

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

MARK LORE

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 26th of June 1998. This is an interview with Mark Lore, L-O-R-E. No middle initial?

LORE: No.

Q: This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Well, to begin with, could you talk about when, where you were born and something about your family?

LORE: I was born in September 1938 in New York City. My father was an active journalist. My grandfather was a well-known writer for the *New York Post*, an expert on German politics which was pretty relevant in those years.

Q: Oh, yes.

LORE: My father worked for my grandfather and also as the years went by developed his

own career in radio and broadcasting and later in the advertising world. My mother and father were divorced when I was four years old. My mother was a psychiatric social worker and she raised my brother and me subsequent to the divorce. We were an East Coast family. My mother had grown up on the East Coast; my father was a native of Brooklyn. So I always lived in that area until I went away to college.

Q: Where did you go to school? I'm talking about elementary grades and all.

LORE: P.S. 33 in Manhattan was my grade school. When I entered the sixth grade I started at Fort Lee Junior-Senior High School. Fort Lee is a very close-in suburb of New York on the New Jersey side right where the George Washington Bridge meets the Palisades. I lived in Fort Lee, graduated from high school there and subsequently went for a year to Fairleigh Dickinson University in northern New Jersey as a commuter, but got tired of that. In those years it was relatively easy for college students with minimal means to go away to school in the Midwest. State schools were very charitable with their out-of-state fees. I went to Bowling Green State University in Ohio for the rest of my college education. I graduated as an undergraduate in 1960.

Q: I'd like to go back a bit. In grade school, high school, what were your major interests?

LORE: In high school, I was interested in music. I played instruments, saxophone. I was, I think, very much involved in history and anthropology. I didn't study anthropology, but I was very interested in museums of natural history, paleontology, the sort of things that I think have become much more popular in recent years, such as dinosaurs and prehistory. So I think at that time that was where I focused quite a bit. I was not much interested in public affairs in those years.

Q: What about at Fairleigh Dickinson? How do you spell Fairleigh, by the way?

LORE: Fairleigh is F-A-I-R-L-E-I-G-H.

Q: There, what were you taking?

LORE: General liberal arts. I didn't have a clear idea of what I wanted to pursue. Several courses that greatly impressed me were things that you didn't get in high school, at least in those years, about world politics.

Q: In this time before you went away to school, were you getting plugged in at all on the international field? I mean, your father and grandfather had been dealing with the world, you might say. Did that intrude at all in your...?

LORE: You would have thought so, but my memory of those years and continuing on into college was one of relative indifference to current events and to foreign affairs. I think as much as anything it was a sign of the times. The late fifties were not a time when people were greatly focused on subtleties. I mean, there was the Cold War and that was it.

Q: At Bowling Green, Ohio, it's in the heartland of the United States, but you're not looking out at either the Pacific or the Atlantic there. Did you find there was anything stirring, internationally, in your education exposure?

LORE: No, there wasn't much interest in foreign affairs in a place like Bowling Green in those years and in that environment in the late '50s. I think my interest in the Foreign Service however, was peaked during the latter part of my time there. I remember taking a political science course, undergraduate political science, nothing very sophisticated. But the professor was well acquainted with the State Department. He may have served in the State Department as a civil servant. In any case, he talked to me about taking the test, as he talked to others, I think, and that sort of stuck with me later on.

Q: Well, you graduated, what, 1960?

LORE: 1960.

Q: What were you pointed towards?

LORE: I was pointed towards getting a graduate degree in English, in literature, and becoming an English and literature professor. That was sort of the thing I was doing. I had a minor in American studies. But my assumption was that I would teach Great Books. But I had difficulty in really developing much enthusiasm for that. The job market for that kind of thing was already beginning to weaken although it was much better than it is today. But I think rather what happened was I went straight from university into the Army. I had an ROTC commission and I served in the military for four and a half years. This was the period of the Kennedy administration and like many others I was caught up in the enthusiasm for foreign affairs, for the world role, for "Ask not what you can do for yourself..." and so on, "What you can do for your country?" This seemed to be the area that was more interesting and with more leisure time working more or less a normal day in my Army duties, I had time to read and get caught up in this area. I decided that foreign affairs was something I wanted to pursue.

Q: Well, you were in the Army for four and a half years, which is beyond the normal ROTC obligatory time, so I take it you wanted to stay for a little while longer.

LORE: I looked at the Army as a possible option for a career. When I got to the end of my two-year obligation there didn't seem to be anything on the horizon. I had by that time just taken the Foreign Service test, but I wasn't sure I wanted to join the State Department. Like many others I took the test in part just because it was a useful way to test your education at no cost. Many people take the test for that reason. So without any other real options - life was good, I liked the Army, I seemed to do well in it - I signed up for indefinite status. Which meant I could leave any time with proper notice if I wasn't in certain billets. But I immediately got thrown into one of those billets because I was sent overseas.

Q: What had you been doing for the first two years?

LORE: I was a Nike-Hercules officer, an air defense officer. These stations have pretty much vanished now, if not completely. But you remember, the suburbs of U.S. cities were surrounded by Nike installations to shoot down attacking bombers. I worked in the Chicago area for several years at a Nike site in suburban Chicago serving as a platoon leader for both radar and for missile preparation. I was also executive officer of the battery. So it was a somewhat atypical Army experience in that I wasn't on a big base.

Q: Just about two weeks ago I was interviewing somebody whose name I can't remember who was an enlisted man with a Nike unit protecting Philadelphia and ended up as the unit librarian and had been a very indifferent student and started reading the good books through. Somebody gave them a set of the Chicago series of the good books and he ended up going for his doctorate, I think, and eventually ended up in the Foreign Service. I mean, this is a real career change.

LORE: For a young person who isn't quite sure what he wants to do, the military can be a very nice port of call. You're making a decent salary and much is taking care of for you. So many of the usual vicissitudes of life are smoothed over by the way the military operates. Your life is relatively uncomplicated and you can give more attention to delving into things you might be interested in.

Q: Where did you get assigned overseas?

LORE: One of the reasons I wanted the indefinite status was because I knew I would be assigned overseas. I thought this would be a good way to test my desire to live overseas as a career. Unfortunately I was assigned to probably the one place outside the continental United States where there was no civilization or accessible local culture to speak of. That was Greenland.

Q: Oh my God!

LORE: There are a few Eskimos and the Danes who still administer the territory to this day, but it was really a pretty isolated spot. But that is where I was sent. To Thule, Greenland, which is about 700 miles south of the North Pole and about 500 miles north of the Arctic Circle. I was assigned there for a year.

Q: Radar, or part of the...?

LORE: It was a missile defense battery. There was a battalion of four sites that surrounded the large Thule Air Base. Thule Air Base was in its time a very strategic location. It had been a major base for our SAC fleet, for the Strategic Air Force Command which was essentially our first line of defense. When SAC left in the late fifties, however, the base continued to be important because a huge B-MEWS radar was installed there. I guess they're still up there in Alaska, northern England, Greenland. You have these huge radars, bigger than a football field that could spot incoming missiles - ICBMs - as they came over the horizon from the Soviet Union. So our mission was to protect that radar from attacks. So I continued to do the same kind of work but in a

different environment.

Q: Obviously, there wasn't a lot of time for getting out and seeing the country and all that. There wasn't much to do. How did you spend your time?

LORE: You have a lot of time on your hands. You did a lot of shopping. First of all, you went to the PX a lot. You bought a lot of stuff at very cheap prices, because you really had nothing to do with your money. You had craft shops, you had gyms, you actually kept in pretty good shape just because you had the time to do it. You did a lot of reading. I played a lot of Parcheesi. Television was limited to a local armed forces station. It was pretty crude by today's standards. But you kept busy.

Q: You did this for about a year and then what?

LORE: Came back to the States. I was married during the time I was in Greenland. During that year you could come back to the States on leave. My fiancée - Sandy - and I decided to get married at that point. So I had left for Greenland engaged, but ended the tour as a married man. My wife and I wanted to set up housekeeping and we thought the best thing to do would be to find an assignment in the Washington area since my name was on the list for the Foreign Service and I wanted to avoid a move if possible. So I was assigned to a Nike Hawk unit, which is mobile air defense, at Fort Meade in Maryland. We got an apartment in Laurel, Maryland and I worked there from September of 1964 until January of 1965. I got the call from the State Department in December of '64.

Q: You obviously took the oral examination. Do you recall anything...how it went, any questions?

LORE: I do. I took the oral examination in Chicago before leaving for Thule. I had a board of three officers, one I remember was from USAID, the other two I believe were from State. A couple of the questions have stuck with me over the years. One was to explain the Monroe Doctrine and its various corollaries. I was also asked to imagine that I was in Caracas, Venezuela as a young embassy officer and I was called into the ambassador's office and told the president was going to make a state visit to Caracas. "We're going to make you the control officer," he says "and I want you to go back to your office and sit down and take fifteen minutes and sketch out what are the main things that need doing and in what order of priority." I thought that was a very good question for the Foreign Service.

I was asked to imagine myself in a foreign country and approached by a national who said, "Look, I'm very interested in the United States. My theory is that we can learn the most about a country by consulting a variety of its newspapers. I'm not necessarily looking for the best newspapers, but the ones that seem to have a particular personality. Journalistically they might even be among the worst, but they have a particular personality that says something about American culture. I don't have all the time in the world, so I can take five subscriptions. What are the five papers that you would suggest?".

Q: What did you come up with? Did you remember?

LORE: I have trouble remembering now. I obviously said the *New York Times*. I probably said the *Washington Post*. I think I said the *Los Angeles Times*. I think I said the *Saint Louis Post Dispatch*. I might have said the *Miami Herald*. But those are the ones I would immediately think of today. As a cross-section I might even throw in something like the *New York Post*, just to give an idea of the yellow press in the United States. But I thought that was a good question, too. There was a question about economics in which I was very weak in at the time, I'd never had an economics course. I had quickly read a copy of the Samuelson textbook before the exam. I was asked a question about a plant manager would deal with a particular labor cost issue. I broke a cardinal rule in these orals which is, if you don't know, say so. I tried to bluff my way through it, and at the end when I was called back in to be told I had passed, they said, "but please learn some economics."

Q: Well, I think I was told exactly the same thing. While you were out at Fort Meade, and Laurel and all, were you beginning to do some reading up about international affairs and what the Foreign Service was about and all that?

LORE: I was. Once I had taken the test, and passed the orals, the idea of a foreign service career tended to gain a certain momentum. The stint in Thule was not unhelpful in that regard because I was able to do quite a bit of reading. So I did catch up on the issues, but I never had the sort of classical foreign affairs education that you might get at Tufts or at Georgetown.

Q: I think for most of us, we didn't.

LORE: That's right. That's right.

Q: So you came in what, 196...?

LORE: January '65. As an army officer, I just missed the first Johnson build-up into Vietnam. If I had been called for a class in March, I probably could not have left the Army.

Q: Because we were beginning to throw troops into the...

LORE: In December of '64, it was relatively easy to walk your papers around and be out in a week or two. Everything was getting buttoned down and frozen as of February '65. I would never have joined the Foreign Service in that case. I would have gone off to Vietnam, I would have become a major, I would have had some time invested, I would have made an Army career.

Q: Could you describe your basic officer course, called the A-100 course, that you joined in '65.

LORE: I can't remember a lot about it. There were standard briefings on various aspects of Foreign Service life - how to handle your finances, medical insurance, etc. I do recall some general briefings on international situations, on geopolitics, on terrorism. But much of it has faded from memory.

Q: How big was it and what did it include as far as people go?

LORE: We had a relatively large class. I guess we must have been about 40 in number. I was coming in my late 20s and thought that I was going to be the old man of the class. In point of fact I was right at the median. There were a number of people older than I. That was my first discovery of the peculiar nature of the Foreign Service, that so many people do join after doing other things and don't jump in at the beginning. I think it's a real strength.

Q: Oh, I do, too.

LORE: Yes. They came from all walks of life. They were not, for the most part, foreign affairs experts. They had not studied at Georgetown or Tufts. They were pretty much people like me.

Q: Minorities, women?

LORE: We had several women. Nowhere near the percentage you would have today. Women in the class were definitely a minority. The picture of my class hangs in the Foreign Service Club now and I look at it occasionally and I marvel at the composition of the class. No minorities, no Hispanics I can recall, no blacks. It was pretty much white middle-class males.

Q: At that time did you have anything you wanted to do? Either a specialty or an area or anything like that?

LORE: No, I was pretty much an open book. I hadn't lived overseas - Thule doesn't really count - in fact I had never traveled overseas. You know, a brief visit to a Mexican border town when I was doing my basic missile education in the Army was my only experience outside the country. I had no preconceived ideas. I didn't speak any foreign languages. I didn't have any strong driving interests. So I was fairly open to anything. My initial choices, and in fact a good part of my career, really were defined by my language preferences. Since I didn't speak a foreign language, I aimed for a world language and I thought Portuguese would be an interesting change from the usual Spanish or French. Portuguese at that time was taught in Rio de Janeiro that made it very attractive also. So it's a case of your choice of the language tends to define much of the way your career went.

Q: How about your wife? Had she had any experience in this or were you sort of two babes in the woods?

LORE: Two babes in the woods.

Q: Again, as most of us.

LORE: She had never been overseas. No foreign languages, no background in foreign affairs.

Q: Where did you go in your first post?

LORE: We went to Rio. I indicated a preference for Portuguese, they honored that. At that time you went down to Rio. We found ourselves, to our great surprise, because most people after you came in the Service, your various courses, consular, A-100, and language and all the rest, you didn't get out to post until sometime in the latter half of the year you entered, after six-eight months. By early April we were suddenly in Rio. We arrived there without speaking Portuguese and went right into intensive Portuguese training in the embassy building.

Q: You and your wife?

LORE: Yes, both of us.

Q: Just to get while you were in Brazil, '65 to when?

LORE: We were in Brazil '65 to October of '66.

Q: Can you tell me about your impressions of Brazil and Rio while you were...at this time?

LORE: Much about Rio's special atmosphere remains the same today. It is very sultry, with unique topography and beauty. This city itself is rather plain. That is to say, the man-made buildings are generally not distinguished by great architecture. They haven't done much in terms of preserving the old colonial buildings, so the streetscape can be rather bland. However, you lose sight of that because of the fantastic topography and the terrific street life. The combination of the tropical vegetation which cascades down the mountains right to the sea and the city sort of laid out through these mountains.

Rio's topography makes its tremendous disparity of income unusually visible. Many of the poor live in *favelas*, the urban slums, on the mountain sides. Unlike Washington, DC or Sao Paulo in Brazil or many other cities which spread out laterally, the rich look up from their affluent neighborhoods and can see the poor. For their part, the poor are not as isolated, off in geographically distant areas. So that if you go to Washington you can spend years and never really see abject poverty if you stick to the Mall and Northwest and a place where the more affluent live. In Rio that's not possible. The poor and the rich are cheek to jowl because the poor live on the mountains just above the affluent housing areas of Copacabana and Ipanema.

Brazil was just beginning its second year under the military dictatorship. There was still

the feeling among Brazilians and I think in the American embassy that this was a temporary state of being. That it was perhaps regrettable that the military had taken over, but that the military who were running the place from General Castelo Branco on down, were right-minded people - people who really wanted to introduce reform. It was viewed as a more benevolent version of the Pinochet regime which later ran Chile. Our expectation was that the Brazilian military would get the economy right and then quickly hand a stable government back to the civilians. It was viewed on the whole, particularly given the Cold War mentality of the time, as a necessary evil that was going to be good for both Brazil and for the United States in the long run. So there was a fair amount of optimism. Brazilians were still optimistic; even if there was protest and some unhappiness at having the military running the government, it was relatively muted.

There wasn't at that time an oppressive feeling of authoritarianism in Rio or in the country, at least that I could see as a foreigner. The press was quite free, people were quite free, people spoke in opposition on television to the military's rule, at least in those years. It was quite an open environment so you didn't feel like you were living in an oppressive dictatorship by any means. It was a delightful place for people who had never been overseas to suddenly parachute into. Once we got some Portuguese under our belts it was very stimulating. The Brazilians are extremely kind with people who try to speak their language and very supportive, so you are able to practice a lot. They also don't speak a lot of English. So it was a very good environment for a first-tour officer and spouse.

Q: Did you find that you were plugging into the young executive part of Brazilian society, people of sort of comparable age and moving into business or politics or what have you?

LORE: Not so much in Rio. You have to remember that we arrived in April of '65. The first three and a half months were consumed with language training and getting settled and we left the following April for Brasilia. So we had relatively little time. My wife had a medical problem in the middle of this, too. She had to go up to Gorgas Hospital in Panama. So we weren't really able to get to know many Brazilians in Rio. Another thing was that the embassy was enormous. It was one of the two or three biggest American embassies in the world. Lincoln Gordon was the ambassador, the framer of the Alliance for Progress. It was to be the touchstone for the Alliance for Progress. We had money, we had a willing government which wanted the money and was willing to do the things with it that we requested. Our AID mission was enormous. So a junior officer like me felt rather lost in that environment. Very frankly, it was hard to do any substantive business because people were fighting for the crumbs - too much staff for too little work. When I heard about the rather desperate state of our embassy office in the new capital of Brasilia volunteered to go up and work there, where I felt I could do more interesting things. So we found ourselves by April of '66 in Brasilia.

Q: You were in Brasilia from '66 to when?

LORE: We got there in April of '66 and we left in October of '66. We wound up being there for only about six months.

Q: What was Brasilia like at that time from your perspective?

LORE: Brasilia was fascinating. It was a new capital, it had been inaugurated in 1960. It was still quite unfinished. There was red dust everywhere because they had not planted the large areas, particularly the central mall area of Brasilia. It is a very dry, almost desert-like environment for part of the year. This red dirt would blow into the tiny gaps in houses and in clothes. It was everywhere. There was very little in the way of entertainment. There was one movie theater or two, there were very few restaurants, certainly none that were very appetizing. It was in a lot of ways an African assignment. It was too far removed from Rio or Sao Paulo to easily travel to these places if you weren't a Brazilian congressman with your way paid.

Q: What were you doing?

LORE: I was a junior officer and at that time you were what they called "central complement" on your first assignment. You moved from one function to another. USIA still does this with their new officers... You moved around the embassy working in different sections. I had done some economic work and some consular work in Rio, so the idea was I would do political and admin in Brasilia. I started off doing the political work but it was largely sort of catch-all of political and economic. We had a very small staff, very few people. I worked for Herb Okun who was my principal officer and he really had a gaggle of several junior officers. For various reasons there wasn't much in the way of middle grade.

I worked a lot on land sales. This sounds dry, but it was fascinating because at that time there were some unscrupulous operators out of the United States who had brought up lands in central Brazil and were trying to sell them as retirement spots to mostly Middle Western farmers in this country. They had glossy brochures that gave the impression that these lots were overlooking the city of Brasilia - which they were not. They were 50-75 miles away in the middle of Brazil's central savanna, worth very little money even today. We couldn't do much to get these farmers' money back, but we worked with the Brazilians to confirm the land deeds, at least. It was a very interesting issue and you had the feeling, unlike in Rio where there were so many people, you had the feeling you were making a real contribution to improving a situation that had been inflicted on many unsuspecting U.S. citizens.

