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[This interview was not edited by Ambassador Marshall.]

Q: Mr. Ambassador, would you want to give us a sense of your early years and education as they might have formed your interest in foreign affairs? I know that you graduated from Brown University in 1950.

MARSHALL: Yes, I did. I graduated from Brown, but Brown was after I’d been in the Marine Corps. When I left school (school was in New England called the Brooks School), I left Brooks School the middle of my last year to go into the Marine Corps and ultimately to Iwo Jima and Guam in a rifle platoon at the time. I was very keen about going into the Marine Corps. My grandfather, who had been a Commandant, the 16th Commandant of the Marine Corps, instilled in me the sense of love of flag and country. So when the war came, I decided, after talking with him, to leave school and I was able to get my diploma although I was not a good student. I needed further education. And then I spent four years in the Marine Corps.

I came back and decided what I’d really like to do is to write. I thought well, I’d like to join a magazine. Time Magazine would be a good idea. I went to see a friend of mine – a man by the name of C.D. Jackson. He said, “Tony, I can give you a job starting tomorrow.” I couldn’t believe it. It was too good to be true! I didn't expect that. And he said, "Yes. See that wastepaper basket over there in the corner?" I looked at it. I didn't see the relevance of this. It didn't hit me right away. And I said "Yes." He said, "Well, I can hire you tomorrow. And if you empty that wastepaper basket for two years, maybe I might be able to put you into a training program. But if you empty that little piece of paper – I mean a degree from college – then I could put you right into a training program." I said, "Well, thank you very much." And it's obvious that stuck with me. So, thanks to another friend, Walter Hoving, who was then head of Tiffany, and who was a trustee of Brown University, I then got into Brown University. I graduated from Brown with a BA in English History and English Literature, which was not what I should have taken. I should have taken Political Science. Later, I became a trustee of Brown and am now a trustee emeritus, but I really didn't get my education at Brown. I got my education in the Marine Corps. I got a piece of paper at Brown. It's very, very interesting.

Q: Did the wartime experience steer you towards a career in foreign affairs?

MARSHALL: Yes and no. I wouldn't say that landing on Blue Beach and Iwo Jima was necessarily a diplomatic experience. But it did lead me in one way, and that is that when I was at Brown, I felt I still would like to write, having sort of put this thought of writing in the background – although I did end up by writing. I think C.D. Jackson might have been a little bit proud of me. I've written six books, articles, all kinds of other things as a correspondent. But that was not my career. I felt that I would rather like to get into civilian government work. So, I took a look at the Foreign Service and decided that that
was probably not what I wanted to do. And I contacted again a friend who gave me good advice, by the name of Bill Donovan. General Donovan was head of the OSS during the war, as we all know, and in 1947 helped to create the CIA as a peacetime agency. It seemed we needed something during peacetime in addition to war. And he gave me the names of two people: Fisher Howe in the old R area, now called INR at State, and another man by the name of — I can't remember his name, but anyway he was at the Agency, the head of personnel, I believe. I went to the Agency and had a talk. I then had a talk with Fisher Howe, who introduced me to another man by the name of T. Achilles Polyzoides, who was head of a staff called the special projects staff in the R area in intelligence in the State Department. I took a job there where I was responsible for shuffling through all the hard copy of the desk security agency tapes and sorting it out, writing reports, and then reporting to people like Homer Byington at State on a regular basis. My area was Europe — Italy, Spain, France. So I did that for two years. Then a good friend of mine by the name of James A. Cunningham, Jr., who I met at Brown because he was the Dean of the Graduate School. I don’t think that took up a great deal of his time. What he really was involved in was as the placement officer for Brown University. He was also a Marine and we met in Brazil. When I came back from General Donovan's, having sent me down to Washington, I said to him, "You know, I just had a meeting at the CIA and they look like a pretty good organization." I think there’s a future there.” You know, he’d never even heard of it. A lot of people then thought the CIO and the CIA were the same thing and what were they? So he promptly went down there, and they offered him a job to head up recruiting. So, back to 1952, when I was still with the Special Policy Staff, Jim and I had lunch one day and he asked me, "Are you happy in your job? How's it going?" I said, "Well, it's not something I want to stay with forever." He said, "Why don't you come work with me?" And so I did.

I transferred up to the Agency and Jim had a number of recruiters who stayed in Washington as well as about four or five, as I remember it, who were in posts around the country, such as San Francisco. He made me a roving recruiter. And that was really quite a fun job. I went to Monterey and shuffled through all of their files to try to find a red-haired Finn who spoke Russian, and things like that. And I went to the Menninger Clinic because the Agency wanted to hire two or three psychiatrists. I interviewed probably nearer to two hundred than a hundred. This was really fun training for psychiatry, in one way, because it was absolutely ludicrous. I learned more about their self-analysis, which put me off psychiatry for life. But also, I remember one time in Baltimore, when I was interviewing a psychiatrist, I was sitting at his desk and he was lying down on a naugahide brown sofa. Anyway, I think I ended up giving him a pretty good desk and we were able to fill that requirement. I did that for two or three years and then Jim left his job as head of recruiting in the Agency because he came to the attention of a man by the name of Richard M. Bissell. Dick Bissell, who had just been assigned the job by Allen Dulles to take on a special extremely, extremely covert U-2 project. And Jim went over to that. I just lost track of him, although we saw each other once in a while. Until after another year or so, Jim and I had another lunch — we seemed to only think when we were eating. It happened in Washington and elsewhere. He said, "You know, would you like to make a change again?" He said, "Dick took me on as his special assistant and made me head of
all the administration for the program. We'll be moving from the little site – a small two-story building (which doesn't exist anymore now) on Virginia Avenue to much larger quarters – 5000 square feet – across from the Metropolitan Club. Would you consider – I've recommended you – that you be a special assistant?" So, I said yes. Then I had probably had three years of the most interesting work. Although I had a lot of interesting times at the Department as ambassador, I really had a marvelous time doing this program.

First of all, it was extremely interesting working on the technical aspects. I don't know whether it was that or what. It turned out to make me quite a techie. Now in 1998, my technology interests, my working on computers, have helped to give me a jump. When I came back from being ambassador in 1977 from Kenya, I got in 1979 an Apple 64K computer. There wasn't even anybody who could tell you how to run the thing. Unbelievable. But I mastered that and I did it for more than one reason. I, first of all, wanted to learn about the computer myself, but also I believed that, as of my business then – and a great part of my life has been financed – if I understood the language of the computer, what one was talking about, whether bands or RAM or ROM or whatever, I would understand how one company might be better than another to invest in. So, I bought that. I don't know whether my techie interest today comes from the technology that I was exposed to back in my days with Dick Bissell in the mid-50s, but I think it certainly gave it a boost working with companies who manufactured the hardware like Hycon and Randall, the big hardware like Wooldridge and also Lockheed, which made the U-2. Dick's assignments to me were quite numerous and quite varied.

Perhaps, of all of the things he gave me to do, the most interesting was to go abroad to obtain from heads of state permission to operate the U-2 from their country. And this really was quite interesting on occasion, such as when I went to Pakistan. I also went to Turkey. I can't think of who was Chargé at the time. Anyway, working with him we obtained permission from the Turks to operate from Adana in southern Turkey, which I then visited two or three times later. But I also did briefings in various places. I went with Dick to Tokyo where we set up an operation which became later very successful and branched off. The one to me which was the most interesting was to get permission from the Pakistanis. I went to Karachi which was still the capital and had an appointment with Mirza, who was then the President. I went to see him and I said (naturally, I did not tell him what we were doing; we didn't do that in the Agency) we had a special plane that had been adapted to obtain air samples of the atmosphere and could we have permission from his country to do this from an airfield somewhere in the northern part of Pakistan? He told me he didn't see any reason why not. As far as he was concerned, I had his approval, but he wanted me to see the Prime Minister and I should not tell the Prime Minister that he had seen me or that he had given his approval.

So, I went off and through our people there attempted to arrange an appointment to see Suhrawardy, who was the Prime Minister, and was told that he was sick in bed with the flu. Also, they were going to have the Baghdad Pact Meeting shortly and the ministers were already arriving. He would be hosting a party and would probably get up briefly for that, but it would probably be impossible to see him. Nevertheless, they asked for an
appointment, and he said he'd see me, so I went around to his home and was shown into his bedroom. He was lying in his bed with a thermometer in his mouth, and I thought this was a hell of a way to meet a Prime Minister. And the room was absolutely frozen; enough to give him a cold and he had phonograph records scattered all over the floor. I had time to look around while I waited for him to take his thermometer out, which he did when a wrist alarm went off. Anyway, I told him my story and he said, "Well, it sounds fine to me. You have my approval. On the other hand, I'd like you to see the Chief of Staff and get his approval, and don't tell him that you've seen me."

I, unparenthetically, thought then and in retrospect feel I should have gotten a darn sight better briefing before going out. I think that probably the reason I didn't is that there was absolutely no coordination, no contact between any level except the absolute top level, between State and the Agency. Therefore, to have me go over to State and be briefed on this would have been a little obvious. The Agency had an interest in it, but, nevertheless, I think that somehow, I should have been briefed on the politics of the country. Anyway, true to what he said, that evening he was giving a reception in the garden of his house for the Baghdad Pact. It was a very jazzed up reception. The colors of the National Flag of each of the countries as lights of each of the trees in the garden. And there were probably three or four hundred people there. So I borrowed a tuxedo from the Chief of Station which, fortunately, fit me well enough for the occasion and went to this with him. I don't know what he wore; maybe he borrowed it from somebody else, but anyway we both went because I didn't know what the Chief of Staff looked like. We finally spotted him, but he was talking to the Chinese ambassador. That was hardly the group we wanted to break up. So we waited for a few minutes. The Chief of Staff walked away, and I then followed him. He was a glorious looking man; all dressed up in his white uniform with a full chest of medals, quite a bit taller than I was. He turned when I addressed him – the moment when I started – and unfortunately I had started to talk to him and was getting to the point, and this was the only opportunity I had, all of which was a bad way of doing diplomacy or clandestine work or whatever you want to call it. If I'd been he and been interrupted at a cocktail party, I wouldn't have responded too well to a serious conversation. It's neither the place nor the time, but I hadn't chosen it. I didn't choose it, but I had started it, and I saw that he was absolutely drunk as a lord, so I had to continue. Then he poked his finger into my stomach and said, "You go back and tell your President that we need more tanks." So I then reported to Suhrawardy exactly what had happened. And he said, "You've done that. Leave him to me." I said, "No. He said no, and I want to be sure of this. And I would appreciate your making arrangements for an appointment for me in his office." Well, it did take place the next morning. And he was courteous and agreed we could have a strip up in Lahore that we could use. I don't think he was too happy about seeing me, but nevertheless it was done. It was wrapped up what I considered properly under the circumstances. So, anyway, I hopped on a plane, which we had come down from Europe with some other people on it. We went up to Lahore and looked at the airfield. It really wasn't that adequate. It turned out that we instead used a strip up in Peshawar. But that certainly was one of the more fun incidents.

Q. Was it not in Peshawar that Francis Gary Powers took off?
MARSHALL: Yes, of course it was. And I knew him when he was out at what we called the Ranch in Nevada where all the pilots did their training on the dry lake bed. Yes, it was his takeoff point.

Q: This is fascinating. We were talking about your CIA years as prelude to State – three times as ambassador. You certainly were in the heyday of the – the 50s.

MARSHALL: It was the fun time. You could do what was right. You can quote me.

Q: Which has so much been documented in recent books. That was the period you must have worked in recruitment and training at Camp Peary, which was then being set up, along with Colonel Matt Baird, a rather flamboyant character. You must have had a lot to do with the structuring and corporate culture of the CIA as it took off.

MARSHALL: Well I really did because before... I sort of left out a bit there. But before I worked for Dick, I also had other assignments and so I worked essentially in all parts of the Agency. And I did go down to the farm you were referring to. I went through the course there and other counter-espionage courses. Lot of training. After three years with Dick, I said, rightly or wrongly – retrospectively I think rightly – because that meant I was not involved with him in the Bay of Pigs, which as we all know was a total fiasco – I said to Dick that I would like to get into the covert area. DDPs it was then called; now it is called the DDO. And I would like to get into that, so he asked where I would like to go. What I wanted to do was Africa and for a while was on TDY with the Africa Branch, which was a branch of the NEA (Near East and Africa), which was a division of the Agency. And there were five people there and then they brought a man, Lester Hauck, who had been in Germany, and he only wanted people who had had operational experience abroad in the branch. The fact that I had been to Kenya, the fact that I'd learned Swahili, didn't seem to make any difference. Motivation was not a reason to be employed; field practice, that is operational experience was what was really necessary. But I had gone out (this is going back a few years) in 1954. I had become extremely interested in Africa – actually at Brown University in a general sense and wrote some papers on it. In 1954, I'd saved up all my leave for the past two years and fled to East Africa – that is to Kenya, to Somalia, and to Uganda and Tanganyika, as it was then known, for six weeks. I'd arranged my trip eight months in advance right down to exactly who I was going to see and had a very interesting time. I met General Sir Frank Erskine, who was then head of the British East Africa Forces and I stayed with a man by the name of Lord Portsmouth up in Eldoret in Kenya, who had a large farm (in fact, five farms) up there. I also stayed with Sir Philip Mitchell, who was the retired governor and had gone through the early Mau Mau problems – went through some Mau Mau battles. And this was all self-educational. I wasn't there for the Agency or anybody else. It was for myself because I was interested. It did me an enormous amount of good. When I was posted to Kenya it gave me perspective. Perspective is something you can't tell somebody about. Perspective is something you have to experience. One other thing I did that gave me a good education in being an ambassador, particularly in Kenya, was having had a business
in Nigeria for eleven years. Having very much hands-on experience in business gave me an understanding of the problems Americans have in the kind of businesses that exist in Kenya.

Q: Certainly Africa must have been a very poor step-child in the division of the Near East. You had Kermit Roosevelt, and the Mossadegh affair, so that the front and center men were in the Middle East.

MARSHALL: Yes. What one must remember (and I'm sure most Americans probably don't) is that before World War II, there were only two independent countries in Africa – Liberia and Ethiopia. And if they even know where they are – I'm being sarcastic, but realistic also – I think most people think of Egypt as an independent country since the Pyramids and of South Africa as always independent. That's why there's so much trouble. And now we have more than 50 independent countries. And, of course, they were then the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and South Africa, not independent countries. Anyway, I was curious about it and that's what I wanted to get into, but I never did.

Q: Before we leave that period, Dick Bissell must have been an incredible person to work for: demanding, brilliant. The U-2, of course, was his glory. At what point did you leave?

