The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

ROBERT A. MARTIN

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

State Department - Bureau of Political/Military Affairs	1975-1976
Moscow - Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Talks	
Russian delegation	
Teheran, Iran	1976-1978
Political/Military Officer	
Environment - military, social	
US presence	
Iran's military	
Personalities	
President Carter's visit	
The Shah & trouble	
Department of State	1978-1982
Operation Center - Iran Working Group	
Teheran embassy takeover	
INR - Political/Military Affairs	
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan	
SALT I & II	
Nuclear Intelligence	
Iraq - Iran Conflict	
CIA & NSA intelligence	
Senior Seminar	1983-1984
USIA	1984-1986
Geneva Summit (Reagan - Gorbachev)	
Frankfort, Germany - Political Advisor	1986-1990
State Department	1990-1994
Personnel	
INR projects on Poland & Yugoslavia	
Review panel on arms control issues	
Coordinator for Business Affairs	

INTERVIEW

Q: Today is September 8, 1994. This is an interview with Robert A. Martin being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. I wonder if we could start with you giving a little bit about your background --when and where you were born, a little bit about your family, and then we will move to your education.

MARTIN: I was born in Philadelphia November, 1931. As it turns out, my wife was also born in Philadelphia several years later, although she spent only six weeks there and went on to San Francisco where her family was from. Her father had been stationed at the Navy Yard at that time. My father was also in the Navy as a medical person and had been in the First World War and in the Reserves during the Second World War. My earliest experience was all related to Philadelphia. I used to go in with my dad when he was called out for an emergency operation during the middle of the night when I was eight, nine, ten, eleven years old and watched appendectomies until I thought I could probably do them. When I had a hernia a couple of years ago, I was telling this to the surgeon and he said, "You were probably right. You have seen a heck of a lot more than most of the people that are residents and interns under me."

I went to school in Philadelphia and then went off for a year to Andover and Yale for four years.

Q: At Yale, what was your major?

MARTIN: I majored in international relations having been interested in that area during my school years. But I never really had any particular focus on the Foreign Service.

I was drafted into the Army just after Labor Day, 1954 and spent two years in the Counterintelligence Corps, most of the time in Germany.

Q: What type of work were you doing in Germany?

MARTIN: I was with one of the regional offices in Stuttgart and was doing research and analytical work and occasionally some surveillance work. I wore civilian clothes. It was an interesting time to be there and lots of fun, but certainly we were so green that we never got into the real core of what the effort was at that time.

I got out of the Army in September, 1956, just in time to enter law school at the University of Pennsylvania, which I did for the next three years, all very happily on the GI Bill. When I was in my third year, an international law professor named Covey Oliver, who had had some dealings in government in the past in Washington in a variety of guises, was promoting the idea of people getting into government work. I did several courses under Professor Oliver in that third year and did a couple of papers. With his impetus I came to Washington in the spring to talk to a number of people, as it turned out including Dean Acheson, who Professor Oliver knew. I passed out copies of my paper and got some sense of what the possibilities and prospects might be. Then I finished my law school tenure and came to Washington in August, 1959 and moved into a house in Georgetown with six other bachelors and was doing initially legal work for the Defense Department. Several of the people in the house where I was living were signed up to take the Foreign Service exam in early December, 1959 on a Saturday. So I filled out the postcard form and got a ticket and took it. Surprisingly to me at the time I passed it and then decided that I would really like to

join the Foreign Service. I had to wait for a little over a year. I ended up taking my oral exam in the latter part of the summer of 1960.

Q: What was the oral exam like?

MARTIN: There was a three-person panel in room 2535, I recall that very vividly. They asked me a number of questions, some of which they hoped would be off putting. I guess I measured up reasonably well in terms of the answers I gave. They tried to pose a problem in terms of smoking or non-smoking and lack of ashtrays and all of that, which I thought was sort of silly, frankly. After about an hour, I was asked to leave the room and they had a conversation, after which I was asked back in and told that they thought they would bless me. As it turned out the chairman of the panel didn't have a pen so I had to loan him my pen to sign the piece of paper that he had to sign. After that, of course, they pursued the security clearance, the medical, etc. I got word later in the autumn that there would be a class opening the latter part of January, 1961, and if I were interested I could join up then. I ended up in an A-100 course starting January 26, 1961 with about 28-29 people.

Q: What were your fellow class members like? Can you characterize them at all?

MARTIN: They were an interesting group. Certainly a diverse group. Curiously enough as it turned out we sat in our general classroom in what was then FSI, which was down in the basement areas of Arlington Towers...

Q: The old garage.

MARTIN: ...the old garage. Those who have been there will never forget it. We had a U-shaped table and I sat at one end and almost went into the U. There was one person on my right, and as it turned out it was a chap by the name of Bob Service, the son of John Service. One thing I will never forget from that A-100 experience was the day, relatively early on, when we were asked, and we started on the other side of the U, so I was next to last, as to why we had joined the Foreign Service. Everyone gave his or her, we had one lady with us, views and I gave mine and sat down. Bob Service got up and said that one of the most important reasons to him was the fact that during the very difficult period with his father and, indeed his uncle and the others...

Q: We are talking about the China hands and the McCarthy attacks on this group.

MARTIN: Yes. And John Service, Bob's father, was one of the four or five principally attacked. Bob said that he recalled very vividly how the Foreign Service, the professionals, rallied behind his father and the others without any question. That had impressed itself on him to such a degree that he felt this had to be a noble group to try to join. I was very impressed with his statement, I must say.

Q: What did you want to do when you first got in?

MARTIN: At that time and pretty much still I guess, most people come in generally with the idea of wanting to be political officers. There is a lack of appreciation in early days certainly that it is unlikely that you will come in and be able to start creating, concocting policy or even, indeed, be involved in any central way or probably even any peripheral way in that activity. But certainly that is the glossy eyed view that most have and certainly the great majority of my A-100 colleagues were interested in political officer activity. That has changed to some degree coming up to now as the Service is trying to sort out after the 1980 Act and the experience of almost fifteen years under that the question of cones and that aspect. And, indeed, I think the fact that people coming in frequently older than was the case in the past now are perhaps a little more sensible about it from the standpoint of the long term career and realize that even if you start out doing a lot of admin work or consular work or economic/commercial work, and certainly that latter is one of the most important developments of recent years, you can still [rise] into the management side of things and into the policy formulation side perhaps even more successfully than if you stick to the political officer channel and don't deviate very much from that.

Q: Was recognition made that you had a law degree? Was that a factor in your next assignment?

MARTIN: It really wasn't at all, although it certainly has been recognized in terms of comments about my drafting and my focus on all details and the importance of small points and wanting to make sure all the lose ends are tied up in things I have been involved in over the years of my time in the Foreign Service. So it has been recognized that that measure of training was useful and obviously was a part of the way that I disported myself and conducted my activities.

Q: Where did you go on your first assignment?

MARTIN: Just before we were to put in our bids, I went to see one of the people that I had seen during my law school venture down here several years earlier to talk to him and seek his advice as a part of networking, Herman Pollack. He was at that time involved in the Science Bureau, which is now the Oceans, Environment and Science Bureau, as the head of it. I told him that we were about to make our bids and he said, "What are you going to do?" I said, "I would probably put in for a hardship post and get that out of the way." Mr. Pollack said, "Do you really want to go to a hardship post?" I said, "Well, I am not really sure I do." He said, "Why don't you put in for what you want? You will probably find over your career that 85 or 90 percent of the time you will get that." So I thought that was rather cogent advice and I did put in for what I wanted which turned out to be an organization called the United States Disarmament Administration which was headed by a man named Ed Gullion who was a career Foreign Service officer and had on top of that the two principal advisors to the new President Kennedy on Arms Control, Jack McCloy and Adrian Fischer. One of the people in the USDA had come to our A-100 class to talk to us about arms control and disarmament and I had thought that sounded very interesting and a noble thing to pursue. So I went and chatted with him about it and said, "Do you think you may need some people?" He said, "It is not clear, but we might. So if you are interested put in for it and we

will see what happens." I put that in as my principal bid and lo and behold that is where I got assigned.

So, after further A-100 training and language training in German in the late summer of 1961 I arrived at the US Disarmament Administration. About a month after that at the end of September when President Kennedy signed the bill into law creating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, all of us who had been part of the USDA went over on paper on detail from our agencies, in my case the Department of State, to the new agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. And that is where I started and spent the autumn there doing a variety of very menial things as it turned out. I went through and vetted the telegrams for the director and his deputy. The new director was William Chapman Foster and the deputy was Adrian Fischer, who had been McCloy's deputy in the earlier period. Mr. McCloy went back to being a key advisor but not with any day-to-day responsibilities in the arms control field. Indeed, he was appointed the first chair of the general advisory committee, which is one of the parts of the legislation creating ACDA. The legislation provided for a general advisory committee with a chairman and 15 -20 members. It had a very luminous level group of renown people covering the spectrum from physicists, people who had a lot of experience in the arms control and disarmament area, to businessmen, labor people, so that you had a good cross mixture of America in that group. A very renown group it was and they provided some excellent advice and counsel. They would meet every three or four months in Washington usually for a day or at least half a day for detailed discussions of what was going on. What ACDA was doing, what the state of the world was, and what might be useful in terms of ideas for the US to pursue in the arms control area.

One of the key issues at that time was the question about the test ban.

Q: This was a ban on testing of nuclear weapons?

MARTIN: Exactly. One of the things that was being looked forward to was a conference which would end up being held in Geneva. There had been a conference of five Western powers and five Eastern powers...that is five members of NATO and five members of the Warsaw Pact...which started in March, 1960 before my time. That went along reasonably well for several months, but then the Russians decided to walk out in late June, 1960 and that broke up the conference.

One of the things that Mr. McCloy had been involved in prior to the creation of ACDA was a series of discussions with a Soviet counterpart named Zorin to try and see if it were possible to agree on the composition of a group and a framework so that arms controls, disarmament negotiations could be pursued. Finally, in September, 1961, in the third meeting between McCloy and Zorin, which was held in New York during that autumn's General Assembly, agreement was reached on a new forum. It would have eighteen members--five West, five East and eight so-called third world or non-aligned. It would pursue its efforts within the framework of a set of principles that Mr. McCloy and Mr. Zorin also agreed on that held out as the goal, general and complete disarmament. Part of that would have been, of course, a total ban on testing of nuclear weapons.

When the details had been fully worked out it was agreed that the new talks would begin in mid-March, 1962 in Geneva at the ministerial level. This meant that Secretary Rusk would head the American delegation and Foreign Minister Gromyko would head the Soviet delegation. With much fanfare that set of talks began in Geneva on March 14, 1962. It was called the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) because of the fact that there were eighteen members. Curiously enough the French never deigned to sit so it was seventeen members. Since the chairperson situation rotated for each meeting, the French sign in front of the French delegation just bounced around the table meeting after meeting with no one sitting behind in the four chairs allowed for each delegation.

Q: When you went in there...this is a brand new Kennedy administration...what was the spirit you were picking up about arms control, disarmament within the agency?

MARTIN: Well, certainly within the agency there was all sorts of exuberance and delight to have come into being in the latter part of September, 1961. Everyone obviously was on a great high from the sense of being excited about the prospects. I must say the thought was that progress could be made relatively quickly. Of course, in the end that turned out not to be the case and I will get to that in some respects relating to the conference in Geneva a little bit later. Of course, the exuberance and positive views that were held by the people in ACDA were counterbalanced by skepticism and reticence and uncertainty on the part of the people in the Department of Defense, and particularly the uniformed military. The Department was not quite in the middle, having people on both sides of the coin worrying about rushing too quickly to any conclusion or judgment or giving away too much in the process of negotiating any deal that might be struck. But it still was a very exciting time, I must say, to be a part of that process. From the standpoint of Mr. Acheson's principal book, "President, The Creation," those of us involved really thought we were present at the creation of an exciting process that could well save the world.

Q: Were you involved in going around to the Soviet Desk or French Desk or dealing with the Pentagon?

MARTIN: No. In that early pre-Geneva period my tasks were totally menial supporting the director and the deputy in terms of the telegram flow, making sure that papers got distributed around. It really was an initial assignment doing scud work, which was all right. I was check to jowl with those people doing all those wonderful things and making a lot of contacts and was aware of what was going on. It was very exciting even though my part in it was pretty pedestrian.

Q: I take it you then got involved with those meetings?

MARTIN: I was chosen to become a part of the delegation in Geneva and was the junior person on the delegation. That got me into things more directly in terms of the substance and it was really much more exciting from the standpoint of being involved in what was being contemplated and the tactics for trying to achieve that.

One aside I might mention. Graham Martin was the head of the US mission to the European Office of the UN at that time. We had the same name. I went to Geneva in the latter part of February to be there in advance to get the delegation's quarters in order and to be prepared for the influx of the rest of the group coming over with the Secretary on his plane. That happened the night before the meetings were to begin and Ambassador Martin, of course, was to be in car number one out at the airport in Geneva to take the Secretary back to his hotel and he didn't know much about this new beast called the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but he did know that he had a fellow named Martin who was there and part of that delegation, so he would make the other Martin, namely me, go in car number two and pick up the ACDA director, Bill Foster, at the airport. That was sort of exciting to me. We got out there at plane side and Ambassador Martin greeted the Secretary, Mr. Foster and the other luminaries getting off the plane, which included Foy Kohler who was our ambassador in Moscow and who had flown in from Moscow for the occasion. In the process, Mr. Foster very kindly introduced me to Secretary Rusk. We then got into our various cars and I went back to Mr. Foster's hotel and again very kindly he invited me up to his room to chat for a few minutes. So I went up and spent about 25 minutes with him. He was wondering what was going on and how things were arranged, etc. For the new kid on the block that was pretty heavy stuff to be up there chatting with the boss.

The final point in this story, the next morning at the doorway of the US mission there were a number of us standing around waiting for the Secretary and his high level entourage to arrive and he came through the door and looked around and among other people saw me. He turned to me and said, "Good morning Mr. Martin," and that just knocked my socks off that he would remember me having met me for about 15 seconds at virtually midnight the night before in the dark at the Geneva airport. So, I always felt very favorable towards Dean Rusk as a result of that experience.

Q: You are with the delegation, obviously down at the bottom. What sort of emanations were you getting as to how this thing was going? In the first place, what was the feeling towards the Soviets?

MARTIN: The delegations that had been involved in the past were all fairly predictable. We had had talks with the British, Canadians and the Italians--the French didn't even get involved in those preliminary talks--in Washington before the mid-March opening. There were a couple of those sessions which were very useful to begin to weave together a joint approach on the part of the Western delegation. We then, as an initial activity, had to get to know the non-aligned delegations and the people they had and the expectations they had and the background and expertise that they might bring to this effort. All this work was divided up among the people on the delegation. I was liaison or helping with the liaison with several delegations from the start but got into that in much greater detail later on.

One thing that struck me from the outset was the feeling, particularly among the non-aligned, that this was an activity that was hugely important but not very complicated,

not too hard. We would open at the ministerial level in mid-March, 1962 and then the ministers would depart and we would probably spend six to eight weeks in various plenary sessions discussing this and then, of course, we would have to call the ministers back and have an agreement ready to sign. One of the great pluses of the Geneva Disarmament Conference process was the fact that very quickly on the smart ones among the non-aligned realized that this was hellish hard business, the difficulties were clearly in the details and there were more details than they ever possibly could imagine. Even if you were able to get all of this right, the bits and pieces, the little provisions and the huge array of details, you still required a political decision on the part of the Soviets and the Americans at the same time or you didn't have a deal. But the more important step was the realization, the understanding that came to pass rather quickly, as I say, from the thoughtful, smart people from the non-aligned side that this was really very serious business and would take a long time. They got into it and most all of them became adept, understood the issues and were able to contribute significantly in a lot of useful ways over time. That was a huge plus in terms of starting that process, which had not been the case in earlier negotiations going back to 1960 where there were just five West and five East.

Of course, then as now, in 1962 with the start of the ENDC, the East was hugely predictable. The Soviets called the tune and the Czechs, Romanians, Bulgarians and Poles danced to their tune in various ways complementing Soviet goals and aims with their interventions. It was not very useful in early days from that standpoint and didn't change too much over the time I was there although there were beginning of some indication that there were people who were thoughtful on the Eastern delegations who really did hope that progress could be achieved. That included people on the Soviet delegation. It was quite interesting. They had a broad mix of political officers...arms controllers, as well as KGB agents, and the hard line apparatchiks, plus the leading lights who were generally at that point very hard line people. They were led by Ambassador Zorin who had been McCloy's negotiating alter ego in the effort to put together a package that would permit the conference to start and the process to roll on.

An interesting point to note is that there continues to this day, and it did start on March 14, 1962, an ongoing Geneva armaments conference. It has evolved over time. It has increased in size. It is now called just the Conference on Disarmament and it is still in business. One of its principle efforts at the moment is to try to complete the process for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Q: What was your impression of the uniformed people at the Pentagon? Did they dig their heels in?

MARTIN: Initially on the delegation we had a serving officer from the arms control slice of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, three serving officers. That went on for most of my time which ran from February, 1962 until September, 1964. All during that time there were uniformed Defense representatives on the delegation. Occasionally they would have visitation from the Office of the Secretary Defense, the civil side. Certainly OSD people were following it very closely and there were the principal people involved in the

interagency process to monitor the progress of the talks and to work the position papers and the process back in Washington to support the delegation.

Q: What was the feeling on the delegation, as you saw it, when Kennedy was assassinated? Did that change the thrust of things or anything like that?

