970-1971, and John Negroponte in 1971-1972), plus, at times, Peter Rodman, who was also on Kissinger's staff. Usually, that was about it. The other person who participated from the American side was Maj Gen Vernon Walters, who had a distinguished career later in many other respects, including that of Ambassador to the UN and Ambassador to Germany. He was there as an interpreter, in the sense that in the early going we would present our views in English, Walters would translate them into French, and the North Vietnamese would translate the French into Vietnamese. We finally reached the point where we had an American interpreter (David Engle) who could translate our views directly into Vietnamese. This saved some time and avoided some of the possibilities of inaccuracies resulting from trilateral language use (English to French to Vietnamese and vice versa). Those were the only participants from our side, except for a secretary sometimes in the last stages. In the home stretch Ambassador Sullivan and a legal expert, Aldrich, were also on the team.

Q: Let me just point out what may be obvious, but the South Vietnamese were not there.

LORD: They were not there. We would keep them informed afterwards, through a secret channel through Ellsworth Bunker, our Ambassador to Vietnam in Saigon. This involved double encoding, using a back channel from the White House to Saigon, but only Ambassador Bunker, one Special Assistant, and one communicator knew about it. It was very carefully encrypted and handled on a very close hold basis. Ambassador Bunker would report to South Vietnamese President Thieu, also on a close hold basis, on what had happened. These were general reports. In fact, we did not go into a lot of detail, but it was enough to keep the South Vietnamese generally posted on what was going on. So those were the only people who were aware of these contacts. Our negotiators in Paris who were handling the public sessions were not aware of the secret talks.

Q: What were the public talks?

LORD: These were essentially propaganda exchanges which we had inherited from the
Johnson administration. I'm trying to remember. Phil Habib headed these public talks at
one point. Averell Harriman and Cy Vance before that. Let me give you the logistics on
how our secret talks worked, when we flew from Washington. There were a couple of
exceptions, e.g. once out of London and once on the way back from China. I'll get back to
getting ready for these talks, including the memos and getting President Nixon's approval
and the logistics of getting to and from Paris.

For the secret negotiations I would usually leave my NSC office on Friday evening.
Without exception, I believe, these sessions took place on weekends and/or public
holidays. For example, July 4, Labor Day, and so forth. Otherwise, we handled them on
Saturdays and Sundays, that is, the regular weekends. The obvious point was that, since
these sessions were secret, we didn't want people wondering where Kissinger was. There
would obviously be less notice of his absence over a weekend than in the middle of the
week. Al Haig would always cover for Kissinger, saying that he couldn't bother Henry
with inquiries during the weekend. So the secret negotiations were always held on the
weekend. Only the President, Al Haig, the Deputy Security Adviser; H. R. Haldemann,
the President's Chief of Staff; and a few others on the NSC would know about Kissinger's
absence.

So when a secret negotiation was set up, I would leave the NSC office late on a Friday
evening, after my usual 80 to 100 hour work week, say goodbye to my colleagues, in
effect making the case that I wasn't coming into work the next day for I always came in
to work on Saturdays. I would then go home. Early on Saturday morning a White House
car would come to my house in Washington, pick me up, and take me to Andrews Air
Force Base, where one of the U.S. Air Force Special Mission aircraft would be waiting.
These aircraft were reserved for the President, members of the cabinet, and other senior
officials designated by the President. Usually, it was Air Force Two, not Air Force One,
which the President used. Air Force Two was the aircraft used by the Vice President or a
member of the cabinet. It was a VC-137 aircraft [similar in appearance to a Boeing 707
jet]. Kissinger, Dick Smyser or later John Negroponte, and sometimes Peter Rodman
(latter stages) would also be there.

We would get on the plane. I forget how we arranged to have classified material placed
on the plane. I don't believe that I took it home and guarded it until the White House car
came to pick me up and go to Andrews Field. On the way over to Paris we continued to
discuss the agenda. Keep in mind that I had already put in an 80 to 100 hour week at the
NSC and helped to prepare the briefing books with Dick Smyser or John Negroponte.
Kissinger always asked for revisions to these briefing books during the week. He would
have a Strategy Paper which President Nixon would approve. He would also have his
opening statement, an outline of the probable North Vietnamese position and what our
responses should be, what our objectives were for the meeting, defenses against North
Vietnamese attacks on our positions, subsequent statements that we might want to use in
the course of the meeting beyond the opening statement, and possible contingency
language and possible, specific proposals we might put forward. Anyway, this would be a
very extensive briefing book. Kissinger would always work on this before he left but
would also rework these papers on the way. So we would work all the way over to Paris
on the plane.

We would fly into an airfield in central France. I can't remember whether it was a French military or civilian base. It was in the middle of France, not in the Paris area. First, flying into Paris would be too obvious. Secondly, the cover for these flights was that they were training flights for the Air Force. We probably landed at a French military air base for that reason. We would get out of Air Force Two, walk a few steps, and transfer to a smaller French military jet. We would be met at that point by General Walters, who was the Military Attaché in the Embassy in Paris. He was the go between us and the French Government for these flights. He would make arrangements with a man named Jobert, who was a Special Assistant to French president Pompidou, and later Foreign Minister. The French military jet that we used was, in fact, one of president Pompidou's aircraft.

So we would get into the French president's executive jet with General Walters and fly into a French airport in the Paris area. It was not Orly Airport but some other perhaps military airport in the Paris region. General Walters reveled in this James Bond aspect of the arrangements. On arrival in Paris we got into Walters' car, which was a rental car, not his own car with diplomatic license plates. We drove to his apartment, where we spent the rest of the night. We had code names, because sometimes Walters' French cleaning woman would come in. Luckily, she didn't recognize Kissinger in the morning when we would get up. I forget what his code name was. I had some Jewish code name. I believe it was Lowenstein, for I reasons I can't recall.

We would arrive at General Walters' apartment. I don't remember the exact time, but there was a time difference; we had left Washington early on a Saturday morning. There is a six hour time difference between Washington and Paris. By the time we got to Walters' apartment, it would be close to midnight, Paris time, so we would pretty much have to go to bed. With the six hour time difference, by then it was late afternoon, Washington time, on Saturday, so we would go to bed, I couldn't sleep. I didn't dare take a sleeping pill. I would usually lie awake and then get to sleep an hour or two before the alarm would go off. We would have to get up at 7:00 AM, Paris time, on the Sunday. That was about 1:00 AM Washington time, or very early on Sunday morning, so it was murder to get up then.

We would then drive to a safe house in one of the suburbs of Paris. The North Vietnamese would be there, waiting for us. We would then have meetings, for never less than three or four hours and sometimes as much as ten hours, during which Smyser and I, and later on, Négroponte, would have to take verbatim notes. We didn't have a secretary with us. We should have taken a stenographer, and I think that we did for some of the later meetings. We also had some help from Peter Rodman when he was on the later trips. So we took verbatim notes. As I mentioned previously, Kissinger really wanted verbatim notes, including his jokes and everything else. Luckily, the translations, even if just from English to Vietnamese and vice versa, gave us some time to catch up in keeping the verbatim notes. However, it was an exhausting experience. This went on for several hours, as I've said. We would take breaks for lunch or tea, take walks and ponder what the other side had said, and discuss strategy. But basically we worked almost steadily for
seven hours or so. This was Sunday, of course.

Then, when we finished, we would drive back to the Paris airport, get into the French President's plane, fly to the air base in central France, pick up Air Force Two, and fly back to Washington. On the way back we worked the entire time, first writing a memo for President Nixon, reporting what had happened, and, perhaps, suggesting where do we go from here. Then we would begin to transcribe our verbatim notes on the meeting. We would get back to Andrews Air Force Base between 9:00 and 11:00 PM, Washington time, on Sunday. Of course, by now it was early Monday morning, Paris time. So I would go home and come into the NSC office on Monday morning, Washington time. By then I was absolutely exhausted. Ostensibly, I not only had not worked throughout the weekend but had had a nice, 48 hour break! I somehow had to look bright and lively as someone would who had had a free weekend off.

Q: You remarked how your party went to Paris. Could you talk about the attitude and approach of the North Vietnamese?

LORD: Could I mention first another couple of aspects regarding logistics? I've given you the example of what happened on many of the 19 trips from Washington to Paris to meet with the North Vietnamese. These trips almost always messed up weekends and holidays, although a couple of times we had secret talks as part of public trips elsewhere. Once we went to London for other reasons, and we flew across the English Channel, secretly, to Paris to negotiate with the Vietnamese. Then we flew back to London. On another occasion, in July, 1971, we were in Paris on our way back from a secret trip to China. Not only did the world not know about our secret trip to China, but, while we were publically in Paris, we had secret negotiations again with the North Vietnamese.

In some ways it was even more complicated to keep these discussions with the North Vietnamese secret than these weekend excursions from Washington. Everyone knew that Kissinger was in Paris and was probably following him, in a sense. So we had an elaborate operation working with the American Ambassador, who was Richard Watson. We had to find a way for Kissinger to negotiate with the North Vietnamese without people in Paris knowing about it. So the cover story was that Kissinger was holed up in the Embassy, talking to Ambassador Watson. Dick Smyser and I went off on our own to a big, open plaza looking at the Eiffel Tower.

Q: Was it at the Place de Trocadero?

LORD: Yes, it was the Place de Trocadero. We would wait there. Then Secretary Kissinger slunk down in a car that went out of the back door of the Embassy, since the press was covering the front door. He picked us up at the Place and we went to the meeting place for our negotiation with the Vietnamese. We came back to the Embassy and, while Negroponte and I were writing up the report of the meeting, Kissinger, for cover reasons, went out to a restaurant. Everyone knew about that. In fact, he had a woman named Margaret Osmer as his date, who used to work for ABC Television. She later joined me at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, many years later, to run
my meetings programs. There was a lot of criticism at the time of Kissinger. The press knew that Le Duc Tho, the senior North Vietnamese negotiator, was in Paris at the same time. So the press berated Kissinger, asking why he didn't meet with Le Duc Tho while he was in Paris, to see if he could make some progress with the North Vietnamese, instead of going out with some good-looking blonde to a Paris restaurant. No one knew about the secret negotiations. Of course, this was a cover story for Kissinger, because we had met with Le Duc Tho earlier in the day. That was an amusing aspect, anyway.

I would suggest, if you agree, that I touch on the Cambodian incursion [in May, 1970]. Then, after that, everything else will be essentially all about Vietnam. I can take you right through the negotiations.

Q: Sure.

LORD: A few months after the anguishing experience concerning the report I helped to draft on Laos, which I've already described, we had the issue of the Cambodian incursion. Basically, what was happening was that the North Vietnamese were using both Laos and Cambodia as sanctuaries to station their troops. In the case of Laos, they came down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, going to South Vietnam. In the case of Cambodia, North Vietnamese troops were stationed along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. They would attack South Vietnamese and American troops in South Vietnam by crossing from Cambodia and going into South Vietnam. They attacked American and South Vietnamese troops, inflicted casualties, and then withdrew to the sanctuary of Cambodia. We had some bombing raids of these sanctuaries, but we weren't able to go after them in hot pursuit, because this would mean going into Cambodia. Of course, the North Vietnamese were very good liars and would deny that they were in Cambodia, or Laos, for that matter.

The bombing of Cambodia began in 1969, and I didn't know about it until I became special assistant to Kissinger. It had been justified, in effect, because the North Vietnamese were killing Americans and South Vietnamese, operating out of sanctuaries which we couldn't get at. The least that we could do was to bomb them, while they were sitting in their bases in Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk, who was in charge of Cambodia in the earlier period, before he was overthrown by a coup d'etat led by Lon Nol, had tolerated the presence of these North Vietnamese in Cambodia. He didn't like Cambodian sovereignty being compromised by the presence of North Vietnamese troops but he couldn't do anything about it, as Cambodia was militarily weak. Therefore, he never protested about American bombing of his territories along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, which is lightly populated. He knew about these bombing raids, of course. So the bombing wasn't inflicting very many casualties among Cambodian citizens. The bombing was aimed at North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia, near the border.

Of course, the justification for the secrecy of these bombing raids was that, if they became publicly known, Sihanouk would be placed in an impossible position. He felt that he couldn't say that it was all right for the Americans to bomb Cambodian territory. You might think that he could also say that he didn't want North Vietnamese troops to be on Cambodian territory, either. Therefore, these bombing raids had to be kept secret so that
we could protect South Vietnamese and American troops, without embarrassing Sihanouk. However, of course, the American Congress and press were outraged that the President was bombing another country, without letting them know what he was doing. Many viewed these bombing raids as illegal, unconstitutional, and an act of war. They refused to accept that there was any reason for doing this, even though they knew that there were North Vietnamese troops stationed in Cambodia and attacking South Vietnamese and American troops in South Vietnam. The Administration in turn pointed out that it was North Vietnam that was violating Cambodia’s sovereignty and spreading the war there, as well as Laos. The targets were North Vietnamese troops and bases near the border, and Cambodian casualties were limited. American and South Vietnamese lives were being saved by the bombing. Sihanouk tolerated the bombing so long as it was kept secret. Although a few on Capitol Hill were informed, I believe, extensive briefings would surely have leaked.

The basic debate that went on in the Nixon administration was that one of the reasons we were having trouble in the war, despite the fact that we were doing all right, was that the North Vietnamese had these sanctuaries in Cambodia as well as Laos. Many in the Nixon administration said that it was wrong for North Vietnamese soldiers to go into South Vietnam and kill South Vietnamese and American soldiers, returning to Cambodia where they would be safe from attack while they violated Cambodian sovereignty.

So, over time, it was decided that there should be what was called an incursion. An invasion sounds as if we were going into another country. An incursion meant that we were just doing what the North Vietnamese started. It wasn't our fault. And it would be limited in time and space.

A debate took place within the U.S. Government on several grounds. First, should there be an attack into Cambodia at all? Secondly, if so, should it just be South Vietnamese troops or should it also involve American troops? Thirdly, how long should this incursion last, what should the objectives be, and how deep into Cambodia should the incursion go?

Of course, the arguments are quite familiar. On the one hand you could argue that we could go in. The enemy was abusing the sanctuaries, and, therefore, it's a matter of hot pursuit. The North Vietnamese troops were already violating Cambodian sovereignty. It would be only fair to protect our people and the South Vietnamese by going after the North Vietnamese. On the other hand, it could be said that we were expanding the war, violating Cambodian sovereignty, no matter what the North Vietnamese had done.

Secondly, it could be argued that the South Vietnamese should do it in defense of their own territory and their border. American troops should not be involved, and this position would be much more supportable. It would be a cleaner operation politically. Therefore, let the South Vietnamese do it. This did not take into account the merits of Vietnamization and whether the South Vietnamese could do as good a job as American troops could do. The South Vietnamese needed our help, and we wanted to make sure that the operation was militarily effective, so we had better be involved.
Thirdly, there was a debate about the duration and depth of the incursion. This turned, on
the one hand, on the view that the longer we were there and the farther we went into
Cambodia, the more effective we could be in wiping out North Vietnamese bases. On the
other hand the longer and deeper the drive, the more it looked like an invasion and
expansion of the war. A big mistake was made in setting the objective for this operation
the capturing North Vietnamese headquarters in Cambodia, or COSVN [Committee for
South Vietnam]. In fact, COSVN was located in no fixed place. It simply consisted of the
top North Vietnamese military and political leaders in Cambodia. They moved around all
the time, so it was very hard to pin them down. This got to be a major objective of the
Cambodian incursion, and people were thinking of going into Cambodia and capturing
some major headquarters. It was a mistake to have that out there as an objective.
Some argued that we would have to be in Cambodia for some time, maybe an unlimited
period of time, but certainly for a long period of time to do the job right. To do this, we
would have to go fairly deep into Cambodia so that the COSVN leaders could not escape
and get away from us. We had to mop them up. This was the argument that if we were
going to have a domestic uproar in the United States anyway, we might as well do the job
right. On the other hand, others made the case that, if we stayed close to the border as
such, we would not really be invading Cambodia. If the incursion were brief and limited,
people would see that we were just doing this for the purpose of wiping out these North
Vietnamese sanctuaries and then coming back, not hanging in there, occupying and
destroying that country. These are the kinds of arguments that were made.

I was skeptical, as were several other people on the NSC staff, about whether the
Cambodian incursion was a good idea at all. There were some people who thought that
this idea was wrong because it meant expanding the war and because there were moral, if
not legal objections to this action. That was not my view. I felt that on strictly legal and
moral grounds we were justified in going into these sanctuaries because, after all, the
North Vietnamese had destroyed Cambodian sovereignty in those areas. They were
coming across the border, killing Americans and South Vietnamese, and then retreating
back into Cambodia. It was really unfair to say that we could not go after the North
Vietnamese because this really amounted to fighting with one hand tied behind our backs.
We had a legal and moral case in my view, so I did not object to the Cambodian
incursion on either moral or legal grounds that this amounted to expanding the war and
damaging Cambodian sovereignty. I thought that the Nixon administration was correct on
those grounds.

However, I nevertheless strongly opposed the Cambodian incursion, certainly the
American involvement, though I was less opposed to the South Vietnamese doing it
themselves. I did so on two grounds. I was skeptical as to how militarily effective it
would be, particularly unless we stayed in Cambodia indefinitely, which would really
involve a fundamental change. Maybe we would merely inflict some temporary damage
to the North Vietnamese, but they would just reconstitute the damaged structures and
facilities they had had, and we would be back where we started.

Mostly I objected because I felt that, fairly or unfairly, there would be a domestic uproar
in the United States and that the American people, media, and Congress would object
strongly to this so-called expansion of the war. This would undercut support for what we were trying to do through Vietnamization and serious negotiations. I felt that, whatever military effectiveness we might have, which I thought would be less than some people were proclaiming, this would be counterbalanced by the political damage at home and support for Vietnamization and the negotiations abroad. So I was strongly opposed to the Cambodian incursion. I was most opposed to the American involvement. I was less concerned about South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia, but I recognized that they would be less effective militarily.

I don't have the dates, but the following episode would have been a couple of days before the final decision was made. At this time in the spring of 1970, before the final decision was made, in an effort to display intellectual rigor and explore the options, he brought into his office five staff people who, he knew, were skeptical about this proposed Cambodian incursion. They included me, Roger Morris, Tony Lake, Bill Watts, and Larry Lynn. There was a very heated discussion with Kissinger. I don't recall how long it went on but I suspect that it was for a good hour and a half. Maybe it went on for two hours and maybe for only one hour. In this discussion all five of us laid out our reasons for opposing the Cambodian incursion. Larry Lynn was the least emotional. He based his opposition on analytical grounds and the prospect that it would be militarily ineffective. Others heavily stressed the more legal and moral arguments. I stressed domestic American reactions as outweighing the possible military advantages. The others also spoke about the anticipated domestic reaction. So the discussion was quite emotional. I don't know what the full impact of this discussion was on Kissinger. He said that it didn't change his mind. He said that he supported going into Cambodia and felt that we should have American troops involved in this operation to make it more effective. I also think that he was somewhat uncomfortable about the limits which had been placed on the duration and depth of the incursion. However, you would have to refer to his memoirs on this subject to get his exact position.

Q: Well, did you get any feeling at this time that there was pressure from President Nixon, John Ehrlichman, or anyone else in the White House to go ahead with the incursion? Nixon was known to be tough on this issue. Did that consideration play any role in this connection?

LORD: Well, it was clear that President Nixon was very much inclined to go ahead with this operation. I can't recall the position of Secretary of Defense Laird, who was fairly dovish on Vietnam. Secretary Rogers was probably at least hesitant. I don't want to speak for the views of others; they may have been more modulated on this matter. The American military, of course, were in favor of going ahead, for largely military reasons. I believe that Kissinger was never that far away from Nixon on this issue. People like Ehrlichman [Nixon's Domestic Policy Adviser] and Haldeman [Nixon's Chief of Staff] were not going to get into substance. They were concerned about the domestic, political context. I think that, by instinct, they were sort of hawkish on Vietnam, but they were always concerned primarily about President Nixon's political standing. So I don't know what their personal views of the substance were. They certainly weren't a major factor as far as I can recall.
That night I went home fully intending to resign from the NSC staff. Either it was that night or the next couple of nights, because I really felt strongly about this particular step. I think that I mentioned this at the outset. Once again, I am deeply grateful to my wife, who always took a detached position, looking at the national interest, my personal interests, and their interplay. Her view of the world was similar to mine, moderately dovish but generally supportive of what the administration was trying to do. Of course, I kept her posted on everything I did. I relied on her total discretion. That's the kind of marriage we have, anyway, and I wasn't about to dissipate a marriage by traveling secretly on weekends without explaining what I was doing. I trusted her judgement and total discretion. And I wanted to share all this drama with her.

So she said: "You're crazy to quit. There are big things to be done here in the next few years. You're working for whoever is in charge. If you leave, your perspectives and arguments on various policies, including Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, will be lost, if you're not there, arguing your point of view." I'm sure that she added that the Administration was trying to negotiate an end to the war. She said that I might not agree with every last position, but more importantly, for the national interest, she felt that I had a good case and that I should hang in there. She felt that my perspective should be heard. And, of course, she was not unaware of the intellectual development and career glory that I would have by working with a brilliant man like Kissinger. She said that, even if I quit over the Vietnam issue, what would I do about the opening to China, or Russia, or other matters? She said that I owed it to myself, to Kissinger, and to President Nixon to hang in there, arguing as much as I could on various issues, but serving the country and serving my own career interests.

If it hadn't been for my wife, I probably would have quit. So I began to think about it. In matters like this, you always wonder whether you are merely rationalizing and whether you are morally compromised by not leaving on an issue that you feel strongly about. Within a few days I came around to her view that I should stay on, for the reasons I have just mentioned. If I ever reached the point where the moral stakes were too high, I would leave. However, in the meantime, my general, strategic views were compatible with the Administration, and there were also the secret negotiations that we were conducting, and all of the other things that we were involved in, like China. These were important goals. I was a key person in pursuing them. I would continue to make my case on various issues, and Kissinger would always listen to me. So I decided to stay on.

Three of the other four people who attended that meeting quit. Larry Lynn did not quit, certainly Tony Lake, Roger Morris, and William Watts all left. In the case of Watts, this involved the accumulation of frustrations, both bureaucratic and substantive. In the case of Lake and Morris, they had planned to leave anyway. They chose to move up their departure and link it publicly to the issue of Cambodia.

So that was a close call, the closest I came to resigning during my career.

Q: I don't like to intrude on this, but I've always had trouble over the anguish that went
on about Cambodia. I can see that, militarily, one could question the wisdom of the Cambodian incursion. However, the Cambodian-Vietnamese border had been violated again and again. Maybe, as the bureaucratic saying goes, where you stand on an issue like this depends on where you sit. At that point I was sitting in Saigon, perhaps 30 to 40 miles away from the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. I thought the incursion was a pretty good thing. Give the North Vietnamese a little jolt in these sanctuaries, particularly when they were tolerated, or nobody seemed able to do anything about it. I didn't see any great moral question involved in this.

LORD: I didn't, either.

Q: So I didn't see that this was a matter calling for resignation. I can see that you might question whether the incursion was really going to work and whether it was more trouble than it was worth. Anyway, that's sort of my perspective.

LORD: That's a very fair comment. In retrospect it shows you how emotional a time that was. You agree, of course, with my own comments that, in legal and moral terms, after all, it was the North Vietnamese who had destroyed Cambodian sovereignty. The Cambodian incursion, which was an effort to save American and South Vietnamese lives, was strictly limited to two weeks and a few kilometers in depth of Cambodian territory. So we would go into Cambodia and come back out again. How could people get so mad at us and not get mad at the North Vietnamese for using the sanctuaries in Cambodia? So, in that respect, I agree with you.

The fact is that there was a violent reaction in the United States. In many ways I felt somewhat vindicated because we didn't capture the North Vietnamese headquarters, which was a questionable goal to have in the first place. Generally, there was some military effectiveness about the incursion, and I'll get back to that. However, the principal reaction in the United States was fairly violent. Then there was an incident at Kent State University in Ohio which occurred because of the Cambodian incursion. This involved the Governor of Ohio calling out the Ohio National Guard to preserve order on the campus of Kent State University. Some students who demonstrated against the National Guard were killed when the troops opened fire.

Ironically, given my views on this - but then I did everything else of this nature for Kissinger - I was assigned to write a report on the results of the incursion. This was done in California, when the President was at the Western White House [in San Clemente, CA]. It would have been done a week or two after the incursion was over. I don't recall precisely when this took place, but it was during the summer of 1970.

It was a major report, some 30,000 words long. I collected the information and did most of the drafting myself, though I got help from others. I wrote some of the sections and edited some of the others. I recall submitting a draft of the report to Kissinger, about 24 to 36 hours before he was to submit it to the White House. Of course, he...

Q: This was to be a public report?
LORD: This was to be a public report, a white paper on the rationale for and the effectiveness of our military incursion into Cambodia. It covered what happened, how we had gotten into it, and what the results were. I don't have the exact date when it was issued.

I submitted this report to Kissinger. Obviously, it was in draft. It was a shorter form of the full version, which was to be released to the nation no more than 48 or maybe 72 hours later. Kissinger came back to me and said: "This report is useless." It was not good for my morale, particularly considering the timing. The way he handled this was rather brutal. On the other hand, he gave me a lot of reasons why he was uncomfortable with it. I won't go into them, but his comments covered how the draft was phrased, what should have been emphasized, and what else to put into it. It wasn't so much the compilation of facts but rather the way the narrative ran. I distinctly remember that I considered this draft report as one of the most brilliant drafting jobs that I've ever done.

I sat down and, I think, worked for 12 straight hours at San Clemente, California. I redrafted virtually the whole damned thing. I had to redo lots of it. I don't know how I did it but I worked throughout the night and dumped the product on Kissinger. This left about 48 hours, or perhaps it was 24 hours to go before it was due. I went to bed. Then, when I woke up, he said: "This is a great, a terrific job!" There couldn't have been that much improvement in 24 hours. It clearly was a better document. Once again, he intellectually and substantively polished it and made it much better, however brutal the method. So it was a better document, and I think that Kissinger was sincere, in that respect. We were virtually out of time anyway, but I think that the report was greatly improved.

It was issued. It didn't overly convince people who weren't already convinced, but it was a pretty good paper. At that point it was too early to judge the full military effectiveness of the incursion. However, at that point we were able to report that American and South Vietnamese casualties in the Mekong Delta area, which is near Cambodia and closest to the North Vietnamese sanctuaries, began to decline. Indeed, they did. This was partly because of the effectiveness of the incursion, wiping out and seizing North Vietnamese facilities and equipment. We also used the incursion as justification for further Vietnamization and withdrawal of American forces, because we had reduced the military threat of the sanctuaries in the Cambodian border area. That was the rationale, of course. We put that in. I don't know how much data we had by then on the full impact of the operation. The reality is that over the coming months American and South Vietnamese casualties declined, especially in the areas near Cambodia. And U.S. withdrawals, Vietnamization was speeded up.

Q: When you redrafted this report, it had to have a basic thrust, since it was a public document. Had you given the wrong thrust to it?

LORD: I don't recall exactly Kissinger’s particular complaints about it. It was perhaps partly the structure, it may have been the arrangement of the sections. However, given the time pressures, I don't recall that I was able to add all of that much in the way of facts. That would have been pretty hard, anyway. I wasn't in Washington, after all, and had
limited access to additional material. So I think that it was more a matter of redrafting and rearranging, as opposed to adding new facts. However, I don't recall the details. I just recall that it was a massive paper and that Kissinger had said that it was useless with hours to go. I think useless was clearly too strong a word, although I think that he used that word. He was not pleasant about it. He, figuratively if not literally, threw it on the floor. It was a classic, Kissinger performance.

Frankly, he could also have gotten a better draft out of me, with a different approach. He could have said: "Look, you made a big effort here. Some of the sections are okay, but we still have some major surgery to do. I'm sure that you can do it. Here's what I want." At least, that's the way I would have handled it. However, he basically said that the draft report was useless and that I would have to start all over.

Of course, by then I knew enough about how to deal with Kissinger to realize that he didn't really mean that it was useless but he did want major improvements. There were some sections I could essentially revise, and I could figure out where his real problem was. However, I don't recall the specific kind of changes that he wanted. It was a long document, as I say, about 30,000 words long.

**Q: Did the departure of Tony Lake, Roger Morris, and other members of Kissinger's staff have any effect on the NSC staff? Did you circle the wagons, was there unease, or was there a feeling that the staff was a target of the outside?**

**LORD:** First of all, I would like to draw attention to the revolt among the NSC staff, with the result that people were leaving. This played into the hands of those who were opposed to our policies on Vietnam and Cambodia.

Secondly, Kissinger always put on a brave front, no matter how badly things were going. He was really good at not letting it show that it was getting to him. However, clearly, he was losing a lot of quality staff, including some extremely bright people. Not only Tony Lake and Roger Morris, but the others as well. It was a very strong staff. Kissinger was losing several people all at once which, by definition, left him at a disadvantage.

Third, in some cases, and particularly in the case of Tony Lake, he was on close, personal terms with them. So he had personal angst that he was losing some of these people.

Fourthly, he was caught up, as we all were, in the emotions of the war. He was being attacked by his Harvard colleagues and the press and pictured as a warmonger and so forth, although President Nixon was attacked more fiercely than Kissinger. This added to all of the problems we had. I'm sure that Kissinger was angry as well. You just don't run out in the middle of a crisis. He thought that Lake and Morris were being hypocritical because they had decided to leave anyway. They used their resignations over the Cambodian incursion to grandstand, in his view. Kissinger wondered why there was so much moral outrage. It was the North Vietnamese who had attacked South Vietnam from Cambodia. We had every right to save American and South Vietnamese lives. So this increased the angst in Kissinger's case.
In addition, these resignations surely increased the distrust that the President and the White House staff had of Kissinger’s staff which they already considered too liberal. I'm sure that the quality of the work produced by the NSC staff suffered, at least temporarily. This was inevitable, since Kissinger was losing people of high quality. It had been a very strong staff. However, most of the overall staff stayed on, and Kissinger was able to get replacements. I like to think that he was pleased with my performance, for example. The replacements took up the work formerly done by Lake and Morris, although he missed their substantive ideas and memos on other issues. Morris did a lot of work on Africa, and so on. Certainly, the resignation of these people had a psychological impact, but Kissinger still had a strong staff. He believed in what he was doing and he soldiered on.

I think that one reason that he always treated me better than he treated others, although he could be brutal and just as frank, was partly because I stayed with him during this period. Kissinger knew that I was just as dovish in my instincts as some of the others who had resigned and left. However, I think that from then on he felt grateful that, at a time when he was losing a lot of quality staff members who had reminded him of some of the moral dimensions of the issues and so on, I had stayed on. I received a Christmas present once from him. It was after this period. I forget what the present was, but it was addressed to "Winston Lord, my conscience." So I think that one reason he treated me better than others was this episode, when I hung in there when other key people left the NSC staff, when it was more politically correct to leave it. He also admired my wife for her strength - he knew, or at least inferred, that she had urged me to stay on.

Q: Were there any repercussions within the NSC? I think that it was at this time that a relatively substantial number of junior Foreign Service Officers signed a protest letter to President Nixon over the Cambodian incursion.

LORD: That's a good point. I forget the details. I remember that this did happen. I'm sure that Kissinger's view and that of President Nixon was that Secretary of State Rogers shouldn't have let this happen and should have suppressed this kind of dissent. I don't think that they ever called for these people to be fired, or anything like that.

Q: There is a story that at one point President Nixon sort of lashed out at them.

LORD: I'm sure that he did and that he felt that this was another example of the disloyal, liberal Democratic people in the State Department. I'm sure that this was the sort of mood that people like H. R. Haldemann [Nixon's chief of staff] would have had. I'm sure that Kissinger was upset with the State Department officers because of his view that people serving under him should remain loyal when they disagreed. I think that his view was that he didn't like to have people resigning, but you either resign or you stay quiet. You don't protest, certainly publicly, while you are in government service.

I'm sure that Kissinger also took some heat from H. R. Haldemann and John Ehrlichman [Nixon's chief domestic affairs adviser], if not President Nixon, about Kissinger's liberal staff. Kissinger was always suspected of harboring people holding those views. It was obviously a painful time for him.
Q: What role did Al Haig play at this particular time?

LORD: Haig was certainly on the hawkish side and supported the Cambodian incursion on all the grounds mentioned above. He can speak for himself and has written that American involvement in Indochina was required on military grounds. He has displayed total contempt for those who would leave the President, both in terms of loyalty or the lack of it, and in terms of their intellectual approach. I'm sure that he was disdainful of those who left the NSC staff on this issue. He may have been polite or semi-polite in terms of his feelings, but I'm sure that this was his basic reaction as a soldier. He was also hawkish in terms of not deserting your commander-in-chief at a time of crisis. So that was another interesting episode.

I think that covers Cambodia, and it's time to go back to Vietnam. On Vietnam I've mentioned the logistics and I've sort of touched on how we prepared for the negotiations with the North Vietnamese before we met with them. Dick Smyser, then John Negroponte, and I would work on a memo from Kissinger to the President, saying that we would be meeting again with the North Vietnamese. Here's what is my strategy. So we got President Nixon to sign off on this basic approach to the meeting. We would also prepare opening statements which we might attach as a Tab to the main memorandum, if Nixon wanted to review in detail what Kissinger would say in his opening statement to the North Vietnamese. Basically, the guts of the strategy and our lines would be covered in the memorandum anyway.

So we prepared a memo for Nixon, which included the general approach, and we also prepared Kissinger's opening statement, as I've said. In addition, we assembled some background materials on the facts, and transcripts of previous meetings. We would set out the likely North Vietnamese positions, what we hoped to accomplish and the formula that we might try out, and how we might try to conduct the meetings. These were very careful preparations which, as I've said, we continued to work on the plane trip over. Then, when we would get back, there would be a memorandum from Kissinger to President Nixon, reporting on the meeting and giving his assessment of it. On this, I would get help from Dick Smyser and then John Negroponte.

Now, as a general proposition partly out of hope and partly out of some evidence, we were probably somewhat more optimistic than Nixon about the possibility that the negotiations might produce real progress. Nixon was more skeptical. He, of course, approved of our doing this, but I think that his basic view was that the North Vietnamese were revolutionaries and that there was little prospect that we would achieve much. Over the course of two or three years Kissinger and I were somewhat more hopeful. Probably Dick Smyser agreed with our view, while Negroponte was probably more skeptical. Nixon, and most likely Haig, probably felt that we weren't getting very far. They didn't go so far as to say that the North Vietnamese were simply fooling us, but Nixon suspected that there was no real give in their position. Nevertheless, he approved of our continuing with the negotiations, on the off chance that we could make a breakthrough. In any event, Nixon knew that, for the historical record and when the secret negotiations
were made public at some point, he could say: "Look, I was trying to be reasonable." He was trying to protect his domestic flank.

Not to mention, to be uncynical about it, that Nixon genuinely wanted to end the war. He didn't want to have Americans and South Vietnamese killed. He wanted to turn to other issues. He wanted to end our domestic strife. He wanted to end the war with credibility and honor. So if there was some chance that the negotiations might work, fine. However, basically, I think that Nixon was somewhat more skeptical than we were.

There were times when we thought that there was possible progress, if we looked carefully. I remember specifically the July 1971, meeting, after we came back from the secret trip to China and then met secretly with the North Vietnamese in Paris. We thought that Le Duc Tho [chief North Vietnamese negotiator] and his deputy, Xuan Thuy, were somewhat more forthcoming. On this occasion I recall Kissinger and I thought: "Boy, we may have pulled off a double header on this trip." Not only was there a dramatic opening to China, but maybe we had made a significant advance in the Vietnam negotiations.

A couple of general points. When we met with the North Vietnamese, they would have either one or another head of delegation. Either Le Duc Tho or Xuan Thuy. I once made a pun when we were complaining to each other about Xuan Thuy's performance, which didn't add up to very much. I said: "Xuan Thuy (Wan Twee) doesn't make a forest." So if the North Vietnamese delegation was headed only by Xuan Thuy, we knew that he didn't have the authority to do much and the meeting would be a holding action effort. He was something like a deputy foreign minister. He couldn't negotiate seriously. He would simply repeat their positions.

On the other hand, if the North Vietnamese leader was Le Duc Tho, there was a chance of his being serious. He was Number Five in rank in the Politburo. He was a major political figure and could speak authoritatively for Hanoi. Xuan Thuy was more of a bureaucrat than a representative with his own authority. We never expected very much from Xuan Thuy, although we would still make statements in his presence. We knew that they would go back to Hanoi and be read carefully there. We kept the process going but we hoped that there would be more progress.

Q: Did you have a feeling, either in the back of your minds or more overtly that we didn't know where these negotiations were going? Did we think that the North Vietnamese were a very difficult group and that maybe they wouldn't do anything? However, the other alternative was that eventually we might just pull out of the negotiations, and Vietnamization would take over. Of course, that would still have left the American prisoners of war in detention in Hanoi.

LORD: That's fairly put. We hoped, through a combination of negotiation and pressure when appropriate, that we could bring an end to the war. There were times, as we were carrying out the Vietnamization program, that we would step up the bombing of North Vietnam, and make proposals at the secret negotiations in Paris. We thought that the two strands of action might bring about a negotiated settlement. However, the Vietnamization
program was under way and we did not know what the North Vietnamese time table was. In effect, if they did not agree to a negotiated settlement at some point, we would effectively be out of Vietnam and in a supportive position to the South Vietnamese. But you're absolutely right. This would still have left the prisoner problem. So I guess that the feeling was that, once we got to a certain point, and we hoped that it wouldn't take us long, we would negotiate the status of our prisoners of war, while completing the withdrawal of our troops. I've already said that the major tension that we had with U.S. troop withdrawals was that we were reducing our troop levels unilaterally and without North Vietnamese concessions. So, therefore, the North Vietnamese could just sit there and wait for us to continue to pull out of Vietnam. The key assessment of that situation would turn on how strong did we and Hanoi think the South Vietnamese would eventually be.

Q: Did you feel that the opening to China might have undercut the North Vietnamese position somewhat?

LORD: We felt that the openings to both China and Russia would help us. As I said earlier, President Nixon put great weight on the Russian dimension in particular in adding to the psychological isolation of Hanoi. When Hanoi saw that their two patrons were dealing with us, particularly at the time of the summit meetings of 1972, Nixon thought that Hanoi might get concerned and progress might be made. While we were fighting in Vietnam and simultaneously were meeting with the Russians and Chinese at the highest level, this would cause some unease in Hanoi. Secondly, the Russian and Chinese leaders had a stake in the development of our bilateral relationship. The Vietnamese conflict was an ideological and a political brake and irritant in our relationship. Nixon thought that the Russians and Chinese would lean on Hanoi to make a reasonable deal with us as they could move ahead with their bilateral ties with us.

In our contacts with the Russians and Chinese we essentially said: "Look, please tell Hanoi that we are not unreasonable, that we're willing to have an honorable settlement. However, it's got to be a military settlement. You cannot expect us to sell out our allies, overthrow the Saigon government, as we pull out." Our basic pitch was that we were prepared to leave Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese decide on their political future. As we went on, we got more and more precise about leaving unilaterally, if not on a mutual basis. We wanted a cease-fire and the return of our prisoners of war. However, what we were not prepared to do was to overthrow the Thieu Government in South Vietnam and have a coalition government to replace it. I think that we began to introduce the themes of reconciliation and maybe even economic assistance to Vietnam as additional incentives. We said that this was a reasonable outcome for Hanoi. Moreover, consider that we're trying to develop a bilateral relationship with you. From your standpoint, the Vietnam War is getting in the way and is a distraction in the way of improving relations with you. So it's in your interest to get this Vietnam War out of the way, not to mention showing that we can work together on some of these issues.

We hoped that this line with the Chinese and Russians would help the negotiations. We knew that, by itself, it wouldn't be decisive, but we thought that, combined with military
pressure and a reasonable negotiating position, it would help to end the war. Now, we can't be sure how much Russia and China weighed in with Hanoi. We're quite sure, without having actual proof, that Zhou En-lai and others did not think that our position was unreasonable.

There is some circumstantial evidence that the Chinese, in their own interests, conveyed our rationale to Hanoi. In our discussions, Zhou would urge us to get out to Vietnam, but I don’t recall his urging us to overthrow the Saigon government. The pitch that we made in terms of their national interest was that Hanoi ought to accept our proposals. They could spin this further by pointing out to Hanoi that the Saigon Government was weak and that it might be taken over eventually, once the Americans were out of Vietnam. Their considerations perhaps appealed to Hanoi, but I think that Hanoi was independent enough that it wouldn't fold under pressure from either Russia or China.

Of course, in retrospect, we now know how much China and North Vietnam opposed each other. They fought their own war along the Sino-Vietnamese border a few years later. I don't think that the China equation had a major impact on Hanoi. However, this was certainly one of the reasons that we opened up to China and tried to improve relations with Russia, although this was not the main reason. I think that, around the edges, it probably helped us with Hanoi, and we finally got a settlement in 1973, which I'll discuss later.

Q: Do you want to stop now or would you like to continue?

LORD: Let's continue for a couple of more minutes. I thought that I would cover some general material points.

In retrospect, until we got to the fall of 1972, there were times when Le Duc Tho [chief Hanoi negotiator in the Paris peace talks] was somewhat more polite than others. There may have been times when they showed a more enhanced flexibility. But if you were really hard headed about it, you'd have to say that the North Vietnamese really didn't move very much throughout this period, despite our succeeding proposals. Sometimes, their positions in the secret negotiations were tougher than their positions in the public talks in Paris. They had public positions which, as I say, were more generous than those in the secret talks.

Also, Le Duc Tho often had headaches. When he had a headache, we knew that he wasn't going to be flexible or forthcoming. He'd get a headache, and this signaled his attitude. I think that it's also fair to say, and this is a sad commentary on human nature, that Hanoi generally was more forthcoming when we were hitting them hard, militarily. They were also friendlier. They were more arrogant and intransigent when they seemed to be doing well, militarily and/or we were letting up on the pressure. That's just the way it worked.

In late January 1972, the President’s speech revealed the secret negotiations and our forthcoming negotiating stand. From then on we announced that negotiations had been held after they took place. The friendlier that Hanoi was in describing the meetings
afterwards, (they were holding their own press conferences), the chances were that they were tougher, internally. This may have been because they were trying to show American public opinion that they were being reasonable. To the extent that they were firm and fairly tough in their accounts of the meetings afterwards, the chances were that they were more forthcoming in the talks that we had had. They were trying to cover up somewhat greater flexibility on their side by using tough rhetoric publicly.

I don't want to exaggerate this, because until September-October 1972, they made no real major moves. Nevertheless, there were times in 1971-72 that we came from the meetings, more discouraged than at other times, when we were more encouraged.

Q: Did you have any feel about who was giving them advice? How were they getting their reading of American public opinion?

LORD: That's a good question. This accounted for a lot in the negotiations. We would constantly say to them, hopefully without being overly defensive about it: "Don't count on American public opinion and don't insult us because, first of all, we're going to pursue our national interest anyway." Secondly, we said that when the North Vietnamese talked to people like Jane Fonda [Hollywood actress and anti-war activist and the daughter of actor Henry Fonda], liberal members of Congress, and media figures, they should realize that these people did not represent all of America. We said that there was a great, silent majority out there which supported our efforts in Vietnam. So we said that if the North Vietnamese thought that they were going to make us capitulate because of American public opinion, they were sadly mistaken. We said that we had sufficient public support, plus President Nixon was going to do the right thing, and the North Vietnamese would not be able to humiliate our world position and credibility by forcing us to accede to their demands. That was our basic pitch.

Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy were always trying to work in the view that the American people wanted us to end our involvement in Vietnam and that we didn't have public support. Whenever they cited domestic public opinion in the U.S., Kissinger hit them very hard. You would have to look at the memoirs of the North Vietnamese to know what their actual views were. I think that, on the whole, the conventional wisdom is correct that they thought that the support of American public and Congressional opinion for the war was dissolving and that they had us on the run. That was one reason that they felt that they could afford to be intransigent, both because they felt that, over time, they were going to be stronger than the South Vietnamese when they had to take them on directly, and because American public opinion was undercutting President Nixon. In any event, after all, we were withdrawing unilaterally under the Vietnamization program, so they could afford to sit there and be tough.

Their instinct as revolutionaries was not to negotiate a compromise. They don't have the same, American instinct to try and split the difference and find a negotiated end on the basis of a yearning for peace. The North Vietnamese negotiators had fought for a long time for their goals against the French and us. They had been around a long time and were willing to continue the negotiations for a long time. So they were not in a mood to
compromise. So all of this made it extremely difficult. They got some of their views of American public opinion from their reading of the American media, from American visitors to Hanoi, even people who were pro-Viet Cong and pro-North Vietnamese. I might say that the North Vietnamese might have concluded that they had better not exaggerate things. There was still some American support for the war, and the President was not going to give in to North Vietnamese demands. But on the whole, they must have been encouraged by the debates and demonstrations in our country. They couldn't help but be influenced by them. This became a more and more decisive consideration when Congress began reducing the aid we had promised to supply the South Vietnamese, the incident at Kent State, and the demonstrations against American actions. So this certainly fed their intransigent stance in the negotiations.

Now and then President Nixon would order some strong, military actions, such as in April-May 1972, when he ordered the mining of the harbor at Haiphong and the bombing of Hanoi. He was trying of course to prevail on the battlefield and improve our situation in response to North Vietnamese aggression. But it was clearly also intended to keep the North Vietnamese off balance. President Nixon seemed to hope that the North Vietnamese would be more willing to negotiate, if they figured that they were dealing with somebody who was unpredictable in the White House, whatever the state of public opinion, who was going to take a whack at them.

We'll get back to this, but the North Vietnamese basically had to worry what Nixon, whom they may have considered a madman, might do if he were reelected in November 1972, and no longer had to worry about being reelected again. Then he could do whatever the hell he wanted to do. Having seen by then the May 1972, bombing of Hanoi and mining of the harbor of Haiphong and then, later, of course, the Christmas bombings in December, 1972, the North Vietnamese must have felt concerns. We would tell them not to pay attention to our critics or interfere in our domestic affairs. We would say, by the way, that we have a madman in the White House who doesn't give a damn about public opinion. We would say that he cares about America's position in the world and suggest that he was going to beat the hell out of the North Vietnamese if they were not reasonable.

_Q: What about the nomination and campaign of George McGovern [Democratic Party presidential nominee who was notably opposed to our policies on Vietnam]? Or should we postpone discussion of that?_

LORD: I'd rather reserve that, because it was directly relevant to the breakthrough in the negotiations and why there was a breakthrough.

I'd like to make one other point on the North Vietnamese style of negotiations. I've already mentioned that their style was to hang in there, maybe being friendly on some occasions and tough on other occasions. However, essentially, and month after month, and year after year, their basic position was to call for a unilateral, U.S. withdrawal, the establishment of a coalition government in Saigon, and to stick with all these positions, in a revolutionary spirit. They tended to look to their long investment in what they were doing, feeling that domestic support for the U.S. position was crumbling, for all of the
reasons that I've mentioned. So they basically sought to wear us down. They would come, essentially as a part of their negotiating style, to listen to our positions and see whether the United States was going to make more concessions and move closer to what they wanted.

This is in contrast to other, negotiating styles, if I may digress briefly. Kissinger was very good at understanding and negotiating with different interlocutors, depending on their cultural and historical styles. For example, in the case of the Chinese, he preferred their negotiating style the most. Basically, they would take a position on principle. Then each side would establish its basic principles and state what it had to have, at a minimum. Then, within this framework, we would negotiate about reaching an agreement. At the beginning the Chinese would avoid exaggerating or inflating their positions and then bargain them down, like rug merchants, (and like the Russians). I’m talking about the Chinese style in the 1970s, not in the 1990s. They have a much more conventional, haggling approach today.

In negotiations the Russians are more like rug merchants. They inflate their positions, exaggerate what they need, and expect you to do the same. Then you can haggle, haggle, and haggle, and finally reach an agreement. Even then you have to be careful about how they would implement the agreement, whereas we felt the Chinese carried out their obligations.

The Israelis were like Talmudic scholars and lawyers. They have an understandable sense of insecurity, given their history and the fact that they are surrounded by the Arabs. They were very cautious about every semi-colon and every last detail of every negotiation. They would haggle and set out to exhaust you with their suspicions of the Arabs. Kissinger, for example, would go to Golda Meir or Rabin, or whomever we were negotiating with. The Israelis would present 10 demands or requests from the Egyptians. Kissinger would go to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, get agreement on nine out of 10, go back to Tel Aviv, and present this to the Israelis. Then the Israelis, instead of being grateful for getting nine out of 10 of their demands, would complain that he hadn't gotten the 10th demand for them. Anwar Sadat was more romantic and emotional. He was willing to take a big step as a visionary, as long as Kissinger appealed to Egyptian dignity, self interest, and so on.

So it was very interesting to see the various, negotiating styles, including the North Vietnamese practice of just wearing you down and waiting to hear your concessions. In retrospect, they had no real intention of compromising until they had real incentives to do so, as they did in the fall of 1972.

*Q: What about the style that so often appears when the North Vietnamese give you long, historical harangues, even in the secret negotiations?*

*LORD:* Absolutely. That's a very good point. We would often, particularly in the opening statements, have to sit through a very familiar, re-hash of allegations of U.S. interference in a civil conflict, alleged U.S. atrocities, not to mention the debate in the United States
about our approach. You're absolutely right. Time and again the North Vietnamese would go through their history with the French and Americans. They would say that they have lasted through this period and that period and that they were going to outlast us. They would say that it's their country and demand that we should stay out of their business. They would say that we were killing innocent people.

Probably the major difference we had in the various meetings is that sometimes they would make this basic speech shorter or maybe even dispense with it. We would get more hopeful over the tone. Then, at other times, they would go on at greater length but ostensibly become somewhat more flexible, having made their point and they could send their transcript of the meeting back to the Politburo.

Q: How did our records reflect what went on at the meetings? Did they indicate that the discussion was all very nice, but let's get to the substance of the negotiation?

LORD: Kissinger had a good sense of humor, but sometimes it did not lend itself to those meetings. With all of his interlocutors, including the Russians, the Chinese, the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Vietnamese he made jokes. He and Lu Duc Tho would often go off and walk around privately and it would seem they were having serious discussions.

Kissinger was very hard-headed, of course. He was not naïve. He was with hard-headed revolutionaries, representing national interests. He knew that they would not suddenly become more flexible because they liked Henry Kissinger. However, Kissinger felt that there was still something to be said, even with this group of North Vietnamese, even more than with other interlocutors, for trying to have some personal relationship. He would break the tension, at times, with humor. He would try to establish his credibility for carrying out commitments and respectability for genuinely seeking agreement. Maybe personal touches would help around the edges. Then, when Le Duc Tho or Xuan Thuy would report back to the Politburo, they would draft their reports somewhat more favorably than might otherwise be the case. Kissinger had no illusions that this effort would make a significant difference in this respect. I think that he was correct in trying to do that. It never hurts to try and be more personable, so long as one has no illusions about the real impact.

By the same token, Kissinger would be very tough and sharp if he thought that Hanoi was getting arrogant. He would come back hard at them, either in the plenary session, or he might well do it, one on one, so that there wouldn't be quite so much face lost. Or he might convey privately, in some discussion, some particularly ominous message from the President. He might say that the President was running out of patience, or whatever it was. So he would try to use different techniques of his own with the North Vietnamese. It was fascinating.

Q: Did you have the feeling, as you entered these negotiations, "Okay, this is somewhat a Kabuki exercise. Is it going to take three or four years in order to get from here to there?"
LORD: No, we were a little bit more optimistic than that. I wouldn't want to make us look naive. We acted differently at some meetings than at others. We thought that we owed it to the American people and to the American soldiers, not to mention our South Vietnamese allies, to try to negotiate an end to this war. So even if it looked almost hopeless or might appear to be a kabuki drama, whatever the slim chance that we could end the war through negotiations, we had an obligation to continue to try. That was the first consideration.

The second consideration, of course, was the calculation that if and when we ever made this account public, it would show the American people and Congress that we had made a good faith effort to end the anguish of the war. We would then have their support to do whatever we still had to do, which turned out to be the case in January 1972. It wasn't cynical, in the sense that we were just doing it so that we could show that we were reasonable. It was a genuine effort to end the war. There was also the feeling that it was not us that had kept the war going. It was Hanoi which had kept this tragedy going on.

We genuinely were searching for ways to end the war, consistent with our honor, to search for North Vietnamese flexibility, in the hope that we could make real progress. At a minimum, we sought to show that we had been reasonable. In our own mind we did this also to satisfy our own moral and political instincts and try to end the war as soon as possible. So there were all considerations. Sometimes, as I said, we were fairly upbeat, as we were in July, 1971. At times we were pretty discouraged. We never would sit down and conclude that this process was going to take years. We thought that it would take months, if we did not reach a breakthrough in weeks.

Q: Did you get any reading in your conversations with Kissinger as to how he evaluated Le Duc Tho?

LORD: Oh, yes, sure. We talked about that all the time. Kissinger was quite impressed with Le Duc Tho. He felt essentially that Xuan Thuy did not have much authority. Kissinger felt that Xuan Thuy was a moderately competent bureaucrat who was just mouthing Hanoi's position. Kissinger recognized that Le Duc Tho was a tough customer, a long time revolutionary. At times Kissinger would get irritated with Le Duc Tho, particularly when he would get arrogant. He would get frustrated when Le Duc Tho would try his patience, not only at one particular meeting but over many months and years. Kissinger felt that Le Duc Tho was a skillful presenter of Hanoi's position, however annoying he was at times. Le Duc Tho had authority. We always felt that he was presenting Hanoi's view, even if it was usually somewhat discouraging. But I think that Kissinger had a grudging respect for Le Duc Tho.

Q: Did the tea breaks and the luncheons, particularly with the Soviets, provide an occasion where people get together and mix and mingle a little bit? Was there any of that with the North Vietnamese?

LORD: A modest amount. I would talk to some people at my level, and Kissinger would talk to Le Duc Tho or Xuan Thuy. Or there would be a more general conversation around the table.
However, as we got toward the end of the negotiations and were making real progress, then it got to be - well, friendly is too strong a word - but there was some camaraderie and some shared experience. There was some joking as we began to make progress toward the end. Before the fall of 1972, I would say that these contacts were pretty modest. I didn't get the feeling of expressions of great candor, letting down one's guard, or real camaraderie, even though there were some jokes exchanged which they would laugh at. We would try to make these contacts more human around the edges, but there were never any real exchanges.

**Q: Did the French intrude in these discussions at all?**

LORD: No. They were very cooperative in setting up the logistics, but they didn't offer any views on substance. They didn't interfere in any way.

**Q: Where are we now?**

LORD: We can get to some of the milestones of the negotiations with the North Vietnamese. One other point on the domestic mood in the United States. I don't have a date, but there was a young person named Brian McDonnell who was fasting outside the White House in Washington, in protest against the continuation of the war. He was literally on a hunger strike and was in danger of wasting away. Without any publicity Kissinger came out of the White House and talked to him. He got me directly involved as a kind of house conscience. Kissinger talked to him, listened to him, tried to explain what we were up to, and then invited him and his wife, who was an African-American, to have dinner with my wife, Bette, and me, as well as Kissinger. Kissinger persuaded this young man to end his fast, although we didn't change our policy, obviously. So it was a nice gesture by Kissinger, not consistent with his public image, certainly, and one which he never publicized. I'm not sure that news of this meeting ever got out. I recall no more details on that.

There were some milestones in our negotiations which were more memorable than others, although it's hard for me to reconstruct specific milestones now. [By far the most detailed and authoritative account was published after the interview - “End of the Vietnam War” by Kissinger.]

One milestone I should mention briefly, and I've already alluded to it, was May, 1971, probably over Memorial Day, since we always went to Paris on holidays or weekends at this time. We presented what we considered an extremely significant proposal to move the negotiations forward, which in fact was brought out in the eventual settlement signed in January, 1973. I recall how we agonized over trying to make a major proposal. I don't recall why, but the timing was such that we tried to make a breakthrough at that point. I believe that it was a seven point proposal, which was essentially a military settlement only, consistent with President Nixon's principle of being willing to be flexible on the military side, but not on the political side.
This proposal included a date for total unilateral U.S. withdrawal of forces. It dropped the position of mutual withdrawal. We recognized that Vietnamization and congressional pressures were making our forces useless as a bargaining chip. The only condition was the cessation of North Vietnamese infiltration of all of Indochina. The other basic elements of the proposal included a cease-fire throughout Indochina, the return of American prisoners, international supervision, and independence for Laos and Cambodia. The political future of South Vietnam was left to the South Vietnamese. I don't recall the initial, North Vietnamese reaction or whether they acknowledged the significance of this proposal. Probably not. But unilateral withdrawal was one of their major objectives. I suspect that the North Vietnamese were not generous in their response. Surely they were smart enough to recognize that this proposal was of major significance. Indeed it was the essence of the settlement they agreed to sixteen months later.

I mention this because it was consistent with earlier positions and demonstrate again that the January 1973 settlement could have been reached earlier if Hanoi had been reasonable. For example, the Presidential Statement of November, 1969, which called for a cease-fire in place. You could interpret this to mean that the North Vietnamese were remaining at least temporarily in South Vietnam. So the record will show, especially from 1971 on, that we couldn’t have reached the final deal of January 1973 any sooner than we did, contrary to critics’ assertions. These critics have been totally irresponsible on this point. The historical record is irrefutable on this point.

We would constantly refer to this approach, that is, the military solution only. We were not willing to overthrow our allies in the Saigon Government. I cite this also because, as I've already mentioned, this is the response to those who say that we should have and could have gotten the eventual settlement years earlier. They have to understand that Hanoi would not settle on this basis. They only settled when they could see how the 1972 presidential elections in the United States were going to turn out. Prior to this time they didn't accept this proposal, and there is no evidence that they were ever ready to accept anything less than the formation of a coalition government and the overthrow of President Nguyen van Thieu.

So that was one meeting (May 1971) that was significant. I think that, having made this proposal, we were hopeful that, when Hanoi looked at it, they would realize that this was significant. However, there certainly was no immediate breakthrough at the time. I think that the tone of this meeting was relatively good. Again, I would direct you to Kissinger's memoirs at this point.

I've also mentioned that the next meeting after this proposal was made was the July 1971 session in Paris, when we were on our way back from Pakistan and China, we snuck out secretly from our Paris embassy, as I've already mentioned. This was a moderately good meeting because they made a somewhat less negative reply to our May 1971 proposals. We thought that there might be some movement in the negotiations.

Q: Do you think that the North Vietnamese were aware of the progress being made in the negotiations with China?
LORD: I don't think so. Certainly, we didn't tell them. Now, whether the Chinese informed their North Vietnamese allies, I don't know. This was between the time when we had been secretly to China, just a few days earlier, and the time when President Nixon publicly announced the agreement reached with the Chinese in San Clemente, California, a few days later. We were on our way back to San Clemente to report to the President on the trip and the negotiations on the opening to China. I suspect that the North Vietnamese didn't know. It hadn't come out publicly. We certainly wouldn't have told them. We kept this secret until Nixon released this bombshell in San Clemente. I suspect that the North Vietnamese had not been told of this development by the Chinese.

Q: I take it that the North Vietnamese were not prone to leak material on the talks. You were pretty sure that they weren't going to leak or let people know what they were up to.

LORD: Well, they didn't leak the fact that they had secret talks going on with us. They probably figured that if we were going to be flexible, we would only do this secretly, in view of American public opinion. They would get more out of us if the fact of the talks were kept secret. So they probably thought that it was in their interest to keep them secret.

The North Vietnamese might also have felt that it would discourage the morale of their own troops and the Viet Cong [communist forces indigenous to South Vietnam] if it looked as if they were negotiating an end to the war. They had their own interest in keeping the negotiating process secret.

However, the North Vietnamese played a really nefarious game with world opinion, and we would catch them up on this. As I mentioned, they would sound forthcoming in public on their seven-, eight-, or nine-point plan. Then they would be much less forthcoming in their actual positions in the secret negotiations, which, after all, were the authoritative negotiations. So the North Vietnamese played public opinion to a fare-thee-well. This was not leaking, but it was being more forthcoming in public than they were in reality. That was annoying, to say the least.

Q: Could we play the same game? Did we ever use the public negotiations for any particular purpose?

LORD: Not really, no. The public Paris talks were a propaganda exercise. We tried generally to be forthcoming in public, but we were more forthcoming, for example, in this May 1971 secret proposal than we were in public. Our public position still essentially cited mutual withdrawal of North Vietnamese and U.S. forces, although we were more subtle in the speech by President Nixon in November 1969, with its ceasefire in place. However, in public we were much less forthcoming than in the private proposals.

You had this strange situation where we were more forthcoming in private than we were publicly. The North Vietnamese were more forthcoming publicly than they were privately. Of course, it was the private negotiations that were the more authoritative ones.
Q: Was there any interplay between the public meetings and the secret meetings?

LORD: I think that the best appraisal is that we would hang tougher in the public sessions than in the private sessions. In the interest of public opinion and international propaganda we always tried to make our position look at least reasonable, but in terms of substance we would reserve any real flexibility for the private, secret talks. I don't recall any interplay beyond that. Considerations of timing were not important.

I forget how the public meetings went, whether they were held once a week or once a month. I don't recall this. They were pretty well developed. Both sides, essentially, presented their public positions, appealing to international opinion. We knew that there would never be any real progress in the public talks. We have already talked about secrecy in discussing the opening to China. I agreed with it but there was a certain price that we paid, i.e. with Japan. The rationale for secrecy in the Vietnam negotiations was entirely justified. That is, if there was ever going to be any progress, each side had to be able to speak freely, without having to worry about their domestic opinion, their allies, or anything else.

In our case we also had the South Vietnamese Government to consider. (Hanoi, of course, totally controlled the Viet Cong.) We kept them generally posted. We would send off a cable on the secret meetings for the information of Ambassador Bunker in Saigon, but being careful to not scare the South Vietnamese. We did not wish to betray them, but, in fact, we went beyond what we were telling them through Bunker. We didn't want to get President Thieu prematurely excited about the sessions and try to lock us in on tough positions. I think that it's fair to say that we were less than totally forthcoming with the South Vietnamese and that we rounded off some of the edges in the reporting on the secret sessions which we sent to Ambassador Bunker to draw on in his discussions with President Thieu. On the other hand, most of the ideas floated in Paris were somewhat tentative and exploratory.

Q: Were you getting any feedback from President Thieu as to what you were doing? Did he feel that you were giving away the store?

LORD: There were times when he felt that. However, I think, frankly, that we were being a little bit more responsible than he acknowledged. For example, in the May 1971 proposals to the North Vietnamese we briefed the South Vietnamese generally on our goals if not the specific plan. We tried to prepare President Thieu, over time, that we were going to be out of South Vietnam some day. We said that it was in our joint interest if we could negotiate a deal. The South Vietnamese, of course, were suspicious in general of the negotiations, particularly those that they weren't involved in. They were only being debriefed afterwards on what we had already said. They were more and more suspicious of Kissinger himself. They were afraid that he was more flexible than he indicated and was more eager to have a settlement with the North Vietnamese than President Nixon was. This came to a head, and I'll get to it, in October 1972. There would be times when the South Vietnamese would caution us, but there was never a crisis until that October.
Q: When you mentioned who was on the North Vietnamese delegation to the secret talks, was there ever any question about having the Viet Cong represented?

LORD: No. The North Vietnamese just made the point that the Viet Cong were not a part of their delegation. This fiction that the Viet Cong consisted of indigenous South Vietnamese, engaged in a civil war in which the Viet Cong were key players, was total nonsense. The Viet Cong were controlled by the North Vietnamese. It is true that, after the war, there might be some tension between the southern Vietnamese who had been active in the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese officials. However, essentially, North Vietnam was totally running the show. You could argue, based on one reading of the [Geneva] agreement [of 1954], that they had a right to elections, which should have been held [in 1956]. Saying that this was an indigenous uprising by the Viet Cong is unconvincing. The Viet Cong just didn't have enough support in South Vietnam. Basically, the North Vietnamese were telling the Viet Cong what to do. They made a joke of the conflict being an indigenous, southern revolt. If you accept that, under the Geneva Accord, there should have been elections [for the reunification of Vietnam], it still was partly a civil war as well as invasion. But no one could make the case that it was only a matter of southern Vietnamese against other, southern Vietnamese.

It is conceivable, although I don't know, that the Viet Cong were more hawkish than Hanoi was on negotiations. We know that Hanoi was far from dovish, very tough. It is conceivable that the Viet Cong would be even more hawkish than North Vietnam. I just don't know to what extent the Viet Cong were fully aware of and informed on the negotiations process.

Of course, when we got towards the final signing and negotiations [of the Paris] Agreement on Vietnam [of 1973] and how we dealt with the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, it became very complicated - as it had been in 1968 - as to who was signing what. Just like the shape of the table [at the public negotiations in Paris] was very complicated. This was essentially the same issue.

We've talked about the summer of 1971 when we had at least some optimism that we were going to make progress. This proved premature. Then, for reasons which I can't recall but which I think primarily involved the fact that we were not making progress by the end of 1971, that Hanoi was stonewalling, there was a feeling that we had to shore up domestic and international support for the war. We also felt that North Vietnam was playing this game of looking reasonable in public and intransigent in the secret talks. We wanted to set the record straight on our efforts to negotiate and on the ‘reasonable’ substances of our proposals.
XI. NSC - INDOCHINA, PEACE AGREEMENT (1972-1973)

As we headed toward January, 1972, we gradually came to the conclusion that it was important for the President to make a major, public address, again on Vietnam. In the speech he would outline our strategy and goals, recalling Vietnamization and reviewing the progress made to date in terms of declining American casualties and troop levels in Vietnam. Above all, he would reveal the fact that we had made a reasonable offer to North Vietnam and that for some time we had been conducting secret negotiations with them. It was up to Hanoi to respond in a meaningful way.

I believe that, toward the end of 1971, we fleshed out further the five more proposals made in May, 1971. In fact, I am sure that we did. We held secret meetings in June, July, August, and September, 1971. I believe we took the bare bones of this proposal and added new details to make clear what a military solution only would look like. By January, 1972, it was decided to go public on the heretofore secret negotiations, because Hanoi was not moving, and we were being criticized too much at home in the U.S., as well as elsewhere in the world.

So there was a Nixon speech on January 25, 1972. Like all of these speeches, I worked hard on the drafting of it. Of course, the speech writers turned it into much better English, while I worked on the substance of it. In this case I believe that John Negroponte also worked on it.

In this speech we laid out the fact that we had had secret negotiations with North Vietnam and what the substance of our approach had been. In a way it was forthcoming to Hanoi. It was a conciliatory speech, in fact saying that we had made certain proposals, to which Hanoi hadn't responded. Clearly, the speech was aimed at our friends around the world who were concerned about American involvement in Vietnam and, above all, at American public opinion, Congress, and the American media, to shore up our support. It succeeded in doing so, at least for a while. There was a very favorable reaction, both to the substance of the proposal and to the fact that we had conducted secret negotiations, which had not worked until then. We had made a good faith effort at negotiations. There were some, of course, who were critical, and other critics who said that it wasn't a good enough proposal. Some observers said that this was a ploy to shore up domestic opinion. There were also some hawks who felt that we had perhaps gone too far, although there weren't many of these.

I think that there was a large body of opinion which felt that this show of reasonableness went further than we had any reputation for. They felt that if this wasn't a basis for a final settlement, it ought to be enough to get the process going, and Hanoi should respond. So it really did shore up our position in the eyes of public opinion. We revealed that we had been much more flexible in private than in public, and indeed had been more forthcoming than some of our critics had proposed.

Q: Had we informed the North Vietnamese in advance that we were going to do this?
LORD: We did, just in advance. We didn't want to give them too much warning because they might leak the story and pre-empt us. I think that at the last minute before the speech was given, we told the North Vietnamese that they hadn't responded privately to our proposals. In fact, I suspect that we told them at the very last minute. I know that we didn't tell them well in advance, because we thought that they would rush out and leak the story, spinning it their way.

So on the whole I was pleased with the results of the speech. It showed a good faith effort to end the war. On a personal level my friends could see what we had been doing. The down side was that the North Vietnamese, who were so tough and cynical, anyway, would be upset that we had revealed the negotiations and that this might undercut them with their own friends, the Viet Cong, and embarrass the hard liners in the Politburo. They might also conclude that it was showing bad faith to reveal these secret negotiations and would put them in a spot. As a result, they might dig in their heels and, as a result, become even more intransigent. That was the down side. In fact, secret negotiations are kept secret so that each side can speak more frankly, so that you can hope to make progress. We risked that advantage by going public regarding the fact of the secret negotiations. But we weren’t making progress in the secret talks after more than two years. Hanoi had not responded to our flexible proposals, and we hadn’t met since September.

I know that I felt, and this was a pretty unanimous view, including President Nixon, that it was important to set the record straight and to say that we were not making progress because of Hanoi’s intransigence. Maybe this would embarrass Hanoi enough or rally international opinion and certainly shore up American support, so that we'd be in a stronger position to carry on. The speech also made clear how far we'd come on Vietnamization and the progress we were making in this regard. A final reason, I'm sure, in terms of the timing of the speech, now that I think of it, was that the speech was going to be delivered a month before the President's trip to China, followed by a summit meeting in Moscow with the Soviet leaders. So I think that the President also wanted to get his views on the Vietnam negotiations on record, as he headed toward China. The dates of the China trip had already been made public, and Deputy National Security Adviser Al Haig had already been to China. This speech not only had an effect on domestic public opinion but also, presumably, it helped us in dealing with the Chinese. So there were a lot of reasons for giving this speech, and it was a good thing to do.

So the Nixon speech of January 25, 1972, was an important one. The next important events were the President's trip to China in February 1972, and his trip to Moscow in May 1972. In terms of Hanoi's bilateral relationships with its friends we hoped that this would increase their sense of isolation and make them more reasonable.

The next important period in Vietnam at that time was April 1972. The North Vietnamese launched a major offensive against South Vietnam. (End of tape)

Q: You were saying that the President had a major decision to make.
LORD: The President had a major decision to make. He was scheduled to go to Moscow in a couple of weeks. The issue was how to respond to this major attack by North Vietnam on South Vietnam.

First of all, this offensive was having some impact south of the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone along the 17th parallel of latitude] and in the northern part of South Vietnam, in terms of the military balance. The North Vietnamese were making some real inroads. So there was a military question as to whether this was really a danger to our overall goals in South Vietnam.

Secondly, the offensive showed that they not only were not responding to our offers, which we had revealed publicly, but the North Vietnamese were instead stepping up their military attacks. This was just the opposite of being reasonable.

Thirdly, and this was very much in President Nixon's mind, they were stepping up the attacks on American and South Vietnamese troops with conventional North Vietnamese forces, which were blatantly crossing the border [on the 17th parallel] and so on. They were doing this at a time when the President was about to go to Moscow, which was providing aid to the North Vietnamese. So, in terms of psychology, domestic public opinion, and credibility, the President was very concerned about being in Moscow in May 1972, at a time when American troops were being killed with Russian weapons provided to the North Vietnamese.

So the military balance with Hanoi and Hanoi's psychology in taking advantage of us by attacking and not responding in the negotiations were serious considerations. But, above all, Nixon envisioned talking to the Russians and clinking champagne glasses while the Russians were providing military materiel to the North Vietnamese who were killing American troops. Thus President Nixon felt that we had to respond vigorously to the North Vietnamese offensive, specifically by bombing targets around Hanoi and mining Haiphong harbor. It would be weak and humiliating not to respond to their attacks. He couldn’t go to Moscow in that way.

Counter arguments were advanced by various people, including me, and, to some degree, Kissinger and others. First, all agreed we had to respond to the military threat on the ground. The question was the degree of this response. If we went so far as to bomb around Hanoi and mine Haiphong harbor, Moscow might call off the summit meeting. I remember that there was a meeting in the White House Situation Room, chaired by Kissinger, probably with representatives from CIA, DIA, and from the State and Defense Departments, the NSC, and others. The purpose of the meeting was to judge what the Russian reaction would be to a major escalation, or counter-escalation by us. I believe that, perhaps with one or two exceptions, everybody at that meeting felt that if we bombed around Hanoi and mined Haiphong harbor, we would lose the forthcoming Summit Meeting with the Russians. The general feeling was that the Russians would cancel the meeting.

We had made major progress with the Soviets, and we can talk about this later. The fact
of the opening to China made the Russians more reasonable on the issues of arms control, Berlin, economic relations, and so forth. So we were heading for a Summit Meeting which was set up with a lot of major agreements close to conclusion, including those affecting SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, then in the process of negotiation], arms control, and many other aspects of Soviet-American relations, not to mention the double header of the Summit Meetings in China and in Russia. So we had a lot invested emotionally, intellectually, substantively, and politically looking toward this major advance in relations with the Russians. This had been one of our objectives for several years. Our positions were well established and well prepared. All of this now threatened to go down the tubes at the last minute, because of the proposed bombing of Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong harbor.

To his credit, in my view, President Nixon’s position was firm and correct. First of all, as I said, he couldn’t afford to look so weak, and he would do less well with the Russians if he went to Moscow and didn't respond vigorously to their North Vietnamese ally attacking us with Russian arms. He might be regarded as a wimp by the Russians as well as Americans and the world, if he was in Moscow while American soldiers were getting killed with Soviet-made weapons and we were not responding. Secondly, and this is what distinguished Nixon from everybody else, and certainly Kissinger, he boldly predicted that the Russians would not cancel the Summit Meeting. He believed the Russians would go ahead anyway and let the President go to Moscow, looking strong and reacting strongly against the North Vietnamese attacks. He would gain the grudging respect of the Russians and wouldn't lose all of the benefits of the Summit Meeting in the fields of arms control and everything else. So he could have his cake and eat it, too, as the popular saying goes. Even if the Russians canceled the meeting, Nixon felt that it was better not to go to Moscow in view of our goals in Vietnam and international credibility. The worst outcome would be to go to Moscow and not do anything vis-a-vis North Vietnam.

Nixon proved to be prescient, just as he proved that those who were concerned about losing the Summit Meeting were wrong. On this issue Kissinger has to speak for himself. I suspect that Kissinger understood the need for the President to appear to be vigorous in his response on this issue. I also know that Kissinger felt that we might lose the Summit Meeting in Moscow, and he and I agonized over this. Therefore, I think, Kissinger was truly ambivalent on how to deal with this matter. I think that, on balance, he didn't want us to go as far as we did militarily but I don't want to speak for him. Surely he credits Nixon in retrospect for his courageous prescience.

I myself was opposed to the escalation of the air war against North Vietnam, partly because of my moderately dovish stance on carrying the war to North Vietnam. I felt that, above all, we shouldn't lose all of the advantages which we had gained in terms of relations with the Russians - arms control, Berlin, etc. So I was unhappy with this escalation in the air war against North Vietnam. In this respect, I was probably wrong. I was certainly wrong in terms of my estimate of what the Russians would do.

Q: Was the argument made that, since we had made this breakthrough to China, the Russians, that is to say, the Soviets were concerned with our gaining an advantage with
the Chinese if the Soviets got huffy in their relations with the U.S.? Almost inadvertently, we were playing the China card.

LORD: A very good point. I'm sure that that's one of the arguments that Nixon made, that the Russians had a stake in this Summit Meeting as well and that they couldn't afford to be one-upped by the Chinese. Fortunately, we had already had our Summit Meeting with the Chinese. I don't know what China would have done in the same situation. They might have canceled the Summit Meeting. However, this happened after the Summit Meeting between the U.S. and China. Nixon felt that we wouldn't have any respect from the Russians if he went to Moscow looking like a wimp in the face of this North Vietnamese offensive, using Russian arms.

These were Nixon's arguments, including the China dimension, and they showed his really firm, geopolitical grasp of the situation. I still recall flying up to Camp David on a beautiful spring day [Presidential retreat in northern Maryland, near the Pennsylvania border] with Kissinger in a helicopter to work with one of President Nixon's speechwriters on the speech announcing the bombing of Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong harbor. I was very depressed. Both of us were saying: "All of this effort with the Russians is going to go down the drain." It was a dramatic moment.

So we were able to roll back the North Vietnamese offensive, and the Russians went ahead with the Summit Meeting in Moscow. However, we didn't make any progress in negotiations with the North Vietnamese over the next few months. We had several more meetings with them in 1972 in July, August, and mid-September. We then had one in late September where, for the first time, although we knew that we had been overly optimistic before, we felt that the North Vietnamese had indicated that maybe they might become more flexible. I distinctly remember that it wasn't a breakthrough, but clearly their tone was changing. Then we had the breakthrough in October. Let me explain why this happened.

The North Vietnamese had just been hanging in there with their intransigent, revolutionary position, as I've said. They weren't about to be flexible, anyway, but they had an added incentive to be intransigent in the summer of 1972. By then our presidential election was coming up. At some point during that summer Senator McGovern got the Democratic Party nomination and was offering a deal way beyond what the Nixon administration was prepared to offer. That is, he was offering support for a coalition government to be established in Saigon, as well as a unilateral U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam.

During the summer of 1972, even though Hanoi didn't know how the election would come out, the polls showed Nixon quite far ahead. The North Vietnamese probably did their own wishful thinking and felt that McGovern could still win. This meant first, that Hanoi should avoid giving Nixon any sign of progress in the negotiations with the U.S., which might help get him reelected. Secondly, in the hope that McGovern would win the North Vietnamese would get free concessions from McGovern in terms of what Hanoi wanted politically, as well as militarily. In short, they could just wait for McGovern to
pull the U.S. out of Vietnam and hand over the Saigon government to Hanoi. McGovern was essentially saying, I want the prisoners back and the North Vietnamese can have everything else. So there was no movement in the negotiations with the North Vietnamese during the summer of 1972.

By September 1972, the polls were very clear. Partly due to a spectacular record in foreign policy, Nixon was way ahead. Due to the combination of the fact that President Nixon had gone to China and Russia, plus his January 1972 speech on negotiations with North Vietnam, which had helped us shore up support for the Vietnam War, and other reasons, Nixon was in a strong position. McGovern was a very extreme liberal. This wasn't a centrist Democratic challenge to the President. It was a very liberal challenge to him. Even with all other factors balanced in, there was still a silent majority of people who supported the Vietnam War, plus many others who felt that we should try to end it but felt that McGovern was just totally capitulating to the North Vietnamese. Furthermore, McGovern was attacking American motives, plus everything else. He was preaching isolationism and American guilt, so for a variety of reasons, President Nixon was way ahead in the polls.

By September 1972, even the North Vietnamese, for all of their wishful thinking, began to realize that they were probably going to face Nixon for another four years. Then, by October 1972, this perspective became more concrete in our talks. In September the change in the North Vietnamese attitude had been a kind of mood music. In October 1972, the North Vietnamese presented a specific proposal to us. It was raised on October 8.

So we went over to Paris for this October meeting. By now the North Vietnamese calculation was as follows. First of all, Nixon was likely to be more flexible during the remaining weeks before the election in November. Even though Nixon had an apparent victory in hand, he would want to increase his mandate and make sure he won by looking as if he was negotiating a settlement in Vietnam. So the North Vietnamese figured that Nixon would be at his most conciliatory and would be prepared to make some further concessions on the home stretch in the elections campaign.

Q: By now these meetings were being announced publicly.

LORD: They were being announced afterwards, immediately after conclusion, but not in advance. Secondly, the North Vietnamese figured that if Nixon was going to win, he would no longer have to worry about being reelected. He had a new mandate for four years. The North Vietnamese had already concluded that he was a madman at times, e.g. by bombing Hanoi and mining the harbor at Haiphong [in May 1972]. God knows what he would do when he was free of worrying about public opinion and reelection. Of course, we tried to encourage the North Vietnamese to worry about Nixon being a madman. So the North Vietnamese probably felt that they had better lock this up now, since they weren't going to get McGovern. They were going to get a potential madman for another four years.
So this was the reason, and the only reason, why the North Vietnamese suddenly became more reasonable. They were not being defeated on the battlefield. The overall situation was still very much a stalemate. The Vietnamization program was proceeding. However, the North Vietnamese evidently felt that they could get a good deal, Nixon would be eager for a settlement, and they would avoid having to face Nixon as a mad man in his second term.

We went over to Paris for this meeting in October 1972, and were given a present by Lê Đức Tho. We still had a lot of work to do on it, but basically, it was the break that we were looking for. It incorporated the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces and the release of our prisoners, on the military side. The language of the proposal was fairly specific in this respect. The North Vietnamese proposal also included a cease-fire in place and international supervision of the agreement. The North Vietnamese had moved away from their insistence on a coalition government. There still was some tough negotiating, but they used some new language. They proposed a national reconciliation arrangement, but, in effect, they would leave President Thieu in power in Saigon. So the North Vietnamese dropped the political demands that they had stuck with for years. From my point of view, not to mention Nixon and Kissinger, these demands were something that we shouldn't compromise on.

We received this North Vietnamese proposal at the opening session. Kissinger called for a break in the meeting. I still remember walking with him on a Sunday afternoon in a garden, somewhere in the Paris suburbs. We said to each other: "This is it. We've done it." We knew that we had a lot of tough slogging ahead with the North Vietnamese. Then, of course, we had to get South Vietnamese agreement. However, essentially, the North Vietnamese had dropped their political demands and were willing to have a military settlement only, even though there was a lot of fudgy language about it.

This was a very exciting moment. We continued the negotiations for several more days. We reported home to President Nixon, of course. We didn't want to get Washington's hopes up unnecessarily. So we said that we had made some major progress, though we didn't claim that we were home free. We began to alert the South Vietnamese but again avoided overly exciting them. We said that we had made some progress and were going to continue the negotiations. We had to reply to the North Vietnamese with a counter-proposal the next day. Kissinger had me and John Negroponte take the North Vietnamese draft and then change it, within reason, to meet them part way and keep the negotiations going but also address our remaining concerns.

That night, and I believe that it was the night of October 8, 1972, Negroponte and I took the draft. We worked all night until 3:00 AM. Kissinger had gone out for dinner. He came back, looked at the draft, woke us up at 8:00 AM [on October 9] and said that our draft was too tough. He felt that we had put too many more demands back in and that we hadn't been flexible enough for Hanoi to accept. He gave us some instructions on how to loosen up the draft somewhat. Some of them affected the tone, and some affected the substance of the re-draft but of course Kissinger remained firm on the key points. This was a concrete settlement. It was not just a proposal. It contained the actual points of a
settlement. So we were instructed to make it a little more forthcoming, both in substance as well as tone. I don't recall all of the details. By noon on October 9 we had a re-draft, which Kissinger accepted.

We went back to the North Vietnamese. We had several days of further negotiations, until October 11, trying to improve the draft, generally keeping Washington and Saigon informed. The last day ran for 14 hours straight. As usual we were preparing verbatim transcripts. I couldn't even go to the bathroom when I wanted to, and I had plenty of coffee to keep me going. After Kissinger had made a presentation, I would have taken the notes and, perhaps, be a sentence or two behind him. Then I would catch up when the interpreters started reading the Vietnamese translation. I would have some time while the interpreters were putting Kissinger's statement into Vietnamese and then more time as the North Vietnamese would respond to the Kissinger statement in Vietnamese which I couldn't do anything about, anyway. I had some more time while the North Vietnamese were speaking before it was translated into English for us. So I had a double header of a break in that context. I would wait for a particularly long Kissinger statement, complete the verbatim notes on what he said, and then race out of the room, go to the bathroom, and get back in time, between the translation into Vietnamese and the translation into English of what the North Vietnamese said in reply.

We were really very tired, throughout this period. There were problems, for example, with getting the specific details of when we would get our POWs [Prisoners of War] back and details of proposals on Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam. The North Vietnamese would claim that they didn't have control over their friends [North Vietnamese allies in Laos and Cambodia]. It is possible that this posture, in fact, was true, particularly with regard to Cambodia, although less so in the case of Laos. We had to make sure that we got our prisoners back from Laos and Cambodia, and we were trying to get the communist side to withdraw its troops from there and to have a cease-fire extended there. So that was a problem. Another problem was allowing military aid to both sides to continue after a cease-fire. Then there were the details of the international supervisory system and what the status of the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] was. This was the actual dividing line between North and South Vietnam. There were still a lot of details to handle, and a lot of tough questions to be resolved, but the basic breakthrough had been achieved. The North Vietnamese no longer insisted on a coalition government. The language of the draft made it clear that President Thieu would remain in power, while suggesting that there could be a negotiation perhaps leading toward a government of national reconciliation. We tried to make that as vague and as meaningless as possible. In fact, the object was to keep the Saigon Government in power.

We basically put together a draft agreement. Meanwhile, during this period Hanoi was pressing Kissinger to come and visit North Vietnam, as a final, symbolic gesture to make peace and to show, I guess, that we were sort of paying tribute to Hanoi. Not to mention that this made Saigon somewhat nervous. So there was a further question as to whether, after going to Saigon and trying to get President Thieu's agreement to the draft, we would go to North Vietnam as well. Kissinger was willing to dangle this possibility to get the North Vietnamese to be more flexible about the agreement, on the assumption that it was
worth doing. There was some disagreement with Washington on whether we ought to go to Hanoi. In addition, we didn't want to be nitpicked by President Nixon and Al Haig [Deputy National Security Adviser] on the details of the agreement. However, we kept Washington generally posted on what we were doing. The same with the Saigon Government, which we also kept posted, to avoid, as I say, getting their paranoia into overdrive.

The final day of these negotiations was October 11, 1972. So there were four days of negotiations, but one of these days went for 14 hours straight. Kissinger prepared to go back and report to President Nixon. We had a draft agreement initially agreed, but with some outstanding issues of a secondary nature remaining to be resolved. There were also some technical questions of what specific phrases meant, and so on. So this was an exhausting period of several days, including all night sessions of redrafting, checking, sending cables, reporting, and filling in Saigon and Washington, as well as preparing talking points for the next day. We also had to prepare new proposals, in addition to verbatim note taking and so on.

I was left behind in Paris with FSO [Foreign Service Officer] Dave Engle, who by then had been involved in the negotiations as our top Vietnamese speaker in the Foreign Service. He and I were left behind to have technical talks with the North Vietnamese to clear up some of these sub-issues. So we sat down with the North Vietnamese at the next meeting. I don't remember the details except I was both exhilarated and exhausted. Kissinger took off for Washington, and a few hours later we met with the North Vietnamese. It was quite dramatic at my young age to be directly negotiating the document (albeit minor issues) which could end our longest war.

Dave Engle and I then had to negotiate with the North Vietnamese at our level on the agreement and settle some of the details on the language. We tried to push them in some respects on some of these issues and clarify the meaning on other issues. Engle would have to check out the Vietnamese language on some of the questions. That was a rather challenging experience for me, actually to be negotiating with the North Vietnamese myself. Again, this was pretty heady stuff for someone like me in his early 30s, negotiating the text to end the war in Vietnam. Even though the basic negotiation had been handled by Kissinger, and this was more technical, still I felt a sense that, though I was exhausted, I was doing something extremely historic and very important.

We worked for about 10 hours straight, with no sleep. I think that we did a pretty damned good job of getting movement on some of these questions and clarifying other things. So I went to sleep, ready to take off the next morning and come back with this annotated draft and with the changes made in agreement with the North Vietnamese. I got a phone call from Al Haig or somebody back in Washington, speaking on behalf of Kissinger. I don't remember the details, but I had to go back again to the North Vietnamese, having thought that I had finished, and make some more points with them. I think that we tried to get a couple of more changes. This was one last episode. I was truly exhausted by this time. Then I got on the plane, a commercial flight, of course, going back to Washington with Dave Engle.
I remember being very emotionally moved by this moment. I felt that we had reached a final settlement at the end of these long, anguished years that had consumed our society. I felt that I had played a crucial role in it and had acted on behalf of Kissinger and the President. I remember going into the plane’s bathroom and crying out of a sense of joy and exhaustion. It was a very emotional moment.

We arrived back in Washington. I went over to see Kissinger and reviewed the changes that we had negotiated with the North Vietnamese. He was quite satisfied with them. We made a report to President Nixon.

Then, of course, our next step was to go to Saigon and present this wonderful agreement we had negotiated. Dave Engel had been certified as qualified by the Foreign Service in the Vietnamese language. We had confidence in his ability to check out the translation into Vietnamese. I don't recall whether we had anybody else check it, because the text was so closely held, until we got to a more public stage. What we had was a text which had been negotiated by Kissinger, with some technical and secondary issues of judgment handled by myself with the North Vietnamese. However, there were still some loose ends. These were significant details. I am sure that these included Laos, Cambodia, the DMZ, and some other issues. We were still not entirely satisfied, but the basic issues had been solved and we thought that we now had a rough agreement, in draft, and ad referendum [subject to subsequent confirmation] by Hanoi's Politburo and our President. Of course, we made it clear to the North Vietnamese that we would have to sell this draft to our ally in South Vietnam.

Before we went to Saigon to review the agreement with President Thieu we sent a cable ahead to foreshadow to some extent that we had something. I forget the term we used, but we said that it represented a breakthrough, a possible agreement, or something like that. We clearly let Thieu know, through Ambassador Bunker, that we were coming to discuss this draft with him. So off we went to Saigon in mid-October 1972. I know that it was mid-October because we were there during my son's birthday celebration, which is October 19. I was always away from home for his birthday. It seemed that there was always something going on in Vietnam, China, or somewhere. I would write him a letter on his birthday (he was five in 1972).

On the way over to Saigon, of course, we continued to refine the draft talking points that we had prepared for the discussions with the South Vietnamese, the texts of the agreements, the rationale for each of the points, the defense against what we knew would be Thieu's likely objections, and so forth. Kissinger and I were relatively optimistic about this meeting with President Thieu, although we knew that he would huff and puff. We thought that he would accept the agreement, because we had eliminated the political elements, the call for his resignation, for a coalition government, etc. John Negroponte was very skeptical on Thieu’s reaction, more pessimistic. Among other factors was the fact that North Vietnamese troops would remain in South Vietnam.

Q: What were we getting from Ambassador Bunker? He was the man on the scene and
had been there since 1957.

LORD: I know that Ambassador Bunker felt that we had negotiated a good settlement. I don't recall his predicting President Thieu's response, one way or the other. Of course, Bunker himself didn't know enough about the agreement. He was smart enough to know that we were rounding off the edges, so Thieu wouldn't get too excited. Bunker didn't have enough to go on to predict Thieu's response. I'm sure that Ambassador Bunker sent a cable in advance, stating President Thieu's main concerns, based on what he knew about the agreement. That was his line. I don't believe that he predicted what President Thieu's response would be. I definitely recall in particular that John Negroponte was less happy about the agreement than Kissinger and I were. Indeed, Negroponte was very uneasy and unhappy. He wasn't a mindless hawk, he understood the pressures on the President, and he knew that this was a better deal than the New York Times and other papers were calling for. He knew that this was probably the best deal that we could get, based on the realities on the ground and the realities of Congressional and domestic support, which were still fading. For all these reasons, Kissinger and I were much happier with the agreement than John. Anything substantially better was unrealistic. We had long ago crossed the bridge of giving up on mutual withdrawals. So on the substance of the agreement, Kissinger and I were right, I believe, and John unrealistic about getting a better deal.

John felt that there were some real problems, particularly allowing North Vietnamese troops to stay in South Vietnam, although we had been following that approach since at least May 1971. Negroponte felt that Thieu would have a real problem with the agreement, primarily with the U.S. withdrawing its forces and the North Vietnamese remaining in South Vietnam.

We were more optimistic because until this moment the North Vietnamese had been pressing publicly and privately, and President Thieu knew this, for us to get rid of Thieu and for us to put in a coalition government. At one point they had even suggested our eliminating Thieu. At a minimum, Hanoi had insisted on a coalition government, even if it included Thieu or one of his deputies. This would sooner or later unravel the situation in Saigon.

Thieu felt that the continued presence of North Vietnamese in South Vietnam would be subversive and that the result would be that the North Vietnamese would take over the country. We felt that after several years of hanging tough, getting Hanoi to drop its political demands, and leaving President Thieu in power would satisfy him. In addition, the agreement had provisions for continuing economic and military assistance to South Vietnam, as well as getting our prisoners back, a cease-fire, and so on. The draft agreement provided for some international supervision, although that was always going to be tough. The agreement also made provision for getting South Vietnamese prisoners back. We knew that Thieu wouldn't like allowing North Vietnamese troops to stay in his country. However, we thought that the fact that he would stay in power and would continue to get support from us, that no further infiltration of North Vietnamese forces would be allowed, and that the DMZ was supposed to be monitored so that there would
be no more North Vietnamese troops coming into South Vietnam would satisfy him. Over time, the North Vietnamese presence would wither. Moreover we had invested a great deal in strengthening South Vietnam’s force, and we had made huge human, financial, and political sacrifices in his defense.

The agreement also provided for equipment replacement on a one for one basis. You couldn't build up, increase equipment supplies on either side. For example, if the North Vietnamese fired a round of artillery, they could bring in another round, to take a silly example. At the time, we felt that the situation was sufficiently policed that the North Vietnamese forces would suffer from attrition and that the South Vietnamese could handle this. I'll get back to this later on. So we believed that the fact that North Vietnamese troops would remain in South Vietnam would be outweighed by the fact that we had solved the political problems. Thieu could stay in power and would get a lot of American aid.

*Q:* The North Vietnamese troops would be out in the jungle, in the hinterland, while the South Vietnamese troops would be around the cities and would be under much better conditions.

**LORD:** That's correct. Absolutely. But it turned out that Negroponte was more prescient than we were in terms of Thieu's reaction to the draft agreement.

We arrived in Saigon. We went to President Thieu's office, and Kissinger made the presentation about why it was in the South Vietnamese interest to accept the agreement and that we would back them up. In case there were any violations, President Nixon would react strongly. Thieu could count on us to enforce the agreement. Kissinger said that this was the best deal that we could get, based on the level of American domestic support. We had done our duty by South Vietnam. We had hung tough in the negotiations and kept Thieu in power. He had gotten a lot of economic and military aid from us. We would rush extra aid into South Vietnam before the agreement was signed, so that he would be in the strongest position possible, before the provisions of the agreement entered into effect. This effort was called Project ENHANCE, or something like that. We said that we would resume bombing if the North Vietnamese attacked in violation of the agreement. We said that we would give South Vietnam full diplomatic support as well as military and economic aid. We said that we were working on the Chinese and the Russians to isolate Hanoi and try to get them to cut off aid to the North Vietnamese, if possible, and that this was clearly our intention.

There was also the whole aid dimension, where we had agreed with the North Vietnamese that we would help them with the reconstruction of their country. We wouldn't call this assistance reparations, as they wanted to call it. We would also give a lot of aid to our friends in Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. I think that it involved $2.5 billion for the South Vietnamese. So for all of these reasons, while we didn't think that it would be easy to persuade President Thieu to accept the agreement with the North Vietnamese, we thought that he would buy, despite grumbling. As I said, John Negroponte was suspicious about this.
When President Thieu first heard our presentation, he didn't react. He just listened. We had no reason to be pessimistic after the initial meeting. I don't recall the sequence, but there was some delay in setting up the next meeting, at which we would have Thieu's response. Whenever the next meeting did take place, we were blasted. Thieu was very upset with the agreement, almost across the board. Above all, because of the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops. He picked out all kinds of other language which he thought was weak, in terms of international supervision, supplies, the amount of aid, or whatever. He complained about virtually everything, but above all the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam.

Secondly, Thieu said, in effect, that we had misled him. He said that this agreement went way beyond what we had been reporting to him and what he thought was in store for him. Thirdly, in negotiating this agreement, we had been negotiating the fate of South Vietnam. Now, he said, you come to me, a couple of weeks before your elections, and expect me to accept this agreement, which will seal the fate of my country and my countrymen in a couple of days. He said that the agreement was wrong in terms of principle and also wrong in terms of perception, with the Americans ramming this agreement down my throat and not taking into account the fate of the South Vietnamese people.

So, overall, this was a very tough and discouraging session, to say the least. It wasn't a matter of saying that we should go back and fix this up or deal with this or that problem. He essentially rejected the overall agreement. It was not a total formal rejection of the agreement. He said: "We've got to have the following changes." But he required so many changes, and they were so important, that it was just impossible, to see a solution.

To say that we were depressed, would be a colossal understatement. I would compare the flap on Laos (the 'White Paper' I wrote in 1970) as an occasion when I was equally depressed. This was certainly another such occasion, though in this case I didn’t feel personally responsible. We ended three or four days of very difficult discussions in Saigon. We were reporting back to President Nixon, through Deputy Security Adviser Al Haig, using back channels, which involved double encrypting of the messages. We reported that Thieu was reacting negatively and what he wanted. President Nixon and Haig were already more skeptical of the agreement than we were. They appreciated the breakthrough that we had achieved but they were not quite as enthusiastic about it as Kissinger and his team were, not including Negroponte. Above all, Nixon did not want to have a big split with our ally. After all, it was their country.

Contrary to Hanoi's view, Nixon was determined not to look as if he were overly eager for a settlement just before the presidential election. He did not want to be accused before history or public opinion of selling out South Vietnam for the sake of being reelected, or making a deal which did not redeem the sacrifices which had been made over many years. He said that this would look political. Moreover, Nixon didn't need this to be reelected. The polls showed him so far ahead of McGovern that he didn't need a successful negotiation of the Vietnam war. So Nixon was determined not to have an
agreement on South Vietnam at any price. He thought that that kind of agreement would look opportunistic and would make him look weak to his hard-headed supporters, and others around the world. As I said, he didn't need the agreement for his reelection.

Nixon was considering that, once he was elected, having beaten McGovern, he would have a mandate, and Hanoi would really be nervous about what this madman Nixon might do. They might be more flexible after the 1972 presidential election. Sure, Nixon would have liked to have an agreement and, if South Vietnam had accepted it, he would have been delighted. However, he certainly didn't want an agreement involving a split with our South Vietnamese allies. He couldn't possibly accept a major split, both in principle, in terms of the agreement standing up, and in terms of public opinion at home concerning selling out our friends, or looking opportunistic before the election.

So we stayed in Saigon a couple of more days after the initial blowup to try to get President Thieu to be more flexible and to collect his requests. By then we realized that we would have to go back to Hanoi and try to accommodate what Thieu's priority concerns were. They appeared to be so extensive that it was pretty discouraging.

Meanwhile, we were sending cables back to Washington, reporting the results of our conversations with Thieu. It was maddening, because there was a time delay in sending the cables, especially using double encryption. What happened was that I would sit down with Kissinger. He would tell me what he wanted in a cable, reporting to Nixon through Al Haig. He would outline the action which he thought should be taken and the key issues involved. For example, should we go to Hanoi? All of these issues had to be resolved. So we sent this message back.

We would get responses back from Al Haig, on behalf of the President. By this time Haig was playing games with the President. He was acting for Kissinger at home and was more skeptical about the agreement, anyway. He knew the President was skeptical. This was an opportunity to gain influence with the President at Kissinger's expense. We didn't know how much in the responses reflected the President's views and how much was Haig. Haig’s cables were usually quite tough, criticizing us and being very unhappy about the way things were unfolding. There was always a time lag, so we would be responding to a previous cable. And in response to our cable, they would send another response. So we were one cable behind in each direction. There must have been four or five cables like this. What would happen is that we would draft a cable (Kissinger dictating the substance and tone) and send it to Haig in Washington for the President. We would then get to sleep, and one hour later the communications people would wake me up and say that a reply from Haig was coming in. It wouldn't be a response to the one that we had just sent to Haig. It would be a response to a message sent earlier.

It was maddening. We were very depressed anyway, because of Thieu's reaction. We were nervous as hell about this agreement blowing up. We had President Nixon and Al Haig beating up on us, and we had this communications glitch because of the time difference and the delays occasioned by communications and the double encryption process. We were always one message behind on these things.
Q: Something you mentioned struck me. What about this relationship with Al Haig? Did you have a feeling that Haig, in a way, was reflecting Nixon or was reflecting something else?

LORD: Well, we couldn't be sure. Certainly, Kissinger was particularly suspicious of Haig, and I tended to hold the view that Haig might even have been egging on President Nixon a little bit. I won't try to explain the President's perception. In a way, his was a principled view. He wasn't going to make a lousy deal before the election, both in terms of justice and in terms of self interest and perception. I think that he didn't want to sell out our friends in South Vietnam. Moreover, he always felt that Kissinger was more eager for a deal in South Vietnam than he, Nixon, was. Haig was certainly more hawkish than Kissinger was. Part of this emerging difference would have reflected the President's reaction, anyway. We were quite sure that Haig was saying, in effect: "Well, Henry Kissinger's done it again. Look at Thieu's reaction. He has a point. Why the hell should we do this? Why don't we get the North Vietnamese to do that? Do we really want this argument with our ally three weeks before the election?"

So we had the feeling that some of this rhetoric was either a case of Haig having egged on the President and eliciting instructions from him to this effect. Or Haig was interpreting the President's mood and embellishing it in a fairly tough way. These messages were pretty tough, considering that they came out of Washington. We never could sort that out. Haig, of course, was meticulous about saying that he was only relaying the President's views and that he was trying to represent Henry Kissinger to the President and defend him as best he could. Henry didn't think so, and it was a very tense situation.

We left Saigon with very extensive South Vietnamese demands for changes in the agreement. We had to do a holding action with Hanoi. By this time, of course, it was impossible to go to Hanoi. We could only go there if we could absolutely close the deal. So we had to postpone the trip to Hanoi, and Kissinger said, in effect, to the North Vietnamese: "Well, we told you in Paris that this deal is a good one and we still think that it is. However, we cannot implement this agreement without South Vietnamese acceptance. We will continue to work with our allies and will try to bring them around. However, we're going to have to make some changes. We just can't sell the agreement to the South Vietnamese in this way. We stand by the basic agreement. We think that it's a good agreement. Don't give up. We'll be in touch with you. I can't come to Hanoi now."

So we went back to Washington. I don't know how soon this happened, but within a day or two there was a press release out of Hanoi, lambasting the United States, President Nixon, and Kissinger. The statement said that the United States had agreed to a deal with Hanoi and now, under the pretense that it couldn't tell their lackeys in Saigon what to do, the U.S. was now reneging on the arrangements we had made. Hanoi said that we had broken a solemn agreement with Hanoi and also an agreement for Kissinger to visit Hanoi. They then proceeded to publish the entire agreement that we had reached with them. This would have been on about October 25, 1972, give or take a few days. We are
talking about perhaps 10 days before the election.

This led immediately to Kissinger's first press conference. He had given plenty of backgrounders and so forth. He dealt with the press skillfully and well. However, I don't recall that he had ever given an on the record press conference, standing there with TV cameras on him. I forget what day of the week it was but I recall going into the office and working with him on what he would say and how he would handle questions and what answers he would give. In short, how to handle the press conference.

This was Kissinger's famous peace is at hand press conference, as you may recall. Basically, he outlined the course of the negotiations. He tried to strike a calm tone with Hanoi. In effect, he was angry with Hanoi because they had leaked the agreement. He tried to keep Hanoi aboard without lowering the whole tone, even though they had blasted us and released the text of the agreement. Essentially, Kissinger confirmed that what Hanoi had released was, in fact, the agreement. However, he pointed out that we had told Hanoi that we could never agree to this deal unless the Saigon Government agreed to it. This was true, but we had been pretty confident that when we got to Saigon, we would obtain the agreement of the South Vietnamese Government. Of course, Hanoi was playing this in the opposite direction, saying that the South Vietnamese Government was just a bunch of U.S. lackeys anyhow and that the U.S. was using this as an excuse.

In this connection, we tried to be firm with Hanoi, on the one hand, by saying that they were absolutely wrong. We had told them that we didn't have a deal until the Saigon Government agreed with it. We also said that we stood by the essential deal, so we advised Hanoi not to jump off the reservation. With the Saigon Government, even though we were mad at them for rejecting what we thought was in our joint interest, we said that we had been very patient and invested a lot in their defense over the years. We tried not to be too tough on the Saigon Government. We said that we were still going to have a deal with the North Vietnamese, whether the Saigon authorities liked it or not. The basic deal remained. This was the best we could do, and it was in our mutual interest. However, we said that we would try to make some changes and make it more acceptable to the Saigon Government and we would not rush the process.

Certainly, shortly before an election in the U.S. we were not going to reach an agreement with the North Vietnamese behind the back of the Saigon Government. We couldn't do this anyway, and we would try to make the agreement more acceptable to it. However, the Saigon Government should not think that we're going to have a revolutionary change in the agreement. The basic structure is there now, including, implicitly, the presence of North Vietnamese troops in their country.

So Kissinger summed up his press statement by saying that it was a good deal. He showed some sympathy for South Vietnam, which was our ally, after all. We could never implement this arrangement without their agreement. He also said that Hanoi was acting in bad faith. We had made progress and we were standing by the basic agreement.

That was the tone he set, speaking to the two audiences in Vietnam, North and South, as
well as to the American audience. In the course of it he wanted to show, first, that we were in fact close to an agreement. This was not some cynical ploy by President Nixon to get votes and that there never had been much of an agreement, and it was all PR [public relations]. Secondly, Kissinger wanted to show Hanoi that we were still within range of a settlement. Thirdly, Kissinger also wanted to show Saigon that, whatever their objections - and we were temporarily, by reason of justice and politics, delaying the conclusion of these negotiations - we continued to stick by the essential agreement.

For all of these reasons Kissinger used the phrase: "Peace is at hand." What he meant by that is that we didn't have it yet, but this is real progress. To Hanoi, we stick by the essential agreement. We weren't going to bow out of the agreement, but we had to renegotiate some of it. To Saigon he said, in effect, that we appreciate your objections up to a point, but you're going to have to live with this deal. Peace is at hand, Saigon and Hanoi.

Generally, that is what Kissinger was trying to do. Now, of course, he was immediately criticized, at least in the following week, for exaggerating how close we were to a settlement, in order to ensure the President's reelection. This is exactly what President Nixon wouldn't want done and exactly what Kissinger was not trying to say. I can say that with all sincerity. President Nixon was going to win reelection anyway. Kissinger was trying not only to hold American domestic opinion but to hold Hanoi and Saigon on the reservation. That was Kissinger's purpose, but he was roundly criticized for exaggerating how close peace was, on the eve of the election.

In fact, the agreement was very close. The deal that we finally did sign a few months later was almost exactly the deal that we had then. So Kissinger was absolutely accurate and was not cynical in his portrayal of the agreement. He was trying to hold the situation together, reassuring Hanoi and warning Saigon.

So that obviously put us in a holding pattern until after the elections. We got in touch with the North Vietnamese and said that we wanted to resume the negotiations after the November, 1972, elections, in Paris. By now, of course, it was public knowledge when we were going, although the discussions themselves were secret. I don't recall whether Al Haig went out to Saigon, but we spent this time collecting South Vietnamese views again, trying to indicate what we would attempt to get and what we wouldn't attempt to get. Of course, we would try to get most of what the South Vietnamese wanted, but in terms of a lot of that, we would simply go through the motions. We had tried once to get some of these changes and would try harder once again. We wanted some of the changes the South Vietnamese wanted - they were, after all, desirable. And if Thieu wasn't fully satisfied, at least he would have enough of a fig leaf to show his people and say to himself that he had gotten some improvement in the agreement.

There were some aspects that we would like to have improved. However, we had gotten about as far as we could, and further than most thought possible.

We went over to Paris in November, 1972, after the elections. The Hanoi representatives
were very intransigent. After a couple of days of discussions, when we essentially treader water but didn't make any progress, the North Vietnamese representatives came in and basically tried to unravel the agreement. They began to make some new demands and to take back some of the concessions that they had already made. We said that we were going to blow the whistle and stop. We weren't getting anywhere. So we stopped.

We had another go-around with the North Vietnamese in Paris in December 1972, with the same lack of results. We were not getting anywhere. In fact, we raised the South Vietnamese points with the North Vietnamese, and there were a few technical points they ceded, but we were not getting anything significant, and Hanoi was making counter-demands.

During the November and December sessions we stayed at the U.S. embassy. I recall vividly having sensational, three star meals, but being very gloomy.

As we headed toward the Christmas holidays in 1972, we were at an impasse. We had tried to make clear that we wanted to go essentially with the October agreement but that we needed a few changes, both on the merits and to bring the Saigon Government aboard. But Hanoi was not having any of this.

To try to prod Hanoi into a more reasonable attitude, as well as for military purposes, President Nixon ordered the so-called "Christmas Bombing," the heavy bombing of North Vietnam in December, 1972. I think that the bombing actually continued during the Christmas holidays. I wasn't particularly in favor of this, although this is an example of my dovish instincts again. It seemed to me that in the past this kind of attack had not particularly worked, but I have to say that I didn't have any particular alternative to suggest. After all, North Vietnam was digging in. We had essentially a good agreement that South Vietnam wasn't buying.

So President Nixon ordered the bombing of North Vietnam for two reasons: first, to show Hanoi that we were not desperate and that if they didn't make some changes in the agreement, we would punish them. President Nixon had been reelected overwhelmingly in November 1972, and Hanoi had to worry about his sanity, now that he had a relatively free hand. Secondly, even as we undertook the bombing, we sent Hanoi a message that we still wanted to negotiate, but they hadn't given us any choice except return to military action.

President Nixon was also sending a message to the Saigon Government. He was determined, as Kissinger was, to stick to the original agreement, essentially, as well as to try to get some changes in it. So Nixon was saying in effect to Saigon: "If you buy this agreement, we'll stand behind you. I'm bombing the hell out of Hanoi right now. We can anticipate some disagreements once we conclude the agreement. I'm showing you that I'm willing to bomb Hanoi and North Vietnam. So if you sign this agreement, you can count on my enforcing it." So the bombing of North Vietnam was not only a signal to North Vietnam to be reasonable but also to South Vietnam to be similarly reasonable and to sign off on the agreement.
As always, I drafted, with Kissinger’s supervision and editing, the messages.

Whatever the extent of the bombing of North Vietnam, the objective, of course, was never to cause civilian casualties. In choosing targets, great care was taken to avoid civilian casualties and this was generally done. However, Hanoi, for propaganda reasons, greatly inflated what had been done, and the doves and other people in the United States talked about American atrocities. The fact is that, when we went to Hanoi in February, 1973, the bulk of the bomb craters we saw were in areas which were wholly or relatively unpopulated. I'm sure that there were some civilian casualties, but most of the casualties were military. On the whole, the bombing campaign was carried out as carefully as it could be done.

The fact is that within days of the beginning of the bombing, we received a conciliatory note from Hanoi, suggesting that we resume negotiations. So this worked out well, and it probably encouraged President Thieu of South Vietnam to think that we would be tough in the negotiations with the North Vietnamese, or at least in enforcing a settlement.

Whenever I encounter questions about this bombing of North Vietnam, I always point out that it worked. And that there were minimal civilian casualties. I was reluctant to bomb at the time, although I didn't have an alternative. Nor did anyone else. This was a question of means and ends, and Hanoi was not exactly playing by the Marquis of Queensberry rules.

So, in early January 1973, we resumed negotiations. Things moved quite quickly. The North Vietnamese stopped telling us that certain issues could not be discussed, and stopped introducing new demands, so we weren't going backwards. We reached a few of our objectives of some significance. We made no really major changes in the agreement. The agreement was marginally better in some areas. I believe these included arrangements in the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone around the 17th parallel of North latitude], resupply provisions, matters affecting Laos and Cambodia, and arrangements affecting South Vietnamese prisoners. They were issues of that kind.

We were also negotiating technical protocols. Ambassador Bill Sullivan of the State Department, who had also worked on the negotiation of the Geneva Accord [of 1964] with Governor Harriman, worked on technical arrangements affecting Laos and Cambodia, international supervision, and prisoners of war. These were technical details which we put together. George Aldrich from the Office of the Legal Adviser of the State Department was also involved in these negotiations. By now the State Department was more fully involved in the negotiations. We had a good team to deal with the final details, as well as technical matters.

We concluded the agreement in Paris with the North Vietnamese and initialed it on January 23, 1973. Toasts were exchanged, and there was a feeling of camaraderie all around. There had been too much pain and anguish, but clearly there was a feeling of relief on our part and that of the North Vietnamese.
We had to get the Saigon Government on board with the revised text, in these final days. We sent Al Haig [Deputy National Security Adviser to President Nixon] to Saigon. There were at least a couple of letters from President Nixon to Nguyen van Thieu [President of the Republic of Vietnam]. These letters were very tough and also very reassuring at the same time. I did the basic drafting, as usual, with Kissinger’s direction and Nixon’s approval. Basically, they said that we had done all that we could. We told President Thieu that we had gotten whatever we could and that we weren't going to get a better deal. The letters said that President Nixon felt that the revised agreement satisfied the national interests of the United States and of the Republic of Vietnam. The letters said that we would enforce the agreements and would bomb North Vietnam, if necessary, and that the United States would stick by South Vietnam. Furthermore, we would provide economic and military aid to South Vietnam. We pointed out the advantages of the agreement and our willingness to enforce it. President Nixon said, in effect, that we had given the Saigon Government all that we could give it in terms of years of blood and treasure and in terms of the deal. Now was the time for the Saigon Government to come aboard and support the agreement that had been negotiated.

In effect, the letters were a combination of reassurance, persuasion, and threat. These letters later became somewhat controversial, because Congress felt that President Nixon had promised in them to respond with further bombing to a renewal of North Vietnamese aggression, without consulting Congress. In effect, some members of Congress felt that Nixon had made some secret commitments.

Also, as part of the negotiation, we included the aid program, which was somewhat separate. We were very careful not to promise to make reparations payments to North Vietnam. However, we wanted to offer them some economic incentives. We would call them funds for the reconstruction of Indochina and provide large amounts of money for Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam as well. Here too some in Congress later felt that we had not consulted them sufficiently. But we had been careful to point out in the side agreement that Congress would have to approve any assistance, and that North Vietnam would have to honor the overall agreement.

Thus, with Saigon’s grudging acceptance, we initiated the agreement and returned to Paris for the final signature on January 27, 1973. Kissinger stayed in Washington, and Secretary of State Rogers went to sign the agreement in Paris with the other foreign ministers. I flew with him. There were last-minute negotiations about who would sit where for the signature ceremony. There were protocol arrangements to be resolved at the last minute.

Secretary of State Rogers signed the text of the agreement for the United States, at the official signature meeting. There were two rows of American officials sitting behind him. I had written most of the agreement, along with John Negroponte, a member of the NSC [National Security Council] staff, and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. I had spent three years in the negotiations. But thanks to State protocol, I was sitting the farthest back of the American officials, where you could find State Department people
who probably didn't even know where Vietnam was! So this probably reflected State resentment over the secret negotiations and turf battles. I was probably a GS-14 [civil service rank] at the time, so I guess that you could make that argument as well. However, I just felt that I deserved a higher position in the seating. That's human nature. I should have been seated farther toward the front. That's a minor point, but I was, of course, delighted to have been involved in negotiating this agreement and to be present at the ceremony. Indeed I was euphoric.

On top of the opening to China, the secret trip to China by Kissinger, and then the trip to China by President Nixon, the summit meeting in Moscow and the deals with Moscow on many fronts and, I believe, the beginning of some movement in negotiations on the Middle East, I really felt good about the situation in general for our foreign policy. 1972 had been a truly extraordinary year for America and the world - and the most hectic, dramatic, and successful of my entire career.

Perhaps I could explain now why we thought that the agreement on Vietnam would work. The next question is what we honestly thought ourselves of the agreement that we had negotiated. Clearly, when you are in the middle of negotiations and working out a deal, you're going to have a higher view of the agreement than an outsider would have, one who didn't have to slug it out. We were not naïve. We knew that the agreement on Vietnam was not a perfect agreement. Above all, we didn't trust Hanoi. However, we honestly felt a great sense of accomplishment and believed that the deal could work.

I say this particularly because Kissinger has been accused of cynically negotiating a decent interval between the signature of the agreement and its subsequent collapse. When the agreement on Vietnam collapsed a couple of years later, a lot of people on the Left and on the Right said that President Nixon and Kissinger knew that the agreement was going to collapse. These people said that they basically sought some time, perhaps a couple of years, a decent interval, which would make it look like the breakdown of the agreement was South Vietnam's fault and not that of the U.S. Some people, most of them on the political Right in the U.S., felt that the agreement on Vietnam was a phony setup. Those on the Left said that we could have ended the war earlier. If we were going to have a collapse, anyway, why not save lives and reach an agreement with North Vietnam in 1969 or 1970? Both sides were wrong. It was an honest deal. And we could not have achieved it any earlier.

I can tell you that Kissinger, President Nixon, and I felt that the agreement on Vietnam could work, and there was no thought of a decent interval. People like John Negroponte and Al Haig were more skeptical of it but were not violently against the agreement. No one was sure that it would last, but all thought that it might work especially if the U.S. were firm about compliance. So I want to make clear that there was no thinking about a decent interval going on here to work out a cynical deal which Kissinger and his associates didn't think would hold up.

Why were we satisfied with this deal which we knew was not perfect? First of all, there is the general principle that the United States had lost a large number of lives and an
incredible amount of money, as well as losing concentration on a large number of important issues around the world. We had torn apart our society, domestically, on behalf of an ally, South Vietnam. After a dozen years of this kind of investment, and you can calculate it from 1961, if you wish, we felt that we had really done our duty for a friend. At some point the South Vietnamese were going to have to stand up and defend themselves on their own. We had given them about 12 years of a very large, American investment in lives and material. Certainly, the Vietnamization process had been going on for several years. We had trained, supplied, and built up the South Vietnamese armed forces so that they could take on this burden of defending themselves. There was sharing of responsibility, and we carried this burden gladly, along the lines I just mentioned. Further, there was the Guam Statement and the Nixon Doctrine which stated that countries should be responsible for their own security.

The problem was that time was not on our side. We preferred to reach a deal before the presidential election of 1972, but not for - indeed, in spite of - political reasons. One reason that we might be able to reach a deal with Hanoi was that we knew that they were calculating that President Nixon, whom they considered a madman, would be able to do whatever he wanted to do after the election. We believed that they thought that they had better make a deal now. But we also suspected that this was not the case. We had a better sense of our domestic scene than Hanoi did. We knew that, even if Nixon were reelected, whatever the mood of the American people, who might be the silent majority, Congress was going to restrict us militarily. Far from having a madman to deal with, who could do whatever he wanted, Hanoi would have a Congress which could constrain Nixon by cutting off the bombing of North Vietnam or by cutting off whatever else he wanted to do. Instead of facing a President Nixon who could do whatever he wanted to do, Hanoi eventually came to realize that Nixon would not have such freedom of action. We understood time was running out on compromise, if not public support, of the war and we would have liked a deal before Hanoi fully grasped this.

We realized that the agreement on Vietnam which we had in sight was the best possible deal that we could get, given the situation on the ground, as well as at home. The deal with Hanoi was very popularly received in the United States. The hawks in the United States didn't like it, and the Saigon Government didn't like it. However, overall, as I've just said, this was a major achievement. Most of the critics in the United States had been saying that we not only had to get out of Vietnam unilaterally but that there had to be some kind of coalition government in place, or some approximation of it. The fact that in this agreement we were able to withdraw from South Vietnam without determining its political future or establishing a coalition government was considered a major achievement, which I think it was. Without a doubt the idea of a mutual withdrawal of forces was out of reach.

So we had gotten the best deal we thought we could get, including getting our prisoners-of-war back, confirmed aid for South Vietnam, and a cease-fire under international supervision. We didn't get as much for Laos and Cambodia as we would have liked to get. There were provisions for the resupply of South Vietnam. We were able to provide as much military aid to South Vietnam as we could before the agreement was signed.
Also, the process of Vietnamization had worked to a certain point. We weren't going to get a better deal, and it was on this basis that we decided to go ahead with the agreement in hand.

Finally, and more specifically, we thought that this deal would hold up. We thought that there might be low level, limited violations of the agreement or cease-fire violations by Hanoi, which might nibble around the edges of the arrangements made. However, through the Vietnamization program, the South Vietnamese were sufficiently equipped and trained, they had some good troops, and we felt that they could handle low level violations of the agreement. However, if North Vietnam escalated these violations to all-out or at least very serious, naked aggression, including openly sending troops and tanks across the DMZ, in a major attack, we felt that the American people and Congress, despite their being sick and tired of the war, would approve a substantial bombing offensive, though still short of sending American troops back into South Vietnam.

We could bomb the hell out of Hanoi, making clear that, in a major way, the North Vietnamese were violating the agreement. After all of the investment in American resources and lives, we thought that the American people would want to support enforcing an agreement which North Vietnam was blatantly violating, no matter how they felt about the war as a whole. There would be much lower casualties from an air war. This is not to denigrate these losses, but they would be much lower than would be likely to be incurred in a renewed ground war.

So on the military front the South Vietnamese, with our aid, would be able to handle modest infractions of this agreement. And in response to major violations of the agreement by North Vietnam, the American people and Congress would support action, including a bombing response, even though they were sick of the war.

Furthermore, there was the Russian and the Chinese aspect. With our dramatic opening to China, the major improvement in relations with Russia, both Russia and China had a stake in not seeing the situation in Vietnam unravel. We thought that the Chinese would accept even some bombing near their southern border with Vietnam. There would be some strain in the relations between North Vietnam and Russia and China. Therefore, we thought that Russia and China would help to police the agreement to end the Vietnam War. We would not expect that they would cut off aid to North Vietnam entirely, but we would expect that Russia and China would urge Hanoi to observe the agreement, pointing out that it was a good deal for the North Vietnamese. They could say that South Vietnam would fall into their laps at some point and that Hanoi should avoid giving the Americans a pretext to bomb North Vietnam even if they didn't ask Hanoi not to screw up Russian and Chinese relations with the United States. So we thought that the Russians and Chinese would help to support the implementation of the agreement.

Finally, a further reason why we thought that the agreement to end the Vietnam War would hold together was the economic aid which we indicated that we would consider providing to Hanoi. Not reparations, but aid in the reconstruction of North Vietnam. I think that we estimated this aid might amount to about $2.5 billion. This would be a fraction of what the Vietnam War had cost us and could help Hanoi to accelerate the
reconstruction of North Vietnam. They could call this help reparations if they chose to do so, but whatever they called it, they would get help in rebuilding and developing the North Vietnamese economy. We could provide such aid in an enlightened way, just as we did to Germany and Japan after World War II. Also, we could try to normalize relations between the U.S. and Hanoi. Kissinger agreed to go to Hanoi in February 1973, after the agreement was signed. This would help the discussions on aid to North Vietnam, as well as to assist in resolving the status of American personnel who had been declared to be Missing-in-Action.

We anticipated that in the Communist Politburo in Hanoi there would be a debate on what North Vietnam should do. One alternative would be to work to clearly undermine the agreement, at the risk of a resumption of American bombing of North Vietnam. A counter-consideration would be that there would be some significant, South Vietnamese resistance. Open violation of the agreement by the North Vietnamese would risk annoying their friends in Moscow and Beijing and losing a substantial amount of economic aid from the United States.

The other choice would be for North Vietnam to observe the agreement, not to wait for a decent interval to pass, but generally observing it. In this way the North Vietnamese would avoid some of the retaliation that might be involved in response to large scale violations of the agreement. Given their self confidence and their staying power, as well as the pervasive corruption in South Vietnam, they might expect to be able to take over South Vietnam after the passage of a number of years. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese could hope to get American economic help and normalize diplomatic relations with the United States. By limiting themselves to carrying out low level violations of the agreement, they could hope to undermine and weaken the Saigon Government politically without eliciting an American response. Over time they could hope to take over South Vietnam anyway, while still getting our help and economic assistance.

So we figured that a combination of threats and sticks, on the one hand, including bombing of North Vietnam, and carrots like economic aid and normalization, plus the influence of their allies in Moscow and Beijing and building up South Vietnam through the Vietnamization program, would influence Hanoi in the debate going on there. We thought that, on balance, they would choose to respect the agreement in their own self interest, biding their time, and postponing action to gain control of South Vietnam, if necessary waiting for many years to achieve this goal. Together with our aid to South Vietnam this would mean that the Saigon Government would have a fair chance to compete with the Hanoi Government and to prevail. If the South Vietnamese didn't succeed in this effort, in effect it would be the fault of the Saigon Government, through corruption and a lack of democracy, whatever you want to call it.

Well, that was our rationale. We knew that we were running some risks, but it was the best we could get. We thought that it was an honorable ending to what we had tried to do in Vietnam. We had rejected a major demand by Hanoi, which we thought would have been dishonorable in the sense of making a political capitulation. We got our prisoners-of-war back. South Vietnam was now in a position where it could determine its political
future. We laid this out extensively in press releases and backgrounders which provided a conceptual framework, all of which I worked on with Kissinger and Negroponte.

Within a few months after the signature of the Paris Accord in 1973, Hanoi began to nibble around the edges of the agreement. I left the NSC [National Security Council] staff in May, 1973. As I have done throughout my career, I wanted to take a break. I was exhausted, mentally and physically. I wanted to spend more time with my family and pursue other interests. I didn't know what I was going to do next, but I was personally and emotionally exhausted. By then, the situations regarding China, Russia, and Vietnam were all looking good. We had achieved major breakthroughs. The President had received an overwhelming mandate (this was before any real hint of Watergate). So this was a good time to leave government service. Coincidentally, shortly before I left, I found out that I had been wire tapped. We'll come back to that.

Shortly after I left, and even before I left government service, the North Vietnamese began to nibble around the edges of the cease-fire and began to resupply their forces in South Vietnam in ways which violated the agreement. The North Vietnamese continued to make trouble. While I was out of government service, Kissinger went over to Paris to negotiate with Le Duc Tho (North Vietnamese Politburo member) in an effort to get enforcement of the basic agreement back on track. This effort didn't work out.

Meanwhile, Congress was beginning to put limits on what we could do in Cambodia and stopped the bombing there and in Laos. Finally, a couple of years later Congress virtually put a stop to aid to South Vietnam, a truly dishonorable and reckless act. So, over a period of time, the Saigon Government was being undermined. Whatever its shortcomings - and there were serious ones - the psychological and military impact at limiting and then stopping our aid was devastating. And, of course, it encouraged Hanoi. In 1975 there was an all-out offensive which resulted in the Communists taking over South Vietnam completely. The remaining Americans were taken out of our Embassy by helicopter, and everybody knows about that.

What had happened involved several factors, including the four assumptions that I mentioned. In terms of low-level violations of the agreement, for a while the South Vietnamese were able to hold their own. But generally, the South Vietnamese Army turned out to be weaker than we thought they might be after the Vietnamization process. Toward the end, in 1975, when the South Vietnamese Army was defeated in a hurry, Congress had already, and unconscionably, virtually cut off military and economic aid to South Vietnam. Whatever you feel about the war, we had negotiated this agreement with North Vietnam and had gone through all of this torture and losses. Even though the South Vietnamese Government was not perfect, our cutting off economic and military aid to them, when North Vietnam was continuing to be resupplied by its allies and was breaking the agreement, was absolutely immoral, in my opinion. Whether continued aid on our part would have made all of that much difference is another issue, but has nothing to do with the principle. And imperfect as the Saigon government was, it certainly was preferable to the Hanoi Communists.
In any event the economic and military aid which had been promised to the South Vietnamese was not being delivered, which weakened them further. So our military plans to handle the North Vietnamese threat turned out to be based on a mistaken set of assumptions. This contributed to the South Vietnamese military collapse.

A second consideration was the major offensive by North Vietnam against South Vietnam, to which we had planned to respond by bombing. This plan was undercut by Congressional action in September 1973, prohibiting the further bombing of targets in Southeast Asia. There was also the growing problem of the Watergate Affair, which related to the manner of President Nixon's reelection in November, 1972. As a result, over time, the executive power of the U.S. administration was effectively broken and our ability to take strong action against North Vietnam was further weakened, on top of the general fatigue over the war. In its mood at the time Congress wouldn't even go along with the promise to provide aid to South Vietnam, let alone allowing bombing of North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese figured all of this out, and so the various means of discouraging North Vietnam from attacking South Vietnam were ineffective.

China and Russia may have tried to lean on North Vietnam somewhat, but, particularly in view of their rivalry with each other and competition for influence in Hanoi, they couldn't sustain such a program and make their weight felt under the circumstances.

In terms of U.S. economic aid referred to in the Paris Agreement, Hanoi never got it. We had told them two things. First, we told them that we had to get Congressional approval to provide economic aid to Hanoi. Secondly, North Vietnam would have to observe the Paris Agreement. There was some controversy as to whether we had made a commitment to provide aid to North Vietnam. We made it clear to Hanoi that we couldn't provide aid to North Vietnam without Congressional approval, and we had already told the Congress that. Many members of Congress didn't like the idea of providing any assistance to Hanoi. They also didn't like the fact that we had made promises to provide such aid secretly, even though we had hedged the promise by stating that we needed Congressional approval to provide it. That created further controversy, which was worsened by the fact that from the very beginning Hanoi began to violate the Paris Accord of 1973. These violations were fairly blatant, and then the North Vietnamese escalated the situation by blatantly breaking the cease-fire agreement.

Under these circumstances, we weren't about to give aid to North Vietnam, which we couldn't get out of Congress anyway. So that incentive for Hanoi was rapidly withering away.

All of the sticks and carrots, in short, were effectively removed, and the Paris Agreement collapsed.

Q: One quick question regarding the POWs [Prisoners-of-War]. This is still an emotional issue. Was there a feeling at the time that Hanoi might respond with the release of more POWs in return for our providing U.S. aid?
LORD: A fair question. Of course, I had to live with the POW issue for many years. We worked very hard on the POW issue throughout the negotiation of the Paris Accord on Vietnam, in the interests of justice and also to satisfy domestic public opinion in the United States. It was a matter of crucial importance to get all of our people back from captivity in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. We were very tough on this issue.

On paper the agreement on POWs reached with North Vietnam was very good. They accepted the obligation to return all American Prisoners of War within 60 days of the signature of the agreement [that is, by March 27, 1973]. They were to turn over the POWs in increments, phased with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. We would take some U.S. troops out of Vietnam and we would get some of the POWs back. By the time all American troops had been withdrawn from Vietnam the agreement provided that we would have all of our POWs back. That, in fact, happened, in terms of the list of POWs which the North Vietnamese gave us on January 27. Of those they admitted holding, we got all of them back within the sixty-day period.

However, there were two problems with this arrangement. First, we couldn't be sure how many POWs the North Vietnamese had. We had received reports that many of our people who had been shot down had been sighted in various places. We had rumors of how many had died in captivity and how many were said to be held in North Vietnam. Photographs of some of our MIAs were published in North Vietnamese media. The POW list which North Vietnam gave us was shorter than we had hoped to see. We couldn't prove that the North Vietnamese were cheating on us and we didn't quite see what incentive they would have to keep some of our POWs in captivity, even though we knew that they were brutal enough to do so. Moreover, they might be covering up the deaths of some Americans in captivity.

Secondly, we weren't crystal clear on what the situation was of POWs who had disappeared in Laos and Cambodia, that is, whether they were being held in those countries. The North Vietnamese kept claiming that they didn't have full control over Laos and Cambodia. We were able to be firmer in the agreement about the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from those countries than about the return of POWs. That was more vaguely treated in the cease-fire agreement. We got several POWs back from Laos, but the number there also was less than we had expected to receive. There weren't too many prisoners of war returned from Cambodia.

So we were not satisfied with the return of POWs from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. We were suspicious. However, in good faith we got a good deal on paper and we thought we got the great majority, if not all, of the POWs back. However, we were not entirely happy with North Vietnamese performance in this regard. The list of POWs which we received from North Vietnam was considered shorter than what we expected, but we could not prove that the North Vietnamese were cheating. So we determined to keep pressing on this issue as our highest priority, to make sure all returned and/or were accounted for.

One of the reasons that we went to Hanoi in February, 1973, and I went along with
Kissinger on this occasion, was to try to move ahead with the normalization of relations with North Vietnam. We thought that we might be able to influence the debate in the Politburo of the ruling Communist Party in North Vietnam to tilt them toward observation of the agreement. We also wanted very much to push forward on the issue of the POWs. If we couldn't arrange for the release of additional POWs, at least we hoped to get better information on those personnel who had been declared Missing-in-Action. We had reports from Pentagon sources on people that we thought were still alive and were still prisoners in North Vietnam, on whom we had not obtained full information. We provided the North Vietnamese with specific names of personnel reported to have been held in North Vietnam and we asked them to provide more information on them. We didn't make much progress during this trip to Hanoi in February 1973.

However, we felt tremendous relief when we received back some 800 POWs or so. We'll probably never know whether the North Vietnamese kept POWs alive and in prison in North Vietnam but didn't return them to the U.S. There was some feeling in some quarters that this happened, and some people, even today, believe that they have information on others who continue to be held in North Vietnam. I personally do not believe that many Americans really believe that. Some Americans may believe this to this day, but I think that we will never know. There have, at times, been sightings of Western-looking people in North Vietnam, but usually they turn out to be French or from some country other than the United States. In most cases these reports turned out to be defective in this regard. There was never any solid proof that the North Vietnamese continued to hold American POWs, despite considerable number of reports on Americans still held in North Vietnam. All these were checked out. The issue - and out efforts - continue to this day. It was a high priority for me as Assistant Secretary of State in the early 1990s as we moved ahead with Hanoi.

Right after the cease-fire agreement was signed, many thought Hanoi was holding back but reports to this effect tended to die off with the passage of time. We can't be sure, but the North Vietnamese may be embarrassed in terms of accounting for the way in which some POWs were lost, executed, or tortured to death in jails in North Vietnam before January, 1973, when they turned over to us a list of POWs they held. Perhaps they didn’t want to account for what had happened to POWs who died under such circumstances.

I have never been sure on this issue. The North Vietnamese were certainly brutal and deceitful enough to have held on to American POWs. However, the reason that I doubt this is that this would not have served the self-interest of the North Vietnamese. I've discussed this before. If they were holding Americans secretly, what purpose would be served? They would have had no negotiating leverage. And if they admitted it belatedly there would be howls of outrage. So I never have understood why it would have been to their interest to have held American POWs. I think that it was in their self-interest to turn over all of the POWs they held. Of course, once North Vietnam stated that it no longer held any American military personnel who had been under detention in North Vietnam, it could no longer admit that it had others who had not been returned. And I suspect that some died in jails before January 1973 that Hanoi did not wish to account for.
It is certainly true that there were a lot of people missing whose status we can't explain very well. Since the signature of the Vietnam Accord, we have received a lot of remains, perhaps proving that a lot of people we thought were alive were actually dead at the time of the signature of the Accord.

Q: Well, we'll stop at this point. We can put in the usual end to this section. Is there anything else that we should talk about?

LORD: There may be a few additional points, but I think that that pretty much resolves it.

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Q: This is April 7, 1999. Win, we now have you on the NSC staff. When were you there? What did you deal with? What was your role in dealing with the Soviet Union?

LORD: Right. Going back to the NSC days, I was there from 1969 to 1973. We've already covered two of the most central areas of my responsibility as Kissinger's Special Assistant on the NSC staff. One was China, and the other was Vietnam. We've also covered an area I spent a good deal of time on, namely, drafting annual, Presidential statements at the beginning of each calendar year, reviewing developments in our foreign policy. I've also mentioned preparing early drafts of speeches for President Nixon and getting Kissinger ready for background press interviews. As Special Assistant, I played a general, utility infielder role on ad hoc issues and projects.

The other, substantive issue that I was most involved in was relations with the Soviet Union. Here, however, I was definitely in a supporting role. Hal Sonnenfeldt and Bill Hyland were the key people working with Kissinger on this issue. I sat in on many of the meetings and went on all of Kissinger's trips to Moscow during the NSC years.

As part of my duties as a Special Assistant to Kissinger, I was supposed to be a global resource person for him. I was the one person working under Kissinger who had an overall view of all of the key issues that we were working on. This included Middle Eastern questions, as we went on further into the Nixon and then the Ford administration. Kissinger wanted someone who could see the entire picture, in addition to himself. I was paired with the experts in each case, whether this involved China, Vietnam, Russia, or the Middle East.

Detente, as it became known, was one of the key Nixon foreign policy priorities, as well as a priority for Kissinger, along with the opening to China, ending the Vietnam War, and movement on the Middle East. The relationship with Russia was obviously crucial because we were in the middle of the Cold War, and the global rivalry with the Soviet Union as a superpower was, for several Administrations, the clear priority. Its expansionism presented both a geopolitical problem and an ideological, value problem. This was a global struggle. However, President Nixon and Kissinger, on a hard-headed basis, wanted to improve relations with Moscow. They believed that the best way to do that was to have a policy that mixed incentives and pressures, or carrots and sticks, and there would be linkage between them. In this way we could try to move ahead across the board.

In the view of President Nixon, Russia was his best hope for bringing the Vietnam War to a close. He had said during the election campaign of 1968 that he had a secret plan for ending the war. However, he really didn't have one. What he had in mind was to work with the Russians and try to get them to pressure Hanoi to come to a reasonable settlement with the U.S., even as he would attempt to do the same thing with China.

In addition, with respect to the Russian factor, there was the Chinese dimension, which...
was crucial. Kissinger and Nixon considered an opening to China as an end in itself and a very important one. They also saw it as a way to influence Russian behavior and U.S.-Russian relations. This was intended to keep Russia off-balance by showing that we could deal with the rest of the Communist world, not only in terms of Eastern Europe, which he had already begun to do, but also with China. Kissinger and Nixon wanted to show that Moscow was not the only spokesman for what some people considered a monolithic, communist bloc. They wanted to give Moscow an incentive for improving relations with us because, as long as they were worried about China, they would not want the U.S. and China to gang up on them.

Therefore, this triangular diplomacy was a central feature of the Nixon foreign policy which Nixon and Kissinger crafted. There is no question that in discussions with the Chinese, particularly the private discussions, there was a lot of anti-Soviet flavor on both sides. This was clear from the remarks made by Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai on the Chinese side and Nixon and Kissinger on the U.S. side in talking about the Russian threat to China along its borders with Russia as well as globally. We never hid the fact that we also hoped to improve relations with the Russians on a hard-headed basis.

We didn't take such a decidedly anti-Chinese line in the discussions with the Russians. We made it clear that we wanted to improve relations with China. However, this also drew China's attentions because it knew that we had a lot more negotiations and actual business with the Russians and a generally more mature relationship than we had with China, which was just opening up.

In any event, the idea was to improve relations with both countries, and have better relations with each of them, than they would have with each other. Of course, there were growing tensions in relations between the Chinese and Russians, which most experts were sort of slow to pick up on but which were clear by the late 1960s. This gave us an opportunity. The clashes along the Russian-Chinese border during the summer of 1969 brought home to Nixon and Kissinger as never before that there was a real chance to open up here. I touched on this when I covered relations with China.

**Q: During these times were you called on to look at how the Chinese might feel about the situation as we sort of played with the Soviets? Were you the person who said: "Well, what do you think that the Chinese will feel about this?"**

**LORD:** I certainly got involved in that. Of course, John Holdridge and later Richard Solomon, both China experts, also had an input here. The Russian experts, such as Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Bill Hyland, would also look at this factor, as well as Kissinger and, to a certain extent, Al Haig, who became Kissinger's deputy as National Security Adviser. You're right that by having me included in the Vietnam, China, and Russian initiatives, Kissinger had someone who could help him and put on paper for President Nixon or for whatever other audience were relevant how these factors interrelated. For example, how the opening to China would have an impact on Russia, and we'll see in a minute how dramatic that impact was. Further, by continuing to do business with Russia, this would also give China an incentive to move ahead with us.
Furthermore, we thought that by our dealing with both giants in the Communist world we would have some psychological impact on Hanoi. This showed Hanoi that Moscow and Beijing cared more about their bilateral relations with the U.S. than they did about their relations with Hanoi. They wouldn't snub Hanoi, but psychologically this would help to isolate Hanoi, e.g. holding summits in Beijing and Moscow while we had some of our meetings with Hanoi in the winter and spring of 1972, in the middle of Hanoi's offensive in South Vietnam. Neither Moscow nor Beijing went so far as to cut off aid to North Vietnam or really lean on Hanoi. However, both Moscow and Beijing had a stake in our trying to get the Vietnam War behind us. We made clear to both Russia and China that we couldn't withdraw from Vietnam dishonorably and were prepared for a military settlement only. We made it clear that we wouldn't overthrow the Thieu government in South Vietnam and install a coalition government. The political future of South Vietnam had to be left to the Vietnamese people. We believed that both Russia and China talked to Hanoi and suggested to North Vietnam that, in its own self interest, they ought to settle for a military solution. The Russians and Chinese could tell Hanoi that South Vietnam would ultimately fall in their lap over time because South Vietnam was weak, and the U.S. would withdraw from Vietnam. We were fairly confident that Moscow and Beijing made this kind of argument to Hanoi, in their own self-interests of moving ahead with us.

So there was this interplay between the three factors, and this made it exciting and fascinating to be in on that. I was the only one, beside Kissinger, who was involved in all three of these relationships.

In the early going with the Russians in 1969-1970 the relationship between the U.S. and Russia didn't make much progress. Indeed, there were some crises. There was a challenge over a potential, Russian submarine base in Cuba [in Cienfuegos]. There was Russian backing for radicals in the Middle East. There were some tensions over Berlin. At the same time, there was the beginning of arms control talks and the emergence of a possibility of holding a summit meeting at some point between Russia and the U.S. This was a mixed bag, but the point is that during the period from 1969 to 1970 we really weren't moving ahead very effectively with the Russians, even though there were talks going on.

Of course, as with respect to most key foreign policy issues, the Russians' key interlocutor was Kissinger, and not the State Department. Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., Dobrynin, would meet regularly, usually in the Map Room of the White House to conduct private discussions and talks, as part of the conduct of foreign policy out of the Nixon-Kissinger White House, which we talked about before.

So, from the very beginning, there was an effort to try to improve relations with the Russians. We showed them that we would be tough when necessary, as we were in some of these crises that I've mentioned. Also, we were prepared to try to improve relations with Russia, if we could do so. We gave the Russians an incentive to improve relations but showed them that we could be firm if they pressed us on key areas.
I remember a speech at the UN General Assembly in 1970 which, in this case, was drafted primarily by Ray Price, one of President Nixon's speech writers. He was a political moderate and we knew that when we wanted a more visionary, a more centrist, moderate approach in a speech, whether it involved the Soviet Union or anything else, Ray Price would probably be the speech writer. I worked with him, Sonnenfeldt, Hyland, and others on this particular speech. If the speech involved a tough approach to the Vietnamese, for example, appealing to the silent majority, we could generally count on having Pat Buchanan assigned as the primary drafter. Then, somewhere in between these two approaches would be Bill Safire as the primary drafter of the speech. This was a very strong trio of speech writers, to say the least.

Q: You were in the speech writing business. What was your view of Pat Buchanan and Bill Safire at that time, bearing in mind that both of them later went on to further renown?

LORD: First of all, regarding speech writing, I think that we already discussed that. That is, we discussed how I would work with Kissinger on early, substantive drafts of speeches on, for example, Vietnam, particularly in the early 1970s. Then these three, very able speech writers would take these drafts and give them much more lift and drive.

In terms of writing, I had great respect for all three of them. I can't think of a more effective team of speech writers. There have been individual speech writers, like Ted Sorenson, who wrote for President Kennedy, and Peggy Noonan, who wrote for President Reagan, who were outstanding. I don't know of any President who has had three speech writers of the quality that President Nixon had.

Q: We're focusing on the Soviet Union now.

LORD: Yes, we'd better get back to that.

Q: Were you particularly concerned when Pat Buchanan was given an assignment?

LORD: I can't say that. First of all, in the drafting of speeches for Kissinger, there wasn't too much interaction between his NSC staff and other people in the White House, whether they were on the domestic side, people like Haldeman and Ehrlichman, or even the speech writers. I don't recall sitting down and working directly with one of the speech writers. I prepared drafts, with Kissinger’s guidance, which, when approved, turned over to one of them for polishing. I was mostly involved in the early drafts of speeches, containing the substantive thrust of the speech. I wasn't a great speech writer. I wasn't trying or able to give one of these drafts the kind of eloquence required. Kissinger would talk to the speech writers. As they would prepare drafts or re-drafts, we would see them and review them for substance.

Q: You were saying that Pat Buchanan went for the red meat.

LORD: Buchanan would go for the red meat, domestic support, and the silent majority.
He would probably help people like Vice President Spiro Agnew with their speeches as well. Bill Safire was more difficult to type, although he was clearly more conservative than Ray Price. So we gained some sense of the emphasis the President was going to give the speech by the speech writer who was assigned to draft the speech. However, there was nothing automatic about this. Since I was generally of a more moderate persuasion, I obviously would be more comfortable if I thought that Ray Price was writing the speech. I had personal respect for all three of the speech writers and their ability. No question about it.

Meanwhile, we were still trying to move ahead with the Soviets, going back and forth. As we moved toward 1971 and the channels of secret communication with the Chinese were beginning to warm up and we were beginning to head toward the Kissinger secret trip to China in July, 1971, we had one, significant break that I worked on, the statement on an interim, arms control agreement. I don't recall all of the details now, but it was drafted some time in 1970 or 1971. Sonnenfeldt and Hyland were of course central. This statement dealt with offensive and defensive arms. I received a note of thanks from President Nixon, one of several generous personal letters to me on my service. That was one significant step with the Russians. But there were other, continuing tensions, and we weren't making much progress. The Russians weren't interested, or certainly were not as interested as President Nixon was, in a possible summit meeting.

So that was the general situation as we went on Kissinger's secret trip to China in July 1971. In all of my career experience I never saw such an immediate impact of one event on relations with another country as the impact of the Kissinger trip on our relations with the Russians and the announcement that President Nixon would be going to China. As I said we were going back and forth with the Russians, at that time, and they were dragging their feet on the proposed summit meeting.

As we headed toward China on Kissinger's publicly announced trip to Vietnam, Thailand, India and Pakistan, we tried one more time with Al Haig sitting back in Washington to see whether the Russians would agree to a summit meeting, before we went to China. Of course, the Russians didn't know that we were going to China. We were originally prepared to have the first summit meeting with Moscow and the second summit meeting with Beijing.

So as we were traveling, as I mentioned already, I received a phone call on July 5 from Al Haig in the middle of the night, when we were in Bangkok. In this call Haig talked to me over an open line. He used code words for security purposes, but I knew what he was talking about. He made clear that he had seen Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin one more time to suggest a summit meeting. Once again, the Russians put it off with the vague comment that the time wasn't ripe for it. Little did the Russians know that we were about to go to China to arrange a summit meeting with the Chinese. The Russians would therefore be coming after the Chinese, which would be very annoying for them. If the Russians had known that, they would certainly have agreed to a summit meeting earlier.

Literally within weeks, if not days, after the July 15, 1971, announcement by President
Nixon at San Clemente of Kissinger's secret trip and that Nixon would be going to China early in 1972, relations with the Russians really began to move. We had clearly gotten their attention. For example, within a few weeks the Russians agreed to a summit meeting, which subsequently took place in May, 1972, a few months after the summit meeting with the Chinese. There was further movement on the Berlin negotiations which had been going on for some time but inconclusively. Kissinger was conducting these negotiations, working - through backchannels - closely through our Ambassador to Bonn, Kenneth Rush, and with the Russians. There was movement on the issue of arms control, which ultimately resulted in the SALT-I [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] Agreement, which was signed at the Moscow Summit Meeting of 1972. There was more systematic discussion of economic and trade links with Russia. So, right across the board, in the wake of the China announcement, we began to make progress with the Russians. This was the clearest example of the positive impact of triangular diplomacy.

Q: Win, what evaluation were we getting, probably more from Hal Sonnenfeldt and Bill Hyland, within the NSC [National Security Council] staff, regarding our impression that the Soviets were not interested in having a summit meeting with us at that time? Did they want to stay away from the Vietnam issue?

LORD: That's a very good question. I'm not sure I can answer that. Frankly, I can't reconstruct now the reasons for the Soviet attitude. It's a very good point. You would think that the Soviets would see that a summit meeting was in their interest, as this would give them status as an equal to the U.S. The Soviets always wanted to be treated as an equal with us. A Soviet-American summit meeting would solidify this. I am quite sure that we made clear that the prospective summit meeting would take place in Moscow, which was a further concession to them.

Q: President Nixon had not had a summit meeting with Brezhnev at that time.

LORD: No.

Q: So we're really talking about an administration which was still newly in office at that time. There had been no personal contact with Soviet leaders at that point.

LORD: That's correct. The first time that Kissinger met with Brezhnev, I was with Kissinger in the secret trip to Moscow in April 1972, to set up a summit meeting.

Q: There was a time when Kissinger went to Moscow and didn't tell the Ambassador.

LORD: Yes. I'm just trying to recall the circumstances.

Q: That kind of thing came up fairly frequently.

LORD: Yes. Jacob Beam was the Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time. I think that Brent Scowcroft was in Moscow at the same time. This secret trip took place April 24, 1972.
Q: You can fill that in later on.

LORD: Why don't I just put in the record that there was a call from Al Haig when we were in Bangkok at 3:00 AM on July 5, 1971. The secret trip to Moscow to prepare for the summit meeting began on April 20, 1972.

However, the basic point was that the Russians were dragging their feet about arranging for a summit meeting. But once they saw that President Nixon was going to go to Beijing, they moved quickly on inviting him to come to Moscow. There was probably debate within the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on how to deal with the Americans and how suspicious to be in the negotiations. We could be tough with them at the same time that we offered them incentives. We warned them off establishing a submarine base in Cuba, and in September 1970, we backed the Jordanians against Syrian pressures, backed by the Russians.

Q: This was on the occasion of the Black September uprising against the Jordanian Government.

LORD: That's right. In 1970 there were those two questions, as well as tension involving Berlin. At the same time we indicated that we would try to move ahead on arms control and prepare for a summit meeting. I'm sure that we were dangling some economic incentives for the Russians. So I'm unable to answer your question about the summit. They were clearly not that embarrassed about Vietnam. As we will see later, they welcomed President Nixon to Moscow right in the middle of Hanoi's offensive against us and our retaliation by bombing Hanoi and mining the harbor at Haiphong. Yet the Soviets went ahead with the discussions with the United States. By itself, North Vietnam could not have prevented the Soviet Union from having a summit meeting with us. There must have been debates in the Politburo on the advisability of negotiations with the U.S. and how much to trust us. However, to this day I'm not clear on this subject.

Q: It is a puzzling thing. When you reflect on this, you might recall that Nixon was newly installed in office as President. He was showing a certain interest in foreign affairs. You would think that, since this summit meeting was to take place in Moscow, the Russians would have been eager to show that they were a big player. I think that you're right. It was probably some political affair or might have been a problem within the Politburo.

LORD: I'm sure that one possibility was that we indicated that we didn't want a summit meeting just for show, unlike the summit with China where the meeting was the message - reopening relations after 23 years of mutual isolation and hostility. We wanted to have some substantive achievements come out of it. We thought that, central to that, there had to be something on arms control. It may well have been that the Soviet military leaders, who were rather conservative, didn't like some of the arms control limitations that were being kicked around. Maybe their hesitation about entering into an arms control agreement, which would logically be the central achievement of a summit meeting, slowed things down. It may be that they were holding out and trying to make President
Nixon make more concessions, thinking maybe that he was eager for a summit meeting. If they dragged their feet, they might get such concessions immediately near the summit meeting.

The Soviets may have hoped to extract additional concessions from the U.S. in order to get a summit meeting, whether they involved arms control or anything else. I think that is the most likely reason, based on tactical, rather than strategic considerations. I'm sure that the Soviets would have welcomed a summit meeting, particularly in Moscow. They probably figured that by dragging out the process, they would be able to get a more reasonable U.S. position on certain issues. They saw the negotiations leading to a summit meeting as a sort of bargaining chip. I think that is the most reasonable explanation, because the Russians were fairly crude in their negotiating tactics. They had the mentality of rug merchants.

The Chinese, although they were just as tough as the Russians, were more apt to put out their basic position at the beginning of negotiations and not haggle over it. They would say that this or that is what they had to have. They would ask: "What does the United States need?" The Russians would deliberately inflate their positions, knowing that we would chip away at their positions. They would expect us to inflate our positions in a similar way. The Vietnamese communists were totally intransigent all the way along. They were basically revolutionaries who didn't like to negotiate and just stonewalled us until conditions were such that they had to make a move, as they did in the negotiations with us in the fall of 1972. When the Israelis negotiate, they are something like Talmudic scholars, legal experts who look at every last semicolon. They are insecure because of their history and geography regarding any agreements made. The Arabs are more romantic in outlook, and you have to appeal to some of those elements in negotiating with them.

One of the fascinating experiences we had during this period was to observe the different negotiating styles of other countries. Even if Kissinger was not experienced in the history and culture of these countries, he was very skillful in figuring out pretty quickly, not only their national interests, but also their cultural, negotiating styles. He would then adjust his own tactics accordingly.

In any event, getting back to the Russians, in the course of the 1970s we made several trips to Moscow. I'll get back to some of them in greater detail. I think that I was on five or six of these trips, before, during, and after the first summit meeting, as we tried to move our relationship further along. There were two, generic experiences which were interesting in this connection.

First, except for the summit meeting itself, when we stayed at the Kremlin, we stayed in the Lenin Hills Guest House outside of Moscow. This was a VIP [Very Important Persons] Visitors' residence or dacha. It overlooked Moscow and was located near Moscow University. Of course, just as was the case in China, we assumed that our quarters there were bugged at all times and so we had to be very careful. Particularly with the Russians - we didn't do this so much with the Chinese - we used a machine called a
“babbler.” I'm not sure whether I've already mentioned this, but it was a recording machine in which you put in a tape. When it plays, it sounds like a dozen cocktail parties all going on at once. It's supposed to drown out bugging. If you talk softly, against the backdrop of this babbling, it does the job. It basically consists of a recording of the comments of a lot of different people all talking at the same time at different frequencies or levels. It's designed to shut out any listening devices. I'm sure that it was pretty crude and may have been ineffective, but it at least complicated Russian listening devices when we talked softly. The problem was that it could drive you absolutely crazy. After about 10 minutes of this noise, you were ready to tear your hair out.

There were a lot of jokes about this device. When we were in China, we usually found that it was easier to walk outside the guesthouse where we were staying and talk during walks outside, rather than when we were inside, where our conversations would have been bugged. I suspected, in the case of China, that the trees were probably bugged as well. The babbler was a source of great frustration but also mirth.

There were other aspects. In our dacha the attendants included some fairly attractive women. The Russians were very crude in this respect. It was clear that they weren't above using these women for blackmail purposes, if at all possible. I was never directly approached in this regard, but it was pretty clear that they were trying to tempt Kissinger and, of course, any of us if we were stupid enough, not to mention not being monogamous. I happen to be monogamous and not stupid. Any of us could have gotten into trouble, particularly Kissinger. There were sort of crude jokes made. Of course, he ignored all of this. However, this shows you some Russian crudity, which I don't think that you would find in China.

We also used to joke about how they would drive us nuts. There was a pool table in the dacha. I swear that the pockets you shoot the balls into were smaller than the balls. Actually, they weren't, but they were small enough so that it was particularly difficult to play pool at this table. The pockets seemed smaller than they should be. We figured that this might be psychological warfare.

One final note is that the Russians proved that you could really stagger around because, unlike the Chinese delicacies, the Russians would provide massive displays of food on the table in the guest house. These included caviar, very heavy bread, and all kinds of meat, fish and fowl. I'm sure that the caloric and cholesterol level in this food was extraordinarily high.

I might mention that the motorcades from our dacha to the Kremlin, for example, involved some of the most hair-raising travel that I've ever experienced. The chauffeurs would drive very fast, and each car would be about one foot behind the car ahead of it. If any car stopped suddenly, we would have an incredible, chain reaction car crash. It was always nerve-wracking to be in those motorcades. These are just some colorful aspects of a visit to Moscow.

Q: But the secret meeting...
LORD: We stayed at the dacha for both the secret and the public meetings, except for the Kremlin during the summit.

Q: The secret meeting was the one where the U.S. Ambassador was not informed about it until afterwards. Were you sort of under strict instructions to stay away from the Embassy?

LORD: It was part of this crazy system which is now hard to believe. It wasn't just the Ambassador who was not informed. I believe that Brent Scowcroft must have been a military assistant at the time. He wasn't working directly for Kissinger. He was visiting the Embassy in Moscow as well. I believe that the Ambassador found out or was told afterwards that we had been there in Moscow. As I recall it, I think that we went to Moscow at the last minute. Preparations for the visit were made at the last minute, as it were. As I said earlier, the summit meeting, for which this secret meeting was held to make arrangements for, was held in May 1972.

I think that we were due to go somewhere else. There was some kind of an official dinner party in Washington. We got the word that very evening at the dinner party that we were going to go to Moscow instead. It seems incredible. We traveled in Air Force Two [U.S. Air Force Special Missions Aircraft, a VC-137 Boeing, much like a Boeing 707. Air Force Two was usually reserved for the Vice President or the Secretary of State.] We left Washington so quickly that we gave a ride to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on our plane going to Moscow. It was truly a last minute decision.

I have some recollection that there was some place where we were supposed to go, perhaps China. We changed our itinerary. This shows you how reliable my memory of this period is. In any case, the Embassy in Moscow did not know about the Kissinger visit. The Embassy was engaged in logistical planning for the summit meeting, but we were in Moscow for last minute preparations on substantive issues. I don't recall any of the actual details.

What was fascinating was the lead up to the summit meeting itself. During the spring of 1972 Hanoi launched a major offensive in South Vietnam.

Q: This was the Easter Offensive of 1972.

LORD: Yes, the Easter Offensive. It involved the use of tanks and heavy weapons. It was clearly an escalation of the war. Therefore, President Nixon was faced with a difficult decision, as he was preparing to go to Moscow a few weeks later. It was his instinct to respond brutally and swiftly to Hanoi in terms of the offensive itself, which contained the danger of really threatening South Vietnam's viability. We also needed to try to get the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table, because when you were dealing with Hanoi, you had to deal with them firmly, as well as making offers to them. The problem for President Nixon was that, if he responded to this offensive in a brutal way, would this jeopardize the summit meeting in Moscow? The Russians might say that they could not welcome him in Moscow while we were attacking their so-called allies.
So there were debates within Kissinger's staff in which I took part, in the Situation Room and elsewhere in the White House as to what our reaction should be to the Hanoi offensive. We needed to keep in mind our Vietnam objectives but also our interest in arranging for a summit meeting in Moscow. On the one hand there was the fear that the Russians might cancel the summit meeting if we took vigorous action against the North Vietnamese. If this happened, we would lose an awful lot of work expended over a couple of years to improve relations with the Russians. We were on the verge of reaching the SALTC1 Agreement [First phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] and some economic agreements. The Berlin Agreement was also moving forward at that point. Also, of course, the summit trip itself was a dramatic double header, with the China summit trip just a couple of months before that, in terms of our diplomatic achievements generally, isolating Hanoi, and, not incidentally, affecting the prospects of Nixon's reelection in 1972. This would show that Nixon was a man of peace and that he had made major foreign policy moves. If the summit meeting with the Russians was canceled, not only would this summit meeting be down the drain, but the SALTC-1 and all of the other agreements that were being prepared for the summit meeting would be in jeopardy.

There was a general agonizing debate about whether a brutal response to Hanoi for its 1972 offensive was worth losing all of the fruits of work done with the Russians over a period of two or three years. This also included the opening to China, which could be affected if Beijing saw we had real trouble with Moscow.

On the other side of the ledger, and what was uppermost in the mind of President Nixon, was first that he could not let Hanoi get away with undertaking a major offensive in South Vietnam. This was clearly an escalation and a challenge, even as we were conducting secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese to end the war, after all. Also, there would be the embarrassment for President Nixon to go to Moscow while Hanoi was pummeling South Vietnam and American troops fighting there, killing Americans who were defending South Vietnam, as well as South Vietnamese troops. Moscow, of course, was still supplying North Vietnam with weapons and equipment for carrying on this offensive. President Nixon would be in Moscow, trying to negotiate agreements with the Russians while the Russians were backing a tough offensive in South Vietnam, killing American troops. So there was debate along these lines among President Nixon's advisers.

President Nixon decided for two reasons that he was going to bomb around Hanoi and mine the harbor at Haiphong. This would be a major escalation on our part. First there was the factor of the negotiations with Hanoi to end the war, which was a matter of face, incentives, and seeking to achieve a more peaceful settlement in South Vietnam, both to protect American troops and South Vietnam. A tough response would help stabilize the battlefield balance which in turn was key at the bargaining table. To look weak, on the other hand, would cause Hanoi to be even more intransigent.

Secondly, President Nixon decided that he wasn't about to go to Russia looking weak, both to his domestic, American audience, and to Hanoi and the world. He didn't want to
go to Hanoi's chief supplier of arms and equipment for carrying out this escalation, striking deals while we didn’t defend our troops and our allies.

Thirdly, and most interestingly, I believe that President Nixon was about the only American policy-maker who felt that he could get away with a tough stance, i.e. still preserve the Moscow summit. I could be wrong about this. He was confident that the Russians would not cancel the summit meeting with the U.S. So Nixon felt that he could have his cake and eat it, too. He could be tough and brutal against the Hanoi offensive and still go ahead and reap the benefits of the summit meeting. Nixon would appear to be tough, even as he made deals with the Russians, by showing that he wasn't a wimp on the Hanoi front. I believe that President Nixon felt that Brezhnev and other Russian leaders valued U.S. - Soviet relations and the summit meeting more than they did their ties with Hanoi. He thought that the Russians would stomach the bombing around Hanoi and the mining of the harbor at Haiphong, even while Nixon was in Moscow. Frankly, I thought that the summit meeting with the Russians might well be canceled. I was wrong in this respect, both in my predictions and my advice. Kissinger was more ambivalent in this respect. He thought that we had to be tough, but he was very concerned about losing the fruits of all of the hard work we had put in to improve relations with the Russians. He was more fearful that the summit meeting might be canceled if we responded in a tough and even brutal way to the North Vietnamese. I'll leave it to Kissinger to speak for himself as to how he came out on this issue. He has done so in his volume of memoirs on this period.

Some of Nixon’s advisers felt that we should be tough, even if we lost the summit meeting with the Russians. Some may have felt that we should be tough and that we might not lose the summit meeting in any case. Basically, this was a decision made by President Nixon, showing his visionary and courageous outlook. He felt that we should be tough for the reasons I have mentioned. He said that, furthermore, we wouldn't lose the summit meeting in Moscow anyway. Most disagreed with him. He proved to be right. We bombed Hanoi and we mined the harbor at Haiphong, which constituted a major escalation. Nevertheless, we went ahead with a very successful summit meeting in Moscow.

Q: This shows that it wouldn't have happened if there hadn't been the opening to China.

LORD: I think that's absolutely right. I think that if the China factor hadn't been there, in the first place we might not have had a summit meeting in Moscow. Or, the Russians might have canceled the meeting. But it was more difficult for them to cancel Nixon’s trip to Russia now he had been to China.

Q: In the long run the Soviet Union would have been isolated, rather than the United States.

LORD: But when we went ahead with the meeting in China...

Q: We would have had the meeting with China, and the Soviets would have been left out.
LORD: I think that's absolutely right. I think that the China factor was crucial, not only in terms of the major impetus it gave to our relationship with Russia but also in being able to go ahead with the summit meeting in Moscow and our continued work on other issues. Keep in mind that the Shanghai Communique with the Chinese in February, 1972, specifically had a phrase in it about both China and the United States opposing hegemony in Asia or elsewhere. Now who was going to practice hegemony in the world? Who could that possibly have been but Moscow? So it was pretty clear that we were getting Moscow's attention. We walked right up to the edge of being provocative to do that. We also had to demonstrate to our public and to the Chinese public why we and the Chinese were getting together. You will remember that the Shanghai Communique had all these differences between us listed in it, both on specific issues as well as on ideology.

Q: With Kissinger keeping Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin abreast of this, we were just not going to lose in this connection. The Soviets were supplying the North Vietnamese. We could say to the Russians to knock this off and we would knock off what we were doing.

LORD: Absolutely. The constant factor for a couple of years with the Russians was, first of all, what we said wouldn't be all that explicit. It would depend on how you would phrase it. We would make our points primarily in Washington in discussions with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin but also when we went to Moscow and would see Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as Soviet President Brezhnev. The basic themes we would follow would be that we were trying honorably to end the Vietnam War, but we were not going to do it dishonorably. We would suggest to the Soviets to advise the North Vietnamese to settle for a military settlement only and that we would not attempt to decide the future of the South Vietnamese, which they would decide for themselves. We would say, furthermore, that it was in the interest of the Russians to get this war behind us so that we wouldn't have this major problem in our bilateral relationship. Certainly, Soviet interest with us in arms control, stability in Europe, and economic cooperation with the U.S. were of much greater importance than sticking with these fanatic friends of the Soviet Union, who were just complicating the situation.

We would make clear to the Soviets that we would not expect them to sell out their friends, the North Vietnamese. However, we expected the Russians, in their own self interest, to pressure the North Vietnamese to be reasonable. We would say that, on this particular occasion, when Hanoi launched its Easter Offensive of 1972, this was outrageous. The Russians knew that we were negotiating with the North Vietnamese in an effort to reach a reasonable settlement. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had undertaken this major offensive. We would also say that furthermore, President Nixon cannot go to Moscow while the Soviet Union is supplying the North Vietnamese with weapons, with which they are killing U.S. troops, without responding vigorously.

Obviously, the line which Kissinger took, at this point, was to tell the Soviets that we were escalating the pressure on the North Vietnamese. He pointed out that it was Russia's friends that had caused this problem, not us. Kissinger said: "You can understand that no President can go to Moscow and not make a tough response to what the North
Vietnamese are doing."

Frankly, I believe that the Russians understood all of this. Above all, they understood that their bilateral relations with the U.S. were more important than their relations with Hanoi. And there was the continuing China factor.

*Q:* This line also helped to emphasize something which had happened again and again. That is, how the great powers become almost slaves to their satellite countries.

**LORD:** At least the Soviets understood that it greatly complicated their lives.

*Q:* And Soviet control over the North Vietnamese was not that great. In the same sense our control over the South Vietnamese was also not that great.

**LORD:** That's correct. We can see this today in the sense that China finds North Korea a pain in the neck. China is not about to sell them out, but it does complicate life for the Chinese. North Korea fires missiles in Asia, and this upsets Japan and gets Japan and Taiwan interested in anti-missile defense.

Let me talk a little bit about the Moscow summit meeting itself. It really was a rather dramatic meeting. As I said, we stayed for several days in the Kremlin, and several agreements were reached. One of these was the initial SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement. Kissinger was putting the last pieces of this agreement together, even as the negotiating team led by Ambassador Gerald Smith was in Geneva, trying to put other pieces together which related to it. There was always some lingering controversy whether, under the pressure of the summit meeting, Nixon and Kissinger made some last minute concessions to get a deal which Ambassador Gerald Smith and others felt were unnecessary. I'll leave that to the historians. The eventual, SALT-1 agreement which was negotiated was good for us and the Russians in terms of putting a cap on the nuclear arms race. It was the first major pact of its kind.

Subsequent negotiations by President Reagan and his successors were called START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks]. That idea was to begin to reduce, not just limit, the number of nuclear weapons. What we were trying to do during this period was to stop the further escalation of nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive.

I remember Kissinger explaining the agreement in the middle of the summit meeting, on his 49th birthday in a Moscow night club, which was quite interesting. There were also economic agreements for more trade which would take place between our two countries, as well as a variety of other things, such as a space cooperation agreement and an accord on principles of international behavior. Altogether, these made it a very substantive summit meeting, as well as a very dramatic one.

However, the single, most interesting episode for me, personally, had to do with Vietnam. The Russians clearly felt that they had to show that they were not ignoring the Vietnam issue. The Russians had to show Hanoi that they hadn't completely sold them out. So
there was one meeting where, it was agreed, we would talk about Vietnam with the Russians. It was going to be held in Brezhnev's country dacha [country residence] about a 45 minute to one hour's drive away from the Kremlin. The plan was to have a small meeting on this subject. It was clear that the Russians wanted to talk tough and then send a transcript of the discussions with us back to Hanoi to show that they had stood by their friends.

One of the more hair-raising experiences of my life, which was humorous in retrospect but which left me close to panic at the time, had to do with missing a Presidential motorcade. We were in the Kremlin for a signature of a scientific and space agreement between Brezhnev and President Nixon. It was one of a series of agreements which were to be signed with the Russians. The plan was, after the signing ceremony and reception, that President Nixon would go to his quarters in the Kremlin and freshen up for half an hour or so before going out to Brezhnev's dacha for the meeting on Vietnam, which was to take place in the late afternoon and evening. Right after the signature of the agreement, while people were still clinking glasses of champagne and so forth, John Negroponte, who was the Vietnam expert on the National Security Council staff at the time, having replaced Dick Smyser, and I, went back to our offices in the Kremlin to gather up the briefing books for this meeting between President Nixon and Brezhnev. To our horror we found out that Nixon and Brezhnev, right after the signing ceremony, had agreed that they didn't need to freshen up and decided to go right out to Brezhnev's dacha.

So they went right to the motorcade, and Kissinger himself had to scramble to join the President. They entered the motorcade and left the Kremlin without John Negroponte and me. There were only four Americans scheduled to be present at the meeting: Nixon, Kissinger, Negroponte, and me. You could argue that our missing the motorcade wasn't our fault, and it certainly wasn't. That's irrelevant. You don't miss a Presidential motorcade. We had visions of Nixon and Kissinger being absolutely infuriated that their staff wasn't with them. We had all of the briefing books. We assumed that Nixon and Kissinger were planning to be looking at the briefing books in the motorcade on the way out to the meeting at Brezhnev's dacha, so that they would be prepared.

Of course, Kissinger, whom I admired in many respects, is known to have a considerable temper. We had visions of losing our jobs due to a disaster at the meeting, or holding up the meeting while they waited for us. We went out to the street, desperately trying to catch up with the Nixon motorcade. Well, of course, the KGB [Soviet secret police] was not about to allow us to get into any car and head out to Brezhnev's dacha. So they totally stonewalled us, they wouldn't let us get into a car, and they wouldn't let us go anywhere. We finally turned to Bill Hyland, who spoke Russian and interceded with the KGB people. They finally said: "Wait until Brezhnev and Nixon get to the dacha. We'll be in touch with them out there and we'll see whether you people can go out." That wasn't the point. We wanted to catch up with them. We were just frantic for about 45 minutes.

Finally, we received permission to go out to the Brezhnev dacha, and we went out in the usual speedy hair-raising drive, figuring that our careers were just about over. To our great relief, when we got there, we found that Brezhnev had taken Nixon out on a boat. That was on purpose, to give Nixon a little fun before the meeting; the delay wasn't
intended to fill in the time while they waited for us. We got to the dacha while Brezhnev and Nixon were still in the boat out on the lake, so we got there in time for the meeting, although Nixon and Kissinger still didn't have the briefing books. Well, even the briefing books were largely irrelevant, because Nixon and Kissinger knew that this was not going to be a negotiating session where you need your talking points and positions to refer to. They were just going to listen to some tough lectures from the Russian leaders. So to our great surprise and relief, Nixon and Kissinger took in stride the fact that we hadn't gone out to the dacha with them and were very relaxed about it. So our nightmare was over.

We then went into the meeting, which lasted for three hours, at least. On our side, as I said, were Nixon, Kissinger, Negroponte, and myself. On the Soviet side were secretary-general Brezhnev, prime minister Kosygin, president Podgorny, who was the third-ranking among the Russians, and Alexandrov, the Soviet national security adviser, plus the Soviet interpreter, Viktor Sukodorov. I may not be pronouncing the interpreter's name correctly. It was a very small meeting.

It was ostensibly the most brutal meeting I've ever been at. Brezhnev spoke first, followed by Kosygin and then Podgorny. Each one took about an hour and just ranted and raved about Vietnam, the American bombing of Hanoi, and the mining of the harbor of Haiphong. Somewhat to my surprise, President Nixon hardly said anything. He just sat there and took it. What Nixon and Kissinger realized, even more than we did, although we understood this was going to happen, was that these statements by the Soviet leaders were essentially for the record. The Russians, having welcomed Nixon to Moscow in the middle of our bombing of Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong, had to show that they were tough. They had to have a transcript that they could show to their North Vietnamese friends, and this was all for show.

President Nixon showed admirable self-restraint because the Soviet rhetoric was really rather insulting. It was hot and heavy on this. This went on for about three hours, as I say, and President Nixon barely responded. The meeting ended. Then we went upstairs in the dacha, and immediately the mood changed completely. It was 100 percent different. Brezhnev couldn't have been more jovial. They got out the vodka and the caviar. It was essentially as if the meeting on Vietnam had never taken place. The atmosphere was totally different, which underlined the fact that it was all for show. It was the strangest change of mood that I've ever seen. We ate, drank, and had a wonderful time. Then it turned out that we were due for some further SALT negotiations that evening. Altogether, it was quite a day!

Q: Was Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko present at the meeting?

LORD: Gromyko was not at this meeting. As I said, Brezhnev was cracking jokes, as was Soviet National Security Adviser Alexandrov. We went on for a couple of hours. They were challenging us to drink more and more vodka, and everybody was joking. It was essentially as if the meeting on Vietnam had never taken place. The atmosphere was totally different, which underlined the fact that it was all for show. It was the strangest change of mood that I've ever seen. We ate, drank, and had a wonderful time. Then it turned out that we were due for some further SALT negotiations that evening. Altogether, it was quite a day!

Of course, the Russian people at this meeting didn't have to do the negotiating. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was not at the meeting. He was going to do the negotiating on
SALT, along with their arms control people and their military representatives, all of whom were sitting back in Moscow. Kissinger wasn't much of a drinker. I suspect that the Soviets were not only having a happy time - they wouldn't mind loosening up everyone on the U.S. side to get some final concessions on arms control. We left this strange mood change and returned to the Kremlin and had a late night session on the SALT negotiations. That was a rather extraordinary experience.

Overall, the summit meeting with the Russians was very successful. It was a double header on top of the summit meeting with the Chinese which had preceded it. The summit meeting with the Russians was important for our international position and President Nixon's prestige in general, and the summit meeting with the Russians helped Nixon to solidify his subsequent and overwhelming victory against Senator McGovern [Democratic candidate for President in the 1972 elections]. That was going to happen as well. During the campaign we also made a breakthrough on the Vietnam peace agreement. The election campaign of 1972 was one of those few such campaigns in which foreign policy really was important. I forget how Nixon stood domestically at this time, though most historians today say he was surprisingly progressive on many issues.

Senator McGovern was so extreme that many people thought that even though he opposed the Vietnam war, they didn't want to go quite as far as McGovern went. He was saying: "Come home, America," an isolationist position which was too extreme for the U.S. voters to accept. Just as Senator Goldwater was slaughtered by President Johnson in the elections of 1964 because he was seen as extreme, Senator McGovern was similarly and overwhelmingly defeated because he was seen as extreme. Furthermore, President Nixon's foreign policy achievements were considered quite extraordinary by then.

In all fairness I am convinced that President Nixon engaged in these summit meetings for reasons of the national interest and our international position, not to ensure his reelection. He was not unaware of the fact that the meetings would help him to be reelected. But he saw these meetings as being in the America’s interest and also saw them as part of his personal place in history.

Q: On this subject, what was our view of Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Gromyko in our contacts with the Soviets? I note that they did not attend these talks. Did we have a feeling that this was a good cop, bad cop routine?

