The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR JAMES G. LOWENSTEIN

Interviewed by: Dennis Kux
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is February 8, 1994 and I am interviewing Ambassador James G. Lowenstein in his office. Jim, to start off, tell us something about your background and how you got interested in the Foreign Service.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I think for people in my generation—I was born in 1927−the war years were very important. I will just give you a few stories to illustrate. When I arrived at boarding school in 1941, just before Pearl Harbor, but after the war in Europe had started, I found that I had four roommates and one was a Polish refugee, whose name was Andrei Beck. He was the son of the then Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Josef Beck, who had been the signer of the Beck-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact. All during the ensuing four years as the United States went to war, and as the war raged across the Pacific and Europe, Andy Beck and a couple of other European refugees who were at the school led us young, uninitiated Americans through the histories of their countries. So that by the time I graduated in 1945 from boarding school, I had spent my formative years following the progress of the Second World War day by day.

Not only that, but we were all permitted to join at the age of seventeen in officer training programs to take effect after we became eighteen. So by the time I left boarding school, I was already enlisted in what was then called the US Army Air Corps as an Air Cadet candidate expecting to be called shortly after my eighteenth birthday. I started Yale in June, but my eighteenth birthday happened to be on August 6, 1945, which was the day that we dropped our first atomic bomb. I received a communication the following week from the U.S. Army Air Corps telling me to hold everything, and a further communication about three weeks later saying that the program was ended and that I could either come into the Air Corps as an enlisted man and serve for two years or I could be given an honorable discharge and be eligible for the draft. The draft was still on and there was one reason--namely, a shorter period of service--why it was better to become a draftee at that point than

to accept the offer from the Army Air Corps. So I received an honorable discharge without having spent a day on active duty. Then the draft was canceled before I was called. Hence, my military career was deferred until the time of the Korean War.

My four years at Yale was the period during which the Cold War began, and the whole political configuration of Europe and Asia changed. I decided that my work as an English major wasn't particularly relevant, so I shifted to international relations including a seminar on Eastern Europe, going back to the business of Andrei Beck. I also signed up for a summer in Czechoslovakia, the summer of 1948, with a group called the Experiment In International Living. Shortly before we left events occurred in Czechoslovakia that made it impossible to go—namely, the Communist coup—so instead the group that was going to Czechoslovakia went to Sweden. That summer, the summer of 1948, I remember sitting in my adopted Swedish family's house listening to the radio describe the beginning of the Berlin airlift. So it was impossible to go through those years and not identify with what was going on in the world. And it was during my last year at Yale that I decided that I would try to go into the Foreign Service.

Q: You took the exam in 1949?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes. One of the ways of doing it then was to come down to Washington in early June where there was a Foreign Service Preparatory Course, I think it was called, given at George Washington University. It lasted from early June until a week before the exam, which I recall was given in early September. There were about fifty of us in the course. It included basic economics designed for the exam which was quite different from the basic economics we had studied before plus brushing up on American history.

Then, as I was not a veteran, I did not have a veteran's preference, and hence the oral was deferred.

I then found out that there was some kind of program at ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration], the Marshall Plan, for administrative trainees. I didn't know what that meant, but it sounded interesting to me, so I applied and was hired. The security clearance process was started which, as I recall, took the whole fall because I remember that since I had nothing to do, I worked as a volunteer for the Church World Service Committee on the New York docks helping Russian refugees when they arrived. I had studied Russian at Yale and at that point still spoke it well enough to communicate with these refugees.

Q: Where were you living at that time?

LOWENSTEIN: I was born and raised in Shrewsbury, New Jersey near where my great grandparents had bought, in 1893, President Ulysses Grant’s summer home—his summer White House—from his widow. It then became my family’s summer home until it was sold during the war. My family lived in Scarsdale before and after the war and they were still there at that time, although in the process of moving to Greenwich, Connecticut.

Q: What business was your father in?

LOWENSTEIN: My father was a Wall Street lawyer. He had joined a firm with two other partners in 1919, right after World War I. The senior partner was Francis L. Wellman who was well known for his performance in court. He later wrote a book called “The Art of Cross Examination" which was used as a text in law schools all over the country. My father had come to New York while he was a Naval officer, from Cincinnati where he had been born and raised, and stayed there. My father's law firm eventually grew, merged and re-merged, so that when my father finally "retired" at the age of 79, there were a couple of hundred lawyers, and it had changed names twice.

Q: Was there an international angle?

LOWENSTEIN: No there was not. It was purely domestic, although he had a few Brits as personal clients. My father specialized in trusts, estates, corporate mergers and acquisitions and was on the boards of a couple of companies. My mother had traveled widely and liked it. Her father, my grandfather, had been president of a large silk manufacturing company, family owned, and had been president of the Silk Manufacturers Association. He had led missions for that organization to Egypt, Japan and China. And my mother, after finishing Bryn Mawr and before her marriage, had accompanied him on some of those trips. So while she was widely traveled, my father wasn't although my mother would drag him around every year. I might add as a footnote that my mother, now 93, still travels around the world for two months a year every year and claims that there isn't any country she hasn't been to. I think she is probably right.

So I did not come from a family that was particularly oriented to what was going on outside the United States. Indeed, my brothers became, respectively, a banker and a lawyer without any particular international interests. But I caught the travel bug very early. Before Sweden I had spent a summer in Mexico on a student exchange program and after I had spent the summer in Sweden in 1948, I never stopped going abroad.

To get back to ECA, finally the security clearance came through and I was summoned to Washington. The appointment I was offered was as a Foreign Service Staff Officer Class 12. The salary was, I believe, $3200 a year. When I arrived I was told that the program for which I had been recruited had been discontinued, but that since they had gone to the trouble and expense of having my security clearance, they would take me and would send me to Paris where they needed some extra bodies.

When I arrived in Paris, I was originally assigned to the administrative services section, specifically to the warehouse which took care of handling all requisitions for office furniture for all ECA missions. While this was not very taxing intellectually, the working hours were unsupervised and the

fellow who ran the warehouse, an American local employee, was a master at going around the bureaucracy and getting what he wanted. Hence, I learned a lot.

After about two months in the warehouse, the head of the administrative services section decided that I had had enough house breaking and began to move me around.

Q: Who was your boss?

LOWENSTEIN: My boss was a man named Malcolm Pitts, a very experienced civil servant of the old school. He had been a depression baby and had gotten a job in the civil service, worked his way up, working most of the time in Denver, Colorado with the property management agency. He decided I needed seasoning when I arrived, which was absolutely right, and for that reason had stuck me in the warehouse. Then he relented, and he and I soon became close friends.

He decided to take me a little more seriously and began to move me around through the other parts of this operation, one of which was called organization and management. It was run by a fellow who seemed very old and wise to me, even though he was not yet thirty. He seemed wise because he had gone to the Harvard Business School and wore a homburg. His name was Jack Kubisch. He later became a Foreign Service Officer and was Ambassador to Greece among other things.

Q: Wasn't he Assistant Secretary for Latin America?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes.

Q: And he was the head of AID [Agency for International Development].

LOWENSTEIN: No, he wasn't head of AID, but he had been head of an AID mission. Actually he was head of the AID mission in Ceylon when I was there.

Q: He was a career AID officer.

LOWENSTEIN: He was a career AID officer who transferred over to the Foreign Service.

Then in July the Korean War started. Having escaped World War II, I knew that military service was inevitable and something I really didn't want to escape anyway. So I took two weeks off, came back to the United States, applied for various officer candidate programs with a first preference for the Navy, and then went back to Paris to wait for the call.

A call came in late November, but it wasn’t from the Navy. After Tito's break with Stalin, the US had decided to give economic assistance for the first time to a communist country, namely Yugoslavia. There had been a lot of congressional resistance so long negotiations ensued between the executive and legislative branches. Finally, it was decided to give food aid to Yugoslavia, which had had a drought the year before. When the conditions were all agreed on between the two branches of the government, the food aid program was to be administered through the Marshall Plan but was not going to be called an ECA mission because Tito did not want to subscribe to the Marshall Plan. He had turned it down on Stalin's orders in 1948. So it was called the US Special Mission to Yugoslavia.

Instead of being given to someone from ECA to head, a former chairman of the American Red Cross, Richard Allen, was recruited. He collected a group of experienced ex-UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] observers. I am not sure what they were all doing at this point, but most of them had been with UNRRA and had done this kind of work in Eastern Europe. In addition, there was one Foreign Service officer, Elmer Yelton, and a couple of experienced ECA comptrollers. They came to Paris for a week of orientation before going on to Yugoslavia. During their time in Paris, about halfway through, one of them died of a heart attack. Mr. Allen contacted Everett Bellows, who was the executive director of OSR, the European Headquarters of the Marshall Plan, and said that he had

authority to arrive with so many bodies and he was going to arrive with that number of people and not one less. He, therefore, needed a body and asked Bellows to find a body and get that body down to the station on Saturday night.

So I got the call from someone in Bellows's office. I said, "Well, first of all thanks very much but I really don't want to go, and secondly, I have this Navy problem." About five hours later, Everett Bellows himself called me at home and said, "We don't care what you want. This is not a request, this is an order and I will take care of the Navy. This thing is only going to last six months or so and we will get you deferred. You be at the station Saturday afternoon at 5:00."

So, I arrived at the station and met the other members of the mission. I was at that point 23, and I think the next youngest was about 36 and most were in their mid-forties. They were a very experienced group. The plan was that there would be two people in Zagreb, three people in Belgrade, and one person in each of the Yugoslav republics. There were two particularly difficult republics for climatic and isolation reasons. One was Montenegro and the other was Bosnia-Herzegovina. A third was Macedonia, but the person in Macedonia could drive down to Salonika for the weekend. Then it turned out that Montenegro was only an hour from the coast, so the least desirable by a process of elimination was Bosnia-Herzegovina. When I arrived, the decision had already been made by unanimous consent of the others: I was going to Sarajevo.

Our first stop was Trieste.

Q: Trieste at that point was under control of the UN?

LOWENSTEIN: At that time, it was under Allied military government protection.

Q: It had not been given back to Italy.

LOWENSTEIN: No. There were two zones. Zone A was administered by the Yugoslav army. Zone B was administered by US and British forces. It was, incidentally, part of the Marshall Plan. The troops were there to protect Italian rights vis-a-vis the Yugoslavs. There was a large U.S. army detachment and the reason we had stopped there was that the army was outfitting us with jeeps, C rations and arctic clothing. So we spent four or five days in Trieste then got into our jeeps and drove over the mountains. By this time, it was the last week in November. We were going through snow drifts several feet deep, constantly stuck and having to be pulled out by horses. We went to Zagreb where we had another two or three days of orientation.

Then I left for Sarajevo in a jeep with no sides protecting the driver, marked with the Marshall Plan symbol and the American flag, a trailer full of C rations, a couple of extra tires, not one word of the language, and no experience in the field. I set off over the mountains from Zagreb to Sarajevo.

Q: Were you to be alone in Sarajevo?

LOWENSTEIN: I was not only alone in Sarajevo, but I learned later that I was probably the only foreigner in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The last foreigner who had been living in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been the Italian consul in Sarajevo who had left with his pregnant wife in the middle of a bombing raid. His name, I was told then, was Cavaletti, a name I somehow remembered because when I got to Luxembourg as Ambassador and was calling on my colleagues, lo and behold the Italian Ambassador's name was Cavaletti. I said, "Are you related to the man who left Sarajevo during the war?" And he said, "I am the same person and the lady who met you at the door is my daughter who was born shortly after I left Sarajevo."

So I arrived in Sarajevo. The trip had taken about 12 hours. I had two extra tires in the trailer, and I used both of them. I was as close to exhaustion as I have ever been in my life, before or since. This was the worst winter in Bosnia-Herzegovina in many years. I had been driving through blizzards and getting flat tires

all the time. I didn't know where I was, I could read the signs, but I couldn’t understand them; I couldn't understand directions when I asked.

Anyway I finally got to the Hotel Europa, which was to be my home for the ensuing seven months. And for these seven months, my job was to go out every morning and visit every local distribution point at the level of the *opština*, or municipality. I visited every *opština* in the Republic, driving something like 40,000 miles in seven months in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was out on the road every morning from 6 a.m. to about 6 at night, except for Sunday, which I took off. I did a report every week on every *opština* visited reporting on everything I observed.

Q: What sort of things were you looking for?

LOWENSTEIN: I was looking at the distribution system to make sure that the food aid being provided wasn't being simply driven up to Party headquarters and dumped off in a back room some place for their use. I saw that there were distribution points, that the citizens were lining up to get the food, that there was some method for distributing it, and that it was going from the rail head to these distribution points. At least, that was ostensibly the purpose. In fact, there was another purpose of the mission which became rapidly evident to me although it was never stated explicitly. We were driving around in jeeps with the American flag and the ECA symbol on the side, and we were accustoming the people to seeing Americans all over the country. We were pretending to observe much more than in fact we were capable of observing. But the observing we did do was a deterrent to abuses. And what we were doing, it later became clear to me, was also setting the stage for further assistance programs. In fact, military assistance started soon thereafter. By getting everybody used to the fact that Americans were running all over in jeeps marked with the American flag, the next step was a lot easier for both the government to swallow and the people to accept. It was sort of a salami tactic in reverse. It was the first Western involvement in communist Yugoslavia that involved a visible presence.

Q: Were the Yugoslav people sensitive about Westerners being there or just the Yugoslav government?

LOWENSTEIN: The people were not, the government was. The head of the Party in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a man named Rudi Kolak who had been close to Tito during the partisan years. After I had been there for about three weeks, he called me into his office. I should say that I was alone–that is, I was the only American–but I was given an interpreter. The interpreter was a graduate student from Belgrade who hated being in Sarajevo and whose English wasn't really very good. At any rate, he informed me that Kolak was furious that anyone as young and inexperienced as I was had been assigned to Bosnia-Herzegovina. He felt insulted, and thought he wasn't being taken seriously. So I arrived at Kolak's office. He began by saying, "Are you enjoying it here in Sarajevo?" I said, "Not at all. You don't permit me to talk to anybody [which he didn't]. There is no fraternization. There is nothing to do, and I don't enjoy it at all." At which point he said, "Well, maybe we should introduce you to some pretty girls." I said I thought that was a very good idea. At which point he shook his finger and said, "No, no, that is not a good idea, it would distract you from your serious work."

Q: When you said you were not allowed to fraternize did that mean you couldn't talk to people?

LOWENSTEIN: The only person I attempted to establish a relationship with was the son of the hotel manager who was 19. He liked American jazz, and I had a shortwave radio. I had a living room and bedroom in the hotel. A couple of times he would come in and listen to jazz with me on the shortwave radio. About the third time he came in, he said, "This is the last time. I have been told I can't talk to you again." In fact, nobody talked to me. Well, there were two exceptions. There were two local government liaison officers who would take me out for dinner every couple of weeks, but one spoke no English, and the other a little and I didn't speak Serbo-Croatian at that point. Conversation was all through my interpreter. So I read a lot of

books, although I was so tired at night that most of the time I slept.

Q: How often did you get down to the Embassy?

LOWENSTEIN: Every month we were all called to Belgrade for two days. I would either drive up or go by train. Twice I was called back to Paris, each time for two days. But the only way to get to Paris was by train, and the train took two days each way.

Incidentally, the Ambassador at that time was George V. Allen. He made it a point of visiting each one of the food observers. I should mention that I had been promoted to FSS-9 and had gone from $3200 to $5300! George Allen came down to Sarajevo and spent two days with me. He came with his wife and stayed at the hotel. Whenever I was in Belgrade, he invited the group over for dinner and just couldn't have been more interested, accessible, friendly, open, very impressive. He came up in a later stage in my life which I will get into when we talk about the Navy.

After seven months of this, I finally got word from the Navy that−.

Q: What were your relations with the head of the operation?

LOWENSTEIN: Very good. The whole operation worked well. The observers did an excellent job on the whole. Richard Allen, the former Red Cross chairman, not only had a close working relationship with Ambassador Allen, to whom he was not related, but he was also a wonderful man to work for. So the whole experience was extremely interesting. The work involved a lot of responsibility for someone 23 years old, and while I hated it at times, I loved it at the same time.

Q: Did your reporting extend beyond the distribution system?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, it did.

Q: Would you like to elaborate?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, we were encouraged to put in anything. Since I had a lot of time in the evenings, I did a lot of reporting about the conditions in the countryside, whatever political observations I could make, conversations that I would overhear and ask my interpreter to translate, what the liaison officers were saying, what Rudi Kolak was like, etc. I don't know if anybody ever read these reports, I don't know what happened to them, but I enjoyed writing them.

Q: Now Sarajevo is right and center 42 years later. Would you ever have thought it?

LOWENSTEIN: No. I don't think that anybody who served in Yugoslavia and knew it well, at least nobody I ever met, predicted what has actually happened. That there were all of these tensions, sure. That there might eventually be some separation of the country, sure. That there were going to be perhaps violent local outbreaks, gang warfare, sure. But the kind of thing that has happened, I don't know a single person, Yugoslav or American or foreign, who predicted it. Sarajevo's standard of living in those days was extremely low, and the population spent their energy surviving. People were very poor. There wasn't very much food or heat. The winter was extremely severe. The only time in my life that I saw wolves was coming back from one of these jeep trips after dark and I saw them in the distance in my headlights. This terrified my Belgrade interpreter who hadn't spent much time in the country.

Finally, I was told that my officer candidate class would start in early January 1952. I was asked whether in the interim I would like to stay in Paris and be assigned to something called the Temporary Council Committee of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] which, of course, delighted me. This Committee was known colloquially as "The Three Wise Men." The three wise men were Averell Harriman for the United States, Jean Monnet for France and Lord Plowden for Britain.

The task of these three men was to figure out how to get NATO to divide its resources. What came out of this was first of all what are called the Lisbon goals, which were goals set for the various countries at the Lisbon meeting in early1952. And so something called the Annual Review was born. It existed as long as I have known anything about NATO affairs. All of this was hammered out at what is now the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development] headquarters at the Chateau de la Muette. The U.S. delegation to this committee was very high powered. I still have the list at home. Henry Tasca, Lincoln Gordon, Charles Bonesteel, Harriman, and two young aides. One was Fred Chapin (later Ambassador to several countries), and I was the other. For the two of us, it was really a sort of glorified messenger boy operation−collating papers, running back and forth to the Chateau with stuff for Harriman, proofreading, the executive secretary of a delegation kind of job. But you were hanging around with the great men, and Fred and I became very close friends. In the evenings we would go about together with our group. There was a large group of young Americans around ECA headquarters in Paris in those days. A lot of them were messengers, some of them were junior executives, and some of them worked in the ECA Mission to France. Among those who worked in the mission to France was Arthur Hartman, which is how I first met him. Another was Paul Douglas, the son of the Senator from Illinois. I still see some of this group. Some went into government after that, but many didn't stay very long.

Q: What were your impressions of the operation and the three wise men?

