Background
Born and raised in New Jersey
Yale University, Harvard Law School, and George Washington University
 Entered Foreign Service 1950

Paris, France – ECA/MCA 1952

Navy Career 1953-1956

Reentered Foreign Service 1957

Department of State 1957-1959
Staff Aid/European Affairs
EUR/RA
NATO and German Issues

Colombo, Ceylon 1959-1961
Political Officer
U.S. interests – AID
P.M. Bandaronika

Serbo – Croatian Language Training –FSI 1961

Belgrade, Yugoslavia 1962-1964
Political Officer
Ambassador George Kennan

Economic Bureau – State 1964-1965
UNCTAD

Foreign Relations/Committee Staff 1965-1974
Mike Mansfield (incumbents)
Q: Today is February 8, 1994 and I am interviewing Ambassador James G. Lowenstein in his office. Jim, to start off, tell us something about your background and how you got interested in the Foreign Service.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I think for people in my generation...I was born in 1927...the war years were very important. I will just give you a few stories to illustrate. When I arrived at boarding school in 1941, just before Pearl Harbor, but after the war in Europe had already been going on, I found that I had four roommates and one of them was a Polish refugee, whose name was Andrei Beck. He was the son of the then Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Josef Beck, who had been the signer of the Beck-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, etc. All during the ensuing four years as the United States went to war and as the war raged across the Pacific and Europe, Andy Beck and a couple of other European refugees who were at the school led us young uninitiated Americans through the histories of their countries. So that by the time I graduated in 1945 from boarding school and went to college, I had spent my formative years following the progress of the Second World War day by day.

Not only that, but we were all permitted to join at the age of 17 in officer training programs to take affect after we became 18. So by the time I left boarding school I was already enlisted in what was then called the US Army Air Corps as an Air Cadet bombardier candidate expecting to be called shortly after my 18th birthday. I went to Yale but my 18th birthday happened to be on August 6, 1945, which was the day that we dropped our first atomic weapon. I received a communication the following week from the U.S. Army Air Corps telling me to hold everything, and a further communication
about three weeks later saying that the program was ended and that I could either come into the Air Corps as an enlisted man and serve for two years or I could forget it. The draft was still on and there was one reason—namely, a shorter period of service—why it was better to become a draftee at that point than to accept the generous offer from the Army Air Corps. So I received an honorable discharge without having spent a day on active duty. Then the draft was canceled before I was called. Hence, my military career was deferred until the Korean War.

My four years at Yale was the period during which the Cold War began and the whole political configuration of Europe and Asia changed. I decided that my work as an English major wasn't particularly interesting or relevant, so I shifted to international relations including a seminar on Eastern Europe, going back to the business of Andrei Beck. I also signed up for a summer in Czechoslovakia, the summer of 1948, with a group called the Experiment In International Living. Shortly before we left events occurred in Czechoslovakia that made it impossible to go—namely, the Communist coup—so instead the group that was going to Czechoslovakia went to Sweden. That summer, the summer of 1948, I remember sitting in my adopted Swedish family's house listening to the radio describe the beginning of the Berlin Air Lift. So it was impossible to go through those years and not identify with what was going on in the world. And it was during the last two years at Yale that I decided that I would try to go into the Foreign Service.

Q: You took the exam in 1949?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes. One of the ways of doing it then was to leave your university, even before graduation day, and come down to Washington where there was a Foreign Service Examination Preparatory Course, I think it was called, given at George Washington University. It prepared people for the exam. It lasted from June 5, or whenever it was, until a week before the exam, which I recall was given in early September. There were fifty of us in the course and it lasted all summer. It included basic economics designed for the exam which was quite different from the basic economics we had studied before plus brushing up on American History and the other stuff that you needed for the exam.

Then, as I was not a veteran I did not have the five or ten point veteran's preference and hence the oral was deferred and it was suggested that I get a job.

Q: How long did it take to get the results of the written?

LOWENSTEIN: I can't remember. At any rate I then found out that there was some kind of program at ECA, the Marshall Plan, for administrative trainees. I didn't know what that meant, but it sounded interesting to me so I applied and was hired. The security clearance process was started which, as I recall, took the whole fall because I remember that since I had nothing to do I worked as a volunteer for the Church World Service Committee on the New York docks helping Russian refugees when they arrived. I had studied Russian at Yale and at that point still spoke it well enough to communicate with these refugees.
Q: You were living in New York at that time?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes. I was born and raised in New Jersey, my family lived in Scarsdale before and after the war and they still there at that time, although in the process of moving to Connecticut. So I would drive in to New York every day.

Q: What business was your father in?

LOWENSTEIN: My father was what is called a Wall Street lawyer with a firm that he joined with two other partners in 1919, right after World War I. He came to New York while he was a Naval officer, from Cincinnati where he had been born and raised, and stayed there. He shared a house with three other young Navy veterans, one of whom was Lewis Straus, later Admiral Straus, but who at that point, like my father, was a Lt. Junior grade USNR. My father's law firm eventually grew, merged and re-merged, etc., so that when my father finally "retired" at the age of 79, there were a couple of hundred lawyers and it had changed names twice.

Q: Was there an international angle?

LOWENSTEIN: No there was not. It was purely domestic, although he had a few Brits as personal clients. My father specialized in trusts, estates, corporate mergers and acquisitions and was on the boards of a couple of companies. My mother had traveled widely and liked it. Her father, my grandfather, had been president of a large silk manufacturing company, family owned, and had been president of the Silk Manufacturers Association. He had led missions for that organization to Egypt, Japan and China. And my mother, before her marriage, had accompanied him on those trips. So while she was widely traveled, my father wasn't. He never liked it, other than going to England where he felt comfortable because of the language and the cuisine. Otherwise he had very little use for the rest of the world, although my mother would drag him around every year. I might add as a footnote that my mother, now 93, still travels around the world for two months a year every year and claims that there isn't any country she hasn't been to. I think she is probably right.

So I did not come from a family that was particularly oriented to what was going on outside the United States. Indeed, my brothers became, respectively, a banker and a lawyer without any international interests. I was sort of a fluke in the family. But I caught the travel bug very early. Before Sweden I had spent a summer in Mexico and after I had spent the summer in Sweden in 1948, I never stopped going abroad.

To get back to ECA, finally the security clearance came through and I was summoned to Washington. The appointment I was offered was something called a Foreign Service Staff Officer Class 12, I still remember it. The salary was, I believe, $3200 a year. When I arrived I was told that the program for which I had been recruited had been discontinued, but that since they had gone to the trouble and expense of having my security clearance
and all the rest of it, they would take me. There wasn't any room for me in Washington so they were going to send me to Paris where they needed some extra bodies.

So, a week later I found myself on a plane going to Paris and I was sitting next to a fellow who struck up a conversation and said to me, "Where are you going?" I said, "Paris." He said, "Why?" I said, "Well, I work for the government." "Oh, really? What do you do?" I said, "Well, you really wouldn't understand." He said, "Well, I might." So I explained to him in very simple terms. And then I said, "Well, where are you going?" He said, "I am going to Paris but then I'm going to Lisbon." I said, "What do you do?" He said, "Well, actually, I am the American Ambassador to Portugal." That was the tactful way I began my Foreign Service career.

Anyway, I arrived in Paris and was originally assigned to the lowest form of life there, in what was called the administrative services section—specifically to the warehouse which took care of handling all requisitions for furniture for all ECA missions. While this was not very taxing intellectually, it was a wonderful introduction because the working hours were very unsupervised and the fellow who ran the warehouse, an American local employee, was a master at going around the bureaucracy and getting what he wanted. Hence I learned a lot. I also decided I would start life in Paris by living with a French family in order to perfect my French.

**Q:** How was your French before you got there?

**LOWENSTEIN:** Not too good, despite 6 years of study. But by the time I left it was quite acceptable, and my accent turned out to be particularly good.

**Q:** Did they give you any training?

**LOWENSTEIN:** No, no training of any sort. Anyway in Paris, in 1950 on $3200, I was rich. I later rented an apartment that had been one of Randolph Churchill's pieds-a-terres for which I paid $85 a month. I also had a car and really lived very well.

After about two months in the warehouse, the head of this administrative services section decided that I had had enough house breaking and began to move me around.

**Q:** Who was your boss?

**LOWENSTEIN:** My boss was a man named Malcolm Pitts, a very experienced civil servant of the old school. He had been a depression baby and had gotten a job in the civil service, worked his way up, working most of the time in Denver, Colorado with the property management agency. He decided I was a spoiled brat when I arrived, which was absolutely right, and for that reason had stuck me in the warehouse. Then he relented, and he and I soon became very close friends.
He decided to take me a little more seriously and began to move me around through the
other parts of this operation, one of which was called organization and management. It
was run by a fellow who seemed very old and wise to me. I think he was thirty. He
seemed wise because he had gone to Harvard Business School and wore a homburg. His
name was Jack Kubisch. He later became a Foreign Service Officer and was Ambassador
to Greece among other things.

Q: Wasn't he Assistant Secretary for Latin America?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes.

Q: And he was the head of AID.

LOWENSTEIN: No, he wasn't head of AID, but he had been head of an AID mission.
Actually he was head of the AID mission in Ceylon when I was there.

Q: He was a career AID officer.

LOWENSTEIN: He was a career AID officer who transferred over to the Foreign
Service.

Then all of this came to a head when Malcolm Pitts said...and this must have been late
June, 1950, about a week before the Korean War started, "Okay, the training is fine and
now we are prepared to let you be administrative officer of the ECA mission in Iceland."
At that time, the last thing I wanted to be was an administrative officer in an ECA
mission. So I decided that I would rather just stay in Paris and keep training and see what
developed and maybe my number would come up in the Foreign Service.

Well, the following week the Korean War started. Having escaped World War II, I knew
that military service was inevitable and something I really didn't want to escape anyway.
So I took two weeks off, came back to the United States, applied for various officer
candidate programs with a first preference for the Navy, and then went back to Paris to
wait for the call. By this time it must have been August because the next thing that
happened was in late November. After Tito's break with Stalin, the US had decided to
give economic assistance for the first time to a communist country, namely Yugoslavia.
There had been a lot of congressional resistance to this, so long negotiations ensued
between the executive and legislative branches. Finally it was decided to give food aid to
Yugoslavia, which had had a drought the year before. When the conditions were all
agreed on between the two branches of the government, the food aid program was to be
administered through the Marshall Plan but was not going to be called a Marshall Plan
mission because Tito did not want to become a member of the Marshall Plan. He had
turned it down on Stalin's orders in 1948. So it was called the US Special Mission to
Yugoslavia.
Instead of being given to someone from ECA to head, a former president of the American Red Cross, Richard Allen, was recruited. He collected a group of experienced ex-UNRRA observers. I am not sure what they were all doing at this point, but most of them had been with UNRRA during the war and had done this kind of work in Eastern Europe. In addition, there was one Foreign Service officer, Elmer Yelton, and a couple of ECA experienced accountant comptroller types. They came to Paris for a week of orientation before going on to Yugoslavia. During their time in Paris, about half way through, one of these men died of a heart attack. Mr. Allen called up, I think it was Everett Bellows, who was the executive director of OSR, the European Headquarters of the Marshall Plan, and said that he had authority to arrive with so many bodies and he was going to arrive with that number of people and not one less. He, therefore, needed a body and asked Bellows to find a body and get that body down to the station on Saturday night. This was Thursday morning, as I recall.

So I got the call. I said, "Well, first of all thanks very much but I really don't want to go, and secondly, I have this Navy problem." So about five hours later, Everett Bellows called me back and said, "We don't care what you want. This is not a request, this is an order and I will take care of the Navy. This thing is only going to last six months or so and we will get you deferred. You be at the station Saturday afternoon at 5:00."

So, I arrived at the station and found all the other members of the mission. I was at that point 22 and I think the next youngest was about 36 and most were in their mid-forties. They were a very experienced group. They knew that there would be two people in Zagreb, three people in Belgrade, and one person in each of the Yugoslav republics. There were two particularly bad republics for climatic and isolation reasons. One was Montenegro and the other was Bosnia-Herzegovina. A third was Macedonia, but the person in Macedonia could easily drive down to Salonika for the weekend. Then it turned out that the fellow who was in Montenegro was only an hour from the coast, so the least desirable, it was decided was Sarajevo. When I arrived, the decision had already been made by unanimous consent of the others: I was going to Sarajevo.

As the train left, I was told where I was going. We got off in Trieste where we spent three days. Leonard Unger was consul general at that point.

Q: Trieste at that point was under control of the UN?

LOWENSTEIN: At that time it was under Allied protection. This was before the Austrian State Treaty was signed. Anyway there were American troops there as well as...

Q: It had not been given back to Italy.

LOWENSTEIN: No, all of it had not been given back to Italy definitively. Zone B was still in dispute. The troops were there to protect Italian rights vis-a-vis the Yugoslavs. There was a large U.S. army detachment and the reason we had stopped there was that the army was outfitting us with jeeps, C rations, and Arctic clothing. So we spent four or five
days in Trieste then got into our jeeps and drove over the mountains, which in those days was pretty bad. By this time we are talking about the last week in November, the first week in December. It was quite something. We were going through snow drifts several feet deep, constantly stuck and having to be pulled out by horses. We went to Zagreb where we had another two or three days of orientation. Zagreb had a very unusual consulate. There was a consul and a vice consul and for reasons that I never found out, the vice consul and the consul weren't speaking to each other. They relayed all their messages through the male secretary/administrative assistant, whose name was Mr. Ramsey. You would go to the consulate and one would say to the other, "Mr. Ramsey, would you please tell Mr. so-and-so that I will not be here this afternoon." Mr. Ramsey would swivel around in his chair and say, "Mr. So-and-so, Mr. So-and-so will not be here this afternoon."

Finally the day to leave came. I was put in my jeep with no sides on it, Arctic clothing, a trailer full of C rations, a couple of extra tires, not one word of the language, and no experience in the field. I set off over the mountains from Zagreb to Sarajevo.

Q: Were you to be alone in Sarajevo?

LOWENSTEIN: I was not only alone in Sarajevo but I was the only foreigner in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The last foreigner who had been living in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been the Italian consul in Sarajevo who had left with his pregnant wife in the middle of a bombing attack. His name, I was told then, was Cavaletti, a name I have always remembered. When I got to Luxembourg as Ambassador and was calling on my colleagues, lo and behold the Italian Ambassador's name was Cavaletti. I said, "Are you related to the man who left Sarajevo during the war?" And he said, "I am the same person and the lady who met you at the door is my daughter who was born shortly after I left Sarajevo."

So I arrived in Sarajevo. The trip had taken almost 20 hours. I had two extra tires in the trailer and I used both of them. I was as close to exhaustion as I have ever been in my life-before or since. This was the worst winter in Bosnia-Herzegovina in living memory. I had been driving through blizzards and getting flat tires all the time. I didn't know where I was, I couldn't read the signs, I couldn't understand directions when I asked. Anyway I finally got to the Hotel Europa, which was to be my home for the ensuing seven months. And for these seven months, my job was to go out every morning and visit every local distribution point at the level of the Opstina which were like village councils. I visited every Opstina in the Republic, driving something like 40,000 miles in seven months in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was out on the road every morning from 6 a.m. to about 7 at night, except for Sunday, which I took off. I did a report every week on every Opstina visited reporting on everything I observed.

Q: What sort of things were you looking for?

LOWENSTEIN: I was looking at the distribution system to make sure that all the stuff wasn't being simply driven up to Party headquarters and dumped off in a back room some
place for their use. I saw that there were distribution points, that the citizens were lining up to get the food, that there was some method for distributing it, and it was going from the rail head to these distribution points. At least, that was ostensibly the purpose. In fact, there was another purpose of the mission which became rapidly evident to me although it was never stated explicitly. We were driving around in jeeps that had the American flag and ECA symbol on the side, and we were accustoming the people to seeing Americans all over the country. We were pretending to observe much more than in fact we were capable of observing. But the observing we did do was a deterrent to abuses. And what we were doing, it later became clear to me, was also setting the stage for further assistance programs. In fact, military assistance started soon thereafter in 1955. By getting everybody used to the fact that Americans were running all over in jeeps marked with the American flag, the next step was a lot easier for both the government to swallow and the people to accept. It was sort of a salami tactic in reverse. It was the first Western involvement in Yugoslavia that involved a visible presence.

Q: Were the Yugoslav people sensitive about Westerners being there or just the Yugoslav government?

LOWENSTEIN: The people were not, the government was. The head of the Party in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a charming character named Rudi Kolak who, I was told, had been Tito's radio operator during the war. After I had been there about three weeks, he called me into his office. I should say I was alone--that is, I was the only American--but I was given an interpreter and a mechanic. The interpreter was a graduate student from Belgrade who hated being in Sarajevo and whose English wasn't really very good. At any rate, he informed me that Kolak was furious that anyone as young and inexperienced as I was had been assigned to Bosnia-Herzegovina. He felt insulted, and thought he wasn't being taken seriously. So I arrived at Kolak's office (and he did the same thing to me three times in the course of seven months). He began by saying, "Are you enjoying it here in Sarajevo?" I said, "Not at all. You don't permit me to talk to anybody [which he didn't]. There is no fraternization. There is nothing to do, and I don't enjoy it at all." At which point he said, "Well, maybe we should introduce you to some pretty girls." I said I thought that was a very good idea. At which point he would shake his finger and say, "No, no, that is not a good idea, it would distract you from your serious work."

Now the funny thing about it is that Rudi Kolak later fell into disgrace as the result of a sex scandal which was known as the Palais Rose of Sarajevo which involved women, orgies, etc. So, in fact, he was predicting his own demise.

But Sarajevo was rather rough.

Q: When you said you were not allowed to fraternize did that mean you couldn't talk to people?

LOWENSTEIN: The only person I attempted to establish a relationship with was the son of the hotel manager who was 19. He liked American jazz and I had a shortwave radio. I
had a living room and bedroom in the hotel. A couple of times he would come in and listen to jazz with me on the shortwave radio. About the third time he came in, he said, "This is the last time. I have been told I can't talk to you again." In fact, nobody talked to me. Well, there were two exceptions. There were two local government liaison officers who would take me out every couple of weeks to a restaurant, but one spoke no English, and the other a little and I didn't speak Serbo-Croatian at that point. Conversation was all through my jolly interpreter who by that time was getting on my nerves. So I read a lot of books, although I was so tired at night that most of the time I slept.

Q: How often did you get down to the Embassy?

LOWENSTEIN: Every month we were all called into the Embassy for two days. I would either drive up or go by train. Twice I was called back to Paris, each time for two days. But the only way to get to Paris was by train, and the train took two days each way.

Incidentally, the Ambassador at that time was George Allen. He made it a point of going out and visiting each one of the food observers. I should mention that I had been promoted to the exalted rank of FSS-9 and was making a bloody fortune. I had gone from $3200 to $5300! George Allen came down to Sarajevo and spent two days with me. He came with his wife and stayed at the hotel. Whenever I was in Belgrade he invited me over for dinner and just couldn't have been more interested, accessible, friendly, open, very, very impressive. He came up in a later stage in my life which I will get into when we talk about the Navy.

After six or seven months of this, I finally got word from the Navy that...

Q: What were your relations with the head of the operation?

LOWENSTEIN: Richard Allen? Very good. The whole operation worked well. The observers did an excellent job on the whole. A few of them weren't overly serious and devoted, and they did have a better time than the rest of us. Richard Allen, the former Red Cross executive, not only had a close working relationship with Ambassador Allen, to whom he was not related, but he was also a wonderful man to work with. So the whole thing was extremely interesting. The work involved a lot of responsibility for someone 22 years old and while I hated it, I loved it at the same time.

Q: Did your reporting extend beyond the distribution system?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, it did.

Q: Would you like to elaborate?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, we were encouraged to put in anything. Since I had a lot of time in the evenings, I did a lot of reporting about the conditions of the countryside, whatever political observations I could make without being able to talk to people, conversations
that I would overhear and ask my interpreter to translate, what the liaison officers were saying, what Rudi Kolak was like, etc. I don't know if anybody ever read these things, I don't know what happened to them, but I enjoyed writing them.

Q: Now Sarajevo is right and center 42 years later. Would you ever have thought it?

LOWENSTEIN: No. I don't think that anybody who served in Yugoslavia and knew it well, at least nobody I ever met, predicted what has actually happened. That there were all of these tensions, sure. That there might eventually be some separation of the country, sure. That there were going to be perhaps violent local outbreaks, gang warfare, sure. But the kind of thing that has happened, I don't know a single person, Yugoslav or American or foreign, who predicted it. Sarajevo's standard of living in those days was extremely low, and the population spent their energy surviving. People were very poor. There wasn't very much food or heat. The winter was extremely severe. The only time in my life that I saw wolves was coming back from one of these jeep jaunts after dark and I saw them in the distance in my headlights. This terrified my Belgrade interpreter who hadn't spent much time in the country.

Finally I was told that my officer candidate class would start in early January, 1952. I was asked whether in the interim I would like to stay in Paris and be assigned to something called the Temporary Council Committee of NATO which, of course, delighted me. This Committee was known colloquially as "The Three Wise Men." The three wise men were Harriman, for the United States, Monnet for France and Lord Plowden for Britain.

Q: Who was Plowden?

LOWENSTEIN: Lord Plowden had been...I can't remember what he had been before then. He was later the author of the Plowden Report on organizing the British Foreign Service. I think he had been Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, or he might have been Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Anyway, he was one of the great wise men in Britain in the field of foreign relations and at the same level as Harriman and Monnet.

The task of these three men was to figure out how to get NATO to divide its resources. What came out of this was first of all what are called the Lisbon goals, which were goals set for the various countries at the Lisbon meeting in December, 1951 or January, 1952, I can't remember exactly when. And so something called the Annual Review was born. It existed as long as I have known anything about NATO affairs. All of this was hammered out at what is now the OECD headquarters at the Chateau de la Muette, which was then headquarters for the OECD. The U.S. delegation to this committee was very high powered. I still have the list at home. Henry Tasca, Lincoln Gordon, Charles Bonasteel, Harriman, Milton Katz and two young aides. One was Fred Chapin (later Ambassador to several countries) and I was the other. It was really a sort of glorified messenger boy operation--collating papers, running back and forth to the Chateau with stuff for Harriman, proof reading, the executive secretary of a delegation kind of job. But you were
hanging around with the great men, and Fred and I became very close friends. In the evenings we would go about together with our group. There was a huge group of young Americans around ECA headquarters in Paris in those days. A lot of them were messengers, some of them were junior executives, and some of them worked in the ECA Mission to France. Among those who worked in the mission to France was Arthur Hartman, which is how I first met him. Another was Paul Douglas, the son of the Senator from Illinois. I still see some of this group. Some went into government after that but many didn't stay very long. The after hours activities were a lot of fun. Fred and I had something to do almost every evening, although we usually didn't finish work until 8:30 or 9:00.

