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Q: Ambassador Martin has had a long and very distinguished career in the U.S. Government, the Department of State, and the Foreign Service. I will not recap here any part of that because we hope he will do it himself in his own words. Thank you very much, Ambassador Martin.

MARTIN: Thank you. I appreciate the privilege of telling the story.

My father was a YMCA secretary for most of his life. He had passed the bar exam, but his first couple of cases were nasty divorce cases, and he said, "This is not for me." So he moved around for a few years before taking a job with the Dayton YMCA. Dayton, Ohio, was home for both my mother and father and I was born there in 1908, but we lived in Piqua, Ohio, about 30 miles north of Dayton, for five years, then in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. We moved to Trenton, New Jersey, and then to South Bend, Indiana, and then back to Dayton, where I graduated in 1924 at just 16 from Steele High School as they had done, earning an award for having the best grades for a male but behind 3 females, and in 1925, back to Piqua. It's an Indian name.
My father was a broad-minded YMCA man who had scholarly interests and joined whatever Protestant church was in the neighborhood, not narrowly minded in this respect. He had had the good fortune in a summer training camp, at Silver Bay on Lake George, N.Y. to be in the class of the very distinguished theologian, Harry Emerson Fosdick, who preached a social gospel, which became my father's approach.

Q: You could make that one today.

We experienced some technical difficulties with the tape. Shall we go back and try to pick up some of the gaps?

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: We are back in the happy days of the Epworth League.

MARTIN: The Epworth League of our Methodist church speech was when I was going to high school in Dayton, Ohio. I think I was describing a speech I made at its annual dinner in which I was reflecting to some extent things my father had said, the waste of money in advertising, which does not produce a product anyone uses. How much better off everybody would be if, instead of advertising, there were other cheaper means for people to know where they could buy this or that at what price. It would be a highly economical reform. And that was perhaps my first going on record--I was 14 or 15 at the time--of my views on this subject.

My father's brother was also a YMCA secretary in the Chicago area, and lived in Evanston, Illinois, had two children considerably older than I was that I admired and that led me to decide to go to Northwestern University from which they had graduated. I managed to get a scholarship paying my tuition of $250, for which I did some work in the Chemistry Lab. I lived with a Mrs. Tomlinson who had been a high school friend of my mother's in Dayton and married a Northwestern graduate who was then an officer of the leading Evanston bank. I cut the grass, kept the furnace going in the winter and helped her with some of her outside activities to pay for my board and room, except for lunch.

I then had to stay in Piqua for a year, because my father was ill. I worked part-time and took courses at the high school in public speaking and shorthand.

Then I went back to Northwestern and graduated in 1929. I waited tables in my fraternity house, Phi Delta Theta, and did various other things, including working in the public library half-time for a year.

Then my senior year, I was half-time in the personnel office, interviewing freshmen about how well they were getting along and what problems they had. In addition, I had a fair number of outside activities. My junior year I was on the debating team and a member of Delta Sigma Rho, the debating fraternity. At the end of my junior year, I made Phi Beta...
Kappa. I had three letters in tennis at which my father, an enthusiastic player, started me at 8. My coach was an English professor whom you had to beat to be able to be kept on the squad. We got one racket restringing a year. Otherwise, we paid for everything that was required. My senior year, I was a member of an elected honorary society, Deru, of 15 male students, which started the first men's union, and I was secretary-treasurer of that. I was president of the YMCA my senior year also. My father having been a YMCA secretary maybe helped me. I won the election by the vote of the retiring president.

When I worked in the personnel office I learned that on the Entrance Intelligence Tests, given by Northwestern because its President was a psychologist who had produced the intelligence and related tests used to help make wise assignments of the soldiers coming into our military for the first time during World War I, I had made a score of 99+ out of 100 possible, the grading being on the basis of your rank among the 700 or 800 freshmen taking the test.

Not because I was a Republican as I voted in '32 for the Socialist candidate, Norman Thomas, but for the political experience, I served as a poll watcher in the '32 election for the Republican candidate for Congress from the North Shore Chicago area. He won.

After graduation in 1929, I stayed as a graduate student in political science and economics [my majors were political theory and public law, basically, but government regulation of business especially, so economics was important]. The YMCA connection got me into my first problem with the anti-communist movement in the United States. In 1932 I helped the student YMCA arrange a meeting of students on the depression problem, so serious then, in the light of the upcoming election. As its speaker I got the head of the leftist but not at all communist Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota. There was a woman in Evanston who had a reputation as an anti-red lobbyist, and she got the local American Legion to protest the meeting, alleging the speaker was a communist. The University canceled it. I arranged to get a leading Chicago lawyer to make a speech at the Garrett Theological Seminary, which is on the Evanston campus but a wholly separate institution, on the value of freedom of speech. The chairman of the political science department of Northwestern chaired the meeting. It was well written up in the Chicago Tribune. (Laughs)

To pay my way as a graduate student, I was proctor, which meant living with and helping with special education programs, for the Austin Scholars, named for the man that funded their program. Ten high school seniors from all over the country were picked each year to train as business executives. They got $500 a year for four years and $1,500 for a year abroad, but they couldn't join fraternities; they had to live together separately. I spent three years as their advisor, being paid $1,000 a year.

I might add, with respect to the Austin Scholars, that it was very difficult to select, as I helped to do, seniors in high school who someday would be able to be and want to be business executives. One of them became a writer for the New Yorker magazine, and a couple became lawyers, but we did have some successes in business.
Then for a year I was a special assistant in a course "Introduction to the Social Sciences", doing student counseling and paper grading. One summer, I was a special assistant in a course on the history of political theory, which was still my particular interest. There was no pay so I worked at the cafeteria of a nearby motel serving drinks and deserts and slept on pillows between the stacks of books in the basement of the Social Science Building.

I taught a course three hours a week the last couple of years on American Government. All this slowed me up a bit, but I finished everything except my doctoral thesis. In early 1935 I was told that the '34-'35 academic year was my last at Northwestern.

In April 1935, a White House agency called the Central Statistical Board wanted to recruit an additional professional, and they sent a former professor there to the University of Chicago to do so. They had a very strong program in public administration and related matters. He hired Lewis Sims from there, and then he came up to see a friend of his who was Dean of the Business School at Northwestern, but also an editor of the American Economic Society Review, with whom I played tennis occasionally. He mentioned to the recruiter that I was at loose ends for the coming year and he ought to talk to me. Well, he did, and a week later I was offered a job. A week later, I was in Washington.

This was a major and reluctant shift for me. When I entered Northwestern my goal was to get into politics by way of being a lawyer. Somehow after my year in Piqua, I returned hoping to work for the State Department. I took a course in International Relations from a very respected professor but found it too boring to continue after the first semester and went back to my earlier goal. However, in my junior and senior year of political science I stumbled into the arms of a Professor Ellingwood who had been one of the first Rhodes Scholars at Oxford and used its tutorial method with me for half of my credits. I would read, then write comments, and then we would spend several hours discussing the subject. This turned me to the teaching profession and graduate instead of law school.

I didn't drop this interest when I had failed to find such a job and came to Washington. During the turmoil of war-time Washington with 60 hour weeks. I looked forward to getting a professorship somewhere when peace came. It didn't work out that way as the alternative was challenging but I did find time as a State Department officer to write a book in 1949 and many articles and to start research on a subject I had been introduced to in a course at Northwestern in Historiography. Each of us had to read all the works of an historian and comment on him. I chose Samuel Gardiner who had written a dozen volumes of high repute on English Political History during the first half of the 17th century when a Civil War had introduced democracy into Western political life, critical to the history of not only England but to U.S. political development. He and others had written a lot about the role of the Parliament in this critical period but no one on that of the members of the House of Lords, still important figures in the English government and badly split over the Civil War objectives.
I began by reading Gardiner again and other authors on the period, many contemporary as well as modern experts. Then I started researching on the backgrounds, ability and relationships of the members of the House of Lords in the 1630's and 40's.

After many years of scarce spare time work and assembling a considerable library, in the early '60's a Cambridge Professor published a book on "The Decline of the Aristocracy, 1540-1640." It stole too much of my subject and I abandoned my files and sold a good many of my books.

This professional urge was picked up after retirement in the '80's by the use of several hours a day on top of many other activities on a book on "Kennedy and Latin America."

Q: You went to the Central Statistical Board, a White House agency?

MARTIN: The Central Statistical Board (CSB), based in the White House. It was a New Deal agency. I served as an Economist, there being no Political Science classification in the U.S. Civil Service. There was a fear that the New Deal enthusiasm and multiplicity of new agencies would just make everybody hate the government, because people would be ringing too many doorbells too often to ask questions and using all the data collected carelessly to prove their points. Thus all questionnaires proposed by any Federal agency had to be approved by the CSB as to need and clarity and all reports based on them as to accuracy and proper use of all the data available to the numerous government agencies.

My first assignment from the CSB was with the Civil Service Commission, which couldn't, in its reporting of government employment, keep up with all the New Deal agencies, like the Public Works Administration, and the Works Projects Administration, who funded contracts rather than actually employing them directly. After talking it over with the people working on it, I discovered that they had all been hired when the Civil Service Commission was founded by Theodore Roosevelt in about 1900, and we moved them into a consulting and planning staff. New, younger people were hired who could accommodate themselves to the new situations which had been created.

The Executive Director of the CBS was Dr. Morris Copeland, a former Professor of Economics at Cornell who was a national income expert. In 1938 he let me help him do an article on the "Adjustment of National Wealth and Income Estimates for Price Changes" which was published under both our names by the National Bureau of Economic Research in Vol. II of an annual series of "Studies in Income and Wealth."

Q: Was that during your time at CSB?

MARTIN: Yes, and also, I met my wife there. She was working there. The best man at our wedding was Roger Jones, CSB Administrative officer, who later on was number two at the Bureau of the Budget and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management under Kennedy. One of our ushers, Arthur Stevens, also worked at the State Department later. Another CSB usher was Y.S. Leong, Chinese by birth but then from Hawaii, whom we saw
in the '80's, there, just retired as Chairman of the Department of Statistics at the University of Hawaii.

**Q:** *A CSB officer, Art Stevens.*

MARTIN: Yes, Art Stevens. We also had as summer interns, two economic Nobel Prize winners. Milton Friedman and George Stigler.

Very shortly after I got there, I was assigned to work with a woman, Aryness Joy Wickens, formerly with the Federal Reserve Board, on a number of economic projects.

Because the economy was the crucial issue, we had largely economists on our small staff and hence, also under Aryness, we prepared every couple of weeks a report of the U.S. economy for the President, Cabinet and our Embassies in cooperation with the Federal Reserve Board. I worked on that most of the three years I spent with the Board. I also worked with Bob Nathan, also a Dayton, Ohio boy, then in the Commerce Department, on the first government estimates of our national income.

Under her supervision I also worked with Dr. Stein of the Department of Agriculture on improvements of their statistics on farmers' incomes.

**Q:** *Was the National Resources Planning Board then in existence?*

MARTIN: It was, and I did some work with them. Yes, I knew a number of their people and worked with them on some of their reports, reviewing them.

While there I attended my only college course in Washington. It was at the graduate school of American University and the only one ever given by Dr. Goldenweiser, the top economist of the Federal Reserve Board, a highly respected elder leader in the profession. The subject was the Board's role in regulating banks and influencing the economy through its ability to change interest rates and the credit supply. About 15 of us met with him one evening a week, often at his home, for several hours.

**Q:** *Good way to do it.*

MARTIN: Yes. I also did work with the Harry Hopkins Work Projects Administration (WPA) when I was at the Central Statistical Board. At one point, the WPA decided on a massive program of small projects to put people back to work, and some people were afraid that they would include a lot of unnecessary data collecting. So I had an office for about six months in the basement of what was then the District of Columbia auditorium, between the two present Interior Department buildings. Every project had to cross my desk, to see if it had a data collection implication, and if there was, I could pull it out. The problem was that they changed their procedures to move things more rapidly about every three weeks, and I had projects out under about six different procedures and had to put them back in, with comments, in the proper way. After several months a major change was made; all projects
were to be recorded and processed in what was then called a "computer" system and we worked two nights to do this without slowing the approval rate. It was an interesting and challenging operation.

In 1938 my boss, Arness Wickens, moved to the Bureau of Labor Statistics to head up a program there for a Senate committee called the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC), headed by Senator O'Mahoney, to study the Depression experience and what we could learn from it. Shortly after that, she brought me over there to help with their research projects, in which there were various kinds of analyses. The first one I headed was using their statistics on wages and employment, to compare the wages of workers in the textile industry in New England and in North and South Carolina. A major union charge was that only the low wages of the latter had moved the textile industry out of New England. When we compared them for the same size of firm and the same size of community, there was very little difference. The charge was not true. To analyze all the BLS data for this we had a small staff which included two graduate student summer interns, Julia Henderson and Miriam Camp. The latter worked with me in State in the later '40's and early '50's and the former became a PCC Board member in the early '80's, after being head of IPPF in London.

More important for me was that the "Monthly Labor Review" which the BLS published included in its January, 1939 issue an article by me on the "Basic Problems of the National Economy."

The big one I worked on, which had future implications, was a study of what data do managers of big companies have when they change prices. What makes the price index move? We worked on that in cooperation with the economic department of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

We did studies in the tire, shoe, and textile industries but our biggest project was at the International Harvester Company, which had three sets of books by which to measure costs that related to volume, one on current volume, one on average volume over five years, one on maximum possible volume. Because for your steady overhead costs, the number of units you produce makes a lot of difference in how much of overhead costs each unit gets charged. For that we hired a consultant who was a professor of economics at Harvard, named Edward Mason. We had a very interesting time. We got two vice presidents fired because they gave the wrong answers to our questions. We decided there was so much interesting data there that we needed a research assistant. Professor Mason had a Ph.D. student that didn't have a job yet, that he thought was good, and he did so well--he was a four-hour-a-night sleeping type--that we made him a co-author, not just a research assistant. His name was John Dunlop, who was later Secretary of Labor and head of the Economics Department at Harvard, and a member of the President's Economic Advisory Council. That research program went on from about '38 to 1940.

Also there were hearings by the TNEC Committee, with witnesses from the Departments of Commerce and Labor, and the Security Exchange Commission. The main witnesses were the very able head of the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, Isador Lubin; Willard Thorp, then
an advisor to the Secretary of Commerce and later Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and in the '60's, Chairman of DAC, preceding me; and Leon Henderson, Chair of the Security Exchange Commission, later head of the Office of Price Administration in World War II. I somehow got the assignment of editing the text of the hearings. The problem was that a substantial sum had been paid by David Lawrence to finance the publication of the hearings but in return he had sold to a number of businesses an edited transcript of the hearings to be delivered on the morning after they took place. Thus I had to edit them by midnight on the day that the hearings took place so that he could pick them up and send them out by telegram the next morning. He also had a business newsletter, of course as his basic work.


MARTIN: Yes, I think that's right. But it impressed me, and it's been important subsequently, how easy it is in a question-and-answer exchange, to give replies which are somewhat confusing. I had to do quite a lot of editorial changes to make good sense out of what they were saying, all of them.

In December of 1939, I did a "Digest" of those hearings which was widely circulated. "Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power," which later the TNEC published a book on it which included a chapter by Dr. Dunlop and me on "Industrial Wage Rates, Labor Costs and Price Policies" on "The International Harvester Company."

While there I was invited by a Harvard Professor of Economics to report to his Seminar on the impact of an experimental food-stamp program in, I think, Mississippi, on the malnutrition of the poor. It was partially successful but several decades ahead of the rest of the country. An assistant to the Professor was Lincoln Gordon with whom my path crossed again many times.

Anyway, with the war in Europe in June, 1940, they set up a National Defense Advisory Commission, with a Commissioner for each of various subjects. The Commissioner for Labor, Sidney Hillman, had been president of Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union in New York, and Lubin was asked that month to move over and work with him, and he took me along.

My first job, because of my connections with the Central Statistical Board, was to get agreement between Hillman, and Edward Stettinius, who was the Industry Commissioner, on a Director of Research and Statistics. Finally, they okayed Stacy May, whom I sent the telegram to, and he accepted and had the job for the rest of the war. I worked a little bit with him then because they wanted to be sure they didn't duplicate existing government facilities and capacities which I was supposed to know because of my CSB experience.

Initially, one of the people that was brought in as a specialist on statistics on non-ferrous metals, for reasons I'm not clear about, was Lincoln Gordon, though he was of the Harvard Political Science faculty.
Q: I was wondering when Linc would show up. (Laughs)

MARTIN: Right. He did. Anyway, I stayed on working with the labor people. I had a very difficult job in helping organize labor advisory committees to the industry divisions. The industry divisions didn't want them, and the AFL and CIO were then fighting each other, and who had the most members of the labor advisory committee showed who was dominant in that industry. So it was a tricky one. But in the end, the industry people found that some of the labor people knew a total industry better than any of the industry people, who knew only their special field. So it gradually worked out.

From that in April, 1941, I became head of a staff for a Plant Site Board. The problem was too much political lobbying to get new war production plants built in a Congressman's district. So they set up this board, which had to approve all investments over half a million dollars in facilities, to ensure that there was an adequate labor supply, which was the biggest item, but also power, water, other things. Donald Nelson, formerly President of Sears Roebuck, who was later head of the War Production Board, was its first chairman, and each of the various major divisions of the Board were represented. It became an impartial judge of locations and took it out of the political arena, basically. I spent about a year and a half as head of the staff of that, particularly on the labor shortage angle, working very closely with the National Employment Agency network and making visits to several proposed sites for major facilities. In July of 1941 I spoke to a national conference of Industrial Real Estate agents and the National Association of Real Estate Boards. In March of 1942 I spoke to the American Industrial Development Council on "Plant Site Selection and Development."

Q: Who in the hierarchy, in the White House, might have had something to do with setting these up? Was Harry Hopkins involved in those days, or was it more the Bureau of the Budget?

MARTIN: I would think more the Bureau of the Budget, but there was also a special White House staff and Roger Jones was over there part of the time working on this. I don't know who else was in the White House at this time.

To go back to the War Production Board situation, after working on this Plant Site Board until December 1942, by which time most of the major new facilities had been chosen, there was a decision to try to assign labor priorities, as well as material priorities, to companies producing military goods and drawing on a tight labor supply. I was asked to explore how this could be done when I learned that Lincoln Gordon was heading the other priority system, and he and I visited together a number of the regional offices, including Buffalo, Cleveland, Seattle, San Francisco and Los Angeles, to see what could be done as it was more a local problem than a national one like demand for materials and machinery. [At the time I had the title of Assistant Chief of the Manpower Requirements Branch and in February, 1943 was made its Deputy.]
Q: He was working in which system?

MARTIN: The priority system of materials and machinery and so forth of the War Production Board. It included War Production Board, Defense, and so forth, setting industry priorities for material, commodities, and machinery. At that time, Lincoln Gordon was head of an overall priority staff to which we reported. We had adjoining offices there.

Q: So Lincoln was in that, and you were in Labor.

MARTIN: But after three or four months, we decided there was just no way we could work with the Defense Department on the rather intangible concept of labor priorities. I remember talking to the top people at General Motors and Ford in Detroit about new plants they were building, and they were saying, "Workers are mobile. The problem is management. We don't have enough top management to divide it up and put it where the labor supply is. We have to keep it centralized and let the labor come to us." And we found that in a number of places this was a real problem.

In 1943 I was promoted to P-8, the top professional rank of the Civil Service. When we gave up on labor priorities, I became in the spring of 1943 Associate Chief of the Munitions Branch of the Statistical Bureau of the WPB, headed by my old CSB boss Morris Copeland. We had a large professional staff trying to provide to the WPB, Defense agencies and the White House prompt and accurate data on the output by U.S. industries of the equipment required to wage the war.

In January, 1944 I was made Chairman of the Urgency Rating Commission to replace a veteran in the position who was moved upstairs. It was an inter-agency body which set the priorities the various war industries had in purchasing and getting deliveries of scarce machinery.

By May of 1944, we had agreed on a post-VE Day, the end of the war in Europe, priority system. I had not been drafted because of allergies and certain other physical problems. I had tried to enlist in the Navy as an officer, but because of these problems I could not leave Washington, I'd have to be based here, and I saw no reason for changing from one war agency to another.

Q: Probably to a less interesting and important job.

MARTIN: That's right. Then I was invited to lunch in late May by Ed Mason, my friend from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, who at that point was the Deputy Chief of the Research and Analysis Bureau of the Office of Strategic Services, and an old college friend as an undergraduate and graduate in political science named Charles Burton Fahs, who was head of the Far Eastern Division of Research and Analysis. The point was that we were just about to be able to start bombing Japan from Guam with--I think it was B-29s.

Q: B-29s came in.
MARTIN: The practice for Europe had been that each of the war agencies, OSS, Foreign Economic Administration, Navy, Air Force, Army, had people working on priorities for bombings, and every week or so they met in the office of the Under Secretary of the Army, Judge Patterson, to agree on priorities on targets to send to European headquarters, where there were also staffs. Mason and Fahs said, "Nobody knows something about Japan and the war industry. You know something about war industry. Maybe we could teach you something about Japan." I'd never been outside the United States at this point, not even to Canada. Anyway, I agreed to come. I had to take a cut in grade, but not much in salary. There were some other interesting connections as I replaced a man named Art Hersey, whose brother, John Hersey, was a well-known novelist. Their father had been a YMCA Secretary in China.

Q: That's right.

MARTIN: I found on the staff, head of the political work on China, a man named Wilbur, who later on was a professor of Chinese history at Columbia. He and I had been wheeled in our baby carriages together, because his father, later in China for the YMCA too, having been head of the YMCA in Dayton, Ohio had given my father his first YMCA job, starting him on his lifelong career. Also on the staff was a woman named Pat Barnett, married to Bob Barnett, whose father had also been a YMCA secretary in China. We'll come back to him later. As for her, for the last several years after retiring from State's Research Bureau as a Southeast Asia economic specialist she has been the chief Editor of the Population Crisis Committee where I now work.

We very quickly decided that there just weren't enough people with the capacity to do this the way it had been done for Europe, and set up a full-time joint, inter-agency, target group. My job in this respect became one of picking people from the European theater and transferring them to the Far East theater as the European war phased down.

There were some interesting persons involved. One was Charles Hitch, who had been our area bombing specialist for Europe, later on was a McNamara whiz kid at Defense, then head of the University of California. I was very careful not to mention that he was the fire-bombing specialist when he was out there in the late Sixties with all the student furor about the war in Vietnam, etc. But he was a great asset, because we found that for Tokyo, which was the main industrial center, street numbers were determined on the basis of when the building was built, not location. So you couldn't go through a catalogue or a telephone book and find out where the factories were. But Hitch had been a Rhodes scholar and then stayed on and taught at Oxford until the war broke out. He had a friend that worked for a London insurance company that specialized in fire insurance in Japan. They had hired bicyclists to go up and down the streets and mark on maps with different colored crayons the type of buildings that there were on the basis of their susceptibility to fire. Factory buildings had a different mark from residences and so forth. So that was of major help in picking targets in Tokyo.
Q: It certainly was.

MARTIN: Another pair that fitted very well, with whom I crossed later, were Phil Coombs and Russell Dorr. Russ was the son of a New York lawyer, Goldie Dorr, who was the chief adviser to Stimson, the Secretary of the Army, and later on Russell was State participant at a reparations agency in Brussels and in the State Department, but then became the representative of Chase Bank in Washington for 25 years or so.

Q: This is Goldthwaite Dorr?

MARTIN: Yes. Coombs was the first Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs, put there by Kennedy. He comes back later into this story.

Q: I think Russell Dorr at one time was the head of the Marshall Plan in Turkey.

MARTIN: I think he may have been, yes. I didn't remember that.

Q: That was when I knew him.

MARTIN: Their specialty had been bombing the railway system in Italy, which runs down the Apinine mountain chain, and Japan has a similar geological structure with the railway system going north and south, with tunnels and so forth. So they made a very good transition.

So I worked more on intelligence in preparing for a landing in Japan and these kinds of questions than on targets. In October I was made deputy to Fahs, in charge of political, as well as economic, work. So I got into other things. We began to start looking at what the European people had done before us in OSS, namely what will be our policies if we beat Japan and occupy it or "occupation policy".

Ed Mason moved over to the State Department on the first of January 1945, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. The Assistant Secretary at that time was Will Clayton, the cotton manufacturer from Texas. On April first, I was loaned half-time to work on economic aspects of Japanese occupation policy in the State Department at the request of Mason. That very quickly became full time as the work at OSS ground down, and we more and more had to get to work on occupation policy. I must say there was a certain shock in moving over there. OSS was in a rented apartment building, on 23rd Street, where security was absolutely tighter than a drum. My first day of working at State was in a building on 17th Street right across from the Executive Office Building, which had been apartments also. We were reviewing drafts of documents on occupation and surrender policy, and at the end of the day, I put them in the file drawer which had a key, which you turned to lock it. I said, "What do we do with the key?" "Oh, we put it up here on this little stand where the fan sits that tries to keep us cool." Hardly an OSS procedure. (Laughs)

Q: Oh, my God! (Laughs)
MARTIN: In May, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew announced that I was the State Advisor on Far Eastern Economic Affairs. Anyway, in August or September 1945, I happened to be in the office of the head of military intelligence. We had been doing a fair amount of work together on occupation policy by then. He was Colonel McCormick, who had been brought down, a top New York lawyer, when Deputy Secretary of the Army, Judge Patterson, decided the intelligence people who had been in the military reserves were professors who had made up their minds about the countries that they knew about, whereas the war had changed things. So he got McCormick to come down, and recruit a couple hundred of able lawyers trained in evaluating evidence. Like at the Civil Service Commission, they had moved the professors off to the side, but they were available to be called on for specific information.

While I was there, he got a phone call and was told that the Japanese had signed the surrender document. He turned to me and said, "It's the only fitting end for MacArthur's career," because, as we both knew, "the Emperor, who in Japan is God, now reported to MacArthur." (Laughs)

During this period, I sat in increasingly on meetings of what was called SWNCC, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, which basically worked on occupation policy. One of the people who attended several of the meetings for the Army intelligence staff was a man who had been in the Burma-India theater on the staff of General Stilwell, named Dean Rusk. It was my first contact with him.

For the first few months of my participation, only the Department of Army officers had much to say. Then the Navy sent their Admiral Dermison. He spoke often and very wisely I thought. He was later in London at the end of the '50s when I was in the Embassy, and still impressive.

In September, with the surrender, State created a Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs, and I became a full-time division chief and recruited a staff.

Q: This is which division?

MARTIN: Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs. We hadn't anticipated occupying Korea, so we had to start from scratch there.

Q: This was in the State Department.

MARTIN: This was in the State Department. In the latter half of 1945 the State Department had to begin to organize itself to deal not only with a wide range of new diplomatic problems as the country moved from an isolationist posture to being the most important player on the world scene but also with the temporary but totally novel problem of running politically and economically Japan and South Korea and major zones of Germany and Austria, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, each having a zone too.
Initially State had an Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs with an office for each region and an Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs with an office for International Trade Policy and one for Financial and Investment Policy. The Political Bureau did not make any organizational changes to handle the occupation programs but the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Will Clayton, set up an Office of Economic Security Policy with a Division for German and Austrian Economic Affairs, one for Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs and a Division for Enemy assets to manage overseas resources of our enemies that had been seized and put under U.S. control. The only change in this structure before 1947 was the creation in 1946 of an Under Secretary for Economic Policy position and an Assistant Secretary for Occupation Policy.

Will Clayton was made the Under Secretary. He was notably a successful cotton textile executive but also an able public official. The new Assistant Secretary was needed to ensure coordination between U.S. economic and political occupation policies, to provide a more direct line of authority from the Secretary to the staff handling day-to-day relations with our occupation staffs overseas, and to provide a better channel of policy guidance to similar staffs who reported to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs.

The first Assistant Secretary was General Hilldring whose background was largely European as that theater was seen as the most important because of the Soviet role. He caused me no problems because he took little interest in my area. He had as his Special Assistant Ernest Gross, a New York lawyer, who was first class and later had important foreign policy roles where we met again, especially at the UN. He had as a Special Assistant Philander Claxton with whom I have had many connections due to his role as a lobbyist for our aid programs and for 25 years as a population expert, now on the Population Crisis Committee Board.

When Clayton moved up, his Deputy, Willard Thorp, became the Assistant Secretary and held that position until 1952, our connections have already been noted. Ed Mason had left in '46 to return to Harvard.

During this period Clayton also had as his Administrative Assistant Arthur Stevens, formerly of the CSB and an usher at our wedding. Also George McGhee became a Special Assistant to Clayton in '46. He was a top officer of State in the Kennedy period. Also on his staff then was Harry Labouisse, a very able officer with a great future career, with whom I was associated several times.

Thorp in '46 had on his staff Ty Woods, made his Deputy in '47, a very able man, as was Thorp, and Jack Reinstein, with whom my path also crossed later several times.

The first head of the Office of Economic Security Policy was another brilliant Harvard professor J. Kenneth Galbraith with whom I had had close relations in the '40-'41 period at the National Defense Advisory Commission and was to do so again in the early Kennedy days. His Deputy was Sy Rubin, an Enemy Assets specialist and top lawyer, later Executive
Director of the American Society of International Law with whom my path crossed several times, personally as well as professionally. Galbraith was succeeded in '46 by Hamilton Robinson, a Princeton professor. He never managed, in my view, to understand what his job was.

The head of the German and Austrian Economic Security Policy Division was from the start Charles Kindleberger, a professor from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with for a while as his Deputy Covey Oliver. I got to know him reasonably well. Later on, he was an ambassador in Colombia, a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania and an Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, appointed to succeed Lincoln Gordon at a time when a newspaper error blocked my appointment which had already been agreed upon by President Johnson in '67. But the newspapers announced it before Johnson did it, and he never tolerated that. So the next day, he called Covey and asked him to take the job, and he did. (Laughs)

His reparations expert was Walt Rostow, a Kennedy period colleague of stature. His political colleague was James Riddleberger, later important in the Marshall Plan operation and in the late '50's head of the aid agency. He was the first Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee and for his last ten years a volunteer with the Population Crisis Committee.

With the setting up of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs, for which I had gotten cleared a statement of our general policies and goals, we now needed a staff to help implement it. It was largely recruited in '45 and early '46 from military officers who were such only until the war was over. Important were Roswell Whitman as my deputy and trade expert from the Navy but with a Ph.D. in economics from Chicago, Robert Barnett, grown up in China, and in '60 our Economic Minister in Tokyo, later Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economics in the East Asia Bureau, Yale degree in Asian studies and husband of Pat who worked with me in OSS, Dean Bowman, an economist also with me in OSS, and Ben Moore, to become the Korea specialist, from the military but a former student at Swarthmore of a State officer who had been a professor then and recommended him. I met another young Navy officer who, in interviewing him, seemed to have lots of ideas. You had to sit on two out of three, but somebody having them is better than one not having them. His name was Henry Owen, who later on was Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff of State and then in the Carter White House was the President's Economic Advisor, a very able fellow. So we had an interesting group of about a dozen or so professionals who went on to various jobs.

My first contact in the Office of Asian Affairs was with an older Japan specialist who felt that the only way to keep Japan from going communist was to restore to full command the Emperor and the dominant economic monopolists who had led Japan in attempting to take over power on the mainland. This I disagreed with totally.
He soon retired and I dealt with a former professor of Japanese history, Hugh Burton, who was able and congenial substantively. His boss whom I saw frequently was a career expert who was head of the East Asia Office, John Carter Vincent. I found him most helpful too.

In early ’48 Whitman became Acting Director of Japan and Korean Affairs and when I moved over in June to become Deputy Director of International Trade Policy, he became Acting Head of the Office with Barnett taking over the Japan and Korean unit. The office had by then only a small staff. In October it was abolished. [for a brief period Ross Whitman, who had been my deputy, served as Acting Director of the Economic occupied area staff.]

One of my first experiences in government with the problem of communism was in 1946 with my secretary. We had by then moved over to the Old Executive Office Building. She reported to a McCarran Committee at the Senate which was investigating leftist movements, that she was sure I was a communist because she heard me on the phone talking about agrarian reform. (Laughs)

Q: My God!

MARTIN: The legal advisor of the State Department was notified. It was then Butch Fisher, who later on was the dean of the law school at Georgetown.

Q: His first name, Adrian, is that right?

MARTIN: Adrian. I believe that's right. It was reported to me that he had decided that she was suffering from some of the psychiatric disturbances of menopause, and she was given six months sick leave. (Laughs)

Q: Agrarian reform.

MARTIN: That's right. In ’46, I got to make my first overseas trip. We had sent, in late ’45, a mission to the Far East to study what might be the way to handle reparations from Japan. It had been headed by Edwin Pauley, who was a California oil man, had been an Under Secretary of Navy, had not been promoted to Secretary [of the Navy] and was kind of disappointed, so he was allowed to work out of the White House as head of this Reparations Mission. They went out, and I wrote one of two protest letters ever to my superiors, because reparations was part of my responsibility in State, and I had been not consulted at all about the composition or the terms of reference of it. He had worked exclusively out of the White House. He was a political figure, and they wanted to impress him, I guess. So that's the way it went. So I had it on record. I think I wrote to [Dean] Acheson, who was then an Assistant Secretary of State.

Then in ’46, he went out again, this time with me, to Japan, Korea, and Manchuria, then dropped me off in Taiwan to look into Japanese leftovers there, and I came back to
Shanghai, then to Japan and then to Washington in a military plane, my first foreign experience, lasting about 6 weeks. I was the senior State person on that mission.

We had some interesting conversations in Tokyo, and I got a real feel for the operation of the MacArthur setup there, I think. I had lunch with a number of his top people but did not meet him. One of the rather surprising incidents was that when we were being briefed by General Willoughby, who was head of intelligence, a long-standing MacArthur colleague, he said that they needed an increase in the disease and unrest appropriation because of serious malnutrition in Japan. I said, well, certainly we could go to the Congress to get that. It was an appropriation spent on health and food programs to try to keep down disturbances to the occupation programs, due to the collapsed economies in Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea. But, I added, we needed to have some evidence of the increased malnutrition. "Oh," he says, "that's very simple. Every month there is a substantial increase in the number of deaths in Tokyo of pedestrians who can't step out of the way of the automobiles fast enough." And I had to keep a straight face! (Laughs)

Q: Wasn't Willoughby his chief of intelligence at one time?

MARTIN: He was then! Yes, he had been for years. The main impression I got out of this visit was the quality of the people was very mixed on the staff there. They were mostly old-timers who were 200-percenters.

Q: What do you mean by 200-percenters?

MARTIN: Protecting MacArthur and boosting his reputation. I knew that in the Joint Chiefs during this occupation period, there was a colonel whose only job was to see that all cables sent to MacArthur from any source were properly respectful.

Q: Before he saw them.

MARTIN: Before they left Washington. This is the Joint Chiefs here in Washington, before they left Washington.

Q: I see. Good God!

MARTIN: His sort of Chief of Staff a few years later made a speech at West Point, which was reported to me, in which he said, "We are converting Japan to Western civilization." And one of the students asked, "What is the evidence?" "The Queen Mother now reads a chapter of the Bible every day." (Laughs) This was the style.

The Pauley reparations mission I was on, was studying what the Soviets had taken, the machinery and equipment they had taken out of Korea and Manchuria during their occupation so if they made a claim for reparations, we could charge this against them. Fortunately, this never came up, but we did have a lot of evidence of railroad cars full of equipment that they had moved out.
But I did find out also how badly neglected South Korea was in the whole occupation picture. I realized only on the mission that they had second priority on everything.

There was a strike while we were there of the port workers in San Francisco, and little or no shipping was coming to Japan so there were very limited quantities of anything available. Food for the military was all being left in Japan and none was being transferred to Korea. We stayed in the officers' mess, and we had practically nothing to eat. This was a pattern overall for MacArthur and his staff; "Japan is all that really counts. South Korea is unimportant." I went back determined to try to do a few things to correct that. I also was very interested in the situation in Taiwan in the few days I spent there visiting a number of possible places of interest for future economic development. The State team was occupying an abandoned and partly fire-burned-out Standard Oil building. Then I spent a couple of days in Shanghai. Again, I found very great isolation of the American community there from anything going on. But we did talk a little about reparations and related matters and the restoration of the Chinese economy.

Q: In that period, did you have dealings with UNRRA, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and Harlan Cleveland, perhaps?

MARTIN: Not with Harlan. I did talk to their staff in Mukden, which was then the name of the capital of Manchuria. We got shot at a couple of times, because there were still some of the communists around who had tried to move in there, and saw us when we visited the major coal mines to find out what the Russians had done there. I met a New Zealand couple who had been talking for UNRRA with the communists who were still in the northern part of Manchuria, and they said, "They give us very precise lists of what they need. From the nationalist government here in Mukden, we can't get anything. They don't know what they're doing, what's happening." Mukden was in terrible shape, because it had been occupied and then abandoned by two or three different groups, the Chinese, the Soviets, the Japanese. They had just taken out everything they could. Every windowsill had been taken for firewood. The place was devastated. The hotel we stayed in, which was a modern hotel, had no running water, no electricity. We ran out of K-rations. (Laughs) It was a pretty desperate situation.

We went down to Chiang Ming Tao, I believe it is, down on the coast, to check on what the Russians might have done there. We found a beautifully equipped oil refinery the Japanese had built with walls around it, and a power station. We had never known about it. It was an ideal bombing target. The Chinese were trying to put it back into shape to refine oil. It was at a port where the oil would come in. The Japanese had not destroyed anything, but had just taken the instructions on how to operate it. So I sent a message to Tokyo: "Please find the instructions and send them over." (Laughs)

Livy [Livingston] Merchant was then the consular officer, in Shanghai. I had a brief chat with him there, and found everyone was confused about our whole relationship with the Chinese at this point. This was June 1946.
Q: You mentioned John Stuart Service. Was this the same John Service that had been in China, who was now back in the economic division, when you were in the economic bureau?

MARTIN: Did I mention Service? No, I didn't mention his name, but he did come back to Washington for brief periods and I met him, but later he was in trouble, on the McCarthy situation. I don't recall his role in the Economic Bureau.

I noted earlier that I had written this letter about the first Pauley reparations mission. The reason was that when, in '53, I was named to the personal rank of Minister to NATO, they had to do a full FBI check and Pauley was interviewed and said that I had been on his first reparations mission and had been responsible for recruiting Owen Lattimore who was, I believe, a communist, as a member of it. So I was able to pull out the letter which I had written at the time, protesting that I had not been consulted and to make the point that I was on the second mission and not on the first.

Q: And had nothing to do with Owen Lattimore.

MARTIN: Nothing to do with Owen Lattimore. It was a wrong recollection by Pauley.

Q: May I ask you about the relationships of yourself and your staff to MacArthur's policies, his policies toward labor, toward industry?

MARTIN: Both about his staff and about other parts of the State Department I should say something, and also the Treasury. There were two or three major issues. One was that the then Secretary of the Treasury, Morgenthau, had wanted a scorched-earth policy in Germany, and there had been a real battle about converting Germany into an agrarian economy. I was concerned about that for Japan because I didn't think that made any sense. What I did--they were not very well staffed on the Japan side--I sent them a draft of occupation policy and gave them three weeks to comment. At the end of three weeks, they didn't comment and they were excluded from then on from any role in policy in Japan.

Our policy called for the breaking up of the zaibatsu, the Japanese monopoly corporations. This was resisted by a group in the State Department who felt that the only way to ensure Japanese cooperation with the U.S. and the West generally and not with the Soviets, was to keep in power the Emperor and the corporate group that had been largely responsible for encouraging the expansionist movement, started in the Thirties, to try to become the leaders, the controllers of all of Asia.

Sometime in 1947 I was asked by the American Institute of Pacific Relations to do a more-or-less 50-page description of the U.S. occupation program in Japan for a conference in England it was holding. I managed to meet their target date by a lot of evening and weekend work. It was submitted, of course, to the required clearance authorities at State.
After the meeting the Institute said they liked my essay and given the importance of the subject, they wanted me to expand it to a short book. This took a lot more work but my academic bent persuaded me to do it though it was a bit hasty job. It was published in 1948 by the Stanford University Press in the U.S. and MacMillan's in the U.K. There was some criticism that it was entirely descriptive with no evaluation of the progress made or comment on mistakes. The problem was that I was not a professor but a government official responsible for the U.S. program and from that position I could only describe what we were doing rather than providing a critique of U.S. policies or Japanese performance, useful as that might have been.

Q: Which led to Pearl Harbor.

MARTIN: Which led to Pearl Harbor.

Q: And everything else.

MARTIN: That's right. I had some real conflicts there with the old-timers in the political side of the State Department.
I recruited a man from the SEC for MacArthur's staff to work on this named Raymond Vernon, who later on was at State and then a very distinguished Harvard Business School professor on international corporations. I also recruited a man from Agriculture, who was a specialist on agrarian reform, who later on worked on it in Taiwan and for the World Bank in India, Wolf Ladejinsky.


MARTIN: That's right. He worked in Korea on this also. So we worked very hard on pushing in this direction and not the other direction. And at one point, the McCarran Committee asked John Carter Vincent, who had succeeded the man that I'd been fighting with as head of the Far East Bureau in the political part of State, whether I wasn't a noted MacArthur hater. And Vincent said, "No, not at all."

I did get the impression from several incidents that if you got an issue past his staff and before MacArthur, you were apt to get a sensible answer.

In about late '47, I think it was, the general consensus among the experts was that you needed a devaluation of the Japanese yen, the currency, to get the economy moving again with exports and imports. The many 200-percenters on MacArthur's staff refused to touch it, because traditionally devaluation reflects a failure of government economic policy.

So what I did was to make contact, I'm not sure how, with a Detroit banker who was president of the American Bankers Association, briefed him, sent him out. MacArthur had to see him. In a few months, we had a devaluation, which probably started Japan on its economic progress.
Q: And the name of the banker, Joe Dodge, right?

MARTIN: Right, who later on was head of the Bureau of the Budget under Eisenhower.

At that time, the political chief for German and Austrian affairs was James Riddleberger, who later on was Marshall Plan political advisor to Harriman in Paris. When I came with the Population Crisis Committee, he had been working here for the last ten years of his life, having known Draper in his German connection, because Draper, who founded this organization, had been economic advisor to Clay in Germany.

Q: Riddleberger also became the Head of ICA at one time.

MARTIN: Yes, that's right, in the late Fifties. We overlapped briefly there, too. You're right. We got along all right.

In mid-‘47, we had the speech in June by Secretary Marshall proposing the Marshall Plan. My opposite number for Germany and Austria was Charles Kindleberger and he was drafted to help Averell Harriman, who was then Secretary of Commerce but had been asked to put flesh on the bones of the Marshall Plan, to work with him on that. I was asked in July to take over as Division Chief, handling occupation economic policy for Germany and Austria as well as Japan and Korea, replacing Kindleberger. My salary then was $10,000, generous for those days. I was also asked to liquidate the Enemy Assets Division and transfer the responsibilities to the Justice Department. It was run by three very able lawyers who have been friends since then. One was Seymour Rubin, already mentioned. The others who were both top-notch lawyers too were Walter Surrey and Sam Efron.

We did work the transfer of the operation satisfactorily, although I got into one very difficult dispute, which was with the French who had had a lot of gold in Indochina which the Japanese had seized. The French wanted it back, and the question was whether we wanted an independent country in Indochina. If we did some said that we should not give it back to the French but to the Indo-Chinese. Acheson had a hard time making up his mind partly because Roosevelt had been a strong anti-colonialist, and it finally went to the French. There was also a Czechoslovak claim for gold that got difficult when we were having trouble with them over their Soviet connections.

Anyway, in terms of Germany and Austria, one of the able people I inherited that I crossed paths with again was Walt Rostow, who was the reparations expert.

I also had working for me Dan Margolies, who was on my staff again when I was Economic Minister in London, then when I came into the Latin American Bureau and I wanted to get some fresh blood in, I made him the desk officer for Venezuela. He did a good job.

Meanwhile in the fall of ’46, Hilldring was replaced by Charles Saltzman, who had been a Wall Street banker. In the late Fifties, he came back as Under Secretary for Administration in the State Department. But he had a rather conservative viewpoint, and I had some
difficulties with his views on things. At one point, I wrote a letter of complaint for treatment he gave to the ideas of Fearey, the political officer I'd been working with on breaking up the big industry monopolies in Japan. I wrote a protest to Dean Acheson, who was then Under Secretary. Saltzman wasn't happy.

Ernie Gross was replaced later by Frank Wisner, who became a CIA official, I believe. Both I found to be very good persons to work with. Phil Claxton stayed on through all these transitions over there.

During the '47-'48 period, having been reduced from being an office to a Division of Occupied Area Economic Affairs because we were winding down, we became part of the Office of International Financial and Development Affairs. The first head of that, though I reported much more to the Assistant Secretary than I did through the economic channels, was Norman Ness, who was a very fine boss. Later on he went to work for Anderson Clayton. He was succeeded by Burke Knapp. I had very close relations with Burke. Later on, he became the executive vice president, the number two man, at the World Bank. When I was working on the Development Assistance Committee at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, we had very close connections with the World Bank. Also as Assistant Secretary Economic, I went to several World Bank consortium meetings and was in touch with Knapp. So he was a very good person to know in keeping in touch with World Bank activities.

During these years, they also brought in Dean Rusk as Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, but later on he was moved up to be a Deputy Under Secretary, dealing primarily with U.N. matters. So I had some contacts with him, and got to know him a little bit then. Of course, he was made Secretary when Kennedy came in.

I got to Europe three times in the first eight months after adding German and Austrian occupation economic policy to my job. My first trip was to London in August for a three-power meeting--Britain, France, U.S.--on the level to be permitted on German coal and steel production. General Clay wanted Germany to get off our backs and be a thriving economy again. The French were deadly opposed to their favorite enemy being revived. The head of our delegation was the ambassador in London, Lewis Douglas, a very able political ambassador. I headed the State Department team for that.

Q: The year is '47?