LORD: I can go into some profiles but, before I forget, there was one other incident I want to mention. I'll move back in time temporarily.

After the decision was made to bomb Hanoi and mine the harbor at Haiphong, there had to be a speech explaining it. I recall, on a beautiful spring day, flying with Kissinger on a helicopter up to Camp David, MD, to meet with President Nixon and his speech writer to go over the speech. I remember being very depressed at the time, as was Kissinger. Whatever the virtues of the tough response to Hanoi, we felt that we were going to lose the summit meeting with the Soviets. So we were joking, in the sense of gallows humor, about all the work we had put in with the Russians going down the drain. Kissinger made
some comment to the effect that we could always save the rhetoric we had drafted for
future speeches. I said: "Yes, we can talk about the collapsed structure of peace" as a
result of this episode.

So I remember going up to Camp David on this occasion and working with President
Nixon and his speech writer on that speech, explaining our tough response to Hanoi. I felt
very concerned about what was going to happen.

Q: Did you catch any mood of the President's speech writers, to the effect that: "By God,
we're socking it to them?"

LORD: In this case it was not one of the top three speech writers. I believe that it was a
man named Andrews, who was primarily working on this speech for some reason I've
forgotten, although maybe one of the other speech writers took it over after that. No, I
don't recall any details about this case. Andrews just carried out the instructions of the
President in drafting the speech. I saw Nixon briefly at Camp David. He clearly was in a
resolute mood. He felt that we had to do this. I can't recall specifically, during the brief
encounter that Kissinger and I had with Nixon, whether the President said that we were
not going to lose the summit meeting with the Russians anyway. But that was his view.

That was a memorable experience on a beautiful spring day, going from Washington to
Camp David, flying up on this helicopter and having this terrible feeling that we were
going to lose so many things as a result of the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

Now, returning to the summit meeting with the Russians and the personalities. Brezhnev,
who sat in at the meeting with Nixon and Kissinger, was, of course, completely different
from the Chinese leaders. He was very mercurial in his moods. He could be very tough
and also could be very friendly. He could literally give you a bear hug type of approach.
He reminded me of a sort of tough, labor leader. He was sort of earthy and didn't have the
kind of elegance that Zhou En-lai had, of course. He was much more easy to understand
than Mao Zedong who spoke elliptically and allusively.

Brezhnev had a tendency to go on at great length in his statements, which used to drive
the interpreters wild, because he would speak very fast and go on for a long time without
pausing. It would be very tough for the interpreters to keep up with him. It was also
terrible for note taking because when the translation was made, it might last for 20
minutes or half an hour. With Vietnamese, Chinese, or Russian, you're much better off if
the conversation involves going back and forth between participants in brief paragraphs.
That is easier to keep up with. However, having to jot down notes for 20 or 30 minutes of
a monologue by Brezhnev was something else. Brezhnev could be quite friendly and then
menacing, as his moods changed. He was not above cracking some jokes. He would
sometimes get up from his chair and walk around as he spoke.

I remember a famous exchange with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, in which he admired
Sonnenfeldt's watch, which was very expensive. It was probably a Rolex. Brezhnev had a
cheap watch. In effect, Brezhnev offered to trade wristwatches with Sonnenfeldt. Of
course, Sonnenfeldt couldn't say no to the President of the Soviet Union. So Sonnenfeldt got in exchange some kind of cheap, Timex type watch in exchange for a Rolex.

Also, Brezhnev was trying to cut down on his smoking. He had a little device, kind of like an alarm clock. He couldn't get at his cigarettes except every half hour or hour. A little bell would go off, and he was then able to get out his cigarettes. But he was always cheating and getting his cigarettes out early.

So Brezhnev was a rough, tough guy in many ways, although he had a certain warmth about him. It was clear that he was ruthless, as were the Chinese leaders. However, he was very human and was not an elegant mandarin, like Zhou En-lai and not like a Delphic emperor, as Mao Zedong was. He was more human in many ways.

Q: Did you feel that Brezhnev was in command of the situation?

LORD: Yes. I thought that he was in command, but you could never tell in Russia, as in China, how much debate there was in the Politburo about going ahead. We assumed that there were people, particularly on the military side, who were more conservative and suspicious. So Brezhnev showed some courage in moving ahead with détente. This didn't mean that he wasn't tough or ruthless, but it clearly wasn't entirely easy for him to welcome President Nixon in the middle of our bombing Hanoi and mining the harbor at Haiphong. Brezhnev had his own military people suspicious of the arms control agreement he was negotiating with us. He was dominant but not totally in charge like Mao.

In 1972 and 1973, when I was on the U.S. delegation meetings with him, Brezhnev was still strong and in pretty good form. As time went on, I didn't go to all of the summit meetings, particularly as we entered the period of the Ford administration. For example, I was not at the summit meeting at Vladivostok in 1975. Over time Brezhnev became physically weaker and mentally more sluggish. As I saw Yeltsin's decline mentally and physically, it reminded me of Brezhnev, hanging onto someone's arm, and also staying on longer than he should have.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was extremely impressive. Of all of the foreign ministers I saw in action, he was one of the top three or four. Yaqub Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who was Ambassador during part of the time I was in government, was extremely impressive. Chao Quan-hua, the Vice Foreign Minister of China, who ended up siding with the Gang of Four, was also quite impressive. We met some very capable foreign ministers in the Middle East. Later in my career (in the 1990s) Qian Qichen of China and Gareth Evans of Australia were outstanding. Gromyko was very impressive indeed. He lived and served a long time and had tremendous experience and great self confidence. He didn't have to refer to his notes very often. He was on top of the issues, both strategically and tactically. Unlike his general reputation, he had a good sense of humor. Kissinger always tried to leaven his negotiations with Gromyko by telling jokes. For example, I recall that when Kissinger would have a document in front of him, he would joke with Gromyko and say: "I really would like to have another copy
of this document. I'll hold it up to your camera, which is in your chandelier," or something like that. They exchanged a lot of jokes like that. Or: “which of these flower pots should I speak into?” Gromyko also had an amazing facility in English. I'm sure that it was limited, but he could speak some phrases very well. He was capable, in English, of using quadruple negatives in a sentence. Not just a double negative. He would deliberately use a quadruple negative just to have fun with it. You always think of Gromyko as being very dour and serious. That was his public persona, and, of course, he could be that way in a negotiation. However, he had a remarkable sense of humor at times. He and Kissinger had a lot of light moments.

Another Lord joke occurred when Peter Rodman and I were in a Kremlin men’s room. He said the setting reminded him of Ivan the Terrible. I said it reminded me of Peter the Great.

Q: Did you get any feeling about the relationship between Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin?

LORD: We didn't see any differences between them. I wouldn't say that there was any sign of one being a hard liner or any differences between, say, Ambassador Dobrynin's approach to our relationship and that of Gromyko or Brezhnev. It wasn't a good cop, bad cop situation. It didn't appear that one of them was prepared to be more flexible than another.

If you had to make a choice, of course, Ambassador Dobrynin was always searching for ways to move ahead, but he could be very tough and very effective in delivering a message, including the tough ones which he was instructed to deliver by the Kremlin. There was no clear division between them, however, nor would any Russian envoy show daylight and keep his job. However, there were times, I am sure, when Kissinger would meet with Ambassador Dobrynin, and they would agree to explore on a personal basis possible contingencies or ways to resolve a problem, even stretching their authority. I'm sure that Dobrynin took some chances, and he probably didn't report all of this to Moscow. Kissinger said some things that he wouldn't want to have appear in the transcript of his meetings with Dobrynin. They met frequently, usually without anybody in the State Department knowing about it. They were genuinely working to try to improve the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, Dobrynin would reflect the Kremlin position, and there was no clear division between him and the Soviet leaders. Dobrynin of course was one of the most skillful and important (and lengthy) ambassadors of all time. His talks with Kissinger over the years were historic.

Nor could one really see any division between Gromyko and Brezhnev. Gromyko could be very tough and very specific in his negotiating tactics. He would haggle, as the Russians always did. However, there was no obvious difference between Gromyko and Brezhnev. One wouldn't really expect that on the communist side.

Speaking of diplomatic tactics, there were some very interesting moments. For example,
on the Middle East, Kissinger's strategy was to keep the Russians out of any negotiations. He sought to show to the Arabs, as well as the Israelis, that the United States was the indispensable nation that could deal with both sides. We didn't want the Russians involved because this could dilute our influence. Also, if the Russians were involved in a negotiation, they would be sort of pro-Arab and turn out to be the advocates for their Arab friends. This would sort of drive us into being advocates for Israel. Of course, we had friendship with Israel and ties with it. We were going to help defend their interests. However, if we were the only interlocutor, as we were in the Middle East for years, we could be somewhat more even handed and could show more genuine credentials to the Arab, as well as to the Israeli side. If the Russians took part in these negotiations, it would have been more like four party discussion. We would be with the Israelis on the one side, and the Russians would be with the Arabs on the other. That would mean that we would have less influence in the Arab world, where we had obvious interests, geopolitical as well as in terms of energy and oil. We wanted to enhance our influence in the Middle East with the Arabs, as well as to protect Israel.

So we were constantly involved in meetings with the Russians, fending off their getting involved in the Middle East. Kissinger would give the Russians superficial briefings regarding his diplomacy in the Middle East. The Russians would make proposals about the Russians and the U.S. getting together to work on the Middle East, with the Russians intervening. Kissinger always tried to put off inclusion of the Russians in discussing agenda items and make sure that we would talk about other things. Then he would engage in tap dances of meaningless rhetoric, giving the Russians superficial briefings just to keep them out of ongoing discussions on the Middle East. It was a real high wire act that he was putting on.

One amusing footnote to this was the role of Peter Rodman. He was one of Kissinger's staff aides, took notes during Kissinger's meetings, and also wrote speeches and prepared correspondence for him. On one occasion we were sitting in a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Gromyko wanted some document from us on the Middle East. Kissinger wanted to stall things, as always, on the Middle East. This document was something that we actually had with us. Peter Rodman had it. Kissinger wanted to pretend that we didn't have it, so that he could gain another whole day and put the matter off for the next day. So Kissinger turned to Rodman and said: "Have we got such-and-such a document?" Rodman made the horrible mistake of saying enthusiastically: "Yes, we do. Here it is," and he thereupon handed it over. Kissinger was really annoyed. Rodman was supposed to stall, knowing our general stalling strategy, and say: "No, we don't have it."

I recall that a day or two later Kissinger turned to me for some document, which wasn't on the Middle East. I decided to have some fun with this. Kissinger said: "Lord, have you got this document?" I said: "I don't know, Henry, what's the right answer?" So we had our amusing moments.

I can't say much about the other Russians. Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Dobrynin are the only ones that I had much contact with. Ambassador Dobrynin in particular has to be
regarded as one of the stars in diplomacy. Certainly, he was the single most impressive Ambassador that I dealt with in this period, when I was in the White House and then at the State Department. He deserves great credit for moving the U.S. - Russian relationship along. He stayed within his instructions, but to the extent that he could devise ways to move ahead around the edges, without getting himself in trouble in Moscow, he would do that. He survived as Soviet Ambassador to the United States for an awfully long time and deserves credit for doing so. Of course, he's written his own memoirs.

Q: Did you feel that the Soviet desk in the Bureau of European Affairs was well plugged into what was happening, or was all of this going on around them?

LORD: During the NSC period (1969-73), it was pretty much like relations with China and Vietnam. Relations with the Soviet Union were run out of the White House. Now, this doesn't mean that we didn't draw on expertise from the State Department for background purposes. I can't recall, during the summit meetings with the Russians, who would sit in from the State Department, or whether this was handled only by members of the NSC staff, like relations with China. It seems to me that the exclusion of the State Department wasn't quite as complete as was the case with China, where we only had people from the NSC, led by Kissinger, dealing with Zhou En-lai and Mao. In negotiations with the Chinese, Secretary of State Rogers was limited to handling bilateral economic and cultural issues with the Chinese foreign minister. The negotiations with Zhou En-lai and his subordinates on the Shanghai Communiqué and other issues were strictly handled by the NSC, including me. I don't think that the manner of handling Soviet-American issues in Moscow was quite so closed off from the State Department, but I can't be sure. But surely the principal day-to-day conduct of bilateral relations and the preparation for the summit were strictly Kissinger-Dobrynin/Gromyko affairs.

Q: Did you see a difference between Kissinger's behavior at the Soviet summit meeting and the way he dealt with the China summit meetings?

LORD: Well, as I've said already, we had different negotiating styles with the Russians and with the Chinese. You have to remember that in dealing with the Russians we had real, substantive, concrete business to handle, including arms control, trade agreements, the supply of grain, Berlin negotiations, and scientific and space agreements. There were also questions involving our contacts with the Soviet Union around the world. We talked to the Soviet Union about the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and other places.

With the Chinese we were beginning with a sort of tableau rasa [clean slate]. We were just starting out on a brand new relationship after 25 years of mutual isolation and enmity. The Chinese didn't threaten us as much as the Soviets did, nor were they adventurists. They didn't have that kind of power. Our conversations were mostly rhetorical and conceptual with the Chinese. At this point, in the early 1970s, there weren't a lot of agreements or specific negotiations. Our discussions mostly involved strategic matters of trying to figure out how China and the U.S. could deal with the Russians. We would also talk about Vietnam, the Middle East, Korea, and other issues. However, we weren't negotiating real agreements.
We had a different kind of agenda with the two countries. With the Chinese, Kissinger was much more philosophical, conceptual, strategic, and reflective, which he was brilliant at, as was Zhou En-lai. In their discussions with Kissinger and American officials, aside from President Nixon, Gromyko and the other Russians, along with Ambassador Dobrynin and President Brezhnev, tended to be much more concrete and specific and were interested in genuine negotiations on specific issues, as well as discussing positions more broadly.

Finally, I would say, and it was true then and it's true to this day, without being pejorative, Kissinger liked dealing with the Chinese better than he liked dealing with the Russians. Some people would argue that Kissinger and President Nixon, as well as other, subsequent Republican and Democratic Secretaries of State, National Security Advisers, and Presidents, have been somewhat seduced by the Chinese, that they haven't been tough enough with them. I'll leave that for the historians, but the fact is that Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai were extremely impressive, more impressive than the Russians. They were more exciting and pleasing to talk to. Secondly, in Kissinger's view Russia was seen as much more of a threat to us than the Chinese. Thirdly, the cultural and negotiating styles of the Russians and the Chinese were different. In effect, the Chinese would say: "Now, what do you need? Here's what we need. Here are some basic principles, and how do we get there?" They would not change their bottom line very frequently or haggle like rug merchants. The Russians were much more traditional. Initially, they inflated their positions, asking for more than they really needed, expecting us to do the same. Then we would bargain toward the middle position. This was a much more exhausting and tiresome exercise.

Fourth, rightly or wrongly, Kissinger felt that the Chinese were more trustworthy than the Russians, that the Chinese would uphold agreements, while the Russians would push the envelope, try to haggle around the edges, and not live up to the spirit and, perhaps, even the letter of the agreement. For example, in terms of translations, we negotiated the Shanghai Communique in English. We really - and this was irresponsible - did not go over the Chinese version of the communique closely until the summit meeting was already over and we had returned to Washington. When we looked at the Chinese language version of the Shanghai Communique, our experts concluded that, not only were the Chinese faithful to the English language version of the communique, but there were a couple of places where they could have chosen one, two, or three options in terms of what Chinese word to use and they regularly chose the word that was more favorable to us than to them. Kissinger thought that the Chinese had the vision to see that, as he said, rather than picking up loose change and trying to get some tiny, little tactical advantage by a translation change or not fully living up to something, they were more interested in gaining our sense of trust and credibility in implementing the agreements, a longer-term payoff. He felt that in this way they sought to earn a more flexible and understanding U.S. approach by taking the high road. By contrast there were times when the Russians actually screwed up the translation and then tried to work the resulting situation to their advantage. Or they would haggle and press around the edges.
So when you put all of these four or five factors together which I have mentioned, as a result Kissinger felt more friendly toward the Chinese than he did toward the Russians. This didn't mean that he didn't want to improve relations with Russia. However, he basically felt that the Chinese were easier to deal with and more trustworthy than the Russians, not that the Chinese weren't tough and acting in their own self interest.

That situation has continued to this day. In my view, Kissinger continues to give the Chinese the benefit of the doubt and to be suspicious of the Russians. He has always felt that the Russians will come back some day with their expansionist activities, as they did under the Czars and under the Communists. Therefore, he believes that we have to be careful about a resurgent, Russian nationalism. Similarly, Kissinger has always tended to be suspicious, to some degree, of Japanese militarism, and even of the Indians, to a certain extent, whereas the Chinese get more of a free pass from Kissinger. In answer to your question, these tendencies were seen even back then.

There are two other reasons which come to mind, I think, why Kissinger felt a greater affinity with the Chinese than with the Russians. It is a little ironic, since Kissinger himself is a European and, to a certain extent, a Russian expert, much more than an Asian specialist. He didn't really know anything about the Chinese until we opened up relations with them.

First, of course, the Chinese are much more subtle than the Russians. You can see this symbolically in their food. There is a subtlety and variety in Chinese food, compared to the heavy, somewhat repetitive, Russian food.

You can also see this in their style of protocol. The Chinese are masters at making you feel at home when you're their guest, inducing a sense of obligation in you by treating you well. They are very clever in how they conduct themselves. For example, in terms of sightseeing, we always used to marvel that when we went sightseeing in China to a series of exhibits or museums or trips to various places in the course of a day, we would often linger at various places and take longer than we figured the Chinese had planned for. Yet we would get through the entire tour on time, without feeling rushed. The secret was that on a sightseeing tour the Chinese would divide the planned schedule into, let us say, 15-minute segments. They never rushed the visitor. If the visitor was taking longer than they planned on at, let us say, some exhibit in a museum, they would just cut out the next 15 minute segment and go on to the following portion of the program. We wouldn't know that something had been cut out of the program. They would let us go at our own pace, yet we always got back to our guest quarters right on time and without feeling rushed, feeling that we had seen everything that we were supposed to see. By contrast, the Russians would tend to hurry you along in any tour.

The second reason, and it's related to this, why Kissinger felt more affinity to the Chinese than to the Russians, was the matter of self-confidence. The Chinese knew that they had been the number one power in the world for 4,000 or 5,000 years. They were the Middle Kingdom. Everyone else was either a barbarian or far distant from them. If they were located closer to the Chinese, they were tributary peoples, and China was dominant. China was Number One in the world technologically and in many other ways, up until
about the 17th century. Then the Chinese began to lag and they had a bad century or two when they were exploited by the British, invaded by the Japanese, and humiliated by other, outside powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. As a result there is a curious mixture of self-confidence and arrogance because the Chinese have this awareness of having been the Middle Kingdom for so long. At the same time, they are also thin skinned and xenophobic because of the rape of Nanking in 1937 by the Japanese or the Opium War of the 19th century by the British, and so forth.

On balance the Chinese, when they look at their history and culture, are very much aware that they were the Number One power for the great bulk of their history. They figure that they will be Number One in the next century or the one after that. As a result, the Chinese have a certain self-confidence, which means that they can act in a more relaxed and less haggling, nervous, and paranoid way, whereas the Russians have a much greater mix in their history in terms of how they've done. The Russians see themselves as threatened historically and perhaps in the future on the East by the Chinese and the Japanese, and on the West by Europe and the U.S. They have less self confidence in the way they deal with us. This is reflected in everything from haggling over details of a program as to how they handle their translations. I would add these factors to why Kissinger was drawn more to the Chinese than to the Russians.

Q: Did you find that Bill Hyland and Helmut Sonnenfeldt almost had to gang up on Kissinger to get him to pay more attention to these cultural aspects of dealing with the Soviet Union? How did they deal with Kissinger regarding the Soviet Union?

LORD: No, I didn't see any problem there. There might be some disagreements on specific tactics, such as what to do on arms control, Berlin, or something like that. However, Kissinger gave extremely high priority to our relationship with Russia. Because we had more specific business with the Russians by far than we did with the Chinese, he spent more hours working on Russia than with China. No question about that. Russia, after all, presented the major challenge to American foreign policy for the past 30, 40, or 50 years. Kissinger treated it as such.

So, when I was on the NSC staff during the period 1969-1973, I noticed that he spent more time on Russia than on any other, single issue. He obviously spent a great deal of time on China, as well, in addition to the Middle East, to a certain extent. However, Russia was the overwhelming problem together with Vietnam. It was never difficult to draw his attention to Russia. This didn't mean that Nixon, Kissinger, and their key advisers would always agree. However, I think that there was a general agreement among us on the basic approach to be adopted toward the Soviet Union.

In his latest book of memoirs, and I've already dipped into it, Kissinger goes over this argument by the neo-conservatives that he was too soft on the Russians. Today it seems a little ironic that some people may think that Kissinger was too soft on the Communists. The concept of détente ran into some trouble because it was attacked on the Left and on the Right. I'll get back to that later. To answer your question more directly, no, it was never difficult to draw Kissinger's attention to Russia. The question of Russia always drew the attention of Kissinger and his key advisers.
I was involved in these matters myself but I want to make clear that I was always much more in a supporting role, preparing briefing papers and so on. I was there mostly to give a global perspective, to compare what we were doing with China and Vietnam, as well as to help out on the note-taking. I also did some drafting of documents.

Let me spend just a couple of minutes on the evolution of our policies toward the Soviet Union. As I said, we had this mixed bag of issues in 1969 and 1970. We were not really moving ahead. Then there was a dramatic acceleration of relations with the Soviet Union in the wake of the announcement in July, 1971, that Kissinger had visited China. Having opened relations with China we were able to move ahead with the Russians.

When Nixon was reelected in 1972, we seemed poised to be in excellent shape in foreign policy, for the following reasons. First, we had a President who had won a crushing victory in the elections of 1972 and had an overwhelming mandate from the American people. Of course, this strengthened his position abroad, because he had been reelected by such a large margin. Secondly, since he had been reelected for a second term, President Nixon wouldn't have to be concerned about domestic politics and could do what he wanted to do in terms of foreign policy, essentially because he could not run for reelection. So he could be even more statesmanlike. Thirdly, he had some very significant successes. We had the opening of relations with China and we had detente with the Russians and the specific agreements negotiated with the Russians in the areas that I've mentioned. By January, 1973, shortly after his reelection, we reached a Vietnam peace agreement and were beginning to be active in shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. As a result, President Nixon and Kissinger both felt very good about where we stood as we headed into Nixon's second term as President.

Much more attention could now be paid to our allies and other issues. There was a turning to the year of Europe and the strengthening of our trans-Atlantic relations. Clearly, there was going to be more focus on the Middle East than there had been. We could begin to pay more attention to the Western Hemisphere, to economic and energy problems, and to the Third World more generally, including Africa. All of these matters were in Nixon's and Kissinger's eyes as issues that we could pay much more attention to in the second Nixon term. During the first term, attention was focused on problems of relations with the Communist countries, as well as the Vietnam War, which Nixon felt that he had to settle on what he considered an honorable basis. He wanted to free himself up, not only to deal with domestic debate and distractions, but also to pay greater attention to how we were spending our resources on diplomacy more generally throughout the world.

Detente with the Russians had obviously been more urgent because of the danger coming from the global relationship with the Soviet Union, which was the single, most important issue on which we had to move forward. That was moving ahead, with the summit meeting with the Russians, and so on. Of course, there was also the opening of relations with China, which helped President Nixon on all fronts. This was a dramatic development in and of itself. We also had the impact, for the American people, of easing
the Vietnam trauma. Clearly, any settlement of the Vietnam War was going to be less than perfect. It had some dangers in it, and we later saw it unravel for a variety of reasons which I have discussed elsewhere.

We were extricating ourselves from Vietnam with, at best, an inconclusive outcome; it certainly wasn't a clear-cut victory in either material or moral terms like what we had at the end of World War II. For the American people this outcome could be put in perspective, because simultaneously with that were these other, major moves toward the Russians but, above all, toward the Chinese. We were now dealing with China, the world's most populous nation and a very important one. It was going to be an even bigger country in the 21st century. With this dramatic, new opening, the American people, whether explicitly or implicitly, could see and recognize that this historic move dwarfed in some ways an inconclusive outcome in Vietnam, a small part of Southeast Asia.

So for all of these reasons we were poised to move ahead with our foreign policy, while continuing our momentum on other fronts. We could deal with our allies more systematically on all of the other issues that I mentioned. We could tackle a much broader diplomatic agenda.

Well, of course, what none of us knew, and even President Nixon didn't know, as of January 27, 1973, when the Vietnam Agreement was signed, was that the Watergate Affair was going to undermine all of this. So, in addition to all of the tragedies about the Watergate Affair, which we could discuss but which wiser men who were more directly involved in it than I could better discuss, certainly the impact on our foreign policy was momentous. As this issue wore on in 1973 and 1974, and as President Nixon became more and more preoccupied with it, he paid less and less attention to foreign policy. His leverage abroad was reduced as people saw him in trouble. So our momentum in the field of foreign policy slowed down with Russia and China. The North Vietnamese, of course, broke the Vietnam Agreement of January, 1973, and that settlement unraveled.

We still managed to move ahead on certain fronts, and you have to give Kissinger credit for great skill in working against this backdrop of deteriorating executive authority, as a result of the Watergate Affair and Vietnam. Arranging two agreements with the Egyptians and one with the Syrians in the Middle East were real achievements. I was involved in the shuttle diplomacy in connection with negotiating the two Egyptian agreements. We moved ahead on issues like energy. In Southern Africa, we pressed negotiations regarding Rhodesia, and this began to move the continent of Africa toward majority rule. There were other efforts made as well, and I'll talk about this when we discuss the State Department Policy Planning Staff, which I headed, in our next session.

The point is that this effort during the late Nixon and Ford Administrations was essentially a holding action. During this period, from 1974 to the beginning of 1977, which covered the Ford administration, one of Kissinger's greatest contributions was to make sure that our overall foreign policy position did not collapse, despite the negative impact on executive authority as a result of Vietnam, the Watergate Affair, the transition from Nixon to Ford, and a host of new restrictive Congressional actions. There is no
question that these great hopes that we had in January, 1973, and for the reasons I mentioned, were damaged seriously by the Watergate episode, above all.

It wasn't just a matter of one President being removed from office and under attack before he was removed which complicated our efforts. Also involved was the fact that Congress began passing all kinds of legislation and getting more and more involved in foreign policy, in reaction to the Watergate affair and the perceived excesses of the Nixon administration. Congressional attitudes also changed in reaction to the Vietnam War. The War Powers Act and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on trade with Russia were passed. There was a series of legislative initiatives which made it much harder for President Nixon and Kissinger to conduct our foreign policy. There was a Congressional backlash and micro-management of foreign policy setting in. These tendencies greatly complicated our efforts.

I think that I'll save until later the consequences for policy planning, unless you think I should cover this now as part of the discussion of our relations with Russia.

Q: I think that we can do it now, if you wish.

LORD: All right, we can continue our discussion of our relations with Russia. As part of the impact of the Watergate affair and of Congressional micro-management of foreign policy, the U.S.-Russian relationship began to slow down and run into trouble, during this period from 1973 to 1975. It wasn't a dramatic, overnight process, but clearly the momentum slowed down. It slowed down because we were losing both our sticks and our carrots, for a variety of reasons.

On the conservative side in Congress, including the neo conservatives like the late Senator Jackson [Democrat, Washington state] a much higher value was placed on ideology. This included the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union and generally elements of the unattractive ideological and domestic system of communism. Kissinger was more concerned about external behavior by the Russians. His constant emphasis was on how countries deal with the situation outside their borders, and he didn't spend as much time worrying about what countries do inside their borders. Senator Jackson in particular and Richard Perle, his staff aid, and others were constraining our use of carrots for the Soviet Union.

They undercut the negotiations on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] and sometimes interplayed with people within the Ford administration, such as James Schlesinger and Donald Rumsfeld, from whom they might get some help. So movement in the arms control negotiations with the Russians was slowing down, due to attacks coming from the Right in Congress and elsewhere.

We were also trying to open up more normal trade relations with the Russians. This was intended to provide the Russians with incentives to get economic help through cooperation with us. But the Jackson-Vanik Amendment affected trade relations with the Russians, restricting most favored nation status until there was a specific number of Jews
allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union. Kissinger would argue that the Jackson-Vanik amendment didn't work very well. We got more Jews out of Russia through quiet diplomacy than we did after the amendment was passed. This amendment also screwed up our economic relations more generally with the Russians. So the impact of both the trade and arms control carrots was accordingly limited.

Meanwhile, our use of the sticks was being restrained by the liberals in Congress, most of them Democrats. Specifically, the defense budget was being cut sharply, particularly in reaction to the Vietnam War. Investigations of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], some of which were legitimate, were under way. There were resulting constraints on our defense and intelligence communities. The immediate post-Vietnam licking-of-wounds fed self-doubt about our world role and willingness to intervene overseas. So these potential sticks in our relations with the Russians, were also under attack.

As a result, we had few carrots and sticks available which we had hoped to use as a part of our strategy on détente to move our relations with the Russians ahead. The Russians could see that President Nixon was under attack. They never could understand, any more than many of our European friends, why the Watergate affair was visibly bringing down the President. They saw this affair as a second rate burglary, just as, more recently, some people have not been able to understand why sex scandals [involving President Clinton] should have had the potential of forcing him from office. So for all of these reasons the Russians didn't deal with us as effectively as we had hoped, and we couldn't deal with them effectively, either. We couldn't threaten them as much and we couldn't induce them as much to move ahead in our bilateral relations.

To his credit, Kissinger nevertheless maintained our relations with the Soviet Union so that they didn't deteriorate. More and more he had to do this himself, because President Nixon was preoccupied with the consequences of the Watergate Affair. President Ford helped to improve our relations with the Soviet Union. The Vladivostok summit meeting was held when President Ford was in office. We managed to inch ahead with the Russians. At least we didn't go backward. That was of some significance, but it meant that during Nixon's second term we were unable to continue to make the kind of advances that we had achieved during the first Nixon term.

Part of the reason for this trend was that conservatives, particularly in Congress, were concerned about the Soviet domestic system. This affected the carrots we had hoped to use. Part of the reason was that liberals, especially in Congress, were concerned about alleged American excesses in foreign policy and were taking away the sticks we had hoped to use.

Q: How did you find your own position affected by these developments? Were you isolated from, say, the staffs of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees of Congress?

LORD: Yes. I had no dealings with Congress when I was on the NSC [National Security Council] staff, and that was true of just about all of the NSC staff members. Any dealings
with Congress at that point were essentially handled by Kissinger and Al Haig, his deputy. I was a Special Assistant to Kissinger at the time. However, I don't believe that even the experts on the NSC staff like Helmut Sonnenfeldt, John Holdridge, Hal Saunders on the Middle East, or Bob Hormats on economic affairs, or before him, Fred Bergstren, dealt much with Congress, either. That was generally handled by the domestic Congressional liaison people, plus people like Kissinger and Al Haig, personally.

In subsequent administrations, this has no longer been true. Certainly now, NSC staff members deal a lot with Congressional staffers. However, at the time we didn't deal much with Congress directly. This was largely due to Nixon and Kissinger’s desire for control and cohesion.

Q: What about the Helsinki Accords during this time? Were you at all involved with that, and...

LORD: Yes. Again, that also included my time on the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department. I'm trying to follow the Soviet thread here. The Helsinki Accords had to do with the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. The basic agreement ratified existing European borders but also put human rights on the agenda as a legitimate issue for discussion between East and West. The third basket under the Helsinki Accord [different subjects were grouped together in so-called baskets] involved trade and cultural exchanges.

Kissinger might have a different view on this, but I distinctly remember him as being initially suspicious of the Helsinki Accords. First, he wasn't quite sure that ratification of existing borders was something that was necessarily a good idea and might face a domestic challenge by hard liners in the U.S. body politic. Secondly, he has never been one to be that much concerned about human rights as part of our foreign policy. Therefore, the human rights basket didn't appeal to him so much. He has since recognized more the salience of human rights, and at that time he may even have said that he was in favor of human rights. I'll leave it to him to debate that.

In fact, the human rights basket was very important, and historians now generally agree that the Helsinki Accords definitely worked to the advantage of the West. The Helsinki Accords legitimized human rights as a point for discussion between East and West. This doesn't mean that the Russians would simply roll over on human rights, but whether it involved Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or other Eastern European countries, as well as the Soviet Union itself, human rights became a more legitimate item on which to make attacks on their record and to make appeals for improvement. Also it gave a certain, international cover and legitimacy to dissidents within these nations. This was one of many situations which contributed to the unraveling of the Soviet Union. Other areas included their economic problems and the fact that they were stretched by Star Wars, Reagan's defense budget, and advancing defense technology on which they were forced to spend increasing portions of the Soviet budget. In addition, the rottenness of the Soviet system was also a factor, as well as the human rights question. So the Helsinki Accords turned out to be very much of a factor serving the interests of the West.
And you have to give Kissinger credit for the reasons I mentioned. Kissinger never really opposed the Helsinki Accords, but I think that he didn't realize how useful a tool they were going to be against the Soviet Union and how much they were in our interest. I think that Kissinger was ambivalent about them.

Q: Did you get involved with the Helsinki Accords, the three baskets, and all of that, at an early stage?

LORD: Well, we were involved peripherally but not essentially. I'll get into the Policy Planning Staff agenda later. I don't think that we had a major role to play in that. I wasn't really involved. I went on about half of the trips with Kissinger when he was Secretary of State, but not all of them. I was no longer directly involved in negotiations with Russia.

Q: When you were dealing at this point with matters affecting the Soviet Union, did you see it as an aggressive empire or as an aggressive power? Did you think that we had to be concerned about sitting on it? That is, firming up the borders around it or trying to prevent the Soviet Union from reaching out to Africa, Latin America, and so forth?

LORD: I don't think that I had a view much different from the views of Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt or Hyland on this. I regarded the Soviet Union as a fundamental threat to U.S. interests. I don't think that we lacked confidence. I think that we felt that we were much stronger than the Russians in most respects. However, a fundamental consideration was that, above all, their nuclear capability was essentially equal to ours. How great it really amounted to was frequently exaggerated, but it really didn't matter. It was large enough to be a matter of grave concern to us.

Q: At a certain point, the difference was really not significant.

LORD: Even a more modest Soviet nuclear capability would have been a great threat to the United States. Obviously, the Soviet nuclear dimension and their ability to push the envelope internationally was a matter of concern to us. Remember that the Soviet Union had proclaimed the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968, after the Prague Spring. By the way, this was one thing that really concerned the Chinese. In effect, the Brezhnev Doctrine said that the Russians had the right to determine the domestic system of other, socialist countries. That got the attention of the Chinese, along with the border clashes with the Russians along the Sino-Soviet border on the Ussuri River opposite Manchuria.

So, for all of these reasons we all felt that we had to be firm with the Russians, we had to maintain a strong defense, and we needed to exert some pressure in order to get the Russians' attention, given the way they negotiate and their history. Whether they deployed missiles in Cuba during the Kennedy administration, established a submarine base in Cuba [in Cienfuegos], encouraged radical Arabs, or fooled around with the access routes to Berlin, we felt that we had to react strongly to what we regarded as Soviet provocations.
At the same time, I agreed with the Nixon-Kissinger approach that, in addition to firmness, we had to give the Soviets some incentives to develop a better relationship with us. As long as we made clear that the Soviets couldn't push us around, we also had to make clear that we weren't out to dominate Russia or overthrow their regime and that we were prepared to respect them as a major power. We were prepared to have a more normal relationship with Russia, as far as arms control, trade, and other exchanges were concerned. We were also prepared to negotiate with them on subjects of mutual interest to our two countries. I think that this combination of incentives and pressures reflected our view of the Russians. We thought that they wouldn't be irrational if we gave them an option that would be more attractive. However, we had to be firm so that they wouldn't be tempted toward adventurism.

Kissinger and Nixon came under attack for appearing to be soft on the Soviets. Their view was that we had to have a closely linked position, whether this involved trying to maintain a strong defense and intelligence capability, despite attacks from Congress, whether it involved resisting the Soviets in the many crises that I've mentioned, or whether it was just plain, tough negotiations. This above all, we were not soft. But, beyond that, Kissinger and Nixon felt that an all-out confrontation with the Soviets would, of course, be very dangerous in the nuclear age. It could cause strains with our allies, and could cause some problems domestically. We felt that if we were ever going to have a major confrontation with the Russians, we had to have demonstrated to the American people, the Congress, and other countries around the world that we had tried to be more reasonable and had tried to have a more normal relationship with the Russians. We needed to demonstrate that this confrontation was forced upon us by unrelenting Soviet adventurism, as opposed to our prematurely going into dangerous confrontations. Such confrontations would not only be dangerous; we might not have the necessary allied and domestic support because we had not tried to follow a more flexible approach.

I'm sure that Nixon and Kissinger would argue that they recognized that the Soviets were not all that strong. The Soviets were certainly dangerous, but, over the long haul, we sought to buy time and wear them down by pursuing a policy of containment of Russia and also seeking better relations with them. Over time. Nixon and Kissinger believed, the Soviet system would collapse or erode, as George Kennan himself had suggested in his famous article in "Foreign Affairs" magazine in the late 1940s. He used the pseudonym of "X" for the article.

By far the most exhaustive rationale for detente and review of the record in U.S.-Soviet relations was provided in the summer of 1974. Together with the experts I worked very hard on what was basically a White Paper, and background for congressional hearings. It was a very eloquent document, but received very little attention because Watergate was coming to a climax.

Nixon and Kissinger felt that Senator Jackson, the neo-conservatives, and others, shared the strategic approach of containing the Russians, which they all agreed upon. But Nixon and Kissinger felt that the tactics of Senator Jackson and others were ill-considered, were overly confrontational, and could provoke a crisis and lose domestic support. They felt
that it was necessary to play for the long run by being reasonable as well as firm at the same time. Kissinger felt that Jackson and his staff, e.g., Richard Perle, working with allies like Schlesinger and Rumsfeld, kept undermining our Soviet policy. In one example their attacks on arms control agreements being worked out with the Soviets in Vladivostok in November 1974 sunk them. By the time Kissinger got back to Washington, after visiting China, the debate was lost.

Part of the trouble that Kissinger ran into in the field of foreign affairs during the years of the Ford administration was his underestimation of the desire of our people and Congress to reflect values in our foreign policy. Fairly or unfairly, the American people aren't used to the concept of the balance of power or the European approach to diplomacy anyway, which Kissinger thrived on as an historian, and to this day remains his basic view of the world. The American people and Congress felt that there had to be a human component, that other countries' domestic systems were relevant, and that human rights was a subject to which we had to pay attention. Therefore, Kissinger encountered criticism from the Right that we weren't doing enough to bring about change in the Soviet domestic system of government, even as the Left was saying that we were being too tough in trying to affect Soviet external behavior. The Left too was concerned about human rights. So Kissinger was attacked from both ends of the political spectrum, as I mentioned before, diluting this combination of sticks and carrots. That's why détente ran into considerable trouble.

Q: Incidentally, I'm not sure whether this reflects an age difference. I keep referring to the Soviets, and you keep referring to Russians.

LORD: We ought to say Soviets until they reached the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Q: Well, I'm a Cold War type myself. Of course, you were also.

LORD: Soviets is a better term for the government of the former Soviet Union.

Q: Was there any feeling that the Soviet empire was vulnerable, or was there a feeling that, while this might be true, this would become a real consideration so far in the future that it didn't really amount to a strategic opening.

LORD: Yes. That's a fair point. I don't think that Nixon and Kissinger greatly exaggerated Soviet strength. However, along with almost everybody else that I knew, except maybe Senator Moynihan [Democrat, New York], I think that I - and they - didn't realize how vulnerable the Soviets really were, because of their terrible economic system, not to mention their authoritarian style of government.

Going all the way back to where President Kennedy exaggerated the missile gap, there was a constant practice in the United States of overestimating just how strong the Soviets were. I think, to his credit, that President Reagan instinctively understood, better than his predecessors, that there really was a vulnerable weakness in the Soviet system. He felt that he could stretch the Soviet Union by our own defense spending and firmness, even as
he tried to negotiate with the Soviets, with the help of Secretary of State George Shultz, who, I think, was very important in that respect. I think that Nixon and Kissinger felt that the Soviet Union was a stronger empire and a stronger country than, in retrospect, it really was. But in all fairness, no matter how weak the Soviet Union was in economic or other terms, it was a real danger because of its formidable nuclear capability which could obliterate us.

Q: I know that they also had an awful lot of tanks.

LORD: That's right, in terms of all of the scenarios on Europe, the Soviets were considered to have overwhelming strength in conventional weapons. We were at least their equals in terms of nuclear arms, although there were different views on this subject. Certainly, Nixon and Kissinger would not have predicted that the Soviets would have collapsed in the late 1980s and the early 1990s as they did or that they would lose their empire. Nor that this would happen so peacefully. But then no one else foresaw this either.

However, because of the Soviet nuclear capability and, to a certain extent, the conventional threat which they posed, we had to practice a more nuanced diplomacy than the all-out, confrontational type of pressure that some right-wingers advocated. Nixon and Kissinger felt that a more nuanced approach made more sense. Their approach to détente was no less hard-headed than the approach of the right-wingers.

Q: Before we leave the Soviet Union, what about the status of Berlin during the time that you were dealing with the Soviet Union?

LORD: In retrospect, we didn't have the crisis on Berlin that we had at the time of the Berlin Airlift in 1948 or the Berlin Wall in 1961, when I was still in the National Guard and before I entered the Foreign Service. At that time I was almost called to active duty and might have been extended because of the crisis over Berlin.

Q: I remember that well.

LORD: However, there were some Berlin access pressures and problems. I don't recall exactly when they came up in 1969 or 1970, but they led to negotiations over the status of Berlin, which was a major achievement which Kissinger and Ambassador Ken Rush, among others, pulled off. Rush was an effective Ambassador, and one of the few that Kissinger worked closely with.

Q: He got Dean Rusk much involved in this.

LORD: And others, too. I don't recall much beyond that. I can't be much more helpful on that. There were a couple of frustrating things with the Soviets which happened during trips to the Soviet Union. At the end of the Moscow summit meeting in 1972 we then were to go on to Iran and a couple of other places, Austria before and Poland afterwards.
We got stuck for several hours on the runway in Moscow and President Nixon couldn't take off. Of course, that infuriated everybody. Talk about an anti-climax! Another frustrating event happened, I believe, in the fall of 1973. It was soon after Kissinger became Secretary of State, and I went back into the State Department. The Middle East War broke out in September, 1973. Egypt attacked Israel.

Q: This was the so-called Yom Kippur War of 1973.

LORD: That's correct. I remember that we were at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York in the middle of drafting a major speech by Kissinger before the General Assembly of the United Nations. To his credit, by the way, right in the middle of this crisis, he continued to work on this speech. I couldn't believe that he was still focusing on this speech, even as we were involved in this serious crisis. Also, it was a very sad moment, because the wife of one of our top people on the NSC staff who was working on the Middle East, Hal Saunders, had just died. She died as a result of a fall in a bath tub. It was a very emotional event.

In any event, we went to Moscow shortly afterwards. We were trying to arrange a cease-fire between the Egyptians and the Israelis. The Egyptians had attacked the Israelis in the Yom Kippur War and successfully crossed the Suez Canal. Ultimately, the Israelis counterattacked and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army on the East side of the canal. They were about to wipe it out.

Kissinger again showed his genius in negotiating the cease-fire between Egyptians and Israelis. He was trying to get a cease-fire for the following reasons. For the first time, after several wars, the Arabs had had some success in the fighting against the Israelis. So their long-standing inferiority complex in combat with the Israelis, particularly on the military front, was somewhat relieved. The Egyptians were quite a threat to the Israelis for a while, before the Israeli counterattacked. Not all of the Egyptian gains had been wiped out. The Egyptian Army hadn't yet been wiped out. So, if the war stopped at that point, Kissinger believed, the Arabs, feeling somewhat better psychologically, might be more willing to negotiate than if they had been humiliated by the Israelis once again.

Similarly, the Israelis had been sobered up by the fact that for the first time they had really been set back on their heels by the Egyptians, on the East side of the Suez Canal. Of course, the Israelis counterattacked, but their losses had been heavy, and it was a shock to them to find that they were still vulnerable, after previous, easy victories. Letting the Israelis wipe out the Egyptian Army would once again humiliate the Egyptians and the Arabs. This would probably give the Israelis a new sense of hubris [pride] and self-confidence. Therefore Kissinger saw that, at that moment, there would be a psychological point of balance on both sides that would be suitable for negotiations. There would be an opening for the U.S. to move the parties toward peace. The Arabs would have a little dignity and self-confidence after at least a temporary victory, while the Israelis would feel a certain sense of sobriety, having come close to suffering a major defeat.
In our negotiations with the Soviets in Moscow - at this important juncture - it was important to agree with them on a cease-fire between Arabs and Israelis. Time was of the essence. We had to get word to the Israelis to stop the fighting within a day or two. Otherwise, they might go and wipe out the Egyptian Army, further damaging Egyptian morale and contributing to Israeli hubris. So we were sitting in the Kremlin, trying to get an urgent message out to our Embassy in Tel Aviv to go to the Israelis on a ceasefire.

We were appalled to find that we couldn't do it. The communications system available to us just didn't work. We were going crazy. We didn't think that the Soviets were screwing up our communications; it was in the Soviet interest to have us communicate with the Israelis. We finally had to hand carry our messages to Air Force Two [U.S. Air Force aircraft used by Secretary of State Kissinger] and have the messages sent from the plane.

I remember a specific incident where this problem first arose. Kissinger mentions this in his book. After an exhausting day with the Soviets, he gave instructions for a FLASH message [immediate precedence] to be sent to the Israelis. Kissinger then went to bed to take a few hours' nap.

We were all going crazy. Larry Eagleburger [Kissinger Special Assistant] was there, as was I. I'm sure that Hal Saunders and Roy Atherton were there, and maybe Joe Sisco as well. We couldn't get this damned message out to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv. Of course, above all we were above all worried because there was a very important question of timing and a need to get it to the Israelis as quickly as possible. We also knew that Kissinger would not be a happy camper if he woke up from his nap and found out that this message hadn't been sent. We spent three or four hours trying to send it but weren't able to transmit it.

Then we heard Kissinger coming down the hall. He had taken his nap and he clearly was going to say: "Well, have we heard back from the Israelis yet?" I swear that I'll never forget this scene. There was about a dozen of us in this room, and everybody knew that an explosion was coming. Everybody left the room except Larry Eagleburger and me. Larry was chief of staff to Kissinger and was responsible for operations at this point. I knew that Eagleburger was going to catch unshirted hell. As I said, everybody else had left the room and the advancing storm from Henry Kissinger.

As Kissinger relates in his book, Larry Eagleburger has been eternally grateful to me since then for staying with him, the only one brave enough to do so. Of course, Kissinger exploded, as we thought he would. He's not an expert on mechanical equipment, such as communications facilities. He couldn't understand why the message couldn't be sent. In all fairness, he didn't beat up that much on either Eagleburger or me. It was more a question of suspicion of the Soviets. Kissinger just couldn't understand what was going on. These things were not of cosmic importance, but believe me, at the time, they were scary. And it might have had an impact on the timing of the ceasefire.

**Q: This time it really was an important matter.**
LORD: Kissinger had a right to be flustered about it, and, to this day, we don't know what happened. I don't believe the Soviets were responsible, although maybe they just wanted to screw things up for us and be difficult. Maybe some Soviet official didn't get the word that they ought to let this particular message get out. So maybe it was Soviet interference, but they had no incentive to do that.

There was one other, rather amusing incident that wasn't even related to the Soviet Union, but this happened in 1971 when I was working on the NSC staff. We had a visit scheduled to the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

Q: In the Mediterranean.

LORD: In the Mediterranean. President Nixon was also going to see the Pope in the Vatican. Nobody quite realized that the symbolism of the President going in a helicopter right from the Sixth Fleet to the Vatican wasn't the best idea. Nixon was on the flagship and was looking forward to a major naval demonstration in his honor, with ships proceeding past the ship he was on, with guns and missiles being fired, and so on. I remember that shortly before this we attended a movie on the ship. Someone came in and told us that President Nasser of Egypt had just died. Nasser wasn't a particular friend of the U.S., but on the other hand this was a major event.

On his own, Kissinger ordered the cancellation of this firing demonstration, which had been set up for President Nixon to observe. When Nixon found out that the demonstration had been canceled, he went absolutely ballistic because he wanted to see it anyway. However, Kissinger felt that this would not be taken well in the Arab world when they learned that Nixon was attending a live fire demonstration just after Nasser had died.

On that same trip, but shortly afterwards, President Nixon went to see the Pope, traveling by helicopter from the ship he had been on to the Vatican. The Vatican was concerned about Secretary of Defense Mel Laird being present at the meeting with the Pope. So they asked that Laird not attend. Laird, of course, wasn't going to take "No" for an answer. He wanted to meet the Pope. So he showed up, uninvited, at the Vatican, smoking a cigar. Of course, as the Nixon party went in to see the Pope, Laird was crowding in to see the Pope as well. Laird put his cigar in his pocket, and a little fire began in his pocket, which he tried to put out by slapping his coat. The Vatican people thought that Laird was clapping at something the Pope had said, so they all started clapping, too. This was one of those weird events that happen.

One other thing, as I just skip around here, I can't recall whether I mentioned the Brian McDonell relationship. Brian McDonell was the young man who was opposed to the Vietnam War. He fasted outside the White House. It was a real, serious fast which went on for days. He looked as if he was risking his life. Here was another side of Kissinger that people don't realize. He was genuinely concerned about this person's well-being. He was furious, particularly at the establishment and at the Johnson and Kennedy administration people like the Bundy brothers [McGeorge Bundy and William P. Bundy] who turned on Kissinger and Nixon for not ending the war, when they had a lot to do.
with getting us into this mess in the first place. But Kissinger genuinely respected religious people or genuine pacifists who disagreed or turned against our policies in Vietnam. Kissinger also had considerable respect for people who avoided extremist positions but just generally felt that the Vietnam War should end and that our entry into the war had been a geopolitical mistake, but didn't consider us moral vultures for continuing the war. Kissinger had no respect for people like Jane Fonda [actress daughter of Henry Fonda, the actor], who treated Hanoi as the good guys and us as the bad guys. So Kissinger had respect for some of these people and had compassion for Brian McDonell. Kissinger sent me out to speak to Brian and try to persuade him to break his fast. Then Kissinger invited the young man into the White House without any publicity. He didn't leak this story to the "Washington Post" to show that he was a good guy. I don't think that he ever got any publicity for this event that I am aware of.

McDonell came into the White House and had a long talk with Kissinger. As a result, he called off his fast. I don't know whether he would have died or not, but he might have. Subsequently, we kept in touch with Brian. He had an African-American wife, which was unusual back in 1970, 1971, or 1972, whenever it was. I remember that we (including Bette) had dinner with him and his wife. So that was just a small episode, but it's another aspect of Kissinger that people don't always know about.
Q: You noted that the Watergate Affair sort of cut off our ability really to deal with Hanoi from a position of strength. How did you people regard this situation as it developed? This really intrudes into the work of the NSC and policy planning, but how did you see this?

LORD: First, it was a process of incremental awareness, just as it was for more or less every American. That was true for Kissinger as well as for myself. He didn't know anything about the Watergate Affair. He really didn't know. For all of us it was a process of becoming incrementally aware of what had happened and of the seriousness of it.

It wasn't even a blip on my radar screen while I was at the NSC. I don't believe that Kissinger was aware of its significance before 1973. Of course, this all began during the 1972 Presidential elections campaign. The stupidity of it is well known, not to mention the fact that by the time the burglary of the office of the National Democratic Committee occurred, it was clear that President Nixon was going to win reelection by a landslide in any case. So it wasn't necessary. Then, of course, there was the stupidity of the coverup. However, none of us knew anything about all of this up to and through the elections of 1972. I think that there was a minor newspaper article in the "Washington Post" about a burglary in the office of the National Democratic Committee on the day following the break in. However, nobody that I knew drew any conclusions from that. So this was not anything that one even considered at the time.

I left the NSC staff in May, 1973. I certainly didn't leave because of the burglary at Watergate. I wasn't aware that that was going to be a serious problem, even then. I left the NSC staff because I was exhausted. Four years of dealing with Henry Kissinger were exhilarating and terrific, but they were also exhausting, because of the long hours, the pressures, his style of work, and so on. I wanted to see more of my children, who were then quite young. I wanted to see them before they grew up. I wanted to get out and recharge my intellectual batteries.

So I was getting out of the NSC staff for a variety of reasons. Plus, I felt that we had opened up to China, we had ended the Vietnam War, and we had moved ahead on relations with the Soviets. All of the positive elements were in place, and I thought that it was a very good time for me to leave. In particular, the relations with China were on track, the Vietnam War and negotiations had been concluded. So my two major responsibilities were looking good, as well as our general foreign policy stance.

I always thought that I would be coming back into government service and I also suspected that I would be coming back with Kissinger a few months later. However, as I left government service in May 1973, I was not really aware of the Watergate Affair. I came back to government service in September 1973. I can't vouch for Kissinger's views. I suppose by then that he was beginning to see that this incident and its fallout were beginning to become a problem. However, I only became aware of this gradually. As of
the fall of 1973 we didn't think that it was going to become all that serious, as Kissinger was appointed Secretary of State.

Shortly afterwards, and certainly in the course of 1974, it began to become obvious that the situation involved in the Watergate Affair was serious, although I don't have the exact time-line here. The point I'm making is that there was no one day when we realized that we were facing a crisis, as events happened, and some of them were more dramatic than others. There was Butterfield revealing the taping system in President Nixon's office. There were revelations about John Dean [then White House chief of staff], and then the episodes when Haldeman and Ehrlichman of the White House staff were fired. The Congressional hearings progressed. The potential seriousness of the matter became increasingly clear. We began to get the feeling that we were inexorably headed for a terrible ending. I can't place this feeling in terms of any one day. It was just a series of events which made the situation more and more serious.

Similarly, the impact on foreign policy did not take place overnight. There was a gradual draining away of momentum. For example, each trip to China after 1973 became less productive, until there was a very chilly summit meeting with President Ford in 1975, as I mentioned. Relations with the Soviet Union were slowing down. There was more restraint on what we were trying to do with the Soviets, both ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’. Congress was counter-attacking with legislation, restrictions, and hearings. The North Vietnamese were unraveling the Paris Agreement of 1973, in part seeing the weakness of the President and the mood of Congress. Not all of this was a result of the Watergate Affair but was a combination of the weakness of the Presidency or the fact that President Nixon might actually be leaving office. Then the entry into office of Ford as an interim President meant that things were increasingly slowing down and unraveling.

So Kissinger emerged as the one person sort of holding things together. He was controversial even then, of course. The issue of wiretapping came up, as well as other things which people didn't like about him. However, some people forget that he was generally considered the most admired man in America. He appeared on magazine covers as ‘Superman’. He was the one person that people thought that they could trust or who had stature, in addition to the fact that he was untainted by the Watergate Affair itself, except for the peripheral dimension of wiretapping. Kissinger was also the one American official respected abroad. So I think that was one of his more heroic accomplishments, holding our foreign policy together despite the weakness of the executive branch.

Q: Would you like to talk about the wiretapping?

LORD: Yes. Of course, I was unaware that wiretapping was going on.

Q: Can you explain the background of this practice?

LORD: Basically, what happened was the following. There was a series of leaks on sensitive matters, early in the Nixon administration, in 1969 and then in 1970. One particular leak which triggered a strong reaction from President Nixon and his colleagues, including Kissinger, was the revelation in the "New York Times," by a journalist called
Bill Beecher of the secret bombing in Cambodia of Vietnamese communist enclaves. These Vietnamese communist troops were coming across the border into South Vietnam, attacking our troops, and then going back to sanctuaries in Cambodia. I didn't know about the bombing until I became Kissinger’s special assistant in February 1970.

I felt that the bombing was legitimate, in the sense that these Vietnamese communist troops were violating Cambodian soil and penetrating into South Vietnam. Our bombing was confined to Vietnamese concentrations near the border. They were designed to lessen our casualties. We talked about this and the effect it might have on the level of American casualties. However, the issue was that it was secret from the American people and almost all of Congress, and that we were bombing targets in another country, even if it was justified.

Prince Sihanouk acquiesced in this practice, as long as it was secret. The argument for keeping it secret was that Sihanouk would never agree to it if it was made public. He could not say: "Yes, go ahead and bomb my country". But he didn't want the North Vietnamese threatening his control of Cambodia. He recognized that the Vietnamese communists had invaded his country, that he couldn't do anything about this, and therefore he had no problem with our beating the hell out of the Vietnamese communists along the border, as long as it was secret. So that's why it was secret. It wasn't frivolous to keep it secret.

Nevertheless, Congress, the American people, and the press were very upset when they learned that we had been bombing targets in another country, whether or not it was justified, and without the American people knowing about it. Anyway, that particular leak drew the attention of President Nixon and his associates. Later on, the Pentagon Papers were leaked by Daniel Ellsberg, and that also fed this paranoia. This contributed to the atmosphere in which the Watergate Affair developed, in addition to the wiretapping.

A key point about the Nixon/Kissinger strong reaction to the leak of the Pentagon Papers. I fully shared their view that this was unpardonable. Whatever one’s views, you don’t leak a huge amount of classified material. Moreover, all the study and embarrassing revelations were about the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. So Nixon and Kissinger were defending not against personal embarrassments for their Administration but the general principle of conducting government for future presidents. In addition, this was in June 1971, a few weeks after we had made our major, secret proposal to North Vietnam to try and end the war, and a few weeks before Kissinger’s secret trip to China. Obviously the domestic uproar over the Pentagon Papers did not give Hanoi an incentive to respond positively, through this was not the decisive factor. Moreover, we were secretly trying to open up with China. The Chinese - and other governments - would have little confidence that the U.S. government could keep secrets.

I believe that some time in the spring of 1970 wiretaps were put on the phones of about a dozen people, including several of us on the NSC staff and a couple of journalists. I don't have a complete list of the people whose phones were being wiretapped. There were
about a dozen. Now, why were we picked? Because these were national security leaks, involving Vietnam and Cambodia, and there may have been other aspects. Nixon and Kissinger felt that these leaks could really undermine our foreign policy. We had secret negotiations under way with North Vietnam, we had secret negotiations on the opening to China, and secret dealings to a certain extent with the Soviets. If all of these matters were leaked to the public, it would inhibit our efforts to conduct relations with those countries. It would also tell the Chinese and the others that we couldn't be trusted to keep secrets, and this would complicate everything.

There was also the general principle that if you work for the government, you don't leak secret, sensitive information. If you disagree with a given policy, you can either stay in office and work to try to change the policy from the inside, keep debating, but loyally carry out the policy while you continue to serve. You don't leak information to destroy that policy. Or you can resign as a matter of principle and then try to protest and change the policy from the outside. What you should not do, and I feel strongly about this myself, is to try to undermine a policy with which you disagree by leaking sensitive information, for example, to the press or to Congress. I never leaked sensitive information in my life. I had plenty of criticism of policy and wrote and spoke to Kissinger and others about them. But I believed that if you lost the argument, you either carry out the policy or quit. You don’t sabotage it by leaking.

Of course, we all give background press briefings and say things authorized around the edges, but in terms of actually leaking classified material to unauthorized persons, I've never done that.

So there was general concern, some of which I understood, by the way, about what these leaks were doing to our foreign policy as well as to the basic principles under which it operates. As a result, President Nixon ordered the wiretaps, and Kissinger did not resist. The President and Kissinger were also told by Attorney General John Mitchell that these wiretaps were legal, which they were. So Kissinger went along with them.

The reason that some other members of the NSC staff and I were chosen to have their phones tapped was that some of the information which had leaked had been so tightly held that only a few people knew about it. Therefore, the phones of those who might be suspected of having the ability to learn about the information which leaked were tapped. In my case I had access to just about every conceivable secret in the field of foreign policy that we had. I was Kissinger's right hand man and was in the middle of many secret negotiations on various fronts. I was one of the few people who could have been suspected of leaking this material. In addition, Secretary Kissinger's staff was suspected by Nixon and his people of being liberal Democrats from, God forbid, the State Department and academia, and were considered to be rather suspicious. In fact, we were quite moderate and liberal, compared to the people on the domestic side of the Nixon White House.

Q: I assume that you are talking about Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and people like that.
LORD: That's right. So there was that general suspicion of us as well. Of course, Kissinger justified the wire taps on the ground that he was truly concerned about leaks. He thought that leaks were outrageous in principle, were also hurting our foreign policy, and were jeopardizing ongoing negotiations with the Chinese, the Vietnamese, and others. Secondly, Kissinger couldn't say to Nixon: "How dare you suspect my staff. Just wiretap other people. Don't tap my people." In fairness, we were the ones who had the information, and he couldn't be selective about the persons whose phones should be tapped. He already felt sensitive because President Nixon felt that Kissinger's staff was overly liberal anyway.

Furthermore, Kissinger would argue that he had been assured that it was legal to engage in wiretapping, which it was, however uncomfortable one might feel about tapping someone with whom you were working every day. So that was his defense.

I didn't know anything about the wiretapping, but I will say this. Even though I didn't know anything about it, I had suspicions, which I didn't really believe, that might be going on. I had a couple of reasons for this. My phone had some funny clicks on it at times.

Q: Did this involve your phone at home?

LORD: Yes. Then I distinctly remember one incident that really left me puzzled. To make a long story short, I received a phone call from the White House about one issue or another, when I was at Les Gelb's house on a Sunday. Les was a critic of the Administration. At the time, I didn't know how the hell they knew I was there. On the other hand, perhaps I had left his number since I was always supposed to be reachable.

Kissinger and Haig were the only ones on the NSC staff who knew about the wiretapping. I guess that Kissinger felt sufficiently uncomfortable about the whole issue that he had Al Haig deal with the FBI, informing them which people should be wiretapped, or something like that, and checking transcripts at times.

Leaving aside ethics, this wiretapping was such a dumb thing to do. You're not going to find out about leaking by tapping someone's phone. If I were going to leak something, I wouldn't do it over the phone. I would go to some restaurant, sit in a corner, and whisper in some journalist's ear.

Q: Or garage.

LORD: Or garage. It seemed to me to be a dumb thing to do. That was part of my reaction.

I didn't know anything about the tap on my phone until May 1973. I was just about to leave government service for the reasons that I've just mentioned. I was exhausted, and things looked good in the foreign policy field, and particularly in my areas of specialization.
One day in May 1973, Kissinger called me up to his office. This was unrelated to my departure, since Kissinger knew that I was leaving government service anyway. He said: "I want to let you know something. There's going to be an article in the 'New York Times' which reveals the fact that several members of the NSC staff, including yourself, have had their phones tapped." I would like to think that I gave the right response, though I think that it was probably a little bit on the soft side. We had been through an awful lot together. I knew the entire context and was outraged myself at the leaks. I felt that wiretapping was terrible in principle, but the leaks could hurt our foreign policy. I also knew that Kissinger had a staff that was considered liberal and that it was under suspicion from the White House.

With all of his stature, there were still people who didn't like Kissinger, and he was somewhat vulnerable in the White House. I also knew that I was one of the few who knew all of the secrets which had been leaked. So for all of these reasons, I’m sure my response was restrained, to be sure. I didn't embrace Henry Kissinger, as it were, and say: "Thank you very much for having my phone tapped." I certainly didn't. I didn't suggest that I approved of what had been done. However, I have to be honest. I was not outraged and didn't express outrage. I don't remember exactly what I said but I didn't make this meeting difficult for Kissinger. I said something to the effect that this didn't seem to be a very effective way of stopping leaks, as a practical matter. I said that I wasn't going to hold this against him, or something like that. It certainly wasn't overly unfriendly, and I wasn't tough with him, for all of the reasons that I've mentioned.

One thing that I did which I'm really ashamed of took place because I was loyal to Kissinger and I had a degree of understanding. I was actually interviewed once on TV. I never had appeared previously on TV. The TV people wanted to interview people whose phones had been wiretapped and get their reactions. My comments were roughly as follows, I said that of course I wasn't happy that this had happened. I did say something to the effect that, given the fact that terrible leaks had taken place and given the national security implications of my access to secrets, I said that I didn't agree with this practice, but I understood why it had been done.

As I look back on this, I realize that I should just have stayed off television. I didn't have to get up there and protest, because I had a more nuanced view of this whole matter. I now see that I went too far in the other direction out of loyalty. It was a fleeting episode, and I wasn't embracing or defending wiretapping. But I later realized that if I wasn't going to show outrage, I shouldn't have appeared on TV at all. I should just have kept quiet, rather than looking overly complacent about wiretapping.

I've already basically expressed my views. No matter how you rationalize it, there's something wrong with working day by day with someone, even as their phone is being tapped, and your deputy [in this case, Al Haig] is reading the transcripts of what you said. You can't excuse this practice, and I think that Kissinger has admitted that awkwardness, even with the mitigating factors that I've mentioned. I've never held the wiretapping against Kissinger, unlike someone like Mort Halperin who left Kissinger's staff (for other reasons before he knew about the wiretapping) and went on to sue him. I respect those
who have that feeling of outrage. However, I had this nuanced reaction to this process, and I continue to have it. I don't approve of it. I think that this is a darker side of Henry Kissinger. However, I shared his view that these leaks were serious business.

Q: Well, did any of your colleagues quit because of this?

LORD: I don't believe that anybody quit because of wiretapping. Several people, including Tony Lake, Mort Halperin, Roger Morris, and Bill Watts had already left Kissinger's staff long before this story broke. A couple of other people like Joe Kraft, a journalist, were wiretapped. God knows why they wiretapped a journalist. So I don't believe that anyone quit because of the wiretapping. Either they had already left or, like Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who was also wiretapped, they had the same kind of reaction that I did. That is, the practice was stupid and basically wrong. But it was not something to resign over for the reasons I mentioned.

I can see why people would say that this is a ridiculously soft position. They might say that I should have been so outraged that I should have resigned. I was leaving government service anyway, so I didn't face that choice. To be honest with you, I don't think that I would have left my job because of the wiretapping. However, I was leaving government service anyway, so this issue didn't arise. Of course, I went back to work for Kissinger a few months later, so I obviously wasn't outraged.

One amusing thing that I will say is that there were times when the FBI was listening in on my phone, and my wife was talking. She would often talk to her mother in New Jersey. They would go on at great length in Chinese, which used to drive the wiretappers listening in on this crazy. My wife is not a great one to talk about recipes, but there were times when they were literally talking about Chinese recipes. Here was the U.S. Government, in this case, the FBI, learning about Chinese recipes in Chinese!

Q: It reminds me of an incident when we were in Yugoslavia. My wife was very busy on the telephone, organizing an international Girl Scout troop. I'm sure that the UDBA, the Yugoslav secret police under Tito, learned more about how to organize a Girl Scout troop than they wanted to know.

Q: We're going to pick up your time in Policy Planning...

LORD: Yes. State Department Policy Planning in the years from 1973 to 1977. We've touched on this period to some extent, whether it involves China, Russia, or Vietnam. I can try to give some sense of how I organized the staff in Policy Planning, the assets that I had, what I think that the role of Policy Planning should be, and so on. I can discuss some of the issues that I was involved in during that period.

Q: Great.
Today is September 17, 1999. Win, regarding Policy Planning, when were you there, from when to when?

LORD: I was there from September 1973, until January 1977.

Q: We can get to it, but could you give us the background to how the role of Policy Planning was conceived of when you entered this office, and how it changed?

LORD: Let me cover quickly how I got from the NSC [National Security Council] staff to the Policy Planning Staff.

Early in 1973 I decided that I wanted to take a break from government service. I had worked hard for many years, and specifically as Kissinger's Special Assistant in the NSC. This involved a lot of traveling and very long hours. I wanted to see more of my children, as they grew up. I wanted to take a break and recharge my batteries, as it were, both intellectually and physically. So early in 1973 I indicated to Kissinger that I would be leaving the NSC staff. However, I also felt that this was a good time in terms of where we stood on the issues I had been working on. As of the beginning of the second Nixon administration, and remember that this was before the Watergate scandal really broke upon us, we had ended the Vietnam War and we'd gone to Hanoi in February of 1973, to try to further the normalization of relations with North Vietnam. We'd opened up relations with China, including arranging for the trip by President Nixon, his trip, and later ones. We were on a path in terms of relations with China that was brand new. We were making significant progress with the Soviets. I had also gone to Moscow for that summit meeting. That situation seemed to be going well. Therefore, on the issues on which I had been working most fully, I felt that we had made important breakthroughs. In the case of Vietnam the future seemed to be uncertain, but I felt that we had done all that we could do for the time being. So this was a logical time to leave government service, both in terms of substance, as well as for personal reasons.

In May 1973, just as I was about to leave government service, I learned for the first time that my phone had been wiretapped. We've covered that. Let us go over it again, knowing there will be repetition.

One day in early May, 1973, shortly before I was to leave, Kissinger called me into his office and told me that on the next day it would be revealed in the "New York Times" that there had been a wiretapping operation under way, involving the home phones of about a dozen members of the NSC staff, the Defense Department, and a couple of journalists. I was one of those whose phone had been tapped.

Kissinger gave the following explanation of this matter on this and other occasions. First, he assured me that it was entirely legal and that the administration had carefully gone over this process with the Attorney General and others. Secondly, there had been very damaging leaks to the press, for example concerning the secret bombing of Cambodia, as well as other, national security issues. These leaks had been very damaging to our foreign policy and jeopardized our opening to China and other initiatives, in the view of
Kissinger and of President Nixon. Thirdly, a lot of these leaks could only have come from people who had access to sensitive information, including members of the NSC staff. Fourthly, Kissinger said that he was absolutely confident in my own loyalty and that I hadn't been involved in the leaking of information. He made it clear that the wiretapping was no reflection on me. Fifthly, he said that, as National Security Adviser, he could not tell the President, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and others that his staff should be exempt from wiretapping. If they were going to pursue the wiretapping, since some of the people around Kissinger had access to this sensitive information and were fairly liberal in political outlook, anyway, it would have to include some of the members of the NSC staff, who had access to the kind of information that was leaked. He said that, therefore, this was a form of protection to some of the members of the NSC staff to show that we were innocent of leaking information.

To be honest about it, my own reaction to this information was not one of total outrage and was quite moderate. However, I can understand why others might feel that I should have been more outraged. My view was the following. First of all, this was a very stupid thing to do. If the President and Kissinger were worried about leaks, they were not going to find out about this over wiretapped phones because people who were going to leak sensitive information to journalists would probably go into some quiet restaurant, sit in a corner, and whisper in their ear. They were not going to leak information over the telephone. So I thought that this was a clumsy, as well as obviously somewhat unattractive way of proceeding. I recognized and felt strongly myself that the ongoing leaks were damaging to national security. One can certainly make the case that the Nixon and Kissinger apparatus was much too secretive. We saw the excesses during the Watergate Affair and elsewhere. However, if you're trying to conduct secret openings to China and secret negotiations with Vietnam and other things, one could argue that security was clearly jeopardized by leaks and by giving people in other countries a sense that we can't maintain discipline and security.

So I understood the problem and the rationale. Also, if you were going to wiretap, you had to include the NSC staff, including me, because I was one of the few people who had access to all of this information. The Russians, the Chinese, and the Vietnamese experts, for example, would know everything going on in their area. But I, along with Kissinger and Haig, was one of the few people who had access to all of the areas. I understood the rationale. I still thought that it was stupid, but I did not feel outraged, either in terms of my personal conduct toward Kissinger or my public comments. As I say, I could understand that people would have different views on such matters. To this day, I think that it was not the way to go about trying to find out about leaks.

*Q: There were several resignations, more or less over this matter, including Bill Watts, whom I have interviewed.*

*LORD: No, his resignation was not really over the wiretapping issue. Most of the people who were wiretapped had already left government service or were journalists. For example, there was Tony Lake. I believe that Watts was among those who were wiretapped, although I can't remember now. Mort Halperin was another one. These*
people had left government service over Cambodian policy or for other reasons. We've discussed that in these interviews. They might well have left government service if they had learned that they had been wiretapped, if they were still in the service. However, the fact is that the point was moot. They had already left for other reasons.

Q: Just a further detail, from an historical point of view. Has it come out, or is the suspicion well founded, involving some person or persons over the years?

LORD: Over the leaks?

Q: Yes.

LORD: No. It has never been determined, any more than we know who was Deep Throat in connection with the Watergate Affair. No, the answer is that this operation, which proved to be very damaging to Kissinger politically and personally, as well as embarrassing to the Nixon administration generally, also didn't turn up anything. Indeed, there were even some absurd and amusing overtones. For example, when they tapped my phone, I don't really know, but I assume that the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] people who listened in must have gotten excited when my wife was talking in Chinese to her mother. However, this turned out to be a conversation about Chinese recipes. Their telephone conversations were not of a sensitive nature.

I had some suspicions, even before I knew I had been wiretapped. I remember occasionally hearing funny sounds on my phone. Obviously, I knew that there had been damaging leaks, and I knew that they involved some issues that very few people knew about. And I was among those who knew about them. So we even used to joke about this, at times, wondering about who was listening in on our conversations, never really thinking that it was really happening.

My strong belief is that if you're working for the government and have a problem with the established policy, you debate it internally within the government. If you lose the debate, you carry the policy out faithfully, and you don't leak the issue in an effort to try to damage the policy. If the policy is of such overwhelming moral and political importance that you think it's of fundamental significance, you resign. We discussed this in the context of the Cambodian incursion of 1970. I don't believe in leaks. Now, there's a thin line between leaking and backgrounding. Backgrounding is at least authorized by higher authority in an effort to build support for a policy or try to explain it in a deniable fashion to influence the national debate. That's different from what a more junior person does when he goes out on his or her own responsibility, leaking information in an effort to damage the established or proposed policy.

So, I want to make clear that I was leaving government service shortly after that anyway, after a couple of months of consideration. I didn't leave because of the wiretapping. In retrospect, I should have stayed absolutely mum publicly, in terms of media inquiries. I remember that I appeared on TV once or twice under great pressure from the media to say something. I made a nuanced response to the questions. Nevertheless, I expressed
more tolerance for what had happened than I should have. In retrospect, I wish I had said nothing. It would be hypocritical to criticize the tapping for the reasons which I have just mentioned. However, I should not have expressed myself publicly in any way, although it was only one or two interviews indicating that I wasn't really upset. I should have been absolutely silent in public, rather than expressing partial understanding of what had been done. So I'm not particularly proud of what I did.

I've explained why I was leaving government service. Kissinger was obviously very sorry to see me leave, in view of our personal relationship and our having worked closely together on so many of these issues. He had great respect for my work. However, he understood why I was leaving. The President also greatly valued my work, especially on China and Vietnam. He wrote several nice letters to this effect.

Around June 1973, my wife and I took a trip to Portugal. I took things easy at home and spent time with my wife and children. I began thinking about what I had been through. I didn't have any master plan as to what I would do next. I went out to the Aspen Institute [in Colorado], where I gave a couple of talks on China. It was August, I believe. I was about to have a week's vacation and also engage in an intellectual seminar on great books, when I got a phone call from Kissinger. He asked me to come to California to talk to him because he was about to become Secretary of State and, in fact, wanted me back on his team. I had my usual, ambivalent reaction because I was looking forward to a little bit longer break from government service. On the other hand, I had been out of government for three months. I was excited about returning to the State Department but also sort of wished that this invitation to return to work hadn't been extended so relatively quickly.

So I went out to California. I remember that Brent Scowcroft was there, as well as Larry Eagleburger. I believe that I met Kissinger at San Clemente, where President Nixon went when he went to California. Kissinger told me that he wanted me to become the Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department. I accepted. We all began talking about the coming challenges.

During this period I was out of the service, I hadn't missed too much in the field of foreign policy. There were no China trips, so I didn't miss any of them. Kissinger had planned to go to China during the summer of 1973, but that trip had been postponed. At the time I returned to working for the government, Kissinger was trying to work out a settlement in Cambodia, with the help of the Chinese. Previous work on a settlement had started to fall apart. In any event I didn't miss a trip to China or Russia with Kissinger. The Year of Europe Initiative was launched by the Nixon administration with a speech by Kissinger. He said that it was high time to pay attention to our European allies, given the changing outline of the world and the challenges facing all of us. We had dealt so much with Russia, China, and Vietnam during the first Nixon term. That European initiative didn't get off to a very good start, but the launching of this program took place while I was out of government.

The Vietnam Peace Agreement was beginning to unravel, as Hanoi began to probe and
violate the cease-fire. Kissinger had an unsatisfactory meeting with the North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho in Paris to try and tighten up the implementation of the agreement. Meanwhile, the Watergate issue was picking up steam, though its full dimensions were certainly not yet clear.

It was in September, 1973, when Kissinger went through his confirmation hearings before the Senate. We helped him get ready for those hearings. He was closely questioned on the wiretapping and other controversial issues. He got through that, and then there was a very emotional swearing in of Kissinger as Secretary of State, at the White House. His parents, quite elderly already, were present. His mother held the Bible when he took the oath of office. It was quite a moving experience to have an immigrant become Secretary of State for the first time. A lot of people attending the ceremony were moved to tears. You might think that the person first moved to tears would be Kissinger's mother. She had escaped from the Nazi tyranny in Germany, and her son was becoming Secretary of State. We asked her afterwards: "Everyone else was crying. Why weren't you?" She said: "Well, my son absolutely forbade me to cry. He told me that it was not allowed in any way."
XIV. STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY PLANNING STAFF - GENERAL  
(1973-1977)

LORD: So I entered on my duties as Director of the Policy Planning Staff in September, 1973. Kissinger made it very clear to me that he saw this position as an important post. He wanted someone as Director of Policy Planning who knew his way of thinking and that of President Nixon and who had a conceptual approach to foreign policy. Of course, we had worked very closely together for years, and he thought that I fit the bill in that respect. The job of Director of the Policy Planning Staff is an Assistant Secretary position, but it doesn't require Senate approval, so I didn't have confirmation hearings for this job. Kissinger made it clear that this position was not window-dressing but that he saw the Policy Planning function as an important operation. That was consistent with his approach to foreign policy, the strategic, conceptual, and long term approach, as opposed to some others. We have had many lawyers as Secretary who deal with issues on a short term, day to day basis but don't try to develop a strategic, conceptual approach.

Let me be a little immodest at the beginning with regard to my staff. Others can judge the work we did over the following three and one-half years. When I left Policy Planning in January, 1977, we received a collective Distinguished Honor Award, which is the highest award you can get in the State Department. Frankly, that award could have been given to me, personally, but I told Kissinger that I would prefer that it be awarded to the entire Policy Planning Staff. So the whole staff received it, because this was a collective effort.

I would like to start right off by quickly listing some of the people that I had on that staff. Those who follow the Foreign Service will recognize that this was a very distinguished group. At the time they were quite young and unknown, in many cases. Others were at the mid-career level, while still others were more senior. Almost all of them went on to very elevated careers, and many of them became Ambassadors or Under Secretaries. I won't list every name, but I do want to get this down, because I am very proud of the group we assembled. I purposely looked for a spectrum of views, both liberal and conservative, to the extent that you can determine that in the Foreign Service and other US Government agencies. I tried to recruit younger personnel. I lowered the required age level greatly from what it had previously been; the average age went down many, many years. What I inherited is no reflection on my predecessor. My predecessor didn't have the kind of Secretarial interest in policy planning that the change from Secretary Rogers to Secretary Kissinger was going to bring. He also didn't have a particularly strong staff, because it wasn't that important an office. Again, I'm not criticizing my predecessor. He just had a less bountiful hand to play with than I was given, when I worked for Kissinger.

I also looked for a mix of backgrounds. I wanted the majority of the people assigned to the office to be Foreign Service officers, for a variety of reasons, including morale. I also felt that it was important to bring in some academics from outside the government, as well as some people from the Department of Defense, the CIA, the economic agencies, to a certain extent, and USIA [United States Information Agency]. I wanted to have people who, above all, could think and fit into a policy planning mode and not just be operational in outlook, and could write well. I thought that personnel should be the first
thing to move on, because it is the most important. If you want to do a good job, you get
good people, and you delegate authority to them. In every job, the first two things I do are
to design goals and recruit the best people.

So that's what I gave my greatest early attention to, lining up the best people. I was also
humane to those people I inherited and whom I wanted to see assigned elsewhere. I
talked to a lot of people around the building and elsewhere and found out who was strong
on the staff. I began thinking of people to bring in. I thought moving quickly on changes
was more humane, rather than letting people wonder what their future was going to be. I
made up my mind to let those know early on that they would be leaving the office. I
explained that this was no reflection on them. I was bringing in a new team. I helped
them get other jobs. So within about a week of my taking the job, I alerted about ten
people that they would be leaving the office. This was not a lot of fun, but I thought that
this was a better way to go about the process. It didn't involve a loss of face. It just
involved a new person coming in and making changes. I wanted to get the best possible
people, and, indeed, I had a mandate from Kissinger, which was one of my assets, that I
could line up the best people. He said that he would back me in competition for the
assignment of personnel with the regional and functional bureaus. If I was trying to get a
good person assigned, I could use my clout with Henry Kissinger to get that person for
the Policy Planning Staff.

Just to tick off some of the names involved. I won't elaborate, as it would take a lot of
time. My Deputies over the years included Sam Lewis, Reg Bartholomew, and Nick
Veliotes. Although not officially my Deputies, I used Mike Armacost and Tom Thornton
de facto in this capacity. Going by region, for Europe and Russia, among the people that I
had working with me were Tom Simons, Jennone Walker, John Kornblum, and, of
course, Reg Bartholomew. All of these people have since become Ambassadors. In Asia I
had Mike Armacost, as well as myself, Tom Thornton for South Asia, and Douglas Pike
for Indochina.

Q: Douglas Pike was quite well known for his studies on the Viet Cong.

LORD: Absolutely, yes. He represented the more conservative part of my staff, compared
to some of the others. For the Western Hemisphere, in addition to Sam Lewis himself, I
had Luigi Einaudi. For the Middle East I had Bob Oakley, as well as Sam Lewis and
Nick Veliotes, all of whom later became Ambassadors. For Africa I had a man named
William DuPree, who also helped me on resources for the State Department. For
political-military, arms control, and non-proliferation issues I had Jan Kalicki and Jerry
Kahan in addition to Bartholomew. On economic issues I had Jeff Garten, Chuck Frank,
Paul Boeker, as well as Sam Lewis. On human rights matters, as well as Europe, I had
Sandy Vogelgesang. On speech writing, I had Charlie Hill and Mark Palmer. I won't
elaborate, but I think that people will see that in each case they went on to serve as
Ambassadors, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, etc.

Q: A significant number of them have also been interviewed by us.
LORD: Yes, that's right. So I'm pretty proud of having selected them. I keep debating with others as to whether this was the greatest staff ever assembled. I think that the Kissinger staff on the NSC [National Security Council] staff probably was the best group I ever served with. However, I have never heard of a staff in the State Department that matched this one.

Now for an effective program; this gets more philosophical about the role of S/P [Policy Planning Staff], and I think that's of interest here.

Q: S/P being the Policy Planning Staff.

LORD: Yes. First of all, I changed the name. When I inherited the Policy Planning Staff, it was called S/PC, for Policy and Coordination Staff. I just didn't like the word "Coordination," which looked a little mechanical to me. Frankly, it was also a little misleading because we didn't really coordinate policy among all the agencies involved as much as we might have liked to do, because we were looking ahead. So I simplified the name of the office and changed it back to what it was under George Kennan, who was the first Director of Policy Planning and a man I greatly respected. So I called the office "S/P" for Policy Planning.

I also made sure that I talked individually to all of the former Directors of S/P, including George Kennan, Paul Nitze, George McGhee, and many other distinguished people. I read up about the Policy Planning function. Of course, I also talked to Kissinger and current and past staff members about how we would go about performing our functions. I studied various documents, and so on.

Now, the assets that you need to be effective as a policy planner are the following. Sometimes the policy planning staff has been important, with George Kennan’s time being a very good example. At other times it has been essentially window dressing and was there so that a Secretary of State could say: "I've got someone looking ahead," but he or she hasn't always paid attention to it. At other times the Director of S/P has been personally close to the Secretary of State, but has been primarily operational and has focused on one or two issues, spending a lot of time on them, as opposed to employing the staff fully. At times they have even had clout with the Secretary of State across the board, but did not really engage the staff of S/P. They have written papers that people have not read. They were not really engaged, as a staff, in supporting the Secretary. So there have been different ways of doing this job.

I had a lot of advantages, leaving aside how well we did, which others can judge. I certainly had the assets needed in this job, which included the following. First, the Secretary of State under whom I served had a conceptual outlook and thought in a strategic, global, and long term sense, as opposed to someone who is more legal and tactical. Certainly, Kissinger filled the bill in this sense. I'll elaborate further on that. Related to that, you need a Secretary of State who keeps looking ahead and who wants to know the long term implications of nearer term issues. He also should look to S/P to play a devil's advocate role in challenging what is being done, to see whether it is a mistake or
could be done better, and to do contingency planning.

Next, you need close, personal ties between the Director of Policy Planning and the Secretary of State. The Director of S/P should have the confidence of the Secretary and should be someone who understands his or her thinking and has a sense of how to deal with that person. Of course, Kissinger and I had become very close personally, as well as professionally.

Next, related somewhat to the foregoing, is access to the Secretary. The Director of S/P generally has to have access to the Secretary of State. It helps if there are one or two issues that the Director is almost operational on, as I continued to be on China. This gave me a natural, regular access on that issue. However, beyond that, you need to have general access, whether this involves sitting in on important staff meetings, traveling with the Secretary or more generally knowing what is going on, in global terms. I had much more regular access on all these fronts. This is important to demonstrate to other people in the Department, including Assistant Secretaries, that the Director of S/P is a player in the game, so that they will cooperate and pay attention to him or her. It also keeps the Director in tune with the Secretary’s thinking and gives him regular opportunities to weigh in on various topics.

The next consideration is that the Director of S/P needs to have access to all classified information, including very sensitive information. We all have access to classified information, but the question is whether the Director of S/P is seeing the Eyes Only traffic and other, very sensitive information. Is he seeing the code word material and highly restricted telegrams, and so on? I had that access as well.

Finally, the Director of S/P needs a mandate from the Secretary to recruit the best possible staff, because you often have to compete with others, including Assistant Secretaries of regional or functional bureaus, to get those people. Again, I had that mandate. Kissinger, in appointing me, stated that I would have “top priority on the ablest young people in the Foreign Service.”

In short, in all of these areas needed, to do an effective job in the policy planning field, I had those advantages, from the very beginning.

Then you have to decide how to approach the job, obviously in consultation with the Secretary of State himself. Here was my approach. First, I saw my staff as, above all, shaping and supporting the policies of the Secretary of State and, through him, of the President. Also I saw my role as supporting the various senior officials on the Seventh Floor generally, where the Undersecretaries have their offices. That is where the Undersecretaries for Political, Economic, and Security Affairs are located. It was important for them to feel that they had access to a staff in S/P to which they could turn for a different point of view or to question something which they are getting from the Sixth and Fifth Floors [where the geographic and functional bureaus have their offices].

It seemed to me that the role of S/P was to be global in scope and to have a Presidential, Secretarial, and Seventh Floor perspective, as opposed to the specific regional or
functional approaches of the Sixth Floor and the various Assistant Secretaries. (This was not unlike my personal global role for Kissinger on the NSC staff.) This is not a value judgment, but S/P should be able to look at an issue when, for example, the European Bureau pushes one point of view, and the African or Economic Bureau pushes another one. What they recommend may be good for their region but how do their recommendations fit into the overall priorities of the Department and White House? This is not so much for the domestic, political implications which are up to the political level people to decide, but rather for S/P to say that if you do this or that, it might have an impact over there. This is the kind of perspective that the President or the Secretary of State has to have, as opposed to an Assistant Secretary on the Sixth Floor. So I also kept that in mind.

Now the key issue always faced in policy planning, and I faced it as Director of Policy Planning, is how to steer between the two extremes that you want to avoid? One extreme might be called an Ivory Tower academic approach, where you write papers saying what the world's going to look like in 10 years and what we ought to do in preparation for that. A busy Secretary of State, no matter how conceptual his or her approach, either doesn't have the time or the interest, or he or she doesn't quite know what to do with this approach when they have it. It's apt to sit in his in-box.

The other extreme is to become overly operational and duplicate what the typical regional or functional bureau is doing. This might involve drafting cables and seeing foreign Ambassadors. You don't want to do that. However, you want to have an impact on policy. You don't want to be Ivory Tower academic, but you shouldn't be doing what the regional and functional bureaus should be doing. You have to find a way to steer between those extremes and be relevant to policy, but free of operational details.

One decision which I made, and I believe that it paid off, was to be cooperative with the regional and functional bureaus and to work with them. In fact, to be an asset for them. That was the carrot. I had the carrot because I had all of the advantages I mentioned, in terms of access to the Secretary of State and to information. The regional and functional bureaus knew that I was obviously plugged in to the Secretary, personally and professionally, and in terms of information. This could be an asset to them. Knowing his thinking, I could help them persuade the Secretary of State, where I agreed with the bureau concerned, on what should be done. However, of course, I had a hidden stick. If a given bureau tried to cut me out of what I thought I deserved to have access to, and if they weren't cooperative with me, they knew that I could go to the Secretary with my own memorandum or through my own, verbal approach to Secretary Kissinger. So I had that hidden stick.

I was very conscious of the need to project a very cooperative, positive approach to the regional and functional bureaus. I did this partly because I thought that I could be more effective that way, and partly because I thought that this was the right thing to do. I thought that it was good for the Secretary not to have to fight a lot of bureaucratic battles. Partly also, I was sensitive to the fact that I was in my early 30s and was dealing with senior people whom I respected, who were 10, 20, or 25 years older than I and with
greater experience than I had. I knew that I was seen as close to Kissinger. In terms of my personal style I just didn't want to be seen as some young, arrogant punk using his access to Secretary Kissinger at their expense. In most cases I had genuine respect for the regional and functional bureaus and the people in them in the Foreign Service. I had been a Foreign Service officer. So I thought that it was important to draw on their expertise and perspectives.

My whole approach therefore was based on seeking cooperation with others in the Department of State. This attitude worked better with some bureaus than others. I usually didn't have to play hard ball. On the whole, I felt that we in S/P were allies of the bureaus and not adversaries.

I'll give just one, specific example of where I was able to be helpful. The Bureau of African Affairs was trying to get a change in American policy toward southern Africa and to be somewhat more sensitive to racial questions and minority rights in South Africa, Rhodesia, and so on. Their memoranda to Secretary Kissinger emphasized the utility of being on the side of justice, the aspirations of the people of Africa, and so on. They also even mentioned some domestic payoff in the United States. These were legitimate concerns. However, knowing Kissinger as well as I did, I knew that approach, by itself, was not going to persuade him. He is a balance of power, realpolitical type, and isn't overly preoccupied with human rights and so on. By itself, this approach was not going to be particularly persuasive.

I also believed that we should change our policy toward southern Africa and take some initiatives in this direction. However, I urged the African Bureau to stress in their memoranda to Secretary Kissinger or our joint memoranda the geopolitical advantages of changing our African policy. Namely, in competing for influence in Africa with the Russians and, to a certain extent, with the Cubans, who had troops in Angola and so on. I said that if the Black African nations could see that we were trying to be helpful on some of these issues, like Rhodesia and South Africa, we would have greater geopolitical influence in Africa, as well as meeting local aspirations. That's an example of how I was able to help the African Bureau with their argumentation, since I knew Kissinger's thinking. I don't want to be patronizing or condescending. A lot of the officers in the African Bureau were perfectly able to come to these same conclusions on their own. In any event, our joint-efforts paid off — in the famous Lusaka speech coming out more firmly for justice in Africa; intensive travel by Kissinger to the continent; a Rhodesian settlement, etc.

Q: You advised them to use the right slang or use the right pushbutton words. That is, words that would appeal to Kissinger.

LORD: Exactly. To place the emphasis on building up our influence in the continent, versus the Soviets and Cubans. So, on the whole, I had a very cooperative relationship with the Bureau of African Affairs. I would have my people sit in on the staff meetings of the Bureau of African Affairs. This was true generally. For example, when there were staff meetings in a regional or functional bureau, one of my people would normally be
there. The idea was to get a sense of what was going on and to report back to me. But my purpose also was to try to be helpful to the people in the Bureaus and to relay Seventh Floor moods and feelings, not to mention maintaining the influence of S/P.

Q: I was wondering, as you mentioned this, whether you felt a certain sense of exhilaration within the geographic bureaus that you had someone who was paying more attention to their concerns? Quite frankly, former Secretary of State William Rogers, as I've mentioned before, was a very nice man and a very capable lawyer. However, foreign affairs are just not his strong point. There was a feeling, particularly with Henry Kissinger in the NSC, that the State Department had been superseded. Did you sense this when you returned to the State Department?

LORD: Yes, together with some apprehension as to how to deal with this juggernaut, as some people thought of Kissinger. That's a good point about the attitude in the Department of State toward Kissinger. There were mixed feelings about him. There was a feeling that now the Department of State was going to be the center of the action. There was a feeling that it had been cut out when Kissinger was in the White House. Remember that Kissinger was still wearing two hats at this point. He was Secretary of State and also National Security Adviser for another year, which was a somewhat absurd arrangement, in many ways. He wound up often sending a memorandum to himself. The feeling in the Department of State was that Secretary Kissinger had the ear of President Nixon. Kissinger was a giant figure already, in terms of what he had done in the first few years in the Nixon administration. He was acknowledged as being smart as hell and conceptual in his approach. It was believed that he would drive the Department of State toward excellence. Many people in the Department felt that they would be at the center of the action and that what they did would count. They knew that they would be dealing with an interesting, major figure. Those were all of the pluses.

The minuses, of course, related to Kissinger's secretive nature. There was a fear, which was borne out to a certain extent, and which I will get to, that a lot of people in the Department would be cut out of access to sensitive information. Ambassadors would get by-passed. As a result, there was concern that they wouldn't know what was going on. The fear was there would only be a small number of people in the Department who would be dealing with Henry Kissinger. As I've already indicated, he could be very rough with people in intellectual debate and cut them down if he thought that they didn't handle themselves well. He would make some people nervous. I'm sure that there was some sense that the whole wiretapping episode and other aspects of his personality were less than ideal. So I think that there was some ambivalence about the arrival of Henry Kissinger.

However, I think that, basically, morale in the Department of State and among FSOs [Foreign Service officers] is never perfect. I think that most people in the Department of State were excited by the basic point that the Department was going to be the center of the action, even though they might be somewhat uncomfortable about some of Kissinger's stylistic dimensions.
Relevant to that, and I want to make this point very clearly, is the fact that Kissinger had respect for the Foreign Service before he came to the Department of State. I think that he had more respect for the Foreign Service than, say, President Nixon. Most of his NSC staff was FSOs. Kissinger made clear from the very beginning that he was going to use the Foreign Service, because he knew, based on his operations in the White House in which he had tended to cut out the State Department, that much of the Foreign Service was going to be suspicious of him. Even though they were happy about being the center of power now, they resented what had happened before. So he went out of his way in his rhetoric to say that he wanted to use the Foreign Service. However, beyond that, and much more important than that, which you would expect from a PR [Public Relations] standpoint, he understood that a Secretary of State, with a global mandate now, just couldn't handle his job by himself and a few of his key advisers, many of whom he just brought over from the NSC [National Security Council], like myself. He knew that he had to depend on a much larger team. It was in his self-interest and that of President Nixon to take advantage of the professionalism, experience, and the reach, as well as the numbers of people in the Foreign Service. Therefore, he had no choice but to make greater use of the Foreign Service.

Kissinger developed great respect for the Foreign Service in many ways, although he still felt that many members of the Foreign Service were too cautious or tactical in their outlook. He never lost that view. He obviously had high opinions of some and low opinions of others, as we all do, depending on whom he worked with. From the beginning he understood that he had to find a mix between continuing to work closely with his colleagues from the NSC and he also wanted to involve the Foreign Service in what he was doing. The conventional wisdom in some quarters is that Kissinger came into the department and brought with him Larry Eagleburger, Winston Lord, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Bill Hyland, and Hal Saunders and that they were going to run the State Department. That just isn't true. He did bring all of us into the State Department, and he used all of us very much. However, he did this in conjunction with the Foreign Service.

First, keep in mind that most of the names I've mentioned had either been in the Foreign Service already or in other parts of the bureaucracy anyway. It's not as if these were political appointees who didn't know anything about foreign policy. Many of us had our own ties to the Foreign Service.

What Kissinger did, as Secretary of State, was to continue to work closely with us, but also with Foreign Service officers. He promoted and used as Assistant Secretaries and Undersecretaries the very best people in the Foreign Service. I'm afraid that as I discuss this matter, I'm leaving some names out and I'm embarrassed about that. I should include Phil Habib, both as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and later Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I guess that Joe Sisco, who became Undersecretary, was not an FSO [Foreign Service officer] but was a semi-FSO.

Q: Well, Sisco had been an FSO, but he never served abroad.

LORD: That's right. Many people thought of him as an FSO. Roy Atherton worked on
Middle Eastern affairs. Tom Enders specialized in economic and Latin American affairs and tragically died a few years ago. There was also Arthur Hartman for Europe. These are some of the best Foreign Service officers. I realize that I'm leaving a lot of very capable people out. I believe that in almost every case, at least as far as I can remember, the Assistant Secretaries were FSOs. Some of the Undersecretaries were also FSOs. As I said, Larry Eagleburger and I had also been FSOs.

So Kissinger would have people on the Seventh Floor who were close to him, but they worked very closely with the FSOs. For example, in my case with regard to China, specifically, I worked very closely with Phil Habib, and then Art Hummel, Habib's successor as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. Regarding Middle Eastern affairs, Hal Saunders worked very closely with Roy Atherton, as well as Joe Sisco. On European and Russian affairs, Sonnenfeldt and Bill Hyland worked very closely with Arthur Hartman. The Assistant Secretaries and the FSOs had very broad access to information and were as much involved as any of us who sat on the Seventh Floor. So there was a very nice mix of FSOs and other people that Kissinger had brought over from the NSC. For these FSOs, of course, this was very exhilarating and exciting.

Probably, when you got to the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary, the morale situation was the same, most of them being closely involved in policies/all of them FSOs. I think that there was still some resentment, say, at the Country Director level and below that they were not so directly involved. Kissinger believed in not having very large meetings. If he was discussing particularly sensitive issues, he often would have only the relevant Assistant Secretary there. So the regional bureaus were clearly involved; it was not just Kissinger's insiders that attended these meetings. But he would also notice if a Country Director or below were sitting in on these meetings. He was always worried about leaks and sensitivities. I remember arguing with him about this to no avail. Others also talked to him about this issue, saying that this was not the way to do business. The Assistant Secretary would have to rely on his or her Country Director who would have more detailed knowledge of a particular nation or issue. The Kissinger arrangement was bad for morale to a certain extent. And it was not particularly efficient. Just to take a specific example. If you're meeting with the Foreign Minister of a given country, and the Assistant Secretary is the only person from the regional bureau attending it, the Assistant Secretary has to take the notes and prepare the memorandum of conversation. So it's a waste of senior people's time. It's good for the Country Director or below to take that burden away and also to be kept fully informed and have 'face' with his foreign counterparts. Attendance at some of these meetings would be on an individual, need to know basis, if there was a particular need.

At my regular staff meetings with about 25 officers assigned to S/P, which I thought were important as a management tool and were good for morale purposes, I would review what happened at the meetings with Secretary Kissinger and what was happening in the Department more generally. I felt that individuals should know more about what was going on with our foreign policy and on the Seventh Floor, and not just in his or her area of responsibility. On sensitive matters I would brief those officers on my staff most directly involved. However, I never let Kissinger know how much I was telling all of my
people. I needed their help, I needed their thinking. This, in turn, helped Kissinger and the national interest. I wanted to promote good morale. I also told them that, because of the sensitivity of some of the subjects, I counted on their discretion.

_Q: The Foreign Service is a little like the United States Marine Corps. That is, once you're a Marine Corps officer, you're always a Marine Corps officer. In other words, once a Foreign Service officer, you're always a Foreign Service officer. I would have thought, particularly during the early period of your service back in the Department of State, you would have been buttonholed by a lot of relatively senior people who would ask you: "Tell me, how do I deal with this guy?" That is, they were referring to Kissinger. I would have thought that you would have found yourself in the position of being an interpreter, a fixer, or conciliator._

LORD: That's absolutely right. This happened, particularly during the first few months, but really throughout my time in the Department after my service as a Special Assistant to Kissinger on the NSC staff. I had, after all, been Kissinger's closest associate in the White House.

I think that it's fair to say that in the State Department, on a day to day basis, Larry Eagleburger dealt much more with Kissinger than I did. I was in Policy Planning, not operations, but I had regular access to Kissinger, saw him almost every day, sat in on various meetings, and went with him on about half of his trips. He said I could go with him on any one of them, but I had other things to do, and chose trips selectively. Whereas Larry Eagleburger was Kissinger's operational guy. He was Kissinger's Executive Assistant and also became Undersecretary of State for Management. Eagleburger was the man who would deal with other U.S. Government agencies at a high level. He was the man who had to deliver the bad news and was the hatchet man on tough issues within the Department itself. He was the political antenna for Kissinger and saw him continually.

So, although I remained extremely close to Kissinger and was one of his closest associates, on a day to day basis Eagleburger was to be found more closely by Kissinger's side. In terms of hours spent with him, sensitivities, and politics, Eagleburger was closer to Kissinger. Nevertheless, people would come to talk to me and, I am sure, went to see Larry Eagleburger as well. Larry was a Foreign Service officer and was popular in the Foreign Service. He knew the Foreign Service and always defended it with Kissinger, as did I. Actually, the Foreign Service didn't need that much defending. As I said, Henry Kissinger knew that he had to use the Foreign Service, and he respected it.

So people would come to me and ask me what kind of arguments would appeal to Kissinger and the best way to go about approaching him. I always tried to be helpful, in the national interest and in the interests of Kissinger and the various bureaus in the State Department that were asking my views. Also, I like to get along with people. I thought that made me more popular but also probably more effective, if they figured that I was cooperative, as opposed to outmaneuvering them and using my insider status to unfair advantage.
Q: There was one thing which was so picky about the Baker organization in the State Department and maybe, to some extent, the present situation under Secretary Madeline Albright. There was a coterie which formed around the Secretary of State which almost had, as its main goal, to promote the Secretary of State. They get a little bit protective, like a mother, or a wife, around the Secretary. This happens all the time.

LORD: Sure. Let the record show that those are your words, not mine! I think that there have been different examples, as you say, and I didn't work with all of these administrations, so I can't pretend to be an expert. However, I agree. I think that with Secretary Baker there were a few, selected people, very able, by the way, on the whole, whether it was Zoellick, Tutweiler, or Dennis Ross. These three come to mind. That's also true with Madeline Albright, whether it's Rubin, Shokas, or Sherman, to give some examples.

As far as I could tell the other extreme was the George Shultz operation. As far as I could determine, and I was sitting in China at the time as Ambassador, Shultz relied on the Foreign Service almost completely, with very little inside team coterie. I think that Shultz was a very good Secretary of State, although that's not the only reason.

Kissinger was somewhere in between, as I think I've already indicated. Namely, he did have some insiders, like Larry Eagleburger, myself, Sonnenfeldt, Hyland, and so on. However, he also worked with the geographic and functional bureaus. The bureaus ran policy, in conjunction with Kissinger. On a day to day basis, we relied, for example, on Arthur Hartman, Tom Enders, and Phil Habib to formulate policy, with help from the Seventh Floor. I think that Kissinger was sort of in between. He had enough people that he felt that he trusted and had worked with over the years. These would give him solid advice. He counted on their loyalty. They helped to implement his thinking. He also knew that he had to rely on the Foreign Service and drew on the best Foreign Service officers and worked with them. So I don't think that he suffered from reliance on the inside club mentality. On the other hand, he didn't fully rely on the Foreign Service without some help from his own people, as Shultz did.

Q: I had something in mind a little beyond that. That is, it turns on something that is very important in the United States, the public relations side. In other words, trying to put the best spin on what the Secretary of State is doing. Secretaries of State often bring bad news, because good news doesn't mean much to them. The world, after all, is a messy place.

I'm referring to these others, and particularly the group around Secretary Baker, but people around other Secretaries of State as well. I had the feeling that they wanted to keep their man from being tainted with any bad news. So I was talking about a public relations spin. What was the thrust of the group around Secretary Kissinger?

LORD: Those are your words, not mine, but I think that there is no question about it. It is human nature and also important to try to ensure that the Secretary of State is popular. You don't have an important constituency to rely on, as the Secretary of Agriculture or
the Secretary of Labor has, for example. To be effective in Washington, you have to have a good press. This also helps a Secretary abroad. So these are not illegitimate goals. Of course, if you get to the point where you are preoccupied with PR [Public Relations] considerations, you're short changing American interests, undercutting the President, or being unfair. That would be a mistake, and I won't make those judgments.

There's no question that Secretaries Baker and Albright are two examples of people who are very conscious of their image and can get quite nervous if they think that someone else is upstaging them. Good examples of this are Secretary Albright and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Ambassador Tom Pickering and Secretary Baker.

Q: It was Secretary Baker, who got him out of his post at the UN.

LORD: The Baker-Pickering relationship is a good example. Of course, the UN seems to be a particular place where this issue comes up.

I understand the thrust of what you're saying. I think that in Secretary Kissinger's case, he was clearly worried about PR. However, I would say that the difference here, although obviously Secretaries Baker and Albright spent a lot of time on PR, personally, is that Kissinger was basically his own PR guy. Of course, people like Larry Eagleburger would get on the phone and his press people would try to spin things, as any Secretary of State would have them do.

However, Kissinger spent a lot of time, both at the NSC and, of course, at the State Department, working with the press and working on the public dimensions of foreign policy. He did this for obvious reasons, the ones I've mentioned, and some reasons which were self-serving in some cases. Also, he did it conceptually to try to explain, to our domestic audience and also abroad, what we were trying to do in the field of foreign policy. He spent a lot of time figuring how to get across these themes. At the NSC he did mostly backgrounders. He didn't have a formal press conference until the Peace is at Hand conference on Vietnam in the fall of 1972, because he was the National Security Adviser. As Secretary of State, of course, he held press conferences and gave testimony before Congressional committees, which he didn't do, when he was in the White House. He gave a lot of speeches, interviews and backgrounders in the US, abroad, on planes. He worked on several levels. He didn’t really rely too much on spin-masters, though Eaglebruger and his press people worked at this.

He also thought that this was important because the kind of foreign policies which he and President Nixon were trying to conduct were complex, and Americans were not so comfortable with them. This meant especially policies based on the maintenance of a balance of power, which he thought was more of a European approach to foreign policy. He was always concerned about the Wilsonian tendency to advocate missionary type policies. He also felt that during this period, and I'll get back to this, in the wake of the Vietnam War and the Watergate Affair, the United States was facing a very difficult domestic situation. On the one hand, one reaction to the Vietnam War and the Watergate Affair was that America was sufficiently flawed itself that we ought to pay attention to
our own problems and not get that much involved in the world. This was the line that
Senator McGovern [Democratic Party candidate for President in 1972] emphasized,
suggesting that we were somewhat evil ourselves, as witnessed by the Vietnam War and
the Watergate Affair and therefore that we weren't good enough for the world.

There was a contrary tendency, among neo-conservatives and others, that Kissinger had
been snookered [i.e., deceived] by the Russians. They were a little bit more nervous about
the opening to China and felt that we should be more robust in many ways. So it was a
complicated domestic scene to deal with. Against the backdrop of American idealism and
not paying attention to the balance of power, because we didn't have to worry about it,
thanks to friendly neighbors, continental resources, and two oceans, Kissinger thought
that it was necessary to work hard introducing realism. This was in addition to the PR and
popularity reasons which I have described. It was Kissinger's view that, by virtue of
geography, America was blessed in many ways. We were separated by the Pacific and
Atlantic Oceans from other powers. We had unthreatening neighbors, on the whole,
Canada and Mexico. Therefore, America had the luxury of not having to worry about the
balance of power throughout most of its history, unlike Europe. For geographic and other
reasons the European countries had to worry about which country was dominating the
scene. Kissinger felt that it was necessary to introduce America, including the Congress
and the people, to these themes of American national interest and the balance of power.
He wished to counter the trends of dictating to the world what should be done and
withdrawing from the world, out of a sense of guilt. We should lead but our allies and
friends should bear more responsibilities in an increasingly multipolar world.

For all of these reasons Kissinger paid a lot of attention to the domestic side. As it turned
out, I would say that our biggest problem, and I think that Kissinger would admit this
himself, was that he didn't pay enough attention and certainly did not express himself
enough on the continuing need for idealism and some promotion of values, in addition to
the balance of power. He would state the need to have both and, in fact, gave a major
speech on morality and pragmatism in Minneapolis. I remember helping him to draft this
speech on this very subject, emphasizing that you have to have both ideals and
pragmatism, the national interest and a well developed sense of values. It was a very
thoughtful speech, and, as always, was pure agony to produce.

Clearly, Kissinger came under attack from both the Left and the Right, as did Presidents
Nixon and Ford, for not paying enough attention to human rights or at least values. He
seemed too pragmatic. Anyway, for all of these reasons he worked on the domestic scene.

To get back to your original question, I think that no one spent more time than Secretary
Baker in worrying about these issues. It wasn't just that his troops were going out there;
Baker was working on these issues himself.

Q: He was a real figure. The other Secretaries we mentioned frankly were not really
much fun to associate with. I don't mean that they were objects of fun, but rather they
were not particularly interesting people.
LORD: That's true. Kissinger was a huge and colorful figure, one the media loved to cover. That's a very good point, though Kissinger’s reputation was somewhat distorted. For example, Kissinger's contacts with women were totally exaggerated. Kissinger was not a ladies man, although before he was married, he had dates with various actresses. More importantly, he was brilliant, controversial, and tough. Therefore, there were great emotions expressed about him. He was, however, attractive to journalists traveling with him and covering him because he was so conceptual in his approach. He spent much time with journalists, trying to explain our policies. He had a sense of humor, which is very important. He could engage people and was really quite extraordinary. So, for all of these reasons, he had a well-defined, public persona. I'll come back a little bit later to Kissinger's role as Secretary of State.

I've already talked about the assets I had and my basic approach to the various bureaus in the Department of State. The next issue to address is the role which I saw for policy planning. I thought about this a lot. I saw a distinction between these extremes of Ivory Tower academia, and long term papers irrelevant to policymaking and operational activities which may be relevant to policy but which really don't serve the Secretary or the President and just duplicate the other bureaus.

Among the roles I saw, and some of these overlapped, was the need constantly to look ahead and to consider problems over the horizon. Ideally, the bureaus should be doing this as well, but they are so consumed with day to day problems and operations that it is very difficult for them to look one, two, or three years in the future, ask themselves what's coming at us, and how we go about dealing with it.

This could involve a specific event coming up, such as looking ahead and saying that a world conference will be held on a given issue a year from now. We could consider how to begin to get ready for that. All of this would be done in conjunction with the bureaus, but my staff and I had the time to worry about these matters. By contrast, the bureaus were heavily focused on drafting cables and seeing Ambassadors on a short term basis. Or the next NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] foreign ministers or summit meeting will come up in a few months. How would we get ready for that? Either that or the next UN General Assembly meeting. The bureaus have to worry about these matters as well, but Policy Planning could make sure that either the bureaus were thinking about this systematically, or we could help them think about it in an organized way. A few times we actually went through the process of preparing alert lists, always in coordination with the bureaus. I always wanted to cooperate with them. I would write: "These events are coming up, Mr. Secretary, over the next year," or the next two years and send him a list. We would indicate some of the key issues likely to come up - a conference, election, or anniversary, for example - and how we were getting ready to deal with them. We could say that we were working with such and such a bureau on this subject, or another bureau might be doing this work. Or we could say that nothing is being done yet and we could suggest that the Secretary ask a bureau to do this or that. The idea was to try to stay ahead of events.

Q: What was the role of INR [Bureau of Intelligence Research]? I would have thought
that it would have been a good backstop for you in preparing in depth analyses of an area.

LORD: That's a very good point. Of course, in the case of INR, we had Bill Hyland as Director. He was a very good INR Director. We would often prepare joint memoranda on a given subject. It wasn't just a matter left to the regional or functional bureaus to give their judgments, not only on what was coming up but what was apt to happen. INR was not supposed to be recommending policy. They were supposed to be sort of like the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] in that respect, describing and analyzing situations. Of course, Hyland could take off his INR hat and give Kissinger advice on policy, particularly with regard to Russia and Europe. We would often do joint memoranda with other bureaus, and I would certainly work closely with INR on things like the alert list or anything else involving looking ahead. That's a very good point.

Certain S/P roles overlap. For example, contingency planning. This could involve consideration of what we can do if something goes wrong or, instead of this happening, something else happens. For example, we might reach an agreement with such and such a country, and they start to violate the agreement. Or things are looking uneasy in this or that country. What do we do if the regime is overthrown? We did that kind of contingency planning.

Certainly, we wouldn't always do this ourselves but we would try to think systematically about a given issue and make sure that the bureau involved was looking at this contingency, or we would work with the bureau or as part of some interagency process.

Then, another area where we had a lot to do was to take the lead on issues which cut across the interests of several bureaus or several agencies. Let's say, nuclear non-proliferation, where you have the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the regional bureaus covering the countries concerned, and the Bureau of Scientific and Technological Affairs, which gets into nuclear issues. The Bureaus of Economics, Congressional Relations, and Public Affairs might be involved as well. This is just one example.

Or take the energy issue, where you have the Bureau of Economic Affairs involved, but the key regional bureaus are also affected. Or dealing with the Third World generally on matters which cut across the concerns of several bureaus. Or the Law of the Sea, which involves the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department but there are also military and economic interests to consider as well.

I saw an opportunity, and we managed to do this, to be the leader among several bureaus on some of these issues. There might be a variety of interests involved here. You might give one bureau authority to handle such a matter, as opposed to another bureau, like the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, versus a regional bureau. But this gives an issue an emphasis which is unfair; in this case, you may damage our relations with some country in terms of bilateral interests. Or take the subject of arms control. If you give the responsibility to the regional bureau, then the issue of arms control gets less attention because the regional bureau may not want to hurt their clients.
So Policy Planning could serve as a sort of honest broker, sitting on the Seventh Floor, looking at the issue from the global perspective of the President and the Secretary of State. The bureaus could feel that, at least, we would be an honest or somewhat more detached, e.g., on human rights.

So, particularly on issues which I have mentioned, which cut across the interests of several bureaus, we often took the lead and made sure that every bureau with an interest in a given matter was fairly represented in discussing a given subject and had an opportunity to express its views. We would then send a memo to the Secretary, indicating the views of the various bureaus. Just as the NSC [National Security Council] is supposed to do that for the government as a whole. The NSC could send a memorandum to the President, stating that this is what the various agencies think. In policy planning we tried to perform that function within the Department of State and do it as fairly as we could, without losing our influence on the process. We would surely have our own views and make these clear while presenting the others fairly. The Secretary deserves to have a fair presentation of views on a given issue.

A lot of these issues, including somewhat newer issues such as Law of the Sea, energy, non-proliferation, and the Third World, may not sound new now, but they certainly were in the mid 1970s. On these issues we often took the lead, and our people had the time and chance to give serious thought to some of these matters with which the US didn't have that much historical experience. That was also true of the allocation of resources. We took the lead on that, together with the management people, when they were looking for a substantive input to the financial aspects. Here again we provided the global, more detached perspective and therefore took the lead.

One issue which received attention and where S/P played a central role along with the economic bureau and others, was energy. There was an energy crisis in 1974 and Kissinger convened a major conference in Washington of the importing nations. This was heavily European, and I remember some very hostile jostling between Kissinger and the obnoxious French foreign minister, Jobert. Kissinger called in David Bruce and others as counselors. Over several months there were many consultations, speeches, new projects that were developed, essentially to gain leverage against OPEC. S/P and I were in the middle of this.

Another area was to act as devil's advocate. I always instructed my people to see whether a policy was going off course or whether there was something better that we could do. Again, I always worked in cooperation with the bureau involved. I wouldn't blind side them. However, I wanted to make sure that we didn't just continue along the current course, if there were some problems with it. We would do this, as I say, in conjunction with the bureau, if necessary. If there was resistance, then ultimately I would use my stick and send a memorandum to the Secretary of State to express my concern. In that case I would always send a drop copy to the Assistant Secretary of the bureau concerned so that he or she knew what I was doing. As I say, I wouldn't blind side them. They would always know what was going to happen, and I made sure that they got a copy of the
memorandum.

I don't want to pretend that everything was harmonious. I think that, on the whole, we had very good relations with the various regional and functional bureaus. However, some bureaus were more suspicious of us and less cooperative than others. I think that, on the whole, we did quite well. We could have more influence where we had really good people. For example, the Latin American Bureau realized that Luigi Einaudi was a terrific guy to work with on Latin America. Obviously, the East Asian and Pacific Bureau valued my background and clout on China. In the case of the Middle East, very strong people like Roy Atherton, Hal Saunders, and Joe Sisco were already available to the Secretary, though I did go on the two Egyptian shuttles. So there were some areas where we had more impact and cooperation than others.

Q: You mentioned your various deputies. Were they your principal points of contact with the bureaus? Did they sit in and keep in contact with the bureaus?

LORD: No, this was one step below that. I usually had two deputies. Then I had one or two people covering each of the geographic regions or functional issues, and I have indicated who some of them were. They would sit in on staff meetings and coordinate with the various bureaus. I basically split up responsibilities, for example, when I had Reg Bartholomew and Sam Lewis working with me: on a regional basis Lewis followed Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia, plus economic affairs, and was my principal deputy. Bartholomew followed Europe, Russia, Asia, and political-military affairs. However, it would basically be people one step below them who would be in day to day contact with the various bureaus, as well as with other agencies.

Q: Could you talk a bit about your impression of the response of the various regional and functional bureaus when Kissinger was Secretary of State? I've often heard it said that you could almost rank the bureaus in this sense. Could you give us a feel for how you felt about how well they worked under Secretary Kissinger?

LORD: I have to be careful about this. We are talking about a period some 25 years ago. Sometimes the reputation of a bureau depends on the leadership of the bureau. Obviously, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs was a classic example of a very expert operation. Joe Sisco, of course, was Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and was very heavily involved in Near Eastern affairs, and Roy Atherton and Hal Saunders were also involved in it. There was capable support underneath them. That was a very classy bureau. The Near Eastern bureau did an excellent job of supporting Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy.

Tom Enders and the people in the Bureau of Economic Affairs also did an excellent job. Tom was one of the most brilliant Foreign Service officers that I have ever met.

Q: How did Secretary Kissinger respond to economic issues?

LORD: He developed a better understanding of them. There were a lot of jokes about how little attention he paid to economic affairs. At the NSC, you could talk to Bob
Hormats and Fred Bergstren, both of whom worked there; they would say that Kissinger didn't spend a great deal of time on economic matters. At State, however, he began to understand the importance of economic issues and began to get more on top of them. He realized this clearly on the energy issue and at the G7 Summit Meetings. He had great respect for Tom Enders, Chuck Robinson, and Bill Rogers, Undersecretaries of State for Economics. Not only was Enders brilliant and creative and gave Kissinger a lot of substantive ideas, but he was a tough person who would argue back with Kissinger and often on turf that Tom was more familiar with than Henry was. Kissinger began to be more familiar with economic issues and realized more and more how important they were. Of course, it's a cliché now in the 1990s to say how important economics is, but even in the 1970s economic issues were important. However, during the Cold War, the balance of power was so important, and the economy was much less globalized than it is now, in terms of our dependence on exports and foreign investment. Now there is also the impact of the Internet on economic affairs. Back in the early 1970s you could make the point that political and security matters were more important than economic problems, while you can make the case now that economics have risen to the top of the agenda.

Actually, I can't think of a weak bureau in the State Department of that time. All of them performed well at least on some issues. For example, in Africa we made major strides on Rhodesia and reached a settlement there. Henry Kissinger's speech at Lusaka reflected a change in our policy. That speech received widespread approval. I think that S/P gave great help there, given the geopolitical dimension. On Asia he had good support on China, for example, from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and myself. In dealing with the Russians he had good support from the Bureau of European Affairs. I'm not trying to be popular by not criticizing anybody, but I think that, on the whole, since Kissinger picked good people, in general he had pretty good support.

Q: I'm thinking of two things that come to mind which have arisen in these interviews. One was when I believe that Kissinger went to Mexico City and discovered that our Ambassadors attending a Chiefs of Mission Conference didn't seem to take much interest in NATO and East-West affairs. This launched the Global Perspectives program. I wonder if you could comment on that.

LORD: Yes. This gets a little bit away from policy, but that's all right. That's a good question, and there are some other roles that I want to get at. Kissinger felt that it was important that people not be overly parochial or subject to clientitis. He would often encounter people who provided examples of this. He understood, for example, the need for regional specialists who would promote his or her regional interests. However, he felt that it was important for FSOs not to become overly preoccupied with particular regions or issues. So when he was Secretary of State, he felt that it was important to move people around now and then in the course of their careers so that they would have a more global perspective. I've forgotten the name of the program.

Q: It was called GLOP [Global Perspectives].

LORD: Of course, you have to strike a balance, and I think that he understood that. You
don't want someone who speaks brilliant Chinese or Japanese and then have them spend 20 years in South America. Kissinger understood the need for regional expertise, but he felt that it was important for people to have a little bit of a sense of the global perspective of the President and the Secretary of State and not be overly parochial in their views. So that program was instituted. I'm sure that there were different views on how successful it was.

Frankly, when he came in as Secretary of State, I don't recall how narrowly specialized people were anyway. I'm not sure that they were all that narrowly specialized.

**Q:** I think that Latin America is a special case. As far as I can recall, Foreign Service officers and people who go to Latin America seem almost to disappear as if they had entered a black hole. You almost never saw them again in other areas of the world.

**LORD:** That's a good point. There used to be a sort of pecking order, which I think has begun to disappear during the past decade or so. The so-called best officers and the ones who got the most attention were assigned to Europe. Then, gradually, people assigned to Asia began to attract more attention. However, the view went that people who were assigned to Latin America and Africa tended to be second rate officers. People assigned to the Middle East were more highly regarded. This categorization was very unfair, of course, but you're absolutely right that this view was widely held. I frankly would hesitate now to figure out whether there was some reality to this view. That is, whether less qualified officers were assigned to those bureaus. I would have to say, in all fairness and without generalizing that, on the whole, a lot of the stronger or better qualified officers served in the European, Asian, and Middle Eastern Bureaus.

**Q:** Or, as officers were assigned to Latin America and Africa, they somehow didn't gain much attention, because the major crises weren't there.

**LORD:** It's sort of a vicious circle.

**Q:** That's right, but this raises another question. You have described your working with Kissinger. However, I've gotten the impression from interviewing other officers that they felt that Kissinger had his own mind set, which was European and Cold War oriented. He was often regarded as trying to shoe horn problems in the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America, and particularly places that he didn't pay much attention to, into the framework of East-West conflict, when actually these problems were often local. I think that this practice sometimes skewed our policy. I would have thought that in policy planning you might have found yourself in the position of saying that you can forget about this East-West stuff. For example, the Syrians just don't like the Iraqis, and this has nothing to do with...

**LORD:** I don't want to claim more than we should about the role of policy planning. However, in one sense you are absolutely right about this. In the case of the southern African problem, we were trying to indicate to the Bureau of African Affairs that it should pay attention to the geopolitical and East-West aspects of a problem to get
Kissinger's attention. And also for legitimate reasons, not just to get Kissinger's attention. However, our obligation also was to try to educate Kissinger, if that doesn't sound too presumptuous, about the fact that there were other things involved here beside the East-West dimension. Whether it is in terms of the interests, practices or customs of the countries that you are dealing with, or what American policy should be, you have to take other factors into account.

Now, in terms of a basic criticism of Kissinger's outlook, without getting more specific, there probably is some element of truth in that. Kissinger might well have overemphasized the East-West aspect of foreign policy. However, you have to remember that we are talking about the early and mid-1970s and the very competitive, global tension which existed with the Russians.

In terms of the Middle East, he saw the situation there as an end in itself, in the sense of our energy needs, our interest in oil, our interest in not having war break out which could drag in the United States, as well as our fidelity to Israel. Kissinger also saw the Middle East as an area of competition with the Russians, as well as those countries which were more friendly to the Russians, such as the Syrians and the more radical countries. In his Middle East diplomacy Kissinger very consciously tried to keep the Russians out of the Middle East as much as possible.

We often served as a buffer or transmission belt between some of the views held in the Department of State and Kissinger's mind set. Having said that, and I don't want to exaggerate it, I think that it is fair to say, and I'll come back to that a little bit later, that Kissinger, as Secretary of State, paid much more attention to some of these other considerations. Even he, with his almost superhuman energy and intelligence, a great staff, and the backing of Presidents Nixon and Ford at the White House, couldn't run the whole world. Basically, when he was in the White House as National Security Adviser, he spent the great bulk of his time on Vietnam, China, Russia, and, to a certain extent, the Middle East. When he became Secretary of State, he concentrated to a considerable extent on Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and even on Africa, on which he spent a large amount of time during the last couple of years he was in office.

He also addressed newer issues, including some of those I mentioned, such as energy, Law of the Sea, nuclear non-proliferation, North-South relations, and so on. Our S/P staff played a major role on all these ‘newer’ issues. He probably did this because these issues needed more attention after the preoccupations of the first Nixon term and partly because some of our other issues were running out of steam under the impact of the Watergate Affair. For example, we really couldn't move much further with the Chinese for the time being, and détente with the Russians was running into trouble. In this situation executive power was severely diminished because of the Watergate Affair. President Ford was in a caretaker position in many ways. Kissinger saw part of his role to be addressing these other issues and to highlight the agenda for the future. Indeed, he gave a lot of speeches on these issues, precisely because he saw the need to address these issues which were coming up and also because of the intensity of the attacks from the Right and the Left, the role of Congress in attempting to micromanage foreign policy, the reaction of Congress
to the Watergate Affair, the CIA excesses and investigations. Other considerations included the Vietnam War and its aftermath and the collapse of the Paris Accords that, it had been hoped, would terminate the problems caused by the war. We really were running out of steam on many of these issues of the first Nixon term.

So Kissinger began to pay more attention to some of these issues, not all of them in the context of the East-West struggle. Issues like energy, Law of the Sea, or non-proliferation were not issues which had much in the way of East-West dimensions. These are very good questions.

Let me make one other point about Kissinger's relationship to the Foreign Service. I was talking about the Washington scene. There is no question that, on the whole, with Ambassadors he was not the most benign interlocutor. Now, there were exceptions. If he had confidence in an American Ambassador, then he would make full use of him. A good example of this was Ambassador Herman Eilts in Egypt. He worked very closely with him and had the utmost respect for him. He listened to his views and Eilts was fully plugged in to his concerns. But with other American Ambassadors Kissinger might even cut them out of the action. So, on the whole, I think that his enlightened approach to the FSO and other career communities in Washington was not repeated abroad. Kissinger often undercut American Ambassadors, but he did not always do this. It depended on which Ambassador you were talking about.

Q: Also, I've interviewed people who have berated Secretary of State Kissinger for cutting them down in front of other, State Department people. In other words, if you were an Ambassador, you were the American representative in the country to which you were accredited. Either he would make little use of them or might say openly that we don't pay much attention to them. However, he would leave them in office to deal with their country of accreditation. These people I am speaking of have told me that Kissinger didn't seem to understand the importance of having someone as Ambassador who had the respect of the country to which he or she was accredited.

LORD: I would not deny that. Again, this situation worked both ways. In the case of someone like Ambassador Herman Eilts, who was a good example in my mind, Kissinger not only worked fully with him but, by his body language and the actual statements he made, would support that Ambassador with local elected and senior officials. He would say that this Ambassador had his total confidence and that he was a great guy. Kissinger could be a major asset in certain cases. In other cases, while I don't think that Kissinger went out of his way to be insulting but he was making clear to local officials that he, Kissinger, was the one to deal with, and the Ambassador was someone essentially irrelevant. In these cases, by definition, he was cutting them down.

I don't think that Kissinger went so far as to go around saying to local Presidents and Prime Ministers that the American Ambassador was irrelevant. However, he could certainly indicate by his actions that the Ambassador concerned was not in the loop and truly involved. Moreover, in terms of his personality, and I've discussed this in the context of Kissinger's time in the White House as well as the State Department, Kissinger
was intellectually intimidating. He hated yes men. I think that's one reason that people like myself, Sonnenfeldt, and Eagleburger lasted with him because we would talk back to him. But he also hated vacuous arguments. He had contempt for what he considered poor arguments. It was not that people disagreed with him, which he welcomed, but if they disagreed on sentimental or other grounds which had not been well thought out, then Kissinger could be very contemptuous, including in front of other people. This could be true of American Ambassadors or with State Department and other agency people in Washington.

There were a couple of other roles we played in policy planning. We would also, and here we were not fully effective, stay in touch with other U.S. Government agencies in planning and looking ahead in an effort to encourage that practice with the other agencies. These other agencies included the NSC [National Security Council], the Department of Defense, and the economic agencies, as well as the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. I would occasionally meet my closest counterparts in other agencies for lunch, sometimes with staff members, and we would try to coordinate our views and share information. I am not trying to suggest that we were doing this systematically on an interagency basis. But Kissinger was the lead foreign policy person in the U.S. Government, and we therefore had clout and some influence, as other agency representatives knew. They knew that we were close to Kissinger and working for him.

I also handled policy planning talks with other key countries. That process has continued ever since. There had been some of that going on before I became Director of Policy Planning in the State Department. I stepped up this process. I did it both jointly with the Europeans as a whole and with individual European countries, including the British, the French, and the Germans, as well as with Japan. We worked with a couple of countries in Latin America, but these planning discussions were conducted by Sam Lewis, my deputy.

S/P played a central role in the shaping of resources/priorities in the budget process with respect to goal-setting. This reflected our “honest broker” capacity.

There were a couple of other roles I would mention as a final point. Regarding Kissinger's press conferences, we were in charge of pulling together in advance possible questions and answers. Of course, we always worked with one or more bureaus to get that done, and we played more of a coordinating role in this case. Here too we were honest brokers if there were bureau disputes on the replies. Of course, we worked with the Bureau of Public Affairs and other bureaus.

Finally, there was the issue of speech writing, which is a job often done by Policy Planning Staffs. Some Secretaries of State have had special speech writers who report directly to the Secretary. In any event, Kissinger wanted me to be in charge of this function, so I had no choice. If I had a choice, I would still have agreed. This is not necessarily true of all Policy Planning Staffs. If the Secretary of State doesn't put too much stock in speeches or in public affairs, which I think is a mistake, or if the speeches don't have much impact, you can spend a lot of time writing material which isn't all that important. It is not just the Director of Policy Planning who is involved, but the key,
substantive person in that area of the speech, as well as speechwriters on the staff.

Q: I've interviewed Ambassador Warren Zimmerman. Warren was saying that former Secretary William Rogers told him: "Don't get me out ahead of anybody." If you don't want to be controversial, you've failed in your job.

LORD: In such a case there is no great incentive to take on the job of Secretary of State. Under Rogers I don't know whether S/PC [Policy Planning Council, as it was then called] was directly under the Secretary. I'm almost sure that it was off to one side in bureaucratic terms. I know that in Kissinger's case, and this is important, he saw speeches as serving several purposes. First, he wanted to build domestic public opinion and Congressional support for policy, explaining and articulating that policy. Also, he wanted to explain our policies to other countries around the world. He knew that, even if the speech did not get all that much attention in the U.S., all of the foreign Embassies in Washington would study it closely and send back commentaries on it to their capitals. He also saw speeches as a way to get things done. If he was trying to launch a policy or undertake some initiative, with the deadline for a speech coming up he could often force the interagency process either to come up with creative ideas or make decisions which even he, with his clout, couldn't pull off by himself.

A good example is a major speech which we drafted in August and September 1975. It was right in the middle of an Egyptian shuttle. It was an incredibly difficult process. There was a Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to dealing with developing countries. Kissinger was supposed to deliver the speech to the General Assembly himself, as he did every fall when the General Assembly convened. In this case, since Kissinger was involved in a shuttle initiative, Ambassador Moynihan delivered it on his behalf. For weeks, if not months, before this speech was delivered, Assistant Secretary Tom Enders and I were in the lead. Enders and his staff contributed many creative ideas, as did my people as well.

Kissinger was determined to present some creative ideas about dealing with the Third World, as it was then called. He wanted imaginative ideas to promote development and also American interests. With the deadline approaching for that speech, he got the Departments of the Treasury, and Commerce, and the trade people all butting heads to make sure that we had a creative speech. It was a very good speech, and Kissinger used the deadline to get decisions made.

Also in a speech Kissinger might undertake some major initiative or present some explanation, such as our position on the Law of the Sea negotiations, or on energy and what our approach was on that. Or he could be philosophical, as I said, such as the role of morality versus pragmatism in foreign policy. I knew instinctively, before we got to draft speeches that, over the coming years, this would be an important process for policy impact. I had also worked personally on the early drafts of speeches for President Nixon, particularly on Vietnam. The speeches were then put into really good and effective English by the speech writers on Nixon's staff. I could also write and edit fairly well. For all of these reasons, speech writing became one of our roles. It didn't overly consume us.
I managed to get two, terrific writers from the Foreign Service, Charlie Hill and Mark Palmer. They were both excellent. It's very hard to find good speech writers anywhere in the world, and particularly in the Foreign Service, frankly.

_Q: I have done a solo interview with Mark Palmer. I can't remember the details, but there was an issue before the United Nations which he kept slipping into a draft of a speech for Kissinger. He would put this reference in, Kissinger would take it out, and he would put it back in again._

LORD: Yes, that often happened between us and Kissinger. We took this speechwriting role on for all of the reasons which I have mentioned. It was agony to do this, because Kissinger is very demanding, given the importance he attaches to speeches. It is one of his intellectual strengths.

Fortunately, I was in the role more of orchestra leader rather than playing lead violin. I was responsible for getting the speech drafts to him, and I would supervise the process of preparing them. However, the tough work would be done by Charlie Hill and by Mark Palmer, as well as by Peter Rodman, who was still on the NSC [National Security Council] staff. Those three were the key people involved in drafting the speeches. Of course, we would work with the relevant bureau or bureaus involved in the State Department, as well as my own staff person for that area. If it was a speech on Latin America, we would deal with Pete Vaky, another Foreign Service officer whom I wish to mention, plus Einaudi, myself, and one or more of the speech writers.

Without question, drafting speeches of this kind was an agonizing process. We'd usually have to work on the damned things on weekends, which was the time when Kissinger could pay more attention to speeches. I'm a fanatic Redskin fan [Washington, DC football team]. It seemed that it would never fail that on the Sunday morning of the day when I was looking forward to watching the Redskin game, I'd get a phone call from Kissinger, asking for another draft of the speech in the works. It used to drive me crazy. Fortunately, I could work with the other speech writers, suggesting to them how to present the early drafts of the speech. I could react to Kissinger's comments and do a lot of the editing, as opposed to doing a lot of creative writing myself, which is even tougher. However, I had to do some of that.

There's a story which I tell which is apocryphal, but it does capture Kissinger's demands, whether I was writing for the President's foreign policy report, as we did at the White House, or whether it involved drafting speeches in the State Department. It goes like the following. Kissinger asked for a draft of a speech, and I went in with a draft. He called me back in his office the next day and say: "Is this the best that you can do?" I replied: "Henry, I thought so, but let me go back and work on it some more." So I went back, spent a few more days, redrafted the speech, and brought it back to Kissinger. He called me back in his office the next day and say: "Winston, are you really sure that you can't do better than this?" I replied: "Henry, I thought so, but let me try it again." This process went on through 10 drafts. I finally brought the tenth draft to him. The next day he called me in and said: "Now, look, I know you've been working on this, but are you really sure that you can't do
better and that this is the best you can do?" I said, "Henry, damn it, this is the tenth draft. I've been beating my brains out. There is no way that I can improve this. This is the best I can possibly do, I promise you." At this point Kissinger smiled at me and said, "In that case, now I'll read the draft."

In drafting a speech I would get a group of people together, whom I have already mentioned, including myself, a member of my staff, the key, regional people, the functional people, and the speech writer or writers. Having guidance from Kissinger, I would outline the speech he was going to give and the kind of points he wanted to make in general terms. Sometimes this first meeting would be chaired by Kissinger himself. By definition, for Kissinger, the first draft of a speech or statement can't be any good. So we would submit our first draft to him. He would generally call us in to his conference room, to go over the draft with him. We knew that he was going to rant and rave about it. We just had to go through the process.

Usually, we'd have two or three of these sessions, during which he could be very insulting. At best he would say: "Well, you're making some progress, but we need to do a lot more work on it." His attitude was never very encouraging. I would always prepare my troops for the inevitable onslaught. If I thought that some of the paragraphs were quite good and he didn't like them, I would tell them to keep these paragraphs on hand, and we would put them back in a later draft, when he might like them. We would do something to that effect.

In all fairness, in the first place you had to give Kissinger credit for the attention he devoted to this process. He could be in the middle of a crisis and yet would work very hard on a speech. I'll repeat a good example. Right after he became Secretary of State in October, 1973, the Yom Kippur War between Israelis and Arabs broke out. Egypt [and Syria] attacked Israel, and so on. At the time we were up at the UN and had two days to go before Kissinger was giving a major speech in New York. This speech was to be delivered, not at the UN itself but on and about the UN. Of course, Kissinger had to deal with the crisis arising out of the Yom Kippur War, and he did. However, right in the middle of this crisis he spent a couple of hours on his speech on the night that the latest Israeli-Arab crisis broke out. This speech had nothing to do with the crisis. However, he felt that the speech was very important, and you have to give him credit for giving this much attention to it.

Secondly, he was generally right about his speeches. When he said that some passage was conventional, pap, or was vague, and that it contained the typical exhortations of a State Department press release and nothing creative, he was usually right about it. He could detect a passage which contained too little thought, was too vague, or too conventional. He could spot a weak or rambling structure. You have to give him credit for this, even though we used to get absolutely furious with him because he would throw drafts on the floor or denounce them as useless.

In fact, the speech would get better as we went through this process. Kissinger's ideas turned out generally to be pretty good. So, the process of drafting a Kissinger speech was
painful, but you could see the draft getting better and better, thanks to his process of
whiplashing us. And the further we went along in the draft, and they would easily go
through four or five drafts, while some of them would go through 10 or 12 drafts, the
more involved he became in the process. Toward the end, he wasn't just giving us
general, verbal instructions or marking up a few sections, like "This is crap!" and we
needed a more conceptual approach. Kissinger began to get into the drafting process
himself. As we got closer to the final version of the speech, he would become more
involved in writing things. I would become more involved, as was Larry Eagleburger at
that point, in final editing. It was a terribly painful process but I think that if you go back
and look at his speeches, they were really quite thoughtful and eloquent. No Secretary of
State since (and probably before, except perhaps Acheson) has devoted as much energy
and thought and turned out such thoughtful speeches in my view.

S/P played an important role in drafting these speeches. Kissinger considered it then very
important, for reasons cited. As I have already stated, after the Vietnam War and during
the Ford Presidency, after Nixon left office, Kissinger spent quite a bit of time going
around the United States, trying to build domestic support and understanding for our
policies. There was a lot of focus on looking ahead, as well as on some of the
philosophical foundations of our foreign policy.

Q: Well, now, a speech is a speech. It's out there and it's nice, but who was following
through to see something happen to ensure that it was more than a speech or that it
signified a change in policy?

LORD: That's a very good point. Generally, it was up to the regional and/or functional
bureau to implement whatever had to be done. That was one of the roles of the Policy
Planning Staff as well, to look at a speech and make sure that whatever happened or was
set out in the speech actually occurred. For example, in the September 1975 developing
country speech which was delivered by Moynihan before the UN, we had initiatives to be
pursued in the context of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development], UNCTAD [UN Conference on Trade and Economic Development], or
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. We also proposed some new facilities
and funds. We had to make sure that not only the Department of State but the
Departments of Commerce or Agriculture or the Treasury Department were following up
with what needed to be done. Kissinger paid attention to this. Every now and then he
would ask: "Whatever happened to this or that initiative in my speech?"

Other Kissinger speeches were more conceptual or policy breakthroughs. For example,
he gave a major speech in Lusaka [Zimbabwe], which we helped to draft, together with
people from the Bureau of African Affairs. This speech signaled a change in American
foreign policy, particularly under President Nixon and Kissinger, who were not known
for their preoccupation with human rights and democracy. This speech really went a long
way toward saying that America was going to pay more attention to and be more
sensitive to racial discrimination and minority rule in Africa. It made some specific
proposals on Rhodesia. Rhodesia became independent Zimbabwe eventually as a result of
Kissinger diplomacy.
So there were some Kissinger speeches which made their impact by virtue of a shift in their strategic view. That was implemented by diplomacy, in fact, as we continued to pursue what was signaled as a general, strategic direction in the Lusaka speech. Then there were the more concrete directions in Kissinger's speech to the UN General Assembly. Kissinger also gave a major speech at the International Food Conference in Rome, in which he made major proposals. We had to wrestle with the Department of Agriculture and others to get that done. Other speeches - on Law of the Sea and energy, for example - set out American proposals and positions that were pursued.

You're absolutely right. You have to follow up and make sure that what was promised is delivered. I think that, on the whole, this happened.

Q: I've heard people express the wish that they could get something into a speech by the Secretary of State or by the President, even if it was only one sentence. Afterwards, from then on, they could follow that through by saying that the Secretary of State or the President said this or that. You must have had people from the regional and functional bureaus fighting to get that one sentence in.

LORD: That's a good point. If it was a good and creative idea, of course, we would move forward with it. If Kissinger liked the idea, fine. However, if he thought that it was some parochial idea that one of the bureaus was trying to slip into his speech which didn't make sense, of course he would reject it. I would like to make it very clear that on speech writing, like anything else that we did with the geographic bureaus, we would never attempt to smother other views. That would be self-defeating and wrong. If I were sitting in with Kissinger and drafting a speech on Asia, Latin America, or whatever it was, and the Assistant Secretary was also there, we might have disagreements. I might say: "This idea ought to be in the speech." The Assistant Secretary might say: "No, this would make people mad," or something like that. He would then have a chance to present his views, both on what he wanted to include and what he wanted to keep out of the speech.

You are right that people tended to see that speeches by Kissinger were important, not to mention speeches by the President. They would attempt either to get their general views included in the speech or some, specific hobby horse which they wanted to include.

Q: Did you find that, from time to time as you went through this process, you found, say, that the Bureau of African Affairs might want a particular line included and that you might wait until the eighth draft to bring this idea back in again and see that it was included?

LORD: Yes, this happened. I can't give you a specific example, but there were times when you would try to sense whether it was a good time to try to get Kissinger to agree to include something. I don't want to be overly dramatic about this, but it happened. However, we weren't just yes men. If we felt that there was a good idea or approach which he had rejected, we would bring this point back. I must say, to Kissinger's credit, that, not only did he not like yes men, but he would consider opposing points of view,
and even change his mind.

It would often happen that Kissinger would hear an argument and either keep silent or say that he disagreed with it. Then you would see in a draft later on or in his remarks at a subsequent meeting that he had actually adopted the argument that he had heard previously and apparently rejected. He might never acknowledge that he had been persuaded by this argument. Or he might say that, on further reflection, that he had thought about it and been persuaded by this argument. Often, he would not pick this point up on a later occasion, but nevertheless, if he did, and you got the idea included in a speech or statement, that was fine.

I previously discussed earlier directors of the Policy Planning Staff. I started with George Kennan, who was the first and the most senior. I had great respect for him. One of the reasons I changed the name of the staff was to go back to what it was called when he was director of the office. I specifically invoked him in doing that, both out of my respect for him and out of a desire to have the kind of clout or influence which his staff had previously had. Paul Nitze came right after Kennan. I also talked to Paul and to other directors of the policy planning staff, generally in chronological order.

In Kennan's day, however, there were only about half a dozen people on the staff, all senior officers, who had often served collectively with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of State George Marshall. I don't remember the exact chronology. Frankly, the Policy Planning Staff under Kennan had a much narrower agenda to deal with in terms of American foreign policy than we did, some decades later. Clearly, that policy planning staff and George Kennan personally played a seminal role in developing the Marshall Plan, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], and in dealing with the Russians. I wouldn't want to compare what the policy planning staff accomplished during my term of office with what Kennan did. In any case, it was a different world.

In our case we needed about 30 people on the Policy Planning Staff (increased from 20 when I arrived) to cover all of the regions of the world and functional issues. This was much larger than the staff was in Kennan's day. I met once or twice a week with the whole policy planning staff so that I could talk to them and say what I wanted from them, pat them on the back, fill them in, debate issues, or whatever. We also met sometimes with Secretary Kissinger with a couple of my key people on a given issue. There would also be representatives of people from the regional bureaus at such meetings to discuss specific issues.

One good example was the range of Greek-Turkish issues, which broke out over developments in Cyprus. We wrote a paper on these issues and had a discussion of it with Secretary Kissinger. It was a pretty good discussion.

There were some of these collective meetings, but usually they would involve myself and my deputy discussing issues with Kissinger, as opposed to the situation in Kennan's day. I think that at that time the Secretary of State met fairly regularly with the Policy Planning Staff as a whole.
There are different views as to how to put together a Policy Planning Staff. Did you need a small staff of wise men and women who would meet regularly with the Secretary of State and kick issues around? Or did you want the kind of larger operation that we have had since that time and try to cover the various roles that I have mentioned? There is a case to be made for either a larger or smaller staff.

Now, there is the general question of Kissinger's role during this period, particularly in the wake of the Vietnam War and the Watergate crisis. We have discussed Kissinger's contributions, first on Vietnam, China, and Russia, and then on the Middle East and some other issues that he worked on. I personally feel that probably Kissinger's single, greatest contribution as Secretary of State was holding our foreign policy together in the wake of the Vietnam War and the Watergate crisis. These crises brought a sense of disillusionment and a negative perception of the government and everything related to it. There was an evident lack of trust in the government and a growth of cynicism in America and particularly toward the Executive Branch of the government.

In reaction to this situation Congress asserted an increased role in the field of foreign policy. The War Powers Act was passed in 1973 and there was a growth in the tendency toward micro management of foreign policy on specific issues, with Congress getting into both the tactics and strategy of foreign policy. There was an investigation of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and its role in the field of foreign policy. There was a general feeling by some supporters of Senator McGovern that America ought to come home and that we had played too negative a role in the world. There were others who felt that we were not being robust enough in emphasizing human rights and other values.

All of these developments created a very serious situation in the field of foreign policy. Of course, the Nixon administration gave way to the Ford administration. In his most recent volume of memoirs Kissinger has praised President Ford for his having healed the nation. He regarded Ford's having pardoned Nixon as correct, and courageous, since it may have cost him reelection in 1976. He felt that, because of Ford's personality, he reestablished trust in the Executive Branch of the government. Of course, I'm sure that Kissinger also approved of President Ford because Ford delegated considerable authority to Kissinger. For a time Kissinger wore two hats as National Security Adviser and as Secretary of State. Later, Kissinger lost his hat as National Security Adviser. Kissinger has strongly approved of President Ford's role during this period.

I personally feel that Ford contributed to healing the nation and that he was a decent man. It took great courage on his part to pardon President Nixon. To some extent Ford played the role that Kissinger has described, although I think that Kissinger was too kind to Ford. I don't think that Ford was that great. Perhaps no President at that point in time, following the Watergate Affair, could possibly have done much. I sat in on meetings with President Ford and did not feel that Ford was brilliant, to say the least, certainly by comparison with President Nixon and some other Presidents I have worked with. I personally was outraged at Ford's attempt to appease the Right Wing of the Republican
Party by dumping Nelson Rockefeller as his Vice Presidential candidate for the 1976 elections and replacing him with Senator Robert Dole. I was always a great fan of Nelson Rockefeller. Also at times Ford seemed to distance himself from Kissinger and the whole détente effort. Ford went to the Republican Convention in 1976 and was preoccupied about the challenge to his position from Ronald Reagan.

So my view of President Ford is less elevated than Kissinger's, although I agree that he was a decent man. I might be embarrassed if he heard or read these comments, although I'll leave them in. I don't want to downplay President Ford's contribution to healing the nation. I'm just not as enthusiastic about President Ford as Kissinger is.

Before we return to Kissinger, I want to be very fair to President Ford. Ford also showed courage. A good example is his southern African diplomacy in 1975 and 1976. The conceptual and political watershed was Kissinger’s Lusaka (Zambia) speech of April 27, 1976. Kissinger spent a lot of time on this, and I was with him, going all over Africa. Kissinger specifically tried to promote a settlement in Southern Rhodesia which would lead to majority rule and to independence. The breakthrough occurred during Kissinger’s tenure although actual independence was not achieved until after Ford and he left office. Ultimately, Southern Rhodesia became independent as Zimbabwe. Kissinger also had to deal with the South Africans to do this, as well as Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, in addition to Black African leaders like Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Mobutu, and the Kenyan leader.

Q: Jomo Kenyatta.

LORD: Jomo Kenyatta, of course. All of this was quite dramatic, and I sat in on all of these meetings during Kissinger's trip to Africa. This was coming to a head during the presidential primaries in 1976 when Ronald Reagan was challenging President Ford. I find this hard to believe but, apparently, southern African diplomacy and the push for majority rule in Rhodesia, as well as black rights and majority rule, were considered significant issues in places like Texas and other states in the southern part of the United States. You wouldn't think that the people in those states would be that concerned about such matters. It just shows you how far we've come in our society since then.

President Ford lost a closely contested primary election in Texas in 1976 and, I believe, some other primary elections in other southern states. The outcome was close enough so that Kissinger's diplomacy in southern Africa might have made the difference. To Ford's credit, and Kissinger makes that point in his book, Ford never once mentioned or tried to rein in Kissinger on what he was doing in Africa regarding majority rule and black rights, even though Ford knew that it would hurt him politically vis-à-vis the Right Wing of the Republican Party and Ronald Reagan, especially in the southern primaries.

I remember specifically that we were traveling in Africa during the presidential primary campaign in Texas. I think that we arrived in Ivory Coast at the time, got off the plane, and were greeted by the press. President Ford had just lost the primary election to Reagan in Texas. The press representatives began to sing to Kissinger, "The eyes of Texas are upon you." I want to give President Ford his due. I don't want to be too negative.
To get back to Kissinger's role at this time. It's hard to remember now, but everyone knew that Kissinger, despite the wire tapping and some of the other elements at the time, was completely removed from the Watergate Affair and that he had nothing to do with that. Everyone realized the major contributions Kissinger had made and everyone was looking for someone to trust during this period. Already, of course, particularly on the liberal side, there was some angst [concern] about Kissinger. And some of the conservatives felt that he wasn't tough enough on the ideological and human rights front. However, on the whole, he was the most respected and popular man in America. He was on countless magazine covers. Equally important, of course, was that many people respected him overseas. Those who depended on American credibility and steadiness saw in Kissinger continuity from the Nixon into the Ford era. They saw someone who was able to carry on, despite the fallout from the Watergate Affair and from the Vietnam War, as well as the growing Congressional ascendancy in foreign policy, in addition to all of the other problems that I have mentioned. So Kissinger's holding this country together by virtue of his personality and prestige, making sure that our foreign policy didn't fall apart, was very important, in addition to his other accomplishments.

In addition to some of the Middle Eastern shuttle diplomacy trips and attention to some of these new issues which I have mentioned, as well as a host of other issues where we either prevented damage or even made progress, I think that Kissinger's general role of promoting trust and holding things together cannot be underestimated. Kissinger faced all of the problems that I have mentioned and managed to keep our foreign policy going.

Some people say that Kissinger was one of our greatest Secretaries of State. I think that is the wrong question because you have to look at Kissinger's contributions both in terms of his White House years as National Security Adviser and his years as Secretary of State. By the time Kissinger was Secretary of State, the Watergate Affair and other issues very quickly overtook us. I think that these issues constrained Kissinger, even though he made major contributions in the Middle East and elsewhere. I think that you have to look at his overall contributions during both the White House and State Department years. After all, it was while he was National Security Advisor that we opened to China, advanced ‘détente’ with the Soviet Union, and ended the Vietnam War. In that sense I think that Kissinger was surely one of our greatest diplomats. However, just as Secretary of State alone, I'm not sure that you can make as convincing a case in terms of his actual accomplishments. Even as Secretary of State I think that his record was outstanding because of his more general role, which I've mentioned, of holding things together, as well as progress on issues like the Middle East.

There was no question that we slowed down in terms of developing relations with China in 1975 and 1976. President Ford was worried about the challenge from Governor Ronald Reagan and didn't want to take on the Taiwan issue. In turn, China was going through its own transition, with Zhou En-lai and Mao Zedong sick, and then dying in 1976, and the struggle between the pragmatists like Deng Xiaoping, versus the Gang of Four, led by Mao's wife. Détente with the Soviet Union was under assault from the conservatives or neo-conservatives like Senator Henry Jackson [Democrat, Washington state] and others
who gave priority to Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel as one of the conditions for extending MFN [Most Favored Nation] treatment to Soviet products imported into the United States. These conservatives also opposed arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and thus were taking away some of the carrots we had proffered to the Soviets.

At the same time the liberals in Congress and the Left were hurting our Soviet policy by cutting our defense budget and making us less robust and less of a threat to the Soviets. So the sticks and carrots we had intended to use with the Soviets were under attack. There was also the feeling that we had not been tough enough with the Russians in the field of human rights.

So our détente policy with the Soviets was running out of steam. Our China policy was also running out of steam. The Vietnam settlement of 1973 was unraveling. You could argue whether the agreement with Vietnam was realistic and good enough. I've already explained that it seemed to us that it was the best we could get. You could also argue how much of this deterioration was due to the growth of Congressional authority and lack of trust in the Executive Branch. However, the fact that Hanoi didn't have to fear American retaliation because Congress sharply cut and then virtually eliminated both military and economic aid to South Vietnam and opposed any bombing in response to Hanoi's violations of the 1973 agreement were also major factors. Indeed, Kissinger cites Watergate as single-handedly undermining the Paris Agreement, encouraging Hanoi to attack the South without fear of American retaliation because of the weakened Presidency. I agree that Watergate was a major factor but the American people and Congress had lost staying power on Vietnam, with or without Watergate.

This was a very difficult period for Kissinger. I think that you have to recognize that he was a major figure and influence holding us together during this very difficult period. I think that was Kissinger's greatest, single contribution to American foreign policy during his service as Secretary of State.

Of course, there were also individual achievements, particularly in the Middle East and Southern Africa, during that time, for which Kissinger deserves great credit as well.

Q: Do you want to turn to specific areas?

LORD: Have I answered your general question?

Q: The other question was whether you saw Kissinger's mind set as being consistently European? The European mind set is usually rather pessimistic, whereas the American mind set tends to be rather optimistic. From your point of view in policy planning, was there any yin and yang contrast in this respect?

LORD: Not so much in policy planning, but that is a fair statement in the sense that Kissinger, as an historian in general and as a European expert, had a sense of tragedy which most Americans don't have. Except for our Civil War and the mistreatment of
American Indians and then American blacks, on the whole we've been rather blessed by virtue of geography and history. We don't have a sense of tragedy. We've never had an external war fought on our territory. Europe, of course, has gone through hell for centuries. So Kissinger always had more of a sense of the finite, the tragic, and the historical than most Americans with their generally idealistic outlook. You're absolutely right about this.

This is one reason why Kissinger was suspicious of excessive exuberance, particularly of Wilsonian ideas of pressing for the acceptance of our values abroad, in terms of what's possible and the need for a balance of power. That was clearly a sub-text, both personally, historically, and emotionally in Kissinger's outlook.

It would not be fair to say that Kissinger was a total pessimist. He was strongly aware of America's strengths, both ideological and material, and he felt equally strongly that America had a major role to play in the world. However, I think that this meant that he basically felt that you could only deal with countries, based on their external actions and what they did in the world, and you shouldn't try to mess around too much with their domestic structures. Therefore, that is why Kissinger paid more attention to realpolitik and the balance of power than he did to human rights. This tendency got him into some domestic trouble in an American democracy where people wanted these elements included.

Q: You were sort of a product of America. Did you find, in the field of policy planning, that you were saying to Kissinger: "Lighten up, Henry, America has something to sell." Did you say this kind of thing to Kissinger?

LORD: I don't think that we presented matters in that way. It may have informed some of the specific issues that we discussed in ways that are hard to determine now. I don't want to exaggerate our role at that kind of cosmic level.

Q: There may be nuances here. Did you find that? Mark Palmer was looking at people, rather than power.

LORD: There would be some elements there which we tried to introduce. Sometimes, Kissinger would accept them and sometimes not. However, I don't want to pretend that this was a major, philosophical debate, at least on the surface. Nevertheless, the debate took place around specific issues. It would reflect itself and, perhaps, either one of the bureaus or the policy planning staff would pay more attention to values, democracy, and human rights than Kissinger normally would. He might accept some aspects of this and not other aspects. Kissinger did address this issue of values and interests, pragmatism and moralism head-on in his Minneapolis speech. He would always grant a role for values in our policies.

I don't think that it would be right to say that Kissinger was pessimistic, but he was aware of limits. Part of that was accentuated, of course, by the erosion of executive authority because of the Watergate Affair and the fallout from the Vietnam War and the expansion
of the role of Congress in the field of foreign policy. There were cuts in our defense budget, and we also found ourselves unable to make concessions, either. So that perhaps also gave him a greater sense of what we might accomplish. You should remember that, as Kissinger came into office, he already felt philosophically, before the impact of the Watergate Affair and the full impact of the Vietnam War, although it had already had some impact, that America could not forever be the sole leader of the Free World, so to speak. Already there was some danger that the American people would become fatigued over this role. A tendency in this direction had already started to become noticeable in the late 1960s, and this role had already gone on for two decades. People had become fatigued at the burdens, financially and in other aspects, e.g. psychologically. We were heavily engaged and trying to do everything, virtually everywhere.

So, as I said in earlier interviews, Kissinger stressed the need for our allies to do more. There was the whole Nixon Doctrine and the tendency to look to other countries to provide combat troops. We would provide the nuclear umbrella, foreign aid, and military assistance to support this effort. There was a general feeling in the United States that Japan and Western Europe were becoming stronger and that they should pick up more of the burden of the Western partnership. So these were constant themes, even before the Watergate Affair and the Vietnam War. I think that Kissinger clearly felt that America had to be the leader. However, domestically and for equity reasons he felt that we should look to our allies to assume more of the burden, in the emerging, multi-polar world.

President Nixon himself gave a speech in Kansas City in the early 1970's, in which he said that five centers of power were emerging, and this was 25 years ago. He said that these centers consisted of Western Europe, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. He said that we were beginning to move from a bipolar to a multipolar world. I don’t think that you could call this pessimism; it was a realistic analysis that the American people and Congress, even before the Vietnam War and the Watergate Affair, but certainly afterwards, were not prepared to do everything in the world. And now that Europe and Japan had become strong, they should shoulder more responsibilities. This in time would encourage the American people and Congress to continue to do our share.

That's also one of the reasons why he felt that it was important to open up to China and try to achieve more diplomatic flexibility, so that we could also meet these challenges in a more sophisticated way.

Q: You refer to trips. The Policy Planning Staff would not seem to have been a trip-oriented organization.

LORD: No, and it shouldn't be, in my opinion. That kind of activity leads to one becoming operationally oriented. Now, having said that, I was told that I could go on any trip that I wanted to make. Partly, these trips were fun and exciting. The trips with Secretary Kissinger were also very important. And they gave me policy impact, partly because they provided me with access to Secretary Kissinger himself and to his staff and reinforced my own reputation to others as a close associate.

On the other hand, we had a huge agenda and a lot of work to do in Washington.
Basically, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff was not in an operational position, and our role was to look ahead, in my view. So, therefore, I tried to strike a balance. I think that some of my successors went on too many trips, while some went on too few. I think it's useful to go on a few trips, to get a sense of the Secretary of State's thinking and to maintain your personal relationship and access to him, as well as to demonstrate to people in the State Department that you're one of the key players in the building. All of these things are not insignificant. I probably went on about half of Secretary Kissinger's trips.

I of course went on all of his trips to China, in view of the fact that this was my key specific portfolio item. He made several trips to China when he was Secretary of State. I also went on some of the trips to the Soviet Union, because they were important. I went on some trips that were multi-faceted. I remember one trip when we went to Eastern Europe and the Middle East, ending up in Rome at the World Food Conference. I went on both Egyptian shuttle diplomacy trips, but thankfully I missed the trip to Syria, which was by far the longest. Kissinger made three agreements on the Middle East, and I was involved in making two of them. Having said that, I should add that I was clearly in a supporting role. On the China trips I was the leading staff person, together with a representative from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and with Dick Solomon from the White House NSC [National Security Council] staff. On these trips to East Asia I worked with Phil Habib or Art Hummel or Bill Gleystein, from the bureau, as well as Dick Solomon from the NSC staff. Obviously, I remained the key China person.

On a Russian trip I would be in a supporting role with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Bill Hyland, and Arthur Hartman. On a Middle East trip I played a supporting role with Phil Habib, Joe Sisco, Roy Atherton, and Hal Saunders. However, I could provide some perspective to the other people making these trips. I could remind Secretary Kissinger of what the impact would be on other issues. I could be a good spear carrier and, since I knew enough about the issues, I could help draft memoranda and telegrams on some of these matters, if they needed help, although they usually didn't, in most cases. I would sit in on all of the meetings. Because Kissinger was a traveling Secretary of State, he was in constant touch with Washington, in addition to what he was doing on a given trip. Lengthy cables were going back and forth on other matters. These cables would be from Kissinger's Deputy, from Larry Eagleburger [his Special Assistant], and so on. These people would be taking care of business back in Washington, and some of these matters involved questions that I was concerned with. In this sense Kissinger could use me as a kind of utility infielder.

I went on some of these trips for the reasons I have mentioned but not on all of them. It would have been a mistake if I had done so.

**Q:** Regarding the China trips, you say that you were a lead player. What does that mean?

**LORD:** Well, I was a lead player on China throughout this period. I don't want to say that I was the only specialist on China. Others from State and the NSC played crucial roles, with deep background, and we always worked very well together. However, I was the person whom Kissinger took to the meeting between President Nixon and Mao Zedong,
because I had been in charge of preparing the briefing books for Nixon. Indeed, I went to all - five - meetings with Mao as well as all meetings, hundreds of hours, with and Zhou and Deng Xiaoping. I want to make it absolutely clear that John Holdridge played an absolutely central role. He knew a lot more about China than I did. During Kissinger's State Department years the Bureau of East Asian Affairs did a good part of the hard work and provided the expertise, in addition to the work done by Phil Habib and Art Hummel [Assistant Secretaries of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs], as well as Dick Solomon, who was very helpful in the NSC in the White House. However, the fact is I was involved in the effort to improve relations with China from the beginning. I was very careful always to keep the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs fully informed, e.g. there were times when Kissinger wanted me to meet with the Chinese Ambassador. So basically, the way it worked out, there would be a memorandum for Kissinger's China trip and what he sought to accomplish. This would be a joint memo from me, as Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of East Asian Affairs, which we would agree on. The memo would also probably make it clear that it also was approved by the NSC [National Security Council] because at this time Kissinger was both National Security Adviser as well as Secretary of State. Indeed, we worked jointly with Solomon of the NSC on these issues. It was interesting to see that the memo would show that Kissinger, or later on his successor as National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, was in full agreement, as was Dick Solomon, from the NSC staff. So this kind of memo on China was very collaborative between the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, the NSC staff at the White House, and myself as Director of Policy Planning. I think that it would be fair to say that, by virtue of our personal relationships and my role over the years on China, I was still the person, above all, whom Kissinger looked to on China, but this was a collective operation. China was the one area where I remained operational for the reasons I mentioned. I wouldn't try to be operational on other areas.

Even in the case of China, the heavy lifting in the sense of actual drafting of the basic papers was done by officers in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs and the White House, NSC staff. I would help to draft, or actually do the drafting, on some of the strategy and conceptual approach involved. I would also go over all of the documents involved. However, if Kissinger wanted one person at a meeting with Mao Zedong, Zhou En-lai, or Deng Xiaoping, it would be me. Unlike during the NSC days, when the State Department was often cut out of the operation, the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs was usually included, which was good. The result was that it was a much more comfortable and collaborative effort. It was a more comfortable situation, unlike Kissinger's White House years, when we knew that we were cutting out our State Department colleagues. Kissinger was now Secretary of State, and he believed that the State Department should be at the center of the operation.

The major trips that I recall therefore included the China trips, sometimes paired with other stops. We also went to Japan on many occasions. Kissinger knew that the opening to China was a shock to Japan. During Kissinger's term as Secretary of State he paid a lot of attention to US relations with Japan. He met with successive Japanese Foreign Ministers. We're talking about the situation 25 years ago. Now such meetings are more or less taken for granted. In a bilateral sense Kissinger met with Japanese Foreign Ministers
about ten times in just about two years. Now, of course, there is an opportunity to do this, not only at the UN General Assembly, but at regional security or economic meetings, which provide the venue for meeting with the Japanese.

Q: I would have thought that dealing with Japan was a little bit like dealing with Italy. That is, governments keep changing and there is a collaborative form of government. So it's really hard to go and talk to someone who is going to be able to do anything.

LORD: That is a very perceptive comment. I may have made this point earlier on in this interview, but one reason we had a secret approach to the Chinese was due to the sensitivity of the issues with China and Russia, and even Vietnam, during Kissinger's White House years. Part of it was that Kissinger wanted to control our policy. Partly it was because President Nixon wanted things to be handled in a secret way. Nixon didn't want public comments or controversy. Part of the reason also was that we were not dealing with democracies, to say the least. Therefore, one or two leaders, or at least a few members of the Communist Party Politburo in these three countries could decide and then implement what was done.

In democracies the process is a little messier. You have to do things openly and involve more players. Japan is a classic example of this, but this situation is even true in the European democracies. This is particularly true in Japan with their collective approach to making decisions and the lack of dynamic prime ministers in general, although there are some exceptions, such as Nakasone. However, basically the Japanese come to decisions slowly and collectively. You're absolutely right, that this process of decision making was something less congenial to Kissinger. His critics would say that Kissinger was relatively uncomfortable with democracies and with parliaments. These critics considered that he would much rather have a dictator to deal with. When he dealt with Japan, Kissinger recognized that these were crucial considerations. In fact, he recognized that he and President Nixon had not treated the Japanese very well during the period of the Nixon shocks, that is, the period prior to the opening to China. He appreciated that some nurturing and tending of the relationship with Japan was important. And he considered the Japanese our key ally in the region, of course.

Other trips, particularly those to the Middle East and especially the two Egyptian shuttle trips I went on, were very dramatic. As I said, during the second one of them we had to prepare a major speech to the United Nations at the same time. That speech and the second Egyptian agreement came together on September 1, 1975. That was truly an exhaustive time.

The first Egyptian shuttle trip was also dramatic. I would like to spend a little bit of time on that. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 broke out when Kissinger was up at the UN. This is a good example of Kissinger taking a crisis and turning it into an opportunity. As the Yom Kippur War unfolded over a period of some time, Kissinger didn't want Israel to be overrun by Egypt. However, after a while, when Israel began counterattacking and pushing the Egyptians back, Kissinger recognized that if Israel totally defeated the Arabs, that wouldn't necessarily be very good, either. What he did in that connection was to
make sure that the war stopped before either side scored a decisive victory. The Israelis had managed to push back the Egyptians. They had surrounded the Egyptian Third Army, and there was a real prospect that the Israelis would virtually wipe out the Egyptians. If this happened, the Arabs and the Egyptians would be humiliated once again, and Israel would have total self-confidence again. The psychological climate would not be propitious for negotiations.

Kissinger worked very hard on this. He quickly went to Moscow in this connection to arrange a cease-fire before the Egyptian Army was wiped out. He did this for the following reasons. He was already looking ahead to try to make progress on negotiations between the Egyptians and the Israelis. Kissinger recognized that here was a chance to achieve a psychological balance between the Israelis and the Egyptians. He felt that the Egyptians could take some pride, and for the first time, in having inflicted some heavy damage on the Israelis. They could honestly say that they had not been defeated. The Arabs could feel some satisfaction over this. At the same time the Arabs would recognize that, once again, if it had not been for intervention by the U.S., they might have been totally defeated by the Israelis. So, in Kissinger's view, the Arabs could feel some pride and satisfaction over the Yom Kippur War and that they were dealing from a position of some strength and not humiliation.

Similarly, psychologically on the Israeli side, the Israelis were in serious trouble, militarily, for the first time. Yes, the Israelis had made their usual comeback from a position of some disadvantage, but in fact they weren't as invincible as they thought they were. They felt that they could be a little more flexible on the peace process, in order to ensure their own security. Kissinger sought to freeze the situation at a point where both sides could claim some victory and some satisfaction. The sense of humiliation was less on the Egyptian side than before, in the sense that they were less vulnerable toward the Israelis than before. Kissinger thought that this situation set up the psychological framework for negotiations between the two sides. This was a classic example of Kissinger understanding the nuances of the situation.

Q: Was he articulating this situation to his staff?

LORD: Absolutely. He told us that we cannot let the Egyptian Army be wiped out or we would be right back to the previous position where Israel might think that it doesn't have to negotiate, while the Egyptians and the Arabs might feel so humiliated over the situation that they didn't dare negotiate. Kissinger understood this, and it's a very good example of his thinking ahead, not to mention the difficulties involved in going to Moscow and getting the Soviets to agree to a cease-fire. Then he went to the Israelis, who didn't like the situation and were tempted to wipe out the Egyptians again. It was not easy to convince Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that the Israelis had to stop at that point, with the promise that we would then negotiate hard and engage in shuttle diplomacy for this purpose.

Q: Were the Office of Policy Planning and/or the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs looking with new eyes on President Sadat of Egypt at this time? Remember, at the time he was
LORD: On these Kissinger trips to the Middle East, I was involved as a spear carrier as I took part in the shuttle diplomacy exercise. I sat in on many of the meetings, and so made some modest contribution. However, I want to make clear that I didn't have as much background in terms of the Middle East. I mentioned Bob Oakley, but he wasn't really a Middle East expert and was only involved in this situation for a while. He helped us on other parts of this negotiation regarding the Middle East, on terrorism, and so on. I didn't have much depth of background on the Middle East, but other people in the Department had the strength that they needed, so my role wasn't that great. But Kissinger found me useful in all the other roles I mentioned.

Now, regarding President Sadat of Egypt, you're absolutely right. When he came into office as President of Egypt, people asked: "Who is this guy?" They tended to figure that, after Nasser, he would be something of an anticlimax, even though they had a lot of ambivalence about Nasser. He surprised everyone. There is no question that Sadat showed incredible courage. Kissinger ended up with great admiration for Sadat, and this applied to President Nixon, too. Eventually, Sadat paid for his courage with his life. It was only gradually that Kissinger and others began to realize what a great statesman and courageous man Sadat really was. However, at the outset, I certainly didn't know enough about Sadat to understand this and I don't believe that our Middle East experts appreciated this either. I think that Sadat surprised everyone.

The two Egyptian shuttle negotiations in 1974 and 1975 were really exhausting - and rollercoasters of hope and despair. We not only went back and forth between Cairo and Tel Aviv but also to other key capitals - Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia. I recall the quiet courage of Hussein of Jordan, the maddening elusiveness of Assad of Syria, the surreal Saudi dinners where everyone (all men, all in white) would watch the King and eat/laugh when he would eat/laugh. Then there was the charisma of Sadat and the excruciating demands of the Israelis, understandably insecure.

One more footnote. Again, it's somewhat humorous now, but it sure wasn't at the time. During the trip to Moscow in October, 1973, we were trying to arrange a cease-fire between the Israelis and the Arabs. We reached agreement with the Russians. After that we tried to cut them out of the negotiation as much as possible. However, at this time we needed their help in arranging a cease-fire. We were clear that there should be a cease-fire. So the problem was to get a message to Israel to stop advancing and trying to wipe out the Egyptian Army. Timing was crucial because in a couple of days this could be a fait accompli.

I recall a crucial cable that we were trying to send to our Embassy in Tel Aviv. We had trouble getting this cable out, from the mechanical point of view. It was absolutely crucial to get a message to Prime Minister Golda Meir right away. Kissinger, Saunders, Sisco, and Atherton drafted this cable. Kissinger told Eagleburger, who was his Executive Assistant, to get the cable out. Kissinger was going to go to bed. We suspected the Russians of holding up the cable, but, in fact, the Russians had no incentive to block this message because they also wanted a cease-fire. We didn't know what had gone wrong.
We just couldn't get the damned cable out! Several hours passed, and every hour counted. Kissinger was asleep.

There were about ten of us in the room, still trying to get the damned cable out. We knew that when Kissinger found out that this cable had not gone out while he was sleeping, he was going to erupt like Mount Vesuvius. We knew what was coming. It was just as if a train were coming straight at us. Kissinger wasn't going to listen to excuses. Everybody in that room left Eagleburger alone, except myself. I purposely stayed, knowing what was going to happen. I said to myself that Eagleburger needed some moral support. Everyone else chickened out. There was a mass exodus of the American staff. They all just sneaked away. This seemed to be a tremendous crisis. Kissinger was going to go ballistic when he found out that the cable had not gone out which, of course, is what he did. To this day Eagleburger has always considered me an heroic figure for standing by him at this awful moment.

It was frustrating. It was serious. We finally had to take the cable out to the US Air Force plane which we were using, and which had its own communications equipment. We finally got the cable sent from the plane. To this day we don't know what happened. We might suspect the Russians but, in this case, we couldn't see why they would want to stop the cable. I still don't know what happened.

As always with Kissinger we had our laughs during the hectic travels. Once, as we were flying into a Middle Eastern capital, the Xerox machine on the plane broke loose and headed for the incredibly energetic Sisco. I yelled out: “Catch that machine - we cannot stand to have copies made of Sisco!”

I was with Kissinger on other trips to Europe. I was with him on trips to Mexico that were important. Then, of course, I was with him on trips to southern Africa, when we went to several places. We also went to West and East Africa. There was a major speech which Kissinger delivered in Lusaka [Zimbabwe], which announced our change in position in negotiations with Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia. We also went to South Africa to make sure that a deal could be struck on this matter. And we went to “front line” states for their support. I was on all those trips; two major Africa trips were in April and September 1976. There were others I’m leaving out, such as a successful one to India where Kissinger repaired relations which had been severely strained over our Pakistan tilt during the Bangladeshi crisis. Kissinger recognized India’s preeminence in the region. I helped to draft a nationwide radio address that reached several hundred million people. It was a successful visit. I also went with Kissinger to Pakistan, Morocco, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, many Arab nations, and others I can’t recall. Another major trip ended in Rome where Kissinger made a major speech on world agriculture. This too involved the agonizing process of coordinating with Washington agencies and continually redrafting the speech while traveling.

Of course, I also went on President Ford's trip to China in December 1975. We later went on to Indonesia, and the Philippines.
One major, and successful, focus of Kissinger’s attention which I cannot reconstruct in detail was southern Africa. After the Lusaka speech shifting US policy towards black aspirations, Kissinger engaged in very intense diplomacy to bring independence and majority rule to Rhodesia, later Zimbabwe. This involved a couple of trips to Africa and tough negotiations with Ian Smith and South African leaders. There were also visits to front-line African states to line up their support. Undersecretary Chuck Robinson devised economic plans for Kissinger to bolster diplomatic efforts. We went to London and coordinated closely with the British. Kissinger also consulted at home on these issues with black American leaders. I was in all of the negotiations and trips, and it was very dramatic. There were other stops in east and west Africa. And Kissinger paid considerable attention to Angola, the Cuban and Soviet angles, as well as the Chinese involvement.