MARSHALL: Oh, he was. I was not there when Powers was captured. No. I was there in the early formation of the program there. I was there to see what the result was. By that I mean not ELINT, the electronic intelligence, but mainly the photography we picked up. There was a man by the name of Art Lundahl, who started, organized, developed, ran, categorized all of the photographic tape we have. And then, to my security, but Dick would sometimes send me on briefing missions either to the chief Air Marshall of CINCPAC, the Commander in Chief in the Pacific, in Hawaii or a number of other people. I had to take these large prints, a 2 x3 sheet, the kind of thing you would like to put in your wallet to know where it is! When we went to Japan, I remember I went out a few days before Dick did. He came out with General Lemnitzer and others. I remember staying in the Imperial Hotel. I think it has recently been redone or whatever, but the ceilings were so low you had to bend halfway down to get into the rooms. I remember when I got into my room, I thought, "Where the hell am I going to store these things?!" There was a space above a cabinet or something where I put them. I couldn't walk around the street with them. I couldn't check them. But there was sort of an aspect of security where one was supposed to be so secure that sometimes you have material with you that is unlike – you can secure your mind but you can't secure some material. It's visible, and yet it must be there and alright. Those were uncomfortable moments. It was a wonderful time working with Dick. He was, I thought, a genius. He really was. He was also an eccentric. He had a sense of humor but he never took me really into his private life at all.

Q: I was certain he and Tracy Barnes, Frank Wisner, and Desmond Fitzgerald...

MARSHALL: Des Fitzgerald I knew because he was the partner of a brokerage firm of which I was a partner in New York. But also one name you didn't mention, who I got to
know well then, and have known ever since and well, when he came to visit me in Kenya when he was having problems in Washington, was Dick Helms. Dick I've known well and long.

So, I couldn't go to Africa, which was what I wanted then and eventually did, but not quite yet. In talking to people in the Agency – Hugh Cunningham, not Cunningham – (I can't remember what his first name was), we decided I might go to Ankara. And as things do in life, they got changed slightly, and I went to Istanbul, which was far better and far more interesting and it became very much a part of my life later on in many different ways. I was then sent as a vice consul under official cover to the consulate general in Istanbul where I did work recruiting and spotting and identifying foreign nationals, third country nationals – not Turks, not Americans – who might do some work for us there. I also recruited some Turks. I was there for a year and a half or so and then came back to the United States. I got out of the Agency. There were two reasons for that. One, my mother, who had been married to my father for a number of years, and was divorced from him when I was four, remarried, and was very, very happily married for 20 years to my stepfather (Marshall was his name), whose name I took, since I didn't know my father, had died. And my mother remarried Vincent Astor and he died. So I felt that maybe it was a good idea that I go home. I thought I might be of some help to my mother.

Q: Did those years in Istanbul while you were there for a year and a half coincide with particular violence against the Greek community and the exodus of most of the Greeks living there? Or was that a slightly different timeframe?

MARSHALL: A lot of that happened before. But of course the Turks are such nationalistic people that they really don’t care for anybody except the Turks. It's a little hard to identify sometimes because it depends whom you're talking to. The traditional definition of a Turk is a Seljuk Turk from the center of Asia Minor. A lot of Greeks had left, but there were a great many while I was there. And afterwards, there was another exodus. And, of course, the Jews who came from Portugal were looked down on and the Armenians were looked down on. I remember one time an Armenian whom I knew whose last name was not spelled ian or yan, and therefore who was not clearly identifiable as Armenian, and whose family had changed their name three generations beforehand, had applied for a permit to have a stall at a trade fair in Izmir and was denied it because he was Armenian. There was and is a great deal of discrimination in Turkey. But there was no great Greek problem. There was, of course, the Cyprus problem, but that would be going on through Star Wars.

Q: So you left the Agency at that time.

MARSHALL: I left the Agency and the other reason I came back was that I myself was having marital problems. I didn't get divorced then but I ultimately did get divorced from my first wife, with whom I had two children, two boys.

Q: Do you blame the Foreign Service, in part?
MARSHALL: No, not at all, neither the Agency or the Foreign Service. Anyway, I came back and I got out. I had been a partner in my step-father's firm, Proctor, Henick, and Marshall, for some time. I looked on that and I looked on my brokerage associations in New York as an anchor. No matter where I went, I sort of looked on that as the anchor in New York, not that I couldn't pick up the anchor and go somewhere. But that was my anchor. I then joined another firm. I felt that they were too old-fashioned. It was quite a break for me, leaving my step-father's firm and going into another firm, but I felt that I wanted to do something and I was ahead of my time. I wanted to try and establish a development fund for Africa. I was crazy to think of it then. I mean, people are probably crazy to think of it now! And I'm talking about 1960. And this is 35 years later. They thought I was absolutely crazy. So I thought I simply wanted to do that, so I opened up an office on 55th Street in New York and incorporated a company called African Research and Development Company. And this is sort of cutting corners. I formed the African Research and Development Company, ARDC. And I'm going to abbreviate this a bit, not go into too many details. My purpose, and it was not all that crystal clear to me at the time, at all, because working in the government, in the State Department, was not at all the kind of preparation you want to be in business; as a matter of fact it doesn't help you at all, in my opinion; except if you are going to a career in government and establish contacts, associations, knowledge of foreign countries of that sort. And then you go into business after an interesting but compartmentalized career in government. It did not prepare me. So I made some mistakes. One had to do with people. What I wanted to do was hire people who would do what I wanted them to do: to go out and find projects and business in Africa. At that time, except for academicians, there was really nobody who had any business experience in Africa. So, I hired one man who was a real estate man in Washington. I thought he could take a look at some business opportunities in Rhodesia’s Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which, of course, became Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. So he went out and talked to a lot of people and had a lot of fun. He was cutting corners and wasn't doing what I really wanted him to do. Then I hired another man who was an academic who had studied Africa. At least a little bit of Africa. That didn't work out. Of course, between salaries and travel, that was all very expensive.

What I really should have done, in retrospect (Retrospect is a wonderful thing. It helps you in the future to look back on your mistakes in the past), is to have hired nobody except a secretary. I should have gone out myself, which I did. I traveled a lot, but I should have gone out much more in depth to these countries, identifying opportunities. I began to see that I didn't want to go to Kenya. That was an area that I loved, but just because I loved it, it was much too delightful living in those days. Kenya was not yet ready for independence. I didn't know when they would become independent. We're talking about 1960. Kenya didn't become independent until 1963. Nigeria seemed to be on the verge of independence. So I took a hard look at Nigeria. I first went to London and saw Commonwealth departments, numerous banks who were doing business there, various corporations – I made a great many contacts, some of them, again in retrospect, which I should have followed up on more closely and didn't. I made the contacts and then I jumped off the diving board into the half-full pool rather than making greater use of
those contacts which I'd established. So, anyway, I decided finally to do Nigeria. To put my focus on Nigeria and to incorporate a company there. I also decided on two other things – one, that I wanted to honk the horn of what I was trying to do. So the best way I found to do that was to have a supplement – to produce a supplement – on Nigeria in the New York Times. I created for that purpose – and it did a few other things – an advertising company which produced a supplement in the New York Times at the time of independence on October 1, 1960. I financed the entire thing through advertising and lost money. I went to the Nigerian government and said, "I think you should have a one-year progress report in the Herald Tribune (which was cheaper)." They provided me with a certain amount of financing and also I went and got advertising, and because of the two I was able to better than break even on the two of them. But I took a full page on my company in both of them and indicated what my interests were. I probably could have done a better job on that too. Could have been more specific. And I could have thought a bit more of what I wanted to do, but I didn't know.

I did also feel that if I was to give advice to others on how to do business in Nigeria – which was the object of ARDC, to act as a consultant and also in Nigeria as a manufacturer's representation, which is what it did do – I should have an active participation in an investment in Nigeria. So I started another company called NIDOCO. NIDOCO manufactured food products which were distributed in Nigeria and in neighboring countries, essentially bakery products. That led to managing the largest bakery in Nigeria, Shackleton Bakery, which was owned by Jaja Wachuku, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Minister of Aviation. He and his wife were quite an experience. So was the bakery. From doing that, I felt I had more of a grasp of how to do business or not to do business, or I couldn't do business in Nigeria. And I was able to advise some people – probably should have put more emphasis on consulting, but it was a little easier to do the manufacturer's representation. Actually, although we had about two dozen companies that we represented, I would say three quarters of them were American, although none of them, none of the American ones was a major producer of income. The best was a Belgium company that produced yeast, and that was the real money maker because the Nigerians wanted yeast not only to raise their bread, but to make palm oil. And so that was a real money maker, all in all. So, anyway, I spent about ten or eleven years in Nigeria as a commuter from New York and became a Jekyll and Hyde at doing finance and other things here, and following my other interest in New York's Zoological Society. Going out there four to five times a year, I would spend as long as three months at a time. I was saturated with Nigeria. It was certainly an experience. It was very much of a "sleeves rolled up" experience. I mean, all kinds of problems and people and life, but nothing compared to what it is today. The reason I wanted to go there was it was the ninth largest populated country in the world. It seemed to have all the potential of market, leadership. They are exerting a certain amount of leadership now with Liberia and Sierra Leone, but they didn't then and still haven't organized their own economy and certainly not their politics. Sad.

Q: This was pre-Biafra?
MARSHALL: I was there during Biafra, very much so. I had no security problems – I didn't go to eastern Nigeria; I did, but before the Biafra problem. I mean, I got in my car and drove all over the place. When I left Nigeria, I sold my company to my manager, whom I had hired originally at 3000 pounds a year, which was then about $10,000, as an assistant to the manager, who was a Dutchman who later died. I sold my company to a Nigerian, who eventually paid me back, which was remarkable. He paid me out of profits, but he paid me back. With distance and everything else, and the rather negative history Africans have in finance, he was an exception.

Q: Did you find in establishing contacts that the Ibos were the particularly gifted business people? Did you see tensions coming that would lead to Biafra, as it built up?

MARSHALL: Definitely. I don't know how much you know about Nigeria, but there are 240 different tribes and they speak English in order to communicate with the government and business. There are essentially three large tribes: the Ibos, Hausas, and Yorubas. When I first was interested in Nigeria, there were three states. When I was there, a fourth one was established, and now I believe they have 21 or something like that. And, of course, they moved their capital, which in theory is a good idea, but it doesn't always work out. If you move it from Istanbul to Ankara or from Rio to Brasilia, it doesn't always work out, and it has not worked out yet in Nigeria. But, yes you could certainly see it coming. And, except for the access to the sea, you could see problems. You could see the Northern Nigerians seceding. But I think they probably wouldn't because of access to the sea.

Q: Now in those years it sounds as if your focus was much more trade and development-oriented than extractive and minerals such as, for example, the Maurice Tempelsman operation.

MARSHALL: Yes. I know Maurice. No, no it wasn't extractive at all. I had people who came and said to me "We had a wonderful Liberian... blah, blah, blah... diamonds." I stayed away from that. I thought that was not what I wanted to get into. Maybe I would have made a lot of money that way, but I was more interested in – I wasn't doing it at the time for that purpose – but it certainly gave me an education which I'd not gotten in the Marine Corps and the education I got in the Marine Corps was discipline. Period. I mean I learned a lot of those things, but the education was discipline. Then at Brown, I got a piece of paper which allowed me to get into a job. But then came my own self-education on Africa, on my trip in '54, my sleeves-rolled-up education, although I certainly didn't plan it quite this way, in Nigeria. Then I got more involved in politics because I knew Dick Nixon, and worked with him on the campaign, and got involved with that, and with all the people who were with him in his first try in '68, and moving rather quickly on this, I said that, yes indeed, I would be interested in an embassy. This was what I wanted and what I wanted was Kenya, and I made that very clear. At that point, it took awhile, in fact, it took a bit of time when I was still in government to disassociate myself with my company. I didn't spend any time on it, but on the other hand, I had to sell and so on. So I closed the doors on Nigeria for all intents and purposes, although there was some
cleaning up there. Making a very short story out of a long, political story, I was told that because of my Agency background, it would not be a good idea for me to go to Kenya. But if I would serve somewhere else and reestablished as having been an ambassador, that possibly I could go there on the next tour.

Q: Your Agency background was well known, and you were, so to speak, declared.

MARSHALL: Yes, although I did operate under pseudos and cryptonyms and all that nonsense at times, yes. But more than that, it was decided, quite rightly, that in the seeking of the agrément it should be stated that I had been in the State Department (I can't remember the exact wording), but that I had had special assignments with the Agency. A little bit wishy-washy, but it was clearly said and clear that I had been working with CIA. And in clear terms, not just intelligence activity or whatever.

Q: Were you in that respect one of the first to come out of the Agency to an embassy? I know that there have been others.

MARSHALL: No. I don't know if he was first, but I think Charlie Whitehouse was probably one of the first. He set up the station in the Congo, now Zaire, now the Congo. I don't know when he became ambassador to Thailand, but I don't think I was first.

Q: But you were one of the earlier ones. As that nomination went forward, what was the feeling in the Department? Did you feel accepted, was there a skepticism? How did it seem?

MARSHALL: Oh, there was skepticism. There was also skepticism that a person who had been an entrepreneur in Nigeria would be the kind of person the President would want to send out as an ambassador. Yes, and there was a bit of back and forth. Let me go on a bit. It was then suggested that I get in touch with Elliot Richardson and make a lot of other calls. I'd worked with Maurice Stans, I'd worked with Peter Flanagan, so on and so on. Anyway, Mr. Richardson called me from Washington to New York and said, “Tony, we can't work out Kenya. Would you like to accept Uganda?” I said, "No. I won't." So then he called me again and I said, "Alright. (I had thought it over.) I will." After that, I didn't get it, but I said I would.

Q: Why the reluctance on it?

MARSHALL: Although it was on the border of Kenya, I didn't think it was an interesting enough post. I got an interesting post alright. Anyway, either he called me or someone else called me and said, "No it wasn't going to work out for Uganda." After I'd been told – security check and all that – that I was going to Uganda, I told people I was going to Uganda, which I shouldn't have. I should have waited until after the Senate Foreign Relations Committee appearance. Anyway, Susan Mary and Joe Alsop gave a dinner for me down in Washington; he thought I was going to Uganda. Anyway, I was told, no, not Uganda. So which would you like, it wasn't always clear-cut. Would you like Malawi or
Madagascar? I said, "To be truthful, I know where they are and I know something about them, but I don't know that much. I'd like to have a briefing from the country director on both." So I did. That's when I met a person who became a lifelong friend, John McKesson. I got to know him and his wife, and my former wife and I stayed with them when he was ambassador to Gabon and I've seen him here in New York. I got to know John and he briefed me on Malawi, and he also had somebody else brief me on Malawi and Madagascar. Malawi seemed to me sort of a sleepy little place. Madagascar attracted my attention for both its people and its mixed natural life, both the wildlife and the flora and the fauna. It has always interested me and I was and am now very much involved with the Wildlife Conservation Society in New York. But it interested me very much then. So I said yes to that. So, anyway, I packed up and went off to Madagascar with an interest in seeing what I could do for American business. Our former ambassador there, Ambassador King, had been asked by the Malagasy government to organize a cattle project. As President Philibert Tsiranana said, "We have more cattle than people. We have 14 million cattle and six million people. I want more people, and every 12th child can be named after me, and I will give out honors every national day to the women who produce twelve children." Hardly the formula for the rest of the world.

Q: He, of course, had been the father of Madagascar since independence in '60. Things were beginning to become a bit tense.