Q: What were your impressions of the operation and the three wise men?

LOWENSTEIN: My impression, not only of this particular operation but also of the ECA mission to France and OSR (the European headquarters of the Marshall Plan) was that this was the most competent group of people I had ever seen. The trouble is that this remains true. It is still the most competent group of people I have ever seen. I thought the US government was going to be like this throughout. Sad to say, it hasn't been quite that way. It was a tremendous agglomeration of talent. All of these people seemed to be devoted to getting done what they had to do. I didn't see any bureaucratic backbiting. That is what struck me at the time.

Q: How do you account for that?

LOWENSTEIN: I don't know. Maybe I was too far away from it being so junior. But the atmosphere was totally different from any other organization that I have ever seen. Everyone was highly motivated. It just seemed to me that nobody was paying any attention to regulations and directives, or their next jobs. They were conducting themselves as though the "bureaucracy" didn't exist. I remember when I was finally leaving to come back and go into the Navy, it was just before Christmas, and someone on Harriman's immediate staff said, "Look, since you are going back anyway, would you mind taking this package of documents?" I said, "Sure, what is it?" He said, "Well, it is the US part of the NATO Annual Review." It was highly classified, but nobody paid any attention to it. It was stuck in an envelope and given to me to be turned in when I arrived in Washington, which I did. So it was that kind of operation.

I left Paris a couple of days before Christmas, went to Washington to check out, and then spent Christmas at home.

Q: Did you have much to do with Harriman directly?

LOWENSTEIN: No, very little. He would bark at me occasionally, "Where is that envelope I told you to get?"

Q: How big was the delegation?
LOWENSTEIN: Well, the delegation must have had ten people on it, plus Fred and me. The other representatives had delegations of the same size. We never saw them because we were staffed out of the OSR building.

So, in early January, I reported to officer candidate training at Newport. I went to OCS in January and was commissioned in May as an ensign. I go into the Navy business because it also relates to the Foreign Service. A month before commissioning an officer arrived from Washington to give us our assignments. I had made only one request which was that I wanted to be on a large ship, not a small one, because at that point I was still getting slightly seasick on small craft and thought if I had a choice I would rather be on a large ship. To my astonishment I actually got what I wanted, one of the three largest aircraft carriers, the Coral Sea. The three largest were the Roosevelt, the Coral Sea, and I can't think what the name of the third one was.

I had been aboard the Coral Sea three or four days when the Executive Officer of the ship called me in. He was a Commander and I was the junior ensign on the ship of 3500 officers and men. He said, "I have an assignment for you. Nobody knows this, but we are going to be the first naval vessel to call at a Yugoslav port. Not only that, we are going to have Tito aboard. We are going to take him out for a day. I want you to work with the Admiral's aide and help him organize this thing." I should have said that the Coral Sea was in the Sixth Fleet; the Coral Sea and the Roosevelt rotated.

So in due course we went into Split and the officers and men were all on parade on the flight deck. In front of the gangway were the Admiral, his chief of staff who was a Captain, the Captain of the ship, the Executive Officer, the Admiral's Aide, etc. down to me. There were about ten people standing by the gangway. Tito came aboard followed by Ambassador Allen. The Admiral led Tito on a review of the officers and men standing at attention. As they passed me, with my eyes fixed straight ahead, Ambassador Allen somehow spotted me and said, "Jim, what the hell are you doing there?" I said, "Well, let me explain." He said, "Well, come on. Why don't you come along with us?" He said to the Admirals and Captains, etc., "Why this young man was this and that and the other thing and we worked together, etc." And then he introduced me to Tito. He said something like, this is the young man who helped save your country kind of thing, Tito nodded and said, "Yes, I know, I know, I know." So I had a lovely day. Tito was seated on the flight deck. He went through the chow line and the enlisted men's mess hall. He ate hot dogs. I was with him throughout. I just had a splendid time. Finally they left and I went back to my cabin. The Admiral's aide came down and said, "You know who those men were?" I said yes, and repeated their names and ranks. He said, "How many times do you think you saluted in the course of the day?" I didn't really know the saluting protocol. So to make a long story short I was confined to my cabin for a week for not behaving properly.

The other kind of Foreign Service experience that I had while on the ship was that among other things I edited the ship's newspaper. The ship's newspaper was written by stealing
out of the airwaves all the wire service reports. They were pasted together during the night. The paper had a circulation of 4500 so it was rather a large newspaper actually. The day we were going into Barcelona on an official fleet visit, I had a headline in the newspaper that said, "Signing of Spanish Base Negotiations Postponed" or something like that. They were then being conducted by Admiral King. I should say that by this time I was also used by the Admiral as a French interpreter and sometimes taken as sort of an assistant PAO or PIO when he went ashore. This happened to be one of those times, I was along with his party. There was a formal dinner when we called in Barcelona. The Ambassador was there with members of his staff, etc. The Admiral, whose name was Grover Budd Hartley Hall, got up at the dinner and said that he was delighted to be there on the day that the Spanish bases agreement had been signed. At that point all the reporters rushed off. After the dinner was over, the Embassy PAO asked the Admiral what had made him think the Spanish bases agreement had been signed. The Admiral said, "Because it was in the ship's newspaper this morning and I read it. The editor is this young Ensign right over there." The Admiral's aide then grabbed me and said, "Let's go back to the ship and get this bloody newspaper of yours." So we did. Of course, that is not what the newspaper said at all. Then I went back to shore and helped telephone all over the place--the Embassy, the wire services, etc.

After a year and a half on the carrier, through another set of strange circumstances, I was assigned to the Naval War College. At that point I had been promoted to Lieutenant JG.

Q: You had been in for almost two years?

LOWENSTEIN: No, a year and a half, eighteen months. I was assigned there because the person whom I was replacing, Robert W. Tucker, subsequently an assistant professor at the University of California and after that a prominent professor at Johns Hopkins, had been sent a number of files. One of them was mine because Admiral Hall had sent my file without telling me. I had wanted to go to the Pacific. Tucker had been looking for someone with some kind of experience outside the Navy whom he thought could help in editing the work of the civilian professor at the Naval War College. A distinguished professor is selected every two years for a two-year assignment. The particular professor then was a man named Hans Kelsen who couldn't write English too well. He had been the author of the Austrian State Constitution and was one of the world's great international law theorists, if not the greatest then living. Bob Tucker had been a student of his at the University of California when as a young Naval Officer, just out of the Naval Academy, he had audited his courses. He had become enthralled and had decided to go ahead and get a Ph.D. He resigned from the Navy when his obligatory service was over and became a co-author with Hans Kelsen of a number of works. He had succeeded in getting Hans Kelsen to the Naval War College and had then come along as his assistant. Bob was at that point either a Lt. Senior Grade or a Lt. Commander, I can't remember which.

So, I arrived and walked into Tucker's office and reported for duty. I had never met him. He gave me a baleful look and took two volumes of Oppenheim Lauterpacht's International Law, which totaled 6,000 pages, pushed them across the desk, and said, "Lt.,
go into that office across the hall and read these books." That was Monday morning. For the entire week, whenever I passed Tucker in the hall, he would give me a wan smile, but he would never say anything to me. So the following Monday I went into his office and suggested that either we arrived at some kind of reasonable relationship or I would leave and he would have to find someone else. We subsequently became extremely close friends.

**Q:** Why did he act the way he did?

LOWENSTEIN: Because that is the way he was and is to this day.

**Q:** Had you taken any international law?

LOWENSTEIN: No, I had not taken any international law and so it was all new. The experience of working with Kelsen was absolutely marvelous, very interesting. He was at that point in his seventies and along with his wife living in Newport. I would go to the movies with him once a month and would have dinner with them. It was a fascinating experience. I was the most junior officer on the Naval War College staff and the only reserve officer. So it also showed me how the regular Navy worked in peace time, because by this time the Korean War was over. It gave me an exposure to the hard core Navy which I never would have had otherwise.

**Q:** At that time did they have a State Department Advisor at the Naval War College?

LOWENSTEIN: They had a State Department Advisor. For most of the time when I was there it was Norris Haselton. When I first arrived, it was Ambassador Edward Crocker who had been Ambassador to Iraq. He was, to put it mildly, of the old school in the Foreign Service. He thought that he should rank even the Admiral who was the president of the Naval War College. Not to put a too fine point on it, he was a rather difficult man and certainly paid no attention to me. Haselton was quite different, but I still didn't have very much to do with him. I was in the Navy and he was a civilian; I was working closely with Kelsen and he had nothing to do with Kelsen. Tucker would come up from time to time as a consultant, so the three of us would work together. I also administered the Naval War College correspondence course on international law, which was very time consuming. I had to correct all the papers, etc. But, like every other member of the staff, I had the right to attend any lecture, any exercise, any seminar, and had the full run of the Naval War College, which for a junior officer, 24 years old, was really a great experience.

**Q:** I assume the program of the Naval War College was roughly the way the National War College operates with speakers every morning and classes of about 150?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, exactly. It was a little bit smaller, however. About 100 I think.

**Q:** And you would have about an hour of talk and then there would be a couple of hours of questions?
LOWENSTEIN: Exactly.

Q: And then in the summer time the annual global games?

LOWENSTEIN: Exactly, all that stuff.

Q: They probably haven't changed it much.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I don't know. I haven't been back.

Q: They should get you to go back, if you are interested.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, they invited me back a couple of times many years ago, but it was always in July when I was not around. But I would love to go back.

Q: Newport is a wonderful town.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, not to live in in the winter when you are a bachelor junior officer surrounded by a bunch of regular Naval officers who are all commanders and captains and married with children. It is a real bore. The only other person around was Claiborne Pell, actually. We would attend meetings of the Newport World Affairs Council on snowy winter evenings.

At some point during this last year, I got a call from the Board of Examiners saying, "When you get out you may take your oral and enter."

Q: So you were ready to come in.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, I was ready. Then Kelsen said, "You are a fool. You like this, it is interesting, why don't you take a year and go to law school before you submit yourself to this crazy government. You have already wasted three years in the Navy, what difference does a year make?" And so after thinking about it, I was getting married just that June, I decided to do just that. I asked somebody somewhere in the State Department and they said, "Okay, one year but no more." I said, "Why no more?" They said, "Because you will brush up against the age limit to enter." I think it was 31 at that time. I said, "You know, the last time that I went through this, when I first took the exam, you told me I was too young and to go out and get a job. Now you are telling me I am too old." They said, "Yes, but eight years have elapsed."

So I decided I would try it for a year and went off to Harvard Law School. I did enjoy it a lot and it was very interesting, but unfortunately I got polio in the middle of the year and didn't get an awful lot out of it. I felt rather shaky academically. I got through the year, but not well. I talked to the Dean about repeating the year but finally decided I wouldn't do all
of that. I missed working and the international world and decided to go into the Foreign Service.

Then these charming people in the Foreign Service said, "Take the summer off, you don't have to come in June, why don't you come in September or October." Later I discovered that by accepting their generous offer, instead of coming in as an FSO-6, I had to come in as an FSO-8 because it was during the summer when they changed the system, which, of course, they never bothered to tell me. And then, when I said, "Okay, September," then it turned out that there was no September class. So I ended up not coming in until October as I recall. Hence I had two months with nothing to do in the fall and went back on active duty for two months and worked in the Naval Judge Advocate's Office in the Pentagon.

So I started off being quite annoyed that nobody had come clean with me, nobody made any effort to get me in under the old FSO-6 system. On the contrary they were pushing me off which in those days meant quite a lot because you lost two years.

Q: You lost two years and a grade or two.

LOWENSTEIN: Especially since I was almost 31 by that time. So I did not start off in the greatest frame of mind.

I reported to the A-100 class and then I discovered that a man I had known in Paris at the Marshall Plan, Benson E. Lane Timmons, was director of something called European Regional Affairs. He was the only person I knew in the State Department. I didn't know one other soul. For some reason the people I had gone to George Washington with in 1949 weren't around, they were all overseas. So I went to see Lane Timmons to ask his advice about what I should apply to do after I finished the A-100 course.

Q: How long was the class in those days?

LOWENSTEIN: It was either four months or two months. I can't remember.

Q: Was it still in the apartment building right next to the State Department?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, exactly.

Timmons said, I remember very well, "Don't worry my boy, I will see that you come up here and that will solve your problem." I then asked around and discovered that Lane was an extremely difficult man to work for. As I tried to see whether there was some maneuvering room here I discovered that he was as good as his word, that I was going to work for Lane and that was that.

Q: How had you known him?

LOWENSTEIN: I had known him socially in Paris.
Q: I met him because Galbraith picked him as his DCM in New Delhi. The story was that he looked for the meanest son of a bitch in the Service, and he found him in Timmons.

LOWENSTEIN: Anyway, the fact of the matter is that while Lane was very difficult to work for, I really loved working for him and had a great time. He was very interesting because he was the most dynamic of the office directors.

Q: Talk about the office that he had.

LOWENSTEIN: He had an enormous office. It comprised about half of the personnel of the Bureau of European Affairs. Under his jurisdiction he had NATO, the OECD, the incipient European Community, all the multilateral stuff, all the political/military stuff, and base negotiations. He had an enormous empire and considered himself far superior to any deputy assistant secretary. And, in fact, he saw Dulles all the time. He was in his office all the time.

Lane decided he would teach me the art of bureaucracy.

Q: You were his staff aide?

LOWENSTEIN: I was his staff aide. He was the only office director with a staff aide. I don't know how he accomplished this, but he managed to get it through Personnel.

Q: Did you have a predecessor?

LOWENSTEIN: No, I had no predecessor. The staff aide to the assistant secretary was George Vest and we worked very closely. George was vastly amused by Lane Timmons. Most people weren't. But Lane taught me such things as never try to clear a telegram until 5 p.m.

Q: That's the old Joe Sisco trick. Wait until the last minute.

LOWENSTEIN: And then you make a feeble attempt to clear it and if it won't clear, you take it to the assistant secretary and say, "I tried to clear it, but everybody has gone home." That kind of thing. There were many other laws of the bureaucracy. So I spent a lot of time running around with cables, getting them cleared all over the State Department. But it was a wonderful way of meeting everybody in the place. I was also trying to do a second year of law school at night, which was a horrible mistake because Lane required me to be in the office at 7:00 a.m. and I never got out of there until 8:30 and would rush off to GW law school. I was also newly married and the whole thing was just a nightmare. So I dropped out of law school.

Lane never took a vacation. Finally after about a year and a half, Lane ...Lane's deputy was a man by the name of Bob McBride, who later became Ambassador to Mexico...
Q: Joe Palmer too?

LOWENSTEIN: No, Clint Knox was the other deputy, who also became an ambassador, to Haiti.

Q: And Lane became an ambassador to Haiti.

LOWENSTEIN: And Lane became an ambassador to Haiti, also.

At any rate, Bob McBride came in one day and said, "Well, I think I finally got Lane to go on vacation for a week." So for the next three days, all I did was pack briefcases for Lane. I packed four briefcases full of stuff for him to read and write, all the efficiency reports for the office, etc. The great day came, Lane left and everybody breathed a sigh of relief. Nine days later it was time for Lane to come back, so I went into the office at 7:00 and at 7:10 I heard Lane striding down the hall. He always sounded like a troop of horses when he arrived. He came in and threw down the bags. I said, "Well, how was the vacation?" He said, "A waste of time like all vacations." I repeated this story to Bob McBride and he said, "How would he know, this is the first one he has ever been on."

So that was life working for Lane Timmons.

Q: What were the issues of the day then?

LOWENSTEIN: The issues were mostly sort of technical, political/military stuff. The lines of authority in NATO, the beginning of political consultation, the Four-Power Working Group on German Reunification, of which I was the staff secretary.

Q: What did that do at that time?

LOWENSTEIN: It did nothing. It met and issued ringing declarations and made all sorts of wonderful contingency plans about what they would do if the Russians did this, that or the other thing.

Q: Who were the four powers?

LOWENSTEIN: France, Germany, Britain and the United States. The German representative was Rolf Pauls, who later became ambassador here.

The one thing that happened to me there that I remember was the final report of the Four Power Working Group. It was a monstrosity of about 75 or 80 pages. And, of course, it wasn't done until about 3:00 in the morning. It had to be on everybody's desk the next morning at 9:00. Robert Murphy was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and was technically the head of the delegation.

Q: Where were the meetings being held?
LOWENSTEIN: In the Department. So I got all this stuff collated and delivered to Murphy's office. Suddenly I realized that it had been incorrectly collated and twenty pages had been totally misplaced. So I had to tell Murphy that there was no use looking at the report because it was unreadable, and he was furious. I don't blame him and really thought he would have my head because it really wasn't a very complicated job. So that was my contribution to the Four-Power Working Group on German Reunification!

The other issues, of course, were: Did we really want a Common Market because this common market was going to become very powerful? It was going to be an institution that would provide considerable competition economically for the United States. Did we really want a unified Europe? This was a debate that started then and hasn't ever ended. I don't think we can make up our minds what we want. We certainly haven't been very enthusiastic about the Europeans getting together in their own defense organization.

Q: *The official line was that we wanted it.*

LOWENSTEIN: The official line was that we wanted it, but we wanted it as long as it did exactly what we said, as long as it was obedient, as long as we could control it and as long as we had the British on our side in Europe. Of course, the other issue was the French, de Gaulle and how he behaved and would he come back to power.

Q: *While you were there, de Gaulle came back to power.*

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, he came back to power, and that was when he proposed the inner directorate which was a proposal that absolutely outraged Dulles and Lane, I thought inordinately outraged. This led to the usual ranting and raving about de Gaulle and the French and struck me at the time very forcibly as a totally emotional reaction to de Gaulle and French behavior. I still hold the view today that we can't seem to deal with the French because we don't understand where they are coming from. That was the first time I saw that in action close up. But it struck me that the mind set in the State Department was viscerally anti-French.

Q: *This would have been when?*

LOWENSTEIN: This must have been 1958.

Q: *You came in November, 1958?*

LOWENSTEIN: No, to Lane in February 1957.

Q: *So this must have been in 1958. Up until then we didn't see these problems?*

LOWENSTEIN: No. The only other time was in the Lebanon when we sent our forces in to intervene. We didn't bother to tell the French as I recall. Again Dulles said something
like, "What they don't know won't hurt them," or "If we inform them they will want to come along."

**Q: What about the relations with the others, the British and the Germans?**

LOWENSTEIN: Well, the special relationship was very strong and it principally took the form of nuclear sharing. This was the time of the precursor to the Kennedy Bermuda thing, which I can't remember at the moment. I will have to refresh my memory.

**Q: Were our German relations friendly?**

LOWENSTEIN: Very friendly. They revolved around the question of German reunification and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement which was constantly being renegotiated, and German rearmament and the German role in NATO, etc.

The thing that I found interesting in that office was that the pace was feverish whereas as I would go around to some other parts of the State Department clearing my little telegrams, I found them much quieter with everybody really leaving at 5:00. I found that intriguing and decided this was a pretty active part of the State Department and it has been my experience that this is still true.

**Q: Did you deal a lot directly with Dulles?**

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, the office dealt a lot directly with Dulles. He was always calling us.

**Q: Was Merchant the Assistant Secretary?**

LOWENSTEIN: Yes he was. Merchant was the Assistant Secretary and the deputies were Johnny Jones, Foy Kohler, and Burke Elbrick.

**Q: Was there much of a Secretariat in those days?**

LOWENSTEIN: Fisher Howe was the Executive Secretary.

**Q: Was it difficult moving paper?**

LOWENSTEIN: No, it really wasn't all that complicated. Paper moved very quickly. Timmons, whom a lot of people didn't like, just didn't pay attention to a lot of procedures and would bulldoze papers through himself, which is why he was so unpopular.

**Q: Did you have any sense for the role that the principals played, Murphy and Dulles?**

LOWENSTEIN: No, not really. I had the sense that the real disputes were between Defense and State.
Q: What were the issues then that you saw?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I really can't remember what the other issues were. I was too far down the pike. My main substantive responsibility was the political consultation agendas which I had to draw up every week and make sure that all the cables corresponded to the agenda items.

Q: This was the NATO Ambassadors meeting?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, that's right.

Q: It was probably a pretty good job to start with.

LOWENSTEIN: Oh, it was a wonderful job. I saw how the whole place worked and got to meet everybody. I saw how you moved paper, I saw what was important and what wasn't important to move. I saw the administration of a large office. One of the things that I did was that every morning I would come in and go through all the cables, sort them in piles, what could be thrown out, which I would throw out, and what Timmons had to see before the 8:00 staff meeting and what he had to see later, etc. If I made a mistake I really heard about it. He would say, "Where is that damn telegram that so-and-so told me about? You never showed it to me." It was all my fault.

Q: What was Timmon's drill for a normal day?

LOWENSTEIN: In a normal day he would come crashing in about 7:15, tear through all the cables...

Q: You would have by then gone through all of the cables?

LOWENSTEIN: I would by then have them all stacked up. He would write furious instructions on about 25 or 30 of these cables, which I would have to pass along. He would issue all sorts of totally unrealistic orders like "I want this done by 10:00 this morning." Then he would go off to the staff meeting.

Q: This was with whom?

LOWENSTEIN: The Assistant Secretary. And then there would be telegram writing queries, and the usual bureaucratic routine. Then, of course, he would go off to every NATO Ministerial meeting, etc.

Before leaving the subject of EUR/RA, I think the following is worth saying. After I had been in the Office of Regional Affairs for a year, someone from Personnel told me that I was going to be assigned the partial responsibility for supervising one of the secretaries and that this should be regarded as a great test of my management ability. I said to this person: "When I was 22 I had responsibility in Bosnia-Herzegovina for running the AID
program and when I was a junior officer in the Navy on an aircraft carrier, I had responsibility for a division of men, 35 men, all of their problems 24 hours a day, seven days a week for a year and a half. So supervising half of one secretary just doesn't thrill me or intimidate me." I always thought that was rather typical of the Foreign Service. They tend to treat Foreign Service officers as a bunch of children. So few of them have had any management experience outside the State Department, that supervising one or two people is a big deal, when for anybody who has had any experience in life, this is just laughable. Anyway, so much for EUR/RA.