MARTIN: It didn't particularly, no. At that time, as it turned out, in 1962, at the end of the summer the conference went into recess, although there was a charge by the co-chairmen, we and the Soviets were co-chairs of the conference, and among other responsibilities, to put together the reports that were sent off to the UN on a regular basis about the activities of the conference. One point I might note, although the McCloy/Zorin agreement which permitted this conference and the process to start was completed in New York, it was not a UN agreement. It was a US-Soviet bilateral agreement that was then introduced by ourselves and the Soviets into the UN as the center piece of a resolution in the General Assembly in the autumn of 1961 to bless the McCloy-Zorin agreement so that the UN would say, "Yes, we think that is wonderful, please get on with it. We will provide secretarial support in Geneva to assist the conference in its deliberations and activities." And that is what happened. The Secretary General had a representative who sat next to the meeting chair each day, and the secretariat staff and the translators, etc. were part of the UN Geneva office. But it was not initially an UN activity. It was based on the bilateral US-Soviet agreement.

Over time, it has become essentially a UN activity, so that the current conference on disarmament is a UN entity in the sense that it came into being and the membership is based on discussions that take place in the UN and at the behest of the UN process, which was not the case in terms of starting in March, 1962.

In the autumn in 1962, Arthur Dean, Ambassador Dean, who was the head of our delegation, who was the managing partner of Sullivan and Cromwell, the law firm from which both John Foster Dulles and Alan Dulles, went off with some of the delegation members to New York for the discussions in the General Assembly and the deliberations of the first committee of the UN General Assembly, the place where the arms control discussion took place, and takes place now each autumn during the General Assembly session. The rest of the delegation, including Ambassador Dean's deputy, Charles Stelle, stayed in Geneva and we were charged with the British and the Soviet delegations to conduct on a regular basis meetings of the nuclear test ban subcommittee.

The ENDC really had three parts. It had the plenary session, which was all seventeen sitting members, not the French. It had a committee of the whole, for special efforts of one sort or another, which was again the seventeen sitting members, although the chair for that went in a separate rotation. And it was agreed, and as I recall this was part of the initial agreement creating the ENDC, that there should be an additional separate effort involving only the US, the UK and the USSR, to pursue a nuclear test ban. So in the initial stages we were having plenary meetings three times a week, committee of the whole meetings perhaps once or twice a week, and test ban subcommittee meetings at least twice a week. This

meant that our delegation had as many as seven meetings to prepare for and Ambassador Dean wanted to make a speech at every single session which meant a lot of speech writing for the members of our delegation. We started at a rather large size because of that.

So in the autumn of 1962, some of us stayed in Geneva. In the autumn of 1963, it was decided that we would not have test ban subcommittee meetings in Geneva, the ENDC would close down entirely and all the activity would move to the UN First Committee in New York. So I was detailed from Geneva to New York to be involved with the US mission group that would support the discussion of arms control and disarmament issues in the First Committee. It was during that period that the assassination occurred. So I was in New York at that time.

There was no particular impact on the delegation or in the process of discussing arms control and disarmament issue, it was all part of the larger process that... I am sure we all recall very vividly the total sadness and great shock at what had happened. Many people say that anyone who was alive knows where he or she was on December 7, 1941 and the same is true for people with respect to November 22, 1963.

Q: Did you have any contact at your level with the Soviets at all?

MARTIN: Absolutely. Not in early days in the beginning of the conference in 1962, but over the years as we got into the early summer, etc., I was involved, among other things, in drafting the reports that the co-chairmen would send on behalf of the eighteen member conference to the UN on activities of the conference. That was US-Soviet, so I had the beginnings of a fair amount of interactivity with the Soviets through that process. And, of course, I went to all the meetings and was charged in many cases to doing the reports on the meetings. It was interesting, the Soviets have a manner of speaking, and I don't speak Russian so I couldn't listen in Russian but would listen to the English and the translation would occasionally be "Life itself teaches, history shows," and whenever you heard that you knew something special was coming so you would sort of come out of your revery and take a couple of notes.

Another amusing point between Russian and English, we would say, "from time to time" and in Russian it comes out "to time from time."

Q: As people got to know each other more did things become easier?

MARTIN: Certainly it was easier in terms of personal relationships and people understood one another pretty well as to where they were coming from and what they stood for and the limits of wiggle room that they might have, etc. But, as I mentioned earlier, it was perfectly clear that unless and until we and the Soviets made a political decision at the same time we wanted something, nothing was going to happen. If that great coming together were to occur than anything was possible.

Q: How about the Cuban missile crisis, did that put things on hold?

MARTIN: It really didn't have any particular impact. It was during the time when the main activity was in New York and we were carrying on the test ban subcommittee activity in Geneva. In fact, during the week of the Cuban missile crisis I happened to be on vacation in Berlin. I remember vividly during one of the days in the latter part of that week I was over in East Berlin on a glorious sunny day and there was a huge march announcing the American activity of blockading Cuba and it became clear pretty quickly that the reason it was such a huge success was that it was a glorious day and nobody wanted to work and most were out just enjoying the weather and not caring one way or another--give me a sign, I will carry anything and get off and have a couple of beers and enjoy the sun. It was an apparent success, but in actuality it was more a function of the glorious day in terms of the numbers of people. Certainly their attitude was not anti-American because it was perfectly obvious that I was American to a number of them with whom I had discussions and they could have cared less.

Q: You were there from...?

MARTIN: I was assigned to the ACDA from 1961-64. I was in Geneva, principally, from 1962 until September 1964 and indeed spent the autumn months of 1963 as part of the delegation in New York at the 18th General Assembly. One point I might note in terms of the assassination of President Kennedy, I found out when I got back to Geneva some of the things that had been going on there as a result of the assassination. One of the things that struck me particularly was the fact that in terms of coming together to celebrate and trying to swage some of the sadness and shock it had been agreed that there would be an interfaith service in the cathedral in Geneva. One of the participants was a Catholic priest and it was the first time since before the Reformation that a Catholic had participated officially in a religious service in that building. It was quite something.

Q: Where did you go in 1964?

MARTIN: Oh, let me make one point. Just before I left Geneva, the second Non-aligned Conference was held in Cairo in September, 1964. The question was how could our embassy in Cairo be helped in terms of reporting that from the standpoint of the interests of the arms control side. I thought it would be very useful to have someone there who had some experience and indeed had some contacts, so offered myself. I was turned down by my boss in Geneva. The idea was then put both to the embassy in Cairo and to the people in Washington who thought it was a super idea, so I found myself going off to Cairo for a couple of weeks TDY to help out the embassy there in reporting the arms control and disarmament aspects of that non-aligned conference.

Q: Speaking of the Non-aligned Conference, I am going back to the Bandung...I can't think of the date of the first one...

MARTIN: I think that was late fifties or so. Maybe even earlier.

Q: I recall there was something about an unofficial test ban. The Soviets had set something off and the non-aligned group more or less said that Soviet tests were all right because they are defensive, but American tests are bad because they are offensive. It was something like that. It got a lot of people's backs up about the non-alignment movement and things were never really quite the same thereafter. Do you recall that situation?

MARTIN: Well, we did have an agreement that we wouldn't test pending the effort to try to negotiate a deal, and the Soviets, of course, broke that with their huge atmospheric test in late 1960. At that point on, everybody else began to test again and you couldn't hold back those interested here in the United States and the other nuclear powers from doing it. The non-aligned was always pressing to have a comprehensive test ban and, indeed, there were some who thought it would be possible to achieve that, but it didn't happen. You will recall that we got the limited test ban in early August, 1962 and the background for that is quite apparent. President Kennedy gave a memorable speech at American University's commencement--I think it was June 10, 1962--in which he held out the prospect of being prepared to seriously move on testing. Khrushchev within three weeks of that time, in the first day or two of July, in a speech in Berlin, came back and said, "Yes, indeed, there might be some prospect there." There were negotiations that started in Moscow the end of July with Averell Harriman as the American negotiator and Lord Hume on the British side and Mr. Gromyko on the Soviet side. Dean Rusk joined for the finale and an agreement was reached I think on August 5 on a limited test ban that covered testing everywhere except underground. Many thought at the time, if we had pushed more vigorously, it would have been possible to achieve a comprehensive ban. That did not happen and the world has suffered considerably as a result of that. It really is a shame that that did not come to pass at that time.

Q: Because of the Bandung tacit support of the Soviets, when you were dealing with the non- aligned were they looked upon with a certain amount of suspicion of being more in the pockets of the Soviets?

MARTIN: Oh, the postures and the public prattlers certainly would have been, but the people on the delegations who I referred to some time back, who thought it would be so easy to reach agreements, when they dug into the substance and realized how difficult and involved and complex the issues were, understood the fine points and were not pressing us and not the Soviets. They were pressing us equally for the achievement of, if not a total ban, as large a ban that could be achieved.

Q: Then in 1964 you moved to...?

MARTIN: In 1964 I came back to Washington after my Cairo time, which turned out, indeed, to be a very useful period because the Nigerians and the Egyptians and the Indians as well as the Germans who had observers there were people with whom I could interact with and find out what was going on and do some useful reporting through the embassy back to Washington as to what had happened. After that I came back to Geneva and

finished up and came back to Washington where I was assigned to the office in the European Bureau that handled everything multilateral except NATO.

The things that I was particularly focused on was the European Atomic Energy Community, called EURATOM, and some of the OECD, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, science work. But principally the EURATOM activity. A main issue there was the fact that EURATOM had a different set of safe guards to apply to insure that the nuclear materials and facilities were being used for peaceful purposes as opposed to masking an effort to achieve a nuclear weapon capability, than the International Atomic Energy Agency. Obviously one would need a world standard if one were to achieve anything of meaning in the nuclear testing area. So one of the things that was principal in my activity for that EUR office, was tracking the EURATOM safe guards and trying to work with the people, now my former colleagues, in ACDA who were supporting flat out the IAEA safe guards and insisting that EURATOM had to agree to apply IAEA safe guards. For a variety of reasons, most of which related to sovereignty and the need to appear creditable, EURATOM was not about to buy that. It was a very difficult issue.

Over time, with a lot of discussions, it became possible for EURATOM and the IAEA to come to an agreement that the IAEA was prepared to let EURATOM apply its own safe guards with an overlay by the IAEA to an adequate enough degree so that it appeared to have some substance and the IAEA could put forth a contention that, "Yes, indeed the EURATOM safe guards were good and effective and are being applied in an adequately detailed manner so that we have confidence that the results are equivalent to our safe guards and the activity within the EURATOM facilities is consistent with what is needed." That was an important point, but it took a long time to get there. As I say, I found myself now on the other side from the side I had been on earlier in terms of the interagency scrum in Washington, because I was taking up the EURATOM cause as opposed to the IAEA cause which the arms control people in ACDA and around Washington were pursuing.

Q: How did you fit into EUR?

MARTIN: Initially they were a little skeptical as to whether I wasn't an ACDA spy, in point of fact. I found that a little unsettling because my view was that where you stand is where you seat. I was sitting at that point in the European Bureau's office charged with doing EURATOM work and therefore was totally loyal to that effort as opposed to my views of not too long before when I was in a different situation. But I think over time I was able to overcome that wrinkle. As it turned out during that time I worked, among other places around town, very, very closely with what was then the Atomic Energy Commission and is now the Department of Energy. And that was very useful in a lot of ways in terms of contacts and ability to operate effectively in the interagency process in later years because of the three years I spent on EURATOM issues.

Q: How did you find the French, were they in nuclear issues sort of a burr under the European saddle?

MARTIN: Well, they were never much into it. From the EURATOM standpoint, they would do whatever was necessary but they were never strong supporters particularly and to some degree the French were operating in parallel to the EURATOM effort. In fact they would even support IAEA points occasionally to the exasperation of the EURATOM people. It was again more a question of the political will to strike a deal than any wrinkles or problems on the technical or scientific side. The EURATOM safe guards are good, without any question, and if they are being fully applied there is no doubt as to the judgment one can draw. The IAEA safe guards, indeed, arguably in many ways are perhaps not as good because over time they have not had the number of people they have needed. They have not been able to apply as extensively as would be useful. So nuclear safe guards is a difficult issue, but the thing I was concerned with was trying to help bring EURATOM and IAEA positions together, which was more a political decision than a technical problem.

Q: Getting the principals of any bureau or embassy to sort of go up and present an issue to their opposite number...you always feel by asking them you are drawing on political capital and you can only draw on so much. Did you have a problem getting your principals in EUR to have their embassies make a stand on certain matters?

MARTIN: No. The principal dealings that I had was with our mission to the European Communities in terms of out in the field. The people in EURATOM had a resident person in Washington in the European Communities' office in Washington at that time and I worked very, very closely with him. EURATOM had visitations here quite regularly by all the relevant people. I made several trips to Brussels and indeed one time around to some of the EURATOM facilities in Europe in the summer of 1965.

Q: Did EURATOM have any connection with the Soviet peaceful nuclear...?

MARTIN: No. EURATOM was totally an effort to use nuclear energy as an additional means to bring the Community more closely together and, indeed, to create a single community within Europe.

Q: In the 1980s the worst nuclear accident was in Chernobyl and caused quite a bit of radiation and real problems. Were you getting any feel about Soviet developments and concern about how the Soviets on the peaceful side were going about it?

MARTIN: That was not part of my writ at the time, but certainly with all the association I had with relevant people in the atomic energy and nuclear area around town and through my activities, one got a sense of the fact that the view of the Soviets effort was not very advanced and that they were going about it the wrong way and it was very costly and could lead to exactly what happened in Chernobyl.

[break in the tape]

You were asking about stories of one kind or another. One thing I might recall from my period in Geneva. In early 1963, Ambassador Dean had only headed the delegation during

1962 and he left so we had other people. Mr. Foster, director of the agency came occasionally. Adrian Fischer, his deputy, came occasionally. They got a new deputy during the course of 1963. In February of 1963, Roger Tubby, who had replaced Graham Martin as the head of the US mission to the European Office of the UN, was the permrep. Hubert Humphrey, supposedly the father of the arms control agency, certainly everyone gives him public credit for it and I am sure that is the case, was the chairman of the Disarmament subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee and he had never visited the delegation in Geneva. Mr. Foster was very anxious that he do that. By early 1963 our delegation was much, much smaller, and we were anticipating during this February period that Senator Humphrey would come and visit the delegation. He was supposed to arrive on a Sunday and Roger Tubby kindly asked several of us on the delegation out to his residence because he knew Humphrey and obviously as his position as permrep would be involved in the visit. Mr. Foster was there and as I recall Newt Minnow, who had been and maybe still was the chairman of the FCC, was there for one reason or another.

As the day wore on we got word that Humphrey wasn't going to come that day. He was going to be delayed and come the next day. So we stayed at the Tubbys and Mr. Tubby took up a long dreary afternoon recalling stories when he was Harry Truman's press secretary in years past. One of the stories he told was about the decision to yank General MacArthur out of the Korean War after he had crossed the Yalu and exceed his civil direction. Truman made that decision and it was a very difficult time, clearly. Roger Tubby, who was very much a, "you have to keep fit" person, after the long day when the decision was made and publicly aired and there was all this heat about how could you do this to this great American icon, etc., the next morning about 6 AM was in the White House gym in the basement punching the bag and all of a sudden he heard a voice from behind him saying, "Give him one for me Roger." He turned around and it was President Truman standing in the doorway. He obviously hadn't slept very well either.

And another story that Ambassador Tubby told about Truman was the visit that Winston Churchill paid just before he finally left office for the last time. One evening during that visit, the party which included President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill, Tubby and a few others, went out on the Potomac in the Presidential yacht and cruised down the river. I guess after dinner and many glasses of wine and many glasses of brandy, they were sitting on the after deck watching the nice scenery go by and certainly to all appearances Churchill was totally asleep. In the increasing darkness, he turned, according to Tubby's story, to President Truman at one point and said, "Mr. President, before I leave office I just want you to know that you were the principal person because of your activities and actions to save Western civilization." Just incredible.

I am a friend of David McCullough from my Yale days, and he came to the Yale Club in town here a little over a year ago when his book, "Truman" came out and I asked him about several of these stories in and around the edges of his talk. And answering questions later at dinner...I can't recall if he put the story about Churchill saying to Truman that he was actually the one who saved Western civilization in his, Churchill's, judgment in the book or not. If not, he told it that evening in the process of his remarks. So obviously he had gotten

to Roger Tubby and gotten all those stories. That was quite an unforgettable moment to hear Tubby recounting this story. Excuse me for the interruption.

Q: Well, to move on, in 1967 you left EUR and where did you go?

MARTIN: I left EUR to go to our mission to NATO to replace a fellow by the name of David Aaron, who for a variety of reasons did not want to move with NATO from Paris to Brussels and wanted to come back to Washington to get into things more at this end of the line. He had proposed to Ambassador Cleveland that Cleveland might be interested in getting me to replace him, Aaron, and as it turned out, that is what happened. Cleveland did get me to replace Aaron and I arrived in Paris before the move in the latter part of September and spent almost a month there before we actually made the move to Brussels.

Q: I just want to put in that you were in NATO there from 1967-70.

MARTIN: Let me tell one story about the move from Paris to Brussels. The reason for the move, of course, was because de Gaulle had opted out of the military side of NATO the year before and one of the results of that was that NATO had to move and would no longer be welcomed to be housed in Paris. So the decision was made to move to Brussels. As it turned out, NATO closed down in Paris the end of the working day of Friday, October 13, 1967 and Harlan Cleveland, our ambassador, being someone with a flare for the dramatic, arranged to have a telegram sent from US Mission NATO, PARIS at 1800 Zulu on Friday, October 13th saying, "US Mission to NATO has closed in Paris. We have lowered the flag, etc., etc." He also arranged that Mike Newlin, who was the number two in the political section, would be in Brussels to make sure that we would be ready to open in Brussels the next Monday. And one of Mike's tasks was to insure that from Brussels a message went out at 1801 Zulu announcing the opening of US NATO in Brussels and that the flag has just been raised, etc., etc. I thought that was sort of cornball, but Harlan thought that was great stuff.