MARTIN: Yes. We had a great battle over this. We finally got Washington approval for a compromise position with which Clay was very angry, we knew. He wanted all or nothing always. On several occasions I made suggestions to him of a compromise of one sort or another on an issue and was immediately offered his resignation so I could take his place. In this case less than he wanted was the only way to get any progress. Washington agreed and approved our taking such a compromise position. Ambassador Douglas knew Clay's attitude, and that if he announced this as the U.S. position, Clay would probably call an
angry press conference and then fly back to Germany as he had been unhappy enough with our position to start the engines on his plane once before.

Q: Literally?

MARTIN: Literally. We had consecutive translations. When it came time for the U.S. to make their statement, Douglas turned to Clay and said, "I've got to go to the bathroom. Won't you take my place?" So Clay had to read the U.S. position and couldn't duck out of it. One of the most beautiful diplomatic ploys I've ever run across. (Laughs)

Q: That's the kind of anecdote that makes a lot of sense. (Laughs)

MARTIN: Yes. We also had a little disturbing experience because we had a farewell dinner party at the Claridge's Hotel, where you had chicken if you could get any meat at all. London was short of good food still. There were toasts afterwards. The British Air Marshal, who was Clay's opposite number in Germany, gave a toast to the "remarkable success that the U.S. had had at playing its usual role as intermediary between the U.K. and the continental countries like France." It was, to some extent, true, but the last thing you wanted said publicly. He was retired in a month or so for that mistake.

Q: May I ask you about a personality in all of this? Somewhere wasn't Bill Draper involved? Was he on the scene?

MARTIN: He was not on the scene here as I remember it but he was the economic advisor to Clay in Germany, and I came in touch with him then and frequently in later years.

Q: I see.

MARTIN: At the end of this meeting, Ambassador Douglas went to Paris to talk to the French about how the Europeans were going to organize to implement the Marshall Plan, how it was going to be operated. He telephoned from Paris the next morning to say he wanted me to come over and participate in a talk he was going to have early that afternoon with the French Finance Minister and take back to Washington his report on it. Then we would fly back in his plane to London and I could go on home.

The meeting got delayed and we couldn't come back that day, so I borrowed pajamas from Ivan White, Political Counselor at the embassy, and spent the night at his home. (Laughs) It was my first introduction to mainland Europe.

I do have to introduce another subject, in that for some reason that never was clear to me, in the midst of taking over Germany and Austria, in September of ’47 I was asked to chair an intra-departmental group on economic policy toward the Soviet bloc countries, especially the Eastern European ones as we had not yet given up on friendly relations with the Soviets like we had had during the war. We did a report on that after two or three meetings. It
covered mostly shipping and aviation matters but touched on trade too. This was the start of export controls over East-West trade.

How about the four-power meeting in December of ’47? Was that left out?

Q: I don't think that's in here. I think you ought to talk about your relationship with Marshall and the things you did with him, and that will bring that up. And your feelings about Secretary Marshall.

MARTIN: My closest association with Secretary Marshall was in connection with the meeting in London in December of ’47, with the foreign ministers of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the U.S., on occupation policy in Germany. Marshall was head of the U.S. delegation. He had on it, as a Soviet advisor Ambassador [Chip] Bohlen, Jack Hickerson, who was head of the Bureau of European Affairs at that time, and, of course, General Clay. I was there as Acting Chief of the Division of Occupied Area Economic Policy, because German reparations was a major issue between us.

The meeting was, as all of them were at that time, with translations after the person spoke, not simultaneously, and so there wasn't any back-and-forth, give-and-take. The Ministers just went around the table, each one taking a turn, and some of them dozing a little in between.

We were generally, all involved in negotiating the statement that Marshall would say next. Clay resented this very much. As head of the occupation, he drafted the statement that he thought ought to be made on the basis of what had been said, revising it at the last minute on the basis of the translation of the Soviet statement, which was made just before Marshall's. But Marshall let other people make changes, then read the statement that they had agreed to. After a day of this, there was some comment in the corridors about, "Isn't Marshall able to say anything just on his own?", as the other Ministers were extemporaneously making their comments as their turn came.

Then just before the end of the meeting, we were down to the final issue, and Molotov made a very strong statement in opposition to our position. Without waiting for a draft, Marshall made a very strong reply and re-established his reputation.

During this meeting we had a luncheon at the embassy with a group of labor leaders from Parliament. There was a labor government at that time. They got to discussing union matters, and Marshall drew on his experience running an Army camp in Texas where he had to negotiate with the unions who served the military by constructing and maintaining facilities, and how he had managed to work with them successfully, with some good humor and anecdotes. It was a complete difference from what anyone knew about him as Secretary of State, showing his ability to win friends and influence people, which was outstanding.

Of course, as Secretary of State, he took a position he had taken in the Pentagon. There were stories about his refusing a Joint Chief's nomination for a commander of an Army
corps in Europe because he had made an important decision after lunch, when his mind wasn't as fresh as it should have been. So he read one-page memos only, and all important decisions were made in the morning, which, I guess, he knew was the best time for him. A lot wouldn't have gotten done if briefings hadn't been done this way out of fear of the boss.

He did, on one occasion, show a degree of informality, which was useful. It was in the summer with our two kids not in school. Our boy came down with mumps, and a few days later my wife had a temperature of 106 in the evening, and we had a hard time finding a doctor. It was pouring rain. Our doctor was not available; he was out someplace. We got a doctor friend, who came and said, "We've got to take her to the hospital." We put her in his car and we drove, at about midnight, to the George Washington Hospital. The emergency room couldn't quite decide which of three things she had, all of which were serious—mumps encephalitis which is an inflammation of the brain, infantile paralysis, or spinal meningitis.

The next morning at 6:00 o'clock, I had to bring her some clothing and other things that she needed to have, since we had just put her in the car. Then I came back and arranged for the children to be taken care of by a neighbor during the day. I got to the office a little late. About 11:00 o'clock my secretary came in a little frightened to say, "Secretary Marshall is on the phone," which, for a rather junior officer at that time, was most unusual.

He said, "I'm going to see the President at 12:00 o'clock, and I want to complain to him about the tough line the Secretary of Commerce is taking on handling requests for permission to export commodities to the Soviet bloc. I think they're being much too difficult. My belief is that more wars are lost by worrying about the enemy strength than about our own than for any other reason. Can you give me just some notes from which I can talk to the President?" It is an excellent quote from a very wise man.

Knowing I would have to clear any such set of notes with the Bureau of European Affairs person specializing in Soviet Union policies, I dictated something to my secretary on the typewriter, edited it, she retyped it, and I read it to the political expert on Soviet matters over the phone. He made one or two small changes. About a quarter of 12:00 I got a call from Marshall's aide, Carl Humelsine, "Where is it?" I said, "My secretary has left with it." We were in another building then. "She has left and will be there in a minute or two." It was not one of my most relaxed mornings, shall we say. (Laughs)

But he was, in terms of judgment, an outstanding person. He had with him as Under Secretary most of the time, Bob Lovett, for whom I also had great respect, in what few dealings I had with him. So that was a difficult, challenging period.

**Q: What was your overall feeling about General Marshall as a person and leader?**

**MARTIN:** I thought he was the best Secretary of State that I dealt with. We weren't intimate, but I've dealt with a number.
Q: You have dealt with quite a few.

MARTIN: Yes. He was the best, although he had rather unique working habits, but his judgment was just topnotch, at the top level where it ought to be.

Q: I remember. Didn't the Department change all of its typewriters when he became Secretary, to get smaller print?

MARTIN: My favorite story of him is when he was Secretary of Defense in the early Fifties. This has to do with a problem with respect to the Korean War. There had been some controversy about decisions that General MacArthur had made. Truman's practice, I am told, when he had a major decision to make was to call the Cabinet people involved and say, "Unless you persuade me otherwise by tomorrow morning at 10:00 o'clock, I'm going to fire MacArthur unless you persuade me I'm wrong." I gather he expected Marshall to be very opposed to it.

Marshall went back to his office. The report I have, which I think is right, it may have been published somewhere but I got it otherwise, was that Marshall spent the night reading all the cable traffic between the Joint Chiefs and MacArthur, over the Korean War period, and when Truman came into his office the next morning at 8:00 o'clock, he found Marshall there. Truman said, "I suppose you're going to tell me I can't possibly do it."

He said, "No, Mr. President. I've read all the cables. You should have fired the son-of-a-bitch two years ago." (Laughs)

Then in February '48, there was a six-power meeting to which I went as the State Department representative, which negotiated the establishment of the Ruhr Coal and Steel authority. It was the first step toward European integration. We met in the old India House, which had been abandoned a few months before when Britain made India free. It was a cold winter in London, and they hadn't used any of their scarce coal to heat the building. We met in a room with a big fireplace with a wood fire, and once an hour the delegation moved and a new delegation took off their overcoats and sat with their backs to the fireplace. The meeting turned out to be a success after some difficult negotiations.

After the February meeting, Charles Saltzman, the Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas Affairs—with whom I'd had some troubles on reform programs, and who had been the political advisor to the U.S. Occupation Forces in Austria—arranged for us to go to Austria and then Germany to see at first hand U.S. occupation programs there.

We flew there, got in about 8:00 o'clock at night. Since it was the only free evening we had, Saltzman said, "I've got to go to the opera," so we all went to the opera from the airport. (Laughs) Then we stayed in the hotel where the U.S. occupation military leaders stayed, and discussed basically the beginning of peace treaty negotiations, with which there were some very difficult problems with the Soviets. We had a number of meetings with the staff there.
I met an interesting woman who was the top economist on the staff, named Eleanor Dulles, the sister of John Foster Dulles, and also Dr. Arthur Marget, also an economist, who in the Kennedy period was a top AID officer in Central America. The whole setup was rather grandiloquent, it seemed to me. They had taken over big residences and offices to run the occupation from. They had a dinner party for us, to which several stars of the Vienna opera came and sang for us after dinner.

Then we went to Munich and Frankfurt, took Clay's train up to Berlin to talk to the U.S. occupation staff there, and that's where I met General Draper, who was based at Berlin at that time.

I made some comments, in a give-and-take discussion, about changes that might be made in the way we were transferring local authority to Germans that someone told Clay some Germans might have heard. It seemed to me that some of the turning over responsibility at the local level might be moving too fast, in terms of letting the Germans take hold completely of it. This got reported to Clay and he was not happy that I had any doubts about his policies. Anyway, that's about all I can say about that particular trip, one which lasted over a month.

Q: This was late summer of 1947?

MARTIN: The meeting of the four Foreign Ministers was in December of 1947 and the February meeting in 1948. That month I also spoke at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association on a panel on our German policy. In the spring of '48, I was involved in clearing a cable on a Saturday afternoon with Colonel (then) Lemnitzer in Fort McNair as to how the Western European Defense community, which was having a first meeting, could best ask for U.S. military assistance, largely from the standpoint of Congressional support for it.

Q: It's of interest to our project, the quality or the types of people you found in the State Department regular bureaucracy or in the Foreign Service. What did you find in that period?

MARTIN: I would say it was mixed. On the whole, it was fairly good. The economic staff was moderate, I would say, not outstanding, though there were a few very good people, most of whom I have mentioned. The political people I didn't have too many relations with. I did get to know Jimmy Riddleberger who handled political policy for Germany and was first class, and there were one or two others that were good. John Carter Vincent, who did the same for Japan and Korea as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs I had very good relations with and admired too.

Q: That's where I made my mistake of service with John Carter Vincent. Your own status at this time, you were still Civil Service.
MARTIN: I was still Civil Service. I was "Wristonized" only in '55.

In the summer of '48, they decided to abolish the special occupied area program and moved its staff back into the regular structure of the Department. I moved over to the Office of International Trade Policy (ITP) in June as Deputy Director [for a brief period Ross Whitman, who had been my deputy, served as Acting Director of the Economic occupied area staff].

The director was Winthrop Brown, an experienced trade expert, someone I also liked to work with as his deputy as it was a field that did not appeal to me. Win was a very able man both on substance and management. I succeeded him in '57 as Economic Minister in London. He served successively as DCM in India, Ambassador to Laos, and then Ambassador to South Korea. What particularly impressed me was a unique special assistant job he had created. His role was not only to examine all documents that were sent to Brown for his signature to be sure that they conformed to established policy but also to check that, in the light of the problems they dealt with, established policy was the right policy. For most of my brief stay there it was held by an officer superbly qualified for its challenge, Robert Schaetzel, with whom I crossed paths later in Dillon's days.

Also on the staff was another trade expert, John Evans, who became my deputy in London in 1957-59. Also working in ITP at that time was John Leddy, who moved up fairly fast. When I was Assistant Secretary Economic in '60, he was Special Assistant to Doug Dillon, who was the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs at that time. Then when Dillon moved over under Kennedy to become Secretary of the Treasury, Leddy became the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. As both Assistant Secretary Economic and Assistant Secretary for Latin America, I had a good many contacts with Leddy. We both went to a number of the Alliance for Progress meetings and so forth.

In the fall of '48 I went to Paris, the Hague, and London to persuade the governments to agree to participate in and persuade other European governments to join COCOM, the function of which was to establish agreed controls of exports of security significance to the Soviet bloc. It still exists and the U.S. delegation was part of USRO when I was there '53-'57.

I succeeded an outstanding person, Paul Nitze, who moved up to be Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. I had known him in working with the Foreign Economic Administration in my OSS days. One of my favorite stories was based on his report on a visit to West Germany to evaluate the efficiency of the bombings in reducing the output of military equipment. At one point they found an unexpected increase in German production. They concluded that the only explanation was the destruction by our bombers of the buildings in Berlin of the Ministry of War Production. Without its paperwork and controls they could do better. The lesson was to never bomb Moscow if we had to fight the Soviets.

Since I had been involved very much with the military in the occupations area, and knew little about trade policy--and I tried to be careful from then on not to know too much about
it—and Win Brown was a great specialist in it, I handled other things from my new position, usually as alternate for Nitze who preferred not to spend too much of his time on long interdepartmental debates. I represented the Economic Bureau in foreign assistance matters, relations with CIA, and in the implementation of the NATO Treaty, which had just been adopted. I was fairly active on a committee that George Kennan chaired to recommend what organizational arrangements the NATO Treaty required. I also represented it on the East-West Trade Committee that was chaired by a former acquaintance at the War Production Board, now in the Commerce Department, who later on was convicted of having been during the war a Soviet agent and killed in prison in Pennsylvania, William Remington. He took a harder line on trade controls with the Soviets than we at State did. At his request I wrote a letter to this effect before his trial.

In 1948, I had a problem on this issue, in that the Justice Department issued an order that anybody that had ever belonged to a long list of organizations was to be retired from the government immediately.

Q: The Attorney General's list.

MARTIN: Yes. One of the agencies was a cooperative bookstore in the District.

Q: You, too?

MARTIN: Me, too. Really?

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: My escape was that I had been, when I was at the Central Statistical Board, active in setting up the first cooperatives in the District. I had gotten knowledge about this because when I'd worked with the Work Projects Administration, a man named Jacob Goldschmidt, I believe, had done a study of Swedish cooperatives for Harry Hopkins as a possible way to reduce unemployment. Many people got interested in Co-ops. So a group of government employees, including several of us from the CSB, met and around 1936 or '37 set up Konsum, which had a gas station on Virginia Avenue, across from where the Watergate now is, a grocery store up on Wisconsin Avenue in Georgetown and a credit cooperative. I was on the Board of the credit union and edited a small newsletter for the members issued every month or something like that. I wrote an editorial in that newsletter several years later saying that, "The bookshop, of which I have been a member, has had substantial deficits every month, and nobody can find out who pays for them. I recommend that people resign." That comment enabled me to keep my job.

While participating in the Kennan group on follow-up to the NATO Treaty, I got a little bored by lengthy debates about where its organizational headquarters should be between the advocates of a U.S. location because it was our idea and its power would be provided largely by us and those who saw the threat as directed physically at the European members whose will to resist at any cost needed most to be strengthened. Finally, half-facetiously, I
urged that an ideal compromise which would ensure top level attendance at NATO meetings would be Bermuda. (Laughs) It got a little attention but not much.

Q: Too bad. (Laughs)

MARTIN: Too bad, yes, because I spent a lot of time at the NATO headquarters, first in London and then Paris.

During these years I had worked on some of our European problems a good bit like East-West trade and the Marshall Plan. I got into the latter because Germany and Austria were recipients. In the summer of '47, two evenings a week, Willard Thorp, who was then the Assistant Secretary Economic, had brainstorming sessions for two hours on what do we do to implement the Marshall Plan, and I sat in on those.

In the summer of '49, the head of the Bureau of European Affairs at that time, George Perkins, and his deputy Llewellyn Thompson, a career Soviet specialist, decided that they needed an Office of European Regional Affairs (RA), and I was asked to become the head of it. Coming from the "E" Bureau and a civil servant, I had little status with the Foreign Service officers who staffed the rest of the Bureau, and so they arranged to give me a deputy who did have that status, Douglas MacArthur III. We took over some staff from other units in the Europe Bureau that had been working for State on Marshall Plan liaison, on NATO, on military assistance. We also were given the European Affairs aviation and shipping staff and the USIA liaison group. So we had a rather large organization even just to start with but we had to recruit more.

One of my favorite stories about bureaucratic traps was produced when I tried to bring aboard an officer from the State Department Research Bureau who had moved over after a military role in World War II. I offered him what I saw as a reasonable salary which he accepted. However, when I sent his papers to the State personnel office for processing, I was told that he could only be offered a full grade lower salary as his academic training had been in classical languages, not relevant to his job. Apart from the fact that most of the ablest British foreign affairs specialist I got to know had degrees in the classics from Oxford or Cambridge, Robert F. Goheen, then joined the classics department at Princeton, became President of the University and was a highly successful U.S. Ambassador to the important country of India from 1977 to 1980. It was a very narrow approach to personal abilities that State's bureaucracy took. I'll come back to this problem when I get to the late '60's. That was an extremely challenging assignment, but with very good support from above.

From then on, I was spending a lot of time in Europe. Initially NATO headquarters were in London and I made several trips to meetings there. On my way back to Washington I made a note that during the three day meeting I was never in my hotel after 8:00 AM or before midnight. At the end of the meeting I had to draft a report from Acheson to President Truman and clear it with Assistant Secretary George Perkins after midnight. But in '51 at a ministerial meeting in London they were moved to Paris and I was going there several
times a year. I usually stayed at a small hotel on the Rue St. Honore called the St. James and Albany. Most of the staff spoke English so it had many English customers.

Doug MacArthur moved to Paris early in '51. I had used him because of his military connections through his uncle, General MacArthur, to help negotiate with Defense and the JCS the organization of the NATO military establishment in Europe, which was done by the establishment of the Supreme Allied Command based in Paris in early '51. Eisenhower was made the first Supreme Commander, and MacArthur went over as his political advisor. He had been, before he came with me, the Director of Western European Affairs in the Office of European Affairs [at that time, instead of assistant secretaries, the regional setups were just Offices, headed by an Office Director].

When MacArthur left, J. Graham Parsons came over to be my deputy. As advisor on NATO affairs we had Ridgway Knight. He succeeded MacArthur as the political advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander and was there when I was at USRO. The top economic person was Miriam Camp, whom I had known when I worked in the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Then she was in State, working on the Marshall Plan with a small team headed by Harry Labouisse, and was moved into the regional bureau then. Because of the Marshall Plan being a European operation, we had meetings of all the economic counselors and Marshall Plan mission chiefs of the European countries that were participants, to discuss, in a very informal way, our problems and what had worked and what hadn't worked. She and I went over to a couple of those, one in London and one in Paris, as I recall it.

Because of my frequent going over on NATO matters, one of my practices that I think was useful was to fly over—it was not an easy flight, with two or three stops in those days—but to take the boat back. The principle of that was that I was usually pretty exhausted by what I had been doing in Europe, and also it enabled me to collect my thoughts, what were the lessons I had learned, the actions that I ought to be taking.

One of my most strenuous visits was in January 1952 on a boat taking General William Draper to Paris to become Ambassador to NATO and Chief of USRO. We had had over two weeks of 3-a-day briefing sessions and he suggested the boat trip to rest a bit. For him that meant meetings all day to 2:00 o'clock but some after dinner. I stayed a week in Paris to be sure he got well settled in. In February I joined him in a NATO Ministerial meeting in Lisbon at which the report of the three Wise Men was approved and an annual review of countries' military programs and needs was launched.

Q: To go back to your position at that point, the Office of European Regional Affairs, at that point you said you had people that you coordinated that were not only in your own office, but from other agencies, from information staffs?

MARTIN: No, not really. It was just that the EUR staffs on information (USIA), aviation, and shipping policies were members of my staff as they covered the European region, not individual countries.
Q: I see.

MARTIN: I may say, after a couple of years I felt that they were more trouble than they were worth, and it was better to have them report directly to the assistant secretary. They didn't really relate usefully to the work that we had to concentrate on of NATO and Marshall Plan aid backstopping.

Q: What I was trying to get at and maybe we discussed this before. Was this a forerunner to your LAPC?

MARTIN: No, it was not. There was no committee arrangement involving other agencies at all, no.

To review my relations with the Marshall Plan people in this 1949-51 period, we had some difficult problems. One was that Dick Bissell was a very bright, very energetic, but very hard-nosed, hard-driving individual, who did not easily tolerate suggestions by others. He was very deeply committed to the European integration movement. He wanted to cut off aid from any country that didn't participate actively in pushing it. I resisted that strongly and successfully, because I felt that while close economic cooperation among the countries in many ways would be desirable, to talk about forcing the European countries, with different languages, different histories, different political structures, different economies, into an immediate "United States" by threatening their economic future by canceling Marshall Plan aid, was ridiculous and would hurt U.S. interests in many ways. So we had a lot of conflicts over that.

Secondly, I don't know quite how to put it, but the effort that we made to get political cooperation in the NATO framework sometimes became difficult because of the in-fighting between the U.S. and the other NATO countries on economic issues. The Washington Marshall Plan people tried to dictate all the answers in great detail, with no discretion for the field missions or even the countries receiving aid. There was a lot of conflict within the U.S. government on this.

One of the things we did in Washington which I thought was a most useful device that I helped to organize with Paul Nitze, was to use his membership in the Metropolitan Club for Thursday luncheons. No agenda, but just luncheons. We had 8-12 people from the Marshall Plan operation, from State concerned both with it and NATO, and from Defense handling military assistance. "Jeeb" [Najeeb] Halaby was one of the people who used to come as did Bissell sometimes. For an hour or so we discussed frankly key issues which were currently worrying us.

Q: Halaby was then at Defense?

MARTIN: Yes. He handled military assistance. There was a fellow who had been at Defense, then at the Marshall Plan, who was a very able guy, who helped a lot with all of this integration business, and whom I have encouraged to write about this. He has been working recently on Defense Department history projects. His name is John Ohly [he died...
after this interview took place]. He was very able and a very good intermediary on all of this.

This was a very difficult situation in some ways.

Q: This informal luncheon on Thursdays...

MARTIN: Solved lots of problems. It was a pattern that I've tried to follow in other situations, informal coordination. It, in some sense, was much more informal but performed a function like the LAPC did in ARA. Remind me to mention what I did as chairman of DAC in '68. (Tidewater meetings)

Q: Also, your experience as the regional man, you had that kind of cooperation and carried it over to the LAPC.

MARTIN: Yes. One of the people that I enjoyed working with and became a close friend for many years was Henry Labouisse, who, when I was head of RA, was the U.K. and British Commonwealth office director. Then he was in Paris as the Chief of the Marshall Plan mission and economic minister when I was at USRO.

After discussing it with him, in June of 1952 I went to Ottawa to discuss with the Canadian government the future relations of the U.S. and Canadians with the OECD, still limited to Europeans.

Let me mention one other operation of coordination started at this time, State appointed a Special Assistant to the Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs. His job was to ensure that our aid programs including Marshall Plan programs, the relatively new Point-4 Technical Assistance Organization, military assistance, and one or two smaller efforts were operated in accordance with U.S. foreign policy objectives as determined by the State Department under the leadership of the President and in accordance with the requirements set by the Congress in appropriating the money used. It also, however, helped with the selling of our ideas to the Congress. At first he was to report to the Under Secretary (U), but somebody read out loud the official initials. He was Coordinator of Foreign Assistance, and if it's "U", it's UCFA. So after the first occupant left, they made him report formally to the Secretary, but he still reported on a day-to-day basis to the Under Secretary. (Laughs) So it was SCFA. He did, however, attend all of the Secretary's staff meetings.

Anyway, that was a useful operation, and I worked very closely with it. Tom Cabot, a Boston business man, was head of it in about '51-'52 (he's written a book about his experiences). He had an officer for each regional bureau on his staff, but since I was handling all these things for EUR, he made me his regional man, working very closely with his staff. [As examples of the range of RA responsibilities, in December '49 I wrote a statement describing our "Mutual Defense Assistance Program" that Secretary Acheson read at a press conference.] It was a very effective operation in my judgment. Tom was a Boston Cabot in the carbon black business, Cabot Corporation. He'd also been president of
United Fruit, on which we later had some discussions when the United Fruit got into trouble in Latin America with anti-U.S. investment activities. But he didn't stay too long at the top in either of those business positions. He had outside interests, including a 50-foot yacht that he had at Annapolis, and would take his friends--including us once or twice--on it for weekends. He was a skier, a canoer. Also, in the later Fifties, he financed the Supreme Court case which partially reversed the position on population and abortion issues in the United States, and continued to have a very active interest in that field. He says that he was the man who persuaded Bill Draper when he was heading up the commission for Eisenhower on military assistance to include something on the population question.

Q: That's interesting.

MARTIN: He is a contributor to the organization where I am now, the Population Crisis Committee, and I see him from time to time. He's in his eighties but still going on week long canoe trips and skiing and so forth. He's a remarkable individual in that respect.

Then in '52, the SCFA job was open and I was asked to take it. I told George Perkins I was very interested in what I was doing, and I wasn't particularly interested in moving. But he said, "No, you ought to do it. It has a broader scope, and you're needed there." So I did in May. But I did continue to represent the U.S. in the NATO annual review. I did have a much broader scope there for a relatively short period of time before there was a change after the '52 election.

I still remember a comment Acheson made at one of the last of his staff meetings. He reported that State had cleared for publication a book by a former publisher who had been a political Ambassador in three countries and always a fairly open womanizer and said it had a highly appropriate title, "Lying in State."

I would want to mention that we had a staff of about 14 or 15 professionals reviewing the various aid programs, and we had a major input on the Point Four program, because as newcomers they just didn't know much about how to deal with the Congress. I did some testifying for them, and also taught them a few things about how to prepare for Congressional hearings. They were still being very slow about that.

The change came--and maybe this is a place to sort of tie this one up--with the change in administration, because though I did report to the Under Secretary, I went to all of Acheson's staff meetings.

Q: The Under Secretary at the time was James Webb?

MARTIN: No, it was David Bruce. I did not work with Webb.

Q: Webb had gone by then.
MARTIN: I think so. Bruce was wonderful to work with. I had known him, of course, in other capacities.

I was reporting after the election which made Dulles Secretary of State to "Bedell" Smith, who had been Eisenhower's chief of staff during the war. Bedell took a negative view of anybody who had worked for Democrat Acheson—the kiss of death. George Perkins, who was a great Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, was fired and told he could never have a job again. He had had his first job out of Princeton, working for Coolidge's postmaster general. He was a loyal Republican and contributor and so forth. I learned my problem at a small meeting Smith called to discuss staffing Dulles. Paul Nitze made a suggestion—he was then head of the Policy Planning staff—and Smith turned to Paul and said, "I know more in my little finger about staffing than you'll ever learn, Paul Nitze." (Laughs) I thought this was no place for me, and maybe it was time to get some overseas experience. Paul left soon too.

I had had a few contacts, not a lot, with one of the most respected Foreign Service officers, Doc Matthews, who was then the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I went to him with my problem. He sympathized with it, and I think within a week or so, he said, "We're having a new political ambassador succeeding Draper." Draper was probably a Republican, too, but of course he was out.

Q: Of course he was. Bill was a good Republican. Also, Draper had done the Draper Report. Or was that a little later? That got him in Dutch with the Eisenhower Administration. He had recommended something about population. That comes later.

MARTIN: That comes much later. I was involved in that, too. That was '58, the Draper Report.

He said, "He's going to need a deputy. The deputy has been Livingston Merchant." Livy was Draper's deputy, I think, all through his period as head of USRO. He had a general who was also a deputy with an ambassador title, who was maybe his official deputy. But Livy was also a deputy and head of the political division, so there were three ambassador titles at the top there.

"You can succeed Livy Merchant" who is coming back to be Assistant Secretary for Europe. That's the way I went to my first overseas assignment as the sole Deputy to John Chamber Hughes, who was a textile broker in New York. His wife was wealthy, and she was interested in international affairs. They entertained UN officials a lot. He had been a major on Pershing's staff in charge of social affairs, and when Pershing was in Paris, he had been there and had gotten to know a lot of top French people. From '22 on, he and his wife had spent a month of the summer at the Ritz in Paris. That was his background.

Q: Ah! Place Vendome.
MARTIN: My only instruction from Dulles that I remember was that, "Draper has built the staff to 800. You must cut it to 400 in six months." (Laughs) But my experience with Draper had been, on the whole, good, except he was a workaholic. As the head of the State Department backstopping officer I had to attend all of his two weeks of briefing meetings, nearly always 12-14 hours a day. He went by boat to Paris to "rest up a bit" which meant that we didn't meet after a late dinner. The Paris staff met us at Cherbourg to brief him on the train to Paris and I had to stay a week longer to help break him in.

His immediate reaction to most things was to grab for the phone. Merchant told me that his main job was to say "no." There were just a lot of subjects that you need to spend some time on or not act on, but Draper was reaching for the phone. The other problem was that he would go to a country and talk to the foreign Minister, and not tell the U.S. ambassador either that he was doing it or report what had happened. That was his tendency, and Livy had to fight that all the time.

When the NATO annual review committee was started, he wanted to sit for the U.S. This was just totally out of proportion to who from other countries was participating. In the first year, we were working day and night to get this thing launched, and we were meeting after dinner for three or four hours. Several times, Draper arrived in a tuxedo from a dinner party, to sit in the third row behind me, to see if he could be of any help. (Laughs)

He was a fascinating individual, highly intelligent, smart, but organizationally a little difficult. He had had in Paris a policy planning staff, he had had a CIA unit, he had a USIA unit. Of course, he had a defense division, a Marshall Plan division, and a political division. The defense division was headed by a major general or something like that. It was quite an operation that we had of 800 people scattered all over Paris. That was the job, to break that down.

Continuation of interview: April 13, 1988

MARTIN: I have covered the transition to the position as Deputy Chief of USRO, and Minister to NATO, and how Doc Matthews arranged that for me, working with John Chambers Hughes.

Q: Yes, you did. We have a little fade, talking about the country reviews that were made by the Marshall Plan. Then I believe you were instrumental in making similar country reviews for support of NATO. Then Draper. You got off at Cherbourg. That whole period is out.

MARTIN: What happened was, when I was head of the Office of European Regional Affairs, NATO was just getting under way. We were building up the military strength and really concentrating on U.S.-NATO military cooperation. We had had just a modest operation in London, at which our ambassador was Chuck Spofford, and his number two was Ted Achilles.
They decided that the demands that the individual countries were making for military budgets, to meet the NATO program that had been outlined to meet the Soviet threat, were way beyond what the Treasuries could afford. The question became one of matching our Marshall Plan aid, our military assistance aid, and their own resources with these demands that the military were making.

So they set up a NATO Wise Men's Exercise, it was called, with Jean Monnet, a very distinguished Frenchman, the great leader of the European integration movement, Sir Edwin Plowden of Britain, and Averell Harriman of the U.S.--the three Wise Men--to study this problem. Lincoln Gordon, having been his program officer in Paris with the Marshall Plan, was chosen as Harriman's deputy on this operation. I was, in my position logically, his State Department advisor. We all went over in a Presidential plane to the first meeting. My wife got her first trip to Europe, I having been there a half a dozen times by now, on the plane. Averell took his wife, too.

The end result was a recommendation at what was a major NATO ministerial meeting in Lisbon in February '52. It was a difficult one, because Lisbon is built for hot weather, and they had an unusually cold spell in February at this meeting, and we wore overcoats often to the meetings. Harriman and Gordon and I were on the delegation there, as well as Ridge [Ridgway] Knight, who was my NATO staff specialist, who later on was Ambassador to Portugal. It was agreed to evaluate each country's programs through a country review process similar to that which the Marshall Plan had followed, and in which Gordon and Harriman had, of course, been involved as the U.S. representatives at the OECD, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

This meant that once a year, each country would have to submit, in effect, its military budget, what it planned to do with the money, what forces it could create, and it would be reviewed by the NATO staff and by the NATO military which had a special staff set up to review them, under the Supreme Allied Commander. There were representatives from the other commands, the London and the Norfolk command, also working on this. Then the country being examined would send its top defense officials to Paris and there would be a lengthy discussion of the comments of the NATO staff, the NATO military, and the other NATO countries with the country team defending its programs and its need for more U.S. aid, all working as the NATO Annual Review Committee.

This was a rather long, drawn-out, and vigorous process. It helped the U.S. to share the responsibility for decision making, an objective of it in the Marshall Plan, because other countries were participating, although, in fact, the capacity of most of the others to evaluate each other's programs or what the Russian threat was that we had to meet was limited. It became pretty much a staff exercise and a U.S. exercise in terms of substantive contributions.

For one reason or another, I got drafted into being the U.S. representative at these meetings, which were held several times a year, not just all at once, as I recall it. I think I have mentioned that [William] Draper became our ambassador to NATO and head of the new
organization in Paris in January '52, which had pulled together the delegation to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as the NATO delegation, COCOM, the East-West Trade Operation. They had some public relations activity, too, in the European context. Sooner or later, they got into the European community issue, although not so much right away, Ambassador David Bruce having stayed on in Paris as Ambassador for European Integration Movement relations.

Draper at first wanted me to just sit in the back and he would be our spokesman at the Annual Review. Merchant persuaded him that he ought to be an appeals court and I should sit as the representative at the table. He not only wanted to be an appeals court, he wanted to be able to help if he could in the process. So after dinner parties at 10:00 at night, Draper would come in and sit in the third row behind me, available for consultation in case of a crisis. He was a true workaholic. I worked very closely with several military people, who sat right behind me, on these issues. This led me to make 4 or 5 trips a year to Paris.

One of the most interesting anecdotes from the reviews was that in Turkey, the per capita costs of a conscript soldier, including his pay, were less than the per capita cost of each horse in their cavalry. (Laughs) After you allowed for feeding and so forth. They would train people to drive and maintain trucks, but they couldn't keep them, because the minute their conscript service was over, they got much better jobs in the private sector, because truck drivers were scarce in Turkey. There were a lot of little problems of one sort and another that came up that we had to wrestle with, to get an efficient force, as well as just people there.

Of course, one of the other factors that was difficult for us to take fully into account was that the U.S. did not have a conscript force, like they had. Therefore, we had to spend a lot more to keep our soldiers in line and on board than they did.

Another major effort we made was to develop a common military production program. "Jeeb" Halaby, who was the backstopper in Defense on military assistance, was arguing for a triple-duty dollar program. In other words, for us to invest our money in building up production there, which would give them foreign exchange. In not having to provide the equipment, because they were producing it themselves, and not having to maintain the equipment, because producing it, they could maintain it, that would save us lots of dollars both in aid and military assistance. We set up a NATO Military and Supply Board but the European countries just didn't trust each other's production, and they never were able to develop a standardized European-wide production program. No country wanted to put its companies out of business and rely on a common source. So we never made any real progress with that. We had actually started working at it a little bit in London days, but it never got off the ground.

A few other things about this whole USRO operation. There was a major defense component, usually headed by a military man, working on military assistance, defense planning and so forth.
On the NATO staff dealing with this and other issues, I admired especially Captain Coleridge, a former U.K. naval officer who became a baron by the death of his father, which presented the problem of whether to address him as Lord Captain Coleridge or Captain the Lord Coleridge. He was of the Samuel Taylor Coleridge family. I learned later that the lordship was not given to the literary ancestor, but to his brother, who was a chief justice of their equivalent of our Supreme Court back in the 1850's. Of course, for a good part of the period, the Secretary General was Lord Ismay, better known as "Pug" Ismay, who also was a British military man and had an important contribution to make from that standpoint.

Q: And you dealt with Lord Ismay?

MARTIN: Oh, yes, very closely on all these matters. He chaired the meetings of the council.

Q: What sort of a person was he?

MARTIN: Sort of simple and easy and down-homey, but intelligent and a good consolidator of conflicting views, which was one of his tasks. I think he was a very good operator, and he published a book afterwards on his experiences.

Q: He was Churchill's right-hand man all through the war.

MARTIN: He was. That's right. My U.S. military advisor was a General--Brigadier General then--Robert Woods, who later on was back here handling military assistance programs, and a very competent officer, too, with whom it was easy to work.

At USRO, I had another association with Lincoln Gordon. In the mid-Fifties, NATO discussed the question of whether they could coordinate not only our Soviet policies, but the global policies of its members, which was an ambitious idea. Gordon was hired by NATO to make a study and talk to various governments and so forth. At the end he spent two or three weeks in Paris. He stayed with us then, with a personal request that was a little unusual, but we found in Paris you can rent anything. He was at that time getting very much interested in music and learning to play the cello, and we had to rent a cello for him. We managed to be able to do that.

But the conclusion that he reached, and we all reached, was that this was over ambitious and that you could not expect the people selected as NATO ambassadors to be acceptable spokesmen on global issues for Asia and Africa and Latin America, issues which were perhaps dividing the countries. It was too large an order to expect that to be possible.

We had a major economic staff working on the Marshall Plan, and the economic implications of the military programs, usually staffed out of Marshall Plan funds. And in that connection, I had a fair number of contacts with a former Governor of Minnesota and President of the University of Pennsylvania named Harold Stassen who became head of the
Washington staff of the Marshall Plan under Eisenhower, whom I found full of talk and no substance or action. He was a very disappointing person, as far as I was concerned. I also had some trouble with him. He, on what was totally inadequate information, fired one of our able people, who was sort of secretary of USRO, in terms of keeping the whole thing together, paper-wise and staff-wise, communication-wise, on the grounds that he had had some Communist connections or something that made him suspect.

**Q: Do you remember who?**

MARTIN: Yes, I do, and he almost immediately got a job with the Esso Oil in Venezuela, and then for many years was head of Aspen Institute. His name was Joe Slater, a very successful guy that I still see at meetings. But we lost him because of Stassen's foolishness, because he couldn't prove anything at all.

Our backstopper in State in the RA job I had held was Ben Moore, who had worked for me in the Japanese and Korean Economic Division. He was asked to resign because of some charges that were related to an investigation that had just been made of what was felt to be a small clique of Communist friends in the military intelligence service. I got involved in that one, but my answer was, fortunately, that he had been hired for State by a former professor of his at Swarthmore named Claire Wilcox, who was head of the Office of International Trade Policy. And when he arrived, Wilcox had had a budget cut, and didn't have a job for him, and he asked me if I had one, knowing I was organizing the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs, and I did. He had had, I believe, the economic minister's job in London, succeeding Linc Gordon, and was succeeded by Win Brown, and I succeeded Win Brown. So a string of friends were in a row there.

**Q: You went to London from Paris later?**

MARTIN: Yes, later. That's right. Not there yet.

**Q: May I ask you a question about the staff on the NATO side? Interviewing Linc Gordon for the Marshall Plan, he was profuse in his praise on the job done on the economic side by Robert Marjolin. Was there anyone on the military side like Marjolin? How well was the military side then, as compared to the economic side?**

MARTIN: Marjolin was basically Marshall Plan. By the time I got there, he was teaching, I believe, in the law school where all of the University of Paris Economics faculty worked. He had left. I knew him reasonably well, and his wife, whom he met at the Federal Reserve Board cafeteria in Washington. But on the military side, my view of the Supreme Allied Commander, which I want to talk about a bit, Al Gruenther, was that he was superb, just topnotch. He had a personal aide who was equally good, Colonel Andy Goodpaster, who, later on, was one of his successors. This was a very good relationship. Most of the time, Ridge Knight was his political advisor. Also able was the chap who succeeded him and then was ambassador to Italy, George Frederick Reinhardt.
I got to know Gruenther very well, because he was a tennis player and so was I, and he had a Sunday morning tennis club and a court at the place where he lived. So Peggy went to church, and I played tennis, when the weather was good. Then he left, to be succeeded by Lauris Norstad, who was the best Air Force man, in terms of a broad political sense, I’ve ever run across. I asked Gruenther what his transition instructions were, and he said, "You can't practice chip shots on the tennis court." (Laughs) That's the only thing he said.

Q: Norstad was a golfer.

MARTIN: Yes. I should add that there was a NATO Committee of Defense Ministers and under it a Standing Group of the top military officers of the U.S., U.K. and France which met frequently.

Q: I'm still not clear about the organization. What was your relation to the Marshall Plan then, when you were in Paris?

MARTIN: It was beginning to phase out by '53, but there were still aid programs, and we did have a substantial staff in USRO that was working on the aid programs, and with the OECD which was an active organization for leadership and coordination of the program. Then we had a substantial defense staff that was working on defense aid programs. But they did not replace Draper's two ambassadors under the overall ambassador. They just had me as a deputy with the personal rank of minister. I was also, for the first two years, head of the political section. Then when George Perkins replaced Hughes in '55, he thought we ought to have somebody else head of the Political Section, so I could give more time to being his Deputy. Fritz Nolting was brought in as head of the Political Section with hopes he could succeed me as Deputy when my 4 years were up and he did do so.

I think the working relationships everywhere there in this period were quite good. Two of the young people I had on the political staff were, as I mentioned before, Bob Fearey and Bob Miller, whom we've been close with ever since. Miller later on became ambassador to Malaysia--we stayed with them when visiting there--and ambassador to the Ivory Coast, and Deputy Chief of the Office of Management at the State Department, and now is vice president of the National Defense Colleges. There were some really able people there working with us.

I did want to mention a couple of incidents. One of the most important things that I think needs correction is the situation at the time of the Suez crisis. This was '56. Dulles made some unfortunate comments about the British and the French for their intervention in the UAR-Israel war. It was a mistake, what they did, but he publicly denounced them in rather unfortunate language. It was a press hurrah. The general press comment was, "Is NATO collapsing?" From the way the three countries were talking to each other, you might have thought so.

But in that period, we did three things. One, we had two or three times a week what are called informal meetings, of which there are no minutes, to talk about the Soviet invasion
of Hungary and what our reaction should be. We agreed in that period for the first time on how nuclear missiles could be launched, what the instruction channel was for NATO to launch them, a fairly important subject.

Q: Fairly.

MARTIN: Finally we agreed on a much enlarged--I think to $3 billion--infrastructure program, building NATO airfields, NATO communications systems and networks, that sort of thing. So in terms of concrete results, NATO had never been working together at its level more smoothly and effectively.

A second point that I want to make is that in this period, about this time, the French finally rejected the idea of a European Defense Community. This incensed Dulles, who had been since the middle Forties a great protagonist of European unity, before he ever got operationally involved in international affairs, really. There was about to be a NATO ministerial meeting, which we had two times a year, but this was the big and long one, the December one. I was called back to Washington to work on the speech he was to make there, and met for several hours with him on a Saturday afternoon at his office, and for several hours in his home on Sunday. Each time he took a book from his bookshelf to get a quote to use to persuade the French they should change their minds or else it was a disaster, and the quote was from the same book, The Federalist. The idea that the uniting of the 13 colonies, described in 1788 in The Federalist, was comparable to the unification of the independent countries of Europe, struck me as a total lack of reality.

I have one other Dulles story which reflects the same lack of reality. When he first arrived, I was still a special assistant to the Secretary, so I sat in on the staff meetings until moving to Paris. Dulles told an early staff meeting that he expected to have his major office in the White House, as his major responsibility was to advise the President. He might keep a small office at State, which he might come to once or twice a week. But his job was advising the President, and therefore, running the State Department he would have nothing to do with. That also was total unreality, in my judgment.

I was asked to comment on one other proposal of his, which was the proposal to create CENTO, the Middle East copy of NATO. I forget now who asked me. I think it may have been "Doc" Matthews. I took the position that to think it would ever be possible for the CENTO countries to mobilize sufficient military strength on the Iranian-Soviet border to stop the Soviets from an invasion was ridiculous, particularly because there was no way you could get Turkish military units across the mountains in Eastern Turkey into the Iran border in time.

Second, the other principal defense against the Soviets was to be what I called--and I think some others did--a Maginot Line of fortifications along the Turkish-Iranian border so they couldn't go beyond Iran if they did succeed in getting there. It was an obsolete concept militarily but also I thought that the cultural differences between the countries made
collaboration of the sort that NATO achieved highly unlikely. My impression is that I was more right than he was. (Laughs)

Q: CENTO didn't last very long.

MARTIN: No, it didn't.

I have one other story to tell. One of the most important things that happened at NATO while we were there was the admission of West Germany. This was very difficult to sell the French, and took a lot of work. But basically, the purpose, I think, on the U.S. side, was twofold. One, European unity. If you want to do it on the economic side, you have to have West Germany. And two, to prevent the reunification of Germany, something that many Germans would make a hard drive to do. The Germans would like to be together, but if you tied them into NATO, that would be stopped. So we did get that through at a meeting of the U.S., U.K., and France in London in October 1954, at which I played a considerable role.

Just after it got through, Ridge Knight and I spent a lovely Easter weekend, I believe it was, in Bonn, briefing David Bruce, who had arrived just a few weeks before as the Ambassador, on the implications of NATO membership, what he should be trying to persuade the Germans to do. So we spent it walking in the garden behind the residence there, having a very nice time briefings him. At our meals, Ridge was briefing him on what the good German wines were. Ridge had been the vice president of a wine company before the war, in the late Thirties, had been raised partly in France, was one of the people who could smell the cork and tell you what year it was. So he advised him on what German wines to buy. It worked, I think, very well, on the whole.