LOWENSTEIN: My impression, not only of this particular operation but also of the ECA mission to France and OSR (the European headquarters of the Marshall Plan), was that this was the most competent group of people I had ever seen. It is still the most competent group of people I have ever encountered. It was an impressive agglomeration of talent. All of these people seemed to be devoted to getting done what they had to do. I didn't see any bureaucratic backbiting. That is what struck me at the time.

Q: How do you account for that?

LOWENSTEIN: Maybe I was too far away from it being so junior. But the atmosphere was totally different from any other organization that I have ever seen. Everyone was highly motivated. It just seemed to me that nobody was paying any attention to regulations and directives, or their next jobs. They were conducting themselves as though the "bureaucracy" didn't exist. I remember when I was finally leaving to come back to go into the Navy, it was just before Christmas, someone on Harriman's immediate staff said, "Look, since you are going back anyway, would you mind taking this package of documents?" I said, "Sure, what is it?" He said, "Well, it is the U.S. part of the NATO Annual Review." It was highly classified, but nobody paid any attention to it. It was stuck in an envelope and given to me to be turned in when I arrived in Washington, which I did. So it was that kind of operation.

I left Paris a couple of days before Christmas, went to Washington to check out, and then spent Christmas at home.

Q: Did you have much to do with Harriman directly?

LOWENSTEIN: No, very little. He would bark at me occasionally, "Where is that envelope I told you to get?"

Q: How big was the delegation?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, the delegation must have had ten people on it, plus Fred and me. The other representatives had delegations of the same size. We never saw them because we were staffed out of the OSR building.

So, in early January, I reported to officer candidate training at Newport. I went to OCS in January and was commissioned in May as an ensign. I go into the Navy business because it also relates to the Foreign Service. A month before commissioning an officer arrived from Washington to give us our assignments. I

was assigned to one of the three largest aircraft carriers in the fleet, the USS Coral Sea, one of the three carriers that rotated in the Sixth Fleet which was deployed in the Mediterranean

I had been aboard the Coral Sea three or four days when the Executive Officer of the ship called me in. I was a junior ensign on a ship of 4,000 officers and men. He said, "I have an assignment for you. We are going to be the first naval vessel since the war ended to call at a Yugoslav port. Not only that, we are going to have Tito aboard. We are going to take him out for a day. I want you to work with the Admiral's aide and help him organize this thing."

So in due course we went into Split, and the officers and men were all on parade on the flight deck. In front of the gangway were the Admiral, his chief of staff who was a Captain, the Captain of the ship, the Executive Officer, the Admiral's Aide, etc. down to me. There were about ten people standing by the gangway. Tito came aboard accompanied by Ambassador Allen. The Admiral led Tito on a review of the officers and men standing at attention. As they passed me, with my eyes fixed straight ahead, Ambassador Allen somehow spotted me and said, "Jim, what are you doing here?" I said, "Well, let me explain." He said, "Well, come on. Why don't you come along with us?" He said to the Admirals and Captains "Why this young man was this and that and the other thing and we worked together, etc." And then he introduced me to Tito. He said something like this is the young man who helped save your country kind of thing, Tito nodded and said, "Yes, I know, I know, I know." So I had a lovely day. Tito was seated on the flight deck. He went through the chow line and the enlisted men's mess hall. He ate hot dogs. I was with him throughout. Finally they left, and I went back to my cabin. The Admiral's aide came down and said, "You know who the other officers in the welcoming party were?" I said yes, and repeated their names and ranks. He said, "How many times do you think you saluted in the course of the day?" I didn't really know the saluting protocol. I was advised, in some exasperation, to learn it.

The other kind of Foreign Service experience that I had while on the ship came from the fact that among other things, I edited the ship's newspaper. The ship's newspaper was written by taking all the wire service reports and pasting them together during the night. The day we were going into Barcelona on an official fleet visit, I had a headline in the newspaper that said, "Signing of Spanish Base Negotiations Postponed." They were then being conducted by Admiral King. I should say that by this time I was also used by the Admiral as a French interpreter and sometimes taken as sort of an assistant PAO [public affairs officer] or PIO [public information officer] when he went ashore. This happened to be one of those times. There was a formal dinner when we called in Barcelona. The Ambassador was there with members of his staff. The Admiral, whose name was Grover Budd Hartley Hall, got up at the dinner and said that he was delighted to be there on the day that the Spanish bases agreement had been signed. At that point all the reporters rushed off. After the dinner was over, the Embassy PAO asked the Admiral what had made him think the Spanish bases agreement had been signed. The Admiral said, "Because it was in the ship's newspaper this morning and I read it. The editor is this young Ensign right over there." The Admiral's aide then grabbed me and said, "Let's go back to the ship and get this newspaper of yours." So we did. Of course, that is not what the newspaper said at all. Then I went back to shore and helped telephone all over the place—the Embassy, the wire services, etc.

After a year and a half on the carrier, through another set of strange circumstances, I was assigned to the Naval War College. At that point I had been promoted to Lieutenant JG.

Q: You had been in for almost two years?

LOWENSTEIN: No, eighteen months. I was assigned there because the person whom I was replacing, Robert W. Tucker, later an assistant professor at the University of California and after that a prominent professor at Johns Hopkins, had been sent a number of files. One of them was mine. Tucker had been looking for someone to replace him who had some kind of

experience outside the Navy whom he thought could help in editing the work of the civilian professor at the Naval War College.

A distinguished academic is appointed there for a one- or two-year assignment. The professor then was Hans Kelsen. He had been the author of the Austrian State Constitution, and a renowned work on the law of the United Nations, and was one of the most respected international law theorists in the world. Bob Tucker had been a student of his at the University of California when, as a young Naval Officer just out of the Naval Academy, he had audited his courses. He had become enthralled and had decided to go ahead and get a Ph.D. He resigned from the Navy when his obligatory service was over and became a co-author with Hans Kelsen of a number of works. He had succeeded in getting Hans Kelsen to the Naval War College and had then come along as his assistant. Bob was at that point either a Lt. Senior Grade or a Lt. Commander, I can't remember which.

I arrived and walked into Tucker's office and reported for duty. I had never met him. He gave me a baleful look and took two volumes of International Law by Oppenheim, edited by Lauterpacht, pushed them across the desk, and said, "Lt., go into that office across the hall and read these books." That was Monday morning. For the entire week, whenever I passed Tucker in the hall, he would give me a wan smile, but he would never say anything to me. So the following Monday, I went into his office and suggested that either we arrived at some kind of reasonable relationship, or I would leave and he would have to find someone else. We subsequently became very close friends.

The experience of working with Kelsen was, needless to say, very interesting. He was at that point in his seventies. He and his wife were living in a rented house in Newport. I would go to the movies with him once a month and would have dinner with them. It was a fascinating experience. In addition, I was the most junior officer on the Naval War College staff. So it also showed me how the regular Navy worked in peace time, because by this

time the Korean War was over. It gave me an exposure to the regular Navy which I never would have had otherwise.

Q: At that time did they have a State Department Advisor at the Naval War College?

LOWENSTEIN: They had a State Department Advisor. For most of the time when I was there it was Norris Haselton. When I first arrived, it was Ambassador Edward Crocker who had been Ambassador to Iraq. He was, to put it mildly, of the old school in the Foreign Service. Haselton was quite different, but I still didn't have very much to do with him. I was in the Navy, and he was a civilian; I was working closely with Kelsen, and he had nothing to do with Kelsen. Tucker would come up from time to time as a consultant, so the three of us would work together. I also administered the Naval War College correspondence course in international law, which was very time consuming. But, like every other member of the staff, I had the right to attend any lecture, any exercise, any seminar, and had the full run of the Naval War College, which for a junior officer, 27 years old, was really a great experience.

Q: I assume the program of the Naval War College was roughly the way the National War College operates with speakers every morning and classes of about 150?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, exactly. It was smaller, however.

Q: And you would have about an hour of talk and then there would be a couple of hours of questions?

LOWENSTEIN: Exactly.

Q: And then in the summertime the annual global games?

LOWENSTEIN: Exactly

Q: Newport is a wonderful town.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, not to live in in the winter when you are a bachelor junior officer surrounded by regular Naval officers who are all commanders and captains and married with children. The only other person around was Claiborne Pell, actually. We would attend meetings of the Newport World Affairs Council on snowy winter evenings.

At some point during this last year, I got a call from the Board of Examiners saying, "When you get out you may take your oral and enter."

Q: So you were ready to come in.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, I was ready. Then Kelsen said, "You are a fool. You like this, it is interesting, why don't you take a year and go to law school before you commit yourself to the government. You have already wasted three years in the Navy, what difference does another year make?" And so after thinking about it, I was getting married that June, I decided to do just that. I asked somebody somewhere in the State Department and they said, "Okay, one year but no more." I said, "Why no more?" They said, "Because you will brush up against the age limit to enter." I think it was 31 at that time. I said, "You know, the last time that I went through this, when I first took the exam, you told me I was too young and to go out and get a job. Now you are telling me I am too old." They said, "Yes, but seven years have elapsed."

So I decided I would try it for a year and went off to Harvard Law School. I did enjoy it and it was very stimulating, but unfortunately, I came down with bulbar polio in the middle of December, missed almost three months and didn't get as much out of it as I had hoped. I got through the year, but not with flying colors needless to say, but I missed working and the international world and decided to go into the Foreign Service.

Then personnel said, "Take the summer off, you don't have to come in June, why don't you come in September or October." Later I discovered that by accepting their offer, instead of coming in as an FSO-6, I had to come in as an FSO-8 because it was

during the summer that the system was changed from six classes to eight, which, of course, they never bothered to tell me. And then, when I said, "Okay, September," then it turned out that there was no September class. So I ended up not coming in until October. As I then had two months with nothing to do in the fall, I went back on active duty and worked in the Naval Judge Advocate's Office in the Pentagon.

Q: You lost two years and a grade or two.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, and I was 29 by that time. So I reported to the A-100 class. About halfway through the course, I discovered that a man I had known in Paris at the Marshall Plan, Benson E. Lane Timmons, was director of European Regional Affairs in the State Department. He was, in fact, the only person I knew then in the State Department. The people I had gone to George Washington with in 1949 weren't around. So I went to see Lane Timmons to ask his advice about what I should apply to do after I finished the A-100 course.

Timmons said, I remember very well, "Don't worry my boy, I will see that you come up here and that will solve your problem." I then asked around and discovered that Lane had the reputation of being an extremely difficult man to work for. As I tried to see whether there was some maneuvering room, I discovered that he was as good as his word, and that I was going to work for Lane and that was that.

Q: I met him because Galbraith picked him as his DCM in New Delhi. The story was that he looked for the meanest son of a bitch in the Service, and he found him in Timmons.

LOWENSTEIN: Anyway, the fact of the matter is that while Lane was somewhat difficult to work for, I really enjoyed working for him. He was the most dynamic of the office directors.

Q: Talk about the office that he had.

LOWENSTEIN: He had a relatively large office with responsibility for NATO, the OECD, the incipient European Community, all the multilateral stuff, political/military matters, and base negotiations. He considered himself the functional equal of a deputy assistant secretary. And, in fact, he saw Dulles all the time.

Lane decided he would teach me the art of bureaucracy.

Q: You were his staff aide?

LOWENSTEIN: I was his staff aide. He was the only office director with a staff aide. I don't know how he accomplished this, but he managed to get it through Personnel.

Q: Did you have a predecessor?

LOWENSTEIN: No, I had no predecessor. The staff aide to the assistant secretary was George Vest and we worked very closely together. George was amused by Lane. Most people weren't. But Lane taught me such things as never to try to clear a telegram until 5 p.m.

Q: That's the old Joe Sisco trick. Wait until the last minute.

LOWENSTEIN: And then you make a feeble attempt to clear it and if it won't clear, you take it to the assistant secretary and say, "I tried to clear it, but everybody has gone home." That kind of thing. There were many other laws of the bureaucracy. So I spent a lot of time running around with cables, getting them cleared all over the State Department. But it was a wonderful way of meeting everybody in the place. I was also trying to do a second year of law school at night, which was a horrible mistake because Lane required me to be in the office at 7:00 a.m. and I never got out of there until 7:30 and would rush off to GW [George Washington University] law school. I was also newly married and the whole thing was just a nightmare. So I dropped out of law school.

Lane never took a vacation. His deputy was Bob McBride, who later became Ambassador to Mexico. Bob came in one day and said, "Well, I think I finally got Lane to go on vacation for a week." So for the next three days, all I did was pack four briefcases full of stuff for him, all the efficiency reports for the office, etc. The great day came, Lane left and everybody breathed a sigh of relief. Nine days later it was time for Lane to come back, so I went into the office at 7:00 and at 7:10 I heard Lane striding down the hall. He always sounded like a troop of horses when he arrived. He came in and threw down the briefcases. I said, "Well, how was the vacation?" He said, "A waste of time like all vacations." I repeated this story to Bob McBride who said, "How would he know, this is the first one he has ever taken."

So that was life working for Lane Timmons.

Q: What were the issues of the day then?

LOWENSTEIN: The issues were mostly technical: the lines of authority in NATO, the beginning of political consultation, the Four-Power Working Group on German Reunification, of which I was the staff secretary.

Q: What did that do at that time?

LOWENSTEIN: It did nothing. It met and issued ringing declarations and made all sorts of wonderful contingency plans about what they would do if the Russians did this, that or the other thing.

Q: Who were the four powers?

LOWENSTEIN: France, Germany, Britain and the United States. The German representative was Rolf Pauls, who later became ambassador here.

The one thing that happened to me there that I remember was the final report of the Four Power Working Group. It was 75 or 80

pages long. And, of course, it wasn't done until about 3:00 in the morning. It had to be on everybody's desk the next morning at 9:00. Robert Murphy was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and was technically the head of the delegation.

Q: Where were the meetings being held?

LOWENSTEIN: In the Department. So the report was collated, and I was in the process of delivering it to Murphy's office. Suddenly I realized that it had been incorrectly collated. Twenty pages had been misplaced. So I had to tell Murphy that there was no use looking at the report because it was unreadable. He was furious. I don't blame him and thought he would have my head because it really wasn't a very complicated job. So that was my contribution to the Four-Power Working Group on German Reunification!

The other issues, of course, were: Did we really want a Common Market because it was going to provide considerable competition economically for the United States. Did we really want a unified Europe? This was a debate that started then and hasn't ever ended. I don't think we can make up our minds what we want. We certainly haven't been very enthusiastic about the Europeans getting together in their own defense organization.

Q: The official line was that we wanted it.

LOWENSTEIN: The official line was that we wanted it, but we wanted it as long as it did exactly what we wanted it to do, as long as it was obedient, as long as we could control it and as long as we had the British on our side in Europe. Of course, the other issue was the French, de Gaulle and how he behaved and would he come back to power.

Q: While you were there, de Gaulle came back to power.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, he came back to power, and that was when he proposed the inner directorate which was a proposal that absolutely outraged Dulles and Lane, I thought inordinately

outraged. This led to the usual ranting and raving about de Gaulle and the French and struck me at the time very forcibly as a totally emotional reaction to de Gaulle and French behavior. I still hold the view today that we can't seem to deal with the French because we don't understand where they are coming from. That was the first time I saw that in action close up. But it struck me that the mind set in the State Department was viscerally anti-French

Q: Up until then we didn't see these problems?

LOWENSTEIN: When we sent our forces in to intervene in Lebanon in 1958, we didn't bother to tell the French, as I recall. Again Dulles said something like, "What they don't know won't hurt them," or "If we inform them, they will want to come along."

Q: What about the relations with the others, the British and the Germans?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, the special relationship was very strong, and it principally took the form of nuclear sharing even before the Kennedy-Macmillan meeting in 1961.

Q: Were our German relations friendly?

LOWENSTEIN: Very friendly. They revolved around the question of German reunification and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, which was constantly being re-negotiated, German rearmament and the German role in NATO.

The thing that I found interesting in that office was that the pace was feverish, whereas as I would go around to some other parts of the State Department clearing telegrams, I found them much quieter especially after 5:00 when almost everyone had left for the day. I concluded that Lane's office was one of the most active units in the State Department and it has been my experience that, looking back, I still think that was the case.

Q: Did you deal a lot directly with Dulles?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, the office dealt a lot directly with Dulles. He was always calling us.

Q: Was Merchant the Assistant Secretary?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes. Livingston Merchant was the Assistant Secretary and the deputies were Johnny Jones, Foy Kohler, and Burke Elbrick.

Q: Was there much of a Secretariat in those days?

LOWENSTEIN: Fisher Howe was the Executive Secretary.

Q: Was it difficult moving paper?

LOWENSTEIN: No, it really wasn't all that complicated. Paper moved very quickly. Timmons just didn't pay attention to a lot of procedures and would bulldoze papers through himself, which is why he was so unpopular.

Q: Did you have any sense for the role that the principals played, Murphy and Dulles?

LOWENSTEIN: No, not really. I had the sense that the real disputes were between Defense and State.

Q: What were the issues then that you saw?

LOWENSTEIN: My main substantive responsibility was the political consultation agenda which I had to draw up every week and make sure that all the cables corresponded to the agenda items.

Q: It was probably a pretty good job to start with.

LOWENSTEIN: Oh, it was a wonderful job. I saw how the whole place worked and got to meet everybody. I saw how you

moved paper, I saw what was important and what wasn't important to move. I saw the administration of a large office. Every morning I would come in and go through all the cables, sort them in piles, what could be thrown out, what Timmons had to see before the 8:00 staff meeting and what he had to see later. If I made a mistake, I really heard about it. He would say, "Where is that damn telegram that so-and-so told me about? You never showed it to me." It was all my fault.

Q: What was Timmons's drill for a normal day?

LOWENSTEIN: In a normal day he would come crashing in about 7:15, tear through all the cables...

Q: You would have by then gone through all of the cables?

LOWENSTEIN: I would by then have them all stacked up. He would write instructions on a number of these cables which I would then pass along. He would issue all sorts of totally unrealistic orders like "I want this done by 10:00 this morning." Then he would go off to the staff meeting.

Q: This was with whom?

LOWENSTEIN: The Assistant Secretary. And then there would be telegram writing queries, and the usual bureaucratic routine. Of course, he would go off to every NATO Ministerial meeting which involved a lot of preparation.

Before leaving the subject of EUR/RA [Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Office of Regional Affairs], I think the following is worth saying. After I had been in the Office of Regional Affairs for six months, someone from Personnel told me that I was going to be assigned the responsibility for supervising one of the secretaries and that this should be regarded as a test of my management ability. I said to this person: "When I was 22 I had responsibility in Bosnia-Herzegovina for running the assistance program and when I was a junior officer in the Navy on an aircraft carrier, I had the responsibility for a

division of men, all of their problems 24 hours a day, seven days a week for a year and a half. So supervising a secretary just doesn't thrill me." I always thought that was rather typical of the Foreign Service. The tendency is to treat junior Foreign Service officers as a bunch of children. So few of them have had any management experience outside the State Department, that supervising one or two people is a big deal, when for anybody who has had any experience in life, this is just laughable. Anyway, so much for EUR/RA.