I did a lot of that, I covered the congress, covered what bills and issues that the congress was working which were of interest to us. At that time the congress was still operating, later it was closed down. It had some power. I had some dealings with the foreign ministry detachment there, but most of the foreign ministry was still back in Rio.

Q: Were you running across everybody on the Brazilian side, hated being in Brasilia and they were on their way trying to get back, at least for the weekend or something, to Rio?

LORE: Let's put it this way. The legislators or congress people, as they still do today, would flee Brasilia on the weekend and go back home. Those that had money, even if

they were in the bureaucracy, would get out every chance they could. That includes the small cadre of Brazilian diplomats, who were preparing the way for the installation of the foreign ministry. I often tell the story that, during a typical day, I would go over to the congress and I would talk to people, staffers, about what was happening on certain bills we were interested in. I'd come back to the office at three, four o'clock in the afternoon, and I would often get a call from the Brazilian foreign ministry people wanting to know what the news was up there in the congress. So every now and again I was in the curious position of reporting to the country's foreign ministry on what its own congress was doing.

In those days, Brasilia was not regarded by Brazilian diplomats as prime duty for obvious reasons. But in that group and in other ministries, the military, the private sector, there was a group of young, hard-charging Brazilians who saw that they could really make some difference and they could vault ahead of others in their careers if they took Brasilia seriously and grabbed the responsibility that was out there. It was, after all, the capital of the country. So you had some very attractive young people, more or less contemporaries of mine, who were a lot of fun to get to know. It was uniquely easy to get to know Brazilians in the Brasilia of that day; there were Brazilians from all over the country, not just from one area, and many became leaders later on.

Q: Speaking of young, sort of aggressive people. Herb Okun and I came into the Foreign Service together. Very bright but very difficult person. I've heard that his time in Brasilia was not a happy one for many people. How did you find working for Herb?

LORE: I found it good. He was a good mentor, he was a good teacher. I was a junior officer, first tour. I didn't have any particular vanity about my work. I was learning and so I had no difficulty in having Herb take out his big scissors and cut up my drafts and give them back to me in pieces and in a suggested rearrangement. Some more senior people who had been in the Service for a few years and felt that they knew the business didn't suffer this editing quite that well. Herb did not have a fine touch. My relationship with him was excellent, but it was partly because I was junior. I was in Brasilia because, very frankly, Herb could not keep middle grade officers up there due to his rather heavy-handed managerial style.

Q: How did you find the Brazilian congress? I mean this is a very crucial time. Were they getting along with the military government? What was your impression?

LORE: The congress at the time was still pretty active. But there were definite limits. I'm often reminded of the old Edward G. Robinson movies of the '30s - you know, the scene where he'd walk into a room and people would be disputing and arguing about this and that and he'd take out a great big pistol and he'd slap it on the table in front of him and suddenly nobody had any arguments. He didn't need to use the pistol. Brasilia in the 60's was that sort of environment. Everybody knew that the military would only go so far in entertaining opposition. But at the same time there were not any frontal moves against the congress at that time. There was some criticism, but we were not at the point which Brazil reached later on where there was wholesale attacks on opposition congressmen,

banishing them from Brazil, taking away their political rights. We were still only in the first stages of that process. The military rulers at the beginning hoped to get through without resort to open repression.

Q: What about contacts with the military? In Brasilia itself, what about the military?

LORE: It was all in Rio. There was virtually nothing in Brasilia. There were very few military officers up there. Those that were there would be rather senior, including, of course, the president himself. They would be contacts for the ambassador when he would come up from Rio or for Herb Okun, perhaps.

Q: I was wondering, you had been a military officer long enough to have acquired the patina of...you could speak as a military man. Was this helpful?

LORE: I suppose it was in a certain way. I think it proved more helpful later on in my career. I don't recall Brasilia or Rio as being places where I was able to use that very much. We had such a huge military mission, and of course with General Vernon Walters' particular access and prestige, the State Department officers had a relatively minor role in contacts with the military.

Q: Well, Brazil had become much of the focus of your career. What was your impression of regionalism, through the congress and elsewhere? You're up in a place where you're removed from sort of that incestuous Rio crowd and all that. Did you get a feel that Brazil was more than just Rio at this particular time?

LORE: Well, certainly Brasilia was different. There were still debates going on at that time about just abandoning Brasilia. However, the Brazilian military quickly decided that Brasilia served their interests very nicely.

Q: Why, they get away from the street mobs and that sort of thing?

LORE: Yes, I think it was much easier for them to run the country out of Brasilia. Even today, Brasilia, the way it's built, discourages demonstrations. Demonstrations are swallowed up in those great empty spaces. If there had been any serious problems with opposition demonstrations, they could have rolled tanks right down the middle of the city's broad avenues. Therefore, it would have been very easy to contain any overt opposition. It was also, I think, just nice to be away from the stew of politics and pressure groups in places like Rio or Sao Paulo. So the military found it rather convenient. If there had been no coup, Brasilia's fate might have been different; I think Kubitschek's immediate civilian successors, Quadros and then Goulart detested Brasilia.

Q: It was Kubitschek's idea, right?

LORE: It was Kubitschek's idea. As I said, I think it's quite possible that during the '60s if there hadn't been a military coup that there might have been an at least partial reversion of the capital back to Rio. Certainly the bureaucracy's movement to it would have been

slowed. But the military decided they liked it and by the time the military left power years later it was firmly ensconced.

Q: But Brasilia, the idea of Brasilia was to make it more representative of the whole country and all of that. Were you getting any of that feeling?

LORE: Well, you did meet people from all over the country. There were no native residents; government servants had to come in from everywhere. But even today you don't get much of a feel for the country in Brasilia and that's a real drawback. You get a much better feel for the country in Rio despite its peculiarities; despite its uniqueness, it's very typically Brazilian in a lot of ways. Brasilia remains a rather drab and monotonous environment -- although not without its own natural beauty. If you go outside the city, the countryside can be quite scenic. The central plateau remains relatively virgin and unpopulated. In those years there were very few people so you could drive for miles and never see anything.

Q: How about Sao Paulo. Did that have its own dynamics that you were seeing reflected in Brasilia?

LORE: Sao Paulo was certainly at that time emerging as the major city of Brazil, but it was contesting with Rio. Rio was still viewed by most people as the true capital of Brazil and most companies were headquartered in Rio. There was a large financial and business infrastructure in Rio, some of which still remains.

So Rio was and is an important city in commercial terms but Sao Paulo was becoming become the combination of New York, Los Angeles and Detroit that it is today. It was a very big city, a very confusing place. I saw very little of Sao Paulo when I was there in those years because it was difficult to get to. The road between Rio and Sao Paulo, a narrow national two or three lane affair then, is now a high-speed limited access highway. There was no train and air service was expensive. So Sao Paulo for people who lived in Rio was a long way away. It's closer now with the air shuttle and modern communications.

Q: Well, you were there until '66. Did you get any feel for the relationship between Herb Okun and the ambassador was still...?

LORE: Lincoln Gordon left in my second year. After I got to Brasilia, John Tuthill was ambassador. I didn't have much feel for Herb's relationships in the mission. I would guess that Herb was held in high esteem. He was very able and very smart. Herb's problems, such as they were, were more with subordinate staff rather than with the embassy front office.

Q: In '66 you left, '67?

LORE: I left in '66. We had planned on at least a year in Brasilia. The Department at that time assigned junior officers on a "central complement" basis that is over an above

normal staff. At a large post, when the powers that be decided that you were okay -- you were not going to be an abject failure -- you became fair game for assignment into a regular funded position someplace else. In the second half of '66 Ed Marks was the junior officer in Luanda, Angola, a consulate at that time in a territory under Portuguese control. He was transferred to an economic officer position in Zambia and I suddenly received a cable saying "Proceed directly from Brasilia to Luanda." So by October of '66 we were in Luanda.

Q: Luanda being the capital of?

LORE: The capital of Angola, a Portuguese colony on the west coast of Africa.

Q: For the record I've interviewed Ed Marks on this so the story will pick up. What was Angola like? First place you were in Angola from '66...?

LORE: It would have been October '66 until December '68.

Q: What was Angola like when you arrived? What was the situation?

LORE: Angola was on the surface a kind of baby Brazil. The topography, the vegetation, the Portuguese culture and the racial mix all suggested a kind of a Brazil in Africa. There were a lot of links. So it was a comfortable environment. Of course, politically, it was very different. It was a colony of Portugal. The Portuguese had been engaged since 1961 in a very vicious war against black nationalist insurgents who were trying to kick them out. During the time I was there, '66 through '68, the Portuguese effort had doubled and redoubled. It had reached its peak during my time. There were, as I recall, something like 50,000-60,000 Portuguese troops in Angola and that, along with a large-scale campaign of moving poor Portuguese settlers down to Angola to inject a white presence and a sort of stability in the interior created a situation where the insurgents were fairly marginalized. The insurgents themselves were fighting tribally based vendettas amongst each other. So the Portuguese were pretty firmly in control but only by dint of force of arms, not by the fact that they had any significant allegiance among the African population.

Q: It would have been a consulate general at that point, right?

LORE: That's right.

Q: What was Luanda as a consulate general like? How was it staffed and all?

LORE: It was a very small post. It had the consulate general rank for a number of reasons. Portuguese Africa was a problem for the Kennedy administration. We wanted to keep good relations with our NATO ally Portugal. We particularly didn't want to endanger our presence in the Lages base in the Azores. At the same time Kennedy was under some pressure to accommodate African-American opinion on the colonial issue. So, symbolically, these two little posts, the one in Angola and the other in Lourenco

Marques in Mozambique were put under the African bureau in the State Department -- to the great unhappiness of our ambassador in Lisbon. They were upgraded to consulate general rank to convey that we saw these territories as other than colonies of Portugal. We had taken some symbolic anti-Portugal votes in the UN which, just before my arrival, resulted in some serious violence against the consulate. The U.S. vote against Portugal in the UN, voting for self-determination of the Portuguese colonies, caused a mob to attack the Consulate general cars and throw them in the bay.

Q: This would be Portuguese?

LORE: It was a Portuguese mob, a white Portuguese mob. The consulate had four officers; the consul general was Harvey Summ. I was the junior of the four. I had a great job for a junior officer. My duties were essentially to take care of the administration and the consular obligations of the post which were minimal, and spent a good bit of my time traveling around the province, as it was called, and reporting on the guerrilla war.

Q: First place, when you reported, was there any connection to our embassy in Lisbon, or was it just sort of...sent something, information?

LORE: We never cleared anything with our ambassador in Lisbon. In fact, to do so would have subjected us to criticism from the African bureau. We were supposed to be independent. As I say, our ambassador in Lisbon wasn't crazy about that. They were, during my time, Ridgway Knight and Tapley Bennett. They were both professionals and they understood. They visited Angola. While it's hard not to act as the ambassador, they understood there was a certain difference in how a US official dealt with our hosts down there since we had this political objective of seeming to not recognize Portuguese dominion there indefinitely -- although we did recognize it in fact. So the division of duties was fairly clear. We didn't clash very much with the embassy in Lisbon. We reported on what was going on the ground in these areas, how the war was going, what these colonial societies were like. Were there winds of change? To the degree we could, we reported on local African attitudes, although these were very hard to ascertain. The embassy in Lisbon really reported on how the Portuguese government viewed the question and on the terms of the bilateral relationship.

Q: This was still Salazar, wasn't it?

LORE: It was Salazar when I got there and Caetano by the time I left.

Q: What about your dealings with this? First place, it sounded like it would have been a difficult situation if the Portuguese were putting in essentially blue-collar Portuguese and giving them a hunk of land and all of this, that they wouldn't be very amenable to dealing well with the black population or...It would be a rather intractable sort of (inaudible).

LORE: I think the Portuguese were trapped by their own myth of racial harmony, their own so-called civilizing mission. In point of fact, by injecting significant numbers of white settlers into Angola, they created racial tensions and a racial pecking order that

didn't exist before. American and other foreign visitors would come to Luanda and Portuguese officials would show them around and brag about the fact that here, unlike any other place in Africa, you had white taxi drivers, you had white ditch diggers, you had white waiters, you had whites doing menial jobs and living in the poorest areas. It was a point of pride -- this showed the racial democracy that was developing in the colony. The reality was, in fact, that Africans resented this tremendously since importing whites barred the way for them to be taxi drivers, or waiters, or ditch diggers and they didn't see this as a desirable state of things.

Q: What about blacks? Were there many blacks who had moved up through the bureaucracy or in business and all who became contacts?

LORE: Very few. Virtually none. There was a small group of mulatto, what we would call blacks, but they were distinguished as mulattos. They often moved in white society, often had white wives, had received education in Lisbon and were in the professional class and in some cases, in the bureaucracy. But they constituted very small number and many of them had become disaffected. Some of them had become active and were leaders in the resistance movements, others had just left the country or moved to Portugal to be away from the war. So you dealt almost exclusively with a white bureaucracy and power structure in Angola. Now there was a white settler elite that never reached the level of what you had in Rhodesia next door. There was some nascent complaining about Lisbon and some would occasionally expressed a desire to break away Rhodesia-style. It never came to anything because they knew that if the Portuguese government left, they wouldn't have a chance against the black majority.

Q: I assume you were dealing mainly with Portuguese bureaucrats, weren't you?

LORE: That's right.

Q: What was your impression? Were they sort of the typical, what one thinks of as colonial types?

LORE: Yes, I would say so. Many of them, particularly out in the field, were quite similar to what you see in films, and histories of the British or French empires. Being Portuguese, they lived more humbly than perhaps some other Europeans did. They often came from a poor or humble background. There was not a lot of ostentation and pomp in Portuguese colonialism, even in the capital, Luanda. It doesn't go with the Portuguese character. Portugal at that time was trying very hard, pouring an enormous amount of money and military force into Angola and Mozambique. In fact this led directly to the eventual revolution in metropolitan Portugal in '74 because the country itself was bled white. It's a good example of how a colonial power's attempts to sustain its possessions becomes suicidal because in order to keep the lands you have to put so much into them that you pauperize your own constituents in the home country.

Q: What about the Portuguese military? I would have thought they would have not have been very forthcoming to the Americans there since we had this pretty obvious anti-colonial thrust to our African policy.

LORE: There were individuals who were suspicious. There were individuals who would make snide remarks. But during the time I was there I think the feeling among the Portuguese was that Portugal's attempts to stabilize the situation were on the upswing. They were looking for investment from the Western countries. They thought that they had suffered the worst they were going to suffer in the UN. And as Portuguese, they had for the most part a very favorable attitude about the United States. Some of the settlers were actually more difficult, but the settlers didn't have much political power. They made noise, but they didn't have political power. So I would say that my experience was largely a friendly one.

I remember that we did a little sort of homegrown USIA effort in the consulate for Portuguese who were interested in learning English and practicing their English. Every week we would get together. I decided at one point it would be fun to show the movie about Kennedy which was around at that time, *Years of Lightning, Day of Drums*, you remember that. George Stevens, As an American I found it a very moving movie. I showed it, the lights went up, and there was a very, very chilly reception. Remember that these were people coming to the consulate because they liked Americans and they wanted to learn English. But they immediately said, "You know, he's the guy who voted against us in the UN. We'll never forgive him." They were very resentful of that. But Kennedy had been dead for several years by that time and I think their feeling was that relations with the U.S. were now on a different track.

However some Portuguese, more in the civilian side than in the military side, would say that, "You Americans, you just want to get us out of here so that you can have this for yourselves." My answer always was, look; we were at the worst point of...the high watermark in Vietnam. We had enough problems. We didn't need another one in terms of instability in a resource rich country in the third world. We wanted Portugal to be a force for stability, we just didn't think that it was going about it in the right way, by denying eventual independence and self expression in the African territories. But you wouldn't find much of an audience for that point of view.

Q: What some of the African nationalist leaders? Did you have, you, I mean in the consulate general, have any particular access to them?

LORE: No, we had no access to them. They were on the other side of the line. To have contacted them then would have required that we be out of country. Even then, if the Portuguese learned of such contacts, we would probably have been expelled from Luanda. So we left those contacts to our colleagues in embassies in independent African countries on the periphery - in Zambia or the Congo, Zaire, and elsewhere such as in Europe, where these organizations had representation. We did not have contacts with them.

Q: In Rhodesia had the UDI, Unilateral Declaration of Independence, taken place?

LORE: Yes, I'm trying to remember. It was during that period it took place, right.

Q: I was wondering whether that had any impact or was Angola one world and Rhodesia was another?

LORE: Well, as I say, the white settler elite in Angola, which was a small group, felt to be Angolan, not Portuguese. They had lived most if not all of their lives in Angola... They looked at the Rhodesia events with sympathy and would have liked to have been able to do the same thing but they did not have the power position or the military position to protect themselves and they knew it. They weren't big enough and so they never made any serious attempts. Plus the fact that those 60,000-70,000 troops in Angola from the metropole were also a force for making sure that white settlers didn't cause any problems.

Q: With your military background what was your impression of the Portuguese army and how they were doing the '66 to '68 period?

LORE: They benefited from having farm boys as troops in that these men were able to put up with a relatively low level of comfort. They could live in the field for long stretches easily and without complaint. They required less of a supply chain than, say, a American army would. But they also showed very little interest in aggressive pursuit of the guerrillas. They did only what was absolutely necessary. There was not the kind of imaginative initiative that might have possibly curtailed the threat definitively. That's, of course, also on the political side as well as on the military side.

The Portuguese took a very limited military approach. Units went out, they basically oversaw the collecting of large groups of native Africans into secure villages. They were a presence and yet there was no real political agenda in terms of the underlying issue of white foreign rule. So without that, the military didn't have much to do except to keep the guerillas marginalized. As for the guerillas themselves, they did suffer some deaths, but were left largely alone. It was rather a stalemate. The Portuguese were able to control a good part of the country but at any given time, the insurgents, if they wanted to move in an area probably could. This undercut the psychological security of the white population and of the troop units.

So the Portuguese, despite their overwhelming presence, never felt very secure. The Portuguese military was armed at a fairly basic level. Most of them viewed the war as something to get through, to put in their time. This was true of officers as well as enlisted...put in their time and get out without being hurt rather than going in there with any enthusiasm to accomplish a larger geopolitical goal.

Q: Were there any reflections from our consulate general in Mozambique? Did you see that as sort of a mirror image of Angola?

LORE: We certainly read each other's reporting. During the period I was in Angola, the Portuguese were in a much more tenuous position in Mozambique. This was both because of the geography of the country because there were far fewer whites in Mozambique. Also, there were strong white supremacist views among the settler whites

in Mozambique due to the racial influence of South Africa. The Portuguese authorities were distressed by such racism, because it undercut the multiracial image they were trying to propagate. Finally the Mozambican guerilla group was larger, better disciplined, and a more formidable force, with secure bases in Tanzania next door. The Portuguese largely were not in control in northern Mozambique and accepted that. That didn't really have a correlation in Angola.

Q: In sort of trying to capture the spirit of the times, how much would you and your fellow officers of the consulate general...Do we feel there was the Soviet hand in what was happening there?

LORE: I don't recall seeing it as a Cold War issue. I don't think the administration in Washington did either. We were constrained in that we had this tremendous need for the Azores. But we in Angola didn't live with that day by day. That wasn't something we had to worry about. We saw the situation on the ground as something that was doomed to change, winds of history and all that, and we didn't see it really as a Cold War issue. It was obvious that the Chinese and the Russians were exploiting the situation for their own ends, but we primarily blamed the Portuguese for allowing inroads by these unfriendly powers in important segments of the African populations - probably including the future leadership - by their obdurate policy.

