The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR DAVID E. MARK

Interviewed by: Henry Precht
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background
   Born and raised in New York
   Columbia University
   Entered Foreign Service in 1946

Seoul, Korea 1946-1949
   Political advisor to U.S. military
   Consular duties
   Joint Commission negotiations
   Soviets
   Korea's "People's Committees"
   President Syngman Rhee
   Acheson declaration
   Elections
   Communist inspired rebellion
   Ambassador Muccio
   U.S. military presence and policy
   North Korea vs. South Korea

Berlin, Germany 1949-1951
   Creation of German Democratic Republic
   High Commissioner McCloy
   Travel in East Germany
   Soviet military
   Reunification issue
   Berliners' attitudes

Russian language training - FSI 1951-1952
   Harvard University - Soviet studies
   Visit to Moscow

Bucharest, Romania - DCM 1952-1954
Georghe Gheorghiu-Dej
Soviet influence
Danube-Black Sea Canal
Gulag
Local contacts
French influence

State Department - Yugoslavia desk officer 1954-1957
Tito and Soviets
Dulles and U.S. policy
U.S. support for Tito
Murphy-Collins mission
Robert Murphy
U.S. security guarantee to Tito

Moscow, USSR - Counselor of Embassy
Economic and Political duties
CIA
Soviet surveillance
PNG

Geneva, Switzerland - TDY 1959-1962
Nuclear Weapons Conference
Disarmament negotiations
Gary Powers and U2
"On-sit" inspection issue
"Did we want an agreement?"
"Preventative Disarmament"
MIRVs
Russian intentions
Farewell luncheon with Soviets
Personnel delegation
Soviet defector Nosenko
Berlin Wall
China and nuclear issue
Verification issue
Khrushchev tactics and policies
Soviet economic problems

Harvard University 1962-1963

Department of State - INR - Western Europe 1964-1969
Functions
European Community
De Gaulle and NATO
INTERVIEW

Q: David, perhaps you could tell us something about how you became interested in the Foreign Service and set out on this career.

MARK: I had had no special orientation for the Foreign Service or international affairs during my undergraduate days. As a matter of fact, my only contact with the foreign world was a high school graduation trip at age 15 in 1939 when I went to France and dropped briefly for five days into Nazi Germany and then into Switzerland. But, except for an interest in travel, it had not left me with any particular ideas about a career in the field. In any event, after I finished my undergraduate work at Columbia University, I was drafted into the Army in 1943, so that career thoughts were put off quite a bit.

However, by 1945, when the war had come to an end, I took account of the fact that I had not been sent overseas, and, therefore, was likely to be retained in the service a long time, while people with higher priority would be discharged. And about that time, in September
or so 1945, there was this sign put up on our unit's bulletin board which said, "First post-war examination for the Foreign Service; people who succeed will probably be discharged in order to enter the Foreign Service."

And so I said, "My, God. What an opportunity." At the time, I was going to Columbia Law School, even though in the Army, because I had managed to get assigned to Newark, New Jersey air base and had wangled a job on the night shift so that it was possible for me to go back to law school in the daytime. I had finished one year before entering the service, and this seemed to be an alternative possibility to practicing law.

In any event, I took the exam, which in those days was two and a half days long, and also did, I think, the French and German tests, both of which I failed. I waited for the results, which came about January or February 1946, saying that I had passed the written exam and was marked down for an oral exam in Hagerstown, Maryland, of all places, in April 1946.

That was also my last semester of law school, and, as a favor to veterans, one was allowed to take the N.Y. bar exam while still in the last semester of law school. So I took that, passed it, almost simultaneously made it through my oral exams, and then had to make a choice in about June 1946 whether I'd try a legal career that, even then, looked like a fairly prosperous one, or go into the government where my pay, as it turned out, annual pay at that time, was to be $3,278. But, even though the oral examiners had been a little hard on me, I thought, and had shaken their heads, saying that I had had a very provincial background, even though living in worldly New York and having once traveled abroad and having gone to a decent university, the Foreign Service beckoned.

I assumed that their having passed me meant that I had a fairly decent chance to move along in the service if I got in. And certainly that was the heyday of American power and glory in the world; and the idea of being associated in some way with the events connected with the impending era struck me as more appealing than the lure of money from practicing law in New York. So I opted for the Foreign Service and arrived in Washington at the--whatever it was--the training division, the predecessor of the Foreign Service Institute, in September 1946.

Q: How many were in your class?

MARK: I think we were something like 30 to 40. I can't remember exactly, and I can't remember all the people who were actually in the class. One of them, though, was Deane Hinton, who is still in the Service at the moment as ambassador to Pakistan and has had a long and illustrious career. But I'm sure that if I saw the list of names, there would be a number who distinguished themselves.

Q: Were they all provincials like you?
MARK: Well, everyone came from some city or other, but in that sense, they too were from the provinces. I don't know what their experience had been, nor do I know how many had really planned for a Foreign Service career all their lives.

**Q:** But you didn't sense that you were at a disadvantage because you had had heads shaken at you during the oral exam for your provincialism?

MARK: Well, not particularly; I had some self-confidence, though I felt overawed by the whole process. I mean, I was still just 22, and, once in Washington, I was associating with people who were ambassadors, who had had distinguished careers in the service during the war, who were connected with a mysterious government agency that I was only beginning to learn about; and so I did feel overawed.

For example, I had to learn how to behave at receptions, even really had to learn how to drink a cocktail, because I had been basically abstemious before then, not out of any principle but just because of not having been exposed very much to it.

**Q:** So you went through this basic training. And then what did they have in store for you?

MARK: Well, of course, there was a day, probably around November, maybe late October, in '46 when we were all notified where we were going, and I was told that I was going to Seoul, Korea. And I said, "Oh, my God. I'll never learn that language."

And someone said to me, who I guess had looked into it, "Don't worry. They have an alphabet." Well, it's true. The Korean language does have an alphabet, which now is used much more than it ever was in those days. But basically it is an East Asian language, structurally--what do they call it--syntactically very close to Japanese but, in vocabulary, totally different.

It was a little two-man office in Seoul of political advisor to the commanding general of U.S. forces in Korea, and I was to be the second man. I didn't know it at the time. There was a third man, William Brans, a captain in the Army who had been lent to the office because he had been a Foreign Service auxiliary officer at an early point in the war, and who later on became a Foreign Service officer himself, I think ending up as our consul general in Perth, Australia many years later.

But in any case, my chief was William Langdon, who was one of the real old-time heroes of the Japanese language service, and he had served at various posts in Japan, Manchuria, and even China (Chungking) during the war at one point. I think he was, until the Japanese came in, consul general at Mukden. But, in any case, at this point he was in Korea and trying to influence the course of our policy toward the middle road, which was difficult because the military was in control and not particularly interested in the subtleties of South Korean domestic politics. They were much more concerned about the fact that the Soviet Union had occupied the northern half of the country, and they preferred as leader a staunch anti-communist.
Q: Were you in the embassy, or were you in the military headquarters in Seoul?

MARK: Well, of course, there was no embassy. It was just the political advisor's office, but, in fact, we were installed in what had been the prewar consul general's house. I mean, Seoul had been one of the consulates general under Tokyo before the war, and we had a nice compound in the center of the city with a lovely old-style house that I believe is still used as a residence by the American ambassador, plus a little office down near the gate to the compound. That is not used as an office now. There's a big embassy building up on the main boulevard.

Q: But was that our diplomatic establishment then?

MARK: That was the only diplomatic establishment. The two of us were there, and while Mr. Langdon engaged in high politics--and told me about them so that I could begin learning, I was engaged in everything else, which was a little bit of administration, such as it was, some consular work, and miscellaneous low-brow activities. We had one very faithful, loyal Korean employee, who had held out even during the war under a lot of pressure from the Japanese. And in the consular work, there were people trying to emigrate to the United States. Of course in those days, under the Oriental Exclusion Act, no Koreans could hope to go as immigrant visa holders, but there were a lot of white Russians and others.

Indeed, that got me into maybe the most traumatic personal incident. One white Russian lady, maybe in her late twenties at the time, wanted to emigrate to the States and was trying to get on the quota which existed for non-Orientals who had been born in Korea. That quota was substantially open, and she brought me some documents indicating her birth in Korea. But, evidently, a female rival of hers heard of this and told me, "Well, that's not true. Like the rest of us, she was born in China."

I didn't know what to do about this since the documents were inconclusive, and I thought, as a potential lawyer, why, the thing to do was to bring both of them together in my office and have them confront each other--which happened. The shouting deteriorated to the point where one of them fainted dead away on the floor, so I decided that this courtroom tactic was not appropriate for a consulate. Incidentally, I also attended about 40 marriages of U.S. citizens (mostly soldiers) which in those days was apparently necessary before the vice consul could issue a "Certificate of Witness to Marriage" that would be recognized in all American jurisdictions. So I gained many lessons in denominational differences in the process.

I also began to get into a little bit of what is now USIA work there, but all of this was peripheral, as I say, to learning about what seemed most interesting, namely the politics of the occupation and how the State Department and my boss, Bill Langdon, were really trying to prevent a right-wing victory among the rival South Korean groups, as we moved toward their independence in, as it turned out, August 1948.
Q: Well, tell us something about the perspective of the military on this political problem.

MARK: The military's first interest, as I said, was the Soviet Union and its forces, while, officially, the U.S. was going through some efforts with Moscow to bring about a unified government for Korea, North and South. I think it was the December 1945 meeting of the British, French, American, and Soviet foreign ministers that had laid down a plan for a joint commission on Korea. And the joint commission, American and Soviet, was to meet either in Seoul or Pyongyang, or both, to try to work out a unified framework of government for the country under some form of very tenuous, not spelled out, international trusteeship, that was to be operated by the two superpowers for a number of years before full Korean independence.

Q: In the North and the South?

MARK: The trusteeship was to cover the whole country, because it was to be a unified regime. The problems of convening the joint commission were fairly serious, but it actually happened in 1947 at some point. I don't think it had ever happened in '46, before my arrival, but, of course, I may be wrong about the actual date of the preceding foreign ministers meeting in London, I believe. I said it was '45; it may actually have been early '46. I still think it was late '45 that they got around to creating this joint commission.

In any event, the problem was that, in order to form a united Korean regime, the commission was obliged to consult with various Korean political groups. The Soviets immediately laid down a condition that consultation should only take place with those Korean groups which supported the Allied plan, including the indefinite trusteeship of Korea.

Q: Was there a Soviet office in Seoul at the time? How did you have contact with the Soviets?

MARK: There was a very small Soviet liaison office in Seoul, because Seoul was to be the headquarters for the joint commission. As I recall, there was no American office in Pyongyang. I've clarified the dates now. It was December '45 for the foreign ministers' meeting that set the commission up, and the first meeting of the joint commission actually did take place in 1946, before I got to Seoul.

Q: Your dates in Seoul were?

MARK: From late December 1946 through April '49.

Well, in any case, the process broke down right away, essentially because all of the South Korean groups--virtually all of the South Korean groups, above all those on the right, and therefore favored by the Americans--were against trusteeship. They said, "We want to become an independent country without delay; we are not children, and we don't want to
have the United States and the Soviet Union telling us what to do after we have our new unified government.” And the Soviets, as I said, indicated that you couldn't deal with such (rightist) people because they weren't accepting the trusteeship plan laid out by the Allies. So the thing broke down, because the U.S. was certainly not willing to agree to a government composed only of communists and leftists.

Nevertheless, the American-Soviet negotiations continued to try to get matters started again. And, I think early in 1947, they agreed on a new formula that was going to get around this difficulty. The formula had some words that allowed the rightist groups in the South to avoid saying what they felt about trusteeship, but to note merely that they were adhering to the understanding between the Soviet and American governments, thus leaving unclear just how they felt about trusteeship—even though everyone knew that they were against it.

When the next joint commission session of the Soviets and the Americans convened later in the spring of 1947, these Korean groups began testifying before the joint commission as to what their aspirations were for Korea and the basis on which they hoped a government would be set up. But the Soviets immediately began challenging them again saying, "Well, deep down in your hearts you're still against the trusteeship agreement, aren't you?" And, although we tried to work out modifications of the formula, the effort definitively broke down at that point.

Of course, the Soviets had been developing the North along their political model very assiduously from the beginning, and they even set up a provisional government there in February 1946, I believe.

Q: There was no comparable government in South Korea?

MARK: No, not at that time. No. When we had arrived in Korea in September 1945, the Japanese were still there, had stayed there for three or four weeks after the surrender of Japan. The Koreans, in the meantime, or some Koreans, had begun to form local groups of one sort or another to fill the political vacuum.

The most prominent group was, as it turned out, a sort of center-left grouping that had formed something called People's Committees, and the People's Committees in different places linked themselves up as some sort of central authority. It was very amorphous and tenuous, but, nevertheless, when our troops came in, they immediately disliked the name People's Committees because that was what the Soviets were implanting in the parts of Eastern Europe which they were occupying, and it sounded suspiciously as if the committees were communist entities.

Now, these People's Committees existed in the North, too. The Soviets found them when they got there. What the Soviets did was to keep the form of the People's Committees, but to purge them of everyone but the communist elements. What we did in the South was to argue against the legitimacy of these self-constituted groups, and we gradually forced
them to dissolve, or forced them to transform themselves into a political party of a similar name, while we set up a South Korean adjunct of the U.S. military government that, in effect, used the sort of structure that the Japanese had had.

Q: Did we, in effect, do the same thing as the Soviets then, purge our political opponents from the Korean groups?

MARK: No, because we made the political groups become one or more parties, rather than keep them on as the semblance of a government, as the semblance of governmental authority, while we set up new authorities along the lines of the structure that the Japanese had left behind.

Q: Well, what about any communist or left-wing Koreans in the South? Were they allowed to participate in these parties?

MARK: Yes, they were, until the Communist Party itself got outlawed sometime during 1947, I believe--maybe it was even late '46--because they engaged in a lot of trade union activity and incited a large number of strikes, even general strikes in the country, so we just outlawed that.

Q: Who outlawed it? The military government?

MARK: The military government. And in the meantime, our forces had set up a full fledged military government which was, as I said, along the lines of the Japanese structure, so that even our right-wing friends were not in the government as such, but were, in effect, organized only in political parties. But since our military government had to rely on Koreans to staff the basic field functioning of the government all over the country, we tended to turn to those right-wing groups for local talent, and many of them were people who had flirted with the Japanese in one way or the other, or at least had sympathized with them.

We didn't actually employ at that time people who had been Japanese police officers, although there had been ethnic Koreans in the police. But, nevertheless, we got further and further off to the rightist side; and, of course, we brought back from China--I guess he had been in China, I think, at the time, although he'd been in the States for a long time before that as well--Syngman Rhee, who became the first president of South Korea later on. But he was a man who had an impeccable anti-Japanese record from about 1919, when he had led a little revolt against them and had had to flee Korea. Still, his leanings were all on the right side. When he came back to the country, he was welcomed literally with a red carpet at the airport by our top military officers.

Q: By?

MARK: By American generals, so that the signal was given very clearly that this was a guy whom we wanted to support.
Q: What did the State Department, through your boss, think about this tendency?

MARK: Well, the State Department was rather disturbed at our partiality toward the rightist side, and we were trying to get--

Q: When you say "our," you're identifying yourself with the military?

MARK: Yes. Well, I mean by the American military's partiality, or by the fact that the American military in its own mind probably wasn't partial to anybody. They just wanted from the first to keep the place orderly until they got a united Korean government, and, when that project failed owing to the USSR, until we got some sort of independent government for South Korea. They wanted the groups in power who would make the least trouble for the U.S. Army.

Q: They didn't want any communists.

MARK: They didn't want any communists there for sure. The State Department, and particularly my boss, were trying to promote a middle-of-the-road grouping. I remember a luncheon we had at his house not too long after I came there--it must have been in the spring of '47--in which we had a man who was center left, but, nevertheless, not a communist, and who had been very prominent, extremely prominent, in the people's councils, the People's Committees, earlier on. He was there at lunch in order to be persuaded that he ought to become an activist, the political activist of the center on the local political scene.

I remember that we served cornbread muffins for lunch, which was very important because Korea was short of food at that time. However, instead of handing out rice, which is what they wanted, we handed out corn. And the left accused us of feeding animal fodder to the Korean people. So, we wanted to show them that, indeed, we ate corn ourselves, and we had cornmeal muffins very prominently on the menu.

We also got hold of some of the State Department's confidential funds at the time to send this man, and a couple of other centrist people, down to the first all-Asian political meeting, which was in New Delhi at the time. I guess this was later on in '47 after India became independent, but it was the first meeting of peoples from Asian countries, countries that were independent or had just become independent, or were about to be independent. We got the money from Washington to send down this group of Koreans to Delhi, so that people would know that Korea was indeed a country and was participating in Asian politics.

There was no sense of Asian regional identity at the time. There's precious little of it right now, in spite of the passage of four decades. I mean, the Japanese have a kind of economic hegemony in our times right now, 1989, but there's still no kind of overarching
political identity to the region; and there certainly was not even an awareness of who the players were back then when we inserted these people into the Delhi group.

But, with the failure of the second joint commission effort by the summer of 1947, it was clear that Washington wanted to get some indigenous authority established in our part of Korea; that is, South Korea, and we then began moving toward arranging elections in the South that would legitimize a new South Korean government. Indeed, we even got a U.N. General Assembly resolution passed to that effect.

Q: When precisely was this decision taken to move ahead separately in the South?

MARK: It was taken after the failure of the second round of U.S.-Soviet joint commission efforts; that is, sometime in mid-year 1947.

Q: Was it related only to what was happening in Korea, or would you place it in a global context of our giving up on cooperation with the Soviet Union?

MARK: I'm sure that the latter is true; we had already had so many disappointments in Europe that were in the forefront of the minds of policy makers in Washington that the idea of a third U.S.-Soviet round in Korea seemed most unpromising. Soviet-U.S. relations in divided Germany were rapidly deteriorating, though the blockade of Berlin only started later in the summer of 1948. Thus, still the idea of collaborating with the Soviets in Korea became ever more unattractive.

Of course, all through this period we were debating in Washington about whether we should maintain a long-term interest in Korea. This was argued out in 1947-48 in what was the predecessor of the National Security Council--the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee--and the decision was made not to include Korea in our security periphery. I believe it was later in 1947 or early 1948 that Dean Acheson made a speech in which he clearly indicated that the mainland, including Korea, all parts of it, would not be, in effect, defended within our security perimeters.

Q: But prior to that decision, we were moving in the direction of a separate government in South Korea, which would be sustained, was it your impression, by American troops indefinitely? Or what kind of thinking was there prior to this Achesonian declaration?

MARK: Well, the idea of moving toward a separate government in South Korea probably had a little independent evolutionary history and momentum on its own, as the one alternative left over when the idea of creating a joint government for the North and South collapsed. At first, of course, it seemed to be part of our general strategic interest zone in the Far East, but the SWNCC decision of not including Korea within our security perimeter made it all the more urgent that we at least leave South Korea with some kind of independent government, independent regime established.
Q: But nobody in 1947 envisaged an American troop presence such as we have now. You wouldn't have thought that 40 years later we would still have American troops in that number.

MARK: You are right. On the contrary, if I jump ahead a little bit, to 1948, when this separate government came into being on August 15, 1948, we had already made the decision to pull out of South Korea altogether by the end of 1948. And indeed we had begun to reduce our forces there at that time to what the Pentagon called a reinforced regimental combat team, which was sort of like a brigade within a division, but it had different structural and equipment elements in it. We were going to be out of the mainland militarily by December 31, 1948, but events happened to cause a postponement. I don't know if you want to get into that at this juncture, because we should pick up the story of the formation of the government.

Q: Let's go back and talk about Syngman Rhee a bit. Did the State Department view him with the same sort of red-carpet enthusiasm as your military brethren did?

MARK: No. They considered him at that point a stubborn older man living in the glory of his 1919 revolutionary attempt, who showed no flexibility, who was inherently authoritarian, who was pretty ruthless with any opposition groups or people who wouldn't cooperate with him, who behaved like a politician, to be sure, which he had to be, but, nevertheless, one not in a democratic mold. His years of living in the West, where he had acquired an ambitious Austrian wife, had not imbued him with the ideas that we would have liked to see implanted in South Korea, although we were probably unrealistic then in our hopes.

After all, this peninsula had been formally a part of Japan since 1910, and had really come under Japanese influence in 1905, when Tokyo defeated the Russians; and these people had been citizens, maybe somewhat second-class citizens of Japan, but nevertheless, Japanese citizens. They had lived in an empire that was only formally, nominally, in a way, democratic even before the '20s, on a borrowed Prussian model. In the 1920s and 1930s, it had become transformed into a military dictatorship. Thus, to expect Koreans to suddenly understand what democracy was about and to embrace it and practice it was probably very unrealistic, even apart from their pre-Japanese Confucian heritage.

Syngman Rhee, at least, had been exposed to the West and to democracy. Thus, he might have been about the best that you could realistically hope for, although the State Department kept trying, and although it also was the policy of the military government for a while, ordered by Washington, to promote centrist options. In any event, elections took place; Syngman Rhee was elected. He had outmaneuvered some rivals on the right, and he was inaugurated as president on August 15, 1948, which became South Korea's Independence Day.
**Q:** What happened to your democratic center-left friend and others that the State Department favored for this role?

MARK: They were not physically molested, they faded from the scene. I mean, there was no way in which they could actively participate. The leader we had sent to the New Delhi Conference in 1947 had been assassinated soon after and his politically active brother never achieved much prominence. Moreover, the Syngman Rhee government was very tough on anyone suspected of communist leanings, and while our centrist people were clearly not in that category, they were accused of being unpatriotic. They had no mass base, no financial means, and no sort of organized popular enthusiasms on which to build. Moreover, it should be remembered that less than two years after the inauguration of the government, the North attacked the South and for a few months occupied all of it except for a small southeastern enclave around Pusan and Taegu.