At some time I was called and advised that I had been assigned to Lyon as vice consul, which I was very pleased about. Several weeks later I was called and told that I was not going to be vice consul in Lyon, I was going to be the junior officer in a two-man political section in Colombo, Ceylon and that this was a great opportunity to get into the real meat of the Foreign Service, etc. So I said, "Fine," not having been to Asia at that point.

Q: Did you have any hand in that?

LOWENSTEIN: No hand at all, I didn't even know where the place was and knew nothing about it. I immediately bought all the books I could find on Ceylon. In those days, of course, it was possible to take a ship out, not only from Europe, but all the way from New York to Europe to Ceylon. I can't remember what line we took, but it went to Naples. We had two days in Naples and then continued through the Suez Canal. It took almost a month, and I had that time to do all my reading on Ceylon.

So I got to Ceylon in May, 1959 with a year and a half year old daughter, a pregnant wife who was going to have our second child three months later, and a Swiss nanny we had picked up in New York for the transatlantic crossing. But we all got along so well that she decided to stay with us providing we could get her a visa. The one day we had in Naples, I ran up to Rome to get a visa for her to go to Ceylon.

The Ambassador then was Lampton Berry, but he was very ill and rarely showed up in the office and left in a few months.

Q: He was a source for some research for the book that I did. I found that he was the contact with Nehru during World War II, at a time when the US was terribly active. I always wanted to meet him.

LOWENSTEIN: I think I only saw him twice. He was replaced by a career officer by the name of Bernard Gufler who had been a German expert but had been in Ceylon as DCM before. He knew everybody in the place. He knew the country very well. He was an absolutely marvelous man to work for.

Q: I met him a couple of years later when I was in Personnel. I remember trying to boot him out of the Foreign Service and I loved his attitude. In the old days they would say that your time had come, why don't you quit. His attitude was "Wait a second, I have two
or three more years, here is my address, I am ready to go to work, send my paycheck." He did not allow himself to be browbeaten by the Department.

LOWENSTEIN: No, absolutely not. He was a terrific fellow. When he had begun life in the Foreign Service, he was one of the people originally trained in Russian. He had lived with George Kennan, Llewellyn Thompson, and Chip Bohlen in Riga. Instead of going ahead with Russian, he became an expert on the Baltic countries. But although he was an absolutely marvelous man, I cannot say the same thing about the rest of the Embassy.

Q: There was Smith.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes.

Q: I knew a lady who showed up in Karachi when I was there, Francis Hyler.

LOWENSTEIN: Oh, she was nice. She was the economic officer. Jack Kubisch was the AID director.

Anyway I found that I had carte blanche to do any political reporting that I wanted. The first head of the section was an expert in international law. He was quite academic and liked to deal with the Foreign Ministry. He was succeeded by somebody else who also liked dealing with the Foreign Ministry and had a lot of experience in South Asia. But I was really left alone to deal with the internal politics and what was going on in the country which was exactly what I wanted to do and liked doing. Whenever I felt slightly oppressed by the senior political officer Gufler, whom I saw a lot of, would say, "Don't worry about it." He was extremely supportive. He loved the country, as did I. He provided me with a wonderful opportunity. I didn't feel at all constrained about whom I could see so I got to know everybody in the place from the Governor-General and the Prime Minister on down.

Q: Who was the Prime Minister?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, Bandaranaike was assassinated shortly after Gufler arrived. I went with Gufler to the Prime Minister's as a note taker. When we got there, he said, "I don't think I will take a note taker, stay in the car and wait for me." He went in and came out and we left Bandaranaike's house. As we drove out the gate and down the street, there was a popping noise. We got back to the Embassy and a friend of mine from the British Mission who was their intelligence guy called me and said, "Chap's been shot." I said, "What chap?" He said, "The PM old boy." I said, "Really, that is impossible, we just saw him." "Well," he said, "He was shot right after you saw him." And indeed he was. I think Gufler was the last person who saw him alive. I can't imagine that anybody else could have gotten in there between Gufler's departure and the time of the shot.
Anyway we had five governments in the course of the time I was there...Bandaranaike, Dahanayake, Mrs. Bandaranaike, C.P. DeSilva, and Dudley Senanayake. So there was a lot going on politically. I traveled all over the island.

Q: What was our role in Ceylon? What were the US issues with Ceylon then?

LOWENSTEIN: I would say benign neglect. The issues were Cold War issues...Chinese presence, Chinese and Russian economic and political penetration, the Communist Party, the Trotskyite Party, the cultural wars, non-alignment.

Q: The previous governments had been pro-Western, but Bandaranaike was not.

LOWENSTEIN: He was very much in the non-aligned movement and saw himself as a sort of junior Nehru, and so did all his successors. Non-alignment was a very big thing, but it was a loaded non-alignment. It was much more anti-American non-alignment than it was pro-Russian or pro-Chinese non-alignment. The Chinese had a rice/rubber agreement and were in there trying to carve out a sphere of interest that would have made them the most important foreign power.

Q: Did we have trouble with the Battle Act which prohibited us from giving aid to a country trading with Communist China?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, we did. We had trouble with that and later on we had trouble with the Hickenlooper Amendment which conditioned economic aid on no nationalization of U.S. assets, and by that time they had nationalized everything that wasn't tied down. But the issues were really sort of marginal, looking back on it. We had a small AID program.

Q: Did you think they were marginal at the time?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, I really did. I thought it was too bad that the Ceylonese didn't understand where their true interests lay and that kicking the British out and nationalizing the economy was absurd, that all this Marxist rhetoric was a lot of nonsense and that it was too bad they were going to ruin a great country which is exactly what they succeeded in doing. When I arrived there was still a huge British community. When I left there was practically no British community. This was in a two and a half year period. They just disappeared, because there was no reason for them to stay. Now, at the same time I felt that the British had played their cards stupidly. For example, my son was born in the local British nursing home, which was the only decent hospital in Colombo. It was staffed exclusively by Ceylonese doctors and British nurses. It was called the Krazer Nursing Home. One of the provisions of its charter was that only whites could be admitted. This was 12 years after independence. This meant that an English woman married to a Ceylonese could have her child in the hospital, but if the child became ill two weeks later it could not be admitted to the hospital for treatment. There was that sort of thing. There were clubs where Ceylonese were not allowed. When we gave dinner parties with mixed British and Ceylonese, the British, generally not university educated, would try to high
hat the Ceylonese who had been to Harrow and Oxford. So the whole thing seemed rather absurd in terms of their future interest in the country. Hence the anti-British reaction to a love/hate relationship with the hate translating itself into a desire to see the British leave while mimicking everything British, struck me as totally understandable.

Q: Do you think that contributed to the push for socialism, trying to get the British out? They presumably were the major owners of the plantations.

LOWENSTEIN: I really don't. I think there was a perfectly good alternative, which the Sri Lankans are doing today, which was to run the place themselves as a market economy. I think Bandaranaike managed to marry nationalism with socialist rhetoric and this helped. When the mass of people feel that they do not have a proportionate share of the national wealth, this kind of argument is kind of appealing when they haven't tried it and don't know that it is not going to work and won't produce the kinds of result it promises. Plus the fact that this whole identification of non-alignment with the Russians and the Chinese--I think that was one that got away from us in the West. We should have tried to capture the non-aligned movement, instead of turning against it and describing it as a movement that was antithetical to our interests. After all, that attitude drove the non-aligned into the arms of the Chinese and the Russians.

Q: How was our attitude manifested in Ceylon? Were we just ignoring the Ceylonese?

LOWENSTEIN: No, it didn't happen in Ceylon, it would happen in the UN and in the international environment when we wouldn't give the non-aligned any credit for anything. And we were constantly threatening to cut off aid or conditioning aid or giving aid in a form that was less evident than what the Chinese and Russians were doing.

Q: How big an AID program did Ceylon have?

LOWENSTEIN: It was a major effort in Ceylonese terms, but not compared to any large programs. But we had an awful lot of AID people there and they didn't seem to me to be very effective. There seemed to be a lot of people given the small size of the program. Again, it seems to me we over promised at the time and a lot of what we gave was in the form of credits and other ways of giving aid that aren't very visible and don't make an impact. I mean the attitude of the Ceylonese towards the Americans was perfectly friendly. The intellectuals, the press were rhetorically anti-American. One leading anti-American journalist was a guy named Mervin DeSilva. I used to see him all the time and he couldn't have been more friendly. He is still friendly. I see him whenever I go back. So I think the main thing was not to take all this rhetoric seriously. Americans generally got along very well with the Ceylonese then and they do now.

Q: Were there any relations with the Chinese and the Russians?

LOWENSTEIN: No there were no relations with either the Russians or the Chinese. Gufler saw his Russian counterpart but nobody else mixed...we lived next to the Chinese,
in fact. We never met the Russian diplomats. We occasionally saw large, overweight, white bodies on beaches. The Diplomatic Corps was small, but we had a lot of
friends...the Australians, the British, the French, the Germans, the Indians mainly. We were all a group. We played tennis together, we went on weekends together along with a lot of Ceylonese. It was a very happy, informal, integrated life. That is, the Ceylonese that you could relate to, the city dwellers, were perfectly at ease in this kind of environment and vice versa.

Q: What about relations with the British? Did you defer to them?

LOWENSTEIN: No we didn't defer to them and they didn't expect it. The relations with the British were very close.

Q: You talked about their relation problems with the Ceylonese, what was our attitude towards that?

LOWENSTEIN: Our attitude towards that was that we shouldn't be part of it so that we were not encouraged, shall we say, to join any British clubs that didn't allow Ceylonese members. Obviously an exception was made for the hospital. Except for two British couples whom we knew extremely well, I would never give a dinner without Ceylonese present. And I would never have in my house any red-neck British who couldn't get along with the Ceylonese. I probably wouldn't have gotten along with them either, so the issue never arose. There were plenty of them around. The Brits that I knew were all very integrated into life in Ceylon. At this point there was still a British member of the Ceylonese parliament, the Chief Justice of the Court was still British. I think the commander of the army was still British. Now all these British knew the country very well, and it would never have occurred to them to live a segregated life. So, the British really split into two groups. There was a sort of educated, sophisticated, elite that got along totally with the Ceylonese, and then the sort of red-neck element that had nothing to do with them and only knew each other.

Q: What was the relationship between the government and the opposition?

LOWENSTEIN: It depended on the government and there were five governments during my time there. The opposition was led by either the SLFP, Mr. and Mrs. Bandaranaike's party, or the UNP. The only Trotskyite party in the world, the LSSP, always allied itself with the SLFP. The whole political scene was much more British than it was anything else. There was a lot of spirited debate in the parliament. No political assassinations. A lot of good fellowship after hours. You could mix politicians from any party with any other party, including the Communist Party. In fact, the head of the Communist Party, Peter Keunemann, had been head of the Cambridge Debating Society at the same time that a lot of the UNP people had been students there. The head of the LSSP had gone to the London School of Economics. The head of the Communist Party had gone to Cambridge. The head of SLFP, Bandaranaike, had gone to Oxford. So they all knew each other. It was partisan politics much more on the British/American model than on what
later became sort of bitter ideological, violent politics. On the other hand, the Tamil problem was very much there. It was more difficult to mix Sinhalese and Tamils than it was to mix Europeans and Ceylonese. The Tamils were very sensitive about their position, very worried about their future. There had been riots the year before we had arrived, in 1958, and a lot of Tamils had been killed. I saw no disposition on the part of the Sinhalese, in any political party, to compromise on this issue, to arrive at any solution, to give the Tamils any kind of a break. In one of these governments, J. R. Jayawardene was the Finance Minister. He was just giving the Tamils nothing. I didn't see any disposition to accommodate them. After all, Bandaranaike rode to power on a nationalist platform which was very anti-Tamil by indirection. He was a Sinhalese nationalist who wanted Sinhalese to become the sole national language, Buddhism the state religion, etc. Well this was ipso facto anti-Tamil and a lot of what is happening today you can trace back to Bandaranaike's coming to power. He was the one who really, more than anyone else, changed the political landscape in terms of ethnic racial conflict. The 1958 riots occurred after he became Prime Minister. Before then the two communities had gotten along. The British had favored the Tamils in their usual divide and rule way, but it was really Bandaranaike who started this.

Q: Did the Americans all live and stick together?

LOWENSTEIN: There was quite a lot of sticking together, which we didn't do. That was the first time I had seen that kind of phenomenon in action. I found a kind of reverse discrimination, if you will, in effect. If you didn't have anything to do with the American community and really spent your time with the foreigners of other missions and the Ceylonese, they resented you. On the other hand, if you spent your time with them, well, you weren't in Ceylon to spend your time with a lot of Americans. I would say about half of the people in the Embassy did stick together and half didn't.

Q: Was it more the substantive people who didn't?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, it was more the substantive people who didn't.

Q: It was more the job of the substantive people to get out and get to know the Ceylonese.

LOWENSTEIN: True.

Q: What about the AID people?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I didn't know any of the AID people except Bill Kontos and Jack Kubisch and they certainly mixed.

Our social life revolved around journalists, politicians, and the bright Brits who had been there for a long time. Tennis was always a very important part of my life, and I played every afternoon. So that was another group. That, of course, was mostly with Ceylonese. There was a guy in the Embassy who was a very good tennis player by the name of Frank
Lambert and he and I played in the Ceylon Nationals twice. We were the first American team to play in the Nationals.

Q: Kennedy was elected at the end of this time. Did that bring about a change of any kind?

LOWENSTEIN: My recollection is that it didn't. The policy lines were set and life went on as before.

Q: Jim Grant was the AID director.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, that is right. He was the AID director before Jack Kubisch.

I might add that for the last three weeks, Frances Willis was there, but I had virtually nothing to do with her.

Q: So for the whole time you were there, Gufler was there.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, that's right.

Q: You left Ceylon in May, 1961. How did you get into Serbo-Croatian?

LOWENSTEIN: Apparently when Kennan was appointed Ambassador to Yugoslavia he wanted an embassy staffed exclusively with people who had previous experience and spoke the language. So I received these orders.

Q: You didn't ask for them?

LOWENSTEIN: I certainly didn't ask for them.

Q: What had you put on your wish list?

LOWENSTEIN: I don't think I had gotten to that point. I still had six months to go. I can't remember what I was thinking, if I was thinking at all. And come to think of it, I don't remember ever being asked in those days what I wanted to do.

Q: Did you ever think about staying in South Asia?

LOWENSTEIN: Either I wasn't thinking ahead or this thing about Yugoslavia arrived before I could start thinking ahead, I can't remember which. All I know is that I had no fixed idea about when I was leaving and where I was going. I thought I wanted to get back into the European political/military stuff, but I wasn't absolutely sure. At any rate it all became academic because I got this message saying I was going to be assigned to Belgrade. I said that I had already been in Yugoslavia once without the language and I
wasn't going to go through that again. I didn't really want to go unless I had language training first. So I was assigned to language training.

I came back for language training and in the class were Larry Eagleburger, David Anderson, Stu Kennedy, Harry Dunlop, Dick Johnson, and Dick Johnson's wife who was the best linguist in the group. It was the first time in my life that I had no responsibility all day. The only responsibility was to go and sit in a room and listen to Serbo-Croatian and come home and do some homework.

Q: By then FSI was in the garage?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, in the garage. This was underground. Everybody else was complaining, but I thought it was just marvelous that I didn't have any pressure, or responsibility, or have to get anything done. All I had to do was to do my homework and learn the language. I thought it was a splendid year, myself, although I am not a great linguist.

Q: But, you already had a sense for Yugoslavia.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, I knew what I was getting back into. I was very excited about working for Kennan. So, the only thing that I was concerned about was I didn't want to go through all of this and be assigned to Zagreb or get out of political reporting and be assigned to something else. I did lobby on that and I was assigned to the political section. I don't think it was a tough lobbying job because the political section was enormous.

I was assigned to do internal reporting in the political section, Larry was assigned to the economic section, David Anderson was in the political section too. Harry Dunlop was in the political section. So we all finished language training and went to Belgrade.

There I had the horrible experience of living in a compound, the first and only time in my life. One of the most miserable decisions the US Government ever made was to build compounds in places where it is difficult enough to have a relationship with the inhabitants of the country. This is guaranteed to make it almost impossible, especially in a place like Belgrade. I must say I hated every minute of it and vowed I would never go to a place again where there was any compound living.

I know the Foreign Service doesn't like to make distinctions between substantive and non-substantive people at embassies on the grounds that they are all part of the same family, but they are not part of the same family, or rather they are part of the same family but with different functions. It is absolutely ridiculous to put substantive reporting officers in compound situations. Anyway, I got out of there after a year, but it was a terrible year.

Q: How did you get out of it?
LOWENSTEIN: I got out of it by being on a list to get a house when one came available and my name finally came up. I offered to find my own house but was told I couldn't. The trouble with compounds is that once they are built they have to be filled.

Life in Belgrade was interesting, but not particularly enjoyable. There was a very good group in the embassy. There was some fraternization but on a very superficial level. You could get to know the journalists, the professors in the think tanks, a few odd bods you find here and there, but...

*Q: That was tough after Ceylon.*

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, but after Ceylon it was really a different bag. On the other hand, Yugoslavia was much more important for American interests, there was a lot going on, there were more journalists, more involvement in day-to-day issues that concerned the United States, etc.

*Q: Talk about how Kennan ran the embassy.*

LOWENSTEIN: Kennan ran the embassy in a very distant way. That's not his thing, he is a thinker, obviously. I saw very little of him. Far less of him than any other ambassador I worked for.

*Q: Was the embassy building a big one?*

LOWENSTEIN: No, and he had to walk past my office every day to get to his office. So he walked past it in the morning, on the way to lunch, back in the afternoon, out in the evening. He had to walk past it at least four times a day and on most days far more often than that. He never really dropped in. It was true that I was a second secretary in the political section and he had the political counselor to deal with and the economic counselor and a couple of first secretaries, but...

*Q: How large was the political section?*

LOWENSTEIN: The political section had a political counselor, Dick Johnson, David Anderson, myself and somebody else. It seems to me there were five officers.

*Q: Did the ambassador have a weekly staff meeting?*

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, he had a weekly staff meeting, but the political counselor attended it.

*Q: You didn't attend it?*

LOWENSTEIN: No.
Q: Oh. He didn't have a daily staff meeting?

LOWENSTEIN: No. There was a political section staff meeting a couple of times a week and occasionally he would attend that. But by and large one didn't have much connection with him.

Q: What was he interested in?

LOWENSTEIN: Well there was MFN, the perennial question with the Yugoslavs as to whether they were going to have MFN privileges restored or taken away.

Q: MFN stands for Most Favored Nation status dealing with tariffs.

LOWENSTEIN: It was right after the non-aligned summit in which Tito had come out and criticized the United States for testing nuclear weapons, but had ignored a massive Soviet test of nuclear weapons, thus breaking faith with Kennan. It was a rather rocky period in Yugoslav-American relations. There was a lot of police surveillance and all Americans were on their guard all the time against being overheard, compromised, etc. There was sort of a security neurosis.

There were a couple of things that stick in my mind which didn't really relate to Belgrade. One was...as I recall we were testing the Hungarians to see when they would give diplomatic visas to visit. Two embassy officers every week would apply for visas in pairs. I was paired with Gerry Livingston, who was in the economic section and whom I had known before the Foreign Service. Suddenly these visas came through for us and we were the first ones to go. Our orders were to drive to Budapest and spend the weekend and visit what was then a legation in Budapest, to see if anyone tried to tamper with our trunk because Cardinal Mindszenty was still living in the legation. And to otherwise observe how much we were followed, which wasn't very difficult because we were followed from the minute we crossed the border until we crossed back into Yugoslavia.

Another part of it was that the embassy was divided into field reporting teams. One officer from the economic section and one from the political section. We were supposed to go out two or three times a year. I was paired with Larry Eagleburger. So two or three times a year, Larry and I would go out in a jeep and tour around the country, sometimes with Tom Niles in the back seat, who was a junior officer trainee. I did most of the driving because I don't drink and Larry would accept all offers of slivovitz that began at 8:00 in the morning, so by one o'clock in the afternoon the driving naturally fell to me. I had Eagleburger or Eagleburger and Niles conked out on the back seat. Anyway, those trips were a lot of fun.

Q: Did you get back to Sarajevo?

LOWENSTEIN: I got back to Sarajevo quite often.
Q: Was that part of your reporting beat?

LOWENSTEIN: No, it really wasn't, but I got back during trips down and back to the Dalmatian coast. In fact, jumping ahead, after I got out of the Foreign Service, when I started consulting with companies with interests in Yugoslavia, I was in Sarajevo quite often, so I kept up with Sarajevo.

The reporting in the embassy was sort of the usual grind. What was going on in the Party, what was going on in parliament, the new constitution, what it meant, relations with other countries. There was a daily press summary that had to be translated and edited, which the junior officers in the political section, or what passed for junior officers, we were all rather elderly junior officers, had to take turns doing.

Q: Talk now about Kennan.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, Kennan was someone whose weekly dispatches read almost like movie scripts they were so well written.

Q: Did he do a lot of writing?

LOWENSTEIN: He did a lot of writing and was in the process of writing a history of US-Yugoslav relations.

Q: In effect he was a political officer.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes. He was also doing a lot of arguing with Washington all the time.

Q: What was he arguing about?

LOWENSTEIN: Congress's behavior. Kennan has never felt that Congress has had a role to play in foreign policy.

Q: Do you have any sense as to how the Department regarded him?

LOWENSTEIN: No, I really don't. He cut a very elegant figure in the diplomatic life of Belgrade.

Q: Did he involve others in it or was he pretty much a loner?

LOWENSTEIN: He certainly didn't involve me or some of the other juniors. He did involve a couple of the juniors. Gerry Livingston was a great favorite of his. First of all because his Serbian was absolutely marvelous. He had been a graduate student in Yugoslavia before he went into the Service and had the best language skills in the embassy.
Q: How was yours?

LOWENSTEIN: Lousy. Mine was equal to most everybody else's. David Anderson's was stronger.

Q: What about Larry Eagleburger's?