Q: What was the feeling towards the French at that time?

MARTIN: Against de Gaulle there was not much of a happy feeling, but he could play the way he chose and he chose and that was it. The French delegation saluted and carried out whatever instructions they got, but they felt certainly a little pinched it was clear on many occasions. We did work very closely with them in the NATO context at NATO, delegation to delegation, on most issues and that was very harmonious and amicable. But they had their instructions and we had ours and frequently they were different enough that the differences would come out in sessions of the council. At that time, in following on behind David Aaron, what I was charged with was working all the security issues, all the arms controls, etc. and indeed as it turned out the most important issue was the initial consultations with the NATO allies within NATO on the preparations for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, SALT. That kept me very, very busy during the couple of years I was in NATO.

Q: By this time you were an arms controls and disarmament person with a very narrow specialty weren't you?

MARTIN: Indeed. And the reason that I was that was because in early days in the sixties, the State Department did not have much of a group with any particular background in the arms control, disarmament, national security scad of issues and the fact that I had spent three years involved in that with ACDA and then three years on the nuclear side within the Department in the European context, meant that I probably had more experience than most anybody else. So it would be a natural follow on until the Department got enough people with comparable relevant experience for me to continue doing that. And that is what I ended up doing the first half of my career almost entirely.

Q: What was Harlan Cleveland's mode of operation?

MARTIN: Well, Cleveland was a very, very shrewd, effective, bureaucrat. He had been brought into the Department initially as assistant secretary in the International Organizations Bureau because his prior experience in some measure had been related to the UN and some of the UN activity. Indeed, he had been involved in the Marshall Plan during the initial post-war period and setting that up in Paris, etc., so he was assistant secretary in the International Organizations Bureau. His deputies were Dick Gardner and Joe Sisco. In any event, something happened in the UN context and I can't recall precisely what that Lyndon Johnson, then President, found absolutely cutting across his bow and his instruction was to get rid of that man, Assistant Secretary Cleveland. Dean Rusk, thinking highly of Cleveland, and many others also, were able to get Johnson to agree that sending him to be our permanent representative at NATO would be far enough away and out of town so that Johnson could sleep more easily at night. That is how Cleveland got to NATO.

At that time, our ambassador in Paris was Chip Bohlen. I can remember both Cleveland and Mike Newlin, the fellow I mentioned earlier who was the deputy in the political section...one time when Newlin was in the car driving around Paris going to some meeting before we moved to Brussels, with Cleveland, they passed in traffic Chip Bohlen in his car and Cleveland made the comment that he felt so much more powerful and important than Bohlen because Bohlen only had one country to take care of and Cleveland had all of NATO. He was clearly the principal man in Paris at that time. Obviously Bohlen would have had a different view.

But it was an active time after we moved to Brussels. We were pressing ahead with the non-proliferation treaty and there was much consultation in the NATO context in that regard. We were preparing for the beginnings of the SALT process and that consultation was probably the most important that we had ever had within NATO. We were able, because we understood from the outset the need to insure, at least in the early days, that we were wholly forthcoming and fully looking to the dialogue with our allies to be a give and take and that we were really interested in their views and that they were important to us and that this was not a process such as had been the thought occasionally in the past where the US being the biggest kid in the block and owning all the athletic equipment was dictating

the type of game and how it would be played. We were honestly looking as we began preparations for this really new step in the arms control process getting into the strategic side of the equation with the Russians, we were honestly looking for allied input in the most thoughtful terms they could muster to help us make a success of this activity.

Q: Did you notice any change when the Nixon administration came in which was January, 1969?

MARTIN: I can say several things. In terms of the effort in SALT, it intensified, in fact really got started then. In terms of the other arms control activity they were sticking to more or less the same substantial positions from the past. One thing that I did notice was that with the 20th anniversary of NATO upcoming in April, 1969, and the decision that that meeting would be held in Washington and the importance of it for many reasons, both substantively and symbolically, the new President, Mr. Nixon, had asked Ambassador Cleveland to stay on through that 20th anniversary meeting as the permanent representative to be replaced subsequently. They felt it was that important that Cleveland should stay through that period, which was delightful for all of us in US NATO because we thought very highly of Harlan Cleveland. He had done an outstanding job. He really was a superb bureaucrat.

He would from the field figure out precisely how he wanted to proceed on any and every issue and would send in telegrams outlining all of this and mustering very forceful arguments to support the positions that he wanted to be directed to follow. He then would go to Washington to lobby and engage himself on the Washington end of the line in the process to insure that where he wanted things to come out was where they would come out. Having insured that, he would go back to Brussels and await the telegrams, many of which he had drafted in Washington, instructing him what he should do. He was a consummate pro in that regard. He always made clear that three months was maybe tolerable, but if you let six months go by without returning to Washington, you might as well forget it. So he made sure he got back three or four times a year to work the issues and insure that what he received in terms of instructions was consistent with the instructions he was supporting. And I had the good luck to come with him on a couple of those trips because of the SALT angle in one case and then in terms for need for support for the 20th anniversary meeting in another case.

In connection with that 20th anniversary meeting, there was a reception on the eighth floor in honor of all the delegates. Secretary Rusk being a relatively new civilian at that point of several months, was included, as he should have been. At the end of it, it turned out that a number of us were still there having a nice chat--Secretary Rusk and his wife, and Ambassador Cleveland and Mrs. Cleveland, and a colleague, Alex _____ from the NATO mission, myself and a few others I can't recall--I vividly recall one of the well known waiters coming by the Secretary, Mr. Rusk, and asking him as this conversation ensured if he wouldn't like another drink. Dean Rusk said yes he thought he would. The waiter said, "The usual?" And Dean Rusk allowed how that was the case. The man turned, having checked with other people to see what they wanted, if any thing, and as he was walking away Dean Rusk turned around and said, "Oh, gosh, I just forgot, cancel

that, I can't have another drink, I have to drive home." The first time in eight years that he ever had to leave the Department of State and drive himself. His wife chortled and the waiter had the good grace to laugh too.

Q: As you dealt with your particular section of NATO, were there any particular problem areas, either because of country position or something? How did you view NATO, working within this environment?

MARTIN: Well, of course, for me it was extremely heady stuff. I was right at the center of all the consultation and prepared all the papers for the sessions that we had in the council and was involved in all the discussions that we had of various sorts and various sizes in our delegation with other delegations. I was involved with all the visiting firemen who came from Washington to lead the way on much of the substance and make presentations and so forth. I was charged to doing all the reporting telegrams. In fact that is how the acronym came to pass. I had to do these long telegrams and I took copious notes and ended up with 20 and 25 and 30 page telegrams so that we would get down every jot and tiddle and it became very quickly clear that to put down "strategic arms limitation talks" time after time after time was going to break my wrist so it quickly became SALT. Ambassador Cleveland was not very happy with that, he thought it was a little much, but he didn't push too hard. I subsequently heard from Adrian Fischer, the deputy in ACDA, that he had gone to a high level meeting in Washington during this period and was saying that we just can't use this cute acronym, it was a little much, it has to look serious. Whoever was representing the CIA at this meeting said absolutely not, we have set up our whole filing system based on SALT as an acronym. You are not going to destroy that now. At that point Fischer in the process gave up and SALT was enshrined forever.

So it was an intriguing period for me and indeed the successor to Harlan Cleveland, Bob Ellsworth, a former Kansas Congressman, a young fellow, was interested in the SALT process and realized how important it was. When the then Secretary General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, an Italian, a very esteemed and marvelous elder statesman, was going to make a visit in Washington early in July, 1969, not too long before I would end my two years at NATO, and whenever the permrep went to Washington he generally took one staff person with him. So Bob Ellsworth said that he wanted me to come to Washington and focus on SALT because that is the most important issue we have going. So I went with him on this trip. His reason for going was because Brosio was going on a visit. The morning after we arrived, they arranged to have breakfast with Ellsworth in the State Department cafeteria. We were chatting and he made clear that he wanted me to come to every session that he had. I saluted figuratively and thought to myself okay. And I said, "But you can't mean the Secretary's luncheon with the Secretary General." And he said, "Well, maybe not that, but the meeting in his office, yes."

So a day or two later I found myself waiting in the anteroom outside the Secretary's office. I had had the pleasure in March, 1962, of getting to know Millie Asbajonson, who was one of the great secretaries of the Secretary of State and in June, 1962 when Dean Rusk came back to Geneva principally to participate in a ministerial level session to end the Laos

Conference and also taking the occasion to sit in on one of the disarmament conference sessions, I had met Jane Roth, another one of the legendary secretaries of the Secretary. So I knew those two esteemed ladies and we were chatting away very happily. All of a sudden the group comes out of the Secretary's luncheon and files into the Secretary's office. I file in too and one of the European deputy assistant secretaries, George Springsteen, sort of looked at me and wondered why I was there. He couldn't figure that out and wasn't happy at all. He was the one who had to go out and get another chair so that there would be enough chairs. We got seated and I was sitting caddie cornered across the long coffee table from Secretary Rogers, who had the couch at his left, Secretary General Brosio with Ambassador Ellsworth in the middle and the various others around. Bill Rogers looked up and saw me and didn't recognize me from Adam. Ellsworth understood that there was something wrong and said, "Oh, Mr. Secretary, I thought you knew Bob." And Bill Rogers bounced up and with this totally broad grin on his face reached all the way across the coffee table and I bounced up so we could shake hands. He said, "Of course, of course, I didn't know Bob was coming with you." And he sat back down. I almost split. I didn't make a sound. It was just really well done on the part of Rogers to take the sting out of that. I just happened to look at George Springsteen and he was just foaming. He just couldn't believe this. Anyway, it was sort of fun.

If you will in terms of Secretary Rusk to go back to that June, 1962 time when he came over for the purpose of ending the Laos Conference, I was at that point among others the liaison officer for the Italian delegation. And one of the things that was to happen after the morning disarmament conference plenary session, which the Secretary would attend, was for him to have a meeting with his not quite Italian counterpart, Italian Under Secretary, Carlo Russo. This was just before the Secretary was to go off to the Soviet compound to have lunch with Andre Gromyko. The disarmament conference had not been a very stirring meeting, although it dragged on. It was not clear that there was going to be enough time for the meeting with Russo, so at the point when it seemed that that virtually was not going to happen, the man on the Secretary's party who was going to take the notes in the Russo meeting left and that left me there. At the end of the meeting, I went up to Charlie Stelle who was sitting behind Arthur Dean, who was sitting next to Secretary Rusk, and said, "Gee, what are we doing to do? Are we going to meet with Russo?" Stelle says, "Well, you had better ask the Secretary." So I said, "Mr. Secretary, do you really want to have this meeting with Under Secretary Russo?" He said, "The main thing I want Mr. Martin, is a drink." So I said, "Yes, sir," and scurried out looking for the bar. The bar was closed and Dean Rusk was unhappy. We did get together with Russo. The note taker was not there, I had to take notes. I had no paper so I took notes for about 15 or 20 minutes on the cuff of my white shirt. From that point forward, to this day, I never venture out without a small pad to make notes or whatever might be necessary.

Q: Going back to NATO and SALT, was everyone pretty much on the same line?

MARTIN: Essentially in the formal sessions there was no glaring divergence to the degree that anyone might have had special views that they were interested in making. For example, the British did on a number of occasions and they would do that bilaterally and privately.

The sessions, when we were in the council in NATO...the allies generally took the occasion to make the most use of them from the standpoint of learning themselves and trying to get visitors from Washington with technical background and particular expertise to give everything they had an educating process to help a greater understanding of the whole effort. There were some very, very useful sessions both for us and clearly to the allies. And, indeed, occasionally they would have experts who came from capitals to participate in the discussion and that helped a lot too. You could not only have the benefit of the council discussion but it also meant that you could have luncheons or dinners around the edges of the formal sessions. Generally the case was that in the formal sessions there were not disagreements. The allies took the occasion to try to get the most nourishment from that part of it in terms of getting from us our thinking and trying to contribute to that from their perspectives.

Q: What were the major sticking points at the time you were there--1967-69?

MARTIN: That period was one where we were shaping our position and as with most efforts in this area the difficulties were much more manifest and much more deeply seated in terms of the interagency Washington scrum than they were with the allies, and indeed, frequently with the Russians. It was a lot harder to get something through Washington and into position to air "publicly" in terms of a particular negotiation, whether it was bilateral or multilateral, than it ever was to carry out the particular negotiation itself. That point had been evident from the early days in the Geneva disarmament effort that was far less important in large terms than SALT or any of the follow on strategic dialogue with the Soviets. With the allies there weren't sticking points. There wasn't much they could do other than to try and help shape our position. Clearly the British who are so dependent on us from the testing perspective, wanted to make sure that nothing was done, or were particularly sensitive to the possibility of anything being done that would limit our ability to help them on the testing side. The French would have had a comparable concern from the standpoint of French testing but not any problem from the standpoint of our helping them because we didn't do that. To the degree that we provided them any help that ended very early days and it was our link to the British that was key. So there weren't any really sticking points. It was so new an effort, we were treading ground that just hadn't been involved before in any formal negotiating dialogue. The effort which finally ensured mainly in the autumn of 1969 to put together what would be the US position, was mainly the work, in the initial sense, of Ray Garthoff.

Q: Yes, he has been interviewed.

MARTIN: During the autumn of 1969 by which time I had left NATO and was back in Washington in the office of Political/Military Affairs working on SALT and all the strategic and arms control disarmament issues, in fact was the State staff person on SALT from the beginning, Ray Garthoff put together four different options which were overlays to some degree variations on a core of themes to be address by the interagency process and it was one of those four polished up in various ways that was finally put forward as the US

opening position in SALT. His efforts singlehandedly really to put together those four discreet positions was an absolutely incredible performance.

Q: Did you have any feeling from CIA sources or others that the Soviets were having the same problems--the military saying they liked things as they are and the diplomatic side saying you had to come to some kind of agreement?

MARTIN: Over the years that I had been involved, it certainly became clear that a number of people that I had worked with on the Soviet side and got to know were true believers in the sense that they really did hope and were working toward agreement as opposed to disruption and insuring that no agreement would ensue and therefore be no limitations whatsoever on their country's activities. So, yes, indeed, there were evident, if you will, soft liners, those who were interested in trying to work towards an agreement that would not be inconsistent with the goals and the interests of their side, but indeed did want to see an agreement reached. There were equally evident hard liners who wanted to insure that every roadblock conceivable was put in the way and that no agreement could ever be reached.

We had the same thing on our side, both in the uniformed military and in the OSD, the civil side. Indeed, the hardest liners of all was on the civil side and curiously enough over time it was not unusual to see the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the arms control side of the equation as opposed to the other because of the fact that they understood, as did we all, that the pot was not limitless. There were limitations to the amount of resource that could be used in developing weapons and systems, etc. and where hard choices had to be made, the military might well want to see something not pursued because they didn't think it was sensible from the standpoint of limited resources that would be available. But, if you were interested in a full blown ABM system, countrywide, for example, and various things of that sort that many of the hard liners were pushing, you found that the uniformed military were occasionally taking a different position. I found it interesting when it happened the first time and would aim to try to use it occasionally in the future when it became apparent that the military might have a slightly different view. In the end, they would make their case one way or other, but would obviously go along with the civil leadership because that is what they are trained to do. But at the lower levels it was frequently interesting in terms of the way the lineup developed on any particular issue.

Q: We might stop at this point and pick it up at the next time when you come back to Washington from 1970-74 in the political/military area.

MARTIN: Okay.

Q: Today is September 26, 1994. Bob, you are back in the political/military field. Was it a bureau then?

MARTIN: I arrived back the end of the summer, just after Labor Day, in 1969 and it had become a bureau in August of 1969. Ron Spiers was the director and subsequently that was changed to assistant secretary. Tom Pickering was his principal deputy and Ray Garthoff

was the second deputy. I came back to be the deputy director of the office that would handle all the strategic issues, all the arms control issues in the new Bureau of Political/Military Affairs. That was essentially the end of September, 1969 in the feverish final preparation for the beginning of SALT I, which did indeed start in Helsinki on November 17, 1969.

Q: What was the thinking when you came back about SALT?

MARTIN: Generally the view was that this indeed was very much in our interest and it should be vigorously pursued. You will recall that indeed the start of SALT had been contemplated for September, 1968, but in August the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia and President Johnson obviously could not proceed with the sort of talks that SALT would involve after that. That led to a delay of a little over a year. In the election of 1968, Mr. Humphrey lost to Mr. Nixon and the new administration coming in could not be forced into accepting the work that had been done by the previous administration, so it undertook in a very active way a review of the whole situation which took many months because it was a very complicated set of issues and there were many of them. Mr. Kissinger was the National Security Advisor and Secretary Rogers was the Secretary of State. The review ensued leading to in late summer, early autumn, the setting of the date in essentially mid-November to begin the talks.

Q: The new bureau was staffed with world class people...Spiers, Pickering and Garthoff...did you feel that as far as the bureau's place in the Department at that time?

MARTIN: Well, the Political/Military Bureau certainly had the lead for the substance for SALT. There was some degree of conflict with the European Bureau because of the huge legitimate interests of our closest allies, those in NATO, as to the substance and the potential impact it might have on them and their relations with us and more generally. But there was never any question as to PM having the lead on the substance of the actual negotiations as opposed to the consultations and the keeping in closest touch with our allies. Certainly within the Department there was general support for moving ahead in as vigorous a way as could be arranged. There were some people in Policy Planning and indeed a couple of people in PM who had somewhat differing views, but that was useful to getting a full vetting of the issues and coming to decisions. It was also difficult in the interagency process because you can imagine that at least at this early stage of this sort of negotiation between ourselves and the Soviet Union, the military, both uniformed and civilian, were highly skeptical and uncertain and to some degree tentative as to the disability of proceeding and whether indeed you could expect an honest negotiation without getting taken to the cleaners. That took a long time to overcome, and I am talking now in several decades, over the ensuing negotiations, not just in SALT, but that is where it started because that was initially the first big bilateral negotiation.