**Q:** But in the elections, did they run in the elections?

MARK: I believe they ran candidates in the election, because an assembly was also elected at the time, and there may have been a small number of centrist members. A few of the more prominent disappeared during the Korean war. I mean, they never showed up again. Whether they were killed or whatever is still not very clear, but a number became prisoners of the North.

**Q:** Did Syngman Rhee have substantial American help in winning the election?

MARK: I don't think he really needed it. I mean, he had gotten the symbolism of American approval early on when he was allowed to land in his own DC-4 at the Seoul airport, and a red carpet was rolled out, with representatives of the American command there. Later, his many visits with Lt. General Hodge, who was our occupation commander, and with top military government officers made his political status clear, I am sure that people drew the conclusion that the Americans were very friendly to Dr. Rhee.

**Q:** So now we have the Syngman Rhee government in place. We're moving toward the withdrawal of American forces.

MARK: Right. But there was an event that happened in October 1948; that is, two months after the inauguration of the government, namely a communist military-led rebellion. The managers were people, almost all soldiers, who had infiltrated from the North down the central mountain spine of Korea, and they also had infiltrated into one of the military units of the new army of the South. We had begun to form a Korean paramilitary police constabulary back in 1946, after the Soviets had launched a Korean "People's" army, a North Korean people's army, as of that time, which became far larger, much better equipped, and much more intensively trained than our constabulary.

**Q:** Had we picked up what the Japanese left behind? Or did we recruit with a fresh start?
MARK: We recruited with a fresh start as far as the troops were concerned. We used some officers, though, who had been Japanese army officers; that is, they had had military training--Koreans--who had had Japanese military training. Of course, that was a source of some complaints by non-rightists, but, nevertheless, they were the only people with martial skills.

The constabulary was deliberately kept rather weak by us, not undermanned but underequipped. I mean, when I left Korea, which was April 1949, I remember some Korean-friends officials, who were pleading with me to speak in Washington to higher officials to get a supply of artillery shells for them. And I said, "But you have a six month's supply." And they said, "No, that's only for six months of training purposes. You know, it would be used up in a couple of days if we ever had to fight, and here the North is building up a very sizable army." That was in April '49, I should say, when I left, and history has recorded just how great the military disparities were in June 1950, with the North's invasion.

Q: You were about to talk about this event in October of '48.

MARK: Right. It was a communist-inspired rebellion that broke out. As I say, the people had been infiltrated down the spine of mountains, all the way to the south of Korea, and when it broke out, they really seized control of some areas in the South. As it happened, I was traveling at the time by military jeep--well, it was an embassy jeep by that time.

Q: When did we establish our embassy there?

MARK: On August 15, and I became the acting political counselor, even though I was only a lowly third secretary, because I'd been there the longest and had a wide range of acquaintanceships.

Q: Did we have an ambassador?

MARK: We did have an ambassador, who was John Muccio and we had a DCM, who was a senior Chinese linguist, Everett Drumright, who later on became ambassador himself.

I should revert to that jeep. Much earlier on, back in 1947, we had wanted a jeep for our little advisory office and the military said, "We don't have extra equipment. We can't give you a jeep," and so forth. So finally we got the acquisition cleared in Washington and they sent a telegram back saying, "Purchase of jeep from military is authorized. Payment of so many dollars," and, of course, it was signed, as all cables are, with the name of the Secretary of State, who at that time was General George Marshall. So when we took that cable around to the military, the officer said, "Good, God. If General Marshall wants you to have a jeep, you'll get a jeep." [Laughter]
But anyway, I was traveling around South Korea in early October 1948, and indeed off on the east coast and in the south, which were then very, very distant places from Seoul, isolated and cut off. We did not even have any troops around there. The Americans had little stations of the Army Counterintelligence Corps in a few towns, and we stayed in old Japanese houses where the CIC lived. I got to the Southeast just about the time that the rebellion broke out, so that I stayed around the area and a couple of days later, got back into one of the first towns that the South Koreans had been able to recapture from the communist rebels. It was a terribly gruesome sight all around in this area of combat, because they had taken 200 to 250 people who were prominent in the local South Korean community and killed them.

Q: Who is "they"? The rebels?

MARK: The rebels, yes. And they had marched these people out of town, along a road, tied their hands behind their backs and just mowed them down, so that there were about 200 to 250 prominent corpses along the road. When our people, that is either the South Koreans or the Americans, but this was mainly a South Korean recovery operation, got hold of some of the communist rebels, they were not dealt with kindly, either. It was pretty rough on both sides after what had happened, though only a mild foretaste of the war years.

When I got back to Seoul about four or five days later, I went to see the ambassador and said, "You know, the communist strength, their military strength, is obviously a lot stronger than we had thought, and if we pull out all our forces, as is now scheduled for December 31, we're soon going to lose this place."

Q: But who had put down the rebellion? Had it been American troops?

MARK: It had been the South Koreans for the most part, but Americans were giving them backstopping support, logistic support, and advice, I'm sure. We had advisory--

Q: But Americans weren't engaged in combat or air support?

MARK: No. It wasn't that type of thing. It was really a guerilla operation that had taken over large areas of the country near the spine of the mountains that run down the whole peninsula. They had not gotten into Pusan, the number two city down in the South, but they had been close by.

In any event, I was urging that we stay on and change our policy about pulling out. I mean, from my point of view, even though Japan, of course, was included in our security perimeter, it would have been much more difficult to retain Japan if we had lost South Korea, and it would have been demoralizing to the Japanese really to find Soviet-backed forces right along the Straits of Tsushima separating Korea from Japan.
So the ambassador said, "Well, draft a telegram and we'll send it in." I did so, and it was tinkered with as usual, but essentially those were the recommendations that went in. What Washington came back with--

Q: Could I ask you, what did the military think at that time?

MARK: I don't know what they thought. They weren't particularly involved any longer in policy formulation. We had already cut our forces down to two regimental combat teams, you know, and the total number of forces was somewhere probably between 5,000 and 10,000 at that point.

The response from Washington was that they weren't going to change U.S. policy, but since, obviously, conditions weren't settled and since the South Koreans needed some more backstopping and, at least, an improvement in morale, Washington would agree to let the regimental combat teams stay until July 1, 1949.

Q: Six months.

MARK: Six months longer. And I left in April. I left with a paper that tried to influence American policy--and I don't have a copy of that paper, although a professor who is a revisionist historian of Korean affairs at the University of Washington in Seattle, has found it in the archives, he tells me, and has used it to a small extent in a book that he has written about his version of history of those years in Korea.

Q: What's the thesis of the paper?

MARK: The thesis of the paper started by outlining what had happened in a political sense in the development of the South Korean government and how U.S. policy had changed over the years. It ended up with my statement that I thought we were endangering our position in Japan by pulling out and that we ought to look again at our policy in this broader context. The embassy sent the paper in from the ambassador with a note of his saying, "Here is an interesting paper from our departing acting political counselor. The embassy takes no position one way or the other."

Q: When you left, did you or your colleagues in the embassy have a sense that an invasion from the North was a real danger?

MARK: No, we didn't. We had had this one episode in October 1948, but nobody could know that this was part, or maybe a feeler, for a larger effort. I mean, in retrospect it's easy to see why it should have been seen as a portent of the North's reckless hostility. The Cold War was heating up all over. The nuclear arms race was growing. The Berlin Airlift was going on. The Soviets were facing the problem of how to deal with our airlift. In Europe they clearly did not want to start a war over the airlift, and ultimately, they passed messages in March or April 1949 indicating that they wanted a face-saving way out, which came in the late spring of 1949. In this, they lost some face. But clearly they were
thinking of other places in which they could show that they were able to win episodes in
the cold war, and indeed, by their successes, gain authority.

Korea must have been a very tantalizing temptation, most of all because we had
announced our intention to pull out and had excluded it from our security perimeter, not
even voicing words of conditionality or contingency in that regard. They had built up a
powerful force in the North, an indigenous force that was much better than the one in the
South and that received active Soviet Red Army backing.

Q: The North is a much smaller country, right?

MARK: The North is about half the population size, but that wasn't very important, if
they had succeeded in mobilizing a large part of the population and in equipping it well;
whereas, we had not done nearly as much in the South. The South was not a totalitarian
state. The government was authoritarian to be sure, but there were still dissident elements
in the South. The North probably felt that it had a latent support among groups that had
originally been pro-trade union, pro-general strike, pro-communist, and therefore they
may have expected a broad scale Southern uprising.

Q: Looking at it objectively, would there be any basis for the people in the North to fear
that they would be invaded from the South? Did they have any reason to fear aggression
on the part of Syngman Rhee?

MARK: Objectively, no. Rhetorically, yes. I mean, the Syngman Rhee government was
totally hostile to the one in the North. Kim Il Sung, the venerable leader who's still there
(1989), had already made his appearance in 1945, and the talk in Seoul was, of course,
that this was a usurping and Soviet-imposed communist government and that the
militantly hostile reaction of the South was very clear. But objectively speaking, the
Southern forces were far from ready and there was no longer any announced United
States backing.

I should say that the Soviet army had pulled out of North Korea some time earlier, I
believe in 1948, but it had, in its several years there, built up and trained this very strong
Korean force which was a lot stronger than the South. I don't remember what they may
have said about their security backing for the North Korean regime. They were, in fact--
and that we were well aware of this--supplying military advisors, if not de facto unit
commanders, down even to the company level in the North Korean forces.

Q: What about the Chinese role in Korea?

MARK: No. There was no Chinese role at the time, because the Chinese were just
concluding their own civil war in 1949 and the Soviets and Chinese were, of course,
cooperating closely at the time. The frontier with China in North Korea was a friendly
frontier, but the Chinese had their hands full with their own problems.
Q: During the period you were in Korea, was there any interest or any direction offered you or your military colleagues by General MacArthur's command, or were you strictly on your own for reporting directly to Washington?

MARK: The State Department office, of course, was directly reporting to Washington. General Hodge, when dealing with political and military government questions, reported directly to Washington, with a copy of every telegram sent to General MacArthur's headquarters. When dealing with any troop or military matters, he reported through General MacArthur in Tokyo. The distinction was not always easy to follow, and I'm sure, given the nature of MacArthur's command personality, that Lieutenant General Hodge, with only three stars, was duly deferential to his boss in Tokyo.

Q: All right, now. You've come to the end of your tour in Korea. Any further reflections on that experience?

MARK: Well, just about what actually happened in June 1950 when the Northern invasion took place, and the American riposte was totally unanticipated. I mean, it shows that Harry Truman had a gut reaction that made a lot more sense than the sophisticated deliberations of the cabinet departments in the previous few years; that, instinctively, he knew that a victorious outcome for a Soviet-backed state could undermine our entire position in the Far East and, more specifically, challenge our position in Japan. And I guess it was becoming clear even at that early post-war time that Japan was going to regain its status as a very major voice, a very major actor, in the Pacific. Whether Japan would be "Finlandized" by the USSR, or in a strategically neutral stance, or pro-American was very crucial.

Q: So where did you go, your next career turn?

MARK: Well, I had applied for Soviet language and area training, and when I got back to Washington, they said to me, "Well, we don't have any room for you in that right now. We'll keep your application on file. We do have some other area training that you could go into."

I said, "Well, what do you mean?"

And they said, "We'd like to sign you up for Arab language and area training." Well, although I'm not a practicing Jew, I'm nevertheless of Jewish background, so I said that I didn't think that that would prove to be very useful for the Foreign Service. Besides, I was interested in the Soviet side. So they said, "Okay. Just wait for that and go on to your next assignment, which is Berlin."

Now, before I got to Berlin, everyone arrived through Frankfurt in those days.

Q: This was in--
MARK: This was in approximately August or September--well, maybe it was July 1949. I was informed in Frankfurt that I was not going to Berlin after all, that a new government was going to be formed in West Germany. Our military headquarters would be moving to Frankfurt from West Berlin and, therefore, I should stay in Frankfurt. And I was given a sort of ignominious job as the deputy protocol officer of the new U.S. High Commission under John McCloy that was taking over from the military government.

The protocol officer dealt with all of the diplomatic or quasi diplomatic missions of all the other countries in Germany--which missions were still nominally attached to our military command. Protocol dealt with all of those, except, of course, the other Allies: British, French, and Soviet. And it was a boring routine job at a time when a lot of interesting things were going on. So this was the first time really of unhappiness in my career, because, by this time, my pay had gone up from $3,278 to $3,500 a year, and I was feeling pretty good. And as a matter of fact, I'd even gotten a promotion from grade FSO-6 to grade FSO-5 in the scale of those days.

So I started politicking within the protocol and High Commission offices to get to Berlin anyway. I mean, Berlin just seemed a lot more interesting. And I did succeed in getting shifted out of Frankfurt after a couple of months there to Berlin at the end of September 1949. My boss there was the senior Foreign Service officer left behind in Berlin, Eric Wendelin, and he said, "Well, David, you speak German, don't you?" not knowing that I had flunked German in the Foreign Service entrance exam.

And I answered, "Well, I've been brushing up on it and doing my best to get it back into shape." And he said, "Okay. Your first job"--this was very early October--"is to keep up with what goes on in East Germany." They were about to launch a government, too, to counterbalance our regime in Bonn. He added, "As a matter of fact, it's been announced that Wilhelm Pieck"--who became the first president of the German Democratic Republic--"is going to make a speech on the air, and you listen to it and take notes and find out what he means."

I said, "God, do you think my German's up to that?"

He said, "We'll see." So I did, and, of course, it was the proclamation of the German Democratic Republic, with a declaration of eternal loyalty to Moscow. As it turned out, my German was adequate, not brilliant, but adequate at the time.

A little unit was formed in our office with a more senior officer named John Holt in charge, who was a German specialist; and this little unit was given the task of watching East Germany in some detail. Amazingly, nobody had been doing that in detail for about a year and a half. The U.S. military had started out watching East Germany in 1945 in a non-military sense, that is, what politics the Soviets were dictating there, and the army had continued this through '47 but had let it fizzle out during the airlift. Thus, we were really behind in our base of knowledge.
We didn't know very much about the political undercurrents there in which the Soviets had forced the old Social Democrats to combine with the Communist Party in a subordinate role; that is, Moscow had formed what's called the SED, Socialist Unity Party, but that is still the Communist Party of East Germany. Many other changes had been taking place as the Soviets imposed totalitarian hegemony on whatever political life was allowed in East Germany. So we had a very substantial job of catch-up to carry out in this little unit.

Q: And you were attached to the High Commissioner's office in Bonn? That was your formal status?

MARK: Well, no. There was a branch of the High Commissioner's office in Berlin under Eric Wendelin. As a matter of fact, Berlin and Bonn were in theory co-equal branches under High Commissioner McCloy, because the occupation regime—and there still formally is an occupation regime to this day (1989)—remained located in Berlin. So McCloy came up there; he had a house up there. There were meetings there. There were still some significant contacts in those years with the Soviet side. Indeed, there were a couple of occupation institutions that were maintained, I believe are still maintained (1989), such as the Air Safety Center in Berlin.

There were a couple of other things that survived all the clashes, and we still had—they've lately been revived much more, of course—the military liaison groups. I mean, the U.S. had its military people in Potsdam, in East Germany. They worked out of West Berlin. Likewise, we were assigned to the High Commissioner's office in Berlin. We tried to keep up with what went on in the East, and in those days it was relatively easy because there was no Berlin Wall, and people moved back and forth across the border, and we had all kinds of visitors from East Germany, people in church groups, Christian Democrats who were being forced more and more to the wall in those days, although a rump, sort of pro-Soviet Christian Democratic Party was allowed to continue tenuously. I even had the pleasure of working on these East-West issues with Willy Brandt, later Chancellor of Germany in Bonn who was then the editor of Berlin's Socialist Democratic Party newspaper.

Q: But you could travel without impediment anywhere in East Germany?

MARK: No. We could travel anywhere in East Berlin. For East Germany, we needed special Soviet passes, and I only received one twice during the year and a half that I was there, and they were both to visit the Leipzig trade fair. The Leipzig fair was to be the commercial showcase of East Germany to the world; and the Soviets were anxious to push East German industry, of course, as a foretaste of communism's quality potential. So people were allowed to go there to see how the German Democratic Republic was recovering from war devastation and from Soviet reparations dismantling, which had been very extensive.
We were able to get permits to go just for the several days that the fair took place, but I did get glimpses of East Germany in that way, and at other times, while traveling between Berlin and the West on the one approved superhighway, "autobahn," for which we didn't need permission. That was all regulated by the understandings reached after the blockade had ended in 1949. Again, I was in Berlin when the North Koreans attacked the South Koreans; and, of course, people immediately wondered whether there was going to be an analogy in Europe to this. For all of a week, I guess, I was lionized as the one person around who knew that Korea existed and had some ideas on the subject. And I must say that I took a pretty alarmist view of things at the moment.

I didn't distinguish the Korean situation from the German, but just felt that the Soviets were, you might say, feeling their way to world domination, and indeed probably had similar ideas toward Europe. Because it was at this time that NATO had been formed, and indeed that the first talk had begun about some kind of West German armed force, which ought to be recreated, so that West Germany would somehow be within NATO. That didn't happen until 1955. We had to run through the whole episode of the West European Defense Community, which the French finally killed in 1954. But the Soviets could see the way things were trending, and they had such superiority in ground forces in Europe at that time, much more even than now (1989). We, in our demobilization, had denuded our forces in Western Europe. The British were exhausted; the Belgians, Dutch, French and others didn't amount to very much militarily then, so the vulnerability of Western Europe was even greater. I didn't know it at the time, but the Russians probably did, that our whole nuclear arsenal, not the just tested first hydrogen bomb, but just nuclear weapons, was minuscule. I mean that, by the time of 1948 came around, we had just a bare handful of nuclear weapons. It was probably better by 1950, but not very substantial even then, and the Russians were certainly aware of that, more or less.

Q: But Russia, after all, had been devastated during World War II.

MARK: Right. But they had maintained a huge Red Army and kept it supplied, and they had built up tank factories and airplane factories and whatnot. During the war, they built them east of Moscow, and, of course, they had continued to pump resources into military industry after the war. I mean the time, from 1946 on, when Stalin clearly visualized the cold war and forged the Iron Curtain and the division of Europe.

Q: Did it ever occur to you that the Russians themselves might feel under threat from the West?

MARK: Oh, I'm sure they did. I mean, the Russians have felt that all along. We were the first with nuclear weapons; we were clearly supporting their enemies, that is anti-communist forces, in all the states which they considered to be in their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. We supported anti-communist Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Romanians--well, there weren't many of those, but some--Bulgarians, less so, Yugoslavs, whatever, so that our anti-Moscow intentions were very clear in those areas. And the Russians felt that this was their security buffer zone, and we weren't willing to accept it.
Sure, I guess so, and that was all the more reason why in 1950, at this time when they invaded South Korea, I thought that they would use their military superiority, or be very tempted to do so, to just sweep to the Atlantic—which they could justify as preemption. They would take whatever losses came from a few American nuclear weapon strikes inside the Soviet Union that we landed there, but then they would be masters of all of Europe. And I'm sure it was a very tense period. People in Washington must have been thinking the same thing. I remember that we even had several sessions with General Taylor, Maxwell Taylor, the later Army chief of staff, Kennedy's military advisor who played a very prominent role in our Vietnam military efforts, who was the commandant in Berlin at the time. He was a most impressive man, with a huge grasp of world politics and strategy and tactics, and so, our sessions with him led up to a paper that John Holt and I wrote setting out the dangers for Europe of possible Soviet aggressive moves and what we might expect. We sent that think piece out, it was distributed to other U.S. embassies and produced a good bit of flack, I must say.

Q: What do you mean? People didn't take your perception of the dangers seriously?

MARK: I don't know whether they took it seriously, but they thought that we were exaggerating Soviet willingness to engage in this sort of aggression. And obviously we were, because that invasion in Europe never took place. I don't know how seriously the Soviets ever contemplated it. When we get to "super-glasnost" after Gorbachev, enough of the Soviet archives may be opened so that we learn about such things, but we're not at that point yet (1989).

There's really, I guess, only one thing worth talking about in those years regarding East Germany before I left Berlin, and that is the German reunification issue. The German reunification issue is being talked about again nowadays (1989), but it was sort of quiescent between about 1955, when the West Germans reconstituted an army within NATO, and, let's say, 1987, or some period like that. People didn't talk about it. It was just considered out of the question.

But it wasn't out of the question in the 1950 to 1955 period because, for those years, the debate was going on in Europe about the West European Defense Community, and about a new West German army, and about a possible future role for West Germany in NATO. Throughout, the Soviets were using all of their efforts to disrupt U.S. plans, not just with Communist forces, which were pretty strong in France and Italy at the time, but even with people who were anti-communist, but had grave doubts about rearming Germany under any circumstances and under the guise of any controls that the Allies might set up.

The debate went on for a long time, and the Soviets encouraged people to think--and Germans to think--that if they only did not cooperate with the West, with the Allies, and stayed neutral, why there would be a possibility of German reunification; and we saw this campaign pretty clearly way back in 1950. So we started, in our little unit, to prepare our outline for German reunification, for the democratic reunification of Germany, but
detailing under what circumstances, in what ambience, with what framework, with what sort of elections, with what kind of government to be formed, and so forth and so on.

This document was finished about the end of 1950 and we put it into U.S. Government channels. It actually emerged with very little change, I believe in 1952, and this happened at that time--I was not in Germany then--because it was suitable for the propaganda war that was being carried on in a heightened tone in 1952 about those issues that were so fateful for Germany.

Q: Released by our government?

MARK: Yes, released by our government. It was finally put out as a plan, and it's the only formal plan I think that the U.S. Government has ever backed on German reunification. And, of course, it has been completely overtaken by events, such as Mutual East German-West German recognition in the 1970s, except that the subject has become current in Western circles, even though the West German government says (1989) it entertains no such illusory notions. And I think it still is illusory at this moment, but that has nothing to do with the fact that it remains an issue and a problem which will again have its day in history at some point.

