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GEORGE MCFARLAND

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Q: Now, would you like to continue?

MCFARLAND: Pearl Harbor occurred when I was 11 years old. I was subjected to all the wartime information, patriotic writing, not to say propaganda and I succumbed. I was in ROTC in high school. It was compulsory for all boys. We wore a uniform four of the five school days of the week and learned to drill and to shoot and saw training films on combat. This was within the umbrella also of public attitudes toward the government that we no longer know, an attitude of enormous respect. It was the US Government that had brought the country out of the Depression. It was the US Government that helped decisively win World War I. Then, as time went on, we won World War II. So the thought of working for the US Government was one that involved considerations of respect and feeling honored, of associating with a worthy cause. And besides that, the country was repeatedly in danger. People forget how nearly we were all overrun in World War II. If Hitler had gotten that atomic bomb first, we would all be speaking German now, at least all of us that survived. And then immediately after the war, of course, we went into the Cold War and another sense of danger.

At any rate, I came out of my growing up with several results, one being this intense concern with the country’s security and interest in the military, a feeling that success in battle or a good report of one’s actions in battle were to be very highly esteemed. I suppose another influence on me must have been all the World War II veterans who came back, all those stories about their participation in combat.

Q: Were you at SMU at that time?

MCFARLAND: I entered SMU in 1947. I graduated from high school at the end of May of ’47 and entered SMU, rather against my will, but at my parents’ insistence.

Q: Were you a day student?

MCFARLAND: Yes, I was a day student. I lived at home and commuted.

Q: Of course. That saves money. Money was important.

MCFARLAND: Yes, it was.

Q: I was a child of the depression, too. I know what you’re saying to us.

MCFARLAND: Yes, people simply didn’t have it, and among the student body there were perhaps eight per cent who had cars. Now, I suppose, almost everyone. But parking was not a problem on the campus.
Q: What did you take your degree in?

MCFARLAND: I took my degree in journalism. I had started out majoring in biology and found that I just couldn’t overcome the math requirement. My brain simply doesn’t function when confronted with math problems. Maybe it was a childhood fear, but my intelligence is all verbal. And I worked on the student newspaper briefly while I was in school, and then took a part-time job as a reporter for the Dallas Times-Herald, sort of big thing to make the journalism scene for a time. For the last year and a half I was in school I covered the campus for them during the week and then on Saturdays worked as a regular reporter. It was terribly valuable experience. All the other people in journalism envied it. I was getting a leg up on a future journalism career, and I also was a stringer for United Press and International News Service, which later merged, and for Time Magazine. I got two or three squibs in Time Magazine, which invariably got me in trouble with the university authorities because it was not good public relations for SMU. But that was a time, by the way, of greater control over the press and greater respect on the part of the press for official secrets.

Q: No leaks. If there were leaks, the press respected the source.

MCFARLAND: The White House correspondents during Roosevelt’s time did not publish the fact of his obviously declining health, for example. They simply took the press releases that came out of the government at face value and embroidered on them as best they could. A great deal has changed. I’m a child of another era.

Q: Privacy of the President, oh, my. They didn’t prod him for that, or if prodded, they didn’t print it.

MCFARLAND: The only thing that came close, a colleague of mine at the Times-Herald told me that the Texas press had helped to undo Governor Pappy O’Daniel simply by quoting him directly. He had complained, it seems, that some newspaperman had misquoted him, so they took to quoting him exactly in all his inelegant, garbled, ungrammatical speech, and that finally killed him, or so the journalists thought. That was as close as it came to “investigative reporting.” At any rate, I was all set to become a journalist, and I hoped to become a foreign correspondent. I didn’t realize what form my foreign correspondence would eventually take. I was in ROTC at SMU, Air Force ROTC, the only kind they had. Obviously, the draft had begun again in 1948, when I was a sophomore, and my father had thought it was good insurance to have a commission promised along with my diploma. Of course, you didn’t have to worry about being drafted as long as you were a student, but nonetheless, I’m sure that he was right.

Q: Your father was a strong influence and he imposed a discipline, which was normal in those days, maybe not so normal now, but you listened to your father and did often what he recommended. That is the way it was, yes.
MCFARLAND: I felt as if I had no real choice, and I didn’t want to hurt him or my mother either. My mother governed by the tactic of “Don’t hurt me.” Wonderful woman.

Q: They both lived a long, rich life, I hope.

MCFARLAND: Yes, they did. They lived, my father until ’93, my mother until ’91, I think.

Q: My goodness, it’s great for you, your longevity.

MCFARLAND: But they lived very regular lives. They never stayed out late, and they didn’t drink. My father smoked.

Q: It wasn’t a vice in those days.

MCFARLAND: Well, for my mother it was. She insisted that I never take up the practice, and I have since been very grateful to her.

Q: Well, good for her, good for you.

MCFARLAND: But at any rate, I had the choice on graduation, starting before graduation, of taking a 21-month tour of active duty as a supply officer or public information officer or training of that sort or signing up for pilot training with a four-year commitment. Well, naturally, given my background, we were discussing, World War II, pro-US Government, pro-military and so on, I signed up for pilot training. I was one of five, I think, in a class of something above a hundred cadets to volunteer. The others had more sense, just as the others had had more sense in sticking to business. I’m sure they’ve all prospered since then.

Q: Where was the training?

MCFARLAND: I was assigned first to Bartell Air Base in Florida. It was a contract fly school. The Air Force had faced a sudden tremendous requirement for new pilots along with their infusion of money for new aircraft and the requirements of the Korean War. Truman, as you might recall, had cut the armed forces to the bone and into the bone in the late ‘40’s, so that we had very, very few military resources to throw into Korea when the war came, and those that we had were in some cases decimated. It’s rather sorry. We were almost thrown out of Korea by the North Koreans. But the shock of the Chinese intervention, apparently, in November-December of 1950, decided Truman that he did indeed face a dangerous enemy and he must build up the military. This was just in time for me. There were several contract flying schools, primarily what was then called basic flying school across the country. The people in our ROTC detachment at SMU seemed to have influence, so our group went to Florida. And about half of our entering class of second lieutenants - we were matched also with cadets; we had a group of cadets going through on the same program - but about half of our class came out of West Point, and
they had to be among the top 10 per cent in order to get into the Air Force because there was so much demand for Air Force commissions in West Point. There was no Air Force Academy. The Naval Academy had, of course, Naval Air Corps to offer its graduates who wanted to fly. Some of the Naval Academy graduates did, in fact, enter the Air Force, but they were not at the level of West Point by then. These also were people who had been brought up in the glory of the military during the ‘40’s and again in ‘47, graduated in ‘51, an example of the level, the caliber, is that one of my five apartment mates was Buzz Aldrin. And it was Buzz who started modifying my Texas English into something approximating standard East Coast English.

Q: Well, you didn’t lose it all. You have a little bit.

MCFARLAND: My Texas accent has begun to come back now, with renewed residence in the State.

Q: Oh the Foreign Service modified it too, I would think.

MCFARLAND: Yes, and living in the East generally.

Q: Sure.

MCFARLAND: You tend to become standardized. Lyndon Johnson never did, and I’ve known other people who never lost a deep southern drawl.

Q: LBJ, I was amazed, his mother gave him elocution lessons, so obviously she spoke the way he did. Elocution requires a certain diction. I learned that out at the LBJ family home. She gave elocution lessons to the kids around there, including him, but it didn’t seem to make a difference.

MCFARLAND: Well, maybe he deliberately rejected that.

Q: Well, there you are in flight school.

MCFARLAND: Yes, I suddenly found that I had to try very, very hard, harder than I had ever tried before in my life, and I’ve survived. About 30 or 35 per cent of our class got washed out, including the pitcher of the West Point baseball team. That was a terrible injustice.

Q: That’s a heavy percentage.

MCFARLAND: Yes, it is very wasteful. By today’s terms it would not be tolerated, but those were early days of the contract flying schools, and some of the instructors thought that it was to their credit if they washed out more students. The others felt more protective and thought it was to their credit if they passed more students. I did well enough to get by, but then, to my great distress, was sent to multi-engine flying school for the second
half of my flying training, and I had wanted to fly fighters. I was terribly disappointed. But on my final check ride, I got in with this check pilot who had this terrible reputation, and I just choked up. I was too tight on the stick. I passed, but barely.

Well, anyway, I came out of multi-engine training, again asked for fighters, and I graduated, by the way, on August 2nd of '52, which was 47 years ago yesterday, and was assigned to be trained as a copilot in B-29’s, although in the nomenclature of that time, I was a pilot, and the pilot was the aircraft commander. I was sent to Randolph Air Force Base at San Antonio. I teamed up with a series of World War II veterans, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, and finally got settled down with a red-haired major who was an alcoholic. He had been a sort of a hero in World War II and had even been on War Bond tour, I think, because of his exploits in flying B-17’s out of Egypt. He had, after the war, been unable to adjust to peacetime and his marriage broke up, and he turned to alcohol. He broke down after our 16th mission, on my birthday in 1953, and just after landing, while still on the runway, went into convulsions. I was teamed up with yet another one. But at any rate, I flew a total of 20 missions from February of ’53 until the war’s end, I believe it was the 27th of July, 1953. And we just passed that anniversary also. Those missions gave me an idea of what modern war is all about. It’s very impersonal, even though we were flying outdated equipment, we were still using machines for the most part to carry on the fighting. We flew at night, in the dark of the moon, with our bellies painted black and altitudes to avoid contrails. All these were things that had been learned from attacks by the MIG-15’s, with which the other side had linked up. These were day fighters, and they had no radar on board. They depended on radar guidance from the ground, which could, of course, easily be jammed. So we were never hit. We would see the fighters going by and turn on their running lights in the hope that we would fire at them and then they could see where the fire was coming from and attack us. And before I got there several airplanes had been shot down by MIG’s that flew up their condensation trail. That’s why we avoided those altitudes where you leave contrails. But otherwise it was an easy war. As I was saying about the machines, we dropped bombs using Sure Rans. These are short-range aid to navigation. There were several of them in South Korea, and the planners of the mission would pick two, one that would provide and arc - that is, if you flew a constant distance from the station, that would be your bomb run, and then when it reached a certain distance from other station, the bombs would fall. So it was carried out mechanically - primitively but mechanically. And we also had basic World War II type defenses such as searchlights. But the flak was scary at times, but never touched us. They had no radar. They had to use barrage flak, which is much less dangerous.

Q: You got through the war.

MCFARLAND: We got through the war. I could only imagine later the damage that we caused below, all the innocent people that had died, all the unnecessary destruction of the environment, of houses, of crops, and so on. But it was so impersonal that I began to think I was just part of a team that began with the taxpayer. But I learned several other things. One of the most important was the essentiality of training and discipline. You
don’t send a bunch of barroom brawlers to combat. You send nice boys that are willing to accept discipline, and you train them and train them and train them until, even if they’re being shot at or even if they’re on fire, they go on doing their job. And that was essentially our approach to combat. You may see films of World War II crew that were not so trained panicking - wild things. But we were supposed to be professionals. And we did have a higher level of experience. We had all those field-grade officers as aircraft commanders.

Well, back from the war, I was assigned to Carswell Air Force Base, and I was adjutant for a year and a half, I suppose, until June of ’55. I had been transferred to headquarters 8th Air Force, Massachusetts, Westover Air Force Base. Carswell’s been shut down; Westover Air Force Base has been shut down. These were all big investments at that time for the Strategic Air Command. I was in the headquarters in Massachusetts for the next three years, which is why I took the exam for the Foreign Service in Hartford, Connecticut. I had meanwhile accepted a regular commission in the Air Force with every intention of making it my career, and yet I had this nagging doubt that I really wanted to spend my life practicing to do the unthinkable, or helping others to prepare for the unthinkable. I felt that I had something more to offer in the intellectual area that was not in demand in the Air Force.

Q: Could it have been that you would like to prevent war? Was that part of it?

MCFARLAND: Exactly.

Q: That’s normal. When you’ve been through what you’ve been through, then you just would like to do something to prevent it.

MCFARLAND: That was one of my principal objectives. I had had this experience, and the Strategic Air Command, you know, was dedicated to the nuclear destruction of the Soviet Union and had an elaborate system at that time of bombers and tankers for refueling, forward bases that bomber or tankers would fly to and shorten the distance. There was a huge armada, and perhaps it helped to keep the peace, or perhaps it was just a great waste. I don’t know, but we had something like 70,000 men and 8,000, I believe, were officers, and the 8th Air Force alone, which is one of the three numbered Air Forces in the Strategic Air Command, these were the days of Curt LeMay as SAC commander, the glory days of SAC, and SAC had got anything it asked for. And mainly what it asked for was more aircraft and more bases. We built up Westover and supervised the building up of new bases throughout the Northeast, including the bases up in Newfoundland and Labrador, which were the advance bases for tankers. I had this experience that stamped itself upon my memory during the Suez crisis in 1956. I don’t know how many people were aware of it, but we went on alert, a full alert. I went into the control room of the 8th Air Force to watch as symbols were moved across this gigantic map, and one after another the B-47’s and B-52’s were announced: combat ready, cruising aircraft ready for take-off. The tanker units were flown to the far bases, some of the B-47’s also, until finally all the symbols were up and ready to start. It was like that, a hammer on gigantic
pistol being pulled back, and the end of the world, at most, a good part of it, was very, very near. It would have happened in the next few hours if they had ever gotten the order to go. I thought that was an impressive sight.

At any rate, I was more and more interested in the Foreign Service. I had thought of becoming an Air attaché and had been told, no, that’s not the way to advance. Everybody wanted to just move forward and make that general. I did terribly well, I must say. I had a string of outstanding efficiency reports, in large part because I could write and nobody else could. But also I had a lot of energy and I learned to fly, 22 years old.

Well, maybe it was because of the New York Times. They were so pro-Foreign Service, and George Kennan set a powerful example. Foreign Service officer - develop the greatest strategic idea to govern our foreign policy for years. And I finally decided I wanted to try for the Foreign Service exam. I had been reading a great deal and improving my knowledge of history, foreign affairs, economics, and so on. I got in touch with a professor at Mt. Holyoke. My wife at that time was trying to get a master’s in history from Mt. Holyoke. She later dropped out. Anyway, this was a very bright guy, and he told me what I should read to prepare for the written exam, and I had a few discussions with him, he suggested questions to prepare for especially. Not really a cram course, but it was a great deal of help. So I had an order about three days before the written exam to fly down to El Paso, Texas, and I got back at about two or three in the morning of the exam. I had about two or three hours sleep and got up, into the car, and drove down to Hartford, where the exam was being given in the State House.

Q: *It was all day, too, wasn’t it?*

MCFARLAND: No, this was after the change. This was the exam that lasted, I think, three hours or so.