It is not often recalled that Kissinger was the catalyst for Rhodesian independence as well as more American emphasis for black aspirations, generally. It all started with the Lusaka speech which was one of Kissinger’s most important ever.

A few more comments about Africa on which Kissinger (and I) spent a great deal of time and effort. Generally people, including critics of Kissinger, overlook this - including his significant achievements.

The catalyst was an historic speech in Lusaka - which made the President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, cry. As Kissinger was gearing up for an African trip, the African bureau wished to steer him and the Administration into a much more forceful backing for black Africans’ aspirations for justice and equality - out of principle and to elevate our standing on the continent. I shared these goals but worked closely with the bureau to feature the geopolitical advantages of this approach. An emphasis on humanitarian elements alone was not apt to sway Kissinger. So we also stressed that aligning ourselves with African aspirations would greatly help us in our geopolitical confrontation with Moscow on the continent. The bureau and I sent joint memos to Kissinger on the trip. Kissinger agreed and we went through the usual agonizing process of writing a major speech. In this speech Kissinger strongly backed racial justice as well as addressed other issues. It had a major impact.

There were several African trips, for this and other goals. I recall the very moving poet-leader Senghor of Senegal, who impressed Kissinger - they had a very interesting philosophical exchange. We were all deeply stirred by the sight of the ancient prisons in West Africa, the Ivory Coast, I believe, where the slave shipments began. And Kissinger made another major speech - again the usual agony of extracting ideas and projects from the bureaucracy and going through multiple drafts - on Third World development at an UNCTAD conference in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.

Kissinger made several trips to “fontline” states like Kenya and Tanzania when he began pressing for Rhodesian independence - i.e., become Zimbabwe. On that and subsequent trips there was intensive diplomacy with South Africa (Vorster), Rhodesia (Ian Smith), the British, and the neighboring states. It was a whirlwind, herculean effort that my dim
memory - and so far, historians - is not doing justice. There were the usual mixes of Kissinger sticks and carrots and rationales to various leaders. Chuck Robinson, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, headed up an ambitious effort for economic development in the area as a sweetener.

As a result the die was cast for Rhodesia to become Zimbabwe and this was one of Kissinger’s major diplomatic achievements, and least heralded, in my view. People should consult his memoirs for a much fuller account.

There were some interesting leaders we met. The racist South Africans and Rhodesians. The intellectual (but disastrously socialistic) Nyerere of Tanzania calmly dignified and impressive in his modest home. The flamboyant Kenyatta of Kenya, where I believe Kissinger briefly joined in an African dance. The emotional Kaunda of Zambia. And others. The corrupt thug, Mobutu of Zaire.

Let's see. I've already gone over the Middle East. I can't really add anything to what I've already described. We're covering relations with China in other interviews. We covered Vietnam elsewhere. Basically, the Vietnam Agreement was undermined, as was the agreement on Cambodia in 1975, which collapsed. This was a very painful period. We got our Embassy people out of Saigon and Phnom Penh but did not get all of the Vietnamese and Cambodian people out whom we had hoped to evacuate. The basic question was whom you leave behind and whom you get out. Kissinger was outraged over the lack of Congressional support for our allies and economic and military aid for South Vietnam. A poignant example was the leader of Cambodia saying that they were staying behind and that we had let them down. They were subsequently killed.

The whole relationship with the Russians was running out of steam. However, one thing that became significant, although we didn't realize it at the time, was the application of the Helsinki Accords. There were three parts or baskets in the Helsinki Accords. One involved security and borders, one involved economic affairs, and one involved human rights. Kissinger, consistent with his general position, didn't quite see the significance of the human rights basket, at least as far as I recall. He may regard this differently now. History has shown that was very crucial, because it gave the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union something to point to. It gave an opening for international attention. It had a subversive effect on the Soviet system and its control of Eastern Europe.

Q: You know, some years ago I interviewed George Vest, who was working on the Helsinki Accords. He said that he felt undercut by Kissinger because he would hear from people like the Swedes- (end of tape)

   Anyhow, Vest said that he would hear from the Swedes about the settlement of arms control issues, borders, and all of that. I was wondering whether you were getting any feel for this within your own organization.

   LORD: I recall Kissinger's skepticism on the third basket or human rights affairs. George Vest, by the way, was an outstanding officer. He was Public Affairs Officer for Kissinger
for a while. I would certainly not contradict anything that he said that sounds plausible to me. It is clear that, at the time, Kissinger wasn't that much interested in the third basket of the Helsinki Accords. I think that Kissinger now recognizes that it was very important.

**Q: Did the third basket or the human rights question play much of a role in policy planning?**

LORD: I had Sandy Vogelgesang following the issue of human rights all the time. It was rather difficult for her. She was also working on Europe and on some economic issues. We tried to introduce this matter at various times, but I don't want to exaggerate our impact. In Kissinger's case it wasn't a major element. We would introduce it. I don't recall whether we were pressing third basket issues in the view that it could help our security because it was going to undermine Soviet ideological and other positions; it would help us in security terms, not just values and feel good issues. I know that we not only agreed but made sure that the human rights dimension was included in southern African diplomacy. This included the payoff domestically, as well as justice in Africa. I might say that Kissinger deserves more credit on Africa than he generally got. He spent a great deal of time and energy on this. As we went ahead on African diplomacy generally and specifically on these southern African issues, Kissinger met a couple of times with American black leaders and tried to stay in touch with them. I think that they always remained somewhat suspicious of him, but he tried to reach out and work with them. I don't recall specifically whether we were smart enough to point out the importance of the third basket.

**Q: I think it surprised everybody.**

LORD: Even human rights advocates didn't realize that it was going to be this effective, although in principle they were very much in favor of emphasizing this issue.

**Q: How about the United Nations? What was Kissinger's view of the United Nations?**

LORD: It was sort of middle of the road. He was certainly not anti-UN like some other conservatives are today and have been throughout history. He is nothing like Senator Jesse Helms [Republican, North Carolina]. However, Kissinger also understood that we often would have to act without the UN. American leadership was crucial, and we couldn't rely on the UN. There was a lot of hypocrisy up there at the UN in New York.

He paid a lot of attention to his annual and special speeches to the UN. There were a lot of specific initiatives which Ambassador Patrick Moynihan [American Permanent Representative to the UN at the time] delivered on Kissinger's behalf in September, 1975. So, on some of the developing issues, that is, Third World and economic issues, he thought that the UN could be of some significance. Certainly, we had to work with the UN to some extent on the Law of the Sea. However, there is no question that the UN was not a major factor in Kissinger's approach. He was not antagonistic to the organization. He was just skeptical about how much could be accomplished by working through it. We had much more clout at the UN at the time than we have today. With respect to
Ambassador Moynihan, and I forget who else was in our UN Mission when Moynihan was there...

Q: Was it Yost?

LORD: Yes. Kissinger was impatient with the anti-American rhetoric that you often found at the UN. He was concerned about the North-South divide and how these issues were addressed ideologically, rather than in pragmatic terms, with rhetorical battles between northern and southern countries. Kissinger was somewhat contemptuous of so-called neutral countries. I forget what these countries called their bloc then, the non-aligned bloc or whatever it was. They often sided with the Russians. Kissinger had some suspicions of the UN, although on some issues he tried to use it as a platform. He always went up to New York every fall, of course, for the general debate in the General Assembly and gave thoughtful speeches. He tried to point out where the UN needed reform, but also where it could be helpful to American interests.

I think that Kissinger also recognized that UN members had been playing, and continued to play, a constructive role as peacekeepers in selective areas, whether it was Cyprus, the Sinai Peninsula, or elsewhere. So he looked at the UN as an adjunct of policy, not a central element of it. He was skeptical about the UN, and clearly did not look at it as a major platform, as far as he was concerned.

Q: Regarding his speeches, would he say to his speechwriters that this or that is the theme that he wanted to emphasize? How did this work out?

LORD: His themes would emerge in his conversations with us. Generally, he would kick the conversation off with the little circle of people that I have mentioned. He would say that he wanted to give a speech in this place at this time. He would indicate that these are what some of the themes should be. He would welcome others giving ideas, and he often would use them. He would usually have a pretty clear idea in his mind of what he wanted to accomplish. Sometimes he would express himself in more general terms. He might start out by saying that he wanted to indicate that the U.S. is taking the developing countries more seriously. We don't have that reputation at this time. He would say that he didn't want just general rhetoric but rather some specific proposals that would help the economic situation of the developing countries. He realized this might annoy our Treasury, AID [Agency for International Development], and Commerce Departments somewhat, but he asked us to do this if necessary. He might ask us to give him some ideas and he might have some specific suggestions. He might say that he wanted to make clear that we were going to follow this or that policy with this or that country, this or that issue.

At the beginning of the drafting of a speech, Kissinger would indicate in varying levels of detail what he wanted to accomplish. He would welcome ideas and would have more ideas as he went along. He would reject some and adopt others. However, he always insisted not only on the substance of the speech being as interesting as possible but on its having a well-developed structure. He didn't want the speech to be just a grab bag of
ideas. Generally, you could look at the speech he delivered, much as an English major, and appreciate how it was put together, as it were.

Q: In looking ahead, did you identify any places which you thought might be boils which might burst?

LORD: Part of our role in Policy Planning was to try to do that. That is, to say what might go sour or where we were on the wrong track. This was, in part, the devil's advocacy role which I mentioned before. We did this first in talking to officers from the various bureaus and then with Kissinger, either alone with him or with others, as necessary.

A good case in point is Iran, where we strongly supported the Shah. Frankly, I don't recall personally challenging that position. It is possible that some of my staff did. It's easy, in retrospect, to second guess this position. The fact is that the Shah did some good things, early in his career, including the advancement of women...

Q: And the white revolution.

LORD: And he promoted some economic development. However, he became over ambitious in his plans, and, of course, there were some cases of clear mistreatment of his people as well. That cost him support. I don't recall whether any of us challenged the policy line on Iran as a regional power, as well as the shortcomings of that approach. I was on the trip to Iran and was part of the Shah's summit meeting with President Nixon. One thing that I did personally was to forward dissenting views. I was selective because Kissinger certainly didn't want 100 different views coming from the Policy Planning Staff. But for the sake of policy planning, if someone on my staff had a different view than I did, and I thought that it was well considered, I would forward that view to Kissinger. In effect, I would say to him that on this or that issue my view is that you should proceed as follows. However, I want you to know that some members of my staff feel that were should do something else. Here are my arguments and here are their arguments.

I didn't overdo this. I would discuss the issue among my staff and try to develop a consensus. Obviously, I was in charge and was the boss. However, I felt, and particularly in the case of policy planning, that it was wise to have different points of view expressed. And certainly it was good for staff morale.

I might even attach such a differing view to a memorandum to Kissinger. I might say: "Attached is a view of so and so on my staff on this issue. I disagree with it for the following reasons, but I think that a fair case can be made and has effectively been made. I think that you ought to see it." It is possible that might have happened on issues like policy toward Iran, but I just don't recall.

I must say, I am proud of the performance of my Policy Planning Staff, which Kissinger recognized with the collective Distinguished Honor Award. At the end, we compiled a
complete record of all the significant papers and memos for the historical files. This will give a full record of all our work. I'm really not doing justice here to the hundreds of papers (we averaged at least one per day) that we forwarded to the Secretary and others on all the major issues.

Just a few that I recall include a major strategy paper toward the developing world, several non-proliferation papers, several others on energy, Latin America, etc. Major substantive departures would also occur in speeches - like the UN speech in 1975, the UNCTAD speech in Tanzania in 1976, the Lusaka speech in 1975, a Mexico speech in 1975, and a couple of Law of the Sea speeches - on that complex issue we did a great deal. On all this S/P worked closely with other bureaus and agencies.

_Q: How about the Dissent Channel? Was that in place during your time on the Policy Planning Staff?_

LORD: Thanks for reminding me. Absolutely. There was a Dissent Channel, and...

_Q: You might explain what the Dissent Channel was.

LORD: The Dissent Channel provided an opportunity for Foreign Service Officers, either serving abroad or in the Department in Washington to register their concern about a given policy. This meant that their supervisor didn't want to forward this expression of opinion in a cable from an Embassy or a State office because the boss didn't agree with this viewpoint. But a more junior officer who felt strongly about a given issue had the right to bring his or her view to the top. I'm not talking about personnel or grievance matters now. These concerned substantive issues. A junior officer could prepare a cable saying that he disagreed with established policy for the following reasons. This was a tricky matter, of course, because a lot of bosses wouldn't take kindly to this procedure. However, it was understood that people had the right to do this and that they shouldn't be punished for it. Some supervisors were more enlightened about this procedure than others.

In my case, as I've just described, we didn't need a Dissent Channel on my staff because I really felt that if people felt strongly about a given issue and their viewpoint was well reasoned, I would forward their views. I would certainly go to Kissinger if I thought that such a view was important. This procedure was good for morale, and there was no need for a formalized dissent procedure on my staff.

When I joined the Policy Planning Staff, the Dissent Channel was located somewhere else. I don't recall where it was. With Kissinger's agreement, I purposely had this channel located in my office to provide it with operational support. We would be the people who would forward a Dissent message to the Secretary of State and regularly advertised in the Department and overseas that State Department staff members had the right to make use of this procedure. So this was done. I don't recall any details on it, such as how many cases of dissent were selected to be brought to the Secretary's attention. Sometimes, it was just a matter of referring the matter to the attention of an Assistant Secretary. As I recall it, Kissinger was never very enthusiastic about this procedure. We forwarded
dissent messages and encouraged the process, but I don't think that there was a major series of memoranda on this matter. I don't know what has happened with this channel more recently.

_Q: It's still there. I wanted to ask about this, and then we might break for lunch._

LORD: I would also like to mention that we made sure that there was a full-time job to head up the Open Forum in Washington. Previously it was a part-time job. I arranged that this was handled by someone who would take a year off from a regular Foreign Service Officer job and head this up. We would have meetings with people who held dissenting views to air their opinions. I tried to encourage this procedure as a way of stimulating greater debate within the Department of State. However, this was never something which Secretary Kissinger was enthusiastic about.

I made sure that the person heading the Open Forum program did so as a full time job.

_Q: I think that this person also headed the Dissent channel._

LORD: You're right. I often spoke at the Open Forum meetings at which people could vent their views and sometimes differences within the Department. At times we had interesting speakers come in, including some who were controversial, like the head of the Green Party in Germany, Petra Kelly. That was another process.

We paid quite a bit of attention to this. I thought that it was important intellectually, but also for the morale of the Foreign Service, that people would think that this kind of thing could go on.

One last thing I would like to mention before I forget it. That is, the fact that Kissinger came close to resigning. I'm not sure that I have the chronology right on this, but it began toward the end of 1975, shortly after a trip which he made to China during the Ford administration. I think that it was in October, 1975. Secretary Kissinger was setting up President Ford's trip to China in December, 1975. There was a mini-massacre, not on the scale of the Saturday night massacre during the Nixon administration, when Attorney General Richardson resigned. This was another sort of massacre, involving bureaucratic changes.

As I describe elsewhere, by the way, Kissinger's trip to China had not gone well, and the Ford trip to China two months later ended up being very frosty, although we maintained a polite veneer over it. I don't have all of the details at my fingertips, but shortly after we returned to Washington from this trip to China, Kissinger lost his NSC [National Security Council] hat and was replaced as National Security Adviser by Brent Scowcroft. Also, I think that James Schlesinger [then Secretary of Defense] was fired and Donald Rumsfeld (then Chief-of-Staff) went over to replace him as Secretary of Defense. I believe that at about this point George Bush was brought back from China to head the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency].
Essentially because he lost his NSC hat, Kissinger was upset, although this change made sense. It worked out well, and Scowcroft turned out to be a close collaborator with Kissinger, having the same world view as Kissinger. Kissinger gradually began to realize that this new arrangement could work out well.

However, at the time, both in terms of losing some control, but also because there was a perception abroad that Kissinger's role had been weakened, he was concerned about the implications. We went through several weeks when Kissinger was genuinely debating in his own mind whether he should resign as Secretary of State. This seems absurd in retrospect. Given Kissinger's prestige, wearing two hats made no sense and was no way to run the show. It was an unnecessary distraction and bureaucratically awkward. Brent Scowcroft had worked closely with Kissinger, and it would have been absurd for Kissinger to leave the Department of State. For several weeks Kissinger met periodically with me, Larry Eagleburger, and some other, close advisers, as well as friends such as Bill Simon, who was either Secretary of the Treasury or had held that position. Also in the meetings with Kissinger, I believe, was David Bruce and a couple of other people. At these meetings Kissinger was wrestling over the question of whether he should resign. We met both at the Department and in private homes.

It reached the point, by the end of 1975, either in November or December, that Eagleburger and I drafted about ten versions of a public explanation of why Kissinger was resigning as Secretary of State. We did somersaults, trying to figure out how to write this letter. The more we tried to do it, the less it seemed to make sense. It was a very serious matter, and Kissinger genuinely was thinking of resigning. I still remember that it was on a Saturday or a Sunday that I had met with Kissinger again on the latest draft. I waved goodbye to him as he left the Department in a car to go over from the Department of State to the White House, to discuss his possible resignation with the White House. We thought that this actually might happen.

I forget actually whether Kissinger brought this matter up seriously with President Ford or whether President Ford asked him to forget about it. I don't know whether Kissinger said that he would actually resign. Of course, in moments of heat before, he would often threaten resignation for purposes of enhancing his leverage. These episodes were mostly not serious, but this time his resignation seemed to be a serious possibility. There was a lot of debate among his advisers as to whether he should resign, but most people felt that he was exaggerating the blow of losing his NSC hat.

Then, I guess, we got to the point where it was just about Christmas holidays, 1975. Kissinger finally decided to cool off on the matter over the holidays, noting the fact that we were having trouble drafting this letter of resignation. He said that this meant that we were having trouble finding a real rationale why he should leave the Department. He asked us to think about this matter over the Christmas holidays.

So the process of considering his resignation stopped because of the Christmas holidays, and the whole episode just faded away. He never did anything about this. I don't know how much of that is public knowledge. I haven't read Kissinger's most recent volume of
memoirs yet. This was a strange episode, where a few of Kissinger's closest advisers were trying to figure out what the impact of his resignation would have on our foreign policy. He finally decided that it was in the national interest not to resign.

Q: Of course, it was not in the national interest.

LORD: Clearly it was not in the national interest. People always felt that if Kissinger threatened to resign, it was strictly a ploy. He often did threaten to resign, but in this case he was genuinely considering going through with it. Fortunately, he stayed and was dominant on policy until the end. Under pressure from the Reagan challenge, however, Ford and his staff began to put some daylight between the President and Kissinger.
Q: Just to put this in context, we're going to follow the China thread through the period when you were the Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State, from 1973 to 1977. Then we'll pick it up with your service as Ambassador to China and the period of the Clinton administration. Here, we'll just stick to the China thread. Did the Policy Planning function include a China role?

LORD: I was Director of Policy Planning, of course, but I handled the China role personally. I worked very closely with the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs [EAP], first with Phil Habib, and then with Art Hummel and Bill Gleysteen as Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries, in addition to people on the China desk like Al Jenkins and in INR [Bureau of Intelligence Research]. Also, I dealt with the White House, the NSC, Dick Solomon, and Peter Rodman. So this was a collective effort. As I say elsewhere, Kissinger melded together a team, drawing on the best Foreign Service Officers he promoted, who took over most of the Assistant Secretary positions, as well as people he brought over from the White House, including myself, Hal Sonnenfeldt, Bill Hyland, and Larry Eagleburger. So, contrary to Kissinger's general reputation of allegedly mistreating the Foreign Service and the State Department while he was in the White House, once Kissinger became Secretary of State, he realized the importance of using the Foreign Service. He always paid tribute to the dedication and intelligence of Foreign Service people. There wasn't just a palace guard around him. He really used the best people. He often did not treat Ambassadors with total openness, to say the least, depending on their competence. I'll cover the whole issue of Kissinger's style elsewhere.

The manner in which he handled the China matter reflects what he did on other issues. For example, he would work with Art Hartman [Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European Affairs] on Europe and Russia, but he would have Helmut Sonnenfeldt [Counselor of the State Department] and Bill Hyland [INR Director] work on these issues as well. On Middle Eastern questions, he would work with Hal Saunders, who had come over from the White House staff, but also worked closely with Roy Atherton [Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] and Joe Sisco (Undersecretary). It was always a melding of Foreign Service Officers and people close to Kissinger who had worked with him in the White House. Many of these people, like myself, had once been Foreign Service Officers.

That's the way things worked on China policy matters. I was still the key person, but clearly relied heavily on EAP [Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs] and on the White House staff, because I had these other responsibilities. So that's the way policy matters were managed there.

I made 9 trips to China when I was in the government during this period. We had, of course, the secret Kissinger trip to China in July 1971; the trip in October [1971]; and the Nixon trip [in February 1972], which makes three. Then the trip in June 1972, which makes four. The trip in February 1973, makes five.
I left the government service in May 1973. I was exhausted physically, mentally, and emotionally. Working for Kissinger for four years is enough to drain anybody. It was a tremendous experience but it was also tiring. I wanted to recharge my batteries, see more of my family, and so on.

There was supposed to be a trip to China by Kissinger during that period, partly to resolve the Cambodian question. Partly because of the Cambodian bombing halt and the derailing of those negotiations and for other reasons, that trip was postponed. So I didn't miss any of the Kissinger trips to China, even though I was out of government service between May and September 1973.

The next trip to China, which was the sixth such trip for me and Kissinger was in November 1973. There were two more Kissinger-only trips in 1974 and 1975, and President Ford’s visit in December 1975 (as well as to Indonesia and the Philippines).

Q: I think that we probably should record when you were made Director of the Policy Planning Office in the State Department. Did you wear, in effect, a China hat, as well as a Policy Planning hat?

LORD: That's right. This has been done on several occasions. My successor as Director of Policy Planning was Tony Lake. He wore an Africa hat, in addition to a Policy Planning hat. I’ll treat the policy planning function in another session. Basically, one of the key ways to be effective in this function is to have access to the Secretary of State. One way to do that is to be a key adviser to the Secretary on one or two issues. You then have that natural and constant entree to the Secretary.

Q: By this time, in late 1973, were all operating systems go? Were things looking good?

LORD: Do you mean with China?

Q: With China, yes.

LORD: Well, conditions were improving. As I said earlier, President Nixon was reelected by a landslide [in November 1972], and this was still before the Watergate Affair really became a central preoccupation of the administration. The Watergate Affair really began to emerge more and more strongly in late 1973 and 1974. I cover this in connection with the trips to China and other places. Obviously, the Watergate Affair began to affect our foreign policy generally and increasingly became a focus of President Nixon's attention.

Still, during the fall of 1973 the ultimate impact of the Watergate Affair was far from apparent, and certainly would have been far from apparent to the Chinese. The Watergate Affair was gathering some steam, but it didn't seem to have done so in any decisive fashion by November 1973, as I recall.

Meanwhile, the Vietnam War irritant between us and the Chinese appeared to be behind us, and President Nixon was presumably in office for four more years. The Soviet
problem was still there, although we'd improved relations with the Soviets, which was a good development in terms of our relations with China. We'd improved relations with one country and presumably could improve relations with the other country, because this gave us more leverage.

On the whole, yes, the situation was improving. We had more and more communications with the Chinese through the two channels I mentioned, the Chinese Embassy in Paris and the Chinese Mission to the UN in New York, and now had Liaison Offices in the two capitals. We had worked in parallel on issues like the situation in South Asia, and we kept the Chinese informed on other issues, especially our dealings with Moscow. We were overcoming historical mistrust and isolation between ourselves and China. We were beginning to pick up some momentum in the Chinese-American relationship. We were working on the claims and assets question and on the economic front. We were sharing our intelligence with the Chinese. Generally, things were going quite well. That was the background to the Kissinger trip of November 1973. As I have already said, the February 1973 setting up of Liaison Offices was the single best visit to China.

The November 1973 trip took place at the end of a long swing through the Middle East. The Yom Kippur War [between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria, on the other] had broken out in October 1973, just after I returned to government and Kissinger had been appointed Secretary of State. So we went to Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan. We stayed at the same Guest House in Pakistan from which we sneaked out to China on the secret trip in July 1971. On this occasion, and for the first time, my wife went back to China. I met her there. She had gone to China ahead of me. She saw a number of her relatives. Indeed, this return to China led, many years later, to her best-selling novel, "Spring Moon."

Kissinger received a very warm welcome on this trip to China. He again had very good and wide ranging discussions with Zhou Enlai. Of all of the discussions I have been involved in during my entire career, the Zhou Enlai-Kissinger discussions were the most sophisticated, wide ranging, and interesting, bar none. Kissinger himself has said that Zhou was the number one statesman that he ever met. De Gaulle tied for first place in this respect, but Kissinger only saw De Gaulle a few times. I would also put Zhou Enlai in first place.

Having said that, as I commented to Kissinger, and I think that he agreed and so stated in his later memoirs Zhou Enlai seemed somewhat more subdued and restrained than usual. Kissinger was used to Zhou Enlai as a very charismatic and very elegant figure who often commented on various issues somewhat at length, by contrast with Mao. Zhou Enlai had an elegant mandarin style. I don't want to overstate this, but Zhou probably knew by now that he had cancer, which may have begun to have an impact on his stamina. Maybe Zhou and Mao had begun by now to see the creeping impact of the Watergate Affair, but that's pure speculation, as I've already said. I don't think that it was a major consideration as yet. Zhou Enlai's comments were less lengthy, and he seemed a little bit restrained, although he was still brilliant.
Although this was a good trip to China, and the mood remained friendly on the whole, I would say that you can't expect always to develop momentum during any particular trip. Compared to the trip to China in February 1973, we didn't make as much progress. So it's possible, although we didn't know it at the time, that the struggle that would emerge, certainly during the next couple of years in China, over the succession to Mao, and the Watergate impact on our own domestic scene, meant that we were beginning to see the first signs that domestic constraints on each side were beginning to slow things down. I don't want to stress this too much. I think that this became much clearer in 1974 and 1975. This had not yet happened, and certainly Kissinger had a very warm reception during this trip. Again, Kissinger had an unprecedented, three-hour meeting with Chairman Mao, who normally met only with heads of state. Mao had already done Kissinger the honor of meeting with him in February 1973, probably the first time that Mao met anybody at Kissinger's level, although I could be wrong about that.

As I say, Mao met with Kissinger for three hours and obviously enjoyed the meeting. On several occasions during this meeting Kissinger stood up as if to leave, but Mao extended the conversation. Mao was physically frail, as he had been, but he was still very sharp in his comments. Once again, this meeting hadn't been set up in advance. We assumed that we would meet with him, since we had seen him before. Wang Hairong [Mao's grandniece] would shuffle in and out with notes, and Zhou Enlai would announce that Mao wanted to see Kissinger.

Q: One question. This will come up again, as things developed. As you describe this meeting, obviously everyone was impressed by the meetings with Chairman Mao, and all of that. However, I've just finished reading your wife's book, "Eighth Moon," about her sister. In this and other books about China, it really comes across that Mao was in a class maybe a little ahead of Hitler and Stalin, as far as what he did. In my opinion, Mao was one of the three monsters of the 20th century. Was this a factor in your contacts with Mao, or were we all caught up in something like adulation of Mao?

LORD: Well, it's a very fair and good question. Furthermore, I agree that Mao should be put up there with Stalin and Hitler as a monster. Of course, the official Chinese line is that Mao was "70 percent good and 30 percent bad." They say, and I think that you can reasonably make the case, if you try to be detached about it, that when Mao was fighting to unify China and make it stand up, his record was fairly positive, in Chinese terms. None of us liked communism, of course. But then you had the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the starvation of the people, the brutality, and so on. Even the Chinese admit that Mao went overboard. In view of the tens of millions of people who died, either through starvation or just in the prison camps and in other ways, and the countless others who suffered, there is no question that Mao was a monster.

Now, to return to your question, we were certainly not naïve. We knew that Mao was no Boy Scout. That was true of Zhou Enlai, as well, who was, of course, more elegant. So we knew for a fact that Mao and Zhou did not get to be where they were without ruthlessness. Having said that, I admit that the personal impact of Mao and Zhou put some restraint on our judgment in the 1970s. First of all, we didn't know the full enormity
of Mao's crimes at that point. Some people probably knew or suspected it, but it was hard
to know. I think that it's fair to say that the full disasters of the Cultural Revolution, and
even the famine of the Great Leap Forward were not fully known in the 1970s. But
Communist China was clearly an unattractive society afflicted with the cult of the
personality and with repression. That was obvious to anybody, but the full enormity of it
was not known.

Secondly, we were then on a very hard-headed mission. We were not going to give the
Chinese high marks for good behavior, but we tried to serve American national interests.
At the time we were concerned about the Soviets, the Vietnam War, and all the other
things we had to talk about. We also had the longer range desire to engage with China as
an emerging, great country. So that was uppermost in our mind, rather than passing
judgment on Chinese society.

Thirdly, it was no secret, however, that Secretary Kissinger always had and always will
put the emphasis on geopolitics, as against human rights. Therefore, without approving of
or being naive about Mao's personality, Kissinger was focused on American national
interests and geopolitical considerations. In fairness to Secretary Kissinger, he also
believes that, over the long run, this makes for a more stable and peaceful world, with
less chance of people blowing each other up. This also serves human rights in that sense.

In addition, you had the general tendency of Americans to swing back and forth. There
was this euphoria of opening up relations with China. This made the media and virtually
everyone tend to downplay the ugly dimensions of contemporary China. Today, the
Chinese government often tends to get a very tough press in the United States. And they
deserve it. Yet, compared to the worst of the Mao days, Chinese citizens have a better
life. There is still great repression and many abuses of human rights, but less serious
compared to what they were going through under Mao. However, for all of these reasons,
I am basically granting part of your point. No one thought that Mao was a nice person,
but for all of these other reasons, this consideration was not uppermost in our minds at
the time.

One other point is that both Zhou Enlai and Mao were personally very impressive in
totally different ways. So it was a fact that when you enjoyed your conversations with
them, you tend to think in strategic terms as you are dealing with them. The convergence
of national interests also tends to affect one's judgment.

Q: At the time, in late 1973, when you were seeing Mao, did we see China as being a
decisive factor in the Vietnam War?

LORD: Do you mean in retrospect?

Q: I mean, at that time.

LORD: Well, the Vietnam War was officially over in January 1973, though the North
Vietnamese takeover was still to come.
Q: I guess I mean in retrospect.

LORD: We were still urging the Chinese, of course, to contact Hanoi and persuade the North Vietnamese to live up to the Paris Agreements of 1973. The general judgment was, both at the time we were negotiating the Paris Accords and then trying to keep the agreement holding together, despite the North Vietnamese violations, that the Chinese were more helpful than the Russians. This was partly in their own self-interest. They didn't want the embarrassment of a dispute with Hanoi to get in the way of their own national interest, at least on the ideological plane. We also thought that they weren't going to bend over backwards; they weren't going to do anything that would get them in trouble with Hanoi, and that would lose them influence, compared to Russia's influence in Hanoi.

The same problem existed in Korea, because China was jockeying for position, with Russia nearby. They were in a geopolitical competition with Hanoi. If China leaned too hard on Hanoi, the North Vietnamese might turn more toward the Russians. Not to mention, of course, that we now know much more than we did then, believe it or not, about internal competition for leadership within China as they headed the post-Mao period. Future leaders couldn’t look too tough on their ‘allies’.

Q: Was anybody telling you at that time that the Vietnamese and the Chinese really weren’t blood brothers?

LORD: We knew earlier on that the Chinese put their relations with us first and this alleged relationship of “lips and teeth” [a Chinese and North Vietnamese propaganda term meaning different functions but close accommodation] with Vietnam second. However, they wanted to have their cake and eat it, too, at least as far as the competition with the Russians was concerned. I don't think that we understood the full hostility in the relations between China and North Vietnam. I don't recall anyone making this point very strongly. In retrospect, this may show that we did not have enough sensitivity to history.

Q: What about North Korea, because this must have been one of our concerns. It was one of the few, really hostile land borders we had, outside of the border with the Soviet Union. There was the division between North and South Korea and a feeling that Kim Il-sung could launch an attack on South Korea at any time. Was North Korea part of these discussions with China?

LORD: It was, but as I recall the matter, it was not a very meaningful part. The Chinese expressed a strict line of solidarity with the North Koreans. So we really got nowhere on North Korea, as I recall.

One area where we did make progress over time, and we're talking about a process which covered several trips to China, concerned our alliance with Japan. During the early talks with the Chinese, their basic line was that we were helping Japan to rearm by our alliance with them and that we were making them dangerous. We pointed out that this was an
illogical position. Our alliance with Japan and our troops stationed in Japan, plus our nuclear umbrella over Japan, meant that Japan didn't really need to rearm or go nuclear. We said that it was in the interests of China and the East Asian region that Japan feel its security was taken care of by close ties with the U.S. Therefore, in effect, we were restraining Japanese militarism, and the Chinese should favor that. In fact, that argument had an impact on the Chinese over time, and they began to accept that it was in their interest. They never came right out and said so, either publicly or even privately, that they loved to see our troops in Japan or loved our alliance with Japan. However, they clearly got the point and were much more restrained, although that debate continues in Chinese minds, even as we speak today. Japan was an interesting subject of discussion with the Chinese.

We also talked about the Middle East in these discussions. Kissinger kept the Chinese informed in the course of his visits to China. The Chinese were clearly pro-Arab and were not willing to do much with Israel. This situation changed later on when the Chinese began to get military help from Israel. However, at the time the Chinese took pretty much a pro-Arab, pro-Palestinian position. Of course, we encouraged them to be more even handed. Basically, it was a matter of briefing the Chinese on what we were up to, usually working in our prevention of Soviet influence in the region.

On these trips there was often discussion of Europe. China always wanted us to have strong relations with Europe. They wanted to make sure that Russia had to worry about its Western flanks and could not focus all of its energies on China and East Asia. In some of these meetings with Zhou Enlai and Mao there was also discussion regarding the Central Eurasian pivot area from Turkey around to Pakistan. Of course, the Chinese had a particular friendship with Pakistan vis-à-vis India. The Chinese were suspicious of India. Chinese friendship with Pakistan was a frequent subject of dialogue between us. There were discussions about that area, and its geopolitical significance. Occasionally, there were conversations about Cuba and Africa, but these were not areas for major discussions. There was a lot of talk about what the Russians were up to in these areas as well as the Cuban role in Angola.

On Taiwan the Chinese would press us, of course. We indicated that we weren't going to do anything that would create great difficulties for China, but, of course, we also were not prepared to normalize diplomatic relations with China at that point or to back off from any of our commitments to Taiwan. That all came later. These were some of the agenda items that we were dealing with.

Q: Did the subject of Albania ever come up?

LORD: I'm sure we made some jokes. At one point, Albania was the one point in Eastern Europe that was close to China. Albania said that, between them and the Chinese, they represented one-quarter of the population of the world!

During those several trips, however, almost everything came up, including history and philosophy, in the course of regular agenda items, digressions, or jokes and conversation.
Finally there would be discussion on how to strengthen bilateral ties. The Chinese maintained restraints so as to press us toward normalization. We did establish and expand Liaison Offices. Trade and cultural exchange were limited. We moved on the claims and assets issue.

As the Kissinger visits to China continued, we always took State Department people with us. That was true even when Kissinger was National Security Council Adviser and before he became Secretary of State. Generally, Kissinger would lean on State Department people for support in discussing things like claims and assets, as well as issues of trade and cultural exchanges. Kissinger saw these matters as less than major in and of themselves, particularly compared with the geopolitical dimensions of our relationship with China. However, he saw these issues as valuable in signaling progress to the world and particularly in terms of building up constituencies in both countries for improved relations. He felt that, if we had business, cultural, and academic institutions in the U.S. which were engaged with China, this would help to broaden domestic support for American policy toward China. Similarly, within China, if more constituencies were involved in developing good relations between the U.S. and China, this would help to strengthen the overall fabric of the relationship, and help to buffer it against strains. So, in this sense, Kissinger encouraged these bilateral exchanges and contacts. However, for him these were relatively boring matters, compared to the big, geopolitical issues. And the Chinese, because of the Taiwan issue and our lack of diplomatic recognition, were not eager to allow great expansion of ties that comes with normalization. And, of course, the trips were all one way, our going to China, except for visits by Chinese officials to the UN, which we would use for bilateral exchanges.

Q: Could you talk a bit about how these meetings were conducted? Was this strictly a matter of Kissinger sitting on one side of a table and Zhou En-lai sitting on the other side? Did they talk back and forth or were there times when other people would get up, and somebody more junior might say: "Look, we're making a big thing of this, but remember that this is not as important to us as it may seem." Did people on either side try to put matters into perspective, or was it a matter of the principals talking for the record?

LORD: Well, I won't try to be precise in describing each individual trip. Kissinger went back to China several times as Secretary of State after the Nixon trip to China [in 1972]. He had people from the State Department with him. At the meetings, in addition to me, always there would be John Holdridge (until he became co-leader at the Liaison Office with Al Jenkins) the Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs and so on. After the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing was opened, we had the chiefs of that office as part of the U.S. Delegation.

I was in every meeting. The most central part of the visits would be with Zhou Enlai until 1975, when Deng Xiaoping took the ill leader’s place. Then, of course, Kissinger met three times with Mao on his own, plus once with Nixon and once with Ford. So he and I met a total of five times with Mao. I cannot be precise in terms of chronology, but we also met several times with the Vice Foreign Minister, Qiao Guanhua. Chao's wife was an interpreter. When Deng made a comeback, Chao made a mistake when he put his
chips on the Gang of Four. Qiao Guanhua was a very sophisticated Vice Foreign Minister. He was a very able, number two man in the Foreign Ministry. In a sense, he actually ran the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Minister was Ji Pengfei. He was replaced by Huang Hua somewhat later on. Qiao Guanhua was the key man to work with, as was Zhang Wenjin, the Assistant Minister who became Ambassador to the United States somewhat later, and who accompanied Kissinger and me on our secret flight from Pakistan to China.

Let me here recall one issue that belongs with a previous discussion of the February 1973 trip to China. On that trip we did raise again the question of American prisoners being held in China. The Chinese released a couple of prisoners who had been shot down over China as a result of the February 1973 trip. One was a CIA officer named Downey, who had been held since the Korean War. We raised his case. During the February 1973 trip, Zhou in effect invited some humanitarian reason for them to release him, or perhaps we thought of this angle. We looked into the matter. It turned out that Downey's mother had become very sick, cancer I believe. So I believe that we sent a message to Zhou, stating in effect: "Please release Downey so that he can see his mother before she dies." So Downey got out on humanitarian grounds because his mother was sick.

A couple of years later, lo and behold, Downey's mother was still alive and doing well. So Peter Rodman and I drafted a memo from Kissinger to President Ford at the time. The memo said along the following lines: "Mr. President, something has come to our attention which is deeply disturbing. The Chinese may accuse us of bad faith. We got Downey released a couple of years ago on humanitarian grounds because his mother was believed to be about to die. But she is still alive and doing well. The Chinese are obviously going to think that we misled them and that this is an example of bad faith." We then laid out several options as to what we might do. One of these options was to have the CIA wipe out Mrs. Downey so that we could show our good faith! It was, of course, a joke.

Kissinger then sent this memo to President Ford. Ford called Kissinger to the Oval Office and said seriously to him: "Henry, we can't do this."

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Did you have a sense of how much the Chinese believed their own people on what happened at these meetings? Did you find that the officials lower down in the Chinese hierarchy were informed about these meetings?

LORD: Absolutely. The Chinese are very good at briefing up as well as briefing down. Often we would meet with other, Chinese officials before we saw Zhou, or we would be seeing their people ahead of time. We got the feeling that whatever had been said found its way up the chain, and vice versa. The Chinese were very good at orchestrating and singing from the same sheet of music.

I also said that Mao would use brush strokes in his Socratic dialogue, employing a few sentences and going from subject to subject. He was setting out the basic instructions for Zhou to carry out more elaborately.

Q: Sounds a little bit like Ronald Reagan, in a way.
LORD: True, but I wouldn't want to carry it too far.

Q: Reagan would make a broad brush comment.

LORD: However, in Mao's case you have to be careful. Mao was very purposeful and laid out his points very carefully, if briefly and seemingly casually. President Reagan would be very economical in presenting his views, but I wouldn't put the same, strategic purpose behind what he said as I would in the case of what Mao said.

Q: By this time did Kissinger also make sure that everybody on the U.S. side was well briefed, or was there still an element of secrecy?

LORD: Kissinger was much more open. By this time Kissinger was Secretary of State and was using the State Department, as well as his colleagues on the NSC [National Security Council], I think that Kissinger was fairly open. There might have been an occasional, sensitive issue on which he talked to Zhou Enlai alone. The fact that we were briefing the Chinese on Russian troop and other deployments was closely held, even within our delegation. Jon Howe and I, and sometimes Kissinger, I believe, handled these briefings. Not everyone would have known about that. However, on the whole, in the various meetings, if there was something that was really sensitive, which was not unusual for the Secretary of State, he might just have me there. Or he might just talk about the matter to Zhou Enlai in the course of a banquet.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: But there would no longer...

LORD: There would no longer be the kind of secrecy that we had before.

Q: Was there concern, on our part, about Soviet troop deployments along the Chinese border, or was this just something that we could say to the Chinese, such as: "The Soviets are doing something there..."

LORD: Yes, we had to strike a balance. We didn't want to look as if we were deliberately trying to stoke their paranoia and fear and lose our credibility, when the threat wasn't all that serious. We didn't want to make it look as if we were trying to scare the Chinese for our own purposes. We weren't so stupid as to exaggerate the Soviet threat to China. On the other hand, we did try to point out that there was quite a formidable Soviet presence along the Chinese border, which, of course, the Chinese knew, although probably not in the kind of detail that we knew. We tried to strike a balance and gain Chinese confidence by sharing this information. We reminded the Chinese that the Soviets were a problem and, therefore, it was in the Chinese interest to continue to work with us on this geopolitical balance. However, we did this without exaggerating the Soviet threat or trying to pretend that it was more than it was. I think that, in general, the feeling was that, although the tensions were lower, the Sino-Russian relationship was still fairly hostile. However, there wasn't the kind of border clashes that the Chinese had with the Russians in 1969.
So I'll go to the details of the November 1973 trip, if that's agreeable. As I said, after a long swing through the Middle East, I met up with my wife in China [in 1973]. I felt that Zhou Enlai was more subdued. During the meeting with Mao, I felt that he was more frail. Mao mentioned the Watergate Affair. He compared it with breaking wind, and so forth. He could be a little crude. He made the point that, in Chinese eyes, this was nothing. I think that that was true of the views of most foreign countries, in Europe and everywhere else. However, it showed that Mao noticed it.

In the final, brief statement at the end of the meeting, I don't know whether you could call it a communique, after some exchanges on Taiwan, Zhou Enlai did insert the potentially meaningful phrase, the "Principle of One China."

We made it clear during this trip, and I haven't gone over the Kissinger memoirs, that we couldn't accept the Japanese formula for the normalization of diplomatic relations. The Japanese had leapfrogged us after we surprised them in an unfortunate way in 1972. Then they went ahead with their own process of normalization of relations with China. They broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan and normalized ties with the PRC [People's Republic of China]. Kissinger made clear to the Chinese that we couldn't do that. Kissinger may have said that, maybe some day or some day soon, but he said that we clearly weren't prepared to do that at the time. We said, in effect, that perhaps we could normalize relations if we could do it short of the Japanese formula, so long as we recognized the principle of One China. Zhou Enlai picked up on that. He didn't reject this but rather suggested that we try to get some language in the communique. He actually put in the communique the language, the principle of One China.

We thought that this suggested that the Chinese perhaps were willing to settle for something short of the Japan formula. We had essentially agreed to the term, the principle of One China, in the Shanghai Communique, so we were somewhat encouraged by the November 1973 trip.

We agreed to expand the staff and functions of the Liaison Offices. We agreed to more exchanges in various fields and tried to arrange for more trade. There was some progress made on the claims and assets front. However, as I've said, there was a somewhat more tentative mood in the discussions, on the whole.

On the Mao meeting, as I've said, we were summoned, as usual, on short notice to his simple residence in the Forbidden City. We entered the building. Inside there was a ping pong table and then Mao's study with a semi-circle of armchairs, with books all over the place, behind him, on the floor, and on tables. I've already described Mao.

This meeting with Mao lasted for three hours. Part of the reason for the length was that Mao seemed to enjoy talking to Kissinger. We thought that it showed confidence and that it was important. Partly, we thought, it was also because he was providing somewhat more direct guidance than he did at the other meetings. As we've said, he would provide these brush strokes, and then Zhou Enlai would carry on at great length. Now Zhou was
somewhat more restrained and subdued, and Mao seemed to give somewhat more explicit
guidance. At least in the course of three hours more of their positions was spelled out
than in an hour or an hour and a half. Mao made some jokes about problems with the
Soviets. The Soviets had complained to Mao, and Mao said that it would take "10,000
years to solve this problem." Kosygin [former Soviet Prime Minister] had come on a visit
to China, and Mao made a great concession. Mao said that it would only take "9,000
years to solve this problem." There were jokes like that.

The Chinese expressed some concern about US steadfastness in facing the Soviet threat.
Again, these were not as sharp as the attacks which we got from Deng Xiaoping and
others on détente a year or two later. There was a lot of discussion with Mao on the
Soviet question, Soviet relations with China, and European issues. Mao already was
experiencing some trouble in speaking. He had to make a great effort.

On Taiwan, Mao was relaxed. He basically said that China could do without Taiwan for a
hundred years. This was all in the course of discussions with Kissinger. They talked
about the Near East, including the Near Eastern countries that I mentioned, starting with
Turkey. On Japan Mao again talked about being careful.

All in all, this was a very long - unprecedented in length - and warm conversation. Mao
had summoned Kissinger during the middle of a reception that was being held in his
honor, I believe by George Bush, who was then the Chief of the US Liaison Office in
Beijing. The whole Diplomatic Corps in Beijing had been invited to this reception.
Kissinger had to miss that reception and we arrived there late.

This trip was the last, serious talks that Kissinger had with Zhou Enlai, because Zhou
seemed to be more seriously ill after that. Kissinger visited Zhou in a hospital a year later
for half an hour. Basically, we felt that Zhou was increasingly subdued. In retrospect, we
can see that now, since Mao was giving more explicit instructions. Zhou was not only
beginning to decline physically, but also politically.

We didn't return to China for another year until November 1974. My memory isn't good
enough to recall any significant happenings with China in the meantime. We just kept
working on the various issues.

Q: Regarding the initial Chinese-American talks in 1973, one of the great ties between
China and the United States was American missionaries, who have had a profound
influence on relations between the two countries. Former missionaries, or the children of
American missionaries, have had an influence on Chinese-American relations. Did
missionaries come into these conversations, either in terms of property or the ability to
go back and do their work, or anything else like that?

LORD: I don't recall. This was a long time ago, and almost every conceivable subject
was discussed.

Q: The issue of missionaries wasn't on the front burner.
LORD: I don't recall that there were any American missionaries who went back to China. This was not something that Kissinger had very high, if at all, on his list of topics to raise with the Chinese. I don't believe that we were getting any pressure from within the U.S. to raise the issue of missionaries. There may have been some historical references.

The next trip was in November 1974. On this occasion I went separately and met up with Kissinger, who came from the Summit Meeting with the Russians in Vladivostok. In retrospect, we felt later that maybe this wasn't the most clever thing to do, Kissinger going to China directly from Vladivostok, in view of the overtones. I remember going out to China with Bill Gleysteen in particular [then Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs]. We were under instructions from Kissinger to come up with formulas on Taiwan and different things that we might try out and make further progress on.

On this trip Deng Xiaoping was the host. Deng had made a comeback. He went down again later, and then made another comeback later on. The first time that we ever met Deng was when he headed the Chinese Delegation to the UN General Assembly in New York a couple of months before that, in September or October 1974. We met Deng at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, where our UN Ambassador has an apartment.

I recall that at the time we didn't know much about Deng. Initially, we were not particularly impressed with him. We just felt that, after Zhou Enlai, he was a let down. The initial meeting was at a working lunch or dinner. Deng was the head of the Chinese Delegation to the UN General Assembly. We were struck by the fact that Deng never mentioned Zhou Enlai's name once. We just generally were not impressed with Deng at that first meeting. Of course, the times changed, and given his political ups and downs in the mid-1970s, he was surely cautious at that point.

On the November 1974 visit, we specifically began to probe on the possibility of making further progress on Taiwan. However, Deng stuck to a hard line on Taiwan. We were not overly generous ourselves, either. By then the Watergate Affair was behind us, so this was our first trip to China after Nixon had resigned and Ford had become President. At the time of this trip to China, in November, 1974, Deng himself was in a vulnerable position, trying to deal with the Gang of Four in China. Zhou Enlai was declining in health and politically, and Madame Mao and the other radicals in the Chinese Communist Party were jockeying for position around Mao, trying to get his ear and so forth. Mao was obviously fading as well. So Deng wasn't able to be very flexible on many issues, especially one as sensitive as Taiwan. He couldn’t afford to look ‘soft’.

Q: Did you feel any reflection of U.S. developments, when the Watergate Affair heated up and President Nixon had to resign? Were these developments interpreted by the Chinese in the sense that Nixon had opened up U.S. relations with China but Right Wing American elements brought him down?

LORD: I'm thinking of Mao and Zhou Enlai in particular, who indicated that the Watergate Affair was our business. The general tone expressed by the Chinese about
Watergate was that this was a case of breaking wind. They considered it no big deal and clearly wondered why everyone was so excited about it. They were not explicit; they were not inclined to talk about it because they figured that this was a domestic issue for us to deal with. There was no evidence that they thought that this had anything to do with China. It plainly puzzled them because they just didn't understand our system. They wondered why a third-rate burglary could bring President Nixon down, particularly when he had done great things, such as achieving the opening to China. The Chinese were somewhat baffled by it and were somewhat contemptuous of American puritanical attitudes, and so on, or even of democracy as such. I don't believe that the Chinese thought that the Watergate Affair was somehow related to China. If anything, they may have thought, again incorrectly, that détente with the Russians was beginning to create some trouble for President Nixon. However, I don't think that the Chinese thought that the Watergate Affair was foreign policy related. They realized that this was a domestic problem. They just wondered why America made such a big deal out of it.

I don't think that the Chinese ever expressed any particular view of the matter, other than to indicate that they thought this was a domestic affair for us to handle. There was no evidence that this had anything to do with China.

Q: Since this interview is focused on you and your thought processes, when your wife went to China with you in 1973, did she bring any different insights? After all, she was talking to family members and getting out and around. Hers was quite a different perspective than you would get from a bunch of Occidental officials, sitting around in a reception area and talking to Chinese officials.

LORD: For listeners to and readers of these memoirs, I would refer them in particular to my wife's book, *Legacies - A Chinese Mosaic*, which not only talks about more recent events, like the Tiananmen Massacre, but Chinese recollections of the Cultural Revolution, and some of Bette’s experiences in going back to China and our serving there.

She returned to China in November 1973 for the first time since leaving in 1946. All of her relatives were there, beside her two sisters, one of whom escaped in the early 1960s (she wrote a book about it, *Eighth Moon*) and her parents. Before I arrived, she saw relatives, for example, in Tianjin. They had moved homes just before she arrived back in China. They were living much better than they had been. My wife couldn't understand why her aunt and uncle didn't seem to know their way around their own house. They had to figure out where the silverware was. This was kind of puzzling at the time. Clearly, the government had given the relatives better quarters to impress Bette. Obviously, the sidewalk and everything else had been spruced up as well.

My wife had already begun to hear horror stories about the Cultural Revolution, including how her uncle, her grandmother, and others had suffered during it. She planned to write a book, based on these experiences. Then she realized that this would have been politically too sensitive for them. They might have gotten into trouble. She ended up writing "Spring Moon," a best-selling novel, which had nothing to do with her relatives.
My wife always had a more hard-headed, negative impression of the communists and what they had done to China. She was more skeptical about them. She fully believed that the U.S. should open up relations with communist China, in our own, hard-headed self-interest. She was very much in favor of that. However, then and ever since, she has been more skeptical about Chinese actions and perfidy, particularly in terms of the government and the system. Of course, her friends and relatives made her feel that even more strongly.

Q: Did the fact that you were getting this view from your wife have an impact on your views? There would be conversations in the Office of Policy Planning, and you might have said that the situation in China really isn't that euphoric.

LORD: First of all, I must make it clear that she was very much in favor of the opening to China and she thought that it was in our own national interest, even if we had to hold our noses a little bit. Indeed, she made major contributions to the relationship over the years, especially when I served as Ambassador. She always placed greater emphasis on the human rights issue. I did as well, certainly by comparison with Secretary Kissinger. However, she would put human rights as the major item in the Chinese-American relationship or at least thought that it should be among the major items. I've always held the view that human rights are very important but should not control the whole relationship. No single issue should hold our tries. But human rights is crucial in terms of American domestic support and our values. I feel that at times we have to work with some resignation as to how fast we can make progress. We need to do our best and pursue other interests as well. There can never be really positive relations so long as the Chinese government is so repressive and abusive of human rights.

So I can't say that my wife's perspectives greatly affected my own policy judgments. I greatly respect her insights and believe that she instinctively knows more about China than anyone else. For example, she predicted in the late 1960s that Deng Xiaoping would make a comeback before I got involved with China in the early 1970s. She had her eye on Deng. I don't know anyone else who did. She kept talking about the horrors of the Cultural Revolution when it was still fashionable to overlook it or even justify it. So there always was that element, and I thought that it was good to get a reality check through her. However, despite this, she felt that we should go ahead anyway with the opening to China. It didn't really have an impact on my policy judgments.

Going back to the trip to China in November 1974, I have talked about the limits on Deng and, to a certain extent, on ourselves. We proposed a lengthy, communiqué draft which other people and I had worked on. It noted all of the progress we were making, how we were moving ahead, and so on. We dealt with Qiao Guanhua, the Vice Foreign Minister. He preferred a shorter communiqué draft. We went on to Suzhou and its lovely gardens. So the trip was not negative, but clearly the momentum was slowing down because of the domestic situation in both countries. This was our first encounter with Deng in China, when he was the host. This was the trip when Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger paid farewell call to Zhou Enlai in the hospital.
I'm just doing an account of the various trips, at this point. I haven't tried to reconstruct specific events in between.

Q: With regard to policy planning, was there a change when Ford became President? Obviously, Nixon had a very hands on knowledge of foreign affairs. I would imagine that there would have been a real White House input into policy planning during the Nixon years. How was the situation when Ford became President? Ford did not bring that kind of experience or real interest with him. Did you notice a change in that connection?

LORD: Since we are focusing on China today, we'll reserve a discussion of Kissinger for another time. Just to answer your question in general, President Nixon, as the Watergate Affair began to preoccupy him, became less and less involved in the details of foreign policy. More and more, Kissinger was reporting to him and keeping him informed. Obviously, Kissinger was more and more on his own. So Kissinger, by virtue of being Secretary of State now, was wearing both hats. He was also still National Security Adviser. He totally dominated US foreign policy even during the last year or two, when Nixon was President, since Nixon was so preoccupied with the problems related to the Watergate Affair.

President Ford had less interest and less knowledge and experience in foreign policy. This meant that Secretary Kissinger dominated foreign policy to an even greater extent. Ford's primary purpose was to heal the country after the Watergate Affair and to focus on our domestic scene. That was consistent with Ford's background, but it was also his top priority at that point. So President Ford basically left it to Kissinger to run our foreign policy. He had total confidence in him. Kissinger in turn respected Ford and of course got his approval on major issues and went to him for major decisions.

We've had other examples like that in our history, although perhaps not quite so extreme. President Eisenhower was heavily involved in our foreign policy, but he left it to Secretary of State Dulles to run the basic operation. For a time, especially early on, President Clinton didn't focus all of that much on foreign policy. President Carter preserved a sort of balance between Zbigniew Brzezinski [then National Security Adviser] and Cyrus Vance [then Secretary of State] in foreign policy. Under Nixon the White House dominated foreign policy, of course. The State Department dominated foreign policy under Ford because even with his two hats Kissinger essentially operated out of the Department. President Reagan delegated a lot of responsibility to Shultz. President Bush (senior), on the other hand was more concerned with foreign policy than domestic policy. So we have had a variety of ways of handling foreign policy, and therefore diverse profiles of National Security Advisors and Secretaries of State. But to return to your question, yes, Ford was less interested in foreign policy.

We didn't feel any great shift because during the final few months of the Nixon administration, Kissinger was running foreign policy. Watergate totally tied up President Nixon. Already there was the feeling that, by virtue of being Secretary of State, Kissinger was running the show anyway. That situation continued under President Ford, so there
wasn't any great shift for that reason. Obviously, there was a considerable contrast, say, between 1969 and 1973, but not much contrast, say, between 1973 and 1974. As for State Department policy planning, the staff didn’t play much of a role when Nixon and the NSC ran foreign policy, before I took over the policy planning staff. After that, of course, we played a much more important role. I believe, thanks to our various assets and advantages that I have cited elsewhere, the influence of the policy planning staff was the greatest since the Kennan/Nitze years. Some, outside the staff, called our time “the golden years.”

The next trip to China took place in October, 1975. The object there was to prepare for a visit to China by President Ford in December, 1975. On this particular trip, both Mrs. Kissinger and my wife were members of the official party. This was the most unpleasant, frosty trip of all of the trips I made to China from 1971 to 1976. The Chinese were very cold on substance, at meetings, and in their public toasts. They were very tough on détente and alleged that we were being naïve about the Russians. I don't know when they first made the allegation that we were, in effect, standing on their shoulders to reach toward Moscow and so forth, but that was their attitude. They really were quite tough, in public as well as in private.

During this trip Kissinger saw Mao again, and it still was quite a friendly talk, despite what I've just said. However, Mao was very sick by this time. He spoke in grunts and wrote things down. I used to joke that Mao would speak in a grunt for, perhaps, 10 seconds, then his interpreter would hold forth for, perhaps, two minutes. I suggested that Mao would attach a number to each policy formulation, and relay it to his interpreter. Number One was Taiwan, Number Two was Russia, Number Three was Japan, etc. Mao would whisper the number, and then the interpreter would give the standard policy line.

Q: Wasn't the interpreter the only one who supposedly could understand what Mao was saying?

LORD: She was Nancy Tang. Mao had a very heavy, Hunan accent, among other things. Also, it wasn't only a matter of understanding his accent. It was a matter of understanding him at all. Mao was writing things down and getting very feeble, but he still seemed quite sharp. We were trying to prepare a communique for the Ford visit, even as we had prepared the Shanghai Communique in 1971 for the Nixon visit. The Chinese resisted and rejected mentioning any real, substantive progress in the communique. We had a draft communique which we gave them. They sat on it for two days and then came back and poured cold water all over it. So we left China, resigning ourselves to making further preparations for the visit through cable traffic.

The reasons for this were essentially domestic politics on both sides. Deng was really fighting for the succession to Mao, who clearly was in his final months. Zhou Enlai was also in his final months of life and no longer an influence. Deng could not afford to look soft, vis-à-vis America, especially on the most sensitive issue, Taiwan. By this time President Ford was beginning to think about his reelection. I can't remember when Reagan began to emerge as a rival to Ford in the campaign for the Republican
nomination for the 1976 elections. However, Ford had to watch his conservative flank, particularly on the issue of Taiwan. So the Chinese couldn't do anything on Taiwan, and we couldn't do anything on Taiwan, either. On this trip, as well as on other trips, we said that Ford planned to normalize diplomatic relations with China once he was reelected. However, he couldn't do anything before the 1976 presidential elections.

Q: Was any thought given to canceling Ford's trip to China?

LORD: There was no thought of canceling it. However, we were very unhappy when we left China because we saw this as a trip without any results and, perhaps, even without a friendly reception. There we were having to rely on cable traffic now. We had no agreement on the communique and we didn't know what the outcome was going to be. This was in considerable contrast to the meticulous and positive preparations for the Nixon visit at an earlier stage in our relationship.

As we got back to Washington, James Schlesinger was fired as Secretary of Defense. He had just returned from a visit to China. The Chinese really liked him because he followed a particularly hard line on Russia and was friendly toward China. Kissinger lost his job as National Security Adviser. Kissinger was very upset and started talking privately about resigning. At the time there were long discussions between Kissinger, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, and myself. Sometimes, Kissinger brought in outsiders like David Bruce, and Bill Simon about whether or not Kissinger should resign, essentially since he had lost his NSC [National Security Council] hat. He had voiced such threats before, but it got quite serious when contingency planning began and drafts of letters of resignation began to be prepared.

There was even a Sunday, near the Christmas holidays, when I remember Kissinger saying farewell to Larry Eagleburger and me at the State Department. He said that he was on his way to see President Ford, bringing with him a draft letter of resignation.

Kissinger finally stayed in office because of considerations of the substance of issues outstanding. Also, the more we drafted letters of rationale for his resigning, the more we - and he - realized that Kissinger really didn't have a good reason for doing this. Just because Kissinger had lost his NSC hat, this didn't mean that it was the end of the world. We were concerned about the suddenness of the impact on American national interest. Literally, Eagleburger and I prepared about a dozen draft letters of resignation, but we just couldn't find a credible explanation for Kissinger's resignation. As we got close to Christmas, Kissinger agreed, after all of these meetings with people and thinking the matter through, to put the matter aside and think about it again after the holidays. In the course of the Christmas and New Year's holidays, Kissinger decided to remain in office.

Q: What sparked this change?

LORD: It was in part Kissinger's concern that President Ford was putting him down somewhat, probably out of concern about his conservative flank. Later, President Ford made Rockefeller resign, and replaced him with Robert Dole as a candidate, a huge
mistake which may have cost him the election. Of course, Rockefeller and Kissinger were very close. Ford also appointed Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld had been chief of staff to President Ford. Kissinger saw these developments as a possible threat to his position. But the primary consideration was Kissinger's losing his NSC hat. He felt that in the eyes of leaders around the world and of his own prestige, this was really a put down. Of course, in that respect, this was an overreaction. He was still someone whom Ford depended the most on in foreign policy. Ford felt that conservative elements in the Republican Party were upset with Kissinger over détente with Russia, and other issues. Ford was worried about his right flank. He didn't want Reagan to get the Republican nomination. Ford was sucking up to the conservatives in the Republican Party. That's why later he dropped Rockefeller, and that's probably why he downgraded Kissinger, from Kissinger's point of view. Kissinger felt that conservative Republicans didn't like the policies he advocated, particularly on détente with the Soviet Union.

So for all of these reasons Kissinger felt that he was losing influence in the Ford administration, and his ego was hurt. This was pretty ridiculous because Kissinger was still dominant and was still the Secretary of State. The more we tried to construct a suitable letter of resignation, the more we had trouble in explaining why Kissinger was quitting. However, that was his mood at the time.

Now let’s get back to the December 1975 Ford trip to China. We decided to get tough with the Chinese. We really didn't like the reception we had during the October meetings in Beijing. So in follow up cable traffic we did the following. The original Ford trip was supposed to be only to China and for several days, or maybe as long as a week, to include visits to Beijing and a couple of other cities in addition. In subsequent message traffic we informed the Chinese, politely, in a matter-of-fact way, but unmistakably as a result of our frosty reception in China that President Ford would only be able to go to Beijing. He would just spend a couple of days in Beijing. And we said, by the way, he was not only going to China but also to Indonesia and the Philippines. This made an Asian trip by contrast to the original idea of President Ford's trip to China alone.

We wanted to get the attention of the Chinese. We realized that we had not been very nicely treated, both publicly and in private on the previous trip. There wasn't any meaningful outcome shaping up for this Ford visit to China.

We did get the attention of the Chinese. They immediately began to warm up in the cables exchanged and in their contacts, through the two liaison offices. The Chinese affirmed their desire to have President Ford visit China and promised him a very warm welcome. Sometimes, you have to play things this way with the Chinese.

So President Ford went to China in December, 1975, with visits to the Philippines and Indonesia afterwards. We flew out again to China on Air Force One via Anchorage, Alaska, and visited the petroleum pipeline in Alaska. I remember listening on the plane, even as we went out there, to the incredible football game between the Washington Redskins and the Minnesota Vikings. There was the usual hectic, last minute work on briefing books and toasts. After China, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the President
stopped off in Hawaii and gave a major speech on his Pacific Doctrine. We went to Japan.

The Chinese public reception of President Ford was essentially a replay of the Nixon visit. I would have thought that the reception would have warmed up by then. However, we got the same, austere greeting at the Beijing airport. There were the same, welcoming banquets. The Chinese were very careful to do the same things that they had done for President Nixon. Of course, the reception did not seem as exciting and dramatic to the American people and to everyone else, since we had been through this process before. The Diplomatic Corps was at the welcoming banquet in Beijing.

Some members of the Ford party had the chance to shake Mao's hand before we had the meeting with him. I remember that there was the usual scramble as to who was going to attend the meeting on our side. I was included, as were Brent Scowcroft [National Security Adviser] and George Bush [at the time the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office and later President of the U.S.]. Some of the White House staff, including Dick Cheney [chief of staff of the White House] and Ron Nessin, tried to force their way in. However, the Chinese Protocol Officer, Mr. Tang, kept them out.

Mao had about an hour's meeting with President Ford. Mao agreed with Ford on most issues. At the very beginning, and this is a semi-amusing story, Mao repeated his comment that he would soon receive an invitation from God. President Ford looked a little puzzled at this. He didn't seem to understand that this was Mao's elliptical way of referring to his forthcoming death. So, when we left the meeting, Ford went up to Mao and said something to the effect: "I'm going to overrule Kissinger and make sure that you get that invitation from God very soon." Ford obviously did not know what Mao's reference to an invitation from God really meant. Kissinger and I were aghast. However, the interpreter fielded the comment and surely said: "The President wishes you 10,000 years of life," or something like that. The meeting between Mao and President Ford was quite friendly. Mao agreed with the President on most issues. Unlike the trip to China in October 1975, the Chinese went out of their way to be more friendly to Secretary Kissinger personally, and showed greater respect for him. The White House staff was less friendly and gave Secretary Kissinger and me lousy treatment, including room assignments. There was obviously a little bit of tension between Kissinger and the White House domestic staff. I was kept out of the official party for the visit to Indonesia and didn't go to the dinner with President Suharto, and so on.

Deng Xiaoping made somewhat of a better impression on us during this trip and particularly handled the American press effectively. The fact is that there was really no substantive outcome to this visit, even though the Chinese were correct and certainly didn't insult President Ford. They gave President Ford basically the same reception that they had given to President Nixon. But it was pretty easy to see that there wasn't much in the visit. We didn't even have a communique.

However, after the official meeting and in a seemingly casual encounter Deng and President Ford answered reporters' questions. One of the questions was about the absence
of a communique. Deng answered that there was no need for a communique. The discussions that had been held were themselves the key element. Relations between the US and China were good and getting better. In fact, they really weren't. Relations weren't slipping back, but they clearly weren't improving. Deng showed that he was becoming adept at spin control and was trying to help us out in getting through this. I think that he considered this a holding action, aware of the domestic constraints on both sides. As he proved later, Deng was very much in favor of strong relations between the US and China. He also knew that, given our own domestic constraints, as well as Deng's domestic problems, there wasn't much of an opportunity to move relations forward.

_Q: Did Mme. Mao play any role in this meeting?_

LORD: No. We never saw her at all. During the visit to China by President Nixon she took Nixon one evening to one of those horrible ballets which were staged during the Cultural Revolution.

I've already indicated why President Ford and the Chinese were somewhat constrained. Kissinger and I made a sentimental, farewell visit to the Forbidden City. We figured that this might be the last China trip, even though there was another year to go in President Ford's term. We had tea in the same spot where we had tea during the secret trip in July 1971.

Then President Ford went on to Indonesia and the Philippines, with Mrs. Marcos overseeing the Tinikling bamboo stick dances. There was an incredible motorcade in the Philippines. We went to Japan while the President went to Hawaii to give his Pacific Doctrine speech.

Then, in 1976 nothing really happened regarding China. Things slowed down in terms of foreign policy generally. We didn't go back to China. Relations didn't turn sour, but we were basically just treading water. And, of course, both Mao and Zhou Enlai died during 1976. There was also the symbolic and incredible earthquake in Tianjin, a Chinese symbol of dynastic change.

_Q: When the U.S. Liaison Office was first set up in Beijing, can you talk about its role as you saw it? What about the various people who served in it?_

LORD: During the trip to China in February, 1973, we agreed to establish the Liaison Offices, and these were up and running a few months after that.

We had co-leaders of the Liaison Office at first, in the persons of John Holdridge and Al Jenkins of the State Department. They basically handled bilateral issues like trade, cultural exchanges, and claims and assets on a day to day basis. The heavy lifting on important, sensitive, and geopolitical issues was still handled by Secretary Kissinger. We used the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington. I don't believe that we used the Paris channel any further, since we had a Chinese Ambassador available in Washington.

_Q: So much of what we were trying to do was to set up this relationship. Maybe this is
LORD: Well, you have to see how Kissinger dealt with Ambassadors. Basically, when he was Secretary of State, he would use our Ambassadors a lot more than he would use them when he was not Secretary of State. He used some of our Ambassadors, like Herman Eilts in Egypt, and so on, a great deal. He had great respect for Eilts and certain other Ambassadors. Even as he used Foreign Service Officers to a great extent in Washington, I think that it's still fair to say that he didn't fully employ his Ambassadors overseas on key issues. He would not always keep them fully posted.

As to the Liaison Office in Beijing, as I said, the two officers initially in charge of it were John Holdridge and Al Jenkins. They were distinguished and very knowledgeable diplomats. They were very good choices and very competent, and Kissinger respected both of them. They were followed by senior heads (once the office had been set up and running) David Bruce, then Gates from the Defense Department, and George Bush after that. Everything that I've said was also true regarding people after Holdridge and Jenkins. The basic, sensitive matters were handled by Kissinger. You can apply that throughout this period. These were matters handled by Kissinger in Washington. Now, whenever Kissinger traveled to Beijing, the heads of the Liaison Office were fully included in whatever was going on. They were kept well posted. I kept trying to encourage Kissinger to bear in mind that the heads of the Liaison Office had to know what was going on. However, there is no question that whenever there was heavy lifting on really important and sensitive issues, this would be handled by Kissinger himself and not by the head of the Liaison Office in Beijing.

Q: When Kissinger was in Beijing or Deng was coming here to Washington, how did Kissinger do his heavy lifting?

LORD: By talking to Huang Zhen or whoever was the head of the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington. China had its own Liaison Office in Washington, after all. So Kissinger would work with him and ask the head of the Chinese Liaison Office to send messages back to Beijing. We generally kept our people in the US Liaison Office in Beijing posted on what was going on. However, there might be things that the chief of our Liaison Office in Beijing might not know. I always encouraged Kissinger to keep our Liaison Office as well posted as possible. If a sensitive matter were involved and Kissinger wanted the chief of our Liaison Office to know about it, he could send an eyes only message, or a backchannel message for the chief of the Liaison Office and not for other people in the Liaison Office.

Q: Did you see a parallel to the Kissinger-Dobrynin connection, where often our Embassy in Moscow in effect was bypassed. The Embassy in Moscow might have been informed, but the real contact was Kissinger talking to the Soviet Ambassador to the United States. Was this kind of contact developing between the U.S. and China?

LORD: Certainly, there was an analogy there, because on really sensitive and important
matters Secretary Kissinger would handle them and he wouldn't necessarily tell the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing after the fact. However, this was by no means on the same scale. Now, with the Russians Kissinger had a much more fully developed relationship. In many ways it was less friendly and more dangerous. However, we had more business to transact, and it was a more normal relationship. We had many more regular exchanges with the Russians. We had official Embassies in each other's capital. We had negotiations on arms control, we had trade agreements and other exchanges, we were negotiating on Berlin and other issues. I often went to Moscow with Secretary Kissinger for such purposes in discussions with Brezhnev, Gromyko, and so on. So there were more subjects both for the Ambassadors but also more to keep them in the dark about.

This began to loosen up too. Don't forget that when Kissinger became Secretary of State, and I want to stress this, not only was the Foreign Service more fully brought into the discussions in Washington but our Ambassadors were much better posted than when Kissinger was National Security Adviser in the White House.

Q: Did you feel that it was part of your job, particularly regarding relations with China, which you are reviewing here, to make sure that everybody was singing from the same hymn book?

LORD: Oh, sure.

Q: That was part of your brief?

LORD: Yes. First, it was important for us to be consistent. Secondly, this was essential for efficiency in the operation of our foreign policy. Thirdly, it was important for our morale. I always tried to ensure that our people were kept posted as much as possible, keeping secrecy to a minimum, in Kissinger's own self interest and in the American national interest. This was also important to maintaining the morale and efficiency of our own people.

So the situation was by no means as it was in the early 1970s under President Nixon. We would brief the chiefs of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing before they went out to China. I was responsible for doing that, in coordination with the East Asian bureau and the White House. I remember spending an entire day with George Bush before he went out to Beijing as Chief of the Liaison Office. That was also true of David Bruce and Gates, as well.

Q: What about David Bruce? He was, perhaps, our most distinguished diplomat. He had been Ambassador to all of the major, Western European countries. What was his attitude toward this assignment as chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, and how did he operate?

LORD: First of all, he was chosen by President Nixon and Kissinger. As you say, he was very effective and distinguished. We wanted to get some elevation in this appointment. It was only a Liaison Office. We wanted to make clear to the world and to the Chinese that we had picked someone who was at the very top of our diplomats. He was, in one sense, a political appointee but he was a distinguished and experienced person who enjoyed a
very good reputation. I think that Kissinger felt also that David Bruce was very reliable. He was fairly old by this point, in his 70s. Given the limited nature of what you could do with that Liaison Office, in view of the restraints on travel and contacts with Chinese society, this really was a constrained operation in many ways, even without Kissinger's secretiveness. So Ambassador Bruce didn't need a great deal of energy in this position. He was competent and good and was a terrific human being. He was one of my heroes. Kissinger used him as a guru on other occasions, like the energy crisis, and when he considered resigning.

I think that Bruce would be the first to say that, by virtue of the nature of the job, our lack of diplomatic relations, and the limited scope, he wasn't really a diplomat. He couldn't really mingle much with the diplomatic community. He did not have much access to Chinese society outside the official community or much access to top Chinese officials. This was also true of Gates and George Bush, when they were Chiefs of the Liaison Office in Beijing. There was only so much that Bruce could do, so he wasn't exactly working himself to death.

As I recall, Bruce didn't do a great deal of reporting from China, either. However, this is not meant in criticism of him. As I said, he was one of my heroes. He played more of a symbolic role at that point. As I recall, Gates was not in Beijing very long. He seemed to do a competent job. George Bush was clearly the most enthusiastic Chief of the Liaison Office in Beijing. As you may recall, he had been the head of the Republican National Committee. He was called back from Beijing to become Director of the CIA, about the same time as the other personnel shifts in October 1975.

Some people, particularly of Bruce's, or Bush's, distinction and background, might have said: "This is a Liaison Office, and I am not even an Ambassador. Why should I want to do this?" However, Bush was genuinely interested in China, and he threw himself into the job with great enthusiasm. He rode around Beijing on a bicycle. He did as good a job as he could have, given the constraints. As he himself would say, and did say so in his memoirs, he was kept posted by Secretary Kissinger, but in fact there was not much important for him to do. There wasn't much that Bush could do, but he did what he could do, within those constraints. I was responsible, working with EAP, to make sure that he was informed about what was going on.

**Q:** Were we looking towards tying China into the Western world as much as possible by student exchanges, opening more Consulates, and getting more traffic back and forth? Or had it reached that point?

**LORD:** This was beginning to happen. You have to remember that this was before Deng launched his reforms in 1978. On the one hand China was emerging from the Cultural Revolution and from near total isolation. In the early 1970s, it recalled all its Ambassadors abroad except one, Huang Hua, in Cairo. By virtue of the opening with us, as they knew they made breakthroughs with others like Japan and parts of Europe that hadn't normalized relations as yet. They got into the United Nations. So they were beginning to open up diplomatically in that sense. However, trade was still very
restricted, Chinese society was politically very restrictive, and their own people were very carefully managed. Even on the exchange of persons front, the Chinese were very cautious. They began to agree to some exchanges.

Q: By exchanges you mean cultural exchanges.

LORD: Cultural exchanges, including sports teams and academics, as well as trade. So we made progress in relative terms, including on trade, during these years. However, trade was miniscule, compared to the time when I was Ambassador to China, and even more so, compared to today. It was more a matter of building constituencies to support the relationship on both sides and giving it some content. There wasn't any feeling that we could open up China at that point. The Chinese were just too cautious to make that possible.

Q: Were we seeing much of the tail end of the Cultural Revolution, the Gang of Four, and all that?

LORD: The official end of the Cultural Revolution was in 1976, though the worse excesses were in the late 1960s. I don't want to get my sequence of events wrong. The Gang of Four was blamed for the Cultural Revolution after this period. As I recall, this was during the period of the Carter administration. Deng returned to office in 1977 and solidified his position once again, pushing out Hua Guofeng, who in turn had ousted the Gang of Four. So the blame for the Cultural Revolution was not attributed when we were in office. Much of the material is already in the history books. In 1976 both Mao and Zhou Enlai died. There was a temporary elevation of Hua Guofeng. Mao said that with Hua Guofeng in charge, he was at ease. Hua Guofeng was gradually pushed aside by Deng over the next year or two. The Gang of Four was arrested and tried. All of this is in the history books. The reforms didn't really take hold until Deng came back to power for the third time in 1977-78.

Q: When you were the Director of the Office of Policy Planning during this time, for you were in that position for, what, three and one-half years, we already had a well developed group of Kremlinologists who followed developments in the Soviet Union. They figured out who was standing where and the significance of where they stood on public occasions on Lenin's Tomb, and so forth. They had a very sophisticated ability to read Soviet newspapers and figure out what was happening. They really had quite an insight into what was going on. Did you find that you had any of that kind of expertise or apparatus to follow the situation in China?

LORD: Well, we had some of that. We respected them, whether they were in INR [Bureau of Intelligence Research], the CIA, other parts of the intelligence community, the Department of State, the NSC, or among some outside academics and specialists. We would seek out their views as much as possible. Dick Solomon was in the White House and was a scholar on China. However, in those days a lot of the China watching was still done in Hong Kong, through our Consulate General there. That was our key source of information. We interviewed refugees who came out of China and used other contacts. So
even after we had a Liaison Office in Beijing, the Consulate General in Hong Kong probably produced more material on China. The Liaison Office could give us some material, but the restrictions on their travel and contacts meant that they really couldn't tell us a great deal about what was going on in China.

So we never felt that we knew a great deal about China. Certainly, we learned a lot as we established ourselves there. And, of course, journalists began to take up residence in China after a while. However, it wasn't really until the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1979 that things began to open up, especially in terms of exchanges and access. We began to get a lot of reporting out of China itself to supplement what we were getting from the Consulate General in Hong Kong. I don't think that we really thought that we had as good a feel for what was going on in China as we did for what was going on in the Soviet Union, and even there we had problems, of course.

Q: Well, it was also as difficult a situation as you could have, since this essentially was an ongoing coup or revolution and all of that.

LORD: Oh, you're talking about the power struggle within China. I don't want to pretend to precision here, when my memory can play tricks. I think that we realized even then that Hua Guofeng was not a dominant figure. He was a sort of surprising, safe choice. I'm sure that we must have speculated whether this man was going to last. I don't know whether we thought that Deng might come back again. I don't know whether we were that prescient. I'm sure that we had some feel for the struggle between the radicals and the moderates, but I don't think that we had any precise handle on that.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I was wondering to what extent you had contacts with the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan and to what extent you were perhaps preparing studies on what was likely to happen if normalization went on? To what extent was Taiwan a concern in this context?

LORD: Whenever we had contact with Taiwan, it was done by the Taiwan Desk, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, as I recall. I had a great personal respect and affection for Taiwan. I thought that we should not sell them out, and I don't think that we ever did that. I was always careful to urge that we maintain good relations with Taiwan, both in terms of its reputation and our own historical obligations toward it, as well as in terms of domestic U.S. support for Taiwan. We had to make sure that we didn't stir up the more conservative people in the United States. As I said, my wedding reception was given at the Chinese Nationalist Embassy residence, Twin Oaks, in Washington, DC, and my father-in-law represented the Taiwan government on sugar.

However, I don't recall having that much contact with the Chinese Nationalists. I think that that was left to the Taiwan Desk. With Beijing we basically gave up in 1975 and 1976 any hope of making any progress on the Taiwan issue at least until after the 1976 election. We went through a lot of contingency planning regarding the impact on Taiwan of the normalization of relations with Mainland China. We considered various formulas. We realized that the Chinese communists were not in the mood domestically, and
certainly President Ford was not in the mood, to take any chances. So that was essentially a holding action, although we would tell the Chinese that we wanted to keep moving forward on this issue. We said that we would revisit this issue after the election, when President Ford would have a freer hand and would not have to look over his shoulder at Ronald Reagan.

At one point, I, Dick Soloman (NSC), and either Hummel or Gleysteen of EAP sent a memo to Kissinger urging more progress on the Taiwan issue, but the time was not ripe.

I don't recall that Taiwan was a major area of concern. However, if I had been working in EAP at the time, I would probably have a fuller answer for you.

Q: You were looking at Ronald Reagan at this point as the point man for conservative Republicans. Is that right? Were you thinking that if he were to take over the Republican Party instead of President Ford at that time, that this could really set back our China policy?

LORD: I guess so, but the fact was that I personally never thought, perhaps naïvely, that Reagan had any chance to win the Republican nomination for President. I guess that the contest was closer than people realized.

Q: We're talking about the 1976 presidential elections.

LORD: I don't remember worrying about that too much because I figured that Reagan was never going to be elected. I personally was very upset with President Ford for dropping Nelson Rockefeller as candidate for Vice President. I was a great Rockefeller fan. This annoyed me, but that's neither here nor there.

You have to remember that President Ford, although he relied heavily on Secretary Kissinger, was beginning to be concerned about the conservative Republicans. I don't think that Kissinger attended the Republican Convention in 1976. There were a lot of attacks on Kissinger at that time, especially on détente. Not so much on China policy, which was still widely supported, because those who thought we were soft on the Soviets saw the advantage of dealing with the Chinese.

Again, I may have been naïve, but I don't think that I ever believed that Reagan was going to be the Republican nominee. I didn't think that this was going to be a problem. If I ever did, then I'm sure I would have thought that it wasn't going to be very positive for our China policy.

Q: What about China in the UN? Were we holding our breath about what China was going to do? Did we expect that they were going to act like the new boy on the block?

LORD: China was basically a cipher at the UN in those days. They didn't do anything. They just sort of attended the sessions. I don't think that they used their veto power, as I recall. They generally voted against the U.S., but they weren't active in doing so. They
didn't try to do very much. They were very low key at this point.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: To what extent was the Department of Defense active in our China relationship at this time?

LORD: Very little, as I recall. I'm trying to think about the whole issue of possible military cooperation, but I don't recall any particular details. When I was Ambassador, of course, in the late 1980s the Defense Department was heavily involved.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I'm not exactly sure, either.

LORD: I believe that the answer to your question is that the Department of Defense was not heavily involved in our China relationship at this time. We thought that it was still rather sensitive to be developing a military relationship with the Chinese at this point. We had not fully normalized our relations with China.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I had nothing specific in mind. I was just curious about it.

LORD: China policy was run by the State Department and Secretary Kissinger, although, as I say, Dick Solomon of the NSC was involved in most issues.

Q: Well, in Policy Planning one likes to think that your people are planning policies regarding possible developments 10 years from now. However, the reality is that you tend to deal with matters at hand. Was anybody thinking that, maybe, some time China was going to be an aggressive power and that we should think about some problems in its neighborhood?

LORD: I don't recall that, but you have to remember that this was a long time ago. Certainly, we didn't have the kind of debate that we have today because China, its economy, and its military establishment were all weak. China was just coming out of diplomatic isolation. So concern with China in those days was more a matter of whether they were fooling around with revolutions abroad, like in Southeast Asia, as opposed to any projection of a military threat.

We saw China as actually weak, although we all felt that, given their history and the inherent greatness of the Chinese people and civilization, they would make a comeback some day. However, this was thought to be some time away. I don't recall any long term projections about what the Chinese would do when they became strong. In Policy Planning I basically handled the China brief myself. However, I want to make clear that I worked with EAP most of the time, and Dick Solomon was very helpful in this regard, helping with some excellent materials and analysis.

Q: What about China and Africa? This is one area where the Chinese invested quite a bit of money, including in Mozambique, West Africa, and other places. What did we think of this?
LORD: The Chinese had some interests in Africa at the time. Remember that in Angola, the Russians and the Cubans were backing one faction, the Chinese were backing another faction, and we were backing a third faction. In the general, geopolitical game Kissinger welcomed any Chinese influence that would offset Soviet influence in Africa or anywhere else. He kept the Chinese briefed on his African diplomacy, including working with the South Africans to reach a deal on Rhodesia, which later became Zimbabwe. He did that for geopolitical reasons. In fact, to his credit, and that of President Ford, Kissinger did that even in the midst of presidential primary elections in Texas and other states. This didn't sit well with conservatives in the South.

Africa would come up in conversations with the Chinese, but it wasn't a major issue. The Chinese did have interests in Africa, as you say, and we, of course, welcomed their interest in Africa. We didn't see this as any threat to us, unlike, say, the efforts of the Russians.

**XVI. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.**
**OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (1977-1985)**

_Q:_ Well, now you've left the Policy Planning Staff. I'd like to talk about what you did after that and also your role when you were outside the government but still clued in, still being a resource and a prod.

LORD: Right. During my career I developed a pattern of going in and out of government service, for a variety of reasons. As I said, I started out as a Foreign Service Officer. Then I became a Civil Service Officer, then a Schedule C person, a Reagan political appointee, and finally a Clinton political appointee. I went in and out of government service several times for a variety of reasons.

First, to make sure that I saw more of my family, and particularly my kids, when they were growing up. Secondly...

_Q:_ How many children do you have?

LORD: Two kids. I think that I mentioned them earlier: Lisa and Winston. Secondly, I felt that if you get overexhausted, you are less effective. Therefore, I desired to recharge my batteries physically and even mentally, in terms of the strain involved in government service. Thirdly, to give myself a chance to read and reflect. I usually figured that I would eventually go back into government service, recharged, as it were. Fourthly, I had a conscious feeling in my life that work isn't everything and that I wanted to have time to have a slightly less frenetic working life and be able to pursue other interests, whether these involved sports, culture, reading, or whatever. Finally, I was never under any financial pressures, so I could afford to leave government service and not worry about having an immediate job or the need to make a lot of money.

So the first time I left government service was in May 1973, just for a few months. I had been on the NSC [National Security Council] staff. Then Kissinger called me back in when he became Secretary of State in September 1973. We've already covered that.
Q: By the way, what was your wife's reaction to these changes?

LORD: I said earlier that, in the first place, my wife has always been completely supportive in terms of putting up with long hours, travel, and missing important events. She always felt that it was important for the country and for me personally to be engaged in public affairs and to work hard. She felt personally that I had a contribution to make.

Secondly, by the same token she understood my own desire and recognized my need, to a certain extent, to take breaks and return to work later on. She welcomed that as well. She certainly never urged me to stay on at work when I felt the need to get out. Conversely, however, she was quite strong, keeping me in service at least temporarily, when I felt the need to get out of government service. For example, when I was getting restless over the long hours I was spending, the pressure, and the way Henry Kissinger sometimes treated me. Or when I was close to resigning over the incursion into Cambodia in the spring of 1970. She was the one who kept me in government service. Previous to that, she encouraged me to become Kissinger's Special Assistant, although I knew that the hours I would be spending in that job would be horrendous. She always wanted me to work hard but also to take breaks for the reasons I cited.

Q: How did she feel, particularly about your returning to government service after being out of the government for three months? Then you returned.

LORD: She was very much in favor of my returning to work. She felt, once again, that Kissinger was an exciting person to work with and that this was a big chance for me. I had a three month break. She felt that it was time for me to get back to work, so that was no problem.

The next time I left government service was in January, 1977, when President Carter came in to replace President Ford. Kissinger and the rest of us left government service. As far as my kids were concerned at that point, my daughter was 12, and my son was nine years old. That was the main reason that I wanted to leave, to see more of them, as well as the other reasons I mentioned. So we picked up and went out to Colorado. We wanted to get away and spend some time in the mountains for roughly a year. We didn't have any specific time table. We drove around the country looking at various places. I won't go into any great detail. Our itinerary wasn't of any particular significance. We found a place near Boulder, Colorado, up in the mountains, on a ranch. It was a gorgeous setting. We spent nine months out there. It turned out that this was the least amount of snow that they had ever had in the winter. This affected our skiing. In any event, I did a lot of reading, stayed somewhat in touch with Washington, but not in any great detail. I submitted some ideas to Kissinger and reminded him of some anecdotes which he might want to use in his memoirs. Basically, I just read, got back into good physical shape, and had a very pleasant time.

My wife was writing her first novel at that time, "Spring Moon." This was her second book. Then we got a call from the Council on Foreign Relations. They were looking for a
new President. As soon as I had left government service, I had already been approached by the previous President of the Council, a man named Bay Manning. He asked me if I would be the Director of Studies at the Council. I turned that offer down. Then I was asked if I would consider being named President of the Council, to replace Manning. To make a long story short, I said that I would be willing to be considered. I went back to New York, was interviewed, and in the course of the summer of 1977, I was selected by the Council to be the President. I held that job from September, 1977, until I was appointed by President Reagan to be Ambassador to China in the summer of 1985. I left the Council although, thanks to Senator Jesse Helms [Republican, North Carolina], I was not confirmed by the Senate and able to travel to China until November, 1985.

Q: Let's see. You left the Office of Policy Planning in 1977, you had a year off...

LORD: Roughly, from January, 1977, to September, 1977, when I started work for the Council on Foreign Relations. So I had roughly eight months off.

Q: So you were out of government service from September, 1977, until November, 1985.


Q: Can you explain what the Council on Foreign Relations was at that time and its role?

LORD: The Council on Foreign Relations was originally set up in the 1920s to help to educate the American elite and, through them, the American public of the need for American engagement in the world. You will recall that, after World War I, we had begun to retreat into isolationism once again. This has been a continuing pattern in our history. That was the original impetus for the establishment of the Council. Its membership, in its early decades, was composed almost entirely of residents of New York. However, they had different points of view, from liberal to conservative. They came from different professions, including banking, law, business, journalism, former government officials, or religious or scientific leaders. The common thread uniting them was an interest in foreign affairs. The Council also publishes a magazine, "Foreign Affairs," and has a tradition of sponsoring off the record meetings for members only.

It also sponsored study programs for scholars, who would do work that would inform the public debate on foreign affairs and even help to advise the government in Washington.

In its early years, and particularly during the early, Cold War period the Council was very influential with the federal government. In fact, it participated in some joint work and studies with the Department of State during the late 1940s. Enough of its members were drawn from the American elite that people chosen for federal government positions in the foreign affairs area had often been active members of the Council. That practice has continued to this day. Members of the Council have been chosen for government positions, not because they are members of the Council but because they have an interest or accomplishments in the international field. The chances are that people with such interests would join the Council on Foreign Relations. This has given rise to a lot of
conspiracy theories about the Council allegedly running American foreign policy.

Q: That is, they are supposedly members of the East Coast establishment.

LORD: Yes. For many years the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations was John McCloy. When I was there, the Chairman was David Rockefeller. Now the Chairman is Pete Peterson. Most Americans who have excelled in foreign policy matters at one time or another have been members of the Council.

By the time I became President of the Council in 1977, many more think tanks, of course, had been established, not only in New York but increasingly in Washington, DC, as well, in addition to others in other places throughout the country. There was much more competition. The Council was therefore certainly not the only game in town. It clearly did not have the kind of preeminent position which it had before and it did not have the immediate impact on government policy which it had when it was literally working jointly with the government on some studies.

When I went to work for the Council, I had several objectives. I figured that we had to continue to play the Council's strong suit and traditions, even when we had to adapt to the new foreign policy agenda and to the fact that we had much more competition in the think tank field.

So I set about to do several things. I won't go into too much detail. It would be self-serving and would not be particularly relevant to this discussion. I wished to have policy impact. I wanted to expand the membership of the Council to include greater diversity of background, both in terms of having more women members as well as people from minority groups. Also, frankly, there was somewhat of a tilt in the Council to the liberal side, although we had a variety of people. I wanted to bring in a lot more outstanding conservatives and try to get more Congressmen and Senators. Above all, I wanted to have more of a national reach, not only in Washington but across the country. In the early years of the Council, the East Coast establishment had an Atlantic, European orientation. I thought that the Council had to be more national in outlook, as well as more diverse, as I mentioned, in terms of sex, as well as ethnic background. We needed this geographic diversity. I also wanted younger members. I expanded our term members, that is, temporary younger members, who might later become full members, in addition to looking for younger, permanent members. These membership goals was one effort I undertook.

Another effort was in enhancing the meetings programs, at which we would have more debates and more interesting formats. I also arranged to have occasional meetings on the record, and not just for the members. If a Secretary of State or even the President wanted to give a speech, if he came to the Council, he could only give it off the record to perhaps 200 people or so. This wouldn't attract many speakers. Allowing wider distribution of remarks provided an opportunity to give major speeches. Then there would often be a question and answer period off the record, so that members would get something special. I didn't want to lose out on a chance of affecting a broad audience and attracting a lot of people to come. One of our strengths, of course, was that, because of the influence and
expertise of the audience, we could attract good speakers, both foreigners and Americans, who would want to speak before that group, even if it was off the record. This normal rule was to encourage candor. So under these still usual guidelines, they could reach an elite audience, although it was not a major, public affairs event. Other foreign affairs organizations play that public role well. I didn't feel that we could arrange to have the Council serve the public exclusively, or even primarily. Other groups were doing that, and if we did this, we would risk losing our special strength. However, I did want the Council to have a broader impact than we had, so I sought a balance.

Occasionally, I would allow C-Span [TV channel] or some other TV channel to use our facilities. However, I did this rarely, because I didn't want to upset the tradition of having candid, off the record discussions. I wanted us to give the members something that the public wouldn't have, aiming in this way to influence public opinion by working through the elite.

I put a lot of emphasis on the national reach of the Council, not just in the membership. We scheduled activities around the country, whether these involved conferences or just regular meetings of a dinner-working group type or study groups in selected cities around the country. We also had about 35 or 40 committees affiliated with us in various parts of the country, in large and small cities. There might be only one a few Council members on these committees, but they were leaders of their communities on foreign policy matters. I visited all of them. The idea there was to extend our national reach by working with them. We would leave them completely independent on foreign policy matters, as they should be.

Moreover, we greatly expanded a fledgling presence in Washington, substantially increasing our membership and activities there. After all, this was the key city for direct policy impact.

I would also work with the editor of the Council's quarterly publication, “Foreign Affairs,” first William P. Bundy, who was succeeded by Bill Hyland, to exchange ideas on what might be done. One idea I had was to have an annual issue of “Foreign Affairs” which would review the year in foreign policy terms. I recalled what we had done with President Nixon's annual report on foreign policy. I thought it was useful to have articles reviewing the year in various regions of the world on various issues.

In addition, I worked hard to help the financial situation of the Council. We increased the annual contributions from the members. We substantially expanded our Corporate Program, in terms of members, contributions, and activities - some for it alone, some jointly with individual Council members. We secured some foundation grants for projects. And we tripled the Council’s endowment. We not only achieved a younger, more national and diversified membership, along the lines that I have mentioned, we also stimulated greater participation by the members - in fact doubled - using new settings and formats in the meetings and studies programs. We greatly expanded our program in Washington, DC, which had just begun, making it a second center for the Council, in terms of meetings and members. We also sought to beef up the studies program in terms
of resident and visiting fellows and shorter more readable papers as well as books. This was not as successful in terms of its impact as I had hoped that it would be. I sought to attract people to New York and pay them appropriate salaries. We emphasized shorter publications, rather than long books, and increasing the number of visiting and international fellows, working in the Council. As I said, we also had a year end issue of "Foreign Affairs," worked with the regional committees and increased our corporate program, which raised money but also got members more involved in Council activities. We sponsored many more regional events and activities and recruited additional members. We encouraged them to develop their activities and raise additional funds. The annual revenue from gifts and contributions was tripled. About half of the members of the Council were now contributing on an annual basis. We sponsored a special, fund-raising program for the Council, which raised close to $15 million. We tripled our endowment from $10 to $31 million, which was quite significant in those days.

We also acquired a couple of brownstone buildings next to the Council, which has allowed the Council to expand ever since. We put computers in. We generally tried to revive the Council, because I thought that it was suffering somewhat, not only from competition but also from a lack of energy and morale. These are some of the things that we tried to do.

Now, more philosophically, which is a matter of greater interest to this project, in general outsiders can be helpful to the federal government. I've seen both sides of this, both when I was in the government and outside it. The chances are that outsiders are most helpful in terms of ideas on middle term problems. If an issue is too long term, just like in policy planning within the government, it may not be of great, immediate concern to policy makers who are concerned about getting things done and reducing the size of their in boxes over the next couple of years.

On the other hand, if you're outside the government and try to provide tactical advice on a day to day basis and you don't have classified information available, you don't have the operational experience to give the nuances affecting issues. It's very hard for a member of a think tank, or anyone else outside the government, to give policy makers day to day, tactical advice.

So the basic horizons where outsiders can be helpful involve middle term matters, that is, matters which are coming up the next year or two, for example. This is not unlike what policy planning tries to do within the Department of State. You try to look ahead at issues and sketch things out.

That's generally where your focus is, as opposed to academic or ivory tower exercises or the provision of tactical advice. Having said that, we tried to influence the ongoing policy debate because we wanted to have some impact and prestige for the Council. This is, of course, difficult to quantify.

One way to do that is to have speakers ranging from the President and cabinet officials, down to Assistant Secretaries of State, or even below that level, to come and speak to the
Council, whether in New York, Washington, or elsewhere around the country. They get a chance to present their views to a very important audience and their comments can be rather candid in terms of the off-the-record, non-attribution roles. There is also the matter of the questions that they get; these officials can pick up the mood of the foreign policy elite in this way. From these encounters they may learn that they may be running into trouble in terms of a policy that is not understood or which people disagree with.

These meetings can be very useful in this manner which cannot be quantified. Members of the Council can have some impact on the policy makers in this sense. And policy makers can impress their views - and their persona - upon important audiences.

In addition, there are study programs conducted by a small group which meet six or eight times a year, involving 15 or 20 people who are experts on a subject. They have different points of view and come from different backgrounds or professions. They may be working on a manuscript which someone is getting their advice on or they may produce a paper of their own. You can involve policy makers in such groups as well, to make sure that you have the administration's viewpoint but also to influence them in the give and take, and any written results.

Then, of course articles published in "Foreign Affairs" can provide support or critique or raise new issues and have some impact on the national debate and even on policy making. It is impossible to quantify this, and it shouldn't be exaggerated. However, together with all of the other think tanks in operation, not to mention the Op Ed articles in the media in the country, the magazine provides a milieu of ideas together with other activities that help shape the environment within which the policy makers have to operate. They can take some ideas from all these sources, adjust policies which they think are running into real problems, step up educational efforts to gain public support, learn fresh perspectives, etc.

So I think that organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations can and do play an important role. It shouldn't be exaggerated, but it's important.

Let me make a couple of other, quick points in answer to your question. The Council can also be helpful because the Council and other think tanks in Boston, New York, and elsewhere are often places where people who leave government service come and work, study, give their views, and write their memoirs. Then the latter in turn then help inform the debate and study in the think tanks, but recharge the intellectual batteries of individual members. They may go back into government service in the next administration, depending on which political party is in power. That's of some use. That is to get people who have been involved in policy making to give them a chance to think and write, and then to go back into government, recharged and refreshed.

Also you have other people who come into the Council or other think tanks in the case of groups which are membership organizations. They are educated by going to the meetings, hearing various speakers, or participating in study groups. In this way their capacities can be strengthened. Some day, they may go into government service and help in that way.
These are some of the ways in which the think tanks can be helpful in the making of U.S. foreign policy.

Q: Did you find that the Council on Foreign Relations was active as a sort of shadow government? The American Heritage Foundation serves this function for the conservatives, and the Brookings Institution does this for the democratic side of the political spectrum. They provide places where people can hang around and do their thing until their turn comes up again in terms of the political pendulum. Did the Council play that kind of role?

LORD: Not as much as some of the examples which you cited, which I think are fair examples. In the first place, we have the advantage and the disadvantage of not having an ideological stance. The American Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute are generally regarded as conservative operations. The Brookings Institution used to be seen as a more liberal organization but is not regarded as particularly liberal at present. There are other think tanks which are considered to have one orientation or another. Often, as you say, these organizations are regarded as something like revolving doors. In many ways Brookings might flourish more when the Republicans are in office and the more conservative organizations when the Democrats are in office because they have more people to work with, their best people aren't in government service.

Sometimes, you get more attention when you are critical and give advice which runs counter to policy, rather than supporting it. That is somewhat oversimplified, even for these institutions.

However, these considerations don’t really apply to the Council on Foreign Relations because we were so impeccably diverse that we could not be identified as being liberal or conservative. For years some conservatives were somewhat suspicious of the Council because they considered us as liberal on the whole. I made an effort to get more conservatives into the Council for that very reason, as well as to ensure debate. There are some extreme groups, right and left, who exaggerate the Council’s influence and allege we control government policy.

Q: How did you go about getting more conservatives into the Council?

LORD: I thought of outstanding Congressmen and Senators, military types, or think tank people and journalists who were elsewhere conservative. I would go to mutual friends and ask them to seek people out who might be interested in joining the Council. Not that I could determine membership. I would also ask my colleagues on the staff and Board for suggestions. I made a conscious effort, working with conservatives who were already members of the Council to get more conservatives, because we needed some additional balance in the Council. As a result of this effort, we did get some additional conservatives. Even a few prominent conservatives really help you when you can say, and these are not necessarily people who joined the Council during my tenure as President, "We've got Jeanne Kirkpatrick, we've got George Will, we've got Bill Buckley."
Beyond that, for intellectual reasons, I sought more balance. Also, as I said, the Council is a membership organization. There are now a few thousand members. These other think tanks consist more of scholars than regular members. So, given our diversity and our impeccable non-partisanship, we don't have the disadvantage of looking biased. We also don't have the advantage of having as much direct impact, like the Heritage Foundation or the American Enterprise Institute, which do a lot of studies and send people into the government. When Ronald Reagan came into office as President, you could see the impact of what these other think tanks had been up to. The Council on Foreign Relations is more diverse. This has certain advantages in terms of attracting people who want to speak to and get diverse points, thus this big tent includes a broad spectrum that at times may have less focus and power.

Q: Also, I think that one of the nice things about being a foundation with an attitude is that you can attract money from people who have similar attitudes.

LORD: That's a very good point. I made a big effort, and with some success, to increase our fund-raising and our endowment through annual giving and our corporate giving programs. However, there is no question that people who have a strong, ideological bias and have some money behind them, are likely to support an organization which agrees with their aims. That is absolutely an advantage.

Q: Your headquarters were in New York, weren't they?

LORD: Headquarters were and are in New York, but I opened a sort of second headquarters in Washington, DC, which has expanded since then. I made a major effort in this regard. Then we would work with these committees around the country. We tried to build up particular concentrations in a few cities for actual Council activities. Sometimes these were in conjunction with a local committee, sometimes on their own. So we were realistic. We didn't try to spread ourselves all over. It took a while to get enough members to build up a critical mass in particular areas. We worked, for example, on Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, and Minneapolis. There already was a Council on Foreign Relations in Chicago, which was not related to us. So we didn't try to do as much there.

We would have meetings, conferences, and study groups. We just got this ball rolling. The program has been expanded since then. Now they have the advantage of video conferencing and other things that can be done. Previously, our problem had been that if we got more members across the country, how could we make affiliation with the Council meaningful for them if they were living in California when most of the activity was in New York or Washington. We made it clear that they could come to any meeting, no matter how small, whenever they were in New York or Washington. We would send out newsletters and events calendars to keep them better posted. We would bring out study groups or organize conferences in their area to give them a sense of involvement in the activities of the Council.
We made a modest beginning in these various respects, and we greatly expanded our activities in Washington, DC. A lot more has been done since then. The Internet, webcasting, video conferencing, etc. all help a great deal to reach members across the country.

Q: I would think that one of the groups that you would want to reach, even if they did not have enough money to belong to the Council, would be the academic community and student groups.

LORD: We had lots of leading academics in our membership. The way we handled membership dues was that people would pay more for their membership if they lived in New York. If they lived in Washington, they would pay less than New York but more than anywhere else in the country. Secondly, the older a member gets, the more he or she will pay. Thirdly, if they were business members, they would pay more than if they were not business members but were academics, journalists, or government officials. So we had a sliding scale of dues to make this more manageable for younger, academic, and geographically diverse members. Dues would be higher for businessmen, lawyers, New Yorkers, and older people, which seemed to make sense.

Membership in the Council was a very good deal, because in those days the cost of membership might range from $50-100 annually for a young person, or an academic in California, to, maybe $300-400 for a middle aged businessman in New York. In return for your membership dues, you received a subscription to "Foreign Affairs" magazine. Secondly, you were entitled to attend a whole menu of meetings, conferences, study groups, including meals. It was obviously easier to take advantage of this if you lived on the East Coast. There were advantageous prices for publications, books, and studies which we would turn out. If you were in New York or Washington and just went to about 10 or 20 meetings, at which lunch was free of charge, you would get your money back just in terms of the meals.

An important program at the Council was the International Affairs Fellows. Most of these were future leaders, in their 30s and 40s. We would recruit scholars and place them in government service for a year. We would take government officials and place them in academic communities, the Council, another think tank. In this way government employees got a chance to get out, recharge their batteries, think, write, and be exposed to Council activities. Then they would go back refreshed and with a different perspective. The academics and others on the outside would go into government service, get a sense of what it's really like to make policy and to work in Washington. Then, for example, they could go back and be a teacher or writer who would have a better sense for policy and not just academic, conceptual theory. This has been a very successful program. We would place people in the Department of State, the White House, the Department of Defense, CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and so on. Conversely, we would place people at Harvard University, the Council on Foreign Relations, or some university out West, for example, at the same time.

The way we got more young people, in addition to trying to get people in their 30s and
40s into the Council was to expand our term membership program. It's hard to get people in their late 20s or early 30s to compete with other membership applicants in terms of a resume. It's tough to get in the Council, through the Membership Committee and the Board, in competition with someone who is in their 50s or 60s.

Membership in the Council is for life, unless you fail to pay your dues or do something unbelievably outrageous - or resign because of a lack of interest. Therefore, every year, everyone is getting a year older, so you constantly have the question of keeping the age profiles younger. One way to handle that is to have term members. They are not lifetime members, so you're not committing yourself for all time to someone who has a lesser resume. They, in turn, are not committing themselves for a long time. Term members are in their late 20s or early 30s and join the Council for five years. They have full privileges. After five years, they cannot rejoin the Council for one year. They examine whether they wish to continue as members of the Council. The Council, having seen how they performed during those five years, determines whether they should be elected to full membership. Therefore, you have a constant pool of people who are in their early or mid-30s who can be drawn upon to be full members.

I feel pretty good about my years as President of the Council. I knew that the Council had been drifting. This may sound self-serving. When I spoke at my first meeting with the Board, I was very blunt about the situation and outlined multiyear goals. I think that we invigorated the Council and set some new directions by the time I left. Many of these changes have been implemented very successfully and on a broader basis since then, by the present President, Les Gelb, who has done a really good job.

There was one painful episode which is worth putting in here, involving Henry Kissinger. In getting this job of President of the Council on Foreign Relations I had the feeling that some of the directors on the board felt that I was just a Kissinger representative, as it were, and that I didn't stand for myself. I considered it a plus to be close to Kissinger. I believe some people hesitated about this before I was appointed President of the Council. In the event I had no problems with the board. I worked closely with them and found ways to get them involved in the work of the Council. I made our board meetings more interesting by having substantive discussions among the directors, instead of just doing business.

In connection with the election of directors, it was a bit painful because we had a system then under which you had to get people to agree to run for positions on the board and, of course, their egos are hurt if they run for positions on the board but are not elected to it. There's always a matter of your wanting to have diversity on the board, including such considerations as gender, youth, geography, profession, and ideology. However, you couldn't always engineer that in elections to the board by the membership. Very often the best known among candidates were not young or female or minority members. Since that time we've moved to a mixture of appointing and democratically electing members of the board.

At the time of which I speak, we had a system under which we had only so many vacancies. We had a couple of more people nominated than those to be elected.
In one year, and I forget the exact numbers, but let's say that there were, perhaps, five vacancies and six candidates. One of the candidates was Kissinger. This was a crazy system because only one of the candidates was going to lose. The way it worked was that you had to vote for five out of six candidates. Henry Kissinger was clearly the most qualified of anybody to be a director. On the other hand, he had made enemies, as any strong person would. He, more than any of the other five candidates, was going to pick up some negative votes. There were relatively more people who didn't like Kissinger, either personally or ideologically, even though those who voted for him overwhelmingly would have put all of their votes behind him. By definition, someone who had the highest profile attracted the most opposition. This reminds me of the Chinese saying that the tallest tree attracts the most lightning.

To make a long story short, here was a former Secretary of State, one of our most distinguished diplomats, losing the election to the board of the Council on Foreign Relations. This really caused a strain on our personal relationship. The Council had a crazy system for electing members of the board. Kissinger thought that he had been humiliated by not being elected to the board. He was absolutely right in this respect. I was nervous about the election because I could see this situation shaping up. I hoped that Kissinger would somehow squeeze in. In the event, he lost out for the reasons that I mentioned. Although Kissinger probably got 85% of the vote, those elected probably got 86% or 87% of the vote. There was probably more orchestration of anti-Kissinger votes by his critics. That is, five out of six votes. Kissinger almost resigned from the Council as a result of this outcome. It was a most painful episode for me, because Kissinger was a personal friend of mine, and he also suffered the humiliation that went on with articles in the newspapers and so forth about the defeat of his candidacy to be a member of the board. I'll never forget this episode.

Q: What about the Western versus the Eastern slant? In other words, Asia versus Europe. Was that a problem for you, as you are a New Yorker?

LORD: It was not a problem, although one of the reasons that I wanted to get out beyond New York and Washington was to reflect viewpoints around the country, just generally in the approach to foreign policy. I also wanted to reflect the greater strength and importance of the West, for example, as well as the South in our foreign policy. This included the fact that the areas outside of New York and Washington would be looking more out across the Pacific and toward our Southern neighbors. We had a Eurocentric background. The Council on Foreign Relations was traditionally heavily European in emphasis, as was American foreign policy. So I was consciously trying to broaden our orientation, not only for geographic and diversity reasons but also for foreign policy reasons as well. We wanted to look to other areas in addition to Europe. We would try to look hard at Texas because we knew that Mexican and Latin American issues would be important. Yes, that was part of our strategy.

In the 1970s the importance of Asia was not as dramatic then as it has been in the past decade, with its phenomenal economic growth and all of the other issues which have involved it. Not to mention the fact that more Asian-Americans have come into our society, as well as the shift of our population toward the West Coast and the Pacific
Ocean area, as well as the South. All of this has meant that Asia is more important. This was a theme which I stressed when I became Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. I worked to get Asia up on the agenda, for example, making APEC [Asia Pacific Economic Conference] a summit and the region hosting President Clinton's first trip abroad. Our trade patterns, our security interests, and our immigration patterns have made Asia/Pacific increasingly important. These patterns were not so pronounced in the 1970s.

Q: In dealing with this subject, how did you find a matter which is very difficult for us to handle in the United States, and particularly in New York? That is, the Arab-Israeli situation.

LORD: Well, obviously like any other issue, we had to deal with a tremendous diversity of members and viewpoints. In New York you have a lot of people who are pro-Israeli. There were plenty of members, particularly from other parts of the country, who took a global view. There were people in Washington and elsewhere who were very interested in energy questions and Arab interests. That was never a problem. I never faced any pressures, either on that or on any other issue, to be biased one way or another. I wouldn't have stood for this. It would have been against the traditions of the Council on Foreign Relations.

We had very good debates. Of course, we had speakers and papers of all kinds. I made it a point, as we always have in the Council, to have all points of view presented, not only in our studies but also in the speeches made at our meetings. That presents a certain disadvantage in terms of impact, versus conservative or liberal think tanks. The Council on Foreign Relations is more of a neutral platform, which can mean that we have less influence. We have to rely on individual articles in "Foreign Affairs" and books or, perhaps, a recommendation of one of our study groups and the impact of questions and answers at meetings. We don't exercise the kind of pressure that other think tanks have. On Arab-Israeli issues, we had all points of view presented and debated. We had the same approach in our publications.

Q: How did you find the influence of "Foreign Affairs" magazine while you were President of the Council? During my 30 years in the Foreign Service, "Foreign Affairs" magazine has always been around, and I have looked at individual issues from time to time. However, I wasn't a regular reader of it, and most of my colleagues also were not regular readers. I am much more interested in "Foreign Affairs" now than when I was a serving diplomat.

LORD: Well, it is hard to quantify. There have been individual articles, of course, in "Foreign Affairs" which have had a major impact. The single most famous was George Kennan's article, signed "X," on containment of the Soviet Union [and carried in the magazine in 1947]. There have been other articles...

Q: Henry Kissinger and Jeanne Kirkpatrick made their marks with articles in "Foreign Affairs."

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LORD: That's right. Actually, Kissinger first made his mark for the Council on Foreign Relations in a study group publication which was turned into a book, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy." He's written some articles which have drawn attention in foreign affairs. Richard Nixon wrote a famous article in 1967 about Asia, including China, which foreshadowed his interest in having a more open and normal relationship with China. This was foreshadowed in that article. There have been other, major articles, sometimes not so famous, but they were out ahead of the power curve. They influenced people's discussion and attention on some new issues.

There's no question that for much of its history, and until recently, "Foreign Affairs" generally relied on fairly long articles which were not always easy reading. This meant that, in some cases, they had major impact, like the article by "X." It also meant that many people in government, including people very interested in foreign policy, found these articles a little reader unfriendly. They would be coffee table material.

Q: I saw an awful lot of copies of issues of "Foreign Affairs" on coffee tables.

LORD: During my period as President of the Council we made an effort to try and make "Foreign Affairs" a little more lively, to try to make sure that some younger, less well-known authors were included, that newer issues were addressed, and that some shorter articles appeared in it. We also instituted this year end review of foreign affairs, which I think was used, particularly on college campuses, as a tool for teaching in college, as well as for people generally reviewing the scene. In the last few years the Council has made a major effort, and with some success, to make the material in the magazine much more accessible. This has been done by including shorter articles, essays as well as commentaries, more lively graphics, and having a more friendly format. Hopefully, these changes did not lose, as some would charge, although I would not, the gravitas and tradition of "Foreign Affairs." It has a sufficiently recognizable cover and style, so that you don't forget that it is "Foreign Affairs" and is not "Playboy" magazine. It now contains shorter and spiffier articles that people can relate to. It comes out a little more often, six times a year, versus four times a year as it previously did.

Now, there has been some criticism that "Foreign Affairs" is losing its unique qualities, that it is a little trendy, and that it is light on foreign affairs. It is said that the magazine no longer has the gravitas of articles like that by "X" in 1947. I think that one could introduce a couple of those more serious articles per issue, in addition to the shorter pieces. In terms of influence, there have been individual articles, as I say, but it is very hard to claim that "Foreign Affairs" is a major influence. Having said that, I would add that if someone wants to write an article, and certainly this applies to my time as President of the Council, as well as today, and particularly in my time and before my time, if they want to write a serious foreign policy article and gain attention, they still have to come to "Foreign Affairs," which has the widest circulation of publications of its type. We got the circulation up over 100,000 copies during my time at the Council, which isn't bad for a professional magazine like that. The circulation is even higher now.
Even though harassed policy makers aren't necessarily reading it, the chances are that key columnists and other people from think tanks and foreigners are looking at it. Chances are that, although most policy makers don't read the magazine as a whole, they'll read one or two articles. So it still is something that is sought after. There was much more competition for "Foreign Affairs" in my day and even more now than there used to be. Now, in addition, you have competition from all-news channels, cable TV, and commentaries in so many different magazines, which provide even further competition. "Foreign Affairs" is still the flagship of the Council on Foreign Relations, and most people have heard of it. I would agree that people often didn't read it as much as they bought it. However, there are exceptions to that, and there still are.

Q: Was "Foreign Affairs" a natural publication for the academic community to read, or did you make an effort to ensure that it didn't become overly academic?

LORD: The Council?

Q: I meant the magazine, "Foreign Affairs." Also, I mean, the whole range of Council activities.

LORD: The whole purpose of the Council was and is to try to bridge the thoughtfulness of the academic world and the relevance of the policy and professional worlds. So while we didn't become too much imbued with an ivory tower mentality we had some conceptual and outside thinking that was more than just technical, day to day, policy making. I want to make clear that the magazine was independent of the Council. I had a very good relationship with both Bill Bundy and Bill Hyland, the two editors while I was president.

I never tried to exert any influence on the publication. What I did, from time to time, was to make suggestions on issues which, I thought, might make interesting articles. People from "Foreign Affairs" would often come to me and ask my views on specific questions, particularly on China. That is, they would ask whether something was worth publishing or might even ask that I make editing changes in a given article. I was very careful just to offer ideas, but they had to make the decisions. Like the year-end issue - I would make suggestions and then they would decide whether to adopt or change them.

However, whatever success or lack thereof which we had during my tenure as President of the Council with the publication, "Foreign Affairs," or anyone else's tenure, was the work of the editor, and not that of the President of the Council. To give you an example of independence, David Rockefeller was Chairman of the Board of the Council - I should underline his general influence and, for the Council and our excellent working relations, prestige. He wrote an article on international economic affairs and submitted it to Bill Bundy, the editor of "Foreign Affairs." Bundy rejected it. And here Rockefeller was Chairman of the Board! He was a classy person who was naturally disappointed, but he fully understood the situation and didn't try to put any pressure on anybody. So that is a classic example of independence, if I ever saw it.
Q: I think that we've talked about this before, but did you sort of keep your policy credentials polished?

LORD: Yes, I did. First, of course, in terms of my intellectual capabilities, I went to many of these meetings and study groups. I felt that I should keep on top of things as well as showing the flag as president of the organization. At that point in my career in the 1970s and 1980s, I was still a global expert. I had been director of Policy Planning and a Special Assistant on particular issues during my Foreign Service, Department of Defense, and NSC assignments. Even though I had done a lot of work on China and Vietnam, my perspective was still global. The Council on Foreign Relations was global, and this was all very good in terms of continuing the development of my perspective. I had a lot of friends in government during the Carter administration. Then I was also at the Council for the first few years of the Reagan administration. I kept in touch with these friends. In some cases, particularly on China, they would ask my advice or I would consult with them. I wrote a few op ed pieces.

I didn't have any strategic aims in terms of career goals. I never had them in my life. I felt that I wanted to return to government service some day but I didn't organize my whole life around the theme of, How can I pull this off? I spent about seven and one-half years with the Council. After about five to six years there I was ready, as I have been in any job, to move on. I also felt that I had accomplished pretty much what I could at the Council and that it was time for new blood to replace me. I was beginning to do things every year that I had done the year before, and I risked losing my enthusiasm and drive, which I think is only natural. So I was receptive to returning to government service. I had always been a moderate, liberal Republican, so I didn't think that I would get an appointment from the Reagan administration.

I think I've described how I got the assignment as Ambassador to China. Both President and Mrs. Reagan were impressed with the briefing on China which my wife and I gave them at a White House lunch before they visited China in 1984. She also liked Bette's book “Spring Moon.” Secretary of State George Shultz had been a director of the Council and NSC Advisor Bud McFarlane knew me from the Ford days. Reagan knew of my having worked with Kissinger on China. I was invited by the Reagans to attend a number of social events.

Naturally, I tried to keep up my intellectual abilities. This was natural with the job, in terms of foreign policy, as well as visibility through occasional articles I wrote and trips I made around the country to visit our committees and speak elsewhere. I would stay in touch with Washington and so on. I was just generally interested in foreign policy and had no specific game plan. I had a desire to go back into government service at that point, unlike now, when I no longer have that desire.

Q: Is there anything else that we should cover?

LORD: There are just a couple of things. I also got involved in some other organizations
while I was President of the Council, partly for my own exposure and to learn and partly
out of interest. In part, it was good for the Council for its President to be a member of
other organizations.

For example, I became a member of the Trilateral Commission, which is an organization
started by David Rockefeller, along with Zbig Brzezinski, in the 1970s to coordinate
policies among the industrial democracies. That is, Western Europe, Japan, the U.S., and
Canada. Since leaving government service again in 1997 I have again become a member
of this Commission. I also went to Bilderberg meetings at which Americans and
Europeans gather for candid discussions, to judge the mood across the Atlantic. I have
been a member of the Board of Visitors, or Board of Directors, for the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy [of Tufts University] in the 1970s and 1980s. I belonged to some
other groups.

Then, when I left government service after my stint as Ambassador to China, I have
covered the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 in Beijing. I was then in New York,
staying temporarily in the Plaza Hotel. I was on radio and TV all the time that spring.
Then we went out to Jackson Hole, Wyoming for several months during the summer of
1989. My wife was writing a book, and I wrote a long article for "Foreign Affairs" on
China, which I have mentioned. Then I went back to New York and became a member of
the International Rescue Committee [IRC], the major, non-sectarian group which takes
care of refugees, both resettling them in the U.S. and carrying on relief activities for them
overseas. I became Vice Chairman of the IRC and later Co-Chairman. Since leaving
government service again in 1997, I again became Vice Chairman of the IRC. This
organization was founded by Albert Einstein in 1933 to help rescue Jews persecuted by
the Nazis, both artists and intellectuals, as well as others, and has helped during other
crises such as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, assisting the Indochinese boat people,
Kurdish, Bangladeshi, Cambodian, and Afghan refugees. The IRC now operates in some
30 countries, e.g. all over Africa, including the area of the Great Lakes of Central and
East Africa, dealing with all of the problems of Africa. We have worked in the Balkans
and Caucuses, parts of Asia and the Western Hemisphere. We have resettlement offices
in about 20 American cities.

In the 1970s I was also a member of the Atlantic Council and the Atlantic Institute
following my mother there as well as at the IRC where she was once President. When I
left government service in 1989, I joined the National Endowment for Democracy, an
organization which promotes freedom and democracy around the country. I eventually
became Chairman of that organization. I also was a director and/or member of the
America-China Society, National Committee on U.S.-China relations, the U.S.-Japan
Foundation, American Academy of Diplomacy, the Asia Society, the Draper Institute of
Distinguished Fellows, and the Pacific Council on International Policy

In 1992 I headed up a Carnegie Endowment Commission on Foreign Policy. This was a
very distinguished group organized by Ambassador Mort Abramowitz. I was Chairman.
It was a very broad group which made foreign policy recommendations of a bipartisan
nature for the Clinton administration.
These are examples of groups, think tanks, and commissions which I have been involved in, for my own, intellectual enrichment, to have some impact on these issues, and to keep my profile high, if necessary. In the case of the Council, I traveled on its behalf in America extensively and also abroad. As I was a member of the Council, I found it interesting and rewarding to do so.

During this period (and later) I received several honorary degrees, some in conjunction with my wife.

When out of government I often testified before Congress on China.

In 1983 and 1984 President Reagan set up a Commission on Central America and persuaded Henry Kissinger to act as its Chairman. This Commission looked at the problems of Central America, particularly Nicaragua and El Salvador, but also other problems in that area involving revolutionary activities, determining who were the good guys and who were the bad guys. We studied communist and radical influences, as well as Right Wing excesses, the Contra question, and all of these issues that were coming up. Kissinger appointed me, along with one other person to this Commission, I believe Jeane Kirkpatrick, as Counsellor. I didn't sign off on its recommendations, but I was one of those who took part in its deliberations and helped to draft the report. I was a general advisor and an observer, although I'm certainly not an expert on that region. The work of that Commission covered a period of six to nine months.

Q: What did you think of the work of that commission, which was headed by Henry Kissinger, as you say? In a way Central America was sort of outside his world, and outside your world as well.

LORD: Absolutely. Of course, I didn't have any particular axe to grind, in terms of the Latin American background. Kissinger was a person who was concerned about Soviet influence. He had shown considerable interest, over the last couple of years in the government in Latin America. He visited that area, he gave some major speeches, particularly in Mexico. He asked me to work with him. He trusted me, as I had worked with him for so long. He wanted my perspective as a non expert. He had access to plenty of experts. I forget all of their names now. However, it was a good commission. It worked hard. I don't want to single out particular people on it, but one person who impressed me at the time was Jack Kemp.

Q: He was a Republican Congressman from New York.

LORD: He worked very hard and was open-minded, not dogmatic. The Commission on Central America included both liberals and conservatives. It came out with balanced recommendations, as I recall. It acknowledged the dangers of radical or Soviet and Cuban-supported regimes, but also the excesses of the right wing in many cases. It accepted the need not only to counter nefarious influences but to have positive programs and cooperation which could help governments and also build alternatives to more radical
solutions.

Q: Did you feel the heavy hand of domestic politics on that Commission? One thinks in particular of Senator Jesse Helms [Republican, North Carolina] but also of others who were sort of using Central America as a sort of playground as far as building up forces of good and evil, and all of that.

LORD: The work of the Commission was potentially charged with emotion, but I think that the composition of the Commission and the way it was conducted made it relatively free of that. It took a relatively detached view. It certainly was given a fairly clean slate by the administration. It didn't feel hemmed in. We were aware of these currents boiling around us, but I think that the Commission's work was carried out in a pretty professional, apolitical manner, on the whole.
Q: We are still carrying on the China theme and we're going back a little bit. This session will be devoted to your time as Ambassador to China. You were Ambassador to China from when to when?

LORD: From November, 1985, to April, 1989. That April is an important date. Bette and I were very fortunate to be in China during the most positive period in Sino-U.S. relations since 1949.

Q: That's right. We touched on it before, but let's go back again. Where were you when this job came out?

LORD: I can give you a little background; I've taken some notes. First let me just let me give you a brief paragraph on an amusing incident that took place back in June, 1972. We can insert that in the proper place if that is all right. It's amusing, but it depressed me at the time. I'll double check the date; I think it was June, 1972. The Kissinger trip to China was as National Security Advisor. At the welcoming tea at the guest house, Zhou En-lai was sitting with Kissinger, and Kissinger in the course of their small talk, mentioned that I was a very good ping pong player. I was aghast to have him say this because actually while I was fairly decent, to say that you are a good ping pong player in China is a bit like saying you are a good chess player in Russia. This came back to haunt me.

A few days later at the end of our visit, we were visiting a sports complex outside of Beijing, and we saw volleyball players, and we saw swimmers, and we saw gymnasts. I thought we were about to leave, and the escort said no we have one more stop. We went into a gymnasium packed with a couple of thousand Chinese students, and they brought out a ping pong table and announced to the crowd that Winston Lord, expert ping pong player, accompanied by Dick Solomon who was with me on that trip, would now play ping pong with Chang Tse Tung, who was three times champion of the world, not just China but of the world, plus the current Chinese champion. In any event we got out there and even though it was friendship first and competition second, I wanted to show I was a decent player. I was absolutely horrible, a combination of nerves plus big light balls that we are not used to and funny racquets. I just absolutely disgraced myself and was very depressed by this whole affair. When I got home from the trip, my wife couldn't understand why I was so downcast because things had gone well substantively and it was because of this event.

Q: Just out of curiosity, do the Chinese use a different type ball?

LORD: Apparently they do. I'd always played with American balls, maybe this was international standards. The ball kept sailing off my racquet because it was so light. It also turns out that the player, the three time world champion, was a lover of Madame Mao as I found out later.
I left the State Department in 1977 when President Carter came in, to take a break, to recharge my batteries. After eight months in the Colorado mountains, I went to New York to become president of the Council on Foreign Relations in September 1977. Since we were on China, I will just say how I kept up with China during those intervening years until I was appointed. I generally kept reading about China because of my interest and my background. I kept up my contacts with the Chinese in Washington and New York. When the Carter administration first came in I worked closely with Mike Oksenberg who was the China expert for Zbig Brzezinski (National Security Advisor) going over our China policy and the various records and transcripts. Throughout this period, I kept in touch with him and Dick Holbrooke at State and others involved with China policy.

In 1979 I took a trip to China with Kissinger; in addition to Beijing where we had talks with Deng Xiaoping and others, we went to Xian and Xinjiang in the northwest. This is in a period where Deng had just made his final comeback and was beginning to launch his final reforms. A lot of our talks centered on his plans for China's economy, as well as Soviet relations and the usual international topics.

In 1983 I went back on my own and got a warm reception from various Chinese officials, and by then Deng's reforms and opening were beginning to pick up steam. There was one other contact during this period, to go back to early 1979 when Deng Xiaoping visited the United States just after the announcement of the normalization of relations on December 15; the normalization itself took place on January 1. This, of course, was just before China invaded Vietnam. I participated in a very small breakfast with Kissinger, just the two of us plus Deng and probably the Chinese Liaison Chief. I don't recall. We could see then that Deng Xiaoping was growing in self confidence which we also saw in our later trip that year back to China. I also testified early that year on normalization, supporting what the Carter Administration had done.

Q: This is 1979.

LORD: 1979. Why I favored moving ahead and thought that we could still maintain security and friendship ties with Taiwan at the same time. In 1982 I testified backing the Reagan administration on the third communiqué that was negotiated with respect to arms sales to Taiwan. Here I made the basic point that although it was difficult because it envisaged a lowering over time of our arms sales to Taiwan, I felt this was sufficiently linked to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, that it would provide for Taiwan's security, and the Chinese made a very forthcoming statement in the Communiqué that their fundamental policy was to seek a peaceful resolution. We couldn't actually get them to renounce force, but we felt that was a strong enough indication along with our commitment and arms sales in the same communiqué to give us sufficient linkage and therefore we could always provide for Taiwan's defense as long as they had a security problem. We would only reduce arms sales as the situation got more peaceful.

Now with respect to how I got the nomination in 1985, I think this was based on first a general reputation on foreign affairs and of course, what I did on China with Kissinger and Nixon and Ford. With respect to the Reagan administration, I think we first met the
Reagans in the fall of 1981 when Bette and I went to a small White House dinner in honor of Isaac Stern, and his new movie called Mao to Mozart. I had known George Shultz, the Secretary of State from the Council on Foreign Relations where he was one of my directors. He asked me to lead a Saturday all day seminar in January of 1983, fairly soon after he became Secretary of State, on China with a lot of government officials there and outside experts including Kissinger and others. That went well and increased Shultz's confidence in me. I also knew Bud McFarland, the National Security Advisor, from the Kissinger-Nixon-Ford days at the NSC. We were also invited to the White House in January, 1984 for a dinner for the visiting Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang. My wife, Bette, sat at the head table with the Prime Minister.

Then Reagan, just before his trip to China in the spring of 1984 had a small lunch of five outside advisors which included Scowcroft, Scalapino, Solomon, and Bette, my wife, and myself. The five of us with the President and Mrs. Reagan, and several cabinet level officials. This, I think, went very well again with the President. Mrs. Reagan loved my wife's book Spring Moon, and we are told that in August, 1984, Mrs. Reagan in a conversation with her husband, actually made the suggestion that he appoint me as Ambassador and get two for the price of one in effect. Not only would I be going to China but my wife, Bette, with her unique background would be going along as well.

So, in the fall of 1984, I believe it was October, McFarland was at a Council on Foreign Relations dinner in New York. He sat next to me; I was President then. He mentioned that the Administration wanted me to serve. Would I be interested? Both he and subsequently someone from State suggested Ambassador to China. Almost inexplicably and in retrospect somewhat foolishly, I said no I'd rather serve in Washington for a variety of reasons. My father was quite sick. I wanted to be near my son who was in his final year of high school and other personal reasons. But the more I thought about it and talked about it with Bette, we decided this was not as exciting as being Ambassador to China. By then Shultz had already tried to get me an Undersecretary job at State but was running into some delays at the White House. Anyway, I went back and said no, the other option the ambassadorship, in fact, was our preferred one.

Q: Excuse me. During the time you were in the Council of Foreign Relations and dealing with these China. What sort of impressions were you getting, first of the late Carter period of the people you were talking to, because you know, there is this back and forth conversation? Then with the Reaganites about China. Was it a realistic one?

LORD:: Basically, I kept in close touch with the Carter Administration. I met with Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor, a couple of times privately, including just before he went to China in the summer of 1978 on one of his trips which turned out to be very important. I felt they got off to a fairly rocky start as I recall. They seemed to be emphasizing the Soviet Union, which I have no problem with, but not moving on China. My impression was there was some tension between Vance who was more interested in emphasizing Russia and Brzezinski who was more interested in pursuing China. So, early on they were having some difficulties, but by 1978 they moved toward normalization. Vance's initial trip went badly, and meanwhile they were moving ahead with the
Russians, so the first year or so of the Carter Administration, things were not going very well. I kept in touch with both State and the White House after the Brzezinski trip, but, by the end of ’78 they moved to normalization; they announced it in mid-December while Congress was out of session, during the holiday season, knowing it would be controversial. They announced that normalization would actually take place on January 1. I felt that the normalization agreement was about the best they could do vis a vis Taiwan, given the realities, and I along with Kissinger and people who worked on this issue supported it, plus the Taiwan Relations Act was passed which strengthened the Taiwan side of the equation. I supported that as well and I actually testified on it.

Then the China connection was pretty well maintained until Reagan came in, and there was a great deal of apprehension by the Chinese and others about what would happen to our China policy as President Reagan took office. He had after all been very pro-Taiwan and very tough on the Chinese political system. It generally looked like he might change the bipartisan policies that had been pursued. I remember distinctly on various occasions with the Chinese in New York and Washington, reassuring them saying that any President when he gets into the oval office tends to have a different view of geo-politics. I thought this President would be no exception; he would see the geo-political and other benefits of moving ahead with China, but he wouldn't sell out his friends in Taiwan and he would be respected for that as a reliable ally. I thought he would essentially pursue the policy of his predecessors, particularly because among other reasons, he had chosen Al Haig as Secretary of State who had been heavily involved in the China opening and was very pro engagement with China. Haig would be working on him as well as other advisors. So I told the Chinese to hold their fire, with respect to Reagan, and give him some time to be worked on by his associates and to gain a greater perception and appreciation from the oval office. I recall that Bush went there - I guess it was between the election and the inauguration in the fall - and he had a fairly tough trip over the Taiwan issue.

Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]. Because Reagan said some things during the campaign while Bush was in Beijing that the Chinese didn't like.

LORD: During the campaign he was there?

Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]. Yes, during the campaign.
LORD: Okay. There were some rocky things at the beginning of the Reagan Administration. The tension persisted as the Chinese ratcheted up the pressure over the Taiwanese arms sales to the point where the Administration made the choice, and Al Haig was very influential in this, to do a third communiqué, the first having been the Shanghai communiqué during Nixon's trip in '72, the second one on normalization in '79. This was a very difficult negotiation. Leonard Woodcock was at the other end doing good work, and one of the people helping him became my deputy in China, Peter Tomsen. They were working hard on it back at home in the White House and the State Department. For reasons I have already mentioned I believe the 1982 communiqué was justifiable because of the implicit linkage to a peaceful resolution, and this eased the tension between Beijing and Washington.
Q: By the way, I just want to insert that this is not only Stuart Kennedy here but also Nancy Bernkopf Tucker who is the other interrogator.

Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]. In response to the answer you just gave to Stu's question, one of the things that you mentioned was the normalization agreement that established relations and you basically supported that. You thought it was the best they could have gotten. I think that's probably true, but it was less than the Nixon people thought they could get. Nixon and Kissinger had anticipated for at least a long time that they could maintain some sort of official relationship, a liaison office or something like that with Taipei. The historians at least have looked at what the Carter administration did and said he took less. Do you think that is a fair judgment? Was the Nixon period estimate wrong?

LORD: I'm not so sure it was the estimate. I would like to go back and talk to Henry and others on that. Clearly we would have preferred, I'm sure the Carter administration would have preferred, a somewhat more elevated tie remaining with Taiwan. I don't think we were under any illusions that we could have maintained an embassy certainly, and whether we thought we could get a liaison office, we hadn't reached that level of concreteness during the Ford Administration. As I said in an earlier transcript, President Ford, because of his domestic travails and worrying about Reagan and renomination and the Chinese, because of the Chinese domestic scene, the ascendancy of the Gang of Four, struggling with Deng Xiao Ping, and then the succumbing of Mao and Zhou, didn't move on Taiwan during the last year of his administration. So, we never got to that point although we played with formulas.

I don't recall now that we felt even privately that Carter had settled for too little. We certainly publicly supported the deal, meaning Nixon, Kissinger, and others. I don't recall that being a collective wisdom that we should have driven a harder bargain. It is not my recollection. Even if I thought that, I might have been bipartisan at the time, but that isn't my recollection of my own view either. The fact that they were going to continue arms sales I felt was an important and significant achievement, arms sales to Taiwan as well as the unofficial ties to Taiwan. I also felt that it was not realistic to maintain a treaty alliance or an embassy, so it seemed to me that it was in the ballpark. Maybe I thought at the time we could have gotten a little bit better here and there, but I, in good conscience, supported the basic deal that was struck. I also was pleased at what the Congress did to strengthen our commitments to Taiwan in the wake of normalization.

Q: I was just wondering, during this period, did the Taiwan government, its representatives in the United States carry much weight. I mean I assume they were trying to disturb this whole situation with normalization.

LORD: Because I was in New York, not in the government, I do not recall having too many contacts with Taiwan during this period although I was always friendly to Taiwan, so I'm not a good judge of that. Obviously, there was some criticism in Congress and elsewhere. This was shown by the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act, and there was some criticism that the Administration announced this during the holiday season while
Congress was out of town. It was actually quite wise. It is better to do it during that quiet period despite the flak you take for the timing. In practice it worked out better that way. But, my recollection is there was general support, and that the reaction although quite tough in some quarters was manageable, and that was eased by the Taiwan Relations Act.

*Q: I'm ready to go back now.*

LORD: Okay. I'll try not to go into too much detail about my nomination. It's pretty bloody. I knew from about February-March, 1985, I don't know exactly when, that they were working on the nomination, so I began to work on the various papers that you had to fill out. It didn't leak for awhile until I finally got a call on March 30 from Rollie Evans, the journalist who had picked up rumors. After that it began to leak. This is while my nomination was still being formalized. You know how these things get out in the papers before they are actually formal, so I had to be careful in my public comments. I told the Council on Foreign Relations and the Chairman, David Rockefeller, that I would leave on June 30. I thought I would be nominated and through the Senate during the course of the summer.

It was one of the happiest times of my life because I thought this was a perfect fit, not only for me and my background, but for Bette and her background. There were many overtones including the fact that our wedding reception was at Twin Oaks, the Chinese Nationalist Embassy, that I had first gone into China in '71 with Kissinger, and all that had happened since that we talked about. I had some concern about leaving my ill father, but you don't get into personal stuff in an interview like this. And I was very sorry that my mother, who had passed away in July 1978, never knew that I became Ambassador to China.

In any event, on July 12, I was told that I would be getting a call from the President officially asking me to serve, but right then he had this operation for a cancerous polyp which delayed things. Finally instead of getting a call, I got a very nice letter which was really personalized. It had shaky handwriting with references to Bette and a word from Nancy. It was clear that it wasn't just a *pro forma* letter. I spent this time, of course, getting briefings in Washington, getting in touch with academics and business and human rights groups, reading as much as I could whether it was long books or memos, etc., touching base with various constituencies. Li Xiannian, the President of China came during this period, but I still wasn't official yet, so I couldn't sit in on any of the meetings, but I got to the social occasions and Bette sat next to him at lunch that Shultz gave and sat next to President Reagan at the White House along with Liz Taylor and some others for this dinner. I had my hearing on July 30 introduced by my New York Senator, Moynihan, was voted out by the Foreign Relations Committee 16 to 1, but the day before that Helms had sent a message to Lugar saying he couldn't show up for the hearing and he wanted it delayed. What was the rush about such a controversial appointment?

*Q: This is Jesse Helms, the conservative Senator of North Carolina.*

LORD: Correct. Meanwhile the Chinese had given very fast agreement. Within 48 hours.
After three months of my working on paperwork and security and everything else, it came through right about the time of President Li’s visit. The reason for Helms’ opposition ostensibly turned out to be on the abortion population issue, but he had other reasons not to welcome my appointment. First I was a moderate or liberal Republican which I guess is an oxymoron, but he was suspicious of the Rockefeller New York wing. I had been Henry Kissinger's closest associate, and he at that point (they have gotten friendlier since) thought Kissinger had sold out to the Soviet Union and China and was generally leftist which is quite ironic if you know Henry Kissinger. So, being close to Kissinger was a strike against me. I was a member of the Trilateral Commission which was one of his bête noires. I was President of the Council on Foreign Relations. He and his staff discovered all that. I had written an article in Newsweek a couple years before that argue for a centrist foreign policy, avoiding extremes. I had one sentence in there that I thought was pretty clever. I was taking a crack at McGovern on one side and Jesse Helms on the other. I said, "We should neither McGovern our foreign policy nor have Jesse at the helm." I told myself if I should run into this with Senator Helms at the hearings I would say I'm talking about Jesse Jackson, not you.

In any event there were a lot of reasons why he obviously wouldn't like me plus my whole involvement in the China opening; he didn't like the China opening and so on. I and the Administration were focusing on the need to get this nomination, now being delayed by Helms having been voted on by the committee, through by September so I could be in place for an October visit by Vice President Bush to China which would be a wonderful way for me to begin my tour. It was important to the Vice President as well.

Without going into excruciating details, the next few months while getting ready for my posting, I just pulled out all the stops to try to get the nomination through, to get around Helms, to get through this situation. There are a lot of details I won't go into. I have to say in all candor the Congressional Relations Office of the State Department was totally incompetent. They were somewhat shy about taking on Helms; they were browbeaten. Not only did they not push it very much, they didn't even keep me informed. I had to keep asking where we stood before they would let me know. I got really annoyed at the White House and the Congressional Relations Office. The White House weighed in as we went on and without going in to it blow by blow, at one point the President called Helms in the middle of the Achille Lauro crisis, he called Helms from Air Force One. Another time he wrote him a letter.

I kept telling the Administration as much as I wanted my nomination completed in time for the Vice President, I didn't want them to sell out substance. After all I had overwhelming support in the Committee and in the Senate and I was well qualified and a conservative American president, Reagan, appointed me which ought to reassure Helms. It was not correct on principle to bend on population policy or any other substantive issue just to get my nomination through. As anxious as I was to get this going, I didn't want it to be at the expense of Administration policy. There finally was a letter from the head of AID, Peter McPherson to Helms in the Senate, wishy-washy in language that we would bend our policy somewhat even a little beyond what I would have liked.
Anyway, we finally got it through, but only after Bush had gone to China and come back. I was very upset about that. Then when I saw I was going to miss that in any event, I sort of backed off and just let nature take its course. I was sufficiently exercised to get this through, I thought for the national interest, also my personal interest in getting there on time for Bush, and just generally that I pushed this very hard, even to the point where I thought some of my colleagues in the State Department thought I was overdoing it. So, I sort of laid back. By now the media had paid a lot of attention to this, and there were editorials across the country including lead editorials in the New York Times and the Washington Post and many other areas calling me a hostage and putting pressure on Helms.

There was one particularly painful incident where there was a last gasp try to get me through and out there in time for Bush, and I even made a reservation for a swearing in ceremony for October 8, 1985. My father was very sick in Florida, but he made a major effort to come up for it. We had people invited, thinking the Senate just might do it in time. It didn't work out, and so my father missed my swearing in. He had to go back to Florida. It was another further delay for another month, by which time he couldn't travel. Finally as a result of the media pressure and the McPherson letter generally and as I say the President calling Helms and these other efforts, they finally voted on the evening of November 5. I was voted through 87-7. Helms took a crack at me for having orchestrated a media campaign against him. It wasn't true actually, but I didn't mind the compliment. I remember going down to Florida before we went to China, a few days later and I saw my father and played him a tape of the swearing in ceremony. I had a wonderful swearing in ceremony. Shultz swore me in personally, and there was a tremendous turnout. I made some carefully thought out remarks about U.S.-China relations and other personal dimensions.

Q: I'd like to talk about for somebody who is not familiar. Could you quickly explain why a minority Senator could stop this process, and also how you went about, you say you pushed hard. How does one push hard in the political context of the period? Then, finally, what was the abortion issue from Helms' perspective and from the administration's perspective?

LORD: These are fair questions. I won't go into them in great detail, but pushing hard included lining up conservative friends of mine, conservative Republicans, and have them go to Helms and others on the Hill and explain that I wasn't some pinko Communist and that I was hard-headed. I didn't discourage media attention certainly. I would press the State Department and the White House to be weighing in not only with Helms and his people but also people like Bob Dole and others - I guess he was minority leader even then of the Republicans. The Democrats weren't giving me any trouble. And I was trying to work on parliamentary maneuvers to get it up to a vote because I had already been voted out by the Committee. So, it was getting people like Bill Buckley and others behind the scenes to weigh in.

Q: Bill Buckley being a conservative columnist.
LORD: Letting the media campaign go on, badgering State and the White House, but all the while saying we shouldn't compromise on the population issue. So, this is basically how I went about it. The population issue I don't want to get into with precision. It is still with us even as we speak today in 1998, and it is not unrelated. Basically it was a matter of funding for UN programs that went back to the Mexico City issue even then I believe.

Q: There was a women's conference in Mexico City, a United Nations one. Reagan's daughter went there as our delegate.

LORD: The specific issue, I believe, was the funding for UN programs which Helms didn't want to do. We pointed out that we were not funding abortion, and the UN programs were in fact for areas like education or contraception which would lower the need for abortions if you looked at them sensibly. Helms' position was that all these funding operations were fungible. Our funding would free up other funding which would help abortions. I don't remember precisely how the issue was framed or how the McPherson letter waffled on it, but I do have a recollection that Helms won somewhat of a victory. There was a crimping of our funding, much to my dismay. I made it clear that I would rather wait as long as necessary, but the Administration felt it could live with a compromise, and they did want me to get on to China.

Q: Did you have the feeling at the time that these were deep felt feelings of Senator Helms or was this sort of political ego.

LORD: At the time I thought, although I know he felt sincerely about the abortion issue, that if there wasn't the abortion issue, he would have found something else in order to delay me personally because of my background. Put together the Kissinger connection, the Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations. You could even throw in Skull and Bones at Yale; he probably wouldn't like that if he knew about it. The whole China involvement, being a liberal Republican, I was anathema to him. He was always courteous as he always is, and he was very courtly toward my wife and very polite toward me, but both he and his staff assistant, a guy named Triplett, who has been around for many years, stonewalled me. In pulling out the stops, I talked to Triplett as well. He kept portraying himself as someone who was trying to help me. He was a new staffer then. In retrospect he was also delaying, so I felt it was personal. But, also it coincided with Helms' tactical approach, which he used on many nominations, of trying to extract substantive concessions on policy in exchange for letting names go forward, which is, I think a terrible distortion of the process. We are living with that even as we speak today. It is a terrible morale blow and a national interest blow to hold up important nominations in this hostage way. So I'm convinced if it wasn't the population issue, he would have held me up on some other reason.
Q: Okay. We might as well just keep going. Then you were able to take off.

LORD: Yes. Now let me make some general points about the years in China, and then there are a few areas where I can get a bit more chronological. I do not have the notes to say this happened this month or that month.

Q: One thing too while we are talking about that. Did you carry in your mental attaché case any things, you had been dealing with China a lot, that you really, did you have your own agenda?

LORD: That is exactly right. I thought I would give you some of my general goals and things in general, and then we can go back into some specifics. I don't have the kind of memory to go into great detail.

A couple of comments about the period I served in China, from November, 1985, to April, 1989. My timing really was quite fortunate. I got there when things were really starting to move forward again. There was some tension in the early Reagan years as I mentioned earlier, particularly over the Taiwan arms sales question. The 1982 communiqué broke that logjam, and therefore China and the United States were beginning to have a more positive relationship. Obviously it wasn't easy, but it was beginning to move forward again after having been tense early in the administration.

Q: Who was the Ambassador?

LORD: Arthur Hummel. I left, we'll look at this later, but I left just before Tiananmen Square erupted. In fact I left just after the first week of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Hu Yaobang had died on April 15. His funeral was April 22, and his funeral was the occasion for the first major outpouring of Chinese citizens, roughly 100,000 that day, and of course, our relations took a tailspin after the events of that spring.

So, I was in a period which was probably the most positive period in U.S.-Chinese relations since the opening. Obviously I thought I did a decent job, but I mean it also was very fortunate timing, because if relations go well it is not really thanks to the Ambassador. It is thanks to the overall climate and the leaders in the capitals. I was there during a period where it really did move forward. We had some real tensions as I'll get into, but not the incredible crises, and the general movement was onward and upward. There was a tremendous increase in exchanges and high level visits in both directions and agreements in trade and other areas, and therefore, I felt very fortunate in that sense.

I do want to mention without being overly awkward or self serving the role my wife played there, her background and knowing the language, being Chinese of course, and knowing the culture. Bette was a tremendous advisor to me informally on how to deal with the Chinese culturally, psychologically and even how to interpret their positions that
I would talk to her about. She had an instinct no barbarian could have. She had a tremendous circle of contacts for both me and the Embassy as well as herself. There was a whole area of Chinese society that would not have been possible to reach in such width and depth without her, her language and the fact that she was a well-known authoress - academic circles, cultural circles, intellectual circles, artistic circles which I would have in any event tried to cultivate. We had tremendous entree thanks to her, and she was a tremendous hostess both in terms of briefing visitors on Chinese culture and history and on contacts but also in terms of entertainment. She always tried to make our evenings different and interesting and fun, whether it was foreign visitors, American visitors, diplomats or Chinese themselves. We either had an interesting evening and or an entertaining evening. We never just had the typical evening. We either had roundtable discussions of substance, or we'd have Chinese opera singers or Chinese plays in our garden or musicians or other entertaining, both to show off culture, but also to make an interesting evening. This extended to very imaginative July Fourth parties, the anniversary of the Shanghai Communiqué, the anniversary of normalization. Also Bette worked with Charlton Heston to put on a Chinese production of the Caine Mutiny which was an extraordinary success.

Bette would go with me and travel around the country and make a tremendous impact. She was extremely well-known and popular in China. Some of the Chinese leaders probably had some concerns probably because she knew too much. They always liked to think they could fool the barbarians, but they knew they couldn't fool her. She spent the bulk of her time, as she should, with her official and professional contacts, helping me with the government officials, the party officials and so on, as well as with Americans, the American business community, academics and visitors. She spent a great deal of time to promote U.S. interests, and out of her own personal interest too, in dealing with Chinese intellectuals, artists and academics. Many of these were, of course, pushing the envelope in terms of political freedoms in China, and many fell into the grey area of semi or outright dissidents. Many later, of course, got swept up by the events of June fourth (Tiananmen Square). So, among the more conservative leaders, there were probably some suspicions of her, and even me as we'll talk about later, on these contacts. The Chinese officials were tremendously appreciative of her on the one hand, but probably some of the conservatives were suspicious on the other hand.

Bette worked very hard. She got a lot of publicity at the time even back here, media articles, a Barbara Walters Special on 20-20 television, a big Washington Post profile and so on, including on her interaction with Chinese students, intellectuals, scholars, artists, writers and so on. I want to repeat that she spent the bulk of her time promoting official ties. She wasn't shunning the officials and the government, just the opposite in fact. The Foreign Ministry and others were extremely enthusiastic about her, so she kept up her official side very strongly. In the American community I suspect there were some who felt that she spent too much time with the Chinese and not enough time with the American community. She felt that was the proper priority because of American interests in helping to interpret China as well as to expand our contacts and our interests. There were times where the diplomatic community felt that both she and I didn't pay as much attention as we might. I had a clear list of our priorities, and I'll get to that in just a
minute. Dealing with my fellow Ambassadors was not high on my list. I would stay in touch if they were particularly good ones who could help me understand what was going on in China. Diplomatic dinners were generally late and boring and not very useful. I certainly was friendly and not rude, but I had to choose my priorities. Spending a lot of time with my fellow Ambassadors was not one of them, and that was true of Bette as well.

Some of the events that Bette produced, either at our residence or elsewhere, were truly imaginative, even spectacular. To take just one example - the party she staged at the Great Wall hotel to celebrate the tenth anniversary of our diplomatic relations. This was in December 1988. It was the biggest Western party for the Chinese since 1949. 1800-2000 guests. 36,000 (five kinds) dumplings. The Chinese Olympic table tennis team. 3000 slides and special movies on ten screens that Bette painstakingly put together after wheedling them from American sources. During this period Bette and I did a major media and speaking blitz.

One last point on Bette. She and I felt strongly that at our July 4th party, we should have Chinese visitors to help celebrate July 4th with us as well as the Chinese employees of the Embassy taking part as a joint celebration. We had a huge block party that we instituted. She lined up McDonalds and other companies to provide free food. We had bands and music and booths and parades. Just tremendous what she orchestrated. But the first July 4th party in 1986, we ran into trouble with the some of American community and business who felt that Chinese shouldn't be included.

Bette, justifiably, got extremely high marks for her role. A glowing personal profile in “The Washington Post.” A “20/20” special on ABC TV with Barbara Walters. The highest USIA award from Mr. Wick, head of USIA.

Q: You were saying in the American community there were certain racist...

LORD: I don't want to say the whole community, but among some of the business people and some of the Embassy there was a feeling of why are we involving the Chinese in our celebration which I felt was both wrong and stupid. It was a tremendous opportunity to engage the Chinese. But there was a certain amount of racism there, you could tell. In any event, we always included the Chinese, and this proved extremely popular. That was just an example where there was some critical attention by some of the American community, although the great bulk of them and all the visitors were extremely high on Bette, her briefings, and her entertainment for them.

One other amusing incident involving her novel, Spring Moon. As usual in China, they were pirating it and as they did with all authors, putting out unauthorized translations. There was one being done by committee that was incredibly bad. We counted up in just the first chapter alone 101 mistakes, many big mistakes, not just the natural mistranslations. Not only was it inaccurate, but there was no sense of style or elegance. Now, Bette was not concerned about making money or royalties and was not naive about the ability to enforce intellectual property rights, but was concerned that all her Chinese
friends and colleagues would understand she could write well, and she didn't want it mangled. So, she went to the Minister and Vice Minister of Culture when this unauthorized edition was about to come out and said that if this was actually published, we would personally, and we were prepared to do this, buy up all the copies, bring them to the Embassy, invite all the foreign journalists, have a bonfire and burn the books in our Embassy courtyard. It sounds like a joke and overly dramatic, but literally we were going to do that. Fortunately, there wasn't total freedom in China at least in this area, and it so happens that this edition was killed. Then Bette worked with the wife of the Vice Minister of Culture, a famous Chinese actor named Ying Ruochen. She did a tremendous translation of *Spring Moon*. Bette worked with her until the last chapter and then tragically she died of a blood disease. On her death bed, she said she regretted not finishing the last chapter. Then Ying himself did the final chapter and it was a very well done translation.

Q: I think you'd better for the record here give the substance of or theme of *Spring Moon* because it is mentioned.

LORD: I don't know how relevant this is. She's written several books, but this was her first novel, and it turned out to be a huge best seller for eight months in hardback and number one in paperback. Translated all over the world, main selection Literary Guild. It is basically a novel of China; it takes place in the late 19th century up through essentially the 1930s, but it jumps with an epilogue to the opening to China in the early 1970s. It is the story of *Spring Moon*, this woman and how she grows up and goes through various travails. It is full of the history and culture of China but also Spring Moon’s personal story.

On Bette, I just want to make the point that she was a tremendous help to me personally, not only a good marriage but also in terms of advice and all she did in expanding our contacts, projecting America at its best, great imagination and entertainment, and working hard to promote official ties. Therefore it gave an extra dimension to our stewardship together.

Now, with respect to me, I thought very hard during this longer-than-I-wished period of getting ready to go to China while I was waiting for confirmation, reading up and briefings on how I wanted to advance the relationship, how I wanted to conduct the Embassy and my own priorities. I knew that this relationship was going to continue to be mixed sweet and sour if you will. We had too many differences for it to be smooth whether it was human rights or historical and geographic separation. But, I also was firmly convinced there would be great national interests in moving forward with China. Obviously geopolitical interest which existed then, of course, with respect to balancing off Russia, potential trade, cultural, technological and other interests that were beginning to pick up steam. Regional and global security and other matters that we should be working on. So I made, of course, this determination to move this relationship forward.

As for my priorities, and some of these are overlapping. I can't list them in order, but obviously, my first priority was to advance American interests not only with a general
engagement with China, but to promote U.S. positions, get Chinese cooperation wherever we could on international and regional issues, as well as to expand our bilateral links both as an end in itself and to develop more constituencies on both sides of the Pacific for a stronger relationship. The more you have various fields interacting, the more you have people both in China and the U.S. arguing for a positive relationship for their own self interest and increasing mutual understanding and linkage between us. So my top priority was advancing our interests, expanding the relationship, relaying U.S. positions, and pushing the Chinese on areas where we wanted their help or restraint. The problems included importantly in the years I was there, their dealings on missiles with Iran and Saudi Arabia for example, as well as on human rights generally and in Tibet in particular. That was clearly my overall priority.

Secondly to report on China, to increase understanding in the U.S. about China. I felt very strongly that Ambassadors in general and I in particular should do this clear-eyed, make sure that people in Washington and other readers would understand what was going on in China. This would include the Chinese point of view, but, emphatically avoid clientitis and localitis. I thought it was very important in order to maintain credibility with your readers, to be firm enough with the Chinese, and to give a clear picture of them, that you could not succumb to being snowed by your hosts. A lot of Ambassadors face this danger. The Chinese are particularly seductive, and so I was determined not to fall into that trap and always to be worried about American interests and tough with the Chinese when it was necessary. I would recommend we be tough when necessary, but also remind Washington and others of the larger stakes in the relationship, not letting one issue upset the whole relationship. Reporting on China was, therefore, a very important priority as well.

Thus, number one was advancing U.S. interests and presenting U.S. positions and negotiating for the U.S., and second was reporting on China. I think the third one was building up all these links that I mentioned earlier. Specifically, we had some clandestine cooperation with the Chinese in the intelligence area that even now I can't go into great detail on. It has become public since so I can mention that this included, on the positive side, working with them on monitoring Soviet missile tests and deployments, working with them to provide arms to the Afghan resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and sharing intelligence on other parts of the world. At the same time, of course, it still was a Communist country. There was mutual suspicion on each side, spying like mad on each other, so it was a complex intelligence relationship. This positive side, much of it directed vis a vis Russia, even as we tried to improve relations with Russia, was sort of an anchor in Sino-U.S. relations. We had begun during the Kissinger-Nixon days sharing intelligence with the Chinese, but it really began in earnest under Brzezinski and Carter when we began to monitor Soviet activities and provide joint aid to the Afghan resistance. We maintained that strongly while I was there. Even when there was tension in the relationship on other issues or across the board, this aspect of the relationship was never really affected. We could go forward in good times and bad and build on a solid foundation, not known by the public and only by a few in the Congress. It was important for both sides in times of tension that we had this overall strategic interest to work together as well as we could.
Concretely our CIA people spent a great deal of time working with the Chinese on providing arms through Pakistan to Afghanistan resistance against the Soviets, and monitoring Soviet missile and other activities. Sino-American cooperation on Afghanistan was crucial.

*Q:* I would think on the intelligence side, you say each side was spying on each other in a normal way, but did you find the Chinese effort was the way it has been my experience with the North Koreans and South Koreans, the Yugoslavs when there was a Yugoslavia, spending a hell of a lot of their time really spying or checking the dissident movements in the United States. In other words were they looking as to what is the United States up to or what were the overseas Chinese up to?

*LORD:* I was involved really more with their surveillance of us in China. I wasn't all that familiar in detail with what they were doing in the U.S. They didn't have that many students as yet in college in the United States. That began to expand as we went along, and those are people they'd be watching. Clearly they were eavesdropping and doing things on us in the U.S. even as we were doing that in China. I can't get into detail. We had the constant reality that we figured everything was bugged including our entire household, so we were always careful whenever we spoke in the house unless we wanted to make a point like I hope we aren't having sea slugs at the next Great Hall banquet. You felt, obviously, that you and your people were being followed. In my case, they did it out of security reasons among others. They wanted to make sure nothing would happen to me. Of course, you feel more secure ironically, in a Communist controlled society. You won't get hurt by criminals or other elements because the Chinese are always around and they have got things under control. It wasn't pleasant, but I had the feeling that I could walk around or ride around on my bike without any trouble at a time when worldwide at many of our posts we had increasing concerns about security. It was a major concern at that point if you look back, with the whole project of fortifying our Embassies and so on. We beefed up our security. I always felt personally it was one of the pleasures of China that I could ride my bike, walk anywhere without any trouble at a time when worldwide at many of our posts we had increasing concerns about security. It was a major concern at that point if you look back, with the whole project of fortifying our Embassies and so on. We beefed up our security. I always felt personally it was one of the pleasures of China that I could ride my bike, walk anywhere without any security concerns. The downside was that you always had to watch what you say except in the bubble in the Embassy. You had to be careful in other parts of the Embassy, even in your office as well as at home. Even in our car which we assumed was bugged. I did feel our security was quite lax. We had been briefed, before going out, in the Ambassadors course about the need for security. Within a day or two of my arrival, I walked around and checked out the security of our Embassy building and other buildings there. We tightened things up. On security, the main point I want to make is one we spent quite a bit of time in this area to strengthen the relationship even as we tried to learn more about what was going on in China. It was a very mixed relationship. While I was there, we had three secret visits from three Directors of CIA.

I also was interested over this period and had some success in expanding our military to military contacts. I felt this was important. We shouldn't rush it because of the differences we had, and we shouldn't do anything to jeopardize national security. The military always had and always would play an important political role in China, so we wanted to reach
that constituency. It would give us a chance over time to get a better sense of Chinese strategic and military intentions and capabilities. It would send useful signals to the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries about this relationship with China. Moreover, the military was important with respect to the export of dangerous weapons which we didn't like. If you want to get at non-proliferation, you really have to talk to the military. At this point in the relationship we were getting into a more positive footing after two decades of mutual isolation and hostility, so I thought military contact was useful symbolism.

So, for all these reasons we worked on this. We had some modest arms sales. We had increasing exchanges of visitors. I think while I was there, every Chief of Staff of the services came over and most Chinese went the other direction. There were Secretary of Defense visits and theirs going the other direction. We had the first ship visit, very dramatic, one of the highlights of my stay there in October 1986 in Qingdao. Three American ships came in for the very first time. We worked very hard on this, and this military part of the relationship expanded during this period, but was cut off by Tiananmen Square just after I left in 1989. Similarly on the cultural side...

Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]. Before you go on to culture, on the issue of arms sales, that had long been a very controversial one. It arose initially during the Carter years, and there was that very controversial article by Mike Pillsbury on Foreign Policy recommending this part as a way to get the relationship back on track and move it along. By the time you were Ambassador, was it still controversial?

LORD: It was still controversial but less so as we had moved ahead with China, as we normalized with China. There were some things in the works I believe, certainly by the time I got there, I think by the time Reagan took over from the previous administration. I don't recall precisely how far back some of these had gone. It included working with them on their rather dated but important F-8 fighters, the avionics with that. It included radar for their artillery which was relevant to Vietnam. Some upgrading of some of their ships. These are some of the significant areas. We didn't want to go so fast as to excite controversy in the U.S., but felt obviously that for the Chinese military getting a hold of some of our technology - even if it lagged behind our best - was important in terms of getting their cooperation. We certainly weren't going to do anything that was going to be a threat to Taiwan in our view or to military balances in general. Most of the technology or help we are talking about was 20 years old, give or take a few years. We felt this limited attempt was useful politically and psychologically without causing any undue controversy or upsetting any military balances. I don't recall it being overly controversial at the time. The negotiations with the Chinese always took time. In addition we had these functional exchanges at the National Defense University level for more junior officers. And higher ranking generals and admirals going in both directions, Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of Defense, and the whole thing was beginning to move forward.

Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]. How satisfied were you with transparency? More recently there have been complaints that we show the Chinese everything; they don't show us much until a recent breakthrough with Secretary Cohen. But as a general rule there
hasn't been a very good balance.

LORD: There hasn't been a particularly good balance. We always tried to get more access to what they were doing and we would have some staged visits to some of their units and facilities. When the Secretary or the Chiefs of Staff would come, they were probably embarrassed by how far behind they were us. So there is no question we consciously knew that in terms of technology, of course, even in terms of transparency and access, that they were getting more than we gave them. You couldn't see this as something you could balance off exactly. For example, if they see more of our bases and capabilities we figured that would impress them about how strong we were militarily and how far behind they were. They had an interest generally in dealing with us as a geopolitical superpower and specifically in terms of our technology, so we thought it was to our advantage to show our capabilities. We thought over time it would be more mutual. We kept pressing them on transparency, but I would grant that we didn't get the kind of reciprocity that one would normally expect or hope for, but we knew what we were doing.

We had the same thing on the intelligence side, as I mentioned in the last session, in sharing intelligence with them. Generally we would tell them more about what was going on than we would get from them. We did so to advance our interests, to make them a little nervous about the Russians or concerned about some of their partners in the Middle East who we thought were not helpful elements to regional stability. We did so partly to try to get more information out of them. Here again, we gave more than we got, as one would expect from a more advanced country, but also we felt it would pay off for us even though it wasn't strict reciprocity. It was sort of the same principle as the military exchanges.

Q: While we are on the military subject. What was the evaluation you were getting from the visits and all? I mean what were our military people saying to you about the capabilities and perhaps the positioning? What were the Chinese using their military for during that period?

LORD: Well, they were way behind us. When you visit their ships or see their aircraft or even their elite ground units, you could see just how far behind they were. They had a major big army but it was not that strong because of all its weaknesses. They were just then beginning to cut down the size of the army. I don't remember the chronology of this. They were trying to begin to modernize, and that is, of course, where they had an interest with us in getting technology. Of course, they asked for a lot more than we were willing to give them. I want to make that clear. We were measured in our approach. They also had an unfortunate experience with Vietnam; when they invaded in 1979, they really got a bloody nose from the Vietnamese. If they couldn't handle the Vietnamese, who could they handle? I just have to go back and read the literature about their strategy at that point. They were beginning to move away from, I think, Mao’s mass mobilization where you swallow people up if they invade you; they began to try to have a somewhat leaner and meaner force and more technologically advanced, but they had an awful long way to go.

On nuclear weapons they have evolved a great deal since those days in terms of their
attitude. We were concerned about non-proliferation, although most of the issues we had with the Chinese in that period were on missiles, Silkworms to Iran and some other missiles to Saudi Arabia. They did that to earn money for the PLA as well as to gain friendship and influence in other countries. On the nuclear side, they had a fledgling capability then for deterrence purposes, only regional in nature; they certainly couldn't reach us at that point. At the time they were obviously relaxed about proliferation; they were helping Pakistan with its program.

_Q: I mean were we seeing during this period, mobilizing toward an invasion of Taiwan? Militarily I assume you were watching this closely._

_LORD: No. I want to make sure my memory doesn't play tricks on me. We would always watch their deployments. While I was there, there was no Taiwan military crisis such as we had in the spring of 1996 or we had earlier when we didn't have relations. Their concern was less with Taiwan and more vis a vis the Soviet Union, to a certain extent Vietnam, and they had tensions with India going back to the 1962 war. They had residual historical concerns about Japan and Korea. The Chinese had opened up to us in large measure due to their concern about the Russians. There was a general calculation on their part that the far barbarian, the United States, was less threatening to them in history and geography than the near barbarians. They might not have trusted us or liked us particularly but they felt that since we were not on their borders and since on balance compared to some of their neighbors we had been relatively benign in our history, that they had less to fear from us. We had not invaded them like Japan. We had not taken large parts of their territory - at least as they saw it - like Russia. We had not fought them like Korea or India except in the Korean War. On the whole we were a strong and distant barbarian, and by being in the area and dealing with them, this helped provide geopolitical and security balance as they looked around their borders not only to the Russian threat to the north but these others that I have mentioned. In terms of their deployments and other concerns, it was clearly at that point to the north with the Russians and to a certain extent the south, the Vietnamese, and the Indians. There were not large threatening deployments vis a vis Taiwan.

A more general point. While I was Ambassador, the Taiwan issue was remarkably quiet - probably the calmest phase we’ve ever had with the PRC. This was partly due to the easing of tensions through the 1982 Communique. Partly the general advance of our time. Partly our cooperation against the Soviets, including heavy duty work together on shipping arms through Pakistan to the Afghan resistance.

_Q: To put in context, ’89 was not only Tiananmen Square but also the beginning of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. We are talking about a time where the Soviets were still involved in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union was the Soviet Union, not Russia._

_LORD: That's correct and it was still their primary concern when I was Ambassador. Now they were already easing relations with the Russians during this period. Gorbachev gave a speech in Vladivostok on Asia that I considered very significant at the time. I have to check the date, it must have been about 1987. Clearly that was a pitch for better relations with China. I think the Chinese felt it would help them deal with us, along with
their own security concerns, if they could ease relations with Russia, and it would help them in terms of their military deployments and expenditures. They were beginning to move with the Russians - not at an alarming rate - but I thought it was significant, more so than some of my colleagues. In our reporting cables, I emphasized the importance of the Vladivostok speech and their concern about the Russians. They of course - this is jumping forward - were improving relations, and Gorbachev was to come there in May, 1989. They didn't like the political reforms he was instituting. They thought this was dangerous in terms of maintaining party control and maintaining the empire. In a way they were right, given what happened in Russia, but they drew the wrong conclusions about the need for political as well as economic reform. In any event, their main concern was still north and to a certain extent south, not really pressure on Taiwan during this period.

Q: We are talking about this Soviet situation. How in your discussions of your Embassy, did you use the Soviet card or did you let the Chinese figure out what the Soviets were up to themselves?

LORD: We like to think we did it in a somewhat sophisticated fashion. After all this had been going on now since the early 1970s and here we are in the late 1980s. We were trying to improve relations with the Russians at the same time. We made no secret of that with the Chinese. We also kept telling the Chinese we hope you can improve relations. In fact, our view was, and it was sincere, we wanted a Sino-Soviet relationship that was not tense or hostile but certainly wasn't an alliance. The situation that had existed in 1969 for example, the border clashes, we genuinely thought were too dangerous and too tense. It could lead not only to a conflict between then but a wider conflict in the region with others and even perhaps the nuclear dimension. Even if you could crudely say it is nice to have these two guys fighting each other, we didn't want that kind of hostile, tense relationship between these two major powers.

So, to the extent they were improving relations and easing tensions we would favor that. Now, we obviously didn't want them to go all the way back to the 1950s and be solid allies again. We wanted to have better relations with each one than they had with each other. We felt there was a limit on how far the Sino-Soviet rapprochement could go, and therefore we were genuinely relaxed about the progress they were making with Moscow, and conveyed that to the Chinese both out of sincerity and out of tactics. You don't want to make them feel that they are getting you nervous with their relations with the Russians. We felt that the Russians and the Chinese each needed us more than they could possibly use each other. Of course, in economic terms for the Chinese this is a constant theme from the early 1970s to even as we speak today. The Chinese needed us for the number one priority of developing their country, modernizing their economy, lifting the standard of living of their people, and maintaining Communist party control by giving their people a better life, calculating that man or woman lives by rice alone. That is their number one priority, and they need our technology, our marketing skills, our capital investment, our knowhow, our trade. In order to do that, they don't want to be dependent on Japan or anyone else. As we speak now, we take a third of their exports and we are still the key investment and technological provider. They needed us for that. The Russians needed
many of the same things from us. They couldn't get that from each other given their economies. They both needed us, and we figured that was a constraint on their getting so close that they would engender hostility or nervousness on our part and therefore lose out on the economic connection with us. Similarly on the geopolitical front, yes we had tensions with Russia, the cold war and the nuclear dimension, but we weren't bordering them, unless you count Alaska and Vladivostok, as China was. We didn't have troops facing off against each other, and we didn't have this long history of Sino-Soviet tension. We felt there would always be that constraint between Moscow and Beijing, that no matter how much they patched up their relations, there would be this mutual suspicion.

To make a long story short, we tried better relations with both. Usually we went ahead simultaneously or we fell backward simultaneously. It was not a zero sum gain from our standpoint. We did try to remind the Chinese that even as we hoped they would have better relations, they shouldn't feel secure for all eternity vis a vis Russia, but we tried this in a subtle way. We would keep briefing them on Russian deployments and so on so that they would be reminded of Soviet strength and the need to maintain a relationship with us. We would keep them fully posted on our relations with Russia, again striking a balance to show that we were trying to move ahead with Moscow and we were having some success to make them a little uneasy, but also making it clear that we were tough and not being snowed by the Russians, or overlooking the dangers of falling in love with détente. I'm talking about the '70s as well as when I was there, so we were always trying to strike this kind of balance. I think on balance, and this is true of administrations I didn't serve in, that on the whole we have done this quite well and quite effectively.

Q: What about you in Beijing and our Ambassador in Moscow as well as the European bureau and East Asian bureau? Was this just you sort of working on instinct or was there sort of a controlling hand as to how we were dealing with two superpowers?

LORD: Of course this always has to be integrated from Washington, the White House and the State Department and other agencies. They'd have to balance off our Russian and China policies. I think I had the advantage in my job of not only having the China background, but a general background in policy where I was head of State Department Policy Planning, special assistant to Kissinger, and head of the Council on Foreign Relations. I had a global view which was useful in my talks with the Chinese in terms of my credentials, including having done a lot with the Russians during my NSC period. By the way, I kept up with the Russian Ambassador in Beijing. I forget the first guy's name, but then he was followed by Troyanovsky. We kept in constant touch, working lunches together, even a basketball game which we won, thanks to our Marines.

But, to get to your question, there was not a lot of tension between our Moscow Embassy and our Embassy in Beijing. It was not as if our Ambassadors to India and Pakistan were facing off against each other, which happens a lot. We didn't have that kind of problem at all as I recall. We'd each of course, send a copy of any cable we'd send to Washington to each other. We'd do this always with Embassies Moscow or Japan or Korea or other key people in Europe on our cables, and they would do the same, so there was coordination that way. I don't recall any incidents or events where there was real bloody battles
between us and Embassy Moscow or real disputes about the triangular dimensions. We also were meticulous in debriefing the Chinese if there had been a summit meeting with the Russians, like Reagan at Iceland for example, or arms control agreements or negotiations. Ambassador Rowny, who did a lot of the negotiations, came several times, as did other negotiators to fill them in. I like to think we played this in a relatively sophisticated way.

Q: Did you have a Soviet hand at your Embassy, an American?