Q: What were you doing? How did you operate?

MARTIN: I was serving as the principal staff action person within the Department, which meant that I had to get all the papers and get them circulated around to the various people in

the building from whom we needed to get comments. I had to make sure that I or others attended the very intense spate of interagency meetings. I can remember vividly sitting for hours and hours and hours over in the old Executive Office Building or some place around town with a group that together became all too familiar with one another because of this amount of time. The meetings would just drag on forever and forever. It became fairly clear relatively early on that it was going to be hugely hard to get decisions on an agreement and then have everybody fall in behind that and report it and try to implement it. It was not until sometime later that it became clear that it was infinitely easier to negotiate with the Russians than it was to strike an interagency deal and get decisions on our side alone.

Q: Did you feel there was much difference between the NSC under Henry Kissinger and you and your colleagues representing the State Department, or was the problem really with the military?

MARTIN: It was principally with the military. The NSC was new at this as well, but Kissinger being the very talented individual he was, saw the desirability of getting an agreement, but recognized as we all did that you have to protect yourself and couldn't just give away the store in the process. So it was an interesting period in the sense that everyone was beginning to get a sense of what the process might entail and the costs and benefits involved. As I said the meetings were interminable and, of course, as you can appreciate, it is always easier to be negative and to try and stop something from happening than it is to get something to happen and that is why Defense was able to tie the process up in knots occasionally. When that happened the NSC moved in and did some brokering behind the scenes and pushed the process along and decisions were achieved in reasonably timely fashion. I mentioned earlier the huge role Ray Garthoff played in putting together the four total packages that provided the basis for the US position to open the talks in mid-November.

Q: The four packages were...?

MARTIN: Various different approaches to a comprehensive strategic arms limitation agreement. There were various ways that you could do that and certainly more than four, but he managed in four packages to include enough variations and differences so that it was possible to look at them discreetly and decide which approach might be useful. As it happened, the final decision was a melding of some bits and pieces of a couple of them and that served as the basis for starting the talks and for us to begin exploring with the Soviets. It was understood that initially this really would be an exploratory effort because each side would be laying out some tentative ideas and trying to get some reactions. And, of course, there was some degree of reluctance to react too precisely because that conceivably might be giving something away and the Soviets, of course, are very good negotiators. We are quite talented ourselves, but one always thinks that they are a little bit slicker because they have an easier process and can keep their forces under control and in line perhaps better than we. There were certainly throughout SALT and the subsequent strategic negotiations, indeed all negotiations, always some degree of effort on our side, and conceivably on their side as well, to have some position that was not incorporated in our approach to have

whoever was supporting that to get it back in play. This, I guess, is just natural, but it certainly does protract the process occasionally and make it more difficult to move ahead.

Q: Did you find the CIA was helpful in these things, particularly in the role of verification and compliance?

MARTIN: Yes, I think I would have to say they were generally helpful. They, of course, were feeling their way too. It was the late sixties and much of what has become second nature in subsequent decades from the standpoint of what initially was called national technical means, that is the technical capability that we for our part or the USSR for its part, have to run satellites that would pick up information or high flying planes, etc. So, this was in the days before the National Reconnaissance Office was something that couldn't be even breathed, let alone most people didn't know of its existence. The group that is indeed charged with running the various systems that pick up the information...
[tape turned off]

CIA was generally contributing because it was early days, initial innings, and there was no reason to point a finger at the CIA. They were hoping to get greatly involved because this was a new opportunity for them to essentially expand their writ to some degree to support delegations, to support the whole verification side of the equation which certainly has always been recognized as centrally important. So for them it was a good opportunity and they were working to try and bring it about so that they were one of the central key players.

Q: Was France playing the odd-man-out role as usual in this?

MARTIN: Not really. Again, from the standpoint of the British and the French, anything that would begin to limit US and Soviet nuclear forces would be a good thing because then the small forces that they had would loom larger. So that was a plus. They weren't standing in the way. All of them were intensely interested and wanting to be treated by us adequately from the standpoint of full and complete consultations and not develop a feeling where we were dealing with the Soviets 100 percent but only dealing with them 75 percent. They wanted to feel that they were involved, if not as negotiating partners, at least as full partners in the enterprise that was so much judged to be in everyone's interest, including the Soviets.

I must say that one of the things that we were very careful and scrupulous about, and I think effective in, was the degree to which we consulted with the allies. We understood their questions and wondering about how they would be treated, so we really bent over backwards. That is one thing that I pressed always, the need to have ongoing full consultations fairly frequently. This was generally done in the North Atlantic Council in Brussels with people going over from Washington. Whenever there was a recess, almost certainly have somebody or several people from our delegation involved, which added a degree of flavor and flare to it that was also useful. I think that we were successful in that effort and the allies did feel that we were being quite open. The ones who were most interested, of course, and this went beyond NATO, included Japanese, for example, kept in very close touch with all parts of town in Washington very effectively I must say. The

British, the French, the Japanese and others, kept in close touch with State, Defense, the NSC, the White House to the degree that they could, CIA in one way or another, and in early days several of the allies assigned people with some knowledge and experience in the substance of the negotiations to either Helsinki or Vienna which were the two locations where the negotiations alternated between, to try and keep up on the spot. Over time it became clear that that was not a very useful way to proceed and caused not real problems, but it was a little difficult because our people never had much time to keep up with those individuals. If the Brit got in to see Garthoff and somebody else didn't, that caused problems. So we tried to convince them that that wasn't a very useful approach.

Q: How long were you doing this?

MARTIN: The negotiations started in November, 1969 and proceed until the agreement was reached in the early summer of 1972. We had created a series of boxes, if you will, into which to put information at very rarefied levels of labeling so that very few people had access to what was thought to be the most delicate reporting by the delegation and instructing from Washington to the delegation. That worked reasonably well, but as always there were occasionally leaks and that caused a huge high dudgeon on the part of the President, Mr. Nixon, his National Security Advisor and other luminous levels around town. But other than finger pointing, there was never anyone specifically who was fingered as being a leaker and, indeed, ultimately it did become known that really the person who was most prone to leak then and throughout his career was the then National Security Advisor, Mr. Kissinger. And, of course, with hindsight we ultimately also learned that he had been carrying on his parallel negotiation to the two delegations in Helsinki and Vienna in Washington through Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. That posed its problems in terms of the ultimate agreement, but since none of us were aware of that at the time, we went on blissfully assuming that we were the leading edge of the whole process. Unfortunately, that was not the case.

Q: Were you pretty much the backstopper here?

MARTIN: I was backstopping the whole time. My boss, Jack Shaw, went with the delegation. Ray Garthoff was always on the delegation. There were several others from the Department and the various agencies had their usual people. The head of the US delegation was the director of ACDA, George Smith. His deputy, Phil Farley, was the head of the backstopping in Washington, the interagency process, serving as the chair of the backstopping effort. And one of the assistant directors of ACDA, Kenny, was the ACDA representative, so Farley was not serving as the agency or Department representative, but as an interagency process representative to chair the backstopping. That was to keep the delegation instructed and to deliberate about the reports that were coming from the delegation.

In terms of reaching substantive US positions occasionally the backstopping process was able to do that, but clearly that was not on a point of major significance or any contention. When a point of that sort had to be decided, it was decided through the NSC framework in

the sense of being led by the NSC representatives. Mr. Kissinger, for example, chaired the Verification Panel that met to sort out highly contentious, centrally important issues. The representatives for State and Defense were the two Deputy Secretaries, not the Secretaries. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of CIA would brief the Verification Panel meetings on the intelligence situation with respect to the issues under consideration. They were the principal ones who would speak. Mr. Farley would go and represent ACDA in that group as opposed to being the non-agency, non-department chair of the backstopping process. Again, Kissinger was using all of this for his own ends in terms of his negotiation and we were not aware of that at the time.

Q: I want to come back to that, but first, it would seem that ACDA would be the one to take this. Where did Political Military fit in with ACDA?

MARTIN: The coloration of the principal departments and agencies ...ACDA was, of course, viewed as a proponent of getting an agreement and if you believed the hard liners, any agreement for an agreement's sake was the ACDA line. That was not, in fact, the case but that is the way they were depicted. State was considered to be the honest broker but there really were two parts to State. Those who were honest broker types but were also pressing for the idea of moving ahead to get an agreement, not at a cost to US interests, but just were inclined to think that we should be pressing forward. There was a view principally in this regard on the Policy Planning Staff that was very skeptical of reaching any useful agreement from the standpoint of US interests with the Russians. In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the civil side was essentially of that same view. The JCS was comparable and was not always too vocal, although they did provide all of the staff needed to get the staff work done. The CIA would not usually get involved in taking positions on substance, to the degree that they had views they would inject them through their comments on the verification process. The best staff work in the early days of SALT was done by the ACDA people. ACDA at that time had really a very talented group of people in this effort. The NSC staff below the Kissinger level was charged with making the process move along and push forward possible positions to be reviewed in the Verification Panel chaired by Kissinger and then for Presidential decision. It would more times than not ask ACDA to do the basic staff preparation work because they were so good at it. Even though the general view was that ACDA was not hard lined but just the opposite, the NSC staff did look to the ACDA people to do the staff work if they wanted a good product. Occasionally Defense would insist on undertaking something and usually it was not very well done. Indeed, they would miss deadlines and it was not helpful to getting on with it. Of course, their idea was to try to delay things to protract and try to make it as difficult as possible to move the process along.

I can remember vividly one meeting at the staff level over at the NSC where Defense had a view and ACDA and others and differing views. This was argued out and the Defense view was seen to be totally hollow and silly. Defense objected to moving ahead on that basis saying that they had obviously made some mistakes in their preparatory work and could they have a little more time to put together something that would make sense; they understood now where they had gone wrong. They were given about 45 minutes to do that

and they got something together that was equally as silly which just added to the frustration of the NSC staffers who were under heavy pressure from Kissinger to get on with things. So, it was rather laughable in some respects.

Q: What did you think about the Soviets, what they wanted and how they negotiated?

MARTIN: Since they at least were aware that the real negotiation was going on through Dobrynin and Kissinger, they were able to be a little more laid back in the negotiations and to recognize that that was not the main arena and it gave them some degree of flexibility that we did not have and made it more difficult to move that process along. However, when it was useful to move things along from the standpoint of Kissinger and Dobrynin, then the Soviet delegation would make sure that happened between the two delegations. That is the way progress was made. The real investigation of possibilities, however, did indeed take place between the two delegations because there was enough expertise and both of them were very well staffed with their principal interlocutors. For example, we had Ambassador Smith as chairman of the US delegation and then there was a representative from State, Defense, the JCS, all there. Paul Nitze was the Defense representative. Harold Brown had been involved as a sort of additional person at one point. The JCS had a three star Air Force General. Tommy Thompson was the State representative initially and when he died Jeff Parsons was cast in that role.

The way the negotiations were conducted in either Helsinki or Vienna, was there would be several meetings a week between the two delegations and they would trade-off between the Soviet mission and the US mission. They would have set piece presentations by each delegation and then the chance for discussion at the table. At the end of each session the delegation principals, as well as the staff support people, would get up from the table and there would be refreshments of one sort or another. And they would have additional discussions of various points that were of interest and as a result of that...as I say, that was between the principals on each side. Paul Nitze, for example, and his counterpart; General Allison, the JCS person, and his counterpart; Harold Brown with his counterpart; the lower staff people with their counterparts on the other side. Out of this came a series of memoranda of conversation that over the course of the entire negotiations ran into many, many hundreds of pages and were indeed occasions when a lot of useful work was done because it provided an opportunity for informal exploration of bits and pieces and parts of issues by these highly capable people. These informal talks let to dinners with individuals on each side with their counterparts as a further device of continuing conversation. It proved a very, very helpful aspect of the negotiating process.

Q: Here you have a complex problem--what constitutes limiting arms, etc. You have highly capable people doing this. And then you have a Harvard professor who's field is not arms control and a Soviet ambassador who's field is also not arms control, doing something on the side. What were they doing and how did you view what they were doing?

MARTIN: Well, initially and through the whole process we didn't know that that channel existed, so we had no views about it. There certainly was some thought in retrospect that it

was not necessarily useful to the outcome. There was a feeling on our side that we would have been able to strike a somewhat better deal, had Kissinger not been carrying on his separate channel negotiation. But that was an initial reaction and over time the main thing was to pocket the initial agreement and get on to adding to it through subsequent negotiating efforts. And that happily was what was done. Indeed, in retrospect, the interim agreement, that was what the agreement on offensive weapons limitation side was called, it was interim in the sense that it was only for five years and the idea was, indeed there was a commitment to get on shortly with a subsequent negotiating effort to add to this to further limit and perhaps even reduce on both sides... That one could make a case was arguably not in the US interest and a number of ways no one of which was essentially germane if your thought was that so long as you had mutual assured destruction and both sides were aware of that and were operating under that basis, it didn't matter if they had a few more of this or a little less of that, because it wasn't consequential since both sides understood they would never use these weapons. But from the standpoint of arguing out a result in pure numbers term, the interim agreement was not as advantageous to us as arguably it was to them. But as I say, since in real terms nobody objectively thought that matters, it never was a crippling problem. But certainly the hard line would use that against Kissinger and against the idea of further negotiations. We had been taken to camp, they would charge, even though it was quite without consequence.

The important result from SALT I, the critical one that is now still very much a central issue, was the anti-ballistic missile treaty which was indefinite in duration and where the people who really understood the strategic side of things recognized that this was the vital one to get right. This was true both on our side and on the Soviet side. There had been argument over time between the hard liners and the soft liners that if you could get your defenses right than the offenses didn't matter. So long as you had a defense, no offense could breach it. But history showed that if one got a defense then whoever was interested would find something on the offensive side to counter that and usually vice versa. But generally, from an objective standpoint, it was recognized that the offense was always going to control and there was no way you could have a total impregnable defense. So the idea of essentially banning any anti-ballistic defense was very much in support of the idea of mutually assured destruction. The unlimited duration ABM treaty, with its various provisions that precluded either side from having a consequently defense was really the heart of SALT I and has been maintained to this day, although now there is some effort to get agreement with the Soviets for loosening up on some of the restraints and restrictions in order to do some things on the defense side that we are interested in, and they are being somewhat reluctant about it. They recognize that it is pretty good the way it is.

Q: Looking back on it because obviously you didn't know about it before, what was the effectiveness of Kissinger doing this on the side?

MARTIN: Why would Kissinger want to have his second channel? I can only surmise that being someone who looked upon knowledge as power and he had all the knowledge and others didn't and he was the most powerful person, certainly he could control the second channel since he was the negotiator and didn't have an interagency group overlooking that

activity. Of course the interagency group process was providing him input and substance, but he could then use that information the way he thought most useful from the standpoint of moving things along and getting the kind of agreement that he thought would be most advantageous both from the standpoint of the general substance and from the political perspective. He was a very quick learner and he had a lot of good people working with him. Certainly some portion of the NSC staff knew about this second channel and they were all highly capable to keep him up to speed on any aspect in terms of specifics or the over-arching general situation. It was not as if he was operating in total ignorance. There was someone equally as ignorant, Ambassador Dobrynin, because he obviously had the same support, although I guess not so much from his embassy, but he was a free-wheeler too around town and operating the way Kissinger did. But he obviously had support from Moscow from the people there who were fully involved and conversant with all the aspects of it.

Q: Your responsibilities ended in 1972?

MARTIN: Through the summer and early autumn of 1972, there was a huge effort on our side to prepare for the hearings in the Senate on the treaty and the interim agreement. I guess only the treaty had to be the subject of hearings, but it was clear that the only thing that made sense was to put the whole package together and present that and have discussions about the ABM treaty and the interim agreement on the offensive side. And that is what happened. So we then spent huge number of hours putting together materials to prepare Secretary Rogers for his presentations; Ambassador Smith for his presentations. People in Defense were doing the same thing with respect to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. CIA was heavily involved in that in terms of helping to provide materials to support the various verification provisions and the aspects that we judge would give us a sense of confidence that the ABM treaty and the interim agreement were being carried out by the Soviets as well as ourselves.

Q: From your perspective, how did you feel about the hearings, the political reaction to them?

MARTIN: There certainly was a very positive reaction when the agreements were reached. Indeed, you recall, the President, Mr. Nixon, went to Moscow to sign the agreements in June, 1972 and special arrangements were made because the negotiations were going on virtually up to the time of signing for the delegations to be brought from Vienna to Moscow. They were almost negotiating as they were coming along, finishing up bits and pieces, typing out this, that and the other, and then having to get the two versions in English and in Russian squared away. That is always a very difficult task subject to some screw up almost by definition. But happily that all got taken care of and the agreements were signed. There were many pictures taken showing big smiles on both sides.

It was about that time that there was beginning to be some sense on our side that there had been more than one negotiating channel involved. But, as I say, even though one could argue that the interim agreement was less good from our perspective than from the Soviet

perspective, the keystone and the center piece of SALT I was the ABM treaty and both sides had striven mightily to make sure that was as tight as could possibly be the case. And, indeed, it has been maintained up to the present. There was an effort some few years ago to suggest that the narrow interpretation, the most stringent interpretation of the ABM treaty provisions and the limitations they placed on any effort towards an ABM capability was not the correct one, based on the negotiating record. Happily that effort came to nought and it was agreed finally, even though the then Reagan administration was anxious to have a looser interpretation blessed as the correction one, that did not happen. The principal person insuring that the record that had thought to be the record all along, namely, very strict, very tight interpretation of the provisions was the correct one, was the General Counsel of the Arms Control Agency, Tom Graham.