At some point I was called and advised that I had been assigned to Lyon as vice consul, which I was very pleased about. Several weeks later I was called and told that I was not going to be vice consul in Lyon, I was going to be the junior officer in a two-man political section in Colombo, Ceylon and that this was a great opportunity to get into the real meat of the Foreign Service.

Q: Did you have any hand in that?

LOWENSTEIN: No hand at all, I barely knew where it was. I bought all the books I could find on Ceylon. In those days, it was possible to take a ship to post. I can't remember what line we took, but it went through Naples and then continued through the Suez Canal. It took almost a month, and I had time to do all my reading. So I arrived in Ceylon in May 1959, with a year and a half old daughter and a pregnant wife who was going to have our second child three months later.

The Ambassador then was Lampton Berry, but he was ill, rarely showed up in the office and left a few months later.

Q: He was a source for some research for the book that I did. I found that he was the contact with Nehru during World War II, at a time when the US was terribly active. I always wanted to meet him.

LOWENSTEIN: I think I only saw him twice. He was replaced by a career officer, Bernard Gufler, who had been a German expert but had been in Ceylon as DCM [deputy chief of mission]

before. He knew everybody in the place. He knew the country very well. He was an absolutely marvelous man to work for.

Q: I met him a couple of years later when I was in Personnel. I remember trying to boot him out of the Foreign Service and I loved his attitude. In the old days they would say that your time had come, why don't you quit. His attitude was "Wait a second, I have two or three more years, here is my address, I am ready to go to work, send my paycheck." He did not allow himself to be browbeaten by the Department.

LOWENSTEIN: When he had begun life in the Foreign Service, he was one of the people originally trained in Russian. He had lived with George Kennan, Llewellyn Thompson, and Chip Bohlen in Riga. Instead of going ahead with Russian, he became an expert on the Baltic countries.

I found in the two-man political section that I had carte blanche to do any political reporting that I wanted. The first head of the section was an expert in international law. He was quite academic and liked to deal with the Foreign Ministry. He was succeeded by somebody else who also liked dealing with the Foreign Ministry and had a lot of experience in South Asia. But I was left alone to deal with the internal politics and what was going on in the country which was exactly what I wanted to do and liked doing. I didn't feel at all constrained about whom I could see so I got to know everybody in the place through Ceylonese friends that I met from the Governor-General and the Prime Minister on down.

Q: Who was the Prime Minister?

LOWENSTEIN: Bandaranaike was assassinated shortly after Ambassador Gufler arrived. I went with him to a meeting at the Prime Minister's residence one day as a note taker. When we got there, Ambassador Gufler said, "I don't think I will take a note taker, stay in the car and wait for me." When their meeting ended, the Prime Minister accompanied the ambassador to the car. As we drove out the gate, there was a popping noise. We got

back to the Embassy, and a friend of mine from the British High Commission, who was one of their intelligence people, called me and said, "Chap's been shot."

I said, "What chap?"

He said, "The PM [prime minister], old boy."

I said, "Really, that is impossible, we just saw him."

"Well," he said, "he was shot right after you saw him." So Ambassador Gufler was the last person who saw him alive before he was shot by a militant Buddhist monk who had been waiting on the terrace.

Anyway we had five governments in the course of the time I was there. Bandaranaike, Dahanayake, Mrs. Bandaranaike, C.P. DeSilva, and Dudley Senanayake. So there was a lot going on politically. I traveled all over the island.

Q: What was our role in Ceylon? What were the US issues with Ceylon then?

LOWENSTEIN: I would say benign neglect. The issues were Cold War issues−Chinese presence, Chinese and Russian economic and political penetration, the Communist Party, the Trotskyite Party, the cultural wars, non-alignment.

Q: The previous governments had been pro-Western, but Bandaranaike was not.

LOWENSTEIN: He was very involved in the non-aligned movement and saw himself as a sort of junior Nehru, and so did all his successors. Non-alignment was a very big thing for them, but it was a loaded non-alignment. It was much more an anti-American non-alignment than it was a pro-Russian or pro-Chinese non-alignment. The Chinese had a rice/rubber agreement and were in there trying to carve out a sphere of

interest that would have made them the most important foreign actor.

Q: Did we have trouble with the Battle Act which prohibited us from giving aid to a country trading with Communist China?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, we did. We had trouble with that and later on we had trouble with the Hickenlooper Amendment which conditioned economic aid on no nationalization of U.S. assets. By that time, they had nationalized everything that wasn't tied down. But the issues were really sort of marginal, looking back on it. We had a small AID program.

Q: Did you think they were marginal at the time?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, I really did. I thought it was too bad that the Ceylonese didn't understand where their true interests lay and that kicking the British out and nationalizing the economy was problematical, that all their Marxist rhetoric was a lot of nonsense and that it was too bad they were going to ruin a great country which is exactly what they succeeded in doing. When I arrived there was still a large British community. When I left, there were very few. This was in a two-and-a-half-year period. They just disappeared, because there was no reason for them to stay.

Now, at the same time I felt that the British had not played their cards well in many respects. For example, my son was born in the local British nursing home, which was the hospital the Embassy used. It was staffed by Ceylonese doctors and British nurses. It was called the Joseph Fraser Nursing Home. One of the provisions of its charter was that only whites could be admitted. This was 12 years after independence. This meant that an English woman married to a Ceylonese could have her child in the hospital, but if the child became ill two weeks later it could not be admitted to the hospital for treatment. There was that sort of thing. There were clubs where Ceylonese were not allowed. When we gave dinner parties with mixed British and Ceylonese, the British, many not university educated, would try to high hat

the Ceylonese who had been to Harrow and Oxford. So the whole thing seemed rather absurd in terms of their future interest in the country. Hence the anti-British reaction to a love/hate relationship with the hate translating itself into a desire to see the British leave while mimicking everything British, struck me as regrettable but understandable.

Q: Do you think that contributed to the push for socialism, trying to get the British out? They presumably were the major owners of the plantations.

LOWENSTEIN: I really don't. I think there was a perfectly good alternative, which the Sri Lankans are doing today, which was to run the place themselves as a market economy. I think Bandaranaike managed to marry nationalism with socialist rhetoric and this helped. When the mass of people feel that they do not have a proportionate share of the national wealth, this kind of argument is appealing when they haven't tried it and don't know that it is not going to work and won't produce the kinds of result it promises. Plus the fact that this whole identification of non-alignment with the Russians and the Chinese−I think that was one that got away from us in the West. We should have tried to capture the non-aligned movement, instead of turning against it and describing it as a movement that was antithetical to our interests. After all, that attitude drove the non-aligned into the arms of the Chinese and the Russians.

Q: How was our attitude manifested in Ceylon? Were we just ignoring the Ceylonese?

LOWENSTEIN: No, it didn't happen in Ceylon, it would happen at the UN and in the international environment when we wouldn't give the non-aligned any credit for anything. And we were constantly threatening to cut off aid or conditioning aid or giving aid in a form that was less evident than what the Chinese and Russians were doing.

Q: How big an AID program did Ceylon have?

LOWENSTEIN: It was a major effort in Ceylonese terms, but not compared to any large programs. But we had a lot of people given the small size of the program, and it seemed to me we over promised at the time and a lot of what we gave was in the form of credits and other ways of giving aid that weren't very visible and didn't make much of an impact. The attitude of the Ceylonese towards the Americans was perfectly friendly. The intellectuals, the press were rhetorically anti-American. One leading anti-American journalist was Mervin DeSilva. I used to see him all the time, and he couldn't have been more friendly. He is still friendly. I see him whenever I go back. So I think the main thing was not to take all this rhetoric seriously. Americans generally got along very well with the Ceylonese then and they do now.

Q: Were there any relations with the Chinese and the Russians?

LOWENSTEIN: No there were no relations with either the Russians or the Chinese. Gufler saw his Russian counterpart but nobody else mixed...we lived next to the Chinese, in fact. We never met the Russian diplomats. We occasionally saw large, overweight, white bodies on beaches. The Diplomatic Corps was small, but we had a lot of friends our age—the Australians, the British, the French, the Germans, the Indians. We were close as a group. We played tennis together, we went on weekends together with our Ceylonese friends. It was a very informal, integrated life. That is, the Ceylonese that you could relate to, the educated city dwellers, were perfectly at ease in this kind of environment and vice versa.

Q: What about relations with the British? Did you defer to them?

LOWENSTEIN: No we didn't defer to them, and they didn't expect it. The relations with the British were very close.

Q: You talked about their relationship problems with the Ceylonese, what was our attitude towards that?

LOWENSTEIN: Our attitude was that we shouldn't be part of it so that we were not encouraged, shall we say, to join any British clubs that didn't allow Ceylonese members. Obviously, an exception was made for the Fraser Nursing Home. Except for two British couples, whom we knew extremely well, I would never give a dinner without Ceylonese present. And I would never have in my house any red-neck British who couldn't get along with the Ceylonese. I probably wouldn't have gotten along with them either, so the issue never arose. There were plenty of them around. The Brits that I knew were all very integrated into life in Ceylon. At this point there was still a British member of the Ceylonese parliament, the Chief Justice of the Court was still British, the commander of the army was still British. Now all these British knew the country very well, and it would never have occurred to them to live a segregated life. So, the British really split into two groups. There was a sort of educated, sophisticated, elite that got along totally with the Ceylonese, and then the element that had nothing to do with them and only knew each other.

Q: What was the relationship between the government and the opposition?

LOWENSTEIN: It depended on the government. The opposition was led by either the SLFP [Sri Lanka Freedom Party], Mr. and Mrs. Bandaranaike's party, or the UNP [United National Party]. The only Trotskyite party in the world in a government, the LSSP [Lanka Sama Samaja Party], always allied itself with the SLFP. The political scene was quite British. There was a lot of spirited debate in the parliament. A lot of good fellowship after hours. You could mix politicians socially from any party with any other party, including the Communist Party. In fact, the head of the Communist Party, Peter Keuneman, had been head of the Cambridge Debating Society at the same time that a lot of the UNP people had been students there. The head of the LSSP, N.M. Perera, had gone to the London School of Economics. The head of SLFP, Bandaranaike, had gone to Oxford and had been head of the Oxford Union. So they all knew each other. It was

partisan politics much more on the British/American model than on what later became sort of bitter ideological, violent politics.

On the other hand, the Tamil problem was very much there. It was sometimes more difficult to mix Sinhalese and Tamils than it was to mix Europeans and Ceylonese. The Tamils were very sensitive about their position, very worried about their future. There had been riots the year before we had arrived, in 1958, and a lot of Tamils had been killed. I saw no disposition on the part of the Sinhalese, in any political party, to compromise on this issue, to arrive at any solution, to give the Tamils any kind of a break. In one of these governments, J. R. Jayawardene was the Finance Minister. He was just giving the Tamils nothing. After all, Bandaranaike rode to power on a nationalist platform which was very anti-Tamil by indirection. He was a Sinhalese nationalist who wanted Sinhalese to become the sole national language and Buddhism the state religion. Well this was ipso facto anti-Tamil and a lot of what is happening today you can trace back to Bandaranaike's coming to power. He was the one who, more than anyone else, changed the political landscape in terms of ethnic conflict. The 1958 riots occurred after he became Prime Minister. Before then the two communities had gotten along. The British had favored the Tamils in their usual divide and rule way, but it was really Bandaranaike who started this.

Q: Did the Americans all live and stick together?

LOWENSTEIN: There was quite a lot of sticking together. I found a kind of reverse discrimination, if you will, in effect. If you didn't have anything to do with the American community and spent your time with your colleagues in other missions and with the Ceylonese, they resented you. On the other hand, if you spent your time with them, well, you weren't in Ceylon to spend your time with a lot of Americans. I would say about half of the people in the Embassy did stick together and half didn't.

Q: Was it more the substantive people who didn't?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, it was more the substantive people who didn't.

Q: What about the AID people?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I didn't know any of the AID people except Bill Kontos and Jack Kubisch, and they certainly mixed.

Our social life revolved around journalists, politicians, and the Brits who had been there for a long time. Tennis was always a very important part of my life, and I played often. So that was another group—mostly Ceylonese. There was an officer in the Embassy, Frank Lambert, the Labor Attaché, who was a very good tennis player and he and I played in the Ceylon Nationals twice. We were the first American team to play in the Nationals. I suspect we may have been the last as well. By the way, we didn't last beyond the first round.

Q: Kennedy was elected at the end of this time. Did that bring about a change of any kind?

LOWENSTEIN: My recollection is that it didn't. The policy lines were set, and life went on as before.

Q: Jim Grant was the AID director.

LOWENSTEIN: He was the AID director before Jack Kubisch.

I might add that for the last three weeks, Frances Willis was there, but I had virtually nothing to do with her

Q: You left Ceylon in May 1961. How did you get into Serbo-Croatian?

LOWENSTEIN: Apparently when George Kennan was appointed Ambassador to Yugoslavia, he wanted an embassy staffed as much as possible with people who had previous experience in the country. So I received these orders.

Q: You didn't ask for them?

LOWENSTEIN: I certainly didn't ask for them.

Q: What had you put on your wish list?

LOWENSTEIN: I don't think I had gotten to that point. I still had six months to go. I can't remember what I was thinking, if I was thinking at all. And come to think of it, I don't remember ever being asked in those days what I wanted to do.

Q: Did you ever think about staying in South Asia?

LOWENSTEIN: Either I wasn't thinking ahead, or this assignment arrived before I could start thinking ahead. All I know is that I had no fixed idea about when I was leaving or where I was going. I thought perhaps of getting back into European political/military affairs, but I wasn't absolutely sure. At any rate, it became academic because a message arrived assigning me to Serbo-Croatian language training to be followed by assignment to Yugoslavia.

I came back for language training. In the class were Larry Eagleburger, David Anderson, Stu Kennedy, Harry Dunlop, Chips Chester, Dick Johnson, and Dick Johnson's wife who was, incidentally, the best linguist in the group. It was the first time in my adult life that I had no professional responsibilities. The only responsibility was to go and sit in a room and listen to Serbo-Croatian and come home and do some homework.

Q: By then FSI [Foreign Service Institute] was in the garage?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, in the garage. Underground. Everybody else was complaining, but I thought it was a relief not to have any pressure or responsibility. All I had to do was to do my homework and learn the language.

Q: But, you already had a sense for Yugoslavia.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, I knew what I was getting back into. I was excited about working for Kennan. I was assigned to do internal reporting in the political section, Larry Eagleburger was assigned to the economic section, David Anderson was in the political section too. Harry Dunlop was in the political section. Chips Chester was assigned to Zagreb.

In Belgrade in the first year I had the horrible experience of living in a compound, the first and only time in my life. One of the most miserable decisions the US Government ever made was to build compounds in places where it is difficult enough to have a relationship with the inhabitants of the country. This is guaranteed to make it almost impossible, especially in a place like Belgrade.

I know the Foreign Service doesn't like to make distinctions between substantive and non-substantive people at embassies on the ground that they are all part of the same family, but while they are part of the same family, they have different functions. It is ridiculous to put substantive reporting officers in compound situations. And of course, once compounds are built, they have to be filled. I managed to move after a year.

Q: How did you get out of it?

LOWENSTEIN: I was on a list to get an embassy house when one became available, and my name finally came up.

Life in Belgrade was interesting, but not particularly enjoyable. There was a very good group in the embassy. We were very friendly with Tony Shub, the Washington Post correspondent, David Binder of the New York Times and Emil Guikovati of Agence France-Presse. I had some good friends in other embassies including Thorwald Stoltenberg who later became Norwegian Defense Minister, Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the UN and whom I visited in Oslo several times years later. There was some fraternization with Yugoslavs but on a very superficial level. You could get to know the journalists, the

academics in universities and think tanks, a few odd bods here and there, but—.

Q: That was tough after Ceylon.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, but on the other hand, Yugoslavia was much more important in terms of American interests, there was a lot going on, there were more journalists, more involvement in day-to-day issues that concerned the United States.

Q: Talk about how Kennan ran the embassy.

LOWENSTEIN: Kennan ran the embassy in a rather distant way. That's not his thing; he is a thinker, obviously. I saw very little of him.

Q: Was the embassy building a big one?

LOWENSTEIN: No, and the ambassador had to walk past the political section offices to get to his office. So Ambassador Kennan walked past our offices in the morning, on the way to lunch, back in the afternoon, out in the evening. He had to walk past at least four times a day and, on most days, far more often than that. He never dropped in until the last week he was there. It is true that I was only a second secretary in the political section and that his main daily contact was with the political and economic counselors. .

Q: How large was the political section?

LOWENSTEIN: The section consisted of the political counselor plus Dick Johnson, David Anderson, myself, and two others.

Q: Did the ambassador have a weekly staff meeting?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, he had a weekly staff meeting, but the political counselor attended it.

Q: You didn't attend it?

LOWENSTEIN: No.

Q: Oh. He didn't have a daily staff meeting?

LOWENSTEIN: No. There was a political section staff meeting a couple of times a week and occasionally he would attend that.

Q: What was he interested in?

LOWENSTEIN: Well there was MFN, the perennial question with the Yugoslavs as to whether they were going to have MFN privileges restored or taken away.

Q: MFN stands for Most Favored Nation status dealing with tariffs.

LOWENSTEIN: It was the year after the non-aligned summit in which Tito had come out and criticized the United States for testing nuclear weapons, but had ignored a Soviet test of nuclear weapons, thus breaking faith with Kennan. It was a rather rocky period in Yugoslav-American relations. There was a lot of police surveillance, and all Americans were on their guard all the time against being overheard or compromised.

And on the subject of security, we were testing the Hungarians to see when they would give diplomatic visas to visit. Two embassy officers every week would apply for visas. I was paired with Gerry Livingston, who was in the economic section and whom I had known before the Foreign Service. Suddenly the visas came through for us, and we were the first ones to go. Our orders were to drive to Budapest, spend the weekend and visit what was then a legation in Budapest to see if anyone tried to tamper with the trunk of our car because Cardinal Mindszenty was living in exile in the legation. And otherwise to observe how closely we were followed which wasn't very difficult because we were followed from the minute we crossed the border until we crossed back into Yugoslav

Q: Did you get back to Sarajevo?

LOWENSTEIN: I got back to Sarajevo quite often.

Q: Was that part of your reporting beat?

LOWENSTEIN: No, it really wasn't, but I got back during trips down and back to the Dalmatian coast. In fact, jumping ahead, after I got out of the Foreign Service, when I started consulting with companies with interests in Yugoslavia, I was in Sarajevo quite often, so I kept up with Sarajevo.

The reporting in the embassy concentrated on what was going on in the Party, what was going on in parliament, the new constitution, what it meant, relations with other countries. There was a daily press summary that had to be translated and edited, which the junior officers in the political section, or what passed for junior officers, we were all rather elderly junior officers, had to take turns doing.