Q: What were the dynamics of the consulate general? How were relations there?

LORE: It was a small group. Like many African posts there is really a lot of reason to stick together and be tolerant of other people's behavior. We all had our jobs to do. I remember relations as being fairly good. Towards the end of my time three of the four officers were all about the same age, with broadly similar personalities. Several of us remain friends to this day. So I think relationships were good. The consul general, Harvey Summ, made no bones of the fact that he had been sent there with instructions to tighten things up a bit. This had been a very sleepy equatorial African post in years past; he was interested in instilling some more discipline into the operation, but he was a good manager and I think he was well liked. There were remarkably few tensions given the possibility for them in the consulate during my time there.

Q: Social life? How was that?

LORE: Social life was active, it was good. There were a number of consulates there so you dealt a lot with the foreign community. You dealt a lot with the Portuguese bureaucracy and elite. You did not deal much with Africans for reasons I've mentioned. There were very few Africans of any prominence. I, as a junior officer, had particular responsibility to develop relationships with the sort of mulatto elite, which was very interesting. These people seemed to be quite apolitical and never talked about politics and I didn't press them because it was a serious business. This was an authoritarian state. The secret police were omnipresent and you could get people in real trouble, you might even be risking their lives by compromising them. But I was struck by the fact that when Sandy and I were about to Angola, we were offered a goodbye luncheon at one of the mulatto's houses - just when Salazar had taken his spill out of a chair from which he

never recovered.

Q: What happened? He just collapsed?

LORE: He fell out of a chair and as an elderly man, you know, falls are often fatal to elderly people, and he never really recovered and he was replaced a few months later by Caetano and then eventually he died. But he had just taken this fall out of his chair and I was struck by the very sharp and acerbic jokes at this luncheon about Salazar himself and about the white Portuguese. I had to conclude that, since I was leaving, people felt free to talk in a way they didn't when I was there.

Q: Did you feel yourself attracted towards might be called the Africanist core in the Foreign Service? What did you feel career-wise you wanted to point towards?

LORE: In Angola, of course, one often didn't have the sense of being in Africa. You were in Africa physically, but you were dealing with whites. When I left Angola, I was assigned to be the Portuguese African desk officer in the African Bureau. Probably during that time I felt more of an attraction to an Africanist specialty, since I was dealing with people who had served around the continent. But it never really developed that way for various reasons.

Q: You left in '68 and went back to Washington?

LORE: Went back to Washington. The incumbent as Portuguese African desk officer still had six months to go so the African Bureau worked a deal where I suddenly found myself in the economic training course at FSI, the six-month economic course. I hadn't requested it, although I wasn't opposed at all to the idea. At the time, it was ironic; it was very difficult to get into. It was sought after. So I did the course and then went onto the Portuguese African desk in what was purely political work, not an economic job at all. David Newsom was the assistant secretary. The bureau was, I think, a good bureau at that time. Newsom was a very good assistant secretary. I liked working with him very much. Obviously, the southern African issues were paramount for him in those years, so we in the Office of Southern African Affairs got a lot of attention. But the White House was completely uninterested - in fact, even opposed to what the African Bureau wanted to achieve in Africa. You remember, this is the Nixon administration and there was a great deal of sympathy for the white ruling regimes.

Q: You were in the African Bureau from '68 to...?

LORE: Let's see, it would be '68 to '72. The last period of that time, six or eight months, I was working in the economic policy shop in AF, not the Portuguese African side.

Q: I wonder if you would care to comment, before we turn to the Portuguese African side, about the economic course. How did you find it and how useful was it?

LORE: It was very difficult, as I think it is today. If anything it was more difficult at that

time because the State Department had not gotten into the computer age at all. At that time I remember doing our calculations on Burroughs office machines. It was very well done, however. I had never had any economics so it was a cold shower, but a very useful one. It turned me into an economic officer which I remained being throughout the rest of my career. The physical conditions were difficult. The tower over there in Rosslyn was not the greatest place to do a course, particularly an intensive course of that sort. It was difficult to do it when you were just coming back from overseas and getting settled at the same time. But it was a good course and I've always regarded it as one of the more valuable things I've done in the Foreign Service.

Q: The Portuguese African desk, what did that consist of? What were your responsibilities?

LORE: My responsibilities were to assert the Africa Bureau's interests and concerns in the policy process in the State Department, particularly, on Portuguese African issues. You were constantly plucking the sleeve of the European Bureau which represented Portugal and which, both because it was the European Bureau and because it had all the ambassadors and all the sovereign entities involved on its side, was a formidable foe. Ted Briggs was the Portuguese desk officer at that time. He was, of course, a very able person, but a very professional one as well. While he made sure that his own bureau's interests and the interests of the relationships with Portugal were observed, we had a good working relationship.

It was an unusual desk, because you were representing an important bureau interest but without a constituency. You didn't have an ambassador, you didn't have a resident embassy in Washington, and you didn't have bilateral relations. You were essentially reflecting the African Bureau's general concern with our credibility on the colonial issue with the Nigerians, to the Ugandans, to the Kenyans, to other people rather than to the Angolans or the Mozambicans as such. It was an awkward issue. A lot of it was concerned with arms control questions. We had an arms embargo on the Portuguese concerning application in Africa. At the same time we gave and sold large quantities of arms to Portugal for use in the NATO area. There were constant charges about that the Portuguese were subverting this control and sending arms into Africa. We had elaborate ways of trying to follow this up. We worked a lot with the intelligence community. In sum, you were walking a line which pleased neither the European-oriented, NATO advocates in the U.S. policy community nor the African advocates. Given our conflicting interests, this was probably just about right.

Q: At this point, had the Cubans inserted themselves into Angola?

LORE: No, that came in later years, after the Portuguese revolution and after the Portuguese left Angola.

Q: The Portuguese revolution was when?

LORE: In '74.

Q: So, were there indicators that the Portuguese ability to do anything in its territories of Angola, Mozambique, and...

LORE: Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome, and...

Q: ...those place. Was the feeling that this was beginning to turn and that probably pulling out, or...?

LORE: No, I have to say that there wasn't...either during the time I was in Angola or when I was on the desk. No one could really forecast an end to Portuguese control. The rebel groups were divided. The Portuguese had shown a willingness to do what was required militarily. There was some consideration of very mild reform measures, politically, but nothing approaching independence. There was no imminent chance that Portugal was going to be overthrown on the ground in Africa. But then, suddenly, the Portuguese military overthrew the civilian government in 1974. They displayed an extraordinary amount of discipline and secretiveness in keeping their internal discussions and unhappiness away from foreign observers. Very few if any people, whether in or out of the U.S. government or out of the government saw the Portuguese revolution coming. On the other hand, when I was in Angola, we generally felt that if there was going to be a change, it would be in Lisbon, it wouldn't be in Luanda. That's essentially what happened. It took a coup d'etat in Portugal for everything to be overthrown and no one saw it coming, including, famously, the embassy in Lisbon, which had not forecast it at all.

Q: Guinea-Bissau, wasn't this where some of the really tough fighting was going on?

LORE: Guinea-Bissau was the one area where the Portuguese were in real difficulty militarily, and probably would not have survived militarily. That was the one area where Portugal might have been ousted by force. General Spínola, who was a very flamboyant general, quite un-Portuguese, in charge of the fight in Guinea-Bissau, got a lot of publicity with his attempts to stabilize the situation. In point of fact, he became the author of a plan for a kind of dominion status for Guinea-Bissau which was rejected by the Caetano government. That was the first breach in the Portuguese establishment - when there began to be public discussion of that sort of outcome.

The Portuguese Guinea rebel group, the PAIGC as they called it at that time, was the best led and the best integrated with the population of any of the groups. It had the benefit of working in a very small country sandwiched between two friendly (to it) countries, Senegal and French Guinea, and it was led by Amílcar Cabral, whom I met in Washington during those years as a desk officer. He was a very admirable person in a lot of ways, influenced by his communist sponsors, but still, I think a genuine revolutionary.

Q: What about the Soviet Union? Was there a pick-up in their influence or efforts during this period from our point of view?

LORE: No, it was a cheap investment for the Soviet Union and for China. They provided a few arms. They didn't provide any trainers, much less direct military advisors on the ground. They provided some cash and some arms. It was a cheap investment for them and there was no complication because they didn't care about their relationships with Portugal.

Q: On the reverse side, on our side, this later became, particularly Angola became, the CIA became very much involved. But at this period I assume that the intelligence efforts were rather minor?

LORE: Yes. There was not much of an U.S. intelligence presence in the Portuguese African territories. There was a presence in surrounding capitals that had contact with the insurgent groups and in fact gave some help to some of the insurgent groups to maintain our influence with them. Something the Portuguese, of course, greatly resented. But there wasn't much they could do about it.

Q: This is tape two, side one with Mark Lore. Kissinger and his time as national security advisor I take it had not turned his focus at all on Africa. That came much later.

LORE: I think the only White House interest in Africa was to redress what they felt was an imbalance in our approach, to show more sympathy for the white regimes. The feeling was that these regimes were going to be there for the indefinite future and that we had important strategic interests with the Portuguese and in a different way with South Africa that needed to be taken care of. The Nixon White House often saw the State Department as unreasonable in some of our policy actions towards the white rulers of southern Africa. This was the basis for the famous NSDM, or NSDD 38, I think it was, from those years which proclaimed a more pro-white U.S. policy in southern Africa.

After the Portuguese revolution - when I, was not working in the area any longer - many of us who were familiar with southern Africa were frankly appalled by Kissinger's attempt during the Ford administration to intervene on the side of the same people who were being supported by South Africa, in Angola particularly. The reasoning seemed to be simple Cold War logic, that you had Cuba and the Russians supporting one side, so we didn't care if it was South Africa, or whoever it was, we were going to support the other side. We're still living with the results of that. From the Cold War point of view, the idea was we could not take a hit, we could not see our guys lose because this would have global implications. It was the containment policy gone berserk in my view, but it was what ruled American policy in the mid '70s after the Portuguese had left.

Q: This is a little bit before the fact, but did you have any impression of the relative ability, strength, or whatever you want to call it of our embassy in Lisbon at that time?

LORE: Relative to what?

Q: I'm just thinking after the revolution, it was felt our embassy was rather weakly staffed and they sent Frank Carlucci and I guess Herb Okun, who went in there and really

turned things around. I was wondering how we felt about the embassy in Portugal?

LORE: The embassy had been allowed to drift. We had some pretty strong ambassadors during the time I was in Angola, but the embassy had drifted somewhat. The ambassador at the time of the revolution was a political appointee, a very prestigious, well regarded senior lawyer from, I think New York, who had been the legal advisor in the Department. He was a very accomplished but elderly man with little background in Portuguese or African issues. He was not the man to be in Portugal at that time. He didn't have the background, didn't speak the language, didn't attract the kind of staff that you needed.

The story goes that Kissinger, when he came in as Secretary, wanted his own person as legal advisor and sent off...I'm blanking on the name of the man...but he sent off the incumbent to Portugal just to get rid of him. Shortly thereafter the revolution occurred and as you say, there was consternation because you had what looked like a communist-influenced group running the Portuguese government, a NATO ally. So Carlucci and Okun and others went out there and did a tremendous job at really supporting forces of democracy, Mario Soares in particular, and helping to bring about consolidation of Portuguese democracy. It was quite a job.

Q: What was sort of the spirit? I mean, this was your first Washington assignment and sort of the spirit of the African Bureau. What you were dealing with was not a sleepy situation. You have active rebellion going on in all the areas that you were concerned with. This was your first exposure to Washington and to the African Bureau. Did you feel you were a corps apart, somewhat? Sort of united and somewhat neglected?

LORE: I think that puts it well. I think that the African Bureau has always been probably the most collegial of the geographic bureaus in the Department. Most of its people have lived in Africa, often in difficult circumstances. So they tend to rally around and be more emotionally involved in policy. It's also, I think, been collegial because it tends to be shunted to the side by the White House and by the Seventh Floor of the State Department. African concerns are never paramount, even in this administration. So at that time we had a very good Assistant Secretary who, I think, was very popular in the bureau. But also the feeling that things were going badly for the African Bureau, that the White House wanted a more pro-European, pro-white settler policy. Rhodesian sanctions were under severe attack. As we saw, the Congress essentially overturned them in those years. So the whole movement was towards lowering the importance of U.S. relations with black African states.

Q: How did you feel about what you wanted to do? Whither Mark Lore?

LORE: I think that environment had some effect on the way I looked at it. When it came time to go overseas again...I was first assigned to Vietnam in the CORDS operation. I was, as were many people in my cohort at that time, quite unhappy about this for both policy and personal reasons. This was the time in which the Department had failed in its attempts to pressure new officers to go off and do village resettlement operations in Vietnam - so it began to select more middle grade officers whom they felt would have

less liberty to say "No." My wife and I were in the process of adopting a baby at that time which would have been completely stopped in its tracks by my going off to Vietnam. On that basis I was relieved of that assignment and I was told informally that in point of fact the whole thing was falling apart in terms of State operating the CORDS program. Shortly thereafter AID took it over and basically went out and paid contractors to do that work.

So I never went to Vietnam, but I was told to find a place to work for awhile in the State Department and do honest work and not go off to Paris or someplace pleasant. So when I finally came around to assignment overseas I had a choice of Quito or Rabat, both middle grade economic slots. I needed an economic assignment, I really hadn't had one overseas. I didn't want to learn Spanish in those years because I felt that would type me as a Latin American specialist. I liked the idea of learning French, so we went to Morocco. Morocco was in the African Bureau so it seemed to continue my Africanist direction. In point of fact, Morocco is really not an African country. It is a Middle Eastern country and that was recognized during my tour when it was moved over into NEA.

Q: Before we stop this particular session, being in the Department of State '68 to '72, there was an awful amount of turmoil in the country and within the State Department over Vietnam. Did the events of 1970, the Cambodia invasion, or any other time, how did Vietnam impact on you and maybe some of your colleagues...our involvement there?

LORE: Certainly, I think that most Foreign Service Officers of my generation, this is just my impression in Washington, citing polls, had real questions about policy, about the militarization of our efforts there. I think it discouraged a whole generation from getting into Asian affairs because of distaste for our southeast Asian policy. Plus, very frankly, a fear of getting blown up.

Q: Yes! Dangerous out there!

LORE: So people tended to avoid Asian assignments. There was a negative effect on our ability to staff our posts there and get the kind of people that EAP people would want. But we were too old to join the flag burning opposition to U.S. policy, the spear-carriers for those who felt that all U.S. foreign policy was suspect and illegitimate. I think that we as foreign affairs professionals didn't go anywhere near that far. We tried to avoid involvement in the Vietnam policy to the degree we could. Some people couldn't, those are the Tony Lakes and Dick Holbrookes who left. If I had been told that I had to go to Vietnam, I think that I probably would not have stayed in the Foreign Service for both personal and policy reasons. So it was serious, but I would not make too much of it as an ideological opposition.

Q: Were there any reverberations throughout the State Department during the spring of 1970 when there was incursion into Cambodia and officers were signing petitions and all that? Did that sort of bypass you all?

LORE: In 1970 I was still in the African Bureau so day by day it wasn't that pressing an

event within the State Department. The people I dealt with viewed it more as newspaper readers than...it didn't represent an issue they were working on. I can remember, however, the tremendous outpouring of opposition in the country at large. The weekend of the Cambodia invasion my wife and I were in Williamsburg and I can still remember the card tables for petition signing set up along the streets in Williamsburg by students and others...

Q: William and Mary.

LORE: Either William and Mary or other college students. The weather was nice. It was mid-year sometime, I'm not sure if college was in session. But that's my memory of the Cambodia invasion. People with petitions out there in Williamsburg, Virginia... You know, there's a mindset in the State Department that it's not viewed as seemly to get on a soapbox on an issue, particularly if you're not working on that issue. That it is just not part of the culture. So that if you're in the African Bureau, you as an American citizen, as a newspaper reader, may have certain views, but you don't walk around the State Department and stand over the water cooler grabbing people's sleeves and arguing with them. You stay quiet. It's not because you're afraid of people, you're not intimidated, it's just not part of the culture. It's not viewed as appropriate. You're not there to stand on a soapbox.

So I think that in various times in my career I've encountered situations where, still today, there is something very dramatic going on, very controversial, but there is remarkably little discussion among people in the Department. People just don't feel that it's wise to get into issues that don't directly impact on their work. In some sense it compromises your credibility in pursuing the work that you are being paid to do.

Q: Okay, what we'll do the next time, I put this at the end of the tapes so we know where we're picking up, we'll pick this up, you're off in 1970 to Rabat.

LORE: In 1972.

Q: I mean, 1972 to Rabat.

Today is July 9, 1998. Mark, we're off to Rabat, 1972. Did this come as a surprise or was it a requested assignment, or how did it come about?

LORE: It was a requested assignment. It was a position that was at my grade. It was an economic position. I had taken the FSI six-month economic course and had not done any economic work. I obviously needed a working economic assignment, it was time to go abroad, and it was one of two or three possibilities. I was attracted by the chance to learn French in addition to my Portuguese.

Q: When you got to Morocco, 1972, when you first arrived could you describe the state of the country as you saw it and maybe as the embassy saw it?

LORE: It was an interesting time. As I was doing my consultations preparatory to going out, a number of people congratulated me on going out to a place that was about to explode, a place where the government would change. There had been two attempted coup attempts against the king of Morocco in the summer of '71 and the summer of '72.

Q: '71 was the birthday party and '72 was the airplane, attempt to shoot him down.

LORE: Exactly, you've got it right. So the general feeling was that you had another Libya in the making in Morocco and Foreign Service Officers being what they are, people felt this was professionally great, I was going at a good time. When I arrived in Morocco it was a difficult time for the American embassy because the 1972 attempt had been spearheaded by U.S. trained Moroccan pilots flying U.S. furnished aircraft out of a U.S. controlled base in northern Morocco. The king, not surprisingly, suspected U.S. connivance with the plot to remove him from power and to kill him in the process. The attempt was to shoot down his private plane coming back from France that summer. I didn't think at the time, and I've never thought since that there was anything to that -- what would the U.S. have to gain in doing away with a close friend and ally? Nevertheless, the king was at least standoffish, not being quite sure who in the U.S. government might have known or should have known about the coup attempt.

Some of the young Moroccan pilots, U.S. trained pilots, were married to American women. This increased the impression that the U.S. was abandoning Hassan. The embassy thus was in somewhat of a cold freeze as regards the palace. Late that summer and early fall there was a show trial of the pilots which was exhaustively reported in the local press. By the way, the Moroccan press was, and I think still is, remarkably free. You're not allowed to criticize the king as the king directly but otherwise there is a great deal of freedom. Obviously, the government in this case did not try to stand in the way of almost verbatim reporting of the proceedings. So it was a very tense time and nervous time for the American embassy. That dissipated by the winter, however. Whether the king decided to put his suspicions aside or for whatever other reasons, relations appeared to return to normal during much of my tour.

Q: Your tour was from '72 to...?

LORE: '74.

Q: Did the embassy go through the exercise of trying to find out what possible American influences might have been on these pilots?