There are two amusing stories that I'd like to mention here. One, the difficulty Americans have understanding the French is considerable. During the period of the Suez crisis, the French attitude was exemplified by a story I heard from a wealthy American woman who had lived in Paris for 15 years, thought she was more French than the French. They wouldn't deliver her a newspaper; if she got in a cab, and the driver found she was an American, he'd force her to get out. They wouldn't deliver coal. She got her best French friend and said, "What is this? I'm more French than the French. Why are they treating me this way?"

"Ah," she said, "you must understand. We French think the English are tradesmen, the Italians are wops, the Germans are Huns, the Spanish are beneath contempt. We don't even like each other. Why should we love Americans?"

My second story is that shortly after the Germans were admitted to NATO, Ambassador Hughes had one of his luncheon parties, which he had many of and beautifully. My main problem was conveying what he learned from his French friends at these social affairs to the U.S. embassy, because he had lots of them and learned quite a bit. I sat next to an American woman who had lived there a long time, and was wealthy. She had, on her right, the just-arrived German General who was commander of European ground forces based in
Fontainebleau, to show that they were really integrated. After the luncheon, she said, "I can never remember names unless I can see them. What is on your card?" So she read it, and then turned to the person on her right, "Oh, he took his card. Who was he?" I told her who he was. She said she had been telling him about a trip she was about to make to visit the antiquities of Egypt, and she had asked him--I had heard her do this--did he know Egypt. His reply, very quickly and quietly she said, was, "Only from the maps." He had been Rommel's Chief of Staff when Rommel was preparing to invade Egypt and never got there. (Laughs) Just very blandly, "Only from the maps."

Q: Speaking of Americans in Paris, when you were there, did you ever know an Ambrose Chambers, "Brose" Chambers?

MARTIN: Yes. He was one of the people I had to fire when I was cutting the staff from 800 to 400, and many of them took it unkindly.

Q: "Brose" was a very good friend of Averell Harriman.

MARTIN: Was he?

Q: Yes, a charming man. Did you ever go to his home?

MARTIN: I don't remember it.

Q: He was in Cole Porter's home.

MARTIN: Yes, I do remember that. I think I was there.

Q: He was Cole Porter's lawyer. When the war was over, Cole never wanted to go back to Paris, and he said, "Please sell my home." So "Brose" said, "Well, I'll buy it," and bought it for $50,000, a beautiful house with a garden and gold bathroom fixtures.

MARTIN: Yes, I think I do remember that. We had a lovely apartment bought with Marshall Plan local currency at 89 Avenue Kleber, a lovely location, and four or five bedrooms, staff rooms up above on the top floor, and we could give a cocktail party for a couple hundred people, seat 40 people in the dining room. It was very luxurious.

Q: Where was your office located then, in the Trocadero?

MARTIN: The office was in the Talleyrand, looking out over the Place de la Concorde. But NATO was quartered then in the old temporary UN buildings right at the Place de la Trocadero, just half a block away from our apartment, and that was where the meetings were.

Q: I may have misled you when I said Trocadero.
MARTIN: Yes, overlooking the Eiffel Tower, right there in sort of temporary buildings. We did decide, before I left, to build a building for ourselves. Security was not easy to maintain there.

I'll just mention one other thing, I haven't reported, I believe. When I had to have a full FBI clearance for getting the personal rank of Minister as Deputy to Ambassador Hughes and Minister to NATO as noted earlier, they checked out the book I had written in 1948 on The Allied Occupation of Japan.

Well, because it had been published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, they were suspicious, as it was thought by some to be a pro-Communist organization, and they said, "Secretary Dulles will have to read it and then agree that you may have the title of Minister."

Time went on and time went on, without Dulles finding time to read the book. Herman Pollack was the Administrative Officer for the Bureau of European Affairs and was responsible for personnel actions. He suggested that I just give up having the personal rank of Minister, and I said, "No thank you, I will not." It wasn't until '55, after two years in Paris and several years in Washington, handling top-secret NATO military matters, that I got word that he had approved it.

Q: You had to wait how long?

MARTIN: Two years. Two years in the job. Also, in '55, I was Wristonized and became a Foreign Service officer. At that time, I had been a Class I reserve officer in Paris, and came into the Foreign Service as a Class I officer. So that legitimatized things.

I want to say some things about George Perkins. He was not kept on, as I think I have already said, even though he was a strong Republican, because he had worked for Acheson. But after two years, they agreed to give him a job and sent him to Paris to succeed Hughes. In my mind, he was a first-class "professional." He had been a Marshall Plan mission chief in The Netherlands, I believe, before he became Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. He was a major asset to us throughout. He understood the economics, the politics, had been in the military during the war. He had good personal relations, good entertaining skills, he and his wife. In addition he made me his full-time Deputy and I recruited Fritz Nolting to become chief of our Political Division, having in mind that in 2 years I would have to leave and he would be a good candidate to replace me as Deputy to the Ambassador, as he did.

Q: What did he do before the war?

MARTIN: He had been vice president of Merck Chemical Company. He had married the daughter of Mr. Merck, but his family were Morgan partners, investment bankers. There is a library at Princeton named for an uncle that he gave the money for, so that he had a good New York background, much like Harriman did in many ways. And he was a Princeton graduate. That was a very peaceful period in many ways.
I did do a certain amount of public speaking in that job. We helped set up, and I was strongly for it, an Armed Forces Defense College for NATO, to which the middle-level officers from the various countries could come for training in political-military matters, to which I spoke several times.

In case of war, a coordinated NATO response would be easier if the top brass knew each other from their participation in the courses at the Defense College.

I got invited to speak also at The Netherlands' Defense College a couple of times, in London, I think, once, and some other things. So this made for getting out and around. I had to go to Germany to talk to the Germans about their backstopping arrangements for their NATO ambassador.

We had a lot of trouble with Portugal on the grounds that their foreign ministry never had time to give them any instructions. The ambassador was a retired foreign minister in his seventies, and he kept saying, "Don't make us vote, because I never can get instructions," no matter how urgent it was. There was some talk about whether Portugal ought to be a member of NATO. We also had a lot of talk in this period about the addition of Greece and Turkey, which we did do later on. I, on the whole, had grave doubts about it, on the grounds that for every additional country, the difficulty of getting agreement on actions is increased by the cube. What did they add to our capacity? Well, it was a protection for them, not an addition to capacities. Nobody thought their geographic location would add very much.

Q: That the bases were important?

MARTIN: They were too vulnerable, too close and vulnerable to be much use. Defending them would cost more than the assets would be. There was a real difficulty there.

I want to say a little bit more also about the Common Market issue, which still was a very active one at this time. As I indicated, I was very reluctant about the idea. My basic position--and this was Linc Gordon's too, we were together on this--was that you can't have a real Common Market with economic integration, without political integration. Trade policy is a political decision. Investment policy is a political decision. There's just too much government involvement in the economy of the countries for them to be able to easily make common economic decisions without being politically integrated.

How do you integrate five parliaments, which is what it was then, as different as these are, having as much difficulty as these were just in getting a government in their country that they could support? In Italy, I think by now, the 48th government is being installed since World War II. The Dutch, at this time, were turning over the government once a year or twice a year. The French were running best when they didn't have a government, because they couldn't agree on one. (Laughs) The bureaucrats did a good job. So that he and I were reluctant to get committed too far or try to press them to go too far down this path. "Let's go very slowly and be practical about what's possible."
Furthermore, even more here, additional members would multiply the problems. This, again, got into the Spanish, Greece, Turkey question, of adding them, as causing more problems than it was going to be worth in terms of getting agreement on important issues. Of course, the Common Market currently is wrestling rather violently with questions of agriculture subsidies and a budget deficit of a billion dollars or so, and it hasn't gone very much further than it was then, except in additional members. So this was an issue on which I was off the beaten path a bit during the Dulles-Eisenhower regime.

When it came toward the end of my possible tour there--four years was assumed to be the maximum at that point--I felt that I would surely get a post in a country which was uncivilized. In my OSS days, I had gotten very interested in India, and a change was taking place in India. Ellsworth Bunker had been picked to become the ambassador there. I didn't know much about him, but what I knew was favorable. He came through Paris, and I said, "I would like to be your DCM." And he said, "Fine. Fine with me." So that's what I plugged for.

The Department flatly refused, and I was rather resentful that they insisted that I must go to London as economic minister. I decided later on they were right. Nobody should be a DCM to a political ambassador who hasn't served in an Embassy, and I never had.

Q: I guess that's right. You hadn't, really.

MARTIN: No, I had not. So I went to London. Actually, we were so sure I would be going to a poor country that our daughter took, as one could then, correspondence courses from the University of Nebraska to get enough high school credits, so that she would be ready to go to college when we left Paris. The kids had both gone to the American School in Paris, which was a quite good operation, taught them French well. I was on the Board of the school for a year. Anyway, we went to London.

Q: What year was this?

MARTIN: This was '57. I had gone to Paris in the summer of '53, and my four years were up in the fall of '57. We came back about August for home leave, and then went off to London later in the fall, after the home leave and my briefing. Our daughter had been admitted to Wellesley and Northwestern but we decided that she could learn a lot in England, and she took stenography courses and helped Peggy with many things, and had a very interesting time by not going off to college right away. However, she did cut it short by being married in 1958 at St. Margaret's Church in London, with a reception at the Ambassador's residence, to a Naval officer she had met on the boat going over. His name was Pedro San Juan and in the Kennedy period he was Assistant Chief of Protocol at State. Our son went to Westminster School in London and had a little trouble with the Latin courses, but managed. He went from there to Harvard in '59.

We loved living in London. My wife had thought Paris would prove to have been much more exciting, but the British were so much more friendly than the French. It was great.
Our first dinner party was given by one of my NATO annual review colleagues, Sir Eric Roll, who was then a rather important figure in the British Government.

Q: He later went to the House of Lords, didn't he?

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: Lord Roll.

MARTIN: Lord Roll. Ambassador [John Hay] Whitney was another first-class political ambassador. He had great prestige. He and his wife had founded Bundles for Britain during World War II, for which he was well known. They had a horse racing stable, and the top class in Britain are into that. He was an art collector. He had a fabulous collection of Impressionist art in the residence. We had to know enough about it to show people around when visitors came, and one lady said, "I didn't know he was a painter," when we talked about "the Whitney paintings." The Tate Gallery had an exhibit of them after he left. They were absolutely tops, Rendors and so forth, worth millions and millions of dollars. So he was a very good ambassador.

All this gave him access to U.K. decision-makers. When we had a problem with someone, we would suggest a business lunch or a social invitation, brief him on the problem so he could start the conversation we sought, and then one of us could pursue it.

The residence had been built for the daughter of the founder of Woolworth stores and pretty much donated as the Embassy residence. It was large and had extensive land around it and was located in a park. For our Fourth of July reception about 4000 were invited and 3000 accepted. There were drinks, etc., and excellent orchestra music in the garden. All was paid for by him, of course. All the Embassy staff had assignments for 4 or 5 hours to help everyone have a good time. As a result of several cases shortly after the reception, we called phlebitis an FSO customary ailment.

His DCM, which in London with its big staff is an important post, was Wally Barbour, who was very able. When I was there previously, Julius Holmes had had that job, and he was topnotch. Wally was not married. Whitney's wife was not well, so my wife was often the ranking woman that was available, and so she had a very busy life representing the Embassy at the English-speaking union, and all sorts of places, but enjoyed it thoroughly.

Whitney was a little unhappy, however, as I was not there a good bit of the time, and Evans was a very competent professional but not high level.

Q: Who is Evans?

MARTIN: John Evans, my number two. First, I was brought back for four or five weeks on a selection board of Class I officers, and then I was brought back for six weeks to work with William Draper. Eisenhower had asked him to head a commission on our military
assistance programs around the world, and he co-opted me to handle the European area, which was the biggest part of it because of NATO, which I knew from my NATO background. So I first went to Spain to talk to a U.S. general there who had worked more recently at NATO, but also about Spanish-Portuguese aid possibilities, and then to Washington, and I was there for most of the six weeks. So I had nearly three months that I was not available in London. As I say, he was not totally happy.

But there was a good economic staff. Joe Greenwald was there, who later on was ambassador to OECD and the Common Market. As I said, John Evans and Dan Margolies for a while.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, this was your first position in a regular so-called diplomatic establishment.

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: How did you find it? What was the quality of the other officers laterally to you politically, administrative counselor, and so on?

MARTIN: I think, on the whole, very good. The top political man was good, but not outstanding. All the rest were quite good, indeed. We had very good service, very good collaboration. I had only one really serious problem with the political staff. The Far East specialist was Edwin W. Martin, and I'm Edwin M. Martin. Every phone call had to be answered, "Do you want the Far East Ed Martin or the Economic Ed Martin?"

Q: You are still referred to around Washington that way, you know.

MARTIN: Yes, that's right. Actually, I guess I mentioned how much trouble I had when I first came to State and offered a job to Dean Bowman in Chicago, an OAS colleague, and he sent me a telegram accepting, but I didn't get it; it was sent to Peking, where Edwin W. Martin, the only Edwin Martin the Department knew, was serving. Ever since, we've been reading each other's mail but they're a nice couple, and we have no problems with it. A few years ago, he and I both had a book published by the same publisher, he got the brochures for mine and I got the brochures for his. And it goes on and on. But in the same Embassy, it was a really difficult situation.

I did one other thing of general interest, I think. While I was there Dan Margolies was made Economic Counselor at the Embassy in Zaire, a Class III job. I wrote whoever was the Under Secretary for Administration at that point--I don't remember who it was--that I thought the job in Zaire was much more difficult than the job in London, and that it ought to require the rank of Minister, and mine could be a Class III officer. All I had to do was read the Financial Times, the Economist, and the reports of the Ministry of Finance, to report on the British economic situation. If there was any really important issue, it was usually handled by the Treasury in Washington or the State Department in Washington, not at my level in London. Finally the U.K. government thought, probably correctly, that they knew
better than we how to run their economy. So that neither the reporting nor the negotiating were of any significance. However, in Zaire, Margolies would have to make up his reports as best he could with little help and he could be of important assistance to the government of Zaire in choosing its economic policies as a recently independent country with inexperienced officials. I got no response, as I recall it.

The only real issue that I did get involved in was the question of British membership in the Common Market, which was a very active subject at the time. The Labor Party was opposed. They thought they were the only country with an important Labor Party, and that the European members would force policies on Britain that were against their interests. I felt there were other reasons, too. The whole Commonwealth relationship was a very complex one to be dealt with in the Common Market framework at that time as this was before they had released all of their African group of colonies. So this was something to be handled much more slowly and not pressed hard, as Washington was doing under Dulles' leadership.

My recollection is that the head of the political section did a cable on why they were opposed, and it was sent to me by the Ambassador, and I didn't think it was appropriate, and rewrote it. I think I got some kind of an award from the Foreign Service Association, for a good reporting telegram. I know Jack Reinstein, who was the economic minister in Paris at the time and had worked with me on the Austrian peace treaty, asked for a dozen copies to show around as the best explanation that there had been on the situation.

I did get called on, in view of my NATO background and the fact that a man named Richard Powell that I had known in NATO matters was now the top civil servant in the Ministry of Defense, to negotiate the arrangements for the location of the Thor nuclear missiles in Britain. We put them in Britain and Italy and Turkey at this time, during this period. I handled those negotiations with the Minister of Defense, who was a difficult character--"Drunk Dunk" some people called him. But his assistant, Powell, was very good; we worked well together.

My opposite number in the Foreign Office was Sir Paul Gore-Booth, later Lord Gore-Booth, who was in the Embassy here later, and I had close connections with him, a very able officer. We had tea last fall with his widow in London.

It was an easy group to work with, on the whole, in that way, although the Foreign Office didn't always have as much control or knowledge about what people in the Ministry of Finance were doing and other places as we did. We also had a good contact with the top civil servant in the Ministry--I guess they called it Treasury there. The top civil servant is head of the whole civil service system there.

Q: That's right.

MARTIN: His name was Roger Makin and he was married to an American who was the daughter of Dwight Davis, who founded the Davis Cup of tennis. They lived just a couple
of blocks from us, and we got to be good friends. He later was Ambassador here in Washington.

We made a protocol mistake once at a luncheon, at which we had an important member of Parliament. We assumed that he would outrank a civil servant, but Roger Makin had an Order of the Bath or something like that, and that outranked everybody except a Lord. (Laughs) But they were all very nice about being placed wrong at the table.

Q: "Americans--what do they know?"

MARTIN: "What do they know?" Right.

So we had friends around, helped partly by our NATO friends. Actually, the person that was representing them at this time at the other economic integration organization based in Geneva, the European Free Trade Area, I think it was called, had been my opposite number on their NATO delegation in Paris, the number two at one point. So that things worked out very well on that side.

Then I wanted to also mention things that came to my attention there that added to my very negative view about economic forecasting. My first experience was as we closed down the occupation program in Japan and Korea and Germany and Austria, the conventional wisdom of everybody that dealt with the Japan-Korea situation was that their biggest problem for the future was going to be how to develop enough export income to pay for necessary food imports. Speaking as of '88, they seem to have surmounted that problem rather well.

Secondly, I noted, while I was in London, that one of their big problems was a surplus production of coal, and where could it be stocked to meet future possible demands. During the early years of the Marshall Plan, the late Forties, we had to find very brief ways to keep the President informed of what progress we were making in the economy recovery of Europe from the wartime devastation. We picked, as a key measure that was critical to other things, their ability to increase their output of coal, both in England and in the Ruhr area--Germany, Belgium, Northern France. That was one of the figures that every couple of weeks or month we sent to the President to measure our progress. By the end of the Fifties, coal was a drug on the market, so to speak.

The third thing was that while we were in London a distinguished British economist, Donald MacDougall at the Nuffield Center, a research organization connected with Oxford University, whom I had consulted several times, completed a number of years of work and published a long book whose principal point was that the U.S. surplus and the European deficit in its balance of payments was a permanent problem and they would have to maintain all the controls over their investments and trade and so forth, for the indefinite future. They must put them in place permanently to prevent this U.S. surplus from destroying their economies.
By the time it was published, in '58 I believe, the U.S. was having such a balance of payments deficit, rather than surplus, that we were selling gold to pay for our imports and other expenses overseas. The author later became the principal economic advisor to Harold Wilson when he was the Labor Prime Minister of England, so that he was a man of distinction and reputation. But how long can one be that? So I don't look at the future of things with any confidence at all. If they're good, they may become bad. If they're bad, well, don't worry too much, they'll become good. But anyway, it was a lesson.

Two other things. One I forgot to mention that we had a visit from Vice President Nixon. He visited several European countries in November of '58, just after the U.S. elections, with his wife Pat. He did very well. He made an impressive record. He gave two speeches, one very important at a dinner given by the Lord Mayor of London on Britain's role in the empire, how it could be handled better. It was an excellent job.

He also arranged something that I hadn't run across before and I haven't since. He asked the Embassy to get together four different groups of people for two-hour off-the-record no-agenda discussions. One was conservative members of Parliament, another was labor members of Parliament, a third was newspapermen, a fourth was U.S. and British businessmen. I was responsible for the latter. It was a very open exchange, in which he showed himself knowledgeable and intelligent.

He had one exchange of future significance, I think. One of those present was the head of the biggest British trading company with China. He had, in fact, been born in China in the Thirties. By this time he was a Lord, and it was a very successful business. He asked Nixon, "How long can the U.S. pretend that 600 million people don't live on this globe?" In other words, the question of recognition diplomatically of China. Nixon's immediate reply was that of course we will have to recognize China and admit that those people are humans with us. The problem is that the American public blames the deaths of 50,000 Americans in the Korean War on China. Until our memory goes dim on that subject and we no longer have it in front of our minds, we cannot recognize, but of course we must. My impression is that Kissinger has been given a lot of credit for having persuaded Nixon to make this change in U.S. policy. But in '58, he already contemplated that it would be the appropriate thing in due course, which I thought was rather interesting.

I don't recall anything else that came up of that significance, but he did have a couple of other interesting incidents.

My wife was escort officer for Pat Nixon on a schedule which was not every five or ten minutes after the hour, but seven and a half minutes after the hour, that tight. She thought she handled herself beautifully and was very impressed with the way she supported her husband. Peggy said, "If you want to run for office, I've learned how to do it. You stop and shake hands with everybody you meet, and thank them." (Laughs) Nixon did that on his departure. He was a little late as he had been on a TV program. We were at the airport at the special room for distinguished people, and we had to come up steps right after he got there to walk out to the plane that they were taking to their next stop. Suddenly, he deserted us
and ran back down the steps. We couldn't understand what was happening. We were behind schedule. When he came back, somebody asked him. "Oh, I forgot to shake hands and thank the bartender." (Laughs)

Q: (Laughs) Good for him!

MARTIN: He went out to Oxford to speak to the Rhode Scholars, and one of them asked him, "In a speech in the Congressional campaign (which had just been finished) out in Idaho, you said that you were sure that the American people were not stupid enough to elect a Congress of a different political party than the President. They did. Does that mean that you think the American people are stupid?"

His reply was, "I suspect, young man, that you have a political future. If you do, you will know the American people are never stupid." (Laughs)

We had two other little incidents. He was given a luncheon by the Queen, and then Ambassador Whitney had a dinner for them and her at the residence. The day of the dinner, her representative called up and said she was a little bored with all these white-tie affairs; let's make this one black tie. It turned out that Pat hadn't packed his black tie suit. But he had brought with him as his press advisor a man from the Los Angeles Times who was almost exactly his size, so he loaned him his suit, and I happened to have a spare one that had sort of worn out, and I loaned that to the Los Angeles Times man.

We had another minor problem. Because it was foggy and the plane couldn't land at Heathrow, it had to land at the other airport, Gatwick, from which you can only get up to London fast by train. So we had to all change at the last minute and go to the train station, and there was a red carpet laid down, and each person had their place, a member of the Cabinet, of course, and various other distinguished representatives. The train came in and sailed right past us. Apparently, nobody had told the train driver where he was supposed to stop, and we all had to run about a block and then regroup to be opposite where he was getting off.

Q: And what happened to the red carpet?

MARTIN: It just got left. (Laughs) Little diplomatic snafus, of course.

We also had an Eisenhower visit, which was very much pro forma. The only really interesting thing to me was that I was able to sit in on a meeting he had with a group of distinguished Britishers, and sat right opposite Churchill, who was a quite old man by that point, but still in good control and spoke extremely well in asking questions and giving replies to Eisenhower's questions. He made a very good impression on all of us.

Q: Could you sense any of the relationship between Churchill and Eisenhower, how Churchill felt toward Eisenhower?
MARTIN: I think he felt very well. They did talk a little bit about past connections in a very nice way. No, I think it worked out very well from that standpoint.

Q: Was Churchill then Prime Minister?

MARTIN: No, no. This was long afterwards--1958 or '59.

Q: Even after his second term as Prime Minister.

MARTIN: That's right.

Then I'd like to say one thing about the Draper Commission. It was a very distinguished group, including John McCloy, whom I had to work with very closely because of the European aspects, like Germany, were very important, and he had been Ambassador to Germany. It also included Al Gruenther, a friend from NATO days. This led to a real argument when Draper wanted, with his usual expansive outlook to study in developing countries not only military assistance to them but also their economic ability to support their military. Through somebody's guidance he got into population growth as a factor in reducing their economic capacity, and wanted to recommend that the U.S. do something about this. He spoke informally to President Eisenhower, who was very sympathetic. But Al Gruenther, a very able man, was also a very devoted Roman Catholic. He just refused to go along, and it was a real battle. I believe it did not appear in the report, but Eisenhower was very definitely in favor, and later on, had talks with the whole National Security Council on it and discussed this issue with people from the aid agency of that time, especially Jim Grant, and found them reluctant to do anything until James Riddleberger took over, and then they were much more willing. But by then, it was too late to take a new initiative.

Q: There was nothing in the Draper Report?

MARTIN: Gruenther was too stubborn on that.

One other thing that I picked up in London. I discovered their business had a problem recruiting university graduates, which was a major problem in British competitiveness. There was an Organization of Economic Cooperation Development study of this whole question. The British invented things, but they didn't have staff in their industries to convert them into products that were saleable. They invented the jet engine, they invented penicillin, and so forth. This was basically because anybody with technical know-how was considered a workman and not capable of holding a managerial job. Nobody recruited at the universities, but only looked for graduates of the "public schools," so-called, really private secondary schools in U.S. terms.

I went out to Vickers, making big airplanes very successfully, and we had lunch with the top staff, and I asked the vice president for personnel if they had any university graduates, and he thought a couple of minutes and said, "I don't think of any in the whole company."
They had only sent a few low level staffers to technical institutions that had joined them as apprentices or something like that, but they came back with no decision-making status or role.

Later on, in dealing with the labor people at the top, I found the same thing in the union situation. They had won their basic battle for rights in representing employees, but able union workers tended to be more interested in being promoted to a foreman than in becoming president of a union or taking a union job, because they paid them practically nothing. They paid them a workman's wages. When I told them that the president of the Auto Workers' Union in Detroit, Walter Reuther, whom I had known a bit, probably got a $50,000 a year salary, which in those days was a lot of money, they just couldn't believe it. There was no excitement about the fight with employers, because they had won that and had their party, which was running the government for part of the time. But they didn't pay anything to anybody, any adequate money, and so nobody wanted to stay on and work for the unions. It was a very discouraging industrial scene from both standpoints at that point in time.

I don't think of a whole lot more that needs to be said about the London experience, except one other thing I could say. I did get invited to do a lot of speech-making. There was a lot of interest around, apparently, in the U.S., and its policies and so forth. We were going through a bit of a depression at that time with a foreign exchange deficit too, and that was affecting our ability to do things and our position. There was a lot of interest in our progress in dealing with the depression. So I think I must have made, at the time I was in London, a speech or two a month, one place or another, all around the country. That was fun, getting to know the country and know the people in different parts of the country. We enjoyed that very much.

Q: The ability to deliver a speech is something that's required of a Foreign Service officer.

MARTIN: It's very advantageous, I think. One of the stories I used in the first speech I made, which was to a dinner of the leaders of all the Commonwealth oil companies, members of a petroleum trade association, several hundred people there, on the difficulties of communication. I said we had been told not to go to the theater for six months because you won't really understand English-English, against American English. So I told my favorite language story, that of a movie we had gone to with our two kids on the Champs-Elysées in Paris the first month after we got there, called "High Noon," which is famous. Gary Cooper and Grace Kelly were the leads, one of her first. French subtitles were provided. It ends, more or less, in a bar-room fight that Gary Cooper wins, but pretty messed up, and he staggers across the mud street--it's a Western--to another bar, and collapses on the counter and says, "Give me a shot of red-eye." And the French subtitle was "Un Dubonnet, s'il vous plait." And nobody understood why four people in the center of the theater laughed out loud! (Laughs)

Later on, the retired general who had been head of our Defense staff in USRO saw it in Brussels, where they had moved when NATO did, and his wife sent the subtitle to the New
Yorker, and they printed it and sent her $25. (Laughs) But it was very useful to illustrate the problems of language.

I remembered, also, a negotiating crisis on a ministerial meeting communiqué. That was the most important part about a ministerial meeting of NATO, the communiqué. At midnight, Paul Henri Spaak, a Belgian, and Herve Alphand, a Frenchman, were still arguing over the French translation of a phrase. French was the native language for both, but they couldn't agree on the French translation, and we had to change the English. It's tricky, very tricky business.

Q: What about your administrative support, your representation allowance? Did you have enough representation allowance? Did you find it a handicap?

MARTIN: I'm trying to think. I think it was reasonable at this time. I'd better talk to Peggy a little about that, but I think it was reasonable.

Q: You weren't getting funds, were you, from NATO or from anywhere else? It was strictly Embassy?

MARTIN: Embassy entirely. I don't think that was a major problem. Where we lived, we could seat 12 people at the dining room.

Q: Was that house furnished you by the Embassy?

MARTIN: Yes, it was an Embassy house, 12 Hyde Park Crescent. The administrative officer lived in the next block, right there on the crescent.

Q: Nice to have him close by.

MARTIN: Yes. One of the attachés was around the corner. It was a wide street, very wide crescent, with a church across the way, so it was very convenient. I usually walked through Hyde Park to Grosvenor Square, which was handy, 20 minutes. I was a little depressed about some of the plans for the new building, which was under construction then. They made some serious mistakes on that one, no parking space to speak of, and they had an open-area at the top of the walls between the rooms in the political division, so you could hear what one person was saying in one room if your office was in the next room, which, for security, was impossible.

Q: You mean they didn't have any ceiling?

MARTIN: The walls didn't go clear to the ceiling. For better air-conditioning. Then the entranceway had a huge fountain. What you need is more moisture in the atmosphere in London! But the parking problem was serious, I guess they didn't know that they were going to start charging for parking around the Square.
Q: And you couldn't park very long.

MARTIN: No.

Q: Had to move your car all the time.

MARTIN: That's right.

Then I wanted to mention, also, a little problem I had there, a jurisdictional point with the Treasury attaché. Economic-financial relations were important, and there was a Treasury attaché who was an able man, but I discovered that he was sending either cables or letters reporting on conversations with British officials on critical issues without showing them to anybody in the Embassy. I went to the Ambassador and said that I could agree that he could use private channels, but I had to know what he was saying. He agreed with me, and we worked it out. But a country team operation can be a little tricky if the Treasury tends to feel they're separate and equal and don't need to play within the framework. It did seem to me that it was important that all the people dealing with these issues in practice, if not in form, operate under the Economic Minister or Counselor at the Embassy.

Q: I think this is a very important point as it's gone on over the years, is that coordination at the Embassy. As you know later, as we'll get into, we tried to do that in Latin America.

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: So essentially what happened was that the Ambassador used his authority, however that was spelled out at that time, to...

MARTIN: To say that this had to be done. Yes.

Q: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Continuation of interview: April 19, 1988

MARTIN: As I say, I think that's about enough for England. We came back for home leave in late '59, having enjoyed England thoroughly as a place to live, and I was told that the then-Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Tom Mann, wanted to get back into Latin American Affairs and get an Embassy in Latin America, and I was to replace him. I would come in first as his deputy, replacing the present deputy, who would be taking my place in London. Mann was ill, so I'd have to start as Acting Assistant Secretary. It turned out he was asked to do special Latin American chores for several months, so while I wasn't officially in the job until September, I was Acting for most of that 1960 period. We took a Christmas holiday in Puerto Rico first, though, to be with our daughter and husband.

I came into the office about the third of January, a Thursday, and said, "I'd like to start work on Monday. We've got some unpacking and settling to do, moving back here."
"Oh, there's a meeting in the White House this afternoon with Clarence Randall, who is Eisenhower's Coordinator of Economic Policy, which you must go to." I found out also that Monday I had to chair a meeting of a commission of advisors on our problems with salmon fishing in the Pacific, on which we were having battles with the Japanese, and I had to get briefed. So I broke in kind of fast. (Laughs)

On July 29, 1960, Tom was officially named as Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, instead of an Ambassador, replacing Roy Rubottom, who went as Ambassador to Argentina at the same time. Also in 1960, I got promoted to being a career minister, having been for five years a Class 1 officer after the Wriston transfer from the Civil Service.

In the economic job under the Eisenhower Administration, I had a very happy relationship, I thought, with Clarence Randall, the man in the White House handling economic matters. Both in this case and in the Kennedy Administration, I found that sort of a contact almost indispensable, since the top brass in the State Department, especially after Dillon became Under Secretary and was no longer an Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and Ball who, under Kennedy, was an Economic Under Secretary only briefly and then became a general Under Secretary, did not have much time for economic issues. To deal with the Secretaries of Treasury, of Agriculture, of Labor, of Commerce, who were at this point just getting really involved in the international scene in a substantial way, as the U.S. was becoming more of an international power and finding this a very attractive new experience, I needed White House help often.

Also, in the one special field of aviation there was a White House rule that the U.S. position on an aviation negotiation with another country as to what routes an airline could fly and how many flights and so forth, had to be approved by the White House, and the conclusion of the negotiation had to be approved there before you could sign it. There was no Cabinet person that was considered authoritative enough. This was a very difficult period in the aviation field. I spent a quarter to a third of my time on aviation negotiations, because flying was becoming a much more attractive means of travel, with better airplanes with longer ranges. A lot of the developing countries were establishing their own airlines. Air India was coming in, for example, and Air Pakistan.

Q: And jets about that time.

MARTIN: Jets were beginning to come in and Belgium, Netherlands, Scandinavian countries now had their own airlines. They all wanted additional landing rights in the United States, not just New York but also Boston, Washington, even Chicago, occasionally even Texas. They could now make it that far. They had nothing to offer in return, not even the French. Who wants to have scheduled flights from New York to Marseille or Lyons? Paris is the only place to go, as is Brussels and Amsterdam. There was just no feasible exchange, and even less so for the developing countries. So they all wanted to get rights to the Atlantic route without our getting anything in return that would help our airlines. So if
we had a successful negotiation, we looked at it very carefully, because we didn't think it was possible that we could have an agreement which could be successful for the U.S.

I got to know the Ambassador to the Netherlands--KLM was a particular problem--rather well, because that was one of his main jobs, to fight for their airline. We also got into some real problems in the Caribbean. Our airlines were beginning to be more interested in that area, no longer mostly British colonies, and the British were causing great problems about letting us in. So this was a major unpublicized aspect of the problems at this period, starting certainly in the Eisenhower period in a substantial way.

A second major economic problem which, again, was not a high-level sort of thing, was that involving a system by which, in order to protect the high costs of U.S. sugar producers of both cane and beet sugar, we had quotas, so that only so much could be shipped by each country into the United States. Quota sugar was bought by us at a price usually higher by several cents a pound than the world market price to protect U.S. producers. So every country producing sugar wanted to have a quota. When we took the quota away from Cuba in '60 when Castro took over, and had to redistribute it, we had some 25 countries applying for a piece of it, and the Congress had a role, Agriculture had a role, State had a role. I spent a whole lot of time seeing lobbyists from Fiji, Union of South Africa, Ireland, other strange countries.

Q: Ireland?

MARTIN: Ireland!

Q: Beet sugar.

MARTIN: Beet sugar. Ambassadors, lawyers, lobbyists came in and also I had to testify on the Hill as the Congress had to set our guidelines. At one point, there was one member of Congress from North Carolina who was a key person on the agricultural committee that we learned was a member of a law firm which was getting paid a great deal of money to do lobbying for one of the countries, and he was being very difficult in accepting State-Agriculture recommendations as to how to redistribute the quota. At this point, coffee prices were down, various prices had fallen since the boom after the Korean War, and so everybody was suffering from a limited export income, and a piece of the Cuban quota was just the greatest thing that could happen to them.

Q: Was this after we had broken relations?

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: Not before?

MARTIN: No, I think not. What we did, also, however, after a little while, was to levy a special import tax on their former Cuban quota exports to cut the advantage of getting a
piece of the Cuban quota to almost nothing, because we wanted to make it easier to give it back to Cuba if we got rid of Castro. It was an enticement that we wanted to be able to offer for the Cuban people to get rid of Castro. The result from the Cuban standpoint was that the Soviets had to buy their sugar at a high price to finance Castro, because a lot of his other trade was cut off, and he was losing foreign exchange at a very heavy rate. Sugar had earned two-thirds of his export income. It meant we also put a lot of pressure on other countries to stop buying sugar from Cuba.

I remember one time the Ambassador of Chile said to Rusk, who was complaining that they were still buying some sugar from Cuba, this was back in '62, and he said, "Oh, well, Cuba's an important market for our export of garlic, and they won't buy our garlic if we don't buy their sugar." I was there. Rusk had a hard time containing himself, to say the least. (Laughs) But those were two major problems.

A third rather interesting one arose from our quota system for imports of oil. We fixed the total amount each U.S. company could import, but the companies decided which country they wanted to import from. It made it a very awkward situation. The only exception to the import quota was overland imports. This meant building pipelines from Mexico or Canada. They would be overland, and thus an exception to the quota but it could only be done with U.S. government approval. A principal problem on all of this was Venezuela. We were their closest market, their best market. Ninety-five percent of their export income was oil, and there was a constant battle over increasing the Venezuela quota, and over permitting Canada or Mexico to compete with them through this overland exemption.

One of the problems was that Canada had a surplus from their western wells. Senator Humphrey had clients in Minneapolis who wanted to erect a refinery. It could only be economical if they could get the bulk of their oil from nearby Canada, so they wanted an overland exemption. Their oil companies said, "Unless you do that, we will put pipelines in to Toronto, Montreal, the industrial area," which were dependent upon Venezuela. So it would cut off the Venezuela exports. We didn't permit it for several reasons, especially the impact possible on the oil prices for U.S. well owners. But Humphrey, who was fighting for his constituents, gave us constant troubles of an irrational sort about this.

The second one was Mexico. They had a surplus of a very heavy oil that is a source of asphalt for road building. In the southern United States, we had a real scarcity at this time of this particular product. So there was great pressure from southern congressmen to let the Mexican oil in, but we had great pressure from Texas and other oil producers not to build a pipeline and breach permanently the wall that had been set up.

Somehow, in negotiating a solution to this, I got an inspiration, and we created something called the Brownsville Gap. There had been some talk about shipping the oil in boats up to a little town just across the border in Mexico, and then having trucks or a short pipeline bring it across the Rio Grande River into Brownsville, which was right on the border in Texas. But the pipeline would be a precedent, and nobody wanted to break the quota ceiling that way, and Brownsville didn't want to build up the port facilities in their competitor
across the border, so I got agreement on the "Gap" from the Interior and the Customs Service after a considerable battle. Interior handled oil policy in those days. Under the Gap the boats would come to Brownsville, the oil would be pumped into tank trucks and the trucks would go back, under bond, across the bridge and then turn around and come in "overland." It got to be such a big business that Customs had to have a 24-hour staff on that bridge, checking them, coming back. The leaders of Pemex, the Mexican state oil company, came up to my office to sign the contract under which this was done. (Laughs) But there were just lots of tricky little things like this that one had to deal with.

There was also a major problem with the export of beef from Argentina to the U.S. We refused to accept it, because some of the cattle in Argentina had hoof and mouth disease, or Aftosa, which is transmittable. There's no way you can detect infected beef, and it spreads widely, and we did not have it in this country. So I had, right from the start, several major negotiations with Argentine delegations. We did agree to be willing to do all we could to help them develop the vaccine, which exists for Aftosa, but it was hard there. You have estancias there with a million acres and 2 million heads of cows, and how do you make sure they're all vaccinated? But we tried to help with this.

On one occasion, they said, "Well, you don't permit anything in from England, because they have Aftosa, but you do from Ireland. We could raise cattle in Tierra del Fuego, which is an island separated from Argentina like Ireland is from Britain. Wouldn't you let us export from there?"

Well, I consulted my agricultural colleagues, and they said, "No, it's too close." I wasn't sure they weren't just protecting American beef growers. But when I was Ambassador in Argentina, there was an outbreak of Aftosa in Tierra del Fuego. They were right. They'd taken some beef over from the mainland to slaughter, and their sheep had caught Aftosa, and they had to kill 10,000 of them. (Laughs)

But a British company in Argentina did largely solve the problem by developing a process to make frozen cooked beef as, if it's cooked, there's no problem. By the middle Sixties, they were exporting $50 million a year of frozen cooked. It's very good for frozen dinners or for restaurants. There's no problem with it. That was a very sore point between us and Argentina. In every presidential meeting, the beef problem tended to come up. Those are just some of the difficulties.

I had gotten involved, in this and other ways with the Latin American scene when the Kennedy Administration came in. First I'd better say something about the Kennedy Administration. I assumed that with their coming in, I would go someplace else. This was the normal thing to happen. In the middle of February, I had heard nothing, but was told that this probably would be the case. My good friend Roger Jones was then Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. He had been best man at our wedding, serving then as administrative officer at the CSB.

\textit{Q: All right, sir.}
MARTIN: One Sunday morning, he called me to say, "We're having a meeting this afternoon. The question of where you go may come up."

I said, "Well, I like to be challenged. The only place I have had any experience with which has been handled by career people is Japan. But I know there are lots of problems in Pakistan and Turkey, to which career people go. They're not major, but I haven't had a lot of experience abroad and they would be fine for me." And that was the end of that.

I did understand that Kennedy's practice was to offer posts to people who had been candidates for the Democratic nomination but hadn't gotten it, and so he had offered Harriman a post, and asked if he had a friend he'd like to appoint to some place. On this basis, Harriman proposed Linc Gordon for the economic job at State, for which he had an excellent background. I gather that Linc Gordon wasn't enthusiastic about it, nor was his wife about moving to Washington at all, so he said, I was told, "Ed martin is a perfectly competent fellow, and he's not a Republican. Why do you make a change?"

I didn't hear anything for nearly a month. My wife, Peggy, was saying that when the wives got together from time to time, she gathered several other of the assistant secretaries weren't hearing, and the wives were all wondering what was going to happen. Finally, I caught Roger Jones in the hallway one day and said, "What goes?"

He said, "Haven't you heard? You're going to stay." This was sort of almost mid-March. (Laughs) So I stayed.

I had had a couple of very useful experiences with Dillon, when he was the Under Secretary Economic and then Under Secretary. He had, as a special assistant, John Leddy, whom I'd known very well. I had known Dillon a little in Paris when he was the Ambassador there and I was at USRO, both professionally and socially. At State I had represented him on a number of operations like the Export-Import Bank Board, the Development Loan Fund Board--that was our big aid agency in terms of loans at that time--and several bodies like that. I found him a very constructive boss in the sense that not only did he have good ideas and reasonable positions, but he never had anything in his "in" box. You'd go in and raise and settle three problems with him. "Now," he says, "is there anything else? I've got a little time." And this was not usual for top brass at all, but Dillon really had an output that was very impressive, decisions as to what should be done, and decisions which I had no problems with. So his staying as Secretary of the Treasury was very valuable, because as Assistant Secretary Economic, I had to continue to be interested in these aid agencies.

I should have said, also, I'd been active with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, having been, I believe, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the first Indian and Pakistan Consortium meetings of the World Bank. Since the Treasury is officially the U.S. representative to the World Bank and the regional banks, being able to work with him and Assistant Secretary, John Leddy, was very easy. It's not a question of bragging about who you know, but personal relationships like this enables things to happen.
much more quickly and probably, I think, sensibly. So this was a very good situation, and things went, I think, on the whole well...

Q: Was there anyone at this point in the White House, like Clarence Randall?

MARTIN: Yes, there was. Mike Feldman was my contact in the White House. He had no particular economic background. He was a lawyer, I believe, by training, but he was an able man. And one of the other advantages was that he was also the White House man keeping in touch with the domestic economic Cabinet people like Agriculture and Commerce. So that since many of our problems were in the field of agriculture or commerce, if you had problems, Feldman could pull the strings. Of course, I saw him on aviation negotiations constantly.

One of my first experiences interdepartmentally was with Orville Freeman. One of our big issues had been dealing with the Common Market on trade discrimination. There was a chicken war at this time, discriminating against the exports of U.S. chickens. Orville Freeman, as the new Secretary of Agriculture, decided to go to Europe fairly early in the game to argue with them about this and took me along. Partly at my recommendation, he went to Paris first because usually on these kinds of issues, the French were always the most difficult and stubborn. So he talked to the French Minister of Agriculture and then went up to Brussels. We didn't make a whole lot of progress, but at least we got something started there. He was always a good person to work with. I had no trouble with that. Commerce wasn't quite so easy, but again, not bad. And Labor, with Wirtz and Goldberg, was always very easy to work with. I had worked in Labor. There were people I had known when I'd worked there, and this was no great problem.

The East-West trade issue continued to be a very tricky one, and I had to spend some time on that. The whole developing country world was also an important element in this period.

In my 26 months in the E Bureau, I made 14 trips abroad, all to Europe except two to Ottawa, one to Japan for a Cabinet-level meeting on Economic Relations, and one each to Iran, Brazil and Punta del Este, Uruguay. The last two have been discussed elsewhere.

On one or another of my European trips I attended in addition to ones already discussed, meetings of U.S. African Ambassadors on our aid programs (Tangier).

A most interesting trip was to Tehran in Iran. It was at the request of the DLF on whose Board I frequently sat as alternate to Dillon. They wanted us to break our rules against funding an incomplete project and make a loan to complete an extensive road building project for which they had run out of money. I had an interesting time as my host was Khandi Farman, the 33rd child born to his father, then in his '80's, and his wife in her teens. He was a graduate of the University of Kansas where he met his American wife, had a Ph.D. from Princeton in Economics and had then taught there, and was now Deputy Minister for Planning. While there I visited a U.S. Point 4 agricultural project and two big dams under construction to have power and water supply roles. I also met with the Shah for
15 minutes in the Hall of Mirrors in the glamorous palace. However it had not rained in six or more months and everything in the city was covered with dust. Autos were relatively new and their drivers clearly more interested in speed than the safety of the many bicyclists and pedestrians. I reached one of the dams by flying to one of the holy cities filled with beautiful temples.

One of my more interesting experiences was being the junior member of a 1961 delegation to the meeting of the Economic Policy Committee of the OECD. In April, '61 the issues were those of exchange rates and trade like the agenda of the Group of Seven today. The delegation was headed by the chairman of the President's Economic Council, Walter Heller, and included William Martin, President of the Federal Reserve Bank, Robert Roosa, Under Secretary of the Treasury and Jack Tuthill, alternate chief of U.S. OECD delegation.

A project that took a lot of time was that of building a large dam on the Volta River in Ghana to produce power for an aluminum plant to be built by the Kaiser Corporation. The big issue was what Kaiser should pay for the power. It had to be cheap enough that the product was globally competitive but expensive enough to pay back the loans made by the World Bank, AID and others and pay a "royalty" to the government of Ghana for letting them use the water of the river for this purpose. Dave Sommers, long-time General Counsel of the World Bank, described it as the most complicated international financial deal yet negotiated. I tended to be an intermediary between Kaiser represented by Lloyd Cutler, a lawyer who later was a top man in Carter's White House, AID, the World Bank, and the government of Ghana, headed by a rather Communist dictator named Nkrumah.

I got a lot of pleasure in having lunch in the house Nkrumah built just above the dam for a summer vacation retreat while on a visit many years later as Chairman of DAC, he having been ousted by then.