Q: Talk now about Kennan.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, Kennan was someone whose weekly dispatches read almost like movie scripts they were so well written.

Q: Did he do a lot of writing?

LOWENSTEIN: He did a lot of writing and was in the process of writing a history of U.S.-Yugoslav relations.

Q: In effect he was a political officer.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes. He was also doing a lot of arguing with Washington all the time.

Q: What was he arguing about?

LOWENSTEIN: Congress's behavior. Kennan has never felt that Congress has had a role to play in foreign policy.

Q: Do you have any sense as to how the Department regarded him?

LOWENSTEIN: No, I really don't. He cut a very elegant figure in the diplomatic life of Belgrade.

Q: Did he involve others in it or was he pretty much a loner?

LOWENSTEIN: He certainly didn't involve me or some of the other juniors. Gerry Livingston was a great favorite of his−understandably. First of all, because of his Serbian language skills. He had been a graduate student in Yugoslavia before he went into the Service and had the best language skills in the embassy.

Q: How was your language skill?

LOWENSTEIN: Mine was equal to almost everybody else's. David Anderson's was stronger.

Q: What about Larry Eagleburger's?

LOWENSTEIN: I wouldn't say his was any better than mine. But David Anderson's was better, and Gerry was easily the best. So Kennan liked that because he could use him as an interpreter. He also had a Ph.D. in history from Harvard and could fit right into helping Kennan write the book he was involved in.

I can't say that I got to know Kennan well then. He was there only for my first year. He was replaced by Burke Elbrick, who had a totally different kind of relationship with everyone in the embassy, I would say a very close relationship with everyone. I saw a lot of him, and by that time we had moved into a house built on the back lawn of the residence, so we were also his neighbors. I enjoyed working for him enormously.

Q: He was very open.

LOWENSTEIN: Very approachable, very open, very funny, very experienced, effortless in the way he did everything. He had a daughter who became a good friend of ours. So my relationship with Elbrick was quite different. I remember one amusing incident. He loved Cuban cigars. One evening at a dinner I attended for a visiting congressional delegation, one of the congressmen said: "Mr. Ambassador, are you smoking Cuban cigars?" Without blinking an eye, Elbrick said, "Don't tell anyone, I have been assigned to destroy their overseas supply."

Q: What was your reporting beat?

LOWENSTEIN: My beat was internal politics, yet again.

Q: Doing the same type of reporting you did in Ceylon.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, my theory has always been that the traditional Foreign Service division of responsibilities is that the senior political officer does the foreign office and international relations and the junior does the internal. I think the internal is much more interesting than running down to the foreign office and exchanging notes and reporting views on an issue of foreign policy, but it doesn't give you a real insight into the country or a basis for any kind of original analysis. So I always preferred internal reporting. When Dick Johnson left to go to Sofia to be the DCM and I took his place—.

Q: What position did he have?

LOWENSTEIN: He was the number two in the political section. I then had some responsibility for the external, but it was the internal that really interested me. The thing I spent a lot of time on was an analysis of the constitution, long talks with the Yugoslav author of that constitution using some of the normative, analytical techniques that Kelsen had taught me at the Naval War College. So working with Kelsen proved to have been useful.

Q: Did you predict Yugoslavia would fall apart?

LOWENSTEIN: No, at the time it was difficult to see that they would fall apart, except for maybe Slovenia. My theory at the time was that if you looked at the intermarriage rate among Croats, Bosnians, Slovenes and Serbs, it was so high that within a generation or two there wouldn't be any ethnic divisions. Intermarriage would have obliterated these ethnic distinctions. The second element was Tito’s intelligent policy of, while drafting everyone, making sure that they served outside their own republic. I thought these two things would work against continuing these ethnic divisions, but I was totally wrong. However, there is a large group of Yugoslavs who don't know who they are because they have a Croat mother, a Serb father and a Macedonian wife. The one group that was clearly going to be the object of everyone's prejudice was the Albanians. They were really looked on as *untermenschen* [inferior people] and discriminated against in every possible way.

Q: Why was that?

LOWENSTEIN: First of all, they were of Albanian and not Serbo-Croatian origin. Secondly, they were Muslim. Third, they came from a very underdeveloped part of the country. Fourth, they had stuck together as a group and hadn't intermarried. Fifth, in Kosovo they were far less educated, had fewer opportunities and so they were economically deprived.

Q: So, it sounds like Yugoslavia was not much fun.

LOWENSTEIN: It was very interesting, but it wasn't much fun.

Q: You were more disappointed after Ceylon?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I don't know that I was disappointed, I didn't enjoy it as much. The embassy was quite large. There was a certain amount of bureaucracy. The political counselor was not a pleasant fellow to work with. The compound business really took the bloom off the rose in the first year. In the middle of the

third year I had to leave before my tour was up because my daughter was hurt in an automobile accident. There I found the whole administrative structure frustrating. It was so bad that my then mother-in-law, at her expense, flew her doctor out to Belgrade to pick up my daughter. The embassy had fiddled around for days.

Q: Was that just bad luck do you think or was it the way of operating of that particular mission?

LOWENSTEIN: The latter.

Q: Because the system works if you get good doctors.

LOWENSTEIN: The system did not work in this case. It can work 85 times, but that does not matter if it doesn't work for you the one time in your life that you need it.

So I came back in October or November 1984.

Q: How did you get to EB [Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs]?

LOWENSTEIN: Because my tour was curtailed, I was out of the assignments cycle so there was no place around for me except EB. But when I got back, I was told that I was not going to EB, I was going to be a staff assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. His name was Dwight Porter. I was told to go up and be interviewed. A couple of days later someone from Personnel called me and said, "Well, I don't know, you must have screwed up or something because you are not going to have that job." I discovered a few weeks later that the reason I wasn't going to get the job was because the day after my interview Dwight Porter was told that he was going to be leaving because Under Secretary Crockett had managed to get rid of him in a power struggle. He went off as Ambassador to Lebanon. But he couldn't tell anybody that, including Personnel, so they didn't know why he had turned me down. He had turned me down because he was leaving. So that is how I ended up in EB.

Q: What were you doing in EB?

LOWENSTEIN: EB was sort of a holding pattern I was told at the time, and it turned out for my own reasons to be just that. I was assigned to a very nice lady, a civil servant named Virginia McClung working on UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] matters. It would have been hard to find a subject that I found less of interest to me than UNCTAD and this particular job.

Q: What did UNCTAD deal with?

LOWENSTEIN: Trade and development. Ginny McClung thought that UNCTAD was the most important thing in the world. and I respected her for thinking so. Fortunately for me, Joe Greenwald was the deputy assistant secretary responsible and he would come wandering in every once in a while and say, "Why don't we go to Paris, I will put you on the delegation to an OECD working group or this or that." So that saved my sanity.

Well, I didn't have to spend two years in the job because one of the things I had done in Belgrade was that whenever there was a Congressional Delegation−I did this in Ceylon as well−and they asked for volunteers to be a control officer, I always volunteered because I found it interesting. Much more interesting than a lot of things one does in an embassy. Anyway, I volunteered to be control officer for Carl Marcy, the chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This involved not only being with him in Belgrade but also traveling around the country for a week with him and his wife. When the trip ended, he said, "Call when you get back to Washington and let's have dinner."

So about a year later, when I did get back, we had dinner. He said, "Your old friend John Newhouse has just left the Foreign Relations Committee's staff (this was about a week after I had gotten back, about two days after the Porter business) and Senator Fulbright (then-chairman of the committee) thinks he would like a Foreign Service Officer to enter the competition."

At that point, staff members of the Foreign Relations Committee were picked by a sort of oral examination. Carl would draw up a list of seven or eight people and he would present the list to Fulbright and the two senior Democrats and the two senior Republicans. If they liked the looks of it, they would approve it; if not, Carl would find some other people. And then those on the list would go up and have a little chat with these senators. Finally, the list was narrowed down to three or four and then there would be a formal hearing. The candidates would meet with the two senior Republicans, two senior Democrats and Fulbright and Carl and have what amounted to an oral exam for half an hour. One thing that was never asked, because it was against the then tradition, was what your political beliefs were or what political party you belonged to. You were simply asked about what you had done, what you thought, how you approached problems, what your point of view was on various issues of the day, and that was it. So, I said, "Fine, why not?"

Originally, I was under the impression that I had the permission, if not the encouragement, of the State Department to go up and join the Committee staff on some sort of detail. I don't think they took it seriously because I don't think they thought I would be chosen. But when the smoke cleared, I was. Either the day before I started or two days later, I can't remember, I was told that this was regarded as a violation of the separation of powers to have an executive branch officer serve on a legislative branch committee. At the time there were no Foreign Service officers working on Capitol Hill, except one-year programs under the sponsorship of the Political Science Association, but they were not employees of a congressional committee.

I met with Carl and Senator Fulbright. They said, "Well, look, it is up to you. That is a stupid attitude. There isn't time to straighten it out procedurally. Why don't you come up here for a couple of years and then we will call Dean Rusk and you can go back."

Q: What was the date now?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, this was at the end of the summer of 1965.
There was some rule at that point that you could leave for a couple of years and then come back and be reappointed in the Foreign Service.

Q: Leave without pay?

LOWENSTEIN: Something like that. So, basically that is what I did. Now, of course, two years later, Dean Rusk and Fulbright weren't on the warmest of terms. Also at the time I was in a State Department job that I considered to be less than interesting. My only concern on going up to the Committee was that I might find it equally uninteresting and inactive which looking back on the eight years I spent with the Committee, was certainly an unwarranted concern.

Originally, I was assigned to work on Europe, mainly Eastern Europe. Within about a week, I found myself attending all the meetings of the small staff, which were devoted to discussions with Fulbright on whether he should give a speech on the Dominican Republic. Fulbright was outraged by US conduct in the Dominican Republic and the ambassador's reports—.

Q: Was that Tap Bennett?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, it was Tap Bennett—which he considered to be exaggerated accounts of what was going on and which were further exaggerated by Lyndon Johnson. I didn't know anything about the substance of the problem, and still don't, but I remember the discussion which was along the line that if Fulbright made this statement, President Johnson, having the character that he did, it would result in a break with the administration which would mean, in turn, that he would have less influence. On the other hand, Fulbright felt very strongly that these were things that had to be said, nobody else was saying them, he felt that he had the facts. There was a very good person on Latin America on the Committee staff, Pat Holt, who was a lifelong student of the region. So Fulbright decided to go ahead.

Now interestingly, at that time Vietnam never came up. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had been passed. Fulbright had voted for it with misgivings. So he made the speech on the Dominican Republic and, indeed, a break did occur. That was really the beginning of the breakdown in relations between Fulbright and the Johnson administration−Fulbright on the one hand and Johnson and Dean Rusk on the other.

I began working on Eastern Europe which turned out to be not at the center of the Committee's interests. And then I got into a lot of other things too, including Western Europe. After I had been there for about six months, one thing that struck me, and always had interested me, were the visceral, anti-French feelings on the part of Committee members towards France. This was during the MLF period. The French were whipping boys for everything that was going wrong in the world. De Gaulle was constantly being criticized. In early 1966 I got a hold of all de Gaulle's recent speeches including the one he had made in December 1965 in Phnom Penh on Vietnam and the things he said on Europe. I cut out the attribution lines and underlined portions of these speeches and sent them down to Fulbright with a cover memo that said, "Here are recent statements on foreign policy by a European statesman who it seems to me thinks very much the way you do." He called me a few days later and said, "Well, these are very interesting, and I must say I agree with everything the fellow says. Who is he?" I said, "Well, you will be interested to know that the fellow in question is General de Gaulle." And Fulbright, as was his wont at times like this, replied, "You don't say." I said, "Well, I do say." And then I sent him down the full copies with the attributions. That was one of the things that led Fulbright to decide that there really ought to be a look at Western Europe. So he assigned Senator Frank Church to this task. The idea was that Frank Church would go off to Europe and meet everybody, de Gaulle, Erhard, and all the others. He would come back and do a report which would be the basis for hearings. And, indeed, that is exactly what happened, and Fulbright assigned me to go with Church. We went off to Europe in April 19.

Q: At that time didn't the Senators have their own foreign affairs staff?

LOWENSTEIN: No. They had one of their legislative assistants nominally responsible for foreign policy, but it was a subsidiary role for the staff member. When the Senators traveled on Committee business, they didn't take the people from their own offices, they took a member of the Committee staff. Generally, Fulbright assigned the person, although the Senator had to agree. I didn't know Senator Church when I started on the trip. When I started discussing the trip with Senator Church, I realized that he hadn't kept up with recent developments in Europe. So I structured the trip by beginning in Geneva so he could have a day with Jacques Fremont at the Institute of International Studies and read or talk himself into the issues. We then went to Paris and saw half a dozen cabinet ministers plus de Gaulle, to London where we met with Harold Wilson and two or three other cabinet ministers, to Germany to meet with Erhard and two or three cabinet ministers and to Brussel to see Luns, who was NATO Secretary General.

It was obviously an interesting trip. Church, I must say, was one of the fastest learners I have ever seen. The last stop was Bonn, and George McGhee was the ambassador there. He had set up a dinner with many senior officials of the Foreign Ministry. At the conclusion of the dinner, he invited Senator Church to pronounce himself on what was going on in Europe. I have always suspected that he was trying to sandbag Church. At any rate, Church got up and gave an absolutely brilliant talk which impressed those who were present. I might add that Mrs. Church was along on this trip and proved to be really a great asset. She was a wonderful traveling companion and an extremely quick study herself.

When we came back, I wrote the trip report and sent it to Carl for him to look at before it was sent to the Senator. Carl called me up and said, "Well, this report is quite good. Let's not just issue it as a Senate report, let's turn it into an article and send it up to *Foreign Affairs*." So, we sent it up to *Foreign Affairs*. At

the time Phil Quigg was the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, and Hamilton Fish Armstrong was the managing editor. Phil Quigg called me and said, "The article is fine. We will take it the way it is except for one thing. You have to cut out the last paragraph." I said, "Why?" And he said, "Ask around and you will see." Well, the last paragraph was a quote from Walter Lippmann. I was totally mystified and asked around and discovered that back in the days when they were friends, the Armstrongs and the Lippmanns would meet for dinner and bridge on Thursdays. One Thursday night, Mr. Armstrong showed up and Mrs. Lippmann showed up, but Mr. Lippmann and Mrs. Armstrong didn't show up. The reason they didn't show up was that they had gone off together and subsequently married. And since that day, as it was described to me by someone, the words Walter Lippmann and the words of Walter Lippmann had never appeared in *Foreign Affairs*.

The Committee then had hearings on U.S. Policy Towards Europe. I think the main result of the hearings was that Congressional support for MLF evaporated, and it became a dead issue.

Then I did some things on Eastern Europe. I traveled with some of the Senators to Eastern Europe, particularly Senator Pell, who wanted to go back to Czechoslovakia where he had served when he was in the Foreign Service. We went to Bratislava, Prague and spent two weeks in other places in Eastern Europe. Actually, that was the beginning of 1968. We went back a second time about six weeks before the Soviet invasion. I am quite proud of the report that came out of that trip because in the report I said that it seemed to me that if things kept going the way they were the Soviets would take some sort of military action. At the time that was not the conventional wisdom. Then after the invasion I went back with Senator Pell and his wife and Senator Gore and his wife. We also went to Moscow and Warsaw. I think that was it. Anyway I did a lot of traveling in Eastern Europe in those years. I did a lot of reports on what was going on.

I also took another trip with Senator Clark around Eastern Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary. Again, in each case there were always reports, each concentrating on what the issues were—the Czech gold claims case, the Hungarian Crown of St. Stephen case, MFN and human rights in Poland—the sorts of issues that had been around Eastern Europe for a long time and that were of interest to the Foreign Relations Committee because the legislative branch had a role in all of these matters.

Q: What were your relations with the State Department?

LOWENSTEIN: On Eastern Europe, it was fine.

Q: How did you find the Foreign Service, looking at it from another branch of government?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, at that point I thought it was fine. The embassies knew what they were talking about and were helpful. The ambassadors seemed very good. The trips were interesting mainly because in regard to each issue that needed to be resolved, the resolution was obvious to any reasonable man, whether that reasonable man was a senator or a Foreign Service officer. The problem was always American public opinion, especially the right wing of the Republican Party and the emigre groups. So, there was no movement on most of these issues.

I was very lucky because the Senators I traveled with, during the course of the time I was traveling with Senators, were Mansfield, Church, Pell, Gore, Clark and Phil Hart. I enjoyed traveling with all of them. I thought they were conscientious, very good at their jobs, no nonsense, no shopping sprees, all work, very polite to everyone, handled foreign officials with whom they met extremely well.

In 1967 I got a call one day from Senator Fulbright saying that Senator Phil Hart, who was not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, wanted to take a trip around the world and wanted some help. He asked me if I would like to go along. He

wanted somebody from the Foreign Relations Committee staff. I went over to meet Phil Hart for the first time. We then set off on a month-long trip around the world. I must say traveling with Phil Hart was as enjoyable, interesting and productive as any traveling time I have ever had or could imagine having. He was known as “the conscience of the Senate.” Having traveled with him for a month, I could well understand why. It was not like traveling with a Senator, it was like traveling with one of your old, best friends after about three days.

There are a few things that stand out in my mind from that trip. We began in Tokyo. Hart, coming from Michigan, had been asked by the automobile companies to meet with the Japanese automobile companies and raise the issue of access to Japanese market. So a meeting was organized by the American Ambassador to Japan, I think it was Armin Meyer, and we met at breakfast with the president of the organization and about a dozen men who represented the Japanese automobile industry. Senator Hart began by describing the hardships that not having this market weighed on American automobile manufacturers, how it was very bad for their balance sheets and was a great handicap, etc. He went on and on. The Japanese were all sitting there quietly eating their breakfasts, nobody saying a thing. Finally, the president of the association, who was head of one of the large automobile companies, spoke up. It was the only statement made during the course of the breakfast. He said, "Senator, very interesting presentation. Very moving speech. I would like to point out that the profit of General Motors last year was higher than the national budget of Japan." At that point everybody got up and left the room, and that was the end of the meeting. So, that was my first experience in dealing with the Japanese on the question of market access.

We went to Vietnam and spent about ten days there. It was my first trip to Vietnam. I had asked before we left whether I could go off on my own for a few days during the time that Senator Hart was doing the usual senatorial things in Vietnam−visiting the troops from Michigan, talking to reporters, dining with the ambassador−I went off with an old friend of mine, Charles

Flood, a journalist, to the Delta, to visit some villages. We were dropped by helicopter and picked up 24 hours later. We spent a night in one of the villages and found when we woke up that three people in the house of the deputy village chief in the next village had been assassinated during the night. This had been a so-called safe village. So I began to wonder that if this was a safe village, what was it like in the rest of the villages that weren't considered safe. In accompanying Senator Hart to briefings with General Westmoreland and others, it began to look to both of us as though someone, somewhere down the line wasn't telling the truth.

Q: This was 1967?