Q: *Three hours, but intense.*

MCFARLAND: Yes, but I should backtrack and say that the exam was changed in the mid-’50’s, I think, with the express desire of eliminating the cram courses and if possible moving the geographical center of the Foreign Service a little farther to the left.

Q: *So you came in at the right time.*

MCFARLAND: At any rate, I got to the door fairly in time, and just as a New Englander at the door said, “You’re late!” I could have hit him, but I didn’t. I just did get in with hundreds of other applicants in the exam and was later told that I had passed.

Q: *You passed? Good for you.*

MCFARLAND: And later I had to drive down to Washington to take the oral and passed that. The oral was given by these people I really admire. They obviously were educated.
One of them combined all the virtues - the brains, the decency, the helpfulness to society, service to the government - even through one of them gave me a hard time - he was the bad cop - I got by them. And then began the year - I guess this was in early ‘58 - again, the year I refer to later as the year of the long sweat, because I had to find out whether I’d passed the oral exam, excuse me, all the other exams - security, health, and so on. And then, when was I going to be appointed.

Q: They made you wait, yes.

MCFARLAND: And they had no funds. Finally in the summer I was told by the Air Force I was about to be transferred to SAC headquarters. They liked me too much. And “Sorry, but I’m resigning and going into the Foreign Service.” I was already a captain by that time, and I was willing to accept to go back to second lieutenant with the whole junior officer routine to work through again in order to be in the Foreign Service.

Q: You were motivated.

MCFARLAND: Yes, I was. And in those days they didn’t have much compensation. The best they could offer me was the top level of the entering - the top pay grade of the FSO-8, as it was then called.

Q: So how old were you at that time?

MCFARLAND: I was 28 at that time. I became 28 in 1958.

Q: That’s when I came.

MCFARLAND: You were also 28 or so when you began?

Q: Yes, 27, I think, but then I’d had three and a half years military experience, which set me back.

MCFARLAND: What service were you in?

Q: Army.

MCFARLAND: Where?

Q: Second World War, Pacific.

MCFARLAND: Pacific?

Q: Yes. So they were looking for people who’d had experience other than academic, even then. They were looking for people other than Northeasterners.
MCFARLAND: Yes, and they liked, as I said, my maturity and my Air Force background.

Q: And your experience in the Air Force - yes, those were big pluses.

MCFARLAND: And I suspect the fact that I already had security clearance and there was no question about my patriotism. In those days so many people’s patriotism was questioned for so little reason. Even though, during the oral exam, I had advocated opening relations with Red China on the grounds that it was better to negotiate it.

Q: How’d the board take that?

MCFARLAND: They passed me.

Q: They passed you, yes. Good.

MCFARLAND: I think they were trying to see whether I could defend myself. Perhaps they marked down positively for intellectual courage; I don’t know.

Q: You didn’t waffle.

MCFARLAND: No.

Q: The important thing is you don’t waffle. The Board of Examiners -

MCFARLAND: You served on one.

Q: No, I didn’t, but I have the idea you don’t try to fool them. They like a straightforward answer.

MCFARLAND: Yes. One of them began, the bad cop, began to ask a question, “If you were a resident of England, would you vote for the Labor Party. . . “ and then he retracted the question. And I must have said something smelling of socialism because one of them asked me, “In the Air Force, you are meant to live on base in a very managed society, you know what socialism feels like, don’t you?” “Yes, I do, I do. I don’t like it.” I thought a perceptive comment on his part. I had thought that many times, but I didn’t expect a civilian to make the point.

Q: So there you were. You resigned from the Air Force.

MCFARLAND: Yes, I resigned from the Air Force.

Q: And you still didn’t have your commission.

MCFARLAND: That’s right.
Q: And there you were.

MCFARLAND: But I had to get out before the Air Force moved me, and also I wanted to be instantly available just in case the State Department decided, yes, we’ve got money.

I was married just before going to the Korean War. December of ‘52, I took time out to marry a girl who seemed to be an ideal mate, Phi Beta Kappa, interested in the same things I was. Her name was Peggy Nichols. We had a honeymoon in New Orleans, and then I suffered a great deal when I had to leave her to go off to war. I returned, of course, in late ‘53. We had our first child, Stephen George McFarland, born in December of ‘54, in Fort Worth, at Carswell Air Force Base Hospital. It’s strange that with all the moving around I’ve done, three of my four children have been born in the United States, two of them in Texas. My second child, Anne Seymour McFarland, was born December 23, 1958, in Austin, after I had moved to Austin preparatory to entering the Foreign Service. One other point, backing up, about the Foreign Service oral exam - the examiners seemed to be quite impressed with my knowledge of United States geography, which apparently most Americans lack. I had gained that, or course, from flying all over the country. This was a tremendous benefit that the Air Force gave me. I knew exactly what the country looked like from sea to sea, and I had also, of course, had to drive over a good part of it, moving from base to base. I was quite a citizen of the United States then, preparatory to becoming a citizen of the world.

Well, moving on, back to the period after September of ‘58, I arrived at the University of Texas campus just in time to enroll for the fall semester and a number of courses that would help me prepare for Foreign Service work. The most outstanding of those courses was an international relations seminar led by Professor Jim Roach, and I also took two courses in Spanish hoping to pass the Spanish exam. At that time all Foreign Service officers were on probation until they had passed either the written or the oral exam in a foreign language. Thanks to this study, I was able to pass the written exams shortly after entering duty in the State Department. The long wait, or the longs sweat, finally came to an end in early December of ‘58, when I got a letter, not a phone call, but a letter from the State Department saying that they still didn’t have money in their budget to hire new FSO’s, but they did have money to hire extra people for the Passport Office during the spring rush, and they would like to use this money to bring in 20 people from the top of the list for FSO-8. Would I be interested at all? I was rapidly running out of money and said, yes, yes.

Q: That’s interesting that the Passport Office should need 20 people.

MCFARLAND: But they did.

Q: There was a woman who ran the Passport Office.
MCFARLAND: Frances Knight. She was entrenched with barbed wire in terms of Washington politics.

_Q:_ Powerful.

MCFARLAND: Yes.

_Q:_ Was that directly across the street from the Executive Office Building? We called it Old State, remember?

MCFARLAND: Yes, it was down -

_Q:_ Now it’s called the Executive Office Building. She had her office opposite that.

MCFARLAND: We were on 19th Street at that time. It was not far from Old State. Perhaps they had been at Old State earlier on.

_Q:_ It’s not important. But anyway, you were going to the Passport Office.

MCFARLAND: Yes, they brought us in, and I instantly realized, from being with these other people that I had changed environments. I was among people who laughed at the same jokes I did. The Air Force officers I had known were good men, responsible men, brave men, good at what they did, but they were not overwhelmingly bright - in other terms. I don’t know that every Foreign Service officer could get through pilot training. I don’t think every pilot could pass the Foreign Service Exam. I learned that distinction.

_Q:_ You did both.

MCFARLAND: But it was an elite. There were a few exceptions in our entering class, but most of them were very, very bright. One of them was Tom Pickering. I had Buzz Aldrin in my flying class; I had Tom Pickering, the current undersecretary for political affairs.

_Q:_ But this wasn’t the Foreign Service beginners’ -

MCFARLAND: No, we were put into doing this work that any high school graduate could have done under the supervision of -

_Q:_ But you were still a class, were you?

MCFARLAND: We were already a class.

_Q:_ You were already a class, but you hadn’t gone into the Foreign Service officer orientation. That’s unique. I never heard of it before. You did it. How long did that last?
MCFARLAND: This lasted from the 2nd of January - actually, I arrived in Washington as Fidel was arriving in Havana. I just got that on the radio as I was driving from Austin to Washington. And of course Fidel at that time enjoyed tremendously good press in the States, and I thought it was a very auspicious moment. How was I to know? The first of many ironies. I quickly found that I had exchanged membership in a fairly proud club - Air Force captain, regular commission, on a flying status, well respected - and suddenly I was thrust into this assembly-line job where we were taking on passport applications, looking them over to see if everything was in order, stamping them, and moving them on. And we were given quotas for the day. The only thing useful that came out of it, apart from my association with my colleagues, was that I gained quite an appreciation or knowledge of citizenship law.

Q: That didn't last too long, I hope.

MCFARLAND: This was from January to July.

Q: Oh, half a year. They finally got money.

MCFARLAND: Yes.

Q: Then you got into the regular class.

MCFARLAND: They did finally find out. . . . Those were the days of July 1 - June 30 fiscal years. The did finally find they had money for a class at FSI starting in May, but they already had us employed, and they used that for sort of another group. And we started in July and at that time became FSO’s. Until then we’d been FSR’s, which ain’t the same. The letters change. But we were all greatly cheered up to be out of the horrible Passport Office.

Q: How long was the orientation course? Was it three months?

MCFARLAND: It seems to me there was about two months. Do you remember? Perhaps it was three. I’m not sure. It was an excellent course. We gained, I think, three more members by then, the A-100, and we were all quite pros.

Q: It’s inevitable. I guess they’ve all retired by now.

MCFARLAND: A number of them resigned. Two were thrown out as a result of conflicts with supervisors in the first assignment - three, I think. Those were the days when you were on probation the first two years, I think, till you made FSO-7, and they kept us all at grade eight, with the exception of one guy who was 5/5 in French, but the rest of us stayed FS whatever it was. I was making $5,885 a year, and that’s the way it stayed. I think it was for two and a half years, and I was finally promoted.

Q: And you were waiting for your first assignment.
MCFARLAND: This was two and a half years plus the seven months or so that I had spent in the Passport Office, so it was a long, long time, and I really suffered, and my wife was just getting down. That was when her depressions began.

Q: The uncertainty?

MCFARLAND: Well, not having enough money. She had come from a wealthy family, and she missed her mother. This was actually, I’m being unfair - it actually started in the Air Force, at Westover Air Force Base. She loved being close to New York; she loved New England; we traveled a lot through New England. But she was far from home.

Q: Was she prepared for the Foreign Service?

MCFARLAND: She was intellectually. She was very much supportive of my decision to go in, but the reality was something else. She couldn’t take it.

Q: So you were waiting for your first assignment.

MCFARLAND: I passed the written exam in Spanish, but then they decided that we should all be fluent in a language, and I had wanted to be trained in some other language, especially French. I really wanted to learn French. I already had Spanish. They assigned me to Spanish. I think I got a 2+ in speaking, but they needed 3, so I was sent to four and a half months of Spanish training.

Q: At FSI?

MCFARLAND: At FSI. After completing A-100, those three months including the consular segment.

Q: So they brought you up to three in the -

MCFARLAND: Yes, I think I was S3 or 3+.

Q: Well, that’s fine. So you got your language requirement out of the way.

MCFARLAND: And then went on and polished it up, and when I came back from my first post, Costa Rica, I was more advanced.

Q: So Costa Rica did that? Did that please you?

MCFARLAND: The assignment initially struck me as awful. I wanted someplace where things were going on. And yet, it turned out to be almost an ideal first post. You could make almost any mistake, I think, and then you would have been forgiven, and people
were friendly, and you could see how things work in an embassy and in an overseas community.

Q: How about relations between Washington and Costa Rica?

MCFARLAND: Extremely friendly. The Costa Ricans - I think if we had wanted another state, they would have signed on.

Q: But you had enough Communists to watch.

MCFARLAND: Yes, this was Cold War time, and the Cubans were working there. But there were also some Cuban exiles by this time. This was February of 1960, when I arrived. And Cuban exiles began arriving I guess before May.

Q: What were you working on your first assignment, political, economic?

MCFARLAND: No, my first assignment was consular work. I was vice-consul in a two-man section. But it was easy consular work, in the sense that we did not have a long line of visa applicants that you do now. It was not a visa mill. I had a mixture of visas, welfare and whereabouts, and citizenship papers. And the consul went off on delayed home leave, I think it was, leaving me in charge for a couple of months. In September, I believe, an aircraft carrying three Americans disappeared somewhere in Costa Rica. There was an airplane overhaul facility near Costa Rica which a number of the US airlines used, cheaper to have their aircraft overhauled there than in the States. Two of the chief pilots of, I believe, Eastern Airlines had flown an aircraft down there and had time to kill and met an American rancher from Costa Rica. He invited them to see his ranch. He would fly them there the next day. They had to sleep off their hangovers, so it was after lunch, I think, before they took off, and this was at the time of year when Costa Rica every afternoon was covered by rainstorms. The rainy season in Costa Rica starts usually in April, and the showers begin late in the day and gradually advance, so that by late September one o’clock is sort of a bad time to take off. But these were two senior pilots of Eastern Airlines and a guy who had come to that area and thought he knew the country. They disappeared. I was the consular officer.

Q: It was your case.

MCFARLAND: The Costa Rican civil aviation authorities mounted an air search. We should have been setting up a grid and checking each square in the grid. And that was declared over in about three or four days. The family was going out of its mind back in the States and sending telegrams and phoning and so on. After a week or so, I got a message from some other American living way out in the hinterland that he thought he might have seen a crash out there, so I got the AGS people to lend me a helicopter with crew. The American Geodetic Survey. It’s an army outfit that operated - and still does operate in many Latin American countries - mapping or helping the local authorities to map. They took me down to this man’s ranch, and we checked out the area thoroughly,
and then I chewed out the rancher for a false alarm, and we came back. I did get in a little experience in the helicopter. Then after another week or so and many more frantic telephone calls, I got word from some people back in the jungle that they had seen way off in the distance something on some trees, and maybe this could have been the airplane. Well, we had nothing else to check, so I asked the police to provide me a patrol, and I borrowed a jeep from the army attaché, a Jeep station wagon, and headed with the patrol back into this area. Well, we stopped for the night at a beaten-up hotel and had dinner there, and dinner must have been loaded with bad things. I got sick that night, and we drove on out anyhow and started out into the jungle with a couple of local guides. We made camp, and the next morning I was just debilitated. I tried to keep warm, and I was holding up the others. So I sent them on alone, and this guide took me back to his hut where his wife was living and put me in a storage room to sleep. They came back without finding anything.

But six weeks later, which is the normal incubation period, I believe, for hepatitis, I came down with hepatitis.

Q: You picked that up then?

MCFARLAND: It must have been.

Q: What about the crash?

MCFARLAND: We never found any sign of them.

Q: Could it have gone in the ocean?

MCFARLAND: I think that’s probably what happened. This would have been a reasonable thing to do. It was too dangerous to let down. . . . They may have got caught in the clouds, and without navigation equipment. Under those circumstances, it would have been reasonable to fly west over the Pacific a decent time and then let down very, very slowly and hope to see the water, and they turn back in and at least find someplace to land. But these were superheroes, so maybe they did it some other way. But we never found a trace. Of course, if they’d gone down in the jungle, they could have gone without a trace, too, because there are, as in Vietnam, three levels of foliage.

Q: Then the families finally had to accept that reality.

MCFARLAND: Yes, but I kept getting calls right as I was getting sick, and -

Q: Congressmen?