I want to mention that I did a fair amount of speech making in the economic job on economic issues. In one of them at the annual meeting of the American Historical Society in December of '60 on U.S. economic policies with particular reference to the developing world, my major theme was that the problem with development was that it had been captured by the economists. Unless you had a political structure which could make wise choices as to what to do next and could implement spending of the resources available efficiently and command support from the local community in terms of local currency funds, you wouldn't make much progress. There had to be wisdom and continuity in the political leadership, and we paid no attention to it. That continued to be a problem, and still is.

I think it's fair enough to say that economists can play with figures to make a sensible program on the economic side, but politics is not figures, it's people, and they're much more complicated and hard to manage. (Laughs) In college I was in political science but avoided courses in public administration because I thought it was a matter of personal relationships.
and nobody knew how to teach it. But anyway, I've continued ever since that speech to be interested in political development, as you know.

The Dillon connection was, I think, partly responsible for my staying in the economic office. He had taken me as an alternate chairman to the second meeting of the Board of the Inter-American Development Bank in Rio. This was in '60. I had a very interesting experience and got acquainted with a lot of the Latin American financial people there, as well as with the very wealthy Brazilian upper crust, with whom we dealt and who gave fantastic dinner parties in homes with gold serving plates and paintings by the best French Impressionists and so forth. Then the bank gave a two-orchestra, fancy dinner party at the boat club in Rio with the result that the congressional members of the delegation went home saying, "They (Brazil and the IDB) don't need a penny of our money." (Laughs) It was not a good introduction for them.

Then I was also brought into the preparations of the Alliance for Progress program. I happened to be in the Department on Washington's birthday, talking to George Ball, when he was asked to review the speech Goodwin had written for Kennedy launching the Alliance for Progress, which he gave on March 13th. Ball asked me to read it, and I did. I proposed one change, which was accepted, namely, "Don't compare this to the Marshall Plan." The obvious point, it seemed to me, being that reconstructing a going economy with some damaged physical infrastructure, but the personal infrastructure still there, is totally different from building an economy that hasn't existed. This was accepted and it didn't take very long for Kennedy to get the point and change his approach, too, to reflect this.

I also went to the Punta del Este meeting as an Alternate to the Chairman, Dillon, in August of '61, at which the AFP charter was drafted. He had also been Chairman of our delegation in '60 to a meeting in Bogota, which had agreed on the principal points of the AFP under Eisenhower. They were only given numbers at Punta del Este under Kennedy. Eisenhower had even gotten authorization of an appropriation for a Special Projects Fund to finance generously social projects like education, health, housing, and Kennedy got the appropriation.

Q: That was a large fund, wasn't it?

MARTIN: $394 million. The appropriation was $600 million, but $100 million of that was special assistance to Chile, which had had a severe earthquake, and $6 million was for the staff at the Organization of American States to support the whole Alliance for Progress concept. The $394 million was to be spent in Latin America for projects. There was a major overlap of people, as well as substance in this regard. The same members of Congress were interested. With the '58 election bringing in the Democrats, there wasn't a real transition problem there. Dillon had as his principal aide and coordinator at both meetings, John Leddy. Secretary Woodward, who succeeded Tom Mann as Assistant Secretary for Latin America, was Dillon's Deputy, but Leddy and I were Alternates. Then there were, in addition, a long list of advisors, including Lincoln Gordon.
Q: The paths cross. (Laughs)

MARTIN: (Laughs) That's right.

Q: How about Rostow? Was he on it at that point?

MARTIN: Not actively. He was some, but not actively as he was still at the White House.

Then the countries all wanted money right away; they didn't want to wait. We didn't yet have an aid program to provide them money under the Alliance, but we did agree to handle emergency projects. It wasn't until November that Ted Moscoso, a Puerto Rican, was brought up from being ambassador to Venezuela, to be head of the new aid agency's Latin America Bureau. So an interagency committee was set up in June of 1961 to pass on project proposals that we got in the interim, and I was made chairman of that. So I got that introduction to the Latin American scene. Another was in September where I played a considerable role in an informal meeting of Kennedy with President Frondizi of Argentina. He wanted our full support for a World Bank loan for a power dam but I insisted that an IDB study of its feasibility had to be completed first and won Kennedy's support on the communiqué against Goodwin who always liked to send visitors away publicly happy.

I also had had another introduction to Latin America that came along about this time. For economy reasons, with our serious deficit problems, both in foreign exchange and in budget, we were looking at selling commodities we had stockpiled for emergency use in case of war, raw materials that had to be imported. One of them was tin, a principal producer of which was Bolivia. The price was not strong. Two-thirds of their export income was tin, and they were very bitter about the suggestion that we would export tin on the world market and reduce the price still further. From Kennedy on down, we had talks with the Bolivians on this. One of the points we made was that their tin operation was a very inefficient one, and we needed to help it. We did work out a joint project with the German aid agency and the Inter-American Development Bank, to improve the efficiency of their tin ore operation.

The other point that I had to make frequently was that if tin prices got too high, it would further encourage the substitution of plastic or steel cans for tin-plated cans, and that you have to be aware of this competitive angle of the price situation. But that was a tricky subject during most of this period. We had a certain amount of trouble with some of the people in Defense. But anyway, this worked out.

Q: You did have problems with people in Defense?

MARTIN: Yes, a bit, as they thought they would get the money from selling the stockpile materials and it would help them financially to sell as much as possible.

I want to mention another point with respect to something that happened while I was Assistant Secretary Economic in 1960. We were suffering at the time a serious balance of
payments deficit. At least we thought it was serious. In the Eighties, they would think it was nothing, I'm sure. We were threatened with losing gold. A committee was set up, chaired by the Treasury, which had the big interest in that issue--Grady Upton, I believe, was the chairman, he was then their Assistant Secretary for International Affairs--to find ways big and small to cut the deficit, things like requiring that our military commissaries abroad sell only things purchased in the U.S. and no local products, which got into a certain number of complications: we had to make exceptions for fresh fruits and vegetables, for example. We also reduced the dollar value of goods people brought into the country that was exempt from tariffs. If you were just an ordinary traveler, if you didn't bring in more than $100, you didn't have to declare it. We cut that back, too.

The other thing that I wanted to mention, particularly, was that we felt that the European countries whose recovery we had done so much to achieve during the Marshall Plan period were not doing nearly as much as they should to share with us the balance of payments burden of aid to developing countries. So we decided that we ought to set up a group participated in by the European countries, at which we could beat them over the head on this issue. We named it the Development Assistant Group, and we had a first meeting here in Washington, a second one in Bonn. Grady Upton was the chairman of the U.S. delegation and acted, initially, as chair of the first meeting. I was his deputy at that meeting and chaired the U.S. delegation at the second one.

Subsequently, there were two meetings of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation in Paris, at which we revised its whole structure to reflect the end of the Marshall Plan and other factors, adding the U.S. as a full member, so it was no longer just a European organization. This also permitted Japan and Canada to become members. It was an important change. It also incorporated in its structure the Development Assistance Group as a Development Assistance Committee. Therefore its name became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The first chairman of the Development Assistance Committee, DAC, was Jimmy Riddleberger, whom I had known, of course, in German Occupied Affairs and then in the Marshall Plan when he was political advisor to Harriman in Paris. The second was Willard Thorp, who had been Assistant Secretary Economic and for three years I was in his shop. He was chairman of DAC from '64 to '68, and I took over from '68 to '74. It's always had a U.S. chairman. Many people are not clear why that should be the case, and there have been suggestions of others at various occasions, including when I was chosen. A Canadian was asked then but refused. It's been tempting because the AID legislation provides that if the chairman is a U.S. citizen, he shall receive the salary and perquisites of a Class I chief of aid mission. These have included, since Willard Thorp became the chairman, a lovely small house in Paris on a quiet dead-end street located just a few blocks from the Arc de Triomphe, which was purchased with Marshall Plan counterpart funds in the days when we were able to use them for that kind of facility. It is still being occupied by the DAC chairman who is still an American.

Q: Is it true that when you occupied it, did you resign from the State Department?
MARTIN: No. I was on detail. No, I did not retire until December, I think it was, of ’73. I was a little earlier, a month or so, from compulsory retirement, but I had made my retirement contributions to the maximum--I think it's 35 years--and there were cost of living increases coming up.

Q: As a career ambassador--and there aren't very many--don't you really continue on as ambassador? Aren't you an ambassador for life, more or less?

MARTIN: Not that I'm aware of, anymore than a general is a general for life, or an ambassador who just serves at an embassy, political or career. I just don't know.

Q: I think we always had the idea that it's like a five-star general.

MARTIN: It is equivalent protocol-wise, I think.

Q: It is a five-star rank.

MARTIN: Yes. I don't know any perquisites that would go with those titles. Perhaps. I just don't know.

That move in ’60 to set up this Development Assistance Group, which continues to be a very active organization, was a new step in international arrangements, of value, I think.

One of the other interesting things was that we set up a joint economic Cabinet-level organization with Canada to discuss common economic problems, of which we had lots with Canada. I went up to Ottawa with Dillon for its first meeting.

Then we set up one with Japan, in which five U.S. Cabinet ministers and five Japanese Cabinet ministers sat down for three days in early November ’61, in lovely Hakone Park near Tokyo, to discuss their problems, of which we already had quite a few. I was the chief of staff of the U.S. delegation. One of the problems was that we had to have consecutive translations, not simultaneous. The five Cabinet ministers sat on the two sides of the table, and at one end were three translators picked by the Japanese, and at the other three picked by us. In the middle was a big red light. If anybody talked more than two minutes, the light went on and they had to stop for translation. The Americans, except for Rusk, were mostly politicians who loved to give vent to oratory denouncing the Japanese for this, that, or the other, and were very irritated about the interruptions. I did everything I could to see if we couldn't arrange some way to do it simultaneously. The answer by the translators was, "We would have to have a full text 24 hours in advance and have translated it so we could read it before we could do it your way." So that was that.

After the meeting, we had a day or so in Tokyo, which had changed considerably since I had been there in ’46, in terms of a revived urban area. Then I went with Rusk for a 24-hour visit in South Korea, which had also changed considerably.
On the way back, I made three speeches in a day in Anchorage, Alaska, a Rotary Club, the university, and a World Affairs Council. Before going to Japan I had done so in Spokane, Seattle, Portland and Tacoma, in Washington and Oregon. After Alaska there was a speech in San Francisco. Then we borrowed a car from an old Northwestern friend and drove to Los Angeles and made a couple of speeches there. Then by arrangement with the Mexican ambassador, who was one of the most outstanding people I’ve known, Antonio Carillo-Flores, a marvelous man, we spent nearly two weeks at a little fishing village on the Pacific coast of Mexico called Puerto Vallarta. It was very isolated.

Q: In those days.

MARTIN: In those days, yes. You flew to Guadalajara and then had to take a tiny airplane to get to Puerto Vallarta, and because there were no lights at the airport you had to land on a grass strip in daytime. We got into Guadalajara too late to land in daylight, so we had to spend the night there before going on to Puerto Vallarta. It was a delightful spot, and we had a wonderful time. There was one nice hotel on the beach. It was a fishing village, the women were washing their clothes in the river. There was a small American retirement community there known as Gringo Gulch, and then there was another one on a little hillside called Snob Hill after a San Francisco one called Nob Hill.

While there, however, on a Saturday afternoon coming back from a birding walk—I was a birder at this point—I had a message at the hotel from the consul general in Guadalajara; he wanted to talk to me about my vacation plans. He wanted me to take a plane that afternoon and come back the next afternoon, Sunday. There were no telephones except in the airline office. I went there and sent a message that as I was planning to leave in two days, I didn't want to take off a day. Well, I got a message back about an hour later by courier saying Rusk wanted to speak to me. That was different, so I caught the plane and went to Guadalajara.

Rusk said, "There are a number of personnel changes being made. They will be published in tomorrow's newspaper. I wanted you to know about them before you saw it in the newspaper." Every two weeks we might see a newspaper there, but he didn't know, of course, where I was. "You're being moved to another Assistant Secretaryship, and I wanted you to know it." He didn't mention what it was.

Q: First you had heard about it?

MARTIN: First I had heard about it. And to my wife's consternation, I didn't ask him which one. It was an open phone. If he didn't want to say where I was going, I didn't want to ask him. So she was pretty unhappy. But I said to her, "When I joined the Foreign Service, I decided I would do what I was asked to." That was part of the commitment. Or, I could resign.
Two days later, we went into Mexico City to spend two or three days staying with the Manns, and I assumed he would know what went on. He had known that Rusk was trying to reach me, but not why. He had a New York Times which had a list of seven out of nine announced changes, but not my name. I could only assume that I was one of the two that weren't in the Times. One of them listed was Goodwin to be Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America.

Q: That was in the Times?

MARTIN: That was in the Times. Walt Rostow to be Chief of Policy Planning Staff was in the Times, and various others. I think Bowles becoming a special assistant to the President instead of Under Secretary was in it, Ball becoming Under Secretary instead of Under Secretary Economic. So I didn't know where I was going.

I got back to Washington and asked my secretary if she had heard anything. "No, I haven't heard anything." So I heard nothing more. A couple of days later, at a reception, I asked Roger Jones again. "Oh, hadn't you heard? It was supposed to be becoming Assistant Secretary for Latin America, but Saturday morning Rusk had a talk with Woodward. He had only been officially in the job five months and they decided it was too soon." (Laughs) So that was that. Nothing more of consequence happened until...

Q: The timing on this again?

MARTIN: This was late November, early December of '61.

Then on a Saturday afternoon, March 3rd, I was at an all-day meeting with the Policy Planning Staff, discussing a global policy paper that Rostow had produced--he was capable of producing all kinds of papers in large volume--when George Ball, my old friend, called me to come up to his office. I did, and he said, "The President wants you to take over the Latin American job as soon as possible. The reason is that Dick Goodwin and Ted Moscoso are leaving Sunday night on a mission to negotiate an aid agreement with Chile. We've been discussing the terms, I and Fowler Hamilton (an old law colleague of Ball's, who was then head of the aid agency), with Goodwin. He wanted to be more generous than we did, and he told the President yesterday we'd agreed to his position. We have persuaded the President this morning that to ride tighter herd on Goodwin, you should replace Woodward as soon as possible, and Goodwin will not go on the trip."

I said, "I thought I'd earned an ambassadorship to New Zealand or someplace like that by the years I've spent in the economic job, but again, if that's what you say, though I have no background or experience, don't speak a word of Spanish and am a poor linguist, I'll do it."

Monday morning, I heard that Goodwin had left Sunday night.

Q: He'd gone anyway?
MARTIN: Gone anyway, nothing more.

Q: On his own?

MARTIN: With Moscoso. I didn't hear any more until Wednesday morning, when I was told, "The President will announce your appointment at his press conference this afternoon." So at the 12:00 o'clock staff meeting, I was able to tell my staff in E that I would be leaving. The President did not announce it; the White House lost the memo. (Laughs) But that night from 6:00 to 7:00, while Woodward was unpacking his desk and getting his things out, he briefed me, and the next morning I was Acting Assistant Secretary, and my name was announced and sent up to the Senate that day.

I learned later on Goodwin's departure to Chile that the problem had been that Ball had called Ambassador Charles Cole in Chile to say that Goodwin would not be coming, but Moscoso would, and Cole had indicated, "Goodwin is Kennedy's friend. If he doesn't come, I think the government will fall." My own reaction later, when I knew more, was that if the government was that weak, we'd better let it fall. But Ball was never interested in anything except Europe and the Soviet Union, so he said, "Well, fine, then we'll send him."

There apparently had been a real reaction. A couple of Cabinet ministers had said to Cole that this was a crisis. "We've told President Alessandri that Goodwin, the President's friend, is coming." And it could have been a critical situation.

So I took over. I wasn't actually confirmed until sometime, I believe, in early May, to give me time to be able to answer the Senator's questions with some background. (Laughs)

I found that as far as substance was concerned, Goodwin and I had no disagreements, but my idea of a deputy was somebody that could step into my shoes without any hesitation on a moment's notice for various possible reasons, but keep the show running, because crises can arise at any time. Also I wanted someone who could take middle-level problems and handle them, so I could spend my time on the major ones. Goodwin was a superb speech writer and all right on one or two major projects, but he did not have an interest in the smaller matters or administrative questions. On general policy, we agreed, but he was not an adequate deputy as far as I was concerned. But I was willing to live with it as long as necessary.

I think I might continue on a Goodwin problem.

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: What happened was that in April I got a cable on a Wednesday from Tom Mann, saying, "A very distinguished Mexican author has applied for a visa to go to the United States to appear on an NBC Sunday talk show with Goodwin. We have a copy of his card as a member of the Communist Party. Therefore, we cannot grant a visa unless the State
Department follows the usual procedure of requesting a Justice Department exception from the legal rule, which they can give. I urge that we do not seek such an exception."

Justice didn't like to do it, and State only wanted to do it when it was really critical. We had no knowledge that this was going to take place prior to this, although Goodwin should have checked with our public affairs people before agreeing to appear on the show. When I confronted him, he said that he didn't really know who he was going to be debating with, and he didn't know the rules that he should inform the public affairs staff.

I said, "I do not think that I can say that it's in the public interest for you to appear on television with a Mexican Communist, but you can discuss it with Rusk." I presented the situation to Rusk; he supported me. I think I had discussed it with him probably before I said this to Goodwin. He did see Rusk, I think twice, but Rusk agreed that the exception was not justified.

The New York Times had a story about it on Saturday, saying that the State Department had refused to issue a visa but not mentioning specifically the Communist connection. NBC did some calling to protest, too. Schlesinger called me to protest and Kennedy called me on Saturday to ask about it, based on the New York Times story and probably a Schlesinger protest, because Goodwin kept in close touch with Schlesinger who continued to follow Latin American matters considerably. I told him about the Communist connection, and he said, "I'd like to have wide public debate, but I can see the problem," and did not pursue it. I think he was not too happy about it, and Schlesinger, of course, wasn't at all. They didn't appreciate the State Department problem on this. But anyway, I think at this point Dick decided he'd better start looking around if he was going to be restricted in this way. I don't know that there was anything personal about it, because Rusk was fully supportive of my position.

A couple of months later, an opportunity came to help set up an International Peace Corps, working basically out of Puerto Rico, and he went on leave, in effect, although he did come back to do some speech writing for both Rusk and the President. By September, he said, "You ought to get somebody else." But he was not really operational from early June on.

Q: But I believe he stayed on the payroll.

MARTIN: Yes. In September, I asked personnel for suggestions on a replacement, and they mentioned that Sterling Cottrell, who had been working with Harriman as chairman of a Vietnam policy group, had served in Latin America at a couple of posts, and was available. I spoke to Harriman, and he said, "He's done a first-class job." So I appointed him. My main problem with him was that although he handled routine things quite satisfactorily, if it became a difficult argument with another agency like Defense, he would report to me, "Well, I decided to agree with the Defense position, but I made clear that you could overrule me." In other words, he never would fight it out or say, "I disagree, and you'll have to appeal to Martin." Such an issue came up rather often as he was Chairman of an inter-agency Committee on Cuban policy, a subject on which Defense had strong views. In
other words, he was not combative in a way which on some issues one had to be at this period. We were having considerable difficulty with Defense on the Cold War issues at this time, which is another subject.

I think I might talk now a little bit about the Latin American Policy Committee. Dick Goodwin had apparently helped arrange a presidential decision in February of '62 authorizing the establishment of inter-agency committees in the regional bureaus at State which could coordinate policy, particularly, I think, related to the Cold War situation, in the sense that they would be subordinate in a vague sort of sense to a National Security Council special committee on security and intelligence activities. But nothing had been done to implement it when I came in.

By early April, we did establish a Latin American committee. What I tried to do was to keep it both small, to permit good discussion, and limited to people that could discuss anything from a security standpoint. The membership was one person from the International Security Bureau in the Pentagon; one person from the Joint Chiefs; either Dungan or Schlesinger or both could come from the White House; one person from AID, usually Moscoso; and one person from the U.S. Information Agency, either Don Wilson, who was the deputy director, or Hugh Ryan, who was Director for Latin American Affairs, usually came from there. From the State Department one from the Policy Planning Staff, Rostow or his deputy; one from the Intelligence and Research Bureau, which was either the head of it or his deputy; the office director or desk officer for the country to be discussed from the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs; from CIA, two people, one from the regional office and one from the operational bureau. That was it. I think it came to about 13 people.

There was heavy pressure during my period from CIA to have a third person from their research bureau, and from Treasury to have a member, because in doing country programs, there were often very important economic and financial issues involved, because some of these countries had debt and inflation problems of the sort we're dealing with now. Treasury had a direct interest in these issues and in addition gave orders to the U.S. representatives at the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank. John Leddy protested a number of times. However, Leddy was not cleared to discuss CIA operations and if he attended the LAPC could not do so and they were important to the Cold War we were waging.

Q: So security was the problem.

MARTIN: Security was grueling. Whenever we were discussing country policy papers, we tried to do it when the ambassador was in town. We met when I was in town on Thursday from, I believe, 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock, a one-hour meeting, always the same time so people could reserve the time. We usually had a paper to consider and then some time for things that other people wanted to raise. But at the end of the consideration of a paper, I summarized conclusions and said, "If anybody disagrees, you can have it taken up with Secretary Rusk." I don't recall any time that was done.
Q: Were there notes kept of these meetings?

MARTIN: Very short. Yes, my special assistant kept some notes. He attended and he kept some notes.

Q: That was who? I've forgotten.

MARTIN: Well, there were two or three of them. One went to Mexico from there. I haven't got the names. There were two or three of them. Someone kept brief notes.

Our papers often went up to this special group of counterintelligence, or SG (CI), in the White House for review. We did have small working groups on certain aspects. There was a working group on information programs, for example, or on a few key countries where we had a counterinsurgency plan that was important, that might meet before our meetings.

Three years later, when I came back from Argentina and attended one of the LAPC meetings, it was chaired regularly by the deputy assistant secretary, and there were at least 25 people in the room. It had lost the character that I felt was essential to give it to be as useful as possible. I believe that the Africa Bureau tried to set up one, also, but how effective it was, I don't know.

In ARA I learned a few lessons that I may not have mentioned. One was that no one has the right to criticize a U.S. Ambassador's performance who hasn't read his instructions.

A second was that it can be dangerous if the CIA mission does not show its Ambassador all its messages as he may have to deal with or recommend action to State on a crisis and must have all information on it available to the U.S. I soon added the Deputy Chief of Mission as he may be in charge at any time and have to do the same.

A third was more a problem than a lesson but it derived from the propensity and ability of Kennedy to conduct conversations with heads of State alone or with only a translator. He accepted and remembered full briefings but it wasn't always easy, especially with no translator taking notes, to learn what he may have then committed the U.S. to do in his talks.

I think I might go back a little bit and talk more about personnel. When I came into the economic bureau, the first thing Tom Mann said to me in January of ’60 was, "I'm not interested in personnel. I want you to handle it. Don't consult me, don't tell me what you've done." I thought diplomacy was people, and terribly important. So I welcomed the chance to deal with that.

When I came into ARA, it had a reputation around the Department as being the weakest bureau. It had gotten a fifth priority on budget out of five regional bureaus under Eisenhower. Kennedy changed that. But people who couldn't make it elsewhere were sent over to the ARA bureau to spend the rest of their career, very little movement in and out. They just vegetated there, I was told, and it was, to some extent, true.
So I set up a couple of rules. One, I wanted to try to get someone who hadn't been a lifetime ARA person in the top or second job in each office, each embassy, in terms of career staff. Second, nobody could be appointed in the field or in Washington at an FSO-3 or above without my seeing his papers, and having time to consult people if the papers weren't adequate about his qualifications. I thought personnel was of that much importance.

I felt that there were two people that I recruited, one in EE and one in ARA, that I was particularly happy to get hold of, and they had similarities in backgrounds. I didn't take an initiative; they came to Washington looking for a job. I just managed to persuade them to work with me. One of them came in late '61, as I recall it, or middle '61, and visited several parts of the State Department and Treasury. He had been a businessman, he had been a professor, and he had had a little government experience, but not much. He decided he'd like to work for the government under Kennedy. I made him the Deputy Assistant Secretary Commodity Affairs. His name was Michael Blumenthal. He later on was Secretary of the Treasury under Carter and head of a very large Corporation--Unisys.

The other had a similar combined business and professorial career, and had also done a little bit of government consulting, and his name was Tony Solomon. He became Deputy Assistant Secretary Economic in ARA in '63, having made his money in Mexico. He was Blumenthal's Under Secretary in the Treasury later on, and then head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. They both adjusted to the government scene with great skill and in somewhat difficult posts. I'm not wedded totally to the career background, in terms of getting good people. You can get good people from outside.

Q: You need a mix.

MARTIN: You need a mix. At one point, when Kennedy appointed a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Ambassador to Portugal because he didn't like the way he had handled Navy operations in the missile crisis, I was a member of the Board of the American Foreign Service Association. They wanted to write an editorial requesting that a Foreign Service officer be made Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, since if an admiral can be an ambassador to Portugal, why can't a Foreign Service officer be a Navy commander. I suggested that the qualities of an ambassador are of a personal rather than technical character, working with people, whereas a Navy officer has to have considerable technical skills in operating ships. (Laughs) Different from an embassy. They withdrew the proposal.

Q: They were serious about it?

MARTIN: Oh, yes! They wanted to run a strong editorial, demanding that President Kennedy make this change. (Laughs)

Q: I was in Portugal for a brief time when he was there, and he was a disaster.
MARTIN: Well, he obviously had not been checked out on the subject of his capacities in personal relationship. But it wasn't automatic. David Bruce and Averell Harriman and Lincoln Gordon, George Perkins, I can name quite a few that had been superb ambassadors.

Q: I can give you a very good example: Ellsworth Bunker.

MARTIN: Ellsworth Bunker was fantastic!

Q: His first appointment was as an ambassador.

MARTIN: Yes, and he was fantastic all the way through. So there are lots of them.

There was another administrative effort that I made that you are familiar with and were willing to try out. This was a programming exercise, getting an embassy to study how it spent its money and time in various designated programs that had priority, and what changes might be necessary. We got Tony Freeman, ambassador to Colombia, to try this one out. It was not easy to have the embassy staff and country team staff do a time sheet for how they spent every hour of the day and have the accounting people account for the money this way, but it did, in their case, show up some discrepancies in terms of things that weren't being covered in an embassy which had a dozen or more compartments doing things that were not unrelated, and money being spent less wisely than necessary. But the time and effort was something that you couldn't do every year. Maybe once every three years, it would be worth it. You might set them on track and not need to check more often. But my impression is, it didn't get picked up very widely. There was a very innovative type in State Department administration that was pushing this, but it didn't sell.

I think we also pioneered in introducing the computer into managing the database from which you operate in a country, and tried Cuba, I think, as the first test run by the research people. We cooperated with that, and I think this has been continued and followed up on. In doing these things and other things, I found among the old Latin American hands, there were some better people than most of the Department gave them credit for. Toby Belcher was one of them, who I thought was a first-class operator. And there were others, that if you gave them a challenge, showed them that from the White House down, there was interest, they could work hard and put in long hours and turn out a good product. The challenge was more important than the previous record in determining who worked and who didn't work. They were a good crowd, and I think we had a good show.

I did think that one of the things I should mention--I don't know how widely it was used elsewhere or previously in Latin America--is that I encouraged and participated myself in letter communication with embassies to keep in touch. There are just lots of subjects that are becoming problems or that you can deal with informally in a letter back and forth between you and the ambassador, or the desk officer sometimes and the ambassador, and uncover difficulties before they become serious in ways which, in a cable which has to be distributed all around town and in the embassy, too, usually, you can't deal with nearly as effectively. As I say, I don't know whether this was innovative or not, but I thought it was
indispensable. I have a record, as far as my files are concerned, of letter exchanges with ambassadors on various subjects, which includes some reprimands, but also some congratulations, and also some exploration. Lincoln Gordon and I had quite a lot of difficulty in '63, in getting agreement on how to treat President Goulart and his activities at that time, which bothered us from some standpoints, but you could explain them as wanting to take over the government or as wanting to prevent being taken over by the military. (Laughs) It was impossible to read Goulart's mind. We used letters to try to understand each other's views and what they meant for U.S. policy.

Q: You're talking now about the president of Brazil.

MARTIN: Yes. Goulart. On the other hand, we had a political ambassador in the Dominican Republic, John Martin, who had won various national prizes for his writing abilities, magazine articles in the Atlantic Monthly and so forth, and decided that the best way to communicate was to write a ten-page letter once a month to me. Well, it contained a lot of information that various parts of the government should know about, but it hadn't been in cables. How to make that available to the people who should know it was a very difficult thing. They were eloquent and great, but that was difficult.

One of the other problems with some political ambassadors was that they needed to have a DCM who knew the score and could manage an embassy and knew all the tricks of the trade in dealing with Washington. This same ambassador, I discovered through a back channel, wasn't talking to his DCM. I went down on some pretext very quickly and switched the DCM, sent him to Guayaquil in Ecuador as consul general, which is a very important job, and sent the man from there back up as DCM, and he worked out fine.

Q: Spencer King.

MARTIN: Spencer King was the man I brought back, and I can't remember the other one. You have to take an interest in this.

The other operational problem we had that we wrestled with a bit was the country team situation. With the Alliance for Progress there were more agencies sending people into the embassies. The State Department contingent could be third or fourth in the number of professional staff, so that the ambassador had quite a chore of getting the team to work together. Not all the ambassadors are good administrators or even the DCMs. There was an experiment made by Maurice Bernbaum in Ecuador, of having a special assistant whose job was "country team special assistant" to oversee what each did and how they should be coordinated.

Q: We did the same thing in the Dominican Republic. You sent me down there. As part of this programming process, we got an executive assistant. We got a slot for an executive assistant, and we sent one to the Dominican Republic, who helped Spencer King a great deal.
MARTIN: Yes. All kinds of people were there from various agencies that made it very difficult to keep track of who was doing what.

Q: **Looking back on it, it was kind of a secretariat job.**

MARTIN: Yes, receiving the paper flow and seeing that everybody knew what other people were doing.

Another thing I tried to do was see if we could get the same person holding both the job of economic counselor and aid mission chief, as they had a very similar path to follow. But it didn't prove possible to find people that had the qualifications that the ambassador would accept and aid would accept to do both. Aid is a much more technical job in many respects. So that didn't work out.

I did manage, with your help, to do one other thing, though, to get the aid desk officers moved to offices adjacent to the political desk officers of ARA.

Q: **Back to back.**

MARTIN: Back to back program. I think it's still in effect. I think we were the only people that did it. I think it made quite a lot of difference, because otherwise, next to commodities, aid was our principal headache with most of these countries. The price of coffee or tin or oil, plus aid, were the critical political issues with most of these countries for a large part of the time. So we just had to work together with the aid people, as well as the economic people. Fortunately, I, having been in the economic bureau, could help facilitate that. But it was a very important problem.

In just one other administrative angle, with the New Deal types that came in with Kennedy and with Walt Rostow's professorial background, we got by '62, early '63, flooded with policy papers of various sorts. George McGhee also wanted them. There were six or eight sets of country policy papers floating around, an aid policy, a political policy, a Cold War policy, a long-term strategy, a short-term strategy, and I finally wrote a memo to the Secretary saying, "This is getting totally out of hand." There was a crackdown.

One strategic policy paper was substituted for the half a dozen that were scheduled, never getting cleared adequately, because you had to clear them with your embassies. It was a load of them, too. We were just reading papers all the time.

Q: **You said there was one strategic paper?**

MARTIN: Rusk moved in and called the shots, and got a number of them eliminated. This was in about middle ‘63, I believe, before this was done.

Q: **With Rostow's help, I believe.**
MARTIN: He had to crack down on Rostow, but Rostow became the implementing agent to pull it together. Then McGhee left, so we were able to do a better job. It got very much out of hand in terms of the reading time, and some of them were 70 pages long. So that was, again, a complaint from the embassies.

One other complaint we got from the embassies of this sort that we never were able to deal with adequately, was that with the Kennedy interest in the area, there were just an enormous number of visitors to the embassies, wanting to see what was going on, inspect what was going on, congressional visitors, military visitors, State Department, aid teams. They just didn't have the additional personnel needed to have time to talk to all of them as much as they wanted and to take them around to visit projects and this sort of thing. I know that in Argentina--Ambassador Cole protested this in Chile, too--the military, in particular, could find excuses in February to go to those countries. He called them the "snow travelers." They were missing the U.S. snow and getting the summer climate down there. They just flooded in. Also, Cole commented that they came in their own aircraft with big entertainment allowances and so forth, and "Why don't they ever fly in commercial aircraft? A major in the military will come in his own aircraft while a State Department Assistant Secretary flies commercially. It gives a very bad image of the military status in the country."

Q: A very good point.

MARTIN: It was a very good point. So there were lots of problems of one sort and another of this sort. It took time.

I did feel, too, that it was important that I and other people get out and see what was happening in the field on the spot. You cannot cover issues adequately by cable or telephone. I may say, one of the results again related to this arose from the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was that we hadn't been able to reach people by telephone to get the votes in the OAS for the blockade. The telephone system wasn't good. We decided to put in a special telephone system to our embassies with some classification possibilities. It was going to cost $50 million or $100 million. McNamara said, "I can find that in the Defense budget. That's no problem," which really floored us. (Laughs)

Q: If you remember, I was your man on that.

MARTIN: That's right. You did. We definitely needed that, because we couldn't communicate. Two people didn't vote for the quarantine when we took the regular vote because of the telephone connections, although I had requested AT&T to give us and their embassies top priority and they did. One of them got word after we had finished the vote, and we reopened it again, from Peru. The Bolivian never did, but he voted without instructions.

Q: Was this during the Cuban Missile Crisis?
MARTIN: During the Cuban Missile Crisis. He came up and told us after the OAS vote approving the quarantine that "I'll probably be looking for a job, because I voted without instructions." We had our ambassador tell his Foreign Office how much we appreciated this, and we hoped he wouldn't be punished. (Laughs) So communications was also something that needed beefing up and had to do with the more active interest in Latin America and with the Communist-Cuba-Castro threat, which made it an urgent problem that we hadn't been prepared to deal with.

I'd just like to mention one other jurisdictional problem. On one occasion, at a meeting in the White House to discuss the Castro problem, the Under Secretary of Defense, who was Cyrus Vance, presented Kennedy, without any previous consultation with State, a paper proposing that there be established a position of czar, really, of all Cold War activities, counterinsurgency, etc., in Latin America, and that he be a General Krulak, a Defense Department officer. He had been active in Vietnam and had a good record.

We didn't get much chance to discuss it at that time. This was late in the meeting. But I said I thought that it would require quite a bit of discussion. My position--and I wrote Rusk a memo on this--was that if there is a czar, then he has to have my job, because everything I did was in the light of its impact on the Communist threat in Latin America. Furthermore, Krulak was a man with no experience or background in Latin America, and I didn't think he was competent to do it. Furthermore, there was an inter-agency committee dealing with the whole Cold War situation, of which Cottrell was chairman, which had been discussing a paper on new organizational arrangements that might be necessary in undertaking some new activities, which had been circulated around a bit but not approved. And I thought Defense submitting this directly to the President, without informing the people working on the issue, was out of order. In the end, Krulak became involved in the inter-agency committee, but not as a czar, and shortly afterwards, left the scene. But it was a real play to take over, clumsily handled. (Laughs)

Q: This was a memo that Under Secretary Vance wrote directly to the President?

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: This was then discussed?

MARTIN: Discussed very briefly during a meeting with the President on several subjects including the Cold War.

Q: And you were there with the President?

MARTIN: Yes. The President had to go out briefly, and Vance and I talked about it, and he agreed to postpone further discussion of it with Kennedy.

Q: What type of meeting was this? Was this a special group that met from time to time?
MARTIN: It was not a special group, no.

Q: I see.

MARTIN: I've got something on this in my ARA Oral History; I'll have to check it. I hadn't thought of looking at it before coming here. Anyway, that was one of the critical attacks on what I thought was a decent way to run the show, the right way to run the show from the Pentagon. Otherwise, we got along pretty well.

I got to know McNamara very well in the Missile Crisis, and I found it easy to get to him and settle things and work with him.

Q: But it was necessary to go to McNamara, wasn't it?

MARTIN: Yes. Often.

Q: Wasn't it often that, as I recall, we had a problem with a country and we would recall the ambassador and the Aid director and the USIS director and the military would say, "We're not going. The ambassador can't tell me what to do." Then you had to speak to him.

MARTIN: Yes, to pull back people, military attachés, for example, when we cut relations after a coup. We had to appeal for help.

I just want to say one other thing I ought to have said earlier in this. In terms of coordination, my task was made much easier, infinitely easier, by the fact that Ralph Dungan was, about my time, made the White House man on Latin America. He'd been in personnel with Kennedy when he was a senator and had worked on personnel in the White House. He was made the Latin American man. Ralph and I never disagreed on a matter of substance, and he was always able to get approval for what action I felt was necessary. He had the President's ear and confidence, and he also dealt very well with Latin America. He was a Catholic, but a liberal Catholic. He understood issues quickly, easily. He was very positive on the population problem, even though a Catholic. Later on, when he was the U.S. Executive Director at the Inter-American Development Bank and I was having problems with the refusal of its President to touch the issue, he fought for action though without success.

Schlesinger never became as knowledgeable as Dungan became, and he was somewhat more difficult to deal with, although very able and helpful, but from time to time he was a little farther left of center. I think I'm somewhat left of center, but in defending the Carlos Fuentes TV show with Dick Goodwin, and a few other occasions, I thought he went too far.

Q: This is the Mexican who was to debate with Goodwin on NBC.
MARTIN: Yes. Dungan was an invaluable asset. We were on the phone daily and in each other's offices and so forth, a very relaxed guy to work with. I felt this was a tremendous asset for me.

I thought perhaps in view of the oral history and another document I will give you, which may raise questions, I might say no more than I already have about my ARA period and go on to my years as ambassador in Argentina and how I got there. I don't think I've gone into that.

Q: May I ask you this? The documents you've given me, we discussed that before we began the tape. Would you mind saying again what those are?

MARTIN: What I have given you is an oral history that I did in the spring of '64, when there was a major program after Kennedy's assassination to do oral histories of people who had served with him. It runs about 115 pages; was at one time, until fairly recently, classified secret, but it is now cleared. They deleted about half a sentence and cleared it for public use by scholars.

Q: Any scholar can...

MARTIN: He has to write and get my permission through the Kennedy Library and whether I want to be consulted for quotations or that sort of thing. There's a regular form that has to be filled out before having access to it. But it is no longer classified.

The other document I have given you is a draft section for the book I'm working on, on "Kennedy and Latin America," in which I try to describe how I became the Assistant Secretary for Latin America rather suddenly in March of '62, what my previous experience had been, how the Latin American Bureau was set up, how it functioned, what the personalities were, what were the interagency arrangements, like the Latin American Policy Committee, and how I spent my time divided up between reading, seeing ambassadors, making trips, making speeches, how many people I saw from the corporate world, who they were, and who I saw from the media world. A rather specific discussion of what one did in the job.

Also I will give you the text of an article I did at its request for the New York Herald Tribune newspaper in the fall of 1963 on Kennedy's problems with military camps which became very controversial by claiming that he had made progress as he had told me he wanted me to do in view of imminent action by the Congress on his aid appropriation request.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, how would that material be available to a scholar?

MARTIN: That material was written for putting in a book.

Q: So that could be easily available?
MARTIN: I should think so if the book gets published. Meanwhile I see no reason for not letting any scholar read both of them.

Q: To a reputable scholar. Like the rest of this oral history that we're doing.

MARTIN: Yes. The arrangements for my book, in general, are that my final manuscript will be reviewed by the State Department Freedom of Information people, but as of now, I am not putting that detail in this book, but in another one I'm working on, on how the government functioned, rather than what it did in this period. An interest has been shown in that by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown. I would feel that there is nothing in there that would raise any security questions. It's an open discussion of how we worked, including how you, as my questioner, fit into the scheme of things. (Laughs)

Q: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Continuation of interview: April 26, 1988

MARTIN: When Johnson took over the presidency and I resigned, of course, there was discussion of possible embassies I might go to as an ambassador. It was suggested that I succeed Tom Mann, who succeeded me, as ambassador to Mexico. It would have been kind of an interesting move. I had succeeded him as Assistant Secretary Economic, and then after six months' lapse, I succeeded him as Assistant Secretary Latin America. But I had been in Mexico a couple of times and was rather unfavorably impressed by the number of Americans that had meetings there and all wanted to be entertained in the embassy. Also mention was made of the Philippines and of Denmark, but I wanted to stick with Latin America. I felt interested in that, and I had made arrangements to transfer Ambassador McClintock from Argentina in the spring to the Naval War College. So it was agreed that I should be named ambassador to Argentina, to take office in May, when McClintock was leaving.

My plans were, since as an ambassador in a country I felt I needed to know the language, to spend two or three months at the Foreign Service Institute language school with my wife Peggy, learning Spanish. We were just about ready to take a three weeks' holiday, longer than we had had for several years, and then go to the language school. I was walking out the back door of our house to get the traveler's checks that I needed to take with me. We had cut off the newspaper. We were leaving the next day. My wife was giving a luncheon for the wives of the assistant secretaries to meet Tom Mann's wife. I was halfway down the yard when Peggy called me and said, "Secretary Rusk is on the phone. Can you take it?"

I said, "Well, I guess so."

I came back, and he said, "We'd like you to come to the Cabinet room of the White House right away. Can you do it?"
I said, "I guess so." So I got in the car and found a parking place, went in the Cabinet room, and sat down. There were eight or ten people there, most of whom I knew. I sat next to Tom Mann. I said, "What country is it?" (Laughs)

He said, "Panama." Having cut off our newspaper and we don't normally listen to the radio or TV, I didn't know that there had been riots the day before in Panama, in which four Americans and 21 Panamanians had been killed, a protest against raising the American flag in the canal zone. The net result of the meeting was to decide that Stephen Ailes, the Under Secretary of the Army, who was the Chairman of the Panama Canal Board, Tom Mann, myself, and State's Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, whose name will come to me in a minute...

Q: Manning?

MARTIN: Yes, Bob Manning; we were to fly immediately to Panama to discuss the situation. We were to meet on the helicopter pad at the Pentagon to be taken to Andrews Air Force Base and flown to Panama.

Q: Did you get to go home?

MARTIN: We got to go home for about 15 minutes to pack a bag.

Q: You're lucky. Some people have done that and never got to go home. Like Harry Schlaudeman, when he went to the Dominican Republic, he went directly from the White House.

MARTIN: I can believe it. I did tell a couple of the wives who were there that their husbands were busy at home packing, maybe they could help them. (Laughs)

Q: They didn't know it?

MARTIN: No, no way they could know it yet, Mrs. Mann and Mrs. Manning. So we flew to Panama and spent about 24 hours discussing the situation. Relations had been broken, and that meant the embassy had had to leave Panama, and they were all sitting in the zone. At the end of the discussions, it was decided that it might take a few days to negotiate a settlement with the Panamanians, and somebody ought to be there to help the embassy and the other people to do this.

Q: You said they had to leave the embassy to go to the Canal Zone. Was there anyone left in the U.S. mission in Panama?

MARTIN: No.

Q: How about the Peace Corps?
MARTIN: Of course, they're not in the mission; they're in the country. I think they may have been left in the country. Normally, we do.

Q: No consular people?

MARTIN: No, they were closed down, that's my understanding. Since I was just going on holiday and was free, and they thought that in a few days we would work this out, it was decided I could stay. As they left, Steve Ailes said, "Anything I can do for you? Would you like your wife to come down and be here with you for a while?"

I said, "That would be great." So he did try to arrange that. There was a snowstorm which stopped planes from flying and it took a while. Finally, about three days later, she showed up at 5:00 o'clock in the morning and had to be met at the airport by the Panamanian National Guard, because no Americans were allowed outside the zone, and brought in.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, I helped her pack.

MARTIN: Did you really? (Laughs)

Q: While I was at your house, she got a call from Mr. Cy Vance to give her some kind of message. I don't know whether she came down with Cy Vance.

MARTIN: No, I don't believe so. I think I would have known if he came.

Anyway, she came, and we were staying in a barracks room. It looked like things might be dealt with fairly quickly. It was a Saturday that the others went back, and on a Tuesday night toward midnight, we thought we had reached an agreement perhaps. I'd been on the phone late that evening with Tom Mann, and he cleared some language with the President. It involved a little bit of fumbling with the Spanish translation, but in the end, it did not work. In cabling the text, the OAS staff which had come down cabled only the Spanish text and we had agreed only because one word had been given a little unusual English translation, "discuss" rather than "negotiate," I think, with respect to the Treaty. So it looked like it would be a much larger problem. There was a guest house attached to the old home built for the man who was building the Panama Canal, which was occupied by General O'Meara, the commander-in-chief of U.S. Southern Forces, I think they called him, CINCSOUTH. O'Meara invited us to use it and we spent about five weeks in the guest house living in a military encampment, so to speak.

My job became partly one of negotiating. We had negotiations in a hotel in Panama City, but we had to be escorted there and back by the National Guard; we couldn't leave on our own. My other task was as the representative of the President, to summarize and interpret the cables from the four intelligence organizations trying to collect information on the Panamanian situation and attitudes and so forth. There were also occasional disagreements between General O'Meara, Commander CINCSOUTH, and General Fleming, who was the Governor of the Panama Canal Zone. Some of the intelligence people were believing
anything the Panamanians would tell them. My job was sending a cable every day or so, saying what I thought was really the situation, sorting out these various reports.

Q: Did you have any career Foreign Service officers helping you?

MARTIN: No, there was no one there, as I recall it. Well, I'll take that back. There was a POLAD there.

Q: A political advisor.

MARTIN: Political advisor. I believe he was there during this period, and he did help. He was a bird specialist who took me on birding walks. He had become an expert in Australia and later he served in Brazil and wrote a book about Brazilian birds, I believe. Boonstra.

Q: Clare Boonstra.

MARTIN: Clare Boonstra. Very good. He was very helpful, that's right. That helped.