LOWENSTEIN. I think it was January 1967. Senator Hart had told me before we arrived that he was a strong supporter of the Vietnam War. He had served as an infantry Lieutenant Colonel in the army in World War II and had been quite badly wounded on D day on Utah Beach. He was a moderate to centrist hawk. After he had been in Vietnam for ten days, he became a dove. The conversion was quite dramatic. I remember one incident. We were being briefed by a general about the great military successes of the forces under his command and what their body count was, how many they had killed, and exactly how they had conducted their military operations. Senator Hart turned to me and with a wry smile said, "Makes you wonder whose sons they are." At any rate, that was when I first began to think that perhaps the military was presenting a factually distorted picture of the war, giving one side of the question and not the other. For every fact they cited as a positive accomplishment or a sign that they were winning the war, there was another fact that could be cited that proved exactly the opposite. The least that should have been done for the American decision makers and the American public was to give both sides. But both sides were not being presented.

So when I got back, I wrote a report on Vietnam. At that point Senator Hart did not want to go public with his reservations. He wanted to pick his own time and wanted to get into it gradually.

So, instead of releasing the report, he sent it as a confidential report to the majority leader, Senator Mansfield. That led to Senator Mansfield inviting me to come along subsequently on his trips to the Far East. I don't think it was because of what the report said, but because he was looking for somebody who could write reports in the way that he liked them−factual, understated, unemotional and without value judgments. So I began my travels with Mansfield.

I think there were four trips with Mansfield. A few alone, the rest with a plane provided by the White House, accompanied by the Secretary of the Senate, Frank Valeo, a Foreign Service officer who was an administrative officer and handled all the administration; Mrs. Mansfield and an army doctor. It is hard for me to separate one trip from the other. Two of them were to Cambodia. One of them was to inaugurate the restoration of relations with Cambodia. On that trip we stayed with Sihanouk in his guest house. We were there for a week and spent all of our time with Sihanouk. That led to many amusing incidents.

Senator Mansfield had the reputation of not talking very much and he didn't which is why he got along well with Asians. He listened. He would make a few pithy remarks.

Once I was flying with him from San Francisco to Tokyo. We were on a commercial plane sitting next to each other in first class. By this time, I was used to Senator Mansfield, so I knew one never talked to him unless he talked to you. We had been on the plane for several hours and he hadn't said anything. At that time, you were allowed to smoke a pipe in first class. He was smoking his pipe, and I was smoking mine. After several hours, he said to me, "What kind of pipe tobacco do you smoke?"

And I said, "Well, I smoke Dunhill's."

And he said, "Well, how much is it?"

And I said, “it is $3.00."

He said, "Well, I smoke Prince Albert and it costs $1.25." His pipe tobacco cost a third of mine. Now per pipe the difference was probably less than five cents. At any rate, that was the end of the conversation for several more hours.

Another trip to Tokyo I remember very well. I think it was the first trip I ever made with him, on a plane provided by the White House. When we took off, reverting to my Foreign Service days, I said, "Senator, would you like me to prepare an arrival statement?"

He said, "Nope."

"Well, would you like a departure statement?"

He said, "Nope."

"Well, do you want talking points for your meeting with the Prime Minister?"

Again, he said, "Nope." So we arrived and there were perhaps 100 hundred journalists at the foot of the plane. As he walked off the plane, he said to the waiting press, "See you boys tomorrow," and got into the car and we went to the hotel.

The next day we had a meeting with the Prime Minister, and I was the note taker. I went in and sat while they had this so-called conversation which lasted quite a long time. Mansfield would ask a question and the Prime Minister would talk for fifteen minutes. The Prime Minister would ask a question and Mansfield would deliver two sentences. Finally, the meeting ended, and we emerged from the room. This time there were even more journalists pushing microphones in Senator Mansfield's face. I thought, "Okay, we don't have a statement, let's see what happens."

The Prime Minister got up in front of the microphones and said, "Senator, this visit has been a pleasure and privilege for my country, and it has contributed greatly to the relations between

our two governments and our two peoples, etc." And then he motioned to Senator Mansfield.

He stepped in front of the microphones, turned to the Prime Minister and said, "Well, thanks a lot and so long."

When we got into the car I said, "Now I see why you don't want an arrival statement or a departure statement."

Well, that was the way those trips went. We had some extraordinary experiences. On one of these trips, again in an Air Force plane, we were going from some place to Rangoon and he said to me, "Send the ambassador a cable and tell him that I want to see Ne Win as soon as we arrive." So I sent the cable.

Back came a reply−Art Hummel was the ambassador−which said, "Impossible to arrange appointment with Ne Win, will explain upon arrival." I showed it to Mansfield, and he didn't say anything.

We arrived and Ambassador Hummel met Senator Mansfield at the foot of the gangway and said, "Look, Senator, Ne Win doesn't receive foreign chiefs of mission or visitors. I see him rarely. He doesn’t see ambassadors. It is impossible to see him. It just won't work. Do you want to go to your hotel?"

There was a long line of cars to take us to the hotel. Mansfield said, "No, let's go to the palace and see Ne Win."

The Ambassador said, "Well, as I say, nobody has seen him, he doesn't see anybody."

And Mansfield said, "Well, I think he will see me.”

Well, we got into the cars and off we went to Ne Win’s official residence. Somehow the word had gotten through, and to this day I don't know how. Ne Win and Madame Ne Win came tumbling down the stairs. Ne Win threw his arms around Mrs. Mansfield and said, "Maureen welcome."

Madame Ne Win, known as Kitty, threw her arms around Mansfield and said, "Mike, I am so glad to see you." At which point Madame Ne Win said, "You have to stay for supper. It is going to be in the kitchen and just us." She turned to Ambassador Hummel and said, “Of course, you are welcome to join us.” We went into the kitchen, a large eat-in kitchen in the basement, and we−the ambassador, the Mansfield party and the Ne Wins−had a very jolly dinner. It was obvious that the Ne Wins and the Mansfields knew each other well. On the ride back to town, I asked Senator Mansfield how he had known the Ne Wins.

He replied in two sentences: ”Kitty went to Catholic University in Washington. When she was there, she lived with us.” Now he had, of course, never told me or the Embassy in Rangoon. It was typical of his relations with Asians−they had been developed over a long time, but he never talked about them, so nobody knew what they were.

Q: That is incredible that the ambassador didn't know of the relationship.

LOWENSTEIN: Another incident. Mansfield was a very good friend of Marcos. On one trip we were going from somewhere to Manila, and a cable came into the plane which said, "President and Mrs. Marcos are giving a large dinner for the Mansfields the night of your arrival. Dress is Barong Tagalog. Please provide neck, chest, waist and sleeve sizes of all members of the party. Shirts will be made by Mr. Marcos's personal tailor and will be delivered to your hotel when you arrive so that you can go immediately to dinner."

So I went around and got all the measurements and sent a cable, which in the usual State Department way went not only to Manila but was repeated to CINCPAC [Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet Headquarters], Tokyo, the State Department, the Defense Department, every Embassy we were visiting in Asia. Some erstwhile buddy of mine had gotten hold of this cable, and back came a cable to the plane, which was repeated to all of

these places and which I heard about for years afterward, saying "Please repeat Lowenstein waist size."

We also had a day with the King of Laos in Luang Prabang. The army doctor on that trip had brought his camera along and was determined to get a lot of pictures that day. So he kept saying to the King and to the Queen, who didn't speak any English, "Now, King, put your arm around Mrs. Mansfield." "Get the group together in front of the statue of Buddha." etc. It was a rather colorful day.

Q: Did reports come out of these trips?

LOWENSTEIN: There was always a trip report. Mansfield had a theory that if you holed up in a hotel room in Hong Kong you could get a report finished by the time we got back to Washington, while if we waited until after we got back, there would be interruptions and time would pass. So, indeed, these trips always ended with 24 to 48 hours in Hong Kong, which were spent drafting the report. I would do the first draft. Frank Valeo would go over it, and then we would sit with Mansfield and go over it line by line. They were very complete and always ended with recommendations. As soon as Mansfield arrived back in Washington, he always went to the White House and gave the report to the President along with a confidential annex. Then, in due course, the trip report was released in unclassified form. So, after each trip there was a public report. He was very insistent on including recommendations in every report.

He was a great fan of Marcos's, Sihanouk's and Ne Win. I had some problems with the Marcos part of this, but he felt that these were three Asian leaders who were in tune with their people and could relate to them, were authentic, popular political leaders and not artificial creations of either the West or the Communist world. That is why they appealed to him. He was willing to overlook their shortcomings. He knew Asia very well. So these discussions with these Asian leaders focused on the problems that the political leader in question faced at the moment and what the United States could do about it.

In the meetings with Sihanouk, when we first went there, Sihanouk kept saying, "Look, I know that you are bombing Cambodia. It is perfectly okay with me. You go ahead and bomb the North Vietnamese in Cambodia all you like, just don't say anything about it. Forget all this compromising my neutrality business, it is okay, but just keep quiet."

Mansfield's view was that Sihanouk was the only one in Cambodia who could hold things together. Part of his irate reaction to the war in Vietnam was because of its extension to Cambodia which he thought had resulted in Sihanouk being toppled. I personally don't think the US had anything to do with replacing Sihanouk, but the fact is that what we were doing in Vietnam created an environment in which it was possible for those who wanted to topple Sihanouk to do so on the theory that they would then be supported by the United States, because they claimed that they were going to pursue the war more aggressively than Sihanouk had. Mansfield felt that Cambodia was doomed the minute Sihanouk was overthrown and, indeed, he was right.

Q: What were his relations with Johnson?

LOWENSTEIN: His relations with Johnson were okay. I mean, they agreed to disagree over Vietnam.

Q: Didn't he also want to withdraw troops from Europe?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, now that is another story, and I also worked on that subcommittee. Mansfield formed a special subcommittee on withdrawing troops from Europe. When we started, I had several conversations with him because I was against reducing troops in Europe. I concluded that what really was going on was a very clever, subtle play. It was Mansfield's view that the only way to get the Europeans to do more was to threaten them with this move, that this was the best bargaining chip you could possibly have with Europeans. It was interesting that while he kept putting in his amendment to reduce American

forces by these large numbers—50 percent or 150,000 by the end of 1971—they always failed by a small vote. Had he put in his amendment a smaller number—10% for example—I have no doubt that the amendment would have passed, and I'm sure that he was also sure.

Just to finish up with the Mansfield amendment. My view is that MBFR [Mutual Balanced Force Reductions] was the illegitimate offspring of the Mansfield amendment. The Mansfield amendment forced the administration to go into the MBFR talks seriously because, as far as Mansfield was concerned, he threatened to continue to bring his amendment to a vote if the administration didn't try to find a way to negotiate a phased withdrawal. The administration argued, of course, that Mansfield was holding a gun to their head and weakening their bargaining position. But then, the administration was always arguing that everything the Senate did weakened their bargaining position.

At any rate, it also forced the Europeans to watch it when it came to reducing their percentage of GNP [gross national product] devoted to defense. So, in essence, I think the Mansfield amendment accomplished a lot. It is hard to think back to those days, but the administration wouldn't move on the issue of negotiated troop reductions. They kept arguing that these were sacred figures, and nothing could be done about it. Those in the Mansfield school just felt that Europe was rich and could pick up more of the load.

Before we get to the whole business of the fact-finding missions with Dick Moose, let me say a few things to show you what life was like on the Foreign Relations Committee in those days. The first project I was assigned to was the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union, the first agreement to be reached with the Soviet Union in quite a long time. Fulbright, and those in favor of ratifying the Convention, felt that if we couldn't make progress on something this simple—consular access to citizens arrested and the like—then we couldn't make progress on anything. The opponents argued that you couldn't trust the Russians, and that this would lead people to lower their guard.

Now in those days, members of the Committee staff were assigned to deal with both sides of an issue. The staff member was supposed to become an expert and be able to counsel both opponents and proponents. And that is indeed what I did on the Consular Convention. I wrote both the majority and minority reports. The majority report for Fulbright and the minority report for Carl Mundt. I received, what I thought at that time, since I was in favor of ratifying the Consular Convention, a high complement from Mundt who felt that the minority report was a sounder document than the majority report. Not only did I have to prepare the two reports, I had to go down to the floor of the Senate, sit with the leaders of the two factions during the debate, support the arguments that they wanted to make and act as their counsel during this procedure. That is an example of how a non-partisan staff used to work in the old days.

There was an assignment for Senator Wayne Morse that I think is illustrative in describing the difference between working in a structured bureaucracy, like the State Department, and on Capitol Hill. The State Department issued a legal white paper justifying involvement in Vietnam. I can't remember whether it was in 1965 or early 1966. At any rate, Wayne Morse wanted to attack it. He felt that it was incorrect in many respects and did not justify involvement in Vietnam. Carl asked me to talk to a member of his staff and find out what he wanted. So I went over and talked to Phyllis Rock, one of his legislative assistants. She said, "This is what he wants you to do. He wants to attack the State Department White Paper which he considers to be total nonsense. He wants to make a statement on the floor of the Senate." Incidentally I had never met Wayne Morse. I started going over the document, and it seemed to me to be full of holes and specious reasoning. At least it could be attacked on these grounds. So I wrote a long dissertation about what was wrong–.

Q: Did you contact the State Department?

LOWENSTEIN: No, absolutely not–a long dissertation on what I thought was wrong with this legal justification, checking points with the Congressional Research Service and the office of the

General Counsel of the Senate. I sent it over to Phyllis Rock and waited to have a meeting to discuss it. I waited two days and nothing happened. I got sort of nervous and called Phyllis and said, "When are we meeting to discuss my draft on the State Department White Paper?"

She said, "Well, if you go over to the floor of the Senate right now, he started reading it 5 minutes ago, you can hear it." Which I did.

Afterwards I went up to her and asked why we had not had a meeting on this. After all, Wayne Morse had been dean of a law school and had been in the Senate a long time and presumably would want to check something that somebody he had never met had written. "Not at all," she said. "He went over it, made a few minor changes, thought it was fine, went over to the Senate, got up on his feet and read it." The next morning it was in the world press and in the public domain.

The lesson to be drawn here is that when you are working in a place like Capitol Hill, and indeed in a lot of other places, once you put something in the hands of someone who is going to make it public, you have no control over it. And all the fire breaks and protections you have in the State Department don't exist in lots of other places, especially on Capitol Hill. So, if you are going to make a mistake, you are going to make it. On the other hand, if you produce something that is very wishy-washy and that never takes a position, nobody is going to use it because that is not what they need. It is a good lesson in learning how to live in the real world. At least that is how I interpreted it.

While on the subject of mistakes, Senator Fulbright called me down to his office one day and said, "I am sick and tired of these other countries supporting the war in Vietnam when politically they don't believe in it. They are supporting it because they are making a lot of money out of it. Get the facts and give me a speech that I can deliver on the floor." So I prepared a lot of correspondence that went to the Defense and State Departments asking for figures on exports and all the rest of it. I called the

Congressional Research Service and they did their usual superb job. I wrote a speech. Fulbright went on the floor and delivered a steaming indictment of war profiteering.

The next morning, I got a call from the Counselor of the New Zealand embassy who asked me where I had gotten the figure that Fulbright had given for the profit that New Zealand had made in Vietnam. I described the procedure I had used. He said that that was what they had assumed, as Fulbright had outlined the procedure in his speech, and they had done the same thing. However, their figure was 20 percent of my figure.

I checked my figures and called him back and said, "Well, I am awfully sorry. You are right and I am wrong. So what do we do about this?"

He said, "Well, it may interest you to know that the Prime Minister made a statement in parliament about two hours ago. The ambassador is at the State Department now delivering a formal protest to the Secretary of State. The only thing that my government wants is a formal apology from Senator Fulbright on the floor of the Senate."

So I went crawling down to Fulbright's office and opened the door and said, "I am sorry, I quit, I am leaving, etc."

He said, " What's the matter with you?"

And I said, "Well, the matter is that this happened, and it is embarrassing to you, and I will be out of my office by 3:00 this afternoon. All I can say is that I'm very sorry."

And he said, "Ah, come on, don't be so silly. All right, so they are not making what you said they are making, they are still making a lot. What difference does it make?"

I said, "Well, the difference it makes is that the Prime Minister has made a statement in parliament, and the ambassador is

protesting to the Secretary of State, and they want a formal apology from you on the floor."

And he said, "So, they want a formal apology. Do they really want a formal apology?"

"That's what they said."

"All right, I will give them a formal apology," he said.

So the next day he went on the floor and said, "We made a mistake, they didn't make ‘x’ they made 20 percent of that and we are sorry we made that mistake. But they did make 20 percent of ‘x’ which just proves my point.”

I thought to myself at the time that if this had happened to me in the State Department I certainly would have been reprimanded, at the least, but there it was just another mistake made in the course of a day's work. This also shows that contrary to his reputation among some, Senator Fulbright was a tolerant, understanding person to work for.

ABM hearings, another footnote to history: Bill Bader was handling ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty] and other arms control matters before he left to join the Ford Foundation. In the first hearing, and they were being televised, an interesting thing happened. When the ABM system first became a subject of a congressional hearing, some Senators felt that the system didn't seem to be all that practical, but they weren't really well informed on the subject. The Federation of American Scientists was convinced that the system wouldn't work, so they had been conducting a campaign on Capitol Hill, but it hadn't gotten very far. When the hearings began, David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense, was the first witness. He gave the Defense Department's justification for the system−why it would work, how it would work, etc. Fulbright led off the questioning and said, "Well, that is very interesting. By the way, have you consulted any of the experts in this field?"

Packard said, "Yes, we have consulted all the experts in this field, and they all agree with us."

Fulbright said, "Well, I am glad to hear that. Who have you consulted?"

Packard said, "Well, we consulted with all the experts and they agree with us."

Fulbright said, "But who?"

Packard said, "Well, I really can't remember their names, but we consulted all the experts."

Fulbright said, "Well, can't you give me one name? If you have consulted all these experts, you must know who they are. Give me one name."

Packard said, "All right I will give you one name, Wolfgang Panofsky." He was then Director of the Linear Accelerator Center at Stanford and a recognized expert in the field.

So Fulbright said, "Thanks very much, that is all I wanted to know."

The hearing proceeded. Twenty minutes later the phone rang in the back of the hearing room, and Bill Bader or somebody else picked up the phone and a voice said, "This is Wolfgang Panofsky. I have been watching these hearings. I was never consulted. The only time I ever saw Deputy Secretary Packard was running past him in an airport, and he said something to me and I said something in return, but he never asked me what my view was, and I never told him that I thought this system would work because I don't think it will."

So this is the kind of thing that leads Senators to smell a rat and, in this case, it opened up the hearings. And, indeed, during the course of the hearings, it turned out that the great weight of scientific opinion believed that the ABM system as it was then

designed wouldn't work. Dr. Teller believed that it would. The others, Marvin Goldberger, Panofsky, and almost everyone else, testified against the system. So that is how sometimes a question posed in a public hearing will lead to an unanticipated discovery, and the truth will out.