LORE: I expect so, although I wasn't involved or privy to any such consultations. I'm sure that various people in the embassy were looking at this as well as some people in places in Washington, but it wasn't something I was involved in.

Q: Who was our ambassador then?

LORE: Our ambassador at the time of my arrival was Stuart Rockwell, career Foreign Service Officer who had been DCM in Teheran, preceding this assignment. He was essentially an Arabist and an old line, old style diplomat. Very courteous, but somewhat reserved in his manner and reserved and somewhat distant from the rest of the staff.

Q: Was he there the whole time you were there?

LORE: No, he left probably before he expected to because the White House wanted to put a political appointee in the position. This was at the time that Watergate was beginning to unravel. Remember that Nixon gave one of his famous speeches in which he announced the firing of Haldeman.

Q: It was his chief of staff.

LORE: His chief of staff. It was only shortly thereafter that suddenly the word came that there would be a new ambassador in Rabat. The new ambassador, Robert Neumann came from Afghanistan where he had been ambassador for seven years. Neumann was a California Republican who, in 1964, headed up Republicans for Johnson. When Nixon was elected California Republicans came to him and said, "You may not like this guy." Of course, both Nixon and Haldeman were California Republicans who knew very well why they didn't like Bob Neumann. Nevertheless, it was argued by some powerful people in the Senate and elsewhere that you had to give this guy, who was a foreign policy expert, a job in the new administration. Neumann was sent to Afghanistan, which was an even more undesirable and distant place than it is now. He was allowed, the scuttlebutt said, to essentially just sit there for seven years. The talk was that the White House wanted to just wear him out.

Q: It must have been Johnson who put him in then, because...

LORE: Yes.

Q: Johnson put him in.

LORE: That's right. Johnson put him in but the new Nixon White House prevailed upon to leave him there in order that he...because he did have powerful friends in Washington. But they vowed that they would never do anything else for him. When Haldeman fell out of power, however, that is said to have released him from bondage and he showed up in Rabat soon afterwards as the new ambassador. He was the ambassador for about 14-16 months of my tour.

Q: How did you find him as ambassador?

LORE: He was a man who was very sure of himself. Very sure of his opinions. He's often been compared to having a kind of Kissingerian style about him. Not only the German accent but also an academic who views his opinions as more worthy than those of most other people. He didn't take much of an interest in economics so my embassy section

didn't have as much to do with him as did some others. He did what ambassadors to Morocco have often done, and that is he stayed close to the king. He worried about the security relationship. This stood us in good stead late in my tour during the October '73 war when suddenly the U.S. government looked around and discovered it had no friends in the Middle East, except for Hassan. It used Hassan's close ties with Sadat to develop that relationship. One day we in the embassy were packing our bags and putting them at the door ready to be evacuated when the war kicked off. You have to remember that there were Moroccan troops on the Golan Heights and there were U.S. Naval communications facilities in Morocco that were dealing with the Sixth Fleet which was sending out bombers to bomb those positions on the Golan, so it was a very dicey period. But Hassan realized where his interests lay and essentially brokered the relationship with Sadat. The upshot was that, within a week, we were no longer planning on being evacuated but rather were receiving the Secretary of State for urgent consultations with the King.

Q: Neumann, I believe is Jewish, isn't he?

LORE: I believe so.

Q: Did that play any factor? I'm just trying get, sort of...Morocco is sort of unique in this area and I'm wondering if you could comment on that.

LORE: Neumann's religion played no perceptible role in his effectiveness. Morocco has traditionally been very tolerant of Jews. It's true that, during the '73 war, there were mutterings against the remaining Jewish population. The Jewish population didn't always feel welcome in Morocco but they certainly didn't feel endangered the way they did elsewhere. By and large from the king on down there was an official policy of strict tolerance.

Q: Did you find...again, you're sort of the fly on the wall, you're not in, sort of in the political deliberations, but one of the accusations that's been made against our ambassadors and our embassy in Morocco is they end up identifying so closely with the king that they develop a bad case of localitis, as we call it, rather than representing American interests they seem to represent Moroccan interests. Was that a problem at this period? Did you observe...?

LORE: I think it's always been a problem no matter who the ambassador is. Neumann was not as egregious as some others have been. But the king is very skillful at manipulating us. The king understands, and understood particularly at that time, that the U.S. needed friends. The king needed it, wanted a tight security relationship and a lot of support in the military area. Otherwise, he wanted the U.S. to basically play a relatively passive role in Morocco. We were important to him but I'd argue that, at least at that time, he was more important to us. We needed Arab friends and Hassan was one of the only ones around. Economically, he relied much more on France and on Europe than on us. The one thing we could supply, military hardware, had to be fought for in competition with other claimants. These circumstances inevitably made our ambassador more of an open partisan in Washington. We didn't have much leverage on the Moroccans, they had

a lot on us.

Q: What was the economic work that you were doing?

LORE: We did standard economic reporting on the condition of the Moroccan economy. I did a lot of resource reporting. The Bureau of Mines has been very interested for many years in Moroccan mineral production. It's quite sizable for the size of the country. Morocco was, at the time, the biggest phosphate exporter in the world and one of the biggest phosphate producers, in competition with us to some degree. So we did a lot of minerals reporting. We worked quite a bit, particularly under ambassador Neumann, in the latter part of my tour, on investment promotion. More than I have at any other post in my career. Normally, U.S. economic/commercial sections focus on selling U.S. exports into the country. Investment is certainly supported, but it is not as important an activity. In this case, however it became very important to the embassy to develop various kinds of assistance efforts for the Moroccans to attract American investment into the country. That was the gist of it. Most of the commercial activity was in Casablanca which is a major commercial center.

Q: How did you find life there as far as dealing with Moroccan society? Did you have good contacts and all? Was it difficult?

LORE: Contacts are difficult. It is outwardly an easier society than many others in the Middle East. It has a French veneer and many of the elite bureaucrats in the foreign ministry and elsewhere that you would deal with were French-trained people. They were very, very skillful at their work, multilingual, very smooth, very cosmopolitan. Many of them had French wives. Scratch the surface, however, and it was very difficult to get to know them very well. Moroccans, at least during my time, and I suspect it's still the case, the elite Moroccans with whom an embassy would tend to deal, would have two lives. One was the official life in which they spoke French and did their work. The other was their personal life that they kept rigorously separate and closed to foreigners for the most part. Even closed to many other Moroccans.

Moroccans are not an outgoing people. They're a rather insular culture and it's difficult to break into that culture. I did not speak Arabic or Berber. We didn't have any Berber speakers, serious Berber speakers in the embassy. But our Arabic speakers, some of whom were quite fluent, including Dick Parker, the DCM, had as much trouble breaking into the society as we French speakers did. It wasn't a language thing, it was more a cultural thing. Parker would frequently complain about the difficulty in getting to know Moroccans, where in his long service in Cairo, Egypt he had found it very easy to get to meet and get to know Egyptians on a personal basis.

Q: What about relations with Algeria? How were they at that time in your perspective?

LORE: They were uneasy. The Algerians were supporting the Polisario Front in what was Spanish Morocco. The Algerians were a revolutionary, Marxist regime. On the other hand,

Morocco was essentially a capitalist economy run by large firms, mostly French, and a Moroccan elite - somewhat of a robber baron elite. So the two countries didn't have a lot in common in the way they looked at the world. The Moroccans, having suffered two coup attempts from army officers who were trying to establish a fundamentalist regime in Rabat, understandably were very suspicious of Algerian intentions in this area. Algeria and Morocco have competed for many years. It's not helped by the fact that the Moroccans have always looked down on the Algerians and in fact all others in northern Africa as peasants and they regard themselves as the most culturally developed and cosmopolitan people of North Africa.

Q: Did you find in your economic work that you were up against the French Mafia? I'm using that term very loosely. In other words, did the French establishment didn't want us messing around in their area?

LORE: Yes, it's a fact of life in the country. Most big contracts went to the French. The French were well ensconced at all levels of the bureaucracy. But there are some things that France can't provide and the king's relationship with us was such that you couldn't have blatant favoritism. In the military area, which of course extends into all kinds of hardware and technology, we had an advantage over the French. So this was not a major issue, but certainly we were always aware that the French were very sensitive to our influence in the country - particularly on the commercial side, but also to some degree political.

Q: You say this was your first economic post. How did you feel about both your training and your sort of progress in the field of economics?

LORE: The training was excellent. It's a rigorous course they give at FSI. This was before, really, State entered the computer age. So I didn't get a lot of quantitative economics. But the basic concepts were I think, put across quite well and they were quite helpful in Morocco. The Moroccan economy was an interesting third world economy.

Q: Looking at Algeria where this revolutionary socialist hard-line Marxist government came in and destroyed what seemed to be, at least on the surface, a very wealthy country. They got rid of the French but didn't put anything in its place, they destroyed agriculture, they did everything wrong. One, were we watching the Moroccans to see whether they might be tempted to go this way, and two, were the Moroccans, people you talked to, looking at the Algerians and understanding the trap that they might get into if they tried to get too revolutionary?

LORE: There never was any inclination in Morocco to follow the Algerian example, not even among the Moroccan left. First, the Moroccans look down on their North African neighbors as bedouins - they see Morocco as the only cultured society in the western Arabic world. Second, the organized left in Morocco such as it was, such as it is, is largely trade union based and resembled Western European trade union movements which did not challenge the basic capitalist model. What the generals who tried to overthrow Hassan in the '71-'72 period would have done is only conjecture. The fact is that Morocco has remained a stable, capitalist society. The king has been skillful enough

to stay on the throne, the country has prospered - albeit with great income disparities - while Algeria has continued to disintegrate. This of course has confirmed the views and approach of Morocco's leadership elite.

Q: Did Tangier play any particular role as a bridge to Europe or not?

LORE: No, Tangier at that time, and I suppose it's still true, has diminished in importance. Essentially it is a picturesque ferry stop for tourists. It has little political or economic or commercial importance. It has some cultural importance. But even Moroccans don't look at Tangier with any great interest because it doesn't represent for them the cultural wellsprings of their country in the same way that Meknes and Fez and Marrakech and even Rabat do, the four imperial cities. Tangier is sort of a fabrication largely built and peopled by Europeans. You also have the historical split between French Morocco and Spanish Morocco between which Tangier sat as sort of an anomaly.

Q: As an economic officer and with a commercial hat too, did the Sharia law come into effect? Did it have any impact on commerce? Having served as an economic officer in Saudi Arabia at the end of the '50s I know that the Sharia law didn't work well in modern commerce. I was wondering whether this had any intrusion.

LORE: You'll have to explain the Sharia law to me.

Q: Well, Sharia law is the law of the Koran essentially. It doesn't make allowances for modern commercial practice and all that.

LORE: No, that wasn't a factor in Morocco. To my recollection the only thing in Morocco that was traditional and Islamic in nature was the judicial system. You have to recognize that the French colonized Morocco in a very different way than they did Algeria. Algeria was beyond being a colony, it was considered part of France. It was a department of France. In the case of Morocco, it was a protectorate. It didn't belong to France, France had it by international agreement to administer, but it was not a part of France and it was not a colony of France. There were several other countries including the United States which had a formal role as overseeing this protectorate. So the French were more limited in what they could introduce.

Interestingly enough though, that resulted in a situation where they allowed the traditional culture to maintain its past presence and practices in terms of family life, in terms of judicial institutions, in terms of local government. But they built alongside it a parallel structure of essentially European institutions to run the economy and to run the economic life of the country. This was essentially the balance that the French struck. When the Moroccans took their independence, after a relatively short fight - nothing like the Algerian war of independence - the Moroccans maintained that division as something they felt comfortable with. So commercial life was always quite recognizable to any Westerner.

Q: Did you as duty officer, as an officer of the embassy get involved in any problems with

American youth heading for Marrakech and other places and enjoying hashish and that sort of thing?

LORE: No, occasionally I did a little bit of consular work there and occasionally you would have a problem with young Americans trying to smuggle, as you said, hashish out of the country. Nothing more serious in those days. We didn't have the problem with Americans in jail and the draconian treatment of them that you find in parts of the Arab world and Turkey and Latin America today. There were only a few young Americans trekking around the country. Occasionally there would be a problem such as when a group of them made a stew of poison mushrooms and all died. In general, Americans who were in country in those days largely kept to themselves and were savvy enough to keep out of trouble.

Q: You left there in 1974. What did you want to do and what did you get?

LORE: Well, I had worked in the African Bureau in Washington for some time preceding the Morocco assignment. So I was beginning to look at myself as an Africanist and I thought that would be the natural place to draw a next assignment. I had the French. However, despite that, I was tentatively assigned as the chief economic officer or chief political officer - it was never clear which - in our embassy in Accra. (End of tape)

Q: You were saying you were pleased.

LORE: I was pleased with the Accra posting because it was a good career move. The assignment, however, was canceled. This was the summer of '74, was the summer of the Global Outlook Program, the GLOP that Kissinger proclaimed where everybody had to change their area of specialty. All assignments were reviewed to judge whether the officer involved might have served too long in a particular area and needed to experience a different region. Ironically, my "Africa" service had been in colonial Angola and in North Africa - the latter really being part of the Arab world and, in fact, as I was leaving Morocco, was moved over to NEA. So I had never served in black-ruled Africa. Nevertheless, I was judged to be overly specialized and the assignment was broken. I was assigned as an assistant commercial attaché in Brussels. I was crestfallen. My wife was delighted.

Q: You went then to Brussels. You were in Brussels from when to when?

LORE: From 1974 to 1978.

Q: So I take it, once you were there you adjusted.

LORE: Right.

Q: Or your wife adjusted you.

LORE: Well, I was assigned to the commercial section and did not like it. We had the

usual problem of too many people for too little work. Even in the best of times it seems to me that a country like Belgium and the business sector in a country like Belgium can do business fairly easily without having to come to the commercial section of the American Embassy. American businessmen could usually find their way using virtually every multinational you can think of including headhunters and accountants and banks and all the rest that were in Brussels. I felt at the time and continue to feel that big commercial sections in Western Europe are a pretty marginal activity. Moreover, this was a period when the U.S. economy was going through some tough times, exchange rates were out of line and there wasn't a lot of new trade being generated for macroeconomic reasons. So there wasn't a lot to do. After almost a year of that I was asked to come upstairs into the economic section to be the financial reporting officer and I found that a lot more interesting.

Q: On the economic side. Was Belgium... was this almost the premier international economy? Because this is where almost every European corporation seems to have its headquarters.

LORE: The European Community Headquarters were in Brussels. Belgium itself proved to be a very successful place to invest because there was ample land and excellent road and water transportation. Geographically it was situated right between the big markets. Labor was relatively cheap. The northern part of the country boomed with incoming foreign investment particularly from large petrochemical firms and others who really valued those transportation advantages. So Belgium did very well by the European Community. Belgium itself always regarded the Community as a way out of its language problem. The country is an uncomfortable amalgam of French-speaking and Dutch-speaking peoples. The general prosperity that the EC brought helped to sublimate Belgium's ethnic problems -- Belgians could see that supporting some sort of a Belgian national identity was in the interest of stability. So it has been a very lively place for American business and continues to be. In fact, during my time there, we were beginning to see a great deal of reverse investment from large Belgian firms and banks into the United States.

Q: Did your embassy play any role in this reverse investment? Or were these people...they knew what they were doing, they did it?

LORE: No, we didn't play any role. It's kind of tricky for an American embassy to be out actively encouraging people to take their money out of the country and send it to the United States. You know, at that time Europe was entering a period of very low growth, low job creation, heavy hand of the state, state companies, state social insurance schemes which proved tremendously expensive and so European economies were stagnant. In the late 70's, there were already trends in the U.S. leading towards the so-called Reagan revolution. The new focus on deregulation and liberalization of our economy was very attractive to European entrepreneurs who were frustrated by the lack of opportunities within Europe. So the conditions were already present for reverse investment. All the U.S. government had to do was stay out of the way.

Q: Who was your ambassador? I imagine you had several?

LORE: Yes. The ambassador when I arrived was Leonard Firestone. He was one of the Firestone brothers and died a year or so ago. Firestone was obviously a political appointee, but in an embassy like Brussels it doesn't make a lot of difference. Political and commercial channels between the U.S. and Belgium are well established and the Belgians were happy to have somebody who had some clout at the White House. Leonard Firestone was a very courtly gentleman, very courteous with his staff, low key, accessible. It wasn't unusual to go down to the embassy cafeteria at ten o'clock in the morning and see him sitting around drinking a cup of coffee, chatting with his secretary or with somebody from some section of the embassy. He had no pretensions. He let his staff, particularly his DCM who was John Renner, an experienced Foreign Service officer, pretty much run things.

Q: When the Carter administration came in '77 who came out?

LORE: When the Carter administration came in, Anne Cox Chambers who was from the Cox communications empire replaced Firestone.

Q: Based in Atlanta, wasn't it?

LORE: Yes, she was from Ohio. My recollection is that this family and this conglomerate has strong bases both in Atlanta and in Ohio. There was a Cox who was vice president of the United States, from Ohio. She came from the Ohio branch. There was no southern accent, which people often remarked on because they expected to meet an Atlanta belle. She was also a wealthy contributor and supporter of the political party, in this case the Democrats. That's not to say she was in the Firestone class - Leonard Firestone took over the whole Hilton Hotel every Christmas to throw a big party for all the embassy staff. When you talk about the embassy staff in Brussels it's enormous because there is both the normal embassy, a mid-sized embassy accredited to the king, added to an enormous joint administrative section which serves the three missions we have in Brussels - the bilateral embassy, the NATO mission, and the EC mission.

Q: As financial officer what were you particularly looking at and how did you go about it?

LORE: We did some coverage of the Belgian economy, but relatively little. We did some reporting on Belgian trade issues and Belgian trade policy, but again, even at that time the Belgians were among the first to sublimate their national policies to EC rules. So I dealt much more with my colleagues in the EC mission in trying to understand what Belgium was doing, than with other parts of the embassy. We spent a lot of time working with certain Belgians who had national positions and thus were our property, so to speak, but who were very much involved with the then nascent EC move towards monetary union. We had access to the thinking and plans of these people and to their reporting on meetings that Washington and USIS found very useful even though the issues were essentially non-Belgian. That was a particular opportunity for economic reporting in Brussels at that time. It probably continues to some degree because the Belgians are so

well fixed in the EC bureaucracy.

Q: Well, there really are in many ways, you have the feeling that they have the engine that's driving most of this, at least this is where sort of a lot of the apparatus is recruited from and all that.

LORE: Well, their own government doesn't give them a lot of room. It's a small country and a small government. It has relatively few resources to work with, so the most talented people obviously are working the EC agenda. Belgians have no problem with this orientation; the bigger, better, more active, more intrusive, and more powerful the EC apparatus is, the happier the Belgians are because they see themselves more as citizens of Europe than as citizens of an entity called Belgium.

Q: Did you find yourself up against any sort of jurisdiction, rivalry, suspicion or problems? I mean, here you are a financial officer at one of our three embassies in Brussels which I would think would be sort of...particularly the EC. I imagine the NATO one was not a [problem?].

LORE: Yes, my EC mission colleagues down the street, literally just several doors away, were aware of this and with only occasional transgressions, observed the line. I tried to work with them; if I was going to be seeing a Belgian of interest to them, I'd call and offer to ask any questions they had. As long as they could count on my doing that, they pretty much kept their distance. Now, you can never inoculate the process totally and probably shouldn't try to. People would see each other socially, they would meet at various kinds of meetings, they would exchange words, that was okay. What we didn't want, obviously, was to have these Belgian officials sought out by EC mission people on a regular basis. For their part the Belgians also wanted to observe this line, and so they were cooperative in this.