Q: After your role was over, what then did you do?

MARTIN: Then it was a question of beginning to prepare for follow on negotiations. There were other things entrain as well. Efforts in the biological and chemical area. The negotiations in Geneva in what had changed from the 18 member group to the conference of the committee on disarmament when it was expanded to 26 members. So there was lots going on. The idea of getting the non-proliferation treaty ratified was taking some time. The question of nuclear safe guards as between IAEA and EURATOM was still taking some time. There was lots going on.

Q: You kept this going until 1974?

MARTIN: Yes. In 1974 I had become a tandem couple with my wife, Joanna.

Q: Could you explain what is a tandem couple?

MARTIN: A tandem couple is a husband and wife who are both Foreign Service officers. We were married in early 1971. Supposedly what had been a rule prior to December, 1970, namely that if one Foreign Service officer married another Foreign Service officer, at the end of the tours they were then involved with, one of the two would have to resign or go on leave without pay, to take one of the two out of the work status. I have heard conflicting views in more recent times, that indeed that was never a rule or regulation, but just the way things were done and for one reason or another the tandem couples, two serving Foreign Service officers, did not object to this and went along with it. One example was Bob and Phyllis Oakley. She was not a serving officer for many, many years and then after all her kids were long gone, she petitioned to come back in and has done so. Bob has subsequently retired and Phyllis has served with distinction in several key posts over recent years including the spokesman for the Department and now she is Assistant Secretary for Refugee Programs. Since my wife and I got married in early 1971, in December, 1970 there was a todo to the effect that two Foreign Service officers could get married and continue to serve so long as one wasn't working for the other directly. So we were able to continue working.

In the early spring of 1974, we were assigned to Vietnam and went off there together to serve initially in Nha Trang. After about a month of that there was a need for an officer in the political section in Saigon so Joanna moved from Nha Trang to Saigon. About six weeks later, there was a need for someone in the Pol/Mil section in Saigon so I came from Nha Trang to Saigon and we were together again.

Q: Let's talk about Nha Trang, a port city. What was the situation when you went out in 1974?

MARTIN: We got out there in the end of May, 1974. We went from Saigon, after a couple of days, up to Nha Trang. Joanna was doing political work and I was doing political work, but they were quite different things. I spent much of my time going out and about the Military Region II area to the various other locations there to see what was going on with the people we had working as advisers. At that point there were very, very few military advisers, but the AID missions and that effort was ongoing. I also visited the South Vietnamese forces and the leadership in the various locations there to find out what was going on. One of the things I was doing was tracking the South Vietnamese forces and their loses on a regular basis. We got reports into Nha Trang from various liaison people we had in the key areas throughout Military Region II, and based on that I would put together a message each week on the number of casualties and what was going so far as these reports we got from our advisers.

Q: Was this a cease fire time?

MARTIN: It was after the major forces of the US forces had left, but there was still some military activity in this period. There had been an agreed cease fire before that, but that more or less broke down. At this time it was during a period when there were a number of engagements. It wasn't full war, but there was enough going on. There was a military situation between the two sides.

Q: What was your impression of the Vietnamese forces that now had the responsibility of holding things together?

MARTIN: I must confess I didn't have much basis for having a very precise sense because I was so new. But certainly the sense I did get was that they weren't doing particularly well. Where they had a lot of men and matériel they were able to hold the situation, but they weren't making any particular progress in terms of expanding that situation or bettering their position. It was essentially a defensive effort, or so it seemed to me.

Q: When did you go down to Saigon?

MARTIN: In mid-September, 1974.

Q: What was your role then?

MARTIN: I was working in the pol/mil section in the embassy and was involved with liaison with our military group that was in liaison with the Four Power joint effort to try and add to the agreement and rein in the military activities. There was an Iranian group, an Hungarian group, an Indian group, and maybe Swedish, representation under the UN, if you will, that was trying to negotiate arrangements to tone down the conflict and to bring it more under control. There was also an effort to work out arrangements for solving questions of US missing in action and prisoners of war and I was involved in working with our military in that.

Q: Did we have much of a military contingent there at that time?

MARTIN: We had a rather sizeable headquarters military assistance group in Saigon, but we didn't have too much military out and around the country. It had by that point reverted really to the consulates general and the AID people in the field. It was mainly a civil representation on our part at that point. There were some military around and they got around the country to some degree, but the US presence was really almost gone at that point. Certainly in terms of fighting, it was all gone.

Q: What was the military's impression of what was happening in Vietnam at that particular time?

MARTIN: The US military was, I think, privately recognizing that the South Vietnamese were not very potent or very capable but they were doing everything they could to shore them up by providing them supplies. As you may recall, that was the period where support here at home for anything other than a complete pull out and stoppage of aid was very strong. Graham Martin was our ambassador then. He was doing a really noble effort towards maintaining Congressional support for funding the South Vietnamese following the peace agreement and the pull out of US forces leaving essentially the defense of South Vietnam and the military effort to the South Vietnamese. Ambassador Martin was very confident that if he could have gotten a mutli-year deal through the Congress that there was some hope that the South Vietnamese would pull of their socks and recognize that they did have support adequate to permit them to get on with defending and saving their country. Most of us thought that at the time and were somewhat abashed when that didn't come to past. But certainly in retrospect, it seems fairly clear that the South Vietnamese were never going to be able to do very much effectively to meet their own needs and that their defeat was essentially inevitable.

Q: How long were you there?

MARTIN: We all left, as you know, over the evening of April 29 and early morning of April 30, 1975. Joanna had gone off to Bangkok about ten days before that. The Deputy Chief of Mission, Wolf Lehmann, came to me about the middle of April and said, "You know we are at the point where we have to pare down more. I would like to send Joanna to Bangkok to help out with the embassy there in the preparations that clearly will be coming along before too long with people coming out of Vietnam." I said, "Well, I had understood

that it was coming." Joanna and I talked and I took her out to Mehrabad airport about a day later and she went off to Bangkok. I stayed in Saigon.

Q: Going back just a touch. When did you at your level in the embassy figure that the game was up?

MARTIN: Well, certainly at the point when we began to draw down, it was more than clear. It had really become pretty clear several weeks before that that it was probably about over.

One interesting interlude that we had early in March, which would have been six or seven weeks before we finally all left, was a visitation by a group of former American POWs to Saigon, including now Senator John McCain of Arizona who had been a prisoner for over six years, and several others who had been imprisoned even longer. I don't recall that it included Admiral Stockdale of the last Presidential election political fame. But there were 10 or 12 of these individuals including a sergeant who supposedly was the person who had been held longer than anyone else among American POWs. That was really a fascinating visitation. I was involved with supporting that visit. The principal person, outside of the ambassador and the DCM, was one of the principal AID people, George Jacobson. I worked very closely with Jake and went around the countryside with this group of POWs over the several days that they were there. They even were taken out to the island off the coast where the infamous tiger cages were.

Q: This was a South Vietnamese prison island?

MARTIN: Yes. It really was fascinating days. The Vietnamese were very gracious and they had a lovely large dinner for them the last night they were there and treated them very well. I was surprised at the degree of steadiness and stability and under control that these people who had gone through these horrible experiences evidenced. They really were well in hand and did not give any indication that I noticed that their horrible experiences were preying on them, at least outwardly.

Q: What were they out there for?

MARTIN: To provide an opportunity for the South Vietnamese to thank them for their effort and as a gesture towards the United States, solidarity and all of that.

Q: When had the Highlands started to fall apart?

MARTIN: That was about that time. A little earlier there were several crucial losses up in the northwest portion of MR II. Certainly by mid-March it was pretty clear that things were going very, very badly and it happened very, very quickly. There were several occasions when the North pressed a large Southern forces pretty hard and the Southern forces rather than holding, split and high tailed it and therefore suffered greater losses than would have been otherwise.

In tandem with that was all the reports coming from Washington that the Congress was not prepared to play the game as Graham Martin was proposing, namely, providing multi-year package of support. So there didn't seem to be much heart in the Southern side of the equation at that point.

Q: There are many stories about Graham Martin's talking a game that things would hold and all. What was happening down in the political section?

MARTIN: It was fairly clear that things were going badly, but there was so much activity because...one of the things that was taking a lot of time was people in the United States of one sort or another, both American and Vietnamese who had got to the United States and had friends and relatives who were becoming increasingly at risk...there was a huge avalanche of inquiries about these people. People were coming from the States and other places trying to get involved and to assure the safety of this individual or that small group, etc. Of course, the Congress was getting involved in that as well and that compounded the difficulty. We didn't have much time to think about the military situation.

Q: Were your Vietnamese counterparts seeing what was going to happen?

MARTIN: I really didn't have any Vietnamese counterparts. So I can't usefully comment on that aspect of it. Although it seemed fairly clear generally that the Vietnamese were understanding that it was a very uncertain time and everything was a huge question mark.

Q: When were you basically packed and ready to go?

MARTIN: One thing I might mention in terms of the effort to do good works and save Vietnamese, etc., you will recall that about the middle of March that a C-5 loaded with children took off from the airport in Saigon and very sadly had a problem before they even got fully airborne and crashed. A huge number of the kids on board were killed. The C-5, the largest transport plane we have was configured with two levels and all the people on the lower of the two floors were killed and most of the ones on the upper level were saved. It was a tragic accident. That obviously compounded the problem and atmosphere and the thinking of people at that time. Everything was going wrong.

We packed to leave some weeks earlier in terms of our household effects. The thought that we were going to be drawing down and probably leaving or at least be on a very limited basis had been fairly clear since about the middle of March. So the last half of March was a very frantic effort to pack up the things of the people in the embassy and get them on their way out of the country. Joanna was still there and we did that. We saw our effects off on a very rickety truck, piled up high and I thought as the thing turned the corner of the street we were living on that it was probably the last we would see of all that stuff. But happily our things did get out. Some others, particularly some of the people who had been up in Military Region I in Da Nang, did not have equal luck. One of our colleague officers, Theresa Tull, had her things packed up there and put together as a pallet and ready to go and

then the pallet never got picked up and her things were just left. And there were other cases like that. Al Francis, an officer who had been involved on the pol/mil side in Saigon and then subsequently in the political section in Saigon was sent up to Da Nang to run the consulate general there towards the end and was involved in the evacuation from there of all the Americans, but unhappily not all the American people's effects, subsequently out of Saigon in advance of the actual final departure.

With respect to packing up in terms of when I left, I never did pack. You may recall that, I guess it was the night of April 28, there was a plane that took off from a local military airport and came into the center of Saigon and flew towards the Presidential Palace and fired on it. It did not attack further, but that caused a lot of confusion and people were pretty tense even before that. They got hugely tense at that point and the DCM, Wolf Lehmann asked me to go with him and have dinner at his residence, which I agreed to since my wife had gone about ten days prior to that. We were driven in his car to his residence, which took us quite a while to manage because of the tenseness and confusion in the city. We got there and had dinner and were chatting about one thing and another and Wolf got a call from the ambassador about some aspect of something and the thought was that I should go back home. The DCM's car took me back through town and dropped me off at our place. I went to bed and woke up the next morning to get a call to say that a car would be coming. Just a note in that regard that those of us attached to the embassy and the consulates general around Vietnam, did not have at that time our own vehicles. We were all transported around on the basis of a motor pool and those of us who had individual needs, especially at the consulates general, could borrow a motor pool car to drive around to do what he had to do. In Saigon, all of us had to call up the motor pool and a car would come and pick us up and take us to where we had to go.

So a car was coming to pick me up early the morning of the 29th. I went off to the embassy and about mid-morning it became clear that this was virtually it and I did get a car to take me home and managed to pack up a small attaché case with a couple of things and went back to the embassy. I did not see the maid that we had during that brief return to pick up a few things.

About mid-day the ambassador's secretary, Eva Kim, asked me to go with a colleague, Brunson McKinley, in two cars to go out around town to pick up some people that the ambassador wanted picked up and brought to the compound to participate in the departure. So Brunson got his car and I was to go in the admin counselor's car. We tried to get out one of the gates and we were unsuccessful. We had to go to the back gate to get out and come around the embassy compound and I met the driver of the admin counselor's car in the front of the embassy where it was parked. We took off and McKinley took off and went our separate ways to places around town to pick up some people.

It was not a very pleasant experience. I went to one location where there were all sorts of people and, of course, they all wanted to go. They all had dozens and dozens of bags and baskets and this, that and the other. I said, "Look, we can't possibly take anything like that. One item per person." The idea was to get this lady and two or three of her kids. It was just

really bizarre. At another location I was to pick up this elderly couple and they wanted to take what appeared to me to be a bird cage that was supposedly the treasure of their life. We managed to fit this into the trunk and the car was stuffed. We finally got six people into the car with some of their belongings and went back to the embassy and thought we would try to get in the back in the back gate of the compound near the staff club and swimming pool.

By that time that was so congested that that turned out not to be possible. We were able finally to extricate ourselves from there and to go back around to the front of the embassy. The car had a radio in it and we were able to be in touch just across the grilled fence into the embassy itself. We were told to try to get in the pedestrian gate which was right near where we were parked and that a marine would come down in twenty minutes to open that gate to let us in. Well, of course, as soon as we got out of the car and all the luggage was unloaded from the trunk, people who were watching the embassy like hawks thought something was afoot and it was like the pied piper. We just had dozens and dozens of people.

So I said, "Look, gang, we are going to walk down away from this gate," which we did about 25 or 30 yards down the street to try and get the crowds away from the gate and wait. When I saw somebody coming finally to open the gate we tried to edge back along the sidewalk without being too obvious. But we were obvious and we just took everyone with us. We got to the gate and the gate was open and everybody wanted to come in. Of course, I was standing there sort of playing God, pushing people back and trying to get the people who I had picked up in, the ones that we were particularly interested in, and had people who had been former employees, Foreign Service Nationals who were no longer in the employ and hadn't been able to get in somehow asking to be let in. It seemed to me that if I once started doing anything like that, we would have a riot. So I kept pushing these people out and finally the marines pulled me in and we closed the gate. It was a terrible situation, not a pleasant one at all.

My colleague McKinley had been a lot smarter in some ways. He had recalled that there was a gate between our compound and the French compound, the two backed up to one another. So he had gone to the gate of the French compound and talked to the French, by then Foreign Legionnaires--they had brought in about 75 Foreign Legionnaires to protect their compound and they were the biggest, toughest guys I have ever seen. He talked them into letting him in and he said that not only could they have the car, but there was a case of champagne in the trunk and they could have that too. So they let him in and he left the car and champagne there, got his group and went through the gate between the two compounds. So he had no problems. I hadn't been quick enough on that.

Q: And then what happened?

MARTIN: Then I got the people I had collected in the area back of the compound where I had been told to take them. I left them and went into the chancery, itself, and went back up to the ambassador's and DCM's area and told Eva Kim that my people were in the back with all the others. It was shortly after that that I was walking out in the area just outside the ambassador's and DCM's suite when I heard the telephone on the receptionist's desk ring.

There was no receptionist sitting there so I picked it up. I almost fainted, because the voice on the other end was our maid. I just could not believe how she had happened fortuitously to call and it had come through on this phone just as I was walking by just about three or four hours after I had been home and got just a very few things. We had a chat about what I wanted for dinner and how were things going, etc. I told her what I wanted for dinner, knowing full well that I would never get there, and tried to buck her up a little bit. But it really was an eerie feeling to pick up the phone and have her at the end of it. I just couldn't believe that.

During the remainder of the afternoon, I helped out shredding papers and various things trying to get our paper supply down, and helped out in the ambassador's area in all the things that were going on. Subsequently, at the end of the evening somewhere between 9:00 and 10:00, I was told by Jim Devine, who was the pol/mil counselor and in charge of getting people on the helicopters off the roof as opposed to helicopters that were landing in the parking lot just outside the chancery, that it was time for me to go. So I picked up my attaché case and walked up to the roof and got into the helicopter.

Q: Where did you go?

MARTIN: I went off to the carrier Hancock which had been put back into service for this particular chore in the South China Sea. I was in a CH-47 helicopter, picked off the roof and they didn't close the back door entirely and I was sitting next to the labor attaché and the helicopter was chockablock. We started off and the labor attaché looked back and said, "Gosh there are helicopters chasing us, they are after us." I said, "Come on, that is more of the same kind of gang that we are." He was very antsy about it and I finally got him calmed down. We ended up on the Hancock and I was able to get in touch with one of the officers who wondered if we wanted any thing and I said, "Maybe it would be a good idea if we sent a message off indicating that this group had arrived." So I drafted a message which was sent off to the Department in Washington and I guess we sent it also informational to Bangkok and Manila, which were the two principal places that were going to be receiving the evacuees. I then found where we were going to be billeted on the Hancock and just went to bed. I may have had something to eat.

I have a story in terms of the departure from the parking lot. A couple of days before the evacuation actually began, one of the problems that had to be taken care of was a tree that was right in the center of the parking lot. The admin counselor decided that he would take care of that tree in advance. So he was out there trying to get it chopped down and Graham Martin heard about this and was furious and said to stop that. The reason being, of course, was that if the Vietnamese saw this they would recognize that something was afoot. So that effort stopped. When the tree had to come down, it turned out that our doctor, who subsequently became the head of MED in the Department, a very wonderful person, was the one who actually took care of the tree and got it out of the way. But, it was funny the idea of not taking the tree down in advance because everybody will know that something is going to happen.

Q: I heard stories afterward that people at the embassy would sort of go by and pick off branches little by little because they knew something had to be done.

MARTIN: In any event, as I say, Jim Devine and mission people were in charge of the evacuation from the roof, and the US military was running the evacuation by helicopter from the parking lot and other places around the town and from the military compound which was essentially co-located out at the airport.