One of the more curious stories was that created by a member of the government of Panama, in a fairly important position, who had gotten an advanced degree in anthropology in the United States, had been a professor in Mexico, was seemingly a very intelligent man with a good background. He had been the contact that our AID mission had dealt with when they had problems understanding what the Panamanians really wanted. One of our staff talked to him, and he insisted that he and his colleagues believed that this whole incident had been arranged by McNamara to be able to convince the Congress that he needed another $10 billion for the Defense budget to be able to defend the Canal Zone. I thought for a reasonably intelligent, educated man, this was one of the greatest fantasies that could have been imagined and put out as something to be taken seriously.

Q: What was his position?

MARTIN: He was in the government, but I just don't remember now the position.

Finally, OAS sent down a committee to try to negotiate a settlement. With Panamanian Foreign Minister, Solis, whom I had known from visits in Washington and other occasions--I had been a member of the Panama Canal Board from about late '62 on so that I got down there for their meetings and knew the people somewhat--I worked something out. It looked like it was going to be settled, and we arranged to go home. Again there was some confusion, and Johnson wasn't quite happy with some parts of it but it worked. But we had had with us during the last days a lawyer from the Pentagon helping on the negotiations, and he had a special plane going back, and we went back with him. They landed to refuel at Fort Myer, at the base, and we got off to take half of the holiday we had previously planned in Florida.

Q: This is Fort Myer (sic) in Florida.
MARTIN: In Florida. I will get the name of that lawyer in due course, whom I knew later on. It was Joe Cellophane.

Q: *It's nice to have planes when you're a lawyer with the Defense Department.*

MARTIN: It is. It's a great help.

Q: *Unlike the State Department.*

MARTIN: Unlike the State Department.

Q: *Traveling tourist.*

MARTIN: Actually, now that you mentioned that, while I was Assistant Secretary for Latin America, I got a letter from our ambassador in Chile, Charles Cole, who had been president of Amherst, I believe, and vice president of Rockefeller Foundation, a very able, scholarly gentleman, protesting vigorously the fact that assistant secretaries of state arrived commercially, a single major in the Army arrived alone in a big Army airplane and gave a totally wrong impression to their military about the role of military in a government.

Q: *And to their civilians.*

MARTIN: And to their civilians. They had expense allowances for weekend visits that were equal to the Chilean Army for the year. It was a very negative procedure. Of course, Cole had particular problems because they all wanted to come there in winter, and they really overloaded the Embassy to try to take care of them all.

To go back to '64, we spent two weeks in Sanibel Island in Florida when it was still a very undeveloped place, visited some friends in Naples, and went home and went into language training, and I had a single teacher, just the two of us, spent six hours a day in class and two or three studying outside of class. For the first couple of weeks, it was a Colombian. They speak as good Spanish as any of the Latin Americans. Then even better, we had an Argentine for the final three weeks.

Q: *Because you were going to Argentina.*

MARTIN: We were going to Argentina. He was a semi-professional political scientist, something like this, so he understood the problems, as well as the language, of which the pronunciation is quite different and some word use is different from the standard text the Foreign Service Institute uses. This was very helpful.

Q: *Was this a conscious effort on the part of the Institute to give you an Argentine?*

MARTIN: I don't know. I hope so.
Q: It would be interesting.

MARTIN: We stuck with that until it was time for us to leave, and we took the boat to study our Spanish further, to rest and relax a bit after all the packing and other chores necessary. We did study quite a lot on the boat. We stopped in Montevideo, and an embassy officer came on the boat and said, "There's an Argentine TV reporter here that would like to interview you." So I went to the embassy and did a brief interview on TV in Spanish.

Q: In Montevideo.

MARTIN: In Montevideo, to be shown in Argentina. Then when we arrived in Buenos Aires, they had set up a press conference on the boat. I didn't understand all the questions quite well, but apparently I got by with it. Language is a very difficult subject for me. I'm an eye-learner, not an ear-learner, and that makes pronunciation very complicated. It was much easier to learn to read than to talk. But I did manage with this background and continued work after I got there with a woman in the embassy, who provided lessons.

Q: How did you work that into your day, Mr. Ambassador?

MARTIN: Normally, I think she came at something like 8:30 and we did it for half an hour or an hour in the morning before I left for the embassy. She came to the residence.

The situation in Buenos Aires was a bit complicated in a management way, in that I had been there before, three times, first for a meeting of the Economic Commission for Latin America in Mar del Plata, one of the big resort areas on the ocean, second for a brief stay after a meeting in Brazil to talk to a new Minister of Economy about the problems he found, and for the Inauguration of President Illia. When I got back from the first one, I had written a memo to our buildings administration saying, "This embassy residence is nothing that an American in the Alliance for Progress period should be occupying." It had something like 40 rooms, was designed by a French architect in the mid-teens for an Argentine who was minister in Paris, which was then the ambassador in their embassy, thought he might be president some day and wanted a home that would be appropriate for a president of Argentina. Money was no problem. They brought over workmen to do the wood carving and various other things from Italy and France. It was a little bit of a copy of a palace in the Versailles area. All the ceilings were 30 feet high and there was, of course, an elevator. It had four floors. Like a French building, the ground floor was the work floor, and on the second floor were the public rooms, on the third floor were the residential rooms, and on the top floor were staff and laundry facilities. There were 14 rooms for servants, and we had about that many staff. There was a lately built little swimming pool, a lovely garden, a tennis court, a small building just beyond the tennis court for the chauffeur and his family, so they'd always be available. It was on Avenida Libertador, which has seven lanes each way, the main thoroughfare out to the suburbs. But nobody wanted to buy it, so there was no way of selling it.
I was able to tell congressional visitors, particularly Republicans, that it had been purchased for the U.S. residence by President Hoover in 1929 for $5 million. It was, I believe, the second largest residence, second only to Czechoslovakia.

Q: Czechoslovakia?

MARTIN: They bought a palace in Prague for some reason. We had a ballroom with sliding doors into the living room, and between the two, we could seat easily 200 people for a concert or a lecture. We had a dining room which was set up to seat 36, with Chinese tables and Chippendale chairs, red lacquer and so forth. A very luxuriously equipped setup, except that for some reason, nobody had looked at it from a maintenance standpoint for five or six years. Most of the rugs had to be replaced, because a dog or two had had the freedom of the place. We brought in somebody to paint a few little yellow marks that were showing on the black clothes racks that were on the ground floor, so everybody could hang their clothes up, a big room, and when they started working on them, they discovered they were brass, and it was the black that needed to be taken off, not that the brass needed to be covered. (Laughs) When Peggy first saw the place, she said, "Instead of going to the language school, I should have gone to the Lewis Hotel Training Institute."

Q: Exactly right.

MARTIN: Fortunately, on our floor, the third, there was a dining room that seated about 14 people, so we didn't always have to entertain in the big room, and that was an advantage. In one period of about ten or 12 days shortly after we arrived, we had over 2,000 people in the residence. One was the Marine ball that is held every year, another was a painting show sponsored to raise money by an American women's organization. In May, '66, we gave a supper party for the entire Philadelphia Orchestra with Eugene Ormandy conducting. It was after a free concert, the first of four they gave, to which an Argentine musical organization, The Mozarteum, that co-sponsored their visit with the State Department, and the Embassy had invited for free all the audience of the 3200 the Colon Theatre seated. After the concert 355 people, our friends, those of the Mozarteum, and the orchestra of 130 people or so sat down to a 3 course supper. The president came. He liked classical music though he was a country doctor. His wife was not well and didn't come.

Q: Who was the president then?

MARTIN: Arturo Illia. We had about 30 at sort of a head table, and 55 tables for six, all served out of our own kitchens. To make it American, we started with consommé served by waiters, and Ritz crackers, which the Argentines just love. We never could keep the Ritz cracker plates full. Then we had Lobster Newburg, served from a buffet. That came from the small lobsters from Chile, but to make it more American, PanAm had flown in shells of the big lobsters from Maine to put on the buffet table. One of our American friends, a wonderful couple, he was head of Kaiser Argentina, presented us, instead of flowers or something, with a product of one of the hotels, a full-size ice violin and bow with a spare in case it melted. Then as the last course, Peggy had gotten a couple of cases--the Argentines
don't eat cake--so she got a couple of cases of angel-food cake mix, and the embassy wives made angel-food cakes with icing, and with ice cream that was served as the dessert.

Q: And they liked it?

MARTIN: Oh, they loved it. Afterwards, it finished about 12:00 o'clock, I guess, and as they were leaving, one of the members of the board of the women's organization encountered President Illia, and they gave each other a warm abrazo. Four weeks later, the member of the board, with one of his colleagues, a revolver in hand, ousted and replaced President Illia. His name was General Ongania, who had recently retired. That was the last cordial greeting they had had with each other.

Q: So the rest of your tour there, this general was in power?

MARTIN: The General was in power for the rest of the tour.

I think it's perhaps a good point to discuss a little bit one of the really critical issues, which was this coup.

Q: We're talking what year now, Mr. Ambassador?

MARTIN: This is '66, two years after we got there. Illia, as I say, was a country doctor, a very nice man, very honest, but being governor of one of the Western provinces of Argentina was his only political experience. He was not a competent manager, he did not know how to use his Cabinet, and he was from a rural-based lower middle-class party. Argentina was accustomed to be run by Buenos Aires leaders of the business community. Buenos Aires had a third of the population of the country, essentially, some 6 million or 7 million people, a very big business and industrial complex, and they were used to running Argentina. They resented very strongly this slightly left-of-center lower middle-class people party, its totally inexperienced President, and many of his Cabinet also inexperienced.

So there was an increasing movement to protest the way he was running the show and take over. In addition--and this was very important--there were the Peronists, people who belonged to the party of Juan Peron, who had been ousted in 1956 after 9 years of being a dictator. His supporters were the working class, the unions, and they got about 30%, 35% of the vote, generally. He was still a very popular man, as was his former wife, Evita, who had done even more than he to become popular with the poor people in the country that they called the decamisados, the shirtless ones. Also a great many of the immigrants who had been discouraged from becoming citizens because if they did they would make it more difficult for the Spanish to run the country with the help of the English, were Peronists. If you became a citizen, you were subject to additional taxes and to the military draft. While we were there, the Italian embassy was handling passports for about a million-and-a-quarter Italians who wanted to go to Europe as Italians, not Argentines.
Anyway, Peron had begun to make these people feel they belonged to the country, and so he was a very popular figure. The military felt that he was way left of center, if not Communist, and so they were very strongly opposed to Peronism. President Illia was more tolerant, although not a Peronist by any means. But in elections held in the spring of ’66, the Peronists won a number of governorships. The military didn't want them to be permitted to vote or to run candidates. There was to be another election a little later in the year. In the Spring, there had been one case in which somehow Peron was put on a radio appealing for votes, and the overwhelmingly favorite candidate in the rather important province of Mendoza out in the Andes mountain area was defeated by the Peronist one. They were afraid that in the next congressional election, which would be coming up shortly, the Peronists might win control of the legislature.

Q: Peron was, at this point, in Madrid.

MARTIN: He was in exile in Spain, with a lot of money stacked away to be able to do things and trying to communicate and doing some communication. So that partly it was Illia's incompetence, partly it was fear of Peronism that led to this desire to move in.

I was invited to several lunches or dinners in this period to be lobbied on why this was essential, including by the president that the military had ousted, in March of ’62, Frondizi. I said, "I can recognize some of the problems, although I think they're exaggerated." We felt some of the writers on economic subjects for the newspapers had doctored the figures to make the economy look bad. But the U.S. business community was all for a change, strongly anti-Illia. I felt that it wasn't so much who you put in first, but who comes next. You start in the military system and how do you get out of it? This would be very difficult.

There was a lot of public talk about the coup planning; it wasn't an under-the-table business. I got authority from Washington for the embassy to issue a statement in favor of constitutional regimes and opposition to any unconstitutional change. This made the plotters pretty angry.

I had home leave coming up in early June. I also wanted to be in Washington for some talks that the Finance Minister and the president of the Central Bank were to have with the World Bank and IMF, which they had expelled from the country for what an earlier government thought were unwarranted efforts to dictate government economic policies. Hence they had no access to IMF or World Bank funds. Illia had finally decided that Argentina should be excused for its bad behavior.

Q: This was a possibility of resuming their work.

MARTIN: Yes. So I came back to Washington to help with those talks as I had had good relations in the E Bureau with the top people of both agencies and then to have my home leave. During my leave I was also to participate as a resource person in an Aspen Institute Seminar for Business Executives in Aspen, Colorado. It seemed likely to be a challenging experience. I also had a date to talk to a friend at the New York Times about the factual
errors their man in Buenos Aires had often made in his articles on the political and economic scene. But before I could do this or much with the Bank and Fund, I was awakened at 6:00 o'clock on morning, only a few days after arriving, to hear a coup had taken place the night before. I had checked around with the CIA, everybody else. The plans were for a coup in September. So nothing was expected; my being away for a few weeks was no great problem. This was a surprise. Rusk was not happy that I was not there at the time, and he was right, except that it was totally unexpected.

I found out why later. What had happened was that on a Thursday night, as I recall it, a couple of the Peronist politicians had had dinner with a Major-General in command of the biggest Army base, near the second largest city, Rosario. The word had been leaked to the plotters on Saturday, I believe, about this dinner. There had been a coup attempt several years earlier in which the Navy and Air Force and the Army had fired at each other. Military solidarity was a number-one objective of the military plotters group, and they had often said, "We'll never do it until we can be absolutely united." Because of their anti-Peronist attitude, many were reluctant to have waited this long to have it. But when they found that there was this meeting, without really apparently checking out what it was about, whether it was an attempt to get Army support for the Peronists or Illia, they decided, "We must act now," and they did. That's why it was then rather than later. One of the results was that when General Ongania became the top man, he had a very poor Cabinet. They hadn't picked the Cabinet people, and he had to do some pretty fast changeovers in the course of the first six or nine months.

Q: What time period is this now?

MARTIN: This is still '66. Several months earlier, having retired from the military, Ongania had sought a private date with me, said he wanted to promote his views by publishing a newspaper, and hoped our Export-Import Bank could finance the printing equipment he would need. I checked and equally privately told him that it never made loans for newspapers. It was too political a field. Nothing ever leaked about it, so Ongania decided that, yes, I could come back, and so I did, though several of his advisors had opposed it and I was treated rather coolly by a few of them. However, I was able to deal with the Ongania Government, on the whole, reasonably comfortably for the rest of the period.

While in the late Sixties and early Seventies there was a tremendous amount of leftist guerrilla violence. While I was there it was quite limited and the leftists were not very well informed. In 1963 we had moved our chancery offices out of a bank building to another building which was all our own. A bomb exploded at the bank building about six months later; they hadn't realized we'd moved. About four weeks after we had left the residence to go to Paris, the residence was shot with submachine-gun bullets about midnight from a car driving down the street. There were metal window shades so nobody was hurt, even though there were staff there. They were out of date again.
The chancery we moved to had a certain problem, in that it was on a very narrow street, and you could easily block off the street. The parking was down a ramp. You could have let a car coast down that ramp with a bomb in it, and blown up the whole place. We tried to work out a way to protect the staff. The only escape over to a major street was out a window in the back onto the roof of a building facing the parallel street, and so we worked that out.

_Q: Mr. Ambassador, let's talk a little about that building. I was in on that. As I recall, that wasn't an ordinarily built FBO building. Isn't it true?_

MARTIN: We just bought somebody else's building.

_Q: That's right. So it wasn't planned to be an embassy._

MARTIN: No, not at all. Just an office building, about four or five floors. Anyway, in Buenos Aires, we moved around totally freely doing anything we wanted and personally never had any trouble.

When we got to the provinces, we found people much more concerned and much stricter in their attempt to protect us. We went to one of the major cities, Cordoba, and were told we couldn't leave the hotel without an escort. Well, we liked to walk around and see things. We snuck out one night and did walk around.

On another occasion, we were met outside of the town in our car by a horse cavalry brigade escorting us in to the town. We visited the capitals of, I think, every province, which few ambassadors had done. We stayed in a very poor hotel in one, though the best it had, in a small room with a very flimsy door with a transom that you had to keep open if you wanted to breathe. We heard some noises in the middle of the night and discovered there was a man sitting in a chair all night long outside of our door as a guard. He could hear everything that went on. So that we had quite a lot of this kind of what we thought was overprotection.

Also, at least twice, when I was going to speak to students at a university, suddenly the mayor wanted to give me a vin d'honneur, a wine party in my honor, and the university meeting would have to be canceled. Clearly, they feared protests, student disorders against the U.S. ambassador, and concocted the wine affair as a replacement.

In Mendoza in October, '64, the place I mentioned previously, we also had a curious incident. There is a statue there to General San Martin, an Argentine, who led the fight for freedom from Spain in Latin America. I had to lay a wreath. It's in a park and reached by going up a hill, because you're right on the edge of the Andes Mountains. We drove up, and nothing happened, but we learned later that somebody had sprinkled on that roadway three-pointed nails that if you throw them out, there will always be one nail pointing up, to puncture our tires. But a tourist went up first and got stung, so they cleaned them off. Somebody else rode a bicycle alongside our car who apparently was armed, and he got arrested. But nothing happened, and we were all right. It was much calmer than when I was there in '74, when things were much more difficult in terms of security.
Q: The guerrilla activity was intensified in '74?

MARTIN: Oh, very much. Oh, worse and worse. The ambassador moved only in a three-car group, a car in front and a car behind. It just was a terribly difficult situation. He followed different routes every time he went any place. They were building a bomb shelter in the basement of the residence. There had been a bomb go off right outside our garden, but it had not caused any damage to residents, knocked a few bricks off the wall. So it got much worse for everybody, including Argentines.

Q: Do you feel, from your vantage point--you were there earlier--that the reaction of the generals, the military, to that was justified from what we read in the papers?

MARTIN: No. There was a problem, definitely, but the reaction was a total violation of legal means to control a situation, and it, I think, accentuated the problem, the way they dealt with it. It made it worse.

One of the major problems we had there--on the whole, things were relatively quiet--was that shortly after taking office, Illia carried out part of his platform, which was to cancel all but one of the oil company contracts. They had found that there was quite a lot of oil in Argentina. A number of American and European companies were drilling, processing, and selling oil products. The contracts to do so had been negotiated in the Frondizi period with the companies. There were charges that the companies had bribed people to get more favorable contracts than would be normal and appropriate. Corruption was not unknown in Argentina by a long shot. I don't know whether there was any. The oil companies said not. There certainly was incompetence, in terms of nobody in the government knowing what was a reasonable contract. With no experience on this, it's a tricky subject.

Anyway, his party was committed by election campaign promises to canceling the contracts. They did it for all the companies except one, which was basically Cities Service. I never knew why, except they had an Argentine who was a Yale graduate who was their lobbyist and negotiator. They expanded production, sent profits in dollars back to the U.S. all during this period, while the rest of them were closed down. Actually, after the meeting in Sao Paulo of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in late October, '63, Harriman, who was head of our delegation, went to Argentina to discuss this issue. When he came back he had a meeting with the oil company executives in his offices on November 22nd. In the afternoon, when they all arrived, the oil company people said, "President Kennedy has been shot. Shouldn't we postpone this 'til later?"

Harriman said, "It's a tragic event, but it doesn't justify postponing. The government's business must go on."

Q: That's very interesting.

MARTIN: I was a little unhappy.
Q: That's where you were when I came back to the office and you weren't there.

MARTIN: Yes. Anyway, it didn't last too long. In Argentina we tried our best to see how a settlement could be negotiated. I think the basic problem was that the Argentines had no confidence in their ability to negotiate a good settlement. They didn't trust the oil companies. They had nobody that was really knowledgeable in the field. So at one point, I got a friend of mine with whom I had worked on some oil problems in the Austrian peace treaty, named Walter Levy, who had become one of the world's outstanding petroleum specialists, and I knew that he was willing to help developing countries on this. He had done something for Bangladesh at one point. So I got him to come down and talk to the Argentines about what was a reasonable settlement of the problem. His only compensation was to ask for an Argentine painting, and they gave him one. But they still didn't have the courage to really address it effectively. So we didn't get a settlement while I was there. There were three or four major efforts to negotiate something, but none of them worked. The oil companies said, "We'll never come back."

A settlement was reached a year or so later, and all of them came back when they opened some new offshore drilling areas that really hadn't been explored yet.

This was a constant source of tension with the Illia Government, and the Ongania Government didn't have, again, the abilities to deal with it effectively in negotiating terms.

We had another business problem in that a contract had been negotiated to build a synthetic rubber plant. Three U.S. companies had a cost-plus construction contract put together by a Texas contracting company. They were Goodyear Rubber, Cities Service, I believe, and one other big company. It was completed while I was there. It had the only OPIC guarantee, Overseas Private Investment Contract guarantee, that Argentina ever made, about $100 million.

They had a deal as to what they would pay for the raw materials which were coming in from up in the northwest of the country to produce it, and apparently some assurances from the Frondizi people that, "Well, when you get ready to produce, we'll cut the price." When they were ready to produce, the price was too high and the Illia government wasn't about ready to cut it. But even worse, there was a major surplus of natural rubber globally, and the price was low. So even with a cut price, it wouldn't have been a very good market. And what do we do with it? The retired chairman of the board of Cities Service was kept on just to negotiate on this. We tried to work out a way to get Argentine companies to agree to buy the product but they had never used synthetic rubber. The Goodyear subsidiary even refused 'til we finally got some word back to their headquarters in the U.S. The Italian tire company was one of the biggest purchasers, and they weren't interested.

But we finally worked out a deal by which for every pound of synthetic rubber that the consuming companies bought, they could import so many pounds of natural, a matching
deal. But it was another case, of which I had several, in which American companies weren't all working together, even though we had lots of interest in getting them to do so.

Another case was in Honduras on an agrarian reform expropriation law, in which the United Fruit Company, with big banana plantations, was howling for us to organize a coup against the government for what it was doing, and Standard Fruit, with even larger plantations, saying, "The law's all right with us."

We had another of these in Argentina, where it enacted a law about limiting royalty remittances on pharmaceuticals and setting price controls in which all of the companies screamed bloody murder, except one, which was the biggest in the country, an American company. It said, "We have no problems with this. We think we'll sell more with lower prices." (Laughs) I was in the middle.

In dealing with the U.S. business community, which was pretty well organized there, they wanted me to participate very actively in all of their meetings and be one of them. I was invited to speak at all the Thanksgiving parties they gave. They had some rather large club quarters, and they gave big Thanksgiving dinners for the American community.

Q: An American club there, as I recall.

MARTIN: Yes, it's an American club. I did speak at each Thanksgiving dinner, but at the first one, I said, "You must remember that while I am very interested in the concerns of the American business community, that is not my sole responsibility. We have other interests, too, so I cannot guarantee I'll always be on your side in a dispute, but I'll always be ready to listen." I did arrange that one Friday morning a month from about 8:30 or 9:00 o'clock 'til 10:00, there was coffee at the residence for a group of about 20 people, sort of the board of the American business community, at which we talked very frankly about how we each saw this, that, and the other problem. It was useful.

When I was back there in '74, it just happened they were having one of these. Now it was mostly Argentines, because the violence had been so great, such as the kidnapings of some American business executives, with one of them paying a million-dollar ransom, that American executives had been replaced by Argentine executives almost entirely.

I had a dialogue constantly with them, and I think that was a very important tool to keep in touch with what they thought. They would often be able to tell us things about what the government was doing, good or bad, that we needed to know.

Q: How much help was your staff on this?

MARTIN: A fair amount. I did not have a satisfactory economic counselor, initially. I did get a better one somewhat later. I had real trouble with the AID representative, and I finally had to ask for him to be pulled out as he was very conservative, and a friend only of the most conservative elements there, and very critical of the Illia government. His policies
were not all wise but it was not right for U.S. officials to say so to Argentines without the approval of the Ambassador or Washington. It only encouraged the advocates of a coup, who finally won out in time, 1966.

I tried another approach to the business leaders problem. It was to help them organize a copy of our Business Council with which I had worked a bit when Assistant Secretary of State for Economics. It consisted of a fairly large group of leaders of the business community who met several times a year to hear experts talk about the problems of the U.S. economy and to agree on changes in our governments policies which should be promoted. Then they arranged for their leadership to present their ideas privately to the appropriate officials, usually at the Cabinet level, avoiding publicity.

This approach contrasted sharply with that of an Argentine organization whose tactic while I was there was to present their views to President Illia, usually including a list of Cabinet members they wanted fired, and then hold a press conference to denounce his refusal to agree with them.

I got the President of U.S. Steel who was then or recently had been President of the Business Council to come to Buenos Aires and explore the possibility of creating a copy of it. It didn't work then, mainly because too many of the leading corporations were foreign-owned and often headed by foreigners, a major obstacle to the kind of approach used by the Business Council. But it was done later.

Q: Did you get a replacement for the AID man?

MARTIN: Yes. One of the people that I pulled out went to Norfolk as POLAD. But the political people, I thought, were very good. I had a first-class political staff. My initial DCM went over soon as ambassador to Uruguay, and died there in a baseball game. His replacement was Len Saccio, who later was Acting Ambassador for eight months after I left.

Q: Len Saccio was your DCM?

MARTIN: Yes. First-class.

Q: He's a first-rate man.

MARTIN: Yes. He was fine.

Q: I remember the trouble you and I had keeping Len in the government, when he came back from Brazil.

MARTIN: Yes.
Q: Others wanted him to leave because he was a Republican, and Graham Martin turned his back on him.

MARTIN: I didn't remember Graham's involvement.

Q: Oh, yes. Graham wouldn't see him. You and I arranged that he go as DCM down to, I think, El Salvador, over Ralph Dungan's protest, but we got him in and we saved a very good man.

MARTIN: Oh, we did. We still see Len now and then. He retired to Connecticut.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, to talk about staffing for just a minute, how did you feel about your kind of relationships and, if we can use the word, control over other elements of the U.S. mission--USIA, CIA, etc?

MARTIN: No problems. We did try an experiment of a consolidated administrative staff for all the various agencies, including the military.

Q: Including the military?

MARTIN: Yes. At the end, the military decided not to come along, basically because they had too many people in uniform they didn't know what to do with. They sent them down as their administrative staff.

Q: Did you have any remnant of the program system which you had authorized earlier for Colombia and Argentina?

MARTIN: No. That never came up. The political staff was good. One of the things I did was to arrange for the junior political people to make brief visits to the provinces.

Q: Even though their positions did not call for it?

MARTIN: Didn't call for it.

Q: Like the consular people issuing visas.

MARTIN: Yes. But making visits for just political purposes, because the constitution of Argentina is like the American, and the state governments have their own elections and own legislatures, and they're important in the overall scene, Buenos Aires province, in particular. It's got a very large population. Buenos Aires is not part of Buenos Aires province; it's independent, like Washington. So it has a different political role. The mayor becomes a pretty important person.

Q: But you did feel it was important for people to get out and do all of this.
MARTIN: Yes, out into the countryside.

Q: Did you have trouble financing that?

MARTIN: I think there was a little bit of trouble, but we did manage to find the funds for that. I don't know that, offhand, I can think of anything else that was special.

I might just say about how I left. My four years was nearly up.

No, one other incident. In the spring of '67, Lincoln Gordon was offered the presidency of Johns Hopkins. He was then the Assistant Secretary for ARA. He recommended to Johnson and Rusk that I be brought back to succeed him. In May he asked me to come up for consultation, and we talked about it. At the time, Sol Linowitz, who was the ambassador to the OAS, had expressed an interest in the job. I told Rusk that I was not really much interested in working for Johnson. I'd known him a bit. It wasn't like working with Kennedy. Rusk said, "You wouldn't have as much contact with him as you did with Kennedy."

I did say, "I know about the Linowitz interest. I would rather like to have his job if I could then be the U.S. member of CIAP, the Committee on the Inter-American Alliance for Progress," which was doing a major job then in reviewing country programs, and that's one thing that interested me very much. But no, they said, "We want you to take the ARA job. I'd like you to have a chance to talk to President Johnson about this." He was out of town and it was postponed a couple of days, but I did get to talk to him, and he seemed to be agreeable.

Q: Did you talk policy?

MARTIN: Not really, no. This was maybe on a Friday. On Saturday, I went back to Argentina, with the understanding that early the next week, I would be named, as Linc was anxious to get off.

As the story goes, on Monday, the White House asked the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee if it would need a hearing, since I had been up there often, and at their regular meeting with the press later that day, they mentioned to the press that my name was going to be submitted. I'm told that the press, when they left, said, "We won't publish that, because we know that Johnson withdraws nominations if they're published before he's announced them." There had been a head of the Marine Corps and a proposed Under Secretary of Commerce, Lloyd Cutler, that had had that experience. But the Washington Star correspondent went ahead and published it.

Late on Tuesday night, I gather, Johnson called Covey Oliver, who was a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, to invite him to take the job. Covey said he'd like to think about it overnight, and the next morning, said he would. He had served in the Department. We had known each other in the middle Forties when he was in occupied area
affairs. He had been ambassador in Colombia and had been interested in legal problems in Latin America. He was not eager, because he had a couple of kids going to the University of Pennsylvania, that got free tuition while he was there, but he decided, "If the President wants me, I'll take it."

On Wednesday, Rusk called me to let me know that the President had changed his mind and what he was going to announce. I had already heard. A message had gotten to Panama, and somebody had just arrived in Buenos Aires from Panama and told me, "We understand Covey's taking the job." I was not broken-hearted, but that's where that ended.

The next month I was asked to be on the U.S. delegation to an Economic Commission for Latin America Annual meeting in Vina del Mar, Chile. Covey Oliver was chair of our delegation and I was his Deputy. He had not, apparently, known the background, and he said, "If I'd known that, I would not have taken it." (Laughs)

At the meeting of the Economic Commission for Latin America, my only input there was to protest that several countries were trying to give it a number of new assignments which were not very clear, and it was about two years behind on the assignments it already had. Instead of just trying to veto one, I suggested that "Maybe we ought to wait 'til they finished what they've got before we put more projects on their plate. We may want to treat them differently when they finally get around to them."

I also was invited to a meeting in September of a special Inter-American Economic Commission in Ascension, Paraguay, after a meeting Johnson had attended of presidents in Punta del Este on the AFP.

In October '67 I was brought back from Buenos Aires to chair a study group set up as one of a series by the Under Secretary's Committee, on which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Maxwell Taylor, was also active. Our assignment was to start from scratch to draft a U.S. policy for Latin America over the next five years. There were about 10 of us on detail from various agencies including one or two Cold War specialists with backgrounds in Soviet policy, not Latin America. There were also at least two JCS staffers. Our offices were in the JCS area of the Pentagon and I ate lunch in the JCS dining room. [It was at one of these lunches that Rusk told of trying to persuade the Rockefeller Foundation (of which he had been President) that they should make a grant of $25,000 to any U.S. Cabinet minister who promised never to write a book on his experiences.] We were given 4-6 weeks to do the job and all went to CINCLANT headquarters in Norfolk and that of CINCSOUTH in the Canal Zone to get ideas. Those without LA experience also visited several countries. We called in all sorts of "witnesses" to advise us on our policy choices. I got luckily as a special assistant a White House Fellow who had been assigned to Rusk who didn't know what to do with him. It was Peter Krogh, a Latin American specialist who later became Dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Affairs and was a member with me on the ICED Board in the '80s.
Our report, not finalized textually until early '68 when a couple of the staff brought the final draft to Paris to get my okay, was approved by the Under Secretary's Committee, and enthusiastically by General Taylor. It concluded that the AFP policy of Kennedy should be continued with only one change. It had assumed that the major cold war threat came from rural poverty and stressed agrarian reform and we decided it was the urban middle and lower class, especially students and labor unions that were the main problem. What to do was less clear as we had interviewed the present and previous heads of the Peace Corps and all had confessed a complete failure of their grass roots programs in urban areas and had canceled them.

When I called on the Nixon Assistant Secretary for ARA, Charles Meyer, in early '69, no one knew where a copy of our report was but I finally got him one from the LA Division of INR.

In Argentina, we didn't have too much connection with development organizations. It was a wealthy country, relatively speaking, one of the highest per capita income except perhaps Venezuela with its oil, but the most developed country in Latin America, in terms of general education and so forth. In fact once or twice it explored informally seeking membership in the OECD. Hence it did not use the Inter-American Development Bank to any extent, but as far as I could tell, it was doing a reasonably decent, professional job.

The Organization of American States had its annual meeting of foreign ministers in Buenos Aires in February of 1967. Rusk came down and stayed with us, as did Bunker, the OAS ambassador. I was brought in and sat for the U.S. on a couple of the panels that were set up to deal with particular issues during that meeting. It seemed to go reasonably smoothly, but again, it was not my impression that there were any major challenges that the OAS was facing at this time. The Castro situation was relatively quiet. There were no other major uproars in Latin America that it had to face. It did, at this meeting, adopt a few changes in structures, but nothing of major consequence that I can remember.

So it was, I think, a relatively quiet period for it on the whole, in which there were no great complaints about the way they were functioning. The CIAP operation was doing a quite good job in reviewing country programs and evaluating them. I did think that the pressure we were then putting on for more action by the Latin American free-trade area, or Common Market, structure based in Montevideo was, on the whole, being counterproductive, because most of the proponents of the idea wanted primarily to get a solid block of countries that could talk back to the United States. When we became enthusiastic for it, they lost interest. (Laughs) It is one of the things one doesn't always consider as much as one should.

In September '65 I had to spend a number of weeks in Washington chairing the State Department Selection Board which had to choose the Class I officers that deserved promotion to the rank of Career Minister. However, our list was never sent to the Senate for approval as Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was so upset already with our involvement in Vietnam that he thought no Foreign Service officer
deserved a promotion. In '67 the question of another meeting was raised with me as chairman but it was decided not to bother.

Our Board met after finishing its work with the Under Secretary for Administration to call attention to the unfortunate fact that about three-fourths of the officers we put in the bottom 5% then or in their just previous assignment had had jobs in the personnel field. No Ambassador or Assistant Secretary wanted them. We thought personnel policy was a critical field for effective diplomacy--it is people that count--and deplored this dumping tactic in that area.

In July, 1965, I went to a meeting of ambassadors in Lima, which Jack Vaughn chaired, he being the Assistant Secretary at that point. I got the impression that he had no freedom of maneuver at all. Tom Mann was an Under Secretary and he ran the show, even though he was not specifically responsible for Latin America. Jack Vaughn left after a very short period as the Assistant Secretary, to become head of the Peace Corps. Mann left shortly thereafter too, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused to approve his promotion to Career Ambassador.

I did have one difficult situation that I should have talked about, in connection with the Dominican Republic crisis. Harriman was sent around Latin America to get support on the Dominican crisis, went to Colombia and to Chile and came to Argentina and spoke very dramatically about what was needed. He was talking then a little bit about a U.N.-type force, such as was put in Korea during the Korean War. But the tune was changed very shortly thereafter.

**Q: Was this the point where Ambassador Bunker was negotiating in the Dominican Republic?**

MARTIN: Not yet, no. This is before that. This is right at the beginning. Very shortly after his visit, we decided to try to provide an OAS military intervention capacity, and I was asked one Saturday afternoon to see immediately the foreign minister to get him to change the Argentine position which had been that there should be a political advisor on the staff of the general who was head of the OAS forces. He agreed to change their position.

The next week, I was asked to reverse their position back, because we wanted to put Bunker on as chief negotiator, but he wouldn't change his position. Meanwhile, President Illia had agreed to an Argentine military contribution to the operation. I think on a Saturday or Sunday night, he had signed the document--Saturday night, I think--authorizing this. On Friday, George Ball had brought the UN in without consulting or even informing the OAS, put it on the UN Security Council agenda, a bad procedure. On Sunday morning, *Agence France Press* had a story about a statement by Harriman that, "The Communist forces have been driven out of..." And he said, apparently, Santa Domingo, and it came over the radio as the Dominican Republic.

**Q: He said Santa Domingo.**
MARTIN: The capital city.

Q: But it came out as the Dominican Republic.

MARTIN: That's right. Illia withdrew his authorization for a contribution, as its justification in Argentina no longer existed. We had had a problem with Illia's contribution in any case, as they wanted to know what kind of a role the Argentine general could have. We apparently had committed ourselves, for reasons that weren't clear, that the top Latin American general would be a Brazilian, and we would have to get the Brazilians' approval of the role an Argentine could have. So the combination, all in one weekend, canceled out the Argentine contribution. My own impression--and I've written some notes someplace about this--is that our handling of the DR situation and the Latin American role in it was the worst I'd seen anywhere. It was not well done at all. We reversed positions back and forth and didn't really give the Latin Americans the feeling that they had a role to play, except for the Brazilians. Whether that was Vernon Walters, our military attaché there, and their experience in World War II or what, I don't know. As a matter of fact, I think they rejected the Argentine leadership before the Brazilian Congress had finally approved any Brazilian participation. I've always thought I might like to write a little story about that one.

Before I leave Argentina I want to describe some of the less political reasons we enjoyed being there.

Buenos Aires was a great place to live because in contrast to their incompetence in politics and economics their cultural talents and interests were superb. The Colon Theatre, built in the early teens and with over 3000 seats, had one of the best acoustics in the world according to Robert Shaw who brought his chorale there shortly after our arrival. They also had the advantage of a winter season in our summer so could easily get our best talent. And, of course, Italians and Spaniards are known music lovers. They did almost as well in dance and theatre as in music and opera.

While we were there a girl and a boy returned from studying piano in Europe and we attended their first concerts. In the late '70s we heard both of them at concerts at the Kennedy Center as they were touring the world. The girl had found an outstanding teacher in Vienna so the Foreign Office gave her mother a job in their Embassy there so she could be with her and pay for her stay.

Our musicians we tried to entertain with meals or receptions like the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra, the Robert Shaw Chorale, the Julliard Quartet, and several pianists.

We were pleased that when the government had to entertain distinguished visitors, it was usually at a Colon performance rather than a cocktail party.

One of our most interesting trips was a visit to Tierra del Fuego, the southernmost tip of the continent. We drove across the island, stayed at the home of a sheep farmer with 60,000
head on the treeless northern half and then went through mountains to Ushuaia, the southernmost town in the world. From there we took a boat ride on the Beagle Channel, saw many glaciers and got close to the point of dispute between them and Chile as to the boundary, a dispute since settled. While there my wife and that of the CIA station chief with whom we had made the trip presented a charter to the southernmost Girl Guides chapter in the world. Our boat, an Argentine Navy one, was being used in a cooperative effort by Argentina and the U.S. to measure deep-water currents, of importance I gathered to submarine operations.

At this time I was amused to learn that the Chilean military were begging for more money from their Congress and equipment from us because they thought the Argentines were getting ready to invade Chile across the Andes, a wholly impossible operation even if the Argentine government had wanted to do it. I also found it curious that despite this open hostility 75% of the workers at the Argentine Naval Base in Ushuaia, from which they also made trips to Antarctica, were Chileans. Argentines only like to live in Buenos Aires and one-third of them did.

Q: I think that would be very useful.

MARTIN: I'd like also to mention several of the visitors we had while in Argentina that were somewhat interesting. One was a congressional delegation staying at a hotel, the head of which called the residence between 10:00 and 11:00 on a Saturday night and said, "I have to have a bottle of bourbon right away." Finding it was not easy.

More pleasant was a visit by Jackie Kennedy, Caroline, and John-John, in April, 1966, where her husband, their father, had first known Latin America, because he had visited, the estancia--a big farm--of the Ambassador to London from Argentina, Miguel Carcano, who had been there when John Kennedy's father was Ambassador to London. Jack had become good friends of the Carcano children and they showed him Argentina. So she brought them down, and they went out to visit this same estancia that their father had visited many years before. She and the Secret Service were very concerned about security, but she was equally concerned that the children didn't think anything was being done. Driving in from the airport in the morning, there were soldiers lined up on both sides of the road, and she explained that they were having exercises to wake themselves up, and all that sort of thing.

We also debated where she could best stay and be protected, and the Secret Service people decided the embassy residence was the best. But we did have a little problem there, because at one point, they couldn't find John-John. The kids had been in our large yard and he had disappeared. So the Secret Service deserted the front door and everyone looked for John-John. He had found the rather secluded residence of the chauffeur, who had a couple of kids, and was in there playing with the chauffeur's children. (Laughs)

The president of Argentina gave a luncheon for her, and while she didn't speak Spanish, she did speak enough Italian that she had learned at some point, to be able to talk to him in Italian as his parents had come to Argentina from Italy. Revealing perhaps a minor
limitation of Illia, a country doctor family from the west of Argentina, we were a little astonished when the fish course came on. It was a very large pink trout--they can weigh ten or 15 pounds--a special variety that grows in the lakes up in the Andes Mountains, having in its mouth a large plastic ball filled with water, in which a number of goldfish were swimming around. (Laughs) And we had to keep a straight face.

A very distinguished visitor to Argentina as part of a Latin American tour was Charles de Gaulle. He should have canceled the visit because when Peron left Argentina for exile in Madrid, de Gaulle signed a warm letter of welcome to him. As a result, no one was on the sidewalks to welcome him as he drove in from the airport. When he arrived to speak to the Congress he was barely able to get in for the crowds with banners denouncing him. He had taken the precaution of having a helicopter follow him around carrying an extra long coffin and an M.D. At the President's reception for him he found an opportunity to ask me to give his warm wishes to President Johnson which I did.

Another was Richard Nixon. He came in May '67 when I was in Washington. It was part of a Latin American unofficial tour during which he did not want any social affairs, he said. But when he came back one evening and saw that we were giving a formal dinner in honor of a new member of the Ex-Im Bank Board, Tom Lilley, he said he'd like to attend [Lilley was formerly President of Ford International]. My wife got a black tie and tuxedo for him. When he came down to shake hands with my wife who was receiving some 25 guests, he stayed by her, shaking hands too with them. She concluded that he thought he was the most important U.S. guest, not Lilley, decided Lilley was not an uptight person, and had her secretary, who never left until we sat down, switch places, putting Nixon at her left, the Argentine Minister of Economy being at her right. It was the right thing to do in the circumstances. When I joined the Population Crisis Committee in '78, Lilley was our full-time volunteer Treasurer.

Nixon had with him what we called a "bag-carrier." Despite several exploratory conversations with him, at which Peggy was good, she never found out what his relation with Nixon was until she saw his picture in the press at the time of the '68 Republican Nominating Convention. It was Nixon's long-time political Bebe Rebozo, a bank officer in Miami.

I should have mentioned that Bobby Kennedy's visit in May of 1967 was part of a Latin American tour, but in Argentina particularly to dedicate a very large monument several hundred feet tall to President Kennedy out on the campos--the great flat area of Central Argentina where you could see it for 30, 40 miles. It was quite an occasion. A little hard to get a big crowd there, but it was quite an affair. He handled it extremely well.

The enthusiasm of the Argentines for the Kennedys was shown by the way they surrounded him everywhere with their fingers pointed up, knowing he wanted to be a candidate for the U.S. presidency in the '68 election. Several times he jumped on the top of the Embassy Cadillac to wave back and we had to make a few repairs. The party of about eight, including Ethel and our son-in-law, Pedro Sanjuan and Dick Goodwin, stayed at the residence. It was
a busy time. He made a speech to a student group, translated by our son-in-law. He also wanted to talk informally to some political leaders. We couldn't host it in view of their natural opposition to the military government with which we had to deal but I arranged for the excellent Time magazine correspondent to do it at his house.

We also had a visit from a group from the American Jewish Congress, including Morris Abrams, later candidate for governor of New York, an old friend named Ted Tannenwald, who had been in the State Department, then a Tax Court judge. This had some political importance. Their purpose in coming was to persuade the Argentine cardinal to vote properly in the upcoming Vatican Council meeting on the issue of were the Jews responsible for the crucifixion of Christ. They persuaded the cardinal to do so. But they also investigated the problem of the Jews in Argentina. They decided that the Jewish community was as much at fault as anyone. They had organized sort of a social insurance organization to take care of each other, an organization which had grown to include most of the half a million Jewish people, about the same number as there were Turks or Arabs, and they thought of it as an almost independent state, very violently Zionist. The President was the Israel ambassador. They also found convincing evidence that one or two of the alleged atrocities had been staged by the Jewish community. They told me, as they were leaving, that the ambassador must be replaced right away with a different outlook on this community. He left within three months. So that is another bit of evidence which I mentioned before, that the Jewish problem there had been exaggerated in a number of respects in terms of the discrimination that had taken place, at least in my time. In addition, the leader of the largest opposition party in their Congress was a Jew. During this period the first Jewish Seminary in Latin America opened its doors with a ceremony at which Vice President Perette was the main speaker. Students spent two years there and then two at one in New York. The Arab League sent a representative to Argentina to mobilize opposition to Zionism lobbying charged to the local Jews. He worked out of the Egyptian Embassy. President Illia expelled him from the country as not representing a country with which Argentina had diplomatic relations.

A: After the departure of the Israel ambassador, was there any change?

MARTIN: It began to quiet down. A little later we had a visit from Dr. Salk, the developer of one of the infantile paralysis vaccines, who was a Jew. He'd just married again and had a new wife with him. His vaccine had been used in connection with an outbreak of infantile paralysis in Argentina in the late Fifties. He was awarded by the president the highest medal that he could bestow. He was given a luncheon by General Alsogaray, the chief of staff of the Army, to which all the Cabinet came. He was given a dinner at the Israel Embassy, at which a number of the members of the Cabinet came as we did. We couldn't possibly fill all the requests for speeches by him. The welcome was just unreserved in every way. I just happened to see him a week ago, the first time since then, with a new Brazilian wife, and he still looks in good health and remembers very keenly how he had been received in Argentina, somewhat unexpectedly. So that was a very interesting visit.
At the same time there was another interesting visit of another sort. I was actually at the airport meeting Dr. Salk when a gentleman got off the plane, a distinguished American opera conductor who was to conduct the opening at the Colon Theater of an opera done by an Argentine composer of real distinction, Alberto Ginastera. I've heard a number of his works here at the Kennedy Center. Two days later he came to see me, and he said, "I don't know what's going on here, but the opera has been canceled, and I'm going home. I don't understand what's happening." Well, it turned out that somebody had shown General Ongania, who was then the president, a review of the opera which had been performed in New York, which said it was full of sex, murder, and perversion, unpleasant subjects, and he decided that it was not for Argentina, so he had canceled it. Censorship.