MARSHALL: He was fading. His health was fading. He had to go to Europe to get medical attention. He had to go to Paris, France. But also his mental facilities were failing. When I arrived there, I thought it was an absolutely delightful, and it is a terribly interesting country. Having been separated from Africa for at least 50 million years – that was a figure I used to use, other people use a figure much older than that – but with the flora and the fauna and the people, and the fact that there is no man on Madagascar as there is in East Africa where Richard Leakey and others are digging up bones all the time. A good friend of mine, but that's what they're doing. David King had been asked to start a cattle project, not to start it, but for the United States to see what it could do to help Madagascar in regards to its cattle. And he didn't do anything. I couldn't not do something. First of all, I wanted to do something. I didn't want to just go sit, although maybe sometimes that's what one should do. For people representing our country abroad, maybe sitting is the best policy, but it is neither in my nature, nor did I believe it was the right thing. I thought that by creating closer economic ties we would have better relations between the two countries, and I say that for anywhere. Maybe timing is wrong in some instances, but I believe that's the truth. So I went about trying to find out who and where and how much, and talk to people. So I talked to Malagasy. This is condensing it a lot. I talked to the French, whose agreement on doing the project. My proposal was one-third, one-third, one-third. The Malagasy provide land and whatever, the French have the abattoir, and the Americans have the ranching. Where was I to get the American side? That was the next thing I was faced with. I made contact with some companies – American – but wasn't able to really find one. I thought of contacting Bob Anderson – Robert O. Anderson of Atlantic Richfield, but also, at the time he and may still be, the largest owner of land in America. With cattle. He, after sending somebody out to
Madagascar, a man by the name of Sid Goodlow from Roswell, New Mexico representing Bob Anderson's company, the “Dotted A,” decided that we would meet in Paris with the Malagasy and the French – Bob Anderson and Sid Goodlow. I mean, a lot of work went into it. He decided to go ahead with the project. I continually coordinated it in Madagascar. That, in addition to being in contact with all American companies in Madagascar, going to Kenya a number of times (also for other reasons, there was a UNIDO conference that took me there), getting in contact with African regional representatives of American companies who were and are headquartered in Kenya, and talking with them and seeing if they would take a look at Madagascar. Then, we had ship visits, we had CODELs.

Q: In trying to get something done there, in trying to reinforce the American presence, were you up against the French; did they not feel it was a French fiefdom? Were they quite suspicious of your activities?

MARSHALL: I don't know whether you'd call it suspicion or jealousy, or just French. I think I'd call it just French. I wouldn't accuse all the French nation, but sometimes the French can be what we would call very French. There were two factors that were working. One was Malagasy politics. The other was the French not liking the Americans succeeding in their area. The Malagasy politics were quite complicated, but there was a man by the name of Andre Resampa.

Q: Oh, yes, the Minister of Interior, closest associate of Tsiranana.

MARSHALL: Yes. He helped him get to be what he was. But then Tsiranana became suspicious of his motives; his actions. He was a likely candidate to take over from Tsiranana but Tsiranana did not want that while he was still alive. There were others – I think more than Tsiranana, who was really failing – much, much more. At the top of the list was the fact that there were people down the ladder from Tsiranana who were playing politics. They were both egging Tsiranana on to thinking there was going to be a coup and they were planting themselves into a proper position no matter what might happen.

Q: Does playing politics mean exploiting friction between the highland people and the coastal people? Hadn't there been some riots?

MARSHALL: Yes. There were some riots. There was a Maoist riot in the south of really no consequence. But reportable. I thought I had good relations with Tsiranana. I thought how could I improve? This probably aggravated the French. But it was what I thought should be done. I said I would like to pay a call on Tsiranana's home village. Nobody else had done that. Even the French hadn't thought of it, regrettably. When Tsiranana heard about this, he was absolutely delighted. He said, although he would not be there, I would be a guest of his and his wife's and he would send his half-brother, a non-entity in all other respects, to be with us. He would send him with me, as well as a Protocol officer, in his plane. We went up and I can't remember who else I took with me, and there were speeches, and there was a meal cooked out on the outdoor stove, and toasts, and the
whole business. I saw the hospital, the new dentist's chair they had just bought, and it was what should have been a totally successful day. Two days later, I was visiting a non-resident diplomat who was at the Hilton Hotel and we were talking about what had appeared in the paper that day and the day before, and that was that a foreign power was trying to incite a change in government. I said I'd already called several of the other ambassadors and we were trying to get the government to say what they were talking about because otherwise we were all accused. We know the Germans were giving the Socialists money. We're not certainly. While I was talking to him, I got a call from my secretary saying the Foreign Minister wanted to see me right away. So I trotted around and saw him, a man by the name of Jacques Mantasara. He was and is a very nice man. He said, “I have to tell you that you must leave the country.” And I asked why. And he said, "I can't tell you why. I'm just the messenger." "Well, I’d like to see the President." "He won't see you. I've already asked." I said, "You're making a terrible mistake." He said, "There's some evidence of people in your embassy who have been acting against the government. And the President has been shown evidence of this." I said, "Can I see the evidence?" "No, you can't." So I said, "You have the right to do this. But it's all wrong." And he said, "I'm afraid you must go immediately." I asked what was "immediate?" And he replied, "What would you like?" "Two weeks." Word came back that afternoon for me, giving me five days. The next morning, he called me back to the Ministry and simply got out the printed diplomatic list of all the embassies, opened to the U.S. embassy page, and there were little ticks beside five names. He said, "These people also have to go. You haven't done anything wrong, except that you're the captain of the ship and you have to go and these people also have to go."

So anyway, I went back, packed up and left. There was great confusion in Washington about what to do about this. There were many talks about it. I said that I wanted to go back and make farewell calls. So this became a point which we were asking for. They said they would like another ambassador sent and replacements for all of these five that were sent out. We were pretty firm on the issue. Ramanantsoa came to the United States for the UN General Assembly Meeting and he met with Secretary Rogers, but that didn't really get anywhere. Before that, they'd sent a mission which was supposedly to show the evidence, which they did not bring with them. So we really weren't getting anywhere. I met with Ramanantsoa clandestinely. He established the place and the time. So he was doing this really as a friend to tell me there was nothing he could do and that I probably could not come back. Finally, they did agree to my coming back – this was October, November – coming back in February. We said this was out. I was going on to another post. Meanwhile, the whole issue was hanging. I went on to Trinidad and Tobago. I'd gone to see the President. He said, "Tony, what would you like to do? You want to get out, or want another post, or what?" He was just assuming I'd done nothing wrong, although obviously there was a cloud over my name and future. I'd been in CIA, hanky panky with someone or something else? He said, "Well, I don't think Africa..." I said, "No, I don't either, but I would like..." He said they'd been children for their whole history and would be children for 500 more, so don't go there. I was a little shocked at that.

So I went on to Trinidad and my story of Madagascar really continues to Trinidad.
because I found out later – and I'd just as soon not reveal how – very precisely, who were the two Malagasy who had brought this forgery – we'll call it that, it's as good a name as any – to the attention of Tsiranana. I found out exactly who they were. They were rather high-up people in the President's office. And, what I would call, although I couldn't go to court to prove it, absolute confirmation that the French ambassador was involved both by what he didn't do and by what he did do. What he didn't do was that he took off on holiday for a week – went to the beach in Madagascar – while all this was going on, rather than taking some part. He'd been told by Paris to get this matter settled. Paris – the Quai d'Orsay, at least – was telling him to do something about it, to get it settled somehow. But it was clear that he was taking his orders from Foccart – clear to me and clear to others. I then got a copy of the forgery, which was absolute nonsense. An illiterate would not believe it. Absolute, absolute nonsense! Unsigned, pure garbage. And then, finally, almost a year to the day (I was in Trinidad at the time), I got a cable saying that President Tsiranana had held a press conference. I'm glad he held it then because just a few months later he was no longer in office. It said that God had come to him in the middle of the night… (end of tape)

Q: At the time you left Madagascar, it must have been David Newsom who headed the Africa Bureau. Was that the case? So there must have been a very interesting process of deliberation there in the Bureau and with the NSC; how did that all play out? You were back for it, of course?

MARSHALL: Well, the way it played was that, yes, Dave Newsom was in AF then. There was a question of what was going on at the Department, yes indeed. I, as I said, wanted to go back to Madagascar if I could to make my farewell calls and do sort of a clean close on Madagascar. There were certain people in the Department who believed that we should go ahead and send an ambassador out right away. The principal one was the Secretary of State – Rogers. He didn't tell me this, but it was quoted to me that we have too many bridges that are being burned and here these people want to reestablish relations and so I want to send out an ambassador. I thought that was entirely wrong. Sulzberger wrote a piece in the paper saying that Uncle Sam was having egg thrown in his face. If this was the image, we shouldn't allow a country, any country, to throw egg in our face. Somebody said, "Oh, well, never mind. Go about business as usual." I had two very strong supporters for my position – my position being, "Yes, fine. That is, certainly keep relations, but build them up later, send in an ambassador, but let there be a good cooling-off period and, hopefully, in that time we will – which we did – begin in a different way and get things straightened out. By that I mean that we were not at fault and we would see the evidence. The two supporters were U. Alexis Johnson, who was Deputy Secretary of State, and Marshall Wright. Marshall Wright was in the White House. Between the two of them that was the position we took. The next ambassador we sent out was Joe Mendenhall, who, in fact, had had a preview of the post because he'd been the inspector at the post while I was there. He gave very good ratings, which was very nice, and he became our next ambassador.
Q: Must have also been a challenge leaving so quickly to explain and motivate the team you left behind to carry on in the circumstances. You had a good DCM?

MARSHALL: Yes.

Q: In the end, thinking back on it, what were our real interests – U.S. interests – in Madagascar at that period? Was there a NASA station there?

MARSHALL: There was a NASA station there which ultimately was closed after I left.

Q: Simply outlived its use or as part of this misunderstanding?

MARSHALL: I don't know how it would operate now, but it was extremely important, if not essential, at that time because of the Apollo missions. Two things about Apollo – parenthetical of course – before going to Madagascar and when I went to see President Nixon before leaving, I sent a memo to the White House. I don't think it ever got to him. I said, "Mr. President, I understand you are having put together some flags and moon dust and I wonder whether I could take one when I present my credentials? Bus Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol, was present, and so the President asked him to get it done. So I did. I took that out, and during my time in Madagascar we had a unit from COMIDEASRFOR, Admiral Bain, and a third one who had been part of the Apollo mission who were a worldwide tour. They had a visit which was a great success. But getting back to the NASA station, the NASA station got the first fly-past of the first orbit that had taken place, and it also did other things that I was never told about, but I think it was of considerable use. I think probably now it would not be needed. We had one in South Africa, of course, I visited when I was in Madagascar.

Q: What were our other interests?

MARSHALL: Well, we fell into that general Cold War category of interest in protecting traffic of oil from the Middle East, an interest in all of Eastern Africa – Kenya and, of course, in its own way, Somalia. The tensions in Somalia were to a great degree because of oil. And we wanted to maintain a military presence there, not only in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, but also in Bahrain, where COMIDEASTFOR was headquartered and Admiral Bain, who did come down from Madagascar, was CINC COMIDEASTFOR. We wanted the ability to have ship visits to show the flag as well as to have shore leave not so much in Madagascar and Kenya.

Q: You would down to the ports for these visits? Difficult travel in those days.

MARSHALL: I never missed a ship anywhere. I’d say economic interests were minimal. We imported 70 percent of their vanilla supply, but I don't think we'd go to war over their vanilla supply, no matter how important ice cream or may be.

Q: In your time Madagascar was still on the French model and French system and there
was talk of Tsiranana being attracted by what he called the Israeli model. But then after these events and then Tsiranana's departure, things changed very much towards a less friendly, more leftist, less prosperous in Madagascar.

MARSHALL: When we got there, Madagascar obviously was politically independent. They made it very, very clear that what they wanted was economic independence, which was stupid, if not realistic. Their thinking was they didn't want to be dependent on anybody, they wanted total freedom to decide what they wanted to do in economics as well as politics. What that in real terms meant was – this was after I left, but it was churning as I left – that they'd broken the French franc, and that was stupid. They kicked the French Army out, which was stupid only in my mind in very practical terms, because the French Army was taking care of defense, while the Malagasy Army were building roads. That's an over simplification. And then they nationalized a number of companies, and, of course the French didn't like it, but they were kicked out of the glorious building at the end of the square which was the residence of the French ambassador. They took away his right to have a plane. And a number of other things. When I was there, I had a plane. I went all over the place. We had an operational mission, an Air Force plane. Somehow or other, where I wanted to go, their operational missions seemed to mesh most of the time.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, you went to Trinidad and Tobago in 1972?

MARSHALL: 1972, yes.

Q: That was a totally different setting from Madagascar.

MARSHALL: Certainly was.

Q: Trinidad and Tobago, I understand, was a relatively peaceful country. They had no coups, but there had been some confusion at the time of the Black Power movement in 1970, and I understand the period you were there was one of political and economic relative uncertainty, still in the time of Eric Williams, the founding father.

MARSHALL: Well, he was the founding father. He had hopes of a greater empire in the form of a commonwealth with Jamaica and Guinea and Ghana. But that didn't work out. I think he was a little frustrated by that. He was a very intelligent man, an historian. He liked to write; he was a thinker. He didn't like the United States. He and I really didn't get on. I couldn't find any rapport with him. And he didn't help me very much to try and find one. I got along well with a number of other ministers fortunately, and extremely well with the Governor, who was Chinese. His name was Ho Tsoy. When I had a problem with the Prime Minister, I was able to go to the Governor. In those days the Governor was the representative of the Queen, who was appointed by the Queen of England, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. A rather odd arrangement in a constitutional monarchy, I feel, or felt. I have to go back a little bit in the history of Trinidad, to briefly give picture of the way it was and the way it was changing. One has to go back in a very
simple way to look at the people who came to Trinidad because the blacks from Africa came to Trinidad as slaves to work in the sugar fields. Then slavery was abolished – you might say, almost as far as Trinidad was concerned – because a lot of the slaves were kept on on a paid basis but at very menial wages, and indentured servants – Indians – then came in, were brought in, to replace the blacks. What happened to Trinidad when I was there, was that it was 40% Indian, 40% black, and 20% mixed – Chinese, Carib, White, other races and nationalities. The blacks essentially moved into government and the Indians moved into business. I'm oversimplifying it and being a little cynical about it, but it's what happened. Each eyed the other and the blacks felt, "Well, I'm in power, so why shouldn't I do something to fill my pockets and get into business?" The Indians felt a little threatened by this and therefore wanted to get into politics. All of which was happening when I was there. It happened even more so, I believe, since I left.

Trinidad could have been much more of a success than it is, than it turned out to be. I really only can comment on my time there with first hand commentary on, but they made quite a lot of money from that oil They had four oil companies who were doing business there. The one I was closest to was Amoco, because they wanted a relationship with the embassy. Texaco felt that they didn't need anything. I got a tour of their plant and that was about it. Tesoro was a little operation down in the southern part of the island which was almost operated like a country club. But Amoco had an official operation that was quite successful. All in all, oil was coming in as an income, as a revenue-bearing industry. And the Trinidadians, to an extent, squandered it, either in the island, or maybe some of it might have gotten into private pockets, private government pockets. And they also gave a lot of their money away to other Caribbean countries – a worthwhile cause. But on the other hand, this didn't help them that much. So, that's the way I saw the situation when I arrived.

Q: And, at that time, did we have the naval facility at Chaguaramas?