Q: What happened to you next?

MARTIN: We spent a couple of days just going in circles in the South China Sea waiting for others who might come. And, indeed, on the second day a helicopter came in loaded with Vietnamese. A Vietnamese military person had stolen a helicopter with his family and as many friends and relatives he could stow on board and landed on the flight deck of the Hancock. Because there was so much in terms of people and no storage space, they got the people out and pushed the helicopter off the Hancock, which was done just in order to save space.

Finally, after four or five days we went into Manila, into Subic and were let off there. We were supposed to be taken by helicopter to the chancery downtown, but somehow that got all fouled up and we went by bus someplace else. Ultimately we got back to the chancery. A colleague who had formerly worked for me was in the embassy in Manila at the time so I linked up with him. I knew the then ambassador, Bill Sullivan, quite well, so I called him. He was out at the residence and said, "Oh, come on out we are just sitting around the pool and having a drink. I have the Iranian Four Power people out here, the ambassador and the general." So my colleague took me out in his car to the residence and I sat around during the course of the afternoon having a couple of drinks and chatting away. It was at that point that Ambassador Sullivan said that he had been tempted, when the evacuation was underway, to send a telegram to Ambassador Martin in Saigon to commiserate with him but also to provide a reminder to insure that before he left that he turned out the light at the end of the tunnel. Sullivan chortled and said that he just didn't have the heart to send it. He might just have well, because the story, I am sure, has made the rounds many times since.

After a day or so in Manila, I flew off to Bangkok to join Joanna. From there, after a day or so, we began the trek back to the United States. We went through Hong Kong, Hawaii and finally through California and back to Washington.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point.

MARTIN: Okay.

Q: Today is October 13, 1994. We have you being evacuated from Saigon. Could you give me a feel about how you were received when you and your wife got back to Washington? This is always one of the awkward things. You become a placement problem.

MARTIN: Actually, very well. In fact, one of my close colleagues who was still in the Service then was saying, "It is fantastic. You tell me what happened during your final months, weeks and days. It sounds just like going to work and coming home and yet here you were viewed as real heroes." I said, "Gee, heroes, that is a little much. It really was just like going to work on a regular basis and doing just what you were asked and supposed to do. When it came time to leave I was told that was the case and a number of us went up to the roof of the embassy and got into a helicopter and off we went. It wasn't thought of a any big deal at the time. I think there was some degree of danger in it, but that is true of many things that one does."

In any event, we were well received back in the Department. The problem was compounded in some measure because it was not only the people, and there were quite considerable numbers of them coming out of Vietnam, but also, as you recall, not more than a couple of months or even less prior to that Cambodia was evacuated, Ambassador Dean and his, by then, relatively small group. That compounded the problem a little bit. It worked out actually quite well for Joanna and myself because she had been in Saigon in the political section and knew a lot of the people and then gone off several weeks prior to the final departure to Bangkok to work with the embassy there in anticipation of more people coming from Vietnam through Bangkok, as well as Manila. When we got back, we and all the others, were part of the EA family. They had great need, for example, to deal with the Indochina refugees that were of fairly considerable numbers around the country. So Joanna got involved working on that problem on a task force. I was asked relatively early on if I would be prepared to become the Department of State representative on a delegation that would be leaving relatively shortly for Moscow for the third round of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion talks with the Russians. It was obviously agreeable to me, it was really quite an intriguing prospect. I had worked on delegations negotiating with the Russians in arms control for a number of years, a decade or so before, but had never gone to the Soviet Union. I had been in Geneva and New York and the United Nations and in Washington, but never gone to home base.

Q: That's right, you were the backstopper the whole time.

MARTIN: The backstopper on the SALT side of it in Washington. Before that I had been in Geneva with the general disarmament delegation and had been in New York at the United Nations during the 18th General Assembly during the autumn of 1963. So it was a happy prospect for me. I went, however, to the EA Bureau powers that be and said that this request had been made and noted that I was interested, but recognized that I belonged to them and if they had any problems with that, why then we had to see what would happen. To get rid of a body in these circumstances was a very happy developed from their standpoint so they said that if I could be of use somewhere else to do so. So I was picked up by the Bureau of Political Military Affairs again and was thrust into the quick reading-in process as to what had happened during the first two rounds of the negotiations, and left for Moscow on June 1, 1975.

Q: What was the issue that you were going to be working on?

MARTIN: You will recall that in the summer of 1963, several events led to a political circumstance that made it possible to have negotiations on limitations on nuclear testing. The events were a speech that then President Kennedy gave at the American University graduation on, I believe, the 10th of June. The Soviets in the form of then leader Khrushchev, made a speech I think on the July 2 in Berlin in which he indicated in response to the several paragraphs that Kennedy had included on the potential for some progress on the testing issues, a willingness to pursue that. And very quickly delegations were formed and talks begun in Moscow among ourselves, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the three participants who had been engaged in nuclear test limitation discussions for several years prior to that time. Because the political signs were right and everything was pointing in the correct direction, an agreement was reached very quickly and signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, to limit nuclear testing to underground testing only. That is, outlawing it in the atmosphere, above ground and under water. One of the provisions of that agreement was an undertaking by the parties to spare no effort to pursue and try to add to those limitations on nuclear testing in the future. Talks continued sporadically all along, but were not very serious.

Then in 1974, an agreement was reached relating to a threshold limitation, that is, neither side--and this was just US/Soviet, the British were no longer involved--would test a nuclear weapon that had a yield above 150 kilotons. And there were a variety of provisions to try to insure that, including more verification than we had had in the past. It went beyond national technical means. There was a time limit on that treaty of five years. Article three of that treaty was a commitment by both parties to pursue talks on the peaceful use of nuclear explosions in a direction to try to get an agreement on a framework to permit the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions, but again with the threshold of no more than 150 kilotons to be in line with the threshold treaty. So the threshold treaty had been concluded in the summer of 1974 and the delegation that I was to become a part of in June, 1975 was the peaceful nuclear explosions add on to the threshold agreement that had been concluded the year before. It was the third session and, as the first two, it was going to be held in Moscow. I must say that there were a number of us on the American side who would have been delighted to have the negotiations occur in Moscow, perhaps, on one round and then go to Washington or some other place for the next round, and then back and forth. But for some reason, then Secretary Kissinger wanted the talks to be in Moscow every time. So we dutifully went off to Moscow for each negotiating session.

The third session began in early June and as the earlier sessions they usually ran on for four to six weeks. In the case of the third session it went on until virtually the end of July in Moscow.

One surprise that awaited me, the third week in June the Soviets announced that to repay us, the American side, for some courtesies that had been extended them on the nuclear side area to visit sites in the United States, we were going to spend the third week in June as guests of our Soviet colleagues on a trip to Tashkent, Bukhara and Samarkand in central Asia to see not only those three fabled towns, cities, but also to see a Soviet peaceful

nuclear explosion site and to continue our discussions in that framework. It turned out to be a fascinating excursion that I had not expected when I arrived in Moscow only a couple of weeks before.

Q: What was your impression of the Soviet attitude at the time and the how they dealt with this?

MARTIN: From my previous experience in arms control disarmament talks with the Russians, I knew a couple of people on the Soviet delegation, which was a happy circumstance. As was always the case on the Soviet side, indeed as it was on our side, there were people who were very capable, very qualified in the substance of the discussion, who really wanted to see progress achieved. There were also some hard liners who had their own agendas and views of things, and an element that was not the case on our side. Certainly it was much easier in Moscow where the KGB, although not apparent, was obviously looking over the shoulder and keeping tabs on us and trying to track and gain any advantage they could for purposes of the Soviet side of the agreement. But the discussions were quite useful and it was at this point summer of 1975, and serious discussions, of one sort or another, had been going on indeed until the late fifties on many of these topics. So there was a body of expertise and a group of people on their side who were very interested in moving the process along and making progress. The discussions were quite useful and interesting. We had technically capable people on our side and the technical discussions were very detailed and we learned some things that got us to thinking and they too. It was a good exchange. But we were still at the time where the political signs had to be in accord to move the process forward so the discussions were protracted and slow, but it was always at least in a positive direction.

Q: Then you came back and what happened?

MARTIN: We came back between sessions and had the review of what the situation was and prepared for the next session. The period between coming back at the end of July and going out again was about six weeks. As I recall we went out to Moscow again certainly by mid-September or so and were there until around the end of October and then we came back for only a few weeks and went back for a relatively brief session which ended shortly before Christmas. We then resumed again in Moscow in late January, 1976 and that session ran until about the middle of March and then we broke again. We finally on the next session did achieve nominal agreement, which ultimately was signed in Washington by President Ford and in Moscow by Chairman Brezhnev in July, 1976.

In our case we had reached agreement, but we still were not wholly happy with the verification provisions and, although both sides undertook commitments to adhere to the 150 kiloton threshold in any peaceful nuclear explosion and we had reached an agreement on the parameters of conducting such tests, it really had almost outrun its utility because although in years past the Soviets had been very interested in peaceful nuclear explosions, using nuclear power for peaceful purposes to make new rivers and to change the geography in ways that they considered useful, when they really began to look into it, they realized that

the problems with fallout and so many other aspects of the use of nuclear explosions was so great that really they did not make nearly the sense that they had originally thought. We had gotten to that point well before the USSR. So there wasn't much interest on either side in actually conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion. But, as I say, there was the benefit of very detailed talks relating to verification provisions and trying to get a better understanding of the seismic and other aspects of monitoring nuclear explosions on both sides, so that we would be better able to do that and have a better sense that we could understand the data that would emanate when a nuclear devise was exploded.

So, you then had the parallel peaceful appendage to the threshold nuclear weapon test limitation of 1974 and each side agreeing in formal statements that they would adhere to the terms of the treaty even though they had not entered into force. So the fact that it took many, many years for that final step, the advice and consent of the Senate and the formal ratification on our side and the comparable formalities on the Soviets side did not occur until ten or a dozen years later. But it really didn't make any difference in actual terms because neither side plan to take any steps that would be contrary to the provision that they had agreed to in these two agreements. There was an aspect of it that made clear the uncertainty that still remained in terms of what one could precisely know from the data one would pick up if the other side conducted a nuclear explosion because there was a formal statement to which we both agreed to the effect if, because of uncertainties, either side conducted an event that breached the 150 kiloton threshold, it would not necessarily mean a breach of the agreement. But certainly both sides made clear that they would wish to look into any such event very, very carefully. Another aspect of the joint statement was to the effect that the side that had the uncertainty because of the action of the other side, could seek consultations for clarification purposes.

Q: Then what did you do, we are talking about mid 1976?

MARTIN: I was preparing, as was my wife, to go off to Iran. I to become the political military counselor and Joanna to be in the political section. We did leave Washington to do that in August, 1976 and I can remember vividly arriving in the airport in Tehran after a number of delays, having gone through London, and arriving about midnight local time to be joyfully met by the person I was to replace, Henry Precht, who had been the Pol/Mil counselor there for a number of years and was very happy to be leaving.

Q: What was the political situation like as you saw it and from what you were getting from the desk and other places as you and your wife were going out there? We are talking about when you arrived.

MARTIN: Certainly in all the reading-in that I had done prior to our departure, I had no sense of what would happen, the beginnings of which were underway prior to our departure two years later in August, 1978. I had no sense of that at all. I was going to be involved essentially with the foreign military sales program which was the center piece on the pol/mil side of our relationship with Iran. It was huge. Over the years of the seventies, prior to the Iranian revolution and the return of Khomeini, it had involved many, many billions of

dollars of purchases of military equipment and support by the government of the Shah. It really was the center piece of our relationship in all important respects. The amount of money alone made it that without any question. When we arrived, Richard Helms, the former director of the CIA, was the ambassador and he was there in that position until essentially the end of 1976. We arrived on a Friday evening and Saturday being a work day in Iran, I was greeted the next morning by Henry Precht to took me out and began me on my rounds meeting on the American side the military heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force sections of the Military Advisory Assistance Group. I had already met in Washington the head of that group who was a two star Air Force general, but the others I had not met.

The activity was very intense, but as I say there was no sense that I perceived, nor my wife, of what was coming only a few short years later. She had a very interesting time there, and this really is indicative of the fact that what was coming, although it was almost certainly below the surface to some degree, was not readily apparent, because one of the things that she had to follow was the status of women in Iran. The Iranians had really done some remarkable things in that regard in having someone as alive and vital and interested in all that as the empress, was tremendously helpful. Over recent years it had been possible for women in Iran to go abroad for education, and many of them had done that. And there were some tremendously well educated women who were making their way not only in the private sector but also very definitely in the public sector, in the government, itself. It was one of the great tragedies and great sadnesses of the Khomeini revolution that it just chucked all that away. Certainly the women in Iran have suffered probably more than the men because of that.

Q: During the time you went out there I remember there was in the press, but also in the Foreign Service, quite a bit of disquiet or unease about what the hell were we dumping all these arms and things like that on the Shah? The feeling was that this was being over done. What were you getting and what were you feeling about this as you looked at this initially?

MARTIN: In general terms, after the fact, after we had left in August, 1978, in discussing the situation in Iran and what had been going on under the Shah and what the reaction had been, I was prepared and did vigorously put forward the case...certainly I couldn't speak for all the Iranian people, but it was clear to me, and I had gone around the country to a considerable degree because I went to virtually every military facility and location in Iran, and in the process I got to see a large amount of the country. I must say that I was very impressed that with the military buildup and the huge expenditure of money on weapons and systems and support for them, at the same time there was a very, very large expenditure of money tied in with this in building roads and schools and facilities to support better health for the people and trying to make the lives of the general populous better, more comfortable, whether they wanted to be drawn toward the 20th century or not. And there was an awful lot of support for this. There was, as you can appreciate, a great deal of lack of understanding, misunderstanding about much of this. But generally it was having a very good impact on Iran as a country. The infrastructure was being built up, facilities and things to support the population were ongoing and making good progress.

At the same time, sure, there were a lot of people making a lot of money and there clearly was corruption on a very large scale, I guess one would have to say. But I still say one could make the case that what was entrained was going to be greatly helpful to Iran and the Iranian people. That being said, all of this got started when the Shah's father, who had been a sergeant and had worked his way up, took a lot of land from the Mullahs years before and the Mullahs had been biding their time waiting to get theirs back and Khomeini represented this. The cassette power...

Q: We are talking about sending sermons on radio cassettes and surreptitiously brought in through Iraq.

MARTIN: One might argue that the great mistake of the Shah and his regime was sending Khomeini out of the country. If he had stayed in the country he would have been far less significant as a political power. But he went out and word came back through cassettes and other means and the Mullahs were able to feed on the unrest that was certainly there and build on it and the Shah ultimately got overthrown. I thought that one could make a very objective case that what was ongoing with all its imperfections was useful in terms of bringing the country and the people towards, at least, the 20th century.

Q: One of the concerns that I heard was that there were far too many Americans there. These were not sophisticated diplomats, they were helicopter mechanics, etc. who would ride around on their motorcycles, etc. There were just too many and it helped fracture the society. Was there concern at that time, or was that something that was felt later on?

MARTIN: There was concern about that. It would have been clearly better had the Iranians been able to do everything on their own, but that certainly was not the case. You mention the sorts of Americans that were probably most evident as part of the huge Bell helicopter program that was ongoing. These people in the numbers involved would not have been available had we still been in Vietnam. Many of them were what I came to call, and I heard this from somebody else, "bamboo bums," who when Vietnam and Cambodia collapsed were looking around for the next possibility and it turned out to be Iran starting in 1973 after the oil shock. It is now quite clear that one of our tactics was to make up for the money pinch that we felt as a result of the rise in prices by selling the equipment, weapons and support to principally Iran and others in that area. When that was successfully done, it required large numbers of support personnel to come in and in terms of the Bell helicopter program particularly, they were not a very savory bunch. Most of them had come from Vietnam. Many of the ones in Tehran, for example, and in many other parts of Iran, working on different programs were much less of a problem in the ways you were outlining a minute or so ago. But I guess it was just a function of the large numbers that were involved in the Bell program, essentially principally concentrated in one area, that led to an exacerbation of the sorts of problems that you were suggesting. But it was to some degree true with all the programs, and we were aware of it. There were efforts to try and shape the situation up through the companies in frank discussions with the company management, both at the top in terms of headquarters that would come to visit for various reasons, and the people who were running the programs in country.

On the Iranian side, there were a lot of qualified people who picked up what was needed very quickly. Some, just like in any group of people, the example I gave related principally to the Iranians who were trained to operate the F-14.

Q: Those are the top of the line fighters.

MARTIN: They are terribly, terribly difficult to operate. They have two crew, a pilot and a weapons person. Many Iranians went off to be trained in the United States in that system. They came back and in terms of American Air Force personnel who were in country who I talked to, they were amazed at the ability that some of the Iranians, probably 20 percent, had in just being able almost intuitively to work the system, pick it up and do it exceptionally well, better than many Americans. But the top 20 percent was not all of them and they had some problems and they needed support. The F-14 is a very tough system to operate and takes a lot of support.

As well as large weapon systems such as the F-14, there was also programs in terms of logistics and in terms of supply management, all of which were training cadres of Iranians to do these things. And again, many of them were very adept at it picking it up very quickly, but it continued to require some number of Americans in terms of the training and in trying to pass along the acknowledge that would enable the Iranians to take over. But it was going to be a long process and had not ended by the time we left in August, 1978 and not too long after that the whole thing collapsed.

Q: What was your impression of the top Iranian military brass?