MCFARLAND: Well, they didn’t go to congressman. They just bugged me periodically. Q: And hepatitis is no fun. You were laid up for -
MCFARLAND: No, when I got it, I was out of action altogether. It’s a lazy man’s disease. It’s not all that painful. The beginning’s like flu, of course. You have fever.

Q: But bed rest, that’s the only thing you can do.

MCFARLAND: Yes, that’s the only thing. They put me in the hospital and put me on intravenous feeding and kept me quiet. I couldn’t move even to go to the bathroom.

Q: Any damage to your liver?

MCFARLAND: No, I survived without that, but I was off duty for quite some time. I think I came down with this illness in mid November, let’s say, six weeks after the search, and I finally started back to work in January, but only half days. I found that I couldn’t handle visa work or anything else that imposed a strain on me. I just emotionally had no stamina, emotional stamina. I just sat there. I didn’t break down and cry; I just didn’t handle it. It was sad, so I was given a chance to do political work - and that’s what I really wanted to do anyhow.

Q: Well, good for you, but you were able to do it?

MCFARLAND: Yes, so I came in half days for the political section, then full days, and I even got some plaudits from the Department, which in those days reacted to reporting.

Q: Well, that was the pattern, I guess. It was in my case. They wanted to be sure you were in all sections of the embassy in the first couple of tours. So you had consular and political.

MCFARLAND: Yes, and then - I was trying to arrange my own rotation - they had a junior officer job that opened up in the economic section, an economically inclined junior officer assigned to it. I said, “Look, let’s work out a rotation so that he goes to consular and gets his rotation in consular work, I go to economic, and now we’ve got a rotation schedule for junior officers, those two positions.” And that was accepted. So I spent my second and final year out of two and a half in Costa Rica in economic work.

And then during that year, I was trying to decide what hard language to sign up for. You may recall that in those days the Department had a very grown-up policy that all officers should have a “world language” and a “hard language.” And I was sucker enough to believe in it, I guess. It was a good choice.

Q: What did you choose?

MCFARLAND: I chose Turkish, at the urging of my DCM, who had been a very promising Turkish language officer. I had thought about Japanese, but my older brother was already a specialist in Japanese religions. He went into academia, and I thought two brothers in Japan to be one too many. I thought about another Far Eastern language,
because the Far East interested me. I hadn’t been there in three and a half years. And I considered Russian, but what I heard about the problems of living in Russia and being under constant surveillance didn’t encourage me much.

Q: Well, Turkish limits you to Turkey, of course. You couldn’t use it anywhere else.

MCFARLAND: Well, no, my first post was Cyprus.

Q: Well, that was before it was divided.

MCFARLAND: Yes. It was when it was divided.

Q: Oh, so you saw some of the fireworks.

MCFARLAND: Oh, I should say I did. I finished up the Turkish course in May or June of 1963, and went on the Cyprus Desk for three months waiting for a job to open up in Cyprus. It turned out to be the consular job, but it was only a sort of part-time consular work. There wasn’t that much to do in consular affairs in Cyprus, and the rest was supposed to be political, and I was being sent there as the first Turkish-speaking officer in the Embassy. And it was otherwise and overwhelmingly a Greek-oriented embassy. All the other language officers were Greek language officers.

Q: Do you remember the ambassador at the time.

MCFARLAND: Well, that was Fraser Wilkins, when I arrived.

Q: Oh, yes. I know Fraser.

MCFARLAND: I arrived there in September - so many things in my life seem to happen in September - and had about three months to get my feet on the ground and meet the Turks and start taking Turkish lessons to keep my conversation going, because I had to live in the Greek Sector. It turned out I never found a house. We were looking all over the island and couldn’t find a place that suited my wife. We stayed in the temporary apartments that were right across the street and a half block beyond the embassy, just a vacant lot between us. The embassy was in two joined apartment buildings or office buildings, with a slight break or dip between them. And the night that it all broke loose, I was embassy duty officer, which was just, I think, three nights before Christmas. It think it was December 22nd of ’63. It was at 11 or 12 o’clock at night I heard a tremendous siren go off, and I figured it was from the police stations. Other sirens, then BOOM! BOOM! Grenades and gunfire. It was pretty loud. I quickly jumped into my clothes and ran across the street to the embassy and notified the ambassador. He asked me to get the country team together - that was everybody - so I started calling them, and I was interrupted by a fellow from the Tourism Hotel. “What’s going on here?” This was for me the definitive instance of the fog of battle. I didn’t know what was going on, and I had to tell him so. I didn’t know that this many years later we would still have a Cyprus
problem. No one is quite sure yet what set off that incident that developed into full-scale fighting between the paramilitaries of the two sides.

Q: You don't know who fired the first shot?

MCFARLAND: No.Apparently a Greek police patrol was pressing the Turkish Cypriots. A Greek police patrol was in the Turkish Cypriot area of north Nicosia, and fighting broke out, but I don’t know who fired the first shot or why. But the two sides had been getting visibly more tense for some time, since I had arrived there. And the Greek Cypriot police had been searching for hidden Turkish arms, trying to round up Turkish Cypriot paramilitary. Well, in the next couple of days, some 104 Turkish Cypriots were killed. Only five of them were from battles. And then the next three or four months, the Turkish Cypriots, who were then 18 per cent of the population, were driven back out of their villages into about five per cent of the Island’s area, where they’ve stayed for the next 10 years. This, today, would be called, of course, “ethnic cleansing.” In those days, we couldn’t see it that way.

We had, of course, an element of adjusting to the initial shock, responding in a variety of ways. The British had forces on the island who did a very good job of moving in and interposing themselves and talking truce and getting the fighting to stop within about two days. But it wasn’t sure how long the peace would hold. So that on Christmas Day, I organized a convoy to go into the Turkish Cypriot sector and bring out American and any other foreigners that were cut off there. We knew there were about 17 Americans that were cut off.

Q: So essentially, the island was divided.

MCFARLAND: Yes, it was.

Q: It was divided just almost overnight.

MCFARLAND: Exactly.

Q: That was before the Turkish forces arrived.

MCFARLAND: Yes, that was another thing here later, 10 years later.

Q: But it’s the British that interposed, because there was no UN presence at that time.

MCFARLAND: The UN forces came in a few months later, and the Brits continued to be part of the UN force. They were the largest contingent, but there were Canadians, Norwegians. . . . It was a big operation. It was, I think, the first UN peacekeeping force. UNPECYP, it was called.

Q: You as a Turkish-speaking officer, were you suspect?
MCFARLAND: Yes, I was suspect, of course. They Greeks thought that I was pro-Turkish, and the Turks were quite pleased initially to have me as eighth man in the embassy, and then they began thinking, Hey, he lives in the Greek Sector. He’s coming over here to spy on us and going back and telling the others. So I was suspected by both sides. And that corresponded with my own attitude, which was “a plague on both your houses” - get along, as you used to.

Q: You were there for the US national interests, nobody else. You weren’t trying to be a partisan in the conflict. Just Uncle Sam’s interest required you to be that way.

MCFARLAND: Exactly, that’s right. But the Greeks, especially, whose initiative had set up the whole thing, were paranoid and bloodily paranoid. They were willing to kill. They had shot an American member of the embassy in the late ‘50’s, when they were trying to get the Brits out. Somebody went to the man’s door, and when he opened it, someone fired six or so shots from a revolver and it was only because he fell to one side he lived - I mean, he was badly hurt, but he survived. And we had repeated threats against us, because we were trying to keep the Greek Cypriots from going out an completing the job of wiping out the minority Turks. And the Turks, meanwhile, “We have the right of intervention under the 1958 agreement, and we could exercise it.” “Oh, no,” the United States Government said. Britain said, “you would set off a war with Greece.” “Greece would fight Turkey?” Well, this became our policy - that we would avoid Turkish intervention. The Turks should not intervene; they should sit by and let their community sit and be squeezed, besieged, by the Greeks. The whole thing, of course, had started out of the desire of Greece, and especially the Greek Orthodox Church, to reunite all the regions where historically Greeks had been present and where actually there was a large Greek population. This was enosis of Greece, and in another term it might be called Greek territorial expansion, or territorial ambitions. I don’t think we came out so strongly against Greece, but we had called a spade a spade, and it was their ambition, and not any ambition of Turkey’s on Cyprus, that caused the problem. The Brits, as a historical footnote, had offered Cyprus to Greece in 1914, that Greece would join the allied side in World War II. Athens then had a lot of German influence, and Athens refused. It was a terrible mistake. After World War II, after the Italians had been forced out, Greece wanted to continue expanding, and they saw the successes of nationals elsewhere against the British Empire and got curious. They sent they young monk Makarios to Cyprus after training him in the US with the specific mission of uniting Cyprus for Greece. The Church was a direct inheritor of Byzantium. A great many people make the mistake of considering Greece to be the inheritors of Pericles. That’s not Greece. So that Makarios did what he could to carry out his mission. He had accepted the London-Zurich Accords, not happily, but he had accepted them, dividing the government of the island, but keeping the island whole and integrated. He became the first president, and the Vice-President was a Turkish Cypriot, Dr. Kücük, a medical doctor. I don’t know if you’ve found this. There are a great many medical doctors that rose to prominence in politics in very small countries.
Q: Did you have any feel for the Greek lobby in this country? Was it powerful?

MCFARLAND: Oh, terribly powerful.

Q: The Turks were separate.

MCFARLAND: I heard personally from it.

Q: And the Turks had no lobby, really.

MCFARLAND: No.

Q: And the Greek lobby is powerful on the hill. You felt that in the early days. It was always there pressuring the White House.

MCFARLAND: Yes. This, I suppose, was a basic reason for our taking such a pro-Greek stand on the issue. Another part, of course, was the threat of the Soviet Union. Greece could have been torn loose from its association with NATO, could have opened the door to their co-religionists in Moscow. That’s possible. I’ll concede that as a possibility. But at any rate, we were not concerned with righting injustices against minorities; we were just concerned to keep the lid on, don’t explode.

Q: And it was Cold War time. Everything related to the Cold War. A Communist threat was always there. And for 25 years I dealt with the Communist threat, as you did. That was our main preoccupation.

MCFARLAND: Precisely. Everything was oriented toward basically our national survival and the contest, in any case, with the Soviets, the KGB, and all its many fronts.

Q: And they must have been pretty busy on the Island.

MCFARLAND: They had a Communist Party there and a Communist trade union which was quite powerful.

Q: Did they have an embassy also.

MCFARLAND: Oh, yes, there was a Russian embassy.

Q: So they ran a powerful operation.

MCFARLAND: Oh, yes.

Q: The CIA had to watch them very closely.

MCFARLAND: Of course, they watched the CIA.
Q: Did you have any problems with the CIA?

MCFARLAND: No, I didn’t.

Q: They were there. They were going about their business.

MCFARLAND: The CIA people that I knew were Eagle Scouts. They were all close friends. We even lived. . . . Most of the families were moved out - several of us shared an apartment. There were two CIA officers and two State officers, buddies. This was not the CIA of myth; this was the CIA of good, highly patriotic people. They simply had a different method of operating than we did, but the same goals.

Q: So you had two years in Cyprus.

MCFARLAND: I had two years in Cyprus. I should point out some of my adventures there. I was living, as I said, not far from the embassy, in clear view of the embassy. In early February we got a warning that a small fanatic group of Greek Cypriots led by Makarios’s personal physician, who had sworn to attack Americans - the British intelligence put this out and passed it on to the CIA, which passed it on to everyone. Everywhere around the world (the rest of my Foreign Service career I was getting at least one threat every six months, I think) - but this was specific and time-related, and it was confirmed by later events. The evening of the 4th or 5th of February I was standing out in front of the temporary apartments talking with a neighbor who was a communicator and saw this sand colored Land Rover with several people inside pull up to the side gate of the embassy, about 30 or 40 feet from the embassy itself. The gate, of course, was unlocked. There were no guards outside. These were the early days. Somebody got out, unloaded something from the back of the Land Rover, pushed the gate open, walked up to a permanently closed side door, entered - it was the wrong building - set down the package, struck a match, and lit the fuse, and at that moment converted himself into an enemy of my country. I got his description. He ran back to the Land Rover, which tore off. I couldn’t see the license plate as I ran. I ran to the embassy and told the Marine guard to get everybody out of the building, and the bomb went off. And with the Marine behind me, I ran around the end of the building to check to damage, and someone, some person we had evacuated, called from behind to look out, there may be a second one in there. He saved my life. I ducked around the corner of the building, and - KABOOM! - the second one went off, knocked down the Marine, who miraculously was not hit by these flying fragments of pipe that had been put inside a threaded pipe so it would break up into shrapnel. One piece went through the side of a car, and another one cut down a small cypress tree. They were picked up all over the place. And just after the first one went off, just after I’d ducked around the side of the building, the ambassador, who lived on the top floor of an adjoining building, the penthouse, called down, “What’s going on down there?” because I hadn’t had time to notify him. And I said, “One small bomb, Sir.” BOOM! - the second one went off. “Correction: two small bombs, Sir.”

Q: Were you knocked on the ground by the second one?
MCFARLAND: No, I was around the corner from it. The Marine was knocked down, though, and I was okay. Nobody’s hit me yet. A lot of people have tried, though. So the ambassador called a country team meeting and decreed evacuation. So I spent the rest of the night as consular officer organizing my share of the evacuation. We got all of the families off the next morning for Beirut.

Q: That’s the evacuation of the embassy. What about the other Americans on Cyprus? Did they leave voluntarily?

MCFARLAND: There were not many other Americans. We had already had a cutting back of the official presence to essential personnel, so the Peace Corps left, most of the AID mission, and so on. The Americans who remained were in the station that I can’t refer to in greater detail and the cadre of the embassy. And let’s see, the UN force came in. I was the principal go-between with the Turkish Cypriots. I kept in constant touch with them. I had finished the Turkish course with an S4/R4, which at that time was a record, I think, and in fact led them to... There was a couple with an S4/R4 in Hindi that Tony Quainton achieved. Our success motivated FSI’s hierarchy to proclaim that henceforth nobody would get S4 on the basis of 10 months of language training.

Q: Rather arbitrary, I would say.

MCFARLAND: But anyway, the linguists thought we were both deserving of it. At any rate -

Q: Your family had gone.

MCFARLAND: My family was gone.

Q: Where did you send them?

MCFARLAND: Beirut. And they stayed there until May. My wife had an operation and then went back to Texas to recover. The children were with her. I was all alone in Cyprus until December, when they returned. Things had settled down by that time, and there was no longer a threat to Americans. I finally found a house, where we stayed for seven months or so.

And let’s see, what other stories can I... Oh, yes. Let me continue what I started, this critique of US policy. The Greeks made a flagrant attempt at annexing Cyprus in July of 1974, when the Greek junta was in power, which impelled the Turks this time to invade. And many casualties and considerable destruction. This could have been avoided if Turkey had been permitted to intervene in 1964 on the outbreak in December of ’63, and the intervention would have been to restore the status quo ante, the London-Zurich Accords, that is, the combined government -
Q: So they had a right.