MARSHALL: No, we didn't. That had been closed, just prior to my being there. There was a (I can't remember what they called it.) NAGO, I think it was, or something foolish like that, an instrument finding, directional, navigational aid facility on the island. Very small, and although I had contact with them it was not a major interest. As I had been before when I was in Madagascar, I was interested in trying to help American business. I did get around to all the American businesses but, except for the oil companies, there were companies that bought fabric from North Carolina and elsewhere and brought it into Trinidad and Tobago and set up workshops at low wages and shipped the material, the ready made articles of clothing out. The Trinidadians didn't like that. They felt they were being used which, of course, they were. There was an artificial tooth factory there which seemed to me probably to be a rather unique thing but, nevertheless, they were used to doing the same thing – they found cheap labor to make artificial teeth. Singer Sewing Machine, of course, was there. They were always there and everywhere, all over the world. There were a few companies, but they really didn't need an embassy. In fact, this gets me around to making comments on embassies. I personally – I don't know if I said this when I was talking about Madagascar; it didn’t apply there – it certainly applied in
Trinidad and it applied also in a delightful country to which I later became accredited – the Seychelles. So I comment on both of them at the same time, making this observation. And that is that I think it's too bad that we ever gave up legations – legations which were headed by a Foreign Service officer with the rank of Minister. It showed a dignity, an appreciation of the country, a recognition of their needs. But it was not a full grade embassy – a full grade senior country, or developed country, if you want to put it that way. I think it's too bad we did that. In my way of thinking, which would not have been acceptable, Trinidad only needed a consul general or, if you wish, a consulate general because the main business of Trinidad really was visas, and it was a consular operation, as it was also in Jamaica, where Vincent de Roulet was ambassador the same time I was. He made a big noise about it. Too much of a noise, I'm afraid to say. He was rather derogatory about it. I felt the same way, but I did not raise my voice with the Trinidadian about it because there was no need to do that.

Q: The consular and visa operation you mentioned was basically Trinidadians coming to the U.S. or was it U.S. tourists?

MARSHALL: Trinidadians coming to the U.S. In my second year there, I remember 46% of all the applicants for a visitor's visa had to be turned down because they did not qualify. They had no job in Trinidad, no bank account in Trinidad, no reason to go back to Trinidad. But they came up and Brooklyn, New York, was principally their geographic target where they had relatives. And they would come up here and be allowed to live... in the United States. And I'll parenthetically mention here that the visitor's visa is different from the immigration visa which usually took 18 months for an applicant to receive such a visa and that meant that they went through the process of applying to come up here and live. But we didn't want and don't want, and didn't then want foreigners coming to the United States on a visitor's visa and staying. So we ran into, particularly after World War II, we ran into this elimination of legations. I'm not sure whether Switzerland was one of the last countries – it's hardly an underdeveloped country – to have a legation, but we should have stuck with legations.

Q: Ambassador George Kennan made that same point in a conversation I had a few weeks ago with him.

MARSHALL: Really?

Q: Yes, that we should return to legations, but it's hard when the other countries are at the level of embassies, for us to walk back to legations.

MARSHALL: You can't go back and change it. It's hard to take away something you've given, whether it's a wedding ring or a dollar bill. But I think that there is a little example here which I must say I'm not totally informed on, but I'm going to jump to the Seychelles which has nothing to do with Trinidad and Tobago except that I was appointed as non-resident ambassador to the Seychelles when I was ambassador to Kenya. The issue of legations/embassies is relevant, so I'll mention it here. And that is that, after the
Seychelles had its independence day, and I had presented my credentials and gone through all the formalities of agrément and all that, to the President, James Mancham—we did all that. We could have had a resident ambassador. There were resident ambassadors there, but we chose to have a non-resident ambassador, which is half a step down. We had to have an ambassador because it was still during the Cold War. Not only were the British and French there, but the Chinese were coming, the Russians were coming, and we had an Air Force Tracking Station on the Seychelles. We not only wanted to protect that for as long as it was necessary for that to operate, but we also wanted to protect ourselves in the Cold War in the Indian Ocean.

So, time went by and what has happened? After I left Nairobi, we appointed a full-time resident ambassador to the Seychelles. More time went by. Where were we now? As I understand it, and unless something changed the game, we have no ambassador in the Seychelles, and any questions or administrative or economic information or action is held through Mauritius. We do have an agent in the Seychelles. Well, when I was in Trinidad and Tobago, we had an agent in Tobago, if you want to make these comparisons. I think if a country of 50,000 people, which is what the Seychelles was when I became ambassador, even though they are scattered over 1500 miles across, in the Indian Ocean—86 islands—that pure geography is not as important to us now as when we wanted to see oil pass through the Suez and we wanted to have access to the Persian Gulf. I got a little side-tracked there, but having served as ambassador in both countries, I think my drawing the analogy, drawing the comparison, is valid.

Q: Returning to Trinidad and Tobago, to finish up on that. In your second year there, I think there was a somewhat controversial election in that many of the other parties boycotted Eric Williams, although I think he was reelected and continued on until he died in '81.

MARSHALL: He was reelected. That was the ongoing process, as I see it, of the conflict between the blacks and the Indians. The have-nots. All of which produces a turmoil in politics and can have an effect on the economy.

Q: Coming back to what you said before about Eric Williams, it would seem to me that he would have had so much to gain from an easing of the relationship with the U. S. ambassador in terms of trade and the role and power of the United States in the Caribbean. What was it in his make-up that held him back, as an obstacle?

MARSHALL: I really think he was more of an intellectual than a politician. He wrote a number of books which had very good observations on government. And I think he was more of an intellectual, than a practical one. A simple observation.

Q: Coming there from Madagascar, did you see more similarities than differences in terms of new nations in the flush of independence, or was it a completely different Caribbean culture?
MARSHALL: I did know the Caribbean quite well before I got there. I'd been to Tobago in 1954. So I'd been down there. I had visited all of the Caribbean Islands for one reason or another. So, what was there was no surprise to me. It was island living. You can't compare it to Madagascar, the fourth largest island in the world. You can't compare the small island of Trinidad which were tops of mountains to Madagascar. I think that – I'm sort of searching now to answer your question – one might have analyzed them not from the standpoint of their own culture, because their own culture became a lot of what was imposed on them, but rather to have looked at them from the standpoint of whether it was the French or the Dutch – and I did not get over to Curacao – or the English, who had a colonial influence there. I must say that one of the islands that I thought was the most peaceful and delightful was the little island of Saba, up in the northern part of the Caribbean which was owned by the Netherlands. Part of the Netherlands, I think. But I think you might stretch it and say there was an analogy between the colonial approach and temperament in Africa and the Caribbean in that the British in Africa brought Africa administration and the French brought them culture. I used to think it was an easy simplification, but it's not; it is a very complicated over-simplification. It does have some truth to it though. The French did bring them language. They spoke French and not pidgin English as in Nigeria. I'm skipping around now, but I remember when I first went to Nigeria – you know I was in business there for 10 years – I learned a little pidgin English. There was one pidgin English phrase that I thought was a good example and perfectly ridiculous – I had a house there – when I ordered a light dinner and wanted my steward to go home, I would say, "Bring small chop, then you go for bush." Well, that is not a very sophisticated way of teaching people how to speak the language. I think the British did allow and even encourage that kind of development, a holding back development, while the French did the opposite. Getting back to the Caribbean, I think the French parts of the Caribbean – particularly Guadeloupe and Martinique, are quite delightful sophisticated areas, with an emphasis on culture. The culture of Trinidad is, in one word, carnival. Three days a year, they are wild with carnival, with jump-ups, steel bands, floats, drinking and abandoning everything for the carnival life. And the other days of the year are in preparation for carnival. And that is not an over-simplification.

Q: That's fascinating. You stayed two years in Trinidad and Tobago and then moved on to Kenya and Seychelles. That would have been in '73?

MARSHALL: '74. Yes, I left in January, '74, and arrived in Kenya in '74 in Nairobi. Before leaving, I went to the White House to see President Nixon, who had appointed me originally to Madagascar and then to Trinidad and Tobago, which I think I've already covered, and we had a nice talk. It ended up by his giving me a little farewell, Godspeed message of "Now Tony, don't get kicked out of any more countries." So, we shook hands, had the usual photo op, and I went on my way to Nairobi, which, I believe I've already said, I knew very well. From 1954 when I was there as a private citizen for six weeks, and intermittently on business and safari, and then up to Madagascar, and now I was really getting what I wanted, which all along had been Kenya. Needless to say, I was absolutely delighted. I followed Rob McIlvaine, who was our ambassador there, but who resigned a year before and a charge had been in charge of the embassy for a year – Ralph Lindstrom,
an extremely competent Foreign Service officer. Rob stayed in Nairobi and took on a job with the Africa Wildlife Leadership Foundation. Then he moved back to Washington. But he was there for a good deal of the time that I was there. I hasten to add, although that could be a problem, it was not. In fact, I either gave dinners for him or invited him to many dinners. We were on very good terms, and it all worked out. Generally though, in principle, I would disapprove of that. I think it's a bad idea. I also think, I know, it made it difficult for my DCM, who was then charge – Ralph Lindstrom – do some of his work. Not that Rob was interfering, but people would go in and ask him questions because he was there. My coming actually took a load off of Ralph Lindstrom's shoulders because they finally recognized that Rob was no longer ambassador. 

Our first ambassador to Kenya, though, was William Attwood – Bill Attwood – who was editor of Look Magazine and a writer. He liked very much to write. He wrote before and he wrote after he'd been to Kenya, and he wrote a book called The Reds and the Blacks, which was published as quickly as he could get it onto paper, and into the press when he came back. And this was not at all well received by the Kenyans because he reported conversations which they thought were confidential. And certainly they were not historic, in the sense that what he was saying was still the matter of the moment. I believe, and I think it can be done, the trick is for an author to write about something that is “his in history” and not of the moment. But being a journalist, he thought like one, and he got back and wanted to write a story. The part the Kenyans objected to most was his representative role to Thomas Kanza, the self-appointed middle man and arch rival to President Kasavubu. He, Bill Attwood, and the Kenyans ran into a number of problems where the U.S. was either taking action or saying things that the Kenyans didn't approve of. Kenyatta, though, who at that time was appointed chairman of an OAU (Organization of African Unity) committee to take a look at what was happening in the Congo, which then became Zaire, as you know, and is now Congo again. So when Bill Attwood's successor got there, Glen Ferguson, who is a good friend of mine, he came back and said to me that it was like operating in an iron curtain country. The Kenyans simply didn't want anything to do with the American ambassador, which was most unfortunate indeed. If one wants to look at the area handbook for Kenya, it states that diplomatic ties with Kenya received a setback in 1967 with the publication of The Reds and the Blacks, by previous U.S. ambassador William Attwood. 

So, he wasn't entirely forgotten by the time I got there, but what I was pressing was not politics, I was pressing business. And they were interested in business. And there was an opportunity for business in Kenya. The proof in the pudding evidently was not in Madagascar. And in Trinidad and Tobago there was really nothing to do. I presented my credentials to Kenyatta on my arrival, along with the Yugoslavian poet and Malawi ambassador down at his state house in Mombasa. Kenyatta, in fact, had several state houses; one in Mombasa, one in Nairobi, one en route to Nakuru, one in Nakuru. He need not necessarily perhaps have had as many. They weren't palaces, but they were very nice buildings – all of them. The reason he did this was, he believed he should be out of the capital with the people –and he didn't like being in town, although I did occasionally see him at the State House in Nairobi. The first matter of business was when I paid my calls
There were 74 countries accredited to Kenya at the time. Ambassadors such as Sir Tony Duff later left Kenya to become head of MI-6. He was replaced by Stanley Finland. There was Hamid Ganane, who represented Pakistan and became a very good friend. I told him that one of my deep desires was to visit the province of Spat – or the country of Spat really – in northern Pakistan. He said he could arrange it and I always wished that I could have somehow talked myself into giving myself two weeks pure pleasure, but I felt I really couldn't leave Kenya for something like that, but I really wish I had gone. There was Rudolph Resse, a Norwegian, who was an admiral and who was really receiving a post that was below his capabilities and his rank, but doing so because of his health. He was extremely competent and a terribly nice man. He and I had a very strong interest in common and that was the land and development of Kenya. He and his country, through him, was building roads and developing the water and the shores for fishing of Lake Rudolph and Lake Turkana and other water and road projects, as we were doing in part but I hoped we'd be doing more of. I knew the Iranian ambassador quite well, but that was mostly just a pleasure. He always brought a pound of caviar when he came to play backgammon with me. The Belgian ambassador I found extremely nice. He was very helpful to me because we could not, at that time, go to Uganda because Uganda was under Amin. He not only went there himself but had very good contacts there with missionaries and others. And every time he went there and came back, I'd meet with him and get considerably good information. Not just information, but good intelligence. And I became as friendly as I could during the cold war with the Soviet ambassador, Boris Geroshinknov. We talked about UNEP, which he was interested in, and which I was then accredited to as a permanent representative.

Q: It was by then already headquartered in Nairobi?

MARSHALL: Yes, the United Nations Environment Program. It was just becoming established then. I presented my credentials to Maurice Strong, who was the head of the conference center. UNEF then moved outside of Nairobi. Maurice Strong turned his position over to Dr. Mustafà Tolba, an Egyptian, who then operated from outside Nairobi. And we, the United States, then appointed a full-time permanent representative. I gave my job up to him, and we were represented directly by one person, who is responsible to the ambassador, but accredited to the UNEP. I made contacts with people whom I knew well in the past, with whom I wanted to continue to establish contact, for one reason or another. Dr. Mike Wood, who is head of the Africa Medical Research Foundation, on whose board I served since 1960, and which had a flying doctors' service in Kenya, and headquartered at Wilson Airport, and radio contact in those days with 65 different clinics throughout Kenya and later expanded its interest in the Sudan in particular. I was on the New York Board – there were several country boards and their headquarters were in Nairobi – and I had the highest regard for Mike Wood, and we were great friends. I also continued to see, and had seen a great deal of him over the years when I was in Kenya, Richard Leakey. I knew his father sometime before I knew him, Louis Leakey. Richard was and is a controversial person. I'm not going to go into the present; I'm only going to
stick with the past in this report. In those days, I very much valued sounding some problem off on Richard and getting a totally independent, non-diplomatic, non-black Kenyan – Richard is a Kenyan citizen – non-embassy view on some problem. I did this with Richard a number of times. I hate to say this, but he became more and more, maybe even bitter, but certainly more opinionated through the years. A lot of it was – I said I wasn't going to talk about it, but I am now really – because of some of the experiences he went through, such as losing his kidneys, both of them, and being given one by his brother, Philip, almost dying in the process. And then, somewhat more recently, when his plane crashed and he lost his legs. But in those days, and that's why I'm mentioning it, he was younger, active, lively, ambitious, and had achieved some of the goals which he'd set out to do. I naturally knew his brother, Jonathan, who was an entirely different kind of person, who lived up in Lake Loringo. He grew melons, and milked snakes for their venom, which he sold. But Richard was a true Kenyan. When he was born, a man by the name of Konange, who, when I was there, was the Minister of State in President Kenyatta's office, spat on Richard. For the Kikuyu, that was a great honor. That meant that he was accepted into the Kikuyu tribe. I knew a number of other people there. Tubby Block, who was a colonial, and I saw a great deal of him, although there were a very few colonials who I did see. Actually I stayed away from the colonial group. I spent my time talking with the black Kenyans.