LORD: Well, my Deputy, Peter Tomsen, had served in the Political section in Russia, so he had considerable Russian perspective and spoke Russian. I don't recall whether we had others with great expertise. We didn't have a single person who was just a Russian expert.

Q: Because sometimes we had. How about a China hand in Moscow?

LORD: Well, I think there were people in Moscow who had served in China, but I don't recall specifically. We didn't have a slot just assigned for that purpose.

Q: While we are still on the Soviet side, did you sense any concern about the was it the Gorbo mania. Gorbachev was a new type Soviet leader, and he became rather the darling of Europe, the British, and the United States in this period and seemed to have a rapport with Ronald Reagan which was happening during your time. I was wondering whether they were feeling miffed or concerned that we were getting too close to the Soviets?

LORD: Well, first if the Chinese were miffed or concerned, they would not show it. I mean just for tactical reasons, they wouldn't want to show they were concerned. We got a lot of lectures as you recall from earlier sessions from Deng Xiaoping and others in the ‘70s about being naive about the Soviets, not being tough enough. We didn't hear that in the ‘80s, probably because they were improving their own relations. With respect to Gorbachev, however, I don't recall that they were all that frank in their discussions with us. Clearly we knew that they were suspicious of what he was doing and had real ambivalence. They liked the fact that he wanted to improve relations with China, and they worked with him on that, but they were very concerned about what Gorbachev was doing on the domestic political front in terms of freeing up that society both because it might have a contagion effect in China and unleash similar currents there and because they felt, and they were correct in a way, that this would lead to lack of control by the Communist Party in Russia and even loss of their empire. So, they were suspicious of Gorbachev, and generally on balance, didn't like him. On the other hand, they were pragmatically dealing with him to improve their bilateral relationship.

We can pick up some of these things again later, to get back to bilateral relations, we spent a lot of time trying to expand educational and cultural affairs with the Chinese. We made some progress here, but there is always some, and it continues to this day, restrictive paranoid quality about Western ideas. Basically the Chinese strategy was to get Western technology and Western money without being subverted by western ideals, culture and ideas. We made some progress in terms of agreements signed and exchanges.
back and forth. Bette worked extremely hard on this and did a lot to promote groups going back and forth, but we would have reminders of their repression.

I remember one example where we were going to send to China an exhibit from the National Portrait Gallery. Just before it was about to come over, the Chinese said there are two portraits that cannot be included in this. One is Golda Meir from Israel, the other is General MacArthur, I guess because of the Korean War connection. We were very tough. There were some in my USIA section who wanted to bend on this. I thought this was absolutely wrong. I'm not saying everyone in the section, but some elements who sort of wanted to work it out with the Chinese. I said we had to be very tough on this out of principle. Furthermore there was some absurdity here. It is not as if we were putting Hitler there. It was pretty absurd to pick on Golda Meir and even MacArthur. We were prepared to make sure that the texts underneath the pictures wouldn't go out of their way to be insulting to China. We weren't about to remove the pictures. I thought it would be bad both generally as a principle and setting a precedent for future cultural exchanges, and also I thought it would set off an uproar in the United States where there is still understandably great suspicion of China not only on its human rights but its cultural repression. So we hung very tough on this, but the Chinese wouldn't give in and the portrait exhibit didn't take place. This was an example of their idiocy. This took place about 1987, about that time. So, we have continued examples like that. We did manage nevertheless, to have considerable expansion of student and cultural exchange, and science and technology. We worked very hard on all that. Along with other aspects of our growing relationship there was a great increase of exchanges both ways in all these fields, not to mention business activity and tourists in China.

Q: What about with student exchange, I know that it was very evident with any exchange program we had with the Soviet Union. The Soviets were sending people to learn hard science, and we were sending people to learn about icons. It was of this nature and the Soviets were milking us for everything they could scientifically and not allowing people who were might be get infected by studying American poets or something like that. Did you find that balance?

LORD: There was an element of that, although we thought it was to our advantage to let Chinese students come to the U.S. and be exposed to American society no matter what they were studying. We just thought it was a good idea and obviously still feel that way. They heavily loaded up, somewhat understandably, on their practical science, technological and economic needs, steering their student exchanges toward science, engineering, and so on. So, the great bulk in that period were in that area. It doesn't mean they couldn't be exposed to American ideas and views and be another link in strengthening U.S.-Chinese relations. It would have a beneficial impact when they got back to China. From the Chinese standpoint they were taking a certain risk either that they wouldn't return or that they would be semi-subversive when they did return or at least expect things they had gotten used to in the United States for their professional and economic abilities. This was a great transfer of technology from their standpoint, learning a great deal about science and technology, so it was a tradeoff that was in both sides' interests. We tried to get more students to come from the U.S. to China, which was a very
small number. We had Fulbright exchange programs which I promoted very heavily. We also worked very hard on the international visitor program of USIA which is very important where you select middle level people of middle age, still with a big future but of rising importance to come and spend a few weeks in the U.S., get exposed to American society, go all over the United States and go back again. It was a constant struggle to get people that were not just politically correct from the Chinese standpoint and were not just cadre or hacks. We had mixed success on that, but it was an important program, so we worked very hard in this whole area.

Another objective I had, of course, was economic, and one of my highest priorities was to promote American trade and investment interests. The culture of the Foreign Service was just beginning to change at this point. You know we have a tradition further back in our history where the average Ambassador in his Embassy was saying this isn't really traditional diplomacy. I think it is fair to say 20-30 years ago American businesses saw American Embassies generally as not being particularly helpful. Trade and investment, of course, were less crucial then in international relations. There was less globalization and less of our economy depended on exports and our presence abroad than it does today. But for all those reasons, the change in the importance of this element, the culture has been changing clearly in the State Department. Today people are rated very heavily on how well they perform economically as Ambassadors and elsewhere and it is high on any Ambassador's list pretty much now.

We were just making that shift generally in the culture then, and I was very much in favor of that shift. I felt that Ambassadors and country teams had a distinct obligation to American businesses. It would help American jobs and exports back home and that was important. It would also help to strengthen the overall relationship with China, so it had that benefit as well. And over time it might loosen up the Chinese system. I think if you divide up my labors and it were possible to quantify it, I think I spent as much time if not more on our economic relationship than any other aspect during my 3 ½ years there. This was in terms of seeing Chinese officials on investment or trade matters, opening exhibits, promoting deals, lobbying for American companies, reporting on economics back home, devising strategies to improve the investment and trade climate. I worked extremely hard on that and spent a lot of time on it. As a result, I had very good relations with the American business community. Some have been critical about me in recent years because of my strong human rights stand, but business interests were a major part of our effort. We had a lot of economic agencies come out there. We had cabinet-level commission meetings with Commerce and Treasury and Science and Technology, and a lot of cabinet and sub-cabinet officials and others went back and forth. We spent a great amount of time on that for the reasons I mentioned, to further our concrete interests but to also strengthen the overall relationship.

Q: I can understand why from strengthening the overall relationship, the more American investment we had in China the better, but what is in it for the United States economically, the United States per se to have a lot of McDonalds?

LORD: Well, it means increased earnings for American companies, increased jobs in
America, increased exports from America as well as the effect of loosening up broadly Chinese society, and, over time, including reforms through American business practices and interactions. Over time, it could loosen up the political and cultural restraints in China, but there were these very concrete American economic interests involved.

Q: Were you watching the situation that American jobs were essentially being lost because American firms were using Chinese labor rather than American labor?

LORD: It wasn't that big at that point. In fact, even today it isn't that large compared to say Mexico or some other places where this happens. This was really not an issue at the time. Prison labor hadn't really reared its ugly head at the time although even today it doesn't involve American businesses very much, at least hopefully not. Most of them are very sensitive to that. Also at that point we even had modest surpluses with the Chinese. The trade was growing strongly while I was there, but it is modest compared to today of course. But, it was growing and we didn't have this tremendous trade imbalance at the time. So this was not at my time there as sensitive issue as it is now. Now it is sensitive because of the tremendous surplus the Chinese have. It has been sensitive, not so much recently, because of prison labor. As for investment, it was a constant battle to get the Chinese to relax their investment climate so that we could get in there. So, that was a large part of our time trying to make it easy for Americans to invest there as well as promoting trade and deals. We had great competition from the Japanese and European businesses. As I said, we launched the joint commissions back and forth, and many high level visits. I spent a lot of time with businessmen briefing them at a weekly happy hour at our commercial section which I would join talking with these people. I went around the country and promoted American business in various places, so this was a large part of my time. Whenever I went, to Shanghai or Guangzhou, even the interior, these other Chinese cities, this would be high on my list with the local authorities.

Q: Well, did you, were you looking over your shoulder at Japan, because in Japan already we were having a tremendous trade deficit with Japan. I think it was already certainly at that time, the latter half of the ‘80s, and the Japanese had this system where it was almost impossible to penetrate; while the Japanese are selling their goods to the United States, it was very difficult to sell American goods to Japan. Were you looking at that and having problems of that nature because of their system or were you seeing this on the horizon as we moved ahead with the developing trade?

LORD: Well, we kept in mind the Japanese example. We didn’t want to end up in China like where the Japanese market was closed and we had this large trade deficit, so that general concern was in our mind. But, as I said, trade was modest compared to today, and we really didn't have a trade imbalance. These concerns were not acute at the time. A good part of our struggle was to get the Chinese to make it easier to do business with less and less red tape and more transparency and so on. Also a major concern was access to the Chinese domestic market. Their emphasis particularly in those days was too narrow; they wanted American technology and investment in China and exports, but they were severely restricting American access to that large Chinese market. It was a constant battle to get more access to China’s market for U.S. companies.
Q: In the ‘30s there was a book called Oil for the Lamps of China and there were millions of customers. Now over a billion customers, and this has always been a theme throughout the history of the United States, if we can only get into that market. It has usually turned out to be not as profitable or as easy as was thought. Can you talk about the attitude of business, the professionalism, the capabilities of American business and any problems or maybe examples of what you had to deal with?

LORD: Well, for American businesspeople, I think, this was still relatively early. The Deng Xiaoping opening and reforms started in ’79, so outside investment started after that including American investment. It was only a few years later. Already there were frustrations for American business because some had been there for a few years and weren't getting anywhere, so some were quite frustrated, but on the whole I think there was a feeling, a recognition that they had to have some patience. They were anxious to be in there for the long run; if they got in early and earned some credit with the Chinese they might have the inside track vis a vis their competitors when things got a little looser. So, without being able to generalize, there was a feeling that this was a little frustrating, but we have got to play for the long run. A few got sufficiently frustrated that they actually pulled out while I was there, but most of them stayed or started coming in.

A lot depended also on local leadership. For example, I worked very hard with the mayor and vice mayor of Beijing to get more projects into Beijing. At one point we set a quota for the next year of 15; we got up to 23. I was reminded of this at a banquet, again modest by today's standards, but they were anxious to move ahead. In Tianjin in particular there was very dynamic leadership and a new economic zone promoting foreign investment. Li Ruihan was the dynamic mayor then, and he remains one of the top leaders today. We could make progress there. In Shanghai, there was a tremendous contrast between the two mayors I dealt with. The first was Jiang Zemin, now the leader of China, and he was not very helpful. The climate was not very good for investment in Shanghai when I first went down there in late '85-'86.

Q: He is now the President of China.

LORD: And the American business community was very frustrated about the business climate in Shanghai when I first arrived. Then Zhu Rongji, who is now the Prime Minister of China, took Jiang Zemin’s place as mayor and there was an immediate change. For example, rather than have to go to a dozen different places to get permission to start a joint venture or transaction, Zhu started one stop shopping where they were all consolidated in one place. In other ways he encouraged investment, and was very impressive. When I went back to Shanghai in ’87-'88 there was a tremendous change. The American businessmen were very pleased at the progress that was being made.

I think American businessmen on the whole, I'm now generalizing, were not naive. Yes there was a huge potential Chinese market, and that is why they wanted to get a foothold there for the future. But they also recognized this would take time; there wouldn't be immediate dividends. Also it depended on what areas you were dealing in. Not only
geographic, but in areas where the Chinese needed investment, they would make it easier for you to invest than in other areas. The biggest problems were transparency, red tape, delays, ability to have access to the Chinese market as opposed to being pressured just to export or to provide technology. Also the hiring of the Chinese staff, the ability to get the best Chinese workers and keep them. Often American business would get them, train them well, and then the government would take them back and send them elsewhere. So, there was control by the government over personnel working in American joint ventures and businesses, and there was a constant struggle to allow American business to have access to the best people and to keep them once they had them. So these are some of the problems that American businesses faced, but on the whole, things were moving ahead and there were some success stories.

Q: Was there any instead of sort of a Harvard Business School, a Beijing Business School or someplace that was training to managers, or were they relying on the genetic instinct of the Chinese to be good businessmen?

LORD: The Chinese do have a genetic instinct for great entrepreneurship, but they also had a terrible Communist economic system and state enterprises and all the other elements that were holding back their economy even in those days. We had one specific program in Dalian, an institute where we trained Chinese managers. We brought them over to the United States. That was a very positive force; we worked hard on that. It was run by the Commerce Department. Secretary Shultz on one of his two trips when I was there, went to visit that institute. Obviously, individual American joint ventures and businessmen were helping train Chinese as they worked together with them. The Chinese had an International University of Economics and Business. Which Bette and I both addressed. This was going on as well. But, this was still pretty early compared to where we are now in the 1990s in terms of Chinese learning management skills, developing entrepreneurship, and even loosening up their system and moving it toward a capitalist operation.

Q (Bernkopf Tucker): Did you have any trouble at that time with dual use technologies? Was that an issue yet?

LORD: These are technologies that we would export that could be used for either military or civilian purposes, and the issue is that if you export it, you have got to make sure that it is used for the reasons it is supposed to be used for. I do recall that we were constantly trying to expand the list of exports we thought we could safely export to make more money for Americans and more jobs without endangering national security, including a looser definition of computers because computers have advanced so far that we felt that some could now be safely sent to China. I don't recall any of this being a huge issue. We did point out to the Chinese that our exports of dual use technology were related to their performance, and this echoes today, of how they were dealing with Iran and Saudi Arabia on missiles. There was an implicit tradeoff that we managed on one of Shultz's trips or Secretary of Defense Carlucci's trips.

Q: Carlucci was Secretary of Defense.
LORD: To loosen up on certain areas of exports, not on national security items under export control, but rather dual use items in exchange for better Chinese performance in sending missiles to the Middle East. It did not have the kind of controversy that we have now in the 1990s.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: You mentioned several times and I didn’t bring it up earlier, but the co-question of missile proliferation in the Middle East. How did you go about dealing with the Chinese on that very difficult issue?

LORD: As I recall, there were two major issues here, again we won't be precise on chronology. One was they sent Silkworms to Iran. That was a significant problem, and we worked very hard on it. We finally got them to agree not to send any more. They claimed they never had sent any, but we got them to agree that while they never sent any, they wouldn't do so again! Shultz worked hard on this, and we worked very hard on this over time, but I don't have any precise dates. That was one area. Then there was another area when their Foreign Minister, Wu, was visiting Washington in the late '80s, and even as he was there, we got reports of their sending missiles to Saudi Arabia, and we got them to clamp down on that. There was also still ambiguous activity with Pakistan with respect to the nuclear program. That was why a nuclear agreement we negotiated with China was never sent forth to Congress until last October (1998) when Jiang Zemin visited the United States. The other issue that has some resonance now was Chinese rockets launching American satellites. While I was there the Challenger blew up, an American tragedy.

Q: It was an orbital shuttle.

LORD: That was a tragedy obviously in personal terms, but also a setback for our whole launching capabilities. Our satellite industry wasn't able then, even as it is not today, to have enough launches of American capability so they could get their satellites up. Plus we felt in general orbiting satellites for communications purposes would feed into the whole communications information revolution and it would have a positive impact on China. Above all, we wanted to help our satellite makers, but we also had to work out certain limits so we wouldn't unfairly hurt our own satellite launchers. They could still do some. We had certain quotas we were shooting for with the Chinese. This was a major agreement we worked out when Secretary Carlucci visited China, I'm quite sure in 1988. We are hearing about it today (1998) for Chinese rockets to launch American satellites. We had several conditions we worked on even after the Carlucci visit. One was the number of launches so we wouldn't hurt American industry. Another was tight controls and inspections so there wouldn't be any security breach. I think there were one or two other conditions.

On missile proliferation, generally we had serious problems on Iran and Saudi Arabia as I mentioned. Along with Tibet which heated up while I was there - we will get back into that - those were probably the most serious issues we had while I was there, as well as the general Chinese restraints on political and cultural freedom.
Q (Bernkopf Tucker): What kind of arguments did you make to the Chinese to try to persuade them not to do this?

LORD: It is not unlike what we have been doing in recent years on proliferation issues. You use a combination of sticks and carrots. We didn't have in place as many sanctions then as we do now, so we didn't have any sanctions we could impose as I recall. The Chinese were interested in getting more technology, including dual use technology. For commercial reasons we were interested in this as well, so we would use that, saying in effect if you behave yourself on missile proliferation, we can do more on exporting dual use technology. So there was that trade off. We also tried to appeal to their geopolitical interests, saying instability in the Near East and the Persian Gulf was not in their interest either. Now that argument has much greater weight today when they have to import oil themselves. They want stability. We also made the point that arming Iran with Silkworm missiles that could hit American ships was a serious problem for U.S.-Chinese relations in terms of American domestic and congressional opinion. Resentment over this could seriously set back the U.S.-China relationship.

So the incentives were more economic and technological cooperation, avoiding the dangers of hurting American domestic support for the relationship, and geopolitical arguments. Now, that had to be balanced off with their need to make money, the PLA in particular, and their desire to have an influence in the region. It was not easy going. There was a lot of tough work over many months by us at the Embassy and in Washington, but we did make progress on both Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Q: The PLA is the People's Liberation Army.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Was it more difficult to argue the case about Saudi Arabia since that is an American ally? Did you have to approach it differently than Iran?

LORD: I guess it was somewhat more difficult. I remember we hit them when foreign Minister Wu was in Washington in '87 or '88, around that period. Shultz had a barbecue at his house in Washington. We took this up with Wu. It was the first time this had come up, just before Wu had arrived. He got hit also by the National Security Advisor, Colin Powell as well, not only that evening I believe, but in his office the next day. I think Reagan also referred to it but not as precisely as Powell. I don't recall. We had to appeal to different interests. On the one hand the Saudis were an ally. But we thought it was destabilizing to have missile proliferation in the Middle East generally. And of course, we had the Israeli connection which we were concerned about. Even then the Chinese had some contacts with Israel including military supplies and this grew all the time. So, even though they had a position in the Middle East, interests with the Palestinians and the Arabs, they had some fish to fry with the Israelis as well. We appealed on instability in the region and the impact on American opinion.

I'll move on to some other elements in our relations. One specific thing that I was very happy with, and that I worked very hard on, was the Peace Corps. Before I went out to
China in 1985, I remember agreeing with the director of the Peace Corps, Loret Ruppe, that this would be a goal. I just felt it was a great program generally and it would be very helpful to get it into China. I worked hard on that for my entire tenure. The Chinese still had residual suspicions that the Peace Corps might be a front for spying. It had, they thought, some historical baggage, and they didn't even want the name Peace Corps name to be used. It had to be, from the Chinese translation, “American Volunteers” or something like that. I worked very hard on this for several years. One of the last things we accomplished was to sign an agreement letting American teachers go into Sichuan Province just before I left as part of a 3-3 ½ year effort.

By the way, I took Chinese lessons my first few months in China and picked up some phrases for evidence of my efforts. But it was impossible, part-time, to make real progress.

Another major objective of mine was to build up support in the United States for the relationship, in a hard-hearted way and not coming across as being infected with clientitis or being naive about the Chinese. I was stressing concerns about human rights and missile proliferation and Tibet, whatever the issue was. I worked hard to get not only government officials who were already generally committed to this, but also members of Congress. I was anxious to get as many of them to China as possible, particularly conservatives and skeptics of the relationship. They could reinforce our positions to the Chinese with their own points. And they could learn more about the benefits of our relations. Indeed the very first high level delegation to China after I arrived as Ambassador included two or three Senators who had voted against my confirmation (the vote was 87-7). They subsequently became strong supporters of mine, e.g., Senator Hatch of Utah.

I would go back to the U.S. every few months. I think Ambassadors as a matter of policy should do this for a variety of reasons. One of course, is to push issues along in the bureaucracy that are hung up and you can only get it done by lobbying directly at high levels in Washington and moving things along. Second getting the mood back there, getting a sense both in the government and generally the political mood of how things are going so you can relay that to the Chinese and also keep them in mind as you operate back in China. I would see as many congressmen and Senators as I could when I got back. They are always tough to get appointments with. I would get with the academic experts and compare notes with them, talk with a lot of business people and get their perspectives on doing business in China and how we could help them. What their frustrations and goals were. I would also relay my impressions of China to various audiences. Give speeches to various groups outlining our goals with China and building up support for the relationship as well as backgrounders with the press and on the air interviews. I remember on one trip, I did a real blitz because it was the anniversary of normalization of the Shanghai Communiqué or one of those dates. I remember interviews with the New York Times and the Washington Post. I was on the McNeil- Lehrer Show, and NBC Today when I went back.

Another objective was to keep in touch with the American scene, move the bureaucracy
along on issues, also plan upcoming trips. I'd be back before Shultz coming over, or the Secretary of Defense, and try to strategize the trip, and to keep in touch with America and what was going on. Also I went back several times to accompany high level Chinese visitors. I already had lots of cabinet and other people coming to China and eventually President Bush toward the end of my stay. In turn, we had high level Chinese visitors going to the U.S. I accompanied them to not only Washington and New York but to other places around the country. Several high level Chinese included a couple of Vice Premiers, Foreign Minister Wu (February 1988), and soon to be president Yang Shangkung (May 1987). We went to various places like Minneapolis, New Orleans, North Carolina, Texas, and California, not to mention New York and Washington. This was very useful. It was fun to see America through other eyes, traveling with the Chinese. What they saw had to impress them with our strengths. It gave me a chance to have access continually with these high level leaders and establish relations with them and try to influence them, to try to make some points and get American perspectives and interests advanced in our discussions with them. It was useful to go back there and advance the relationship in these ways. On one of these trips, sadly, in May 1986, my father passed away in Florida. I had skipped a meeting with Secretary Shultz, with his blessing, to see him a last time a few days earlier.

Q (Bernkopf Tucker): Can I interrupt for just a second because it follows from what you were saying. Were you able during this period to form personal relationships with the Chinese leadership. How approachable were they? Did you only see them in these formal occasions?

LORD: I will go over some of the Chinese leaders and my impressions. First a couple of other points.

I have said that my three and a half years were the best ever since the 1971-2 opening in terms of bilateral relations, and that’s true. But, of course, we had problems all the time in this mixed relationship. Probably the rockiest time was the last three months or so of 1987. We hit the Chinese hard on their giving Silkworm missiles to the Saudis and on Tibet. They hit us on Tibet and a Congressional Record resolution and canceled some exchanges. In my usual year end personal review cable I set forth a strategy, including visits and exchanges, for improving the situation. I also planned to step up my own travels around China. In early 1988 the situation improved.

One thing I put great stress on was personal cables, not overdoing it, but setting out in writing every few months my own impressions of what was going on in China as well as key issues and how to advance them. So I would do this and make sure it got to the Secretary and National Security Advisor and others. I took great interest in doing this personally as well as working carefully on the usual Embassy scene setters. I did this personally to prepare visitors on key trips as well, either editing drafts of my staff or doing them personally. So I spent a lot of work on some of these personal notes. You did it selectively so you wouldn't wear out your welcome. I got some very good feedback on that.

We took very seriously visitors from Washington whether executive branch or
congressional or actors like Gregory Peck and Charlton Heston or Billy Graham or top level business people. It didn’t matter who it was, we went out of our way to give them as good briefings as we could. Particularly when American government leaders came we would give them specific scene-setters. This was standard in our Embassy. I put great stress on it both to help them do a better job when they got to China but also frankly to burnish the reputation of the Embassy. I think, without being self serving, we got a very good reputation with our briefings once they got there as well as our scene setters in advance. We took very seriously briefing these visitors in advance as they set out to do their business and frankly both in writing and verbally we did very thoughtful briefings.

Finally as Ambassador I was concerned about staff morale. I did believe in working people hard and pursuing excellence as the main goal, but we had a variety of ways to engage the staff and help morale. We had monthly staff meetings at the house where spouses would be invited. Very small lunches with junior or mid level officers that you don't see in the normal course of events. Tremendous engagement with Marines even to the point of playing basketball every Saturday and softball every Sunday. We had our Marines picked as the best unit in Asia a couple of times running out of all detachments out there. I would make an effort to write personal notes to the staff on cables to show I was keeping on top of what they were doing. I made sure that my secretary or staff would keep me posted on any personal developments so that I could weigh in whether it was a birth or death in the family or whatever. We took that quite seriously as well. Now, these are some of the objectives I had as Ambassador.

Related to this was my attention to our four consulates - Shanghai, Guangdong, Shenyang, and Chengdu. I visited all of them several times. I, of course, would meet with the American and Chinese staffs and have personnel accompany me in meetings and travels. I sought their views and paid attention to morale, just as I did of the embassy. I worked hard, together with my deputy and others, to improve the poor working conditions, housing, the security, the schooling, etc - both at the consulates and in Beijing. We pressed the Chinese hard on this and travel restrictions and I/we spent much time on these and property issues and made some progress. I also met frequently and Bette and I socialized with our Chinese employees in Beijing and elsewhere. Their morale was important to us.

Another thing I should mention is human rights. Human rights has been a thorn in our side ever since we opened up with China. It has become more acute, most people agree, since Tiananmen Square and the images we had of that massacre. Even in those days though, it was one of the big problems in our relationship. I felt then, as I do now, that this is an important issue in and of itself and in terms of building American and Congressional support for the relationship. But I also felt there were many other interests in China and no one issue can hold the whole relationship hostage. That has always been my view. I raised human rights lots of times. We took it seriously, we raised it, and we pressed it, whether it was freedom of expression or Tibet. But, it was not as high profile an issue as it has been in the 1990s. It did get quite high profile in Tibet where there was tough repression of demonstrations. It was a problem, but it was not the dominant issue. I will get back to this later because I want to give a real vignette about the experience Bette
and I had on democracy at Beijing University. While we were there human rights was a continuing problem, but it didn't dominate the relationship. It wasn't as high profile as it is today since Tiananmen Square.

One problem, it's not strictly human rights, but having to do with journalists an issue that came up on several occasions. For example, I was at Chengdu with my wife and son. We were about to launch on a brief summer vacation traveling through Kunming and Guilin. My first day there I got word that John Burns who was a New York Times correspondent although he was a Canadian citizen actually, had been detained by the Chinese because he had traveled in areas that he didn't have permission to travel in. My instinct told me this was a possible bombshell since he was a New York Times reporter although he was not an American citizen. I immediately dropped my vacation and raced back to Beijing and worked very hard with the Chinese. We were visited by Abe Rosenthal and another man from the New York Times editorial board on this issue. It was very tense because there was some concern they might actually charge Burns with trespassing or violating security. In the Chinese so called justice system, once you are charged, you are guilty. So, if he would have been charged, he probably would have been jailed. He was being detained. We worked extremely hard, much harder than the Canadians did.

Q: I was going to ask about the Canadians.

LORD: Well, we tried cooperating on this but they were nowhere near as concerned about their own citizen as we were. We got a lot of credit with Rosenthal and others for the efforts we made. I pulled out all the stops and we finally got Burns expelled and not detained. In the process, of course, we lost a tremendous observer of the Chinese scene. Ironically he was writing an article for the Times that was positive about Deng's reforms in the countryside. But, in so doing, he was deliberately going to off limit areas without getting permission. He was on a motorcycle accompanied by a young man named Ed McNally, a very bright lawyer from Yale who helped me with some July 4 speeches.

Q: What arguments were you using with the Chinese authorities?

LORD: The main argument was of course the impact on our relations. You take the premier American newspaper, you jail that reporter, it is going to have a devastating impact. Secondly, he clearly wasn't spying. I don't recall how we fuzzed up how much he knew about restrictions, but he could not have been not spying. His motive was journalism. I made the point that he was telling, he was in fact about to write a positive story about what was going on, and he just wanted to see as much of China as he could, the innocence of what he was doing. He limited his self confession; he violated certain restrictions, but this was for journalistic reasons, not spying reasons. So, we worked very hard and successfully on that.

There was another American with the AP who was kicked out a few months later from Guandong. The journalists generally were always frustrated by the surveillance they had in China. The longer they stay there, the more cynical they get about the Chinese and human rights in general. In fact, they were nervous about making contact with students or dissidents or intellectuals because they might get them in trouble. Their phones and
probably apartments were bugged, and they always had to get permission to travel places. There were a lot of frustrations there. It was a tough place to do business even though it was fascinating in terms of substance. There were several meetings where I met with them both Americans and correspondents in general, and they were pressing for even stronger U.S. actions including retaliating by kicking out Chinese reporters from the U.S. and so on. I think they felt I lobbied as hard as I could with the Chinese on restrictions of the press and specifically on these cases. This was a source of tension. I just mention this in the general area of human rights although it was not exactly the same thing as Tibet or dissidents. I'll do Tibet a little more later.

In addition, I spent a lot of time with resident, as well as American, journalists, mostly on background to explain our policies and impressions of China. Every few weeks my key officers and I would meet with the resident journalists to brief them and answer their questions.

Among the vivid memories Bette and I have of our China tenure. The first American ship visits to China since 1949 - October 1986 in Qingdao. Going to a Chinese Catholic church on Christmas Eve, 1986 I believe - it was totally packed. I introduced the Superbowl on Chinese television on March 9, 1986 - sadly a lopsided, dull victory for the Bears over the Patriots. Honor guards for high level American military visitors. Countless banquets in the Great Hall of the People and the Guest House. Travels all around the country. Parties at the residence with Chinese friends. Bette and I won a diplomatic tennis tournament and my son, Win, and I got to the finals of men’s doubles. I also won a men’s doubles diplomatic tournament. The prize was a week’s vacation in Yugoslavia which I never took.
XIX. AMBASSADOR TO CHINA - CHINESE LEADERS, POLITICAL ISSUES
(1985-1989)

Q: You were going to talk about your impression of the Chinese leadership both individuals and its collective ability, how you appraised it at that time, because its collective ability was tested just after you left.

LORD: I had really very good access to Chinese leaders in the sense that we had so many visits and high level visitors during my period, and they would always see most of the top Chinese leaders. It is the Chinese style when they host people of cabinet level or above that the American visitor should not only see the Foreign Minister and his/her cabinet counterpart, but also Vice Premiers, the Premier himself, the Party Secretary or the President or some combination. I had a lot of impressions from those meetings and I had meetings of my own. We had other high level visitors like Kissinger coming back, old friends, e.g. Jimmy Carter, who would also have meetings with these people.

As for Deng Xiaoping I don't remember how many times we saw him but of course he was less frequent. Even then he wasn't as accessible as some of the others. I must have met him a dozen times at least, probably more, while I was there. I had seen him on many other occasions before I was ambassador. I saw Zhao Ziyang frequently. He was premier and than Party Secretary while I was there. He took over the latter job from Hu Yaobang, who was kicked out in early '87. I probably saw Li Peng as much as any. He was the Premier from '87 onwards. He would see American corporate executives who were visiting as well as American leaders, so I saw a great deal of him. Jiang Zemin I saw as mayor of Shanghai. He didn't have an important role in Beijing by the time I left so I don't recall seeing that much of him after the Shanghai tenure of the first couple of years that I was there. I saw quite a bit of Yang Shangkun, who became the President of China. Also Zhu Rongji, who was the mayor of Shanghai the last couple of years I was there, so I only saw him in the Shanghai context. I also met Hu Yaobang on a couple of occasions, once with Brzezinski. And, of course, I saw the Foreign Minister and other Cabinet officials countless times, also governors and mayors in the provinces, many of them future leaders in Beijing.

The interesting thing is that we are now talking about 10-15 years that have passed and many of these players remain central. Jiang Zemin is President and Party Secretary of the country. Zhu Rongji is Prime Minister and Li Peng still has an important role as NPC Chairman and just left as Prime Minister. Zhao Ziyang is under house arrest. Yang Shangkun has essentially departed from the scene. Now some impressions. You have got to remember that working since the Kissinger-Nixon years I was used to Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai and they were tough acts to follow. I said in an earlier transcript Deng Xiaoping was not that impressive in our first encounters in 1974-'76, but was certainly more impressive by the time we had breakfast with him, Kissinger and myself, in 1979 when he visited the United States. We saw him together when we visited China a few months later. By then he clearly was an impressive human being.

There were some constant themes in the meetings with him. He was pretty consistent.
First, very self confident and lively. Not as stiff as many Chinese leaders. His general habits are well known. He would smoke a great deal and occasionally use a spittoon. He was very short, you know his feet hardly reached the floor, but he was a commanding presence. He always wanted to talk about big issues, geopolitical as well as the bilateral relationship. He would never get down into details. He felt that was not consistent with his position. He had given up all his titles. Even then he was grooming his successors. He was clearly in charge, number one, but on a day to day basis and on greeting people he wasn't that involved. He was already phasing down some of his active involvement. He was Chairman of the Board, strategist. He would give the general lines of policy and leave the details to his subordinates, the Party Secretary, the Premier, etc. Generally during most of the visits where you had a visiting cabinet official like the Secretary of State or Defense or from economic agencies, he would come toward the end and would usually be the good cop. If there were mixed messages to be sent in the course of a visit, some of the tougher ones would be sent by the Premier or the Foreign Minister, whereas Deng generally would emphasize the positive. He seldom gave us unpleasant news; it was usually a very cordial meeting. His strategic discourses depended on the skill of his interlocutor. With somebody like Kissinger of course, they would clearly be on a geopolitical plane. People usually felt good about him and his relationship because he was usually playing a positive role in his meetings. I'm sure he orchestrated the meetings so if there were some tough messages to get across, he would have made sure it would have been done by then by subordinates, and it would be done. It wasn't his role.

He was very much dedicated to U.S.-Chinese relations. He had a lot to do with improving them and clearly wanted to keep that moving ahead despite tensions. He wanted to emphasize that in our meetings, and he always did. He wanted to look ahead as well as backwards, and he always used a historical and strategic context. In almost every meeting there were cracks by him against the Russians and usually against the Japanese as well. I remember my final meeting with him was with President Bush in February, 1989. He talked about Russian and Japanese history and what they had done to China. Clearly he was making a point that whatever China’s near term improvement in ties with those countries, as he looked ahead, they were still strategic concerns for China, and therefore major reasons for maintaining good relations with the U.S. So, on geopolitics, he was very skillful and interested in that. He always thought in a strategic and long term context, and he was very strong on the U.S.-Chinese bilateral relationship but wouldn't get into detail. He would talk a good deal about Chinese economic reforms and opening up to the outside world. His formulations on human rights would be minimal, but emphasizing as all Chinese leaders did, the need for stability which was a code word for them for political control or even repression, as they opened up generally to the outside world and they moved ahead with economic reforms. It was the traditional Chinese communist excuse that they need more control to maintain stability in this vast country and the challenges they faced.

As for my own record on him, I actually wrote a pretty good piece when he died; I got it done too late to get it published. I think there will be a mixed historical verdict on him. I have a mixed verdict on him. The good news is, of course, and none of this is overly revolutionary, he was the architect of the opening after the Cultural Revolution, opening China to the world and what all that means, including economic reforms and moving
them into a freer economic society. Secondly he was crucial in improving U.S.-Chinese relations, from normalization all the way up. Even when there were tensions, he kept emphasizing the positive. He has helped the material lot of many Chinese citizens. For all this he deserves considerable credit. He was a tough customer who rebounded several times from tough experiences and came back from the Cultural Revolution, and other setbacks. These are positive items and he deserves credit there.

There are clear black marks as well. He was always conservative on the political level, even though at times even when we were there, things were loosening up somewhat. His general pattern was one of firm control on politics. After all he sacked Hu Yaobang, the party Secretary General in early 1987, partly because he felt that Hu was too liberal on political reforms, too liberal on issues like Tibet. Maybe also he didn't like Hu’s freewheeling, self-confident style. There was also the element of feeding him to the conservatives who were upset about the student demonstrations in Shanghai in December-January of 1986-87. So, Deng fed Hu Yaobang to the wolves as a result of that unrest to maintain a collective balance to his leadership. He also did it out of concern for Hu Yaobang’s liberal instincts on politics and his freewheeling style. After all, Deng Xiaoping had been the henchman for Mao in the anti-rightist campaign way back in the late ‘50s. With all his positive aspects on economic reform and opening to the world and U.S.-Chinese relations, you get a consistent trend of political conservatism and repression. He not only dumped Hu but also his successor as Party Chairman, Zhao Ziyang, in 1989 because the latter was too friendly toward the demonstrators at Tiananmen Square. Li Peng was the heavy during the 1989 massacre because he declared martial law; he was out in front. The fact is it was clearly a Deng Xiaoping decision to attack, fully unwarranted in my view. We will come back to that. And he sacked Zhao Ziyang in the process, so that is two political reform-type party secretaries that he dropped.

Peng will be remembered for the Tiananmen Square massacre and general political repression as well as for the positive things and will come out with a mixed verdict.

Hu Yaobang and I met only a couple of times, and the portrait of him that is in my wife's book Legacies, however brief, is very vivid of him. He was unpredictable. He was somebody who really was spontaneous and he wasn't scripted. A very active and physically small person. I think he was the only one who was smaller than Deng Xiaoping. Clearly, although we probably elevated this in retrospect, he was for a looser political system. I have talked to many Tibetans who felt he was very enlightened on Tibet and indeed he was trying to loosen up the repression in Tibet. There is documentation for that. Clearly he felt the need for political reform as well as economic reform. He was pushing the envelope. The reason he was sacked by Deng on January 16, 1987 was the feeling among the conservatives that he was encouraging these trends.

Zhao Ziyang now looks very good to reformers and those of us who want to see a better political system in China, and he was in the Tiananmen Square episode arguing for restraint, not using the Army, meeting the students halfway. He was sacked for this. He has kept up on occasion from his house arrest his drumbeat for the need for political
reform. He has come out dramatically twice in the last six months on the eve of summits with letters to the leadership calling for a reversal on the official verdict on Tiananmen Square. When I was there he was trying to separate the party from the government, trying to loosen up the political system, not dramatically, but pushing the envelope. So, you would have to put him on that side of the spectrum along with Hu Yaobang. Zhao was very intelligent, very smooth, very impressive in his meetings, generally on the friendly side in dealing with Americans, private citizens or official visitors. He gave a sense of great confidence. He was a good example of the new kind of leadership in China where they earn their leadership credentials as technocrats, economic experts, pragmatists. They get things done, particularly in the economic area. He was proven in the provinces because he had been governor of Guangdong and Sichuan. He was impressive in many ways.

Li Peng is everyone's scapegoat. Li Peng deserves a negative verdict from Americans. There has been enough proof in his demeanor, the way he has acted in meetings, from intelligence reports, and from reports from other Chinese, that he is generally more suspicious of the U.S., more conservative on economic reforms, certainly very tight on political issues. He not only declared martial law but believed in putting down the students and others in Tiananmen Square. Generally he has caused us trouble on issues. Therefore, he has not been a positive force in U.S.-China relations. On the other hand, he is enough of a pragmatist to recognize that China needs the U.S., particularly for technology, trade, investment etc. He is an engineer by background and clearly sees the need for the relationship for those reasons. Nevertheless, with his Soviet background and his general suspicion of the U.S., particularly our human rights policy subverting their political system generally, he has been a restraint on U.S.-Chinese relations. Probably tougher on Taiwan and some other issues and conservative on economic reform, certainly very conservative on political issues.

**Q:** What was his position while you were there, and what is his position now?

**LORD:** I guess he was Vice Premier when I was first there and became Premier. I don't have the timing on this. He was Vice Premier when Hu Yaobang was sacked in early '87. Zhao Ziyang had been Prime Minister until then. Zhao moved up to be Party Secretary and then Li Peng was appointed Prime Minister. He was Prime Minister about the last year and a half while I was there.

**Q (Bernkopf Tucker):** I think maybe, I'm not sure, but when you first got there, he may have still been with the state education commission.

**LORD:** He might have had a cabinet level position on the economic side. He was an engineer, there is nothing wrong with engineers, but he was not one for conceptual discussion, geopolitical discussion. He would sort of take practical stands on issues. He would sometimes lecture us on human rights or Tibet or Taiwan or perhaps our building up of Japan as dangerous. These kinds of negative things would come in. Generally he was the bad cop and Deng and (recently) Jiang Zemin were good cops. It doesn't mean Li was totally hostile and there were some meetings where he was friendlier than others. But
generally visiting business people, or high level people from previous U.S. governments or cabinet level officials from the current government, most of them came away not enamored of Li Peng, either his personality or the substance of his thoughts. He could be quite rough. This continued during the Clinton years when we had dealings with him.

One example of his rather limited approach. I was initially impressed that he arranged to have Lee Iacocca (the chairman of Chrysler Corporation), who then was a big hero bringing Chrysler back, to a small dinner at a restaurant. In terms of protocol he didn't have to do this. It was the kind of guy he would see in the Great Hall. But he invited him to have a small dinner, just Lee Iacocca, myself, and a couple of the Chinese. I thought, maybe I have misjudged this man. He knows enough to look at a person like Iacocca who has got all this experience particularly in a market economy, and bringing a failing company back, and to see how it could apply to China. Almost the entire evening, however, was devoted to Li Peng’s talking about Chinese advancement and in particular the transportation area, citing the number of kilometers of roads that were being built and the number of automobiles they would have one day and other items like that. He just wasted the evening. He didn't draw Iacocca out on anything of significance. So, this sort of demonstrated Li’s limits. Now, having said that, the man obviously had more staying power than I gave him credit for. After his martial law and direct negative involvement in Tiananmen Square in 1989, I didn't think he would last very long. But he served as Prime Minister until the Constitution made him retire just a year or two ago. He clearly is head of the conservative camp and with Jiang Zemin’s and Deng’s general approach to a more collective leadership and the need for balance plus his own bureaucratic alliances he maintained his position, much to my surprise.

Yang Shangkung became President of China. We first of took notice of him when he came to the United States. We had visitors going back and forth. We would have the Secretary of State or Defense or others come, but we also moved to get Chinese to go to the U.S. I mentioned earlier the four trips that I went on, one of which was with Yang. At some point, we wondered who would be the next visitor. We weren't at summit levels at that point, at least visiting the U.S. We were running out of Vice Premiers, and the Chinese suggested Yang who was a military man. In fact, he had been Mao's Chief of Staff, been on the Long March, across the grasslands three times. His wife of almost 60 years had just died a couple of years beforehand. She had been on the Long March with him. I think he was Vice Chairman of the Military Commission at the time; he wasn't President yet. When he was suggested as the next visitor by the Chinese, we didn't oppose it, but we were puzzled. They went out of their way, the Chinese and the Foreign Ministry and their Ambassador back here, to explain how important this guy was and to be sure he had a good trip. We didn't quite know why, but it turned out he was very close to Deng, going back to the Long March. He was to become President. He was a major political figure and remained that for several years.

I got along with Yang extremely well when I accompanied him back in the United States in May 1987. He asked me for advice on the various audiences he would deal with, whether it was meeting with the President or a business group or the press. I would ride around in cars with him as well as be with him between meetings. After meetings, he
would ask me afterwards how he did on questions and answers. Very appreciative of my advice, had a good sense of humor, spoke movingly about the Long March. We could never quite figure out where he came out on some of the issues. He clearly backed Deng Xiaoping and the reforms and the opening, but to this day it is not clear what his position is on political reform. It is probably fairly conservative. People aren't quite sure where he came out on Tiananmen Square; certainly he didn't oppose the use of force, but there is some feeling that he wasn't in the forefront on that like say Li Peng.

Jiang Zemin is obviously the most important today as we speak. He was not that important when I was there and as I say as mayor of Shanghai was much less impressive than his successor, Zhu Rongji, who is now Prime Minister. He did not strike us then as a man of tremendous gravitas. He was friendly, he was jolly, and he would like to show off his English and his affinity for some Western culture and classics, but didn't seem entirely serious. I would not have picked him as the future leader of China. But he has lasted, and he has been on a roll for the last couple of years - his visit to the U.S., Clinton's visit to China, the 15th Party Congress solidifying his position, has been in power now for many years, first de facto then de jure, and the return of Hong Kong. He has done quite well and is clever enough to have someone like Zhu Rongji out there doing the hard economic reforms. If they work, Jiang basks in success. If they fail, he has a scapegoat. He has balanced off the conservatives and the moderates. He has been quite impressive, but none of this I would have predicted.

Q (Bernkopf Tucker): Doesn't he get launched in part because of how well he handled Shanghai during the Tiananmen period in '89? Also maybe you could comment on the importance of Shanghai for producing political leaders.

LORD: That is a good point. When Zhu took his place as mayor of Shanghai, Jiang moved up to be Party Secretary and was in charge during the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. There was a bloody outcome in Beijing. There were very large demonstrations in Shanghai, but no blood was shed there and Jiang and his cohorts did handle this skillfully. I don't recall offhand whether Zhu was involved in this skillful handling or not, but Jiang certainly gets the credit for having defused very tense and large demonstrations in Shanghai without the kind of bloody put-down that you had in Beijing. That did capture people's attention. It also protects him somewhat about a reversal of the verdict on Tiananmen Square. Although it may not happen anytime soon, it will happen in my view. I think that did help move him.

Clearly Shanghai has been a source of Chinese dynamism and leadership for good or for ill for many decades. That is where the Cultural Revolution started. You have, of course, Jiang from Shanghai, the number one guy. Now the number two guy Zhu from Shanghai. The Foreign Ministry for decades, not so much now, but certainly when I was there during the ‘80s was dominated by key people from Shanghai, at least the American handlers. In any event, this has been a source of Chinese leadership. It's got a history, of course, of being China's most dynamic and forward looking city. It also produced some of the Gang of Four and has a history of radical currents.
Q: I wonder if you could talk about how, again we are talking about the '85-'89 period when you were Ambassador. You and the Embassy were looking at how all these people fit together. In other words a little bit like criminology. How were decisions reached? How effective was the government at that time?

LORD: Well, on the whole we thought the government was pretty effective in the sense they were moving ahead on economic reform. Most of the time you had the feeling that the envelope was also being pushed somewhat on political and cultural issues, but there was certainly tremendous control still. There was more a sense of the ability to publish more and somewhat freer cultural activity particularly outside of Beijing. Some lively journals like the World Economic Herald in Shanghai which was subsequently shut down. Some of the things Bette was able to do in our cultural exchanges. People pushing the envelope like Liu Binyan, the reformist reporter, in covering corruption. You even had in some of the universities including Beijing University some beginning to speak up for political reform. On the whole we felt that things were moving in a generally positive direction but there were swings back and forth - e.g. the sacking of Hu Yaobang by Deng in 1987. We were still very concerned, particularly about Tibet and the continuing holding of dissidents and repression. With respect to the leadership, of course, we were rooting for those like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who thought it was in China's own self interest as well as to improve our relationship to be more moderate on the political front than, say, Li Peng. We knew that Deng was rather ambivalent and would go back and forth, but on the whole, conservative. As we were there, there were attacks on spiritual pollution, on bourgeois liberalization even as the envelope was being pushed.

On the whole we thought the government operated quite effectively. Deng, I have already given my impressions of: He obviously was very able, although we were unhappy with some of his political and cultural instincts. We could see even then that he was trying to groom people to come after him which in a communist society is a useful innovation. He was clearly number one even as we left, but even then, by the late ‘80s, he was beginning to delegate responsibility in meeting with foreigners and day to day decisions of operating the government, all of which we thought were useful. Now clearly we saw trouble signs twice while we were there and just after, where his successors, Hu and Zhao, were dumped by him even as Mao dumped his heirs or successors. Deng was falling into a pattern of dumping his. He got rid of two, both of whom were more liberal in a political sense than he was. There was room for some concern as well when these campaigns that would take place like the Four Cardinal Principals, stressing socialist ideals as well as anti-spiritual pollution and anti-bourgeois liberalization. On the economic front we felt they were making progress, and we thought the leadership was generally quite effective. They were beginning to promote people now based on merit and economic performance rather than revolutionary credentials or military exploits, probably because they had gotten to the point where most of the Long Marchers had passed from the scene or were too old anyway.

Also I was impressed with some of the younger leaders coming along. I made a big effort to travel throughout China, usually with my wife. It was fun and interesting and she could give insights that I couldn't do by myself, and she was a great ambassador. I traveled
widely, partly to show the flag, sometimes to advance our economic interests, partly because it was fun, partly to report back to Washington about what was happening around the country, and partly to meet upcoming leaders. I could see that the mayors and the governors were going to be the future leaders of China. Whether it was the mayor of Tianjin (Li Ruihan) or vice governors elsewhere. I remember Sichuan in particular and Guangzhou and Zhu Rongji in Shanghai. I was impressed with the pragmatism, the desire for good relations with us, certainly the economic reforms, that I found in these people. You couldn't tell so much on the political side. On the whole I felt there was a pretty competent group. That was true of the Foreign Ministry, e.g. Qian Qichen (the Foreign Minister) and Zhu Qizhen (the Vice Foreign Minister). Now in decision making, it was clear that Deng was calling the shots on the important issues, U.S.-Chinese relations, U.S.-China-Russia relations, relations with Japan, basic economic reform decisions, Taiwan. These were determined by Deng pretty much on his own. Day to day operations, details, and secondary issues including running the economy on a detailed basis, he would delegate.

Q (Bernkopf Tucker): Did you have any sense, from the outside it may be impossible to say, was some of this independent decision making on Deng’s part a result of negotiation with Li Peng or others who might have been more hard-line or liberal, or was he really just making up his own mind?

LORD: The honest answer is you can't be sure, because to get back to one of your earlier questions, it was still a fairly opaque society and system even then, though much less than it had been in the ‘70s. We had much more contacts, more travel, and more reporting. Despite all that, an area that we were not strong in despite all our best efforts was decisionmaking. Certainly our impression was that Deng had an absolute veto. There was no important policy that could be promoted if he opposed it. That's a given. The basic lines, clearly, were supported by his subordinates. It wasn't as if he were enforcing it. Most people wanted to have better relations with the U.S. These people were convinced, although some were more cautious like Li Peng and others, of the need for opening and reform on the economic front. There would be debates on the political side on issues like political reform and Tibet. I think Deng was clearly first among equals, much more in charge than Jiang Zemin today, not having to check so much as Jiang would have to check, although he has solidified his position. Deng, however, was much less a one man show than Maoczedong. He was somewhere in between, but clearly a dominant figure at that point. He knew enough to know that he wanted to keep both conservatives and moderates happy. He would basically vote by conviction, not just power balance. But he would not veer too much in either direction and was particularly back and forth on political liberalization. Just when we were there, there were two or three periods when politics was getting looser and then it got tighter again. That is clearly where the internal debates were taking place, most vividly demonstrated when Deng had to sack Hu Yaobang to appease the conservatives. So, he didn't want that to get too out of kilter with others, but he clearly was in charge on all the key issues. At heart, throughout his career - and shown again during the June 1989 Tiananmen massacre for which he was responsible - he was very conservative politically.
Q: While you were making these trips out in the country and all and also in Beijing with our officers also out and about, what was your impression of revolutionary Marxist fervor? The cultural revolution wasn't that far away. It had gone completely sour, but the point being that you had almost a billion people running around as revolutionary as you can get.

LORD: Well, first, on my previous 11 trips to China before I was Ambassador plus my time in that post, by the time I left, I had been to 24 or 25 provinces out of the 30 or 31 depending on how you count Taiwan or Hainan. I was missing Anhui and Ningxia and Guizhou and Hainan for example. I really got around quite a bit for all the reasons I mentioned. Second to answer your question, there was none of the Marxist fervor. Still a lot of people didn't want to talk about, and there was a lot of bitterness about, the Cultural Revolution. Also people whether officials or non-officials were cautious in their conversations. The same is true today. People can speak somewhat more freely when they are alone with you. They can't get up and make speeches that are unsettling to the Party, and they can't organize opposition or distinct parties. In the late '80s, some students and intellectuals might loosen up a little on political issues. Nobody was trying to spout Marxism or revolutionary fervor, to answer your question. They would talk with some bitterness about past excesses, but nobody was going to be criticizing the government or promoting political freedom. The clear exception, with Bette's help, was the circles we had a lot of contact with, students and others in the cultural, academic, and artistic communities, where there was a call for greater political and cultural reform. Even there they would be somewhat cautious. We had a lot of these people to our house. And embassy officials would talk to reformers. Bette went often to people's houses including Liu Binyang and Fang Lizhi. She worked hard on the official front as well. But she stayed in touch with these people to be on the cutting edge. This probably excited some concerns by members of the Politburo. But overall Marxist ideology was pretty dead. Even then people were focusing pretty much on economics and what worked.

Q: How about the kids in school or in college. Did they have to take compulsory Marxism, the works of Mao Zedong and that sort of thing?

LORD: I think we are talking about a trend here. They were pretty much getting away from that; they were getting more pragmatic. But surely there were still ideological parts in their curricula.

Q (Bernkopf Tucker): I remember in the summer of 1987 at one of these informal lunches that you talked about earlier that you would have with them and the staff, that I was there and...

LORD: You served six months as an intern.

Q (Bernkopf Tucker): Yes, and we talked about what was happening in China ideologically and the sense that communism was no longer a very useful tool to rally support for the government, but in those days nationalism still had not risen. If you were analyzing what was happening in China and trying to explain to the State Department and the White House where the Chinese people were, where were you putting your
emphasis? What were you telling the United States about the Chinese people ideologically?

LORD: Well, we were somewhat humble and not generalizing, clearly. Obviously we felt that people would be more concerned about these political issues if they were urban dwellers than in the countryside. There was no longer any faith, as you say, in Marxism ideology as an approach and a lot of cynicism given that the wind had shifted so many times in China about what is ideologically correct, leaders going up and down, all of that behind them. Nationalism, although anti-Japanese feeling was clear even then, on the whole didn't rise as naturally as it has today when they have grown so much stronger in power. The authorities increasingly substitute that for the loss of ideology. We reported that the people, certainly in the artistic, intellectual and academic communities, had a real desire for more political reform and a feeling they needed that for economic development as well as to meet the aspirations of the people. So in those circles, we would report considerable ferment and a pushing of the envelope, but without exaggerating their power yet. Frankly, we did not predict Tiananmen Square. I don't think anybody did in terms of the massive demonstrations that did take place not only in Beijing but in over 200 cities. Now those weren't only for democracy, they were against corruption, they were against inflation and for education needs and so on. Basically even then I think we felt the people's basic preoccupation was having a better economic existence, a better life and getting away form the horrors in the past. At least they were close enough to the Cultural Revolution to reach some happiness, some contentment that they at least weren't suffering as badly as they did in the Cultural Revolution. It was early enough in the economic lifting in their lives that they were perhaps not quite as concerned about political issues with the exception of the circles I mentioned. I think we were basically saying there were tensions rising on the political front and some of the elements that were most important and most influential were pushing the envelope. But the broad contacts, encouraged by Bette, made this clear. We didn't realize it was quite as fermenting as Tiananmen Square proved.

Q: Again, looking at China with a cold eye and trying to look at the future particularly in light of what happened within a few years to the Soviet empire where the nationalities thing split it up, were you looking at nationalities within China? I mean sort of 20 years 50 years down the thing will China hold together or not?

LORD: Well, my basic view I'm sure then, I know it is now, was on the whole I felt China would hold together. That was our basic view in the embassy. Tibet was the most serious issue, and that flared up a couple of times while we were there, with some riots and killings. I was the first Ambassador to visit Tibet, very concerned about it. It was a hot issue through much of my stay there. Xinjiang didn't seem to have much unrest then. It was hard to get to know, and we tried to get reporters out there. In the southern areas where there were minorities or Inner Mongolia, there also didn't seem to be much unrest. In the long historical sweep, we knew about Chinese history and warlords against the emperor, going back and forth between tight central control and splitting up the country. We knew there were those dangers. We also knew already and we reported on it, the tensions between the provinces and Beijing about taxes, about foreign exchange, about
autonomy, about how much did they need permission from Beijing to approve joint ventures, what levels, so there was already tension on the economic front between central control and the provinces. We felt, however, this was in a safe framework of unity within the country. There was no real evidence or prospect that China was going to split apart.

For a variety of reasons I believed - before we knew about the Soviet Union breaking up - and I believe now in retrospect that China has advantages in holding together that the Soviets and Russians did not have. First of all, 93% of the Chinese are Han, whereas in the Soviet Union they were 50% Russian and 50% non-Russian. Secondly in the Soviet Union, certainly there was an empire; the Baltic States for example, parts of Central Asia, and some other places were clearly only recently or loosely part of the Soviet Union. Whereas, in China - again, Tibet is a more complicated example - on the whole the present territory of China most people would argue has been Chinese for a considerable period of time. So it is not so much an empire like the Soviet Union was in that sense. Thirdly the Chinese have always had a tremendous advantage in overseas investment, including Chinese, in helping their economy, and the Russians never had that. Fourthly, the Chinese are more self-confident based on 5,000 years of being number one, more a feeling they will be number one again than the Russians, who are less secure. Finally, there is a good deal of Chinese nationalism.

So for all these reasons at the time I felt, and I still feel, that chances are China will be able to hold together. Furthermore, those who are taking power at the center are generally coming from the provinces or cities and therefore they have some of the perspectives of the outlying areas they could bring to Beijing and some empathy and sensitivity on how to handle this. Having said that, even as we were there, there were considerable tensions between Beijing and the provinces, economic autonomy and who gets the taxes and who accrues investment. A good example was Shanghai where in those days it had to pay very heavy taxes to Beijing. Shanghai felt it was the most dynamic part of China; Beijing was reaping the benefits and they weren't. Indeed in recent years with the help of Shanghaiers like Jiang and Zhu there was a great shift and Shanghai has surged ahead as a result.

Q: Can we talk about Tibet?

LORD: First, more on political issues. As I said, on the whole, during the period I was Ambassador, China with fits and starts was moving to become somewhat more open politically and culturally as well as economically. There were obvious tensions and some periods of setbacks both within China and in our own political and cultural relations. For example, we got there in late '85, and up until late '86, on the whole they were moving in a somewhat more liberal direction in terms of artistic and political expression. I do not wish to exaggerate. But, in December, '86, actually while I was back on home leave, there were large scale demonstrations by students in Shanghai and considerable angst within the Politburo that these were not controlled faster and better. Partly as a result of that Hu Yaobang was ousted and indeed a period of some retrenchment on political and cultural freedoms set in. Not only was Hu kicked out as Party Secretary, many of his friends and intellectuals either were repressed or rounded up. There was a campaign
against bourgeois liberalization, an emphasis on the four Cardinal Principles. Don't ask me to repeat what they were. Four of your socialist principles. The conservatives generally in this area were on a roll and the reformers were on the defensive. Now having said that, it wasn't a complete rollback.

Let me give you the reasons Deng dropped Hu. I have already mentioned it, but just to put it here again. He had an unpredictable style that might have annoyed Deng. Deng thought Hu was a little unpredictable and wasn't fulfilling his vision of what a future leader of China should look like and maybe shouldn't be a successor. More fundamentally, Hu's instincts on political reform and issues like Tibet were much more liberal than Deng's were, which were always instinctively cautious. Hu was clearly alienating some of the conservatives on some of these issues and Deng always had to maintain a balance even though he was clearly in charge. Therefore partly out of conviction that Hu was a little bit too liberal, partly because he thought that Hu had helped to cause this unrest in Shanghai, partly to maintain his balance in the Politburo and appease the conservatives, he dropped Hu. As I say, they went after some of his cohorts as well. I said that Ziao Ziyang was also, although not as dramatically, pushing the envelope on political reforms like Hu. Clearly he was also interested in greater political reform, but he was not only maintained as Premier for a while but also made Party Secretary. On the one hand, Deng removed those the conservatives disliked the most. But he didn't do a clean sweep and get rid of Zhao as well or put Li Peng more fully in charge. Zhao wore both hats for a while - he was acting Party Secretary until he became confirmed and then when he became that, at that point Li Peng, who was more conservative, took over as Premier.

Other incidents occurred at this time. As I said earlier, another American newsman from the Associated Press was kicked out. Some overseas Chinese student had come home for the holidays and was arrested. There was a Chinese journalist in Sichuan sentenced to seven years for counter revolutionary activity and so on. I remember sending in, in early February, a think piece to the Secretary on this whole issue. It was quite serious, and there was a considerable rollback taking place. I was more alarmist than my colleagues. They tried to water my cable down. I didn't let that happen. Other sackings at this time included Liu Binyan who was this very outspoken journalist who attacked corruption and has since become a major dissident living here in the United States. Some other Shanghai writers, some officials at the universities and the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences, and the rather moderate propaganda head were all sacked. This clearly was a period of retrenchment. I remember feeling at the time that this was tarnishing Deng's reputation. He was once again showing that it is tough having an orderly succession when he was dumping his successor, killing all political reform, at least temporarily, maybe even having an impact on economic reform, hurting China's international reputation, creating considerable fear and anger among the intellectuals. It so happened it was about the 30th anniversary of the anti-rightist campaign. All this at a time when Gorbachev was beginning to gain momentum and an international reputation, for reform including on the political and cultural side in Russia. Of course, this was the classic Chinese dilemma. The leaders wanted to have economic reform without political reform. They were ambivalent about foreign influence, needing outside help but worrying about
spiritual pollution. How do they get western technology without western influence?

Q: Did you get hit with you say spiritual corruption, American movies, American films. I mean the things the French and other people rage about. Did this come up to you at all as far as our youth culture and the whole thing?

LORD: Never conceptually, but there were incidents - I mentioned this National Portrait exhibit. Somewhat later, more related to Bette personally, near the end of our tour, Bette's book finally got a good translation, *Spring Moon*, but when the Chinese edition came out on the news stands, I guess this was late 1988, you couldn't get it anywhere in the bookstores. She went to a book signing, but the only people who were there were the owners of the store, no readers. As soon as she left, the books were put away. That might have been her personally - her contacts with reformers - because there is nothing really revolutionary about *Spring Moon*. Certainly when you get into spiritual pollution campaigns, that has the overtones of American cultural influence and American political influence. This would ebb and flow during this period I'm talking about. Early 1987 was clearly an ebbing of any political and cultural freedom. We got a lot of feedback from our artistic, intellectual, and academic friends who were concerned. We had people in the Embassy keeping contact. I don't mean it was just Bette by any means, of course not. We had a lot of good people in the Embassy doing this as well. As I say some who were rounded up and released were intimidated. The foreign journalists reflected this as well. I told you the AP guy had been kicked out. The Burns episode before that. Forty-three of them signed a petition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Twenty of them came over to my residence, and they felt the U.S. Government hadn't been strong enough generally, I held a backgrounder with the press every month. I made a practice of keeping in touch with journalists generally when we got back to the U.S. meeting with editorial boards, etc. I thought that was useful in terms of our own interests and getting the word out on what we were trying to do there. This was generally a period of some malaise. Right after that, Secretary Shultz came in March and moved the U.S. relationship forward. We can get back to that at some other point.

The Tibet issue flared up a couple of times while we were in China. In the fall of 1987, I have already mentioned how in that year, particularly in the spring, there was a clampdown particularly on political and cultural expression. Whether or not related, things began to heat up in Tibet. The Dalai Lama went to the U.S. in the middle of September, 1987. On September 27, and the next few days there were considerable riots and demonstrations in Tibet. I gather from the few notes I have, there were about 20 deaths and hundreds injured. The Congress passed a resolution 98-0. Tom Brokaw had just been there for NBC and did a piece on China, including on my wife. It was basically positive, but he went to Tibet and said some nice things about the Dalai Lama. The Chinese weren't too happy about that. As I said the Congress sent letters to Zhao, several Congressmen or Senators did, and they passed a resolution 98-0. The media generally was saying we were a little bit too soft on this. We tried to monitor the situation and made representations about torture and repression and putting down the demonstrations in Tibet. We had a political officer that happened to have been there from Chengdu and we kept him there. We tried to get our political counselor in there. It was very difficult.
They were making it hard for us to have access, but we smuggled out reports. Again journalists during this period generally had problems. You had to give Beijing 10 day notice to travel anywhere. I think it is fair to say this general period was difficult, with the Tibet problems and human rights more generally, our media and Congress getting more upset, and I believe the Iranian missiles, Silkworms, issue at this point. So when you put all this together, it was a difficult period.

Q (Bernkopf Tucker): On the Tibet stuff, you have the Dalai Lama in the U.S. and then you get demonstrations and riots in Tibet. Some specialists on Tibetan affairs, Americans, have suggested that one of the things that was happening was the Tibetans becoming more sophisticated on how to play to American public opinion. Was this a concern in the Embassy that there was an effort to circumvent the diplomatic corps and get to Congress directly.

LORD: No, I don't think we had that feeling. I think you are right. I think there was some synergy between the Dalai Lama's visit in the United States and the demonstrations taking place a few days later. Our reaction was not one of how dare the Tibetans express their views. We were really upset about the Chinese reaction. Now obviously, without suffering from clientitis, we didn't want the Tibet issue any more than any other one issue to wreck our whole relationship. I pushed the Chinese on it, but we would also try to keep the overall relationship going.

As I said, I went to Tibet, Bette and I went, the first American Ambassador to ever go there, and it may be the first foreign Ambassador of any country who went there on his own, not in connection with some high level visitor. We went from August 4, to August 10, 1988. By now, as I said, I had visited about 24 provinces out of 30. Obviously Tibet continued to be an issue and concern, and I thought one way to get at it was to show the flag by going to Tibet, both to convey our concerns to the officials running Tibet as well as back in Beijing. Show the American flag for whatever that might do for the morale of Tibetans and to show the Congressional and domestic audiences that we cared. The Ambassador went personally out there. This stirred a couple of Congressional visits. Among the issues I pushed for was access for our consular officers to visit there. It was covered by Chengdu, we don't have a consulate itself in Tibet. And I pushed for more media and journalists to get in there and outside groups in general, Congress and the press, even human rights groups. I had the most comprehensive talks up to then on Tibet that any American official ever had with the Chinese. I can't say I got very far. I pressed the human rights situation there generally, the suppression of Tibetan culture and people. They gave their familiar defense of how Tibet had been a feudal enclave there before and very badly in need, enduring slavery under the Dalai Lama, how much better off the Tibetans were now. On access I did make some progress. I did get more consular visits and some journalists in there. On prisoners all I got were some numbers, official numbers, and general assurances on treatment, but I could see no breakthroughs there. I wasn't able to visit a jail; they made some vague commitments maybe in the future. We did take a trip across the country to Xigatse. It was spectacular. We continued to treat this issue throughout our stay there.
Q: Did you have the feeling, it's almost I don't want to sound too cynical, but that served as a good rallying flag for particular conservatives who just detested our China policy and this gave them a cause, or did Tibet run deeply in your opinion in the American public?

LORD: Well, the province of Tibet is so remote it is hard to get coverage of it and know what is going on. There is the inherent problem of really knowing what is going on and conveying that to the American people generally. I do think people in Congress and other human rights groups were absolutely sincere in their concern for Tibet and the extinguishing of Tibetan culture, the treatment of nuns and monks and the roundup of prisoners and the put down of demonstrations. Clearly those who were suspicious of China for human rights generally would also highlight this issue for that reason, but it was born out of a genuine concern for what was a genuine problem. I would say it probably was a higher level profile in human rights than anything else we had then, even prisoners or anything else while we were there. It doesn't mean there weren't lots of prisoners.

I mentioned how generally while we were in China the political and cultural atmosphere was loosening up somewhat back and forth, and I mentioned how we had a tough period particularly in the early part of 1987 and even the latter part of it. As an Embassy, and personally, we raised human rights issues, not just Tibet, of course, but also all the other human rights issues, the need for political reform. But, it was not as high profile as it has been the last few years. Beyond that we tried to have an impact by having philosophic and relatively candid discussions with Chinese officials on the need for political reform and loosening up, including when they would come to our house for meals and round table discussions with American visitors. In addition, I personally and the Embassy generally, with my wife at the center of much of this, spent a lot of time with intellectuals, artists, academics, reformers etc. We wanted to do this partly to report to Washington what was going on in those areas and partly to push the envelope. We could do that culturally in some ways more than we could politically of course. Partly to establish ties with what we felt would be future Chinese leaders. A lot of these people were very bright - the best and the brightest and the younger, and we felt this was important for U.S. national interests as well as being inherently interesting.

Q: You know we spent a great deal of time dealing with the Soviet intelligentsia, and they turned out not to be very important I gather in what happened in Russia. They gave the impetus and then sort of faded out. When you think of the Chinese culture as being centered on scholarly work and all, did you feel these people would be an important power source?

LORD: Not only I thought they would be, they turned out to be in Tiananmen Square, in and around it. The jury is still out and the history is still being written about the future of China on this front. Even then many were important. I'm not just talking about dissidents although we were in touch with people like Fang Lizhi and Liu Binyan, my wife in particular. But, also people in think tanks, many of whom reported directly to Zhao or Hu with ideas on reforms, both economic and political. These are the kinds of people we had
for discussions at the Embassy and so on. So, people already in positions of power although young, in their ‘30s and ‘40s, in terms of ideas and think pieces, and the debates going on in China on the need for more political reform. And the cultural side with enlightened people like the cultural Vice Minister Ying Ruochen, the famous Chinese actor, as well as Bette's dealings with the Chinese cultural community, the promoting of a famous opera singer, now in the United States, working with them on the Caine Mutiny Court Martial, putting on Chinese performances at the Embassy and the residence and so on. We felt these people were already important in the internal debates and would be important to future leaders of China.

Now, as part of this general effort, I would take stock, usually at the end of the year or the Spring Festival in February, of our goals and my goals, personal ones, for the coming year or six months, in addition to sitting down at the Embassy and doing strategy for the year and pursuing our interests and having game plans and so on. We would do this rigorously.

For the last couple of years I decided, and Bette agreed, that we would make a more concerted effort to continue what we were doing as I have said with the intellectuals and artists, but to get out more to Chinese universities and think tanks in Beijing, Shanghai and other cities more systematically. Even as we carried on all of our official contacts and everything else, we sought to have more interaction with the younger generation, the think tanks, to show the flag, to get their mood and to try to modestly encourage reform efforts.

So, over a period of just a few months, we each went individually to the National Defense University. It was very unusual for Bette to do that. In fact, I was the first Ambassador there, I believe, and she certainly was the first spouse of an Ambassador. We went out to Beijing University a couple of times with smaller groups. I'll get back to the key one later. We met with a law class and we went to a graduation party. We also went out there with high level visitors. Bette spoke at the People's University. We both spoke at the Foreign Affairs College. We both spoke at the International Business and Economic University. Some were joint appearances including questions and answers. I visited universities in Xiamen and Chengdu. I had a few others later on that either weather or political complications canceled. I visited many think tanks in Beijing, Shanghai and elsewhere. This was all in the period of a few months, so we made a concerted effort to get out there with these groups.

Now part of that, and this is where the story gets interesting, we were invited to come out to Beijing University, June 1, 1988 is when we actually went, to meet with the students outdoors on the lawn. I don't know if it was known then, but in retrospect, it was known as Democracy Salon. The students, among whose leaders included Wang Dan, the famous dissident that has gotten out of jail with U.S. efforts and was exiled to the United States, invited various people to come and speak to them about China and its future, including political reform and the concerns of young people in informal settings. Not for speeches but to sit on the grass and hold conversations. It turns out we were the fifth in a series. One of our predecessors had been Fang Lizhi. I have a story about him later. Bette
and I agreed to go out there. Frankly, at the time, perhaps naively - we would have done
it anyway - we didn't realize just how sensitive this was for the leadership, for whom we
now know in retrospect this whole operation was very sensitive, the students having
people like Fang and now the ambassador and his wife. We made no attempt to hide that
we were going out. We couldn't anyway because we were bugged all the time and people
were following us anyway. I even told - not for purposes of clearance, just courteously or
casually or by chance - one of the Foreign Ministry types that by the way I'm going out to
Beijing University. Certainly our driver knew it ahead of time and a lot of the local
people. There was no question they knew we were going out there, and of course, no one
ever complained, at least before the event.

So we went out there. It was the biggest audience they had ever had. It started at between
300-500 and kept growing while we were there. We arrived at 6:45 and we went on until
it got dark at 9:30. A very agitated, excited, enthusiastic crowd. It was no speech, just
questions. Many of the questions were personal. What is it like to have an inter-racial
marriage in America.? How did you two meet? How does your marriage work? Things
that were almost forward. We didn't mind that at all. We were happy to talk about it.

Some questions on foreign policy and U.S.-Chinese relations, but a considerable amount
on the domestic situation. I was very struck, even though we had been tracking this and
thought we knew what was going on, at the degree of unhappiness, impatience,
frustration of the students. Tough questions about the need for political reform, even that
the leadership wasn't doing a good job. I was really struck by the openness and the fervor
of this group. I, of course, knew there would be security people in the crowd hearing
every word. Partly for that reason, knowing I'd be heard, partly as Ambassador, you
shouldn't be overly provocative, partly out of conviction because I thought on the
economic and opening front, Deng Xiao-ping was doing positive things, and partly so the
students wouldn't get in too much trouble, I was very careful. We were very candid about
personal things. At times, I found myself almost defending Deng Xiao-ping against the
students saying, “Look, he has done a lot of good things and reform will be coming. It is
an inevitable process.” I even had a quote that ended up in a Hong Kong newspaper on
the front page with my picture, something to the effect that he was one of the more
impressive world figures, something very positive. I just mention all this as a matter of
fact but also because of what happened next. It was a very exciting, dynamic event. I
frankly didn't understand just how sensitive this was for the leadership. I was struck by
how excited this crowd was. There weren't just students; there were older people there as
well. I assume some teachers, security types, and officials. There was a lot of cynicism
among the Chinese students including on corruption, backdoor influence, inflation, future
control of their lives. They wanted their leaders to be more accessible and engage in the
kind of exchange that they had with us. Anyway, it was a very exhilarating experience.

We wrote a couple of careful and quite good telegrams back to Washington. By very
unfortunate coincidence, the very next day a student was murdered by hooligans. As far
as we know it was totally unrelated to any of this, but demonstrations broke out at Beijing
University. This was the day after we had been there. They were basically demonstrations
on the need for greater security so students wouldn't be murdered by hooligans. It spread
to meetings and to wall posters and a march on Tiananmen Square that was aborted and so on. This was quickly controlled by the security people with warnings to the students, plus it quickly died out because many of them realized the ‘86-'87 protest hadn't helped. In fact, it resulted in Hu Yaobang’s having been kicked out. I think many of the students felt that though they were in favor of reform, and they wanted to go faster, they realized that if they got too out of control, they would give the conservatives ammunition.

Obviously the leaders were very antsy about this, generally, our going out there and meeting with the students at the Democracy Salon and there were demonstrations the next day, although it was because of this hooligan murder. They knew from the '86 demonstrations and just generally that there was increasing concern about corruption and inflation. Not just the students but the workers as well. The leaders would always be concerned about the students and the workers linking up. It is one thing in a communist society to have students and intellectuals unhappy, but if you have in a Marxist society the workers unhappy - and they have got the same dilemma today - then you really have a problem for social stability. Clearly they had been watching what had been happening in Poland and Hungary and Yugoslavia, lots of unrest even then in the USSR. There had been a heavy Reagan emphasis on human rights in the late May/June Moscow summit. For all these reasons, the Chinese leaders were obviously antsy. I was out there, as was Bette, to maintain ties with the younger generation, get a feel for what was on their minds, and generally show the flag. We were not there to cause any trouble, obviously, but we did feel this was an important part of our job, also very interesting.

On June 8, Liu Huaqiu, who was then Country Director for American affairs (he later was Vice Minister and National Security Advisor), called me in to talk about the upcoming trip by the Secretary. This would have been Shultz's second trip. This was a little bit out of line on protocol. Ordinarily he would be dealing with my DCM. I don't know if this was purposeful or not. On the way out after talking about the trip, he took me aside and suggested in friendly fashion that in the future I notify the authorities in advance so that they could make proper arrangements for meetings like this. He casually shrugged it off. I lightly explained why we went out there without being defensive, described some of the subjects we talked about. I said usually when we go to a University or think tank we have to work through authorities just practically, but in this case there was no problem. We just got in touch with the students and went out there. We didn't need help.

I was in Tianjin on June 9. A new Vice Mayor, new that week, and I guess the Foreign Affairs Director made a friendly warning about a visit to Nankai University that afternoon. Some people were worried about our appearance, but they knew I was an experienced diplomat who would do nothing to disturb stability. We went to the University. I think it was both of us, Bette and me. We had a long session before our speech with the officials that sort of cut off our time with the students. We started later than scheduled, and then there were long and friendly introductions. They made me use translator which cut down the time allotted, even though the audience all spoke English. The questions were written and screened obviously rather than from the floor. All of this was contrary to the way we had operated before where we had informal talks and
simultaneous translation, lots of time for questions and answers. The session actually went very well, especially the questions and answers, and the officials did allow it to run over the allotted time by 20 minutes. A big enthusiastic crowd. But we were somewhat rushed.

I got back to the residence, and then I was about to go to Shanghai for a trip and again I could see a pattern, and we knew this was related to what had happened. We learned the students we were supposed to meet with in Shanghai at Jiatong University, my father-in-law’s alma mater actually, were suddenly too busy on their exams to see us. We were also supposed to go to Fudan University, and that didn't work out either, in this case perhaps innocently because the Polish Premier was there on Friday and they couldn't get a big student audience on Saturday. I asked for two substitute appointments to take place, one with the World Economic Herald, this progressive newspaper, and one with the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Both of them were too busy to meet me. I met with a Herald reporter at the hotel and made my unhappiness known. Then I met with the Shanghai Mayor, Zhu Rongji, and after some friendly talk about American investment and so on, I said I wanted to meet others and promote cultural and academic links. I was disappointed I couldn't meet people. He said I should come back and would then clearly see people. I don't know how much he knew at the time. The investment climate had greatly improved as I said. We went to a performance of an O'Neill play that evening to open a big festival in Shanghai. Before the show we had a half an hour with the Vice Mayor and others. We purposely, literally sat for half an hour silently, and Bette and I absolutely refused to say a single word to the Vice Mayor for the whole time. We were showing that we knew what had happened to us in Shanghai and we didn't like it. I, of course, went up on stage after the show and congratulated the performers; it wasn't their fault.

Then during the following week we got reports of displeasure over the Beijing University appearance. There were reports of displeasure about it at a Politburo meeting. I don't recall how we got these reports. They were secondhand, but I think, reliable, probably Embassy contacts.

The banquet was at Beihai Park in Beijing. As I was walking in, the Ambassador to Washington - Han Xu his name was, he was called back to China for consultation - asked me to step outside. I had known him ever since the first trips to China. By now so many things had happened this past week, I figured what the subject was going to be about. He said something of the following. The Chairman, Deng Xiaoping, respected me greatly and in a friendly and private way he suggested that I be more prudent with students. I went back very toughly. Han Xu was an old friend I had known since the Kissinger days. I knew he was going to be the messenger, so I wanted to make sure. I was clear and firm. I said I was astonished and upset. I wasn't rude, but I made clear I was mad. I pointed to the South China Morning Post from Hong Kong which said that I had said that Deng Xiaoping was one of the most impressive leaders in the world. I had, out of sincerity, certainly said nothing negative and behaved myself with the students. Someone was misinforming the Chairman; I was deeply saddened about this. In any event I don't
understand and I can't accept this. I was very surprised and deeply displeased. How would he feel if we told him he had to coordinate every meeting at an American university in the United States and we restricted his movements. I explained my reasons for going out there. How would he feel if Ronald Reagan sent a message through me to him saying you can't go to Yale University without checking with us and so on. He didn't respond. We sat next to each other at the banquet. I repeated my messages during a very stiff time. I wasn't friendly, but I wasn't discourteous. He was an old friend.

Then I asked him to step outside afterwards and said please convey my message to the Chairman. As I was driving away in the car, he ran up and tapped on the window to catch up with me to be sure he got the message right. I think he was a little taken aback, so he wanted to make sure I would go over it again. He got an envelope and wrote it down. I basically said I have deep respect for the Chairman. I told the Beijing students he was one of the most impressive leaders I have met. I was very sad that someone was misinforming him about the encounter. We should straighten this out. I just don't understand because there is no better friend of U.S.-China relations. I have worked on it for 17 years. I was surprised and sad. Then I added the other themes, I have every right to do this, and what is going on and so on. Han Xu was clearly upset. I reported all of this in close held cables. I had my Deputy go in and basically repeat the same themes to Liu Huaqui the next day. Washington's comment a couple of days later was a bit ambivalent. It is great you guys are getting out and talking to all the students, thanks and we applaud this. But I thought there was a little bit of softness there because Washington also asked, “Do we really need to have such a high profile at this point?”

Q: That's typical, you know, don't rock the boat.

LORD: Sometimes it is the other way around, with the Ambassadors saying don't rock the boat, and it is Washington wanting you to be tougher. So this is backwards you know. However, I think my message back to the Chinese did have some impact because without going into great detail, they began to be quite friendly again. At the banquet the next night, the Vice Premier was extremely friendly, said he wanted to play tennis with me. This also came from the mayor of Tianjin who wanted to play tennis. The Vice Minister of Public Security was friendly. Several high ranking people came to a Nabisco joint venture opening when they had absolutely no reason to do so. Liu Huaqui told the DCM to tell me not to worry at a dinner a few days later. All the contacts were very friendly. It just shows you their paranoia and their collectivity. It shows you how they all act together canceling things and postponing things on the one hand, and then you get tough and they back off and they get all friendly again. I really laid into them, and of course, all of this has much greater resonance now when we think of Democracy Salon, Tiananmen Square, Wang Dan and everything else.

Q: No, this is very interesting. Now, other times you were saying what was said at the salon of democracy, but how about when you are talking at think tanks or students prior to this? Were you getting good solid questions?

LORD: That is a good question. It would vary. I mean there were times when you'd go to
think tanks, and you could usually have very good discussions on U.S.-Chinese relations, on international issues, you know the Middle East or Russia. Taiwan you'd get the party line. You wouldn't raise that yourself unless they did, and they usually didn't. When it came to the Chinese domestic scene, not much problem, even some debate on economic reforms. But, I never felt there was much loosening up either in these joint sessions or even one on one on political issues. Despite the fact the envelope was being pushed open, people were still very cautious, including my best friends in the government as well as think tankers certainly about talking in front of others with any degree of candor about political issues and even alone. Occasionally we'd have working dinners at our house with a mixture of officials, semi-dissidents, reformers. We were always trying to keep this debate going and hear about it and participate. People would venture modestly into more controversial issues. The only frank discussions would take place when some of our Embassy contacts who could speak Chinese were alone with people at times, and certainly Bette and her conversations in her circles.

The universities always gave very enthusiastic receptions. I think it was genuine, they were pleased to have an Ambassador and his spouse come out and they like America generally. The questions were always clearly either softball easy ones or ones designed to put you a little bit on the defensive. I'm sure they were all screened.

Q: Be true in the United States, too.

LORD: No, I don't think so. I don't think in the United States we would do what they did to Clinton in Beijing (in 1998) where they had the questions orchestrated and the students weren't even allowed to stand up when he came in. Even today they control events, let alone back then. I have no illusions that our meetings with the students were anything but carefully scripted (except for Democracy Salon). No student is going to ask a question that would get him in trouble. But often they asked personal questions or interesting questions on other issues. But never much engagement on political issues with the exceptions I talked about, particular circles and particularly courageous individuals like Fang Lizhi and Liu Binyan.

Q: This is really on the same theme, but I was wondering for somebody reading this a couple of centuries from now, some historian will be ruffling through this. To get a feel for the role of the United States you conceived I mean in the world, Did you feel that what you were doing in a sense in the American Embassy, you were alone or were the French Embassy, the French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, were others out there pushing these same themes, or were we pretty much on our own?

LORD: Pretty much on our own. That is true even as we speak. Certainly in any official government policies on human rights we were generally on our own. The others gobble up the contracts and hold our coat so to speak, while we take on the tough issues. The Japanese, partly because of the guilt feelings of what they did in Nanjing and elsewhere in World War Two, partly because they worry about making money, the Europeans because of money. There were some exceptions, the Australians, occasionally the Canadians, sometimes the British or the Europeans would weigh in. With respect to
Ambassadors, I can't be sure about what every Ambassador or Embassy was doing, but I don't know of any that were getting out to the students or the think tanks like I was. I know there was nobody anywhere close to the kind of contacts that we had thanks to Bette with the reformist, cultural, academic, and artistic communities.

Q: But as a mission, we in a way, I mean besides due to your wife you had these contacts, but I mean you felt you had as part of the mission of the American Ambassador to push these things.

LORD: Yes, and I also...

Q: These other ones were not particularly pushy.

LORD: That is absolutely right. Whether it is specific issues like Tibet or prisoners or whether it is generally getting engaged in debates on political reform. Now I want to be accurate here and not self-serving. I don't want to pretend that we were vigorously leaping up and down and beating the drums and pushing the envelope in aggressive, obnoxious ways. We were somewhat circumscribed. Human rights was less of an issue in the average cabinet level meeting than it would be today or at least it was when I was serving in the Clinton Administration. You cannot have a cabinet level meeting today or even a working level meeting without these issues coming up. That was not the case in the late ‘80s. Not because we didn't care, but it wasn't quite as high profile. This was still during the Cold War and before the Tiananmen massacre, so don't want to exaggerate our pressures. Having said that, compared to other countries and other embassies, we certainly worked on these issues, and certainly Bette in particular and also I personally worked on these issues.

We did so for a variety of reasons. First, human aspirations and justice, some of the human rights issues, freedom of expression, that man or woman doesn't live by bread alone. Particularly as you build up a middle class and you have economic advancement, people are going to want this. Improvements on human rights and freedom would greatly build up support in America for an engagement policy and conversely setbacks made it more complicated - in the interest of our bilateral relationship and therefore in China's interest as well. A feeling even then, although it is much clearer now 12-15 years later, that as you open up to the outside world and develop your economy with the help of outside investment and technology, and as you begin - it was not that clear then - to have computers and Internet and fax machines, that you've got to have a freer flow of information. You can't develop a modern economy without greater dissent, greater debate, greater openness, greater ability to express your views, greater pluralism in the political system. As you move toward a marketplace, you have less control, all of these things are important. And a feeling, again I felt then and I do now, that as the President said on his recent trip, that stability requires freedom. China was - and is - undergoing the pain of transition from one kind of economy to another with unemployment and all the other problems, corruption, inflation, etc. The Chinese people must be able to express views peacefully. If they don't have those avenues of peaceful dissent, the other alternative is to take to the streets. All of this opposed to the argument of the Chinese
authorities, that is self-serving, that one needs repression for stability, I felt and still feel that you need more openness for stability. You can't get at the problem of corruption without a free press, and you can't get, attract and maintain investment without the rule of law. You can't debate about top economic decisions without the free flow of expression and information and a free press. You can't have stability unless people can let off steam through peaceful means. By virtue of the American relationship and support for our ties with China, by virtue of justice, by virtue of China's self-interest, I felt that this was part of our mission.

I also want to make it clear that I felt very strongly that we needed to move ahead with China despite its clear imperfections and the problems of human rights. Because of our strategic, economic, and political interests, we spent an awful lot of time promoting these other elements of our relationship, indeed the bulk of our time. Bette, for example as well as I, spent the overwhelming part of her time with officials, in addition to pushing the envelope with some of these other groups.
XX. AMBASSADOR TO CHINA - 1989 EVENTS AND GENERAL COMMENTS (1989)

Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I don't know about where you are on things. Do you want to talk about the Bush visit and Fang Lizhi?

LORD: Yes, because that is an interesting story, too. This will be about President Bush's trip to China in early 1989 in the home stretch as my tenure as Ambassador. Let me say that I greatly looked forward to this trip as sort of a capstone of my tenure there. I had made clear before the November 1988 election that no matter who was elected, as much as I loved this job and it was the best job I had ever had for enjoyment, that I was ready after three and a half years to move on. Washington ought to think of a successor.

Bush I had known for a long time. I had played tennis with him on occasions. I had seen him almost every time I went back to Washington, talked to him about China when he was Vice President. I briefed him on behalf of Nixon and Kissinger when he went out to head up the Liaison Office early in his career. I had what I thought was a very good relationship. He was a newly elected President. He was going to Japan to see the Emperor, but he was going to come to China on an official visit, but not on a full state visit.

As an old friend of China, one who had worked on the relationship, he was looking forward as was Mrs. Bush to return home and see all their old friends. As we got ready for the visit, it couldn't have been a better lead up. To make a long story short, we went full speed, and we were good at this frankly, my Deputy Tomsen and my whole team working with the advance team to get ready for this trip. The head of the advance team who had been working on trips for more than a decade said it was the best Embassy he had ever worked with. I was the most involved Ambassador he had ever worked with. This is not to be self-serving but to set up something later on. Indeed we just beat our brains out, for a President, a new President. Everything was going terrifically well, logistics, even though it was going to be a 48 hour short trip. The advance team was ecstatic. We sent in the usual think pieces. I personally wrote some personal ones for the President and made sure they got to him. I got word back that he very much enjoyed them before he came out including two portraits of Deng Xiaoping, one with what he had accomplished generally in Chinese history and the challenges he faced and secondly a personal portrait of Deng, his family, his background, his history and how to deal with him. And we had other scene setters. The Chinese had gone out of their way to make this a friendly visit. The Chinese media play was the warmest for any visit I had seen. Again, our relations were fully on track after Shultz's visits and the Secretary of Defense and many others. We were moving along pretty well, although we had continuing problems. He was a new President and an old friend. Everybody wanted to see him so the problem was sorting out who got on his schedule on a brief 48 hour visit. The Chinese agreed to have him go on live television. The first time I believe any foreign leader, certainly the first time any American President, had addressed the Chinese live, well before this Clinton visit (1998). They also worked with us, very unusual for them, to stage a "spontaneous" photo opportunity in Tiananmen Square. He'd get out of his car and
mingle with the crowds. Indeed he got a great picture with Tiananmen Square in the background. It was on the cover of Time International. So everything was going swimmingly. I had visions of a perfect capstone to my tenure there, going out with a successful trip by the new President, and we were very excited about it.

As part of the trip, there was to be on Sunday night, he arrived on Saturday, his return banquet for the Chinese in the Great Wall Hotel. We had instructions from the White House to make it a big banquet, include all walks of life, old Chinese friends but all parts of society, reach a broad audience. They asked us for guest lists. Let me just sum up the experience I had, and then I'll tell you what happened. Mao Zedong once said that a revolution is not a dinner party. Well, this turned out to be a dinner party that turned out to be a revolution. In order to draw up a guest list that we had to have approved by Washington, we asked each section of the Embassy to come up with suggestions as to who should be included. We came up with a full list which we sent into Washington a couple of weeks before the visit, soon after they had asked for it. It included all kinds of people, officials, American businesspeople, Chinese, academics, you name it. It also included a few dissidents, depending on how you define dissidents, at least pro-reformers, several of them, one of whom was Fang Lizhi, who had been at Hefei University. He was outspoken on political reform, going around giving speeches that the Chinese authorities were not happy with. He had lost his job there, but was still an official research worker for the Chinese government in Beijing. So, he was still officially that. Although clearly pushing the envelope on political reform, he was not some wild eyed radical trying to overthrow the government, but obviously was someone of some controversy. At the same time, he was a widely respected scientist, a world class astrophysicist. Three different sections of our embassy individually recommended Fang be on the list.

Our view was the following which we explained in a cable we sent back with the guest lists. We pointed out the several reformers/dissidents with explanations of all of them on the list. We said the Chinese won't like this but frankly we did not expect an explosion in the reaction. We said we thought it was important that the President demonstrate his overall concern with human rights as part of our engagement with the Chinese, out of principle, to lift the morale of reformers, to try to help the China situation and to protect himself with his domestic audience and Congress back home. If we had a separate meeting with dissidents - after all, Reagan had done this in Russia - if we had a separate meeting with dissidents, generally or with Fang in particular, this we felt would be overly provocative to the Chinese. Particularly in such a very short visit with so many friends, so many Vice Premiers and others were disappointed not to see him. To say he couldn't see Vice Premier so and so, but then he sees dissidents, we just felt this was going too far. But we thought it was important that he show some demonstration of concern for human rights for all the reasons I mentioned. Thus we had him visiting a church on Sunday morning, which he did. We had him refer to human rights although much more gingerly than we do now. There were related elements in his remarks on TV. We had Secretary Baker raise the issue of human rights as well.

Q: Baker being Secretary of State.
LORD: We felt the other way to do it was to include a few dissidents in the banquet which after all was huge. Not have a separate meeting. This was a nice balance. We sent the list in to Washington. Given the usual inertia you usually get on those things, we got no response approving the list. We were running out of time because we had to issue the invitations. Actually in putting together the list, we got suggestions from three different sections, the political section, the science and technology section, and the USIA section, press and culture. Each suggested separately several dissidents including Fang. I would have added him if he wasn't included. Three different sections told us we should do this. I mention this partly because there was a New York Times article a few weeks later which said that Bette Bao Lord, this known radical, had inserted Fang on the guest list which caused trouble at the summit. Or, maybe it was said approvingly by the human rights people. Whatever way it was said, it was totally inaccurate. I had her go over the list too, because I welcomed her judgment. The point is even before we got to the list, three different sections independently had suggested him and other dissidents.

So, we sent it to the White House and the State Department, the whole list on February 10. As I say, we had a few dissidents, and we specifically foresaw some problems. To be fair we did not see there would be an explosion. We got no reply, so we sent a moderately changed guest list with some additions and some deletions on February 18, but no changes among the reformers. Again I made sure we flagged Fang in particular for Washington. By now we are running out of time; the President is arriving about a week later. We pressed the advance team to help us.

**Q: You were saying you were consulting...**
LORD: We are talking about the Fang Lizhi banquet incident. Finally, the top White House advance man called the White House and got approval on the phone for the whole list. We had to move fast on the invitations. We had one of our Chinese local employees (who report to the Chinese security service all the time) call the Academy of Sciences to extend the invitations orally to those at the academy including Fang. We did a lot of invitations by phone to alert people, and then we were going to follow up with a written invitation. We heard the next day on February 22 some confused report about somebody saying Fang wasn't actually on the list. It turns out later that a protocol person from the Foreign Ministry called over to the Academy later and said Fang wasn't invited after we had invited him. We then got the invitations out. In many cases we had to hand carry them to many places; we had such short notice. We had somebody from the Embassy hand carry the invitation to Mrs. Fang for both of them. We did this in many other places because of time constraints.

That evening at an advance team banquet, a protocol guy complains, taking us aside. It wasn't a huge complaint but it was the first warning we got. We said relax, big crowd, diverse. Don't get so upset about this. We’re inviting Fang as a world reknowned scientist. We immediately alerted Washington to this. This could be trouble. We want you to know they reacted to the Fang invitation.

Then for the next 48 hours, getting closer and closer to the President getting there, we
didn't hear anything from the Chinese, so we began to feel pretty good and figured this wasn't going to be a problem. We kept wondering if we were going to be called in and they were going to escalate this. We hadn't heard anything, so we began to feel pretty good. Meanwhile, somehow the French press runs with something in Taiwan about how we invited Fang and some idiot in our Embassy on background said, yes, we did this to make a statement. The Chinese would have reacted anyway, I'm sure. Throughout this, however, a tremendous warm reception was building for Bush and very warm friendly media coverage continued to go forward. We kind of figured we were pretty well home free.

Then at 6:30 on Friday, February 24 (the day before the President’s arrival), the Vice Minister, a guy named Zhu Qizhen, said he wanted to see me. I get a little nervous; I wonder what this is about. I think I probably know what it is about although I thought we were home free. So I go out to Daoyutai guest house for a final thank you to the advance team and then to the Foreign Ministry. I don't remember the exact chronology. Zhu said this is a real problem for the Chinese, their leadership. I don't have this exactly right, but it was, I believe, around 9:00 Friday night. We had the roughest meeting I have ever had with the Chinese. With Zhu I went through all the arguments about how they shouldn't blow this out of proportion. It is just one person at a banquet. He is being invited as a reknowned scientist, etc. I, of course, when I first heard their complaints, just on my own said to the Chinese, I will report this. I said, I can't speak for Washington but I am sure they won't want change to the guest list. I couldn't imagine, particularly after it had leaked, that we could back off from this. The President would have gotten massive criticism. Because there was so little time, I didn't want the Chinese to have any illusion that we were going to back away. I said, of course I'll report and consult. I immediately sent a message to Korea and Air Force One. It was less than 20 hours before the President's arrival. I kept sending messages in. I mention all of this because it comes up later about whether I kept Washington informed.

Scowcroft in response to my cable calls me in the middle of the night and tells me to go in for another appointment. We both knew the Chinese were listening in so we made points about not causing controversy for their benefit. I go in at 9:30 that Saturday morning to try to turn this around again. Another tough go around.

Q: Scowcroft is the National Security Advisor.

LORD: Again I send another wire to the plane. Then at 12:30, the President is landing four hours later. The Vice Minister calls me again. This is a message from President Yang Shangkun to President Bush, basically saying if Fang Lizhi comes to the banquet, Yang is not coming and nobody else is coming from the leadership. By now I know I have a disaster on my hands. With each development I sent a cable either by NIACT [Night Action] or Flash, which is almost like a nuclear war, to make sure the President’s party on the plane knew exactly what was happening. The last one they didn't get because it was so shortly before they landed in Beijing. The last Yang message, Bush didn't get that until he was at the guest house. He was well aware of the problem, but he had not realized it had escalated to this point.
I went up on the plane to greet the President which you usually do. He was distinctly unfriendly. You could tell he was mad at me about how this whole thing had come up. I rode in with Baker and I said I still thought there was a chance that either the Chinese would relent or Fang would decide not to cause trouble and not come. Something might happen.

We proceed with the trip. Perhaps it was like Mrs. Lincoln at the play, but the rest of the trip went extremely well. The whole time Bush was nervous, as we all were, about how this was going to come out. It would be a clear debacle to have a return banquet and no Chinese leaders there. It would not have gone unnoticed by the press. Throughout the Chinese are keeping us hanging. Their official position remains the same. We go through the rest of the trip. Bush has a meeting and a working lunch with Deng that goes very well. He gives Deng some boots and Deng gives him a bicycle. He meets with the Embassy staff, and now, he and Mrs. Bush are not all that friendly to us. They figure we had gotten them into this trouble. In his remarks to the Embassy employees, he barely mentions the Ambassador or his wife which a week earlier would have been unthinkable. He has meetings with all these other people and they all go well. I won't go into all the details. He was given a warm welcoming banquet. All is going very well in substance. There is one meeting which is running late that we are nervous about because he is due to go on live television. He races there and goes on at the last minute, and that goes well. It is a very productive, good trip, but this incident is hanging over us, and obviously keeping everyone on edge.

Let me segue for a minute to show the edge. My wife, of course, was in charge of Mrs. Bush's itinerary. She had known her well and favorably in the past. For several weeks she had sent messages back to Mrs. Bush, to her chief of staff, with schedules and plans and never got any response. To this day we don't know if it was total ineptness or unfriendliness or what. Literally no guidance on what to do with the First Lady. We would call and send messages, just a black hole. Bette had prepared and recommended some very interesting and imaginative events for the First Lady, none of them in the least controversial.

Q: This, of course, is before...

LORD: Before they ever took off. This is totally unrelated to the Fang issue. We think it was just plain incompetence in Mrs. Bush’s office, but who knows? It was impossible for Bette. Anyway she came up with a spectacular series of events. I don't want to sound self-serving for my wife, but it happens to be true. She got an old place opened up that hadn't been open for years, and arranged a session with top Chinese women of all walks of life, none of whom were radicals. They were artists and academics and working women and wives of leaders. She had special tables and entertainment. It was totally cultural, not political. It was a beautifully thought out event for Mrs. Bush, all of which Bette had to do without guidance because she hadn't gotten any guidance. During the rest of the trip everything went well; the usual things Mrs. Bush wanted to do. The Bushes went to church Sunday morning. We were very moved by the whole affair, the very idea
of this church again in China. It went back to when Bush was in the Liaison Office. He sat next to a 90 year old woman who had tears in her eyes and hadn't been in church in decades. All of us were moved by this. I come out and I am with the President. Mrs. Bush gets in another car with my wife and starts screaming at her literally at the top of her lungs about the next social event Bette had planned. Why did you get me into this affair with these Chinese women? I don't want a lot of political controversy. Why can't I go to the Summer Palace? Bette, of course, said she wouldn't do anything to embarrass her. I think you will enjoy this, she said. She was quiet about the fact that she hadn't had any guidance from Mrs. Bush. This incident made clear to me that Mrs. Bush's public appearance is not quite the same as her private personality. She was unbelievably rude to my wife. It turned out the affair was fantastic. Mrs. Bush enjoyed it and she hugged Bette at the end and so on. It was something we didn't forget. By then that particular episode was reflecting the tension of the Fang problem, obviously. I still don't understand why we didn't get any guidance before then.

Anyway, back to the main drama. Finally at the President's meeting Sunday afternoon with Zhao Ziyang, the banquet being Sunday night, we get a note passed to me from the Chinese that the Chinese leaders have now agreed to come to the banquet. We are throwing our hats in the air and figure everything is fine. They didn't say anything about Fang not coming; they just said they were coming. The Chinese said they don't want any press conference about Fang at the banquet or him at the head table. We said obviously we are not going to do that; we are going to treat him as a regular guest. Then the tension is relieved; it is going to be a great trip. Even though we had been on edge for the last 48 hours, it was going to have a happy ending.

We had this big Texas style barbecue at the Great Wall Hotel. We had all friendly people at Fang’s table but made sure his table wasn't in direct line of sight of the leaders. We were trying to be as sensitive as possible. We go through the banquet. I'm feeling great. We are having good discussions and the toasts are great, and everything is terrific. I can't see Fang’s table from where I am sitting at the head table. I'm just assuming he is there. I don't see anything. We all assumed that. At one point Bette got a note passed to her during the banquet saying an academic - they got the name wrong but something that rhymes with Perry Link - wants to see you. Bette didn't know what that was about, and said I'll see him later or something. It turns out as the history books now know that it was Perry Link who was with Fang and his wife. They had gone to the hotel and were turned away by the Chinese security and weren't allowed to attend.

None of this we knew until I got into the car after dinner, feeling euphoric at the end of this trip. My economic counselor lets me know that Fang is at the Embassy. He couldn't go to the banquet; he had been prevented by Chinese authorities. My heart stopped. I knew the press was going to get a hold of this. It turned out to be a disaster beyond my wildest dreams. We get back to the guest house and Fang holds a press conference at a hotel. That's all the press cares about, nothing else about the trip. It is all down the drain.

Meanwhile, I should point out for the history books that Scowcroft had told me beforehand on Saturday that first this was just a fantastic job of getting ready by the
Embassy for the President. Secondly he volunteered the Fang problem, which is still up in the air, was certainly not the Embassy’s fault. He was mad that it hadn't been brought to his attention or Baker's attention, that lower level people had cleared the guest list. I immediately said, I don't want them to get burned, that it is nobody's fault. None of us could have predicted the Chinese would be so unreasonable.

Back to the unfolding disaster. I had to take a sleeping pill to get to sleep. It was a low point in my career; I can tell you that. You know you don't want to see a presidential trip go down in flames particularly when you are in the middle of it. The U.S. side is having breakfast the next morning in the guest house, the top of the American team. I am purposefully, obviously not invited to the breakfast with the President, Baker, and Scowcroft. It was highly unusual, the Ambassador not being there, having a skull session on what to do. They decided to have the President say he complained to the Chinese before he got on the plane at the airport, and they would issue a stronger statement once they were airborne, not on Chinese soil.

The President does this at the airport and I am sent in to Zhu to complain as well. I spend the next couple of days madly working on the press, sending cables to the party, playing up the positive side of the visit. The Chinese are beginning to relax about it and cooling off about it and playing up the positive themes. I am urging the White House to do the same. It was clear that Bush was so pissed off at what had happened that he wasn't hearing much of this. The whole idea was to put a positive spin on the trip, which had the virtue of being true. It was important for a variety of reasons, and the Chinese were willing to play ball at that point. We were making some progress; this thing was quieting down.

Then there was a backgrounder in the press that was given by Scowcroft. It was clear at the time it was either Scowcroft or Sununu, the Chief of Staff. It appeared in the Washington Post and the New York Times, and was picked up by papers all over the place, Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, American papers. The backgrounder was by a senior White House official effectively saying the Embassy had screwed up the President's visit, it hadn't kept the Washington team informed about the Chinese being upset, and it had invited Fang Lizhi on its own. All of which is totally untrue of course. That is why I wanted in this history to go into details in terms of clearing the list. We hadn't predicted the time bomb, but nobody did. We did point out probable Chinese irritations. I still think it was the right thing to do obviously. We kept Washington fully posted. The White House and State had cleared the list, including Fang, etc.

My Embassy colleagues were about ready to lob nuclear bombs on Washington. I immediately called the entire senior staff together and said no one is to talk to the press. We are supposed to support the President and show a united front. This is a stupid backgrounder and it is unfair to the Embassy and not in American interests but I don't want any stories coming out of here. Keep your mouth shut. Nothing came out of the Embassy. So there was total discipline by the outraged Embassy staff.

Over the next two days with the help of Tomsen and my wife, I drafted a secret message to Scowcroft with a copy to Baker. I knew Scowcroft had done this, but I didn't want
Baker to think, no matter what the subject, that I was communicating with the National Security Advisor without keeping the Secretary of State informed. Baker was in Vienna; Scowcroft was in Washington. I had it double encrypted and sent by the CIA through the White House Situation Room, hand delivered so no one else would see it except Scowcroft and the same procedure in Vienna with Baker.

I rewrote the message about 10 times. I wanted to keep it professional and cool. I basically said the following. I pointed out the President's trip had gone well and we should otherwise accentuate the positive. I said I'm a professional, I have been around for 30 years. There are times when you need a scapegoat for the national interest or the President, and an Ambassador or someone else should take a fall. I don't have any problem with that principle. I think that's time honored and sometimes useful. But, leaving that aside, first, of course, you will remember the chronology - I did clear the list, I did keep them posted and so on. I did it just clinically. Then leaving that aside, let's just look at it from the U.S. national interest. What has this backgrounder done besides being totally inaccurate? Number one, it revived the whole issue, just when the Chinese and the American sides were letting it die. So, it overtook any positive play. Number two, it looked weak to the Chinese, having the President look defensive and embarrassed about inviting somebody who was not a bomb thrower at a banquet with 900 people. Reagan had gone to Moscow and met separately with dissidents. This backgrounder made it look like we are so sorry we hurt the Chinese feelings. That is not the way I said it in my message, but it is the thrust of my message. We looked wimpish and weak to the Chinese which is not a good idea at any time with any country particularly not the Chinese, and particularly not for a new President of the United States starting out a new relationship with the Chinese. It is just a bad way to begin with these guys. Thirdly, it was wrong. It is the Chinese who should be on the defensive. It is the Chinese who screwed things up, not the U.S. Their reaction was totally out of bounds. It was the Chinese who had misbehaved.

Fourth, even though the trip was said not to have gone well, the President at least was getting credit with Congress and the press and human rights groups for inviting dissidents to his banquet. They were saying at least he has the guts to do this. So the background undercuts all his credit with the human rights and congressional types by making clear that he was sorry this guy came to the banquet and he hurt the Chinese feelings. Finally, and this was the least important because I was leaving anyway, he had destroyed any possible influence I could have in my remaining tenure as Ambassador. In effect he was saying to the world and the Chinese this Ambassador is out of control, did something on his own, didn't tell us about your reaction, and ruined my trip.

Anyway, I sent this message to Scowcroft whom I had known for 15 years, who was a relatively good friend and working colleague, who had praised the trip as being sensational, etc. To this day, I have never had even an acknowledgment of the message or explanation. Not one. I know he got it because I had the CIA confirm to me the exact time they handed him the message in the Situation Room and the exact time they handed it to Baker. Scowcroft didn’t even have the courtesy to say he got my cable and let’s talk about it, or you’re wrong for the following reasons, etc.
Let me just finish by saying I have had a lot of bad moments in my career as well as a hell of a lot of good ones. The Laos statement in 1970. The failure of the Vietnam negotiations in October of 1972 when we went to Saigon and felt we had an agreement, and President Thieu turned us down. I think this Fang affair ranks at the bottom with those events, the combination of angst, disappointment, anger at the Chinese and our President and his National Security Advisor, just generally leaving a sour taste in my mouth.

This issue faded as time passed. The Chinese got extremely friendly toward the end of my stay - I left two months later. I am sure, however, because of Democracy Salon and now this incident and this backgrounder, that Deng and others had ambivalent feelings about me as well as Bette. By the time we left, Bette and I got an incredible sendoff. For example, on the same day, I saw the Secretary General, the Prime Minister, and the President. I had special meals in my honor and special toasting and messages sent to me. The same with Bette. So we got an incredibly warm sendoff by the Chinese. Also, back in the United States, I figured most people knew the White House misbehaved, and were pissed off at them, not me. I was a semi hero, beyond what I deserved, with the human rights and congressional groups. I mellowed out more generally. But having said that, obviously for the sake of the United States and the sake of President Bush, and for my own reputation, I would have much preferred a glorious Presidential trip to end my tenure in China.

Q: Just to put this in perspective, this is very early in Bush's term.

LORD: That's right, a few weeks after inauguration.

Q: You also have George Bush who is probably has as good a résumé in foreign affairs including going to China. It wasn't a Bill Clinton of Arkansas. Then, Scowcroft who had been around the NSC for a long time, but in a way it sounds very much like a brand new administration with new boys on the block who don't really understand the game and so if anything happens you have to blame somebody. It sounds like something out of the first couple of months of the Reagan White House, also the first couple of months out of the Clinton White House.

LORD: I want to try to be as detached as I can. First, Scowcroft claimed and I believe Baker claimed to me at some point, that nobody in their departments had brought to their attention the list and the possible controversy. By the way, Stape Roy was a hero in this. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary, one of the top diplomats we’ve ever had. He stuck his neck out and backgrounded to the press, talk about sticking your neck out, that the White House was all wet, but, in fact, the list had been vetted by the White House and the State Department, and he knew that Lord was not to blame. So Stape was a hero on that.

First of all, we all underestimated the Chinese response. To this day I am surprised by it, that with Fang to be at a big banquet at some obscure table, they'd get this excited. Also, if I had to do it all over again, I wouldn't do it any differently. If you have a separate
meeting, it is more provocative. If you don't do anything, you are vulnerable back home, and you are not sending the right signals to the Chinese or the Chinese people or the reformers whom you are trying to help and give support to. Even if it were brought to the attention of Baker and Scowcroft, they would have been told, as we suggested, the Chinese would be unhappy about it, but the payoff is much larger than this, and it will be under control essentially. We made clear that the dissidents in general might be a problem. By the way, there were other dissidents in this controversy, clearly people pushing the envelope that the Chinese never mentioned. Obviously Deng Xiaoping had a particular thing for Fang.

Part of the Bush reaction might have been that he felt he had not been informed. Having said that, you would think, not that I wanted it to be this way, that the President would get mad at his subordinates in Washington rather than his Embassy if he feels he has a right to be mad at all which I don't think he does. Moreover, I'm not even sure Bush, Baker, and Scowcroft didn't know. There was a Camp David session with outside China experts before the trip. To this day I have never gotten it straight. At least one or two of the participants told me that the Fang invitation which as I say, had leaked by then, was a topic of conversation among the outside experts. Who were at Camp David? Baker and Scowcroft, at least I believe they were there, and the President. To this day I don't know whether it came up in front of the President, if he knew, actually did know about this, let alone Baker and Scowcroft. So, there is a little confusion.

Anyway, trying to be detached about it, here is the President. He is a brand new President. He has a particular soft spot for China. Going there he expects a triumphant homecoming which he got in every other way. He expects it to be a wonderful personal experience for him and his wife, going back there, and a big media plus, and getting off to a great start on foreign policy and generally on his image, and instead this happens. You can see why I'm trying to be detached about this. I just have to assume that he felt that we should have predicted this more. What bothers me the most is he didn't get mad at the Chinese for ruining his trip. He got mad at his own team. Now, I don't think it reveals lack of experience in foreign policy which they both had, the two people you mentioned and Baker, but frankly a clear softness on human rights, and a feeling that we shouldn't do anything to ruffle the Chinese. The President, in fact, did not raise human rights directly in his meetings with the Chinese at all. He got Baker to do it the first night, but the President didn't raise it. Marlin Fitzwater, the press spokesman, confirmed to the press that the President didn't even raise human rights. We had to scramble and say he was going to church and speaking about it on his radio and TV, and Baker raised it the first night. Clearly, this softness was shown by the President's tepid response later to Tiananmen Square.

Q: I think so, too, with Scowcroft...

LORD: Yes, Scowcroft going over there secretly after the Tiananmen Square massacre. So this is just a preview of their view on this subject.

Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Given this terrible experience, it is not very long thereafter
when you begin to get the demonstrations in the Square of the students. Did this experience influence in any way the way the Embassy understood what was going on and reported what was going on with the students? Because obviously you couldn't have known what was going to come to begin with on Tiananmen night. Was there a concern that there was an unwillingness in Washington to hear about this? Does it have an impact do you think?

LORD: We didn't pull our punches on reporting. That didn't affect our reporting. Now, we couldn't predict Tiananmen Square. We clearly were made even more aware by the Fang affair than we had been how sensitive Deng and the leadership were to the human rights question. We clearly kept our eyes and ears open even more for that. We did as we had done all along during my tenure, kept reporting on the pushing of the envelope by the reformers. We kept in as much touch as we could on that. I don't believe there was any direct correlation of any magnitude between the Fang banquet issue and Tiananmen Square. It was just a symptom of the sensitivity of the Chinese leadership and their repressive attitudes. Also Deng’s annoyance at Fang personally - I believe Fang had talked about corruption under Deng.

Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: You are not getting anything when you are making these early reports on what is happening in the Square, you are not getting any responses from Washington that suggested you guys are doing it again?

LORD: No, absolutely not. Just to make it clear, I left one week after the Tiananmen demonstrations began. I left during the first big demonstration on April 22, 100,000 people at Hu Yaobang’s funeral. He had died on the 15th. In the intervening week there had been posters and wreaths to Hu. The sentiment was growing, and then they used the funeral as the first big occasion. We were reporting this. I certainly did not think it was going to grow to the dimensions it did, I don't know anybody who did. It grew to extraordinary dimensions, of course. When people think of students in Tiananmen Square, what they forget is in the first place there were seven weeks without a single incident of violence, without a single death. If anything, the traffic ran better than ever. It was the most orderly, responsive, disciplined crowd. Not one accident, not one incident in seven weeks with a million people sometimes in the Square, absolutely extraordinary. Furthermore, it was not just students. It was journalists, academics, party members, military, business people, farmers, peasants, workers, all kinds of people demonstrating, not just students. Now it wasn't just about democracy. It was about inflation, corruption, nepotism, poor conditions, physical and mental at the universities. There were a lot of different sources of angst. It was in over 200 cities - not just Beijing - which was extraordinary. None of which the scope of which we predicted.

Q: But to take Nancy's question... I mean after all, an Embassy essentially just consists of Foreign Service Officers who are looking at foreign governments and trying to sense who are they, where are they going, and what are they doing. It is so hard to turn that ability off when you look at your own government. Here is a brand new government. Here is George Bush who sometimes had the view of not being quite serious, you know, sort of a dilettante. He did this and he did that, and saying you know, this is not that strong a
President.

LORD: Look, the Embassy and I personally were extremely mad at the President and Scowcroft, although I am proud of the discipline we showed. There was never one leak out of that Embassy complaining about Washington. The angst was confined to my back channel messages which never got a response. Yes, we were mad, but first of all he was the President. Number two, he was not a dilettante about foreign policy. He was quite serious about it, knew a lot about it, had extensive experience, and did some good work as the Gulf War showed. None of us thought he'd suddenly become a lightweight. I didn't encourage a lot of griping and whining at staff meetings. I can't tell you what went on around the water cooler. We maintained discipline at staff meetings: look, we are going to show a united front. I know how some of you feel. I know how I feel. It is unfair, but we've got to serve the national interest and serve this President. That is all I would say in front of others. With my wife and my DCM and one or two others I was more frank one on one. I was hopping mad. No, our job was still, and I really think I am being accurate on this, to not pull any punches either way in our reporting, try to serve the President. I kept trying to stress - I worked hard on this for a matter of weeks despite my other unhappiness - to put as positive a spin on the trip as I could in terms of substance and perception and kept urging Washington to do the same. Of course it was overcome by this event; it never really recovered. So, it didn't really affect our reporting. I and others were very angry and disappointed that the President would get mad both inaccurately and just wrong in substance at the Embassy and have his Security Advisor tell the world, as opposed to being mad at what the Chinese had done to him.

Q: Was it ever proposed that after this thing happened, I can see somebody else reacting saying well why don't we have tea and cookies with Fang at some point. You know if you are sticking it to me I mean talking to the Chinese, why don't you come over and we'll have a midnight snack or something like that, or did that even come up?

LORD: Well, later he had to get refuge in the Embassy when my successor Jim Lilley was there. I immediately saw Perry Link who was with him and went over this with him and expressed our concern about Fang’s well being. I think he was surrounded and under house arrest by this point, so we could never get at him, but I can't reconstruct what happened to him at that point. Basically he was hemmed in. We didn't make any effort to have a high profile meeting with him. I immediately went and made sure I saw his buddy and sent word to Fang about how concerned I was. I met with Perry Link, the professor who had been with him, but I didn't meet with Fang.

Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Do you have a sense in the Bush administration, Bush himself considered himself somewhat of a China expert because of his experience in China. Were there any other people at the very top that had any interest in China, Scowcroft and these other people, or were they mostly Europe oriented?

LORD: That is a good question. Scowcroft was more arms control and Russia, but he had been a generalist. He had been National Security Advisor under Ford after all, so by definition he was a generalist, including China. He wasn't without background on China.
certainly. Baker hadn't had much dealings with Asia generally I believe or with China. There were plenty of good people like Stape Roy and others back there working on it. I don't think there is any need to go through the other parts of his trip. We hit some of the positive stuff. We followed up. I was instructed immediately after the President left to go and ask for an explanation and complain about what had happened, in addition to a statement issued from the airplane.

Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Were there other key policy issues Bush was trying to resolve during the visit?

LORD: Resolve may be too strong a word. By the way, there was another positive element in the lead up to the trip. They allowed the President to use his car whenever he was riding without a Chinese official in it. For security reasons, they never had allowed that before. It is just another little example of how they went out of their way to be hospitable. In terms of the agenda, it was the usual suspects, and the talks went very well. There were discussions on Russia, on Japan. The Chinese raised Taiwan but not very vigorously. A discussion of Chinese reforms and where they were going. Reminiscing about Bush's days in China. Baker raised human rights and Tibet. When I say it went well, partly it was because the reception was so terrific until that last incident, all these other factors I've mentioned. The President also did address the Chinese people which in those days was significant. They did have good discussions at the beginning of the President's term sketching the future of U.S.-Chinese relations and our common interests and talking about issues like Japan where he had just come from, and Russia, and some of the other areas. There may well have been some further movement on exchanges in bilateral agreements, but remember we only had about a three weeks advance notice on this. He was a brand new President, so the purpose was not to make breakthroughs, but to establish a positive tone to the beginning of the relationship as he came into office.

Before this, under Reagan, Secretary Shultz visited China a couple of times during my tenure as did almost every other cabinet official. It was a sign of the times and a fortunate window of opportunity we had during those years. We had three different CIA directors coming in black hats. We had a couple of Secretaries of Defense. Shultz was there twice. Almost every other cabinet level economic type, not to mention directors of USIA and Peace Corps and all kinds of Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Congressional delegations which I encouraged. High level visits from everyone from the Stock Exchange to President Carter to Billy Graham to Kissinger to Gregory Peck, Charlton Heston. A great variety. It made it a lot of fun and also helped to expand our relationship and our bilateral links. Probably the single most positive visit and the most important one was Secretary Shultz's trip from March 1 to March 6, 1987.

Q: Of '89?

LORD: Of 1987. He said afterwards, I think I got this from Dick Solomon who was head of policy planning, this is the best foreign trip he had ever taken as Secretary of State both from the standpoint of substance and logistics. He was extremely pleased with the trip. I'm trying to be self serving like some other people you talk to.
Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: That's all right because I wrote the background paper for his wife for that trip.

LORD: You were there during that trip weren't you?

Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Yes.

LORD: You would agree it was a terrific trip.

[Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I actually didn't get to go on the trip, but I helped advance it from Washington.

LORD: Anyway, it started out in Guilin on a boat trip, and he came to Beijing where he met the Foreign Minister, Li Peng, the Vice Premier, the Defense Minister, President Yang, Zhao Ziyang, who at that time was Party Secretary. Of course he met with the Embassy staff. Deng Xiaoping. A couple of press conferences and speeches and so on. He went up to Dalian and visited this U.S.-sponsored institute training people in business and management. I pushed hard for that visit, even though some were trying to drop it. Then he went on down to Shandong and visited Mount Tai where you climb to the top and Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius, and then out through Shanghai. It was a pretty long trip for a Secretary of State in those days, about six days, March 1-6, 1987. Indeed after the trip, even though it got extremely positive coverage, there was some inquiry and carping about the expense, the number of people, and how long he had been there. It's peanuts compared with other entourages since then, but at the time it was a very minor flap, and we had to explain how important it was.

I had been back in Washington that January to help script the trip. If I do say so we were pretty good on these high level trips, scene setters and think pieces ahead of time and careful work by advance people, advice. I was with Shultz every step of the way, helping him on this, as my wife was with Mrs. Shultz. It was an important time, because as I pointed out earlier there were the Hu Yaobang sacking and some tightening up and some other developments in our relationship. There was less momentum, a slowing down in our relations before this trip. I think this was an important one in terms of resuming that momentum. It was the first trip as I say after Hu was sacked. On our domestic scene, we had the Iran-Contra issue flaring up. Each side's domestic scene was a little shaky. The strategic purpose of the trip, against the backdrop of these domestic events, was to make sure that we moved forward again in our relationship and our agenda on the bilateral front and to have in depth discussions on the international issues which included Russia, Afghanistan, Indochina, Korea, the Iran-Iraq War. Then a lot of emphasis on the economic agenda both in the discussions and the meeting at the Dalian Institute and the McDonnell-Douglas plane factory in Shanghai and so on. Also he saw many parts of the country. He gave a couple of important speeches and toasts, including on American values like Reagan had done at Fudan, and I stressed that was important to do. Also a careful formulation on Taiwan which in effect said we would welcome any progress between Taiwan and Beijing. We had some formulations. They were not dramatically
new. They didn't upset Taiwan, but they gave some encouragement to the Chinese about our position. I did recommend that he not do this on Taiwan at the beginning of his trip in Beijing. It might get so much attention that it would dominate the rest of his trip, but rather do it in Shanghai toward the end.

Since there was some obvious debate going on in China among the leadership on political reform given what had happened in preceding months, I warned the Secretary not to be snowed by what would inevitably be a show of unity and solidarity by the Chinese leaders. I pointed out the tensions in the wake of the Hu fall. I urged him, and he did do this much more than Bush was to do later, to state carefully both in his public speeches and his private remarks, that the gathering repression or the falling back on the liberalization however modest, was not good for China, and also wasn't good for American opinion. It was important to the relationship, discussion among the media, academics, and Congressmen. Many of the latter, Congressmen and academics, were beginning to send letters on treatments of intellectuals and artists. There was a contrast in China to the developing positive events in Russia under Gorbachev. The Secretary did raise some of these themes.

The Chinese didn't react negatively.

I had a lot of talks with the Secretary privately about the Washington scene. At another time, by the way, the Secretary was in the middle of the Iran-Contra debate. As you may recall, at some point Poindexter had been fired and the Tower Commission had been set up. Also we listened to the President's speech on this issue, on the train between Shandong and Shanghai. But at one point, there were rumors that Shultz was thinking of resigning, and I had sent him a private very personal message, literally personal. It must have been through CIA close hold channel urging him to stay on and why I thought it was important and his contributions and so on. Obviously, I didn't turn him around myself, but I know he appreciated that. It was important to send such a message.

So, I felt this trip did provide new momentum in the relationship. Both sides could say that despite our somewhat uneasy domestic scenes, we can and we will move ahead. We agreed with the Chinese on new contacts with the North Koreans through our respective Embassies in Beijing, trying to encourage north-south dialogues. We began to preview how we might begin to liberalize some exports of technology, again if Beijing behaved itself in other areas. We agreed to a PRC Consulate in Los Angeles. We got some movement in reciprocity issues of interest to us. Shultz gave a good rundown on U.S.-Russian relations. We relayed to the Chinese Foreign Minister and economic ministers and others our concerns about business, trade, and investment problems. None of this is necessarily dramatic, but it gave substance as well as logistic smoothness to a very complicated trip. One of the Secretary’s secretarial staff said it was the most complicated Secretarial trip they had. I was really proud of the performance of our embassy and consulates.

Let me now return to the end of my tenure as Ambassador.
In the wake of the Bush trip and for the remainder of my stay, there was still obviously continuing ferment for political reform and dissent. I don't want to exaggerate this, but clearly the debate was continuing and we were reporting on this. Nobody I'm aware of either inside or outside of China predicted or could have known of the size of the demonstrations that were about to come.

As we were saying our good-byes, we had a tremendous sendoff, lots of parties and the usual speeches and so on. We had one party for Chinese at our house on April 15, a week before we were leaving. We heard at that party that Hu Yaobang had died. This is in Bette’s book, *Legacies*, at the beginning. Little did we know that was to be a signal for a major event in Chinese history. Hu had always been known as someone unpredictable and spontaneous, feisty, unlike most stodgy Chinese leaders, and had been liberal on political reform and Tibet and related issues. In retrospect he was built up as even more of a liberal hero than was actually the case. In any event, Chinese intellectuals and students saw him as someone who was hopeful. They were unhappy to say the least about his having been sacked a couple years earlier, as well as the continuing lack of real political reform in China. Thus, starting relatively slowly but building up quickly, people reacted to his death by circulating poems and posters and wreaths to his honor, and people began to demonstrate in Tiananmen Square in relatively modest numbers. A state funeral was ordered for Tiananmen Square on April 22, the day Bette and I were leaving China, by coincidence. On that day there was a huge, very big crowd of roughly 100,000 people with the excuse of paying tribute to Hu but also beginning to demonstrate on behalf of greater freedom and democracy, against corruption, against nepotism, for better conditions in school and universities etc. We were reporting this fully, of course, but I felt as I left, although this was very significant obviously, I had no idea that it would mushroom and get to the point that it did. Let alone the massacre a couple of months later. Indeed Bette and I went on from China, had a stop in Singapore, and were invited to a private dinner around his pool by Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yu, who I had known favorably off and on. He asked me in this private dinner with all his leadership what was going to happen in China. I said that I thought it was significant, but controllable and manageable - showing how prescient I was.

*Q:* Well, I think we really are talking about something that even at the time, to me it was fairly obvious as an unknowledgeable person about the thing, that this was something that a moderately apt leadership could deal with. You know, you see some people; you do some things. You could have turned this thing off.

*LORD:* Absolutely. One reason I was so outraged by the massacre was that it was unnecessary. Particularly in the early part of this, the first couple of weeks, the actual requests by the students and others were very modest, essentially to have a dialog with the government. There were some stunted dialogue with Li Peng and others, but basically they were not asking for anything revolutionary. There were occasional signs that were insulting, but basically it was obviously very peaceful. As I said earlier, no violent incidents or death in 49 days. And it was all walks of life so clearly it was important. A leadership that had its act together and was moderately inclined could have defused this thing. I remain convinced of that to this day. Obviously there was debate in the Politburo.
They were paralyzed as to how to respond. There were those, probably Li Peng and some of the military from the beginning who felt that any demonstration however peaceful in the center of Tiananmen Square with all its history was either inherently dangerous or symbolically dangerous. They ought to squash it right away. There were others like Zhao Ziyang and some other generals including a former Minister of Defense who wrote to the leadership saying don't use force. They thought they ought to meet the students part way. They were paralyzed, and when Gorbachev came, they felt particularly insulted because they couldn't greet him at Tiananmen Square. They had to greet him at the airport. What was supposed to be a major rapprochement with Russia was overshadowed by the demonstrations. In front of worldwide media attention. That made them mad. They held off until Gorbachev’s visit because they didn't want to make a big incident beforehand. They began to tighten the screws after that. The history is familiar to everyone. I don't have to go through it.

Personally, it turns out by coincidence my wife had to double back to China. A few months earlier when we knew we were leaving, Don Hewitt of 60 Minutes visited China and knew then that Gorbachev was coming in May to see the Chinese which was a major event that CBS and the other networks were going to cover. So, they asked my wife, knowing we'd be gone by then, whether she would come back and be a commentator on television on the Gorbachev visit, essentially giving background pieces on Chinese culture and history and so on. We checked this out carefully with the White House and the State Department to make sure there was no problem with the wife of a former Ambassador doing this. It was clear from the beginning that she wouldn't be identified as such. She would just be identified as a Chinese-American author. They said fine. We thought it would be a totally conventional nice puff piece type of thing, and she'd come back to China for that.

Well, by the time we left, this thing had heated up and CBS wanted her back right away. She had made the commitment, but she had no idea she would be covering such an historical event. So, after Singapore, she went back to China and I went back to the U.S. She was a commentator on CBS until late May when she left thinking the crisis was over. The numbers in the Square were dwindling, getting down to a few thousand. The authorities clearly could have declared victory and gotten out, but they wanted to move in a show of force. People know the history. She was there commentating almost every day, and she was there when the Chinese pulled the plug on the feed to CBS. She acted as interpreter for Dan Rather and stalled as much as she could until he got there; they did have to deal with him rather than a producer. She did a fabulous job as commentator, but always identified only as an author.

Meanwhile I went back to Washington and was deluged by the media once I left the State Department. I appeared on all the major TV, radio shows, in which I supported the Administration. In support of the demonstrations, I expressed the hope that the Chinese government would act with restraint and meet the students and other protesters halfway with their reasonable demands, but of course, was very tough in my statements after the massacre. Having said that, I still felt we ought to stay engaged with China as I said in an earlier interview. Over the summer I wrote, and that fall, I published in Foreign Affairs.
magazine an article called "The Big Chill" which was very tough on the Chinese on Tiananmen Square and the lack of political reform, but also pointed out why political reform was in their self interest and not just a favor to us. Then I made the case that while pressing human rights we should continue to engage China and move ahead with the relationship.

As I have said elsewhere there were tremendous exchanges of delegations and visitors and negotiations and agreements throughout my period as Ambassador. We were lucky to have this positive window. Without trying to give an exhaustive list of any kind, let me give an example of a couple of months period. In the spring and summer of 1987 the following happened. These are just the major events, not Assistant Secretary and below level or other events. In a two to three month period we had a ministerial level meeting of the Joint Commission on Science and Technology; a visit by CINCPAC; a visit by former President Carter; a visit by the Attorney General, Ed Meese; Henry Grunwald, the editor in chief of Time magazine; Pam Harriman leading a delegation; Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor; Henry Kissinger; Charles Wick, head of USIA; Senator Cranston; several other congressional delegations; the U.S. Air Force Band; Ambassador Walters, our UN Ambassador; Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor; former Ambassador Anne Armstrong for security matters; Tom Brokaw in an NBC special on China; and a few other assorted events. This gives you an example of the kind of pace that we had and the interesting and positive exchanges.

Q: Well, should we just put at the end here.

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[Kennedy] Today is August 7, 1998. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker is with us and will be asking some questions concerning filling in on China. Could you explain what the student demonstrations were, when they happened, and then how you dealt with them?

LORD: We actually covered a great deal of that, but not with any great precision, partly because of my memory and partly because, by coincidence, I was actually in the United States at the time. So just to go over it and at the risk of some repetition I should say that at the end of 1986 there were demonstrations in Shanghai by students. As I recall, these dealt with the typical student issues of greater academic freedom, corruption, and inflation, probably political issues as well. These demonstrations were thought to have been partly inspired by Fang Lizhi and other scholars who were debating these issues at the time. As I recall, there was no bloodshed, but there were widespread demonstrations. I only remember their taking place in Shanghai. By coincidence, I was in the United States on vacation at the time. I kept in very close touch with this development in case it developed into something more serious.

However, what was most significant was the fallout in terms of Chinese domestic policy. Hu Yaobang was then Secretary of the Communist Party of China. He was known even then and, of course, has been known, in retrospect, to have been more progressive on political reforms than most Chinese leaders. As a result of these student demonstrations,
there was debate in the Politburo of the Party on responsibility for the unrest. As a result, Deng Xiaoping sacked Hu at some point in the succeeding months.

We in the Embassy, of course, covered these demonstrations at the time as matters of great significance. In retrospect, they were something like a tremor in advance of the earthquake in June, 1989, which none of us, as I've said elsewhere, would have predicted would occur on such a large scale. Again, as I recall, the earlier demonstration in 1986 was fairly peaceful.

Of course, the sacking of Hu Yaobang was very important because he was the heir apparent to Deng, as the Secretary of the Communist Party. Deng had already taken himself out of day to day operations, though he was still the number one person in China by far. There were several reasons for the sacking of Hu. First, Deng had always had a balancing act of including more progressive people like Hu and Ziao Ziyang in the leadership as well as more conservative people like Li Peng. Deng had to watch the balance. Deng himself may have felt somewhat vulnerable from the conservatives, because of the unrest. Therefore, he threw Hu to the wolves. We felt that that was one element in play.

Secondly, Deng was convinced, to some degree, of the dangers of liberalism. This was not just opportunism to protect himself. Deng had never been notably in favor of liberalization of the regime. He was very conservative on this front, even as he had been very receptive to economic reforms and on the opening to the outside world. Thus, Deng probably felt that Hu had gone too far. Deng himself had been concerned about the unrest. After all, he was Mao Zedong's right hand man in the anti-rightist campaign. He was to be, in fact, the author of the Tienanmen massacre.

Thirdly, Deng was probably a little uncomfortable with Hu’s style. Hu was spontaneous and feisty and said what he believed. He was much more colorful and unpredictable than most Chinese leaders. This had led to some complaints among the Chinese leadership.

So I think that there was a mix of reasons for sacking Hu Yaobang. Also in the succeeding months, it was not just a question of sacking Hu; there was a general process of tightening up under way. As I said earlier, in this period of the late 1980s there was considerable discussion among academics, scholars, students, and writers, many of whom we met in the Embassy, and particularly through my wife's contacts as well as those of the Embassy, about political reform and about the need to open up on that front. There seemed to be more tolerance on these issues in China. So there was that kind of ferment at the time.

However, in the wake of these Shanghai demonstrations, not only was Hu sacked but they undertook some of these conservative, ideological campaigns. I believe that these campaigns included the “Four Cardinal Principles.” Don't ask me to repeat these socialist tenets, but that was one thing that they did. There were also campaigns against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalization, guarding against peaceful evolution, which was their code word for Western and foreign ideas undermining Marxist and Communist
political principles. There was a tightening up in the cultural field, as well, during this period. That campaign lasted for several months.

Q: [Bernkopf] Could you say anything about what some American leaders thought about China, but not of other countries? I'm thinking particularly here about former Secretary of State George Shultz. Do you have any sense of what his views were and how important he thought China was, particularly in terms of China versus Japan?

LORD: Yes. Secretary Shultz was clearly in favor of engagement with China. He recognized the strategic as well as the economic importance of dealing with China. He recognized that in the next century China will be increasingly important. He saw the impact of China on regional and global issues, as well as the very extensive, bilateral interests we had in China, including the economic area, which is of particular concern to Shultz. Like any responsible, American leader, he didn't like the Chinese political system and felt that human rights were a legitimate part of our agenda. However, he also didn't feel that the Chinese-American relationship should be held hostage to this issue. Therefore, he would raise it and we would raise it and press on it, even as we hoped for progress. We thought that this was in China's own self-interest, involving economic reform and opening up China to the outside world, with the U.S. and others encouraging this trend. We realized that we would have to move ahead with an imperfect regime because of our other interests to promote this broader agenda.

So I would say, in terms of the current debate, that now he should speak for himself. However, I believe that Shultz would be closer to the Bush and Kissinger viewpoint, and now the current Clinton viewpoint. He would differ from those in Congress who would attach a higher priority to the human rights dimension. He would not ignore human rights but he would stress the need for engagement with China.

Q: [Bernkopf] He had trouble with other members of the Reagan administration over Iran-Contra issues. Was China ever such a contentious issue?

LORD: I don't recall that China was ever an issue for debate during the Reagan administration during my time of service. There were periodic debates on China policy during the early part of this administration, which other persons can document. Reagan came into office as being pro-Taiwan and, obviously, a first-class anti-communist. Al Haig came in as Secretary of State, after having worked with Kissinger on the opening to China. He clearly pressed Reagan in a more positive direction. I am sure that there was a lot of debate in the Reagan administration over the Shanghai Communiqué of 1982, which defused the arms sales question. The Chinese put the heat on this issue during the early part of the first Reagan administration.

You will recall that around the end of 1985 I arrived in China as Ambassador, following my previous position as President of the Council on Foreign Relations. By the time I arrived in China, we had signed the 1982 Communiqué and President Reagan had been to China. He had spoken very firmly on values but also urged the development of the Chinese-American relationship. The atmosphere eased greatly, both in bilateral terms and
even, to a certain extent, within China. By then there was unanimity within the Reagan administration on China policy, although there may have been some disagreement on particular, tactical issues or negotiations. However, on the general strategy of engagement, even though we kept in mind our values, I don't recall that there was any real dispute on China policy at any time.

Q: [Bernkopf] I remember that I worked in the Department of State at that time. The way we described the Chinese-American relationship was that it had matured to a point where we anticipated that nothing could derail it again. So I think that this was a period of great optimism for those of us who were working on Chinese affairs.

LORD: I think that, as I've said previously, it's not that we didn't have problems with Chinese policy, tough negotiations, or some problems with human rights in China or Tibet. However, on the whole, during this period we were greatly expanding our contacts and our constituencies regarding the relationship on both sides. There were high level visits and negotiations. So it was the most positive period in our relations from the Nixon opening right up to today.

Q: [Bernkopf] Along those lines, and you may already have answered this question, but just to be specific, what was the attitude of Paul Wolfowitz, who has emerged more recently as a critic of Clinton administration policy toward China? I think that he left the Department of State in 1986 or 1987.

LORD: He was Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs during the first part of my tenure in China as Ambassador. Then Gaston Sigur was Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs after that.

Q: [Bernkopf] Could you talk about both of them in terms of their views on China and maybe then any differences in operating style?

LORD: First, it's only fair that they speak for themselves, of course.

Q: [Kennedy] I have interviewed Gaston Sigur but I haven't interviewed Paul Wolfowitz.

LORD: Let me say right off, and this is not to show happy collegiality, that I don't recall any distinctive, real debates with Paul Wolfowitz or Gaston Sigur. Sometimes, Paul and I would tangle on personnel matters or things like that. However, I had very good relations with both Wolfowitz and Sigur. They are both very bright and both in favor of the opening to China. I think that both of them put a great deal of emphasis on geopolitical, security, and strategic aspects of U.S. relations with China, and not just the economic aspects. At the time the economic aspects were of growing importance but nowhere near as important as they are today. Both Wolfowitz and Sigur were concerned with human rights, but, again, although these were an important part of our agenda, they were not enough to hold up the development of our whole relationship with China. So I don't recall any significant differences with either one of them or with the views of either one of them.
I think that both Wolfowitz and Sigur were concerned at all times that we should not undermine Taiwan. I know that they were both firm on that front, as I was, as well. This is not a very interesting answer, but I believe that it is accurate.

Q: [Kennedy] I don't recall your mentioning it but, for the record, I recall that both Wolfowitz and Sigur were Assistant Secretaries of State for East Asian Affairs.

LORD: They were Assistant Secretaries of State during the first and second parts of my tenure as Ambassador to China.

Q: [Bernkopf] Were there any significant differences between these two men in operating style that are worth noting?

LORD: Nothing that really jumps out at me. They are obviously different personalities. Paul Wolfowitz is a more dynamic and blunt type. Gaston Sigur is more soft spoken and gentlemanly, but that doesn't mean that he doesn't have strong views. In terms of dealing with the Embassy in Beijing, on a day to day basis, and this is natural and correct, our work with the Department was most often either with the Country Desk or with the Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of Chinese Affairs, who in this case was J. Stapleton Roy, who did an outstanding job. He was a solid supporter, as I was of his in the mid-'90s when he was Ambassador to China and I was Assistant Secretary.

So, on a day to day basis, I would deal most often and directly with Stape Roy. This was only natural, as the Assistant Secretary himself has to cover the whole East Asian region. I dealt with Stape Roy more than with either Gaston Sigur or Paul Wolfowitz. I couldn't have had a better back up than Stape Roy, in terms of intelligence, loyalty, openness, and deep knowledge. In addition, I had very cooperative and solid backup in the Pentagon led by Rich Armitage, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Jim Kelly, and others were also helpful. I would consult closely with all of them when I was home, and we all worked together very well.

Q: [Bernkopf] You mentioned Taiwan. I just wanted to say, and perhaps this is the last thing I would want to mention, that this was the beginning of a period of tremendous change in Taiwan. That is, it was the beginning of the process of democratization and of real change. This was a change which, one can even argue, completely altered our perspective on Taiwan. Suddenly, Taiwan became what we always wanted it to be, with an open, democratic process.

How skeptical were people in charge in the State Department and you, as Ambassador to China, about these changes in Taiwan? How much of a surprise were they? How much of an impact did they make in terms of your view of the balance between China and Taiwan?

LORD: I can't speak for others, but my own view was, first, that I was not skeptical of these changes in Taiwan. On the contrary, I was encouraged by the changes in Taiwan.
Chiang Ching-kuo was followed as President of China by Lee Teng-hui.

Chiang Ching-kuo had started in the right direction. He was able to do that because he had the mantle of his father, Chiang Kai-shek, so he could hardly be accused of doing anything against him. In a sense, Chiang Ching-kuo opened doors on the political process. It was easier for him to do this because he was part of his family. Therefore, this protected him against opposition and legitimized the great, further steps that his successor, Lee Teng-hui, took. It also made it possible for someone born in Taiwan (Lee) to be the leader of the country. So, Chiang Ching-kuo's contribution was very significant. I forget when he died, but his contribution was very meaningful. Although they weren't close to open elections in Taiwan while I was Ambassador to China, the Taiwanese were clearly moving in the right direction.

I was not skeptical about the changes in Taiwan. I was encouraged. I also felt, even as I do today, that these changes, if not inevitable, were predictable. In my view we have seen economic progress in Asia and the aspirations of the middle class reflect the universal principle that man or woman does not live by rice alone. This process has been at work in Taiwan as well.

I was consistently in favor of maintaining strong, unofficial ties with Taiwan and not giving in to unreasonable Chinese demands, even as we balanced off our interests with mainland China. So my own views certainly didn't change. I felt that we had a moral and historical connection to Taiwan in any event and that we should stand by our friends. If anything, of course, their movement toward a freer political system reinforced my view that we should strongly support Taiwan even as we moved ahead with China. I believe that six American presidents of both political parties have done very well in carrying out this balancing act.

I don't recall now the impact the changes in Taiwan had on China. These changes didn't affect our policy. We have pursued a consistent policy which had been set out by previous administrations, in which I served. Taiwan has always been a key issue with the mainland Chinese. There is no way that you could have a high level meeting with the mainland Chinese without the Taiwan question coming up.

My recollection of that period when I was Ambassador to China is that the Taiwan issue was not as hot as it is today or was, when we opened diplomatic relations with mainland China or during the early years of the Reagan Administration. The Taiwan issue was always there, but the mainland Chinese were already deploying troops away from the coast facing Taiwan and were concerned about the Polar Bear to the North [i.e., Russia] and the Vietnamese to the South. As I recall it, the rhetoric concerning Taiwan was obviously unpleasant but not at a very high decibel level. Taiwan was not an issue that they kept beating us over the head with at our various meetings. Taiwan has always been and will continue to be a key issue in our relations with China. However, I felt that throughout this period it was quite a manageable matter.

Q: [Kennedy] I would have thought that you belonged to the Kissinger school of
realpolitik. In this context Taiwan, as a rather small area, has really been screwing things up with China by doing exactly what we would want and would aspire to have them do. However, the gap between what Taiwan has been and what it is becoming has been growing. It's going to be harder and harder for the United States and the world to refuse to accord recognition to Taiwan. I would think that, in terms of policy planning and looking at the matter with the cold eye of what's in it for us, this, in a way, would be a disturbing development. Did you find this to be a consideration?

LORD: No, not at all. I really felt that the changes in Taiwan were - and are - an encouraging development. They are good for the people of Taiwan. Initially, we didn't have as extensive a debate as we have had in recent years on universal versus so-called Asian values. This is a phoney debate and Taiwan's move toward democracy proves that. I think that these changes in Taiwan are not only good for Taiwan itself but are a good example generally in the world, in Asia, and to show that Chinese people want freedom, too - a strong message to the mainland.

I don't recall Congressional sentiment bubbling up about a need to be more pro-Taiwan and anti-mainland China because Taiwan was becoming freer, and mainland China wasn't. I don't think that the Taiwan issue really complicated our policy toward China while I was Ambassador. Above all, speaking personally, I've always set great store about promoting our values. I've been insistent on that. Clearly, I also have geopolitical instincts since I worked for Kissinger and I think that these are legitimate. However, you have to balance off these considerations. My only reaction to these changes in Taiwan is a feeling of pleasure for the people of Taiwan. If anything, these changes might encourage political liberalization in China, at least in a modest way. Now of course you could argue that Deng Xiaoping and others who are more conservative might see developments in Taiwan as a threat to their position. However, I think that they were looking more particularly at what was happening in mainland China.

It is hard to judge the impact of what has been happening in Taiwan on the people in China. I suspect that Taiwan developments didn't have much of an impact on them in the past. You should recall that when I was Ambassador to China the authorities in Taiwan were loosening up, but they had by no means reached the point of free elections. So the situation in Taiwan had by no means approached the dramatic point which it reached by the early 1990s.

Q: [Bernkopf] I would like to raise one more issue and that is the situation in Korea. This was also a period when the Chinese were moving toward developing diplomatic relations with South Korea. I was wondering to what, if any, extent the mainland Chinese have tried to bring the American Embassy into this process in terms of how you saw it and what you thought the implications were, as well as whether you worried about what the North Koreans would do in the event of normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea.

LORD: I would like to make a couple of comments on Korea. First, South Korean diplomacy was very skillful. Events started moving toward improved relations with China toward the latter part of my tenure as Ambassador to China. I think that in this
context one of the key events was the Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988. Both mainland China and Russia agreed to attend the Seoul Olympic Games. The Eastern European countries agreed to attend as well.

Basically, by that time the economic performance of South Korea was terrific, and the poor economic performance of North Korea was becoming clear. South Korea was eclipsing North Korea after starting out, perhaps behind it in the 1950s or even in the 1960s. South Korea was being recognized by more and more countries. Sometimes this involved dual recognition and sometimes it involved recognition just of South Korea. In particular this involved communist countries. The Seoul Olympic Games brought a major breakthrough, both in terms of general prestige but also in achieving attendance at the games and furthering diplomacy behind the scenes with the Russians, the Chinese, and the Eastern Europeans. So this was just the beginning of the mainland Chinese exploring better ties with the South Koreans.

Both the mainland Chinese and the Russians were very careful about their North Korean flank at this point, although North Korea was clearly unhappy about mainland Chinese and Russian attendance at the Seoul Olympic Games.

The other side of this situation was that the U.S. was exploring improved contacts with North Korea as well, in close consultation with South Korea. My view is that South Korea ought to take the lead in this process. We had some initial contacts in Beijing through our political section. I believe that Ray Burghardt was the key contact with the North Koreans. These contacts never really got anywhere, but they were the first contacts that I can recall taking place. These initial contacts probably took place in 1988, although I would have to check that.

On our way to the airport on April 22, our second faithful Chinese driver gave Bette and me a photo album of demonstrations for Zhou En-lai in Tiananmen Square in 1976, with preserved leaves included. He asked us to keep this gift secret. Our first driver (also for Bush) had been retired by the Chinese the year before. He cried on his last day. He died soon after. The Chinese didn’t allow me to go to his funeral. For further personal accounts of our stay in China, I recommend “Legacies - A Chinese Mosaic” by my wife.

The day before I left Beijing (April 21), I sent a final cable which I personally drafted summing up the state of U.S.-Chinese relations. I enclose here the full text.

Farewell Cable From Ambassador Lord on April 21, 1989

From Ambassador Winston Lord to Washington and key posts.

Ref: Beijing 3855

1. (Confidential - Entire text.)

2. I depart Beijing tomorrow with both a solid sense of progress and an awareness of
fresh challenges in the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. These are the themes sounded in my farewell meetings with China’s top leadership, notably an April 19 tripleheader with the President, the Premier, and the General Secretary. Much of the progress is due to world events, Washington policies, USUN efforts, the private sector or just plain serendipity. The Chinese, of course, have made their own great efforts. This embassy and our consulates, I believe, have also played their part. The challenges - and indeed some tension - will be perpetual as befits two such contrasting nations. But some of our new problems flow from past success. And they will be resolved or managed if the Chinese and we act wisely, recognizing that our common interests clearly outweigh our inevitable differences.

3. This message will focus on the concrete and programmatic in our bilateral relations. For my analysis of China’s foreign policy and domestic scene, I refer the interested reader to the personal scenesetter I wrote for President Bush’s February visit (reftel). In that paper, I stated that China was prospering in the world while floundering at home. There weeks from now Gorbachev and Deng will clasp hands. In a few hours as I head for the airport there will be a memorial service for Hu Yaobang near Tiananmen Square, filled for days with protesting students. Progress.

4. Since November 1985 Sino-American relations have greatly advanced and further matured. The foundations have been broadened and deepened in a wide variety of fields. Highlights and recommendations include the following.

5. Visits.

A steady two-way stream of high-level and working-level visitors, most notably President Bush, has provided impetus, enriched perspectives, nurtured personal links, and strengthened domestic support for a positive relationship. Such exchanges, including distinguished private citizens, will remain crucial. In particular we should continue to encourage congressional delegations, given the many issues involving Capitol Hill.

6. Political dialogue.

Our discussions with Beijing on international topics have changed the PRC position on Silkworms, generated greater Chinese responsibility on ballistic missiles, and substantially modified their approach to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The Chinese, in turn, (along with Japan and South Korea) helped to improve our posture on the INF agreement. We have closely compared notes on the Soviet Union and provided mutual reassurance. We have enhanced collaboration or CONFIDENTIAL Section 02 10 Beijing 11017.

Comprehension in other areas such as Afghanistan, the Gulf War, and Korea, where the Chinese have facilitated our dialogue here with the North Koreans. The Chinese have somewhat moderated their Third World rhetoric and become more cooperative at the United Nations. They have relaxed their positions toward some of our friends, such as Israel and South Korea. On Central America Beijing has been more sensitive to our concerns and even tossed a bouquet at our latest initiative. We have successfully managed the Taiwan question.
7. In some areas, of course, it has been hard going or worse. Prominent examples include Tibet, population policy, and human rights generally. On others there are promising beginnings, such as dugs and arms control, or potential for initiating exchanges, such as on terrorism and the environment.

8. Overall, as the President and Chinese leaders recently agreed, we need to make our dialogue on international topics even more systematic at the working level.


Nowhere has our growth been more impressive. Annual trade has leapt 100 percent the past three years, exceeding $14 billion in 1988. Agricultural sales have risen from negligible levels to $1.2 billion this year. We are China’s second largest export market and, with $3.4 billion committed, the leading investing country. Our export controls on technology have been significantly eased in recent years and yesterday we reached agreement that will include China in our distribution system. We have continued to implement the trade development program, over 25 percent of whose budget has been dedicated to feasibility studies for major Chinese projects. During the past three years we have forged new agreements on civil aviation, taxes, textiles and maritime cooperation.

10. The record is mixed at best on other economic fronts. The investment climate has been substantially improved since 1985, symbolized by opening ceremonies I have attended ranging from one of the world’s largest coal mines to the world’s largest Kentucky Fried Chicken. But major obstacles and frustrations remain for American business. The current credit and liquidity crunch of domestic retrenchment is having a significant adverse impact. Longer term problems include Chinese practices, soft loans from our competitors, and residual technology controls. We have gotten nowhere on a bilateral investment treaty. In the past year we have moved intellectual property rights from almost footnote status to the very top of our bilateral economic agenda. We have been intensifying our education campaign. The Chinese remain serious violators; and this issue could be among our most troublesome near-term problems in bilateral relations. We have consulted thoroughly on China’s GATT application, but its trade reforms must be advanced in order to avoid a heavily safeguarded admission. We need to reinvigorate the JCCT and JEC. On the former we have now agreed with the Chinese to flesh out our proposal for working groups to effect more concrete progress.

11. Science and technology programs.

Our thirty protocols constitute the largest bilateral program either country conducts. We face the continuing challenges to improve the balance of mutual benefits and the commercial applications. And we have correctly hinged the five-year renewal of the umbrella accord on satisfactory Chinese assurances on protection of intellectual property rights. After intensive negotiations we reached a major agreement on satellite launches with the Chinese which will marry Chinese rockets with American satellites on a case-by-case basis.
12. Our military ties have been substantially enriched over the past three years, notwithstanding a temporary pause induced by the missile issue. Virtually every top military leader on both sides has recently crossed the Pacific and a heavy schedule of further trips will unfold during the remainder of this year. Meanwhile working level delegations expand our professional links. One of the most dramatic events of my tenure was the first visit ever to the People’s Republic by American naval ships in the autumn of 1986. A year later the U.S. Air Force Thunderbirds performed over Beijing. Earlier this month I saw off the first PRC warship ever to visit the West. More American vessels will steam into Shanghai while Gorbachev is in China, perhaps in Shanghai itself. We have been implementing $800 million worth of defensive weapons sales and are exploring possible new items.

13. We will need to continue measuring our tread in our military cooperation. It projects useful symbolism and enlists constituencies in the PLA which could play a key role in Beijing’s future orientation. But as China grows stronger, so will apprehensions among its Asian neighbors about its intentions and possibly our involvement.


These have mushroomed since 1985, due to one of the most fertile USIA programs anywhere and the proper, expanding, indispensable role of the private sector. American campuses welcome more than 35,000 Chinese students, over half of all those abroad. Increasing numbers of American students and teachers are coming to China, including 25 Fulbrighters at fifteen universities. The world’s largest international visitors program has sent almost 300 present and future Chinese leaders to the U.S. VOA reaches and affects tens of millions of Chinese, from ordinary citizens to the highest leaders. We have recently installed a TVRO and are stepping-up direct trans-Pacific dialogue through WorldNet as well as placing programs on Chinese television. President Bush was the first foreign leader to address the Chinese people live on television. I was the first American Ambassador to be interviewed on the Chinese screen (or, to introduce the “Barbarian” Superbowl). Our book program has translated and published fifty-nine titles on American life.

15. Especially young Chinese are beginning to appreciate our culture as well as our technology, thanks to a continual flow of American artists, performers, troupes and exhibits. These range from Ailey to Joffrey, Peck to Heston, Disney to the Redskins, “The Music Man” to the “Caine Mutiny Court Martial,” which is having a remarkable impact here.

16. We can never do enough in these areas. For our most profound challenges include promoting mutual understanding and reaching the younger generations of Chinese. Whenever I succumb to temporary pessimism about China’s future, I need only recall the warmth and enthusiasm in overflowing university auditoriums greeting Mrs. Lord and me - or, more accurately, America.
17. With occasional blips, cultural exchange has progressed despite the periodic clampdown on intellectuals and expression in China. A potentially dicey area is official nervousness about our access to campuses. If this translates into significant obstacles I believe we should consider reciprocal actions against Chinese diplomats in the U.S., while recognizing the dilemmas presented by our free society.

18. Three weeks ago I signed an exchange of letters which will pave the way for the first Peace Corps volunteers ever to serve in a communist country. This is the fruit of four years of strenuous effort. No fruit has tasted sweeter; few programs hold more potential for Sino-American friendship over the long term.

19. Working and living conditions.

Major improvements have lifted both morale and efficiency. Comprehensive reciprocity talks yielded good results on housing and travel, though we are now stalled on almost every front. The separation of negotiations on housing and selective retaliation hopefully will enable us to resume a positive course benefitting both sides. During the past three years we have built a snack bar, swimming pool, and tennis court as well as additional office space. We have moved the international school to spacious new quarters, allowing steady expansion. We have vastly improved our security posture but are still highly vulnerable on the technical side; we urgently need Washington funding to shore up our defenses. We have managed the burgeoning bilateral relationship sketched in this message with no net growth in our personnel ranks since 1985. Our future substantive performance would be enhanced, and our budget greatly reduced, if we required three year tours here of all but junior officers.

Challenges.

20. These areas illustratively document the basically sound and growing nature of our bilateral relations. Much more than in the 1970s this relationship now stands on its own, regardless of our changing ties to other nations. We have multiplied the constituencies on both sides of the Pacific which have a stake in positive bonds. When serious issues surfaced - such as missiles, expulsions, or satellites - each side strove to insulate frictions from the core of our relations, to maintain overall momentum even as specific initiatives might be put on hold.

21. While we can therefore take comfort on broad foundations, we can hardly be complacent. Coming years will bring demanding tests we cannot now foresee: four years ago I would have been amazed if told that Silkworms, Tibetans and dissidents would cause more angst than Taiwan. Our most fundamental challenges, however, are already taking shape. I outlined these in my late 1988 San Francisco and New York speeches and in my farewell remarks these past few weeks. Current headlines symbolize the three broad areas: Gorbachev is coming to town; our traders and investors are being squeezed by retrenchment; and there is palpable Chinese nervousness about domestic dissent.

22. The political challenge.
The international framework for our bilateral relations is changing rapidly. The world of the 1970s has been radically altered; so has the world of the mid-1980s. Washington will have a more comprehensive view of this than those of us here. The underlying trends toward multipolarity and interdependence accelerate. The decline of Marxism and Stalinism, the spread of the market and democracy, are ever more apparent. The age of technology and information has already arrived. Gorbachev seeks to transform the Soviet Union, and Moscow’s relations with the United States, China, Eastern and Western Europe dramatically evolve. (Can Japan be far behind?) China grows stronger and more assertive on the world stage.

23. We have coped reasonably well with the impact of these changes on our bilateral relations - whether concerning approaches toward Moscow, regional conflicts, missiles, or satellites. We have every reason to be positive. We can take in stride the coming media blitz over the Deng-Gorbachev summit. The history and geography of Sino-Soviet relations will not change, nor will their long border and overlapping ethnic populations. As the Chairman made amply clear to the President, China will need the United States to balance the Soviet Union - and Japan. China’s overwhelming preoccupation with modernization must orient it toward the West for capital, management, technology and trade.

24. Our central task - for our China as for our global interests - is to act responsibly and purposefully around the world. So long as we do, our relations with Beijing should flourish. Early in the next century, when China can project its power and our Asian friends consequently project their concerns, we may have to review the bidding. But a stronger China is much more likely to be responsible - and responsive to us - if we have fully engaged it on international issues and participated in its development.

25. The economic challenge.

As our overall relationship with China matures, so must our economic ties. We have come a very long way from our mutual illusions in the early years after the opening. Our business people - eyeing China’s size, population, natural resources, inexpensive labor and needs - held exaggerated visions of the huge China market. Many got burned. The Chinese, in turn, assumed that eager outsiders would pour capital and technology into this country. They were somewhat slow to recognize that they had to offer profits and compete with other markets for foreign attention.

26. Both sides have learned a great deal, often at the cost of considerable frustration. Americans are more realistic about near-term gains and adept at trading and investing in this opaque and bureaucratic environment. Despite well-publicized setbacks, few have gone home. Most are playing for the long-run. And many success stories unfold unnoticed behind the media glare on problems.

Meanwhile the Chinese have substantially improved the investment climate, though its quality varies greatly from one province or city or sector to another. As a result our trade statistics have shot up dramatically the past few years. So have the number of investment
projects, though the value remains modest.

27. We have only begun to tap the potential of our economic cooperation. The next two or three years will bring a substantial slow-down overall, and some backsliding in certain areas. The negative effects of the current retrenchment are already being felt. The Chinese clampdown on foreign exchange, credit, construction, and local autonomy will kill or delay many promising deals. One can only hope this period of tightening will be brief and that momentum toward reforms and the opening can be effectively regenerated. If China settles into long-run stagflation or, worse, reverses field back toward central planning and protectionism, then our commercial ties will be seriously affected. So in turn might the stability of China and its overall relationship with the West. I do not believe this will happen, but prudence suggests that it could.

28. Assuming we move through and beyond the retrenchment phase (as we have before), we will still face the more fundamental challenge of reconciling our two very different systems. The mutual imperative will be to loosen up and open up. The United States should increasingly “normalize” its economic relations with China as we have done on the political front. (See the recent Nicholas Lardy report published by the National Committee on U.S.-China relations). This requires further relaxation of strategic controls on technology, consistent with national security. Our anti-dumping approach toward China calls for revision. Protectionism in general needs to be resisted. And other steps, like unconditional MFN and GSP, should be considered in tandem with China’s willingness to free up its own system.

29. If we are to consider such movement on our part, the Chinese must take reciprocal actions. As China becomes more fully engaged in the world economy, it must assume a more open stance. If it wants to gain admission to the GATT, it must liberalize its trading regime. If it wants more technology, it must protect intellectual property rights. If it wants more investment, it must make it profitable. This imposing agenda will demand much of both sides, officials and entrepreneurs alike, during the coming years. The stakes, for our political ties as well as our commercial benefits, are very high.

30. The cultural challenge.

The newest, and perhaps most prickly, problem in our relationship flows from the intermingling of our societies and values. As with our other challenges, the stage has been set by success. The explosion in educational and cultural exchanges, most of it in the private sector, is a major positive force. It enriches both our countries and greatly expands personal networks that will buttress our overall relationship in the future. But Chinese officials resist the intrusion of certain ideas. China has always been particularly wary of foreign cultural contamination, whether because of middle kingdom arrogance or its century long humiliation by foreigners.

31. Several factors have now joined to make the issue of human rights especially sensitive:

The serious economic and corruption problems that have surfaced since last summer have created disaffection among the people and malaise among the leaders. The latter currently
place their premium on stability (as Deng and Zhao told the President). They see the free expression of ideas as leading to instability rather than helping them find answers to complex questions.

Dissident activity, traditionally restrained in China, is picking up, including the signing of petitions for amnesty for political prisoners.

As Deng fades from the scene, the jockeying for succession has intensified, adding to political tensions.

Thanks to Gorbachev’s “Glasnost” political and cultural reforms in the Soviet Union have outpaced those in China. Chinese intellectuals and artists have been unfavorably comparing their lot with that of their Russian and Eastern European colleagues. Political developments in Hungary and Poland also have caught their attention. Meanwhile, Chinese leaders look with apprehension at the unrest in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe caused by political reforms.

We have made human rights a prominent part of our agenda with the Soviet Union and achieved some success. The American domestic audience has increasingly questioned the disparity with China. The question I have been most frequently asked in recent public appearances and backgronders is why we practice a “double standard.”

Tibet has emerged in the past one and a half years as a major human rights issue.

The question of U.S. funding for the UNFPA program will focus attention in coming weeks on China’s population program.

The death of Hu Yaobang is fueling fresh demonstrations and protests as the 70th anniversary of the May 4 movement looms.

32. Against this backdrop the Chinese are currently defining “stability” in very narrow terms, i.e., the suppression of dissent. So far the smothering of expression has been confined to the political arena and has not appreciably affected cultural life, but it would not be surprising to see it spread there as it has in past campaigns. During the past decade Beijing has generally affirmed that intellectual ferment and creativity was needed to help China find the answers in its perplexing quest for modernization. Political reform was needed alongside economic reform. “Let a hundred flowers bloom.” These themes are largely absent today. To be sure, Chinese policies, even when misguided, on the whole show relative improvement. Dissidents are ostracized, or (sometimes) allowed to leave the country, rather than locked up. Continued employment may be allowed even as Party membership is lost. But steam is building up in intellectual circles. Official nationwide campaigns are increasingly difficult to mount because the people won’t support them. The Party’s image continues to deteriorate. Cynicism is rampant. There is a feeling that the CCP has lost its ideological bearings and flounders in uncharted waters.
33. It is arrogant for the outsider to judge how best China can balance progress and stability, how fast it can move toward a freer society. But we can hope that China will soon resume again the generally positive course it has pursued since reforms began; that Chinese authorities will make distinctions, for example, between free expression and instant multi-party democracy; that “stability” will be given a more sophisticated definition. For the long run I am hopeful, as younger generations - exposed to Western ideas - seize the reins.

34. For our part we will need to strike a balance in our human rights policy toward China, as we do elsewhere. We should project our values, maintain contact with activists, and register our disapproval concerning abuses. But we must also weigh our strategic, political, economic and other interests. We must employ approaches - sometimes public, sometimes symbolic, often private - which can have a positive impact on China’s future course, not just make us feel good.

35. We should maintain an appreciation of the awesome challenges China faces as it seeks to move from one century to another, from one system to another, in a few short decades. We need to have some sense of what is feasible, either in terms of pace or cultural context. We should use carrots as well as sticks, welcoming positive moves and helping the Chinese to develop a legal framework for human rights. We should keep an eye on overall trends, not merely take snapshots.

36. We can hope, but should not expect, other democracies to make human rights a multilateral issue, not just a Sino-American bilateral one. The recent European posture on Tibet has been helpful, but our allies in Europe and Asia will generally let us take the lead - and take the heat. The Soviet Union will try to exploit this issue to its advantage. Some Chinese leaders will be prone to contrast Soviet restraint with American meddling.

37. The Feng Lizhi banquet incident was an unfortunate but minor blemish which did no damage to the relationship. But it was a harbinger of serious tensions to come in the human rights arena. As time passes from the wisdom of our symbolic gesture will be increasingly clear. The Chinese were entirely to blame for their needless escalation. They are geniuses at making foreigners feel guilty and dividing them. One very important lesson to be learned from this episode is not to let them succeed.

Conclusion

38. I am delighted with President Bush’s appointment of Jim Lilley as my successor. His broad experience, outstanding career, and closeness to the President make him a superb choice to strengthen our relations with China. I will do all that I can to help him.

39. I conclude with expressions of gratitude to the following:

President Regan for having appointed me.

Those in Washington who have supported me and our mission in China.
The members of this embassy and our consulates during my three and one half year tenure for their talents and their tenacity in the pursuit of excellence. Overall they have formed the best overseas team I have seen in decades of service.

40. For Mrs. Lord and me it has been a joint venture and a joint adventure.

Lord.

End of message
Q: [Kennedy] Well, let's turn now to the time that you were Assistant Secretary of State...

LORD: Let me say that Nancy Bernkopf is welcome to stay. Nancy, you won't hurt my feelings if you leave.

Q: [Bernkopf] I will stay until noon.

Q: [Kennedy] In the first place, could you explain what you had been doing and how you were tapped for this job of Assistant Secretary of State? It was under a completely different administration and so forth.

LORD: I put together some notes on this and some dates. I left China as Ambassador on April 22, 1989. It was one week after the Tiananmen demonstrations began. It was the date of the funeral of Hu Yaobang. There was a major turnout for the funeral, which perhaps 100,000 people attended.

On my way back to the United States I stopped off in Singapore and had a small dinner with Lee Kuan Yew. I brilliantly predicted that the demonstrations in China, although very important, were manageable by Beijing, as far as I could tell. Even then I was not aware of the magnitude of what was coming.

I got back to the U.S. and spent a lot of time on television and with the radio and print media. Did we cover this?

Q: [Kennedy] I'm not sure, but go ahead.

LORD: I spent a lot of time with the media, commenting on unfolding events in Tiananmen Square, even as my wife had circled back to China as a commentator for CBS Television. This is probably repetitious. I'd better get it straight.

Q: [Kennedy] You talked about her role.

LORD: She was recruited for commentary on Gorbachev’s visit to China by Don Hewitt of “60 Minutes.” I'm pretty sure that we've been through all of that. Then we went out to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for three months. During this period my wife wrote a book called "Legacies," which was another best seller, I might add, and chosen by Time magazine as one of the 10 outstanding books of the year. It covered true stories of her family and Chinese of all walks of life, set against the backdrop of Tiananmen Square.

I wrote a long article for "Foreign Affairs" on China policy, looking to the period “Beyond the Big Chill” and the impact of the Tiananmen Square events. In effect, I was very tough on the Chinese regarding the Tiananmen Square incident and on human rights in general. I also made a strong pitch that we had to stay engaged with China and get
through this period. That article was published in the fall of 1989.

Q: [Kennedy] I wonder if you could explain how you perceived the role of articles in "Foreign Affairs" magazine at this particular time, because this is important. How were articles like this used within the foreign affairs establishment?

LORD: Keep in mind that I had been the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, which publishes "Foreign Affairs," although the magazine itself is independent of the Council. In fact, to demonstrate that, William P. Bundy, who was the editor of "Foreign Affairs" during most of the time that I was President of the Council, once rejected an article by David Rockefeller, who was then Chairman of the Council's Board of Directors. That demonstrated the real independence of the magazine. To Rockefeller's credit, he never took it out on Bill Bundy. In fact, he admired him for his courage, if not his judgment.

So I think that it's fair to say that, although sometimes people leave copies of "Foreign Affairs" on their coffee tables - the magazine was not as sprightly as it is today - nevertheless, it is among the elite publications reviewed by members of the think tanks, Congress, administration, and media. It is purely concerned about foreign policy and probably has about as much influence as any one magazine can have. It published the famous "Mr X" article on containment [in 1947] by George Kennan. It has published many other distinguished articles.

So I felt that my article and its placement were important in terms of the debate on U.S.-China policy in the wake of Tiananmen Square. Given my credentials and long involvement with China and having just been U.S. Ambassador to China, I felt that this was an appropriate time to set forth my views on the current situation in China.

The article had two elements to it. I was much tougher than the Bush administration on Deng Xiaoping and what the Chinese were up to. Then, having established my credibility on that front and saying that human rights are still very important, I then went on to say that we have great stakes in a better relationship with China. I said that we have to get beyond the big chill in our relations with China. I laid out the reasons for the broad agenda we have with China as we look to the future. I needed the space that a long article like that could give me. I had time to think about this subject when we were out in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, so I put a lot of care into the article.

I checked the article out with Dick Solomon, a predecessor as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, and the administration, without giving him or them any veto on its content. I didn't expect him to make any changes but I wanted to make sure that I didn't have anything inaccurate in the article. I welcomed his views, as an old colleague, going back to the Kissinger days and in recognition of his qualifications as a scholar on China. As I recall, Dick Solomon had some helpful suggestions to make on the article, although they were not really of major significance. He was not uncomfortable about the article. It had not been my purpose as to whether he was uncomfortable with it. I wanted to be sure that I had not left anything out of it or made any inaccuracies. I also believe in the
principle of not blindsiding colleagues, especially old friends and coworkers.

I can't judge how much impact the "Foreign Affairs" article had. However, I felt that it was important to express my views.

Q: [Kennedy] Do you think that this article was picked up by people who eventually were going to form the Clinton administration?

LORD: No. This article appeared in the fall of 1989, about three and one-half years away from the entry into office of the Clinton administration. The article was very strong on human rights in China. I note that in succeeding years there were increasing charges that President Bush was too soft on China or that China was too nasty in the field of human rights. The article also had a lot of emphasis on maintaining our engagement with China. I have no way of knowing whether the article had any influence on those who read it. Probably, Warren Christopher read the article. He was to be Secretary of State during the first Clinton term as President. He had been a member of the Board of the Council on Foreign Relations. Probably Tony Lake (to be NSC Advisor) and others in the Clinton administration read it, too. We can come back to this matter later.

During this period I wrote some Op Ed pieces [articles which appear on the page opposite the editorials in some newspapers]. I kept in touch with the media as a commentator on China in particular. I testified before Congress on occasion, essentially on China. I was deposed and testified at some length on the POW/MIA [Prisoner of War/Missing in Action] issue in Vietnam. I believe that I testified on this matter in the summer or fall of 1992. I gave lengthy testimony on the Vietnam Peace Agreement [of 1973], with emphasis on the POW/MIA issue, before Senator John Kerry, Senator Smith, and others. As I said, I gave speeches, either for money or pro bono. I joined the Board and became Vice Chairman of the International Rescue Committee [IRC], the largest, non sectarian organization which both helps refugees abroad and resettles them in the U.S. A few years later, I became co-chairman of the IRC. I became a member of the Board and then Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy, which promotes freedom and democracy around the world. I was an active member of the Council on Foreign Relations and also worked on projects in other think tanks. I was a member of other groups, like the Trilateral Commission, and on the Board of Advisors for the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. I have cited other affiliations elsewhere.

Then, for about a year or a year and a half I worked for and with Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, who was then President of the Carnegie Endowment, on a major, national commission on U.S. foreign policy, in the wake of momentous events, including the move toward freedom in the world, globalization, and all of the other elements that you are familiar with. I was Chairman of this Carnegie Endowment's National Commission on America and the World, which put out a report on foreign policy in 1992, looking to the time when the next administration would enter office. This job took up a great deal of my time. This Commission was a very distinguished group. We can go into more detail on it at some other point, if you like. So I kept up my interests, my work, and certainly my visibility on foreign policy, including on China.
Then, when Clinton was elected President, I think that the following considerations led to my appointment as Assistant Secretary of State.

Q: [Kennedy] This was the election of 1992.

LORD: That's correct. First, I already had a bipartisan reputation. I happened to be a liberal Republican, which is an oxymoron these days. I had worked under several presidents of both parties as a career Foreign Service Officer, as a civil servant, as a Schedule C, and then as a political appointee Ambassador under President Reagan. I had always taken a centrist and bipartisan approach in my politics and foreign policy issues. Without being pompous about it, I considered that we do need some competency and professionalism in foreign policy from administration to administration. One should serve any President as long as that President has a reasonable approach in foreign policy. Some of my heroes, as I've said before, were people like John McCloy, David Bruce, and Ellsworth Bunker, who had done this at more exalted levels. So that was my instinct, and I think that my reputation has been that of someone who is bipartisan and not ideological.

Probably the least important reason that I was tapped as Assistant Secretary was that I was the one Republican under consideration for a post requiring confirmation by the Senate. I don't think that that was, by any means, a major reason. I think that that was very marginal and very modest. However, along with David Gergen and Dick Morris, I think that I was about the only Republican with any interest in serving in the Clinton administration.

More importantly, I had gotten to know Warren Christopher, who was appointed Secretary of State and headed the transition team on personnel appointments in the first Clinton administration. Christopher was a member of the Board of the Council on Foreign Relations and Vice Chairman when I was President. We worked together when we set up programs on the West Coast, in addition to those in New York and Washington. Once, when I came back from China, just before the elections of 1988, I spoke to the Council on Foreign Relations in California. Christopher chaired that meeting. We renewed our acquaintanceship, and he said that he was impressed with my speech and presentation on that occasion. So we had kept in touch.