MCFARLAND: They had a right under those accords, which we prevented them from exercising, we and the Brits. And furthermore, this would have prevented the partitioning of Cyprus, that would have meant to the Greeks great advantage. And, yes, we couldn’t do that. It was a major shortsightedness of policy.

Q: Whether the Greek lobby is to blame for this?

MCFARLAND: I’m not aware of it, but I simply say that it was a major failing, and I think it bears relation to the policy over Yugoslavia. This Greek-Turkish problem in Cyprus was, in fact, our first Balkan War of the second half of this century, and the same elements present in Yugoslavia were present there, especially the incitement of ethnic anger.

Q: Makes sense.

MCFARLAND: And the fight over holy land. Well, so much for our policy. I continued to carry it out as an embassy officer. I had to defend it at one point. I was invited by a Turkish Cypriot friend to visit his club one evening. I arrived on schedule and was shown into this conference hall where about 50 Turkish Cypriot men, obviously the educated type, were assembled, and I was shown to a seat at a table facing them. I thought I was there as a guest. It turned out I was there as an object of questions, and for an hour or an hour and a half I carried on in Turkish defending the United States position. It was, I guess, the roughest time I ever encountered with people who were under siege as a result of United States policy.

Q: Were you allowed to write that up when you went back to the embassy?

MCFARLAND: I wrote it up.

Q: You wrote it up.

MCFARLAND: I believe I did. I think it’s on the record. Although the people in the embassy were so pro-Greek, they thought they were bending over backwards. I was kind of like the token Negro. Although the ambassador did later make a point of meeting with the Turks every week. Fraser Wilkins lasted only until about March of ‘64. He began drinking rather heavily under pressure. George Ball came out on a peacemaking effort and was not well impressed and had him withdrawn. He never again had an ambassadorial job. He was inspector general later.

Q: Who replaced him?

MCFARLAND: He was replaced by Toby Belcher, Taylor G. Belcher -
Q: Oh, yes. I know Toby.

MCFARLAND: - a great guy. We were all friends, and he had this instinct for -

Q: Energetic.

MCFARLAND: - diplomacy, and particularly for a trouble spot or a hot spot. He knew where to send people and what to do, how to get things done. And I ran afoul of the Turks, in particular, one instance which I frustrated an effort by a Turk in their embassy to set off a Turkish air strike. He was the, I suppose, USIS equivalent. He sent off a false report to the Turkish radio station in Ankara to the effect that Greek Cypriots were attacking a Turkish village in the north of Cyprus. We picked this up on, what is it, the -

Q: FBIS?

MCFARLAND: - FBIS, yes, thank you, almost immediately. It came in as a flash message. I quickly checked with the UN. “Has there been any attack on this Turkish village West Akron?” Because he had reported artillery shelling. “No, it’s all quiet there.” “Are you sure?” “Yes.” I reported, put in the ambassador’s support, “Tell the Turks, don’t react.” They had sworn that they would send in fighter bombers next time a Turkish Cypriot village was attacked. We frustrated this. And I was pinned with the responsibility for this in the Turkish eyes, and this particular Turk sent off a message which I later heard about thanks to CIA saying that I was CIA. I was supposed to be an operative. It discredited me, but another Turkish Cypriot told me that this man had confided to him that “I have prepared a pilaf for Mr. McFarland, and he is going to have to eat it.” Well, I didn’t have too much difficulty eating that particular pilaf. But this must have been in May or so. In late July or early August, after working seven days a week for about seven weeks straight, I took a few days off and went down to Tel Aviv to rest on the beach and see something of Israel, and the first morning I was there, I picked up the newspaper: “Turkish Jets Bomb Cyprus.” Oh, God! Just when I was away! I tried frantically to get a flight back there. The embassy in Tel Aviv couldn’t have cared less. I had to wait until my scheduled return. Meanwhile, other people had handled it.

Q: People were hurt.

MCFARLAND: People were hurt, and then the Greek Cypriot armed forces got hurt. They had attacked Turkish Cypriots and tried to extend their . . . and the Turks responded.

Q: By air. So you were due to leave. You were there more than two years?

MCFARLAND: I was there not quite two years. I arrived in September and left in July.

Q: Theoretically you were ready for a Washington assignment, were you?

MCFARLAND: Well, I was sent on to Istanbul. That was my reward for Cyprus.
Q: So this is three overseas assignments in a row.

MCFARLAND: Yes, of course, separated by Turkish language training.

Q: So Istanbul.

MCFARLAND: It had changed from your time even then. They had built some new highways and torn down parts of the city to open up traffic. It was then about 1,300,000, probably not much change from your time, but certainly far smaller, about a tenth of the size that it is now.

Q: Oh, yes - 12 million. I was there a couple of weeks ago, 12 million in Istanbul.

MCFARLAND: Really, wow. Well, anyway, I loved Istanbul.

Q: The consulate, when I visited a couple of weeks ago, they have a big wall right on the street to close the street between the two buildings. It’s just a solid wall, and they’ve taken bombs, rockets into the garden. I went inside. Remember what a wonderful building, the two of them?

MCFARLAND: Yes.

Q: In a cage of concrete.

MCFARLAND: I wouldn’t want to see it.

Q: It really broke my heart.

MCFARLAND: Well, my heart was already broken by what they did after I left. When I was there I had the greatest most beautiful office I’ve ever had. Maybe it was your office too.

Q: Second floor?

MCFARLAND: Marble fireplace. You went in the front door of the old main building.

Q: The main building?

MCFARLAND: The main building. Over on the right.

Q: No, I wasn’t there. I was in the other building. You were in the main building?

MCFARLAND: Yes, the consul general was at the back on the left side, and we had the ballroom upstairs.
Q: Yes, it’s a different place. Were you political then?

MCFARLAND: Yes, I was assigned there as a political officer. My consular days were finally over.

Q: Well, good for you.

MCFARLAND: And I had not been doing all that much consular work in Cyprus. The weirdest case, I suppose, in Cyprus was this woman who came in one day, an American citizen, bar girl type, with a scarf around her neck and dyed hair and so on, tall woman, and brought this American passport. She had spilled hair dye in her purse, and it had unfortunately gone right across the identification page, and she filled out an application for a new one as Roberta such and such. Well, of course, that was presumptive fraud, and we had to send down the application to the Department, and back it came and “Roberta” was actually Robert. He/she had been working as a bar girl in the bars frequented by all the UN people.

Q: In Nicosia.

MCFARLAND: In Nicosia.

Q: Isn’t that cute.

MCFARLAND: And then on top of that became destitute. I had to arrange a loan from relations she had in the States and then finally issued a passport good only for return to the United States in the name of Robert. And he/she objected to this wildly. “I’m going on the airplane representing America, and how do you want me to look? Nice, dressed up, like a pretty girl, or looking like a god-damned queer?”

Q: She wore a dress, did she?

MCFARLAND: Yes, bar girl, you know. Well, sorry, but this is you - you’re Robert and this is the only thing I can do.

Q: There was a sex-change, as far as you could tell?

MCFARLAND: He or she claimed to have had the preliminary operation for a surgical change of sex. I was at the end of the chain of command.

Q: You got rid of her; that’s the important thing.

MCFARLAND: Yes, I had various other consular adventures. There was one that I couldn’t have gotten away with now, but there was this paranoid Greek American who had flown back to Cyprus and had run out of funds; at the same time he was causing
problems with his behavior. I think he may have been paranoid-schizophrenic, the most dangerous kind. He had worked in a restaurant in the States. He was a big strong guy. And we finally issued him a passport good only for return, and got some sort of clearance to get him on the next flight out. And then when we went looking for him at his hotel with the navy corpsman and ambulance driver and ambulance, and the navy corpsman and I found him sitting outside his hotel. The people there had shoved him out. And we each grabbed an arm and got him into the van, by force. As I say, we couldn’t do that these days. And once he was in the ambulance, we shot him with something or other and calmed him down and put him on the plane. But it sure solved the problem of his misbehavior and his safety in a dangerous situation. He could have done some wild thing, and the Turks would have shot him dead.

Q: He could have gone berserk.

MCFARLAND: The sides were not that far apart, you know. There was just the Green Line, as the British named it. It was a green line because they had chosen the green grease pencil to draw to draw on the map. That’s the origin of the term green line.

Q: But your relations with the British were cordial.

MCFARLAND: Oh, yes, very cordial, and probably the UN troops. They were all excellent people. The Irish had a particularly outstanding contingent there.

We had a good time in Istanbul. I loved the city, but life there was considerably duller, without conflict except, of course, that the resentment against the US stewed and stewed, and one of my regular chores was to go to Taksim Square and count the number of people who were engaging in the latest demonstration against the United States. And I nonetheless met a lot of Turks who really became friends, and I was sorry to leave them.

Q: Who was consul general?

MCFARLAND: Lansing Collins. He was a Princetonian who had served in Ankara some years before as counselor for pol-mil affairs. This was his last post. I think he retired after that. It’s often used as a retirement post. I had been promoted fairly rapidly. After I got into Istanbul, I got the old Class 4, which would be Class 2 now. So I caught up with my colleagues in the Air Force, who were making lieutenant colonel about that time. Unfortunately, the second year I was in Istanbul, my wife had sort of broken down in depression and so on and had to go back to the United States again. The deputy consul general’s wife invited me to dinner. And I had something else going on at the time I took the call, and failed to write it down, and I failed to go to the dinner. She got extremely hurt. Her husband took extreme exception. It wasn’t an excusable thing to do, but it wasn’t worth the penalty that I suffered, because I got an efficiency report out of him that Lansing Collins tried to counteract but couldn’t. There were the days before you could argue, and so on. I spent 10 years in that grade.
Q: My goodness, that was devastating.

MCFARLAND: It was devastating. I didn’t “get along well with other Americans.” That’s all. And in Cyprus I had been given some report to the effect that I should be promoted to old Class 2 by age 40, in a position to make the grade by age 40, rapid riser, and all that. And he said I should be kept in grade at least until about 1975, I think, or ‘72. Anyhow, I was promoted in ‘66 and promoted the next time in ‘76 or 7.

Q: Because of that one supervisor?

MCFARLAND: Yes. Well, that plus I went to the Cyprus Desk, where I thought I did a brilliant job, but there was this durn - darn Bob Folsom, who was put in over me as Cyprus country officer, director of Cyprus affairs. And this same one who had given me the bad efficiency report in Istanbul had moved to the Turkish Desk for this time, and he poisoned this guy against me, and this happened to be the time when efficiency reports included a secret annex which could not be shown to the recipient, and he said in there that I had been promoted too fast and was too young or something.

Q: Well, that’s -

MCFARLAND: And in all due immodesty, I had run circles around the man. And -

Q: Nasty, that one dinner party did it.

MCFARLAND: - anyway, it was unbeknownst to me.

Q: Istanbul was not a happy place. Your wife had her problem, and you had your problem.

MCFARLAND: Yes, but that was only the second year I was there, because the first year I got promoted. And I really liked Istanbul, I was happy, and I enjoyed not having my wife there, once she left.

Q: The kids, what about them? Did they go with your wife?

MCFARLAND: They went with the wife. My life in Istanbul was kind of idyllic in retrospect, because I enjoyed the language, I enjoyed the people, with the entrée I had I could go anywhere in the city at any hour of the day or night. All of the waiters in the good restaurants knew me. Life was cheap.

Q: Where did you live?

MCFARLAND: I lived in Bebek.

Q: Oh, my.
MCFARLAND: I had a partial view of the Bosporus, not the greatest, but I drove or took the bus or a bulmus up and down the Bosporus to go to work. And it was always a drive through history, and the Bosporus of course, was constantly changing its moods.

Q: Yes, I had lunch in Bebek last time I was there, a couple of weeks ago. It was the restaurants, yes.

MCFARLAND: Well, I understand that it’s now a very expensive place to live.

Q: Oh, yes. I wouldn’t want to live there, not at all. So you had two years.

MCFARLAND: I had two years in Istanbul and then was sent to the Cyprus Desk in Washington. Well, Jack Horner was the one who asked me.

Q: Oh, yes, Jack Horner.

MCFARLAND: To go there, but he retired after I had been there only about a month or so, and Bob Folsom, then, who had been consul general in Salonika, was brought in as the country director.

Q: Well, this is still GTI, isn’t it?

MCFARLAND: Sir?

Q: Was it GTI? Greece, Turkey, and Iran?

MCFARLAND: At this point they had broken up GTI. It had been GTI when I was on the Cyprus Desk before, but then they had reorganized with these country directors with the idea of eliminating one layer so that in effect the deputy assistant secretary became the office director with the Turkish country director and the Cyprus country director and the Iran country director underneath him. Stuart Rockwell was the supervisor.

Q: Oh, yes. I remember him.

MCFARLAND: And I again arrived just in time for a crisis. This was a crisis engineered by a General George Grevis, formerly of the Greek army, who decided to take some armored cars into a Turkish village and start shooting things up. This determined the Turks to intervene. This was, I think, in late November or early December of ’67. And that was when Cyrus Vance was sent as mediator. I was handling the whole crisis and almost lost control to the Rostow brother, not Eugene, but there was a Walter?

Q: Walter, Walt. The one who was here in UT.

MCFARLAND: Oh, maybe it was Eugene. I’m sorry, but one of them was in State.
Q: Yes, Walter is the economist, I think. Well, they were both in State, I guess, at one time.

MCFARLAND: Anyway, he was moving to take over this crisis when there was a crisis in pound sterling, and he moved to that instead, so the pros handled it and did all the work, and it went very well. So twice in a row we were able to keep the Turks from intervening. But the first time - I should have mentioned this while I was still on Cyprus - there was the Johnson letter (this was, I think, in June or July of ’64), which I believe George Ball said was “the crudest piece of diplomatic writing every developed.” It was written by a woman that made me a great favorite of hers. Formerly she was the head of GTI, Kay Bratman.

Q: I remember Kay.

MCFARLAND: I looked it up in the files later, and found that she was the drafting officer.

Q: For LBJ?

MCFARLAND: And LBJ signed. Indeed, it was from Lyndon to Inonu.

Q: “Crude,” you say.

MCFARLAND: Oh, it threatened that if the Soviet Union intervened against Turkey because of Turkey’s actions against Cyprus, we would feel under no obligation to come to Turkey’s support. That was its principal proviso. And to Inonu, who was frankly - founded his relationship as Atatürk’s chief lieutenant - was frankly like Mohamed, a sacred figure in the cult of Atatürkism.

Q: What was his response?

MCFARLAND: It was a terrible thing to do.

Q: What was the response? The Turks did not invade.

MCFARLAND: Well, the Turks did not invade. They did not intervene.