Q: What was your perception of the attitude of Germans--East Germans, Berliners--toward the Soviet-American conflict at that time?

MARK: The Berliners, of course, had just been rescued from the airlift, I mean, by the airlift. They had just lived through this challenging period, so you couldn't have found a more pro-American population anywhere outside of the United States, and it remained that way for many years. I mean, that's why Kennedy got, you know, this resounding reception when he said in 1963, "Ich bin ein Berliner." The Wall had gone up by then, but the population was strongly pro-Western, pro-American. And, of course, until the Wall, people had been fleeing East Germany by the tens of thousands and settling in the West; this showed what they generally felt.

East Germany, even by then, had begun losing population. East Germany, I think, started out with 18 million people in 1949, and by the time the Berlin Wall went up in mid-1961, it was somewhere around 16 and a half or 17 million. So I think that statistic shows the general attitudes toward the Soviet Union, not that there weren't many pro-Soviet people too. I mean, you can always get some minority to support a totalitarian or communist regime out of ideology or careerism or mistaken self-interest.

But anyway, I got notice, to my surprise and pleasure, about February 1951 that I had been selected for Soviet-area training and language training. I had begun a night course in Russian at the local Army school in Berlin and hadn't gotten very far, which led me to wonder whether I could. I mean, it looked so tough as a language, but, nevertheless, when the notice came that I'd been selected, I happily went trundling off to Washington and started that course in March 1951 for four very intensive months of study in Washington.
That was when we still had the barracks buildings there along D Street, I believe. Or is it C Street? C Street, yes, along C Street. At the time, State only had the old 1940 Army building that was used before the Pentagon went up and that then became the old State Department. We had all these barracks around temporary buildings that had been put up during the war and there were a couple of old apartment houses that had been taken over, too. None of them had air-conditioning, and during the previous summer in the Russian training program--maybe in others, too--it had been terribly hot in Washington, which had been disastrous in terms of learning achievement. So to avoid that, our group of about seven or eight was packed off to Cornell University to continue our Russian language training in the cool weather of central New York state. And it was very pleasant indeed and we did learn a lot more.

Then everybody in the group went off to Columbia, except me, for a year's area training; and I didn't go because, as I pleaded with the people in State, I had, after all, studied at Columbia for over six years and I really would like a different place. Their rejoinder was, "How about Harvard?" and I said, "Great. Let's go off to Massachusetts." So I had the first of two years of my career at Harvard, and I got to know a good number of the first generation of Soviet Union scholars.

Q: What year was that?

MARK: By that time it was the fall of '51 and I stayed through the end of the academic year of '52. You know, it was really exciting for me to study matters Soviet. I didn't have to pass any courses. I just could sit in on any ones that I wanted to; and as a result, I sat in on about 10 or 12 of them that covered Soviet literature and Russian culture and history and economics, Soviet law, all kinds of things in a diversity that would have overwhelmed any serious student because he would have had to take exams. But I didn't. I was just learning things, and I fully expected to go to Moscow.

Indeed, I got a visa and my passport assigning me to Moscow. Then, shortly before leaving Harvard, there came a telephone call from the Bureau of European Affairs saying, "David, unfortunately you can't go to Moscow because we need someone urgently in Bucharest; and since you are a bachelor, we can switch you around without any trouble."

And I said, "Hey! But I haven't been studying Romanian; I've been studying Russian."

They said, "Don't worry about the Russian. There's a Russian-speaking minority in Romania, and you can try it out on them, but we really have to get someone in there." I came back to Washington very disappointed, and talked to some people, about a decision reversal, but the order remained definite.

And then I said, "Well, look. Here I've studied about the Soviet Union a lot, and I've got a visa. Let me at least go to Moscow and then after I get there, you know, within a week you can say to the Soviets that I've been transferred to Bucharest."
And they responded, "Well, we'll have to consult the passport division on that," which was headed by Mrs. Shipley at the time, who was the czar in her bailiwick; indeed even congressmen were said to tremble before Mrs. Shipley.

Her reaction was, "Well, using that visa when you're being assigned to Bucharest would be perpetrating a fraud on the Russians. I won't back that sort of thing." Fortunately, the Bureau of European Affairs, with more sympathy for me, intervened again. And she said, "Well, all right, if it's really only for less than a week."

And so four days were agreed upon, and I actually went to Moscow. And I'm certainly glad I did, because it was the last year of Stalin's reign. In the Korean War, there was no longer much fighting going on, but there was no peace yet, and Moscow was in the throes of the most violent anti-Americanism that I could have imagined. I mean, there were posters on every wall of every building showing snakes and spiders and whatnot that all represented the United States, or Syngman Rhee in some cases, but mostly the United States because the Soviets had invented the lie that we were engaging in germ warfare in North Korea, and they were pushing that unremittingly, even though international commissions had found that there was no truth to it.

The atmosphere in Moscow was poison. Even if you sat down at a collective table at a restaurant or a cafe, people would get up when they found out that you were American. They just didn't want to be seen in proximity to you. In a way, it's a valuable memory for me of how extreme a totalitarian regime can get, how it can create psychological biases and an aura of total fear and obedience. That was what mainly came across, but not much else in four days of stay, and I went back out to Frankfurt, got a Romanian visa, and traveled on to Bucharest.

Actually, the Bucharest experience was pretty useful because I became the DCM, and I was not even 30 years old at the time and thus I lucked into a serious job. The reason it happened was that there had been a DCM, but he was suddenly called away to become the DCM in Bolivia. A close friend of his had been made ambassador to Bolivia and had exercised his prerogative to get the guy he wanted as his DCM. That left Bucharest without a DCM, and they decided not to fill the job with anyone else. I had been sent there as the political officer, but I became the DCM for two years.

It was technically not an embassy; it was a legation, one of the last legations that the U.S. has ever had. And the minister plenipotentiary was a man named Harold Shantz, who was a delightful old-timer--also a bachelor, by the way--in the Foreign Service, who recounted such tales as having been the chargé d'affaires to Liberia in 1935 or '37 when the government there was so broke (and how much has changed, may I ask?) that the electricity bill was unpaid for the Congress, the lights went out, and they all lit candles to carry on legislative and political business in the Congress.
Well, Harold Shantz gave me an education in mission management, and the experience was also interesting because then, as now, Romania was the most internally Stalinist of the satellites.

Q: Was Ceausescu in charge?

MARK: Oh, no. Mr. Ceausescu, I don't know what he was doing at the time; he was working his way up. A man named Georghe Gheorghiu-Dej was in charge, and he had just ousted, in some communist maneuver, a predecessor red regime.

When I say that it was Stalinist, and remains Stalinist to this day, there was an additional factor that made it even worse at the time. The Soviets had, in fact, virtually taken over anything of value in Romania by creating about 20 or 22 joint Soviet-Romanian, supposedly 50-50 companies. Well, you can imagine who ran them, and that included the airline, the steel mills, the insurance company, road transport, harbors, any other kind of industry that you can think of. There was virtually nothing that was left to the Romanians except farming. There were all these Soviet-Romanian joint this or that.

When Stalin died in March 1953, Romania, alone among the satellites, had a week of mourning. The whole place was closed down. I mean they were that closely tied to Moscow, and yet it's surprising that within three or four months of that time, they began breaking away. Not only were they breaking up these joint companies, but they were beginning to establish distance from the Soviet Union, keeping the domestic Stalinist features, but establishing this distance internationally.

It was very curious, and we had no direct inkling of what was going on in late 1953 and early 1954, but the Danish chargé d'affaires had been a longtime resident of Romania and had amazing contacts all over the place. Thus, he assembled all the pieces of information that spelled out the changes. I studied Romanian and could speak it at the time--I can't now--but my study went on for only three months, and then, my teacher was arrested and sent out to the most feared forced labor camp.

At that time, the regime had a 30,000-people enforced labor Gulag-type site, where they were building a canal that was going to shorten the route between the Danube and the Black Sea by a relatively few miles. Foreign diplomats were then not usually allowed to travel around the country except that they could get permission for one-day summer trips, without staying overnight, to the Black Sea coast. They could not go to Constanta on the Black Sea, but to a little seaside resort called Eforia, just below Constanta where one changed trains.

Enroute to Constanta, we actually went through the Gulag. You could see these poor ragged people in long lines pushing handcarts, pushing things on rails to build this canal, which was abandoned, of course, soon after Stalin's death. The canal project was renewed much later on in a different form and completed by more modern methods. But in any case, Romania was a classic example of how a Communist satellite was molded and
made to function, as well as of how thoroughly the Soviets at that time dominated the East European area.

Q: What business did we have with Romania? What was our agenda with Romania during this--what was the period you were there?

MARK: It was from 1952 to 1954, two years. We had no business to speak of. We had some consular activities. Americans of Romanian descent, of course, sought to help their relatives who were trying to get out of the country. We made some interventions with the regime, which, of course, were completely brushed aside. The U.S. had, I guess, some residual connections with the royal family which had formally been ousted in 1947. We had no--

Q: Were they living in the United States?

MARK: No. I think they were living in Europe at the time. We had no economic business to speak of. That had been expropriated. I mean the Romanian telephone system had been part of IT&T at one time. That was how IT&T got started around the world as an international telephone and telegraph company in some of these East European countries, but that had long been expropriated. So basically we were a listening and watching post and, of course, the CIA operated to the extent that it could in Romania. It was very difficult in those times.

Q: Did you have any useful contacts with the Romanian government?

MARK: Not with the government. We had minor contacts with some of the old regime people who were still around, although the government was very ruthless in harassing anyone who dealt with us. They even in effect murdered one of our local staff. They pumped so much Sodium penathol, the truth drug, into her that she died, and so it was pretty dangerous to have associations with us.

The one sort of light incident that happened concerned the diplomatic club. There was a diplomatic club on the outskirts of Bucharest that also had a six-hole golf course. It had earlier had, in pre-communist days, an 18-hole golf course but the Soviets and the Romanians had confiscated 12 holes very soon after they took over. So we were left with six plus the clubhouse, and the diplomatic corps used it a great deal, except for the Soviets who weren't club members.

Well the Romanian communists had established a people's park in the 12-hole area that had been confiscated, and they announced that they wanted to take over the remaining six holes to expand the people's park. We, of course, talked to some of our Soviet colleagues about this, and the Soviets finally said, "Well, the Soviet embassy really didn't have enough space for playing volleyball"--which was their favorite sport--"so could they get volleyball courts built at the diplomatic club if they joined?" And we said, "Oh, sure. Absolutely."
And so after a good bit of negotiation, we arrived at an arrangement whereby the Soviets would enroll enough members so they would have a 52% or 53% majority and thus be able to gain control of the diplomatic club board. Indeed, they joined in just the right numbers and once they were in there, of course, they weren't going to give up the six-hole golf course area to the Romanian people's park. Thus, the club was preserved by this difficult negotiation that we had had with the Soviets. But that's a sign of how important our regular diplomatic business was in the Romanian capital.

Q: Why did we have a legation and not an embassy? When did we change it to an embassy and why?

MARK: I think because throughout Eastern Europe we had had legations before the war.

Q: The traditional thing?

MARK: Traditional thing and it was changed, I guess, sometime in the late '50s when we just decided that having legations had gone out of fashion and that it made our chief of mission technically inferior in rank to foreign ambassadors who were assigned to the country; so we just gave it up.

Q: Did you have a lot of contact with the other embassies in the capital?

MARK: Oh, we had a lot of contact, particularly with the French who were very active in Bucharest and who had more insights into things. Romania had been more of a prewar French cultural colony. Not that Bucharest really was the Paris of the East as was claimed, but nevertheless there was more French influence there. I can even remember once having to interpret between the French and Soviet ambassadors since neither spoke the other's language, and I spoke both.

Q: Your French was also much better?

MARK: Yes. My French had gotten considerably better after high school.

Q: So after Bucharest you were off to...

MARK: In Bucharest, I got a phone call one day and I was told that I was to become the new Yugoslav desk officer in the Department. Of course, I had never served in the Department, but needed this experience; therefore, I was to stop in Belgrade on the way back to Washington. So I got a quick look at Tito's Belgrade, talked to some people there, and then went back to Washington and began the learning process of what it was to be a desk officer in what was then the East European office of the Bureau of European Affairs.

Q: You'd been in the Foreign Service then about eight years?
MARK: I had been in the Foreign Service eight years, seven and a half years, right.

Q: And this is your first assignment to Washington?

MARK: First assignment to Washington. And, of course, it was a time in which I learned a great deal, and particularly because the Yugoslav desk was one of the most active in the Department at the time. And that was because John Foster Dulles, as Secretary, envisaged Tito as the soft underbelly of the Soviet empire in Europe, envisaged Tito as a means for corrupting and getting Western influence into the East European camp. Of course, Tito had defected from Stalin, so to speak, in '48, '49. It had taken us several years to accept the fact that he was a genuine defector, and then to begin the process of establishing relations with him, of using him for our purposes, but at the same time providing him with the support that he needed to keep going--economic support and military support. We got heavily into supplying Tito with aircraft and with military technology and so forth. But there was a lot of opposition to our policy of supporting Tito, before I arrived in Washington, and this opposition, particularly in '53, had been promoted in a way by Clare Boothe Luce, who was our Ambassador to Italy at the time and who was backing Italy in a very difficult struggle over ownership of the Trieste territory. I mean, this was almost a "casus belli" between Italy and Yugoslavia. We were doing our best to negotiate some sort of solution, and we ultimately succeeded, but we had to browbeat Tito, and naturally, it didn't sit well with Mrs. Luce and others that we were supporting Tito at the same time, even on the military side.

At that point, Yugoslavia was still a fairly classical communist regime, and Tito had a cult of personality a mile long. But nonetheless, our strategic interest in using him and John Foster Dulles' vision of how he might prove valuable to us was predominant in our policy. The policy not only didn't have unanimous support in the Congress or in the country, it didn't have all that much support in the State Department, either. I would say that among the people between Mr. Dulles as the Secretary and me as the lowly desk officer--and there were a lot of people and layers between us--there was almost no support.

Under Secretary Robert Murphy at the time had an understanding for what Dulles was trying to do, but his own innate anti-communist feelings were so strong that he wasn't all that sympathetic to the effort. He was just understanding of it and ready to follow the Secretary's orders. The Assistant Secretary for European affairs and his deputies were not understanding at all. In any event, matters--

Q: Did Dulles then stand alone with you against--

MARK: Well, that's what it came to by 1955. The situation deteriorated--that is, in terms of U.S. policy--because Tito, who had by now established pretty clearly that he was going it alone and was able to do so, didn't want the tension that had existed with Stalin to be continued. So he began making overtures to the new Soviet leader, Khrushchev, first to Malenkov and then to Khrushchev.
This culminated sometime in mid-'55 in a Khrushchev visit to Belgrade, and, of course, Khrushchev said all kinds of things to try to entice Tito back into the fold, or at least to act in friendly fashion, and the more that Khrushchev talked, the worse it looked for our policy of using Tito as a fifth column within the Soviet camp, and the more that opposition developed to the whole approach. This meant that the lack of support in the State Department itself became more important.

As the support diminished in the government and in the Congress, I felt that implementation of Dulles' policy was becoming weaker and weaker, and that something drastic had to be done to reverse the trend. This was, oh, sort of late spring, summer of 1955. Something drastic had to be done to redeem the relationship, and I felt that we had to send some very high-level person to Yugoslavia. So I wrote--it was in May or June, I think--a memo to Dulles, through the proper channels of course, urging that a mission be launched and urging also that it be the Army Chief of Staff, General Lawton Collins, I believe, to do it.

**Q:** Why did you prefer a military representative?

**MARK:** I thought that he was someone to whom Tito would listen, since he had that background in European affairs. It would impress Tito with our seriousness. Also military supply was one of the key issues, i.e., whether we were going to keep up our military supply, given the charges that Tito was now headed back toward Moscow's camp.

**Q:** But was there a military threat that we were dealing with, or was this just reassurance for Yugoslav independence from the Soviet Union?

**MARK:** Well, I think--you mean the reassurance--

**Q:** I mean the military supply was a symbolic gesture on our part, wasn't it?

**MARK:** Oh, no. It was important. I mean the Soviet armies were poised. There's something known to defenders of Western Europe, and particularly northern Italy, as the Ljubljana Gap, Ljubljana being the capital of the Yugoslav republic of Slovenia. And this is apparently a fairly level area that has been the path of invasions many times. The Soviets were in a position to overrun it fairly readily, so that our building up Yugoslav forces, and tanks were involved, as well as artillery, was not a gesture. It was serious business.

Anyway, it was a critical time. I had seen Dulles before. I had been at meetings in his office on Yugoslav affairs. With this memo, he took to dealing with me fairly often on a direct basis. He would just phone down and ask me up or ask for something. I remember once being called up there and his brother, Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, was also present, and we were soon discussing the issues.
Q: That was rather extraordinary, wasn't it?

MARK: It was pretty heady stuff.

Q: He didn't consult many junior or middle-grade officers, did he?

MARK: No. It was pretty heady stuff, I must say. And, of course, the other people in my office knew about it, so that it was, you know, it was appreciated that at least Dulles liked the kind of policy line I was taking. And I, frankly, thought his strategic point of view made great sense in terms of supporting Tito, if not because he was going to be an effective fifth column in Eastern Europe, then at least because he would be a symbol of how a communist state could make it on its own and could develop independent ideas. I mean, the Yugoslavs were already beginning to develop some ideological heresies, such as factory management by workers and government decentralization in some economic matters. It wasn't really very much. It didn't convince ex-Tito ally, Milovan Djilas, who wrote the heretic book, *The New Class*, exposing fully the huge perquisites of the Communist Party apparatus. It didn't affect that. But nevertheless, it was a change, and Yugoslavs soon began tourism to Western Europe, which people in the Moscow satellites soon learned about.

Well, in any case, after much ado, Dulles decided to send Robert Murphy, not Lawton Collins, over to deal with Tito, and we made preparations for the Murphy trip. I was to go along, of course, and I was to carry a special diplomatic bag which had some documents for Tito, including a letter signed by Dwight Eisenhower that I had drafted inviting Tito to come to the United States. But while I was on the train in Italy, before I even got into Yugoslavia, Eisenhower came down with his ileitis attack, his intestinal attack, and was very ill. So it was decided that we couldn't--we didn't know what was going to happen to Ike--and so we couldn't deliver the letter. So that was scrapped for the time being.

Q: Still, such an invitation, I would think, would not sit well with a lot of Yugoslav émigré societies in this country.

MARK: It didn't. I haven't mentioned the Yugoslav émigré situation. I mean, they were on top of us all the time, and, indeed, the main effort of the Yugoslav secret police representatives at Tito's embassy in Washington was to keep track of the émigrés in the U.S. and to nourish pro-Tito cliques.

We particularly had one case in California. I think the man's name was Artukovic, who had been a Minister of the Interior in the rump Croatian separatist state that Hitler had set up, and who had executed many thousands of people, or who at least had approved their execution. He was in the States and we tried to extradite him to Belgrade and this provoked a terrible court battle. I think he was finally extradited as a very old man to Yugoslavia in 1988. He's been on trial there. Maybe it was 1987. That was a sideline, but it was an extremely complex matter, which took a desk officer's time, a lot of a desk officers' time.
But anyway, to get back to our meeting in Belgrade, Murphy handled it very skillfully, as he always did, a consummate diplomat. Our ambassador was James Riddleberger, one of the most senior ambassadors at that time in the Foreign Service, who later became the administrator of what's now AID abroad. And I think Tito understood our point of view pretty well and understood better the balancing act that he had to carry out in view of U.S. domestic pressures.

**Q: Did you attend the meeting with Tito?**

MARK: No. I didn't attend the meeting with Tito. I flew back with Murphy in his plane to Paris--this was the plane that General Norstad, who was then the Air Force Chief of Staff, had put at our disposal--he was chief of staff or Air Force commander in Europe, one or the other--and just before Paris, the pilot announced that the landing gear of the plane would not come down, or at least that the light wouldn't go on saying that it had come down, or maybe it wasn't locked in place, or whatever.

So we circled Paris for about 45 or 50 minutes, and Murphy got to reminisce about how he, as a young man, and trained in the law too, like me, had made the decision to join the Foreign Service. And he'd given up fortune--didn't have very much by way of it now, but had really had a fantastic life. I mean, during the war he'd landed by submarine in North Africa--and so he was very glad that he had chosen the Foreign Service as a career. You know, it was all very nice to be a lawyer, but that was pretty prosaic compared with the opportunities that he had had.

**Q: What's your estimation of Murphy? How did he shape up?**

MARK: I think he was an extraordinarily skillful diplomat, I mean negotiator. I mean, and not just because he was Irish that he could charm the bejesus off anyone. Even if he had been of Greek ancestry, he could have done it in Belgrade. He was just extraordinarily talented in dealing with people and in playing his cards in practical situations. I saw no evidence that he was a great strategic thinker, though I may be wrong. He wasn't particularly appreciative of Dulles' policy toward Yugoslavia, but he carried out his instructions earnestly and very capably when he had to do so.

I should add that the landing gear turned out to be perfectly okay. It was just the signal light that hadn't worked, and so we landed safely in Paris without any further trouble.

It wasn't the last of my connections with Murphy in the case of Yugoslavia, because 1956 was an election year, a presidential election year; Ike was running for reelection. And the leader of the Republicans in the Senate at the time was Senator William Knowland of California, who was strongly against Dulles' policy of playing up to Tito. This was just before the Russians invaded Hungary.
But, in any event, during the summer of 1956, the AID bill was up in the Senate, and Knowland was opposing the Yugoslav part of it. And so Murphy and I went up to Philadelphia one day to go to the old Bellevue Stratford Hotel in the middle of the city to spend two hours in a smoke-filled room with the senator, sort of arguing out the terms under which State Department policy towards Yugoslavia would be allowed to continue. We got a certain degree of freedom of action, we got some aid, but there were also all kinds of conditions laid down by Knowland which we felt obliged to accept.

Q: Did he--Knowland--feel strongly himself on anti-communist grounds, or was he responding to the Republican right, or to ethnic groups, or all of the above?