LOWENSTEIN: I wouldn't say his was any better than mine. But David Anderson's was better and Gerry was easily the best. So Kennan liked that because he could use him as an interpreter. He also had a Ph.D. in history from Harvard and could fit right into helping Kennan write the book he was involved in.

But, I can't say that I got to know Kennan well. He was there only for the first year. He was replaced by Burke Elbrick, who had a totally different kind of relationship with everyone in the embassy, I would say a very close relationship with everyone. I saw a lot of him and by that time we had moved to a house that was a prefab built on the back lawn of the residence, so we were also his neighbors. I enjoyed working for him enormously.

Q: He was very open.

LOWENSTEIN: Very approachable, very open, very funny, very experienced, effortless in the way he did everything. He had a daughter who became a good friend of ours. So my relationship with Elbrick was quite different. I remember one great incident with Elbrick. He loved good cigars, and he smoked Cuban cigars. At one point, there was a congressional delegation visiting, and one of the congressmen said, and I was there at the dinner, "Mr. Ambassador, are you smoking Cuban cigars?" Without blinking an eye, Elbrick said, "Don't tell anyone, I have been assigned to destroy their overseas supply." He never heard a word about it again. He was a wonderful ambassador to work for.

Q: What was your reporting beat?

LOWENSTEIN: My beat was internal politics, yet again.

Q: Doing the same type of reporting you did in Ceylon.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, my theory has always been that the traditional Foreign Service division of responsibilities is that the senior political officer does the foreign office and international relations and the junior does the internal. I think this is totally crazy. The internal is much more interesting and much more important. Given a choice, I would prefer the internal. After all the other is running down to the foreign office and exchanging notes and reporting views on something, but it doesn't give you a real insight into the country or a basis for any kind of original analysis. So I always preferred internal reporting. When Dick Johnson left to go to Sofia to be the DCM and I took his place...

Q: What position did he have?
LOWENSTEIN: He was the number two in the political section. I think then I had some responsibility for the external, but I never paid much attention to it because it was the internal that really interested me. The thing I spent a lot of time on was an analysis of the constitution, long talks with the Yugoslav author of that constitution using some of the normative, analytical techniques that Kelsen had taught me. So working with Kelsen proved to be a very useful experience for that particular job.

Q: Did you predict Yugoslavia would fall apart?

LOWENSTEIN: No, at the time it was difficult to see that they would fall apart, except for maybe Slovenia. My theory at the time was that if you looked at the intermarriage between Croats Bosnians, Slovenes and Serbs, it was so high that within a generation or two there wouldn't be any ethnic divisions. Intermarriage would obliterate these ethnic distinctions. The second element was the very intelligent policy of Tito which was to draft everyone, but to make sure that they served outside their own republics in other republics. I thought these two things would work against continuing these ethnic divisions, but I was totally wrong, obviously. However, there is a large group of Yugoslavs who don't know who they are because they have Croat mothers and Serb fathers and Macedonian wives. The one group that was clearly going to be the object of everyone's prejudice was the Albanians. They were really looked on as untermenschen and discriminated against in every possible way or ridiculed.

Q: Why was that?

LOWENSTEIN: First of all they were of Albanian and not Serbo-Croatian origin. Secondly, they were Muslim. Third, they came from a very underdeveloped part of the country. Fourth, they had stuck together as a group and hadn't intermarried. Fifth, in Kosovo they were far less educated, had fewer opportunities and so they were economically deprived.

Q: So, it sounds like Yugoslavia was not much fun.

LOWENSTEIN: It was interesting but it wasn't much fun.

Q: You were more disappointed after Ceylon?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I don't know that I was disappointed, I didn't enjoy it as much. The embassy was quite large. There was a certain amount of bureaucracy. The political counselor was not a pleasant fellow to work with. The compound business really took the bloom off the rose in the first year. In the middle of the third year I had to leave before my tour was up because my daughter was hurt in an automobile accident. There I found the whole administrative structure absolutely unbelievable. The child was almost killed, needed to be evacuated and I couldn't get permission to do so. I finally said the hell with
it. It was so bad that my then mother-in-law, at her expense, flew her doctor out to Belgrade to pick up my daughter. The embassy fiddled around with it for days.

Q: Was that just bad luck do you think or was it the way of operating of that particular mission?

LOWENSTEIN: The latter.

Q: Because the system works if you get good doctors.

LOWENSTEIN: The system did not work in this case. It can work 85 times, but if it doesn't work for you the one time in your life that you need it, it scars you personally.

So I came back in October or November 1984.

Q: How did you get to EB?

LOWENSTEIN: Because my tour was curtailed, I was out of the assignments cycle so there was no place around except EB. When I got back, I was told that I was not going to EB, I was going to be a staff assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. His name was Dwight Porter. I was told to go up and be interviewed. So I was interviewed. A couple of days later someone from Personnel called me and said, "Well, I don't know, you must have screwed up or something because you are not going to have that job. We are going to stick you in EB." Then I discovered that the reason I wasn't going to get the job was because the day after my interview Dwight Porter was told that he was going to be leaving because Under Secretary Crockett had managed to get rid of him in a power struggle. He went off as Ambassador to Lebanon. But he couldn't tell anybody that, including Personnel, so Personnel didn't know why he had turned me down. He had turned me down because he was leaving. So that is how I ended up in EB.

Q: What were you doing in EB?

LOWENSTEIN: EB was sort of a holding pattern I was told at the time, and it turned out for my own reasons to be just that. I was assigned to a very nice lady who was a civil servant named Virginia McClung working on UNCTAD matters. It would have been hard to find a subject that I found more boring or less productive than UNCTAD and this particular job.

Q: What did UNCTAD deal with?

LOWENSTEIN: Trade and development. The strange thing is that when I left this job, which I will get into later, Mort Abramowitz took it for the same sort of reason, a holding pattern, and again also managed to get out of it after about a year. But Ginny McClung thought that UNCTAD was the most important thing in the world. I respected her for thinking so, but I felt it was deadly. Fortunately, Joe Greenwald was the deputy assistant
secretary and he would come wandering in every once and a while and say, "Why don't we go to Paris, I will put you on the delegation to an OECD working group or this or that." So that saved my sanity. But I thought at the time that if I had to spend two years in the job I wouldn't last.

Well, I didn't have to spend two years in the job because one of the things I had done in Belgrade was that whenever there was a CODEL...I did this in Ceylon as well...and they asked for volunteers for control officers, I always volunteered because I always found it interesting. Much more interesting than most things one does in an embassy. Nobody could understand that. Anyway, I volunteered to be control officer for the chief of staff of the Foreign Relations Committee when he was coming through Belgrade, Carl Marcy. This involved not only Belgrade, but taking a trip for a week with him and his wife. He was a marvelous fellow, very interesting and a lot of fun. Afterwards he said, "Call when you get back to Washington and let's have dinner."

So about a year later when I got back and had this famous EB job, I called and we had dinner. He said, "Look, your old friend John Newhouse has just left the Foreign Relations Committee's staff [this was about a week after I had gotten back, about two days after the Porter business] and Fulbright thinks he would like a Foreign Service Officer to enter the competition." At that point, staff members of the Foreign Relations Committee were picked by a sort of oral examination. Carl would draw up a list of seven or eight people and he would present the list to Fulbright and the two senior Democrats and the two senior Republicans. If they liked the looks of it they would approve it, if not, Carl would find some other people. And then you would go up and have a little chat with these people. Finally it was narrowed down to three or four and then there would be a formal hearing. You would go over and go into a room with the two senior Republicans, two senior Democrats and Fulbright and Carl and have an oral exam for half an hour. One thing that was never asked, because it was against the then tradition, was what your political beliefs were, what political party you belonged to. You were simply asked about what you had done, what you thought, how you approached problems, what your point of view was on various issues of the day, and that was it. So, I said, "Fine, why not?"

Originally I was under the impression that I had the permission, if not the encouragement, of the State Department to go up and join the Committee staff on some sort of detail. I don't think they took it seriously because I don't think they thought I would be asked to do it. But when the smoke cleared, I was asked to do it. Either the day before I started or two days later, I can't remember, I was told that this was regarded as a violation of the separation of powers and that you couldn't have an executive branch officer serving on a legislative branch committee. It is very amusing to look back on that now. At the time there were no Foreign Service officers working on Capitol Hill, except one year programs under the sponsorship of the Political Science Association, but they were not employees of the Committee, they were on detail as some sort as students or out of government assignments. So there had never been anyone who actually worked on a staff who was still in the Foreign Service.
At any rate I was rather upset and went up to see Carl and Fulbright. They said, "Well, look, it is up to you. That is a stupid attitude. There isn't time to straighten it out procedurally. Why don't you, if you want to, come up here for a couple of years and then we will call Dean Rusk and you can go back."

Q: What was the date now?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, this was the summer of 1965.

There was some rule at that point that you could leave for a couple of years and then come back and be reappointed in the Foreign Service.

Q: Leave without pay?

LOWENSTEIN: Something like that. So, basically that is what I did. Now, of course, two years later, Dean Rusk and Fulbright weren't speaking to each other so this whole thing became academic. Also at the time I was in a job that I considered to be less than interesting. My only concern on going up to the Committee was that I might find it equally boring and inactive and that I might be trading one job that I didn't think was very interesting for another one that I didn't think was very interesting, which looking back on the eight years I spent with the Committee was a rather amusing concern.

Anyway, I arrived and originally I was there to work on Europe, mainly Eastern Europe. Within about a week, I found myself attending all the meetings of the small staff, which were devoted to discussions with Fulbright on whether he should give his speech on the Dominican Republic. Fulbright was outraged by US conduct in the Dominican Republic and the ambassador's reports...

Q: Was that Tap Bennett?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, it was Tap Bennett. ...which he considered to be exaggerated accounts of what was going on and which were further exaggerated by Lyndon Johnson. I didn't know anything about the substance of the problem, and still don't, but I remember the discussion which was along the line that if Fulbright made this statement, President Johnson, having the character that he did, it would mean a break with the administration which would mean, in turn, that he would have less influence and power. On the other hand, Fulbright felt very strongly that these were things that had to be said, nobody else was saying them, he felt that he had the facts. There was a very good person on Latin America on the Committee staff, Pat Holt, who later took Marcy's place and was a life long student of Latin America. So Fulbright decided to go ahead. Now interestingly at that time, Vietnam never came up. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had been passed and Fulbright had voted for it with misgivings. So he made the speech on the Dominican Republic and, indeed, a break did occur. That was really the beginning of the total breakdown in relations between Fulbright and the Johnson administration ...Fulbright on the one hand and Johnson and Dean Rusk on the other.
Then I began working on Eastern Europe which turned out to be not at the center of the Committee's interests. And then I got into a lot of other things too, including Western Europe. After I had been there for about three or four months, one thing that struck me, and always had interested me, were the visceral, anti-French feelings on the part of Committee members towards France. This was during the MLF period. The French were general whipping boys for everything that was going wrong in the world. De Gaulle, who was back in power by this time, was constantly being cursed. One day I got a hold of all de Gaulle's recent speeches including the one he had made in Phnom Penh on Vietnam and the things he said on Europe. I cut out the attribution lines and underlined portions of these speeches and sent them down to Fulbright. I said, "Here is a thinker on foreign policy questions who it seems to me thinks very much the way you do." He called me up and said, "Well, these are very interesting and I must say I agree with everything the fellow says. Who is he?" I said, "Well, you will be interested to know that the fellow in question is General de Gaulle." And Fulbright, as was his wont at times like this, replied, "You don't say." I said, "Well, I do say." And then I sent him down the full copies with the attributions, etc. That was one of the things that led Fulbright to decide that there really ought to be a look at Western Europe. So he assigned Senator Frank Church to this task. The idea was that Frank Church would go off to Europe and he would go around and see everybody, de Gaulle, Erhard, and all the others. He would come back and do a report which would be the basis for hearings. And, indeed, that is exactly what happened and Fulbright assigned me to go with Church.

We went off to Europe...

**Q: At that time didn't the Senators have their own foreign affairs staff?**

LOWENSTEIN: No, at that time the Senators did not. They had one of their legislative assistants nominally responsible for foreign policy, but it was a subsidiary role for the staff member. When the Senators traveled on Committee business, they didn't take the people from their own offices, they took a member of the Committee staff. Generally Fulbright actually assigned the person, although the Senator had to agree. I didn't know Senator Church when I started on the trip. The trip lasted for three weeks. When I started discussing the trip with Senator Church, I realized that he didn't know very much about Europe. So I structured the trip by beginning in Geneva so he could have a long day with Jacques Fremont at the Institute of International Studies and read or talk himself into the issues. So that is the way it began. We then went to Paris and saw half a dozen cabinet ministers plus de Gaulle. We went to London and saw Harold Wilson and two or three other cabinet ministers. We went to Germany and saw Erhard and two or three cabinet ministers. We went to Brussels and saw Luns, who was Secretary General at NATO. I think that was it.

It was obviously a very interesting trip. Church, I must say, was one of the fastest learner I have ever seen. The last stop was Bonn, and George McGhee was the ambassador there. He had set up a dinner with all the high officials of the Foreign Ministry. At the
conclusion of the dinner, he invited Senator Church to pronounce himself on what was going on in Europe. I have always suspected that he was trying to sandbag Church. At any rate, Church got up and gave an absolutely brilliant talk which impressed those who were present. Now, that was the positive side of Frank Church. I might add that Mrs. Church was along on this trip and proved to be really a great asset. She was a wonderful traveling companion and an extremely quick study herself.

There is an amusing side note. I don't mean this to be insulting at all, but it is an interesting vignette, I think. When we came back, I wrote the report and sent it to Carl for him to look at before it was sent to the Senator. Carl called me up and said, "Well, this report is quite good. Let's not just issue it as a Senate report, let's turn it into an article and send it up to Foreign Affairs." So, we sent it up to Foreign Affairs. At the time Phil Quigg was the editor of Foreign Affairs and Hamilton Fish Armstrong was the managing editor. Phil Quigg called me up and said, "The article is fine. We will take it the way it is except for one thing. You have to cut out the last paragraph." I said, "Why?" And he said, "Ask around and you will see." Well, the last paragraph was a quote from Walter Lippmann. I was totally mystified and asked around and discovered that back in the days when they were friends, the Armstrongs and the Lippmanns would meet for dinner and bridge on Thursdays. One Thursday night, Mr. Armstrong showed up and Mrs. Lippmann showed up, but Mr. Lippmann and Mrs. Armstrong didn't show up. The reason they didn't show up was because they had run off together. And since that day, as it was described to me by some one, the words Walter Lippmann and the words of Walter Lippmann had never appeared in Foreign Affairs. So, that was the first amusing thing about the article.

The second thing was I called Carl and said that the article had been accepted. He said, "Fine." I said, "What do we do about showing it to Senator Church?" It still hadn't been shown to him.

Q: With his name on it?

LOWENSTEIN: With his name on it. So, he said, "Well, when the galleys come in I will take them in and show them to him." In due course the galleys arrived and they went into Senator Church. He made a few minor corrections and added one paragraph. The galleys went back and out came the article. About two days after the article appeared, I was walking down the corridor and Senator Church was coming the other way. As he crossed me he grabbed me by the shoulder and said, "Say, have you read my article in Foreign Affairs?" He then did a double take and said, "Oh, oh, of course you did." So a sidelight on what it is like to work on Capitol Hill.

We then had the hearings and I think the main result of the hearings was that Congressional support for MLF evaporated and it became a dead issue.

Then I did some things on Eastern Europe. I traveled a bit with some of the Senators to Eastern Europe, particularly Pell, who wanted to go back to Czechoslovakia where he served. We went to Bratislava, Prague and spent two weeks in other places in Eastern
Europe. Actually that was the beginning of 1968. We went back a second time about six weeks before the Soviet invasion. I am quite proud of the report that came out of that trip because in the report I said that it seemed to me that if things kept going the way they were, the Soviets would take some sort of military action. At the time that was considered to be not the conventional wisdom. Then after the invasion I went back with Senator Pell and his wife and Senator Gore and his wife. We also went to Moscow and Warsaw. I think that was it. Anyway I did a lot of traveling in Eastern Europe in those years. I did a lot of reports on what was going on.

I also took another trip with Senator Clark around Eastern Europe...Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary. Again, in each case there were always reports, each concentrating on what the issues were...The Czech gold claim case; the Hungarian Crown of St. Stephen case; MFN and human rights in Poland...the sort of issues that had been around Eastern Europe for a long time and that were of interest to the Foreign Relations Committee because the legislative branch had an important role in all of these things, since there was always legislation involved.

Q: What was your relations with the State Department?

LOWENSTEIN: On Eastern European things it was fine.

Q: How did you find the Foreign Service, looking at it from another branch of government?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, at that point I thought it was fine. I felt that the embassies knew what they were talking about. Most of the ambassadors seemed very good, with some notable exceptions. The trips were interesting mainly because in each case the issues that needed to be resolved, the resolution was obvious to any reasonable man, whether that reasonable man was a senator or a Foreign Service officer. The problem was always American public opinion and the political scene, especially the right wing of the Republican Party, and the emigre groups. So, there was absolutely no movement on most of these issues, even though everyone who had any responsibility for the policy felt that these things should have been done.

I was very lucky because the only Senators I traveled with during the course of the time I was traveling with Senators were Mansfield, Church, Pell, Gore, Clark and Phil Hart. I enjoyed traveling with all of them very much. I thought they were conscientious, very good at their jobs, no nonsense, no shopping sprees, all work, very polite to everyone, handled foreign officials with whom they met extremely well. I thought they were wonderful trips.

In 1967 I got a call one day from Senator Fulbright saying that Senator Phil Hart, who was not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, wanted to take a trip around the world and wanted some help. He asked me if I would like to go along. He wanted somebody from the Foreign Relations Committee staff. I said, "Of course," and went over
to meet Phil Hart for the first time. We then set off on a one month trip around the world. I must say traveling with Phil Hart was as enjoyable and interesting and productive as any traveling time I ever had or could imagine having. He had the reputation of being the conscience of the Senate and he was the most respected member of the Senate. Having traveled with him for a month, I could well understand why he had that reputation. It was not like traveling with a Senator, it was like traveling with one of your old, best friends after about three days.

There are a few things that stand out in my mind from that trip. We began in Tokyo. Hart, coming from Michigan had been asked by the automobile companies to meet with the Japanese automobile companies and protest the famous issue of access to Japanese markets on the part of American automobiles manufacturers. So, a meeting was organized by the American Ambassador to Japan, I think it was Armin Meyer, and we met at breakfast with the presidents, 12 men who represented the Japanese automobile industry. Senator Hart began by describing the hardships that not having this market worked on the American automobile manufacturers and how it was very bad for their balance sheets and it was a great handicap, etc. He went on and on. The Japanese were all sitting there quietly eating their breakfast, nobody saying a thing. Finally, the president of the association, whose name I can't remember, but who was head of one of the large companies, spoke up. It was the only statement made during the course of the breakfast. He said, "Senator, very interesting presentation. Very moving speech. I would like to point out that the gross income of General Motors last year was higher than the national budget of Japan." At that point everybody got up and left the room and that was the end of the meeting. So, that was my first experience in dealing with the Japanese on the question of market access.

We went to Vietnam and spent about ten days there. It was my first trip to Vietnam. I had asked before we left whether I could go off on my own for four or five days during the time that Senator Hart was doing the usual senatorial things in Vietnam...visiting the troops from Michigan, etc. I went off with an old friend of mine, Charles Flood, who was a journalist, to the Delta, to some contested villages. In one of them we spent two nights and we found when we woke up the second morning that three people in the house of the deputy village chief had been assassinated during the course of the evening. This had been a so-called safe village. We were dropped by helicopter and picked up 48 hours later. So I began to wonder that if this was a safe village, what was it like in the rest of the villages that weren't considered safe. In going to all the briefings with General Westmoreland and all the others, it began to look to me as though somebody wasn't telling the truth somewhere along the line. On the way out to Vietnam in the plane, Senator Hart had...

Q: This was 1967?

LOWENSTEIN: This was '66 or '67, I will have to look it up. I think it was January, 1967. ...Senator Hart had told me that he was a strong supporter of the Vietnam War. He, himself, was a combat veteran of World War II, in fact I think he had been quite badly
wounded in World War II. He was a moderate to centrist hawk. After he had been in Vietnam for ten days, he was a dove. The conversion was quite dramatic. I remember one incident. We were being briefed by a general about the great military successes of the forces under his command and what their body count was and how well they had fought and what they had done, etc., and exactly how they had conducted their military operations. Senator Hart turned to me and with a wry smile said, "Makes you wonder whose sons they are?" At any rate, that was when I first began to think that...my own view was that the military was not telling the truth and were presenting a factually distorted picture of the war giving one side and not the other. And for every fact they cited as a positive accomplishment or a sign that they were winning the war, there was another fact that could be cited that proved exactly the opposite. The least that should have been done for the American decision makers and the American public was to give both sides of the issue. But both sides were not being presented.

So when I got back I wrote a long report on Vietnam. At that point Senator Hart did not want to go public with his reservations. He wanted to pick his own time and wanted to get into it gradually. So, instead of releasing the report he sent it as a confidential report to the majority leader, Senator Mansfield. That led to Senator Mansfield inviting me to come along subsequently on his trips to the Far East. I don't think it was because of what the report said, but because, I suppose, he was looking for somebody who could write reports in the way that he liked them written which was factual, understated, unemotional and without value judgments. So I began my travels with Mansfield.

I think there were four trips with Mansfield. Some alone, the rest with a plane provided by the White House, accompanied by the Secretary of the Senate, Frank Valeo, a Foreign Service officer who was an administrative officer and handled all the administration; Mrs. Mansfield and a doctor from the military. It is hard for me to separate one trip from the other. Two of them were to Cambodia. One of them was to inaugurate the restoration of relations with Cambodia. On that trip we stayed with Sihanouk in his guest house. We were there for a week and spent all of our time with Sihanouk. That led to many amusing incidents.

Senator Mansfield had the reputation of not talking very much and he didn't which is why he got along well with the Asians. He listened. He would make a few pithy remarks, and I will tell a few stories to illustrate that. In terms of history and what Senator Mansfield is like, I think they are interesting.