Q: But they resented it deeply.

MCFARLAND: But they resented it deeply.

Q: Did you consider Johnson pro-Greek? I know he spent time in Greece.

MCFARLAND: I don’t know. I don’t know if he was or not.
Q: Well, anyway, you would have known if you were on the Desk. I know he visited Greece at least once. I know that he never was in Turkey.

MCFARLAND: Well, there wasn’t - and he didn’t do anything particular for Greece at the time I was on the Desk.

Q: But he was President then. I think he went to Greece before, when he was Vice-President.

MCFARLAND: We used to send over these snippets for the President’s evening reading but had little hope that they would ever be read.

Q: Vietnam was there anyway.

MCFARLAND: There’s only so much presidential time available during the day. Anyway, we got past that second crisis, so we stopped the Turks from intervening twice. Now once by threat and once by mediation. To advance a little on my story, in July of 1974 - I was by then acting political counselor in Ankara - the Greek junta tried to depose Makarios and set up a Cyprus for Greece. I cannot understand the prime minister in Greece in those days, Ioannidis. He had spent his life as a neighbor of the Turks. Their prime intelligence target must have been Turkey, and surely should have understood how the Turks would react. And yet he thought that “our great, good friends, the Americans, who had stopped them twice will stop them a third time, and it is their duty and responsibility to do so.” (Of course we couldn’t.)

Q: The Turks marched.

MCFARLAND: They had a division earmarked for Cyprus. It did a miserable job of command and control, but it got ashore. Then there had to be a second invasion. But Makarios survived. He escaped their attempt to arrest him and fled to the Brits, and the junta wound up being deposed themselves. They paid heavily for their mistake, just like the Argentine junta.

Q: What did they do on the Island? A new line was drawn by the Turkish troops?

MCFARLAND: Yes, they came in the first time, they saved the airfield and a small area around Farinya and then around Alistim. It wasn’t a large enough holding, so the Turks reorganized, sent in more forces, and reopened the battle a few weeks later. And it was that second intervention which brought international opprobrium on them, and the first one was considered to be within their rights under the London-Zurich treaty. But the second one just seemed to be gratuitous, and it was on that basis that the United States, in its wisdom, cut off all further supplies of arms to a NATO ally, Turkey. And that was what I suffered under in Ankara. I spent a good deal of time defending that.
Q: Explaining that.

MCFARLAND: Defending the US and explaining its policy, and fighting with people in Washington. I think I must have had to spend as much time arguing in Washington as I did talking to Turks. But anyway, my only contribution to the Cyprus Desk, really, apart from day-to-day forecasting and handling that event - must say, I made accurate forecasts; I only missed once - I developed a proposal for standby mediation, based on the success of the Vance mission. The US would have a mediator briefed and ready to step in, and this proposal was accepted by the ambassadors in all three countries involved, and we took it to Joe Sisco, who at that time was assistant secretary for the UN. Joe Sisco vetoed it. No, Cyprus is a UN concern now. We cannot take this down the road. Better let the UN handle it. And Stu Rockwell okayed my idea, which essentially has come out now with a special coordinator for Cyprus affairs. Well, but nonetheless, this would have been further along the lines of policy that I have seen now as mistaken, the idea of keeping Cyprus as an undivided whole, undivided except for the Greek lines around the Turks, and subject to future trouble.

I don’t know if I spelled out my position adequately to begin with, but the problem is that the core of the Cyprus problem is Greece’s desire for Enosis, opposed by Turkey’s concern that Greece will then control its entire coastline. All the approaches from the Mediterranean and Aegean will have to pass close to Greek Islands. This is anathema to Turkish security planners. Atatürk felt that Turkey must be a secure territory, with no expansion, just secure territory. Turkey, apparently, has no real ambitions for territory in Cyprus. The reason for the partitioning of Cyprus is to prevent Enosis, as I see it, not to breed a terrible financial burden and drain on Turkey of having a separate Turkish Cypriot state which can’t support itself.

Q: So there are Turkish troops there, and it’s a republic.

MCFARLAND: Yes, recognized only by Turkey. The rest of us seem to want to have a unitary Cyprus once more. Now a unitary Cyprus would simply be another target for the Greeks to try to capture, which would set off more conflict. The best long-term solution for Cyprus is what we’ve got now, the division, the partition, which is resented by Washington and, or course, most of all by Athens, because it makes Enosis impossible. It’s better to make Enosis impossible, and then let’s get on about the business of living.

Q: But the UN has a substantial force there.

MCFARLAND: Yes it does.

Q: To avoid conflict.

MCFARLAND: Yes, I doubt that there would be any conflict if the UN force left. There might be some shooting by hotheads. It would depend very much on the leadership of both sides. I read in the newspaper that fighting was going to start again. I doubt that very
much. That depends very much on the mainland countries. The problem with Greece’s attitude toward Turkey is that as a small country it does not have the power to overcome Turkey, so it keeps sticking its finger into the big guy’s eye, provoking Turkey without a rational hope of accomplishing any good end.

**Q: Pure nationalism.**

MCFARLAND: Yes, and bravura. I understand it in the Greek psyche and the Latin psyche, but it’s just not rational, and we should not let ourselves be captured by it as we have let ourselves be captured by it. We went into Yugoslavia, I think, initially with the idea that there should be no partitioning and found that good fences do make good neighbors, or at least neighbors that are some sort of peace. And I’m afraid that that’s the only solution for Cyprus.

**Q: Greece is part of the Balkans.**

MCFARLAND: Greece is part of the Balkans. And Turkey is. Turkey was the Balkan power. But this is another Balkan war that’s best settled by partition - which we’ve got in place. There’s not been any fighting since partition was established in 1974. Before that there was fighting periodically. They could live on their own without Uncle Sam I’m quite sure. I would hope that Greece and Turkey would little by little withdraw their own forces.

**Q: Well, Greece doesn’t have any forces there.**

MCFARLAND: Oh, yes, they do. They have 10,000 or 12,000 troops, and Turkey has more than that. I think they have most of a division. And they’ve even established a university around Famagusta.

**Q: A Greek university?**

MCFARLAND: No, a Turkish Cypriot university.

**Q: Oh, I see what you mean.**

MCFARLAND: A friend of mine in Ankara has gone there to teach. He retired from teaching at Ankara University and moved down there.

**Q: Well, is there a Greek Cypriot army or police force?**

MCFARLAND: Yes, I’m not sure what their arrangements are now. They had a police force, which rapidly was converted into infantry at the time of the fighting. And there was a small army, but they depended mainly on the Greek army contingent. Under the London-Zurich agreement, both the mainland countries were permitted to position contingents. And they fought. One of the last incidents of the time when the Turkish
invasion occurred. Turkey’s difficulty was in communications and maintaining command and control. In Ankara we were contacted by the Turkish General Staff who said, “Our aircraft has reported a Greek destroyer to the north of Cyprus steaming toward Cyprus. This is within an area that we consider unacceptable. Please inform Athens to turn that ship around, or we’re going to sink it.” We quickly got off a Niact, Flash, whatever it was forwarding a message to Athens. They contacted the Greeks and came back with the response “that’s not our ship. We have no destroyers in the area. If you think it ought to be sunk, go ahead and sink it.” Well, the Turkish Air Force was unable to contact the destroyer. It was of course flying a Turkish flag on its stern, but of course those perfidious Greeks would do that. And using their US training they peeled off and put bombs onto it. It sank. About a week or so later, crew members on a lifeboat were picked up by a passing freighter, and the truth came out. The Turks had bombed their own ship. They didn’t have common frequency between ship and air.

Q: That’s inexcusable.

MCFARLAND: Lack of information, lack of communications, planning, and discipline. It was the Turks’ first time in combat since Korea, and Korea was sort of an exception. They were fighting under our command, and it was just a brigade. It was not all branches. The Turkish Air Force had never been in combat.

Q: Well, how did things go on the Cyprus Desk in general?

MCFARLAND: The thing is, once that December crisis cooled off and I’d tried to get my paper accepted, things became very, very dull, and I began running out of things to do, and I thought about getting on another desk and thought there was a chance here to write a paper. I asked for a year of independent study. It was run by FSI, and I went to the Library of Congress and then to the State Department library. This was during Vietnam times, and I wrote on the subject of consulting the electorate in making foreign policy.

Q: Consulting -

MCFARLAND: - the electorate, the US electorate, because it was felt at the time that there wasn’t enough consultation. Studies of McNamara had shown that, yes, there’s plenty of consultation, and the public did support the initial investment in Vietnam, and only then turned against policy. But anyway, I spent a year working up the paper, which, again, was not published. I thought I had a lot of good ideas, and in effect, the ideas were carried out later - not that . . . I had advocated sort of direct consultation with individuals. We were already in consultation with lobbying groups, of course, but what happened was that Congress started asserting a greater role in foreign policy making.

Q: So your paper was not published.

MCFARLAND: No, it wasn’t published.
Q: It’s in the archives somewhere, is it? It has to be.

MCFARLAND: It may be. I have a copy of it, at least.

Q: If you did it under FSI, it would be part of the FSI archives, wouldn’t it be?

MCFARLAND: I guess. I don’t know. I have a copy of it still, about a 50-page paper, 50-60 pages. It was too long to be an article and too short to be a book. I think that was it’s main problem, and by the time I finished it, of course, I was ready to move to a new post and thinking about that and didn’t want to take the time to shorten it or lengthen it. Toby Belcher, my ambassador in Cyprus, was reassigned to Lima, Peru, and asked to have me transferred there to his political section. And he tried, he wrote a letter to Cyrus Vance with a copy of this, urging that Cyrus Vance get it published in Foreign Affairs, but nothing further happened.

Anyway, I moved on to Lima, Peru. My marriage, by that time, had been growing worse and worse and worse. My wife was in tears almost all the time. My firstborn, my son, was delighted with the prospect of moving to Lima. I had thought that he would want to finish his high school in Bethesda, Bethesda-Chevy Chase high school, where he had just started. But no, he was delighted to go. He had learned Spanish in Costa Rica, where he’d gone as a child, and so off we went to Lima. It was then run by a military dictatorship which was very anti-American. They had started out their régime by confiscating, nationalizing, American oil companies, International Petroleum. This was in ’68. It was actually registered in Canada but American-owned. And nationalization without compensation went down crosswise. This had become a big nationalist issue in Peru, and foreign exploitation of their sacred oil, as it was in so many countries. I arrived just about six weeks after the great Peruvian earthquake in 1970. I got there in July. I guess it happened the end of May. There was a kind of international competition to provide aid to the survivors. About 70,000 people were estimated to have been killed, most of them up in the mountains, a great many of them in one mudslide that simply covered an entire town. That first weekend, I took a shared taxi and went up close to visit the destruction. There, typically, relief efforts which were largely being carried out by the Catholic Church, with a great many foreign priests. The next weekend, I borrowed an embassy jeep in terrible condition and drove up this makeshift road to the disruption of the mountains, and found the international fair of relief efforts. The Russians were there with one effort; the Cubans had sent an entire field hospital and were busy infiltrating. A number of other countries. We had been the first to send in help. We had a navy carrier in the vicinity. They sent helicopters to get over the mountain ridges and into this valley. One of the helicopters crashed just below the ridge line. I think it got caught in a downdraft. I passed by the wreckage. And then the Soviets tried a long-range air support operation and dropped an AM-24 into the North Atlantic. They stopped their air bridge at that point. They had a small airport there with airplanes from all over. I reported on that, the political aspects of emergency assistance, competition.

Q: Was that a big political section?
MCFARLAND: No, I was the number two, and there was a junior officer and a labor officer.

Q: And Toby was ambassador.

MCFARLAND: Toby was the ambassador, and Ed Clark was the DCM.

Q: Oh, yes, I remember Ed.

MCFARLAND: He retired from there. He was another Princetonian. We had a happy embassy.

Q: That’s good. But you were a bachelor when you arrived.

MCFARLAND: No. As I was saying, my marriage broke up finally in February of '72. My wife had gone off to visit her mother yet again, and I made the decision to be cruel and decide finally that we had to seek a divorce. My two children had been staying in Lima and were quite happy there. The older of the two decided to stay in Lima with me and finish high school there. He was then in his senior year about to graduate, and the younger of the two, a daughter, stayed with her mother and had a very bad time, as it turned out. Divorce is, I guess, always wrenching and traumatic for all concerned. It was just an unfortunate situation. I had put it off for as long as I could. I wanted to let the children get as old as possible so they could handle it better, but still, it was difficult. At any rate, my son did finish at the Roosevelt High School, it was called, the American Field Service school in Lima, in July of '72 and went on to Yale. One of the happiest moments of my life was getting his acceptance letter from Yale and getting him out of school to read it to him over the phone. After he left, I was all on my own in Lima. I should say that my brother came down for a visit, and he and my son and I went off to the jungle on an expedition, away. I happen to like the jungle, and I traveled all over Peru. I took my son to see as much of it as possible, and he loved doing it. And of course his Spanish became excellent by studying with Peruvian friends, having all that exposure to life in Peru. But October the 7th of '72 my present wife, whose full name is Maria Rosario Sánchez Moreno, and now is de McFarland, but everyone calls her Rosario. She’s 15 years younger than I. At that time she was 27 and I was 42. I met her at the birthday party of a Peruvian friend. It was her birthday also, and she dropped by with some girlfriends, and we met. And my life has been constantly happier since then.

Q: Good for you.

MCFARLAND: I had great resistance to marrying again. I wanted to make sure that this time I had an adequate person, particularly a strong person. She, I finally realized after a few months of going out with her, was exactly the person that I had in mind. I was crazily lucky to find her. She’s the daughter of a good family there. Her father was a doctor for the Ministry of Public Health, had his own clinic. Her older brother was a doctor also.
She had studied in a school run by American nuns. She spoke English and was a leader among people, a great gift for getting along with people, charming them and at the same time very down to earth, unassuming, great personal dignity and strength and courage, and just made a simply terrific wife and mother, a terrific diplomatic wife as well.

Q: Yes, I could see that, yes.

MCFARLAND: Accustomed to entertaining and accustomed to dealing with people from other cultures. She had none of the class attitude that characterized Peru, the curse of Lima, in fact, an inheritance from its days of being a viceroyalty with an extreme classism, which looks like racism but is in fact classism-racism, because the lower classes usually are darker, they just automatically confer higher class to a person who’s lighter skinned. We were married after I was transferred to Turkey after my divorce came through. At any rate, nothing much happened in Peru in the time I was there except that I had to learn how to deal with a really closed political society and a semi-hostile government.

Q: It was a junta.

MCFARLAND: Yes, a military government which was at the same time a socialist government. They were appropriating socialist ideas apparently with the idea of uniting the populace behind them. This was a very big theme, the unity between the people and the armed forces.

Q: They were trying to look like populists, were they?

MCFARLAND: Well, they were populists.