MARK: All of the above. All of the above. I should say that the issue had come up again of a Tito visit to Washington by this time. Knowland was against it and we scrubbed it. But, before this had happened, I had drafted another letter of invitation. I revised the first letter, and Dulles got Ike to sign it, and it was sent over to Tito, inviting him to the States. I guess Knowland knew about it. I mean, he got us to kill any visit at that time.

We killed it by putting on such conditions of implementing the visit that we knew Tito couldn't accept. We were going to limit his stay to three days in the States, and so forth and he wanted much more, so he canceled it. He did come later in Ike's term in '59. After all, by that time we had had Khrushchev in Washington, so why not have Tito?

But there was one other aspect of it. The fact of the existence of the invitation letter had leaked out, and Joe McCarthy was still going in the Senate at the time, although he was not the powerful Joe of a few years earlier. And he said to Dulles, "I know, Mr. Secretary, that you didn't write that letter yourself, that you didn't send it. So who was the commie fink inside the State Department who did all that for you?"

And Dulles said, "Well, of course I didn't write it myself, but I protect my people and I'm not telling you who it was who did that, who wrote that letter." As it happened, the letter had gone to Belgrade at a time when Dulles was in the hospital. I think it was his first bout with cancer. And since he had been in the hospital then, he said to McCarthy, "Well, naturally I was in the hospital at the time, and maybe if I had known about it I wouldn't have let the letter go up to the President for signature. But I'm standing by it and I'm not telling you who it was."

Well, of course, that was just an out-and-out lie. He had been in the hospital to be sure, but the letter had gone to him in the hospital. Not only had it gone, but he had fiddled with the language of the operative paragraph of the invitation, so that he had gotten the nuances to sound exactly as he wanted before it went to the White House.

Q: Are you saying that John Foster Dulles wasn't the militant anti-communist that he's sometimes thought to be?
MARK: Oh, I think he was a militant anti-communist. He saw the merit of using fire to fight fire, and he thought of Tito, as I said earlier, he thought of him as the means of undermining the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. Of course, the crisis in Hungary was going on at the time, late 1956. This was just before that, this was some months before, but the tendencies with Imre Nagy in Hungary were very clear. And so Dulles was not above telling a little white lie about his involvement with this letter at the time that the thing was sent.

And, as a matter of fact, when the Russians later invaded Hungary, when Dulles' policy was succeeding only too well there and in Poland, and in Eastern Europe generally, we decided not to back the anti-communist up at all. We wouldn't even release some rifles that we had in Vienna to the Hungarian rebels. I remember working all night once in the State Department in October of '56 when the crisis was on. The White House made the decision right then and there that there would be no military backing for the anti-communist fighters.

Q: Some people in the State Department were pushing to send them weapons across the line?

MARK: I think there was some pressure, but Dulles wouldn't do it either despite prior speeches about "rolling back the Iron Curtain." And, of course, Tito was scared to death at this time. There was a secret--I don't know whether it's still secret or not--but there was a communication of his to Eisenhower at the time in which he asked for a military security guarantee from the United States in case the Soviet Union, driving through Hungary, invaded Yugoslavia, and we gave it to him. Ike gave it to him.

Q: In writing?

MARK: No, I don't think so. I think it was all verbal, but we responded positively.

Q: Do you think we would have maintained our word on this?

MARK: I think we probably would have. I mean, we just considered that that's where the Iron Curtain was at the time and one didn't allow the Iron Curtain to be moved because it could have had all kinds of implications for the politics and morale of Western Europe.

I should note here one other sidelight. I pleaded in 1955 to have a U.S. consulate general established in Sarajevo, Bosnia, because with its ethnic mixture, that city seemed like a microcosm of the country as a sensitive sounding board. And I got my way in 1956, but the new outpost was unfortunately closed down late in the 1960s during one of the State Department's periodic budget crises.

Well, I think I stayed on the Yugoslav desk only a little while after that, because in mid-1957 I was assigned to Moscow at long last.
Q: To pause there for a minute now, you've now been in the Foreign Service 10 years, 12 years?

MARK: '46 to '57.

Q: Eleven years. What was your estimate of the Foreign Service at that time? Were you convinced that you made the right choice?

MARK: Oh, yes. Absolutely. I was hugely enthusiastic about it. I worked all kinds of late hours at night. I had met lots of people I was interested in. While I was the Yugoslav desk officer, Walt Stoessel was in charge of Soviet affairs within this Office of East European and Soviet Affairs. They hadn't split as of that time. And, you know, just watching him operate, seeing him operate. I mean, he was a diplomat's diplomat, and I sort of not literally but figuratively sat at his feet watching and learning. And, of course, I was interested in the Soviet Union. It was no wonder that he later rose so high in the Department; to Deputy Secretary of State.

And lots of other people were there, who just had enormous experience. My immediate boss as head of East European affairs was a man named--I can't even remember his first name now. He was known as Butch Leverich, and I learned much from him. And even the other people--Jake Beam (later Ambassador to Warsaw and Moscow) was deputy assistant secretary for Eastern Europe within the bureau--it had become a bureau by then--so that I was enormously impressed with my colleagues and my bosses, with the subject matter which I was dealing with, and which was being dealt with in Washington, with service for officers mixed between the field and the United States. Besides, since I was still a bachelor, why, I had unlimited time to give to this.

Q: But you missed what many Foreign Service officers got, and that was a large dose of visa work, the routine work at that time. You had had excellent assignments. How did that happen?

MARK: I have no idea how it happened. I never did any consular work, except for that one small aspect of my job in Korea with the fainting experience of those two women confronting each, and a few other jobs there. I have already mentioned the other main consular job in Korea, attendance weddings. Lots of American soldiers married Koreans, and I attended something like 40 weddings, and I learned every different sect's wedding procedures, from Catholic to Buddhist to all the types of Protestantism, Jewish, though I didn't have any Muslim marriages, I think.

Q: But did you have to become a manipulator of the Foreign Service personnel system in order to get these good jobs, or did they just descend on you from a beneficent management?

MARK: They just descended. As I said, the only manipulation I ever tried was to get out of Frankfurt and over to Berlin, and I hadn't been on the consular side in Frankfurt; I was
in the so-called protocol business. But that was the only time I did it. To be sure, as I was finishing as Yugoslav desk officer, I tried very hard to get the assignment to Moscow to become what they then called "chief of chancery." Chief of chancery, a British Embassy designation, was what corresponded to a combined counselor for political and economic affairs.

I had just gotten promoted to Class 3 in the old (pre-1981) system, and I was 33, and some people were saying, "He's not old enough for the job in Moscow and so forth," and I hadn't served in Moscow before. Usually the political counselor, as number three in the Embassy, had had some prior assignment there in the Soviet Union; I hadn't. But nevertheless, because the Yugoslav desk work had gone well, I got the job.

Q: But during this period, this period was also the period of McCarthy and a lot of pressure on the State Department from outside, a lot of criticism. You, after all, took the position in the Yugoslav thing which might invite some criticism. None of that touched you? I mean, Mr. Dulles defended you on one occasion, but you never got tarred by it. Did it bother you, what was happening to the State Department?

MARK: Oh, sure.

Q: Did any friends of yours get affected by it?

MARK: I can't think of any. But, I felt a lot of empathy for people like John Service and the others--Graham Allison--who were caught up on the China side of things. You know, because I thought that Dean Acheson had been so right in his judgments about China, about what we had tried to do there, even though we had failed to be sure. But I didn't see any great virtues in the Chiang Kai-shek regime; hence, why blame fine U.S. diplomats at the operational level? It wasn't my area. I didn't know anything about it, quite obviously, except from my tour of duty in Korea, but I just thought it was disgraceful that those kinds of McCarthy things went on.

I was waiting for some Mr. Welch to appear before he actually materialized to take on Joe McCarthy. I didn't understand why Eisenhower had failed to do it. I didn't understand well how Washington worked on domestic issues, and how wheels grind slowly before the time is right; yet even then it's risky to make the plunge to take on a person who had developed the position of power that McCarthy had.

Q: Okay. So then in 1957 you're off to Moscow as political counselor?

MARK: The title was "Chief of Chancery," a British rank, but for me it was being the political and economic counselor.

Q: Both of them?

MARK: Both of them.
Q: You had never done economic work before?

MARK: No, I had never done economic work. We had ten people in the section including me, and two of them sort of worked on economic matters, to the extent that one could amidst Soviet statistical secrecy. There's nothing I can add to the history of the Khrushchev era that I participated in. I worked for a tremendously able ambassador, Llewellyn Thompson--"Tommy" Thompson. This was the first of his two ambassadorial tours there. He had an easy working relationship with Khrushchev, whom he often saw informally.

It was a time of great change there. Not as much as now with Gorbachev, but since we were much closer to the Stalin era, it seemed like a lot. Moscow was scrubbed of any anti-American posters that I had remembered from 1952. We were able to speak to many more people.

We also had weekly meetings with counterparts from many embassies of NATO allies to exchange specific information and insights. From these many sources and from some contacts during rail and automobile trips in Russia, I came to the conclusion that the Soviet dictatorship was too strongly entrenched to be overturned. This conclusion, of course, would have great significance, if true, for U.S. objectives during the Cold War confrontation. I wrote a long essay on this matter in 1958, and Ambassador Thompson sent it on to Washington with an introduction of his own saying that matters were not as hopeless for a pro-Western outcome as I was predicting. I wanted to rebut his argumentation, but he said that I was being impolite to a superior. So that my addition never went in. I couldn't foresee the Gorbachev era 30 years later, but I wish that Ambassador Thompson were still alive to experience it as a validation of his relative optimism.

Regarding automobile trips, I was the first non-military American to get a driver's license. Nowadays it's done reciprocally. Soviets get them in Washington and we get them in Moscow, but I had to go through the whole exam business.

I was excused from just one thing that Soviet drivers had to do and that's to pass a mechanic's test for repairing the car. But I had to take a big physical exam and then I had to learn all the rules and regulations. There they don't have signs--they didn't then at least-have signs on the streets saying, "Parking Two Hours," or "No Parking," or whatnot. You just learned all the rules, that within ten meters of such and such a lamppost or whatever, one doesn't park. Or when you have double trolley tracks, you can't do certain things about turning left. There was a large book of rules, and I had to study, study, study because you were tested via a sort of a little gaming board, moving cars around, and then you got a road test in addition. And so, as I say, I was the first American to get a license and I had my own car over there.
I don't know--I guess we can say it; enough time has passed, about 30 years. Some things can be declassified. But one day before I went to Moscow the--I guess he was still deputy assistant secretary--Jake Beam, who was soon to become ambassador to Poland, called me in and said, "David, the CIA would like you to support them a bit when you're in Moscow."

And I said, "Well, what do you mean?"

He said, "Well, they don't have anybody in Moscow."

Q: They didn't?

MARK: Well, that's part of the story. [Laughter] "They don't have anybody in Moscow and so they need some help with things. If you agree, why, I'll put you in touch with them and they'll tell you about it." So that happened and I was put in touch with some people from the operational side in the agency.

And they said, "Well, you know, you just have to learn some of the tasks that we have vis-a-vis the USSR, and of course, there will be surveillance on you which you must keep in mind." And so they gave me some sporadic lectures in Washington, before I went out there, and I was to use a channel of communication through the diplomatic pouch.

Well, about four or five months after I got there, someone arrived as a security officer at the embassy, and he turned out to be one of the people with whom I had studied Russian back in 1951 in the Department. And I knew at that time that he was CIA officer, so I immediately asked through my channels, "Well, isn't this a CIA officer?" and they came back in due course and said, "Yes. But we'd still like you to go on with support work." So we only communicated with each other writing inside the embassy, since we suspected that the place was bugged, which it was, as we now know for sure. As it turned out, only occasionally did he ask me to do something, but, at those occasions, I did try to help.

And I guess the Soviets suspected it, because they began tailing me even more closely. I should have guessed this perhaps when, on some Saturday going to visit a country museum near Moscow, I came back to my car, started it off--it was a Jeep station wagon actually--and soon, after I'd gone a little distance back toward Moscow, a taxi driver said at a red light, "Say, you're leaking some oil underneath." And sure enough, the KGB agents, at the museum parking lot, wanting to wreck my motor, had pulled the plug on the oil reservoir. So I got towed the rest of the way back by an embassy truck; and that saved the car.

Then, a little later on, there was another big incident involving their effort to take away my driver's license under some spurious pretext. I kept driving anyway and we complained to the foreign ministry, which eventually returned my license. What this finally led to after I had been in Moscow two years, and when I had been assigned to Tokyo as my next post, was that I was declared PNG (persona non grata).
Q: Was this a reciprocal action because of something that happened here?

MARK: Yes, it was. We had just thrown a guy out of Washington who had been dealing with agents, and about a week later they threw me out. Well, our ambassador complained at the Soviet foreign ministry, and even saw Gromyko; but Gromyko just said, "Oh, well. If you knew about him what I know about him, you'd agree with me, but I can't tell you what I know about him." [Laughter]

The formal charge was that during a trip to Riga in Latvia, which I had made 19 months earlier as the first U.S. embassy official to visit a Baltic state since their annexation by the USSR in 1940, I had tried to suborn an Intourist agent. They had, in fact, gotten it wrong. It had been a U.S. military man who tried to do the suborning. The Intourist agent paradoxically had just returned--he was a Latvian--had returned from forced exile in Siberia, so he was bitterly anti-Soviet, and beyond suborning anyway. So that was just a pretext, and I'll tell you more about that a little later on.

But I think, you know, in retrospect, the services I performed for the CIA were marginal, and I think it was a great mistake ever to have been asked to do this by the Agency. And I told that to the people in the Agency later on, because the guy who got me involved was later on was the Agency's chief of station in Paris, when I told him that. My job was too prominent in the embassy as the political counselor to get involved in that sort of thing. Now, my job may have made me attractive to the Agency. They may have thought that it was less likely that I would be followed as closely, but I think that since they know the KGB and its operations much better than I, they should have known what the KGB would do, particularly to a person with his own private car. Indeed, Ambassador Beam should have rejected CIA's approach, instead of putting the question to me. And the CIA, after all, knew it was untrue that they had no representation of their own in Moscow.

Q: It would seem in bureaucratic terms, from their standpoint, they were getting the services of someone without the usual risks. They always risk losing someone through compromise and have to start all over training a replacement. They didn't have to worry about that with you.

MARK: A friend of mine in the Service who left--who was "PNGed" from Moscow a year before I came, I think pretty clearly had been in the same position vis-à-vis the CIA, and they had had their own person there at the time, too. So I think that because they were at that time limited to a very small station of their own in Moscow, they wanted to have supplemental "assets." But in using Foreign Service officers to help them they were coming close to upsetting a basic State Department rule that the CIA cannot be given the protective title of "Foreign Service officer" for its own personnel. Or, at least, that is the way it was through 1980.

Q: But the State Department limited the CIA size in Moscow then?
MARK: I think probably we did, but also owing to general circumstances; and the CIA station expanded, I guess, later on. But in any case, this episode really changed my whole career. I mean, I think my career was headed pretty well in the Soviet-U.S. orbit. Still, I must admit that I don't know how far upwards I would have gotten anyway, because I committed one other sin in Moscow within the Service, when I told something to an Egyptian colleague which I shouldn't have done.

Q: That was not a sin that the Soviets objected to?

MARK: No, no, no. No, no, they didn't know. But what happened was that I had been let in on some information that I now know involved the U-2 spy plane. It involved the Gary Powers-type thing that came to public attention in 1960.

Q: You mean the source of the information?

MARK: Yes, the source of the information, and that was sort of the only way such facts could have been known—or by some other means of intelligence operation. And I had not been cleared for that information, and therefore had never really been warned about its sensitivity. Nevertheless, I was given the information in the embassy with an injunction not to pass it on to anyone. But in a conversation, trying to get somewhere, get something in return out of my Egyptian colleague, I mentioned it, and the Egyptians noted it, and it got back to the ambassador, and he was very upset about my mistake. So that my efficiency report for that year said that there was no harder working, no more brilliant reporter in the embassy, but that he, at times, did not show the discretion that he should have. And it took me until 1962 to get promoted--that had been five years--up to Class 2, I think very directly reflecting upon my lapse in Moscow.

But in any case, regardless of how that turned out, getting PNGed by the Soviets changed my whole career pattern. Even in 1973, when I next tried to visit there, the Soviets refused a visa. But I had been assigned to Tokyo anyway. I was to be the officer who followed all Japanese foreign policy, except toward the United States. That is, all other aspects of Japanese foreign policy, and the Department planned to give me an intensive six months Japanese language course using a new pedagogic method, which much appealed to me. But instead of going directly to Tokyo--

Q: You left Moscow when?

MARK: In, I guess it was June 1959. I had arrived in June of '57.

But at the last minute, Washington said, "Well, instead of going to Tokyo right away, could you please put in three months on TDY--temporary duty--in Geneva, because we have this conference going on to ban nuclear weapons." I think at the time, it was soon after the conference to discuss the scientific possibilities of banning nuclear weapons had ended more or less successfully. The final agreement had said that there were enough possibilities of verification scientifically to justify the political negotiation effort. But
anyway, they told me, "Would you go down there, because we always have a sort of Soviet expert on the delegation, and our Soviet expert is being pulled away very suddenly for some other job. So until we get another one, could you fill in there?"

I said, "Sure." So I went down to Geneva for three months and began learning something about the subject. I fell into the hands of the extremely able disarmament crowd, including such people as Ron Spiers. And after three months, there was an adjournment. That was at the end of September 1959. These conferences always have periodic adjournments. And they said, "Well, you know, we're going to resume soon and go on up to Christmas. We will see how these things go, but you've learned enough now. So couldn't you stay another three months, and we'll fix it up with the Japan desk about your Tokyo assignment." And I said, "Sure. It's okay with me."

Q: Did you want to stay in Geneva?

MARK: Geneva was a nice place. I went back to the States actually in October 1959 and got engaged at the time. I had met a lady in Moscow, an elegant American lady who was running the Anglo-American school there; she left the year before I did, but we corresponded. I went back to the States, and on that leave in October 1959, we got engaged. So Geneva was sort of closer to Washington than Tokyo, it seemed to me, and thus I went back to Switzerland for another three months.

Well, as you might imagine, by year's end, I had acquired six months of experience, had begun writing many of the speeches for the disarmament delegation for its formal presentation, had begun learning the details of the issues there, and had begun understanding something about how arms control efforts were evolving. This subject was the name of the game at the time; the nuclear test ban was politically important; and so the Department said to me, "Well, you know, if you want to stay in Geneva and don't want to go to Tokyo, you can."

The East Asian office was very upset. They said, "We've had this job vacant nine months now and it's an important job; but, okay, we've taken our lumps," and I went back to Geneva. So I was there four years altogether, until the conference ended in July 1963. By the time it ended, much had happened. We always had a political appointee as the head of the delegation. Initially, it was James Wadsworth, who had been our U.N. ambassador for a while, and then, after that it was Arthur Dean, who had been the head of the prestigious New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell.

We had initially had a couple of very distinguished Foreign Service officers as chief of staff. When I first got there it was David Popper, who doesn't need any description, later Ambassador to Chile and Assistant Secretary for UN affairs. Then it became Charles Stelle, who died very suddenly later on but who was, of course, an old Iranian hand, too, like you, Henry (Precht, the interviewer). But anyway, he came to Geneva, and when he left, I became chief of staff, "Coordinator", of the delegation. Thus, I got heavily involved in the disarmament side. I finally received my promotion, because I had sort of worn
away the stigma, I guess, of that lapse in Moscow, and because I had learned something useful about disarmament processes with the USSR.

Q: Did you like it? I mean, that technical business is quite different from what you had done in the past.

MARK: Right. But it was political too, because the aim of the conference--there were three countries negotiating it: Britain, Soviet Union, and the United States--the second aim of the conference was to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading to any additional nations, besides the first aim of stopping the testing; and this political aim was going to be realized through the clauses of the eventual test ban treaty. It was a very complicated formula that was going to involve bringing the French and the Chinese into the arrangement.

But no one could envisage in those days what happened subsequently. I mean that, in 1966, a separate treaty was concluded to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, which is still in existence. Our conference was just on testing, but since non-dissemination was then the side aim of the negotiations, we were heavily engaged in all kinds of political issues at the same time regarding non-spread, and we also wanted to set up the structure of a test ban verification agency. It got us into intrusive verification questions that were, you know, quite insoluble until more recent days.

Also, in the last year of the conference, the test ban issue was subsumed under the new 18 nation disarmament conference that was set up in 1962. We three nations maintained a kind of separate identity as a "subcommittee" within that larger conference. But our delegation--again it was still the same delegation--had now to spend time on the new conference's attempt, that went on for a year, to negotiate general and complete worldwide disarmament, nuclear and conventional.

Q: Did you take this all seriously?

MARK: Well, people didn't take the conventional disarmament side so seriously, but nevertheless there was the glare of publicity on it, and we had to come up with overall disarmament plans. We had all kinds of staged conventional disarmament plans, getting rid of planes, tanks, and artillery and troops and zones and whatnot. I mean, these things were thought out. They've only come to life really in the present day. But 25 years ago, we were discussing lots and lots of these same issues.

Q: But did you really think that you were doing work that would have a practical outcome?

MARK: Yes and no. On the nuclear test ban side, we always had hopes of success because, obviously, the Soviets had an interest there, too. But on the rest, no, we didn't. But nevertheless, it was an exercise in which for the first time we were forced to think about all these matters in a systematic way. I mean, if you were serious--and as far as
world public opinion was concerned we had to seem to be serious--then what did you propose you do? What kind of disarmament plans; and what was wrong with the Soviet plans, because they had come up with them, too? So anyway, that was all.