A few weeks later, the diplomatic corps were invited to the Colon for a show which was what the President normally did for distinguished visitors. This time it was the Crown Prince of Japan. They put on "Swan Lake." We noticed, some of us, and it got in the local journal, that the same characteristics could be attributed to "Swan Lake." (Laughs)

Q: And to many famous operas.

MARTIN: Many famous operas beyond that.

To turn to other subjects, Argentina is a Catholic country whose President is required to be a practicing Catholic. However, in the cultural pattern of France, which they frequently boast of in many ways, including controlling the birth rate. The population growth rate was between 1 and 2% a year. I heard once that there were as many women in the hospitals having abortions as having babies. Moreover, in the Catholic University of Buenos Aires, there was started while we were there a post-doctoral research program financed by the Ford Foundation on new techniques of birth control.

Yet over all in the Spanish tradition the universities had made almost no contribution to the economy despite the receipt of two Nobel Prizes by their professors. Until the Ford Foundation made a grant in the late '50s, neither agricultural economics or production was taught anywhere in the country despite over 90% of its exports being farm products. Nor was there any scientific research anywhere related to agriculture until the mid-Sixties. As a result a world-wise Argentine friend told me in '64 that no changes had been made in their production techniques since the '30s and Europe and North America had surpassed them greatly in production efficiency. The most glaring example to me was the total failure to use any form of fertilizer except on their modest crops of sugar and fruit in the north. I got the feeling that the land quality and water supply in the area 150-200 miles out from Buenos Aires was so good that no one had bothered to improve technology. It was often said that estancia owners lived luxuriously in Paris, coming home only a few times a year to sell several trainloads of cattle. I was sometimes reminded of southern plantation owners before the Civil War whose slaves gave them a similar independence of new initiatives. These mansions were similarly splendid.
Given the recent war with the U.K. over the Falkland Islands, in my view useless except as a haven for some interesting birds, I might mention that as a stamp collector I was surprised not to find its stamps in any of the excellent stamp shops in Buenos Aires. I was told only the Malvinas existed and thus stamps with the Falkland name were not valid.

I should note that twice I had to call on my status as a representative of the President, not just the State Department. Once 2 or 3 Navy chaplains had chosen February to escape the snow of Washington and "inspect" the chaplain service to Navy personnel in the southern area. They came first to Chile and then planned to visit us. Plenty of our time was taken up by visitors from the U.S. in the winter months so I sent a cable to AID Washington refusing them entry to Argentina on the grounds that there were no Navy chaplains stationed in the country for them to inspect and too few Navy officers for them to possibly conclude from a visit that one was needed. My view was accepted.

On another occasion the Argentine government asked AID to help build modern silos at Rosario, the main port, for the export of wheat and corn. AID Washington prepared to send a retired Kansas contractor with no record of ever being involved in silo construction. I turned him down successfully too.

Another person I would like to mention was a man named Mariana Grondona, in many ways the brightest man, I think almost, that I have met. When I was there, he was writing a political column for the equivalent of Time magazine in Argentina. He was professor of government at the Catholic university there, just a very astute individual. I arranged with Ambassador Gordon to have him to go to Brazil to find out why the Argentine economy was stagnant and the Brazilians' was booming at this point. What was the difference? Ambassador Gordon arranged for him to talk to a number of Brazilians. When he got back, I gave a luncheon at which he reported to a number of top Argentine figures. He had a number of comments to make, but basically his point was that the Brazilians still think God is a Brazilian, and the Argentines have given up. In other words, there was just no confidence in their future. It was that lack of a will to grow and invest and promote development, an attitude problem, which was the basic issue.

One has to remember that in the late Twenties, Argentina was one of the rich countries of the world, relatively speaking, and starting in the middle Thirties with the Depression and then the World War, when nobody bought their exports, and after the war when everybody had debts and couldn't pay them, then Peron, who was anti-private investment, basically, put on an embargo on imports of many essential things to protect domestic industry, they had stagnated, a combination of bad policies and world events that had hurt them badly. So it was a very difficult situation that they had to face, and this was Grondona's answer.

Later on, Grondona became the director general of a very important organization which published Vision magazine, which is a Latin America Time magazine. He's quite an outstanding individual, but found it hard to get along in Argentina.
The Argentines differed from most of the other Latin American countries in the high proportion of the population which was of Caucasian origins. There had been a fair number of Negroes from Africa but in the latter part of the 19th century they were forced to leave or were killed. There had been many Indians there when the Spanish arrived but they were brutally almost eliminated. "Almost" is important for in the foothills of the Andes and in the far north there were still quite a few but Argentine officials always denied it to us.

While we were there my wife and a few friends who had seen on visits to these areas some of their craft objects opened a small shop in Buenos Aires to sell them. We furnished a guest bedroom in the residence with their products.

There was a very outstanding Argentine foundation, one of the few in Latin America, financing the arts and research on urban problems, called the Instituto Torcuata Di Tella Foundation, a copy of American foundations. The Di Tellas were an Italian family that had founded an industry which ran afoul of the problem of "the family is all we trust," because they started making refrigerators, and then they had a license to make gas pumps from the Ft. Wayne Pump Company in the United States. Then they went into a British model of automobiles. One child graduated from Oxford, and he ran the foundation. Another one had a Ph.D. in economics from MIT and wanted to do something else. [In 1990 he became the Ambassador to the U.S. of a new Peronist government and in 1991 the Argentine Foreign Minister.] The company went bankrupt. They wouldn't bring in outside competent management, and they were a diversified corporate structure that needed that kind of help.

This foundation was an important factor, but not the only factor in what was, in our period, a very outstanding outburst of painters and sculptors in Argentina. They won first prize a couple of years in a row in a Latin America art show in Sao Paulo. One of them won a first prize at the Venice Global Art Show. When we went to Paris from there, there were between 75 or 100 Argentine painters and sculptors working there. Then when we came back to Washington, there were about the same number in New York. The government had a way of helping them get started. A very promising painter, Ocampo, was attached to the consulate in Paris so he could study art. When we came back to New York, he was the consul general in New York, but had also an art studio for his paintings, and he still lives in New York. They promoted this sort of thing very vigorously.

So it was an interesting place to live in many ways.

*Q:* Of course, Argentina had the great writer, the man who became blind. I'm sorry I can't remember his name.

*MARTIN:* Oh, yes, very much so. We did meet him, and he was given sort of an ex officio job as the chief librarian.

*Q:* Do you remember his name? I can't think of it at the moment.

*MARTIN:* Not off hand, but on checking it was Jorge Borges, I believe.
Q: But one of the great world figures.

MARTIN: He got a Nobel Prize for his writing. Did I mention the Lutheran pastor? I guess maybe I did.

Q: No, I don't think so.

MARTIN: A Lutheran bishop. This was characteristically an Argentine problem. He was American, but his diocese included the Argentine branch of the church, which served a large group of German migrants, who came around the 1900 period. They were successful farmers north of Buenos Aires. After visiting them, he came back to me with a very difficult problem. He said, "Some of the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the original settlers only speak Spanish, and I can't find any preachers that can speak Spanish. They still all speak only German." The lack of integration of other nationalities was--and still is--a major problem to Argentina. As I may have mentioned, when they organized the Central Bank in '35, the heads of the big banks were the board of directors, and only one of the heads could speak Spanish. It's a crazy situation.

If an Irish girl of the fifth generation living in Argentina should marry outside the Irish community, as a friend of ours did, her husband being from a wealthy Basque family with a graduate degree in economics from Columbia University and while I was there appointed President of the Central Bank, her Irish relatives did not speak to her for a year.

In '65 a Welsh Colony in Patagonia, brought there 100 years earlier to grow sheep which they had done successfully, celebrated the anniversary with a Welsh "songfest" which was an exact copy of what was done on special occasions in Wales.

In Buenos Aires there were daily newspapers in English, French, German and Italian in addition to Spanish.

We also had a visit by our astronauts, and that was a certain amount of a security problem, because they had a parade of them in an open jeep sort of car, and the security people wanted to drive no less than 30 miles an hour through town in the parade. They kept slowing up so they could wave to people and so forth, and the car behind with Secret Service kept pushing them, shoving. We had quite a battle over that one.

That's probably enough for that.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, before you leave Argentina, you say this problem with integration, various nationalities kept their own. Could this be a part of the problem with Argentina, that they don't have this fervor?
MARTIN: Yes, there is little feeling of sacrifice for their nation. They want to go back to their home country. I did mention the million and a quarter Italian passports. Brazilians don't want to go back to Portugal. It's a different story.

Q: Very much different.

MARTIN: Yes, very much. That's another aspect of it. You're quite right.

However, one of my more interesting trips was in July, 1965 to a small town rather far from Buenos Aires which was celebrating the 100th anniversary of its founding. I was there because in 1865 "Lincoln" had been chosen as its name. This was an unusual interest in United States events in a country that was very Europe-oriented from the beginning well into the 20th century. It reflected the unusual interest of an Argentine who not only wrote a good biography of Lincoln but became a fairly distinguished President. Also it should be noted that the current Argentine Constitution, adopted in 1952, was a close copy of that of the U.S., including the relations between the state governments and the national one.

I don't think of anything else to say in this general field.

I should add why my very competent deputy, Leonard Saccio, was acting Ambassador for eight months. The story I heard was that President Johnson hated to appoint Ambassadors as in doing so he pleased one person but disappointed half-a-dozen. Eventually at a barbecue at the King Ranch in Texas which had several cattle ranches in Argentina, Kleber, the owner, said we need an Ambassador in Argentina. Johnson said OK, who should I appoint? He recommended Carter Burgess as his choice and he was named the next week. [Burgess had been Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower in the mid-Fifties and later was president of several big corporations.]

The story is that with the election coming up soon he gave money to the Nixon campaign through Senator Goldwater so his resignation if Nixon won would not be accepted. He won but it was the first one accepted as he had gone around State to the White House, though unsuccessfully, on two issues in which he had sought to increase his popularity with the Argentines.

Q: Do you have any more time, Mr. Ambassador, or not?

MARTIN: I think this enough, mentally as much as anything.

Q: Fine.

Continuation of interview: May 3, 1988

MARTIN: Now we get off to Paris. In late '67, the head of AID, Bill Gaud, called me to know if I'd be interested in taking the job of Chairman of DAC in Paris. [Gaud was Chairman of the PCC Board in the late '70s.] I had had no contact with DAC at all since
helping to set it up, and I didn't know what it was doing, how it was functioning. But I made some calls, got some documents sent down to me, and decided that it was an active affair, and that I would be willing to be nominated. The nomination went in, and I was elected in January of ’68. The elections were in January of each year by the governments of the 14 donor countries which were members of DAC. Having been elected Chairman of it in early January, I went to Paris on the 7th to check out the professional and personal situation for our move there, attending a DAC meeting to make a statement about my background and objectives, and then returning to Buenos Aires.

We went to Washington on January 20 for 4 weeks of personal and official business, including a visit to Ottawa to meet their aid staff dealing with DAC. We left on February 18 for Paris "by direct transfer from Buenos Aires" but actually going via Los Angeles, Honolulu, Tokyo, Manila, Sydney, Canberra and Bangkok for get-acquainted visits with both donor and recipients of aid, and to New Delhi for the UNCTAD meeting, the major UN forum for developed-developing country confrontations. We got to Paris March 23.

I don't know that it's necessary to go into a lot of detail about DAC, but I would say that it was, in many respects, the most fun job I had, and a very unique one. [1968 was very much a "getting your feet wet" year. So long as the chairman was a U.S. citizen he received the salary and other benefits--house, staff, car and chauffeur, entertainment allowance--of a Chief of AID Mission in a Class 1 Embassy. The U.S. also paid for a secretary. The OECD paid for the staff of 15-20 professionals.]

Although I had a staff of 15-20 professionals provided by OECD I did not report to the Secretary-General of the OECD in any way. However, I always sought to have a good personal relationship with him and keep him informed of important developments. Sometimes the Secretary-General was unhappy about this independence.

Although I had been a founder of DAC, I had lost touch entirely with it for six years, the transition was facilitated by the fact that my predecessor was Willard Thorp with whom I had, as noted, worked closely when he was head of the E Bureau in the late '40s and early '50s. He gave me lots of good advice.

As a bureaucrat, there were several special advantages. One, my job was to be as critical as I could of the participating governments in order to improve their performance with major help from the professional staff, for which I had no administrative responsibilities. It had a staff director, whose office was next to mine and whose secretary shared an office with my secretary. He was responsible for all administrative matters. I had brought Louise Hughes, my secretary from the E Bureau to ARA to Buenos Aires, then to Paris, but shortly she had family problems and had to leave, but a very good secretary from the OAS succeeded her.

The OECD published each year a 200-300-page report on the development effort by donors over the Chairman's name, a draft of which the governments could comment on. Although the staff drafted most of it I was responsible for every word in it. It was published in two or three languages and parts translated into a couple more, widely distributed.
I was expected to travel and visit the battlefields which were in the developing world, and the capitals of the DAC members to persuade them to do a better job. The OECD paid my travel expenses, first class, everywhere I went. My wife had to go on my salary, often tourist class, in which she thought the people were more interesting than first class. (Laughs)

Q: That was before you could get free mileage.

MARTIN: Yes, it was, unfortunately, because we traveled a great deal both in Europe and Africa and Asia and once or twice to Latin America.

In Manila on my way to Paris I took up the population issue with the recently appointed economic advisor to President Marcos, Dr. Mapa, a recent recipient of a Ph.D. degree from Harvard in economics. He called my attention to the fact that for their industries to be cost-efficient they needed large markets for their products and hence farmers must have many children. I suggested that if they did so, feeding them would take all the money they had. He then said that they were threatened with a war with Malaysia over an island and they would need lots of conscripts. To that I noted that as a result of 8 years of experience with the military in NATO, I felt sure that military strength required basically more capital for weapons, rather than labor investments. He was not impressed, moving up over the years to more and more important roles in the government without changing his position as he was, I learned later, a devoted member of the Opus Dei Catholic movement. I also visited the Rice Research Institute and the Asian Development Bank.

While in Delhi again briefly to speak to the SID World Conference in 1969, I had lunch at the home of the AID mission chief with the principal agricultural staff of the Ministry of Planning. They were concerned about the stimulus the new "green revolution" wheat seeds were having on the growing of wheat at the expense of legumes, an essential source of protein for the poor. I asked if they had any able specialists on plant breeding of legumes who might make them more prolific, knowing they were scarce everywhere. The answer was typical of other experiences I had had in developing countries. It was that they had several but they only wanted to win a Nobel Prize by finding how legumes fix nitrogen and none wanted to make two beans grow in place of one.

In late May of 1969 I was in Greece, Cyprus and Israel. The main purpose of the trip was to persuade Greece and Israel that they should accept the role of developed countries for the purpose principally of making more consistent with each other the DAC and UN statistics on the developed and developing countries as groups. If they did, I felt fairly sure that I could persuade Spain, classed also as a Mediterranean country, to do so and to add Kuwait to match an Arab country with Israel. None were receiving aid in any real sense and Kuwait and Israel were even small donors.

I failed only because at the same time the European Common Market was preparing to offer special tariff concessions to the "developing" countries bordering the Mediterranean that
promised to provide real economic benefits and outweighed the public relations benefit of being classified by the OECD as a developed country, though Greece and Spain later were.

In Greece I talked to the Foreign Minister and to the Finance Minister. I went to Cyprus also only because we were not allowed to fly from Athens to Israel. There I had useful talks with the Prime Minister and several of his Cabinet about their development problems.

In Israel I talked at his home and at his office with the Foreign Minister and met with the Finance Minister and the head of the Central Bank. I also visited several villages and rural health and water projects, in both cases involving pioneering ventures of interest and value. They included reforestation programs, drip irrigation from in-the-ground pipes, careful coastal water pumps to avoid getting salt water on the fields, a village health clinic that did an excellent screening procedure before an ill person could enter a hospital for treatment.

1970 was a busy year starting with official visits to the capitals of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and to the Arusha headquarters of the East African Common Market of the three countries, all after a couple of weeks of holiday in Kenya, including considerable driving around the country. I met with the long-time President of Tanzania, who had translated Shakespeare into Swahili. The trip ended with participation in a seminar for local rural development officers of Tanzania at the Dar-es-Salaam University. The head of the OECD Development Center chaired it. Maurice Strong, head of CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) at that time was a member but the most relevant comments came from the member from Israel. Tanzania's major agricultural reform program was analyzed and a few villages visited with the conclusion it was wastefully irrelevant. I made a speech to the seminar and submitted a paper.

While there Strong and I had lunch with the Minister of Finance, an able economist of Indian origins, and the Minister of Planning. We asked why they had voted against reforms proposed by Jackson in the UNDP operation, which we liked. They had never heard of the proposal as it had been seen only by the Foreign Ministry which did not deal with their development program and feared it was a developed country trick. I later learned the same thing had happened in India with the UN delegation sending it to their boss at the Foreign Ministry which also acted on political grounds only.

At a private lunch, I urged Strong and he urged me to become a candidate to succeed the retiring head of UNDP. I said I was sure Nixon would never support me as I was a Democrat.

From Nairobi I visited the agriculture research center of the Common Market headed by a Rockefeller Foundation expert. They had launched a wise innovation noting that all the land in the region with enough water to grow wheat or rice was already doing so and they were concentrating their breeding efforts on sorghum and millet which need less moisture. But more original was a small staff they had recruited to find ways to cook them so people would like to eat them as much as wheat and rice.
In August-September I made a long trip to Asia on my way to the DAC High Level Meeting held that year in Tokyo to get Japan to make more of its riches available to LDC’s on better terms. The first stop was West Pakistan where in a meeting with a large group of senior officials I criticized their educational program for spending too much money on universities and too little to provide primary and secondary education to more of its youth, especially females, and for using so little in East Pakistan, badly neglected in every way. This was not welcomed by them. Then I went to East Pakistan, talked to the General from the West who was its governor and found again no sympathy for my position.

In Bangkok, my next stop, I found the only donor field coordination program ever, something I constantly pressed for in DAC. Staffed initially by the USAID mission and then by the UNDP local staff, all donors reported their technical assistance projects and proposals and the list was published and distributed at regular intervals with the full cooperation of the Thai government. They then all had regular meetings to discuss priorities for future projects. At this time it was in the south where replanting of rubber plantations had to be planned because more productive tree varieties were available, the people were poorer than most in the country, and in bordering Malaysia areas there were reports of communist guerrillas who might become a threat.

From there it was Djakarta for meetings with top government officials, a visit to an agricultural experiment station and a speech to the American Club. The Minister of Mines, who was also a Professor of Geology at the local university, invited me to tea to complain that only half-a-dozen or fewer students were majoring in geology despite the major oil and mineral deposits the country had. The reason, he insisted, was that students feared they would have to live near the deposits and they only wanted to live in Djakarta, a very common problem in all the developing countries. I couldn't help him.

From Djakarta, after a week of rest at a beach in Bali, I went to Saigon where we stayed with a friend from War Production Board days when he was a labor expert, Sam Berger, our second Ambassador; Ellsworth Bunker, the number one ambassador being on a visit to his new wife, FSO Carol Laise, now Ambassador to Nepal. The purpose of my visit was to persuade other donor countries to give more aid to rural development programs in South Vietnam; to persuade more rural people to stay on or move to our side in the largely guerrilla-type warfare we were waging with the North Vietnam forces. I visited half-a-dozen embassies for this purpose but little progress was made as it was a very complex situation to break into.

In a helicopter, accompanied part of the way by Sam Berger, my wife and I flew with John Paul Vann, a famous military helicopter operator, now assigned to rural development programs; south along the Mekong River and visited two villages after noting small clouds of smoke several times that clearly resulted from artillery fire. One of the villages had a TV on a high stand in the main square which was used for educational purposes but also some amusing programs.
We were gone most of the day but in the evening the Bergers had a small dinner with several leading figures in the government and their wives present. After it we all got into jeeps and were escorted through the streets by a large group of military vehicles to a music auditorium built by the French but not used since they had left. In it was given an excellent performance of "Hansel and Gretel" with the income to be used for the many Vietnamese orphans. The music was provided by an Air Force band. The Director was a Red Cross lady with a music degree from the University of Indiana who had done some directing of operas in Germany. The leading roles were played by two other USO or Red Cross or nurse women and the older man by a Britisher who was the minister of an Episcopal church.

It was an ugly life everybody led but Sam had tried to survive by using his large yard and a fence around a French-built tennis court to grow orchids and breed hummingbirds.

From there we went to Hong Kong for a brief visit to try to understand better why it was such a prosperous city. As so often my answer was not only a unique location for international trade but that most of the people enjoyed a Chinese cultural background. I later wrote in the 1972 DAC Report that if I wanted my country to be prosperous and developed I would always choose such a hard working and saving background over oil wells.

Finally we reached Tokyo for the DAC meeting. All went well at it except that the French blocked my effort to get agreement to untying aid to all the least-developed countries, many of which were Francophone African ones. ["Untying" meant that it did not have to be spent in the donor country.]

I had a 45-minute interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister on the government TV network with simultaneous translations. I also spoke at a dinner of 30-40 leading businessmen and top government economic officers, nearly all of whom, I discovered, had held responsible jobs in each other's areas, explaining the close cooperation between the two communities which made it so difficult for the U.S. to get government help in lowering barriers to U.S. exports. I also had a lunch with the press and held three press conferences. We did get in our most expensive game of golf at a course near Mount Fuji, arranged by the Japanese Ambassador to the OECD.

From there I flew to Moscow for a full morning meeting with some fifteen professional staff of the Academy of Science concerned with developing country problems, to which I made a statement on our views. It had been arranged by one of them who had spent time at UNESCO in Paris where we had met. They all understood English and most asked their questions in it. They basically agreed with us on what were the critical problems in the LDC's.

They ducked only one question. It was if there was a coordinating body for Communist Bloc country programs to help developing countries like our DAC. They insisted that they had no knowledge of what the other Soviet Bloc countries were doing.
I asked my friend if many of them were not also professors. He said they had been but a year before a Minister had discovered that the two salaries that they provided gave them more than he got so it was now forbidden.

From there we flew to Paris with one night to catch our breath and sort our luggage after being on the road from August 15 to September 20 before leaving the next day for the annual Bank and Fund meetings in Copenhagen.

In November I went to New York to attend a meeting at the UN of a UN Advisory Council on Development Priorities, set up basically by my objections to highly competitive lobbying by several UN specialized agencies like FAO, ILO, UNICEF, WITO to persuade developing countries to get UNDP to make grants for projects to be done by them, regardless of what the real priorities of the country was or the UN agency capacities were. It was soon abolished as it was decided that a better answer was to give each country a multi-year allocation of UNDP funds, putting recipients almost entirely in control of the use of UNDP funds, regardless of what UN agencies could do best with UNDP money.

1971 was not a usual DAC travel year as it was not until I went to Mali on December 29 that I set foot in a developing country. That doesn't mean I stayed at home in Paris. On DAC business I went to Strasbourg, Berne, Copenhagen, Vienna, Lausanne, Washington, New York, Ottawa, Chateau Laurier, New York, Bellagio, London, Amsterdam, Amsterdam again, London and Geneva, chronologically. I also spent about two months in the U.S. on home leave, during which I again spent two weeks at an Aspen Institute Seminar as a "Resource" participant.

Several of my DAC trips and speeches were to interesting audiences. In January at Strasbourg I spoke to the Council of Europe composed of several members of the Parliaments of each country. In February I was in Berne to testify and answer questions to a Joint Committee of the two Houses of the Swiss Parliament on why they should join the OECD and the UN In April I had a rather unique audience in Vienna, the World Conference of the International Chamber of Commerce.

In May, 1971, while I was in New York to participate in another meeting of the UN Advisory Council on Development, I had lunch alone with Ambassador Bush. He invited me to attend a ball game along with many UN Ambassadors, his family owning one of the teams. I sat next to a new U.K. Ambassador who had never heard of "baseball" and I had to try to explain what was going on with occasional references to similarities or differences with cricket which I knew a little about. It was not easy.

Important then and for the future was a second meeting at Bellagio sponsored by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on the world population problem.

A most challenging additional assignment received in February, 1971, was the chairmanship of a new OECD Committee on Science and Technology for Development, sponsored by the DAC and the OECD Science Committee. It was composed of a dozen
persons selected without regard to their nationality or position but for their ability to find answers. The question was what are the biggest obstacles to development progress, especially for the poor, to which researchers might find solutions but are not adequately engaged in doing so; who is best qualified to do it, and where can the money be found? I recall several problems we worked on. One was solar power to run irrigation pumps in tropical areas, the obstacles being having solar power generators and batteries to store the power when the sun was out but pumps not needed, which were simple to operate and maintain. Another was cheap and easy to maintain facilities to process sewerage and purify water for villagers. A third was ways to fight the serious health threat of schistosomiasis.

In 1972 I made up somewhat for my neglect of the LDC's in 1971, following the visit to Mali started at the end of 1971 with visits to the Ivory Coast, Ghana and Nigeria. Mali was clearly one of the poorest countries in Africa with few resources to exploit and being on the dry fringe of the Sahara desert. It had been the first to declare itself totally free of French control and the French had reduced their aid program in return. But even what they did do was kept secret from other donors. As DAC Chairman and hence "international," I was able to find out what they were doing and quietly pass it around. Another handicap was that imports had to come by train through Senegal. The railroad was short of locomotives and freight cars and Senegal kept them for its needs. Foreign help was hard to get to come to such an isolated place, especially as to combat the dryness of the air you were supposed to drink at least a glass of liquid every hour. We got a good feel for the problems by staying with the U.S. Ambassador, Bob Blake, who had come from being the DCM in Paris. He had a strong commitment to help the Malians.

We were there for the New Year's greeting to the President from the Diplomatic Corps, read always by the "Senior" one, he who had been there longest. To my great surprise it was the Ambassador of North Korea. Had they forgotten he was there? [Some years later it was the Ambassador of the PLO. I didn't know they had them.]

My Ghana visit had four interesting angles.

1. I was especially interested in the success of the Volta River dam on whose financing I had spent a great deal of time when I was Assistant Secretary for Economics. The demand for power was so great that the Japanese were installing more turbines. A boat was just starting to provide cheaper transport on the lake back of the dam to the poor farmers of north-central Ghana. A UNDP team was trying to start fish breeding and grain growing on the banks of the lake during the low water season. And the lovely small cottage high above the dam, built for the pleasure of then-President Nkrumah, was now a government guest house where my wife and I had lunch. And I visited the aluminum plant which was the original justification for and source of financing of the dam and found it doing well.

2. The government which had replaced the leftist dictator, Nkrumah, was having economic problems but in talks with the U.S. Embassy, the U.K. High Commission, the UNDP Representative, a Harvard Development team, and a University Economic Professor, I was assured that it was making enough progress to be secure in office. The Finance Minister, an
Economic Ph.D. from Oxford University, gave me a large lunch at an historic fort and came on my airplane to see me off for Nigeria. The next morning at my 8 A.M. meeting with the top Civil Servant in the Nigerian Ministry of Finance, he started by asking me if I had listened to the radio news program. I said no. He said that last night the Ghana government had been ousted by the military and the Minister of Finance was under "house" arrest. Under the new Constitution all members of Congress had to list their assets. He hadn't done so. He clearly had more now than his salary could justify so he must have behaved corruptly.

3. Less important was a visit to a village not far from Accra where a team from the University of California at Los Angeles was collecting data on birth rates to send home to be put in a computer, not usual at that time. Then they were to set up three types of free family planning clinics, each in three, I think, villages, one with nutrition help, one with that and female health care, and one with nothing but family planning to see which would be most cost-effective. They were having trouble with their data though as a child wasn't considered born or given a name until it was a year old, an age that many never reached. Later they had worse problems as women traveled from their village to the closest one in which the clinic was giving the most services.

4. More amusing but characteristic of the educational problems in the ex-British colonies of Africa, was a secondary boarding school in Accra which as we drove past I was told had just undergone a major reform to cut costs by reducing the caretaker staff from 100 to 70 per 100 students. I had to express my approval and not laugh.

My stay in Nigeria was notable primarily for a visit to Ibadan, a large town which physically resembled most a collection of African villages. There I had three interesting experiences.

1. I went primarily as a result of an invitation from an outstanding development economist, Dr. Onitiri, whom I had met elsewhere, to speak to his seminar at the University of Ibadan. We had an interesting exchange, focused especially on relations with the former colonial powers.

2. I made a most stimulating visit to the major CGIAR research center there, trying to create alternative cultivation patterns to the customary African one of letting land stay fallow for several years after a short period of crop growing. Also there was a Nigerian agricultural research station which I also visited.

3. I had an interesting talk with a Dr. Redwood, a Welsh forestry specialist there on a UNDP grant, to plan how the constant cutting down of trees around the villages for firewood could be slowed and replacements planted. He was not very optimistic.

On my way back to Lagos I stopped at the Mayflower School which the Minister of Development of the U.K. had praised to me for its fine adaptation to the needs of a
developing country. Peggy and I had lunch with the Headmaster. I got the following mixed but on the whole discouraging answers:

a. It was coed, rare in its society.

b. It did not prepare for university only but expected its secondary school graduates to go to work.

c. The students made their beds, served their meals, etc.

d. In addition they raised food crops, chickens, pigs, etc.

e. But the curriculum was identical to that of our son at Westminster School with neither boys nor girls studying any subjects of direct relevance to employment, family life, etc.

f. I asked how many of the 2000 alumni had gone into agriculture to meet more efficiently the food needs of the country and was told of only one who had inherited a farm from his father.

Traffic in Lagos was as bad as I had ever seen with it often taking three hours to reach the airport.

My last visit was to the Ivory Coast, staying in the luxurious Hotel d'Ivoire with the only ice-skating rink in Africa. We got a good feel for the society of the country. It was a bad case of colonialism. The great majority of government officials and professors were still French, school budgets were set by the French Minister of Education, and public services were concentrated in the capital for the benefit only of the French and a few of their Ivorian colleagues who all tried to live like Parisians while the rest of the population tried to survive, just like most other Africans. Peggy visited a hospital with only half the beds filled but described as more modern in its equipment than any in France while no health care was available to most of the villagers.

The big meeting of 1972 was UNCTAD III in Santiago, Chile. It was the U.N. organization which had a broad mandate to improve the cooperation of the developed countries with the developing ones in improving the rate of development of the latter. This was worked on mainly with words: it was an international negotiators field day. How much the words agreed upon affected action was another matter. DAC had a major role as it was largely responsible for getting the donors to agree on what they could offer. DAC, and me as chairman especially, tried to make their offers both wise and generous which seldom was easy, partly because a few countries like the Scandinavian ones were generous and others like the U.S. were not. The Santiago meeting avoided a collision between north and south but not much more.

A successful effort of 1972 was getting the donors to agree on a rather complicated arrangement to finance a Special Fund for use by the African Development Bank whose
members or newly independent countries had refused to permit any donor role in its operations only to find it could mobilize few resources without them, especially as some of the supposedly larger member contributors to its capital like Egypt had failed to make any payments. I chaired a series of informal meetings in Paris between the Bank leadership and representatives of the DAC countries. An agreement was finally reached and in July I attended the annual meeting of the Bank in Algiers at which it was approved. Under it the DAC countries contributed to a Special Fund whose operations were supervised by a committee of representatives of both the African countries and the donor ones.

As to DAC itself this year we concentrated on the education problem and had some interesting meetings in one or two of which the head of UNESCO participated.

In 1973 I made two trips to the developing world. In the spring I was invited to speak at a lunch at the 25th annual meeting of the Economic Commission for Latin America in Quito, Ecuador. I took advantage of being so close to go also to Bogota, Colombia, to review their progress and to get advice on the Latin American development scene generally from Carlos Sanz de Santa Maria, a major player for nearly 20 years, most of them as chairman of CIAP.

Then in July and August when Paris could be hot and was always half asleep, I went to Sri Lanka and Singapore to learn more about special efforts being made in each place to do research on new and appropriate technology for use by their industrial sectors. In Colombo the emphasis was on use of local raw materials with which they had developed several good programs but the leftist government wanted them used only by government corporations but couldn't find the money to do so.

In Singapore my visit coincided with the quarterly meeting of the Board responsible for such research and I was invited to participate. They were mostly Chinese in background and as such highly pragmatic in their approach, not only working out new technologies for small businesses but giving training courses on how to apply them.

From there I had one of my most challenging tasks. Australia had been assigned after World War II Papua New Guinea as a Trust Territory under UN auspices. A new Foreign Minister was for some reason worried that he would come under criticism from the UN for abusing their role and had persuaded his government to make it a free country quickly. I had been asked to educate the current, soon to be independent, government on how to deal with aid donors and mineral concession seekers.

With my wife I went to Port Moresby, the capital, and spent several days talking to the Prime Minister, key members of his Cabinet, especially the able, part-Philippine Finance Minister, relevant university professors, and Australian government and business leaders. Then we flew to the high plain where most of the natives lived--there was no road connection--to check the central government's outreach. It was most interesting in many ways but my conclusion was clear and I reported it to the government and press in Australia. Independence was very premature. Ninety-five percent of the officers of the Treasury Department were Australians and the native ones had come out of college only in
the last year or so. There was almost no local police and no military force and serious ethnic threats to political stability, apart from normal problems of public disorder. There were also some important resources to be exploited and no talent to negotiate fair deals. They already had one on a copper mine with price increases producing nothing for the government and I arranged later for a Harvard expert in this field to go out and help them. He worked out a better deal.

From there I visited Canberra to report my conclusion that independence now would create a disaster, and then went to Melbourne to speak to a lunch of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. From there we went to Wellington, New Zealand to brief the government, the Congress and the people on their responsibilities as new members of the DAC. As part of this I spoke at a meeting of the Institute of International Affairs.

I should have reported earlier that DAC had an annual review procedure such as we'd had in the Marshall Plan and in NATO and CIAP, in which each country presented very detailed information about their program each year. Often it was their usual annual report.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, let's go into detail a little bit about that operation. These are the donor countries' own financial situations?

MARTIN: Their own aid programs. I, as chairman and the delegates of two member countries were the principal questioners of each program. The top aid people came from the government being examined. The head of AID was usually the person that came for the AID examination. It would last a day or two days, with no holds barred. It was off the record. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund always had observers from their Paris offices at all DAC meetings. While I was there, I got permission for them to participate in the examination, too.

Q: How about UNDP?

MARTIN: No, there were no UN people.

Q: No UN people?

MARTIN: No, as the UN staff represented developing as well as developed countries and we wanted to be free to say just what we thought about each other's performance, not possible with LDC people listening. Some of the countries brought members of their Parliaments to hear what people thought of them, because we were making criticisms that were the responsibility of their legislatures to correct, especially on aid volume. Since the U.S. was doing badly at this time under Nixon, I could criticize the U.S. more harshly than I did other countries, at least for amounts. That made the others accept more easily my criticisms of them. The U.S. did have some innovative ideas, however.

At the end of the examination, I wrote a letter to a top political figure in their government, sometimes a foreign minister, a finance minister, or the head of the aid agency, on what
were the final conclusions, good and bad. It was a confidential document. They took it seriously.

I've got some notes on the DAC period. I'm not sure how accurate they are, but they are a summary of what I did during that period.

Q: This is travel?

MARTIN: Travel, speeches, days I had chaired DAC meetings, chaired other meetings, books and articles I wrote. I propose to add them as an annex. The 1985 DAC Report was entitled "Twenty-Five Years of DAC." Each of the chairmen did a summary of his successes and failures during his period as DAC Chairman for that report. The standard format of the annual report I did for six years was that the first chapter reflected the "personal views of the chairman," with the rest done largely by staff, but the subjects carefully chosen and text edited by me.

Q: I see.

MARTIN: Then in the back, all the statistics on developing countries' progress during the year.

Q: I'd like to get a copy of this sometime.

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: It's probably available here at the OECD office.

MARTIN: Oh, yes, it is. I still get them and have a shelf of more recent ones. I've got one in Japanese, and the Germans have been translating them somewhat. In my time, several parts of them were translated to Spanish. So there's been a certain circulation beyond the English and French, the standard. It was a difficult business, because a text had to be sent in September to governments for comment. I didn't have to accept any comments, but they had to be distributed. August was a holiday in France, everything closes. I always took drafts with me wherever we went, and spent part of my holiday reviewing it, so that I could submit it to the governments in September. Sometimes the comments would not arrive until the end of October. You have to do a final text by early November and it comes out the first of December. So it was a little bit of a load, but it was fun to be able to do it and say what you think people were doing or not doing.

Q: Yes, that's excellent.

MARTIN: Usually we would have a chapter or two on a subject on which we'd had a special meeting, like health or education, population, and so forth.
My travel was to stimulate the effort of DAC members and to see on the battleground of the LDC's how well we were doing in promoting their development. In the six years I visited member countries 60 times and developing countries, less accessible and almost excluding Latin America which I already knew well, 28 times with only one or two duplications, like India.

One of my most interesting European experiences was in Austria, which was doing very badly in aid volume. Their people still thought of themselves as a poor country. Since the war, they had become rather prosperous and could have done a lot more. When I was making a visit to check on their performance, as I did to all the countries who were members of DAC pretty regularly, I also tended to have TV programs and press conferences to answer questions about their programs. In Vienna the prime minister called me to say that he understood I was meeting the press, he had his aid appropriation before their legislature, was having trouble with it, and could I be as critical as possible of his government's aid volume. (Laughs) Rather unique. I was, and it was not hard.

When I talked to very able Bill Gaud before going to DAC he told me that at the annual meetings each minister talked only about what a great job he was doing, and by the time they were through all their talks, there was no time to talk substance like shortfalls in performance. So I did three things to correct this problem. One was to try to fix the agenda so that they had to talk about substantive questions in their opening remarks. But when we adjourned to have a luncheon with just the heads of the delegations and one or two of my staff there, at which we could talk from 1:00 to 4:00 at a private restaurant, informally and confidentially while our staffs negotiated the communiqué, which was the most important output of the meeting. Then we came back at 4:00 o'clock to agree on the communiqué.

Q: You were talking, Mr. Ambassador, about the luncheon part of the annual meeting.

MARTIN: Yes. Third, I arranged for a day and-a-half or two day meeting of the same level of people that headed the delegations to the annual meetings from the principal countries, not all of them, with also the top people from the Bank and the Fund and the UN. No staff could come or be substituted. We had the first one in the spring of ’68 at the Tidewater Inn on the Eastern Shore here in Maryland. They are still held and called "Tidewater" meetings. I had to finance this first one out of my representation account. I hoped that the Overseas Development Council would finance it, but they had to be able to pick who attended, and I had to pick who attended, and so I couldn't use them.

Q: Who all came? The principal donor countries?

MARTIN: Oh, yes, only donors. About the ten most important countries, represented by the heads of their aid agency. I would take no alternates. If he couldn't come, then they didn't come. The head of the World Bank, McNamara, the head of the IMF, the Under Secretary General of the United Nations for Economic and Social Affairs, and my chief of staff, that was it. There were no agenda, no minutes, no communiqué.
Q: Excellent!

MARTIN: Just talking. The French and the Germans did not come to the first meeting, because a meeting that doesn't have an agenda, that doesn't adopt a resolution, what's that? A bull session was not a concept that they knew anything about. When they heard what had happened, they came to all the rest of them. From then on, it was hosted by countries.

Q: Where?

MARTIN: Different places.

Q: Could it be their country?

MARTIN: Oh, yes. One of them was hosted by the British Minister of Development, Judith Hart, at the Ditchley Conference Center near Oxford.

Q: Good place.

MARTIN: One of them was hosted by the Dutch at a little hotel where we were all alone, in a park south of Paris. Another one was hosted in a small hotel just outside of Lausanne, Switzerland. We went all around.

Q: These were informal, off the record?

MARTIN: Yes. It did come that there might be a primary subject, but anybody could talk about anything. There was an organization attached to the OECD that dealt with relationships with developing countries on a research basis, the Development Center. They had completed a study of unemployment in agriculture. The ILO was also studying unemployment at that time in developing countries. So I invited the head of ILO, the number two man at this development center, Monty Yudelman, who had headed its agricultural staff; later on he was head of agriculture at the World Bank for 15 years.

Q: But the research center was...?

MARTIN: The Development Center, a separate small organization with separate quarters, but part of the OECD structure.

We discussed poverty, the unemployment situation, particularly in the rural areas, but generally. McNamara sat through that without saying a word, really. But I'm told that that meeting led to the speech he made at the next annual Bank meeting in Nairobi, which I attended, at which he announced that poverty in rural areas was a major bank priority.

At another meeting, I guess it was the second one, it was attended by Nixon's head of AID, a new man, who had been president of Michigan State University.
Q: John Hannah.

MARTIN: John Hannah. Most of the talk, both at the meeting and at meals, was on what USAID policy was going to be under the new administration. It was a critical matter. But we also had at that time, an Australian military man initially, but he had been doing lots of other things since, who was making a major study of the UN development program at the request of Paul Hoffman, the former Marshall Plan head who was then head of UNDP, and there were a lot of criticisms of it.

Q: Was this Commander Jackson?

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: Married to Barbara Ward.

MARTIN: He was for a while. Right. He was there discussing his report. Also there was the head of the UN Advisory Council on Development, a Dutchman. It met every so often, sort of private people, more or less. They had thought they were far apart; they found they were close together by breakfast conversations there. At another one, Pearson, the former prime minister of Canada, who was doing a major study of the development situation was with us.

Q: Lester Pearson.

MARTIN: Lester Pearson. I invited him, and he got, apparently, a lot of help from the discussion there of this informal character for input for what was published as a book. So it performed a useful function, I think.

On one occasion we met at a conference center outside of Ottawa in Canada.

Q: A big log cabin?

MARTIN: Yes, Montebello, I believe.

Q: I've been there. A wonderful place.

MARTIN: Wonderful place. We were then dealing with one of the major issues, UNCTAD, the U.S. Committee on Trade and Development, which became a major forum for developing countries to make complaints about developed countries. We were discussing how we would respond to its demands. It was a very important subject.

Tidewater still meets but not only some OPEC but some less developed country officials now attend it.

As noted earlier in my trip to Chile in 1972, one of the important DAC functions as it developed was the coordination of the developed countries' positions for the UNCTAD
meetings. At the UNCTAD meetings, there developed a practice of the developing countries, the 77 they were called because at one time there were that many countries, and the developed countries having coordinating meetings right alongside of the official plenaries, of the UNCTAD itself. Usually the developed-country group was in fact the DAC group, and I chaired it. I acted as sort of a liaison with the developing country 77 group. So that there was a lot of communication back and forth through these informal structures, which helped in reaching agreement on things, in my judgment.

So that it was just more than a DAC operation itself; it fitted into the UN structure quite considerably.

Q: The international structure, not just UN.

MARTIN: International, yes; not just UN. At one point, we helped get the UN, as a result of the Jackson Report, take a different approach to the UNDP programs. We felt that they should give more policy guidance to their field staffs on what should be the priorities for UNDP projects based on their needs and the capacities of the UN agencies. They set up a policy advisory committee to the UNDP on this, of which I was a member. That eventually didn't work, however. The UNDP structure just didn't adapt to it well at all.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, from the viewpoint of that position and other positions, what about the coordination among the UN agencies--WHO, ILO, FAO, all of those?

MARTIN: It was not good, on the whole. Poor. One of the problems that stimulated the Jackson study was that the individual specialized agencies of the UN were spending a lot of time in the developing countries, persuading them to ask for the financing of UNDP projects that their agency would carry out. There would be half a dozen people in Indonesia from the World Health Organization doing nothing but lobbying for their projects. The UNDP was faced with a flow of requests that was stimulated by the specialized agencies for their own benefit. So what the Jackson study urged was that, "Here is an allocation of so much money from UNDP in your country. We will work with you in choosing what to do with it, bypassing the specialized agencies." What it came down to being, unfortunately, was that the countries owned the allocation or felt they did. However, they didn't know what the UN agencies could do well, nor often have a good sense of what should be their own priorities. I became a little discouraged about putting more money into the UNDP. The UNDP resident representatives were not of high quality, they had not been well chosen, and so they often couldn't advise the countries on what UNDP could do best.

We then at DAC got into having meetings on one of the UN specialized agencies to help give guidance to them, and then write it up in the DAC reports. In other words, there would be a meeting on the World Health Organization programs, participated in by the head of the World Health Organization, on hunger with the head of the Food and Agricultural Organization or on education with the head of UNESCO. We would finance studies in advance of those agencies' programs by outside specialists as material for our discussions in DAC. People would come from capitals, not just the heads of the DAC delegations
full-time in Paris, for these specialized meetings. This has continued to be a regular practice at DAC. I went three or four years ago, and they were meeting on the population issue, at which the Deputy Director of the UN Fund for Population Activities was there, and the top person in USAID on population came. I was there as a consultant to the DAC on behalf of the NGO's in this field, to participate in the discussions. So this has continued to be a major role.

Toward the end of my period at DAC, things got a little more complicated with other donors that weren't members of DAC, and it became even worse when OPEC got set up and the Middle Eastern countries became major donors. So they had to try to work out special arrangements with them.

In my visits to a great many of the developing countries, quite a lot of them, I always talked to the UNDP and the UNICEF people, because they were important donors in the field of technical assistance, which is so essential in training people, in helping people. UNICEF helped children, which is very important. I always found the UNICEF man much better than the UNDP man. I found that the UNDP people had been selected basically on personal patronage. Paul Hoffman was just too old to pay much attention to it, and nobody else did.

I talked to my old friend Harry Labouisse from back in European Bureau days, who was then the head of UNICEF. He spent a lot of time on personnel, checking them out. He told me the story of turning down three Soviet nominations for a UNICEF head in one of the African countries; they just didn't have the background and qualifications. He tried to have a personal interview with all the nominees. In other words, he realized that as far as the people they were interested in were concerned, the resident representative was the important person, not his headquarters staff in anything like to the same degree. It was a big and unfortunate difference, because there was a tendency for the UNDP to try to exercise some coordinating role over the UN agencies in a country. Most of them were just not qualified. I ran into a couple of people who had been retired early out of the Foreign Service, and a friend had gotten them named to a UNDP resident rep job. They'd not been selected for their competence.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, do you know whether it improved any when Brad Morse took over at UNDP?