Q: I'm trying to catch sort of how we looked at things at this particular time, we're talking around, in the '75-'78 or so, concerning the development of the EC. Because I would assume, you're an economic officer, you're sitting around with your colleagues who are working with the EC. Others, I mean, you're looking at this thing as it developed. EC has always been sort of the key element in American foreign relations in a way. Somehow getting the Europeans so they don't fight each other. Yet at the same time I would think by this time there might be some growing concern about, "Yes, this is fine, but what's it going to mean for American trade, and are we building up a rival structure that's going to freeze us out?" I was wondering, try to go back to that time and figure out how were we thinking.

LORE: Well, yes, I mean this was a period of growing trade discussion with the EC. The post-war period was long gone -when the U.S. economy was healthy and dominant while Europe's economies were recovering from the war. The emphasis in those days was all political; the political value of a thriving EC overcame any concerns about rivalry on the commercial side. Well, those days were passing quickly or had passed. There was concern about unfair practices by the EC in commercial matters. Of course these issues

concerned my colleagues in the EC mission more than me. We told Washington very frankly that there wasn't much we could do to encourage a Belgian voice for diluting EC disciplines or subsidies. The Belgian government was focused on building a prosperous EC and just would not carry our water in these areas.

Q: This was to make it easier for American goods to enter the market.

LORE: That's right. The Belgians had nothing against American goods but they weren't about to take up the cudgels for U.S. interests in this respect. Their interest was more a harmonious and growing EC in which the interests of France and Germany, particularly, were more important. France, Germany and Holland were Belgium's major trading partners. So it's understandable that while the Belgians were very polite and very helpful, within the constraints of what they could do, they didn't feel they could do much. They didn't have any appetite for adventurism in trying to test EC disciplines in the councils of the EC by arguing for anything different.

Q: Did Ambassador Chambers show much interest in the economic side of things?

LORE: No, I wouldn't say so, no.

Q: Firestone?

LORE: No. He would occasionally call, and one of the charming aspects of the way he operated, he would just call you on the phone, rather than send notes down or anything else. Every once in a while he would ask you to come up and give him a briefing on this or that - for instance when there was a story out about an exchange rate crisis or problems with "the snake," the band of European currencies. He would want to be briefed but his demands were minimal.

Q: How did you find Washington? I assume you were reporting to the Treasury too, but I would suspect that Treasury probably had their own person right there, didn't they?

LORE: Treasury didn't have a person in Brussels. There was a Foreign Service Officer who did the financial stuff out of the EC mission. I worked, as I say, closely to help him on these matters. Treasury's interests in Belgium as such was minimal. Most of the reporting on the larger EC financial picture was out of the EC mission. This was very early in the move towards monetary union so even EC wide, you wouldn't call it a big story.

Q: Were there any events that come to mind outside of sort of the regular reporting work you were doing during this period?

LORE: It was a fairly routine assignment. There were not any major events. You did a lot of carrying of the mail - every time Washington wanted something to come out of the EC. Most of this is economic in nature. So we'd get cables before council meetings, before a chiefs of state meeting of the EC, or before various kinds of subcommittee meetings. There was always some sort of meeting going on in the EC. The U.S. wanted to

achieve certain things so it would sent out these shotgun messages to every capital in the EC asking us to go in and make a representation. I found that I spent inordinate amount of time, as I did later in Portugal when it joined the EC, carrying these messages. One can argue about how effective all this effort is, given the amount of manpower that goes into it.

Q: When you carried the messages what did you get? Sort of play, well this is it or (inaudible)?

LORE: Yes, you didn't get much reaction because again, the Belgians with very few exceptions were not willing to take a stand against the Germans and the French. Now, where the Germans and French differed, they had to pick sides, but in most cases that wasn't very useful for the United States.

Q: Did you get any feel for the German and French missions to the EC while you were there, particularly on the economic side?

LORE: No. I had no contact to speak of with other embassies. The nature of the work didn't require it. Occasionally you'd meet people socially. Interestingly enough there was a side activity that I think of often these days. It was called the tripartite gold commission. This was a commission created at the end of the Second World War to adjudicate the claims of various countries in Europe who had had their holdings of gold raided by the Nazis. This was a large operation in its day, set up in Brussels for reasons that I've forgotten now. It was a regular commission with people assigned to it from capitals who had full-time jobs operating it.

Over the years the activity dwindled down to become a residual activity by embassy officers from the French, British, and American embassies. The commission's secretary general, by the time I arrived, was an elderly gentleman in his 80s. He is long dead now. He had started off as a relatively young man in the mail room, but over the years had become the commission's font of institutional knowledge. During my time, the British Embassy had given him a back room, he had some files and we had occasional meetings to discuss the commission's last remaining cases. We embassy officers would, in sort of Peter Ustinov style, play our national identities. We would talk about the dispersal of the last remaining parcels of gold - some of which didn't get released for one reason or another, and may not be released to this day. The Tripartite Commission sometime later on was disbanded and left to capitals. Probably some of it is now bound up in the current controversy over money and other asset claims from World War II.

Q: There's a footnote. The controversy today in 1998 is over Nazi confiscation of gold and other things from individuals, mainly Jewish and how Swiss banks, Swedish banks, and maybe other banks may have profited by this. There is a lot of soul searching.

:LORE: The issue is somewhat different but there are some linkages. In any case, that was an activity we spent some time on as well, and basically in my position I was responsible for the American embassy representation on that. Interesting experience,

although not real lively.

Q: Well, I think by this time you must have felt that you really developed your economic credentials both particularly having been... some commercial work but mainly financial, which was more technical. How did this serve you in the future?

LORE: It was a good assignment. It was the solid economic assignment I'd been looking for although, as I say, there were no dramatic events. It was a typical assignment for economic work in the Europe of the day. I learned a lot about the European Community, about how it functions which stood me in good stead later on. It also emboldened me to apply for university training in economics for which I was accepted coming out of Brussels.

Q: So in '78 you went where?

LORE: I went to the University of Wisconsin for a year of graduate economic training.

Q: Why Wisconsin?

LORE: It's probably mostly because my wife's family is in the Chicago area. You spend a career in the Foreign Service continually taking your spouse away and taking grandchildren away from grandparents. The opportunity to be close by for even a year is something that you look at seriously. And, of course, the University of Wisconsin had and I think still has one of the most prestigious economic departments in the country.

Q: I'm think in particularly of labor economics, but others, too....

LORE: Well, they're well renowned for that, but they had a solid economics department. You certainly couldn't say that you were trying to get a soft deal by going to Wisconsin. It seemed a most practical way to give Sandy and our still fairly young children a chance to see more of my in-laws without necessarily living right next door. So Wisconsin seemed to be a good fit. FSI was delighted; most applicants for university training want to do it in Washington, to avoid an extra move, or go to the Kennedy School at Harvard which is not regarded as the most rigorous economic training. FSI wanted to get people into various locations in the country rather than have them all congregate in Washington. So everybody was happy, we went off to Wisconsin for a year.

Q: In the first place, what were you concentrating in the '78-'79 period at Wisconsin in economics?

LORE: It was awkward at first. The University of Wisconsin had never received a Foreign Service Officer on this kind of training assignment. Ironically, surely by coincidence, another officer had asked to go to Wisconsin for the same training, the same year. The two of us showed up and the economics faculty didn't know what to do with us. Wisconsin, at least at that time, had a very traditional economics department. They took graduate students as Ph.D. candidates. There was provision for a Master's degree, but the faculty didn't assign any value to it. If they had no interest in a Master's program, they

were even less interested in providing a one year, non-degree graduate program for government people. So they really didn't know quite what to do with us for a few months. As some of them said to us later on, they thought that maybe we were just there for a good time, to relax and not work.

We did not have the preparation that many of the graduate students had, but we worked hard to bring ourselves up to speed as best we could. I think that that showed we were serious and so by the middle of the fall semester we were brought into the regular graduate program; in my case at least, I did a little extra work and was able to get a Master's out of it. As for the coursework, the first year of graduate school has a pretty well prescribed set of courses. I focused on the theoretical areas, trade and international finance. I did some statistics and econometrics with which I had mixed success. Again, my preparation in statistics and so on was weak. All this was useful grounding, although the heavy dose of purely theoretical economics, essentially studying and building mathematical models, can be frustrating to a Foreign Service Officer. I did audit a course in Marxist economics which showed me the side of the University of Wisconsin that many of us of our generation recognize - the radical, populist side. The graduate economics group were all buttoned down, hard-working computer geeks. The black sweaters and radical attitudes were over on the political side. They're the ones who talked of Marxist economics.

It was hard work. My objective, and I think that of many people, was not necessarily to become a hard economist myself but be able to converse and understand the language and concepts so that I can deal with hard economists, use their work and understand it and make it intelligible to Washington. In that I think I succeeded.

Q: At the time, to sort of pick up the academic world and government interests and all, this is in the late '70s, was there much concern about what we would call today "global issues?" I'm talking about, which are economic ones, but interdependent. Population, pollution, you know, some of these other things. Essentially sort of the global things that are affecting everybody in the world.

LORE: There was. Probably not as much as you would find today, but a fair amount. The focus of international economics and finance then and now was very much the nation state, individual balance of payments, international systems such as the IMF and others. The old fixed-rate regime had been done away with and the new regime of floating rates at that time was not highly controversial. It hadn't had a chance to develop and show some of the problems that we now face. We were four years past from the first oil shock and only on the edge of the second one. At the time the effects of the first oil shock had largely been absorbed. The second one proved much more damaging but that was still in the future.

Q: Being the University of Wisconsin as with the University of California one always thinks of a campus politics. Did they intrude at all or was that just...?

LORE: No, in those years, '78-'79 the campus was very peaceful. I only remember two

demonstrations. One demonstration was by Iranian students against the Shah. This was at the time when that movement was beginning. The other was a sham demonstration to change the name of the University of Wisconsin to the "University of New Jersey" so that Wisconsin would, for the first time, gain respect as "an elite Eastern establishment." This gives you some of the idea of the depth of passion among students at that time. The reverberations of the Vietnam war had pretty well settled out and students were very much concerned with their own education, with getting a job. This largely still continues today.

Q: Well, you got out in the early summer of '79.

LORE: Yes, that's right.

Q: Where did you go?

LORE: In '79 I came back to serve my almost required tour by that time in EB, in the Economic and Business Bureau.

Q: You were from '79 to when?

LORE: I was there from '79 to '83.

Q: When you initially went to EB what type of work were you doing?

LORE: I came to work in the commodity policy office of EB, just following the second oil shock.

Q: The closing of the Suez Canal and that sort of thing.

LORE: In the mid '70s during the Ford administration when Kissinger was Secretary of State, there was a big push to try to avoid the emergence of quote, other OPEC's, unquote. So the U.S. suddenly became very interested in developing and joining international commodity arrangements and agreements to guarantee access to important raw materials, particularly those that were deemed strategic, such as rubber, tin, what have you. We wanted to be inside the tent with the producers, so that unhappiness about price levels or about movements in the international commodity prices could be discussed in a forum where we would have a voice and a vote. So in those years the commodity division of the State Department was a busy place and people were running off negotiating all kinds of commodity agreements. This was part of the so-called North-South Dialogue of the time. By the time I came into EB it was certainly the most lively part of the Dialogue from the U.S. point of view.

Q: Could you explain what the North-South problem was as seen in those days?

LORE: The South - the developing countries were essentially demanding that the global division of income be redistributed by government fiat to provide more income and

revenues to the developing countries, most of which were newly independent countries. Simple as that. From this, the industrialized countries extracted the theme of commodity pricing. Our focus was stabilization of commodity prices; we agreed that such stabilization could be useful for producing countries. They could plan and develop more effectively if they had some idea of a buffer and of a low point and high point beyond which these prices wouldn't move. We could live with that.

The idea was that, if you ran the models, this would probably not mean higher prices to American consumers over time. In fact, for some commodities like coffee it could avoid sudden run ups in prices after a drought, say, because supplies could be released from the buffer stock. By the same token, the buffer stock could acquire supplies at times of overproduction, keeping prices at an economically sustainable level and permitting producers to continue to plant trees and renew investment to keep production from becoming unduly depressed. However, the developing countries looked at commodities as a different issue. They wanted commodity prices increased above market rates as a kind of a hidden aid program to the South. There were other activities in the North-South dialogue, other areas of discussion such as investment, shipping and so on. But resource pricing was the most actively discussed and the one where the South found the North most ready to talk because of the OPEC scare.

Q: Who was Mr. Commodities in those days?

LORE: The head of the office during my time was John Ferriter. But in an issue like this, really State was just one among several players. The Treasury Department was very active, as was Commerce to some degree. Those were the major actors.

Q: Did you find yourself with State taking a different position often on commodity problems than, say, Treasury?

LORE: By the time I came into the office the policy had evolved. When it first began in the Kissinger period I think that there was probably a certain implicit acceptance in the State Department that some additional diversion of revenue to commodity producers could be justified for geopolitical reasons and to preserve our access to vital materials. You have to remember, it was deep in the Cold War; this was not a completely economic question. As time went by, as the demands of the producer countries often became more egregious, the U.S. administration, the Carter administration, became more conservative in the way it looked at these questions. Treasury gained dominance in the process. Therefore we moved to a position of willingness to participate in commodity arrangements, but only if they could be justified on the basis of market fundamentals. In reaction, the producer countries obviously lost some interest in the exercise - as they realized that commodity agreements were not going to be the money pots that they had hoped for.

Q: Did you have any particular slice of this commodity side as far as negotiations and all?

LORE: For the first 18 months or so, I worked mostly on the Common Fund for Commodities, one of the ideas that grew out of the North-South dialogue. The Common Fund was to be an umbrella financing facility for the various individual commodity agreements. It would also have a so-called second window that would provide certain kinds of technical assistance to particular organizations in some commodities where market stabilization wasn't deemed to be an issue but where we would want to help make these producers more competitive. Examples are hard fibers, soft fibers such as jute, certain other kinds of commodities, bananas, things like that.

Eventually, around 1980 or 81, there was a big negotiation in Geneva. I spent many weekends in Geneva hotel rooms. As that played its way out to a final agreement, the common fund was born. It proved to be stillborn; the final negotiated product didn't hold much interest for anyone, but at the time, it was the major accomplishment of the North-South dialogue. After the common fund had been negotiated I moved over to what I found the most interesting assignment in that office and that was to be the desk officer for sugar and also for fibers, hard and soft fibers. Most of my time was spent on sugar policy. By the early '80s the world price of sugar had fallen precipitously. There was a strong movement for protection by U.S. sugar producers, who are very powerful politically...

Q: I imagine you got to know the delegation from Louisiana very well.

LORE: Well, you did. The Reagan administration had just come in and there was the famous deal engineered by David Stockman where in order to get...

Q: This was the director of the Office of the Budget.

LORE: That's right. In order to get yellow dog Democrat votes for the first Reagan budget, which you remember was the major objective of the incoming administration in early 1981, the Reagan administration and David Stockman specifically sold the farm on sugar price supports. That is, the administration essentially agreed to guarantee a level of support to domestic producers if prices fell below a certain point. At the same time, the administration did not allocate any budget monies to do this. The inevitable result was very tight sugar quotas to control the price in the United States to make sure that there never was a point where the U.S. sugar producers would turn that sugar over to the federal government.

This became a very important international issue with the sugar producing countries. It introduced me to the joys and headaches of administering, along with the Department of Agriculture, a sugar quota system. The issues were very interesting and very politically charged. They coincided with a renegotiation of the International Sugar Agreement, taking me frequently back to London and Geneva frequently, which wasn't completely objectionable. So that was a very interesting time, both because of the domestic support program and the international quotas that came as a natural corollary and because of the attempts by the U.S. to fashion a new sugar agreement which would help our domestic situation.

Q: Did Cuba act as a factor, or Cuba went to the...

LORE: Only a relatively small amount of Cuban production went into the world market. For that reason and because of its political isolation, Cuba was not an important force, although it did belong to the International Sugar Agreement. It was one of the few places that American and Cuban diplomats would see each other and talk, but not very much.

Q: How about the Philippines? Were they a problem?

LORE: No, the Philippines were quite happy with our going back to a quota system. The quota system was set up on the basis of historical trade, historical exports of sugar to the United States. Well, the Philippines had been a large sugar supplier for many years so their historical record was very high and their quota thus was quite high. They did as well if not better. Of course, these countries were selling their sugar into an artificially inflated U.S. market and they made a killing on the profit. So some countries like the Philippines, like Brazil, made ritual criticisms of the quota system but in fact they were quite happy with it. The Dominican Republic was another one. Some newer producers who didn't have that historical record and also sometimes were more efficient producers such as Australia, were very unhappy with it.

Q: Did the politics sort of intrude down? I mean, somebody from above would say, "Get off the back of the Australians" or something like that?

LORE: No. There were two places that politics played a role. One was the case of Nicaragua where the Reagan administration was actively trying to undermine the Sandinista government at that time and wished to deny Nicaragua its quota. We in the EB bureau argued against that because we wanted the credibility of the system to remain untarnished. It was a GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)-based formula. The GATT prescribed that if you're going to have quotas they have to be implemented on a nondiscriminatory basis. That was the reason for our using an historical formula. But in this case, we were saying "Well, we know what we said and it applies to everyone else, but Nicaragua doesn't get a quota." The Right wing of the Republican party as well as powerful people in the White House and elsewhere at that time felt that this was disguised foreign aid to Nicaragua and the quota was, as I recall, taken away or at least reduced significantly. So there was a case of politics, but it wasn't very controversial in the United States at that time.

The other case I recall was Rhodesia, which had just become Zimbabwe. Laborious peace negotiations by Britain had borne fruit. It was a free black African country. Because of the sanctions regime on white-run Rhodesia over the years, Zimbabwe had no record at all of shipments to the United States. So we had to devise a formula, a kind of a "what if." If they had been able to ship, what does history show they could have shipped? This was politically driven insofar as the last thing the United States wanted to do was to punish a new independent Zimbabwean state for the sins of its predecessors. But, again, I don't think it was controversial with anyone particularly because everyone understood that we had an anomaly there that had to be addressed. Other than that, it was pretty

straightforward.

Q: Did you stay on this particular thing during the time you were with EB?

LORE: That's right.

Q: Was there a wrench at all when the Reagan administration came in on economic policy?

LORE: Yes there was. The Carter administration as I said had already been pulling back from the earlier attitude of the United States to support commodity agreements. When the Reagan administration came in, it was actively antithetical to them. It allowed some negotiations to continue. In the case of the International Coffee Agreement, for example, one could say that politics did play a certain role because some of the most fervent supporters of the Coffee Agreement were the people who we wanted to support in Central America. So the Central American war played a different role in the case of coffee than it did in sugar. But basically the Reagan administration had little use for commodity agreements which it saw as price-fixing, anti-market arrangements. Over the time of the two Reagan administrations the U.S. commitment to them dissipated to the point where today, I don't think we belong to any price stabilization agreements at all. Since we don't belong they've collapsed.

Q: In '83 where did you go?

LORE: In '83 I was assigned as economic counselor in Lisbon.