Q: The colonial group was associated with certain places, clubs and spots and was an enclave of its own?

MARSHALL: Yes, very much. Although I was a member of one club, the Muthaiga Club, which is about as colonial as you can get. There were black Kenyans who were members, but the LOLS (for little old ladies, as they were called), would come in and put their foot up on the stool for their arthritis every day and sit and have tea. It was pretty colonial.

A very good friend of mine, whom I'd corresponded with a number of times and had met before I got there, was Joe Murumbi, former Vice President of Kenya. He was retired when I got there. He lived very close to where I was. He was a person I could turn to for a completely different kind of reading. He was half Masai and half Goan, but he was a Kenyan citizen, very much so, having been Vice President. He was the kind of intellectual whom I like. I'm not against intellectuals, but having just criticized Eric Williams as an intellectual, I want to make it clear that I like people who have good minds and Joe Murumbi certainly did. When he lived in London as a student there, he would often, he told me, go without any lunch in order to save 10 shillings or five shillings to go buy a book. And he had the most marvelous library; I think about 5,000 books, all on Africa, in his home in Nairobi. He also had an extraordinary stamp collection. He very kindly gave me a rather large sample of them when I left. And a good coin collection. And maps. He had wonderful maps of Africa.

I then got to know really very well Charles Njonjo, who was the Attorney General, who in those days was the second most powerful man in Kenya; more powerful than the Vice
President, because in those days he had absolute authority, which was taken away.

Q: The Vice President was already Moi, the current President?

MARSHALL: Yes, he was. But Charles ran into problems. They were political problems. He did nothing wrong, in my opinion. But he was charged with high treason. He wasn't put into prison, but his passport was taken away from him. To give you an example of the way things were run in Kenya, one day Charles went to the airport (this was quite a bit later). It was after I'd left, but I'd returned on a visit to see his wife off. His wife was English, and she was going to England. She still had her passport. Kenyatta was at the airport. He said, "What are you doing here? Why aren't you going with your wife?" Charles turned to the President and said, "You took it away from me." And he said, "Oh, you should have it back." And the next day he had it back. And that's sort of a strange way for bureaucracy to work. I liked Charles. There were a number of issues which I went to him on or which he called me about. I'll go into some of them in a minute.

I turned my attention at the same time, naturally, as I was making calls and meeting or catching up with people, to the embassy. The embassy had 41 Americans; 83 locals, plus the staffs of USIA, USAID, Peace Corps, which had 208 volunteers in the country. I'll stop on the Peace Corps for a minute. A month after I'd been there, my wife and I gave a reception on two consecutive nights for all Peace Corps volunteers; and if they had a friend, they could bring a friend. I felt this was important for them to know they weren't just operating in a vacuum there. In addition to those organizations, the Library of Congress had a small staff there, and the Foreign Agricultural Service and the IESC, the International Executive Service Corps, was headed in Nairobi by a man by the name of General Ryder. I felt very strongly about IESC, which was founded by Frank Pace and David Rockefeller, using retired people. I'm sure that all people who either read the text of what I'm saying or hear me say it know about IESC. IESC sends retired or available executives out into developing countries to help with regards to the management of businesses.

I then had my meetings with my country team – an absolutely essential group. I didn't make any major changes in the members of the team. What I did was sometimes include people who were not members of the country team in a meeting of the country team on issues that I felt it would be a good idea if they knew about them or got their opinion. A word about Ralph Lindstrom, whom I've already mentioned. As I say, he was extremely well qualified, and we worked very well together during my time there. But I think, and I'm saying this even though some day he might know what I've said even though I've never faced him with it, that he was a little disappointed that a political ambassador was coming. And, if a political appointee was coming to Nairobi – to over-simplify it – there are two kinds of political appointees sent out as ambassador. One is someone who just wants to play golf and have fun and go to receptions and there's the other, which was me. And that is I wanted to run the embassy. And it's a little hard, and I recognize that, for a career Foreign Service officer to be displaced – not replaced – by a political appointee even if he's already been to another country or two as ambassador; particularly if he's
been charge for a year, by someone who wants to run the embassy, which is what I did do. Also, I know that it hit him rather hard when I left Kenya because there was a change in Administration and Jimmy Carter then became President and I submitted my resignation. But submitting my resignation at that time – it wasn't done in January, but was later – I don't remember exactly when – but it wasn't until April that I was told – I got a cable – telling me that I was to be replaced. Ralph, I know, was hoping that I would leave in January of my own volition. I didn't want to for a good reason, and in April I even sent back a cable saying, "Can I stay on active duty until (I can't remember the exact date) about six weeks ahead?" I did. I was two weeks in Nairobi and then went to a chief of missions conference in Abidjan and then back to the States, because if I was on active duty for another six weeks, I would have 20 years of government service and that meant something to me. That was my motivation, but I think it was hard for Ralph Lindstrom to swallow.

Q: Probably, there was even a financial side, to have a longer period as chargé with chargé pay.

MARSHALL: Of course.

Q: I feel from a career perspective that the DCM has far more responsibility and challenge working with a motivated political ambassador than he would with a career person with the same knowledge base.

MARSHALL: Yes. I'd like to think so. We did work rather well together. After we got adjusted to each other, which didn't take any time, and I'm not just saying this; it's absolutely true, until the time I left, no until January. But from January on, I did note a change.

Q: Certainly the relationship you would have had sets the tone for morale in the embassy. A good relationship radiates good morale and a sour one sours the whole operation.

MARSHALL: Yes. I had a very good staff. The ones who were there the longest – there was an economic officer who then left. There was a man by the name of John Eddy, who was my economic officer. He had I got along absolutely – because my interest was economics – perfectly. He went on to become consul general in Dhahran. And then consul general in Bombay. Two ideal posts. And he's now living in Vermont. I see him now. He's terrific. I had a very good chief of station, I suppose I can say that. Murat Natiroff was very good; he was absolutely outstanding. He became chief of station in Moscow and he also was chief of station in New York at the UN. He and I stayed in touch, as I did with John Eddy. I had a good political officer, a good consular officer; they were all good.

Q: For the Chief of Station, you had come yourself from higher reaches of the Agency working for Dick Bissell.
MARSHALL: We had a perfect understanding. It sounds maybe like I'm honking my horn by saying this, but my reputation for an interest and activity in intelligence affairs was well known to him when I got there. I don't think I said it when I was talking about Madagascar, but Jack Hazy, who was my chief of station there, received a top order from de Gaulle, and had a most extraordinary career in intelligence. They were all outstanding, but Murat was absolutely outstanding. I could also mention Paul Garbler, who was my chief of station in Trinidad – that was sad. He had been pushed into a corner, rather than letting him out, while they tried to decide whether he was a mole. He retired somewhere in the West. I don't know whether he got some compensation for having been considered and accused and tainted.

Q: That would have been in the Angleton years. This was a period of go-go activity for the Agency. Did you, as chief of mission, feel these guys were pushing the envelope, that you had to pull them back a little bit? Were you concerned that something might blow up in your face?

MARSHALL: You bet it was. I was all for it. But they also protected me. They probably would have for anybody, but the PLFP, one of these splinter groups of the PLO, but a radical one – I don't say the PLO isn't radical – but the PLFP is even more so, had sent a team down to Kenya and there were some others with them who were going to blow up a plane at the airport with a bazooka or something similar to that. There was a very close watch on them by the Special Branch. The Agency worked very closely with the Special Branch. The Special Branch were able to apprehend them just before they did it. That was one thing. But there were four people who, we knew, were in Nairobi and they wanted to make an example. They wanted to make the noise that terrorists make – they wanted to embarrass Kenya. Sometime later, maybe you remember, a bomb ruined a whole wing of the Norfolk Hotel. This was the same sort of thing. Anyway, it was understood that they wanted to probably kill me. So the chief of station and the embassy's security officer came to me and said, "You should have maximum security." I said, "What do you think that is?" They said, "Well, we think you should have somebody rid in the front seat of your car with a machine gun and a car following you. Maybe a car preceding you, too." I said, "No. No way. Absolutely not. That simply draws attention to me and I'm not going to do that." They said, "What will you accept?" I said, "I'm a damn good shot. I go out and shoot with the Marines at the firing range here. I've always been a good shot. Give me a weapon, and for as long as is necessary, I'll carry it." So I did, for three months. But I did find it very embarrassing. I was the only one who was embarrassed about it, because no one else knew about it; but to be carrying a weapon with me when I was in black tie, sitting next to some lady at dinner!" The Agency and the chief of station, because of their good relations, all of that might have happened, but if you know what people are talking about, you have a clearer view, and they accepted the way I wanted to do it.

Q: Staying with the Agency, did the charges in Madagascar of CIA involvement in the episodes there at the time you left cause any ripples with the Kenyans? Did you have anything to overcome with Kenyatta?
MARSHALL: None whatsoever, not even mentioned. They even complimented me on it.

Q: They were aware of course?

MARSHALL: Oh, yes. It was in the agrément.

Q: Why that difference between those two countries? Francophone/Anglophone or

MARSHALL: The British and the Americans always wanted to work together. The French were different. Two days ago – this has got nothing to do with it – but two days ago the Duke of Edinburgh was here and we were asked by the British consul general to come for a drink. And he had all kinds of huge receptions, but he only asked about 60 people. I had met him years ago, but by this time when I met His Highness, the Duke of Edinburgh, he said, "You were an ambassador. Are you still?" I said, "No, Your Highness, I was an ambassador" and he said, "To what countries?" I said, "To Kenya and Madagascar, with Trinidad sandwiched in between." He said, "Oh." I said, "Yes. I enjoyed Kenya very much; and, of course, the French were in Madagascar." He roared with laughter.

Just some few notes about the embassy. We had a groundbreaking ceremony for the new Chancery on the 17th of December, 1976. Funds were approved in '74, and some years later I went into it. Looks great now, at least it looked great when I went into it in the '80s. Has two basements and four floors, and 60,000 square feet, but believe me it was a real pain getting built. The hole kept filling up with water. They put all kinds of things in it to try to take care of that and couldn't. Also, it's at a place where there is no parking, which was too bad. It was a third location that we were offered. Either of the other two would have been infinitely better, but we weren't prepared in Washington to shell out the money.

I've been honking the horn about business in Madagascar and trying my best in Trinidad. Here was really my opportunity to do something; at least I felt there was. There were 125 American businesses represented there, either in manufacturing or plantations, some small plants, or service facilities, or area representation. Or franchises. And what I really wanted to do was to visit all of them, and I did. I knew all the representatives of American business. And they weren't all Americans. What I did do was – and this had not been done before – start an American businessmen's meeting. There was an American businessmen's club, but that was lunch and a talk every month or six weeks, or whatever. I invited, not all – and I selected those I wanted – there were about 60 or 80; (there were very few left out) of the representatives of American business. There was a Nigerian, there was a Greek, Brits, several different nationalities. But I put it on the basis that it was up to the company who they wanted to have as their representative, not me. And I'm interested in American business. Coca Cola was headed by a Greek, Alexander Paresis, and he was representative for all of Africa. He was a Greek citizen, but it was an American company. I first had one session, and it got to be too big, so I had two sessions on two consecutive nights at 5:15 for drinks, 5:30 you sat down, and at 6:30, I stopped. I remember even stopping Paresis half-way through a talk (he could be a long talker).
said, "I'm sorry. It's 6:30." I said, "I'm doing this, Alex, so that people can come here and know that they're not going to be here until quarter to seven, or whatever, and they will come again." I sometimes brought a visitor, a Congressman or whatever, but most of the time we simply talked about problems the companies had: one company's problems, discussing them, help another, taxes, whatever. So that proved to be useful.

AID: the U.S. aid program in Kenya was twelve million dollars in 1974, for cattle, ranches, water facility, a seed project, and a population program, a family planning program. I had trouble with AID. I approved generally all of the projects they had on the agenda, but I had serious questions on some of the management of it and the distribution of funds and the accountability of funds. The greatest problem I had was with the director of AID. There was an acting director when I arrived. Then a man by the name of Carlos Thomas Nelson arrived. I have to say that he was black because it became an issue. He had been ambassador to Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho. They did not have independent ambassadors; there was only one ambassador for all three. My problem with him was that he would not send me copies of any cables received or sent. And I said that he had to. And he said he wouldn't. So we had a small meeting with Ralph Lindstrom, my economic officer, and one or two of his people, and he still said he wouldn't. So I communicated this to Washington, to Sam Adams, who was head of AID for Africa, and who was black. Extremely nice and extremely capable person. And Dan Parker, who was then head of all of AID.

Q: You had a very strong letter from the President laying out your supervisory responsibilities for all of these agencies in no uncertain terms?

MARSHALL: Yes. I said I just can't have this. And Sam Adams said to me when I was on consultations back there at one point (I've forgotten if I raised it or if he did.), "Look, Tony, if you want to have him recalled, that's alright with me. And we will recall him." I was talking to a man, fortunately, who was black and whom I liked. And I said, "Sam, you know, there is a question he's black and there may be repercussions about this." And I felt this fellow, Nelson, might make them - create them. Sam said, "Whatever you want to do." I went back. Carlos Nelson wouldn't meet again. Sam then came out to Nairobi, and the three of sat down, and in front of Sam, I said, "Look, will you change, Carlos?" There was a long silence and he whispered, "Yes." I said, "Alright, but you are going to have to prove it. I want to see those cables." It did work alright. I did get the cables. It was an unnecessary thing to have gone through and, as a result of that, we worked well together on what was being done. We did not get to the creative state, to which I was hoping we could have gotten. I had one creative project which did not succeed that I did do, which was a self-help project and I needed some USAID input, which he gave me, unwillingly, but there was a self-help project which I thought could have been very helpful if it had worked out. But I think it was unfortunate. I don't think I would have changed my mind about changing because I think there was a black PAO (public affairs officer) who was rather vocal, and I had had another problem of the suffragan bishop of Washington, Walker, who came out and went back and wrote to The Washington Post that all political ambassadors cared about was having fun and never talked to the locals.
And that I didn't pay any attention to this group of clergymen that came out there. In fact, I saw 15 of them. He never came around to see me. And it wasn't a delegation. They were there for a conference. So we had an exchange of letters through The Washington Post. There was enough of black American criticism, and I didn't want to exacerbate it. I wanted to sidestep it, if possible. And so I tried to work things out, rather than letting this possible problem become worse. One little footnote on AID: about a couple of months after I'd gotten there, there was a population conference just outside of Nairobi at the Outspan Hotel in Nyeri. I guess I didn't take time to ask what's our policy on population control or family planning, and nobody briefed me on it or gave me any paper. There was a man by the name of Ravenholt from Washington who came out, who was head of the whole family planning program in AID. I was asked to open the conference. So I got up and said that I felt very strongly that one had to take social conditions and cultural conditions into account in family planning and that you simply couldn't go off and distribute a lot of condoms into the countryside. Well, the truck was waiting outside full of condoms in boxes that they were planning to dump on somebody's doorstep, which is what happened the next day. There was a sort of flutter of emotion when I was through because I was saying just the opposite of what the head of family planning was saying. I still don't agree.

A word about Seychelles: Seychelles was covered by the embassy until I was accredited as non-resident ambassador for reporting purposes. I think I'll just skip that for a moment and come back to it, when I did present my credentials.