MARTIN: Yes. Brad Morse did improve it. The immediate successor to Hoffman just spent three days a week there, still lived in San Francisco, did not much good, and he also let UNDP go bankrupt at one point. They had spent their money. But Brad Morse did a much better job. He worked hard at it and there's been a substantial improvement. I think that's no doubt the case.

Q: And now the head of it is William Draper, III, is that correct?

MARTIN: Yes, and he's hard working, and he knows the problems we talk about.
I did want to mention a very interesting Bellagio meeting that I went to. It's in northern Italy, a lovely conference center of the Rockefeller Foundation, which the Ford Foundation often uses with Rockefeller. One of them was in the spring of '68, and it was in two sections. The first section was the Ford-Rockefeller meeting to decide what to do with the several agriculture research plant breeding centers that they had jointly supported. Rockefeller started it, but they were jointly supporting two or three of them. At that meeting, with the participation of the World Bank, it was agreed to set up the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, headquarters in the World Bank, with donors both from the public and AID agencies, the World Bank, and private foundations like Ford and Rockefeller. There was a German foundation that has made substantial contributions. It now, of course, has a network of maybe 15 research centers. The "green revolution" which greatly increased wheat and rice production per acre and per dollar, so needed in a world with constantly increasing number of mouths to be fed, is a product of this CGIAR operation, and one of the great success stories of this century.

*Q: Mr. Ambassador, isn't that organization really, using the word properly, a unique one, in combining government and private funding?*

**MARTIN:** To some extent, the population research operation at the World Health Organization also gets similar support now. Actually, in the early Seventies, a Canadian named David Hopper, who I got to know through my DAC role as he was then head of a special government-financed but totally independent foundation which the Canadians set up, very imaginative, trying out new things, and I tried to set up a population family planning contraceptive research organization similar to the CGIAR. We ran into jurisdictional disputes between the World Health Organization and the UN Fund for Population Activities, one based in Geneva and one based in New York. It's, of course a different kind of research, but still, the joint financing and exchange of experience would have been valuable.

We made another attempt just a few years ago when Hopper was a senior World Bank officer, and at this point, the idea was to put it under the World Bank. Most of the European potential contributors like Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries who were very interested in this, said, "Too much is run out of the U.S. We're tired of that." And so insofar as there is an effort, we replaced an American with a very able Chilean as head of the World Health Organization Reproductive Research Center in Geneva, and this is now being built up and contributions are being made. It's the nearest thing.

Going back to population issues in the DAC period, the OECD Development Center hosted a meeting once a year during my period on that subject with experts from all around the world. I always went and General Draper was often there. In the late '60s, I arranged an "informal" meeting of the DAC delegations at which Draper discussed the need for more support for the IPPF and the UNFPA which he had just gotten set up. He thought that it had been quite useful.

*Q: And it is located where, sir?*

I think I did mention the meeting in Beirut, to try to get the religious groups to collaborate more closely on the development program. Did I not?

Q: No, sir, I don't believe so.

MARTIN: In April '68, I attended a meeting which was held to try to get principally the World Council of Churches and the Vatican, although we had observers from the Muslim religious community, to set up a central joint organization in Geneva, to organize country joint organizations in the developing countries and in the developed countries, to promote development in the Third World, to attack poverty and high death rates, the basic social problems in the developing countries, on a joint basis. Barbara Ward, later Barbara Ward Jackson, was a leading Catholic participant in this meeting. There were distinguished people there from a number of other denominations. A monsignor who was head of a major organization of the Vatican, an American, was there. We met at the hotel just above Beirut for four or five days.

It looked like something could happen. In fact, they did set up a joint organization based in a suburb of Geneva, which operated for two or three years and got some things going in several places, but jealousy developed between the Vatican staff and the World Council of Churches staff as to who was using whose money for which purposes. "We're financing, and you're using it for promoting your religion." It broke down.

Then a number of years later, there was organized a conference which was held in Bellagio, but in the hotel, not in the Rockefeller Conference Center, proposed by a Jewish group in New York City, but with high-level Catholic and Protestant participation, on the same general subject: how can the religious community do more for the developing world? I attended that. It was not able to reach agreement on practical activities that would be constructive. We got into political angles too much, so that was, unfortunately, a failure too. It was too bad.

We also tried to keep track of Soviet donor activities. There was some cooperation in a few places. My recollection is that in Pakistan and Afghanistan, there were Soviet programs and there was some cooperation with other donors.

We did work very hard organizationally on getting better coordination in-country, in developing countries, because if there were eight or ten donors operating there, plus multilateral agencies, and private aid agencies, it could be a very confused situation. We made several times a major effort to get local coordinating groups established, never successfully, with one exception. The basic reason was you can't have just a donor group; there has to be host country participation. They objected to the idea because they didn't want one donor to know that another donor had turned down a project as a bad one. In
addition, in Francophone Africa, the French wouldn't tell anybody anything about what they were doing; they were very jealous.

A major effort we made in DAC was to get a definition of "aid" that required a maximum length of repayment for the loans and really concessional interest rates. That was agreed. Otherwise, transfers of funds wouldn't be counted as aid. We also tried to get much more concessional loans, and to substitute more grants for loans for countries that we would classify as really poor. For this purpose we initiated a program to identify those developing countries which should be treated as "Least Developed Countries" and hence get special concessions. Australia, however, gave only grant money. Other countries gradually increased the generosity of their aid in repayment terms, but we didn't get it to the extent we sought. It continues to be a problem, I think, in a number of ways. There were a lot of jealousies here.

We also tried to get more aid untied so that it could be used to buy products in the cheapest markets, not confined to the donor's exports. It would make a dollar go much further in many cases. For a number of the countries--Japan was the worst in this respect--their aid was primarily to promote exports. For a long time, they only gave aid to nearby countries to which they had export opportunities that were good. This was a major issue at the Tokyo DAC HLM and I almost won but the French said no and most of the others were not ready to do it with no access to French aid funds. The U.S. was not free of that problem of promoting exports with more aid. (Laughs) So we made little progress on this.

In late '73, I thought I had written six Annual Reports which was hard to do, and it was time to let somebody else pick up that bag. It also became clear that the reelected President Nixon wanted someone with views close to his in the DAC job. I thought I was retiring to do quite different things and might want to go into academia or something like that. But it was not to be.

1974 was one of the busiest in my career due to my role as Senior Advisor to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in charge of U.S. preparations for the World Food Conference held in Rome in November of that year.

I have described the more or less formal history of getting agreement on U.S. goals for the Conference and of the Conference negotiations themselves in an essay published by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy of Georgetown University in 1976. However, there is more to be said about my more informal and personal activities that year.

In early December 1973, I was in the U.S. for two weeks in connection with my retirement from the U.S. government, and the transfer of the DAC Chairmanship to Maurice Williams, to chair the Sixth Annual Tidewater Meeting, and to pursue the possibility of a Rockefeller fellowship for a year starting in February or March to work on a UN reorganization for promoting development. I was leaving Washington on Friday, December 7 for the Tidewater Meeting at Belmont, then to be in New York on the Monday to discuss various 1974 work possibilities, back to Washington briefly the following
Friday, and then to Paris. As I returned to my office base in AID from my last appointment late Friday afternoon, December 7, Miss Troy, handling my phone calls, said, Mr. Bushness of the NSC (National Security Council) wishes you to call him urgently." [He had been sent by State to work with me on the review of our Latin American policy in 1967.] When I did so, he said that Secretary Kissinger had decided to appoint a senior person in his office to take charge of U.S. preparations for the World Food Conference and wanted me for the job. Would I be interested? I said I might be but was leaving Washington in an hour. I would try to get back a little sooner from New York than planned to discuss it further.

But I was totally incredulous as it had been made clear that the U.S. had opposed my reelection for one more year at DAC for White House political reasons. So early in the next week I called Ruth Phillips and one or two other State Department friends from New York and asked them to feel out whether or not this was a serious offer. On Wednesday they said yes and on Thursday I came back and had lunch with Bushness and his boss at NSC, Chuck Cooper, head of the NSC economic foreign policy staff. They showed me a copy of NSC's memo to Kissinger re the job, proposing three names, mine being first, with Kissinger's O.K. to the proposal and a check opposite my name. On this basis I accepted. I did so in the full knowledge I was giving up both a long-planned several-month retirement holiday and a more leisurely workload when I went back to a desk. There were three reasons: first, I felt strongly that, not only temporarily, the food and nutrition problems of the developing countries were crucial subjects on which I had written frequently in the DAC Annual Reports; second, I had been a close observer of UN agency activities on international economic issues, but had never participated as a member of a national delegation, an experience I thought essential to a balanced view of how to improve its functioning; and, finally, I had heard and read much about Secretary Kissinger's work habits and wanted to see them close up. I might add that I had only met him once very casually in the '50s and had then been so untactful as to express my appreciation for his abandonment of his earlier thesis, with which I disagreed strongly in my capacity as U.S. Minister to NATO, that tactical nuclear weapons could be fired at each other by NATO forces and the USSR without increasing the risk of a strategic nuclear exchange.

At my request, Cooper immediately made a date for me to see our Secretary of Agriculture, Butz, as I realized his great natural interest in the Conference and my need to have his cooperation. Also, I wanted him to give me a senior person as a deputy who knew the substance and could tap the resources of the Department of Agriculture. This was essential as Agriculture had to be the source of most of our information on the problems of and answers to the world food problem. In all other countries it was the department handling preparations--Kissinger had just stolen the job from Butz. He saw me the next day, Friday, December 14, and we had a good talk. This was our first contact. I also alerted AID and the Director-General of the Foreign Service of the need for a more junior staff officer from each of them with a similar ability to draw on their knowledge. I also got ideas from several friends.

AID and the Food for Peace organization did detail able people to my staff for as much time as I needed and State gave me an able young Foreign Service Officer, Ed Casey, on a
full-time basis as my Staff Assistant. The Food for Peace officer, Dan Shaughnessy, was later Chief of Staff for the Carter Advisory Council on World Hunger in 1978 on which I served as a Consultant.

The only problem worrying Cooper was whether I would insist on being made an Ambassador-at-Large as he thought it would be opposed, in principle, by Fulbright, who thought there were already too many. I said I could use another title in the light of my having been both a Career Ambassador and a country one, and thought it was not important. I also arranged to have space and other facilities when I returned for a couple of weeks in January to get my office organized before having to go back to Paris to hold the last DAC meeting. AID had had trouble filling Williams' job as Deputy AID Administrator and had welched on their commitment to make Williams available as of February 1 or earlier. However, it was only in February after I had turned down several retired foreign agriculture agents that I accepted an active one, Glenn Tussey. He was as able as I had hoped with excellent access to his department's resources, so necessary to our task.

Henry Kissinger had proposed in a September, 1973, speech that there be such a conference, and so was supposed to have a special interest in it. As his senior advisor, I think I saw him personally once and I was at meetings with him about three times. What I did was to channel memos on what I was doing or planning to do to his personal aide, Lawrence Eagleburger. I also worked closely with Win Lord, who was the head of the Policy Planning Staff at State and supposedly close to Kissinger. So I tried to keep them informed on what I was up to, and assumed that if it wasn't what the boss wanted, I would hear about it.

I also worked fairly closely with Bill Eberle, who was the economic man in the White House at that time. He later was on our Population Crisis Committee board. We got help too from a very able Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs named Don Paarlberg, a former professor at Purdue. Butz, of course, came from Purdue, as well. Paarlberg was a very broad-gauged, sound person who was most helpful.

One of the first things that had to be done was to set up a staff for the World Food Conference, as such. I had some relevant experience and a good friend who had been head of staff of the World Environment Conference at Stockholm, a Canadian, Maurice Strong, whom I still see something of. He had been head of their AID agency. So I thought it was very important that he get the job.

FAO was very jealous of the conference, however, even negative about there being a conference as usurping their role. They helped pick an Egyptian to be the secretary general of the conference, who had been Minister of Agriculture in Egypt. He had had agricultural experience as a breeder and raiser of Arab race horses, which wasn't very helpful and very little international experience. So I felt it very important to get a topnotch deputy, and the U.S. could claim that, as having been a proposer of the meeting and a big figure in the developed world, he should be an American.
I managed to persuade the just-retired head of the AID agency who I got to know well at DAC, who had been head of the Department of Agriculture Economics and then president of Michigan State University, John Hannah, to take the job as deputy, and the UN authorities to name him. He brought in a couple of very able younger people from the Ford Foundation and elsewhere, so that we got a good staff operation going. One was Dale Hathaway, who later became Deputy Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs.

I also was able to draw upon my DAC experience in coordinating policy among developed countries, and we had a special DAC meeting or two for this purpose. There were three preparatory meetings for the World Food Conference at which I chaired the U.S. delegation, at each of which the donor countries, the DAC countries, as the developing countries did, had meetings to discuss common positions and what they wanted to have done and so forth.

Almost before I or the Conference staff could get organized, the first preparatory meeting was held in New York in February with delegations from all UN members expected to attend. I could say little as few U.S. positions had been agreed. More progress in agreeing on an agenda for the Conference and rough drafts of Resolutions was made at the Geneva one in June and the Rome one in September but the Conference itself was left to make all the major decision.

We did have a considerable amount of trouble with the White House and the Treasury as we started drafting a final U.S. position because it was a period of threatened inflation in the U.S., price-wise as related to oil prices and so forth. So there was great opposition to any increase in U.S. government spending. President Ford had gotten out a little campaign button which said NOW, something like that, that was a slogan for saving money. We were under a lot of pressure, because there had been worldwide drought for two years, great starvation in South Asia and Africa, and the result of this and the general inflation had been a rise in the price of grains, which nearly tripled. Our Food for Peace allocation, which was designed to provide grains for people that were starving, was a dollar figure, not a tonnage one. So we had to cut the volume back very substantially. A $3 bushel of wheat, compared to a $1 bushel of wheat cuts into what you can do. The Treasury people and some of those at the White House and Office of Management and Budget made as their main point, "Don't get involved in any increase in U.S. appropriations."

I recall one meeting in which we were discussing Kissinger's speech. He was invited as one of two proposers to make an opening speech at the conference itself. So this was a very important document. He was also extremely jealous. No one could see it. I had great trouble letting the Secretary of the Treasury read it while I sat there, or even Butz read what he'd say. We had a long debate at the interagency-White House economic coordinating group, chaired by Eberle, about the speech and what our position papers said, especially about our food aid amounts. They kept saying, "But no figures. No figures." I finally said, "Can I put page numbers on?" (Laughs) I was getting a little fed up. Actually, as soon as the conference was over, we did raise our food aid amounts. But anyway, at the conference we made no commitments.
At one of the two or three big meetings we had with Kissinger, I was mentioning some problem that I had with Butz on a particular point, who was a very cautious, conservative man in many ways. Kissinger replied, "I see the President 20 times for every time Butz does. Pay no attention."

Another time when I was having trouble with Treasury on figures, he was saying, "The Secretary of the Treasury will do what he's told." (Laughs) His arrogance was considerable as to his Cabinet colleagues.

Kissinger was a real help at the start, however, when he told me to be sure to consult his former colleague at Harvard, Jean Mayer, Professor of Nutrition at its School of Public Health. He had a global reputation in his field but because a commission on child health in the U.S. which Nixon appointed in '69 and he chaired, I think, concluded that in the U.S. children were dying of starvation Nixon had ordered that no government official could contact him in any way. Kissinger told me to consult him and I did and got much excellent advice.

The U.S. public was interested in our problem both because we were a major food producer and exporter and because of their concern with TV pictures of starving people in dozens of countries. We were interested in their support for our policies, especially as they might require sacrifices by us in food supplies and even in new public aid. The result was an active public relations program. In the U.S. I made 33 speeches, some more formal than others, did 7 TV interviews or tapes, did 5 radio interviews or tapes and held 1 press conference.

To explore the views of other countries and explain ours I traveled to Argentina and Chile in May, to Paris (DAC) and Brussels (EEC) in June, to Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico also in June, to the Ivory Coast in August to speak at the Triennial meeting of the Society of International Development to delegates from around 100 countries, and then to Ghana, Egypt, and to England, Brussels (EEC) and Paris in September.

I also played a major role in developing the work program of a Special Senate Committee on Nutrition, chaired by Senator McGovern, head of Food for Peace under Kennedy and hence an old friend. They started with a big dinner in the Senate Office Building in June at which I was a speaker. Later I testified four times to regular Committee Hearings.

A real problem Butz and I had with Kissinger, however, was that I had done quite a lot of radio, TV shows, speech making, trying to sell our position, and traveling in the U.S., Europe and Latin America for this purpose. One was to make a tape of our goals for USIA, about a 30-minute question-and-answer recording. Just before the conference opened, Kissinger made a trip to South Asia, and in New Delhi on a Wednesday, his speech to the WFL being on the following Tuesday, somebody let him hear the USIA pitch that I had made. He immediately called Eagleburger on the phone and said, "Between now and the time I make my speech, Ed Martin and Butz can have no contact with the press, make no
public statements of any kind." We were silenced absolutely as he wanted to be the first to
tell the world the U.S. goals and actions to cure hunger. Well, I got this message, and I told
Eagleburger that I was supposed to speak the next day to a luncheon of the annual meeting
of the National Canners Association, who were kind of interested in the world food
problems; did I have to cancel it now, the night before? And Eagleburger said he got
Kissinger on the phone, and the answer was, "Yes, you have to cancel." So I did.

Then when we got to Rome on Monday, as Butz tells the story, the embassy said, "We're
going to give you a cocktail party." He got there and it was nothing but press, and it was set
up as if for a press conference. He says they totally misled him on this. He tried to say as
little as possible, but word got out. The next day--Kissinger arrived the next morning--he
sent Butz a very nasty letter, which Butz showed me.

He went to a dinner that night by the president of Italy for him, and while he was dressing,
he called me into his room, because we were all at the same hotel, the Excelsior, and said, "I
only want one thing--some useful organizations set up by this conference, additional ones,
new ones." So that was my only instruction given only the night before the conference. He
left it open as to what else should be achieved. Anyway, we did get several, and also many
other Resolutions. [After the conference I did an amusing analysis of the 14 different initial
words or phrases of the 116 Resolutions approved by the WFC: mostly they reflect varying
degrees of pressure on countries to act. The two most common were "Requests" (33) and
"Recommends" (28). Next came "Calls on" (15) and essentially identical phrases "Calls
Upon" (7) and "Calls For" (2), followed by "Urges" (16). The remaining 9 are "Invites" (5),
"Resolves" (3), and used only once, "Endorses," "Affirms," "Reaffirms," "Stresses,"
"Expresses," and "Takes Note." Even so further softening phrases were added quite a few
times such as "as appropriate" (3), "in a position to do so" (3), "consideration be given to"
(2), and "review to determine desirability and feasibility" (2). Used only once were "able
to," "to minimum," "with due regard to national sovereignty," "as much as possible," "if
necessary," "study feasibility," and "wherever practicable."]

One of the interesting events at the conference, was that being in Rome, it was arranged that
the entire conference hear a speech by the Pope. In the course of the speech, the Pope said,
"Don't worry about feeding more people. God will always provide food for everybody." This led Secretary Butz, later on, to mention it to the press--and get quoted, inadvertently, I
suppose; he probably didn't mean it to be on the record. He had a whole cabinet drawer full
of jokes and wisecracks and whatnot he showed me once that he used a lot. He then
commented that on the Pope's "promise" he said, "The Pope no playa the game, no maka
the rules," with respect to population growth.

Secretary Butz went off to the Middle East for several days to do some business, and I was
the acting head of the delegation. At the conference, the U.S. press found it hard to follow
what was going on as until the last meeting there were a variety of special committees
working on one issue or another so I started a daily briefing at 5 P.M., usually lasting an
hour or more as questions were welcomed. After the first couple, press from other countries
came too and we had 50 or more at each meeting. I gave six of these.
We also got, as another interesting delegation member, sent over as a White House representative several days after it started, Anne Armstrong. I had to spend an evening briefing her on what had gone on. I got a very favorable impression of her, a very able woman.

On our way back after the conference, Butz let us join him and his wife in the President's plane, and we played bridge. He had picked up a verse in the population field that apparently was written by the Irish wife of the Dutch Secretary General of the Food and Agricultural Organization, who had a penchant for these things: "The bee is such a busy soul, he has no time for birth control. That is why, in times like these, there are so many sons of bees." (Laughs)

Q: (Laughs) Very good!

MARTIN: I said, "That's the one he should have said to the press, not the one about the Pope." Our New York cardinal took great exception to the one about the Pope, and I think that was a major factor in his dismissal by Ford.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, you say the policies that you were trying to propose, the U.S. position, can you state those briefly? What were the policies that the U.S. was trying to get across?

MARTIN: We were trying to emphasize two or three things. One, we wanted a global program of stockpiling of grains for emergencies like the one we were just going through, globally managed, probably physically decentralized, to make shipment easier to the places that needed it most. But globally financed and globally managed. We felt this could be a very important contribution to dealing with famines and sharing the burden of dealing with them and the blame, in some sense, for not dealing with them. There was controversy on this, particularly from U.S. farmers, who felt a stockpile would put a lid on prices. Well, we did want to put a lid on prices; that was the way you help people get enough to eat.

We also wanted to emphasize that producing food wasn't the sole answer; it's the ability of people to buy it. In other words, the cost-efficiency of the food system was a very important factor. Part of that was the efficiency of food production, including the distribution of fertilizers and seeds. You have to get into all these things to get a cost efficient food production and distribution system.

Also, you have to have not just stockpiles for famines but stockpiles over the seasons, from one harvest to the next, and from the farmer to the consumer in the big city. The losses were enormous in some countries from very poor stockpiling mechanisms in the normal chain of distribution. Some people said a third to a half might be lost between the farm and the household table in some of the developing countries due to inadequate storage and transportation facilities. So we were trying to improve the cost efficiency of the system.
Then we did want to have more money available from donors for well-designed food production programs--irrigation, fertilizer availability, things like this--that would make them more efficient in countries that needed it, though one of the things I tended to fight was a desire by many countries to be self-sufficient in food. Self-sufficiency is not necessarily the best answer. It came up in connection with some African countries that were using their good land to produce export crops, often stimulated by the former owners of the countries who wanted cotton produced by their "colonies" for their industries, for example.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, you were talking about the production of food in these various countries.

MARTIN: There was a great clamor to be self-sufficient. This was in part a desire for national independence, it was in part an absence of foreign exchange to pay for food imports, but we felt this wasn't automatically the answer. It was very cost-expensive to produce foods in some countries. They could do other things better. Maybe they should produce cotton and export it and then buy the food. Part of the problem there, of course, is that many of the African countries don't have a good distribution system, so you have to pay attention to that. In other words, the food comes into the port and never gets out to the countryside where the cotton-growers need it. But we were trying to look at it in this broad sense, as what is the economically most efficient way for each country to handle its hunger problem.

As a result, we got set up several organizations despite bitter fights from the FAO against them, but not as many as were proposed at one point or another. One was the World Food Council, which would bring together the top agricultural officials from all the countries of the world once a year or once every two years to discuss the situation and what changes needed to be made in the program. John Hannah took responsibility for getting that going.

A second was a financing agency which the U.S. was very reluctant to support. IFAD is the initial--International Food and Agriculture Development--based in Rome. I got agreement to support it, despite the existence of the World Bank and the regional banks and various aid agencies, because the OPEC countries agreed to contribute one-third of its total assets. Washington opposed it and only did a couple of phone calls by me from Rome persuaded them to accept it. Up to that point, they were making billions out of their oil price jump and not doing anything for developing countries. They agreed to make a major contribution, and they had an OPEC person selected to head it up when we finally set it up. Again, Hannah played a major role in getting the Congress to make our appropriation to that. It's still in business and very effective in reaching the villages, small-scale projects. It's been very good at that.

Then there was a Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment in Developing Countries, which was a compromise between nothing new and a proposal for a new, many-billion-dollar aid institution opposed by the donors. For the "Group," each continent was to select four or five countries to represent it, and elected them every three years. It's staff was financed by the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the UN
Development Program jointly. Its job was to critically review and analyze how well the countries, both developed and developing, were carrying out the rather extensive recommendations of the World Food Conference on food production and distribution in the developing countries and what could be done specifically to change and improve that performance. It was agreed that it should work out of the World Bank offices as a good central location and be managed by the World Bank management team.

With the arrival of 1975 I started again to plan how I could use my time in retirement. One project was a book on my fascinating 6 years as Chairman of DAC, focusing primarily on the problems of the developing countries and the successes and failures of the donors in helping to solve them. I also hoped I could continue my interest in current attacks on world hunger. I even hoped to give more time to my hobbies of making wildflower slides and collecting British America stamps. But I had barely scratched the surface of my future when, in mid-January, McNamara called me in and said, "It's agreed we want you to be chairman of this consultative group." So I agreed to do that. For its staff I asked the FAO, the UNDP, and the World Bank to each assign an able person. I got a very able one from each of them, particularly the FAO man, who was from Benin, with a Paris Ph.D. in economics, had been head of FAO for Africa, Moise Mensah. He was my Deputy. He has been, for a number of years since, the vice president of the IFAD organization. He was a leading candidate last year to take over as Director General of FAO, but he did not win that vote.

The World Bank assigned an also-competent and experienced Indian, Subash Mazumdar. The World Bank provided me with my best secretary, who could even read pretty well my handwriting, Gill Odam, a native of the U.K.

We put a primary emphasis, as urged by the countries, on each country having a food plan. In other words, having a country, as part of the national plan, or, if without one, on its own, look at its resources and its nutritional needs and decide how much they wanted to produce themselves for the next five years, how much they should depend on imports, what were the things they could produce best and cheapest, who could they look to help them most cost efficiently in producing those things. So we picked out four countries, Honduras in Latin America, Sudan and Senegal in Africa, and Bangladesh in Asia, as experiments to develop a food plan, a good geographical spread. They all needed one, where very poor, and we worked with them on developing those plans.

We urged donors to give them special aid. A food plan required an analysis of the countries' food needs, how best they could be met by local initiatives and by donors, involving both financial and technical assistance with carefully worked out priorities.

I went abroad on CGFPI business in late February and early March to London, Paris, Brussels (EEC), Rome, Paris again and the Hague, trying to increase donor interest in the hunger problem. In May I went again to the Hague for a Conference on Hunger organized by their Minister of Development, and then to Paris for talks with the OECD staff. In time I was back in Europe for a DAC meeting in Paris and to Rome for the annual meeting of the
FAO Council. Later that month the World Food Council, also set up by the WFC, met in Rome and we discussed the CGFPI role. From there I went to Tehran to get Iranian help in getting support from the newly rich OPEC countries for solutions to the world hunger problem in cooperation with the CGFPI. In December I went to Manila for a meeting on a Survey of Asian Agriculture of the Asian Development Bank and gave a speech on the role of the CGFPI. A speech on the CGFPI was also made in Manila. I went on to visit Bangkok to visit ESCAP and other groups on food issues.

I was full-time for a year, and then half-time for one and a half more years. The first year was a very busy one as apart from getting the CGFPI started, U.S. interest in the hunger problem had not declined and I made 43 speeches, appeared on TV 7 times, had 1 press conference and did 1 radio tape. My speeches were not confined to the Washington area, taking me to, chronological, Amarillo, Texas; New York; Grinnell, Iowa; Cincinnati and Dayton, Ohio; Baltimore; Dallas, Texas; Norfolk, Virginia; Hilton Head, South Carolina; Oxford, Ohio; St. Paul, Minnesota; Rensselaer, New York; New York, New York; San Francisco, California (4 speeches); Denver, Colorado; New York; Baltimore; Boston, Massachusetts; and Columbus, Ohio. But by mid-1977 it had been decided by our sponsors that the CGFPI contribution was not worth its cost and our functions with respect to food plans were transferred to the World Food Council.

Q: Why?

MARTIN: Well, three reasons. One, it was difficult, particularly with developing countries, to take us seriously enough. We didn't have money in our pockets. So there was some tendency to send the economic counselor of their Washington embassy to a meeting in Washington. We only met a couple of times a year, though not always in Washington. Second, the representatives of the continents, especially the developing ones, had no machinery to get the views of a majority of the countries they represented or the cooperation of the money countries from whom they were supposed to be getting more aid. Discussions at the meetings tended to be dialogues between the chairman and staff, the sponsoring agency representatives, and a few of the donors. Third, the FAO was trying to abolish everything that the Conference produced that was remotely competitive with it. The new man who came in just at this point was Saouma.

Q: At FAO?

MARTIN: As head of FAO. He was a Lebanese Christian educated in Paris, anti-U.S., basically, very jealous of his prerogatives and of any other multinational agencies in the food or agricultural fields. One of my favorite stories--it may have gotten back to him--was that at his first meeting with the African regional FAO council, representing the various countries, and with the staff of the FAO African regional bureau present, he opened by saying, "I've brought along Mr. So-and-So who's in personnel so in case I want to fire any of you staff people, we can do it right away and not have to go back to Rome."
At his office, he built a big platform about a foot high and put his desk up on the platform so he could look down on anybody that came to see him. Well, he was not happy with me in any way. Occasionally I was critical of some of the things the FAO was doing, feeling that they could use their resources better. In some ways, he has used FAO resources well, but he also abolished a food manufacturers' committee, advising FAO as, "Its there just to please the capitalist exploiters." And he abolished a fertilizer manufacturer's group. I got very much involved in the fertilizer problem, trying to get it produced and delivered more cheaply, and he was jealous of that.

Then I was also critical of some World Bank projects. I was sent by a vice president a Burma project, the first project they'd ever had in Burma, as a sample of what fine things they were doing. I wrote a memo back that was quite critical. The project provided $50 million of IDA money, which was very scarce, low-interest, 50-year repayment money, at 13 different locations on irrigated land that had deteriorated and had to be rehabilitated, in a country in which they had not operated and had a bureaucracy which was one of the weakest of any. It seemed to me unduly complicated for Burma. The justification was based on a forecast over the next ten years of the increase in productivity per acre in each of the 13 areas for each of three crops. There was another table on the projected increased use of three different kind of fertilizers on five different crops in each of the 13 areas over a ten-year period.

I suggested that they didn't know what the production or the fertilizer use was in each of the 13 areas last year, let alone try to guess what it would be. This was just a waste of money and time. They also estimated that the increase in rice production would enable Burma to repay the loan, because it would all be exported. No allowance was made for the fact that some of the farmers had been on land which had deteriorated badly and had to be totally rehabilitated and weren't getting enough to eat and would consume some of the additional rice. That did not make me popular with the World Bank people. There were also problems with a Bangladesh project.

I had some other problems with projects in Africa. I may say, that since then the head of their agricultural program, the functional head, Montague Yudelman, with whom I had worked in Paris, has joined the World Resources Institute and published a Report concluding that not one World Bank rural development project in Africa had been successful. Anyway, I was fairly critical, and they didn't like any criticism. However, several years later when I mentioned the two Asian projects to the Vice President for that area, an old friend, his only comment was "Disasters."

When I looked back at this time to my close involvement with McNamara at the World Bank during my DAC period, several experiences seemed relevant. One was the history of the first attempt by its Evaluation staff to study not just projects but a country program. They started with Colombia for which one of the first Consultative Groups of donor countries had been organized in the early '60s. A principal conclusion was that several large transportation projects, mainly for railroads, had been done with no evaluation of how they fit together and they hadn't, sharply reducing their value to the economy. Before the report
was distributed to the Bank's Board of contributors, a substantial softening took place. Before it was made public it was further weakened. No more country evaluations were permitted, at least for a long time.

Repeatedly I urged McNamara, who had his MBA from Harvard, to replace many of his econometricians with anthropologists if he wanted his desirable new priority for rural development projects in the poorer countries to be relevant to the needs and potentials of their targets. He never did so. His chief economic advisor, Hollis Chenery, was a perfect tool in this respect. As a senior Bank official in his period recently observed to me, his country reports would refer in a sentence or two to political and social problems and then devote 30 pages to economic statistics.

There was an Indian lady with a Ph.D. from Cornell in agricultural economics and anthropology who worked for the African Bureau of the Bank for several years who wrote a report on rural development projects in Africa of various aid donors. It was critical of several Bank ones and the Bank refused to publish it and tried unsuccessfully to prevent it being done by a university press. Then it tried to fire her but she had some high-level friends who blocked that and she went to East Africa to help develop such projects for the Bank.

When the CGFPI was being closed down I did a brief report for McNamara on where we stood and how our work should be carried on by other agencies. It concentrated on our Country Food Plan program as our most successful and useful initiative. I noted that we had sought the help of Bank regional staffs on it but the answer had always been that they were too busy with projects to work on plans. When I paid my farewell visit to McNamara, I summarized the report's conclusions including this one. He replied that there was no reference to it and he was sure it wasn't true. Clearly, his functional staff through which my report was transmitted had deleted it knowing as I did his strong support for the idea.

At this time the Bank had essentially no staff stationed in developing countries. I suggested several times that both to be able to supplement the expertise of the briefly-visiting teams that traveled to the countries to help in preparing their development plans and to identify and review projects but even more important to assist the largely inexperienced bureaucrats in the implementation of projects including modifications where field experience made this desirable, as it often did, they should have experts stationed in all the principal recipient countries with others covered by regional staffs. Nothing happened then.

McNamara always spoke strongly on the need to control the population growth rates of the developing countries and joined the Board of PCC as soon as he left the Bank. But the Bank did little. My old friend from my London days, William Clark, who for most of McNamara's period at the Bank was his P.R. man, who went everywhere with him, explained that he would tell a staff meeting how important it was and leave. Then they would return to discussing their traditional programs of dams and roads, etc.
Finally I tried several times to persuade him and some of his staff that more of the half-billion a year or so of profits from interest on its loans should be spent on a grant basis for special programs like was done for the CGIAR, especially to help the poorer countries prepare good projects of which there was always a shortage. The answer always was that those profits had to be put in a reserve for losses due to the failure of countries to repay their loans. Otherwise it would cost much more to sell their bonds in the financial markets of the donor countries, an important source of their loan money. Since they had never had a default by the middle '70s and the reserves were already quite large I was not impressed with this excuse.

Before we were abolished, they did consult a sample of developing countries' governments about whether we had been useful. Their contacts were in the Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Finance. Their response was negative, I'm told. But it didn't surprise me, because my experience had been that we were giving the Minister of Agriculture or the Ministry of Food, if they had one, ammunition with which to fight the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning for more resources, and they didn't want to be fought. So anyway, we were abolished after two and a half years.

I did one interesting job in relation to this job. I was asked, with two other people, one of whom, Bong Tanco, later president of the World Food Council, and at the time was Minister of Agriculture of the Philippines; the other one a Dutchman teaching Development Economics at the University of Pittsburgh, but earlier head of agriculture at a Dutch university in Indonesia, to give advice to the president of Bangladesh on what to do about their food problem. There had been a UNDP project for six months studying it. We were to digest that in a couple of weeks and say, "These should be your priorities." That was a very interesting experience. There was a real potential there for increased production, particularly for wheat rather than rice, and we recommended that wheat be made part of the ration, because the culture says rice is the best to eat, wheat is second-rate. But in terms of nutrition and cost-effective production, wheat was much better. There was a real potential for yam with a high protein content, if they could find a way to keep it good from one crop to the next by canning it or making it in powder form or into dried-chips or whatnot. But it was a very interesting experience, and the president showed keen interest in our presentation to him and wanted to follow up. There were some good people in his staff, but he was assassinated later.

We had one of the Consultative Group meetings in Manila, hosted by this Minister of Agriculture, who was a very interesting person with some Harvard education, but we had to tell him that some of the things they were doing were not panning out very well. Anyway, that was the end of my last permanent job in the public field. For a summary of what I did, year by year, as a non-public employee from 1976 to 1991, see Annex A.

Finally in February of '78 I debated Congressman Tom Harkin of Iowa at a luncheon at the Mayflower Hotel organized by the International Development Conference on the use of U.S. aid to promote human rights. He advocated an automatic cut-off of aid to non-democratic governments as they were violators of human rights. I urged flexibility
pointing out that U.S. aid was seldom important enough for its withdrawal to cause a major crisis, that what impact it would have would be mainly on the poor people who needed our help most and not on the oppressors, and that if it did cause an economic crisis it would make continued rule by harsh means more likely according to all our experience, as fully democratic governments had seldom been able to handle such situations. Our debate was summarized in a report on the whole conference and the texts were published in the "Economic Impact" magazine in its fall issue.

During the Carter Administration I did two chores for the White House. One involved getting Paul Nitze and one or two other old friends who had some good contacts to support the ratification by the Senate of the new Treaty with Panama on the Canal. It worked.

More important was serving in 1979 as a Consultant to a Commission on World Hunger appointed by Carter, chaired by Sol Linowitz, a colleague from my ARA days, and with the able President of Johns Hopkins as his Deputy, Dr. Steven Maller. It had 15 or 20 members of considerable distinction and met fairly frequently over several months. I not only wrote some papers for it but was invited to participate in several of its discussions of its recommendations. Finally I helped draft its Report to President Carter. Since most of the staff were agricultural specialists, I had to add the importance of poverty and related population growth to world hunger, not just food production. Unfortunately he did nothing with it.

In 1979 and 1980 I did 3 special studies for the State Department. In the late '40s and most of the '50s there was a Coordination of Foreign Assistance organization reporting to the Secretary of State which I had headed in 1952-53. In the late '50s it was abolished. In the Carter administration the problem again got attention. There was a bill which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee discussed which would have set up a coordinating staff. I was asked to testify. At the last minute, there was a crisis and no hearings, and I just submitted a written statement. But I was very strongly in favor at that time, because of the expansion of agencies and activities in this field. I thought it ought to work out of the White House rather than the State Department. It finally was set up as IDCA, in a weaker form, partly because Treasury, which represented the U.S. at the regional banks and the World Bank, resisted being coordinated.

Q: IDCA was the thing that was set up.

MARTIN: Yes. I worked closely with them, and I did my first consulting job for Tom Ehrlich, the head of IDCA, who said he'd had a lot of briefings about the UN, but he had gotten no idea what use the UN agencies were to U.S. development objectives. So he gave me three months to figure out what was the answer. I studied it essentially from Washington, having learned a lot about the problem at DAC. The major conclusion I reached was that for not a single one of the specialized agencies involved in development did the U.S. have a set of the objectives we wanted it to achieve that had been agreed across the board.
It was very important, I concluded, that we strengthen the Bureau of International Organization affairs (IO) so that the top people in the economic and social field could do more than just pass on the budgets. Particularly they should develop agreed U.S. objectives. The job had been sort of taken over by Agriculture for FAO, and Labor for the International Labor Organization, but nobody had agreed what was most important and what were the priorities. AID had not been involved in any way in this to speak of. So it was an important task for him to see that this got done as the coordinator of U.S. aid, how what we did through other channels fit into what the UN agencies were doing and how they could supplement it best. We had neglected it totally.

As a result of my study, the Bureau of UN Affairs in the State Department, IO, named a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs. Up to then they had only dealt with UN budgets, not with substance. I think that was a helpful move, as we had a coordinating function.

Then early in 1980 the IO people with whom I had dealt, asked me to study a Helms amendment problem. Senator Helms had pushed for an amendment to the U.S. appropriation for the UN saying that none of our assessed contributions could be used by the specialized agencies to help a developing country carry out its economic or social programs.

Q: What?

MARTIN: This is assessed contributions, not the voluntary ones to UNDP or one or two of the others. But none of the assessed contributions could be used in developing countries. Carter intervened and got it stopped, but he was afraid it would come back again. So I was asked to study what was the answer to the Helms proposal if he tried again. On this one, I went to Paris, Geneva, and Rome to talk to the specialized agencies on just what funds they were using in developing countries and how it could be done otherwise. (UNESCO, WHO, ILO, and FAO and IFAD.)

Q: The funds that went to those agencies were assessed?

MARTIN: Most of them, not all of them.

Q: Not all. But those, according to the Helms amendment, would not have been available for developing countries.

MARTIN: The assessed ones could not be so used. UNESCO reported to UN New York headquarters that none of their budget was used for developing countries. This was obviously wrong, because there were UNESCO committees in all developing countries to carry out projects there, financed by UNESCO. But they said none, perhaps to avoid the Helms type of criticism.
The World Health Organization had a mandate from their council that 60% of their budget must be spent in developing countries. So they were putting into their developing country accounts a lot of expenditures that were substantially of benefit to developed countries in order to meet the 60% figure. Again false accounting. Of course, some things are to the benefit of all countries like smallpox eradication. It's hard to distinguish. Several of the others just didn't keep books so you could not tell what was going on.

The FAO had a sample of a way to get around this, in that there had been set up a joint FAO-World Bank program to finance technical assistance in developing countries to prepare good projects. The World Bank had also done a little bit of this with UNESCO in Latin America. So I was able to recommend this as an example of the kind of an operation that we could support, and we should put some of our money in these kinds of special trust funds. We could be sure they were used for good purposes in a way we could not do with assessed contributions.

I think IO wanted me to say, "Put all our money for developing countries in UNDP and then that will take care of it." I did not, because, as I think I have mentioned, I felt that the reforms recommended by the Jackson Report which provided each country with a five-year allocation, prevented the UNDP from exercising any effective control over the use of that money; it belonged to the country. Thus to put it in UNDP would not help us to achieve our objectives in developing countries with our money in any reliable way. Trust funds and that kind of arrangement which had worked in several cases was the way to do it if we wanted to use effectively the UN specialized agencies' skills, field staff, and so forth.

Q: Very ingenious.

MARTIN: In the spring of 1980, Cy Vance called me in to ask me to chair a group of three to study the economic functions of the State Department. I had with me two very able old colleagues, Frances Wilson, whom I had made head of administration for the Economic Bureau some 20 years before and who had retired recently, and John Leddy who had been in that bureau with me and Assistant Secretary of Treasury, Assistant Secretary of European Affairs in State etc.

Q: Excellent.

MARTIN: We were given six months half-time with a generous travel budget, garage spaces, and offices in the State Department to do this. The problem had arisen out of recent legislation, stimulated for some reason, apparently, by the leading Democratic politician from Texas, Robert Strauss, with some other support, which had transferred the responsibility for the commercial operations of our embassies to the Commerce Department, and said that the head of the commercial staff should report directly to the ambassador, not to the Economic Counselor. The implementing regulations had also transferred responsibility for U.S. commodity policy and for the protection of private business investments from State to the Trade Representative. Naturally, there was a
considerable amount of upsetting confusion, resentment, and opposition to how this was going to work out, especially in State.

We spent six months talking all around town. Leddy went to Europe and to Asia, I went to Ottawa, Brasilia, Sao Paulo, Santiago and Bogota. Frances Wilson wasn't able to travel because of a sick sister. We interviewed the business community, the embassy people, and talked to the top people here, like the Special Trade Representative, the Under Secretary of Commerce and similar figures in Agriculture, Labor, Interior, and Energy. I had long talks with my old friend Lloyd Cutler in the White House about his feelings on the subject.

The U.S. trade representative head said, "I want a strong State Department. I want a strong staff in the State Department because the major problem that we face in our export promotion is our security restrictions on what we can export and to whom. The National Security Council makes those decisions like the export embargo on Chile when they had a military dictator." He then said, "Neither I nor the Secretary of Commerce sit on the Security Council. The Secretary of State does. You ought to have a staff of computer experts, a specialized staff that can calculate, looking backwards as well as at new proposals, what are the cost-benefit ratios of these proposals." Cutler made the same points.

I got much the same answer from an old friend from Commerce, who was now with the National Association of Manufacturers in an international trade job, that this was a major problem.

The Commerce Department was not belligerent in defense of its increased role at all.

Overseas we found that the major U.S. business community investors could handle most of their problems. What they needed help on was going to the Cabinet members or the President. And for that you needed the ambassador, the DCM, or at least the economic counselor. The commercial attaché, his reporting, his negotiating abilities are for the small businesses, basically, and of no great importance in the overall system.

We did find a problem in some embassies. In Paris, for example, the Commercial staff had a special person on steel. We had real policy problems with the Common Market on steel that that person ought also to handle with the French. Major reporting on policy with respect to steel exports of France had also to be handled by that person. So that you couldn't have that person not available to the economic minister. There was also a question of what to do, in countries like Brazil where Sao Paulo was the major commercial reporting station, not Brasilia. The same thing is true in Germany. Bonn isn't important. In Morocco the capital isn't important. How do you handle that question? Does the consul general in the major economic centers have to be a Commerce person?

Anyway, a lot of the embassies resisted strongly. We decided that you must give the ambassador freedom to use his staff the way he chooses best, both on personality, geography, and so forth, the nature of the problems.
The transfer of the commerce people and positions to Commerce did not do great damage to the State Department's ability to function, though we were concerned that in a number of the countries that we visited, the local staffs had been mostly put with the commerce people and a few or none left with the economic people. The locals were very important for the reporting that the economics people had to do. That had to be more flexible.

We did object to the transfer of commodity policy and investment policy to the Special Representative, who had no relevant personnel or files, and because "In 50 countries commodity policy is political policy." You've got to work closely with the political people on the coffee policy or the sugar policy and so forth. This was often the most important relation we had with a country which was a major exporter of one or more commodities.

We felt also that the Ambassadors and DCMs, after we made some surveys of their capacities, needed to have more economic experience and background than they, on the average, had. That ought to be a much more important factor in choosing people for these positions so that they could handle better the problems of the U.S. business community. We also thought that there ought to be more training at FSI for them on the economic factors in their jobs.

We also felt that there ought to be a greater role played by the Under Secretary Economic. At that point, we had an able Yale professor but he really took no interest in the interagency situation. We got one next under Reagan who took no interest in State's role and we've had Economic Assistant Secretaries who, on the whole, have not been aggressive people or particularly outstanding. There has been some buildup there, but not much. Part of the implementation problem was that when we finished our report in the required six months, the Secretary of State was Muskie. We talked to Muskie. He had read our summary, thought it made sense. He said, "I'll recommend this strongly to Haig," about to succeed him.