Q: They were populists.

MCFARLAND: Military populists, if you will, and they held rallies in which they transported people in from the shanty towns on the edge of town, and they demonstrated. But they became the first Latin American government to become recipients of Soviet heavy military equipment, including tanks and artillery and aircraft. And they established relations with Cuba, one of the few Latin American countries to do so, and they had in short order a Soviet embassy, a Cuban embassy, I believe a Chinese embassy, and a North Vietnamese. And money, of course, was flowing from their intelligence services, into various groups around the country, but under the close eye of the Peruvian armed forces. At the time, I was astonished that there was no resistance to the rule of the armed forces. They carried out one nationalization after another. The nationalization of the petroleum company was followed by the expropriation of farms and ranches above 150 hectares, and sometimes those even smaller. This was agrarian reform. It was badly handled. It was at the time a focus of a great deal of admiration on the part of the American academic community. And the military learned to use terms that were in vogue among American academics, such as social mobilization. They even had an agency, which was social
mobilization, and there were great hopes for the agrarian reform. It turned out a disaster. Probably, though, if they had contented themselves with the agrarian reform and had concentrated on that and making it work and making it just, on ending the corruption that was involved - because generals were arranging deals by which they would benefit in return for not taking quite so much of a person’s holdings - if they had concentrated on that, they might have gone down in history as a government that did something to advance Peru. As it was, they were responsible for the “lost decade,” in which Peruvian income dropped, Peru turned from an agriculturally exporting country to an importing country - in sugar. Grace had invested heavily in developing sugar production for a new industry. It never existed before Grace came in there on a large scale. They confiscated Grace’s holdings. In return, Grace decided to end all its investments in Latin America, where it had been a pioneer, you know.

Q: Yes.

MCFARLAND: And henceforth we’re going to invest in Europe. We know it’s stable. By the time I left, the talks were well advanced to the impasse over our compensation for IPC, and that issue was settled shortly after I left. There were other issues: the 200-mile territorial sea limit. Peru was a leader in that movement, and saw an international settlement that negated their position. They had been seizing our fishing boats. We had a continual source of friction between us also. But it was only when I returned in the ‘80’s that I found Peruvians were not passive after all. They can be violent, but at that time no one wanted to take on the military government. There was no sense of shared interest among the conservatives, among the landholders, among anyone else that was affected. The military government practically ran its course. Velasco had a serious illness, was weakened, and was finally ousted in ‘75 by other generals. It seemed that his whole purpose in mounting this series of reforms and trying to bring the populace behind him was to have support for a new war with Chile. Chile in the War of the Pacific in 1879 had taken away a large part of southern Peru, and he wanted to be ready to mount a new war in 1979 to redeem the lost Peru and with full popular support. The other generals weren’t having any, and I got fragmentary reports from people who were around that tend to confirm that objective of his. Anyhow, he was dumped, and another general, Morales Bermúdez, who had been his finance minister and saved him from a number of bad mistakes, took over as president and led the country through a very bad time and finally turned over power to an elected president in 1980.

Q: Was the Soviet military, was it substantial?

MCFARLAND: The Soviet military?

Q: The Soviet military aid?

MCFARLAND: It was substantial. It was a substantial price tag.

Q: What they paid for it.
MCFARLAND: It was aid only in the sense that it was on somewhat concessionary terms, but the Peruvians ran up a bill - I’ve forgotten whether it was two billion or three billion. It doesn’t make much difference which because given their economy it was irrelevant. It was simply not an expense that Peru needed to burden itself with at the same time that they were sabotaging their own economy.

Q: We cut off military aid to them, I guess, at one stage - for good reason.

MCFARLAND: Yes, the one problem was that before I got there we had decreed that we would not sell any more sophisticated aircraft to South American countries if they did not need it. Peru took a violent reaction to this. This was, I think, one of the grievances that the Peruvian military had. They got their high-powered military equipment -

Q: And they paid for it.

MCFARLAND: - and it was absolutely useless.

Q: Yes, they never used it.

MCFARLAND: Some of it later was used against Ecuador, but that, again, was useless.

Q: Yes.

MCFARLAND: One result of the Peruvian military’s adventure in government, was that the military was absolutely corrupted and was almost ruined as a military institution.

Well, I was invited to go back to Turkey in ‘73, to the Political Section. I of course had not been promoted. I had to go out as number two in the political section. I’d been number two in Lima, not advancing. By that time I should have been political counselor. And there I was. I accepted and went back, arrived there in 1973, and I was married the following June. Rosario came over with her sister and stayed there a few months working as secretaries in Latin American embassies and when the divorce came through we got married. I had to take over as acting political counselor in April, just after my divorce. My predecessor left me with zero political contacts. He had only a few of his own, and he didn’t turn them over to me. He was not a Turkish speaker, number one. I had to set about rebuilding political contacts, and in fact, I was approached to report him. The ship was dead in the water. Furthermore, I had a useless officer, graduated from Harvard - I don’t know how - but he was absolutely useless.

Q: You were on your own, really.

MCFARLAND: Yes, and I was bearing down -
Q: Who was the ambassador?

MCFARLAND: The ambassador was Bill Macomber, William B. Macomber -

Q: Yes, I remember him.

MCFARLAND: - who had been deputy assistant secretary for management, and he started us on the Cyprus force over on the side of management and administration. At the time he came out with this I had written memos to him taking issue with the view that managers and administrators are a dime a dozen in the United States, and people who can interpret overseas political events are in extremely short supply, and our essential role is interpreting what’s happening overseas, not in administering. But he had his marching orders from Lyndon Johnson, as he told me later, which was for a State Department that could manage in doing a good job over there in Vietnam. We were never, ever predictably going to have another Vietnam situation with all those people. And the need for greater ability to manage, which is altogether under-emphasized in the Foreign Service compared to the military, but still, we didn’t need to go overboard, as we did, which added to the length of my time in grade, because they started promoting administrative officers and consular officers and making up their quotas. But I got along well with Macomber after the first year or so. I was acting political counselor for several small crises - an Aegean crisis between Greece and Turkey, then a crisis over Turkey’s opium production. This was in late June of ’73. Macomber was pulled back to Washington in protest of the Turkish Government’s attitude. And then for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, for which Macomber was returned very quickly. He was very under-confident of his ability to handle political issues, and overcompensated by browbeating, by keeping us all awake. At the start of any mini-crisis he would call everybody together at the residence, but nevertheless, he and I became friends when he began to see that I had ability that he could count on and ability that perhaps he didn’t have. But we went through a rough time. He initially began addressing me simply as “Goddammit,” and it got around the embassy that this was my other name, Goddammit. And then as his exasperation rose in step with the increasing tensions over Cyprus and the invasion and so on, I reached my highest point. I became “Jesus George,” as in “Jee - zus, George, do I have to do all the thinking around here?” After that he decided I passed the test, and we were friends, and we still are friends.

Q: Did they bring in another political counselor over you?

MCFARLAND: Yes, yes. I was acting until about August, when they brought in another one. Nobody wanted to work for Macomber; he had such a bad reputation. And the job, after all, was and FSO-1 job, not an FSO-4, and now the minister counselor. And they found an FSO-3 who had some connection with Turkey and was willing to try it, and he lasted I think just under three months, and the alcoholism that he had under control before took hold again, my second time to be involved with an alcoholic. He fooled me. Other people knew. The secretary knew and so on. I didn’t until one day he arrived late, and the Marine guard found him holding onto the rail of the stairway unable to climb, and he was
evacuated. And I was again acting political counselor. And then Macomber decided to think big. “That’s where you should be anyhow. You’re the political counselor, and you’re entitled to the political counselor’s quarters, a beautiful place, the top apartment.

Q: So you got the job.

MCFARLAND: I got the job.

Q: That’s something.

MCFARLAND: A three-grade stretch.

Q: Well, that promoted you then.

MCFARLAND: No, no, no, no.

Q: I don’t understand.

MCFARLAND: But that summer while I was still acting, I had gone through all these crises, but that year they were promoting on the basis of cones. There were only about, I think, five political officers promoted, of whom three were from Kissinger’s own staff, who he saw to it. So the other two... I missed. There was an economic officer in Istanbul who had done nothing. He got promoted, and I didn’t. An inspector came through after I was political counselor and recommended me for a double promotion. Well, they didn’t do it. But at least I finally did get promoted after demonstrating over and over again that I could do the job three grades higher and under pressure and conflict and a big embassy. We had people there from just about every agency, and they liked me. I enjoyed it, good time there. And the other embassies had good people there too.

I knew a couple of people in the Russian embassy, not that I was on good terms with them. I set up a carefully planned reporting program, and by the time I left, visitors told me that we had become one of the outstanding reporting posts in Europe. Of course, by that time Turkey had been transferred over to the EUR, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. And as the EUR hands complained, we brought them their first war in 30 years - not counting the Greek Civil War, I guess. At any rate, we had a good time there, traveled a lot on weekends and so on, whenever we could. I had to work long, long hours.

Q: It was your honeymoon?

MCFARLAND: Yes, I got three days, and Kissinger got five. But from there, of course, I was overdue for a Washington assignment or for a DCM-ship. What I really wanted was a DCM-ship. I wanted to catch up, make up for lost time, and as an O-3 I was eligible. But I was offered DCM-ship in Cyprus. Think again. There’s a Greek lobby in your town, isn’t there? And do you imagine what they would say, and can you imagine what the Greek Cypriot Government would say to having a Turk - in their eyes - as a number two
in the American embassy? And they called me back the next day and said, “You’re right.” They also offered me deputy office director for Turkey, Greece, Cyprus. I mean, they had reinstated by this time the offices, and I made the same point. With the Greek lobby it would never wash, and it didn’t. And eventually all they could offer me was Turkish Desk officer - well, good Lord! I was going down from two stars to O-3? I couldn’t take it. What was the stretch all about? So I instead opted for senior training, and I was offered a year at Princeton, at that wonderful Woodrow Wilson School. It was a great year.

Q: Well, that’s great.

MCFARLAND: And we got into New York frequently, and I renewed my acquaintances there.

Q: What, did you write a paper?

MCFARLAND: No, I went to seminars. I wanted to get out of Turkish things and into a more general preparation. I wrote some little papers, but nothing big. And I’m rather sorry now that I didn’t specialize more on Turkish matters, but I was up to my ears at this point in being with the Turks. I could have taught a course, I guess.

Q: Yes, but Princeton was pleasant. It’s a nice -

MCFARLAND: Oh, yes.

Q: There were no midnight cables no Niact’s. You know what I mean.

MCFARLAND: They let us live in junior faculty housing. By this time we had a daughter, the first of the second generation. She was born in Turkey. What a great gift. And the first flowers that arrived in the room were from Bulent Ecevit, who is now the prime minister, who was then the recently ousted prime minister, a great political figure.

Q: That’s great.

MCFARLAND: Maybe now’s the time to bring it in. I should have gone back to Turkey.

Q: All right, go ahead

MCFARLAND: As DCM, seven years later. I was EUR’s candidate. I was the person indicated. I had far more qualifications than anybody else. By this time I had become a senior officer, FE/OC in current terms, and the then ambassador was a political appointee, Strausz-Hupé. He was an Austrian financier who had emigrated to the States just before World War II and had gone into academia and become one of the founders of the Institute for International Relations. And during the Nixon Administration, he had been appointed ambassador to several places - Sri Lanka, or Ceylon, as it was then, and married a Sri Lankan, and Sweden, I think, and then USNATO. Anyway, when the DCM he inherited
had to leave, whom I knew, he had the problem of replacing him. I was number one on
the list, and he preferred somebody he had known in USNATO who had no Turkish, no
Turkish experience. He knew that he wasn’t a threat. And somebody who counseled him
or had the basis for sending him up said, “There is no way that he would have brought in
a Turkish language officer as his number two.” He was afraid I would show him up. Of
course, I wouldn’t have.

Q: No, of course not.

MCFARLAND: I know what it is to be loyal to your chief. I would have helped him. I
had great respect for him.

Q: But he didn’t know you. He knew the other guy, yes.

MCFARLAND: He knew the other guy, and this was the reason for my retirement - I’m
advancing considerably in my story. This was probably the principal reason for my
disillusionment.

Q: Or at least consul general in Istanbul or Ismir - would that have been satisfactory?

MCFARLAND: No, I wanted a DCM-ship. I wanted real policy.

Q: Okay.

MCFARLAND: And I just lived there with the idea to bring my knowledge of Turkey
and Cyprus to bear on US relations, and I think I could have made a contribution, and it
was never made.

Q: So you

MCFARLAND: They did fill it.

Q: Beg pardon.

MCFARLAND: Well, I stayed in Ankara a total of five years, summing up, a total of
seven years in Turkey plus two years in Cyprus plus two years on the Cyprus Desk plus a
year studying Turkish. It was a considerable investment. That was my real specialty. And
that was the reason why, I think, EUR and the State Department plumped for me as the
DCM. Ron Spiers, who succeeded Macomber as ambassador and made me - I thought he
made me - a protégé at least, told me after I had retired, when he was undersecretary for
management, that my case had been among several that motivated a change in the DCM-
ship selection procedures, where ambassadors were no longer allowed a completely free
hand.

Q: But in the meantime.
MCFARLAND: It’s a hard issue to settle, but I was deeply disappointed. Okay, well after I went on from Turkey to Princeton and then started looking for an onward assignment, I didn’t want to go back to Washington because the jobs there just weren’t adequate. There was nothing good at all, so I started looking around overseas, and there was an opening as political counselor in Brasilia, which was at least equivalent to what I had had before and was still a stretch assignment. The only problem was that I had never been in Brazil, and I had no Portuguese, but I had had previous South American experience, and I had been political counselor in a Class I post, a far more challenging post than Brasilia, for that matter, and I had gotten an A in the course. But Robert Sayre was the ambassador there, and for some reason, over the overwhelming contrary advice of everyone in the Brazil Office, he asked for me as his political counselor. And then when I began challenging him on various thing he may have regretted it, but anyway, we moved to Brasilia and it was another quiet time in another military dictatorship, but this time I had what turned into an excellent political section. It wasn’t so great at first. I had inherited this same zero quantity from Harvard that I had been taxed with when I started in Ankara, but I persuaded him to move on, and people came in of top quality. I had three Ph.D.’s working for me at one point, having one who moved down from INR. My number two after a year or so is now an ambassador in Africa. I helped both of them. I gave both of them great reviews.

Q: What about your Portuguese? Did you have time to study?

MCFARLAND: I was given five weeks to adapt my Spanish to Portuguese. Unfortunately, FSI was not well prepared to do this, and -

Q: That’s not much time.