_Q: You were talking about your service at the Geneva disarmament conference._

MARK: Well, this conference went through a number of phases. Of course, to jump ahead, we do now have a nuclear test ban treaty; it's a partial test ban treaty. It doesn't cover underground nuclear tests. Our negotiations were aimed at concluding a total nuclear test ban, but we ended up with a partial one as a result of direct negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev in 1963, that at the last stages brought in Averell Harriman as chief negotiator.

To jump ahead even further, after the end of this conference, I was sent for my senior Foreign Service training to Harvard to be a Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, of which Henry Kissinger was then deputy director. And one could do almost anything one wanted during that year; and one of the things I did was to write a book about my nuclear test ban experiences. This turned out to be a fairly lengthy book of a couple of hundred pages, and it does record my experiences, as well as describe the details and motivations of the four years of negotiations. Unfortunately, I never could get it published in the United States. I tried a number of university presses and they said, "But you don't have footnotes."

And I said, "Well, a lot of this is my personal recollection."

And they said, "Well, we're not sure it will sell very well."

And I said, "No, but that's why a university press exists." And in any event, the book finally got published in 1965 in German by the German Foreign Policy Association.

_Q: You didn't have to translate it?_

MARK: No. I didn't have to do the initial translation draft, but after each section was translated, it was sent back to me for correction--the German text was sent back for correction. It had taken me four months to write the book, but it took five months to correct the German.

But incidentally, and this is jumping ahead to the present day (1989), a friend of mine still on duty in the State Department in Soviet matters, who has kept up with disarmament types on the Soviet side all these years, was in Vienna in 1989 to talk with the Soviet diplomat who is now involved in negotiating with us on the conventional arms force cuts. I believe that's the conference that I'm talking about.

Anyway, this man, named Oleg Grinevsky, had been a very, very junior man at the time of the test ban talks. He was then just starting his Soviet Foreign Service career. But he
said to my friend that he is now putting together all his recollections to write a book of memoirs about disarmament efforts from the Soviet point of view, but unfortunately, he didn't have any really solid recollections about the test ban negotiations. And my friend said to him, "Oh, haven't you read Dave Mark's book about it?"

He said, "I didn't know he'd written a book."

And my friend said, "Yes. He wrote a book but it's in German, unfortunately."

And the guy said, "Well, I don't read German."

So my friend said, "Well, I'll talk to Dave and find out whether he's got the original English manuscript." And I rummaged around and found an English original and sent it to my friend in Washington, on condition that he xerox me a copy, as well as xerox one for our Soviet colleague. And so now a Soviet has a copy of it and may look through to see how that contributes to his recollections of this conference and to his understanding of American negotiating positions.

But anyway, getting back to the time of the conference, the Eisenhower Administration carried the conference in effect up through November 1960. That's when we adjourned. We adjourned just about the time of the election in which Kennedy was elected. And this was the only Soviet-American negotiation that survived the U-2 crisis in May 1960; it continued going. Much of our emphasis had been on test ban verification problems. How, if we got to a nuclear test ban, how could we be sure on our side that the Russians weren't cheating on the treaty?

Well, nobody had been talking about Gary Powers and the U-2, even though he and his colleagues in U-2s were flying over the Soviet nuclear testing site in Siberia, Semipalatinsk. So we had a lot of intrusion. We could see every time the Soviets began surface preparations for blowing up a nuclear weapon. I mean, there were extensive towers and testing equipment and whatnot, that one could see from the U-2.

Q: And presumably they knew we could see?

MARK: I would think so, because I had not been let in on the U-2, but while in Moscow in 1958, I had read a debriefing report of a defected Soviet soldier, who was really Polish, but had ended up in that part of Poland taken by the Soviet Union in 1944-1945, and who had been drafted into the Soviet army when he got of age. He had been a young boy at the time the war ended. And he told about being in a unit in Siberia which periodically got very agitated. Then, he heard from one of his officers that there was something hostile flying over now and then, but that there was nothing that the Soviets could do about it. He was in an antiaircraft unit, but they couldn't do anything about it and this got everybody very excited.
So, of course, that was the U-2. I didn't know its name then. Even after reading it, I thought, "Well, that's an interesting kind of defector's report." But, in fact, the U-2 was what was going on. So obviously the Soviets did know about it. They knew about it all too well.

But we had the U-2's information, and we also had technical detection possibilities which we talked about, and which meant tracking seismic events. I mean, earthquakes cause seismographs to register, and so do nuclear tests. But then the question was, "Well, if the Russians did it in certain kind of rock layers, wouldn't that tend to mask the seismic waves or cause us to confuse them with natural events?", natural events being the earthquakes. Then we got into the "big hole theory"; namely, that if you had a tremendous cavity in the earth like a salt cavern and the U.S. or the USSR did the explosion in that, it would muffle the sound. And there were, you know, scientific postulations that supported the "big hole theory."

So we said that, obviously, to be sure about things, you had to have on-site inspections. I mean unless you could have on-site inspections, you couldn't ever know what was a "natural event" or a man-made nuclear event, or whatnot. And so the Soviets, naturally, in that era said, "On-site inspection is espionage." But after much to-do, they said, "Well, we'll agree to three of them a year."

That was a tremendous concession. And they agreed to three of them without ever agreeing, then or later, on what an on-site inspection would consist of, on what specific steps the other side could take in terms of looking around the suspected place. That was another whole set of arguments that occupied days of meetings. But the question of whether a mere three could ever be accepted by us was not a very difficult one. The answer was "No." Three were never going to be enough. Because if you used one, then you had two left. And if you used one of those two, you felt that you had none left, because if you ever used it, if you ever used your last one, then the Russians could test with impunity because you had no on-site inspections left.

Q: Did we really want an agreement? Did our side?

MARK: Well, I'm coming to that in a minute. [Laughter]

So what would be enough? Would five be enough per year, or seven, nine, eleven? The question you just asked, "Did we really want an agreement?" then came into play. A lot of people didn't want an agreement, and the top of the Eisenhower Administration was split very clearly. Defense didn't want an agreement; the Joint Chiefs didn't seem to want an agreement; State wanted an agreement; and Disarmament was not then a separate agency, it was within State; Eisenhower wanted an agreement, but only a sound and politically defensible one.

Everybody wanted to get rid of nuclear testing in the atmosphere because it was producing radiation. Strontium-90 was affecting milk and all that sort of thing. Testing
was the origin of what we now call the "green movement," but those kinds of tests in the atmosphere could have been easily prohibited by a simple agreement. There was no danger of cheating on that. You didn't need international verification means other than what the U.S. possessed on its own; and our military would have preferred a simple thing of that sort.

But other people wanted a total nuclear test ban, not just an atmospheric ban. I even invented for one of my speeches at the conference, I think sometime in 1960, the phrase, "preventive disarmament." In other words, if we could prevent nuclear tests, we'd prevent all the weapons that new nuclear warheads could go into. As a matter of fact, from what we now know we couldn't have developed MIRV missiles, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles. We couldn't have had them because, if we had had a complete test ban in the early '60s, we never would have been able to develop a warhead for a MIRV missile. As a matter of fact, our whole range of missiles would have been totally different, much, much simpler. The whole problem of large-scale disarmament would have been totally different if we had arrived at a nuclear test ban treaty.

Q: Why were some people opposed? Why were some people in favor? What was the motivation?

MARK: Well, some people, of course, didn't want to have agreements with Soviet communists under any circumstances. I mean, we find people more or less like that today. I would say the people represented by Richard Perle in current-day Washington (1989).

Q: People so distrusting of communism or fearful of the Russian power?

MARK: Or not wanting to reduce the United States to seem a mere coequal instead of a greater and better nation. You know, if you sign an agreement in which you pledge not to do what they're also pledging not to do, you give them legitimacy as coequals, and these people didn't want to give that status to the Soviet Union. They also thought, there were a lot of people who still thought, we could gain supremacy if we kept on testing. You know, we had more technology and we had more resources.

It's this old idea that has come up again in the Reagan years of spending them into bankruptcy. We have succeeded more or less in doing that, but we've done it to ourselves almost as badly in the course of it, so that's the irony of the thing. But in any case, there were those factors there in the 1960s.

And yet there were other people who were for disarmament, people like Ambassador Gerald Smith, who was already involved in those days and for years after, ultimately as head of the Arms Control and the Disarmament Agency, a Republican serving in all kinds of administrations. I mean these people believe that disarmament is one of the means by which we would gradually reach a Soviet-American entente, or at least an understanding about live and let live. And of course they were urging this in the Khrushchev era, so there was then already some reason to think that evolutionary possibilities existed.
Q: Did you get the sense that there was a similar division on the Russian side?

MARK: Not on those issues, and the Russians were extremely difficult to fathom then. We were only tentatively starting at that time what is now standard practice at disarmament conferences. It began for us in '62 when we merged the nuclear test ban into the new 18-nation disarmament conference. And the new aspect was that, after each meeting of the 3 nation test ban subcommittee, the sides would get together informally and just exchange notes, exchange remarks on the meeting, or sometimes use it as an occasion to talk informally about what might be going on in the other's capital. That began in 1962 and is, as I say, now standard practice, which led to the hit Broadway nuclear disarmament play, "A Walk in the Woods," that sort of thing.

But it had not happened before mid-1962. Before then, at most, we had lunch together every now and then, of which more later. There was also for me another incident. But the Russians were extremely tight-lipped about things. The only hint we got was that there might be a fight in Moscow about whether they should resume nuclear testing. Because the Soviets, when they went into this conference in 1959, had declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and we had not. I mean, we came to stop testing later, but we didn't declare it officially. So we went on testing in 1959, and then we did get into a short moratorium. But then we said that we were going to come out of the moratorium soon, whereas the Russians were still stuck with their earlier unilateral moratorium; and they obviously were uncomfortable militarily with this one-sided hiatus. We got a sort of threat from them--"Well, if the U.S. doesn't come around, and if the U.S. reserves the right to resume testing, then the Soviets would have to resume testing, and so forth." I mean, they finally did resume in--just to jump ahead--in September, I think, September 1, 1961, but this issue was clearly a problem for them within the delegation.

Also, there was some problem with their scientists. We got into such trouble in 1959 about how to distinguish seismic tests, which were natural events versus to distinguish natural events, that we decided to have another conference of scientists (there had been one in 1958). Indeed, we had a couple of them on different technical issues. And their scientists came to Geneva and clearly they were willing to say certain things about the difficulty of verification with instruments alone; and therefore they implied that one would need on-site inspections, but in saying this, they were deviating from the official line. So much so that after one of these scientific meetings, when there had been a joint U.S.-Soviet declaration by the two teams of scientists, the Soviet government repudiated its own scientists officially at one of our political meetings. So that was another sign of some intra-Soviet disagreement, but that was not on the political side; that was on the scientific side.

Also, we did have the impression that the Soviet delegation took the lead at times in pressing Moscow to agree to adopt a certain position. It wasn't that they were taking sides. They were being creative in proposing ways around impasses with the U.S. and UK. We did feel that happen from time to time. But to get back to the American point of
view, there were those differences, and the differences centered most visibly, though not uniquely, on this question of how many on-site inspections per year would be enough. And people in Washington in 1959 generally agreed that ten were probably as much as we needed to ask for, but they said, "Well, but look. We're in a negotiating business with the Russians, so you can't ask for ten because you'll never end up with ten. Let's ask for 20." So they asked for 20. And, of course, once they asked for 20, 20 became a sacred number, supposedly reflecting technical necessity. Everyone forgot, if they ever knew, that 20 had been put in there purely for bargaining purposes, but it became the "scientifically valid" number that the U.S. would need for its security.

Well, of course, there was nothing scientific about any of these numbers, even ten. It was just a value judgment about how intrusive you had to be to keep the Soviets honest, and there were some Americans who thought you really didn't need inspections at all, because you had photographic satellites soon that replaced the U-2. I mean, we had the first, I think, KH-4 satellites, not long after that, and though they weren't as refined as some of the later ones in terms of distinguishing objects on the ground, they certainly could tell about nuclear test preparations. Plus, as I mentioned seismology told us a good bit.

We said that, after all, you don't have to be 100% sure that the Russians had not tested. All you have to do is create a situation that would prove frightfully embarrassing for them before world opinion if they were ever caught red-handed. And you could create such a situation just by your seismic monitoring and a few on-site inspections. That would be enough. The Russians wouldn't dare cheat, particularly when you kept your powder dry, i.e. you kept yourself ready to resume testing whenever they cheated. Indeed, that was one of the conditions that the Joint Chiefs later forced us to append to the ratification protocol in the Senate, that we keep our powder dry, keep our nuclear laboratories going, be ready to test at a moment's notice.

So, anyway, toward the end of the--I guess it was in 1959 that we came to 20--December 1959--this demand for 20 inspections, and that, of course, became a hang-up for all the remaining period of the negotiations, this inflated number. There were lots of other issues that developed, and I can say with all modesty that you can find this recounted ad nauseam in my book on the subject, which is one of only two serious full-length books on the test ban. [Laughter] There other one was written by a law professor at, I think, either Michigan State or the University of Michigan; and I've been told by objective outsiders, who have read both, that if you want to really know what that conference was all about, you must read both books, that each by itself is not as good as taking them together. And I'm sure that very few people ever will so read or ever have done so.

Q: But did Henry Kissinger find your research, or the research you did for him in Harvard, interesting?

MARK: Well, it was written at Harvard, but it wasn't done for him. I don't know that he ever looked at it. I sat in on a course there that he gave, which was a seminar on world security issues. The head of the Harvard Center of the time, though Kissinger later
succeeded him, was Bob Bowie, who was later Policy Planning Director in the Department. Maybe he was also an assistant secretary in the Pentagon at one time. He is still, now in his late seventies, very active in foreign affairs matters.

As I say, I attended this Kissinger seminar, and so for some years if we met thereafter in the State Department or wherever, he would say, "Oh, yes. That is my old student." [Chuckles] But that's about as close as I ever got to Henry Kissinger, despite a few occasional meetings later in the State Department on transient issues.

The conference on a nuclear test ban had a long break from November 1960 when Kennedy was elected, because he wasn't going to be inaugurated for a while and would then want to review negotiating policy. He was inaugurated on January 20. And so, after our last meeting in November 1960 we went to a farewell luncheon with the Soviet delegation.

There were three of us on each side, including me, and we ate in a very nice restaurant in Geneva. We started at 1:00 p.m. and everybody drank a lot, and the head of the Soviet delegation, who was named, Simyon Tsarapkin, later the Soviet ambassador to West Germany, drank more and more and more vodka. And about 4:00 in the afternoon that day, he pulled me aside and spoke Russian. Well, he always spoke Russian to me, but this time he spoke used the "you familiar" form, which he had never used before and never used again.

He started by saying to me, "David, I know what you did in Moscow, and it was a terrible thing for a young man to have done such harmful things against our great Soviet motherland. But, you're a young man still, and you can make up for it. There are things you can do which will right the wrong which you committed. I want you to think about that and I want you to do the right thing. And when you've decided to do the right thing, speak to Yuli over here."

Yuli was his number two. "Yuli" is Yuli Vorontsov, the Soviet first deputy foreign minister, currently ambassador to Afghanistan, who I don't think was ever a KGB agent. I think he was pressed into service as liaison for the KGB just as I had been contacted earlier by the CIA. But in any case, I never responded to that effort. I just reported it to my boss and to the CIA; and Tsarapkin, after a few more vodkas, passed out dead drunk. [Laughter]

So the two delegations didn't get together again until March 1961. And I should say, speaking of Tsarapkin, just on the side, that once early in 1963, when we were still negotiating, at that time on general and complete disarmament as well, we were at a cocktail party that someone gave. My wife was there, as well, and Tsarapkin came up to my wife and spoke English to her and said, "I can't tell you how difficult it has been for me all these years sitting opposite your husband."

"Why?" she said, "What's the matter?"
He said, "Because he chews gum, and he's there all the time chewing gum while I'm talking and while everything's going on. It's a terrible habit, you know, and why don't you tell him that he should stop?"

So my wife did, and I said, "Well, the Soviets are right for a change." And not a piece of gum, despite much temptation, has crossed my lips since that day. [Laughter]

Q: But the Soviets seemed to have put into these disarmament negotiating jobs more senior professionals than we did. Is that a fair generalization?

MARK: Well, not any more. I mean, I think we've had tremendous professionals there, people like Ray Garthoff now.

Q: Ray Garthoff is now the Deputy Secretary of State; some Russians rose to that rank.

MARK: No, no.

Q: He's not even an ambassador.

MARK: No, though he has been an ambassador, ambassador to Bulgaria.

Q: Not to Germany, though.

MARK: No, no. Well, that was to West Germany for Tsarapkin, you know, and West Germany is big stuff for us, but East Germany is big stuff for the Russians. I should say that even this assessment has changed for the Russians since the 1960s. Their ambassador to West Germany is now important, and, indeed, one of their former ambassadors to West Germany is one of Gorbachev's right-hand men, Falin, who is now one of the secretaries of the party's Central Secretariat in Moscow.

Q: Maybe these people that were assigned to this job later moved into jobs that were much more important than comparable jobs on our side.

MARK: Right. Well, I think Vorontsov, for example, whom I mentioned, and there is also the guy who started out as a very junior fellow who now has my book manuscript in English, who is now leading the Soviet delegation on conventional disarmament talks. The Soviets have consistently taken people up through the ranks of disarmament negotiations. I mean, Karpov, who is the head of their SALT negotiations--START, I guess they call it now, Strategic Arms Negotiations, he's a guy who has also risen from the ranks.

Q: Why is it that our system hasn't made the same use of you that they did of the Soviet participants? What's the difference?
MARK: Well, first of all--

Q: I'm not trying to get you to defect at this late date. [Chuckles]

MARK: Well, I mean the Soviets generally don't have political appointees to various jobs. I mean, the heads of our delegations to these talks are invariably political appointees. Max Kampelman, for example, who went from Carter to Reagan, but he started out as a political link to former Vice President Hubert Humphrey, is a political appointee who has gained very professional expertise. But when I was in disarmament talks, Arthur Dean and James Wadsworth were politically connected, and there have been people like that all along in every negotiation.

Occasionally, a negotiation will have a Foreign Service officer as the head of it. Our negotiation to the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) talks, which dragged along for what, 13 or 15 or 17 years without getting anywhere on cutting conventional forces in Europe, got so dull that, even though it started off with Stanley Resor, who had been Secretary of the Army, ended up with professional Foreign Service officers as chiefs. But that was because it had become so unpromising, more or less. But, otherwise, we get political people put in at top and our able professionals are then the much relied on number twos.

Q: But so were the able professionals in the Russian side number twos and number threes.

MARK: And number one.

Q: But the number twos and number threes moved on up the ladder.

MARK: Right. Well, a lot of our people have moved to other jobs. Some career people do break through to the professional ranks. Walter Stoessel, after all, became Deputy Secretary of State.

Q: David Popper became . . .

MARK: David Popper became the assistant Secretary of State for UN affairs, ambassador to Chile, so it does happen. Take Larry Eagleburger, whom I first knew as special assistant to Under Secretary of State Katzenbach in Lyndon Johnson's Administration--and even then showing that he was a guy destined to go a lot further by the sheer brass of his decisiveness, willing to take on senior people in the Department, even though he was very junior in 1966. You know, he has arrived at the top.

Q: No, no. I'm not saying our people don't rise to the top. But what I'm saying is that people that have gone the disarmament route have not seemed to prosper to the same extent they have in the Soviet Union.
MARK: Well, Ron Spiers was in disarmament for years. That's the way he started out, and he has just ended up as Under Secretary of State for Management. He has now gone on to the U.N. as Under Secretary General of the U.N. He's been ambassador to Turkey and Pakistan and Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research as well as for Political-Military Affairs.

Q: Okay. I withdraw the point.

MARK: And let me say even more that the guy who got his first overseas assignment on our delegation in the test ban talks in 1960, and then went on with the 18-nation disarmament committee, has gone from entry level to Class 1--that was in the old Class 1 in the Foreign Service--faster than anyone in history--12 years--and is now our ambassador to the United Nations, Tom Pickering. He started out in that delegation and worked on disarmament affairs, and just everybody saw immediately that this was a comer.

Q: But not very long. I mean, most of his career was elsewhere.

MARK: He was there on disarmament, I think, two years.

Q: That's right, but that's not very long.

MARK: And then what did he do? I mean, then he went off to become a Swahili linguist and went down to Zanzibar.

Q: That's right. But what I'm saying is, my point, which maybe is an ill-taken one, is that disarmament negotiations are not necessarily the road to the top in the Foreign Service.

MARK: No, they haven't been, although Spiers got involved with disarmament again very heavily as the head of State's Bureau of political-military affairs. Jim Goodby has had a career that's been mostly disarmament. He's been off in NATO to some extent, but it has been mostly disarmament, and a very successful career.

Q: But he hasn't done anything much recently.

MARK: He was head of the European security talks on Stockholm and laid the groundwork, I mean, for the agreement with Moscow that we have on exchanging observers at each other's troop exercises in Europe, and on surprise attack questions. He has been ambassador to Finland and, you know, that sort of thing.

Q: I think that makes my point. But anyway, that's a diversion.

MARK: I didn't finish with one other thing about the test ban talks, and that was, I think, it must have been in early '63, when we were already part of the 18-nation disarmament conference. But it might have been late '62, but I think it was early '63. At the end of one
of our meetings--this was a meeting on the nuclear test ban, which, as I noted earlier had become a subcommittee of the main 18-nation subcommittee, still consisting of just the British, Americans and Soviets, a Soviet delegation member came up to me. As I said earlier, we had then inaugurated, what is now standard disarmament practice, these information conversations, postmortems on the meeting. And he said to me, "I'm new on the Soviet delegation"--in Russian--"I'm new on the Soviet delegation and I'd like to talk to you."

And I said, "Go ahead. We're talking."

And he said to me, "No, but I don't want to talk here. I want to have lunch with you."

I said, "Okay. Where?"

He said, "Well, you know Geneva better, so you pick a place."

And I said, "Okay." And I thought of a restaurant a little bit out of town and said, "Well, how about meeting there?"

And he said, "When?"

"Well, whenever you want."

"Tomorrow."