Peter Tarnoff was my successor at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was also very close to Christopher, who knew him very favorably and well. He was ultimately tapped to be Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the State Department. I knew a great many of the other people going into the Clinton administration. So, to the extent that they would check me out with the White House, Tony Lake would know me best from his time on Kissinger's staff, where I also had served. There were, of course, my general credentials in foreign policy, including as Kissinger’s Special Assistant, Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ambassador to China.

Finally, of course, as we mentioned before, I had met with Clinton in New Haven,
Connecticut, on or about Labor Day, 1992. We talked about Japan and China. That conversation went well. Strobe Talbot gave my name, along with Tony Lake, to Clinton. Talbot was obviously very close to Clinton. So, given my career history, my bipartisan credentials, and my personal contacts, I think that all of this led to the prediction by Peter Tarnoff that I would receive an appointment in the incoming, Clinton administration. Tarnoff had already been chosen as Under Secretary for Political Affairs during the Christmas holiday season, after the election in November, 1992.

Then fairly close to the inauguration of President Clinton on January 20, 1993, I received a phone call from Christopher, in which he invited me to serve in the new administration. Of course, I accepted, after first talking the idea over with my wife, as I always do on major decisions.

Q: We will come back to other matters. However, if you could, would you mention your own position? If you were not a rock ribbed Republican, you were in the Republican camp for a long time. How did your meeting with President Clinton come about, and so forth?

LORD: I started out as a career Foreign Service Officer, then transferred to the Civil Service and worked in the Department of Defense. Then, while still in the Civil Service, I was assigned to staff of the NSC [National Security Council] in the White House. Subsequently, I was a Schedule C officer in the Department of State. I then left government service and was appointed Ambassador to the People's Republic of China by President Ronald Reagan, a Republican. I left government service again. However, I've always been bipartisan. I've been a centrist in ideological terms on most matters. I'm what you might call a liberal Republican, which is almost an oxymoron these days.

I've always felt that you should serve Presidents and administrations, assuming that they're responsible on foreign policy, and there is considerable continuity in American foreign policy. Although you should not be extreme, you should serve any President and try to contribute some continuity and professionalism, in addition to what the Foreign Service could give. As I've said, I was once in the Foreign Service.

Some of my heroes have been those who have done this. I wouldn't put myself in their league, of course. However, whether it was John McCloy, David Bruce, Ellsworth Bunker, or people like that, I felt that I would like to serve in that way. I've gone in and out of government to recharge my batteries, see more of my family, get my tennis game in shape, pursue other interests, get away from the strains and pressures, think and read, and get in better physical shape. So this has been the pattern I have followed.

To answer your question, I don't recall who it was from, specifically, but I got a phone call from someone speaking on behalf of Tony Lake. It might have been Tony Lake himself. This was some time in the course of July or August, 1992. I was asked if I would meet with Governor Clinton, who was the Democratic candidate for President. Lake and I had worked on the NSC [National Security Council] staff under Kissinger. We hadn't really stayed in close touch, but there was some mutual respect. Lake was in charge of
foreign policy issues in the Clinton campaign, with Sandy Berger as his deputy. Lake had the job of enlisting outside experts to meet with Governor Clinton, prepare briefing papers, questions and answers, policy positions, speeches, and so on.

Clinton wanted to be briefed on Japan and China, so Lake assembled a group of people which included not only himself but myself, Dick Holbrooke, and two other people who were more expert on Japan. So we met with Clinton in New Haven, Connecticut, either on Labor Day, 1992, or the day after that. In any case, it was early September in New Haven.

I walked into the room where the briefing was to be held. The first thing that Clinton said to me was: "Strobe Talbott is very high on you." It occurred to me that not only had Tony Lake brought me to the attention of then Governor Clinton but also Strobe Talbott. I had known Talbott ever since he covered the White House as a reporter. We had kept in touch, and I had great respect for him. It was obviously mutual. I didn't realize at the time how close Talbott was to Governor Clinton. In addition to Clinton, one other person at this meeting in New Haven was a man named Shearer, who was close to the President. Also Mike Mochizuki, a Japan expert.

So we sat down and discussed both Japan and China. I'll get back to the substance of the discussion. Then during the next couple of months, during the Presidential election campaign, I received calls on a couple of occasions from Nancy Soderberg, who ended up as the number three official at the NSC and is now at the UN. Nancy asked for my advice specifically on China policy, including the MFN [Most Favored Nation] issue. So there was this background during the 1992 Presidential election campaign.

Then, after the 1992 election, Warren Christopher was chosen to be Secretary of State. As I understand it, he was asked to take Cliff Wharton as his deputy. I think that Christopher was thinking of Tom Pickering or Peter Tarnoff for this position. I also knew Wharton from the Council on Foreign Relations and Christopher from the Council on Foreign Relations as well. He had been on the Board of Directors of the Council. The number three person in State was Peter Tarnoff, my successor as President of the Council on Foreign Relations. Tarnoff was very close to Christopher. I didn't really know Sandy Berger but I knew Tony Lake from the White House staff.

So in addition to the combination of all of this, I suppose I had made a favorable impression on Clinton. He did not get involved in making choices of Assistant Secretaries of State. He left this pretty much up to Christopher, the Secretary of State-designate. There may also have been a feeling that it wouldn't hurt to have at least some relatively high level Republican in the administration. However, and above all, there was the fact of my past service on Asian affairs generally and on China specifically. So that is how I got involved in the Clinton campaign and then in the Clinton administration.

Q: [Kennedy] Yes. Can you give us a feel for what you saw of the foreign policy apparatus when you came into the Clinton administration? First, could you talk about your confirmation by the Senate? Then, could you discuss your initial impressions of the
new administration? One has the impression that there is some feeling of reserve about
him, as with a lot of new administrations, particularly of a President who comes from
Arkansas. The same thing was true with Ronald Reagan. Every new administration goes
through this kind of experience. That is, it tends not to be overly interested or competent
in the field of foreign affairs. I'm talking about the political figures in the incoming
administration.

LORD: First, it was clear from the Clinton campaign, and this was correct, in my view,
that he was going to focus above all, at least early in the administration, on domestic
policy. Probably the major reason that he defeated President Bush in the election was that
he demonstrated or presented the view that Bush was so wrapped up in foreign policy
that he didn't pay enough attention to domestic issues. Speaking objectively, President
Bush was more interested in foreign policy than in domestic issues. So, out of conviction,
instinct, and his own experience as Governor of Arkansas, where he spent much more
time on domestic than foreign policy issues, it was clear that President Clinton was going
to pay his attention first to domestic issues.

I thought that that concentration of attention and effort was important for the country, but
also considered that it was important for our foreign policy for us to put our domestic act
together in order to be effective on the world scene. Now, I thought that immediately
addressing some foreign policy matters was also a crucial consideration.

I didn't know Warren Christopher intimately. From the comments of others who had
worked with him and what I observed, I thought that he would be a competent Secretary
of State. I knew that he wouldn't have the flash and excitement of Henry Kissinger, but
he wouldn't have some of the down side of Kissinger, either, in terms of his operating
style.

I'm trying to recall now how many of the other major figures I knew who were being
appointed to the new administration. I knew slightly Cliff Wharton from the Council on
Foreign Relations. I also knew, as I said, Peter Tarnoff, the incoming Under Secretary for
Political Affairs in the State Department, and Tony Lake. I knew Strobe Talbot, who was
being tapped on Russian policy. I had known him favorably and well as a journalist and
was a pretty good friend of his. So I was convinced, from what I knew of the people
being assembled and from what Clinton had said, that I would be comfortable with the
general thrust of the foreign policy of the new administration.

I'll get back to this in more depth, but I thought that it was important that we elevate the
position of Asia on our agenda. I don't recall that I focused on this at the time, but the fact
that Secretary Christopher came from California and had spent most of his career on the
West Coast meant that, in my view, he would probably have some sense of the
importance of the Pacific area.

You could say, on a very petty level, that as I was becoming an Assistant Secretary of
State and had been Director of Policy Planning in the Department of State a couple of
decades before that, I was essentially coming back to the Department at about the same
level. That's a silly way to look at things. First of all, in protocol terms, an Assistant Secretary of State has to be confirmed by the Senate, whereas the position of Director of Policy Planning does not require such confirmation. Much more essentially you serve your country. If Governor Averell Harriman could go from being Governor of New York to being Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I figured that I could do that.

Of course, I would not have minded being tabbed as Number Two or Three in the Department, as opposed to being an Assistant Secretary. However, I knew enough to realize, from my long experience in the Department, that the Assistant Secretary position is the real engine of the Department. That is where the policy level and the global perspective meet with more detailed, specific, regional concerns. The Assistant Secretary is the nexus for such concerns. I don't want to be self-serving, but it's my observation that this position, in many ways, is the most demanding job in the Department, short of the position of Secretary of State itself. You have to know enough detail to run your own bureau, overseas posts, and Embassies to testify before Congress, to talk to the press, etc. You can't get away with being just generally familiar with the various problems, as the Secretary or Under Secretary does. You have to be on top of the details, but you also have to have the perspective of the Seventh Floor in the State Department [where the Secretary and other senior officers have their offices] and put together our strategy and global approach with regional strategies.

In terms of the demands that I would be faced with, I knew that the position of Assistant Secretary was going to be very important, exciting, and challenging. I will say right here, before I go any further, that this was the toughest job that I ever had, in terms of how far I had to stretch and the demands placed on me. It's as different as apples and oranges from being Special Assistant to Henry Kissinger, which was a pretty demanding and tough job, too. However, I would say that the position of Assistant Secretary was even tougher than the job of Special Assistant to Kissinger. Being Ambassador was my most pleasant job. The times with Kissinger were the most dramatic.

Q: [Bernkopf] Is that because the position of Assistant Secretary is more independent than what you had as a Special Assistant to Secretary Kissinger?

LORD: Well, Kissinger was tough in another way. It was tough in physical terms, but, then, I was a lot younger when I was Special Assistant to Kissinger. So I was able to handle that. Being Special Assistant to Kissinger was tough in terms of travel and the hours I had to work. It was also tough because of Kissinger's personality. It was also exhilarating because of the excitement of working for someone like Kissinger, who was so brilliant, as well as the attraction of being involved in dramatic events. I'm not going to say that being Special Assistant to Kissinger wasn't a tough and demanding job. However, my focus was much narrower. I was dealing with China, Vietnam, to a certain extent Russia, and I was writing and drafting material of very great importance - whether communiques, peace agreements, or presidential statements. I was focused on those countries and was essentially reporting to one person. As Assistant Secretary, I was the nexus between the Secretary of State and the Seventh Floor and my Bureau and/or the
Embassies in the East Asian area. Not to mention the White House, the Defense Department, the economic agencies of the government, the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and other institutions, non-governmental organizations, business, the media, etc.

I enjoyed the job of Ambassador to China the most, but working for Secretary Kissinger was more dramatic. The most enjoyable job was being an Ambassador. A more difficult job was being Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The good thing about being an Ambassador is that you essentially are running your own show. You have to take instructions from the State Department in Washington, but you're in charge of your own team. It's much less bureaucratic in terms of infighting and jungle warfare than you inevitably have in Washington. That doesn't mean that you don't have your own share of such bureaucratic warfare, and you have personnel problems in an Embassy. However, at least you feel that you are running your own ship, whereas in Washington you are involved in constant, bureaucratic battles. On the other hand, you have much more power in Washington, more influence on policy.

So the Assistant Secretary not only has to run his or her own bureau. You have to deal with and instruct 20 or 25 Ambassadors. You constantly have to deal with Congress and the press. You have to work the inter-agency circuit. You have to deal with other bureaus in the Department, in competition with officials on the Seventh Floor. You have to deal with think tanks and interest groups, all of which makes it fascinating and demanding but which stretched me even further. I'll get into all of that later on. I don't recall what this question involved, but these were all reasons for my mood as I took over the position of Assistant Secretary and my approach to it.

Q: [Kennedy] What about the process of confirmation by the Senate?

LORD: That was an important experience. After getting this phone call from Secretary Christopher, I went down to Washington. My wife took only one day to find a terrific place to live. By the way, I don't know whether it is important to record this, but she found this house in one day. The next day she went to Woodward & Lothrop [Washington department store] to buy furnishings for the house. They already were having a Christmas sale. She asked them if they would give her another 20% reduction if she furnished her whole house that afternoon. They gave her some incredible deals, and she had the place furnished in two days. We moved into the house a week later. That may be of no interest to anybody except me.

The point is that I went down to Washington and I stayed in a hotel for two months before we began looking for a house, and while I was awaiting my hearings..

Q: [Kennedy] This shows an attitude of mind. Regarding your confirmation by the Senate, did you anticipate that this would be a problem?

LORD: No, I didn't think that it would be a problem at all and I'll get to that. I went to the hotel and began working very well with Bill Clark, who was my predecessor. He even
invited me to sit in on staff meetings. My security clearance and all of the related, paper work had to be taken care of. I began to talk to many of the people in the Bureau. I began to think about staffing the Bureau with people whom I would need. I'll come back to that later, because the personnel you get is a very important consideration. Meanwhile, I was studying the Asian area, reading up about it, and beginning to think about my confirmation by the Senate.

My hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee finally took place in March, 1993, which was fairly rapid, by today's standards. The confirmation statement I presented was really quite important. I have a copy of it right here. I was determined to give a very thoughtful confirmation statement. Usually - and this is not a value judgment, this is more a matter of prudence - confirmation statements are usually pretty cut and dried. You start off by saying that it is an honor to be chosen by the President for this position. You say that you will do your best to work with Congress. Then you take some boilerplate language out of some handy questions and answers that you have to briefly review the situation in the region. You say that we have great interests in the area and that you will promote them, or something on that relatively limited level of sophistication.

I was determined to take a chance because I thought that it was very important, right at the beginning, to try to elevate Asia. I wanted to set out a conceptual framework for my approach to foreign policy, a device which I had learned from Kissinger. I thought that I wanted to make this statement eloquent and I had the time to work on it. I'm a good drafter. I thought that I would get officials in foreign Embassies to look at the statement and the attention of the Senate, which was confirming me in this position. I was going to mail copies of it widely to think tanks, journalists, and others.

With this statement I sought to commit the Administration in certain directions. I was taking a certain chance in this respect. I obviously didn't do anything that was radical. I was pushing the envelope, to some extent, and I'll get into this in a minute. My aim was precisely to get off to a fast start and to get the Asia-Pacific agenda lifted up in the field of American foreign policy. Through most of our history we have been Eurocentric for legitimate reasons. Most of our immigrants came from Europe until the last 20 or 30 years, and we have a heavily European-oriented population. Until the past 20 years or so most of our trade was across the Atlantic Ocean. We've been involved in wars in Europe, as well as in Asia, of course. So it was somewhat natural that we focused on Europe.

However, for a variety of reasons which I set forth in my statement, I felt that it was important to equate Asia with Europe in terms of our interests. We didn't have to say that Asia was more important than Europe. I used the formulation that no region is more important to the U.S. than Asia.

So for all of these reasons I was determined to present a thoughtful and comprehensive statement. As I drafted this statement, and we got closer to the date for my hearing, I ran into a buzz saw from the Bureau of Congressional Relations. Wendy Sherman [Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations], whom I respected then and still do, is a very able person. However, she and her staff, from what I understood, felt that I should not be
making such a substantive statement. This might open me up to questions from some of the Senators, and I might get into trouble. There was also the feeling that I was out there making policy. To an extent, of course, I was guilty of the latter. I felt very strongly about this. For all of my cited reasons I wanted to make a statement of substance. I had worked hard on it and I thought that it was a very good statement. I was determined not to take "No" for an answer. So I had to go over to talk to Peter Tarnoff in the first instance. I made it very clear that if he didn't support me, I was going to go to Secretary Christopher. I felt very strongly about this. I was fairly sure that I would prevail. However, you don't go around threatening or hinting to resign shortly after you are appointed. You shouldn't do that lightly. I don't know whether I would have resigned in this case or not. I never got to that point but I was prepared to engage in an all out battle, even if I had to go to the White House, because I felt that it was that important. Frankly, this approach paid off, and I'll go into the substance of this matter in a minute.

As I said, this approach paid off. I have to be careful not to appear to be self-serving, but it was a hell of a good statement. It's the best statement that I've ever seen presented at a confirmation hearing before the Senate. I can say that without wishing to appear egotistical. The statement attracted considerable attention in Asia and a lot of commentaries in this country. There were a lot of favorable comments when I mailed copies of it to a lot of people. It set out new themes which, I think, we applied over the four years I was Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Q: [Kennedy] I'd like to ask you about the themes in your statement. However, first, you didn't mention the White House. Tell me the reaction in particular from Tony Lake, the incoming National Security Adviser. When you were preparing this statement for the senate, I thought that you would have to protect your flank by checking the statement out with Tony Lake.

LORD: Yes. Of course, I cleared the statement around the government, including the NSC. The problem came from H [Bureau of Congressional Relations], not on the substance, but on the general principle that you don't make substantive comments when you go before the Senate for confirmation. That probably makes sense, because you can get into trouble when you appear to be pressing the envelope. I felt that I wasn't really pressing the envelope, because I had cleared the statement all around the administration. So I thought that I was on safe ground in that respect. The fact is that I was projecting policies. It was mostly a matter of the conceptual approach, as opposed to breaking new ground in specific policy terms. However, there were some cases where I was probably pushing the envelope. I know that I cleared the statement generally.

Q: [Kennedy] What were the salient points of your statement, particularly the ones which would have involved moving ahead, rather than the usual contents.

LORD: I don't want to go into it at great length, because it's probably more than you want to know. What I did was the following. First, the title of the statement was "A New Pacific Community: Ten Goals for American Policy." When I referred to it over the next few years, I called it, "Lord's Ten Commandments." This may not have been the first use
of the term, "Pacific Community," but it was the first use by an official of the Clinton Administration. I don't know whether it had ever been used as a goal of American policy.

My theme was that it was in our interest to work with other countries. We needed to work to build a new, Pacific Community. I started out by listing all of our interests in Asia. I won't go through them, as it's not necessary here. However, they included security, political, historical, cultural, economic, and social interests. The fact is that we have a growing number of immigrants coming from Asia. Our population is moving from the East Coast to the West Coast. These are all reasons why Asia is already crucial and will be even more so in the next century. I included the statement that there is no part of the world more important to United States interests than the Pacific region.

I set out that view, in addition to the usual introduction about my background, the honor I felt at having been chosen for this post, and pledging to work with Congress. Then I went into the importance of our interests in Asia. One of the themes I used, and I'll get more specific in a minute, was that we had to pursue our bilateral interests by all means, as these were crucial to the U.S. I wasn't suddenly saying that there was a community already existing out in Asia. That was more a vision than a reality. So there was a mix of going over the key, bilateral relationships, with heavy emphasis also on trying to build more of a community in the Pacific area, even as we have already done in Europe. However, I made clear that the concept of a Pacific Community was a lot different from a European Community.

I laid out 10 goals. I would like to keep this very brief, but they were basically as follows. I purposely put Japan first, as I thought that it was our most crucial partner. Particularly since I have a heavy China background, I wanted to make clear to everyone else, including the Japanese, that I thought that Japan was the most important country in terms of U.S. interests. I put South Korea second because it was another key ally and the site of the most urgent security challenge. Then I got to China and the others. I'll just read off the Ten Goals, because that's the easiest way to review them.

I mentioned our need to forge a fresh, global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature balance of responsibility. Global partnership means not only our bilateral relationship but increasingly working with Japan on many regional and global issues, as well as a more mature balance of responsibilities, meaning that Japan needs to assume, in conjunction with the U.S. but also in terms of its own self interest, more responsibility in the world. I was trying to be very careful in my drafting.

Secondly, I mentioned erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. This was aimed at disposing of the problem and then trying to build a more stable and long lasting solution.

Thirdly, restoring firm foundations for cooperation with China, where political openness should catch up with economic reform. That is, trying to restore momentum in the Chinese-U.S. relationship, in cooperation with China, but also working in the fact that political openness needed to catch up with economic reform. I tried to go into both the
strategic interests and also the concern for freedom.

Fourthly, I referred to the need to deepen our relationship with ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], as it broadens its membership and scope. I wanted to make clear that although much emphasis had been placed on the big actors in Northeast Asia, ASEAN was really growing as a major economic and diplomatic power in many ways. I also made clear, consistent with my overall theme, that we not only had to deal with ASEAN as a group of countries, as a part of building a Pacific Community, but also the U.S. had very important, bilateral relationships within ASEAN which we also had to nurture.

Then I referred to obtaining the fullest possible accounting on our Missing in Action, as we normalized our relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Of course, I put the accounting of our MIAs first, as we always did, we had to do, and we should do also. We needed to do this, both in terms of what we needed to do but also in terms of building domestic support for this policy. However, I worked in the phrase, "As we normalize our relations with Vietnam." This involved stretching the envelope a little bit because I was projecting the normalization of relations with Vietnam.

Then I went on to speak of working to secure a peaceful, independent, and democratic Cambodia. Cambodia was scheduled to have elections in May, 1993, so that was an urgent goal. I went on to refer to ASEAN in its collective dimension as being key on this issue as well.

The last four goals were sectoral and essentially oriented more toward a Pacific Community, speaking in collective terms. I spoke of strengthening APEC as the cornerstone of Asian Pacific economic cooperation. APEC is the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which is not the world's greatest title. It was not self-evident that, in listing 10 goals in the Pacific Region, we would include APEC. At this point APEC had been going for a few years, beginning with the Bush Administration, but it hadn't achieved much of a profile or attracted much interest. I wanted to talk about our economic interests in Asia in general, which obviously were crucial. However, I also wanted to make clear that APEC would be a major vehicle for promoting our economic interests, and I'll get back to that.

So I put that in. The order of these goals was important. I wouldn't argue that all 10 goals were equally important, but I put strengthening APEC down as one of these goals. Then I got to the security goal, subtly making the point that in our new foreign policy economics was at least as important as security, unlike during the period of the Cold War.

On security, and here I was pushing the envelope again, I spoke of developing multilateral forums for security consultations, while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances. I'll go into more detail on this, but I would point out that the Bush Administration, with some plausible reason, was very skittish and reluctant to push regional security schemes. They were concerned about the old threat from the Brezhnev Doctrine and the implications of collective responsibility. They didn't want anything that
looked as if we were walking away from our bilateral and unilateral security obligations and replacing them with some fuzzy, regional mechanisms. They didn't want to signal to anybody that we were pulling out of East Asia. They were worried that if we put too much emphasis on regional security dialogues, we would look naive. They felt that Asia wasn't Europe, where we have NATO as a long established, defensive alliance.

I believed that these interests and considerations were not mutually exclusive. So I made it very clear that we should maintain the solid foundations of our alliances and our forward, military presence. However, as long as we keep our alliances and our forward, military presence as the foundations of our policies, we could supplement and not supplant them with regional security dialogues. This concept was pretty much embryonic at that point, but I signaled in this statement that we were going to emphasize these dialogues and forums. Again, this concept was not particularly controversial, but it was a new departure, versus the views of the Bush administration in terms of our emphasis. I was signaling that.

Both the APEC and regional security dialogues were picked up by the President in his first few months. He lifted APEC to the summit level, and he suggested overlapping regional security approaches in addition to our alliances and military presence in a major security speech in South Korea.

Then I referred to spurring regional cooperation to deal with global challenges like the environment, refugees, health, narcotics, nuclear non-proliferation, and arms sales. This reflected the new foreign policy agenda and some of the issues involved. Actually, these issues were not all new, but they were growing in importance. Secretary Christopher would have a new Under Secretary for Global Affairs, for example. Nuclear non-proliferation, the environment, and so forth were very important. I knew that President Clinton was interested in some of these issues, so I wanted to make sure that they were highlighted on the agenda. Again, I felt that regional as well as global cooperation could contribute to our positions in the Pacific and to meeting these problems.

Then, finally, and because the last goal is almost as prominent as the first goal in an agenda, I put down promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to flower. This goal underlay and would contribute to all our other goals. So I ended with it, not to mention the rhetorical value.

So those were the ten goals, and I went into greater depth on each one. As I said, I think that the statement was well received and I'm glad that I went to the trouble I did.

A NEW PACIFIC COMMUNITY
TEN GOALS FOR AMERICAN POLICY

Opening Statement at Confirmation Hearings
for Ambassador Winston Lord
Assistant Secretary of State-Designate
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
March 31, 1993
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

President Clinton has honored me with his nomination as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific. I am grateful for the trust that he and Secretary Christopher have invested in me to help shape America's policy for this critical region.

If I am confirmed, our exchange today will be the first step in a journey charted-by thorough consultation and cooperation, This I pledge in the national interest and my own self-interest. There 'is much to be learned from your perspectives and those of the American people. There is much to be gained when policies are jointly crafted.

Thus, in addition to ad hoc exchanges on breaking issues, I will maintain a process of regular meetings, on the Hill and in the Department, with key members of Congress and their staffs. I also intend, as both opportunity and responsibility, to traverse this nation to listen to Americans and clarify our Asian-Pacific policies.

I come to this assignment with a global perspective based on three decades of international experience in the Government and non-profit sector. I am foremost a generalist - as a Foreign Service officer with varied assignments, a member of the Defense Department's Policy Planning Staff, Special Assistant to the President's National Security Advisor, and Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Outside government I have served as President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy, Vice Chairman of the International Rescue Committee, and Chairman of the Carnegie National Commission on America and the New World. Throughout I have dealt extensively with Asian issues, including as Ambassador to China and as director and member of many organizations with emphasis on that region.

Above all I come in the spirit of bipartisanship, with a record of service under all but one Administration since Kennedy. I am gratified to have been selected by both Presidents Reagan and Clinton for positions requiring Senate confirmation. Seasoning has sharpened, not mellowed, my conviction that the greater our unity at home, the greater our success abroad. America has permanent interests. They do not change every four years.

A New Pacific Community

Today no region in the world is more important for the United States than Asia and the Pacific.

Tomorrow, in the twenty-first century, no region will be as important.

In that vast area most of the world's people live. Many of the richest cultures flourish. The most dynamic economies beckon. The major powers intersect.

America has fought in three wars in Asia during the past half century. We have abiding
security interests there. Forty percent of our trade is with the region, its share swelling more rapidly than that of any other, and half again as large as with Western Europe. More and more eager, talented Asian immigrants enrich America's cultural and economic mosaic. Our nation's population and production shift steadily toward our Pacific Coast.

In sum, the firmest guarantees of America's staying power in Asia - more credible than rhetoric from the rostrum or writs on paper - are our overriding national interests.

Ever since the Vietnam War we have enjoyed broad bipartisan consensus on the most salient policies in the Asia-Pacific region, this has contributed mightily to our successes. But in recent years, preoccupied by crises in Europe and the Middle East, we have paid insufficient attention to major transformations underway across the Pacific. Our Asian partners have noticed. Some are apprehensive.

Asia has been moving from an arena of confrontations to the premier growth area of the world. Economic, political, and cultural exchanges within this region have mushroomed. Familiar landmarks are shifting. New patterns are taking shape. New generations are taking charge: We risk squandering assets and lagging behind trends.

We have enormous stakes in the Pacific. We need to integrate our economic, political and security policies. We need fresh approaches and structures of cooperation.

It is time to build - with others a New Pacific Community.

A survey of the regional landscape yields both hopes and hazards:

- It includes the world's fastest-growing economies and most lucrative terrain for American exports and jobs. But we risk losing markets to aggressive competitors, and we are running unacceptable deficits with some of them.

- The end of the Cold War eased relations among regional powers and deflated regional conflicts. But some of our bilateral ties are frayed or fragile and new security challenges cloud the horizon.

- Global revolutions in technology, transportation and communications lift the hopes and prospects for countless Asians. But global risks resonate ominously in the area - the proliferation of dangerous weapons, the burgeoning of populations, the spectre of AIDS, the degradation of the environment, the spawning of refugees, the traffic in drugs.

- The universal tides of democracy, fanned by information and free markets, flow in the region. But four of the world's last five communist regimes, together with other repressive governments, remain caught in a time warp in Asia.

How then do we remove the peril and realize the promise?

Foreign policy for the region - as for the world at large - begins at home. President
Clinton has wisely declared the renewal of America as his supreme goal. This is not only essential for the American people. It is essential for American interests and values abroad. As the Carnegie Commission, which I recently chaired, stated, "First, our foreign policy must be founded on a renewal of our domestic strength; rebuilding our economic base' is now our highest priority."

Equally compelling is the need to perfect the American experiment in democracy. We must practice at home what we preach overseas. We can project to troubled countries a multi-ethnic society that reconciles the need for national purpose with the right of groups to be distinctive. As President Eisenhower once said, “Whatever America hopes to bring to pass in the world must first come to pass in the heart of America.”

There can be no greater contribution to our Asian policy than fostering domestic economic vigor and social cohesion in America. Our Asian friends recognize this. Progress at home will burnish our leadership credentials. It will make us competitive in the marketplace of goods and credible in the marketplace of values. It will help secure the resources needed for international action. And it will steady popular support without which our foreign policy founders.

Looking forward, we can see ten major goals for American policy in Asia and the Pacific. They are not listed in any order but rather as parameters of progress.

- Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature balance of responsibilities.
- Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation on the Korean peninsula.
- Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with a China where political openness catches up with economic reform.
- Deepening our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its membership and scope.
- Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing in action as we normalize our relations with Vietnam.
- Securing a peaceful, independent and democratic Cambodia.
- Strengthening APEC as the cornerstone of Asian-Pacific economic cooperation.
- Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances.
- Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like the environment, refugees, health, narcotics, non-proliferation and arms sales.
- Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to flower. Let me briefly elaborate on each one.

**Japan**

Our fortunes in Asia, indeed the world; will hinge on developing a comprehensive, durable partnership with Japan. This will be my highest priority.

Together Japan and America comprise forty percent of the world's GNP. Our alliance reassures friends, promotes stability, and deters arms races. We are - or must become - partners on issues ranging from Korea to Somalia, Cambodia to Russia, technology to foreign aid, the environment to democracy.

We offer our Japanese friends both reassurance about our intentions and a sense of urgency about festering frictions. We will maintain a substantial military presence in Asia.

We will strive energetically to open markets. Japan will have our strong support for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council; while complex negotiations are underway, we will consult Tokyo systematically on all major issues before the world organization.

In return, equity and reality require more vigorous Japanese performance on economic issues and international responsibilities. An open global economic system is crucial to that country's future. Its current account surplus of 125 billion dollars strains that system; its 49 billion dollar surplus with us creates severe tension. During the past decade our deficits with Japan have totaled almost half a trillion dollars.

We are addressing this imbalance on several fronts - making the American economy more competitive; urging Japanese macroeconomic measures to stimulate demand and imports; implementing agreements already negotiated; and achieving concrete export and investment results in selected areas.

Globally, Japan has already taken some promising initiatives ranging from peacekeeping to foreign assistance. But Japan's aspirations for a central seat at world councils should be bolstered by contributions worthy of a major political and economic power.

It is time to shape a global partnership with Japan. Together we should thicken webs of consultations and cooperation on three levels. On the global plane, we should collaborate on the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the G-7 process, UN peacekeeping missions, and international challenges such as non-proliferation, the environment, refugees, health-, human rights and democracy. On the regional plane, we should together nourish economic institutions like APEC and security consultations on a range of issues. On the bilateral plane, we should pursue a structure of economic consultations and deepen our dialogue on our respective policies toward major nations like Korea, Russia, and China.
In this way we can forge a more equitable, positive partnership. America will listen more, lecture less. In turn, Japan should step forward, not in response to American entreaties or pressure, but in a spirit of enlightened self-interest and mutual benefit.

Korea

The Korean Peninsula reflects at once remarkable progress, tenuous openings, and lurking dangers.

The Republic of Korea represents one of Asia's greatest success stories. Its economic growth has been little short of astonishing. Its diplomacy has scored a series of breakthroughs. It is steadily shouldering more of its self-defense. Its continued movement toward democracy - crowned by the recent inauguration of a President who had spent three decades in opposition - heartens those living under authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the region.

We applaud these advances even as we work towards greater economic cooperation and reforms on intellectual property rights, financial liberalization, the investment climate and market access.

But the threat from the North remains the most perilous legacy of the Cold War. Prodded by a disastrous economy and estrangement from its major patrons, Pyongyang has toyed with opening toward the outside world: After some promising moves in the past two years, North Korea currently seems to be retreating toward paranoia. In recent weeks it has fueled anxieties in the region by first reneging on commitments to inspection of its nuclear facilities and then declaring its intention to withdraw from the Non-proliferation Treaty. Looming ahead are the profound uncertainties of its political succession.

The policy lines of the United States are clear and consistent. We will maintain significant military forces in South Korea as long as Americans and Koreans believe they are needed for deterrence and regional stability. We will continue to support fully the IAEA and other international bodies to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat. North Korea's nuclear challenge is to the world community, not just to the United States, as Pyongyang seeks to portray it. This problem is critical to the worldwide campaign to stem proliferation.

The future of the Peninsula must be resolved essentially through direct South-North negotiations; we remain prepared to enhance this process through close consultation with our South Korean ally and multilateral diplomacy. We also stand ready to improve our relations with North Korea if it cooperates on fundamental issues.

China

Ever since participating in the opening to China more than two decades ago, I have worked hard to build Sino-American relations. I will continue to do so, conscious of both
American interests and values.

China is an influential member of the international order. More than one of every five humans live there. It possesses nuclear weapons and exports nuclear technology. It launches satellites and sells missiles. It represents a huge market and one of the world's richest civilizations. It holds a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It is central to key regional issues like Indochina, Korea, and disputed islands. It abuts the unsettled Central Asia region. It is salient in new challenges that require global action.

In recent years, China has opened up to the world, moved toward a market economy, and enjoyed the fastest growth rate in the world. Together with the greater Chinese communities of Taiwan and Hong Kong it has become one of the most promising areas for investment and trade.

At the same time, its leaders cling to an outdated authoritarian system. Serious abuses persist. While Beijing releases some prominent activists toward the end of their jail sentences, it arrests others for the peaceful expression of political views. The Chinese leaders are gambling that open economics and closed politics will preserve their system of control. It is a gamble that sooner or later will be lost. Economic reform produces - and requires - political reform. In today's world, nations cannot prosper for long without Opening up their societies. Technology and information, the forces of modernization, and global democratic trends have been eroding communism and totalitarianism across the globe.

All of the Asian models of economic success toward which China looks - many of them Chinese societies - have shown that political relaxation, tolerance of opposition a freer press, the rule of law and other democratic elements are inescapably linked with economic development.

Our policy challenge therefore is to reconcile our need to deal with this important nation with our imperative to promote international values, we will Seek cooperation with China on a range of issues. But Americans cannot forget Tiananmen Square.

The United States therefore should conduct a nuanced policy toward Beijing until a more humane system emerges. Shunning China is not an alternative. We need both to condemn repression and preserve links with progressive forces which are the foundations for our longer term ties.

We will continue to be guided by the three Sino-American joint communiques that have provided a flexible framework for our relations. It is up to China and Taiwan to work out their future relationship; we insist only that the process be peaceful. Consistent with our undertakings not to challenge the principle of "one China," we will continue to build upon our unofficial relations with Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act. In our diplomacy and through the 1992 U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act we should make clear our large humanitarian and commercial stakes in the future of Hong Kong.
Against this backdrop we face a host of serious issues with China: Widespread human rights violations, including in Tibet. Chinese exports of dangerous weapons and technology to volatile areas. Our fastest-growing trade deficit, which is now more than 18 billion dollars, second only to Japan. Collaboration at the United Nations and on regional conflicts. Emerging challenges like the environment and drugs. We should work together where our interests converge and bargain hard over differences.

We will press forward with this agenda in a sober, constructive fashion. Our approach will reflect that China is a great nation. In response to positive movement by the Chinese, we are prepared to address their concerns and strengthen our ties.

The Chinese people hold the same aspirations as others around the globe. We will support those aspirations - without arrogance - recognizing that the Chinese people will determine their own destiny, but confident that we are aligning ourselves with the future.

ASEAN

The ASEAN nations, with 330 million people, boast some of the fastest-growing economies and became last year our fourth-largest overseas market. We welcome ASEAN’s establishment this January of the world's newest free trade grouping. By the year 2000, ASEAN could become a trillion dollar economic area encompassing eleven countries. We will therefore intensify our efforts to promote U.S. exports and the jobs they create. Last year a successful American tour by our Ambassadors to ASEAN raised awareness of this dynamic region. We will continue such efforts to attract more American Farms to this competitive market.

This institution, 25 years young, serves regional stability as well as prosperity. The future admission of the Indochina countries would encourage them in constructive directions. The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, which brings together the Ministers of ASEAN and seven other nations, is evolving into an increasingly important forum for regional security consultations. Imaginative diplomacy by Indonesia and others has been crucial in moving the Cambodian peace process forward and exploring peaceful ways to resolve competing claims in the South China Sea.

With the closing of our military facilities in the Philippines, we are gradually developing a diversified pattern of security ties in Southeast Asia. All the ASEAN countries view a continuing U.S. military presence as a stabilizing element during an uncertain period; each in its own way is helping to make it possible. Our commitments to Thailand and the Philippines - both exemplars of democratic advance - remain firm. We welcome more cordial relations with Malaysia. We will strengthen those with Singapore and Brunei.

The United States will accord ASEAN and its individual countries the growing attention they merit - for American trade and investment, for regional security, for the extension of freedom.

Vietnam
We are taking an especially close look at our policy towards Vietnam. Let me emphasize that obtaining the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing from the Vietnam War, including those lost in Laos and Cambodia, will remain a central objective.

I have reviewed the findings of the Senate's Select Committee on POW/MIA, before which I was honored to testify. The Senate's exhaustive examination of this highly-charged issue was a major achievement. I congratulate the Committee, whose findings have served to narrow uncertainties and ease some of the families’ pain. Most of the twenty-year record of Hanoi on this issue has been one of callousness and deceit, but we can be encouraged that the Senate Select Committee has confirmed that Vietnamese cooperation with our investigations has substantially improved: While we may never find all the answers, this Administration will make every effort to accelerate the process. We must secure whatever comfort we can for the families of the missing.

I assure you as well that we will vigorously pursue POW/MIA issues with Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing.

Looking to the future, Vietnam, a rapidly-growing country of 70 million, the fourth largest in East Asia, can play an important political and economic role. If the necessary groundwork is laid we can strengthen regional stability. A key factor will be the political settlement in Cambodia. Vietnam has taken a positive role to date in the UN peace process; we expect its full support for the elections in May and the establishment of a new, independent Cambodian government.

On the economic side, Vietnam has undertaken market reforms, opening up promising vistas for trade and investment. The American business community is eager to take advantage of these opportunities and compete effectively with others.

At the same time, Vietnam continues under a repressive Communist political system. There are scant traces of freedom. As we seek to normalize relations, the intensity and warmth of our ties will depend on progress in this area.

The graduated, reciprocal policy of recent years has successfully induced the Vietnamese to be more cooperative on the POW/MIA and Cambodian issues. South Vietnamese personnel have been released from re-education camps. Now we need to consider how further steps toward normalization can serve our multiple objectives.

With Vietnam's cooperation we are prepared to heal the wounds of history.

Cambodia

Cambodia continues to be a land of tragedy, torn by two decades of war and ravaged by the brutal policies of the Khmer Rouge.

After arduous diplomacy involving many nations, the fragile outlines of a settlement
Finally emerged - cease fire, demobilization, a large United Nations presence and free elections leading to an independent Cambodian government. Even more is at stake here than the fate of that country and regional security. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia - UNTAC - is the largest Peacekeeping operation in the history of the United Nations. Thus we face a crucial test of multilateral peacekeeping by the international community.

The situation is Precarious. The headlines are grim. Yet UNTAC has recorded some impressive achievements. The 20,000 peacekeepers have managed a ceasefire for over a year. UNTAC has registered over 95% of the eligible voters for the elections slated for May. Almost all of the 360,000 Cambodian refugees have been repatriated; the detaining and repairing of the country's infrastructure goes forward.

Formidable obstacles remain. The Khmer Rouge refuse to participate in the elections; they seek to disrupt them; they are apparently hunkering down for a long-term struggle to take over the nation. The Cambodian government, installed by Hanoi in 1979, fears repudiation at the polls; it is using violence to intimidate potential voters; it threatens to discredit the election results.

There will be no easy path through this thicket. Working with others, the United States must support the process of free and fair elections and assist the government that emerges. The immediate task for UNTAC is to convince the Cambodian people that their votes will be secret and that their votes will count. The looming policy choices before the world community include the ongoing role of the United Nations; the means to strengthen the future government, and the ways to contain the genocidal Khmer Rouge and others who seek to undermine the settlement.

One of the most complex and central tasks for our Asian policy will be to help provide the Cambodians with a brighter future. No other people deserve peace more.

Economics

In the aftermath of the Cold War, economics is increasingly supplanting military considerations on our foreign policy agenda. More than ever our national security depends on our economic strength. With domestic renewal now America's highest priority, trade and investment are critical. And no region is more central for American economic interests than the world's most dynamic one - Asia.

When I served as Ambassador to China, I devoted more time to promoting American business and economic interests than any other task. I will do so as well in my forthcoming role. I will consult closely with the American business community on their problems and their goals. I will urge our overseas posts to do the same. For the private sector in Asia, as elsewhere around the world, is an increasingly important actor. Helping American businesses to penetrate overseas markets will be key to America's prosperity.

The Asia-Pacific region is the world's largest consumer market and our biggest export
market. Last year our exports were worth more than 120 billion dollars and 2.3 million American jobs.

We need to confront our Asian economic challenges and opportunities on several levels. Foreign policy begins at home - strengthening our competitiveness is a sine qua non for an effective policy. The successful completion of the Uruguay Round is the most urgent multilateral task - this would dramatically increase trade and investment in Asia as in the world, and it would help preserve an open global system against the dangers of protectionism and regional blocs. We welcome the positive role played by Australia and New Zealand as active Cairns Group members. Here, as on other issues, we will consult closely with Canada. Bilaterally we must continue to pry open Asian markets, particularly in those nations running large surpluses with us. We will champion expanding trade but we will insist that others open up to our products and services. As the President has said, we will compete, not retreat.

In addition to these domestic, global, and bilateral policies, greater regional cooperation is required.

The most promising vehicle is APEC, established in 1989 through the efforts of Australia and others. Today this trans-Pacific grouping brings together fifteen Pacific economies representing almost half of the world's GNP. It underscores the new imperatives of interdependence. It can dampen the appeal of exclusionary regional blocs. It can advance regional trade liberalization and integration. It can anchor America in the world's most dynamic region.

As the host for this year's annual Ministerial Conference in November, the United States has the opportunity to strengthen this organization. This will be at the top of our agenda this year. Working with others we can create a true Asian-Pacific economic community.

Security

By virtue of history and geography the United States is the one major power in Asia not viewed as a threat. Virtually every country wants us to maintain our security presence. While balance-of-power considerations have declined in the wake of the Cold War, they remain relevant as Asian-Pacific nations contemplate their fates. Each one harbors apprehensions about one or more of its neighbors. A precipitous American military withdrawal would magnify these concerns. Add the increasing resources available for weapons purchases in the rapidly growing Asian nations and there is a recipe for escalating arms races and future confrontations that could threaten U.S. interests.

American security policy for Asia begins with a reaffirmation of our treaty alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines; our military arrangements under the Compact of Free Association; and the maintenance of a substantial military presence. To be sure given the end of the Cold War, stronger friends, and budget considerations, there could be prudent modifications after close consultation with our allies. And they can and must assume a growing share of the security burden.
Unlike other regions, crises in Asia do not dominate the headlines, but serious security problems persist. Those left over from the Cold War - such as the Cambodian conflict and tensions on the Korean Peninsula are being addressed by the appropriate groupings of nations. The dispute between Japan - whom we support - and Russia over the Northern Territories belongs to bilateral negotiations.

Clearly, however, we must develop new mechanisms to manage or prevent other emerging concerns. We welcome increased security consultations in the framework of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference. This process can usefully encourage nations to share information, convey intentions, ease tensions, resolve disputes and foster confidence. The United States will fully participate.

For the first time in this century, there are no adversarial fault lines among the great powers in Northeast Asia: the United States, Japan, Russia and China. The post Cold War period invites dialogue to prevent arms races, the forging of competing alignments, and efforts by one power or group of powers to dominate this strategic region. Our voice will be crucial. In close concert with our Pacific allies, we could engage Russia, China and others inside and outside Northeast Asia.

Asia is not Europe. We do not envisage a formal CSCE-type structure. But it is time to step up regional discussions on future security issues. We are open-minded on the arenas. We will heed the ideas of others, like Japan, Australia, and ASEAN, which have been particularly fertile in this domain. Together we can explore new Asian-Pacific paths toward security.

Global Issues

President Clinton and his Cabinet officers have already moved to restructure the executive branch to meet the new global challenges in our foreign policy. These issues loom large in Asia and the Pacific. They will assume increasing prominence on our regional agenda as we approach the twenty-first century.

A brief checklist illustrates some of these problems:

- With the end of global superpower rivalry the proliferation of dangerous weapons now poses the greatest threat to our security. In Asia, North Korean programs currently dramatize this challenge.

- It took until 1830 for the world's population to reach one billion people. Now it increases by that number every decade, with 90% of the growth in developing countries. Asia, East and South, is home to half the world's people. Twenty years from now a billion more people will live there.

- Many measures of human impact - from water use to the emissions of trace gases - show greater change since 1950 than in the previous 10,000 years. The Asian region, with its
massive increase in energy consumption, faces severe environmental problems. They range from the plundering of Southeast Asian forests to China's burning of coal to the threat of global warming for some Pacific Island states.

- There are almost 20 million refugees in the world today. Even more people are uprooted within their own lands. While some recent developments in Asia are promising, poverty, repression and uncertain political succession could unleash major migrations in the future.

- The traffic in drugs remains a scourge on American society. Although the battle must be won at home by eliminating demand, the supply of narcotics from Burma and neighboring countries exacerbates our calamity.

Surely this is a daunting array of issues. But problems common to all nations can stimulate communities. They can be positive additions to our bilateral and regional dialogues. And if they are not addressed effectively in Asia, they can hardly be addressed by the world.

Increasingly we will inject these global subjects into our relations. We will also encourage new institutions, like APEC, to enhance regional consultations and Cooperation.

**Democracy and Human Rights**

History is on the side of freedom. In recent years hundreds of millions of people have won more open political systems. For the first time ever a majority of the world's nations are governed by some form of democracy.

This spread of liberty not only affirms American values but also serves our interests. Open societies do not attack one another. They make better trading partners. They press for environmental reform. They do not practice terrorism. They do not produce refugees. Thus, as President Clinton has emphasized, promoting democracy must be one of the central pillars of our foreign policy. Moreover, the end of our global rivalry with the Soviet Union reduces the Pressure to muffle concerns about unsavory governments for the sake of security.

Naturally this pursuit cannot be our only foreign goal; we must weigh geopolitical, economic and other factors. Nor do we seek to impose an American model; each nation must find its own way in its own cultural and historical contexts. But universal Principles of freedom and human rights belong to all, the peoples of Asia no less than others.

Mongolia was the first Asian country to throw off the communist yoke. From Korea to Taiwan to Thailand and the Philippines, we have witnessed encouraging strides toward more democratic and humane societies. This phenomenon is not a product of “Westernization;” rather it is an imperative of “modernization.” How can countries attract investment without the rule of law? How can they combat corruption without a free
press? How Can they shape wise development policies without the unfettered exchange of ideas? In an age of technology and information it is impossible for nations to develop without pluralism and openness. And Sooner or later - accelerated by exposure to television and tourists, fax machines and cellular telephones, cassettes and computers - economic advance produces political yearnings.

To be sure, areas of Asia lag behind the march of history. First-generation Communist leaders still hold together repressive regimes in several countries. Grave human rights violations continue from Tibet to Rangoon to East Timor. But it is only a matter of time before the impact of economic reforms, the transmission of international values, and the thrust of human aspirations lead to sunnier climes.

The remainder of this century will be marked by a series of portentous successions in Asia.

Thus, even as we deal pragmatically with authoritarian governments we should press universal principles. Whenever possible we should work with others to expand the frontiers of freedom.

There are many instruments at our disposal - consistent public positions that eschew double standards; quiet diplomacy; multilateral organizations; selective conditioning of foreign aid; and the efforts of private organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy and the Asia Foundation. The establishment of a Radio Free Asia will be a vital supplement to the Voice of America and will signal our commitment to liberty.

**Conclusion**

Today a Pacific Community is a vision. Tomorrow it can become a reality.

The initial contours, eased by the end of the Cold War and strengthened by the dynamism of the region, are already emerging. The rapid growth of trade and investment within the area. The increasing integration of economies, technologies, and ecologies. The deepening of ASEAN and its expanding dialogue. The promising evolution of APEC. The beginnings of regional security consultations. The spread of freedom.

These are promising trends. They reflect the foresight of the region's leaders and the energies of its peoples. They also reflect the achievements of a bipartisan American foreign policy that has supported for half a century a huge investment of our national treasure.

It would be a tragic error for America to rest on its oars. That would tempt the forces of adversity, sowing conflict rather than cooperation.

This generation of Americans owes it to the labors of those who came before us, and the hopes of our successors, to help build a new Pacific Community.
Q: [Kennedy] You made these points, and there was this concern by the Bureau of Congressional Relations you have referred to. How did the hearings go? There is always the wild card of Senator Helms, the conservative, Republican Senator from North Carolina. I would have thought that he would not be your friend.

LORD: As you will recall from our earlier discussions, he hadn't been a friend in holding up my nomination as Ambassador to China for months. However, in this case I had no opposition or any real problems, as far as I recall. I did the usual round of going up to Congress ahead of time and talking to the Senators. They asked questions, but these were easily handled, and I had worked very hard to get ready. I knew the issues. And I had a solid, bipartisan reputation and credentials.

I had some follow-up, written questions to respond to, but it all went very smoothly. I don't recall how long it took, but it was fairly fast. Any controversial questions really went quite smoothly.

Senator Helms didn't cause me any problems this time around. In his case I had been outspoken about Chinese behavior regarding human rights, so that probably made him feel that I wouldn't roll over for the Chinese. This was one of the key issues in that area.

In 1992 I could have run into trouble in my deposition on Vietnam. That is always an emotional issue.

Q: [Kennedy] You're talking about the Missing in Action issue.

LORD: Yes, the Missing in Action question. I recall that my confirmation as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs was an easy process. Certainly, there was a very enthusiastic response to my confirmation statement. I think that some of the Senators actually read the statement!

Q: [Kennedy] Did you have any problem with human rights being listed in tenth place among the objectives?

LORD: No. I could have put human rights in fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth place, instead of tenth place. However, I made it clear that in a way I was giving human rights more prominence by saying that this underlined a lot of what we were doing. It certainly didn't mean that it was in tenth place in order of importance. I made it clear that these objectives were not meant to be read in numerical order. It is true that I made sure that Japan was in first place. However, I listed the bilateral objectives and then moved to the multilateral objectives, in both economic and security terms. Then I moved to the new, global issues. I really felt strongly about putting values and democracy in last place. I put it in last place to emphasize it, rather than listing it in sixth or seventh place.

Q: [Kennedy] I thought that we might turn now to the atmospherics of the Clinton administration. When you first arrived on board as Assistant Secretary, how did you feel that this administration was going to shape up, in comparison with the temperature of other administrations? Could you discuss how you assembled your team? Then we can
approach other issues in thematic or other form.

LORD: Any new administration taking over the White House, particularly if it is from a different political party, is going to experience a certain degree of elbowing, confusion, anxieties, ambiguities, settling down, to-ing and fro-ing, and so on. In the case of the Clinton administration I didn't feel that there was an excessive amount of this. Clearly, the emphasis of President Clinton in the early months, as I knew it would and should be, was on domestic issues. However, there was an initial period of reflecting on our policies and seeing whether we should move in any new directions.

One thing that I was very conscious of was that we had some lucky breaks on the calendar, in terms of my effort to get Asia and the Pacific area firmly up there on the agenda. As I said in my confirmation statement, there were two events coming up which I felt we could use for that purpose. It was the luck of the calendar.

The first event was the annual G-7 meeting, a meeting of industrial democracies. By luck, in 1993 this meeting was going to take place in Asia, in Tokyo. It was one out of seven chances that that would happen. Therefore, President Clinton was committed to go to Asia in July, 1993. I knew that in advance and knew that we could build on that. I'll get back to that in a minute. It turned out that that was his first, overseas trip as President. He had been to Canada before that but he had never been overseas anywhere else as President. So his first trip was to the Asia-Pacific region.

We didn't want to press our luck and schedule a long trip involving a number of countries. But after Japan President Clinton went to South Korea as well. That was one strategy that we used. South Korea was our second most important regional ally and a major security challenge, with American troops, etc. It was also second, after Japan, in my Senate statement.

We'll get back to this trip, but in Japan President Clinton laid out the Pacific Community concept that I had first mentioned in my confirmation statement. Then, in addition to the bilateral aspects of the trip to Japan, there was the G-7 aspect. He gave a major speech which essentially set out our economic strategy for Asia for the next four years. We also purposely arranged for President Clinton to give a speech in South Korea, which embodied our security strategy for the region for the next four years. He went to the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] and met with American troops. In both speeches we introduced the themes of promoting freedom and democracy. We used the concepts of prosperity, security, and freedom as catch words. We added global issues as we went along in the administration. We got our conceptual approach across early with these two major, blueprint speeches. So this involved the President's going to Asia and giving major speeches, hitting economic themes in Japan and security aspects in South Korea. All of that was very useful and helpful.

The other break that we had on the calendar was the fact that, as a member of APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Conference], we were the host country for this meeting, which rotated each year among the various member countries. I believe that at that point there
were 17 or 18 members of APEC. Additional members were added since then. As luck would have it, we were the host in Seattle for the APEC meeting in November, 1993.

I want to be clear here that I had not immediately decided to push for lifting APEC from the Foreign Minister to the heads of government level. Since APEC was established in 1989, the various delegations always had been headed by the Foreign Ministers of the member countries. I knew that we could use this gathering of all of the countries of the Pacific Region as another way to advance our agenda. The APEC meetings had been held at the Foreign Minister, Trade Minister, and Finance Minister level. After our first few months in office I became convinced that we should raise it to the heads of government level, as the first ever summit meeting of Pacific countries. This was a dramatic departure which underlined to the world and to the American audience the importance of Asia.

Finally, I had in mind the regional security dialogues complementing the regional economic dialogues in APEC. I knew that these would begin first at my level, involving senior officials in the spring of 1993. Then, in July, 1993, these dialogues would be at the Foreign Minister level, where there would be a meeting with ASEAN representatives. These would include both meeting with them generally but also talking about security problems, in an effort to energize that process.

Therefore, what I had in mind more generally was that if there were a leaders' meeting of APEC every year and there were these regional security dialogues at the Foreign Ministers' level, this meant that in every year, in our administration, as well as in future ones, the President of the United States would be expected to go to the Pacific area, although sometimes he would go to Canada or Mexico, as APEC grew. However, on the whole the President would have to go to Asia just about every year, just as he has to go to Europe for reasons in our historical past. And the Secretary of State would have to go with the President for an APEC meeting. That would be one trip, and the Secretary would also have to go to Asia for these regional security dialogues and the ASEAN meetings. So that would be another trip.

This would mean that our Secretary of State would be locked in to at least two trips to Asia annually. The President would be locked in to at least one such trip every year. Given the way the U.S. Government works, as you know, it's not just the trip in itself but the process leading up to a trip involving the Secretary of State or the President. In preparing for such a trip the government bureaucracy focuses on the problems of the region. The imminence of deadlines concentrates the minds of officials wonderfully in terms of getting decisions out of the bureaucracy, working with other countries in pushing issues forward, and getting so-called deliverables and outcomes, pressing the institutions to function in terms of regional economic or regional security problems. So there is a whole process of getting ready for such trips and making them productive.

Finally, of course, you can tell the White House, in the case of the President, and the Secretary of State, as foreign minister, that he or she is going to be out in Asia anyway, and might just as well stop off in a couple of other places as well. So, therefore, you tack on other stops for the President and the Secretary of State.
One other element in getting Asia prominently in view in terms of getting the Administration on board very early was to stress the bipartisan support for our alliances and military presence. We were maintaining our military force levels in Asia at roughly 100,000 troops, which was then about the same level as in Europe, as we reduced force levels there. We do this to maintain our stabilizing and security presence, underlining our engagement in the region, together with reinforcing and reaffirming our alliances. Throughout my tenure as Assistant Secretary, I never once got a question or complaint from the Congress about our commitments and our force levels in the region.

So, there was my confirmation statement, lifting APEC to the national leaders' level, elevating the importance of the regional security dialogue, and using President Clinton's first trip overseas as chief executive to lay out themes reinforcing our alliances and foreign military presence. In all of these ways I thought that during the early months of the Clinton administration we could place the Asia-Pacific region up there among our key interests, along with Europe, in terms of world perceptions, attention, knowledge, and involvement of the President and our top, cabinet level leaders in the region. This underlined to the American people, media, and Congress the importance of this area.

Q: [Kennedy] Did you run across any problems in this connection? I was thinking in particular of the early years of the Reagan and other administrations where, you might say, there was a kind of court around the President. There was the President's Chief of Staff and the Special Assistants and all of that who tend to resent anybody from outside getting any control over the President's calendar, time, and agenda. They usually look for political opportunities to serve domestic purposes. It sounds as if you didn't have that particular problem.

LORD: Well, first of all, I don't want to inflate my own importance in this context. I'm just saying how I approached these problems. Obviously, I had to work through the Secretary of State, my associates in the NSC [National Security Council] context, and the various economic agencies. Usually, they were very receptive in terms of my view of the importance of these interests. The reason that I said the President's calendar was so important is that you can't expect any President to lay on trips to Asia, which is far away, on his own initiative. It's different from going to Mexico or Canada, or even Europe. You can't casually commit the President to a trip to Asia during the first few months that he is in office.

This was all the more the case since President Clinton was determined to focus on domestic issues, above all. So that's why we were very lucky that the G-7 meeting was scheduled in Tokyo, and the President had to attend it. Also, it's a matter of human nature. He is a very engaged kind of guy when he gets interested in something. Once you get a President involved in something, it is important. He meets the personalities involved, and they form personal relationships. He gets into the issues by reading briefing books and participating in the meetings. Then you have a President hooked for the rest of his administration.
So we were very lucky. It wasn't a matter of having convinced the White House that the President should make a trip to Asia, which would have been a tough sell that early in the Clinton administration. This was his first trip abroad as President, as I said. In fact, he had to attend the G-7 meeting in Tokyo. For the decision to raise the level of the APEC meeting, we got a lot of help from Paul Keating, the Prime Minister of Australia, who was very enthusiastic about APEC. He was a big mover and shaker and one of the organizers of APEC.

During the summer of 1993, we were debating in the government and trying to promote a meeting of heads of government in Asia-Pacific to be held in November, so there wasn't much lead time. Paul Keating visited the United States, met with President Clinton, and pushed him hard on this meeting. He deserves a lot of credit, although I think that we would have been able to persuade the President to attend this meeting anyway. He helped us to convince the White House that this was a good idea.

Q: [Bernhardt] Where did this idea of raising the level of participation in APEC originate? Was it with you?

LORD: No. I think that it originated with some people outside the U.S. Government. Fred Bergsten was very helpful, working with us on the APEC meeting. He probably floated the idea of raising the level of the meeting, although I don't recall precisely. I certainly had the idea, but many others had it, too. I can't pretend that this was a brilliant idea that only I thought of. The Australians had floated it. It just seemed to me that this was a terrific way to highlight the Asian region, to get President Clinton engaged in it, and to start a process of Pacific leaders meetings, as European and Atlantic leaders had been meeting for decades already. They were in constant touch and were talking about issues that they had in common. I thought that this was a good way to build a Pacific Community which was in our interest, even as we maintained our bilateral foundations. Those meetings would also be a good umbrella for a series of bilateral meetings at the site of the conference - just like the United Nations General Assembly in the fall. Indeed President Clinton was able, for example, to have regular meetings with Chinese President Jiang before he was able to visit China.

Q: [Kennedy] And Secretary of State Warren Christopher was a principal player.

LORD: Yes, he was receptive to it. Again, in terms of elevating the level of APEC, this all came to a head in about June or July, 1993. It was not pushed earlier than that, and even we didn't push it right away. There was some debate about it. However, the more we considered it, the more we thought that it was a very good idea. Secretary Christopher was certainly supportive of it. I don't recall that there was any particular controversy over it. I think that the economic agencies also liked the idea because Asia was such an important part of our economic interests. If there was any resistance to this, and I don't say this critically, it would have been from the people who schedule the President's program in the White House. We'll get back to that later on.

As I say, regarding the Asian trip, I don't recall any particular problem. Not only was it
easy to persuade the President to go to Japan, but it was quite easy to persuade him to go to South Korea as well, since he would already be out there in the Western Pacific, anyway.

Q: [Kennedy] Before we get to these trips, can you talk about assembling your staff in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs?

LORD: Sure. Generally, my approach here was that the most crucial part of the job was the people I had working for me. When I worked as Special Assistant to Kissinger, I operated pretty much on my own. However, in connection with every job I've had since then, whether it was the Policy Planning Staff, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Embassy in Beijing, or this job as Assistant Secretary of State, I believe that my strength was magnified whenever I could get good people.

I think that I have certain qualities myself but I don't think that I am so grand that I could handle these jobs entirely on my own. I've always thought that I needed good people and that I'm relatively good at leading a team. I believe in picking the best people, giving them responsibility, and holding them accountable. So I put a lot of emphasis on this, as I'm sure that any Assistant Secretary would emphasize recruitment of qualified staff. Of course, you inherit a group of people, and in the State Department you can't do much in terms of great changes at the Country Director level or below. It's really at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level that you can make a difference, but I won't go on at any great length in this regard. I reached back to my Deputy Chief of Mission from the Embassy in Beijing, Peter Tomsen, to be my principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. He had tremendous experience, not only in China, but in Russia, Vietnam, and India. So he brought a general perspective on Asia, and I thought that his geopolitical feel was really very good.

I was very conscious of the fact that, given my identification with China and that of Tomsen, I needed a very strong Japanese specialist on my staff. So I asked around very carefully and settled on Tom Hubbard. He handled Japan and Korea. One Deputy Assistant Secretary whom I held over from my predecessor was Ken Quinn for Southeast Asia. This didn't mean that the others weren't good, but I very much wanted to keep him on my team. I kept Ken Quinn and a woman named Sandy Kristoff, who was Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Economic Affairs. Then she was stolen from me by the NSC a few months later. Subsequently, I recruited another woman named Sandra O'Leary, who was the person I considered best qualified for this job, male or female, though I very much wanted at least one woman among my deputies. I always put quality first but I was determined to have a woman in this position, if at all possible. The first Special Assistant that I chose was another woman, Patricia Scroggs.

On personnel choices I pushed the issue of appointing women and minorities to the Bureau very strongly. This had been a conviction of mine for some time. My mother was a strong woman, my wife is a strong woman, and I felt very strongly on this issue, as a matter of equity. I made a major effort for several years on personnel issues to improve the participation of women and minorities at senior levels of the Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs.

I did less well in getting African-Americans than women. I did well in appointing Asian-Americans, but not too well on appointing African-Americans. There just weren't that many qualified African-Americans in the Foreign Service. At least there weren't that many qualified people who were interested in Asia. My efforts in that regard were less successful, although they were very successful in terms of women. I made it very clear that quality and excellence came first, but we had to expand our net, try to find suitable women and minorities, and then pick the best person. The odds would be better and we would get more women and minorities if we actively sought to recruit them. EA/P [Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs] did not have a particularly good reputation in this area. I worked very hard to improve it, with considerable success.

I had my Special Assistant, Patricia Scroggs, conduct a comprehensive campaign to contact women and minorities, including those at overseas posts and in the Department, and try to get them interested in serving in EA/P. I kept pressing our Country Directors as they were recruiting people for the country desks to make sure that there were women and minorities on their lists. I always made clear that I wasn't going to sacrifice excellence or apply quotas. However, I also made clear that I wanted the number of women and minorities to go up both in recruiting and in providing a more receptive atmosphere in EA/P in which they would want to work. I think that we built up some momentum in this regard and got a reputation for doing better than the bureau had done in the past. This applied, not only in Washington, but also in our senior positions overseas.

Q: [Kennedy] Talking about minorities, what was your impression of the recruitment to positions in EA/P of Asian-Americans? Would you say that they were sort of coming on stream?

LORD: I think that by definition we had more Asian-Americans in our Bureau than in any other Bureau. There was a lot of interest among Asian-Americans in our bureau, and we had a lot of them there. I considered that as part of the minority mix as well. That was a fairly easy objective to achieve. Even when I came into the bureau, I noticed that we had quite a few Asian-Americans. The real problem and challenge was and remains the recruitment of African-Americans. The bureau and the Foreign Service in general have done much better in the recruitment of women. However, we're still lacking in terms of African-Americans. Nevertheless, I attached a high priority to this, and the powers that be in the Department of State recognized and appreciated that.

Could I mention a few other, generic issues which might be helpful to you? I'm talking now over a period of several years. First, and I'll get back to these, I went on all of the Presidential and Secretary of State Asian trips overseas during my tenure as Assistant Secretary. I traveled with the Secretary of Defense to China, Japan, and Korea. I went semi-clandestinely with the Director of CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] to China. I went with the NSC Advisors on a couple of Asian trips. In each of these cases I was the top adviser to the principal representative.
I don't have the numbers, but in my own personal travels I went to Japan the most. I made it clear, particularly early on during my service as Assistant Secretary, especially with my China background, that Japan was our number one partner in East Asia. Japan was the first place that I visited on my own, as I recall, and certainly this was very early on in my term as Assistant Secretary. Almost every time I went to Asia, I would try to go to Japan. I would always seek Japanese officials out at meetings of senior officials on regional security, around the edges of the UN, and so forth. I would try to show that I wanted to consult and concert with them as much as I could on the various issues in Asia under consideration.

On my own trips, and when I traveled with the President and the Secretary of State, I must have visited Japan about 15 or 20 times during this period. I would say that I visited South Korea at least 10 times; China, six times; Hong Kong several times; ASEAN countries probably varied from Brunei, twice, to Thailand, about eight times, with the other countries more or less in between and closer to the level of trips to Thailand. I visited Vietnam roughly six times; Cambodia, roughly four times; Australia, maybe four times; New Zealand, maybe three times; and the South Pacific, maybe three times. I went to Europe several times and to Russia twice for consultations on Asia. I thought that these trips were important in pushing our interests and for all of the other reasons I have mentioned.

I also gave high priority to dealing with the press. To be honest about it, I got to be fairly good at it. Mike McCurry [White House press spokesperson] would have me go out after Presidential meetings, sometimes by myself, and sometimes with White House people. It was fairly unusual for White House people to let a State Department official handle this. Such meetings with the press were often on a background basis but sometimes on the record, especially in terms of Presidential meetings and always in the case of State Department meetings. I would often be brought down by the State Department press spokesperson, first Mike McCurry and then Nick Burns, to give special briefings at the State Department. I did a lot of press contact work on the telephone and gave a lot of backgrounders to the press.

I did a lot of work with the foreign press, not only on the phone, but also at the Foreign Press Center in the Department of State. I had more appearances by far on USIA’s WorldNet than any other Assistant Secretary.

Q: [Kennedy] Can you explain what WorldNet was?

LORD: WorldNet is a USIA [United States Information Agency] operation where we televised live interaction with people of other countries. I would often be on these programs, which would concern three or four countries, with audience participation, questions, and so on. Or I would discuss major, upcoming trips and try to set the scenes for them.

I believed that dealing with the press was important in terms of getting our policy themes
out. These events were either on the record or on background. I have to say that my general view is that the press quality and coverage is way down now, compared to my days in the 1970s. In the 1970s the quality of the journalists traveling with Secretary Kissinger was extraordinary. Some of their names would be more familiar than others, but they included people like Ted Koppel, Strobe Talbot, Bernie Gwertzman, Murray Marder, the Kalb brothers, and other people who were outstanding. In the 1970s, when I talked to them seriously, I felt that I had a better response than in the 1990s where it was a mixed bag. On foreign policy issues, there tended to be a certain attitude among journalists of gotcha and confrontations. So therefore, although I had some impact when dealing with the press, many times I felt frustrated. I would give them what I thought was a great rationale, a conceptual approach, and all of the pluses of our policy, but some of the journalists would only pick out the negative aspects. They would think that I was spinning and emphasizing those areas of advantage to the government, while I would think that I was being educational. Of course, I was spinning as well! But whether it was a particular issue on the results of a meeting or trip, the press often seemed to be searching for the bad news.

I did a lot with the press overseas, too. Every time I went to a country, I would have a press conference with local and foreign press representatives, as well as with American journalists and international observers. That was important. You get a lot more coverage from the overseas press than you do from the American press. If you have a press conference in Singapore, South Korea, or Japan, it's a much bigger deal than when you have a press conference in the United States. The foreign press really covers a press conference. So I would do that religiously. I would also work on background with foreign and American media.

I’m still talking about generic activities as Assistant Secretary. Congress was extremely important. I testified before Congress often. I always did my homework and was comfortable doing this. I was very fortunate in that the two Congressional Subcommittees on East Asia (Senate and House) which I dealt with the most were headed by very responsible people. I thought that most of the time that I was up there they were there to learn and wanted to have an exchange of views and hear what I had to say, rather than trying to embarrass me and put me on the spot. Now, there were some controversial questions such as on Vietnam and the Missing in Action question, which were exciting. Other examples included the proposed visit of Taiwan’s President Lee or the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity in the Taiwan Straits. On the whole, my colleagues and I worked very closely with the members of these sub-committees. I would go up to Congress to keep specific members of the sub-committees or elsewhere informed, particularly on trips that were coming up. Then either my superiors or I would debrief them when we would come back to Washington. So we would keep in touch on key issues.

The classic example was Vietnam, where I dealt a great deal with Senator McCain [Republican, Arizona], Senator John Kerry [Democrat, Massachusetts], and Senator Bob Kerrey [Democrat, Nebraska], as well as Congressman Pete Peterson [Florida]. Senator McCain was very important on this issue as a former POW [Prisoner of War] himself. He and the others I mentioned gave the President political cover in normalizing relations.
with Vietnam. We coordinated very closely for several years on the gradual normalization with Vietnam.

I paid a lot of attention to think tanks, whether it was my own Council on Foreign Relations, the Asia Society, or some of the conservative think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation in Washington. I also spoke often outside of New York, including on the West Coast. While in the cities, I would meet with the media as well. I would try to keep in touch with outside experts and hold meetings with them, either individually or as a group, and get their views. I also tried to build support for our policies. I gave quite a few speeches, an example of a major one being the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco.

I also thought that it was important to get the views of outside groups and also to build support among other groups. I met regularly and separately with business representatives, usually the representatives of companies in Washington of the business community. Whenever I traveled abroad I also met with American business groups to explain our policies and, most importantly, to hear how we could help them with local governments. I would make a few remarks to outline a few, key issues and ask for their views.

I also met with representatives of human rights groups. I think that I was the only Assistant Secretary of State who did this, except for John Shattuck, who was the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights in general. I met with the leaders of human rights groups every few months to get their views. I definitely wanted to get their perspectives and ideas but I also wanted to maintain support for our policies.

I was very fortunate in the interagency dealings we had. The most crucial was with the NSC, where I had worked in the Kissinger days, when NSC-State coordination was less than ideal! I was very fortunate first that I had actually recommended to Tony Lake [then National Security Adviser to President Clinton] that he recruit Kent Weideman as his Asian NSC person. Kent had been my Economic Counselor in Beijing and then was DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] in Israel. He had also been DCM in Singapore. So I worked, first with him and then with his replacement, Stan Roth, and had extremely good relations with them. I was enthusiastic about Kent and then about Stan. These were good people over in the NSC, but they were also people that I could deal with. It was very important that we had tremendous cooperation with the NSC, even to the point where we would show them drafts of memos that we were writing in our own building to get ideas and make sure that we coordinated with each other as much as possible. They would do the same with us. We never had major disagreements with them. We had healthy debates, but always cordial and collegial. After Roth came Sandy Kristoff with whom relations were also good, but she was less open.

The same excellent ties were true of the Department of Defense, particularly with Joe Nye [Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs] and Kurt Campbell, his deputy. We were able to work extremely well with the Defense Department. We had weekly meetings with the key, security related bureaus in the State Department, the intelligence people, and the key counterparts in the Pentagon and NSC. We discussed regional security issues. This was a very useful mechanism which my predecessors had used. I instituted a new similar mechanism on economic issues. This
was not as productive as the meetings on security issues, but still was helpful.

I was very conscious of our overseas links, including keeping in touch with our Ambassadors. I would send occasional, conceptual messages to all of our overseas posts, outlining our policies and reviewing major issues. I was very concerned to make sure that our Embassies were well informed and I stressed the importance of this to our country desks. I was in touch with our Ambassadors personally, as were my deputies, on their personnel concerns, as well as substantively.

We had only one Chiefs of Mission meeting while I was in office as Assistant Secretary, due to budgetary reasons. In 1994 we had a Chiefs of Mission meeting, when we were having some problems with some aspects of our Asia policy. I thought that it was very important to air different people's views, do some course corrections, and generally get our policies on a better track. So the Chiefs of Mission meeting of 1994 was about as good, important, and productive a meeting of this kind as I've ever participated in. Together with a memo I wrote to the Secretary that spring (which was leaked by someone to the press and became famous), this meeting resulted in significant changes in style, even substance, over succeeding months, which really helped in the region.

In Washington I had regular staff meetings. I emphasized having younger people sit in on meetings with foreign Ambassadors and other meetings, so that it was not just the Country Directors that were involved. I made it clear that I wanted to see as many of the younger people as possible, both to add to their experience and for morale purposes in general. I would also try to get their views. I already mentioned my emphasis on women.

I spent a lot of time on personnel matters every year, working with our Deputy Assistant Secretaries and Country Directors to get the best people in the bureau, and not just to get diversity, but also quality. Getting the best people for our overseas posts and in Washington was a very high priority for me. I had regular, brown bag lunches with junior and medium level officers whom I would not normally see as much of as some of the others. I had occasional meetings with women and minority officers to talk about issues that they were concerned about.

When I would read a particularly good memorandum or cable, I would send the drafting officer a message complimenting him or her. The same with cables from abroad. I also asked my Special Assistant and Secretary to keep me posted on personnel matters, such as whether someone was having a baby, a death in the family, or whatever it was, so that I could be in touch that way. I tried to find ways to give a feeling to people in a large bureau that there was some interaction with the top levels in the office. I also spent a great deal of time on efficiency reports - a process I hated but knew was important to officers’ careers and morale.

So those are some of the generic approaches that I used. I hope that I don't sound too self-serving. I'm just trying to describe elements I considered important in doing the job.

Q: [Kennedy] You mentioned meetings with the Pentagon. Did you find, at least initially,
a certain wariness on the part of the Pentagon, particularly in terms of the uniformed people? President Clinton had not served in the military. He had brought with him, particularly in the White House, some younger, political types or some bumptious, younger people who reportedly looked down on the military. I was wondering whether that attitude spilled over to your contacts with the Pentagon, because you had important, political concerns in some, specific areas.

LORD: That's a very fair question. The President had evaded the draft during the Vietnam War. He had been against the war. One of his first issues with the military concerned the issue of gays serving in the military. The Clinton people were less identified with strong, military policies than was the case during the Reagan administration, and so on. Therefore, there undoubtedly was some unease in the military when Clinton came into office. To his credit, I think, he overcame that initial feeling to a certain extent. But he got off to a poor start, to say the least.

Having said that and knowing that some negative feelings about Clinton existed generally in the services, I did not find that this kind of criticism popped up in my context. In the first place, I don't think that unless you know somebody particularly well, and particularly if he or she is a political appointee, they aren't going to criticize the White House. You wouldn't expect that to happen.

The fact is that I'm sure that there was some unease about some of the policies of the Clinton administration. However, the crucial issue in my region, about maintaining our force levels in the region, was never debated or discussed in the bureau or at higher levels. There was a consensus that the level of military troops stationed in the region played a key role in our foreign policy. No one made the kind of mistake that President Carter made in talking about pulling our troops out of South Korea.

Personally, I had excellent relations with the military as well as Pentagon civilians. Overseas, I worked especially closely with CINCPAC. The first one I overlapped with was Admiral Larson, and he was superb, one of the best officers I've dealt with. His various activities - military exchanges, military assistance, ship visits, exercises, tours of the region, etc. - were very helpful to our goals. Toward the end of my tour, Admiral Prueher also was outstanding.

Q: [Kennedy] I was in Seoul when President Carter entered office. That was a major issue at the time.

LORD: It was, and I've yet to find anybody who was responsible for that policy. People tend to say: "Oh, no, I didn't recommend that."
I will say that on regional security dialogues, and I kept emphasizing this, we were maintaining our alliances and our military presence, which were crucial to our security. These dialogues were just something that we were trying to build on top of that. Maybe, decades from now, we may be able to shift some of the responsibilities and turn some of these institutions into real security forums. Maybe they will be effective. However, as far ahead as we can see, we are going to need our troops and our alliances. I kept stressing
that.

However, having said that, I found that there was less enthusiasm in the Pentagon generally for the regional security dialogues than there was in the State Department. There was no outright opposition to them. A lot of the reason for this lack of enthusiasm for the dialogues is that it was mostly State Department and NSC people doing the talking at these meetings, and not Department of Defense officials. I pushed to have military representatives sitting in on these meetings as well and had some success in that regard. It was somewhat slow going, and we'll get back to this. However, there was some feeling that although this might be a noble objective, the Defense Department people didn't think that they were all that crucial. However, it wasn't a major issue.

President Clinton strongly supported maintaining our military presence in East Asia. As I said before, he visited South Korea early on in his first term as President. I don't recall any real problem coming up in this regard.

Q: [Kennedy] Would you like to talk about the two, major meetings? First, there was the trip which President Clinton made to Japan and to South Korea. Then we might move over to the Seattle meeting of APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Conference]. Perhaps we could begin with a brief, overview of the situation and problems during the four years of the first Clinton term. Then we could hit each country and problem separately.

LORD: Right. We're talking about both reality and perception of how we were doing in Asia and in the Pacific during this time. When we had some of our biggest problems, I think that you could say that our Asian problems were like what Mark Twain said about Wagner's music: "It's not as bad as it sounds."

I think that it's fair to say that we got off to an early and good start. Although there was some friction right away with Japan on trade, we took advantage of the calendar that we discussed, including the President's trip to Asia. Generally, during President Clinton's Asia trip, he set out broad themes in Japan and South Korea on economics, security, and human rights/democracy.

My Senate confirmation statement was of use in my early dealings with other countries. I went on an early trip to several countries in East Asia in May, 1993, before the President went on his trip to the area and began moving on regional dialogues. I negotiated with the Congress, on behalf of the President, MFN [Most Favored Nation] extension for China. At the time, and people tend to forget this, this was greeted as a very positive outcome. Although the President had been very harsh on China during the campaign and many in Congress wanted very tough conditions or to cut off MFN altogether, the human rights conditions we negotiated were modest. They put some pressure on the Chinese, but they weren't so onerous that the Chinese couldn't meet them, and thus we wouldn't lose MFN extension as a result. In any event, I worked well with Congresswoman Pelosi [Democrat, California] and Senator Mitchell [Democrat, Maine] on this issue. There was disappointment from the beginning with the economic people in the administration, who didn't want any conditions. Later they sabotaged the President’s policy. But at the time
(June 1993), the MFN deal was greeted as a success.

Then, by the end of 1993 we had the very successful meeting in Seattle of APEC. There was the drama of the first meeting ever of the leaders of the various, participating countries and setting forth provisions for greater trade and investment in the Pacific. This was part of a triple play on trade. Just before President Clinton arrived in Seattle, NAFTA was approved by the U.S. Congress. And soon after Seattle there was a breakthrough on global negotiations in the Uruguay Round of GATT.


LORD: That's right. President Clinton arrived at the APEC meeting, having just won a major victory on NAFTA, with the help of the Republicans, I might add. This was accomplished literally one day before he arrived in Seattle. If he had lost this agreement, it would have hurt everything. So the President came in on the wave of a major success. This gave an impetus to the whole APEC meeting, of course.

Then the bold vision set forth by the APEC leaders in turn directed the attention of the Europeans to the Uruguay Round of tariff and trade negotiations. The Europeans had been dragging their feet on the Uruguay Round. Then the Europeans began to see in APEC that the U.S. and Asia might get together at Europe's expense, and they began moving on the Uruguay Round. Within a couple of months, therefore, we had major breakthroughs on NAFTA, on APEC, and on the Uruguay Round in GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations.

When you put all of that together - the MFN deal on China, the President's Asia trip, APEC, etc. - things looked as if they were going pretty well in the Asia-Pacific region in 1993. We did have trade problems with Japan. However, on the whole, things looked pretty good at that time.

During the latter months of 1993 therefore I was getting a good press, and people were generally supportive of our initiatives. I might add at this point that Secretary of State Christopher decided that Cliff Wharton wouldn't work out as new Deputy Secretary. So Christopher was looking for a Deputy Secretary. I'm just giving you the general rhythm of the administration, but it reflected the fact that Christopher and the White House were happy about how things were going in Asia at that point.

As I say, at the end of 1993 Secretary Christopher was looking for a Deputy. I know for a fact that the choice came down to Strobe Talbot or myself. Indeed, at one point Elaine Sciolino from the "New York Times" called me and said that the "Times" was going to run an article on the following day, saying that I had been chosen to be Deputy Secretary of State. I said: "Well, you know something that I don't know," and I steered her away from that. This was just as well, as the story was not accurate.

One semi-amusing comment here. I was told by someone very close to Secretary
Christopher that the choice was between Talbot and myself and over the following weekend Christopher was reportedly going to choose between Talbot and myself. One thing that he doesn't do, unless it involves a crisis, is that he doesn't bother you on weekends. He's not like Kissinger, who might go out of his way to contact you on weekends, if he possibly could. It was very unusual for Christopher to call you on weekends. He might call you on Saturday morning, if you're in the office or he sees you. Otherwise, you don't generally get a call from Christopher over the weekend. He would say to himself: "This can wait till Monday."

So I went into the weekend, knowing that the choice was probably between Talbot and me and against this background of Christopher’s habit of never calling on weekends. At about 6:00 or 7:00 PM on Sunday night a call came through that Secretary of State Christopher was calling me. So I sort of looked at my watch and thought that I might be asked to be Deputy Secretary at about 6:50 PM on such and such a date.

What Christopher discussed with me was some press report on China. It was not all that important or urgent and could have waited until the next morning. We discussed this report for about ten minutes. I kept waiting for the other shoe to drop. Not only did I know that he was making up his mind on his deputy but I also knew that he knew that I knew! So here we had this ten minute conversation about some relatively modest issue about China. He got to the end of it, said: "Thank you," and hung up. I was totally puzzled. In any event, I found later that Christopher had chosen Strobe Talbot instead of me. He called me finally in Vail, Colorado.

Frankly, and this may sound amazing, I was not that disappointed. First of all, I thought very highly of Strobe Talbot. I'm not just being polite for the record. Secondly, I really liked what I was doing and had my teeth sunk into the job. Obviously, on balance I would have preferred to have been selected as Deputy Secretary of State. However, I've always had some anxiety levels as I've moved up, so I had mixed feelings about the resolution of this issue.

Q: [Kennedy] Well, I'm trying to get a feel about the inner workings of the bureaucracy and do not want to criticize anybody. However, what was your impression and the word as to why the relationship between Cliff Wharton and Christopher hadn't worked out?

LORD: Well, I had known Cliff Wharton as a Director of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a very able man. I think that the conventional wisdom is true, in that Christopher didn't think that Wharton had all of that much experience on foreign policy and that he wanted either Peter Tarnoff, Tom Pickering, or somebody else as his number two man in the State Department. I think that it actually was Tom Pickering's name which was floated around most often at the time. However, the White House, with its laudatory goal of increasing diversity in the administration, put considerable pressure on Christopher to choose Wharton, who is an African-American. You'd have to ask Christopher if this is true, but I got that feeling. So I don't think that Wharton was Christopher's first choice to be Deputy Secretary.
All of us have strengths and weaknesses. I think that Cliff had served in AID [Agency for International Development], but he was not a bureaucratic jungle fighter and wasn't all that decisive. I just think that Christopher needed more support, and Wharton wasn't working out in the job. I think that Wharton wasn't all that happy, either, as Deputy Secretary. It is a little awkward for me to discuss this matter, and I think that you ought to talk to the people most directly involved. I must say that Wharton is an extremely decent guy. I think that Christopher needed more decisive, stronger support and that he, Christopher, found that he couldn't successfully delegate key issues to him.

I don't mean to digress too much on this Deputy Secretary issue. I believe that if you are detached about it, strictly in terms of foreign policy resume, mine was probably more impressive than Talbot's, because he had only worked for the government for a year. He had done extremely well as a special representative on the Soviet Union. However, he didn't have the equivalent of my experience on foreign policy, although he had a very impressive resume in other ways. But he had shown in one year that he was terrific on policy making and on dealing with the bureaucracy, as well as on substance. Above all, he was very close to the President, which I felt was valuable for Christopher. I thought that that would be very helpful for Christopher in dealing with the White House and the President. So I thought that on those grounds, as well as Talbot's other qualities, he was a very sensible choice.

Anyway, Talbot is so decent a person that he would handle his close relationship with the President and serving Christopher with great skill, and he did so. In short, he was an asset for Christopher in terms of the White House, but he clearly never played Christopher off against the President and never used his White House connection to Christopher's disadvantage. He retained enormous respect from Christopher and from the President. He did an excellent job and has done so ever since. He is just a great human being. I would say that off the record as well as on the record.

This is more or less by way of telling the good news in a general way on the first year foreign policy - and my reputation - in the Clinton Administration. Now I'll get to the bad news. As I said, during the first year of the Clinton administration I think that people felt, and I felt also, that we were off to a good start. Then we ran into some trouble, no question about it, in the first few months of 1994. Several things conspired to produce this result.

First, and I'll go into more detail on Japan, but what dominated the public and media perception of Japan policy was trade disputes with that country. I'll get into that later. Basically, the conventional wisdom or the view of the hard liners in economics was that we ought to confront the Japanese on these matters. But even those who were worried about the balance of payments deficit or market access felt that all of this noise and dispute with Japan was dominating what after all was our most important partnership. One way or another many thought we were hurting relations.

Secondly, at the same time, we had this reversal on MFN [Most Favored Nation] status for China. We had the unfortunate trip by Secretary Christopher to China in March, 1994,
and then the President changed his position on MFN conditionality. It is now called "Normal Trade Relations" or "NTR," instead of MFN, which is what it was called at the time. So we were embarrassed on that front and weren't making a great deal of progress with China. Therefore, it looked as if we weren't doing very well with China. People like Kissinger and other Republicans in particular said that we weren't giving enough emphasis to strategic dialogue and that we were too focused on human rights. At the same time, the human rights people, including some in Congress, were unhappy that we had reversed our policy on MFN. So there was considerable criticism of how we were handling the China relationship.

In addition, in the early months of 1994, the Korean issue heated up. The North Koreans were threatening to leave the NPT.

Q: [Kennedy] NPT is the Non Proliferation Treaty.

LORD: Yes. There was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing about IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. So we had a buildup of tension on the Korean front. And trouble with our two biggest partners in Asia, Japan and China. You put all of this together, and there was considerable criticism of our Asia policy. This became increasingly personal. With respect to the MFN reversal - I’ll discuss in detail later - people were looking for scapegoats. Clearly, I was a likely target. I had been in favor of conditional MFN extension and I had advised President Clinton to that effect. I was Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, including China, and so there was a lot of press backgrounding and even foregrounding, particularly by the representatives of our economic agencies, that I had not consulted enough with them and had sort of screwed things up. There was an article in "Newsweek" with my picture asking: "Is Lord about to be fired?" So this was not the happiest time of my career.

I obviously thought, at the time, that although we had some problems, they were manageable. There was also the debate at the time about Asian values. There was a conference in Vienna about Asian values versus universal values.

Q: [Kennedy] Could you explain what that distinction means?

LORD: Well, people like Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, not to mention communist rulers, basically were saying, with different nuances and degrees, that human rights are not universal. They felt that there are some regional emphases that we should pay attention to. They tended to say that Asians care about discipline, family, community, and stability. They said that Western emphasis on liberty and freedom sometimes leads to chaos, crime, and drugs, and that we shouldn't be pushing our values on Asian countries. We'll get back to all of this. That had been a controversy. So in early 1994 we ran into some problems and debates on that as well. That was part of the mix which made it look as if we were not having a great deal of success in Asia at the time.

Obviously, I had my own views on this. First, I felt that you don't judge the correctness of
a policy only in terms of whether you are getting along with another country. If there is a trade problem with Japan, it's easier to sweep it under the rug and make things look as if everything is going well than confronting it directly. And I'll get back to Japan in more depth. Anyway, I thought that it was important to be firm with Japan. We had some problems which may have reflected that we had a different style of dealing with this, but the rest of the Department of State and I were firm about being tough with the Japanese on that. It was not a matter of the economic agencies being tough and the State Department being soft. We felt that Japan was simply being unreasonable. I thought that some of the people commenting on the Japan issue didn't realize that if we didn't make progress there, it could hurt our security interests over the longer run. Americans and Congress at some point might zero in on the continuing huge trade deficit with Japan and China and begin to link it with security issues. We wanted to head that off by getting Japan to open up its market.

Also, I was already working with the Department of Defense and other people to isolate our security interests and other involvement with Japan from the economic aspects, so that we wouldn't lose them. So I felt that some of the criticism of our policy wasn't realistic. You can't judge relations as excellent just because everything is going smoothly. If you have a problem, it may get worse if you don't address it. I believed that some temporary flak might be necessary to get to a more solid relationship with Japan.

On China, I think that if we had it all to do over again, we probably shouldn't have had conditional MFN renewal. But we were in a box in 1993 because of the President's campaign positions. I also think that it might have worked. I think that in 1993 we got the best possible outcome, given the President's campaign rhetoric. The compromise that we got from Congresswoman Pelosi, Senator Mitchell, and others, the yardsticks for Chinese improvement were realistic. If we had not been undercut by the economic agencies of the U.S. Government and our business community, we might have worked this out.

Nevertheless, China policy was looking rocky. During the summer of 1993, State drafted a strategy paper which we sent on to the White House. I had a lot to do with drafting it. (End of tape)

We had drafted this paper on the strategy of engagement with China. It essentially presaged our future policy and was approved by the White House in September 1993. We were trying to be more closely engaged with them. I felt that some of the critics who said that we hadn't engaged in enough strategic dialogue with China didn't appear to realize that we weren't exactly talking to Zhou En-lai and others of the older generation of Chinese leaders. However, I understood that we needed to straighten out China policy in some respects. In the case of Korea we had inherited a very difficult problem from the previous administration, and there weren't very many good choices available to us. So I felt that we were doing the best we could on that front, and we were negotiating rather than selling out to North Korea or going to war with it on the nuclear issue.

More importantly, I believe that we were making progress on other issues that had been lost sight of. We will go into all of these issues in more detail. We were already moving
ahead toward normalization of diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. We had raised APEC to the leaders' level, with all of the positive implications of that. We were moving ahead with APEC as a major instrument of free trade and investment. We had begun to launch regional security dialogues, which I thought were important.

On a much less cosmic scale we were improving our relations with New Zealand, which had been treated as something of a pariah by the United States for some time, over the issue of visits to New Zealand ports by U.S. Navy ships carrying, or alleged to be carrying, nuclear weapons. In Cambodia there were free elections under UN supervision, however shaky the coalition government that emerged from these elections. I thought that that was a positive development. We had elevated the East Asian region in terms of our interests. We were maintaining our force levels. So, although I would grant that we had some problems in some of our relations, I thought that the criticism had been overdone.

Nevertheless, having said all of that, both in terms of reality and certainly in terms of perception, the early months of 1994 were certainly the nadir of my tenure as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. But, during the rest of 1994 and later, we really began to pick up again. I'm trying to be as detached as I can in this respect. Perhaps this was less so in the case of China, but we got beyond the initial MFN dispute and began to have more visits and to work on a broader agenda. With Japan we negotiated several trade agreements, the trade deficit began to go down, and we were stepping up our dialogue, working with Joe Nye of the Department of Defense on security issues. We were beginning to make progress on that.

In October, 1994, we negotiated the Korean Nuclear Accord, a framework agreement which was a major step forward. We made much further progress on relations with Vietnam and moved ahead on that. In July, 1994, not only did the regional security dialogue move ahead but we created the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Forum, which brought five new countries, including China, Russia, and Vietnam into this security dialogue. That was a significant step forward.

By January, 1995, I think that we had done quite well. During this period I used two instruments to try to help our efforts. First, I wrote a memo which became fairly famous. This memo, which was written some time in the spring of 1994 when we had the most trouble with our Asian policy, talked about the malaise in Asian-Pacific policy.

Q: [Kennedy] I would have thought that you would have avoided the word malaise after President Carter used the term!

LORD: Right. So whenever I was accused of using a bad name, as you have pointed out, I would say: "You people have it wrong. You haven't seen the memo. It was 'Malaysia,' not 'Malaise.'" I think that I was quite honest in referring to the fact that we did have some problems in Asian policy. We certainly had public relations problems. So this memo was a self-critique of the administration's policy. By definition, as I was the key person at the working level, it was an analysis of what we had been able to do, and where
we were not succeeding.

This memo was subsequently leaked to the press. Both the subject and the actual text were leaked. I can swear on my family that I did not leak it. I've never leaked any document. I really haven't. I believe that if you don't agree with a policy, you should fight it out and try to win the battle over it. If you don't win the battle, you soldier on. If it's such a crucial, fundamental issue, you resign. But I don't believe in leaking documents. I take a very religious view of this issue.

Many people seemed to feel that, even if I didn't leak it, I wanted to make sure that it got out. They would cite, with some justification, that it had a relatively low classification. I think that it was CONFIDENTIAL. I wanted to get the text to our posts, as well as to the Seventh Floor in the State Department, the White House, and so on, because I thought that it was important, that we ought to be reviewing the bidding, and I wanted to generate comments. But some suspected that I really wanted it to get out to the press because, with such wide distribution, it was bound to get out. That was not my intent, but it's a fair suspicion, because there were hundreds of copies of this document in circulation.

Q: [Kennedy] That happens.

LORD: It happens, particularly when a memo is critical of what you are doing. So I can understand that accusation, however wrong. That's just a sidebar.

First, the memo did lay out where things were going well. I thought that this was only fair. I didn't want to get everyone too depressed, and so I pointed out where things were going well, along the lines which I have mentioned, even then, in the spring of 1994. But then I spent the bulk of the memo saying that we were having some problems, what they were, and why we had them. Honestly, I haven't looked at this memo for a couple of years.

Some people thought that this memo was written as a part of the China policy debate and before the MFN decision. It was about that time, though I can't remember exactly when it was. It wasn't primarily about China, though it included China. Basically, I talked both fundamental issues as well as stylistic problems. On China I believed we needed more strategic dialogue and to expand our agenda.

However, the memo wasn't written primarily because of China. China was one of our problems. Basically, my view was that we have to broaden our agenda with China. Human rights are still crucial, but we have to talk about a lot of these other issues, like Korea and so on, as part of a broader agenda.

On Japan we were already working with the Department of Defense on the need for stepping up our visible as well as our invisible security dialogue.

But the news focused on broad themes, not specific policies. I went through the various issues before us. There was a general theme of getting more multilateral support. I
focused on this and the Asian values issue. I also emphasized that we should act without arrogance. With other nations, I thought we should appeal to self-interest themes.

I talked about style generally with the Asians and how we had to be respectful without rolling over. I don't recall everything that I said but I did talk about our stylistic approach, and the need for greater Congressional and media attention. I covered a lot of issues in this comprehensive memo. I was trying to get us on a more positive track, both in terms of substance and in terms of perception.

I think that the memo was pretty useful. It was designed to encourage a debate on these issues. When the memo leaked, a lot of people felt that I was covering my flank or other parts of my anatomy by criticizing the Clinton administration on our policy. This was nonsense, because I had helped to fashion it. I didn't always succeed in this regard, because, frankly, we didn't have control of Japan policy in the early period of the Clinton administration. There were some problems. However, I was basically being self critical, too, pointing to areas where we could do better. It would be nonsense to say, at least of policy toward East Asia, that our problems were everyone else's fault, not mine.

So that was one thing that I did in the spring of 1994 when we had problems in Asia.

The other thing that I did was to convene the Chiefs of Mission conference of 1994. These meetings are sometimes pretty routine, but we did a lot of work on this meeting. Everyone was there from all our posts and from various agencies in Washington, bringing up problems and suggestions. Again, this happened in June 1994. That meeting was important in getting ideas on how we should approach things. People then went back to their post, sometimes instituting a new style and approaches.

So I think that those two efforts were fairly important.

Q: [Kennedy] Well, regarding the memo, you can write one, but the question is: "What came back?"

LORD: What came back was discussions with Secretary Christopher and others in Washington regarding the memo. I can't remember whether we had a special meeting called to discuss it. However, there was a very enthusiastic response in terms of providing intellectual grist for the mill. I also invited comments from our Embassies and asked them to reply to the points made in the memo. There was very good dialogue with our posts.

I can't quantify the impact the memo had. First of all, I am very careful to avoid claiming that this memo turned around our Asian policy. I don’t think that things were that bad, as some people thought. Secondly, our policy would have been turned around to some extent, as you always learn on the job. The whole Clinton administration was learning and adjusting. But I think that the memo had some influence, and in fact that we began to pick up speed. In the subsequent months, there were adjustments in our approach as recommended in my memo and other papers we wrote. By itself, this memo wasn't going
to solve the Korean nuclear problem or some of the other issues I mentioned. However, I think that the memo underlined the need for greater emphasis to our China policy in the sense of the need to broaden our agenda. I think that it underlined the need for having other elements in our Japan policy. I think that, stylistically, we adjusted our tone somewhat in the region. I did that by constant iteration and instructions in this regard.

Speaking generally, I think that this memo got people thinking, although I can't quantify to what extent. I got some very good feedback on it from various people. As I said, there was some criticism from people outside the State Department who said that it was designed to have a self serving purpose at a time when I felt defensive about where we were. But people in the government bureaucracy and at our overseas posts tended to think that it was a very useful exercise. In most cases people agreed with its main themes. Recently, I received a copy of the memo as published in a Japanese newspaper. I enclose it here for the record, as published.

Washington - The following is a letter Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State, submitted to Secretary of State Warren Christopher:

Subject: Emerging Malaise in our Relations with Asia

When this Administration took office, the fundamental challenge in the Asia-Pacific region was to raise the region’s profile in our foreign policy. We sought to highlight the stakes for our domestic audience and convince Asians of our staying power.

(1) In the first year, we have succeeded - through the travels of the President, yourself and others; high level bilateral meetings; major speeches setting forth the vision of a pacific community; maintenance of our military presence; the APEC leaders meeting; promotion of regional security dialogues; forward movement with Vietnam; staunch support for a democratic Cambodia; modest improvement of ties with Indonesia and Malaysia; reinforcement of relations with Australia on arms control, regional security and APEC; and a change in our contacts policy for New Zealand.

(2) Now, we face a fresh, growing, more complex challenge. With our Asia-Pacific partners more persuaded of our long term engagement, they now are beginning to resist the nature of that engagement. A series of American measures threatened or employed, risk corroding our positive image in the region, giving ammunition to those charging we are an international nanny, if not bully. Without proper course, adjustments, we could subvert our influence and our interests.

(3) The malaise

This spring, the positive Pacific community principles articulated by the President in Seattle are being crowded out by a plethora of problems which Asians perceive as caused by hostile unilateral U.S. actions. These are creating a sense of resentment and apprehension in our relations with the region - and also engendering some tension within the Administration.
(4) Central to this malaise are the problems in our two principal Asian relationships.

(5) Japan and China.

We view these as arising from the unwillingness of Japan and China to conform their policies to international norms. Asian, and others, view us as placating domestic interest groups and criticize us for tactics that destabilize relationships which are central to the region’s peace and prosperity.

There are a host of other frictions. Our attempt to interject workers rights issues into the world trade organization has been universally opposed by Asians and non-Asians alike (France being the major exception). It threatens (threatened?) to mar the APEC Trade Ministers meeting in Marrakesh. We have sanctioned China on the MTCR, and Thailand for Libya. We just announced sanctions on Taiwan regarding endangered species. We have decertified Laos on narcotics, although granting them a national interest waiver softened the blow. We continue to press Malaysia and Indonesia on workers’ rights and Singapore on its flogging sentence against an American teenager. We disagree with almost all Asians about the proper tactics for promoting reform in Burma. In varying degrees our promotion of human rights and democracy complicates our ties with several nations.

This is not to suggest that such policies are basically wrong. We have a right and a duty to pursue our interests and reflect our values. Moreover, one should not judge success by an absence of friction; harmony sometimes is purchased by paper over differences, risking larger problems down the road. Some of the frictions can be viewed as inevitable bumps in the road. The confluence of these individual issues, however, has fostered malaise, eroding the sense of optimism and partnership forged in Seattle.

In brief, the Asia-Pacific region presents in acute form a general challenge for American foreign policy. How do we reconcile our competing goals in a post cold war agenda when security concerns no longer lend us a clear hierarchy?

The risks

The way we are seeking some goals entails costs in our bilateral relations. Beyond that are the risks to our broader interests. These include:

- An increasing gap between the President’s vision of a Pacific community and the reality of some bilateral dealings.

- Weakened U.S. influence in APEC; lost opportunities for partnership, business and growth in Asia; the prospect of an essentially damage-control agenda for the President in Bali.

- Less Asian receptivity to U.S. views in the regional security dialogues you will be
inaugurating at the ASEAN Regional Forum.

-Fuel for Mahathir’s concept of an EAEC excluding the United States; resonance for Mahathir, the Chinese and others who charge we are seeking to dominate Asia.

There are some disturbing straws in the wind:

Hosokawa’s undercutting of U.S. on human rights during his China visit,

Kim’s softer pitch in Beijing on the nuclear issue,

Evans playing up of our trade disputes with China and Japan,

Romulo’s criticism of our Korean policy,

The Bangkok meeting last spring which sought to counter the universality of human rights,

Increased soundings of these themes in Asian and American circles.

All of this is played out against the backdrop of dwindling resources in personnel, overseas posts, and aid levels for this priority region.

Balancing interests

A common thread is the question of how we pursue global agenda issues in our bilateral relations. In most instances, we have sought to use trade measures to achieve non-trade objectives.

I have long advocated the importance of raising the profile of transnational issues in our foreign policy. Indeed, I chaired the Carnegie Commission report which underlined this theme, served as chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy and Vice Chairman of the International Rescue Committee. These issues reflect our domestic agenda, congressional perspectives, important interests groups and American values. Working with other agencies and functional bureaus, EAP has sought to weave these interests into the fabric of our relations in Asia. I have counseled my bureau and our posts to resist parochial impulses and keep in mind our broader national objectives.

At the same time, we must weigh the impact of pursuing specific short-term goals on our overall long-term interests in East Asia and the Pacific. These include tapping Asia’s huge economic potential and shaping a sense of community that will anchor us in the region and foster peace and prosperity.

In the long run our broad economic, security, and democratization goals are mutually reinforcing, but there will be times when trade-offs are required between competing short-term objectives. We need to look creatively for policies that advance various interests.
simultaneously, though at times we will need to set clear priorities. Our recent successful effort to define ways of promoting human rights in Indonesia while furthering our economic and security interests shows this can be done.

Policy guides: How can we address the malaise?

First of all, we retain considerable assets for influence in the region: the near universal Asian-Pacific desire for a continuing American security presence to maintain stability and balance between historic rivals and potential antagonists. Our large market for Asian exports and our capital/technology for investment. The overall trend toward more open societies from Mongolia to South Korea to Taiwan to Cambodia. A fifty year legacy of good will among many Asians.

Upon such foundations we can and should:

- reemphasize our shared interests with the Asian-Pacific region in economic prosperity and peace, rekindling the positive aspects of the historic Seattle conclave. The remainder of 1994 offers good opportunities; the U.S.-ASEAN dialogue and the regional security meeting in May, the ASEAN-PMC and ARF ministerial in July and the APEC ministerial and leaders meetings this fall.

- temper our rhetoric and work with the Congress to reduce expectations about quick fixes to what are often structural problems.

- oppose or readjust proposals from other agencies, often pursued for domestic reasons, when we are convinced that they will prove ineffective or counterproductive.

- weigh more carefully the costs/benefits of taking unilateral actions, consider multilateral alternatives.

- define more effective means to advance global agenda issues in an Asian context which emphasizes gradualism and consensus.

Generally, we must pay greater attention to our style. While Asians want us engaged, they are increasingly conscious and proud of their accomplishments, in contrast to trends in other regions. Their growing prosperity and power require that our relations be seen as founded on equality. We need a sophisticated diplomacy that is better calibrated to the changing Asian environment.

Looking forward

I plan to give this strategic imperative my highest priority in coming months and have instructed my colleagues to do likewise. We have submitted a major interagency PRD study on Asian policy to the NSC which begins to address these questions. I have asked the intelligence community to assess Asian perceptions and their impact on U.S. interests. I am convening a chiefs of mission conference in Hawaii in June and have invited key
seventh floor colleagues to join us - the central themes will be those in this paper and the
management of our dwindling resources.

This then is a core challenge in the Asian-Pacific region for U.S. policy makers. We in
EAP welcome the counsel and help of others - in this building, at our overseas posts,
elsewhere in the government, and in academia and think tanks. To this end, I invite
comments on this paper.

Q: [Kennedy] Was this memo designed to stimulate thinking for the Chiefs of Mission
conference? Did the Chiefs of Mission conference come after the memo was distributed?

LORD: Yes. It came after the memo was distributed, but I can't remember the exact
dates. I think that, as a general rule, you ought to have a Chiefs of Mission conference
every couple of years, anyway. We had budgetary problems, and I didn't arrange another
Chiefs of Mission conference again, although I would like to have done it.

Secondly, it was held in Hawaii. There were a lot of newly appointed Ambassadors who
had been at their posts for a few months, so it was a good time to hold the conference.
Above all, I was concerned about some of the problems that we had, and I wanted to
address those as well. A meeting like this is also a way of making sure that all of our
Ambassadors developed a feel for the Washington scene as well. We had people from
other U.S. Government agencies come out and address the Ambassadors. We exposed
Ambassadors to Washington realities, as well as the Washington people to the interests
that the Ambassadors had.

Q: [Kennedy] While we're on the subject of a Chiefs of Mission conference, how did you
feel about Ambassadors appointments to your area? A new administration had come in,
and they had political payoffs and all of that to consider in making such appointments.
How did you feel that you came out?

LORD: I felt that we won some and we lost some. I made a real effort, both on the merits,
to get the best people as Ambassadors, and, in terms of morale in the Bureau, to get as
many outstanding senior Foreign Service Officers who had served the Department
loyally, preferably in the Asian-Pacific region. I think, on the whole, that I did well in this
regard, over the course of two, three, or four years. I can't quantify this. Naturally we
didn't always get the Ambassadors that we wanted, but I felt that, with one or two
exceptions, I had a full crack at getting our views across.

Sometimes Ambassadors appointments depended on the White House and sometimes it
was up to the Seventh Floor of the Department of State. However, more often than not,
we managed to get good people assigned as Ambassadors who deserved appointment. I
say this without being critical of my predecessor, there was a feeling that, in recent years,
not too much attention has been paid to this. It's one thing to nominate someone as
Ambassador. It's another thing to get into a bloody fight to make sure the appointment is
made, including lobbying people on the Seventh Floor of the Department and/or the
White House.
I spent quite a bit of time on this matter. I believed that, on the whole, we had been successful in making pretty good appointments overseas, and I felt that I won more than I lost. Of course, I welcomed truly qualified political appointees - such as Mondale to Japan - so long as the percentage was not high.

I will just finish up this overview now, and then we'll go into issues in more depth. I felt that in particular, we had some pluses and some minuses in our policies in 1995. Our experience in 1996 was very good on the whole. There were several developments in this connection that made me feel very good. One of the reasons that I left office at the end of the first Clinton term was that I felt that our Asia-Pacific policy was in good shape.

In 1995, by the way, we normalized diplomatic relations with Vietnam and opened up an American Embassy in Hanoi. That was a major step forward.

We will discuss developments with China in 1996. In the spring was the Taiwan missile crisis and other issues included intellectual property rights, nuclear proliferation problems, and human rights issues. By the end of the year, we had gone from crisis to genuine, major progress. Secretary of State Christopher went back to China in November, 1996. This was a very successful trip, and set up subsequent summits. I had worked on this with Tony Lake [National Security Adviser] in a July 1996 trip. The future summit meetings were announced at the Manila APEC meeting at the end of 1996. So relations with China were on a positive track.

With Japan we had President Clinton's trip in the spring of 1996. I think that this was one of the best prepared and most successful summit meetings which I had ever been involved with regarding any country during my whole experience with foreign affairs. This trip reaffirmed and updated the alliance after the Cold War. It closed with a major joint statement on our partnership, the defusing of the Okinawa rape incident, which we'll get back to, and the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This involved working on new defense guidelines that would update our treaty and clarify how we would work together on various regional, as well as bilateral, security problems. This was a very successful trip which made me feel particularly good, given the importance which I attached to Japan and the problems which we had during the first couple of years of the first Clinton term. This was the fruit of a dialogue for which I give Joe Nye and Kurt Campbell [of the U.S. Defense Department] full credit. Nye and I, as well as our deputies, had worked closely together on security issues, which resulted in some of these results. Full credit also goes to Secretary of Defense Perry, who did an outstanding job, particularly on the Okinawa rape issue, on which he and Ambassador Mondale also worked very hard.

So I thought that relations with China and Japan were both on the right track.

On Korea, the Agreed Framework which we had negotiated in 1994 was still holding up in 1996. By then, and after considerable effort, we had launched Four-Power Talks [involving the U.S., China, North Korea, and South Korea]. So the situation in Korea was looking good. We had some tensions with our South Korean friends, but we were able to
ease them.

By 1996 APEC had gone through several meetings with national leaders and had become an institution. We had free trade and investment goals announced in APEC in 1994 and made good progress in succeeding years. These were major objectives which, in turn, inspired the countries of the Americas to move toward free trade, and so on. So APEC was well established. Regional security dialogues, notably the ASEAN regional forum, were moving ahead as well.

Cambodia was still holding up. We had improved our relations with New Zealand, as I said, and strengthened relations with Australia.

In short, I believed that by the end of the first Clinton term we were in good shape in these countries, and in the regional generally. Of course we had made some mistakes, especially early on, but I was pleased with the progress over the four years, both on specific issues and on elevating the region on our foreign policy agenda. The overall record stacked up quite well with the goals and my March 1993 Senate statement. Now, of course, I was also fortunate in the timing of my departure, since we had a domestic scandal [Monica Lewinsky affair] in the White House, which emerged after I left and increasingly preoccupied the President and his people and caused problems back home. There was also, of course, the major Asian financial and economic crisis which also broke soon after I left the government.

Q: [Kennedy] All right. Can we just discuss one question? There was sort of a political earthquake in the United States resulting from the Congressional elections of 1994, when the Republicans gained control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The new Congressional leaders brought in very much of a conservative agenda. It seemed as if the Clinton administration was greatly weakened. Was there any sort of conservative focus to this development?

LORD: That's a very good question. I would say that, for a variety of reasons, it didn't have any major impact on our Asian policies. There is no question that it had a tremendous impact on political alignments in the United States. I haven't thought about this systematically, but it might have had some impact on other foreign policy issues.

Regarding Asia, this change in Congress didn't really hurt us. First, the bad news was that generally we saw people emerge in Congress who were less interested and less informed on foreign policy. This was continuing an established trend. We had people coming into Congress who didn't have a passport. When Congressmen go overseas, which I think they should do, most of them work hard. They get unfairly criticized in the "Washington Post" for going on boondoggle trips. I think that there were two or three Republican Congressmen who boasted that they hadn't been overseas since the late 1980s. This was a ridiculous situation, in terms of ignorance. This resulted in problems caused more by ignorance than ideology.

Having said that, I found that most of the issues that I dealt with involved contact with
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, and particularly the sub-committees dealing with Asia. We found very responsible leadership in these committees, which continued when they were taken over by Republicans. We saw Senator Thomas come in as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Asia and Congressman Bereuter as Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Asia. They were both bipartisan, serious people with whom I was able to work extremely well, as I did with their predecessors, Senator Robb and Congressman Ackerman.

We were fortunate in the people who were chosen to serve on the key sub-committees on Asia. We were also fortunate that there wasn't that much controversy over Asian problems. We had problems throughout with a guerrilla minority on the Hill dealing with Vietnam. The other part of the problem with Vietnam involved the White House. The biggest part of the problem was political skittishness of the NSC and the White House, rather than Congress. That situation didn't change. It was there anyway.

The Korean Framework Agreement was generally approved, but funding problems emerged as we went on, but this wasn't any particular reflection of the 1994 elections. Problems with the Framework Agreement were more the result of North Korea being such an unattractive, opaque, and lousy regime. No one liked to make deals that were less than perfect with the North Koreans.

On China the MFN debate, no matter who controls Congress, given China's policies on other issues such as human rights, trade, Tibet, or nuclear non-proliferation, always presented problems. I don't think that this problem was appreciably worsened by the results of the elections of 1994.

On Japan many Congresspeople continued to think that we should be firmer on economic issues. Then, as we began to have more positive security relationships with Japan, that wasn't much of a problem.

This is a long way of saying that the elections of 1994 were of major significance in terms of domestic policy and maybe some foreign policy issues, but not in terms of Asian issues that could really hurt us. Ironically, I think that most people would say that in general the Clinton administration on foreign policy, and certainly Secretary of State Christopher, with his reputation, did much better during the final two years of the first Clinton term than during the first two years.

This was an interesting phenomenon. At the outset of the Administration, you had the stumbling over Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia, as well as some of the Asian problems that we had during the first two years of the first Clinton term. Obviously, there could be criticism of many foreign policy issues, but I think generally that most fair-minded people, and even Clinton's fiercest critics, would say that by the end of 1996 our foreign policy situation looked a lot better than it did at the end of 1994. This was despite the fact that Congress was going in the opposite direction during the period 1994-1996. Now, how you put those two trends together is somewhat ironic. So, the fact that we faced a
new, less attractive, and less informed Congress did not particularly hurt our foreign policy. The Clinton Administration ultimately got its act together, gained more experience, and changed some policies. We did a better job on Asia, as a whole, during the last two years of the first Clinton term than during the first two years.
Q: Could you talk about China as you described it to candidate Clinton? Also, did China come up as an issue during the 1992 presidential election campaign?

LORD: The answer is "Yes, of course." As we get into this more current period on China, let me say that, from the beginning, I was, of course, a strong believer in engaging China. The United States and China are two great nations looking to the next century. From the American national interest and in the global and regional interests, they need to work together.

At the same time I've never had any illusions about the difficulties of doing this. Nor the fact that, throughout these years and as far ahead as I can see, the relationship between the United States and China will be periodically sweet and sour, if I may use this expression.

Two of the more important people in my life on various China issues have been Henry Kissinger and my wife. Of course, in many ways my head is with Kissinger, but my heart is with my wife, in every way, but including China in particular. What I mean by that is the following.

Particularly when I was younger and working with Kissinger, my overwhelming emphasis then was on geopolitics. I don't recall focusing as much on human rights, trade, and other matters. I continue to share Kissinger's view of the strategic importance of the relationship between China and the United States. However, frankly, and he would admit this, too, we had somewhat of a parting of the ways on China, not so much personally but conceptually, since the Tiananmen Square massacre [of 1989]. Therefore, I agree with Kissinger on the one hand, in the sense that I agree on the importance of engagement with China and that was the basic approach of the Clinton administration. However, I assign a higher priority to human rights than Kissinger does, both generally and in foreign policy terms, and specifically on China. Not only because of the virtues and values of human rights and idealism and the need to maintain Congressional and domestic support, but also because I think that it is in China's self interest to emphasize respect for human rights.

I believe that China cannot develop its economy without a freer society, especially in the age of information. I think that it is in China's interests in terms of maintaining stability for the Chinese people to be able to express themselves peacefully. With unemployment and other pressures, there will be instability in China. If there is no room for peaceful dissent, then people will take to the streets. For all of these reasons I think that the protection and promotion of human rights should be an important part of our policy.

However, I do not go as far in this direction as my wife, who also agrees with the concept of engagement with China. From the beginning, she supported the opening toward China and still does. Nevertheless, she believes that human rights must be a centerpiece of our
policies toward China. She wouldn't hold the whole relationship with China hostage to human rights, but she would be much more apt to go slow and be tougher unless there is more progress made in China in the area of human rights.

So, therefore, I don't believe in holding back the development of the Chinese-American relationship because of the human rights situation in China as much as my wife would favor. However, I would certainly put more stress on human rights and be less defensive about the Chinese than Henry Kissinger and, say, the great bulk of the American business community and experts on China. So much for the general background.

Now, I will start after the Tiananmen Square massacre, which I have covered.

Regarding the Tiananmen Square massacre, I was not shocked in the sense that I knew that the Chinese authorities could be brutal. But of course, I was very distressed by what the Chinese authorities did in Tiananmen Square, which was totally unnecessary in my view. The demonstrations were fading away.

Q: This was in June...

LORD: June, 1989. Coincidentally, I had left China on April 22, 1989, when the Tiananmen demonstrations were just beginning to take place, a week after the death of Hu Yaobang and the day of his funeral, when the first big crowd of about 100,000 people assembled in Beijing.

I returned to the United States as the news of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations grew and I was therefore immediately invited to appear on television and speak to other news outlets in May, June, and July, 1989. As I said, I had left China in mid-April, 1989. Obviously, I supported what the Bush Administration was doing at the time. However, I was very tough on the Chinese authorities, even though I believed very strongly in the development of our relations with China, where I had just been Ambassador. Like other observers, I was hopeful about how the situation would turn out. I thought that the demands of the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were reasonable. I thought that the Chinese Government's solution to this incident was brutal and unnecessarily so, because the crowds were dispersing when the crackdown took place. In my view, this situation could have been solved peacefully. So, in my comments on this incident, I was very critical of the Chinese authorities.

Nevertheless, I still believed that we had to deal with China and had to keep moving ahead in developing the Sino-American relationship. I thought that we should react strongly to this incident in a rhetorical sense and apply sanctions for what the Chinese authorities had done.

The approximate sequence of events was as follows. I had left China as Ambassador in April, 1989. After a short interval my wife was commenting on CBS [Columbia Broadcasting System] television, identified only as an author. During the summer of 1989 I wrote an article for "Foreign Affairs" magazine, entitled "Beyond the 'Big Chill,'" which was published in September, 1989. In that article, as I say, I was very tough on the
Chinese authorities. I said that they needed to move toward greater freedom. I said how unnecessary all of this repressive action had been. But I also made a strong case for holding the Chinese-American relationship together and continuing to move ahead.

At this point the Bush Administration had been relatively firm in its response to events in China, although, even then, not enough to my liking. Its public rhetoric was relatively too moderate, but the administration had taken certain steps involving some sanctions. At that point I was unaware of the secret visit by Brent Scowcroft [National Security Adviser] to China only a week after the Tiananmen Square massacre.

I showed my article for "Foreign Affairs" to Dick Solomon on the NSC staff, just for his ideas but not in the sense of any censorship. We had worked together. The fact remained that my article was very tough on the Chinese and maybe tougher than the Bush administration wanted. However, it was also very positive about forward engagement and was supportive of the Bush Administration's general policy line. So there wasn't any real daylight between my position and that of the administration. I thought that administration officials were fairly happy with the article. However, whether they were happy with it or not wasn't the point. I was simply expressing my views.

Over the next couple of years the MFN issue as it related to China began to be debated every spring.

Q: MFN means...

LORD: Most Favored Nation. It is renewed every year because of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. The President is required by this legislation to certify that emigration from China [and other communist countries] is relatively free, which it has been, despite all of the other things the Chinese have done. We could conscientiously say that this was so. Nevertheless, we could only renew MFN for a year at a time, because China didn't have permanent, MFN status. I won't go into all of the details of MFN.

I don't have the exact chronology before me. I don't remember whether this issue came up in 1989 or whether it was too late by then to consider whether to extend MFN status for China. In 1990 I did not favor placing conditions on the MFN status for China and certainly was not in favor of revoking it. I have never favored revoking MFN status. However, as the years went by, I felt that the Bush Administration was overly soft on China, even though I believed in engagement. I thought that we had allowed the pendulum to swing too far in the other direction. I was getting increasingly restless about what I thought was an overly compliant posture toward China.

Then, it was publicly announced that Brent Scowcroft had been to China in December 1989. Scowcroft was pictured exchanging toasts with a senior Chinese official, whose name I don't recall. Scowcroft also made, in my view, some ill-considered remarks on this occasion. This was sort of the last straw for my growing impatience with the Bush Administration's posture on China. Again, I'm not against engagement with China. I am not one of those right wingers or left wingers who care only about human rights.
However, in terms of respect for the Chinese people, the world, our values, and our interests, I thought that we had to take a stronger stand. I began to get more dissatisfied with the posture of the Bush Administration. In fact, the Scowcroft trip pushed me over the edge, as it were. I wrote a very strong op ed piece about the Scowcroft trip which was published in the "Washington Post."

I knew of the Scowcroft trip and wrote this article in a few days. I learned just after I published the piece that Scowcroft had not only visited China in December but also in July a week after the massacre. Had I known that, I would have adopted an even stronger posture. Given my past service as Ambassador and association with Scowcroft and others, my article made quite a splash. From then on I began to express a more critical view of the administration but hopefully not nasty or partisan. I kept saying that engagement with China was important and continued to sound that theme. Moreover - I don't remember the exact sequence of events - either when asked for my comments or when testifying before Congress, I said that I was not in favor of revoking MFN status for China or placing conditions on granting MFN status in 1990.

I believe that by 1991, or certainly by 1992, when I was asked to testify before Congress, I modified my position. I felt that, on the one hand, we should not revoke MFN status for China. MFN status is really normal and available to almost all countries, including terrible regimes. More importantly, I thought that there was much substance to the argument that you can encourage a society by engagement and by opening up our relations. If we cut off MFN status, we would be cutting off the reformers and business people who were working in the direction we wished. This would also hurt American business interests and legitimate concerns, both in terms of our exports to China and imports from China of cheaper goods for our blue collar people who buy textiles, shoes, sneakers, toys, and so on. This would also hurt innocent bystanders, particularly Hong Kong and also Taiwan, if we cut off MFN status for China. Cutting off MFN status would be too blunt an instrument to express our displeasure with what China had done. Such action would put us in confrontation with China, when I still believed in engagement. On the other hand, I was increasingly frustrated with what I thought was the overly soft approach toward China by the Bush Administration and the fact that we didn't seem to have any leverage with China. (End of tape)

Q: You say: "...with some reluctance?"

LORD: With some reluctance, I modified my stance. I didn't favor China's losing MFN [Most Favored Nation] status. I came out in favor of what I considered modest conditions for an extension of MFN status for China. The point here was to lay out some objectives, sufficiently concrete to be meaningful, but not so specific and detailed that we would box ourselves in. We needed to have some flexibility on how we would interpret making progress. So my basic position was that we needed some leverage to make progress which would not lose MFN status for China for all of the reasons that I've mentioned. However, by setting some modest conditions, that would give the Chinese some incentive to make progress. They could do enough to meet our conditions but not so much so that they would have grounds for worrying about instability or risking their control of the
situation. At least we would have some leverage on the Chinese because of their huge trade surplus with the U.S. and because of the importance of trade to them.

Therefore, I advocated modest, not heavy but realistic conditions concerning progress in human rights, which they could meet in the course of a year. I reluctantly decided that this was the next step in trying to find a way to move the Chinese on this issue.

Q: You've been a Washington operator. Where did you feel that the thrust for this sort of business as usual attitude or policy on the part of the Bush administration was coming from? Bush had been the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing.

LORD: I thought that this attitude came directly from President Bush himself, related to his time in China and elsewhere. This was proven to me in connection with the Fang Lizhi incident, which we covered. Basically, he blamed me and the Embassy, instead of blaming the Chinese for their outrageous behavior. I was careful not to let my personal animus against him and Brent Scowcroft [National Security Adviser] get in the way of my policy prescriptions.

It was clear to me, in view of President Bush's supine reaction to the Fang Lizhi incident, that this kind of attitude toward the Chinese was coming from him.

And I figured that Brent Scowcroft shared Bush's view. Secretary of State Baker was more politically attuned and kept his head down on China, because he knew it was not popular in Congress and among the public more generally, although he got more involved later on. So Baker was a little bit more nuanced in his approach. Certainly, I thought, Bush and Scowcroft were soft on China. That's why I gave you a little bit of philosophy in the beginning of this segment. I believe strongly in engagement with China. I think that it's phony to debate isolation versus engagement. I think that you can have engagement of a hard headed nature. You can be firm with the Chinese and keep your powder dry, but also have a broad agenda of positive things to accomplish. You should hold firmly to human rights but should not let human rights hold the relationship between China and the United States hostage. I just felt that the balance in this relationship had been upset by the Bush approach.

So in careful congressional testimony I laid out this rationale for a modest position on MFN extension. This would be enough to induce progress but not so much as to risk losing MFN extension. I figured that the economic interest for China was enough to make this approach work.

I was equally strong against either extreme: either revoking MFN or placing heavy conditions, on the one hand, or business as usual and not stepping up some of the pressures on China, on the other hand.

My view probably also came to the attention of the prospective Clinton Administration, which was looking for a policy on MFN extension. They were not happy with the position of the Bush administration.
Now, in the course of the Presidential election campaign of 1992 candidate Clinton used very strong language. He was tough on President Bush's position on China saying Bush had allegedly coddled dictators, or whatever the language was that he used. I was not consulted on the language he used in his speeches. I thought that it was excessive. Even though I myself was frustrated by what the Bush administration was doing, I had never gone as far as candidate Clinton went. I thought that Clinton went too far.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Do you know where the language used by Clinton came from?*

LORD: No. I don't want to be disingenuous. I was not unhappy that Clinton was being critical of the Bush approach. I was not happy with it myself. However, I was not consulted and did not help to write the language which Clinton used on China during the campaign. I would not have gone that far myself, because when you become President, you need more room for maneuver.

So after the New Haven meeting around Labor Day [of 1992] I got a few phone calls on behalf of Clinton from Nancy Soderberg, Sandy Berger, Tony Lake, and so on, asking for my views. I wrote a paper or two. I basically set out various options and recommended the line which I had used in my testimony before Congress, involving setting modest conditions, and I stress the word, modest.

Thus, I advocated conditional MFN extension. So that's where I stood when I ultimately agreed to serve in the incoming Clinton administration.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Do you have a sense that Clinton used this attack on President Bush as an important part of his campaign?*

LORD: If you are asking whether this issue came up during the 1992 Presidential election campaign, in fact foreign policy was never as big a deal as other issues. Clinton's basic campaign was that President Bush ignored domestic policy. However, in the foreign policy area, I think that it's fair to say that China was one of the three or four topics that Clinton touched on.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Right. It's interesting to note, insofar as one can tell, that candidate Clinton had been to Taiwan when he was Governor of Arkansas. However, he had no real experience with, or interest in, China as such. So were his remarks on China part of his basic view or were they obtained from someone else?*

LORD: I think that these views were part of his own convictions. In the first place, then Governor Clinton probably was friendly to Taiwan. However, he wasn't being propelled by a pro-Taiwan outlook. I think that he understood, and certainly this was clear in our conversations, when he asked good questions, that China was important. I want to make clear that in my briefing, and I should have made this point more clearly, that, in addition to coming out modestly for conditional MFN, I placed heavy emphasis on the need to
engage China and the importance of moving ahead. In fact, I emphasized that the U.S. and China had many interests in common. I also said that I thought that we had been too soft on the human rights issue and that the granting of conditional MFN was the way to go.

There was more discussion with Clinton in my September 1992 meeting with him, not specifically on MFN, but on the relationship with China and where it had been over the years. That is, what the context was and the importance of moving ahead. So a lot of this discussion was based on that. Clinton asked good questions. I had the feeling that even then, before he was President, he considered that the relationship with China was important. He didn't want to swing all the way over to isolation and containment. He genuinely was concerned about China on human rights grounds. Surely, there was a partisan element in this. This sort of thing happens in every campaign. Clinton saw that Bush was vulnerable on this issue, and it might play well before the American people. I'm sure that that was another factor.

Q: Can you talk about who asked you to be Assistant Secretary of State? Also, can you talk about your confirmation hearings for this position?

LORD: Sure. Warren Christopher, the incoming Secretary of State, called me on the phone. I don't recall the exact date, but it was sometime in December or perhaps January, 1992. The appointment was not announced, I think, until January 20, 1993. When I was nominated to be Ambassador to China, Senator Jesse Helms [Republican, North Carolina] held me up for several months. I had a long wait for confirmation as Ambassador to China. This time the process was easy. My appointment as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs was announced on January 20, 1993. My hearings took place about two months later, in March, 1993. Then I was approved, more or less right away. I don't want to get too far away from the China scene. We can get back to my confirmation hearings some other time.

I worked very hard on my opening statement for the confirmation hearings. The Congressional relations people at State didn't want me to make a major statement. They preferred bland opening statements, such as that I was happy to be here, that the appointment as Assistant Secretary of State was a great honor, that I looked forward to working with Congress, etc. Then I could say that I would be happy to take questions from the Senators. Instead, I prepared a broad-ranging speech, including my view on how we should deal with China. I had to fight to give it. After all of the work I had put into the original draft...

Q: When you say "the Congressional people," do you mean the people in the Bureau of Congressional Relations?

LORD: Wendy Sherman, for example, was the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. She was concerned about it. She said that I really shouldn't get into tough questions and problems in a confirmation hearing. I can understand her standpoint. All nominees were asked to be very bland. You don't try to make policy before you're even
confirmed. In principle, she had a point. In practice I wanted to get out of the starting gate in a hurry and lay out an Asian policy that I was sure the Administration was comfortable with. I wanted to give my presentation a conceptual framework and, frankly, demonstrate to the Senate and House of Representatives and to the key people there that I knew what I was doing and that I was going to take a conceptual approach to foreign policy. I wanted to make a more ambitious opening statement and to elevate Asia in our foreign policy, because throughout our history we have usually been Eurocentric in our orientation.

I thought that it was important to get our regional approach out there quickly, because now it was March, 1993. I wanted to make the point that Asia was as important as Europe.

Q: Stick with China. Okay.

LORD: Shortly after I was confirmed as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in fact, within a few weeks, I had to go to Brunei to attend a regional security dialogue.

This was convenient, because I wanted to get overseas quickly on my first overseas trip in my new position. Of course, I thought that it was also important to go to China, particularly since we had the MFN deadline looming. At that point some people even thought that President Clinton might recommend revoking MFN for China. There was a lot of sentiment for revoking MFN or attaching strong conditions to extending it in the Congress, in addition to Clinton's own statements made during the campaign. There were a lot of questions about what President Clinton was going to recommend. For example, was he going to wait until he was close to the June renewal deadline for MFN status for China? It seemed to me, and, of course, Secretary of State Christopher agreed, that I should get out to China and sort of test the waters.

I can't tell you the exact date I went to China on my way to Brunei and a couple of other places. It was in April or May, 1993. While in China I made the point that President Clinton wanted a good relationship with China. I tried to stress some positive elements. I drew on and pointed to my own personal involvement and the experience I had with Secretary Kissinger and then when I served as Ambassador to China.

The Chinese officials I met knew, of course, that I had been critical since the Tiananmen Square massacre [of 1989]. So by this time they had sort of ambivalent feelings toward me, all the more so since my wife had been even more critical and outspoken, even though they had loved her while she was there with me when I was Ambassador to China. So they probably looked at me with some ambivalence. They knew that they would have to deal with me for four years. They were probably concerned about what President Clinton had said in his own campaign in the fall of 1992. They credited me for my role with Nixon and Kissinger and as Ambassador. But for the Chinese conservatives, at least, my interaction with Chinese students and the Fang Lizhi incident had created some concern.
The Chinese basically listened to my presentation, which included a heavy dose of comment on human rights and the need for progress. However, I was careful to cover a broad agenda, including regional and global issues, as well as bilateral problems. I was honestly concerned about the looming deadline on MFN extension to China for another year. Therefore, I made a pitch for progress on that front.

The Chinese gave me a cordial reception, because of my past contributions to Chinese-American relations. A new, American administration was in office, and they wanted to get along with it. They sought to display general courtesy to me. The reception was not as warm and outgoing as it would have been before the Tiananmen Square massacre. It was a perfectly proper reception in terms of whom I saw and so forth. However, the Chinese officials didn't go overboard. The subsequent discussions I had were workmanlike. I didn't expect immediate progress, particularly in the first meeting. I didn't get any sense that there was going to be any movement on the human rights issue in particular. Therefore, while I can't say that I was surprised, I surely wasn't encouraged by this trip to China. Our immediate preoccupation was with the MFN debate, but I was trying to set the stage for the Chinese-American relationship in general.

When I returned to Washington from this trip, of course, we were getting close to the MFN deadline. In the course of May in particular we had to start figuring out what our decision would be. However, it couldn't just be our decision in the State Department or even the White House. Congress was controlled by the Democratic Party. Basically, I handled the key negotiations with Representative Nancy Pelosi [Democrat, California] in the House of Representatives and Senator George Mitchell [Democrat, Maine] on the Senate side. I was the point person for President Clinton, accompanied usually by Wiedemann of the NSC. Of course, we consulted other agencies of the U.S. Government. We weren't just winging this issue on our own. However, I think that it's fair to say that the economic agencies didn't feel that they had had a fair enough crack at the process at that point. They never liked any conditions on MFN. Sandy Berger [Deputy National Security Adviser] was involved, as were several other officials. However, I was essentially the point man who worked this issue out with Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell. We had a series of meetings with them and their staffs where we crafted a package that was realistic from the Administration’s view and sellable to the Congress at large.

What people now forget is that what we worked out at the time was, on the whole, hailed as a very good outcome. To be sure, the economic agencies of the U.S. Government would have preferred no conditions on MFN extension. They don't like sanctions, they don't like any uncertainties in trade, and all of that. Further, they advanced legitimate arguments on what might result from losing the extension of MFN status to China. The business community in general didn't want any conditions on MFN extension. So they were not happy. However, I think that even the people in the business community and former colleagues of mine like Kissinger (I believe he killed the outcome “statesmanlike”) and others were somewhat pleased over how moderate the conditions on MFN extension ultimately were, given the President’s campaign and the Congressional mood.
There were plenty of people on the other side of the argument who wanted much tougher conditions on MFN extension or even outright revocation of MFN status. Therefore, when we came out with what were really moderate and realistic conditions, this was hailed in most quarters at the time as a significant success. I'm sure that many people, certainly in Congress, thought that the outcome was much too mild. In the academic community I'm sure that there were some people who were opposed to any conditions at all. Certainly, economic observers didn't want any conditions. However, on the whole, MFN extension with moderate conditions was greeted as a significant achievement. As I recall, most people were pleased because we had headed off MFN revocation or heavy conditions.

The outcome on this issue took into consideration President Clinton's rhetoric in the 1992 campaign, which I thought had been quite heated. However, we had avoided loading on conditions which the Chinese could not realistically meet. Specifically, we came up with two mandatory conditions. First, there was the Jackson-Vanik amendment language, which had always been there and which related to free emigration from China. The other was connected with goods produced by prison labor. We had five other conditions which dealt with prisoners, Tibetan culture, and other matters. In dealing with these conditions we stated that there had to be overall progress on them. We had to be specific enough to make it possible to figure out what we were trying to do but flexible enough to give us some leeway on judgements whether this related to preserving Tibetan culture and history or getting prisoners released. However, we had to avoid being so specific as to put us in a box, by saying something like: You must release 28 prisoners, or something like that.

So we said that there must be significant, overall progress. It wasn't even put in terms that there must be overall progress in each of the five categories. There just had to be overall progress made, whether on each of them, all of them, or some of them. Therefore, there was some judgment calls on what needed to be done, but enough specificity to be credible to our domestic audience and comprehensible to the Chinese.

The feeling was that, with the Chinese stake in this bilateral relationship - and we would stress other parts of the relationship at the same time and work with them on this - there would be enough progress, so that, a year later, we would not have to revoke MFN status for China. We would have made some progress. We could then review the bidding on conditional extension of MFN status and extend, revise, or drop the conditions at that point. However, all of this was contingent on what we hoped and expected would be enough progress as to justify renewing MFN.

Q: Just to get a feel for the political environment in the United States, the Bush administration, which had been a Republican administration, had been castigated for being too soft on China. Was there any significant number of Republicans or conservative Democrats who were in favor of doing something to China?

LORD: There was real doubt about the outcome. It was key that we obtained the support of Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell, who were quite outspoken on this issue.
and carried a majority of their colleagues. There were some people like Senator Helms [Republican, North Carolina] or Congressman Solomon [Republican, New York], and here I'm just picking names out of the air, who either wanted to revoke MFN status for China or attach very heavy conditions on MFN extension. Then there were some Democratic and Republican members of Congress and a lot of Republicans like former Presidents Ford and Bush, who favored MFN extension without conditions. By no means did this category include all Republicans. There were conservative Republicans as well as liberal Democrats who felt strongly about conditioning MFN extension. Some Republicans and a few Democrats, mainly those serving on economic sub-committees and who represented economic interests, didn't want any conditions attached to MFN extension.

The major problem at that point was to avoid having heavy conditions attached to MFN extension, given the sentiment in Congress. The fact that Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell agreed to much less than what they had said that they wanted made the job easier for us. They were very statesmanlike, because they didn't want President Clinton to be in a box. As long as some, modest conditions were attached to MFN extension, they would go along with this outcome. When we set out, it was not a foregone conclusion that we would not have either MFN status revoked or have heavy conditions attached to MFN extension. It appeared more likely that heavy conditions would be attached to MFN extension than to have MFN status revoked.

Moreover, we obtained congressional agreement to have this set forth in an Executive Agreement rather than legislation. This gave the President even more flexibility. These were significant achievements, given the political climate.

So at the time our outcome was generally hailed, as was I for my role. This was generally forgotten a year later when President Clinton had to reverse his position on this issue. Frankly, one reason that I received personal praise, as did the Clinton administration at the time from most quarters, although I'm not saying that this was unanimous, was that we were able to have Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell deliver the broad, middle ground of people who were critical of China but didn't want to wreck Chinese-American relations. When we got the credentials of Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell behind us, we were able to move ahead. There was some grumbling from economic specialists in Congress and a lot of grumbling from those who thought that we had been too soft on China. However, Pelosi and Mitchell gave us the necessary cover...

*Q: Senator Mitchell was the Democratic majority leader in the Senate. However, Representative Pelosi...*

*LORD: She was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. She is from San Francisco, represented a lot of Chinese in her district, and always has been very outspoken in favor of Chinese dissidents and scholars. She had regularly urged President Clinton to be firm with the Chinese authorities.*

*Both Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell were very responsible in their attitudes*
on this issue. I went up to Capitol Hill and dealt with both of them, personally. There were other people with me, of course. As I say, we were very pleased with the outcome.

Now, the dirty little secret is that, over the next few months, in fact, thanks to the extension of conditional MFN and engaging the Chinese, we made some progress. Now, it was not monumental progress, and that's for sure. I don't want to exaggerate it, and we never did. However, until we got to the trip to China by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in March 1994, we were beginning to make some progress during that period. Secretary Christopher met his Chinese counterpart in July at the regional security dialogue in Brunei. President Clinton met the President of the PRC, Jiang Zemin, in November, 1993. This was his first meeting with Jiang Zemin, and I'll come back to that in a minute, at Seattle, when we lifted the APEC meeting to the summit level...

Q: APEC means?

LORD: The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. This is a grouping of major economic powers in the Asian and Pacific region to promote free trade and investment. It now meets annually and is attended by heads of government. We were the host at the first meeting during the Clinton Administration in 1993 in Seattle and we lifted this meeting to a summit level to underline our interest in Asia and the importance of Asian trade, as well as Asia's political significance.

The fact is that these meetings with China produced some general commitments through quiet work. The Chinese, however grudgingly, were making some gestures in the field of human rights. There were a few releases of prisoners, somewhat better accounting of the number of detainees, and an agreement to talk with the Red Cross about prison conditions. Chinese formulations on Tibet were less bellicose, certainly than they are now. The Chinese agreed at some point, and I don't remember the timing, to a regular and formal dialogue on human rights with John Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs. We reached a prison labor agreement, and emigration from China continued to be quite free.

While I don't claim major progress, I believe the last half of 1993 represented the most progress we made during the first Clinton term. Surely the MFN conditions were of some help.

MFN extension was agreed to in June, 1993, and we were looking to the renewal of MFN coming up in June, 1994. We were concerned whether we were going to get over the bar of debate on MFN renewal and whether enough, significant progress would be made. We did not by any means think that the situation was hopeless. There was enough progress in the fall of 1993 to make it possible to say that we were beginning to move ahead.

However, we also encountered serious problems in carrying this out. First, there was general, Chinese resistance to pressure. The conditions of course were public pressure, even though we worked to implement these arrangements in private, as much as we could. The Chinese remained preoccupied with repression and political control. Jiang
Zemin himself had not yet solidified his position as Chinese political leader. Above all, the Chinese considered human rights to be an internal issue.

On the other hand, China was extremely interested in trade and exports, and sought to have good relations with the U.S. But there was disarray on our own side, which totally undercut our leverage on this issue.

First, there was the U.S. business community, which didn't want to have any conditions placed on MFN renewal and which, at the end of the road, generally doesn't care about human rights at all, although there are some exceptions. The business community doesn't realize why a politically more open society is in their own interest. Anyway, the U.S. business community, instead of lobbying the Chinese to improve human rights practices in China, so that MFN could be renewed on its own merits, was lobbying the Clinton administration to drop any conditions and was very vociferous in that respect. That is, perhaps, understandable and certainly legitimate, although you would like to think that they would lean on the Chinese, as well as President Clinton and Congress.

What was not legitimate was the behavior of our economic agencies, particularly the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the USTR [Office of the U.S. Trade Representative]. Sometimes they would put themselves on the record, expressing half-hearted support for the President's policies. However, very purposefully and on background, they were attacking the President's own policy. This came to a crescendo in the winter and spring of 1994, but this pattern of behavior was already evident from the very beginning of the Clinton administration. This totally undercut us with Beijing. Obviously, they could see the disarray within the U.S. Government.

President Clinton, to his detriment, didn't rein in these economic agencies. He refused to knock heads as he should have done in ensuring that his own policies were carried out. Therefore, we had splits in our position, which the Chinese could see and which totally undercut our leverage. The Chinese could say to themselves: "Well, the White House is not policing its own agencies. All of the economic types in the American administration are unhappy. The business community is 'lobbying' the administration. They're unhappy, so why should China make concessions?"

I'm not saying that this is the only reason that we ran into trouble. I am saying that it sure as hell hurt us. If the President disciplined his own administration, we might well have pulled this off. It was a major failure of leadership by Clinton, not backing the State Department in carrying out his own policy, letting his economic officials undercut his own policy.

Throughout 1993-1994 I convened interagency meetings to monitor our overall China policy as well as progress on the human rights question. I also convened such meetings in 1995-96 as we continued to make progress, despite ups and downs, with China.

I'll get to the March 1994 trip to China by Secretary of State Christopher next, but let me circle back to President Clinton's first meeting with PRC President Jiang Zemin and give
a little chronology here.

Q: This was in Seattle?

LORD: Yes, in November, 1993. By then, as I said, Secretary Christopher had met the Chinese Foreign Minister in Brunei in July, 1993. I want to make this clear. Christopher has been accused of not spending enough time on China. It has been reported that Christopher went to Syria countless times and to China twice. The fact is that he met his Chinese counterpart 12 times in four years. So, on the average, this was about once every three months. Christopher made two trips to China. The second trip was very successful. The first trip to China turned out to be very unfortunate. Throughout the four years, he continued to correspond with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. He met with him at least 12 times, probably in seven or eight different cities. This included every summer around the edges of the regional security dialogues. It also included every fall in New York on the occasion of the UN General Assembly meetings and APEC [Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation] summit meetings. This was in addition to Christopher's trips to China, and so on. We even met once in The Hague. Of course, I was at all of these meetings, as I was at every Presidential meeting. The point here is that Christopher devoted a great deal of time to China and was in constant dialogue with his Chinese counterpart.

Q: This was before the first Christopher trip to China. Christopher had been Deputy Secretary of State during the Carter administration. What was your impression of any baggage which Christopher carried to China, when you first were getting acquainted with him, and all of that?

LORD: I would say that he had a pretty balanced approach. There were two elements which certainly made him somewhat more skeptical and hard-headed on China than, say, Secretary Baker during the Bush administration. The main element was that Christopher had always been strong on human rights and had a lot to do with implementing President Carter's human rights policy. The issue of human rights became a part of the U.S. agenda during the Carter administration.

So Christopher had a human rights background as a lawyer, and he was genuinely concerned about this issue. So he had some distaste for the Chinese political system. He believed that it was legitimate to press for progress in this regard. Having said that, I would add that he was obviously a very experienced, international operator. He understood the importance of China in our foreign policy. Christopher had spent most of his life in California, had a Pacific orientation, and believed in the importance of the Pacific Ocean area. Indeed, I got a lot of support from him in elevating Asia in our foreign policy.

So Christopher wanted to improve relations with China but had no problem with being pretty firm on human rights as part of that. Again, like me, he didn't advocate holding the whole Chinese-American relationship hostage to the human rights issue. He believed that human rights were an important factor. He had no problem with the extension of
conditional MFN status to China. He agreed that we should try to make the conditions modest when we negotiated with Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell.

So that's where Christopher was coming from. He had also delivered the bad news to Taiwan in early 1979 about full normalization of our diplomatic relations with Beijing. In Taipei his car was rocked back and forth by Taiwan demonstrators. However, he didn't hold that against Taiwan. He understood their emotions, and this incident didn't make him anti-Taiwan or affect his view toward Beijing.

I just want to repeat at the outset that he worked very hard on the relationship with Beijing. When we improved this relationship during the last year of the first Clinton term [1996], I believe that Christopher did as much as anyone, if not more than anyone else, to get us back on track, contrary to what has been said in various media and books. Tony Lake in 1996 helped out in doing this and also deserved a lot of credit for it. I worked side by side with Lake also.

Anyway, President Clinton met Jiang Zemin in November, [1993], and it was frankly a poor meeting. I believe that they spent about an hour or an hour and a half together. At this point Jiang Zemin didn't have full self-confidence. He was still consolidating his position in China. I had been dealing with Zhou En-lai, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping, who were very impressive, and Jiang suffered by comparison. During the course of the meeting with Jiang Zemin, President Clinton asked Jiang a question about economic reforms and Chinese economic policy, as an easy way to get a conversation started with him. President Clinton was then treated to about a 45-minute monologue in which Jiang Zemin cited statistics. It wasn't a hostile meeting by any means. It was just wasting time during this first meeting between the two Presidents. Jiang Zemin went on and on about how China had done economically. Then they touched on other issues briefly and to no great consequence toward the end of the meeting. So very frankly, although of course we went out and said what a wonderful meeting it was, President Clinton was disappointed with it, as were we all.

Again, I want to make clear that the meeting wasn't hostile on human rights or anything else. It was just that this was a wasted opportunity on the essentials. President Clinton put the usual, more positive spin on it, although if you look at the statements made, you can see that we were careful not to portray it as a great meeting. We didn't go overboard in our characterization of the meeting, as far as I can remember.

I frankly don't remember much about the Christopher-Qian meeting which took place in July 1993. It was pretty workmanlike. There is no question, and I want to be honest here, that during some of these early meetings, we usually had only an hour or an hour and a half on the edge of an international conference. A lot of the agenda focused on problem areas, including human rights, the trade deficit, and nuclear non-proliferation. On the Chinese side, the issues they raised included Taiwan. We tried to talk about other, positive aspects of the agenda. I think, looking back, that we probably should have tried harder. Too much of the meetings consisted of each side covering its complaints. However, I think that people have to understand that, if you want to have a strategic
dialogue with the Chinese these days, it isn't all that easy. Not everyone can conduct such a discussion as well as, say, Zhou and Deng used to do. And we had some real bilateral problems which we had to deal with.

I should add that in the summer of 1993, that is, after we had come out with the MFN conditions policy, we worked on a strategy toward China. I believe that this was at my initiative, but at any rate it was agreed in the State Department and the White House that we should be laying out a strategy for the administration, now that we had gotten through the initial MFN extension issue. While I don't recall if we actually used the word engagement, although I think that we did, the basic policy toward China which we are following today was laid out in that memo prepared in the summer of 1993.

Of course, we said that we had to be firm on human rights and we already had a conditional extension of MFN. But we sought in this paper to define elements of constructing a broad agenda, included trying to find positive elements on which to work with the Chinese and the importance of China and the U.S. working together in the next century. Outside observers discern themes at best toward the end of 1996, but these themes were in that paper prepared in 1993. I think that it was a hell of a good paper. It took a long while to get White House approval of it, not because of opposition to it. The delay in obtaining White House approval of it was just due to inertia. It was massaged through a couple of high-level, interagency committees and was then sent to the President. I think that he finally approved it in September, 1993.

I don't think that we implemented this paper well, in terms of strategic discussions. In a typical case, let's say, Secretary Christopher would be having a meeting of an hour and a half, perhaps a working lunch, with his Chinese counterpart. You have to cover human rights and try to make progress, as well as telling the press that you covered human rights. The Chinese foreign minister would take up time on the Taiwan issue. We had some urgent matters for discussion, including possible sanctions on non-proliferation. You had to address economic issues. So by the time you got through all of that, there was very little time left to talk about North Korea, Cambodia, regional security, APEC, global issues, and some of the more positive matters.

So, if we had it to do over again, maybe we should have done things differently. We always had longer meetings with the Chinese than we had with anybody else, but then were still compressed. You could argue that Secretary Christopher should have gone right away to China. I grant that. What I am saying is that the basic approach of engagement with China, of having a mixed bag of positive and negative issues on the agenda, of trying to construct a strategic relationship, even as we grappled with these problems, and of trying to demonstrate to domestic American and Chinese opinion that we had some converging and parallel interests, all of that was in our basic strategy paper. We had some difficult issues to deal with. But we didn't implement this strategy paper as well as we might have done. And, of course, the Chinese didn't make it easy.

Q: The Clinton administration came into office in 1993, not really well focused on foreign affairs. I'm not talking about the Clinton team but rather how it was directed. The
domestic economy was considered the major issue. As an outsider looking at this, I had the feeling that President Clinton did not have much background on foreign affairs. In fact, he had virtually no background in this area. At least as reported through the media, there seemed to be a certain amount of drift and really no great focus on foreign affairs. However, you were on the inside of this on major issues. Was there any of this?

LORD: Yes, that is fair. I think that this was the view on the outside of the administration and I think that it was also a fair view from the inside. I think that most fair-minded people, who were not partisan either way, will tell you that the last two years of the first Clinton term were much better in terms of foreign policy than the first two years. If they are really fair, they will say that the last two years of the first Clinton term were pretty good. Most people would say that the first two years of the first Clinton term were pretty bad. I say two years. Maybe it was a year and a half versus two and a half years.

In reply to your point specifically I would say at the outset that the administration had to deal with Bosnia, Somalia, and the Haitian problems, for example. There was backing and filling on the extension of MFN status for China in 1994. So, both in terms of perception and reality, I think that it's fair to say that the Clinton administration didn't do well at the beginning.

This was partly due to the process of shaking down a new administration. It was partly due to the fact of the President's overwhelming focus on domestic issues. Clinton was elected the first time by saying that President Bush had ignored domestic issues. There was the election slogan, "It's the economy, stupid." Clinton genuinely wanted to focus on the economy from the beginning, and I think that this was correctly the case. However, you pay a price for this. You can't run foreign policy without the full involvement of the President and the White House. This is certainly true of China policy.

A good example of this is that for years I pushed strongly, and I persuaded Secretary Christopher to push for a Presidential speech on China. I also worked directly with the NSC [National Security Council] staff on this. I started this effort in the summer of 1993. Certainly, it was one of the recommendations of the strategy paper, which was finally approved in September, 1993, and which contained a recommendation for a Presidential speech. I thought that it was important to have the strategic approach to China laid out to the public in a broader framework, so that these constant problems that we had on human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, trade, and Taiwan wouldn't be the only things that people noticed. These issues could be put in a broader context of the need for engagement on some of the more positive aspects of the agenda.

I literally spent four years trying to get President Clinton to give a speech on China. In fact, I wasn't able to get the President to give a speech on China during the first Clinton term. China would often be part of a speech but never the main issue. Once Clinton started giving speeches of this kind, they turned out to be pretty good and they helped. Even Secretary of State Christopher didn't speak out solely on China for a couple of years. I was pushing for that as well. Every time we could do so, we would work in a reference to China at some length in a speech on Asia, or in testimony before Congress.
But Secretaries of State just don't get much public attention when they speak, anyway. Christopher is a man for whom I have great respect, but he's no Billy Graham [well-known preacher and evangelist] when he gives a speech.

So the point I'm making is the same as yours. That is, President Clinton did not focus that much on foreign policy. He is a very quick fix, very smart, you can brief him up in a hurry, and he will do a great job. However, he just wasn't that much involved. This has changed over the years, but he paid the price on China because he didn't give a speech containing a strategic concept on what we were trying to do, he didn’t discipline his own cabinet, he didn’t give sustained interest or direction.

Q: This points out the importance of having insiders who know how significant speeches are. Insiders have that ability to deal with speeches. They know the work that goes into writing a speech. If you don't make the effort, that is an act in itself.

LORD: It was partly the fact that we were never able to get President Clinton's attention. This was due, very frankly, to some of his political advisers. If the President gives a speech on China, you know that it's going to be controversial. There is no way that you are going to make everybody happy. Part of the problem was the lack of emphasis on foreign policy but a large part of it was the realization among some of the President's advisers that this was a delicate, sensitive matter. First, because it involved campaign positions. Then, as time wore on, and the President changed his position on the extension of MFN, he would make statements around the general subject of MFN, but these would be 10 and 20 minute statements. I don't mean that President Clinton never spoke on China. It was just that he never gave a long speech on China, which we desperately needed and wanted. It was a great disappointment, and it hurt us.

Q: I think, too, that you are also pointing out the problem facing a new administration just entering office. The people surrounding the President are essentially domestic, political operators. In many ways they have the ear of the President, and there is the impetus of not making waves in the field of foreign affairs. This means that foreign affairs operators like yourself continue to be frustrated.

LORD: This is true of many administrations.

Q: It is true of many administrations.

LORD: In addition, there is the general question of giving a foreign policy address. The specific subject of China is especially sensitive.

Anyway, that was the background of the trip by Secretary Christopher to China in February or March 1994. In effect, he was going to China to promote our China relationship generally and specifically to make the further progress needed so that we could renew MFN. Keep in mind what I said. We had made some progress, but we hadn't made enough progress as yet.
We were going to China by way of Australia. There was a joint meeting with the Australians and the respective Foreign and Defense Ministers. While we were in Australia and also while we were heading toward China, the Chinese, in advance of Christopher's visit, began rounding up dissidents. This reflected their general nervousness. The Chinese authorities figured that these dissidents would speak out, try to meet Christopher, or something like that.

Then, literally when we were flying to China and to our own surprise, Assistant Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs, John Shattuck, met privately with Wei Jingshen, the most famous Chinese dissident. Shattuck had gone to China ahead of Secretary Christopher and his party to try to make more progress on human rights, so that Christopher could push the ball down the field a little farther. In effect, Shattuck would prepare the way. Again, we had this MFN deadline coming up in a few months. So Shattuck was in China as part of our formal dialogue. This was one of the reasons that we were making some progress. At least we had that dialogue.

Shattuck consulted with Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, our outstanding Ambassador to China, but what they didn't do was to consult with Secretary Christopher, which, in my opinion, they should have done. So we were blindsided by this development. The fact is that Ambassador Roy and Assistant Secretary Shattuck had every reason to meet with Wei. Wei was an heroic figure. He'd been let out of jail, at least on a temporary basis. This was one of the things that we managed to accomplish. For about 24 hours the Chinese authorities failed to react, even though, with their surveillance system, they knew that Ambassador Roy and Assistant Secretary Shattuck had met with Wei. Then Wei made some public remarks, and the Chinese authorities, in effect, felt forced to react. So that's what happened.

In any event, the Chinese authorities blasted the hell out of everybody because of the meeting with Wei in advance of the Christopher visit to China. Again, I believe in meeting with dissidents, but I also believe that something this sensitive should have been checked out in advance with Christopher.

In this atmosphere, as we were heading toward China, there were some calls in the United States to cancel the Christopher visit to China. So we had debates on this issue within the delegation before we got on the airplane to go to China and on the airplane itself. Secretary Christopher got on the phone and touched base with a few Senators and Congressmen. My recommendation was that we should not cancel the Christopher visit. If we canceled the visit, we weren't going to get the MFN conditions met and we would have to make the horrible decision to cut off MFN extension. Then, whatever we did, the whole Chinese-American relationship would come to a standstill. Indeed we might have a crisis.

On the other hand, when people say that Secretary Christopher had a bad trip to China, let's remember that the Chinese were rounding up dissidents before we got to China. I said that we had to go ahead with the trip, despite the firestorm of Congressional and media criticism at home.
So, in effect, I recommended on the plane, and I think that we pretty much all agreed on this, that we should not cancel the Christopher visit. Instead, I said that we should make some public statements and some on background that we were very unhappy with what the Chinese authorities were doing. So we recommended that Secretary Christopher should get on the phone, from the plane, to some key Senators and Congressmen, to deflate any pressures to cancel the trip and assure them that we would press strongly on these issues. We felt that Secretary Christopher should do all of this before he reached China. In this way he would have made the point and protected his domestic flank while he was going ahead with the trip. At the same time, if he didn't do this so vocally on Chinese soil, it would be somewhat less provocative to the Chinese. In this case the Chinese authorities were being provocative by rounding up dissidents. Still, we didn't want the whole trip to fall apart.

This was my recommendation, others on the plane agreed, and Secretary Christopher agreed with it. He used some pretty tough rhetoric before we arrived in China. I say that because he has been criticized. Well, the point is that he could either cancel the trip or just ignore what the Chinese authorities were doing, such as rounding up dissidents, and so on. I felt, and I still feel, that all that Secretary Christopher could do was to be firm in public before he got to China. This was to justify going ahead with the trip and to show the Chinese that he wasn't just a pushover. Then he need not be so be critical of the Chinese on Chinese soil and could see whether we could make progress.

When we reached China, we had a frosty reception. I forget how long we were there. I think that it was for two or three days. The first meeting was with Li Peng [Prime Minister], who was extremely rough and tough.

Q: In what way?

LORD: He was very dismissive of Christopher, accused him of meddling in China's affairs, and criticized Assistant Secretary John Shattuck's dealing with Wei. We didn't make progress on other issues, either. Li Peng was always tough on human rights issues. So it was just a very nasty atmosphere, and the general atmosphere of the Chinese reception was cool.

I don't whether the next meeting took place on the same day or not. I wouldn't say that President Jiang Zemin played "good cop" to Li Peng's "bad cop." Jiang Zemin wasn't particularly friendly, either, but he was a lot less vitriolic. This was his style, anyway. He's always been more tempered in dealing with our relationship than Li Peng has been. However, Jiang Zemin was also less than cordial. He was less insulting, but he was fairly firm. I had the feeling that he was sort of letting us know that first we were going to be hit over the head. Then he would ease up a bit, and we were supposed to feel grateful.

Actually, on the last day of the visit, when we met with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, we began to make some progress on a few issues. They were not major issues, but compared to where we started with at the beginning of the visit, we moved forward. In
the course of this visit there were some volleys fired back and forth with the Chinese press spokesman. I had to brief our press. The Chinese blamed us for hurting the atmosphere of the trip. This was during the trip. I got up and said that this was a great “leap of chutzpah” on the part of the Chinese. In effect, they accused us of ruining the atmosphere of the trip while they had been rounding up Chinese dissidents. So there were some pretty nasty exchanges, back and forth. I was pretty pleased with some of my one-liner comments. This was clearly not making the trip a smashing success, but I felt that we had to be firm in facing the Chinese.

So we left China obviously unhappy. We had made no progress on human rights. There were a couple of vague promises in a couple of areas, but I can't remember what they were. As I say, the meeting with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was somewhat better, but mostly in relative terms. We made some headway on a couple of other issues. All in all, the trip wasn't a total disaster, since we had made some progress. But the press was already saying that the visit had been a disaster. People back in the U.S., including the representatives of the economic agencies, were giving background interviews with reporters. They were directing their attacks at Secretary Christopher, and not the Chinese. This was really a disreputable performance by our government.

Of course, it was important to get a White House statement backing up Secretary Christopher. This had to be a Presidential statement, saying that Christopher had represented American interests firmly. We needed a statement which said that we wanted good relations with China, but the Chinese had to behave themselves better, and that kind of thing. We never got such a statement from the President, who remained silent. Christopher tried to get this statement but without success. So the combination of the attitude of the economic agencies in undercutting Christopher and the President's not only not coming to Christopher's aid or disciplining his cabinet but just being silent made this a very tough period. The White House was irresponsible, leaving Christopher (and the rest of us) twisting in the wind.

We didn't have a great deal of conversation on the plane. However, Christopher and I, more or less independently of each other, began to think through where we went from there in our policy toward China. Christopher was detached and cool enough at the time. Rather than just getting mad at the Chinese, Christopher felt that we had to rethink whether we were on the right course on the MFN issue, however modest the conditions were and whether the MFN issue wasn't too blunt an instrument for dealing with the Chinese. He was wondering whether we had to think of some other approach.

So we returned to Washington. It was pretty clear now by March, 1994, that we weren't going to make it over the hump and get enough progress on human rights to get an extension of MFN status for China by May, because of the lack of progress on this trip and the disarray in our own government. The U.S. business community was continuing to lobby us and not the Chinese.

We made one last effort during this period by sending Mike Armacost, former Under Secretary of State, to Beijing on a secret trip to Beijing to try and get last minute
development on human rights. We made little progress.

During the spring of 1994 we went through an agonizing reappraisal. We did a lot of computer runs, working with the Department of Commerce, to see whether it was possible to come up with an MFN arrangement hitting only those Chinese exports that were from Chinese military industries or were derived from military sources. In other computer runs we considered to what extent we could hurt China with higher tariffs on some Chinese exports but wouldn't hurt Hong Kong or Taiwan. So we tried to see, since the Chinese did not make enough progress on human rights, whether there was a way selectively to affect Chinese exports by hitting only military industries or picking products that didn't affect innocent bystanders.

We just couldn't find any way of doing this. There was no way to sort out the Chinese structure of military versus civilian companies and cut-outs and cover and producers versus exporters and holding companies. The only thing that we could identify, which we finally did, was Chinese arms exports of handguns to the U.S., which were coming onto our streets. That was one kind of merchandise which was coming from the Chinese military, and we could single it out. But we just couldn't come up with a nice deus ex machina program to identify anything else to get us out of this box.

We had hoped that we could say, in effect: “We don't want to cut off all of our trade with China, but we are going to hit them selectively because they haven't made enough progress on human rights. We are going to hit military companies, we are going to spare Taiwan, Hong Kong, etc.” We figured that this might be enough to satisfy our domestic audience in the U.S. We would admit that China had not made enough progress on human rights and so we were taking these limited steps. We weren't going to cut off all MFN trade. We were trying to get something that might affect, for example, 10 to 20% of their exports to the U.S., as opposed to the majority of their exports. So there would be enough damage limitation so that we could continue with MFN status on most Chinese exports to the U.S. and avoid the major problems I mentioned. We would have selectivity in the application of trade controls, avoiding harming Hong Kong and Taiwan, but also maintaining some momentum in the overall Chinese-American relationship.

Well, as we got down to the wire, we found that we didn't have those options. We just couldn't come up with a program or, rather, the computers couldn't find it.

So then we had three choices. First, we could say that the Chinese hadn't met the conditions, however modest, for the extension of MFN. Therefore, we were revoking MFN status for China. We didn't want to do that for all of the reasons I have mentioned. The negative impact on Chinese-American relations and on our business and exports, as well as the impact on Hong Kong and Taiwan were generally things that we wanted to avoid. We never wanted to harm them.

Q: Can you explain why, whatever we did with MFN status for China, it would have an effect on Hong Kong and Taiwan?
LORD: Well, a great deal of Chinese exports to the U.S. go through Hong Kong. Many of them are reprocessed and given a higher value in Hong Kong. This is one reason why we have disputes in our trade. The Chinese think that we exaggerate the deficit in our trade with China, because a large part of this trade with the U.S. really comes through Hong Kong. So, by hitting Chinese exports to the U.S., we were going to hit the economy of Hong Kong very heavily. I don't have the figures in front of me, but a great deal of Chinese trade with the U.S. goes through Hong Kong. And a large number of jobs in Hong Kong would be affected. We would be raising tariffs on goods of Chinese origin, if China lost MFN status, to a level which would be prohibitive, in many cases. Hong Kong would have been severely affected, and Taiwan, somewhat less so.

Q: Why would Taiwan have been affected? Was Taiwan also at that point reprocessing mainland Chinese goods destined for the U.S.?

LORD: Taiwan had some investment in China and so it imported some goods from China, reprocessed them, and then re-exported them to the U.S. from China. Indeed, a large part of our trade deficit with China was caused by Hong Kong and Taiwan production going into China. So our trade deficit went down with Taiwan and Hong Kong but went up with China. But Hong Kong and Taiwan still would have been affected by our limiting our trade with China.

There were mixed feelings in Taiwan because the government there didn't like Beijing. However, they also didn't want to hurt their own economic interests, so they were pretty quiet on this issue. In fact, the Taiwan Government did not lobby Congress to cut off MFN status for China. I think that the Taiwan Government just stayed neutral on this issue. So, one of the choices facing us was cutting off MFN status for China. We didn't want that choice. In the U.S. government, I believe John Shattuck was the only one favoring revocation of MFN, or at least selective revocation.

Another choice was to say: "Well, China already has MFN status. We're not happy with Chinese behavior. However, based on how we define them, the Chinese have met enough of our goals, and we will renew MFN status for China." Maybe we could again renew MFN extension but with conditions. That would be one sub-option. We could renew MFN status, saying that China had made enough progress to justify renewal, but we are still going to keep some conditions on because China has not done as much in the field of human rights as we would like. We rejected that course as well. Rejection of this course was strongly recommended by Secretary Christopher, myself, and others because it would have lacked credibility.

On the two mandatory conditions, emigration was an easy call - dissidents and other people could get out of China without any great difficulty. Prison labor involved somewhat of a stretch, but in good conscience, taking into account the views of the lawyers, we could say that we already had a prison labor agreement and we had some inspections provided for to ensure that they were not exporting the products of prison labor. It wasn't an airtight breakthrough by any means, but we thought that it was enough to justify meeting that condition. However, in terms of overall significant progress in
releasing prisoners, there wasn't much to point to. The Chinese authorities had let some people out, but they were also beginning to round up others. On prison conditions nothing had really happened. Nothing had happened in the case of Tibet. On these and other conditions, we just felt that the Chinese authorities hadn't made significant progress on them. If we had tried to stretch what had happened, we would have had a firestorm in Congress. Probably this would have resulted in having the President overridden by Congress, anyway.

In any event, it would have made the President look so eager to stretch the truth that he would have done anything to renew MFN status for China. We would have lost credibility in Beijing because the Chinese Government would have concluded that the American Government was so desperate to renew MFN status for China that they were calling our bluff. The Chinese hadn't made any real progress on most issues. Our lack of credibility would have had an impact around the world. So we ruled out manufacturing progress because of domestic and Chinese reaction.

I think that the third choice, which we eventually selected, was the least bad alternative. Certainly, it was what I recommended at the time, but it was very embarrassing. It meant a reversal of policy. The President hadn't been willing to discipline the economic agencies or present a united front in any event. The Chinese would continue to do what they had been doing, and placing conditions on renewal of MFN status just wasn't going to go anywhere. We weren't prepared to pretend about progress allegedly made and we weren't prepared to revoke MFN status for China. So we felt that the only choice we had, and the least bad choice was simply to renew MFN, while pressing human rights in other ways. And this is what we did.

This was awkward, but it was the only choice available to us at the time. Some people might say that we should never have placed conditions on the renewal of MFN. Some people said that we should have kept MFN, while others said that we should have revoked MFN status for China. I still feel, to this day, that if we had had a united administration and a strong President on this issue, we might have pulled off our initial policy of MFN renewal with modest conditions.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I was just curious. In initiating this policy to what extent, if at all, did you consider that you were giving leverage to the Chinese? In many ways the renewal of MFN status for China could only work with Chinese good will. That is, if the Chinese were willing to come far enough under these conditions. So the initiative for making the Clinton administration policy work was in Chinese hands. Was that a consideration?

LORD: Yes. However, put another way, we felt that the Chinese had enough of a stake in the Chinese-American relationship in general, and the export and trading part of it in particular, to have Chinese good will. After all, we were taking one-third of their exports, and they had a huge surplus in their trade with the U.S. Therefore, in this view the Chinese had an incentive to cooperate with us, if not out of good will, at least in their own self-interest. However, that depended on China's concern that there was a real
danger of their losing MFN status. And between the business lobbying and what the economic agencies were saying, that clearly was not the case. There is no question that one can criticize conditional MFN, albeit forgetting that we headed off revocation of MFN and the imposition of heavy conditions on MFN extension. You can say that extending conditional MFN status should never have happened in the first place, but in 1993 we faced the realities of Clinton’s campaign positions and the congressional mood.

The President said that he wasn't going to pretend about the extent of progress. He said that we considered that conditional MFN renewal had been a useful instrument up to now, but we had used up whatever utility it had, and we couldn't make any further progress on this front.

We stated how we would be vigorous on human rights on other fronts. Specifically, we revoked or cut off MFN status on Chinese small arms and handguns, so there was a tiny sector that we did hit. We stressed that we would continue to consider human rights a very important part of our policy and that we would do it through resolutions passed in Geneva, and through the human rights dialogue. We began to mention legal reforms in China at that time. We mentioned that we would work through Radio Free Asia and other programs involving non-governmental organizations. We also said that we would try to work with the business community on the adoption of good business principles to promote human rights. There were a couple of other elements which were announced at the time.

So we've renewed MFN without conditions and changed our position. And we set out to improve our relations and press human rights in other ways.

In the fall of 1994 Secretary Christopher met again, in Indonesia, with the Chinese. The APEC meeting that year was in Bogor. He was working hard by cable, by letter, and also at periodic meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Various issues came up, but I can't give you the chronology.

We had the famous case of the Chinese ship with the chemicals on it. We received poor intelligence from our people. The ship wasn't transporting dangerous chemicals. We stopped the ship, boarded it, and examined it. We got egg on our face as a result. What happened was that our intelligence people had proof, from the cargo manifest of the ship, that it was scheduled to load certain dangerous chemicals on board. Either the Chinese snookered us in a kind of con game and took these chemicals off at the last minute to embarrass us or, in fact, they had unloaded it in planned fashion. It didn't have any dangerous chemicals on board at the time we inspected it. The Chinese predictably blasted us for this.

We were also concerned about Chinese nuclear proliferation activities with Pakistan. We had to slap sanctions on China a couple of times in this connection. I think that this occurred once in 1993 and again in 1995.

We made very little progress on human rights. The Chinese called off the dialogue with Assistant Secretary John Shattuck after a while. We would go to Geneva and lose on the
votes taken there to pass a resolution critical of the Chinese.

On the other hand, the Chinese were somewhat helpful on North Korea and became increasingly helpful in this connection. On Cambodia the Chinese halted their aid to the Khmer Rouge. They were more helpful there and supported the UN operation and the elections. Our exports to China were increasing, even though the overall trade deficit with China was increasing generally. There was some, slogging progress on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly in the wake of the sanctions that were applied to China. We tried to talk about broader issues with China. We began to talk about developing a new agenda on some of the global issues. So the Chinese-American relationship began to make some progress. It was not dramatic, but clearly it was getting way beyond the level of the Christopher trip, which had gone so badly.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Could you say something about the relationships within the American administration? One of the things that has often been talked about is the growing role of Ron Brown, Secretary of Commerce, in defining how the relationships worked, and foreign policy more generally. What did you see as the dynamic in this situation? To what extent was Secretary Christopher as important a player as previous Secretaries of State might have been?

LORD: I think that Secretary Christopher was important during this period. No question about that. In fact, on China I think that he was the most important player short of President Clinton, despite criticism of him. Now Tony Lake, the National Security Adviser, got into this picture constructively toward the end, and we'll get into this later.

But in the first few years, his deputy, Sandy Berger, was the key person at the NSC on China, and Asia generally. Having said that, there was no question that Christopher did not control foreign policy as Kissinger did. So there was in some people's eyes, and probably in the eyes of the Chinese, some varying degrees of emphasis which were different, if nothing else.

Whenever there was an economic cabinet member, like Ron Brown, or the Secretary of the Treasury, or the USTR [United States Trade Representative] going to China, we would work with them. I would often send one of my people with them. We would brief them and encourage them to raise human rights, even as they promoted our economic or commercial interests, and try to show a united front. This was particularly the case after the tough going early in the Clinton administration. I must say that, after that change in MFN policy, we had a much more united and disciplined administration. Most official visitors who went to China, even though they didn't particularly like it, would raise the human rights issue. So we began to get a more cohesive policy, partly because with no conditions standing in the way of MFN renewal, the economic agencies were comfortable with the policy. I think that the President was happy no longer to have this yearly deadline of MFN renewal staring at him. It had been an awkward and embarrassing situation, but we began to make progress overall with the Chinese.

Again, the economic agencies were important, but they didn't dominate foreign policy. We had very good relations between the White House and the NSC [National Security
Council]. That was generally true with regard to policy toward East Asia. The NSC Asian officers and I and my colleagues worked extremely well together. The same with the Defense Department.

On China there were a lot of skull sessions, particularly when we got to the renewal of MFN status each year or when the President was going to meet Chinese President Jiang Zemin at an APEC meeting or Secretary Christopher was going to meet Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at some international conference. There would often be an interagency meeting, usually chaired by Sandy Berger [Deputy National Security Adviser]. Tony Lake [National Security Adviser] wasn't too much involved with China in those days. We worked well together, so there was a cohesiveness which had been previously missing. I think that it is fair to say that, although the White House became more involved, the Department of State was still in the daily lead on China policy. However, the economic agencies were important and were bound to be important. At this point we at least had a united policy. It was constructive that the White House became generally more interested and in control of China policy. Christopher and I personally were fully involved throughout. There has been some revisionism that after the 1994 MFN change the White House took over and State was cut out. This is total nonsense. We worked very closely together.

Secretary Christopher very much promoted our economic interests. He took a lot of time at meetings in doing this, even the economic agencies would mention human rights when they went to China. So we had a better team at this time than had previously been the case.

_Q: Were we, not only in front but virtually all by ourselves in dealing with human rights in China, compared to the British, the French, and so forth?_

LORD: The answer is "Yes." I have said publicly that our friends would hold our coats when we raised some of these tough issues with the Chinese, whether it concerned human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, or even trade negotiations. They would hold our coats and then take the trade contracts while we took Chinese annoyances.