Q: Let's stop here for just a second. Okay, you were economic counselor there?

LORE: I went to Portugal as economic counselor. I had not had a Portuguese-speaking assignment since my Angola tour and of course, the degree to which I spoke Portuguese as a Portuguese African desk officer. I had been working in French since 1972, so I had to brush up my Portuguese at FSI. However, it seemed like a natural assignment. At the time Portugal was just emerging from the rocky period after the 1974 revolution. So again, it was a place that people wanted to go to and where they wanted to serve.

Q: You were there from '83 to...?

LORE: '83 to '87, four years.

Q: What was the government like in Portugal at that time when you arrived there?

LORE: In the spring of that year of '83, Mario Soares was elected as prime minister. This brought into power a moderate socialist regime, very close to the United States. Soares and Frank Carlucci, who had been ambassador during the worst period of the military rule after the coup, were very close personally. Politically, the Portuguese situation had been resolved in a way that the United States was happy with. The good guys won. But

economically, the country was a basket case. The difficulties following the revolution -, the loss of the colonies, the return of large-scale white populations from the former colonies creating a big burden for the beleaguered government in Portugal, uncertainty about Portugal's reliability as a NATO ally, a drying up of investment and generation of relatively large fiscal deficits and foreign debt - all created considerable uncertainty.

By the spring of '83, Portugal's very high international debt was viewed as almost unfinancable. It was an economic basket case. There were considerable worries that, while Portugal was making strides politically, it might be undermined by its severe economic problems. But four years later, when I left, Portugal was a member of the EC and politically and economically it was doing great. Of course, I don't take credit but again as in Morocco I went out to a country which was generally thought to be in for a bad siege and in fact things turned out much better than they had been expected to.

Q: Before we examine what happened, when you arrived who was our ambassador and how were American relations then?

LORE: The ambassador was H. Allen Holmes, a career officer. It was his first ambassadorship, his only one. He has been ambassador in other senses, but this was his only bilateral ambassadorship. He was an excellent ambassador, a man who was almost universally liked. Just a very nice and very competent man. The bilateral relationship was a good one. Soares was obviously a man we knew. The U.S. had helped him and Soares knew we had helped him. We'd been a major part of his support in allowing the moderate socialist forces to come back. At the time we were beginning Azores negotiations to renew our base rights - always the major issue between the two countries. But they were being conducted in a non-confrontational way, easier in many ways because we didn't have the African problem that we had had in earlier years when Portuguese governments tried to hold us up on African policy as a condition for continuing our base rights. So the relationship was good, but there was considerable uncertainty at the beginning about whether Portugal could right itself economically.

Q: What happened? Again from your perspective, did the United States have any hand in it? I mean, we're talking about a basket case up to an aspiring young EC member in those '83 to '87 period.

LORE: Well, Soares, when he ran for office, promised the Portuguese people that if he was elected he would give them austerity. Portugal is one of the few countries that I know where you can win on that sort of a pledge.

Q: They're a rather dour, austere people.

LORE: Well, they can be. They're very friendly, very warm people, but they have this outer appearance of dourness and austerity. It's a country that had been beggared by its own colonial ambitions. Portugal was at that time still really more of a third world than a first world country, and most Portuguese were not used to having very much. So austerity may not have held the same kind of threat for them that it might have had for others. In

any case, Soares appointed a strong economic team, worked closely with the IMF, and ran an austerity program that was very tough - as events proved, too tough. It bit harder than it needed to and Soares was ousted when he ran for reelection later on.

But, just to show the Portuguese didn't bear any grudges, they ousted him as prime minister but, oh I guess it was a couple years later, brought him back as president of Portugal. So the Portuguese people still regarded Soares with some affection but he was given a good slap across the knuckles. In any case, the IMF program, the austerity and the growing interest in Portugal as a base for serious investment given its negotiations to join the Community all helped to revive the economy.

Q: What was your role as economic counselor while this was going on? Was it a passive one of looking at it and saying, "Gee this is happening," or was it one where you were helping people to encourage to invest, etcetera?

LORE: Somewhat like Morocco. The embassy did work hard at promoting U.S. investment in Portugal. Again, because this was viewed as important, particularly in a relatively small country, a few big investments make a lot of difference, particularly in certain regional areas. So we did encourage investment. We had some trade problems at the time. Throughout my tour we had serious problems which took a lot of my time in the area of codfish and the area of textiles. The numbers weren't big, but these are two products that are near and dear to the Portuguese heart. They are among the world's great cod fishermen and traditionally had always fished off St. George's Bank. However in the 70's, we largely restricted these waters to our own fleets. Likewise, the Canadians largely closed off theirs to preserve what little is left. So the Portuguese had to go elsewhere. There were delicate negotiations about access to Alaskan waters where we were promoting fishing activity at that time. Sensing their leverage, American commercial interests drove a hard bargain. The Portuguese weren't easily reconciled to traveling to such distant waters and were nervous about the costs of doing so.

The textile area is a more familiar story. Portugal was shipping lots of cheap textiles into the United States. That's something they do very well and they have a highly developed textile sector. They ran afoul of some of our textile limits and this required considerable discussion. It was very politically hot for the Portuguese government because the northern part of the country where the textiles come from is the most politically powerful part of the country.

Q: How did you work this? I can see this, you and the ambassador and all caught between the fact that you want to help encourage the Portuguese to have an industry and textiles is a good one, yet at the same time the mills in North Carolina and elsewhere aren't very happy with this. Did you find yourself with a balancing act?

LORE: Yes, well, the fact of the matter was a country will hit our arbitrary import limits, then there is an immediate call for consultations, and these consultations are inevitably highly political. They're conducted by USTR by this time - and USTR didn't view itself as the protector of U.S.- Portuguese relations or relations with any individual state, but

rather the protector of U.S. textile interests. But nevertheless at the same time they have a mandate to serve the consumer as well, so they can't deliver themselves over to the kind of protectionist positions that the Department of Commerce sometimes defends. When you had a periodic crisis, in quotes, where we would suddenly put the breaks on imports, there would be consultations, there would be a certain amount of give and take, and some arrangement would be worked out.

We followed the textile sector closely because of this. But we had good working relationships with the Portuguese officials involved. We also had some issues on shoes which were getting important at that time. There you didn't have a formal quota mechanism but you also had some protectionist pressures coming out of the United States. We got through it okay, but it was, I don't know if it still is, but trade was during those years a significant irritant in U.S.- Portuguese relations.

Q: I would think that even with the USTR who has only one client and that is the United States economy as opposed to the government, would be less likely to want to beat up on the Portuguese than say some other countries too, in a way. Was this ever a factor? I mean, the Portuguese have a good image in the United States and it's not like some of these other ones where it looks like you've got masses of...like the Chinese, Taiwanese, Mexican, or something, where you've got masses of ill paid labor and it could flood us. I would think the Portuguese would be treated somewhat differently. Was there that feeling at all?

LORE: Well, probably in the background there is. If our relations with the country are generally good, then I think it does affect the climate of these talks and perhaps the ultimate willingness of people to compromise. Obviously, the State Department, which has influence, believe it or not, in these discussions is going to fight harder for Portugal in those days, particularly given the concerns about stability, than it might for some other country. But I wouldn't exaggerate the importance of all this. It does seem to me that textile policy is run on a highly micro-basis, where you're not talking about Portuguese textiles per se, but you're talking about provision of men's wool overcoats, say, from any source and you get into very highly differentiated markets where it's difficult to show a lot of flexibility without real questions being raised by U.S. producers and other foreign suppliers.

Q: What was your impression of Portuguese negotiators, government people, and all, the people that you were dealing with?

LORE: In the textile area they were okay. They tended to string things out, which is a Portuguese way of doing things. They tended to complicate things. But they were businesslike and usually tried to play the game the way we felt we had to play it rather than excessive pleading to higher levels which some countries try to do. So by and large they were cooperative negotiators and we got business done. The Portuguese government is small and their depth isn't great. Their ability to deal with our much more numerous delegations and far greater resources was a problem off and on, but that exists in many cases.

Q: What was your impression about the Portuguese attitude towards the Reagan administration? I think by this time, or I'm not sure, maybe you were there at the time of the bombing of Libya and all that and our action in Nicaragua and Grenada and all that. Was there concern about what's the United States up to, or not?

LORE: The Portuguese were not in the EC yet so they didn't have those constraints. They were among our most loyal allies. This was so, even in areas where there was some controversy domestically about the U.S. position. For example, there was only muted criticism of Grenada, despite the fact that most European countries took a more forthright stand against it. The Portuguese permitted aircraft to refuel and use Portuguese airspace during the Libyan bombing, again something that was controversial in places like France. So no, we had extensive cooperation as events later proved. In fact, although I didn't know about it at the time, Oliver North had engineered shipments of some of these Iran-bound missile components through Portugal, a sign that the White House at the time viewed Portugal as a particularly pliable ally.

Q: What about the role, again from your perspective, of Sweden and...I'm thinking that Portugal... "starling" is not the right term, but was a favorite. The socialist governments in Sweden and Germany and France felt that they wanted to make sure that a moderate socialist country survived so they were quite active. How did you find this? Helpful, not helpful? What was the role?

LORE: Very helpful. Particularly the German support.

Q: The SPD.

LORE: Yes, was very, very important. Arguably as important if not more important than the support the United States gave.

Q: But we weren't running crosswise?

LORE: No, we were working together on that. It was true that just after the Portuguese revolution when Kissinger was Secretary, Kissinger had the idea of just letting Portugal collapse and it would be the so-called inoculation in Western Europe against any other adventures in communism. Take a small relatively insignificant country, let it go communist, it collapses, it shows how terrible things are, and you can use that as the bad example to the French and Italian communists and others as this is what happens if you go down the wrong path. Carlucci opposed that policy vigorously and won out in the internal debate.

Q: I think it's one of the great moments of American post-war diplomacy.

LORE: Yes, and Carlucci gets a lot of credit for basically saying, "Look we don't need to give up on this country. We've got friends there, things we can do." Working with others like the Germans and so on in a small country where the public was predisposed to a Western and pro-West orientation, it proved to be doable.

Q: Was there anything else you think we should cover at this point in Portugal?

LORE: No, I think that my last two years particularly were heavily involved with the oncoming EC membership. As Portugal negotiated its way into the EC this had several ramifications. In general, however, Portugal never had much trouble in the negotiations. The European Community of that time was not worried about Portugal. It was too small. They were worried about Spain. But the Portuguese were not controversial.. Everybody wanted Portugal and Spain to come in to consolidate democracy in these two countries and the Portuguese did not offer an economic threat so it was a done deal.

We covered this extensively with the foreign ministry and with other parts of the Portuguese government that were negotiating the accession arrangements. In the final year the U.S. became concerned with possible trade effects. It had to do with soybeans and it had to do with soy oil and other issues where the EC was trying to extract from Portugal certain commitments to buy European rather than world market which meant us. This was something we were quite concerned about and made a major issue with the European Community at the time of Iberian accession. So that also was a major focus of my last year in Portugal.

Q: How did it come out?

LORE: It came out with the usual kind of muddled compromise. But I think it came out with a compromise that we could live with.

Q: One, we had a Secretary of State, George Schultz, who had an economic background, probably the only one....the only Secretary to have this. Did you feel his hand on things? Not necessarily on Portugal, but on economic matters?

LORE: I don't have the impression that Schultz, as it turned out, had much time for international economic policy. I think he came in intending to be much more active in that area. But the reality of the position of Secretary of State is that you're on a plane most of the time putting out fires in places like the Middle East and you really can't get into GATT renegotiation or IMF diplomacy or other things that you would like to do, even absent the competition from Treasury and other people who have the inside track on these issues. While we appreciated having a Secretary with a feel for economic policy and economics, in point of fact, most of his time had to be spent on political matters.

Q: At this time looking at the accession of Portugal into the EC, I take it, because of the concerns about soybeans and all there was even a greater concern about the EC as being exclusionary on our part.

LORE: That's right. There was great concern that the EC would use Iberian accession to shut the U.S. out of some quite lucrative markets. It's got to be remembered that while Portugal is a small country, it was a pretty significant agricultural market for U.S. goods. Portugal has to import much of its agricultural consumption. So particularly in areas like

wheat, corn, oils, rice, Portugal is a major consumer and a very attractive market.

Q: Well, why don't we stop at this point and next time we'll pick it up where you left Portugal in 1987 and you went off to...?

LORE: I came back to be the deputy director of Brazilian affairs.

Q: Okay, we'll pick it up then.

Q: Today is the 23rd of July, 1998. All right, it's now 1987 and you're off to the Brazil desk or whatever it is.

LORE: Deputy director of Brazilian affairs. I reported into that work in the summer of 1987 after having left Lisbon.

Q: You did that until when?

LORE: I was deputy director for a period of something like a year. I don't remember the exact dates anymore. I worked for Dave Beall who was the director, Bob Gelbard was the deputy assistant secretary. After the year Beall was asked to move upstairs to become executive assistant to the assistant secretary and I took over as director of the office. So this is about late 1988, about the same time I was promoted to the senior Foreign Service.

Q: So you did this from '87 to when?

LORE: In the total time for Brazil in the Office for Brazilian Affairs from the summer of '87 to the summer of '92.

Q: Wow, that's a good solid year.

LORE: Five years.

Q: Well, let's talk about the state of Brazilian affairs in 1987. Brazilian-American affairs and also the government in Brazil at that time.

LORE: Starting maybe with the government; it was only two years after the government had returned to civilian rule in 1985. The military had left power. You had a weak civilian government with rather poor leadership, in part a development of circumstances. The first civilian president of Brazil replacing the military was to be Tancredo Neves, a very astute and well-regarded politician, although not necessarily a modern man. In any case, no one will ever know what Tancredo would have been able to do. He was elected in an indirect election that was allowed by the military as they walked out the door. Then Tancredo died on the eve of his inauguration, leaving the presidency with his vice president Jose Sarney. Sarney was a compromise candidate who had been a supporter of the military governments. He was not exactly what lots of folks had in mind as the first step toward a new day.

In any case, Sarney was a career politician of some ability, also a fairly well regarded poet. But he was both unwilling and, I think, unable to cope with the terrible financial problems that Brazil was having at that time. The country was essentially broke, inflation rates were very high, something on the order of 2,000% a year, and because of its foreign debt it couldn't really raise money on foreign markets. There were lots of big economic problems -- in true Brazilian style the new administration tried a number of flashy tricks to try to rectify things. They only succeeded in making things worse. So this created a lot of frustration. There was also at the same time a constitutional convention going on in the city of Brasilia. Those in the congress were double hatted as representatives to the constitutional convention. This meant the congress was doing even less than it normally did and it was distracted by the needs of writing this new constitution.

As in many countries under authoritarian rule for a long period of time - in the case of Brazil, 21 years - there were many wish lists around as to what people wanted to insert in the new constitution. Many political pressures had built up over that time, with attendant agendas. The new constitution quickly became unwieldy.

All this was going on when I came in on the desk. It contributed to rather scratchy relations at the time with the United States. We were in the midst of several very bad trade disputes that the Reagan administration was pressing for domestic reasons. Brazil was a country that, while important enough, was not the kind of country where the U.S. saw serious political costs to acting tough on trade. We were rather vociferous about disputes on matters like informatics, computer trade, intellectual property and other things.

Q: To be fair, they had a rather flourishing industry didn't they...or at least serving as a center of pirated things?

LORE: Piracy was part of the mix here. There was indeed open circulation of pirated items, avoiding US copyright laws, such as computer software, music CDs, movie videos, apparel, etc. There were in particular questions of copyrighted software being distributed in Brazil; the big problem was more that, by manufacturing its own computers, computer hardware and software, whether licit or illicit and keeping ours out, Brazil was frustrating a very important part of our export potential there. This was the basis for the famous "informatics" dispute.

We were suffering from a trade deficit internationally and with Brazil. This was one of the areas where we felt we could really sell into Brazil. At the same time, we pointed out that Brazil was hampering its own economic and industrial development because its protected production of home-grown computers and software was not really world competitive without this kind of protection at the border. On the other hand, there was a feeling on the Brazilian side that they had overcome their military dictatorship, that their new civilian government was struggling and the United States, far from helping, was in fact looking for ways to be hurtful. I don't think that was fair, but I think that was part of the emotion that was around at that time.

Q: Did Brazil have laws in place at this point, sort of, "We can do everything on our own" and trying to keep foreign goods out and that they would sort of produce everything themselves?

LORE: Yes, they had strong national industrial policies, infant industry policies which had begun in the 1950s and were expanded by the military government. These policies may have made some sense in certain industries at a certain time, the automotive industry in the 50's, for example. But they had long outlived their usefulness. In addition, they had extended into areas such as computers which were not really appropriate for that kind of national policy. The difficulty in these matters, of course, is that the louder the United States yells about these things, the more the other government will use that opposition to rally its population against foreign protests. There was a latent suspicion in Brazil - which I think has now largely disappeared - that U.S. industry wanted to come down and basically take over Brazilian industry and markets and to hamper Brazilian development in the interest of exporting into a big market.

Q: Pharmaceuticals, were they in this too?

LORE: Yes. Brazilians did not recognize patents on pharmaceuticals. This was a big issue and remained one for some years.

Q: If I recall too, it wasn't just Brazil but there was a spillover into...Brazil was surrounded by...I mean, most Latin American countries...and the borders were kind of... I mean smuggling was a pretty big business, wasn't it?

LORE: Well, yes. It wasn't so much smuggling but Argentina also had counterfeit pharmaceuticals and didn't recognize patents on pharmaceuticals - in fact, does not to this day. It's a remaining issue for us with Argentina. But I think that any time you have a large country and a major trader which follows practices which are egregious in the trade area and we don't have overwhelming political military, geopolitical stakes in that country - at that moment, you have a recipe for a hard line U.S. stance. The U.S. bureaucracy believes strongly that to ignore infractions from one direction makes it very difficult for us to crack the whip with others. So it's not surprising in terms of our own politics and enforcement of our own worldwide interest that we went after the Brazilians.

Q: Would the U.S. Trade Representative, the USTR sort of lean on you to do things or did they go their own way, or?

LORE: The Trade Representative's office at that time was cooperative with the State Department. There was not much distance between the State Department and USTR in terms of the strategy or the tactics of pursuing Brazil on these questions. There would be occasional differences and marginal differences on the operational side. USTR then and now doesn't have the horses to do all the work. They need to work cooperatively with State and Commerce, particularly if the U.S. was to be effective. I think the teamwork was pretty good in those years.

Q: Well, let's stick to the economic side which in many ways was the name of the game, wasn't it? We'll move to the other side, but Chile had the Chicago Boys following...Chilean economists who had been trained in the University of Chicago, rather conservative economics, seemed to be working quite well. I was wondering whether there was anything the equivalent in Brazil or were we giving advisors or something to try to move their economy out of the mess it had gotten into?

LORE: No, Brazilians are rather stubborn in these areas. Brazil sees itself as a large country with educated people and with its own way of doing things. They don't take advice easily from outsiders, particularly in the economic and financial areas. Nor would we, to be fair. They had very qualified economists. They had people who had studied in the States who could measure up to the best you would find internationally. But I think that the politics of the country combined with weak leadership did create situations where the Brazilian government tried to have it both ways - opting for easy fixes rather than taking hard steps towards reforming its own practices, particularly a tendency towards fiscal deficits. Admittedly, this is a painful thing to do. The budget deficit, both federal and state, were way out of line and getting worse and were an engine for continued and growing inflation. The problem persists to the present.