"Okay. We'll meet tomorrow." So, of course, I told the CIA people about this right away, and they said, "God, why did you pick that restaurant? That's where all the spies go."

[Chuckles]

I said, "Well, it seemed nice, out of town."

They said, "Well, we'll cover you there just in case there's anything funny going on here."

We got out to the restaurant and he was there; and he said to me that his name was Yuri Nosenko. He was the new security officer for the Soviet delegation; and he had come to me because he had to do some business with the Americans, and he knew that I was a CIA man. And I said, "But I'm not a CIA man. I've always been in the Foreign Service."

"Oh, no, no," he said, "I know about that, because I've read your file in Moscow, and it says you're a CIA man," going back to these incidents while I was at Embassy Moscow. [Laughter]

And I said, "I won't argue with you about that. What is the problem?"
And he said, "The problem is that, as the security officer of the Soviet delegation and a member of the KGB, I am given some dollars for emergency use." The dollars in his case were $900. In 1989 terms, that might be about $2,500 or $3,000. And he said, "I did something I shouldn't have done. I went to a bar. We're not supposed to do that, but I went to a bar and I got drunk, and the money was stolen from me. I've got to account for it. I've got to make it up. So I can give you some information that will be very interesting to the CIA, and all I want is my money." So I gave his presentation in detail to the CIA.

Q: He gave the so-called information?

MARK: No, he described the nature of some Soviet operations, without naming people or places that he would betray.

Q: There was no deal yet?

MARK: There was no deal. I didn't have the money anyway. And so I told the CIA people and they said, "Oh, he's just kidding you. He can't really, as a KGB man, believe that he can sell us two bits of spying information, and then that's that. Because once he does that, so to speak, he's in our clutches."

I should say that at lunch I had asked this guy, I said, "Okay, you're in trouble. Why not confess you did something wrong? You lost the money and you're terribly sorry. It will hurt your career some, but look, now you're going to commit treason. You want to turnover information to me that--

Q: You're trying to save his soul.

MARK: No. I was trying to understand a KGB man's mentality. But he said, "But I don't feel that way about things. I've been in the KGB a long time, and when Stalin was running things--and that was almost ten years earlier--we knew where we stood. I worked in the Kremlin guard unit at that time, and I knew I was defending the Politburo and I was defending the party and whatnot. Now with this guy Khrushchev, I don't know whether I'm coming or going. He's changing things all around the party, the system. He's making bad speeches about Stalin. That's not the Soviet Union that I grew up in nor the motherland that I want to defend."

Well, maybe this was a rationalization on his part, but it may be the way some people are thinking about Gorbachev at the present time. Who can tell? Who can tell? In any event, when I told the CIA people, they said, "Well, we'll just take him over from you. So you arrange a meeting place."

Q: Were they trying to dismiss him as not serious in order to get you away from the game?
MARK: No, no. I wanted to get out of the thing. I had no interest in following up on it. On the contrary, they were in dead earnest. I mean, what turned out--and I guess I can say this here; I don't know if I should.

Q: Sure.

MARK: Maybe it's still classified; maybe not. They succeeded. I mean, they got hold of him, and I guess they gave him his $900. But what they did was to turn him into a double agent. And Nosenko went back to Moscow for two years, and I was told later that he had been extraordinarily valuable to us for that period.

Q: Did he eventually defect?

MARK: Yes. Nosenko defected two years later publicly, again in Geneva. He was security officer for another Soviet delegation, and he openly defected, and the Soviets complained and the Swiss investigated, duly and whatnot, and the Soviets accused us, of course. I don't know the details, but I think that after two years of being a double agent, things were getting a little hot in Moscow, or he was afraid they were. Ironically, he came here soon after Kennedy's assassination, and there was part of the CIA led by the then chief of CIA counterintelligence, James Angleton, which believed that the Soviets, through Lee Harvey Oswald, who, after all, had a big personal Soviet connection, had been involved in the Kennedy assassination. And they thought that Nosenko had been sent over here by the KGB to disabuse us of the idea of Soviet involvement.

Now, Nosenko did tell us that the KGB had had nothing to do with the assassination, because that is what he knew to be the situation. Angleton didn't believe it, and he, in effect, arrested Nosenko and kept him in a CIA jail for three years. Now, I thought that whole approach was ridiculous. How could Angleton, knowing of the two years in which Nosenko had been a double agent, and an extremely valuable double agent, knowing in effect that he had really first defected from the then Soviet Union in late '62 or early '63, let's say, how could he believe that Nosenko would do the Soviets' bidding and palm off a phoney story about Lee Harvey Oswald after Kennedy's assassination. It didn't make any sense.

But nevertheless, Nosenko went all through this. Angleton was finally overruled on this, and then forced to retire, not only for this, maybe, for other things, too. And some aspects of his story have come out in testimony before one Congressional committee. Not all about the double-agent part, but about Nosenko and his quasi-jail sentence that followed.

Q: What happened to him after this?

MARK: He has been successfully resettled here, and I don't know what his current name is or what he's doing or where he's living, but he has successfully resettled in the United States.
There's one other thing that happened in my Geneva days, and this has to do with the Berlin crisis which Khrushchev started in '58 demanding that we, in effect, recognize East German authority over West Berlin and threatening to resume the blockade and various other things. This was a crisis which dragged on until the middle of '61 when they ended it, in effect, by building the Berlin Wall that was, in hindsight, a defensive move which admitted their defeat on the issues raised three years earlier. But this had been, of course, a very, very hot and heavy matter for three years, and had been prominent at the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit meeting in Vienna, I believe, in the autumn of 1960, before the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which Kennedy had--

**Q: 1961, right?**

**MARK:** The Cuban Missile Crisis was '62.

**Q: The summit, too.**

**MARK:** What?

**Q: Kennedy was elected in '60, so that would be '61.**

**MARK:** Of course. He was elected in '60, yes. And '61, right. Well, the Vienna meeting was the autumn of '61 and then the--or was the Cuban Missile Crisis in '62? But in any case, at the summit meeting, despite the new Berlin Wall, the Kennedy effort to defuse the Berlin crisis failed, and we still didn't know how far the Russians were going to go. And, of course, in the immediate vicinity of Berlin, they've got all those big forces. I mean, they have division after division in East Germany and we've got sort of a nominal unit of 5,000 or 8,000 or whatever, with small British and French units in West Berlin.

There was a diplomatic dinner, in Geneva, probably early in 1961, in connection with U.N. matters to which I had been invited. And there was a guy down from Moscow who was heavily involved in the Berlin question, and we sat next to each other at that dinner.

**Q: An American?**

**MARK:** No, a Soviet, a senior Soviet foreign Ministry official. And we got to chat about Berlin, and he put forth a very, very tough line, saying that Khrushchev had no leeway, that his personal prestige was involved, that his whole standing in the Politburo was at stake, and that he couldn't back off. There was no feasible compromise. It was not just a question of demanding things from us, but his own political position depended on the outcome. I duly reported all this to Washington, and apparently, from what I later learned, it made quite a stir and caused some conversations at the very high levels about what tactics we were going to pursue.

Well, I think, in fact, that this guy had not particularly been using me, but it was a reflection of the uncertainty at the top levels of the USSR about how far they were going
to go to push the Berlin issue. I think that when Khrushchev finally did get thrown out in '64, and was accused of harebrained schemes, this related to his having had to back down in Berlin, as well as in the Cuban Missile Crisis, although there were a lot of failed domestic policies too. So Berlin was kind of a nail in the coffin for him, and therefore that had been one of the considerations reflected in the official's remarks to me.

Q: Was this guy delivering a message, or was he just making observation?

MARK: I don't know, really. I think he wouldn't have delivered a message through me. I wasn't the right guy for it. I think we were just talking about things, and he was putting his spin on matters in Moscow.

Maybe a couple of other things deserve mention. First of all, at the nuclear test ban conference, as I said much earlier, one of our aims was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to new powers. Thus, our objective, of course, was to keep the Chinese from developing nuclear weapons, and that would have depended on gaining their adherence to the nuclear test ban treaty. We kept bringing this up with the Soviets, and the Soviets kept telling us through this whole period (though they knew they must have been lying through their teeth), "Don't worry. We're in touch with the Chinese, and we can deliver them."

Well, of course, by 1962 or 1963, the Sino-Soviet rift was extraordinarily deep, and obviously they couldn't have delivered the Chinese, who were furiously developing their own weapons toward a first test. But this shows how complicated things became, and how the Soviets were not willing to own up to what was really happening within the communist world.

I went through a four or five month period in which there were very few nuclear test ban meetings. I think this was sort of at the end of 1961 and throughout the early part of '62, after the Russians had resumed nuclear tests. At any rate, at some point, our Ambassador to the U.N., Graham Martin, who was later Ambassador to South Vietnam in 1975 at the fateful end of our involvement there, said to me that his DCM was going off for four months on home leave and that he needed somebody to fill in at his mission to the European headquarters of the U.N. His mission also dealt with the World Health Organization, world meteorological organization, International Telecommunications Union, Red Cross, etc., etc., and wouldn't I take the job? If any meetings on the test ban came up during that time, why, of course, I could go do that.

And I said, "Well, it might be fun, rather than just sitting around here. But why don't you take someone from your own delegation who knows much more about the U.N.? I don't know anything about it."

"Oh," he said, "it's easy to learn. You can just ask me and others about this stuff." So I had four months in which I really did get involved to a little bit on these technical activities related to the U.N., as well as on some other business that came up from time to time. And I must say it was an interesting aspect of Geneva that I had never considered before and that has a life of its own, which is still going on. It's not bad background

57
knowledge for anybody, no matter what type of work he or she is doing in the Foreign Service. Well, from Geneva--

Q: Before we leave that, let me just ask you a--

MARK: I shouldn't leave it anyway. There's some more I can mention.

Q: Well, go ahead.

MARK: Well, as I said earlier, around the time of the Cuba Crisis, Khrushchev and Kennedy got into correspondence about the test ban, and we almost made a breakthrough on the on-site verification business. The Russians seemed to be telling us that we could have maybe more than three nuclear test ban verifications per year, and that we should try to work out the mechanics of verification. But then at the last minute, after some more private correspondence, which has never been divulged, between Kennedy and Khrushchev, they decided to go for a lesser test ban, one that excluded the underground environment that was hardest to verify technically. Our military was much happier with that resolution because there weren't verification problems.

So we ended up with a top level meeting in Moscow in July or August 1963 at which they formally signed the document that bans nuclear tests in outer space, underwater, and in the atmosphere, but not underground. And we've been wrestling with extending it ever since, while nuclear weapons have gone on being developed without any let or hindrance during this whole time, unfortunately. So, although we've kept strontium-90 under control in the atmosphere; we haven't kept the arms race under control, and that was an extraordinary failure in 1963.

Q: You weren't allowed to go back to Moscow for the signing of this document?

MARK: No, I wasn't. I've only been in Moscow once, and I can't really say I've been in Moscow. I've been at the Moscow airport once since that time, after I had already retired while flying from Tokyo to Frankfurt on Aeroflot and I had to change planes in Moscow.

Q: Let me ask you about the Khrushchev era. From the perspective of Mr. Gorbachev's Russia now, you hear it said from time to time that if the United States had responded more positively, more creatively to what Khrushchev was trying to do, that it might have made a difference in the evolution of the Cold War at that period. Do you think so now, or do you have any thoughts then that we were not handling Khrushchev correctly?

MARK: No. I thought we certainly did make good decisions, because I felt that the Soviet system was firmly implanted there and, after all, Khrushchev was trying to strengthen the Soviet system. He was in favor of dialogue with us because he thought he was so good at dialoguing, that he had such talents for it, but he was very confrontational at every moment of his reign.
I mean, after all, he started out angrily at the U.N. General Assembly when in New York in 1959, by banging his shoe on the desk, and this was before the U-2 shoot down. He wanted to learn from us, but only, as he said, in order to bury us. He boasted that in whatever period of years it was, ten years or whatever, the Soviet Union would have drawn abreast of the United States in per capita GNP output, and thereafter it would steadily forge ahead. He may have wanted to cut down on conventional forces--indeed, he did demobilize a bit of the Red Army--but he went ahead with nuclear development very heavily, with the technological side of armed forces development, with the military-industrial buildup, and so forth.

Nothing that he did was aimed at achieving a less tense world in which the Soviet Union would play a structural role in a general global detente. On the contrary, he was using all of his Communist Parties in Western countries, his satellite armed forces, and other Soviet assets to mobilize against us. I mean, propaganda was extremely brutal. There was little opportunity to work together, other than our test ban talks in Geneva. I mean, if we had been willing to sell him our latest technology, I'm sure he would have bought it rather than try to steal it.

Q: But he was quite different from Stalin.

MARK: Oh, he was totally different.

Q: Or we were different in our treatment of him than we were of Stalin?

MARK: Oh, sure. I mean, with Stalin, except during the war, when we had a marriage of convenience, with Stalin there was pretty much total hostility, and we expected only the most dire things from him.

With Khrushchev, there was this beginning of some exchange of people and some traveling. Officials, to be sure, for the most part, but at least a few people were seeing each other in an East-West context. There was a slight relaxation of Soviet censorship about what could be written about the United States or said in movies or on radio or in embryonic television. There was a recognition by that time that nuclear war would be suicidal. That had actually started a few years earlier with Malenkov, before Khrushchev ousted him. And Khrushchev had come out in 1956 with the secret speech about Stalin, in which he had revealed Stalin's crimes and murders; so Khrushchev showed himself to be a man of some pragmatism and conscience about the kinds of terrible distortions that had afflicted the Soviet Union under Stalin's rule. And Khrushchev tried some major economic innovations, which only partly succeeded.

In that sense, he was certainly different. But the consequences for us of his rule were still pretty alarming. I mean, given all his confrontational rhetoric against us, if he had succeeded in really boosting the Soviet Union anywhere near Western economic and technological standards, we would have faced an avowed confrontational foe, much more capable of the military and geopolitical confrontation than the USSR had been before.
Q: Well, now we talk about a Soviet Union as a failed system. This is 25 years later. As a system that can't produce economically, that is stagnating to the point of collapse, that its political system is not working. Of course, the United States is not the same country it was in 1960, early '60s, either. But was the Soviet Union that much different? I mean, were or was there danger that Khrushchev was going to bury us? Did we have a valid assessment of the real potential of the Soviet Union in our analytical capabilities?

MARK: I think so. I think we thought the likelihood of Soviet economic supremacy to be highly remote. The Soviets at that time were producing something like 40% of U.S. GNP. Maybe it was even less. Maybe it was a third to two-fifths of U.S. GNP for a population that was then considerably larger than ours. We could see the possibility that they would get 50%, 60% maybe, of our GNP. We didn't really see their going further.

People who were specialists in the Soviet economy by the 1960s, late '50s, '60s, understood the inherent limitations in the central command management system. They were already citing things, less systematically in terms of statistics than anecdotal. They were more anecdotal. But still, there was a flood of anecdotal information about the rigidities in the system, about the inability of the system to accomplish tasks, let's say building construction projects on time or on estimate, anywhere near the planned cost estimate. Of the difficulty of arranging manpower mobility to move from project to project, or out to Siberia, for example, where a lot of the development would have to take place.

So I think we understood some of the problems that we now know much better and, indeed, that the Soviets talk about themselves a great deal. But that was still an era in the late '50s and early '60s, all through the '60s maybe, or most of the '60s, I'd say most of the '60s, in which the Soviets still had large amounts of unused resources that they weren't applying. And if you throw enough resources at a system, even a cockeyed system such as the centralized planned Soviet economy was, you can get some results—though for them, always at the expense of mass living standards.

I was—this was in 1989— I was at a meeting in New York at which a member of the Soviet Academy of Agricultural Sciences was present, and he was describing the drastic drop-off in results from new Soviet investment. He said that if you put five rubles into an investment, 15 years ago you got ten rubles back in three years, let's say. Whereas now, if you put in five rubles, you're lucky to get one ruble back in four years. And so I think that, looking back at the Khrushchev era, as they invested huge sums of rubles, there was so much underutilized manpower, there were so many new mineral and petroleum resources waiting to be exploited, there were so many new lands to be opened up—and he opened up the whole wheat belt of northern Kazakhstan—that they could and did get results in spite of this weird management system.

But now that's no longer the case. They have neither the capital, nor the quantity of untapped resources, nor the flexibility, such as it was, in the system—and Khrushchev did
try to change the Communist Party system. He split the Party in two, into regional commands and a reduced central headquarters. He split it between urban and rural. That was one of the things that got him ousted. He was tampering with the perks of the party bureaucrats. I think that this, as much as any of his policy mistakes, led to the coalition in the central committee in ’64 that kicked him out.

Well, anyway, I went from Geneva to Harvard's Center for International Affairs, and had this very pleasant year learning about things and meeting people, and then wondering what my next job would be. I was rather disappointed when I heard. I thought it wasn't the job for me. It was out of my Soviet field, but then I didn't know what I was likely to get, given my past experience of being thrown out of Moscow and all that. I was made Director of the Office of West European Research in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department, called INR. I had had no experience with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research before that time, even though, then and now, many, many, many young Foreign Service officers within the first five years have a sort of stint, a very enlightened tour of duty as an intelligence or research analyst in that Bureau. It's a fascinating Bureau, I may say, still not in the main line of advancement in the Department, not the sort of place that most bright, young new officers would ask to go to. Still, I can say again that my friend, Tom Pickering's first assignment, before he even got to our test ban negotiations, was for I think a year or so, or maybe a year and a half, in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. So if you are great enough personally, nothing will stop you, even that. [Laughter]

But anyway, I came back from Harvard to this office. And of all the offices in Intelligence and Research, it is probably among the least prestigious. Well, the reason for that is this. If you're dealing with the Soviet Union or East Europe, or with East Asia, or maybe even Africa and whatnot, a large part of the information on which you write your analyses and reports depends on intelligence sources, depends on getting information from CIA clandestine sources or from what they now call national means of intelligence, or national means of verification, which is understood to be various types of spy satellites, or other super secret intelligence agency information.

But in regard to Western Europe, that isn't the case. In regard to Western Europe, virtually all information is embassy reporting, which everybody gets in the Department, or comes from reading the New York Times or the Washington Post. And if those open or semi-open sources are the basis of the information on which the Office of West European Research is writing its reports, well then what's so special about those reports? I mean, why are its reports any better than the embassies' reports or the analytical papers of the operational Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs?

Q: And the people who run the Department already know Western Europe.

MARK: Right. They already know Western Europe, to boot. So therefore, West European "intelligence" is in a sense the least prestigious. You get a lot of fun things to work on,
but the office is not providing many special insights based on intelligence data. And, of course, the function of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research overall in the Department is more or less twofold. One is to provide finished think pieces, either on events of the moment or on longer range perspectives, to the operational officers of the Department, the people who are really running things by deciding on policy.

The other function is to provide the liaison between the State Department and other Washington intelligence agencies. I mean, those intelligence agencies are doing operational things, and if what they do concerns foreign countries, and if they run athwart the foreign policy activities of the Department of State, how do you coordinate the whole thing? Or, even more broadly, how do you get the intelligence agencies to do things that perform tasks that respond to the needs of the Secretary of State and his subordinates on foreign policy issues? How do you make intelligence the handmaiden of foreign policy?

So the bureau acts as a liaison. Not an exclusive channel by any means, but it acts as a regularized liaison. And each of the offices of the bureau, such as West European Research, is active in some aspect of these two functions. Well, anyway, in my time--

**Q: What were your years in INR?**

**MARK:** Well, my years in INR--

**Q: In this assignment.**

**MARK:** I was in this assignment in the Office of West European Research from mid-1964 to early 1969. It was about four and a half years, late ’64 to early ’69, and then I went up the ladder in INR and changed jobs and stayed on there until 1974. We'll get to that later, I guess.

Anyway, my period in the West European Research job was also the period in which official attention in Washington was getting focused more and more on Vietnam. It was also the period in which the Six-Day War took place in the Middle East (1967). But nevertheless, a lot was going on in Europe. Specifically, we were trying to promote West European regional identity, the European Community, and we were trying to keep General de Gaulle from throwing a monkey wrench into the works in regard to European regional integration. And there was no doubt in anyone's mind in the Bureau of European Affairs, that is in the State Department's operational side, that de Gaulle was an enemy of our goals.

That Bureau was full of people who were dedicated Europeanists, and the vehicle for showing you were a dedicated Europeanist at that moment was something called a "multilateral nuclear force." I mean, it was argued that our West European allies would never be able--and that really meant the Germans, because the British and French had their own national nuclear forces--would never be able to stand shoulder high in the world unless they had some structural role to play in nuclear military strategy.
Well, no one wanted to give the Germans independent nuclear weapons, that was sure, nor did the Germans want them. But nevertheless, we dreamed up this scheme of a multilateral nuclear force in which we would set up destroyers and cruisers with multinational allied crews. And there would be nuclear weapons on board, missiles or artillery pieces that would have nuclear warheads; and there would be a dual-lock system in which the U.S. had one key and the Europeans collectively had another. So this was going to promote a European weapons system, but one that could work only in conjunction with the U.S.

Well, the British were willing to play ball with this project, because their nuclear relationship with us was very solid anyway. I mean, uniquely with Britain, we had an agreement to help them develop and test new nuclear weapons. But the French didn't take to the scheme at all, and so, for our people, it was another desirable way of excluding the French. They were self-excluding really, because, officially, they were invitees to the force, but the invitation was part of the game that we were playing. When, for example, the Germans and French signed a treaty of friendship and amity and collaboration in 1963, which should have made us leap for joy, because, after all, their hostility had led to two world wars, we were alarmed. We were so dismayed that we forced the German Bundestag, in ratifying it, to add another preambular clause saying that, of course, this treaty didn't derogate from anything that Germany was doing in NATO and, that indeed, NATO and the Atlantic relationship were more important than the Franco-German one.