On the matter of the staff reports that Dick Moose and I did. The origin was that I had a talk with Senator Fulbright and argued that the Foreign Relations Committee couldn't possibly conduct an effective examination of US policy and the legislation relating to US policy in Southeast Asia, and indeed to other parts of the world, if it used the information base that the State Department provided. The State Department, I argued, could control whatever information it released to the Senate and could mold that information to serve its purposes while the Senate had no independent information base. When Senators traveled they were taken in hand by the military, they hadn't had time to do the necessary preparatory work, they had to spend a lot of time in the field doing the things that Senators have to do like shaking hands with their constituents, and if the Committee was going to be serious there had to be an effort to get its own information. He agreed, and Dick Moose volunteered to participate. So with the permission of Senator Aiken, the ranking Republican, we went to Vietnam in December 1969.

When we came back, we submitted a classified report to the Committee. They found it interesting and decided that a sanitized version should be made public. Dick and I met with representatives from State, Defense and CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], decided with them what needed to be deleted for national security reasons and then issued a public, unclassified report. In the summer of 1969, there were many statements by Nixon, Laird and Rogers that Vietnamization would succeed, was in place and that the policy was going to permit the war to be ended on American terms. This position was more or less accepted as gospel by the public.

Q: The press also?

LOWENSTEIN: Well. the press was somewhat more skeptical, but looking back on it, not as skeptical as they should have been. So, finally, when we issued our unclassified report, which had a conclusion section in it, which the original classified report did not, it ended with the following sentence which turned out to be the sentence that made the report so widely cited. The sentence read as follows: "Dilemmas thus seem to lie ahead in Vietnam as they have throughout our involvement in this war that appears to be not only far from won but far from over."

Headlines on the front pages of every newspaper in the United States the next morning read−Senate staff says war not only far from won but far from over. This is an unexceptional sentence if you look at it on its own, but in the context of the mood in the United States at that time, it had extraordinary resonance and produced, as I say, this enormous rash of publicity.

Q: Were you aware of how Kissinger reacted to that?

LOWENSTEIN: I know from various people who worked closely with Kissinger, including Larry Eagleburger, who had been a colleague of mine in Belgrade, that they were on his desk the morning they were released.

At any rate, Vietnam in December 1969 was followed by Cambodia in May, 1970; Cambodia again in December, 1970; Greece in February, 1971; Laos in April, 1971; Thailand, Laos and Cambodia in January, 1972; Vietnam in May, 1972; Korea and the Philippines in November, 1972; US air operations in Cambodia in April, 1973; Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in April, 1973; and US security issues in Europe, burden sharing and offset MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] nuclear weapons in September 1973.

I thought that this was the sort of thing that we should be doing all over the world, that it should be institutionalized within the Committee, that there should be a fact finding staff that operated on a non-partisan basis that went and looked at any situation where there seemed to be a dispute on either the facts or the

policy where there was a legitimate legislative interest because legislation was involved These reports got so much publicity that a few Senators began to complain that the "staff" was getting more attention than the members of the Committee. Dick and I were often asked to join Sunday morning talk shows and be interviewed. We were always asked not to do so, which was perfectly okay as far as we were concerned. But we couldn't control the press coverage. We had a half page in *Newsweek* with pictures of the two of us, for example.

Q: Wasn't the administration furious?

LOWENSTEIN: Not from the positions the reports took but from the facts that they brought to light. The Republicans on the Committee were not particularly partisan, Senator Scott being an exception. Senator Aiken, Senator Case and the other Republicans didn't object to the reports because they were anti-administration. What Senators began to object to, as I said, was that these reports were getting more attention than they were.

I won't bother going through all the reports and what they said. Anyone who is interested can check because they were covered extensively in the *New York Times,* the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and in magazines. Furthermore, they are available because they are public documents.

Q: The classified reports are different?

LOWENSTEIN: The classified reports were far more explosive. Let me give you an example which could no longer be considered classified. I think we were the first to discover that American soldiers in Vietnam were fragging their own officers. This was in the classified report but not in the unclassified report. The Defense Department said it wasn't happening, but we knew it was because we were told about it by junior officers whose friends had been wounded by fragging. That is the kind of thing that was in the classified report but not in the unclassified report

Q: What else was in these classified reports−things about the Agency?

LOWENSTEIN: No, not really. There was a lot of order of battle stuff that is totally out of date and of interest to no one now.

Q: Talk about your modus operandi.

LOWENSTEIN: Before we left on a trip, through the Congressional Research Service, we would get hold of every piece of available information in the public domain−the last figures given by the Defense Department on their appropriations for what they were doing in military assistance, congressional testimony, what had been in the press. We had, in a way, far more access than the State Department did to what information was in the public domain because the Congressional Research Service is a marvelous outfit and could give you anything that had been in the press anywhere in the world. So there was a lot of raw material to go through before on a trip.

Then we would scour our network of friends in the government, the press and the academic world, to see who knew whom, who was worth talking to and who knew what was going on. We drew up a list of the people we wanted to see and made sure we knew how to get to see them. We would schedule the official briefings at the embassy and with the military, which turned out to be much more informative than one would have thought if you knew what you were talking about when you went into the briefing so that you knew what questions to ask. Then on the trip we would collect as much written material as we could lay our hands on. Every time the military or the embassy had a document describing something, we would pick it up.

Q: Why did you do that?

LOWENSTEIN: Simply because that was something in writing that could be used as analytical material compared to everything else that we had, and inadvertently a lot of facts were revealed in

these documents that only became clear if compared either to other documents or to what was said in a briefing or to what was said in a meeting with the ambassador or senior military officers. So you could tell when the military knew what they were talking about and when they didn't. The same thing was true of civilian authorities.

There wasn't anything very mysterious about this process. We weren't getting material fed to us by the French Secret Service, or anything like that. This was all strictly basic analytical field work. Looking back on my time in the Foreign Service, it is exactly the kind of thing I went through when I did my analysis of Communist Party participation in the Yugoslav parliament. I got my hands on every piece of documentation that I could and waded through it, and a picture emerged that enabled you to find out who had what position in the party and at what level. So, if you go through these reports, I think you will see that they are analytical and rely on a lot of factual data.

Q: Did anything come from the administration?

LOWENSTEIN: Oh, yes, a lot of it came from the administration.

Q: Were they cooperative?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, they couldn't not be. If you wrote and said, "Please send a copy of the testimony in blab blab," or "What are the latest figures on military assistance?"...

Q: Did you go around and get briefings in Washington?

LOWENSTEIN: No, we didn't do much of that. Then, of course, facts would emerge that were not the product of analysis. The most dramatic, I suppose, was how we discovered the illegal air operations in Cambodia which was the subject of the report of April 1973. We had gone to the embassy and been assured that the embassy had no role in these operations and that it was somebody else, the Cambodians, the Thais, or our imagination. It

wasn't happening. I was off interviewing a Khmer Rouge POW [prisoner of war] in a prison camp, to see what he had to say about what was going on. Dick was in downtown Phnom Penh meeting with Sylvana Foa, a lady journalist from the UPI [United Press International]. She had a five-dollar pocket transistor radio. She said to Dick, "Do you want to hear something interesting?" She turned on her pocket radio and there were American pilots talking to an American air controller. He knew from all of our experience in dealing with air operations in other places that these call signs meant that the embassy was vectoring the fighters. It was as evident as it could be. Furthermore, the radio's range made it impossible to argue that they were listening to Thailand. They were listening to a plane that was fifteen miles away.

So we went in and confronted the embassy, and you will see this not only in the report but also in the appendix to the second volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs where there is an account of this episode and of the problems we had with Tom Enders, who was then the DCM in Cambodia. We went back to the embassy and said, “this is what we understand from what we heard from a transistor radio and these are our conclusions just looking at the facts."

The answer was, "It is none of your business."

We sent Senator Symington, who was chairman of the relevant Subcommittee, a message through the embassy saying, "Here is what we found. This is what the embassy tells us. Our view is that we shouldn't leave here until the embassy gives us a briefing on exactly what they are doing, which was a violation of the law incidentally, and exactly what the air operation situation is here."

We got back a telegram from Symington saying, "Wait right there, I will straighten this out." So we waited.

Senator Symington went to the Secretary of Defense and didn't get any place; then to the Secretary of State with no result, and my recollection is that he finally went to the President and said,

"This is what these guys say, this is what the law says, this is what this Committee is considering in terms of legislation and they are going to stay out there until they get the briefing." So after about four days, we finally got our briefing and that is what led to a legislative brouhaha which finally ended these illegal air operations in Cambodia.

While we were waiting, incidentally, we attended a dinner given by the American press at which they drugged our soup with hashish. I was semi-conscious for 24 hours. So it was just as well that we had to wait—in fact, we were invited to the French Embassy for dinner two nights later. The French Ambassador there was an old friend of mine, and when we arrived I said to him, “ I can come to the dinner table but I can't eat anything except soup and you will have to forgive me for having a hand that shakes so much but this is what happened to me."

He said, "Don't worry about it, the same thing happened to me the day before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs arrived, and I couldn't even stand up when he got off the plane."

I'm trying to think of other incidents where facts were brought to light by accident rather than by analysis. Fragging was one, air operations over Cambodia was another. Military briefings were very informative because all kinds of things were said that were so obviously not true that you could tell what was being covered up. Dick had been in the military for a short time. I had been a naval officer for three years and had been to a lot of staff briefings and had to do a lot of briefing myself, and I had been all through the Naval War College routine where I had been on the staff for a year and a half. So I had a pretty good sense of military presentation and military vocabulary. The military had this way of inventing words to cover things that they don't want to say, so they would use another word. "Terminate with extreme prejudice," of course, would be the best example. Although that was a CIA term, it could have been a military term.

The week before the invasion of Cambodia, Dick and I were sitting in a hearing, and I think Secretary Rogers was testifying.

It was on the subject of what we were going to do in Cambodia. After the hearing finished, we went to see Senator Fulbright and said, "There is something going on out there and we think we should go." So we went. By the time we got to Hong Kong, it became even more clear. The next day we got on a plane and ended up in Vietnam. The morning after we found ourselves in a helicopter from a base in western Viet Nam watching the troops crossing the border and advancing through Cambodian territory. Now, of course, when you do things like this when the military says that they are only shelling or bombing military targets and that there have been no "collateral" civilian casualties, and you have been in a helicopter over a place that has been leveled, this kind of claim is not only patently absurd but demonstratively untrue. And this was the kind of thing that the military kept getting themselves into. Pressure to produce results led to distortions of the truth. My own theory is that this is how the United States got into all this trouble in the first place because the civilian leaders in Washington kept getting reports from the military that weren't true. And they didn't seem to have any way of finding out independently what was really going on. So they were getting a distorted picture.

We went out to Korea at one point to look at what secret promises had been made to the Koreans in return for their participation in Vietnam. We got off the plane about 8 in the evening and Dan O'Donohue, the political counselor at the embassy, met us and said "Phil Habib [then-ambassador to Korea] wants to see you two guys right away."

We said, "It has been a long flight. Can we go to the hotel and change?"

"No, he wants to see you right away. My orders are that you are not to go any place until he sees you." So we went to the residence.

Phil met us in a dressing gown and said, "I want to tell you two guys something." We had both known him well and liked and admired him. "I don't care what you find out here. You are not

going to find out anything that I don't know about. You are not going to find out anything that I don't know a lot better than anybody else you are finding it out from. And you are not going to reach any conclusions out here that I haven't already reached myself a long time ago. So, you can do whatever you like, but my advice to you is check with me when you finish" Well, only from Phil Habib would the two of us take that. I must say, he was absolutely right. He was somebody who really did know what was going on. There were a few things that we found out that he hadn't told anybody, but he had done that on purpose not by accident. It is an amusing sidelight on the way Phil Habib operated. He said, "I didn't even want you going to the hotel and talking to the maid before I got hold of you."

Greece, the embassy was–.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

LOWENSTEIN: Henry J Tasca was the ambassador. He had become a total apologist for the colonels. When we went out, we saw all the opposition leaders–those who were in prison and those not in prison. Nobody had bothered to see some of them in years. We were helped by some of the expatriates who had been in Greece for many years, if not all their lives, working with charitable institutions, church organizations and the like.

Q: Did anyone in the embassy help you?

LOWENSTEIN: The embassy was sort of under a reign of terror. However, privately we did talk to some Foreign Service officers. I must say that in every case where an embassy was in the hands of an authoritarian ambassador who was insisting on a policy that a lot of reasonable people would not have agreed with, there were always people in the embassy who would help us because they thought that the policy was wrong, or who agreed with the policy but believed that we were entitled to get the facts. So we always found mid-grade and junior officers very helpful. And, in fact, junior officers in the military were also helpful as were

journalists and academics. So we had a broad range of people that we could turn to.

Q: That is quite a range.

LOWENSTEIN: A very wide range. Furthermore, because we had security clearances, we were able to get classified briefings as well. This wide range makes it possible to find out what is going on and why I think that senatorial investigating missions are often ineffective. Let me just take the case of dealing with the military. When the military decides that they don't want someone to find something out, there is an easy technique for doing so−it is to keep the people in briefings and in motion. For example, in Vietnam they loved taking visitors, senators for example, all over the country because by the time you get from your hotel to the airport, take a helicopter ride that lasts two hours, visit the local military headquarters, have a briefing that lasts for an hour and a half, lunch with the general that lasts another hour, go back to the airport, get on the helicopter, fly to Saigon, drive from the airport to your hotel−the day has gone. And if you repeat that exercise with its variations, you can tie any visitor up indefinitely. Point one.

Point two. The only way that you can find out what is going on, obviously, is to use as many sources as you possibly can, and I will get back to that in a minute.

Point three is that whether an investigator is a detective, a journalist, a congressman, or a Foreign Service office trying to find out what the local government is doing to pull the wool over his eyes, the thing that almost always breaks open a case is happenstance. And happenstance only occurs if you have a lot of time. If you are rushed and programmed all the time, nothing happens.

Let me give you an example on the third point. The way we discovered that the US had illegally trained some Cambodians who were alleged to be native soldiers was that we were walking along a street and ran into one of these guys—just another local

soldier in fatigues. I can't remember whether it was Dick or I, but one of us said to this fellow in French something like, "Where is the hotel?"

Instead of answering in French, the guy said, "Say again, sir?" Well, it didn’t take a genius to figure out where he had learned that phrase. It wasn't in the Cambodian army because we weren't training the Cambodian army at that point. And then we discovered that these were the Khmer Krom, who had been in Vietnam and had been shipped over. These were Khmers who were basically Vietnamese, part of the South Vietnamese army who had been trained by the Americans.

Q: You tell in an earlier session how you found out something in Phnom Penh through someone who was listening to a radio–.

LOWENSTEIN: A correspondent, Sylvana Foa, who today, incidentally, is the UN High Commissioner for Refugees spokesperson. She was then a UPI correspondent.

Q: Yes, but that was by chance.

LOWENSTEIN: Let's get back to the using as many sources as possible part of it. When we were trying to find out exactly how many sorties we were flying over Laos and Cambodia, and who was flying them, the information was not given to us. I can't remember whether this was on security grounds, or they didn't know, or the records aren't kept here, or it is none of your business. At one point, we were in CINCPAC for a few days to draft one of our trip reports, and someone said to us: "We have this fantastic computer. It logs in every sortie in Indochina. It has an account of exactly when the pilot takes off, where he is going, what he has done and when he gets back." We said, "Well, that is interesting, we would like to see it" So they said, "Sure, it is marvelous, you will be impressed." They took us into a big room and there was the computer. We said, "Well, just as a test case, what if we asked you what sorties had been flown in Laos last month." The guy said, "No problem." He punched a sheet, and out came a map of Laos with every sortie listed. As I recall, we

went through all of the sorties in Laos and probably Cambodia as well. That is where the figures came from in the report that we did on that subject. They came from the CINCPAC computer. Now those guys who were sitting off in a room, far removed from the theater of operations, knew more than anyone else in the world, except the Pentagon to which they sent their reports. They knew much more than anybody in the theater or in Vietnam or Okinawa.

Q: They didn't know that the Pentagon didn't want you to know?

LOWENSTEIN: There was another interesting incident at CINCPAC on another trip. We were trying to find military assistance figures without much success. We were at dinner one night with someone who had brought along a friend of his. This fellow said, "Meet Frank so-and-so from the comptroller's office in the Pentagon. Frank plays the computer the way Paderewski plays the piano."

We said, "Oh, that's interesting. Can you pull up the figures on exactly how this military assistance program works, what the funding is, the commitments, etc.?" Again we got the whole story. Now this fellow did know what we were supposed to be told and not told. He knew that the information we were asking for was in support of a congressional authorization and that it had been supplied in bits and pieces but was not totally current. The fact is, nobody else knew how to access this information. He also explained how this information was presented in order to meet various legislative restrictions on amounts, conditions, etc. So, indeed, he did know how to play the computer like Paderewski plays the piano. The point is, sometimes what you discover depends on where you get the information. In this case, it wasn't as available as easily any place else.

Q: One thing that puzzled me is that you were later hired by Kissinger. It was my recollection that your reports were regarded, although you said they weren't partisan, as a highly anti-administration effort trying to undermine the effort in Vietnam. And you guys were very effective because of the things

that you turned up, concrete incidences in which the administration was caught out, not telling the whole story. How come you got hired?

LOWENSTEIN: When I went in to see Senator Fulbright and said that I was going to leave and that I thought I might go to business school, he said, "Well, I am seeing Kissinger tomorrow, do you want me to ask him whether he would like to have you back in the Foreign Service?" I said, "Well, sure ask him, see what he thinks." And I was told that the reaction was favorable. Larry Eagleburger was working for Kissinger, made the same check and said that Kissinger would be amenable to having me back. In fact, he wanted me to work on speeches.

Q: It still surprises me.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I like to think it's because he thought the reports were good. Some of them were not critical of the administration. In the first Cambodian report we said that we thought the Cambodians really were worth supporting, and we never in any report implied that the invasion had made inevitable a Khmer Rouge victory. What we did say was that it had driven the Khmer Rouge further into Cambodia as U.S. forces crossed the border. They were always deployed along the Thai border and the Vietnamese border, but they had moved into places they hadn't been before. Our argument on the Cambodian invasion was that there hadn't been any consultation with the Congress, which there was supposed to have been, and that militarily it seemed to us that it might prolong the war in Vietnam. If you go back and look at that first Cambodian report, and the press reports on that report, you will see that the administration used it as an argument that even we had agreed with them on certain things that they were saying about it.

I was sort of surprised, too, that I was welcomed back. Dick had a different relationship with Kissinger, but he didn't want to go back anyway.

There then arose a problem. Peter Flanigan was in the White House, a member of Nixon's inner circle and very partisan. I had known him because his wife and my then wife were classmates at boarding school. Anyway, he got wind of this appointment and had begun to ask questions. At that point, as I recall, Eagleburger said to Secretary Kissinger, "If we are going to get this thing done at all, it has to be done right away." So it was done very quickly and by the time Flanigan really got up in arms, I was already there.