Once I was flying with him from San Francisco to Tokyo and we were in a commercial plane and sitting next to each other in first class. By this time I was used to Senator Mansfield, so I knew one never talked to him unless he talked to you. So we got on the plane and had been on the plane for about three and a half hours and hadn't said anything. At that time you were allowed to smoke a pipe in first class. He was smoking his pipe and I was smoking my pipe. After several hours, he said to me, "What kind of pipe tobacco do you smoke?" And I said, "Well, I smoke Dunhill's." And he said, "Well, how much is it?" And I said, "Well, it is $3.00" He said, "Well, I smoke Prince Albert and it costs $1.25."
His pipe tobacco cost a third of mine. Now per pipe the difference was probably less than five cents. At any rate, that was the end of the conversation for several more hours.

Another trip to Tokyo I remember very well. I think it was the first trip I ever made with him on a plane provided by the White House. When we took off, reverting to my Foreign Service days, I said, "Senator, would you like me to prepare an arrival statement?" He said, "Nope." "Well, would you like a departure statement?" He said, "Nope." "Well, do you want talking points for your meeting with the Prime Minister?" He said, "Nope." So we arrived and there were 300 hundred journalists at the foot of the plane and he walked off the plane with Mrs. Mansfield and me and said, "See you boys tomorrow" and got into the car and we went to the hotel.

The next day we had a meeting with the Prime Minister and I was the note taker. I went in and sat while they had this so-called conversation which lasted quite a long time. Mansfield would ask a question and the Prime Minister would talk for fifteen minutes. The Prime Minister would ask a question and Mansfield would deliver two sentences. Finally the meeting ended and we emerged from the room and this time there weren't 300 journalists, there must have been 600 journalists with everybody pushing microphones in Senator Mansfield's face. I thought, "Okay, we don't have a statement, let's see what happens." The Prime Minister got up in front of the microphones and said, "Senator, this visit has been a pleasure and privilege for my country and it has contributed greatly to the relations between our two governments and our two peoples, etc." And then he motioned to Senator Mansfield. He stepped in front of the microphones, turned to the Prime Minister and said, "Well, thanks a lot and so long." When we got into the car I said, "Now I see why you don't want an arrival statement or a departure statement."

Well, that was the way those trips went. We had some extraordinary experiences. On one of these trips, again in an Air Force plane, we were going from some place to Rangoon and he said to me, "Send the ambassador a cable and tell him that I want to see Ne Win as soon as we arrive." So I sent the cable. Back came a reply...Art Hummel was the ambassador and probably does not remember this incident...which said, "Impossible to arrange appointment with Ne Win, will explain upon arrival." I showed it to Mansfield and he didn't say anything. We arrived and Ambassador Hummel met Senator Mansfield at the foot of the gangway and said, "Look, Senator, Ne Win doesn't receive foreign chiefs of mission or visitors. I haven't seen him in two years. He hasn't seen any ambassadors. It is impossible to see him. It just won't work. Do you want to go to your hotel?"

There was a long line of cars to take us to the hotel. Mansfield said, "No, let's go to the palace and see Ne Win." The Ambassador said, "Well, as I say, nobody has seen him, he doesn't see anybody." And Mansfield said, "Well, I think he will see me. Let's go see Ne Win."

Well, we got into the cars and off we went to the Viceregal Palace which is an enormous structure. We pulled up in front of the Palace. Somehow the word had gotten through and to this day I don't know how. Ne Win and Madame Ne Win came tumbling down the
stairs. Ne Win threw his arms around Mrs. Mansfield and said, "Maureen." Madame Ne Win threw her arms around Mansfield and said, "Mike, I am so glad to see you." At which point Madame Ne Win said, "You have to stay for supper. It is just going to be in the kitchen and just us." I thought that the ambassador was going to faint. And, indeed, that is what happened. We went into the kitchen which was a big eat-in kitchen, and we, the ambassador, the Mansfield party and the Ne Wins, had this very jolly dinner. Well, it turned out, I discovered on the ride back to town, that when Madame Ne Win had gone to Catholic University in Washington, D.C., she had lived with the Mansfields, a little fact that he hadn't bothered to tell anybody. It was typical of his relations with Asians where they had been developed over a long time, but he never talked about them, so nobody knew what they were.

Q: That is incredible that the ambassador didn't know of the relationship.

LOWENSTEIN: Another incident. Mansfield was a very good friend of Marcos and we went to see him a number of times. On one trip I remember we were going from somewhere to Manila and a cable came in to the plane which said, "President and Mrs. Marcos are giving a large dinner for the Mansfields the night of your arrival. Dress is Barong Tagalog. Please provide neck, chest, waist and sleeve sizes of all members of the party. Shirts will be made by Mr. Marcos's personal tailor and will be delivered to your hotel when you arrive so that you can go immediately to dinner." So I went around and got all the measurements and sent a cable, which in the usual State Department way went to Manila and was repeated to Cinpac, Tokyo, the State Department, everyplace all over the bloody globe, I discovered later, because some erstwhile buddy of mine had gotten hold of this cable, and back came a cable to the plane, which was repeated to all of these places and which I heard about for years afterward, saying "Please repeat Lowenstein's waist size."

We also had this incredible day with the King of Laos in Luang Prabang in which the doctor on that trip, who I think was an Army doctor, had brought his camera along and was determined to get a lot of pictures that day. So he kept saying to the King and to the Queen, who didn't speak any English..."Now, King, put your arm around Mrs. Mansfield." "Get the group together in front of the statue of Buddha." Etc. It was a rather colorful day.

Q: Did reports come out of these trips?

LOWENSTEIN: There was always a trip report. Mansfield had a theory that if you holed up in a hotel room in Hong Kong you could get the report written so that it was totally finished by the time we got back to Washington. If we waited until after we got back to Washington, nothing would get done. So, indeed, these trips always ended with 24 to 48 hours in Hong Kong, which were spent totally in drafting the report. The technique was that I would do the first draft and Frank Valeo would go over it and rewrite it and then we would sit with Mansfield and go over it line by line. They were very complete and always ended with recommendations. As soon as Mansfield arrived back in Washington, he
always went immediately to the White House and gave the report first to the President along with a confidential annex. Then in due course the trip report was released in unclassified form. So, after each trip there was a public report. He was very heavy on recommendations.

He was a great fan of Marcos's and Sihanouk's and Ne Win's. The reason he was, and I had some problems with the Marcos part of this, was that he felt these were three Asian leaders who were in tune with their people and could relate to them and were authentic, popular political leaders and not artificial creations of either the West or the Communist world. That is why they appealed to him. He was willing to overlook any shortcomings that were brought to his attention, which he probably knew about anyway. He knew Asia very well. So these discussions tended to be always discussions of problems that the political leader in question faced at the moment and what the United States could do about it.

Now the meetings with Sihanouk, when we first went there, were very interesting because in those meetings, Sihanouk kept saying, "Look, I know that you are bombing Cambodia. It is perfectly okay with me. You go ahead and bomb the North Vietnamese and Cambodia all you like. Just don't say anything about it, I won't say anything about. For God's sake just shut up. Forget all this compromising my neutrality business, it is okay, but just keep quiet."

Mansfield had a strongly held view that Sihanouk was the only one in Cambodia who could hold things together. Part of his irate reaction to the war in Vietnam was as a result of its extension to Cambodia with the result that Sihanouk was toppled from office. I personally don't think the US had anything to do with replacing Sihanouk, but the fact is that what we were doing in Vietnam created an environment in which it was possible for those who wanted to topple Sihanouk to do so on the theory that they would then be supported by the United States, because they claimed that they were going to pursue the war more aggressively than Sihanouk had. Mansfield felt that Cambodia was doomed the minute Sihanouk was overthrown and, indeed, he was right. I agreed with him. It was very easy to see that that would happen.

Q: What were his relations with Johnson?

LOWENSTEIN: His relations with Johnson were okay. I mean, they agreed to disagree over Vietnam.

Q: Didn't he also want to withdraw troops from Europe?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, now that is another story and I also worked on that subcommittee. He formed a special subcommittee concerning withdrawing troops from Europe. I was the senior staff person, as I recall, on that subcommittee. When we started this, I had some long talks with him because I was against reducing troops in Europe. I concluded that what really was going on was a very clever, subtle play. It was Mansfield's view that the
only way to get the Europeans to do more was to threaten them with this move, that this was the greatest bargaining chip you could possibly have with Europeans. It was interesting that while he kept putting in his amendments to reduce American forces by these enormous amounts...50 percent or 200,000 or whatever it was...they always failed by a small vote. Had he put in his amendments a smaller number--10% or 50,000 for example--I have no doubt that the amendment would have passed and I'm sure he was also sure.

Just to finish up with the Mansfield amendments. Since we had a little tape accident here I can't remember if I said this before, but MBFR was the illegitimate offspring of the Mansfield amendment. The Mansfield amendments forced the administration to go into the MBFR talks seriously because as far as Mansfield was concerned, he threatened to bring these things to a vote if the administration wouldn't try to find a way to negotiate some phased withdrawal. The administration argued, of course, that Mansfield was holding a gun to their head and weakening their bargaining position. But then, the administration was always arguing that everything the Senate did weakened their bargaining position.

At any rate, it also forced the Europeans to watch it when it came to reducing their percentage of GNP devoted to defense. So in essence, I think the Mansfield amendments accomplished a lot. It is hard to think back to those days, but the administration wouldn't move on this whole issue of negotiated troop reductions. They kept arguing that these were sacred figures and nothing could be done about it. Those in the Mansfield school just felt that Europe was rich and could pick up some of the load and that this was sort of silly.

Before we get to the whole business of my investigating missions with Dick Moose, let me say a few things to show you what life was like on the Foreign Relations Committee in those days. The first project I was assigned to was the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union, which was the first agreement to be reached with the Soviet Union in quite a long time. Fulbright and those in favor of ratifying the Convention felt that if we couldn't make progress on something this simple, consular access to citizens arrested, etc., then we couldn't make progress on anything. The opponents argued that you couldn't trust the Russians, and that this was deceiving and would lead people to lower their guard, etc. So those were the general philosophical arguments. Now in those days members of the Committee staff were assigned to deal with both sides of an issue. The staff member was supposed to become an expert and be able to counsel both the opponents and proponents. And that is indeed what I did on the Consular Convention. I wrote both the majority and minority reports. The majority report for Fulbright and the minority report for Carl Mundt. I received, what I thought at that time, since I was in favor of ratifying the Consular Convention, a high complement from Mundt who felt that the minority report was a sounder document than the majority report. Not only did I have to prepare the two reports, I had to go down to the floor of the Senate and sit with the leaders of the two factions during the debate and support the arguments that they wanted to make and act as their counsel during this procedure. That is an example of how a non-partisan staff used to work in the old days.
There is an incident involving Senator Wayne Morse that I think is interesting in describing the difference between working in a structured bureaucracy, like the State Department, and Capitol Hill. The State Department issued a legal white paper justifying involvement in Vietnam. I can't remember whether it was in 1965 or 1966. At any rate, Wayne Morse wanted to attack this document which he felt was flawed and which he felt was incorrect in many respects and did not in fact justify involvement in Vietnam. Carl asked me to go over and talk to a member of his staff and find out what he wanted and do it. So I went over and talked to a very nice lady named Phyllis Rock, who was one of his legislative assistants. She said, "Well, this is what he wants you to do. He wants to attack this thing which he considers to be total nonsense. He wants to make a statement on the floor of the Senate." So I went back. I hadn't met Wayne Morse. I started going over the document and it seemed to me to be full of holes and specious reasoning. At least it could be attacked on these grounds. So I wrote a long dissertation about what was wrong...

Q: Did you contact the State Department?

LOWENSTEIN: No, absolutely not. ...a long dissertation on what I thought was wrong with this legal justification, checking a few points with the Congressional Research Service and the General Counsel of the Office of the Senate, etc. I sent it over and waited to have a meeting to discuss it. I waited two days and nothing happened. I got sort of nervous and called Phyllis Rock and said, "When are we meeting to discuss my draft on the State Department White Paper?" She said, "Well, if you will go over to the floor of the Senate right now, he started reading it 5 minutes ago, you can hear it." Which I did. Afterwards I went up to her and asked why we had not had a meeting on this. Did he consider it? Did he discuss it? After all Wayne Morse had been a dean of a law school and had been in the Senate a long time and presumably would want to check something that somebody he had never met had written. "Not at all," she said. "He went over it, made a few minor changes, thought it was fine, went over to the Senate, got up on his feet and read it." The next morning it was in the world press and in the public domain.

The lesson to be drawn here is that when you are working in a place like Capitol Hill, and indeed in a lot of other places, once you put something in the hands of someone who is going to make it public, you have no control over it. And all the fire breaks that you have and protections you have in the State Department don't exist in lots of other places, especially Capitol Hill. So, if you are going to make a mistake, you are going to make it. On the other hand, if you produce something that is very wishy-washy and that never takes a position, nobody is ever going to use it because that is not what they need. It is a very good lesson in learning how to live in the real world. At least that is how I interpret it.

Now, on the subject of mistakes, let me just give you the other side of the picture. One day Fulbright called me down to his office and said, "I am sick and tired of these other countries supporting the war in Vietnam when politically they don't believe in it. They are supporting it because they are making a lot of money out of it. So, get the facts and give
me a speech that I can deliver on the floor." So I prepared a lot of correspondence that went to the Defense Department, the State Department, asking all sorts of questions and figures on exports and all the rest of it. I called the Congressional Research Service and they did their usual superb job of a research document. I got all the facts together and wrote a speech. Fulbright went on the floor and delivered this steaming indictment of Allied behavior in Vietnam.

The next morning I got a call from the Counselor of the New Zealand embassy who asked me where I had gotten the figure that Fulbright had given for the profit that the New Zealanders had made in Vietnam. I described the complicated procedure by which I had arrived at this figure by taking various figures from various attachments and adding and subtracting and multiplying, etc. and assured him that is where the figure had come from. He said that that was what they had assumed since Fulbright had outlined the procedure in his speech and they had done the same thing. However, their figure was 20 percent of my figure. I assured him that he was wrong and said I would check.

I checked my figures and called him back and said, "Well, I am awfully sorry. You are right and I am wrong. So what do we do about this?" He said, "Well, it may interest you to know that the Prime Minister made a statement in parliament about two hours ago. The ambassador, in fact, is in the State Department right now delivering a formal protest to the Secretary of State. The only thing that my government wants is a formal apology from Fulbright on the floor of the Senate."

So I went crawling down to Fulbright's office and opened the door and said, "I am sorry, I quit, I am leaving, etc." He said, "Well, what's the matter with you?" And I said, "Well, the matter is that this happened and it is embarrassing you and I will be out of my office by 3:00 this afternoon. All I can say is I'm very sorry." And he said, "Ah, come on, don't be so silly. All right, so they are not making what you said they are making, they are still making a lot. What difference does it make?" I said, "Well, the difference it makes is that the Prime Minister has made a statement in parliament and the ambassador is protesting to the Secretary of State and they want a formal apology from you on the floor." And he said, "So, they want a formal apology. Do they really want a formal apology?" "That's what they said." "All right, I will give them a formal apology," he said.

So the next day he got on the floor and said, "We made a mistake, they didn't make "x" they made 20 percent of that and we are sorry we made that mistake. But they did make 20 percent of "x" which just proves my point that here they are. Now it is true they didn't make "x" but as I said they did make 20 percent of "x".

I thought to myself at the time that if this had happened to me in the State Department I undoubtedly would have been fired, transferred, gotten a bad efficiency report, etc., but there it was just another mistake made in the course of a day's work. This shows that contrary to his reputation, Fulbright was a tolerant, understanding person to work for.
ABM hearings, footnote to history: Bill Bader was handling ABM and other arms control matters and he left to join the Ford Foundation and the ABM hearings were dumped in my lap. By this time the hearings were well underway. I attended the first hearing and an interesting thing happened. When the ABM system was first a subject of a congressional hearing, some Senators felt that the system didn't seem to be all that practical, but they weren't really dug in on the subject. The Federation of American Scientists was convinced that the system wouldn't work, so they had been conducting a campaign on Capitol Hill, but it hadn't gotten very far. So when hearings opened, David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense, was the first witness. He gave the Defense Department's justification for the system...why it would work, how it would work, etc. Fulbright led off the questioning and said, "Well, that is very interesting. By the way, have you consulted any of the experts in this field on this system." Packard said, "Yes, I have, we have consulted all the experts in this field and they all agree with us." Fulbright said, "Well, I am glad to hear that. Who have you consulted?" Packard said, "Well, we consulted with all the experts and they agree with us." Fulbright said, "But who?" Packard said, "Well, I really can't remember their names, but we consulted all the experts." Fulbright said, "Well, can't you give me one name? If you have consulted all these experts, you must know who they are. Give me one name." Packard said, "All right I will give you one name, Wolfgang Penofsky." I think he was then at Stanford but it might have been the University of California, but he was a recognized expert in the field. So Fulbright said, "Thanks very much, that is all I wanted to know."

The hearing proceeded and twenty minutes later the phone rang in the back of the hearing room and Bill Bader or somebody else picked up the phone and a voice said, "This is Wolfgang Penofsky. I have been listening to these hearings. I was never consulted. The only time I ever saw Deputy Secretary Packard was running past him in an airport and he said something to me and I said something, but he never asked me what my view was, and I never told him that I thought this system would work because I don't think it will."

So this is the kind of thing that leads Senators to immediately smell a rat and it opened up the hearings. And, indeed, during the course of the hearings it turned out that the great weight of scientific opinion believed that the ABM system wouldn't work and that it was principally Dr. Teller who believed that it would. The others, Marvin Goldberger, Penofsky, and literally almost everyone else, testified against the system. So that is how somehow a question gets opened up and I suppose if you agree with me that it is a good thing that the truth will out, that public hearings can serve a useful purpose.

On the matter of these staff reports that Dick Moose and I did. The origin was that I had a talk with Fulbright and argued that the Foreign Relations Committee couldn't possibly conduct an effective examination of US policy and the legislation relating to US policy in Southeast Asia, and indeed in other parts of the world, if it had the same information base that the State Department did, because the State Department, I argued, could control whatever information it released to the Senate and could mold that information to serve its purposes and the Senate had no independent information base. When Senators traveled they were taken in hand by the military, they hadn't had time to do the necessary
preparatory work, they had to spend a lot of time in the field doing the things that Senators have to do like shaking hands with their constituents and if the Committee was going to be serious there had to be a serious effort to get its own information. He agreed and Dick Moose agreed to do it as well. So with the permission of Senator Aiken, the ranking Republican, we were allowed to go out to Vietnam in December, 1969.

When we came back we issued reports. The first was a classified report to the Committee which they found very interesting. It was, in fact, their idea that a sanitized version be made public. Now the summer of 1969 was at the height of the statements being made by Nixon, Laird and Rogers that Vietnamization would succeed, was in place and the policy was going to permit the war to be ended on American terms. This was more or less accepted as gospel by the public.

Q: The press also?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, the press was somewhat more skeptical, but looking back on it, not as skeptical as they should have been. So, finally, when we issued our unclassified report, which had a conclusion section in it which the original classified report didn't, it ended with the following sentence which was a sentence that really made the whole business of the report a public issue. The sentence read as follows: "Dilemmas thus seem to lie ahead in Vietnam as they have throughout our involvement in this war that appears to be not only far from won but far from over."

Headlines on the front pages of every newspaper in the United States the next morning read...Senate staff says war not only far from won but far from over. This is an unexceptional sentence if you look at it on its own, but in the context of the mood in the United States in December 1969, it had extraordinary resonance and produced, as I say, this enormous rash of publicity.

Q: Were you aware of how Kissinger reacted to that?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, but that gets me into a whole other phase. In fact, there were a total of 12 reports and Kissinger was always very complimentary about these reports as being a terrific headache but very well done. In fact, he invited me back into the State Department because he thought the reports were so good. I know from various people who worked closely with Kissinger, including Larry Eagleburger, who had been a colleague of mine in Belgrade, that they were on his desk the morning they were released and he read them very carefully.

Well, I thought that this was the sort of thing that we should be doing all over the world and that this should be institutionalized within the Committee. That there should be a fact finding staff that operated on a non-partisan basis that went and looked at any situation where there seemed to be a dispute, on either the facts or the policy and where there was a legitimate legislative interest because legislation was involved. What happened in the course of these ten reports was that these reports got so much publicity and frankly were so well received that various Senators began to get jealous and began to complain that the "staff" was getting more attention than the members of the Committee. So this exercise was doomed to die eventually and indeed September, 1973 was the last one of these reports written in a period of four years and it was at that point that I decided to leave. But had I stayed, this exercise would not have continued. Dick and I were constantly asked to join Sunday morning talk shows and to be interviewed, etc. We were always forbidden to do so, which was perfectly okay by us. But the press coverage was really out of control and we had a full page in Newsweek and pictures and the whole bit.

It showed something else, which is that even if staff is supported by both Republicans and Democrats, and that was never the issue with these reports...

Q: Wasn't the administration furious?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, the administration was furious as an administration because they were anti-administration not from the positions they took but from the facts they brought to light. But the Republicans on the Committee who were not particularly partisan, Senator Scott being an exception to this, but Senator Aiken, Senator Case and the other Republicans didn't object to the reports because they were anti-administration. What Senators began to object to was that these reports were getting more attention than they were. So this exercise was doomed to have a short life. By about mid 1972 the Committee was becoming quite politicized.

I won't bother going through all the reports and what they said, etc. Anyone who is interested can go and check the press, because these reports were covered extensively in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, and magazine articles. Furthermore, they are all available because they are public documents.

Q: The classified reports are different?

LOWENSTEIN: The classified reports were far more explosive because there were certain things that were not in the unclassified reports. Let me give you an example which could no longer be considered classified. I think we were the first to discover that American forces in Vietnam were fragging their own officers and this was in the classified report but not in the unclassified report. The military denied this and said it wasn't happening but we knew it was happening because we were told about it by countless junior officers whose friends, in fact, had been killed or wounded by fragging.
That is the kind of thing that was in the classified report and not in the unclassified version.

Q: Are they now available?

LOWENSTEIN: No. I don't know what has happened to the classified reports. Among other things when Church and I took a trip to Europe, we also did a classified report that had classified memoranda of conversation including a long memorandum of conversation with de Gaulle and one with Wilson on such things as the sanctions in Rhodesia. Some of those things would be very interesting if historians could spring them loose. As far as Mansfield is concerned, I did a verbatim transcript of a three hour conversation between Mansfield and Sihanouk when I went out with him on the first trip which, again, would be a very interesting document if anybody could get their hands on it. The most classified of all these reports, the last one, which dealt with nuclear weapons in Europe and the figures in the unclassified report, represent the first figures that the military was willing to declassify on nuclear weapons and are still used by scholars on the subject of nuclear weapons in Europe as the only unclassified information available. The classified version of this report has a lot more stuff in it and a lot on the lack of security around some of these bases in Europe that make rather interesting reading.