That's a very good point. It's another reason why the conditional approach on MFN renewal did not work. We were all alone in this respect. No other country tried to put on sanctions or conditions on trade status. Other countries didn't press the Chinese on human rights. There were modest exceptions to this, like Great Britain, because of Hong Kong, and Australia, because they cared about human rights. Other countries just went through the motions. So the Chinese, of course, were very adept at saying: "Well, you people may want to place conditions on MFN renewal or keep bugging us on human rights, which are our internal affair, but our European and Japanese friends don't do this. We'll just give them the contracts."

In fact, the Chinese wouldn't always do that because we might have better technology or better deals. The Chinese didn't want to be dependent on Japan and Europe, so the Chinese bark was sometimes louder than their bite. However, there were times, for
example, when we were left with the feeling that maybe Airbus Industries got a contract for aircraft that Boeing might have gotten. Maybe some French or Japanese company got something that an American company might otherwise have gotten. So this lack of multilateral help hurt us. One of the criticisms was that the U.S. was pressuring the Chinese unilaterally and why didn't we do this in coordination with our friends? The answer to this is that we tried very hard to get our friends to act in coordination with us. I would have policy talks with my counterparts, including the British, the French, the Germans, and the Japanese in particular, and try to persuade them to work with us on human rights issues so that we would have a more effective approach to the Chinese. We never got anywhere with this approach. This really hurt our efforts in the field of human rights in China. No question about it.

One of the reasons that our business community was upset with stressing human rights was that they figured that the Chinese would shift business to their competitors.

**Q:** During the period from 1993 to 1997 the issue of birth control and particularly of abortion were hot button issues in American politics. Did you have to deal with that?

**LORD:** I had to deal with that, but, strangely enough, even though it was always there and always simmering, these never became overriding issues. There were major issues on human rights in general, but I would say that prisoner release, Tibet, and prison labor policy. Of course, some Chinese officials saw the need to hold down the growth of China's population in any way possible. However, I think that there was less and less proof that forced abortions were going on, although there surely were some. This issue, at least in my recollection, never became one of the major matters.

Every now and then there would be related matters like infanticide, killing girl babies, mistreatment of orphans, organ transplants, or issues related to these. These might come up. However, these were just among the human rights issues that we were concerned about. They were never at the top of the agenda. We were concerned about them, but I just don't think they caused that much steam in Congress, compared to other matters, like prisoners and Tibet.

**Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]:** One other question. I'm not sure whether it belongs here or maybe later, but how much access, if at all, did people concerned with the China portfolio have to the President? Did you have opportunities to meet with him and brief him? Did Secretary Christopher go on trips with him?

**LORD:** Well, early in the first Clinton term foreign policy was not the President's major preoccupation. However, we would meet with President Clinton before he met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, perhaps a week or so in advance. Then we would meet with President Clinton again just before he would go into the meeting.

Most of the interagency meetings on China policy were at the level of Sandy Berger [National Security Adviser], Peter Tarnoff [Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs], and myself, at the Department of State level. Joe Nye would sit in, representing the Department of Defense. These meetings did not involve the President. I don't recall a
full-scale, NSC [National Security Council] meeting on China alone during the first two or three years of Clinton's first term, if, in fact, such a meeting ever occurred. There were a couple of sessions at which we briefed the President, attended by outside experts in addition to ourselves. However, President Clinton did not pay a great deal of attention to foreign policy at this time. He made up for this later on, to some extent. Often, if he was going to an APEC meeting or on an Asian trip, we would work in China issues as well. I can't recall more than one or two such sessions which were just on China, for example, before President Clinton met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin. However, President Clinton is a quick study, and we had the opportunity to brief him before he would meet with someone, as I say, like Jiang Zemin.

Generally, briefing President Clinton was a little hair raising because he was usually late for them. I'm talking about the briefings just before he would go into a meeting. These are supposed to take place an hour in advance of such a meeting. But the President would show up for his briefing with only about 15 minutes to go before the meeting. Several people would be standing around in the Oval Office in Washington or some hotel, wherever we were, shouting last minute advice at him. He would be looking through his talking points. His press secretary would be going over his public statements. We would be pretty nervous. We didn't know how much homework he had done and whether he could absorb all of this advice. However, he would perform quite well at these meetings.

Now, as time went on, some outsiders thought that our China policy was not really progressing as much as it should have. We did what we could to engage the President. I know that, on occasion, President Clinton met with former Secretary of State Kissinger or Al Haig. Often, businessmen would weigh in on U.S. policy toward China. We know now, of course, that even campaign contributors could do that. However, in terms of your basic question as to whether President Clinton was exposed to a lot of expertise and heavy thinking and debate on China policy, I shouldn't think so.

Q: There wasn't somebody who was a friend of President Clinton's from Little Rock, Arkansas, who had a Chinese cousin or something like that? Sometimes, it happens that somebody who is personally close to the President may have pronounced ideas on China.

LORD: It's not surprising that business people, either in a meeting or if they are talking to the President at a reception, or when they are having coffee with him, or on some such occasion, would advocate trade or investment with China, or engagement with China in general. There is nothing wrong with that, and I am convinced that anything which President Clinton did on China was not done as a favor to contributors. Again, we have to look at investigations now going on and make sure that they are fully carried out. However, President Clinton's views on China policy would have been what he thought was in the national interest, not the result of a lot of systematic access by outsiders. That was true, not just on China, but on foreign policy issues in general. At the same time, the consistent economic emphasis by businesspeople seeing him undoubtedly had an effect.

So we were sort of moving ahead on China policy. I can't quantify it. However, as we reached the beginning of 1995, we had had these periods of ups and downs. Then we
reached the visit to the U.S. by President Li Teng-hui of Taiwan.

Let me just step back on Taiwan for a minute. In 1993-94, we launched the first, systematic review of our Taiwan policy since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. This review went on for a good year or so, including debates on how bold we could be. I don't remember the specific timing, but it happened early in the first Clinton term. We in the bureau led this effort, personally headed by me and my deputy, Tomsen.

There was never any feeling that we were going to revolutionize policy toward Taiwan in one way or another. We weren't going to go backward and resume having official relations with Taiwan. That would really have hurt ourselves with Beijing, as it was one of the most sensitive areas from Beijing's point of view. Nor were we going to flip over, do the bidding of the PRC [People's Republic of China] Government, and hurt Taiwan in any significant way. That would be weak, unnerve allies, demoralize a good friend, and caused an upheaval in Congress.

So this review was constrained from the beginning, and I think correctly so. We didn't want strawmen options and we ruled out either extreme. However, within that framework we wanted to see whether we could strengthen ties with Taiwan, without significantly hurting our China relationship.

Many anomalies had grown up since we had passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. These had turned out to be awkward in terms of how we deal with Taiwan, because this relationship has to be unofficial. So the questions came up, Where can you meet Taiwan officials and in which U.S. Government buildings? What level of American Government officials can go to Taiwan? Who could visit the U.S. from Taiwan? What shall the name be of the Taiwan Government office in Washington? A lot of things were rather hurriedly thrown together in 1979 to compensate for normalization of relations with the PRC [People's Republic of China] and to control keep our ties with Taiwan, both in legal terms and in terms of nomenclature, and in political terms with regard to Beijing. These arrangements had become cumbersome and awkward in dealing with Taiwan. So not only did we want to strengthen relations with Taiwan but we wanted to simplify relations in a way that wouldn't have major substantive impact but which would just make it easier to work the Taiwan side of the issue.

So we went over this subject for probably a year. It took a long time, partly internal debates, partly White House inertia. Taiwan kept pressing us in terms of what was going to happen. The results were constructive. They were modest, but I think that they were helpful. I can't remember all of them, but we changed the name of the Taiwan office in Washington to "Taiwan Economic and Cultural Relations Office [TECRO]." Now what was it called before?

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: It was called, "The Coordination Council for North American Affairs."

LORD: The Coordination Council for North American Affairs is a real mouthful, and
TECRO was a modest improvement. We did that, but it certainly didn't make this office more official. We wouldn't do that, but it gave more sense of what this office was up to. We did approve, in principle, economic cabinet level official visits to Taiwan, which was quite significant. However, such trips had to be related to specific goals. Such trips wouldn't be frequent, but they would be acceptable when they could help us, particularly in the cultural and economic areas. Until then, I believe, the only U.S. Cabinet level official who had ever gone to Taiwan was Carla Hills, at the end of the Bush administration. She was U.S. Trade Representative. We also said that Taiwan officials who have economic functions could meet in U.S. Government offices, even though we said that they couldn't meet U.S. officials in the State Department in Washington, because this would suggest diplomatic overtones.

We decided that we would vigorously support Taiwan membership in international organizations which didn't require statehood. And in the case of those which required statehood, we would press to make sure that their voice could be heard in some fashion, perhaps as observers. In the case of those organizations which didn't require statehood, such as APEC, WTO [World Trade Organization], and other economic agencies, we would push for some Taiwan presence more strongly.

At the APEC meeting in November, 1993, we also worked out that Taiwan could attend the summit meeting that year. That was also very tough and delicate. Taiwan had already become a member of APEC during the Bush Administration, but it was not a foregone conclusion, when we lifted the level of representation from Foreign Ministers to Heads of State or Heads of Government, that Beijing would settle for Taiwan being present. So we had delicate negotiations conducted by my deputy, Peter Tomsen, in which we arranged for Taiwan to send a representative to the APEC meeting. This representative would not be President Li Teng-hui of Taiwan. This would have been too much for Beijing to accept. The Taiwan representative was, in effect, at the economic cabinet level. This got Taiwan into the APEC summit meeting but at a slightly lower level. It was a rather ingenious compromise which represented a step forward for Taiwan in many ways. They really couldn't have expected to have President Li Teng-hui at that meeting when PRC President Jiang Zemin was there. The PRC didn't like this arrangement, and Taiwan didn't like it either, which shows that it was a good deal. It has lasted ever since.

I want to underline that I worked very hard at maintaining good relations with Taiwan. I met with their representative, as well as visiting officials very frequently, probably more than any Ambassador in my region. Because of unofficial ties, we couldn’t meet in the State Department - I would go across the street to meet in a hotel room; sometimes we had meals at the Four Seasons Hotel in Georgetown. I was dedicated to good relations even as we went ahead with China, because we had moral and historical bonds, we were responsible for Taiwan’s security through arms sales and rhetoric and deployments, it was a democracy in contrast to China, we had strong economic links and there was great congressional and media support for Taiwan. I kept Taiwan closely briefed on trips and meetings with China - my own, the President’s, Secretary Christopher’s, etc. I always supported a robust arms package. Except for the Lee visit interlude, my relations were very cordial, especially with Ding Moushi and Jason Hu.
In any event, we did all of these things and others for Taiwan. I forget when we announced the results. Of course, it was less than Taiwan had hoped for, but we felt that we had cleaned up a lot of the anomalies, maintained our basic policy, avoided really annoying Beijing all that much, and modestly pleased Taiwan. I think that we came out quite well. The outcome wasn't dramatic. It correctly avoided the extremes.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Why did it take so long?

LORD: Essentially because people disagreed. Also, frankly, this was a result of inertia in the White House, particularly when there was sensitivity on this issue. It was hard to get meetings scheduled and decisions made.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Were there people arguing that this was going too far, that we were going to hurt Chinese feelings, and this was a bad move?

LORD: I don't remember that there was a lot of passion in the discussions, to be honest, because it didn't mark a dramatic departure. I don't recall anybody in the Clinton administration pushing for much bolder moves in support of Taiwan. I don't recall anyone saying very passionately that this was going to hurt our relations with Beijing. Thus, you have raised a fair question, why this process took so long. I think that a lot of it was simply a matter of plain inertia in getting the White House to come to grips with the issue. There might have been some nervousness that, maybe, Beijing would be a little annoyed, but I don't recall that this view was held very passionately.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I ask because, from the outside, I think that the feeling always was that if movement had been faster on this issue, it would have been seen as a really positive, administration move.

LORD: A very good point.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: However, it took so long that everybody's expectations were raised.

LORD: That's a very good point, and I am glad to record it here. This package of measures involving Taiwan was not revolutionary by any means, of course. We did not review or change our policy on arms sales to Taiwan and the basic policy of unofficial and friendly ties with Taiwan. But if we had done all of this, say, in three or four months, people would have said: "Well, they're looking at the situation affecting Taiwan and they're cleaning up some anomalies. And there's some good steps forward. This is not as much as we 'Taiwan' supporters would like, but it's a step forward. They did it without alienating Beijing. It was a pretty good job." And I think that in fact was the case.

However, taking a year for action was damaging. Not only were the economic and academic experts on the outside watching this situation, wondering what the hell was going on. Taiwan, of course, was working with Congress to try to pressure on the
administration to undertake some bolder moves forward. They had their expectations raised, although, through careful backgrounding of the press, we tried to keep those expectations down. I also tried to keep them down in my meetings with Taiwan representatives. By the time these changes came out, a lot of people probably thought that we had produced a mouse. I think the outcome was better than that. I think that it was partly the delay which caused this misperception.

Having said that, however, we didn't pay a price of any significance in Beijing, and we got modest kudos from Taiwan. On the whole, Congress thought that we should have done more, but members of Congress grudgingly said that we at least did something.

Then, in the course of 1994, there was the episode of President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan wanting to visit the United States in transit to Central America, where he was making a state visit. I believe that it was in 1994. Up till then we hadn't even allowed transit visits by top officials in Taiwan through the United States, bound for another destination. This was due to opposition by Beijing, which had a tremendous, double standard in this regard. They accepted that President Lee Teng-hui could play golf and have official meetings with the leaders of Southeast Asian countries. Beijing would hardly say anything about it. But the U.S. was a different matter, as was Japan.

In any event, in 1994 President Lee Teng-hui wanted to have a visit, preferably a stopover somewhere in mainland U.S., en route to Central America. He wasn't asking for an official visit to the U.S. at that point. What he wanted was more like a transit visit, but a leisurely transit visit. We split the difference. We decided that we would make the case that, given considerations of geography, it was only natural for him to go through the U.S. en route from Taiwan to Central America. It would have been a little tough and inconvenient not to do so. It was also a matter of airplane distances. You couldn't fly directly from Taiwan to Central America. So on grounds of logistics, convenience, and courtesy, you could make a case for approving this transit visit through the U.S. We knew about Beijing's sensitivities and we decided to have the transit take place in Hawaii. Yes, Hawaii is part of the United States. However, it's in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. A short visit there was not like landing in New York or California. We decided to approve a transit visit which was genuinely a transit visit. It would be a refueling stop. President Lee Teng-hui would come into the VIP lounge while his plane was refueled. I sent out the head of our Taiwan office in the State Department to greet him as a matter of courtesy.

The problem is that this solution didn't work in any direction. The Chinese Government in Beijing was mad and beat up on us, but that was manageable. We could live with that. President Lee Teng-hui, wanting a more high profile visit, said that he wanted to spend a couple of days in Hawaii, play some golf, and meet local people. Instead of Taiwan being grateful that for the first time ever its President had set foot on American soil, it turned out that it was not at all satisfied that the arrangement approved was a step forward compared to what any other American administration had previously permitted. Lee was upset because he just had this refueling stop in Hawaii.
Lee decided that he would play up this incident and magnify it by not getting off the airplane. As I said, I had sent one of my officers from the Taiwan office to meet and greet him and bring him into the VIP lounge. To this day, like the "Energizer Bunny" [advertisement for a brand of flashlight batteries], I've been trying to stamp out this rumor that we wouldn't let Lee get off the airplane in Hawaii. Of course we wanted him off the plane. We wanted him in the VIP lounge in the airport in Honolulu. By the time my officer met him at the plane, Lee decided that he would get more propaganda advantage by staying on the plane. Then Taiwan put out a statement that we wouldn't let Lee off the plane in Hawaii. We never caught up with that allegation. I became blue in the face, telling every newsman and every Congressman and Senator that I could get my hands on that this allegation was not true. The Taiwan Government keeps saying, to this day, that Lee couldn't get off the airplane in Hawaii. This is total baloney.

In any event, that was a little forerunner of what came next. Beijing was upset, but this was all right with us. We knew that they weren't going to be pleased. We thought that this was a fair splitting of the difference, balancing security, comfort, and courtesy. We were not being provocative. President Lee didn't have any press conference while he was in Honolulu.

This incident foreshadowed what happened in 1995. Lee started pressing for an official visit, or at least a working visit. He knew that he couldn't come as a head of state for an official visit. The excuse he used was that he wanted to receive an honorary degree from Cornell University. This was nonsense, because he already had an honorary degree from Cornell. The idea was that he would go up to Cornell University, give a speech, and be feted by his former university.

Taiwan already had strong lobbyists on Capitol Hill, of course. Taiwan was in second place, just behind Israel and just ahead of Greece in its lobbying effort in Congress. Taiwan also hired a PR [Public Relations] firm, Cassidy. My own view is that Taiwan would have been able to mount a lot of pressure for a travel permit, which is shorthand for Lee being able to come and visit the U.S., even without the PR firm.

They had four million dollars available for this campaign. There were some people in the Taiwan Government who argued against this trip, saying that they should not annoy the Americans and pressure the U.S. Government or go around and lobby Congress, but there were various factions in Taiwan behind this project. Who knows all of the details? In any event, the pressure was intense for us to allow Lee to come to the U.S. and give a speech at Cornell University. This particular episode, along with the reversal of our policy on MFN extension, were the two key events for which the Clinton administration has been criticized on specific aspects of our China policy.

So we had to deal with the question of the Lee visit. There was a view in the administration, held fairly generally, that Lee should not be allowed to come. You never know when the President was consulted, but he was clearly aware of the matter. The fairly generally held view was that, even though the Chinese Government was being somewhat unreasonable by objecting to an unofficial, private visit by President Lee
Teng-hui, the turbulence that would be caused in our relations with Beijing wasn't worth granting a travel permit to Lee. We continued to talk about a transit visit, but when it came to a working visit, this would present a fundamental problem. The basic policy for several administrations had been not to allow visits by high level Taiwan officials. We already had moved on transit visits.

I remember going up on Capitol Hill on several occasions and just getting lambasted. I was asked: "What the hell is going on? Can't a guy who is a distinguished person, the head of a democracy, come to the United States and visit his 'alma mater'? We're not talking about a high level, high profile visit. We're just talking about letting this poor guy come here and get an honorary degree. Are you going to let these 'pirates' in Beijing pressure you? This guy Lee is a democrat and a friend of the U.S. What the hell is going on here?"

I remember thinking frankly, during all of the time that I was testifying to the best of my ability, that I privately agreed with the Congressmen. This was an absurd situation. I'm not saying that I argued, within the administration, that Lee should be given a permit. I saw the turbulence building in Beijing and I was not in favor of giving him a trip. However, I felt that, on the merits, it was absurd saying that Lee, as a democratic politician, couldn't get honored by his alma mater. We kept on fighting the Congress and telling the PRC Embassy and Beijing that it was our fundamental policy not to have a visit to the U.S. by such a high level official of the Taiwan Government. This position was also relayed in a meeting in April, 1995, which Secretary Christopher had with PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at which he said that our fundamental policy was still not to allow visits to the U.S. by high level Taiwan officials. However, Christopher also said that we were having a difficult time convincing the U.S. Congress that this was the right course, and the pressure was building up. Understandably, Qian Qichen reported the first part of Christopher's remarks back to PRC President Jiang Zemin and others that the U.S. continued to oppose such visits. Either he didn't report the second part of Christopher's remarks or didn't give appropriate weight to these Congressional pressures. Maybe Qian Qichen thought that, whatever these pressures, we would just ignore them.

I'm not trying to say that Secretary Christopher was trying to tell Qian Qichen that we were going to reverse our policy on visits by high-ranking Taiwan officials. The PRC authorities, I think, were caught by surprise, but there was a lot of foreshadowing by Christopher to Qian Qichen of the ultimate decision, based on the fact that there were great difficulties in the way of continuing this policy. When we did reverse this policy on visits to the U.S. by high-ranking Taiwan officials, Qian Qichen didn't say that he was personally embarrassed. PRC President Jiang Zemin was embarrassed, to the extent that he looked as if he had been outflanked by Taiwan at a time when Jiang was trying to consolidate his position. This was a very sensitive issue, which was embarrassing both for President Jiang and for Foreign Minister Qian. Qian was identified with dealing with the U.S. and for having gotten these assurances that there would be no further visits to the U.S. by high-level Taiwan officials. It was one of the reasons why Foreign Minister Qian was so hard-line during the later Taiwan Straits missile crisis. He needed to show that he could be firm on Taiwan and so protect his flank. The same was true with Jiang.
Anyway, the pressure kept up on this proposed visit to the U.S. by President Lee Teng-hui. Congress voted unanimously, without dissent in the House of Representatives, to allow Lee to come for a short visit. In the Senate, I think, the vote was 97 to 1. These were "sense of the Congress" resolutions without legal effect. However, the votes were overwhelming and were a clear message to the administration. The only holdout in the Senate was Senator Bennett Johnson [Democrat, Louisiana], who voted both out of conviction, to avoid upsetting Beijing, and because of various oil interests and so forth. This took guts, I must say, no matter what his views were. So we got to the point where we felt that Congress would be so outraged if we held out on this issue that it might tamper with the Taiwan Relations Act and might enforce other things with respect to Taiwan which could really hurt our policy toward Beijing. The media was also generally beating up on us. The Cassidy firm had been very effective, but these pressures would have been there anyway.

We also felt that the PRC Government was overreacting, of course, but basically we knew that continuing to decline to issue a traveler's permit to Lee Teng-hui was going to cause huge problems. On the other hand, we knew that we had told the PRC Government that we would hang in there, so it was very awkward for us.

Now, I was traveling overseas in May, 1995, so I didn't get directly involved in the last few days of debate in Washington on the Lee visit. I don't know exactly what I would have done if I had been in Washington at the time. However, I want to make very clear that I knew through back channel messages from my deputy, the acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, as I was traveling, what was happening and that we were going to reverse our policy and let Lee Teng-hui visit the United States. I did not oppose that decision.

In retrospect, if I had this to do all over again, I think that we should have agreed to grant Lee a traveler's permit from the beginning. We would then have avoided the flip flop in the eyes of the PRC Government, although they still would have been outraged at the decision. However, on the merits, I think that Lee Teng-hui should have been allowed to make a private, unofficial visit, and then we should have been prepared to tough it out with the PRC. Another thing that we should have done, and I'll get to this, is that we should have been much more air tight on the speech that Lee was going to give at Cornell University.

Q: By any chance, during the arguments on this issue within the administration, was the case for letting the Shah of Iran into the United States for medical treatment brought up as something that might have been a parallel?
LORD: No, I don't recall that. By the way, I happen to have been in favor of allowing the Shah of Iran to be brought into the U.S. for medical treatment. But that parallel...

Q: I was just wondering whether that case was considered. There is a certain symmetry...
LORD: In terms of our relations with another country, I understand that, but I don't recall
that that argument was used. Basically, it was the impact on Beijing and the pressure on Beijing, versus the impact of the pressures from Congress. And, of course, there was the feeling that the PRC Government was really overreacting on this issue. However, in the end, we were also concerned that Congress might pass legislation which would really tie our hands on Taiwan and China. As I have said, these were incredibly overwhelming votes in both houses of Congress.

There also was the question of timing and the President, and I'll never sort this matter out. When he announced the decision on the travel permit for President Lee Teng-hui, President Clinton expressed the view along the lines of: "I believe in freedom of travel. Why can't the President of Taiwan come to the United States privately?" This seemed to suggest that Clinton didn't know what American positions on proposed visits had been. He finally seemed to conclude that our position had been unreasonable and that we were going to change it. I can't tell you how much President Clinton consulted with Tony Lake [National Security Adviser] and Sandy Berger [Deputy National Security Adviser] as he went along. However, it was such a visible issue that I can't believe that the President wasn't in favor of holding the line. He just changed his mind, and put emphasis on the freedom of travel and other considerations when he announced his decision. Of course, the Congressional pressures were key for him.

Of course, we tried to package this decision for the PRC Government as best we could. What we told them, and what we told Taiwan at the same time that we did this, was that this visit was going to be at the lowest key possible. So we worked out that President Lee would hold no press conferences. He would land in California and go directly to Ithaca, New York, [where Cornell University is located] and not even go through New York City. Of course, not Washington, but not even New York City. He would go directly to Ithaca. He would not be met by any U.S. Government officials, although we would have my Taiwan Country Director accompanying him, partly to keep Lee under control, to work with their people, and make sure that he didn't do something that would be awkward.

There were Congressmen and Senators who wanted to go up to Cornell and meet President Lee. We couldn't do anything about that. However, he would not meet with any administration official, there would be no press conference, and he would not even go through New York City. We were assured by Benjamin Lu, the Taiwan representative in Washington, that Lee's speech would be low key, would be non-political, and would cover economic reforms in Taiwan. So, in retrospect, the other thing that we should have done was to obtain the text of his proposed speech in advance. I know that we attempted very vigorously to get details of the speech from the Taiwan representative in Washington, but without success. This should have made us suspicious.

In retrospect, and I didn't argue this at the time, we should have given him the visa from the beginning, so we wouldn't have had a public flip flop on the issue. We wouldn't have had these pressures from Congress and the awkward reversal of policy. This would have helped modestly with Beijing. In the context of air tightness, on the trip being unofficial and low key, which we managed to pull off on other things, besides the speech, we
should have said that we would only approve the issuance of a travel permit for Lee if we could see the text of the speech in advance. If he didn't like this condition, he didn't have to come to the U.S. at all.

I am convinced that the Lee speech created a major problem. The PRC Government was going to scream and shout, even without the speech. However, the fact is that during most of the Lee visit, we kept the press away, we limited his itinerary, and we explained all of this to the PRC Chinese. They did not react all that strongly during the lead up to the Lee visit and even during the first couple of days of it. The reaction was strong, but not in terms of the decibel count that I was familiar with in terms of the Chinese rhetoric. Then Lee gave his speech. In his speech he had countless references to the "Republic of China on Taiwan, in addition to other provocations." He totally double crossed us. Of course, the PRC Chinese went ballistic. I must say that I went ballistic as well, as did others in the U.S. Government. After all, on this issue President Clinton had stuck his neck out, risking our relationship with the PRC, and then Lee gave a big political speech on Taiwan.

As a result, on my own, I just refused thereafter to receive Benjamin Lu, the Taiwan representative. I was not personally given any instructions to do this and I didn't consult anyone. For a few months he had absolutely no access to me. I was the highest level official in the State Department that he was allowed to see and I had been seeing him regularly. Because of his performance on the visit, however, and to register our displeasure on the speech, I just ignored him. He was finally recalled to Taiwan. I would like to think that I had something to do with it. He is a nice man but ineffectual. However, he personally could have been more helpful. He was either weak or disingenuous. He had been lobbying Congress and going around us, without attempting to discuss the matter with us. He wasn't respected in Taiwan, anyway. Everyone thought that his appointment to Washington was somewhat puzzling to begin with. I was therefore sending a message to Taiwan about our unhappiness over this issue but also our unhappiness with his behavior. As a result, he was withdrawn from Washington, but not just because of me. But the Taiwan Government saw that he had no access to the State Department, and this contributed to its decision to withdraw him from Washington.

Anyway, we were very tough with Taiwan afterwards. Also we went back to Beijing on it, but in any case the damage was done. PRC President Jiang Zemin and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in particular thought that they had been embarrassed on this matter. I don't remember all of the things that happened, but the PRC Government cut off some trips and exchanges. They withdrew their Ambassador from Washington, and relations got very frosty just when we had been making some progress on our relationship. I think that the PRC began its first military exercise [in the Taiwan Straits] in summer, 1995, not long after the Lee visit.

I also paid close attention to Hong Kong throughout my tenure. The British colony was to return to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997, after I left office. I thought it was important to underscore American support for Hong Kong’s future autonomy and freedom under Chinese rule. I enthusiastically supported Governor Chris Patten’s efforts
- and tangle with Beijing - to introduce some elements of political choice and democracy. This would constitute a glass ceiling which the Chinese would have to break if they wanted to roll back reform. Of course, the British were late at doing this - Patten had the courage and foresight to do this whereas all his predecessors had essentially kow-towed to Beijing. Some of them, and some so-called China experts in the U.S., criticized Patten for this. I strongly supported him, as did our government. I would always see him, usually at a private working breakfast on my several trips there to show the flag.

I would also meet with the Chinese representatives (NCNA) and urge tolerance in China’s self-interest. Christopher and I would also raise this in our meetings with Chinese officials elsewhere. In Hong Kong I would also meet with American businesspeople, Hong Kong business types, and Hong Kong legislators, including democracy activists, like Martin Lee. I would include support for Hong Kong in various speeches and hold press conferences there, as elsewhere in Asia.

At any rate they fired some missiles and had some military exercises. We reacted to this, saying that these exercises were not helpful, but I don't recall any high level protest, since they were not particularly provocative.
XXIII. STATE DEPARTMENT ASSISTANT SECRETARY - CHINA (1996-1997)

In 1995 we got MFN status renewed for China by a fairly significant majority despite the controversy that came up every year. We kept working on other issues. However, as we reached the beginning of 1996, it looked as if we faced a real nightmare. This was even before the Taiwan Missile Crisis heated up again. We had been able to improve relations somewhat with the PRC but we discovered that there was a whole minefield ahead of us. The Chinese were sending ring magnets to Pakistan, which helped Pakistan develop their nuclear capability. Consequently, we slapped on sanctions because of that.

We had very tough negotiations on intellectual property rights. American business interests were losing billions of dollars each year because of pirating [unauthorized copying] by the PRC Chinese of CDs [Compact Discs], VCRs [Video Cassette Recorders], computer software, pharmaceutical products patented in the U.S., and so forth.

In March, 1996, we had coming up the annual tussle in Geneva over a resolution critiquing Chinese human rights. This was always a source of irritation between us and Beijing. The MFN extension would come up after that in May-June, and the human rights issue wasn't going well. There was still the chill left over from the withdrawal of the PRC Ambassador from Washington in the wake of the Lee visit, although he would have returned by then. I don't remember when exactly. However, there was a basic chill on exchanges with the PRC. So the relationship between the U.S. and the PRC Chinese was not in very good shape early in 1996 and difficult issues lay ahead.

With my encouragement Secretary Christopher - of course with the full agreement and encouragement of the White House - said that we have to look at our whole policy toward China and see how we are going to get back on track in terms of our relationship and get through all of these minefields. I don't recall whether it was January, 1996, or it may even have been in the fall of 1995. At any rate, we began a process of intensive, strategic reviews, both in the State Department and at the White House. Either Sandy Berger would chair meetings at the White House or Christopher chaired meetings at the State Department, with Sandy Berger or Tony Lake coming over to the State Department.

The point I am making is that this contradicts stories that this was essentially a Christopher-led operation or a White House one. Meetings were held at the White House and the State Department and there was total cooperation. Everyone felt that we had to see how the hell we were going to get through this minefield of issues. So we not only looked at specifics about what we would do about IPR, what we would do about nuclear non-proliferation, and what we would do about human rights. We also considered our approach to all of these issues, generally. It was agreed, among other things, that we really would try to make a much more aggressive effort to engage in a strategic dialogue with the PRC, even as we referred to individual issues.

I should add that at this time Liu Haoqui was Tony Lake's equivalent within the Chinese hierarchy as National Security Adviser, although not as powerful, reporting directly to
Lee Peng [PRC Prime Minister]. He was also Vice Foreign Minister. He had been an America hand for some time, including when I was in Beijing as Ambassador. Anyway, Liu was coming to visit the PRC Embassy in Washington in March, 1996, to talk to all of the PRC Consuls General and the PRC Ambassador. This was a sort of "Chiefs of Mission meeting," whatever they called it. So, with close coordination between the State Department and the White House, we requested that Liu spend some time, not only with the usual suspects in the State and Defense Departments but also with the National Security Adviser. We arranged a day-long retreat and to have a strategic dialogue with him.

This was done with Christopher's agreement with the understanding that I would sit in on all the Lake-Liu talks. The PRC Government clearly appreciated that there was full coordination within the U.S. Government, with Secretary Christopher keeping up his vigorous efforts with the PRC Foreign Minister, which he did, throughout this period.

Lo and behold, on the day Liu arrived in Washington, Friday, March 7, 1996, the PRC fired missiles that landed on either side of Taiwan. One missile landed off one port in Taiwan and two others, I believe, landed off a second port. This incident greatly escalated the tension in the Taiwan Straits. As I previously mentioned, the PRC had already held military exercises in the area, and tensions were building up. That was the other development which was already making things look pretty grim in early 1996.

So that particular time - March 1996 - was clearly the low point in U.S.-China relations during the first Clinton term. All of these factors came together, with the missile crisis being the latest and the most dramatic.

As we looked toward the Liu visit, we had decided not to change our policy toward the PRC, but to implement it much more aggressively in terms of a strategic dialogue, looking ahead at all of these minefields and the continuing problems we were having. We were engaged in mapping out what we would do on each of these issues. But also we tried to think of ways that we could do things the PRC might find positive, in addition to pressing them on things that they would find difficult. So a lot of discussions on strategy went on, as I say, between the State Department and the White House. Secretary Christopher chaired most of the key sessions, unlike what is stated in this "Washington Post" article, which emphasized the role of the White House.

**Q: You might mention why we are mentioning the "Washington Post."**

**LORD:** Well, as we speak here in late June, 1998, there has been a two-part series of articles in the "Washington Post" which essentially could have been written by Tony Lake and his new partner, Rothkop, who used to work in the Department of Commerce. These articles essentially said that U.S. China policy during the Clinton administration was screwed up by the State Department until Tony Lake rescued it. That's what I'm referring to.

I will give Lake his due, as we go ahead, you can be certain. It's just that this is a one-
sided view. I'm not saying that Lake wrote these articles. I'm just saying that these articles contain a lot of spinning, in the sense that they are a very partial view, if you look at them from the historical perspective. The facts are that both Lake (with me by his side) and Christopher worked on improving our relations with China in 1996. There was total coordination in our government. It was natural, and healthy for the National Security Advisor to get more involved (until then, it was mostly his deputy, Berger), but this was done in close concert with Christopher and me. Together we did a very skillful job on China in 1996 and by the end of the year relations were much more positive.

We had arranged for Liu's visit to begin on a Friday night with an informal dinner at the State Department, hosted by Secretary of State Christopher. This was to make clear, as Liu went off the next day for a full day's meeting with Tony Lake and me, that the State Department was still heavily involved in U.S. foreign policy. So as part of a united front, Lake was going to come over to the Department, and they were going to have a joint dinner with Liu.

When we got word of the PRC missile firings, we decided to add Secretary of Defense Perry to the discussions we were going to have with Liu. I don't believe that we included the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Shalikashvili. So the dinner included Secretary of State Christopher; Secretary of Defense Perry; Tony Lake, National Security Adviser; myself; and Jeff Bader, the PRC Country Director, who was note taker. I can't remember whether Sandy Berger was there. It was a small dinner, with about six or seven of us on the U.S. side. We decided to do a full court press, of course, on the PRC missile firings. This was now required before opening up a strategic dialogue on the next day. This had now been overtaken by the PRC missile firings, which we had to address first. We weren't going to cancel the Liu visit. However, we had to carry out our policy of having a strategic dialogue against the backdrop of firmness in view of this Chinese provocation.

It was agreed that first Secretary of Defense Perry, then Secretary of State Christopher, and then National Security Adviser Lake would speak, although I am not entirely certain of the order in which they spoke. I know that Secretary Perry went first. Each of the three speakers was to deliver a tough message over dinner. We worked closely together on this. In effect, Perry, and this has been covered in the article in the "Washington Post," said that what Beijing had done could result in grave consequences. This was a pretty heavily loaded term. He said that this could lead to a possible conflict with the United States. He likened what the PRC had done, firing missiles North and South of Taiwan, as a kind of bracketing artillery fire, where you fire to one side and then to the other side so that you can zoom in on the actual target. He used that image, which was strong language. And Christopher and Lake also used strong language.

Our clear impression was that Liu was totally surprised by the timing of the missile firings, if not the missile firings themselves. I’m sure he was not pleased that this was the way that he was starting his visit to Washington. Liu, of course, was firm. He is always firm. He can be jovial at times. He was personally very friendly to me and my wife on many occasions when we were in China, so I have personal respect for him. However, he
can be very feisty in his discussions in defending Chinese interests and attacking the U.S. So he was tough. However, I felt that, by Chinese standards, he was on the defensive, and his decibel level was under control. He clearly felt awkward about this situation, although he didn't say that, of course.

So we basically spent the whole dinner on this one subject. We made some references to the view that we hoped to move ahead with our relationship. We noted that Liu would be meeting with Tony Lake throughout all of the following day. However, we indicated that we thought that this was a hell of a way to start important discussions.

On the next day there was a lot of snow on the ground, and it was cold. We drove down to Pamela Harriman's estate in Virginia. It is called "Pelican Estate" and it is secluded. I forget the exact town it is near. There were four of us on our side, including Tony Lake, Bob Suettinger of the NSC staff, Jeff Bader, and myself. We had worked closely with Tony Lake in setting this up. We worked very well together. Tony Lake did an extremely good job and deserves a lot of credit. He helped a lot. He had not played that much of a role on China policy, as Sandy Berger had. Now he was getting more involved on some of these Asian issues, generally and specifically on China. It's true that Lake had been advised by some outsiders that the White House should get more involved, including Tony Lake personally, as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger had formerly played key roles on China issues. Lake should have been doing the same thing here. In years gone by Kissinger and Haig had urged the importance of our having a strategic dialogue with China, and the importance of having the White House involved in it.

So we carefully scripted how we would approach the meeting with Liu. We sat in a comfortable living room. There were four people on the Chinese side, plus one interpreter. We sat around a fireplace and then went into the dining room for a working luncheon. Following this, we came back to the living room and sat around the fireplace. The discussion lasted roughly from 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM, including lunch. Our strategy was the classical one to follow at a time like this. First, we had to repeat the warnings and the grave concerns expressed at dinner on the night before, regarding the Chinese missile firings at Taiwan. We began with that.

Tony Lake also made references to words that we heard from Charles Freeman about a potential Chinese threat against us (Los Angeles specifically), if we had a nuclear confrontation. We said that we didn't know how authoritative these words were, but we didn't like what we were hearing. So there was some tough talk at the beginning, reiterating the points made the night before.

We then went over to what was supposed to be a more constructive discussion. We decided to do that in three parts. They were carefully scripted but were also projected to the Chinese in advance. The first part of the presentation was more conceptual, philosophical, and strategic, describing two great powers heading into the next century, that is, how we could work together, why that is important, and how we see China. We said that we want to see China as a strong, stable, prosperous, and open society. We weren't out to contain China, divide it, or subvert it. We thought that it was in our interest
for China to have these attributes. We would not oppose China in developing such a society and, indeed, would work with it. However, we said that we were also hard-headed and would defend our interests. We would maintain our force levels and our alliances. We would be firm in negotiating. We had interests and would stand up for our values. This was a philosophical discussion of our approach and why it was important to have a strategic dialogue with China. We sketched out some areas where we could work more effectively together and give some content to this approach.

Some of the areas involved ranged from Korea to Cambodia, regional security dialogues, APEC, economic questions, Chinese admission to the WTO [World Trade Organization], and environmental questions, crime and narcotics. All of these things have become more familiar today. We laid most of those out on this occasion, as I recall.

So we started with this conceptual, philosophical, and strategic framework of a rather positive nature, after the initial pounding about Chinese missile firings in the vicinity of Taiwan.

Then in the second part of the day we took on the tough issues. We didn't want to start with the negative side. We wanted to set out a strategic, positive framework within which to take up these tough issues. We also didn't want to end up with negative issues but rather on a positive note. So we put the tough issues in the middle. We covered human rights, trade, nuclear non-proliferation, Taiwan, and so on.

Then we ended up in part three by indicating where we could go on some of the issues which we had sketched in the agenda earlier in the presentation. We outlined some suggestions on how we could make progress on troublesome issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, and some other matters, as well as reference back to regional security, economics, and some of the other positive aspects. We also proposed the intensification of exchanges between the two countries at various levels, and, I believe, some foreshadowing, without locking ourselves into it, of a possible summit meeting. We indicated that our Presidents had met on occasion and we suggested that this might be a good idea.

Q: President Clinton had not yet made a state visit to China.

LORD: No. He hadn't made a visit to China of any kind. The last visit had been made by President Bush in 1989.

That, basically, was the approach we made to the Chinese. Tony Lake handled himself very well. There was a firm discussion, particularly in the middle part of the agenda. However, it was clearly constructive, and, obviously, the Chinese liked the fact that this was a discussion at the strategic level of two great powers. Lake and Liu livened the discussion with some humor at times, and so on. On the whole, it was the most extensive discussion and the most strategic that we had with the Chinese during the first Clinton term.
It was the best such discussion that we had had because previous meetings, whoever was conducting them for the U.S., lasted for only an hour here or two hours there. We never had more than a two or two and a half hour meeting. For this meeting we purposely got out of our Washington offices and from within range of telephones. We knew that we had seven hours to discuss these matters. It was an important step, particularly since we had reached the nadir of our relationship at that point. I believe that this meeting helped set the stage for an improvement in our relations thereafter. It was a turning point. I'll get into more detail on that.

We still have to comment on what the Chinese were up to at this point. Do you want me to answer any questions about this meeting, which was held, I believe, near Middleburg, Virginia?

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Could you say something about what the Chinese raised with you when you asked them for this meeting? How serious were the discussions which Chas. Freeman had with General Xiong?

LORD: It depends on whom you were talking to. Chas. Freeman likes to think that these discussions were of fundamental importance. I think that that's baloney. It was vague, at least the way we heard it at the time. It seems to have gotten more precise since then.

But I think that we all felt that there was enough there that we had to respond and take note of it. We didn't want to inflate its importance. Obviously, it wasn't coming...

Q: What was supposed to be coming out of this?

LORD: Basically the Chinese were alleged to have said more or less as follows. They said: "Look, we're not worried if we get into some tension and potential conflict with the United States. By the way, we have nuclear weapons, too. In the event of a real confrontation we don't think that the Americans are going to give up Los Angeles in exchange for Taiwan."

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: They basically said that in the 1950s and 1960s it was possible for the United States to eliminate China with nuclear weapons. However, times have changed, and the United States would not be willing to sacrifice Los Angeles for Taiwan.

LORD: So this was unpleasant, but it wasn't so authoritative that we wanted to give this comment the dignity of an official, Chinese position. We also wanted to let them know that we had noticed the comment. I wonder whether this exchange was quite as important as Freeman suggested. Nevertheless, he felt that he had the obligation to report it, and it was of potential significance. So we addressed that matter head on at the Saturday session as well, but not at great length. Does that answer your question?

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Yes.
LORD: On the very next day we met in Secretary of Defense Perry's office on the Taiwan missile crisis. This was Saturday, March 8. We were, of course, very concerned about Chinese actions. We felt that, obviously, China was seeking to intimidate Taiwan and influence the Presidential election there. There still was residual fallout not only from the visit of President Lee Teng-hui to the U.S., but from Taiwanese diplomacy, which was trying to get more international profile. Taiwan was trying to get into the UN, in response to growing independence sentiment in Taiwan. Beijing, in its heavy-handed way, was trying to prevent this.

This shows how little the PRC leaders understood about democracy. All they did was to increase Lee's margin of victory in the Taiwan presidential elections and make many people on Taiwan very angry. The Chinese also scared countries in East Asia. On the other hand, in effect the PRC sent a message to Taiwan that, although they can't attack Taiwan in an amphibious way, they could lob in a few missiles. They could affect the Taiwan stock market, investment, and so forth. So the PRC didn't lose totally on this. I'm sure that the PRC rationalized it in their own mind that their tough muscling around had some positive impact.

In any event, we met in Secretary Perry's office on Saturday morning, March 8. I remember that I went over to the Georgetown section of Washington and joined Secretary Christopher at his home and then rode over with him to the Pentagon for this meeting. The Americans present were Perry, Christopher, and myself - I was the only sub-cabinet official there - John Deutch, the Director of Central Intelligence, was there, as was JCS Chairman General Shalikashvili, and either Tony Lake or Sandy Berger from the National Security Council staff. Probably Lake, but maybe both of them were there. I just can't remember.

Perry's office had charts on display for the meeting. Perry had Gen Shali do the presentation. Basically, there was no debate. The question was what, if anything, we could do to deter Chinese use of force. Neither we nor Taiwan had any intelligence that the PRC was going to use force at that time against Taiwan, beyond firing a few missiles and using intimidation. We had no evidence that the PRC was going to hit an uninhabited island with a missile or harass shipping. Certainly, the PRC was not going to attack Taiwan if they didn't even have the capability to attack one of the offshore islands. As far as we knew, none of this was within the PRC range of capabilities. Our best judgment was that the PRC wanted to engage in psychological and political warfare to intimidate Taiwan and send a signal about the sensitivity of this issue, from the PRC point of view. Taiwan intelligence agreed with that view.

Having said that, it was agreed that there was a five or ten percent chance that we were wrong. The PRC might take aggressive action at the lower level, namely, for example, seize an uninhabited offshore island or lob a missile at some uninhabited territory. The PRC might possibly go after one of the larger, offshore islands, although we believed that they couldn't take even one of the offshore islands without bloody fighting, and they would have to prepare to do that well in advance. We knew that the PRC wouldn't attack Taiwan itself, because they couldn't do so. Furthermore, that would be incredibly
provocative.

There was a danger that our intelligence was wrong and that the PRC might just do something of a modest nature which would still be very humiliating and which would make it very difficult for us to decide what to do in response. Or, through miscalculation, the PRC might stumble into action. Either a missile misfire could hit a populated center, or harassment of shipping could result in a collision or some incident in the air. Or something could happen just inadvertently. There was unanimous agreement, and Secretary Perry stressed this point, "an ounce of prevention is worth an awful lot of cure." Our choices after the Chinese had done something would be much more difficult, even after an accident, however modest it was, than if we deterred them from the beginning. So the feeling was that we had to have a demonstration, beyond the rhetoric that we had been applying, both privately, through diplomatic channels, and publicly, when we strongly criticized what the Chinese were up to.

We had to show the Chinese that we were serious. Furthermore, we wanted to show our allies and friends in the East Asian region that we were reliable partners. We wanted to remind Beijing that we were number one in terms of military power. We also, of course, wanted to reassure Taiwan about its security concerns. We wanted to show Beijing that provocation doesn't pay and is dangerous. And, of course, we were concerned about our domestic front in Congress, whose views we shared completely. Many members of Congress were concerned about Taiwan and were angry about what Beijing was up to. For all of these reasons there was a unanimous view in this group which met in Secretary Perry's office that we needed to do something significant.

We had the usual aircraft carrier deployed in the region. I think that the USS INDEPENDENCE had been undergoing repairs and overhaul in Yokohama. I guess that by the time of this meeting it had already sailed, with its accompanying battle group. We made sure that it moved close to the region of the Taiwan Straits. This key decision, by itself, would get some attention from Beijing, in the sense that this was a carrier deployed in the Pacific. When we moved it closer to Taiwan, this was significant but it was not particularly dramatic. We didn't want to take any half measures. So we purposely decided, again without anybody disagreeing, to deploy another aircraft carrier, along with its accompanying escorts, to the area, which would really make our point. This would marshal the biggest fighting force in the Western Pacific for a long time.

We had to get this second carrier, which I think was the USS ENTERPRISE, from the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf, so this carrier had to be replaced from somewhere else. Of course, it took some time for it to get to the vicinity of Taiwan. The very fact that we were deploying a second carrier would - did - get everyone's attention. So it was agreed, and Sandy Berger or Tony Lake, whoever was there, and I guess it was Lake, said that he would take this matter back for presidential approval, which he got by that night. We agreed that we wanted the word of this redeployment of the second carrier to get out quickly. We didn't want to be overly high profile, but it was important for the word to get out rather quickly to have an impact on Beijing and U.S. domestic audiences. After all, the information about the PRC missile firings had spread quickly and was causing a great
Secretary Christopher was due to be on the TV program, "Meet the Press," which was one of the Sunday talk shows on March 9. We decided at the State Department to have Secretary Christopher handle the announcement during this program. I don't know whether we checked with anyone else on this, but it had been agreed by everyone who had been at the meeting in Perry’s office that we would get the word out. Christopher had taken enough of a beating on China policy and deserved better than the treatment he had received. So, it was appropriate for him to take the public lead on this key move. So he got the word out. I forget the exact phrasing he used on "Meet the Press."

We were working on this matter on both sides of the Straits. With Beijing, of course, the most dramatic signal was the deployment of these aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits. Both publicly and privately in our rhetoric, we were telling Beijing not to use force and get into a conflict with grave consequences and so forth. At the same time we were providing them both for real as well as for face reasons, evidence that we were not changing our policy toward Taiwan. Our policy was still a One China policy. We assured Beijing of continuity. We also told Beijing that we were telling Taiwan that they shouldn't be overly provocative in their diplomacy. So we sent a double barreled message to Beijing, that is, aircraft carriers, “tough rhetoric,” and “don't use force” coupled with assurance that we were sticking with our China policy. We were disturbed with what Beijing had done but we weren't going to change our policy on One China. We were urging Taiwan to cool it. We were encouraging Beijing and Taiwan to have direct talks across the Taiwan Straits. We did not put the carriers in the Strait itself but kept them nearby.

With Taiwan, of course, the deployment of the carriers was reassuring and a great boost to morale. It made the point. We also filled this in with appropriate rhetoric. We told them that we found what Beijing was doing was unacceptable. However, we told Taiwan that we didn't like Taiwan's being overly provocative in its diplomacy, because this might drag the U.S. into a conflict. We said that we didn't think that this would serve Taiwan's interest because tensions in the Taiwan Straits don't serve Taiwan's security or the economy of Taiwan. Recalling President Lee’s speech at Cornell University and Taiwan's direct dealings with the U.S. Congress, we were not going to let them outflank us. As for Taiwan's international diplomacy, the U.S. would support Taiwan's efforts to get into international organizations which do not require statehood for entry. In fact, I don't recall whether we tried to discourage Taiwan from its campaign to get into the UN but we did say that we didn't want Taiwan to act in a provocative way. We told Taiwan that they could see that we continued to ensure its security, and they could see what we were doing with the deployment of the aircraft carriers to the Western Pacific. In return, Taiwan owed us some restraint.

Specifically, we had Peter Tarnoff, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and Sandy Berger, Deputy National Security Adviser, meet secretly at a hotel in New York with Ding Moushi, who had been the Taiwan representative in Washington during the early part of the Clinton administration. He was now a direct adviser to the Taiwan
Government on national security affairs, although not the national security adviser to President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan. We knew that he had a direct pipeline to President Lee and was also an able guy, unlike Benjamin Lu, then representative at the time in Washington. We didn't even tell Benjamin Lu that this meeting was taking place at a hotel in New York. So they met up in New York. I didn't go. My country director, Bodey, went. Tarnoff represented State. He and Berger delivered both the reassurances to Taiwan and the point that they not be provocative at the same time.

I happen to think that this combination of rhetoric and diplomacy with Beijing and Taipei was one of our finer moments. This deployment of carriers to the Taiwan Straits helped to cool things down. From then on our relationship with Beijing started to improve. As I've already indicated, Beijing probably saw that the missile firings had backfired. They had caused apprehensions in Asia and caused a conflict with us in which Beijing had to stand down and stop firing missiles. So their firing of these missiles hadn't been a ringing success. On the other hand, President Jiang Zemin, of the PRC, had now protected his flank on Taiwan, after looking awkward because of the visit to the U.S. by President Li Teng-hui of Taiwan. Jiang Zemin was still consolidating his position. The PRC showed that it could cause jitters of an economic, if not security, nature, with regard to Taiwan. But on the whole, we figured that the missile firings toward Taiwan was not one of the PRC's wisest decisions.

Meanwhile, we got lots of credit in Asia. Taiwan, of course, warmly welcomed our show of support. The Asian reactions were very supportive but as usual quiet. I think that the Australians came up with a public statement. Many Asian governments patted us on the back and were very happy, although not many said so publicly. This was the usual game that they played with Beijing. We know that we did ourselves an awful lot of good throughout Asia, without exception, because the East Asian countries were concerned about this episode, about China creating mischief in 1994 in the South China Sea, and China's buildup of its military. Even though nobody wanted a confrontation with China, and rather wanted engagement, the East Asian countries were concerned about Chinese power. That was one of the reasons, along with keeping Japan under control, that these countries welcomed the U.S. military presence in East Asia. So they welcomed our checking China. These actions were also applauded in Congress and in the U.S. press. We got a lot of credit, in contrast to our previously having taken a beating on China policy on some occasions. It was kind of refreshing to have all of these kudos. I think that we deserved them and that we handled this situation quite well. To this day, even critics of the China policy during Clinton's presidency all applaud our handling of the 1996 missile crisis.

We then worked on all of these other elements of the Chinese-American relationship. There were major negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation. We got the Chinese to agree by May, 1996, not to ship any nuclear materials to non-safeguarded facilities in Pakistan. With this and other Chinese steps, we were able to lift the sanctions previously imposed, and so we made progress on nuclear non-proliferation.

On intellectual property rights we threatened China with the largest sanctions in the history of trade negotiations in order to get their compliance. These sanctions would have
affected about $3.0 billion worth of Chinese exports. We got close to publishing the list, but our leverage worked. As a result of tough negotiations, we got a very good agreement, including arrangements for enforcement by the Chinese, which our industry strongly supported. So we got that issue out of the way.

We were stepping up our dialogue on other issues. We had continual meetings at my level in Washington and, of course, in regional security talks in July, 1996. Also, Tony Lake went to Beijing in July, 1996. I went with him once again. We continued the strategic dialogue with the PRC, in this case in Beijing. It was held in the Dai Yutai guest house, which is in a compound away from the office buildings of the PRC Government. It wasn't as distant from the center of the PRC Government as Pamela Harriman's estate in Middleburg, Virginia, had been for the talks with Liu. We had similar meetings with PRC officials on the strategic dialogue regarding where we wanted to go strategically in the future in handling ongoing, tough issues, as well as expanding our positive agenda.

We were now talking about reciprocal summit meetings. We got pretty concrete during that visit. We had come up with this idea earlier as well, but not in as concrete terms. In addition to Tony Lake carrying on this dialogue, I participated in it, and we found it very helpful. Secretary Christopher was also working very hard through messages to the Chinese foreign minister and through his meetings to get the Chinese-American relationship back on track. Christopher made several statements and speeches, although we never got one from President Clinton. We had begun to solve some of the contentious issues. The extension of MFN was resolved without difficulty. We made modest progress on trade, nuclear non-proliferation, and even human rights. None of this was dramatic. The Taiwan issue was defused, and we began to expand our agenda.

In short, by the time Secretary Christopher went to China in November, 1996, we had developed considerable momentum. Already in the air was the possibility of a summit meeting. We went to China just before going to Manila, where the annual summit meeting of APEC was taking place, and President Clinton would meet PRC President Jiang Zemin. This was a happy note to close off Clinton's first, four-year term, in contrast to Christopher's earlier Beijing visit. There were very warm and friendly discussions with PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. It was agreed that the two Presidents would announce mutual summit meetings when they got to Manila a few days later. We made some progress on other substantive issues.

Christopher gave a major speech on bilateral relations in Shanghai. With my encouragement, he deleted references to “partnership” with China as being overly optimistic. We had a banner with this phrase at the speech site changed. Christopher and I didn’t want a misleading label that would make us look naive in our relations with China. But in the second term, after we had both left, the Clinton Administration unwisely used the even worse phrase “strategic partnership.”

We went from China to Manila where the two presidents jointly announced the two summit meetings.
So we concluded the first Clinton term in a lot better shape than we had been at any time during those four years [1993-1997]. Specifically, we had come a great distance from March, 1996. Now I'll answer your questions.

I would agree that we could have done some things better before 1996. On the other hand, I think that any fair-minded critic would say that from March, 1996, the nadir of the Chinese-American relationship, we did an excellent job. This continued till the end of the first Clinton term where U.S.-China relations were in their best shape of the four years. I think that we handled ourselves very well with an appropriate mixture of firmness, expanding the dialogue, and highlighting a positive agenda. We finally were getting more public statements about our policy toward the PRC, but still not out of the White House.

So this was one of the reasons that I felt comfortable about leaving at the end of the first Clinton term. I thought that our policy toward Asia was generally in good shape. We had strengthened our alliance with Japan, reduced tensions in Korea, normalized relations with Vietnam and moved ahead with APEC and ARF, and made progress elsewhere. I felt that our China relationship was on track and heading for summit meetings. We had gotten out of this difficult period and were headed on a generally positive but still inevitably mixed course. Given my long relationship with the China issue, I wanted to feel that way before I left government service.

_Q: We're probably reaching our endurance levels here, but, just for a minute, let's talk about when we were in the trough of our relations with China. At that time, did anyone say that we ought to play or threaten to play, the Taiwan card? I mean that if the PRC was going to be beastly on human rights or something like that, we might do something like invite President Li Teng-hui to come to the U.S. for an informal lunch at the White House, or something like that._

LORD: That's a good question and a fair one. The answer is: "No." I don't recall anyone ever suggesting that. I myself would have been against such a course. I could get impatient with the PRC and would argue about how firm we should be with them. I believe in using leverage and pressure at times. However, you have to take into account the best mix with the Chinese and face and the effects, as opposed to posturing.

On Taiwan I always felt that we shouldn't touch that. It was too sensitive. I didn't think that we should be any less faithful to Taiwan but I also didn't think that we should be provocative to Beijing. I don't recall anyone ever suggesting that we should stick it to the Chinese by fooling around with our Taiwan policy. So this just didn't happen.

In the inevitable debates over individual arms sales to Taiwan some people in the Pentagon and in the Department of Commerce may sometimes have wanted to be somewhat more ambitious, although I'm not even sure about that. The Pentagon would not necessarily always be for arms sales to Taiwan. These were individual decisions, and reasonable people could disagree on Taiwan defense needs, whether offensive or defensive. I was always supportive of a solid arms sales policy to support Taiwan.
As for diplomacy, no, no one ever said that the PRC leaders were being tough and therefore let's give President Lee Teng-hui a state dinner at the White House, and so on. This kind of possible action was never proposed at my level, or any other level.

*Q:* Regarding the missile crisis caused by the PRC firing missiles near Taiwan, there had been an even more dangerous crisis during the Cold War. We deployed Patriot missile batteries in Israel. The Patriot missiles were designed to shoot down just the type of missiles that the PRC had. Did we consider doing anything of that nature?

**LORD:** We had already provided Patriot missile equipment to Taiwan. It was called MAD. This did not mean "Mutual Assured Destruction" but something else called, "Modified Air Defense." I don't remember that we rushed this equipment to them during the middle of the Taiwan Straits crisis. Maybe we provided it to them afterwards.

*Q* [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: We had promised to provide Patriot missiles to the Chinese Nationalists at some time before the Dole-Clinton election campaign of 1996. I know that Senator Dole spoke about providing Theater Missile Defense to Taiwan, while Clinton said that we were going to speed up the delivery of Patriot missiles to Taiwan.

*Q:* [Charles Stuart Kennedy] This was during the 1996 election campaign.

*Q:* [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker] This was after the Taiwan Straits missile firings began, so I'm not sure what was actually in place in Taiwan. I have a few other questions. What was your assessment of Lee?

**LORD:** I'm basically positive about him. I am less positive than I used to be. He jerked us around on the question of his 1995 trip and speech and the way he was playing with Congress directly instead of the Administration. So that behavior has modestly altered my view of him. However, in terms of the big picture, I think that he deserves great credit. He will be recognized as the man who consolidated and really brought democracy to the presidential level in Taiwan, while maintaining its great economic performance. So, on those grounds alone, I think that he deserves a great deal of credit. His state to state formulation of relations with China in the late 1990s was unduly provocative, however.

Let me make this clear. I can understand his frustrations, and Taiwan's frustrations, about not getting any more international space. We have encouraged the PRC, and we should continue to do so, to let Taiwan participate in some of these international organizations, making clear that this doesn't represent recognition of Taiwan's statehood. It's not a threat to Beijing or to the one China policy. The PRC has let Taiwan participate in APEC and in the WTO. Why not some of the other organizations? Taiwan should be a member of the organizations that don’t require statehood and an observer in those that do.

I understand Taiwan's frustrations. It has turned in a great economic performance, is one of the world's largest markets, despite its relatively small size, and has gold and foreign
exchange reserves which are among the largest in the world. It is a flourishing
democracy, has generally acted in a responsible way, and has a population of 23 million
people. I understand its concern that it doesn't have more international profile, even if it
preserves the one China principle. However, having said that and against that backdrop,
Taiwan, in fact, Lee bypassed the American administration and dealt directly with
Congress. It would be a correct description to say that Taiwan did this, in addition to
Lee’s double crossing us in connection with his speech at Cornell University.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Our policy toward Taiwan has basically been one of
strategic ambiguity in terms of what we would do in this situation. First of all, how much
discussion has there been of changing that policy? Secondly, do you think that President
Lee Teng-hui made an assumption that Taiwan would have American support, regardless
of what happened?

LORD: A good question. Of course, we didn't want Taiwan to think that they had a blank
check from us That was why we were telling Taiwan not to be provocative just because
we were deploying the two carriers to the Taiwan Straits. After all, it was Beijing which
provoked that crisis. Nevertheless, it was not in Taiwan's or our interest to have a conflict
or tensions in the Taiwan Straits. Just because the U.S. had a commitment to the security
of Taiwan, it should not think it could abuse that commitment by getting us all into a
scrape which we all would be well advised to avoid.

During the 1996 missile crisis, there was some discussion of the question of strategic
ambiguity within the Administration, but I don't recall that there was any view that we
should be more precise. During this time I testified a lot before Congressional committees
and gave a lot of interviews to the press. I got a lot of questions about why we were not
more precise in our response to the PRC challenges, i.e., why we maintained strategic
ambiguity. In answer to these questions I used one or another of the following themes.

First of all, the Taiwan Relations Act itself states that any administration has to consult
the Congress before taking any specific actions. So I said to Congressmen opposing
ambiguity that it was rather ironic that they seemed to want the administration to get out
in front of them, whereas the Taiwan Relations Act states that there should be
consultations with Congress before action is taken. Secondly, there is a provision in the
Taiwan Relations Act, and I don't have the verbatim language of the act here before me,
that the administration is obliged to come to the Congress when the situation has
developed to the point that the threat to security is so serious that we should consult with
Congress on what to do. We've never reached that point. Even in the crisis which arose
over the PRC missile firings in the general direction of Taiwan, we didn't invoke that part
of the Act. Thirdly, it is prudent generally that you don't state in advance what you will
do in specific situations. Fourthly, and most fundamentally, if we get away from
ambiguity and go in either direction, we're in trouble. If the PRC thinks that we won't
come to the defense of Taiwan in a crunch, it’s going to be aggressive and will press
Taiwan. In that case we're likely to run into a difficult situation and possibly a conflict.
On the other hand, if Taiwan thinks that we're going to come to its defense, no matter
what happens, it’s going to be provocative, knowing that it’s going to have a free ride no

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matter how angry Beijing gets.

Therefore, we can't be precise about what our response would be in a crisis. Having said that, we've got to use the right kind of adjectives and send aircraft carriers at the right moments to make clear that it's dangerous for Beijing to think that it can act aggressively. However, as we did it, we reassured Beijing that we're not changing our policy. Meanwhile, we made it clear to Taiwan that it doesn't have a blank check.

So there wasn't much debate within the administration on this crisis. Most people saw that rationale. I don't recall people arguing that we should be more precise. Frankly, I didn't feel too much pressure from Capitol Hill. I think that the merits of the case were pretty persuasive. A few Congressmen argued that we should be very precise and tell Beijing exactly what we were going to do.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Yes. Subsequently, I think that both Secretary of Defense Perry, and particularly Joe Nye, have said publicly that we ought to be more precise. Would you say that this is a point which may have evolved in their thinking since the missile crisis in the Taiwan Straits and which they didn't express at the time?

LORD: That's correct. I'm not even sure that Joe Nye was in the administration at the time of the crisis over PRC missile firings at targets near Taiwan. I think that he may have left the administration by then.

Now, to complete the coverage of China during the Clinton Administration, I went on a trip with Secretary of Defense Perry and Senators Nunn and Warner [Democrat, Georgia, and Republican, Virginia, respectively], which modestly advanced the military relationship with the PRC. I don't remember the date. I also went on a trip with John Deutch [then Director of CIA], which was black hat but not totally secret. We were prepared to confirm the trip, which, indeed, was part of a longer Asian trip. It leaked out, when he was in South Korea, that he had already been to China. I was with him on that trip. This was very unusual - for the CIA Director to take an Assistant Secretary of State with him. But Deutch had a high opinion of me and wanted my counsel on China. We got along very well. He was not particularly pleased with the Chinese response to intelligence sharing and other issues. He generally wasn't too enthusiastic about the Chinese. I wanted to cover those two trips which I went on, in addition to meetings I had with the President.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Could you say anything about why Jim Sasser was chosen to be Ambassador to the PRC? How did that happen?

LORD: First, Ambassador Stape Roy had been terrific, but he was due to leave China and go to Indonesia. We needed a top grade replacement for him in Beijing. Of course, ideally we would want somebody who had had a lot of experience on China and would have the kind of background that Stape Roy and I had. On the other hand, we also needed someone of stature. We were at the point where we were trying to improve our relations with the PRC. We had former Vice President Mondale in Japan, so we wanted somebody who had some stature in Beijing.
We have some terrific people, career people on China in the Foreign Service. But in terms of timing, we've gotten beyond Stape Roy, Art Hummel, Winston Lord, and that generation, and the other ones coming up haven't quite made it to the point where they could yet be Ambassadors to the PRC. Even if these other, capable people could handle the post of Ambassador to the PRC, they don't yet quite have the reputation to do so in terms of their resume. So in the career service we weren't quite at the point where we had a natural choice, though Charles Freeman thought that he was a natural choice to be Ambassador to China. Chas was very disappointed. He had hoped that he would get this assignment. There were some people in the administration who thought that he was overly sympathetic to Beijing. You could have made the case for appointing Freeman as Ambassador to the PRC, since he had been Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, he had the best resume, the most expertise, and was the best Chinese language speaker in the Foreign Service. But there were doubts whether he would be objective enough, whether he would suffer from clientitis.

Briefly, there was no other career candidate. You would have to talk about how well he got along with people in the Pentagon. I don't know anything about that. I would think that they would have checked him with the White House. As I say, some people felt that he wouldn't be tough enough on the Chinese. I never got the impression that Freeman was almost going to be chosen. I believe that in the White House there was a feeling that there was a need for a political Ambassador, one with status and political ties.

Jim Sasser had been senior Democratic Senator from Tennessee. I think that he probably would have been Democratic leader in the Senate if he had been reelected to the Senate in 1996 and if the Democrats hadn't lost their majority in the Senate. In any case, he was one of the leaders of the Democratic Party. He was very close to Vice President Al Gore. He was defeated for reelection to the Senate in 1996 and was looking for a job. So I believe that the initiative for Jim Sasser's appointment as Ambassador to China came from Vice President Gore. President Clinton also thought highly of him. So that's how it came to be.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I've forgotten exactly when the U.S.-Japan guidelines were finalized, but clearly they were being discussed while you were still in the State Department.

LORD: Oh, absolutely. We'll get into that in some other session, but I worked very closely with Joe Nye to insulate the U.S.-Japan security relationship and our overall ties from the trade disputes that we had with Japan. Bill Perry [then Secretary of Defense] took the lead on defense guidelines, and Secretary Christopher, my deputy, Tom Hubbard, and I worked with him and his people, especially Kurt Campbell. These guidelines came out around the time of the President's trip to Japan, which was in the spring of 1996.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Yes.

LORD: It was a very successful trip. It had been postponed from November, 1995,
because President Clinton said that he had to stay home because the budget had not yet been passed. He couldn't go to the APEC meeting in Japan. He was scheduled to make a state visit to Japan, as well as attend the APEC meeting.

We were determined to strengthen our relations with Japan, which is, of course, an important partner in Asia. We had had these trade disputes with Japan. I want to get into this in more detail in another session. We also felt that with the end of the Cold War and the passage of 15 or 20 years it was time to update the guidelines on U.S. policy toward Japan. China had started complaining and had become suspicious. This feeling seemed to have been directed at Taiwan. It appears that the initial, Presidential visit and the Defense guidelines document, also reaffirming the Japan-U.S. alliance generally, which would have taken place in November, 1995, would have been strong, in any event. Then the Taiwan missile crisis, which relates to your question, I'm sure, intervened between the original date for the Presidential visit to Japan and when the visit actually took place, in April, 1996.

Some people have said that the Japan guidelines document was strengthened because of the Taiwan missile crisis. The answer to this is, "Yes." Japan again began to become worried about an aggressive China. However, I want to make the point that this Japan guidelines was going to be a very strong statement of principles. I can't remember the exact time when we finalized the revision of the Japan Defense guidelines document, because this was an ongoing process. It was clear that the revision of the Japan Defense guidelines document was given greater impetus by the Taiwan missile crisis. It was kept ambiguous whether the guidelines document applied to Taiwan. Neither we nor the Japanese have either confirmed or denied it. We were not about to deny that it applied, because it might well apply. However, it was provocative to Beijing to say that it does apply because it considers Taiwan part of the territory of China. The phrasing of "situations surrounding Taiwan..."

_Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Situations and areas surrounding..._

_LORD: “Surrounding Japan,” so it doesn't mention Taiwan. So we and Japan effectively stonewalled the Chinese on what the guidelines document really means. We wanted the Chinese to understand that it might well mean Taiwan. However, we didn't say that it did, because that would be provocative.

_Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: In your experience has it been difficult to get Japan to talk about China? Have there been continuing consultations between the Japanese and American Governments on China problems?_

_LORD: There have been no difficulties at all. I went out of my way on this subject myself, because of my own, personal experience in the 1970s, the Nixon Shoku, and so forth. I thought that it was crucial to stay in close touch with Japan. I'll talk about Japan in another session. I went to Japan more than to any other country by far. On almost every Asian trip I would drop in on Japan, either at the beginning or the end. We regularly had regional security dialogues, which I promoted and which we worked on at
my level, in getting ready for the ministerial meetings. In May I would usually make a trip around Asia. We would meet with Japan at the beginning and coordinate our strategy. We would maintain a constant dialogue on China policy and make sure that there were no surprises in this regard.

The only rift between us was on human rights. Japan just wouldn't put any pressure on China. Partly this was natural policy because Japanese commercial instincts always overrode everything. It was also partly because of their guilt feelings about World War II and the "Rape of Nanjing." The Japanese didn't want to look as if they were lecturing China, when...

Q: The Japanese weren't the right people to do that.

LORD: They weren't the right people. They haven't been exactly forthcoming in confessing their sins in China, or Korea, or World War II generally.

Q: That's what I mean. They haven't really fessed up.

LORD: Yes. Also, on the other hand, the Japanese have sort of said that, because of their history, it's awkward for them to discuss human rights abuses, even though they don't acknowledge their history.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: The Japanese always seem to be uncomfortable, both when our relations with China are bad and when our relations with China are good.

LORD: A very good point. If our relations with China are bad, then the Japanese get nervous about tensions in the Taiwan Straits, because they might have to choose between the U.S. and China. If U.S. relations with China are good, the Japanese wonder if it will be at Japan's expense. So the phrases which they have been using, and which you may be familiar with, is that we may either bash Japan or may bypass Japan. Right now the Japanese are concerned about our possibly bypassing Japan.

Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: One final question that might be a little sensitive, but, particularly, there has been recent pressure by Congress on the administration. Many questions have been asked in Congress about whether the administration should have sanctioned China and/or Pakistan about transfers of missiles and missile technology from China to Pakistan. The administration has always insisted that these transfers haven't been clearly demonstrated. However, intelligence sources have recently suggested that the administration did know about these transfers of missiles and missile technology and that there were such transfers.

LORD: Well, as you know, there have been a lot of issues during the last several years regarding transfers of technology from China to Pakistan and elsewhere in the nuclear and chemical areas. These reports have reflected varying degrees of precision and severity, sanctionability, and so forth.
We did invoke sanctions against China on two occasions, in 1993 and 1995, in this general area. I think that the specific area to which you refer is whether we had evidence to prove that they shipped missiles and technology to Pakistan. The general feeling was that they were right on the edge, but we never had a smoking gun. In effect, without getting into classified material, we saw suspicious crates and heard chatter about unpacking these crates. We were able to see some signs of training by Pakistanis on how to use certain equipment. This would have been a real hammer if we had invoked the sanctions. I admit that people were not anxious to do this. In any event, you need very high legal standards if you're going to do that, and we didn't have a smoking gun.

Furthermore, we were making progress, generally, in the nuclear area with China. But we were now more concerned about missiles. At that time, the Chinese were then, and even more so now, linking their proliferation of missile technology with our providing arms to Taiwan and in specific terms, Theater Missile Defense equipment. So the Chinese are tough on missiles. They say that it is proliferation when we ship something to Taiwan, which we of course totally reject. There are some ambiguities regarding materials useful for chemical weapons. However, in the nuclear area the Chinese were making progress throughout this period. That was another incentive not to find the PRC guilty on missiles.

It is fair to say that there were those, certainly in CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and maybe in DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] who felt that the evidence was sufficient and that we should invoke sanctions. But others, including in State, argued we had to have a smoking gun.

We never crossed over that line. I would be the first to admit that we were not anxious to do so. I will also say that if we did have a real smoking gun, of course we would have invoked sanctions. We had every legal and moral obligation to do so. And the Congress would have been very insistent.

There were different sanctions for different reasons. Whatever their laudable purpose, they were generally not well crafted, leaving aside a debate on whether sanctions are effective at all. Most of the effect of sanctions is to cut off our exports. So it hurts our economic interests and has very little impact on Chinese imports. Now, of course, sometimes they want our technology, for whatever reason. But, on the whole, the sanctions were hurting American companies more than China. So the sanctions did not apply particularly effective pressure.

We made progress in the nuclear area. China signed many international agreements. It cut off nuclear assistance to Iran, beyond what it was required to do. It also tightened up on Pakistan. We worked very hard on the missile and other areas as well, through a combination of selective sanctions when we had to apply them and when we felt that they were required. Incentives, either involving lifting the sanctions or possibly by defining more carefully dual technology exports, and the geopolitical dialogue which we carried on were maintained. We have continued to explain why it is in China's self-interest to clamp down on nuclear and missile proliferation. We have said many times that the nuclear arms race in South Asia is going to be of more concern to China than to the U.S., because of geography. We have suggested to the Chinese that they may have helped to create a monster in their own backyard. And with China’s growing need for Persian Gulf
oil, it has an interest in making sure countries like Iran cannot threaten shipping with missiles. Also nuclear weapons in North Korea would be a real headache for them, and could provoke Japan, South Korea, even Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons.

So the PRC has joined the NPT [Non Proliferation Treaty] and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, even though the Chinese had done much less testing than anybody else. They agreed to cut off the export of fissile materials. They made this agreement on non safeguarded facilities after the ring magnet episode with Pakistan. They agreed not to ship any more missiles to Pakistan. China also joined the Zanger Committee on nuclear exports, and has helped us with regard to North Korea. I think that it's fair to say that, on the whole, they've moved forward on the nuclear front. Of course, that was shown by the decision of President Clinton to go forward with a nuclear agreement during the visit of President Jiang Zemin last October, implementing the agreement which we reached in 1985 when I was Ambassador to the PRC. We had never sent this agreement to Congress for ratification because we couldn't say, in good conscience, that the PRC had ended its unhelpful activities with Pakistan and Iran. The fact that the President could now go ahead with the nuclear agreement showed the progress made with China in the nuclear area.

Anyway, we made progress with nuclear arms after heavy slogging over a period of months and years. We encouraged the PRC successfully, when I was Ambassador in Beijing and since then, to cut off all nuclear cooperation with Iran, even though it's legal. Iran is a member of the NPT and is subject to supervision under that treaty. We just said that such nuclear cooperation was unwise, even though it wasn't illegal. Such cooperation, if it had been with Pakistan, would have been illegal. China has also agreed to cut off sending any conventional missiles to Iran, so we have made further progress in this area.

Let me make just a couple of other points. Whatever tactical mistakes we made with China, and I think that we inevitably made some in this complex relationship over the four years I have been talking about, I have tried to explain also where I think that we have done well. I think that the mistakes we made were not so egregious, although I would say that we did much better toward the end of the 1993-1997 period than at the beginning. I would like to make the key point that it takes two to tango, to use that awful cliche. There is a tendency by some of my former government colleagues and academic experts, which I still resent, that when things go wrong in our relations with China, it's always the fault of the U.S. In fact, it may often be China's fault.

I still feel strongly about some of the experts and former officials who jumped on us because of some of these matters, when they really ought to have been tougher on China. That is also true of the business community as a whole. This is not to say that we did everything correctly. My experience with China now goes back to the 1971 secret trip with Kissinger and a year or two before then, preparing for it. During recent years, the mood and the attitude of the Chinese leadership has been the most arrogant and prickly that I've ever encountered. This doesn't mean that I'm not in favor of engagement with China or that we shouldn't work at this relationship. As I've said, "They never promised
us a rose garden." However, for a variety of reasons the Chinese have been particularly difficult to deal with. This includes their growing power, invocation of nationalism, apprehension about American encirclement.

Before I go any further in that direction, let me say that in our own backyard we suffered greatly because President Clinton never gave a speech on China during 1993-1997 and that our moves were not always the wisest. However, we faced the lingering effects of the Tienanmen Square massacre, the end of the Soviet threat, and Chinese aggressive actions. It wasn't just that the Chinese are bad at public relations. They do things in the field of human rights, Tibet, weapons transactions, market access, and Taiwan that are bad period. They deserve a bad press at times. So you put that together with Tienanmen Square images and the end of the Soviet threat, and you have problems in the U.S. with respect to China.

Moreover, there is the Chinese mood. First there is the point that, over 5,000 years of its history, China was number one and the "Middle Kingdom." Everyone else was a barbarian, irrelevant, or was a tributary state of China. The Chinese were leading the world and were superior. Then the Chinese had a bad century or, say, 150 years when they were humiliated by foreigners. The country was carved up by European powers. There was the Opium War and the Japanese invasion of China. Whatever the case, China from the mid-1800s to when Mao Zedong took over the country in the late 1940s, looked as if it was being trampled on by outsiders.

So China is a country which, in effect, has very little experience - only the last couple of decades - in dealing with outside countries as equals. During most of its history China was number one. More recently, it has been humiliated. So there is a combination of arrogance, xenophobia, and nationalism. This is not new. It goes back for some time, but it is part of the general background to the present.

Then, on top of that, there is the always tricky phenomenon of an emerging power like China, which is in the process of becoming a great power, adjusting its status to the world's superpower. That was the case with the Germans early in the 20th century. That is a difficult process to handle. This often happens. Then, on top of that, there is the fact that China is growing very strongly in the economic field and, to a certain extent, in military terms, though this has been exaggerated in some quarters. This gives the Chinese a certain self-confidence, a certain arrogance and a certain desire to flex their muscles and also to be treated as equals, as they should, anyway, as a great, rich, historic and cultural force. On top of that the Chinese have a certain smugness vis-a-vis the Soviet experience. They figure that Gorbachev and other Russian leaders allowed too much political freedom without making economic progress. So the Soviets lost their empire, and the Communist Party lost control of the country. The Chinese feel that they're not going to make the same mistake. And they say, see, it's working. The Chinese leaders say that they have lifted the lives and living standards of the Chinese people, and that they have managed to do that without allowing political freedom. They think that they're not going to make the same mistake which Moscow made.
Then the Chinese military are demanding more of a role. In the South China Sea and the Taiwan missile crisis, they clearly had a significant role to play. They showed that they can be more aggressive. In addition, there is the fact that there isn't a single, dominant leader in China; whether he was good or bad is another issue. The Chinese had previously had Mao, Zhou En-lai, and Deng Xiaoping. Although Jiang Zemin is now clearly the first among equals and is consolidating his position, throughout most of this period he was still engaged in trying to solidify his status. It was only in 1997 that he completed strengthening his position. He had had a successful Congress of the Communist Party of China, Deng had passed away, there was a relatively successful reversion of Hong Kong to China, although the jury is still out on this, and Jiang Zemin had a successful trip to the U.S. However, during most of this time Jiang Zemin was watching his flanks. The Taiwan missile crisis is a good example of that. So this meant he couldn't afford to look soft on sensitive issues. Thus, China did not have a self-confident, charismatic leader who could steer the China-U.S. relationship as Deng, Mao, and Zhou had done earlier on.

Then there are Chinese suspicions of the United States. Some of these are probably for tactical reasons to put us on the defensive. But some of the Chinese leaders genuinely feel this. The most extreme Chinese view of the United States is that we're keeping them down, and we don't want another super power around. So, in this view, we are trying to restrain, contain, and isolate them. This is allegedly proved by our maintaining our military presence in the Pacific Ocean area and by our strengthening our relations with Japan and so on. Allegedly, the U.S. is trying to control China's exports of military materials and military sales and is allegedly interfering in the Taiwan Straits and in Taiwan generally. Another allegation is that we are trying to keep China out of the WTO [World Trade Organization], and generally trying to keep China down. Then we are trying to divide up China's territory, with pressures on Hong Kong, Tibet, and Taiwan. On top of that we are allegedly trying to subvert China politically by pushing human rights and democracy, so that the PRC Government will lose political control of the country.

If you put all of these allegations together, I would argue that that's a fairly difficult mood to deal with. This is not by any means an excuse for any mistakes we might have made. It just means that, objectively, it's not going to be easy to deal with these people.

We should continue the policy of engagement, which I am in favor of. However, when we run into trouble, because the Chinese fire missiles, lock up dissidents, crush Tibet, or sell dangerous weapons in volatile areas of the world, some of the so-called China experts in the U.S. or some of the former U.S. Government officials should admit that maybe the Chinese are making trouble, and it's not just the U.S. administration.

One other China-related issue - the visit of Mrs. Clinton to China in September 1995 for a UN-sponsored International Conference on Women. I may have covered this elsewhere. I was with her as foreign policy advisor. She also went on to Mongolia with my urging to show support for that struggling democracy, and an inherent contrast to repressive Beijing. There she met with high level Mongolians, of course, and visited a nomadic family in a yurt. Very colorful trip, and the Mongolians were immensely pleased.
I had met Mrs. Clinton before, including sitting next to her at a White House dinner. I was very impressed with her intelligence which is well known. We worked hard with her and her staff to get ready for the trip. On the plane to China, and throughout the trip I was also impressed with other qualities, not so well known by the public - her sense of humor, her willingness to listen to ideas, her approachfulness, without losing the dignity of First Lady. We had a good time, figuratively putting our feet up, with her and her staff. She was pleasantly surprised that I encouraged her to be tough at the conference on women’s issues, rather than being a State Department softy worried about upsetting the Chinese who were a clear target on some of these issues. I knew she cared deeply about these issues and that U.S. leadership was important and that her audience would be watching her. So she gave a very firm and well received speech. There was a driving rainstorm and trouble getting around the swampy compound outside Beijing that the Chinese forced the NGO groups to occupy so as to isolate them. I also knew that being firm on these global issues wouldn’t really hurt us with the Chinese.

We didn’t even finally decide to go to China for the conference until the Chinese released Harry Wu, a dissident who they caught sneaking back into China.

**Q:** Right. The next session will concentrate on your time as American Ambassador to China. Then we'll revert back to your time with the NSC and talk about things other than China. Particularly Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

**LORD:** That's right. We'll do China first, and then you're welcome to hear about anything else. I assume that that's up to you. I assume that that's what you want.

**Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]:** That's the main thing.
**LORD:** We'll certainly finish the discussion of China, I think. I would welcome both of you going over the transcript and thinking of any additional questions that you might have. I'll try to make sure that I haven't left anything out. Maybe in half a day we can get through the rest of it.

**Q:** Fine.
XXIV. STATE DEPARTMENT ASSISTANT SECRETARY - JAPAN (1993-1997)

Q: [Kennedy] Maybe we ought to review the situation, on a country by country basis.

LORD: Unless you have any general questions about the course of events.

Q: [Kennedy] Some may come up, but let's start with the number one country on your list of goals, Japan. First, I'd like you to talk about dealing with Japan. I remember reading, in Kissinger's White House Memoirs, about the problems involved in dealing with the Italian Government. The Italian Government kept changing, and it was difficult to deal with the Italians. I was wondering who called the shots and where Japanese Government policy is decided, from your perspective.

LORD: First of all, throughout my service as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I considered Japan the single most important partner of the U.S. It had the highest priority for attention.

There is no question that our relationship with Japan was complicated somewhat by the Japanese internal politics. During the course of the four years of the first Clinton term there were five Japanese Prime Ministers and five Foreign Ministers for Secretary Christopher to deal with. Of course, in Japan there is the general problem caused by the fact that they work slowly and deal by consensus. So it takes a while to get decisions out of them. On the plus side is the fact that, once they reach a decision and there is full consensus on it, they can implement it fairly quickly. However, even that is being challenged as we speak. The general cautiousness of Japanese politicians always makes it difficult to deal with them, and this is especially true on sensitive issues, such as economic questions, where a government decision can affect their domestic constituents. As a result, members of the Japanese Government are always looking over their political shoulder. That was a general, complicating factor.

In the Bureau of East Asian Affairs we felt, and I think that it is fair to say that the Clinton administration felt, that Japan is still our number one partner. It is not a zero sum game to try to improve relations with both China and Japan. We shouldn't have to lose ground with one country because of the situation in the other country. However, first of all, Japan is our major ally in Asia. We have troops stationed in Japan, and this country is a cushion for our whole security position. Japan’s economy accounts for two-thirds of the region in GNP. Japan is a giant in terms of our economic connections. It is a democracy and is a democratic ally.

Beyond that, in addition to the bilateral ties between Japan and the United States, there is an increasing number of areas where we believed that we could and should work together. These ranged from regional security questions, like those in Korea and Cambodia, both of which are very important, and the regional security dialogues, to economic questions, where Japan plays an important role in APEC, as well as Japan's economic strength. Another area of close contact between the U.S. and Japan is the United Nations, where we have supported them for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This reflects Japan's strength and responsibilities. Also included are the so-
called newer issues, which I referred to in my confirmation statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These are the environment, science and technology, and all the other items on this common agenda which we developed with Japan during the four years of jointly addressing global problems. Increasingly, Japan, and here Prime Minister Hashimoto gets some credit, is willing to engage in United Nations peacekeeping activities. Japan has been willing to set aside the taboos on the use of military force which goes back to World War II. This included active involvement in Cambodia, where Japan stationed some peacekeeping forces, in Africa, and elsewhere. Japan was getting involved in world affairs in that way, and we encouraged that.

The strategy which we set out was to address the one, serious part of our relationship which was not in good shape, and that is the economic relationship, while simultaneously we sought to insulate that problem from the security relationship. We worked increasingly with the U.S. Defense Department in this regard. As I said, Joe Nye [Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs] deserves considerable credit for this, as does former Secretary of Defense Perry and Kurt Campbell, Nye’s deputy. We conducted a serious dialogue on security, to review our bilateral relationship, update it, and make sure that we coordinated with Japan on all security matters in the East Asian region. We continually expanded our agenda with Japan, so that we would work increasingly closely on global problems.

I spent more time on Japan than any other. I went to Japan more than to any other country. Our basic approach early on was the following. If we allowed the trade deficit with Japan to continue indefinitely, and it was not just the trading surplus with us but with the entire world economy, and Japan continued to resist deregulation and opening up its market, over time the political cost in Congress and in labor unions in the U.S. would be such that it could begin to poison the overall relationship with Japan. And perhaps this would erode support for our security relationship. This is important for our security alliance and our troop presence in Japan. After all, this relationship is in our own interest and is not just a favor to Japan.

Also, we were genuinely concerned about American jobs and exports. So just on economic grounds we wanted to improve the situation. We didn't feel, of course, that we had to have a strict, bilateral balance with every country in the world. That's not how the world trading situation works. We felt that when the trade deficit with Japan reached $40 or $50 billion a year, that is a point where it became a political problem, as well as a matter of economic unfairness. A large part of this trade deficit was due to the fact that Japan was unwilling to open up its domestic market to U.S. exports. Japan had taken action to protect its inefficient farmers and in other areas. Also, we were concerned about investment as well.

As we set out in the Clinton administration, we had a fairly conscious plan about where we wanted to be in terms of Japan after the four years of the first Clinton term. We knew that we would run into some problems with Japan and in public perceptions, including even our domestic audience, if we stepped up the pressure on the economic front. We felt that that was necessary on the economic measures, as I've mentioned, to preserve the
other parts of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Throughout this period the Department of State was not a soft partner on this. Obviously, the most aggressive and most visible agency was the USTR [U.S. Trade Representative], led by Mickey Kantor and later, Charlene Barshefsky. This was also and emphatically the approach with almost everyone in the U.S. Government. There were serious disputes among the various agencies, with the Embassy in Tokyo weighing in as well, about, for example, going for specific, numerical targets in terms of increasing our exports, how much we would hit the Japanese in public, and the tone and tactics to be used. However, it was never a matter of the Department of State saying that we were being too tough on economic matters with Japan, to the detriment of other aspects of our relationship. The U.S. Defense Department said essentially the same thing, i.e., we needed to address the economic issues while - and in order to - preserving the security ties. Thus disagreements within the Administration were on tactics, not the basic strategy.

The economic agencies and leaders oriented toward domestic problems were also saying: "We have to do this or that for domestic, political reasons, as well as for economic reasons."

There was a united view in the U.S. Government that the trade deficit was a problem and that it was unfair. Furthermore, unfortunately and sadly, the only way to move the Japanese was to exert pressure on them. We would much prefer for the Japanese to come to the conclusion that they should open up their markets in their own self interest, not to have such a huge, global, trade surplus, as well as a surplus with us, which was unbalanced in terms of the world economy. Above all, we would like to see the Japanese Government persuade Japanese consumers that a better life and better choice of goods could be available to them, and at lower prices, by opening up their domestic markets.

We had some hope that the Japanese Government might move in terms of their self interest because of what seemed in 1993 and 1994 to be the beginning of some political reforms in Japan. It seemed that the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] wasn't going to be totally dominant. Indeed, in 1993 the LDP was voted out of office, and the Japanese opposition took over the government. We thought that if, in fact, Japan would become not just a democracy but a two and three party democracy, this meant that Japanese politicians would genuinely have to compete for votes and that the domestic consumer in Japan would insist on having a better life and a better choice of goods at cheaper prices. This, in turn, would lead to more competition in the political area, as opposed to domination of the system by one party. We thought that this might lead to pressures on the politicians running for office to open up the Japanese market when they entered office.

This expectation turned out to be premature, because that just didn't happen. We didn't like the fact that whenever you sought to make progress with Japan, you had to bring matters to a head and create a crisis, because that presumably meant that the Japanese Government would be seen as yielding to outside pressure. This wasn't good for the overall relationship between Japan and the United States. It soured the situation because
it meant that, even if we succeeded, there would be an after taste that could create a nationalistic backlash in Japan.

So we kept trying to appeal to Japanese self interest. However, the fact is that this tactic hadn't worked with previous Japanese administrations and, by itself, wasn't going to work with this administration. So we set out early on in the Clinton administration to try to craft a different approach. Obviously, in many ways the American economic agencies played a major role in this, as one might expect. I can't say that the State Department maintained total control over our approach to Japan. However, we were heavily involved in this approach, and, as I've said, we didn't disagree fundamentally with the economic agencies of the U.S. Government in this respect.

By the time President Clinton went to Japan on his first trip there in July, 1993, we had been working hard on setting up a new approach to our trading problems with Japan. I forget exactly what this approach was called, but it was referred to as a framework agreement. This approach was announced in Tokyo. We were there for the G-7 meeting but we were also there to deal with bilateral problems. Basically, as I recall it, the agreement consisted of three aspects.

One of these involved macroeconomic considerations. We tried to make this as mutual as possible, and each side act. For example, we had to have fiscal discipline and attack our budget deficits. Clearly, it was aimed at opening up the Japanese market to American exports. Here our emphasis was for Japan to undertake greater domestic stimulus, expand Japanese imports, and generally take more of our trade through fiscal stimulus and through deregulation. This was a major issue in Japan.

Secondly, progress was to be made in certain sectors, which were identified, including automobiles, telecommunications, and so on. Here we got into a debate over time on how much we would identify specific indicators to show progress being made, after a year or two. Part of our problem was that there were a lot of agreements with Japan entered into under previous American administrations, which tended to be agreements in principle, but the implementation usually fell short. We had no way of measuring whether or not we had success in this respect. The big debate in Washington was whether and to what extent we could come up with specific, measuring sticks. Japan felt that this approach involved locking them into quotas that would either be politically difficult or would not be acceptable. Or this would involve running the risk of the U.S. applying sanctions if there wasn't enough progress made. So, over the next couple of years, a lot of the negotiations with Japan involved how could we define progress. On the whole we sort of came out, without being overly specific, with measures to indicate progress, but without tying down the Japanese to specific quotas. In a couple of sectors, percentages of their consumption were introduced as targets.

The third part of this framework agreement was included at the request of Japan. It was called a common agenda, which was a program to attack global issues such as the environment, drugs, and disaster relief. This agenda kept expanding over the next couple of years. Actually, a lot of good work was done in that context. However, despite our best
efforts, we never had much attention paid to this common agenda. People focused on the economic disputes. When things improved somewhat, the common agenda wasn't sexy enough for people to pay much attention to. However, throughout the four years of the first Clinton term, Tim Wirth [Undersecretary for Global Affairs], as well as the rest of us, worked hard on this. We tried to make progress on a lot of these issues and introduce a positive element to this framework, as well as these tough, economic measures.

On a macro level, we in turn were committed to reducing our budget deficit. In fact, we kept our part of the bargain over the coming years. So that was agreed upon during the Clinton trip to Japan of July, 1993.

Q: [Kennedy] Just to get down to the modalities involved, how did you deal with the Japanese Government? There was just one party in power but there were revolving governments and so forth. I was thinking that it would be very difficult to pin anybody down. Could you talk about where you could go, in the case of foreign and economic affairs, to get some continuity? Could you also talk about the role of Ambassador Walter Mondale and the American Embassy in Tokyo in this connection?

LORD: On all of these matters it was obviously the Japanese Prime Minister that we looked to. However, he didn't have the individual clout that, say, our President would have in our government. The Japanese Prime Minister would always have to rule by consensus within his party. The process of developing a consensus could be slow moving. During the early period of the Clinton administration Hashimoto was the Japanese trade negotiator with Mickey Kantor. He was more dynamic than most Japanese leaders and then he became Prime Minister. By the way, he was very good on security issues but was always tough on economic issues.

On security matters the Japanese Ministry of Defense isn't all that important. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister are the key points of contact on security affairs. When questions become sensitive, as they did over the Okinawa rape case, new defense guidelines, or host nation support for our defense budget, it really required the leadership of the Prime Minister.

On trade matters, the Japanese trade negotiator in the initial phase was, of course, Hashimoto. He was the key man. Obviously, he had to coordinate with the Prime Minister, because you had to influence him.

The Japanese bureaucracy is generally very influential. To this day, it controls many issues, with the politicians coming and going, in and out of office. The senior bureaucrats remain in place. The Ministry of Finance was generally pretty conservative on these matters, as were the other Japanese economic agencies. We also had to try to appeal, and did, though maybe not as effectively as we might have done, to Japanese consumers and public opinion. We had to try to go over the heads of the government leaders and to appeal to their own self interest. In this way we hoped to increase what we saw as the momentum in support of possible political reform, or put pressure on politicians to be responsive to consumer needs.
However, the quick answer to your question is that on security matters we dealt with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Ministry. At times the Japanese Defense Ministry was also involved. On economic matters, we dealt with the Prime Minister and the trade negotiators from other financial and economic institutions.

Q: [Bernkopf] I think that Stu Kennedy also asked about the role of Ambassador Walter Mondale.

LORD: In my view Mondale was a very good Ambassador. From the beginning of his assignment as Ambassador to Japan, he was determined to be very polite and supportive in public, on the whole, but to be very firm privately with the Japanese on economic issues and to speak candidly to them. What was refreshing about Mondale was that he never suffered from clientitis. He always made clear that he was working for the United States. Obviously, he would represent the Japanese point of view to Washington, as any Ambassador should do. He would have views on how to deal with the Japanese. However, he was very good at carrying tough messages to the Japanese. He worked very hard and was firm in private, even as he treated the Japanese publicly with great respect. You don't want an Ambassador in Tokyo who simply bashes the Japanese, and you don't want someone accused of clientitis. Mondale was neither.

In all candor, many people felt that Ambassador Mike Mansfield was terrific as an Ambassador early on. However, by the end of his term as Ambassador the American business community felt that he wasn't tough enough with the Japanese on economic issues. He began to lose his reputation in this regard. I think that Ambassador Armacost was considered very good by the American business community. However, some Japanese may have felt that he was a little abrasive in public, although I didn't think so. I think that he was an excellent Ambassador. I'm sure that Ambassador Mondale, building on the work of his predecessors, may have appeared to be like Ambassador Mansfield in public. However, in private he was like Armacost, firm and tough. I think that Mondale was successful in that. He also had great clout in Washington, and with the President which he used effectively without undercutting Secretary Christopher.

Ambassador Mondale also brought tremendous, political instincts to the job which, given his background, was only natural. These instincts served us very well at key moments. For example, there was an incident where some Japanese students were murdered in the U.S. Ambassador Mondale, without waiting for instructions, went immediately to the Japanese press, apologizing to them over this incident and defusing it. He did this also, and above all, on the rape incident in Okinawa, which happened in 1995.

Q: [Kennedy] Can you explain the background and what happened?


Q: [Kennedy] I think that she was a very young girl.
Q: [Bernkopf] She was a 12 year old girl, in fact.

LORD: She wasn't killed, but it was a particularly humiliating and terrible situation. To this day it continues to hurt our defense relationship and could have destroyed it entirely. Everybody worked hard on this, including Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and President Clinton. However, Ambassador Mondale, without waiting for instructions, because he knew that speed was necessary, arranged to appear on Japanese television and apologized without even checking with Washington. He just knew that he had to move quickly and visibly. So on this occasion and on others he was very good in dealing with Japanese public opinion.

Now, in his first year or two as Ambassador, he was frustrated because he felt, even though he believed in pushing the Japanese hard on trade issues, that we didn't have our act together back in Washington. Sometimes the USTR would be saying one thing, and someone else would be saying something else. Even if there was a general consensus, at least tactically it looked bad. He felt that we were losing a public relations battle in Asia and around the world by going for managed trade. This was ironic because Japan was essentially the party which was going for managed trade. We were for free trade. But our use of specific indicators lent itself to attacks. We were accused by the Japanese and many of our Asian trading partners of trying to promote artificial trade. We were accused by some people in the U.S. who were worried about security that we were risking our security ties with Japan because of economic considerations. They felt that we were going about this matter in the wrong way.

Anyway, Ambassador Mondale felt, and correctly, that we weren't handling this matter correctly in terms of public relations. Also, he felt that tactically we were not speaking cohesively and that some of our approaches, such as overly strict, numerical targets, were actually wrong. He felt that this was the wrong way to go about it. So, for a variety of reasons, Ambassador Mondale was on the phone to Washington a lot, talking in particular to Joan Spero, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and we; Secretary of State Christopher; the White House; Mickey Kantor [USTR]; Ron Brown [Secretary of Commerce]; and other key economic players. Mondale tried to develop more cohesion and more sense in our policies with Japan.

I think that Ambassador Mondale felt frustrated, as many of us also did, during the first two years of the first Clinton term. However, by the time he left Tokyo, he felt very good, indeed, after the triumphant, Presidential trip to Japan at the end of the first Clinton term. So Ambassador Mondale was an important player. People knew of his political clout, if he went to the President, as he would do from time to time, but only selectively. He wouldn't overdo that access. Mondale was very helpful. Both Joan Spero and I worked very closely with him. We would be in touch with him fairly regularly, trying to keep Mondale posted, and not just through the usual cables. We would get on the telephone or use sensitive back channels and try to coordinate with Ambassador Mondale on strategy and tactics.

Q: [Kennedy] What were your relations with Mickey Kantor, the U.S. Trade
Representative [USTR]? In the press he has been portrayed as being a very aggressive, New York type, or something of this nature. I would have thought that there would be a problem between the nuanced State Department style and the Mickey Kantor style.

LORD: That would be a fair supposition. I know that it may look suspicious because I'm being nice to everybody, and that is my instinct when I am speaking on the record, but I'm a genuine admirer of Mickey Kantor, although there were times when his tactics left something to be desired. For example, after a caning incident in Singapore [when a young American was administered with several strokes of a rattan stick, pursuant to a Singapore court order because he possessed narcotics], he opposed agreeing to Singapore being the world headquarters of the World Trade Organization [WHO]. He didn't check with anybody, and we had to roll that one back. I helped to do that. There were times when Kantor wasn't careful enough in his public remarks with respect to Japan. In my view these were essentially nit picks, compared to his overall performance.

I thought that, even though he got into some trouble and may have had some stylistic shortcomings, on the whole Kantor and Barshevsky, his deputy, were extremely able. I wouldn't exaggerate the progress we made on trade agreements, and some people could say that we paid a price for this. The fact is that we negotiated 23 different trade agreements during this period. The key point was that the trade deficit with Japan began to decline. I felt that Mickey Kantor had the practice of being willing to compromise at the last minute. He was tough but he wasn't stubborn to the point of giving up on trade deals. I thought that we made some progress on trade, even though, from the public relations point of view, we did poorly with our Asian and domestic audiences.

Q: [Kennedy] When you mention PR, did this mean that we were seen as just beating up on Japan?

LORD: Yes. Of course, this was welcomed in some quarters. Those who were worried about the trade deficit and those who had been frustrated in their dealings with Japan, some of them in the business community and some labor figures, supported this. Others, who put their emphasis on geopolitics and security, would still feel that we were exaggerating the importance of this issue.

This may have reflected a left over of attitudes from the Cold War. During the Cold War, if we had a trade problem with Japan, the State and Defense Departments and the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] would go to the White House and say: "Look, Japan is a key ally. We are engaged around the world in a struggle with the Soviet Union. We can't afford to 'mess this up' with petty economic problems." In effect, they would tell the economic agencies to get lost. Well, in addition to other reasons we felt that the greater role being played by economic developments in foreign policy, something which President Clinton clearly felt strongly about, and the relationship between the domestic economy and the global economy meant that economics had to have a higher priority. But there were some people who still thought that we were sacrificing our security ties with Japan, even though we tried to insulate them and indeed succeeded in doing so.
Then there were others who agreed on the urgency of the economic problems between the U.S. and Japan but felt that we were handling them in the wrong way. They felt that we were either involved in too much public bashing of Japan in terms of the numerical, fixed targets for trade we were trying to achieve, or we didn't know whether we could reach these targets anyway. They tended to think that these targets were somewhat artificial and were too close to managed trade. There was a variety of reasons why some people were not pleased with our approach to trade negotiations with Japan.

Q: [Kennedy] Here was a situation where the balance of trade was seen as THE top issue with these countries when you became Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, more or less.

LORD: It was a big issue in terms of there being problems and controversy, as well as tough negotiations. Therefore, these attracted media attention. As I tried to say, we worked assiduously on security ties and political consultations, but did not attract much attention, and perhaps understandably so. The problems on the security side and our common agenda on global issues were quieter and less controversial. The common agenda also involved our working together with Japan at the UN, on regional security, regional economic relations, and so on. There is no question that the trade issue between the United States and Japan was front and center. As I said earlier, we had a four year plan. We felt that we might have some friction during the first couple of years but we hoped that, by the end of four years, things would be better on the trade and economic front and therefore in the overall relationship.

First, we had to get the trade deficit down and the market more open. I say down. We knew that we weren't going to eliminate the trade deficit. We were trying to get the trend going in a different direction.

Secondly, we strengthened Japan-U.S. security ties. Thirdly, we increased cooperation with Japan on regional and global issues. If you look over this four year period, I think that we did quite well. We strengthened the security relationship, which was capped off by President Clinton's trip to Japan in 1996. We had also made some progress on the trade deficit and we had greatly expanded our agenda with Japan.

Q: [Kennedy] With all of the attention paid by the Departments of State, the Treasury, and others, and as we look at this situation with considerable hindsight as we are looking at this now, in 1998, we can see a horrendous problem with the Japanese economy. I'm thinking in particular of bad loans, bad investments, and all that. Did any of our agencies say: "Really, the Japanese aren't doing very well with their economy." Or were we so focused elsewhere that we weren't looking at that?

LORD: That's a very good question. First, I'll answer it more directly. The reason that we had this three-part, framework agreement was that the Japanese wanted positive cooperation on global issues. They wanted a “common agenda.” So that was inserted, and we had no problem with that.
The Treasury Department felt that the key area was in the field of macroeconomics. This meant fiscal stimulus and deregulation. In its view, over time this would make more of a difference than slugging it out on different sectors and inching along here and there. The USTR felt that it was great to have attention paid to macroeconomics, but there were a few areas where we really had a comparative advantage, and the Japanese were particularly unreasonable on them. The Commerce Department, too, felt that we had to make progress on economic grounds, as well as domestic political grounds, in these areas, like automobiles and telecommunications. So that's why we had those three segments in the approach.

To answer your question, we were still essentially in the syndrome of regarding the Japanese as having an extremely strong economy, although we were also in a transition period. We now know, as we sit here in the summer of 1998, that even by the beginning of the Clinton administration, the Japanese economy was beginning to level off and stagnate. Banking and real estate problems were beginning to take hold. After all, the Japanese have essentially been in a recession for seven years. So that goes back to the beginning of the Clinton Administration.

Having said that, I do not recall that there was much notice taken of the condition of the Japanese economy. By the mid to late 1990s we had somewhat moved beyond the view that Japan was 10 feet tall and we were pygmies. In the 1980s, books were coming out which said that the U.S. had to be more like Japan. The view was that we have to have lifetime employment and an educational system like that of the Japanese. A number of views like this were expressed.

By the time the Clinton administration came into office [in 1993], American companies had become leaner, meaner, and more competitive. We knew that, and this process continued throughout his first term as President. Our budget deficit was still a problem, although after a couple of years we began to get that down. So we were in a psychological mood where we were not feeling so weak ourselves, as we had felt during the mid-1980s, when we thought that Japan was going to dwarf us and gobble us up and that we had to imitate them. We were getting more self confident about American business opportunities. Therefore, there was all the more reason for Japan to be fair in opening up its markets, because now we could really compete with them.

Previously, part of the problem was that even if Japan opened up its markets, our businessmen didn't speak Japanese and didn't have patience. We didn't make automobiles that had steering wheels on the right hand side, as automobiles do in Japan. However, now we felt that American business was doing its job and was ready to compete in Japan, if the Japanese would open up their market. We could be more competitive generally, including sales of rice and meat. Therefore, there was all the more reason for us to press Japan.

On the other hand, we didn't have a sense of Japan's weakness. As you say, this process was already beginning to take hold. We had thought that we were dealing with a very strong partner. I don't remember any discussions focusing on the fact that the Japanese
weren't all that powerful. But that was a good question you asked.

Q: [Kennedy] You talked about how Ambassador Mondale reacted to Japan. However, the Okinawa rape problem had horrendous repercussions in Japan. Can you tell us how the news came to you and how the Departments of State and Defense responded? After all, everybody in the U.S. Government was involved in all of this.

LORD: First, let me finish off on the economic side. I don't have a precise recollection of this. After the framework agreement was reached in July, 1993, we then began tough negotiations to implement it. By the time Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa came to Washington in February, 1994, we'd really reached an impasse and hadn't made much progress. We said that we should make progress within the next year, fleshing out the framework agreement. We had made some progress on the global agenda items. It was less controversial to work on them. On macroeconomics, things were not going well. President Clinton and Prime Minister Hosokawa did not try to cover this up.

So this was part of the general malaise in our Asian policy, which I was talking about in the spring of 1994. Prime Minister Hosokawa made a trip to Washington, at the end of which Clinton and Hosokawa held a joint press conference. Although the conference was polite, as the Japanese generally are in their diplomacy, it was clear that we had not succeeded in the intervening months on the economic front. The other parts of the Japanese-American agenda were positive, but the whole press coverage of that summit meeting reflected a failure to make progress on the economic front.

We kept at it. Our strategy, in addition to continuing to press on fleshing out the framework agreement, was based on the view that, over time, APEC and the WTO [World Trade Organization] would put multilateral pressure on Japan to open up its market. But that wasn't going to solve our short term problems with Japan. Again, as with all Asian economic problems, we looked on the economic negotiations with Japan on three levels, bilateral, regional, and global. That is, bilateral, depending on the partner. In the case of China and Japan we faced some tough negotiations. There were regional negotiations, in this case through APEC. Over time, particularly as we reached the goals of free trade and investment by a date certain, there were multilateral pressures to bring to bear and not just the U.S. bugging other countries to open their markets. Then there were global negotiations in the Uruguay Round and the WTO.

In any event we began to make progress. I can't remember right now, but probably part of the reason for this progress was due to the yen-dollar exchange relationship, which always affects the trade. This is true even now. Our trade deficit gets worse when the yen is relatively weak and the U.S. dollar is strong. We made some concrete progress, perhaps not as much as might have appeared, because we emphasized it and perhaps excessively. However, the progress made was a lot more than our critics admitted. The U.S. trade deficit was going down, and U.S. exports to Japan were going up. We had statistics to show that at least in some areas, if not across the board, our exports were going up faster in the areas where we had negotiated agreements than was generally the case in other areas. In some areas, such as automobiles, we really didn't make too much
progress, although we made some.

Over time we made enough progress on the economic front, perhaps helped by the dollar-yen exchange rate, as well as the trade negotiations, so that by the end of the first Clinton term the trade deficit was going in the right direction. That was coupled with progress on the security and other fronts. This put our relationship with Japan in great shape by the time President Clinton went to Japan in April 1996.

Q: [Kennedy] How did you use President Clinton or, perhaps, how did President Clinton use you as an instrument in these negotiations? Now it had been arranged that the President was going to see the Japanese Prime Minister twice a year, at least, in the context of the G-7 meeting and in the bilateral...

LORD: It had been agreed that there would be a bilateral summit meeting once a year. In fact, there were meetings more or less firmly scheduled between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister three times a year, in the context of APEC, the G-7 meeting, and a bilateral summit meeting.

Q: [Kennedy] Obviously, this was the main consideration. How did President Clinton deal with this series of meetings with the Japanese Prime Minister?

LORD: These meetings were always high on President Clinton's agenda. To be totally candid, I always thought, and I felt that others did, too, that when he got into a meeting with his counterparts, President Clinton wasn't as tough as he might have been. He was correct, he was polite, and he emphasized the positive side of our relationship. He always raised the economic issues and spent quite a bit of time on them, but I think that there were times when he edged more toward a polite formulation than what was needed. With the Japanese you can and should be firmer with them when you are in a one on one meeting than when you are with them in the presence of others. This is a matter of face with Asians, particularly with the Japanese.

I'm not saying that President Clinton should have been rude or pounded the table, in his contacts with the Japanese. However, I can remember some meetings where he should have been firmer. I was at virtually all of his meetings with the Japanese. Sometimes a meeting would be small and would be followed by a larger meeting. I attended both large and small meetings. At times President Clinton would go off alone with the Japanese Prime Minister when he had a really tough message to convey. On balance, I'm not sure that it would have made a huge difference if Clinton had been tougher. Given the Japanese negotiating system, I think that it probably wouldn't have made much difference.

I might add that, throughout this period, particularly in 1994, 1995, and 1996, Secretary of State Christopher worked very hard on our bilateral ties. Essentially, he met with Japanese Foreign Minister Kono but also with Foreign Minister Ikeda toward the end. He sought to try to manage the overall Japan-U.S. relationship. Christopher and his Japanese counterpart would meet several times a year. Either Secretary of State Christopher would
Christopher would almost always meet with his Japanese counterpart, and with my encouragement he would go over a whole agenda of issues. He tried to do essentially two things. First, to make clear to the Japanese that the Department of State was on board with the USTR, the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department, etc., and the White House about the need to make progress on economic issues. He would press hard on those issues and would be on the phone a great deal in between meetings. He would try to appeal for help on some of these difficult negotiations. At the same time he would go over all of the issues on which we had positive relations, to make clear how important other parts of our relationship were, and to try to expand the areas of agreement, whether they involved security problems or two plus two meetings where we actually had the Secretaries of State and Defense sitting down with their Japanese counterparts.

We had several of the two plus two meetings and we expanded the common agenda generally, as well as talking about UN peacekeeping, Korea, Cambodia etc. On Korea we launched the process - at Christopher’s level and mine - of trilateral consultations between Japan, Korea, and the U.S.

So I think that Secretary Christopher had some positive effect on the Japanese-American relationship, making sure that even during rocky moments of trade negotiations that the relationship was kept on keel, as far as possible. Of course, President Clinton worked at this as well. And Secretary Perry was terrific on security issues. For all of these reasons, by 1996 we had put the Japanese-American relationship back on track. The big issue, of course, was security on Okinawa. We can cover that now, if you like.

Q: [Kennedy] One other thing we might consider first. You were talking about these meetings between President Clinton and the Japanese Prime Minister. There were two problems in this connection. One was the relatively large number of Japanese Prime Ministers involved, since they were only in office for a few months.

LORD: Right.

Q: [Kennedy] Every six months to a year, it seemed, there was a different Japanese Prime Minister in office. This made it tough because it was impossible to develop the experience of dealing with a single Prime Minister. Politicians can cover this kind of ground pretty quickly, but, still, this is putting a strain on the getting to know you system.

LORD: Let me say that that is a very good point because, as we discussed before, obviously, national interest determines your position, but if you can meet with your counterpart over time and build up a certain relationship of trust, so that you can handle some business over the telephone or empathize with the other person's domestic, political problems, this can help a relationship develop around the edges as it were.

We've seen this with the China relationship, where the President first had a stiff and
unsatisfactory relationship with Jiang Zemin, but over the course of several years and several meetings, that contact has gotten easier, and I think that it's helped the relationship to develop.

You are absolutely right that playing a game of musical chairs with a succession of Japanese Prime Ministers certainly complicated our problem.

Q: [Kennedy] Did you work on the President and Warren Christopher or did you get your Japanese experts to encourage them to be sensitive and understand the Japanese way of approaching things? Did this get in the way?

LORD: I don't think so. Christopher's inherent style would be polite and respectful, so that would play well with the Japanese. But he could be tough when he had to be. President Clinton is very quick at understanding cultural differences. As a real, master politician, he is very good at putting himself in the shoes of his counterpart and understanding what his counterpart needs domestically.

I think that, stylistically, there was no problem. You could argue that there was a problem in the case of Mickey Kantor, although Prime Minister Hashimoto was not all of that different from Kantor. But you could argue that Kantor was a little too blunt, frontal, and occasionally brutal, compared to some of the others. On the other hand, unfortunately, in my experience, you have to calibrate your style with the Japanese. You have to be pretty firm with them, or they just won't move. As I said earlier, it is clear that they would move out of their own self interest, rather than in response to foreign pressure. However, often, they may know that they should move, but they rely on foreign pressure as an excuse to get themselves to move. That's very unfortunate.

Q: [Kennedy] Shall we move on to the situation in Okinawa? In Washington how did we deal with security problems generally involving our armed forces which were deployed in East Asia, when the Okinawa rape incident occurred?

LORD: My memory and lack of files will make it difficult for me to be very responsive, I'm afraid.

First, security considerations, as I've said, were a crucial area for us in Japan and for our whole presence in Asia. At Defense Department initiative and with strong coordination from the Department of State at all levels, in addition to support from me, my deputies and Ambassador Mondale, and with support at the cabinet level, we launched a joint Defense-State dialogue with the Japanese at various levels. We set up committees at different levels to talk about our defense needs, and to coordinate on regional security policy. We undertook a division of responsibilities. We did this as an end in itself and because we hadn't had this exhaustive a look at security issues since the 1970s. With the end of the Cold War and in view of all of the other changes in the world, we clearly had to update and reaffirm our alliance with Japan.

We did this to make sure that trade disputes, which we knew would inevitably come up when we set out on this review, would not spill over into the security area. So we already
were working very hard on this. I can't give you specific dates on when this process was actually launched and when committee meetings were held. This was always a joint State-Defense operation, but I want to give full credit to the Department of Defense. We were making progress when the Okinawa rape incident occurred.

This case, as I've said, involved two Marines who were abusing a very young girl. This caused a tremendous uproar in Japan. As I said, Ambassador Mondale moved in on this immediately with an apology. From then on Defense Secretary Perry was superb, going to Japan and working with the Japanese Government. His deputies, like Joe Nye, worked closely with us. Ambassador Mondale worked very sensitively with the Japanese.

This incident precipitated a furor about the American base presence in Japan and our troops there. Okinawa, of course, had a disproportionate number of our defense bases and a substantial number of American troops deployed. I don't have the exact numbers of our troops present on Okinawa at the time of this incident. I think that Okinawa had something like 75 percent of all of our military bases in Japan, including a large number of Marines at our facilities in Okinawa, as opposed to other parts of Japan. So there was a dual problem. It wasn't only a U.S.-Japanese problem involving our base presence and the sensitivity involved in that, when Japanese citizens suffered from inconvenience, noise, pollution, and, above all, traffic accidents in which Japanese people were killed. Now we had to deal with the misbehavior of American service people.

There was also a second problem, involving tension between Tokyo and the Japanese provincial government in Okinawa. The Okinawans felt that they were carrying the brunt of the inconveniences of the American presence and that Tokyo politicians, as they weren't on the island, thought that they could let the Okinawans worry about it. On the mainland of Japan these politicians were not disposed to carry the full burden, for political reasons. So a lot of this involved negotiations between the Prime Minister of Japan in Tokyo and Okinawan authorities about the division of labor and the economic help provided to Okinawa to compensate Okinawans for the burdens that they were carrying.

There was a provincial governor in Okinawa who is still there to this day. He has been pressing this issue on a nationalistic basis. He wants the U.S. forces out of Okinawa by a date certain. He continues to press for a reduction of our forces in Okinawa. I met with him a couple of times when he came to Washington. Then there was Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto, who was excellent on this issue and moved with considerable courage. He tried to work with us to defuse this issue.

I don't have the chronology immediately available, but we soon launched a process called SACO, whose purpose was to look at our overall base presence in Japan. The terms of reference were set up to make clear that both sides felt that the continued presence of American forces in Okinawa was in their national interest. So, from the point of view of the Japanese Government, there was no question of removing U.S. forces from Okinawa. Rather, the purpose of this review was to see whether any consolidation of American forces could take place, as well as any diminution of inconveniences like noise and
pollution, accidents, and the use of land. We also sought to determine whether there could be any relief of the disproportionate burden on Okinawa resulting from the U.S. presence, and so forth.

So, in addition to an apology by Ambassador Mondale over the rape incident, we needed to make sure that the trial of the Marines took place, that they received the proper punishment, and that the President extend his own apologies. In addition to apologies by American cabinet officials over the rape incident, we also launched a process of looking again at our military presence on Okinawa. We had been engaged in desultory talks during several administrations over whether we really needed every last facility on Okinawa. For example, did we really need to fire artillery rounds across roads, did we really need to make night flights that wake people up in the middle of the night. In short, did we need all of this? In fact, we couldn't persuade the Pentagon to move overtly on this matter because they didn't have much of a sense of urgency.

Well, the rape incident precipitated the sense of urgency. Our whole military presence could suffer if we didn't show good faith efforts really to move on these longstanding issues of consolidation and reduction of base facilities.

To get this process moving, Secretary of Defense Perry set up a system of coordination with the State Department, including a coordination mechanism of committees going up to the cabinet level and time tables during which this was to be done. He worked very hard on this. To make a long story short, a lot of progress was made. The key issue included a major base in Okinawa, called Kadena, which was a particular imposition on the Okinawan people because of safety and noise. There were bloody battles on this issue, with Secretary Perry, Joe Nye, and others being very tough with the military services. Other people, like Kurt Campbell, when he came in, were also involved. Perry sought to reach an agreement among the services to relocate Kadena, in exchange for Prime Minister Hashimoto agreeing to find another kind of base to make up for whatever capability we were losing with the relocation. We kept stressing to the Japanese, particularly Prime Minister Hashimoto, that having our bases (relocated and consolidated) had to be portrayed, not just as a favor that the Japanese were doing us, but that it was in Japan's national interest. This approach was well received by Prime Minister Hashimoto, who was good on this issue. With our bases in Japan, the Japanese didn't have to go nuclear. They had our security cover. Perry also stressed that point in the tough negotiations he had with the Okinawan authorities. The negotiations went on, and we had the attention gathering mechanism of the Presidential visit coming up. President Clinton was due to arrive in Japan in April, 1996. Just before then, Perry went to Japan and consolidated the basic agreement to make it possible to defuse that issue before the President arrived, so that there would be no negotiations while he was there. I went with Perry on this visit. As a result, there was an easy atmosphere before the Summit Meeting. This allowed the Summit Meeting to concentrate on our relationship across the board, plus reaffirming our defense alliance and reviewing our defense guidelines. The implementation process went forward over the next few months.

Also during this period the Japanese held firm, in a statesmanlike way, on how much they
would pay to support the U.S. bases. This was the most generous agreement by far with any ally, amounting to something like $5.0 billion a year. We reached an agreement, under which that arrangement would continue for several years. This was negotiated mostly by my deputy, Tom Hubbard and Kurt Campbell, as well as their colleagues in the Departments of Defense and State. At times, Joe Nye and I would meet with the Japanese; at times, Nye would be on his own. Then there were occasional two plus two meetings around the edges in New York, during the UN General Assembly session, or in Tokyo, when Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry would meet with their counterparts at various stages of the process. This turned out very well.

This was a very major challenge throughout this period, particularly during the last two or three years. However, it came out extremely well. We reaffirmed the Japan-United States alliance, we updated our defense guidelines, we strengthened the partnership in general, and the Japanese continued their host nation support. We had a very positive outcome for the President's visit to Japan in April, 1996.

I might mention a footnote here. The President was originally due to go to Japan to attend an APEC meeting in Osaka in November, 1995 as well as a state visit. By then the Japan-U.S. defense relationship was looking a lot better. We had done a lot of work on the new reaffirmation of the Japan-U.S. defense relationship, plus the defense guidelines. I should make the point that since the 1970s we had had guidelines on how we operated with Japan, but these basically considered what would happen if Japan were attacked and how we would work together in such a case. The world had changed greatly since then. Clearly, we had to look at issues involving regional problems, the situation in Korea, and what Japan might do beside ensuring its immediate defense. So we covered a lot of sensitive issues about what to do if Japan were involved in a pre-crisis situation and what to do if something broke out. A lot of this was fleshed out after I left office as Assistant Secretary. This expanded Japan's regional responsibilities, without letting Japan take on responsibilities that would scare its Asian neighbors. So the Japanese became more committed to refueling U.S. forces in Japan, allowing the use of air and naval bases automatically in emergency circumstances, mine sweeping, as well as Japan's usual, defensive efforts, are other examples of what we accomplished. At least there was quick agreement on some of these contingencies.

The most contentious part was where did the guidelines apply. The Chinese have been complaining that these guidelines might apply to Taiwan. Both we and the Japanese cleverly agreed not to confirm that. We agreed not to rule out the defense of Taiwan, in case China becomes aggressive and attacks. We agreed not to be provocative toward China or say that the guidelines covered what the Chinese considered their territory. So we neither confirmed nor denied that the defense guidelines covered this. In effect, we said that this relates to situations, not geographic entities. We danced around this matter and we're going to continue to do so. The Chinese continue to press us and the Japanese to exclude Taiwan. Of course, neither we nor the Japanese will do that. We wish to deter Beijing's use of force without being provocative.

Now, a footnote on the Osaka meeting of APEC. The President was due to go there in
November, 1995, for the APEC meeting, but also to make another, bilateral trip to Japan. We had a budget crisis back here in the United States, which preoccupied the President. Rumors began to fly around Washington a week or two weeks before the President's scheduled departure on this trip that he might have to cancel or postpone the trip. I thought that this was unthinkable. First, it would be unthinkably wrong, but I also didn't believe that this was going to happen. However, I had enough doubts on this score, that I decided in perhaps a naive way, at my level, to lock this trip in - as much as I could, as if an Assistant Secretary of State can lock in the White House.

At this time I was setting up a press briefing at the Foreign Press Center on the President's trip. I usually met with them to preview a trip by the President or Secretary. I went on record, and some of my colleagues were a little uneasy about this, because I was concerned that the President was going to cancel the trip. I just said flatly that it was unthinkable that the President would cancel. This would be a “disaster” (perhaps I used a milder phrase) for our relations with Japan, as well as our general relations in Asia, for the process of APEC and the Leaders' Meeting which the President helped to start. It would be a real blow to our general Asia-Pacific policies if the President didn't go. I said of course the President was going to go. Well, a week later he canceled the trip.

I will mention a little footnote here. I have since learned, and I don't know whether it's true or not, that the day when the President either met or allegedly began fooling around with Monica Lewinsky was the very day when he canceled his trip to Japan. [Ms. Lewinsky was a White House staff aide at the time. Later, the President said publicly that he had had an improper relationship with her.] The President said that the cancellation of the trip was for budgetary reasons. I'd like to think that there is no connection between the affair with Ms. Lewinsky and the cancellation of the trip to Japan, although I don't know whether there was such a connection. I am not presuming the President's guilt or innocence in this regard, but it was a horrible coincidence. I think that he met her for the first time on that day.

I pulled no punches in saying how disastrous I thought the cancellation of the trip would be. I probably overstated it. I was just going through State Department files yesterday and found a memo I had written after the Osaka APEC meeting. I sent this memo to Secretary Christopher and said, in effect, that the cancellation of this trip had really hurt us in Asia and that it would take some time to repair it, for all of the reasons that I had predicted in the first place.

So Vice President Gore went to the meeting in place of the President and did as well as he could have done under the circumstances, both for APEC and for our bilateral relations with Japan. The Japanese were very mad about this cancellation, and all of the APEC heads of government said that this incident just showed that President Clinton didn't care about Asia. Despite our emphasis on Asia and the general success we had had in raising the level of APEC, the fact is that Secretary Christopher had earlier canceled out on a trip because of Bosnia, the Middle East, or some such place. Christopher had to leave early from a regional security meeting and canceled a trip to Australia, which made the Australians mad. So this cancellation of Clinton's trip to Japan was another echo of that. This was repaired and, by the time of the next APEC meeting, it was forgotten.
Moreover, in April, 1996, Clinton had his tremendously positive trip to Japan.

I mention this incident in this context because we already had pretty strong U.S.-Japan agreement on the reaffirmation of our security relationship with Japan and the defense guidelines, and the Okinawa issue was in pretty good shape. So we would have had a successful Summit Meeting in Osaka. However, it turned out that between November, 1995, and the President’s April, 1996 trip to Japan, the Taiwan missile crisis developed. The missile crisis unnerved the Japanese. As a result, we got a stronger defense statement and greater movement on the defense guidelines, as well as probably an easier time on the Okinawa issue, because of the intervening events.

Some people feel that we got these improvements only because of the Taiwan missile crisis. This is not true. By November, 1995, we already would have had a good agreement and summit. However, there is no question that we used the intervening time, not to mention the Taiwan missile crisis, to strengthen that whole package further. So the President's visit to Japan in the spring of 1996 was more successful than it would have been in November, 1995. There was a silver lining somewhere.

Q: [Kennedy] While we are talking about defense developments, did the issue of ships carrying nuclear weapons or the storage of nuclear weapons come up at this time?

LORD: It never came up. Earlier, when I had been working in State and Defense and with Kissinger in the White House, this had been a sensitive issue. It was always amazing how Japanese leaders would dance around and neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan. I don't recall its being an issue throughout the four-year period, when I was Assistant Secretary of State. It seemed to be pretty well behind us.

Q: [Kennedy] Did we get involved over - I'm not sure what you call them - or did we just sit back and relax over the Northern Islands [Kuril Islands] problem? I'm not sure that that is what you call them. They are located between Japan and Russia.

LORD: We supported the Japanese position on those islands. We were clear on that. We supported Japan both privately and publicly on this matter. We called for an improvement in relations between Japan and Russia. Every now and then someone would surface with the stupid idea that we mediate on this issue. How can you mediate something when you have already taken one side's position? I've never understood that. We spent some time on that issue, and I worked with Strobe Talbot [Deputy Secretary of State] on trying to improve relations between Japan and Russia. We tried to introduce this matter in our talks with the Russians to gain some perspective on this issue. I might add that during my four years as Assistant Secretary I engaged in bilateral consultations on Asia with the Russians. I went to Moscow twice, and Russian officials came to the U.S. once or twice to discuss Asian issues across the board. The feeling was that we were moving with China and Japan on regional security issues in general. Russia was a Pacific power which had specific interests in Korea, and it had relations with all of these other countries. Russia had potential economic interests and a desire for investment. They wanted to get into APEC and into the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF]. I felt that Russia was a
legitimate, important player, and one way that we could deal with them, particularly when they weren't in the other organizations yet, was to have these bilateral consultations.

I also pressed for Russian entrance into the ASEAN Regional Forum, and I helped to get them into ARF, as well as China and India.

Q: [Kennedy] Well, I was wondering. I started with the status of the Northern Islands.

LORD: Oh, yes. Without being belligerent about them and certainly recognizing that these islands involved something that Yeltsin couldn't resolve overnight, we made clear that we supported the Japanese position on that territory.

Q: [Kennedy] Now, before we leave Japan and U.S. relations with Japan, were there any issues in the Middle East, in the United Nations, or anywhere else on which we were either working with Japan or colluding with Japan. Also, in connection with the United Nations, were we involved in giving Japan one of the permanent Security Council seats?

LORD: Well, we of course supported them on this issue and still do, by virtue of Japan's weight and financial contributions which are important on the world and regional scene. We've supported Japan and Germany for permanent seats on the UN Security Council for some time. They've always appreciated the fact that we have kept that up.

You're absolutely right. We would meet and talk a lot about bilateral, economic, and security issues. We also spent a lot of time, particularly Secretary Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry, on the security side. We would also discuss other issues as well. On some of them the Japanese were very helpful, while on others they were cautious and not helpful.

On the Middle East the Japanese were helpful economically, in terms of contributions. However, they were always worried about their Arab flank because they obtained a lot of oil from the Middle East. We could never count on them to lean on the Arabs to be reasonable. Similarly, they were more cautious about Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf. Because of their dependence on oil, they wouldn't be as tough. That's sort of their style, anyway.

On Korea the Japanese were very helpful. They engaged in close coordination on this issue with us. They understood the Four Party Talks approach [involving the U.S., China, North Korea, and South Korea], without feeling that they were being shut out. We were meticulous in consulting with them. I also instituted trilateral consultations, between Japan, South Korea, and ourselves, at my level and arranged to have them conducted at the foreign ministers' level, as well, to make sure that the Japanese were comfortable with our approach. So over the last couple of years, every time we met in ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum] or APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Conference], when I went on my own for some meeting, or whenever the foreign ministers met, either in New York or elsewhere, we would often have my level or the foreign ministers of the three countries get together and make a statement, both to make Japan comfortable, but also to make
clear to the North Koreans that they faced a united front on our part and that they couldn't divide us from South Korea or divide Japan from South Korea. The North Koreans wanted to deal with us directly. This would make South Korea nervous and irrelevant. We couldn't let that happen. There were a lot of reasons to do that.

So on Korea, Japan was helpful. The Japanese also were willing not to press ahead with normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea, which would make South Korea nervous. They were willing to pace their relations with North Korea to what South Korean sensitivities determined. Financially, the Japanese were very helpful in supporting KEDO in an agreed framework agreeing to supply billions of dollars. We had good cooperation with Japan on Korea.

Similarly, on Cambodia, Mr. Akashi, a Japanese diplomat, was the lead UN official there for the elections, early in my term as Assistant Secretary, not to mention the fact that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Ogata, was also Japanese. The Japanese also stationed peacekeeping troops in Cambodia, a breakthrough for Japan. These Japanese troops were very carefully not provided with much in the way of weapons, and they stayed out of any situation where they would be likely to incur casualties. The Japanese were also helpful on Cambodia economically and in diplomatic terms.

On the other hand, regarding Burma, the Japanese were always concerned, as they often are in their diplomacy, about economics. They were not really willing to lean on the repressive Burmese Government. Japan generally provided economic assistance to Burma beyond what we thought was prudent. So the Japanese weren't particularly helpful on that. Certainly, on human rights they were not very helpful, partly because they were concerned about contracts and economic matters, as were the Europeans. The Japanese left it to us to do all of the heavy lifting on human rights. Partly, they still had guilt feelings about World War II, the rape of Nanking, and the occupation of China and Korea. The Germans have repeatedly acknowledged their misbehavior in Europe. The Japanese haven't really apologized for the rape of Nanjing and other atrocities but they are, nevertheless, sensitive to it. The Japanese feel awkward about lecturing the Chinese on human rights, when they behaved in such a bestial fashion during the 1930s and 1940s.

Q: [Kennedy] Did Vietnam enter into your discussions with the Japanese?

LORD: On Vietnam we kept in close touch with the Japanese. I would say that the Japanese were generally quite helpful. A problem in connection with Vietnam was not to have the Japanese leap too far ahead of us and sort of isolate us on the Vietnam issue in multilateral institutions and bilaterally in other contexts. The Japanese were out in front of us, but I would not say in an unhelpful way. We really can't complain too much about what the Japanese did on Vietnam and some other issues.

Q: [Kennedy] How about Bosnia? Did they...

LORD: I would say that the Japanese were helpful in that they contributed money for Bosnia programs. That's why we and the Japanese were so frustrated that it took so much
effort to get any money out of the Europeans on Korea and on KEDO. They finally did, but I use this as an example. Japan saw security in global, and not just regional terms. For example, they were willing to help out in Europe. But the Europeans wouldn't really help out in Asia.

May I mention Iran? There was a lot of concern over the Iran question. The Japanese weren't always helpful on that issue, in particular.

Q: [Kennedy] What about sanctions against Iraq? Did the Japanese play any role or did they try to stay out of it?

LORD: They kept a generally low profile. I don't think that they were disruptive on that. Of course, the Gulf War was before my time as Assistant Secretary. During the Gulf War the Japanese gave a lot of money, but they didn't get any credit for it. They didn't do it quickly enough. They didn't contribute anything like minesweepers or anything else that we wanted them to do.

Q: [Bernkopf] I was going to say, in just going around the circle, what about the Japanese attitude on Taiwan? You referred to the defense guideline issue. To what degree were there consultations on the Taiwan issue with Japan?

LORD: Well, we kept in close touch with Japan on China generally, including Taiwan. We never had any real disagreements. The mood in Japan in recent years sort of fluctuated on China and Taiwan with public opinion. Over the last several years, and particularly the last couple of years, there was a growing feeling that Japanese interests lay more with the mainland of China and that Japan shouldn't hamper itself by being overly solicitous about Taiwan. The Japanese never wanted to dump Taiwan, but the feeling we got was that they wanted to improve their relations with mainland China. However, the Chinese keep bashing the Japanese on different aspects of World War II. More recently, they have criticized China in connection with disputes over the control of certain islands. They have also beaten up on the Japanese regarding the exchange rate of the yen. These actions by China have tended to make Japan nervous. Whenever there is a U.S.-China summit meeting, the Japanese have been a little concerned as well.

For all of these reasons I think that, consequently, there has been some recent concern among the Japanese about Taiwan. I don't want to exaggerate this and I'm just talking about an amorphous mood. However, I felt that in the course of my four years as Assistant Secretary that the Japanese romance with China began to sour a little bit. The Japanese still knew that they had to and wanted to deal with China, but they began to see that China is going to be a real rival in the region. The Japanese are getting a little annoyed at the Chinese sticking it to them all the time when they meet with the United States. The Chinese seem to want to make the Japanese feel guilty. As I said, there are still some territorial disputes in the Yellow Sea, or other areas. Japanese-Chinese relations have always been a love-hate relationship.

On Taiwan there has always been a suspicion in China about Japanese motives, because
of the history of Japanese involvement in Taiwan. Regarding Taiwan the only two
countries that the Chinese really care about are the views of the United States and the
relations between Taiwan and Japan. The Chinese leaders generally look the other way
when Taiwanese leaders visit Southeast Asia, whether for official visits or golf games.
However, the Chinese go crazy when President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan goes to Cornell
University, either unofficially or to get an honorary degree. Also, President Lee Teng-hui
attended a Japanese university. So the Chinese complain loudly to us and Japan about
high-level dealings with Taiwan, but tend to overlook other countries.

I don't know of any U.S.-Japan disagreements on Taiwan. During the Taiwan missile
crisis, the Japanese welcomed our sending aircraft carriers to the region. They would not
have admitted this in public, but then they never do.

Prime Minister Hashimoto and other Japanese officials were very good on the defense
guidelines. One of their cabinet spokesmen got out of line, in effect, when he said that the
defense guidelines applied to Taiwan. I think that he was fired for that remark. Then,
somebody else tried to pull back and said that the defense guidelines didn't apply to
Taiwan. I think that was Koichi Kato. Prime Minister Hashimoto reaffirmed the U.S.-
Japan security treaty during the President's trip to Japan. Just as we reassure Japan when
a senior American official goes to China, without being defensive, we also don't want to
be provocative with Japan when we're dealing with China, although I would rather lean
toward Japan if we have to choose.

So before President Clinton's trip to Japan and during the process of reviewing U.S.-
Japanese defense arrangements, we kept the Chinese posted. We briefed the Chinese fully
just before the announcements in Japan and on the public statements made during the trip
by the Japanese Prime Minister and the President, specifically on the defense guidelines.
We made clear that our defense treaty was not directed at China and that we wanted
constructive relations with China. We talked to the Chinese privately as well.

We found ways to remind them, however, that firing missiles in the Taiwan Straits and
being belligerent might well contribute to a tightening of the relationship between the
U.S. and Japan. We said that it wasn't in China's interest to be provocative. However, that
was done with some subtlety.

So, in answer to your question I don't remember any serious disagreements between the
U.S. and Japan on Taiwan.

Q: [Bernkopf] Were the Japanese at all reluctant to discuss Taiwan and future problems,
in the event of a conflict?

LORD: The Japanese certainly made no public statement or let any comment on this
subject leak out, although they were more relaxed in talking about Korea than they were
about Taiwan. I wasn't in on all of the detailed discussions on contingency planning, and
I can't say just how precise we were on this. However, the U.S. and Japan continue to
maintain that the defense guidelines apply to situations and not places. Nevertheless, it's
clear, and this is a strictly hypothetical comment, that if China launched an obvious act of aggression against Taiwan, and Japan wouldn't let us use our bases in Japan or help us out, a lot of Americans would wonder what the U.S.-Japanese alliance was all about. I think that the Japanese understand that. However, everyone hopes that we never get to that point.

Q: [Kennedy] When we talk about a defensive alliance, we should note that things have changed. You have to be defensive against something. How would we deal with a putative Chinese attack on Taiwan and what have we been thinking about that? Taiwan is obviously something.

LORD: Obviously, the easiest thing to point to, and the least controversial aspect is Korea. We had no objection to saying, either publicly and privately, that we were going to work out with the Japanese how we can coordinate better in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In such a situation Japan would be absolutely crucial as a staging base. We would want to be sure that we could use all of Japan's bases and we would want to be sure that they would back us up with refueling, minesweeping, and so on. So that's an easy contingency to discuss. That's the one that we point to.

Beyond that, what we've been stressing generally is the importance of this treaty for regional stability and reassuring people with our presence, with the added virtue of having troops in the area. Beyond Korea we are not specific in using examples in public. The treaty is there and it's meant to be a deterrent. I don't even know, myself, in the years since I left the Department of State, how much private precision we have on the Taiwan situation, on a contingency basis. We do have quite a bit of precision on South Korea. It's hard to be specific and quantify, but there is no question that our defense relationship with Japan does provide a sense of stability in the region. The U.S.-Japan relationship and our troop presence generally in Asia are going to be under review if not challenge if we ever get a settlement in Korea. Don't hold your breath until this is accomplished. However, if the Korean situation is resolved and the country is unified, or at least peace returns to the Korean Peninsula, then people are going to wonder why we have all of these U.S. forces in Asia.

We'll get to Korea in just a minute. That's the next subject. However, the fact is that the Koreans themselves, and I've heard President Kim Dae Jung say this in so many words, want us to stay on in South Korea even if North and South Korea are reunified. He said that he would say this to his North Korean partner if the country is ever reunified, and we'll get back to that. If we take our troops out of South Korea and they're only in Japan, that will put all the more domestic, political pressures on Japan to ask the U.S. to withdraw our forces from Japan as well. So we have to stress, and we believe this, that the presence of U.S. forces in the area, including Korea, provides regional stability.

In fact, if the threat to our forces and to South Korea all but disappears, then we probably should reduce or redeploy at least our ground forces. But our air and naval forces generally and troops remaining in Japan and to some extent in South Korea would still be relevant. We don't want Japan to be the only place in the Pacific where we have troops,
besides Hawaii and Guam. Have I answered your question?

Q: [Kennedy] Yes.

LORD: Our posture should be one of being ready to cooperate in crises unforeseen. This is not automatic, but the point is that the ways are greased to make it possible to move much more automatically and quickly in a cooperative way, with Japan's support, on any crisis in the area. So a crisis could be over islands out in the Pacific Ocean which are disputed by various countries. Another hypothetical crisis could involve Taiwan. Still another possibility could involve Korea. Among other things, we're talking about sea lanes and commercial lanes of communications which are used by the great bulk of the trade of Japan and other countries. These sea lanes of communications could be used for the movement of energy resources from the Middle East. We're talking about strategic locations. So our purpose is to be ready. The fact is that, right now, people cannot envisage specific conflicts that are likely to emerge beyond the case of Korea, which is a specific commitment, and Taiwan, where we are deliberately ambiguous. I think that people would say that those are the two points of the greatest, potential danger in East Asia right now.

Q: [Kennedy] You served as Ambassador to China, and you saw, I don't know how many, but in any case a lot of Chinese going to the United States to study. I mean, they were studying subjects at important levels. They were coming back to China. Obviously, this present generation of Chinese includes a lot of people who have a real understanding of the United States. They will be moving into important positions in their families and elsewhere.

What about Japan? Was there much intermingling between official Americans in Tokyo and Japanese who were going to the United States for graduate studies?

LORD: Quite a few Japanese have come to the United States for study and other purposes. They have not come in as large numbers as the Chinese and people from Taiwan, Malaysia, and so on. The real problem is that there are very few Americans going to Japan to study over there, probably for language reasons. One of the goals of Ambassador Mondale was to increase the number of Americans going to Japan, both to increase understanding between our two countries and to develop a cadre of Americans who, in the future, would understand Japan better and how to deal with it.

I don't have a good sense of the number of Japanese coming to study in the U.S., but there are quite a few, and the number is significant. Certainly, as the younger generation of Japanese grows up, you can see this trend, when you deal with ordinary people and even if you meet people at the Vice Ministerial level - the younger generation of Japanese speaks English much better, is more outspoken and more candid with you, and is more willing to speak up at multilateral conferences, and even disagree among themselves. This tendency has been partly nurtured by an organization of which I was a member, The Trilateral Commission, which was set up in the early 1970s. Among other reasons, it was established to encourage the Japanese to understand their global and regional responsibilities and to become more outspoken. That has encouraged the process, as has
This question of cultural and educational exchange is important. This may sound like a bromide, but I do believe that it has a lot to do with improving relations. I was a member of the U.S.-Japan Foundation, one of the non-governmental hats I wore before I went to work for the U.S. Government. We were promoting this. I think that there are enough Japanese coming in this direction, but there aren't enough Americans going in the other direction.

**XXV. STATE DEPARTMENT ASSISTANT SECRETARY - KOREA (1993-1997)**

*Q: [Kennedy] Let's turn now to Korea, North and South. You mentioned that you had gotten involved in the nuclear issue, but maybe, initially, we should talk more about how you saw both of these countries at the time you became Assistant Secretary and how things the situation later evolved.*

LORD: I listed Korea after Japan in the 10 goals I mentioned in my statement at the confirmation hearing before the U.S. Senate, when I was appointed Assistant Secretary. This was not a strict, rank ordering, but Korea was one of the early goals I mentioned because it was the most urgent security problem facing us, certainly in East Asia, and probably in the world. Various aspects of Korean affairs were to occupy a great deal of my time, correctly in my view, during the four years I served as Assistant Secretary. Probably, Korean affairs tied with Japan in first place for my attention, although China was very important as well. However, Korea was very important throughout this period. I guess that Japan, Korea, and China are and were the highest priorities in terms of significance to the U.S. in East Asia.

Korean affairs also involve the most difficult issues facing the United States, and not only in terms of the security challenge. North Korea is one of the most opaque and difficult regimes I have dealt with in my political career, and I've seen some pretty nasty and mysterious governments. Our intelligence on North Korea is very poor. I'm not blaming the intelligence community for that. We just don't know what the hell is going on there. So that's one part of the problem.

Then South Korea is very sensitive to any dealings we may have with North Korea. You always have to be very careful not to hurt that relationship. I feel very strongly about that principle. Furthermore, it is not only us who don't understand what's going on in North Korea. The Japanese, the Chinese, the Russians, and the South Koreans don't really know much about North Korea, either. North Korea is not only a very unpleasant regime. North Korea is almost totally opaque, and that made it difficult to deal with them.

Korea is obviously important to the U.S. because we have about 37,000 troops in Korea South of the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone]. We would certainly win any conventional war with North Korea, but there would be tremendous casualties on the U.S. side and particularly among the South Koreans and their people. The DMZ is only 20 or 30 miles North of Seoul. The North Koreans have a very large number of artillery pieces lined up North of the 38th parallel, and God knows what they've hidden in underground caves.
They can wreak a lot of damage before we can put the genie back in the bottle. Then, on top of that, there is the potential nuclear threat coming out of North Korea, and I'll get to that in a minute.

Then there is the fact that we once fought a war there against North Korea and with China, so there's an important, Chinese dimension, including their influence. There are crucial security, historical, cultural, and even economic reasons for Japan to be interested in Korea. Russia is clearly interested in Korea. So, for all of these reasons, North Korea presented extremely important and complex issues to the United States.

Throughout my four years as Assistant Secretary my personal principle was that our relationship with South Korea, however difficult at times, always had to come first. It is true that there were some people in my bureau, able and good people, who would get sufficiently annoyed with the South Korean regime in Seoul, or sufficiently worried about the nuclear crisis, or who advocated tactics that would be more efficient, if we leaned a little bit more toward North Korea. I wouldn't give South Korea a veto over our policy, but within the State Department I was probably the one most solicitous of South Korean sensitivities. I don't say this in criticism of others. I think that we could disagree about how much the South Koreans were holding us back and endangering our security interests at times by being overly sensitive. During the early 1990s, the Seoul government, under Kim Young Sam, was somewhat “hawkish.” It became more “dovish” under Kim Dae Jung after I left. I always felt that we had to be rock solid with the South Koreans, as a matter of principle and because of how we need to treat our allies. The South Koreans were the closest to North Korea and were the most threatened by the North Korean regime. It is their peninsula after all. For domestic political and Congressional reasons, our ties to our allies, and our democratic allies at that, versus this nasty regime in North Korea - these were other reasons to be close to South Korea. I spent a great deal of time on South Korea both in consultations and trips there. I think that my major contribution throughout this period was holding the South Koreans' hands and working hard on that aspect of our relations, even as I enthusiastically supported the agreed framework and our efforts to try to open up North Korea. This was in our own self interest.

I understood that South Korea could be unreasonable and that we had our own interests to defend. I felt that we shouldn't let South Korean sensitivities endanger our other security interests. But I understood the South Korean point of view, and my basic impulse was to stick with South Korea.

So in view of this principle of working with the South Koreans, I applied it during many trips of my own to South Korea, as well as in dealing constantly with the South Korean Ambassador in Washington. I did this by pushing for as many meetings as possible between the foreign ministers, not to mention the Presidents. I instituted trilateral consultations between the Japanese, the South Koreans, and myself, at my level and at the foreign minister level. I went with the President to South Korea. I also traveled there with Secretary of State Christopher and with the U.S. Secretary of Defense, etc.
Above all, I pushed for North-South dialogues. I sought to deflect the North Korean
decades-long objective of dealing directly with us over the heads of the South Koreans.
The North Koreans were trying to make the South Koreans nervous and irrelevant. Now
that brings us to the nuclear question, which, of course, was the major issue, although we
can get into some other issues as well. There's been some criticism of the 1994
Agreement which was finally worked out with the North Koreans, including criticism by
figures from the Bush administration. I think that it is reasonable for us to have
disagreements, but the fact is, and I'm not a partisan in this respect, that we had a
festering nuclear problem which the Bush administration hadn't done a hell of a lot about
by the time President Clinton came into office. So for these Bush administration figures
to turn around and be critical of the nuclear agreement reached by the Clinton
administration is misguided.

Not everyone from the Bush administration was equally guilty in this respect. To his
credit Ambassador Don Gregg has been superb on this issue and has been very
supportive. Others have been less supportive. Some have been harshly critical.

The other problem that I have with the critics is their view of the nuclear agreement.
Although this agreement is not perfect, no one has come up with a better solution. I'll go
into this in more detail, but the choice we faced was either the agreement we reached
with North Korea or a real possibility of war with a North Korea which had a significant
military threat. Essentially what we did was to reach an admittedly imperfect agreement
aimed at closing off the North Korean nuclear capability over time. This was in exchange
for economic help to North Korea to replace the energy they wouldn't have, with an
ability to call off all bets if the North Koreans started violating the nuclear agreement.

When the Clinton administration entered office, the problem was that the North Koreans,
who had signed the NPT [Non Proliferation Treaty], I believe, in the 1980s, were
obligated to undergo inspections of their nuclear facilities by the International Atomic
Energy Agency [IAEA]. During the early months of the Clinton administration the North
Koreans were dragging their feet on this issue and, particularly, on a plutonium
producing complex in Yongbon.
There were negotiations and pressures, as well as attempts through the UN, the IAEA,
and in cooperation with the Chinese and others, to try to get the North Koreans to do
what they were obligated to do under the NPT. We got to the point where a crisis was
precipitated by a North Korean threat to withdraw from the NPT. This would have been
bad for the treaty in general. However, and more specifically, this would have meant that
the North Koreans were hell bent on developing a nuclear capability.

So we began an intensive process of negotiations, and here we get to the point which
involved Bob Gallucci. Let me say that he did a superb job in very difficult negotiations.
At the time and since then some people wondered why Win Lord didn't handle this job or
why he didn't seem to have a problem with Gallucci doing the job. First of all, I can't tell
you whether, if I had wanted this job, I would have been chosen to handle it. It required
tremendous expertise on nuclear non proliferation issues which Bob had. I knew much
more than Bob did about Asia. However, it was never a contest because I didn't want to
do this job.

This was absolutely true for two reasons. First, I felt comfortable with this arrangement, with the U.S. taking the lead with North Korea on this nuclear question. Like it or not, we had to take the lead, and not South Korea. This is a global problem, involving nuclear weapons and non-proliferation. It has implications around the world and not just for the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the symbolism of a non-Asian person being in the lead made sense to me, not to mention some of Bob Gallucci’s great experience in nuclear proliferation and technical matters. I had done a lot of work on proliferation but I wasn't even close to his expertise, even though I knew more about Asia than he did. So I felt that, symbolically, this made sense.

More significantly, in my own judgment, I knew that handling these negotiations with North Korea was a full-time job. In terms of prestige and profile, I know you are better off taking one big job and pulling it off, whether this involves someone like Bob on Korea or Dick Holbrooke on Bosnia. That's the way to give yourself a high profile. This was earned by both gentlemen, I might add. However, I was concerned about our Asian policy in general. There was no way to do the Korean negotiations without spending somewhere between 75 and 99 percent of my time on it. The job involved running around, negotiating with the North Koreans and talking to the South Koreans, Russians, Japanese, and Chinese, plus dealing with members of Congress and the press. It was a full time or at least three quarters time job.

In my job as Assistant Secretary I was concerned about China, Japan, Southeast Asia, the Pacific Community, and all of the other issues, including Vietnam, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC. To give all of that up and leave it to my deputies just didn't make sense. I mention that because some people say: "Well, Lord turned over Korea to Gallucci and so on."

**Q:** [Kennedy] Could you give us a quick background note on Gallucci?

**LORD:** For a detailed background, we'd have to look it up. I know that he had served in Politico-Military affairs and had handled some specific non-proliferation negotiations.

**Q:** [Bernkopf] He was out in the parking lot in Iraq, in the early days after the Gulf War, trying to get inspections done. The Iraqis were stonewalling us. So he'd been involved in the same kind of situation.

**LORD:** Yes, and his general background was arms control and non-proliferation. He was the head of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and a very smart guy. He turned out to be a terrific negotiator. I might add, to the disappointment of our listeners who prefer controversy, that he and I couldn't have worked more closely together than we did.

**Q:** [Bernkopf] I wanted to ask you that. How did you find working with a specialist of this kind?
LORD: This was an ideal setup. It's another reason that I didn't want to do this job. I wanted to do all of these other things. It wasn't as if I was being cut out. I obviously wasn't going to have the profile. He had elevated rank, which meant that he could report to the NSC [National Security Council] and to the White House directly with Secretary Christopher and everyone else sitting there. This was the way it worked in practice and the way I knew it would work, because we had good relations and we also worked in close coordination. So the first thing I did was to make sure that Gallucci’s deputy was also my deputy. That is, Tom Hubbard. We also had a very strong desk and gave a lot of support to him. It was a real intermingling of the Bureau of East Asian Affairs and the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. Gallucci knew that he needed help on the Asian front, even though he knew non proliferation issues, particularly regarding Korea.

We kept in the closest touch. We did that also with the Defense Department, as you have to, and with the intelligence agencies. There were seldom any major disagreements on ideas. He negotiated, sometimes being a little bit more flexible toward the North Koreans, while I, with my South Korean loyalties, would at times be a little bit more restrained. This was never a major issue. Gallucci deserved all of the credit that he got, and he did a fabulous job. He would be the first to say Tom Hubbard was essential to what he did and that we worked as two bureaus in a beautiful fashion. So it really was an achievement. Sometimes this kind of arrangement doesn't work. However, it is a good example of a regional bureau and a functional bureau in the State Department, working together hand in glove. People in the delegation would go to negotiate and then meet back in Washington. They would get as much, if not more, from my bureau than from his own bureau.

It was a terrifically integrated affair. I felt that I had full input into policy recommendations and decisions. I spent quite a bit of time on it but I was able to do everything else that I wanted to do.

Q: [Kennedy] You say that there was criticism that we should have done this or that. Did you find that you were involved in more or less fending off criticism while Gallucci went on with his work? Were there a lot of quarterbacks in the press?

LORD: Do you mean on the ultimate agreement or on my role?

Q: [Kennedy] Not on your role as such. I'm really talking about your role in dealing with the problem of all of these other quarterbacks who were trying to say that we should do this or should do that.

LORD: Well, Gallucci had to deal with that problem front and center as well.

What I will do now, without going into any great detail that is well known, is to say that since we are talking about Korea, the first major event was President Bush's trip to South Korea in July, 1993, after he went to Japan. He visited the DMZ to underline our solidarity with South Korea. He gave a major, security speech in Korea.
Q: [Kennedy] Who was the President of South Korea at that time?

LORD: Kim Yong Sam, a former dissident, came in as President about the same time.

Q: [Kennedy] How long...

LORD: They never really hit it off very well. Kim Yong Sam, in all fairness, was a little flaky and volatile, reading the editorials in the press from day to day and often adjusting his policies in accordance with them. He was very suspicious of the U.S. Understandably, he was also suspicious of North Korea. He was frustrated, as many Koreans were, that they were not in the lead on negotiations with the North Koreans. We kept pressing very hard for North-South talks as well but we thought that we had to take the lead on the nuclear question because we were a nuclear power and had leverage with North Korea that South Korea didn't have. We went out of our way to keep the South Koreans posted and to consult with them throughout. They were on the scene, and we would talk to them after the meetings. We talked to them in Washington and in Seoul.

There was less than full camaraderie in the President’s meetings, although the atmosphere wasn't unfriendly. It was just that Kim Yong Sam was frankly not particularly impressive, unlike his predecessor. He had been a dissident. I had first met him when I was in Seoul for the Olympic Games in 1988. We had breakfast together. I can't remember what the issue was but first we said that we would keep our conversation essentially off the record, and not debrief the press afterwards. Then Kim Yong Sam turned my position upside down with the press, so I never had a particularly positive view of him.

On the whole, Kim Yong Sam was cordial to me, and I used to see him occasionally on my own. I attended a lot of meetings with the Foreign and Defense Ministers and the President. However, I would have to say that Kim Yong Sam was not one of the more impressive leaders that we had to deal with. This didn't help our diplomacy during this period because he was unpredictable. He would often sway back and forth, depending on public opinion. As I said, he was particularly suspicious of our dealings with the North Koreans, even though we went out of our way to keep him informed. I spent a lot of time personally in consulting with him and his colleagues and reassuring them.

Q: [Kennedy] Did you find that you could deal with a corps of professional Ministry of Foreign Affairs people in Seoul whom you could include on the team there?

LORD: Kim Yong Sam had a very secretive way of operating. He would play his advisers off against each other. For example, he would play the Blue House, which is the equivalent of our White House, against the South Korean Foreign Ministry.

Q: [Kennedy] Sounds like Kissinger...

LORD: I was, of course, shocked at all of this. The most helpful person was the first Foreign Minister we dealt with while I was there, a man named Han Sung-Joo. He had
come out of academia. I had known him for a long time. He had been my host when I was at a conference at a think tank in the late 1970s. He was highly respected. He had never previously served in the South Korean Government.

He turned out to be quite courageous in supporting our efforts with North Korea. He obviously represented South Korean interests and views very strongly but he was always trying to get the South Korean President and the Blue House to be reasonable with regard to our dealings with North Korea and on the agreement. He paid a price for it, essentially by helping us to get the agreement completed, despite some South Korean concerns. I think that some people in the Blue House developed some animus against him, and he was eased out as Foreign Minister at a certain point.

His successor as Foreign Minister was also very helpful. He was Ro Myung Gong, who had been South Korean Ambassador to Tokyo. He was a career diplomat and also was a very constructive force. He worked with us. He was eased out later on. His place as Foreign Minister was finally taken by the former South Korean National Security Adviser. So we essentially had him to deal with.

During this time we were blessed with a superb Ambassador in South Korea, Jim Laney, who had taught in Korea and spoke Korean. He had previously been in South Korea in the 1970s, I believe. Again, he was a good example, as Ambassador Mondale had been, of the opposite of suffering from clientitis. He would present the South Korean perspective. But he would carry difficult messages and would press the South Koreans to be reasonable. He was an extremely able and good person to work with. We were blessed with a strong American Embassy in Seoul. Ambassador Laney's Deputy Chief of Mission, Chuck Kartman, is now a Special Ambassador for negotiations on the nuclear issue. He was confirmed by the Senate last week. We had a strong team in the Embassy, working with Hubbard, in addition to Gallucci. Other people in Gallucci’s office were very good. They were supported by a strong desk in Washington.

On the South Korean side we had very little to deal with. We had a volatile top guy and an able, constructive Foreign Minister who didn't have all that much power. So it was not easy.

Q: [Kennedy] We're talking now about an opaque system, which allows editors and commentators to have a wonderful time because they can make up anything that they want. Had Kim Il Sung [long time leader of North Korea] died at this point?

LORD: Well, before answering that question I would like to get back a little bit to the narrative. In the midst of the difficulties that we were having with the North Koreans, and I don't recall the exact dates, as 1993 wore on, and then in 1994, we got to the point where the North Koreans were on the verge of pulling out of the NPT [Non Proliferation Treaty]. So we went to the UN and pressed for sanctions against North Korea. The situation was getting quite tense. Of course, we had to bring along the Japanese, who were a little bit nervous but were generally supportive. The South Koreans, of course, were happy to work with us. The Chinese were dragging their feet, as were the Russians.
However, we managed to get a UNSC President’s statement even though we didn't get a Security Council resolution. We were moving toward sanctions because the North Koreans were flouting the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections.

I don't recall the exact language they used, but the North Koreans threatened that sanctions could or would lead to war. So people have to remember that this was a very dangerous situation. We couldn’t ignore the budding nuclear threat, and we didn’t wish to risk a bloody war. We negotiated a less than perfect agreement but a very good one, in my view. Also, we were willing to flex our muscles. This was a classic lesson in diplomacy. You have to have sticks and carrots to use. The stick was that we were prepared to go for sanctions, and we worked hard on that at the UN. This was a very tense time, and people tend to forget this.

During this time we also reinforced our forces in South Korea to strengthen our diplomatic hand and to be ready for conflict. We sent Patriot anti-missile weapons. We sent Apache helicopters. And, in the middle of an NSC [National Security Council] meeting, at which I was not present, there was talk of further force deployments. There were options being considered of major reinforcements, moderate reinforcements, and token reinforcements. The President was close to deciding even at that meeting to have another, major buildup of our forces. Then a message came from former President Carter, who was visiting North Korea, of a possible breakthrough with Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader.

Let me just back off a bit and refer to former President Carter. There was a lot of ambivalence about his role. Obviously, there was general respect for him as a former President, as someone who had been a capable ex-President interested in humanitarian causes. He conducted himself very well in the service of world peace and alleviating disease and hunger. Of course, he was a Democrat. President Clinton was also a Democrat, and you had to pay attention to that, although the two of them had never been close. Secretary Christopher had worked for President Carter as Deputy Secretary of State and knew him well. However, President Carter also had a tremendous ego. He didn't mind getting the Nobel Peace Prize. On occasion, despite a strong reputation on human rights, he has shown an amazing ability to tolerate really ugly world leaders. He has been on occasion a kind of unguided missile.

Q: [Kennedy] When was this? You have to get the feel for the man.

LORD: Carter had some ego, and former Presidents tend to have some ego. In any event, President Clinton couldn't say "No" when former President Carter said that he would like to go to North Korea. Nor could Secretary Christopher. However, everyone was a little bit nervous. As you know, this was a tense time. We weren't quite sure how rock solid former President Carter would be with the North Koreans or whether he would undercut our position. So Gallucci and I, in addition to others, including my deputies and so on, brought former President Carter up to speed as best we could before he went out to North Korea.

It is only fair here to say that former President Carter played a major and significant role
at this time. We were at this very tense moment of possible major redeployments of U.S. forces. We were already strengthening our forces in South Korea and moving at the UN. The North Koreans were using very bellicose language. At that point, a telephone call came through from former President Carter that he had seen Kim Il Sung [long time leader of North Korea]. I don't have the exact language that Carter used, but the report was that the North Koreans were willing to freeze what they were doing on the nuclear front in exchange for negotiations. The North Koreans had been doing several things in the nuclear area. Now, of course, they wanted to negotiate only with us and thus make the South Koreans nervous. However, for the reasons I mentioned, we were in close consultations with the South Koreans, and that's the way we had to proceed anyway.

This North Korean offer did put a hold on North Korean nuclear development. At some point, and it may have been at this same meeting, he persuaded Kim Il Sung to agree to meet face to face with President Kim Yong Sam of South Korea. However, then Kim Il Sung died before he actually met with him.

Nevertheless, this offer was important because it gave us an opening for the negotiations. It stopped the momentum of the North Korean nuclear program, which meant that it lessened the tensions that had built up by this time and opened up the possibility of negotiations. It meant that the Great Leader [name generally used to refer to Kim Il Sung in North Korea], who had all of this prestige in North Korea, whether it was deserved or not, had put his stamp on at least talking about this issue and being at least willing to bargain away their nuclear program. Any successor to Kim Il Sung who took over in North Korea, particularly Kim Il Sung's son, Kim Jong Il, could negotiate on this issue because he had the cover that this process was started by Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong Il couldn't have started this by himself.

So former President Carter made an historic contribution, for all of the concerns and nervousness we had in connection with his travels. One of my officers traveled with him on each of his trips in East Asia. Dick Christianson had actually been the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] for some time.

Then the negotiations with the North Koreans started. Again, I don't have the exact date. The basic agreement was reached in October, 1994. Without trying to be precise on the details, the agreement contained the following main points. The North Koreans would stop the operation of the small reactor that they had had for some time. They not only would not have any activity at this site, they would not continue to build two larger reactors. They would dismantle them over time. The North Koreans would agree to store the reprocessed nuclear fuel that they already had and which was possibly of weapons grade; they would agree to store and not use this reprocessed fuel and hopefully ship it out of the country. They would agree to real IAEA inspections. They would remain within the NPT system. So, in effect, they were saying that they would freeze their nuclear program and ultimately dismantle it, in exchange for certain things, which I will get to in a minute.

The fact is that, at this point, we thought that the North Koreans had enough plutonium
for one or possibly two nuclear devices. This doesn't mean that they had already produced the devices, but there was enough plutonium not accounted for to make one or two bombs. This was what the big crisis over IAEA inspections was about. That is, their accounting for their plutonium. However, I have seen estimates that, with their facilities, they were on the verge of being able to produce anywhere from six to 10 nuclear weapons a year in the following years. So we faced the prospect of tens or dozens of nuclear weapons at some point over the coming years.

One choice was to acquiesce in that - this was an unacceptable danger to the Korean Peninsula, to South Korean and American lives, and to the global, non-proliferation system. The other choices were to probably go to war or make an agreement with North Korea. Sanctions, by themselves, clearly weren't going to stop the North Koreans from pursuing their nuclear program. We put sanctions on and created pressure so we could remove those sanctions in exchange for genuine negotiations. I am referring to temporary sanctions and not the long-standing, bilateral sanctions such as on terrorism. It was clear that North Korea was an economic basket case. However, it was sufficiently non-reliant on outside help that international sanctions, even if enforced across the board, were not going to make them change their nuclear program, even if they had to suffer economically. We were not at all confident about full Chinese compliance in any event.

So we didn't have the option of stopping the North Korean nuclear program strictly by economic means. This left the option of stopping their nuclear program by military means. Now, we bandied about a surgical strike on their nuclear capabilities. We looked at these things carefully. First, we weren't sure that we could hit the North Korean nuclear facilities. We didn't know whether the North Koreans had some underground facilities or what we could hit. Secondly, we couldn't be sure that there wouldn't be radioactive fallout from the facilities that we did hit. In the relatively small Korean Peninsula we might wind up hitting ourselves and our own troops, as well as the South Koreans and the North Koreans. Depending on the way that the winds blow, there was a danger that the nuclear fallout from nuclear strikes would hit Japan. Finally, of course, whatever our superiority, if we attacked North Korea’s nuclear sites, we thought that the odds were extremely high that the North Koreans would launch an attack on South Korea, with all of the consequent devastation in Seoul and elsewhere. So, serious as this was, we didn't think that “surgical strikes” was an attractive option either.

I'm not trying to set up a straw man. They really were terrible choices which people now forget, when they criticize the agreement reached.

In addition to freezing and eventually dismantling the North Korean nuclear program and their staying in the NPT, North Korea also agreed to IAEA inspections, but we didn't get everything that we wanted. The only important thing that we didn't get was an immediate accounting for the plutonium in North Korea which had set off the crisis in the first place. At the most, this material would have been enough for one and possibly two bombs. But the North Koreans were committed to account for their plutonium over a projected period of five years, at a particular stage when we would provide critical help with the “safer” nuclear reactors we were to build. The North Koreans accepted the obligation to allow
the inspections before they got the essential components for the two nuclear light water reactors, which we promised to provide them. So they wouldn't get what they needed before they fessed up. However, they didn't have to fess up for about five years.

A lot of people criticize this fact. They said that we were prepared to let the North Koreans continue to hide this plutonium for several more years. It's true that we would have preferred to get an immediate and full accounting for this plutonium. Thus, in exchange for freezing and dismantling their nuclear program, there was the danger that they might have enough plutonium for one or two bombs, which they couldn't do anything with anyway. We felt that this risk was worth it in order to freeze the rest of the North Korean nuclear program, have them dismantle these facilities, and get this accounting for the plutonium in a few years.

Q: [Kennedy] Was this five year moratorium basically a matter of face?

LORD: No. The North Koreans obviously wanted to delay dismantling their facilities as long as they could. One can be suspicious of them, and with good reason. It wasn't literally a delay of five years. Dismantling these facilities was required at a stage when we were prepared to give them major components for building light water reactors. They would have to dismantle these existing facilities and account for their plutonium.

Together with South Korea and Japan, we agreed on a couple of other things to make it worthwhile for North Korea. When you make a deal, you have to make concessions. First, working with others, we would provide two light water reactors to replace the kind of graphite moderated reactors, whatever the kind they had, which are more dangerous for proliferation. The North Koreans were going to dismantle these. The light water reactors were intended for energy generating purposes to replace the energy they were giving up through dismantlement.

This reactor building program involved a roughly $7.0 billion commitment spread out over about 10 years. We worked out an agreement with the North Koreans, which remains in effect today, that the South Koreans would provide roughly 70 percent of the funding and the Japanese would provide roughly 20 or 25 percent of the funding. We told our Congress that we wouldn't be financing the construction of these light water reactors. The reason that the South Koreans and the Japanese agreed to this is that, first, they thought that the overall deal was in their interest, easing tensions in their region. Secondly, a lot of South Korean and Japanese companies would expect to get the construction contracts. Also this would intertwine North Korea and make it dependent on South Korean and Japanese funding, construction, and engineering. Thus the agreement would expose North Korea to Japanese and particularly South Korean personnel and open up North Korean society to them. So there were a lot of reasons for Japan and South Korea to agree to this.

At that point there wasn't an Asian financial crisis. Even Japan looked pretty rich at that point. Certainly, South Korea didn't seem to have a financial problem.

On the other hand, until North Korea got these new reactors built, with the old reactors being frozen, North Korea claimed, and to a certain extent this was plausible, that they
had energy deficit problems. So we also agreed to provide a certain amount of heavy fuel oil for electric power generation. I forget the exact tonnage involved. The U.S. assumed the responsibility of getting help from others and agreed to provide a major share of this help. There were a lot of other details, but it boiled down to a commitment on our part of something like $25-30 million a year over 10 years. A delay of several years would be involved in finding out whether the North Koreans had plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs in exchange for their freezing and then dismantling their entire nuclear program and putting in its place something much safer and with Japan and South Korea footing almost all of the bills. Now, I'm not claiming that this agreement was perfect, but that the our rationale we used. None of the critics of the deal have come up with a better solution to the crisis we faced in 1993-94.

The South Koreans were nervous throughout this process because they weren't the chief negotiators. The North Koreans always made it difficult for the South Koreans. They continued to insult the South Koreans and President Kim Yong Sam personally. So there always was a lot of tension involved, not only in working on this agreement but in implementing it. The South Koreans didn't like the fact that we couldn't uncover plutonium secrets. They weren't wild about this agreement, but this wasn't a huge problem. They were concerned about the cost of KEDO [Korean Economic Development Organization, set up to implement the deal], but I've told you why they didn't mind going ahead. There were a lot of hard liners in South Korea who didn't want to negotiate with North Korea. They thought that this agreement might also tend to prop up North Korea. It was a difficult choice for South Korea. It took some leaning on them to obtain their agreement.

We insisted, and I was very strong on this point, as was Gallucci, that there would be a provision in the agreement that North Korea had to talk to South Korea about the future of the Korean Peninsula. (End of tape)

Q: Dr. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker will be in attendance in this section of the interview and may ask some questions.

LORD: With regard to Korea, our clear principle from the beginning was that North Korea had to talk to South Korea. While we would take the lead on the nuclear question, North Korea had to talk to South Korea and not skirt South Korea and try to talk to us on questions like stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula and a possible peace agreement, maintaining the armistice agreement of 1953, a reunification agreement, and so forth. So we were prepared to walk away from the agreement if North Korea did not talk to South Korea.

The last crisis in the negotiations which Gallucci conducted was on this very issue of a North-South dialogue. We said that, without such a dialogue, we wouldn't have an agreement. So North Korea caved on that issue at the last minute. That didn't mean that they immediately rushed to talk to the South Koreans, but at least we had the principle accepted, which we could point to.

Throughout this process we kept our Japanese, Chinese, and Russian partners closely
involved. The Chinese generally supported the agreement. I don't know whether they leaned on the North Koreans. They wouldn't tell you if they had, and probably, as I said earlier, at this point they weren't quite prepared to be as helpful as they were later on regarding the Korean question. However, they were already generally constructive. We kept them very closely posted on this issue. We asked them to work on the North Koreans and to try to get them to be reasonable throughout this process. The Japanese and the Russians were generally supportive. Of course, later on the Russians were upset when we had Four Power Talks [involving the U.S., China, North Korea, and South Korea], because they were left out. They preferred a Six Power approach.

The Agreement which came out of negotiation with North Korea generally had a positive reaction, including in the U.S. However, then, and ever since, there has been some criticism of the agreement. I understand this to a certain extent, although I have explained the very difficult choices we faced. I am convinced to this day that the agreement as it was reached was the best outcome at the time and one of the major achievements of the Clinton administration.

There are those who just don't like dealing with the North Koreans. After all, they are a nasty, brutish bunch. There are those who feel that several billion dollars worth of light nuclear reactors, plus the heavy fuel oil provided to North Korea amounted to rewarding brutish behavior, threats, buying off the North Koreans, and bribing them. There are those who feel that the North Koreans can't be trusted anyway. Also, many of the critics didn't like the fact that we didn't discover whether they had one or two nuclear bombs. There were mixed signals occasionally coming out of South Korea expressing doubts about the agreement or about our fidelity to them, which in turn stirred our domestic critics. At times we would have to slap certain of these South Koreans down, and they would then deny having made these comments. Then we would find them leaking the same views to someone else. This sort of fed conservative opposition to the agreement at times.

However, on the whole South Korea supported the agreement. Obviously, they would have preferred their being more directly involved in the negotiating process. They had some doubts but they basically supported it. We wouldn't have entered into this agreement if they didn't support it, but it did take some leaning on the South Koreans, as well as very tough negotiations with the North Koreans.

Of course, Japan, China, and Russia were very positive about the agreement. Ever since then we've been working to implement the agreement. The most difficult area on the domestic front, in concrete terms, has been to get enough funding for the heavy fuel oil. Even as we speak the KEDO reactor expenses are coming under pressure, but that's back loaded, there isn't a lot of heavy expense for Japan and South Korea in the early period. KEDO’s presence is a major part of the agreement, i.e., sending a lot of South Koreans and other people up to North Korea. It is beginning to have an impact on perceptions in North Korea, and that's useful.

The U.S. Congress has been reluctant to provide a lot of money for the heavy fuel oil.
We've had to pass the tin cup to countries all over the world, with mixed success. Some countries in Asia have helped. Countries, like the Australians and Singapore, have been moderately helpful. Some of the ASEAN countries and some of the rich countries like Brunei have been dragging their feet. The other Asians haven't been as helpful as they should have been. It took a long time to convince the Europeans. Our Congress has been very reserved, so we've been rolling over debts and achieving accounting miracles to try to keep this process alive.

The other problem, of course, is that every now and then the North Koreans try to push the envelope on implementation, and they've engaged in suspicious activity. They have suggested that there isn't enough U.S.-North Korean dialogue going, or they're upset about something else, and they threaten to resume reprocessing spent nuclear fuel or do something else. I can't tell whether the North Koreans may be cheating here or there. There are always concerns about possible activities which they may be hiding. The IAEA inspections which have gone forward have often been pushed to the edge. The North Koreans chisel around the edges and don't fully comply with the regulations. However, these shortcomings are never quite enough to break the agreement. The North Koreans are a real pain in the neck and you can't trust them. However, we're going to keep at them. Again, in retrospect, I don't see any better approach.