So there were all these multiple efforts going on. Well, I, myself, and even more the experts in our INR office on these matters, didn't really see the French position as all that unreasonable or all that unexpected, even when de Gaulle later took France out of NATO's military functions. I mean that action was rather extreme. I think it was stupid on his part. It was giving vent to his egotism. But nevertheless, the people in our Bureau of European Affairs were totally hostile; and when our office, which works quite independently from the Bureau, wrote papers on France's historical role in Europe, on the indispensability of a French role, if you're going to have any solid kind of Europe, on the reason why Germany, or Germany plus Britain, could not fulfill that role in Europe without France, and on many other questions, which also raised very serious issues of nuclear arms control in regard to the multilateral nuclear force, our office became highly unpopular.

We were considered enemies by the Bureau of European Affairs. INR's Director--he is what is now called the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research--at the time was a genius political appointee named Tom Hughes. And Tom pulled me aside one day around 1965 or so and said, "Well, David, I like the stuff your office is turning out on Europe. It's sound reasoning. It makes points well. But it's really killing me with the people in the Bureau of European Affairs and with George Ball," who was Under Secretary of State, the number two in the Department, and who was the leader of the Europeanists in the Department. And he said, "I'm doing fine with them on Vietnam," because they were generally doves on Vietnam and INR papers were raising all sorts of
doubting questions about events in Vietnam at the time. He added, "I'm sort of neutral in other areas of the world, but in Europe I'm really in hot water."

So I said to him, "Well, what do you want me to do about this? Do you want me to stop writing these reports?"

He said, "No. I'll take the heat if you really feel that these are points that must be made. But let me tell you that you're not doing your career any good and it will probably affect it as long as these people, the top-level Europeanists, are around." [Laughter]

So I said, "Well, I'm sorry to hear that but, you know, I feel I've got to be intellectually honest." And so we went on doing it, and he went on taking the heat for us.

These Europeanists were so upset about things that they developed a scheme. When de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO and kicked NATO's staffs out of Paris in 1966, which, as I say was a pretty extreme action, these people thought it was their chance really to build a Europe and a European Community without France. I mean, they had been incensed that de Gaulle had kept the British out. You know, he vetoed British entry in 1962. I guess it was finally in 1961, or something like that, when the British first tried to join the Community. And then de Gaulle created a crisis in the community's decision making which was finally settled only in 1966 when the rest of the community more or less caved into de Gaulle and agreed that the provisions in the original Treaty of Rome about majority voting on some issues would almost not come into effect at all. And other things also went de Gaulle's way. So our European Affairs people were more and more angry with de Gaulle, and they thought that this NATO crisis was an opportunity to get him.

Well, when our ambassador in Germany, who I guess was George McGhee at the time, tried to point out that there were certain things that Germany and France absolutely had to do together, and he said this in the wake of discussions between the French and the Germans over the status of the French forces in Germany, that were still left there after the French pulled out of NATO. I mean, the French had important forces, and we didn't want the Germans to have anything to do with them. When George McGhee suggested that this wasn't quite realistic, these people in the Bureau of European Affairs put out instructions that virtually excluded our Ambassador to Germany from further participation in the negotiations on these matters. They were livid that he would even think of flexibility on this matter.

I mention all these things because I got involved, too, in a small fry backlash. The MLF, I should say the multilateral nuclear force, what I considered a diversionary boondoggle, got killed because McGeorge Bundy, the National Security advisor to the President, finally saw that it wasn't going to make any sense in terms of our European relationships, and he got it killed at the White House end. I happened to be at a European Affairs staff meeting with the Assistant Secretary and others when the news came through that the White House had done this, and the place just fell into dead silence.
Q: How did he do it?

MARK: Well, I mean, Bundy got the President to decide to drop the whole thing, because it was taking too much energy and not worth it. You know, it was muddying up our other relations in Europe, including those with France; and so he just undercut George Ball and the Europeanists. I mean, Dean Rusk was Secretary of State and he didn't have any--he wasn't against it, but he didn't have any great enthusiasm for it. It was George Ball and those people.

Well, I mention all this because there was an incident that happened to me. Well, there were two incidents that happened involving me and these Europeanists. One incident involved a man whom they sent around to see me who was in the Europeanist group. He was a professor at the time, though he later became an ambassador actually in the Lyndon Johnson Administration, an ambassador named Neumann.

Q: Bob Neumann?

MARK: Yes. He got involved in Near Eastern affairs.

Q: Afghanistan.

MARK: Ambassador to Afghanistan and then to Morocco and so forth. But he was a professor in California at the time and a Europeanist, and he was closely connected with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European community affairs in the European Bureau at the time, Robert Schaetzel. And so Neumann came around to see me in Intelligence and Research, which was kind of odd. I mean, they usually didn't court me. And he said, "Well, I understand"--he introduced himself--"I understand Mr. Mark that you are very knowledgeable about all these European matters, and I would like your point of view on some things. Try to imagine--I know it's terribly difficult--but try to imagine that you are de Gaulle and you are shaping French policy. What do you think he will do on this, and how do you think he will react on that, and so forth?"

We had a talk of about an hour or an hour and a half on these matters. Well, I never thought any more about it at the time, but Schaetzel, oh about six months later, was appointed Ambassador to the European Community in Brussels; and some people told me thereafter that when they went to clean out his desk of papers that had been left behind, they found a memo from Neumann to Schaetzel about me. It said, "Imagine what David Mark said to me about France. And here are all the points he made about what we should do with France and so forth," portraying what I had said in response to his question about guessing de Gaulle's positions, as if this had been my own opinion about desirable U.S. policy. And Schaetzel had appended some note to Neumann's memo implying that we could use this memo to take care of David. [Laughter] That was how far things had gone. But, of course, Schaetzel left before taking such action.
The other thing involved George Ball. Incidentally, he had as his right-hand man, who was also a convinced Europeanist at the time, a special assistant named George Springsteen, and George Springsteen later became one of the deputy assistant secretaries in the European Bureau too. But he knew all about me and, of course, he had at one point even tried to--he had called me up--and tried to get me to change the content of some INR analytical report on Europe, which I wouldn't do.

But the other incident happened one day, about three or four weeks before George Ball quit the State Department. Nick Katzenbach came in as his replacement, George Ball was going off to private life, I guess, at the time, in the middle of the Johnson Administration in 1966. He had run afoul of President Johnson on Vietnam issues.

But my boss, Tom Hughes, asked me to go up to Ball's office that day to represent him at a small meeting; he couldn't go. And what was being discussed in Ball's office? Well, it was again on what to do about de Gaulle in another context. It seems that there was going to be a big mass meeting in Paris organized by pro-communist groups that wanted to try Lyndon Johnson as a war criminal because of his policy in Vietnam. George Ball was sure that de Gaulle would be delighted at this turn of affairs and was going to encourage these groups to go ahead with their war crimes trial of Lyndon Johnson. We had present at the meeting Ben Read, who was the Executive Secretary of the Department at the time, and Adam Yarmolinsky, who was from Defense, a civilian very close to McNamara, and so the--let's see. That makes four of us, I guess, who sat there in Ball's office talking about this. And Ball was saying, "What can we do to prevent de Gaulle from vilifying the President?"

Cautiously, I said, "Well, don't be angry if I challenge your premise. I mean, however much de Gaulle disagrees with our policy in Vietnam, he will not let any pseudo war crimes trial happen in Paris, because he has a keen sense of what it is to be a chief of state. For himself he has that sense of dignity, and for anyone like an American President, he would feel exactly the same way. So this is just not something that can happen in Paris while he's president."

And Ball was furious. He said, "How can you say such nonsense? On the contrary, this fits right into his plans and this will be something that he'll promote. I don't want to hear anything more about your hypothesis that this will not take place in Paris. I want to figure out what to do to prevent de Gaulle from permitting it." And so he developed some scheme in his own mind that we could countercharge de Gaulle with having committed war crimes of his own in Algeria; and then we would pass this out to the press and that would create such a stench that de Gaulle would see what was up and call off the thing in Paris.

Well, of course, that latter was never done, and de Gaulle suppressed communist plans in Paris as I had thought. But a few days later, Ben Read, as Executive Secretary of the Department, said to me, "Well, George Ball was very upset by the line you took in his office, and he wants you to know that he doesn't want to see you anymore as long as he's
around the State Department." Well, as I say, that was only for three weeks, but nevertheless, it was a sign of just how fanatic these Europeanists people were on some issues.

**Q:** His reaction was before or after de Gaulle had closed down the "war crimes" trial?

**MARK:** Well, they had never gotten to the point of actually--

**Q:** No, but I mean before the stage that it wouldn't happen.

**MARK:** Yes, right.

**Q:** So he didn't know that you had been right at that point?

**MARK:** No, he didn't. But he was just so upset that anyone in his State Department would seem to defend Charles de Gaulle.

**Q:** But you were the chief of the office; you must have had people writing for you.

**MARK:** Right. But at that time I was very active and I actually wrote about, I'd say, 12 to 15 very major analytical essays on these issues myself and on other related issues over a two- to three-year period, so I was not just an office director. I was very active. Moreover, I got an additional job there, and that was fascinating, because it had nothing to do with Western Europe.

One of INR's functions at that time was to brief the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary--the title of Deputy Secretary had not yet been created, so the Under was the number two--every morning to give them a view of the whole world that included all types of information: intelligence information, including that from secret sources, including technical means of intelligence, plus all the important embassy cables that had come in from anywhere of whatever classification or restricted distribution, plus any relevant articles in newspapers and magazines that fitted into the picture. And INR was to distill all of this down to 10 or at most 15 minutes and present it orally to the Secretary of State by 8:00 or 7:45 in the morning.

And Tom Hughes had been doing all that himself. He had worked out a system whereby he had one person representing each of INR's offices, and that's the six geographical areas of the world, plus the economic research office and the political military research office. One person from each of these offices stumbled in at 5:00 in the morning, or something like that, and began to sift through this mass of material that had been collected in pigeonholes for each one overnight and from the previous day. And then Tom would come in at about 7:00 in the morning and he would look through some things himself. And then about 7:15, he'd meet with these eight dead-tired people and get briefed by each of them, and sometimes, they would even type up some notes. And he would put it all together and decide what the priorities were among different subjects, and then he would
run off at a quarter to eight, or at whatever the set time was, to see Dean Rusk. And then he would take in George Ball separately after that.

Well, he, as you can imagine, got a little tired of this. And so around 1966 he asked the office directors, "Are there any of you willing to do this job, as a sort of understudy to me? Or maybe one of you can take on the Under Secretary, or even do the Secretary, when there's time? You don't have to say yes. It won't affect my judgment of anybody."

But I said, "Sure. I'd love to do it." And so I started in on training. Well, I had been going to George Ball a little bit on this task, but not for long.

Q: This was before your trouble with him?

MARK: Right. So he knew me as a result. As a matter of fact, I also got to know Dean Rusk. It was great from that point of view, and it was a great way to get a worldwide view of what was going on as far as our government was concerned.

So I switched--I mean, there was the hiatus when Ball threw me out--but then Katzenbach came in and I started in with him and continued doing this until the end of the Johnson Administration. And so I got insights into everybody else's area of the world and, of course, I began asking my people questions, you know, because I knew that I was going to have to face the Secretary or Under Secretary. I got to asking people in the different INR offices to help me out with analyses or to think about issues. So, in other words, I kind of interfered a little bit in everyone else's bailiwick, but legitimately.

At one point, I think it was in '66, I even wrote a memo on Vietnam about how we could get out of there without much loss of face, and this was around the time of the anti-war Buddhist troubles in South Vietnam, when even the South Vietnamese first army corps commander more or less deferred to the ideas of the Buddhist movement about not fighting other Vietnamese and so forth. And I wrote a memo to Tom Hughes in which I said, "Look. We have a perfect opportunity here to claim victory. We've done all we can for the South Vietnamese, and we're supporting their government. But now if their government doesn't want to fight and they've taken up Buddhist principles, we can say, 'Well, great. We did all we could. We have been successful so far in all the efforts undertaken, but we're not going to stay if we're not wanted.'"

And Tom said to me, "It's very ingenious, David, but if you don't want to get both of us thrown out of here with Lyndon Johnson as President, you had better just not give this to anybody else." And that was the end of that. I was not brave enough in that case to pursue it. And anyway, it would have been superfluous, because Katzenbach very quietly gathered around him a "non-group" including Dick Holbrooke to figure out some way to disengage honorably from Vietnam.

But I did get into everyone's bailiwick more or less, and this briefing continued on into the next administration. I did it for Secretary Rogers under Nixon and for Elliot
Richardson, who was the Under Secretary of State, and thus I got myself involved with all
the other bureaus in the Department, not just with Europe. But, of course, by that time I
had changed jobs too, in 1969, about the time the Nixon Administration came in, but
while Tom Hughes was still there. He stayed on for eight or nine months, although he had
been a Democratic political appointee. He stayed on until he was appointed DCM in
London by Rogers, by the Nixon people. He turned the morning briefing job over to me
completely, and I was kept briefing until about 1972 or 1973, when we had to change the
briefing format.

It was Kissinger who changed the system; he wanted a written preparation that involved
detailing about a dozen people in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research just to work on
preparing the written morning report for Henry Kissinger. And then this morning report
began going to the White House and was delivered to Nixon, and afterwards to Ford, at
the same time as the CIA's morning report; so it was a competing morning intelligence
analyses. But the oral presentation that I had done up until '73 finally ended.

It had been an exhausting thing. I mean I had to get up at 5:30 every morning in order to
do this, but on the other hand it was an invaluable experience in terms of meeting the
senior policy people who were running the Department, and thus having some access to
them for other purposes. And, as I say, beginning in early '69, I was in a new job. I left
West European research and became what is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary for INR
supervising all of the research offices in the Bureau. Thus, I had a legitimate reason to
poke into other areas of Western Europe.

Well, as I said, by this time in 1969 I had moved up a notch to be what would now be
Deputy Assistant Secretary, supervising all the research offices. Tom Hughes had wanted
to put me in as his Deputy Assistant Secretary for liaison with all the other Washington
Intelligence agencies, but at that time, Tommy Thompson was the super honcho on
Intelligence questions in the Department. I am referring to my former ambassador to the
Soviet Union, this was after his second tour there, and he vetoed me. He remembered that
incident when I had been indiscreet back in Moscow in 1957 or '58 with the Egyptian and
said, "Well, I don't know whether we should put someone like that into what is probably
the most secret set of relationships that we have in Intelligence in the State Department."

So I didn't get that job and had to wait a little bit until I became privy to that side of
things. I mean, afterwards, much later in 1978 when I became the number two man in
INR, of course I was privy to all those other things, and I think I can say without boasting,
that I never leaked any secret. But nonetheless, the 1969 incident shows how events in
one's career can have an effect even much later on.

Well, the interesting part of becoming chief of all research was that I came to learn even
more than I had earlier as the morning briefer, though I kept on as morning briefer. One
gets to learn about every other area of the world, because all INR papers are cleared
through you. The State Department's input to National Intelligence Estimates, coordinated
by CIA, is cleared through you, and so forth. The result was that I received a broad
general foreign policy education from the many, many experts in our Bureau. And also, I now had more contact with all the operational bureaus of the State Department. You could see how they work, and how they think, and you get a better feel for the interplay of Intelligence and policy making, decision making. And, of course, there were many, many things that went on in the 1969-'74 period when I was there.

One of the things that struck me most, of course, was the exclusion of our Secretary of State, William Rogers, from the real action that was unfolding in Washington. I mean the real action had moved to the National Security Council where Henry Kissinger and his staff presided; and we felt this in many ways. But one of them was in seeing how Rogers, who was a very distinguished lawyer and has worked so ably on many things, including investigating the Challenger space shuttle explosion, and much more, how he moved heaven and earth to get in on real policy over at the White House.

I knew this from such things as not being able to brief him one morning because he had managed to work himself into the White House breakfast that Kissinger was having with Nixon after he got back from a then secret trip to China. I had the feeling that Rogers was cut out of crucial information on many of the major things that were going on. I don't know when he had been cut in on the Kissinger approach to China or how much he was involved in some of the Vietnam and Cambodia matters. But, of course, all of that made us in the Department realize that we were second-class citizens, and not really much participating in the formulation of top level foreign policy.

I remember sort of bravely writing my own essay for Rogers before he went off with Nixon and Kissinger to China. I mean, Rogers played a very minor role in that formal state visit at that point. I was trying to urge Rogers to argue that we not go overboard on the Chinese side as against the Soviets. I mean, it was one thing to play one off against the other--the Nixon and Kissinger strategy; but it was another thing to develop excessive enthusiasm for the Chinese. Yet I knew that an essay of that sort, even if read by the Secretary, wasn't likely to mean anything because it wasn't addressed to a person who was leading the action.

I remember that we felt frustrated again on this China matter at the time of the Bangladesh independence movement, when India and Pakistan went to war in 1971. I mean, the intelligence community was pretty clear as to the vast provocations to India that resulted from the situation out there, when Western Pakistanis strove to impose their will on East Bengal (later, Bangladesh), and we thought the Indians were doing about as little as any self-respecting nation would do in the circumstances to protect vital interests. But, of course, Kissinger had to tilt toward Pakistan, which was helping Kissinger on the secret approach to China. Therefore our intelligence community judgments were questioned, and some of our efforts to bring these issues out into the open through intelligence channels, such as National Intelligence Estimates, were kind of squashed, because top policy officers improperly dictated intelligence judgments in this respect.
Q: What do you mean "kind of squashed?" You could have gone forward with your own memoranda couldn't you?

MARK: Oh, yes. Within the State Department that certainly could have happened, but Rogers wasn't fully cut in. Yet, when it came to intelligence community action in the form of National Intelligence Estimates and analytical judgments that people had to make, there was much sort of looking over one's shoulder to see where the White House stood.

Q: But the embassy, the consulate general I guess it was at the time, in Dacca stood up to the Secretary. It caused some career grief, but did anyone in the Department join in in support? Did anybody's career go on the line in support of that position?

MARK: It was Arch Blood there, I think.

Q: Yes, right.

MARK: I don't think so. I don't think so. I mean we put out our INR Intelligence statements, but nobody took them that seriously. They didn't bind policy makers; they were just there for the record, and we put them out. I think it was really a very considerable failing, maybe made for higher policy reasons, but nevertheless, the Pakistani behavior in 1971 was pretty reprehensible.

Q: When was the failing? I mean, obviously Mr. Kissinger, I think, had his own, but what about the State Department professionals? Should they have been more outspoken and more forthright in their advice to the Secretary, even though they knew it was going to be unpopular?

MARK: Well, I don't remember what Rogers' own personal position was on this, if he had one, or whether he just left the ball completely in the Kissinger court. And since people in the Department didn't have that much direct access to Kissinger either, the Department didn't count for much. I don't know who the man for South Asia was over in the NSC at the time.

Q: Hal Saunders.

MARK: Oh, Hal Saunders, right. Well, you know, they might have gotten to him. I mean, Hal is a very judicious and balanced person, but the die had pretty much been cast by Kissinger.

Q: What about the Secretaries that you knew: Rusk, Rogers? How did they stack up in your estimation compared to, say, Dulles earlier?

MARK: Well, I didn't know Rusk that well. I briefed him in the mornings at times, but I never really was close to him. I was much closer to Katzenbach, who was the final Under
Secretary (before the title changed to "Deputy Under Secretary"). I was closer to Elliot Richardson at the time and to Rogers. And I only observed Dulles in the very limited framework of Yugoslavia. Yet, he was so clearly in control of things in his day.

I mean, it's true that Eisenhower was said to have overruled Dulles about the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam in 1954. After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu we had supposedly been toying with the nuclear idea in order to prop up the French position, and Eisenhower wouldn't do it. But, otherwise, Dulles seemed to be so clearly in command of things and so able to get Eisenhower to do what Dulles wanted on key issues.

And I don't know the nature of the private Kissinger-Nixon relationship. Obviously Kissinger got Nixon to do a lot of things, but it was not all one way. I mean, Nixon was himself a pretty powerful thinker on strategic issues and, indeed, it was he who had written about the opening to China in the journal Foreign Affairs, before he ever became President.

Q: What about the Deputy Secretaries? Do you see those as been or having some real impact on foreign affairs through their personalities and knowledge?

MARK: Well, certainly George Ball did. I described that. Katzenbach did. As I mentioned, Katzenbach organized the Department's informal effort on extrication from Vietnam. It was a group that met informally and that produced so-called "non-papers" about how to get out of Vietnam. I mean, that was part of the big division within the administration fighting for Lyndon Johnson's soul, I guess, and that took more of his effort than anything else; and I'd say he was pretty influential on that. And though he was a foreign policy outsider, he had been a member of the cabinet as Attorney General. He wasn't a careerist, and he was perfectly willing to do anything he felt right.

I think that Elliot Richardson, because of the very keenness of his mind and his incisive argumentation, was very influential, maybe more influential than William Rogers in the Nixon Administration. This would be on non-Vietnam matters. I think he probably had an "in" with Henry Kissinger too, although they are totally different types personality-wise. They wouldn't have fitted personally together, but sort of business-wise, I think they probably did a great deal.

Q: What were some of the key issues that you faced? You mentioned the Sadat thing.

MARK: Well, I only mentioned that off tape. [Chuckles] Right. Well, there's one thing before that, and that is when peace finally came about in Vietnam at the end of '72, early '73, we had a very excellent Vietnam analytical staff in our Office of Research for the Far East at the time. And the Vietnam staff sat down and wrote up a paper in the first half of 1973 analyzing the military situation. I mean, supposedly there was a truce or an armistice now that the war had ended. In fact, we had poured in every last bomb and piece of military hardware that we could before the deadline to end supplying, and the North Vietnamese had done the same to their forces in the South. Presumably, they were still
breaking the peace agreement by infiltrating as much as they could get away with after the deadline.

Taking this situation into account, with U.S. forces withdrawing and North Vietnamese forces left in some southern areas, these guys wrote a very lengthy estimate of the situation, weighing the strengths and weaknesses of the two sides. And to make it short, their conclusion was that 1974 would be a rather quiet year, while the North continued its buildup preparations, but that in 1975, all hell would break loose, and the probability was that the North would conquer the South.