What else was in these classified reports? Well...

Q: Things about the Agency?

LOWENSTEIN: No, not really. There were a lot of order of battle stuff that is totally out of date and of interest to no one. I could go through these unclassified reports with anyone who was interested and tell them what was interesting in the classified version that was cut out because it is indicated by brackets. I couldn't tell them what was in the brackets because I can't remember and don't know where the things are, but I remember the general categories of things that were cut out.

Q: Talk about your modus operandi.

LOWENSTEIN: Before we went to a place, we would, through the Congressional Research Service, get hold of every piece of available information that was in the public domain. That is, the last figures given by the Defense Department on their appropriations for what they were doing in Thailand in military assistance, testimony, what the press had said, etc. We had, in a way, far more access than the State Department did to what information was in the public domain because the Congressional Research Service is a marvelous outfit and could give you anything that had been in the press anywhere in the world. So you had a tremendous amount of raw material that you could go through before you went on a trip.

Then we would scour our network of friends in the government and in the press and in the academic world, to see who knew who and who was worth talking to and who knew
what was going on, etc. We drew up a list of the people we wanted to see and made sure we knew how to get to see them. We would schedule the official briefings that had to be scheduled in the embassy and with the military, which turned out to be much more informative than one would have thought if you knew what you were talking about when you went into the briefing so that you knew what questions to ask. Then, on these trips we would pick up as much written material as we possible could lay our hands on. Every time the military had a document describing something, or the embassy had a document describing something, we would pick it up.

Q: Why did you do that?

LOWENSTEIN: Simply because there was something in writing that could be used as analytical material compared to everything else that we had and that inadvertently there were a lot of facts being revealed in these documents that only became clear if compared either to other documents or to what was said in a briefing or to what was said in a meeting with the ambassador or senior military officer. So you could tell when the military knew what they were talking about and when they didn't. The same thing was true of civilian authorities.

There wasn't anything very mysterious about this procedure. We weren't getting material fed to us by the French Secret Service, or anything like that. This was all strictly basic analytical field work. Looking back on my time in the Foreign Service, it is exactly the kind of thing I went through when I did my analysis of Communist Party participation in the Yugoslav parliament. I got my hands on every piece of documentation that I could and waded through it and a picture emerged that enabled you to find out who had what position in the party and at what level, etc. And the same thing is true in analyzing the information. So, if you go through these reports, I think you will see that they are extremely analytical and rely on a lot of factual data.

Q: Did anything come from the administration?

LOWENSTEIN: Oh, yes, a lot of it came from the administration.

Q: Were they cooperative?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, they couldn't not be. If you wrote and said, "Please send a copy of the testimony in blab blab," or "What are the latest figures on military assistance?"...

Q: Did you go around and get briefings in Washington?

LOWENSTEIN: No, we didn't do much of that. Then, of course, there was the journalist part of it, how facts would emerge that were not the product of analysis. The most dramatic, I suppose, was how we discovered all the illegal air operations in Cambodia which was the subject of the report of April, 1973. Now we had gone to the embassy and been assured that the embassy had no role in these operations and that it was somebody
else, the Cambodians, the Thais, or our imagination. It wasn't happening. I was off interviewing a POW in French, that is a Khmer Rouge POW in a prison camp, to see what he had to say about what was going on. That is also the kind of thing that we would do. Dick was wandering around downtown Phnom Penh with a lady journalist from either the AP or UPI who had a radio, a five dollar pocket transistor radio. She said, "Listen, do you want to hear something interesting?" She turned on her pocket radio and there were American pilots talking to an American air controller. We knew from all of our experience in dealing with air operations in other places what these call signs meant. What they meant was that the embassy was vectoring the fighters. It was as evident as it could be. Furthermore, the radio's range made it impossible to argue that we were listening to Thailand. We were listening to a plane that was fifteen miles away.

So we went in and confronted the embassy, and you will see this not only in the report, but in the appendix to the second volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs there is an account of this and the problems between us and Tom Enders, who was then DCM in Cambodia. So, we went back to the embassy and said, "Now look, this is what we understand from what we heard from a transistor radio and other things and these are our conclusions just looking at the facts." The answer was, "It is none of your business."

So, we sent Senator Symington, who was chairman of the relevant Subcommittee, a message through the embassy saying, "Here is what we found. This is what the embassy tells us. Our view is that we shouldn't leave here until the embassy gives us a briefing on exactly what they are doing, which was a violation of law, incidentally, and exactly what the air operation situation is here." We got back a telegram from Symington saying, "Wait right there, I will straighten this out." So we waited there, through a couple of nights of bombing raids, incidentally, in which we were taken out of our hotel to the basement of the embassy along with all the other Americans.

Symington went to the Secretary of Defense and didn't get any place; went to the Secretary of State and didn't get any place. And, as I recall, he finally went to the President and said, "This is what these guys say, this is what the law says, this is what this Committee is considering in terms of legislation and they are going to stay out there until they get the briefing." So after about four days, we finally got our briefing and that is what led to a huge legislative brouhaha that really meant the end of these illegal air operations in Cambodia.

While we were waiting, incidentally, I attended a dinner given by the American press at which they drugged my soup with hashish and I was unconscious for 48 hours. So it was just as well that we had to wait because as I said to somebody...in fact we were invited to the French embassy, the French Ambassador there was an old friend of mine and invited us over to dinner. I said, "Look, I can come to dinner, but I can't eat anything except some soup and you will have to forgive me for having a hand that shakes so much but this is what happened to me." He said, "Don't worry about it, the same thing happened to me the day before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs arrived and I couldn't even stand up when he got off the plane."
I'm trying to think of other incidents where facts were brought to light by accident rather than by analysis. Fragging was one, air operations over Cambodia was another. Well, there were a lot of them but they don't seem to come to mind. Military briefings were very informative because all kinds of things were said that were so obviously not true that you could tell what was being covered up by what was being said. It was a very curious thing. Dick had been in the military for a short time. I had been in the military for three and a half years and had been to a lot of staff briefings and had to do a lot of briefing myself. And I had been all through the Naval War College routine. So I had a pretty good sense of military presentation and military vocabulary since the military had this wonderful habit of inventing words to cover things that they don't want to say, so they use another word. "Terminate with extreme prejudice," of course, would be the great example. Although that was a CIA term, it could have been a military term. So it was very easy for me at a military briefing to figure out exactly what they were saying. Whereas, someone who hadn't had a long exposure to the military, would have found it a bit more difficult.

The week before we invaded Cambodia, Dick and I were sitting in a hearing and I think Rogers was testifying. It was on the subject of what we were going to do in Cambodia. After the hearing finished, I remember we went to Fulbright and said, "There is something going on out there and we think we should go." So we went. By the time we got to Hong Kong, it became even more clear. The next morning we got on a plane and ended up in Vietnam. The following morning we found ourselves in a helicopter from a base in western Vietnam with the general who was directing the invasion of Cambodia. We actually went in with the troops and watched these guys crossing the border and running through Cambodian territory. Now, of course, when you do things like this...and we did a lot of things like this, a lot of things in helicopters, motor bikes, etc.--when the military says that they are only shelling or bombing military targets and that there has been no "collateral" civilian injuries and you have been in a helicopter over the place that has been leveled, this kind of claim is not only patently absurd, but demonstratively untrue. And this was the kind of thing that the military kept getting themselves into. A tremendous pressure to produce results that led to tremendous distortions of the truth. My own theory is that this is how the United States got into all this trouble in the first place because the civilian leaders in Washington kept getting reports from the military that weren't true. And they didn't seem to have any way of going behind them and finding out what was really going on. So they were getting a distorted picture.

So, it led me to conclude that whenever you get into something like this, the executive branch, especially the White House, ought to have its own independent investigatory group that would make sure that the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense were really getting the facts and not just the results of military reports being passed up the chain of command with no checking within that chain of command.

We went out to Korea at one point and we were looking at what secret promises were made to the Koreans in turn for their participation in Vietnam. We got off the plane and Dan O'Donohue, the political counselor at the embassy, said, "Phil Habib wants to see
you two guys right away." We said, "It has been a long flight. Can we go to the hotel and change?" "No, he wants to see you right away." It was about 8:00 at night. "My orders are that you are not to go anyplace until he sees you." So we went to the residence and Phil was in a dressing gown. We walked in and he said, "I want to tell you two guys something." We had both known him quite well. "I don't care what you find out here. You are not going to find out anything that I don't know about. You are not going to find out anything that I don't know a lot better than anybody else you are finding it out from. And you are not going to reach any conclusions out here that I haven't already reached myself a long time ago. So, you can do whatever you like, but my advice to you is check with me when you finish because you are not going to get anyplace that I haven't already been to." Well, only from Phil Habib would the two of us take that. I must say, he was absolutely right. He was somebody who really did know what was going on in every respect. There were a few things that we found out and he hadn't told anybody, but he had done that on purpose, not by accident. It is just an amusing sidelight on the way Phil Habib operated. He said, "I didn't even want you going to the hotel and talking to the maid before I got hold of you."

Greece, the embassy was...

Q: Who was the ambassador?

LOWENSTEIN: Tasca was the ambassador. He had become a total partisan of the colonels and what they were doing. When we went out we saw all the opposition leaders who were either in prison or not in prison. Nobody had bothered to see them in years. We were greatly helped by some of the non-Greeks who had been in Greece for many years, if not all their lives, working with charitable institutions, church organizations.

Q: Did anyone in the embassy help you?

LOWENSTEIN: The embassy was sort of under a reign of terror. However, privately we did talk to some Foreign Service officers. I must say that in every case where the embassy was in the hands of someone who was extremely authoritarian and was insisting on a policy that a lot of reasonable people would not have agreed with, that there were always people in the embassy who would help us because they thought that the policy was wrong. I was always surprised there weren't more actual resignations. There were always people who would help us. And even people, in a lot of cases, who agreed with the policy would help us because they believed that we were entitled to get true facts and not a lot of garbage. So we always found mid-grade and junior officers very helpful. And, in fact, junior officers in the military were helpful. Journalists were very helpful and some academics were helpful. So you had a large range of people that you could turn to and that is why I think you get some perspective. You are not only dealing with the Foreign Service officer or with the particular government officials to whom his job relates

Q: That is quite a range.
LOWENSTEIN: A very wide range. And more, because we had all the security clearances that were possible so that we were getting classified briefings from everyone. So we had a much wider range than journalists, in fact.

[continuation of interview, June 6, 1994]

...This is how you find out what is going on if a branch of government doesn't want you to know. And why I think that senatorial investigating missions are totally ineffective. Let me just take the case of dealing with the military. The military, when they decide that they don't want someone to find something out, has a very easy technique for dealing with this and it is to keep the people in briefings and in motion. For example, in Vietnam they loved taking visitors, Senators or alleged investigators all over the country, because by the time you get from your hotel to the airport, take a helicopter ride that lasts two hours and go into the local military headquarters, have a wonderful briefing that lasts for an hour and a half, have lunch with the general that lasts another hour, get back to the airport, get back on the helicopter, go back into Saigon, get back from the airport to your hotel, a day has gone. And if you repeat that exercise with its variations, you can tie any visitor up indefinitely. Point one.

Point two. The only way that you can find out what is going on, obviously, is to use as many sources as you possibly can, and I will get back to that in a minute. Point three is that whether an investigator is a detective, a journalist, a congressman, or Foreign Service officer, trying to find out what the local government is doing to pull the wool over his eyes, the thing that always breaks open cases is happenstance. And happenstance only occurs if you have a lot of time because if you have a lot of time, accidents will happen. If you are rushed and programmed all the time, nothing happens.

Let me give you an example on the third point. The way we discovered that the United States had illegally trained some Cambodians who were alleged to be native soldiers was that we were walking along a street and ran into one of these guys. I can't remember whether it was Dick or whether it was me, but one of us said to this fellow in French something like, "Where is the hotel?" Instead of answering in French, the guy said, "Say again, sir?" Well, it didn't take a genius to know where he had learned that phrase and it wasn't in the Cambodian army because we weren't training the Cambodian army at that point. So that is an example. And then we discovered that these were the Khmer Krom, who had been in Vietnam, who had been shipped over. These were Khmers who were basically Vietnamese who were part of the South Vietnamese army who had been trained by the Americans. So that is the way you find out that kind of thing.

Q: You tell in an earlier session how you found in Phnom Penh through somebody's girlfriend who was listening to a radio...

LOWENSTEIN: Well, she wasn't somebody's girl friend, she was a well known correspondent, Sylvana Foa, who today, incidentally, as we speak is the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees spokesperson. She was then a UPI correspondent. I went through that incident before.

Q: Yes, but that was by chance.

LOWENSTEIN: That's by chance. Let's take the using as many sources as possible part of it. When we were trying to find out exactly how many sorties we were flying over Laos and Cambodia, and who was flying them, the information was not given to us. I can't remember whether this was on security grounds or they didn't know, or the records aren't kept here, or it is none of your business, or we need authority from Washington, or whatever it was. But we didn't get it. When we stopped in CINCPAC, we were around there for two or three days and at some point somebody said to us, "You know, we have this fantastic computer and it logs in every single sortie in Indochina. It has an account of exactly when the pilot takes off, where he is going, what he has done and when he gets back." We said, "Well, that is interesting, we would like to see that." So they said, "Sure, sure, it is marvelous, you will be impressed." They took us into a big room and there was the computer. We said, "Well, just as a test case, what if we asked you what sorties had been flown in Laos last month." The guy said, "No problem." He punched a sheet and out came a map of Laos with every sortie listed. As I recall we went through all of the sorties in Laos and probably Cambodia as well. That is where the figures come from in the report that we did on the subject. They came from the CINCPAC computer. Now those guys who were sitting off in a room far removed from the theater of operation, knew more than anyone else in the world, except the Pentagon to which they sent their reports back. They knew much more than anybody in the theater in Vietnam or Okinawa.

Q: They didn't know that the Pentagon didn't want you to know?

LOWENSTEIN: And they didn't know that. There was another interesting incident in CINCPAC where we were trying to find out military assistance figures. We were trying to find them out without much success. We were at dinner one night with someone and he brought along a friend of his. This fellow said, "Meet Frank so-and-so from the comptroller's office in the Pentagon. Frank plays the computer the way Paderewski plays the piano." We said, "Oh, that's interesting. Since you can play the computer, can you pull up the figures on exactly how this military program works, what the funding is, the commitments were, where it came from, etc.?" Again we got the whole story. Now this fellow did know what we were supposed to be told and what we weren't to be told and that, of course, was something that we were supposed to be told because that was a congressional authorization. The fact is, nobody else knew how to do it. He also explained how this stuff was presented in order to meet various legislative restrictions on amounts, conditions, etc. So, indeed, he did know how to play the computer like Paderewski plays the piano. And the point is, that was where you get the information. It wasn't as available as easily anywhere else.

Q: One thing that puzzled me in your congressional discussions is the fact that you were later hired by Kissinger. It was my recollection that this was regarded, although you said
it wasn't partisan, as a highly anti-administration effort trying to undermine the effort in Vietnam, etc. And you guys were very effective because of the things that you turned up, concrete incidences in which the administration was caught out, not telling the whole story. How come you got hired?

LOWENSTEIN: I really can't answer that question. All I know is that when I went in to see Fulbright and said that I was going to leave and that I thought I would go to a business school or something, he said, "Well, I am seeing Kissinger tomorrow, do you want me to ask him whether he would like to have you back in the Foreign Service?" I said, "Well, sure ask him, see what he thinks." And I was told that the reaction was very favorable. At that point Eagleburger was working for Kissinger and made the same check and said that Kissinger would be delighted to have me back. In fact he wanted me to work on speeches.

Q: It still surprises me.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I like to think it's because he thought the reports were really very good and some of them weren't criticizing the administration. The first Cambodian report in fact said that we thought the Cambodians really were worth supporting and we never in any report implied that the invasion had made inevitable a Khmer Rouge victory. What we did say was that it had driven the Khmer Rouge further into Cambodia because they had to get out of where they were as the US forces went across the border. So they were geographically in a deeper penetration than they had been in some ways. They were always along the Thai border and the Vietnamese border, but there was some movement into places they hadn't been before. Our argument on the Cambodian invasion was that there hadn't been any true consultation with the Congress, which there was supposed to have been and that militarily it seemed to us that it would prolong the war in Vietnam. If you go back and look at that first Cambodian report and the press reports on that first Cambodian report, you will see that in fact the administration used it as an argument that even we had agreed with them on certain things that they were saying about it.

I was sort of surprised too, that I was welcomed back. Dick had a different relationship with Kissinger and he didn't want to go back anyway. But I don't think Kissinger liked Dick very much.

There then arose another issue during this negotiating period which was that Peter Flanagan who was in the White House and a member of Nixon's inner circle and very partisan...I had known him a long time because his wife and my then wife were roommates at boarding school together, and, as I recall, they had been at our wedding. Anyway, he got wind of this and started saying that this was politically unacceptable. At that point, as I recall, Eagleburger said to Kissinger, "If we are going to get this thing done at all, it has to be done right away." So, he said, "Okay, go ahead and do it." So, it was done very quickly. And, by the time Flanagan really got up in arms, I was already there.

Q: This was in 1974?
LOWENSTEIN: It must have been April or May, 1974.

Q: Kissinger was riding high then.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes. I think it was April.

Q: You came back to EUR?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, I came back into EUR as the number two deputy. Wells Stabler was the number one. I was given the multilateral responsibilities—that is the offices of European Regional Affairs, Political Affairs and Economic Affairs. So I had NATO, EC, OECD, ECE, all that stuff, plus special assignments on the Yugoslav problem. Plus various other things that came up that weren't part of the multilateral stuff. I think I had WE at one point. Anyway, it didn't make any difference because Arthur was always handling whatever the number one crisis was and Wells very soon thereafter became totally immersed in the Cyprus problem. The Cyprus war erupted in July, 1974 and I remember I went up to Maine for a two-week vacation and I arrived in the evening at 7:00 on Friday night and the next morning I left at 7:00 AM and I never went back. I was originally on the Cyprus Task Force. Then it was decided that Wells should head it because one of the last reports that Dick and I had done was on Greece and there was too much baggage there for the Greeks to accept, so Wells was the head of the Task Force. But whenever he got tired, I went up and took his place and spelled him. So that summer between the war in Cyprus and Nixon's resignation and Ford being sworn in, was extremely hectic. I remember there were several times when I didn't get to bed or out of the building for 48 hours.

Q: What do you have to say about the Cyprus situation?

LOWENSTEIN: My recollection, I didn't have anything to do with policy, I was totally involved in mechanics. I remember all this time on the Task Force what I was doing was getting messages from Sisco or Arthur and making sure that they got to the right person at the right time and making sure that the answers got back and that they were cleared and that they were right. I just never got into the substance of the thing. It was totally procedural. There was a lot of protection of American citizens stuff, lots of inquiries, lots of disorganization. It was an organizational job and one of the first task forces set up under this system after Kissinger became Secretary. I just never had anything to do with policy. So I can't comment on that.

I will tell one joke because I think it should be preserved for posterity. This joke was told to me by John Brademas, who was then a congressman. He and Paul Sarbanes, who was then a congressman, had gone out on an inspection trip and when they were landing somewhere, and I think it was in Cyprus, the plane blew a tire and veered off the runway. They were evacuated by chute. There was some danger that the plane would burst into flames but didn't. So when they got back they met with Kissinger and Brademas and
Sarbanes told him the story. When they finished the story, Kissinger wagged his finger at them and said, "Remember, Brademas, that was only a warning."

I really don't remember the policy implications, except that Kissinger's attitude was, "Well, they are sort of all unreasonable and we have done the best we can and that is the way it is going to be." Of course, it did have one good result, it got the colonels out of power.

I went to Cyprus last summer for a week, and I must say I was amazed to see that this situation has been frozen in time and that people are living on both sides of the wall looking at their former residences and haven't been able to visit those residences for 20 years now.

Then there was Nixon's departure. That was a very wild night. The day before the resignation became public, Kissinger called all the assistant secretaries and I think all the deputy assistant secretaries...anyway, I was there, so it must have been all the deputy assistant secretaries...to tell us what was going to happen so that we could get started on the messages. I remember he made one of his famous "this is a test of the discipline of the Foreign Service whether they can keep this to themselves, etc." I think that was done. So that was another wild night because all these messages had to go out to chiefs of state saying that the American policy would remain exactly as before, blab, blab, blab, the usual stuff.

Q: What were the other issues?

LOWENSTEIN: One of the issues that sticks in my mind was the famous Eurocommunism issue. Kissinger was absolutely convinced that the Portuguese Communists and the Italian Communists were going to take power and that would be the end of the free world. Frank Carlucci got into a huge disagreement with Kissinger. There had been an ambassador to Portugal, a political appointee whose name I can't remember. A rather elderly gentleman. But Kissinger didn't think that he was energetic or knew what he was doing, so he sent Frank. Frank went out and said, "You are wrong. We should support Soares." So there was a lot of ranting and raving and screaming and yelling and talk about firing Carlucci. Frank absolutely never wavered. He simply said, "Do whatever you want, but I am telling you the way it is." And, of course, he was proved right. I was sent out a couple of times to Lisbon.

On Italy, there was just simply a decision that everything had to be done to prevent this from happening. I won't go into it. But once again, the Bureau kept saying that they thought the Secretary was a little bit over excited about all this.

Q: Who was the ambassador then?

LOWENSTEIN: I think that the ambassador was John Volpe.
So that was one issue. There were lots of nuclear issues in NATO. There was a constant battle with the then American Ambassador in Belgrade, Larry Silberman, about policy toward Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe in general. That was another special charge that I was given.

**Q: He's a very conservative Republican.**

LOWENSTEIN: A very conservative Republican. He thought that the Yugoslav desk officer was a crypto communist. The Yugoslav desk officer was a very nice fellow named Ken Hill.