This agreement still could blow up in view of the uncertainty of funding, giving the North Koreans either an excuse or the cover to pull out of the agreement. They could shift their views. They're never going to get a better or more forthcoming interlocutor than Kim Dae Jung, who has been very forthcoming.

**Q:** Kim Dae Jung is the new President of the Republic of Korea.

**LORD:** He was elected President in January, 1998, I believe. He has only been in office for about six months at this point.

So that's the basic story on the agreement, which I consider a major achievement. However, the jury is still out on whether it will last for all time or whether it will break down.

**Q:** As we were dealing with the North Koreans, really for the first time, other than in the sterile Panmunjom talks, were you, as Assistant Secretary, getting any feel for what was going on in North Korea? There was also a defector in play.

**LORD:** That came later. The quick answer is, "No." To this day none of us knows what the hell is going on in North Korea. Obviously, we got a little bit of sense of their negotiating style. We got a little sense of what's going on. We had people at KEDO. I'll get into U.S.-North Korean direct relations in a minute. Without getting overly sensitive here, our assets in North Korea are not particularly strong. So we're just pretty much in the dark. I don't think our friends know much more than others. There are certain, general conclusions that we can reach. Kim Jong Il has generally been in charge. Obviously, the North Korean military are very important. There probably are some disagreements between the military, which is generally considered to be hard line and is more concerned
about keeping its nuclear options alive, than the North Korean Foreign Ministry and economic types who are more worried about diplomatic relations with the outside world and economic aid. They often play the usual game in negotiations, saying: "We have hard liners at home. You have to help us convince the hard liners by giving us some concessions," and so on.

Q: We use Congress for that.

LORD: That's right. So it's hard to know how much of that is genuine. There may be some of that. Some of it may just be negotiating tactics.

I want to make clear that I didn't deal with the North Koreans. My deputy, Tom Hubbard, or Bob Gallucci did. My Korean desk officer did a great many times, through contacts at the UN in New York. We purposely did not give them the protocol benefit of dealing with me. We used somebody lower ranking, except for Bob Gallucci, who handled the nuclear negotiations. He was the highest ranking U.S. official in touch with the North Koreans, and that was on a highly selective basis. I had Tom Hubbard or the Korean Country Director contact the North Koreans in New York, as I said. We never got to the point, in our relations with them, that I would get involved, out of considerations of sensitivity toward the South Koreans and the fact that the North Koreans were generally not forthcoming.

Part of the understanding of the Framework Agreement was to be an increased dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea, including some relaxation of sanctions. We always felt that broadening and expanding contacts with the North Koreans, if they turned out to be at all reasonable, would be positive in terms of gently subverting their system and opening them up to outside influences. The general strategy was to integrate North Korea into the regional and world system, so that they would be less paranoid and disruptive. They were a much more extreme example of a closed society than China was and on a different scale. But we were also very careful about this.

In this context I always weighed in on the side of South Korea, frankly, in not going too far with North Korea, until it began to talk to South Korea. There was a constant process of jockeying with South Korea and a calculation of how much we would talk with North Korea and about what subjects. I made it clear that we would not get out in front of the South Koreans. I said this publicly and privately during the many times that I went to South Korea to consult with them. However, we didn't want to give the South Koreans full veto power over this process.

So we took minimum steps on sanctions early on, when the Framework Agreement was first being implemented. We relaxed controls in a couple of areas. With the North Koreans, we accorded them the bare minimum of relaxation of controls under the Framework Agreement. There was really nothing much done economically or in political terms. This wasn't particularly controversial in the U.S., even when South Korea would get annoyed with the North Koreans. I think that we fulfilled our obligations with North Korea under the Framework Agreement, but just barely. We went slowly with North
Korea because it was unhelpful and South Korea was very sensitive.

So we did enough with North Korea and we made clear that we were prepared to go further. We always said that we couldn't do anything meaningful with the North Koreans unless they were prepared to talk to South Korea. We said that the North Koreans ought to be prepared to talk to the South Koreans, not to the U.S. We said that we wouldn't talk to the North Koreans about South Korea. We said that what we would talk to them about was their missile exports, their terrorism, possible establishment of Liaison Offices, and possible further relaxation of sanctions.

We made it clear that we would tie the relaxation of tensions to how the North Koreans dealt with South Korea and also how they acted on these problems. We conducted separate negotiations on North Korean missiles but never got anywhere with them. We discussed their taking steps on terrorism, but this did not lead anywhere. We suggested that they could be more cooperative in the Military Armistice Commission [MAC] or could let up on the rhetoric against President Kim. There were several issues where we were trying to make progress. We sort of inched along but really didn't get very far with them. Regarding the agreement and the attitude which the North Koreans displayed toward South Korea, we indicated that we wouldn't go very far unless North Koreans talked to South Koreans. However, the North Koreans didn't make much of a move in this direction. We thought that, on balance, if they made progress with the South, and assuming that they were flexible enough on key issues, further interaction with the North Koreans could be a positive development. It could give them more of a stake in observing the framework agreement and being a responsible member of the regional and world community.

We never made much progress on any of these matters, even on the matter of the establishment of Liaison Offices. Despite the fact that we got close to agreement, we essentially held off because the South Koreans were sensitive about that. Then later on, and ironically, when we got Four Power Talks going and the South Koreans were more relaxed, the North Koreans were the ones who dragged their feet. The North Koreans were worried about a foreign presence in their capital, Pyongyang, and the impact this might have. We wanted to have a presence up there and to have a better sense of what was going on in North Korea. This development got hung up over the issue of whether we could send mail pouches over the DMZ. The North Koreans insisted that these pouches would have to go from Seoul to North Korea via China, or some place or another. We were prepared to say that, in principle, we maintained the right to send pouches directly from South to North Korea but that we were prepared to start off with a more convoluted system. But the North Koreans weren't prepared to do even that. So they are the ones who held up the establishment of Liaison Offices.

In any case, we had sporadic contacts with North Korea - in full consultation with South Korea - at the country director level in New York generally, and occasionally through Tom Hubbard. We just didn't get very far, although we kept pressing the North Koreans. We tried to get the Chinese to press the North Koreans to talk to the South Koreans directly.
There was one incident during the Christmas/New Year's holidays of 1994/1995. A couple of American helicopter pilots went down in North Korea. I remember this distinctly because my wife and I were planning to take a long-anticipated vacation. We had lined up, well in advance, theater tickets to hit shows in New York. We lined up five Broadway shows in a row between Christmas and early January. Suddenly, there was this helicopter crash. One of the helicopter pilots was killed, and the other one was captured. We wanted to get the body of the dead pilot back and get the other pilot out of North Korean captivity. The name of the captured pilot was Bobby Hall. To make a long story short, we needed someone at a high level to be on duty around the clock on this incident. Peter Tarnoff took this duty during the first couple of days and, of course, I took the rest of the time. I not only wanted to do this but felt that I had an obligation to be on hand. I hurried back to Washington and missed, God only knows, what incredible shows in New York. I was in Washington for the next 10 days to two weeks. We managed this crisis effectively. We sent Tom Hubbard to North Korea to arrange for the release of the pilot who had survived and to retrieve the remains of the other, dead pilot.

There were daily conference calls among the White House, either with Sandy Berger or his Asian hand, Stan Roth, and whoever else was called in from the Department of Defense, and with Ambassador Laney in South Korea and our military people there. Often we had Tom Hubbard on an open line. We of course knew damned well that the line was bugged and we said things purposefully for the North Koreans.

While we would report to our superiors, I was in daily charge of the coordination of this effort to get instructions to Tom Hubbard. We let him know what to do. We would double check with our superiors, although, during the end of the year holidays, it wasn't easy.

So I remember that there were often conference calls at 2:00 or 3:00 AM. It was a pretty dramatic time. We got the surviving pilot out of North Korea and recovered the remains of the dead pilot, without making any major concessions. This was a good success, and I felt good about it. The only gesture to North Korea was some convoluted reference to military talks at the DMZ, but we still insisted on the South Koreans being involved. I forget what the formulation was. The South Koreans were a little suspicious, but they were reassured when Tom Hubbard came out and debriefed them. So that was a mini-crisis, but it could have been a lot worse. It ruined my holiday, but of course it was crucial to rescue our pilot. And I am proud of the job that Tom, our team, and I did.

The other issue involving North Korea, of course, has been their terrible food and famine problems, throughout this period. It got worse, particularly during the last year or so when I was Assistant Secretary. Here we had a humanitarian problem, of course, of helping the North Korean people. Even though the North Koreans blamed this problem on floods, it was more the result of their lousy system of food distribution and related, structural problems of agriculture. Also their policy of feeding their cadre and military and not the people in need. So, therefore, they had a flood disaster generally and then, particularly, they had a food and famine disaster. Some NGOs [Non Governmental
Organizations] have estimated that there were a million or two million people who died of starvation during this period. The NGO estimate may be exaggerated and we can't be sure about the truth in that opaque society.

Basically, the situation was a little tougher before Kim Dae Jung became President of the Republic of Korea in January, 1998. We tried to square the circle and show some humanitarian concern over the situation in North Korea. There were some efforts in Congress to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea. Other members of Congress said: "Why help these bastards? Their problems are their own fault." In effect, we said: "We have no objection to other countries helping North Korea." We provided some assistance, but only through international organizations and not directly. And only with inspection of the results to make sure that the food got to the North Korean people and not just to the North Korean military. I am quite confident that most food aid we provided got through to the people but there was surely also some diversion. It was enough to relieve the immediate crisis of starvation, but not enough to let the North Koreans off the hook. They needed to reform their system, which was the real cause of the crisis.

First of all, the North Korean system is all screwed up. In the second place we have evidence that they diverted some of their food aid, not our food aid, but aid coming from other sources. They don't allow inspectors from donating agencies in countries providing assistance to go everywhere. At one point, when Kim Young Sam was President of the Republic of Korea [1993-1998], the South Koreans loaded ships with grain and sent them to North Korea. The North Koreans seized these ships and raised the North Korean flag on them. So the North Koreans just made it very tough to help them. Just as Saddam Hussein exploited children in Iraq, the North Koreans were torn between wanting to get food and admitting that they had a crisis. They wanted to get food but also, in many respects, they wanted to get it for their military, and to hell with their people. This was a very tough question. As I say, we provided enough assistance to head off a disaster, but not enough to let the North Koreans off the hook.

Q: [Bernkopf] I don't know whether we've already covered this. Could you talk about working with China on the nuclear crisis involving North Korea and the agreed framework that was developed?

LORD: Yes. This issue is certainly relevant here. From the very beginning of my term as Assistant Secretary I thought that it was important, as did the administration, to work as much as we could with China on the problem of North Korea. In the first place it was the most urgent and dangerous problem.

Q: [Kennedy] Can you explain what the problem was?

LORD: We'll do this again briefly. When we entered office, the North Koreans were refusing some IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections of some of their nuclear facilities, which they were obligated to have inspected under the NPT [Non Proliferation Treaty], which North Korea had signed.
This issue came to a head after we entered office, when the North Koreans threatened to withdraw from the NPT. We threatened to apply sanctions, built up our forces, and went to the UN. The North Koreans were saying that the imposition of sanctions could lead to war. It was a very tense situation, which I have dealt with in more detail.

This was the most urgent security problem that we faced, certainly in Asia and perhaps during the first year or two of the whole Administration. We thought that it was important to involve China, for several reasons.

First, we thought that China probably had more influence with the North Korean regime than anyone else, although we knew that the North Koreans were prickly and weren't going to take orders from anybody. In terms of influence with North Korea the Chinese certainly eclipsed the Russians, although we also wanted to stay in touch with the Russians also on this issue. So the Chinese were going to be a crucial factor in restraining North Korea, as they already were a crucial factor in propping up North Korea economically.

Secondly, we felt that there were some parallel objectives in this situation. China already had an important economic relationship with South Korea, which was growing. The Chinese had fish to fry with the South Koreans. We were quite sure that for a considerable period of time the Chinese had been restraining North Korea from any military adventures, because they didn't want to be dragged back into a possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula, as they had been during the 1950s. The Chinese didn't want to complicate their relations with the U.S. and Japan, not to mention South Korea. Generally, China didn't want a war, particularly with nuclear implications, right on their border. So China had been a source of restraint on North Korea. The Chinese were becoming much more even handed now that they had interests in South Korea. There was a parallel linkage between Chinese contacts with the two Koreas.

Thirdly and more broadly, we felt that by cooperating on this issue we could also demonstrate that we had regional, global, and strategic interests with China on our agenda. Perhaps we could agree to cooperate in other areas and achieve better exchanges on regional security matters, for example. In this way we could demonstrate to the American and Chinese publics that China and the U.S. could work together on some of these regional and global issues.

So for all of these reasons we put a high priority on dealing with the Chinese, and we worked with them throughout my four years as Assistant Secretary of State.

Generally, in the course of those four years and since I have left that position as well, the Chinese have become more cooperative, without going so far as to be in lock step with us. In the exchange of information during this four year period and since then we did not get much out of the Chinese at all; they would profess not to have a great deal of information on North Korea. They generally told us that the situation in North Korea was not as bad as people had been saying and that, in particular, the economic situation was not as bad as many people believed. They told us that the situation was stable. They were
not particularly candid with us, to say the least. By contrast, over the past couple of years
the Chinese have acknowledged that the economic situation in North Korea is very
serious, although they have emphasized that the political situation is relatively stable.
I want to make it clear that they have not always been entirely helpful. However, they
have been increasingly helpful throughout the past few years. The Chinese have always
been careful to guard their flank with North Korea, but we sensed a clear frustration on
China's part with North Korea. First, because of the dangers involved and, secondly,
because North Korea has such an opaque regime which is very difficult to deal with. This
was accentuated by the fact that the Chinese had long, personal associations with Kim II
Sung, but when he died, he was replaced by his somewhat flakey son [Kim Jong Il]. As a
result, Chinese personal ties with North Korea were consequently reduced.

The Chinese were also frustrated that they had been urging the North Koreans for some
time to reform their economy as the Chinese had done. The North Koreans had resisted
that advice because they were worried about losing political control of the country to
outside influences. So the Chinese had to bail out North Korea economically.

For all of these reasons over time the Chinese were increasingly concerned about the
situation in North Korea. In addition, the Chinese have had greater exchanges of
information with us, they have come to have greater trust in us, and have had greater
contact with South Korea. They have become somewhat more helpful to us, although
they have never moved in lock step with us.

This has meant that the quality and quantity of their exchanges of information with us on
North Korea expanded over these years. This meant that, after considerable delay, they
finally agreed to join the Four Party Approach [North Korea, South Korea, China, and the
United States], which was helpful in the effort to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Most of the talks in that context have been at the technical level. There has only been a
couple of talks at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level until after I left the State
Department. However, as I understand it, the Chinese have moved from a position of not
being particularly helpful or being passive or sometimes even taking the North Korean
side, to the point of actually facilitating talks and the four party approach. The Chinese
never joined KEDO, which is an organization set up to help provide alternative and less
dangerous, nuclear reactors.

Q: [Kennedy] Is that spelled K-E-D-O?

LORD: Yes, it deals with North Korea. So that has been frustrating. The Chinese have
provided a great deal of economic assistance to North Korea, including food and oil,
which has kept it from collapsing, more than any other factor. As I say, diplomatically the
Chinese have recently been more helpful.

So this is a theme in all of the regional and global issues. This is the first one that we can
cite in terms of pointing to the fact that we have some parallel interests with China, in
spite of our ideological and other differences. This is an area where the Chinese have
been constructive. They haven't always been perfect. We've had a lot of trouble during
this period about military contacts at the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] at Panmunjom in Korea. The North Koreans have constantly challenged the armistice agreement of 1953 and have demanded a peace agreement. They have tried to force outside countries acting as observers to withdraw from Panmunjom. We've had less than all out help from the Chinese on that. Even on that, their attitude was nuanced. They wouldn't pressure the North Koreans or back us fully on some of these issues. However, they would make the point to the North that the armistice agreement still was in place, until a peace agreement could replace it.

So the Chinese were still somewhat worried about their North Korean flank. However, on the whole the Chinese involvement in Korea was helpful. They obviously helped to put pressure on North Korea and they helped to prop up North Korea so that it didn't collapse. They demonstrated that we had shared interests which supported the Chinese-American bilateral relationship in general.

Q: Why don't we turn now to bilateral relations between the U.S. and South Korea? I think we had some economic issues outstanding. What was your feeling about the political situation in South Korea? How did you think South Korea was handling its foreign policy? Are there any other issues that you might want to discuss?

LORD: Yes. I think that we can cover these issues fairly quickly. We've already covered them, to a certain extent. One of my major concerns was to make sure that we had as much solidarity as possible with the South Koreans, even though we sometimes had a prickly and paranoid President of South Korea to deal with. I have already indicated that we worked hard on that matter, as did others. It was not just me. Also included were Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry.

Throughout the four years I served as Assistant Secretary, our primary preoccupation with South Korea was dealing with North Korea. We had economic issues in dispute with South Korea, but we actually had a trade surplus with them. So, in terms of trade, it wasn't as pronounced a problem as it was with Japan or China. When I initially got the job as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, one of the first things that I did was to meet with American business people in New York. Hank Greenberg, a major businessman and head of a large insurance company, pulled together a lot of American business people interested in Asia. We went around the table and asked them what was the most difficult place in East Asia to do business in, particularly in terms of American investment. Almost unanimously, they said South Korea, more than Japan, China, or any other place.

So we obviously spent some time on the trade issues. We finally got South Korea into the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. This was all before the financial crisis in Asia, which occurred after I left office. We instituted semi-annual consultations on economic issues, addressing macroeconomic as well as specific trade issues. I would raise these issues when I went to South Korea. Secretary of State Christopher and others would raise them. However, in all candor, although they were significant issues, they took up a very small percentage of our time and attention,
compared to the nuclear question, the North-South talks, and North-South security questions.

South Korea generally could be counted on to help us on UN issues, but they were so preoccupied with their own security questions that we didn't expect much, nor did they do much in other areas. We consulted closely with South Korea on regional issues, such as, for example, the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF]. We worked with them in APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum] in terms of economic advancement. However, in relative terms the economic dimension wasn't relatively that significant, compared to the security dimension. I think that that's the correct proportion. This doesn't mean that the American economic agencies didn't spend a lot of time on economic issues. I'm simply saying that I didn't spend too much time on these issues, although when I talked with them I pressed them, as I always did, on general and specific economic, trade, and investment problems.

We had some difficulties in our bilateral relations with South Korea because, as I've suggested, President Kim Young Sam was rather volatile. The South Koreans were understandably frustrated at not participating in negotiations with North Korea on nuclear weapons, although we consulted with them closely. The South Koreans were understandably suspicious of North Korea. First of all, it was North Korea which invaded South Korea in 1950. The North Koreans assassinated a good part of the South Korean cabinet in Burma in the mid-1960s and tried to kill the Prime Minister not so many years ago. The North Koreans made at least one raid on the Blue House [South Korean Presidential Residence] in an effort to assassinate President Park Chung Hee. On this occasion they killed Park Chung Hee's wife. The North Koreans continually insulted President Kim Young Sam personally and the South Koreans in general. They threatened South Korea by deploying their troops near the DMZ, close to Seoul. So there was every reason for the South Koreans to be suspicious of North Korea. Even those South Koreans who wanted to be somewhat more flexible would have to be concerned with understandable South Korean public and Parliamentary suspicion of North Korea. Therefore, the combination of the suspicion of North Korea in the general body politic and on the part of the South Korean leaders was such that they could be, at times, overly sensitive on North Korea. I was sympathetic with South Koreans on these grounds. This was in addition to the fact that North Korea had been trying, for decades, to deal with us directly and push the South Koreans aside. So for all of these reasons it was clear that we had a difficult partner in South Korea but one that we wanted to be sympathetic with.

It was therefore important for President Clinton to go to South Korea after Japan on his first trip to Asia, indeed to anywhere. President Clinton hosted a state visit to the United States by President Kim Young Sam, which was quite successful. I think that this visit took place early in 1995.

After we reached the Agreed Framework Agreement with North Korea, our big effort was to get talks going between North and South Korea. We tried to accomplish this by pressing the North Koreans and making clear that we would hold back on developing our
relationship with them until they talked with South Korea. We encouraged the Chinese and others to weigh in on North Korea to talk with South Korea. We pointed to North Korea's obligations to do this in the Framework Agreement. However, this was like pulling teeth, and we never really got any results on this.

Finally, at the instigation of President Kim Young Sam, he and President Clinton agreed on a bold new initiative of Four Power talks, to include South Korea, the United States, China, and North Korea. Obviously, strictly North-South talks would have been better, and that's what we wanted. However, failing that, the South Koreans agreed, and we, of course, agreed with them, that we ought to try this other approach. The rationale was as follows. First, the parties included were signatories to the Armistice Agreement [of 1953]. The Chinese had fought in Korea, so they were a party to the Armistice Agreement. Therefore, in addition to geography, history, economics, and ideological ties with North Korea and improving ties with South Korea in their direct interest, they had that rationale. The Japanese had not been a signatory to the Armistice Agreement.

Secondly, you never could tell whether the North Koreans welcomed the Chinese or not. On balance, they probably didn't. They didn't like trilateral discussions involving North and South Korea and the U.S., which made the balance two against one. Then the North Koreans may have thought that, since China was shifting somewhat toward South Korea, this might make the balance three against one. Ostensibly, the Four Power talks were designed to be two communist powers over here and two good guys [the ROK and the U.S.] over there. So there was that cover. We were very careful to make sure that the Japanese, in particular, were comfortable with this arrangement. They were and they never gave us any trouble on this. They understood the rationale of the Armistice and they understood that if they were included, the Russians would have to be included. This would have meant Six Power Talks, which we thought would be too complicated. We of course continued to consult closely with Japan, both bilaterally and together with South Korea.

The Russians were very upset about this. They thought that they had a legitimate interest in Korea and wanted to know why they were not included in these talks. As I said, we never had formal consultations with the Russians on this subject. In informal talks with them we basically said that we saw some value in Six Power talks at some point, whether for guarantees or other purposes. Therefore, we could see that a Six Power arrangement might have some function. However, meantime we told the Russians that we would keep them closely informed, and why didn't they join KEDO? They have not been happy about their not being included in these consultative talks.

The other rationale for the four-party approach on Korea, however, was that if we got four parties together, then, under that cover and around the edges of that conference, we could promote a North-South dialogue. The North Koreans have resisted talking to South Korea for so long that, for reasons of cover, it was easier for them to talk to South Korea directly as long as everyone was in the same city for the Four Power talks. Also, the carrot for North Korea was that that meant that they could talk to us as well. So we made it clear that if North Korea came to the table in the Four Power talks, we wanted to urge
that North and South Korea conduct the basic negotiations, with the Chinese and us being in a facilitative role. However, the North Koreans would also have the benefit of talking directly to us, which they wanted. As against that, they would also have to talk directly to South Korea as well, which they may not have wanted.

For all of these reasons this was announced at Cheju Island, when President Clinton met there with South Korean President Kim Young Sam, I believe in the summer of 1995. I was there for this meeting.

We spent the rest of the first Clinton term trying getting the North Koreans to move ahead in the talks. They would inch along in talks at the Country Director level at the UN in New York. We tried to get the Chinese to weigh in. The Chinese were supportive, but they weren't prepared to pull out all the stops. They kept arguing more U.S.-North Korean movement. As always, the North Koreans were a pain in the neck. They would inch up to the starting line and give us the impression that we were going to get the four-party talks started. Basically, we only had talks about the talks. We never had actual talks. Instead, there were talks to see whether we could have talks. We finally reached the point where we could have four-party talks at the level of my deputy, Tom Hubbard [Deputy Assistant Secretary of State]. Since I left the Department of State, my successor has had a couple of rounds of fruitless discussions at the Assistant Secretary level.

Meanwhile, recently elected South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has been more forthcoming toward North Korea. He has encouraged U.S. investment and U.S.-North Korean direct talks, including relaxing our sanctions. He has himself opened his arms to the North Koreans but so far has been rewarded by considerable intransigence, although the rhetoric from North Korea has been more restrained.

There was another complication in U.S.-South Korean relations. I don't have the exact date, but late in the first Clinton term, probably in 1995 or 1996, a North Korean submarine stranded in South Korean territorial waters. There were both North Korean commandos and sailors on it. The commandos killed all of the sailors, and many of the commandos escaped. There was a big manhunt all over South Korea. Some of the North Korean commandos were captured, and some South Koreans were killed. This caused a furor in South Korea and held up any movement toward talks or anything else with North Korea.

Again, during this time I spent a good deal of time holding the hands of the South Koreans, pledging U.S. solidarity with them. I remember that once I arrived on a trip to South Korea, and there was a big cartoon in a South Korean newspaper which showed a South Korean watching television. The video was all screwed up. It was on the blink. It just wasn't working. The heading of the cartoon referring to the video said: "U.S.-South Korean Relations." The cartoon showed me coming in through the window. The caption showed me saying: "I'm here to fix your television set."

Q: Did you have the feeling or was it conventional wisdom that the North Korean infiltrations, such as the case of the North Korean submarine, may have been designed by
the North Korean military to louse things up?

LORD: That's a very good question. That is one explanation of this incident. However, it seemed to us to be somewhat inconceivable that the North Korean military could do this without the blessing of Kim Jong II, the son of Kim Il Sung and the apparent ruler of North Korea, or at least his acquiescence. The North Korean military couldn't have just done it on their own. So to this day, since we don't know anything about North Korea anyway, we don't know what happened. We do feel, without falling into the trap of good guys and bad guys battling within the Politburo of the Communist Party, that there are some people in North Korea, probably within the Foreign Ministry and the economic agencies, who want to implement the Framework Agreement and get outside help. There are others, probably including most of the military, who are hardliners. There are probably even some who would like to sabotage the agreement.

So if I had to hazard an explanation of this incident, I think that this infiltration incident was an ongoing thing which they did all the time. They didn't launch it specifically to screw things up. They didn't want to be caught. If you're not caught, you don't screw things up. So this was ongoing, and probably Kim Jong II was kept posted. He probably said: "Just because we're negotiating with the Americans, we don't stop our intelligence activity. Just don't get caught." So they went ahead and screwed up.

Q: This is something like our U-2 incident in May, 1960, when we launched a U-2 flight just before a scheduled meeting between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Khrushchev.

LORD: So, to return to the North Korean submarine episode, there were some who felt that this was done deliberately to sabotage relations with South Korea. My instinct, without my being sure about it, is that it was something that was fairly regularly done. Maybe it wasn't really done regularly, because there weren't all of that many North Korean commandos. Maybe this operation was approved at a higher level than usual. Perhaps it was something that they decided not to stop, and they got caught in the act of trying to infiltrate personnel into South Korea. If they didn't get caught, as I said, it would not have destroyed anything. So this incident strained relations with the South Koreans and with South Korean public opinion. We managed to get things back on track. We stressed solidarity with the South. We pressed the North Koreans over time, and if you can believe this, we finally got an apology out of the North Koreans, which is probably the greatest diplomatic achievement in the history of foreign policy with North Korea. I forget how half assed the apology was. It was, in any case, an expression of regret by the North Koreans, which got things back on track.

Q: Well, is there anything else that you would like to say about North Korea?

LORD: I think we've just about covered it.

Q: Just one question. Did that incident involving a high level North Korean defector
occur on your watch as Assistant Secretary? Did this add anything to our knowledge of North Korea?

LORD: Yes, it did happen on my watch. This incident didn't really add anything. There were some reports that this defector said that North Korea had a nuclear capability. We couldn't tell whether ROK [Republic of Korea] intelligence, which is very hard line, leaked this or whether the defector was misinformed or simply deduced things. The North Koreans are capable of anything. We had the usual trouble of getting direct access to these defectors. Right away, the South Koreans would often use them for propaganda purposes. They were still getting information from this defector after I left the Department of State. I don't believe that we actually learned a great deal from him, either directly or indirectly. This defector was one of North Korea's top ideological types. I think that the general conclusion was that he wasn't totally plugged in to what was going on in North Korea. That is my impression, but I could be totally wrong on that.

There was one other, mini-crisis, in which a South Korean in the U.S. was caught spying. I believe that he may have been a businessman, but he was someone connected with the South Korean Intelligence Service.

Q: I think that he was caught in Los Angeles.

LORD: I thought that it was in New York. However, in any event, we expelled him and expressed our displeasure. We didn't want to have that kind of activity disrupt our relationship with South Korea or give any incentive to North Korea. You know, even among the best of friends these things happen. The U.S. has spied on France - although I am not sure that we are the best of friends.

The other thing is that we always were a little concerned about the South Koreans keeping us totally informed. We went out of our way, and, again, I kept on pressing this point, to keep the South Koreans fully consulted, informed, and debriefed on all of our talks with the North Koreans. However, there was evidence that the South Koreans were not always totally open with us. They were making some gestures to North Korea, secretly. They didn't have much success in these efforts, but they weren't keeping us posted about them. We would occasionally make references to the need to keep the communications flowing in both directions. So that was a simmering problem, not a major one.

Q: Why not stop at this point? We'll note at the end of this section that we've covered relations with China, with North and South Korea, and with Japan. So we're ready to move on to the rest of Asia during this 1993-1997 period.

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Today is October 21, 1998. We might now look at some of the other issues. I'm going to
leave it to you to pick the matters to raise as we go along. They're almost completely
separate issues. So if you will name them, we'll start off.

LORD: Okay. What I would propose to start off with is ASEAN, both collectively and in
terms of its individual members. This would include the newer members, such as
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma. Then we'll pick up Australia, New Zealand,
Mongolia, and the other pieces of Asia that we haven't covered already. We can then look
at some regional approaches, whether it is APEC, ASEAN and regional security matters,
global problems like the environment, and then the whole question of promoting
democracy and human rights, as well as the Asian values debate. Then I might cover my
more general recollections on the four years of my service in the Bureau of East Asian
Affairs, after we've gotten through these individual pieces. Okay?

Q: All right. In the first place you mentioned ASEAN. Can you tell me what ASEAN
stands for?

LORD: Sure. ASEAN stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It's an
organization of several countries of Southeast Asia which was established 25 or 30 years
ago. It originally consisted of Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Singapore. Then it added Brunei a few years ago. In more recent years it has added
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma. Of course, the addition of the countries of the
former Indochina and Burma has complicated ASEAN's performance. I won't dwell on
this, because most of it happened since I left office as Assistant Secretary. These
additions have added poor countries to other countries which were generally regarded as
economic tigers. It also added generally authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments
to a grouping which was mixed but had a considerable degree of political freedom. So the
addition of some of these newer members has affected the cohesion of ASEAN.

ASEAN started out essentially for economic purposes to promote economic progress
among these countries and also to damp down regional and historical tensions between
Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. There have been disputes among
these countries, one way or another. Even as the European Community was meant, in
part, to ease historical antagonisms and prevent future conflicts between France and
Germany, for example, so, although on a less grandiose scale, one of the purposes of
ASEAN was to try to mute these rivalries and to promote cooperation among these
countries.

What started out as an economic grouping also began to take on some political and
diplomatic force as well. As the Clinton administration came into office in 1993,
obviously the giants of China and Japan, as well as South Korea, given the historical
involvement of U.S. troops, captured a great deal of our attention, including continuing
public and media attention in the U.S.
However, we have become very much aware of the fact that Southeast Asia, including ASEAN, is also crucially important, both collectively and in terms of its individual members. For example, as ASEAN heads toward the year 2000, and with its new members, the 10 members comprising all of the Southeast Asian region, have a population of some 400 million. If you take the ASEAN countries collectively, this group of states has already become roughly our fourth largest export partner. These countries are located in a very strategic area, which includes the Straits of Malacca and the passage of oil and trade through there, which affects not only the U.S. but also key allies like Japan. Therefore, ASEAN is very strategically located.

Of course, the ASEAN area also has historical resonance because of our involvement in Vietnam. Indeed, the Vietnam War, while a tragedy and a mistake, in my view, had a clear silver lining in the dark clouds - the fact that by our involvement in Vietnam we bought time for the Southeast Asian countries. Whether you believe in the domino theory or not, the Vietnam War did give them some time to develop, with the buffer of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and, in a certain sense, in Laos and Cambodia, to protect them. This allowed these Southeast Asian nations to get on their feet and not only not be taken over by communism but to begin to develop their own, free market approach and their own economies. In fact, they became economic giants.

I would like to enter a little footnote here. We'll get to APEC later, but when President Clinton was about to make a speech at the APEC meeting in Seattle, he was going over his speech drafts. When he was traveling out to Seattle on Air Force One [aircraft on which the President usually travels], he noticed a phrase which he thought was terrific. The phrase said that the Asian countries had grown from dominos to dynamos. He told the speech writer, who was going over the text with the President, that this phrase was terrific. The speechwriter very generously said: "Oh, that was Win Lord's phrase." So when the President actually gave the speech in Seattle at the APEC meeting, he got applause when he got to that line. The President stopped, looked in the camera, and said: "I have Winston Lord to thank for that line. I'm glad that you liked it." There never has been a more generous speechwriter. You can appreciate that when the President says something, the speechwriter should not take credit for a given phrase; but citing to the President somebody else for the phrase was an act of generosity that I will never forget.

Again, as we speak today, we see some serious economic problems in the Southeast Asian region. However, on the whole, during the last 25 years a lot of the tigers in Asia have been in the Southeast Asian grouping. The movement toward freer trade among the Southeast Asian countries of ASEAN, as well as the political and security stability among them which ASEAN fostered, had a lot to do with their very dramatic economic growth. Also, of course, the U.S. security presence in Asia helped to provide stability for ASEAN as well as for many other countries, including even China. This allowed the people of these countries to focus on improving their economies and not having to worry about conflict.

In any event, we saw ASEAN as important. As I said, ASEAN as a group is already the
fourth largest partner of the U.S. in terms of trade. It has 400 million people and 10 member countries. It is in an important geographical position. We have two treaty allies among the ASEAN countries, Thailand and the Philippines. There is also this huge country, Indonesia, the fourth largest country in the world in terms of population, and the world's largest Muslim country. Also, in terms of military cooperation, many of the ASEAN countries are also providing us, under bilateral agreements, port and airfield access, joint exercises, and military exchange programs to compensate for our withdrawal from our former bases in the Philippines. So countries like Singapore, and even Malaysia and Brunei, and others, to a certain extent, participate in cooperative efforts to help maintain the U.S. presence in the area. That's in addition to our treaty allies.

In addition, ASEAN collectively has become increasingly important as a diplomatic force. The ASEAN countries usually speak with one voice in international organizations like the United Nations, giving them further clout. They also act collectively as a diplomatic instrument. A good example of this is Cambodia. ASEAN worked very hard with the United Nations, the United States, France, and others to hold the elections in that country in 1993 and achieve the general, UN-sponsored settlement there. Under Indonesian leadership ASEAN has tried to settle questions involving the islands of the South China Sea. ASEAN is also a significant force in APEC, the regional economic grouping which we'll talk about later. It also has been the core of a movement to promote a regional security dialogue. When the Clinton administration came into office, we had a security dialogue with ASEAN and other, outside countries, and then collective meetings in the context of what ASEAN called the "Post-Ministerial Conference," for discussions with other powers outside of ASEAN. These discussions were held between ASEAN and these powers outside of it once a year, after the ASEAN ministers have met. We then created the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 1994, grouping these countries and adding China, Russia, Vietnam, etc. We’ll discuss that later.

So, for all of these reasons we thought that it was important to pay a lot of attention to ASEAN and its individual members, even though a lot of our energies were directed toward Northeast Asia. In my own case I made many trips, both ASEAN-related and bilaterally to the individual countries. Every time that there was a group meeting with ASEAN, it gave us a chance to have bilateral meetings as well, of course. I would go out to Southeast Asia every spring to help to prepare regional security dialogues, at my senior official level, with my counterparts. I was able to establish very important and productive relationships. This would be followed, a couple of months later, by ministerial meetings on regional security. I would go out to the area again with the Secretary of State to attend these meetings. He would use the occasion to tack on other trips to other Asian countries, even as he went, normally in July, to the ASEAN meetings. This was an annual way of getting top level officials out to the region, even as APEC, which we'll talk about later, did the same thing.

Q: When you are talking about regional security, normally you are pointing at a threat, or something like that. It sounds as if there was no longer a threat.

LORD: Could we come back to the regional security meetings before we go into that? I
thought that I would treat that separately in the context of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Q: Sure.

LORD: ASEAN was crucial for the regional forum, but this included many other members, and I would rather do this under the general rubric of regional institutions. That's a good question.

I also made a considerable effort to meet, not only my own counterparts, but also foreign ministers during the general debate at the UN General Assembly each fall, when the Secretary of State was too busy to meet with some of them. (End of tape)

I'll go through the specific countries.

Indonesia was clearly the giant in ASEAN by virtue of its population. We had a mixed relationship with Indonesia. The difficulties lay in the human rights area. Indonesia had an authoritarian regime, a lot of corruption, and a problem with East Timor which Indonesia had taken over from the Portuguese back in the 1970s. There was a movement for the independence of East Timor or at least much greater autonomy. There was also somewhat similar unrest in Aceh.

Q: That's at the northern end of Sumatra.

LORD: Right. So Indonesia was a constant concern of human rights groups and others. It put a certain limit on our relationship with Indonesia. Indeed, every time that the President, the Secretary of State, or I met with our Indonesian counterparts, in addition to a very positive agenda, which I'll get to in a minute, we would usually raise East Timor or human rights issues. So this was a controlling factor preventing us from having a full blown relationship with Indonesia.

Having said that, I should add that we had a very positive agenda as well, and we treated Indonesia as a very important country, even though we disapproved of some of its human rights practices. As I've already mentioned, it's the fourth largest country in the world in terms of population, it's the largest Muslim country in the world, and is generally very moderate in its approach to Islam, as opposed to radical fundamentalism elsewhere in the world. So it's an important example of toleration and general restraint in that area.

Indonesia provided us with some military cooperation. Some of our training activities with the Indonesian military were restricted by Congressional concerns over human rights. Some of the Indonesian leaders whom we trained were enlightened in terms of the rule of civilians over the military, legal justice, and human rights practices by the Indonesian Army. However, there were some graduates of U.S. training programs who turned out to be involved in the suppression of some groups, and this caused controversy. So there was a constant debate about how much we should cooperate with the Indonesian military which, of course, is a very important political force in Indonesia. In fact, it's the dominant political force. We generally felt that through the exchange programs and joint operations we exposed Indonesian military personnel to professionalism and attitudes
toward democracy and human rights which would pay off and would be good over the long term, on the whole.

However, given the Indonesian military role in East Timor and in other areas, you can see why Congress had some concern. However, we had some access for U.S. Navy ship visits and training programs with the Indonesian military, so that there was a military dimension to these activities.

Indonesia is an important country economically, as well. It has been a significant and positive force in diplomacy. Often it led ASEAN activity. As I said already, in the South China Sea Indonesia didn't have any territorial claims of its own and therefore could play a less subjective role, holding workshops and trying to promote cooperation among the ASEAN countries and with Vietnam before it became a member of ASEAN. Indonesia was also very important with respect to diplomacy regarding Cambodia and efforts made to try to reach a cease-fire there and organize elections. On that issue, as on so many others, its very dynamic Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, was a crucial player.

Indonesian troops were involved in UN peacekeeping in various areas. Indonesia was an important player in the regional security dialogues. In November, 1994, Indonesia was the host to the APEC meeting in Bogor [West Java], where it supported the objectives of free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by the year 2020 and for developed countries by the year 2010, which were set forth under the leadership of President Suharto.

Of course, Indonesia was very strategically located, as I already indicated. So for all of these reasons we had many goals of a positive nature to pursue in Indonesia. However, we were somewhat constrained by various human rights problems.

Q: While we're on Indonesia, were we looking at Suharto's eventual successor and how Suharto was doing?

LORD: The answer is that this question was always in our mind. It was clear that he was going to hang around for some time. This is a classic example, not only in Indonesia but elsewhere in the world, of working with someone who has done a lot of good economically for his country but runs into other problems. There has been a dramatic rise in standards of living and the quality of life for Indonesians. However, Suharto was also authoritarian in outlook, although he clearly was not in the most nefarious class of people who were really distasteful. He was somewhat in the same class as Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, although a little less attractive in many respects. There was the specific East Timor case, problems of human rights, and the repression of opposition groups.

Many observers of the Indonesian scene were well aware of widespread corruption. Looking back on that period and what has happened since then, there isn't much that an outside country can do to promote the succession to a ruler long established in power. This gets to be a very sensitive issue. We raised the human rights question, we raised the East Timor issue. As far as I can recall, corruption was never directly addressed with the
Indonesian leaders. That, again, is a tricky issue, although it was expressed as a concern at economic gatherings.

So, on the one hand we recognized that Suharto had done a great deal for the country. On the other hand, there were some concerns about what would happen after him. However, to be fair about it, no one predicted the swift collapse of the Suharto regime and the economic difficulties suffered by Indonesia, to the extent that they did occur, after I left office. This is true of many Asian countries.

*Q:* There is an economic component in your bureau. I was wondering whether anyone was saying: "Look at these investments. They seem to be overly exuberant."

LORD: This was a problem which we discovered after I left office. To be fair about it, the answer is: "No." There were not a lot of people running around and saying that there was too much investment going into Indonesia or that the bubble was going to burst. Again, this problem was not confined to Indonesia.

There was a lot of concern about corruption. Of course, American business people didn't participate in that because of our own laws. They should be grateful that they don't have to consider the question of whether to get into that twilight zone because they could get into trouble with U.S. legislation. Therefore, American businessmen are clean. They sometimes lose business, but this makes it easier, in a way, to make decisions. Corruption was very much a problem. On the other hand there is no question that the economy had improved for the people, as a whole. I don't recall anyone who questioned the fundamental strengths of the Indonesian economy, to be honest about it.

*Q:* In Congress was there anyone who was particularly interested in the question of East Timor? Usually, when there is a problem, there is a Senator or Congressperson who sort of focuses on that.

LORD: There were several, although with my advancing age I'm having trouble pulling their names out of the hat. There were several in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Generally, these critics of Indonesia, such as Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi [Democrat, California] and others in the House of Representatives expressed concern about human rights in Indonesia. As I recall, Senator Feingold [Democrat, Wisconsin] was very interested in Indonesia, although I'd have to refresh my memory in this regard. Indonesia would come up in Congressional hearings, whenever there was a discussion of ASEAN or Southeast Asia or a more general view of our Asian policy.

In talks with either the House of Representatives or Senate Sub-Committees these issues would come up. Even friends of Indonesia would urge greater attention to human rights matters. However, like all issues, the emphasis would depend on the political orientation of the Senator or Congressman or Congresswoman. Those worried about economics or security concerns might touch lightly on East Timor or human rights, whereas others who were very concerned about democracy and human rights would emphasize that more.

In a discussion with Congress or the representatives of human rights groups you couldn't
escape a discussion of allegations of Indonesian repression and the situations in East Timor and Aceh [North Sumatra] and Irian Jaya. I'll talk about this later, but I met with human rights groups and business groups regularly. I would meet with individual players on the Indonesian question, like a bishop in New York who were very concerned about it, as well as human rights activists.

Whenever I went to Indonesia, both at my level and also when Secretary of State Christopher went there, we met with the Indonesian Human Rights Commission, which actually was set up by the Indonesian Government. This might make the commission a little suspect. However, it was relatively independent and, to this day, is playing a role which is independent of the Indonesian Government, although they have to tread a somewhat careful line. We made it a practice in our bilateral meetings with Indonesian officials, to raise the questions of human rights and East Timor. We would also meet with the Human Rights Commission and get their views on what was happening and show symbolic support for them. Indeed, some U.S. AID money went for the purpose of promoting human rights in Indonesia.

Also, the Indonesian press was quite mixed. We're not talking about a country that is anywhere near as repressive, of course, as places like Burma, Vietnam, or China. However, Indonesia was somewhat worse than a country like Singapore and nowhere near the democracies of Asia.

I think that Indonesia presented the classic balancing act that we have to carry out in foreign policy in terms of weighing various interests. We have really major economic, security, and diplomatic interests to be weighed against Indonesian human rights policies. We got criticism from both sides. Some observers, including geopoliticians and the supporters of realpolitik, feel that we should stop nagging Indonesia so much on East Timor and human rights, given all of the other interests we have in that country. On the other hand human rights groups and others often expressed the feeling we tended not to press these issues hard enough.

The fact is that we pushed the East Timor and human rights issues more than any other country did. I attended three or four meetings between President Clinton and President Suharto. It sometimes happened that President Clinton would have a smaller meeting on these sensitive issues. The two Presidents would go off with, perhaps, one additional person each and raise it there. I must say that each time that President Clinton raised these issues with Suharto, he got a pretty stiff answer. The answer was either brief or it was a recitation of history. In the case of East Timor Suharto would say that the Indonesians had lifted the Timorese people out of poverty under Portugal and had given them a great new life. So there wasn't much progress made. However, President Clinton made it clear that, by raising these issues, we tended to set a limit on the scope of our relations.

On the whole, I would argue, we struck a fairly good balance, given Indonesia's great importance. We spent quite a bit of time on these sensitive issues. We also developed further the overall relationship. There were some individuals in Congress who felt that we
should have been much tougher, but I think that there was a general recognition that there was a "balancing act" to be performed, given our huge stakes in Indonesia. I think that we struck this balance about right. I never felt that we were under severe pressure on these issues or that we had not been tough enough. President Clinton devoted quite a bit of time to this relationship with Indonesia.

_Q: Was there any concern about Islamic extremism developing in Indonesia?_

LORD: Not really, no, because Islam in Indonesia is a moderate religion. There wasn't much in the history of Islam in Indonesia or in Islamic movements there which would lend themselves to Islamic extremism. On at least one occasion I met with one of the Muslim leaders in Indonesia, who was of the generally moderate stripe. I think that there was a feeling that this was not a major problem. Considering the impact of Muslim fundamentalism worldwide, there is always a concern that it might spread. We never saw much evidence of that. Even to this day, I don't think that there is much Muslim fundamentalism in Indonesia.

_Q: What about ecology, cutting down forests, and all of that? Was that a big problem?_

LORD: That was more of a problem in Malaysia than in Indonesia, although there was some problem in Indonesia, as well. In all candor, this wasn't a major issue which we raised with Indonesia. We would raise the environmental issues generally at ASEAN meetings. However, environmental issues were not of major significance at the bilateral level.

_Q: Were there any passenger or shipping problems with Indonesia?_

LORD: No. I mentioned Ali Alatas, the Foreign Minister, who was one of the most impressive foreign ministers in Asia. He was also one of the longest serving foreign ministers. He survived many political twists and turns. Even to this day he is still working for President Habibie in the post to which President Suharto originally appointed him. He is a very dynamic force, particularly on the Cambodian situation, but also on many other issues.

He often projected a rather moderate image. I was never quite sure whether he was playing the good cop. He was always loyal to Suharto. I always had the feeling that he was suggesting to me that he was trying to work on Suharto and people in the Indonesian military to be more forthcoming on East Timor and human rights issues. You could have very thoughtful discussions with Ali Alatas. He would try to be reasonable. He had considerable vision and you felt that he was working on these human rights problems in a constructive fashion. He was well disposed to the United States. Along with Foreign Minister Evans of Australia, he was one of the most impressive foreign ministers I dealt with in the region.

_Q: Did we see any influence by the United States on the younger generation in Indonesia, such as Indonesians going to the United States for education, whether technical or otherwise, and then returning to Indonesia?_
LORD: There was some of this, but nowhere near the scale of Malaysia, believe it or not. For some reason our exchange program with Malaysia has always been one of our most expansive programs. It is one of the three or four largest exchange programs, after the Chinese and Taiwan programs.

I believe that a lot of Indonesian economists were trained in the United States and then returned to Indonesia.

Q: Was there a big wave of Indonesian students who studied in the United States?

LORD: Not that I was aware of. We might as well continue. As I go over my notes, some other points might come up.

Thailand, of course, is an ally under the SEATO [Southeast Asian Treaty Organization] treaty. We have large economic interests in Thailand and, basically, a very positive relationship. Our biggest problems with Thailand during the period when I was Assistant Secretary concerned the Khmer Rouge [Cambodian communists] and the drug problem. As the four years of my term went on, conditions improved on both fronts, even as Thailand and the United States cooperated in many other areas.

Elements of the Thai military had always had a cozy relationship with the Khmer Rouge along the Thai-Cambodian border in terms of logging and other enterprises. For years the Thai Government would say that it was trying to crack down on this cooperation with the Khmer Rouge. They would let the Khmer Rouge come over the border into Thailand if they were pursued by the Phnom Penh Government forces. We thought that it was crucial to get Thailand to crack down on the Khmer Rouge if there was going to be peace in Cambodia. In fact, it was essential to deal with the terrible Khmer Rouge threat and to bring an end to the genocide carried out by the Pol Pot Government in Cambodia. We thought that if we could really get Thai cooperation, on top of assistance or acquiescence from the Chinese Government, which had been the other, major backer of the Khmer Rouge over the years, this would reduce that threat.

It was a constant battle with the Thai on this issue. They would say: "Yes, we'll do whatever we can." They said that some of the local Thai military leaders along the Thai-Cambodian border wouldn't cooperate. That wasn't good enough for us. So we leaned very heavily on the Thai. As time went on, they gradually tightened up on the Khmer Rouge, partly because of our pressuring them. Also, other countries joined in pressuring them. Partly also, because I think that the Thai are very good at knowing which way the wind blows. They've always been very good at sniffing out trends. They were the one Southeast Asian country that wasn't colonized by Europe, and they have maintained their independence. I think that they saw the balance of forces shifting against the Khmer Rouge. This helped to influence them to be tougher with the Khmer Rouge.

As you will recall, in the wake of the Vietnam War there was the classic problem of the Khmer Rouge taking over and establishing a brutal regime in Cambodia. We'll get back
to Cambodia later. Part of the problem was further exacerbated by the participation and influence of other, outside countries. On the one hand there was China, with its historic animosity toward and problems with Vietnam. This was ironic because we saw China as a patron of Vietnam during the Vietnam War. We underestimated the actual tensions between China and Vietnam.

China essentially backed the Khmer Rouge, apparently thinking that a Khmer Rouge-dominated Cambodia would be a kind of buffer between Vietnam and China, or that a Chinese-influenced Cambodia would put more pressure on the Vietnamese. As you recall, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 and installed a government essentially dominated by the Vietnamese. China was always involved in trying to weaken that government. The Chinese don't worry about things like genocide and human rights. Anyway, they didn't have to hold their noses very much when they were working with the Khmer Rouge.

On the other hand the Vietnamese, of course, wanted to see a friendly government in Cambodia. In fact, the Hun Sen Government in Cambodia was disposed in a friendly way toward the Hanoi Government.

Then there were the Thai working with the Khmer Rouge for the reasons I have mentioned. The Thai have some historical tensions with Vietnam as well, of course. The Thai were allied with us against North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.

There were also residual French interests and a residual U.S. role in Thailand.

The Cambodian conflict was complicated by these outside powers, all of which gets me back to Thailand and our leaning on them. Gradually, the Chinese became more even handed. They cut back and then cut off aid to the Khmer Rouge. The Thai began to crack down more effectively along the Thai-Cambodian border. All of this helped to weaken the Khmer Rouge. As we speak now the Khmer Rouge are just about finished as an effective force in Cambodia. In many ways Cambodia is a tragic country. At least they no longer have the threat from the Khmer Rouge.

*Q: During the time that you were Assistant Secretary were we working on China to "withdraw its support" from the Khmer Rouge?*

LORD: Absolutely. They would never acknowledge directly to us that they were doing what we wanted. They didn't do it primarily for our purposes. Again, they did it because they saw that Hun Sen and his forces were in the ascendancy. The Chinese knew that they were paying a price for their blatant support of the Khmer Rouge, in terms of international opinion, which isn't as important to them as geopolitics and the balance of power. Anyway, as the Khmer Rouge began to grow weaker, the Chinese began to see that maybe they could have more influence in Southeast Asia by displaying less support of the Khmer Rouge.

*Q: Cambodia received support from China.*
LORD: Yes, but, given China's historic problems with Vietnam, anything that makes Vietnam nervous helps China with their Vietnam problem. Again, we would raise this matter with the Chinese, appealing to their own interest and influence in the region. With the Chinese you don't get very far by invoking the human rights dimension and by talking about the terrible genocide. You have to cite practical reasons, including their desire to have better relations with Southeast Asia and their general interest in having more stability in that region.

In any event, returning to Thailand, we really raised the Cambodian issue in almost every meeting with the Thai, because it was very crucial to us. As I said, the Thai became more and more helpful, to the point that, during the last couple of years of my service as Assistant Secretary, I think that it's fair to say that we were pretty satisfied with what the Thai were doing. We would check out what the Thai were doing through our intelligence reports. We had a pretty good reading as to whether the Thai were reining in their people. It reached the point where, not only did the Khmer Rouge no longer count on Thai aid or even Thai asylum but sometimes they would be turned back from the Thai-Cambodian border. So working with the Thai became another way of weakening the Khmer Rouge.

The other problem with Thailand was illicit drugs. The Thai became more and more cooperative on the drug problem, which had been a major issue for us. So we made progress with that. I cite those two problems as being typical issues we dealt with in Thailand, along with intellectual property rights. We made some progress on that issue, as well.

Thus, we had some difficulties with Thailand, but we had a very good security relationship with them. Thailand was our most important Southeast Asian security partner. We had our second largest military exercise in East Asia with Thailand, after another major exercise in South Korea. There have been numerous exchange programs and exercises, and we have had access to Royal Thai facilities.

We had one disappointment in 1993 or 1994. We tentatively approached the Thai to see if we could preposition some supplies offshore, in Thai waters, for possible future contingency use. This would have consisted of materiel and equipment which we could get to quickly, not only for Southeast Asian contingencies but also those involving the Middle East. We didn't handle this issue very well, diplomatically. We didn't prepare the ground well, news of it leaked, and it got caught up in Thai domestic politics. Thailand never really turned the proposal down, but it put it off indefinitely. This was somewhat irritating, since Thailand is an ally, and we thought that, given their cooperation in so many other areas, we would obtain their approval. Instead, the issue got tangled up in Thai domestic politics, since it looked as if Thailand would become involved in regional conflicts if it agreed to pre-position U.S. military supplies in Thailand. The U.S. JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] finally decided a year or two later that we really didn't need this equipment storage facility. That was one example where, on the military side, we did not have full cooperation from the Thai. This was an exception to the rule of broad cooperation from the Thai.
I visited Bangkok on many occasions and talked to them often at regional and UN meetings.

**Q: What was your impression of the Thai Government during the time you were Assistant Secretary?**

**LORD:** They were constantly forming and dissolving coalitions. You wondered whether the Thai military were going to get back into the political game. The Thai Governments certainly didn't strike us as particularly strong. Often, they had to maneuver because they were coalitions. However, on the whole they were friendly to the U.S. and sort of muddled through their problems but they were still doing all right. I don't have a strong feeling that the Thai Governments were particularly weak. Certainly, they were not hostile to the U.S. Thailand didn't have particularly dynamic leaders but they were friendly to us on the whole.

When you think of Singapore, you think of Lee Kuan Yew. When you think of Malaysia, you think of Mahathir Mohammed. When you think of the Philippines, you think of Marcos as a past leader but also of Fidel Ramos. In Thailand the leaders were more low key, low profile. They reminded me of Japan, at least in the sense that they did not have particularly strong leaders.

However, the good news was that Thailand was not authoritarian. It was a democracy. Democracies, of course, can be sloppier, and their leaders may be less dynamic and dominant. You can't have it both ways. On the whole, we had a very solid, friendly relationship with Thailand during this period. There were really no major problems, beyond the ones I've mentioned.

**Q: Were refugees from Burma and Cambodia an issue?**

**LORD:** They were an issue, but the Thai were generally helpful. At times, in terms of the refugees from Burma, the Thai would be worried about their relations with Burma. We sometimes felt that the Thai could have been a little bit more sensitive to refugee needs. However, on the whole, the Thai had a very good record on refugees. Whether it concerned refugees from Vietnam, Burma, or Cambodia, the Thai had a record of taking them in. They tried to support them financially, as did the UN and others. On the whole the Thai deserved high remarks for their treatment of refugees.

I think that those are the major themes affecting Thailand during this period. On the whole the Thai record was pretty positive, and our relations with Thailand were pretty problem free, particularly as we made progress in dealing with the Khmer Rouge, drugs, and intellectual property rights.

Now the Philippines, particularly during the first couple of years of the 1993-1997 period, was lagging behind the rest of its neighbors, on the whole, in terms of economic growth and dynamism. A lot of this ironically turned out to be a plus for the Philippines
at the time because during this period they had to undertake a lot of reforms in order to get IMF [International Monetary Fund] assistance.

So the Philippines undertook a lot of reforms and restructuring that the IMF imposed. As a result, they streamlined and worked hard on their economy. There was a great movement toward democracy. They got rid of President Marcos and, at first got Mrs. Aquino as President. She was a good democrat but not that effective on the economic front. Then they had Fidel Ramos as their principal leader and ultimately President. I think that he was one of the most impressive leaders in the world during this period.

During this period before he was elected President of the Philippines Ramos effectively protected Mrs. Aquino against military coups d'etat and threats to democracy. When he became President, he launched an economic reform program which, together with what the Philippines had been doing with the IMF, really got the country into a position for economic take off. As a result, by the time he left office, the Philippines had done very well economically for a couple of years. It attracted a lot of foreign investment which it previously had been unable to obtain. It consolidated its democracy and was catching up with the rest of Southeast Asia.

Because the Philippines had just gone through a tough restructuring period and was quite open, democratic, and transparent, it has survived the Asian financial crisis which has occurred since I left office much better than its neighbors. Now, it's been hit by an economic recession like everyone else, but it's still growing, although very moderately now. Instead of the contraction and disaster that happened in Indonesia.

Q: Had our air and naval bases in the Philippines been closed when you were in office as Assistant Secretary?

LORD: I think that it was two years before. Then we had reconstituted low-key military cooperation. We had ship visits and some joint military exercises with the Philippines. President Fidel Ramos was very friendly, but there were still some people on the U.S. side who were bitter about our withdrawal from the bases in the Philippines.

In a way I think that our withdrawal from these bases was a healthy development. I yield to no one in my support for a base presence in the Philippines. The bases were crucial for the U.S. forward presence, stability, and so on. However, there was no question that when we had large, land-based facilities like that, they were always subject to political problems at one point or another. In addition to economic benefits for the local population, we ran up against the irritations which the presence or intrusion of U.S. forces always creates. We had seen this happen in Japan and elsewhere. We obviously didn't want to leave the Philippines, because of the tremendous, strategic value of our bases there. However, we were forced to leave by the political winds that began to blow. In a way I think that this was a healthy adjustment. Now, during the period when I was Assistant Secretary, we talked about gaining access to base facilities in the Philippines and ad hoc arrangements, rather than permanent bases in the Philippines, which were subject to political pressures.
As I say, each of the countries of Southeast Asia, almost without exception, has stepped up to help compensate for our withdrawal from the Philippines. Whether the country involved is Thailand, Malaysia, or even Brunei or Singapore, there are military exchanges and joint exercises, access to ship repair facilities, and so on. The Philippines was doing this to a modest degree. We had to work out a new arrangement, since we no longer had a SOFA or Status of Forces Agreement, to cover our military personnel who went to the Philippines temporarily for exercises or for other reasons. This was a problem which came up late in my term as Assistant Secretary and has been resolved since I was there. We had to make some ad hoc arrangements, and this constrained our military cooperation to a certain extent.

However, on the whole our relations with the Philippines were very positive throughout this period. As I said, Ramos deserves great credit for his contributions to democracy and protecting newly won democracy, since Marcos left office. Then there were the tremendous, economic reforms, the boosting of the Philippine economy, and Ramos' continued promotion of democratic principles. He was one of the most effective world leaders during this period.

Q: Were we able to use any of the facilities for temporary ship repairs at Subic Bay in the Philippines, and all of that?

LORD: Subic Bay was turned very successfully into an Economic Investment Region. I visited there during one of my visits to the Philippines. I went to the Philippines several times on my own, as well as with the President, who attended the APEC Summit Meeting in Manila in 1996, and with Secretary of State Christopher on other occasions. I also went to the Philippines with Secretary of Defense Perry and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when there was a commemoration of the defense of Corregidor in 1941-1942. I think that in terms of the American forces actually committed, when we retook the Philippines with MacArthur, the numbers of troops involved were even larger than our troop strength in Normandy. I may have the numbers screwed up, but the forces involved in the operation were on a major scale. Of course, this operation didn't have the publicity or the resonance in history and cannot be considered as important as the liberation of Europe was. In any case, that was a major commemoration.

Along with Thailand, the Philippines has been a positive force in this whole debate about Asian values, which we'll get to later. Thailand and the Philippines are democracies. Of course, it is important that they make economic progress, to show that democracy and economic progress go hand in hand. You don't have to have authoritarian governments to make progress in terms of their standard of living, and so on. So, therefore, the rise of the Philippines was very encouraging in that respect as well.

Q: It's interesting that there has been tremendous immigration from the Philippines to the United States, over the years. However, in my perusal of the newspapers and so forth, there doesn't seem to be much of a Philippine lobby here in Washington.

LORD: I've noticed that as well. I think that this is true of the Asian lobby in general.
Q: I can hardly believe that in time the South Koreans won't have a lobby of their own.

LORD: You're absolutely right. It's true of the Philippines and it's generally true of Asian immigrants in the U.S. They've done very well, of course. They have this sense of entrepreneurship, academic excellence, and family values. So whether it's their good behavior in terms of avoidance of crime or whether it's being at the head of a class, whether they are Vietnamese, Japanese, or whatever, or whether it's their success economically, they have added greatly to our society. One of the reasons we wanted to stress the Pacific Community generally in our foreign policy is the growing importance of Asians in our society.

However, they haven't been active politically. This is partly due to their style and partly because they've done well and maybe they don't have to press on it. This doesn't mean that all Asians have done well. Some of them have done better than others. This may be changing somewhat, even as we speak. There may be more lobbying by Asian-Americans in the future.

I was going to mention Taiwan, but that's something that has been done by the Taiwan authorities. It's not due to the Chinese or Taiwanese in this country. It is an interesting phenomenon. You're absolutely right.

There is one issue of more benefits for Philippine veterans which is still outstanding as we speak. We might move on to Malaysia, which is another classic example of balancing off interests as it is in Indonesia. This applies to Malaysia particularly, of course, because of the personality of Prime Minister Mahathir, who has raised the whole issue of Asian values and so on. He has been the most outspoken anti-Western person in his rhetoric. He has been a great proponent of Asian values and has been critical of what he has called the “decadence” of the West. He defines this as consisting of too much liberty. At times he has exhibited a certain racist dimension, both in his general attack on white men in general in his excluding Australia and New Zealand from “Asian” groupings, and his anti-Jewish remarks at times, including comments he made during a recent crisis since I left office as Assistant Secretary. He has attacked George Soros and others, probably because they are Jewish. He is a very unpleasant, nasty person. However, he is obviously very intelligent. We won't get into current events, but he is under some pressure now, as we speak, for mistakes he has made. There is no question that he did a terrific job in lifting the Malaysian economy, notwithstanding the crises which have occurred since I left office.

I know that when Secretary of State Christopher went to Malaysia and was driving into Kuala Lumpur from the airport, he was struck by the signs of dynamism and construction going on. Not all of this is an illusion. Asia has not gone from miracle to meltdown, and Malaysia hasn't, either. There has been tremendous growth, the standard of living has risen, investment has been attracted, and there has been a notable effort to turn Malaysia into being a technological leader. Prime Minister Mahathir has tried to build a Malaysian version of Silicon Valley and attract high tech investment. There is a lot of construction
going on in Malaysia. The world's tallest building has been constructed there. Some of this has turned out to be overexuberant, as we have seen since then. However, it has not all been illusions. There is no question that under Mahathir's leadership Malaysia has improved very much economically. He has a dynamic program, looking toward the year 2020. All of this has suffered somewhat as a result of the Asian financial crisis since then. So, on the one hand, we had growing economic interests in Malaysia. The Malaysian Government was cooperative on the security front, in terms of access and joint exercises. Malaysia is a member of the Five Power defense arrangement. It doesn't include us, but it is composed of Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Malaysia was generally helpful on the Cambodian issue, in which it has considerable interest. Of course, Malaysia is a member of ASEAN.

For all of these reasons there were some positive elements in our relations with Malaysia, as well as some great irritations with Prime Minister Mahathir personally, at times, especially his attacks on the U.S., the West, and our values. In terms of human rights Malaysia was certainly better off than the worst parts of Asia and probably better than Indonesia. However, it was not a democracy like Thailand, enjoying full freedom. There was a mixed picture on that front. I don't think that you could accuse Mahathir of the excesses of Suharto and other major figures in Asia.

Q: Did you meet Mahathir?

LORD: Yes. I had at least one meeting alone with him when I visited Malaysia in my own right. I sat in on meetings between Secretary Christopher, President Clinton, and Mahathir. I saw him in the White House.

I should add that Mahathir wasn't totally hostile at all times. He could turn on the charm, but you never forgot that he held these views of suspicion of the West, even as he wanted Western investment. I will also say that he supported the U.S. military presence as being in the interests of Malaysia and Southeast Asia for stability. He still has some residual concerns about China or Japan and so he sees the U.S. as a balancing force. Even then, he was somewhat more ambivalent toward us than, say, Singapore, the Philippines, or Thailand.

One thing that always amazed me was the contrast between Mahathir and his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim. Again, we won't get into current events, since Anwar Ibrahim is in prison and this has led the unrest in Malaysia. Even as Mahathir was going around, promoting Asian values, attacking the West, and denigrating human rights, Ibrahim has been just the opposite. In a number of speeches that I made I would quote Ibrahim. First, he was eloquent, and, secondly, because he was Mahathir's deputy. This was to make my point that "Asian values" is a phony term because who speaks for Asia? Of course, I would cite all of the democracies in Asia and the fact that people believe in democracy, whether this involves Japan or Taiwan. Taiwan shows that, even on Chinese soil, you can have democracy. Or the Republic of Korea, with the help of Kim Dae Jung and others, or Thailand, the Philippines, and even in Cambodia, where the people wanted to vote, or in Mongolia, where the people threw off the Soviet and communist yoke and enjoyed free
I would point to all of the democratic forces in Asia and add that one shouldn't just listen to people like Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir, let alone Jiang Zemin of China, or the Vietnamese or North Korean leaders. It's a mixed picture. We'll get back to that subject again. In my speeches I would also quote Anwar Ibrahim, specifically, to ask, even in Malaysia, "Who speaks for Asian values?" I could never understand why Mahathir tolerated such a contrast in philosophy and rhetoric in his own government. He, himself, said on one occasion: "Anwar Ibrahim will take over from me some day," although that day seems to keep receding into the future.

Also, even on economic issues, and that has become more dramatic with the emergence of the Asian financial crisis, Ibrahim was even more open to transparency and outside investment than Mahathir. So Mahathir and Ibrahim were always an odd couple. We've seen just how odd they were in recent months, when Mahathir has arranged to have Anwar Ibrahim arrested and imprisoned.

Q: But you were saying that Malaysia had one of the largest groups of students going to the United States and then coming back when their studies were completed. Did this seem to foster better ties between Malaysia and the United States, at least in terms of business and so forth?

LORD: It has in all of these countries. It's been one of the great assets of American foreign policy around the world, and not just in Asia. I still think that this is going to have an impact on our relations with that area of the world and in Malaysia, in particular, in the future. I can't quantify the number of Malaysian students in the United States. I want to stress that, despite the prickliness of Mahathir, the Malaysian students who have studied in the U.S. are really quite positive about their experience in this country.

We didn't have such glaring issues outstanding between Malaysia and the United States as East Timor or a huge human rights crackdown. It was clear that there was some evidence of corruption in Malaysia, but it wasn't as blatant as it was in Indonesia. We also had good cooperation in the economic and military field. So our bilateral relationship really reflected quite strong ties between our two countries.

The problem came up in broader discussions of values, as I've already mentioned. Then there was the particular issues of the East Asian Economic Caucus. Mahathir had the idea of forming an Asian-only grouping, partly to give Asia more clout and partly to balance off U.S. and Western influence. Mahathir already had ASEAN as a group, but he wanted to include Japan, China, and others to form a caucus which would take collective positions. This idea had been simmering for several years, before we even entered office. Former Secretary of State Jim Baker had taken on Mahathir directly and frontally because we didn't want to see an Asian-only group which might exclude the U.S. Because of this idea there had been some tensions between Mahathir and the Administration of President Bush.
However, by happenstance or somewhat by accident, to be honest about it, I at least temporarily became an instant hero with Mahathir when I first came into office, because of a comment that I made during my confirmation hearings.

I've got to get more details and see exactly what the Senators had in mind with their question and what Mahathir had in mind on my response. I certainly didn't give him any encouragement on EAEC. However, instead of being instantly hostile, in effect I said that I wanted to hear more about it. Frankly, I didn't ascribe much importance to the answer which I gave to a question at my hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This comment was immediately played up in the Malaysian press as a more forthcoming, constructive, fair-minded attitude by the new American administration compared to Baker’s frontal opposition. This was almost an honor that I almost didn't want to receive.

In fact, I helped to shape a policy over the coming years which, I think, was quite effective on how we dealt with this issue. On the surface, it's pretty hard to make the point, at least superficially, that the Asians should not talk among themselves. In other words, why does the U.S. always have to be present for discussions?

One reason that we promoted APEC, regional security dialogues, regional institutions, and the whole Pacific Community concept, as I said earlier, was to have trans-Pacific organizations and approaches, and not Asian-only ones. That would anchor us there and get us at the bargaining table from the beginning. But the fact is that it is pretty hard to make the case that it is somehow against the law for Asian countries to get together without our being present. It's okay for the Europeans to do this, even though we are also a transatlantic nation, too. So at least superficially it was a little difficult to do this for Asia.

Having said that, what we didn't want was to have not only ASEAN but Japan, China, and South Korea as well get together and decide on positions before we had a crack at them. Then we would have had to face a united front, although it would be difficult for these countries to do this because of their varying approaches and ideology. Nevertheless, we just didn't want to be excluded. Then, when we got to some issues, we might find that with the EAEC [East Asian Economic Community] we couldn't develop too much influence because the EAEC would say: "Well, we're still trying to develop the EAEC position." Then, when they had prepared this position, they might say that they couldn't change it, because this was a collective position. We didn't want to get caught on that kind of “Catch-22” deal.

So we didn’t like the EAEC concept, but we just avoided taking them on frontally. We dragged this process out, slowed it down, and deprived it of meaning as best we could. We delayed and stalled. Meanwhile, there were specific institutions like APEC and the regional security dialogues we were developing, which would anchor us in Asia and make us indispensable. We would try to let this process of development of the EAEC die a slow death, or at least deprive it of any real meaning. Meanwhile, we would work behind the scenes, with Japan in particular, and try to make the case in Asian debates that
the U.S. shouldn't be excluded. However, the Japanese had to be careful not to look like puppets of the United States. We were sensitive to that concern.

I think that it's fair to say that we dragged this process out over several years. Finally the Asian countries would get together for breakfast before an APEC meeting or a regional security dialogue meeting. We could live with that. At these meetings Japan and South Korea, in particular, would make sure that no decisions were made which would exclude the U.S. So we would work with them before these meetings to make sure that things would not come out badly. In effect, we adopted a relaxed attitude, when there were some of these meetings, which were called usually at the initiative of Prime Minister Mahathir. So this process never really amounted to anything. There never was a major bloc established. Mahathir had to keep redefining it himself, saying that he wasn't trying to exclude the U.S. from Asia. This was just a chance for Asians to talk among themselves.

I think that our less frontal approach lowered tensions with Mahathir on this issue. He may have been frustrated at our tactics but he couldn't say that we were totally hostile. Meanwhile, we beefed up APEC with President Clinton raising it to a summit level. We endorsed these regional security dialogues. We got ourselves anchored more and more in these Pacific-wide institutions. So the EAEC never became a major problem. I think that we handled this issue quite skillfully. We couldn't solve the problem overnight for many reasons. It was hard frontally to approach Asian caucusing, but we also didn't want them to threaten our interests.

Toward the end of my term as Assistant Secretary and since then, the point has been reached where there developed Asian-European dialogues which would include ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, and China on the Asian side and the Europeans on the other side. However, by then we had become more relaxed about this. Again, as you look at Europe, Asia, and the U.S., clearly the Asian-European dialogue was and is the weakest. They had the right to talk to each other, even as we had our own ties across the Atlantic and the Pacific. So this is a way of saying that the EAEC issue was a fairly significant irritant and problem as we came into office, but by our strategy of stretching it out, delaying it, talking to Japan and South Korea, and building up Pacific institutions we handled it well.

*Q:* As you talk about Prime Minister Mahathir, one can't help but remember the phrase used to describe him as the Asian De Gaulle.

**LORD:** It might have come up. It certainly was not a bad analogy, in terms of nationalism and so forth. In fact, I think that this is a pretty good analogy. I think that De Gaulle was for France and its grandeur, even to the point where this had some negative effect on his attitude toward European unity and so on. He wanted France to stand out. Mahathir thought of building up Malaysia, certainly, but also tended to think of himself more as an Asian spokesperson.

*Q:* He was working from a much smaller base.

**LORD:** Yes, he was working from a much smaller base.
Q: Still, we had had the experience of having to deal with this kind of attitude before. As you were working on this problem, were there any voices within our government, within your bureau, or even internally, within yourself, saying: "What are we doing, getting into this Asian question? Maybe we should not be so intrusive in Asia."

LORD: There was some debate. It wasn't an emotional debate. It was a matter of degree and emphasis. There were some who felt: "Let them go ahead. It's not going to hurt us." They didn't feel passionately about it. There were others, including some on the economic side, who were concerned about Asian countries developing a caucus and maybe even, on economic issues, taking stances, let alone on security matters, and so on. That would have been difficult for us to deal with. They may have felt that we ought to deal with this a little more frontally. However, I think that the center of gravity in the U.S. government was pretty much where I described it. We didn't want to embrace an Asian caucus, because it did have some possible dangers over time. But we didn't want it to become a major irritant, not only with Malaysia, but, putting our other friends in Asia, like Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines, in a bind. They didn't want to look as if they were not good Asians or were U.S. puppets, though they themselves didn't want the U.S. to be excluded.

We thought that it was important to strike a middle ground and try to slow down any momentum developing toward the establishment of an Asian caucus because of the possible exclusion of the U.S. We recognized the principle that they had the right to talk to each other, and we just kind of dragged the process out. So there were some debates, but it was never a major source of tension between agencies of the U.S. Government or even in my own bureau. I think that most people felt that this was about the way to handle it. Occasionally, somebody would speak up and say that we ought to be tougher. Others would say that it wasn't worth worrying about. It was never a major issue within the Administration.

Singapore is a good example of a place where we had tremendously positive relations on every conceivable front except one. This again was the issue of Asian values and the Singapore Government's treatment of some of its citizens. On the one hand they had the rule of law there, but the government was pretty authoritarian. I needn't elaborate on this. Lee Kuan Yew was now the Senior Minister with Prime Minister Goh, who was the man in charge, although many people felt that Lee Kuan Yew was looking over his shoulder.

The bad news in Singapore was that there was a caning incident where a young American citizen was punished by caning for something he did. I can't even remember now what it was.

Q: He was a kid. He went out and, I think, hit some cars. He did some damage to parked cars.

LORD: That's right. This became a major issue with some people in the U.S. Some columnists, such as Bill Safire, and some members of Congress always had it in for Lee Kuan Yew. There were some people in the U.S. who sort of approved of Singapore
saying, in effect, that a little discipline is a good idea. If you don't like drugs, you ought to be happy to have Singapore so tough on drugs. If you want clean streets, you ought to be happy that he doesn't let people chew gum, throw it away on the street, and so on. So there was some feeling here, in reaction to alleged permissiveness in U.S. society, that a little caning goes a long way. However, the overwhelming reaction, including that in editorial opinions, was one of considerable outrage.

We did weigh in on that, out of our concern about it. We appealed to Singapore's self interest in terms of their image in the United States. We didn't get very far with this approach, needless to say. I have to tell you that I personally felt that we shouldn't go overboard on this issue. Singapore had the rule of law. I felt that, on the whole, and compared to many other countries, that it was quite enlightened, although I was annoyed at Lee Kuan Yew's Asian values approach and so on. I also recognized that on almost every other issue Singapore was one of our best friends.

This was the only concern that we had with Singapore, to be balanced off against very positive relations on almost every other issue. So, first of all, I didn't think that Singapore was that bad on human rights. I didn't like caning either, but I didn't think that this issue should disrupt our entire relationship. Secondly, we had all of these other, positive aspects in the contacts between our two countries.

In this connection there was one significant glitch where Mickey Kantor, our U.S. Trade Representative, got incensed about the caning, and without checking with any of us, he said that the first meeting of the World Trade Organization, which was being set up to take over from the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], should not take place in Singapore because of the caning episode. This was an uncoordinated position which we had to walk back.

So for a few months the caning issue was one of considerable tension. We also had problems with Singapore where the government was restricting circulation of certain magazines and newspapers. The "International Herald Tribune" was being sued, and some people were subjected to Singapore's libel laws. So there was some irritation.

For these reasons presumably, despite my best efforts, for several years the White House would not approve a meeting in the Oval Office between Prime Minister Goh of Singapore and President Clinton. This was a constant frustration to me, because President Clinton just would not receive Prime Minister Goh in the Oval Office because of domestic political reasons and because of concern about Bill Safire, and others. Once Goh was in the U.S. anyway for some economic conference. Here was an opportunity for the President to see him, without actually inviting him to come to the U.S. He could have a businesslike meeting. I just ranted and raved on this matter because Singapore was a staunch supporter of the U.S. presence in Asia, cooperative on security issues, a free trader, etc. I worked hard on the NSC. Goh had all of these positive aspects. If President Clinton would agree to see Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia in the Oval Office, not to mention President Suharto of Indonesia, why couldn't he see the Prime Minister of Singapore? I had feelings of total frustration. It was a good example where domestic...
politics in the White House overruled our foreign policy interests.

The President would see Prime Minister Goh at APEC meetings and would have a bilateral meeting with him there. Usually, there was some controversy over whether it was an official bilateral or not. I thought that the White House was overly sensitive on this issue. I was frustrated with some of the Asian values which the Singapore Government advocated. However, compared to some other countries' human rights performance, and given Singapore's tremendous positive ties with us, I felt that the White House was being ridiculous on this issue of not receiving Prime Minister Goh in the Oval Office. This matter was a constant source of frustration. I'm happy to say that Prime Minister Goh finally got in to see President Clinton in the Oval Office in 1997.

Q: This was an example of the political person at the White House...

LORD: I would have to say that Tony Lake and Sandy Berger [National Security Advisers] were not prepared to press President Clinton very hard on this issue. I always felt that if we could approach the President directly, that he might be more relaxed. You can never tell on some of these matters. When we get to Vietnam, we'll get to that point as well - that is, there was a question as to how much the NSC was reflecting what they knew the President's predilections were, how much they were just protecting him without consulting him, and how much they were affected by the domestic political advisers in the White House. In this case, for all I know, Mickey Kantor [U.S. Trade Representative], who was very close to the President, might have weighed in on some of these issues. Or perhaps it was the influence of other people who just didn't like what Singapore was up to.

Q: On this caning issue a compromise was sort of reached.

LORD: Yes. The young man was caned, but they reduced the sentence to a more moderate number of strokes of the rotan, as the saying goes in Singapore.

Q: Yes, I think that the young man received three strokes instead of 12.

LORD: So they made an effort to limit the impact of the affair. However, once it got to the point where there was actually a request from the President on the matter, you got into a question of face. This made it impossible for the Singapore Government to back off completely.

So I spent quite a bit of time on this relationship with Singapore. I met continually with the Singapore Ambassador, who was a very able man named Nathan. I also visited Singapore several times. I tried to work on the positive aspects of this relationship. I kept talking about the positive aspects of this relationship. We had considerable economic interests in Singapore, despite the fact that it's a very small. It's a very dynamic country, of course. Singapore is a regional leader, in many respects, far beyond its size. Its diplomats and bureaucrats - well paid to discourage corruption - are exceptionally able. Singapore was always in the forefront of free trade. It was probably the greatest
proponent of free trade and opening up economies in all of Southeast Asia, and perhaps in all of Asia. This was one reason why one of the first meetings of the WTO [World Trade Organization] was held in Singapore. Whenever we had battles with ASEAN on economic issues, Singapore was always on the side of justice and light as far as we were concerned.

Singapore was the single, strongest proponent of a U.S. military presence in Asia. We had a tremendous military cooperation program in Singapore, including access to their bases. To his credit, Lee Kuan Yew, even though he would tangle with us on Asian values was the most outspoken figure, as was Prime Minister Goh and other Singapore ministers, on the need for an American military presence in Asia. They regarded our military presence as a stabilizing force. Singapore was always very helpful on diplomatic efforts to deal with Cambodia or anyone else. On regional security dialogues, Singapore always advocated moving forward in building regional security institutions. So on almost every issue which we cared about, Singapore was among our greatest friends. There was this single restraining factor, which I think was exaggerated by the White House.

Q: Then should we move on to another country or back to talk about the overall situation?

LORD: The other original of ASEAN as we entered office was Brunei. Without being condescending, I would say that our contacts with Brunei obviously do not reflect a crucial bilateral relationship. Brunei is a very wealthy country. I think that from the point of view of per capita Gross Domestic Product, Brunei is either number one or number two in the world, because of its oil. That gives it some significance, well beyond its tiny size. We would often go to Brunei for financial help in connection with the situation in Bosnia and on KEDO, the agreed framework initiative on Korea. The Brunei Government was never very generous on KEDO, but they did help out on Bosnia. So even though Brunei itself was not that crucial, obviously, because of its financial clout, we were able to arrange meetings between the President and the Sultan of Brunei at APEC meetings, and so on. Even if the meeting involved only a pull aside for 10 minutes or so to help us make the point that we wanted their help.

Brunei has a very authoritarian society in many ways. However, it cooperated with us on the military front and was very friendly in its bilateral relationship with the U.S. It had an extremely able, senior official, Mr. Lim, who was my counterpart. He basically ran Brunei's foreign policy. The Foreign Minister was a relative of the Sultan, and he delegated his authority. It happened that the first senior officials' meeting on regional security for me, which was held every May, took place in Brunei in 1993. We made considerable progress, thanks to the leadership of this gentleman in the Brunei Foreign Ministry. During my tenure as Assistant Secretary I visited Brunei a couple of times. That was one of them, and I went there another time.

Q: During this time were there any border disputes? Did people get along pretty well together?
LORD: That was one of the major accomplishments of ASEAN, as I said earlier. They did this by working together as a group diplomatically and moving toward a free trade area, which they affirmed during my time as Assistant Secretary. Despite some financial difficulties, they also subsumed their internal problems with one another. Whether these involved border problems or other, territorial disputes, including refugee problems, none of these really flared up during my tenure.

It so happened that in the year or two since I left the Department of State, immigration from poorer countries like Indonesia into places like Singapore, the Philippines, and the flow of refugees into Thailand has led to a resurfacing of tensions, particularly between Singapore and Malaysia, over immigration questions. There was a lot of history to this dispute. These problems have been kept quiet and are still relatively quiet. Certainly, between 1993 to 1997 there were no intra-ASEAN tensions on this subject.

Several of the ASEAN countries had conflicting claims to certain islands in the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands, and so on. China and Taiwan are also involved in a dispute over some of these islands. The Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, and Malaysia also have claims to these islands. I may have left some country out. These differences never really reached the point of real tension. As time went on, the ASEAN countries sort of grouped together to exercise a sort of balancing force vis-a-vis China. When we get to regional security matters, I can get back to that point.

Relations among the ASEAN countries are really quite good, despite certain disparities. Certainly, Thailand and the Philippines are more pro-democratic than Indonesia and Malaysia. However, all of them felt the need to work with us militarily and all of them welcomed our presence in the area. All of them, with the Philippines still engaged in catching up, are doing quite well economically. They are working quite effectively together as a diplomatic force. But with the newer, poorer, more authoritarian countries, ASEAN cohesion will be more difficult.

Q: That leaves Burma.

LORD: Let me take a quick break. Then we might go to the other Southeast Asian countries, starting with Vietnam. We can also touch on Laos, Cambodia, and Burma.
Q: Okay, we're back in business.

LORD: Let's start with Vietnam, which has recently become a member of ASEAN in its own right. Let's start off by talking about Vietnam primarily in the bilateral context, which most concerns us, on the whole, although better relations between the U.S. and Vietnam made improved relations with ASEAN easier when Vietnam became a member.

I would say that, from a personal standpoint, I had more personal impact individually, while working with others, of course, on this issue than perhaps on any other matter in the region. I would like to think that I was heavily involved, and I was, in all of the major Asian issues and made a contribution on many of them. However, I think that in terms of the normalization of relations between the U.S. and Vietnam, if I can be slightly immodest, it would not have happened without constant efforts on my part.

This involved a real balancing act. There were several factors in it. First was Hanoi itself, and our negotiations with the Vietnamese Government. Then we had to consider the interests of the White House, which was very sensitive on this issue. The White House was very concerned about domestic, political criticism, particularly since President Clinton had avoided the draft during the Vietnam War. Also important to consider were domestic pressure groups, veterans' groups, and members of the families of the Missing in Action and POWs [Prisoners of War]. They did not all hold the same view. They often had different views, some of them very strongly held. Then there were the political sensitivities of members of Congress, who were on different sides of this issue. They held varying views, but many of them were very suspicious of Hanoi, as were other domestic groups.

So we constantly had to watch all of these flanks as we tried to move ahead with the Vietnamese-American relationship. I believe that the policy we ultimately followed was one of our most constructive and most successful during these four years. We moved from the point where we inherited this issue to full, diplomatic relations by the time we were finished, less than four years later.

Q: Could you describe how the Bush administration handled this issue, to understand where you moved?

LORD: Absolutely. I would like to make a general introduction. I also think that this was one of the understated achievements, when people talk about foreign policy successes in Asia and generally in Clinton’s first four years in office. They often leave out Vietnam, or barely mention it. I'm not claiming that this was a cosmic issue of great importance, but creating a new relationship was a substantial achievement.

Vietnam is really a much bigger country than many people realize. I think that the population was estimated at about 70 million in 1994. It is potentially a dynamic country, despite its tragic history. Given the sensitivities and wounds in our society, it was
significant that we moved toward normalization of relations with Vietnam. Given the sensitivities, it was not an issue which the White House ever played up in terms of trumpeting success.

A quick note on my own background. As we have discussed elsewhere, I was heavily involved in the Vietnam negotiations in the early 1970s with Dr. Kissinger, on behalf of President Nixon. Indeed I drafted much of the peace agreement. These were secret negotiations. So I dealt with Hanoi representatives during that period and, quite frankly, got to distrust them very much. I didn't dislike them personally so much as I realized that these were tough bastards who subsequently then broke the agreement which we had negotiated.

Consequently, I had a lot of mistrust for Vietnam, not only because they broke the agreement of 1973, but I felt that the Vietnamese communist leaders weren't cooperating fully on POWs [Prisoners of War] and MIAs [Missing in Action] in the 1970s and 1980s. I had a lot of sympathy for the families and the veterans, their frustration over this issue. There was as well Vietnam's general authoritarianism; I didn't like their human rights violations. I didn't particularly appreciate Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1979, although anything that gets rid of the Khmer Rouge can't be all bad. I opposed Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia on the general principle that they violated an internationally recognized border. However, my own background of suspicion, distrust, and even antipathy toward the Vietnamese with whom I dealt was not personal or anything like that with the people, of course. I had great respect for the Vietnamese people, including their tremendous success as immigrants to this country.

On the other hand I also had a sense that Vietnam was an important country. It was important to try to heal the wounds left by the Vietnam War in our society. Moving ahead in relations was our best bet to get more information on our missing in action. Vietnam was also potentially important from the economic point of view. It obviously was also important in geopolitical terms. It has a large and dynamic population. Given the traditional Vietnamese antagonism toward China, it was also useful, in dealing with China, with which we wanted better relations, to improve our relations with some of China's historical enemies. This was just to remind the Chinese of the balance of power considerations applicable in this situation, whether it involved India, Vietnam, Russia, or Japan. Having good relations with those countries is helpful when we deal with China. So, for all of these reasons I felt that it was important to try to move ahead with Vietnam, even though I had this distrust of them.

Now, when the Clinton Administration entered office, I thought that the preceding, Bush administration had followed a pretty constructive policy. They were following what was called a road map, which was adopted back in about 1991 or so. One of my predecessors as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Dick Solomon, had a lot to do with developing this road map. They had arranged with Vietnam that, to the extent that the Vietnamese were more forthcoming on MIA and POW issues, the U.S. would be more forthcoming with them on economic and other issues. The human rights issue really wasn't included in the road map, although it was always mentioned. The argument was
that if the Vietnamese did certain things on MIA and POW issues, we would do certain things in return.

I generally supported this policy. I felt that, both on the merits and for political reasons in our own society, making progress in getting more information on the Missing in Action and the Prisoner of War questions was important. We would try to exert leverage on these matters. It was important to try to move ahead with the relationship between Vietnam and the United States.

We adopted this general approach of the road map. I think that we were a little bit more forceful about it. Our strategy was essentially to avoid two extremes of policy, and I think that the Bush administration was doing that as well. In short, we sought to pursue a middle course. One extreme was to seek to isolate Vietnam and to display hostility toward it. Under this heading we would say, in effect: "Until you do everything that we want on the MIA/POW questions, we're not going to do anything with you people." The Clinton administration felt, and I did also, that this course wasn't going to produce progress. We felt that we had to give the Vietnamese some incentive to be forthcoming on MIAs and POWs. The Vietnamese had their own bitterness left over from the war. They had many more dead and missing than we. They had their own domestic problems. Just in pure, pragmatic terms, they probably wouldn't be forthcoming with such information, even though we might say that they should be, in terms of honor and humanitarian considerations, unless they saw something in it for them.

On the other hand, I was certainly not in favor of great leaps forward with the Vietnamese, such as promising the normalization of diplomatic relations, moving ahead immediately on economic issues, hoping that this would induce them to be friendlier and more forthcoming. I thought that such a course would give away our leverage. Knowing the Vietnamese as I did from the negotiations on the Peace Agreement of 1973, I knew what tough customers they were. I felt that we had to have a more nuanced approach.

So we followed a more middle ground approach where we would have some engagement to gain cooperation, make clear that the MIA/POW question was the number one issue, but also make clear that we would be willing to work with the Vietnamese and improve our relationship. We proceeded to make incremental progress in this regard. In exchange for progress for MIAs, over time we moved to loosen some economic restrictions and moved toward normalization in a series of steps.

We didn't follow the exact road map of the Bush administration, although we found their general approach and some of the criteria in it quite useful. We didn't reject this approach as a whole but we didn't insist that that particular blueprint had to be followed. One thing we did bureaucratically was rather tricky. In our own interagency group, which looked at the MIA/POW question and Vietnam policy as a whole, we had an anomalous situation. The head of the biggest MIA family group was a member of that group, along with U.S. Government officials, helping to make policy. I thought that it was crucially important to maintain contact with her, with the other MIA groups, and with veterans' groups. They had every right to have a say about our policy and help us with what we needed on MIAs
and POWs. However, I thought that it was absolutely crazy to have such an outsider a member of this policy group, no matter what his or her position was. I felt that a private citizen shouldn't sit in on a government agency group determining our policy on this issue, especially given the sensitivities of the issue and the personal stakes.

So, as we decided on the way we would approach Vietnam policy bureaucratically, I let her participation in the interagency group lapse. She was quite upset about this and complained to the White House. However, we managed to do this on the basic principle that we should not have private outsiders as members of U.S. Government groups. We sought gradually to get her where she should be, along with the representatives of other family groups and veterans groups having an absolute right to appeal to us and work with and coordinate with us, but not to be a member of the decision making body within the government.

Q: Could you explain for the record what we mean when we talk about MIAs, what the situation was, and how it had progressed, because this is a crucial consideration?

LORD: Absolutely. I should say, because of my own background, that I had testified at very sensitive hearings during the latter part of 1992. This was actually a few months before I knew that I was coming back into government service. My testimony was before the Joint Congressional Committee, of which Senator Smith [Republican, New Hampshire] was a member. He was very tough on this issue. Another member of this committee was Senator Kerrey [Democrat, Nebraska]. He was a war hero and was in favor of moving ahead with Vietnam. The Joint Committee held extensive hearings and tried to get the facts together and see exactly where we were, along the lines of what you said.

The first issue, which was very vivid in the 1970s and 1980s but which began to fade as time went on, was whether there were any more live Americans being held by the Vietnamese communists. I might say that this confused the POW/MIA issue. The term “POW” suggested that the Vietnamese still held some of our prisoners of war. This continues even to this day to be controversial in some areas. However, most of those particularly interested in this matter, including even family members and members of veterans' groups, feel that the Vietnamese no longer hold prisoners of war. There would occasionally be alleged sightings of Caucasians apparently held by the Vietnamese. On a couple of occasions they may have been deserters or were other Caucasians, such as Australians or French. I don't have all of the details on this. There would be occasional incidents of people who claimed that they saw Americans being held. However, there was never any proof of this.

I'm not saying that just after the Vietnam Peace Agreement was reached in 1973 that the Vietnamese communists might not still have held some POWs whom they kept back or held POWs who later died in captivity - out of a sense of embarrassment, the Vietnamese might have sought to cover these cases up. It is possible, but we never had any proof of it. We never got as many prisoners back as the estimates of numbers of POWs whom we thought that we should have gotten back, who we thought were still alive after their
capture. There were examples of cases where pilots were shot down, and the U.S. command had radio communications from them after they reached the ground. So we knew that they had been captured, as opposed to being dead. However, some of them basically were never accounted for after that. The Vietnamese communists said that they had died, or something to that effect.

So there was enough ambiguity, on top of Vietnamese foot dragging and general lying and brutality, so that even the existence of live POWs certainly was an issue in the 1970s and 1980s. However, by the time the Clinton Administration came into office in 1993, the great focus was on MIAs, whom I'll get to in a minute, and not on whether the Vietnamese still had live prisoners. The Vietnamese would continually deny that they had live prisoners.

On very pragmatic grounds I tended to believe that the Vietnamese didn't have any live prisoners of war. The Vietnamese were brutal enough to deceive us on this issue. However, for the life of me I couldn't see why this would do them any good. It seemed to me that if we didn't know that the Vietnamese held any more live POWs, and they denied that they had them, what leverage would this provide them for trade or any other reason? If they ever did use them in some respect and they said: "Oh, yes, by the way, we do have a few live American prisoners, we'll give them back in exchange for MFN [Most Favored Nation] trade status" or something like that, there would be incredible outrage in the United States that the Vietnamese had held American POWs for 20 years or so. And that would rule out any progress in developing our relationship.

So, on purely practical grounds, I just didn't see why the Vietnamese would be holding live American prisoners. Not that they weren't capable of doing this in terms of brutality, but I didn't see what their self interest would be in doing this.

When I was working as Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger, I always wondered whether there might have been some POWs left over after the Peace Agreement, despite our best efforts to settle this issue. The Vietnamese may have held some POWs back, originally, perhaps because they didn't want to turn them over because they'd been so brutally treated. And perhaps then didn’t want to acknowledge that some had eventually died in prison. So it's possible that, for a while, the Vietnamese communists had some POWs that we didn't get back. We don't have any proof of that. After awhile, I personally never felt that the Vietnamese communists were holding any more, although we always raised the matter out of principle, just in case they were. Every conceivable lead was followed up before the Clinton administration entered office and, of course, during the Clinton administration whenever there was any ambiguity. There was never anything close to proof of live prisoners. That consideration was always there, but it was not the main focus. Most of the POW/MIA family people and the veterans groups agreed that this was no longer a big issue.

There was, however, a minority of people among the POW/MIA groups that felt that the Vietnamese communists were still holding live POWs. Part of the reason for this was that there was understandable anguish on the part of loved ones who had no accounting for
missing family members. They were just hoping that they were alive, without any evidence to this effect. Part of this hope was based on evidence on some of those that were caught by the Vietnamese communists. There was never an accounting for them.

Q: The POW/MIA groups were a political movement, to a certain extent.

LORD: Yes. I want to get to that point. Absolutely. On the MIA question, this was a matter of accounting for Americans, so that people would get their remains back, such as bones or whatever, which they could bury in this country and get some closure on their grief. Or, at a minimum, they could find out what exactly happened and put any uncertainty to rest that there was a possibility that their family member was still being held prisoner. Or, at least, they could find out and come to terms with the fact that their loved one had died. They would know what happened. Where they were and what happened? Did they die when they first crashed, or did they die in prison? These kind of considerations.

Of course, we are a country, and I think that we are to be admired for it, which puts more stress on this matter than any other country, in terms of finding remains or collecting information on its MIAs. We put an enormous amount of effort into this, and not only diplomatically. Indeed, all of our MIA teams are out there, searching, digging, and facing dangerous conditions to try to find teeth, bones, and so forth. This is absolutely extraordinary. I think that this amazed the Vietnamese communists.

So the issue regarding the MIAs was to get an accounting for those who were still left unaccounted for. There were a couple such cases which we hadn't definitely been accounted for as either dead or returned to us. Among those 2,000 or so, there were some leads which were more promising than others. There were the so-called “live sightings.” I forget what the exact phrase was. These involved people who had been in contact by radio or on the ground after being shot down, for example, and we knew that they hadn't died as of that time. Or it involved former prisoners who came out and said that they remembered seeing somebody, at some point, in some prison. Some of these leads even went back to some of the most promising cases we raised with the Vietnamese communists after the Agreement of January, 1973. We were still trying to get more information. So there were some special cases that seemed to be promising.

In addition to finding further information, of course, there was an attempt to try and find actual remains using DNA analysis and identification when the remains were discovered. On this basis we might then be able to determine who the individual was. So that effort was made on what actually happened to people.

We also wanted increased access to Vietnamese communist archives and their own files to see what could be found. We would also deal with the Russians and the Chinese to try to get any information which they might have on Americans missing in action. So the focus was on information, remains, and what happened to the MIAs and their histories.

The fact is that there were very tough U.S. criteria in effect to remove someone from the
MIA list. I forget the numbers, but the total number of between 2,000 and 3,000 was always cited as the number of people that hadn't accounted for. The fact was that you could only get somebody off that MIA list in one of two ways. One was if the person were returned alive. Of course, as I said, that was becoming impossible. Secondly, there had to be absolute, total verification of remains, such as, for example, dental records or DNA evidence.

If you didn't have either of those two outcomes, then, even though you were sure, on other grounds, that this person was decisively identified, you couldn't take him off the list. For example, we had several hundred pilots who had been shot down, and we had verification that they had dived into the sea. I think that were something like 400 cases like this. You could never get their remains because they were at the bottom of the sea in 1,000 feet of water, or so. We knew that they had fallen into the sea. People had even seen their planes go in. Yet they could still be on the MIA list, because we didn't have either a body, DNA evidence, or a dental record.

Or there was, for example, crashes in remote places. We would have “dog tags [identification tags]” or bones, but not enough to get a reliable DNA sample. We would have an exact location and the testimony of nearby villagers who said that these people had died. We had confirmation from military communications and records that these people went down at a certain point. We might have this person's boots, with his name in them. However, he would still be on the MIA list because we didn't have an actual DNA sample, dental records, the remains, or a live body.

So the evidence would sometimes be very strong but still not sufficient to take names off the list. We spent most of our time working on a couple of hundred cases where, we felt, there was the best chance of getting more information.

Now, in terms of your question about motives. First, as I said, I had, and we all had, a lot of empathy for the families and the veterans organizations and the admirable instincts to come to closure and bring our men home and remove ambiguities and doubts. The great bulk of the veterans groups and the MIA families had good motives and were genuinely concerned. Some were more supportive and some were more suspiscious of the U.S. Government. In the past the U.S. Government had not made as vigorous an effort as, I think, it made in the 1980s under the Bush administration and thereafter. I think that there was some sloppiness in record keeping and so on, which bred distrust and frustration among the families and veterans. Most of these people were very well meaning.

There were others, I think, who had become almost paranoid about this and had become so suspicious of the U.S. Government that really they had become unfair and were stoking political fires. They were so hostile to the Vietnamese communists that they didn't trust them on anything. They were genuinely convinced, I think, that the Vietnamese communists were such evil people that they were holding things back, and the U.S. Government wasn't making enough of an effort. There were others, in Congress and elsewhere, who were just playing to domestic political considerations, the residual frustration over losing that war, and our hatred and distrust of the Vietnamese
For some, to be crude about it, this subject had become something of a “cottage industry.” Certain people could make a living, as it were, by continuing to be consultants, by pressing this issue, and by claiming that the U.S. Government wasn't cooperating. They were in it to get publicity and/or funding for their efforts.

So there was a mixed bag of considerations, but there was overall a strong political reality to this matter. Moreover, we owed it to the families, the veterans, and our sense of honor to pursue this.

Also, as I said, we had other interests in Vietnam which we wanted to pursue. So the trick was to keep this quest at the top of our agenda and have a version of a road map approach that would give Hanoi some incentive to move ahead. We had a lot of reasons for moving ahead.

First, we felt that incremental engagement, if we didn't “leap frog” and lose all of our leverage, was the best way to make progress on the MIA question. That was our top objective, and the best way to get information. We rejected the two extremes - throwing away all of our leverage through major concessions on the one hand, or being hostile and standoffish so that Vietnam had no incentive to be cooperative, on the other. So we felt that this measured engagement was the best way to make progress on the single, biggest issue, the MIAs. We also knew that we had to make progress on that issue so that we would be able politically to move ahead generally with Vietnam.

Secondly, we had some potential economic interests with Vietnam, both now, and greater potential in the future, given the relatively large population of Vietnam, the spirit of entrepreneurship of the people, and the possibility of finding oil and other resources off the Vietnamese coast. I remember that the American oil industry was interested in getting into Vietnam. In fact, some American oil companies had held oil prospecting permits issued by the former Saigon Government. There could be considerable trade and investment prospects in Vietnam at some point.

Thirdly, there was the general question of our influence in Southeast Asia, both in terms of Vietnam itself and when it became a member of ASEAN. This affected both our bilateral ties with Vietnam as well as when Vietnam became a member of ASEAN. Also, Vietnam would be a balance to China in a modest way, with all of the advantages of that.

Then there were other, specific issues on the agenda which we wanted to pursue. For example, cooperation on drugs and narcotics, which was an important issue both there in Vietnam and generally in Southeast Asia. We wanted to encourage the Vietnamese to behave responsibly in Cambodia and try to promote stability there. It was also in our general interest to build a Pacific Community, including our former adversaries, whether it was China or Vietnam, and try to maintain U.S. influence in the area. Finally, moving ahead on normalizing relations with Vietnam would have benefits in our own society, healing the wounds in this country that still existed from that war, and trying to put it
behind us. So for all of these reasons we wanted to move ahead, and it was important that we do so.

Q: Were you getting much support from the Asian countries on normalization of relations between the U.S. and Vietnam?

LORD: The Asian countries generally supported us and wanted us to move ahead on normalization of relations with Vietnam. Most of them had already normalized relations and had fairly good contacts with Vietnam. Japan was holding back a little bit because of our desire that they not give too much aid to Vietnam until we made more progress on the MIA issue. They wanted us to move ahead so that they could move ahead.

China was ambivalent. On the one hand, they would say that we should move ahead without worrying about issues like MIAs and human rights. They would ask why shouldn't we have normal relations? However, underneath this, I think that they would just as soon we not have good relations with Vietnam because of their own historical antagonism with Vietnam. One of their concerns probably was that normal relations with Vietnam would give us more leverage against China. For historical reasons the French would say that we should move ahead on relations with Vietnam. So most countries thought that we should make progress in this direction.

Now, a little more on the politics of this issue. I've already said that the White House was very sensitive on this question. Making progress on this matter was often like pulling teeth. Secretary Christopher was very helpful on this matter. He spent a lot of time on this. I spent a lot of time with him to get him working on it at his level. He wanted to move ahead, along all of the lines I mentioned, as did many people in the State Department. I had terrific support in my own bureau with outstanding FSOs, like Peter Tomsen, Ken Quinn, Kent Weidemann, Chris LaFleur, with experience in the area.

The U.S. economic agencies were anxious to move ahead because of the economic dimension in particular. The Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wanted to move ahead, probably because they thought that we could get more information on the MIAs and partly because they saw the China aspect I mentioned above. Just generally, in terms of our interests in the area, they thought that having a better relationship with Vietnam wouldn't be all bad.

So there was a widely held view in the U.S. Government that we should be moving ahead, with the single huge exception of the White House.

In these memoirs I won't be criticizing people, particularly friends, whom I respect. However, I have to say that Tony Lake [National Security Adviser] in particular, whom I admire and with whom I worked on many issues, was the single, biggest brake on the policy of normalization of relations. I don't question his motives or his values. But frankly, I could never figure out whether he felt that he was protecting President Clinton and his domestic, political interests. Tony Lake had been heavily involved in Vietnam in many ways, as I had. Who knows? Maybe there were some psychological problems
involved. On the other hand, Tony was very helpful in maintaining good relations with the MIA groups. He and I talked to them together and separately on numerous occasions, and we maintained close coordination on that plane.

However, there is no question that he, and the White House more generally, were the biggest brakes on our moving ahead. Toward the end of this 1993-1997 period, I think he was more positive on relations with Vietnam. By then both he and the President could see that there was modest political damage, and indeed some benefit, from moving ahead.

Q: Did you have any feeling about the instincts of the President on this issue?

LORD: No. To be honest about it, I never could really figure out how much of this feeling of reservation about Vietnam was Tony Lake's and how much was the President's. Tony and I worked together very well on Asian policy, particularly toward the end of this period. I think that he would agree that he was much more cautious on this issue than I was, or the other players in the Government. It would be interesting to find out what his instincts were. He shared our genuine desire to get information on the MIAs, but I thought that the way to do this was to move ahead on normalization with Vietnam. Part of it may have been domestic politics in the U.S. We all distrusted Hanoi; that wasn't the problem.

So this really was rather puzzling to me, and there was a constant question of how we could get the White House to move on this issue. There was foot dragging and an attitude of slowing down and caution. So that was a major problem.

Now, in Congress there were some people who were very tough on this issue, like Senator Smith [Republican, New Hampshire] and several Congressmen who just didn't want us to do anything with Hanoi until we had much more information on the MIAs, and so on. To counter this, there was a crucial element of senators/congressmen who really allowed the President to move ahead. This was an absolutely fundamental consideration on the political scene which enabled us to move ahead.

On the Senate side there was Senator John Kerry [Democrat, Massachusetts], Senator Bob Kerrey [Democrat, Nebraska], and Senator John McCain [Republican, Arizona]. There was Congressman Pete Peterson on the House of Representatives side. Now, Pete Peterson is no longer in Congress and is presently our Ambassador to Vietnam. All of these members of Congress had been POWs and/or war heroes. Therefore, when they said that we should move ahead with normalization of relations with Vietnam, they gave tremendous political cover to President Clinton. So, particularly given the President's record during the Vietnam War, we couldn't have normalized relations with Vietnam without their support.

For example, their efforts included those of Senator Kerrey on the Senate Committee on finding out and putting to rest some of the more extreme versions of Hanoi's lack of cooperation on the MIA issue, including the issue of live prisoners. He spoke out generally, he visited Vietnam and pressed the Vietnamese authorities, and he worked with conservatives in the U.S. on this issue. These gentlemen took a lot of flak and heat.
from those elements in the veterans' and family groups who didn't want to normalize relations with Hanoi. They were active in handling letters, speeches, and doing all sorts of things. Senators Kerry and McCain did likewise. So I'll always be grateful, and I know that President Clinton will be, for the cover that these people gave him.

Senator John McCain spent five or six years in a Hanoi prisoner of war camp, where he was held in solitary confinement and was often beaten up by his captors. When he said that it was in our interests to move ahead on normalization of relations with Vietnam, who could be holier than he?

So the attitudes of these members of Congress were absolutely fundamental to normalization of relations with Vietnam. I spent a great deal of time working with those members of Congress and others, on the House and Senate side, on this issue. As I said, I also spent a lot of time speaking to MIA and veterans' groups and dealing with them, to get their views on how to proceed, and to underline our commitment to their cause.

Q: Because it might have gotten lost, you might explain that, while we didn't have formal diplomatic relations with Vietnam, unlike North Korea, which is really sealed off, we had all sorts of contacts with Vietnam. There were visits by prominent Americans to Vietnam. Even teams went out to Hanoi to talk about MIAs.

LORD: Yes, we had teams in Hanoi which we greatly beefed up under the Clinton administration. We had people up there, even before the Clinton administration entered office, searching for remains of MIAs. We were working with the Vietnamese to get more information. Our military people doing this were extremely dedicated, and doing hard, sometimes dangerous, work.

There were some official American visitors going to Vietnam. We were not totally isolated from Vietnam, as was the case with North Korea and some other countries. We had an embargo on trade. We also blocked World Bank and IMF loans to Vietnam. Of course, we had no Embassy, Liaison Office, or anything else.

Q: But we had an immigration program, the so-called orderly departure program.

LORD: That's right. The orderly departure program helped people get out of Vietnam and travel to the United States if they wished to do so. There was also the problem of Vietnamese boat people who escaped from Vietnam and went to Hong Kong or to one of several countries in Southeast Asia. We tried to work with the Vietnamese authorities on that.

There was some contact with Vietnam, including under the Bush administration. There were at least one or two meetings with the Vietnamese, I think, at the undersecretary level. So the Bush administration made some progress in getting information. However, there hadn't been much progress in moving ahead with Vietnam generally, although Vietnam was not as isolated as North Korea had been and still is. Nevertheless, Vietnam was clearly an area where we had very little interchange, only sporadic visits, and some
cooperation on MIAs. There was no trade or investment. Generally, this was a pretty hostile relationship.

*Q: What was our reading on the Vietnamese Government at that time? That is, in 1993.*

LORD: Well, it was pretty authoritarian. There were some indications even then, in 1993, and the process continued, that there was a desire in Vietnam to reform their economy. Somewhat like what the Chinese had done, to open up to some extent to the outside world. The Vietnamese Government seemed to be interested in trying to get more foreign investment. However, the picture on human rights in Vietnam was still very grim. So that was our general impression. There were some members of the leadership who were considered more pro-reform than others. However, it was going to be a tough row to hoe, certainly in the field of human rights. But there were some indications that the Vietnamese Government was opening up.

As we looked at the situation in Vietnam, I've explained what we saw in it for us, in terms of moving ahead. From the Vietnamese point of view, first they had a major economic incentive to open up with us. That is, getting American trade and investment to help them in their efforts to open up to the outside world generally, in a way similar to what China had done, and to reform their economy. So they clearly had a tremendous, potential economic interest in normalizing relations with us. Not only oil research, for example, but investment generally and all kinds of other things.

Secondly, Hanoi had a general sense of diplomatic isolation because of us. The Vietnamese knew that we were, in effect, holding Japan back somewhat, for example. If they could normalize relations with us, this would open the diplomatic gates more generally. They managed to have pretty good relations with other countries, but normalization with the U.S. would generally help them. Thirdly, more specifically on the diplomatic and geopolitical front was their concern about China. By normalizing relations with us they would have some assurance and/or leverage vis-a-vis the Chinese.

So for these economic and geopolitical reasons, we figured that they had a lot of incentives to work with us. The trick was to play on those incentives to get the Vietnamese to be more cooperative on the MIA and the POW questions, in their own self interest.

I would like to make one more quick point, before I forget. I have talked about my own role, somewhat immodestly, but I could not have done this without tremendous help from a lot of Foreign Service Officers, and particularly Ken Quinn, who, as we speak, is now our Ambassador to Cambodia. Also, Kent Wiedemann, who is supposed to be our next Ambassador to Cambodia. There were other Foreign Service Officers, including Chris LaFleur, who is now DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] in Tokyo. He was previously on the Vietnam desk. Desaix Anderson, who became our first Ambassador as we moved ahead. A lot of people worked very hard on this process of normalization. Obviously, this was always a collective effort.
Now, basically what we did in the course of several years was to make some progress on MIAs and then take a step forward in the relationship between Vietnam and the United States. One way we went about this was that we had to have some criteria to define progress on MIAs.

I don't have all of these yardsticks at my fingertips, but we had four or five main areas where we wanted to see progress made. These included, I recall, finding the remains of MIAs. That is, getting as many remains back as possible. Also included in the yardsticks was information on the missing in action, particularly the most promising cases. There were about a couple of hundred of these cases. We sought access to Vietnamese archives to get more information on the histories. Also, we wanted cooperation from the Vietnamese people. It wasn't just getting cooperation from Vietnamese Government officials. We also needed cooperation from villagers, some of whom might have seen things relating to the MIAs. The Vietnamese Government people always said that one way we could get help from the villagers was "to help us with our MIAs," even though they didn't care as much about them as we did about our MIAs. We did try to help them with their MIAs in terms of turning over our own records and archives, so they could go to their own people and say that the Americans are helping us with Vietnamese MIAs. They would then ask the village people to volunteer information to us.

One thing that the Vietnamese Government officials did was that, in their communications with their own people, they made it clear that they should cooperate and that it was in their interest to do so. Some of the Vietnamese people might not want to cooperate because they had bitter memories of the war, the American bombing, and so forth. So it was important to show that we Americans were providing the Vietnamese officials with information on Vietnamese MIAs. I recall that I went on a couple of trips to Vietnam where we brought information on their MIAs, so that they could tell their own people that they ought to cooperate with us.

Another criterion was cooperation with Laos and triangular searches. A lot of MIA cases involved locations in Laos, as well as some in Cambodia. I might add quickly that Cambodia was always the most forthcoming of the three countries of the former Indochina on the MIA question, although it was the least important in terms of information. The situation of MIAs in Laos provided a mixed picture. The Laotian authorities were generally quite helpful. However, they were generally poor in providing logistic help, so our assistance was needed.

So we had these criteria and probably some others that I've forgotten. Whenever we wanted to take a step forward, and I'll mention these in just a minute, we would also have White House white papers and State Department press releases, explaining how the Vietnamese Government had stepped up their cooperation, before we could take another step in normalizing our relationship.

In addition to dealing with Congress to get support, President Clinton also sent special missions to Vietnam to deal with MIA questions. I was Co-Chairman of these special missions, along with a man named Herschel Goldberg, who played a crucial role in them.
Herschel Goldberg was the Deputy Director of the Department of Veterans Affairs. He was from Arkansas and had been working on veterans' affairs in Arkansas. He was on close terms with President Clinton. Then he came into office as the second ranking official in the Veterans Department. He also had served in Vietnam and spoke some Vietnamese. Because he represented veterans' interests and because he, himself, was suspicious of Hanoi, was from Arkansas, and was close to President Clinton, I welcomed his cooperation in this effort, in which he became heavily involved. It turned out that his involvement in these special missions was crucial to their success. So it wasn't just the State Department, the Defense Department, the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], the economic agencies, and the White House. The Veterans Administration, which obviously had a clear interest in the Vietnam issue, was represented by Herschel Goldberg, its deputy director, who turned out to be very important in this regard.

If somebody goes to the President and says: “The Vietnamese Government is cooperating on MIA issues, and we ought to move ahead to broaden trade, or something like that, with Vietnam,” and this person is from the State Department, from the Defense Department, or one of the economic agencies, the impact would be less than if Goldberg did. Not that we wouldn't have credibility, but the President might say: "Well, how do I know that the Vietnamese Government is really helping us?" So when a tough-minded, suspicious guy like Herschel Goldberg would say this to the President, it would carry a lot of weight. Also, Goldberg was very helpful with veterans groups and, to a certain extent, with the MIA families organizations. He would have more credibility with them than State Department or even Defense types. Tony Lake and I in particular worked with family and veteran groups as well. I made several appearances before them as well as consulting them.

From the very beginning and even before I had personally met him, I saw Goldberg as an asset. As I say, he turned out to be very crucial. He and I headed up several Presidential Missions to Vietnam. I was always an equal ranking member of the mission but was mainly concerned with the political side of it. I would make sure that Goldberg was treated as the first among equals, even though we were co-chairmen of the mission. In fact, the NSC [National Security Council] representative on the mission, whether it was Wiedemann or Roth, would be the third-ranking person. Goldberg was the co-chairman and was the “first among equals,” as he should have been, both because he was a sub-cabinet level official and also because he was close to the President. I felt that, for credibility purposes, it was very important for our domestic audiences to see that the number one person on the team was a Veterans Department man and not a State Department official.

Goldberg and I worked extremely well together. It was not because we particularly liked or trusted the Vietnamese Government officials we met on the successive trips to Vietnam, though we liked the Vietnamese people. Rather we saw that it was in the self-interest of the Vietnamese Government to help us on MIAs. Because of our efforts to press them on this matter, they were, in fact, cooperating, and we were able to go ahead on the normalization of relations. We regularly made reports to President Clinton after these trips on the cooperation we had received from Vietnamese Government officials.
This had credibility because Goldberg was involved in preparing these reports, in addition to myself, the Defense Department people, and so on. We always had an officer dealing with POW/MIA matters from the Defense Department at about my level, as well as other experts from the Pentagon and so on.

We made several of these trips. I made some trips on my own but often went with Herschel Goldberg. On the first couple of trips we also had some representatives of MIA and veterans groups with us, because they could help us prepare for the trip, sit in on the discussions with the Vietnamese, and also report back to the President, as did Goldberg and myself. This was somewhat of a risk. We had to include various members, some of whom were more radical than others and more distrustful of U.S. Government officials. However, we felt that this was a good move in terms of domestic politics, since it gave them a chance to participate on these trips. Secondly, it made it possible to bring more leverage and pressure to bear on the Vietnamese officials because they would be sitting in on these meetings. The Vietnamese officials would hear directly from MIA family representatives and from U.S. veterans groups and could see how important this matter was to us, from the political point of view.

These representatives also gave us some good advice. We constantly had to make sure that we were in charge of the talking points. We often would go over our approaches with them before the trips, though we couldn't give family group and veterans organization representatives a veto over talking points. On these trips we would make our presentation. Then we would turn to the veterans and the MIA family representatives. They would make their own comments, individually.

I would say that in the veterans community there were different groups. Some of them were willing to follow our approach. Others were more suspicious of the U.S. Government. We didn't convert everybody. Some of these representatives were still hostile to the Vietnamese Government and didn't want to go ahead on normalizing relations with Vietnam. Others were already in favor of going ahead. I think that some of those in the middle were somewhat influenced to cooperate with us once they went on these trips.

Q: When you were talking to the Vietnamese officials, what was your impression of how well informed they were about America?

LORD: I think that they were pretty well informed, considering the fact that we didn't have a lot of communications with them. Some of them had made occasional visits to the U.S. and so on. I don't know how to quantify this, but I think that Vietnamese officials were relatively well informed about America. I think that they understood the domestic political pressures on our side. They certainly had to understand this, from the aggressive talking points we presented on the MIAs. We always spent the first couple of hours of a meeting with them on this issue alone. They understood how important this issue was for us, in principle, in terms of our domestic politics, and in our being able to move ahead on normalization of relations with Vietnam.
Really, it was quite extraordinary to go to Hanoi, either alone or a co-leader of the Presidential Commission on MIA questions, and spend three-quarters of our time on the MIA issue. From the standpoint of the Vietnamese Government officials we met, they were thinking about economics and geopolitics and the fact that, after all, we had lost the war. They had many more missing in action than we did. I'm sure that some of the Vietnamese officials were sort of puzzled and others were annoyed that we should spend so much time on the MIA issue.

It really got to be repetitious. We used essentially the same talking points at every meeting with them. However, I think that, by virtue of our presentations and, I'm sure, from their conversations with fellow Asians and fellow diplomats, they gained an improved knowledge about Americans. This added to their general knowledge. I feel that they understood the U.S. pretty well.

Q: I would think, though, that in a way this MIA issue would be almost a freebie for the Vietnamese communists. They might well say: "Sure, go ahead. Do what you want." In other words, we would make our points, and this would be something going on.

LORD: Well, that's right. First of all, it was quite expensive to send teams, especially joint Vietnamese-American teams out into some of the remote places in Vietnam to search for MIA remains. There were a lot of difficult excavations, and so on. We covered the cost of those searches. Some of the more radical Vietnam veterans and members of the MIA family groups in the United States thought that this was bribery. To a certain extent they were probably charging us a little more than it really cost. On the other hand we thought that this search was in our interest, and the cost from that point of view was legitimate. We would fly helicopters out there, we would go out into remote areas and dig for MIA remains, and we would use Vietnamese labor to do it. They were doing the work, and they had to be compensated for it.

We felt that it was in their interest to be forthcoming. Not that we trusted them, but just on the basis of our pragmatic interests. If the Vietnamese wanted more trade, wanted to "balance" China, and wanted to have diplomatic relations with the U.S., why not be forthcoming? I think that the proof is that they got more and more cooperative as we went along, because we were moving ahead in developing our relationship with Vietnam. I'll get to the statistics in just a minute. The fact is that we were moving ahead in our relationship with Vietnam, and the Vietnamese saw that it was paying off.

We never knew, of course, whether we could fully trust the Vietnamese. They really had difficulty in finding records that we thought they should have. They would claim that these records had been destroyed, and we thought that we just had to get them to work a little harder at it. Or we'd give them more incentives to deal with Vietnamese villagers and even reward people if they came in with remains or information concerning American MIAs. We did that partly by giving them information on their MIAs. The Vietnamese officials would claim that their people would not understand why we were spending so much time on this issue and why we weren't moving ahead with our relationship. They would say that this was a matter of face, and all of that stuff. But in
their controlled society the heads of government could do what they wanted. And in many ways they had an incentive to cooperate with us.

Having said that, I would say that the process could be agonizingly slow at times. This began to improve as we went ahead. We often wondered why the Vietnamese didn’t just speed things up. On the whole, I agree with your premise, they had an incentive to be cooperative. We gave them that incentive through the strategy we followed. Indeed, we felt, without relying on trust but on self-interest as well as the testimony of our people on the ground out there, that the Vietnamese were cooperating with us. Every time we went out on a mission in Vietnam, we would be briefed by our teams. We had people who were members of a Joint Task Force permanently stationed in Vietnam, coordinating our efforts with Vietnamese officials, going out and searching for remains, searching for archives and for information, and often working along the Laotian border. These people, who were hard-headed American military personnel, would constantly tell us and visiting Congressmen with us, visiting Vietnam veterans and members of MIA family groups, who would either go with us or on their own on some of these trips, that, "Yes, the Vietnamese are cooperating."

This was one of the reasons why Goldberg, other American officials, and I would go back to President Clinton and say that the Vietnamese officials were cooperating. It wasn't just because of what we heard in our meetings with these Vietnamese officials, of course, or even because of the information that we were getting. Our people on the ground were very able and very dedicated, young American soldiers out there, working every day with the Vietnamese officials and villagers. They could really tell us whether these Vietnamese were being cooperative or not. At times we would encounter some bureaucratic problems. Some elements of Vietnamese society were more helpful than others. However, most of them were very helpful, and the Joint Task Force continually gave us evidence of efforts by the Vietnamese to be helpful.

So this had an influence on our reporting, as well as the specific, concrete results that we got on the MIA question.

The challenge was to have enough concreteness and specificity in the criteria, so that we could have some way of measuring actual progress, and not just general statements like, "The Vietnamese are helping us." On the other hand, if we got too specific and said that we had to have so many sets of remains or so much information, we might set unrealistic targets. We just didn't know what they had and what they could get, particularly in terms of remains. So you couldn't always quantify what they were doing. We had a real challenge to have enough specificity to be credible, but not so much as to box us in and set up yardsticks impossible to meet. I think that we handled this matter fairly well.

Q: Modern sampling techniques, particularly the use of DNA as an identifier, were really just coming into their own.

LORD: That's right, and they became more and more helpful. We would dig and dig in these incredibly remote and heavily forested hillsides, and DNA samples were very difficult to find. Sometimes it took heroic efforts by our people, and by the Vietnamese
villagers as well, to conduct these searches. In the course of the search they might just come up with a couple of teeth, or something like that. Digging around took an extraordinary effort. The DNA samples helped.

We had laboratories in Hawaii, which I often visited with the Secretary of State and others when we went through Hawaii. These laboratories did the DNA work, which sometimes took considerable time. They would look at the remains very carefully, piecing things together.

In summary, how we moved ahead was roughly as follows. Based on Presidential Commission trips made by Goldberg and myself or in the course of my individual trips, we reported back to the President, and the White House released a summary of the findings. In 1993 we took the first step of no longer blocking or vetoing support from the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank in the form of loans for Vietnam. This actually was in many ways more important than the bilateral trade embargo, which we still had at this point. It freed up money from other countries. Up to this point we had blocked IMF and World Bank loans to Vietnam. This was the first step we took in response to some progress in MIA identification, which we reported back to the White House. This was in 1993, I believe.

I don't have the specific date in mind, but some time in 1994 we took the next step and lifted our embargo on trade with Vietnam. This was another step, which was also based on further progress with the MIA cases. Later in 1994 we set up Liaison Offices in Washington and Hanoi, just as we had had previously done years earlier with the Chinese. Up until then we had been dealing with the Vietnamese in the United States, primarily through their Ambassador to the UN in New York. He was very helpful. He would come down to Washington and talk to me, and I would see him up there in New York. However, now we set up Liaison Offices in each other's capitals. That was a major step forward, as they were de facto embassies.

Then, in 1995 we moved to full diplomatic relations. In one of the most dramatic events in the four years I spent as Assistant Secretary, Secretary Christopher made a trip to Vietnam in August, 1995, during which we raised the U.S. flag at the new American Embassy in Hanoi. I'll get to this trip in just a minute. Given all of the historical baggage behind it, that was quite a moment. So this was the way we proceeded over a period of several years. He also visited Cambodia on this trip and, along with the rest of us, was depressed once again by Khmer Rouge atrocities.

In each case it was like pulling teeth to get the White House or Tony Lake to continue the process. We sent along enough convincing reports to the President by Goldberg, myself, and others - backed up, as I say, by the Pentagon and by the economic agencies in Washington - to give us reasons to move ahead. Very frankly, this was not an easy job. Over the years I and my colleagues had to maneuver and press the White House, as well as working with Congress and the family and veteran groups. It took great effort and Christopher was very supportive.

Secretary Christopher has characterized his trip to Vietnam in 1995 as a very moving
experience for him. He deserves a lot of credit for his effort in accomplishing this, working in cooperation with the White House, on this whole saga over a period of several years.

In the course of this two-day visit to Hanoi we spent the first day essentially and symbolically on the past. The second day we spent on the future. As always, on the first day he met with the Joint Task Force people to see how we were doing in cooperation with the Vietnamese in collecting and shipping remains and developing further information on MIAs. This, of course, represented the past. He participated, as I had on an earlier visit to Hanoi, in a repatriation ceremony. This was a very simple ceremony at the airport in Hanoi. The Vietnamese turned over to our people several coffins containing the remains of deceased American military personnel, which were then loaded upon transport planes and flown back to the U.S. It was one of the most moving experiences in my life when I witnessed one of those ceremonies. I had the same experience with Secretary Christopher as well.

As I said, the MIA issue was still a high profile matter, and this took up the first day of the Christopher visit to Hanoi. We then took up other issues, of course, including economics, geopolitics, and so on. There were further meetings with Vietnamese officials and discussions about where we could cooperate and develop our bilateral relations. There were meetings with U.S. businessmen to underline our economic interests in Vietnam. Raising the U.S. flag at our new Embassy symbolized the beginning of a new relationship. Then Secretary Christopher gave a speech at the University of Vietnam before a group of Vietnamese students. He talked about the past and also about the future, looking toward the next century.

This was a nicely symbolic trip which was the final and major step accomplished over a period of several years to normalize relations. It turned out, by this time, to be very well received in the U.S., including the media, with minimal criticism.

During the remainder of those first four years of my service as Assistant Secretary, we continued to try to flesh out that relationship with Vietnam. We had Desaix Anderson, a distinguished Foreign Service Officer initially serving in Hanoi as our first Ambassador. Then Pete Peterson, a former POW, went to Hanoi to replace Anderson. We worked to get more information on repatriation and to move on trade and the MFN [Most Favored Nation] issue, discussed geopolitics, including China. We also talked to the Vietnamese about human rights. We had several dialogues on this issue while I was there. These were like the human rights dialogues which we had with the Chinese. They were conducted by Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck and people from his Bureau of Human Rights, with other people from our bureau sitting in. These dialogues took place both in Washington and in Hanoi.

Q: Was the subject raised of trying to take care of those who had worked for us at our Embassy in Saigon and in other programs? They may, perhaps, have fallen into disfavor with the new, communist leaders of Vietnam or may have been imprisoned, following the fall of Saigon to the communists in 1975. Was that an issue?
LORD: Yes, it was, but there already was momentum on that before the Clinton Administration entered office. An orderly departure program had been set up. We had worked for some time under previous administrations and we continued to press for people being allowed to leave Vietnam.

There were human rights problems in Vietnam. I mentioned the dialogue we had. There were also some specific cases of people being held, either Vietnamese-Americans or some prominent Vietnamese citizens who were being held by their own government. We would raise these cases, and Congressmen or Senators raised them. We made some progress on that front, but not a great deal. We would also make the point that, in addition to working on MIA cases, it would help them if they worked on some of these specific cases or on human rights generally. We said that this would improve the climate generally for making progress on trade and other relations.

Q: As we were moving on these issues, what was the role of Senator Helms [Republican, North Carolina]?

LORD: It was interesting. He was among those who, you might imagine, would be opposed to this. However, he never seemed to be as much out in front on this issue as he was on some other issues, like abortion or the United Nations. He was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, obviously, and he was generally very suspicious of Vietnam. He was generally not helpful. Senator Smith [Republican, New Hampshire] and various Congressmen were much more vocal on this issue, and they could count on Senator Helms' supporting them. It was more Senator Smith and others that we were dealing with on a day to day basis. As I have said, we had indispensable help from Senators and Congressmen who were war heros or POWs.

Q: Obviously, this whole opening to Vietnam was a very emotional and also a political issue, one that really engaged the attention of Americans. What was your impression of the Vietnamese leadership in Hanoi, when you were talking to them? Did they seem to have the same...

LORD: We dealt, on a day to day basis, at one level, of course. I'll get to the Vietnamese leadership in a minute. The Vietnamese representative at the UN in New York later came down to Washington to head up their Liaison Office. He is now their Ambassador in Washington. The Ambassador and the Foreign Minister, a man named Cam, were pragmatic and relatively easy to deal with, particularly for Vietnamese, based on my experience during the 1970s. They were clearly interested in moving ahead with the Vietnamese-American relationship, in their own national interest. Therefore, they wanted to be helpful on the MIA question.

They would sometimes play the game that, "We have our own hard liners in Hanoi. We need your help in order to satisfy them" or, "Don't press us too hard on human rights. This is a sensitive issue among our leadership." Or they would say: "There's a debate in our leadership, and there are suspicions of U.S. intentions. So please be careful." They would play that game but, on the whole, at this level people seemed to understand the
U.S. fairly well and genuinely wanted to improve our relations. I must say that we had really cordial and friendly relations with some very helpful people in Hanoi, as well as their representatives in Washington and New York.

I would see members of the Vietnamese leadership when I was heading the Presidential Commission on MIAs with Goldberg, or when I was with the Secretary of State. You got different emphases from them, at one time or another. I saw the Prime Minister, the head of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and the President of Vietnam. The impressions we had of them would vary. If I recall correctly, the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers were generally more pro-reform. You got the sense that they were somewhat easier to deal with and friendly, whereas the head of the Party was sort of in the middle, and the President was more hard line. These were people in their 70s. They clearly had a personal legacy left over from the war, but we sensed no particular bitterness or vitriol coming out of them. They didn't rake over old coals. Generally, they were patient listeners, whether at my level or a higher level, to long presentations on nothing but the MIA question. They always pledged full cooperation with our efforts, sometimes noting their own MIA problems.

I can't say that any of these officials were incredibly impressive, as, say, Zhou En-lai had been impressive or even someone like Fidel Ramos of the Philippines and other officials of a more democratic stripe. So those were my impressions of them.

Q: My question, beyond that, was whether dealing with United States representatives seemed to stir any emotions on the part of Vietnamese officials?

LORD: There might have been one or two meetings where emotions of this kind would pop out on occasion. I can't be specific about that, but there might have been a phase of the conversation where the Vietnamese would get slightly testy. However, on the whole, whether we were dealing with the Vietnamese leadership, with people at my level, with the Foreign Minister, or with a few ordinary Vietnamese citizens that we met, there was a remarkable lack of bitterness about the past. There was a general commitment to look to the future in our mutual, national interest. I had seen the same phenomenon in China, where, despite our mutual hostility and isolation for two decades, there was an immediate positive response to us. I got very little evidence of an adverse, emotional reaction to Americans.

The other interesting thing is that in the U.S. I would only occasionally see and meet with Vietnamese-American representatives. While we had a lot of dealings on the domestic front with Congress, with families, and with veterans organizations, moving ahead with Vietnam did not seem to be a major source of controversy. Normalizing relations with Vietnam did not seem to be a serious issue. The Vietnamese I met in the U.S. wanted to normalize relations with their country, because they felt that it was in their own self-interest to do this. Another reason might have been that this might give them a chance to go back and see their families in Vietnam. If they were from South Vietnam, you might have expected that they might be bitter because they had worked with the U.S. and had to leave Vietnam when the war ended in 1975 or 1976. Or, if they were boat people, they
might have left Vietnam because they were violently against the communist government and were opposed to improving relations with it. But for some reason the Vietnamese people who had come to the U.S. had very little contact with my office or with me personally, even though obviously I was one of the point men on the whole policy of improving Vietnamese-American relations. They didn't play a major role in our policy. I never had the sense that one of the obstacles to moving ahead, for example, would be the opinions of Vietnamese who had fled their country and come to the U.S. There was much more American than Vietnamese-American opinion opposed to normalization of relations. And even this turned out to be modest, in part thanks to our skillful handling of the issue.
Q: Well, then, turning to the other parts of Indo-China, such as Laos and Cambodia, we talked somewhat about Cambodia already.

LORD: Yes, let me deal with Cambodia, and then we'll discuss Laos, Burma, and some other places.

This is another issue, like Vietnam, that had some personal resonance with me on several issues. First, in dealing with the Vietnamese negotiations in the 1970s. When I worked with Dr. Kissinger, Cambodia and Laos were also on the agenda. As I already mentioned, I came close to resigning from Kissinger's NSC staff over the American incursion into Cambodia in the spring of 1970. Also, like every human being, I was subsequently totally shocked and outraged by the Khmer Rouge atrocities in Cambodia. I think that most people would agree - although, more recently, Africa has had its own horrible stories in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo - that after the holocaust of the Jews in Europe, Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, the Khmer Rouge brutalities were among the worst events in the second half of the 20th century. I have great respect and affection for the Cambodian people. I also had Cambodia a little bit in my background because when I was Ambassador to China, Prince Sihanouk spent several months out of each year living in China. I used to go and call on him, just to stay in touch. The Chinese played an important role in the ongoing Cambodian situation, of course, supporting opposition to the Vietnamese, but this also reflected our past association. I had met Sihanouk several times when I was traveling with Dr. Kissinger. For a long time, he suspected that the Nixon Administration had engineered his overthrow in 1970 - this was not true.

So I saw Sihanouk several times in Beijing, whom I always found very interesting. It was very easy to get ready for a meeting with Prince Sihanouk. You just had to think of one question which you wanted to ask him. You asked the question, and he would then give you an hour's monologue in reply. It would be fascinating and emotional, usually high strung and fast, but it would also answer all of the other questions that you might have had. Sihanouk was always polite. He spoke in a very high pitched voice. When I called on Sihanouk in Beijing, when I was Ambassador to China, he would always serve iced champagne and caviar. He would have a little, white dog there, and I would sometimes meet his wife, Princess Monique. I think that he had a special assistant, a woman who usually sat in at the meetings. His rapid fire monologues were a real challenge for my note-taking abilities.

I always felt considerable admiration for Sihanouk. He acquired in some quarters a reputation for being a buffoon because he was always changing his mind, going with the wind, and switching sides. Perhaps there was an element of that even in these meetings, but I felt that here was a man who was doing a balancing act but who always had his country's interests at heart. He was genuinely trying to ensure that Cambodia might become more peaceful and prosperous and live a more democratic life. He was personally torn by his own personal angst about his country, and the difficult choices he faced.
On the one hand, of course, he was a fierce, Khmer nationalist who loved his country and always put it first. He was always trying to figure out what was best for Cambodia. Therefore, he always had natural, anti-Vietnamese instincts as a Cambodian. He opposed the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979. On the other hand, he detested the Khmer Rouge, who had murdered something like 15 or so members of his own family and who kept him essentially as a front for their rule for seven years, during which time he was under house arrest. He was torn between an intense dislike of the Vietnamese and an equally intense dislike of the Khmer Rouge. He steadily searched for the best way through this thicket, which involved a lot of emotional, personal, and political dilemmas for him. Certainly, Sihanouk was in favor of promoting a third force, an alternative to the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese influence, that still is led by his son, Prince Ranariddh, who has always been rather ineffectual and weak. So I found from our conversations that Prince Sihanouk reflected this terrible agony of his country and genuine patriotism. I thought he was shrewder than many people gave him credit for, even as he has periodically reversed his positions. He was above all a survivor. To this day, he’s a force in the country.

Anyway, I came to Cambodia in 1993 with some considerable historical baggage, just as I had with Vietnam. Early in my tenure as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, Cambodia was high up on my agenda. I came into office in March, 1993, and the Cambodians were gearing up for elections in May, 1993. The biggest peacekeeping program in the history of the UN was being implemented in Cambodia at that point. The program was called UNTAC. I don't have the details at my fingertips, but literally billions of dollars were being spent on a very large UN presence.

As I was saying, by the early spring of 1993 the huge UN operation in Cambodia had succeeded in doing many things. First, violence had substantially declined in Cambodia, compared to the Khmer Rouge period and even after that, when there was fighting between the Khmer Rouge and other factions.

Secondly, with UN help, 350-400,000 refugees, most of whom had been in Thailand, had returned to Cambodia and were being resettled. Thirdly, outside influence of a nefarious nature was being reduced. The Chinese were backing away from their support of the Khmer Rouge. The Thai were beginning to crack down on the Khmer Rouge along the Cambodian-Thai border. The Vietnamese were being generally helpful. Elections were being organized in Cambodia. All in all, this was one of the most successful UN operations ever.

So my first task, or rather the Clinton administration's first task, on the Cambodian front was to give as much support as possible to the electoral process and to make sure that the elections were as fair as possible.

I went to Cambodia early in my tenure as Assistant Secretary to show support for this electoral process. This was only about ten days before the elections. There were some outbreaks of violence and some question as to whether all of the various political parties
were going to participate. Some observers were not sure that the elections were going to work out, even though 95 percent of the people had been registered. This was quite an achievement. So I purposely went there to urge all of the political parties to take part in the elections. I held a press conference to show American support for this process. Even though I wasn't 100 percent sure, by any means, how it was going to come out, I expressed great optimism and U.S. support for this process. I said that I hoped that it would be a fair election and said how meaningful this would be for the Cambodian people, who had had such a tragic history.

The UN operation in support of the elections was headed up by the Japanese, a Mr. Akashi, who then went on to Bosnia afterwards. He did a fabulous job in Cambodia. Working with him was Australian General Sanderson. Of course, I met with them, as well as with others, when I was in Cambodia. In my various trips to that country I met with many people, including government leaders, members of various factions, representatives of non-governmental organizations and human rights groups, American business people, and so forth.

The elections took place in May, 1993, with 90 percent of the people voting. The process was observed by international representatives and was determined to be remarkably fair. The non-communist third way group, the FUNCINPEC, led by Prince Ranariddh, the son of Prince Sihanouk, won a majority of the votes. FUNCINPEC derived support from its link to Prince Sihanouk, whose popularity was tremendous among the Cambodian people, thanks largely to Sihanouk's name recognition. There was another group which had Vietnamese support, the Hun Sen faction. They were relatively constructive at this point, planning for the long haul. The Hun Sen faction was close to Vietnam, and Hun Sen himself was a former Khmer Rouge leader. Obviously, the Khmer Rouge did not take part in the election. They refused to take part in the elections and were formally banned by the National Assembly in June, 1994. Hun Sen's group came in second in the 1993 elections. I don't have the figures, but it was roughly 60 percent for the Ranariddh forces [FUNCINPEC] and 40 percent for Hun Sen and his supporters.

After the elections Hun Sen began to make ominous noises, in effect saying: "I've got to share power in this arrangement." Then a decision to distribute power between the leading parties was made by the UN. I have to say that we supported this choice with some reservations but we thought that a power-sharing arrangement was the best outcome. People now look back and say: "If Prince Ranariddh won the election, we shouldn't have let Hun Sen in 'under the tent,' because he was sure to muscle his way forward against the ineffectual Ranariddh forces. Hun Sen didn't deserve to be part of the government chosen by the election." Furthermore, people said that the government set up after the elections was something of a "Rube Goldberg" operation, with "Co-Prime Ministers," "Co-Foreign Ministers," and "Co-Everything."

The arguments for a coalition government of this kind, and the reason that we went ahead, without any illusions about the difficulty of such a coalition, were that Hun Sen controlled the Cambodian Army, in effect, which clearly was a stronger military force than the other military groups. Moreover, Hun Sen controlled most of the government...
ministries. This was the situation before the elections and still was the situation after the
elections were held. It was a very difficult situation. There was a real danger of violence
and conflict breaking out again. We calculated that Ranariddh had no power to enforce
his position, unless the UN forces would stay on in Cambodia more or less indefinitely.
Everybody in the UN had agreed that the UN forces had to withdraw after the elections.
Furthermore, Hun Sen had won between 30 and 40 percent of the vote, so it wasn't as if
he didn't have some popular support, whether justified or not. For example, it wasn't as if
he had obtained, say, only five percent of the vote or less.

So, with some trepidation we figured that the least bad alternative was to avoid possible
civil conflict, recognize that in fact the Hun Sen forces had won 30 or 40 percent of the
vote, and that, above all, they had the muscle. Even though there was a certain injustice to
such an outcome, maybe this would work out. There was set up a coalition government,
with Prince Ranariddh "First Prime Minister," Hun Sen as "Second Prime Minister," and
the other ministries similarly shared. An effort would be made to meld the armies
together. If we had it all to do over again, I think that we still would have done that, but,
considering the way it turned out, one could argue it would have been better to have
taken the chance of agreeing that Hun Sen and his forces should be excluded from the
Cambodian Government. But, I think that we would have had civil conflict again at that
point. These were tough choices. We didn’t know at the time that the Prince would be so
ineffectual.

Therefore, this new, strange, bifurcated government took over, with the Hun Sen people
pretty much in de facto charge of the administrative structure and still dominant
militarily, as I said. In meetings I had with the Cambodian leaders Hun Sen and Prince
Ranariddh would always both be there. The same thing was true if I called upon
the Cambodian leaders with Secretary Christopher in New York. At these meetings Prince
Ranariddh would do all the talking, and Hun Sen would just sit there. As I said, he had
been a member of the Khmer Rouge organization and he had only one eye. The other eye
is made of glass. He had lost one eye due to an injury. Prince Ranariddh reminded me of
his father, Prince Sihanouk. He had a sort of high pitched voice. He was very polite and
friendly but he clearly was not a real heavyweight.

Although Hun Sen would sit in at these meetings saying nothing, I had the feeling that he
didn't have to say much. He was smart enough to bide his time. I thought that he was
probably going to take over the government. Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen were very
much an odd couple.

Over the next few years we had a consistent policy of urging cooperation between the
factions and giving aid to Cambodia. We promoted respect for human rights in non
governmental organizations and the development of a civil society and the rule of law.
We also provided military aid to help them against the Khmer Rouge and economic aid
more generally. In fact, some reforms did take place. The economy was making some
progress, they were beginning to get some foreign investment, the status of human rights
was not perfect, but there were ample human rights groups. The press was not entirely
free, but, on the whole, was fairly free, and there were a lot of newspapers and
magazines. The Khmer Rouge continued to be on the defensive. Refugees had been resettled. On top of this was always this uneasy odd couple I mentioned, and there was an air of tension. However, on the whole, they seemed to be cooperating, and making some progress in the face of immense challenges.

We would keep urging them to cooperate whenever it would look as if a real split in the government was developing. So we just tried to make this arrangement work. During this period I visited Cambodia several times, calling on Prince Sihanouk and on the "Co Prime Ministers" and others. Secretary Christopher visited Cambodia at the same time that he went to Hanoi in August, 1995. He also met with the same Cambodians at the UN in New York. Christopher's visit to Cambodia was the first by any U.S. Secretary of State since that of John Foster Dulles in 1955. Christopher's visit to Vietnam was the first by any U.S. Secretary of State since Secretary Rogers visited there in 1970. Of course, Rogers went to Saigon, so Christopher was the first Secretary of State to visit Hanoi. When I worked for Dr. Kissinger, as National Security Adviser, I went with him to Hanoi in February, 1973, right after the signing of the peace agreement.

Phnom Penh was clearly a poor city, even compared to Hanoi. However, as I say, I noted some of the progress that was being made. We had no illusions about the difficulties and the continuing tension between Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen. We thought that probably, at some time, Hun Sen would make his move. As I said, he continued to control the ministries and the Cambodian Army pretty well, even though Prince Ranariddh was the figurehead leader. However, we didn't have a better solution in sight at that time.

Now, at the same time that we encouraged cooperation among the Cambodian leaders, we gave them aid and so on. We also warned them against problems that we saw arising. There was corruption, and there was increasing maneuvering by Hun Sen to gain power. We urged Hun Sen to try to behave himself. There was increasing pressure by the Cambodian Government on NGOs [non governmental organizations] and the press. So there was a balancing act going on. Again, in our Congress and in American public opinion there were some people who probably felt that we should have been tougher with the Cambodians on promoting human rights, on dealing with the corruption problems, and on the Hun Sen maneuvering. We liked to think that we were pretty firm in saying, in effect, "If you don't cooperate, you're going to lose international and U.S. aid." We would raise these issues from time to time. However, as I say, we were doing a balancing act. In fact, there was no good choice there. Above all, we wanted to see the Khmer Rouge wiped out. With our support, our pressure on the Thai, our dealings with the Chinese, this took place over a few years. That was an important goal.

To what extent should we have tried to isolate and pressure Hun Sen? Since I left government service, Hun Sen has taken over the government, essentially by coup d'etat. Now he has won a recent election, which was generally considered fair on election day but which was stacked in advance by intimidation, murders, and exiles. In the new government the "First Prime Minister" was to be Hun Sen, and the "Second Prime Minister" Prince Ranariddh. The issue was whether you hold your nose and try to work with Hun Sen and try to keep the coalition government together and keep some pressure
on him, knowing that Hun Sen is pretty brutal. Under his leadership there have been some serious human rights abuses, including some killings of the opposition. However, we thought that by our policy we at least prevented civil conflict from breaking out again. We also knew that if we wanted to isolate Hun Sen and really put pressure on him, we could expect no help from ASEAN or other interested groups. We would be alone and ineffectual. So we have continued to muddle through.

This lack of help from others was a constant dilemma. We were constantly trying to get ASEAN, Australian, and other help to make the points to Hun Sen about behaving himself and to make the points to Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen about corruption and human rights.

Let me make one last point. As I think that I mentioned, the Cambodians were very helpful about the MIA question.

Q: You mentioned that a decision had to be reached, early on in the process, about what we should do. Would we support Prince Ranariddh fully, or would we go for cohabitation, or however you call it? On an issue like this, I think that it's interesting to follow the process. How was the decision made? Was it made by you, or...

LORD: First of all, it was essentially a United Nations decision. Or at least it was a decision made by the countries participating in UNTAC [UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia]. As I recall, the decision was unanimous among the countries involved that, even though we didn't like the way Hun Sen was muscling his way in, he had received some 40 percent of the vote in the election of 1993, and we were going to have civil conflict, so we ought to live with this. The UN certainly made that decision. Indeed, it was a UN and not a U.S. decision. Obviously, having said that, I must add that we were crucial to it. But if we had held out, I am not certain that we could have changed it. We would have stood pretty much alone in this respect.

Within our own government, I don't recall the exact process. As the very least, it would have been a decision approved by Secretary of State Christopher and by Tony Lake, the National Security Adviser to President Clinton. I don't know whether it ever reached the President. Certainly, it was the kind of key decision that would be dealt with at that level.

Q: What about Laos?

LORD: I don't have too much to say about Laos. It was rather quiet during my watch. You have to have priorities, and of course you have to say about every country that it's important. And Laos does have some importance, but I'm not going to sit here and insult people by saying that Laos, Brunei, and Papua New Guinea were our highest priorities. I visited Laos a couple of times. Since it was part of the former Indochina, it had a certain resonance for me. I’ve already mentioned that my first assignment as special assistant for Dr. Kissinger was to write a paper on Laos in 1970 and this turned into a crisis because of misleading information fed to me by other agencies. Like Vietnam in the early 1990s, Laos had an authoritarian government and had some human rights problems. However, Laos was very important to us regarding the MIA question, second only to Vietnam. It
was not so much the numbers of MIA cases but the fact that many of the most promising ones concerned Laos, because we were getting more information on those in Laos. Laos was also important in terms of the narcotics traffic.

So we paid some attention to Laos. I tried to get the attention of Secretary Christopher and others directed to Laos, though I couldn't justify it very much. I visited Laos a couple of times. I always saw the Lao Foreign Minister when he was in the U.S., either at the UN in New York or in Washington. I would try to get him in at higher levels of the State Department, probably at the Undersecretary of State or Deputy Secretary level.

We worked to improve our relations there and to increase trade and investment. We didn't have the kind of embargo to deal with that we had with Vietnam. We tried to get Lao cooperation on the drug program. We made fair progress with some effort.

On MIAs I always felt that the Lao weren't very helpful. For some reason the American MIA family groups said that Laos was more helpful than Vietnam. I didn't think so. Part of the Lao problem was just poverty and a lack of resources.

So I spent some time on Laos. I was always very courteous to them. Even before Laos became a member of ASEAN, if Lao representatives were in town for whatever reason, I tried to see them. Whenever Lao representatives went to an ASEAN regional security dialogue, I made a particular effort to see them. However, Laos was not a high priority for me. The single most important issue on the agenda of contacts with Laos was MIA cooperation. We managed to improve that. Often we tried that together with the Vietnamese. We did some work along the Vietnam-Laos border. At one point I went to an excavation camp in that area where we searched for MIA remains, working with the Lao and the Vietnamese.

Laos was a secondary issue for us. We made modest progress with Laos during my four years as Assistant Secretary. It wasn't on a major scale, but there was some improvement on the investment front, on the MIA question, and on drug cooperation.

_Q: Burma?_

LORD: Next to North Korea, Burma had probably the most unattractive regime in East Asia. Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy, had in effect won the 1990 elections, much to the surprise of the military junta, which was known as the SLORC, or the State Law and Order Restoration Council. Subsequent to the elections of 1990 the SLORC acted to disallow the elections, and there has been tension ever since. Since then Aung San Suu Kyi has been the symbol of the disenfranchised, democratic majority and the repressed in Burma. The SLORC is responsible for all of the authoritarian human rights abuses practiced by the Burmese Government. Burma has a very tightly controlled society which, furthermore, has promoted the drug traffic and has produced a lot of refugees, which has put pressure on Thailand and other countries.

The Burmese Government is very isolated. I believe that if you went back 30 years or so,
foreign observers would probably have predicted that the Burmese economic situation would be one of the most promising in that part of the world. Instead, the Burmese Government turned Burma into a total basket case because of their mismanagement, their authoritarian rule, and the general isolation from the rest of the world, part of it self-imposed.

For several years China had continued to develop its relations with Burma, because the Chinese leaders, of course, don't care about human rights in another country. Secondly, for geographic reasons, the Chinese have sought to extend their influence in Burma and eventually to gain access to a warm water port in Burma. So there has been a lot of Chinese military aid extended to the Burmese Government.

Our interest in Burma was to see whether we could improve the human rights situation and gain the Burmese government's cooperation on drugs. There was some debate within the U.S. Government and within our Congress about which objective should have priority. Some observers, including some Congressmen from Harlem [in New York] and other places where drugs were a huge problem, consider that drugs are decimating our youth. They feel that, in this case, our overriding priority should be dealing with the narcotics situation. Even if it meant giving some aid to the Burmese Government while holding our nose about the nature of the regime, they felt that we had to do something to stem the flow of opium and other drugs into the United States from Burma, which was a key supplier. I don't have the figures before me now, but a huge percentage of the opium traffic in general and other drugs was coming out of Burma.

On the other hand the human rights groups were saying as follows: “Burma has such a terrible regime. Human rights must come first, even if it means a little bit less cooperation in drugs, it's worth it because to gain any cooperation on drugs, you're going to lose the money anyway through corruption. Even when we've tried to work with them on drugs, we haven't had much success. Frankly, the best way to solve the drug problem is not to try to staunch this huge flow of drugs out of Burma with efforts that are only going to be half baked, but rather to change the nature of the regime so that it will be more open and less tolerant of corruption and drugs. We need to get at the narcotics problem at the source, so to speak, rather than tolerating with this authoritarian regime. We'll always have a drug problem so long as they have that government.”

We had this kind of debate going on within the U.S. Government as well. We made an effort - I believe in the fall of 1993 - to see whether we could move on Burma, in a way that was sort of analogous to what we were trying to do in Vietnam, although it's a completely different situation in many ways. Namely, we would lay out a program under which, "You do this, and we'll do that." My deputy, Tom Hubbard, went out to Burma and sat down with the Burmese authorities. This was after continual negotiations within the U.S. Government about what the talking points would be and what we wanted out of the Burmese Government. That is, how much emphasis on human rights and how much on drugs and so on.

We finally settled on doing both, although the human rights dimension had a slight edge
over the anti-drugs program. We basically said that while we were not trying to set out a specific timetable for actions and reactions, we laid out some of the areas that we wanted to emphasize.

Specifically, we wanted the government to free Aung San Suu Kyi or at least to start a dialogue with the NLD [National League for Democracy], which was headed by Aung San Suu Kyi and which had won the elections of 1990. It was prevented from taking its seats in the People's Assembly that it had won. We wanted a better record on human rights generally and also more aggressive efforts on the drug traffic. So those were the areas that we wanted to emphasize. In exchange for positive steps in these areas we could loosen up on some trade and investment restrictions and upgrade our relations.

We had only a Charge d'Affaires in Burma and not an Ambassador. So at some point we were prepared to upgrade our relations. When I came into office as Assistant Secretary, by the way, there was a debate on whether we should have an Ambassador to Burma. The debate was between those who said that the only way you are going to make progress with this regime is to have an American Ambassador in residence who can engage the Burmese at that level. We would not be doing them a favor. We have Ambassadors in a lot of countries where we don't like the governments.

On the other hand there were those who said that we should delay assigning an Ambassador to Burma. That should be saved for leverage purposes and should be used later on. In any event, if we move now, under a new American administration and nominate an Ambassador when we inherited only a Charge d'Affaires from the previous administration, it would look like we were rewarding an oppressive Burmese Government. It's one thing if we already had an American Ambassador assigned to Burma and we replaced him. However, if we only had a Charge d'Affaires, why upgrade the post?

So that kind of debate was taking place. I was strongly in favor of staying at the chargé level and using an upgrade as a bargaining chip. This position prevailed.

We were getting little help from ASEAN and others in terms of pressuring Burma. ASEAN didn't believe in interference generally. The Thai were concerned about Burmese refugees flowing into Thailand. Several other countries were concerned about drugs and wanted to work with the regime. Of course, Japan wasn't willing to muscle anybody. They followed their usual approach, emphasizing trade promotion. The Japanese still have these guilt feelings left over from World War II on human rights and their misadventures in Southeast Asia, China, Korea, and elsewhere. The Japanese were always shy on this issue, and they had their commercial objectives. So while Japan held back on major aid projects because of our representations, it really wasn't prepared to pressure the Burmese. So this left us pretty much alone.

We also made sure that we saw Aung San Suu Kyi every time we had some major personality go to Burma. We made sure that we saw her, as well as the Burmese authorities.
In any event, laying out this plan, a kind of mini road map for Burma, really didn't get us too far. We really were generally frustrated throughout the four years that I was Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, in terms of making any major progress with Burma. But there were a couple of positive moves.

On the drug side we had some activity, including some UN drug programs. We made some modest gains in this respect, and some of the people concerned about drugs thought that we ought to step up these efforts. However, on the whole, the feeling was that most of the money the programs cost was not being well used and that you couldn't make real progress with the kind of regime that Burma had.

We did manage to achieve the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from prison which initially gave us some hope. I forget exactly when that happened, but it was probably in 1995. She was transferred from jail and put under house arrest, where she wasn't able to engage in much political activity. Access to her was often limited, so she really wasn't getting anywhere. We constantly supported her and tried to get others to support her. We tried to get ASEAN to work on the regime to have a dialogue with her, but without much success. Clearly, getting her out of jail was one of our objectives. Some people felt that since the Burmese had done this, for whatever reasons, they had met part of our concerns and perhaps should have received a more positive response as a result of Aung San Suu Kyi's release.

Yes, she was released but, again, under conditions providing for tight surveillance and restrictions on both her physical movement and political activity. And her followers were still harassed and jailed.

The other modest success was that the Burmese Government arrested one of the biggest drug lords along the Thai-Burmese border. However, they then proceeded, in effect, to give him a free ride and even, we think, let him continue his drug trafficking, although by more indirect means. They arrested him but didn't really punish him.

So these were two areas where, at least superficially, it looked as if we had made some progress, though we really hadn't. So the tensions continued in Burmese-American relations. We continued to support arms interdiction and tried to get other countries to help us, but without much success. Finally, with Congress getting more and more impatient, we agreed to go along with tightening sanctions against Burma in 1996, as our Congress proposed to do. We did not resist this effort by Congress. We went along with increased sanctions against Burma, as proposed by Congress.

So that's really the Burma story. It was not a major issue. It was important for human rights purposes, but we had very little leverage and very little impact, with the exception of the release of Aung San Suu Kyi.

Q: Were there any other political personalities on the scene, apart from the Burmese military and Aung San Suu Kyi, whom we were concerned about?
LORD: Not really. I don't recall anyone else. There was the usual speculation about who was somewhat more reasonable and who were the hard liners in the regime. There was speculation about who might be somewhat more willing to deal with Aung San Suu Kyi and who wanted to isolate her totally. We had some reason to believe that there were some different factions, but the Burmese were never really forthcoming. The collective decision of the Burmese military continued to reflect a hard line.

Outside the government, Aung San Suu Kyi’s supporters who won the 1990 elections by a landslide - many of them were harassed or imprisoned. The only other force in Burma are the ethnic groups. There were a lot of ethnic insurgencies in Burma, including three or four different major rebellions. The Burmese military junta moved to crush and/or reconcile itself with each of these different groups, to make sure that they could consolidate their power. Through military pressure and some process of negotiations and bribery, they managed to stamp out several of the ethnic insurgencies.

Some of these groups were at least potential allies of Aung San Suu Kyi, at least temporary allies of convenience with a common enemy. They might have been able to weaken the Burmese Government's central control of the country, but the alliance of these ethnic groups with Aung San Suu Kyi was not particularly effective. As a practical matter, there was no real way that we could deal with them. Some of these ethnic groups were engaged in drug trafficking, so they weren't necessarily good guys either.

Q: Still sticking to this general area, did Hong Kong amount to anything in particular?

LORD: I can't recall how much we talked about Hong Kong in the China context. This was not a major agenda item with the Chinese or British, although we were concerned about the return of Hong Kong to China in July, 1997. We made clear our interests in China’s living up to its obligations to preserve Hong Kong’s autonomy. I visited Hong Kong several times and always met with Governor Patten, Anson Chan, the local Chinese representative and Americans and Hong Kong business leaders and Hong Kong legislators including Marin Lee, plus the media. Patten, in my view, was terrific and very courageous in trying to carve out political space and freedom for Hong Kong before the Chinese took over. He incurred Beijing’s wrath and insults by pursuing reforms that gave the Hong Kong people somewhat more political clout. He was trying to make it difficult for the Chinese to roll back this process after the 1997 takeover. I - and our government - strongly supported Patten, who was extremely impressive. We established good personal ties as well.

Now let me review Mongolia briefly.

I always had a soft spot in my heart for Mongolia. To the credit of Jim Baker, the former Secretary of State under President Bush, he visited Mongolia twice. Once he was supposed to visit there even longer and do some hunting. Then there was some kind of international crisis that he had to leave Mongolia to deal with.
Q: It was the Gulf War.

LORD: The bad news is that I believe Baker went to Mongolia during his tenure as Secretary of State twice as often as he went to Japan. He went to Japan only once, I believe, which, in my view, reflects a somewhat skewed priority.

Although it was obviously not at the top of my list, Mongolia at least deserved attention and sympathy for several reasons.

First, it was the first Asian country to throw off the yoke of the Soviet Union, in 1990 or 1991. You should remember that the Mongolian economy was about 90 percent dependent on the Soviet Union. So this was a courageous move for Mongolia, even in that early period after the disappearance of Soviet influence and empire.

Secondly, the Mongolians have tried consistently now, and for several years, including my term as Assistant Secretary, to promote both economic and political reform. Mongolia is unlike Vietnam and unlike China, which have only gone in for economic reform, and are still authoritarian in outlook. Mongolia promoted democracy at the same time as they promoted opening up their society to a free market, foreign investment, and trade.

Thirdly, Mongolia is sitting out there between these two giants, Russia and China. There is obviously a lot of romance and nostalgia and admiration for these nomadic people, who have lived between these two giants. Mongolia has no human rights problems. They are trying to promote democracy and the free market. Not only should we have some sympathy for that, but also we believed that they could establish a pattern and influence debate about what course much of Asia is going to take. This concerned the issues of Asian values, authoritarianism, human rights, and more political freedom. Mongolia could be an example, even though a modest one given the fact that while it is a large country, it has a small population of only two or three million people. A successful Mongolia would show that you can have open politics, with free elections and democracy, and make economic progress at the same time. The example of Mongolia could make it possible to counter the Chinese argument - and the phony Asian values argument - that you need stability to make economic progress with “stability” translated into repressive government.

So for all of these reasons, I always worked hard on Mongolia. I labored to get as much aid for Mongolia as possible. Whenever a Mongolian visitor would come to the UN General Assembly or would visit Washington, I would always try to make it possible for him to see as high a level official as possible, like the Secretary of State or the Deputy Secretary. I took two trips to Mongolia. The first trip really demonstrated my commitment. I went in January-February, 1994, when it was ice cold. I went out over the Gobi Desert in a helicopter. I met with all the Mongolian leaders. We had some very interesting geopolitical discussions in the Gobi Desert with their National Security Adviser and their Foreign Minister. I was very moved by the whole experience.

I went back to Mongolia in the fall of 1995 with the First Lady, Mrs. Clinton. We had
gone together to China for the International Women's Conference, and we went off from there to Mongolia. She was also very touched by the visit. I've always kept in touch with Mongolia since then. I meet periodically with their Ambassadors in Washington and in New York.

After I left government, I pressed for a time to have President Clinton stop in Mongolia when he went to China, but I gave up on that after a while. I thought that the symbolism of the President's visiting this neighboring democracy in Asia would be impressive. (On his trip to China, President Clinton didn't even go to Japan).

We managed to get quite a bit of aid for Mongolia, which couldn't absorb all that much. The aid was for energy and for other purposes. The total amount was $10-$15 million annually. Given the shrinking AID budget and the fact that Mongolia is rather distant from the point of view of an average American, we did well. We emphasized to Congress that the Mongolians were trying to promote freedom, as well as the capitalist system. They had no human rights abuses. They had free elections. They went from a communist to a non-communist government. I thought that the Mongolians really deserved our support. Several Senators visited Mongolia and came back supporting an aid program for that country. During the last year I was Assistant Secretary, we got more aid for Mongolia from Congress than we asked for, which is almost unheard of, particularly in a time of declining aid budgets.

Sadly, and as we speak, Mongolia has had some real problems. A certain deadlock has developed between the President of Mongolia and the Prime Minister and Government. The jury is still out on what they're going to do. I spent more time on Mongolia than, perhaps, many people would think that it deserved. But I had a soft spot in my heart for that country, and I thought it was an important example of courageous people trying to move in the right direction.

Q: Should we talk about Australia and New Zealand?

LORD: Exactly. Contacts with Australia and New Zealand are two of the easiest relationships we have in terms of values, chemistry, and everything else, although they presented different challenges. Australia was a solid ally, but we had had a falling out with New Zealand over the question of visits of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered vessels to New Zealand. This put a strain on our relations with New Zealand.

Let me start with Australia which, without any question, was the most trouble free bilateral relationship we had in my tenure as Assistant Secretary. We strengthened our relations in the course of those four years [1993-1997]. This was partly because Australia had very enlightened, dynamic, and creative leadership. Prime Minister Paul Keating and Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, and Defense Minister Kim Beazley [all from the Australian Labor Party] were extraordinarily able and friendly leaders who contributed a great deal to Australian-American relations. They led an Australian Labor Party [ALP] government, but this was fairly conservative leadership. It was very friendly to the U.S.
Our relationship with Australia during these four years was essentially a love feast. We had a strong relationship between our military forces under the ANZUS treaty which, in effect, is now a bilateral arrangement, since New Zealand in effect has left it. There are a lot of joint defense facilities in Australia, joint exercises, and training exchanges. Australia was probably the most active country in Asia on human rights. They helped us a great deal in that area, whereas other countries were timid and selfish. The Australians would speak up to the Chinese and others on this issue. Australia played a very important role in the Cambodian settlement and was very active in various aspects of Cambodian diplomacy, peacekeeping, arms control, nuclear testing, and the negotiation of the treaty on chemical weapons, where they took the lead.

Australia was among the top promoters of APEC. In the early summer of 1993 Prime Minister Keating personally helped to persuade President Clinton that he should raise the APEC meeting in Seattle in November, 1993, to the summit level. Although others in the U.S. Government and I myself recommended this, Keating was key with the President. He was really excited about the potential of an APEC grouping and an Asian-Pacific Summit Meeting for the first time in history. Gareth Evans was by far the most impressive Foreign Minister that I dealt with with Alatas of Indonesia and Qian Qichen of China, the other outstanding ones. He was very creative, whether he was dealing with arms control, UN reform, APEC, or Cambodia, or any other issues. He had more answers than there were questions. Most of them were creative, good, and very helpful to the U.S.

I worked hard to make sure that we had yearly Australian Ministerial Talks, known as the AUSMIN Talks. This meant that the American Secretaries of State and Defense met with their Australian counterparts. This practice has now fallen into some disrepair. I managed to arrange for three of these meetings in my four years as Assistant Secretary, both in Australia and in the U.S.

One rather amusing though somewhat painful episode took place at the first meeting of ministers for the regional security dialogue in the Clinton Administration. I forget where it took place, to be honest, though it was somewhere in Southeast Asia in July of 1993. I think that it was held in Singapore, actually. Secretary of State Christopher was supposed to go on from these dialogues to Australia for a visit. A crisis came up, either involving Bosnia or the Middle East. Christopher had to cancel his trip to Australia and come back to the United States.

I had a fabulous relationship with Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. He was also known to be very testy with his staff. He would lose his temper and was tough in defending his interests. On this particular occasion I had a very difficult conversation with him. I had to convey the news that Secretary Christopher was not going on to Australia. I was on the phone, I think, in Singapore. Evans said: "Well, we've got to put out a communique, promising that Christopher's coming back in a couple of months." Evans was greatly annoyed that all of this effort had been made, and now to no avail. Evans and Keating had even moved the meeting place from southern Australia, in Canberra, the capital, to Cairns on the northern coast of Australia to make it easier for Christopher to attend the meeting, from the logistical and geographical point of view.
Then, two days before the visit to Australia, Christopher was canceling it.

Frankly, I, too, was annoyed that this development had undercut our efforts in the first year of my tenure to highlight Asia and the Pacific community. Now Christopher was pulling out of this Asian meeting and skipping a visit to Australia to go back to the U.S. to treat another part of the world. I thought that this was terrible symbolism and was terribly uncomfortable about it. However, of course, I defended the decision made by our Secretary of State. He was under pressure from the White House to get back to Washington.

Anyway, Gareth Evans said on the phone: "Get me an answer right away on this communique" to announce the cancellation of Christopher's visit to Australia. Evans used the phrase, which I gather is an Australian expression, because I had never heard it before: "What you Americans are getting for me back home is a 'shit sandwich.'"

So an angry Evans was on the phone saying: "I want your agreement to this language" in a communique committing Christopher to go to Australia very soon, which, after all, is a very long distance, once Christopher was back in Washington, for me to promise that he was coming back to Australia in a few months was not easy. However, I was pretty tough with Christopher. I said: "This really hurts us with the Asians and with Australia. The least you can do is to promise that you will reschedule the trip to Australia." I distinctly remember having Gareth Evans on the phone, shouting at me: "Get Christopher's agreement right away," so, in effect, I literally put Evans on hold, walked down the hall in the hotel in Singapore to Christopher's room, and got his agreement to reschedule the trip to Australia. By this time Christopher was getting annoyed with Evans and his insistence on his coming out to Australia. However, I thought that the Australians were essentially correct on this. So I got Christopher's agreement to rescheduling the trip and went back and talked to Evans.

Ever after that Evans and I used to joke about this, although it was painful for me at the time. I remember once when I went in to see Evans in his hotel room at some international conference. I arranged to see him on some bilateral matters. Evans had a plate of hors d'oeuvres sitting there with drinks. I sat down and purposely sort of picked around the hors d'oeuvres and said: "Excuse me, Gareth, I'm trying to find the 'shit sandwich.'"

So the subjects we discussed with Australia were UN peacekeeping, various regional conflicts, and issues like Cambodia, relations with key Asian countries like China and Japan, open trade, progress toward free trade, lifting APEC to the summit level, forceful and regional security dialogues, always being forthcoming and trying to move these dialogues along, while taking on the Chinese and others, environmental and non-proliferation issues. These discussions with Australia really reflected dream relationship.

Interestingly enough, Australia was the one country in Asia with which we had a trade surplus. Indeed, the Australians used to point out that, in terms of the percentage of trade, their deficit with us was bigger than our trading deficit with Japan. I remember the first
AUSMIN meeting, because it was in March, 1994. It involved bringing Secretary Christopher to Australia as well as Perry. This was on the way to the terribly difficult Christopher trip to China, when the Chinese had locked up dissidents. Anyway, I remember this AUSMIN trip for that reason. When we got to Australia, we had terrific meetings of Defense and State Department representatives. We agreed on just about everything. However, at that point, as I've said elsewhere, we were having difficulties both in our Chinese and Japanese relationships. With China, because of human rights and the MFN issues. With Japan, because of trade disputes - Mickey Kantor, the U.S. Trade Representative, took on Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto and others, and so on. Even though Evans and Keating and the Australians in general were very high on human rights and democracy, they didn't think that we ought to link them with trade and MFN with China. They also didn't think that we should be getting into a big battle with Japan, particularly when it looked, as a result of our poor public relations that we were in favor of managed trade, while Japan was in favor of freer trade. This of course turned upside down our two countries’ positions.

I mention all of this, because when we came out for a joint press conference with Foreign Minister Evans and Secretary of State Christopher, as often happens, the media focused on the one problem area. 99 percent of our agenda and meetings had been positive. We had a tremendous communique. We had agreed to cooperate on all of these regional and global issues. However, Evans got one or two questions on Japan and China. He took a whack at U.S. policy, and that just dominated the entire media coverage in Australia and the U.S. coverage of the meeting. So it looked as if we had had poor meeting whereas, in fact, we had had a fabulous meeting. This was really unfair and the media often do that - bad news is more news than good news.

Secretary Christopher was annoyed at that, including Evans’ role, although you can't really blame Evans for giving an honest answer and then having the Australian press totally dominated by it. The press likes to fasten on differences between countries. We had such a love match with the Australians on all of these issues that it was almost boring. It was unfortunate that such a successful visit was marred by this media slant. Not to mention the fact that we were all preoccupied by the upcoming Christopher visit to China.

Although Secretary Christopher began to appreciate Gareth Evans more, there is no question that the "chemistry" between the two of them was not exactly perfect. Christopher is a very decent guy, very reserved and somewhat shy. He is very professional, with little flair. Conversely, Evans is a big talker, loquacious, full of ideas and full of himself. He can be very "straightforward" in his language. As I said, he has more answers than there are questions. Christopher found him a little self-satisfied and overbearing at times. I'm sure that Evans found Christopher a little on the dull side at times. However, I think that this relationship improved over time, particularly when Christopher saw how helpful Evans was on so many problems. But the two personalities never meshed. In all, our relationship with Australia during this period was a very happy story. There isn't much else to say about it.
Q: I would have thought that Australia might be ahead of us as regards human rights in Indonesia, for example.

LORD: It's interesting that you mentioned this. After all, Indonesia is a very important issue for Australia. Both Australia and New Zealand have been very heavily involved in Indonesia, in Papua New Guinea, and the South Pacific. Australia used to consider Indonesia as one of its potential security problems.

Australia has had a long and extensive relationship with Indonesia. It was important to them. Australia took a balanced view on human rights in Indonesia, for the same reasons that we did. Australia was concerned about human rights, and they are very pro-democracy. They also recognize the importance of Indonesia, the fact that Indonesia was making progress economically, and all of the other, positive things I mentioned earlier about Indonesia's regional and global role, as well as its moderate Muslim approach.

So, although Australia was helpful and would talk about East Timor and human rights, as we did, and was probably more helpful than any other country in Asia in this respect, Australia was certainly not more forceful than we were or out in front of us on that issue. As I said, Australia was helpful on human rights with the Chinese, even though sometimes it cost them. It was helpful on Cambodia, and on all of these other issues. However, I wouldn't say that they were more forceful than we were. Just that they looked better than any other Asian country. They were in the habit of being helpful to us.

Also, another thing that the Australians were doing, which I clearly understood and had no problem with, was that they were trying to become more of an Asian country. Of course, they had started out with an almost undiluted, heavy, British background. So they looked to England and Europe and the Commonwealth in general until recent years. Then they shifted in their trade patterns, their alliances, their interests, and influence. They looked more to the United States, which is now a major influence on Australia. Now Australia, when I was in office, also wanted to be seen more as Asians than Europeans. They were excluded by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia from his EAEC [East Asian Conference] concept, which made the Australians (and New Zealanders) mad because they thought that they should be accepted as Asians.

Australian trade patterns were beginning to be more with Asia and not just with the U.S. and Europe. They were a leader of APEC and pushed regional security dialogues. Japan was key to them. So was Indonesia. Australia had loosened up on its immigration policies, with the result that more Asians were coming to Australia. They played a major role in Cambodia. They were part of the five power defense arrangement. They played a major role with the South Pacific nations. So what Prime Minister Keating and Foreign Minister Evans were trying to do was to try to identify Australia more and more with Asia, without losing their close relations with the U.S. We did see any conflict here. We understood this rationale.