Q: This was in 1974?

LOWENSTEIN: It must have been April or May 1974

Q: You came back to EUR?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, I came back into EUR as the number two deputy assistant secretary. Wells Stabler was the principal deputy. I was given the multilateral responsibilities−that is, the offices of European Regional Affairs, Political Affairs and Economic Affairs. So I had NATO, EC [European Commission], OECD, ECE [Economic Commission for Europe] plus special assignments on Yugoslavia. I think I had WE [Western Europe] at one point. Anyway, it didn't make any difference because Arthur was always handling whatever the number one crisis was, and Wells very soon thereafter became totally immersed in the Cyprus problem.

The Cyprus war erupted in July 1974. I remember that I went up to Maine for the weekend, I arrived at 7:00 on Friday night and the next morning I left at 7:00 AM and never went back for the whole summer. I was originally on the Cyprus Task Force. Then it was decided that Wells should head it because one of the last reports that Dick and I had done was on Greece and there was too much baggage there for the Greeks to accept. But whenever Wells got tired, I went up and took his place. So that summer, between the war in Cyprus and Nixon's resignation, was extremely hectic.

Q: What do you have to say about the Cyprus situation?

LOWENSTEIN: I didn't have anything to do with policy, I was totally involved in mechanics. I was getting messages from Sisco or Arthur and making sure that they got to the right person at the right time and making sure that the answers got back and that they were cleared. I never got into substance. There was a lot of protection of American citizen stuff, lots of inquiries. It was an organizational job and one of the first task forces set up under this system after Kissinger became Secretary.

There was one event at that time that I think should be preserved for posterity. It was related to me by John Brademas some years later. He was then a congressman. He and Paul Sarbanes, also a congressman, had gone out on an inspection trip to the area and when they were landing somewhere, and I think it was in Cyprus, the plane blew a tire and veered off the runway. They were evacuated by chute because there was a possibility that the plane would burst into flames. When they got back, they met with Kissinger, and Brademas and Sarbanes told him the story. When they finished, Kissinger wagged his finger at them and said, "Remember, Brademas, that was only a warning."

I really don't remember the policy implications, except that Kissinger's attitude was, " We have done the best we can and that is the way it is going to be." Of course, it did have one good result, it removed the colonels from power.

I went to Cyprus last summer for a week at the invitation of USIA, visited both the north and the south, and I was amazed to see that this situation has been frozen in time, that people living on both sides of the wall are looking at their former residences and haven't been able to visit their homes for 20 years.

Then there was Nixon's departure. That was a very wild night. The day before the resignation became public, Kissinger called all the assistant secretaries and I think all the deputy assistant secretaries–anyway, I was there, so it must have been all the deputy assistant secretaries–to tell us what was going to happen

so that we could get started on the necessary messages to foreign governments. I remember he made one of his famous "this is a test of the discipline of the Foreign Service whether they can keep this to themselves, etc." So that was a rather wild night because messages had to go out to all heads of government saying that our policy would remain exactly as before, the usual stuff.

Q: What were the other issues?

LOWENSTEIN: One was Euro-communism. Kissinger was concerned that the Portuguese Communists and the Italian Communists were going to take power and that would be the end of the free world. Frank Carlucci got into a disagreement with Kissinger. There had been an ambassador to Portugal, a political appointee whose name I can't remember. But Kissinger didn't think that he was energetic enough, so he sent Frank out. After Frank arrived, he sent a message saying, in essence, "You are wrong. We should support Soares." So there was a lot of ranting and raving and talk about replacing Carlucci. Frank never wavered. He simply said, "Do whatever you want, but I am telling you the way it is." And, of course, he was proved right. I was asked to go to Lisbon during this period, and I stayed with Frank, so I got the whole story.

On Italy, there was a decision that everything had to be done to prevent the communists from coming to power. I won't go into it. But once again, the European Bureau kept saying that they thought the Secretary was a bit over excited about all this.

So that was one issue. There were lots of nuclear issues in NATO. There was a constant battle with the then American Ambassador in Belgrade, Larry Silberman, about policy toward Yugoslavia. That was another special charge I was given.

Q: He's a very conservative Republican.

LOWENSTEIN: He was very critical of the Yugoslav desk officer—a very capable fellow named Ken Hill.

Q: Later Ambassador to Bulgaria.

LOWENSTEIN: Yes. He was very critical of the Foreign Service. Instead of appointing a Foreign Service Officer as his DCM, he had taken a former White House fellow, Brandon Sweitzer, who later became a close friend of mine. There was a problem about an American who had been put in jail for doing something, and other disputes about trade embargoes, etc. So I was asked by Eagleburger and Arthur to go out and talk to him. I arrived at the embassy and met with him. He said, "Well, what kind of a job do you back there think I am doing?"

I said the diplomatic equivalent of, "Actually, we think you are a real pain in the neck."

So he said, "Well, I want to see you down in the tank this afternoon and we are going to hash this out." So at 3:00 pm we went down to the tank and he said, "You know, it is funny you say that because here is a back-channel message from Kissinger a couple of days ago telling me what a great job I was doing." At that point I decided there wasn't much to be done. I didn't accomplish anything because the ground had been cut out from under me.

I was struck at the time by how much time went into the mechanical things that had to be done. Supervising the preparations for the President's trips, NATO Ministerials, OECD Ministerials, EC consultations, etc. The EC consultations were conducted at a rather low level.

Q: Tell us what that is.

LOWENSTEIN: Every six-months there would be a day of meetings between, supposedly, the Secretary of State, but it was always delegated down, and the European Commission in the person of Christopher Soames. He was the vice president of the Commission in charge of external relations. Once, in fact, everybody was busy on something else, so I conducted the

bilateral consultations. They consisted of going through the issues and giving our views. There was an agenda, something like a NAC Ministerial. It was the beginning stages of consultation between the European Community and the United States. That followed the famous Gymnich formula according to which the Europeans decided that they would not consult with the United States until they had first an agreed position so that consultation wouldn't be the United States and individual EC members, it would be the United States and the EC Commission. This was something that Kissinger didn't like at all. So one of the items in these consultations was always "Can't we do this in a different, more effective way and can't we get our views given more weight before you make a decision instead of just exchanging views after you have reached your decision?" That was really the issue.

Q: Why didn't Kissinger like it?

LOWENSTEIN: Because he felt that it put the United States in the position of always being faced with a fait accompli and that the time for consultation was before a decision was made and not afterwards.

There were all kinds of ways around that, and obviously one was to use your friends. Our principal friend was, of course, the British. I kept thinking about de Gaulle's objections to admitting the British to membership on the ground that they would be a Trojan horse for America. And I must say on the basis of what I saw during those years, he was right.

Q: Do you recall other issue.

LOWENSTEIN: One other issue I remember was the CSCE. Kissinger never liked the CSCE, but he finally agreed to it.

Q: The Helsinki Conference.

LOWENSTEIN: That's right. He finally agreed to it. He sold the Berlin Talks four different times, as I recall, and one of the four

was for CSCE [Commission for Security and Co-operation in Europe]. He kept saying that we would not participate unless they did this and that. One of the "this" was the CSCE agreement itself. He thought it was too soft, would never amount to anything and gave the Soviets an opening wedge of influence into Western Europe where they had no business being. He really didn't see that it was going to work the other way and end up being a dagger pointed at the Soviets instead of the other way around.

My only contribution to that process was President Ford's speech at the CSCE Helsinki summit. Various drafts were being circulated. One day Eagleburger called me up and said, "You do a draft and give it to me. We are not going to send it through anybody. The Secretary is going to send it right over to Ford."

So I did the draft and a good 80 percent of the draft survived including, notably, the last sentence which read as follows: "History will remember us not for what we say today, but what we do tomorrow, not for the promises that we make, but for the promises we keep."

Q: So you became a speech writer after all.

LOWENSTEIN: I became a speech writer after all.

Q: How did you find the Department functioned under Kissinger?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I thought at the top it functioned extremely well. Everybody on the sixth and seventh floor team were really terrific. Bill Rogers was the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs; Joe Sisco was there, Larry Eagleburger, Winston Lord, Jerry Bremer, George Vest was Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs, Roy Atherton was NEA, Phil Habib was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I must say that working with Phil Habib was an unadulterated joy. So I enjoyed all those people a lot. The only person I didn't enjoy was Helmut Sonnenfeldt, the Counselor of the Department, who was

a bit of a burden for anyone working on European Affairs, because he was constantly cutting in and assuming the position of a sort of superior assistant secretary for European affairs. He had enlisted three very competent, highly intelligent, younger officers who didn't have the restrictions of a bureau or the day-to-day responsibilities of running anything. Bob Blackwill, Jim Dobbins and John Kelly. They were a formidable trio.

Q: What substantive things did they get involved in?

LOWENSTEIN: Absolutely everything involving Europe.

Q: Did he have a different point of view?

LOWENSTEIN: No, it really wasn't that. It was mostly turf fighting, who was going to be closest to the Secretary, who was going to brief the President, who was going to sit where, etc.

Q: Art Hartman was the Assistant Secretary?

LOWENSTEIN: Arthur was the Assistant Secretary throughout the period. I had worked with Arthur first in 1950-51 in Paris when he was with the Marshall Plan; again in EUR/RA in 1957-58; and I had seen quite a lot of him when he was DCM at the US Mission to the European Communities. So I already had known him quite well. He was one of the people I admired most in the Foreign Service. I considered the chance to spend three years working for him a great privilege, and here I am working with him again. This is the fourth time.

Q: I remember that when Kissinger came over from the White House to the State Department Sonnenfeldt knew where the action was. It was not at the NSC.

LOWENSTEIN: The NSC [National Security Council] at that point was headed by General Scowcroft. Of course, Kissinger had headed the NSC before becoming Secretary and for a brief period had both titles. The Senate had brought that to an end, so while he no longer had both jobs de jure, he practically had both

jobs de facto. He dominated the process. I found that working around him was fascinating. He had a bad temper and could be difficult and insulting, but so what. I felt he would always listen to you if you had something to say. He was very, very funny. He didn't suffer fools gladly, but why should he. Isn't that a good thing in the upper reaches of the State Department? So I really enjoyed working for him.

The people he was riding were those right around him−Larry Eagleburger and occasionally Arthur. Arthur's reaction though was "If you don't stop riding me, I am going to resign as assistant secretary and you can find somebody else." That was a very effective way of getting Kissinger's attention. Anyway, I thought it was an extremely good team. I thought they were fast, smart, there was a lot of open discussion, a good idea of where they were going, reacted well to crises. When Kissinger decided to take an issue and mobilize support in Congress or with public opinion or with the press, he did it, and it seemed to me he showed that was one of the principal jobs of the Secretary of State.

It is true, I think, that he was devious. He did things that sometimes didn't make any sense. I remember once I was in Europe, I can't remember where Kissinger was, but he was off somewhere with the President. I was visiting some friends in the French countryside for the weekend between two meetings. I got a call from Sonnenfeldt. It was a Saturday night. He said, "Henry wants you to arrange a private meeting with Olivier Chevrillon" −who was then the editor of a magazine called *Le Point*−"he wants to have dinner with him Monday night in Paris, but he doesn't want anybody to know about it. He wants you to pick a quiet restaurant where he won't be seen. And you can't tell anybody in the embassy about it. So get it done and send me a cable at such-and-such a place."

I took a train to Paris on Sunday and got in about 11:00 at night. I was staying at the Travellers Club, they had a phone book, so I looked up the address of the magazine. The next morning at 8:30 I walked over to the Le Point office, waited for somebody to

open the door, went in and asked for Mr. Chevrillon. He later became a friend of mine, but at that point I didn't know him. He came out and I said, "I need to see you alone."

He said, "Why?"

I said, "I can't tell you until I see you alone." So he took me into his office, and I conveyed the message. I said, "Now the problem is how are you going to know that I am for real? Here is my card, but under the ground rules here you can't call the embassy and confirm all this. What you can do is call Mr. X [the political counselor whom we both knew] and he will tell you that indeed I am who I represent myself to be and indeed that I am in Paris. But you can't say anything else." The dinner took place, but all of this was totally unnecessary. He could have called the DCM in Paris and asked him to arrange a private dinner. Now, I assume that this was really Kissinger's idea and not something Sonnenfeldt dreamt up or put words in his mouth. But, anyway, all of this seemed very curious at the time.

A couple of years later, when I was involved in starting the French-American Foundation, one of the first people involved in this project was Chevrillon. We had many chuckles about our first meeting—this strange character showing up at his office at 8:30 in the morning with an unlikely story.

Q: If I recall, you rejoined as an FSR [foreign service reserve officer]?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, I was an FSR and I can't remember if that lasted for a year or a year and a half before I was re-integrated as an FSO.

Q: The system didn't give you any grief?

LOWENSTEIN: No I had to appear for an oral hearing before three or four senior officers. The problem was arranging for the hearing. They were all very busy. By the way, so was I. I had to go to Kissinger's morning staff meeting a lot of the time because

Arthur was somewhere else in the world. That meant reading all the cables and papers by the time the meeting began.

Q: How did you find these meetings?

LOWENSTEIN: I found them intellectual tests. Secretary Kissinger was on top of most things. There was a lot of scolding people for not doing what he thought they should be doing. They were very substantive meetings.

Incidentally, one thing struck me when I went back into the State Department−I was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Tom Enders, who was Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, was a member, but none of the other assistant secretaries were members. I called up Bayless Manning, who was then president of the Council, and said, "This is really ridiculous. How can you have a council that is supposed to be representative and spot young talent and yet you have an entire State Department hierarchy who are not members of the Council." What was so interesting to me was that it showed in a way how parochial not only the Council was, but so was the State Department. There wasn't much contact with the outside world, and that was one of the great advantages of having been on Capitol Hill. You were thrust into a wider world that involved Capitol Hill, the executive branch, the press, academia, think tanks, because you operated in an environment that was much wider. Whereas the State Department, it seemed to me, has always operated in a much narrower environment.

Q: Did you get into non-proliferation?

LOWENSTEIN: Some, but most of the action was in PM. It was between PM [Bureau of Political-Military Affairs] and ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] and Sonnenfeldt. Arthur was involved at Presidential level meetings, but other than that we weren't.

Q: Was Kissinger close to the French Foreign Minister?

LOWENSTEIN: He liked Michel Jobert and thought that he was interesting. But he was in a constant running battle with the French. One of the incidents that occurred at that time was an overflight of the Pierrelatte French nuclear installation. The French charged that it was a spy mission. We claimed it was an accident. I can't remember who was right and who was wrong, but there was a tremendous flap. I asked a colleague in the Bureau of European Affairs, Ed Beigel, a civil servant who had been there forever, to do a report on exactly what the state of nuclear cooperation was between the United States and France. It showed that the extent of that cooperation was far larger than anybody who hadn't paid a lot of attention to it realized. That confirmed my suspicion that, while we were bitching about the French all the time, in fact we were doing a lot with them−far more than anybody thought.

Q: Then Ford lost the election.

LOWENSTEIN: When the administration changed, Phil Habib was in charge of transition arrangements. Each Bureau had a representative on the transition team, and I was the EUR representative. President Carter had appointed a commission to examine all political appointees.

Q: The Askew Board?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes. I very often had to appear before it.

Q: Talk about the Askew Board.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, one thing that I remembered was when the question of who was going to be appointed to go to Moscow came up. Arthur said, "You go up and you tell those people that Moscow, today, requires someone who knows the Soviet Union well and not some amateur politico."

I said, "You want me to go up in front of that commission, chaired in effect by Averell Harriman, and make that statement?"

He said, "Yes I do, and that is the Secretary's viewpoint too." So I did as I was told. Harriman was at the head of the table. I went through my spiel. He fixed his cold blue eyes on me and said, "I don't agree with anything you said."

The Askew Board, headed by former Governor of Florida Reubin Askew, took every post and drew up a list of what the requirements were for that particular chief of mission. As I recall there was some kind of prioritizing of missions in order of importance from a career point of view. Which posts really had to have a career person.

Q: Askew was the head of it?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, but Harriman was running it. I remember two discussions with Harriman. One was on the Ambassador to Moscow and the other was that EUR felt that Walter Curley had done an unusually good job in Ireland and that he should be kept. Harriman said, "We are not keeping any Republicans on."

Q: Stage one was to examine the posts?

LOWENSTEIN: Stage one was to examine the post, and then stage two was to look at the candidates. But I didn't get into the looking at the candidates part. The only thing I got into was the discussion of each post, what the issues were, what expertise was necessary, without reference as to whether it should be a career person or not, except in certain cases. Moscow was one of those cases.

Q: How did the Luxembourg Ambassadorship come about?

LOWENSTEIN: One day Carol Laise, who was then Director General, called me up and said, " We will put you up for Sweden." Larry Eagleburger was going to be put up for Belgrade, but they thought that there might be objections to him on party political grounds and so the list was going to have him first and me second. This came out of the system about two months after the inauguration.

Anyway, I was number two on the list for Belgrade, but as usual Democrats, being much more forgiving than Republicans−when Reagan came in, he purged almost everybody−the Democrats said, "Well, absolutely, he is a competent fellow, of course he can go to Belgrade." Then I was put in for Sweden where I had a long relationship starting with having been a student in 1948. I had been back a lot since including during the past 3 years.

Q: What were the issues?

LOWENSTEIN: Vietnam. Remember, the Swedes didn't have an ambassador here until halfway through my time as Deputy Assistant Secretary

Anyway, I was number one on the list to go to Sweden. Carol went over to the White House with the list, and when she got back she called me and said, "Well, guess what happened?” We got over there and it was cleared by the political staff and cleared by the appointments staff, cleared by everybody and had gone to the President. At that point, the President apparently said that he was sorry he had forgotten to tell everybody, but he had promised the post to a supporter of his from California, Rodney Kennedy Minot.

Well, strangely enough, the week before, the Luxembourg Ambassador had come in to see me−he had come in to see Arthur [Hartman, Assistant Secretary], but Arthur wasn't there, so he saw me...with a message from his Prime Minister, Gaston Thorn, saying that they were not anxious to grant agrément to a political appointee. They had not had a career diplomat, and the Prime Minister wanted one. I sent the message on up the line to Carol. When Carol called me, she said, "Well, since Sweden has fallen through, what about Luxembourg, because of the message that came in last week?"

I said, "Well, what are the alternatives?"

She said, "Well, right now there aren't any."

So I said, "Then, I'll take it." So that is how that happened.

Then, of course, [President] Carter turned it around and shortly thereafter said to a meeting of Democratic supporters at a dinner, that he was taking a new position on the rewarding of high contributors with embassies and that they should know that even when it came to Luxembourg he was appointing a career officer. This was at the same time that he was appointing political appointees to other places like Sweden. He got quite a lot of publicity out of that. I kept a scrapbook with all the editorials that commended him for naming a career person to Luxembourg since it had always gone to political contributors. So that is how Luxembourg happened. It was an absolute fluke. I saw the list at the Askew Board of the people who wanted to go to Luxembourg. There were 35-40 names of contributors to the Democratic Party.