**Q: Later Ambassador to Bulgaria.**

LOWENSTEIN: Yes. And at one point Larry Silberman asked that he be fired. There was a dispute about an American who had been put in jail for doing something, and all kinds of disputes about the trade embargoes, etc. So I remember I was asked by Eagleburger and Arthur to go out and talk to Silberman. So I went out and met with him. He said, "Well, what kind of a job do you think I am doing back there?" I remember I said, "Actually, we think you are a real pain in the neck." So he said, "Well, I want to see you down in the tank this afternoon and we are going to hash this out." So at 3:00 we went down in the tank and he said, "You know, it is funny you say that because I got this back channel message from Kissinger a couple of days ago telling me what a great job I was doing." At that point I decided there wasn't much to be done and Larry Silberman and I became good personal friends in the course of these missions that I had out there. I didn't accomplish anything because the ground was always cut out from under me. But we did have long, fierce running debates that have continued to the present, whenever I see him. He lives around the corner and I see him from time to time. He hasn't changed his mind and I haven't changed mine. He never changed his policy and the administration didn't want him back in Washington because Ford at that point was fighting for renomination and didn't want trouble from the right. So Larry stayed out there.

I was struck at the time by how much time went into the mechanical things that had to be done. Supervising the preparations for the President's trips, NATO Ministerials, OECD Ministerials, EC consultations, etc. The EC consultations were conducted at a rather low level. Christopher Soames was the fellow who conducted them.

**Q: Tell us what that is.**

LOWENSTEIN: That was an every six-month consultation where there would be a day of meetings between supposedly the Secretary of State, but it was always delegated down, and the European Commission in the person of Christopher Soames. He was the vice president of the Commission in charge of external relations. Once, in fact, everybody got busy on something else, so I conducted the bilateral consultations. That was just going through the issues and giving our views. It had an agenda something like a NAC Ministerial where there would be agreed positions to be taken. So that was the beginning
stages of consultation between the European Community and the United States. That followed the famous Gymnick formula where the Europeans decided that they would consult with the United States but not until they had first an agreed position. And then the consultation wouldn't be the United States and all the EC members, it would be the United States and the EC Commission. This is something that Kissinger didn't like at all. So one of the items on those consultations was always "Can't we do this in a different, more effective way and can't we get our views given more weight before you make a decision?" Instead of just exchanging views after you have reached your decision. That was really the issue.

Q: Why didn't Kissinger like it?

LOWENSTEIN: Because he felt that it put the United States in the position of always being faced with a fait accompli and that the time for consultation was before the decision was made and not afterwards.

There were all kinds of ways around that and obviously one was to use your friends and our friends were, of course, the British. I kept thinking about de Gaulle's objections to admitting the British to membership in which he said that they would be nothing but a Trojan horse for America. And I must say on the basis of what I saw during those years, he was right.

Q: Do you recall the issues you had?

LOWENSTEIN: I really don't. The problem is I can't recall most of the issues during that period, other than Cyprus, Eurocommunism, Italy, the Yugoslav problem. Did you do any research that turned up any issues?

Q: My own recollections are of Ford treading water, of détente being in trouble. The administration was sitting on fences with Congress asserting it's weight with the War Powers Act. On various fronts the administration was in trouble. Then you had Vladivostok in 1975 and we didn't ratify the agreement. And then the campaign started. It was a treading water period at best.

LOWENSTEIN: One other issue I do remember was CSCE. Kissinger never liked the CSCE, but finally agreed to it.

Q: The Helsinki Conference.

LOWENSTEIN: That's right. He finally agreed to it. He sold the Berlin Talks four different times, as I recall, and one of the four was for CSCE. He kept saying that we would not participate unless they did this and this. One of the "this" was the CSCE agreement. He just thought it was too soft, the areas involved were too soft and would never amount to anything and it gave the Soviets an opening wedge of influence into Western Europe where they had no business being. He really didn't see that it was going
to work the other way and end up being a dagger pointed at the Soviets instead of the other way around.

My only contribution to that process, I remember, was when Ford had to make his speech at Helsinki on the CSCE. Various drafts went around and finally one day Eagleburger called me up and said, "You do a draft and give it to me. We are not going to send it through anybody. The Secretary is going to send it right over to Ford." So I did the draft and a good 80 percent of the speech was untouched, including the last sentence which was, "History will remember us not for the promises we make, but for the promises we keep." There was another line, but I can't remember..."Not for what we say, but what we do. Not for the promises that we make, but for the promises we keep."

Q: So you became a speech writer after all.

LOWENSTEIN: So I became a speech writer after all.

Q: How did you find the Department functioned under Kissinger?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I thought at the top it functioned extremely well. Everybody on the sixth and seventh floor team were really terrific. Who was there: Bill Rogers was the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs; Joe Sisco was there; Larry was there; Winston Lord was there; Jerry Bremer was there; George Vest was the Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs; Roy Atherton was NEA; Phil Habib was the Under Secretary. I must say working with Phil Habib was a sheer unadulterated joy. It was a marvelous experience. So I enjoyed all those people a lot. The only person I didn't enjoy was Helmut Sonnenfeldt who was the Counselor of the Department and who was a terrible burden for anybody who was working on European Affairs to suffer because he was constantly cutting in and assuming the position of a sort of superior assistant secretary for European affairs. He had drafted three or four very competent, highly intelligent, younger officers who since they didn't have the restrictions of a bureau or the day-to-day responsibilities of running anything were able to create a lot of havoc. Those were Bob Blackwill, Jim Dobbins and John Kelly. They were a formidable trio.

Q: What substantive things did they get involved in?

LOWENSTEIN: Absolutely everything involving Europe.

Q: Did he have a different point of view?

LOWENSTEIN: No, it really wasn't that. It was mostly turf fighting, who was going to be closest to the Secretary, who was going to brief the President, who was going to sit where on the delegation, etc.

Q: Art Hartman was the Assistant Secretary?
LOWENSTEIN: Arthur was the Assistant Secretary throughout the period. I had worked with Arthur first in 1950-51 in Paris when he was with the Marshall Plan; again in EUR/RA in 1957-58; and had seen quite a lot of him when he was DCM at the US Mission for European Communities. So I already had known him quite well. He was really one of the people that I admired most in the Foreign Service. I considered the chance to spend three years working for him a great opportunity, a great pleasure. It was, and here I am working with him again. This is the fourth time.

Q: I remember that when Kissinger came over from the White House to the State Department Sonnenfeldt knew where the action was. It was not at the NSC.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, the NSC at that point was Scowcroft and Kissinger absolutely dominated Scowcroft. So, while the Senate had not permitted him to have both jobs in de jure, in fact he had both jobs de facto. He absolutely dominated the whole process. I always thought that working around him was fascinating and a lot of fun. He had a bad temper and could be very difficult and insulting, but so what. I felt he would always listen to you if you had something to say. He was very, very funny. He didn't suffer fools gladly, but why should he. Isn't that a good thing in the upper reaches of the State Department? So I really enjoyed working for him.

Now, it is true he wasn't on my back a lot as he was some others. He was never riding me as he did some others because the people he was riding were those people right around him...Larry Eagleburger and occasionally Arthur. Arthur's reaction though was "If you don't stop riding me, I am going to resign as assistant secretary and you can find somebody else." That was a very effective way of getting Kissinger's attention. Anyway, I thought it was an extremely good team. I thought they were fast, smart, there was a lot of open discussion, a good idea of where they were going, reacted well to crises. When Kissinger decided to take an issue and mobilize support in Congress or public opinion or press, he did it and it seemed to me he showed that that is one of the principal jobs of the Secretary of State.

It is true, I think he was devious. He did a lot of things that sometimes didn't make any sense. I remember once I was in Europe, I can't remember where Kissinger was but he was off somewhere with the President, and I was visiting some friends in the French countryside for the weekend between two meetings. I got a call from Sonnenfeldt. It was a Saturday night. He said, "Henry wants you to arrange a private meeting with Oliver Chevrillon, who was then the editor of a magazine called Le Point. And he wants to have dinner with him Monday night in Paris and doesn't want anybody to know about it. He wants you to pick a quiet restaurant where he won't be seen. And you can't tell anybody in the embassy about it. So you had better get it done right away and send me a cable at such-and-such a place."

So, I thought this might be a bit of a problem. I managed to get to Paris on Sunday on a train that got in about 11:00 at night. I was staying at the Travelers Club and they had a phone book, so I looked up the address of the magazine and walked over to the office at
8:30 in the morning and waited for somebody to open the door. I went in and asked for Mr. Chevrillon, who later became a friend of mine. At that time I didn't know him. He came out and I said, "I need to see you alone." He said, "Why?" And I said, "I can't tell you until I see you alone." So I saw him alone and conveyed the message. I said, "Now the problem is how are you going to know that I am for real? Here is my card, but under the ground rules here you can't call the embassy and confirm all this. What you can do is call Mr. X [the political counselor whom we both knew] and he will tell you that indeed I am who I represent myself to be and indeed I am in Paris. But you can't say anything else." And so that is the way it went and the dinner took place. But all of this was totally unnecessary. He could have called the DCM in Paris and said that he just wanted a private dinner, but this had to be done this way without anyone in the embassy being told and all that nonsense. Now, I assume that this was really Kissinger's idea and not something Sonnenfeldt dreamt up or put words into his mouth. But, anyway, that is one of those incidents that seemed very curious at the time.

I remember a couple of years later when I was involved in starting a foundation in the French-American field, one of the first French who was involved in this project was Chevrillon. So later on we had many chuckles about this first meeting and about this strange character showing up at his office at 8:30 in the morning and going through this routine.

Q: If I recall, you rejoined as an FSR?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, I was an FSR and I can't remember if it was for a year or a year and a half.

Q: The system didn't give you any grief?

LOWENSTEIN: No. The system gave me no grief at all. I had to appear before three or four senior officers, can't remember who they were. My problem during this period was that I was so busy in order to prepare for Kissinger's morning meeting, which I had to go to a lot of the time because Arthur was going around the world doing something or other. I really had to get up at 5:30 in the morning and read all the cables and papers by the time the meeting began. It seemed to me I never got out of that office until 8:30 or 9:00 in the evening.

Q: How did you find these meetings?

LOWENSTEIN: I found them intellectual tests. He was on top of most things. There was a lot of scolding people for not doing what he thought they should be doing. They were very meaty meetings. Anyway, I was so tired a lot of the time. There was so much to do procedurally. There were all these meetings all the time, all these papers that had to be done, all these foreign ambassadors coming in for one reason or another and the whole administrative business.
One interesting thing struck me when I went back into the State Department... I was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and one of the other assistant secretaries, Tom Enders, who was the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs was a member. None of the other assistant secretaries were members. So I called up Bayless Manning who was then president of the Council and said, "This is really ridiculous. How can you have a council that is supposed to be representative and spot young talent and yet you have an entire State Department hierarchy here that is not a member of the Council." What was so interesting to me was that it showed in a way how parochial not only the Council was, but a lot of people in the State Department were. There wasn't much contact with the outside world, and that was one of the great advantages of being on Capitol Hill. You were thrust into a much wider world that involved Capitol Hill, the executive branch, the press, academia, think tanks, and the whole business, because you operated in an environment that was much wider. Whereas the State Department, it seemed to me has always operated in a much narrower environment.

I Started to get into the Administration, plus the administrative stuff, which just took forever. I mean, personnel problems, budget presentations all through the budget process in the State Department and on Capitol Hill. The efficiency report business. I had to write all the efficiency reports for Arthur's review. If I wasn't writing them, I was reviewing them. So I would get on a plane with this enormous bag filled with efficiency reports...I was traveling a lot back and forth to meeting, two days here and two days there. It was hectic, but I must say...

Q: Was it less satisfying?

LOWENSTEIN: No, I enjoyed it a lot. The policy imprimatur was in the final stages of a paper. A paper would come up and at that point you had the operative paragraph and that is how you made policy. Or you made policy by getting the Secretary of State's decision at a morning meeting or in a memo that went up. So the whole system worked pretty well, actually. I went to interagency meetings, etc. I think the whole thing worked pretty well in that administration.

Q: I think you are right.

LOWENSTEIN: Then Ford lost the election.

Q: Did you get into non-proliferation?

LOWENSTEIN: Some, but most of the action on that was in PM. It was between PM and ACDA and our dear friend Sonnenfeldt. So we weren't in that a lot. Arthur was in it when he got to the Presidential level meetings, but other than that we weren't.

Q: Was he close to the French Foreign Minister?
LOWENSTEIN: He was and he wasn't. I mean he liked Jobert a lot and thought he, of all the foreign ministers, intellectually the most interesting. But he was in a constant running battle with the French. One of the incidents we had was the Pierrelatte overflight where we overflew a French nuclear installation. They claimed it was a spy mission and we claimed it was an accident. I can't remember who was right and who was wrong, but there was a tremendous flap. I asked a guy in the Bureau of European Affairs whose name was Ed Beigel, who was a civil servant and had been there forever, to do a report on exactly what the state of nuclear cooperation was between the United States and France. It was a very interesting report because it showed the extent was larger, far larger than anybody who hadn't paid a lot of attention to it realized, which confirmed my suspicion that, while we were bitching about the French all the time, in fact we were doing a hell of a lot with the French—far more than anybody thought.

We were constantly saying that the Europeans had to stand up and not let themselves be victimized by these oil producing countries. Well, let's face it, it was a period when the United States was leading on most issues and the Department of State took a very aggressive position. A decision had to be made on what to do and then it had to be carried out, and it was.

Q: We were starting to take it on the chin in...

LOWENSTEIN: I was there when Saigon fell.

Q: Where?

LOWENSTEIN: ...in EUR, through the end of the administration and beginning the next administration.

Then what happened was, when the administration changed, Phil Habib was in charge...each Bureau had a representative on the transition team and I was the EUR representative. Carter had this commission that was going to examine all political appointees and I very often...

Q: The Aspen Board?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes. ...I very often had to go up to the Hill and testify before the Aspen Board.

Q: Talk about the Aspen Board.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, one thing that I remembered very well was when the question of who was going to be appointed to go to Moscow came up, Arthur was going some place so he said, "You go up and you tell those people that Moscow, today, requires someone who knows the Soviet Union well and not some amateur politico." I said, "You want me to go up in front of that commission, chaired by Averell Harriman, and make that
statement?" He said, "Yes I do, and that is the Secretary's viewpoint too." So I went up and Harriman was at the head of the table and I went through my spiel. He fixed his cold blue eyes on me and said, "I don't agree with anything you said."

**Q: The Aspen Board was...**

LOWENSTEIN: The Aspen Board took every post and drew up a requirement list of what the chief of mission should be. As I recall there was some kind of prioritizing of missions in order of importance from a career point of view. Which ones really had to have a career person.

**Q: Aspen was the head of it?**

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, but Harriman was running the thing. I remember two discussions with Harriman. One was on this Moscow business and the other was that EUR felt that Walter Curley had done an unusually good job in Ireland and that he should be kept. Harriman said, "We are not keeping any Republicans now." I can't remember what their respective responsibilities were.

**Q: Stage one was to examine the posts?**

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, stage one was to examine the post and then stage two was to look at the candidates. But I didn't get into the looking at the candidates part. The only thing I got into was the discussion of each post, what the issues were, what expertise was necessary, without reference as to whether it should be a career person or not, except on certain cases, and Moscow was one of those cases. Unfortunately it was a bad case and got a political appointee.

**Q: How did the Luxembourg Ambassadorship come about?**

LOWENSTEIN: One day Phil Habib, or Carol Laise, who was the Director General, called me up and said, "We will put you up for Sweden." Well, the first idea was that Larry Eagleburger was going to be put up for Belgrade, but they thought that there might be objections to him on party political grounds and so the list was going to have him first and me second. This came out of the system about two months after the inauguration. These lists were drawn up as they are today. Anyway, I was number two on the list for Belgrade, except that as usual Democrats being much more forgiving than Republicans--when Reagan came in he purged everybody--the Democrats said, "Well, absolutely, he is a competent fellow, of course he can go to Belgrade." Then I was put in for Sweden where I had a long relationship starting with being a student in 1948 and had been back a lot and had been sent back a lot during this time I was a deputy.

**Q: On what issues?**
LOWENSTEIN: Cooperation. Vietnam and general US-Swedish relations. Remember, the Swedes didn't have an ambassador here at that point. One arrived half way through my tour.

Q: We had Holland there?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, we had Holland there.

Q: How was he?

LOWENSTEIN: I don't remember. I think he was pretty good, he just got caught up in this...He was pretty good except the Swedes, you know, again it is the problem of a society which is racist or not racist. I think the Swedes are basically very racist, so I think that was two strikes against him. I think everybody assumes that the Swedes aren't racist, but they are.

One time I went back was when Deputy Secretary Ingersoll was going to Scandinavia. I was sent along with him. And there were several bilateral consultations that I went over for. Wachtmeister was the political director. There were several bilateral consultations with the Swedes on various issues. I can't remember what they were, of course, at this point.

Anyway, I was number one on the list to go to Sweden. Carol went over to the White House with the list, and when she got back she called me up and said, "Well, guess what happened. We got over there and it was cleared by the political staff and cleared by the appointments staff, cleared by everybody and went to the President. He said that he had forgotten to tell everybody, but he had promised this job to an old supporter of his from California named Rodney Kennedy Minott, and he was terribly sorry to have neglected to mention that. But it was a commitment and there was nothing more that could be done."

Well, strangely enough, that same week, the Luxembourg Ambassador had come in to see me...he had come in to see Arthur [Hartman, Assistant Secretary], but Arthur wasn't there, so he saw me...with a message from his Prime Minister, Gaston Thorn, saying that they were not anxious to grant agrément to a political appointee. They had not had a career diplomat and the Prime Minister wanted somebody that he could talk to on important issues. I said, "Thanks a lot" and sent the message on up the line. Carol called me and said, "Well, since Sweden has fallen through, what about Luxembourg, because of the message that came in this week?" I said, "Well, what are the alternatives?" She said, "Well, right now there aren't any." So I said, "Then, I'll take it." So that is how that happened.

Then, of course, [President] Carter turned it around and shortly thereafter said to a meeting of large Democratic supporters at a dinner, that he was taking a new position on the awarding of high contributors and they should know that even when it came to Luxembourg he was appointing a career officer. This was at the same time that he was...
appointing political appointees to other places like Sweden. He got quite a lot of publicity out of that. I kept a scrapbook with all the editorials that commended him for naming a career person to Luxembourg since it had always gone to fat cats. So that is how Luxembourg happened. It was an absolute fluke, because if that message hadn't come in...I saw the Luxembourg list up at the Aspen Board and the people who wanted to go and were on the list was absolutely enormous, there were 35-40 names on that list of contributors to the Democratic Party.

Q: They put their own names on the lists?

LOWENSTEIN: I think a lot of them did. The Luxembourg list was almost as long as any other list, it was amazingly long.

At that point, Arthur didn't know if he was going to stay or what was going to happen to him. Vance told him that he wanted to change assistant secretaries because he wanted a new imprint on European policy. They discussed various posts with Arthur. One of the last days I was up there he came in absolutely white as a ghost. He said, "You will never guess what has just happened to me." I said, "What?" He said, "Well, I am going to be appointed Ambassador to Paris." This was because all of the other major posts by this time had been filled...London, Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, China, etc....and the French were getting very annoyed. The post had been offered to a number of people. It had been offered to Fulbright. I was told, and for history's sake this rumor might be checked some time, that it had also been offered to someone else who hesitated for quite a long time, which is one reason the process hadn't gone any further, and that this person was Chief Justice Warren Burger, the theory being that this was the way to change Chief Justices. I heard that from a very reliable source. At any rate apparently the administration decided they couldn't go through this any more and a way out of it, because there were so many people at this point competing for the job, was to appoint Arthur. So that's how that appointment was made. And in May I went to Luxembourg.

Q: What about the change in administrations?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I thought that these transition teams serve a totally useless purpose. I just don't understand what they do. They are a bunch of people running around writing papers about future organization which nobody paid any attention to, at least they didn't during this particular change.

Q: What about Dick Moose?

LOWENSTEIN: Dick Moose was part of it, but he wasn't head of it. I can't remember who was head of it. I was there from January until May and again going to Vance's staff meetings, which were quite different than Kissinger's. They were not as explosive, or as funny. Vance was very systematic and unlike Kissinger, who would simply bring up a problem or ask a question of whoever was representing a bureau when there was a question to be asked. Vance would go around the table and say, "What do you have to
report?" They were somewhat different. And he was a very good questioner, as you would expect. The atmosphere was less amusing but more civilized, you might say.

One of the first things that was discussed was our policy towards Italy and Eurocommunism. How this happened I don't quite remember, but I found myself in the Oval Office with Carter and Zbig [Brzezinski, National Security Adviser] and [Frank] Carlucci, who was by this time Deputy Director of CIA. It was very shortly after the inauguration, I think it was the following week. I found Carter extremely intelligent and perceptive. He asked all the right questions.

Q: Let's talk about Luxembourg.

LOWENSTEIN: When I got to Luxembourg I found a number of things. First of all, I remember the first day I was there...the DCM was Dan Phillips who I asked to stay over, I had known him before, and he agreed to do so for another year...the first day he walked into my office he said, "I have to tell you that except for you and me, this is the biggest bunch of losers I have ever seen in one building in my life." I said, "Well, that is okay, we can do it all and won't have to worry about anybody else." In fact, it was just a total bloody mess. Everybody was fighting with everybody else.

Q: How big was the staff?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, it wasn't that big. There was myself, the DCM, economic officer, commercial officer, couple of other agency types, Marines, Defense Attaché who was there half time, admin officer and admin assistant, couple of communicators. There was no USIA. I guess that was it. At any rate there were a lot of personnel problems, which never got resolved. They resolved themselves when people were transferred. I decided that in fact Dan Phillips and I could do everything and it was not necessary to make a big deal out of it and it was not necessary to try to find people to come there. I would work with whoever showed up and see whether there was some way to make the place work. The personnel problems revolved around the administrative officer and some of the agency people. It was just a god awful mess.

The other thing that was bizarre was that the whole communications setup was totally inappropriate. There was no direct connection between the embassy switchboard and the residence, which was right next door to the chancery. There weren't enough lines. Nobody really paid much attention to getting messages to anybody after hours. It was not, let's face it, a very efficient operation.