Brazil would not take advice from the IMF and avoided an IMF program feeling again that it was different and it didn't need that kind of help. The nadir of this whole period was the so-called Cruzado Plan in the mid-80's which was very, very popular and very, very irresponsible... The Cruzado Plan gave Sarney a great amount of support in the congress, but the plan ultimately collapsed. It artificially held down prices on all sorts of goods and commodities in the country for a short period of time, created a buying boom that then ran out of steam. There was no incentive on the production side, so essentially goods ran out and people were without goods on the shelves. This was a very serious period.

So you had a worrisome situation as I say, with poor leadership and frustration. The successful reassertion of civilian rule, restoring prosperity, all these goals seemed elusive. Brazil has always thought in big terms. You know, "*grandeza nacional*." Brazil had gone through a period during the military dictatorship when it was growing at ten percent a year during the major economic boom of the 1970s and there was an idea that this could go on forever. It didn't, it collapsed after the oil shocks and the new government was not able to find the key to restarting growth. Instead there was terrible inflation, triggering Brazilian financial and trade measures which caused an adverse U.S. government reaction and, on the part of the private sector, a lack of interest in investment. Which meant that Brazil's economic relationships with the rest of the world were in very poor repair.

Q: I have sort of the feeling that here is the colossus of the south and the colossus of the north and there really wasn't an awful lot going between them.

LORE: That's right. Brazilian diplomats and others would come to Washington and

would constantly harp on how we need a more positive agenda. What they were saying was, the U.S. only talks to Brazil when it has complaints. But there wasn't else to discuss at that time. In addition to the economic area we had serious problems with Brazilian long range ICBM-type missile development and with their nuclear program which had become a major flashpoint during the Carter administration but still remained a grave concern in Washington.

Q: While the Brazilians were doing this nuclear weapons missile business, usually you can point to somebody, I mean, another country. Was this sort of a national pride toy, or were they concerned?

LORE: I think there were those in Brazil who argued the United States only really pays attention if you develop nuclear arms and thus oblige attention. So this was something...this was perceived as a ticket into the first world so to speak. I think there was concern about the Argentine program as well. It wasn't exactly an India-Pakistan situation but you did have concern that Argentina and Brazil were verging on a nuclear and missile arms race.

Q: We talk about we have to have a more positive attitude, more cooperation, you know, but frankly, what I'm trying to say is, what was there to cooperate about?

LORE: There wasn't a lot. We also had at that time a fair amount of finger pointing on the environment. Tropical forest burning in the Amazon had just become a big issue. Brazil's record was not good. It was ineffectual at trying to control such burning. During the military period there had been a policy of actively encouraging poor settlers from the northeast to move to the Amazon for both political and demographic reasons. These people went out and burned plots in order to farm. This sudden influx of poor populations into the Amazon was environmentally very destructive and all of these pigeons came home to roost about the time the civilians took over. On our side there was a lot of gratuitous fingerprinting by U.S. Senators and others who would come down and give press conferences about what Brazil should do. I've always thought that the *Exxon Valdez* incident at that time, if it had any saving grace, was that it reminded many Americans that our environmental skirts, so to speak, were not all that clean.

Q: Explain what the Exxon Valdez is.

LORE: The *Exxon Valdez* was the oil tanker which ran aground off Alaska and polluted the shores of Alaska. It was a terrible scandal that still is not completely repaired today. It was a world-class environmental disaster and I think it reminded many American, particularly those in Washington, that environmental pollution was a problem in which nobody had a perfect record. In any case, the environmental issues began to turn around. In later years, they have not been as much of a problem with Brazil - largely because the Brazilians have become much more environmentally conscious.

With time, the trade disputes were largely resolved, or if not resolved, at least worked out in a way that permitted both sides to work them in separate, more technical channels. The

financial problems, as financial problems tend to do, were corrected because they had to be corrected. There was just ultimately no choice. Brazil had to sit down with its creditors in New York and hammer out a deal. Brazil's strong point here was that the size of the economy and the relatively small size of the foreign debt, even though it was very large in absolute terms, compared to the Brazilian economy. It wasn't hard, ultimately, once you got over the political hurdles, to fashion an arrangement for a long term payoff of the debt. It's going along very well and it's proved quite absorbable for the Brazilians.

Q: Were your bosses, assistant secretary for ARA and others saying, "For God's sake, come up with something positive we can do with this." Were you sort of sitting around saying, "What can we do nice," or something?

LORE: Yes, there was a lot of that and I'm not sure how much we ever did come up with that was positive that made sense and that didn't cost money. But of course you didn't have much hope of getting budget allocations for Brazil, particularly given the generally hostile attitudes in Washington towards that country at that time. There were some successful attempts at developing scientific cooperation. Brazil has some world-class scientists who were educated in the United States and were used to working with American scientists. That was jumping on top a moving train. But beyond that, no, I think we were more or less obliged to wait for a government with which we could work more easily, and wait for the Brazilians to finish their constitution writing and to begin to talk seriously with their creditors about their debt. Those things came about in the late '80s and in 1992 a new government was elected with a modernist president, although he proved a failure for other reasons. But at least he took some steps to open up areas of dialogue we hadn't had in the past. That helped. That was Fernando Collar.

Q: How did the nuclear issue work out during your time?

LORE: It was always felt that you needed Brazil and Argentina to join hands and jump off the cliff together, so to speak. To take the initiative jointly. When both countries found themselves in the mid-'80s with new civilian governments, there was an opening for creative diplomacy. Brazil and Argentina engaged in some extremely creative diplomacy where the president of each country visited the nuclear installations of the other creating a basis, both for their bureaucracies and in popular opinion, for an arrangement. Brazil and Argentina negotiated an arrangement, an international control mechanism headquartered in Rio, which exists to this day.

This arrangement - called ABECC - is still often cited as a possible model for Pakistan and India. Both countries avoided existing international control mechanisms such as the Nonproliferation Treaty to which they didn't belong. They based their actions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Latin American NPT. But ABECC was well put together. It gained credibility from the international nuclear establishment and it provided the basis for presidents Collar and Menem to officially end their nuclear weapons and research programs.

Q: Did we play any role in that?

LORE: I don't think we played much of a role in the final solution. I think in years previously to that we certainly had made clear on our concern and our willingness to work with the two countries... I think that probably was helpful in getting across the idea that if they were willing to take the necessary steps we would be supportive, as in fact we have been.

Q: Was there any change when the Bush administration came in '91, as opposed to the Reagan administration? They were both Republican, but I was just wondering if there was a change in attitude, or Brazil just wasn't that much of a focus of things?

LORE: Latin America still wasn't a big focus but it became more of a focus in the Bush administration. The Bush administration created a program called the Enterprise for the Americas which was based on private trade and investment development, not on official aid flows. This was a region-wide initiative, it was not taken just for Brazil. In fact, I think probably the framers, the people that wrote it, largely in Treasury, didn't look at Brazil as an immediate target of this program given Brazil's problems. It has, in recent years, however, been very much the focus of U.S. trade and investment efforts in South America. So this wasn't viewed as a Brazil program, but it was welcomed by the Latins as something that made a lot of sense, that offered some carrots and didn't brandish too many sticks, which the Latins are always sensitive to.

The Bush administration also marched smartly away from its predecessors' Central American involvement. While Central America is not of any particular interest to Brazil, our fixation there had been frustrating to the large countries of Latin America because they felt that the U.S. was diverting all of its attention and resources into small guerilla wars in tiny countries. They believed that the U.S. really wasn't focusing on the major priority which was them. I think they were right. The fact that this was a self-serving argument doesn't mean it was wrong.

Q: Speaking of wars, did you all get involved at all during the Gulf War when Iraq invaded Kuwait. I was just thinking that Brazil being a major country, did we make any overtures or do anything with them to get their support.

LORE: No, Brazil was not prepared to do what Menem did in Argentina and that was to actually send some limited assistance to the Gulf. Brazil initially was not particularly helpful on the Gulf War question. Brazil had developed very strong trade relations with Iraq in the years preceding the war. Brazil had made a fair amount of money by providing arms to both sides, arms and vehicles.

Q: Iraq and Iran.

LORE: To both Iraq and Iran in the first Gulf War and Brazil was uneasy about its investment, particularly in Iraq where they were owed a great deal of money. So I think there was initially a tendency in the Brazilian foreign ministry to look for ways in which Brazil could stay on the sidelines. This was not popular in Washington but it wasn't terribly important either because essentially we had our coalition. We didn't really need

the Brazilians we just wanted them to stay out of the way. They did so, so that was pretty much it.

Q: You mentioned the foreign ministry and all. Within the American Foreign Service the Brazilian foreign service has a very high reputation. What was your impression when you were dealing directly with it, about how it worked?

LORE: Of course, the impression I have is an impression that has been developed over many years. Not only from those assignments, but later on as DCM in Brasilia. The Brazilian foreign service is a very able, very impressive group of diplomats. Many of them are children and grandchildren of diplomats, although this tendency has lessened in recent years. It's a somewhat ingrown corporation, generally well off to wealthy, generally raised overseas, extremely well educated, classical diplomatists. These are people who are much better than we are at knowing the history and traditional practices of diplomacy. They suffer from, I think, the other side of many of the same qualities. They are somewhat elitist. They don't represent their country, certainly racially, or in class terms as well as, say, the American Foreign Service has come to. Their focus on traditional diplomatic practices and values sometimes blinds them to opportunities which might depart from those practices.

A case in point was when Fernando Collor, the president elected after Jose Sarney finished his term. When Collor came in he unilaterally removed many trade barriers and reduced trade tariffs in order to get Brazil to develop into a less protectionist, more open market global trader. I think this part of Collor's foreign policy was well conceived. There was a great deal of unhappiness about the program in the foreign ministry; they complained that Brazil was giving away quids without getting quos. In other words, if you were going to lower trade barriers, you don't do it unilaterally, but you do it though negotiations.

Well, I think one could argue that to provide a dramatic indication of new Brazilian direction this was the right way to go and to the degree that needed Brazilian investment relied on actually on getting these things done rather than having years of negotiations. It was much better for Brazil to get the resulting cash flows sooner rather than later. But the Itamaraty diplomats love negotiations. That's their stock in trade and sometimes they're criticized for losing the forest for the trees - negotiations become almost more important than what you're trying to achieve at the end. In sum, Brazilian diplomats are a formidable presence in their government. They have very strong support, generally, within the Brazilian government and from a succession of Brazilian presidents both military and civilian. They're much better placed in the power struggles in Brasilia than we are in Washington. They take good advantage of that.

I think that many of the more reflective diplomats at Itamaraty, however, recognize that there will be new demands and new things that are required as Brazilian democracy consolidates itself. As its congress becomes inevitably more active in foreign affairs, as other agencies of the government assert their interest in foreign affairs more aggressively than they have so far,- Brazilian diplomacy will have to reflect more views and inputs

from outside the formal foreign ministry bureaucracy. Another factor moving things in this direction is the consolidation of the Mercosur free trade arrangement with its neighbors.

Q: This is a southern cone...

:LORE: A southern cone, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, with Chile and Bolivia as associate members. Mercosur is seen as a kernel for the development of a broader South American trade grouping that would be an alternative to NAFTA if you will, and it's gone very well. But as you ground your foreign policy in such arrangements, I think it's a real question whether any foreign ministry, no matter how adept, is going to be able to exercise total control.

Q: How did find the Brazilian media was covering the United States during that period? Or was there really much interest?

LORE: There's a great deal of interest in the United States. Relatively minor developments in our politics or economics are front page there. There's a fascination with the United States, a love-hate relationship, we might say, with the press. The press in Brazil is very good. It's very lively, not always responsible, but it has had quite a good record of muckraking over the recent years to the point where they essentially got a president impeached for corruption through their discoveries and hard detective work in bringing out some scandals. But since Brazilian journalists are intellectuals, and I think it's fair to say, tend to be more to the left, the tone of press coverage is often rather cynical about the United States, that is often questioning and disparaging.

At the same time, the papers indulge themselves in long articles and features about Disneyland and various aspects of the United States such as our music, business and culture. Brazil, whether all Brazilians like it or not, is submerged in North American culture. You only have to go there to see the movies. listen to the radio. The character of the two populations has many similarities and I think that tends to encourage a interest, a fascination with American life.

Q: How did you find the Brazilian embassy operated? Some embassies understand where power is and worked the corridors of Congress as well as elsewhere. Did the Brazilians seem to play that game or were they very active?

LORE: No and I don't think they do much even to this day. They give lip service to the idea of working the Congress, but I don't think they really know where to start. In fact, I don't think they're alone. With the possible exception of Mexico, there is no Latin American embassy which really spends any time on the Hill. To be fair, it's a hard nut to crack. It's hard to get to see staffers, much less members. Diplomats can't open doors in Washington the way diplomats can open doors, particularly American diplomats in many other capitals. It is another world on Capital Hill, as it is for us to some degree, so you can imagine how our diplomatic colleagues feel coming from other countries. They are often frustrated by the difficulty of finding the locus of decision making on any particular

issue at any particular time within the executive branch, let alone the congress. I have to admit, it's often hard to figure who's making decisions, if anybody.

Q: Were there any other issues in this '87 to '92 period?

LORE: From '87-92 drugs were becoming a major issue for the United States. Drugs came to be proclaimed as a major if not the major American preoccupation in Latin America. Brazil was not in the front lines in this area because they do not have a cocaine industry. The stuff isn't grown there or processed there. But Brazil, given the fact it borders on countries which do have this problem and is used as a route to ship drugs to the United States and Europe, both through ports and by air, became part of our drug focus.

Our relations with Brazil over this have been okay, Brazilians still don't give it as much importance as we think they should. They argue that it's just simply not as big a problem for them as it is for us. They argue that they've got populations which are undernourished, they've got regions of the country that are essentially lawless, they've got environmental devastation, they've got other major problems. So we have a difference in that area but it's one where we've agreed to disagree and cooperation hasn't been too bad - and is improving.

Q: Were we keeping a...through our embassy but other means...of keeping a close eye on the military during this period? To see if they were going to get restive and try to move back in?

LORE: There were those in Washington and in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs who felt that we should be more worried about the military. I took the position that we didn't need to worry about the military. The military, in Brazil at least, were exhausted. They had run the country for 21 years. They had run it basically into a sandpit. They left feeling unappreciated. Their professional expertise, their equipment, their doctrine was all hopelessly out of date because trying to run the country had distracted them. They had no appetite at all to come back in. It didn't mean that they wouldn't occasionally send a message publicly or privately when they felt that the civilians were going off course. But there wasn't really a saber behind that and I think that is still very much true.

It could come someday that you'd have a renewed threat, but it seems increasingly unlikely. Latin America - certainly including Brazil - does seem to be embarked on a period of sustained democratic rule. These democracies are not perfect by any means, they have their weaknesses, but they're not particularly susceptible to military coups. The situation in some of the smaller countries is less favorable, but certainly the big countries appear to be relatively stable. One has to remember that in Brazilian history, the military have only taken power when they were in effect invited by civilian factions to do so. In Brazil, unlike in some Latin American countries, there is not a military *deus ex machina* that decides on its own when it might take power.

Q: Should we move on then do you think? In '92 whither?

LORE: In '92 I was assigned as DCM in Brasilia. It was a natural development from being office director for Brazilian affairs. As these things develop, they're always somewhat haphazard. The new ambassador appointed in '92 by the Bush administration was Alec Watson. Watson was a Brazilianist, who had also had high-level assignments in other parts of the area. He knew Brazil very well. I think it's fair to say he was delighted by the chance to be ambassador to Brazil. He asked me to come as his DCM. I did not know him well before then but we had had some phone conversations and I guess he might have valued my recent contact with the issues - he had not been working on Brazil in recent years. He had himself been DCM in Brasilia some years earlier. So I think he saw some value in having someone who was aware of the issues and personalities. As it happened, I took the assignment, went out in the summer of '92, but Watson never became ambassador. Late in the Bush administration, the Senate began to delay action on presidential nominations requiring confirmation and he ran out of time. The Clinton administration came in, renominated him to be ambassador to Brazil, but then ran into terrible problems trying to find an assistant secretary for Latin America who would be acceptable to various interest groups in the United States.

Q: Particularly Senator Helms I guess.

LORE: Well, not only Helms. They first decided on a black Cuban-American, a lawyer from Newark. The Clinton administration tripped over itself, as it did often in those first months, by not really focusing on the fact that this guy may have been a black of Cuban descent, but he wasn't one of the Miami Cubans, he was a Newark Cuban and he was looked at with some suspicion. I'd hope it wasn't racial, although there were some charges there was a racial component to it. But certainly, he was looked at with some suspicion by the wealthy Cuban-American community in Florida as someone who had been willing to travel to Cuba and to meet with Castro, so he wasn't a true believer.

So that nomination came under fire. The administration ducked for cover, went to ground and as often happens, then turned to a career diplomat who was non-controversial and well liked by both sides of the aisle. The result was that Watson suddenly found himself as assistant secretary for Inter-American affairs. The ambassador who was there, Rick Melton, remained for an extra year. I wound up working as his DCM. When Melton left, I served as *charge* for about seven months until the new ambassador, Mel Levitsky, took over. Levitsky has also stayed on longer than he intended to because of the difficulty in finding and confirming a replacement. He only just left last week.

Q: Well let's see, you go in '92 and when did you leave?

LORE: I went in the summer of '92 and I left in the summer of '95. It was three years.

Q: We've already talked rather extensively about the issues up to '92. Was it pretty much a continuation of that? How did you find Brasilia after being away for so long?

LORE: I found Brasilia extraordinarily comfortable. It's very isolated, a little boring and monotonous. You do not get the sense of color and excitement that you do in the big cities of Brazil. On the other hand, it's a very comfortable, easy place to live. A ranking

officer of the American Embassy can go to three or four cocktail parties a night and still be home by 8:30 in the evening because the city is built for the automobile. There is a system of major roads, some of which really resemble our interstate highways, connecting the city's neighborhoods. So although there are more cars there now than there used to be, you still get around very, very quickly. The climate is good. The housing is extraordinarily good, particularly for higher-ranking people (although morale has suffered in the past because lower-ranking people in the embassy lived in some rather undesirable apartments). The higher-ranking people lived in southern California type housing with swimming pools and extensive lawns. As for work, it's an ideal place for a workaholic because there's not much to do other than work on your tennis or golf game. Isolation was an issue for some; as DCM, I was able to travel around the country so, unlike some of my colleagues, I was able to see something of other parts of Brazil and deal with Brazilians in circumstances outside the capital.

I found that a major challenge of the job was to deal effectively with the problems of an embassy in an isolated place with a large staff from different agencies. We had a great many staff people who could not speak much Portuguese and they and their families often felt estranged from their surroundings. It was a community that had to rely on itself. There wasn't a greater American community out there, virtually the only Americans in Brasilia are those with the embassy. The other embassies were much smaller and, at the staff level, largely stayed to themselves. In the Brazilian community, one has to speak Portuguese - but even if you did, Brazilians in Brasilia essentially live a suburban existence where they go home every night and there is not a great deal of culture activity or interchange. You couldn't go downtown in the evening, for example, to participate in the culture and do things that brought you into the county. You went to a shopping center and you went to a movie, just like you do in the U.S.