MCFARLAND: It’s not, no, and I came out of it with a basic knowledge of Portuguese, but without fluency. I was slow in speaking, and once I got to Brasilia, there were other things to do besides participate in Portuguese. Anyway, in a year or so, I had enough to function in the embassy. And Portuguese and Spanish, you know, don’t coexist very well in a person’s mind unless he uses them constantly, and even then. I spoke Spanish at home with my wife and Portuguese with the Brazilians, but the two would cross over into one another. Even the native Spanish-speakers had that problem.

Q: Buy you and Sayre got along eventually.

MCFARLAND: No, not really. Sayre was a very cold fish. He didn’t go out and mix with the Brazilians. I picked up an excellent contact high up in the Foreign Ministry, and he decided he liked that, and that was his contact in the Foreign Ministry from then on. And he had certain ideas that were his and were fixed and he was not going to be talked out of them, and I had the temerity to tell him so. For one thing, he insisted that the military government was really a nest of democrats, in effect, and while he was off on home leave, I wrote a report on the corruption in the military, and when he came back he
was just about ready to sack me. He demanded an immediate explanation. I had undercut all of his work for the two previous years convincing people in Washington that the military were outstanding people, and, well, they were moving towards an “opening,” as they call it, toward democracy, but it was still a directive government, authoritarian with just the dressings of a military controlled parliament, but a military president and so on. And I fortunately was able to go back and give him a memo citing exactly the inverse, picking up all of this, that, and the other. And I didn’t hear any more about it, and I wasn’t sacked, but he was president of the Promotion Board. And it was only after Tony Motley arrived, a political appointee, that was far, far superior to Sayre, better than an FSO ambassador, and I finally got promoted in the senior service. By that time I was into my early 50’s. I think I was 51 or 52. It was a little late. I should have had that promotion ten years earlier if I was going to do anything with it. And I suppose before I left Brasilia I was already seriously thinking about retiring. I asked for Ankara, which I thought I’d be a shoo-in, but just in case I asked also a DCM-ship in Lisbon. I had Portuguese by that time, fluent at it. And Lima, where I managed on a previous tour and then my wife’s connection. And in each case it went to a favorite. And I was thoroughly disillusioned. And all the other jobs - a political-military advisor - I didn’t care all that much about them, but they didn’t happen anyhow. So I was thinking about having to go to Washington and writing another paper for a year waiting for an onward assignment and worrying about what this would do to my children, to be jerked around from post to post. And a job opened up, well below my grade, as DCM, but actually chargé d’affaires, in Antigua, in the Caribbean, with responsibility for Antigua, and St. Kitt’s and Nevis, which became a republic two months after I arrived, and the three British Crown Colonies, Montserrat, and the British Virgin Islands. I thought it would be wonderful. And it sounded like the chance to be in charge of a post. And it was better than going to Washington, I thought, better than writing a paper and just killing time waiting for something. It turned out, by the way, that if I had gone to Washington, I would have been in Ankara a year later, because the DCM went out on time in grade.

Q: But did you get to Antigua?

MCFARLAND: I did go to Antigua in 1983, after my four years in Brasilia. I had, by the way, a total of eight years as political counselor in two Class I posts from two different areas.

Q: Now who was your ambassador. Did you report to an ambassador in the Caribbean?

MCFARLAND: Yes, Antigua was under the ambassador in the Bahamas, and I can’t remember the name.

Q: That’s to hell and gone, not even close.

MCFARLAND: No, it’s a long way away, 800 miles or so. I’m sorry, not the Bahamas. Barbados.
Q: Oh, Barbados. Okay.

MCFARLAND: But it’s still -

Q: But did he, in effect, supervise you?

MCFARLAND: He wanted to, and he was very sensitive to competition and rivalry between the two posts, which actually began with his own embassy down there in Barbados. He had the idea they were a big embassy, and yet they were very small, but they had strange ideas and very, very competitive. Anyway, he was a political appointee from Nebraska, and he visited Antigua just once or twice, I think - not a bad guy. Actually, I was in charge. His visits were only to show his face. The -

Q: Were you chargé d’affaires then? On the diplomatic list?

MCFARLAND: Well, there was not a dip list in Antigua, it’s only 2,000 people.

Q: I know, it’s only a little spot in the Caribbean. But you had a title of some kind.

MCFARLAND: Yes, I was chargé d’affaires. I was always introduced as the American chargé d’affaires or American chargé. I appeared on televisions all the time. I was Mr. United States down there.

Q: And the ambassador came to town, and then I guess you weren’t called chargé.

MCFARLAND: That’s right. I was temporarily his DCM.

Q: But you appeared on the, I guess, the diplomatic list in Barbados, or did you? No?

MCFARLAND: I don’t know. I never saw it.

Q: Well, I never heard of such an arrangement, but anyway it worked, as far as you were concerned.

MCFARLAND: It didn’t work. It was a problem.

Q: The embassy was crowding you.

MCFARLAND: Yes, they were needlessly competitive, got us out on things. I would find an AID officer puttering around town without notifying us. The USIS also, when I asked for things, they wouldn’t necessarily supply them. I did have. . . . Well, we had the Grenada operation while I was there. We lined up support from the governments in Antigua and Montserrat, that were in my district, and notified the State Department, and this was a beautiful case of intervention in terms of diplomatic support. We had a request for intervention from all the area governments, unanimously. And my father died just
about this time, and I had to leave and go home, and returned after the intervention was well underway, and the embassy in Barbados had charge of that.

We had a lot of administrative problems. I had written the ambassador there about them. I sent him a message to send on to Washington. Well, he didn’t send it on. The inspector who came through later said I should have sent it directly to Washington, and therefore it was my fault.

Q: So it didn’t work.

MCFARLAND: It didn’t work. And I spent a lot of my time straightening out administration.

I think the most rewarding thing I had to do there was handling a drought on the island of Antigua. The prime minister waited until the island’s reservoir had gone completely dry during the long drought, summoned me to a meeting of his cabinet and said, in a deep voice, “I want the United States Government to give us $1 million for drought relief.” I fortunately happened to have a visiting AID representative, who reminded me that I had authority to pledge $25,000 on my own. There was a certain shortfall. I did organize the island’s response. I got one of the prime minister’s sons, who was a minister, to handle the Antiguan side of things. AID sent in a water engineer, from whom I learned a great deal about hydraulics, such as the meaning of the term “total dynamic head” and the interesting bit that most old water systems leak up to 60 per cent of the water that’s put into them. We were able to help Antigua in buying water from other countries, but they had to pay for barging it in. The Seabees, very helpfully, sent in a detachment which worked on repairing water mains and rebuilding water storage tanks, which would receive the water from the barges, and in fact installed a floating water line to connect from the barges in the harbor, such as it was, to the storage tanks. These were very impressive people, just couldn’t get enough work to satisfy them. And we got through the water crisis.

Q: I have the impression that it’s a very corrupt government, a family.

MCFARLAND: Yes, well, all the Caribbean governments tend to be more or less authoritarian one-man régimes, and this in particular. But the prime minister was a venerable figure, but anyone opposed to him had already long since left the island. There was a token opposition, but out of 72,000 people, you couldn’t have too much discontent. The island later became a haven for gun-running and drug smuggling, but not during my time. We had a navy station and an Air Force downrange rocket observing station and, in addition, an AID representative and a Coast Guard representative. So I had a decent-size country team, despite the small size of the embassy. I had a serious problem with the administrative officer that was sent, an African American who had made a career out of suing the United States Government for discrimination and had invested his winnings in his own defense fund. The inspectors cited him for a serious administrative misstep, and on that basis, I asked the Department to reassign him. He instantly applied to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Office, was granted unlimited time to prepare his own case. He disappeared for approximately two and a half months and returned in an extremely combative mood. After I had retired, still I had to answer questions and make depositions about his conduct there. I understand that he was eventually removed from the Service, but it was a sour note for ending the Service.

I took retirement very early, the 2nd of January of 1985 and moved directly to Lima, Peru, with my wife and two small children. I should have mentioned that my second child of the second generation, a boy, was born at Princeton just before I left there. I moved to Lima largely for family reasons, not because I had any employment lined up there. In fact, there was none to be found at a decent wage. Peru was in the depths of a very long recession with no end in sight. I was not interested in trying to go into business for myself, not having had business experience and after considering the general reputation of Peruvian business practices, which are not terribly open and legal. And I settled down to write novels. I dedicated several years to writing novels and finished two, and finished them, in fact, several times after rewriting, but was unable to get any published. It’s possible that I was too far away from the United States to be in touch with publishing trends or I didn’t have the right connections. It’s also possible that the manuscripts just weren’t good enough. But it was a very disillusioning experience, because I had thought that my only real gift was in writing. It turns out that novel writing amounts to more than writing, though. The two children adapted well to Peruvian life, growing up surrounded by a large and very caring, close Peruvian family. I benefited from that, too. This family, like most Peruvian families, has a sense of “family-ness” that goes well beyond anything practiced for the most part in the United States. For example, to this day, I get birthday greetings from nieces and nephews in Peru and not one from my nieces here in the States. I traveled around taking the children to see most of Peru with my four-wheel-drive pickup, and we did a great deal of camping up in the mountains, in a largely unvisited area, probably Valley of the Volcanoes. From north to south, wherever we could go that was safe, we went. We wound up camping a great deal on the beach because in the mountains travel became very risky because of the terrorist threat, Sendero Luminoso, Shining Path, Hispanicist operations. It was a, quote, Maoist organization, a phenomenon in South America because it was without dependence on outside support. They charged, in effect, taxes to people whom they could threaten, who were within their reach, and they ruled by fear.

Q: How Communist are they, or were they?

MCFARLAND: Totally. They were Pol Pot types.

Q: In other words, they went by the book?

MCFARLAND: By the book. By the Maoist book.

Q: They weren’t just... Well, that’s a long time ago. Even China has evolved.
MCFARLAND: Until 1992, roughly, and there are some of them operating. In 1992, after they had started trying to move into Lima, and had set off a car bomb that devastated a whole block of downtown Lima, the police got very serious about catching their leader, which was the objective that President Fujimori had set, and they caught him - and within a mile of our house, a middle-class area where you would never have expected him to be hiding, was his house.

Q: Fujimori did it.

MCFARLAND: Fujimori gave the right strategic directions - go for the head of the organization.

Q: Would you care to talk about Fujimori?

MCFARLAND: Certainly. He’s a remarkable figure. He has already overstayed his fame, his moment, in Peru. He took office in 1990, after two decades, 22 years, really, of decline, when Peru reached a point well below what it was in ‘68 when Velasco had taken over. Fujimori succeeded APRA president, American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, named Alan Garcia, who had been a very credible, very promising young politician when he ran for office in ‘85, and was elected overwhelmingly, and promptly betrayed all hopes by becoming one of the most corrupt presidents on record, not only he but all the people with him, only a few of whom have actually been charged but were generally on the take. He has been living in exile ever since 1990 in one luxurious setting after another, which you can’t do simply on the retirement pay of a former president. He obviously has millions. He’s living in Paris right now in a luxury apartment with his own security force, and previously spent a long time in Bogotá. If there was anything Peru did not need at that point it was betrayal, and he betrayed it. The reaction against him resulted in Fujimori’s election.

Q: Pardon the interruption - is Fujimori anti-corruption, or is he also a taker?

MCFARLAND: Well, he’s got his own thing, now, apparently. But he was anti APRA corruption because politically -

Q: But he’s vulnerable to the same Peruvian disease.

MCFARLAND: He is now, but it’s not known. I mean, it’s only surmised.

Q: Okay, all right. I just thought I’d ask.

MCFARLAND: But in the case of Juan Garcia it was quite obvious, and in fact was attested to by one of the Italian executives of a company who worked on building an electric railway through Lima. It never got beyond the point of building a series of gigantic concrete pillars in one street, several miles worth of pillars - no train. He apparently made quite a lot of money off that, and off a deal that Peru had ordered I think
it was a little over 18 Mirage fighters. Now they didn’t really need them. Of course they didn’t. And these were greatly in demand at the time, and Alan worked out a deal by which another country would buy them at a much higher price. Peru would recover whatever it paid for them, and he would take the rest. As I say, he lives well in Paris.

And of course, this gets into the question that was posed by a Brazilian at the time. It’s not just him, it’s all of us. They people who pay bribes are no less guilty than those who accept them. But in this case, it wasn’t Peruvians who were paying bribes. It was a sharp operator who was making money off his country. But there is a very, very strong tendency among Peruvians. Do we sell out whatever crook we’re working for?

Q: Well, now, you as a retired government employee living in that environment on a limited pension, how did you faire in that environment?

MCFARLAND: The first year I saved more money than I had been able to save on active duty, but after that the cost of living began to rise and rise and rise. It’s not quite clear why. After Fujimori came in, he began privatizing the state-owned enterprises.

Q: Was that a good thing?

MCFARLAND: Yes. And bringing in investment in a variety of things. The money came in. There was also a great flood of unacknowledged narco-dollars from drug smuggling. Peru is a tremendous source of cocaine. It’s the largest coca-growing country in the world. It’s not clear just what proportion of Peru’s total dollar supply comes from that. I suspect that a much larger proportion comes than what they acknowledge.

Q: Do you have drug lords there as you do in Columbia?

MCFARLAND: Yes.

Q: Are they known

MCFARLAND: No, they stay more out of sight, and they’re not so well known. There’s great suspicion, though, that a great many of the top people in the army are compromised. The problem, of course, comes back to our requirement. I had never professed to have a solution to the drug problem. I can see in both ways. I’m horrified by drugs. I am equally horrified by the cost of the drug war. And one of the costs has been that by making drugs illegal, we have raised the profits of the drug lords, for all the smugglers, and because they are making so much, it’s nothing to them to pay off police, army generals, judges, governors, whoever. In all the producing countries, this is having a terrible effect on the fabric of society, on the civil authority, on people’s confidence in government - not that they had much confidence previously. That’s been their historical experience. Their governments were not to be trusted much. That is one reason for the election of this son of Japanese immigrants, Fujimori, to be president, because the little people have had it with the traditional ruling group. They have been one failure after another, even though
the army was not really part of the traditional ruling group, they tried that experiment. The Peruvians actually had tried all the varieties of political organizations just about, except out-and-out Communism, but they picked this Japanese as someone who was wily and smart and yet not a European type. And his first term was a great success. He brought security to his country after this long reign of terror, and he acknowledged involvement and investment, even though very little of it trickled down. But the poor people seem to have infinite patience. They felt that after a while they’d begin to get theirs. The trouble is, now, being seated on a second term, he closed down congress at one point and fired the supreme court justices, made way for himself for a second term, and now in his second term people are thoroughly fed up with him. The economic policies have not resulted in greater wealth farther down. Even the people at the top are beginning to have problems. And something like 30 or 40 per cent of Peruvians live in extreme poverty, by which I mean not having enough to eat and not having adequate clothing or adequate housing. People in the United States don’t understand, on the basis of US experience, what it is to be poor, as you know very well.

Q: Yes.