There were some problems within the Marine group. That was one thing that struck me. Another thing that struck me was there was an extremely low representational allowance since all my predecessors had been people of independent means, to put it mildly. My immediate predecessor, who had only been there a year, was a Republican National Committee woman from Missouri whose name was Rosemary Ginn. Her husband had been head of the state police. Her predecessor had been Ruth Farkas and Dan Phillips had
been the DCM through it all. One day I had to call up Dan Phillips when I was still
deputy assistant secretary, and say, "You are going to receive a message asking you to
serve a subpoena on the husband of your chief of mission and you have to do it." He said,
"I can't do that. How do I do it?" I said, "You go over to the residence. You ring the
doorbell and if he answers the door, you hand him the subpoena. If he doesn't answer the
door, you find him and just give it to him." He said, "I just can't do that." I said, "Some
day history will record this as a first. You have to do it." At any rate, those were the two
predecessors.

So, those were the immediate practical problems. In substantive terms, the Prime
Minister, who subsequently became President of the European Commission, was totally
frustrated. He felt he was far more important than the size of his country and he had a
very close personal relationship with Helmut Schmidt and a difficult but very frequent
relationship with Giscard. His predecessor, Pierre Werner, had been the originator of the
Werner plan which in fact subsequently was adopted and changed somewhat by Schmidt
and Giscard when they proposed the whole business of the EMS.

Q: What is the EMS?

LOWENSTEIN: The European Monetary System.

So these two men felt that they had been ignored by the United States, especially Thorn
much more than Werner, and that they had a role to play. In fact, later Thorn became head
of the EC Mission to the Middle East and did a lot of other things. He turned out to be a
very interesting source of insight because he would see Schmidt on Monday, Giscard on
Tuesday and we would have dinner on Wednesday. So for anyone who was interested in
what was going on in Europe, it was...

Q: Previously, nothing happened?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, he wouldn't talk to the others.

Q: He wouldn't talk to the DCM?

LOWENSTEIN: He would and he wouldn't. He was rather protocol conscious. The
British had for years been sending to Luxembourgh their brightest stars on their first
ambassadorial assignments. The British Ambassador who left just before I got there went
on to be Ambassador to Spain and Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office. The
British Ambassador who then arrived, Patrick Wright, now Lord Wright, became
Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office. And his successor, now Sir Jeremy
Thomas, was ambassador to three or four other places. So the British had very high
quality appointees there.
The French had a man named d'Ornano who came from a very old and distinguished French political family. He had been High Commissioner in Djibouti and other places. He was one of their best political/military trouble spot type fellows.

I found the whole thing unlike what I thought it would be like. I thought it would be a lot of fun but not very interesting and after two years I would try to leave. In fact it wasn't much fun at all, but it was very, very interesting.

Q: Oh, really?

LOWENSTEIN: No, it is not much fun. There is no cultural life. The upper stratum that you deal with, who head the government and the major companies, are terrific, but underneath that it tends to get a little slow.

Q: What was the population in the town?

LOWENSTEIN: It was small, 60,000. Everybody is always amazed when they go there to find out later what the population is because it looks much larger.

Q: I had an experience before that. We were in Bonn and we went over to Luxembourg for a week to visit a good friend who was in graduate school somewhere. He took us over to the Foreign Ministry and I remember there were nine people working for the Foreign Minister.

LOWENSTEIN: Thorn was the Prime Minister; the Foreign Minister was a lady named Collette Fleisch who had gone to Wellesley and Fletcher; the Deputy Foreign Minister, the State Secretary was a guy named Paul Helminger, who had gone to Oxford and Stanford; the Minister of Energy was a fellow by the name of Josie Bartel who had gone to Harvard. Both Fleisch and Bartel had been on the Olympic team and Bartel had won a gold medal. The Minister of Finance was a graduate of Cornell, etc. They were a very well educated, sophisticated group of people.

Q: All business, no fun.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, fun in Luxembourg...there was an article in the Wall Street Journal last week, I don't know if you read it. It was about Luxembourg and it said that it had the highest standard of living of any country in Europe, highest per capita income, highest quality of life, etc., except for two things. One thing was it had the lowest rating in terms of culture of any European capital. Secondly, in the list of favorite occupations, where other countries it would be theater, opera, sports, etc., in Luxembourg it was sleeping, and the second one was resting. Well, that was a bit of an exaggeration, but the government people and the heads of the companies...the banks, steel companies, radio stations, etc....were people who led exactly the same kind of life as their counterparts in other capitals. That is, they were constantly traveling, very stressed, worked all the time, over worked and under staffed and had a tough stressful life. Everybody else relaxed.
The routine was that every night there would be a dinner party either given by somebody in the government or by an ambassador or by me or one of the bankers, etc. So I was at a dinner party almost every night. But that is all there was, that was it.

There was a lot of going to graves and decorating tombs and cutting ribbons. There was an American/Luxembourg society full of 75-year-old people who still constantly talked about World War II. So there wasn't much fun.

It happened from my point of view that there was great tennis and squash, so I was able to do either one or the other practically every day at some point. So that made things tolerable. Also, I was a bachelor at this point. So I had to go through all of this myself. I had to run the household budget, do the seating, do the menus, keep everything under control financially. I didn't have a wife to help me with all that and I had to do all the entertaining, of which there was a great deal. I can't remember what the figures were, but it was something like when I arrived my entertainment budget was $14,000 and when I left it was $60,000. I established a rule in the embassy that no one was to spend one single dollar out of their own pocket for representation. Whenever we ran out of money...George Vest was Assistant Secretary...I would send a message saying there was no more money and if we don't get any more money there isn't going to be any more entertaining, which was perfectly okay with me. I was perfectly happy to stop it, but there wasn't going to be any. I always got what I needed.

I hired a wonderful household staff who understood the situation so that they were able to stretch the entertainment dollar very effectively. We had a list posted in the kitchen of prohibitive items that were never to be seen in the house...caviar, lobster, etc. And we had a list of ingredients that were to be used for hors d'oeuvres...tomatoes, eggs, cucumbers. The butler was such a genius that he used to fill drinks with far more ice than was necessary in order to cut down the amount of whiskey. So that all worked perfectly well.

One thing that I felt was missing and badly needed there was a USIA function and I knew I would never get a USIA officer. Anyway there was a fantastic local journalist, a lady, whom I thought could do this with her eyes closed. She knew everybody in town, very well connected, very good political mind, wrote wonderful political stuff and was willing to do it. So I got authorization to establish I think the only local USIA post in Europe. It was a one person post and we did the entire gambit of stuff...Amparts, Leader Grant Program, Fulbright, everything. We did everything that other posts did and we did it with one local employee.

The issues were principally, obviously, multilateral issues. One of them was strangely enough the AWACs issue because all the principal countries of NATO got into a fight about who would be willing to register the AWACs. Eventually we got the Luxembourgers to register the AWACs. Then there was another question of storing what was called M-60 tanks. The army wanted to put an enormous number of tanks into a storage unit that wasn't any further from the front line than Luxembourg but was far
enough so that it wouldn't be overrun in the first attack. Anyway, they came out with 
Luxembourg as the ideal place to do this. Luxembourg had never had a foreign military 
installation, so we negotiated that. It took about a year and a half. The storage site was 
built, the tanks were moved in and when it was all over, Luxembourg ended up with the 
highest proportion of tanks to people of any country in the world, including Iraq.

*Q: Did you have a lot of trouble with the negotiations?*

LOWENSTEIN: There was a lot in parliament. The government had changed by the time 
the site had to be built, there was another Prime Minister, Pierre Werner and the 
Conservative Party led the government. So there was quite a lot to do. It was very 
technical. The principal military person involved was a general named Groves, who was 
the son of General Ernest Groves of nuclear fame. An extremely nice fellow. The Defense Attaché involved was very smart.

The other issues really were the question of what kind of information could be gotten in 
Luxembourg that couldn't be gotten any place else. European Council summit meetings 
were held in Luxembourg, at least one of the three was always held in Luxembourg. Very 
often it was possible to find out much more from the Luxembourgers than from the 
others. For every NATO issue or EC issue, the same thing was true. It was a very good 
place for information. And it was possible to use Luxembourg as sort of a friend in court 
the way the British had been used at the beginning.

*Q: What was their relationship with the French?*

LOWENSTEIN: Well, they had lots of problems with the French, including the nuclear 
problem because one of the big nuclear installations of France sits on the Luxembourg 
border. It is called Cattenom. It was a tremendous issue in internal politics. The 
relationship with the French was very difficult on certain things. In fact when the question 
arose of who would become the President of the European Commission and Thorn 
became President, Giscard's support was very important and there was a lot of dirty work 
at the crossroads at the last minute, which I won't get into. Thorn almost didn't make it.

*Q: Who were the other candidates?*

LOWENSTEIN: One was Martin Bangeman, the German politician. And there was a lot 
of fancy footwork there between Bangeman and Thorn. And there were some other 
candidates, but I can't remember who.

Then there were people who would be coming in and out for European Parliament 
sessions. In those days it met in Luxembourg half of the time and the other half in 
Strasbourg. The parliament staff was in Luxembourg. The European Investment Bank 
was there. The accounting office for the EC was there. So there was a lot of EC 
institutional work. And they were also in the middle of the steel crisis because of Arbed 
which in past years had been responsible for 60 percent of the GNP of Luxembourg and
had been the fifth biggest steel company in the world. When I arrived it was still the key
to their economy, but by the time I left, it was much less important. The banking sector
and the Radio Television Luxembourg, which belonged to a holding company called
CLT, had became more important in terms of revenue produced for the country.

The banking sector exploded. There were a lot of American banks there. There were a lot
of other funny little things. There was a huge Russian embassy. Nobody could ever figure
out what it was doing. I kept saying to our friends across the river, "I thought you were
here to find out what these people are doing. What are they doing?" They could never
find out. The Ambassador was an Armenian, so he was doing a lot with the Armenian
communities all over Europe. But, other than that, we could never find out. It was
absolutely enormous. There was a very good Chinese Ambassador there who spoke
impeccable French. He had gone to the Lycee in Shanghai. There was a lot of stuff
relating to Libya. Luxembourg is one of the transit points for planes going to Libya and to
Cuba. There was a lot of funny stuff at the airport. There were a certain number of
terrorists who would cruise in and out, including the most wanted international terrorist,
Carlos. Anyway, it turned out that he had spent his vacation in Luxembourg and rented a
Hertz car at one point. So he had been running around. So there were all kinds of things
going on, especially when there was a small staff. I did all the political reporting and
everything else except the technical economic reporting.

There were a lot of disputes on bank secrecy, too. There were a certain number of visits
from attorneys and law enforcement agencies trying to get the Luxembourgers to release
records of certain transactions. The Luxembourgers had a law on bank secrecy that was
just as strict as the Swiss. So that at times was a bilateral issue.

Q: Did you stay there three and a half years?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I actually stayed over four years. At the end of three years, there
were two important Democratic Party contributors who had announced their intention to
arrive. In fact, at one point I was back in the United States for something and up on
Capitol Hill, I guess with the Prime Minister, and Senator McGovern came up to me and
said, "Well, since my friend, so-and-so, is going to Luxembourg, what are you going to
do next?" At any rate the Prime Minister preferred that I stay so he took it up with Vance
and I stayed, to make a long story short. At this point there was only a year left for the
Carter administration and he did not want to change. So, in fact, I stayed for a little over
four years.

Another contribution that I made was that it seemed to me that intellectually they didn't
have a forum for any discussion of international affairs. So I decided to form something
like the Council on Foreign Relations, which was called the Luxembourg Society for
International Affairs. It was a group headed by a former cabinet minister that met once a
month and had a speaker with a question and answer period. I funded it by going to a very
wealthy American citizen who spent six months of the year in Luxembourg, originally a
German who fled to the United States during the war and went back to Luxembourg after
the war but kept an apartment in New York and split his time between New York and Luxembourg. He was a reliable source of funds for the American School and American charities. He agreed to fund this. We got whatever speakers were around in Europe and brought them down. The organization exists to this day.

An unusual experience that I had was that I had to deal with the Grand Duke of Luxembourg on a political matter. The Grand Duke is enjoined from dealing with political matters by the constitution. He is not permitted to participate. However, he was a member of the International Olympic Committee, the only chief of state who was a member of that committee. When President Carter decided that the Moscow Olympics should be boycotted, I had to take up this matter with the Grand Duke, who wanted to take it to the cabinet but he couldn't because the cabinet wouldn't take jurisdiction. He was not very sympathetic to this idea of President Carter's. That was a unique experience.

*Q: What role does the monarchy as an institution play?*

LOWENSTEIN: It's a symbol of the country, of its continued existence. It is very popular with the people. It performs a ceremonial role, and that is about it. It is a way of representing Luxembourg in places where otherwise it might not be represented. No one questions the existence, the wisdom of having the royal family exist. They comport themselves with great dignity and do very well. I don't think there has ever been a scandal involving the royal family. The children of the Grand Duke, when I was there, were all attractive, well behaved, well educated, very conscientious about their duties. So, I would say that it is a model monarchy.

A lot of people want to be ambassador to Luxembourg because they think they are going to have a glamorous court life. But there isn't much court life that doesn't involve other royal families. This is a royal family that spends most of its time with other royal families. Except for a couple of receptions a year, that is it. There were a few of my predecessors who had personal relationships with the Grand Duke...Kingdon Gould and Wylie Buchanan...but I didn't and most people didn't.

There were a lot of CODELs that came out. I had Chief Justice Burger for a week staying in my house, sitting up talking until 2:00 in the morning. Whenever there was a European Council meeting, the entire press corps from Paris would show up from all the major newspapers and magazines, and I would put up as many of them as I could and give a large dinner for the American press corps and invite whoever was around in the Luxembourg government.

So there was always quite a lot going on, but as I say, not a million laughs.

*Q: That comes across. You were probably ready to leave.*
LOWENSTEIN: Well, I was ready to leave Luxembourg. I think four years was enough. But I made a lot of good friends and enjoyed it. If the offer had been made to stay another two years, I wouldn't have wanted to do it, but I was glad to have had the four years.

Q: What happened next?

LOWENSTEIN: So what happened then was Ronald Reagan was elected, Al Haig was appointed Secretary of State. Al Haig knew me quite well from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Indochina days and I think had absolutely no use for me at all.

When he was SACEUR, I did go up and pay the usual courtesy calls. He gave a dinner for me once as he did for all NATO ambassadors and sort of swallowed at least his political dislike and had people over. But he arrived with a group of people in the White House and the State Department, many of whom had been on the Nixon White House staff who obviously were not going to want me around. In fact, they did not treat me very well. They originally said that career appointees would stay in their jobs until they were replaced. Very early on a man named John Dolibois, who was I think the chancellor of the University of Miami in Ohio, had been told that he would be appointed to succeed me. He had been born in Luxembourg, immigrated to the United States, had a career at Miami University and had even established a branch of that university in Luxembourg for American students, was a Republican and his ambition had always been to return to his native country as ambassador. With the support of the Ohio delegation he got the job. He had told me that early on. He had also told me that he couldn't get there until the fall because of various commitments, the hearings, the university, etc.

I gave him every possible cooperation and asked the Department when they wanted me to leave. The answer was to stay through the summer and leave three weeks before he gets there. I said, "fine." It happened that I was remarrying on the fourth of July in Luxembourg. On the third of July, as I was looking out the window watching my future in-laws arrive in a caravan of automobiles, a cable was handed to me instructing me to leave Luxembourg in 72 hours. I called up Larry Eagleburger, who was then assistant secretary and said, "Sorry this is impossible. I am dean of the diplomatic corps and am not going to leave this place like a dog slinking out in the middle of the night, never mind the fact that as you know very well I am getting married tomorrow. I don't think it is right that I don't pay a goodby call on the Grand Duke, members of the government, etc." He called me back and said that he had talked to the White House staff and they wanted me out in 72 hours. I said, "I don't care what they want, I am not leaving for another week." Finally, he was able to obtain a one week delay.

The Grand Duke was at that time off on vacation some place and he came back to Luxembourg for a day to receive me for my farewell visit. I didn't have time for a goodby party. The French Ambassador gave a small farewell dinner for me. I ran around and called on as many ministers as I could find. And then left. But it was a bit humiliating at the end. I had to brief the incoming dean of the diplomatic corps on all the stuff he had to do.
Q: And you had your wedding...

LOWENSTEIN: Well, never mind the personal part of it. I felt this was a bit much. I have to say in a way it didn't surprise me from this group but I thought it was uncalled for.

Q: If it had happened earlier and they had said on February 15 we want you out of there it would have been understood. But why the delay until July?

LOWENSTEIN: Because I think the White House hatchet staff hadn't found me, as I understand it. They hadn't really focused on who I was, this fellow with the horrible Fulbright, Dick Moose connection. These guys did not like Dick Moose.

So I came back to Washington in late July and wanted to protest my treatment. I asked for an appointment with the Deputy Secretary, one William Clark, and couldn't get it. I went to see Walter Stoessel, who was the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who basically wasn't interested at all. I said, "I am going to leave anyway, but it seems to me I have a right to complain to the Deputy Secretary." Never could get in the front door. Nobody was interested in this story or in me. So, as so often happens in the Foreign Service, departure is the low point of one's experience, which I regard as too bad. By this time Joan Clark, who had been my administrative officer in the Bureau of European Affairs was the Director General and never made any effort to say goodbye. Absolutely no concern at all. It was like walking out of a car repair shop. I decided I would stay on the payroll for a year after leaving Luxembourg to get over that one year bit.

Q: What is that?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, you know you are not suppose to have contact with your previous bla-blas until a one year passes.

Q: They didn't object to that?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, they never raised the issue. I was given an office in EUR and various odd jobs to do. I went to the European Parliament and gave a speech on behalf of the administration and did some other things.

Q: Were people decent to you?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I don't want to get into personalities, but I will say that virtually nobody was particularly decent to me. So it was unpleasant.

The day I left I went up to the Director General's office and said to one of the secretaries, "Where are the ambassadorial flags?" She said, "In the file cabinet." I said, "Good, I want mine." She said, "Well, go pick it up." So I walked over and picked up an ambassadorial
flag and left. She said, "Do you want the American one too?" I said, "No, this is okay. One is enough." And that was it.

Now, whatever else the Foreign Service is or isn't, it is an institution that should do something about this kind of situation. I know there have been some changes made recently. I wonder whether they will last.

Q: Well, as you look back on the Foreign Service now, how do you feel about it as a career?

LOWENSTEIN: I think I was very lucky in the Foreign Service because I really never had a boring job. I know they are there, but I never had one. My general view is that you look back at the Foreign Service as it was in the 1950s and you look at it as it is today, I hate to say it, but it was a hell of a lot better in the 1950s. I think it is a Service that has gone down hill. It has gone down hill because it has become much more politicized. I think once this business of putting political deputy assistant secretaries with ties to the White House in every bureau, I don't know if that is still true, but it was true in the Reagan and Bush administrations, I think that has a terrible effect on the openness of the policy process. I think that the administrative, security functions got totally blown all out of proportions when it comes to the numbers involved. I think that the procedures are much too complicated on travel and all that kind of stuff. But, I think intrinsically it is a very interesting career. I think that an awful lot of people in the Foreign Service who have substantive responsibilities do tend to live lives that are too cloistered, both in Washington and abroad. They tend to stick together in their own communities, which I think is something that absolutely has to be guarded against. I think that the new attitude of wives in the Foreign Service that they weren't hired to do this job kind of thing is not a way of having a Foreign Service that is effective. I think that is going to do some damage over a long run.

On the political appointee business, have I given you my solution for the political appointee problem?

I might as well get this on tape. I think that one of the problems is that there is no effective monitoring of ambassadorial performance. That is true of both non-career and career. I have talked to a recent inspector general of the Inspection Corps to see whether the situation has changed, and he tells me it hasn't. Inspection teams are loath to criticize the chief of mission's performance and, if they do, they tend to do it confidentially to the Secretary. And the Secretary is loath to go to the President about a fellow Presidential appointee unless the situation is disgraceful. He will get rid of a career appointee, but he won't do anything about a political appointee.

I think that the White House ought to have a small staff that reports only to the President, that monitors ambassadorial performance of both career and non-career chiefs, and gives those reports only to the President so that he has some idea of how his people are doing. He shouldn't appoint such a staff or permit such a staff to operate unless he intends to act
on their recommendations. He ought to know when someone is putting in a miserable performance and not doing his administration any credit, and he ought to be able to get rid of that fellow because he knows what is up. Presently, he doesn't know. He doesn't have a clue of who is good and who is bad.

Q: It seems to me that the way to get at this problem is to find out through the corridors and then leak it.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, there are a lot of Presidents who won't act if something has been in the press. That creates a counter reaction.

Q: What about scandals?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, but there are a lot of cases where it isn't a scandal, it is just ineptitude. I also think that if a potential nominee, especially among the non-career people, knew that he was going to be subjected to this kind of scrutiny, maybe he wouldn't apply for the job in the first place, if he wasn't confident that he couldn't do it in the right way. So, that is about the only constructive suggestion that I have to make.

Q: Your own story of Luxembourg...

LOWENSTEIN: I am not quite sure how to deal with this, but one of my successors, not Mr. Dolibois, who was a great credit to the United States, was an absolutely scandalous case and everybody knew it. Everybody in Luxembourg knew it, everybody in the United States knew it. It is exactly that kind of case that should be brought to the President's attention, because I bet the President didn't know. You just can't have that kind of behavior, but we do. We can't have it any more from a career person than we can from a non-career person.

Q: The system will take care of the career person.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, he or she probably has been so examined by the time he or she gets there that their case is pretty well known. Probably some people flip their lids in these jobs and let the whole thing go to their head and lose their bearings, fall in love with someone who causes their behavior to change, etc. But generally, I think, career people have been scrutinized and examined so they are probably going to behave pretty well.

I don't think the system is going to change, but there should be some way of controlling it rather than trying to prevent it in the first place, because you can't prevent it. It is part of life in America.

Other than that I really don't have any bright thoughts. I haven't thought about it much in the last ten years, to tell you the truth.

Q: What about Presidential transition teams?
LOWENSTEIN: That is a new phenomenon. Also I think budgetary cuts have made the Department far less efficient and far less responsive to the public. A number of times I have called up the State Department and some receptionist answers the telephone who doesn't have a clue about anything, doesn't know where anybody is, isn't particularly polite, and doesn't take your message accurately. I think that it is worse and worse.

Q: Yes, you are right.

LOWENSTEIN: And you get an awful lot of desk officers who it seems to me don't know what they are talking about. They just got there and there is nobody around who can answer the question. I think it is harder for the public to deal with the State Department now than it used to be.

End of interview