Q: There still are economic officers in all embassies that are State Department officers?

MARTIN: Oh, yes, there are. We also recommended, by the way, that there ought to be an AID-Treasury combined economic policy officer in a half a dozen of the big developing countries. That was a good idea because the AID people were only project people. The general economic and financial scene, usually critical to development progress, was not being adequately covered. But not much has happened.

One of our conclusions was that there ought to be an aid coordinating organization, preferably in the White House, EDCA having died. I did get support from Lloyd Cutler, who was then in the White House as a top advisor to President Carter, because of his feeling of missing anything like this that was pulling things together in a sensible fashion. He had had a study made of it, as a matter of fact, by Sy Rubin, who had once worked with AID and with the Development Assistance Committee. But it hasn't happened, and I think it's still too bad. The economic bureau is totally inadequately staffed to do this.
Q: This coordination of economic affairs...

MARTIN: Of aid affairs, connections with developing countries.

Q: Developing countries. You make a distinction between that and our total foreign economic policy.

MARTIN: Oh, yes, absolutely. Yes. As far as total foreign economic policy, there has been a more or less active White House coordinator and a National Security Council committee, and sometimes they have worked, and sometimes they haven't at all. But there has been a White House-NSC-type person on economics in recent years from time to time. Henry Owen, in effect, did that once, whom I have mentioned earlier.

Q: We had a coordinator of that kind of assistance, I believe, in the White House when Harriman came back from Europe, probably in 1949 or '50. I forget what his title was. He coordinated and brought Linc Gordon back from Paris, as you recall.

MARTIN: He came back working with Harriman.

Q: So Harriman had that function in the White House for a while.

MARTIN: To some extent, yes. He was basically working on Marshall Plan. He didn't do very much beyond Marshall Plan.

Q: He had something to do with Point Four.

MARTIN: He may have. That's possible, yes. I don't know. I don't remember that. But then there was set up this unit in the Secretary of State's office.

Q: That worked very well, and Dillon became the head of that at one time, did he not?

MARTIN: No, he was not, but in practice he did more coordinating of aid at the end of the '50s as Under Secretary of State than I think we have had since.

I heard some things at lunch yesterday that are very depressing, about the whole promotion scheme. This was at the meeting of the AIT board with Dean Brown.

Q: AIT?

MARTIN: American Institute in Taiwan. Dean Brown and I are the outside members of the board. The indications are that if a man has a choice between economic minister in Paris or consul general in Guadalajara, he'll take the consul general job because that's management, and the system now is you can't get promoted to the senior service unless you've had management experience. An economic counselor or political counselor is not management. DCM in Chad is more important than economic minister in Brazil. (Laughs) Just because
"management" has been the critical word. They don't recognize that an economic minister or a political minister has management responsibilities. That sounds ridiculous to me. But head of a consulate is a manager.

Q: He supervises more people.

MARTIN: Maybe more, but not necessarily more important functions. (Laughs) It's people at a routine level. As I say, our report died on the vine.

There were a number of people in the Economic Bureau who were very interested in pushing it, but the administrative officers were not strong supporters, or the assistant secretaries. State representation on the interagency committees was not pushed hard. We did point out that Labor and Agriculture were major issues, not just Commerce, because they have also a major role in international economic policy.

We also found that the Energy Department had 150 people in their international division, and I visited Canada in connection with this. Those people were conducting their considerable business with the Canadian Government by phone or telegram, without the embassy ever hearing about it, let alone the State Department. Energy relations with Canada are quite important. You had a problem also with the Interior on fisheries, on which our relations with Canada are important and ought to be coordinated effectively but were not.

Q: You can't beat something with nothing. You need people and you need authority, and you need other resources. State's just been cut, cut, cut.

MARTIN: Yes, that's right. Dean Brown was telling us more stories than I'd ever heard about, of political ambassadors. They have this training courses for them. He and Shirley Temple, a former political ambassador, were there helping for a week or two at the training course, and he said the Reagan ones particularly, but he could name some others earlier, they had never heard of the State Department. They insisted that they only reported to the President. Why bother with the State Department? (Laughs) Ambassadors to little African countries which the White House would never have heard of said if we have a boss, it's the NSC and the White House.

Q: We have had policy being made out of the NSC for a long time.

MARTIN: The new head of the AIT was an NSC man named David Laux, so he knows it, in the Reagan Administration. (Laughs)

You want some generalizations?

Q: Yes, I very much do. But before we get to that, I want to know why you now feel it important that you're doing what you are now doing with the Population Crisis Committee. I think we have a gap.
MARTIN: I don't know why I got interested in the population field. It was just a logical problem, I guess. My scholarly pursuits were history of political theory as my favorite subject, and I read Malthus, and he makes some points on that subject. Why I got further into it, I'm not sure, but I have found a memo I wrote in 1951 to John Leddy about the idea of giving a lot more aid to Morocco, I think it was, to raise the standard of living of the Moroccans. We should get the Europeans to do more. I said, "All that would do would be to reduce the death rate of children and increase the population growth rate, and you will still have just as much unemployment."

Of course, Draper got very interested in the population problem in developing countries, in his study in '58 for Eisenhower on military assistance and how much help they needed and I was on his staff. But General Gruenther was on his committee and as a strong Catholic he refused to sign the report if it mentioned this population problem. Draper did talk about it to President Eisenhower and found him very understanding of its importance. Then when Kennedy came in, one of my old colleagues that I had first hired in the State Department was made the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Population, Bob Barnett. I worked closely with him, supported him from the economic assistant secretary job on that subject. It was obviously critical in Latin America. At the first staff meeting--perhaps I mentioned this--I asked for a report on the population situation in each country. Costa Rica had the highest growth rate, which didn't make any sense, because it was the most developed, by most standards. "The women are so pretty," is the best answer they had.

Q: Pretty good answer.

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: I believe now Costa Rica's birth rate has cut back.

MARTIN: Yes. They hadn't made the transition. It's a Catholic country and I hadn't realized that low death rates, education and prosperity which ought to cause cutting back of population growth, take time to be reflected in family decisions.

Then having had repeated experience with Draper, when he in '65 became Chairman of a recently set up organization, the Population Crisis Committee, one of his first tasks was to get a UN agency organized to deal with the population problem, and also to greatly strengthen and expand the activities of a private organization called the International Planned Parenthood Federation, based in London. He worked on both of those very hard.

In the late Sixties, at the Development Assistance Committee, I arranged an informal meeting of officials from its various countries to let Draper talk about the need to contribute to the International Federation and to the UN Fund for Population Activities, which he'd gotten set up. We did have a small group working at the Development Center at the OECD on developing-country problems, which hosted meetings once a year on the population issue. Draper used to come to those meetings, and I went to them.
Draper had been a real leader in developing the U.S. position for the first UN Conference on Population, held in Bucharest, also in ’74, and had gone there and lobbied hard to get a strong statement made.

There had been a group of NGOs, non-government organizations, which met to make plans for the Budapest one. One of the speakers at those meetings was John D. Rockefeller III, who was very active in this field. Preparing for that speech, he had decided to change his mind. He had always believed that you should just put money into population, but now he decided that population and mother and child health might well go together; you could sell it better in combined approaches. So after the food conference, he got in touch with me, and in January, ’75, we had lunch on how to implement this on a combined basis and how to shift gears. We had a very interesting time.

Draper went to the food conference, again, with his aide from PCC, Larry Keegan, whom I had known from the War Production Board and other places. He was then president of this organization and Draper, its founder, was chairman.

With my support they had easily gotten a paragraph in its resolutions on the importance of controlling population growth to controlling hunger. Just after the food conference was over in December of ’74, I got a phone call from him. He called me to talk about some Congressional testimony I was going to be giving on the food problem a few days later, and hoped I would talk about the population aspects of it, and I assured him I would. He had called from Naples, Florida, wakened me up on a Sunday morning, and four days later he died in his middle eighties, a workaholic 'til the end.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, you were talking about...

MARTIN: I was just going to say that in ’74, I was invited to a couple of board meetings of the Population Crisis Committee and agreed to join the board. So I’ve been on the board since February, ’75. When they abolished the Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment in Developing Countries in ’77, I was invited to have an office with the Population Crisis Committee as a volunteer, and used it most days I was in Washington.

Initially, its president, Dr. Fred Pinkham, had an idea about a joint arrangement in which I would do work for the Population Crisis Committee internationally, and also work with him, who was part-time, and Dan Parker, former head of the AID agency, of the Parker Pen family, who had offices adjacent to us and who was a close friend in a consulting operation in running small U.S. businesses overseas. I would do some work with them, advising smaller corporations on developing countries as places to invest and what the risks were, and make some money out of that. We were going to do that jointly with a group that was working out of the Brookings Institution.

When we got down to the brass tacks, that group and our group didn't have the same ideas at all, and Dan Parker got health problems. Nothing serious ever developed out of that. I
just stayed on as a volunteer with the Population Crisis Committee. [In 1979 I was appointed to its Executive Committee, in 1981 made its Chairman, and in 1988 became Acting Chairman of its Board, a position I held until 1991. Starting in 1978, when in Washington I went usually every day to my PCC office. However, no more than a half or more often a third of my time was spent on PCC affairs. Throughout the '80s a third or more of my downtown hours was devoted to a book on "Kennedy and Latin America," mostly at the State Department Library or Records Office. Much of my non-downtown time, including during vacations, was also spent on it. None of my other Boards took much time beyond their occasional meetings.]

The cut of my CGFPI role to half-time in 1976 and its elimination in 1977 gave me more and more time to pursue my interests in not only population, but also environment, hunger, and developing-country poverty by participating in non-governmental organizations (NGO's), making speeches and writing. The organizations I joined and their major projects will be described here and lesser ones covered more briefly in the year-by-year reports in Annex A.

My earliest NGO membership had been on the New York-based Council of Foreign Relations of which I became a member in 1960, and still am. In the '70s they set up a Washington branch whose meetings I attended when the subject was interesting. With their headquarters I participated in several projects which produced books and was the speaker at several of its meetings.

In the mid-'70s, I think, a Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs, which only hosted meetings, was set up and I joined it. I have chaired some of its meetings and been the speaker several times.

I was a member of the Overseas Development Council and the Society of International Development from the '60s. I became a member of the Board of the former in the mid-Seventies and spoke or chaired panels at the SID triennial world conferences several times. For one held in Baltimore I was chair of the Finance Committee which raised about $180,000--$5,000 more than needed. It was my only fund-raising experience.

In 1975 I was elected a member of the Cosmos Club. In 1982 I became a member of its Award Committee and then its chairman.

In 1980 I was elected to the Board of "Partnership for Productivity International" but because of concern about senior staff quarrels in the mid-Eighties I resigned, just before it was abolished by AID for misuse of funds. Founded by Quakers, it funded and provided technical assistance to micro-enterprises in developing-country villages, using mostly AID money.

In 1979 I was elected to the Board of the International Council for Education Development and continue to serve on it. It meets annually in various countries as its Board comes from at least a dozen countries.
In 1979 it was decided to establish as a non-profit corporation, the American Institute in Taiwan, to become the equivalent of the U.S. Embassy which we could not have after recognizing the People's Republic of China which claimed Taiwan as part of its territory. It had a contract with State and was financed by a line-item appropriation in the State budget. From its start I was a member of its three-man Board, later four, of which one and then two were staff people. I was the economic policymaker and Dean Brown, former Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, helped with those problems. After the first couple of years when we had serious pay versus pension problems, we met only two or three times a year but I made week-long inspections in Taiwan in '85 and '89.

A project on which I was fairly active in the late '70s and early '80s was that of representing through a close Paris friend, Al Davidson, an able lawyer in the U.S. and London for many years, and then involved from Paris in a U.S. proposal to build a tunnel under the ocean between England and France, in the Association of Americans Abroad in their campaign to get Congress to approve bilateral agreements between the U.S. and foreign governments under which each would pay certain medical costs of citizens of the other with annual balancing as was done for people living close to the Canadian and Mexican borders for whom the closest facility was in the other country. Many of the Americans involved were retirees who while living in the U.S. had made payments for receiving later medical compensation which they could not receive while abroad. We got House approval and a bill submitted for Senate action by Senator Dole but not even hearings held. My work involved mostly contacting House and Senate committee staffers, White House personnel concerned with overseas Americans' problems, and several other sources of information in the U.S. government like the State Department medical staff.

In the late '70s, Jean Mayer, the new President of Tufts University, and a world-famous nutritionist whom I had met during the World Food Conference preparations, created a School of Nutrition and I was appointed to its Visiting Committee on which I served about 6 years.

In the mid-eighties, through its Executive Director, Sy Rubin, a friend from occupation days in the '40s, I was named to an Advisory Committee on Research and Policy Studies of the American Society of International Law and served about five years.

In about 1985 I became one of about 70 founding members of the American Academy of Diplomacy, all retired career and political Ambassadors, devoted primarily but not exclusively to improving the quality of U.S. Ambassadorial appointments by reviewing the record of nominees as the American Bar Association does for nominated judges and passing its views to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

From 1981 to 1990 I was a member of the Board of the Audubon Naturalist Society of the Middle Atlantic States which met about ten times a year and was very active on local environmental issues. Nine years was the limit. I got them to give attention to flowers as well as birds in the environment.
On the Board of the Atlantic Council from 1975 to 1981, a private U.S. group supporting NATO, I did a book with them on the "U.S. and Developing Countries." A committee to produce it was set up by the Council of which I was both Chairman and Rapporteur. We talked about the subject at a good many meetings, and then I wrote our Report as a book with help from a couple of them, especially Lincoln Gordon.

I later did a 57 page booklet for the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University on the negotiating history of the World Food Conference, the first book that they had published on how diplomacy worked in the multinational field. Both came out in the late '70s.

Q: This is at Georgetown University.

MARTIN: It is part of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. I did some work with the Council on Foreign Relations on a study of the financial problems of developing countries, which resulted in a book by somebody else from a number of sessions that we had there. I also got involved in a study of the health damage to farmers which pesticides were doing in developing countries and how their use could be better controlled. I chaired a final meeting in Key Biscayne of the top executives of the leading producers in this country and Europe and half a dozen Latin America governments on how to tackle the problem. Substantial agreement was reached, to my surprise, on corrective actions by both groups that have been effective, I think. Anyway, quite a bit in the food-related field I had opportunities to do, but increasingly I moved to the population field.

Then I was asked, I believe it was in '80, to participate in a seminar being held on the population problem of Haiti, and did a paper on the general background of Haiti for it. A few months later, I was asked by SAIS, the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, who were resuming publication of a magazine, if I could do a piece related to the Caribbean. As I had just worked a little on Haiti, I did an article on Haiti and cleared it with the State Department, sort of a general background on Kennedy and Haiti, calling it "A Study In Futility." That was sort of the beginning of the Kennedy and Latin America book that I've been working on for maybe an average of two or three hours a day since 1982, using State Department records and documents, the Kennedy Library, my own recollections, a little bit of talking to people. I'm hopeful it may get to a publisher in the next year or so.

Q: I hope so.

MARTIN: I'm now mostly cutting down 1,800 pages on a word processor into a book on Kennedy's activities more basically, and another one that's of interest to the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy on how the State Department functioned during the Kennedy period in Latin America. I'm working on both of them.
With the help of the Audubon Naturalist Society of the Mid-Atlantic States, and friends in the Smithsonian from the Foreign Service, I got a book published by the latter, "A Beginner's Guide to the Wildflowers of the C&O Towpath," after quite a lot of walking on it from '81 to '85 and taking pictures of its wildflowers. Wildflower photography wherever I was had been a hobby of mine since our stay in Argentina.

For PCC I made two speeches to meetings of the World Congress on Fertility Progress, who are the specialists in curing infertility. I spoke to one in Buenos Aires and another one in Dublin on the subject of what we need most is more research on sterilization as a method of contraception. Because the main problems of population control are administration, reaching the countryside in spite of bureaucratic incapacity, and "men," they often not being willing to do family planning or let their wives do it, what we needed most, I said was easily reversible sterilization, and experts in infertility ought to be best able to develop easily reversible sterilization procedures, both for men and women. It would take one decision, easier to make if reversible, and one action.

I also gave speeches often in the late '70s on hunger and world food security, emphasizing that it isn't a problem of producing food so much as it's one of poverty, and we have to use every possible means to have food produced more cheaply and used by the family more efficiently from a cost-effective standpoint. Research must emphasize not productivity per acre, but productivity per dollar, to get it cheap. Increasingly, I think, the food system is doing it that way. But all of these things have kept me reasonably out of mischief.

Q: You have mentioned just briefly the problem of management, of public administration in connection with population programs. I take it that is an important factor?

MARTIN: It is, I think, more important in population and in health, generally, than in many other fields because what you find is that Ministries of Health are staffed by doctors, and if doctors were good administrators, they wouldn't have become doctors, they would have done something else. So the ability of them to process papers, to delegate responsibility, to work in the field, is just very limited.

Furthermore, the experience in developing countries, generally, is that if you get a good education, you don't want to leave the capital or at least a major urban center. The population of Africa is 75% in rural areas, and if you're educated you don't want to live there, and usually you can't talk to or listen well to the villagers. You can't understand their problems and find solutions for them unless you can work with them. In the population and health field, the theory is that if you're to be successful, you have to have a lot of education, and preferably you go to a developed country to get it, and that's a disaster in terms of working with rural populations.

This is also true in world development. If you're an agriculturist with a degree from some good university, you can't do anything about rural development. It's a major headache. Therefore, simplification is a major part of the problem.
I must say I also have a bit of a bias, which may be out of date now, but in my experience in the department of political science at Northwestern for eight or nine years, I got no feeling that the people teaching public administration knew what they were doing or what the answers were. Public administration is handling people, and I think handling people is a very difficult subject to teach. You can talk about how to do papers of one sort and another, and I guess computers can give you some answers that we didn't have then. But I think it's one of the major challenges, a better way of teaching public administration, rather than teaching only the substance that people are handling. It's a different subject entirely, and how to teach it is difficult, as is getting people willing to study it who feel that they must know only substance, that its the only thing that's worth learning. You know about this by far more than I. I started with a bit of pessimism on this.

Q: Thank you.

MARTIN: As a matter of fact, on education, too, I have a complaint. I was going to be a professor. That was my ambition. After I'd finished three years of graduate study, I asked my professor, "Now, where do I go to learn how to teach?" "Learn how to teach?" You just learn the subject and you'll know how to teach." Well, I'd had enough teachers that didn't know how to teach at the university to know that that wasn't true. But nobody respected the idea that there was a subject called teaching that had to be taught. As a member of the board of the International Council of Educational Development, I am a pain in their neck, because they talk mostly about how do you measure the quality of a university, and I try to focus on literacy and primary education, what is for most people all they get. When they talk about university quality, all they talk about is the publication and research record, and I keep butting in and saying, "But aren't they supposed to teach, too?" And they just won't admit it. As I say, a man who is a great man in the laboratory may be a lousy man as a teacher. I've sat in on some meetings in Paris, in which the Professors were just terrible, and read an interesting novel written about teachers who just couldn't communicate with students worth a damn. It's a sad thing.

More generally, I think that I find it very difficult to face up to the luck that got me where I got. Two people, I've mentioned them, were responsible. I think, Ed Mason and Doug Dillon. Doug Dillon I got to know reasonably well in Paris when I was at USRO and he was Ambassador to France. I often had problems with the French that I could talk to him about. I think he got me the job as Assistant Secretary Economic when he was Under Secretary of State under Eisenhower, and probably as Assistant Secretary for Latin America when he was Secretary of the Treasury under Kennedy. Ed Mason, a Harvard Professor of Economics and I had worked on a Bureau of Labor Statistics project in 1938-39 and he got me into OSS first, and then when he went from there to State, he got me into State. It was just luck that both of them, non-career people, went to the right places and decided to bring me along. George Perkins helped me that way, too, again a non-career person.

Q: You're being a little modest, Mr. Ambassador.

MARTIN: I just think that luck is a big part of the game.
Secondly, I'd like to put on record that long hours is part of the game, too. The civil service is not an easy place. In my four years as head of the European Regional Affairs Office and then Special Assistant to the Secretary, '49 to '53, four years at USRO, my years from '60 to '63 as an Assistant Secretary, a 50-60 hour week was routine. If I got two weeks of holiday over a three-year period, I was lucky. That's the way the game was played. An 8:00 o'clock staff meeting in the morning and getting home at 8:00, that was normal. Always Saturday morning and maybe Saturday afternoon, and usually an hour reading at night if I didn't have an official social affair of some kind during these periods.

I want to stand up for the civil servant, so to speak, because that's what you have to do to keep going. I had a health problem and I was supposed to have a relaxing life. I found if I liked the work and kind of watched my step, I could handle it. I've been on a bland diet since 1930.

Q: Bland diet?

MARTIN: Yes. Stress problems, so called, causing what they call an irritable or spastic colon. They've changed the rules for bland diets in a major way since then, but it used to be very bland. About seven or eight years ago, fiber became part of the bland diet. It isn't lettuce or cabbages or any of the brassica family. That's botanical. Also very limited alcohol, but I never was a drinker. My family raised me differently. And no spices. So in certain countries I have trouble.

Q: I see.

MARTIN: Yes, no spices, no vinegars or acid, and only the orange fruits as fresh fruit. The acid fruits--apples, pears, or peaches have to be cooked.

Q: This must have given you problems in your travels.

MARTIN: Oh, it has from time to time, and I always have to take a supplement. It used to be a sea plant, agar-agar, but now it's Metamucil.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, I do know you have some hobbies that you've pursued. How do those relate to your working life?

MARTIN: Walking has been a major hobby, not jogging. They say walking is better than jogging if you're over 60. Walking has been a major hobby. I was a tennis player, and I did play a lot of tennis until the mid-Fifties. Then I found it a little strenuous. Now I play with grandchildren. I really gave up in Argentina and switched to golf. The advantage of tennis over golf is you get exercise in a shorter period of time.

Before I took up the Kennedy book, I was working on other things. As I say, I had been interested in the history of political theory. I took a course on historiography as a graduate
student, and we had to read all the works of one historian, and I read all those of Samuel Lawson Gardner, who wrote about 16 volumes on English history between 1600 to 1656, which was the period of the civil war of the parliamentarians against the King, very important in political development.

So I decided on history and historiography--how to analyze and write histories--as a spare-time hobby. I was thinking that as soon as the war was over, I was going to get a job teaching. There had been a lot written about the role of the English Parliament in that period but nothing about the role of the House of Lords, which split between the Parliamentarians and the King, and I thought that might be a fun subject, the contributions to the political development and theory of the period. So I started doing research on that, accumulated a book collection of considerable size on that civil war period, the first half, shall we say, of 17th century English history, and books on historiography. So my reading was that.

I also had liked English fiction, so I did a lot of reading of 18th and 19th century English fiction. When I got to Paris, I read a lot of French 18th and 19th century fiction as relaxation, where you don't have to take notes. Those have been reading hobbies. I made a lot of notes on my history book and not much drafting. Then somebody stole the subject, in a sense. A Cambridge University professor who later on was professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton, wrote a book on the "Decline of the Aristocracy from 1560 to 1660." He had access to a lot of the family documents and whatnot. I was doing genealogy to a considerable extent in terms of detailed work, rather than general reading, because who was related to who, who could marry who, was important politically. Relationships were important to who came down on which side, who was supporting Charles I and who the Parliament. But anyway, that is pretty much past, but that was a hobby on the side.

In the mid-Forties, a neighbor who was a Geological Survey expert started me on birding, to get more interesting walks, at Pennyfield on the C&O Towpath. I got into that, and we took some holidays down on the Chesapeake Bay during the war period at a place that was nearby, Scientists Cliffs, and didn't take much gasoline to get to, and we didn't have much. The kids had a beach and I watched birds. So I was into birds when I had spare time. But when we went to Paris, they say the French eat the birds, and there weren't many around. There were lots of flowers, some very good beginners' guides to flowers, so I began to identify flowers. I could go out to the Epte Valley, about 25 miles out of Paris, on Sunday afternoon and come back with 50 or 60 different species of flowers that I would identify.

Then in London and here in Washington, I didn't have time to do much, but it was birds, basically, as much as anything. Then I decided, when we went to Argentina, that I'd take pictures of birds. We went by boat so we could continue studying our Spanish and get total relaxation, and we bought a camera at a stop in the Caribbean. Birds don't sit still, and I'm not patient. I decided that gradually I would shift to flowers, and I started taking pictures of flowers. But most of our travels around Argentina were semi-official. It was hard to get
loose to do something on your own, except on holidays in a great place, like Bariloche, 500 miles southwest of Buenos Aires in the Andes mountains.

Then we went to Paris, and I took up flowers seriously. In that job, I did an enormous amount of traveling. I'd sneak out in spare time to take flower pictures.

Now I'd like to summarize briefly some of my conclusions about diplomacy and State. I think it should be emphasized that diplomacy is personal relations. If you've got a reasonably good intelligence, you can teach people what they need to know, and it's personal relations that count. The most important part of the State Department ought to be the Office of Personnel to pick the people, know them, take advantage of their personal qualifications. That's why we've had non-career people like Doug Dillon, David Bruce, Averell Harriman, and Ellsworth Bunker as such distinguished diplomats, because it's the personality that counts. The job of diplomacy is understanding other people and thereby being able to persuade them to accept your point of view. Diplomats do that on a person-to-person basis, basically, although their personality also affects their abilities to use the media, to convert larger groups. Again, that's a question of personal capacities. Testing those is probably even harder than management capacity, but management capacity is a personal one, too.

Q: Yes, the two things are very closely related.

MARTIN: My biggest shock was when Tom Mann said to me, when I became his Deputy, "Never mention personnel to me. Do what you want to do and don't tell me."

Q: That's very interesting.

MARTIN: It's a totally wrong approach. I think that the more the State Department understands that, the better job they'll do. It's, of course, not only in foreign relations, but it can have some value on the Hill with the Congress.

Q: Exactly.

MARTIN: That's personal relations, too, although now more with staff than with congressmen. (Laughs)

Q: Yes. That's how it has developed.

MARTIN: Yes, unfortunately, because good congressmen should be interested in doing a congressman's job.

Q: Yes.
MARTIN: They're raising funds, managing staff, pleasing the people of their district, not dealing much with substance. They're not dealing with the people who can contribute substance. I'm worried about U.S. politicians.

I'd just like to emphasize, too, how important it is for the government to speak with one voice, and for there to be adequate coordination. The State Department must be the head man under the White House in foreign relations, and we need able people. This means that the Secretary alone cannot begin to do that. There are half a dozen or a dozen top people that are absolutely critical, including the Under Secretary Economic in the field that I'd been in.

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: As an example of this, I found myself in the Kennedy period more, but even in the Eisenhower period, going to the White House International Economic coordinator constantly, because I was dealing with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary of State was just too busy with international diplomatic headline items to understand and know the somewhat more technical issues that came up with these other people, but they were important. I had to deal with them. To get help, I had to use the White House--Clarence Randall under Eisenhower and then Mike Feldman under Kennedy. Feldman was a great asset in the Kennedy period, because he was handling domestic economic policy, too. [Randall, by the way, was an interesting man. Formerly head of Inland Steel Corporation of Chicago, he had written several times including once in the Atlantic Monthly, about his conviction that for manufacturing concerns like his, the best college graduates were those who had followed a Liberal Arts curriculum from which they had learned how to learn [sic] because by the time they had reached positions where they had to make important choices, what engineering and science graduates of their age had learned was out-of-date.]

Q: Then your relations with Dungan.

MARTIN: Then with Dungan in Latin America. He was useful, very useful. It was particularly when I was in the economic field that I was dependent on the others.

Q: How do you think organizationally, is there some answer to that relationship between the State Department and the White House and the other departments?

MARTIN: In my period--and I suspect this may have passed--their role internationally was new, really. Their Secretaries would talk to an Assistant Secretary. I suspect they're more accustomed now to wanting to do it themselves and not that way.

I think that there needs to be an effective White House foreign economic committee, or economic-financial committee, at the Cabinet level. But I don't know what it is now. I don't know what it has become, but on the whole there has not been a very active functioning
body in the economic field. It ought to be accepted that the Under Secretary for State attends for State, but the Secretary can come from the other places.

Q: Were you talking about the economic coordination?

MARTIN: I'm talking about basically the economic coordination. I think that's the one that tends to be dispersed. I think the other State-Defense, and that's a separate type of question.

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: But I think the economic function has gotten much broader, and Energy is big in it. Interior has a number of aspects that are important. Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce have always been big, and the Special Trade Representative is big now. So there's got to be a way to make them pull together in an effective way.

Q: Problems of coordination.

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: Coordination of our own and then coordination abroad, coordination of donors, coordination of the recipients of aid.

MARTIN: Yes. There's a multiplicity of organizations. I don't know whether I've mentioned to you a study made by a German who lived in one of the small African countries for two years to study the NGO's function there, and made a list of 2,024 of them.

Q: No.

MARTIN: In one of the Francophone countries.

Q: Organizations of people?

MARTIN: Organizations from outside the country.

Q: Unbelievable.

MARTIN: Just unbelievable. How could they possibly manage it? Another one of the small Francophone African countries had 300 visits a year from donor delegations.

Q: Terrible.

MARTIN: When do you do your work? (Laughs) You're entertaining visitors all the time. The multiplicity of organizations is just unbelievable. On the other hand, you can say that if an organization gets too big, you've got an impossible problem, too. I mean, bigness is a problem, as well as multiplicity.
I've had some real disagreements with Harlan Cleveland, who is a good friend in many ways, who talks about the information revolution that will simplify all our problems. I don't think it simplifies at all. I think it creates more possible conflicts of information, more choices to be made. In the Pilgrims' day, the choices that people had to make were really very simple and few. And everything from where I take my holiday to what will I do tomorrow morning, the information revolution has just added enormously to the data that we have to look at to make decisions. It hasn't simplified decisions that I can see. Choices are value choices, and statistics don't solve such problems.

Q: That's true.

MARTIN: And the more important statistics are about people and their attitudes, and they're the worst to be sure about. The Latin America custom is always to tell a person what they want to hear. If my car's broken down and I ask, "How far is it to the next gas station?" if it's ten miles, they'll tell you, "You have to walk?" "Yes." "Oh, it's only about a mile." (Laughs) And so forth.

Q: So what we get down to is the individual, the person, the human being, and how they react.

MARTIN: Yes, every time.

Q: The most important.

MARTIN: Yes. Survey questions are very tricky.

Q: That's true.

MARTIN: On population statistics saying that 63% of women in union in Brazil are practicing contraception, I have two questions. One, they probably think you want a high figure, and the questioner wants to think that they're doing that. It's a popular thing to do. And second, which are women in union?

Q: I don't even know what that means. Married?

MARTIN: Yes. With 10 or 12 abandoned million street kids, to have 50% in the northeast practicing modern contraception I can't believe.

Q: That is true?

MARTIN: That's what this Westinghouse survey team said.

Q: That's what they said. I see.
MARTIN: Yes. Whether it's true or not, I don't know. Probably modern contraception to them means a wide variety of practices. Did I tell you about Ambassador Marshall Green telling one of my favorite stories? He's a very humorous man, has a wonderful sense of humor. He told one of our PCC board luncheons that our biggest enemy was the savings and loan associations in the United States, because on every TV and radio program, you'll see an advertisement about how much interest you can get if you make a certain deposit, and it always ends with, "But remember that there's a penalty for early withdrawal." (Laughs)

Q: Wonderful! (Laughs) Thank you. That's a good note, Mr. Ambassador, to end on.


Ambassador Martin's Herald Tribune Article

Annex A

Policy Issues in 1945-1957 period
(Done for writers of a book on European Cooperation)

1. I recall the Schuman plan as an outgrowth from the U.S. standpoint of two goals. First was the desire to promote both European and German recovery by taking the wraps off the German coal and steel industry. Shortages of coal were such a critical element to European production that coal output was one of few statistics included in reports to the President on the progress of the Marshall Plan. To the French this brought bitter memories and violent opposition. The issue was first confronted in August 1947 at the three-power talks on the level of the German coal and steel industry. This was followed, after the failure to agree on German policy at the December '47 Council of Foreign Ministers by what were in practice six-power talks in London in February, which created the Ruhr Authority. French acceptance of this was a big breakthrough. But the results were not in practice as good as hoped for.

For this reason and because the U.S. was looking for tangible evidence of increased European economic cooperation, especially from the French, the Schuman plan was warmly welcomed. My recollection is that we first heard of it in London while preparing for the Lisbon NATO meeting on the Report of the Wisemen on NATO economic capacity to meet the goals set by the NATO military, by telephone call from Paris to Linc Gordon. I don't know who had been pushing it on our side but I would strongly suspect Tommy Tomlinson and Ambassador Bruce, at least.

2. I do not recall serious tension between State and Congress on a U.S. of Europe. There was, however, tension in the Executive Branch over European "integration." This was pushed hard by ECA, largely by Dick Bissell, as necessary to improve efficiency of economic recovery. He sponsored conditioning aid to a country on acceptance of integration. I recall conversations with him on what "integration" meant to him. I did not feel I got a clear answer.
3. A second support for European collaboration, more political in emphasis, was led by Henry Byroade, head of German Affairs in State, as the way not only to tie W. Germany to the West but also to persuade the French to relax occupation controls which Clay felt were making his job as military governor harder and was restraining the German contribution to the economic recovery of Europe and, looking ahead, would facilitate needed German contribution to defense of [the] West against Soviets.

4. I was a leader of skeptics along with Linc Gordon. Both of us had been in government, mostly as economists but our primary training was political science. We could not see effective economic integration without a single political authority to decide how to deal with inflation, unemployment, fiscal and monetary policy. And we could not see any early prospect of even a few Western European countries, each struggling to run themselves well despite frequent changes of unstable coalition governments, combining to create a European political party system that could govern even moderately effectively. Loyalties to nation-states and to local parties were far too deeply entrenched to be transferred to "Western Europe." In any case it would only work if they wanted it badly; it had to be a European creation, as they agreed; to be forced by aid leverage was a guarantee of failure. We pressed this case hard enough to get veiled warnings that our views threatened our careers.

5. One source of U.S. opposition to European economic cooperation was the Treasury, committed to a global economic system through IMF by the Bretton Woods agreements. One modest step in the right direction which worked well and was to some degree purchased by U.S. aid was the European Payments Union. Somehow, it fell to me to go to an NAC meeting at Treasury to persuade them to withdraw their veto of Marshall aid to launch it. My case was that no global system would work without the solvency of the European countries and the EPU was an essential step to that end. The Treasury most reluctantly backed down.

6. In the mid-Fifties, I participated with Dulles in preparing a strong plea for integration at the December NATO meeting that followed the collapse of the EDC.(1) I was astonished to find that both at the State Department and at his home he pulled out a copy of the Federalist to get what he considered an appropriate quote. It showed in my view a complete lack of historical understanding.

7. The political fragility of the exercise is perhaps illustrated by two comments that were rather current during my time. One was that the only countries in which there was real public interest in a "European arrangement" had suffered a German occupation. This had so humiliated them that they could at best think of a European loyalty as substitutable for their previous national loyalty. But there were doubts about how permanently this memory would dictate such a change in attitude.

The second was the unfounded charge by left-of-center politicians that the whole idea had been cooked up in the Vatican as a means of maintaining church and conservative control.
of Western Europe, given the control by Catholic parties of the three largest countries whose peoples and parties could be expected to dominate a European state. The evidence cited was usually no more than the strong support for the movement of Adenauer, Gasperi, and I think, Schuman. More basically, this view reflected the fear of leftists that their reforms would be more difficult to get accepted in the larger entity than one by one in the countries, an attitude which was later the main factor in Labor Party opposition in the U.K.

Turning to NATO matters:

1. During the discussions of the Kennan Committee on NATO organization, there were advocates of what we called the "dumbbell" concept--a European and a North American organization with an overall Ministerial Council to meet perhaps once a year. One of the problems of such a concept was where to locate the small staff of the Council and hold its meetings. More than half-facetiously I suggested Bermuda as neutral ground geographically as well as a place where Ministers would like to come, increasing thus the average level of attendance. The latter point reflected our lack of assurance about the future of any implementing institutions.

2. Among the pressures for U.S. military assistance to Europe and indirectly for NATO that I recall as important as early perhaps as 1948 but certainly by 1949 was Harriman's insistence that European economic progress depended on a level of effort and especially investment by Europeans which was not and would not be forthcoming without greater assurance against Soviet attack and communist takeovers. There should be messages on this subject.

3. I seem to recall a vigorous debate not only on Norway and Italy but also on Greece and Turkey as NATO members. It was based not only on geography and underdevelopment but also on the increased difficulty of operating an institution with each added member. I think it is an important consideration, perhaps more so than was realized at the time. This increased operational complexity also was a major negative factor with respect to the idea of different classes of memberships, a suggestion which I do not recall was taken very seriously. Even the 15 who got in created awkwardness on even some routine matters. I recall one instance of the Portuguese Ambassador begging the Council to waive the unanimity rule on a financial question about which there was some urgency but on which he had been unable to get instructions from Lisbon.

In addition, I believe present membership has operated as a major brake on efforts to broaden the scope of the NATO agenda to global issues by such exercises as that led by Mike Pearson in about 1955 for which Linc Gordon served as Chief of Staff. Many of the countries have neither the interests nor the information to participate in a useful discussion of most such issues, let alone vote on them if that became necessary. Even on the NATO annual review, it was embarrassing that the vast majority of the questions and comments came from the U.S. or the Secretariat, most countries being entirely silent participants.
4. Having NATO deal with problems outside its area never had a chance because of, rather than in spite of, the colonial interests all over the world of several of its members. These countries had vivid memories of the anti-colonial attitudes of FDR and had been given no reason to believe that the basic U.S. attitude, derived in part from its history as an ex-colony, had changed. The last thing they would agree to was an opportunity for the powerful U.S. to use NATO to promote its views on colonial quarrels.

5. Probably beyond the time-frame of the article, one of the earliest crises in NATO which deeply involved Marshall Plan goals was that created by the report in 1950-'51 of the military committee on the forces required to meet the Soviet threat. They far exceeded those in place or planned or deemed feasible by the governments. The needed reconciliation was undertaken, of course, by the Harriman, Plowden, Monnet wisemen's exercise with Gordon as Harriman's Chief of Staff. At issue were not only European efforts but also U.S. contributions of forces and of military and economic assistance. It brought economics into the NATO mainstream. The main result was the annual review process, modeled on the OECD Marshall Plan review, also set up primarily by Harriman and Gordon. (Amusingly, some ten years later, the U.S. delegation to an IA-ECOSOC meeting in San Paulo headed by Harriman with Gordon and myself as his advisors sold a similar procedure for guiding U.S. assistance under the Alliance for Progress.)

6. On page 32 of the article, I would suggest that the loss of "overseas empires" came too late to be a major factor in the "formation" of NATO. At that time there was taking place only a political erosion of their positions and the U.K. and France still had major colonial possessions.

7. I was glad to note the thanks given to Stalin. In my speeches in the early '50's, I often referred to his skill in getting us out of difficulties by undertaking a unifying initiative.

* * *

(1) European Defense Community

Ambassador Martin's Herald Tribune Article

"By tradition and conviction as well as a matter of policy, the United States opposes the overthrow of constitutional and popular democratic governments anywhere.

This is especially true in Latin America with whose people we have such close historical ties and whose aspirations for political and economic freedom we support wholeheartedly. Moreover, under the Charter of Punta del Este, the people of the Western Hemisphere have bound themselves in a joint effort for political and socioeconomic development--the Alliance for Progress--within a framework of free and democratic institutions.
The deviations from these principles, which we have observed in the two years since Punta del Este, have caused some to question the validity of the principles of the Charter and some impatient cynics to ignore the progress which has been made.

Both the impatient idealists and the defeatist cynics ignore the realities of rising nationalism; the anxieties caused by social revolution; the challenge posed by the Alliance for Progress to old value systems; the threat to the established order brought on by the new, and finally the strain which rapid social and economic change places on fragile political institutions.

Two Views

In short, there is a temptation to measure current events not against historical reality and substantive progress, but against somewhat theoretical notions of the manner in which men should and do operate in a complex world.

We all have respect for motherhood and abhor sin. We may observe, however, that while motherhood has prospered, so has sin. In an increasingly nationalistic world of sovereign states, a U.S. frown doesn't deter others from committing what we consider to be political sins. And as we are pretty nationalistic ourselves and rightfully proud of our great successes, we sometimes find this fact frustrating.

Our task has only begun when we have stated our position. The real issue is how, under the conditions of the present-day world, we can assist the peoples of other sovereign nations to develop stable political institutions and help them strengthen their beliefs in these institutions so as to make them effective against brute force.

In Latin America there are very few who would argue as a matter of principle for violent overthrow of constitutional regimes. Most of those who support or accept coups d'état would simply maintain that their particular case was surrounded by unique circumstances. This is the "yes, but" argument.

The Obstacles

Genuine concern with an overturn of the established order, fear of left-wing extremism, frustration with incompetence in an era of great and rising expectations and sheer desire for power are all formidable obstacles to stable, constitutional government--especially in countries where the traditional method of transferring political power has been by revolution or coup d'état. In most of Latin America there is so little experience with the benefits of political legitimacy that there is an insufficient body of opinion, civil or military, which has any reason to know its value and hence to defend it.

No two countries are alike, but in general we feel that in order to enlarge their experience of legitimacy, and thus their respect for it, we must strengthen in each society the power of the educated middle class with a stake in the country, and hence in peace and order and
democracy for all the people. This is in fact what the Alliance for Progress is all about--it is as much a socio-political revolution as it is an economic one.

As societies come to have more respect for constitutional civilian governments with wide popular support, these governments will no longer be easy targets for military coups. But to tip the balance even more in favor of established civilian governments, we also must assist the military to assume the more constructive peacetime role of maintaining internal security and working on civic action programs. The latter are especially valuable in identifying the military with the problems and goals of the civilian population.

Even in the U.S. we argue about the areas of national policy in which the military have a rightful voice. In Latin America we cannot aim to reduce them to impotence in the national life--rather it is a problem of acceptance of a mission in support of legitimate governments against subversion from extremists of both Right and Left, whose threat of force must be met by force. There must be military participation in the formulation of some national policies; they cannot be excluded altogether.

Reforms Backed

I should not wish this emphasis on the need for the military to acquire a new and somewhat more limited role in political life to be read as a downgrading of the real contribution they have made to political freedom and stability in many countries. Peron in Argentina, Perez Jimenez in Venezuela and Rojas Pinilla in Colombia were all military dictators who were thrown out with the help of their own military in the 1950s. And the two worst dictators today in Latin America, it should be noted, are not military men and were able to consolidate their power only by reducing the regular military forces to impotence.

Nor are the military universal supporters of those who oppose change as represented by the programs of the Alliance. Governments controlled by the military have overseen the election to power this year in Argentina and Peru of two of the most progressive regimes either country has ever had. This year in Ecuador and Guatemala, military regimes have announced reform programs of substantial importance.

Nevertheless, the fundamental facts remain--military coups thwart the will of the people, destroy political stability and the growth of the tradition of respect for democratic constitutions and nurture Communist opposition to their tyranny. Moreover, the military often show little capacity for effective government, which is a political rather than a military job.

Apart from our and the Alliance's vigorous long-term efforts to eliminate the political vacuums on the civilian side which invite military action, as well as our efforts to train the military in their most valuable role, what can the U.S. do in the case of specific threats or coups which nevertheless arise?
Unless there is intervention from outside the hemisphere by the international Communist conspiracy, the use of military force involving the probability of U.S. soldiers killing the citizens of another country is not to be ordered lightly.

Nor can we, as a practical matter, create effective democracy by keeping a man in office through use of economic pressure or even military force when his own people are not willing to fight to defend him. A democracy dependent on outside physical support of this kind is a hollow shell which has no future. The people had better start over again. Moreover, once outside military support is used, it may prove hard to withdraw. We have seen in this century--in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua--how politically unproductive military occupations are, even when carried out with the best of intentions.

We must use our leverage to keep these new regimes as liberal and considerate of the welfare of the people as possible. In addition, we must support and strengthen the civilian components against military influences and press for new elections as soon as possible so that these countries once again may experience the benefits of democratic legitimacy. Depending upon the circumstances, our leverage is sometimes great, sometimes small.

One should not underestimate what has been accomplished by the U.S. and Alliance policies I have described. They are accomplishments that have truly enhanced the long-term prospects of the Alliance.

Cooler Heads

In Argentina, the military walked up the hill a number of times to look at the green pastures of full military control and the power and perquisites that would go with it. Each time a combination of wiser heads in the military, along with more and more confident civilian leaders who were strongly buttressed by U.S. diplomatic support and aid programs, turned them back. The elections were held on schedule.

In Peru, the one-year rule of the junta was about the most respectful of civil liberties, most progressive in its policies and quickest to give up its power peacefully in the history of Latin American military regimes. Here again the strong stand taken by the U.S. prior to recognition helped to secure public commitments and follow-through from the junta to pursue liberal policies--liberal of course only for a military dictatorship.

A similar story can be told of the Ecuadoran junta, which is governing through an able and representative civilian cabinet and generally without repression of civil liberties.

Reprisals Pass

In every case mentioned there has been a novel and notable absence of reprisals against the leaders of the ousted regimes. The firing squads or prison guards so characteristic of earlier political upheavals in Latin America, have been eschewed. This restraint can be credited to the progress Latin America has been making under the Alliance and to U.S. influences,
brought to bear through all the means open to us, to produce moderation and a prompt return to constitutional and democratic regimes.

I fear there are some who will accuse me of having written an apology for coups. I have not. They are to be fought with all the means we have available. Rather I would protest that I am urging the rejection of the thesis of the French philosophers that democracy can be legislated--established by constitutional fiat.

I am insisting on the Anglo-Saxon notion that democracy is a living thing which must have time and soil and sunlight in which to grow. We must do all we can to create these favorable conditions, and we can do and have done much.

But we cannot simply create the plant and give it to them; it must spring from seeds planted in indigenous soil."

End of interview