Well, we circulated that report. Not widely, but we circulated it. And so one day, there stormed into my office in the State Department our ambassador to Vietnam, my old temporary boss in Geneva back in the early '60s, Graham Martin. And he said, "How dare you send out this stuff! It's all full of rubbish and nonsense. It's not going to happen that way at all. You know, I didn't know what I should have my staff in Vietnam do, whether to just have them send in an analytical cable saying the INR paper was all nonsense and pointing out why, or whether to do what I'm doing now to get you to pull and retract the paper and to say it was all an error."

But, in any case, he and I argued about different points, and he even met with the team of INR analysts, and we stuck to our guns. Next, he showed me the paper he was going to send in from Saigon, supposedly making mincemeat of us intellectually, but, in fact, he never sent that in, either. And, of course, it was just as well for his reputation since history unfortunately tells us that what happened was exactly what our careful INR analysts had written.

Q: But did you get any reaction from the White House to the paper?

MARK: We didn't get any reaction from the White House which was wholly enmeshed then in Watergate. Of course, the whole Vietnam thing was fraught with trouble for everyone. I mean, the matters that came up in that trial. You know, CBS was accused of slandering one of the generals. What was it, General--

Q: Westmoreland.

MARK: Westmoreland, yes. That's right. About things that concerned what the actual count of communist troops had been. Well, INR had been in the middle of all those battles. The Bureau had been involved, sending people to Vietnam, counting Viet Cong troops, and arguing about how you counted troops, etc. In fact, with all the arguments in the intelligence community in the late 1960s, Tom Hughes, who wanted to protect his position on the record, got an outside consultant (Professor) who was an expert on the Far East to come in and spend six months in 1969 going through all of INR's most secret files, writing a history of INR's positions on Vietnam issues, on National Intelligence Estimates, on what papers had been sent up to George Ball and Katzenbach, and all that
stuff. This was just to cover our tracks in case we ever got into a full-scale Congressional investigation or whatnot. It was all laid out in great detail, the whole history.

Q: Never been revealed?

MARK: I don't think it has ever come out at all. I don't know that anyone would care, except a historian maybe. But there it is, our analogue to the Pentagon Papers.

Well, anyway, there was that, and I mentioned the India-Pakistan thing. And then what I had talked about to you earlier was the growing dissatisfaction that Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt at the time, began showing in 1973 about living with the Israeli victory of 1967. The Israeli hold on the Sinai, which was Egyptian territory, particularly bugged him, and the Egyptians couldn't tolerate it, and he came to feel that they had to break the tension one way or another and take military action.

Sadat made a lot of remarks along these lines. The intelligence community looked into it but thought it was mostly bluff. And in May 1979 I wrote a--


MARK: I'm sorry. May 1973. I wrote a think piece myself that ended up saying that the way things were going, and considering the pressures in Egypt, and the military supplies available to it, and Sadat's relationships with Syria and so forth, the chances were better than 50-50 that, if no move were made internationally to accommodate the Egyptians to some extent, the chances were better than 50-50 that Sadat would launch military action within six months.

And so this piece was distributed. You know, some people noted it and said, "Well, that's his view of things." Anyway, the conclusion was pretty fuzzy. Better than 50-50, what's that? It's an intelligence community-type expression. We never got to November, of course, to judge the six months. It all happened at the beginning of October. And there had been other more recent signs, ambiguous signs. The intelligence community was sort of activated toward the end of September, and there was a huge inner-governmental postmortem afterwards about how it was that this had happened without our anticipating it more definitively.

Q: But, I mean, there you put down an element of judgment, which people could accept or not accept depending on the arguments you had. But what about the technical information available? What's hard to understand is how, with all the technical facilities available to us, that we weren't able to tell something was up.

MARK: Well, actually, the technical facilities did not show very much until right close to attack. The things that were more interesting were CIA agent reports. Although there were some consistent reports in the last week of September before the attack that some military move was going to happen, these were from agents whose credibility was, to
some degree, doubtful, and therefore the intelligence community was withholding its judgment.

You know, we were reporting on all these things. I remember briefing Secretary Rogers on this in September pretty extensively. We had a weekly meeting at that time with him to try to wrap issues up, and yet nobody could be that conclusive. I mean, I remember saying, "It looks more ominous, but we still can't say positively," and that was about three or four days before the actual attack. As I say, the big postmortem which was done by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and also, I think on the Hill, as well, also left things unclear.

Q: What about Sadat's interest in peace before this? I've heard it said that going to war was unnecessary if people had taken him seriously.

MARK: I agree. I think that's what he was saying. He wanted to negotiate about something, but no one was willing to take him that seriously.

Q: Why wouldn't anyone take him seriously?

MARK: I think because it would have meant bringing the Israelis to the conference table. I mean that itself would have required enormous U.S. pressure. The Israelis weren't willing to go to the conference table at that point and, you know, they only were later pushed into doing that after the October war, when Henry Kissinger maneuvered them into it.

And he did. I mean, his tactics at the time of the fighting and his passing a threat of Russian intervention, about which we also wrote extensively in intelligence at the time. I think the threat was somewhat exaggerated, the Soviet threat, and we wrote him a paper to that effect, but nevertheless, Kissinger used it a great deal. Then the way in which he convened an international conference. It only met once, but nevertheless, Kissinger used that to create new international negotiating frameworks. And various other things, such as setting up a truce commission.

He began to prepare the Israelis for a pullback on the Sinai side so that when Sadat came to Israel in '78, I guess, even Begin was ready to move to that point. After all, the Sinai does not figure in Israeli mythology in the way that Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) do, and therefore it was something that could be bargained away, and I think it took all that work on Kissinger's part to get them up to that point.

Q: Did you have anything to do with Kissinger during this period?

MARK: No. Virtually nothing to do with him. I mean, he visited INR. At some point in that period, yes, in '73, he launched something called the "year of Europe," and he was trying, in effect, I think--it was well after de Gaulle's death--he was trying to reestablish American hegemony, if you will, over Western Europe after the "distraction" of Vietnam.
Under the guise of arranging for equal dealing between North America and Europe, he was, in fact, trying to establish new sets of ground rules on consultations and other things which would have reinforced a sort of American domination. And people in the Bureau of European Affairs saw this right away, and I attended some of their early meetings. Hal Sonnenfeldt, a former INR star performer, was his liaison agent to try to put this across, but European Bureau people raised all these objections by saying that, "Okay, it's not important to Kissinger whether we raise it, but the Europeans are surely going to do so anyway."

And Kissinger pressed ahead and pressed ahead and got, I think, one weak declaration out, but the whole thing fizzled. It just wasn't in the cards, and yet, it was part of his way of trying to wrap things up, between the U.S., Western Europe, and the USSR. He was probably trying to get greater control over the West Europeans because we were just into an active new phase of diplomacy with the Soviet Union, and we didn't want to have the Europeans going off on their own in any way. This was to have been a way of consolidating things under American control.

Q: Yes, giving them an impression of consultation.

MARK: Right, much more than the actuality. Consultation, that's another subject matter I won't go into. I mean, it has been the same thing for 40 years and it works as well now as it ever did. Quantitatively it has always been very, very large. Qualitatively, it goes in cycles with the West Europeans.

Q: All right. What else happened to you in INR? Then you were off to Burundi?

MARK: How did I ever get to Burundi? I mean, that's not my normal area, for sure. When a Foreign Service officer moves along and eventually gets his first ambassadorial post, it's often in Africa somewhere. But it doesn't have to be. It can be maybe a little more substantive than that. Well, not that some African posts aren't substantive, but Burundi isn't. I mean, if you asked me several tapes back what business the United States had with Romania in the early 1950s, and I said it was not much. But still, it was a lot more than we had with Burundi in the middle 1970s.

But how did it happen to me? Well, Henry Kissinger had gotten to appoint the head of INR after Tom Hughes went off as DCM to London, and his choice was a career CIA senior intelligence officer, named Ray Cline.

Q: This was in what year?

MARK: In the end of 1969. Ray Cline was a senior Intelligence man in CIA. He had earlier been the head of station for CIA on Taiwan. He was very close to Chiang Kai-shek, and later on, even more importantly, he was station chief in Germany, which is a
key area. He had also been the Deputy Director of CIA for Intelligence, which means not operations, but all the analysis done by CIA.

And so he came over to State, and he thought he knew Henry Kissinger. I mean when Kissinger ran that seminar at Harvard that I attended in 1963-64, Ray Cline was an annual speaker at that. And Kissinger thought that he could get--I mean Cline thought that he could get Kissinger extremely interested in intelligence, listening to reports that the Bureau of Intelligence and Research would put out, and that he, Ray Cline, would play an active role in State Department policy making, first when Kissinger was over in the White House, and later when he came over as Secretary of State.

But Kissinger didn't pay that much attention to intelligence or that much attention to Ray Cline. I'm sure his relations with the Director of CIA were pretty close, undoubtedly, but not with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department. So Ray Cline was very disappointed, and when he saw in 1973, when Kissinger became Secretary--

Q: No, no. 1974. Or was it '73? I thought it was when Ford became President, right?

MARK: No, I think Nixon arranged to get Kissinger over.

Q: Okay. Well, anyway, go ahead.

MARK: Well, anyway, when he saw that things weren't changing, he decided there was no point in his staying in INR, and he put out some public statement blasting Kissinger for inattention to intelligence information and analyses.

Well, of course, Kissinger didn't take that slight lightly, and Ray Cline resigned at the same time. Kissinger sent in his deputy--well, I'm not sure he was Kissinger's deputy at the time, or whether he was head of the Soviet operational policy part of the White House staff--Bill Hyland, currently (1989) the editor-in-chief of Foreign Affairs Quarterly, and told Bill Hyland to clean out that INR place, clean out the top people there.

Well, I was one of the deputies, and so Bill said to me fairly early on, "Well, David, when are you leaving?"

And I said, "Well, you know, I think I've reached the level where I merit an embassy and, you know, arranging that really is in your bailiwick. You know Kissinger and all these people. What can you do about getting me an embassy?"

Well, he didn't do anything, and a couple of months later he again said, "Well, David, we've been getting along fine together on business, but still it's time for you to go, and when are you leaving?" And I repeated my line. Well, shortly after that, maybe a month after that, Larry Eagleburger called me on one Saturday and said, "David, I think we've got an embassy for you. Drop in and see me."
So I went up to see him and he said, "Yes, at the moment we have only two embassies open, and one is Malawi and the other is Burundi. And I have someone else I have to take care of, and he doesn't speak French and you do, so why don't you go to Burundi?" And that's how I left for Burundi. It was part of the housecleaning of INR.

Q: And you went there in '74?

MARK: '74 and stayed there through '77. I mean, the Burundians weren't sure whether to accept my credentials. They had been signed by Nixon and here Ford had become President in the interim; and it took some six or eight weeks of intensive consultation with juridical experts, until the Burundians finally accepted the documents.

There's not much to say about Burundi. It was an education for me; all of Africa was an education. The U.S. has no business with Burundi. Hardly anyone does. The Belgians, I guess, because they used to be the colonial power, and the French because it's French speaking, and they are would-be coordinators of everything that goes in any place in Africa that speaks French. And the United States buys a lot of Burundi's smallish coffee crop, which doesn't amount to very much anyway, and coffee is virtually the whole economy. There are a few other little things, both then and now (1989).

It's a country that has this sort of South African situation, only instead of white versus black, it is two black groups which have managed to kill many more than have been killed in South Africa, believe it or not, since the estimate is somewhere around 100,000 dead in the 1972 massacres of the majority Hutu group by the minority Tutsi, the 15% minority that is 100% of the army and almost 100% of the government. The ratio of officials is a little better nowadays (1989).

So, you know, in a way, all of this was interesting, as was a chance to visit other parts of Africa: West, South, and East. That was all very nice. And to learn a little bit about how an embassy ran and what the CIA did there. I mean, CIA worried about threats to Mobutu in Zaire primarily, and about the Soviet and East European presence in Burundi and Rwanda next door. But all in all, my stay was a diversion.

Q: Well, then you came back and went back to--

MARK: They had no job for me. It was the start of the Carter Administration, and I went off for a year as Diplomat in Residence at the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee. My job there was to speak to any groups interested in any foreign affairs matters throughout the state of Wisconsin and in the northern half of Illinois.

So that kept me busy during the school year and, in addition, in the second half of the school year I devised and taught a course that's never been taught there before or since. It was about international organizations not part of the U.N. I mean, everything from OPEC to the Warsaw Pact to the Organization of American States and the Common Market. It was kind of fun, except I was very discouraged by the level of background knowledge of
undergraduates, at least at that particular university. But, on the other hand, it was a real challenge to me, you know, to assemble my thoughts rationally and pedagogically. I think all Foreign Service officers who get into the university teaching business have that experience when they take it up.

Q: Then you came back to INR?

MARK: Yes. Naturally, the Department said that they still had no job for me, and that at my level, it was really up to me to find a job for myself. INR had a number two man--it was Roger Kirk, who was getting an assignment as Ambassador to Somalia. Bill Bowdler, who was a Latin American expert, born of English parents in Argentina and naturalized as an American during his adolescence, and who had also been ambassador to South Africa, was the Director of the Bureau, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research. And, you know, I popped in and said, "Well, how about me for the Kirk job?"

And he said, well, he had been thinking of someone else, Kempton Jenkins, who was an expert on Soviet affairs, but for some reason, "Jenks" was vetoed for INR elsewhere in the Department. He had had some run-ins with someone in the Carter camp, and so he didn't get that job.

He did much better, really. He went to Commerce as a Deputy Assistant Secretary over there, and moved from that to become, at a very high salary, the American Director of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, and then was picked up from that by the Director of ARMCO Steel--I mean the CEO of ARMCO Steel, later Secretary of Commerce, Bill Verity, and "Jenks" is still vice president of ARMCO Steel (1989) and head of their Washington office, doing exceedingly well. So it couldn't have happened to a more able and nicer guy, but he didn't get into INR.

Q: So you got his job in--

MARK: 1978, by default. And really for the next six months I generally ran INR, because Bill Bowdler was sent off on a special mission that I really haven't seen written up anywhere. He was sent off on a mission to do something about Nicaragua. I mean, there were other people. Pete Vaky over in ARA (Latin American affairs) was certainly involved in that problem, and other people were involved too.

But the idea was to keep the Sandinistas from taking over Nicaragua. The Sandinistas had made a raid on Managua in the fall of '77, I guess, and they had shown their strength, and they were active in the field, but the Sandinista National Guard--I mean, Somoza's National Guard--was still pretty strong. Their morale was not great but it wasn't zero either, and people in the State Department thought, "Well, if we're going to avoid a Sandinista takeover, we'd better get very active to find some solution."

And they got some kind of okay from Carter to do this, and Bowdler was the point man. And he negotiated for months and months with everybody, including people who were
fronting for the Sandinistas, and he worked out an elaborate scheme which would have led to elections, observed internationally, with the Organization of American States involved. The Sandinistas accepted this through the intermediaries, and it all came up to whether Somoza was going to set the process in motion, and going to, in effect, agree to his own resignation, when the new government and the new congress were in place.

And so Bowdler, early in 1979, came to a sort of showdown meeting with Somoza, who had previously okayed the process but clearly didn't like it. And when Bowdler went in to see Somoza at that time, who should be there with Somoza but the congressman from Staten Island, New York, Murphy I believe, who was later caught up in the ABSCAM scandal, but who was then chairman of the House Merchant Marine Affairs Committee, or Maritime Affairs, whatever its name was at the time.

Q: Later indicted for something.

MARK: Yes. He was indicted in the ABSCAM bribery case, and he went to prison for it. And Murphy had been in business dealings with Somoza that had earned Murphy a lot of money, millions. But he was not indicted for that.

In any case, Somoza turned to Bowdler and said, "I'm sure you know Congressman Murphy. I'm sure you know Congressman Murphy's important role in passing legislation to implement the Panama Canal treaties, and I think that President Carter should be aware of these connections before he forces me to sign on to this scheme that you, Bill Bowdler, have negotiated here."

So, of course, Bowdler carried the word back to the White House and there was a meeting in which Carter said, "Well, I can't risk the Panama Canal treaties for the sake of Nicaragua," and so a golden opportunity to prevent the Nicaragua tragedy was lost. Would it have been a lasting solution? Who knows? Yet, it had so many important people behind it, and the Sandinistas at that point were so unsure of their actual standing as against the Guard, that I think there had been a pretty good chance of success.

But after that, the Guard sort of fell apart as fighting was renewed during that spring, and when it was clear that Somoza was going to be chased out, Bowdler went in again with a last-minute scheme that involved abdication of Somoza in favor of his brother-in-law. This happened, but then, under the scheme, his brother-in-law was supposed to turn things over to another more neutral group. Somehow, Somoza's brother-in-law got delusions of grandeur and tried to stay in power, until he was forced out in a few days. And the Sandinistas were by then so confident of themselves and so powerful that a power-sharing deal wouldn't have held up anyway. And for his pains, of course, Bill Bowdler was tossed out by the incoming Reagan Administration. He received orders to have his desk cleared and to be out of the building by noon on January 20, 1981.

Q: That hurt him, didn't it?
Q: Have you talked to him since then?

MARK: I've seen him just once, and he is quietly bitter about the thing, but has never really published memoirs, and has no plans to do so as far as I know. And there are other people from ARA who could do so, and this Frank McNeil, who just resigned in protest in '87, or something like that, over our Central American policy, was the closest to Bowdler in actually working out the Somoza replacement details at the time. He could write things. There is also Tony Lake, who was head of State's Policy Planning Bureau under Carter, who wrote a book, which I haven't read, about Central America and about Nicaragua; maybe he covers Bowdler's work to some extent. But I don't think so. I don't think Bowdler has really given people the inside story, and no one who has had the inside story has really written about it.

Anyway, during all that period I was sort of running INR and I was really learning about the whole Intelligence Community, because Admiral Stansfield Turner, who was the Director of the CIA at the time, instituted biweekly breakfasts. And each of the major intelligence agencies in Washington--and INR was an intelligence agency though with the lowest budget of any of them. I mean, the rest of them wouldn't have spit on our budget, which was then something like ten million dollars a year.

But nonetheless, we got to the breakfasts and we met all the other agency chiefs. I mean, I did at the time; Bill was never there until later. We met all the other people in the intelligence community. We learned about things and, for the first time, we really got the State Department involved in asking the Community to do things for us. This was mainly Turner's contribution. He organized the Intelligence Community, which had been mostly a formalized fiction, a nominal fiction before, into a real community, in which agencies contributed and in which there was--and still is--a community staff that does some things jointly. Really for the first time, he got a total community budget going, so that even those parts of the Defense Department that relate to intelligence are funded in this budget. I mean, it's not passed by Congress as such.

Congress knows about it. The budget for the intelligence committee goes through the House and Senate intelligence committees, and in the course of this, the State Department, for the first time, got into the habit of saying at a high level--and I mean the Secretary of State--of meeting with the other people in a NSC body to say, "Well, you know, this satellite is very nice or that satellite is very useful for you guys in Defense, but for what we need, for the kinds of information, we need in political crises or whatever, or in economic crisis in some sense, we need other kinds of data."

And this is part of our State Department tasking of the intelligence community. I don't want to overplay it; I mean, we're not a major player in these things. But nevertheless, the Secretary of State has become a voice that is respected and has gotten a role to play in spending other people's money. It's not State Department money, but spending other
people's money, and Cy Vance as Secretary took it very seriously. I remember going to several meetings with him in 1979, precisely when these issues came up of how funds were going to be split, and which things were important from the State Department point of view.

Very good. Well, I think that's about all.

Q: Didn't you write a memorandum during the Iranian hostage crisis--in the beginning?

MARK: Yes, I'm sure I did. I can't remember specifically what I--

Q: In which you predicted it was going to last a very long time and people ignored that.

MARK: Oh, yes. I did do that. That's right. I said it was going to last a very long time. I did other maverick things. When the Russians invaded Afghanistan, of course, we were all trying to think of what to do to punish them; and it was fairly early brought up that we should boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics. I wrote a paper urging that we not boycott the Moscow Olympics because there were other more effective things we could do, and that we had more fish to fry than to ruin the hopes of our young athletes who were competing on a worldwide basis. But, of course, I knew that this plea wouldn't get anywhere, and it didn't. You know, it's just down there in some record. I mean, I figured that was the main job of an Intelligence Bureau, not only to bring information to bear on the rest of the Department, but also to say things that no one else wanted to say in an operational sense.

Q: Let me ask you one last question in the few minutes we have. Do we spend too much money, put too much emphasis on Intelligence? I mean, it seems to me the risks that we take around the world gathering Intelligence, the jeopardy we put our interests into in a lot of places in the world are not repaid in the value that they use it in Washington.

MARK: Well, I don't know. I mean, we couldn't have verification of arms control without a huge intelligence apparatus. Most of it is technical but, of course, the great cost of Intelligence is on the technical side now. I am referring to when I was there; I understand that Bill Casey increased the budget for CIA a great deal while he was there under Reagan, particularly for the human operations of CIA.

Q: That's what I'm referring to.

MARK: But when I was there, I mean the CIA budget was fairly small. I mean, it's not the meager ten million of INR, but it was a relatively small part of the total intelligence community budget, and the human Intelligence side of CIA was even smaller. It was, in Pentagon terms, it was peanuts. Now, Casey may have increased it some, but I'd say it's still fairly--

Q: But there are other costs up and down. There are costs in diplomatic--
MARK: Okay. That is a never-ending question. How do you resolve them and, basically, it often goes to the President. I mean, it depends on what a given Secretary of State wants to do to fight for his ambassador. Because the only way that the State Department can control things in a particular country is through the ambassador; and the question of what insights a given ambassador will be allowed to acquire about the operations of his CIA station chief are fought over at the beginning of each administration and during each administration. The battle involves Washington personnel as well as the ambassador.

*End of interview*