There were a number of problems in Kenya, as there are in any country one has to deal with. One was the Saul Miller Ruby Mine case. Saul and Miller, American citizens, came in and received a permit from Kenya to go off into Tsavo Park (a particular corner of it that is well documented) and to dig for rubies, which they began finding. But that was the problem. They then were going to be arrested for not having a permit, because all the papers were lost and one could not find them. It became a scandal. A lot of reporters descended on Nairobi specifically to find out about it and interviewed me. I maybe should have left it to the PAO to comment on it, but I didn't. I became involved. I involved myself. I thought it was important enough in our relations with the Kenyans to get this solved. Washington was saying, if it can't be resolved, we were going to cut off aid and such things as that. And I thought I wanted to do it myself. It was a long story. It went over a six-month period of time, all in all. Newsweek, The London Times, The Washington Post and a number of others came in. Ordway, I think it was, of The Washington Post, came in and he was going to have a story to break. He came to see me when I was giving a dinner one night for the Indian High Commissioner. It was about 10:30 at night, and he said, "I've sent my story in. It's going to break tomorrow." He said he'd like to stay around a couple more weeks and see what happens. I said, "Get out. Maybe nothing would happen, but you don't want to even take a chance of being put in jail. And that could well happen." He left the next morning.

There were a lot of rumors as to what happened. Certainly, some Kenyans – and I can't state who they were, although I'm pretty clear – had a personal interest in the mine and
wanted to get it. Saul left, and Miller was left in Kenya. He was going to be arrested if he
didn't leave. I had him come in and give himself up. They took his passport away and
then kicked him out. Strangely enough, not too much longer, but a bit later, the lost file
was found. At the same time, a legal process was pursued by which the mine was
declared invalid for prospecting. I think that I heard – and I'm not sure of this, but
considerably after I left there – that Saul and Miller somehow tried to get back there and
do something, or somebody else. I don't know. I'm only reporting on my time there. But
that was quite a problem. I also heard through the chief of station that there was a
counterfeiting ring operating in Nairobi, and one day I got a call from Charles Njonjo, the
Attorney General, who said, "I have a young girl by the name of Laura Wood who is
being detained and she will serve seven years in jail if it goes to court for counterfeiting."
I said I'd like to see her. He said that was a little unusual. I said, "Well, have a guard bring
her to my office." He did. I asked the guard to leave us alone, and I asked her what was
this all about? Evidently, there was a ring and she was part of it. She was guilty. There
were Union Bank of Switzerland false notes that were total forgeries that were printed,
which the ring would get these young girls and maybe young boys to get exchanged in
camera shops or whatever. Anyway, she got caught. The Attorney General said, "If she
will tell us all, maybe we can be lenient." To make a relatively long story short, I did
persuade her to tell all, and she went back and told them all she knew, which she hoped
would be enough. She was then sentenced to one year in jail and, at that point, her uncle –
not her mother or father – they were divorced and her mother couldn't care less about her
– came over. He said, "Really, I love this girl and she's run into trouble and what can I
do?" So, I got hold of Njonjo again, and to bring the story to an end, she was released.
She spent about a month in jail, which was a far cry from seven years. He took her back.
He was in the publishing business, and he sent a lot of books and textbooks to the
government in appreciation.

I had innumerable ship visits, which I love. I love ships.

Q: You would go down to Mombasa?

MARSHALL: I went down to Mombasa. They didn't come to me. One of the ones I was
on in 1974 was the guided-missile cruiser Chicago. The captain of the ship wanted to stay
on shore at night, and I said I'd like to sleep onboard ship, so he gave me his cabin. Just
before I went to bed – I was you might say on American territory – the news came over
that President Nixon had resigned. I then went up to Somalia to visit our ambassador,
Roger Kirk. I'd been to Somalia in 1954 and found a considerable difference.

By the end of 1974, the first year I was in Kenya, East Africa was certainly tensing up.
Somalia had been invaded by the Soviets, who established airfields on Somalia's
mainland, as well as maintaining a base on the Island of Socotra. Ethiopia and Somalia
had been engaged in border war since 1964, in their efforts to unite a greater Somalia:
British, French, Italian, Ethiopian, the Ogaden...

Q: Was that concentrated in the Northern Frontier District?
MARSHALL: Yes, in Northern Kenya. Then in 1974, the Somalis were living in Northeastern Kenya, and they revived gorilla warfare against Kenya. And then in Ethiopia after Emperor Selassie was deposed, a military government took charge, which advocated socialism and leaned towards the Soviets. In 1971, Idi Amin overthrew Milton Obote and assumed the presidency of Uganda. He not only created havoc in his own country, and border clashes with Tanzania, but publicly claimed that Uganda's border should be rightfully extended to Lake Naivasha in Kenya, which certainly brought me and President Kenyatta into conversation on the subject.

Q: How did he feel when we were getting so much deeper into Somalia and the Somalis were disrupting the northern provinces of Kenya? Did that create any frictions for you?

MARSHALL: Not really. No it didn't. I think because we reacted positively to some of his requests. He was very concerned about what they might do. Particularly Amin. I'll get to that in just a minute, but he was also concerned about Somalia, and he had reports that Somalia and Uganda might gang up together in a united clash with Kenya. But before I go into that, beginning in 1975, in February, the Enterprise, the aircraft carrier, came to Kenya. I got a very nice cable from Admiral Oberg inviting me and any four people whom I wished to bring to come aboard and spend the night. This was absolutely great. I make the point here that this is the sort of thing, not only the ship visits in port, but if you can get – if it's an aircraft carrier and you can land on it – a carrier, it is absolutely wonderful for your relations with your host country. Anyway, I chose Colonel Tedan Kichuru, who was Commander of the Kenyan Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel James Kimaro, Kenyan Navy, and a man by the name of Claudius Wachugwe, who was Under Secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Philip Kitongu, who was Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense. And that seemed like a good balance - seemed like the obvious balance – plus my political officer, Gregory Matson. Gregory Matson, when I was asked to suggest someone who might go to open the office in the Seychelles – and I was very pleased that Washington would ask me and not just send somebody – and become the chargé, was the person I recommended, and that worked out very well. So, anyway, all of us took off in an aircraft – I can't remember what the aircraft was, but an aircraft from Mombasa and had a tailhook landing with the cables on the carrier. And then we were treated to a day show of all kinds of activity and also a nighttime show. I never realized – although I had been on an aircraft carrier from Hawaii to Guam, there were no planes taking off – the pyrotechnics that go on when the cables have gone across the deck and the plane lands. It really was spectacular! They also had the F-14s. All the Kenyans were able to sit in the cockpit of an F-14 on the deck and have their picture taken, and that was a great hit. They went up to the bridge and from the bridge we saw an F-14 pass at bridge level at supersonic speed and then they had a rescue at sea with a helicopter demonstration, and it was an enormous hit. And then we got into Mombasa and they took us off the helicopter.

I had to come back to the United States several times, but '75 was not an altogether good year for me. I came back once because Mancham, who was the Prime Minister and then
became President of the Seychelles, was going to be in Washington. So I had to be there to take him to IBRD and EXIM, and we had a meeting with Sam Adams and AID, and the Department of Defense and lunch, and we discussed ship visits and the Peace Corps, and I took him out to see Representative Diggs, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee, who visited me in Madagascar, but also visited me in Nairobi when I was there.

Q: Charles Diggs? Who subsequently had some difficulties.

MARSHALL: Oh, yes. He had some difficulties. He went to prison, yes. Well, he deserved it. Then I went to Memphis because Holiday Inn was planning to put up a Holiday Inn in Kenya. That didn't happen, at least not on my watch. And Kevin Wilson, who was head of Holiday Inn, invited me out there to see what it was all about and go through, which was very interesting, but it didn't turn out as productively as it should have. And that didn't work out. But I saw Holiday Inn's University, where they show people how to run a hotel. Then I went to Chicago and spoke before the Mid-America Committee. It was hosted by the Continental Bank. Then I had a medical exam. The doctors at State saw that I had a little spot on my lung. They sent me off to someone else to take a look at, and I had an independent opinion. They decided that I should have an operation on my lung. I first went back to Kenya and then came back and had the operation. That sort of set me back a little bit; a couple of months, unfortunately.

I had a number of visitors come out in 1975. My family did; my mother did; one of my sons did – Philip. Did I talk about a man by the name of George Reppas and the cattle project?

Q: You talked about a cattle project.

MARSHALL: Right. There were two cattle projects: the one I was interested in and then another with these two Greeks, an American-Greek and a Greek-Greek, in Southern Madagascar in Moliavie and they were doing all the wrong things. But this was two years later. I'd been away from Madagascar and then in Trinidad and then come to Kenya. I was in my office one day and my secretary came in to see me and said there was a Mr. Reppas, who was here and would like to see me. I said, "What?!" And George Reppas came in, and I said, "Where were you from? Where have you been?" He said, "I just escaped." I said, "Well, sit down and tell me about it." So he told me a bit about it, and I said, "Well, George, who?" (And he admits it. He was just stupid.) My wife was away, but I said, "Come on back to the residence, and let's have lunch." So he then told me his whole story, which I will abbreviate, and that is that he was put in prison in Madagascar along with his associate, Boucopoulos, and Boucopoulos went berserk in prison. Reppas tried to establish a sort of stability for himself there. He smuggled in sleeping pills. He had a man who was allowed to be in prison with him who waited on him. Cleaned his cell and did his cooking, but then he was taken away from him. The cooking equipment was still there – a little open fire. George made a cake, in which he stuffed all the sleeping pills, and he was about to give this to his guard, when a revolution broke out. A shell hit
the prison that he was in, so he rushed out of the prison through this hole along with Boucopoulos. But Boucopoulos turned left and was immediately apprehended, but Reppas turned right, and looked up a Malagasy girlfriend, whom he stayed with for a few days. Then he reported in to the embassy. Mind you, I wasn't there. This was another ambassador. He was given a room in the same building where the Marine Guards had their rooms – their headquarters. Then the ambassador told him he would not be able to stay there very long. He'd have to give himself up. So he got hold of his girlfriend (I'm abbreviating this. There's a lot more to it.). He got a hold of his girlfriend and arranged an escape. He somehow or another had some money and he had a car waiting for him and went in the car on a seven-hour drive to Magunga. At one point, a policeman opened fire on him and hit the vehicle, but didn't hurt him. And he finally got to Magunga. He had made previous arrangements there with a man who owned a little sloop. He got hold of the man and said he wanted to be taken to the Comoros. The man hemmed and hawed and, anyway, they agreed on an amount which would be paid when he got to the Comoros (It was a Frenchman.), and they got into the sloop and it had a motor that stalled. They started drifting toward a naval boat, some sort or other, a police boat, but the Frenchman was also an expert diver, so he went over and cleaned out the seaweed that had gotten caught in the propeller, came up, and took him to the Comoros, where he somehow or other arranged for some money to be sent from San Francisco, his home, to the Comoros to pay this man off and got the French to give him enough authority on paper – not a passport or anything – to go from there to Nairobi, which is when he walked into my office and wanted a passport. I think that is quite a little story.

Also, in 1975, I was still at the embassy and we received a cable saying that some guests or visitors were coming to Nairobi, and I thought it appropriate to ask them for Thanksgiving lunch, which I did. It was Mrs. Coretta King and two of her children, and an energetic young Congressman by the name of Andrew Young. At the lunch, Mrs. King said, "You will be hearing more about this young man." We certainly did. And Margaret Kenyatta, I asked, who is the daughter of Kenyatta and also the Mayor of Nairobi, and a man by the name of George Githii who is head of the Nation newspaper. So, during the year I had numerous meetings with Moi, with other ambassadors, with other CODELs, with U.S. business, and with masses of visitors to Nairobi.

One person who came and is a very good friend – and was and is – and had been a good friend since my days in the Agency, was Dick Helms. He, at the time, was ambassador to Iran, but he was being recalled to Washington at that time regarding previous testimony in which he was convicted of having perjured himself, for lying to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about Agency efforts to mount a Chilean military coup. Which all brings me to the obvious comment: "How the hell can you have an Agency, how can you have any organization that runs intelligence and then call them up on the mat and expect them to tell you the truth about something that is supposedly covert and confidential?"

That's not the way to run a business. Fine, have a little committee that reports to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, one committee, not seven. He made about 10 trips back. He arrived in Nairobi pale as the proverbial sheet – looking green even – he and Cynthia, his wife, and they said, "We need a rest." He had a bodyguard with him, and he
wanted to go out on Safari. The bodyguard said, "Yes, Sir, I'll make the arrangements.” He said, "No. Do whatever you want to do. I want you to stay here in Nairobi. The ambassador is going to make the arrangements for me. I don't even want you to know where I am." That's what happened. He went out, and he and Cynthia had a wonderful safari. He met wildlife, and he came back looking healthy and refreshed. In fact, he wrote a very nice note in our guest book when they left, saying that they had really had been rejuvenated. He's a wonderful man and I think very highly of him. In any organization, there are differences. Dick Bissell, in his book on his years in the Agency, criticized Dick Helms for not having given him, Dick Bissell, his views on the Bay of Pigs Operation before it went into effect. But then, if you turn the page in his book, you'll then read that Dick Bissell said, "It was not up to him to tell me because if he had, he knows that I would have disagreed with him and not listened to him. It was up to me to ask him and I didn't. I made a mistake. I should have."

By the end of 1975, Kenyatta had regained much of his political ground.

Q: He'd previously been in poor health and there had been a big bus bombing in '74?

MARSHALL: Yes. There was this business about Jan Kariuki, who was a highly regarded individual, a critic of government who all of a sudden disappeared. In fact, he disappeared right in front of the Hilton Hotel along with some other people, and he was later found on the other side of the hill in Ngong Hills, dead, and in pretty bad shape, too. I mean, beaten up. Which brings me to another point about Kenyatta – a point on Kenyatta. I'm not saying that Kenyatta ordered this to happen. Let me put this in parenthetically, that when you're working for, when you're under someone like Kenyatta – it doesn't have to be Kenyatta, it can be in this country or anywhere else; it has happened in our country every day probably – the top people under the top people, the top person, tend to want the top person to like what is happening and they do things to please him without his knowing it. They sometimes please themselves more than him. That can even happen as an ambassador. But things are done in your name – the ambassador wants, the ambassador thinks – which is all wrong, and I'm sure it happens a lot in business. The President wants, the President thinks. So, of course, if you're number one, you're like the captain of the ship or the president of the company. You have to – or you should – take the blame for what is happening under you. Having said all that, what I believe is good, was good then when I was ambassador and is good still for a developing country, is a benevolent dictatorship.

I am not as solidly sold as some people, including President Nixon, that all the world should have democracy. I don't think that developing countries can jump right into being a democracy. I think they have to go through some painful steps first. I think that one of the processes that can take them more quickly and better through painful steps is a benevolent dictator. I would cite as a prime example – although I think that Kenyatta was a benevolent dictator – Ataturk. One might agree with me in including Salazar, although I think he was a candidate for being a benevolent dictator. Ataturk – I know his history well, and what he did – had people killed, but he brought that country into the modern
world. It may be regressing now into fundamentalism, but that's another matter. I do think that Kenyatta was the right person at the right time. I think that whether or how much he may have been responsible for the deaths of Kariuki or for Tom Mboya is questionable. But I think that, as a whole, the management of the country the way he managed it was good and better than now.