Q: They put their own names on the lists?

LOWENSTEIN: I think a lot of them did. The Luxembourg list was almost as long as any other list.

At that point, Arthur didn't know if he was going to stay or what was going to happen to him. Secretary Vance had told him that he wanted to change assistant secretaries because he wanted a new imprint on European policy. They discussed various posts with Arthur. One of the last days I was up there he came in absolutely white as a ghost. He said, "You will never guess what has just happened to me."

I said, "What?"

He said, "Well, I am going to be appointed Ambassador to Paris." This was because all of the other major posts by this time had been filled−London, Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, etc.−and the French were getting annoyed. The post had been offered to a number of people. It had been offered to Fulbright, I was told. And for history's sake. this rumor might be checked some time, that it had

also been offered to someone else who hesitated for quite a long time, which is one reason the process hadn't gone any further, and that this person was Chief Justice Warren Burger. I heard that from a very reliable source. At any rate, apparently the administration decided they couldn't continue to delay and so the decision was made to appoint Arthur. So in May I went to Luxembourg, and Arthur went to Paris in June.

Q: What about the change in administrations?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, I thought that these transition teams serve a totally useless purpose. I just don't understand what they do. They are a bunch of people running around writing papers about future organization which nobody paid any attention to, at least they didn't during this particular change.

Q: What about Dick Moose?

LOWENSTEIN: Dick was a member of the transition team. I can't remember who was head of it. I was in my deputy job from January until May often going to Vance's morning staff meetings, which were quite different than Kissinger's. They were not as explosive or as funny. Vance was very systematic, unlike Kissinger who would bring up a problem or ask a question of whoever was representing a bureau when there was a question to be asked. Vance would go around the table and say, "What do you have to report." And he was a very good questioner, as you would expect. The atmosphere was less amusing but more civilized.

One of the first things that was discussed was our policy towards Italy and Eurocommunism. How this happened I don't quite remember, but I found myself in the Oval Office with President Carter, Zbig [Brzezinski, National Security Adviser] and Frank Carlucci, who was then Deputy Director of CIA, discussing this very subject. It was very shortly after the inauguration. I think it was the following week. I found President Carter well informed, intelligent and perceptive. He asked all the right questions.

Q: Let's talk about Luxembourg. How big was the staff?

LOWENSTEIN: Small. The DCM, an economic officer, a commercial officer, consul and vice consul, couple of other agency types, Marines, Defense Attaché who was there half time, admin officer and admin assistant, couple of communicators. There was no USIA [United States Information Agency].

One thing that was bizarre was that the whole communications setup was totally inappropriate. There was no direct connection between the embassy switchboard and the residence, which was right next door to the chancery. There weren't enough lines. Nobody really paid much attention to getting messages to anybody after hours.

There were some problems within the Marine group. There was a very low representational allowance since most of my predecessors had been people of independent means, to put it mildly.

In substantive terms, the Prime Minister, who subsequently became President of the European Commission, was frustrated. He felt that he was far more important than the size of his country. He had a close personal relationship with Helmut Schmidt and a difficult but close relationship with Giscard d'Estaing. His predecessor, Pierre Werner, had been the originator of the Werner plan which subsequently was adopted and changed somewhat by Schmidt and Giscard when they proposed the whole business of the EMS.

Q: What is the EMS?

LOWENSTEIN: The European Monetary System.

So these two men felt that they had been ignored by the United States, especially Thorn much more than Werner, and that they had a role to play. Thorn had been President of the UN General Assembly in 1975. A few years after I arrived, he became head

of the EC Mission to the Middle East, and he did a lot of other things as Prime Minister before becoming President of the European Commission in 1981. He turned out to be a very interesting source of insight because he would see Schmidt on Monday, Giscard on Tuesday and we would have dinner on Wednesday. So for anyone who was interested in what was going on in Europe, it was a great opportunity.

Q: Previously, nothing happened?

He was rather protocol conscious. The British had for years been sending to Luxembourg their brightest stars on their first ambassadorial assignments. The British Ambassador who left just before I got there went on to be Ambassador to Spain and Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office. The British Ambassador who then arrived, Patrick Wright, now Lord Wright, also became Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office. And his successor, now Sir Jeremy Thomas, was ambassador to three or four other places. So the British had very high quality career appointees there on their first ambassadorial tours.

The French Ambassador was a man named d'Ornano who came from a very old and distinguished French political family. He had been High Commissioner in Djibouti and other places. He was one of their best political/military trouble spot type fellows.

I found the whole thing unlike what I thought it would be. I thought it would be a lot of fun but not very interesting and that after two years I would try to leave. In fact, it was very interesting. Prime Minister Thorn and his wife became close personal friends with whom I spent a lot of time. The Foreign Minister, Collette Flesch, had gone to Wellesley and Fletcher. The Deputy Foreign Minister, the State Secretary, Paul Helminger, had gone to Stanford, the Minister of Energy, Josie Bartel, had gone to Harvard. Both Flesch and Bartel had been on the Olympic team, and Bartel had won a gold medal. The Minister of Finance was a graduate of Cornell, the Grand Chamberlin of the Court had gone to Fletcher They were a very

well educated, sophisticated group of people most of whom were my age or a bit younger.

Q: All business.

LOWENSTEIN: The government people and the heads of the banks, the steel company and the other companies led exactly the same kind of life as their counterparts in other capitals. That is, they were constantly traveling, over worked and under staffed and had a stressful life. There was plenty of social life, very good restaurants, an excellent symphony orchestra so there were lots of concerts, there were wonderful music festivals in the summer, the usual diplomatic receptions and occasional receptions and events at the Grand Ducal Palace.

It also happened that there was a lot of squash and tennis, and I fell in quickly with the Luxembourg tennis establishment. I was a bachelor at this point. I had to run the household. Fortunately, I had an excellent social secretary, Myriam Zigrand (now Myriam Norris) to help with the seating at dinners, the menus, keeping everything under control financially. There was a considerable amount of entertaining. I can't remember what the figures were, but the representation budget was something like $14,000 when I arrived and $60,000 by the time I left. I established a rule in the embassy that no one was to spend one single dollar out of their own pocket for representation. Whenever we ran out of money−George Vest was Assistant Secretary−I would send a message saying there was no more money and if we didn’t get any more money there wasn’t going to be any more entertaining. I always got what I needed.

I had a wonderful household staff who understood the situation so that they were able to stretch the entertainment dollars very effectively. We had a list posted in the kitchen of prohibitive items that were never to be seen in the house−caviar, lobster, etc. And we had a list of ingredients that were to be used for hors d'oeuvres−tomatoes, eggs, cucumbers. The butler used to fill drinks with more ice than was necessary in order to cut down the amount of whiskey. So that all worked perfectly well.

One thing that I felt was missing and badly needed was a USIA function. I knew that I would never get an American USIA officer. Anyway I thought that my social secretary, Myriam, could do the job. She was efficient, knew everybody in town and had good political instincts. So I got authorization to establish, I think, the only local USIA post in Europe. It was a one-person post and we did the entire gambit . . . Amparts [USIA "American Participants"], Leader Grant Program, Fulbright, everything. We did everything that other posts did, and we did it with one local employee. Myriam received a State Department commendation for her work. When she left, her replacement was a Luxembourg journalist, Yolande Wilwers, who also did an excellent job.

The issues for the U.S. were principally multilateral. One was the AWACs [airborne early warning and control aircraft]. The principal countries of NATO got into a fight about who would be willing to register the AWACs. Eventually Luxembourg agreed to do so. Then there was the question of storing what was called M plus 60 tanks. The army wanted to put a large number of tanks, available for the first 60 days of hostilities, into a storage unit that wasn't any further from the front line than Luxembourg but was far enough so that it wouldn't be overrun in the first attack. Anyway, they came out with Luxembourg as the ideal place to do this. Luxembourg had never had a foreign military installation. It took about a year and a half to negotiate. The storage site was built, the tanks were moved in, and when it was all over, Luxembourg ended up with the highest proportion of tanks to people of any country in the world.

Q: Did you have a lot of trouble with the negotiations?

LOWENSTEIN: There were some problems in parliament. The government had changed by the time the site had to be built. There was another Prime Minister, Pierre Werner, and the Conservative Party led the government. So there was quite a lot to do. It was very technical. The principal military person involved was a general named Groves, who was the son of

General Ernest Groves of nuclear fame. An extremely nice fellow. The Defense Attaché involved was very smart.

Another issue was the question of what kind of information could be gotten in Luxembourg that couldn't be gotten any place else. European Council summit meetings were held in Luxembourg, at least one of the three was always held in Luxembourg. Very often it was possible to find out much more from the Luxembourgers than from the others. For every NATO issue or EC issue, the same thing was true. It was a very good place for information gathering. And it was possible to use Luxembourg as sort of a friend in court, the way the British had been used at the beginning.

Q: What was their relationship with the French?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, they had some problems with the French, including a nuclear issue. One of the large nuclear installations in France, Cattenom, is on the Luxembourg border. It was an issue in Luxembourg's internal politics. When the question arose of who would become President of the European Commission and Thorn was a candidate, Giscard's support was important. There was a lot of dirty work at the crossroads at the last minute, which I won't get into. Thorn almost didn't make it.

Q: Who were the other candidates?

LOWENSTEIN: One was Martin Bangemann, the German politician.

Then there were people who would be coming in and out for European Parliament sessions. In those days the Secretariat of the Parliament was located in Luxembourg, and the Parliament itself would meet in Luxembourg from time to time. The accounting office for the EC and, of course, the European Court of Justice were also in Luxembourg.

At the same time, the country was in the middle of a steel crisis. ARBED [Aciéries Réunies de Burbach-Eich-Dudelange] in past

years had been responsible for 60 percent of the GNP of Luxembourg and had been the fifth largest steel company in the world. When I arrived it was still an important factor in their economy, but by the time I left it was much less so. The banking sector and Radio Television Luxembourg, which belonged to a holding company called CLT, had become more important in terms of revenue produced for the country.

There were a lot of other funny little things. There was a huge Russian embassy. Nobody could ever figure out what it was doing. I kept saying to our friends across the river, "I thought you were here to find out what these people are doing. What are they doing?" The Ambassador was an Armenian, and he was doing a lot with Armenian communities all over Europe. There was a very good Chinese Ambassador there who spoke impeccable French. He had gone to the French Lycée in Shanghai. There was a lot of stuff relating to Libya. Luxembourg was one of the transit points for air traffic to Libya and Cuba. And then there was an incident involving the most wanted international terrorist, Carlos. It turned out that he had spent his vacation in Luxembourg and had rented a Hertz car at one point. So there were all kinds of things going on, especially for a small staff to cover. I did all the political reporting.

There were disputes on bank secrecy. There were a certain number of visits from attorneys and law enforcement agencies trying to get the Luxembourgers to release records of certain transactions. The Luxembourgers had a law on bank secrecy that was just as strict as the Swiss. So that at times was a bilateral issue.

One other thing I might mention. I realized that there was no forum for any discussion of international affairs in the country. So I decided to form something like the Council on Foreign Relations, the Luxembourg Society for International Affairs, and I persuaded a former cabinet minister to head it. We met once a month and had a speaker with a question and answer period. I funded it by going to Henry J. Leir, a wealthy American industrialist and philanthropist, who spent half the year in

Luxembourg. Originally German, he had fled to Luxembourg in 1933 and then to the United States in 1939. After the war, he divided his time between the US and Luxembourg. He was a reliable source of funds for the American School and American charities. We got whatever speakers were around in Europe and brought them to Luxembourg. The organization exists to this day.

An unusual experience that I had was that I had to deal with the Grand Duke of Luxembourg on a political matter. The Grand Duke is enjoined from dealing with political matters by the constitution. However, he was a member of the International Olympic Committee, the only head of state who was a member of that committee. When President Carter decided that the Moscow Olympics should be boycotted, I had to take up this matter with the Grand Duke, who wanted to take it to the cabinet, but he couldn't because the cabinet wouldn't take jurisdiction. He was not very sympathetic to this idea of President Carter's. That was a unique experience.

Q: What role does the monarchy as an institution play?

LOWENSTEIN: It's a symbol of the country, of its continued existence. It is very popular with the people. It performs a ceremonial role. It is a way of representing Luxembourg in places where otherwise it might not be represented. No one questions the existence or the wisdom of having a royal family. They comport themselves with great dignity; I don't think there has ever been a scandal involving the royal family. The children of the Grand Duke, when I was there, were all personable, well educated, very conscientious about their duties. So, I would say that it is a model monarchy.

Then, of course, there were the usual CODELs [Congressional delegations] and official visitors. I had Chief Justice Burger for a week staying in my house, sitting up talking until 2:00 in the morning. Whenever there was a European Council meeting, the entire American press corps from Paris and Brussels would show up. I would put up as many of them as I could and give a large

dinner for them and invite whoever was available in the Luxembourg government.

So there was always quite a lot going on.

Q: What happened next?

LOWENSTEIN: Ronald Reagan was elected, and Al Haig was appointed Secretary of State. Al Haig knew me quite well from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Indochina days, and I think had absolutely no use for me at all.

When he was SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe], I did go up and pay the usual courtesy call. He gave a dinner for me once, as he did for all NATO ambassadors. But he arrived with a group of people in the White House and the State Department, many of whom had been on the Nixon White House staff, who obviously were not going to want me around. In fact, they did not treat me very well. They originally said that career appointees would stay in their jobs until they were replaced.

Very early on a man named John Dolibois, who was I think the chancellor of the University of Miami in Ohio, had been told that he would be appointed to succeed me. He had been born in Luxembourg, immigrated to the United States, had a career at Miami University and had even established a branch of that university in Luxembourg for American students, was a Republican and his ambition had always been to return to his native country as ambassador. With the support of the Ohio delegation he got the job. He had told me that early on. He had also told me that he couldn't get there until the fall because of various commitments. I gave him every possible cooperation and asked the Department when they wanted me to leave. The answer was to stay through the summer and leave three weeks before his arrival.

It happened that I was remarrying on the fourth of July in Luxembourg. On the third of July, as I was looking out the window watching my future in-laws arrive in a caravan of

automobiles, a cable was handed to me instructing me to leave Luxembourg in 72 hours. I called Larry Eagleburger, who was then assistant secretary, and said, "Sorry this is impossible. I am dean of the diplomatic corps and am not going to leave this place like a dog slinking out in the middle of the night, never mind the fact that as you know very well I am getting married tomorrow. I don't think it is right that I don't pay a goodbye call on the Grand Duke and members of the government." He called me back and said that he had talked to the White House staff and they wanted me out in 72 hours.

I said, "I don't care what they want, I am not leaving for another week." Finally, he was able to obtain a one-week delay.

The Grand Duke was at that time off on vacation and he came back to Luxembourg for a day to receive me for my farewell visit and to decorate me. I didn't have time for a goodbye party. The French Ambassador gave a small farewell dinner for me. I briefed the incoming dean of the diplomatic corps on the things he had to do. I ran around and called on as many ministers as I could find. And then I left. But it was not a very dignified departure.

Q: If it had happened earlier and they had said on February 15 we want you out of there, it would have been understood. But why the delay until July?

LOWENSTEIN: Because I think the White House hatchet staff hadn't found me, as I understand it. They hadn't really focused on who I was, this fellow with the horrible Fulbright, Dick Moose connection. These guys did not like Dick Moose.

So I came back to Washington in late July. As so often happens in the Foreign Service, departure is the low point of one's experience, which I regard as too bad.

The day I left I went up to the Director General's office and said to one of the secretaries, "Where are the ambassadorial flags?"

She said, "In the file cabinet."

I said, "Good, I would like mine."

She said, "Well, go pick it up." So I walked over and picked up an ambassadorial flag. She said, "Do you want the American one too?"

I said, "One is enough." And that was it.

Now, whatever else the Foreign Service is or isn't, it is an institution that should do something about this kind of situation. I know there have been some changes made recently. I wonder whether they will last.

Q: Well, as you look back on the Foreign Service now, how do you feel about it as a career?

LOWENSTEIN: I think I was very lucky in the Foreign Service. My general view is that you look back at the Foreign Service as it was in the 1950s and you look at it as it is today, I hate to say it, but it was better in the 1950s. I think it is a Service that has become much more bureaucratic and more politicized. I think this business of putting political deputy assistant secretaries with ties to the White House in every bureau, I don't know if that is still true, but it was true in the Reagan and Bush administrations, I think that has a terrible effect on the openness of the policy process. I think that the administrative functions are now blown all out of proportion. But I think that intrinsically it is a very interesting and rewarding career. I think that an awful lot of people in the Foreign Service do tend to live lives that are too cloistered, both in Washington and abroad. They tend to stick together in their own communities which I think is something that has to be guarded against.

On the subject of political appointees, I think that one of the problems is that there is no effective monitoring of ambassadorial performance. That is true of both non-career and career. I have talked to a recent head of the Inspection Corps to

see whether the situation has changed, and he tells me it hasn't. Inspection teams are loath to criticize the chief of mission's performance and, if they do, they tend to do it confidentially to the Secretary. And the Secretary is loath to go to the President about a Presidential appointee unless the situation is disgraceful. He will get rid of a career appointee, but he won't do anything about a political appointee.

I think that the White House ought to have a small staff that reports only to the President, that monitors ambassadorial performance of both career and non-career chiefs of mission, and that gives those reports only to the President so that he has some idea of how his people are doing. He shouldn't appoint such a staff or permit such a staff to operate unless he intends to act on their recommendations. He ought to know when someone is putting in a miserable performance and not doing his administration any credit, and he ought to be able to get rid of that person because he knows what is up. Presently, he doesn't know. He doesn't have a clue as to who is performing well and whose performance is problematical.

Q: It seems to me that the way to get at this problem is to find out through the corridors and then leak it.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, there are a lot of Presidents who won't act if something has been in the press. That creates a counter reaction.

Q: What about scandals?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes, but there are a lot of cases where it isn't a scandal, it is just ineptitude. So, that is about the only constructive suggestion that I have to make.

Q: The system will take care of the career person.

LOWENSTEIN: Well, he or she will probably have been so often examined and rated by the time he or she gets there that they are pretty well known. Some people may change, may let

being a chief of mission go to their head and lose their bearings, may fall in love with someone who causes their behavior to change, for example. But generally, I think, career people have been scrutinized and examined so the chances are that they will behave pretty well.

I don't think the system of having political appointees as ambassadors is going to change, so there should be some way of controlling it rather than trying to prevent it in the first place, because you can't prevent it. It is a fact of American political life.

Also I think that budgetary cuts have made the Department far less efficient and less responsive to the public. A number of times I have called up the State Department and some receptionist has answered the telephone who doesn't have a clue about anything, doesn't know where anybody is, isn't particularly polite, and doesn't take your message accurately.

Q: Yes, you are right.

End of interview