MCFARLAND: They know what it is in Peru, and one of my brothers-in-law remarked to me years ago, “We live in a poor country,” and I caught his whole meaning: that its poverty had an impact everywhere you looked, people’s attitudes, and the way people lived, from the top to the bottom. And everything is relative. By standards of Bill Gates and, indeed, by the standards of a good many millionaires around Austin, I’m poor. By the standards of poor people in Lima, I’m terribly rich.

Q: Well, there are a few rich ones at the top, a few families that are rich, is that it? Is there a middle class of some dimension and then a heavy lower class? Is that still the pattern?

MCFARLAND: Yes, for many years, there was this land-based aristocracy, the hacendanos. Hacienda? - that was the owners, the families, the owners of hacendados. And they pretty well ran things, especially outside Lima, in their own districts. They were like squires or barons or whatever. And if there were votes, their people voted the way they wanted.

Q: And they had serfs on their land.

MCFARLAND: Well, not really, but something -

Q: What do you call them?

MCFARLAND: What, the peones?

Q: Peones? Were they sharecroppers, or did they pay?
MCFARLAND: More or less, they were sharecroppers. That’s right. Or they were paid minimal wages. It depended on the landowner. Some were quite enlightened and treated their people well, and then others were brutal. But that was the old system, and that was broken up by the agrarian reform of the military government. That’s what I was saying - if they had stuck with that, they might have had a place in history that was more favorable to them; but they broke it up, but they didn’t really introduce anything good enough to be viable in its place. They were all wary, I think, of carrying out agrarian reform. Japan did it. Israel did it. But in Peru they didn’t catch on. And it had difficulty feeding itself.

Q: Relations with Washington are better with Fujimori?

MCFARLAND: No, they were for a time, but we became critical of his human rights practices.

Q: Prisoners, and political prisoners.

MCFARLAND: Well, yes, and . . . It’s not quite fair. There’s something on both sides. It’s a question of due process. During the worst of the terrorism, as they called it - it’s fair to call it an insurgency - the police were on the point of being undermined and corrupted by the influence of the Sendero Luminoso. The police, after all, live in these same slums where a lot of the revolutionaries live. Their families were hostage when they were off, and they’d restore them at night and on weekends. Their loyalty was not entirely unquestioned. The army also, drawn mostly from up in the mountains, by forced levies - there was enough of a draft of them, mainly enforced just against the poor and powerless, because the sons of the wealthy could always buy their way out. If you really wanted somebody you had to go to the villages and pick them off the streets without even letting them notify their families. So they weren’t sure of the army either. That’s why there was an elite force that went in and got this leader of the Sendero, an elite force from the police, not from the military. The military never won its war. But I’ve lost my thread.

Q: I’m sorry I interjected. You were living in Lima now, and you lived there for, you say, 13 years.

MCFARLAND: 12 years.

Q: And then you moved to Austin.

MCFARLAND: Yes.

Q: For good reason. To be close to family.

MCFARLAND: Well, by the time I left, the insurrection was, for all practical purposes over. That was just before we left. Another small guerrilla group, MRTA, Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, stormed the Japanese embassy during a diplomatic reception.
Q: Oh, I remember that. That’s a very dramatic incident.

MCFARLAND: That was just before Christmas.

Q: You were there.

MCFARLAND: Yes. Early December, I guess, and took all these hostages. We were still there, but we were not close to it. We’d had dinner near it a night or so before. But we were by this time moved out of our house and were in a furnished apartment we’d rented to stay there during Christmas, and then after Christmas we’d planned to move on. At any rate, that was the only security problem, apart from just plain crime. Peru suffers from the problem of respect of government. We have never really suffered from it, but we are starting a trend toward lack of respect toward government and lack of respect of laws, for authorities, generally. It started during Vietnam, I think. It’s at a far more extreme state of development in Peru, and I hope it doesn’t get that far here. But in Peru there’s practically no respect for authority. The police are corrupt and forfeit all respect. You get pulled out of the car for going through a green light, and the policeman claims it was red and wants to be paid off.

Q: Does this compare with Mexico? Do you know enough about Mexico?

MCFARLAND: Mexico is worse. The police there are actually carrying out a large percentage of the crimes. In Peru they may be conniving with the criminals, but they are not themselves the criminals, in most cases. In Mexico there was all these.

Q: So you came to Austin for other reasons, returned to Austin.

MCFARLAND: Well, I was fed up with Peru for a good many reasons. One person asked me what I most missed about the United States, and I said, “I miss the bureaucracy and the police.” And that’s absolutely true. People complain about the bureaucracy and the police here, and they don’t know how good they are.

Q: Because here they are service organizations.

MCFARLAND: Exactly.

Q: Here they provide services.

MCFARLAND: Exactly.

Q: To the taxpayer.

MCFARLAND: And if you’re not satisfied, you can complain.
Q: Yes, and you can throw the rascals out.

MCFARLAND: That’s right, and there, to begin with, you can not pay a bill by check through the mail, first, because it would be stolen by the post office employees, and second, because even if remotely enough it did arrive they wouldn’t honor it, they wouldn’t believe it. Nobody there writes real checks. There’s no point in trying to cash it because it would be returned without funds.

Q: It’s very hard to live with a pocket full of - whatever they are, dinars.

MCFARLAND: So you go to the bank or to the government office involved or for some things, like utility payments, you go to drugstores and make your payments there. But everything has to be done in person, so there’s an awful lot more traffic on the streets and millions of man hours lost. And then the bureaucrats themselves are extremely whimsical. I understand that France has the reputation of the worst bureaucratic country in the world. Well, these people must have taken lessons in France. They have the same whimsicality I’ve heard about, and that’s every bureaucrat making his own decision, variation on what the rules are. Maybe you catch him in a good moment, and maybe not. I remember, the last several years my wife had to do all of her dealings with the government offices because I became enraged. Another thing is the traffic. I am a safe driver, a careful driver, and I frankly regard it as a threat to my life when somebody runs through a red light at me or fails to honor a stop sign when I’m crossing the street and come close to hitting me. I grow irritated. And so my wife started doing all the driving in the city. And it’s not only Americans who get road rage there. I had a Peruvian spit from his Volkswagen at my pickup as we were both snarled in a traffic jam and shouting insults at me, which I couldn’t hear - just as well - and finally the little man got out of his Volkswagen taxicab and drew this enormous screwdriver from behind the seat and was apparently challenging me to a duel. What he didn’t know was that I had a 380 automatic. I was returning from the beach, and I always went armed when I went out of the city because of the danger of highway robbers. And of course I didn’t draw it; I didn’t do anything. If he had had a pistol and had drawn it and fired it at my family, I would have shot him as quickly as that. I’m a good shot. And I was psyched up to fire if we were attacked, but only if we were attacked.

Q: That’s a difficult situation.

MCFARLAND: Yes, it’s hard to train, but I trained myself well. And you don’t draw unless you’re attacked. You don’t show your weapon. I had that bit of insurance just in case.

Q: Now you don’t have that here. I mean, those are things you left behind. Those things you described you left behind. You’re here, and you’re content.

MCFARLAND: Yes. There is a sense of safety here. People complain about threats. This is a far safer and more trusting society. In Peru you simply cannot leave things outside,
even a garden hose, much less a bicycle. People will run off with it. They’ll occasionally steal bicycles here, but not garden hoses, not lawn furniture. Even plants. And perhaps that has something to do with the stage of economic success that we have. It’s just not worthwhile. But there it is worthwhile.

Q: Are you glad you did 26 years in the Foreign Service?

MCFARLAND: Yes.

Q: In retrospect, are you glad you made that decision?

MCFARLAND: It was the overwhelmingly good decision of my life, and the worst decision was leaving it. I’m sorry I retired when I did, although I had only about four or five more years to go before mandatory retirement, but I wish I had stuck with it. Still, it would have been at high cost to my children, and I balanced those things.

Q: Also, if you’d taken jobs that weren’t interesting, you could have spent your five years in the Service, but you didn’t want to take uninteresting jobs.

MCFARLAND: No, the -

Q: And I didn’t either. You know, I saw, after I was named ambassador, then I got two other assignments which were worthy - they were worthwhile - but I had the feeling that maybe they wanted me to move on, make room for others, so I moved on.

MCFARLAND: I had that feeling also.

Q: Yes, but I could have walked the corridors for another five years, but I didn’t want to. I wanted a second career, and you chose a writing career. I chose an oil company. So you come. . . . I think we’re similar in that regard - 25 years in the service, and then another period of productive work of one thing or the other. And so a second career, in our society, is a normal thing.

MCFARLAND: Yes, it is.

Q: Two or three careers, as a matter of fact, nowadays. You don’t just stick with one till you die. And I didn’t want to die, you know, at my desk. I just wanted to die somewhere else. But anyway, I’m putting words into your mouth - or not putting words into your mouth.

MCFARLAND: Those are good observations, though. I -

Q: And then you’re in environment, as I am -

MCFARLAND: I think that -
Q: - now, which I like. I like Austin, for a lot of reasons. This is a good place for this phase of my life. I’m content, and you’re content, so that’s why you live here.

MCFARLAND: Well, I’m very content to be here, and -

Q: And you have family considerations.

MCFARLAND: And I’m glad that they had the experience in Lima that they did. That was a great gift that I gave them. And I don’t regret that. It’s just that I think I became over-dedicated or over-accustomed to that life, and there was really nothing else that I wanted to do. I didn’t have a second career lined up, as I said. I should have done that. I should have planned my retirement more carefully than I did.

Q: You can’t do it over again. But you’ve had happiness of a different sort.

MCFARLAND: That’s right, mainly with -

Q: - family and friends.

MCFARLAND: That’s right.

Q: And you’re alive.

MCFARLAND: And I feel good about helping out with the children.

Q: And there are plenty of volunteer jobs around, if you need them. I’m involved too much in them, but not too much because I like them. Well, do you have anything more you’d like to say?

MCFARLAND: I could backtrack perhaps.

Q: Yes, do you want to go back to Rodger Davies?

MCFARLAND: Yes, I think so. I’d like to continue.

Q: Why don’t you do that, and we’ll probably end this and the secretary will await your instructions on that.

MCFARLAND: Yes, well, we’ll move back to the Ankara period and the consequences for the United States of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The Greeks in Cyprus and in Greece simply were infuriated that the United States had not saved them from their own folly in provoking Turkey at that time to get rid of Makarios and make Cyprus part of Greece. It had been quite clear that Turkey would not be held back a third time, but the Greeks wouldn’t see that. Well, anyway, a few weeks after the invasion of Cyprus, there
was a mass demonstration around the American embassy in Nicosia, and two members of Greek Cypriot organizations, carrying rifles, without any opposition from the Greek Cypriot police, entered a building next door to the American embassy, went to a window that looked directly into the windows of the ambassador’s office from about 50 or 70 yards distance, and opened fire with AK-47’s. The staff of the ambassador was in the DCM’s office. They were covered down the hall in an area where there was a change of level in the halls. The ambassador was the last to take refuge, and as he arrived where they were, a bullet caught him right in the chest. He fell, and a Foreign Service national, a Maronite Christian in Cyprus, a girl, reached out to catch him and had the back of her head blown off by a second bullet. I had known her while I was there, and I had worked with Rodger Davies for a time in the State Department while he was deputy assistant secretary for Near East. Some time later, in December of ‘75, I believe it was, I was on home leave in the US when I got the news that my good friend Richard Welch, who had been station chief in Athens and whom I had worked with in Cyprus and in Lima, had been assassinated by three Greek nationalists in Athens, right in front of his residence and with his wife watching. His wife still has not recovered. We stayed in touch with her. This was a very high price to be exacted for irrational expectations of US behavior.

Q: Yes, it tempts you to generalize about the character of a people. I’m not asking you to do that, but these were Greeks who were killing Americans for no good reason. Are there many like that, or would you find Turks doing that?

MCFARLAND: I would hesitate to generalize on the mass of Greeks, but Greece does include all too many psychopathic killers, psychopaths who kill Turkish Cypriot noncombatants, shepherds out in the field minding their sheep. Greek Cypriots stop in the road in their cars and pick them off. There was entirely too much of that.

Q: It’s a Balkan disease.

MCFARLAND: It does seem to be so, doesn’t it?

Q: Yes, it’s certainly not Pericles. Well, do you have any further thoughts or footnotes?

MCFARLAND: Perhaps I will add them when I review.

Q: When you get the text, you can add and subtract.

MCFARLAND: I had a great many. . . . Oh, yes. There’s another story I should tell about the Greek attitudes to Turkey. My wife and I in 1977 visited Athens with our baby daughter and traveled - this was at Easter time, or just before Easter, I’m sorry, just before the Greek Orthodox Easter, not the Western Easter - and from there we traveled up to Thessaloniki. I have another story about that. I’ll have to backtrack yet again. Bob Fulsom, the one I worked for on the Cyprus Desk, had been consul general in what was then called Salonika, and a friend of mine who worked for him, went the story, came in one day and told Fulsome that the Greeks called this Thessaloniki; they don’t call it
Salonika. I think we should do the same. And Fulsom said, “You’re absolutely right.” He sent off a recommendation to Washington, which was adopted, and as a result, it is now called Thessaloniki, and we had to spend, I think, about half a million dollars in redoing navy charts and air force maps with the new name.

Q: Folly, folly.

MCFARLAND: That was Bob Fulsom’s great gift to the world. But at any rate, we visited Salonika-Thessaloniki and went on to cross the border with the intention of being picked up on the Turkish side by a consul general car from Istanbul and go on from there, see more of that part of Turkey. And we got to the Greek border post at the river which is known in Greek as Maritsa and in Turkish as Meric. The two border posts are separated by a bridge about a kilometer long, and the Greek border post was decorated with posters that were strongly anti-Turkish - Turkish atrocities and whatnot. I had heard that the entire border was mined on both sides. They were nothing if not fearful, angry, of course, and demonstrating, but fearful. And he stamped our passports, waved us out the door. There was no taxi that could take us over to the Turkish side. We had a kilometer to go with the baby in a backpack and about 70 pounds of baggage. And I stood on the Greek side and looked across this bridge.

Q: No taxi.

MCFARLAND: No taxi. And the Turkish driver could see us, but he couldn’t come to get us.

Q: So the bridge really was no man’s land.

MCFARLAND: It was no man’s land. We started across, I felt like refugees.

Q: You were heading in the right direction. You were heading for Turkey. Funny last kilometer.

MCFARLAND: A wonderful way to treat an American diplomat, right? And to demonstrate their feelings. Their NATO ally was their most bitterly hated enemy. I honestly think that if it hadn’t been for their war against the Communists in the late ‘40’s, they might well have allied with the Russians. Maybe that’s another factor in our pro-Greek stance. But anyway, we struggled across the bridge.

Q: Well, if you have any other thoughts, just give them to the draft. It’s been a pleasure. I’ve enjoyed this, and I appreciate your giving us the time.

End of interview