Q: But as the architect of the Mau Mau insurgency and author of Facing Mount Kenya, there is a good deal of violence there, so it's conceivable that...

MARSHALL: But he changed a lot. He changed a great deal. Doing this a little chronologically, let me move into 1976, which was an extremely active year for Kenya and for me.

Q: Kenyatta had been reelected in '75?

MARSHALL: Yes, he was. I should have mentioned that. You're absolutely right. Well, beginning in 1976, Kenya and Kenyatta reacted to Amin's statement of aggression, which I've mentioned, and this led to President Kenyatta – who in Kenya was referred to as Mzee, meaning the old man, literally, but it was a reverent term used – Mzee led a march in Nairobi and meetings in Nairobi. He was trying to show that he was in command of the country and supporting the people. I'm going to give a few dates through here. In February of '76, Vice President Moi asked me whether the United States would give credits for military purchases. Things were hotting up a bit, as I say, because of Kariuki and a bit of violence and some bombs in Nairobi which didn't seem to bother me very much at the time.

Q: Those were, though, not externally launched.

MARSHALL: No, they weren’t PFLP or anything like that.

Q: They were rivalries between the Kikuyu old guard and the Moi people? Or were they Odinga and the communists?

MARSHALL: No, they were anti-government really. Yes, to a certain degree, they were tribal. In Kenya, the Kikuyu is the dominant tribe, although that is not the tribe of Vice President Moi, now President Moi, who is a Kalenjin. He comes from, you might say, the mid-west, up near Lake Marenge. But there are two Kikuyus. There is one that comes from Nyeri and then there is the Kikuyu that come from just outside of Nairobi. And they don't always agree. In fact, they disagree almost as much between each other as they do with the next largest tribe, which is the Luo, or with the other 18 tribes. So, it's a bit tribal.

Q: Mboya, who was assassinated, was a Luo?

MARSHALL: Yes. But Double O – Odinga – as he was called, had pretty much quieted
down. He was making political noises and receiving a little money from China to help him along, but nothing terribly critical.

Q: So, Attwood's book notwithstanding, there wasn't a real communist menace of any kind?

MARSHALL: No. No communists, none at all. And the Russians really had no interest there either. They did in Ethiopia, but not in Nairobi. And in Somalia. Anyway, I gave a considerable number of speeches when I was in Kenya either opening a conference, or a session, or a meeting, or the beginning of something or other or at a school. I gave a bicentennial speech in Nairobi in February, '76, to the Rotary Club and in Mombasa, the second half of my bicentennial speech in March. I made a point in Mombasa, not in Nairobi, doing what I think is very important, if you can – and I put a lot of time in it – and that is I gave the first five minutes of my speech in Swahili. All of my lessons, and I had two lessons a week – really that one time was almost worth the whole thing because it was really appreciated. I had a Swahili teacher who came from the coast, where the best Swahili is spoken. I drove her up the wall practicing my speech, but it really is important.

Q: Were you perhaps he first U.S. ambassador, and maybe any ambassador, to do that?

MARSHALL: One of the first, I think so, but I'm not entirely sure. I think so. The 25th of April, 1976, was the first meeting of our Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger with President Kenyatta at the State House in Nakuru. President Kenyatta asked for an additional amount of 20 million dollars. We had already approved 45 million dollars to purchase a squadron of F-5Es; actually it turned out to be F-5Es and Fs – Fs being the two-seater and Es one. They also asked for A-4s, which is an attack aircraft, which the Ministry of Defense wanted, at least head of the Ministry of Defense wanted. Henry Kissinger felt it should be considered. I was against it, because I felt that they should not have an attack aircraft. I think Henry came around to that thinking, too. I felt that if they wanted them to defend themselves – that was the point they were making – against neighbors, and that's fine, but why an attack aircraft? Also, at that meeting Henry asked Kenyatta whether he would visit the United States and that was the subject of several follow-up meetings. In principle, he wanted to come to the United States, but he really wasn't well enough and he didn't want to fly, but he didn't give these excuses. He said, "Yes. I will come some day." But it never happened. In principle, he wanted to.

Q: His problems in those years were heart-related?

MARSHALL: I don't really know exactly what they were, but he was not well, and he went to England a number of times for treatment. Anyway, the subject of the F-5Es was a protracted one. Moi was the first one to bring it up with me, as Vice President, when I went to see him one day in the office, which is really quite funny, at least I thought it was funny, because I knew what he was going to talk about before I went. When I went to see him, we chatted about I don't know what, inconsequentials for several minutes and then he said, "Well, Tony, you know we would like to get, we would like to get-" I couldn't
stand it. I said, "F-5Es." He said, "Yes. That's what we want." I also felt that in giving it away he wouldn't really catch on that I knew it and I don't think he did. Anyway, as I said, that was a subject of considerable conversation. I also pointed out to President Kenyatta that you couldn't just have the planes tomorrow. Who was going to fly them? It would take two years of training in the United States. So we ended up giving them credits to buy the aircraft, which they did. They bought six, while I was there. Then we gave them a grant for the training of the pilots. I saw Kenyatta a great deal. Another time I talked to him about South Africa. Henry Kissinger was interested in going down to South Africa or to Southern Africa, trying to be a catalyst. I don't think he would put it that way, but in trying to be a catalyst in bringing changes to South Africa and bringing South Africa and the rest of Africa together. Parenthetically, I think South Africa will be the leading country in Black Africa within the next one to two generations.

Q: It is already, no?

MARSHALL: South Africa? Not leading the Black countries. They're not doing what I thought Nigeria could have done. Nigeria has missed the boat. That's what I mean. They're simply the best organized and in better shape than anybody else. I didn't mean that. I meant leading the Black Africans. They’re selling to them, they have promise, but they're not the leader. They haven't quite achieved that pinnacle of political capability yet.

I had a lot of fun on the 14th of June, 1976, mind you it was our bicentennial year. I had an Independence Day celebration at the Hilton Hotel. I got them all interested in it, and they decorated a room like the Wild West, which I wasn't too keen about, but I guess that's an image of America. What I did, though, was I had given these talks, one in Nairobi, one in Mombasa, a relatively straight talk on independence, although I did refer to George Washington and the cherry tree. Then I talked about change. That's what I focused on. I wanted to do something different. At the Hilton, after everybody had had dinner, I got up at the podium and said, "You know, I've given these talks on our independence celebration of 200 years and tonight I'm not going to talk to you about our independence. I'm going to talk to you about your 200th anniversary. And it is now 2163. You arrived here – so forth and so on – and the whole thing was science fiction and magic. They loved it! Because what I had done was to invite not a lot of Americans, as I also pointed out, because this wasn’t for Americans, it was for the Kenyans to understand and share our day with us. I had invited 100 Kenyans who had been in America, one way or another, either on a scholarship – one was a dentist – and I had a menu program printed with the names of all of the people and the reason they were invited, their association with the United States, all 100. The whole thing was translated. It was printed in English the next day in the paper, but also printed in Swahili and put in the Swahili paper. It was kind of a pixyish thing I sometimes like to do. And I did it, and it seemed to work. But it was a fantasy.

Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was coming out, and I went to see Kenyatta in preparation for that. On the 17th of June, Rumsfeld was to meet with Kenyatta. On the 16th of June, I met Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld at the airport and brought him into the
Intercontinental Hotel. We had a talk. After I talked to him, I went down and I found out that one of the members of his staff was holding a press conference and telling them about the 5-Es and Fs. I blew my lid! I went back and told Secretary Rumsfeld, who was absolutely appalled and took very strict action. I'm not quite sure what he did. This was not his fault, at all. I don't know if it was a PR man or what, but it was somebody else's fault. It was a press conference. That's what he was giving. And the papers would have it the next morning before Kenyatta would meet with Rumsfeld, which was wrong in every way. First of all, Kenyatta did not want this information released so the neighbors would know, at least not at that point. Also, for it to come out in the press before Russia even... I mean... We had a dinner for Rumsfeld that night and I called up Konange, the Secretary of State in the President's office, who was coming to the dinner, and I asked him to meet with me before the dinner. I took him into the library and I said, “This is what's happened.” He turned pale. He said, "This is terrible. I'm not hearing this.” I said, "Yes, you are. I want you to know. I won't say that I've told you, but I want you to know what has happened, when you wake up tomorrow morning, and see what has happened.” Anyway, to this day I don't know if he told him everything or not. I don't think he said anything, but I did want him to know.

Q: Was that because Kenyatta was not somebody who would suffer bad news easily from the messenger and the people around him were scared of him?

MARSHALL: Oh, terrified! Anyway, the next morning, I later learned that Kenyatta was furious and he thought it was one of his people. He said, "Tell me who this man is and I will have him properly punished." We walked into the State House in Nairobi; we walked into this large room with a long table and all of Rumsfeld's people were down one side and all of Kenyatta's people were down the other side. I think I was the second one; I think Rumsfeld was next to Kenyatta and then I was next, and icicles were forming on the ceiling. I mean, Kenyatta was frigid. And he said, “I want to welcome you to Nairobi.” No further welcoming words. And then he said, "I think you want to say something," turning to Rumsfeld. And I interrupted him. I don't know that I'd do it now, but I interrupted Kenyatta. I said (It was a little bit of gall, but it turned out to be the right thing to do.), "Mr. President, I just would like to ask you whether we are going to be going to a smaller meeting after this, whether this is our only meeting?" With that, he got up and said, "We're going to a smaller meeting now." He hadn't even been thinking of it, of course. So we moved into the other room with just the Secretary of Defense, myself, and a couple of others. The first thing that Rumsfeld said was, “No, this wasn't your fault. This was mine. One of my people did it and he's going to be punished.” Immediately, it got warmer. And then they got down to it and worked it out. But believe me, the lessons: don't let a visitor let the cat out of the bag before the President knows.

Then Kenyatta, at a different meeting, said to me, "I may have a lot of trouble with Uganda and that fellow." He never said Uganda; he never said Amin. He said, “That fellow,” and I knew that meant Uganda. "And he may gang up with those people up there," meaning Somalia. "I would like to know whether the United States will back me up if we have a problem. Would you ask Secretary Kissinger if the United States would
do that?" So I sent whatever one did – a flash – Henry liked flashes. I do, too, but only if the walls of the embassy are coming down, which they seemed to be all the time. I got back to Henry and reported it. I got a cable back saying that, indeed, the United States would cooperate and help Kenya. So, I immediately got into the car and rushed back up to Nakuru and told this to Kenyatta. He said, "I cannot find words to thank him. What does that mean, though?" So I thought, "Can I say nothing? I probably shouldn't. What can I say?" So I gave him what I thought was an innocuous, fair, honest reply, that the United States would not come in with troops, that we would probably help them by taking a stand in the United Nations, and they would certainly have our support in that. But I made it clear – no troops. I got home late and, when I got home Schaufele, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, called me that evening (I've been debating whether to say this to you, but I'm going to.). He said, "Tony, you got a cable today." I said, "Yes." He said, "What have you done about it?" I said, "Well, I went off and I've just prepared a report on my having seen the President and I told him what was in the contents of the cable." He said, "Tony, a word was left out." I already guessed it, but I couldn't believe it. He said, "Not." And so, I didn't like that. And then I got a cable the next morning ignoring that from Henry, saying that I should not interpret these cables.

Q: This was in response to your report?

MARSHALL: In response to my report, but not putting on paper the "not." That was on the telephone. I got another trip in between, but I'm going to skip right now to Henry's second visit, which was on the 23rd of September, when Henry visited Kenyatta again. When he came, I said I'd like a private meeting with him soon. I went to his room at the Intercontinental. I said I was sorry that there was a misunderstanding when you gave me the message that the United States would fully support Kenya, and I reported that to President Kenyatta. Then I received Schaufele's telephone call, in which he said a word had slipped out – "not." I said in no way was I going to go back to Kenyatta and tell him that. "But I just want to say this to you personally, Mr. Secretary." And then he said – and this is what I wasn't sure I wanted to put on the tape, but I am. He then said, "It was intentional." And there's only one interpretation for that. I went down and my good friend, my economic officer, John Eddy, was sitting in the lobby, and I took him aside and I said, "I'm only going to tell you. I'm not going to tell anybody else this. Anybody. But there's only one interpretation. Officially, we're supporting, but if anything happens, he can say that stupid ambassador of ours out there got things all messed up." I know Henry well. I see him from time to time, but I will not forgive him for doing it. And I don't think I was the only one he did that to, but I just think that's not the way to treat an ambassador. I think the ambassador should have your confidence, and you should have his.

Anyway, going back a bit, back to July, I went up to Germany because I wanted to see what an F-5E looked like, and I wanted also to get an area briefing from the command in Germany. So I went up there and I stayed with General Robert Huyser in Stuttgart and went over to Ramstein, Germany, where I saw the F-5E and also – it was not on my list to look at but there was one there and I was intrigued by it as I'd never seen one before at that time – a C5 and also the Black Light Harrier. Then also, in August, there was another
ship visit, the USS Barry, and I had to come down to Mombasa anyway to deliver a message from Henry Kissinger to Kenyatta who was at his State House in Mombasa. That turned out to be quite an interesting time – a little different. Kenyatta did not like diplomats, he didn't like high commissioners, and he didn't like ambassadors; and he and I, very fortunately, got on very well. I'd arranged for four of his children to go on the USS Barry and so when I saw him and gave him this message – I think it was on South Africa – he said, "Oh, my children had a wonderful time and they're still here." So he called them and they came in, and they still had their caps on. That was sort of a hit. But then he said it's terrible how sometimes you say something that comes first in your head – but then he had to explain it. He then said, "When are you going back to Nairobi?" I said, "I'll go back after our meeting – now." Then he said, "Won't you stay for dinner?" I never had heard, never, of him having any ambassador for dinner privately. Then he said, "And then stay on and join me for the dancers," which is like turning on the television for him. That is what he did every single evening. The first thing that came into my head was, "Mr. President, that's an offer I can't refuse." I didn't want to quite explain to him who the godfather was after having said that, so I sort of fumbled and mumbled my way out of that. It was an offer I couldn't refuse, so I did stay on and had a delightful evening.

Another time I saw President Kenyatta about the Kenyan ambassador to Washington. Kenyatta was rather annoyed because a man by the name of Kireni had received agrément. I told him, I said, "Your ambassador-designate to Washington has received agrément and I am delighted." He said, "Who? Why?" I said, "Kireni. You appointed him." He said, "No, I didn't. Sometimes people do things I don't know about. And sometimes they do it because they fear me." I said, "I'm not at all surprised. They have every right to fear you." He roared with laughter. It turned out that he didn't go. A man by the name of Imboiga went. And he didn't know about it, or if he did, he'd forgotten it. But at the same meeting, I told him I was going on consultation to the U.S. in a few days, and was there anything I could do? Any message? We talked about the arms request again and I said, "In December, we're going to have our national day, and could we have a fly-by of American planes?" I said, "I don't know if that's possible or not, but I'll do everything I can." He'd also brought this up with Kissinger. I said, "It's a little difficult, but I'll see what we can do." Then he said, "On the planes, I'd like to have Kenyan markings." And I said, "Mr. President, I don't advise that because, first of all, no one will believe it. Maybe they won't even see it, but nobody will believe it. And it would be wrong if they did." And he said, "Well, will you please ask whether that's possible?" I said, "Yes, I will, because you're asking me to. But I want you to know that I'm recommending against it."