MARTIN: Very competent. The head of the Air Force, General Rabie, who subsequently was shot, was an extremely competent man. His top people were the same. The Army people that I met I was less impressed with. The Navy people, again at the top, were excellent. They were the ones that I was dealing with. The commanders-in-chief of all the Iranian services, the equivalent of our JCS, that was the level of the Iranian that I was dealing with. My principal contact was General Toufanian, who happened to be an Air Force officer but was in charge on behalf of the Shah of all the procurement of both the weapons, the supporting systems, the logistics and the supply, etc. He was in charge of all that. He was my principal contact, but I regularly saw the Air Force people and the Navy and Army.

I must say, even with the advent of the election in 1976 and President Carter coming in, and the new laws relating to foreign military assistance and sales, the effort to clean up that act and put some bounds on it so that it just wasn't an American export effort that would have make some sense in larger terms relating to arms supply and possible over buildup of arms around the world that could lead to conflicts of one sort or another...after that legislation was enacted, we scrupulously adhered to its provisions and I continued to be amazed at the ease, indeed, with which a proposal could meet all the legislative provisions and still push a project forward. Although you had to get the ambassador and the political side of the House

on board and take into account all sorts of considerations as to what this impact might have in terms of regional situations, arms levels, etc., it was always possible to craft your package in a way to meet all those provisions and be supportable. I must say, this was mainly on the Air Force side because they were the big dollar programs...the F-16 program, the AWACS program. I never ceased to be impressed with the head of the Air Force section of the MAAG because he was very, very adroit, very good, in terms of new programs or ongoing projects. He would always be in touch with me. He would always before the fact have the presentation of the Air Force side of the MAAG done up and ready to go. He would come over to the embassy and put on a dog and pony show briefing me individually before we got into discussions with the Iranians and putting together the package that would meet all the requirements of law, but also make it possible to push the particular program along. He was really good at that. Unfortunately, he has become more renown in recent times because it was Dick Secord.

Q: Who was involved in Irangate--Iran-Contra arms deal.

MARTIN: He was a very able guy.

Q: All this stuff was going into the Iranian military. What was the purpose, what were we thinking? Were we concerned about the Soviet Union, Iraq, the Shah being too aggressive and trying to move elsewhere in the Persian Gulf area?

MARTIN: As I mentioned earlier, certainly part of it was a counter to the oil shock of 1973 in dollars and cents terms.

Q: What you are saying is they would be taking Iranian oil dollars and buying US things with them.

MARTIN: Right. Another result of the way things were evolving was that for general military purposes we did not have as much resource available and we were looking for "islands of stability" to quote President Carter in some comments he made in his over the end of the year day and a half visit to Iran arriving December 31, 1977 and leaving in January 1, 1978. We were clearly looking for allies we could rely on in various parts of the world and in this particular part of the world, Iran was to be such an ally to us. If it were armed to the leading edge with sufficient equipment and trained personnel to take on various tasks that otherwise would probably have been left to us, that was viewed as a plus. So the idea of having Iran, in military terms, with its socks up was good. As I say, at the same time, it seemed to me that part of the impact on the Iranian side was new roads, new schools, new health potential for the people and bringing them along in a variety of ways irrespective of the military buildup would have been a good thing, but would not have happened without it because much of that infrastructure was done to support aspects of the military, but it had a very positive, more general aspect to it as well.

Q: Richard Helms was the ambassador when you arrived?

MARTIN: Yes. We arrived in the third week in August and Ambassador Helms and his wife left between Christmas and New Years in 1976. One point I might make about Dick Helms, who I really got to know and admire and respect very greatly. A week after we arrived on Saturday morning, the last day of August or so in 1976, one of the contractors that was supporting one of the programs on the military side, Rockwell International, three Rockwell employees were being driven to work and were assassinated. That certainly made clear that there was some considerable potential that had serious consequences in terms of the American involvement on the military side in Iran. Unhappily, this car full of Rockwell employees went at the same time, the same route, the same everything, day after day after day and it was easy to set them up. Sunday morning at staff meeting, since our weeks began Sunday, he made the comment that it was a tragic situation and something certainly to aim to avoid in the future. But he also made a comment that I will never forget, "You know, even if they varied their route, even if they had done this, that or another, if somebody wants to get you they get you. There is no way you hide. You just can't do it unless you divorce yourself from the world." I found that very interesting to contemplate at a later time.

Then, for six months in the early part of 1977, there was not a new ambassador, Jack Miklos, who had been Dick Helms' DCM, was Chargé. In the spring, Bill Sullivan was named to replace Ambassador Helms and Ambassador Sullivan arrived in late May or early June, 1977. An interesting aspect of that was the pol/mil aspect of embassy business was that I worked very closely with the ambassador and I happily had known him in the past for some years. It turned out that there was one other person in our large American family who worked with Ambassador Sullivan before, and that was Dick Secord. The night they arrived at the VIP welcome area at the airport, Secord and I were there, with many others, and it was nice to see Bill Sullivan again. Dick Secord had worked with him in Laos when Secord was a major and involved in some of the activity that was taking place from Laos into Vietnam.

Q: First, let's talk about Helms. One of the stories that comes out, under Kissinger/Nixon, that the political section felt under constraints not to report the dark side of the corruption, the work of the secret police. It was supposed to be positive reporting. Did you feel any constraints while you were there?

MARTIN: I certainly didn't feel any constraints of that sort, but my job really had nothing to do with that. I was so busy in terms of the huge number of programs that were ongoing which for the entire two years I was there were the main attraction for visitation to Iran. The number of congressional delegations and congressional staff people that came out during the two years was just immense. So I was control officer for some visitation almost the entire two years I was there. It wasn't every day, but far and away larger control officer duties on my part than any other dozen people in the embassy. It just continued with regularly the whole time. Not only the House Foreign Affairs Committee but Armed Services and the Senate the same thing, staffers of one stripe or another coming to look at one thing or another.

Q: Were you picking up information about problems with corruption or Savak, or anything like that?

MARTIN: I certainly didn't have any since about what Savak was about. I had a good relationship with the CIA station chief and his deputy, who was an old pal of mine, and knew a number of people on that side of things, but I didn't have the time and they obviously to the degree that they may have been involved or known about various things that you are suggesting, weren't going to share them with me or anyone else. So I didn't have any sense of that.

With respect to corruption, it was clear that there was some corruption, but I couldn't put my finger on it as to specific details or how it may have been carried out. As I mentioned earlier, there certainly was some people who were profiting very greatly from the strides forward that Iran was making under the Shah. The money was there to be spent. Tehran, not too many years before we arrived, had been a pretty sleepy town. The pace of life was not very rapid. During the time that we were there it was in a constant state of building frenzy. I used to say, it didn't happen quite this way, that you could almost drive down the street and look to the left and look to the right and on both sides you would see buildings start popping up out of the ground. Roads were being built out from Tehran leading to new building complexes of one sort or another, whether they be great houses for this new wealthy class or business construction. In fact, Tehran wasn't a very attractive place in that respect because there was so much dust and dirt, so much building going on. It was claimed that if you wanted to see Iran, you had to leave Tehran and go to other Iranian cities.

Q: Did you get involved in the Carter visit? Was the visit to celebrate the 2000th anniversary of the Peacock throne?

MARTIN: The 2000th anniversary that you mention had occurred sometime before so Carter's visit was not the center piece of that, but it could be looked at as a part of it. But it was principally on our side, the idea of the President coming and spending a day and a half there and in the process King Hussein of Jordan flew his own plane to Tehran in order to have a visit with Carter in the area. Carter wasn't able to travel around to every place that might have been useful and Iran was a center piece. As I said earlier, one of the things that Carter said in his remarks at the airport was noting that Iran was a "sea of stability in an ocean of discontent and uncertainty." Of course, all that came crashing down around Carter's ears less than a year later. He was reminded of that frequently. But that was the general underpinning of it. There was so much going on in terms of these military assistance programs, etc. and boosting Iran as a great friend in this part of the world. So, the Carters came and it was a grand visit. King Hussein flew his own plane and brought our ambassador there, Tom Pickering, who was an old friend and stayed with us over the weekend. It really was a fantastic occasion. I wasn't involved other than having to be at the airport with embassy staff for the meet and greet upon arrival and departure the next day. The talks and all the rest of it involved Ambassador Sullivan and the DCM, and President Carter and his party on our side principally. There were discussions not only with the Shah

and his key government officials, but also King Hussein. There were some others, but I can't remember who they were.

The degree of security along the roads between downtown Tehran and the airport and around town was quite considerable and very noticeable and quite impressive.

Q: Did you notice any difference in the view of Helms, which you would pick up in staff meetings towards the situation and the Shah, and that of Sullivan?

MARTIN: I didn't notice anything precisely. I must say, Dick Helms coming from the background he came from was pretty close to the chest in his modus operandi. Indeed, I was getting my feet wet during the early months I was there, and he was essentially winding down. The degree of ambassadorial involvement in the programs just was not required or called for during the Helms period, as it became during the Sullivan period, for a variety of reasons. There were some programs in discussion and getting started and difficulties that emerged over time and Sullivan was around before and had a background that fit in much more to the pol/mil side of things than Helms. Henry Precht, my predecessor, had much involvement with Helms during his time when problems arose, but during the five months that I was there before Ambassador Helms departed, there weren't any problems. I was getting into things and hadn't developed the degree of involvement with the Iranian military that quickly grew as 1977 came upon us. The various intensity of several potential programs heated up with discussions and negotiations and visitations about them. So there was a lot more going on as we moved into 1977 that hadn't been the case that Helms was there. I mentioned the AWACS earlier...

Q: AWACS is Airborne Warning Control System.

MARTIN: We were very interested in having Iranians buy into that program. We had it, of course. NATO got involved with its own AWACS element. But in terms of dollars and cents it would have been very useful to get yet another buyer and the Iranians fit into that very nicely, so there was huge interests on our side. They had great interest in it too because it would enhance their capabilities and Iran is a very large country with demons all around in various guises historically.

So that was a big program, and there was the continuation of the F-14 program, getting the Iranians better into that. The Bell helicopter program which was mainly located in Isfahan that I mentioned earlier. There was a huge logistics program centered in Tehran and going out around the country that Lockheed was involved in. A big Navy program was coming along. And that sort of thing led to a much greater involvement on the part of Ambassador Sullivan then had been the case with Ambassador Helms.

Q: You left there when?

MARTIN: We left, as we had arrived, the third week in August, 1978.

Q: What was the situation by that time? Had there been a change?

MARTIN: It was beginning to change. The initial problem was very starkly evident in Isfahan in the early days of July when there had been some unrest apparent. But there was little evidence in quite so stark terms up to the point when we left. We went back from Tehran through Brussels because my wife was going to take up a job in the European Bureau working in the NATO office and we were to spend several days there so she could meet some people and get some sense of the programs that she would be involved in at the NATO end of the line. We left on a Friday, on Saturday morning, the big headline in the International Herald Tribune was about a tragic fire in Abadan where a bunch of fanatics, crazies, I guess, had sealed the doors and then torched a motion picture theater and the people in side were fried. So that was yet another stark evidence that things were beginning to unravel to some degree. That intensified as we got past Labor Day and into September, and indeed, by the middle of the month there were manifestations in Tehran, itself, in the south part of the city involving some of the military on the Iranian side who in the face of some unrest on the part of the civilians...some tried to bring things under control while others were not prepared to deal harshly with their Iranian colleagues. That was not a very good sign from the standpoint of the Shah. There had been much thinking that if the Iranian military had stood firm, the Shah could have got the situation under control. But, of course, he, by that point was very, very sick. This had been ongoing for some time but not apparent, at least to me nor to many people on our side. We know now that CIA and the embassy didn't have much sense of what was coming in the stark terms that we eventually got to. Certainly reports were going in about problems, but not the degree that would have given a sharp indication of what was to come.

Q: What did you come back to?

MARTIN: I came back and initially, because by the time we finished home leave things really were unraveling in Iran, I spent the next three or four months working in the Operations Center in the Department as head of what became known as the Iran Working Group. Henry Precht, my predecessor, was the Iran Country director and he was busy as could be dealing with the day to day problems on the desk and dealing with Congress and dealing with everyone in a sort of public way. We needed a working group, and there was one going by the time I got back, but based on my experience I was asked if I wouldn't sort of take over the Operations Center part of it. Since I did not have at that point a regular job, I was able to work odd hours and help out in a variety of ways that were indeed very useful.

One of the things that we had was an open telephone line between the Operations Center and the embassy in Tehran almost 24 hours a day, and were able to keep track of things. You will recall that, I guess it was in late September, there was some problem at the embassy in terms of the initial takeover for a very brief period, several hours. That was worked out and the takeovers left the compound and things were brought under control. Subsequently, of course, in November, the compound was overrun and the hostages were taken.

Q: November of 1979?

MARTIN: Yes. So the initial embassy takeover must have been in early 1979 and not in September, 1978 as I had suggested. And, indeed, by the time the hostages were taken in November, 1979, Ambassador Sullivan had left during the summer, and his replacement to be had not arrived. So we had a Chargé there. The DCM had left and the incoming DCM was Bruce Laingen, the former consul general in Shiraz. Vic Tomseth had moved up to become the political counselor. One of their colleagues was with Laingen and Tomseth at the Foreign Ministry when the embassy was invaded by the mobs and taken over in early November, 1979. Laingen and Tomseth and the third chap spent the hostage period at the Foreign Ministry.

Q: In 1979 you moved away from the working group which grew and grew and grew.

MARTIN: In February, 1979 I took over the political/military office in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research which at that time involved the general purpose forces and the conventional military side, but did not get into the nuclear and strategic side. That was another office in INR. Later, in 1979, the director of that other office left to return to the Central Intelligence Agency and on his departure it was decided that they would combine that office with the conventional forces office, and I was the director of the whole thing. This made a lot of sense because it meant that all the political/military subjects were handled by one office and we could support the entire Political Military Bureau more effectively then having a couple of offices, at least that was the idea. And it worked out very well. Of course, it was a lot more fun having the additional issues.

Q: What were the prime areas that you were working on?

MARTIN: The Iranian situation was obviously an issue to be tracked very closely. The Soviet incursion into Afghanistan took much of our time. The various strategic and nuclear issues related to the ongoing negotiations at that time. Further episodes in the SALT negotiations leading to SALT II, following the agreements that had been reached from the initial talks in the summer of 1972. By 1979 the talks had turned to what was called START, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, as well as support for the various consultative commissions that were part of each of the agreements that had been struck from the standpoint of discussions with the Soviets about how the agreements were being implemented and efforts to achieve more effective, efficient verification. We tracked all of that. Clandestine nuclear efforts by several countries were very much of interest to us, a prime example being Pakistan where we had a very good intelligence, we thought, as to what was going on there. It enabled us to deal with the Paks in rather candid, frank terms, but the Afghan invasion by the Soviets changed that equation because it turned out that higher priority for us was the ability to use Pakistan as a means of moving equipment and weapons to the Afghan resistance. That took a higher priority than trying to slap the wrists of the Pakistanis over their efforts to acquire a nuclear capability. So the political equation changed, not what we did, but the ability to use some of the intelligence we had effectively.

Q: Were we getting good intelligence on the Israeli developments in nuclear things? We haven't dealt with the Israelis the way we did with Pakistan and South Africa.

MARTIN: In the nuclear area, including Israel, Pakistan and South Africa, the packaged product reflecting all the various bits and pieces that came to our attention was, as you suggest, never so packaged so starkly and clearly as might have been possible. There was always a lot of hedging involved because you couldn't be categorically sure, but it was clear that progress was being made by the three that you mentioned, as well as some others.

But it was an interesting time to be involved in that set of issues from the perspective of the intelligence side of things, and I was really hugely well served by some supremely competent, capable people who had lots and lots of experience across the board in all the political/military issues. Indeed, a number of them gained great renown as briefers and would brief the Secretary and all the Department notables. Occasionally they would brief foreigners as well if it seemed necessary. Of course, there was some sanitization of the content, but we were able to put on some very impressive dog and pony shows in terms of what we knew as to what was going on and how we could predict possible future courses, particularly relating to conventional activity.

Q: In the period you were there, 1978-82, there were two conflicts, both practically on top of each other, that were going on of particular interest. One was the situation with the Soviets trying to put down the Afghani resistance. Was there a change in how you viewed the situation in Afghanistan from the time you arrived and the time you left?

MARTIN: Well, it was obviously of considerable concern to us as to what the real Soviet intentions would be. There didn't seem to be much to be gained in going into Afghanistan even if you take over Afghanistan without proceeding further. What the further would be was not a very happy prospect from our perspective. It did not occur immediately, but it seems to me it wasn't too awful long before you began to hear comments about the Soviets' Vietnam. Mired down and horrible problems and the reaction back in the Soviet Union as to casualties, which were not well known and frequently not known at all by the families and friends for long, long periods. The Soviets withheld that information. The use of minorities in Afghanistan, perhaps as cannon fodder, for example, was something that was not too well known, or certainly wasn't aired back in their home areas. But over time the idea of Afghanistan being a real threat began, it seemed to me, to recede and the idea of the Soviets having got into a real quagmire began to grow. Certainly the effectiveness of the resistance, as we were able to move weapons and equipment in to support them, grew markedly over time. It took some while for that to occur but when it did, it was really very quick and got the Soviets' attention.

As we found out later, there were certainly many on the Soviet military side who didn't want to go in in the first place and would have preferred to get out much earlier had they been able to, but it didn't happen that way. So Afghanistan as a problem other than a drain on the Soviets and complicating our relations with Pakistan in terms of the proliferation issue as opposed to keeping them happy and hence a ready conduit for equipment and

supplies to the resistance on the other side, it didn't appear to be a great potential threat beyond Afghanistan.

Q: The other conflict was right next door and that was Iraq's attack on Iran. What were our concerns on that and how did we look at it during the time you were in INR?