All of this placed a very heavy burden on the ambassador and on the DCM and on their spouses to show some leadership in creating a cohesive community where people felt they had a home. It wasn't a nine to five arrangement. Several evenings a week, there were various kinds of embassy community functions where your presence was expected.

Q: Were there any issues that you particularly were involved in? You were charge, so you must have had a piece of almost any issue.

LORE: Well, we still had the trade issues. After all, we still have problems with Japan and the EU, so why not with Brazil? We did have quite a positive agenda, I think, on the nuclear side. That was developing very nicely during my time there. It had moved from becoming a negative to a positive. On drugs, as I say, I think that we're working out some areas for cooperation. I spent a lot of time personally on two issues where I thought that the embassy could make a big difference. One was on visas, where Brazil had a much more restrictive, less forthcoming visa policy for American travelers than we had for Brazilians.

We took some rather tough steps on restricting Brazilians in order to create pressure for change in Brazilian visa law, and we succeeded. That went through just before I left. So

we were able to get a much better deal on visas for our citizens, which I think was important. It allowed us in turn to provide Brazilians with even better visa conditions. This is something we badly needed to do. Brazil is one of these countries, and there are a number of them around the world now, that with some prosperity and with lower airfares and with the attractiveness of the United States as a destination given our low costs for lodging, car rentals, etc., we've seen an explosion in demand for American visas. Our visa sections are just not equipped to deal with it. So we have to find some imaginative ways to deal with that explosion rather than just adding bodies to stamp visas. Rather than 20 visa officers to issue three-month visas, it's a lot better over the long run to have five or six who are doing four- and five-year visas. Maybe one day we can do away with the visa requirement altogether.

Q: Was there the problem that there was very obviously the relatively wealthy traveling class and then there were the poor people who were trying to go to the United States?

LORE: Yes, the poor people of course ran up against the *bona fides* problem that we're all familiar. They're almost automatically rejected because it's difficult for them to establish where they get the money to make the trip to the U.S. and to sustain themselves here. The rich of course get their visas long ahead of time and have ways of circumventing the system - they don't have to stand on line, they send a driver and all the rest. It's among the middle class that has legitimate aspirations to visit Disneyland, or Disney World, where you have the big problems. It was cheaper for a Brazilian family from Sao Paulo to go to Orlando for a week or two weeks' vacation than to go someplace in Brazil. So it wasn't unusual, it was quite credible that people would want to go to the United States - but they may also be motivated by greater economic opportunities in the U.S. Our visa sections are just not set up to handle timely adjudication of visas for these large groups.

The other area that I got into was the question of reciprocity of treatment for official staffs. Our chief concern was to obtain better treatment for our people in terms of their household shipments and their imports. This involved their treatment by Brazilian authorities, port authorities, customs authorities and the rest. These might seem to be mundane problems but they impact significantly on mission morale and on our ability to attract high quality staff. We had less success on the reciprocity side than on the visa side. But these were two issues where I put a lot of time.

Q: Usually when you have this reciprocity problems, it usually that means relations aren't very good between two countries, because basically it's bureaucrats giving the other country's bureaucrats a rough time. Was this it, or was this deliberate?

LORE: No, I don't think it was deliberate. Much of it grew out of the fact that a Brazilian diplomat who comes to Washington really is quite self-sustaining here. He doesn't have to bring things from Brazil. He'll buy his Ford Taurus, he'll go to the Giant. He does better than we do because he has a tax card, but even if he didn't have the tax card, products here are relatively cheap and everything is available. Aside from the occasional specialty item, he never has to order anything from Brazil. So customs problems and import complications are simply not on his scope. On the other hand, an official

American in Brazil wants to bring in far more - either because items are not available in Brazil or because they're available but they're of inferior quality or higher price.

Having to import into Brazil, one runs into all of the lingering problems of a bureaucracy and a mindset that still after, despite some changes, is still somewhat protectionist in nature. It tends to operate according to a system of a great many highly detailed regulations which no one obeys, but foreigners - particularly diplomats - have to obey because they're in a position where they have to. It's not that the Brazilian authorities were necessarily harassing Americans. Some smaller embassies in Brasilia, perhaps composed of less ethical diplomats, will take advantage of loopholes and bring in extra cars and do other kinds of things and make money. The Brazilian authorities have the constant problem, as do we here in Washington, of not creating rules that give latitude to those less honest embassies.

So the American embassy, being the biggest and most visible, was forced to follow the rules to the letter. When the Brazilian government tried to introduce legislation into the congress to give us special treatment, reflecting reciprocal conditions, it did not prosper. Brazilian politicians immediately suffered an attack of "gringoitis" and decided that giving so-called favors to American diplomats was something Brazil shouldn't do. You can't win for losing.

Q: You traveled around. How did you find the role of Rio and Sao Paulo particularly? Were they sort of almost autonomous? Brazil, I mean, is such a big country.

LORE: Sao Paulo state cannot be compared to any state in the United States. Even California does not loom as large in the United States, politically or economically, as Sao Paulo state does in Brazil. This gives the governor a great deal of power. He enjoys more power, under current arrangements, than our state governors do. Sao Paulo as a state is bigger in terms in GDP and population, certainly GDP, than any country in Latin America other than Mexico. It's much bigger than Argentina. Sao Paulo is the engine that drives Brazil. The city is sort of a combination of New York and Detroit. Rio is still the sentimental capital of Brazil. It is the place that all Brazilians want to be from or want to go to. But increasingly it plays second fiddle to Sao Paulo. There are important businesses in Rio and probably will be for a long, long time; it is an important business capital in its own right. Over time, however, it's increasingly losing ground to Sao Paulo, which is the major financial and industrial capital of the country. Sao Paulo state is much larger as a state and has other big cities in it and other resources outside of Sao Paulo city. Rio suffers somewhat for not having much of a hinterland and thus politically doesn't have the same kind of clout in the federation.

Q: I would think that sort of country representation-wise this would create a certain amount of frustration in Brasilia. Here you are stuck up in the hinterland and dealing with things where the engine and all and the consul general is sort of right in the middle of it. It's always been considered the equivalent to being an ambassadorial post. Did this cause any problem?

LORE: It may be considered that by the consuls general in Sao Paulo, I'm not sure it's considered that by his/her supervisors in Brasilia.

Q: I understand what you mean, but as far as posting goes, it's considered a very prestigious posting.

LORE: Our last consul general there was Melissa Wells who had been ambassador to several countries. We do send former and future ambassadors to Sao Paulo. But it's not the embassy. It does not deal with the foreign ministry. It is not where the important conversations take place between presidents, between ministers of the two governments and so the opportunity for influencing country to country relations is quite limited. You have a big stage, you get to meet a lot of businesspeople, but I think your geopolitical influence is severely limited.

The Rio consulate general has shrunk in size and is being consciously downsized and downgraded in terms of the rank of the consul general. It's not beyond imagining that some day we might not even have a post in Rio. Probably it's going to be a long time yet. But in fact we don't maintain anything like the staff we used to. In these days the push is on to close consulates and the fact that we had four - plus several consular agencies - during my time in Brasilia was remarkable. There are not too many countries in the world where we still maintain that many consulates. We've closed one of them so now we only have three, and I wouldn't give a lot of hope for Recife which is the number three, and as I say, even Rio might go someday.

Q: We were talking about the Brazilian embassy and its access to Congress, which was almost nil.. You were mentioning that putting down the gringos is apparently a good solid Brazilian game. How about our access and ability to work in the corridors of whatever pass for the Brazilian "Hill?"

LORE: I think we did quite well in that area on the pharmaceutical intellectual property issue, where legislation was needed. There was a visa bill that we got through, and a number of other areas where we could be useful. An embassy always has to be careful how much visibility it has in the host country's legislative corridors - particularly an American embassy in a Latin American country. But within those constraints I think we have been fairly effective. The potential for effective legislative diplomacy is limited in Brazil because the Brazilian congress, while improving, still is not a strong branch of government.

There are too many Brazilian congressmen and senators who are exceedingly provincial, who are corrupt, who do not, because of the Brazilian electoral system, always represent the interests of their district in the way that American congressmen would. Their political parties are weak; it's hard to lobby where party discipline is not strong. But on specific issues with specific people, usually legislators who have taken the trouble to become knowledgeable in certain areas like intellectual property, an embassy can have some effect.

Q: How about access to the government from the president on down? How did you find that?

LORE: Very good, very open. Brasilia helps. It is a place where obviously, people are very busy, ministers are very busy but their lives are eased by the fact that they're living in an administrative capital far from the distractions of Rio and Sao Paulo. There's better access to high levels of the Brazilian government in a place like Brasilia than there would be in a normal city where the government was spread around more and it was more difficult to get to people.

Q: Was there anything else you think we should cover in this period?

LORE: No, I think we've pretty much covered it. I was *charge* for a period of time. The Clinton administration was fairly new in office, so during my last two years in Brasilia - first as *charge* and then with Ambassador Levitsky - we had a succession of high level visits from virtually everybody you can think of starting with Al Gore, when I was *charge*. Gore was in for an overnight. It wasn't even overnight. He came in at about five o'clock in the evening and left at about midnight in Brasilia. We had a number of cabinet members and the USTR. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown was in and out several times since Brazil was given much more importance by the incoming Clinton administration as one of the "Major Emerging Market."

The Clinton administration created this concept of ten large emerging markets. This displaced the Enterprise for the Americas in a way, because it really focused on ten markets where we were to apply our trade development efforts, Brazil being one of them. So we saw an awful lot of people like Ron Brown. Madeline Albright came when I was *charge* and she was UN ambassador. We had Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Shalikashvili, and so on and so on. All of which was very good in terms of developing more of a dialogue at high levels with the Brazilian authorities, particularly on global issues and problems.

Q: So in many ways the Clinton administration, because of its trade emphasis...Clinton was elected on the slogan "it's the economy." So this in a way by gravity pushed it towards Brazil as being a big market.

LORE: That's right. The Clinton administration had and continues to have a strong emphasis on promoting foreign business overseas. The trade and investment potential for Brazil is enormous and that was recognized. In 1994, about six to eight months before I left Brasilia, Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso initiated the Plano Real, which was a bold but successful and very well executed attempt to stop inflation in Brazil and to provide a basis for growth and global engagement. The plan worked well, it got Cardoso elected as president later in 1994. Janet Reno came down on New Years Eve, 1994 to attend the inauguration the next day.

Q: She's our attorney general.

LORE: Yes. Anyway, Cardoso went on to preside over a rather startlingly successful economic plan called the "Plano Real," which he had initiated while still Finance Minister. It both stopped inflation and greatly helped the poorer classes of Brazil, inflation being the cruelest tax, as they said. All of this provided a good basis for the Clinton administration to push even harder the idea of engagement with Brazil on the economic side. Therefore, my Brasilia tour ended on a high note as we were entering into a period of really more active engagement with the Brazilians. Much of that engagement is in the private sector, not government-to-government, but that's probably as it should be.

Q: But you helped prepare the groundwork.

LORE: Well, governments can help prepare groundwork and then they can stay out of the way. Sometimes it's very difficult to stay out of the way. So I left Brazil in the summer of 1995. I think we've covered pretty much the major developments during my time as DCM.

Q: Well, in '95 where did you go?

LORE: In '95 I wanted to do something different. I had had what I felt was the large and exciting managerial challenge of being DCM of a very big embassy. I wanted to try something different. Many of us, of course, were reading tea leaves at the time and seeing that you could not count on an endless career in the Foreign Service and you ought to start thinking about other things. For these reasons I was attracted by an opportunity to go to the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island and teach strategy and policy, a course which used historical case studies of the use of power. This was quite a departure, something I had never done before, and I enjoyed it very much.

Q: You did it from '95-'97 or so?

LORE: I did it for two years, '95 to '97. I came home to Northern Virginia in the summer of '97.

Q: How did you find the War College? Sometimes the Navy has two faces. One is it's sometimes considered by people in the Foreign Service to be the most...the less internationally sophisticated, yet it's all over the world. But it seems to be more into itself than, than say, the Army, which is used to going out and sitting out in foreign soils so in their training they seem to be much more, in our perspective, outward looking. How did you find the War College?

LORE: The U.S. Navy is a different culture. It's often been remarked upon. It is more insular than the other services; it is a culture which reminded me in some ways of the Foreign Service. For example, there used to be idea in the State Department if you wanted to get promoted you had to be overseas. That still exists in the Navy. The only way to get promoted is if you're driving ships. Sitting in an office doesn't do it. That's why there are relatively few Navy officers in Washington, why the Navy's presence in

Washington is nowhere near what the other services' have. The Naval War College suffers from this - it has traditionally had difficulty in getting some of the Navy's top officers to take a year off and sit on dry land even if at the edge of the ocean, and study books. This is true despite the fact that the Naval War College was the first of the service war colleges.

Q: Albert Thayer Mahan.

LORE: Albert Thayer Mahan, a great and prestigious history, a great intellectual tradition. The college today is fairly said to be the most rigorous of the service colleges and probably of all the war colleges. Students there don't take trips. They don't have recreational unit athletics and that kind of thing. It's very much nose to the grindstone, writing papers and doing some pretty demanding graduate-level work. The college offers its students a master's for their year's work; it was the only war college to do so until the National War College in Washington began to do so. The college is a proud and traditionalist institution mirroring the service it represents.

I found it very stimulating to work in the department of strategy and policy. This was a department created by Stansfield Turner, Admiral Turner, who was president of the Naval War College in the, I think, the Ford administration. This would have been before he came to Washington as the director of the CIA under Carter. Turner had created this course to look at historical uses of power to achieve national goals. It was stimulated by the Vietnam experience. Vietnam was too sore a subject in those years to discuss directly, you couldn't get people sitting in a classroom talking academically about the whys and wherefores of our policy in Vietnam when they had just been over there and had had buddies who died. So the ancient Greeks served as a substitute. There was intense study of Thucydides and of the Athens-Sparta wars, and from this stemmed a whole curriculum of also looking at other major wars. Examples are the Napoleonic wars, Bismarck's wars, the First and Second World Wars, the Russo-Japanese War, and so on. They're even now beginning to develop the Gulf War as a separate case study.

This is very interesting because you play with history in a way that historians are not allowed to, to try to imagine or at least discuss what the outcomes of alternative strategies might have been. Whether these alternatives might have more successfully achieved policies, or whether the policies themselves made any sense. Of course, there are no real answers - the course is about raising questions. All of this, of course, pointed towards Vietnam - and Vietnam itself was eventually incorporated as a two-week unit.

Q: I would have thought in a way it was almost pernicious looking at Thucydides and all the Athens-Sparta thing because you end up with Syracuse and what is it, having done all that men can do, they could do no more, or something like that, and you have the Athenian collapsing and going into the mines of Syracuse as prisoners. Which all seem to imply that a state like the Soviet Union could outlast and be tougher than a more open society such as Athens. Was this a lesson that was coming out or not?

LORE: Well, you could get some pretty good discussions going on "Is Athens really the United States and is Sparta really the Soviet Union?" You could make a pretty good case

that in fact it's the opposite. Obviously you can't stretch these parallels all the way and they're going to be inexact either way. We're all dazzled by the great art and architecture and theater, the attainments, the cultural, intellectual attainments of ancient Greece, by which we mean Athens. But Athens was an exceedingly cruel and dictatorial ruler of its various colonies.

Q: What was the island that got wiped out because they wouldn't join?

LORE: Milos. Some horrible things are recounted in Thucydides which sometimes recall the Nazi death camps or Russian tanks rolling in Prague. You can make a case that really Athens may be more analogous with the Soviet Union particularly in its foreign relations. Sparta, while an uncultured warrior society, was surprising flexible and generous with the members of its coalition. It needed to be; it didn't have the same kind of control over its allies and it had to negotiate with them. It operated in a NATO-like environment. So you can argue this different ways and the important thing is not to draw an exact parallel with Athens, i.e. "Is North America Sparta - is the Soviet Union?" The interesting point is that certain characteristics of the Athenians and the way they went about their business may well have prevented them from operating effective strategies to achieve their political goals.

What you're trying to get across to the students is really not history, although you have to absorb a lot of history to have the discussion. It's more "Let's think about what works and what doesn't" and "How do you think about constraints, how do you assess your strengths and weaknesses, how do you assess the strengths and weaknesses of the others, how cold can you be about it?" and if Athens had done that, for example, they would have realized that they had real problems with their coalition because of the way they had treated its members in the past

Q: Did you find it was easy to get the Naval officers intellectually engaged?

LORE: Most of them. Like any group of middle Americans you tend to get people who are very technically advanced in their particular specialties. You would have some people who really resisted the course and were somewhat intimidated by it. But I would say that, by and large, most of the officers, even those who perhaps were uncomfortable with abstract concepts and lacked confidence in discussing them nonetheless were greatly stimulated by the course. It was a real challenge to encourage them while also forcing them to think through their ideas. To not discourage them, but at the same time to force them to be intellectually vigorous. I think most of them took to it quite well. They're military officers, they know that they have to take to it if they want to get through that year. Most officers regarded the four months of strategy and policy as the highlight of their time at the War College. The other two courses that they took, one in national security policy and one in joint operations were more traditional War College fare. The students liked them, but they weren't anywhere near as popular.

Q: Did you think they came out of it with a greater appreciation of the diplomatic arm of the United States?

LORE: There was one other FSO who was there on the faculty and the two of us viewed educating these military officers about the State Department and foreign service as among the most important contributions we could make. Most of the officers we came in contact with were middle grade, men and women in their 30's, maybe early 40's. They're at the point in their careers where they step beyond their technical specialties and begin to draw assignments in joint commands with other services, civilian agencies, sometimes nationals of other countries. I put together and taught a course on how the foreign affairs bureaucracy works in Washington, at the working level. How the sausage is prepared. I didn't do much with organization charts but rather used case studies and guest speakers to explore how things actually work or don't work when you're trying to implement national policy in the foreign affairs area.

I think that, just through my presence and by the social interaction that you have with the students, they were able to get a much better idea of who we were and what we do. I enjoyed that. I have written both in the *Foreign Service Journal* and in *Government Executive* about my feeling that there should be a greater outreach from the State Department to these service war colleges, i.e. sending more students and more faculty from the foreign service in order to better understand the military mindset and what military criteria are. I think the uniformed military are much more curious about us and learn much more about us than we design to learn about them, and I think that's unfortunate.

Q: I'm 70 years old and I come from a generation that all my cohort almost to a man, and the word "man" is operative, had...I had my four years in the military as an enlisted man. But almost all of us had a good solid dose of military service so that like it or lump it, we had a feel for the military which I don't think the new generation has.

LORE: We're not going to bring back the draft, so at least maybe you try to get FSO's and other foreign affairs operators in closer touch with military counterparts before you actually have an evacuation or a Bosnia or other things where you've got to work together. It seems to me you work much more smoothly together in times of crisis if there's already been this familiarization in a non pressure and academic atmosphere. But in these days of budget limitations and downsizing, the general response at FSI and elsewhere in State is "We just don't have the money for that."

Q: Well, in '97 you left and whither?

LORE: In '97 I came back to Washington to retire. I took the retirement planning seminar and transition course, and at the end of September I retired.

Q: Well, I guess this is probably as good a place as any to stop.

LORE: Well, seems like a logical place.

End of interview