That's why Australia placed such major emphasis on APEC and the regional security dialogues and why they wanted to get into the EAEC if there was going to be one. They
thought that they (and New Zealand) were being kept out of the EAEC by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia on racist grounds. They were regarded by Mahathir as white Caucasians, as were the New Zealanders. The Australians would say that Mahathir would let the South Koreans, the Japanese, and the Chinese into the EAEC, but not the white man.

The Australians were trying to reorient the direction of their relations without in any way denigrating their ties with the U.S. We understood that, for economic and other reasons, they had to take on a more Asian coloration. Shall we go on to New Zealand?

Q: Yes.

LORD: Regarding New Zealand, this is certainly not a major issue, but, again, at the risk of sounding immodest, just as in the case of Vietnam, I would say that in terms of my own personal impact, and maybe because this was a more modest issue, I think that I had the central role on our relations with New Zealand. And that I was key in modifying our policy. The New Zealanders themselves recognized this.

Going back about a decade, New Zealand had refused to allow U.S. Navy ships to visit New Zealand unless we declared that they were not carrying nuclear weapons. We had a global policy of neither confirming nor denying whether nuclear weapons were aboard U.S. Navy ships visiting foreign ports. You could always tell whether the ships were nuclear-powered, but the issue was whether they were carrying nuclear weapons. Some of our ships carried nuclear weapons and some didn't. However, if we allowed New Zealand to insist that we reveal whether a ship carried nuclear weapons, every other country would want us to do that or put us under political pressure to do that. This would severely constrain our global, naval policy and the ports our Navy ships could visit. We had a tricky, ambivalent position on this with Japan as to whether we had nuclear weapons on our ships. The Japanese really never asked us, following a policy of "Don't ask, don't tell."

After all, New Zealand was part of an alliance with the U.S., called ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S.]. There were alliance obligations. This should have been a tougher issue for Japan - with its nuclear history - than New Zealand. I was out of U.S. Government service at the time, but agreed with a tough U.S. response to New Zealand’s port call policy. If they wouldn't let our Navy ships visit their ports, when we were helping to protect them as an ally, there wasn't much purpose to this alliance.

Meanwhile, Australia, at some domestic political cost - although it was not great - was holding the line and not insisting on our stating whether U.S. Navy ships carried nuclear weapons. Australia felt that New Zealand should not be allowed to act differently. In fact, Australia felt that, de facto, New Zealand was not in the ANZUS alliance if it would not fulfill alliance responsibilities. So I was always for a pretty tough response to New Zealand's nuclear policy. And when we came into office, New Zealand was in fact in a much lesser category, as it should be, than Australia. This concerned relative sharing of intelligence, military technology, military exercises, and levels of contacts.
On the other hand, this was the only problem that we had with New Zealand. New Zealand was extremely helpful on UN peacekeeping, free trade, regional security, and many other issues. Therefore I thought our policy had reached an egregious level of shunning New Zealand in diplomatic terms. We were treating New Zealand worse than some really unattractive regimes around the world. To take the clearest example, when I came into office as Assistant Secretary, the U.S. did not authorize any New Zealand dealings between the State Department and the Pentagon and their Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry above my level. That is, above the Assistant Secretary level. At the same time dictators, unattractive people, from unfriendly countries were seeing the President and the Secretary of State, even the Secretary of Defense.

So it was my feeling from the beginning that we should find a way to be much more friendly with New Zealand but not reward them for their nuclear policy. So the first principle that we followed throughout was always to coordinate carefully with Australia whatever we did with New Zealand. We didn't want to punish the faithful Australia by giving New Zealand anything that looked as if New Zealand was being rewarded or that we had forgotten New Zealand's nuclear policy, while Australia was faithful to our alliance. So we wanted to make sure that Australia was comfortable with any improvement in our relations with New Zealand. Out of principle, we didn't give Australia any absolute veto on our relations with New Zealand, but we didn't want to jeopardize our very strong and much more important relationship with Australia for New Zealand's sake.

To my pleasure, the Australians not only didn't object to our improving our relations with New Zealand, they encouraged us to improve that relationship, primarily because they were worried about New Zealand's fading defense capability and a declining defense budget. The Australians generally wanted the New Zealanders to feel less isolated. They felt, and we felt, that New Zealand should not be treated as full allies again, that we should draw a line, but that we should be much friendlier.

So what we did was to devise a policy under which we would increase the level of our contacts with New Zealand to reflect a relationship with a very friendly country. We would still draw a line between that and New Zealand's being an ally. We would not let them back into ANZUS officially. We would treat New Zealand differently from Australia, in the sense that we wouldn't sell New Zealand certain advanced, military equipment; we wouldn't participate with New Zealand in joint military exercises, and there was some intelligence that we wouldn't share with New Zealand that we did with Australia. My staff and I prepared policy papers and began to press changes with our supervisors.

Over time, we were able to make some changes in policy. Here the Pentagon was the most cautious, the White House was relatively neutral, and the State Department was in favor of an improvement in relations with New Zealand. New Zealand was already very friendly toward the U.S. They were very free trade oriented. They had a positive position on human rights and were a democracy. We had good economic relations, although trade
was not huge, given their population of about 3.5 million. They provided troops for UN peacekeeping missions. So here was a very positive, constructive country, sharing our values, with this one problem.

To initiate a new policy toward New Zealand, my staff and I had to work quite hard, both within the Department of State and with other U.S. Government agencies. We reached agreement to high level visits by senior U.S. officials and some limited sharing of intelligence, where it served international purposes, for example, on Bosnia where New Zealand had deployed peacekeepers. It made sense to share intelligence information which would help New Zealand and its peacekeepers in Bosnia. But we still wouldn't share other information of a strictly bilateral nature. We also held back on military sales of a certain kind. So we managed to upgrade our relations and to share intelligence, even as we told the New Zealanders that they should change their nuclear policy. We said that they had to amend it if we were going to have a full-blown and friendly, allied relationship once again. All of this was done in close consultation, and full backing from, Australia.

Policy on nuclear weapons was a very sensitive domestic issue in New Zealand. The opposition Labour Party, was strongly against any relaxation of the ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons in New Zealand, but there were those in the New Zealand Government, like Prime Minister Jim Bolger and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don McKinnon - both extremely able and friendly to the U.S. - who wanted to move at least part way on this issue. There were two questions: nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion. The New Zealand Government had made a study a couple of years previously which declared that nuclear propulsion was as safe as conventional propulsion. Therefore, this study concluded that nuclear propulsion should no longer be an issue. We were hoping that the New Zealand Government could at least amend that aspect of its policy, if not the nuclear weapons aspect. We couldn't make any immediate progress on the nuclear weapons aspect, but we hoped that Bolger and McKinnon would work on public opinion and that if our regular, bilateral relationship which featured our new policy of higher-level contacts improved, and New Zealand looked less like it was being ostracized, perhaps public opinion in New Zealand would evolve. Then we could also move on the nuclear weapons issue as well.

Throughout, Prime Minister Bolger and Foreign Minister McKinnon made clear that movement on the nuclear weapons issue was always going to be tough and would have to be done gradually. They didn't promise anything soon on this front.

Well, as it turned out, the New Zealand Government was never able to take really meaningful action in this connection, despite a lot of intensive dialogues. However, we felt that it was in our interest anyway to go ahead with higher level contacts. I believe these high level contacts strengthened their already good cooperation in many fields. They may have had this orientation anyway but they consistently helped out whenever we asked them for help on peacekeeping. They sent a token naval force to the Gulf, they helped out in Bosnia, and, I think, in some other places. They continued their constructive policies in APEC, in the regional security dialogues, and in connection with free trade.
They were very helpful. I think that the consultative visits at higher levels helped to promote this process of mutual interaction. So that was our payoff, with the hope that over time they could move on the nuclear issue. Meanwhile, we continued to treat Australia, correctly, as a first class ally.

I visited New Zealand a couple of times on my own. I got Strobe Talbot, the Deputy Secretary of State, to go there. We welcomed their Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs McKinnon for official visits to the U.S. We gradually upped the ante. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally visited New Zealand, as did other service chiefs, not to mention trade ministers. Finally, as a capstone, in 1996 Prime Minister Bolger came to the U.S. on an official State Visit to Washington.

During all of this time we tried to get the New Zealand Government to move on nuclear weapons. Frankly, although the New Zealand Government wanted to do this, there wasn't much that they could do. This wasn't an excuse for them. There just wasn't the necessary political support which would have permitted them to do this. We thought that it was an end in itself to do what we were doing, though we continued to prohibit military exercises, the sale of some military equipment, and the provision of certain kinds of intelligence. We left those issues to be resolved when New Zealand cooperated fully on the nuclear weapons question.

One personal note is that I'm a tremendous sports fan. When I went to New Zealand on my own, I was taken personally by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister McKinnon to a rugby game, which is very popular in New Zealand. Their national team is called the "All Blacks." They were playing the South Africa team in a major match. They knew how enthusiastic I was about rugby. I went out on the field after the match, kicked a field goal through the uprights, just for the hell of it, in the rain. We had a lot of fun doing it. I made sure our embassy leaked my exploits to the press. A picture of this event was on the front page of one of the newspapers on the next day. They had my picture in the newspaper, saying that this was the first goal that the State Department had kicked in New Zealand for many years!

To make a long story short, Prime Minister Bolger came on a state visit to Washington in 1996. He is now New Zealand Ambassador to the United States. I just talked to him the other day. After the state dinner at the White House, he hosted a return dinner in his embassy. Vice President Gore was present. After the exchange of toasts between the Vice President and the Prime Minister, to my astonishment Bolger said: "I have one other announcement to make." He then got up and paid tribute to me, personally, for what I had done to improve U.S.-New Zealand relations. He then presented me with a tee-shirt worn by the "All Black" New Zealand rugby team and signed by every member of the team, which I, of course, framed and hung in my office. I was very proud of that.

That improvement in relations with this friendly country was a very satisfying achievement, if not exactly of cosmic importance. It was a source of satisfaction to improve the U.S.-New Zealand relationship and bring it up to the level they deserved, given their friendliness and their help, but still reserving parts of it until they shape up on
the nuclear weapons issue.

Q: What about the ANZUS Treaty? Is it still in force?

LORD: Not in the triangular sense, I believe.

Q: Did that go out of effect earlier on?

LORD: I don't know what the legal situation is. I think that it's sort of in limbo. I think it's not in force but it's in limbo. I don't know what the exact legal term would be. I don't know what you'd have to do to revive it. I don't think that that's going to happen in the near future. I don't see New Zealand changing its mind on the nuclear question.

Q: My understanding is that during the immigration from England, New Zealand got some of the most virulent left wing Labourites. I believe that they have seized on this issue.

LORD: You said “immigration.” Do you mean that it was that recent?

Q: No, I mean over the years.

LORD: I didn't know that. I never heard that.

Q: I heard an Australian Ambassador describe the status of the ANZUS Treaty by saying that Australia was concerned that New Zealand had gotten too many old Labourites from Great Britain.

LORD: I never heard that. One last word on New Zealand, I've been granted but haven't been able to take it up yet, the John F. Kennedy Fellowship for allegedly distinguished Americans who worked to improve U.S.-New Zealand relations. My wife, Bette, and I have been invited to visit New Zealand for two weeks and talk to all sectors of society, give speeches and so on. This fellowship was set up by the New Zealand Government after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Among others who have been awarded this fellowship but haven't been able to take it up is Retired General Colin Powell.

The only thing I have left to cover is the South Pacific Island territories.

Q: I was going to ask that.

LORD: Are you satisfied with my discussion of Australia and New Zealand?

Q: Yes.

LORD: Obviously, no one's going to pretend that the South Pacific Islands are the most important part of our relationship, either. However, we did feel that they had some
importance, so I gave them some time.

First, most of these territories are democracies. Secondly, there still is some residual, strategic significance about them, not that we have any bases there, but we are at least denying others the possibility of having bases there. Thirdly, there are some important resources there, such as fisheries. They are relevant to environmental issues, particularly coral reefs in the context of global warming, which, if it gets too serious, could swamp some of these territories. Fifthly, there are a lot of these territories, therefore, when we try to win UN votes, it is important to have them friendly and voting on our side, This can be of significance to the U.S.

The Fijian, Micronesian, and the Cook Islands vote are as important as those of England, Russia, or China, except that they are not on the Security Council.

So, for all of these reasons we felt that we had to pay some attention to the South Pacific territories, though we had no illusions that we could pay a great deal of attention to them, both because of their small size and because of the tremendous distances involved. It didn't take much effort for me to show much more interest than my predecessors had done. I don't criticize them. Everyone has to have priorities. But I made it a habit to attend every year, at my level, what is called the South Pacific Forum.

Once a year there is a Summit Meeting of all of the South Pacific nations, also attended afterwards by outside powers with an interest in the region. After the South Pacific countries have their own, internal meeting, they meet for a dialogue with the outsiders. It is like the ASEAN countries; after they have their meeting, they meet with powers from outside their region. For the South Pacific Forum, these outside powers include Australia and New Zealand and also Japan, the EU [European Union], China, the United States, and maybe one or two other countries.

So, even though it was a long distance away from the U.S., I made an effort to go to these meetings each year. One of these meetings was held in Brisbane, Australia; one in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea; another one was in Majuro, the capital of the Marshall Islands.

I also visited Papua New Guinea in its own right. When I went to Brisbane, Australia, I went on to Papua New Guinea, not realizing that the South Pacific Forum was going to be in Papua New Guinea the following year. Two trips to Papua New Guinea were more than I needed. I should have chosen more carefully. But Papua New Guinea is the most important country among the South Pacific nations. I also went to Fiji on another trip. So I did some visiting in the area for the reasons I've mentioned.

We emphasized trade and investment in some of our cooperation programs. I managed to bring with me a Department of Commerce representative and often got others to go with me to the South Pacific Forum. For example, I brought an environmental specialist. I once had a briefing conducted by an official from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] of the Department of Commerce on the “El Nino” phenomenon.
and its impact on the South Pacific. I think that those attending the South Pacific Forum appreciated the effort I had made. The purpose of these efforts was to show the flag and encourage some additional investment.

As I said, Papua New Guinea is the biggest South Pacific country. It is a very tough place to visit. It has a lot of crime and is very poor. There is an internal problem on Bougainville Island, which the Australians and New Zealanders are trying to help them solve.

Fiji is also very interesting, not to mention beautiful. One thing we did there, with the help of a good political Ambassador, was to help them behind the scenes to revise their constitution and help the ethnic Indians to play a more equal political role with the indigenous Fijian people.

I would meet with these people in New York and at the UN General Assembly. It was a modest effort but, I think, it was appreciated by those countries.

Q: One of our policies at one point, when the Soviet Union was still intact, was to try to deny these islands to the Soviet fleet, including fishing vessels. When the Soviet Union disappeared, it took another one of those points from our attention.

LORD: You're absolutely right. We had another problem. During this period, and it has improved somewhat since I left the Department of State, there was a budget squeeze on the Department and foreign affairs agencies generally. This affected AID [Agency for International Development] Missions and the USIA [United States Information Agency] as well. I was constantly trying to head off reductions in our diplomatic, commercial, and USIA presence in the region. Although I was able to prevent more serious damage, the fact is that we closed down some of our posts in the South Pacific region, both commercial and diplomatic. This was cutting across my symbolic effort to show that we really cared about those countries. We didn't have a very strong hand to play. AID levels were down. Our presence there was sufficiently poor that it was hard to promote investment.

I'm not claiming any major breakthroughs, but I think that we showed a moderate amount of interest. I'm happy to say that my successor as Assistant Secretary has kept up this effort as well.

Also, by attending conferences of the South Pacific Forum it gave me a chance to have a lot of bilateral meetings at the same time. This is always an advantage in these regional groupings. You can meet around the edges of the conferences, at mealtime, and so forth. Outside the formal meetings you can have bilateral meetings. I could see Japanese, Chinese, Europeans, Australians, and New Zealanders outside these meetings.
What I have to cover now are a couple of functional matters.

Q: I was going to ask you about APEC, mutual defense, and Asian values. I think that we can also cover a couple of other matters.

LORD: Some of this I have touched on tangentially already, but let me go now to APEC and then regional security.

Q: Could you explain what APEC stands for and how it came to be?

LORD: APEC stands for the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. It is, perhaps, the most awkward name ever devised. The word "Forum" is usually dropped, so just call it APEC. It's a trans-Pacific operation which had been started a few years earlier. I believe that the first meeting of the group took place in Australia, and some of the other, early meetings took place in Seoul [South Korea] and elsewhere. It was designed to promote freer trade and investment in the Pacific area. It included the major countries of the Asia-Pacific area, plus the United States and Canada. Under a compromise that had been worked out a few years earlier in Seoul it also included both Taiwan and China. It's one of those organizations which didn't require statehood to be a member, like the UN. Rather, one could become a member of APEC if it were a recognized, economic entity. Given Taiwan's economic importance, the Chinese allowed Taiwan in, although there was constant fighting about how much influence Taiwan could have, at what level, and so on. Hong Kong was also a member.

When the Clinton Administration came into office, there had been a lot of “alphabet soup” going on in the Pacific area, including economic and other organizations. Even I can't remember all of the initials, but there was the Pacific Basin Economic Council and a couple of others. Some of them were strictly to promote trade and investment. Others were think tanks, and there was a whole bunch of organizations. However, this seemed to be easily the most promising to us. It always met at the foreign minister and trade minister level.

We decided, and I highlighted this also in my confirmation statement, that in striving to elevate Asia in our foreign policy agenda and to build incrementally, with others, a Pacific Community we would blend both bilateral and regional approaches to Asia. If it were a matter of defense, this obviously meant maintaining our bilateral relationships and alliances but also promoting a regional security dialogue.

For example, if we were concerned about Korea, we would wind up not only promoting bilateral talks between both North and South Koreans but also four power talks, including China and the U.S. If it was APEC, we wanted to pursue trade and investment bilaterally, but we also wanted to use APEC for trade and investment liberalization. Often, it's easier to encourage countries to open up if there is collective pressure, not to mention
incentives, than if it was just a bilateral meeting with another country. We thought that, over time, whether it was Japan, China, or whoever else where we had trade problems, not only would we negotiate with them bilaterally but we also hoped that the collective commitments and pressures toward freer trade in the area would work on these countries as well and help us to open them up. In this way we wouldn't have to do all of the heavy lifting by ourselves, even as we hoped that the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and then the WTO [World Trade Organization] would help on a global basis.

We also saw APEC as being important because it included the U.S. and Canada. Therefore, it was trans-Pacific in character and would tend to head off regional blocs limited to Asia only, including the EAEC [East Asian Economic Caucus]. However, one of the debates about trade policy concerns whether it is dangerous to have a regional organization like APEC, or one like NAFTA [North American Free Trade Area] tending to promote trade within blocs, as opposed to a global approach to trade, under the GATT and now the WTO. The fact is that these two approaches are not mutually inconsistent. We always referred to APEC and the North American Free Trade Association as leading toward or at least promoting global trade liberalization, not as regional trading blocs as such.

Indeed, we used movement on trade and investment in APEC, as I'll mention in a minute, as an inducement to the Europeans to be more reasonable in GATT and in the Uruguay Round. It also helped to spur progress in the Western Hemisphere.

So we had the fortunate calendar timing that I mentioned earlier. There were 15 members of APEC when the Clinton administration entered office. The host country for these meetings rotates every year. It just so happened that in the first year of President Clinton's first term, the U.S. was the host country. Even as the G-7 [meeting of the largest industrial countries] had taken place in Tokyo, when there was a one out of seven chance that the G-7 meeting in its first year would be held in Asia. We used that to promote the Pacific community right off the bat in the Clinton administration. So the U.S. was the host nation for APEC in 1993, and the meeting was held in Seattle. This provided an opportunity to put Asia on the map in our foreign policy, public consciousness, and also in Asia's perception of American priorities.

Later in the game, and with the support of Prime Minister Keating of Australia, President Clinton and the White House agreed, roughly in June or July, 1993, to raise APEC to the Summit Level at the meeting scheduled to be held in Seattle, Washington, in November. This would be the first ever summit meeting of Asia-Pacific powers, in and of itself important. We would give APEC more visibility. We would increase the pressure on the various bureaucracies to come up with meaningful arrangements to make progress for their leaders. It would give political impetus from the top on trade and investment, and not just at the ministerial level. This would help to anchor the U.S. in the Pacific area. It would show Presidential leadership, particularly on an issue like international trade, which was very important to our domestic economy and increasing our exports. And it would mean that every year the President would meet with Asian-Pacific heads of government, usually traveling to the region.
President Clinton had based his campaign on the slogan, "It's the economy, stupid." So it all played into Clinton's domestic priorities. Clinton was very conversant and comfortable with trade and economic matters, unlike with some other, foreign policy issues on which he had very little experience.

For all of these reasons we promoted lifting the APEC meeting to the Summit Level. It's one of the best things we ever did. It meant a huge challenge for our Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, with 15 heads of state or government coming to the U.S. There was an awful lot of agenda items to prepare for, and to coordinate with the White House, with the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, and the Treasury Department. There was the whole scheme, with all of the separate bilateral meetings, plus all of the other paraphernalia of a Summit Meeting.

The meeting was held in Seattle, of course, on the other side of the American continent, involving not only heads of state and governments, but economic and foreign ministers, with all of the schedules, logistics, and preparations required. With the great help of my principal deputy, Peter Tomsen, we put together a major task force in the Department of State and practically coordinated for the whole U.S. Government a large part of the substance of the meeting, working with others, of course. We also were involved in working out the logistics of this large scale meeting. I think that it's one of the best things that our bureau ever did. This was fairly early in my tenure as Assistant Secretary, and I give full credit to my colleagues for their efforts.

We had one, specific diplomatic challenge, too. That was the representation of Taiwan at this Summit Meeting. As long as it was not at the Summit Level, China had lived with a Taiwanese economic minister coming to the APEC meetings, but did not want to have the Taiwanese foreign minister attend, for symbolic reasons. Taiwan always had a minister there, just as other countries did. But the other countries also had foreign ministers attending in previous years.

When you get to the Summit Level, what do you do? Taiwan, of course, wanted to send President Lee Teng-hui, and the Chinese were sending Jiang Zemin. The Chinese said that they would not agree to having Lee Teng-hui at the meeting. So we had a hell of a challenge. Again, my deputy, Peter Tomsen, took this on, including the preparatory meetings on APEC, which I also went to. Tomsen was the point person for the preliminary arrangements, with the help of Sandy Kristoff. After working with the Taiwanese and the Chinese we worked out a deal in Seattle at the working level, which was then referred back to the respective capitals. The Chinese agreed that Taiwan could attend, although they had not even wanted a Taiwan representative there at the Summit Meeting. The Chinese agreed that the Taiwanese could still participate in the meetings of the foreign or economic ministers prior to the Summit Meeting itself. However, the Chinese didn't want to sit in the same room with, or accept the presence of, someone else representing Taiwan at the chiefs of state level. This would look like two states or two governments representing China.

It wasn't easy, but we got the Chinese to agree that Taiwan could attend. We got Taiwan
to agree in turn that the chief Taiwanese representative would not be Lee Tung-Hui, the President of Taiwan. Instead, the chief Taiwanese representative would be a kind of super economic minister. He was at a somewhat higher level than the chief Taiwanese representative had previously been at APEC meetings, but he was still not a head of state or head of government. His functions were purely economic.

We thought that this was a pretty ingenious deal, which has held up every year since then at APEC Summit Meetings. Prior to these meetings Taiwan and China would come to us. Taiwan would want to up the level. We would say: "Go to the host country. It's their problem this year, not ours." They have always stuck to this level, and it's probably going to continue to stay at this level. However, our arrangement was a matter of considerable significance. Taiwan is very important, economically.

I've already told the story perhaps, but I'll tell it again. On the way out to Seattle, President Clinton was going over his speech. He came across a phrase which he told the speechwriter he liked very much. The text said that Asian countries had gone from being dominos to being dynamos. In a very generous and unusual gesture for a speechwriter, he said that this was a phrase from Winston Lord. The President's speech was carried on national television two days later and was interrupted by applause. The President said that Winston Lord came up with that phrase. He said that Lord had a lot of good ideas but he came up with that phrase. I've always been grateful to the speechwriter.

Anyway, Secretary of State Christopher gave a major speech on Asian policy. The President gave another speech. We got a lot of visibility out of this in the press and around Asia. We had a very fortunate chain of events in this connection, which made this even more successful. Just before President Clinton arrived in Seattle, he got a favorable vote out of the Senate approving the NAFTA Treaty, using the APEC meeting as leverage to a certain extent.

Q: [NAFTA is the North American Free Trade Association.]

LORD: He got that with Republican Party votes, certainly. It was a good example of how President Clinton, when he really throws himself into something, can get something done. Unfortunately, he doesn't often do that on foreign policy, but he did in this case. He won a very tough vote on the approval of NAFTA. If he had lost that vote, it would have been another day or two before he arrived in Seattle. He would have come into the APEC meeting severely weakened politically. He would have gone to a major conference on trade and investment after having lost to his own Senate. Conversely, having won that vote, President Clinton came in with considerable momentum, having won a major victory on an issue that had looked very tough.

Together with the Asian leaders, he worked out a statement which at the first year of meetings at the Summit Level, was essentially a vision for the future. It wasn't concrete yet, but it was a commitment by all of the leaders attending the APEC meeting to promote freer trade and investment in the region. It stressed the importance of working together. It contained a lot of visionary language. This was very much needed. The very
fact that it took place at the Summit Level was a real achievement during the first year of such meetings. No specific agreements were needed. This gave a whole new lift to APEC, which had been meandering along, in the shadows, without making much progress. Now it was a useful meeting each year.

So that APEC meeting really was a huge success. In subsequent years APEC made further progress. The most dramatic step came the next year when APEC took that vision, and the leaders agreed, that there would be free trade and investment throughout the Asia-Pacific area by the year 2020. For the developed countries like the U.S., Japan, and a couple of others, this goal was to be reached by the year 2010. Now, a few years later, this may look relatively cautious, since these are objectives to be achieved in 20-25 years. However, at the time, we were talking about the elimination, in principle, of all tariffs and investment barriers throughout this huge, vast region, which is the fastest growing area in the world. It offers the greatest terrain for U.S. exports.

This was a pretty bold objective. From the standpoint of the United States, it is particularly good, because most of our tariffs and investment restrictions are fairly low, anyway, and we have relatively free trade. Whereas in countries like China and Japan, as well as in Southeast Asia, this objective has major implications. Even though this deadline was some time off in the future, the value of a deadline like that is that investors, governments, and entrepreneurs start making decisions about trade and investment, knowing that this element of much freer trade and investment is coming up. So this was a major political, as well as economic, statement made in 1994 in Bogor, Indonesia.

In the following year, 1995, the APEC meeting was held in Osaka, Japan. The meetings are always held in November of each year. There are always lots of lesser meetings throughout the year in preparation for this meeting. Foreign and trade ministers meet just before the Summit Meeting itself, doing business of a more nitty, gritty nature than the leaders. The summit leaders would lay out a vision for the next year and would be working at it for the next 12 months. Then the foreign and trade ministers would reach agreement in November and report to their leaders.

Right after that, the Summit Meeting itself would be held, issuing new directives for the next year. It was sort of a rolling process.

President Clinton was due to go to Osaka, Japan, where the APEC Summit Meeting was held in 1995. He was also supposed to make a state visit to Japan, in addition to attending the APEC meeting. Well, there was a budget battle between the White House and Congress in the fall of 1995, as you may recall. There were rumors, hints, and speculation about a week or two before he was to leave on this trip to Osaka that, since the U.S. Government might be shut down because the budget had not been passed by Congress, this was so important an issue that the President might have to cancel his trip to attend the APEC Summit Meeting and make the state visit to Japan.

I felt that the cancellation of this trip to attend the APEC Summit Meeting couldn't be allowed to happen and, in fact, was unthinkable in the sense that it would be a political
blow to our Asian policy. Frankly, I didn't have any illusions about my leverage, but I hoped to put more pressure on the White House to stand by its commitment that the President would make the trip. I didn't think that the cancellation of the trip would be justified. The President could go for a day or two to Japan and then come back, if necessary.

Before the APEC and other major, international meetings to which the President or the Secretary of State traveled, I always went down to the Press Office in the State Department and gave a briefing to the press, American and foreign. At times I'd also talk to the foreign press on Worldnet and other international television programs and would go to the White House and brief the press over there. In my briefing leading up to the trip to Japan and APEC, I boldly said, in response to a question, "There is no question that the President is going to make this trip. He is sure to go. Indeed, it would be a serious blow to our policy if he did not go." I surely was stretching the envelope at this point, in terms of my level. Lo and behold, the President did cancel the trip!

A little, historical footnote. The day he canceled this trip was the first day that he fooled around with Monica Lewinsky. He later said publicly that he had made improper advances to her. I'm not saying that that's why he canceled the trip. However, it made me particularly mad at the President, in addition to his recklessness on other accounts. The day he canceled that trip was literally when he had his first encounter with Monica Lewinsky. The budget shutdown was the official reason given for the cancellation of the trip.

Of course, the cancellation of the trip hurt our credibility with Asian leaders. After all, it was President Clinton himself, who raised the level of the meetings and had publicly made a commitment to the Asia-Pacific area at the Summit Meeting in 1994. This trip cancellation also hurt us badly in Japan, which had gone to great trouble to prepare for Clinton's state visit there. President Clinton sent Vice President Gore in his stead. Gore did as good a job as he possibly could, but he is not the President, after all. The natural outcome of the Summit Meeting in Osaka in 1995 was less dramatic. You couldn't have as dramatic an announcement at Osaka as we had had at Bogor, Indonesia, in 1994.

There was some significance at the Osaka APEC meeting in 1995 in terms of each nation preparing and submitting for review what they called “Initial Action Plans.” That is, how they were going to move, incrementally, over the coming years toward the targets to be met in 2010 or 2020, in terms of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. So we did make some further progress. However, this was pretty well overshadowed by the cancellation of President Clinton's planned trip to APEC and Japan.

This was a significant blow to us, at least temporarily. I wrote very frank memoranda, talking about the fallout. I didn't pull any punches. I was really very annoyed. I didn't believe the budget issue justified total cancellation. However, it so happened that the postponement of the trip gave us a few more months to work on the President's rescheduled trip to Japan, which took place the following spring, in April, 1996. We had prepared pretty well for the Summit Meeting in Osaka, and it would have been a success.
However, it turned out that the intervening months made this Japan Summit Meeting even more successful. The postponement of the Summit Meeting gave us more time to strengthen our defense relationship and the security declaration that we were going to announce.

In the interim we had the Taiwan missile crisis, which made Japan willing to be even stronger on defense matters, although it would already have been a strong statement. As I mentioned in my discussion on Japan, we were able to work further on the Okinawa problem, which was set off by the terrible rape by Marines of a young Okinawan girl. So we set in motion a process to adjust the presence of our forces in Okinawa and Japan and to consolidate them.

When it eventually took place, President Clinton's trip to Japan in April, 1996, turned out to be a smashing success. It was even better than it would have been, had he gone to Osaka in November, 1995, although the interim period was rather awkward and painful.

Finally, the last APEC meeting when I was in office was held in Manila in November, 1996. In some respects it was less sexy and visionary than previous such meetings, as it would inevitably have to have been. The various Initial Action Plans were revised, and some were more forthcoming than others. Our own Initial Action Plan was somewhat hampered by the fact that the U.S. did not have fast track negotiating authority, although our barriers to trade were already pretty low. There was an agreement to work on specific sectors and to free up trade and investment in these areas well before the deadlines of 2010 and 2020. One particular area concerned information and telecommunications. There was a major agreement to pursue free trade in this area. This was a huge sector in international trade, and particularly for American exports. So that was not insignificant.

I would like to mention a couple of other, incidental points on APEC. First, we had a heavy involvement with the private sector. That is, the business people. We would consult with them extensively in advance. As I did continually throughout my tenure as Assistant Secretary, we would try to find out what were the practical barriers which individual businessmen and business groups faced in the fields of trade and investment. In this connection I would meet individual businesspeople as well as business groups. I would ask: "What could we do that you would find helpful?" So we would feed in their ideas.

We would also have meetings with American business people from around the East Asian area, as part of the APEC Summit Meeting activity. So there would be private sector meetings, as well as state sector meetings. There would be private advisers consulting with U.S. Government officials, and so forth. We tried to have a real partnership between the two groups.

Also, as I mentioned, the Seattle meeting of APEC came after the NAFTA [North American Free Trade Association] victory. Then, when the bolder vision for freer trade and investment was declared at Seattle in 1993, this got the Europeans nervous, because they saw that the U.S., Canada, and Asia were moving ahead, not as a single, great bloc,
but certainly with a lot of trade interaction. So the Europeans were getting a little concerned. They made some concessions in the Uruguay Round of tariff negotiations under the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], which helped that effort to conclude a couple of months later.

So, within about four or five months we had what we called a triple play. We had a NAFTA victory, an APEC Summit Meeting and the “Bolder Vision” of APEC for the future, and then there was the GATT Uruguay Round agreement. So it was a rather major period in international economic history. Probably it was the most significant trade liberalization achievement in any concentrated six-month period in the history of the world. So President Clinton deserves high marks, particularly in the early going, for his international trade strategy. APEC was a central feature of it.

Finally, APEC, even when I was in office and certainly now, faces choices about its future direction. In other words, how do you maintain momentum when you're slogging out action plans to move toward a deadline? Each year you try to get a little bit more liberalization. How can you keep this process going? Can you do this by trying to free up whole economic sectors and move ahead? What do the foreign ministers talk about, because the trade ministers have taken over the basic ministerial level meetings, where they worked on nitty, gritty trade issues? Above all, what do the national heads of government talk about? To what extent do you talk about issues other than trade and investment?

An easy answer is to talk about issues that are closely related to economic matters, like the environment, which they are beginning to do. The tough answer is whether to talk about political or security issues. My answer to this is that it's hard to draw the line all the time. Already the leaders were talking about political issues, to a certain extent, but not security matters, which should be reserved for the regional security dialogues. The lines between the two are often blurred. Moreover, you have to make these meetings interesting for the heads of government, or they won't attend.

Now, if you have a financial crisis in Asia, as we have seen since I left office, there is plenty to talk about. One of the challenges now is whether APEC will be more active than it has been so far in meeting that crisis.

One last note on APEC. It is also useful as a focus for all kinds of bilateral meetings. It is like the UN General Assembly, which is an umbrella and excuse for people to converge in one place and have a series of bilateral, trilateral, and other lateral kinds of meetings. At an APEC meeting, President Clinton would always have five or six formal bilateral meetings. On other occasions he would sit next to leaders of others countries at dinners or receptions or simply when he was walking around. So this was a terrific time for him to meet with a whole bunch of Asia-Pacific leaders. It was also a very economic use of his time. We use the APEC meeting not only for the President's meetings but also at the foreign minister level. The same thing would be done with trade ministers.

So over the course of several days at an APEC meeting, there would be all kinds of
bilateral and trilateral meetings at all different levels, which was very helpful. We had a Korea-Japan-U.S. meeting on the Korean crisis, for example. This was a time each year when our President would meet with the President of China, who at the time was Jiang Zemin, before we had summit meetings in each other's country. Even though politically we hadn't prepared the way for mutual visits, such as we have had during the last couple of years, there was a chance for the two leaders to meet bilaterally in the context of the APEC meeting. It made it very easy to arrange.

So, for all of these reasons, APEC turned out to be a very valuable asset. The question is whether APEC can maintain its momentum.

Q: I notice that when you were saying "Asia-Pacific," you were also saying, "the United States and Canada" on some other issue. There were two other countries that I was thinking of: Mexico and Chile.

LORD: Yes. I'm glad that you mentioned that. Membership is an issue that came up. There is a classic question, first of all, as to whether you deepen a fairly new, international organization, or whether you widen it. The EEC [European Economic Commission] faced that issue in Europe. Nor was there a clear, overriding threat, like the Soviet Union during the Cold War. So there was always a debate about that.

In APEC we were talking about important countries of the Pacific area. In the Western Hemisphere there are countries like Chile, Mexico, and Peru. The primary considerations are that they are important in terms of trade, they border on the Pacific Ocean, and they are generally free traders. Then, of course, there are other claimants for membership in APEC. Russia considers itself a Pacific power. Shouldn't they be included in APEC? Vietnam was a growing power. Shouldn't they be in APEC? So there were a lot of debates and controversy, particularly at the foreign minister level. It occupied us during the first couple of years.

Secretary of State Christopher got around this issue by declaring a moratorium after letting in Mexico and Chile. We then had a three-year moratorium, and this issue of expansion began to come up again after I left the Government. Since then Russia and Vietnam have expressed interest in joining APEC. (End of tape)

Q: Could we continue for a little more and talk about Asian values, whatever that means, and the issue of regional defense? Then could you talk about Secretary of State Warren Christopher and President Clinton and your views about them? Then about the budget squeeze?

LORD: Let me discuss those questions, minus Secretary Christopher and President Clinton. We can see whether we have the time and energy to discuss them or whether I ought to think more systematically about them. We could start with them the next time.

Q: Sure, no problem.
LORD: And we could look at the other substantive issues. What would that cover?

Q: Well, here you were, the head of the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, dealing with the appointment of Ambassadors and so forth. I'd also like to ask for your views about the American Institute on Taiwan (AIT), political Ambassadors, and general matters of that kind.

LORD: We can get back to those and deal with the other issues here.

Regarding the issue of regional security, I talked about that in my confirmation statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in terms of the building of the Pacific Community. As another aspect of our East Asian policy, we wanted to blend both the bilateral and the regional aspects of it, particularly as the Pacific area really wasn't a community at that time. You don't throw away your important bilateral relationships. You maintain and strengthen them and you also try to build some of these regional approaches. I've mentioned various examples of that.

This is where we departed somewhat from the policy of previous administrations. On the whole, Asian policy has been fairly consistent from one administration to another, though with some different nuances and emphases. For example, we raised the APEC [Asia Pacific Economic Conference] meetings to a summit level, and we were more aggressive on normalization with Vietnam.

On regional security we took a different tack. Frankly, I did this without any particular authorization because I was still in the process of being confirmed. I more or less previewed this different tack in my confirmation statement. The Bush Administration approach, which I think was quite understandable was that if you encourage regional security organizations and dialogues, you run some serious risks. Encouraging new regional security organizations might be interpreted by our Asian friends as an effort by us of seeking a way out of our responsibilities, of trying to turn over the burdens of American defense responsibilities in the East Asian region, in both psychological and financial terms, to regional organizations in an effort to try slowly to withdraw from the region. So we might be sending the wrong signals if we indicated that we thought that new regional security arrangements could replace our long standing bilateral alliances. Secretary Baker had specifically laid out a concept that our Asia policy should be composed of spokes in a wheel, with the U.S. in the middle of this wheel, and with various, bilateral spokes going out from it.

Also, the previous, [Bush] administration had plausibly pointed out that Asia is not Europe. Asia is much more culturally diverse and more geographically spread out. There is no real, collective security approach, unlike NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] in Europe. So any possible parallel approaches would not really hold up. Also, as I have pointed out, regional security schemes, which had popped up over the course of many years, often had a subversive quality. The Russians, and Brezhnev in particular, often used to propose collective security in Asia, precisely to try to reduce American influence. This Russian idea appeared to involve turning to peacekeeping and a
collective mini-UN type of approach, in order to drive out the U.S.

So for all of these reasons there was little enthusiasm in the previous administration for regional security arrangements.

I took a different view. I don't think that there was unanimous agreement in the new administration but I encouraged this for those who hadn't thought about it. I set this idea forth in my confirmation statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I said that, first of all, we reaffirmed our bilateral alliances. They came first. We should not lightly dismiss them or in any way call them into question. In fact, we should try to strengthen them. They were still relevant and still important in the world following the end of the Cold War. That should be our foundation.

Secondly, another foundation should be our forward military presence. We had reached the level of roughly 100,000 troops deployed in East Asia, having reduced this level down from about 130,000 during the latter phase of the Cold War. We should make clear that we were going to maintain a level of about 100,000 troops deployed in East Asia, assuming that the host countries, and particularly Japan and South Korea, the major powers concerned, wanted to continue to have us do that. I said that these countries wanted us to maintain this level of troop deployments as a stabilizing presence. So in no way would we question these foundations which were in place and which the previous administration had also been in favor of.

However, to supplement and not to supplant these foundations, we could begin to look to the conduct of a regional security dialogue. Not as a replacement, as I said, but as an additional factor to deal with this vast region of East Asia. I said that we should do this gradually. This should not be seen as an attempt to shed our responsibilities. Rather, we should seek to reduce tensions and promote a better climate in the area, even as we maintained our hard headed alliances and a forward, military presence.

Conceivably, over a long period of time, maybe the climate would change and these regional organizations would be strong enough that we could begin to reduce our presence in the area. However, we didn't assume that this would happen, and this wasn't our purpose. This was to be added insurance for security purposes and stability.

We felt that we should encourage regional dialogue, though not so much on the level of NATO. NATO was one bloc set against another bloc in Europe and a defined threat in the form of the Soviet Union. Rather, we should seek to develop a gradually increasing dialogue with the countries of East Asia to have a better understanding of each other's intentions, reduce miscalculations, build up a somewhat greater climate of trust, and talk about sensitive issues. We would seek to develop confidence-building measures and perhaps to move on to preventive diplomacy, where you seek to head off conflicts, and even get to the point of conflict resolution, where you try to resolve conflicts.

When we came into office, an annual practice had developed under my predecessors.
Every year, in the spring, usually in May, there was a meeting with the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries at the Assistant Secretary level to prepare the agenda of security issues for a subsequent meeting in July, when the Foreign Ministers would meet. This Foreign Ministers meeting was called the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference was a summit meeting of ASEAN leaders and their Foreign Ministers. After that, the ASEAN countries would have a dialogue with key outside powers in two forms. First, there would be a series of bilateral dialogues. The ASEAN leaders would sit with their interlocutors from the United States, the EEC [European Economic Community] countries, Japan, China, Australia, and New Zealand. By that time, the Republic of Korea was also included. Second, the ministers of all of these countries would meet at one time in one place and talk about regional issues.

There was no attempt to do any work between these sessions, such as holding committee meetings. There wasn't much discussion of sensitive issues. The participants made mostly set statements. These really didn't go very far.

So the first thing I did was to make sure that Secretary of State Christopher would be willing to attend this ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. Generally, the Secretary of State attended these meetings, but on a couple of occasions he missed attending these sessions. That sent a very bad signal. I wanted to make sure that as part of our effort to make some fast progress with our Asian associates, our Secretary of State would attend these post-ministerial meetings.

Again, just as was the case with APEC, this was very useful, not only for the dialogue with the Asian countries but also for the various bilateral meetings that we would have. So it was possible to have bilateral meetings with other countries which were there to have a dialogue with ASEAN countries, as well as the dialogues we had there in the collective meeting.

In 1994 we agreed to invite other key countries which had not been attending this post ministerial conference. We wanted them to join that, and we arranged to call this meeting the ASEAN Regional Forum, or the ARF. I was always glad that we didn't call it the “Biannual ASEAN Regional Forum,” which might have been contracted to "BARF!" So we included China, Vietnam, Russia, Laos, and Papua New Guinea, which had not previously attended this meeting. We agreed that every year, at the Foreign Ministers' level, these countries would meet with the rest of us collectively, in addition to the ongoing bilateral meetings with ASEAN.

We also maintained the somewhat separate grouping; the ASEAN post ministerial conference had become a little cumbersome. We really talked generally about relations between the countries concerned. The discussions were not limited to security matters. The new ASEAN Regional Forum as such was just concerned with security issues.

Starting in July, 1994, we would start first with the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF]. It started out as a half day's meeting and then extended into a full day. The emphasis was on very informal meetings with only the Foreign Ministers and one aide present from each
country participating. In that case I was the aide present with Secretary of State Christopher. Since then they have managed to expand participation to one more person, so that they could get someone from the Pentagon attending. There would be a note taker in another room, listening in on a public address system, so thank God I didn't have to take notes! There was just the Secretary of State, me, and another official. After that we would have the post ministerial conference, on issues beyond security.

We made modest progress throughout this period. Several interesting things happened. At first the Chinese were quite cautious. They were happy to join these consultations but they didn't want to discuss sensitive issues there. They wanted to keep it a general discussion, partly because they wanted to deal on sensitive issues with countries on an individual basis, particularly with regard to the South China Sea, which was of interest to many ASEAN countries. The Chinese figured that they could throw their weight around by dealing with this issue bilaterally. They were worried that if the various issues involved in the South China Sea became involved in an ASEAN forum, they would have to take on ASEAN collectively. There were other issues which they didn't want to discuss, such as Taiwan and so forth.

So in the early going we tried to make progress in the sense of discussing sensitive issues at these meetings. In addition, we sought to have meetings throughout the year in between these Foreign Ministers' meetings. We talked about confidence building measures that could be explored at these sessions. However, the Chinese wanted to go slowly. Some of the other countries such as Malaysia, I believe, also wanted to go slowly. Some other countries, such as Australia, Singapore, and the United States, wanted to move more quickly. Japan and Korea were somewhere in between.

As time went on the Chinese became a little more relaxed about becoming engaged, and more sensitive issues, including the South China Sea, came up. We even discussed Burma, which, after all, is a Southeast Asian country. We discussed Burma while the Chinese were sitting there, and they even joined in the discussion. So the dialogue became a little freer and a little more spontaneous, with a little less speech-making. I don't want to exaggerate the speed of the process. It still had some distance to go at this point.

We also got the Foreign Ministers to agree on confidence building measures, and the U.S. did much of the heavy lifting in this respect. Countries agreed to issue white papers on their defense policies. During this period China issued its first two white papers on this subject. There was cooperation on search and rescue issues and on dealing with some natural disasters. There was some discussion of having observers present at military exercises and arranging for exchanges of military officials.

So the first step in the ASEAN Regional Forum agendas was to include these confidence building measures, involving greater transparency and cooperation. We hoped to move over time into more diplomatic areas, such as perhaps preventing crises or at least heading off miscalculations, and maybe some day getting into conflict resolution, although we were a long way from that.
One specific contribution the ASEAN Regional Forum made involved Mischief Reef, a disputed island which China occupied in the Spratley Islands, which the Philippines claimed as its territory. It was close to the Philippines. There was a lot of tension about this island where the Chinese were establishing a presence. We issued a very strong statement. It was not anti-Chinese, but it was clearly meant to warn China against the use of force. We said that we took no stand on the territorial issues involved here, but said that there shouldn't be any unilateral actions. The international law of the sea and freedom of navigation should be observed, and we hoped that the countries involved would work out this matter peacefully. This was a much stronger statement than had ever been made previously. There also was a rather strong ASEAN statement which supported the Philippines.

I believe that the advent in 1994 of the ASEAN Regional Forum added to the pressure on the Chinese to back off, to talk to ASEAN collectively, and to behave themselves on this issue. So the advent of the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting, together with these other actions, persuaded the Chinese to back down. It helped to defuse that crisis. This showed the potential of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

We added a couple of more members, Cambodia and Mongolia, in the ASEAN Regional Forum which, we felt, were important. Meanwhile, we had to differentiate this meeting from the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. We were trying to push the latter conference into more global issues, like nuclear non-proliferation and terrorism, and even some issues which overlapped with APEC, such as the environment.

I don't want to exaggerate the significance of the ASEAN Regional Forum, but we thought that we had started something which could be quite useful. Under the umbrella of these meetings we held bilateral discussions with the Chinese, because Secretary of State Christopher would always meet with the Chinese Foreign Minister on such occasions. As I said, even though Christopher only made two trips to China, he met with the Chinese often, in various cities. He also attended high-level, trilateral meetings on Korea (U.S., Japan, South Korea) which took place around the edges of ARF. So this was another part of our effort to build a Pacific Community.

Q: I gather that with these institutions you have to draw the line somewhere.

LORD: Yes.

Q: However, as I look at the map and think of some of the issues involved, I would think that there would be a temptation to bring India into the discussions as an observer, or something like that. In a way, India has some interest in a good number of these matters.

LORD: I'm glad you made that point. I'm glad you mentioned this. In my last year as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs [1996] Indian participation became a hot issue for exactly the reasons that you mentioned, in view of India's geographical position, to some extent its naval capability, and the tensions in its relationship with China.
So as you can imagine there was a debate, and even within the U.S. Government, on Indian participation. You can imagine the debate that took place between the various bureaus of the State Department on this matter. The issue was a classic one. There were all of the reasons mentioned for including India. However, the problem was how to include India without including Pakistan. When you start opening up the membership...

Q: Then you have to include Sri Lanka and others.

LORD: And you turn it into a sort of mini-UN. On balance, I favored including India, drawing the line against including Pakistan, even though this might cause some strain with Pakistan. I think that India has a clear, East Asian dimension, just by virtue of geography and culture. It has a much greater interest and presence in East Asia than Pakistan.

I felt that the way to do this was to make clear that Sub-Continent, South Asian issues like Kashmir and so forth, would not be discussed. We would only discuss East Asian issues with India's participation. Obviously, there was no happy way to resolve this, and Pakistan was not pleased. We worked hard on this matter. I worked effectively with Singapore behind the scenes. Singapore has a heavy Indian influence and so wanted to include India. One of the Singapore arguments, which I agreed with, was rather subtle. Singapore argued that the inclusion of India in the ASEAN Regional Forum would increase leverage on the Chinese. Any consideration of Chinese-Indian tensions would involve having one more entity to work with in dealing with these tensions, not to mention the legitimate security concerns of China, India, etc.

Q: Absolutely. When you look at this matter, it really looks incomplete.

LORD: You are very perceptive. I can't think of anything else.

Q: While you were Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, how did the Indians respond to the matter of inclusion in the ASEAN Regional Forum? Did you find that they were a positive influence?

LORD: Yes. India was only included in the forum during the last year I was there [1996]. They were quite responsible, and very grateful to the U.S., and me personally, for getting them in.

Q: I think you have already referred to it but I wonder if you could explain the issue of Asian values.

LORD: Yes. There is one other thing I would like to mention first. One of the challenges facing the ASEAN Regional Forum was that it was pretty well driven by the ASEAN countries themselves. They organized it and provided the host country every year. However, there was a feeling that the ASEAN countries perhaps dominated the organization too much. After all, by the time I left the Bureau of East Asian Affairs,
while the six ASEAN members were in the process of increasing to 10, there were 19 members of ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum]. With the increase of ASEAN members to 10 the ASEAN countries provided about half of the membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum. So we often met with non-ASEAN members of the ARF to try and get our strategies aligned. Not so much with China but with some of the other countries. We thought that ASEAN had a right to provide a certain driving force in the ASEAN Regional Forum, but we also didn't want the ASEAN countries to dominate everything.

Also, to the extent that the ASEAN Regional Forum was driven by the ASEAN countries, it didn't seem particularly well suited to discuss Northeast Asian situations. We would talk about Korean issues and, to a certain extent, China-Taiwan, and U.S.-Japan defense relations in the ARF as part of our effort to discuss sensitive issues. However, part of the problem with the size and diversity of the ARF, which I supported, was that you couldn't really discuss some of these key issues in any meaningful way.

We had always envisaged our approach to regional security as not only involving alliances and foreign military presences plus the ASEAN regional dialogue. We also thought of other groupings which would address specific issues. On Korea, for example, we ended up with Four Power Talks (the two Koreas, China, and the U.S.). We also started an informal, non-governmental six power dialogue on security. We called it the Northeast Asian Security Dialogue. This was organized by a professor from the University of San Diego named Susan Shirk, who is now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs. With her help and leadership we created a grouping of six countries, including the U.S., Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, and Russia.

There was one exploratory meeting held during my first year in the Bureau, which was at the technical level. This meeting was attended by academic figures and governmental officials from Defense and Foreign Ministries, in their unofficial capacities. There were North Koreans attending that first meeting. We generally had yearly meetings afterwards at the deputy level (Peter Tomsen went for the U.S.), but we never got the North Koreans to join in this unofficial organization. Partly for that reason, we never tried to make this an official organization, but this remained our longer term goal. We felt that it was important to have a smaller grouping concerned with Northeast Asia, which would be more manageable than the ASEAN Regional Forum. Also, this sent a certain signal to the ASEAN Regional Forum that we had other options if the ASEAN countries tried to dominate the proceedings in the ARF.

We felt that at unofficial meetings people would speak more freely than they could if they attended as government officials. This was something like sending scouts out on the terrain, trying to see what the situation was. They would report back to their governments, even though the meetings were unofficial. We were working with some academics and scholars, trying to see whether some progress could be made. That was another area where we tried to make progress, although we never got very far.

A couple of points on “global issues” before I get to the issue of Asian values. In my
March, 1993 confirmation hearings, I included matters related to the environment and other “global issues.” President Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher put emphasis on these global issues. We can no longer call them new, but they were still fresh issues in addition to the traditional security and economic matters. Other such issues besides the environment were refugees, terrorism, drugs, and international crime. Some people would put down nuclear proliferation under this heading. So I included that as one of the ten challenges I mentioned in my confirmation statement. It seemed to me that, by definition, since most of these were global issues, they would have to be treated globally and not regionally. However, just as we can have regional trading groups that led to global approaches, I thought, we can do some work here in the East Asian region on these matters.

I'm not going to pretend that this was our highest priority, but we made some efforts on these global issues, both bilaterally and regionally, as well as globally.

Bilaterally, with Japan, we established what we called a "Common Agenda." I mentioned that in the Japan section of this interview. This includes the environment, natural disasters, AIDS, science and technology, etc. There is a whole range of such issues on which we work collectively with Japan. It never got much publicity, but we did a lot of useful work.

With China we similarly tried to carve out positions on some of these issues, which I mentioned in the China section of this interview. We sought to increase cooperation with China on the environment on drugs, terrorism, and other issues. We fleshed out our agenda bilaterally and also addressed these problems globally.


We would talk about the environment in places like APEC [Asia Pacific Economic Conference] and the ASEAN Regional Forum. The environment was a major part of our agenda in the South Pacific Forum, which I mentioned elsewhere in this interview. The Clinton administration was pro environment and worked on global climate issues or, for example, the coral reef initiative. Secretary of State Christopher gave increased emphasis to the environment within the State Department by appointing an additional Under Secretary for Global Affairs, Tim Wirth, a former U.S. Senator who coordinated the work of various bureaus within this area like the environment, narcotics, crime, human rights, refugees, and so on.

Under this heading the drug issue was important, and there were certain, key countries, such as Burma, which I have already mentioned. With Thailand we had increasing cooperation, and the same thing was true with Laos. There were some discussions with Vietnam. We had some cooperation with Cambodia, where there was a growing problem of drug addiction. We had considerable cooperation with China, where there was more and more concern about the drug problem.

Thus, we did pay some attention to global issues. I can't say that we ever really achieved
a great deal, although we certainly made some progress, in terms of some of our bilateral relationships, and to a certain extent with APEC and elsewhere where we had more systematic discussions of the issues.

Finally, let's move on to the whole question of democracy and human rights, and the related so-called Asian values. I hate to keep referring to my confirmation statement but I knew that matters of this kind were going to be a part of the intellectual and political debate during my projected four years as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, or however long my tenure in office was going to be. So I paid considerable attention to issues of that kind. I made promoting democracy and human rights the tenth of my goals, although this did not mean that this issue was the tenth most important. Indeed, in a way, it summarized the intellectual challenge. I couldn't put it first, but putting it in tenth place gave it more visibility than making it fifth or sixth, and it cut across all the other nine issues.

Promoting human rights and democracy amounted to a mixed bag in Asia. There were a lot of established democracies of different types in the region, or what we would call democracies. Among these are Japan, which, of course, is essentially a one-party democracy. In South Korea they have made considerable progress in making more sense of their political system; South Korea had become a democracy, with elections, by the time we entered office. Taiwan is making its democracy take root, making clear that Chinese care about freedom. The Philippines and Thailand are democracies. Mongolia is struggling to become a full-fledged democracy. In Asia and around the world, people have struggled and even risked their lives to vote, whether in Cambodia, where almost 90 percent of the people voted, crossing minefields and facing massive intimidation, or in Mongolia, traveling for miles and miles on horseback in order to vote. All of this, in my mind, proves that democracy is one of the universal aspirations of mankind and that it isn't just a Western concern. The people time and again showed that it was important in their view.

The field of human rights is not the same thing as democracy but closely related to it. Human rights are most respected and protected in democratic systems. I have discussed at length how we handled these issues with China. With Vietnam, as in the case of China, we had a formal dialogue and raised some specific issues as well as the general matter of human rights, including the release of some prisoners. Burma’s repression was a key problem. In Indonesia, there were human rights problems, particularly in East Timor. These were some of the major human rights problems. I have just placed each of them in their own context elsewhere in my interview.

In promoting human rights and democracy, I often took on the so-called “Asian values” question, which I tried to include in some of my speeches. I said that we would promote democratic values without arrogance, but also without apology. By saying “without arrogance” I meant that we had to be careful not to be self-righteous and not to display a kind of missionary zeal. That is, other people didn't have to be like us, because they had national histories and cultures that were different. We had to avoid making this the only issue in our bilateral relations, when with these countries we had many security,
economic, political, and other interests to deal with. We had to avoid looking as if we were being overbearing on this issue, hurting other interests by looking arrogant or overly zealous. Sometimes we needed to avoid complicating our efforts by being too public and expressing our views in a way which was too much in other people's faces, as it were. This could make it mighty difficult for them to move, even if they wanted to do so. So we tried to avoid arrogance.

However, on the other hand, we also avoided making apologies, in the sense that we made it clear that we stood for certain things in this country. Americans have always had the view that their foreign policy has some idealistic, as well as some practical realpolitik elements. To maintain support for our foreign policies in Congress and among the American people, we had to express some of these values in our relationships. So this was important in our foreign policy generally, as long as we didn't promote them in an arrogant way. We would do this without apology.

Also, in terms of tone, we tried to promote our democracy and human rights in terms of other nations’ self-interests, as opposed to just appealing to human goodness and universal aspirations. For example, in my speeches I continually made the case that, in an age of globalization, of computers, fax machines, cellular phones, satellites, and the Internet, a country cannot develop its economy, certainly over a period of time, without opening up its society. You need to have pluralism, openness, and freedom of information if you want to compete in today's world. This is just a matter of objective reality and of self-interest. Maybe, if a country has a small economy, like Singapore's, which has the rule of law but still isn't a full democracy, you can get away with some undemocratic behavior for a while. Maybe, as in the case of China, you can have a mixed bag with economic reform and political repression and, for a while, make progress. But this cannot last long.

Over time, open societies are clearly necessary for development purposes. For example, you cannot attract investment, which you need to develop, if there is not transparency, the rule of law, the rule of contracts and honoring contracts, which are elements of democracy. For example, you cannot attack corruption, which is so much of a problem in so many countries, including those countries which have an emerging free market system, unless you have a free press to attack corruption and ventilate these problems. You cannot move forward on difficult reforms where there is going to be disagreement about the proper role of the state, without some free dissent and debate, with different viewpoints freely expressed. You cannot have what can be painful transitions where you have at least temporary unemployment or other problems of adjustment in a global economy, without some political safety valves through which people can express dissent peacefully. If they can't express such dissent peacefully, then the only way that they can do so is to take to the streets. I think that that's going to be a problem in China, which has huge problems of unemployment, exacerbated by widespread corruption. If the Chinese Government doesn't give people the chance to express themselves peacefully, there will be more ominous demonstrations of discontent, especially when it gets into the WTO.

We tried to lay out this self interest line and to say that it was in the interest of the Asian
countries to loosen up and be more pluralistic and more open. We said that you don't have to attempt to implement Jeffersonian, American democracy. We said that elections aren't the only yardstick of a free society, although elections are important to hold governments accountable because if they make mistakes, there can be peaceful change and some other government can enter power, as happened in Korea and Thailand. In contrast, the previous government of Indonesia was overthrown because Indonesia didn't have a democracy.

So, as I say, we tried to stress the self-interest aspect as well as specific components like the rule of law, free press, etc.

Furthermore, I believed strongly in another reason to promote freedom which we stressed to American audiences. I often raised this with my old boss, Henry Kissinger and others, who were less enthusiastic about how important democracy should be. The fact is that democracy and open societies serve our hard-headed national security interest. I read this in a book - I don't know how a person can judge this, but it's stated in this book that there have been roughly 350 wars fought since 1819 and none of them has been between two established democracies. Whether or not this is absolutely accurate, the fact is that people cannot come up with examples where two democracies have fought each other.

*Q: You can play a real game with the case of Germany versus France in 1914.*

LORD: Well, I wouldn't call the Kaiser's Germany a real democracy. You can get into some semantic battles, but the fact is that, depending on how you define democracies, wars, and so on, it's very hard to find many, if any, examples of two, open democracies fighting each other. Generally, democracies are not aggressive, even against non-democracies, although they will defend their interests.

Furthermore, open, democratic societies don't persecute minorities and their citizens. Therefore, they don't drive people into opposition of a militant kind, because the people can express their views. Or, put another way, democracies don't generate refugees. You lessen refugee flows with open, democratic societies. Furthermore, democratic governments do not practice government or state terrorism. They are apt to be better trading partners and they are apt to be better in terms of the environment. The Chernobyl disaster occurred partly because Russia did not have a free press reporting on its problems.

So there are a lot of hard-headed, pragmatic reasons to promote human rights and democracy.

So we also wove that theme in. We said that we were not just dealing with some idealistic mission. We know that we have other interests to balance off with human rights and democracy. But in a pragmatic way and particularly in terms of security and economic development, the spread of freedom is crucial. It is in the self-interest of the country that we are talking to. These are universal aspirations are not just “Western” ideals. We can cite examples of this around the world the past decade which I have mentioned
particularly since the fall of the Berlin Wall, including many places in Asia.

Furthermore, we tried to work in, without being overly defensive, the view that the U.S. was not perfect either, and we've had some need to perfect or improve our own society. An important theme is that democracy is not just a matter of elections. You can have elections in a given country which might bring in a government which might then crack down and practice human rights abuses, despite the elections. So you need to build a civil society, the infrastructure of democracy, not just hold elections.

Personally, I would introduce these themes at meetings which we would have and I would include them in speeches. We would also balance these themes with our other interests.

Generally, we tried to get as much multilateral support as we could on these themes. With the exception of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand we wouldn't get much help from other countries in promoting these values. Japan was nervous in terms of its guilt over World War II and didn't want to lecture other people. It also had commercial interests. ASEAN has a couple of democracies but generally didn't believe in interference in the internal affairs of its members or other countries. European countries were more interested in business contracts than in promoting human rights. Thus, even though we tried, at various levels, to get some help, usually it was the U.S. operating by itself in dealing with these matters.

That brings us to the Asian values question, which is closely related. In that debate we would make all of the points that I have already made. That was part of our position in this debate. We would also point out that there aren't any Asian values per se, because there are so many spokesmen for Asia. You have Anwar versus Mahathir [in Malaysia], Aung San Suu Kyi [in Burma], Kim Dae Jung [in South Korea], or the Dalai Lama [for Tibet]. There are a lot of such people speaking for Asia beside the autocrats who use the slogan of stability as an excuse for maintaining authoritarian government.

The Asian values question came into concrete focus during the first year of my service as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. A conference was held in Vienna to review the UN Human Rights Covenant. Some of the Asian countries were promoting amendments to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to provide for some escape clauses to take into account local considerations and move away from universality. We beat that effort off. Secretary Christopher was very strong on that.

I always felt that this was a phony debate, as if Westerners didn't care about discipline, community commitment, and family values, or Asians didn't care about freedom.

I often met with human rights groups in the State Department and with such organizations when I went to other countries, such as Cambodia, Indonesia, and so forth. I met with human rights groups in the U.S., I'd say every three or four months, even as I met with business people and other interest groups to try to help to form our policy. I heard their viewpoints and reported back to them on progress that had been made in Asia.
I think that the whole fervor in the Asian values debate has sort of calmed down somewhat. I think that people are now so concerned with the financial crisis that the Asian values debate is beginning to fade from sight. It will be important to see whether Thailand and South Korea, which are democracies and which are also trying to carry out IMF [International Monetary Fund] recommended reforms, succeed.

Asian values were a hot issue during much of my tenure as Assistant Secretary. In the spring 1994 memo to the Secretary which I wrote, and which we discussed, I pointed out we were having some difficulties with our policies in the region. This was a relatively famous memo which, I think, was called by some the “Malaise Memo.” I have joked that it really was called the “Malaysian Memo.” I addressed this values question. What I stressed in my memo was that we should be careful about our tone, but promoting our values should be a high priority. I thought that we should try to stress some of the themes that I have suggested, so that stylistically we would be more effective and sensitive in promoting our values.

In my final week as Assistant Secretary I gave a farewell for journalists at the Foreign Press Center. My opening talking points highlighted the challenges and accomplishment of the past four years.

**Q:** We might close at this point. There is one specific question which I'd like to ask. One of my recent interviews was with David Dean who, at one point, was Director of the American Institute on Taiwan [AIT]. He said that it should be understood that we would never have a political appointee as the Director of that office. Politically, the AIT is very sensitive. However, during the Clinton administration a political figure was appointed to it. I think that we talked about this issue.

**LORD:** Let me give you a run down on that. First, a comment about Ambassadors generally. I think that, like most Foreign Service Officers, I'm a strong believer in having a mix of career and political Ambassadors. All that I ask, and all that most FSO's ask, is that, first, political appointees should be qualified. Secondly, they should be a distinct minority of Ambassadors, so that you don't remove the incentive for Foreign Service Officers to move up to the top level of the service. Thirdly, they shouldn’t get all the most important posts.

In my view every administration has been guilty of having too many political appointees. I think that roughly 15% of the Ambassadors should be political appointees. But early in administrations, the figure of political appointee Ambassadors is often about 40%. Then the figure drops down to about 30% as the term wears on.

**Q:** It's in that range.

**LORD:** I think that there are too many political appointee Ambassadors. Having said that, I think that there's room, and there should be space for new people coming in who are particularly qualified to take on an assignment as an Ambassador. Someone who is well
qualified and also politically connected with the White House can take on assignments where clout is important. You can always have experts qualified in that country, including DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission], supporting the political appointee. However, you have to reserve the great bulk of Ambassadorships, including many of the most important positions, in terms of quality as well as quantity, for the Foreign Service. Otherwise, you're going to destroy morale and you may not have as good Ambassadors. I can look at this question in a detached way because I've been a Foreign Service Officer. However, I've also been a political appointee, including my assignment as Ambassador to China. Clearly, in my case I was qualified to be Ambassador to China, not only because I had spent much of my career working on Chinese affairs, but I had the other qualifications.

Some of our best Ambassadors have been political appointees. To take a couple of examples, we had Ambassador Mondale in Japan and Ambassador Laney as Ambassador to South Korea. They were both terrific and were well qualified. We should make sure that political appointees are well qualified and that the Foreign Service provides most of the Ambassadors. There should always be room for some political appointees in Washington. The Secretary and some of the Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries should be political to provide new blood and effect White House perspectives. But they should be experienced and able. And most of their high level positions should be career people, to provide continuity and maintain high morale in the career service. I don’t believe there should be more than occasional political appointees below the Assistant Secretary level.

I'm not sure that I would ever make a permanent exception for any post, one way or the other. If there is ever a case where you should only have career appointees, it probably would be the Director of the AIT [American Institute on Taiwan], who is a de facto Ambassador. Actually, we're not talking about the person who is in Taiwan. In this case what David Dean is referring to is not the Director of the AIT, who continues to be a career appointee; other Directors have been Lynn Pascoe and Daryl Johnson. He's talking about the man who was sitting in Washington and had David Dean's job. AIT is a strange, unofficial relationship. It is a mechanism to maintain the appearance of unofficiality while having an intermediary here in Washington, but of an unofficial nature.

We're talking for purposes of this recorded interview about the AIT person sitting here in Washington, not the person in Taiwan, who has continued to be a career officer and, in my view, should be. I'm not saying that this overseas position should always be unofficial. However, as long as it is unofficial, I think that it should be held by a career officer, as much as possible.

The same thing is true of Washington, where we traditionally had distinguished people like David Dean, who had a China and/or Taiwan background, spoke Chinese, and knew people on Taiwan. These people also usually know quite a bit about China. Above all, they should know the delicacies and sensitivities of the Chinese-American relationship, how to manage this unofficial Rube Goldberg contraption with Taiwan and who are not
subject to domestic political pressures from the Taiwan lobby and so on. So I would agree with David Dean's basic premise that the Director of AIT should be a career Foreign Service Officer.

Now, this practice was broken in the Clinton administration. This proved that David Dean was right and that I was right, although I was not strong enough in defending this position. The time came for a replacement for David Dean who, after all, had been in the position for several years. It was only fair to replace him. David Dean said that he didn't mind being replaced, as long as his replacement was a good man. But that wasn't the issue.

We began to get strong pressure from the White House to replace David Dean. The White House pushed hard for James Wood. Wood had previously served in the State Department as a political appointee. There was some controversy about how well he did in that capacity. He left the Department. Some people felt that he left because he was "incompetent" and perhaps this is not totally unfounded.

Wood had no ostensible qualifications to work on Taiwan affairs. He had helped President Clinton in the election campaign of 1992. I forget now, but I think that he was close to some people in the White House and elsewhere. He didn't have a particularly distinguished career, including this murky time when he was previously in the State Department. He claimed to have worked, at least to some extent, on the Taiwan Relations Act. However, it was clear to me and to my colleagues in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs that he did not have strong qualifications. Above all, there was the principle that David Dean mentioned, namely, that Taiwan was too tricky, sensitive, and arcane a relationship to be handled by an inexperienced political appointee and subject to political pressures. Not to mention a need to sense nuances from the substantive point of view in dealing with Taiwan and China.

So frankly I kept getting pressure from Dick Moose, who was Undersecretary of State for Management. Dick, in turn, was getting pressure from the White House to appoint Wood as Director of the AIT for Taiwan. I frankly ignored this pressure, I dragged my feet, I said that he wasn't qualified, I said that they should try somebody else if we couldn't keep David Dean in this position. I said that if this guy needed a job, they should get him a job somewhere else where he may be qualified. I said that maybe he was a good guy. I wasn't saying that he shouldn't get a job, but not THIS job. I kept dragging my feet. I got several phone calls. I dragged this out for about a year.

Finally, the pressure got very heavy, and I made a mistake. I said that I would interview the guy and check him out. He came across not too badly in the interview. The pressure was so intense that I said that I finally didn't agree with this appointment but we would have to go along with it if it was this important to the White House. This was a mistake that I made at this point, frankly. Maybe I could have stopped this appointment if I had really broken a lot of crockery and resisted strongly enough. That's not certain, however.

However, the pressure from the Seventh Floor [of the State Department, where the
Secretary of State and other senior officers have their offices] and from the White House was very heavy. I pointed out the problems, but finally decided that I would go along with the following package. The Secretary of State would appoint him, but first we would have a written agreement with Wood on what his job was and how free he was to operate. We would make it clear to him that he was under my guidance and that of the State Department in general. This was the case, and it's always been understood by career officers. That is, if Wood was going to be a political appointee, we would have a charter showing that nevertheless he was under our control. Secondly, we would get very strong (in effect Vice) fellow Directors at AIT. We had had some good people, but they weren't heavyweights; sometimes they were appointed to AIT as a favor to them as retiring FSOs. This made clear we were going to get two people who were knowledgeable on China and Taiwan and strong people to help control Wood if he was going to be a problem.

If I had known that he was going to be a disaster, I would have resisted his appointment even more. I finally decided that the package seemed okay. I thought that we would have a charter on how he was going to operate and would also have two strong Directors in AIT to control and guide him. Indeed I didn't really think that we would need to really control him. I thought that he might be weak, but not nefarious. So we got Chris Phillips, who had been an Ambassador in our Mission to the UN and had been the head of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. We also got Bill Brown, who was an expert on Asia, and had also been Ambassador to Thailand. So these were two heavy hitters.

Q: Hadn't Brown been Ambassador to Israel, too?
LORD: Israel, too. So these were two substantial people. We made it clear to them in advance that we wanted their help. So, as a package, with the charter with Wood, and with our feeling that Wood was not very strong and these two colleagues, we felt that we could manage it. Secretary of State Christopher was under great pressure himself, at this point, to appoint Wood. So we went ahead with the appointment, which was a mistake.

Wood was not only a loose cannon, despite our best efforts, but he began to cause real problems. When he came in, there were some aspects of administrative and financial messiness, although not malfeasance, both in AIT and in Taiwan. Because of this strange and unofficial relationship with Taiwan and its very cumbersome apparatus and financial dealings, handling visas unofficially, and all kinds of things like that, there was a lot of tidying up to be done. Wood pressed hard on that, and some of this was legitimate. However, he was also trying to make something political out of it by saying that his predecessors who had attacked his appointment as the Director of AIT, including David Dean, had screwed things up and maybe even participated in fraud and so forth.

So Wood was beginning to be nasty about this. More importantly, he was dealing with Taiwan officials without checking with me. This was the way I was supposed to exercise policy control over him. Then, of course, it was uncovered, alleged that he had engaged in illegal, fund-raising activities when he went to Taiwan on behalf of President Clinton and the Democratic Party. I don't know whether that has been proven or whether it's still
under investigation.

In short, Wood caused us a lot of grief. We tried to keep him under control as best we could. Then finally, with my strong encouragement, we moved to get rid of him, which we finally did. Wood held a press conference. He tried to say that we dumped him because we were worried that he was going to uncover malfeasance in AIT. He got very nasty but he got nowhere because he had no credibility. Thus, this assignment of Wood to AIT turned out to be a mistake. Frankly, it didn't cost us much in terms of our Taiwan or China policy. It never had a major foreign policy impact or became a major domestic political issue. But controlling him created a lot of angst. We wrote memos trying to control him and worked with Phillips and Brown in reining him in, but with no great success.

So this was all a distraction, an annoyance, and a mistake, though it was by no means a disaster. It was just something that shouldn't have happened.

At this point I enclose my opening talking points at a January 14, 1997 farewell press conference I gave at the Foreign Press Center. It summed up our accomplishments and ongoing challenges.

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Scene Setter Opening Remarks
for Ambassador Lord’s Farewell Briefing
Foreign Press Center
Tuesday, January 14, 1997

* In my March 1993 confirmation hearings, I stated that “Today no region in the world is more important for the United States than Asia and the Pacific. Tomorrow, in the twenty-first century, no region will be as important.” My four years as Assistant Secretary have reconfirmed my belief that the world’s most promising and dynamic area is Asia and the Pacific.

* It has been an honor to serve in the Clinton Administration. I believe that this administration can take satisfaction in having laid the groundwork for a more secure, prosperous and free Asia-Pacific.

* Despite crises elsewhere in the world which often have drawn attention away from events and trends in Asia, the Clinton Administration elevated the region on the foreign policy agenda through the President’s Pacific Community vision and addressed Asian fears of U.S. disengagement - through maintaining our force levels, revitalizing our security alliances, lifting APEC to the Leaders level, and shaping regional security dialogues.

* President Clinton’s leadership has been key. His first overseas trip in 1993 was to Japan and South Korea, our two allies in Northeast Asia, where he sketched his vision of a Pacific Community. He created an annual leaders’ summit at APEC. And his first overseas trip after re-election was to Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, our other
three democratic allies in the region.

* Let me cite some specific areas of achievement during the first four years of the Administration:

* Under the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, we have frozen - and will eventually dismantle - the most urgent security threat of four years ago, the North Korean nuclear program. We are working with our ROK allies to ensure that the Agreed Framework and Four Party meeting remain the focus for moving towards peace on the Korean peninsula. We have agreement in general among the three parties to meet toward the end of this month for a joint U.S.-ROK briefing on the Four Party process.

* We have strengthened U.S.-Japan ties, highlighted by the President's April 1996 trip with its broad communique of cooperation and reaffirmation of the security alliance. In 1993, we launched the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective, which ensures close teamwork on pressing global issues such as the environment, health, and science and technology. And we completed the bilateral SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) Okinawa review, including a replacement for Futenma, in December.

* We have put our relationship with China on a firmer foundation, expanding on areas of cooperation and seeking to manage our differences so that individual issues do not upset the entire relationship. We have agreed upon a series of high-level meetings - including an exchange of summits - to propel this relationship forward. We have made some progress on non-proliferation, but we continue to have serious concerns in that area. Human rights remains an area of difference between us; the U.S. will continue to speak out when it sees human rights abuses in China as elsewhere. Opening China's markets to American goods and services remains a priority, and we continue to push for progress; we reached an agreement on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.

* We have normalized relations with Vietnam, thereby achieving the most cooperation ever on the POW/MIA issue, promoting our security and economic interests, and healing the wounds of our most divisive war. The President has resubmitted former Congressman Peterson's nomination as Ambassador to the Senate, and we expect the Senate to act speedily to confirm him early in the new session.

* We have supported Cambodia's dramatic progress away from the killing fields - UN elections, return of 370,000 refugees, removal of foreign interference, formation of a coalition government, decimation of the Khmer Rouge threat.

- Massive defections from the Khmer Rouge this past year are proof that even they are beginning to recognize the future lies on the path to democracy and development. Cambodia has embarked on that path thanks to support and leadership by the U.S. along with the rest of the international community.

- Granting of MFN to Cambodia last fall marks full normalization of our
economic relations with Cambodia. We hope these efforts encourage greater trade and investment.

* We maintained strong U.S. pressure and rallied international pressure on the Burmese regime, the SLORC, to urge it to make progress on democracy, human rights, and counter-narcotics. Though the SLORC released Aung San Suu Kyi after six years under house arrest (in part due to international pressure), the regime continues to restrict her activities and has resisted entering a dialogue with her party and the ethnic minorities.

* We revitalized our relationship with the Philippines (Presidential visits), moving toward a maturing partnership which gives greater significance to pursuing mutual economic benefit, through trade rather than aid. We also consulted closely with the Philippines on how best to pursue our shared commitment to the furtherance of democracy, human rights and other issues of global importance.

* We reaffirmed our strong strong economic and security ties with Thailand with the first Presidential visit since the Vietnam War era and the signing in 1996 of new treaties dramatically expanding civilian aviation links and easing tax burdens for entrepreneurs.

* We reaffirmed security ties with Australia (Presidential visit) and revitalized political ties with New Zealand (without according it allied status).

* We strengthened political and economic ties with Pacific Island countries.

- Participation in South Pacific Forum dialogues in Brisbane, Port Moresby, and Majuro.
- Meetings of Joint Commercial Commission working groups to facilitate trade and investment.
- Encouragement of Fiji’s process to make its constitution more ethnically balanced.

* And we encouraged democracy elsewhere in the region.

- Taiwan (stronger unofficial ties, movement of carriers)
- Mongolia (diplomatic and economic aid)

* We integrated global perspectives into the fabric of U.S. foreign policy by pursuing international arms control and environmental policies.

- NPT extension, CTBT, 1996 signature of SPNFZ protocol, which affects both arms control and environment
• Promotion of effective, realistic policies for cooperation on climate change (China, Japan, Pacific islands) and application of El Nino research (promoted at South Pacific Forum)

• Protection of coral reefs (follow-up to International Coral Reef Initiative, President Clinton's speech in Australia)

• Secretary Christopher's environment and diplomacy initiative (establishment of environmental "hub" at Embassy Bangkok)

• Common Agenda with Japan, Sustainable Development Forum with China

* Last but not least, we promoted aggressively American economic interests in the world's most dynamic region

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Globally (Uruguay Round and WTO, first ministerial meeting in Singapore where we agreed with our trading partners to eliminate tariffs on all information technology by the year 2000)

• Bilaterally (23 agreements with Japan, opening the market, expanding our exports, and reducing the trade deficit; IPR agreement with China)

* Most notably, APEC advanced our regional objectives.

• It has anchored the U.S. in the role of a Asia-Pacific leader, reassuring our allies of American commitment to the region.

• It has reinforced our multilateral and bilateral objectives to open markets. The meeting of APEC Leaders called by President Clinton in 1993 gave a big boost to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. APEC Leaders just last November again moved multilateral trade negotiations ahead by endorsing the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which was subsequently approved by WTO Ministers meeting in Singapore in December.

• Regionally, APEC’s commitment to achieve free trade and investment in the region by 2010 (developed economies 2020 (developing economies) is a major success.

• APEC Finance Ministers meetings pursue the development of safe, efficient capital markets, consistent with the Administration's goal of promoting a global financial system that can withstand the sort of shock Mexico experienced in December 1994.

• APEC has advanced our interests in global issues. Although much of APEC is about trade, is also promotes our environmental goals, e.g., the Clean Oceans and Seas Initiative and the Clean Production Initiative.
Finally, APEC has generated opportunities for U.S. business. The active participation of American businesses in the Manila APEC meetings is an indication of the relationships with other businesses and governments that has taken place.
XXX. VARIOUS POSITIONS, PERSONAL PROFILES (1969-1997)

Q: Well, now we're back from lunch. I thought that we might do some profiles of people that you've worked with. I was thinking of the first term, Clinton administration, involving President Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and others. So I'll turn you loose and may have some further questions on this subject.

LORD: As we sit here on April 27, [1999], I note that I've done profiles on Henry Kissinger, President Nixon, and Mao Zedong, as well as, to a lesser extent, on Zhou Enlai, and Brezhnev. I dealt with Al Haig a little bit, Gromyko a little bit, and so on.

Let me begin first with the Presidents I've worked with. I've worked with every President since President John Kennedy, except for President Carter, when I left government service to take a break during that period. I didn't meet Presidents Johnson and Kennedy directly or work with them. I was too junior at that time. So President Nixon was the first President that I had extensive interaction with. The next one, of course, was President Ford.

I went on some trips with President Ford, including his trip to China, Indonesia, and the Philippines. I sat in on some of his meetings but I don't want to exaggerate my exposure to him. I didn't have as much contact with him as I did with Presidents Nixon or Clinton, or even with Reagan. Through Kissinger, through my own observations, and through selective meetings with President Ford, I formed some impressions of him.

Kissinger has a new book out on sale, which was published in the spring of this 1999. It is very laudatory of President Ford. It basically talks about what Ford did to heal the nation after Watergate and to hold the nation together. He talks about Ford's decency in improving the atmosphere, and the political price he paid by pardoning President Nixon for the good of the nation. It may have cost him reelection [in 1976]. Kissinger's book is entitled, "Year of Renewal." He credits the renewal to President Ford.

I would grant all of those things to President Ford, certainly including his decency. He was always polite and straightforward. You didn't have to stop to figure him out, as I did with a complicated man such as President Nixon. President Ford came across, in the sense that, "What you saw is what you get." All of which is to be applauded. I would also, as I say, applaud his "healing function" and his courage in pardoning President Nixon. I would also add, on the positive side, that he showed courage on occasion. For example, in 1976, Kissinger undertook a lot of diplomatic activity in Africa, including trying to bring majority rule to Rhodesia, which came to be known as Zimbabwe. Some of this activity was happening during the Presidential primary campaign, including in Texas and some of the other primaries in the South. Ford was being challenged by Reagan and the conservative wing of the Republican Party. Meanwhile, we were pressing for equal rights for Blacks in Africa, which was not the most popular issue at the time in the U.S. South. To Ford's credit, he explicitly told Kissinger that: "This may hurt me," in terms of a challenge from the Right wing of the Republican Party in these southern primary elections. He added: "However, you go ahead and do what is correct." Kissinger
moved ahead along this line.

I remember one day when we landed in Senegal, I believe. On the very day that we landed there, Reagan had beaten Ford in the Texas primary election. So, in our usual black humor, some of us on the staff greeted Kissinger by singing: "The eyes of Texas are upon you," and so on. I make this point to indicate that Ford showed some courage there. I don't want to be negative on Ford. He had these positive dimensions and deserves to get credit for them.

Having said that, I think that President Ford was not a great man by any means. From what I've read of Kissinger's memoirs, and I've read a lot more in other books about Ford, I think that Kissinger was overly generous toward Ford. I think that Ford had his limitations. This is based on superficial contacts I had with him. I must admit that Ford was nothing but nice to me and was always a decent man. So I hesitate to be critical of him, but in the interest of candor I just think that he was limited in terms of intelligence or conceptual strength. To his credit, he knew his limitations and delegated to Kissinger the basic running of foreign policy. He was able to make some difficult decisions, not only in Africa but on some other issues during his tenure as President.

First of all, I didn't think that Ford was particularly smart or handled himself all that well in meetings that I attended. More significantly, with respect to his essential decency and courage, this was limited in some respects. Certainly, he was courageous in pardoning President Nixon, and that dwarfs other things. I want to acknowledge that. However, despite Ford's closeness to Kissinger and respect for him, Ford didn't really defend Kissinger very strongly when the Reagan people attacked Kissinger. At the time Ford was watching his right flank. Kissinger did not even go to the Republican convention where Ford was given the Republican nomination for President. Ford knew that Kissinger would be a magnet for conservatives who didn't like Secretary Kissinger and didn't like detente. I just don't feel that Ford was very loyal to Kissinger, any more than President Eisenhower was very loyal to General George Marshall when he was attacked by Senator Joseph McCarthy, though I don't want to compare the two - Ike was a great American and great President. So there was that element.

What also dismayed me about President Ford was that, in a stupid attempt to appease the right wing of the Republican Party, Ford dropped Nelson Rockefeller as nominee for Vice President. Rockefeller was one of my heroes. He was a moderate Republican. Ford replaced Rockefeller as nominee for Vice President with Bob Dole, whom I didn't particularly like. I felt that that action was both stupid tactically and showed weakness in exaggerating the right wing problem in the Republican Party, particularly as time went on. In any event, this was no way to treat Rockefeller, who had been a loyal Vice President. Rockefeller, to his credit, never complained, either privately or publicly. He was a good soldier. I found that a major mistake on Ford's part. So my own view of President Ford is mixed, and that's really all I have to say about him.

Q: Did you get any feel for Nelson Rockefeller during the time you were on the NSC staff? As Vice President, Rockefeller went back to the 1940s as far as being involved in
Latin American affairs was concerned.

LORD: Right. I met Rockefeller on several occasions. I certainly didn't know him well. I had met him superficially on social occasions, as I recall it, when I was younger. I met him through Kissinger and went to his house at least a couple of times but didn't deal with him and sit in on meetings with him while Rockefeller was Vice President, at least as far as I can recall. On the occasions when I did meet him, he struck me as very dynamic, someone who was very gregarious and energetic. Being a moderate Republican, I basically liked his views, although as I look back on it, he advocated perhaps too big a role for government for my taste when I think of his service as Governor of New York.

I knew of Kissinger's great respect for Rockefeller. I also had great respect for him. Rockefeller seemed to run his political campaigns on the basis of ideas, thinking that he would be nominated for President by issuing policy papers. That is not quite the way you do it. Meanwhile, he risked being cut up by the conservatives and could never quite get through a Republican convention. I was very upset when people like Senator Goldwater beat Rockefeller. I was particularly upset when Rockefeller was booed at the party convention in San Francisco by the Goldwater people. I liked Rockefeller because he was forthcoming on the racial issue and was a strong proponent of integration and equal rights. He was very strong on that. Rockefeller seemed to me to have a kind of vision on foreign policy that Kissinger did, in terms of a combination of firmness but also a willingness to negotiate with our adversaries. America had to play a large, international role. So I was a great fan of Rockefeller's, but I didn't know him well.

Q: I was wondering whether, during the time that Rockefeller was Vice President [under President Ford] and he was the patron of Henry Kissinger, there was any evidence of the hand of Nelson Rockefeller behind Kissinger?

LORD: I don't recall. Kissinger kept Rockefeller posted, because he was Vice President, because he was a close friend of Kissinger's, and because Kissinger had worked for Rockefeller. To Nixon's great credit, he chose Kissinger to be his National Security Adviser. Indeed, as Kissinger tells it, when he was approached by Nixon after the election of 1968 to be National Security Adviser, Kissinger had the effrontery to say to Nixon: "Let me think about it. I'll get back to you." He was thinking about whether to take a chance and work for Nixon. After all, he'd been with Rockefeller, he'd been with the Harvard University liberal intellectual crowd, even though he wasn't a liberal himself. He was wondering whether he would be criticized and would feel awkward, working for Nixon after he had opposed him in the primary campaign. Rockefeller, of course, generally came out of the Harvard, etc. milieu, which was suspicious of Nixon.

Kissinger went to Rockefeller, and Rockefeller said: "Look, Nixon is taking a much bigger chance by appointing you than you would be taking by joining him. After all, he has his own perspective. You've worked for me. You're a Harvard intellectual." I don't know exactly whether Rockefeller said that Kissinger was a Jewish immigrant, but he said, more or less, that if Nixon was willing to take a chance on Kissinger, how could Kissinger have the effrontery to tell the next President of the United States that he would think about it and get back to him. Rockefeller said to Kissinger: "Call Nixon right away
and say that you accept." And that's exactly what Kissinger did. Kissinger tells this story himself about his reaction to the offer from Nixon and Rockefeller’s comments.

That's the approach Rockefeller had. The other approach was that Rockefeller never expressed bitterness, either publicly or privately, about being dropped as Vice Presidential candidate by President Ford. Rockefeller remained loyal to Ford, even though it must have been a bitter blow to someone who wanted to be President. He probably thought that his best bet was to succeed Ford as President, after being Vice President, never envisaging the humiliation of being dropped from the ticket.

The next President I dealt with was Ronald Reagan. As I said, I left government service in 1977 and therefore didn't serve during the Carter Administration.

Q: Before we leave President Carter completely, were you getting...

LORD: I can give you something on Carter...

Q: Could you? There are always waves of Presidents. I was wondering, particularly because of the work you did, the milieu you came from, and all of that...

LORD: I should talk about Carter. I knew him superficially. I didn't know him very well before he became President, although I believe that I had met him. I was attracted to Carter in the sense that he looked to me like a moderate Democrat from the South. I'm a centrist myself. Throughout my lifetime, I have voted almost exactly 50 - 50 for Republicans and Democrats. I stayed away from Senators Goldwater [Republican, AZ] and McGovern [Democrat, ND] and generally voted for candidates from the center, whether moderate Republicans or moderate Democrats. Even though it's a secret ballot, I'll be very honest and say that I was sufficiently unhappy with President Ford dropping Rockefeller from the Republican ticket in 1976, as well as other dimensions of his record that I didn't approve of, and was sufficiently intrigued by Carter, even though I didn't know much about him, that I actually voted for Carter in the 1976 Presidential election. I did this, even though it meant that if Carter won and Ford lost, I'd be leaving government service. In fact, I wanted to leave anyway. I was exhausted, and this prospect didn't bother me.

So, superficially, I was attracted by Carter. Since then, I have met him in various milieus. I met him even during the Clinton administration, when he negotiated on the Korean issue. I met him when he came to China, when I was Ambassador. I saw him at the Carter Center in Atlanta once. I've also been at meetings where I hosted him at the Council on Foreign Relations at which he or his wife spoke. I have met him and have some impression of him, even though I didn't work directly for him.

None of these impressions will represent a particularly revolutionary analysis. There is no question that President Carter is very smart in a detailed, tactical way. I think that the conventional wisdom is correct, that he was terrific on details but he paid too much attention to them. Unlike any other President or a busy executive, he would not only read
the full memoranda sent to him, but he would read the annexes and attachments, even though they were bulky. He would get to know a subject intimately. However, the problem was that he would know the trees but would no longer know the forest. It is rumored that Carter even scheduled appointments on the White House tennis courts. I find that hard to believe, although as a great tennis fan, that's probably not a bad idea. So there is that aspect. He was a bright, smart engineer.

There is no question that on Korea Carter was very helpful to the Clinton administration, and I've gone into that in a previous interview. Carter is sharp. In retrospect, I give him more credit than I did at the time for giving us a new emphasis on human rights in our foreign policy. In the 1970s, and when Carter became President, I was still more of the realpolitik school of Kissinger. I was more interested in human rights than Henry Kissinger was, but that's not a very high barrier to leap over. I tended to agree that, on the whole, you worry more about the foreign policies of foreign countries than you do about their domestic systems. I have greatly evolved in my thinking. I think that human rights are a legitimate item in our foreign policy agenda and an important item with any country. We need to look at human rights carefully, not only to maintain domestic and Congressional support, but also to reflect our values and to include idealism as well as pragmatism in our foreign policy. Above all, I think that this concern for human rights also advances our security interests because more open, democratic nations are less aggressive and less apt to produce wars. They don't generate refugees, they don't practice terrorism, and they are less involved in the drug traffic. Therefore, there are concrete security and other benefits to be gained from promoting democracy and human rights in foreign countries, in addition to humane considerations.

Also, in the age of the Internet, fax machines, satellites, and computers, I don't think that you can develop an economy effectively without a more democratic, law-based, open, transparent society. If you don't do this, you're going to fall behind at some point in your development. So, for all of these reasons, I am now convinced that human rights and democracy are legitimate aims of our foreign policy. They are not the only aim, and cannot dominate all other considerations, whether it is with China or any other country. However, promoting freedom as such is an important aim of foreign policy. I feel that more strongly than Kissinger did. I feel that more strongly than I did when I was judging the performance of President Carter. At the time I thought that Carter was probably pushing human rights too much.

Of course, President Carter has been a terrific, ex-President. He deserves the kudos he has gotten for his humanitarian work, his important efforts at the Carter Center in Georgia, as well as some of the selective diplomacy he has engaged in, including Korea. At other times I think that he has been too generous toward real dictators and, as a human rights advocate, has tended to overlook some of their excesses. Sometimes, he has meddled in some issues without cooperating fully with the U.S. Government. So his record has been a mixed bag. However, on the whole, you have to give him credit for his performance as an ex-President.

As for his presidency on foreign policy, clearly by the end with the hostage crisis and oil
problems, he was on the defensive and looked weak. But you have to give him credit for at least three major achievements which people tend to forget: the Panama Canal Treaty, which took great courage. The Camp David Middle East Peace Accords. Normalization of relations with China. That’s impressive.

Having said that, I think that he falls short, certainly on personality grounds. He has no sense of humor and is very egotistical. (End of tape)

One example of Carter not being overly generous involves his visiting Beijing in the late 1980s, when I was Ambassador there. We had a good visit with him and Mrs. Carter. However, in the course of a series of banquets and luncheons, where the hosts were Chinese, there would be toasts to U.S.-Chinese relations, including Carter's contribution to normalizing relations in 1979, for which he deserves credit. However, there I was sitting there, the current Ambassador to China who had been involved in the opening of relations with China with Kissinger and President Nixon and who would like to think that he made his own contributions to reopening U.S. relations with China. However, not once, throughout this visit, in any of his toasts or public comments, or even private comments, to Chinese, when he was talking about the development of U.S.-Chinese relations, did he talk about anything but his own contributions. He never acknowledged what Nixon and Kissinger, and, to a certain extent, what the serving U.S. Ambassador, who was his host, had done. I don't want to exaggerate this, but this shows a certain lack of grace.

Q: It essentially shows a character flaw.

LORD: I think so and I also think that it's dumb in terms of the Chinese. They remember old friends. They give Carter credit for what he did but they also give President Nixon and Henry Kissinger a lot of credit. It would have been more graceful, and the Chinese would have respected him more, if he had mentioned that. I don't want to exaggerate this, but I think that President Carter has a tendency toward self-righteousness, pomposity, and a lack of humor. He has always been very decent to me. He has never been impolite to me. He is bright, and I think that he knows it. But he doesn't spread generosity around.

Q: Moving up the line of the Presidents, did you have any feel for the role of the Presidents' wives, as we go through this review? Did you have any dealings with them?

LORD: I really can't comment on the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. I've always felt that Jackie Kennedy [Mrs. John F. Kennedy] was overrated. Why she should have put up with what her husband did, I'll never understand. Mrs. Lyndon Johnson, of course, put up with what her husband did, as well, but I think that she was formidable. She is one of my favorites as First Lady. I think that she has great strength of character. Mrs. Nixon, of course, was an enigma, very shy, and obviously didn't like the public life of a First Lady. She was living with a complex person, but I only met her very superficially and never really got to know her. The same is true of Mrs. Ford. I didn't know her as well. Of course, she was struggling with alcoholism at that time and was not very prominent. As far as the First Ladies that I knew, these were all women who didn't expose themselves
very much to outsiders.

Now, I got to know Mrs. Carter during their trip to China. I also hosted her at the Council on Foreign Relations in the late 1970s. I was quite impressed with her. She was just as smart as her husband. She had a warmer edge to her than her husband did. She was a little more friendly and a little more generous. It was clear during their trip to China that there was tension between the Carters at that point. I think that they had a very good marriage, but they had just co-authored a book, and they admitted themselves that during the writing of that book, they disagreed a great deal. I recall that during this trip to China in the late 1980s that she tried to show her annoyance with President Carter in the following way. The Chinese always kept to a very tight time table. When you go to the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, the Guest House, or some other place for a meeting or a dinner, they don't make you start too soon and then expect you to wait around. They leave just in time, so you get there on time.

My wife is convinced that, on at least one occasion, Mrs. Carter went into the ladies room just before we were to leave and stayed there for 10 or 15 minutes. There was nothing wrong with her physically. She just wanted to make her husband concerned about being late for the next event on the schedule. My wife had to go in and sort of get Mrs. Carter out of there. So that was an amusing footnote. Mrs. Carter struck me as a very able person. I respected her.

That brings us up to President Reagan. First, as I think I mentioned earlier, I think that we were chosen partly by Mrs. Reagan, as well as by the President to go to China, because she had read my wife's novel, "Spring Moon." She loved it and pointed out to her husband that if I were to be appointed Ambassador to China, the U.S. Government would have two people for the price of one, as my wife is Chinese and would add a great dimension to my assignment. I always found Mrs. Reagan very approachable. I basically saw only her good qualities. I had no doubt that she would be so fiercely loyal to her husband that, if you ever crossed her, you would be in deep trouble. She could be tough but she struck me as someone who was really quite gracious in our various encounters, and I had many of them. She seemed friendly. I always felt that she was so loyal to her husband and so worried about his place in history that she was a moderating influence on issues like dealing with the Soviet Union. She wanted President Reagan to go down in history as a peacemaker. In that sense I think that she was probably helpful. I have no doubt that you could get into trouble if you weren't fiercely loyal to the President.

Reagan himself presents an interesting phenomenon personally. I have always said that I was a moderate Republican and still am. That's almost an oxymoron as we speak in 1999. However, I always distrusted the Right wing of the Republican Party. I thought that, to some extent, it had a racist dimension, even if it was unintentional. In some cases right wing Republicans were isolationist and in other cases they were nationalistic and confrontational in a way that was not effective in foreign policy, when we needed a balance of firmness in negotiations and cooperation. I didn't know that much about Reagan when he was Governor of California. However, as he began to aim for the Presidency, first challenging Ford and later when he actually was elected President, I
really wasn't a fan of his. I was a Rockefeller or Nixon supporter. I felt that they were people more toward the center of the Republican Party. I didn't expect that I would think highly of Reagan.

However, by the time he ran against President Carter, because of the Iranian hostage crisis and what I thought was a very poor response to that event, as well as some economic problems in the U.S., I actually got to the point where I voted for Reagan. However, I had some concerns about his outlook, including his policy toward Taiwan which, at that point, threatened to cause a problem with China. Nevertheless, I figured that, once he entered office as President, he would see, as his predecessors and successors have, that we had a great interest in working with and trying to deal with the Chinese, even though we had to “hold our noses” at times. I also thought that people like then Secretary of State Al Haig and others would be working on him to follow the example of his predecessors. Indeed, this is an interesting phenomenon. In successive presidential elections we have seen the challenger to the sitting President attack him as being too soft on China. Once the new President gets into power, after a year or so in office, he has adopted the policies of his predecessor toward China.

President Carter attacked Kissinger and Nixon for sucking up to the Chinese and being too soft after reading some of the transcripts of meetings with the Chinese. Carter, of course, normalized relations with China after some initial lean toward the Soviets. He promoted the relationship with China, and this is to his credit.

Some Republicans, although not the great bulk of them, attacked Carter for selling out Taiwan. However, Carter was attacked by Reagan regarding his Taiwan policy which, he charged, was much too soft. Reagan gave great emphasis to this issue. Of course, after he was elected President and had been in office for a couple of years, and the 1982 Communique of Taiwan arms sales was negotiated, Reagan than went to China, and he moved China policy forward, as his predecessors had done. Reagan was followed by President Bush, who endorsed his policy toward China but ran into early trouble because of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.

Then President Clinton came along, and he bashed President Bush for being too soft on China, particularly in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre. He conditioned MFN [Most Favored Nation] trade on Chinese improvement in the field of human rights. Then, after a year or two, President Clinton changed his policy toward China and moved more toward the policies of his predecessors as President.

So this has been a recurring phenomenon and makes for an interesting footnote.

I developed a growing respect for President Reagan, which continues to this day. I'm not one to mythologize or eulogize him and ascribe to him heroic, Churchillean accomplishments, as some of his worshipers do. Having said that, I think that Reagan proved that there are certain qualities that are more important than being brilliant. Of the Presidents I dealt with, I'd say that Reagan and Ford seemed to me to be the least intelligent in the conventional sense. Nixon, Carter and Clinton, it seemed to me, are the
most intelligent, with Bush somewhere in between. There is no question that in meetings I sat in on with Reagan, mostly on China, because I was Ambassador then, he would follow his cue cards. He would follow his script, at times somewhat mechanically. So I didn't feel that there was a great mind at work here, something like Nixon on foreign policy or Carter on details, and so on. However, Reagan proved that if you have a certain few principles and convictions and you stick to them, and don't bend with the wind and consult the public opinion polls, as Clinton has done, you can get some things done. Perhaps the single largest achievement of Reagan was to restore the spirit and confidence of the American people, especially after Carter's period of "malaise," economic problems, oil shocks, and American hostages. Observers were saying that the American presidency was fatally weakened. Reagan disproved all that and showed that a President could do great things. His optimism, faith in America, strength of character, fidelity to his principles all made a huge difference in the American psyche in addition to his specific accomplishments.

In addition of course he was one of the great orators and could lift his audiences, whether at a time of national tragedy like the American Challenger space tragedy or telling the Russians to tear down the Berlin Wall. Of course speechwriters like Peggy Noonan - or Ted Sorensen for Kennedy - deserve great credit.

The economy did well under President Reagan. Of course, he also helped to bring about the end of the Cold War. Now, I give great credit for this to Secretary of State George Shultz, and I'll come back to this later on. I'm not sure that President Reagan could have done it by himself. There's no question that he was tough and firm with the Soviets. He built up our defenses. He went too far with the idea of Star Wars [which he called the "Strategic Defense Initiative," or SDI]. This was a crazy idea which sought to build up a perfect shield to protect the U.S. However, by stretching the economy of the Soviet Union and the ability of the Soviets to keep up with us technologically, it certainly helped to bring down the Soviet Union. Under the influence of Secretary of State George Shultz, Mrs. Reagan, and some others, he used the assets available to him with the buildup of our defenses and technology drive to create further leverage on the Soviets and also negotiate with them. He helped to bring about the demise of the Soviet Union and was helped in this regard by the administration of President George Bush. The rottenness of the Soviet system had an awful lot to do with this, so that not all of the credit for this should go to President Reagan.

The policies of Reagan's predecessors also had a lot to do with this, including those of Nixon and Kissinger and, to a certain extent, those of President Carter. So, no one person deserves credit for our victory in the Cold War, but certainly President Reagan deserves and is getting much credit. I've changed my mind about Reagan. He showed good judgment in choosing people like Secretary of State George Shultz and using them effectively. He showed a willingness to adjust to changing circumstances, as he did in the cases of Taiwan and China, as he did on negotiating with the Soviets, and on maintaining his principles. I think that all of that is a plus. I still can't figure out how culpable he was in the matter of exchanging arms for American Embassy hostages in Iran, which I thought was a disgraceful episode. However, Reagan was always vague, and he managed
to slip through that, because of his vagueness. He has to be held responsible for the Iran-Contra affair, and that is a major mark against him. It was outrageous to be dealing with Iran in that way, not to mention possible violations of law by subordinates and a possible coverup because of Reagan's vagueness.

However, on the whole, I would give Reagan very high marks. I would give him lower marks on what he did on our budgetary deficit. The term “voodoo economics” is true. You cannot raise defense spending, which I think we needed to do, cut taxes, and say that you are going to get a balanced budget. This just can't be done. On the whole, I think that Reagan deserves great credit and I would certainly put him above Ford or Carter as President. Nixon was much more brilliant in the field of foreign policy and had much more dramatic achievements in some respects, although, because of the Watergate Affair, you have to rank him lower in terms of his overall performance.

Next came President Bush (Senior). This is the mirror image of my evolving view of President Reagan. I went from negative to positive on Reagan. I did just the opposite in evaluating President Bush. Again, I'm a moderate Republican and therefore, for that and many other reasons, George Bush appealed to me greatly. I had known him and played tennis with him. I had known some members of his family favorably and well. He was a WASP [White Anglo-Saxon Protestant] like myself. He went to Yale, as I did. He was in the Skull and Bones, a secret society at Yale like myself. He was a moderate Republican and seemed like an eminently decent guy. When he went to China as one of the first chiefs of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing before we had full diplomatic relations with China, I was in charge of getting him ready to go to China on behalf of Kissinger. I briefed him and took him around to call on a number of people. I was very impressed, not only with his enthusiasm but his ability to absorb the various dimensions of China policy. I thought that he did an enthusiastic job in Beijing, even though there wasn't much that he could do in terms of policy. He was kept on a tight leash by President Nixon and Kissinger. The Chinese didn't allow him a great deal of access in Beijing in a still very restricted environment. So, for all of these reasons, I was a fan of George Bush before he became President.

Furthermore, when he was Vice President under Reagan and I was Ambassador to China, almost every time when I came back to Washington for consultations or when I was accompanying a Chinese leader, such as a Vice Premier, on a trip to the United States, I would see Vice President Bush. He was one of the hosts of the Chinese leaders. He would host either a dinner or a lunch in honor of the visitor, in addition to entertainment by the President, if it was appropriate, depending on the level of the visitor. But I would see Vice President Bush on my own, just as an old friend to bring him up to date on China, in which he was very interested. He had had the same driver that I had in China. He wanted to hear about his old friends in Beijing, as well as talk about policy issues. There was always a very full exchange of views, back and forth. He was very friendly, so I was a great fan of George Bush.

I voted for George Bush and thought that he would be a terrific President. I also thought, very naively as it turned out, and I have covered this point elsewhere, that I would get a
high level job with George Bush. There were rumors in the press that I might be National Security Adviser to President George Bush. Bill Safire, “Newsweek,” and others suggested key jobs were awaiting me. It was reported that I was favored to be appointed CIA Director, which was absurd. Someone else had me down for appointment as Deputy Secretary of State. There were a lot of rumors going around. I didn't know what I'd be, but I was pretty sure that I would be up for a pretty high level job, given my good relationship with George Bush and the fact that I thought that I had done well on China, as well as during the rest of my career.

I want to emphasize genuinely that the fact that I did not get a high level job is not the reason why I changed my mind on George Bush. I changed my mind on Bush because of his trip to China, which we’ve covered at great length elsewhere in this interview, so I won't repeat myself. Basically, leading up to this Bush trip to China, I wrote personal memos for him and personal profiles on policy, which I thought were very good. His advance people thought that I and the embassy had done a terrific job. So everything up until that trip to China was positive, as far as my view of George Bush was concerned. By then I had found out that I wasn't going to get a high level job working for Bush, but that didn't affect my view of him. Frankly, I was disappointed and puzzled, but this didn't change my positive view of Bush for all of the reasons that I have mentioned.

I changed my view of Bush as a result of his trip to China in February, 1989. My views regarding Bush on that will be found elsewhere in this interview. It completely soured me on his character.

Q: The Tiananmen Square incident occurred in...

LORD: June, 1989. Bush's trip to China took place in February, 1989, right after his inauguration as President. I've covered that and his weakness in the face of the Fang Lizhi incident and his sending Brent Scowcroft [National Security Adviser] to do a press backgrounder which was totally inaccurate and which attacked me and my Embassy.

That annoyed me, both on personal grounds, which is only human, but also, and more importantly, in terms of a general weakness toward the Chinese and a general lack of character.

As time went on, after I left government service, I felt that President Bush had been very weak in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre. So I was increasingly disillusioned with him. I admired what Bush did in terms of Desert Storm [victorious campaign in the Gulf War in 1991], for which he deserved great credit. He marshaled public opinion and had the courage to intervene there. He maintained a complicated alliance with several countries in fighting that war. I think that President Bush was right not to march on Baghdad. We would have been bogged down. But I think he should have continued the fighting for a couple of more days and decimated the Iraqi Republican Guard. And he should have provided air cover for the rebelling Kurds and Shiites. However, on the whole, he deserves the credit he's gotten for that. I think that he managed the transition from the Cold War after President Reagan very well. Certainly, he supported the
unification of Germany effectively and dealt with Soviet President Gorbachev at a time when the Soviet empire was crumbling, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was losing control in that country. He made sure that the Soviets didn't feel "cornered" and that they were able to save some face. So there was a peaceful denouement to this situation. President Bush deserved credit for many developments in foreign policy.

As I said, I thought that Bush was increasingly weak on China. I became steadily more impatient with him on that front, to the point where finally, after hesitating, I began to speak out against Scowcroft's trips to China after the Tiananmen Square massacre, as well as his general softness versus Beijing. I became more and more critical of President Bush and also more disillusioned with him. I also felt more generally, as an American citizen, that Bush largely ignored domestic policy because he was so interested in foreign policy. Essentially, I believe that's why Bush was not reelected. People thought that he was ignoring domestic issues. So in that respect I thought that Bush was delinquent. More generally, I began to see a weakness in Bush's character, in contrast to Reagan. I reached the point where I admired President Reagan a lot more and President Bush a lot less.

I had been a fan of Mrs. Bush as well. However, she has a public reputation beyond what she deserves, in my opinion. She is one tough lady. Never mind about her being tough. I'm in favor of that. But she can be quite nasty and was to my wife, during President Bush's trip to China. So I generally have a less elevated view of her than the general grandmotherly vision that she projects to the American body politic.

That brings us to President Clinton. Of course, President Clinton swung too far in the other direction and did so much in the field of domestic policy early in his first term that he didn't pay enough attention to foreign policy. By the time the election campaign of 1992 rolled around, I was critical in private and in public of Bush on China and was generally disillusioned with his character as I saw it. Clinton appealed to me the way that Carter had many years before. That is, he appeared to be a moderate, centrist Democrat. As I said, I was disillusioned with Bush. I served Democrats and Republicans. It appeared to me that Clinton was not a left wing Democrat by any means. And he clearly was bright.

I knew something of his background as a womanizer and some of his weaknesses, obviously his evasions on the Vietnam War, as well as the Jennifer Flowers affair. It was clear to me that Clinton was not a perfect human being. I'm very old-fashioned on marriage vows, and I didn't approve of his behavior. However, I understand that Clinton's behavior was irrelevant to other people. People disagree on the importance of that, and certainly they say that this is not a crucial matter for a President. A lot of Presidents have been in trouble in this respect. Clinton was not my first choice among the Democrats, but once he became the nominee of the Democratic Party, I preferred him over George Bush.

Indeed, I met with him once on Japan and China policy during the 1992 election campaign around Labor Day, 1992, and this has been documented elsewhere. I was extremely impressed with this first meeting with Clinton, and he has made a good impact on many people. Among his characteristics are his intelligence and his clever answers to
questions. He is a good listener. He is also charming, friendly, and open. When I walked into the room to meet him, he said: "Strobe Talbott [now Deputy Secretary of State] speaks very highly of you." I didn't know that Strobe Talbott, who is a good friend of mine, was also a Rhodes Scholar, as Clinton was, and is very close to Clinton. Presumably, Talbott mentioned me to Clinton as someone to keep in mind for a future position.

I had a favorable exchange with President Clinton on China and Japan, voted for him, and came into the Clinton administration enthusiastically. By now, I am totally disillusioned with Clinton as we speak here in the spring of 1999. I had mixed feelings while I was working for Clinton. On the whole, I had a positive attitude toward him. Clinton did some good things. I liked the fact that, for whatever calculating, poll taking, triangulating reasons, Clinton had moved to the center and committed himself to welfare reform and balancing the budget. I think that the Republicans also deserve a lot of credit for that. I was frustrated about Clinton's lack of systematic attention to foreign policy during the first couple of years of his first term. I felt that he was right, that domestic policy had the highest priority after the Bush administration, and I thought that if the Clinton administration was strong domestically, that would help him in the foreign policy field. So Clinton clearly wanted to make domestic affairs his major priority.

Having said that, I found that Clinton was a little too sporadic in foreign policy for my taste. We encouraged him to host the first APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Conference] summit meeting in Seattle in November, 1993, which was an important element in our Asian policy. We managed to use his calendar for that reason during the first year of his first term. Also, in July, 1993, we were able to arrange for President Clinton to go to Japan and South Korea on his first overseas trip, because there was a meeting of the G7 [seven most highly industrialized countries in the world] in Tokyo. We managed to get him involved in Asian affairs early by using the calendar. But he was sporadically involved in foreign policy issues generally early in his Administration.

I was most frustrated with President Clinton on his China policy. After I had negotiated a deal with Congress with moderate conditions on MFN renewal, the economic agencies undercut us and showed division in our government to Beijing, undercutting our leverage. The President never disciplined his Cabinet and made them support his own policy. Then when Secretary of State Warren Christopher went to China early in 1994, it was the last chance to get the Chinese to make progress on human rights, so that we could renew MFN [Most Favored Nation] treatment for China. We had a chance to advance enough to say that they had met minimum conditions for MFN treatment for China. This was a very tough trip to China, which I have described elsewhere. The Chinese cracked down hard on dissidents. We tried for a week or two to get President Clinton to issue a statement supporting Christopher and making clear to the Chinese that the turbulence in China was the fault of the Chinese Government and that the President was backing up Secretary of State Christopher. However, we couldn't get a single statement out of the White House by President Clinton or the White House, backing Christopher. This clearly undercut Secretary of State Christopher at the time. It gave the Chinese every incentive to hang tough on human rights.
Also annoying to me was the fact that throughout his first term President Clinton never
made a speech on China. I tried mightily to get him to give one. Now, China is one of the
most complex relationships that we have, probably THE most complex. You have to
explain to an American audience why engagement with China is in our interest and why
engagement is not appeasement or rolling over. We need a mixture of firmness in
negotiation and cooperation. Our relationship with China will continue to be a mixed
relationship, both sweet and sour. That can only be handled by a President, articulating a
strategic approach, which President Clinton never did during his first term. We had a
policy of engagement with China, which my staff and I had advocated in a memo
prepared in September, 1993. It looked very much like what we're doing today, as we
speak. However, we never got President Clinton to present this policy. He and his
political advisers always calculated that this topic was too sensitive to treat in a speech.

We convinced Secretary of State Christopher to make long comments on China, but a
Secretary of State never gets the attention that a President does. So that just documents
the fact that President Clinton was an in and outer on foreign policy, and our foreign
policy during the first couple of years of the Clinton administration suffered as a result.
I'll get back to this when I get to Secretary of State Christopher, but we were much more
successful in 1995 and 1996 on several fronts. We stumbled early on policy toward
Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. We had to reverse ourselves on China, and there were some
serious problems early in the Clinton administration. Then Christopher got much better
afterwards, as did the Administration generally on foreign policy.

Nevertheless, despite this mixed review, I always liked President Clinton in terms of his
charm, his warmth, and the feeling that he was engaged with you. I considered President
Clinton extremely bright. He is the smartest President that I ever worked with. He is also
the dumbest President that I ever worked with, and I'll get back to that. In terms of his
smartness, I've never seen a President who could absorb issues so quickly and put this
understanding to good use. The most concrete example of this was getting him ready for
high level meetings, in my case, with Asian leaders. Whether the meeting was in
California or at the White House, at an APEC summit meeting, the UN, or wherever it
was, you are supposed to have time before a given meeting to get the President ready.
This is not always literally the case. You don't know whether the President has read his
briefing book. You don't know sometimes how much he had grasped of the leader he is
meeting with or the issues involved.

In some cases we had interagency briefings of Clinton, sometimes with outside experts, a
week or two before a trip or meeting. But usually just before the meetings themselves,
with all of his advisers waiting around, Clinton usually ran late. He would be available
for briefing purposes with only 10 or 15 minutes to go before the meeting instead of the
hour scheduled. At this point I would worry greatly that he won't know enough or know
what to do. For example, there were times in the Oval Office [of the President] when you
would have, say, Secretary of State Christopher there and maybe also the Secretary of the
Treasury or the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Adviser, depending on
what the issues and who his interlocutor was. His chief of staff and his press adviser,
McCurry, or whoever it was, would also be standing around him. All of them would be trying to get in a few words about what he had to do on this issue, that issue, how to handle the press, and the kind of questions he was going to get. There would also be advice on how President Clinton should conduct the meeting. It was especially awkward for me because I had a superior, Secretary of State Christopher, present at such a time. There wasn't much that I could say, particularly when my boss was there, although Christopher is a very decent man and didn't mind it too much.

So we would be sitting around a table or standing near the President's desk in the Oval Office. There were about 10 or 15 minutes to go, with perhaps five people talking at once. President Clinton would be shuffling his cue cards containing his talking points. You didn't know what the hell was going to happen. So what happened? He went into the meeting and performed brilliantly. He not only knows the issues as well as you do. He knows how to conduct the meeting. For example, he would start off with a fairly warm and friendly approach, depending on the circumstances. I am generalizing, but he would be relatively friendly and cooperative during this early part of the meeting. Then the tough or difficult issues that he would have to grapple with, or the warnings or problems he would want to raise, he would put in the middle. Then he would make sure that he ended up on a positive note again for face or mood reasons. He didn't want to start off or end negatively. This is pretty elementary as an example of an A-100 course in diplomacy or negotiations. However, President Clinton had an instinct for this, and I use it as an example. He not only knew the issues but would also handle them in the right sequence.

That was one of his strong parts, and I use it as an example of President Clinton's brilliance in absorbing the details affecting complex issues and giving them back to the visitor. He had a slight weakness. I think that he wasn't tough enough at some of the meetings. For example, with the Japanese on economic issues or the Chinese on human rights. He had a certain tendency of wanting to be liked by his interlocutor. Particularly in terms of meetings with the Japanese and Chinese, I felt that he wasn't quite firm enough at times on some of the issues.

So when I left the Clinton administration at the end of 1996, it certainly wasn't because of Clinton himself. I had no particular complaints. I felt that our foreign policy was in much better shape than it had been when I entered office [as Assistant Secretary of State in 1993]. I certainly felt that our policy toward Asia was in good shape. The China summit meeting was scheduled, and relations with China were on track. We had come out of a crisis with China related to the Taiwan missile crisis. President Clinton had had a very successful visit to Japan, where he had handled himself very well. I was with him on that trip as well, of course, as I was on all of his Asian trips. I had also sat in with him in Oval Office meetings, as well as meetings on Air Force One. I had had a lot of exposure to Clinton. I liked him personally and thought that he was a good President in many ways.

We had also normalized diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. APEC meetings were moving ahead, and regional security and a lot of other things were going well on the Asian front. We had the Korean Framework Agreement. We had terrific relations with Australia and had greatly improved relations with New Zealand.
We were doing well with ASEAN. Also Mongolia.

Since I've been out of office for more than two years now, I've learned, as has the rest of America, including some of his closest advisers, that President Clinton has some fundamental, character flaws. When I worked with him, I went through a period of semi-denial that this was so, as was the case with some of those advisers. Maybe I was naive not to have known this, but if I didn't fully understand this, how about George Stephanopoulos [former key staff for Clinton] and others, who claim not to have fully understood it either? Well, without going into a great deal of detail which is particularly relevant to this record, I have learned of the coverups and lying to the American people and violations of the law by the nation’s chief law enforcement officer. This is now confirmed by the judge, who has concluded that Clinton appears to be guilty of contempt of court. Not to mention how he treats his wife, his daughter, his cabinet, and the American people, especially women.

For all of these reasons I was glad that he was impeached by the House of Representatives in early 1999. I also became disillusioned with him because he follows public opinion polls too closely. He was selfish and reckless and immature and put his stupid, mind-boggling gratification above his Presidency, his character, and his family. He is a person who clearly was already in danger because of his relationship with Jennifer Flowers and Paula Jones and all of the rumors of other matters. He didn't even have the sense to do what he was doing outside of the Oval Office.

I think that people may disagree on whether he should have been removed from office. The biggest argument against his removal is that the American people didn't want it, and therefore there would have been bitterness and polarization on this issue. I can live with impeachment and a finding by a judge that Clinton has been guilty of contempt of court, as well as permanent stains on his record. However, I stand by some of the positive aspects of his record, including some of the things that he accomplished. On balance, I am furious at what he did to the country and how he let down the American people. It was a tremendous waste of talent. And the issue was not “sex” but the breaking of the law and coverups and how he dragged this nation deceitfully for years.

So those are some comments of mine about the Presidents I served under. Regarding Vice President Al Gore, I knew him only superficially before I entered office under the Clinton administration. In 1992, I chaired a Carnegie National Commission on Foreign Policy, to look at our foreign policy and make suggestions to the incoming Administration. One of the people we talked to before we wrote the document was then Senator Gore. We talked to him about foreign policy, and particularly on the environment, where he has been an expert. At that meeting and in the course of other, superficial observations of him, I was impressed with Gore as a moderate Democrat, a dynamic and experienced figure, basically centrist in his instincts. This view of Gore, which is widely held, was reinforced during the occasions I had to deal with him during the first term of President Clinton. This included dealing with visiting Chinese or other Asian leaders, for example, and substituting for President Clinton, as Vice President Gore did in Osaka in 1995.
In debates on Vietnam policy I thought that Gore conducted himself well. For example, on Vietnam policy, as I've said, I thought that President Clinton was very skittish because of his own draft evasion and his worry about domestic backlash. Gore was generally supportive of my efforts and those of Secretary of State Christopher to move ahead in a graduated way with normalization of relations with Vietnam, which I thought was in our interest. Gore was very helpful in that regard. So I generally had, and I still have, a basically positive opinion of Vice President Gore. He was extremely hard-working, well-versed, experienced, and, on the whole, a centrist figure. However, I have become less enamored with him because he got up, on the day that President Clinton was impeached, and said that Clinton was one of our greatest Presidents. That was a bit much for me. I realized that he felt that he had to be loyal to the President, but I thought that went too far.

Gore certainly has been a very impressive Vice President. I don't think that any Vice President has been as intimately involved in policy matters. This has not just involved PR [Public Relations] but counseling the President, sitting in on key decisions, and undertaking important assignments abroad and at home. He has handled these matters quite competently. So I have no animus against Vice President Gore. He has certainly treated me decently. At a couple of meetings which I attended, Vice President Gore did seem to be following briefing cards and not knowing the issues very well. However, that was the exception, rather than the rule. Gore is a little stiff, as people say, but I thought that he was a decent man. Again, I'm basically positive toward Gore, but I can't live with his statement that President Clinton was one of our greatest Presidents.

I was originally a tremendous fan of Mrs. Clinton. I first got to know her, sitting next to her at dinner at the White House, when I had occasion to talk to her for most of a couple of hours. I also met her superficially at various meetings and social occasions. She was always very gracious, warm, and obviously intelligent. I became a super fan of hers when I accompanied her on a week-long trip to China and Mongolia. That this was in the fall of 1995. She went to a United Nations conference on women's rights in Beijing. We attended this conference for several days. It was primarily an international conference, not a U.S.-China meeting. She had no bilateral meetings with Chinese leaders. We were having trouble with the Chinese at that point, but that wasn't the question. She was there for the UN meeting as a representative of the U.S. Then we went on to Mongolia.

First of all, she confirmed what everyone knows. She is extremely bright and the smartest First Lady that I've ever met. However, beyond that, she took advice I gave her on a speech. I was there essentially as her adviser on China and Mongolia. I was the only person outside her immediate staff. They were very loyal to her and very friendly to me. I encouraged her to be tough with respect on human rights and women’s rights, including implied criticism of her hosts.

Some of the State Department people and other advisers were telling her: “Don't embarrass the President” by beating up on the Chinese record on women's rights or human rights. However, I said: “Absolutely not. You're here to speak at a UN women's
conference. You're addressing that issue and you can put it in universal terms and not just China. But you shouldn't shy away from it. That's not inconsistent with engagement with China; it is another dimension of it. You should express your own convictions and principles because of the nature of the conference and to show that we have a balanced policy toward China. We're just not going to roll over for them." So, if anything, I toughened up her speech. She probably expected me, as the Department of State adviser, to suggest that she not annoy our Chinese clients or to be nice to them. I may have gained her respect in that sense. In my consideration of the issue, I advised her in terms of what I thought was right for U.S. policy.

She took other advice and was modest in her approach. The speech was strong and good and went over very well. She got a tremendous reception on a day when it was pouring rain. I still remember the unbelievably bad conditions under which it was delivered. She spoke in a tent.

Mrs. Clinton was also very friendly, warm, and approachable. She didn't lose her dignity, and she was still the First Lady of the United States, but you felt that you could talk to her as a human being and a friend. She displayed a good sense of humor. So I just liked her on every level and I retain these positive views of her to this day.

However, because of the scandal involving President Clinton, I've lost some respect for her. She is too smart not to have known what was going on. Therefore, she was an enabler for the President. She said that this affair involved a "vast right wing conspiracy" and said that right after the Monica Lewinsky scandal broke. She had also protected the President during the campaign on the Jennifer Flowers issue. You can't judge other people's marriage, but, perhaps out of ambition, for a woman who is supposedly a spokesperson for women's rights to put up with this kind of performance by her husband to me is beyond the pale.

Q: Let's turn to your experience with the various Secretaries of State you knew. You've already talked quite a bit about George Shultz...

LORD: I've already talked about Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, and Warren Christopher, the three Secretaries of State I worked with the most. I've discussed Kissinger at great length, as well as Shultz and Christopher. I've already talked about Shultz and I'll just touch on him briefly.

I think that George Shultz was a truly excellent Secretary of State, one of our three best since World War II, though he is not Dean Acheson or Henry Kissinger in stature. By the way, Kissinger deserves to be ranked as one of our top Secretaries of State and National Security Advisers. I think that it's just a bit misleading to say that Kissinger was a great Secretary of State. You have to include his 5-6 years as National Security Adviser. He was a great Secretary of State, but he was also a great National Security Adviser. You have to put the two positions together because, otherwise, you lose some of his almost incredible achievements during the first four years of the Nixon Administration. I've covered his achievements at the Department of State as well as the NSC. At State in
addition to Middle East breakthroughs and independence for Rhodesia (becoming Zimbabwe) and his other specific accomplishments, perhaps Kissinger’s greatest contribution was his holding the country and our foreign policy together almost singlehandedly in the wake of the Watergate Affair. But you have to add the 1969-1973 achievements, what he did in terms of China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the Middle East, etc. before he became Secretary of State.

Shultz, of course, was brought in after Al Haig’s debacle and Haig's quarreling with Jim Baker and the White House staff generally, as well as Haig's general personality. Shultz brought in a steadiness of personality but, much more important than that, on most issues I happen to have agreed with Shultz. I think that he had just the right balance of toughness and a willingness to negotiate with the Soviets and with others. He was out in front on some issues like terrorism and the importance of technology to foreign policy and the world in general. He was way ahead of most people on issues like that. He had patience and toughness of the kind that Warren Christopher had, and I'll get back to Christopher later. Shultz had somewhat greater conceptual strength than Christopher did, though obviously much less than Kissinger.

Shultz didn't have the most effusive kind of personality. He didn't have a great sense of humor. He was very tough to figure out, not just for me, but for others as well. People used to call him "the Big Buddha." If you were briefing him for a meeting, he was a terrific listener, and you knew that he was taking in everything that you said. That's the good news. The bad news is that you had no idea how much he agreed. He would listen and absorb what you said and, perhaps, ask a few questions. However, you never got much feedback. You never knew how much he was taking aboard and how much he agreed with. You knew that you were being listened to, carefully. But Shultz handled himself extremely well in meetings, and you could tell that he took aboard your briefing. So it all came out all right, but you never got a sense of feedback, nor was he ever particularly generous in extending praise to his subordinates. That's the least important attribute, but, if you're a human being, you have to get some feedback.

A couple of times I got some feedback from George Shultz indirectly. For example, in connection with his lengthy trip to China in 1987, I think that I've mentioned what he said on the airplane on the way back to the U.S. He said that this was the single, best trip he had ever taken as Secretary of State, and maybe as a public official. Our Embassy and I had something to do with that. I know that George Shultz thought highly of me, but I could never have proved it by his exchanges, his memoirs, or anything else. He had a Buddha-like quality, but that's the least important characteristic about someone.

When you talk about President Reagan bringing an end to the Cold War, you have to include George Shultz in there as well. I don't think that Reagan could have done it by himself. Reagan was excellent, in the sense of being principled, firm, and steady. With the help of George Shultz and Mrs. Reagan he also saw the need to negotiate. However, essentially, he built up our assets. An additional factor which helped to bring down the Soviet empire was the basic rottenness of the Soviet system. In addition to that it was U.S. spending on defense, and particularly the Star Wars program, calling the Soviet
Union an Evil Empire, his insistence on human rights, as well as negotiating with the Soviets and meeting separately with dissidents in Moscow. In supporting all this, Shultz had the basic instincts to conduct a firm policy and exert some leverage on the Soviets. He continued to exert pressure on the Soviets over their invasion of Afghanistan. When I was in China, we did an awful lot of work against the Russians, with the help of the Chinese. Reagan was very good at putting pressure on the Soviets. Shultz could turn those assets and leverage into negotiated outcomes and use them effectively, in a diplomatic sense. So Reagan deserves credit for picking the right man as Secretary of State, that is, George Shultz, after making a mistake with Al Haig.

I think that you have to give Shultz a lot of the credit for steering President Reagan, in a hard-headed way, toward negotiations with the Soviets and using the leverage that he had built up. I give Shultz a lot of credit for that.

Shultz was clearly opposed to the Iran-Contra idea of trading arms for hostages. He skated close to flatly denying his involvement in that. He clearly was against it, but it seemed to me that it turned out that he knew that something was going on in this respect. However, he didn't dare try to find out just what it was, which is not the most heroic position to take. He certainly was a lot better, as were Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, than Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, Bud McFarland, and the rest of the group on the National Security Council staff. But he could have been more aggressive, and not just passively against the Iran-Contra maneuver. He could have poked around a lot more than he did. So Shultz sort of escaped criticism for that.

I recall that Shultz agonized over this issue. I could tell from the media and what I had heard that he debated whether he should stay on as Secretary of State after the Iran-Contra debacle. Not because he was involved in it, but just generally because of his unease over the whole matter. I wrote him a personal, back channel message, on November 22, encouraging him to stay on as Secretary of State. I told him how important he was, how steady he was, and that he had invested too much to leave his position. I'm not pretending that this message had much impact on what he decided to do. I just cite it. Obviously, others were telling him the same thing. I don't think that Shultz ever really came close to resigning as Secretary of State, but there were some rumors circulating to that effect. (End of tape)

In 1984, during President Reagan's trip to China, the American business community had a meeting with Secretary of State Shultz. Or maybe it was a separate trip which Secretary of State Shultz made by himself. Anyway, Shultz was in China on this occasion, and the businessmen began criticizing the United States over our maintaining controls on exports and not sharing technology with China. The American business community also complained about other aspects of how the U.S. dealt with China in the economic field. To his credit, Shultz controlled his anger but, in effect, said: "If you don't like the United States, leave it." He said in substance, support your government. I don't recall his exact words, but in effect he made a very tough reply to the American business community.

The American business community also attacked Secretary of State Christopher when he
went to China. They were more polite, but they still displayed an obnoxious attitude to him. They undercut our policy in China by lobbying us, together with the U.S. economic agencies, and by splitting the U.S. government and thus encouraging the Chinese to be inflexible on human rights, as I discussed earlier in this interview. They never pressed the Chinese. Zhu Rongji has just been in Washington as we speak in the spring of 1999. The American business community is regularly critical of the Administration and the President but fawns all over Zhu. So on the whole, and with some exceptions, the American business community has behaved outrageously on China trade issues, as it has on human rights issues generally. Thus I always respected Secretary Shultz for responding firmly to them on that issue. So I always gave him very high marks, although I couldn't always figure out what he wanted to do. I thought that he was a solid, steady presence. There were considerable achievements made during this period.

As we sit here in this magnificent Foreign Service Institute [FSI], my understanding is that Shultz was responsible for the rehabilitation of this building for use by the FSI at a time of budget constraints. He realized the need for training our diplomats. He put aside the necessary money for this work and held firmly on this issue. At the time it would have been very easy to say: "Well, we'll do that some other time. I have to worry about nuts and bolts now. That's for next year." He deserves credit for that as well.

In terms of style as Secretary he relied heavily on his Assistant Secretaries and the career service rather than a palace guard of close aides (as Baker did). In this respect he was probably the best in using professionals and was popular for that.

Any more questions on Shultz?

Q: No. I thought that you might express whatever thoughts you might have on Secretary of State Jim Baker, even though you did not serve under him.

LORD: Well, under Reagan he was Secretary of the Treasury after he was White House Chief of Staff. At the time I was serving as Ambassador to China. The only really direct experience I had with him was when he made a trip to China as Secretary of the Treasury. This must have been some time in 1987. I was very impressed with him. I had heard about his political shrewdness. I had admired his performance as White House Chief of Staff. I knew that he was skillful in getting people elected but also did a terrific job as Chief of Staff to President Reagan. It seemed to me that he was doing a good job as Secretary of the Treasury. I had a favorable impression of him before he came to China, and it was even stronger after he left. I thought that he dealt with the Chinese well. He didn't fawn over them. He was polite but businesslike, which you have to be with the Chinese. Too many people fawn over them, as business people often do, and they are seduced by their Chinese experience.

A minor issue came up during Secretary of the Treasury Baker's visit to China. I can't remember now what it was, but he skillfully negotiated a concrete solution to the problem while he was there. I think that it involved financial services of some kind. It may have been related to the dual taxation treaty, or something like that. It was not a matter of
cosmic importance, but I saw the skill with which Baker handled it. He was very personable. I liked him and was very impressed with him. I always thought that he was an able person. I think that he did a pretty good job on foreign policy during the Bush administration. Certainly, he performed well during the Gulf War and with respect to the German reunification issue.

But handling relations with China reflected the less laudable side of Secretary Baker. He made sure he stayed away from controversial issues. As a result, he was not obnoxious on China in terms of being soft, as General Brent Scowcroft and Bush had been. He just tried to stay out of current issues on China policy altogether. He just basically let other people deal with the Chinese because he knew that in domestic, political terms, after the Tiananmen Square massacre, China was not a popular issue. So he had a tendency to stay away from something that would hurt him politically. This was not exactly an admirable trait.

Also Baker really relied on a palace guard at State. They were very able. But the Foreign Service felt excluded and resented this.

Q: From my interviews I have the feeling that Baker, in effect, was somewhat interested in running for President. He kept that option open, which is always very dangerous for a Secretary of State. As was the case with Kissinger, a Secretary of State deals with things that most Americans don't want to have to deal with.

LORD: That is an issue that I would fault Baker on. The example of China is a good one. There were some others that were controversial that I now forget. He tried to keep a low profile on them. He would be happy to be engaged in the more popular ones. But in terms of dealing with the Russians and German reunification, the Gulf War, and some of the big ticket items, Baker was excellent. The team of Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Scowcroft, and President Bush made up a pretty harmonious group, whatever else you may think of them.

Baker was very skillful. At first, when he entered federal government service, he was one of three people working for President Reagan as co-chief of staff in effect. He shoved the other two aside skillfully. I forget their names now, but Baker became first among equals. Later, he became Secretary of the Treasury for Reagan and then Secretary of State for Bush.

One footnote here. Baker didn't treat George Shultz, his predecessor as Secretary of State, very well. They were both moderate Republicans, working for Republican administrations and they had been cabinet colleagues. I know that Shultz, who was pretty tight-lipped, was pretty annoyed that Baker wasn't particularly graceful during his transition into office as Secretary of State. As I recall, he consulted Shultz only once, and never called him very much afterwards, so Shultz was somewhat annoyed that his successor as Secretary of State wasn't more gracious.

You're right. Baker was someone who was always calculating his political image and would stay away from controversial issues. Maybe he was too clever by half, certainly
more of a negotiator and tactician than he was a conceptualizer, like Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski. On the whole, I think that Baker did a pretty good job as Secretary of State.

I naively thought that I had a pretty good reputation with him, too. I obviously can't judge people. Baker didn't invite me to be in the Department of State with him, which sort of surprised me, to be honest. However, I have no particular animus against Baker.

I think that the fact that he stayed away from some controversial issues suggests that after President Bush’s term was over, they were not the closest of friends. In contrast, Scowcroft at first wasn't particularly close to President Bush - certainly not as close as Baker - but he became much closer to him and collaborated with him on the book published by Bush. I think that Bush feels that Baker distanced himself from some of these controversial issues.

Q: Baker kept his distance from Bush, although they were both from the same city.

LORD: It sounds that way now. They used to be very close friends, and Baker’s low profile on some tough issues may be the explanation for this new distance.

Q: Then we come to Secretary of State Christopher. I would also like you to talk a bit about former Vice President and then Ambassador to Japan, Fritz Mondale.

LORD: All right. Let me comment on Mondale briefly. I have covered him elsewhere, too. I had known Mondale superficially off and on over the years. He was involved with the Council on Foreign Relations when I was there. I had also met him in some other capacities. My mother was from Minneapolis, so there was always a Minnesota connection to a certain extent, but I didn't know Mondale well. As I say, I knew him superficially as Vice President. I got to know him best when he was Ambassador to Japan, during the Clinton first term as President. I got to like him and, to this day, I'm full of admiration for him. Mondale was always more liberal on domestic politics than I was, as a centrist, but that's not a sin. I always respected him. He is an extremely decent man. He was a perfect example of why a political appointee as Ambassador can be so good. Every Foreign Service officer that I know welcomes good political appointees of good quality, if they deserve it and if they bring new blood into diplomacy. All of this is positive, as long as you don't have too many political appointees, taking all of the best posts.

Mondale's appointment as Ambassador to Japan was important to show Japan that we had someone of elevated stature for assignment to that post. It was a wise appointment and paid the Japanese tribute. However, more important, Mondale's political instincts turned out to be terrific. I remember when I was briefing him before he went to Tokyo in 1993. I recall his saying that what he intended to do was to be very respectful of the Japanese in public but to be as tough as he had to be in private, particularly on economic and trade issues. Ambassador Armacost had been tough with the Japanese as well. In fact, some of his toughness in private crept into the public dimension, and he was knocked around a
little bit by the Japanese because of it. I think that was a bum rap. Armacost was a very close friend and was my deputy at one time. He was terrific and did an excellent job in Tokyo as Ambassador, particularly in the wake of former Senator Mike Mansfield. I yield to no one in my respect and affection for the Senator, but Ambassador Mansfield increasingly suffered from clientitis and was much too soft on the Japanese on economic issues. Ambassador Mansfield was disdained by the American business community. I don't always side with the American business community but I think that they had a point that Mansfield wasn't always tough enough with the Japanese. So Armacost had to correct that impression when he replaced Mansfield.

I think that Ambassador Mondale combined the best of all worlds. He was very respectful and cordial with the Japanese in public, without fawning over the Japanese. However, he could be very tough with them in private, including on economic issues, even as he worked with us and others, including Secretary of Defense Perry, myself, and Joe Nye to insulate our security relationship with the Japanese from our economic frictions. Mondale proved his worth, not only in terms of his style with the Japanese, but in terms of his political instincts also.

There was one incident during his tenure as Ambassador to Japan. I don't have this exactly right, but a Japanese student in this country was shot to death.

*Q: This was during the Halloween period in Louisiana, or some place like that. It was awful.*

* LORD: That's right. Ambassador Mondale didn't ask for instructions or even get on the phone and ask whether he could do this or that. Using his political instincts, he immediately went on Japanese television and apologized on behalf of the United States. Not in a guilt-ridden way that would be excessive, but in an appropriate way. He defused the domestic Japanese backlash immediately by his instinct to get out there quickly in the same news cycle as the report on the murder. This showed that his political instincts were very good.

Another example was when there was the terrible incident of the rapes in Okinawa. He was magnificent in dealing with the Japanese public on that, as well as privately with Japanese officials.

So I was very high on Mondale's firmness, his hard work, his balanced view that we had to do something about economic issues, as otherwise they might intrude on security matters; the security relationship is in our own interest, and we have to keep it insulated from economic issues. This takes hard work on the security side. Together with Defense Secretary Perry, Mondale deserves a lot of credit. I think Mondale was an excellent Ambassador and a very decent man. I have great admiration for him.

Let's discuss some of the other people in the Clinton administration, starting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher. I have great respect for Christopher, who is a very decent person. Everyone knows his public service. He served twice in the Department of
State as Deputy Secretary and then as Secretary. He also had responsible positions in California and was Deputy Attorney General of the United States. He dealt with riots during the Vietnam War and police problems in Los Angeles. He's really had a distinguished career. Whether it was dealing with the problem of hostages from the American Embassy in Teheran or police problems in Los Angeles, he's had some genuine accomplishments. I consider Christopher a friend, and he's always been very decent to me.

I believe in being loyal and I will be loyal to Christopher. Having said that, I think that he was too old for the job of Secretary of State. He came into the position at age 70 or 71. Some people are very vigorous at that age, and he is in great shape, physically. He jogs all the time, he's thin as a rail, and he's tough. However, I got tired in my late '50s as Assistant Secretary of State. I don't think that you can be in your 70s and be President or Secretary, although Reagan managed to pull it off. Toward the end with Reagan, it was a close call. There were times when I just felt that Christopher's stamina was amazing for someone of his age and in view of the pressures he was under. But that's the point. A Secretary of State shouldn't have to have amazing stamina. I really don't think that people in their 70s should be President or Secretary of State, no matter how vigorous they are. I just don't think that they can handle the job, as a rule. So I think that he paid a certain price for his age, even though, God knows, he was amazing in his resilience, in recovering from jet lag, and in being tough. There were times when you could tell that he was tired and not at the top of his game. I don't blame him for that. He was a great public servant. At his age he could have rested on his laurels but he was willing to serve his government. But I think that the factor of his age intruded on his effectiveness. Like Shultz, Christopher was very difficult to figure out. He was very much like Shultz in briefings. He would listen, but you had no idea how much he was taking aboard. Having said that, I felt that, like Shultz and perhaps even more so, it was worthwhile to brief him because he was following a lot of your ideas. He would stick very closely to the talking points he was given. He knew his material and worked very hard at it. However, I had the feeling at times that he had a schedule which he had to get through, no matter what, and he didn't have a great deal of spontaneity or time for important detours or follow-up. I wonder whether he could decide whether or not to be discursive or to follow up on something. What you hear about Christopher is true. He was patient, decent, dogged. He had a willingness to take the long view and to hang in there. He was a good negotiator, tactful, and decent. He had all of these qualities. Of course, he had great stamina for his age, but I've already addressed that.

On Asian matters, I have to say that we didn't do badly when he was Secretary of State. We always had to fight the problem of Eurocentrism. My whole strategy for my confirmation statement and later on was to make Asia as important as Europe in our foreign policy. Looking ahead, I thought that this was as it should be, and in fact it actually was. I had good cooperation from Secretary Christopher on that point. Certainly, Clinton too cooperated on the calendar of the first year of the Clinton presidency, when he started off by going to Japan and Korea, then raising the APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] talks to the summit level. Christopher supported that. He made several of his own trips to Asia to visit specific countries and/or to attend economic
(APEC and security (ARF) conferences. If I really needed to get his attention on an Asian problem back in Washington, I could do it. I always had direct access to Secretary Christopher and never had any problem with that.

Having said that, I would have to add that problems with Bosnia or the Middle East could distract his attention. That's understandable to a certain extent, but it could be frustrating. There are times when you can only do so much at the Assistant Secretary of State level. I would like to think that I did quite a bit and I surely had access to other leaders, even though the protocol divide was quite extensive. However, at times you have to involve the President or the Secretary of State, and both the President and Christopher at times were distracted by some of these non-Asian matters. We managed to get across to the Asians, and fairly successfully. I think, that we thought that Asia was more important because of the APEC Summit Meetings, because of the regional security dialogues we started, and because of the President's trips to Japan and Korea, his engagement with China and the normalization of relations with Vietnam, etc. For these reasons we managed to elevate the status of Asia within the U.S. Government.

There were times when the situation was frustrating. On one occasion, as I have related elsewhere, Christopher had to turn around from a regional security meeting somewhere in Southeast Asia, cancel a trip to Australia, and return to the U.S. I recall an anecdote in that connection. The Foreign Minister of Australia, Gareth Evans, was the most impressive foreign minister in the region. He could also be very tart and tough. I had a great relationship with him. He had a great sense of humor and is a brilliant and creative man. However, he was understandably outraged that Secretary Christopher, on this occasion, was canceling his visit to Australia. The meetings were scheduled to last for two days. We were going to go to northern Australia and meet there so that we wouldn't have to go all the way down to Canberra. I was on the phone with Evans, trying to negotiate what the communique would say about why Secretary Christopher had to go back to Washington.

Evans was screaming in my ear, in effect saying: "You've got to get Christopher to say in the statement that he will visit Australia in the next six months," or something like that. He must be committed to go to Australia. I ran down the hall to Christopher's office and finally got him to agree to go to Australia. In fact, Evans beat up on me by characteristically using an Australian expression: "You've given me a shit sandwich to deal with my own public opinion and my leaders back home."

I mention all that because a couple of months later I was calling on Evans in New York at the time of the UN General Assembly meeting. It was a one on one meeting, although we also had some advisers present with us. I had access to these foreign ministers. Evans greeted me. There was a little plate of finger sandwiches on the table. So I sat down at the table and moved the sandwiches around, looking at each one of them. Evans noticed this and said: "What the hell are you doing, Lord?" I said: "I'm looking for the shit sandwich!"

In any event, there were some distractions, but on the whole Secretary Christopher helped us on Asia. I say this against his background of great decency and humanity. I like Christopher. However, he is stiff and is basically shy. To me some of the most impressive
foreign ministers he dealt with were the ones he liked least, because they were full of
themselves and, like Evans, were very blunt and egotistical. However, I thought that
Evans was so creative and so friendly to the U.S. on the whole that he was one of the
ministers that I liked. Secretary Christopher did not have good chemistry with some of
these ministers.

One issue that Secretary Christopher was very helpful on was Vietnam. I've mentioned
elsewhere how we had to fight the White House, because of the skittishness of President
Clinton and National Security Adviser Tony Lake on this issue in moving ahead on
normalization of diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. I went to
Christopher and got his support to back up our reports of Vietnamese cooperation on
MIAs [Missing in Action] and the interest we had in moving ahead on normalization. He
would argue with President Clinton and Tony Lake that we should continue to move
ahead. Secretary Christopher was always a very solid factor and deserves a lot of the
credit, and I think that I also do, frankly, for our normalization of relations with Vietnam.
Secretary Christopher clearly didn't have as much conceptual strength as Secretary
Kissinger did. However, who the hell does? Christopher approached negotiations on
foreign policy more like a lawyer on discrete issues which you try to solve pragmatically,
one at a time, without enunciating great, strategic concepts. You could argue that, in
the wake of the Cold War, that was appropriate. However, Christopher didn't have the
developed sense of grand strategy that Kissinger had.

I think that Christopher came out looking fairly good as a Secretary of State. He won't be
ranked with the great Secretaries. Part of that is due to the opportunities which some of
them had, such as Secretary Acheson did. Part of it is how good the Secretary is. If his
record had been written after his first two years as Secretary of State, Christopher would
have looked worse than he does as a whole. That is true of President Clinton's first two
years as well.

One of Christopher's big mistakes, as he freely admits, is that he went to Europe to
discuss policy toward Bosnia and backed off from being tough with the Yugoslavs,
because of European skittishness, as opposed to showing leadership. There were
problems in Somalia, and some of them were due to President Clinton. There were initial
problems in Haiti, although that ended up coming out pretty well. There was a tough trip
we made to China in March, 1994, which we have talked about. Certainly, President
Clinton didn't back up Christopher on China policy. So the first couple of years of the
first Clinton administration were pretty tough for Christopher. He had a pretty bad press.

The press is never as kind when things go well as it is vicious when things don't go well.
I think that by the time Christopher left office, the press gave him a much better
scorecard than he would have gotten for his first two years in office as Secretary of State,
but I think that he deserves better than that. His patience and plodding paid off with some
progress in the Middle East. We finally got the Dayton Accord on Yugoslavia. Of course,
Assistant Secretary Dick Holbrooke had a lot to do with that. One could question now
whether we should have dealt with Milosevic. However, the Dayton Accord stopped the
killing in Bosnia for three years, if nothing else. Holbrooke himself said that Christopher
was very helpful on that front. I've indicated that Christopher was helpful on Vietnam and policies toward some other Asian countries which we have discussed. I'm not trying to recall everything that Christopher did. I know that he worked very hard with the Chinese, despite the problems, to get us out of the hole that we were in following the Taiwan missile crises. In 1996 he met several more times with Qian Qichen, his counterpart. Even as Tony Lake was getting more involved, you have to give Christopher a lot of the credit, after some rough times with the Chinese, for helping to restore that relationship. He held strategy meetings on how we could get through this difficult period in the spring of 1996, and he helped to implement this strategy. He stayed in touch by correspondence and by meetings with Qian. He ended up with a successful trip to China in November, 1996, where we fixed the summit meetings with the Chinese, which was announced a few days later in Manila at the APEC summit meeting.

Christopher also worked hard with the Japanese Foreign Ministers, who kept changing to try to make sure that our economic frictions did not spread to the overall relationship, including security ties and a common agenda on global issues and so on. So Christopher worked quite hard on the Japan front. He also was very involved and supportive of our policy on Korea.

I think that, by the time he was through as Secretary of State, the Clinton foreign policy looked better, and Christopher also looked better. I think that he will go down, and rightly, as a solid and competent Secretary of State, though not a great Secretary.

Q: Coming from the White House, where you had served previously, did you get the impression this was one of those things that happens from time to time? When things weren't going too well, such as the situation in Somalia, and it looked as if Haiti was going badly, there were those on the domestic side of the White House staff who sort of bad mouthing Christopher.

LORD: I wouldn't say that this was systematic. The back biting and bad mouthing was not as bad as I've seen in other administrations. Although I was never that close to Secretary Christopher, it was clear that there were some tensions developing with National Security Adviser Tony Lake. This was the situation, even though both Christopher and Lake had sworn to avoid a repetition of the Brzezinski-Vance era, where there were significant tensions between the White House and the State Department, and the Kissinger-Rogers era, when there were similar problems. Lake was getting somewhat secretive. Occasionally, it looked as if Lake was trying to cut Christopher out, to a certain extent. Christopher always had a good relationship with Defense Secretary Perry, so his problem was manageable.

To be honest about it, I don't recall too many reports coming out of the White House knocking Christopher. But during the March, 1994, trip to China, as I have said, there was a noticeable lack of support for Christopher. I'm sure that there was some effort by the spinmeisters [White House staff members who sought to put their own spin on events] to make sure that, if President Clinton was having trouble on foreign policy - e.g.,
on China in March 1994 - this could be attributed to Secretary Christopher and away from the President. I don't think that it was any accident. Christopher took a lot of the heat for some of the Clinton administration's early stumbles on foreign policy, when it was really a distracted President Clinton who had something to do with this as well. But many White House staffs do this to Cabinet members.

One last anecdote of a personal nature with Christopher. It shows a little bit how he was tough to figure out. His first Deputy Secretary of State was Cliff Wharton. He was a very decent and able man in many ways but not a good fit to be Deputy Secretary of State. He just wasn't working out in the job. It was clear by the end of the first year that this wasn't working out and that Wharton really wasn't helping Christopher very much as Deputy Secretary of State. Christopher had actually wanted somebody else as Deputy Secretary. I can't remember whether it was Thomas Pickering or who it was. However, the White House, to make the cabinet have more of the ethnic variety of the United States as a whole, wanted to have an African-American as Deputy Secretary of State. Wharton had a distinguished career and is a great guy but he just wasn't fit for that job. So Christopher was looking for a new Deputy Secretary of State.

In any event, to make a long story short, and this happened in the November-December, 1993, period, the list of alternative Deputy Secretaries kept narrowing. I had heard, although indirectly, as no one actually told me in so many words, that I was on the list of possible appointees to be Deputy Secretary of State. Then on a weekend, which must have been early in December, 1993, Peter Tarnoff, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, asked me into his office. I don't recall if this was for some other reason, but he asked me to come up. Peter Tarnoff is very close to Christopher. He told me: "I want you to know that Christopher has now narrowed down the choices for Deputy Secretary of State to yourself and Strobe Talbott. He'll probably make up his mind this weekend between the two of you." This was interesting news. I had heard that I was one of the candidates, but this was more specific information and was clearly a concrete indication of where we stood. Tarnoff wasn't laying odds on either Talbott or me.

I don't recall the sequence, but I got a phone call, and I think that it was after this conversation with Tarnoff, but certainly before that weekend, from Elaine Scolino of the New York Times. She said that she was writing a front page story that Winston Lord had been chosen to be Deputy Secretary of State. I said: "If that's true, you know something that I don't know. You'd better check that out before you finish this story. It doesn't sound right to me. No one has told me that." She checked the story out and found out further and learned that it wasn't true. I think that at that point the choice had not been made. Anyway, I received this phone call reportedly anointing me as Deputy Secretary of State.

I got home that weekend after the conversation with Peter Tarnoff, figuring that Christopher was going to make up his mind on this appointment. People may not believe this, but I was relaxed about this choice, either way. Of course, I wanted the honor and challenge of being Deputy Secretary of State, but I really liked doing what I did. In some ways, as the Assistant Secretary of State in a regional bureau, you can do a lot more than doing a lot of grubby work as Deputy Secretary. So in terms of protocol, ego, and in
historical and resume terms, it would have been great if I had been appointed Deputy Secretary. However, also, due to the pressures that would be on me as Deputy Secretary, as well as other considerations, I wasn't panting to be Deputy Secretary. I felt that I would be happy either way. So I wasn't on pins and needles in that sense. But human nature being what it is, when you are one of two finalists for a sub-cabinet job like that, this made for an interesting weekend.

To get back to the point about Christopher's rather puzzling personality, I am sure that Christopher knew, through Peter Tarnoff, that I knew that he was trying to choose between me and Talbott. He also knew that I knew that he was about to make a decision, probably during that weekend. So I was sitting at home, in December, 1993. It was a Sunday evening at about 6:00 PM. The phone rang, and it was the Operations Center at the State Department. They told me that Secretary Christopher would like to speak to me. I made a mental note for my memoirs that I had been offered the job of Deputy Secretary of State at 6:00 PM that day. This must be the purpose of his call, because he almost never bothered his colleagues on weekends unless there were a crisis.

Anyway, Christopher got on the phone, and he asked me about some news report on something that had happened in China. I think that it had to do with a dissident or something like that. It was a little strange, and a funny way to start, given who we were, the context, and so forth. I told him what I knew of the report, and I recommended how I thought we should handle it and what our reaction should be to any questions from the press. Then he said: "Thank you very much," and hung up the phone.

I was flabbergasted, primarily because Christopher never called on the weekend. He is such a decent guy that Christopher would only call you on the weekend if there was a crisis. In this sense he is unlike Kissinger, who seems to go out of his way to call you on the weekend if he possibly can. Before this episode, Christopher had almost never called me during a weekend. I found it amazing that he called me at home, when he knew that I knew that I was down to the wire on this choice of possibly being appointed Deputy Secretary of State. The report about an incident in China was not urgent. It could easily have waited until the next morning. There was no reason for him to call me on a Sunday evening. Nevertheless, he called me on a relatively inconsequential matter and then hung up. I like Christopher, but it was almost cruel and unusual punishment in a way. He didn't know that I was relaxed about this issue. He must have figured that I would like to have the job and was very anxious and knew that he was down to two candidates for the position.

Actually, he didn't make his choice that weekend. It was a week or two later. In fact, it was actually during the Christmas holidays that he made his choice. It must have been in late December, because I was skiing with my son. I'm strange enough that I almost didn't want to get the job because it would interrupt my skiing vacation. When I was skiing with my son in Vail, Colorado, I received a call from Christopher, who said: "I want you to know, before it's announced, that I've chosen Strobe Talbott as my Deputy. I think very highly of you." He never said that I was the other candidate in the running and had almost been appointed to the job. He knew that I knew this. So that was a very gracious gesture.
on his part. I said that he had made a very good choice. I wasn't just being polite. I called Strobe Talbott and congratulated him.

Clearly, I had a much more impressive resume than Strobe Talbott had, in the sense of strict foreign policy experience and given everything that I had done, both in and outside of government service. Strobe Talbott had never served in the government, except during the Clinton administration, and then only for a year. However, it's a tribute to him that he had done so well in such a brief period of time in government in managing the relationship with the Soviet Union generally. At that point he was sort of a Special Assistant to Secretary Christopher for Soviet affairs. He had so impressed Christopher by the way he had handled that. Plus, let's face it, and I think it's a very valid reason, he had a very close relationship with President Clinton.

So Secretary Christopher decided to choose him as Deputy Secretary of State. Plus, I honestly thought that Christopher considered that I was doing a very good job handling Asian affairs and therefore, he wanted me to continue to handle those matters. I think that Christopher made the right choice in Strobe Talbott. I'm not being falsely modest. I had great respect for Talbott. What I respected above all was his ability to be loyal to Christopher and loyal to President Clinton at the same time. He never used his access to the President in any way to exercise leverage on Secretary Christopher. Just the opposite. He was always in Christopher's corner. He was loyal to President Clinton, but he was above all Christopher's deputy. If he could be helpful with the President at Christopher's behest, go over and talk to him, so much the better.

Talbott was absolutely meticulous and one of the most decent, public servants that I ever met. Also, he was one of the most articulate, and it was a joy to travel with him. He really took briefings seriously and conceptually. He would join in kicking around ideas, make suggestions, be articulate, and use his talking points but vary from them as necessary. He would invite me or others in the group to join in his meetings and make our own points and not just let him dominate it. Then, afterwards, he would have an immediate post mortem to decide what went right, what went wrong, what could have been done better, where we should go from there, and what the outcome would be. It was a joy to write a trip report for him because he was so articulate himself. You could write something really colorful. Secretary Christopher would always take out the best lines, whereas Strobe Talbott would revel in them.

I have great respect for Strobe Talbott. I mention this incident which is interesting in and of itself, and also because it shows that Christopher was a very decent guy but very hard to figure out. I have kept up good relations with Christopher since then. I've helped him on his book on the Asian part of his service as Secretary of State, his memoirs which have already been published. I continue to have great respect for him.

I have less to say about some of the others, but a couple of them...

Q: I was thinking of Tony Lake and Sandy Berger [National Security Advisers to President Clinton during his first and second terms]. Maybe you could comment on
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BILL PERRY first.

LORD: I think that Bill Perry was certainly one of the most impressive people in the first term of the Clinton administration. I think that Mickey Kantor [U.S. Trade Representative and then Secretary of Commerce] was also impressive. He had a down side in terms of hurting us in some of our relationships, but he got an awful lot done in international trade negotiations. In connection with the APEC [Asia Pacific Economic Conference] summit meeting he was helpful, as well as with the Uruguay Round of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement], in addition to some bilateral talks. His deputy, Charlene Barshevsky, was also Kantor's successor as U.S. Trade Representative. She was equally impressive. Obviously, Bob Rubin and Larry Summers [Secretary of the Treasury and Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and eventually Secretary of the Treasury] were impressive on the economic side, given our economic performance and the respect they commanded. However, Bill Perry was up there as one of the most impressive and most decent people in the Clinton administration. He was an excellent Secretary of Defense and a man of great integrity.

Traveling with Perry, as I did on his trip to China, I found, as was the case with Strobe Talbott, that he was a joy to work with. He would sit around informally and prepare for a meeting carefully, discuss objectively strategy as well as tactics and how we should approach the issues involved. He would invite me to speak with his interlocutors while I was sitting there with him. I was with him during his meetings with the Japanese and the South Koreans, as well as with the Chinese. He would handle himself extremely well and do the post mortems afterwards. He and Strobe Talbott were the best people to travel with because they were terrific in this respect. You didn't get that feedback or intellectual exchange from Secretary Christopher, who was more "Buddha-like," or from Secretary George Shultz.

In my view, Perry was right on the issues. He was tough-minded and firm, as a Secretary of Defense should be expected to be. He was also flexible. He saw the value of the Agreed Framework with the North Koreans, even though it wasn't a perfect agreement. He saw the extremes of either acquiescence with the North Korean nuclear program or perhaps going to war. These were less good alternatives than the one he came up with. Secretary of Defense Perry was also helpful on China, helping us develop a military relationship. He not only went to China himself, and I accompanied him, he had his top deputies go with him to develop the exchanges with the Chinese military, generally recognizing the strategic importance of China. However, he could be firm with the Chinese as well. He was a major force, though the decision reflected a unanimous collective opinion, in moving the U.S. Navy aircraft carriers near the Taiwan Straits during the March, 1996, missile crisis affecting Taiwan and China. He felt that this would get the attention of the Chinese leadership, so he proved that he could be very tough, too.

Above all, I think that his greatest accomplishment, at least in the area I was involved in, was Japan. We had a lot of points of friction with Japan on economic issues. He wanted to insulate those problems from our security relationship. I worked hard with Joe Nye,
with Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, and with others to do that. There was no question that the Pentagon took the lead on this issue, as it should have done. They handled this matter very well. Perry also handled very well the aftermath of the Okinawa rape incident. He displayed his sensitivity, going ahead with reviewing our defense relationship and guidelines with the Japanese. He helped in his own trip in March 1996 to set up a very successful trip to Japan by President Clinton in April, 1996, during which we reaffirmed our strategic partnership, if that's the word we used, and I think that it was. We did so along broader lines, as well as managing the Okinawa rape crisis and relocating and consolidating our defense facilities in Okinawa to defuse that tension politically and maintain our force presence in Japan. He performed magnificently on all of these fronts. Now, of course, he is heading a review of the role of our Korea policy, and he has the kind of credibility with Congress and domestic public opinion to do that in a very effective way.

Tony Lake was one of the most puzzling people in the Clinton administration. I had known Tony, of course, first when he was on the staff of Henry Kissinger as National Security Adviser. He had resigned, ostensibly over the Cambodian incursion in 1970, but he was already intending to leave anyway from that position, as I mentioned earlier. I certainly respect his principled objection to the Cambodian incursion. I objected to the Cambodian incursion, too, although I didn't resign, for reasons I've stated. I found Tony a little aloof during the first three years of the first Clinton term. He didn't get much involved in Asia policy. Lake's deputy, Sandy Berger, handled that. Lake seemed much more interested in Bosnia, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. He didn't pay much attention to Asia. As I said, he seemed at times to be playing games with Secretary of State Christopher. He was very secretive. He clearly defined his job as staying close to President Clinton and advising him, traveling with him, making sure that he was briefed, and otherwise taking care of the President. Meanwhile, he had Sandy Berger run the NSC [National Security Council] system on a day to day basis. You can argue that that's the way to do it, in the sense that Brent Scowcroft and Bob Gates [former National Security Adviser and his deputy] did, or Colin Powell did, for a time. That's one way to do it. However, Sandy Berger was overloaded with responsibilities and had too much to do. I think that Lake worked very hard, but he didn't seem that much engaged in Asia. He certainly was cautious on the normalization of diplomatic relationships with Vietnam. He had his own hangups from his Vietnam experience, whether or not he was protecting the President or reflecting his own views or feared a backlash in this country or protecting the President's domestic right flank. I just never figured out what he was up to, especially he generally was “liberal,” but he was very unhelpful, on the whole, on Vietnam, except that he kept up a good relationship with some of the families of MIA [Missing in Action] and military personnel. Not only I, but everyone else I have spoken to regarding Lake, found him a puzzling and secretive person to deal with. We couldn't quite understand where he was coming from on some issues and procedures.

Having said that, I would have to say that Lake was very helpful on Asia policy during the last year of the first Clinton term. Specifically on China, Lake became more involved. This was something that Secretary Christopher didn't mind, although he tried for a long
time to prevent a trip to China by Lake. Christopher probably didn't want a repeat of Brzezinski's [National Security Adviser during the Carter administration] taking over China policy from Vance. But in 1996 they acted as a tag team, exchanging roles with one another. In 1996, Christopher worked very hard on China policy, and so did Lake.

I joined Lake in strategic discussions with the Chinese in the spring of 1996 at Middleburg, Virginia, at the Harriman estate. He handled himself very well, and we worked closely together. In July, 1996, I went with him to China, where we had important, strategic exchanges and really began to get into substantive discussions with the Chinese, which we should have done a long time previously, on some of the big issues around the world. We were also tough with the Chinese where we had to be. Essentially, we broke the ground for a summit meeting, which Secretary Christopher cemented in November, 1996, during his trip to China.

Lake was also helpful on Korea. He met with the Koreans and helped to come up with the four party peace proposal, which President Clinton and President Kim Dae Jung announced. I forget the year, but I think that it was during the summer of 1996.

So, when he finally got himself involved on Asia policy, Lake was very good and very helpful. However, he took a while to do that, and he had these personality quirks which none of us ever figured out.

Sandy Berger, who was Lake's deputy as National Security Adviser, was one of the hardest working people I have ever met. I think that he was overloaded with responsibility. He was a very decent man, open to all opinions. He felt, as any Deputy NSC Adviser should do, all agency views must get fair consideration. He ran meetings well and with impeccable fairness to all points of view. With my encouragement, after the change in our MFN [Most Favored Nation] policy toward China, we began to have Berger chair meetings on China, as opposed to me.

We worked very closely together. I would go to all of these meetings, but unlike what Jim Mann suggests in his book, this was not a case of the White House taking something away from the State Department after a failed policy. Rather it was recognition of the fact that we had to have more White House attention devoted to China. We had to balance off competing government interests and get discipline among the economic agencies which undercut us in terms of MFN policy and generally have a more integrated China policy. We wanted to have everyone singing from the same sheet of music, and this is not something I could do out of the State Department. Moreover, more NSC leadership meant more Presidential and White House attention. We had to go to the White House and at Berger's level. We were much more successful once we did that, with my full encouragement. I was fully involved in every meeting. I went on every trip, including trips with Tony Lake. So I had no complaints, and this is a typical case of distortion by Jim Mann. This allowed the strategy for 1996, which had come from Secretary Christopher, to be implemented at White House meetings. I think that Sandy Berger was very fair and very good. I had great admiration for him. I thought that he was overwhelmed at times. I think that we can stop here, unless you have some questions.
Q: This may be somewhat out of sequence, and we could put it at the end. Here you were, dealing with Asian affairs and particularly Chinese matters. Your wife was born in China. I imagine that your nerve endings would be particularly sensitive to this, but did you find that in the political outlook of many Republicans, and we're talking about 1999, you encountered an almost anti-Chinese, racist bias, as there has been, for example, against the Blacks or Jews or other minority groups?

LORD: The quick answer to your question is "No." I don't think that there is a racial dimension, certainly in the Republican or Democratic Party as a whole. There may be something of a more general, racist dimension in the American body politic as a whole.

Let me just address this matter briefly. As we speak, there may be a tendency in certain quarters, although I don't know how much evidence there is of this tendency as yet, that, because of indications of official Chinese fund raising and espionage in the U.S. by Asian looking people, there may be some feeling of suspicion toward them. Unfortunately, most Americans can't tell a Chinese from a Japanese or a Korean. I don't think that such a view is very widespread, and I don't even have any proof that it exists. There may be some Chinese-Americans who have a different view of this. They may feel that some Americans have inherent suspicions of Asians, just as some police officers may have inherent suspicions of Blacks or Puerto Ricans they meet on the streets. I don't believe that this has become a major factor as yet among the American public in general. It certainly is not true of Republicans (or Democrats) as a whole.

First of all, the reaction to indications of official Chinese fund raising and spying isn't just a Republican matter. A lot of it is, for obvious reasons, but there has also been fund raising on behalf of the Democratic Party. It is also true that some recent cases of spying have taken place during Democratic Party administrations. There are a lot of Democrats who are concerned about some Chinese activities. That includes the Cox Committee Report, which is due to be issued soon and parts of which have already leaked out. This report expresses virtually unanimous views on Chinese spying, from both Democrats as well as Republicans. Certainly, the Republican Party is not unified on China or on this particular aspect of China.

The views of China as we speak, in the spring of 1999, are not a matter of controversy between Republicans and Democrats. The debates on China are held within the two parties. On the Democratic side, you have great concerns about China in the views of Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi [Democrat, California], union leaders, and some liberal Democrats, primarily because of human rights issues, but also on nuclear non-proliferation and maybe trade deficit issues, and jobs in the case of trade unions. They want a tough posture toward the Chinese. On the other hand there is the Clinton administration and many Democrats who favor engagement with China.

Similarly, as far as the Republican Party is concerned, there is a debate within the party with respect to policy and attitudes toward China. One of the Republican groups involved in this debate is led by people like Kissinger, Ford, and Scowcroft. These are people who, in the past, have worked for engagement with China and still believe, for geopolitical or
other reasons, that we should move more closely to China. Plus businessmen who, on the whole, are Republicans and very much in support of engagement with China. On the other hand there are conservative Republican figures, such as Pat Buchanan or people concerned about the pro-life issue, such as Gary Bauer, or religious people worried about religious discrimination in China, or human rights advocates in general. These people are also worried about our trade deficit with China or about nuclear non-proliferation. And these people, including some in think tanks, see China as a looming military threat. Some consider that China will inevitably be an enemy, and that we should contain that growing power.

So, getting back to your question, I don't think that it's a matter of the Republican Party being racist on China. In the first place, the people most critical of China are within both parties in this debate. And those friendlier to China are within both parties, too. Also, I don't think that those who are against China do so for racist reasons. Sometimes, it's hard to figure out what is implicit racism, but I really think that those who are anti-Chinese, including those in the Republican Party, hold these views for reasons that are understandable and have nothing to do with race. I think that they honestly believe that the Chinese have behaved in a reprehensible way on human rights, on Tibet, and on religious persecution. These people believe that the Chinese have a huge surplus in their trade with the U.S. because they keep their domestic market closed to us. They also believe that the Chinese have been exporting technology, nuclear weapons, and missiles to sensitive areas and rogue regimes, that they are trying to bully Taiwan, and that they are getting arrogant. And many believe that China is becoming a military threat.

On top of that, the Chinese have been spying against the United States. Some aren't particularly shocked at this, because everyone, including Israel, engages in this kind of activity. But these people consider that this kind of activity is additional evidence of unfriendliness toward the United States. Others feel that the Chinese have tried to influence our political campaigns, although definitive proof is not yet available. Some of these people emphasize some issues more than others. Some of them look at the situation across the board. Plus, there is the matter of China's growing power, and some people believe that China is going to challenge us in the future, not only in Asia but around the world as well. They genuinely want to see a tougher policy pursued toward China, and it's not because the Chinese happen to have yellow skins.

Now there is no question that some of these people get upset at some things the Chinese do but don't get upset if other people do the same thing. I mean, bad as the Chinese are in the field of human rights, Saudi Arabia, for example, does not exactly have a good record in terms of human rights. Just take the treatment of women. There are other bad regimes which we beat up on, like Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or Serbia under Milosevic. We tend to pick on smaller nations. We beat up on other countries in the field of human rights. Obviously, Israel has advantages because it has tremendous, political clout in this country with Congress and public opinion. People have to worry about the Jewish vote, and so on, much more than they have to worry about the Chinese vote. Israel is also a democracy, and it has some genuine, security concerns. So Israel gets a much easier ride than China, which is not a democracy. On the other hand, some nasty regimes get much tougher
treatment from us than China, with whom we have a greater range of interests.

That's a long-winded way of saying that I ascribe no feelings of real racism in these anti-China tendencies, because I think that it is made up of all these other elements.

Let me go back briefly to the end of my tenure as Assistant Secretary, after the APEC summit meeting in November 1996.

In addition to ongoing business, I and my bureau worked hard for the transition to a new Secretary, Madeleine Albright, and my successor, Stanley Roth. This included the preparation of many briefing papers and memoranda, as well as verbal briefings and meetings. There was one particularly important, comprehensive session that I had on the region with Ms. Albright and her top aides.

I also sent messages and farewell cables to our overseas posts, summing up our years and thanking my colleagues. I also worked on helping the career moves and next assignments of several in my bureau and abroad.

There were various farewell parties, including a large one with staff, colleagues, and friends (including my wife) at which Secretary Christopher spoke in positive terms.

Incoming Secretary Albright asked, indeed urged, me to stay on as Assistant Secretary. I declined for reasons cited earlier in this history, including my view that we had made major progress in the region and that our relations with key countries and institutions were in good shape. Also I was tired after four years of the most demanding, along with the Kissinger years, of all my jobs.

Ms. Albright then offered me my pick of any embassy in the EAP region (and I inferred that other regions might be possible, too). Sandy Berger, the National Security Advisor, clearly with her concurrence, called me to offer specifically the Ambassadorship in Seoul, Korea. I again declined with appreciation. Finally the State Department recommended me to the White House as Ambassador to Japan, the one post I would consider. The White House, however, settled on House Speaker Tom Foley.

On January 20, 1997 I left government service for almost certainly the last time. I had served in a series of challenging, often dramatic, assignments at the State Department, in Geneva, at the Pentagon, in the White House, again at State, at the Council on Foreign Relations, in China, again in the private sector, and once more at State.

Q: We're ending this now but we're leaving it somewhat open-ended in case there are further subjects that you might want to cover. You'll be dealing with this in the course of editing the transcript.

LORD: Let me say for the record on this afternoon of September 17, 1999, that I want to thank you, Stu Kennedy, for your patience and good questions. My gratitude to you and the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training for conducting this series of
interviews, as well as Marie Warner for her superb transcriptions. It has been very interesting and helpful to me and, I hope subsequently, to historians and scholars, as well as any grandchildren.

(I enclose here, at the end, my biographic resume as of the date, February 2003, that I finished editing this oral history.)

WINSTON LORD

Co-Chairman, International Rescue Committee
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1993-97
Chairman, National Endowment for Democracy, 1992-93
U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, 1985-89
President, Council on Foreign Relations, 1977-85
Senior Counselor, President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 1983-84
Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1973-77
Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1970-73
Staff Member, National Security Council, 1969-73
Member, Policy Planning Staff, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, 1967-69
Department of State, Foreign Service Officer, 1961-67

Boards of Directors
America-China Forum
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (1990-93)

International Rescue Committee
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (1990-93)

National Endowment for Democracy (1990-93)

Trilateral Commission U.S.-Japan Foundation (1990-93)

Memberships
American Academy of Diplomacy
Asia Society (1990-93)
Aspen Institute Distinguished Fellows (1990-93)
Council on Foreign Relations

Trilateral Commission

Honors and Awards
Honorary Doctorates:
Williams College, Tufts University, Dominican College, Bryant College, Pepperdine University

Outstanding Performance Award, Department of Defense

Distinguished Honor Award, Department of State

National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Award

Hotchkiss School Alumni Award

Guest appearances on all major television and radio networks
Articles include New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Newsweek; Time, Foreign Affairs...

B.A., Yale University (Magna Cum Laude)
M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (First in class)
Married to author, Bette Bao Lord
Father of Elizabeth and Winston

End of interview