MARTIN: Our posture in general terms certainly was to try and hope that the conflict Iran-Iraq would ameliorate the impact of Khomeini and the revolution that led to the American hostages and our departure from Iran. So, what the United States was doing was to try to insure that at worst it was an even contest between Iraq and Iran and probably we saw some benefit in pumping up the Iraqis in various ways so that they would be able to beat up on the Iranians effectively. In hindsight we now know that we were doing much more than was well known to support Iraq in a variety of ways including provision of intelligence information to help them. We may have come to regret this now, but at that point decisions had to be made and they were made in the direction of trying to assist Iraq to make it at least an even fight and perhaps tilt it in the direction of Iraq being able to pound Iran to ameliorate the situation and lessen the effectiveness of Khomeini and the revolution.

Q: What was your impression of the information you were getting from the CIA?

MARTIN: On Iran and Iraq?

Q: Well, really all over and including intelligence from the military as well as the CIA.

MARTIN: To digress slightly, the United States has so many channels and has mounted so many efforts to gather information and has been so successful in that that there is just a huge, huge, huge amount of various sorts of information, both photographic, and electronic communications, well above and beyond the human intelligence, of which there is a huge amount as well. But it is very difficult really to gather all that in and get on top of it in a way to be able effectively to use it. So that is one aspect of the intelligence side of things.

At the same time there certainly is a proprietary view of the intelligence that the CIA gathers in various ways, or that the National Security Agency, mainly picking up communications, electronic intelligence, gathers. In both cases, some of the most rarefied intelligence would be kept in a very rarefied form to be disseminated to a very rarefied level. But it is hard in most cases to do that effectively for very long because more and more people get to know about possible possibilities and begin putting two and two together and coming up with a sense of what might be available. So you can go back and press to try and test whether there is additional information of various sorts available from these various collection entities, the CIA, the NSA, the Defense Intelligence Agency on the military side...we have come now to admit to the National Reconnaissance Organization which is run both by the CIA and Defense to pick up the photographic intelligence from the skies, the spies in the sky so to speak.

The fact of having critical intelligence that would change something on any given issue is not too frequently the case. It occasionally happens, but generally issues can be addressed very effectively and accurately on run of the mill information that comes from open sources a great deal of the time, augmented by the rather pedestrian clandestine collection, not the creme a la creme, much of the time. It is not too frequent that a critical piece of intelligence is gotten through some very delicate means is going to be crucial to a policy decision. It happens occasionally, but not very frequently. So this sort of racy stuff that would be very sexy and known by only a very small number of people is probably not too significant in policy formulation terms, although it is interesting or nice to have something that very few people have, or at least that is the sense one has until it becomes rather routine to have access to that sort of thing. But it doesn't make a huge amount of difference. There are occasions when we do get something and we have been pretty good at keeping the wraps on some fairly significant sources of information during my experience. I can't go into that sort of thing here, but it is not too frequent where that is a critical part of the equation in policy formulation terms anyway.

Q: How did you feel that what you were producing on the political/military side was being used by the rest of the Department? Did you feel that you were part of the process?

MARTIN: Yes. I was certainly, and my people principally, that was the only resource we had. The intelligence community on a daily basis puts out a number of summaries or documents capturing the general intelligence situation day by day by day in trouble spots around the world. Also, the intelligence community puts out a great number of specifically focused reports of one sort or another on individual issues. To get back to the daily product, it will sound bias, but I think it is true and we have evidence now in recent times, for example, Mr. Clinton with his predilection to focus on domestic issues and his lack of experience in foreign affairs, started out having the same sort of arrangements as most Presidents, namely an intelligence briefing on national security set of issues to start his day. Mr. Clinton frequently does not follow through on that because his time gets usurped for other purposes. And, indeed, it has been said in a number of newspaper articles that the so-called President's Daily Brief, which is put together by the Central Intelligence Agency specifically for the President, and as it turns out a handful of people around town...the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, Defense, perhaps the Secretary of the Treasury. Tony Lake, the National Security Advisor, has said because he came out of the State Department in terms of earlier jobs, likes the State publication, the Secretary Morning Summary, which is done by the INR analysts, as being more insightful, more helpful to policy makers than the facts and figures and lack of analysis that is usually the hallmark of what the CIA and other entities put out. So he would give the State publication to the President, not the President's Daily Brief. That was my reaction as well. I think day in and day out the analysis and the product in brief synopsis covering the trouble spots and spots of interest around the world based on intelligence materials available, what INR does is far and away the best in town. That would be viewed by the CIA and in other intelligence communities as a biased comment.

Q: Then you left INR and had a couple of brief assignments, one with EA and then you went to the Senior Seminar. What were you doing in EA?

MARTIN: I was doing a study that involved some highly sensitive intelligence activity assessing some ongoing activity for the EAP leadership to insure that they had an understanding of what was involved and what the consequences might be for continuing some of this activity or broadening it, expanding it in various ways that were being contemplated.

Q: And then you went to the Senior Seminar?

MARTIN: Well, after I finished that project, I spent from the spring of 1983 until Labor Day of 1983 working with the new Coordinator for International Information Policy and Ambassador Leonard Marks, the former head of USIA, who was to be the chairman of one of the international telecommunication union meetings, the first session of which would occur in January, 1984, relating to the high frequency, that is short wave radio spectrum. The title of the conference was the HF World Administrative Radio conference under the auspices of the International Telecommunication Union. The United States had to prepare a position for that. So Diana Dugan, who was the first Coordinator for International Information Policy in the Department, and Leonard Marks chatted with me. I was available prior to the Seminar and they asked me if I would work with them, principally with Ambassador Marks, to move the interagency process along towards a US position to be used in the first session of the HF conference. I agreed to do that and spent from May until Labor Day in the interagency scrum trying to push the agencies along to come up with a technical position for Ambassador Marks to take to the first session of the HF conference. The first conference was in January and February of 1984 and the second session was about a year later in the spring of 1985.

Q: You went to the Senior Seminar for a year and then went to USIA for a couple of years.

MARTIN: Then I went on detail, curiously enough, to USIA from September, 1984 until September, 1986. They had had an individual running a small office over there related to international information policy and they needed someone to take that over. Although I had gone over to talk to them about another job, during the discussion it became clear that this job made more sense and they asked me to do that and I agreed. I spent two very pleasant and useful years at USIA.

From my experience in the spring of 1983 until Labor Day, dealing with comparable issues, I knew a number of the people involved in the international information process and the various agencies in the government, and that helped a lot. From the perspective of the Department of State I was able to be useful both to the Department and USIA bridging those two key agencies in the international information policy area. Knowing, if not everything about all the technical aspects of these issues, at least I knew enough about them and where to get answers so that I could be useful with that regard, bringing that into the equation in a positive way. So it was an enjoyable experience, a different experience.

Probably the greatest contribution I made during my time with the government was made during that period because in November, 1985, at the Geneva Summit between President Reagan and President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, one of the agreements that was struck as USSR relations were warming was an agreement to reestablish our exchanges program. As a result of that it was necessary for us to figure out what the first exchange program would be in the Soviet Union. There was much ado about that with Mr. Wick, the director of USIA at the time, having several ideas as to what would wow the Russians. But it seemed fairly clear to me that there was no question about what the subject of the exhibit should be, it really should push home all across the Soviet Union with a good exhibit the reality of the information telecommunications revolution that was even then ongoing and show the Soviets what Secretary Shultz in a speech to the UN during 1986 said was indeed the case that any country that tried to keep its people from participating in being a part of the information telecommunications revolution was damning that people to a third world status and that those people would never be able to become a vital part of the modern emerging world that we are now seeing exploding all around us with computers and equipment related to it in terms of what we now call the national information infrastructure or the information superhighway. But that was the thing that seemed clear to me had to be the subject matter of the exhibit. Many heated meetings took place. Finally I was abetted in my effort by the arrival in Washington from Moscow of the Public Affairs Officer, the principal USIA person in the mission in Moscow, for consultation and he joined one of the meetings where these intense discussions were ongoing. He broke the meeting up and solved the problem by agreeing with me that clearly something along the lines of Information USA that could make all this clear to as many Russians as possible was the only thing that made since and indeed made a huge positive sense from the standpoint of promoting US interests. Finally it was agreed and, as we say in the trade, "Mr. Wick got the idea finally and golly it was a great success."

Q: Then you went to Frankfurt where you were political advisor from 1986-90. What did being the POLAD involve?

MARTIN: The Department decided that it would be judicial to have the capability closer to hand for the European problem, for the North African problem, for the Middle East problem, etc. So I agreed that I would take it and went off to Frankfurt in late 1986 and continued with this from there until the latter part of the summer of 1990.

It was a most entertaining experience involving very close relations with the ambassador and the DCM in the embassy in Bonn. I had close relations with the US military around the European theater which covered all of Europe and all of Africa and verges on the Middle East including Turkey, the eastern part of NATO. I also had close dealings with the specialized aspects of the US military and, of course, close dealings with the Central Intelligence Agency which was heavily involved in that equation. It was thoroughly enjoyable. I got to travel around quite a bit and had close relations with a number of interesting people throughout those several communities that I just mentioned. Unhappily from the perspective of many of my colleagues, but frankly in all candor I was never

displeased as to the situation, we never did get actually launched to go and cope with an actual incident. We were on alert a number of times but never got beyond that. However, in between times we carried on a very vigorous and very, very useable training schedule, including a lot of exercises of various sorts to try to replicate an actual incident and how it might fit in, and that was always fascinating. The capabilities that we could draw on, had available to us, were really quite fantastic.

One of the things that I did in the interagency group was go on a number of briefing trips to embassies in Europe and the Middle East and Africa and as far afield as South Asia to brief the ambassadors and the key advisors on the capabilities that were available. We also had private sessions with the Ambassador to make known that help was closer at hand than suggested by our general briefing of capabilities.

Another thing to do, was to work out problems in advance of actually being called and work with several governments in the area to work out arrangements that would permit us to be facilitated in the event of an actual event. That was very interesting and most enjoyable dealing with governments in that way.

Q: And then you came back to Washington?

MARTIN: I did indeed and worked in Personnel in a variety of ways. I did revise performance pay entirely, but never got what I thought was an excellent idea blessed to change the system. Two things of note and worth mentioning. I did two projects for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research over the period of several years. The first one was related to Poland. On a continuing basis INR arranges to have a senior officer do an assessment of Department of State reporting from the post or posts in a particular country. I was asked if I would do that for Poland.

It was a particularly interesting time, Walesa was the president of Poland and initial efforts of economic reform and building stability was ongoing. There were many problems in that regard and the reporting was very interesting and exceptionally good. I would read it and get a sense of it and then go around to all the departments and agencies and other entities around Washington who had access to it to get a sense of how useful it was from their particular perspective in terms of their responsibilities. I was able to put together a report that was glowing in terms of the reporting that was coming in and also had some suggestions and insights as to how that might be made somewhat better for purposes of particular users and their needs.

The second one of those I did a year later related to the former Yugoslavia. Of course, it was suggested that I look at the set of issues from a regional perspective and that obviously was a useful tack to take initially. It became quickly clear that not only regionally, but it would have to be looked at globally and could not be limited in any way that would be useful at all if it was only State channel reporting. It had to be all source reporting. All source had to cover not only the nice, compartmented and sensitive intelligence on the one hand, but all the way across through the normal State channel reporting to the open sources of TV and

press and all media that were covering in late 1991-93 the ongoing activities in the former Yugoslavia and all the problems there...the several wars with the Croats and finally the center piece of Bosnia; the efforts by initially former Secretary Vance and former Foreign Secretary David Owen of the UK to try and negotiate a settlement, an outcome; through Vance's retirement and his replacement, and other plans; then Owen's departure; the sharp focus of the world and the world press and media of all the horror that was going on. It was very interesting to try to get on top of that and to capture it in a way that would be useful.

I reached several conclusion, one of which mirroring comments that I got from virtually everybody I talked to that there is more than enough information, and that is the term I used rather than reporting, available readily to the policy making process to formulate policy. The problem is that the choices are so horrendous that one is prompted rather to avoid making decisions than to make policy. Unfortunately in that situation every day that passes it becomes harder to make decisions that would have been called for. So it wasn't the question of lack of information it was a question of difficulty of choices in terms of supporting the policy process. At the same time, I did find that as a result of the newness of the problems of trying to get information when we essentially have nobody on the ground or very limited access at best on the ground, and much of the ground, no access, led to the development of some non-traditionalist, some new efforts to gather information that were quite innovative and imaginative, I thought. I spelled these out in my report and urged that in the future that any crisis look at these means of gathering information to see if it had any possible application or utility...

Q: Are these classified sources?

MARTIN: Some classified and some not. On the unclassified side, for example, the Conference on Security and Cooperation on Europe brings together all the European countries and provided a forum for airing many of the issues relating to the former Yugoslavia and how to try to cope with that and move towards some sustainable, equitable solution. In the process a number of ideas emerged about trying to get CSCE small teams on the ground in various parts of the former Yugoslavia to track some of the aspects of human rights, relations among these people, ethnic problems and all that. It was fairly imaginative and innovative and did provide some measure of information. That is the sort of thing that I think should be looked at in the future to see if there is any application of that along those lines, or other lines that one might indeed think of.

One thing that I urged was that after my report an additional effort be mounted to look at all the problems around the world, or at least the key ones. I suggested this be done by some people with a little time to think about it to see if there weren't some new tacks that could be taken to help out in other issues and problems. Sadly, that has not really been done in any systematic way just because that is the nature of the beast and there is too much going on in the world at the moment.

My assessment of the Yugoslav situation did lead me to conclude, and this is not related to the acquisition of information, but it certainly suggested to me that the UN, NATO, the

European Union, and the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as examples, if you use the former Yugoslavia, it seems to me their inability to be effective with respect to the former Yugoslavia raises real questions as to whether these entities remain viable instruments in the post-Cold War world. And I think that is a very valid question. Again, that is not the sort of thing that people wanted to be confronted with and even though I put it into the report, it again didn't get anywhere in terms of several suggestions I had.

A third thing I might mention is my membership on a review panel that was formed as a result of legislation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee calling for the Executive Branch, in fact naming the Inspector General of the Department of State, who also was the Inspector General of ACDA, to in essence make happen a review of the arms control function of the Executive Branch and how well or not ACDA, itself, had been doing in meeting those tasks. Also charging the Inspector General to make recommendations if any developed through this review on how the government should be put together to conduct the set of arms control issues. Sherman Funk, the dual hatted Inspector General, undertook this task and wisely decided to get somebody to put together a small review panel to carry out the review itself. He would oversee it through its entirety but not be involved in the day-to-day carrying out. He asked former Ambassador James Goodby to chair a small panel and Goodby asked me, among others, to participate.

Representatives from the Department, CIA, Defense, Department of Energy reviewed essentially the arms control function in the Executive Branch. We started that in the spring of 1992, the legislation had been December, 1991 calling for a report to the President, to the Speaker of the House and to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the December 14, 1992. Goodby and his small panel began work in late May, 1992 and worked intensively over the summer with the aim of substantially being finished by Labor Day. The panel, six or seven of us, conducted interviews around the government, put together a list of relevant individuals that had been involved one way or another with the arms control and security issues, and talked to several hundreds of them. We broke up into small groups of two or three people and made some trips out to California and up to Cambridge to talk to think tank people. A couple of us went to New York to talk at the UN and to several people in the city. The same pair of us went off to Geneva and Vienna to talk to the arms control people involved in the ongoing conference on disarmament in Geneva and to the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe people in Vienna. In the latter place we principally talked to US people, in Geneva we also talked to a number of foreign delegation heads and the Secretary General's representative who chairs the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva as well.

By Labor Day there was a report in hand, although we said it was a close call, it did recommend that if the President, if the Secretary were interested in arms control issues and had a close relationship with the director of ACDA and that agency was staffed by the sort of technically competent, extremely capable people that had been the case occasionally in the past, but we did not judge to be the case at present, if all those things were to be the case, and indeed as well if the Congress was prepared to support ACDA in terms of funding and making it possible to get the necessary qualified technical staff, then we thought there was

a strong case of continuing and looking to an arms control agency to do this sort of work that was done occasionally in the past but not throughout its career. We said that if the Congress was not prepared to do its part, and if the President and the Secretary of State were not particularly interested in looking to such an entity for the kind of support that could be available properly staffed, then we agreed that ACDA should be disestablished and folded into the Department of State.

After my colleagues left, I stayed on working the report with Sherman Funk very closely and occasionally getting my colleagues back together, essentially editing the report and getting it into proper order to publish it. And we did get it finished and published and dated December 12 in keeping with our requirement of December 14 and got it out to the President, the House Speaker and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was used as the basis of President Clinton's approach to arms control and Secretary Christopher now has a former law partner of his, John Holum], as the new director. Director Holum also knows the President from a prior incarnation. So, ACDA continues to exist. I don't think the level of technical staffing has been achieved, but Holum says that is his aim and maybe that will happen over time if it continues to exist.

The last thing I did prior to retirement was to spend about six months working for the new Coordinator for Business Affairs, a position that had been created October 20, 1993 in an all day meeting held at the Department of State involving the Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Commerce, the Federal Reserve Chairman, Mr. Greenspan, and I guess then OMB director, Panetta, and several other luminous level people boosting the idea of support for American business abroad and exports. The Secretary made the point that there were so many desks in the Department that now there was going to be an America desk and he was going to sit behind it and everybody in the Department was going to sit there with him and help assist American business do great things and support our export operations abroad. He said that to help him in this he was that day, October 20, 1993, appointing a Coordinator for Business Affairs to be his representative with the business community and as a point of contact on a daily basis when he, the Secretary, might not be available. I was asked by that Coordinator to help out on...

Q: Who was the Coordinator?

MARTIN: Paul Cleveland. ...several projects that were related to that activity that the very small staff of about five or six just were not able to cover. I did that until retiring midnight, July 1, 1994.

Q: Well, I want to thank you. It has been great.

End of interview