That very same evening, he said, "Yes, there is something you can do. I would like to send a letter to President Ford." I said, "What would you like to put in the letter?" He said, "Well, oh, you know. Here. Here's some paper. Go in the other room and write the letter for me." So I went in the other room. Kongange was looking over my shoulder. He was the only other person present. And I wrote this letter. I could hardly read it myself. At least it's not as bad as my handwriting now, and I took it into him. It was on a yellow scratchpad or whatever or white paper. I said, "Would you like me to read it to you?" So I read it to him. He said, "That's fine." So two hours later, I had it signed and on my desk.
So I took it back to Washington. (This is, I think, a funny story.) I gave it to the country director, and I said, "I don't know whether to send this to the Assistant Secretary or to the White House. He said to send it to the White House. So we sent it to the White House. They sent it back to the desk officer and asked them to prepare a letter. I said, "Give it to me, and I'll prepare it." So I went to the typewriter and prepared a reply from President Ford to President Kenyatta to my letter. And then I took it back and gave it to him. That, I thought, was fun.

Then Diggs came, and he saw the President, along with Representative Collins and Dr. Challinor. At that time, they talked about the past and American blacks and Kenya. Kenyatta, though, talked to him in a different way than he talked to Henry Kissinger. And he tapped his wrists and said in those days you had to wear bracelets and, around his neck, he made a motion and said you had to wear tags at that time. He said "We were treated like dogs and we were very bitter. But our bitterness gave us strength." Then, on the 12th of December, Kenyan Independence Day, the Marine Corps had Harriers which they flew by. Unfortunately, they were not able to do it from the Guam, which they sent down from Naples. This is how the government spends its money. So they flew off from the Guam and then down into Mombasa to fly by. What I was hoping they would do, which they would have done but they didn't have enough fuel to fly up and back, was to stop in mid-stadium in the air. I mean, all the people would have dropped out of their seats. But they weren't able to do that. But one thing that was amusing after this event was that the Soviet ambassador broke away from us as we were all going down the steps – the diplomatic section – he broke away from his interpreter for a second and came up to me. This was the only time, the whole time we were there, that he spoke to me in perfectly good, simple English, and he said, "That was wonderful! I enjoyed it."

I took a number of trips when I was in Kenya. I did take some safari trips, but "safari," after all, is a word that in Swahili means simply “journey.” If you call someone at the office and talk to the secretary, she says, "He's on safari," which means he's out on a business trip. I did take some wildlife safaris for a night or two or three, or whatever. Also, I went on a two-day trip – the government chartered a plane – I took members of the embassy up for all the obvious reasons to stop here, there, and there, all was well planned-out – to the Northern part of Kenya to Wajir, to Garisa. At Garisa, we saw an irrigation project and the secondary school in Meru.

Q: The first two were in Somali areas?

MARSHALL: Yes. They were all Somali areas. Then Haresane where Chevron oil had a rig. In Habasway, there was a camel auction. I loved that. I threatened to buy a camel and ride him back to Nairobi. In Wajir, there were all kinds of little things – handicrafts, etc., so forth. We gave books away and I gave out ten kilos of candy at the school in Wajir. There were some Peace Corps volunteers up there and I went around and saw them, and gave books away, as I said, to the school.

Then I went back to the States in May for a medical check-up. I went back for just two
days on the 19th of June because my friend, Frank Malloy, whom I've spoken about
before, had been killed in Lebanon. And I arrived at Dulles just in time to get to Andrews
at 4:20 in the afternoon. Then the funeral service.

Then the 27th of June till the first of July, I went to the Seychelles for their independence
ceremonies and, getting off the plane with a lot of other diplomats who either were
resident in Nairobi or came for the occasion, including the Italian ambassador – the
British, German, French – but we all went off in some order that had been predetermined
and walked down the steps of the plane, and a car was waiting for us there with our flag,
and we were introduced to the driver and to our ADC. My idea of an ADC is a Brit, who
has polished boots, maybe with spurs, a sword at his side, epaulet, everything spic and
span. I was introduced to my ADC, whose name was Jeannine, who was a 16-year old,
very buxom, Seychelloise girl! I said, "Get in the back seat with me so you can tell me
what we are doing here and what the program is." She got in and she said, "What should I
call you, Mr. Marshall or Your Excellency?" I said, "Please just call me Mr. Marshall."
That would do. She said, "Mr. Marshall, may I open the window, because I get car sick." Anyways, the whole thing, as I told Mancham, who became President the next day, at the
party the night before, "Look, this whole thing is a debutante party." He appreciated that
because he spent thousands of dollars on this party. I'd been to the Seychelles when
Governor Allen was there, when we were still only on a reporting basis from Nairobi, and
then come the time when Mancham was there. The important thing when Allen was there
was to decide which way to pass the port. And I went when Mancham was there, and he
had two blondes, one on each side of us, that he picked up at the cosmetics counter at
Harrods. It was a little different atmosphere. We all had to sing during dinner. He had a
guitar coming in. Anyway, the whole thing was quite amusing. Independence was about
five minutes late because he had insisted on reading a poem in French, English, and
Creole, which he had written. He had to turn and silence the French horn which was
already beginning to boom up for independence.

Anyway, one or two small items for '76, we had a mini-com meetings which we had had
in Madagascar, which I think are a good idea. I don't think you have to wait for the
regional Chiefs of Mission conference. I think you can have a mini-con. There were just
four of us – and Hummel, who later went on to become ambassador to China – and two
others. I think we all found it quite useful, to compare notes about the region. What does
your country think of ours? And up and down from that. Then Billy Graham came out
there in the summer of '76. I got a good suntan while up in the stands on that. And Lady
Bird, whom I'd known before, in fact I had a memorable time once in Washington when I
down with my mother, because Buchanan Park was to be opened in Washington
which my mother's foundation put some money into – a grant. And Lady Bird Johnson
was interested because she was interested in flowers. She was at the opening of the park.
She asked us to go back to the White House and have lunch in Lincoln's Press Room.
They set up a little card table there for the three of us – and to me that, even though I'd
been to the White House for dinners – that is the most memorable time. I think because it
was so private. It was wonderful. Anyway, she came out because of the National
Geographic Board Meeting that was held out there. I saw quite a bit of her, and we gave a
dinner for about 80 people, and had ballroom dances, and all kinds of things for her. So that was nice. In 1977, I was only there until April.

There was one project that I alluded to, a self-help project that I wanted to get started up, not Lake Berringo. Cimarron and Degours had an area above the gorge, which in rainy weather, which was infrequent, would fill up with water and then flow through the gorge. My ideas was that this is an example of how you can dam up this very narrow gorge and then have a pipe running down from above where the water was stored that, for at least a while, you'd have some water that could be of use, not for irrigation, I don't think, but at least water for camels, and people and goats. Since this was then-Vice President Moi’s area, Richard Leakey and I and Ken Mueller, who was head of an agricultural organization here in the United States, and President Moi went up in a plane and took a look at this gorge. This all sounds rather farcical now that I think of it, but it was very serious then. We all hiked up this riverbed and Moi's bodyguard was right in front of me. All of a sudden, I heard this terrible noise, something banging, right in front of me. This bodyguard’s gun had fallen on the rock; thank God it wasn't cocked! It could have killed me! Anyway, we all thought it was a good idea, but it never worked out. I thought if we could set this as an example, then on a self-help basis, if we gave money to other regions with a similar geographic situation, we could do it because only 17 percent of all Kenya's land is arable. And if semi-arid land, no matter how small, could be used in addition to wells – ground water – we could also get water from above. More meetings with Kenyatta and that's a farewell... I think that sort of sums it up.

Q: And then Kenyatta, if memory serves, died the year after you left.

MARSHALL: Yes, he did. A year after I left.

Q: So you were there at the end of an era in Kenya? An historic period.

MARSHALL: Yes, it was.

Q: People say that Mama Ngina was a major force behind the throne. Were you able to interact at all with her?

MARSHALL: No, I wouldn't describe her that way. I would describe her and Margaret Kenyatta, both his young wife and his sister, as not forces behind the throne; I really wouldn't describe either of them that way, but independently. They were – I mean it was all over the papers – they were notoriously in the ivory trade and making a lot of money out of it. Kenyatta himself, I felt, was the most unavaricious head of state in Africa.

Did I mention going down to Lesotho? That made me think of Mobutu. Lesotho had its 10th anniversary of independence while I was in Kenya. I think it was Dave Newsom who was supposed to go down there to represent the U.S., but he had something else he had to do. So I was asked to go down from Nairobi and, anyway, I went down and spent two nights in Pretoria with our ambassador there, and then went to Maseru, Lesotho. Actually,
although the ceremony and all that was interesting, and the people I found absolutely fascinating, and the horses really wonderful and the pageantry. But the most interesting thing didn’t have anything to do with Lesotho. Mobutu was there. He thought David was going to be there and he asked to see him and was told that he wasn't, but I was. So he asked me to come up to the palace where I was staying – nice house – and he asked me whether I spoke French. I said, "Yes I do." So he said we didn't need a translator. I had met him once before at a Chiefs of Mission meeting in Kinshasa where I thought he seemed terribly arrogant. So I was prepared for that and, think what one may about him and all the horrible things he's done to his country, I liked him for that moment. Just like with a lot of other people, you may like them for a moment even though you may dislike them for a lot of other things. He said, "I'd like to send a message to Secretary Kissinger." The subject was Southern Rhodesia and personalities and who he was hoping Henry Kissinger would support – one rather than another. He said, "Here's what I'd like you to say," and then he said, which I thought was very thoughtful of him, "Now let me just repeat it. These are the points – one, two, three." Fortunately, I got the communications officer at home and out of bed and got him to send off a cable and had an answer for him the next morning. But I rather enjoyed meeting him and seeing what is not an image of him.

Q: You certainly have covered Kenya. Winding down, as you said, we have done three hours, do you have any general comments reflecting on your three ambassadorships? Quality of the staff, the career Foreign Service as you saw it? Maybe the direction of Africa, overall?

MARSHALL: Can I comment on that one first?

Q: Sure.

MARSHALL: Good. Commenting on staff, I had excellent staff at all three posts! No question about it. I've the highest regard for Foreign Service officers, the ones I have known and worked with, and certainly the Agency and, for the most part, all the other agencies. Obviously, as I pointed out, I had problems with AID, but I got support in Washington. It was just an individual. I think it is unfortunate, and nobody can do anything about this at this point, I don't think; but I make the observation. I think it is unfortunate that we've gotten to the stage where an individual's rights are so protected that you can't make a frank statement about their good qualities as well as their bad in a fitness report – an efficiency report (I'm getting the military and the Marine Corps at this point mixed up.). But it really is unfortunate. And you can't talk about their wives because this is invading their privacy. You can't say whether a man drinks too much or not – whether he drinks too much – and that's not good for his job and performance. You have to use all kinds of cues to lead the person who is reading it to understand that there is a problem and leave him guessing. I think that's unfortunate. You can't commend a wife, either. It didn't happen with me, but I heard of a case in Japan where a wife had learned the language; she was doing all kinds of things to benefit the embassy, and the reporting officer could not say that she was such an asset because you were talking about a wife, or
a spouse, one way or the other. I think that is unfortunate. That's the comment that comes
to mind most readily, because I think it would be healthy for the Foreign Service to do
that.

Q: There certainly is a lot of sentiment that way in the Service. On the other hand, the
feminist movement is looking the other way

MARSHALL: You're not going to be able to do anything about it.

Q: You can't do anything about it. And there's also a feeling that it might disadvantage
the man who is single; the woman who's single.

MARSHALL: It gets all entangled.

Q: Africa has been a focus for you over many years. You've seen it at different periods.
You were involved earlier, I think you told me, in a development fund for Africa. What
are your reflections about the way it's going? President Clinton is about to go in the next
days on his first African trip to demonstrate U.S. interest. How do you feel as you
look back on it as we're on the verge of the 21st Century?

MARSHALL: I think first of all, overall, Africa is far worse off today than they were at
the time of their own independences, which began with the Gold Coast and then Uganda
in '54, I think – '56. And most of them in the 60's. Perhaps they were not given the right
kind of help and guidance by the British, the French, the Belgians, the Portuguese, the
Italians. Somebody said this to me in just the last few days – how long can the Africans
continue to blame the colonial powers for things not going right for them now? I would
agree with that comment. The time has come, and is well past, I believe, where they
simply have to get a hold of their own management of their own countries. And I think
that management, corruption, and mismanagement are the three major problems of
Africa. In some parts, population is a problem. I think that misdirection of education and
economic development – the two together – which allow (depending which way you want
to look at it) the unemployed to come into the cities, or (looking at it the other way) not
keep or provide some incentives for employment throughout the country results in strife
in the major cities and that leads to crime. Which certainly happens in Lagos, Nairobi,
and many other places. I think that there are some countries that have surprisingly turned
the corner; Ghana is in better shape than it ever has been. There are a few others that
have. Kenya, which we've been talking about, I wouldn't say it's in worse shape than at
the time of independence, but it is heading down from where it was. There is no doubt
about that. The reason for that is mismanagement, if you have to use one word and not go
into why, but I think it's obvious from what I've been saying what the why is.

With reference to the new AID effort program for Africa, and President Clinton's trip, I
would hope that we would – and if I read it right in reading about the new AID program,
we’re doing what I had suggested all along – and that is that we get something for our aid.
We should get – and each country may be a little different – an economic benefit of some
sort. I'm not looking for reassurances or for promises, we've gotten those all along, but we should get some beneficial aspect which could be just for the United States, or it could be something more general. It could include Europe. We could do it in partnership with Europe. It's a little bit like when you charge admission for an organization that you're going to go in to visit – whether it's a museum, amusement park, or whatever. If you charge admission, you're going to get more interest in that organization and you're more likely to get a more organized, politer attitude toward it, and people will enjoy more getting out of it what they're going to get, what they're going to see or do. So if there is more of that sense that “we have to give back something in order to get it,” it could lead to economic benefits. We could talk about taxes, property, land, whatever, something we think should be established – a free zone, whatever's best for the country and for our relations with it. We shouldn't be too careful, too sensitive – I know I'm trampling on real feet here – about human rights. And that's a dangerous thing to say. I certainly believe we should focus our attention on human rights and should constantly hammer the point home that they must be observed, but when it comes down to the nitty gritty, I don't think we should not be helping somebody or not going into relations with somebody because they have a bad human rights record. I think the two must be considered for their own benefits and separately.

As for the President's trip, I was a little sorry, and I can't even remember at this point, but I looked at them carefully at the moment and now I've forgotten them, the countries he's going to. I don't say that he should go to Nairobi, I don't say he should go to Lagos (Maybe it would be good if he went to Lagos.). I just felt that, of the countries he's going to, I don't know quite frankly why they've been selected. I hope they weren't selected to come back and state conclusions which had been reached before he went.

Q: Well, unless you have other things you'd like to put on the tape...

MARSHALL: You've been very patient with me.

Q: It's been an extremely interesting interview. I look forward to seeing it written up as a transcript. Thank you very much. This concludes Part II of the March 20 oral history interview with Ambassador Marshall.

End of interview